# Strategic Analysis Network (RAS-SAN) / Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS-SAN) — full content > English — Our watchwords are: responsiveness and creativity. Incubator of Canadian and global expertise on geostrategic events, we offer in-depth, real-time analyses of a turbulent world while developing the next generation of experts. Our work focuses primarily on the competition between great powers, multilateral defence cooperation, and the future of capacity building. > Français — Nos mots d’ordre sont : réactivité et créativité. Incubateur de l’expertise canadienne et mondiale sur l’actualité géostratégique, nous offrons en temps réel des analyses approfondies sur un monde en turbulence et développons la prochaine génération d’experts. Nos travaux se concentrent principalement sur la compétition entre grandes puissances, la coopération multilatérale en matière de défense, et l’avenir du renforcement des capacités. Detailed version of llms.txt (https://ras-nsa.ca/llms.txt): the full content of the posts, in plain text. ## Battle Rhythm URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/battle-rhythm/ Modified: 2026-09-08 > The Battle Rhythm podcast features timely discussion on the defence and security issues of the day, as well as feature conversations... The Battle Rhythm podcast, co-hosted by Stephen Saideman and a weekly guest host, is co-produced by the CDSN and the CGAI. Battle Rhythm is released every second Wednesday and features timely discussion on the defence and security issues of the day, as well as feature conversations with academics and practitioners. Battle Rhythm has a sister podcast in French called Conseils de Sécurité, the result of a partnership between the Strategic Analysis Network and the CDSN. Host Stephen M. Saideman: Director of the CDSN-RCDS and Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University. His research focuses on NATO, civil-military relations, and international security. ## Conseils de sécurité URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/conseils-de-securite/ Modified: 2026-09-02 > The Conseils de sécurité podcastcovers security and defence issues in French.  The Conseils de sécurité podcast covers security and defence issues in French.  Hosted by Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Laurent Borzillo, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Artur Wilczynski and Col Marie-Christine Harvey, Conseils de Sécurité (available in French only) covers security and defence issues in French. Co-produced with the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN), the Réseau canadien sur la défense et la sécurité et France-Amériques, Conseils de Sécurité is one of the first transatlantic podcasts. Hosts Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé  est professeure titulaire à l’Université Bishop’s et Fellow non-résidente au International Peace Institute, New York. Elle est directrice adjointe du Centre FrancoPaix . En 2018–2019, elle détient la Canada Fulbright Research Chair for Peace and War Studies. Elle est membre associée du Centre d’études pour la paix et la sécurité internationale et du Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal (CERIUM). Laurent Borzillo est Chercheur postdoctoral à l’École Nationale d’Administration Publique. Fondateur de l’association française Forum de Défense et de Stratégie, il est titulaire d’un doctorat en science politique obtenu en cotutelle de thèse entre l’Université de Montréal et de l’Université de Montpellier. Aubin Gonzalez Lapos est juriste, entrepreneur et enseignant, actif à la croisée du droit, de l’innovation technologique et des relations internationales. Il est actuellement Secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques, où il conçoit et pilote des projets de diplomatie économique et culturelle visant à renforcer les partenariats entre l’Europe et les Amériques. Artur Wilczynski est professionel en résidence à  l'École supérieure d'affaire publiques et internationales à l'Université d'Ottawa et conseiller stratégique sénior chez Samuel Associates. Artur a travaillé au Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST) de 2018 à 2022, notamment à titre de chef adjoint associé du SIGINT – le renseignement électromagnétique – de 2020 à 2022. Col Marie-Christine Harvey s’est joint aux Forces armées canadiennes en 1996, initialement en tant que réserviste et membre du rang au sein du Régiment du Saguenay. Son parcours opérationnel comprend des déploiements domestiques et internationaux en Bosnie, Afghanistan et au Kuwait. Plus récemment elle a commandée le 5e Groupe-Brigade mécanisée du Canada de 2021 à 2023. Thanks to David Côté for the theme music for our podcast! Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 59 – Mathieu Luinaud, consultant en stratégie et expert du secteur spatial December 10, 2025 Pour ce nouvel épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Mathieu Luinaud, consultant en stratégie et expert du… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 58 – Paul Charon, directeur du domaine « Influence et Renseignement » de l’IRSEM November 12, 2025 Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam Marti-Brûlé et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos reçoivent Paul Charon, directeur du domaine Influence et Renseignement de l'Institut de… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 57 – Le Général Alexis Rougier October 29, 2025 Dans cet épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le général Alexis Rougier, général de brigade aérienne en charge de… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 56 – L’Amiral Xavier Païtard July 30, 2025 Dans cet épisode, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent l’Amiral Xavier Païtard. L'Amiral revient sur un parcours exceptionnel, du cockpit d’un… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 55 – L’Amiral (2S) Alain Coldefy, ancien Major Général des Armées, directeur des opérations à l’État-major de la Marine July 16, 2025 Dans cet épisode, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé accueillent l’Amiral (2S) Alain Coldefy, ancien Major Général des Armées, directeur des opérations… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 54 – Colin Gérard, docteur en géopolitique et chef d’équipe à VIGINUM June 18, 2025 Dans ce 54e épisode du Conseil de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Colin Gérard, docteur en géopolitique et spécialiste reconnu… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 53 – Daniela Irrera, professeure au Centre des hautes études de défense June 4, 2025 Dans ce 53ème épisode du balado Conseil de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Daniela Irrera, professeure de science politique et… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 52 : Renée Larivière, directrice de la gestion des programmes chez Interpeace May 21, 2025 Pour ce 52ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s’entretiennent avec Renée Larivière, directrice de la gestion des programmes chez Interpeace. À… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 51 : Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, docteur en science politique de l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne May 7, 2025 Dans ce 51e épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, docteur en science politique de l’Université Paris 1… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 50 : Brigadier-général Éric Laforest, Chef J5 au Grand Quartier général des puissances alliées en Europe (SHAPE) April 23, 2025 Pour ce 50ième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le Brigadier-général Éric Laforest, officier chevronné en… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 49 : Giovanna De Maio, chargée de mission au Centre d’analyse, de prévision et de stratégie (CAPS) April 9, 2025 Dans ce 49ème épisode du balado Conseil de sécurité, nous recevons Giovanna De Maio, spécialiste des relations transatlantiques et de la politique… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 48: Amélie Zima, chercheuse au Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI March 27, 2025 Pour ce 48ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Amélie Zima, chercheuse au Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI (Institut… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 47: Natascha Hryckow, conseillère principale pour l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique March 13, 2025 Pour ce 47ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Natascha Hryckow, conseillère principale pour l'Initiative de la Corne de l'Afrique. Cette… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 46: Colonel Dariusz Niedzielski, chef d’état-major au Centre d’excellence de l’OTAN February 26, 2025 Dans ce nouvel épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec le Colonel Dariusz Niedzielski, chef d’état-major au Centre d’excellence de l’OTAN… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 45: Tjorven Bellmann, ambassadrice d’Allemagne au Canada February 12, 2025 Dans ce nouvel épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec Tjorven Bellmann, ambassadrice d'Allemagne au Canada. Elle revient sur les moments… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 44: LT.Col. Chris Labbé, CHEF, BUREAU INTERARMÉES CONTRE AÉRONEF SANS ÉQUIPAGE September 4, 2024 Dans ce 44ième épisode, Brigadier-Générale Marie-Christine Harvey et la professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le Lieutenant Colonel Chris Labbé, CHEF, BUREAU INTERARMÉES CONTRE… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 43: l’Inspecteur David Shane de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM) February 21, 2024 Pour ce nouvel épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey reçoivent l'Inspecteur David Shane, responsable des communications et porte-parole du Service de… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 42: Colonel Véronique Gervais, l’Opération CALUMET December 20, 2023 Pour ce 42ième épisode, Marie-Christine Harvey et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent la Colonel Véronique Gervais, Commandante de la Force Opérationnelle CALUMET en Égypte.… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 41: Sébastien Carrière December 7, 2023 Pour ce 41ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Marie-Christine Harvey reçoivent Sébastien Carrière, ancien Ambassadeur du Canada en Haïti, Chef du Protocole du Canada… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 40: Guillaume Darmé November 23, 2023 Pour ce 40ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Marie-Christine reçoivent Guillaume Darmé, Coordonnateur du Renseignement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix de l'Organisation… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 39: Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey November 8, 2023 Pour ce nouvel épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent la Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey. La Colonel Harvey nous parle de son parcours, des défis… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épsiode 38: Lise Howard, professeure titulaire à l’Université de Georgetown May 17, 2023 Pour ce nouvel épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Lise Howard, professeure titulaire à l'Université de Georgetown, avec des nominations conjointes au Department… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épsiode 37: Caroline Xavier, chef du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST) March 22, 2023 Pour ce 37e épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Caroline Xavier, chef du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST). Ils discutent de… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 36: Wendy Hadwen, Politiques stratégiques, planification et partenariats (CA PSPP) Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Artur Wilczynski March 8, 2023 Pour ce 36ième épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Wendy Hadwen, chef adjointe des Politiques stratégiques, planification et partenariats (CA PSPP). Nous discutons… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Épisode 35: Annick Goulet, l’Ambassadrice du Canada February 22, 2023 Dans ce 35e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam présente son nouveau co-animateur, Artur Wilczynski. Artur et Sarah-Myriam discutent avec Annick Goulet,… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Interview with Dominic Rochon, National Security and Cyber Security Sector June 15, 2022 For this new episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, National Security and… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Interview with Emma Soubrier, Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies, George Washington University May 18, 2022 For this 33rd episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Emma Soubrier, a visiting scholar at the Institute for… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Interview with Chantal Lavallée, Deputy Director of CRITIC at the Royal Military College of Saint-Jean Chantal Lavallée May 4, 2022 For this 32nd episode, Thomas and Sarah-Myriam interview Chantal Lavallée, Assistant Professor of International Studies and Deputy Director of the Centre for… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Interview with Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, from the University of Leiden in the Netherlands April 6, 2022 In this 31st episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas talk with Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, from the University of Leiden in the… Conseils de sécurité Podcast Interview with Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, Director of the Institute for Security Studies regional office for West Africa, Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin March 23, 2022 For this 30th episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas welcome Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) regional office for West… Page 1 / 212» ## Contact URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/contact/ Modified: 2026-07-28 > Have a question? 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Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) Université du Québec à Montréal Pavillon R, Local R3490 315 rue Sainte-Catherine Est Montréal (Québec) H2X 3X2 Canada info@ras-nsa.ca Executive Team Justin Massie Director massie.justin@uqam.ca Frédérick Gagnon Co-director gagnon.frederick@uqam.ca Thomas Hughes Co-director athughes@mta.ca Alexander Lanoszka Co-director alexander.lanoszka@uwaterloo.ca Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Co-director smartin@ubishops.ca Jonathan Paquin Co-director jonathan.paquin@pol.ulaval.ca Émile Lambert-Deslandes Publications Manager e.lambertdeslandes@queensu.ca Antonin Blanchard Coordinator | website and communications blanchard.antonin@courrier.uqam.ca Walid Ferguen Coordinator | Events Nadia Silva-Hurtado Executive assistant silva_hurtado.nadia@uqam.ca Credit: Website Developped by [ ZAA.CC ] Design web ## Experts URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/experts/ Modified: 2020-06-02 Search Network Affiliation Network Affiliation Emerging Scholars  (74) Executive Team  (10) Fellow Researchers  (39) Practitioners  (32) Researchers  (66) Strategic steering committee  (7) André Abel Barry Practitioner Maria Aftimos Emerging Scholar Tetede Babatunde François Akilatan Emerging Scholar Marie-Pier Allard-Caron Emerging Scholar Isabella Aung Emerging Scholar Niagalé Bagayoko Fellow Researcher Pauline Baudu Practitioners Pauline Baudu Practitioner Daphné Beaudoin Emerging Scholar Kim Beaulieu Emerging Scholar Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard Researcher Stéphanie Bélanger Researcher Jeanne Bélanger Emerging Scholar Jean-François Bélanger Researcher Hager Ben Jaffel Fellow Researcher Adib Bencherif Researcher Chloé Berland Emerging Scholar Junru Bian Emerging Scholar Marc Bigaouette Strategic Steering Committee Louise Blais Practitioner Fabrice Blais-Savoie Practitioner Tehya Blake Emerging Scholar Antonin Blanchard Coordinator | website and communications Yvan Blondin Strategic steering committee Alice Bonardi-Igout Emerging Scholar Antoine Bondaz Fellow researcher Laurent Borzillo Practitioner Jean-Christophe Boucher Researcher Yolande Bouka Researcher Guillaume Boulianne Emerging Scholar Arthur Boutellis Fellow researcher Maya Bouton Emerging Scholar Yann Breault Researcher Camille Brugier Fellow researcher Kerry Buck Practitioner Amélie Chalivet Emerging Scholar Roromme Chantal Researcher Bruno Charbonneau Researcher Laurent Charbonneau Emerging Scholar Daphné Charotte Emerging Scholar Andrea Charron Researcher Stéphanie Chouinard Researcher Judith Clech Emerging Scholar Pierre Colautti Emerging Scholar J. Michael Cole Fellow researcher Jeffrey F. Collins Fellow researcher W. R. Nadège Compaoré Researcher Jérémie Cornut Researcher Isabelle Côté Researcher Alexandre Courtemanche Emerging Scholar Jean F. Crombois Fellow researcher Satcha de Henning Michaëlis Emerging Scholars Marie-Christine De Tilly Strategic steering committee Igor Delanoë Fellow researcher Laurence Deschamps-Laporte Researcher Delphine Deschaux-Dutard Fellow researcher Marie-Eve Desrosiers Researcher Emma Donnaint Emerging Scholar Corinne Dory Emerging Scholar Marc Doucet Researcher Dirk Druet Fellow researcher David Dubé Emerging Scholar Alexane Dumoulin Emerging Scholar Caroline Dunton Emerging Scholar Charlotte Duval-Lantoine Practitioner Emilie El Khoury Researcher Mohamed Elgayar Emerging Scholar Sarah Elimam Emerging Scholar Ralf Emmers Fellow researcher Walid Ferguen Coordinator | Events Renée Filiatrault Practitioner Gianmarco Fontana Emerging Scholar Jacob Fortier Emerging Scholar Maxandre Fortier Practitioner Michel Fortmann Researcher Philippe M. Frowd Researcher Danny Gagné Researcher Frédérick Gagnon Co-director Brigadier-General Richard Giguère (ret.) Practitioner Aubin Gonzalez Lapos Strategic Steering Committee Will Greaves Reasercher Marianne Grenier Emerging Scholar Zachary Griffiths-Julien Emerging Scholar Heidi Hardt Fellow researcher Siobhan Harty Strategic Steering Committee Ronald Hatto Fellow researcher Marina Henke Fellow researcher Stéfanie von Hlatky Researcher Stephanie C. Hofmann Fellow researcher Thomas Hughes Co-director Charline Hutin Emerging Scholar Anvesh Jain Emerging Scholar Tancrède Jankowski Emerging Scholar Daniel Jean Strategic steering committee Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer Practitioner Joseph T. Jockel Fellow researcher Pierre Jolicoeur Researcher Thomas Juneau Researcher Anessa Kimball Researcher Nicolas Klingelschmitt Researcher Page 1 / 3123» ## Home URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > Incubator of Canadian and global expertise on geostrategic events, we offer in-depth, real-time analyses of a turbulent world... Strategic Analysis Network Latest News Analyses Japan is Back, Again? Takaichi’s Security Strategy Put to the Test of Regional Recomposition Axel Reybard October 22, 2026 “The status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a nuclear-weapon state has been consolidated irreversibly and permanently.” With these words, spoken by Kim Jong-un at the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party on 23 February 2026, North Korea cemented the permanence of its nuclear arsenal. By defying every mechanism arising from the Treaty… From Measuring to Anticipating Conflict: An Early Warning System for Africa and the World Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 14 – MGén Alain Forand, Ancien Colonel du R22R — Ses Mémoires : Entre feu et verglas October 2, 2026 Publications Analyses Giving Meaning to Associate Membership: Canada’s Place in the EDIP Justin Massie October 19, 2026 In her State of the Union address on September 16, 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed paving… Strategic Reports Canadian Foreign Policy Postures After the 1956 Suez Crisis: Lessons for Current Debates Antonin Blanchard September 18, 2026 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant from the… Strategic Reports Growing Tensions in the Taiwan Strait and Implications for Canadian Interests J. Michael Cole September 17, 2026 Arguably no other conflict on the planet today holds the potential of sparking the kind of superpower — and possibly nuclear —… Strategic Reports Canada’s Strategic Autonomy in the 21st Century: A Roadmap Justin Massie, Philippe Lagassé September 9, 2026 Executive Summary For the first time in its history, Canada is making strategic autonomy a guiding principle of its defence policy. However,… Policy Forums What security benefits or risks should the Government of Canada consider when thinking about AI? Matthew da Mota, Balkan Devlen, Jennifer Irish, and Dave McMahon August 5, 2026 Policy Forum Politique is a publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic… Analyses Canada should seek more than observer status on GCAP Brian Wu July 15, 2026 The multilateral collaboration is an unprecedented opportunity for Canada to build the next generation of air power The Global Combat Air Programme… Video Podcasts CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.23: Planning for the Next Pandemic with CAF’s Surgeon General, MGen Scott Malcolm Battle Rhythm Podcast S4 Ep.22 : Planning for the Next Pandemic with CAF’s Surgeon General, MGen Scott Malcolm Stephen Saideman September 18, 2026 Welcome to a new academic term and a new episode of Battle Rhythm, Steve Saideman and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department… CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.22: The Next Generation of Security and Defence Battle Rhythm Podcast S4 Ep.21 : The Next Generation of Security and Defence Stephen Saideman September 18, 2026 Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa… CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.21: The Private Sector and National Defence Battle Rhythm Podcast S4 Ep.20 : The Private Sector and National Defence Stephen Saideman September 18, 2026 Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow… Page 1 / 6512345…102030…»Dernière page » Upcoming Events From Measuring to Anticipating Conflict: An Early Warning System for Africa and the World Trump après les midterms: quelle géopolitique mondiale au lendemain du 3 novembre? Quebec Facing Global Rearmament ## Le Nord Stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique/ Modified: 2026-09-08 > Balado Conseils de sécurité traite de questions de sécurité et de défense en français. Coproduit avec le Réseau... The French-language podcast on defence, geopolitics and security. Le Nord stratégique (available in French only) is a premium French-language podcast hosted by Éric Sauvé, devoted to geopolitics, defence and contemporary security issues. It is aimed at an educated, professional and influential audience, while filling a significant gap in the Canadian francophone media landscape through credible analysis grounded in real operational experience. Why now Defence, security and geopolitical issues now occupy an unprecedented place in the news: the war in Ukraine, great-power competition, Arctic security, military artificial intelligence, the resilience of critical infrastructure and rapidly evolving threats. Yet few French-language platforms offer serious, in-depth analysis of these questions. Host Eric Sauvé is President of Innovigo Inc. and has over thirty years’ experience in the fields of defence, intelligence and security. A former officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, he served in the infantry, special operations and intelligence communities, notably during deployments to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan. He has also collaborated with international partners, including the US Defence Intelligence Agency and other allied intelligence organisations. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history and a master’s degree in war studies. He teaches, advises public and private organisations, and regularly contributes to the media on issues relating to defence, geopolitics and national security. His career combines operational experience, strategic thinking and the ability to make complex issues accessible to a wide audience. Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 14 – MGén Alain Forand, Ancien Colonel du R22R — Ses Mémoires : Entre feu et verglas October 2, 2026 Le major-général Alain Forand met actuellement la touche finale à ses Mémoires. Et quand on regarde son parcours, on comprend… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 9 – Charlotte Duval-Lantoine – La culture organisationnelle des Forces September 2, 2026 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Fellow au Canadian Global Affairs Institute et auteure de The Ones We Let… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 10 – Lt-général (ret.) Richard Evraire – Leadership, bilinguisme et une vie au service du Canada September 2, 2026 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard Evraire pour revenir sur une carrière militaire exceptionnelle et, surtout, sur… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 8 – André Gélinas – Une vie dans la police August 18, 2026 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit André Gélinas, policier retraité et analyste bien connu du public québécois, pour une discussion franche… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 7 – Charlotte Duval-Lantoine – Recrutement et rétention August 11, 2026 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Fellow et vice-présidente aux opérations à l’Institut canadien des affaires mondiales (CGAI), pour… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 6 – Marc Dauphin – Médecin de guerre August 5, 2026 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le Dr Marc Dauphin, ancien commandant du Role 3 multinational de Kandahar et auteur du livre… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 5 – André Gélinas – Former la police afghane July 30, 2026 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit André Gélinas, sergent-détective retraité du SPVM et vétéran de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan, qui… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 4 – Marc Dauphin – la guerre en Ukraine July 30, 2026 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le Dr Marc Dauphin, médecin militaire, auteur et vétéran des Forces armées canadiennes. Au cours… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 3 – Philippe Lagassé – Le système d’acquisition militaire est-il brisé? July 8, 2026 Le Canada investit des milliards en défense, mais pourquoi les projets prennent-ils autant de temps? Dans cet épisode du Nord Stratégique, le… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique – Ép.2 – Thomas Juneau – Iran et Moyen-Orient July 3, 2026 La guerre entre Israël, les États-Unis et l'Iran semble prendre fin. Mais les véritables conséquences stratégiques de ce conflit commencent à peine… Le Nord Stratégique Podcast Le Nord Stratégique, Ép. 1 : Justin Massie, les leçons de l’Ukraine et de l’Iran June 29, 2026 Tirons-nous les bonnes leçons des conflits en Ukraine et au Moyen-Orient? Justin Massie, professeur à l'UQAM et directeur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique,… ## News URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/news/ Modified: 2020-06-12 ## Podcasts URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/podcasts/ Modified: 2026-09-02 Discover the podcasts associated with the Strategic Analysis Network. Battle Rhythm The Battle Rhythm podcast, co-hosted by Stephen Saideman and a weekly guest host, is co-produced by the CDSN and the CGAI. Battle Rhythm is released every second Wednesday and features timely discussion on the defence and security issues of the day, as well as feature conversations with academics and practitioners. Le Nord Stratégique Le Nord stratégique (available in French only) is a premium French-language podcast hosted by Éric Sauvé, devoted to geopolitics, defence and contemporary security issues. It is aimed at an educated, professional and influential audience, while filling a significant gap in the Canadian francophone media landscape through credible analysis grounded in real operational experience. Conseils de sécurité Hosted by Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Laurent Borzillo, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Artur Wilczynski and Col Marie-Christine Harvey, Conseils de Sécurité (available in French only) covers security and defence issues in French. Co-produced with the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN), the Réseau canadien sur la défense et la sécurité et France-Amériques, Conseils de Sécurité is one of the first transatlantic podcasts. ## Privacy Policy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/privacy-policy/ Modified: 2020-05-27 > Here we explain how we collect, use and process your information when you navigate and use the functionality of our website. 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Contact us If you have any questions about the Strategic Analysis Network (NAS), our Services and privacy, contact us at info@ras-nsa.ca. ## Publications URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/publications/ Modified: 2020-06-08 Search Types of publications Types of publications Analyses  (133) Analyses  (133) Books  (8) Compendium  (1) Debriefs  (3) Policy Forums  (7) Strategic Plan  (1) Strategic Reports  (87) Experts Experts   (1) Alexander Lanoszka  (4) Alexandra Lamarche  (1) Amélie Chalivet  (2) Anaïs El-Amraoui  (1) Andrea Charron  (2) Anessa Kimball  (1) Anik Dupuis  (1) Antonin Blanchard  (6) Anvesh Jain  (1) Arthur Boutellis  (1) Arthur Stein  (4) Brian Wu  (1) Bruno Charbonneau  (1) Camille Laty  (1) Camille Raymond  (4) Chantal Lavallée  (1) Charlotte Duval-Lantoine  (1) David Dubé  (1) Dominika Kunertova  (1) Emmylou Sergent  (1) Fabrice Blais-Savoie  (1) Falk Petegou  (1) Frédéric Lasserre  (5) Frédéric Mérand  (1) Gaëlle Rivard Piché  (3) Gianmarco Fontana  (3) Hannah Hollander  (3) Igor Delanoë  (1) Isabella Aung  (1) Jacob Fortier  (2) Jacob Tuckey  (2) Jacques Lévesque  (1) James Lee  (1) Jean F. 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Sharma  (1) Sarah Pedneault  (1) Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé  (1) Satcha de Henning Michaëlis  (3) Srdjan Vucetic  (3) Stéfanie von Hlatky  (11) Stéphane Roussel  (1) Stéphanie Chouinard  (1) Stéphanie Martel  (3) Tancrède Jankowski  (6) Tetede Babatunde François Akilatan  (1) Theodore McLauchlin  (6) Thomas Juneau  (2) W. R. Nadège Compaoré  (1) Walid Ferguen  (2) Whitney Lackenbauer  (1) Yann Breault  (1) Yf Reykers  (2) Yolande Bouka  (1) Zachary Paikin  (3) Émile Lambert-Deslandes  (3) Analyses Japan is Back, Again? Takaichi’s Security Strategy Put to the Test of Regional Recomposition Axel Reybard October 22, 2026 “The status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a nuclear-weapon state has been consolidated irreversibly and permanently.” With these words,… Analyses Giving Meaning to Associate Membership: Canada’s Place in the EDIP Justin Massie October 19, 2026 In her State of the Union address on September 16, 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed paving… Strategic Reports Canadian Foreign Policy Postures After the 1956 Suez Crisis: Lessons for Current Debates Antonin Blanchard September 18, 2026 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant from the… Strategic Reports Growing Tensions in the Taiwan Strait and Implications for Canadian Interests J. Michael Cole September 17, 2026 Arguably no other conflict on the planet today holds the potential of sparking the kind of superpower — and possibly nuclear —… Strategic Reports Canada’s Strategic Autonomy in the 21st Century: A Roadmap Justin Massie, Philippe Lagassé September 9, 2026 Executive Summary For the first time in its history, Canada is making strategic autonomy a guiding principle of its defence policy. However,… Policy Forums What security benefits or risks should the Government of Canada consider when thinking about AI? Matthew da Mota, Balkan Devlen, Jennifer Irish, and Dave McMahon August 5, 2026 Policy Forum Politique is a publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic… Analyses Canada should seek more than observer status on GCAP Brian Wu July 15, 2026 The multilateral collaboration is an unprecedented opportunity for Canada to build the next generation of air power The Global Combat Air Programme… Strategic Reports Sustaining Public Engagement on Canada’s Security and Defence Priorities Emmylou Sergentand Gabrielle Andrychuk July 14, 2026 This policy brief is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS),… Analyses Buyer or Co-Producer? Canada Must Decide What It Wants from the Acquisition of New Submarines Justin Massie July 9, 2026 By selecting ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) as the preferred supplier for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, the Carney government has settled the… Strategic Reports Cooperation in the Arctic and the North Atlantic: Roles to Play by Canada, France, and Portugal in a Changing Maritime Order Céline Rodrigues and Homa Azodi July 7, 2026 This policy brief is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS),… Analyses Alliance Commitment and the Limits of Strategic Reorientation in Canada Nicolas-François Perron June 29, 2026 Deterring with Partners: Where should Canada focus its alliances, and to what ends? Where should Canada focus its alliances, and to what… Analyses Why Not Canadian Nuclear Submarines? Jonathan Cassels June 22, 2026 Canada’s submarines are running out of time. Built over thirty years ago for service with the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy, the four-boat… Strategic Reports Credibility First: Rethinking Canadian Strategy in the Face of American Hostility Walid Ferguen June 19, 2026 Introduction: The Missing Link in Canadian Strategy The Canadian strategic debate is monopolized by rearmament, military deterrence, and alliance management. These priorities… Analyses Rethinking Moderation Through an International Lens: The Case of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria Between Statecraft and International Pressure Gianmarco Fontana June 15, 2026 Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's (HTS) shift from one of the most radical jihadist movements of the Syrian war to a globally acknowledged ruling… Analyses Lithuania’s Upcoming EU Council Presidency: Interests, Goals, and Implications Alexander Lanoszka June 1, 2026 Lithuania is poised to take the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 January 2027. Although the… Policy Forums PJBD Suspension: What Should Canada’s Reaction Be? Justin Massie, Nicholas Glesby, and Richard Shimooka May 29, 2026 Policy Forum Politique is a publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic… Analyses Iran Under the Guardians: How China Is Adapting to the IRGC’s Growing Influence Pierre Pahlavi May 28, 2026 The Iranian crisis is not merely a matter of airstrikes, threats, and diplomatic statements. It also plays out in the internal realignments… Strategic Reports From Sanctuary to Confrontation: The Arctic at the Heart of Geopolitical Tensions Quentin Martel April 28, 2026 Introduction Long regarded as a forum for global cooperation on environmental protection and sustainable development, the Arctic – which covers an area… Debriefs From Ambition to Action: Succeeding in Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy Antonin Blanchard March 31, 2026 This text is a summary of the conference From Ambition to Action: Succeeding in Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy held on January 26,… Strategic Reports Between Commitment and Constraint: Lessons from the Korean War for Canadian Defence Policy Nicolas-François Perron March 30, 2026 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant from the… Debriefs Four Years of War in Ukraine: What Prospects for Peace and Transatlantic Security? Antonin Blanchard March 25, 2026 This text is a summary of the conference ‘Four Years of War in Ukraine: What Prospects for Peace and Transatlantic Security?’, held… Analyses Four observations on the Russia-Ukraine war and the prospects for peace Dominique Arel March 24, 2026 This text is a transcript of a presentation given at the conference ‘Four Years of War in Ukraine: What Prospects for Peace… Analyses Industrialization without Emancipation: The Limits of Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy Justin Massie March 23, 2026 Under the impetus of Prime Minister Mark Carney, the Canadian government has embarked on a major reorientation of its defence policy. According… Strategic Reports The Failed Attempt to Withdraw Canadian Troops From NATO and the Lessons for Mark Carney Nicolas-François Perron March 23, 2026 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant… Strategic Reports From Friendship Motive to Absolute Loyalty: Lessons from Canada’s Experience in NATO’s Libya Campaign Stéfanie von Hlatky, Thomas Juneau March 4, 2026 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant… Analyses Europe and Canada after NATO: thinking about Euro-Atlantic security without Washington Justin Massie February 17, 2026 If Trump were to abandon Europe and retreat to ‘his hemisphere’, we would have to defend a continent and an ocean without… Policy Forums How Should Canada Manage Its Relationship with China in 2026? Pascale Massot, Balkan Devlen, Yuxi Liu, and Stephen R. Nagy February 16, 2026 Policy Forum Politique is a new publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a… Strategic Reports Forging Northern Bonds: Strengthen the Canada-France Arctic Partnership in a Shifting Global Order Theo Urvoy and Andrew Erskine January 27, 2026 This policy brief is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS),… Analyses Canada Facing Trump’s US: Vassal or Sovereign? Justin Massie, Srdjan Vucetic January 21, 2026 Canada is preparing to release its first National Security Strategy since 2004. Twenty-two years. A strategic eternity. Since then, the world… Policy Forums Canada in 2025: Successes and Failures Louise Blais, Alexander Lanoszka, Sarah E. Sharma December 23, 2025 What issue in Canadian foreign and defence policy saw the least improvement during the last year, and where should the Government of… Analyses TRIPP: A Genuine Path to Peace Between Armenia and Azerbaijan? Martin de La Garanderie November 25, 2025 Analysis of Donald Trump's plan for Armenia and Azerbaijan On 8 August 2025, Donald Trump welcomed Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian… Analyses Sovereignty and Security in the Canadian Arctic: Who Should We Be Wary of? Frédéric Lasserre, Mathieu Landriault, Pauline Pic, Stéphane Roussel November 17, 2025 Several articles published in September 2025 revived alarmist positions on threats to Canada's sovereignty. Their authors paint a bleak picture of a… Policy Forums How should Canada deploy, support, and expand its new strategy for Africa? W. R. Nadège Compaoré, Marie-Eve Desrosiers, Nicolas Klingelschmitt, Falk Petegou November 14, 2025 Policy Forum Politique is a new publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a… Analyses Terrorism in South Asia and its Global Resonance Following the Pahalgam Attacks in 2025: A Diasporic Perspective Natasha Fernando November 11, 2025 The attacks on Jaffar Express, Pahalgam and Khuzdar, which took place in 2025 in South Asia, prompted several global and regional responses… Strategic Reports “Not an inch”: How Russia Puts NATO to the Test Maxime Philaire November 6, 2025 Introduction "We will do everything in our power to protect and defend every ally. And every square inch of NATO territory," said… Analyses European Nuclear Deterrence: A Credible Project? Antonin Blanchard October 24, 2025 Why such a project? Donald Trump's arrival in the White House in 2025 sent shockwaves through the European community. The reliability of… Policy Forums How can the Government of Canada address the recruitment and retention crisis in the Canadian Armed Forces? Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Stéfanie von Hlatky, Philippe Lagasséand Richard Shimooka October 1, 2025 Policy Forum Politique is a publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic… Strategic Reports Ecological Security, Indigenous Marine Guardian Programs, and Expanding the Concept of ‘Climate Security’ Aly Tkachenko September 22, 2025 This brief illustrates how an ecological security perspective can shed new light on the intersections between climate change, security, and the relationship… Analyses How New Delhi Views Moscow: Between Diversification and Strategic Convergences Amélie Chalivet September 15, 2025 On August 7, India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin would make an official visit to New… Analyses The Iranian Naval Withdrawal from the Red Sea: Abdication or Strategic Repositioning? Pierre Pahlavi September 5, 2025 While Iran has suffered its most severe attack since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in the context of Israeli and U.S. strikes against… Policy Forums Should Canada Join the Golden Dome? Andrea Charron, Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Jean-François Bélanger and Paul Meyer September 2, 2025 Policy Forum Politique is a new publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a… Analyses Canadian Independence from the United States Means Investing in Defence Ross O'Connor August 19, 2025 Over the last few months, President Trump's threats of Canada as a "51st state" have reignited Canadian feelings of national insecurity and… Analyses The Perils of Attractiveness: Small States on NATO’s Eastern Flank Facing American Uncertainty Jean F. Crombois July 17, 2025 Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House for a second term presents a significant challenge to the security approach of the countries… Debriefs What’s Plan B? Rebuilding Foreign Policy in Response to the Predatory Policies of the Trump Administration Nicolas-François Perron July 7, 2025 This text is a summary of the conference What Plan B? Reshaping Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Trump Administration’s Predatory… Analyses Canada and ReArm Europe: More Buck, More Bang? Jacob Tuckey, Alexander Lanoszka June 30, 2025 With the world becoming “increasingly dangerous and divided,” Prime Minister Mark Carney has declared his intention to revive the Canadian Armed Forces… Analyses Security in Competition: Analyzing the Perceptions of Boko Haram in the Far North of Cameroon June 12, 2025 This Hot Take assesses local and international perceptions of the terrorist group Boko Haram in the Far North region of Cameroon, as… Analyses Leaving the Free-Rider Club: Lessons from Belgium Michelle Haas and Tim Haesebrouck May 30, 2025 While tensions over unequal burden sharing within NATO are nearly as old as the alliance itself, so-called free-riders have never come under… Strategic Reports 2025: A Pivotal Year for National Defence in Canada Quentin Martel May 28, 2025 For decades, Canada, a close ally of the United States, has relied on the latter’s hegemony for protection. However, Donald Trump's re-election… Strategic Reports Canada must defend itself against US aid by developing sovereign capabilities Philippe Lagassé, Justin Massie May 26, 2025 How should Canada adapt its defence policy to deal with the realities of the new geopolitical environment? Since Donald Trump's return to… Analyses The Ukraine Wake-Up Call: Adapting Canada’s Defence Posture to Meet Strategic Objectives Justin Massie, Nicolas-François Perron May 20, 2025 Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Canada has provided incremental, yet relatively modest military assistance compared… Analyses The Russo-Ukrainian War as Seen from the Arab World Rachid Chaker May 13, 2025 In February 2025, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting between American and Russian envoys to agree on the terms for initiating direct Russo-American… Analyses Trump’s High-Stakes Game: Pressuring Iran and Countering China’s Rise Pierre Pahlavi May 12, 2025 In a March 30 interview, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened Iran with bombing and secondary tariffs if Tehran did not agree to… Analyses Firewalls and Frontlines: Canada’s Cybersecurity Leadership Potential in the Age of Foreign Information Operations David Dubé May 7, 2025 1- Introduction Cyber threats are escalating across Canada, and NATO allied countries, evolving in both scale and sophistication. While traditional cyberattacks targeting… Analyses Taking Stock of the First 100 Days of Trump’s Foreign Policy: Issues and Prospects for Canada Jonathan Paquin May 5, 2025 In this closing world, the United States assumed the role of stabilizing and sometimes even benevolent power. It worked to provide a… Analyses Engaging With a New Syria Mohamed Elgayar May 1, 2025 As Syria embarks on a new chapter following the end of the Assad regime, Canada reaffirms its commitment to peace, stability, inclusive… Strategic Reports A Dual-Use Solution to a Dual Problem: Canada’s Innovation and Defence Spending Fabrice Blais-Savoie April 16, 2025 Summary Canada is currently under intense pressure to meet the NATO agreed 2% of GDP spent on defence and 20% of defence… Strategic Reports Protecting Canadian Elections in the Age of Interference Jacob Tuckey April 14, 2025 Introduction The weaponization of information against democracies has become a hallmark of modern geopolitical competition. In the last decade, countries across the… Strategic Reports Poland and the Defence of Europe Against Russia Maxime Philaire April 11, 2025 ‘They have lost a good opportunity to keep their mouths shut’. In February 2003, the French President at the time, Jacques Chirac,… Strategic Reports Keeping Canadian Policy Promises: Addressing the Myanmar Crisis Isabella Aung April 8, 2025 In its November 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Canada identified rising violence in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup d’état as one of the most… Analyses The Case Against Canadian Nuclear Weapons Émile Lambert-Deslandes March 21, 2025 A Changing Non-Proliferation Paradigm?  Should Canada build its own nuclear weapons? While self-evidently against the country’s own non-proliferation and disarmament commitments, this… Strategic Reports Conflict Sensitivity: A Key Approach for Climate Adaptation Amanda Makosso March 17, 2025 This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS),… Analyses Canada Must Prepare for American Coercion Justin Massie March 15, 2025 While Canada has long enjoyed a close and stable relationship with its American neighbour, threats to stifle the Canadian economy in order… Analyses French Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Politics Florian Galleri March 12, 2025 What role did French nuclear weapons play in post-Cold War politics? At first glance, this question might seem marginal or even obsolete.… Analyses German Elections 2025: Scenarios for Military Aid to Ukraine and European Defence Nicolas-François Perron February 21, 2025 On February 23, 2025, German citizens will be called to the polls for early federal elections, a rather rare event in the… Strategic Reports Franco-Canadian Industrial Defence Cooperation: Current Situation and Development Prospects Gaspard Schnitzler and Erik Vouvalidis February 4, 2025 This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS),… Strategic Reports The Narratives War in the Arctic: Between Russian Disinformation and International Rivalries Mathieu Landriault, Julie Renaud January 14, 2025 This policy brief is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS),… Strategic Reports The Transatlantic Security Architecture and the Potential of the Franco-Canadian Alliance Léa Pérémarty, Leah Schmidt December 21, 2024 This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS),… Strategic Reports Potential French-Canadian Collaboration in the Face of New Security and Climate Threats in the Canadian Arctic Magali Vullierme, Alexandre Cicard December 19, 2024 This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS),… Analyses The End of the Assad Era in Syria: Between International Pressure and Domestic Challenges Gianmarco Fontana December 16, 2024 (The End of the Assad Era in Syria: Between International Pressure and Domestic Challenges - Gianmarco Fontana) After years of stalemate, the… Analyses Italy and the Russo-Ukrainian War: Strategic Continuity or the Impact of Populist Tensions? Nicolas-François Perron December 12, 2024 (Italy and the Russo-Ukrainian War: Strategic Continuity or the Impact of Populist Tensions? - Nicolas-François Perron) Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in… Analyses Egypt in the Russo-Ukrainian War: Impossible Non-Alignment? Antonin Blanchard December 10, 2024 Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War, two camps have rapidly emerged. Those supporting Ukraine in the defence of its territory and… Analyses Canada Must Prepare for the Seismic Shakeup that the Pentagon Will Face Theodore McLauchlin December 6, 2024 (Canada Must Prepare for the Seismic Shakeup that the Pentagon Will Face - Theodore McLauchlin) Donald Trump’s election has such wide-ranging implications… Strategic Reports Space Cooperation: Will Canada Dare to Take the Lead? Mathis Couturier December 5, 2024 Canada must intensify its international cooperation in outer space to remain competitive and relevant in the global arena. This strategic note explores… Analyses The Power of Narrative: Disinformation, Strategy, and Prediction of Future Scenarios in the Russo-Ukrainian War Walid Ferguen December 3, 2024 The Russian-Ukrainian war, triggered by the Russian invasion of 2022, is not limited to military confrontations. At the heart of this modern… Analyses The Russo-Ukrainian War from Iran’s Perspective: An Inconclusive Political and Strategic Test for the “Tehran-Beijing-Moscow Axis”? Kevan Gafaïti November 14, 2024 Are Iran and Russia truly allies? This sensitive and timely question finds substantial answers in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine,… Analyses The Islamic Republic Under Pressure and on the Brink of Collapse Pierre Pahlavi November 14, 2024 In many ways, the events of fall 2024 represent a significant setback and a major turning point for Tehran's influence in the… Analyses “Maybe tonight, maybe tomorrow, maybe a week from now”: Deterrence and limited war between Israel and Hezbollah Benjamin Toubol October 21, 2024 On August 5, 2024, the Secretary General of the Lebanese Shiite political-military group Hezbollah (“Party of God”) tweeted in Hebrew: “Maybe tonight,… Analyses Foreign agent law in Georgia: Russia steps up to the plate Martin de La Garanderie October 7, 2024 The foreign agents law under the leadership of Bidzina Ivanichvili and the Russians Last May, the government led by the Georgian Dream… Strategic Reports The Arctic, a Geographical Region Beset by Geopolitical Tensions with Russia Quentin Martel October 4, 2024 Geopolitical tensions linked to the Arctic have developed as a result of Russia's hostile attitude in the region. The war in Ukraine… Strategic Reports Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum? Armenia and Azerbaijan in Search of Regional Stability After the Nagorno-Karabakh War Martin de La Garanderie September 27, 2024 In the autumn of 2023, Azerbaijan's armed forces completed their reconquest of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, until then controlled by the self-proclaimed… Analyses China’s Best Friend in the West? The Rising Threat of Chinese Involvement with New Zealand’s Quantum Research Bailee Dobson September 9, 2024 The development of quantum technology is at the forefront of international security concerns. Unsurprisingly, with quantum computers expected to break current cryptographic… Analyses Israel/Hamas: Strategic Surprise and the October 7th Attack Antonin Blanchard September 6, 2024 “... surprise therefore becomes the means of acquiring superiority... When it succeeds, it sows confusion and breaks the enemy's courage” - Carl… Strategic Reports Is Canada’s Donation of 900 Drones to Ukraine an Appropriate Response to Needs on the Ground? Camille Laty August 29, 2024 On February 19, the Department of National Defence issued a press release announcing a donation of more than 800 drones to Ukraine.… Analyses Building a safer North: Climate security risks, gaps, and opportunities of the Canadian Arctic Pauline Baudu July 26, 2024 “What happens in the North impacts the world, and when you look at security issues and climate change, the world is paying… Analyses Don’t Count on Us: Canada’s Military Unreadiness Philippe Lagassé, Justin Massie May 30, 2024 Canada’s military is in a “death… Analyses Back to the Basics of the “Shadow War”: 6 Months of Escalation Between Iran and Israel and the Aftermath Pierre Pahlavi May 6, 2024 Following the recent clashes between Iran and Israel, and with the situation tending towards a return to calm, it is time for… Analyses Towards Russian Recognition of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”? Eliott Le Gall April 5, 2024 Cyprus, a divided island "Peace is not the absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a will to… Analyses Donald Trump and the Coming Disintegration of the West Kim Richard Nossal April 5, 2024 In many respects, Donald Trump’s 100-minute rally held in Conway, South Carolina, on February 10, 2024, was just like his previous rallies.… Books Indo-Pacific: A Strategic Region April 5, 2024 Get the book Indo-Pacific: A Strategic Region, the seventh volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in… Analyses What Strategy for the West in Ukraine? Renunciation after Default Olivier Sueur February 29, 2024 One year ago, Le Rubicon honoured me by publishing an article entitled “Ukraine-Russie : une guerre de 20 ans” (Ukraine-Russia: a 20-year war),… Analyses The “Ins and Outs” of the Rapprochement Between Iran and Sudan Pierre Pahlavi February 29, 2024 In early February 2024, Sudan's acting Foreign Minister, Ali Al Sadiq, traveled to Tehran to meet his counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and Iranian… Analyses With Waning Media Attention, External Monitor Keeps Focus on Military Culture Change Marie-Pier Allard-Caron, Private: Cindy Cruz, Stéfanie von Hlatky February 29, 2024 In the wake of the 2021 sexual harassment and assault crisis involving allegations against high-ranking officers, including two Chiefs of the Defence… Analyses Ensuring the European Union’s Economic Security: a Revolution in the European Model Olivier Sueur February 8, 2024 After thirty years of quite peaceful coexistence between the economic and geopolitical spheres (1990-2020), the former is being overtaken by the latter… Analyses Does France really have a problem with the concept of Integrated Deterrence? David Pappalardo January 30, 2024 The concept of “integrated deterrence” is central to the US National Defense Strategy published by the Biden administration at the end of… Analyses Hamas attack on Israel: What’s in it for Iran? Pierre Pahlavi November 16, 2023 Hours after the spectacular raid carried out by Hamas by crossing the Israeli border on Saturday, October 7th, the attention of many… Analyses Beyond the Approval of Finland and Sweden joining NATO: making sense of Turkey’s unstable approach towards the alliance Tetede Babatunde François Akilatan November 9, 2023 In the wake of Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden announced in May 2022 their intention to join NATO. These historic… Analyses The Risks of Ambiguity: Taiwanese Public Opinion, US Credibility, and Effective Deterrence James Lee, Ja Ian Chong, Hsin-Hsin Pan, Chien-Huei Wu and Wen-Chin Wu November 6, 2023 The United States’ policy toward Taiwan has been a source of continuing controversy. Amid warnings that Beijing may be preparing to use… Strategic Reports Military Support for Ukraine – A Necessary Coherence Around Three Dimensions: Discourse, Material Donations, and Industrial Production Rachel Sarfati October 25, 2023 Western opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has undeniably had consequences for interstate diplomatic, military and economic dynamics. Among them is the… Strategic Reports The Arctic Continental Shelf and Canada: What Political Risks? Mathieu Landriault October 17, 2023 The allocation of the continental shelf in the Arctic region has generated significant speculation. Some, particularly in the media, portray this issue… Analyses Fear of missing out: Meloni’s moderation for the stability of the international scenario. Gianmarco Fontana October 3, 2023 The latest Italian elections, held in September 2022, represent a turning point for both the country and the international community. According to… Page 1 / 3123» ## Publish with Us URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/publish-with-us/ Modified: 2026-10-22 > Publication types include Policy Briefs, Policy Reports, Hot Takes, and Articles. To submit a publication please email our... Publication Types Analyses Blogs on current topics. No limit or precise template. References in hyperlinks (no bibliography). Strategic Reports In-depth analysis aimed at presenting political considerations, analyzing policy options, and recommending courses of action to the Government of Canada. See instructions below Spotlights Short essays that serve to convey published academic monographs and university press books in security studies, Canadian foreign and defence policy, international relations, security studies, and strategic studies. See instructions below Policy Forums Short essays from multiple experts on a question relevant to Canadian national security or foreign policy. Natasha Fernando, publications coordinator | natasha.fernando01@gmail.com Alexander Lanoszka, co-director, publications Download Guidelines (PDF 247kb) Submission guidelines To submit a paper in any of these categories, email our publications coordinator Natasha Fernando (natasha.fernando01@gmail.com) beforehand to approve the topic and angle proposed. Propositions must be related to one of the three axes of the NSA. Once approved, papers will be reviewed, translated, and published online by the Strategic Analysis Network. Honorarium Contributions are voluntary and unpaid. However, the Strategic Analysis Network may, on a discretionary basis, offer a modest stipend to solicited authors to fulfill specific requests. - More details per publication type Analyses Analyses– The Strategic Analysis Network What is an ‘Analysis’? An ‘Analysis’ is an informed short essay that addresses a particular policy question or problem. It should have a clear argument, provides at most two paragraphs of context, and makes an impactful statement, if not a provocation, that is intended (a) to stimulate thinking on an issue among members of the Canadian national security community; (b) to raise awareness of an underappreciated aspect of that issue; and/or (c) to convey to an informed audience a particular policy recommendation. The ‘Analysis’ should be informed by scholarly or analytical expertise, but it must be free of jargon. Do note that ‘Analyses’ are reviewed in a double-blind manner. What can an ‘Analysis’ be about? An ‘Analysis’ can be about any matter of relevance to international security as well as Canadian defence and foreign policy. However, owing to its brevity, the ‘Analysis’ should be as specific and concrete as possible. For example, rather than consider the impact of the new defence policy update, an ‘Analysis’ should focus on its impact on NORAD—that is, a particular program, international arrangement, and so forth. Format Use the NSA template Hyperlinked references: no footnotes or author-date references, no bibliography or list of references Structure ‘Analysis’ is open-ended in structure, but the author(s) should convey the basic argument (or provocation) no later than three paragraphs into the essay. Headings are useful for signposting the text but should be specific enough to signal to readers the content of the essay, if not parts of the argument. Writing Style Use short sentences. Avoid flaunting your knowledge. Get to the point. Avoid academic jargon. Use a more direct style, which can be understood by non-specialists. Make sure that the facts, ideas and arguments clearly match the conclusions and, if any, recommendations of the ‘Analysis’. Strategic Reports Strategic Reports – The Strategic Analysis Network What is a policy report? Strategic reports are topical and innovative analyzes on topics of interest and concern to security policy makers, analysts, scholars, and the general public. By exploring a topic in more detail than a traditional policy brief, strategic reports use evidence-based research and analysis that provide readers with critical information about the context and key characteristics of a topic, issue, or situation, as well as recommendations focused on Canada and its policies. In the field of security and defence, the range of potential topics is wide, and authors are encouraged to use Strategic reports to inform policy decisions and public debate on any topics they feel merit further consideration – not just those who have dominated recent discourse – and to mobilize conventional or unconventional perspectives on security. What are the objectives of a strategic report? Strategic reports should meet the following objectives: Present evidence-based research, information and analysis on topics of interest in order to amplify the voice of experts and provide a more solid basis for decision-making; Highlight approaches and areas of interest to the security community that have been under-researched and require further attention; Promote innovation and encourage a multidisciplinary and synergistic approach to research and analysis; Present clear and timely policy recommendations and considerations in order to productively contribute to discussion, debate, and decision-making. The Strategic reports for the Strategic Analysis Network should fit into one or more of the strategic challenges that guide the NSA: The evolving role of great powers in a shifting world order Multilateral cooperation in international security The future of defence capacity building for global partners Format Use the NSA template Length: 8 pages maximum The strategic report should include a summary of approximately 150 words Hyperlinked references: no footnotes or author-date references, no bibliography or list of references. Structure Strategic reports are divided into three parts: Introduction Describe the topic, riddle or problem associated with it and the author's argument. Development Provide general and contextual information on the subject. Provide an analysis of the information and outline the potential implications, noting the existing debates and different points of view Use headings and subheadings to structure the brief and guide the reader in your analysis. Policy considerations and recommendations Proceed logically to coherent, Canada-centered policy recommendations or considerations. Considerations for the author(s) The policy report must provide a clear argument on an easily identifiable subject among the three strategic challenges of the RAS. Recommendations are essential. The report is expected to provide Canada-focused policy recommendations that build on the above analysis and are supported by a clear rationale and expected outcomes. The report should be based on evidence-based research and analysis, drawing on subject expertise to provide a foundation for recommendations. The report can contribute to an existing debate or open a new topic for discussion. Writing style Make sure that the purpose of the topic covered in the report is clear: the reader should know why this topic is important and what its implications are. A strategic report is longer than a policy brief. This extra space should be used to provide more in-depth information and analysis. Avoid academic jargon. Use a more direct style, which can be understood by non-specialists. Make sure that the facts, ideas, and arguments clearly match the conclusions and recommendations of the strategic report Keep different audiences in mind. Although the information, analysis and policy recommendations should be of particular interest to the Government of Canada and certain departments, notably DND/CAF, the strategic report should also be useful to other organizations, institutions, and the general public.   Spotlights Spotlights – The Strategic Analysis Network Spotlights are Short essays that serve to convey recently published academic monographs and university press books in security studies, Canadian foreign and defence policy, international relations, security studies, and strategic studies. Spotlights are akin to a book review but should not be confused for one since they offer neither 'academic take downs' or 'praise singing'. Rather, spotlights summarize the main argument of the key work in question, explain the significance of its findings to practitioners and informed audiences interested in national security, apply the theoretical framework of the body to illuminate recent or current events, and/or outline the implications for Canadian foreign and defence policy. Spotlights serve to translate, as well as to highlight, the cutting edge in academic research to broader audiences who may not be familiar with the scholarship or do not have the time to consume it in full. Format Use the NSA template Length: 2000 words maximum Hyperlinked references: no footnotes or author-date references, no bibliography or list of references Structure ‘Spotlights' are open-ended in structure, but the author(s) should convey the basic argument less than two paragraphs into the essay. Headings are useful for signposting the text but should be specific enough to signal to readers the content of the essay, if not parts of the argument. Writing Style Use short sentences. Avoid flaunting your knowledge. Get to the point. Avoid academic jargon. Use a more direct style, which can be understood by non-specialists. Be faithful to the original argument. Represent it well without sensationalizing it for effect or ignoring the caveats that come with it. Many authors have to make bold claims up front but then attach important qualifications to them. Policy Forums Policy Forums – The Strategic Analysis Network Policy Forums aim to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic of national security significance to Canada. Each edition will comprise several very short essays that are no longer than 300 words each. Contributions should be free of jargon as much as possible and involve staking a clear position on the framing question. Hyperlinks to substantiate any key claims are desirable but they are not obligatory. Contributors will be writing blindly without seeing the other arguments. They will be reviewed only by the editorial team at RAS. ## Resources for Emerging Scholars URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/emerging-scholars/ Modified: 2026-08-04 > This section, intended for the students, aims to share a number of opportunities and resources offered by the NSA and our partners. For Students This section, intended for the students, aims to share a number of opportunities and resources offered by the NSA and our partners. Our Student Training Videos Training Workshop Focused on the SSHRC scholarship programs, for MA and PhD students Practical Workshop Writing Policy Briefs Preparation Workshop Policy Officer Recruitment Program Information Session PORP at the Department of National Defence Becoming a student member or an intern at the NSA The NSA offers students the opportunity to become an emerging scholar or student collaborator. Membership criteria are available here. Emerging Researcher Graduate student or young professional Supervised or sponsored by an NSA researcher or collaborator Actively working on one of the NSA’s research themes Student Contributor Undergraduate student Supervised by an NSA researcher Interest in one of the NSA’s research themes Student members of the NSA are encouraged to analyze issues in the field of security and defence through four types of bilingual publications (Hot Takes, Policy Briefs, Policy Reports and articles). To learn more about the publication process, please click here. The NSA offers a variety of student internships. These positions allow students to acquire professional skills such as initiative, organization, rigor and analytical thinking. For an unsolicited application, contact us at info@ras-nsa.ca. Our Student Partners Here you will find some student-led organizations in the field of defence and security that may be of interest to you. ## The Network URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-network/ Modified: 2026-08-24 > Mobilize Knowledge. Train the Next Generation. Incubator of Canadian and global expertise on geostrategic events, we offer in-depth... Mobilize Knowledge. Train the Next Generation. The Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) is a bilingual, independent, and nonpartisan research center specializing in defense and international security issues. Its mandate is to provide the Defense Team with rigorous, timely, and relevant expertise on the transformation of the international order and its implications for Canada’s defense policy. The Network’s work focuses on: Analysis of strategic competition and cross-domain threats, including the strategies of Canada’s adversaries, lessons learned from contemporary conflicts, the evolution of deterrence strategies, NATO’s adaptation, and new allied security initiatives; The study of issues related to the defense of the Arctic, the North, and North America, including the evolution of Canada-U.S. defense relations, changes in the U.S. strategic posture, and their implications for continental security; An examination of Canada’s defense industrial and technological base, including issues related to capability acquisition, interoperability with allies, the development of sovereign capabilities, and the implementation of Canada’s Defense Industrial Strategy. Objectives In this context, the Network pursues three objectives: Mobilize – in French and English – innovative and multidisciplinary research in the field of defence and security in order to develop synergies and amplify the voice of experts; Disseminate the results of strategic analysis to the Government of Canada, partner organizations and the general public so as to inform political decisions and public debate; Train the next generation of security and defence experts by integrating students into the development and dissemination of knowledge and through the professional development of young researchers, with a particular concern for equity, diversity and inclusion. The RAS/SAN is a research incubator that is committed to the academic freedom and non-partisan nature of its analyses. Through an inclusive approach, these values guide the RAS/SAN’s mission and direct its activities. Our strategy on intersectionality, designed by our GBA+ leader, Isabelle Caron, structures all of our mobilization, dissemination, and training activities. The RAS/SAN’s community of diverse viewpoints and members is fundamental to achieving its mission. Pluralism is a virtue recognized as such by the Network. Particular attention is given to including ideas from marginalized groups and/or those with minority status. Led by Justin Massie (UQÀM) and a steering committee comprising Frédérick Gagnon (UQÀM), Thomas Hughes (Mount Allison University), Alexander Lanoszka (Waterloo), Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Bishop's) and Jonathan Paquin (uLaval) the Network brings together more than 80 leading researchers and experienced practitioners. In addition to researchers working on at least one of the three topics mentioned above, the Network mobilizes the expertise of international collaborators, a Strategic Steering Committee and emerging researchers. Members The SAN has five membership categories to represent its professional, faculty, graduate and undergraduate members. Our members are bilingual, which means they have the ability to understand both of Canada's official languages, English and French. All members are free to express themselves in the official language of their choice. In addition to bilingualism, each category of membership has its own eligibility criteria, details of which are provided below. Scholar Professor in a Canadian university or researcher at a Canadian research center Expert in at least one of the SAN research themes Collaborator Experienced practitioner Expert in at least one of the SAN research themes Associate Researcher Professor at a foreign university or researcher at a foreign research center Expert in at least one of the SAN's  research areas Emerging Scholar Graduate student or young professional Supervised or sponsored by a SAN scholar or collaborator Actively working on at least one of the SAN research themes Intern Student credited by their University institution Participates in the organization of SAN activities Supervised by one of the members of the SAN team For a spontaneous application, contact us at info@ras-nsa.ca. Publications The SAN is proud to mobilize research in the field of defence and security through four types of bilingual publications (Analyses, Strategic reports, Policy forums and Debriefs). Read our publication guidelines here: Publications RAS/SAN. The Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program is designed to facilitate collaboration and mobilize knowledge between the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, and academia and other experts on defence and security issues. Through its Targeted Engagement Grants, collaborative networks, scholarships, and expert briefings, MINDS works and collaborates with key partners to strengthen the foundation of evidence-based defence policy making. These partnerships drive innovation by encouraging new analyses of emerging global events, opportunities, and crises, while supporting a stronger defence and security dialogue with Canadians. Canada.ca/minds-defence Justin Massie Director Frédérick Gagnon Co-director Thomas Hughes Co-director Alexander Lanoszka Co-director Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Co-director Jonathan Paquin Co-Director Our partners ## Universities URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/universities-and-partners/ Modified: 2026-06-22   ## Upcoming Events URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/events/ Modified: 2022-07-11 From Measuring to Anticipating Conflict: An Early Warning System for Africa and the World Trump après les midterms: quelle géopolitique mondiale au lendemain du 3 novembre? Quebec Facing Global Rearmament Past Events Search Categories Categories Call for Applications  (5) Call for Papers  (4) Colloquium  (13) Conferences  (35) Conférences  (35) Scholarships  (1) Workshops  (8) Journée Transatlantique & la Patrouille de France Canada’s Strategic Autonomy in the 21st Century Summer School in Strategic Studies: “Thinking About Conflicts in the 21st Century” The Arctic: Between the Reshaping of Alliances and the Consolidation of Sovereignty Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under DoubleTree by Hilton, Ottawa Annual Colloquium | Can Canada Enhance Its Autonomy in Defence? Invisible Invasion? Russia’s Hybrid Warfare and Europe’s Evolving Countermeasures Zoom | Salon Orange, Centre Pierre-Péladeau, UQAM What Plan B? Reshaping Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Trump Administration’s Predatory Policies Inscription en ligne (Zoom) | Université de Montréal The Prevalence and Degree of Infiltration of Russian Disinformation on the Russian-Ukrainian War in the Western Information Space Zoom (inscription requis) | UQAM - Pavillon Athanase-David (D), salle D-R200 The invasion of Ukraine: 3 Years On Amphithéâtre Banque Nationale du campus, Côte Ste-Catherine, HEC Montréal CANADIAN DIPLOMACY IN A TURBULENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM Call for applications: France-Canada Future Leaders Program on defense and diplomacy issues The Politicization of Defence and Strategic Issues Zoom (registration required) | R-3465, Pavillon des Sciences de la gestion, UQAM What Lessons Can We Take From the War in Ukraine? Demarais (DMS) 4101 - Camille Villeneuve, University of Ottawa 2024 Colloquium – The Strategic Implications of the American Presidential Election Queen's University RAS-NSA’s Intensive Professional Development Retreat for Emerging Scholars Zoom (registration required) | ENAP, room 4045 The Evolution and future of NATO’s relationship with the Arctic in a context of (non)-politicization of defence issues French Embassy Future Zones of Conflict and Tension by 2030 Théâtre de poche - POL 2113 - Pavillon Maurice-Pollack, Université Laval Hedging in a Transforming World Order: Looking at the Strategic Ambiguity of Washington’s Allies and Partners Salon orange (Centre Pierre-Péladeau, UQAM) The Ukraine Invasion, Two Years Later Bishop's University Canada’s Fight for Purpose: The Challenges of Talking and Walking our way to Peace University Club, University of Victoria Pacific Climate Security Conference and Career Development Workshop Zoom | Ambassade de France RUBICON COLLOQUIUM – The multidimensional challenges of foreign interference Call for Applications: Programme de personnalités d’avenir France-Canada sur les enjeux de Défense University of Ottawa - Faculty of Social Sciences Building, Room 4007 WORLD POLITICS IN LIMBO: Non-Alignment, Hybrid Challenges, and New Frontiers Call for Applications: Climate Security Association of Canada Research Fellowship Call For Communications – Student Competition for 2023 Colloquium University of Ottawa Peacekeeping-Intelligence: Challenges and Opportunities UQAM Summer School – Computational Analysis of Texts on the War in Ukraine Zoom Roundtable – Security Challenges in Africa Zoom | Université du Québec à Montréal What to Expect from the War in Ukraine? Hotel Monville Information at the Speed of Trust: (dis/ill/mis) Information and Security Issues Centre d’études sur la paix et la sécurité internationale Global Tensions, Local Wars? The Changing International Politics of Civil Conflict Zoom | Pavillon Altman Center - The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina. The War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and the Future Political Settlement Zoom | Queens University, Robert Sutherland Hall - Room 202 From the Margins and Outside the Box: New Perspectives on Researching the Military Zoom | UQAM, Pavillon des Sciences de la gestion, Panel Discussion – Drones and new military technologies: what lessons were learned from the Russian-Ukrainian war? Zoom | Université de Montréal The crisis in Mali and its international dimensions – Roundtable National Arts Centre FINDING OUR WAY BACK: Defining a Coherent International Strategy for Canada Zoom DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER RECRUITMENT PROGRAM (DIORP) Info Session On Twitter Understanding the Five Eyes Zoom Is War Over Taiwan Coming? Zoom Québec Undergraduate Security Conference, 5th Edition Zoom | Bishop’s University Ready, Engaged and Informed: Canada and the Role of Intelligence in Addressing Emerging Threats and Challenges Zoom Quebec and Canada’s Strategic Directions: Security & Diplomatic Challenges. Bishop’s University Preventing Violent Extremism: Using a Pan Disciplinary Approach UQAM Information Warfare: Strategies, Rules and Challenges Supporting Security and Capacity Building Efforts in Africa Zoom The End of the Afghanistan War: Its Impact on NATO and Great Power Rivalries What’s next? Managing traditional and new threats through international cooperation Information Session on the Department of National Defence Policy Officer Recruitment Program Zoom Geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus Zoom Democratic Allies’ Defence Cooperation to Counter Authoritarianism in a Shifting World Strategic Analysis Network’ 2021-2022 Doctoral Scholarship Zoom Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World – Non-American Perspectives Zoom Ten Years On: Assessing the U.S. Strategic Pivot (Rebalancing) to Asia Operation IMPACT: Capacity building and fight against terrorism Zoom (Re)thinking Canada’s role in Peacekeeping Call for Papers-“(Re)thinking Canada’s role in Peacekeeping” Zoom The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada Zoom The CAF and Capacity-Building under COVID-19 – Virtual Workshop Panel 5 Call for papers – The State and National Defence in a Disorderly World Zoom NATO and Defence – Virtual Workshop Panel 4 Call for Papers – Quebec Undergraduate Security Conference Zoom Peacekeeping – Virtual Workshop Panel 3 Zoom Counterinsurgency and Counter-terrorism – Virtual Workshop Panel 2 Zoom Training Workshop for Graduate Students and Emerging Scholars Zoom Capacity Building at Day Zero – Virtual Workshop Panel 1 ## Protected: Workshop in January 2027: Why Marketing Must Help Define Dual-Use Technologies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/workshop-in-january-2027-why-marketing-must-help-define-dual-use-technologies/ Modified: 2026-10-22 > Canada and Europe are investing heavily in technologies that move between defence and commercial markets. Now is the time for a clearer dual-use technology construct and a plan to follow firms over time. Workshop concept and presentation Article: Why the Scientific Rigor of Academic Marketing Must Help Define Dual-Use Technologies Pre-Workshop Community Survey Workshop concept and presentation Why Marketing Must Help Define Dual-Use Technologies Intersection of Political Economy of Marketing, Exogenous Shocks, and Dual-use Technologies Location: Montreal, QC, Canada Organized by: Drs. S. Vaid, J. Massie, and A. Kimball Our goal for the day is to conceptualize and define the construct of dual-use technologies through the scientific rigor of academic marketing. A useful working definition is straightforward: dual-use technologies are technologies that move from defence to commercial settings and vice versa. While this definition has generally found acceptance, it has remained deliberately broad and useless for marketing science. The workshop will bring together approximately 20 serving military personnel, firm managers, Department of National Defence officials, and academics. Participants will systematically and rigorously examine whether dual-use is : (a) a technical property of a solution or invention, and/or (b) an exchange across B2B/B2G markets, institutions, users, buyers, customers, and purposes. The starting point for the workshop is that marketing and related exchanges are integral to dual-use technologies, not peripheral to them. Technologies move from defence labs to commercial settings, while businesses at the cutting edge of advances in AI, software, data systems, and digital platforms increasingly edge their way into defence circumstances. The commercialization pipeline requires firms to identify and engage with users, buyers, consumers, and customers while communicating value, encouraging adoption, and building legitimacy. If commercialization is the journey, marketing science is the explanation. The need for a clearer construct is both scientific and practical. If academics cannot scientifically conceptualize and define dual-use technologies, how do we study them? How would funding agencies develop a rubric to distinguish a genuinely dual-use proposal from a typical commercial solution wearing a defence label? How should evaluators assess viability and commercialization pathways? How will we know whether defence investments offer public value by improving the performance of the firms they are intended to support? The workshop will therefore pursue four connected objectives: Conceptualize the construct: Examine the defining characteristics of technologies that move from defence to commercial settings and vice versa. Clarify the unit of analysis: Consider whether the construct should describe a technology, a firm, a movement between markets, or some combination of technologies, firms, users, buyers, customers, capabilities, strategies, institutions, and purposes. Develop a working definition: Identify the boundaries that distinguish a genuinely dual-use technology from a typical commercial solution wearing a defence label. Prepare for measurement: Identify the elements required to measure the construct and eventually study firms across multiple periods, tracing how technologies and firms move between defence and commercial markets and how policy affects their innovation, revenues, exports, and survival. The workshop is conceived as the beginning of a patient, systematic, rigorous, and scientific effort. Its immediate task is to conceptualize, define, and prepare to measure the construct of dual-use technologies. Its longer-term task is empirical: identifying firms, mapping their commercialization pathways, and quantifying downstream outcomes. Our workshop will be recorded, submitted to AI, and offered as a ‘Meta’ co-authored AI paper to a prominent journal. Workshop Agenda Time Activity Notes 9:00–9:20 a.m. Welcome, workshop objectives, and participant introductions Introduction to the central question: If we cannot scientifically define dual-use technologies, how will we study them or allocate investments? Participants briefly identify their perspective: serving military personnel, firm manager, DND official, or academic. 9:20–9:45 a.m. Organizer Presentation 1: Why Academic Marketing’s Scientific Rigor Must Help Define Dual-Use Technologies Introduces the scholarly and practical gap. Marketing and related exchanges are integral to the movement of technologies across defence and commercial settings. 9:45–10:10 a.m. Organizer Presentation 2: The Working Definition and Its Boundaries Examines the working definition: “technologies that move from defence to commercial settings and vice versa.” Considers dual use as a movement across B2B and B2G markets, institutions, users, and purposes—not simply as a technical property. 10:10–10:30 a.m. Tea and coffee break 10:30–10:55 a.m. Organizer Presentation 3: From Conceptualization to Measurement Considers how to identify firms, map commercialization pathways, quantify downstream outcomes, and follow firms over multiple periods. 10:55–11:20 a.m. TBD Presentation 1 Presenter applies the workshop’s working definition to the movement of technologies from defence to commercial settings or from commercial to defence settings. 11:20–11:45 a.m. TBD Presentation 2 Presenter considers the practical consequences of defining—or failing to define—dual-use technologies for firms, funding, evaluation, or public value. 11:45 a.m.–12:15 p.m. Questions and synthesis of morning presentations Identify points of preliminary agreement, disagreement, ambiguity, and questions requiring further discussion. 12:15–1:00 p.m. Lunch 1:00–2:15 p.m. Breakout Activity: Construct Definition and Boundaries Four mixed groups of approximately five participants. Each group should include, where possible, serving military personnel, firm managers, DND officials, and academics. 2:15–2:30 p.m. Tea and coffee break Organizers consolidate the breakout submissions. 2:30–3:15 p.m. Preliminary Findings from the Breakout Groups Each group reports its proposed definition, defining characteristics, construct boundaries, and unresolved questions. Organizers identify common elements and important differences. 3:15–4:15 p.m. Round-Table Discussion: Toward a Scientifically Useful Construct Whole-group discussion of whether the emerging definition can distinguish a genuinely dual-use technology from a typical commercial solution wearing a defence label and support future measurement. 4:15–4:45 p.m. Summarizing the Workshop Review areas of convergence, remaining disagreements, and the elements of a preliminary working definition. 4:45–5:00 p.m. Closing Remarks and Next Steps Summarize the immediate conceptual task and the longer-term empirical agenda: identifying firms, mapping commercialization pathways, and quantifying downstream outcomes. Suggested instructions for the breakout activity Each breakout group should address the following questions: What is a dual-use technology? What must be present before a technology can reasonably be described as dual use? Does dual use reside in the technology itself, or in its movement across markets, institutions, users, buyers, customers, and purposes? How should we distinguish a genuinely dual-use technology from a typical commercial solution wearing a defence label? What changes when a technology moves from defence to commercial settings? What changes when a commercial technology moves into defence circumstances? Which users, buyers, customers, capabilities, or strategic changes can cause a firm to become dual use? What would researchers need to observe and measure across multiple periods? How could the construct help assess commercialization pathways and public value? Each group should produce a preformatted slide deck addressing the following: A proposed one- or two-sentence working definition; Three to five defining characteristics; Two or three construct boundaries or exclusions; The principal unit or units of analysis; Two unresolved questions requiring further scientific study. Why the Scientific Rigor of Academic Marketing Must Help Define Dual-Use Technologies Canada and Europe are investing heavily in technologies that move between defence and commercial markets. Now is the time for a clearer dual-use technology construct and a plan to follow firms over time. Sash Vaid If one looked closely, many technologies visible today in commercial contexts had either been born in, or evolved through, defence environments. These include technological solutions developed for sensing, imaging, cybersecurity, simulation, artificial intelligence, and geodata, among many others. Marketing facilitated that transfer since the commercialization pipeline requires firms to identify and engage with users, buyers, consumers, and customers, while communicating value, encouraging adoption, and building legitimacy. The transfer of technologies also happened the other way. Businesses at the cutting edge of advances in AI, software, data systems, and digital platforms have increasingly edged their way into defence settings. In common parlance, we refer to these as dual-use technologies. A useful working definition is straightforward: technologies that move from defence to commercial settings and vice versa. This definition has generally found acceptance, but it remains deliberately broad. The wide angle of this definition sees dual use not just as a technical property of a solution or invention, but as a movement and exchange across B2B and B2G markets, institutions, users, and purposes. Marketing and related exchanges are therefore integral to the phenomenon, not peripheral to it. If commercialization is the journey, marketing science is the explanation. Recently, discussions around dual-use technologies have begun to gain ground in Canada. Dual-use technologies have meandered from policy settings into public discourse. Accompanying that discussion is the humbling realization that Canada is confronting long-standing gaps in defence readiness even as it is looking to develop a new Defence Industrial Strategy. The numbers are nearly eye-popping; the scale is difficult to ignore. Over the next decade, over half a trillion dollars will be invested in Canadian security and related areas. Of this, $180 billion is earmarked for defence procurement and $290 billion is planned for defence-related infrastructure. It is estimated that $125 billion will flow towards downstream economic activity by 2035. The share of defence acquisitions awarded to Canadian firms is expected to rise to 70 per cent, while defence exports are expected to increase by 50 per cent. All this is predicted to create up to 125,000 jobs. One part of this strategy that merits mention is its repeated focus on defence and dual-use innovation. The issue is not limited to Canada. Europe is equally focused on treating dual-use technologies as central to strategic autonomy. The Horizon Europe 2026-2027 work program places significant emphasis on strategic and dual-use technologies, space autonomy and commercial space capabilities, critical technologies and industrial ecosystems, research security and the export control of dual-use technologies, as well as AI, advanced materials, advanced manufacturing, sensing, robotics, and quantum technologies. These are certainly engineering priorities, but they are also marketing science questions. A focus on market uptake, supply-chain resilience, business cases, and exploitation strategies is key to the commercialization of these ideas. The construct of dual-use technology is not consistently conceptualized or clearly defined, and the scholarship on the subject is remarkably thin. The most directly relevant foundational papers are two articles published in Research Policy in the mid-1990s that defined and conceptualized dual-use technology. Yet neither Cowan and Foray (1995) nor Molas-Gallart (1997) operationalized dual-use technology as a measurable construct or subjected it to empirical construct validation. Over three decades, only a handful of papers referred to the idea in their abstracts. None of the articles I identified appeared in a marketing journal. There is no doubt that adjacent scholarship in engineering, security studies, technology governance, and related fields has sought to define dual-use technologies. As a result, an eclectic mix of definitions exists today, including those found in publications and frameworks from the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, the Wassenaar Arrangement, MIT’s Dual-use Readiness Model, the Bureau of Industry and Security, the Business Development Bank of Canada, as well as in practitioner commentaries. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, these and many other definitions (a) have not been developed and empirically validated as measurable constructs, and (b) have not systematically grounded the construct in marketing theory or empirically validated its marketing dimensions—even though marketing is integral to realizing dual-use potential by commercializing technological capabilities across civilian and defence markets. That gap matters. If marketing academics cannot define and scientifically conceptualize dual-use technologies, how do we even study them? How would funding agencies develop a rubric to distinguish a genuinely dual-use proposal from a typical commercial solution wearing a defence label? How do evaluators assess viability and commercialization pathways? And how will we know whether Canada’s defence investments offer public value by improving the performance of the firms they are intended to support? My experience gives added weight to these observations. Earlier this year, I was invited to Queen’s Park through Science Meets Parliament Ontario 2026 to make this case on dual-use technologies. I was expecting brief, formal meetings; however, conversations with parliamentarians and legislative staff ran longer than scheduled. The definitional problem I discuss above seemed to resonate with our representatives. My argument to parliamentarians was straightforward: if we cannot scientifically define dual-use technologies, how will we allocate investments? The visit revealed another dimension of research impact beyond publications, which clearly remain the currency of academic life. I saw value in how marketing science scholarship can help parliamentarians frame questions that precede societal and market exchanges. This gap is also visible at the firm level. The Regional Defence Investment Initiative states that southern Ontario has more than 900 defence-capable organizations. For starters, who are these firms? Which are defence firms, which are dual-use firms, and which become dual use only after a change in users, buyers, customers, capabilities, or strategy? A single count of 900 defence-capable organizations cannot answer those questions. Researchers must patiently, systematically, rigorously, and scientifically study these firms as a panel over multiple periods (preferably years), tracing how technologies and firms move between defence and commercial markets. Only then will researchers know how policy—that is, a defence industrial strategy—affects their innovation, revenues, exports, and survival. This is the research agenda now taking shape in my lab. The Vaid Lab for Dual-Use Technologies aims to connect three areas that are too often separated: the political economy of marketing; dual-use industrial and cyber technologies; and exogenous shocks at the regulatory and firm levels. The immediate task is to conceptualize, define, and measure the construct of dual-use technologies. The next task is empirical: we must identify firms, map their commercialization pathways, and quantify downstream outcomes. As Canada and Europe look to make generational investments in defence capability and economic resilience, it is time for some hard talk—tough, direct, and challenging. Before we judge whether these policies work, we need to know what, precisely, we are even talking about and what is being funded. Only then can we measure how value is exchanged between defence and commercial settings. For marketing science scholars, this is not an incidental concern. I see it as an invitation to study how technologies originate and find markets, how markets reshape technologies, and how taxpayer dollars generate—or fail to generate—commercial and societal value. *** Disclosure: I, Sash Vaid, am the author of this article and take full responsibility for its content. I used Microsoft 365 Copilot carefully and with judgment between June and September 2026 for editorial assistance and to convert my detailed notes, arguments, sequencing, and source directions into preliminary guides. I then wrote the article in my own words and voice and approved the final text. Pre-Workshop Community Survey Defining Dual-Use Technologies The accompanying article offers the following working definition: Dual-use technologies are technologies that move from defence to commercial settings and vice versa. However, important questions remain about what should qualify as dual use, where the boundaries of the construct should be drawn, and how dual-use technologies should be evaluated. Your responses will help inform the workshop discussion. There are no right or wrong answers. Response scale Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement: 1 = Strongly disagree  |  2 = Disagree  |  3 = Neither agree nor disagree  |  4 = Agree  |  5 = Strongly agree Defining dual use # Statement 12345 1 A technology should qualify as dual use only after both defence and commercial uses have been demonstrated. 12345 2 A credible potential use in either a defence or commercial market is sufficient for a technology to qualify as dual use. 12345 3 Whether a technology is dual use depends more on how it is applied than on its technical characteristics. 12345 Technologies and firms # Statement 12345 4 Dual use should describe technologies, not the firms that develop, commercialize, or sell them. 12345 5 A firm should qualify as dual use only when it actively serves both defence and commercial customers. 12345 Breadth and construct boundaries # Statement 12345 6 A broad definition of dual use is preferable because technologies can acquire new users and purposes over time. 12345 7 A narrow definition is necessary to prevent ordinary commercial technologies from acquiring a dual-use label primarily to obtain defence-related funding. 12345 8 A definition of dual-use technology should specify what does not qualify as dual use. 12345 Evaluating dual-use proposals # Statement 12345 9 Defence relevance should carry more weight than commercial potential when dual-use proposals are evaluated. 12345 10 Commercial viability should carry as much weight as defence relevance when dual-use proposals are evaluated. 12345 11 Funding eligibility should depend on demonstrated outcomes rather than on whether a technology carries a dual-use label. 12345 The role of marketing # Statement 12345 12 Marketing is part of what makes a technology dual use because it enables movement between defence and commercial markets. 12345 13 Marketing becomes relevant only after a technology has already been classified as dual use. 12345 One definition or multiple definitions # Statement 12345 14 Researchers, funding agencies, regulators, military organizations, and firms should use one common definition of dual-use technology. 12345 15 Different communities should be permitted to use different definitions of dual-use technology for different purposes. 12345 About You Which perspective best describes you? Serving military personnelGovernment or defence officialFirm manager or industry representativeAcademic or researcherStudentOtherPrefer not to say Which field is closest to your work or experience? Defence or military operationsDefence procurement or public administrationBusiness or managementEngineering or computer scienceMarketingSecurity or strategic studiesTechnology governance or public policyOtherPrefer not to say How familiar are you with dual-use technologies? 1 Not at all familiar2 Slightly familiar3 Moderately familiar4 Very familiar5 Extremely familiar Optional Final Question What is the single most important issue that workshop participants should consider when defining dual-use technologies? Disclosure: I, Sash Vaid, used Microsoft 365 Copilot carefully and with judgment between June and September 2026 for editorial assistance and to convert my detailed notes, arguments, sequencing, and source directions into preliminary survey guides. I then used Microsoft 365 Copilot to help design this survey around substantive questions raised by the accompanying article, which I authored, and during its review. I reviewed and approved the final survey text. ## “Le Yémen en guerre” URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-yemen-en-guerre/ Modified: 2021-09-15 > Sarah-Myriam talks with Thomas about his new book, "Le Yémen en guerre," recently published by the University of Montreal Press. In this new episode, Sarah-Myriam talks with Thomas about his new book, "Le Yémen en guerre," recently published by the University of Montreal Press. It explores the causes and consequences of the war that has raged in Yemen since 2015. In particular, he analyzes the internationalization of this war, or how outside powers have taken advantage of the weakness of the central state to make the country a theater for their confrontations. Thomas explains what this was initially about; a domestic conflict between the Houthist movement and the central government. But this conflict became internationalized in 2015, when Saudi Arabia and its partners intervened to counter the Houthists, who were themselves close to Iran.   ## “Russia Must Not Be Humiliated.” The Formula and its Political-Strategic Implications URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/russia-must-not-be-humiliated-the-formula-and-its-political-strategic-implications/ Modified: 2022-11-17 > What does "not humiliate Russia" mean in the current strategic context? And how can we understand the origin of this discourse? In a June interview with La Dépêche du Midi, President Emmanuel Macron said: "We must not humiliate Russia so that the day the fighting stops, we can build a way out through diplomatic channels. I am convinced that it is France's role to be a mediating power. [..] I think, and I told him, that has made a historic and fundamental mistake for his people, for himself and for history. Still, Russia is a great nation." These passages are interesting because they help to reveal some of the President's preferences, in particular his understanding of the strategic issues related to the new Russian aggression against Ukraine, his vision of France's international role and the relationship to be established with Russia. This is not the first time that Emmanuel Macron wishes to avoid "humiliating Russia," which has the gift of strongly irritating many of France's allies in the EU and NATO, as well as Kyiv, but signals a strong conviction on his part, which should therefore be taken seriously. Alexander Lanoszka has already explained here why historical analogies are fallacious, and that as a result the image of France has been greatly degraded. But one question remains: What does "not humiliate Russia" mean in the current strategic context? And how can we understand the origin of this discourse? What Humiliation? The French President basically identifies a theory of exit from the crisis. Usually, such a theory can be reformulated according to the following model: if factor X (hypothesis), then Y will occur (outcome) because Z operates (causal mechanism linking the hypothesis to the outcome). In this case, we can reformulate Mr. Macron's words in this way: if there is no humiliation of Russia, then a diplomatic solution can be found. We can thus immediately see that the causal mechanism, the "because," is absent from the reasoning: we do not know why the President so strongly associates the absence of humiliation with the success of a diplomatic solution. In Romania, the President reiterated that negotiations with Russia would have to take place at some point, but again without mentioning the conditions that would allow these negotiations to take place. The argument would be more credible if he explained his reasoning because, in the absence of a causal mechanism, it is more an act of faith than an informed basis for a public policy. Perhaps we need to study the scholarly work on the subject to try to learn more. In the last decade or so, several scholars of International Relations have expanded on the insights of classical realists about the importance of emotions in general, and honor, in the conduct of diplomatic affairs, and have emphasized the role of status. Simply put, status can be defined as the position of an actor vis-à-vis a reference group. Status is also intersubjective: it exists only in terms of how others view it. For cultural and historical reasons, some states may be very attached to having a comparatively high status, expecting honor and recognition from other states. Above all, states may go to war in order to maintain or increase their status. Richard Ned Lebow argues that the majority of conflicts since 1648 have not been initiated for security reasons, but for reasons of status or revenge, while Jonathan Renshon illustrates how the gap between "perceived status" and "desired status" is a powerful driver of conflict. The problem is further compounded, for William Wohlforth, in multipolar systems where hierarchies of power (and associated status) are more ambiguous, potentially leading to states more often seeking to assert themselves within the system. Finally, Joslyn Barnhart has shown that states – and particularly major powers – are statistically much more likely to engage in status-enhancing actions, such as aggression against a weaker state, when they have undergone a humiliating experience (understood as the failure to live up to their international image). A good example of this mechanism is the French invasion of Tunisia in 1881, following the defeat against Prussia in 1870. In this context, one could maliciously argue that, in order to guarantee peace, one should not humiliate Ukraine... The literature has widely noted that contemporary Russia is a state obsessed with its status, having difficulty accepting its decline, which leads it to aggressive behaviour. Iver Neumann, for example, has shown how, since 1991, the dominant discourse of the Russian elites has been one of superiority over Europe which is presented as declining and on the verge of collapse. This discourse itself is linked to a conspiratorial vision of international relations which perceives any negative event as the result of the hostile action of a West bent on destroying Russia. Limited to certain nationalist circles in the 1990s, these discourses have been consciously promoted by Vladimir Putin's regime since the beginning of the 2000s in order to create national unity in the face of a designated Western enemy, justifying at the same time the regime's authoritarian turn. This vision of a Russia under siege by a decrepit and hostile Western enemy is not only a discourse for internal use used cynically by Russian elites too happy to enrich themselves and acquire properties in London, New York and on the French Riviera: it also deeply permeates the Russian security discourse as expressed in military and international relations journals. In this ideological context, it is understandable that Russia can easily feel "humiliated," as Western countries do not recognize the status to which it believes it is entitled, and that it comes, as mentioned above, to use force to make itself recognized. This intuitive argument (it is well understood that humiliation can lead to aggressiveness) is probably a valid explanation for the Russian decision to go to war, at least in part, i.e. the temporality ad bellum. But this is not President Macron's argument, since according to him, avoiding humiliating Russia would lead to a better peace: the temporality is therefore that of in bello. The President, and some of his supporters, have tried to make a distinction between the "Russian people" (who should not be humiliated) and their leaders, but this approach looks like a rhetorical device. Beyond the fact that the discourse of humiliation has been shaped by Russian power circles, as we will see below, it is Vladimir Putin and not the "Russian people" who will decide what is acceptable or not for Russia. This brings us back to the lack of a causal mechanism in the President's speech: How can the absence of humiliation of "the Russian people" (implying that Vladimir Putin could be humiliated?) lead to a change in Russian foreign policy given the functioning of the current regime? However, if we do not see the arguments that allow us to establish the logical link as the President does, there are at least two points that plead in the opposite direction: to enter into the discourse of "humiliation" is to take up Russian propaganda and to de facto give Moscow a right of control over Western actions; and this discourse based on emotions eludes the strategic conditions necessary for the establishment of a more lasting peace. A Revival of Russian Propaganda In the first place, the discourse of "humiliation" is a reiteration of a Russian strategic narrative centered on a one-way reading of the end of the Cold War. According to this narrative, Western countries did not "respect" Russia's dignity or its interests. This distortion of history is transparent in the multiple statements of Vladimir Putin, who would cancel the disintegration of the USSR if he could, considers that the end of the USSR meant the end of "historical Russia" or that he is in the lineage of Peter the Great and conqueror of supposedly "Russian" lands. Obviously, this fundamentally neo-imperialist reading is not shared by the countries of the former USSR, which do not consider themselves part of "historical Russia" and understand the collapse as a liberation. The Ukrainian historian Mykola Riabchuk reminds us that the discourse of Ukrainian and Russian "brother peoples," sometimes held in Western countries, is also a Russian vision of history that denies the reality of the construction of the Ukrainian nation. Table 1. The Russian Strategic Narrative (Source: Charles-Philippe David and Olivier Schmitt. La Guerre et la Paix. Approches et Enjeux de la Sécurité et de la Stratégie. Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2020, p. 215). One might recall that the West, represented at the time by U.S. President George Bush, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and French President François Mitterrand, was particularly attached to the stability of the USSR for fear of the violence and the risk of nuclear proliferation associated with a sudden collapse. Then, in the framework of a very Russo-centric approach, Yeltsin's Russia obtained millions in aid from Western institutions, particularly from the European Community, to support a young Russian democracy. No other country of the former USSR benefited from such assistance. The EU signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia in 1994. Then, in 2003-2005, under Putin's presidency, Russia and the European Union agreed on the terms of a strategic partnership, which was to lead to the creation of four "common spaces”: a "common economic space”; a "common space of freedom, security and justice”; a "space of cooperation in the field of external security”; and a "common space of research and education, including cultural aspects.” In turn, NATO has proposed cooperation with Russia within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program since 1994 and, subsequently, the NATO-Russia Council since 2002. Finally, Western countries have facilitated Russia's entry into multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The entire approach of Western states has been an attempt to "socialize" Russia into multinational institutions, an approach that has failed. It is clear that if Western countries had wanted to "humiliate" Russia, they could have done it differently. But that is the main issue: the problem with the discourse of "humiliation" is that it is the Russian leaders themselves who define what "humiliates" them. And given the ideological evolution of the regime, it seems that everything that does not correspond to the fulfillment of the desires of the Russian leaders will be experienced and presented as "humiliation" by Moscow. Therefore, adopting a vocabulary of "humiliation" amounts de facto to giving Russia a rhetorical right of review of Western actions in favor of Ukraine, which will always be presented as humiliating. In the current context, one must ask what would really be a "humiliation." That Ukraine returns to the situation of 23 February 2022 by repelling the invasion? That it recovers the entire Donbass occupied since 2014 (which is the declared objective of President Zelensky)? That it even wants to take back the Crimea annexed in 2014? A military defeat may indeed be vexing, but Russia did unleash an illegal invasion under spurious pretexts: there is no rhetorical or strategic reason to adopt its vocabulary, even if it resonates with certain national political myths. Indeed, to think that Russia's (self-declared) "humiliation" is an obstacle to peace misunderstands the strategic preconditions for ending hostilities. In his book How Wars End, Dan Reiter identifies two variables that determine the end of an armed conflict: the first is the belligerents' information about the balance of power and the adversary's will, and the second is the belligerents' confidence that the adversary would respect a possible peace agreement. Applying these two variables to the situation, the stakes are twofold. First, Moscow must be convinced that it will not be able to make territorial gains in Ukraine, that it will not be able to establish military superiority in the future, and that Ukraine will respect a peace agreement. From the Ukrainian perspective, the perspective is reversed: it must be convinced that the balance of power is not dangerously stacked against it, and that Russia will respect a peace agreement. Since Russia has been the regional aggressor since at least 2008, when it invaded Georgia, it will have to give significant proof of credibility and good faith to reassure Ukraine. Thus, if the issue is really to achieve a stabilized situation, the priority should be to allow Ukraine to balance the military balance of power against Russia, and to ensure that Russia respects an eventual peace agreement. Before worrying about Russian emotions, the challenge is to create the strategic conditions that will allow the situation to stabilize. It is certainly important to be alert to the risks of escalation, but there is no strategic justification for using Russian language. Why Resume the Discourse of Humiliation? As we can see, there is no logical or strategic justification for the adoption of the vocabulary of a so-called "humiliation" of Russia. It is therefore a question of trying to explain its persistence in French public discourse. The formula basically raises the question of the interpretation of Russian foreign policy: is Russia primarily seeking to protect itself (and in this case engaging in dialogue helps to improve mutual understanding), or is it primarily an aggressive power seeking to change the strategic status quo (and in this case engaging in dialogue is an invitation to aggression)? The two interpretations have been at odds for the past twenty years, but there were a number of indications that the latter was more plausible than the former: in an academic article published in 2020, we showed that Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organizations revealed a political priority given to the restoration of a neo-imperial status, often at the expense of collective security. The February 2022 invasion confirms this analysis, with the so-called "denazification" of Ukraine and the alleged concerns about NATO serving as a poor pretext to justify what is basically "a colonial war under nuclear protection". However, some supporters of the first interpretation refuse to draw the consequences of Russian actions, and still seem to believe in the possibility of a good faith agreement with Moscow. The mantra "we must not humiliate Russia," which is not reserved for the President, is part of this logic: the subtext is indeed to return to cooperation as soon as possible, despite the absence of any empirical evidence to justify this hope with the current regime. This attitude can be explained in at least two ways. First, the end of the Cold War led to a disconnection between the sources of security and the sources of prosperity for European countries: security remained within the transatlantic alliance, but prosperity became dependent on potentially hostile states like Russia. This situation has allowed Russia to "weaponize interdependence" by providing opportunities for economic coercion, but also by creating a network of influential actors with a personal interest (especially financial) in maintaining strong ties with Moscow. In addition to these sectoral interests, Russia has a soft power that is probably underestimated, based on the attraction of the conservative and authoritarian fringe of Western countries for a country fantasized as a model of Christian nationalism, while certain left-wing movements see it as an objective ally of their Americanophobia. Domestic political considerations (especially in the electoral context of the legislative elections) cannot be ruled out for the President: since his main political opponents (Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon) both display pro-Russian positions, he cannot display a position that is too clear-cut on the subject, at the risk of being accused of "Atlanticism." Denial of current Russian policy, however, prevents the establishment of a theory of victory and the identification of common interests with our allies. The United States has defined its theory of victory: noting the impossibility of establishing a stable relationship with the current Russian regime, and wishing to continue to focus on containing China, it has concluded that the objective is to weaken Russia as much as possible so that it is no longer a danger to European security. This diagnosis is shared by the Ukrainians, in the first place, but also by a significant number of France's allies. On the other hand, Paris, Berlin and Rome (in particular), wish to "keep an open channel of communication with the Russian President, in order to encourage him to negotiate a cease-fire and a peace agreement, in the hope – still hypothetical – of stabilizing Ukraine in the long term and restoring the European security order." As mentioned, there is no indication to date of any Russian willingness to negotiate (on the contrary, there has been a complete radicalization of Russian discourse), and after Chechnya, Georgia and the two invasions of Ukraine, the burden of proof is particularly high for those who think that a reasonable dialogue is still possible. But the risk of European fragmentation on the subject – a major objective of Moscow – is real. In this context, the presidential statement that France should be a "mediating power" is strange. A mediator is normally a neutral third party, but France is not neutral: it is a member of the EU and NATO, two organizations considered by Ukraine as supporters and by Russia as enemies. The other countries that have made offers of mediation (despite the very limited chances of success due to the ongoing fighting) are more credible in this area: first of all Israel, and to a lesser extent Turkey which, despite its membership of NATO and its arms deliveries to Ukraine, also maintains good relations with Moscow. One might also add that the previous French mediation (on behalf of the European Union) of a war of aggression involving Russia, namely Nicolas Sarkozy's intervention in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, was widely criticized as having given in far too easily to Russian wishes, which has left its mark and is affecting French credibility in the current process. Here we find the classic French attitude of a "reluctant Atlanticism" (a form of "at the same time" before its time), which has historically only served to annoy our allies without allowing any political gains with our adversaries. One could object that this positioning is also aimed at third-party audiences, for example African, Asian, or Middle Eastern countries that would be happy to see France as an "alternative" partner. But apart from the fact that this discourse can be used by the elites of these countries in a strategic manner in order to flatter French ears that are all too happy to hear it, without necessarily covering up real intentions, it would also be necessary to make an honest assessment of this attitude: is the hoped-for gain with third-party audiences worth the cost of the loss of credibility with our allies and the failure with our adversaries? Finally, Mr. Macron has his own understanding of the subject. The scientific literature has shown that "fundamental beliefs," i.e. some strong ideas that decision makers have about the functioning of international relations, are not very sensitive to change and matter in the decision-making process. Brian Rathbun has distinguished two main types of decision makers: realists (like Richelieu or Bismarck) who take a cold view of power relations, and romantics (like de Gaulle, Churchill or Reagan) who believe that their will and talent can overcome all structural obstacles. Mr. Macron is certainly a romantic (and it is doubtful that the mode of election of the Fifth Republic can "produce" anything but romantics), which explains his obsession with establishing a personal relationship with Mr. Putin, in the hope that it will lead to political stabilization. This romantic view of his own talent is accompanied by a fundamentally culturalist and deterministic understanding of what Russia is, which is made very clear in his speech at the opening of the Morozov Exhibition: the President speaks without any irony about "Russian soul" and other romantic-psychological clichés. His words about the "great people" should be clarified, especially in order to find out who he thinks are the "small people," who apparently deserve to be humiliated. The combination of a favorable political context and the President's personal convictions thus explains the prevalence of the discourse of "humiliation." Conclusion The stated desire "not to humiliate Russia" is understandable in the French political context and allows certain actors to flatter themselves by thinking they are "responsible" or "reasonable" in the face of the "emotions" of other countries, but it has a significant reputational and political cost. Indeed, as mentioned by Alexander Lanoszka, the attitude of Paris has greatly reduced the goodwill that might have existed towards the idea of "European strategic autonomy": the lesson learned by many allies is that France does not take their security concerns seriously and is easily willing to compromise with aggressors, while the United States and the United Kingdom are reliable partners. This situation forces the Élysée to make some welcome clarifications, but they reveal the confusion generated by the President's words, and mask the real support France gives to Ukraine, both in financial and military terms. We see here the link between domestic and international politics: sacrificing to the discourse that one thinks is politically profitable is sometimes contradictory to the country's international interests. In politics, the choice of words is important. The original version of this text was published in French on Le Rubicon. Check it out here! ## “Spécial élections et politique de défense au Canada” URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/special-elections-et-politique-de-defense-au-canada/ Modified: 2021-10-13 > For this 21st episode of "Conseils de sécurité", a special on elections and defence policy in Canada. Podcast. For this 21st episode of "Conseils de sécurité", a special on elections and defence policy in Canada. Thomas Juneau and Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé welcome Stéfanie von Hlatky and Justin Massie. Stéfanie von Hlatky is Canada Research Chair in Gender, Security and the Armed Forces, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University, Director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP) and Co-Director of the Strategic Analysis Network. Justin Massie is a full Professor of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal and co-director of the Strategic Analysis Network. His research focuses on multinational military interventions, global power transition, paradiplomacy and Canadian foreign and defence policy. Our guests introduce us to the Strategic Analysis Network. We discuss the Liberal government's record on defence and identify its key challenges for this new mandate.     ## “Maybe tonight, maybe tomorrow, maybe a week from now”: Deterrence and limited war between Israel and Hezbollah URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/maybe-tonight-maybe-tomorrow-maybe-a-week-from-now-deterrence-and-limited-war-between-israel-and-hezbollah/ Modified: 2024-10-21 On August 5, 2024, the Secretary General of the Lebanese Shiite political-military group Hezbollah (“Party of God”) tweeted in Hebrew: “Maybe tonight, maybe tomorrow, maybe in a week”. He was referring to the anticipated attack by Hezbollah and Iran on Israel in retaliation for the assassinations of Palestinian Hamas political bureau head Ismail Hanyeh in Teheran and Hezbollah chief of staff Fouad Shukr in Beirut. Some media predicted an imminent conflagration in the region, a regionalization of the Gaza conflict, this time involving Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah militiamen against Israel's northern border, leading to a potential full-scale conflict between the USA and Iran. On September 27, 2024, Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the Shiite group since 1992, was killed in a strike against an underground military complex in Beirut. In short, the conflict between Israel and the Iranian satellite group is certainly deadly and extremely volatile, but the protagonists will have carefully avoided escalating violence until mid-September 2024. How can we understand this balance, which is part of the evolution of the war in Gaza? The coordinated assassination of Hezbollah's chief of staff, Fouad Shukr, in Beirut on July 30, 2024, targeted by an Israeli air raid, and that of the head of Hamas's political wing, Ismail Haniyeh, who was visiting Teheran the following day, had already seriously undermined the credibility of the Teheran-Damascus axis in the Middle East. The assassination of Nasrallah at the end of September 2024 and of his successors a few weeks later further destabilized the Shiite group's chain of command. But while the assassination of the Hamas leader dealt a symbolic blow to the Palestinian Islamist group's establishment in Gaza, particularly as regards its links with Iran and Qatar, it did not in itself influence the evolution of the conflict in the Palestinian enclave. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas's military chief and mastermind of the October 7 attack in Israel, is still nowhere to be found in the terrorist group's network of tunnels, although these have largely been destroyed. On the other hand, the elimination of Fouad Shukr followed by that of Hassan Nasrallah represents a major symbolic - rather than tactical - victory for Israeli military intelligence against the Shiite group in Lebanon. A military advisor to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Shukr was considered to be one of those primarily responsible for the attack on the multinational force in Beirut, which claimed the lives of several hundred American and French servicemen in the Lebanese capital on October 23, 1983. In Hezbollah's organization chart, Shukr's photo was therefore very close to Nasrallah's. Following confirmation of Haniyeh's death, the Lebanese Shiite party announced that it would in due course retaliate firmly against Israel. This unequivocal escalation, teleguided by the Iranian Islamic regime to which Hezbollah is affiliated, was a response not so much to the death of the Hamas leader as to the humiliation of having been struck in the heart of the Iranian capital just hours after a summit meeting between Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the head of Hamas's political wing. After the bombing of the radar defense system of a nuclear facility in Isfahan last April, the elimination of the Supreme Guide's “special guest” has called into question Iran's credibility in the region. This contextualization enables us to grasp the regionalization of tensions between Hezbollah and Israel. It is inaccurate to consider that this conflict depends solely on the war in Gaza. Hezbollah's existence is part of the Shiite-Iranian regionalist expression following the political vacuum left by the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990. It is also part of a response by a fringe of the Lebanese population that led to the end of the Israeli army's occupation of southern Lebanon, in order to limit the activity of Palestinian groups in the region. To this day, the Lebanese Shiite party is the key element in Iran's regionalist policy, as part of a project for a “Shiite arc” from Iraq to Syria. On the other hand, we shall see that the Palestinian cause and, more recently, the war in Gaza fuel the Shiite party's war rhetoric, as well as a certain vision of Lebanese nationalism. One might have thought that targeting the Lebanese capital, which until now represented an implicit red line between the two belligerents, would have inflamed the conflict. However, the elimination of Shukr in Dahieh, a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs, in response to the drone attack that killed a dozen Druze children in Majdal Shams, in the Israeli Golan Heights, only inflamed the rhetoric of the belligerents. One of the reasons why the Iranian-Lebanese axis persists in its war of attrition in northern Israel is to gain a strategic advantage. Over the past year, this situation has forced 90,000 Israeli civilians to flee their homes, becoming internally displaced persons in the center of the country. On the Lebanese side, several thousand civilians have fled to the center of the country, leaving behind them, like Israel, a land subjected to bombardment from Lebanese militia hideouts. This context highlights a second problem: the apparent shortcomings of the Israeli war cabinet's strategic approach. Indeed, despite a series of tactical victories that have significantly reduced Hamas's capabilities in Gaza and targeted key Lebanese Hezbollah sites and figures, no long-term strategic breakthrough appears to be materializing. Since this analysis was written, the war between Israel and the Shiite group has certainly taken a rapid turn. Now deprived of its chain of command, Hezbollah is losing ground in southern Lebanon to the Israeli army, reinforced by intelligence gathered since the last war in Lebanon in 2006. Nonetheless, the analysis proposed here is still relevant to the perception of the conflict and what is at stake. Above all, it qualifies the systematic link between the war in Gaza and that in South Lebanon, allowing us to grasp local rather than regional issues. Hamas-Hezbollah: Non-brother enemies It is important to remember that the war in Gaza is not directly linked to the conflict on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Lebanon has not finished licking the wounds of a civil war which, even before the invasion of its southern border by Tsahal on June 6, 1982, had been the scene of destructive fighting between Palestinian factions of Fatah, the Lebanese army and Christian militias since 1975. Since then, Palestinians have suffered severe discrimination in all strata of Lebanese society. Moreover, the second Lebanon war, which broke out in 2006 following the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers at the border, left deep wounds in both societies. The “just war” principle put forward at the time by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert fractured, paving the way for a disorganized military establishment. On the Lebanese side, Hezbollah capitalized on reminiscences of the occupation of southern Lebanon to accentuate its role as a major player in the “axis of resistance ”. This trauma for both the Tsahal and the Shiite militia is one of the reasons behind the wait-and-see attitude of the two protagonists. Already fragmented by multiple ethnic and religious tensions, Lebanon has gradually become the laboratory of a political hybridity (confessionalism) based on an outdated demographic reality derived from a 1932 census. To speak of solidarity between the two groups, the Sunni Hamas from the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Shiite Hezbollah supported by the Iranian Shiite clergy, is to ignore the regional reality. In reality, Iran has only financed and armed Hamas because the latter predominates in the south of Israel, presenting the only threat to Israel with an opening onto the Mediterranean. As a Sunni organization, Hamas does not share the Shiite religious link with Iran that characterizes Hezbollah and most of Iran's proxies. Iran would not risk triggering a regional war by using its armed wing in Lebanon, Hezbollah, to rescue Hamas in its war in Gaza. Iran's doctrine boils down to waging a war of harassment against Israel via its proxies, thus preserving its military component and above all its influence, creating a Shiite arc encircling Israel and Saudi Arabia, the mullahs' other great rival. Lebanon is thus vital to Iranian influence, and justifies the extreme militarization of southern Lebanon, a stronghold of the Shiite militia that has become a state within a state. On the other hand, the narrative of the Palestinian cause feeds the rhetoric of Hezbollah, which thus finds an audience in the Sunni world, among others. The large-scale terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, followed by the invasion of the Palestinian enclave by Tsahal, gave the Shiite group the opportunity to strengthen its influence on the Israeli border. Yet it did not take advantage of the stupefaction in Israel to threaten the territorial integrity of the Golan Heights or Galilee, nor did it benefit from the barrage of hundreds of missiles and drones fired mainly from Iran and Iraq on the night of April 13, 2024. In short, the regionalization of the Gaza conflict is not sought by Hezbollah, which is aware of its significant but limited capabilities. This relative restraint also comes from Ayatollah Khamenei himself. As Iran's third president during the devastating Iran-Iraq war (1981-1988), the Supreme Guide forged close ties with the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's main armed wing. The bloody conflict with Iraq made him a realistic administrator of the facts of war, far from the image of a fanatical ideologue. True to his doctrine of divide and rule, he was the architect of Hezbollah's establishment in Lebanon and the main instigator of the development of Shiite proxies in the Middle East. In this sense, through Hezbollah, he feeds a vision of Lebanese nationalism specific to the Iranian regional agenda, which sees the Shiite group not as an expression of national liberation, but rather of Iranian control to secure access to the Mediterranean. Given the nature of the players involved and the regional reality, the conflict on the Israeli-Lebanese border is neither an extension of the war against Hamas nor a new front in the war, but a radically different issue facing both the Lebanese and the Israelis. Gaza is a local war, while the Israeli-Lebanese border is a regional issue. If a peace agreement were to be reached involving the release of the Israeli hostages still in Gaza, it is highly unlikely that a cessation of hostilities with Hezbollah would follow, since Gaza and the Palestinian cause are no more than a rhetorical element in Iran's regionalist discourse. The conflict of attrition between Iran's satellite group and Israel is therefore a long-term one, which in practice eludes any breakthrough in the conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. It's a conflict that is maintained by a certain balance of terror, illustrated by the development of deterrents. The rear front and civilian attrition August 25, 2024, was the most tense day since the elimination of Shukr in Beirut a month earlier. Like the Iranian missile strikes in April, Hassan Nasrallah's aim was to saturate Israel's warning systems in the north, declaring that he was targeting military bases and Mossad headquarters on the outskirts of Tel Aviv. Much of the Shiite militia's planned arsenal was pre-emptively destroyed by an Israeli raid, and most of the missiles fired were intercepted by Israeli air defense. Nasrallah declared that he would not seek further escalation after a “major success” and that his militants “ could rest ”. Once again, this astonishing interruption of what was supposed to be a major offensive to avenge Shukr's death, with no objective achieved, raises questions, and illustrates a division among Lebanese and Iranian Shiite leaders. Part of the answer lies in the fact that the objective was first and foremost a media one. Hezbollah and Iran occupy the information arena, posing as the only legitimate players in the “axis of resistance” against Israel and flooding the Lebanese media. Here again, Khamenei's doctrine is illustrated by Iran's restraint in this conflict to the benefit of satellite groups such as the Shiite militia. “War takes many forms [...], it's about thinking correctly, speaking correctly, understanding things precisely and hitting the target accurately “ The aim is not to move towards open warfare, which Iranian officials know Iran does not have the economic or military capacity for, but to turn to a war of attrition in the North with Hezbollah, which also has to deal with growing resentment against its policies [1]. On the Israeli side, public resentment against the government persists. In addition to a war that is more tactical than strategic, criticism focuses on the lack of conclusive results regarding the return of Israeli hostages, and the impossibility of neutralizing the head of Hamas's military wing, Yahya Sinwar, who has now succeeded Hanyie. The image of internal refugees fleeing missiles in the North is added to that of hostage coffins returning from Gaza and contributes to undermining the credibility of the Netanyahu government, already embroiled in its own legal difficulties. It is therefore highly likely that the Israeli public's resentment of the government will push it to break the glass ceiling of Israel's chain of command, leaving the Kyria (Israel's defense headquarters) more room to maneuver. Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi has repeatedly criticized the lack of a long-term strategy in Gaza and northern Israel, and the sclerosis of the chain of command in suppressing Hezbollah's threat to northern Israel. Temporary conclusion The war on the Israeli-Lebanese border is not an escalation, but the continuation and reflection of deep-seated regional tensions. Iran, through Hezbollah, has repeatedly expressed its reluctance to escalate violations of Israel's territorial integrity. For its part, the Hebrew state has asserted its readiness for any type of intervention, including a ground incursion, while stressing that escalating the conflict does not serve its interests. This strategy, however, is double-edged: it leaves the displaced Israeli and Lebanese populations with a feeling of abandonment and jeopardizes the Israeli government more than the conflict in Gaza. This crisis of legitimacy is also reflected in major demonstrations across the country, although these are still confined to the Tel Aviv region, which has historically been left leaning. The Shiite axis will not come to the aid of the Hamas still active in Gaza, as the costs of such an intervention would outweigh the benefits in the context of the conflict against Israel. On the other hand, continued harassment of northern Israel is intended to divide Israeli military resources and prolong the siege feeling on the borders. In the final analysis, while an open war of the same intensity as in Gaza between the Shiite militia and Iran by proxy is likely to take place in southern Lebanon, the objectives remain radically different due to the socio-political environment and the spiral that such a war would represent in the dynamic of rivalry between Iran and Israel. For the time being, the Israeli army's incursion, which began in October, is intended only to desaturate the border from the threat of militia incursions into Israeli territory, and to neutralize the missile fire aimed at towns in northern Israel. However, the objective of pushing back Hezbollah's presence to the north of the Litany river (twenty kilometers from the border), although envisaged by the Israeli war cabinet, would imply that Israel would relaunch itself (as it did in the 2006 Lebanon war) in a campaign that would generate a long-term occupation of Lebanese territory and revive the Lebanese and Israeli traumas of a war of position that neither state wishes to relive. [1] Lebanese journalist Nancy Lakiss, an opponent of Hezbollah, posted a poll conducted by the American magazine Foreign Affairs showing that 70% of Lebanese do not trust Hezbollah. She added the hashtag “#Lebanon_doesn't_want_war” (X account of Nancy Nessrine Lakiss, August 4, 2024).     ## “Not an inch”: How Russia Puts NATO to the Test URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/not-an-inch-how-russia-puts-nato-to-the-test/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Introduction "We will do everything in our power to protect and defend every ally. And every square inch of NATO territory," said then-NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on 25 February 2022 at a press conference following the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine the day before. Since then, the phrase ‘Not an inch’ has become the slogan of the Atlantic Alliance's leaders to show their determination to honour their commitment, as former US President Joe Biden declared during the extraordinary NATO summit on 24 March 2022 that "we will defend every inch of NATO territory. Not an inch will be given to aggression." As this war has reignited fears of a larger conflict in Europe, it has led NATO to refocus on its primary mission: the defence of the territory of all its member states. Since its creation in 1949, NATO has invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty only once, after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States by Al-Qaeda. Since then, there has been no need to invoke this article in response to a conventional armed attack. By increasing the number of joint military exercises, NATO seeks to improve the interoperability of allied forces and deter any potential attack against one of its members by demonstrating the credibility of each member's commitment. During the Cold War, NATO was therefore able to demonstrate sufficient credibility in the face of the Soviet threat to avoid direct conflict. However, since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian Federation has stepped up its negative actions against several NATO member countries, including disinformation campaigns, infrastructure sabotage and acts of vandalism aimed at increasing division within Western societies. The year 2025 also marks a turning point in Russian provocations. Relations between the allies and the Trump administration have become strained, with the American president now believing that they must increase their military spending to ensure their own security and casting doubt on a potential American withdrawal from the old continent. Since this summer, Russia has escalated its provocations, repeatedly violating the airspace of several Member States (e.g., Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania) during September. These repeated violations show an escalation in Russian provocations against the credibility of the Alliance. Indeed, even before 2022, there had been limited incursions, but recent months have seen an intensification and a change in method (the use of drones). The Alliance must respond to these provocations and strengthen its deterrence if it wants to take control of the initiative and prevent Russia from maintaining its grip on the situation. The Russian Army is Closing in on the Eastern Flank It has been more than three and a half years since Russia launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine, and although we are aware of the very high human cost on both sides, it remains difficult to establish this with any precision. Western intelligence estimates that Russia has suffered approximately 790,000 casualties,[1] making this the deadliest war for the Russian army since Soviet losses in the Second World War. At the same time, Russia's territorial gains have remained relatively small, as since 2022, Russia has not advanced much and still controls ‘only’ 20% of Ukrainian territory (including Crimea). Russia's advances in the Donbass region of Ukraine since 2023 have certainly included numerous localities, but they remain at a tactical level and no major breakthroughs have allowed Russia to make strategic gains. However, it should be noted that Russia seems to be adapting to the war effort in Ukraine and is now in a position to cause concern to the various NATO countries by being active across the Alliance's entire eastern flank. On the one hand, the start of the 2025 academic year is marked by Russia's major biennial military exercise, Zapad. The last Russian military exercise in the west took place in 2021, a few months before the invasion of Ukraine. The exercise planned for 2023 did not ultimately take place, and some Westerners, such as the British Ministry of Defence, believed that this was due to a lack of troops and military equipment. From 12 to 15 September 2025, Zapad-2025 was therefore organised in Russia and Belarus. Russian President Vladimir Putin explained that this exercise is taking place on 41 different training grounds, involving around 100,000 soldiers. This exercise, which is also a show of force to NATO members, has raised fears among many allied countries close to the Russian border, as in 2021 the troops participating in the exercise remained near the Ukrainian border and took part in operations. Several allies therefore took part in various military exercises, such as the ‘Tarassis 25’ exercise, which brings together a dozen northern European countries and NATO members, the annual Lithuanian national defence exercise ‘Thunder Strike’ and the Polish exercise ‘Iron Defender-25’, involving around 30,000 soldiers. On the other hand, NATO's north-eastern flank is also experiencing renewed activity. On 4 April 2023, Finland, which had remained outside the transatlantic alliance since its creation in 1949, joined the military alliance in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine a year earlier. Since joining, the alliance has been working closely with Finnish officials. A few days before the Hague summit in the summer of 2025, Finland announced its wish to host a group of advanced ground forces on its soil in the form of a brigade (5,000 soldiers) from around six countries, including Sweden, the latest state to join the alliance. On 3 October 2025, Finnish Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen inaugurated NATO's Joint Land Command (MCLCC) in Mikkeli, illustrating Helsinki's full integration into the alliance. However, on the other side of the border, in Russian Karelia, there has been a military build-up for several months. The Russian armed forces have redeployed resources to military bases abandoned since the end of the Cold War and have also announced a new military base to serve as an operational platform for the Baltic and Arctic theatres. The Finnish government has announced that it is closely monitoring the situation, fearing an increase in tensions in the region. While the first two years of the war in Ukraine forced Moscow to mobilise a large part of its forces in the theatre of operations, the Russian army is now strengthening its presence on the borders of Member States, raising fears of provocations against them. However, after military exercises and infrastructure construction, it appears that Russia has decided to move forward with its attempts to assess the strength of NATO's defences. Increased Violations of Allied Territory September 2025 saw a significant increase in Russian actions against NATO allies. On the one hand, this increase in actions is causing great concern among allies in Europe. On the other hand, the US president is becoming increasingly impatient with Russia's lack of commitment to peace talks, or at least a ceasefire, in Ukraine. On the night of 9 to 10 September, Polish airspace was on alert after identifying a massive incursion of Russian drones (between 19 and 23 drones) coming from Belarus at the same time as an attack on Ukraine by Russia. This incursion, too large to be a simple error or system failure, prompted a response from Poland and its allies. Several fighter and reconnaissance aircraft took off,[2] and ground-based radars and air defence systems were put on high alert to monitor the drones' route and shoot them down if necessary. Poland also closed its eastern airspace on the border with Ukraine and Belarus, as well as several of its airports. Following this event, Warsaw invoked Article 4 to meet with its NATO allies, claiming that Poland's security was under threat. Just a few days after this incursion (19 September 2025), a new alert was issued, this time in Estonia. Tallinn reported the violation of its airspace by three Russian fighter jets (MiG-31) near the island of Vaindloo in the Gulf of Finland. This violation, which lasted about 12 minutes, was considered very serious due to several factors: transponders turned off, no flight plans and no radio contact with Estonian air traffic control. Although this incursion was not the first of the year, it was the longest. As with Poland a few days earlier, Estonia invoked Article 4 to bring the Allies together and discuss the threat to its security. Finally, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there has been an increase in violations of NATO members' airspace (see Figure 1). The most notable incidents occurred in Denmark, where for several nights, multiple unidentified drones flew over airports (Copenhagen, Billund, Aalborg), but also and above all military bases in Skrydstrup and Karup. These flyovers prompted the Danish government to close its airspace and airports for several hours each time an alert was issued. Without directly accusing Russia, Copenhagen denounced a possible ‘hybrid attack’ on its territory. In the same region, the Karlskrona archipelago in Sweden, where a naval base is located, was also flown over by drones similar to those identified in Denmark. Drones have also been identified in other countries such as Belgium, Germany and France. Although it is not possible to identify these drones as part of operations carried out by Russia, some doubts may be raised due to the sensitive locations near which these flights were detected. For example, in France, an alert was issued over the Mourmelon-le-Grand military base at the end of September. This military base, home to the 501st Tank Regiment, was responsible for training the Ukrainian Anne de Kyiv Brigade in 2024. Figure 1 - Map showing NATO member countries in Europe that have publicly reported violations of their airspace by drones since 24 February 2022. Russia's multiple violations of NATO countries' airspace demonstrate a clear intention on Moscow's part. From a military perspective, these incursions can be seen as testing allied defences and their responsiveness in the event of an attack or direct threat. From a political perspective, these incursions serve to gauge the level of support among NATO members, at a time when the US administration continues to criticize its European allies. Moscow also appears to be testing the allies' determination to defend all of their territories and to enforce the ‘not an inch’ policy. The Allies’ Firm Response Faced with increasing Russian provocations, NATO members responded with strong statements and concrete actions. NATO allies took turns speaking before the UN Security Council in New York in September to warn of the seriousness of the situation. At an emergency meeting on 12 September 2025, the Polish delegation reported some 20 incursions, some of which caused minor material damage. Poland described this action as a deliberate provocation. On 22 September, the Estonian Foreign Minister in turn denounced a dangerous escalation by Russia after the incursion of MiG-31s into its airspace. During the same session, Tallinn received the support of the United States, which reiterated that any violation of an ally's airspace was a threat to collective security, calling on Moscow to exercise restraint. The French delegation also denounced a pattern of repeated provocations against NATO's eastern member states. It reiterated France's unwavering solidarity with its Baltic and Polish partners. Finally, a Nordic statement (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) was made on the same day by the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs condemning the violation of Estonian airspace. These interventions were followed on 23 September by a statement from the North Atlantic Council reaffirming NATO's collective determination to defend the territorial integrity of its members in a coordinated manner. Between the statements in New York and that of NATO as a whole, the allies displayed unwavering unity, which was also, and above all, reflected in concrete actions. On 12 September, NATO announced the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry, which aims to strengthen the Alliance's defence posture on its eastern flank. The operation includes the mobilisation of Allied forces with additional combat aircraft and air defence systems deployed. As part of this operation, several allied countries quickly deployed resources to Poland. The United Kingdom deployed RAF Typhoons and France deployed Rafale fighters directly to Poland. The French announcement was the subject of particular attention, as it was possible to identify the origin of these fighters. The three fighter jets deployed to Poland are part of the 2/4 La Fayette Fighter Squadron, based at Saint-Dizier Robinson Air Base 113 (BA 113), which is home to part of the French Strategic Air Force (FAS) responsible for nuclear deterrence. The deployment of fighter jets from the nuclear deterrent forces sends a strong strategic message to Russia about France's determination to defend its allies in Europe. Other allies such as Denmark (F-16) and Germany (Eurofighter Typhoon) have also sent resources to reinforce air cover on NATO's eastern flank. Finally, several NATO and EU members have decided to create a new initiative to establish a ‘wall of drones’ along the eastern flank called Eastern Flank Watch.[3] The aim of this initiative is to improve detection and response to Russian incursions into allied airspace. NATO members responded unanimously to condemn Russia's actions on the alliance's eastern flank. Beyond mere words, this response has taken the form of concrete action in the form of operational reinforcement through the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry. For its part, Canada has issued numerous political statements reiterating its full support for its allies, but no concrete action has been taken in response, making Ottawa a peripheral player in the crisis. However, despite this show of unity among the Allies, there is now a major issue regarding American support, which remains a thorn in the side of the Alliance. Indeed, the Allies remain primarily dependent on the United States for military support. European allies are still unable to match Washington in terms of logistical, industrial and material capabilities, whether in terms of supply chain, strategic transport or air and maritime support. The return of US President Donald Trump poses a serious challenge to the Alliance, calling into question the American commitment, which could eventually lead to a reconfiguration of NATO. So despite the images of unity, NATO and its deterrence capability in the face of the Russian threat remain dependent on the decisions of the US government, and it is not certain that the Allies would be able to ensure their security if the US commitment were to be reduced. The Kremlin’s Military and Economic Difficulties Moscow's multiple provocations in September conceal a military and economic situation that is more difficult than the Kremlin would have us believe. On the military front, Russian forces in Ukraine are struggling to make significant advances. Russian losses continue to mount, with an estimated 59 casualties per square kilometre conquered in 2024. In September 2025, average Russian losses were estimated at around 950 soldiers per day, with approximately 332,000 casualties since the beginning of 2025, according to the British Ministry of Defence. The years 2024 and 2025 are the deadliest for the Russian army since the invasion began, representing no less than double the Russian losses in its other wars since 1991 (see Figure 2), with average daily losses of between 1,000 and 1,500 soldiers, compared to 400 to 530 in 2022. By way of comparison, the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan, which is particularly unpopular in the memories of Russians, caused the loss of ‘only’ around 13,833 soldiers between 1979 and 1989. The Russian regime has not experienced a war with such high mortality since 1945, so much so that the government decided to stop publishing demographic data through its agency Rosstat in the summer of 2025. This is a way of hiding the level of losses. In addition to these human losses, there have also been significant material losses in Ukraine, forcing Moscow to mobilise a large part of its industrial capacity for military production. Figure 2 - Graph comparing estimated Russian losses in Ukraine since 2022 with other conflicts in which Russia has been involved since 1991.[4] Economically speaking, Russia has seen its primary asset for financing its war in Ukraine (oil and gas) severely damaged by Kyiv's deep strikes against its energy infrastructure. It was not until September 2025 that Ukraine was able to intensify its attacks on Russian oil facilities in various cities such as Volgograd, Ryazan and Saratov. These strikes led to temporary closures and reduced production. In August 2025, there were around 20 strikes, double the number in September 2025. Although the Russian government does not publish any data on its oil production situation, certain indicators suggest that a fuel distribution crisis is emerging in Russia. In September 2025, internet searches on Yandex (the Russian equivalent of Google) for oil in the country peaked at 114,000, compared to 79,000 two years earlier. In addition to this damage to infrastructure, Russia is also finding it difficult to find energy buyers, as European Union member states have begun reducing their imports of Russian gas, which are expected to be zero by 2027. As it intensifies its war in Ukraine and takes increasingly aggressive action against NATO members, Russia faces significant military and economic difficulties. The projection of an image of strength and determination hides a situation that is more critical than the Kremlin is willing to admit, mocked by the US President who describes the Russian Federation as a ‘paper tiger’. Political Considerations for Canada The growing tensions are still far from Canadian territory, but they have serious consequences for the collective defence of NATO, of which Canada is a member. It is important for the current government to continue to monitor the situation and maintain its message of unwavering support for its European allies. What should Canada take away from these Russian incursions into NATO airspace? Political considerations to keep in mind: Canada's presence in Latvia Canada plays a leading role in NATO's defence system in Europe, particularly in the Baltic region, where it is the framework nation for the multinational brigade in Latvia as part of Operation Reassurance. This mission, launched in 2014, is the Canadian Armed Forces' largest overseas military commitment. In August 2025, the Carney government extended the operation until 2029, signalling Canada's determination to contribute to collective security. In 2026, brigade-level capabilities are expected to be fully achieved with approximately 2,200 Canadian soldiers present. However, this extension means that Ottawa will have to make a significant military effort to ensure its mission, neglecting other potential theatres of operation such as the Arctic. The vulnerability of Canada's Arctic defence Despite its active role in Europe, Canada remains militarily vulnerable in the Arctic, a region that is strategic for Canada's raw materials and threatened by several powers, notably Russia. Canada's defence capabilities in the North are still limited, as indicated in a 2023 Senate report, with an insufficient number of icebreakers and underdeveloped surveillance infrastructure. The Canadian Armed Forces are working to strengthen their presence in this region with the aim of deploying an almost permanent presence. Complex relations with the US administration Since the start of Donald Trump's new term in office, relations between Canada and the United States have been marked by tensions due to protectionist trade policies and differences over defence priorities. This tension is undermining North American coordination within NATO. Canada is therefore attempting to manoeuvre between improving its bilateral relations with Washington on trade issues and strengthening cooperation in the area of collective defence, both within NATO and through NORAD. Recommendations for the Canadian Government 1) Support a firm allied response to incursions The Government of Canada should publicly support the position of several European allies who are calling for the shooting down of any Russian aircraft (drone or fighter jet) that violates NATO airspace. A public statement by the Prime Minister could carry significant weight in Canada's position within NATO. It would also be possible to deploy Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft on the eastern flank, particularly for maritime reconnaissance with CP-140 Aurora aircraft, thereby strengthening Canada's presence in collective defence. This support would send a clear signal about the Alliance's determination, deterring Moscow from further testing the limits of collective defence. A firm, coordinated position would strengthen the credibility of the deterrent posture and potentially reduce the risk of further provocations. Indeed, there could be fears that if the allies do not respond sufficiently, Canadian forces deployed in Latvia as part of Operation Reassurance could be targeted by drones. 2) Strengthen the protection of territory and critical infrastructure Canada should increase technical and military cooperation with its allies and Ukraine to improve the defence of sensitive infrastructure against drone threats. This enhanced cooperation would enable the joint development of anti-drone capabilities and the training of personnel for this purpose. This cooperation would therefore improve internal defence for military infrastructure (naval, air and land bases) as well as all sensitive civilian infrastructure (airports, ports, power plants, rail logistics, etc.). The alliance's current air defence capabilities have proven difficult to intercept Russian Geran drones (the Russian version of the Iranian Shahed), but above all, they are very costly. Following the incursions into Poland, Ukraine offered to help train Polish soldiers to shoot down these threats. Canada could therefore consider establishing training for members of the Canadian Armed Forces with Ukrainian partners in particular. 3) Intensify Arctic cooperation with Nordic allies Canada could also strengthen its military and strategic cooperation in the Arctic with the Nordic NATO member countries (Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden) in order to better anticipate and counter potential Russian threats (air and/or naval). Agreements already exist with Finland in particular, but this cooperation could include increased coordination of air and maritime patrols or even consideration of a drone surveillance programme for the Arctic Flank Watch region, similar to the Eastern Flank Watch mentioned above, which would aim to establish an intensive joint surveillance system. The signing of the ICE Pact between Canada, Finland and the United States illustrates this strengthening of cooperation in the Arctic with the joint production of icebreakers. [1] This number includes both wounder and killed. [2] From Poland, the Netherlands, and Italy. [3] Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Finland. [4] Sources: 1st Chechen War, 2nd Chechen War, Russo-Georgian War, Russian Intervention in Syria, Russo-Ukrainian War. ## « Spécial élections et politique de défense au Canada » URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/special-elections-et-politique-de-defense-au-canada-3/ Modified: 2021-09-29 > Pour ce 21e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, un spécial élections et politique de défense au Canada. Balado. Pour ce 21e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, un spécial élections et politique de défense au Canada. Thomas Juneau et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Stéfanie von Hlatky et Justin Massie. Stéfanie von Hlatky est détentrice de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur le genre, la sécurité, et les forces armées, professeure agrégée au département d’études politiques de l’Université Queen’s, directrice du Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP) et co-directrice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Justin Massie est professeur titulaire de science politique à l’Université du Québec à Montréal et co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Ses recherches portent sur les interventions militaires multinationales, la transition mondiale de la puissance, la paradiplomatie et la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada. Nos invités nous présentent le Réseau d'analyse stratégique. Nous discutons du bilan du gouvernement libéral en matière de défense et identifions ses principaux défis pour ce nouveau mandat. Faits saillants - Épisode 21 ## 2023 Colloquium – Keynote Speaker: General Wayne Eyre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/2023-colloquium-keynote-speaker-general-wayne-eyre/ Modified: 2024-01-08 Opening Remarks: Justin Massie, Network Co-Director and Full Professor, UQAM Keynote Speaker: General Wayne Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces Moderator: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Network Co-Director and Full Professor, Bishop’s University ## 2023 Colloquium – Panel 1 – Cooperation In An Era of Emergence: The New Frontiers URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/2023-colloquium-panel-1-cooperation-in-an-era-of-emergence-the-new-frontiers/ Modified: 2024-01-11 > This panel will investigate the challenges and opportunities for cooperation on these various emerging security domains as well as their... Panel 1 – Cooperation In An Era of Emergence: The New Frontiers The security implications and the rising threats in the cyber, information and AI domains, including the “new frontier” of space, beg for more governance, the design of new rules, and a kind of cooperation that is becoming increasingly more challenging as interstate competition makes these issues matters of national interest and zero-sum. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation remains elusive as this same competition has brought back rearmament to the fore. This panel will investigate the challenges and opportunities for cooperation on these various emerging security domains as well as their implications for Canada and the world. Chair: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Full Professor, Bishop’s University Speakers: - Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor, University of Waterloo - Michael Manulak, Assistant Professor, Carleton University - Marc De Bellefeuille, Deputy Director – Cyber, Space and Emerging Tech, Domains and Technology Policy, National Defence - David Dubé, PhD Student, McGill University ## 2023 Colloquium – Panel 2 – Beyond Allies and Enemies: Non-Aligned Actors in World Politics URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/2023-colloquium-beyond-allies-and-enemies-non-aligned-actors-in-world-politics/ Modified: 2024-01-12 > This panel discusses an often-neglected aspect of world politics: the resurgence of non-alignment, motivations behind this phenomenon... Panel 2 – Beyond Allies and Enemies: Non-Aligned Actors in World Politics Shifts in global and regional balances of power have fostered a more complex environment, granting an expanding number of actors the capacity to wield varying degrees of influence. Existing international institutions have adapted to new realities as rising powers continue to gain prominence with the expansion of organisations such as the BRICS. This panel explores the impact of increasing multipolarity on the global environment, in a context where certain states require change in the rules-based order, some more assertively than others, while other actors act outside of its formal bodies to secure their own interests. This panel discusses an often-neglected aspect of world politics: the resurgence of non-alignment, motivations behind this phenomenon, and strategic implications for Canada. Chair: Jonathan Paquin, Network Co-Director and Full Professor, Laval University Speakers: - Marion Laurence, Assistant Professor, Canadian Forces College - Jean Daudelin, Associate Professor, Carleton University - Emmanuelle Rousseau, PhD Candidate, Université de Montréal - Amélie Chalivet, PhD Student, UQAM ## 2023 Colloquium – Panel 3 – Cooperation or Competition? The Case of Natural Resources URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-cooperation-or-competition-the-case-of-natural-resources/ Modified: 2024-01-12 > This panel will discuss how the drive for natural resources is affecting different regions of the world, how actors compete over them... Panel 3 – Cooperation or Competition? The Case of Natural Resources Natural resources are distributed unevenly around the world. The rise of geopolitical pressures and the return of economic nationalism means that states—and industries—are positioning themselves to compete with neighbors, rivals, and even partners to secure access. Oil, ores, and even water are the objects of covert or overt interstate and intrastate conflicts. This fact is only made more complex—and worrisome—by the durable impact of climate change on their distribution and (un)ethical extraction. This panel will discuss how the drive for natural resources is affecting different regions of the world, how actors compete over them, and how they might potentially cooperate. Chair: Sarah Sharma, Network Co-Director and Assistant Professor, University of Victoria Speakers: - Nadège Compaoré, Assistant Professor, University of Toronto - Pascale Massot, Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa - Frédéric Lasserre, Full Professor, Laval University - Victoria Breda, Senior Analyst – PCO ## 2025: A Pivotal Year for National Defence in Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/2025-a-pivotal-year-for-national-defence-in-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 For decades, Canada, a close ally of the United States, has relied on the latter’s hegemony for protection. However, Donald Trump's re-election and his policy of focusing on national priorities have highlighted tensions in the unity and alliance between the two nations. Canada and the United States share many defence benefits, such as NORAD and the protection of international interests in the Arctic. Yet, the year 2025 begins with growing tensions between the two neighbours, fuelled by the interventionist stance of the 47th President of the United States, particularly on the issue of immigration. Donald Trump's victory in the 2024 US presidential election marked a major turning point in US defence policy, with a renewed determination to reduce US military engagement with allies who do not meet their financial obligations, but also an annexationist agenda towards Canada. The main objective of Donald Trump's political manoeuvre on this issue is simple.  He wants all NATO member countries to spend at least 2% of their GDP on military expenditure. In 2024, Canada was one of only two countries, along with Belgium, that had not met this target. The country had a participation rate of 1.37% of its GDP, which is 0.73% below the average. This considerable investment, representing approximately 16 billion of Canada's 2,168 billion GDP, comes at a time when Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced his resignation on 4 January 2025 and his successor came to power, seemingly intent on redefining the relationship between the two countries. A new era seems to be dawning for the country, marked by Canada's desire for independence from its closest ally. The year 2025 promises to be a major challenge for Canada, which has had to deal with the consequences of the American protectionism imposed by the president-elect since February. The latter has repeatedly shown his willingness to reduce the United States' commitment to defending foreign interests. The pressure exerted by the American president reinforces the uncertainty surrounding the future of bilateral cooperation. He has also mentioned on several occasions that he would like to make Canada the 51st state of the United States, revealing a barely concealed desire to annex its closest ally. To ensure this political manoeuvre, the US president did not hesitate to use economic sanctions, a form of economic coercion aimed at forcing Canada to accept the US president's request. Canada was quick to retaliate by imposing 25% tariffs on certain products from the United States. This deterioration in international relations poses a risk to Canadian national defence, particularly with regard to NORAD, a radar system that is crucial for monitoring and protecting the skies over North America, on which Canada continues to rely heavily. The purpose of this policy brief is to analyse the national security challenges raised by Donald Trump's re-election as President of the United States. It will highlight the key issues that the Canadian government will face over the next four years. In a constantly changing geopolitical context, characterised by shifts in the balance of power between major powers, Canada must expect the United States to adopt a more isolationist trade policy, prioritising its own interests at the expense of international cooperation. It is time to take stock of the nation's operational capabilities Canada has long slowed down the development of its military power, believing that threats to its territory and national interests were minimised thanks to the increased commitment of the United States in its favour. However, the year 2025 marks a significant change in bilateral relations between the two countries. The arrival in power of Donald Trump and his policy of prioritising his own country's interests has led to a deterioration in the historic relations between the two countries. This deterioration adds to the many challenges facing Canada, prompting the Canadian government to review its defence policy in order to ensure the protection of its sovereignty and its population. In a recent article by Justin Massie and Philippe Lagassé published in Rubicon, it is pointed out that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) face significant challenges in terms of operational capabilities. The country is short of 16,000 regular soldiers, while the state of readiness of military equipment is a cause for concern: only 45% of the air fleet is said to be combat-ready, compared to 46% for the naval fleet. These worrying figures come at a time when deteriorating relations with Washington could increase pressure on Canada to ensure better maintenance of NORAD. This protection system is considered the cornerstone of North American defence. Staffing shortages, capacity deficits and international pressures highlight a certain vulnerability in the Canadian Armed Forces' ability to defend the nation's interests. According to an internal table from the Department of National Defence, only 58% of the Canadian Armed Forces would be ready to respond to a request for assistance from NATO countries. However, the former Canadian government planned to invest considerable sums in upgrading its forces. The document entitled ‘Capital Expenditures Planned Under Canada's Defence Policy’ reveals a significant increase of $51.5 billion since 2022, bringing the total budget from $163.3 billion to $214.8 billion over the next 20 years. This increase is mainly due to the renewal and upgrading of the army's land, air and sea equipment, as well as the NORAD modernisation project. This budgetary trend can be seen in the main expenditure budget for the 2024-2025 financial year, which allocates $30.6 billion for equipment modernisation. This investment seems assured, given the new Canadian Prime Minister's stance on national security issues. The decline of the Canadian Armed Forces is also due to the accumulation of delays in the delivery of new equipment. Announced in 2017, several vehicles expected by the CAF had still not been delivered in 2024, leaving the equipment in a worrying state. Now, we will have to wait until 2025 to begin reviewing tenders to modernise the Canadian infantry's light armoured vehicles. Delivery is scheduled for 2030. Canada must reconcile the need for renovation with the increased demands of its partners. This is a major challenge for the new government, which will have to work on the issue to ensure the protection of the country's sovereignty and the defence of its borders. The threat from the United States and its potential impact on national security The year 2025 could mark a turning point in diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States. The US President recently carried out his threats against the Canadian government, threats that the US President justifies by Canada's mismanagement of migration flows and opiates. This political manoeuvre by the 47th President of the United States is fuelling existing concerns about future tensions between the two countries. This is especially true given that Donald Trump has raised the possibility of withdrawing from NATO and reviewing the participation of US forces in the protection of allied countries, such as Canada. Although this measure has not yet been implemented, the unpredictability of the new occupant of the White House suggests that it could become a reality. The possible withdrawal of the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation would have a direct impact on Canada, particularly in the strategic region of the Far North Arctic, where geopolitical tensions have escalated since the start of the war in Ukraine. This is what Kim Richard Nossal shows in a recent article. Canada has close defence ties with the United States, notably through the North American Aerospace Defence Command, better known by its acronym ‘NORAD’. Added to this are the US administration's requests for funding for the infrastructure needed to protect international interests, particularly for NORAD. This is all the more important given that it is crucial for the United States to continue to ensure NORAD's presence, as without it, the system could become obsolete, given the budgetary and material constraints it entails. The former government of Justin Trudeau had launched an ambitious funding plan to modernise the means of protection against new technologies developed by foreign powers such as Russia and China. This plan was the subject of an announcement by the new Canadian Prime Minister, who announced the development of a transhorizon radar in partnership with Australia. However, the Canadian Armed Forces' assessment remains the same, indicating stagnation in military capabilities and highlighting the country's “inability” to protect itself independently against these growing threats. This poses an organisational challenge for the country, especially as it must ensure its participation in joint missions to protect the Arctic North and in international interests related to NATO. A transition to defence autonomy as a solution to US protectionist policy Despite significant investments in defence, Canada lags significantly behind due to a less sustained policy based on the perception that threats to national security and sovereignty were only moderate. This approach is justified, among other things, by the country's strong diplomatic ties with several major world powers, some of which are international hegemons. Canadians have always considered national defence to be secondary. Surveys and opinions on the subject clearly show that Canadians have historically relied on the military power of the United States to guarantee their security. However, the situation has changed dramatically. Today, the threat to Canada's sovereignty no longer comes only from outside North America's borders, but from within. Its long-time ally seems to want to reduce its commitment, leaving Canada with increasing responsibility for its own defence. Faced with increased international pressure on Canada, including NATO requirements, US expectations, escalating tensions in the Arctic and Russia's omnipresent presence in the circumpolar region, there is no doubt that Canada is obliged to strengthen its defence autonomy in order to secure and fulfil its national and international commitments. However, the annual report of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces on the activities of the Canadian Armed Forces for the year 2023-2024 highlights an improvement in operational capabilities and the achievement of several strategic objectives. However, it also highlights persistent structural flaws, such as a shortage of personnel, ageing equipment and a lack of financial resources commensurate with the country's ambitions. Canada must continue to invest and diversify its international commitments beyond its historic relationship with the United States in order to ensure a sustainable transition to military autonomy, which now seems necessary. The current situation and diplomatic tensions between the two countries suggest that the United States may reduce its involvement in the defence of Canadian territory. This recent shift in diplomatic relations between the two nations should enable Canada to strengthen its military defence alliances with other countries, allowing it to distance itself from the United States and ensure a degree of military independence. Europe, France and the United Kingdom could be key partners in this large-scale project due to their capabilities in the defence industry and their independence from American dominance. Recommendations The year 2025 represents a turning point for Canada's national security, forcing the new government to strike the right balance between fiscal policy and significant investments in the country's defence. The country must become more self-sufficient militarily in order to preserve its sovereignty and maintain its place on the international stage. Mr. Carney's government must honour the commitments made by its predecessors to the Department of National Defence. This requires strengthening the operational capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces, taking into account the investments needed to ensure the modernisation of equipment. In addition, an investment plan should be launched to acquire new icebreakers. This would strengthen the current fleet and ensure its commitments to protect national borders in the Far North Arctic region, an area subject to significant geopolitical tensions. It would also be appropriate to relaunch the study on the deployment of a missile defence shield in the necessary areas to ensure the sustainable and effective protection of the Canadian population against new threats. This idea could come to fruition following the announcement of a new partnership between Canada and Australia to develop a new over-the-horizon radar, as announced by the new Prime Minister during his visit to Nunavut. To guarantee its military autonomy from the United States, the Canadian government must strengthen its arms industry by supporting domestic companies. This would stimulate arms production on its territory and develop its arms manufacturing industry to ensure a permanent supply without being dependent on the American or European industry. Canada should also strengthen its collaboration with other allied countries in order to break away from American dominance in the defence of North American territory. This collaboration could include the acquisition of European military equipment and the development of international cooperation in the defence of maritime borders, particularly in the Far North Arctic region. Diversifying the army's material resources would prevent the country from being subject to the United States, a scenario that would allow Canada to turn to European markets. Another idea would be to assemble aircraft in the country's factories, thereby reducing costs and developing the local economy in terms of armaments and defence, an idea that has been put forward by the Canadian Prime Minister. If this approach were to materialise, it would be a real step towards the military autonomy sought by Canada, but at this stage there is no information to suggest that this will happen. ## A Dual-Use Solution to a Dual Problem: Canada’s Innovation and Defence Spending URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/a-dual-use-solution-to-a-dual-problem-canadas-innovation-and-defence-spending/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Summary Canada is currently under intense pressure to meet the NATO agreed 2% of GDP spent on defence and 20% of defence spending assigned to equipment. Simultaneously, Canada is facing a productivity decline. Looking at Canada’s present defense spending, its current policy, and its R&D ecosystem, this paper proposes utilizing the increased defense spending to empower Canada’s innovation policy to facilitate commercialization and to align it with defense needs. It does so by suggesting to 1) bolster of the IDEaS program’s commercialization capability by taking inspiration from NATO DIANA, 2) redesign Canada’s AI Strategy to emphasize military-civilian partnerships and 3) modernize the Ministry of Transportation’s Drone Strategy to put an emphasis on dual-use drone technology. Introduction In 2014, NATO members agreed to commit a minimum of 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) to defence spending within a decade. 10 years later, 23 of the 32 members have reached this goal. Following up on that commitment, President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized members of the alliance for not reaching this target, going as far as asking for the bar to be raised to 5% when the United States currently spends 3.38% of its GDP on defence. In response, the Canadian defence minister promised to reach the 2% goal within two years. There has not been any clear plans on how he aims to do so, and no official government update, as the most recent policy, endorsed by both major prime-ministerial candidates, aims to not reach it by 2032. Despite this uncertainty, one area appears particularly opportune: equipment spending. A secondary promise to the 2% goal is to spend at least 20% of the defence spending on major equipment, including research and development (R&D). Canada is currently spending 18.6%. At the same time, Canada is falling further behind on innovation and productivity despite having leading expertise in contemporary industries such as artificial intelligence and aerospace, and a highly educated population. A refocused policy on dual use technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and drones is an opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: solve the R&D commercialization problem and reach both NATO commitments.  The Current Spending Plan The current official policy of Canada, outlined in the 2024 defence policy update Our North Strong and Free, aims to incrementally increase spending every year until at least 2030. The policy’s spending emphasizes naval and equipment maintenance, as well as ammunition production. Though not detailing any spending past 2030, it mentions the desire to achieve the 2% target by 2032. To this end, Canada has developed a NORAD modernization plan, which involves almost 40 billion dollars in investment over 20 years. In line with this plan, and responding to President Trump’s proposal to create an ‘Iron Dome’-inspired missile defence system over North America, Canada has offered to develop the sensor system, a program that may yet involve more spending. The Prospective Future Spending Plans With Canada in the middle of an election, the two main contenders have limited proposals for updating the current policy. Pierre Poilievre, the Conservative candidate, has not given extensive details on his plan to reach the NATO target. He previously said that he would maintain the current (Liberal) defence spending policy. He has also said that he said he would cut “wasteful foreign aid” to reach the target, and, more recently, stressed that the Arctic would be a key focus in his defence plans. The newly appointed prime minister, and Liberal candidate, Mark Carney, promised to accelerate the current plan by two years during the leadership race. He also announced a partnership with Australia to develop Over-the-Horizon Radar technology for the Arctic. It is unclear if this is a new investment or part of the existing spending plan. Canada’s Current Spending NATO divides defence spending is into four categories: Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, and Other (operations). At first glance, Canada’s spending on infrastructure is in line with other NATO members, but it overspends on personnel, and operations, relative to other areas. The relatively low spending on equipment, which includes research and development (R&D), suggests that it may be an under-explored avenue for going about further investment. Personnel Although increasing personnel directly increases capacity, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have failed to meet recruitment targets for the last three years, with the available military personnel, at best, stagnating. Nevertheless, the CAF has recently implemented important changes to facilitate recruitment, loosening medical criteria and hastening the recruitment process. They have also improved working conditions for the members of the force. Recruitment continues to be an important concern, with key policy initiative undertaken, but personnel spending is unlikely to grow drastically in the next few years. Infrastructure Infrastructure is in a similar situation to personnel. Additional investment would theoretically be possible. With only 60% of the Department of National Defense’s (DND) infrastructure in “suitable condition”, it is even necessary. However, the long-term nature of infrastructure investment and the “payment actually made” approach to calculating defense spending makes it hardly suitable for a fast turnaround to hit the 2% target. Though out of scope for this analysis, infrastructure investment needs to figure within the medium-long term plan and will certainly play an important in maintaining 2% target and ensuring sustained capacity. Furthermore, similar to R&D and as acknowledged by the Department of National Defense Deputy Minister, military infrastructure often has a dual uses such as: runways in the Arctic connecting remote communities and housing for the CAF reducing pressures on the commercial market. Operations (Other) Operations spending  — essentially, ammunition, fuel, and repairs — is unlikely to move the needle in the short term as the CAF is already particularly active in training missions and spends a sizeable segment of its budget on operations. Compounding this issue is that operations costs often scale with personnel and, as explained above, that is unlikely to grow in the short term. Furthermore, the current spending, inflated by donations to Ukraine, may to cool down, as ceasefire negotiations are underway. Equipment Equipment includes two major components: procurement and R&D. With almost half of equipment “unavailable and unserviceable”, expenditure on procurement will have to be a major priority for future budgets. Nevertheless, even if the Canadian government wanted to spend the money, it might not be able to do so with its current approach. The Parliamentary Budget Officer estimates a 25% discount on equipment spending because of consistent delays in procurement, suggesting the need to, especially if the timeline becomes constrained, look at other spending avenues. These delays are likely to be further exacerbated by reconsiderations of procurement in the United States and pressure on Europe’s industrial base from the continent’s rearmament. These two issues highlight the need and opportunity of developing a domestic technological development industry. The lack of personnel also throws into sharp relief the importance of R&D spending: with fewer troops, effectiveness becomes more important. Furthermore, with one of the most highly educated populations in the world, and a number of high technology research centres and universities, Canada has a large pool of potential employees for R&D heavy industries. A glance at Canada’s spending relative to other NATO members and the current geopolitical context suggests that equipment is a good category to target for spending increases. Canada and R&D Looking at spending provides one reason to focus on R&D, but Canada’s economic characteristics as well as recent trends in both domestic and alliance-wide R&D lend further support for having such emphasis. NATO has recently accorded much significance to equipment development, with Canada set to host the North American office of NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). Hosting this office positions Canada well so that it can contribute to, and benefit from, NATO’s research investments. The purpose of DIANA is to bring early-stage startups to market is also where Canada falls furthest behind comparable countries. Indeed, Canada ranks last in the ability of its startups to scale and to make it to market as well as in average funding per startup. Pairing R&D funding and military needs addresses both of these problems. Canada also consistently underperforms its peers in research intensity (R&D spending/GDP). As the defence industry is three times more research intensive (R&D spending as a share of profits) than the broader manufacturing sector, jumpstarting it may help Canada catch up. Investing in the defence industry is also particularly interesting for its impact on the broader Canadian economy as the industry keeps 55% of its supply chain expenditures within Canada. Investing in defence R&D also opens the door to the development of dual use technologies that could propel Canada’s capacity for pursuing cutting-edge research. NATO prioritizes nine disruptive technology fields. Of those, in 2022, barely 3% of Canadian companies adopted artificial intelligence, and slightly more than 2% adopted robotics. This statistic is a reflection for how Canada’s real R&D funding has been declining for decades. Finally, investment in R&D also alleviates another of Canada’s problems: its relatively small population. As shown by how Ukraine has resisted Russian aggression, technology acts as a force multiplier for armies. Canada will never be able to contribute significant troop numbers to NATO, but it can still strengthen the entire organization by mobilizing its strong economy, its highly educated population, and integrated research ecosystem. Key Policy Areas Canada currently has two main defence research funding programs: Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) and (Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS). MINDS mostly targets policy and public information solutions, while IDEaS aims to solve technological shortcomings in Canadian defence. Both qualify as defence spending, but IDEaS aligns more directly with the development part of R&D since it provides support and funding through all steps of the innovation cycle, from idea generation to real world testing. Unfortunately, since its launch in 2018, IDEaS has only had four projects make it to the “test run” phase. This fact, in addition to the lack of post-development steps such as commercialization, were highlighted as key weaknesses of the program in its 2023 evaluation. This evaluation also highlighted that this step was determined as “international best practice” by similar programs in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the core problem is insidious as single-use military technologies have limited commercial potential outside of militaries. This flaw highlights the need to focus research on dual-use technologies which can then be commercialized to a greater market. Refocusing the IDEaS program to incentivize dual-use development as well as increasing funding and support at the commercialization phase would thus both provide a more targeted avenue for mass-production scale defence capability development and help bring Canadian disruptive technologies to market. The IDEaS program should thus be complimentary with the new NATO DIANA accelerators which share the same goal but approach it with a squarely commercial focus. Two complimentary technologies are worth highlighting for their potential for Canada: artificial intelligence and drones Artificial Intelligence Canada has had great success developing basic research in AI, with one British-Canadian academic based at the University of Toronto recently receiving a Nobel Prize for “foundational discoveries that enable machine learning.” Canada has thus shined as an early player in the field, being the first country to establish a comprehensive national strategy and the development of the Digital Charter. This edge has dulled slightly in the last few years, but the formal structure of research institutes and advisory council remain key actors in promoting the ethical use of AI. In more recent times, Canadian industry has had difficulty in operationalizing its research. The Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy has tried to address this challenge by tasking three institutes with commercialization. However, the lack of focus and guidance in the policy has produced mixed results, especially regarding domestic ownership and adoption of the technology. Adding a defence pillar to the strategy, including guidance on priority technologies, could be sound. This pillar could take the form of military-civil partnerships, solving both problems by drawing a clear path from research to market and aligning military needs with research, ensuring demand. This collaboration, as shown by the United States’ Project Maven, allows the tech sector to develop useful products that align closely with military needs, while funding research into those technologies that can then be commercialized. Canada should draw on its strength in both AI ethics and development to ensure its industry remains world leading, not only for its capability but also for its reliability. Drones Though NATO does not label drones as an ‘emerging and disruptive technology,’ their manufacturing is downstream from all but one of the nine. Drones were specifically targeted in DIANA’s 2024 challenge. Canada is already a global leader in the civil aerospace industry, ranking in the top four largest producers for both engines and aircraft manufacturing. Still, the Canadian drone industry lags behind. In 2024, the CAF purchased combat drones for the first time. These drones will be manufactured entirely by a U.S. company based in California. As Canada reconsiders the reliability of the integrated defence supply chain with the United States, it becomes imperative that the development of this future technology happen, at least partially, in Canada. This need for domestic production is further emphasized by the importance of Arctic capacity for Canada, a capacity that no drone currently has, and the new market opportunities that European rearmament (which excludes U.S. corporations) could perhaps creates. This year is also a key moment for the drone industry in Canada as the Drone Strategy, established in 2021, is expiring this year. This policy has a squarely civil and risk management focus, but its renewal opens the door to rethinking its structure. Section 4.4 currently involves investment in safety research and mandates the Ministry of Transportation (MoT) with simplifying access to market by aligning international certification. The partnership between the MoT and the DND already included in the strategy could be bolstered to add a second pillar to the section. It would focus on providing additional investment in dual-use drone technologies - especially at the development and commercialization stage - and on ensuring interoperability with other NATO members. This approach aligns with the EU defence fund’s focus on increasing interoperability and investing heavily in rapid technological turnover to catch up Russia and China. Conclusion and Recommendations Canada is under intense pressure to reach the NATO 2% target: the United States threatening to pull out of the organization or to impose tariffs, and it is now in the slim minority of members which has not reached the benchmark since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Canada’s military equipment is falling apart, while its innovation ecosystem fails to deliver disruptive technologies. Canada’s innovation capacity has been hindered by chronic underinvestment and its economic growth has been hampered by low productivity and failure to commercialize the country’s extremely educated population. These challenges can be addressed by focusing investment in defence R&D and aligning civil and military research. Of course, Canada will not be able to meet the entirety of its NATO obligations simply by increasing R&D spending. However, this avenue is arguably the most useful, practical, and scalable one for increasing defence spending, all while maximizing the benefits to the Canadian economy. Canada must leverage its potential by investing in key industries and creating guiding frameworks, notably by: Bolstering the IDEaS program to incentivize dual-use technologies and facilitate commercialization, in line with NATO Diana Accelerators; Redesigning Canada’s AI Strategy to give it a clear defence pillar, aligning defence needs with civil utility; Modernizing the Ministry of Transportation’s Drone Strategy to emphasize dual-use drone technology R&D. ## A New Regional Order in the “Indo-Pacific”? Lessons for Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/a-new-regional-order-in-the-indo-pacific-lessons-for-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Canada is realizing that some adjustments to its position in the Asia-Pacific are needed. Bidding on the ASEAN is not necessarily a self-evident path, but it remains the right call. As the frenzy intensifies around the “Indo-Pacific,” Canada must play its cards right with a mix of prudence and creativity. To do so, bidding on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is not necessarily a self-evident path, but it remains the right call. In a volatile international context, marked by renewed rivalry between the United States and China, unprecedented pressure on multilateral institutions, and “wicked problems” that cannot be tackled without enhanced collective action among states, Canada is slowly realizing that some adjustments to its fragile position in the Asia-Pacific are needed. This recalibration could possibly take the form of an Indo-Pacific vision, framework or strategy, as many governments have already done to secure new diplomatic and strategic footholds in the region. To succeed in this delicate enterprise, with limited material capabilities that are being rerouted by COVID-19, and with the interest of Canadians in mind, Ottawa must proceed carefully and make sure the foundations and relationships it has worked hard to develop over the years are not discarded for the latest fad. Canada must step up its game in providing constructive and principled support to regional multilateralism, including its institutional core: ASEAN. To do so, it needs to better understand the value of these institutions –for what they are, not what Canada would want them to be. Ottawa must also find ways to convince its partners that it is ready and able to contribute productively, tangibly, and for the long run to regional peace and stability on terms set by ASEAN itself. A Misunderstood Institution ASEAN remains very poorly understood in Canada. If it reaches us, it is usually through photoshoots of strange handshakes and other "exotic" rituals of an atypical diplomacy (for Western eyes), conducted far away. Sometimes, our Prime Minister, as well as, more often, the members of his Cabinet, join the regional multilateral game while Canadians remain unconvinced of the value of such performances, with concrete and short-term results not immediately apparent. The current disillusionment with multilateralism is certainly not exclusive to ASEAN and the platforms in which it exercises “centrality” - the ASEAN Regional Forum, of which Canada is a member, as well as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus, from which it remains excluded for the time being. This disenchantment is observable wherever multilateralism seems like an end unto itself, and whenever states fail to agree on adopting concrete measures to address thorny problems that cross national borders and require common solutions, from conflict management to pandemics and climate change. Yet it is especially salient when it comes to the Asia-Pacific given the "strange" character of ASEAN for an audience much more familiar with institutions like the European Union and NATO. These organizations still form, not always for good reason, the yardstick by which multilateralism is assessed across the world. ASEAN, with its small secretariat populated by some 300 souls, its limited budget, and a well-known tendency to sweep contentious issues under the carpet, is therefore at a disadvantage. Does this mean that Canada should redirect its energies elsewhere and find new spaces to promote its strategic and economic interests in Asia? It most certainly does not. Canada Needs More ASEAN To secure firmer footing in this region of undeniable strategic importance, Canada needs ASEAN –and more so than the other way around. Because of what the association can deliver, despite the lack of flamboyant results, but most importantly due to its unique ability to reconcile a diversity of perspectives, interests, and preferences about what regional order ought to look like, in a multilateral context where “the West” does not dominate. According to a popular metaphor in the region, coined by Singaporean academic and retired diplomat Bilahari Kausikan, ASEAN is “a cow, not a horse” and it is unrealistic to expect a cow to run as fast as a horse. That doesn’t mean it has no value. The value of ASEAN is, to some extent, visible in terms of relative practical successes that fly under the radar, such as in the fight against infectious diseases or disaster relief. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, while Canada was busy securing as many vaccines as it could without much care for the rest of the world, ASEAN has agreed to develop a Regional Reserve of Medical Supplies and a response fund to mitigate resource and capacity disparities across countries. ASEAN also plays a thankless role in the management of the South China Sea disputes, which pits four of its members (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) against each other as well as China (and Taiwan). ASEAN is spearheading ASEAN-China negotiations over a code of conduct of parties in the South China Sea. While a binding and effective code remains unlikely at the moment, parties to the disputes have agreed to establish hotlines, implement guidelines for unplanned encounters at sea, and hold joint military exercises. These measures are no panacea, but they can help manage mistrust and prevent incidents that could destabilize global maritime trade, an estimated third of which transits through these contested areas. ASEAN needs its “dialogue partners,” including Canada, to strengthen its ability to provide tangible results to these major issues with important transnational repercussions. That said, the main value of ASEAN is more abstract and less tangible, because it is not reducible to specific crises. ASEAN has made itself most indispensable over the years as an “honest broker” between a diverse group of regional states with interests and preferences that are often diametrically opposed. It offers them the opportunity to sit at the same table, discuss issues of common concern, and agree on shared principles of conduct meant to support regional stability and cooperation. No other actor, including powers with far superior material capabilities like the United States or China, has been able to fulfill this role. This is also the reason why every time an external partner of ASEAN, be it Australia, Japan, or the United States, proposes a new encompassing institution for the region, or even a “NATO for Asia” (a familiar refrain in the region), the debate always ends in the same way: all involved inevitably come to recognize, once again, and if only reluctantly, that if ASEAN did not exist, it would have to be invented. The current consensus in the region, despite the buzz around the relaunch of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (a.k.a. the “Quad”) between Australia, India, Japan and the United States and its potential expansion to others, is that strengthening existing institutions is preferable to enviable but less viable mechanisms that require people to pick sides. Again, erring on the side of caution and taking a page out of ASEAN’s book is in Canada’s best interest. Taking Stock and Next Steps Being careful does not mean being passive. Canada will have to be creative in order to make its mark in an overpopulated regional ecosystem that features much heavier weights. To do so, it must clarify its added value in specific issue areas where it can make a substantial and original contribution, such as on the Women, Peace and Security agenda, which is attracting growing interest in ASEAN institutions and circles at the moment. Canada would be misguided to neglect ASEAN in favour of alternate arrangements with an even more uncertain fate. The multiplication of Indo-Pacific “visions” and strategies, the latest of which come from the Netherlands, Germany, France, soon to be followed by the UK and the European Union, creates a sense of urgency that is hard to ignore. There is certainly room for new commitment from Canada to the Asia-Pacific at all levels –including through “Track 2” diplomatic channels– supported by appropriate resources, as many Canadian experts of the region have been arguing for years to no avail. Rushing headlong into the gold rush towards the Indo-Pacific without a proper and comprehensive reflection on the why and the how, however, would be a mistake, and it could be a costly one. There also remains a great deal of ambivalence and contradiction among Quad countries on key issues, from the boundaries of the “Indo-Pacific” to how to cope with China’s rise. Further, ASEAN retains, for better or worse, the prerogative of setting the terms under which the multilateral game is played in this region, and its response to Indo-Pacific initiatives from external partners has been, unsurprisingly, cool at best. In this context, if the time has indeed come for Canada to devise its own outlook for the Indo-Pacific, it would be wise to follow the lead of key Southeast Asian players, including Indonesia, Singapore, but also Vietnam, whose ASEAN Chairmanship in 2020, despite the challenges of the pandemic, has attracted widespread praise. This will mean, crucially, embracing an inclusive approach. Canada has important lessons to learn from ASEAN when it comes to being “caught in the middle” and navigating tensions between the great powers without sacrificing its principles. It has everything to gain by betting on the cow in the endurance race of Asia-Pacific regionalism. ## Ad Hoc Crisis Response and International Organisations (ADHOCISM) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ad-hoc-crisis-response-and-international-organisations-adhocism/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This hot take presents the new project ADHOCISM: Ad Hoc Crisis Response and International Organisations... International organisations (IOs) are created with the aim of solving collective action problems when a crisis arises. Yet, member states have repeatedly established ad hoc crisis responses in situations where IOs might be expected to play a central role. ADHOCISM asks what is the impact of ad hoc crisis responses on international organisations? In this way, ADHOCISM wants to contribute to filling this knowledge gap through a systematic study of ad hoc crisis responses in two policy domains: security and health. With this paired comparison, ADHOCISM wants to tap into a broader empirical governance phenomenon. Ad hoc crisis responses are here understood as loose groups of actors that agree to solve a particular crisis at a given time and location outside of an existing international organisation in the same policy domain. Ad hoc crisis reponses can, in the short-term, lead to more rapid and effective crisis responses among like-minded states, but if international organisations are no longer seen as the principal instruments to confront global challenges, the risk is also that the relevance of these international organisations will diminish, and similar trends may unfold in other domains. The complex web of international and (sub-)regional organisations has been one of the principal subjects of inquiry in international relations. While, initially, much scholarly attention went to explaining the proliferation of IOs, focus gradually shifted to studying the effects of this wider palette of options (Alter & Meunier, 2009; Hofmann, 2019; Jupille, Mattli, & Snidal, 2013). A central claim has been that memberships in institutions with similar mandates increases the chances of forum-shopping, reflecting a functionalist logic (Drezner, 2009; Hofmann, 2009). Member states can nowadays select from an increasingly broad menu of options in global governance, ranging from traditional multilateral strategies by working through formalised IOs, minilateral solutions via so-called ‘governance clubs’ to informal governance (Rogers, 2020), of which loose ad hoc crisis responses are an integral part. The result is an era of “contested multilateralism” (Morse & Keohane, 2014) or “global governance in pieces” (Patrick, 2015). Governance clubs and informal multilateralism or ad hoc coalitions are often seen as more effective, flexible and nimble than IOs. At the same time, they are criticised for lacking legitimacy. Scholars tend to agree that IOs at global, regional and sub-regional levels overlap in terms of mandate and memberships, which can lead to cooperation or competition to be first responders (Brosig, 2010). More recently, Hofmann (2019) has highlighted how the interplay between membership overlap and preference diversity might not only lead to forum-shopping, but also to “brokering” and, more disruptively, even “hostage-taking”. In general, membership overlap between institutions with a similar geographical and functional mandate is seen as offering states the chance to pick and choose the vehicle that best suits their interests (see e.g. Haftel and Hofmann, 2019). Obvious examples include the EU’s and NATO’s security architecture, but military crisis response interests by the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ad hoc coalitions like the Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (JF-G5S) in Mali, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) fighting Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast Somalia (CGPCS) are equally good illustrations. As such, inter-organisationalists not only highlight these opportunities of forum-shopping and cooperation, they also increasingly stress the risk of rivalry between institutions, such as competition for resources and legitimacy (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Brosig, 2017). What we thus see is an increasing literature theorising the effects of overlapping organisations, but so far with a blind eye towards the impact of ad hoc coalitions on the multilateral system. For many good reasons, ad hoc coalitions are mostly viewed in a positive fashion. They are seen as giving member states more choice and flexibility, inter alia creating “a framework for states to cooperate while pursuing their national interests” (Brubacher, Damman, & Day, 2017, 11). Ad hoc coalitions also avoid bureaucratic delay and do not create precedents for future crises responses (Reykers & Karlsrud, 2017). They enable states to pursue national interests (Brubacher et al., 2017) and avoid bureaucratic delay and future precedents (Karlsrud and Reykers, 2019). Rynning (2013) has underscored the strategic need for better connecting coalitions of the willing, institutions and so-called “tents” or contact groups – where ad hoc coalitions are viewed as the “sharp end of the spear” and IOs and broader groupings of like-minded nations can offer necessary strategic guidance and political legitimacy. Other scholars have focused more on the on-the-ground effects of institutional proliferation and ad hoc coalitions. Ad hoc coalitions allow states to remain more in control – of, for instance, their military troops or personnel – and they provide an opportunity for “pivotal states” to “buy allies” through financially or politically rewarding third parties “to serve in multilateral coalitions”, in order to pursue national goals (Henke, 2019; see also Stone, 2013). However, this approach does not explain the continued investment in rapid response mechanisms such as the AU African Standby Force, the EU Battlegroups or the NATO Response Force, all of which have not been put to use to date. A key problem is that the term ‘ad hoc coalitions’ is generally used as a catch-all concept, which does not reflect empirical complexity. Ad hoc coalitions can differ in e.g. duration, resources, membership, geographical scope and relationship to formal IOs (Karlsrud and Reykers 2020: 1527-29). Because we lack understanding about what ad hoc crisis responses are, we also do not know how different ad hoc coalitions might affect existing and emerging IOs. We do not know if, when, and how these ad hoc coalitions compete with, or perhaps even undermine, established or developing IOs. In this way, also the long-term effects of ad hocism and the resilience of IOs to this phenomenon remains a black-box. Cases and methods: To advance knowledge on ad hoc coalitions, ADHOCISM will establish a dataset on ad hoc crisis responses in global health and security. In health, the case study will be on the relationship between the World Health Organization (WHO - IO) and the Vaccine Alliance (Gavi), the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and the joint COVAX project. In the security domain our case studies will be the AU African Standby Force and EU Battlegroups (IOs) and the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram (MNJTF); the Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (JF-G5S) and Barkhane, primarily in Mali; and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). ADHOCISM will also quantitatively and qualitatively map select member states’ strategic choices to explore and explain variation among ad hoc coalitions, and their relationship with IOs in the same domain. Through a set of case studies, it will make a significant academic contribution to our understanding of the complex interrelations between member states, ad hoc coalitions and IOs. Besides Karlsrud and Reykers, the team includes Malte Brosig (University of Witwatersrand), Stephanie C. Hofmann (EUI and Collaborator, NSA Network) and Pernille Rieker (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs). The authors: John Karlsrud (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) and Yf Reykers (Maastricht University and Collaborator, NSA Network) ## After the AUKUS Crisis, Are France-U.S. Relations Back on Track? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/after-the-aukus-crisis-are-france-u-s-relations-back-on-track/ Modified: 2022-04-21 Pierre Morcos, "After the AUKUS Crisis, Are France-U.S. Relations Back on Track?," Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 16, 2021. ## Alliance Commitment and the Limits of Strategic Reorientation in Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/alliance-commitment-and-the-limits-of-strategic-reorientation-in-canada/ Modified: 2026-06-29 Deterring with Partners: Where should Canada focus its alliances, and to what ends? Where should Canada focus its alliances, and to what ends? The question sounds forward-looking but, answering it honestly requires confronting a prior problem. I argue that Canada has rarely been in the habit of asking this precise question. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, Canada's engagement with NATO has over time shifted from active deliberation to reflexive consensus. Today, commitments are perhaps maintained more by institutional inertia than by strategic calculation. Second, and more importantly for this panel, the historical record suggests that breaking this pattern is structurally difficult even when political conditions seem favourable. The Trudeau government's 1968-69 defence review remains the most serious attempt at strategic reorientation in the postwar period, and its partial failure offers a precise diagnosis of the constraints Canada faces today. From Deliberation to Consensus Pierre Elliott Trudeau arrived in office in 1968 with a coherent intellectual critique of Canada's alliance posture. In his view, defence policy had come to drive foreign policy rather than the reverse: Canada's commitments to NATO shaped its strategic identity and behaviour, rather than flowing from a prior definition of national interests. He was not alone. A faction within the Liberal party, led by former Finance Minister Walter Gordon, had been making comparable arguments since the mid-1960s, contending that Western Europe's postwar recovery had made the scale of Canada's military contribution to the continent both unnecessary and costly. Outside government, a number of academics lent intellectual legitimacy to the challenge. These were not peripheral voices; they represented a genuine attempt to subject a foundational assumption of Canadian foreign policy to rational scrutiny. What those debates looked like matters. In the House of Commons during the spring and summer of 1969, the NATO question produced genuine ideological conflict. These conflicts were not merely partisan. Indeed, they were not only between parties, but within the governing Liberals themselves. For instance, Liberal MP Warren Allmand called for complete withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe; his Liberal colleague Norman Cafik strongly opposed any reduction. The Progressive Conservatives argued that the Soviet threat that had created NATO had not diminished; the NDP argued, in Tommy Douglas's words, that the logic of Trudeau's own position pointed toward full withdrawal. These were substantive disagreements about strategy, interest, and the purpose of alliance membership. They were, in short, exactly the kind of debate that sound defence policy requires. Contrast this with Canada's parliamentary debates since 2022. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, support for NATO and for Ukrainian military assistance has been, in the words of one Liberal MP, marked by a striking "unanimity." The Progressive Conservatives had long favoured comprehensive military assistance; the Liberals followed; even the initially hesitant Bloc Québécois and NDP moved into alignment within weeks of the February 2022 invasion. By 2023, what had briefly been a contested question had become politically settled. The recent depoliticization of the debate is, in itself, revealing. Consensus is not the same as strategy. When alliance commitments cease to be contested, they also cease to be examined. To be clear: the argument here is not that Canada should disengage from NATO or withhold support for Ukraine. Both commitments may be well-justified on their merits. The concern is rather with the reasoning process, or its absence. A commitment arrived at by default, because it was never seriously questioned, is a fragile one. It cannot be calibrated, sustained, or adapted to changing circumstances with any coherence. Active and engaged NATO membership, and meaningful support for Ukraine, are most defensible and most durable when they are understood as instruments serving identifiable Canadian objectives, not as ends in themselves. The Structural Limits of Reorientation If the habit diagnosis is accurate, the more consequential question for this panel is whether it can be corrected, and under what conditions. Here the Trudeau case is instructive, and rather sobering. Trudeau entered office with substantial political capital: a majority government, a clear personal mandate, and a willing Cabinet faction. At that time, public opinion was largely in favour of recalibrating Canada’s engagement within NATO, and the bilateral relation with the United States. The formal defence review he launched in May 1968 was comprehensive, and the directive establishing it explicitly opened to question the full range of strategic commitments Canada had accumulated since 1949. By any standard, the conditions for meaningful reorientation were as favourable as they were likely to be. What followed nonetheless fell well short of transformation. The outcome, which would amount to a reduction of Canadian forces in Europe from 10,000 to 5,000 troops, was real but modest. It was achieved only after prolonged internal conflict and at considerable political cost. Three categories of constraint account for the gap between ambition and result. The first was bureaucratic. The Department of External Affairs produced internal studies recommending the maintenance of Canadian forces in Europe before Trudeau had even won the Liberal leadership. One of them is particularly telling. Its author, Norman Robertson, was among the principal architects of the postwar internationalist consensus. He contended that Canada's military presence in Europe was the currency that bought Ottawa a seat at the table of Western consultations. As such, withdrawing forces would mean voluntarily surrendering the diplomatic leverage on which Canada's international influence depended. This logic was deeply embedded in the institution and proved remarkably resistant to political direction from above. The second was allied. Washington and European capitals applied sustained pressure throughout the review process. American officials made clear their expectation that Canada would maintain its European commitment. Allied governments, facing their own domestic pressures to reduce defence spending, were reluctant to accept a Canadian precedent for disengagement. A tense Cabinet meeting in December 1968 exposed the depth of the conflict: Trudeau's questioning of NATO's strategic premises prompted his Defence Minister, Léo Cadieux, to fear he was dismissing the Soviet threat entirely, while External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp reportedly considered resigning. The compromise reached at the March 1969 Cabinet meeting relied on the phrasing "planned and phased reduction" rather than withdrawal, preserving Cabinet unity precisely by remaining ambiguous enough to mean different things to different ministers. Thirdly, Trudeau did produce an articulated alternative framework: the 1971 White Paper on Defence established an explicit hierarchy of priorities, placing the protection of Canadian sovereignty first, the defence of North America second, NATO commitments third, and peacekeeping fourth. Defence policy, it stated plainly, must reflect and serve national interests rather than drive them. This was precisely the kind of prior strategic framework the review had been criticised for lacking. Yet even this relatively clear ordering proved insufficient to durably reshape institutional behaviour. By the mid-1970s, Trudeau had become an active advocate of NATO and the hierarchy the White Paper had established quietly eroded. Subsequent governments did not replicate the exercise. More than fifty years later, Canada has still not conducted a comprehensive integrated foreign policy review of comparable scope. What the episode reveals, then, is not that a framework was absent, but that producing one is not the same as institutionalising it. The bureaucracy, the allies, and the logic of accumulated commitments proved more durable than the policy document meant to reorder them. What This Means for Canada’s Alliances and Partnerships? Where Canada should focus its alliances and to what ends? Canada must rebuild the habit of deliberate strategic reasoning that the late 1960s debates, whatever their outcome, at least exemplified. The present moment makes this more urgent, not less. American disengagement from European security commitments, the rapid growth of European defence spending, and the ongoing war in Ukraine have altered the structural conditions of the transatlantic relationship. Canada's military assistance to Ukraine has been substantive in absolute terms and politically uncontested domestically, but when measured against economic capacity it ranks among the most modest of NATO contributors. More importantly, the political conditions that have made it uncontested, meaning cross-party consensus, low media salience, and a permissive public environment, have also removed the incentive to think carefully about what Canada is trying to accomplish and whether current commitments are calibrated to achieve it. The Trudeau episode identifies what a more deliberate approach would require: a prior articulation of the interests Canada's alliances are meant to serve; an explicit hierarchy of commitments when priorities compete; and sufficient institutional and political preparation to sustain a chosen course against the predictable pressures of allied expectation and bureaucratic inertia. Image Credit: NATO via Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. ## America’s Allies and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/americas-allies-and-the-decline-of-the-u-s-hegemony/ Modified: 2020-10-01 > NSA expert Jonathan Paquin discuss the decline of U.S. Hegemony in an interview with Sylvie Noële. It has been 4 years since Donald Trump promised to return greatness to the United States - "Make America Great Again". But as he seeks a new term, experts note that the perception of a relative decline in American hegemony, already seen under Obama's tenure, has intensified under the Trump presidency. In this context, 14 international researchers analyzed how the allies of the United States anticipated this loss of relative hegemony. America's Allies and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony, published by UK Routledge Editions, is co-edited by our experts Justin Massie and Jonathan Paquin. Sylvie Noël speaks with Jonathan Paquin, professor of political science at Laval University. Listen to Jonathan Paquin's interview on RFI     ## An Opportunity for NORAD Modernization in a Joint CA-US Cyber Component URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/an-opportunity-for-norad-modernization-in-a-joint-ca-us-cyber-component/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This paper explores the creation of a bi-national Joint Interagency Cyber Component at NORAD, to address cyber threats to North America. Kristen Csenkey and MCpl Dominique Philippe Genest, “An Opportunity for NORAD Modernization in a Joint CA-US Cyber Component,” Strategic Perspectives, NAADSN, January 21 2021. ## Arctic Multilateralism and the Consequences of the Ukrainian Conflict URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/arctic-multilateralism-and-the-consequences-of-the-ukrainian-conflict/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Arctic Multilateralism and the Consequences of the Ukrainian Conflict. The Russian invasion of Ukraine soon shattered this image of... On February 23, 2022, the Kirkenes Conference opened, a conference held annually in northern Norway since 2002. The forum has gradually gained prominence in the regional dialogue since then, becoming an important meeting, particularly at the scale of the Barents region. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was present and gave an opening speech focusing on regional cooperation, emphasizing that “over the years, the forum has asserted itself as one of the leading platforms for the constructive and depoliticized discussion of the pressing issues of international cooperation.” He also said there were “well-established traditions of mutual assistance and good-neighbourly relations” in the region. This speech could demonstrate what some call “Arctic exceptionalism,” referring to the Arctic being supposedly isolated from global geopolitical tensions. However, on the night of that very day (February 23 to 24), Russia invaded Ukraine, rapidly shattering this already questionable image of an Arctic region being insulated from major geopolitical issues. Indeed, reactions have been swift: as early as March 3, the Arctic Council paused all its activities. Most regional and subregional organizations followed suit, effectively isolating Russia on the Arctic stage — precisely when the country was assuming  its rotating chairmanship of the Council. The Arctic Council “should not deal with matters related to military security,” as stated in the famous footnote to the Ottawa Declaration — the  Council’s founding statement. However, circumpolar cooperation still relies upon “the core principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, based on international law, have long underpinned the work of the Arctic Council,” of which the Russian invasion constitutes a “flagrant violation,” as underlined in the March 3 joint statement. While this pause in the regional cooperation — which now extends far beyond the Arctic Council — seemed unavoidable, this policy brief aims to look at Arctic multilateralism in light of this new geopolitical context. On June 8, 2022, a communiqué was issued by seven Arctic Council members — all of the member states except Russia — which announced a limited resumption of the Council’s work, resuming tasks that did not involve the Russian Federation. Therefore, the question of Arctic multilateralism remains to be answered. The Strength of Weak Ties in the Arctic: A Region Marked by Cooperation One of the major characteristics of Arctic cooperation is the multitude of institutional formats for cooperation between regional actors — and other actors interested in the region. Indeed, while the Arctic Council has gradually established itself as an essential forum for regional governance, several “soft” forms of governance also exist at the regional and sub-regional levels, particularly in the Barents Sea sector. In addition to this Council, there are important conferences such as the annual meeting of the Arctic Circle or the Norwegian Arctic Frontiers conference. By attracting thousands of Arctic stakeholders annually, these two events have established themselves on the regional political scene and play an important role in the Arctic dialogue. Furthermore, these meetings encourage scientific cooperation, another regional structuring force, particularly reflected in the 2017 agreement precisely designed to promote it. The International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), founded in 1990, is also a significant driver of scientific cooperation. In the Arctic, science has established itself as a fundamental diplomatic tool, allowing for continuity of cooperation even when “when diplomatic channels among nations are unstable.” Cooperation is also built around many non-Arctic actors such as the Council’s observers; it is structured around sub-regional organizations such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council or the Northern Dimension policy of the European Union. Last but not least, this cooperation is also carried out by Indigenous organizations whose traditional territories do not necessarily correspond to state borders. These “weak links” are the strength of the regional Arctic model: they allow for cooperation at every scale — as it even involves actors beyond the Arctic —; at all levels — involving non-state actors — and in various sectors — scientific, environmental, or search and rescue with the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Crucially, this cooperation has deliberately been built around issues unrelated to military security — hence the idea that the region could be isolated from global tensions. For a time, the Arctic Security Force Roundtable gathered the heads of the Arctic states’ armed forces, but the annexation of Crimea in 2014 put an end to it. In 2021, Russia had raised the possibility of resuming talks, but the other states did not follow suit. All in all, regional cooperation has solidified precisely because it excluded security issues. Instead, it is structured around issues that require circumpolar cooperation, the collaborative management of which being mutually beneficial. Just a few days ago, Nikolay Korchunov, who holds the current presidency of the Arctic Council, incidentally reaffirmed that Russia remains convinced “that there are no problems in the High North that require military solutions.” There has indeed been a recent movement toward the remilitarization of the Arctic, particularly in the Russian Arctic, with regular exercises also being conducted in the region, which could contrast with this statement. These exercises should also serve as a regular reminder of the importance of having functional communication channels to limit the risk of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of their objectives and thus limit the risk of escalation. Cooperation Now Overtaken by Geopolitical Issues? This cooperation model has gradually been built since the end of the Cold War. Although it has experienced ups and downs — particularly after the annexation of Crimea — it is the first time that diplomacy has come to a complete standstill in the region. This necessary pause is a strong signal of a major disagreement regarding the violation of international law — when these principles of international law precisely underpin regional cooperation. Firstly, we should raise an important nuance: cooperative ties are suspended but not entirely broken. The closest deadlines were the first to be postponed: a meeting of the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council was scheduled in Saint Petersburg, and, as things stand, it was inconceivable to hold it. For its part,  IASC also indicated that decisions would be taken later on. Of course, the immediacy of traditional security issues implies that they take precedence over others, but the break is not yet complete, and it seems too early to state otherwise. As the Council announced that it would resume activities that do not involve Russia’s participation, it seems to abound in this sense: for the time being, there is no discussion of formally excluding the Russian Federation altogether. It comes as no surprise that, on the Russian side, Nikolay Korchunov described the decision to suspend the Council’s work as regrettable. However, two elements can be identified in his statements. Firstly, the ambassador stresses that Russia has “no alternative” but to develop its Arctic territories — and the region is indeed a strategic priority for its national economic development. For this reason, it may be noted that maintaining the Arctic as a zone of peace may remain a priority for Russia, which would have no advantage in seeing the economic development of its Arctic façade affected by armed conflict. The country has announced that it will pursue its agenda for economic development, which had already been set out in its roadmap, published when Russia took over the chairmanship of the Council. Korchunov also points out that “a temporary freeze on the Council’s activity ‘would inevitably lead to the accumulation of the risks and challenges to soft security in the region’.” This is the core of the problem. Security in the Arctic region is generally understood in a very broad sense and is not limited to traditional security issues. It also encompasses environmental, social, economic, or human security issues. Thus, many of the matters addressed in the Arctic Council are transnational by nature, foremost among which are environmental issues. Cooperation on these matters is essential, as an approach constrained by artificial borders would prove neither relevant nor effective. As such, these issues would be the first to suffer from a disruption in the Arctic cooperation model. While a temporary suspension of cooperation seems essential in order to send a strong signal, the question now is how to return to regional dialogue on these issues — a possibility that has not yet been completely ruled out. Which Arctic Cooperation Without the Russian Arctic? On top of this “strength of weak ties” and the importance of these broader security issues in the regional dialogue, there is another, unavoidable dimension: geography. A quick glance at a map of the Arctic shows that the Russian part accounts for about half of the circumpolar region. Therefore, any cooperation format that excludes this Russian part loses, strictly speaking, its Arctic dimension. This issue has been very widely raised, in particular by Indigenous organizations. The statement issued by the Russian section of the Saami Council stated that “the Sami are one people who live regardless of state borders” and that “now, more than ever, the Sami people in Russia need international support to continue cooperation between the Sami of the four countries.” The communiqué issued by the Inuit Circumpolar Council also emphasizes the importance of the circumpolar dimension of cooperation that cannot be limited to national borders: “ICC emerged from the Cold War as a unifying voice for Inuit across our collective homeland of Inuit Nunaat. We worked hard to ensure that our sisters and brothers from Chukotka were able to join us in 1992.” Regional cooperation cannot claim to be “Arctic” if it does not have a circumpolar dimension; it must also ensure that Indigenous peoples always have a say in regional dialogue. Political Considerations Indigenous people have been directly involved in the drafting process of Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. This process had been put forward as the new “gold standard” for Arctic policies by ICC President Dr. Dalee Sambo Dorough. Building upon this leadership position, Canada should continue to work to ensure that Indigenous peoples continue to have a voice on the Arctic stage throughout this pause in regional cooperation. The Arctic Council is the only regional institution where Indigenous peoples can fully express their views, thanks to their status as permanent participants. Despite the pause of the Arctic Council, their voices must continue to be both heard and taken into account, allowing them to be included in possible future joint statements. This pause of the Arctic Council cannot deprive them of their position as permanent participants whose voice must be considered in any consensus-based decision. The immediacy of traditional security issues should not wholly obscure the magnitude of the climate issues we face. Scientific research is fundamental to both understanding and mitigating climate change, and Arctic research is crucial in this regard, as the region is at the forefront of ongoing and future changes. Therefore, finding a way to keep doing research in the Russian Arctic is essential. Some voices pointed out that maintaining scientific cooperation with Russia would equal conceding them a diplomatic victory. Some Russian university rectors have also reportedly signed an unequivocal pro-war declaration, making cooperation all the more difficult to consider. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the climate issues means that the issue cannot be swept under the carpet. It thus seems essential to find a way not to lose sight of this crucial issue while maintaining a firm stance toward Russia. Scientific cooperation cannot simply be shut down. The resumption of projects, particularly those already funded and initiated and those not involving sensitive data, should be a priority. This would also have the advantage of keeping a discussion channel open. Scientific cooperation through personal scientific relations without going through Russian institutions could be prioritized to maintain existing ties. This could serve as a basis for a subsequent resumption of cooperation once the conditions for resuming traditional diplomatic relations have been met. Ultimately, a return to regular functioning of the Arctic Council should be prioritized as soon as possible — even if limited to low-key issues. The success of its model is based, among other things, on its ability to establish a truly regional dialogue: this is what has allowed it to become the essential forum for Arctic discussion. Too long of a pause, or even a formal exclusion of Russia, would close the door on this regional dialogue while potentially opening it to other partnerships for Russia — which could end up posing strategic problems. The importance of keeping a channel of discussion with this Arctic partner should not be underestimated. The pause in regional cooperation could also remind Canada that it should aim to resolve its border issues through diplomatic channels. The recent resolution of the border issue with Denmark and Greenland on the island of Tartupaluk (Hans Island) is a strong signal for the region’s stability, as a peaceful situation strengthens regional stability. In line with the Ilulissat Declaration and the commitment to respect international law, in particular, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is crucial to ensure that a peaceful and diplomatic approach is maintained when dealing with any disagreements. This applies to the claims for extended continental shelves currently under consideration. Three overlapping applications in the Arctic have been filed by Canada, Russia, and Denmark for Greenland. Recommendations of the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelves are pending. Since the role of this commission is advisory and it is up to the states to negotiate on the basis of its conclusions, it is the states’ responsibility to maintain a diplomatic and peaceful approach during future discussions, to contribute to regional stability. The technical and scientific considerations at the source of the conclusions to be delivered by the commission should be considered as the necessary basis for future negotiations, beyond political or symbolic stakes — as the three countries’ requests overlap, particularly at the very emblematic geographical North Pole. -Pauline Pic ## AUKUS: A New Anglosphere Partnership for the Development of Nuclear Submarine Capabilities URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/aukus-a-new-anglosphere-partnership-for-the-development-of-nuclear-submarine-capabilities/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > A new joint defence partnership will see the United States, Britain and Australia join together into what is already called AUKUS... A new joint defence partnership will see the United States, Britain and Australia join together into what is already called AUKUS (Australia-UK-US). The objective of the partnership is for the three allies to share information, technology and expertise in areas such as artificial intelligence, cyber security, undersea systems and long-range strike capabilities. The central focus of the partnership, however, is the nuclear domain, primarily the development of nuclear-powered submarines. The United States has since long switched to a non-conventional submarine fleet, which has several advantages over conventional diesel-powered models. They have a greater range of action, are quieter and can carry a larger load. Britain also made this change in the 1960s. It recently planned to renew part of its fleet. Until now, only Australia did not operate this technology. Thus, this is a significant change in its defence policy, which risks fuelling the arms race in the region. Canberra justifies the switch to a nuclear fleet precisely by the deterioration of the strategic environment, even if the tripartite announcement does not explicitly mention China. There is no doubt that the prospect of greater interoperability with its allies is also a major reason for this choice. This announcement means that Canberra will cancel its project to acquire 12 conventional submarines it had signed with the French Naval Group. In the planning stages since 2009, the purchase had been heavily criticized, among other things for cost overruns, in what turned out to be the most expensive arms purchase in Australia's history - $90 billion. Negotiations were held last winter between the Australian and French governments to save the deal. The source of the problem was the desire to have the submarines built in Australia, which had set up a dedicated infrastructure to build its previous fleet. Speculation was that the French model was chosen because it was the conventional version of the nuclear submarine operated by the French Navy, leaving Canberra the option of choosing the same model during the project. Instead, Australia will acquire at least eight submarines, the type of which has not yet been disclosed. These are likely to be multi-purpose attack submarines, but Australia's emphasis on developing long-range strike capabilities could mean that it will also seek ballistic missile submarines. The allies have also confirmed that the fleet will be built in southern Australia. This choice raises several questions. For example, the timeline for the project is still unknown, while Australia's current fleet of submarines is scheduled to be decommissioned in the 2030s. In order to avoid a loss of submarine capabilities, Canberra and Washington have agreed to station American submarines at Perth naval base. How the United States and Britain intend to share nuclear technology with their ally also remains unspecified. Nothing specific has been released, but this is a major challenge for Australia. Although it is the world's third largest uranium exporter, it has no nuclear power plants and remains the only state in the G20 where nuclear energy is banned by federal law. Developing the infrastructure to sustain a nuclear fleet will necessarily increase the total cost of the program, which has not been discussed. Although China is not included in the official announcements,  the partnership must be understands as part of a balancing strategy against China and a response to its recent vindictive diplomacy in the region. China’s rise had already motivated Australia's strategic defense update as it was for the British shift to the Indo-Pacific region. This announcement also follows a rise in tensions between Beijing and Washington, on the issue of Taiwanese independence among other things, which would be symptomatic of a new Cold War. In any case, this partnership heralds an important balance of power shift in the Indo-Pacific. Canada's absence from this new partnership has raised many eyebrows, as the country has been sidelined from the partnership. Indeed, Ottawa already co-operates closely with Washington, London and Canberra through the Five Eyes. Moreover, Canada just launched a program to renew its submarines, and could have benefited from this type of collaboration. How can we explain the situation then? On the Canadian side, the country has historically avoided engaging in the Indo-Pacific region in this way. While Canadian governments like to point to Canada as a Pacific nation, the presence and sustained investments the new partnership will require goes beyond its traditional defence strategy, which focuses primarily on the Euro-Atlantic region. Partisan politics may also be at play, as the Trudeau government has avoided taking a position in the growing tensions between Beijing and Washington. Joining the AUKUS would have been counter to this trend. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the Conservatives have been quite willing to join such Anglosphere initiatives in the past. It is also worth noting that Canada has often had difficulties with its military procurement projects, especially those involving submarines. According to intelligence and defence sources, Canada's absence could be explained primarily by a loss of confidence on the part of its close allies regarding the seriousness of Ottawa's commitments in terms of defence and relations with China. Canada was not informed of the new agreement until the very last moment. The AUKUS thus points out that a small circle is being created within the Five Eyes, from which Canada and New Zealand would be excluded. It remains to be seen whether this new partnership will be sustainable and lead to the joint development and commissioning of new capabilities beyond submarines. If it does, Canada will see increasingly strenuous relationships with its three allies, who will have drastically increased the integration and interoperability of their armed forces and defence industries. As it stands, the current partnership is as much a reflection of Ottawa's poor image of reliability as it is of the growing fear of the Chinese threat within AUKUS. ## Back to the Basics of the “Shadow War”: 6 Months of Escalation Between Iran and Israel and the Aftermath URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/back-to-the-basics-of-the-shadow-war-6-months-of-escalation-between-iran-and-israel-and-the-aftermath/ Modified: 2024-05-06 Following the recent clashes between Iran and Israel, and with the situation tending towards a return to calm, it is time for an initial assessment. A six-month period of unprecedented escalation has brought the region to the brink of the abyss but seems to be now moving in the direction of a precarious truce and a return to the fundamentals of what specialists call the Israeli-Iranian "shadow war". However, the re-establishment of this form of indirect confrontation could have disastrous and potentially underestimated consequences. In the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, the Islamic Republic adopted an asymmetrical strategy, recognizing its weaknesses and the dissymmetry in the distribution of power in favor of the United States and its allies. Like other Eurasian powers, Iran relies on this multifaceted approach, which consists of compensating for its relative shortcomings in the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres by combining all its assets in a pragmatic and unconventional manner - i.e., by carefully avoiding direct confrontation with its American and Israeli adversaries. The 33-day war of summer 2006 marked a new stage in the institutionalization of its asymmetric warfare doctrine. In the words of its principal creator, Major-General Mohammad Ali Djafari, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp: "Given the enemy's numerical and technological superiority, Iran will henceforth systematically resort to an 'asymmetric' strategy". To a large extent, Iran conducts this gray-zone strategy, under the radar and below the threshold of conventional warfare, through a myriad of non-state, Shiite or pro-Iranian movements, such as Yemen's Zaydi Houthis, members of Iraq's Hashd al-Shaabi, or the Sunni fighters of the Palestinian Hamas. The Iranian sponsor's approach is to offer this type of proxy sufficient autonomy and operational leeway to act indirectly, while retaining the ability to plausibly deny its involvement in their ad hoc initiatives. United around anti-Zionism, the players in this proxy struggle form the famous "Axis of Resistance", orchestrated from a distance by Teheran, whose modus operandi consists of harassing and provoking American and Israeli forces, while allowing the Iranians to evade any direct reprisals. With the more or less explicit support of the United States, Israel is also waging this "shadow war" through a number of indirect initiatives, including the assassination of Iranian scientists working in the nuclear field, the elimination of officers from the IRGC and support for separatist movements in Iranian Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, and Kurdistan. In the months since the attacks of October 7, 2023, this policy of all-out pressure on the Islamic regime and its regional allies has intensified. As this irregular confrontation, particularly prone to uncontrolled escalation, intensified, observers began to fear a spark that could lead to the outbreak of a direct war between Israel and Iran, a prelude to regional conflagration. After a period of observation, events followed in rapid succession from the beginning of 2024, generating an upward spiral of violence. Between January and March, several officers of the Al-Quds Force, the expeditionary arm of the IRGC, were eliminated by the Tsahal air force. On April 1, this systematic targeting of the Iranian network of influence reached its first climax with the bombing of the Iranian diplomatic representation in Damascus and the death of several Iranian officials, including Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Al-Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon. As the strikes against its embassy could be interpreted, under the principle of extraterritoriality, as a direct strike against Iran, Teheran could not remain passive without compromising its credibility—domestically, regionally or internationally. On the night of April 13-14, 2024, the Islamic Republic launched 170 drones and fired 120 ballistic missiles against Israeli territory. Strictly speaking, this came as no surprise, since the Iranian authorities had even warned, 72 hours in advance, that the Revolutionary Guards were preparing to target Israel. Nevertheless, the fact remains remarkable: for the first time in 45 years, the Islamic Republic was directly attacking the Hebrew state, without going through its traditional intermediaries and from its own territory. Although Teheran seems to have broken with its modus operandi of warfare under the threshold of armed violence, the break nevertheless needs to be put into perspective. The use of ballistic missiles is part of Iran's strategy, which combines various conventional and non-conventional assets. The aim remains to deter any attack against its essential interests. The choice of weapons, drones and ballistic missiles, above all reflects Iran's desire to send a strong message to Israel. The idea was also to restore the Iranian regime's tarnished reputation since October 7, 2023: in the months following Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa, Teheran had confined itself to lending its moral support to the Palestinian movement, without getting directly involved alongside Hamas and the Yemeni Houthis. This cautious stance made it appear particularly pusillanimous, even resigned, in the eyes of its partners in the Axis of Resistance. The mid-April counterattack was therefore as much a military operation as a public relations initiative aimed at restoring the Islamic Republic's status as champion of the "anti-Zionist struggle". Believing that they have fully demonstrated their firmness against the Hebrew state, Iranian political and military leaders now hope that "the matter is closed" and that the ball will remain in Israel's court. Their wishes are in line with those of the Americans and Europeans who, having helped neutralize the Iranian attack, are also appealing for calm. Anxious to defuse the crisis, the White House warned that it would neither support nor condone an Israeli punitive expedition. However, the Netanyahu government was eager to wipe out the Iranian affront, and to use it as a way of distracting international public opinion from the crisis in Gaza. On the night of April 18-19, Israel fired several missiles at an air base in Isfahan, which is responsible for protecting Iranian nuclear sites, including Natanz, for two reasons. Firstly, to demonstrate Tsahal's technological superiority and its ability to penetrate deep into Iranian territory under the mullahs' noses and strike at the Islamic regime's sensitive infrastructure, in particular its nuclear facilities. Secondly, and by the same token, to illustrate the IRGC's inability to repel such an attack and defend its national territory. Unlike Tsahal and its anti-aircraft dome, which succeeded in intercepting 99% of the projectiles launched by the Iranians, the Pasdaran were unable to annihilate the missiles, probably launched remotely via MALE drones and possibly supported by F-35 stealth fighters, revealing the full extent of Iran's vulnerability. Moreover, the Netanyahu government wanted to demonstrate its ability to act in a fully sovereign manner by warning its American interlocutors only one or two hours before the start of the operation. The day after Israel's response, after six months of escalation, with the international community holding its breath and tensions having reached a paroxysmal level, tensions suddenly subsided. The Hebrew state and the Iranian regime locked themselves into a deafening silence—as if to pick up their "shadow warrior" act where they left off in October 2023. Choosing not to claim responsibility for the attack, the Israeli government categorically refused to comment on it. In so doing, it allowed the Islamic regime to save face once again by minimizing the scope of the strikes and denying that they could have been perpetrated by the "Zionist entity". By opening the door to de-escalation, this sequence augurs a return to the "shadow war" between Israel and Iran. But this indirect confrontation also promises to be conducted in a more bitter manner, through the more systematic use of cyber tools, attacks, targeted assassinations, sabotage and the use of proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. Iranian strategists can also be expected to accelerate their nuclear program (through increased production of enriched uranium, the development of new technologies and the construction of nuclear facilities), more aware than ever that their conventional means are insufficient to secure its territory. Israel's approach to containing the Iranian regime by dismantling and destroying its system of proxies could in fact encourage the Iranians to turn in on themselves and seek to ensure the security of the Iranian fortress and the survival of the Islamic regime by other means. Many observers believe that if Israel persists in weakening Iran's regional relays (such as the Hach al-Chaabi forces in Iraq), Iran could be driven to compensate for its losses in strategic depth by strengthening its nuclear deterrent. In other words, Israel would substitute the relatively manageable threat posed by these non-state actors for a far more serious threat: that of an Iran possessing atomic weapons. ## Back to the Future? The Creation of a Foreign Human Intelligence Service in Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/back-to-the-future-the-creation-of-a-foreign-human-intelligence-service-in-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This paper aims to review the salient points of the debate between advocates and opponents of the creation of a foreign human intelligence... The question of whether Canada should have a foreign human intelligence service, along the lines of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), dates back at least to the 1990s, and even to the end of the Second World War with Canada's decision not to pursue espionage activities abroad. However, the issue regularly resurfaces in academic, political and media circles. This paper does not aim to settle the debate definitively, but rather to review the salient points of the debate between advocates and opponents of the creation of a foreign human intelligence service (FHIS) in Canada, considering the current international context and recent developments in Canadian intelligence. While recognizing the existing transformations in Canadian intelligence, this paper argues that whatever Canada's intelligence needs may be, it is unlikely that it will move towards the creation of a foreign human intelligence service in the short to medium term, and that Canada's intelligence needs can be met without the creation of a foreign human intelligence service. Canada and Foreign Human Intelligence Intelligence activities are relatively unpublicized in Canada and rarely part of the political debate, unlike our American and British neighbors. A 2021 report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) on public attitudes of itself shows that Canadians know relatively little about CSIS' functions as an intelligence service. When the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is mentioned to Canadians, only 26% say they have heard of it and 11% may have heard of it. This demonstrates that Canadians are largely uninformed about their intelligence agencies and their functions. CSIS was created in 1984 to replace the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Security Service, which was accused at the time of having, among other things, an aggressive approach to intelligence by using illegal political espionage operations. The goal was to move security intelligence to a civilian – not a law enforcement – agency. The RCMP, however, retains its law enforcement mandate in matters of national security. CSIS, on the other hand, has no police prerogative. Its mandate is to investigate and report to government on activities that may constitute threats to the security of Canada, to take steps to reduce the threat, to provide security assessments on individuals requiring access to classified information, sensitive sites or on applicants for citizenship, permanent residence, refugee protection or other temporary visitors. It is also mandated to collect foreign intelligence, on Canadian soil, at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence. The notion of foreign intelligence in Canada is not understood in geographic terms, but rather in terms of the nature of the intelligence. Thus, while CSIS has limited foreign intelligence collection capabilities, it does have a presence abroad as part of its security intelligence mandate. Security intelligence relates to threats to the security of Canada as set out in Section 2 of the CSIS Act: espionage or sabotage directed against Canada or detrimental to its interests; foreign-influenced clandestine activities threatening Canada; terrorism in or from Canada; and covert and unlawful actions aimed at the violent overthrow of government or the undermining of an established system of government. Foreign intelligence is broader and is understood to be any intelligence about a foreign, i.e. non-Canadian, entity. While the distinction may appear clear in the text, the reality is more ambiguous. First, according to Section 16, CSIS may collect foreign intelligence within Canada, provided that it is not directed at Canadian citizens or permanent residents and only at the request of the departments of Foreign Affairs or Defence. Second, it is questionable to what extent CSIS can collect foreign intelligence under its Section 2 mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada. However, if one thing is clear, it is that CSIS has limited capabilities in terms of foreign intelligence collection and foreign operations. The second primary intelligence agency is the CSE, the heir to the World War II signals intelligence intercept and cryptanalysis efforts. CSE's primary mandate is to protect the Government of Canada's information and computer systems, collect foreign signals intelligence, and conduct defensive and active cyber operations. As such, CSE is Canada's foreign intelligence service, although its mandate is limited to signals intelligence. However, CSE cannot intercept signals intelligence on Canadian territory or from Canadian citizens, except when assisting other agencies such as CSIS, the RCMP or the Canadian Armed Forces. Canada does have a foreign intelligence service, but it is limited to signals intelligence. This Canadian specificity leads some to propose the creation of a specifically foreign human intelligence service in Canada, which would then fill the presumed weakness of CSIS. For the Creation of a Foreign Human Intelligence Service What are the main arguments in favour of such an intelligence service? First, a foreign human intelligence service would provide Canada with information that would allow it to make relevant decisions based on information that Canada has decided to collect according to its priorities, especially in a changing world where reliance on foreign intelligence from our allies no longer necessarily serves Canadian interests. Indeed, as Stephanie Carvin and Thomas Juneau argue, the information Canada receives from its allies often reflects the priorities and interests of those allies and not necessarily those of Canada. Some argue that Canada has potentially missed out on important information for its decision-making, and that the opportunity to collect foreign intelligence would advance Canada's geostrategic, economic, military, environmental and scientific objectives. While not arguing for or against the creation of a FHIS, Farson and Teeple examined four options for Canada to develop a human foreign intelligence capability, none of which appear to be a solution. First, Canada could create a new institution, but the costs involved (estimated at about C$200 million in 2006, compared to the current C$500 million for Australia's foreign intelligence service) would likely exceed the country's intelligence needs – not clearly identified by the authors – and it is not clear that the creation of such a service would be well received by the public. Second, Canada could significantly expand the role of CSIS, allowing it to collect foreign human intelligence and conduct clandestine operations, but this would raise many legal issues, although they could be resolved. Third, it would be possible to add a foreign human intelligence component to an agency that already facilitate foreign intelligence activities, such as CSE. However, such an addition would run up against the particular organizational culture of CSE, which exclusively focuses on signals intelligence. Finally, the last proposal would be to moderately expand the foreign intelligence powers and mandate of CSIS. Recently, several articles have been published that bring the debate over the creation of a foreign human intelligence service in Canada back to the forefront. While assumed that this debate, at least in the academic arena, was over, Hensler has reopened this debate by publishing an article examining Canada’s foreign human intelligence service question, 25 years after he first spoke out in favour of such a service. The author begins by reviewing the long hesitation and evasiveness of various governments, both Conservative and Liberal, to address the issue, sometimes arguing that more studies are needed (when there are already enough), sometimes claiming that such a service would damage Canada's international reputation. For the author, not only is this not the case, but it reflects a lack of understanding by governments on what a foreign human intelligence service is and what it does. Finally, the main point of his argument, apart from noting that Canada would gain independence from the foreign intelligence it receives and that it could gain influence, is that Canada falls behind most of its allies, and that the creation of such a service would show Canada's allies, notably the Five Eyes, its commitment to being on an equal footing and thus increase its prestige. On the other hand, over the past few months, numerous academic, journalistic and intelligence practitioner forums have also revived the debate. Some, without taking a position, remind us that it is time to seriously consider the question, as Canada is increasingly dependent on allied intelligence. Others point to the financial and political costs of creating such a service and of engaging in clandestine espionage abroad. However, even if it is to enter the arena of international espionage, a foreign human intelligence service must be at least aggressive in its pursuit of valuable information. The government must be prepared to support this aggressiveness and, above all, to take responsibility in the event of failure or leaks to the media. The arguments for the creation of such a service all focus on the defence of Canadian national interests through the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence and the over-reliance on allied intelligence. The allies could indeed decide to terminate intelligence-sharing with Canada, although this seems unlikely at this time. Canada would need such a service to have a decision-making advantage, while advancing its interests on the international stage. For example, a very good threat and intelligence assessment of Iraq's possible possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2002-2003 allowed Canadian intelligence to assess that there was insufficient evidence to support this possibility. However, this correct intelligence assessment was made in the absence of an FHIS and on the basis of intelligence provided by allies. Against the Creation of a Foreign Human Intelligence Service On the other hand, many people are against the creation of such an intelligence service. For Robinson, this would be a considerably suboptimal policy choice for the Canadian government, as it raises many questions about the public accountability of such a service while questioning the usefulness of this type of intelligence for decision-making. Indeed, there is no solid proposal currently to make clandestine operations accountable to the public, and there is no evidence to suggest with certainty that foreign intelligence has a direct impact on the choice of a particular policy. For others, the purpose of Canadian intelligence would not be to spy extensively on foreign countries to gain foreign policy advantage, but rather to protect Canadian territory and people. Stuart Farson's 1999 contribution takes a similar stance on this debate. According to Farson, Canada would not need a foreign human intelligence service because all of Canada's intelligence needs are being met. He identifies four areas of intelligence utility in Canada: business and commerce, national security, foreign relations, and international obligations. In the first two areas, business and national security, intelligence is directed inward. Political intelligence for foreign relations is already well provided by the network of Canadian embassies, which report a great deal of information that only needs to be better analyzed and disseminated. Finally, as for Canada's international obligations, it can rely on its main allies to obtain the necessary information. Moreover, one of Canada's concerns would be not to be a threat to the United States, which leads it to favour inward-looking intelligence. However, it could be argued that since 1999, Canada's intelligence needs may have changed, which will be the subject of the next section. Is It Time for Canada to Have a Foreign Human Intelligence Service? While we have seen the pros and cons of such an intelligence service, the main question remains: does Canada need it? Thus, even though Canada is largely dependent on its allies for foreign human intelligence, and that it would be advantageous for decision-making to rely on its own intelligence, it is not clear that Canada needs a new service for this purpose. Stephanie Carvin and Thomas Juneau, who agree on the importance of decreasing dependence on foreign intelligence from our allies, all the while increasing Canada's ability to collect its own intelligence and produce its own analysis, propose to "Canadianize" Canadian intelligence. By this, the Juneau and Carvin intend mainly to improve the analytical capabilities within the Canadian intelligence community, while relying more on Canadian-gathered intelligence. Thus, there is no need to create a new intelligence service, but rather to increase the efficiency of existing services. This proposal is consistent with recent developments in Canadian intelligence. For example, there has been an incremental evolution in the mandates and powers of CSIS and the CSE over the past twenty years. CSE now has the authority to employ active operations in cyberspace, including the disabling of devices or computer networks that pose not only a threat to Canadian security, but also a threat to Canada's international affairs. For its part, CSIS now has a disruption and threat reduction mandate. However, this still applies to security intelligence and CSIS is prohibited from incurring physical harm against any person. In addition, a federal judge recently authorized CSIS to conduct investigations abroad, even if the investigations violated the laws of the state in question, when dealing with threats to the security of Canada. While Canadian intelligence is still quite limited with respect to foreign intelligence, there are incremental developments that consider the contemporary context in which intelligence operates and are intended to make Canadian intelligence more efficient in its tasks. On the other hand, and without risking a hazardous prediction about the future of Canadian intelligence, it is unlikely that Canada will engage in such an institutional creation soon. Even Hensler, an advocate of the creation of such an intelligence service, notes that Canada has an inherent aversion to foreign human intelligence. Moreover, Canada's national security culture is rather risk averse. Other recent research on the Canadian intelligence community has also come to similar conclusions, suggesting that the Canadian way of doing intelligence is not to engage in clandestine foreign intelligence gathering. Rather, Canada is said to have a defensive and minimalist intelligence culture, emphasizing the protection of Canadian territory and people, while collecting foreign signals intelligence and contributing to a multilateral intelligence-sharing partnership. Conclusion Canada has a unique approach among its allies to foreign intelligence, understood not in geographic terms, but in terms of the nature of the intelligence collected. Canada has chosen to have a very limited foreign human intelligence capability, while at the same time developing a significant foreign signals intelligence capability. This lack of foreign human intelligence has led many to argue in favour of an FHIS in Canada, whether this means creating a new intelligence agency or expanding the mandates of CSIS. For advocates of the creation of a FHIS, the advantage would be that Canada would decide what intelligence to collect based on its priorities and interests, rather than relying on the intelligence, or even analysis, of its allies, which often do not reflect Canadian interests. On the other hand, some are skeptical about the benefits and feasibility of such a service, arguing that Canada has no additional need for foreign intelligence, that the costs would be significant, or that Canada's priorities are not in spying on foreign countries, but in protecting its territory and its population against specific threats. In particular, the paper argues that Canada currently does not need to create an FHIS. Instead, it needs to make the existing Canadian intelligence apparatus more efficient through its “Canadianization”, as proposed by Carvin and Juneau, i.e. by improving analytical capabilities and relying more on Canadian intelligence. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the country would embark on such an institutional creation given its rather minimalist and defensive risk-averse culture. Thus, while this makes the creation of a foreign human intelligence service unlikely in the short term, it does not preclude an incremental evolution of the legal framework surrounding intelligence practice in Canada. The evolution of the legal framework is necessary, as noted by CSIS Director David Vigneault, for Canadian intelligence to adapt to the international environment and to new security challenges. This is the option that various governments have chosen over the past 20 years. ## Between Alignment and Distancing: The Strategic Dilemma of Washington’s Allies in the Biden Era URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/between-alignment-and-distancing-the-strategic-dilemma-of-washingtons-allies-in-the-biden-era/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Washington's allies face a central dilemma: strengthening their strategic alignment with America or, on the contrary, increasing their strategic autonomy. Key Points: Donald Trump's tenure has eroded the confidence of key democratic allies in the United States. So much so that the latter now doubt Washington's loyalty and their commitment to ensuring their security in the medium and long term. Fear of Washington's abandonment has prompted diverse reactions in allied capitals ranging from a desire to strengthen their alignment with the United States to an assumed strategic distancing. While the election of Joe Biden has reassured allies about America's intentions in the next four years, it cannot erase Donald Trump's legacy, any more than it can halt the relative decline of the United States and the shift of power to Asia. The Biden presidency will surely have a calming effect on relations with the allies, but it cannot resolve their strategic dilemma. Context America’s democratic allies are now celebrating the fact that Joe Biden is the president of the United States. During the presidential campaign, Biden reiterated his desire to bring the United States back to the centre of the international game by strengthening the bonds of trust with his allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region while promoting a multilateral approach in the management of the international issues. This may be short-lived, however, as it is unlikely that the United States will resume its role as the unchallenged hegemon to which it has accustomed us in the past. First, the exceptional conditions that favored the “unipolar moment” are a thing of the past. The rivalries between great powers and the conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership remind us that a power transition is underway from the West to the East and that the Biden presidency will not change it. Next, the 74 million Americans who voted for Donald Trump last November confirmed that Trumpism was not a mistake, but a political force that Washington's allies will have to contend with in the future. The assault on Capitol Hill on January 6 is a reminder of how far some radical elements of the movement are willing to go. Finally, the United States faces many challenges in domestic politics including the health crisis, the economic recession, but also the deep political divisions that will have the effect of weighing down American initiatives internationally. In short, this tense and uncertain context underscores the central dilemma facing Washington's allies at the dawn of a Biden administration: strengthening their strategic alignment with America or, on the contrary, increasing their strategic autonomy, or even privileging their shift away from Washington, in order to anticipate the possible return of an administration hostile to multilateralism in January 2025. Trump and the Fear of Abandonment Over the past four years, President Trump's rhetoric and the strategic incompetence of his administration have encouraged traditional allies to view the United States as a risk rather than a source of security. First, the 45th President strove to question alliances made with the allies. No alliance has been spared as both NATO and alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia were denigrated during his tenure. Second, the Trump administration has disengaged from several international treaties, such as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change or the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but also from several international institutions, such as UNESCO and WHO. Over the past four years, Trump has eroded the confidence of his allies and has dramatically increased their fear of being abandoned by Washington in times of need. That is why, despite their commitment to liberal international order, America’s historic allies have had to seriously anticipate the possibility of having to ensure their security and defense without Washington’s help. Evidence suggests, however, that these allies have reacted in disparate fashion since 2017 by adopting various strategies to deal with this risk. Between Alignment and Strategic Distance The range of strategies adopted by Washington’s allies can be summed up by four main strategic behaviors that have manifested themselves in recent years. The first is a strengthening of engagement with the United States. Some allies, such as Poland and Japan, have maintained or even deepened their security relations with Washington. Faced with real external threats and in the absence of a viable strategic alternative, these states have signaled their willingness to intensify their strategic alignment with Washington in order to demonstrate their loyalty, thus hoping to reduce the risks of abandonment on the part of Washington. Hedging is the second strategy observed among several allies. This is about reducing the risk and losses associated with the uncertainty caused by Trump and the relative decline of the United States by diversifying its strategies. It is often embodied in an increase in defense capabilities and the desire to develop a certain autonomy in matters of foreign and defense policy, without losing the privileged link with Washington. Germany and Australia, which are good examples, believe that it is unrealistic to do without the United States altogether in defense. This is why German Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer declared that “Europe remains dependent on American military protection, both nuclear and conventional, but the United States cannot carry the banner of Western values alone.” With regard to Australia, the government plans to build a larger army while declaring itself attached to the security alliance which has united Australia and the United States since 1951. Therefore, these countries do not wish to distance themselves from the United States, but nevertheless remain aware that they are responsible for ensuring the stability of their regional environment. The third behavior observed, especially in France, is strategic autonomy. The purpose of this is twofold. First, the objective is to have more influence in the resolution of international issues. The French initiative of the Forum for Peace is a good example. Second, this autonomy is intended to prepare for the eventuality that the United States no longer honors its commitments. For the supporters of this approach, it is necessary to build a European defense and thus work for autonomy in technological and strategic fields. This is notably the will of French President Emmanuel Macron. Finally, the last strategy adopted by some allies is that of distancing or even changing alliances in favor of competing powers. This is the case with Turkey, which has distanced itself from Washington by drawing closer to Moscow and Beijing and which is working to establish a fully independent defense industry. Ankara is in fact increasingly antagonistic towards its NATO partners, in particular by purchasing S-400 defense systems from Russia, but also through its military engagement in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Caucasus, and in the Mediterranean. President Erdogan also forged new strategic partnerships with Russia’s allies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These new agreements promote intelligence sharing, collaboration between defense industries and joint military exercises. Turkey is ultimately counting on China to diversify its economic and diplomatic relations. With the conclusion of 10 agreements since 2016, China has become Ankara's second-largest trading partner after Russia. Erdogan thus favors economic and strategic opportunities over his historic relationship with the United States. Can Joe Biden Ease the Allies' Strategic Dilemma? It is a truism to say that the Biden presidency is eagerly awaited in allied capitals. Especially since the 46th President of the United States wants to breathe new life into international action and cooperation. The appointment of Anthony Blinken as Secretary of State sends a clear signal in this regard. In particular, Biden pledged to organize a World Summit on Democracy during his first year in office to renew the spirit and common goals of democratic nations. He also intends to solidify international organizations that have been damaged by the Trump administration and displays unwavering loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance. Joe Biden can also rely on willing states like France in Europe or Australia and Japan in the Indo-Pacific to achieve these goals. These states indeed share the idea that China is a systemic competitor capable of destabilizing the international order. They also argue that allies must take responsibility for defense and actively participate in the management of their environment. France is thus intervening in Africa as part of the fight against terrorism, while Japan and Australia are stepping up multilateral initiatives to shape the Asian security architecture. Ultimately, these are states that are capable of evolving, through their high level of technology and interoperability, jointly with US military forces in the event of a major crisis. Thus, unlike his predecessor, Joe Biden's style should stimulate coordination and the exchange of information between the United States and its allies. According to Joe Biden, America is back. But will that be enough to alleviate the strategic dilemma faced by many allies? It seems at first glance unlikely that the allies will turn back the clock by somehow erasing the Trump years. In a context of relative decline of the United States, the diversification of economic, diplomatic and strategic ties will continue, as will the allies' desire to become more independent of Washington. In 2021, Europeans agree on the idea that they must take responsibility for their own defense. This translates into an increase in their defense budget, cooperation between the defense industries of each country, as well as the institutionalization of European defense. Diversification and empowerment are also wills shared by close allies of the Indo-Pacific. The recent signing of a defense pact between Japan and Australia indicates that these two countries wish to continue their empowerment while maintaining a strong link with Washington. Ultimately, the calming effect of a new Biden administration will not make deep existing differences between the United States and its allies disappear. They are economic and financial (agriculture, taxation of digital companies, regulation of online privacy), but above all strategic. Indeed, US foreign policy prioritizes rivalry with China, while Europe wants attention to focus primarily on terrorism and the resurgence of Russian aggression. The nature of responses to these threats also remains problematic. There is a certain reluctance among the allies to blindly follow the US strategy of confrontation with China. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada While European and Indo-Pacific allies have adopted mixed strategies in response to the actions of the Trump administration, Canada has for its part privileged its relationship with the United States, interdependence and geography oblige, despite tensions and disputes with President Trump. Canada should take advantage of the Biden administration and of the relative stability it is expected to provide to advance the following initiatives. First, Canada should actively participate in strengthening the bonds of trust within NATO while maintaining its military contribution to deterrence measures in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Second, Canada should build a clear strategy for Asia. Ottawa has so far been unable to define such a strategy. Canada could increase its participation in various multilateral mechanisms aimed at preventing crises and mitigating risks in this region. These forums are the right places to defend the values we deem ​ essential. Canada could also deepen its relations with Indo-Pacific like-minded states such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. More specifically, strengthening the integration of defense industries as well as collaboration between the armed forces could be a favourable avenue. This could also result in signing strategic partnerships with these countries. There still needs to be political will and the allocation of additional resources, which is far from obvious in times of health and economic crisis. ## Between Commitment and Constraint: Lessons from the Korean War for Canadian Defence Policy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/between-commitment-and-constraint-lessons-from-the-korean-war-for-canadian-defence-policy/ Modified: 2026-07-09 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant from the Department of National Defence’s MINDS program. Summary In June 1950, the invasion of South Korea confronted Canada with a strategic dilemma between the imperatives of collective security and internal military constraints. The unpreparedness of the Armed Forces reduced Ottawa’s room for manoeuvre, forcing the government into a gradual response shaped more by material necessity than by a pre-established strategy. U.S. pressure, parliamentary considerations, and the requirement for a United Nations mandate combined to produce a conditional engagement, most of which was ultimately redirected toward NATO in Europe. Three key lessons emerge for contemporary Canadian defence policy: military unpreparedness fundamentally constrains political options in times of crisis; managing external pressures requires clearly articulated guiding principles in advance; and an explicit prioritization of commitments across theatres of operation is essential to maintain both allied credibility and national strategic coherence. Introduction When, on June 26, 1950, forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea, the Canadian Cabinet viewed the crisis with ambivalence: while the event held “great political importance,” it was considered by ministers to have only “minor strategic importance.” Politically, the crisis constituted a decisive test for the collective security system of the United Nations (UN) and for Canada’s credibility as a reliable partner. Strategically, however, the Korean Peninsula held limited relevance for Canada’s direct security, with Europe remaining, according to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, “the main front requiring defence.” Only two months later, however, the Liberal government announced the creation of a Special Force of 4,485 personnel for the Korean theatre. This force would quickly double to nearly 10,000. In total, just under 27,000 Canadians would serve in Korea. The crisis also catalyzed rapid rearmament: defence spending peaked at over 7% of GDP in 1953, while Ottawa began a military deployment to Europe as early as 1951 that would continue until 1993. This rapid reversal raises a central question: through what mechanisms did Canada decide to send troops to Korea, and what factors determined the timing, scale, and nature of this engagement? This strategic note examines the Canadian government’s decision-making process between June and December 1950. It highlights how U.S. pressure, internal military constraints, parliamentary considerations, and the principles of UN multilateralism combined to produce a gradual, cautious, and conditional response to the Korean crisis. The analysis underscores a persistent tension between three competing imperatives: meeting allied expectations, preserving Canadian decision-making autonomy, and maintaining sufficient military capabilities to ensure continental and European defence. This case study thus provides three key lessons for contemporary Canadian defence policy. First, military unpreparedness fundamentally constrains the political options available in times of crisis, reducing Ottawa’s ability to respond autonomously to allied requests. Second, managing external pressures requires clearly articulated guiding principles in advance to avoid improvisation and preserve strategic flexibility. Third, in a context of limited resources and divergent priorities across theatres of operation, explicit prioritization of commitments is essential to maintain both allied credibility and national strategic coherence. Military Unpreparedness as a Fundamental Decision-Making Constraint When the Cabinet met on June 26, 1950, ministers noted that Canada had no forces immediately deployable. At the same time, officials from National Defence and External Affairs warned that, without external intervention, the government of the Republic of Korea could quickly fall. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent nevertheless emphasized that deploying the airborne brigade would dangerously weaken the country’s defences. This fundamental material constraint—the absence of ready expeditionary capabilities—would shape the entire Canadian decision-making process in the months that followed. Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, articulated the central strategic dilemma: U.S. intervention carried the risk of a broader conflagration, while inaction could lead to the rapid collapse of South Korea. Faced with this alternative, the Cabinet acknowledged the considerable political importance of the crisis without making an operational decision. This initial hesitation reflected the absence of immediately viable military options available to Canada at the outset of the conflict. On June 28, the Cabinet adopted three initial measures: sending two officers as observers, consulting other UN members on their planned contributions, and assessing the usefulness of Canadian destroyers in Pacific naval operations. These decisions allowed Canada to signal political and multilateral commitment without undertaking a land deployment, while buying time to assess the evolving military situation and allied expectations, particularly those of the United States. During the parliamentary debate of June 26, Opposition Leader George Drew (Progressive Conservative) underscored the urgency of the crisis by noting that Korea was closer to Canada, in transport time, than Poland had been in September 1939. Despite this emerging consensus on the seriousness of the threat, concrete options remained limited. Pearson’s subsequent statements to Parliament in August 1950 highlighted the extent of Canada’s unpreparedness. He acknowledged that prior defence planning had relied on a small, highly trained regular army primarily designed for continental defence, and that rapid expeditionary deployment had not been envisaged. The Chiefs of Staff confirmed this reality at the Defence Committee meeting of July 19, advising against any additional land deployment and indicating that any immediate dispatch would require dismantling the Mobile Striking Force, Canada’s only continental defence asset. Resisting U.S. Pressure While Preserving Decision-Making Autonomy From the earliest days of the crisis, Canadian decision-making was strongly influenced by U.S. pressure, while also being framed by Ottawa’s explicit desire to preserve political autonomy. On June 27, the U.S. ambassador to Ottawa, Stanley Woodward, presented Pearson with a draft statement from President Truman regarding the North Korean attack. Pearson firmly opposed two key elements: the reference to “communist imperialism” and the U.S. intention to act militarily before obtaining formal UN authorization. He believed Washington was taking the initiative while expecting others to support it after the fact. This was not an abstract attachment to multilateralism, but a fundamental political condition for maintaining parliamentary consensus and public support. The issue of command structure crystallized this tension when Washington proposed on July 4 that UN forces operate “under a unified command under the United States.” Pearson strongly objected, asserting that Canada attached “the greatest importance to United Nations auspices” for any participation. The compromise reached on July 7, authorizing unified command under U.S. leadership while affirming the UN character of the operation, temporarily reconciled these positions. As the military situation deteriorated in July, U.S. pressure intensified. On July 14, UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie issued a public appeal for additional contributions, including ground forces. Pearson learned of this appeal through the media, prompting Cabinet irritation. At the July 19 meeting, several ministers criticized the unilateral nature of the move, while St. Laurent expressed regret over the Secretary-General’s initiative. Pearson’s private correspondence revealed frustration with U.S. diplomatic tactics, noting that American diplomats appeared instructed to use all efforts to push Canada toward sending ground forces. Canadian decision-making thus appeared as a constant effort to reconcile two competing objectives: meeting allied expectations while preserving strategic autonomy. The Shift Toward Ground Engagement Even before a decision on ground forces was reached, the Cabinet adopted a series of intermediate measures on July 19 that reflected Canada’s incremental approach: deployment of a North Star transport squadron, acceleration of defence programs valued at $40–50 million, and publication of a public statement on Canada’s position. The Cabinet also examined four options for expanded contribution: formed national units, domestically recruited volunteer forces, volunteers for a UN division, or individual volunteers for a foreign legion–type formation. The decision-making process entered a critical phase at the end of July 1950. At the extraordinary Cabinet meeting of July 27, Pearson argued that Canada should begin recruiting a volunteer brigade for the United Nations to strengthen the U.S. position in the struggle against communism. Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton referenced the British decision to deploy a brigade despite military reservations, creating a political precedent Canada could not ignore. Like Ottawa, London faced significant constraints in deploying troops in this manner. Other Canadian ministers emphasized the importance of supporting the United States. C.D. Howe (Minister of Trade and Commerce) predicted that commitments by other Commonwealth states would make pressure irresistible, while R.W. Mayhew (Minister of Fisheries) argued that Canada could not “honourably fail” to assist the United States. The formal decision came on August 7, 1950. The Cabinet approved the creation of a Special Force of 4,485 personnel, including a brigade headquarters, three infantry battalions, artillery, anti-tank, engineering, signals, medical, and service units, as well as approximately 900 reinforcements, at an additional cost of $90 million. By August 15, 3,027 enlistments had been recorded, nearly half of them veterans. Recruitment proceeded rapidly, and the government accepted a higher target. By August 18, the Special Force had effectively reached full strength with 9,979 personnel including reinforcements. However, St. Laurent’s radio address revealed some ambiguity: for Ottawa, the Special Force could be deployed either to Korea or integrated into NATO’s collective defence structure in Europe. Strategic Prioritization: Europe Before Korea Once the August decision was made, Canadian decision-making focused on deployment modalities and managing pressure to expand the commitment. On August 24, Ottawa insisted to the British High Commissioner on the strictly UN nature of its contribution, rejecting any interpretation as an imperial or Commonwealth commitment. Canada explicitly rejected the idea of a “Commonwealth division,” suggesting instead a designation such as “First United Nations Division.” After the success of the Inchon landing in September 1950 and the rapid advance of UN forces, the context shifted. The evolving situation led the government to reassess the relevance of a combat deployment. Reports from Brigadier Fleury warned that Canada was “cruelly condemned to an occupation role,” which would become a major morale issue, and recommended limiting participation to the minimum acceptable force. General Bradley informed General Foulkes that U.S. Chiefs of Staff had approved a recommendation not to deploy the Special Force to Korea. The Cabinet adopted a conditional approach: deploying one battalion to Korea for limited missions, while sending the rest of the Special Force to the United States for training in preparation for deployment to Europe. The massive Chinese intervention in November 1950 disrupted these calculations, but the fundamental decision-making framework remained unchanged. In December, Pearson argued that the main front requiring defence was Western Europe. This assessment was grounded in a broader strategic analysis. Pearson warned that the “period of greatest danger,” initially projected for 1953–1954, had already arrived. Soviet support for Chinese intervention suggested a willingness to risk global conflict, threatening to place most of Asia and Europe under communist domination. Within this framework, the bulk of the Special Force was directed toward NATO, while a limited commitment—the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry—remained in Korea. This rearmament culminated in the adoption of “Program B” on January 15, 1951, with a budget of approximately $140 million. The Navy was ordered to reacquire 23 ships and build 11 new vessels; the Army standardized equipment along U.S. lines and expanded anti-aircraft regiments to 20,000 personnel; the Air Force accelerated production of F-86 aircraft to 50 per month and established training facilities for 1,100 NATO crews. While the Korean crisis catalyzed this expansion, European defence remained the primary strategic priority. Lessons from the Korean War for Contemporary Canadian Defence Policy In 2026, Canada faces a comparable strategic trilemma: the prospect of a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the near term, persistent Russian aggression in Europe for over a decade, and the management of continental and Arctic security. As in 1950, Ottawa must respond to a rapidly deteriorating international security environment from a position of structural unpreparedness while committing substantial military investments under time constraints. Just as Canada had to assemble an expeditionary force from scratch within weeks, the government today is called upon to rebuild military capabilities significantly eroded by decades of underinvestment, while simultaneously responding to pressing allied demands within a rapidly evolving strategic relationship with the United States. The Korean War decision-making process thus provides a useful analytical framework for understanding the structural constraints—material, institutional, and political—that shape Canada’s ability to rapidly recalibrate its defence policy. Military Unpreparedness Fundamentally Limits Political Options in Times of Crisis First, military unpreparedness fundamentally limits political options in times of crisis. The shortcomings revealed in 1950 forced Canada into a gradual response not by strategic choice, but by material necessity. While preserving decision-making autonomy, requiring a UN mandate, and maintaining parliamentary consensus would likely have led Ottawa to favour an incremental approach, unpreparedness transformed this prudence from a policy preference into a structural constraint. A government with deployable capabilities retains the ability to calibrate its engagement and thus holds diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis allied pressures, whereas a government without such capabilities loses that flexibility. Data from the 2025–2026 Departmental Plan confirms the persistence of this constraint. With approximately 63,500 regular personnel and 23,000 reservists in 2024–2025, the CAF fall short of the authorized strength of 71,500 regulars and 30,000 reservists. Operational readiness is similarly deficient: in 2023–2024, only 29% of planned readiness targets for core missions were met, and 67% of force elements were ready to conduct operations. Equipment condition further exacerbates these gaps, with availability rates of 45.73% for naval fleets, 49% for land equipment, and 48.9% for aerospace fleets. To address this, the government increased defence spending to 2% of GDP in 2025–2026, or approximately $63 billion, with a goal of reaching 5% by 2035. However, these investments will take years to produce results, limiting Canada’s strategic options in the meantime. Articulating Clear Principles to Balance Allied Pressure and Strategic Autonomy It is also necessary to articulate clear principles to balance allied pressures and strategic autonomy. The Korean War highlighted the structural asymmetry in Canada–U.S. relations and the need to define limits and modalities of contribution in advance. In today’s context of geopolitical realignment and evolving bilateral relations with Washington, this lesson is particularly relevant. The experience of 1950 illustrates the costs of lacking a predefined decision-making framework: Canada’s contributions were defined under pressure and in response to events, depriving Ottawa of the ability to negotiate from a position of coherence rather than reaction. The dominant currents in U.S. strategic thinking—whether focused on competition with China or continental retrenchment—both imply a relative disengagement from traditional allies. For Ottawa, this requires developing sufficient military and industrial defence capabilities to ensure genuine autonomy of action. Without such capabilities, Canada remains structurally dependent on Washington and constrained to accept engagement conditions that may not reflect its own priorities. The Defence Industrial Strategy published in February 2026 is a first step, but ongoing tensions between operational imperatives and economic objectives within government suggest that the balance between strategic autonomy and access to high-end allied capabilities remains unresolved. Canada should also prioritize developing minilateral engagement frameworks on specific strategic issues, strengthening targeted partnerships—particularly with the United Kingdom, Nordic and Baltic countries, and certain Indo-Pacific allies—to create collective leverage capable of balancing the asymmetry with the United States. Such flexible coalitions, based on shared interests and complementary capabilities, provide a more agile framework than large alliance structures for industrial cooperation, procurement coordination, and resilient defence collaboration amid uncertainty over U.S. support. Explicitly Prioritizing Commitments Across Theatres of Operation Finally, the Korean War demonstrates the necessity of explicitly prioritizing commitments across theatres of operation. From the summer of 1950, the Canadian government faced simultaneous and competing demands: continental defence, UN engagement in Korea, and NATO commitments in Europe. Parliamentary opposition clearly identified the risk of overextension. Victor Quelch (Social Credit) warned against dispersing limited forces across multiple theatres while North Atlantic Treaty commitments remained unmet, while Douglas Harkness (Progressive Conservative) cautioned that the Soviet Union could exploit multiple small conflicts to weaken the West. The government’s response—one battalion in Korea and the bulk of the Special Force redirected to NATO—constituted a de facto prioritization. This lesson remains directly relevant today. Driven both by allied expectations and its own strategic ambitions, Canada seeks simultaneously to reinforce its presence in Eastern Europe under NATO, contribute to Indo-Pacific deterrence, modernize continental defence through NORAD, and expand its Arctic posture. However, despite an explicit hierarchy prioritizing territorial defence, then continental security, then international commitments, limited capabilities necessitate trade-offs that current defence policy does not fully resolve. To avoid repeating the improvisation of 1950, the government should define engagement criteria in advance—deployment conditions, contribution ceilings, and reassessment mechanisms—to provide a structured framework when responding to allied requests. The risk identified in 1950—dispersing insufficient resources in response to allied demands—remains. In this context, Canada would benefit from focusing its efforts on Arctic defence, where national sovereignty and alliance obligations converge. Anchoring Canada’s NATO contribution in northern flank defence would not only rationalize resource allocation but also strengthen strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Such a prioritization, clearly articulated and communicated to allies, would enhance rather than weaken Canada’s credibility within the Alliance by replacing symbolic dispersion with reliable and predictable contributions in a defined strategic niche. Image Credit: Jim Hoffman, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 via Flickr ## Between the West and East: Italy’s Ambiguous Position in a Changing World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/between-the-west-and-east-italys-ambiguous-position-in-a-changing-world/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > In a context of increasing competition between the great powers, this article aims to provide information on the Italian position of this competition. In a context of increasing competition between the great powers and a relative decline of the United States, this article aims to provide information on the Italian position of this competition. Italy is in fact feeding a certain form of ambiguity as to its intentions while at the same time defending a strong Euro-Atlantic commitment and being in agreement with Russia and China. This apparent misalignment of Italy with its main Western allies risks weakening transatlantic relations, which could have several consequences for Canada and NATO. A Strong Euro-Atlanticism Italy's Euro-Atlantic engagement has never wavered or been questioned. Italy remains a deeply Euro-Atlantic country, both in its strategic posture and in its identity. The 2015 Italian Defense White Paper, Italy’s most important strategic reflection for decades, emphasizes the shared values ​​of the Euro-Atlantic community that transcend borders. This community was forged at the end of World War II to become one of the strongest pillars of international stability. From a military alliance, the Euro-Atlantic community evolved into a deeper and more extensive relationship. In this context, Italy conceives of international security jointly with the European Union (EU) and NATO. Speaking to Parliament in July 2018, Italy's Defense Minister placed the relationship with NATO and the EU as one of the top defence priorities. NATO, more than the EU, represents Italy's benchmark alliance for ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and for deterring potential threats. In this regard, the Minister of Defense undertakes to promote all initiatives to strengthen NATO's commitments, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and to continue to provide an important contribution to the missions of the alliance. It is important to note, however, that Italian contributions to NATO missions vary. This Italian Atlanticist identity explains why, traditionally, Italy has always aligned its defence policies with its main allies, led by the United States. Recently, the current Italian Defense Minister Lorenzo Guerini recalled Italy's privileged relationship with the United States and the importance of relying on NATO to deal with emerging threats. Moreover, at the level of defence, the European Union is conceived by Italy as having to complement NATO, by taking up the postulate of non-duplication and non-competition between a Europe of defence and NATO. However, this Atlanticist activism has started to crumble since Donald Trump took over as President of the United States. Italy indeed faces a more withdrawn United States, skeptical of liberal institutional arrangements and questioning NATO. These uncertainties about the position of its main ally are seen by Italy as a risk to its foreign policy interests and to the overall institutional framework. Despite this, Italian Defense Minister Lorenzon Guérini reaffirmed on October 22, 2020, at a meeting of NATO defence ministers, Italy's constant and concrete commitment to the alliance. A Pro-Russian Position Taken On the other hand, since the Cold War, Italy has always seen itself as a mediator between NATO and the European Union in the west and Russia in the east. Italy had notably offered to act as an intermediary between NATO and Russia after the invasion of Georgia in 2008 or during the recent Syrian crisis. Italy has also often opposed the imposition of new sanctions against Russia. These friendly positions towards Russia are a constant in contemporary Italian foreign policy, and seem to be shared by the entire political class. However, some political parties currently in government or having been in government recently seem to share more than friendly strategic positions towards Russia. This is particularly the case with the 5-Star Movement and the Northern League, two right-wing political parties that have solid foundations in the Italian electorate. Matteo Salvini, current Northern League senator and former interior minister, has genuine admiration for Putin's Russia and speaks of Crimea as liberated Russian territory awaiting international recognition. Symptoms of skepticism towards the European Union can also be seen in the pro-Russian positions of these two parties. These Italian political parties go so far as to call for the formation of intimate intelligence cooperation between the two countries, but also for Russian support in resolving crises in the Middle East. For its part, Russia remains cautious about these declarations of love as these two political parties sometimes come close to neo-Nazi or Islamophobic movements. Furthermore, Russia is aware of the mostly rhetorical aspect of Italian populist discourse and that Italy has little influence in the Euro-Atlantic sphere. In reality, the pro-Russian discourse of the Italian populist parties is primarily directed at the Italians, who seem increasingly pro-Russian and less and less pro-American and pro-European. In a poll carried out in May 2020, 32% of Italians polled consider Russia a friendly country, compared to only 17% for the United States. In April 2020, confidence in the European Union was only 27%. There would then be a perception among Italians that relations with Russia would be more profitable for Italy. However, these friendly foreign policies towards Russia should come as no surprise. Indeed, as early as 2015, Italy explicitly stated in its Defense White Paper that it would develop new relations with emerging powers, while strengthening its relations with its NATO and EU allies. On the European continent, this position did not change when in 2019, the Italian Minister of Defense affirmed that Italy's objective is to develop a “dual track,” reaffirming its commitment to NATO and deterrence on the eastern front, while opening a dialogue with Russia to bring about less competitive relations. This posture will be reaffirmed in February 2020 when the Italian Defense Minister stipulates that Russia is one of the key players for cooperative security and the protection of Italy's strategic interests. The Minister took the opportunity to reiterate his intention to develop cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the Arctic and in the fight against maritime piracy. Acceptance of Chinese Influence On October 30, 2019, in front of the Italian Parliament, the Minister of Defense affirmed that China's rapid growth at the military level poses a threat to the country's security. Yet this discourse is contrasted by the close relationship between Italy and China for many decades. If Sino-Italian relations date back to the Cold War, it was really only from 2019 that Italian foreign policy really turned east. Italy is thus the first G8 country to support and participate in China's new Silk Road (Belt and Road Initiative), despite the reluctance of the United States. Italy is now stuck between Washington and Beijing, between guarantees of security and economic opportunities. Indeed, now that the United States appears to be exerting some withdrawal from the international system and developing a more negative stance towards the EU, China is returning to the center of the map in Italy. In 2019, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte asserted that China would exert increasing influence in the world, both economically and politically. In fact, this is what the United States fears. Mike Pompeo recently asserted that increased Sino-Italian economic and political ties served China's comprehensive influence strategy and that China was taking advantage of Italy. The German foreign minister also accused Italy of choosing Beijing to the detriment of its Western allies. However, it is on another subject that the agreements with Beijing risk destabilizing transatlantic relations. Italy has not officially banned the Huawei company from its 5G network. First, Huawei is already well established in Italy in the 4G sector and involved in several trials for 5G. However, Italy is not blind to the risk posed by the Chinese firm's technology. The Italian Parliament’s Security and Intelligence Committee recommended in December 2019 to seriously consider a ban on Huawei from 5G infrastructure. On the other hand, even if Italy has a legislative framework allowing it to protect its essential infrastructures, including telecommunications, its application to the Chinese company largely depends on political wills which seem absent for the moment. However, Italy's main allies, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have strongly insisted on the importance of protecting Huawei's 5G telecommunications infrastructure for national security reasons. Conclusion It is difficult to understand Italy's intentions in this era of competition between the great powers. On the one hand, it displays a strong Euro-Atlanticism, but on the other, it wants agreements with Russia and China. Italy seems to fuel the ambiguity, and this can be seen within the US administration. An American official said that it was difficult to predict Italy's behaviour. However, Italy’s apparent misalignment to draw closer to illiberal eastern countries risks having significant consequences for transatlantic relations and for Canada. Italy, like Canada, is an important contributor to NATO, a defender of the alliance and potentially an actor engaged in the emergence of a so-called alliance of democracies under the leadership of the United States and Joe Biden. An Italian misalignment would risk weakening the alliance, which is already being severely tested by an American disengagement and by internal friction in the Mediterranean. Even though Biden's arrival as President of the United States might reconcile Italy with its Atlanticist activism, Italy's agreement with Russia and China will continue, confirming its ambivalence between west and east. More importantly, Huawei's involvement in Italian 5G risks undermining intelligence cooperation or military cooperation if the Italian military command uses Huawei technology. Finally, Italy can become the center of Chinese propaganda and disinformation targeting the West, in particular by the presence of Chinese influence on Italian territory, but also by the connection of certain influential political parties with the illiberal ideas. Italy would then become the weak link in Euro-Atlantic ties. ## Beyond the Approval of Finland and Sweden joining NATO: making sense of Turkey’s unstable approach towards the alliance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/beyond-the-approval-of-finland-and-sweden-joining-nato-making-sense-of-turkeys-unstable-approach-towards-the-alliance/ Modified: 2023-11-10 > In the wake of Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden announced in May 2022 their intention to join NATO. These historic bids... In the wake of Russian invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden announced in May 2022 their intention to join NATO. These historic bids had encountered tough opposition from Turkey as it accused the two Nordic countries of harboring people with ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara has labeled as a ‘terrorist group’. As an additional condition for its support, Turkey also demanded that both countries end their “arms embargoes” against Ankara. They did not officially ban the export of military equipment to Turkey, but neither country has issued export licenses after Ankara had launched a ground offensive against the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia in 2019. However, last year, Sweden and Finland signed a trilateral memorandum with Turkey in a bid to address its concerns. As a result, only Finland managed to secure Ankara’s ratification of its NATO membership earlier this year. Sweden, by contrast, continued to face Turkey’s opposition until Erdogan announced at the NATO summit in Vilnius that Ankara would back its bid to join the alliance. But prior to this move, he said that Brussels should clear the path for Ankara’s accession to the European Union before his country approved Sweden’s bid for NATO membership. Could this sudden link of Sweden’s NATO bid to Turkey joining the EU be the real motive behind Ankara’s initial stance towards the two countries? If significant, how does this motive help understand the dynamics of Turkey's positions within the alliance? And what are its implications for the alliance’s future? Erdogan’s turnaround in Sweden’s NATO bid Apart from signing the trilateral agreement, Sweden made some significant efforts to address Ankara’s concerns. These efforts range from extraditing a PKK supporter to initiating investigations against terrorism financing and working with Turkish law enforcement agencies in order to keep track of the activities of people with ties to PKK in Sweden. Despite these efforts, Turkey was still holding off on Sweden’s membership until Erdogan brought out another card by urging his allies to “first, come and open the way for Turkey at the European Union and then we will open the way for Sweden, just as we did for Finland”. This can be seen as a strategic blackmail to which Erdogan is accustomed as he quickly changed his mind and announced his support for Sweden after he is said to have gotten some assurances from US on F-16s, and Canada on arms embargoes. According to Middle East Eye, Ankara’s deal with the US included “40 new aircraft and kits to overhaul 79 of Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet, as well as 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs.”  Canada has not yet decided to drop its export controls measures against Turkey, but agrees to reopen talks that can lead to their lift. While these assurances are quite important to Ankara, they are far from being its target goal. And the quick turnaround in Sweden’s membership proves that terrorism issues might not be the real motive behind Turkey’s objection from the beginning. What Turkey wanted was to bring to light its accession issues with the EU, even if it did not demand an immediate restart of membership talks (which have stalled since 2018) in return for Sweden’s accession. In other words, what Turkey was likely trying to imply, but had not admitted from the outset, is that it could not accept Finland and Sweden into NATO unless it got concessions commensurate with the frustration it ‘feels’ about its stalled EU membership. And the reason why Ankara did not raise this motive at the very beginning of its opposition to the two countries is that, by doing so, it would risk not being taken seriously or not being able to obtain concessions from different parties. According to a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Asli Aydintasbas as reported by The Wall Street Journal, “Whether that is something Europeans give, something the U.S. gives, or Sweden gives, my sense is Erdogan will not let this go without getting something in return”. Even a Swedish member of Parliament, Amineh Kakabaveh, seemed to have made sense of Ankara’s motive by declaring in 2022 that “Erdogan wants to have contact with Biden. He wants to have contact with EU countries”. What Ankara would also fear in prematurely advancing this real motive at the very beginning is that it would get reactions disavowing it or rendering its concern illegitimate, such as those (after Erdogan's previous statement) from Dana Spinant, spokesperson for the European Commission, who declared that “you cannot link the two processes”, or NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who stressed that Turkey's relationship with the EU was “not an issue for NATO, it's an issue for the European Union”. So, if Ankara ended up playing the EU card without fear of any reaction, it was because it had made progress in its negotiations with the US to obtain concessions on the F16s, and it would have been necessary to evoke this motive to make these negotiations more conclusive. That is, Turkey has made the strategic choice of first highlighting its concerns about terrorism and the arms embargoes in a bid to obtain concessions first from Finland and Sweden through their trilateral memorandum, and from the US and Canada, before returning to the real motive which is its EU membership issues. Ankara has even made Sweden show ‘support’ for “efforts to reinvigorate Turkey’s EU accession process, including modernisation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union and visa liberalisation”. But how might Ankara’s initial objection be rooted in a sort of frustration that it had been encountering in its relations with the West and/or the EU? Turkey's longstanding western vocation and frustration Turkey’s encounter with the West if not fruitless, is yet to be profitable. In fact, China and Russia have surpassed the United States and European Union in securing the sympathy of Turkish people according to a poll carried out by Metropoll in January 2022. Even in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, another poll showed in March that 33.7 % of Turks believe Russia was responsible for the war while 48.3% hold the US and NATO responsible. This fact could be a result of the anti-Western sentiment that reigns in the country. The rise of this sentiment was attributed to Erdogan’s anti-Western narratives presenting the West as plotting against the country. Meanwhile, the question of Turkey’s westernization, especially its accession to the EU, remains a major goal for the Turkish public and political elites. According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish people retain their strong support for EU accession. The support of public opinion is the real driving force behind our reform efforts.” It would benefit most young Turks to see Turkey join the EU. For some of them, this integration into the EU—if complemented by membership into the Schengen area—is an important solution to unemployment in the country as they could go to the Schengen countries of the Union offering better job opportunities without visas. The process of Turkey’s EU membership is longer for many reasons, mostly due to follow-on domestic legislation that must be passed after initial reforms, and this is paradoxically a barrier to the integration. Moreover, it might understandably be expected from some EU members  such as France and Germany to not want Turkey in the EU as it would possibly oppose bids to promote their political preferences. Another reason is that some EU countries might consider blocking Turkey’s accession to protect their economy from ‘cheap labor’. But when one knows that Turkey has officially applied for EU membership since 1987, the wait and uncertainty are likely to create frustration. This frustration can be a key element in understanding the reason behind Turkey’s initial stance towards Sweden and Finland, which are not the direct target. Turkey is instrumentalizing the two countries’ membership to get more more attention and concessions from the West and/or NATO who neglect the Turkish national (security) interests. For instance, Turkey has faced opposition from some western countries and/or NATO allies on key issues related to its EU accession, maritime disputes with Greece, conflicts in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, etc. Another goal associated with the Turkish attempt to block the two Nordic countries was obtaining US concessions, particularly, the purchase of fighter jets including the F35 program of which it was kicked out. All these developments have shaped Turkey’s existing competitive foreign policy in a way that seriously impacts its relations with the West and its NATO allies. And as far as these competitive ambitions are concerned, they are essentially rooted in a ‘neo-ottoman’ vision. Far from being an illusion, this vision might be another way to believe that a modern Turkey reflecting the glory of Ottoman empire is still possible. Since the 2000s, Ankara has been improving its economic, diplomatic, and socio-cultural influence across the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Latin America, Central Asia, Africa, etc. This rise in  global influence constitutes a change of direction from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s efforts, which were mainly aimed at institutionalizing a modern Turkey embedded in a “western” value system. By contrast, over recent years, Turkey has affirmed its engagement in its middle eastern environment with the restoration of its relations with Arab states. The making of this ‘neo-ottoman’ engagement in Turkish foreign policy can be imputed to the ‘islamist’ identity of Erdogan’s ruling party as well as some insights put forward by Ahmet Davutoğlu, a scholar who became Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2014), then Prime Minister (2014-2016). His 2001 book titled “Strategic Depth” continues to shape Turkey’s foreign policy even if he is more moderate than Erdogan and no more part of the regime. Davutoğlu proposed an expansion of Turkish influence all over the world, most especially, across previous areas of the Ottoman empire’s influence. He wanted to make Turkey regain prominence and possess a pivotal position in the international system worthy of its glory days of the Ottoman empire. He also wanted Turkey to consider the Middle East as its sphere of influence to gradually assert itself as a major power in the international political arena. This foreign policy trajectory while helping Turkey realize its loss of the Cold War era-alike enthusiasm with the West, emboldens Ankara to embark on a competitive and almost no-negotiation approach with its western allies. Ankara can acquire the necessary capabilities in a bid to advance its agenda as in the case of its acquisition of the Russian S400. Thus, the West and/or NATO must rethink their relationship with Turkey to avoid risk of a potential Trojan horse within the alliance. The rehabilitation of Turkish-Western/European relations: an opportunity for a more allied Turkey within NATO Despite some of its controversial positions, Turkey remains a crucial member of NATO not only as far its geographic potentialities are concerned but also when it comes to its ability to cooperate with the alliance’s ‘rivals’. It is important for NATO allies to not lose sight on the incredible asset that Turkey might be in enabling the alliance to engage and achieve potential negotiation or cooperation with some countries such as Russia, Iran, etc. It is worth emphasizing the role Turkey played alongside the UN in signing the agreement on the export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea, a prowess that the West or NATO might not have achieved because of its clear stance in the Russian-Ukrainian war. That said, the West or NATO allies including Canadian foreign policymakers must rethink their relationship with Turkey in a way that priority is given to the pursuit of compromise and mutual commitment with Ankara. The reorientation of this relationship also implies the address of any relevant and necessary concern that might trigger Turkey’s discontent within the alliance. This can clear the path for some sort of equity that helps Ankara meet some of its interests and essentially reignite more positive sentiments towards NATO and/or the West. That is, European allies’ support in this change of course will be very important for the West and/or NATO to avoid five more years of tensions with Erdogan’s regime. The same applies to Turkey as the EU has serious concerns about the continuing deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary, which Ankara has yet to address. Turkey must take advantage of a reorientation of its relations with the West to improve its current reputation and boost Western investors’ confidence in its battered economy so that it can be able to speed its EU accession process and gain more attention from its fellow NATO allies, especially, the European ones. This also implies a need to show good faith and be more cooperative than competitive within the alliance.   Acknowledgments This research was supported by a grant from the “Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS)” programme of the Department of National Defence of Canada. ## Bridging the Gap Between Academic and Defence Policy Communities in Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/bridging-the-gap-between-academic-and-defence-policy-communities-in-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The authors evaluated the nature and causes of the divergences between academic and defense policy communities in Canada based on their personal experiences and from interviews with defense officials. In their article published in the Canadian Public Administration journal, the authors evaluated the nature and causes of the divergences between academic and defense policy communities in Canada based on their personal experiences and from interviews with defense officials. For the benefit of the Network of Strategic Analysis, whose mandate includes mobilization of research expertise for the Canadian defense community, they reconvene to explore avenues of action that could bring these two communities together.   Academics and defence practitioners have a complex and occasionally tense relationship, due to the divergent incentives and goals of their professions. Nevertheless, these two communities have an interest in narrowing the gap between them, and steps can be taken to ensure the success of the Department of National Defence (DND)'s new academic outreach program. Since the 1960s, DND has supported academic outreach and support programs that have helped bridge the gap between academics and practitioners, but also promote the study of defence issues within the academic community. With the establishment of DND's new program, Mobilization of New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS), it is necessary to question the nature of the gap between academia and policy in order to not repeat the mistakes of past programs, such as the Security and Defense Forum (SDF), which was eliminated in 2011. Indeed, the impression among defence practitioners was that the SDF lacked dynamism, intellectual diversity, and innovation, but also that it lacked results given DND’s investment. In 2019, when DND announced the establishment of MINDS, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) awarded a grant of $ 2.5 million to the Canadian Defence and Security Network. This network takes up the torch of the late SDF program by bringing together the Canadian defence and security community and funding research on Canadian military issues. For its part, the MINDS program is aimed at university and non-university specialists. In addition, due to the shorter timeframes in the world of politics, it relies on a rapid response mechanism. This allows DND to mobilize on very short notice the expertise of researchers working on evolving issues for which internal knowledge is lacking. This, however, represents a challenging goal for DND: it has always been difficult to identify problems quickly and to manage the process of contracting out work effectively. Challenges of the MINDS Program The first challenge for MINDS is its structure. Specifically, the objective of MINDS is to build nine three-year networks on an ongoing basis (three networks were created in 2019 as well as in 2020 and three more are expected to be created in 2021). The non-permanent funding of these networks is intended to encourage high performance. However, this raises questions about the long-term capacity of these networks. It is not clear how the relatively small community of defence and security experts in Canada can sustain this pace, even if the networks mobilize the participation of specialists who are working not only on Canadian defence issues in the strict sense. There may not be enough experts to staff and support nine research networks, so to speak. This raises a significant risk that in a few years because the experts will be too dispersed among nine groups, there will be a growing perception within DND that the networks are underperforming and that the department is not getting a good return on its investment. The risk, from our perspective, is that the design of the program itself will lead once again to a repetition of the disappointing SDF result. A second challenge for MINDS will be to precisely define its objectives and then communicate them clearly to current and potential network members. This goes hand in hand with a third challenge which is crucial to the long-term success of the program: identifying overlap between DND's expectations (the output of the networks) and the incentive structures of the academic community. From our perspective as both practitioners and academics, if there is no overlap, or if the overlap is too small, there will be insufficient incentive for academics to invest a significant amount of time in the networks. The most important incentive would be support, financial or otherwise, for research and publications, including the hiring of research assistants or support for field research. Furthermore, MINDS appears to be set up primarily to help DND and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) get what they need from academia. If this impression is correct, the risk is that some academics, believing that the returns on their investment (i.e., their time) are limited, may be reluctant to put significant energy into the networks. In order to ensure its success, MINDS could distinguish itself and contribute to reducing the gap between researchers and practitioners by providing researchers with experiences and information that would deepen their understanding of the "real world" of defence. This would not only benefit academic research and public debate but perhaps help ease the tensions that arise when researchers propose policy solutions that do not fit the constraints and realities facing DND. Bridging the Gap In our view, two concrete initiatives would deepen academic understanding of the world of practitioners: temporary assignments and high-level briefings. First, under a secondment program, MINDS would cover the salary of an academic for one year and assign them the functions of a special adviser or consultant on a particular case. Although they would not be able to publish on issues they have worked on in government, academics on these assignments would return to the academic community with a better understanding of how DND works and of how decisions are made in government. Second, high-level briefings are another initiative that MINDS could put forward. MINDS could facilitate more regular and in-depth briefings with a wide range of researchers, by using videoconference for academics outside Ottawa. Beyond these two initiatives, we believe that MINDS would be well placed to facilitate events specifically aimed at bridging the gap between practitioners and academics. Recognizing that researchers tend to answer long-term questions with theoretical approaches, seminars could be organized between researchers and practitioners to identify defence problems that lend themselves to this type of study. MINDS could also be responsible for linking participants with officials and agents who could provide unclassified data to support this type of research. Furthermore, DND should recognize that reciprocity is necessary to foster a fruitful relationship with the academic community. Beyond DND, it is equally important to remind defence academics that they too have an important role to play in bridging the gap with the political world. This includes appreciating the strengths of academic work while recognising that there are many issues and topics that civil servants are better able to understand and analyse. In conclusion, academic research provides practitioners with alternative perspectives, expertise, and policy analysis that may be less prominent within the government. While this type of work may not be relevant to the day-to-day problems and policy issues addressed by practitioners, it provides important context and an appreciation of future considerations that may prove useful over time. Researchers, in turn, benefit from understanding how political processes work, how the government understands defence issues and the factors that shape defence decisions. Therefore, both academics and practitioners stand to gain from bridging this gap. ## Building a safer North: Climate security risks, gaps, and opportunities of the Canadian Arctic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/building-a-safer-north-climate-security-risks-gaps-and-opportunities-of-the-canadian-arctic/ Modified: 2024-08-29 “What happens in the North impacts the world, and when you look at security issues and climate change, the world is paying attention more than ever,” recently noted Canadian Governor-General Mary Simon at an event at the Arktikum Science Centre in Rovaniemi, on February 9th, 2023. Her comments reflected the profound and ongoing effects that Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has had on Arctic security, leading to a renewed global focus on the region – a focus which, in Canada, further intensified recently with the Chinese spy balloon incident acting as a reminder of the role that the Canadian Arctic plays in continental defense. Governor-General Simon’s remarks also mirror how interconnected climate and security realities are, in a region where freezing geopolitics interact with thawing landscapes. In the Canadian Arctic, which is warming at least three times as fast as the rest of the globe, the physical impacts of climate change include permafrost thaw, decreasing snow cover, reducing summer sea ice, and sea-level rise leading to coastal erosion and flooding (in the Beaufort Sea, sea level has been rising by almost an inch a year over the last two decades). Climate change also contributes to changes in Canadian Arctic ecosystems -such as tundra greening and shifting boreal tree line due to intensifying boreal wildfires– ocean acidification, and increased precipitation. Climate change is increasingly being recognized as a threat (or risk)-multiplier, as its effects interact with and have the potential to exacerbate pre-existing threats and other drivers of instability to contribute to security risks. In an effort to advance Canada’s awareness of these risks, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service recently published an analysis outlining how climate change compounds and accelerates other security issues. *** To keep reading, go to Vanguard. ## Buyer or Co-Producer? Canada Must Decide What It Wants from the Acquisition of New Submarines URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/buyer-or-co-producer-canada-must-decide-what-it-wants-from-the-acquisition-of-new-submarines/ Modified: 2026-09-16 By selecting ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) as the preferred supplier for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, the Carney government has settled the largest military procurement in the country's history. The decision, announced in Halifax on the eve of the NATO Summit, is defensible considering the evaluation criteria the government itself had established. But it must be said plainly: selecting a supplier was the easiest step. The real test, one that will determine whether Canada becomes merely a buyer or a co-producer, begins now and will unfold at the negotiating table. A Choice Consistent with the Evaluation Criteria Ottawa evaluated the two finalists (the German-Norwegian Type 212CD and Hanwha Ocean's South Korean KSS-III) according to a weighting scheme revealed in the bid instructions: in-service support accounted for 50 percent of the score, the platform itself for 20 percent, the bidder's financial capacity for 15 percent, and strategic and economic partnerships for the remaining 15 percent. The weighting says almost everything: the government was not primarily buying a submarine; it was buying fifty years of operational availability. To be sure, a weighting system only imperfectly reveals a program's true priorities, which are embedded in the detailed requirements that are rarely made public. When competing bids perform similarly on the most heavily weighted criteria, secondary criteria often determine the outcome. Nevertheless, the weighting remains revealing of the trade-offs Ottawa chose to emphasize publicly. It reflects the hard lesson learned from the Victoria-class submarines, of which only one is currently (and only intermittently) operational. It was precisely on the dominant criterion that the German proposal enjoyed its greatest structural advantages. TKMS, which supplies roughly 70 percent of the submarines currently in service within NATO, proposed replicating on Canada's two coasts the maintenance model it is developing with Norway in Bergen, supported by a trilateral program with Germany and Norway in which combat systems, supply chains, and operational doctrines are already standardized within the Alliance. Hanwha could counter this architecture with the scale of its Geoje shipyard, its highly concentrated supply chain, and the expertise of Babcock Canada, which currently holds the Victoria-class support contract. Ottawa's wager, however, appears to have been that support guaranteed by two allied governments offers greater long-term reliability over half a century than a supply chain concentrated an ocean away. With respect to the platform itself (20 percent), the 212CD offers significant advantages for Canadian requirements: a non-magnetic steel hull, a diamond-shaped design optimized for acoustic stealth, a proven air-independent propulsion system, and a design specifically intended for operations in cold waters. South Korea, despite the impressive demonstration of the ROKS Ahnmu's trans-Pacific voyage to Victoria, could not compensate on the platform criterion for what it conceded on the much more heavily weighted support criterion. Regarding partnerships (15 percent), TKMS substantially strengthened its proposal after its initial offers were judged insufficient. The company pledged industrial benefits equivalent to the contract's value, signed around twenty memoranda of understanding with Canadian firms (including CAE and Marmen in Quebec) and proposed related investments ranging from liquefied natural gas to the Port of Churchill. It is worth recalling that this bureaucratic evaluation represented only one stage of the process: the final decision rested with Cabinet. Both Minister Mélanie Joly and Secretary of State Stephen Fuhr emphasized the importance they attached to industrial and technological benefits for Canada. Finally, the bid instructions required an accelerated delivery schedule: proven production submarines were to be delivered no later than 2035, followed by subsequent deliveries incorporating increasing levels of Canadian content. Berlin and Oslo addressed what had been their principal disadvantage relative to Hanwha through a significant political commitment: transferring submarines from their own production orders to enable delivery of the first four units by 2034. By agreeing to move behind Canada in their own production queue, Germany and Norway provided a concrete demonstration of what it means to belong to a trilateral program. What Canada Is Giving Up Every procurement decision involves trade-offs, and this one entails sacrifices that would be dishonest to ignore. The most visible concerns capability. The KSS-III is equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) featuring dedicated cells for launching long-range cruise missiles. By contrast, the 212CD relies exclusively on its six 533 mm torpedo tubes. A nuance, however, deserves clarification. The platform is designed to launch both anti-ship and land-attack missiles through its torpedo tubes, including the submarine-launched version of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM-SL), capable of engaging both surface vessels and coastal targets, as well as, in the future, the supersonic 3SM Tyrfing missile jointly developed by Norway and Germany. Canada is therefore not abandoning all submarine strike capability but rather its depth of fire. Every missile carried occupies the space of a torpedo within a shared weapons magazine, whereas the Korean VLS provides dedicated launch cells enabling salvo fire—at precisely the moment when allied doctrines increasingly emphasize the dispersion of long-range fires and when Canada's future River-class destroyers will each carry only twenty-four VLS cells. This trade-off stems directly from the evaluation framework itself, under which Ottawa assigned only 20 percent of the total score to the platform. It is a deliberate choice by the Carney government, which appears to have prioritized economic benefits over sheer firepower. The second concession concerns development risk. The KSS-III is already in active service with the Republic of Korea Navy and benefits from a mature, active production line. Although the 212CD is derived from the proven Type 212A, it remains a new design, and no unit has yet been delivered. Canada is therefore accepting a degree of technical and schedule risk that the Korean option would have significantly reduced. This risk is far from theoretical: given the precarious operational state of the Victoria-class fleet, any delays in TKMS's delivery schedule could interrupt the continuity of Canada's submarine operations altogether. The accelerated timeline agreed to at the final stage of the competition will have to be closely monitored against the actual production capacity of the shipyards. Finally, Ottawa is foregoing an important instrument of strategic diversification toward the Indo-Pacific. A decades-long partnership with Hanwha would have anchored Canada to Asia's leading democratic defence industrial power while providing a strong naval foundation for its Indo-Pacific Strategy. The German choice instead reflects a clear hierarchy of theatres of operation: the North Atlantic and North Pacific—that is, the maritime approaches to the continent and the Arctic—take precedence over distant power projection. This prioritization is hardly surprising. It is in the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and beneath the Arctic ice that Russia's submarine threat poses the most direct challenge to Canadian territory. It is also precisely in these regions where Washington, increasingly focused on the Indo-Pacific, expects its allies to assume greater responsibility. By favouring a submarine designed for high-latitude operations over a long-range platform optimized for extended oceanic deployments, Canada is affirming its identity first and foremost as a Northern Hemisphere power. This choice also reflects a hierarchy of political interests as much as operational theatres. Purchasing a European platform also means acquiring political capital with allies from whom Ottawa expects reciprocal benefits, ranging from economic security to participation in Europe's growing defence-industrial programs. The consequences must therefore be recognized. Canada's presence in the Indo-Pacific will rely primarily on its frigates—three warships deployed annually on a rotational basis, meaning that rarely more than one or two will be on station at any given time—along with a limited number of maritime patrol aircraft and diplomatic engagement, rather than on its submarine fleet. This is a signal that Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra will undoubtedly recognize. Rejecting what many regarded as an unbeatable Korean proposal therefore carries a reputational cost within the region. These sacrifices are real, but so too are the benefits they purchase: full interoperability with European navies, a platform optimized for Arctic operations, and above all Canada's integration into the European defence ecosystem at a time when diversifying the country's strategic dependencies away from the United States has become a national imperative. The Hardest Part Is Still to Be Negotiated The government has been clear: TKMS is a preferred supplier, not yet a contracted one. What follows is a negotiation period lasting between six and eighteen months, and it is during this phase that the true value of the decision will be determined. The CEO of TKMS has been unequivocal: submarine production will take place entirely in Germany, at Kiel and Wismar. If Canada accepts this starting point without modification, it will have written the largest cheque in its military history while remaining nothing more than a customer. Yet the Carney government intends to use this acquisition as an instrument of economic development. The central issue in the negotiations is therefore Canadian content. Nothing guarantees that the final contract will maximize Canadian industrial participation unless Ottawa explicitly requires it. The federal Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) policy has demonstrated its limitations. In 2024, the Auditor General found that, despite more than $36 billion in industrial obligations, the policy was being implemented without clear rules and that neither its precise economic benefits nor its overall cost could be accurately determined. Likewise, the Parliamentary Budget Officer observed that nearly half of all ITB transactions bore no relationship to the procurements with which they were associated and that small and medium-sized enterprises captured only a marginal share of the benefits. Caution is warranted all the more because the academic literature on industrial offsets is generally sceptical. Their economic returns frequently disappoint, even though defence investments can generate positive spillover effects in advanced economies such as Canada. It is therefore essential to reverse the current logic. It should not be up to the supplier to determine where its offset obligations are credited; Canada must specify from the outset, within the contract itself, the capabilities it intends to develop. Scattershot ITBs designed around the contractor's commercial interests merely purchase compliance, whereas targeted ITBs have the potential to build a genuine industrial base. Two priorities stand out. The first concerns production transfers. Beyond the hull sections already assigned to Marmen and the promised torpedo-related work, Canada must secure an expanding share of work performed domestically while concentrating efforts where success is realistically achievable. Integrating suppliers into an already established production chain once manufacturing is underway is exceptionally difficult. Greater emphasis should therefore be placed on in-service support, mid-life upgrades, and high-consumption items—including munitions—rather than on an artificial division of production work. The second concerns technology transfers. TKMS's commitment to making "essential elements" of its intellectual property available under sovereign Canadian arrangements must be translated into comprehensive data rights, licensing agreements, and domestic engineering capabilities. There should, however, be no illusions. The intellectual property that an industrial contractor is willing to transfer is rarely its most valuable, and it is only meaningful if Canada possesses both the capability and the determination to exploit it. This is where Canada can transform a concession into an advantage. Since we will not be assembling the submarine hulls, we should invest as development partners rather than late-stage subcontractors in the areas that will define the future of undersea warfare—and where Canada's industrial and scientific base already possesses significant strengths. These areas include autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), which are indispensable for the surveillance of the Arctic and Canada's three oceans; underwater sensors and acoustic monitoring networks, where Canadian expertise in underwater acoustics is internationally recognized; and weapons and missile systems, including the integration—and ultimately licensed production—of the submarine-launched Naval Strike Missile (NSM-SL) and the Tyrfing missile. Kongsberg's central role within the program provides a natural avenue for Canada to offset, in terms of overall firepower, what the absence of a vertical launch system costs in dedicated launch cells. Canada should also prioritize communications and command-and-control systems based on sovereign artificial intelligence, a prerequisite for preserving national decision-making autonomy even while operating within the Alliance. Investments in these areas would serve Canada in two ways. They would strengthen the defence of Canadian territory while simultaneously positioning Canadian firms within the value chains of the trilateral submarine program and, more broadly, within Europe's expanding defence rearmament effort. *** The selection of TKMS represents a calculated wager on Europe and the Arctic. But a wager is only as good as its execution. If Ottawa negotiates these contracts with the same determination it displayed while courting bidders, Canada will emerge from this program not simply as the purchaser of twelve submarines, but as a genuine co-producer possessing enduring areas of industrial and technological expertise. That is the standard by which this historic decision should ultimately be judged. Image Credit: JustSomePics via Wikimedia Commons. ## Can Canada Be Influential in a World of Great Power Politics? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/can-canada-be-influential-in-a-world-of-great-power-politics/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Canada must not only contend with the waning of America’s hegemony, but also face a return to the kind of hard power politics witnessed in Ukraine, Syria and the South China Sea. The question is whether Canada has what it takes to influence international relations in this new environment. Highlights Canada does not have the means and power to influence, let alone shape, the nature of the international system. Although Canada cannot influence the nature of the system by playing power politics with China, Russia or other rising powers, it can still aspire to impact its dynamics by working in small groups and with its alliance partners. Canada can mitigate the return to hard power politics in two ways: through regime building on specific security issues and by promoting institutional binding to protect the current order. Context There are multiple signs suggesting that the world is moving away from a US-dominated order. While it is too early to define this emerging world, it already poses serious challenges to the liberal international order, which has brought prosperity to Canada and the world for over 70 years. Canada must not only contend with the waning of America’s hegemony, but also face a return to the kind of hard power politics witnessed in Ukraine, Syria and the South China Sea. The question is whether Canada has what it takes to influence international relations in this new environment. And, if so, what are the areas where Canada can expect to play a constructive role? The Nature and Dynamics of the International System The international system gathers states performing different roles based on a combination of material power and the perception they hold of their own place in it. With this in mind, Robert Keohane, a well-known professor of International relations, came up decades ago with a typology of behaviour that is highly relevant today for understanding Canada’s place in a transforming world order. Keohane’s first category is composed of “system-determining” states or superpowers. States that are powerful enough to shape the nature of the international system and dominate it through military might and the size of their economies. The United States, and most likely China in the 21st century, fall into this category. Graham Allison’s Destined for War is a reminder that Americans and Chinese are the great rivals at the top of the international structure and that a war between them over the nature and domination of the system remains a possibility in the 21st century. “System-influencing” states make up Keohane’s second category, referring to countries that cannot dominate the system but can still influence its nature. France, Russia and the United Kingdom, being nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, would currently come under this category. Russia’s annexation of Crimea or France’s opposition to the US war in Iraq in 2003 remind us that even if they cannot dominate the system, these states must be taken seriously because they have the power to influence it through unilateral actions. But what about Canada? Canada falls under Keohane’s third group: the “system-affecting” states. Countries that cannot shape or influence the nature of the system but can have an impact on its dynamics by working in small groups within international organisations. This is how Canada was able to exert influence in the past. Canada helped reduce international tensions during the Cold War and has been successful at influencing states’ behaviour through norm promotion since then. By working with others today, Canada can perhaps seek to mitigate power politics by overcoming new sources of anarchy, and by defending the current international order through regime building and institutional binding. After all, norms, rules and institutions are just about all Canada has at its disposal to ensure its security and prosperity in the 21st century. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada International regimes set the limit between conformity and deviance in international relations and their underlying norms exert social pressures on states to comply with expectations. Armed with this knowledge, Canada should promote new security regimes to compel great powers to comply with new norms with the goal of reducing their temptation to rely on unilateral actions. Canada Should Regulate LAWS One source of anarchy that must be overcome is the lack of regulation over the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). These weapons are transforming our relationship with security, war and peace and have the potential to bring about a dramatic shift in the transforming world order. Experts are now predicting that fully autonomous weapons systems – military devices that are able to select targets without direct human intervention – could be operational in the very near future. This possibility raises security concerns in a system that is increasingly fragmented and where hard power appears to be on the rise. The good news is that fully autonomous weapons have yet to be created and that international discussions on their use are already underway at the United Nations in Geneva. Over the last six years, Canada, alongside many other nations, has participated in numerous meetings at which the legal, ethical and technical aspects of this issue have been addressed. The bad news is that several states, including China, Russia and the United States, are working on developing these weapons. Moreover, after years of discussions, experts still cannot agree on the technical definitions, notably regarding what constitutes “autonomy”. This lack of consensual definitions is preventing the UN from progressing towards an international regime that could legally constrain the use of LAWS and limit potential drifts. In the meantime, however, research and technology are progressing rapidly. Several states have already called for a preventive ban treaty on LAWS (e.g., Columbia, Pakistan, many African states) while others are calling for a legally binding regime to ensure human control over some of their specific functions (e.g., Austria, Brazil and Chile). Meanwhile, an international campaign to stop these weapons (the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots) has garnered the support of more than 80 national and international NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. However, many governments are opposed to a legally binding regime. Some of them would settle for a political declaration on the need for human control and accountability (e.g., France and Germany), while others are simply opposed to any measures that would constrain their use of these weapons (e.g., the United States, Russia, Israel, Australia). Recent developments suggest that the Canadian government takes this issue seriously. Canada’s Foreign Minister Champagne’s mandate letter issued in December 2019 indicates that the minister must “dvance international efforts to ban the development and use of fully autonomous weapons systems”. Since then, however, the government has not issued a formal statement supporting a ban against these weapons. Canada should seize on this opportunity to join, or even lead, a multilateral effort to ban the use and production of LAWS that would operate without a meaningful level of human control. This could be a significant way for a system-affecting state like Canada to impact the dynamics of the emerging world. Canada has four main assets here.  First, it is known not to be developing fully autonomous weapons and is therefore well positioned to act as a legitimate actor. Second, Canada has well-known expertise as a norm-building entrepreneur and invested in significant multilateral initiatives in the not-so-distant past. The Ottawa Mine Ban Convention and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty attest to the fact that, with political will, Canada can be an important “system-affecting” state. Canada has already demonstrated that it knows how to bring states together and build consensus. Third, Canada is a member of several organizations including the G7, G20, NATO, APEC, the Commonwealth and the Francophonie. These institutions could be used as force multipliers to amplify Canada’s effort and increase its chances of success. Fourth, Canada is a nation of both the Atlantic and Pacific. Over the years, it has maintained close ties to both “system-influencing” and “system-affecting” states, in Europe and the Pacific region, mainly for cultural and security reasons. Canada could thus capitalize on this advantage to facilitate coordination with like-minded nations and pressure close allies, notably, France, the United Kingdom and Australia, to join in such a regime of cooperation. Some observers will argue that since UN discussions on LAWS have already been underway for years, Canada and its allies should simply stay away from this issue. However, it is relevant to look at what transpired with the negotiations on landmines at the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in the 1990s. System-affecting states such as Canada, Norway and Belgium were frustrated by the UN consensus-based system, benefitting great powers that did not favour a ban on these weapons. Discussions were dragging on and negotiators were looking to find the “lowest common denominator” to reach a consensus. This led Canada to push for a new regime negotiated outside of the United Nations. Ottawa was initially able to bring together many system-affecting states and NGOs and eventually, through effort and leadership, more than 120 countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia and Japan, signed the Ottawa Treaty. This case shows that when political leadership is exercised, system-affecting states can indeed impact the dynamics of the international system. Canada Should Defend the International Order by Intensifying Institutional Binding     Change in the distribution of power does not automatically imply change of international order. The relative decline of the US hegemonic power does not necessarily mean the end of western liberal hegemony if a key group of powerful states collectively ensures the sustainability of this order. While Canada and other “system-affecting” allies such as Germany, Italy, Japan, and the MIKTA countries, cannot stop systemic transformations from occurring, they can potentially preserve the current order, or at least slow its demise, by teaming up with “system-influencing” states such as the United Kingdom and, more importantly, France, which exerts strong political leadership within the European Union. For this to happen, however, this group of  states would have to better coordinate their efforts and exert greater leadership within international institutions, notably within the WTO and the G20. These states could promote institutional co-binding to overcome power politics and zero-sum games. In the words of Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, the strategy of co-binding intends to tie “one another down by locking each other into institutions that mutually constrain one another. […] This binding practice was significantly and independently motivated by an attempt to overcome anarchy and its consequences among the Western states” in the 20th century. This practice is especially important with respect to threatening powers such as China and Russia, as institutional binding would tie these states down into acceptable patterns of behaviour, possibly reducing their temptation to rely on unilateral actions. The idea here is not to rely on institutional counterbalancing within the G20 or the WTO to block and harm China or Russia. Focusing on coercive measures against Beijing or Moscow within these forums would be counterproductive. Such measures would simply alienate these states and increase their incentives to create an alternative to the current liberal order. To paraphrase Joseph Nye, system-affecting and system-influencing liberal states must hone their ability to shape the preferences of great powers through appeal and attraction rather than coercion. They must help bridge divides and build consensus within these institutions. Once again, Canada could be opportunistic and benefit from its comparative advantages to promote co-binding. As an Atlantic/Pacific nation, it could not only increase coordination with its Five-Eyes, G7 and NATO partners, but could also move closer to the MIKTA countries, which openly work to bridge divides through consensus building with the aim of preserving the current world order. ## Can Washington Save Its Leadership in NATO? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/can-washington-save-its-leadership-in-nato/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Much action will have to be taken by the new administration for the United States to regain its full influence in the alliance. The abandonment of American leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not begin with Donald Trump. From the end of the Cold War, the weight of the United States within the alliance was called into question by European allies. The refusal of NATO intervention in Iraq in 2003 by France and Germany already indicated at that time that American leadership was no longer unchallenged. More recently, the Obama administration did not seek to reaffirm US hegemony in NATO. On the contrary, President Obama instead put forward the "lead from behind" strategy, thus promoting a readjustment of burden-sharing within the alliance. This neglect of leadership is illustrated in particular with Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011. During this intervention, Washington only played a support role, leaving France and Great Britain to take the reins of operations. When he came to power, President Donald Trump continued on this same path. With his slogan "America First," Trump made his allies understand that Washington’s priority is no longer international affairs. Trump believed that US military interventions were long and expensive and that it was better for Washington to focus on domestic policies. This is why he did not hesitate to withdraw his troops from Syria in October 2019 without consulting his allies first. The train of Washington's gradual withdrawal from the management of world affairs has therefore been running for a long time. The 2020 US presidential elections are unlikely to change this trend. Much action will have to be taken by the new administration for the United States to regain its full influence in the alliance. Joe Biden’s Priorities Joe Biden has said it over and over again: Under his presidency, the United States will show stronger leadership on the international stage, and it is a safe bet that NATO will be at the heart of its strategic framework. According to him, NATO is "the most effective political-military alliance in modern history." But how will the new president of the United States be able to regain leadership in the alliance? The first thing to do certainly will be to try to repair the transatlantic relationship, which has been damaged by President Trump. To do this, Biden hopes to organize a NATO summit in the first months of his tenure. Diplomacy at the top will be the perfect opportunity for the US president to show that the United States is back and wants to strengthen ties with its allies. Biden is clear in this regard, this summit will serve to mark the return of the United States to the heart of the international game. Biden also wants to reaffirm American leadership by reviewing the organization’s strategic concepts. NATO's last strategic concept dates from 2010 and no longer reflects international realities. Writing a new strategic concept would include conventional elements, including the emergence of China and threats in international waters, but also non-traditional threats such as artificial intelligence, militarized corruption and related challenges to space. Rewriting a new concept would allow the United States to advance its foreign policy priorities. Next, Biden wants members to reaffirm their democratic commitment to the organization as he believes that strengthening democratic institutions in member countries is a priority so that NATO itself follows the values ​​it preaches. This could imply an even a harsher attitude towards the actions of Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea and in Nagorno-Karabakh. Biden stresses the importance of shared values ​​and trust in order to ensure greater cohesion in NATO. Ultimately, the issue of fair burden sharing and achieving the 2% is unlikely to go away, despite the election of Joe Biden. Certainly, while Donald Trump attached great importance to this, he was not the first American president to insist that his allies pay their share. Biden will continue in this same vein. The main difference will be in the approach. President Trump has repeatedly mentioned that the United States will not assist an ally in need if the ally has not paid 2% of its GDP in defense, questioning the sanctity of article 5 of the 1949 Treaty and applying a transactional logic to the principle of collective security at the same time. Joe Biden is unlikely to fall into such extremes. Washington's aid is not conditional on the 2%, and as he mentioned in a March 2020 essay for Foreign Affairs, “the alliance transcends dollars and cents; the United States "commitment is sacred, not transactional." Recommendations for Canada Canada will not be able to stand still in the face of these changes within the transatlantic alliance. The Trudeau government will certainly have to take steps that will allow it to keep its American ally close while remaining loyal to the organization. Two decisions will have to be made by Ottawa. Demonstrate commitment to NATO. Canada must continue to be proactive and be involved in various NATO interventions, training and exercises, especially like the one it is already doing in Latvia. Canadian involvement must not wane, as Biden highly values Canada’s place in operations. Continued engagement could certainly allow Ottawa to gain more weight in the North Atlantic Council. The commitment to NATO also means increasing military spending. Canada is still a long way from achieving the required 2%, nor does it plan to reach it by 2024. Nevertheless, according to Stephen Saideman, NATO under President Biden would be more focused allied actions than spending. Participate in the NATO reform proposed by Biden. The review of strategic concepts will be the perfect opportunity for Ottawa to put its two cents in the future directions of the transatlantic alliance. Fortunately for Ottawa, Biden and Trudeau hold similar views about NATO, Russia and democracy, which may make it easier to advance Canadian national interests. As for democratic reforms, the advantage for Ottawa of participating is that the implications and costs for the Canadian armed forces will be less as Biden seeks the use of force as a last resort. All in all, even though Joe Biden was elected the 46th President of the United States in a bid to break with Donald Trump's international policies, that does not mean that the remaining problems within NATO will be resolved overnight. All member states will have to do their part, not only to eliminate the growing tensions internally, but also to define a clear leader who will put the alliance back on track.   ## Canada and Huawei’s 5G URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-and-huaweis-5g/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Canada and Huawei's 5G 5G technology and the Chinese company Huawei 5G is the fifth generation of mobile communications, following on from 4G. 5G will bring a new technological terrain that will allow interconnection between different domains, applications, and customers. This technology will be based on a predominantly virtual ecosystem, that is to say, that it will be made up more of software than of hardware infrastructure. This development will make it possible to connect a multitude of users on the same physical infrastructure, each with a virtual network. Among the areas where 5G technology is expected to be implemented in fields such as health (remote surgery), industry (remote control and diagnostics, connected objects, factory automation), energy (smart meters, consumption forecasts, renewable energies), municipalities (smart cities), automobiles (vehicle empowerment and automation), or virtual reality and augmented reality. However, it should be emphasized that 5G does not just come with new software advancements, but also with new hardware technologies, especially for data transmission methods that involve the installation of new hardware infrastructure. However, this new technology comes with its share of concerns. First, according to Martijn Rasser 5G scrambles the distinction between the core and the peripheral of the network, making it more complex to isolate certain network elements, unlike the current 4G. Next, according to Melissa Hathaway, the software component of the network causes the multiplication of lines of code, which is likely to make network security more complex and exposed to many more vulnerabilities. By analyzing the 5G offerings of the Chinese company Huawei, the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Center (HCSEC) of the United Kingdom discovered several hundred vulnerabilities sufficiently important to create serious damage in the event of malicious exploitation. Finally, Huawei being the most advanced company in the field of 5G and its presumed proximity to the Chinese government leads several Western democracies to question the place of Huawei in their national infrastructures. Indeed, in an era of competition between the great powers, the shadow of the Chinese state behind the Huawei company particularly worries Western democracies in which the company is already well established. The new Chinese Law on National Intelligence of 2017 is especially problematic. The law makes it clear that national security is everyone's business in the country. Article 14 allows the state to request relevant bodies, organizations, and citizens to provide them with assistance, support, or any necessary cooperation. Article 16 allows intelligence officials to enter places and restricted areas of interest, interview relevant persons, organizations, or institutions, and read and collect relevant records, documents, or articles. In this context, the fear is that the Chinese government could ask the Huawei company to cooperate with the department's intelligence and obtain access to networks or information about rival countries like Canada or the United States. This is why mobile networks must be considered activities of vital importance, as is the case in France, where they designated the sovereign action of the state as a source of protection. Five Eyes partners dealing with Huawei 5G The Five Eyes, the intelligence partnership between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, is one of Canada's most important national security assets. The issue of Huawei 5G is of particular interest to the Five Eyes countries, insofar as the latter exchange a large volume of intelligence. So, what is the position of Canada's allies on the 5G developed by the Chinese company? The United States has already prohibited several departments from using Huawei technology. The United States is also warning the Five Eyes allies that if they accept Huawei 5G technology, intelligence exchanges would be compromised. The United Kingdom, first simply restricted Huawei’s access to its 5G infrastructure, but recently decided to completely ban 5G technology from the Chinese company and will require that all of Huawei’s installations are removed from networks by 2027. The British decision was taken so as not to harm its relations with the United States, especially in a period of Brexit. Australia is even more hostile to Huawei 5G than the United States and decided to ban Huawei’s 5G network completely. This decision was taken based on extensive research by the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO). According to Patrick Walsh, Professor of Intelligence and Security Studies at the University Charles Sturt, after simply looking to restrict and secure its network from Huawei technology, the intelligence service concluded that the scrambles t of boundaries between the core and the edge, and the virtualization of the network made this kind of security very difficult. Finally, New Zealand, like Canada, has yet to make a final decision on Huawei's 5G. The New Zealand government has claimed that this technology poses certain security concerns. However, New Zealand is in a special position, between the United States and China. The country is very dependent on the Chinese economy and therefore tries to manage its relations. On the other hand, New Zealand is afraid of abandonment by the United States if it does not follow Washington's positions. However, according to Joe Burton of the University of Waikato, New Zealand also fears being trapped by the choice of the Five Eyes and having no choice but to follow its partners. It is likely then that New Zealand will wait for the Canadian decision to position itself, unless Canada’s strategy is to wait for New Zealand’s decision. Beyond the Five Eyes, European countries are also looking at the thorny issue of 5G technology from Huawei. France, without completely banning Huawei equipment, has decided to provide limited permissions to operators using Huawei technology and encourages operators who have not already adopted Huawei to not do so in the future. The Netherlands has not taken a government decision on whether to ban the Chinese company, but its largest telephone operator has decided to ban Huawei equipment from its core network, while Denmark's largest mobile firm reserves its 5G contracts to European suppliers. In any event, the European Union has decided to make securing its telephone and IT networks a priority and to tackle the problem together. What choice for Canada? Canada, one of the last Five Eyes members to make a decision, is under more pressure to finalize its stance since the UK decided to ban the Chinese company from its 5G network. This is in addition to the pressure the United States is exerting on Canada by threatening to reassess cooperation in exchange for intelligence if Canada allows Huawei in its 5G infrastructure. Justin Trudeau said he was watching carefully to what our allies decide to promote economic opportunities while securing networks and infrastructure. The Prime Minister is also paying attention to national security advisors. Richard Fadden, former director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and former national security adviser to Stephen Harper and Justin Trudeau, believes that there is no real consensus within the Canadian intelligence community on banning Huawei 5G. Some would be in favor of such a ban while others believe it is possible to simply limit Huawei's access by securing sensitive networks. Either way, it seems difficult for Canada to make a decision that would go against the choices of its Five Eyes partners. Certainly, such a decision would be damaging to its relations with the Five Eyes, and especially with its American neighbor. In addition, given the very great integration of telecommunications and networks between the United States and Canada, an authorization of Huawei's 5G on Canadian soil would directly threaten its American neighbor, which Canada does not want. It is, therefore, possible that these elements will weigh on the future Canadian decision, which seems to favor a common approach within the Five Eyes. However, according to Melissa Hathaway, the race for 5G is already lost for Canada, and it should now invest in research and development in the technologies of to break out of the technological dependence on China. Beyond just 5G, the whole Canadian vision of its approach with China must be rethought. According to Fadden, Canada will have to acquire a comprehensive strategic vision on China as it is realizing that China may never be an important strategic partner because of its aggressiveness intelligence practices. Stéphanie Carvin, professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carlton University, believes that Canada must rethink its cybersecurity strategy and must adopt an effective doctrine in this area. The 5G issue, therefore, goes well beyond the simple question of technological development. It is symptomatic of the geostrategic positioning that Canada intends to adopt in an era of uninhibited rivalry between China and the United States. ## Canada and ReArm Europe: More Buck, More Bang? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-and-rearm-europe-more-buck-more-bang/ Modified: 2025-06-30 With the world becoming “increasingly dangerous and divided,” Prime Minister Mark Carney has declared his intention to revive the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) through a major spending program aimed at addressing key capability gaps while reducing overall reliance on the United States. Carney has even pledged to expand defence spending to two percent of Canada’s gross domestic project by March 2026. The catalyst for this rearmament is plain to see. Despite pledging to meet the two percent benchmark at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, Canada has lagged behind most of its allies despite the Russian belligerence toward its neighbors and the security challenges that stem from the rise of China. More recently, annexationist rhetoric from the President of the United States—however serious—has also stirred anxiety within Canada over its inability to secure its own political sovereignty and territorial integrity. A key plank of this initiative to rebuild the CAF is to involve Canada in ReArm Europe, as envisioned in the joint security and defence statement issued by Canada and the European Union on 23 June 2025. Established this past March by the European Commission, ReArm Europe is a loan program that unlocks up to €800 billion ($1.25 trillion) over five years for EU Member States to spend on defence. It is open to non-EU Member States like the United Kingdom and Canada. On the surface, joining ReArm Europe would advance three related objectives for Ottawa. First, access to those funds would in theory enable Canada to expand its defence spending. Second, those additional funds can help stimulate Canada’s defence industry. Third, and finally, participating in this loan program will substantiate Carney’s stated goal of diversifying Canada’s security partnerships so that it can lessen its reliance on the United States. But what really is ReArm Europe, and what can be reasonably expected from Canada’s participation in it? Despite the headline-making sums of money involved, there is little in Canada written about the EU loan program. The purpose of this essay is to offer an assessment of ReArm Europe by explaining what it is and what problems in the European defence industry it aims to solve and, more crucially, will not solve. We then demonstrate how Canada could fruitfully participate in ReArm Europe. In a nutshell, we argue that Canada should manage its expectations for what this strategic defence initiative can offer. Although it may unlock some funds for Canada, the lack of significant structural change in the European defence market and Canada’s own bespoke needs will limit what ReArm Europe can do for Canada as it tries to revive its own armed forces. The stated purpose of ReArm Europe is to induce more collaborative spending, but the practical effect will probably be to support European national industries.  What is ReArm Europe? The first thing to note is that “ReArm Europe” is a misnomer. Although King Charles III referred to it explicitly when he gave his Speech from the Throne in May, invoking the name ‘ReArm Europe’ is somewhat anachronistic. Because Spanish and Italian prime ministers worried that the phrase was too provocative, the strategic defence initiative has been rebranded as “Readiness 2030”, with 2030 being the date suggested by European intelligence as when Russia could have the capacity to attack EU/NATO Member States. That European leaders have trouble calling a spade a spade is indicative of some of the challenges outlined below. Regardless of the politics behind its name, the European Commission unveiled ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 in March 2025 to serve as a strategic defence initiative that aims to mobilize industry and capital for joint security. Intended as a supplementary boost to defence modernization efforts at the national level, it aims to achieve economies of scale in the sector and to ensure military supply, primarily through regulatory harmonization, rapprochement of capital markets, and coordinated procurement between participant states. According to recent estimates from European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen, ReArm Europe aims to mobilize €800 billion over five years. That said, this number is slightly misleading, as ReArm Europe is financed not by increased EU-level contributions, but mainly through EU-sanctioned deficit spending. Though its constituent Security and Action For Europe (SAFE) regulation will provide joint procurement loans totalling €150 billion, ReArm Europe will see the remaining €650 billion raised by exempting military spending from fiscal requirements under the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. Other benefits to the sector will be delivered via deregulation, with defence projects qualifying for investment using Member States’ economic aid and assistance from the European Investment Bank, which has recently tripled its defence portfolio. The duration of loans given under the banner of ReArm Europe is up to 45 years, making the debt a multi-generational one in order to mitigate the guns-versus-butter trade-offs that European countries are already facing.  In turn, how would Canada fit into this system? Considering it is not a member of the EU, it is not bound to any of its fiscal regulation being softened. According to the SAFE regulation, third parties can qualify for joint procurements if they sign a Security and Defence Partnership (SDP) with the bloc, a step confirmed by Canadian policymakers. Given the intense debate surrounding Canada’s reliance on the United States for defence-related products, many policymakers, including the Prime Minister, have touted the mechanism as an opportunity to reduce that dependence and to diversify Canadian security ties. Nevertheless, several elements of the plan leave several major questions unanswered, and the integration of countries outside the European Union offers fewer benefits, especially outside the continental security environment, than what would be the case for actual EU Member States. Structural Constraints in the European Defence Sector The overarching purpose of ReArm Europe is to facilitate defence spending on the European continent. After all, the combination of the post-Cold War peace dividend, the focus on out-of-area expeditionary operations, and financial austerity have depleted many European defence establishments in the three decades prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That the United States provided strong security guarantees and has competitive defence contractors that sell high-quality military capabilities has not helped the European defence industry either. With few firms emerging as market leaders on the European continent, legacy contractors entrenched themselves in domestic procurement markets. As demand relaxed and military budgets shrank, the sector in Europe experienced less disruptive innovation compared to what the U.S. defence industry has experienced despite the latter’s bias for legacy companies. Governments still saw value in their national defence industries, but procurement tended to follow industrial aims in the spirit of juste retour, thereby putting a damper on joint procurement projects and creating inefficiencies across many, but certainly not all, military products. The result is duplication in certain systems, like armored fighting vehicles and command and control systems, while other needs, like ammunition production, went neglected by many. Too many countries have tended to see defence as a source of employment rather than a means for generating strategic preparedness. Though up from 11% in 2010, spending on European collaborative defence equipment procurement remains short of the European Commission’s goal of 35% at 18% in 2020 of total defence spending. European defence establishments are not scaled to prepare for high-intensity war despite their aggregate latent power potential. More to the point, they have struggled to fulfill existing orders. Supply bottlenecks have been characteristic of the European defence industry. A 2011 Commons Committee of Public Accounts (United Kingdom) report highlighted how the Typhoon—a multirole aircraft that Britain purchased with Germany, Italy, and Spain—provided a cautionary tale as regards to European defence collaboration in view of the “huge delays and spiralling cost increases” that attended the project. The Royal Air Force was later forced to cannibalize its aircraft for spare parts. Australia had to quash its fleet of European-made NHIndustries NH90 Tactical Transport Helicopters fifteen years ahead of schedule out of frustration with their subpar performance and “lack of spare parts support.” Although aerospace is one of the most Europeanised parts of the European defence industry, Canada’s own procurement of the Airbus C295 is already six years behind schedule. These frustrations have only become more acute after Ukraine proved capable of defeating Russia’s efforts at regime change in the opening days of its full-scale invasion. Even before Donald Trump restored his presidency, kickstarting the European defence-industrial base has become a priority. Setting aside its previous pro-market instincts, the bloc has pivoted towards an industrial policy to secure its energy supply and to rebuild its manufacturing capabilities. The enthusiasm for ReArm Europe’s debt-financed spending renders this point even more salient when considering military aid to Ukraine, which is viewed in part as a preventative expense for future conflict involving the EU. And indeed, one reason for why certain NATO members gave more military assistance to Ukraine, at least through 2022, was how much they had spent on their own strategic preparedness in the years leading up to Russia’s full-scale attack. Still, as the naming controversy over ReArm Europe, EU Member States remain divided on supporting Ukraine and, for that matter, preparing for strategic conflict with Russia. Thus, as much ReArm Europe tries to address industrial undercapacity by consolidating and coordinating the production of key defence systems, the basic gist of ReArm Europe is that it throws money at the problems inherent in the European defence industry. Supply chains will remain complicated and national differences will also complicate joint procurement plans. Inefficiencies will persist absent a more robust common defence vision of the sort that various commentators have declared as essential for the European defence industry to make meaningful progress. No Great Expectations Due to how the initiative is structured, joining ReArm Europe through SAFE as a non-EU state comes with several structural hurdles for Canada. Unfortunately, as much as the initiative is worth pursuing, Canadian leaders should not oversell the benefits that it will receive from ReArm Europe. As part of a broader effort to increase efficiency and productivity within the European Union following the 2024 Draghi Report, the European Commission established the Savings and Investment Union (SIU). This initiative will augment ReArm Europe since integrating capital markets and facilitating cross-border banking transactions serve to connect European savings with investment needs. Canada is not part of the SIU and so it will have little bearing on Canadian financial markets. Crucially, directing European savings towards investments in Canada go against the stated aim of strengthening Europe’s own defence sector and global competitiveness. Indeed, the primary purpose of the SIU is to reduce fragmentation in the European banking sector and to encourage economic growth within the European Union. Of course, Canadian defence contractors could indirectly benefit from their European counterparts possessing more capital facing fewer investment barriers than they did before. However, one can argue that Canada does not need EU funds to go about its own deficit spending. Canada just needs to spend its own money. Crucially the strategic initiative will prioritize projects that contribute to continental defence. It was, after all, called ReArm Europe, and not ReArm North America or even ReArm North Atlantic. Embodying this prioritization is the fast-track status (i.e. no SDP required) that is given to European countries that have at least partial integration with the European Union common market, including those in the European Economic Area, the European Free Trade Association, and Ukraine, the last of which is meant to benefit from the defence integration and military assistance that ReArm Europe could help expand. Common procurement is even available for acceding and candidate states like Serbia and Turkey, however long their odds for joining the EU are at present. The prioritization of European defence products for Europe also is evident in the requirements for how the funds are to be used. The rules are clear. With respect to war consumables like ammunition and missiles, Member States “must ensure that components representing 65% of the cost of the end product originate from the Union/EEA EFTA countries/Ukraine.” This requirement is more exacting for complex systems because EU Member States must also ensure that “the contractors fully control the design of the defence equipment” so as not to create “new dependencies” in their production. In short, the most optimistic scenario has Canadian contractors being able to make as much as 35% of the cost of the final product. Reality will fall short of that threshold since European policymakers will likely see the deployment of capital across the Atlantic as the mere geographical distance of Canada from European supply chains and military assets raises costs and will constrain its inclusion in joint procurement projects. Indeed, considering that nearly two-thirds of Canada’s defence exports went to the United States in 2022, the Canadian defence industry is so integrated into its U.S. counterpart that unshackling it will be difficult, not least since, under Title III of the United States’ Defence Production Act, Canadian defence companies are treated like U.S. ones. That Canadian defence procurement has been slanted towards the United States hamstrings Ottawa’s credibility as a prospective investor and may make meeting the issue of design control a sensitive one with Ottawa. Finally, ReArm Europe will likely help finance big legacy companies that are national champions on the continent. For these reasons, the scope for collaborative innovation and technology sharing across the Atlantic Ocean might remain inhibited. The few initiatives that have been proposed, such as onshoring production of Saab’s Gripen fighter jet in Canada, should be treated with skepticism. Two matters arise. One relates to the feasibility and economics of standing up and sustaining new production facilities within a reasonable timeframe. Another more pertinent one relates to the wisdom of acquiring the specific capabilities that those initiatives would encourage. One reason why the European defence market is fragmented is because, as Jan Joel Andersson notes, “diverging national requirements, design philosophies, and political and industrial interests make it difficult to agree.” Canada has its own set of considerations that reflect its geopolitical orientation, not least its extensive involvement in the defence of North America. Although the record of Canada’s future fighter jet program is peculiar, not least because of the controversies that have attended the procurement of the F-35, one reason why Dassault and Airbus are out of the picture is because they could not abide, at reasonable cost, by the command, control, and communication systems requirements that Canada’s participation in North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) necessitates. A more sensible approach could be to situate Canada’s participation in ReArm Europe in the context of its pre-existing European commitments. After all, Canada is in the process of expanding its troop commitment to the Multinational Brigade in Latvia, of which it has been the Framework Nation since 2017. Concerns regarding the viability of the Canadian commitment have intensified following the 2022 Madrid Summit decision to upgrade what was once the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup from the size of a large battalion to a brigade. Rotating 1900 CAF personnel between Canada and Latvia has been a major strain on Canada’s overall force posture. And so those capability needs that directly service the Canadian contribution—ammunition and other consumables—could be financed through ReArm Europe, thereby taking advantage of the shorter supply lines and the existing partnerships that the Brigade already embodies. Conclusion Joining ReArm Europe has been a declared priority for Prime Minister Carney as part of his worthwhile pursuit to revive the Canadian Armed Forces. Becoming a member of ReArm Europe does have its benefits, especially since Canada is already involved in European security as a leading contributor to the Multinational Brigade in Latvia. However, the benefits should not be oversold to members of the Canadian public. The Canadian defence establishment should have tempered expectations for what ReArm Europe can realistically provide. The reason is simple: the European defence industry will likely remain fragmented along national lines and thus prone to inefficiencies. The use of any funds loaned under this initiative will give strong preference to European products made in Europe. The massive sums of money associated with ReArm Europe should not divert attention away from these issues.  Jacob Tuckey is pursuing a MA in Global Governance at the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo as well as an emerging scholar in the Strategic Analysis Network. Alexander Lanoszka is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo as well as co-director of the Strategic Analysis Network. The authors thank Richard Shimooka for comments on an earlier draft. ## Canada and the power struggle in the Arctic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-and-the-power-struggle-in-the-arctic/ Modified: 2020-10-27 > In this third capsule of the NSA, our experts Whitney Lackenbauer et Magali Vullierme are looking into the Arctic, this vast territory coveted by Russia, China, the United States and other powers whose interests can clash with those of Canada. Should Ottawa fear their ambitions? Who are its allies? What should it monitor more closely?  In this third capsule of the Strategic Analysis Network led by Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, our experts Whitney Lackenbauer et Magali Vullierme are looking into the Arctic, this vast territory coveted by Russia, China, the United States and other powers whose interests can clash with those of Canada. Should Ottawa fear their ambitions? Who are its allies? What should it monitor more closely? ## Canada Facing Trump’s US: Vassal or Sovereign? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-facing-trumps-us-vassal-or-sovereign/ Modified: 2026-01-21 Canada is preparing to release its first National Security Strategy since 2004. Twenty-two years. A strategic eternity. Since then, the world has tipped over—and with it our mental comfort. The international order that protected Canada while asking little in return has fractured. That threat does not come only from Moscow or Beijing. It also comes—and increasingly clearly—from Washington. This idea may seem shocking because it clashes with decades of Canada–U.S. friendship and a “benevolent” US hegemony. But international politics is not a scrapbook of memories: it is made of power relations, and those relations have changed. The US threat to Canada will outlast the Trump administration for three reasons. The first reason is ideology. The US government openly supports extremist political forces, promotes leaders aligned with Trumpism, and marginalizes those who diverge from it. Security thus becomes conditional on political alignment with Washington. Ideology in turn inform an imperial approach to resources. The official US rhetoric toward Venezuela and Greenland is unambiguous: certain resources are deemed too strategic to be left to the sovereignty of others. Where consent is not forthcoming, pressure will be applied. The third reason is geography. In the Western Hemisphere, strategic autonomy is no longer tolerated. It is redefined as deviation—and treated accordingly. The Carney government in Ottawa knows all this, hence the attempts to diversify the Canadian economy, while developing greater autonomy in defence. But the forthcoming National Security Strategy will have to address a basic strategic dilemma last discussed a century or so ago: vassalization or resistance. The first option is comfortable—in theory. It means continuing as before: buying American, thinking American, planning our defence in the shadow of the Pentagon. By inviting the US empire in, vassalization allows the preservation of what remains of core Canadians values and institutions. The resistance to the idea of diversifying our trade with China and other overseas markets attests to the strength of this way of thinking. The second option is demanding in both theory and in practice. It is costly and politically risky. But it is the only option compatible with the very idea of sovereignty. To resist is to accept a brutal truth: the only language the Trump administration understands is the language of power. Resistance therefore requires substantial investment in our security and defence capabilities as well as in our economic resilience – at the expense of budgetary certainties to which we have grown accustomed since the time of the Korean War. Resistance, however, cannot be a solitary project. The path forward runs through a partnership of the willing democracies. The first concrete test will be Greenland. If Canada is serious about sovereignty and international law, it must join the European initiative aimed at offering the government and people of Greenland a kind of pact of security, defence, and economic development—one that is consensual, not imposed. If democratic allies fail to provide a credible alternative, they will leave the field open—including the rest of the Arctic region—to US coercion. The second test will come from our choices in military procurement. Will we continue to align ourselves with the US military-industrial complex, or will we accept diversifying our partnerships, at the risk of irritating Washington? This choice is deeply political. It will determine whether Canada sees itself as a strategic actor or merely as a loyal customer. The Defence Industrial Strategy, which has yet to be unveiled, will signal the direction chosen by the Carney government, as well as the scale of the resources it is willing to commit to its implementation. Canada must choose. And it must do so now. Justin Massie is a professor and head of the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal. Srdjan Vucetic is a professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa. This text was originally published in La Presse. ## Canada in 2025: Successes and Failures URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-in-2025-successes-and-failures/ Modified: 2025-12-23 What issue in Canadian foreign and defence policy saw the least improvement during the last year, and where should the Government of Canada focus its efforts for the next? Policy Forum Politique is a new publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic of national security significance to Canada. For this fourth edition, we ask three experts for their perspectives on Canada's performance during the last year, and where it should focus its efforts next. Louise Blais | Laval University The issue that has seen the least progress this year is the defence and security relationship with the United States, a pillar that we continue to address in a fragmented manner. Despite additional investments, particularly to modernise NORAD, Canada has still not articulated a proactive strategy that addresses all of the continent's security challenges. This shortcoming becomes even more concerning when considering developments in Mexico. Washington is now openly discussing possible targeted military operations against cartels on Mexican soil. Such a decision would create a major strategic dilemma for Canada: are we prepared to define our position if our main ally chooses to act in this context? Have we assessed the impacts on trilateral cooperation, on the USMCA, and on the security of our own borders? There is no indication that such a scenario has been seriously anticipated. More broadly, our lack of a continental strategy sometimes leads us to compensate by moving closer to Europe. While important, this pivot cannot replace our defence relationship with the United States, without which neither the protection of our territory nor the stability of our supply chains can be guaranteed. Distancing ourselves from Washington, whether voluntarily or by omission, would undermine our own security. For the coming year, the priority must be clear: to build a North American security strategy that is embraced at the highest level, linking our investments, our commitment to NORAD, and sincere preparedness for emerging dilemmas, including those related to Mexico and US military decisions. Louise Blais is a diplomat in residence and associate member of ESEI. She served as Canada's Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 2017 to 2021, responsible for the 2030 Agenda and the campaign for the Security Council. Alexander Lanoszka | University of Waterloo In a decade from now, members of the Canadian defence community might reflect on 2025 in at least one of two ways. They could come to regard 2025 as the year of overdue catalytic change that helped to bring much needed vitality to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). After decades of neglect, Canadian leaders finally were able to make an enduring financial and political commitment to rebuild the CAF, restoring Canada’s reputation as a militarily reliable ally while giving the country much-needed agency in a world increasingly beset by violent conflict. Yet there is a risk that 2025 could be a blip. New financial commitments might prove temporary, not unlike what happened during and before the Harper years. Despite all the right things said by political leaders at the time, old habits proved hard to break. Rather than consider procurement in terms of military needs and functions, politicians still saw it as a means for regional economic development and job creation, to say nothing of scoring easy political points. Military capability and defence capacity suffered as a result. The ongoing F-35 review is indicative of how the path forward remains uncertain. Initially prompted by corrosive statements made by U.S. President Donald Trump, the review continues to drag amid highly questionable claims made by Saab about the job benefits of producing Gripen aircrafts in Canada. Thus, if there is one area for improvement for Canadian civilian leaders, it is that they need to take seriously what the CAF really needs to perform what is asked of it, and to align better their investments and plans accordingly. Alexander Lanoszka is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo as well as the Director of the Master of Public Service program. He is a Co-Director of the Strategic Analysis Network and his research focuses on alliance politics, theories of war, and European politics. Sarah Sharma | University of Ottawa Renewable energy is key to Canada’s a secure and sovereign future. This past year, the Carney-led Liberal government undertook the most significant claw back of Canadian climate policy in the last decade. Perhaps most significant, the federal government and province of Alberta announced a MOU to build a new pipeline in the interests of “nation-building.” In reality, we cannot afford public investment in energy infrastructure projects that have no economic business case, threaten relationships with many First Nations and cause inter-provincial strife that could jeopardize other major infrastructure projects. Canadian energy sovereignty cannot sit on the shoulders on the oil and gas industry. A group of retired senior military officials recently affirmed that the climate crisis and energy insecurity represent legitimate threats to Canadian national security. Renewable energy is the most viable path forward to net zero and can provide win-wins for both sustainability and security. We must invest in renewable energy across Canada, particularly in remote and Arctic communities that are increasingly sites of geopolitical concern. Arctic communities must see investment in geothermal engineering to protect permafrost, renewable energy to replace diesel and forms of ecological conservation to protect lives, livelihoods and ecological systems. Beyond the Arctic, implementing infrastructure that can withstand extreme heat, including through clean energy sources, will be vital for Canadians facing health risks from increasingly warm summer months. Renewable energy is not a “nice to have” that is added onto the policy agenda when the going is good; it is a “need to have” for a strong secure economic future. Sarah E. Sharma is an Assistant Professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her research examines how power, politics and economics shapes environmental policy and its outcomes at transnational, national and subnational scales. ## Canada must defend itself against US aid by developing sovereign capabilities URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-must-defend-itself-against-us-aid-by-developing-sovereign-capabilities/ Modified: 2026-07-09 How should Canada adapt its defence policy to deal with the realities of the new geopolitical environment? Since Donald Trump's return to power, a number of experts have suggested that Canada should overhaul its foreign policy, diversify its strategic partnerships, and develop more autonomous capabilities in terms of intelligence, deterrence, and the defence industry. These proposals may seem like heresy, so discordant are they with Canada's historical complacency on defence matters. Yet the current geopolitical situation demands that Canada be equipped with sovereign defence capabilities. The current debates are nothing new. In this analysis, we propose that Canada return to a little-known concept in Canadian defence policy. This concept is that of ‘defence against help’, developed by Nils Ørvik in 1973 with the aim of proposing the contours of a defence policy for a state facing a major power on its borders. When this concept was used to give meaning to Canadian defence policy, particularly in the context of its asymmetrical relationship with the United States, many argued that Canada was pursuing this strategy in its relations with the United States. However, this is not the case. Rather than adopting a strategy of developing a military force capable of guaranteeing Canadian territorial control without recourse to ‘American aid’, successive federal governments have favoured a force structure largely defined by close integration with the United States. As a result, they have ignored the potential threat posed by the United States to Canadian territorial integrity. Given the Trump administration's hostility to Canadian (and Danish) sovereignty, its threats to abandon the protection of US allies and its desire to wage all-out tariff war, it is clear that the United States is no longer a reliable or benevolent ally. As Prime Minister Mark Carney put it bluntly: ‘The old relationship we had with the United States, based on the deep integration of our economies and close cooperation on security and defence, is over’. With this in mind, he launched a review of the F-35 acquisition and affirmed his interest in participating in the ‘Golden Dome’ project announced by President Trump, declaring: ‘We are now in a position where we will collaborate if necessary , but we will not necessarily collaborate’. This strategy is based on two pillars: diversifying Canada's partners by moving closer to more reliable allies, such as the Europeans, and prioritising the development of a Canadian military industry. To implement Mr. Carney's vision, we need to revisit Ørvik's original idea in order to outline a defence policy against American aid for the decades to come. To do this, we will begin by recalling how Canada found itself in the difficult situation in which it finds itself today. We will then outline the challenges that Canada is currently facing. Finally, we will propose a series of measures to help Canada overcome these challenges by implementing a defence strategy against aid. Giving up sovereign defence capabilities To understand Canada's current defence situation, we need to go back quite a long way. It is important to recognise first of all that Canadian military spending in the aftermath of the Second World War only really took off between 1950 and 1953 as a proportion of GDP. As SIPRI data shows, Canada went from allocating 2.43% of GDP to military spending in 1950 to a peak of 7.37% in 1953. Then, with the end of the Korean War, the proportion of military spending fell steadily until 1974, when it reached 1.78% of GDP. This gradual decline coincided with the introduction of social programmes and reflected the development of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction between the United States and the Soviet Union. In this context, it made no sense for Canada to devote a substantial proportion of its expenditure to the armed forces. Indeed, as the White Paper on Defence published in 1970 by Pierre Trudeau's government pointed out, ‘there is no obvious level of defence expenditure in Canada’.  Although the statement may seem trite, it was a turning point in Canadian defence policy since the Korean War. Rather than setting a percentage of GDP to be achieved, the White Paper felt that military spending should take account of the needs of other government programmes. On the one hand, Pierre Trudeau's government halved the Canadian contingent deployed in Europe, from 10,000 to 5,000 troops and from six to three CF-104 squadrons. In effect, the White Paper reversed Canadian priorities, putting the defence of national territory ahead of our obligations to the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, although the White Paper stated that the primary objective of Canadian defence policy was to ‘preserve the sovereignty and independence of the country’, it accepted Canada's dependence on American protection in terms of nuclear deterrence. In view of the threat posed by Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, the White Paper refrained from ‘devoting significant sums to the purchase of new equipment or facilities that could be used in the future only for active anti-bomber defence’. Canada chose to rely entirely on the United States' anti-missile detection, interception and retaliation capabilities to ensure its territorial protection. Since the NORAD agreement ‘does not specify any level of forces, equipment or facilities’ required, ‘the nature and extent of Canada's contribution remains a matter for decision by the Government of Canada’. Yet in 1975, Pierre Trudeau's government launched a programme to rearm the Canadian Forces. It substantially increased the defence budget between 1976 and 1984, in order to acquire a new fleet of fighter aircraft, ships, armoured vehicles and tanks. While the first objective was to replace a number of ageing capabilities, a second was to maintain a substantial military commitment in Europe in order to increase trade relations with the Old Continent and maintain NATO's reputation as a reliable ally. The proportion of GDP devoted to defence thus rose from 1.78% in 1974 to 2.12% in 1984, a real increase of 49%. The Mulroney government intended to continue along this path in the 1980s by promising a significant increase in defence spending, but this never materialised. The end of the Cold War and Canada's budgetary constraints rendered obsolete the impressive measures announced in 1987. Despite the rearmament programme initiated by its predecessor, the Mulroney government felt that the resources devoted to defence were insufficient to meet Canada's military commitments. The 1987 White Paper drew a harsh conclusion: The maritime forces have too few operational vessels, an extremely limited capacity to conduct operations in the Arctic and no means of ensuring that Canada's waterways and ports are free of mines. . The air force, for its part, has a clear shortage of aircraft to transport troops and equipment to Europe in times of tension and to provide support during hostilities; it also lacks maritime patrol aircraft and modern weapons for the CF-18s, and has no replacement CF-18s to make up for losses suffered in peacetime. Rather than reducing Canada's commitments in Europe, which would have had the effect of compromising ‘the cohesion of the Alliance’, the White Paper advocated major reinvestment in the armed forces. With real growth in military spending of 2% per year (i.e., after inflation), some 270 major equipment procurement projects were planned, including: nuclear-powered submarines (SSN), long-range patrol aircraft, CF-18A fighters and additional frigates, the North Warning System, fixed sonar systems in the Arctic, and space surveillance systems. Added to this was the creation of additional territorial brigades, an increase in the number of troops posted to Europe, and the consolidation of military commitments in Europe, so as to be able to deploy a division (i.e., two brigades) to Germany in the event of a crisis. It goes without saying that, in the eyes of the Mulroney government, Canada did not have the necessary capabilities to defend the country against possible external aggression. For example, to justify the acquisition of 10 to 12 SSNs, the White Paper stated: ‘The SSN is the only type of vessel capable of providing surveillance and control in the Arctic Ocean and in ice-covered Canadian waters... The SSN is considered to be the most advantageous purchase for the Navy because it is an anti-submarine platform capable of conducting operations in the three oceans of interest to us’. In November 1989, however, during a visit to the USSR, Prime Minister Mulroney declared that the 1987 defence policy was outdated. Canada was giving up the idea of maintaining an effective anti-submarine presence in the three oceans that surround it, an oceanic area of almost six million km2. In order to balance the federal budget, the Chrétien government introduced major budget cuts in the 1990s. The defence budget was cut by 30% between 1994 and 1998 and the renewal of major equipment was delayed indefinitely. Military spending fell from 2.11% of GDP in 1986 to 1.11% in 2005, and the government reduced the size of its forces by a third. Nevertheless, the Canadian Armed Forces were deployed in almost all allied operations, from the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan, via Bosnia and Kosovo. The combination of a high operational tempo and low expenditure led Canada, and many other European allies, to optimise its military planning and spending. This optimisation involved relying increasingly on the United States to fund the research and development of new military capabilities, enabling Canada to benefit from them at relatively low cost. As a bonus, the Canadian Armed Forces were able to increase their interoperability with their American counterparts and, above all, were able to take part in operations alongside the United States at minimal cost. Under NORAD, Canada also deepened its close collaboration with the United States to defend the North American continent, while delaying additional investments, such as new fighter and refuelling aircraft, radar and air defence systems adapted to advanced technologies, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and submarines capable of operating in icy waters. This solution was considered optimal because Canada could maintain a multi-purpose force with combat capabilities in all three services, while spending just over 1% of its GDP on defence, given the close collaboration with the United States. The debate surrounding the Canadian government's refusal to participate in the US missile defence programme also illustrated this dynamic. As Philippe Lagassé pointed out, some argued that allowing the United States to defend the continent against ballistic missiles without a Canadian contribution would undermine Canadian sovereignty. Unlike the Ørvik defence concept, however, few analysts suggested that Canada should build its own missile defence system, or even acquire its own interception capabilities. The arguments against the Canadian government's decision were not aimed at developing sovereign defence capabilities against US assistance, but rather at taking advantage of the protection offered by the US system and the low costs of Canadian political support, while retaining a ‘seat at the table’ in the hope of participating in decision-making on missile interception. The Carney administration's stated interest in Canadian participation in President Trump's ‘golden dome’ seems to signal that Canada recognizes that American protection will no longer be free. Continued alignment during the first Trump term In 2017, Justin Trudeau's government launched a vast programme to recapitalise the Canadian Armed Forces in order to replace ageing or obsolete equipment and, in 2022, to modernise NORAD facilities. Planned defence capital spending up to 2037 was estimated at $215 billion. In 2024, the Trudeau government announced another recapitalization programme, increasing the annual defence budget from $41 billion in 2024 to $57.8 billion in 2029, an increase of 41%. However significant, this increase would only take military spending from 1.35% to 1.58% of GDP, a far cry from Canada's commitment to NATO to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2024. The significant but modest increase in military spending planned by the Trudeau government was part of the same approach of aligning itself with the United States as its predecessors, which mainly provided for the acquisition of American capabilities. Of course, Canada bought 16 CC-295 Kingsfisher aircraft from Airbus to carry out search and rescue operations, as well as nine CC-330 Husky aircraft for air-to-air refuelling and VIP transport. There are many other examples of European capabilities being acquired for the CAF, but when it came to major investments in combat capability, the Canadian government remained firmly committed to American technology. Examples include the acquisition of 88 F-35A fighters from Lockheed Martin, three Beechcraft King Air 350ER intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft from Textron, 16 P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft from Boeing, Lockheed Martin's Aegis combat system for the 15 future warships, and Boeing's broadband satellite communications system (WGS-9). By favouring the acquisition of military capabilities produced abroad, Canada was effectively depriving itself of the development of these systems by its own national industry. The acquisition of a fleet of P-8As, worth $10.4 billion in 2023, was controversial because the Canadian government preferred an American supplier (Boeing) to Bombardier, a Canadian company, and the advanced maritime surveillance capabilities developed by General Dynamics Mission System - Canada to replace the CP-140 Aurora fleet. Bombardier's proposed option seemed too uncertain in terms of timing and operational availability for Ottawa, despite Bombardier's assurances that the aircraft would be ready by the early 2030s. This decision is a prime example of the Canadian military procurement strategy, which requires existing and proven capabilities at the time of the acquisition decision, accepts the Canadian military's preference for aircraft that are interchangeable with those used by the United States, and at the same time foregoes the development of a Canadian industry in such a strategic and sensitive sector as the aerospace industry. If Canada had opted for the development of sovereign capabilities, it would have invested in Canadian industry several years before the time came to replace the Aurora fleet, so that when the time came there would be a tried and tested, made-in-Canada solution. This renunciation of the development of sovereign capabilities could have been an optimal choice at a time when the CAF recapitalisation programme was based on a projection of military spending below 2% of GDP and confidence in close integration with the US armed forces. This was the situation at the start of Trump's second inauguration. Since he came to power, however, it has become clear that this strategy is putting Canada at risk. The challenge of Trump 2.0 US President Donald Trump has called into question Canada's sovereignty, launched a trade war against his allies and cast doubt on the US commitment to Article 5 of NATO. These attacks are repeated, target several allies, are part of a vision enacted in his first term and, unlike his last term, are now being aggressively implemented. For example, the American intelligence services are conducting espionage operations in Greenland. As far as Canada is concerned, there are two opposing interpretations. Some believe that President Trump's rhetoric is part of a strategy to include Canada in a North American fortress, while others believe that Mr. Trump should be taken at his word, namely that the United States does not need what Canada has to offer and that Canada's defence is too costly for the United States. Regardless of which of these views is more representative of President Trump's thinking, the fact remains that this administration is challenging the foundations of Canadian defence policy and planning. Whether Canada is dropped by Washington and forced to provide for its own security, or whether it is confronted with the American desire to unilaterally make up for the shortcomings of Canada's territorial defence, both scenarios would spell the end of the policy of joint and friendly defence of the North American continent that has prevailed since the late 1930s. One of the most worrying possibilities is that Mr. Trump or one of his successors will conclude that Canada is so important to American security that it must be defended by the United States on Washington's terms. The administration would then apply the same rhetoric to Canada as it did to Greenland. This scenario may be improbable, but many of the things the Trump administration has done in recent months initially seemed improbable, such as aligning itself with Vladimir Putin's Russia, undermining the US intelligence community, and undermining the fundamental principles of the US Constitution. Many in the Canadian security and defence community believe that Trump is only a temporary problem, and that Ottawa must therefore maintain a strategy of duck and cover. Former Defence Minister Bill Blair played down the threat posed by the US in mid-February 2025, and the Ministry of Defence is stalling on the need to reconsider the acquisition of F-35 fighters. This attitude is understandable, given the close ties that bind the Canada-US defence community. However, the Canadian government does not have the luxury of assuming that the hourglass strategy will work in the face of Trump. It would be politically irresponsible to play for time with Trump and avoid protecting against scenarios of American abandonment or coercion. It is quite possible that the populist, nationalist, protectionist and authoritarian underpinnings of Donald Trump's foreign policy will be with us for the long term. The actions and words of the Trump administration represent a clear threat to Canada, even if they do not lead to war with Canada. While the scenario of a full-scale invasion of Canada by the United States is not credible, a far more likely scenario is that of a US incursion to secure access to Canadian natural resources, critical infrastructure or shipping lanes, including in the Far North. This scenario could see the US deploy military forces on Canadian territory under the pretext of ‘helping’ to resolve an incident or security problem, but never leave afterwards. This would be done under the guise of a friendly intervention, an offer of assistance in the face of a real or fabricated threat. President Trump has already offered to deploy US forces to Mexico to help the country fight drug cartels, and his adviser Peter Navarro has said that the cartels are expanding in Canada. A similar ‘offer’ could therefore be made to Canada. If this offer came, or should we say if this offer was imposed, it would be Don Corleone-style - with no way of refusing. Canada would be asked to accept unfriendly help in friendship and would not be able to count on its European allies to lend a helping hand. Defending yourself against unsolicited help What should Canada do to prepare for such an eventuality? When Ørvik proposed the principle of defence against aid to Canada, he meant it in the Finnish sense of the term. Indeed, Finland ensured that it did not need Soviet “aid” to maintain its independence and sovereignty during the Cold War. Defence against aid represented the best strategy that a small state neighbouring a potentially hostile great power could adopt. According to Ørvik, three principles are essential for a successful defence against aid strategy: 1) the greater the strategic importance of a small state’s territory to its powerful neighbor, the more it will have to invest in its military capabilities to deter unsolicited aid; 2) the small state’s willingness and ability to prevent access to and use of its territory must be perceived as credible by its more powerful neighbour; and 3) the small state must practice a policy of non-alignment with respect to its powerful neighbour's rival states. Given the growing importance of Canadian territory to the United States due to its geographical position and natural resources, Ottawa's adoption of a defence-for-aid strategy would require, in addition to the non-alignment with China or Russia that Canada already practices, the development of a credible and sufficient military capability to deal with any incident, problem, or threat on its soil, in its air, or in its waters. Such a defence policy, based on self-reliance, resilience, and diversification of partners, would prevent a neighbouring great power from using a pretext to deploy its forces on the territory of its smaller neighbour. In this way, Canada could credibly say to the United States: "We don't need your help." It would take more than a decade or two for Canada to realistically implement a defence-for-aid strategy, given Ottawa's systematic underinvestment in defense and the neglect of developing sovereign capabilities. That said, the task is not impossible. In the short term, Canada cannot forgo existing American capabilities. Abandoning them would make Canada even more vulnerable and harm its military industry, which is deeply integrated with that of the United States. But at the same time, Canada must now and urgently develop its sovereign capabilities in critical sectors and forge partnerships with reliable allies to reduce its chronic dependence on the United States. This would lay the foundation for a credible defence-for-aid policy by 2040. What would this look like in practice? It would mean a force capable of defending its own air and sea space, as well as responding to major accidents and natural disasters across the entire national territory, including in the Arctic. It would also mean a force with independent communications, intelligence, and surveillance systems, including satellites, underwater sensors, and radars. Finally, defence against aid would mean prioritizing the defence of Canadian territory over expeditionary missions and favoring the development of sovereign capabilities over the acquisition of American equipment. The most striking example is the acquisition of the F-35, which has been questioned by Prime Minister Carney. Some rightly believe that Canada should turn to a European alternative, such as the Gripen or the Rafale, to reduce its dependence on operational and technological support from the United States. However, critics are also right to point out that Canada is so desperate for new fighter jets that it cannot afford further delay in replacing its CF-18s, and that the F-35s offer stealth capabilities unmatched by their European competitors. In a defence-for-aid approach, Canada should therefore opt for a mixed fleet, as advocated by former Royal Canadian Air Force commander Yvan Blondin. A fleet of 50 European fighters should be added to the 88 F-35As planned for 2026-2034, bringing the Canadian fleet to 138 aircraft, the same number as the number of F-18s acquired in 1982. The choice of the second aircraft should be conditional on its capabilities to defend Canadian territory as much as on the supplier's willingness to develop production capabilities in Canada, in order to lay the foundations for a national industrial capacity. This is, in fact, what Dassault and Saab had committed to. This should be supplemented by Canada's participation in the development of a sixth-generation fighter, either through the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) developed by the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy, or with France and Germany and their Future Combat Air System (FCAS), in order to jointly develop drone capabilities that will be an integral part of the future generation of fighter aircraft. There is no doubt that a mixed fleet and the development of a national aerospace industry would be costly and demanding in terms of personnel. The model of a single, interchangeable force with the United States is much less costly. This is precisely why it has been optimal for Canada to favour this model until now. Some might argue that as long as American coercion does not materialize, there is no need to guard against it. The problem with this logic, of course, is that if such coercion were to materialize, it would be too late to prevent it. While countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Greece, and Poland have chosen to maintain a mixed fleet of fighter jets, Canada could draw inspiration from their model for developing personnel and the associated infrastructure. Other strategic sectors should be prioritized by Canada's future defence industrial strategy, which is expected in the summer of 2025. Among the sovereign capabilities to be developed are airborne early warning aircraft (AEW&C), a wide range of drones (unmanned surface vessels, unmanned underwater vehicles, low, medium and high altitude unmanned aerial vehicles), underwater acoustic sensors, and air-to-ground and anti-ship missile systems. In other areas, such as submarines, a strategic partnership with Sweden (Saab), France (Naval Group), Germany (TKMS), Spain (Navantia) or South Korea (Hanwha) will be necessary. The choice of supplier should be based not only on the technical capabilities of the proposed submarines, but also on the willingness to transfer to Canada the intellectual property and infrastructure necessary to maintain and develop the capabilities associated with the submarines. In this light, Prime Minister Carney is right to consider participating in President Trump's ambitious "Golden Dome" missile defence program. In the Prime Minister's words: "Yes, it's a good idea for Canada to have missile protection, because from now on, there are real threats to Canada from Russia, North Korea, and possibly China, in the near future." It should be noted, however, that Canada already participates in the North American missile defence program's early warning and detection system and is collaborating with the United States on the development of radars, satellites, and other infrastructure associated with the modernization of NORAD. However, in line with the logic of defence for aid, Canada's participation in missile defence should be based on the development of Canadian surveillance, detection, and interception capabilities, within the limits of what appears useful to guarantee Canadian sovereignty. Thus, it would be wise to invest in radar, satellite, and long-range missile systems, but probably less in space-based interception capabilities. Implementing a defence-for-aid policy would necessarily be more costly than the current policy of integration within the U.S. armed forces. But the political context is favorable to major investments in defence, and the majority of Canadians support an increase in military spending. Prime Minister Carney's plan calls for adding more than $30 billion to the Our North, Strong and Free (NNFL) budget forecast, announced in April 2024. This would increase the annual defence budget from $41 billion in 2024-25 to $68.4 billion in 2028-29, a 67% increase. If NATO allies agree as planned on a new threshold of 3.5% of GDP for defence, this would mean, according to estimates by the Parliamentary Budget Officer, an annual budget of $128 billion in 2030, a 212% increase compared to the 2024-25 budget. Such budget increases would therefore make the implementation of a defence-for-aid strategy not only possible but imperative, since spending such sums on American rather than Canadian industry would be scandalous. Indeed, if Prime Minister Carney is correct in asserting that 75% of Canada's current military procurement is spent on American equipment, maintaining such a ratio would be economically indecent and politically risky. In a context of major defence investments, a defence-for-aid strategy is the best path forward. Conclusion The history of Canadian defence policy reflects a consistent choice of dependence on the United States, based on a logic of budgetary rationalization and strategic interoperability. However, the return of Donald Trump to power, and more broadly the growing political instability in our neighbouring country, requires a profound revision of this posture. Updating the concept of "defence for aid" would allow Canada to regain its military sovereignty by strengthening its national capabilities, diversifying its industrial and strategic partnerships, and preparing a credible response to any attempt at "friendly" interference from Washington. This change of direction requires not only massive investment but also sustained political commitment to develop an autonomous and resilient defence industry. On the cusp of crucial budgetary choices and lasting geopolitical tensions, Canada has a historic opportunity to transform its dependence into a sovereign power. The success of this transformation will depend on our collective willingness to bear the costs of our independence and to build, starting today, the foundations of a national security designed by and for Canadians. Fatigue will be a major challenge to overcome. Many Canadians will be watching for the slightest sign of Trump backing down to assert that we must return to our old ways. It is true that the old ways are easy, comfortable, and inexpensive. The prospect of returning to the status quo ante and never having to worry about Trump again is very attractive and could ultimately prevail. But only a defence-for-aid strategy will allow Canada to protect its sovereignty, leverage its economy, and make itself less vulnerable to American political upheavals. ## Canada Must Prepare for American Coercion URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-must-prepare-for-american-coercion/ Modified: 2025-03-21 > While Canada has long enjoyed a close and stable relationship with its American neighbour, threats to stifle the Canadian economy in order... While Canada has long enjoyed a close and stable relationship with its American neighbour, threats to stifle the Canadian economy in order to force it to join the United States, to stop protecting Canada, to redraw the borders, or to exclude Canada from the Five Eyes alliance mean that we have to consider the possibility that President Trump will exert pressure that could undermine Canada's sovereignty and security. We can certainly hope that President Trump will not carry out his threats, but it would be irresponsible not to prepare for the worst. Especially as the threats of annexation are aimed not only at Canada but also at another transatlantic ally, Denmark, and as President Trump persists in his appetite for 19th century imperialism. While the idea of the US turning against its northern ally may seem far-fetched to some, we need to be aware of the potential risks. A clear-sighted approach to national security requires us to anticipate and prepare for scenarios where the US would use its considerable leverage to achieve its imperialist objectives. In this analysis, I examine four possible scenarios and propose a way forward to increase Canada's resilience and mitigate the risks posed by Donald Trump's brutal policies. Four scenarios for American coercion For decades, Canada has relied on US protection through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and broader military cooperation. However, a more transactional and selfish US administration might decide that military protection of Canada is no longer in its interest, either because it costs too much, as Trump supports, or because Washington wants to pressure Canada into accepting annexation to the US. Canada would then find itself highly vulnerable to external threats, including potential aggression from rival states such as China and Russia. The principle that the United States will guarantee Canada's security no longer holds because the bond of trust has been broken. Canada could be dropped by its main ally with a simple message on social networks. Canada must therefore prepare for the possibility of strategic abandonment, whether in the face of a cyberattack or the violation of its airspace or sea lanes. US economic and strategic interests could also lead to more aggressive unilateral action on Canadian territory. This could manifest itself in territorial disputes such as the Northwest Passage, which the Americans consider to be international waters and not Canadian, or in the Great Lakes, which Trump openly covets. Similar concerns could apply to the Arctic territory for its natural resources, or to airspace to make a show of force and make Canada bend. This, of course, would test the country's ability to control its own territory. The Canadian Armed Forces are heavily dependent on American technology and equipment. If Washington decided to restrict access to critical military resources, such as spare parts, software updates or intelligence sharing, it could significantly weaken Canada's military operational readiness. Systems such as the F-35 fighter jet, the sensors and combat system on Canada's future warships and the North Warning System, which is undergoing a major upgrade, all depend on continued support from the United States. If access to this equipment were blocked, Canada's ability to defend itself and contribute to allied operations would be seriously compromised. Finally, another potential risk lies in the possibility that the US government – or private entities operating with tacit approval – might support actors within Canada seeking to destabilise the country. This could involve massive disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing Canadian elections, economic coercion targeting strategic industries, or even support for annexationist movements. Such tactics have been used in other countries to influence and create divisions, and Canada must be vigilant against these threats. The Canadian response: autonomy, resilience and risk mitigation In the face of these threats of coercion, Canada must take decisive steps to strengthen its sovereignty, diversify its security partnerships and increase societal resilience. The era of the unwavering and unchallenged alliance with the United States may be coming to an end. Canada must therefore rethink the fundamentals of its defence policy. The first step is to develop a long-term defence industrial and technological base as a matter of urgency. Canada must develop its own capabilities in key areas such as UAVs, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies, strategic lift and communications systems. By fostering a strong domestic industrial base, Canada can reduce its dependence on US military technology and ensure that its operational readiness is maintained, regardless of external pressures. This first step must be taken as a matter of urgency, but cannot be achieved in the short term. Consequently, Canada must also broaden and deepen its strategic defence partnerships beyond the United States. While bilateral relations with Washington remain important, excessive dependence on a single country is an unacceptable vulnerability. Strengthening defence ties with countries that have a military industry that is relatively autonomous from the US but interoperable with US forces should be a priority, such as France, Sweden and South Korea. These countries could provide Canada with other sources of advanced military technology, including long-range precision fire, submarines, air defence systems and intelligence sharing. These countries share Canada's commitment to democratic values and global stability, making them natural partners for strengthening national security. For example, the idea of ruling out the acquisition of the F-35 is spreading because of the lack of confidence in the United States. The Canadian Defence Minister has expressed his intention to re- examine the acquisition of 88 F-35s by 2034. The best strategy would be to adopt a mixed fleet, i.e. to maintain the purchase of 88 5th generation fighters from Lockheed Martin, but to add a fleet of Gripen or Rafale fighters in order to reduce Canada's dependence on the United States. This would give us a fleet of fighter jets similar in size to the one Canada had during the Cold War. Similarly, this should be combined with the development of a 6th generation fighter aircraft with partners other than the United States, such as the project led by the United Kingdom, Japan and Italy. Canada plays an important role in European security, whether through its military contingent in Latvia, whose mission is to defend that country against possible Russian aggression, or through the military support offered to Ukraine to resist Russian invasion. These contributions are essential to dissuade Russia from invading its neighbours, but they were made on the premise that the United States would guarantee the protection of Canadian territory in the event of war. This assumption no longer holds. Canada should therefore reassess its commitment to European security by making it conditional on European support for its own sovereignty and greater access to European military production lines in the process of modernising and empowering the Canadian Armed Forces. For example, Canada could negotiate the acquisition of French submarines, air defence systems or fighter aircraft in return for relocating production to Canada and Canadian investment in the production of other military equipment produced in France. Joint military exercises with the Europeans, without the presence of the United States, would also make it possible to forge closer and more resilient relations between the Euro-Atlantic allies and guard against a possible American disengagement. This could be part of a wider process of deepening relations between Canada and the European Union, along the lines of the British, Norwegian and Swiss models. This could result in the formalisation of a mutual defence pact that would explicitly include Canada's territorial integrity. Reciprocity must be a cardinal principle of Canada's defence policy. We can only deplore the Europeans' lack of eagerness to denounce Trump's annexationist ambitions, especially as nearly 2,000 Canadians are currently deployed in Latvia to ensure the integrity of the borders of European allies, and Ottawa is not ruling out contributing to a deterrent force in Ukraine to ensure compliance with any ceasefire. In the face of President Trump's questioning of the principle of Article 5 of NATO, an alliance within the alliance, comprising the most proactive allies, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Poland, is more necessary than ever. The idea is not new, as shown by the Franco-Hellenic strategic partnership and the one between London and Warsaw Perhaps most importantly, Canada needs to make its public more aware of the changing geopolitical landscape. Many Canadians still believe that the United States will not threaten Canada's integrity. This assumption is increasingly risky. Government transparency is key to maintaining trust in the authorities, and must therefore be substantially increased in order to preserve social unity. This includes a vast social media campaign to provide accurate information that is accessible to all, and to counter the lies spread by hostile actors, including Americans. Public awareness is an essential pillar of national resilience, ensuring that Canadian citizens support the necessary investments in security and self-sufficiency. Similarly, support for Canadian think tanks must be increased to encourage dialogue and inform public debate. Added to this is the absolute necessity of launching a consultation campaign in order to develop, within the current year, a new foreign and defence policy statement capable of offering a clear, strategic and coordinated vision to ensure Canada's protection in the face of American coercion. Canada cannot afford to be blindsided again by the brutal pivot of the United States. While the current awareness is to be welcomed, it is now time to take action. The United States remains Canada's closest ally and most important trading partner. However, we cannot ignore the real risks posed by shifting U.S. priorities and the potential for Washington to pressure Canada in ways that undermine our sovereignty and security. A proactive approach is needed to prepare for scenarios in which the United States poses a threat to Canada's national security. ## Canada Must Prepare for the Seismic Shakeup that the Pentagon Will Face URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-must-prepare-for-the-seismic-shakeup-that-the-pentagon-will-face/ Modified: 2025-01-13 > Donald Trump’s election has such wide-ranging implications. Canada must prepare for the seismic shakeup the Pentagon will face... (Canada Must Prepare for the Seismic Shakeup that the Pentagon Will Face - Theodore McLauchlin) Donald Trump’s election has such wide-ranging implications for Canada that it is easy to lose track. One that is less obvious but that the government must prioritize is the coming politicization of the American armed forces. Canada relies on the United States for defense and for pursuing its security objectives elsewhere. There is not much way around this. They are our continent’s colossus. Our armed services work with theirs every day: in NORAD with its integrated command structure, in NATO, among officers on exchange, in long-term planning. We have not always been able to count on the United States to act responsibly or effectively. Nevertheless, one thing we have been able to count on is a relatively professional American armed forces, one that gives its civilian leadership the best advice it can and then implements those civilian leaders’ decisions, within the constraints of the Constitution and the law. Like any enormous organization, this is hardly a well-oiled machine. The legal limits on its actions are debatable and at times clearly inadequate. But we have never had to deal with an American military riven by partisan divisions and finally unbound by the law. Until, very possibly, now. Since his first presidency, Donald Trump has had it in for the Pentagon and its generals, whom he holds responsible for resisting his will. He has pledged since that time to remove “woke” generals concerned by diversity, equity and inclusion or climate change, and even invoked executing former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley. And in the background is Trump’s express desire to use the armed forces in unprecedented domestic missions, to round up migrants and to repress protests. By custom and tradition, these are not supposed to be missions for the regular armed forces such as the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force or Marines. Indeed, the Posse Comitatus Act is supposed to forbid their deployment in a domestic law-enforcement capacity. The Insurrection Act, however, permits the President to bypass Posse Comitatus legally. True, unlike the regular armed forces is organized by the states unless brought under federal control, the National Guard has a primarily internal, domestic role, including suppressing civil disturbances. However, Trump’s orders may well be unprecedented even for them, depending on the circumstances and rules of engagement. In any case, he and his allies have invoked both National Guard and regular forces. Such orders may be unconstitutional. They will certainly be controversial. Soldiers can (and must) resist “manifestly illegal” orders, but what this means in practice is far from clear. A military bent to Trump’s will is a military that will bite back its objections, or hold none at all. And if senior civilian and military leadership at the Department of Defense and in the armed forces go along with such orders, refusal becomes much more difficult. With these orders in the background, all signs show that the threatened purge is coming. A draft executive order is circulating that would create “warrior boards” of handpicked retired officers to toss out senior leaders deemed problematic, with a “wokeness” litmus test for MAGA loyalism. It would apply to three- and four-star generals (169 positions as of September 30, 2023). There are some legal limits at the margins, but in broad strokes, nothing can stop some version of this plan. The fact that Trump named Pete Hegseth for Secretary of Defense suggests his clear willingness to carry it out. Hegseth is a Fox News commentator who has no senior experience in national defense but who inveighs against senior military leaders as “woke”, and champions the January 6th rioters and convicted war criminals in uniform. Even if Hegseth does not wind up as Defense Secretary, his nomination speaks to Trump’s evident wishes. Such a purge is entirely unnecessary. Trump could implement his major defense policy proposals without firing anyone. He has earned the democratic mandate to do so, a mandate that the armed forces are duty-bound to respect. He could have at least tested whether his plans were implemented, and then—legitimately—removed military personnel unwilling to do so. But by installing loyalists from the outset, Trump will be creating a sea change. The rules of the game for becoming a senior leader could involve telling Trump what he wants to hear; serving as a political prop, as Gen. Milley did during the Black Lives Matter protests of 2020, unwittingly and to his regret; badmouthing your competitors as insufficiently MAGA; and implementing even Trump’s most legally and constitutionally dubious orders. In short, this is loyalty over competence. We know this because this is how Trump picks people to serve under him. The Hegseth nomination itself is proof enough. Needless to say, this is no way to create trust, get the best military advice, or plan for the future. There will still exist an enormous reserve of professionalism and competence in the American officer corps. But the result then would be a battle between partisans and professionals, the entrenching of factions, and battles over promotions that are every bit as partisan as what we see in the Supreme Court. Over recent years, norms of nonpartisanship within the armed forces have eroded: military officers now typically see nothing wrong with active-duty personnel insulting a political leader at the workplace or on social media, or retired generals speaking at political conventions. However, the coming purge would have the potential to blow all of this wide open. And it could not be easily contained again. Future Presidents could attempt to swing the officer corps back to “their” own loyalists. And even an attempt by a future President to restore professional rather than partisan criteria for military leadership would necessarily attack the MAGA movement’s hold on the senior military leadership, and would be seen as itself a partisan move. The consequences for Canada are potentially grave. For example, our National Defence personnel may have to doubt whether their U.S. counterparts’ analysis is as objective as possible, or just what sounds good to the boss. As quietly as possible, and depending on the scope of personnel changes, this skepticism may have to become part of the policy planning process. The major risks, however, are in the medium and long term. The coming controversies in U.S. defense could have spillover effects on debates in Canada. On this issue, Canada’s political parties have a critical role. They must keep their distance from the coming battle in the Pentagon lest it take hold here. The war on DEI could exacerbate still further the controversies and challenges over culture change in our own armed forces. The parties disagree about this issue, as is legitimate and proper in a democracy with civilian control of the armed forces. But in service of these debates, they must resist any temptation to target Canada’s senior military personnel the way Republicans have done. That is a recipe for deepening mistrust and factionalism within the CAF, from which Canadians can only lose. Further, political leaders in Canada should also approach the coming military debates in the United States with a great deal of discretion. If Canada is seen to intervene overtly, it risks blowback from Washington, becoming an American political football and coming under pressure to change its own military policies to suit American preferences. Finally, over the long run, Canada’s chief military partner and ally looks set to become more divided internally, to have its personnel and policies shaped by rancorous partisan political debates, to further lose public trust, and to be less able to plan effectively and thus to manage the challenges of the 21st century for the long term. This will make it more challenging for Canada to maintain its continental defense and pursue its security objectives abroad. We must contemplate what it means not to be able count on the United States in defence as much as we once did. A time of major choices is coming. ## Canada should seek more than observer status on GCAP URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canada-should-seek-more-than-observer-status-on-gcap/ Modified: 2026-07-15 The multilateral collaboration is an unprecedented opportunity for Canada to build the next generation of air power The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) is a trilateral collaboration between Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet to respectively replace the British and Italian Eurofighter Typhoons by 2040 and the Japanese fleet of Mitsubishi F-2s slated to retire by 2035. For Canada, it is expected to be formally granted observer status at a meeting of the three defence ministers in July, thereby gaining access to sensitive project information while Ottawa debates whether to participate as a future development partner or buyer. Opening the door to the GCAP is a natural next step for a Carney government intent on diversifying defence procurement away from U.S. solutions in favour of closer partnerships with like-minded allies and partners. It follows the Government's major decision to enter into negotiations with Saab to purchase its GlobalEye early warning system over American offerings. I argue that the moment is ripe for Canada to push for deeper involvement on GCAP beyond observer status as a development partner able to make unique contributions. Canada has a competitive aeronautics sector with strengths in avionics, sensors, and radars. It boasts world-class flight simulation and pilot training firms. With its wealth of critical minerals mining and refining infrastructure, Canada would supply vital production inputs that the trio must otherwise source from China. Canadian participation on the GCAP should be considered distinct from the ongoing F-35/Gripen debate because the latter are fifth and 4.5-plus generation fighters weighed as options to replace the RCAF’s aging fleet of CF-18s due to retire in 2032. Even if GCAP proceeds on schedule, deliveries for Canada would likely not take place until the late 2030s. As a result, the F-35/Gripen question will remain salient in the short-term. The GCAP platform as a “system of systems” What makes a sixth-generation fighter? In addition to improved stealth capabilities and increased operational range, the defining characteristic is a “system of systems” framework where a manned fighter leads a squadron of artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced drones known as unmanned collaborative combat aircraft (UCCAs) acting as “loyal wingmen” exercising a high degree of autonomy. These future fighters are being envisioned as airborne supercomputers and command centres executing a “quarterback” role, building on fifth-gen capabilities such as electronic warfare and advanced sensor-driven reconnaissance and placing them at the forefront of the fighter’s role profile. In the cases of fourth-generation fighters designed to bypass air defenses and strike both aerial and ground targets or fifth-gen fighters’ increased emphasis on advanced stealth capabilities, the manned fighter has been the principal actor. By contrast, sixth-generation fighters are expected to almost always operate with a swarm of UCCAs designed to boost the mission’s “combat mass” and act as the “extended arms” of the pilot, who analyzes the real-time data collected by fighter’s AI-enhanced sensors and processed by the broader “combat cloud” to execute mission commands. The GCAP platform entails more than industrial cooperation in building a fighter jet. It is an ambitious bid for technological integration in digital technologies like AI, shared intellectual property, interconnected supply chains, and autonomy away from the United States. Beyond Canada, other countries that have expressed interest in joining the project include Australia, Saudi Arabia, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, and Germany. However, whereas Britain and Italy have signaled a degree of willingness to expand the consortium, Japan has shown reluctance to take on additional partners over concerns that it would involve a complex and time-consuming negotiation process that would halt project momentum. This reflects in part differing priorities between the partners. Tokyo is focused on delivering jets by 2035 so that it is equipped to respond to a deteriorating regional security environment driven by rising tensions with China, whereas London and Rome favor a more flexible timeline to fully develop the GCAP’s “system of systems” capabilities. A Canadian case for joining the project should be calibrated around its ability to fill targeted capacity and supply chain gaps in the core trilateral partnership. For example, over the next decade, Canada is expected to become one of the few major rare earth producers outside of China. In defence applications, high-tech systems like fighter jets are one of the top consumers, with a single F-35 housing over 400 kilograms. Given the extent of technological upgrades expected for sixth generation fighters, they can be expected to require even more. Expectations of significant revisions to the existing industrial workshare would be unrealistic because it would create more transaction costs and dilute the agreed upon roles each partner has already secured for its respective national defence champion in building the GCAP platform. The trio will be especially wary of taking on more partners given that industrial disagreements between France’s Dassault and Airbus Germany recently sunk the €100 billion Future Combat Air System (FCAS) collaboration, another sixth-generation fighter project. As a result, the three partners are more likely to welcome countries that can bring injections of funding and commitments to future jet orders without accompanying demands for significant renegotiations of the existing workshare. The main reason is that the fiscal health of the project, which is estimated to eventually cost upwards of $130 billion, is on increasingly uncertain ground. Britain had been scheduled to commit billions of pounds to GCAP in late 2025 as part of its Defense Investment Plan for the next decade, but repeated delays have cast doubt on whether it can come up with the funds. Similarly, Japan has contributed ¥500 billion ($3.1 billion) in the five years to March and approved an additional ¥170 billion, but significantly higher sums will be needed in the years ahead. This comes at a time when Tokyo is facing its own fiscal pressures after announcing its first ever consumption tax cut on food, a move that is expected to cost the government 8 trillion yen over two years. What Canada Should Do Canada should focus on securing collaborative R&D and innovation opportunities as part of a long-term multidimensional investment in the RCAF’s future capabilities and the benefits accrued to the Canadian defense sector’s knowledge and technological base. Canada’s procurement of sixth-generation fighters is not a question of if, but when. In line with the Defence Industrial Strategy’s “Build-Partner-Buy Framework”, Canada should thus seek to participate in developing a next generation system as a partner instead of merely observing from the sidelines as a potential buyer. However, committing to GCAP could bring about a future scenario where Canada has a three-fighter mixed-fleet along with the F-35 and Gripen at a time where there is already significant opposition against even a two-fighter fleet. A sensible path would be to follow through with the 88 orders of F-35s given the resources already committed in terms of supporting infrastructure, maintenance, personal training, and software. The F-35 would cover Canada’s main commitments to continental defence and NORAD. Remaining resources should be allocated to developing and procuring future GCAP fighters and UCCAs that would enhance the RCAF’s expeditionary potential bridging Europe and the Indo-Pacific. An alternative to the GCAP would be to commit to partnering with Saab to build Gripens in-country, a deal that could potentially dovetail with a major role on the Swedish firm’s own sixth-generation fighter project. The Konceptet Framtidens Stridsflyg  (KFS, “Concept Program Future Air Combat System”) is reportedly pursuing a similar system-of-systems approach as the GCAP and is the process of conducting early-stage conceptual studies. However, joining the GCAP would open the door for Canadian firms and research institutes to collaborate at the industry’s cutting-edge with Britain’s BAE Systems and Italy’s Leonardo, both production partners for the F-35 and which previously worked with Airbus on the outgoing Eurofighter Typhoon, and Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which built the Mitsubishi F-2 (based on the American F-16) and has been working on precursors to the GCAP project stretching back to the early 2010s. The knowledge gains and joint R&D opportunities would thus significantly exceed a collaboration with Saab alone. With the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS project cancelled, the GCAP is the most promising of the remaining Western sixth-generation fighter projects that Canada could feasibly join. Some may point to the United States’  Next-Generation Air Dominance program developing the F-47. However, though Washington may open the door to future international collaboration, the likelihood is low given that the F-47 is designed to replace the F-22 Raptor, the air superiority fighter which has never been exported to allies to protect its sensitive technologies. As a result, the GCAP is Canada’s best gateway to a meaningful role in designing and building a sixth-generation fighter. Should Ottawa proceed with making a strong case for the unique contributions it would bring to the project, it will undoubtedly find receptive ears. Image Credit: Hunini via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0. ## Canada’s Military Awakening Is Not for Tomorrow URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canadas-military-awakening-is-not-for-tomorrow/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > If it is in Canada's interest for Ukraine to inflict a total defeat on Russia, why not provide more military support to Ukraine? The Russian invasion of Ukraine sent such a shock wave through Western capitals that it led to a military surge. This is marked, among other things, by massive reinvestments in defence budgets, the deployment of thousands of troops to NATO's eastern borders, the accelerated and substantial delivery of weapons to the Ukrainians, a consensus on the clear and immediate threat posed by Russian revanchism, and an expansion of NATO to include Sweden and Finland. In short, the Atlantic Alliance appears resurrected after its so-called "brain death" announced in the fall of 2019. To this portrait of unity, however, it must be acknowledged that some disparity remains in the allies' surge on two levels. First, allies vary in their level of defence reinvestment and in the extent of support for Ukraine. President Zelensky sees this as a result of their differing interests. He was critical of the French, who refuse to provide offensive weapons "because they are afraid of Russia," and of the Germans, who "are making a mistake" in wanting to preserve their economic ties with Russia. The allies also differ on the desired outcome of the war. The United States and the United Kingdom share Ukraine's maximalist position: the total defeat of Russia. According to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, "Ukraine can still win the war" by permanently weakening Russia to the point where it cannot invade its neighbors. Similarly, the British Foreign Secretary argues that Ukraine's victory - a "strategic imperative" - requires "to push Russia out of the whole of Ukraine" and providing it with NATO-standard defensive and offensive weapons. In contrast, France, Germany and Italy, in particular, remain faithful to the initial objectives of the war, i.e., to minimize Ukraine's territorial losses and force Russia to negotiate a cease-fire that is as favorable as possible to Ukraine. In the words of President Macron: "We remain focused on our objective: to do everything to obtain a ceasefire and help Ukraine negotiate on the terms that Ukraine will decide for itself." The German chancellor also believes it is imperative to end the war as soon as possible. While both sides agree that they support Ukraine's territorial integrity and that it is up to the Ukrainians to determine the acceptable terms of a negotiated settlement, the maximalists have an interest in prolonging the war to inflict lasting losses on Russia. The minimalists, in turn, favour a rapid resolution of the conflict and a peace agreement that is "neither in denial, nor in exclusion of one another, nor even in humiliation.” What about Canada? If the rhetoric coming out of Ottawa is anything to go by, it is firmly in the maximalist camp. Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland went so far as to call for a regime change in Moscow: “The world’s democracies—including our own—can be safe only once the Russian tyrant and his armies are entirely vanquished.” During his visit to Kyiv, Prime Minister Trudeau also called for a Ukrainian victory over Russia. The problem is that, true to form, the Canadian government is easy on the rhetoric and soft on the action. It is acting in contradiction with the advice of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt: Canada speaks loudly but holds a small stick. This paradox is illustrated in terms of defence investments, troop deployments to Europe and the provision of arms to Ukraine. This gap between words and deeds is not new, but it undermines Canada's ability to articulate a coherent defence policy. If it is in Canada's interest for Ukraine to inflict a total defeat on Russia, why not provide more military support to Ukraine? It seems that Ottawa prefers grandiloquent rhetoric at lower cost, which translates into a cheap liberal internationalist posture. It would be better to focus on better defining the contours of the desired peace and to mobilize all energies to achieve it. Modest Defence Reinvestment While delivering a fiery speech calling for the defeat of "the Russian tyrant," Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland announced a modest additional investment of $8 billion over five years. The vast majority of this amount, $6.1 billion, will be used to modernize the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and to fund Canada's contribution to NATO. $500 million has been budgeted for direct assistance to Ukraine. The dispersal of funds over time suggests that the Canadian government is not in a position to quickly replenish its military budget. Indeed, the annual breakdown of the $6.1 billion will go from $100 million in 2022-23 to $1.875 billion in 2026-27. As the Canadian government's budget projections illustrate, the new expenditures have been on an upward trend since the Trudeau government took office in 2015. Defence spending is set to double between 2016-17 and 2026-27. However, the largest increases are also the furthest away. Given the rampant inflation - over 7% in 2021 - and the inability of the Department of National Defence to fully spend its annual budget (almost $10 billion was not spent between 2017 and 2021), the increase in Canada's military budget may be much smaller than projections suggest. According to the Parliamentary Budget Officer, military spending is expected to increase to a peak in 2027-28 and then fall back sharply. Given rising inflation, spreading the projected cost over time may reduce the purchasing power of these increases, requiring new investments to acquire the desired equipment. The budget increases announced with great fanfare by Minister Freeland will not allow Canada to reach the NATO target of 2% of GDP. Canada would have had to invest an additional $16 billion per year to reach such a target – 10 times more than planned. Without additional investment, Canada's defence spending as a share of GDP will not exceed 1.5% in the coming years. This contradicts the commitment made at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, where all allies agreed to seek "to move towards the recommended 2% over the next ten years." While the Minister of Defence once hinted that Canada might meet or even exceed the 2% threshold, this is no longer being considered. This under-investment, which has been evident since the end of the Cold War, has long irritated the United States, which has criticized Canada for not paying its fair share of the defence burden. Canada ranks 25th among the 30 NATO allies in terms of military spending relative to its gross domestic product. While the 2% target may seem arbitrary, the same cannot be said for the target of investing in defence in line with national needs. Canada is equally poor on this score. The 2017 defence policy did not include a budget for the modernization of the North Warning System (NWS), a chain of radars along the Arctic Ocean to monitor airspace, which the former NORAD commander said was becoming obsolete. While modernizing the NWS could cost Canada as much as $6 billion, the 2022 budget provides only $252 million in funding over five years to "lay the groundwork" for modernizing the defence of the North American continent. Details of a "robust" package of investments for North American defence are expected in the coming months, including the construction of an arctic over-the-horizon radar in 2028, estimated to be worth over $1 billion. While the Minister of National Defence acknowledges that Canada faces a "less secure, less predictable and more chaotic" security environment, she promises to deliver a "bold and aggressive" approach to the defence of the North American continent later. Furthermore, the Trudeau government has been silent on how much of the reinvestment will go to NATO. Does this include the decision to acquire 88 F-35 fighter jets, 23 more than planned, to simultaneously contribute up to 36 fighter jets for NORAD and a squadron to NATO air patrols? Or does Ottawa intend to increase the capabilities of its three mechanized brigade groups, including the one on alert for NATO’s Response Force, first activated in response to the invasion of Ukraine? No details have been released since the budget announcement, leaving the nature of the reinvestments in doubt. Given the discussions at NATO regarding the reinforcement of military contingents in Eastern Europe, which could result in the pre-positioning of troops on a permanent basis, it is unclear whether Canada is anticipating the costs that this could represent. Military Deployments in Decline Canada's usual response to critics who accuse it of under-investing in defence is to focus on the country's actual contributions to allied operations. In the words of Prime Minister Trudeau: "At the end of the day, the most important parameters are always: are countries building the capabilities that NATO needs? Are we able to provide different resources and demonstrate the kind of commitment to the Alliance that needs to always be there?" On that level, Trudeau believes "Canada can be extremely proud." It is true that Canada is one of the allies commanding a NATO battle group as part of its enhanced forward presence mission in Eastern Europe. Canada has led the NATO battalion in Latvia since June 2017, following the Atlantic Alliance's decision to enhance its military presence in the region in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea. This NATO presence was further strengthened following the invasion of Ukraine, with the deployment of additional multinational battle groups to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The Alliance also deployed additional ships and aircraft to increase its deterrence and defence posture against Russia. In this context, Canada announced on February 22, 2022, the deployment of an M777 artillery battery and an electronic warfare troop, composed of about 165 soldiers, bringing to 695 the Canadian military contingent in the battalion it commands. In addition, a second frigate is stationed in Europe to augment the one that is deployed there virtually year-round. Given that Canada has only five to six operational frigates, this contribution raises concerns about the capability limits of the Canadian Navy. Canada has also reassigned a CP-140 Aurora long-range patrol aircraft from Iceland to augment NATO forces in the Euro-Atlantic region. While six CF-18 Hornet fighter jets have been deployed to Eastern Europe six times since 2014, the last deployment was in the fall of 2021; no deployment has been announced following the invasion of Ukraine. As commendable as these additional deployments are, they fall short of those of other NATO framework nations, even at the ground force level. The United Kingdom, which commands the battle group in Estonia, has doubled the size of its contingent - from 900 to 1,750 troops - and deployed more tanks and armored vehicles. The U.S., leading the battalion in Poland, has increased its presence by an additional 4,700 troops, as well as expanding its presence in Germany, Lithuania and Bulgaria, bringing the number of U.S. troops in Europe from 80,000 to 100,000 since the Russian invasion began. France has deployed 500 troops to Romania, including armored vehicles, to command a new battle group there, along with 300 Belgian troops. Germany deployed an additional 350 troops to the 550 stationed in Lithuania, including an air defence system and artillery units, to augment its contingent leading the battle group in that country. Moreover, Canada's additional contribution in Latvia is less than that of other allies under its command, including an additional 250 Italian troops and more than 800 Danish soldiers as reinforcements. These figures demonstrate that Canada's reputation as a free-rider in the Atlantic Alliance is not unfounded. For those who might think that Canada's small contribution in Eastern Europe is anecdotal, the data collected by Scott Cooper and Kendall Stiles shows that it is symptomatic of a larger trend. On a per capita basis, Canada's military deployments to NATO "out-of-area" operations are below the average of other NATO members. Canada ranks 19th in terms of military contributions relative to population between 2004 and 2018. Some may be tempted to believe that Canada is choosing instead to focus its military contributions to international security in other types of operations. After all, shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Trudeau declared that Canada was "back" on the world stage, particularly through UN peace operations. However, of the 600 peacekeepers and 150 police officers promised, only a maximum of 167 military and 89 police officers were actually deployed in 2019 and 2015 respectively. This under-contribution continues a clear trend since the early 2010s: a net decrease in Canadian military deployments abroad, regardless of the type of mission. For example, since the end of its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2010, Canada has deployed just over 1,200 military personnel abroad on an annual basis, compared to nearly 4,000 between 1991 and 2010. Significant Military Support to Ukraine The picture is brighter when one looks at Canada's direct contribution to Ukraine. Canada was one of the few allies to deploy troops to Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea to help train its military. Given the battlefield success of the Ukrainian military, the 200 or so Canadians who have trained more than 33,000 members of Ukraine's Security Forces since 2015 – including nearly 2,000 members of the Ukrainian National Guard, have much to be proud of. They are partly responsible for the Ukrainian military's unheralded successes against the Russian invader, which relies on, among other things, the tactical skills, combat training and professionalization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces developed since 2015. These capabilities could have been even greater, were it not for the misleading intelligence assessment, which overwhelmingly underestimated the Ukrainians' willingness to fight and overestimated the advantages of Russian military superiority. If these intel reports had been more accurate, military support from the U.S., U.K. and Canada might have been greater. That said, the allies limited their support for Ukraine after the annexation of Crimea so as not to provoke Russia into further invasion of Ukraine. Not to be outdone, Canada has long limited its material aid to non-lethal military equipment, including flak jackets, night vision equipment, helmets and gas masks. It was not until February 14, 2022, that it agreed to provide the weapons requested by Kyiv. At that time, Ottawa announced that it would join the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Lithuania in supplying arms to Ukraine. However, these were limited to small caliber weapons, including pistols, machine guns and sniper rifles. It was not until the February 24 invasion that Ottawa agreed to supply Ukraine with larger calibre weapons. The Trudeau government first increased the delivery of non-lethal equipment, including night-vision goggles, and on February 28 offered 100 Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons systems and 2,000 rockets. Three days later, Ottawa added 4,500 M-72 rocket launchers and 7,500 grenades. These weapons were welcomed by Kyiv but judged insufficient. The Ukrainian president asked for heavy artillery, tanks, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, helicopters, fighter planes and missiles. However, the Minister of National Defence says that Canada has "exhausted" its weapons inventory and that the Canadian Forces are facing "capacity problems." This startled many, including former Chief of Staff Rick Hillier, who suggested that Canada deliver 250 of its upgraded light armoured vehicles. But government sources explain Canada's reluctance because of the need for training and spare parts for Ukrainian forces. Others suggest that Canada provide Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 120 of which are stored by the Royal Canadian Navy, to help the Ukrainians defend Odessa against a Russian assault. Government sources say the U.S. is opposed to this, which U.S. officials deny. After weeks of international and political pressure, the Trudeau government announced on April 18 the delivery of heavy artillery, four M777 howitzers among the 30 batteries acquired from the United States in 2005, as well as training on these systems in a country bordering Ukraine. In addition, eight armored vehicles, cameras for unmanned aerial vehicles, and satellite imagery have been supplied to date. During his visit to Kyiv, Prime Minister Trudeau stated that Canada would continue to do "whatever is necessary" to support Ukraine, which pleased President Zelensky, who in turn stated that he could not ask for more than to put pressure on other allies, since Canada had already provided him with "everything he had." According to data compiled by the Kiel Institute, Canada is the sixth largest national provider of assistance to Ukraine since January 24, 2022, with a total support of 2 billion euros. This is considerably less than the United States, which has offered close to €43 billion -- about three times the assistance offered by all European countries and institutions (nearly €16 billion), or the United Kingdom (€4.8 billion), Poland (€2.6 billion), Germany (€2.3 billion), and France (€2.1 billion), but far ahead of Italy (€0.48 billion) and other Western states. In terms of GDP, Canada is the 10th largest donor, this time also outpaced by the Baltic States, Slovakia, and Hungary, but ahead of Germany. Canada moves up the rankings in terms of the main commodity requested by President Zelensky, the provision of weapons, with total support of 0.76 billion euros. This is still well below the €24 billion committed by the United States, but nearly five times more than the support offered by France (€0.16 billion) or Italy (€0.15 billion). Finally, in terms of heavy weapons, which could enable Ukrainian forces not only to repel the Russian assault in the Donbass, but possibly to recapture lost territory, the Canadian commitment pales in comparison to that of its allies. Canada's main contribution is the delivery of four M777 howitzers, which is less than the amount of heavy artillery units offered by the United States (90), the Czech Republic (20), France (12), Estonia (9), Germany (7), Australia (6), and the Netherlands (5), according to data collected by the Kiel Institute. Unlike many, Canada has not offered tanks, man-portable air defence systems, or drones, heavy weapons that are crucial to the battle in Donbass. Thus, while Canada is offering significant support to Kyiv in the war against Russia, its assistance does not commensurate with its posture in favour of a total victory for Ukraine. Contrary to the desire of the Minister of Defence, Canada does not appear to be "ready for a potentially more dangerous phase of this war," i.e., to offer the weapons necessary for Ukraine to attempt to regain control of its territorial sovereignty. Atlanticism at a Lower Cost What does Canada seek with its Ukrainian policy? Officially, Canada aspires to the withdrawal of all Russian military forces and their "proxy agents" from the entire territory of Ukraine. This has been the case since the annexation of Crimea, as evidenced by the famous statement of then Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper during an unannounced meeting with President Vladimir Putin at a G20 summit: "I guess I will shake your hand but you need to get out of Ukraine." Of course, not only did Russia not pull out of Ukraine, it chose instead to attack it again in an even more brutal manner. So, is Canada's Ukraine policy just a sham? One could certainly think so, given the imposing size of the Ukrainian diaspora in the country - the second largest in the world after Russia, with 1.4 million nationals of Ukrainian origin, or 3.8% of the Canadian population. Its electoral weight is particularly concentrated in the three Canadian Prairie provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba), where it represents 11% of the population. All the main political parties are therefore courting the Ukrainian diaspora vote by adopting strong positions. One might therefore have expected the Trudeau government to accede to the repeated demands of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress to do more, including providing the heavy weapons that Ukraine has long been asking for. The gap between rhetoric and action with respect to Ukraine is explained by Canada's Atlanticist strategic culture, that is, its predisposition to support the Atlantic Alliance in order to avoid Canada's international marginalization, but at a lower cost. Canada has supported every major NATO initiative since its inception and has actively sought to resolve the differences that have divided its major allies over the past decades. However, this commitment is made with a view to minimizing costs to Canada. Canada's strategy for defending itself on the international stage is to brandish the Maple Leaf, that is, to ensure a visible Canadian presence, without seeking to achieve any strategic goals other than avoiding marginalization. In other words, Canada sees its military contribution in Ukraine as evidence of the success of its strategy, rather than a mismatch between political objectives and military means. There are several inconsistencies that flow from this Atlanticism at the expense of the United States. While Canada lobbied with the United States for Ukraine’s "full membership in the alliance" at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, it has so far refused to offer the security guarantees desired by President Zelensky in exchange for Ukraine's renunciation of NATO membership. Similarly, Canada has declined to offer direct security guarantees to Sweden and Finland until they join NATO, despite its unqualified support for their candidacy. Finally, Canada favours a multi-role defence posture that allows its military to operate in multiple roles, but on a temporary and marginal basis, rather than focusing its limited resources on specific advanced capabilities. It therefore has several weapon systems, but not in sufficient quantity to contribute with impact to a long-term proxy war. This sampling does not allow for the volumes of armaments needed for sustained high-intensity warfare. Conclusion Canada's military awakening is not for tomorrow. The main obstacle to reversing its reactive and minimalist posture lies in an invariant that is not likely to disappear any time soon: the U.S. involuntary security guarantee towards Canada. Regardless of its public positions, Canada does not have to invest significantly in its defence, since the United States protects it against foreign aggressors. It must only contribute enough to maintain a certain international visibility and satisfy its domestic public. Canada can thus call for the overthrow of President Putin while refusing to supply the weapons necessary for Ukraine to defeat its aggressor. It can also want Russia to respect Ukraine's sovereignty, while refusing to enter into dialogue with its president. This disconnects Canada's desired outcome from the war in Ukraine from the efforts required to achieve it. The main consequence of Canada's posture lies in the deprivation of international influence and the absence of strategic anticipation. By refusing to "pay its dues" and clearly articulate its interests, Canada is at best uninfluential and at worst marginalized. In the context of the war in Ukraine, this translates into a lack of weight on a possible end to the war. Given that a partition of Ukrainian territory is more than likely, and that a revanchist Russia is here to stay, Canada should focus its attention on these scenarios and mobilize its resources for medium- and long-term protection of Ukraine. In other words, Canada needs to think and act strategically rather than make sweeping statements while wallowing in the comfort of its North American security. Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies. Data compiled by the author. The original version of this text was published in French on Le Rubicon. Check it out here! ## Canada’s Potential for Leadership in the Post-War Reconstruction of Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canadas-potential-for-leadership-in-the-post-war-reconstruction-of-ukraine/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Canada’s Potential for Leadership in the Post-War Reconstruction of Ukraine. Charles Tilly’s pithy maxim that “war made the state... Introduction Charles Tilly’s pithy maxim that “war made the state, and the state made war,” succinctly describes the effects of wartime constraints in shaping and accelerating institutional reform within modern states. Conflict acts as a catalytic agent: it demands that state organs either mobilize or perish. In line with Tilly’s formula, the mortal perils posed by the 2014 annexation of Crimea and Russia’s (re-)invasion of 2022 have necessitated a global modernization of Ukraine’s system of governance. Over the past eight years, Ukraine has successfully shed its post-Soviet heritage while restructuring towards a more liberal and democratic future outlook. Canada, in conjunction with its Western allies, has an integral role to play in cementing these long-term gains in Eastern Europe. Despite the sham referenda conducted within occupied territories, Ukraine will most likely seek a resolution on the battlefield, not at the negotiating table. A potential exception might be made in the case of a Russian offer to return to the front of February 24, or after an abrupt change in the military situation. Putin’s desperation in the face of Ukraine’s impressive fall counter-offensive has manifested in a mass conscription drive and the renewed spectre of a limited nuclear strike. Though Ukraine’s victory is not yet assured, heavy Russian losses in Kherson and Kharkiv demonstrate an ongoing evolution in the battlefield balance of power. Canada and other supporters of the Ukrainian military effort should begin to action an architecture for the peace which will eventually follow the war. Regardless of the final territory under Kyiv’s authority at the time of a future peace agreement, a proactive commitment to the integration of Ukraine must be realized through the delivery of a comprehensive post-war reconstruction and assistance package. Canadian technical expertise and leadership on this front can help quickly rebuild Ukraine, coordinate allied resources, facilitate the return of displaced citizens, strengthen the rules-based international order, and bolster Canada’s standing within NATO and other multinational bodies. Ukraine Will Require a Monumental Multinational Reconstruction Program While Ukraine has managed to prevent institutional collapse in the wake of Russia’s invasion, the war has brutalized the country’s population and its economic infrastructure. In September 2022, year-over-year inflation was in excess of 20% and the government has had to borrow massive amounts of debt to remain solvent. A June 1 report estimated total direct damage at over $97 billion (USD), with Ukraine’s housing, transport, commerce, and industrial sectors particularly affected. Disruption to the economy is expected to cost another $252 billion (USD) this year, increasing the proportion of Ukrainians in poverty and cutting the nation’s GDP by 15.1%. In July, the International Ukraine Recovery Conference held in Switzerland produced the Lugano Declaration, signed by representatives from over 40 countries in addition to the European Investment Bank and the OECD. It will guide the reconstruction of Ukraine through international partnership, a reform focus, greater transparency, the rule of law, and multi-sectoral stakeholder engagement. Likewise, on October 25 the German G7 Presidency co-hosted an International Expert Conference on the Recovery, Reconstruction and Modernization of Ukraine together with the EU Commission in Berlin. There, it was estimated that Ukraine’s external financing needs could reach anywhere between $3 billion and $5 billion (USD) a month depending on the final extent of Russian bombing. Canada’s federal government should be prepared to outline specific commitments to Ukrainian recovery that will constructively engage with the Lugano and Berlin agendas. Since the start of the year, Canada’s political system has exhibited remarkable dynamism in utilizing the various crisis-response levers available to it. To date, Canada has offered up to $620 million (CAD) in bilateral loans, of which $500 million has already been disbursed to Ukraine. At the IMF, Canada has offered up to $1.4 billion (CAD) in loan resources to the Ukrainian government, of which $1 billion has already been provided. Between January 24 and August 3, Canada was the fifth-largest overall provider of military aid to Ukraine, the third-largest provider of humanitarian assistance, and the fourth-largest provider of total financial outlays. After helping coordinate the multinational sanctions regime implemented against Russia, Canada also became the first Western country to seize sanctioned Russian assets in order to repurpose them on behalf of Ukrainian war victims. Moving forward, these initial efforts must be parlayed into a wider-reaching reconstruction package that addresses the regional and global after-effects of the conflict. Given Kyiv’s daunting aid requirements, Ottawa will have to become a pragmatic spender to avoid budgetary rigor from setting in to its decision-making. Avenues for Canadian Institution-Building in Ukraine Immediate priorities ought to include measures to alleviate stress on the Ukrainian agricultural supply chain to combat global food insecurity, especially for developing nations that rely on Ukrainian and Russian crops to feed their populations. A new agricultural agreement between Canada and Ukraine can save lives at a time when inflation-adjusted food prices have reached their highest point since the 1970s. Though Canada has funded a $52 million (CAD) project through the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to address grain storage shortages in Ukraine, more can be done to expand capacity and encourage better farming practices to improve total yield. Over 65% of arable land in Ukraine is comprised of Chernozem, a type of hyper-fertile organic black soil. Canadian knowledge transfer in the form of educational exchanges and expert advice can introduce the modern technology, processes, and financial methods needed to capitalize on Ukraine’s natural agricultural advantages. Each year, 500 million tons of Ukraine’s soil are eroded by outdated practices such as large-scale till farming. Canada and Ukraine, therefore, have a shared interest in protecting arable lands and mitigating the adverse effects of climate change on agriculturally productive areas. International guidance in the modification and deregulation of Ukraine’s centralized legacy economy can further unlock the potential of its businesses, exporters, energy suppliers, and nascent tech industry. With tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees eager to return from Canada, coupled with the gumption of the Ukrainian-Canadian diaspora community, the country is ripe for a structural transformation undergirded by overseas investments and innovation. To best welcome these new assets, the Ukrainian state will need to slash red tape and develop an environment conducive to real property rights, free from the corruption endemic to the country’s post-1991 history. For its part, the Government of Canada should explore the revival of the Department of Justice’s International Legal Programs Section in partnership with the National Judicial Institute and the Canadian Bar Association. A framework to send highly-qualified Canadian jurists to Ukraine can contribute to legal reorganization and capacity-building initiatives, legislative drafting education, and the overseeing of much-needed law reform commissions. Long-term prosperity in Ukraine will be predicated on a stronger conception and application of the rule of law, guarded by a vigilant and responsive judiciary. On the diplomatic front, Canada’s membership and stature within prominent multilateral bodies such as the UN, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the G7, the OECD, and NATO provide a platform for the advancement of Ukraine’s cause along multiple vectors. Canada could, for example, lend its support to the creation of a Special Tribunal to Prosecute the Crime of Aggression Committed Against Ukraine. A proper inquiry into Russia’s leadership on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes reinforces the foundations of the international legal regime while bringing deserved justice to Ukrainian victims. Similarly, Canada’s vocal advocacy for Ukrainian accession to NATO yields abiding benefits in the form of a grateful future partner within the transatlantic coalition. Failure to uphold regional order in Eastern Europe has shifted the burden on Western nations, who must now take prophylactic steps to ensure the non-repetition of Russian transgressions against Ukraine. In the military aid and intelligence-sharing domain, Canada need not be the chief security provider for Ukraine. It can, however, pursue complementarities and reprise a convening function with allies to fill gaps in Ukraine’s defense apparatus. Last month, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) upgraded the capacity of the Prestwick transportation hub in Scotland to accelerate the shipment of weapons and equipment to Ukraine. Through Operation UNIFIER, Canadian officers assisted in the modernization and training of 33,000 Ukrainian soldiers between 2015 and 2022. This training proved critical to Ukraine’s resistance against the initial Russian onslaught in February. As conditions stabilize, Cabinet should be ready to authorize the resumption and expansion of CAF capacity-building missions in Ukraine to promote systems-interoperability and bring the Ukrainian military to NATO standards in preparation for eventual accession. Establishing Principles for the 21st Century The war between Russia and Ukraine, as Timothy Snyder has hauntingly described, interrogates “policies of mass death and […] the meaning of life in politics.” It has become about establishing “principles for the 21st century.” Just as the 2014 annexation of Crimea spurred the fundamental reconstitution of Ukrainian society, so too might the aftershocks of Russian bellicism act as an impetus for sweeping national and transnational reforms. Canada has a choice to make in this regard: to espouse a genuine material commitment to democratic resilience abroad, or to render mere platitudes in its name. Winning the war in Ukraine is a precondition to winning the peace which follows. In numerous metrics and along diverse parameters, Canada finds itself in a special position to exert influence over the post-war Ukrainian reconstruction process. It should not squander an opportunity to help Ukraine back to its feet while buttressing European security in the process. Here, Canadian diplomacy can deliver a lasting generational impact in Eastern Europe. Direct institutional contact and information exchange allows Canada’s leadership to listen and learn from Ukraine’s painful wartime experiences. Lastly, developments in cyber-warfare, anti-disinformation techniques, and new battlefield doctrines may adumbrate the scale and configuration of future 21st-century military conflicts. -Anvesh Jain ## Canada’s Role in the New Nuclear Landscape URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canadas-role-in-the-new-nuclear-landscape/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Canada, through the use of NPT and the development of a coherent foreign policy on counter-proliferation and nuclear risk reduction, could... The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference is scheduled for January 2022. Since its ratification in 1968 and the end of the Cold War, the nuclear landscape has changed dramatically. The growing geopolitical tensions of the current multipolar era have created a new sense of urgency for nuclear disarmament. With the challenges facing the international community now too numerous to be dealt with bilaterally, multilateral dialogue will play a key role in addressing the dangers surrounding nuclear weapons, their proliferation and potential use. Competing frameworks to the NPT have even emerged with the signing of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty (TPNW) in 2017. Canada is a member of the NPT and, through the use of its forum and the development of a coherent foreign policy on counter-proliferation and nuclear risk reduction, could play a key role in building a safer world. This policy report is divided into four sections. First, it sets out the current legal framework of the NPT and highlights its main weaknesses. Second, it assesses the two underlying factors that make more concerted action on proliferation and arms reduction necessary. Third, it identifies the three risks that make up the modern nuclear landscape. Fourth, it provides recommendations to the Government of Canada on how to moderately revise its role and chart a new, more prudent course with respect to nuclear weapons. The Legal Framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conceived during the Cold War, the NPT is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. It brings together 191 states and is based on three pillars. These pillars refer to non-proliferation per se, the right of all parties to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and finally, disarmament procedures. These require that all parties commit to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.” While the NPT has been relatively successful in regulating non-proliferation for decades, the changes that have transformed the international system after the end of the bipolar world have generated fundamental questions and challenges about its effectiveness. The intensification of interconnections among states means that, in many respects, this Cold War treaty is now unable to cope with the current landscape. With respect to non-proliferation, the granting of a timeless monopoly to acceding states that already possess weapons has led many to describe the NPT as a “grand bargain.”  And even though most states have ratified it, the scope of its provisions is undermined by the very foundations of international law, namely the principle of state sovereignty. Since a treaty cannot create obligations for third states, states such as India, Pakistan or even Israel have never been subject to the limits imposed by the NPT, even though they are now all public or secret nuclear powers. This illustrates the limits of the treaty in terms of non-proliferation. Although it has provided a framework for states’ nuclear weapons practices, its inapplicability to non-member states and its lack of moral legitimacy in granting monopolies have serious consequences. Meanwhile, peaceful research, while entirely legitimate, has led to a greater diffusion of nuclear materials and technologies within the international system. Thus, as early as 2007, some 40 states were identified as “possessing enough fissile material to produce a bomb.” While peaceful research activities should not be prohibited, they nevertheless complicate the calculation of the nuclear threat today, as we see an increase in the number of states using nuclear energy as part of their “clean” energy efforts. While it is true that nuclear power is a powerful energy source and can be central to the energy transition agenda, it is still relevant to assess the diffusion of nuclear technology through the lens of security and disarmament policies. While nuclear energy is not inherently bad, the fact remains that the diffusion of nuclear technology has proven too diffuse to be effectively supervised, as originally intended. Finally, it is in the area of disarmament that the NPT seems most obsolete. Although the spread of nuclear weapons has been controlled horizontally, vertical proliferation has peaked far beyond expectations. In this sense, the NPT refers more to an obligation of means rather than one of results and is particularly unspecific with respect to disarmament obligations. This is in contrast to treaties covering other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), such as those on chemical or biological weapons. While it is clear that the NPT has had a significant impact on controlling nuclear proliferation, the current dynamics reflect a significant disconnect between the context surrounding its conceptualization and the current state of power relations in the international system. Although the TPNW recently entered into force, there is little doubt that nuclear powers and nuclear umbrella countries will not ratify it. The Netherlands shows this, as even in the face of strong public opinion in favour of joining the treaty, international pressure outweighed domestic concerns and kept them out of the treaty. What the current framework demonstrates is that self-monitoring is probably not the best way to achieve disarmament, nor to stop WMD programs, because it is the states most in need of monitoring that set the parameters, from which they continually evade. At a more “micro” level, bilateral treaties are failing to keep pace with the current dynamics of the international disarmament system. There are now multiple nuclear dyads (US-Russia, US-China, US-People's Republic of Korea, India-Pakistan, India-China, and potentially others), and the links between them are more numerous than ever. As a result, arms restrictions through bilateral agreements are difficult to maintain, as countries may view them as a self-deprecation of their military capabilities against other competitors. This is evidenced by the recent withdrawal of the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in response to China’s treaty-free military modernization. While still useful for the implementation of concrete disarmament policies, bilateral treaties alone cannot be the solution to nuclear disarmament. In light of this brief overview of the legal structure, it is fair to say that the current framework of international law has become ineffective, and that nuclear disarmament remains a modern challenge. It is in need of renewal. The Underlying Factors Even within the current international legal framework for the possession and development of nuclear weapons, there are important underlying factors. While none of these risks are new, it is essential to take them into account. The last nuclear strikes occurred in 1945, more than 75 years ago. Yet the threat to human survival from nuclear war remains as great as it was during the Cold War: in 2021, the World Economic Forum still ranks the use of weapons of mass destruction as the third most impactful risk and the greatest existential threat. In the context of belligerent nuclear rivals challenging each other in this new era of great power competition, the current level of risk is increasing, as even UNIDIR argues in its 2020 report. There are two underlying factors: the pervasiveness of perception bias in the international system and the destructive power of modern nuclear weapons. Combined with the dangerousness of the modern landscape, they fuel the disconnect between the positions of nuclear states and the actual threat they pose. The possession of nuclear weapons makes it necessary to develop doctrines to effectively deter rival aggression. Yet these rivalries fuel mutual skepticism, which is compounded by the perception biases inherent in the international system. Because the system is “multilateral and interactive” and “the notion of separate deterrence dyads may no longer be a useful framework,” the danger of misperceptions, i.e., misinterpreting signals sent by another state, should not be underestimated. The core of the international system is that “many of the ways in which one state attempts to increase its security diminish the security of others”: the security dilemma. As states perceive through the “active process of reality construction,” their perception can be distorted by miscommunication, conflicting signals, incomplete information, and interpretation bias. For example, Charles A. Duelfer and Stephen Benedict Dyson have convincingly argued that perception errors were at the heart of the U.S.-Iraq conflict. Indeed, professional military organizations tend to be influenced in their behavior by organizational tendencies that often result in deterrence failure. As it plays a role in conventional conflict, misperception could also be at the root of any nuclear conflict and deterrence dynamic. Something as simple as a misinterpreted statement, made increasingly likely by human error and the growing interconnectedness of nuclear deterrence dyads, could trigger the arsenals. This is a feature of China-U.S. relations, with competition over core interests compounded by status dilemmas. This is particularly important since studies have found that “public attitudes about the desirability of using nuclear weapons are largely driven by consequentialist considerations of military utility,” as “the willingness to use nuclear weapons increases substantially when nuclear weapons offer advantages over conventional weapons in destroying critical targets.” Since the NPT was originally founded on the doctrine of extended deterrence, doubts by allies about U.S. security commitments, if not reassured, could mean that more states may seek proliferation to ensure their security. Thus, perception bias between powers and its increasing probabilities of impact makes the current landscape, due to its volatile and multilateral dynamic, concerning. The destructive potential of weapons of mass destruction has been ingrained in the world's consciousness by the image of the atomic mushrooms of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the hundreds of thousands of deaths. With the technological advances that have taken place since then and the development of thermonuclear bombs, it is now plausible that a single bomb could result in the deaths of millions. While the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a power of 15 kilotons and 20 kilotons of dynamite, respectively, modern thermonuclear weapons now have the equivalent of at least 100 kilotons of dynamite or more. The use of less than 1% of the currently estimated 13,125 warheads could even disrupt the global climate. As such, the increasing destructive power of nuclear weapons since their invention constitutes, in itself, an existential threat. These two factors expose what should be considered a "disconnect" between the way nuclear-weapon states treat their arsenals and the actual threat they pose. Indeed, the way in which countries and actors view and calculate the real risks associated with nuclear weapons is based on intuition and faulty data that stems from the fact that these weapons were only used when they were far less destructive than today. The sub-strategic use of nuclear weapons in limited engagements was directly suggested by the United States in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which emphasized the role of limited nuclear warfare potential for deterrence and regional theaters of engagement. While Cold War-era doctrines did raise this possibility, this ignores what has been a guiding principle of U.S. and Russian nuclear policy since 1985: the Reagan-Gorbachev agreement that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The risks posed by nuclear weapons are catastrophic, and the potential for even limited nuclear conflict is significant. Canada should therefore see the NPT review not only as an opportunity to engage in this debate, but also as a means to ensure its own long-term security through multilateral arms reduction treaties of the major powers. The Modern Nuclear Landscape The current nuclear landscape must also be seen as a source of concern. Even today, heads of state and government have little incentive to implement policies to abandon their nuclear arsenals. Although their respective arsenals have generally declined since the NPT came into force, nuclear weapons still pose a current risk to the international community. There are currently nine states that possess nuclear weapons: China, the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, North Korea, Israel, India, and Pakistan. Only the first five are subject to the provisions of the NPT. Notwithstanding the small number of nuclear-weapon states, any argument that reduces the nuclear threat to an outdated issue must be systematically rejected for several reasons. The first is that some states are on the so-called “nuclear threshold.” These states, which possess the capability to develop nuclear weapons, if necessary, represent a significant proliferation risk in the current nuclear landscape. Not all of these states pose a threat: research suggests that states that pursue economic liberalization are more likely to embrace moderation and latency than “their inward-looking, nationalistic, and sectarian radical counterparts.” It is when such a threshold state adopts a hostile stance toward its neighbors or rivals that the current weakness of the non-proliferation regime is highlighted. The most important and concerning threshold state is Iran. Despite international pressure and sanctions, as well as the 2015 agreement, it is estimated that by September 2021, Iran was one month away from having enough enriched uranium to make a nuclear warhead. With Iranian leaders unwilling or reluctant to return to the negotiating table with the United States, this untenable situation calls into question the strength of the non-proliferation mechanisms currently in place and opens the door to further crises. Moreover, because Israel perceives this as an existential threat, it openly warns that it will not hesitate to strike. To work, the NPT needs all participants to act in good faith and to be reliable. The unreliability of the United States, due to its changing domestic politics and the competing foreign policy goals of the Democratic and Republican administrations, has made agreements under the current framework much more difficult. Another key issue is the modernization of nuclear weapons. Although the overall number of nuclear warheads is declining, this is primarily due to the campaign to dismantle retired warheads by Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, every country that possesses nuclear weapons is currently modernizing its inventory. In this regard, the case of China is the most worrying. Nevertheless, every country that possesses nuclear weapons is currently in the process of modernizing its inventory. In this regard, the case of China is the most worrisome. Since its first nuclear test in 1964, China has maintained a doctrine of minimal deterrence, aimed only at a credible second-strike capability. However, recent developments regarding China’s nuclear capabilities raise many questions about its commitment to this doctrine. However, recent developments regarding China’s nuclear capabilities raise many questions about its commitment to this doctrine. It currently has about 250 silos under construction at Yuman and Hami, which is the largest expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal to date. China is not the only country following this specific path either: the United States and Russia are simultaneously modernizing their nuclear warheads, missile and aircraft delivery systems, and nuclear weapons production facilities. Moreover, the recent technological developments in the field of hypersonic missiles only seem to have exacerbated this dynamic. In a context of intensifying great power rivalry, the lack of trust between the actors seems to encourage active reinvestment in nuclear weapons, which calls into question the NPT and makes it increasingly obsolete and difficult to enforce. Finally, a third reason is the increasing dependence of states on nuclear-powered weaponry. The new trilateral AUKUS partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States is the most recent example of this phenomenon. The first project of the partnership will be to “deliver a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia.” This new development and the associated normalization of possession of nuclear material outside the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection system challenges the non-proliferation regime by introducing a loophole that other states could exploit. If nuclear technology and equipment become globally widespread and part of the conventional arsenals of most states, this could bring an increasing amount of enriched uranium into the current landscape without any international safeguards. While all of these issues make the current nuclear calculus considerably more complex, the fact that the shortcomings of the NPT are exacerbated by the underlying nuclear dynamics of the international system inevitably plays a role in the emergence of these new issues. Reframing Canada's Role and Interests As a member of NATO, Canada has long been involved in the international nuclear discourse. However, it has maintained an ambiguous position: while it does not seek to possess its own weapons and supports their elimination in principle, it supports the continued possession of WMD by its allies and relies on them to ensure its security through NATO and NORAD. In particular, developments within NATO on this issue may be imminent. Observer status in the TPNW by Norway and Germany could have significant impacts on the alliance’s cohesion. With nuclear deterrence once again becoming a common strategic tool and “arms control diplomacy running out of steam,” Canada has an opportunity to review its strategy in moderation and define a new, cautious but proactive foreign policy on nuclear weapons. One that protects its interests and strategic objectives, and maintains a necessary ambiguity, but also promotes greater security within the international system. We propose that Canada approach the NPT Review Conference as an inflection point and an opportunity to moderately reframe its contradictory nuclear position. The interrelationship of the two underlying factors noted above with the modern nuclear landscape makes the danger of increased proliferation and the associated risks too great to simply ignore. Future instabilities within NATO with respect to nuclear weapons also mean that the current Canadian strategy of maintaining the status quo will not be entirely sufficient. As nuclear modernization makes the principle of "deterrence by punishment" more costly, and as the current debate is about adopting a posture of "deterrence by denial," it seems clear that the risk of an increase in the speed of the arms race and technological innovation among the major powers is not inexistent—indeed, we are arguably already in one. The Canadian government should engage in a multilateral nuclear disarmament campaign to try to prevent further proliferation and manage the growing risks. We suggest three ways in which the Canadian government could do this. 1. Promote Nuclear Arms Reduction and Progressive Disarmament There is currently a lack of trust between the non-nuclear-weapon states and the nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, particularly with regard to disarmament commitment. Although the number of nuclear-weapon states represents only 3% of the NPT membership, the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon states have yet to be heard. Although polls show that a strong majority of Canadians would like to see Canada join the TPNW, Canada would likely face repercussions from its allies by doing so, which severely limits its flexibility. However, as Canada is already a member of the NPT, it could benefit from being part of this existing platform. In the context of the upcoming review conference, Canada must play a facilitating role. Since Canada cannot spontaneously harden its position on nuclear weapons, it should at least seek to promote a transparent dialogue between the NPT-nuclear weapon states (P5) and the non-nuclear-weapon states. As bilateral agreements are more easily abandoned, multilateral agreements should be the new path forward. To avoid nuclear war, arms control must accompany deterrence. Canada could argue for the renewal of arms control policies. In practice, this would mean Canada opposing the expansion of nuclear weapons storage within NATO beyond what is necessary to maintain its current deterrent capabilities. This would also involve supporting the negotiation and implementation of new treaties to limit the number, scope and destructive potential of nuclear weapons technologies and promoting sanctions against any country that abandons these new treaties 2. Bridging the Gaps and Rebuilding Confidence in the NPT The NPT framework has become, in some respects, outdated and ill-suited to the growing challenges it faces. At the upcoming review conference, Canada should advocate for the introduction of new safeguards and supervisory control over the possession of nuclear materials as part of states' conventional arsenal. Bringing the NPT back under the IAEA inspection system could be a positive step to prevent the setting of a new damaging precedent, to make it impossible for “potential proliferators to use naval reactor programs as cover for nuclear weapons development.” It is possible that Canada will have to acquire nuclear-powered submarines to replace its aging Victoria-class vessels, given that maintaining the operational capabilities of its navy is one of the objectives of Canadian national defence. Thus, the promotion of this new measure could be a preventive show of good faith that would considerably strengthen its credibility if it were to go down this path, even if there is no chance that it will acquire nuclear weapons. Of course, if Canada decides to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, the impact would be limited, but closing the oversight gap is essential to restoring confidence in the NPT. The increasing importance of nuclear energy for many countries’ transition plans toward a low-emission economy could be a positive phenomenon. Yet, increasing the monitoring of peaceful energy programs could also reduce distrust and avoid rogue states using those programs for covert motives. Finally, energizing the NPT by introducing enforcement mechanisms to penalize states that do not respect its provisions, or withdraw from them, should seriously be considered. The weakness of the current regime is partly exacerbated by policy reversals from major players, as it relies on them to initiate non-proliferation initiatives and measures. Systematizing sanctions and consequences could be one way of addressing this concerning development 3. Strengthen Existing No-Use and No-Test Standards Nina Tannenwald argued that, since 1945, the norm of non-use of nuclear weapons has been "the most important phenomenon of the nuclear age. This norm “has stigmatized nuclear weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction.” Although it has been upheld to date, the fact that it is a normative principle means that it could also be broken since it has no enforcement mechanism of its own and aversion to nuclear weapons is relative among the population. The Reagan-Gorbachev principle, though Cold War-era, should be renewed and promoted by Canada. Some dyads, such as the United States and Russia, have recently recommitted to it. Encouraging other states to follow suit would be an important step. Preventing states from seriously considering first-use strategies and limited engagement is another step needed to strengthen this standard. In addition, the nuclear test ban standard should also be strengthened, as it “signifies recognition of the dangers associated with use.” In practice, this means that Canada should use its influence and forum to promote the engagement of all nuclear powers on these issues, and their recommitment to those two norms. ## Canada’s Strategic Autonomy in the 21st Century: A Roadmap URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canadas-strategic-autonomy-in-the-21st-century-a-roadmap/ Modified: 2026-09-09 Executive Summary For the first time in its history, Canada is making strategic autonomy a guiding principle of its defence policy. However, the government has provided neither a concrete definition nor specific targets to assess its achievement, which risks turning it into a rallying cry that is more rhetorical than practical. This study addresses this gap: it defines Canadian strategic autonomy (CSA), identifies its dimensions, the vital interests that underpin it, and the threats that justify it, and then proposes a capabilities- and institutions-based roadmap to achieve it. CSA is understood here as the ability to conduct military operations with the United States whenever possible, but without American support if necessary. This approach is one of risk mitigation rather than decoupling, and it is broken down into three dimensions: decision-making, operational, and industrial and technological. It constitutes a medium- and long-term objective, with a target horizon of at least 2035–2040. KEY HIGHLIGHTS Two vital interests: The defence of Canada’s territorial integrity, including the Arctic and critical infrastructure, and that of its allies’ territorial integrity, along with the preservation of freedom of navigation for international trade. Three main threats: Conventional and hybrid threats from Russia, including a possible test of Article 5 within the next three to five years; the end of unwavering American support to European defence, which must become the guiding assumption for planning; and the rise of China, the effects of which would impact Canada even without direct confrontation. Three Key Constraints: Budgetary: Base defence spending will need to reach $159.1 billion by 2035–2036, according to the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Capacity: Only 61.3% of force elements are operationally ready, and the CAF faces a shortfall of approximately 16,000 personnel. Policy: Inconsistency between government rhetoric and procurement decisions. Defending Canadian territory: Securing and maintaining critical and defence infrastructure; cyber defence and counter-drone capabilities; a sovereign command-and-control system complementary to NORAD; space-based surveillance and communications; air and maritime surveillance; and air defence systems procured from non-U.S. suppliers. A mixed fleet of more than 130 combat aircraft: Complete the acquisition of the 88 F-35s by 2034, then add approximately 50 next-generation aircraft from 2035 onward, acquired through a non-U.S. allied program and paired with collaborative combat drones. A sovereign deep-strike capability: Allied diversification (JSM missiles, European ELSA program), a sovereign low-cost effector program, delivery systems, and end-to-end control of the targeting chain, in support of the Canadian Deep Precision Strike Capability (CDPSC) project. Defending allies: Providing attritionable capabilities (ammunition, interceptors, drones) and enablers (expanding the fleet of refueling aircraft to 12 or 15 and the GlobalEye fleet to 8 or 10), supplementing the twelve Type 212CD submarines with autonomous underwater vehicles and the combat aircraft fleet with collaborative combat drones, and building a land-based force of approximately 50,000 military personnel with staggered readiness. Four recommendations: Develop a new defence policy that explicitly defines vital interests; publish a ten-year investment plan validated by the Parliamentary Budget Officer; increase research and development to at least 3% of the defence budget; and provide structural funding for an independent analytical ecosystem. Risks Taken: CSA requires a generation of political consistency, exposes Canada to U.S. coercion, which can be managed through transparent and gradual risk mitigation, and opens a window of prolonged vulnerability: command autonomy is achievable within a decade, denial autonomy in fifteen to twenty years, and deep-strike autonomy beyond 2040. For the first time since 1987, Canada has the financial resources and political will necessary to build credible strategic autonomy. The proposed roadmap aims to turn this ambition into reality before this window closes. Read the full study here. Image Credit: Virginia Guard Public Affairs via Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0. ## Canadian Armed Forces and COVID-19: Abroad and at Home, Adapting in Times of Crisis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canadian-armed-forces-and-covid-19-abroad-and-at-home-adapting-in-times-of-crisis/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This hot take focuses on the Canadian Armed Forces, their challenges and adaptations during the coronavirus pandemic. Throughout the fall of 2020, Theodore McLauchlin and Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Professors at the University of Montreal, organized a series of virtual workshops in association with the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) on capacity building in the era of COVID-19. To close this series, a fifth workshop focused on the Canadian Armed Forces, their challenges and adaptations during the coronavirus pandemic. Speakers featured Stéphanie Bélanger, professor at the Royal Military College of Canada and a Canadian Armed Forces Reservist; LCol Pierre Leroux, J5 (i) at Canadian Joint Operations Command; Theodore McLauchlin, professor at the University of Montreal; and Major Audrey Hudon, a social worker with the Canadian Armed Forces[1]. Watch the video of the fifth panel Currently deployed on over twenty operations abroad and on Canadian territory, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have had to review and adapt their interventions in a global pandemic context. The CAF is trained to work in exceptional contexts, whether it be natural disasters, political crises, or humanitarian aid. Assisting isolated communities and citizens, working under strict health conditions, managing morgues: these are all situations that the armed forces are trained to respond to. This is not the first time they have had to intervene in a health context linked to an epidemic. Nevertheless, in the current context, two trends in terms of impact seem to be emerging: the effect of the pandemic on CAF interventions abroad and the impact it has had on the national mobilization of these forces. Capacity Building Abroad: Navigating a New International and Health Context  The missions of the armed forces abroad and their objectives have not changed. Still, how they are carried out, including how capacity building is managed, has been fundamentally impacted by the pandemic and the many health measures to be respected. The CAF had no choice but to adjust its interventions internationally and re-evaluate the deployment of 2,000 troops abroad. The adjustments made to the Unifier operation in Ukraine illustrate the pandemic's impact on the way capacity building has been modified over the last year. The situation has forced the government to question the CAF's priorities for defence and security capacity building. Operation Unifier is part of operations that were paused for a while during the summer before resuming in the fall of 2020. In the field, a whole logistics system has been put in place over the past few months to limit the health risks for the FAC, including the delimitation of risk zones from red (high risk of infection/uncontrollable environment) to green (controlled risk of infection), mitigation measures, or even troop withdrawal from certain regions (based on risk assessments). Capacity building is essentially based on creating links and mutual trust between the different actors present – elements that are difficult to maintain in times of a pandemic. It requires co-operation between actors with expertise and actors who will be recipients of that expertise, thus depending on how local forces perceive the training forces. However, creating a close relationship and trust bonds can be difficult when human contacts have to be reduced. The work of capacity building in the current context is, therefore, more difficult. Still, the CAF finds alternatives to adapt to social distancing obstacles with activities that do not require face-to-face contact. Although relations with local forces are now different, less warm in times of a pandemic, it is still possible to work on structural elements by focusing on improving training standards or the framework of interventions. Mental health services available to CAF also had to be adapted. For example, virtual preparations replaced the classic "Pre-deployment – during deployment – post-deployment" evaluation meetings. Both in Canada and abroad, digital platforms were heavily mobilized. In the case of mandatory isolation during deployment, contact was maintained daily via a platform or telephone call with the CAF members in isolation. The study of the pandemic's impact on the CAF will have to be conducted at several levels of analysis: at the organization's level to understand how it has adapted, and at the individual level to explore the personal consequences for CAF members. In Canada: A New Reality for the Military Mobilized on Operation Laser The consequences of the pandemic on Canadian military activities seem to have been greater at home than abroad. Operation Laser required an impressive adaptation effort on the part of the CAF, with 24,000 troops ready to respond and be deployed across Canada at any time: regular troops, reservists, Canadian rangers. With three objectives, Op Laser is: Saving lives; Assisting federal, provincial, territorial, and regional partners; Maintaining the readiness, effectiveness, and resilience of the CAF. This operation required a great deal of adaptive effort on the CAF’s part in its own territory. Feedback from the CAF members mobilized on this operation shows that most of them learned a great deal from their experience. They were able to gain humility, put forward their professional ethics, and discover another aspect of their work, one that nonetheless responds well to why they are committed: committing to their nation and its security. Since December 2020, CAF members are also mobilized to support the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine in Canada through Operation Vector. In addition to mental health issues and maintaining the link between social workers and deployed members, the issue of boredom during deployment and long periods of isolation was also brought forward. To respect health measures, mid-deployment leaves have been paused, and boredom can set in for troops mobilized over a long period of time. Nevertheless, this new way of operating also has a logistical advantage for military personnel, who are not obliged to disrupt family organization with round trips in COVID-19 time. On the return trip, it was difficult for CAF members to be so close to home but not go there until they had completed their mandatory quarantine. It was also difficult for soldiers deployed on Operation Laser to be so close to their environment but not be able to get there. This operation also brought the issue of reservists back to the forefront, both in their training and support. The reserve comes with its own set of challenges – the relational bonds between the troops are not the same as for a team trained to work together over the long term, social support may not be as present. While they responded in large numbers to Operation Laser, special consideration was given to them to make sure that they would not fall through the cracks of the support system after their deployment. It can take up to 5 years to complete training in the CAF reserve at this point in time and this fact raises even more questions in times of the coronavirus pandemic, especially regarding operational issues. With all these adaptations, the pandemic's influence on the mobilization of forces on the national territory has become an important concern for the Canadian government, and for the Canadian Institute for Military and Veterans Health Research (CIMVHR). The latter has invested in several longitudinal studies to study the impact of COVID-19 on CAF personnel over the past few months, particularly through their mobilization for Operation Laser. The CIMVHR also offers a special issue of the Journal of Military, Veteran and Family Health (JMVFH) "Addressing the needs of military members, veterans and their families during the COVID-19 pandemic". Conclusion  The armed forces' operational and strategic adjustments in response to the coronavirus pandemic have raised many issues and questions that will need to be considered over the medium and long term. In the short term, how can we protect CAF personnel from the virus in a context where more and more operations are taking place in high-risk national areas? To what extent will the pandemic and its budgetary impact affect the ability to deploy and sustain operations abroad over the long term? More broadly, what will be the priorities of the Canadian Armed Forces over the next few years? In a changing world in which the armed forces must adapt and reinvent themselves, older questions are reiterated, such as the way to retain both regular and reserve members or maintain the quality of the mental support provided to them. Even more so at this time, the moral and psychological support offered to CAF personnel is crucial. How can the CAF ensure that it maintains the best possible personnel while increasing retention in the face of a situation as unique as the coronavirus pandemic? As for the increasingly systematic use of technology – to maintain a link with the military and make the necessary preparations for their deployment – their increased mobilization implies questioning the security issues that may arise simultaneously (information leaks, identification of military personnel, etc.). Capacity building operations delivered by the CAF respond to a need to support foreign partners facing shared security challenges, such as the counterterrorism effort or in support of peace operations in unstable regions. This type of activity comes with its own set of challenges. There is always a risk that operations will not achieve the expected results and will be seen as a waste of effort, that the political context will not be conducive to the smooth conduct of activities, or that unintended effects may be perceived (e.g., that training received by local forces will not be put to good use). As discussed throughout the NSA’s workshop series, the pandemic has increased the challenges posed to this practice with direct consequences on the way capacity building is delivered by the CAF abroad and by creating a context in which CAF is increasingly in demand domestically. In addition, in the mid-term, the risk will be to face limited budgetary means due to the pandemic's economic impacts. Given that capacity building efforts take place in a multilateral context – typically operations are conducted by several forces within a coalition – the future consequences of the pandemic will therefore have to be analyzed as part of a whole, and attention will have to be paid to international co-operation and military institutions. [1] However, the ideas presented are those of the author. ## Canadian Foreign Policy Postures After the 1956 Suez Crisis: Lessons for Current Debates URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canadian-foreign-policy-postures-after-the-1956-suez-crisis-lessons-for-current-debates/ Modified: 2026-09-30 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant from the Department of National Defence’s MINDS program. Summary Since Donald Trump’s return to the American presidency in 2025, the reliability of the United States as an ally within NATO has been seriously called into question. Faced with this uncertainty, Canada finds itself at a crossroads, a situation reminiscent of the one that followed the 1956 Suez Crisis. This article examines the three strategic postures Canada considered in the wake of that crisis—alignment with the United States, closer ties with Europe, and strategic independence—in order to draw lessons for the contemporary context. The analysis shows that each of these postures carries specific advantages and risks, and that none can be adopted in its pure form. The article concludes that Canada should favour a hybrid approach: maintaining sufficient North American cooperation, deepening its European partnerships, and actively diversifying its alliances to strengthen its strategic autonomy. Introduction Since 2025 and Trump’s arrival at the head of the American government, the question of the transatlantic alliance has repeatedly returned to the table. The United States has expressed, rhetorically, a firm desire to withdraw from European security issues and is seeking to shift the burden of defence onto its allies. Although, in terms of capabilities, the efforts of the Trump administration are open to qualification, a sword of Damocles still hangs over Europeans and Canada with respect to their ability to count on their common ally. Moreover, the growing number of aggressive American stances toward Greenland and toward Canada has a direct impact on transatlantic cooperation and, more particularly, on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The American desire to disengage, combined with its aggressiveness and the possibility of its withdrawal from the alliance, is creating growing uncertainty across the Western sphere. So, faced with the possible fracture of NATO, what defence posture should Canada adopt to strengthen its security and remain credible on the international stage? Rarely has the transatlantic alliance come close to faltering. In 1956, however, during the Suez Crisis, NATO nearly broke apart because of the American reaction to the Franco-British decision to intervene in the Suez Canal following its nationalization by Nasser. This situation led Canada to consider a new posture to adopt in foreign policy. Should it follow the Europeans, and principally the United Kingdom, or continue down the path of alignment with the United States already begun in the 1940s? A third solution also emerged: the assertion of an autonomous foreign policy for a still-young, only recently independent country seeking to consolidate its national unity. These debates animated the Canadian political scene in the aftermath of the crisis, and again in the early 1960s. This article addresses the lessons Canada drew from the Suez Crisis, chiefly concerning relations between allies in a context of discord and rupture, in order to examine, in a context with similarities, the postures Canada might adopt. To do so, it first examines the context of the 1960s and the current situation in order to draw parallels. It then turns to the three postures open to Canada—alignment with its American neighbour, alignment with the Europeans, and strategic independence through the pursuit of new partnerships—analyzing what they concretely imply for the country and the risks they carry, particularly given a United States that continues to voice strong ambitions with respect to its northern neighbour. This text proposes that Canada adopt a blend of the three postures: drawing on a defence model based on autonomy, continuing its cooperation with European allies, and putting in place a strategy of hedging toward its American neighbour. 1956 and 2025: Two Different but Similar Crises The situation surrounding the Suez Canal led to a major crisis in the late 1950s. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the canal triggered a sharp Franco-British reaction, as those two countries sought to regain control of infrastructure they had previously administered. Pressure from the United States brought about a genuine rupture in relations between allies, as well as a change of posture for France and the United Kingdom. This moment marks a fracture within NATO. Canada’s response to the crisis is well known: under the leadership of Foreign Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson, the creation of a United Nations intervention force helped stabilize the situation and was praised around the world, earning him the Nobel Peace Prize. This episode, however, gave rise to deeper debates within Canadian politics about what direction to take in a time of rupture within the alliance. Some called for following the United Kingdom, others argued for consolidating the link with the United States, while still others defended an autonomous and independent posture, at a time when Canada needed to strengthen its bicultural identity. The 1950s and 1960s were thus marked by a period of rupture between allies, placing Canada at the intersection of three paths. Certain parallels can be drawn with the current situation. Today, Canada is no longer going through a crucial period of nation-building, although some identity issues have resurfaced since Trump’s arrival. Rather than building, Canada finds itself in a period of contestation because of the uncertainty surrounding the referendums in Quebec and Alberta. Moreover, the crisis is not of the same nature: it is no longer a matter of European powers wanting to keep their hold on former colonies, but of the unreliability of a previously valued ally, the United States. Trump’s second term has been marked by numerous high-profile moves that have profoundly altered perceptions of the international system and of NATO. The American president openly displays his desire to disengage from Europe, while multiplying aggressive acts and statements toward his allies on issues such as Greenland, the war in Ukraine, and relations with Canada. Given this, cooperation within NATO appears more difficult than before, which poses risks of division among members and may undermine its effectiveness, while Europe, driven largely by France, seeks to draw its partners toward strategic autonomy. Although this project is proving more complex than first envisioned, the split in transatlantic relations is deep enough that a review of past postures is called for. Canada thus finds itself once again at a crossroads. It could choose to turn to its neighbour and strengthen its ties with it—although the American attitude toward Canada makes this option hard to envisage in the current context. It could also move closer to the Europeans, which would offer an alternative to an unpredictable neighbour, but with some uncertainty about Europe’s ability to guarantee its security and about the American reaction, as well as the fact that geographic distance places a heavy burden on cooperation with Europe. Finally, the search for outside partners and the assertion of an independent posture constitute a third path. Although the two moments are marked by crises of different natures, they bring back similar problems for Canada. The parallel is therefore relevant, and it is useful to examine the postures the country considered in the 1960s in order to gauge their resonance in the current context. Three Possible Postures for Canada The first posture considered was that of alignment with the United States. In the 1960s, some argued that, given its cultural and geographic advantages, Canada ought to deepen its relationship with the United States. This relationship was seen as a strategic asset: moving away from it would have caused the country to lose considerable influence on the world stage. This logic also rested on the fact that, after the Suez Crisis, Canada enjoyed notable influence over American policy, particularly when it directly affected Ottawa. Some therefore believed the country should play an intermediary role, serving as a spokesperson for global concerns to Washington, notably for Western and European allies, but also for neutral or communist countries in the context of the Cold War. This is the idea of quiet diplomacy, championed by Lester B. Pearson: through its informal proximity to the United States, Canada could try to steer Washington’s policies through discreet channels. Moreover, coming out of the Second World War, alignment with its neighbour seemed the most natural path, particularly to benefit from the American security umbrella and continental defence. For proponents of this orientation, Canada should prioritize NORAD and NATO. Some, however, saw a risk of satellization, arguing that shared interests did not guarantee the absence of vassalage, while others considered this risk negligible. This path thus rested on maximal rapprochement with the United States, bringing postures into line, taking full advantage of American coverage, and allowing Canada to serve as a diplomatic relay for other powers, in the hope of exerting influence on American foreign policy. The second posture was that of strategic independence. Some believed that Canada should adopt a policy of neutrality, which would have allowed it to act for the common good and contribute to the resolution of international crises, something that would be impossible with alignment with Washington. This option did, however, mean giving up the security benefits tied to the relationship with the United States, notably NORAD coverage. Paradoxically, this rupture was also seen as protective: by no longer presenting itself as an American ally, Canada would have reduced its exposure to the geopolitical tensions arising from that alignment. Proponents of strategic independence also held that the priority of the moment was not maintaining American power, but strengthening Canada’s bicultural identity, promoting international equity, and the socio-economic modernization of the Third World. By opting for neutrality, Canada could have positioned itself as a leader of newly independent and decolonized nations, defending the interests of the countries of the Global South. Unlike quiet diplomacy, this approach assumed that Canada would “speak loudly” and publicly stand by its positions, out of a logic of distrust toward the United States. Risks of retaliation were also identified, since the United States had shown, in its relations with Egypt, Poland, and Yugoslavia, that it did not hesitate to use economic or political pressure. The existing alignment had until then spared Canada such risks; strategic independence would therefore have increased the likelihood of American coercive measures in the event of policy differences. This approach thus rested, in the context of the time, on the need to assert Canadian identity and to diversify partnerships. The question of neutrality or of distancing from the United States encompassed the idea that Canada could become an influential player among the countries of the Third World and the non-aligned. It nonetheless implied an effort at autonomous military build-up and a reduction of dependence on Washington, at the risk of exposing the country to significant retaliation. Finally, the third possible path was that of alignment with the Europeans. Less popular at the time, it consisted of supporting the British and French positions in the post-Suez period. Given its strong historical ties with both countries, Canada could have found first-rate strategic partners there. The Suez Crisis had in fact revealed divisions within Canadian society over whether to follow the United Kingdom or to favour the relationship with the United States. The idea of a rapprochement with Europe, beyond the NATO framework alone, was present in the debates. This rapprochement was also seen as a way of rebalancing the relationship with Washington and of reducing structural dependence on the American neighbour by diversifying strategic partnerships. It could also fit into a perspective of counterbalancing American influence, both in Europe and in Canada, whether within NATO or outside it. Finally, some stressed that strengthening the transatlantic link, notably through NATO, created a security interdependence that made Europe an indirect guarantor of Canadian security. Alignment with Europe thus offered Canada the possibility of freeing itself from its American dependence and weaving a new network of partners, both within an allied framework and outside it. This path would not, however, be the one taken in the 1960s, as Canada turned increasingly toward the United States, in effect increasing its dependence on its North American neighbour. What Are the Implications for Canada? The first path available in the current situation is still that of alignment with the United States. The structural and geographic interdependence between the two countries lends this orientation a certain logic: NORAD remains an unavoidable pillar of bilateral defence cooperation, and economic and trade ties remain tightly intertwined, with no real possibility of self-sufficiency between the two countries. The Canadian government, even in the current context of tension, continues to maintain converging interests with Washington without breaking openly with the American administration. Transposed to the present context, this posture would involve deepening the diplomatic relationship with the Trump administration, in the spirit of the quiet diplomacy so dear to Pearson: quietly influencing Washington’s direction rather than opposing it openly. This would, however, require prior alignment with the priorities of the administration in office, at the risk that any public disagreement would generate friction. On the defence front, this path would mean maintaining the existing North American security architecture, while forgoing diversification of partnerships toward Europe, Sweden, or other actors. This option, though pragmatic in appearance, is not without trade-offs. It currently implies a form of subordination to U.S. positions and would confine Canada to an intermediary role that does not necessarily reflect its own ambitions. It would also accentuate an already deep dependence on Washington and expose the country further to American interference. Even so, a total break with the United States remains unthinkable: this path should therefore be seen as a minimal foundation, not as a sufficient strategy in itself. The second path is that of rapprochement with Europe. This orientation is already partly under way: integration into the SAFE program, the possible but unconfirmed partnership with Sweden and SAAB around a potential fleet of Gripens, the acquisition of airborne early warning aircraft, participation in the coalition of the willing, and the military deployment in Latvia all point to a growing European anchoring in Canadian defence policy, at least politically and rhetorically. On the capability side, Canadian and European participation in each other’s defence industries remains too distant, which requires partnerships to be made concrete and a stronger commitment from both sides toward the other. Going further would nonetheless require structural choices: making the acquisition of European military equipment the norm to reduce dependence on American manufacturers, attracting European defence industrial base investment to Canada, intensifying transatlantic trade, and perhaps deepening the institutional framework linking Ottawa to Brussels. Such a pivot would not go unnoticed in Washington and would expose Canada to measures of retaliation—a risk already raised in the strategic debates of the 1950s. It must also be acknowledged that Canadian and European interests do not always coincide: perceived threats, geographic priorities, and strategic ambitions diverge enough to make full alignment unrealistic. This path therefore appears more as a lever for rebalancing than as a full and complete alternative. The third path, finally, is that of strategic independence. Canada would give itself greater autonomy in defence and foreign policy, or even an openly declared non-aligned posture. As in the 1960s, this would involve seeking new partnerships outside the American and European spheres. Certain contemporary signs point in this direction: Carney’s stance on the multipolar world order, the rapprochement with China, or the cooperation possible with countries such as South Korea in rearmament, or with Australia. This would also be reflected in a pullback of Canadian positions with respect to American decision-making. This path raises, however, a question that the debates of the 1960s had addressed: national unity. In 1956, the Suez Crisis had revealed tensions between Canada’s English- and French-speaking communities and the need for the country to work on its identity and bicultural character. Today, this fracture takes a different but equally salient form. The referendums announced in Alberta and Quebec are bringing back significant risks to Canadian unity, at a time when American pressure has only intensified. A posture of strategic independence could appear to be the solution while also heralding new problems. By breaking with North American security structures and with NATO in order to assert a non-aligned or neutral posture, Canada could fuel internal tensions rather than ease them and isolate itself on the international stage from some of its allies. For provinces that see the relationship with the United States as a vital economic issue, such a disengagement would be politically difficult to defend. The assertion of an autonomous path must therefore be accompanied by a message of national cohesion, failing which it risks weakening the country more than strengthening it. Conclusion Thus, Canada need not follow any one of these paths in full. Each has its own problems: increased dependence, risk of retaliation, risk of isolation and of loss of credibility. These perspectives represent archetypes of workable positions. In this sense, Canada could pursue both integration with the United States at certain levels and, in parallel, develop its alignment with Europe, as it is already doing, without pushing fully toward a rupture. Finally, the search for new partners is becoming more attractive as a way of strengthening the established objectives of independence in defence and foreign policy. In light of the historical analysis and contemporary issues, five policy recommendations emerge to guide Canadian strategy: Maintain pragmatic engagement with the United States through NORAD. Canada must preserve existing continental defence mechanisms while refusing any form of political vassalage. Informal, discreet dialogue—in the tradition of quiet diplomacy—would allow it to exert influence on Washington without compromising Canadian sovereignty. Accelerate and institutionalize the strategic rapprochement with the European Union. Partnerships already under way—the SAFE program, acquisition of European materiel, presence in Latvia—must be deepened and formalized. Canada should consider framework agreements on defence cooperation with the EU in order to reduce its dependence on American equipment and security guarantees. Invest heavily in national defence capabilities. Any posture of strategic autonomy, even a partial one, requires a credible industrial and military base. Canada must give itself the means for a more autonomous defence, notably by meeting NATO’s 2 per cent of GDP target, diversifying its suppliers of military equipment, and developing a competitive national defence industry. Diversify strategic alliances beyond the transatlantic framework. Canada should strengthen its partnerships with middle powers that share its values, notably South Korea, Japan, and Australia. This diversification would reduce the country’s vulnerability to reversals in American foreign policy, while also offering new technological opportunities in the defence sector. Articulate a clearly defined foreign policy doctrine. Given the instability of the geopolitical environment, Canada would do well to publish a defence and foreign policy white paper explicitly setting out its strategic priorities, its red lines in the face of American pressure, and its commitments to its partners. Such doctrinal clarity would strengthen Canada’s international credibility. Image Credit: Imperial War Museums, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. ## Canadian Independence from the United States Means Investing in Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canadian-independence-from-the-united-states-means-investing-in-defence/ Modified: 2025-08-19 Over the last few months, President Trump's threats of Canada as a "51st state" have reignited Canadian feelings of national insecurity and awoken a patriotic rallying cry amongst the populace. As a result, many Canadian politicians and pundits continue calling to end our reliance on the US and find a new star to hitch our wagon to. While diversification must be pursued, those suggesting Canada walk away from the US (and perhaps join the EU) are in need of a reality check. Any serious assessment of Canada’s place in the world must conclude that its partnership with the US remains its greatest asset. If we are to have an honest discussion about Canadian interests, then we cannot let pride and insecurities get in the way. Forging an identity and finding Canada’s “place on the world stage” should start by increasing our negotiation power with our indispensable partner (the United States). To this end, Canada should make a greater investment in defence capabilities to achieve what most Canadians are looking for: 1) greater leverage with the US, and 2) greater capacity to act independently from the US if need be. In other words, to invest in Canada’s defence is to invest in Canada’s independence. Trump’s actions speak louder than his words. Lest I be accused of being overly sympathetic to the current US President, allow me to make my view clear upfront: Trump poses an unprecedented threat to Canadian security and prosperity. However, Canada’s close partnership with the United States must endure because neither country can survive without the other. While we should be wary of Trump’s imperial menaces, we should be even more watchful of his actions, or in some cases, lack of actions.  By his own admission, the idea of Donald Trump ordering a military invasion into Canada remains extremely unlikely. His wish to incorporate Canada into US real estate holdings is rooted in his P.T. Barnum-esque flair and bombastic negotiating tactics than in any realist agenda. Much like Barnum, the famed showman who captivated audiences with exaggerated spectacles, Trump frequently tosses out inflammatory ideas without the follow-through like his unfulfilled 2016 promise to build a wall entirely paid for by Mexico. Rather than getting head faked by his constant menacing, building a more resilient Canada remains the best method to Trump proof the country. Independence begins at home To secure Canada’s long-term security and independence, logic dictates that we must invest in our national security infrastructure. This produces several benefits: protecting Canada, making us a more reliable ally to all our partners, and building a new national identity as a protector of our country and defender of our allies, not as a supplicant or sidekick in need of a patron to protect him when things get rough. A good place to start would be to further invest in the Canadian navy and coast guard to help Canada assert sovereignty over the longest coastline in the world and be invaluable help to allies to secure maritime shipping lanes, help patrol against illegal activity and act as a deterrent to potential maritime embargos, chokepoints, blockades and other flashpoints. Furthermore, as we seek to strengthen relationships with new allies, there are two countries that Canada needs to strengthen more than any other: Japan and South Korea. Stronger naval capacity would allow Canada to participate in Asia Pacific missions to shore up new alliances. Most of the commercial growth for Canada and most of the global political risk lie in the Indo Pacific. The Canadian Indo Pacific strategy launched under Justin Trudeau in 2022 contained similar policy recommendations, we just need to start implementing them. More naval assets would also better protect the Canadian Arctic. China continues to clandestinely map Canada’s seabed and builds ice breakers with a deep-diving submersible that could put deep-sea cables at risk. Canada has taken a good step in its commitment to build new submarines and ships but more is needed. Autonomous marine systems like underwater vehicles, anti-drone capability and rapidly deployable sensors must be part of building a new independent identity. A strong marine presence on Canada’s coasts and in the Arctic sends a strong message to the United States and to the Canadian public that its identity and defence is not dependent on being America’s sidekick. Mark Carney has announced a new dawn, but have things really changed? The Carney Government’s message on the campaign trail regarding Canada US relations was crystal clear: the US has become an unreliable partner and it’s time to review options. In his announcement to renew Canada’s military, he specifically mentioned that  Canada must reduce its dependence on the United States and promised billions of dollars of additional investments towards a Canadian industrial defence strategy as well as participation in ReArm Europe, in order to diversify defence spending. However pure his intentions, Mark Carney’s actions (so far) tell a different story. On defence acquisitions, we are still buying American for the time being. Despite numerous suggestions that Canada should halt the purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and take our business to Europe, the truth of the matter is that finding a different supplier at this point would not only be prohibitive in terms of price, it would further delay a replacement process that began in the late 1990’s and was supposed to have delivered its last jet 15 years ago. Canada’s chief of defence Jennie Carignan has recently signaled her aversion to switching out the F-35’s by stating that buying a European jet would only add more costs. In fact, the idea of pivoting to Europe for defence purchases also relies on a very optimistic assessment of what Canada can realistically achieve with transatlantic allies in matters of industry. While Canada’s recent adhesion to a strategic defence and security partnership with the European Union gave the impression that Canada’s defence sector can now compete for contracts in Europe, the hard truth remains that European defence markets remain highly protected, with industry leaders reluctant to cede ground, and are themselves grappling with equipment shortfalls and production bottlenecks in the wake of renewed demand. Even the UK is being made to pay a substantial price of admission to participate in the EU rearm program and despite a lot of tough talk from the EU on how it needs to rely on itself for defence, it has just promised to purchase up to $600 billion in US military equipment as part of their trade deal with Washington. Canada can expect similar demands from Trump and we will likely acquiesce. The hard truth is Canadian defence contractors are deeply embedded in North American supply chains—financially, technically, and logistically. They cannot simply pack up and reorient to an entirely different ecosystem without enormous cost, disruption, and uncertainty. On the matter of securing Canada’s perimeter, Mr. Carney appears to be drawing ever closer to the United States, signaling that he is open to joining the American “Golden Dome” otherwise known as Trump’s proposed multi-layer missile defence system for the United States. Should Canada join the Golden Dome, Carney would be charting new territory: no Canadian Prime Minister — from Pearson to Mulroney to Justin Trudeau — has ever formally partnered with the U.S. on missile defense. Participation in missile defence would not only mark a historic shift in Canadian defense policy, but it would also further reinforce NORAD, Canada’s most important security alliance and the only military partnership the United States has vowed to honor indefinitely. On the economic front, Prime Minister Carney continues to forge what may be the closest Canada–U.S. partnership in a generation. At the heart of this effort is his ambitious push for a new bilateral security and trade agreement—an initiative Carney says is the result of direct and ongoing direct talks (and texts) with President Donald Trump himself. The goal: to secure long-term market stability and to lift or mitigate the tariffs that threaten sectors of the Canadian economy.  Yet even under the weight of these punitive tariffs, Canada remains the United States' most privileged trading partner, enjoying greater market access than any other country. These developments sharply undercut any narrative that Canada is drifting from Washington; in truth, the data points to a deepening partnership—economically, diplomatically, and strategically. Doomed to succeed No matter how bad things get between Canada and the US, we will still be each other’s main security and defence partner. Those calling for Canada to abandon the US and find a new great power partner (example, the EU) are forgetting our unique geographical position and are overly optimistic about what other potential partners and allies can provide. If we are truly interested in independence, we have the power to come to our own rescue via investments in our own defence and security that makes us more resilient to US arm twisting.  For these reasons, an increase in spending on defence remains the best way to consolidate Canadian interests and give us the strength and independence to negotiate with the US as a partner and not as a beggar. About the Author Ross O'Connor was previously Foreign Affairs and National Security advisor to Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Senior Policy Advisor to Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. ## Canadians Want to Play a Larger Diplomatic Role in International Affairs: Building a New Path for Our Place in the World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/canadians-want-to-play-a-larger-diplomatic-role-in-international-affairs-building-a-new-path-for-our-place-in-the-world/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Jean-Christophe Boucher analyzes the results of an August 2020 survey on Canadians' foreign policy preferences and ambitions. The last two decades have been difficult for Canadian foreign policy. Successive governments in Ottawa have been struggling to articulate a coherent policy anchored in our values and interests as well as allocating resources toward these objectives. In short, we have lost control of our own destiny in the world. In such confusing times, a first step toward rethinking our place in the world should start with understanding Canadians’ foreign policy preferences and ambitions. To that end, the Canadian Defence and Security Network convened some of Canada’s leading experts to design a comprehensive public survey. A University of Calgary-led group worked with Nanos Research to deploy a survey in August 2020, asking 1,504 Canadians about their attitudes toward foreign and defence policy. Click here to view the survey results.  We first asked Canadians what they felt should be our role in the world. By far the most common response (31% of respondents) was that Canada should be a peacekeeper, a mediator, or a voice of reason in international affairs. Other common responses spoke about Canada being a leader/decision-maker, being a role model and advocate for human rights, and helping those in need. These responses show that Canadians generally believe that our contribution to world affairs should focus on deescalating tensions in a fraught international environment where reasonableness is in short supply. To be clear, this is an ambitious role for any country, let alone a small power like Canada who has neither the economic nor military might to steer the course of world events. Furthermore, our traditional means of influence, leveraging international organizations, has been limited by the increasing entanglement in great power competition. What we can do, however, is direct our energy and determination toward building stronger relations with like-minded countries – such as the UK, France, Germany, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – and mobilize these networks to carve out zones of order in a turbulent world. Second, we asked to what extent, if any, they thought Canada faced international threats. 41% of respondents answered that such threats were important, while 36% were neutral, and 20% to a low extent. This indicates Canadians’ awareness of the deteriorating security environment in the world. When prompted on what they believed was the most and second most important threats, China (34%) was identified as the main menace, with the US/Trump very close (31%), followed by cyber-attacks (16%), and terrorism (13%). Canadians’ patience with China and the US is eroding and, consequently, this is increasing the domestic cost of the government’s efforts to promote better relations with these countries. Figure 1: Perceptions of the threat among Canadians (disparities between region and gender) Third, we examined how Canada should promote its place in the global environment. The most common responses were diplomacy (82%), international trade (80%), and environmental policy (79%). Comparatively, immigration (59%), foreign aid (54%), and national defence (54%) were considered less important as foreign policy tools. This focus on diplomacy, trade, and environmental policy aligns with the notion that our added value in world affairs is our capacity to transcend narrow self-interests and work toward broader long-termed goals. What is surprising, however, is that we haven’t really invested in these tools. The current budget of Global Affairs Canada for diplomacy, advocacy, and international agreements is relatively modest (sitting close to $900 million) compared to the resources invested in either foreign aid (close to $5 billion) or national defence (around $21 billion). Although money allocation is an imperfect indicator of a government’s priorities, there seems to be some support amongst Canadians to increase resources devoted to Canadian diplomacy. Figure 2: Importance of foreign policy tools to promote Canada's place in the world Fourth, on the question of the balance between promoting our interests and our values, 59% of Canadians argued that we should prioritize promoting our values around the world while only 17% suggested we should focus on our interests, with some important variance found between regions and gender. A very large number of Canadians (36%) identified trade and economic exchange as our primary national interests, while 16% answered environmental responsibility, 8% security, and 6% oil and gas/energy. When probed specifically on what values should be promoted, 25% answered inclusivity, fairness, and equality; while peace (13%), human rights (13%), and democracy (11%) followed. This emphasis on inclusivity is very interesting. In terms of foreign policy, Canadians articulate the need to be authentic – to use Charles Taylor’s notion – on the world stage. This could be achieved by anchoring our policy in our shared sense of self as a pluralist society, striving to develop a political project that recognizes the strength of diversity. In this, the Trudeau government’s focus on a feminist foreign policy is a good first step as it recognizes our attachment to gender equality. Nevertheless, it does not fully leverage the breadth of a society that negotiates, imperfectly, bilingualism, the inclusion and recognition of black, indigenous, and persons of colours, and a commitment to promote LGBTQ+ rights. Clearly, there is room for the Government of Canada to redefine its priorities and be more audacious. This is just a glimpse of what we are learning on Canadians’ attitude toward foreign policy, but two major conclusions seem to derive from these results. Firstly, Canadians want to be involved in world affairs, engaging vigorously in diplomacy to promote our values – especially our dedication to a political project centered around tolerance and diversity – and our economic interests. Secondly, aggressive posturing from Beijing and Washington, D.C. are perceived as the main threats to Canadian sovereignty and international stability. Canadians have taken note of the mounting competition between these two powers and are increasingly distrustful of them. This warrants efforts by the Canadian government to develop better relations with other states around the globe and invest resources in our diplomatic corps in order to reduce our dependency on China and the United States. ## Capacity Building Before and After COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/capacity-building-before-and-after-covid-19/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > ocusing on the impact of the pandemic on capacity building activities, the panel gave rise to a lively discussion on the multiple questions that capacity building already raised before the pandemic, and on how COVID-19 is affecting them today. On Friday, September 25, The Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) organized the first panel of a cycle of 5 workshops on capacity building in the COVID-19 era. It was moderated by Theodore McLauchlin, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Center for Studies on Peace and International Security (CIPSS) at the University of Montreal. The panel included two speakers: Renanah Miles Joyce, Postdoctoral Fellow in Grand Strategy, Security, and State Art in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School and, jointly, in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Linnéa Gelot, associate professor in peace and development studies and senior researcher at the Folke Bernadotte Academy. Focusing on the impact of the pandemic on capacity building activities, the panel gave rise to a lively discussion on the multiple questions that capacity building already raised before the pandemic, and on how COVID-19 is affecting them today. This ‘hot take’ summarizes the highlights of that exchange. Watch the video of the first panel Capacity Building Before COVID-19 Capacity building is a form of security cooperation through which an actor transfers technical capacities and knowledge to another actor in order to improve the skills of the latter's armed forces to effectively face the challenges of peace and security, capabilities. This has become over the years an important foreign policy tool for several Western countries. It presents itself as an alternative means of contributing to international peace and security, a means that involves less risk and cost than the alternative of direct large-scale deployment. According to Theodore McLauchlin, who is currently working on a project called Politics of Foreign Military Training where he examines the political impacts of international military training, it is therefore a means of getting involved abroad without paying a heavy price. Several objectives underpin these capacity building operations: military performance, the fight against insurgency, counter-terrorism, respect for human rights, and democratization. Before the pandemic, capacity building was also an opportunity for ‘provider countries’ to extend their influence in ‘recipient countries.’ Indeed, through training activities, the armed forces conducting the training had the opportunity to interact with and socialize their recipient counterparts. For Renanah Miles Joyce, whose book project Exporting Might and Right: Great Power Security Assistance and Developing Militaries focuses on the effectiveness of security assistance as a tool of great powers to shape norms and behavior of militaries in small states, it is therefore a springboard for easy dissemination of the provider's values ​​and interests. For some authors, states that receive military training from the United States - for example - easily develop a pro-American vision. Certain standards such as liberalization, respect for human rights, reduction of repression would thus be accepted more easily by recipient countries. However, this point remains debated in the literature. In addition, the literature and discussions among professionals also focused on issues such as the impact of capacity building activities on coups d'état; the usefulness of these activities in the context of authoritarian or corrupt governments; or the effect that the multiplicity of providers can have on the ability to carry out a coherent transfer of standards and practices - depending on whether they are acting in a logic of coordination or competition. COVID-19 therefore extends the list of questions to be asked about capacity building. The Disruption Caused by COVID-19 One of the first consequences of this pandemic is the economic hardship it has caused on a global scale. With economic difficulties come budget cuts and recalibration of priorities and emergencies. Thus, the first question that arises is, to what extent capacity building will remain a priority for provider states. While this was a cheaper way to achieve certain international security goals, the paradox that arises is that with the pandemic, its value may change. For Theodore McLauchlin, capacity building would no longer be absolutely a priority in the current context - of economic crisis and internal emergencies - for certain powers that were involved in this kind of activity. On the other hand, the low cost of capacity building, compared to other forms of intervention, may make it more attractive in an era of economic damage and shrinking budgets. Indeed, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have canceled or reduced some training activities since the start of the pandemic, while others like China, Russia and France have not. According to the panelists, capacity building activities could also be limited to core activities. But, what activities will be considered essential? Geopolitical interests could become another element likely to tip the scales: choices could then be made according to criteria such as gaining ground, extending or maintaining influence, sending a message to adversaries about our capabilities. For example, we observe that some providers, such as China and Russia, have continued military training activities despite the pandemic, just as France did under Operation Barkhane in the Sahel. In addition, COVID-19 poses the problem of restrictions on movement and physical contact. Limits to the movement of the training or recipient armed forces raise the possibility of conducting instruction remotely. But, according to Renanah Miles Joyce, problems arise with the lack of technological infrastructure in some developing countries and regions, the accentuation of the difficulties posed by language barriers, and the hindrance to the process of socialization which is important to Western providers. Also, strategic training could suffer more than tactical training with distancing measures: it usually takes place in classrooms (not in the open air). In addition, its emphasis on deepening people-to-people bonds between officers from different countries is particularly difficult to maintain with the move to online courses. The discussion on capacity building in the COVID-19 era was also an opportunity to visit alternative security management instruments. Linnéa Gelot, whose current project is called African Union Waging Peace, raised this point from the framework of peacekeeping operations. Gelot recalled that, that, in a context of crisis of multilateralism and lack of coordination between state powers, several peacekeeping missions have been forced to downsize or stop - this is the case in Congo, Haiti, in Darfur and in Liberia. Gelot underlined that now political (mediation) missions are increasingly put forward to the detriment of military deployments, and that operations focus more on essential tasks rather than on the multiple dimensions which are more suitable to help people affected by conflict. This trend which predates the pandemic could therefore intensify in the current context of the health crisis. Likewise, declining Western investment in capacity building could create an opportunity for regional initiatives, whether in capacity building or peacekeeping operations, to develop further. This could be an opportunity for international organizations and great powers to encourage regional initiatives. ## Chad’s Unlikely Transition URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/chads-unlikely-transition/ Modified: 2026-03-19 > Last year’s peace talks between Chadian authorities armed groups and the National Dialogue may have appeared to usher in a new dawn... Last year’s peace talks between Chadian authorities armed groups and the National Dialogue may have appeared to usher in a new dawn for the central African country after the death of long-time president Idriss Deby. This was likely a mirage. Since independence in 1960, changes in Chadian leadership have never been the result of democratic, inclusive, or transparent processes. This transition is unlikely to be any different, and Chad’s allies and donors must prepare for this reality. For too long, stakeholders like the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and the United States (US) have turned a blind eye to undemocratic practices in the country, ostensibly because of Chad’s longstanding relationship with France, and strong military capable of staving off armed insurgent threats. While true, these are not grounds to continue to support authoritarian practices. The current crisis of legitimacy began in April 2021, when President Idriss Deby was killed in clashes with rebel group Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (FACT) after holding onto power for 30 years. Ignoring the Chadian constitutional rule that leadership should be passed onto the president of the National Assembly until elections, Idriss Deby’s son Mahamat Deby declared himself President of the Military Transition Council, which was due to govern for 18 months until democratic elections could be held. Millions of dollars have been provided by Canada, the EU, and France to support the transition process, but the likelihood of a real transition is fading away. In addition to elections, the 2021 transitional roadmap guaranteed the organisation of an inclusive national dialogue to determine the terms of constitutional reforms and lay the groundwork for national elections. After months of delay, a peace agreement, brokered in Doha, Qatar in early August 2022, secured the participation of many armed groups in the national dialogue processes. Although the Doha Accord is not insignificant, it unsurprisingly fell short of paving the way for any real effort to reform the security sector. Its biggest failure was that the two main peace spoilers, the FACT and the Conseil de Commandement Militaire pour le Salut de la République (CCMSR) as well as a handful of smaller groups, boycotted the two processes—putting into question their effectiveness and inclusivity. One of many billboards in N’Djamena placed by Chadian authorities to thank Mahamat Deby following the signature of the Doha Accord on August 8, 2022. Photo credit: Alexandra Lamarche   Less than two weeks later, the Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (DNIS) opened on August 20, 2022. The DNIS brought together more than a thousand stakeholders from opposition parties, armed groups, civil society, trade unions, as well as Chadian authorities and military. National dialogue processes should typically occur in the post-conflict stage. Of course, peace with some is better than peace with none, but the FACT and the CCMSR’s refusal to partake in the processes makes it clear that these tensions remain unaddressed. While some international stakeholders applauded the launch of the dialogue, Dr. Yamingué Bétinbaye, senior researcher at Chad’s Centre de Recherches en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines, told me that "rare are those who believed in a real change in the system" (original quote in French: « rares sont ceux qui croyaient à un changement véritable du système »). Their scepticism was justified when the forum culminated with the extension of the transitional government for an additional two years and the announcement that elections would only take place in 2024, after this “new phase of the transition”. The transition has not been entirely without positive change. Exiled rebel leaders Timan Erdimi and Mahamat Nouri were able to return to Chad after nearly decades abroad in order to participate in the dialogue and former rebels have since been brought into a new unity government. While these significant changes must be acknowledged, will they truly bring change? Or have these compromises and both the Doha Accord and the DNIS mostly served to legitimise Deby’s disputed takeover? In an ideal world, the dialogue would have been the opportunity to redefine the relationship between the state and the population. A quick look at Chad’s National Dialogue Commission Report—which troublingly isn’t widely available—shows little progress. Instead, it lays the foundation for the dynastic succession of Mahamat Deby. Although he had promised not to run for president, the report permits him and other members of the military junta to present themselves in the next election. Many Chadians feel misled since the change of plans. On October 20, civilian frustration with the outcome of the DNIS, and the state of the transition more broadly, came to a head and thousands took to the streets across the country. Chadian security forces responded with live bullets, killing over 50 people and injuring dozens more. Despite human rights organisations’ repeated calls for thorough investigations into the gruesome event, Chadian authorities have failed to take action. Dr. Bétinbaye lamented that since October, “we have, once again, fallen back into the old system” (original quote in French: « on est de nouveau retombés dans l’ancien système »). Deby senior’s regime—which began in 1990 following a coup—was described as “an old family kingdom as his sons, brothers, and […] in-laws have been appointed in state positions that give them access to wealth, power and coercion”—a reality that undoubtedly encouraged Mahamat Deby’s power grab in the wake of his father’s death. The decades of Idriss Deby’s rule were known for opposition crackdowns, fraudulent elections, and unmet promises of democratisation. Despite these tendencies, international support for Idriss Deby rarely wavered. Given his son’s track record over the last two years, it is hard to imagine the new iteration of a Deby government will be very different. It is paramount that Chad’s partners and donors break the tradition of unconditionally supporting the Deby family. The events of the past year are no real surprise. This reality begs the questions: why did anyone fund this hollow transitional process and why is international condemnation so weak? Of course, stability in Chad and the broader region is important, but prioritising maintaining the status quo at the expense of the Chadian people choosing who represents them and how, undermines democracy. Ending the game of follow the leader Shortly after Idriss Deby’s death, Jerôme Tubiana described the transition as a family succession and “a ‘regime of exception’ in view of the clearer international condemnations of authoritarian attempts in other countries in the region” (original quote in French : « à un « régime d’exception » au regard des condamnations internationales plus claires envers les tentatives autoritaires dans d’autres pays de la région. »). This unwavering loyalty must end. Since Chad gained independence in 1960, France has had a special, and complicated, relationship with its former colony. For too long, France was only focused on stability and propping up Idriss Deby and other countries followed suit. Despite Deby senior’s violent repression of his opposition, and the questionable elections that saw him re-elected in the 1990s and 2000, France and most of the international community continued to acknowledge his rule. Since then, Chad has been France’s main military ally on the continent. Agreements between the two countries have led to France training Chadian soldiers and bolstering their intelligence capabilities. In return, France has maintained military presence in the country, affording it “the capacity to secure French citizens and economic interests in Chad and neighbouring countries”. French boots on the ground have also been credited with disincentivising rebel groups from overthrowing Chadian leadership. This was particularly apparent in 2008 and 2019, when French forces conducted airstrikes to stop rebels on their way to attack the Chadian capital, N’Djamena. Chad has been France’s key partner in its ‘War on Terror’ across the Sahel—from Mauritania to Chad—through its Operation Serval from 2013 to 2014, and Operation Barkhane between 2014 and 2022. At Idriss Deby’s funeral, French President Emmanuel Macron pledged his country’s continued support: "France will also be there to keep the promise of a peaceful Chad alive" (original quote in French: « La France sera également là pour faire vivre la promesse d’un Tchad apaisé »). During my last trip to N’Djamena in 2022, Chadians made it clear that France’s support for Deby’s junta is fuelling anti-French sentiment across the country. After years of following France’s lead in the country, international stakeholders seem to be starting to engage different in Chad. It’s high time. statements from key players in the US State Department and on Capitol Hill highlight an interest in a new kind of policy towards Chad. While the EU has often followed suit, they appear to be less aligned with France in the face of recent events. On December 14, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling Deby’s takeover a “military coup d’état” (words few governments have uttered) and condemned the military junta’s use of violence against protestors. Of course, demanding more of Chadian authorities comes with risks. In early April, Germany's ambassador to Chad was expelled from the country for “discourteousness and disrespect for diplomatic customs” (original quote in French : « attitude de discourtoisie et le non respet des usages diplomatiques » ), which sources claim was a reaction to the ambassador’s criticism of the delayed elections. Germany authorities responded by expelling Chad’s ambassador to Germany days later. While France may continue to support the Deby dynasty, other players must continue to break from this harmful tradition—not in an effort to break ties with Chad but to compel the government to do right by its people and to encourage France to echo these demands. The Role of International Stakeholders Instead of overlooking Chadian authorities’ transgressions because of their status as a ‘regime of exception’, diplomatic partners should at the very least condition their support in exchange for basic improvements in terms of human rights and the provision of basic services—responsibilities long-ignored by the security-focused government. An opinion shared by Dr. Bétinbaye, who argued that "conditioning the support could make leaders feel compelled to change their approaches" (original quote in French: « conditionner le support pourrait faire en sorte que les dirigeants se sentent obligés de changer leurs approches »). For its part, the African Union (AU) must play a bigger role in pushing Chadian authorities. With Moussa Faki, a Chadian, as the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, this is not without its challenges. Condemnation from the regional organisation is discounted as sabotage because of the possibility of Faki’s own political ambitions in Chad, and a lack of critique is viewed as favouring the Deby regime. Regardless, the AU’s Peace and Security Council must be more vocal about what it expects from the Military Transition Council. The new government could very-well be leading the country to another boiling point. Mahamat Deby may hold onto power beyond two-year transitional period by repeatedly postponing elections or holding opaque elections. In these cases, he will be proven to lead another regime that rules harshly but offers a semblance of consistency. This, coupled with rightfully disgruntled population and the lack of an accord with groups like FACT and CCMSR, run the risk of further destabilising the country. Hopes for further talks have not died, however. In early March 2023, members of the FACT and 17 other Chadian armed groups gathered in Italy in an effort to reignite the dialogue and come to an agreement with leaders of the transition. What happens next will be pivotal. As donors continue to finance the transitional process, and shore up funding for the anticipated 2024 elections, diplomatic levers must be utilised to encourage the transition to effectively engage in these newly-initiated peace talks, and ensure that Deby doesn’t continue to shirk his responsibilities to hold elections and provide for Chad’s citizens. If international partners continue to turn a blind eye, the transition may only be a mirage and the civilians will continue to pay the price. ## China’s Best Friend in the West? The Rising Threat of Chinese Involvement with New Zealand’s Quantum Research URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/chinas-best-friend-in-the-west-the-rising-threat-of-chinese-involvement-with-new-zealands-quantum-research/ Modified: 2024-09-10 > The development of quantum technology is at the forefront of concerns. Many countries consider its development crucial for their... The development of quantum technology is at the forefront of international security concerns. Unsurprisingly, with quantum computers expected to break current cryptographic standards, many countries consider the research and development of these technologies crucial for their own national security efforts. To increase the speed and depth of research and development efforts, states often turn to international collaboration. Of particular note is the Five Eyes intelligence partnership composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. At an official Five Eyes summit in October 2023, representatives from each country commented on the importance of adapting to emerging technologies. The UK’s MI5 Director General Ken McCallum stated that “the stakes are now incredibly high on emerging technologies; states which lead the way in areas like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and synthetic biology will have the power to shape all our futures.” This emphasis on quantum and other emerging technologies within the security sector demonstrates the Five Eyes’ commitment to securing leadership in these realms. Emerging from a US/UK pact to continue sharing signals intelligence after the Second World War, Five Eyes is a crucial intelligence-sharing partnership among leading Anglosphere countries. Recently, the partnership has made headlines as the conduit for intelligence that led to Canada accusing India of assassinating Hardeep Singh Najjar in 2023, showcasing its ongoing relevance. All Five Eyes members have recognized China’s potential threat within the quantum realm, marking that country as their primary quantum challenger. Should China take the position of global leader in quantum, China would, by default, become a global leader in cybersecurity. In 2020, China successfully established a secure quantum link between two ground stations of over 1,000 kilometers. This was a major breakthrough in the realm of quantum communications, putting China ahead of other countries and closer to claiming supremacy in communications. Recently, China has also reported on closing the gap between US and Chinese quantum computing. Previously, the United States claimed to be ahead of Chinese developments; however, recent data suggests that the race for leadership in this domain is now closer than ever. But what would leadership in quantum mean for China and the Five Eyes? In this Hot Take, I provide a summary of the risks and benefits associated with quantum technology and the potential impact of New Zealand’s quantum collaboration with China on security and the Five Eyes partnership. To examine the extent of New Zealand’s collaboration with China and whether this collaboration presents potential risk to New Zealand and its Five Eyes partners, statistics and data from the Dodd-Walls Centre for Photonic and Quantum Technologies’ annual reports between 2021 and 2023 were consulted. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief recommendation to New Zealand officials to mitigate potential risks associated with the Dodd-Walls Centre’s ongoing quantum collaboration with China. Quantum – Shifting Security Standards and Strategies Quantum computers can process information and break most existing cryptographic standards at a significantly faster rate. In fact, Google’s most recent quantum computer completed a task within seconds that would have taken a modern computer 47 years. If China takes leadership in this quantum domain, secure communication systems as well as secure national documents used by the Five Eyes would become vulnerable to interception and corruption by Chinese mal actors. However, quantum computing and cryptography are not the only domains of quantum that present a security risk. Sensing and communication developments also present a unique advantage to whichever country claims supremacy. Within sensing, quantum offers increased accuracy and speed compared to modern sensing technologies. While this accuracy and speed is groundbreaking in health and environmental sectors, these developments are also groundbreaking in security and defence sectors. Quantum leadership in sensing domains offers militaries the opportunity to determine the location of bases, ships, submarines, and to engage in space-based warfare with unprecedented accuracy. Chinese mal actors may utilize these technologies to identify weaknesses or targets for future attacks. Finally, quantum communications offers a unique security benefit – in addition to being more secure than modern communications, it cannot be intercepted or altered in any way without notifying the receiver and sender. While the development of these technologies also requires the development of grids and systems capable of supporting quantum, it is important to recognize the significance and potential impact of advancements in these sectors. Advancements in quantum domains, even in early stages of development, have the potential to completely alter current international security standards. With all the benefits and risks associated with quantum development, it is no wonder that countries like New Zealand have begun investing in these sectors. New Zealand’s quantum development efforts have emphasized the importance of international collaboration to solidify the state’s position as a quantum leader. Other countries, such as Canada and the United States, have taken a more cautious approach to international collaboration. In an effort to counter malign foreign research and development efforts, the United States and Canada have released lists of organizations with whom collaboration should be limited or nonexistent. Organizations are placed on these lists due to their connections with high-level foreign military and defense efforts or for their association with entities identified to be working against national priorities. With these lists and a clear positioning of the Five Eyes and China as competitors, collaboration within the Five Eyes is no surprise. Collaboration with China, however, is. Despite expectations that Five Eyes partners would be at the top of quantum collaboration with New Zealand, China has remained the top international co-author for New Zealand’s Dodd-Walls Centre for Photonic and Quantum Technologies’ publications for the past 3 years. Some cooperation with China is to be expected - China is a leader in technological developments and offers many benefits in this realm. However, it is the collaborative relationship between New Zealand quantum and Chinese entities that have been labeled as ‘risky’ by the United States and Canadian governments that is concerning. The following sections explore the extent of this collaboration with Chinese organizations and their potential threat risk and proposes areas for increased cooperation within the Five Eyes to further secure research development efforts. New Zealand’s Quantum Collaboration In 2021, the Dodd-Walls Centre released its first annual report including data on international co-authors. Surprisingly, Chinese co-authorship ranked highest, accounting for 27% of all internationally co-authored publications from the centre. The same situation occurred in 2022, with Chinese co-authorship ranked at number one, accounting for 36.34% of the centre’s internationally co-authored publications. This story repeated itself once more in their recent 2023 report, in which China accounted for 34.67% of co-authored publications. This collaboration with China is not inherently bad. Some organizations within the country do not represent a national security threat. The organizations that do, however, have been identified by both the United States and Canada on their respective entity and named research organization lists. Of the organizations that appear on these lists, at least three appeared in the Dodd-Walls Centre’s 2021 annual report. These organizations included Beihang University, the Beijing Institute of Technology, and Nanjing University of Science and Technology. In 2022, Northwestern Polytechnical University, which is named on both the United States and Canada’s lists, was listed as a co-author. And, once again, in 2023 Baihang University, the Beijing Institute of Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, North University of China, and Sichuan University were listed as co-authors. While these organizations appear on both entity lists and the annual reports by name, there remain others that represent a potential risk. In 2021, the annual report included the Chinese Academy of Science, the Graduate School of the China Academy of Engineering Physics, and Sichuan University of Science and Engineering. The United States’ and Canada’s entity and research organization lists name specific departments within these academies and universities, such as the Chinese Academy of Science’s Shenyang Institute of Automation. However, the Dodd-Walls Centre does not name the specific department or institution it is collaborating with in its annual report. The distinction of departments on entity lists and lack thereof in the Dodd-Walls Centre’s annual reports continued with the Graduate School of the China Academy of Engineering Physics and Sichuan University of Science and Engineering. Using the lists published by the United States and Canada and cross-referencing the publications from organizations named by the Dodd-Walls Centre as international co-authors, I examined the potentially ‘risky’ cooperation within the Dodd-Walls Centre’s Chinese collaboration. The number of collaborative publications from these ‘risky’ entities was compared to the total number of international co-authored publications and the total number of Chinese co-authored publications. The process was repeated adding in the unspecified departments to provide data on the highest possible risk currently present in the Dodd-Walls Centre’s collaborations. The findings of this cross-reference and data examination are as follows: In 2021, the percentage of the Dodd-Walls Centre’s co-authors that appeared on both Canadian and American watch lists was at least 2.4%, but potentially as high as 4.8% accounting for the unspecified departments mentioned previously. In 2022, the Chinese Academy of Science and the Graduate School of the China Academy of Engineering Physics appeared again. For 2022, then, the percentage of the Dodd-Walls Centre’s international co-authors that appeared on both Canadian and American watch lists was at least 0.97%, but was potentially as high as 2.9%. In 2023, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Graduate School of China Academy of Engineering Physics made their appearance again. Thus, in 2023, the percentage of Chinese co-authorship that appeared on both Canadian and American watch lists was at least 2.22%, but was potentially as high as 3.11%. When examining Chinese co-authorship independently from the rest of the Dodd-Walls Centre’s international co-authors, I found that named organization and entity collaboration accounted for anywhere between 10% and 20% in 2021, 3.7% and 11.11% in 2022, and anywhere between 6.4% and 8.97% in 2023. In total, the Dodd-Walls Centre claims anywhere between 8 and 38 co-authored publications with the named organizations and entities listed previously in 2021. In 2022, these co-authored publications total anywhere between 1 and 7. In 2023, publications with entities totaled anywhere between 8 and 20. Although the volume of publications between 2021 and 2023 decreased, the potential security risk that comes with any association with these entities did not. The Duality of New Zealand-China Collaboration The presence of these entities and named research organizations on the Dodd-Walls Centre’s annual reports is concerning. If the United States and Canada have both listed these organizations as potential threats to national security, then collaboration should be limited or nonexistent. But that is not the case. Instead, as demonstrated above, New Zealand’s primary quantum development centre has, for the past three years, maintained significant collaboration with these entities. Collaboration between the Dodd-Walls Centre and Chinese entities listed on both Canadian and American watch lists has been focused primarily in environmental and health applications of quantum, aligning with the signed Arrangement on a Five-year Roadmap for New Zealand-China Science and Technology Cooperation. At first, these domains do not appear to be of concern for national security efforts. However, quantum technologies, such as sensors that are primarily developed in health and environmental domains, are classified as dual-use technologies. This means that a quantum sensor developed for environmental or health applications can be more easily and quickly adapted for security purposes. In other words, the same sensing technologies used for locating key mineral deposits beneath the earth or for locating disease in the body could be used to locate nuclear submarines and other critical systems and infrastructures. If China continues to account for the majority of New Zealand’s quantum collaboration via the Dodd-Walls Centre, the security of future quantum communications technologies and other developments within New Zealand and its intelligence sharing partnerships will continue to be at increased risk. Thankfully, through the Dodd-Walls Centre lies a potential for increased Five Eyes collaboration to counter these Chinese quantum efforts. Countering Rising Threats When it comes to quantum policy, New Zealand has often turned towards its traditional partners for guidance. This alliance of quantum policies is crucial to maintaining the advantage in the quantum arms race with China. With both the United States and Canada publishing entity and named research organization lists, New Zealand should seek to follow in these nations’ footsteps. Currently, there exist no named research organization or entity lists in New Zealand to monitor international collaboration efforts. This means potential threats have a greater chance of slipping through this crack in New Zealand’s national security. I thus recommend that the New Zealand government develop an entity or named research organization list that aligns with Canada and the United States. These countries should encourage the development and alignment of such a list with existing ones. Canada and the United States have already provided a foundation of knowledge on these risky entities and aligning with them would deepen New Zealand’s collaborative relationship with its traditional allies. Furthermore, the establishment of such a list would serve to limit or to eliminate quantum collaboration with organizations that pose a large threat to national and international security efforts. Without it, these organizations may continue to seek collaboration with key quantum institutes and may apply any critical developments to their own national security efforts. With the dual-use nature of quantum technologies, organizations can more easily apply developments in quantum sensors and other technologies achieved via health or environmental research to their defensive efforts. These developments remain crucial to national security efforts, and without the alignment of New Zealand quantum efforts with its allies, the threat of Chinese quantum will continue to grow. Conclusion The Five Eyes countries and China are racing to claim the title of leader in the quantum realm. International cooperation has been vital to the increased research and development speed of quantum technologies. However, New Zealand’s Dodd-Walls Centre may position China in an advantageous position as its top international collaborator. While not all collaboration with China poses a threat, the Dodd-Walls Centre has cooperated with known entities and named research organizations identified by the United States and Canada as risks to national security. This is particularly important within the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership, which is likely to rely on quantum technologies to share classified information as these technologies continue to develop. New Zealand’s lack of entity or named research organization lists means these threats can continue to grow and develop within New Zealand quantum. The government of New Zealand must seek to further align its quantum efforts with its allies via the development and publication of its own entity or named research list aligned with those already published by the United States and Canada. Should New Zealand continue its unmonitored cooperation with China, quantum communications and intelligence sharing efforts could be compromised, and research within the quantum realm more vulnerable to potential security breaches. * Bailee Dobson is a researcher with the Centre for International and Defence Policy affiliated with the project “QFVEY: Quantum Security, Strategy, and Technology in Five Eyes Nations.” This project has received funding from the Department of National Defence via a Targeted Engagement Grant through the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) Program. The views and opinions discussed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Armed Forces. ## Combatting the Seen and Unseen Threats of China’s Digital Silk Road URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/combatting-the-threats-of-chinas-digital-silk-road/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Combatting the Seen and Unseen Threats of China’s Digital Silk Road. The 48th G7 summit marked a recommitment by G7 countries to develop... Overview The 48th G7 summit marked a recommitment by G7 countries to develop approaches for challenging China’s increasing geopolitical dominance and cybersecurity threats. The initiative, titled the Partnership for Global Infrastructure, re-frames and re-orients the 2021 US-led Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, which aimed to finance technology and infrastructure projects in developing countries as an alternative to China’s One Belt One Road Initiative (BRI). Announced under President Xi in 2013, the BRI seeks to create a maritime belt and land road running through Eurasia and back to China as part of a larger plan to strengthen China’s position as a great power. Strategically, the initiative has worked to condense State Owned Enterprises into competitive Multinational Companies, which offer generous loans to developing countries to establish critical infrastructure projects. The BRI thus aims to create an integrated economic region centered on China to leverage its geopolitical influence, targeting competitive international trade areas, like the South China Sea, to challenge Western power and transatlantic dominance. This policy brief will examine the BRI with a focus on how Beijing’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) is posing increasing international security threats that remain prominent in discussions among G7 countries. As the world’s largest infrastructure project, the DSR seeks to assist Chinese exporters in the Information and Communications Technology sector by investing in the technological networks of recipient states. Given China’s unprecedented developments in surveillance technology and artificial intelligence, the DSR’s focus on telecommunications networks and smart city projects makes the DSR a key facet of the BRI as it seeks to expand China’s influence. At a time when global economic activity is becoming increasingly digitized, and liberal international norms progressively challenged by China’s authoritarian intelligence tactics, Canada must strive to maintain a competitive technological economy while also defending its security interests. This policy brief will examine China’s efforts to increase its geopolitical power through DSR advancements. It will recommend that Canada promote investment in multilateral projects (like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure) which challenge China’s grip on digital infrastructure and international standards setting, and that Canada convey these projects as investment opportunities to convince Western-skeptic countries and corporate entities of investment advantages. Additionally, it will recommend that Canada leverage its increased investment in NORAD to finance surveillance technologies, like under-ice submarines, and coordinate NATO cybersecurity efforts to combat Chinese cyber security threats. Background Since opening its economy to foreign trade and imposing free-market policies 45 years ago, China has experienced rapid economic growth. China is now the world’s largest global investor, and second largest global economy next to the U.S., which China is projected to surpass by 2030. Following a costly tariff-cutting process to join the WTO in 2001, China’s economic policy has focused on attracting foreign direct investment by signing bilateral investment treaties with over 100 countries. Central to this policy plan is the BRI, which currently includes the economies of over 71 countries across Eurasia, representing two thirds of the world’s GDP. The strategy behind China’s BRI is twofold: First, it seeks to expand China’s economic control by creating new markets and broadening the use of Chinese currency. This expansion helps China maintain its momentum in creating free trade zones and financial cooperation, while also addressing capital surpluses in its productive industries, like steel and cement. Secondly, the BRI works to address shortcomings and vulnerabilities in China’s foreign policy strategy. By implementing a network that allows Chinese companies to control production and maximize efficiency, China can reimagine the region’s energy supply routes, improving access to key resource regions like India and Central Asia. In turn, China can use its resource grip to leverage support for its objectives in regional governance bodies, and use economic investments to justify increased overseas military presence. China’s technology industry exploded following the BRI’s 2013 announcement. Since the DSR offers a low-cost option for instituting blockchain technology, China has seized its competitive edge in the technology sector as an opportunity to decrease reliance on American industry. Consequently, the DSR has become a top priority in China’s economic and foreign policy strategies. To increase buy-in, China has successfully promoted the initiative at international forums: In 2019 alone, the governments of Japan, New Zealand, Israel, Austria, Chile, Brazil, Indonesia, and Kenya each announced cooperation agreements with China for sci-tech, information and communications technology, and fiber optic cable projects. By 2030, Asia will need USD 26 trillion in infrastructure investment for its developing countries to successfully participate in the global economy. The UN recognizes the BRI as necessary for achieving sustainable development and environmental goals, as Chinese loans are one of the only sufficient funding options for developing countries to successfully improve technological infrastructure. Nevertheless, Beijing is taking advantage of Western decay to increase its economic and military power through the BRI, and the security and ideological implications of this tactic must be taken seriously. BRI: A True Case of Debt-Trap Diplomacy? The notion of debt-trap diplomacy is used to describe cases where powerful countries work to broaden and strengthen their influence by presenting weaker, developing countries with attractive loans, even when it is unlikely that weaker countries will be able to repay these debts. Cases like the port at Hambantota in Sri Lanka are often cited as examples of the non-altruistic motives of Chinese enterprises. DSR initiatives, however, are financed primarily by China’s National Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank, which are both largely unconcerned with profit generation given their status as policy banks: In over 85 cases, China has restructured or written off bank debts for BRI projects without confiscating assets. These cases, combined with the generous loan repayment periods offered to many countries undertaking BRI projects, suggest that accusations of China committing debt trap diplomacy, in its traditional sense, may be unwarranted. However, even if China is not explicitly creating debt traps through asset seizure, over 90% of analyzed DSR contracts include clauses stating that China can, if it chooses, “terminate the contract […] if a ‘significant’ change in the recipient state’s laws or policies takes place”, leaving borrowing countries in precarious financial positions. In turn, DSR countries are often pushed into bilateral negotiations that ultimately serve China’s political interests. China has used its economic leverage to encourage DSR countries to support and defend its stance in international governance bodies, especially when controversial issues, like China’s persecution of Uighur Muslims or its arming of the South China Sea, are at stake. So, even in the absence of asset seizure, the motive behind China’s BRI aligns with the logic of debt-trap diplomacy: lend to less-powerful countries for infrastructure construction in Chinese-dominated sectors, like technology and AI, to promote Chinese expansionism and dominance. Economic Potential Outweighed by Troubling Security Implications? The DSR and its rapid expansion pose several security concerns that Liberal states, like Canada, cannot afford to overlook. These risks include the proliferation of authoritarian espionage and data-acquisition tactics, and China denying or manipulating access to critical technologies. China’s DSR has been an appealing solution for countries seeking to accelerate development in technological infrastructure sectors while remaining autonomous. Given the fragility of democracy and the West’s limited influence in the DSR’s target region, the DSR’s rapid expansion is likely to threaten the West’s post-Cold War vision for an open, liberal Eurasia. Firstly, instilling Chinese surveillance technologies among BRI countries may increase and improve authoritarian repression. China has already implemented government-led training programs to officials and technology companies in DSR countries on how to censor and monitor internet activity in real time. Even more troubling is China’s launch of Smart City projects in DSR countries, which, based off the Chinese surveillance state model, use invasive AI and facial recognition technologies to monitor and address public monetary and security activity. Constructing renewable power plants is important for global efforts to advance sustainable energy sources; however, the DSR’s financing of power grid interconnections gives China significant control over regional power allocation. Interconnections used to construct power grids along the DSR depend on communications networks operated by state owned enterprises, like the State Grid Corporation of China, which increase the intelligence and espionage capacities of the Chinese state. As a result, China can restrict or deny energy to DSR countries that threaten or oppose China’s political or economic interests. Additionally, Chinese data-acquisition from BRI countries could accelerate China’s development of AI technologies designed to exploit sensitive material. Tampering is harder to detect in emerging software-defined networks, which poses risks where China is financing overseas port-construction. Undersea cable systems built within proximity to Western military facilities enable improved access to confidential foreign intelligence details with a low risk of detection. If Chinese state-owned enterprises gain access to strategic ports, like Canada’s Nanisivik, the interests of navy forces across North America and the broader West could be jeopardized. From an economic standpoint, China’s port construction, which relies on BRI infrastructure, may also bolster the political influence of Chinese financing companies. Implementing 5G networks enabling espionage and data infringements can be used by China to blackmail politicians in DSR countries, or to exploit trade flows and port-access as a punishment mechanism against political opponents. In Nepal, for instance, China blocked elites and businesses from payment processing on platforms like Alipay and WeChat, using its dominance in the blockchain sector to interfere discretely. Ultimately, the DSR is increasing state surveillance and content-moderation while leaving both DSR and non-DSR countries subject to China’s autocratic espionage tactics. Shifting International Standards Technological standards refer to the regulations and protocols that govern through a repeatable technical task. Typically, these standards are established through global standards bodies like the International Organization for Standarization, and are agreed upon by the organizations’ member-countries. However, standards can alternatively be set via market volume: through market domination, countries can gain implicit international support for their domestic standards, including those imposed by repressive authoritarian regimes. In the case of China and its use of AI and 5G technologies, this alternative standards-setting route could prove to be effective, especially given the current lack of other sizeable infrastructure financing options available to DSR countries. China’s imposition of its own technological standards onto DSR countries is therefore contributing to a polarized global order: By confining DSR countries to the Chinese ecosystem, and leaving them subject to Chinese political pressure, China is making it increasingly difficult for traditional lenders, like the IMF and World Bank, to ensure that technological projects adhere to rigorous policies of best practice in areas like environmental and human rights protection. Lending policies and Structural Adjustment Programs through the World Bank and IMF have historically reflected Western interests, and have contributed to countless economic setbacks and poverty among emerging economies. Given the widespread skepticism among Global South countries towards Western-led projects like the Build Back Better World, it is Unsurprising that many leaders have opted for DSR funding. However, like many historical IMF and World Bank financing projects, DSR investments are producing harmful clauses and outcomes. For example, the terms of loans issued to countries for DSR projects are rarely disclosed publicly. Without official creditor membership in the Paris Club, Chinese banks can evade pressure to operate transparently, resulting in limitless loan provision. Moreover, the complex nature of AI and surveillance projects problematically increases reliance on private Chinese technology companies, which are primarily concerned with promoting their commercial interests by reducing transaction costs. Many DSR projects thus commence without adequate financial, environmental, or social-impact assessments. Consequently, states facing ongoing political and debt crises can turn to China for bail-out to avoid the strict conditions for economic and political reform typically imposed by conventional financial bodies, like the IMF. However, this also means that leaders committing human rights abuses or undermining democratic principles can rely on China for economic support in cases where World Bank or IMF conditions might have worked as effective deterrents. This was the case in Malaysia, where Chinese loans issued for DSR infrastructure projects expanded opportunities for political elites to engage in corruption and rent-seeking; and in Kenya, where political corruption exacerbated by DSR investments escalated ethnic tension. If China succeeds using the DSR to go from being “a standards-taker to a standards-maker", existing norms and practices promoting a Liberal world order are, in fact, under considerable threat. The Partnership for Global Infrastructure aims to attract $40 billion in private sector funding by 2035 to invest in projects according to high environmental and equity standards. Still, in its first year, the B3W initiative saw only marginal progress in attracting investment from the private-sector. White House officials claim that G7 initiatives “ not about making countries choose between and China”, but their evident aim is nevertheless to provide an alternative to BRI investment to challenge China’s increasing dominance. Unfortunately, considering Western skepticism and China’s significant head start in infrastructural investment in the region, Western-led investment initiatives may face difficulties competing with the BRI. Recommendations for Canada In responding to the DSR, Canada must consider the importance of continued economic engagement with China, even under the polarized geopolitical context. Currently, China is Canada’s second largest goods trading partner, with each country holding a strong comparative advantage in exchanged commodities. Although the 2019 Huawei scandal halted free trade agreement negotiations, trade between the two countries remains productive, and outright denouncement of the DSR risks compromising Canada’s long-term objective of diversifying free trade agreements with China and ASEAN countries. To remain economically competitive and challenge China’s market-domination, Canada can take a collaborative approach to the BRI by working to secure multilateral economic partnerships with BRICS nations. As a middle power, however, Canada must exercise caution in future cooperation with China, and cannot let the economic benefits of friendly trade relations outweigh the need to address the security threats the DSR initiative poses. Canada should therefore increase investment in emerging technologies, and increase its involvement in multilateral institutions working to challenge China’s sectorial and standards-setting dominance. Firstly, Canada must continue to work alongside the U.S. and other G7 countries to challenge China’s regional grip, ensuring that the Partnership for Global Infrastructure is strategic and realistic. The initiative may not be able to compete directly with the BRI in terms of scope, but it can better engage with both domestic firms and Western-skeptic countries. By working to convince Canada’s private sector firms of the ability to make investment returns through overseas projects, Canada can increase funding and cybersecurity assistance to countries committed to pursuing projects under the Partnership. This arrangement could also include training cyber diplomats to work with foreign information-communications technology firms and governments to address network vulnerabilities. Increased investment in these projects, which oppose Chinese technological domination, will also help to convince developing countries that the Partnership for Global infrastructure differs from traditional sources of Western aid. By presenting projects as investment (rather than charity) opportunities seeking to “deliver returns for everyone”, Canada can help expose the costs and risks of the Chinese model, and demonstrate that there exists a healthier, well-funded alternative to the BRI. To challenge China’s growing power in the technological sector and international standards-setting, Canada should proactively increase investment in domestic technological firms and while widening its involvement in multilateral institutions. 5G technology will continue to be an important aspect of the global information-communications technology system, and Canada must have a strong industry and educated workforce to be able to compete with growing Chinese firms. While these infrastructures present inevitable risks, better investment in technological enterprises and research will boost Canada’s edge and credibility in challenging China’s anti-democratic use of new innovations. Similarly, by joining multilateral bodies like the AIIB, which already partners with the World Bank and has a record of welcoming foreign expertise, Canada can better influence standards-setting procedures for quality control and funding in DSR countries. Canada should demand that Chinese projects reflect their proclaimed commitment to a green and transparent BRI by insisting on pre-project environmental assessments, and articulating clear standards for what a ‘green BRI project’ must entail. Finally, Canada should use its commitment to invest $4.9 billion for NORAD modernization over the next six years to improve intelligence on China’s activity near Canada’s strategic passages. In upcoming NATO meetings, Canada should capitalize on this commitment, as well as the increased realization among democratic countries that “the risks posed by Moscow and Beijing can no longer be compartmentalized”, to encourage collective defense strategies against cyberattacks. To assert its arctic sovereignty and defend its legal standing on arctic waters, Canada must use NORAD investments to financially and infrastructurally back its commitment to securing and militarizing Northern shipping routes. Given the DSR’s rapid expansion and strategic Eurasian engagement, there is no guarantee that target countries will choose to pursue the Partnership for Global Infrastructure or other Western-based initiatives to counter Chinese influence. Nevertheless, by confronting the risks posed by the DSR, and offering alternatives to BRI investment, Canada can signal to China that even in as multilateralism declines and Liberal ideals become fragmented, Canada will not remain passive in the face of economic and digital coercion. -Michelle Marcus ## Competitions and Power Games in the Arctic – Realities, Fictions and Implications for Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/competitions-and-power-games-in-the-arctic-realities-fictions-and-implications-for-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Bordering the United States and Russia, between NATO and EU member and non-member countries, the Arctic sub-regions are increasingly the subject of often alarmist, sometimes aggressive rhetoric, focusing on the issues of competition between (major) powers. Between fiction and reality, what are the consequences of this rhetoric for Canada? Bordering the United States and Russia, between NATO and EU member and non-member countries, the Arctic sub-regions are increasingly the subject of often alarmist, sometimes aggressive rhetoric, focusing on the issues of competition between (major) powers. Between fiction and reality, what are the consequences of this rhetoric for Canada? We can make three observations. First, the great powers' games of influence and positioning are limited to two Arctic sub-regions, the Russian Arctic and Greenland, in which the great powers are already well represented, which limits the competitive aspect. Secondly, we need to qualify the practical implementation of this rhetoric. Many of them stir up tension and competition but are not necessarily followed by actual mobilisation because of a lack of resources. Finally, Canada has few options for influencing these power games, although strengthening regional partnerships with its allies could be an interesting avenue for action. Power Games in Arctic Sub-Regions Two sub-regions of the Arctic illustrate the competitions between powers: Greenland and the Russian Arctic. In recent years, Greenland has been at the centre of power and influence games between the United States and China. Its geographical position and its potential for mineral resources, particularly rare earth materials, are assets that give the island a highly strategic position for both the United States and China. These games came into the spotlight in the summer of 2019, when President Trump, in a tweet, indicated the willingness of the United States to buy Greenland (a proposal already made in 1867 and 1946). The strategic interest of the United States in Greenland has materialized in the past with the opening of the Thule air base, located in the north-western part of the island. In recent years, however, China has been trying to gain a foothold in Greenland. In 2018, China Communication Construction Company (CCCC), owned by the Chinese state, won a contract to build airports in Nuuk and Ilulissat. Under pressure from the United States, arguing that there was a risk that these airports would be used for military purposes, these contracts were cancelled at the end of 2019 in the name of security imperatives. Simultaneously with these actions, the United States announced several rapprochements with Greenland: the opening of a permanent consulate in Nuuk in the summer of 2020 and the payment of $12.1 million to support Greenland after the COVID-19 crisis in the natural resources and education sector. In short, the United States is standing in the way of China in Greenland, firmly framing the island in the space and defence of the North Atlantic. The development of the Russian Arctic is the second Arctic sub-region of interest. Rather than a territory in search of partners, investments, and capabilities, the Russian state possesses impressive military and industrial means, an unmatched icebreaking fleet, and a long-term strategic vision for its territory. The American and Western sanctions imposed on Russia (post-crisis Ukraine) have led the latter to turn to other partners to develop its natural resources. They have thus contributed to the strengthening of the Sino-Russian partnership in the Russian Arctic, which will intensify from 2014, particularly in the projects to develop natural gas, oil and coal resources in the Yamal Peninsula (North-Central), one of the Federation's most ambitious and strategic projects. A shareholder in the Arctic LNG 1 project via the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with a 20% stake and the Silk Road Fund with a 9.9% stake, China is developing an "Arctic Silk Road", which runs through Siberia. The same goes for the 20% participation by CNPC and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in the Arctic LNG 2 project. However, two observations must be made to contextualize this Chinese involvement. On the one hand, these two projects have also seen French (the energy group Total) and Japanese (through Mitsubishi, among others) participation. In both cases, these partners invested as much as Chinese investors, making them resolutely multinational initiatives. The Vostok Oil project of the Russian firm Rosneft, for its part, would see the involvement of Indian partners. In both cases these projects, and others in development, remain majority controlled by Russian entities (Rosneft, Novatek), underlining Russian control over these projects. The exploitation of these resources and the strengthening of the Russian military presence (especially in the north-western part of the Federation) are closely linked to Russia's strategic objective of developing the Northern Sea Route (NMR) as a viable maritime route. The patriotic rhetoric that is conveyed by a certain press in Russia should not make one forget these more pragmatic objectives. With these developments in mind, it is perilous to see a competition between superpowers in the Russian Arctic, since the United States plays a very marginal, if not completely absent, role. Between rhetoric and actual practice As a consequence of the aforementioned rhetoric and actions, more striking positions have also been displayed in recent years in the Arctic region. However, they must in the context of the actual capacity of states to implement them. At the 11th Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in Rovaniemi, Finland, on May 6th 2019, a speech by Mike Pompeo marked a turning point in the Council's history. He challenged China's concept of a near-Arctic state, while at the same time challenging China's real intentions and the development of the Polar Silk Road. He also denounced the modernisation of Russian military infrastructure in the Arctic and questioned the status of the Northeast Passage (NAP) and the Northwest Passage (NWP). This new hard line is also present in the latest documents guiding American military strategy in the zone (USCG Arctic Strategy Outlook of April 2019, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy of June 2019, National Defense Authorization Act 2020 of June 2019, Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions of June 2020, Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy of July 2020). While recalling existing cooperation in the region, these documents identify China and Russia as aggressive and dangerous adversaries in the Arctic. However, the implementation of this new American line of rhetoric needs to be qualified. Indeed, the United States has a serious capacity deficit, particularly with an icebreaking fleet and port infrastructures reduced to a strict minimum. This discrepancy between rhetoric and actual practice can be illustrated by the statements made in the summer of 2019, underlining the American willingness to conduct Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP) in the NAP and NWP. Apart from the security consequences that this would imply, the US Coast Guard (USCG) simply does not have the capacity to conduct these FONOPs. Although the USCG has one heavy icebreaker and one medium icebreaker, neither is available for this type of operation. The Polar Star, a heavy icebreaker, is mobilized to resupply Antarctic research stations for about seven months of the year. The rest of the time it is in dry dock for repairs and refitting. The Healy, a medium icebreaker, is mobilized along the Alaskan coast during the navigable summer months for search and rescue operations and in support of Arctic scientific missions. In terms of capacity, only two announcements were made by the United States in 2019: a study for the location of future deep-water port(s) in the Arctic (scheduled in the National Defense Authorization Act 2020 in June), and the construction of the first of six heavy icebreakers scheduled in the USCG Arctic Strategy Outlook of April 2019. Most recently, on 9 June 2020, the Trump Administration seemed to take a more concrete position by publishing a "Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions". The Memorandum, which is entirely focused on a programme to acquire an icebreaking fleet for the fiscal year 2029, asks five federal agencies to evaluate, within sixty days, the risks and opportunities of acquiring such a fleet. Despite the title of this memorandum, it should be noted that, to date, this is only another request for a study that does not contain a specific budget - at least until the end of the sixty-day period. Implications for Canada For Canada, these power games and rhetoric have potential security implications. On the one hand, in his speech of May 6th, 2019, Mike Pompeo openly claimed freedom of navigation, describing the Canadian position which considers the NWP to be part of its internal waters as illegitimate. On the other hand, it should be noted that the United States depends on the Canadian Coast Guard to clear the way for its ships supplying the Thule base in Greenland and therefore has no interest in seeing an increase in tensions between the two allies. Moreover, despite Pompeo's declaration and signs from the then U.S. Secretary of the Navy in favour of FONOPs in the Arctic region, these operations have not materialized to date. It is difficult to see how a weakening of the Canada-U.S. relationship and a challenge to Canadian Arctic sovereignty could allow the United States to mitigate Russian and/or Chinese influence in the region. Such action, on the contrary, would be a significant irritant between Canada and the United States, in addition to justifying an increased Chinese presence in the NWP. There is therefore no need to reorient Canadian Arctic policy on this point. In any case, there are few alternatives available to Canada on this issue: the 1989 Arctic Agreement between Canada and the United States still constitutes the bilateral consensus on movement in the NWP, until proven otherwise. In its future plans, Canada should notably include addressing the issue of modernizing the North Warning System (NWS). The federal government did not allocate funds in its 2020 budget for this modernization. Several voices have been raised in Canada and the United States to warn of the obsolescence of the NWS, which would no longer be able to detect new Russian missiles. General O'Shaugnessy, commander of NORAD, has raised concerns about the aging NWS on several occasions before U.S. Senate committees since 2019. Given the repeated Russian flights near North American space, an effective detection system represents a strategic investment that will take several years to become operational. In addition, Canada will need to take a position on a possible strengthening of NATO's presence in the Arctic. The rise of Russian military activism on its northwestern flank has raised fears from Norway, among others. As a result, Canada participated in the NATO military exercise Trident Juncture, held in Norway in the fall of 2018. However, Canada was not supposed to participate in Exercise Cold Response (scheduled for March 2020 and cancelled following the health crisis). Conducted by Norwegian forces, Cold Response exercises bring together the armed forces of many Western partners, NATO members and allies. From the Canadian perspective, the question of what role NATO can play in the region should be posed. At the moment, Exercise Trident Juncture appears to be an exception, a one-time event that the Canadian government has not followed up on. Participation in the annual Cold Response exercises could be an interesting interim solution. Greater synergy between Canadian military exercises in the Arctic and those of Western partners (such as Norway) would help strengthen partnerships with traditional allies. Recommendations for Canada The Trump Administration's strong statements could have an impact on the cooperation and mode of operations of the Arctic Council. Like other international theatres, US Arctic policy now seems to be based on two fundamentals: unilateralism and unpredictability. Although all the Arctic states seem to wish to keep the Arctic as a zone of cooperation and exchange, this new American approach sows doubt. For Canada, the uncertainty surrounding the American position on the NWP is the most significant threat, despite them having taken no action to challenge the 1989 NWP Agreement. The modernization of NORAD and the North Warning System represents an interesting area of collaboration between the two countries. The subject is a matter of consensus and could constitute a strengthening of the Canada-U.S. strategic partnership. On the other hand, games of influence in the Russian Arctic should not have direct consequences for Canada. NATO's increased presence in the region, especially in Norway, should be seen as an opportunity for Canada to develop deeper partnerships with allies, liberal democracies moreover. Furthermore, this engagement would strengthen multilateral practices and cohesion among Western countries, which have been undermined by the antagonism of the Trump administration. Canadian participation in military exercises in Norway should be a permanent feature of Canadian Arctic policy. The participation of French, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish personnel in the Canadian military exercise NANOOK 2019 is an initiative that should be repeated and deepened. For its part, Greenland is the object of American and Chinese interest, but the potential repercussions for Canada are small: the country does not have the tools or the will to compete with these powers. On the other hand, there is significant potential for Canada to cooperate with Greenland. Indeed, regional cooperation in eastern North America (Nunavut, Nunavik, Labrador and Greenland) is poorly developed. Cross-border co-operation focusing on issues of common and technical interest (fisheries, transportation, economy) could be an interesting and low-risk diplomatic avenue for Canada in its interactions with Greenland. This type of co-operation is certainly not as spectacular as investments by major powers, but could create a ripple effect and foster co-operation in this Arctic sub-region. ## Conflict Sensitivity: A Key Approach for Climate Adaptation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/conflict-sensitivity-a-key-approach-for-climate-adaptation/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report highlights the importance of conflict sensitivity in France-Canada climate adaptation initiatives, particularly in... This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program and the DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges. Summary This policy report highlights the importance of conflict sensitivity in France-Canada climate adaptation initiatives, particularly in fragile contexts. These initiatives should not only respond to climate challenges, but also foster social cohesion and community resilience. This analysis synthesizes perspectives gathered from interviews with experts in the field. These experts emphasize both the importance of empowering local players and the challenges of implementing a conflict-sensitive approach. Thus, this analysis supports the idea that French and Canadian climate adaptation initiatives in fragile contexts should include gender analysis and social inclusion (GESI), prioritize local leadership and participatory methods, to develop effective and sustainable adaptation measures. Here are the key recommendations of this analysis: It is essential that climate change adaptation interventions do not aggravate existing social tensions. A thorough contextual analysis and a “Do No Harm” approach must be put in place to avoid exacerbating conflicts. In particular, projects must be designed to be sensitive to local dynamics, including gender and social inclusion analyses (GESI), and participatory methods to ensure that marginalized voices are taken into account. Involving local communities right from the project design phases would ensure that solutions are adapted and truly relevant to local contexts. Local capacity-building and conflict sensitivity training could ensure the sustainability of adaptation projects. Local teams, as well as French and Canadian partners, need to be trained to better understand conflict-sensitive approaches and develop adapted solutions. Finally, to ensure the effectiveness of climate adaptation interventions in fragile contexts, it is recommended to organize an annual consultation between Canadian and French institutions, as well as local ministries and actors. This participatory process is particularly relevant in these contexts, as it would not only help coordinate efforts between local, national and international players, but also ensure that interventions take into account local realities and dynamics. This ongoing dialogue would also promote the inclusion of local communities in decision-making, thereby strengthening collective resilience to the impacts of climate change in fragile contexts. Context According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), climate security refers to the impacts of the climate crisis on peace and security, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Considered a crisis multiplier, and a threat to national, human, international and ecological security, climate change is likely to exacerbate the risks that already threaten peace and security, especially in countries in fragile situations. Although climate change is not a major cause of large-scale armed conflict, it could aggravate and prolong existing conflicts, and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities in already unstable regions. Indeed, population movements, environmental pressures such as floods, droughts and extreme weather events caused by climate change could exacerbate competition for resources, political instability in fragile states and potentially mass migration flows. For countries already beset by multiple crises or conflicts, climate change could further exacerbate social tensions, increase people's vulnerability and grievances, and reduce economic opportunities. Overall, Africa and Asia are likely to be the most vulnerable regions in terms of humanitarian consequences. For example, in SPARC's report on perceptions of cross-border climate change risks and adaptation, survey participants from East and West Africa highlighted that: Droughts and floods are among the most serious climate change-related risks facing their regions. Land degradation and biodiversity loss are constant challenges across the Sahel, impacting livelihoods, water resources and human and animal health. As a result, climate security, a subject of growing concern in recent years, remains an issue of prime importance within regional and international organizations such as the Security Council, the African Union Commission, the European Union and NATO. In addition to threat assessment, climate security includes the ability to meet climate-related challenges. It has an adaptive dimension, as it implies not only resistance to risks, but also the ability to adapt and find solutions to the impacts of climate change. Emphasizing Conflict Sensitivity in Climate Adaptation The first Franco-Canadian partnership for climate and the environment was signed in 2018 and renewed in 2021. The third edition of the partnership has now been adopted for a three-year period (2024-2027). In addition to the partnership between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of Canada for Climate and Environment - 2024-2027, France and Ca-nada are also involved in climate issues affecting many countries in the South, and collaborate with these countries (researchers, governments, experts, etc.) on initiatives aimed at strengthening climate resilience. Their involvement as world leaders in climate action is based on their strategic interests, humanitarian commitment and international development efforts. However, to respond effectively to the impacts of climate change, it is not enough to tackle climate challenges alone. It is essential to ensure that adaptation interventions do not exacerbate existing social and political tensions. In particular, we need to ensure that humanitarian and development interventions do not exacerbate conflict, especially in fragile situations. Indeed, climate change adaptation strategies, particularly those relating to natural resource management, can lead to increased insecurity of land rights, marginalize minority groups, and accelerate environmental degradation. Above all, both local and international institutions could reduce or exacerbate the likelihood of conflict, depending on how initiatives are administered. They could affect the distribution of services; response capacity and the way disputes are managed. Thus, a conflict-sensitive approach defined as an organization's ability to understand the context in which it operates considers certain factors to be effective: public consultation, transparency and consideration of marginalized voices in project planning and implementation. This approach also refers to the concept of “Do No Harm”, “which mandates that organizations take steps to prevent and mitigate the potential negative consequences of their actions on affected populations”. This concern also seems to be shared by France and Canada, which are actively engaged in various climate efforts, notably through initiatives such as CLARE (Adaptation aux changements climatiques et résilience), spearheaded by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), as well as programs such as ADAPTACTION by the Agence Française de Dévelopment. In addition, a conflict-sensitive approach is also relevant to the design and implementation of climate adaptation initiatives in contexts that are not necessarily classified as fragile states or conflict zones. Indeed, many regions may face underlying social, economic, or political tensions, even in the absence of open conflict. Integrating a conflict-sensitive approach into climate adaptation interventions 1. Contextual understanding and analysis of gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) The design of climate adaptation projects must take into account the experiences of different groups in dealing with conflict and climate change. A project that ignores conflict or works in isolation from active conflict is unlikely to succeed. Instead, adaptation projects should draw comparisons and parallels between the ways in which different groups experience vulnerability to climate change and conflict, using this understanding to design interventions that are sensitive to these dynamics. Understanding context through intersectional analysis helps to identify key players and give a voice to marginalized populations, rather than allowing dominant voices to prevail. A GESI analysis would not only reduce the risk of exacerbating conflicts, but could also help researchers to acknowledge their subjectivity, thus ensuring that adaptation interventions are designed with sensitivity to local socio-political dynamics. Most importantly, these analyses are also aligned with the United Nations' Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, which guides gender aspects in development interventions. This agenda emphasizes the importance of involving women and marginalized groups in peace and security processes, ensuring that their perspectives are integrated into conflict prevention and peace-building efforts. 2. The importance of local leadership and ownership Implementing a conflict-sensitive approach would prevent external researchers from parachuting into local contexts. This approach is essential to avoid harm and to ensure that adaptation interventions are truly representative of the local context. For research projects, it is therefore essential to have a good understanding of the context in which we intervene. Who are the key players, and how can they be effectively involved? Above all, experts advocate empowering these players. The first step is therefore to work with local partners, while ensuring that this partnership is equitable, by making sure that they really do have the necessary power to direct the project implementation process. It is important to involve stakeholders and communities in the initial phases of the project, ensuring that this period is used to engage stakeholders and communities, so that researchers have time to revise their objectives, questions and methods if necessary. The Case of South Sudan South Sudan perfectly illustrates the importance of adopting a conflict-sensitive approach to adaptation measures, but also the challenges this represents. Climate change has caused Kapoeta pastoralists to alter their migration patterns, encroaching on land traditionally belonging to other ethnic communities, or crossing the migration routes of other pastoralist groups, intensifying tensions due to increased pressure on resources. In their article entitled “Conflict-sensitive aid at the intersection of climate change, conflict and vulnerability in South Sudan”, Pech and Chan focus on recent research carried out by the Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CSRF), focusing on two case studies: Kapoeta, in Eastern Equatoria State, and the Mangala-Bor corridor. The aim was to identify and reflect the views of South Sudanese communities affected by both climate change and conflict, and their interaction with the aid system. Indeed, in the Mangala-Bor corridor, floods have often coincided with periods of intense political violence. Map of South Sudan (ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 2011) But above all, gender is also a considerable dimension in this nexus of cli-matic change, conflict and displacement. As Pech and Chan point out: As the main providers of food and water, and with fewer livelihood options when displaced, due to generally lower literacy rates and a more fragile social and economic position, women are particularly vulnerable to the increasing scarcity of clean water and food. In some cases, they are forced to undertake risky activities, such as traveling longer distances to access water or selling alcohol, which exposes them to sexual and gender-based violence. At the same time, this intersection also affects men and boys, notably by linking masculinity to cattle-raising, which exposes them more to forms of organized violence. It is therefore clear that a conflict-sensitive approach in such complex contexts would be essential in any climate change adaptation strategy. However, humanitarian actors face complex conflict-sensitivity challenges for a variety of reasons, including community perceptions of aid agencies, criticism of aid responses perceived as “inadequate” and “poorly targeted”. But above all, other issues make it difficult to implement a conflict-sensitive approach, such as “limited resources”, the increasing pressure that aid actors may feel, and above all, the “lack of capacity or expertise to support integrated, climate- and conflict-sensitive action”. This should not, however, discourage efforts to adopt a conflict-sensitive approach, nor lead to abandonment in the face of difficult contexts. Thus, according to Pech and Chan, aid initiatives should: Consider the context in which actors operate. Promote strategies that ensure assistance is contextually relevant and co-designed with communities. Consider the potential impact of the construction of dikes and other flood management infrastructures on migration routes. Integrate conflict management systems into water, sanitation, and hygiene projects such as boreholes, hafirs and dams. Above all, to be effective, a conflict-sensitive approach should also consider a peace perspective, i.e., promote sustainable resource management, but above all foster dialogue between conflicting parties. These recommendations are complemented by the tool presented in Pech and Chan's study, taken from the UNHCR learning document on South Sudan. While this model illustrates how interventions can, in worst-case scenarios, cause unintended damage to communities and community relations, it also emphasizes approaches that minimize such damage, but above all those that positively address the causes and drivers of conflict. Conflict sensitivity model: the Peace Spectrum[1] The Role of Participatory Methods Current best practice in adaptation - whether in research, development or humanitarian aid - tends to be participatory, focusing on the inclusion of different groups through a variety of tools, including living labs. Participatory methods, such as those used in living labs, are essential to foster inclusion and enable vulnerable communities to express their needs in a controlled environment. These methods not only facilitate dialogue and conflict resolution, but also enable experimentation with collaborative approaches. However, it is important to note that participatory methods explored in the context of adaptation can sometimes make conflicts more visible. This is not necessarily negative, especially when these conflicts involve institutions or groups with different social or economic statuses. These discussions and this transparency offer marginalized or disadvantaged groups the opportunity to make their voices heard, which could help to correct injustices and ensure greater equity in the management, governance and redistribution of natural resources. Ensuring the Sustainability and Positive Impact of Interventions To ensure that climate adaptation interventions are both sustainable and beneficial, it is imperative to adopt a holistic approach that integrates climate security and conflict sensitivity. France and Canada, as key players in this field, have a crucial role to play in implementing strategies that respond to local needs while avoiding aggravating existing tensions. Here are the essential elements that could help achieve this objective: 1. The importance of participatory diagnosis A thorough diagnosis is essential to understand local dynamics and avoid the undesirable effects of interventions, including maladaptation, i.e. interventions that exacerbate tensions and conflicts instead of alleviating them. This diagnosis must be participatory, involving local populations in the collection and analysis of information. This approach not only provides an accurate picture of needs and vulnerabilities, but also ensures that interventions do not harm communities. It is crucial to establish mechanisms for continuous feedback and open communication with local stakeholders to enable projects to be adapted and improved on an ongoing basis. Participatory monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are essential to ensure that interventions achieve their objectives without unwanted side-effects. By actively involving local communities and stakeholders, these mechanisms enable potential problems to be detected and corrected quickly, while ensuring that interventions remain adapted to changing community needs. 2. Capacity building and training Building local capacity is fundamental to ensuring the sustainability of interventions. Projects must include training and modules to help local players understand the challenges of climate security and apply the skills needed to tackle them. French and Canadian teams working closely with local players must also follow these training courses. Initiatives supported by France and Canada can support workshops, courses and training to strengthen understanding of climate and conflict management issues, while collaborating with local stakeholders to ensure that interventions are adapted to the specific context. French-Canadian initiatives could support conflict sensitivity in training programs for local actors, and for Canadian and French teams involved in research projects, which would include modules on conflict management, peaceful dispute resolution, and inclusion of the perspectives of marginalized groups. 3. Consultation and collaboration with stakeholders Interventions must be designed in close collaboration with local stakeholders, including governments, NGOs, and communities. It is crucial to consult these stakeholders from the planning and implementation phases to ensure that projects meet local needs and respect cultural and political norms. Projects must include mechanisms to secure stakeholder approval and ensure that interventions do not reinforce existing tensions. Cross-sector collaboration, including mobilizing diplomatic networks and capacities in international development and conflict management, is essential to developing solutions to the challenges posed by climate change in fragile contexts. 4. Promoting social cohesion and avoiding maladaptation Finally, it is crucial to recognize that climate security and conflict sensitivity are intrinsically linked to the promotion of peace and social cohesion. Climate interventions must not only mitigate environmental impacts, but also strengthen social ties within communities, promote inclusion and equality, and support peace-building efforts. Activities such as community dialogue workshops, joint natural resource management projects, or inclusive economic development initiatives could play a key role in reducing social tensions and creating a more stable and resilient environment in the face of climate shocks. Above all, adaptation initiatives must avoid maladaptation. For example, one of the experts pointed out that internal migration caused by climate displacement could create new tensions, particularly in urban areas. Growing urbanization in these areas could overload local infrastructures, increase social inequalities, and even lead to conflict, especially when resources are limited. If adaptation policies fail to take these dynamics into account, they risk generating maladaptation, thereby aggravating social tensions. It is therefore essential to put in place interventions that take account of these migratory aspects in order to prevent new social imbalances, particularly in fast-growing urban centers. Thus, needs-oriented research, co-produced with users through transdisciplinary approaches, is required to ensure that interventions respond to different levels of social vulnerability and promote learning and exchange between communities. A Conflict-Sensitive Approach to Climate Change Adaptation Projects: Strengthening Franco-Canadian Cooperation A conflict-sensitive approach, especially in fragile contexts, is important because incorporating conflict sensitivity into climate adaptation interventions could not only help vulnerable communities adapt to the impacts of climate change, but also contribute to conflict prevention and the promotion of peace and stability. This approach, based on a deep understanding of local dynamics, cross-sectoral collaboration, and particular attention to social inclusion and gender equality, could have a positive impact on the lives of populations affected by climate change. Thus, for climate adaptation interventions to be sustainable and effective, the interventions supported by France and Canada should combine a thorough assessment, local capacity building, ongoing consultation with stakeholders, and particular attention to maladaptation prevention. By integrating these elements, both countries could maximize the positive impact of their interventions while contributing to peace and community resilience in the face of climate challenges. To further strengthen Franco-Canadian cooperation, it is essential to clarify the levels of collaboration between French and Canadian stakeholders responsible for project implementation. This includes institutions such as the French Development Agency (AFD) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). For example, CLARE aims to strengthen resilience to climate change and natural hazards in African and Asia-Pacific countries through a portfolio of ongoing projects in Africa and Asia. The research supported by CLARE seeks to bridge critical gaps between science and action by developing new tools and supporting partner governments, communities, and the private sector to find effective solutions to climate challenges, while also building the capacity of researchers and users of research results. As for the AdaptAction initiative, it supports 15 countries and regional organizations particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in the implementation of their adaptation strategies, by offering technical assistance and capacity-building activities to strengthen their climate governance, and to better integrate climate change adaptation into their public policies. IDRC and AFD could draw on their respective experiences to exchange good practices, analyses, methodologies and experiences, and strengthen their approaches to integrate conflict sensitivity into climate change adaptation projects. Ministries such as Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs should also be included. Cooperation between ministries, both in Canada and France, would allow for better consideration of the security and political dimensions of fragile contexts in climate project planning. Therefore, it is recommended that an annual consultation unit be created that would bring together these key stakeholders. This unit could organize regular meetings to discuss ongoing projects, discuss progress made, and identify challenges to overcome in terms of conflict sensitivity and climate adaptation. Such a platform would foster exchanges between AFD, IDRC, the ministries involved, and other partner organizations, allowing for better coordination of efforts and the systematic consideration of local issues in project implementation. It would also provide an opportunity to discuss the integration of Do No Harm principles and gender analyses into adaptation strategies. This consultation unit would also provide an inclusive forum for exchange where stakeholders and researchers from developing countries, community leaders, and local ministries from the relevant partner countries could share their knowledge and perspectives. To this end, collaboration with local organizations already involved in CLARE and AFD adaptation projects could be essential to ensure that the proposed solutions consider the cultural contexts and unique challenges of each region. The active presence of ministries, both on the Canadian and French sides, would also be crucial for integrating security dimensions into adaptation projects. Their expertise would help prevent the escalation of tensions in fragile contexts. It should also be noted that Canada, through Global Affairs Canada (GAC), has already implemented guidelines on conflict sensitivity. This document does not represent official Government of Canada policy, but it does contain guidelines on best practices. It is specifically intended for organizations implementing GAC-funded projects and offers guidance for integrating a conflict sensitivity analysis. These guidelines could provide a solid foundation for guiding practices in funded projects and could be used as a reference to strengthen cooperation with France and coordinate actions on conflict sensitivity and climate adaptation, ensuring that approaches remain adapted to local realities. Finally, the establishment of this annual consultation unit would not only allow for better coordination of Franco-Canadian efforts, but also maximize the benefits of climate interventions while avoiding exacerbating existing tensions. This approach and ongoing dialogue would make Franco-Canadian cooperation a model of collaboration that respects local dynamics, prioritizing inclusion, active listening, and the co-creation of solutions. [1] This diagram illustrates the impact of interventions in conflict situations, from “Doing harm” to “Contributing to peace”. Conflict sensitivity is a fundamental basis for avoiding negative effects (Do No Harm) and reinforcing positive impacts (Do More Good). It highlights how sensitive approaches can prevent the escalation of tensions, address the structural causes of conflict, and support sustainable peace. ## Consequences of the war in Ukraine in the Arctic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/consequences-of-the-war-in-ukraine-in-the-arctic/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > Faced with the impact of sanctions on major industrial gas projects in Siberia, the Kremlin is not changing its position, vehemently... Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Arctic region has been the focus of many economic sanctions by Western countries, particularly the European Union. The consequences for the Russian economy are immediate, with the suspension of several hydrocarbon plant development projects, Arctic LNG2 in particular. The withdrawal of European companies from the project and the interruption of the supply of technologies essential to its operation could affect the Kremlin's ambitions in its strategy for the development of the Arctic region. The same is true for the construction of the LNG ice-breaking tanker fleet, which was supposed to be in phase with the commissioning of Arctic LNG2. However, Vladimir Putin remains adamant on his Arctic policy and is pushing Russian industrialists to find and implement solutions to compensate for the defection of Western technologies. Russia's absence from the Arctic Council, its escalation of security issues in the northern space, and the Kremlin's desire to make the Northern Sea Route even more secure, all point to a resurgence of tension in this region, which until now has enjoyed an exceptional level of cooperation. ## Continental Defence Modernization and the Future of Canadian Defence Policy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/continental-defence-modernization-and-the-future-of-canadian-defence-policy/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > With threats to the security of North America and a volatile international environment, Canada, like the United States, can no longer afford. On August 14, the Canadian Department of National Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued a joint statement on the modernization of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The statement outlines the two states’ priorities for modernizing NORAD: investing in situational awareness (through upgrades to the North Warning System – NWS), improving command and control systems, conducting research and development, and developing the "capability to deter and, if necessary, defeat evolving aerospace threats to North America." Already suggested by U.S. General Terrence J O'Shaughnessy and U.S. Brigadier General Peter M. Fesler in their September 2020 report, the idea of a more offensive NORAD continues to gain prominence as increasing strategic competition, rapid technological advances and climate change undermine the protection provided by NORAD. Reigniting once again the debate on Canadian participation in ballistic missile defence (BMD), NORAD modernization also raises several issues. Moreover, if this joint declaration seems ambitious, it does not indicate which member state will invest in which priority. Will Canada invest in all declared priorities, or should it determine its own priorities? Following workshops with experts of defence and security[1], this policy brief includes their perspectives on what many have called the "unwritten chapter" of Canada's 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, that is to say a chapter dealing with continental defence issues and NORAD modernization. First, Canada must position itself on the use of missile defence in NORAD modernization. Second, Canada needs to think about its strategic interests, as well as determine its priorities and threats, to choose the regions in which it wants to act. In any case, the modernization of NORAD cannot wait any longer to provide an adequate continental defence against the new threats. NORAD Modernization: What About Missile Defence? The North American continent has been facing weapons modernization by Canada's and the United States' adversaries for several years. For example, innovation in hypersonic missiles designed to penetrate North American continental defences complicates missile defence efforts. To meet these new defence challenges, NORAD's outdated equipment makes modernization more than necessary. There are two major components of NORAD modernization. The first component, primarily defensive in nature, consists of situational awareness and associated sensors. Considering that the current equipment for situational awareness and detection is about to become obsolete, a renovation of its equipment and the installation of new sensors will make it possible to achieve situational awareness in all domains in the near future. This component of NORAD modernization is the cornerstone of continental defence, enabling deterrence, detection, and countermeasures. The upgrade of the NWS, as well as the acquisition of new fighters and ships, for example, are part of this view of information dominance, but NORAD modernization efforts cannot be limited to upgrading Cold War-era equipment at the expense of a strategic vision more adapted to contemporary challenges. The second component, more offensive in nature, consists of the ability to intercept missiles targeting North American territory, as well as the ability to strike the launch platforms for these missiles. The development of these capabilities implies the extension of deterrence through area denial capabilities, making continental defence more offensive. Modernizing NORAD will require both of such components to successfully counter new threats. In face of a multitude of threats and a variety of complementary modernization avenues, what should Canada's priorities be in modernizing NORAD? In the current international context, the debate on Canada's participation in NORAD's offensive capabilities is inevitable. The experts consulted are of the opinion that Canada will and should focus on the defensive side of NORAD, i.e., multi-domain threat surveillance and detection. This is especially important if there is no consensus among political elites while the public opinion is more in favour of defensive contributions. Indeed, some argue that participation in the offensive component of ballistic missile defence could make Canada too dependent on American decisions that may not be in line with Canadian values and interests. Given that Canadians are three times more likely to say that Canada should promote its values rather than its interests, and that Canada has supported strategic stability rather than BMD since the early 2000s, participation in NORAD's offensive capabilities is more than questionable. On the other hand, Canada may need to move towards offensive deterrence in some areas, such as cyber or air defence where the offence has the advantage, to be a credible partner in the defence against offensive threats from adversaries. This participation does not necessarily mean that Canada must host interceptor devices, but it does not necessarily rule that out either. Canada can explore both kinetic and non-kinetic roles, whether it wants to undertake an offensive mission in certain areas or focus on resilience and damage control. In other words, Canada could contribute to missile defence even if it does not directly engage in offensive neutralization mechanisms. The Future of Canadian Defence Policy Beyond continental defence, the question of rethinking Canada's defence policy arises, particularly considering the reorientation of American defence strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. Canada's defence policy suffers from a lack of strategic direction, that is, a guide to the country's international priorities. Canada is facing major international upheavals, including the resurgence of great power competition, and particularly the increasingly confrontational Sino-American relationship –elements that are absent from the 2017 defence policy statement. Indeed, one of the reasons for the early U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was to be better prepared to deal with China, which President Biden sees as the United States' most important adversary. While Joe Biden's goal was primarily to bring back the battered status quo under Trump, and thus rebalance the Sino-American rivalry, his fears are now that the international system is at a critical juncture that will determine the future of democracy in the world. It seems then that Biden sees the United States and other democracies as being in conflict with China and the autocracies. However, the United States is clear in its desire not to let China achieve its goals of power and influence in the world. While the Biden administration lacks clarity, according to some, on how the U.S. will counter China, it is inevitable that the U.S. will seek support from its allies, including Canada. It is not yet clear, however, what the U.S. demands will be with respect to the Asia-Pacific. However, Canada has not traditionally played a major role in this region, focusing more on transatlantic security through contributions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. It is also unlikely that Canada will become a major player in the Asia-Pacific, as this role is occupied by other U.S. allies. But it is to be expected that Canada will be called upon, in one way or another, to contribute to U.S. efforts against Chinese power. Canada's contributions are uneven across issues and cannot be everywhere at once. Canada will have to make choices in the contributions it wishes to make. If, during the so-called golden age of internationalism, Canada built a reputation as a peacekeeper, it now seems to lack a strong and recognizable international identity. Rising tensions in the Asia-Pacific are bringing back an issue that is often overlooked by this country: identifying and prioritizing threats. The 2017 defence statement is a perfect example of a defence policy without a defence strategy. The document fails to clearly identify threat actors and fails to prioritize threats. Yet, since 2017, the international context has evolved without a review of Canadian defence policy. Canada can no longer rely on the United States to defend its interests. If there is a lesson to be learned from the Trump administration, it is that the United States can become a threat to Canadian national interests. The strong partisan polarization in the U.S. risks bringing back a Donald Trump-like administration in the coming years. Therefore, without turning its back on the United States, some strategic autonomy is important for Canada. Canada will have to make choices to deal with the rise of China and Russia, as its allies. Australia, for example, has chosen to join forces with the United States and the United Kingdom in Asia-Pacific. Perspectives of U.S. Experts What do U.S. defence experts think? The consulted experts agree that Canada is an irreplaceable partner, particularly because of its geographic position, but that it is essential to define what threatens it. In doing so, the United States and Canada can develop a common perspective on the threats to North American security and thus decide on a more effective and coordinated joint strategy. The influence of great power competition on the views of U.S. experts is undeniable. In the context of the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific and growing strategic competition with Russia and China, the U.S. perceive Canada as a reliable ally, but one that is somewhat lax in prioritizing and identifying its strategic interests. This is necessarily problematic in the face of assertive U.S. positions. U.S. experts therefore want not only more clarity, but also more openness from Canada. The importance of Canada's commitment to modernizing NORAD is seen as being matched by an openness to new sensor technologies and infrastructure. However, there is no consensus on Canada's participation in missile defence – particularly in BMD – because of its limited scope in the context of great power competition. According to some, priority should be given to situational awareness, especially given the critical state of the NWS in the Arctic. At the diplomatic level, U.S. experts believe that Canada has a very powerful voice, especially when combined with that of the United States. The influence of a unified Canadian and American voice in the Arctic is not to be overlooked. While both countries must deal with the limits of their national sovereignty, it is in their best interest to work together. An alignment of Canadian and U.S. positions on Arctic and Asia-Pacific issues would clearly be the best option for both countries. Recommendations In all cases, Canada must clearly identify and prioritize the issues and actors that pose a threat. This identification and prioritization will allow Canada to target the contributions it can make according to their importance to Canadian interests, but also to the expectations of allies. While Canada has long been divided between its atlanticist (NATO), continentalist (United States) and internationalist (UN) positions, should we now prioritize the Arctic, the Asia-Pacific, or another region of the world more specifically? It is in Canada's interest to refine its positions and to be less scattered among its various international postures. In fact, Canada can no longer afford to sprinkle its capabilities in all regions of the world: it must focus on regions in which it has priority strategic interests. Canada cannot afford to be totally independent of its allies. Canada must therefore prioritize partnerships that support Canada's chosen path, whatever that may be. As a sovereign state, Canada must in some way prioritize the Arctic, given its strategic importance, and that means having a presence in the North. Whether it is through military forces, economic development, service delivery, indigenous peoples, climate change or national defence, Canada must be concerned about the Arctic. Modernizing the NWS, in this sense, is a priority. Therefore, Canada should not participate in the offensive component of the missile defence shield soon, but rather invest its time, funds and expertise in surveillance and threat detection technologies, particularly in the Arctic, as the United States already relies on Canada's assistance in this area –which is not the case with the BMD. In the Asia-Pacific, Canada must find a way to contribute to developments in the region with the limited capabilities of a middle power. This could involve strengthening Canada's diplomatic presence and increasing partnerships with regional allies. Canada can build a reputation in the region without getting involved militarily. Canada can remain a secondary player in the Asia-Pacific. As a middle power, Canada cannot afford to have a significant presence everywhere. It must choose its contributions carefully, where it can add value. To do this, Canada must not be satisfied with small contributions everywhere, but rather target priority regions or issues. It is therefore imperative to think about concentrating resources on niche areas where Canada has proven expertise, such as peacekeeping during the Cold War. This could be capacity building and military training in Asia and Africa, or natural disaster response capabilities. Cyberspace could also be an interesting niche, in cooperation with Eastern European countries, provided sufficient resources are available. However, there are two constraints to focusing on niche areas. The first is to find a niche with symbolic power that can offer international influence on Canada and unite Canadians. The second constraint is that there is a danger in choosing a niche: a country with more resources could make Canada invisible in this area. Thus, niches work best when they derive naturally from a particular recognized state’s experience and expertise. [2] With respect to Canada's alignment with the United States, it is very difficult to imagine that Canadian positions are not at least minimally aligned with those of the DoD, especially with respect to NORAD. However, Canada can no longer afford to be a free rider. Canada's relationship with the United States must be problematized. This is not to say that the United States is no longer Canada's first and most important ally. Rather, it is about realizing and accepting that the United States no longer necessarily sees Canada as its primary ally. The experience of Donald Trump's mandate as President has shown how the United States can also pose a significant threat to Canada's interests. A possible return to political instability is not to be overlooked with our neighbours to the south. With threats to the security of North America and a volatile international environment, Canada, like the United States, can no longer afford to put off modernizing NORAD: the time to act is now. The modernization of NORAD and the NWS is on the platforms of both the Liberal and Conservative Parties of Canada, demonstrating a consensus on the defensive modernization of NORAD. However, with no public debate planned on this modernization and with little detail provided by the parties on the substance and form of this modernization, the NORAD issue is likely to make waves among the Canadian population when the nature and real price of this inevitable modernization is finally known. [1] The first workshop on June 17, 2021 brought together Jonathan Paquin from Laval University, Stéphane Roussel from École nationale d'Administration publique, Gaëlle Rivard Piché from Defence Research and Development Canada, Yann Breault from Royal Military College of St-Jean, Laurent Borzillo from University of Quebec in Montreal, Chantal Lavallée from Royal Military College of St-Jean, Nancy Teeple from Defence Research and Development Canada, Pauline Pic from Laval University, Pierre Colautti from Laval University, Stéfanie von Hlatky from Queen's University, Justin Massie from the University of Quebec in Montreal, Marco Munier from the University of Quebec in Montreal and Camille Raymond from the University of Quebec in Montreal. The second workshop on July 7 featured Christopher Sands of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Anessa Kimball of Laval University; Major General (ret.) Randy "Church" Kee of the Wilson Center and the University of Alaska; Jack David formerly of the U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defense; and Ian Williams of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. [2] We wish to thank Adam Chapnick for this remark. ## Cooperation in the Arctic and the North Atlantic: Roles to Play by Canada, France, and Portugal in a Changing Maritime Order URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/cooperation-in-the-arctic-and-the-north-atlantic-roles-to-play-by-canada-france-and-portugal-in-a-changing-maritime-order/ Modified: 2026-07-09 This policy brief is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges. Introduction Climate change is making the Arctic more accessible, turning this region into a stage for strategic competition. More than ever, the Arctic is a theatre of interest for many non-Arctic states and actors aspiring for a greater role in Arctic affairs. In the North Atlantic, the security of undersea cables, maritime traffic, and the growing influence of Russia and China necessitate enhanced coordination with non-arctic actors. As North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members with significant overseas territories and/or strategic interests, France and Canada have a strong incentive to deepen their cooperation with other less-obvious NATO allies, like Portugal. Canada, France and Portugal are like-minded NATO allies that cooperate on Atlantic operations, equipment sharing and shared Alliance priorities. The March 2025 G7 Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity commits members and partners to closer coordination against risks posed by inadequately insured “dark” vessels, which threaten fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic, and supports expanded coast guard cooperation through forums such as the 2025 Global Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (Government of Canada, 2025a). In June 2025, Canada signed a Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union (EU), strengthening collaboration on maritime security, cybersecurity and counter-disinformation, while opening opportunities for Canadian industry into European defence joint-procurement initiatives such as Readiness 2030 (CBC News, 2025, and Government of Canada,  2025b). Canada further deepened ties with Portugal in September 2025 through a General Security of Information Agreement, enhancing defence cooperation (Government of Canada, 2025c), market access and the secure exchange of classified information, including defence intelligence and sensitive technical data. How can Canada, France and Portugal help shape a stable, rules‑based maritime order as the Arctic and North Atlantic become increasingly interconnected? In this strategic note, we illustrate how non-Arctic powers can become consequential Arctic stakeholders through alliance politics, trade networks, scientific cooperation, and shared legal and normative commitments. Their relationships are not incidental but strategically complementary since cooperation in the Arctic reinforces stability in the North Atlantic and supports the resilience of a rules-based maritime order that also governs Arctic waters. We thus demonstrate that the future of Arctic governance and security will increasingly be shaped not only by geography, but by networks of cooperation that link allies through shared strategic interests, norms, and vulnerabilities. Climate change significance for Arctic and maritime routes Climate change is a “threat multiplier” that intensifies social, economic, and political vulnerabilities (CNA, 2007; Rodrigues, 2025a, 2025b). This framing is salient in the Arctic, which is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, confirming Arrhenius’s 1896 scientific projections (Hendricks, 2018; Favier, 2019; Rodrigues, 2025a). The resulting environmental transformation is inseparable from geopolitical change: melting sea ice is opening new maritime routes and access to resources, while raising security concerns for regional and global actors. Scholars argue that ice itself has become securitized, as its loss threatens ecosystems, sea levels, and atmospheric stability (Kristensen & Mortensgaard, 2024). Since the 2007 CNA report and its 2014 update, climate change has been firmly embedded in security discourse, with Goodman identifying three key effects: the exacerbation of existing stressors, direct impacts on military operations, and the expansion of security agendas to include resilience and infrastructure protection (Goodman, 2024). This approach has been institutionalized by the EU (2008), the UN General Assembly (A/64/350), and NATO through its 2021 Climate Change and Security Action Plan and 2022 Strategic Concept, which identifies the Arctic as a critical region. Despite debates over militarization and calls for ecological security approaches, climate change is now broadly treated as a global security issue requiring coordinated international action (Rodrigues, 2025a). Geographically defined as the region north of 66°33´N, the Arctic spans eight states (Canada, Russia, the United States via Alaska, Norway, Denmark via Greenland, Sweden, Finland and Iceland) and is home to approximately four million people, including Indigenous communities. It holds an estimated 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas reserves. Accelerated warming has already led to the loss of over 40 percent of summer sea ice since 1979 (IPCC, 2021), increased methane emissions from thawing permafrost (NOAA, 2023), and growing risks to ecosystems, infrastructure, and Indigenous livelihoods, while simultaneously enabling new maritime routes (Rantanen et al., 2022). The Arctic Ocean, formally recognized in 1921 by the International Hydrographic Organisation (Sörlin, 2017), acquires more strategic importance as these routes evolve. The Northwest Passage offers a shorter Atlantic–Pacific link but remains hazardous and politically sensitive (Royal Canadian Navy, 2023), while Atlantification is reducing the region’s historical isolation and deepening its geopolitical relevance (Sörlin, 2017; Rodrigues, 2025b). The Northern Sea Route along Russia's Siberian coast can cut Europe–Asia transit times by up to 40 percent but is tightly regulated through permits and icebreaker requirements (Russian Arctic Strategy, 2020). A future Transpolar Sea Route may emerge by mid-century, posing significant environmental and governance challenges (Bennett, et al, 2020). Together, these developments highlight the growing need for strengthened international regulatory cooperation, particularly under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to ensure that Arctic navigation evolves in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner. Strategic Competition in the Arctic and the North Atlantic Many countries increasingly view the Arctic Ocean through a security lens as sea ice recedes and transit routes like the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage become more accessible. These developments impact global shipping, resource extraction, and sovereignty claims. The Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) gap, a Cold War chokepoint, is once again a focus for NATO surveillance and anti-submarine operations (Childs, 2022). Bilateral cooperation between Canada and Russia, including Arctic matters, will remain difficult. In December 2022, Canada submitted an addendum to its Arctic Ocean extended continental shelf claim to counter Russia's 2021 addendum, which had greatly expanded its claim and tripled the overlap with Canada's shelf (Royal Canadian Navy, 2023). Canada's submission rebalanced this overlap. Canada remains committed to resolving continental shelf disputes peacefully and in line with international law. Russia poses a significant geopolitical challenge in the Arctic. It controls 50% of the region geographically (Royal Canadian Navy, 2023) and has intensified both its military and economic activities. In 2020, Russia launched a $300 billion initiative to accelerate the development of its Arctic region, focusing on new ports, industrial infrastructure, and oil and gas projects. This economic strategy is closely aligned with a parallel military build-up, including the modernization of the Northern Fleet, the expansion of Arctic bases, and increased deployment of conventional and nuclear capabilities. Western sanctions have deepened Russia's dependence on China, which declared itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2018. In reality, Beijing is situated approximately 5,580km from the North Pole, but only 4,420km from the Equator (Zellen, 2019). These figures suggest that China is, by geography, closer to being a near-Equatorial state than a near-Arctic one. China is now a key partner in Arctic research, energy development, port construction, and critical infrastructure within Russia's Arctic zone, notably Arctic shipping lanes and resource development (Byers, 2013). This cooperation now extends to military activities, including joint exercises in the Russian High North, building on a 2022 bilateral commitment to Arctic cooperation. Climate change is focusing attention on the Arctic as a sustainable and reliable source of critical minerals, such as lithium, graphite, nickel, cobalt, copper, and rare earth elements, that are vital for the transition to a low-carbon economy. Additionally, research indicates (NASA, 2025) that as temperatures rise in southern oceans, global fish stocks are migrating toward the Arctic Ocean, creating significant challenges for global food security. In 2022, the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft announced a significant oil discovery in the Pechora Sea, located within Russia´s Arctic territorial waters. The find occurred in the Medynsko-Varandeyskoye license area, where Rosneft had previously conducted exploratory drilling. The newly identified reserves are estimated to contain approximately 82 million tons of oil (Nilson, 2022). The growing Sino-Russian alignment (Rodrigues, 2026a) introduces new risks for Arctic governance, freedom of navigation, and regional stability. As a result, non-Arctic partners with maritime and geopolitical stakes, such as Portugal, are becoming increasingly relevant to the broader Arctic–Atlantic security architecture. Looking ahead, states must invest in new partnerships and strengthen existing ones to reinforce the strategic resilience of the Arctic. Canada and France both advocate for the non-militarization of the Arctic and uphold the authority of multilateral institutions such as the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization. Their cooperation is reinforced through the Franco-Canadian Defence Cooperation Council (FCDCC), and both countries remain committed to multilateral governance under the Arctic Council, UNCLOS and the Paris Agreement. Canada and France should identify additional forums and make innovative use of current mechanisms to advance Arctic dialogue and cooperation, with the goal of balancing and limiting the growing influence of Russia and China in the region. The security connection between the North Atlantic and Arctic basins  Recent strategic and academic assessments conceptualise the North Atlantic and the Arctic as a continuous and interdependent geostrategic space, rather than distinct maritime regions (Rodrigues, 2026b). This shift is driven by environmental transformation, evolving maritime routes, and intensifying geopolitical competition. The integration of the Arctic into the North Atlantic system produces several key implications in different sectors. First, economic and logistical transformations are underway. Arctic routes can reduce transit distances between Europe and Asia by up to 30–40%, thereby reshaping global shipping patterns and reinforcing the Atlantic’s role as a gateway to emerging polar routes, which still provide some challenges in terms of navigation. This means that non-arctic states have now the opportunity to improve their abilities and be a part of the new geopolitical context being designed. Second, security interdependence has intensified. Threats originating in the Arctic, such as militarisation, submarine activity, or hybrid operations, can directly affect North Atlantic infrastructure, including critical subsea communication cables. This creates a shared vulnerability space across both basins. Third, the region reflects increasing geopolitical continuity and competition. The Arctic–Atlantic system is now characterized by great power rivalry, particularly involving Russia, whose strategic posture explicitly spans both regions. Finally, these developments necessitate enhanced multilateral cooperation, including coordination between regional governance mechanisms such as Arctic and North Atlantic coast guard frameworks (Rodrigues, 2026b). Maritime security in the 21st century for Canada and many of its allies is thus shaped by the functional integration of the North Atlantic and Arctic basins, which together form a continuous and evolving security environment. Traditionally treated as distinct regions, these maritime spaces are now better understood as a single operational theatre, where risks, threats, and governance challenges transcend geographic boundaries. North Atlantic also means the Azores, a Portuguese archipelago located in the mid-Atlantic, that represent a multifaceted strategic asset whose importance extends across geopolitical, economic, environmental, and scientific domains. Their central location in the North Atlantic positions them as a critical node in global maritime networks, while their vast maritime domain supports economic development and resource management. The significance of the Azores is changing in light of the ongoing global and geopolitical transformations. From its role in maritime security and defence to their contributions to the blue economy and scientific research, the archipelago is integral to Portugal's strategic identity. In an era defined by interconnectedness and environmental challenges, the Azores offer both opportunities and responsibilities. A comprehensive and forward-looking maritime strategy is essential to fully harness their potential and ensure their continued relevance in the global arena (Rodrigues, 2025c).The Azores, more specifically Lajes Base, have also gained renewed importance as a logistical and monitoring hub (Borges, 2026). Their position allows for the observation and management of increased maritime traffic between the Atlantic and Arctic, thus enhancing Portugal's potential role in international governance and cooperation in these regions. Canada’s Arctic Priorities Canada is one of eight circumpolar states, with the Arctic covering 40% of its land and over 70% of its coastline (Government of Canada, 2025d). The region is vital to Canada's identity, security, and economic interests. As a founding member of the Arctic Council, Canada plays a leading role in Arctic governance and cooperation. Canada's priorities centre on implementing the 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy Framework and the 2024 Arctic Foreign Policy, both of which emphasize sovereignty, Indigenous partnership, scientific leadership and pragmatic diplomacy. These priorities include positioning Canada as a global leader in Arctic science, strengthening multilateral cooperation, expanding trade and commercial opportunities for northern communities and deepening engagement with Indigenous Peoples. Key initiatives include appointing an Arctic ambassador, opening new consulates in Alaska and Greenland, launching Arctic security dialogues and advancing boundary negotiations. In line with the 2022 NORAD modernization effort, Canada is also reinforcing its Arctic defence posture by expanding Canadian Armed Forces capabilities and operations. This includes strengthening the Canadian Rangers, who play a central role in asserting sovereignty. Defence spending is expected to nearly triple by 2030 in response to rising geopolitical pressures. Canada continues to advance its extended continental shelf claims through UNCLOS processes and remains committed to multilateral governance through the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization (Rodrigues and Azodi, 2026). Canada's scientific leadership is anchored by Polar Knowledge Canada and the Canadian High Arctic Research Station in Nunavut. These institutions integrate Indigenous knowledge with multidisciplinary research to support adaptation and resilience. Polar Knowledge Canada leads national Arctic research by coordinating scientific programs, collaborating with northern communities and training the next generation of polar researchers, with a particular focus on northern youth. France’s Polar Engagement France, though not an Arctic state, has a robust Arctic policy and a long tradition of polar science. It considers itself a polar nation. Since 1963, France has asserted its scientific presence in the Arctic by establishing a research base in Svalbard, now jointly operated with Germany in the international research village of Ny-Ålesund. It also maintains the Jean Corbel station, dedicated to research in atmospheric physico-chemistry and glaciology (French Ministry of Armies, n.d.). An observer member of the Arctic Council since 2000, France leverages this regional cooperation forum to strengthen its science diplomacy. It contributed to the structuring of polar research through the launch of the Arctic Scientific Observatory in 2010, which coordinates around 400 researchers across Earth sciences, environmental sciences, and the social sciences. All polar infrastructure and logistics are managed by the French Polar Institute Paul-Émile Victor (IPEV), which ensures France's operational presence in polar regions (French Ministry of Armies, n.d). In the Atlantic and Arctic, France's 2025 Arctic Security Strategy underscores the strategic link between the North Atlantic and the Arctic and reaffirms its commitment to cooperation and maritime security (Rodrigues, 2026c). This is reinforced by the 2030 Polar Strategy, France's first comprehensive roadmap for the polar regions, launched in April 2022. Led by the CIMER-POLES interministerial committee, the strategy aims to triple Arctic research resources, establish a new research base in Greenland, commission a new polar oceanographic vessel, strengthen France’s role in Arctic governance bodies, create a French polar foundation and promote Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon as a scientific platform. The proposed polar programming law and the One Polar Summit in 2023 are both key steps in advancing these ambitions. Portugal’s Atlantic Gateway Role Portugal occupies a strategic position at the crossroads of the North Atlantic, linking Europe to the Americas and Africa. Its mainland coastline, combined with the Azores and Madeira archipelagos, places Portugal astride critical maritime routes, air corridors, and undersea cable networks that are essential to global trade, communications, and military mobility. Although Portugal is not an Arctic state and thus not a member of the Arctic Council, its Atlantic geography and maritime orientation give it an indirect but increasingly relevant stake in Arctic-linked maritime dynamics. Historically shaped by its maritime empire and Atlantic identity, Portugal has retained significant naval expertise, port infrastructure, and ocean governance capacity. As a founding member of NATO and an EU member since 1986, Portugal plays a central role in Alliance maritime surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and sea line of communication protection in the North Atlantic. The Azores, in particular, remain strategically significant as a logistical and monitoring hub between North America and Europe, reinforcing NATO´s ability to secure transatlantic reinforcement routes that are increasingly connected to Arctic and High North security (Rodrigues, 2025b; 2025c; 2025d). From a strategic perspective, Portugal functions as an Atlantic gateway for emerging Arctic routes. As climate change progressively alters navigation patterns, potential future traffic from the Arctic, whether via the Northern Sea Route or a future Transpolar Sea Route, will ultimately converge toward North Atlantic ports and infrastructure. Portugal´s ports and maritime services are therefore positioned to benefit from, and contribute to, the resilience of Arctic-linked commercial flows, even in the absence of direct Arctic access. This gateway role also extends to the protection of critical undersea infrastructure, including energy pipelines and data cables, which are increasingly recognized as strategic vulnerabilities in both the North Atlantic and Arctic security environments. Portugal´s relevance further derives from its role within the European Union. Through EU maritime security initiatives, ocean governance frameworks, and research programmes, Portugal contributes to shaping European engagement with the Arctic indirectly, particularly on issues of maritime safety, environmental protection, and sustainable fisheries. Although Portugal does not yet have a dedicated national Arctic policy, it has demonstrated growing interest in polar research, ocean science, and climate governance. Portuguese science is in the Arctic, though lacking diplomatic presence as well as recognition in official documents (Rodrigues, 2025c; 2025d; 2025e). Overall, Portugal exemplifies how a non-Arctic European state can exercise strategic relevance in Arctic affairs through its Atlantic positioning (specifically the Azores Islands), NATO and EU commitments, maritime infrastructure, and inter-oceanic connectivity. Acting as a stabilizing gateway between the Arctic and lower latitudes, the country reinforces the resilience of transatlantic and Arctic-linked maritime systems while supporting a multilateral, law-based order at sea. Its role complements those of Canada and France, underscoring the broader argument that Arctic governance and security are increasingly shaped by interconnected networks of non-Arctic powers operating across the Atlantic world. Comparatively, Portugal's role complements those of Canada and France within a differentiated but coherent Atlantic–Arctic security architecture. While Canada provides territorial sovereignty and operational presence in the Arctic, and France projects strategic continuity across the Arctic and the Atlantic through its global naval posture, Portugal reinforces the southern Atlantic anchor of this system. Through NATO maritime surveillance, protection of sea lines of communication, and undersea infrastructure security, Portugal helps ensure the resilience of the transatlantic link that underpins Arctic deterrence and reinforcement. The Brilliant Shiel Operation had this purpose, to use the capacities of southern allies, Portugal, such as a traditional submarine, confirming it is possible to be under icy waters. This mission was held from April to July 2024 and successfully conducted by the Portuguese Navy. Together, these three states illustrate how geographically distinct but functionally interconnected actors contribute to Arctic stability by securing different segments of an integrated maritime space, linking the High North to the broader Atlantic. Conclusion and Recommendations A strategic logic connects Canada, France, and Portugal. Canada anchors the Arctic dimension as a circumpolar state responsible for sovereignty, governance, and scientific leadership in the Northwest Passage. France operates as a global maritime power that structurally links the Arctic and the North Atlantic through its overseas territories, naval deployments, and polar diplomacy. Portugal, positioned at the crossroads of the North Atlantic, functions as a critical gateway for maritime security, undersea infrastructure protection, and Atlantic connectivity within NATO and the EU. The emerging routes hold promises for shorter global shipping paths, yet pose major challenges, including infrastructure gaps, environmental risk, and the need for international governance to manage safety and sovereignty issues. The Arctic Ocean is already regulated by an extensive legal framework, most notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which defines states´ jurisdictions, rights, and obligations across different maritime zones. These rules cover the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries, navigation, natural resource management, marine environmental protection, and other uses of the sea. All states have rights and responsibilities regarding ocean use that apply equally in the Arctic. For example, under UNCLOS, non-Arctic countries may only conduct marine scientific research in another state´s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with that state's consent. As the maritime order evolves in the face of climate change, power competition, and legal contestation, Canada, France, and Portugal play increasingly important and complementary roles. They share commitments to multilateralism, international law, and maritime stability. Their cooperation spans NATO, the EU, the UN, and the Arctic Council (where applicable). Together, they contribute complementary strengths: Canada ensures Arctic operations along the Northwest Passage and scientific leadership; France bridges the Arctic and North-Atlantic through defence diplomacy and polar research; Portugal fortifies the North Atlantic - Arctic security via submarine patrols, maritime infrastructure protection, and regional defence research and serves as a pivotal point for Atlantic connectivity within Europe through the Azores. Collectively, they exemplify how Arctic-connected oceanic dynamics converge with oceanic links to influence strategic maritime security alliances and posture. Whether through NATO operations in the North Atlantic, scientific diplomacy in the Arctic, these states exemplify how medium powers can anchor stability and cooperation across multiple maritime domains. Building deeper trilateral and quadrilateral partnerships among them will be essential to navigating an era of uncertainty at sea. By working collaboratively and inclusively, these states can help uphold the rule of law at sea, mitigate climate threats, and defuse geopolitical tensions, while strengthening their own maritime security and prosperity in the process. The analysis demonstrates that geography alone no longer determines relevance in Arctic affairs. Instead, connectivity, legal alignment, and coalition-building shape influence. Canada, France, and Portugal collectively show that non-Arctic engagement is neither opportunistic nor destabilizing when grounded in multilateralism and international law. Canada provides Arctic legitimacy and governance leadership; France ensures strategic continuity across oceanic theatres; and Portugal secures Atlantic gateways and critical infrastructure The strategic note answers the guiding question by showing that the engagement of non-Arctic powers is not only possible but necessary for maintaining a stable maritime order across interconnected basins. These states act as strategic connectors: they dilute great-power polarization, reinforce legal regimes, and enhance resilience across supply chains and security architectures. In this context, the recommendations presented below aim to reinforce multilateralism and cooperation among the four countries discussed, with the potential to promote stability, reduce tensions, and foster positive outcomes in the Arctic region. Establish a Multilateral MDA Network; Deepen Climate-Ocean Security Cooperation via working groups; Build Inclusive and Indigenous Maritime Governance Models Collaborate within the EU, NATO, and UN agencies to develop frameworks for inter-regional maritime governance. Ultimately, the Arctic's future will be shaped as much by inclusive networks as by polar geography. By engaging non-Arctic (small and medium) powers through NATO, the EU, UNCLOS-based institutions, and scientific diplomacy, Canada, France, and Portugal, illustrate a model of cooperative maritime governance capable of mitigating competition while adapting to climate-driven change. Image Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jimmy C. Pan. ## Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Rethinking Contested Models in the Age of COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/counterinsurgency-and-counterterrorism-rethinking-contested-models-in-the-age-of-covid-19/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > In this hot take, Arthur Stein synthesizes the ideas presented in the second workshop of the Virtual Workshop Cycle on Building Capacity in the Age of COVID-19. This hot take is written as part of the Virtual Workshop Cycle on Building Capacity in the Age of COVID-19. The second workshop focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and involved Major-General Jennie Carignan, Commander of the NATO Mission in Iraq, Dr. Bruno Charbonneau, professor at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, Dr. Louis-Alexandre Berg, professor at Georgia State University and Dr. Marc-André Boisvert, independent researcher on the Sahelian armies. The information reported in the text is a general synthesis of the ideas presented by the speakers.[1] Watch the video of the second panel How has the current COVID-19 pandemic influenced capacity building in the areas of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism? Many international observers initially seemed to see the health situation as a pivotal moment for operations carried out by conventional state forces in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria) or the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso). On the one hand, affecting primarily the most underprivileged segments of the population, the health crisis significantly worsened social tensions in countries receiving international assistance. On the other hand, faced with significant logistical constraints to protect their personnel, the majority of international donors highly involved in these geographic spaces were reducing their immediate operational activities and putting their military training activities on hold. In this context, it was foreshadowed a renewed engagement on the part of the various armed groups. They could indeed take advantage of the growing operational "vacuum" and the loss of legitimacy of state authorities to regain ground and influence with civilian populations. In practice, however, these predictions have hardly been verified in the field; insurgent groups have not shown any real resurgence in their activities vis-à-vis local state authorities. Certain international actors involved in security operations - such as NATO in Iraq - have certainly drastically reduced their activities, but local armies have so far effectively taken over in terms of operational presence. The Iraqi security forces, for example, quickly adapted to the pandemic context, and made it possible to avoid a disruption of presence in contested geographical areas. While the COVID-19 pandemic has not drastically altered the immediate balance of power on the ground between insurgents and counterinsurgents, it still seems to place a salient paradox of capacity building activities at the center of the debate in terms of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism: the permanent search for international donors to find a compromise between short-term operational investments to support local armies in the face of imminent threats and medium and long-term strengthening of the material and organizational capacity of local armies to face threats heard more broadly. Indeed, the redefinition of the strategic objectives in times of pandemic of the main donors (the United States, Canada, European Union, etc.), and the budgetary reorganizations that are likely to result from them will certainly alter the priorities of these actors. The main providers of capacity building operations are likely to prioritize tangible and easily quantifiable aspects of security assistance (provision of military equipment or dispatch of military trainers) at the expense of less tangible, but essential activities; the development of the legal responsibility of local armies, respect for human rights and the general fight against corruption and the politicization of the security forces. While the majority of “security crises” in Africa and the Middle East are above all crises of democratic governance, as evidenced by the recent coup d'état in Mali in August 2020, this redefinition of priorities risks being highly criticized as counterproductive. After the notorious failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations cannot be considered “panaceas,” and it is now essential that donors move away from purely security-based solutions that have prevailed in the past. These actors must try to act in concert with multilateral entities (the United Nations in particular) to redirect the resources invested towards capacity building programs not only military, but also civilian. This must notably go through the construction of interpersonal relationships of trust with local institutional actors. A central issue that should undoubtedly be better addressed by international donors is assessing the overall effectiveness of their capacity building operations. What indicators do they want to prioritize to assess the strengthening of local structures? Do they want to focus on the security situation and see a certain success in a single “negative” peace? On the contrary, do they want to put at the heart of the assessment the strengthening of the standard of living of the local populations, with the more ambitious objective of promoting the development of a real so-called "positive" peace? Investments made in the past have rarely been followed by a real assessment of their influence, in particular to ensure that they are actually translated into the provision of essential services for the civilian population. Better monitoring of the operations carried out is crucial to prevent insurgency organizations from taking advantage of any institutional gaps to develop their own counter-models of governance. It is also decisive in a context of growing geopolitical competition, where several poles of influence - the United States, Europe, Russia or China - compete to provide their own security assistance. If they must rethink the direction and monitoring of their capacity building actions, international donors must ultimately avoid copying exogenous strategic priorities to political spaces with decisive local characteristics. Reflection on the place of the army within institutional structures, for example, can only be carried out locally and correspond to the threats, dilemmas and historical specificities specific to each space. The strengthening of the legitimacy of local armies can only be done by a genuinely political reappropriation of the issue of security, through the development of real mechanisms for civilian control of military authorities. If institutional security cannot be built at the expense of human security, the question that becomes essential to answer for many countries in crisis is: how do we create more democratic security? [1] However, the ideas presented are those of its author. ## COVID-19 and Canada’s Capacity-Building: Security Assistance and Training in the Pandemic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/covid-19-and-canadas-capacity-building-security-assistance-and-training-in-the-pandemic/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > How has capacity-building, above all security assistance and training operations, been affected by COVID-19? How has capacity-building, above all security assistance and training operations, been affected by COVID-19? What is likely to come? Because Canada’s capacity-building operations occur in multilateral frameworks, the key question for Canada is how the pandemic has affected allied capacity-building operations. The pandemic has meant a general drawdown in security assistance operations. The pattern of operations that have been most affected appear to reflect two criteria: public health and foreign policy priorities. In the next year, we can expect further disruption to these activities with new waves of the virus. Over the longer term, the economic damage and the consequent limits to defense budgets may make capacity-building less attractive (if it is regarded as inessential) or more attractive (if it is seen as a good way of pursuing geostrategic interests at relatively low cost, compared to more robust interventions). Either way, allied military training activities are likely to refocus on core missions. Canada will face pressure to maintain its capacity-building in Latvia and Ukraine but it may increasingly lack multilateral frameworks for these operations in other settings. Security assistance before the pandemic Security assistance has been a key capacity-building activity for the CAF, increasingly so since the end of its major combat role in Afghanistan. This shift was of a piece with Canada’s allies over the last ten years. Under budgetary constraints after the financial crisis of 2008, and responding to the exhaustion of large-scale deployments, several states refocused how they addressed counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and other security challenges, aiming to use their own forces less and build up partner forces more. At the same time, Russia and China have made their presence increasingly felt in capacity-building, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. It is not clear how much of an impact these operations have. Some existing research suggests that training does shape local armies’ prevailing norms and values. Other research highlights its unintended consequences, such as a link between participation in the United States’ International Military Education and Training program and coups d’état. Still other research suggests that capacity-building likely has little effect in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in particular, because it is easily undermined by local authorities who divert training, arms and supplies to political loyalists or who do not permit the officers and soldiers trained to really exercise their training. Regardless of these concerns, however, capacity-building operations have been a popular policy tool, in part because it signals a willingness to do one’s part without taking on an excessive burden.  Drawing down capacity-building under the pandemic: a signal of priorities? Then the pandemic hit. COVID-19 led to the postponement of some capacity-building activities and the scaling back of others. Canada was far from alone here. The CAF, alongside its NATO allies, suspended its training activities in Iraq (Operation IMPACT). Canada also drew down its personnel in Ukraine (UNIFIER), and postponed a training session in Niger (NABERIUS). Similarly, the United States cancelled exercises around the world, including with key partners like South Korea and Israel, and the UK suspended its training activities in Kenya. At the same time, some other states maintained their capacity-building activities, with France notably keeping Operation Barkhane in the Sahel fully operational, and China highlighting that a training exercise in Cambodia in March and April went ahead as planned. Two logics underpinned these decisions: public health and foreign policy priorities. First, the local state of the coronavirus pandemic drove many of these decisions. An extreme example as the United States’ decision in late March to suspend all training activities in any country designated Alert Level 2 or 3 by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). In essence, in an emergency, it adopted a blanket public health criterion, delegated to a public health agency, rather than accounting for country-by-country foreign policy interests. Second, however, these decisions reflect training states’ priorities to an important extent. If NATO suspended its training activities in Iraq on March 20th but kept some training activities going in the Baltic States and Poland, it is difficult to see something other than the alliance setting its priorities, signaling a commitment to member countries on the front lines with Russia over out-of-area operations. Hence, keeping some capacity-building missions essentially unchanged demonstrates a commitment, and is meant as such. This goes for Operation Barkhane, which France has put at the centre of its foreign policy in Africa. Similarly, China made a fairly public show of maintaining its training operation in Cambodia even as it kept much of its own country shut down due to the pandemic. This had a couple of uses as a signal, both showing its commitment to a partner and showing that it—and Cambodia—were not especially concerned about the disease. Some of Canada’s choices showed its own priorities. For example, on March 26th, the day the Operation UNIFIER drawdown was announced, Latvia had more confirmed COVID-19 cases than Ukraine did. By maintaining REASSURANCE while temporarily drawing down UNIFIER, Canada indicated that capacity-building in Ukraine is not as important to it as in Latvia. Whatever the intent, this is the likely signal: a straightforward interpretation, and one that reflects Canada’s commitment to a NATO member. This is a reminder that the central consideration for Canada’s capacity-building operations is what its allies are doing. These operations nearly always take place in some larger framework, whether UN, NATO or an ad-hoc partnership. And so Canada’s decision in Iraq was part of a larger NATO decision. A reasonable conclusion an outside observer can draw is that Canada does capacity-building primarily to fulfill its alliance commitments, and secondarily to build relationships with specific partner militaries. Impacts of COVID-19 on capacity-building in the short to medium term Given that Canada’s capacity-building efforts are part of broader multilateral efforts, used for Canada to contribute to collective efforts, the key question going forward is what its partners in training, like its NATO allies, are going to do. To get a sense of this, we need some assumptions about the pandemic and its overall effects in the next year. The following seem reasonable assumptions: The pandemic will stay with us. It will take at least until mid-2021 to develop a reliable vaccine, and even then it will take many months more for this vaccine to become widely available. Policymakers around the world will try to find ways of preventing and preparing for the next pandemic, for example through greater vigilance, more caution about travel and supply chains, and a greater willingness to adopt emergency restrictions sooner when a new outbreak occurs. These assumptions imply that the concern about capacity-building operations will not go away. There may well be future waves of suspended operations. This will continue to make these operations harder to organize and plan, less reliable, and less attractive. There are mitigation measures that Canada and other states have already put into place and can extend, such as pre-deployment quarantine, intensive health checks, and limiting certain training activities. But much will depend on trust between the training state and a host government, that each will follow strong public health practices. Canada will have to negotiate the terms of health protocols for these missions with local partners in order to maintain trust with recipient countries and multilateral partners. Otherwise, support for these deployments will diminish both at home and in the recipient country. Even then, there is no guarantee that a capacity-building operation will go ahead. Travel and seemingly unnecessary interactions will face widespread, and warranted, scepticism for some time. In the face of a local outbreak, future operations could easily be suspended at a moment’s notice. There will likely be particularly problematic consequences for the United States. There, an astonishing bureaucratic complexity makes it hard to put together training operations at the best of times, because a military planner must cobble together funding from many different programs with different congressional authorizations, each with different reporting requirements and deadlines. Add to this the suspension of training operations, and the resulting administrative disruption will make training quite difficult to plan for. DND should prepare for confusion from its American partner in training operations with which it pairs with the United States. More generally, in the coming year, Canada should be prepared for its key multilateral partners to do less capacity-building. Weighing public-health criteria against foreign policy priorities, Canada’s NATO allies—with possible exceptions such as France in the Sahel—are likely to continue reorienting capacity-building away from counterinsurgency contexts in places like Iraq and focus on preserving capacity-building activities among NATO members and key non-members like Ukraine. Some suspensions may go even farther. In future waves of the pandemic, Canada should be prepared that key allies make decisions about these operations on public health criteria alone, as the United States did, and not on a balance of foreign policy interests. This will limit the multilateral contexts in which Canada can conduct capacity-building and in which it has a foreign-policy imperative to do so. In order to keep up capacity-building in other contexts, Canada will have to prepare to do so with little allied involvement. Longer-run pandemic consequences: capacity-building and COVID-19 in a changing geostrategic context Analyzing the likely impacts of COVID-19 over the longer term requires broader assumptions. The following seem realistic: With the economic crisis, there will be significant and increasing pressure to reduce military budgets, though these can be put off for some time through deficit financing because of low interest rates. Geopolitical competition between China, Russia and the United States will worsen. Unfortunately, these assumptions cannot yet yield a clear prediction about how other states will engage in capacity-building. Two scenarios are plausible, following from the first two assumptions. First, cuts may affect capacity-building operations disproportionately, because they may be seen as nonessential compared to other defense functions (on top of the public-health risks of putting members of different countries’ armed services in close proximity with each other). However, capacity-building operations may instead become more popular in the next few years, particularly if geostrategic rivalry escalates and American and other states’ interests clash in a variety of different countries. Concerns about defense budgets may actually spare capacity-building or even make it more attractive, just as limits to resources helped to lead to a shift from large-scale counterinsurgency missions to capacity-building in the 2000s and 2010s. Great powers pursuing geopolitical rivalries may look for ways to do so that are relatively inexpensive and do not engage their forces in costly, dangerous and potentially destabilizing direct interventions. Capacity-building with local proxies may be just such a policy tool, attractive to states like China, Russia, the United States, France and Britain as they seek to assert their relevance and influence in various countries. In that scenario, Canada’s allies are likely to call on Canada to do more. ## COVID-19 and Capacity-Building: Final Report URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/covid-19-and-capacity-building-final-report/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report examines how has capacity-building, above all security assistance and training operations, been affected by COVID-19... During autumn 2020, the Strategic Analysis Network hosted a series of online workshops on the links between COVID-19 and capacity-building activities. In this policy brief, I update my previous work on the basis of lessons learned from the workshop series. How has capacity-building, above all security assistance and training operations, been affected by COVID-19? What is likely to come? The pandemic has meant a reduction in where capacity-building operations occur, with some missions suspended or reduced. The pattern of impacts seems to reflect a balance between public health and foreign policy priorities, reducing presence while maintaining the operations states and organizations see as the most important. At the same time, capacity-building operations have reduced the scope of their activities, including in places that are foreign-policy priorities. This can send a signal that a capacity-building operation matters for the sending state, and that it will be back to full strength when the pandemic is over. Because Canada’s capacity-building operations occur in multilateral frameworks, one key question for Canada is how the pandemic will affect allied capacity-building operations. In the short- to medium-term, the pandemic appears to be limiting the scope of operations, but it is not the last word on where capacity-building operations are taking place. Canada’s allies are still responding to changing circumstances; their priorities for where to conduct operations in the initial stages of the pandemic are not the same as today. Over the longer term, the economic damage and the consequent limits to defence budgets may make capacity-building less attractive (if it is regarded as inessential) or more attractive (if it is seen as a good way of pursuing geostrategic interests at relatively low cost, compared to more robust interventions). Either way, allied deployments are likely to refocus on core missions in strategically important environments, especially those focused on great-power competition. This likely means, among other things, that there will be a neglect of capacity-building for peace operations, despite a clear need. Security Assistance Before the Pandemic Security assistance has been a key activity for the Canadian Armed Forces, increasingly so since the end of its major combat role in Afghanistan. This shift was consistent with the behaviour of Canada’s allies over the last ten years. Under budgetary constraints after the financial crisis of 2008, and responding to the exhaustion of large-scale deployments and ground combat operations, the United States especially refocused how it addressed counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and other security challenges, aiming to use their own forces less and build up partner forces more. At the same time, Russia and China have made their presence increasingly felt in capacity-building, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. In the peacekeeping domain, capacity-building became an increasingly attractive approach in the 2000s. States from the global north became much less willing to send peacekeeping troops, especially after several missions with high-profile and costly controversies. The development of interest in capacity-building also reflected a sense that regional organizations like the African Union and their members would do a better job of managing peacekeeping operations, with greater local buy-in and a better understanding of local conflict issues. A north-south division of labour emerged in which southern states provide troops while northern states provide the funding and other kinds of support. Building the capacities of southern states to contribute to peace operations is a part of this; for example, the United States’ Global Peace Operations Initiative trained some 139,000 personnel from 1999 to 2016, according to the International Military Training Activities Database-USA. On the other hand, there was a significant degree of concern that existing capacity-building activities were too short-term and limited in scope to grapple with the complexity of contemporary peace operations. It is not clear how much of an impact these capacity-building activities have. Some existing research suggests that training does shape local armies’ prevailing norms and values. Other research highlights its unintended consequences, such as a link between participation in the United States’ International Military Education and Training program and coups d’état (though the jury is still out about this link). A third strand of scholarship suggests that capacity-building likely has little effect in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism in particular, because any tactical gains can be outweighed by problems at the political level. These include factional conflicts and local authorities who divert training, arms and supplies to political loyalists or who do not permit the officers and soldiers trained to really exercise their training. Regardless of these concerns, however, capacity-building has been a popular policy tool, in part because it signals a willingness to do one’s part without taking on an excessive burden. Drawing Down Capacity-Building Under the Pandemic: Between Public Health and Foreign Policy The pandemic checked the rising popularity of capacity-building. It led to changes both in where capacity-building operations take place and what activities they engage in. Each was driven by a combination of public health considerations and foreign policy priorities. COVID-19 led to the postponement of some capacity-building activities and the scaling back of others. Canada was far from alone here. The CAF, alongside its NATO allies, suspended its training activities in Iraq (NATO Training Mission-Iraq). Canada also drew down its personnel in Ukraine (UNIFIER), and postponed a training session in Niger (NABERIUS). Similarly, the United States cancelled exercises around the world, including with key partners like South Korea and Israel, and the UK suspended its training activities in Kenya. At the same time, some other states maintained their capacity-building activities, with France notably keeping Operation Barkhane in the Sahel fully operational, and China highlighting that a training exercise in Cambodia in March and April went ahead as planned. Two factors underpinned these decisions: public health and foreign policy priorities. First, the local conditions of the coronavirus pandemic drove many of these decisions. An extreme example was the United States Army’s decision in late March 2020 to suspend all training activities in any country designated Alert Level 2 or 3 by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). In essence, in an emergency, it adopted a blanket public health criterion, delegated to a public health agency, rather than accounting for country-by-country foreign policy interests. In many settings, public health conditions actually permitted capacity-building operations to carry on with little disruption. The relatively limited direct impact of COVID-19 in the Sahel has been much noted, and as Marc-André Boisvert points out, some operations have been able to carry on with relatively little change, notably in Mali. Second, however, these decisions reflect training states’ priorities to an important extent. A comparison between capacity-building operations and deterrence deployments can help illustrate this. NATO suspended its training activities in Iraq on March 20th, 2020. At the same time, it kept its regular Enhanced Forward Presence deployments active in the Baltic States and Poland. The alliance’s core function, after all, is deterrence towards Russia, while building the capacity of a partner army in an “out-of-area” location like Iraq is an important but secondary priority. U.S. forces in Somalia, according to Louis-Alexandre Berg, focused on their kinetic operations, which seemed to be of immediate importance, while suspending its long-term capacity-building activities. Hence, keeping some capacity-building missions essentially unchanged demonstrated a commitment. In some cases it seems to have been meant as this kind of signal. China made a fairly public show of maintaining its training operation in Cambodia even as it kept much of its own country shut down due to the pandemic. This sent a couple of signals, both showing its commitment to a partner and showing that it—and Cambodia—were not especially concerned about the disease. Some of Canada’s choices showed its own priorities. For example, on March 26th, 2020, the day the Operation UNIFIER drawdown was announced, Latvia had more confirmed COVID-19 cases than Ukraine did. By maintaining REASSURANCE in Latvia while temporarily drawing down UNIFIER in Ukraine, Canada indicated that capacity-building in Ukraine was not as important to it as deterrence and readiness in Latvia. Whatever the intent, this is the likely signal: a straightforward interpretation, and one that reflects Canada’s commitment to Latvia as a NATO member. In a grim version of a similar logic, however, many short-term training activities for PKOs stopped with the pandemic, as Arthur Boutellis points out: for donor countries in the global north, this was a risk too much. But the fact that many other capacity-building deployments outside of the peacekeeping space were maintained suggests that states were willing to take some risks and adapt their efforts if the priority was strong enough. The disheartening conclusion is that capacity-building for PKOs often did not make the cut, reflecting the pre-pandemic trend of short-termism and decline in support for PKOs. This also serves as a reminder that the central considerations for Canada’s capacity-building operations are what its multilateral partners are doing. These operations nearly always take place in some larger framework, whether the UN, NATO or an ad-hoc partnership. Canada’s decision in Iraq was part of a larger NATO decision. This reflects the weight that alliance commitments have in Canada’s decisions to participate in capacity-building operations; building relationships with specific host countries like Iraq is less important. Adapting Capacity-Building Operations At the same time that some missions drew down, capacity-building operations everywhere have adapted to the pandemic by changing their everyday practices. Public-health considerations changed what operations could do. As LCol Pierre Leroux points out, Operation UNIFIER, for example, laid down a colour-coding system to indicate the state of the pandemic in different sites in Ukraine, shaping its decisions about where to send CAF personnel in order to limit their exposure. According to MGen Jennie Carignan, the NATO training mission in Iraq had to rapidly learn how to adapt to the the impact of the virus, and developed a greater degree of efficiency over time as it learned better public-health practices. Finally, as Maj Audrey Hudon explains, the CAF as a whole had to adapt its mental-health approach to its personnel to meet the new realities of deployment under COVID-19, for example grappling with the suspension of mid-deployment leaves, and the difficulties of pre- and post-deployment quarantine on personnel and their families. Much mental-health support has had to come through digital platforms as well. Female CAF personnel have, in particular, faced challenges stemming from the pressure to play a role as household organizers in the context of significant disruption to household routines during the pandemic. Among the most significant consequences for CAF deployments has been the limits placed on face-to-face contact. Any deployment has to try to build acceptance among the local population of the host country; this is as true for a deterrence-focused deployment like Operation REASSURANCE in Latvia as it is for a training mission like Operation UNIFIER. Generally face-to-face contact can help with this. However, in a public-health emergency, limiting contacts can improve trust by making it clear that a mission does not pose a public-health threat. As Carla Martínez Machain explains, COVID-19 outbreaks at two US Marines bases in Okinawa, for example, led to local worries about the deployment. However, in capacity-building operations, limited face-to-face contact has also made it harder to build relationships between the CAF and a partner armed force. Under this constraint, capacity-building operations have shifted to an important degree to focusing on what they can do. LCol Leroux notes that Operation UNIFIER retooled to focus on the administrative side, such as on training standards. According to Stéfanie von Hlatky, gender training in NATO refocused from training its partner armies such as the Iraqi military towards improving the alliance’s own gender practices. Mody Berethe, director of the Peacekeeping School in Bamako, explains that his organization shifted to distance learning and offered more courses to local police and armed personnel to improve their own practices for domestic operations, adapting its curriculum to include courses on terrorism and human rights. The concern, of course, is that capacity-building operations end up distorting the activities of a mission, preventing some significant activities and focusing efforts on the remaining activities. But from another point of view, there is simply not much of a choice. In other words, in the areas that concerned them the most, training states including Canada tried to maintain their operations to the extent possible, but were limited in what they could do. Officers who presented at the capacity-building workshops suggested that the goodwill built up over time is likely to continue, sending a signal to recipient countries that the CAF is present in spite of the pandemic, and will return to full-strength operations with the full array of capacity-building activities when it is safe to do so. This is a nuanced signal of commitment, but given the very real public-health concerns around deployments, probably the most effective one to send. A corollary is that with the ongoing race between vaccination campaigns and infection rates, particularly with new COVID variants and in areas with rickety health infrastructure, operations will face a delicate task of working out just how far they can open up. This is a process that will have to be guided by negotiation between Canada, its multilateral partners, and recipients in order to maintain mutual confidence. Impacts Of COVID-19 on Capacity-Building in the Short to Medium Term Given that Canada’s capacity-building efforts are part of broader multilateral efforts, the key question going forward is what its partners in training, like its NATO allies, are going to do. To get a sense of this, we need some assumptions about the pandemic and its overall effects. The following seem to be reasonable assumptions: The pandemic will stay with the world for years. There is the race between vaccine rollouts and new infections, and vaccine distribution in the developing world is likely to be very slow as rich countries like Canada and the United States snap up supplies. Policymakers around the world will try to find ways of preventing and preparing for the next pandemic, for example through greater vigilance, more caution about travel and supply chains, and a greater willingness to adopt emergency restrictions sooner when a new outbreak occurs. There is, additionally, the grim possibility that COVID-19 and its variants will become endemic, particularly since some variants are resistant to the currently available vaccines, and there is so much virus circulation that further mutations are inevitable. What governments will do to respond to this is unclear. Many may simply decide to live with it: with the prospect that public-health restrictions cannot make the crisis end, they may simply give up trying. But endemic COVID-19 may spell ongoing uncertainty for years to come. These assumptions imply that the concern about capacity-building operations will not go away. There may well be future waves of suspended operations and reduced activities for existing missions. There are mitigation measures that Canada and other states have already put into place and can extend, such as pre-deployment quarantine, intensive health checks, and limiting certain training activities. But much will depend on trust between the training state and a host government, that each will follow strong public health practices. Canada will have to negotiate the terms of health protocols for these missions with local partners in order to maintain trust with recipient countries and multilateral partners. Otherwise, support for these deployments will diminish both at home and in the recipient country. Even then, there is no guarantee that a capacity-building operation will go ahead. Travel and seemingly unnecessary interactions will face widespread scepticism for some time. In the face of a local outbreak, future operations could easily be suspended at a moment’s notice. What will be the general pattern of capacity-building in the next year? In the previous version of this article, I predicted that there would be less capacity-building in the near future and a concentration on key priorities. Specifically, I predicted that NATO would reorient away from capacity-building in counterinsurgency contexts like Iraq in order to better focus capabilities on its core missions; I also predicted some exceptions, such as that France would maintain its focus on the Sahel. I based these predictions on the suspension of NATO training activities in Iraq and the maintenance of Opération Barkhane in the face of the pandemic. I was incorrect on both scores. France is looking to reduce its presence in the Sahel, while NATO has announced a dramatic expansion in Iraq, from 500 personnel to 4,000. This suggests either that my initial analysis of these decisions as signals of priority was mistaken, or that it was broadly correct but not especially useful in predicting how priorities would change in the future. Either way, however, my bold prediction is not as helpful as I had thought. It appears, instead, that the pandemic is now one factor among many to take into account, rather than a force that pushes states to focus only on their most important objectives. The immediate task for Canada is to decide on a renewal of Operation IMPACT past the end of March 2021, when it is due to come to an end. Op IMPACT allows Canada to carry on its role in the anti-ISIS coalition and especially in the NATO mission in Iraq, given the alliance’s new expansion plans. Canada would certainly lose credibility within the alliance if it failed to at least renew a mission already under way. Under the lingering threat of the pandemic, however, the likelihood of major new capacity-building demands after this is probably not very high. At least, that is probably the hope in Ottawa—that Canada will not be asked to do very much more. The pandemic has created significant general strains on personnel. Operations LASER and VECTOR became a major focus of the Canadian Armed Forces, requiring a great deal of effort from the CAF: some 24,000 troops were available at different times for Op LASER in different capacities. As Stéphanie Bélanger’s study concluded, Op LASER had unique challenges for CAF personnel. Further, COVID-19 has set back training and recruitment, leaving the CAF short on troops. The Government of Canada may face even more difficult choices than usual between saying no to allies and stretching the CAF too thinly. Longer-Run Pandemic Consequences: Capacity-Building and COVID-19 in a Changing Geostrategic Context Analyzing the likely impacts of COVID-19 over the longer term requires broader assumptions. The following seem realistic: With the economic and social impact of COVID, there will be significant and increasing pressure to reduce military budgets, though these can be put off for some time through deficit financing because of low interest rates. Geopolitical competition between China, Russia and the United States will worsen. Unfortunately, these assumptions cannot yet yield a clear prediction about how other states will engage in capacity-building. Two scenarios are plausible, following from the first two assumptions. First, cuts may affect capacity-building operations disproportionately, because they may be seen as nonessential compared to other defence functions (on top of the public-health risks of putting members of different countries’ armed services in close proximity with each other). However, capacity-building operations may instead become more popular in the next few years, particularly if geostrategic rivalry escalates and American and other states’ interests clash in a variety of different countries. Concerns about defence budgets may actually spare capacity-building or even make it more attractive, just as limits to resources helped to lead to a shift from large-scale counterinsurgency missions to capacity-building in the 2000s and 2010s. Great powers pursuing geopolitical rivalries may look for ways to do so that are relatively inexpensive and do not engage their forces in costly, dangerous and potentially destabilizing direct interventions. Capacity-building with local proxies may be just such a policy tool, attractive to states like China, Russia, the United States, France and Britain as they seek to assert their relevance and influence in various countries. In that scenario, Canada’s allies are likely to call on Canada to do more capacity-building. This puts Canada in a difficult bind, as its own capacity for capacity-building will suffer from limited budgets in future years. Unfortunately, capacity-building for peacekeeping operations is likely to suffer from limited interest and contributions. As noted, prior to the pandemic, capacity-building was part of a broader north-south division of labour. However, it was also increasingly unclear that the north was holding up its end of what was already a deeply criticized arrangement: funding for UN peacekeeping operations had declined in the several years prior to the pandemic, as Linnéa Gelot notes. With severe budget constraints, there is the unfortunate likelihood that peace operations continue their decline. This may also impact the investments needed for peacekeeping training and capacity-building, notably to convert to the kind of long-term model that we have seen in capacity-building activities with well-established partners in other contexts. If one of the impacts of the global recession is to spur further hardship, inequality and social tension in developing countries, the problems that peacekeeping operations confront may worsen at the same time as they become less capable of responding to them. ## COVID-19 and the Future of Global Order URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/covid-19-and-the-future-of-global-order/ Modified: 2022-04-21 This report was produced by the Centre for Security and Crisis Governance (CRITIC), founded at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean in 2020. CRITIC produces and promotes state-of-the-art research that contributes to public policy debates and to the mission of RMC Saint-Jean. It is led by two members of the Strategic Analysis Network, Professor Bruno Charbonneau and Professor Chantal Lavallée, respectively Director and Deputy Director of CRITIC. Abstract COVID-19 and the Future of Global Order is the start of a conversation and a contribution to the debates about the meaning and significance of COVID-19 for global governance, geopolitics, national security, democracy, and crisis management. The collection of articles offers an overview of the multifaceted and multidimensional challenges that COVID-19 presents to global order. It seeks to make sense of both the pandemic and the analytical and public noise surrounding it. In the first section “COVID-19: a test for Liberal Democracies”, Christian Leuprecht, Wesley Cunningham, Marina Sharpe, Simon Hogue and Elisabeth Vallet highlight how the management of the pandemic has challenged international and national authorities and raised serious issues for democratic governance. The second section “COVID-19: States and Geopolitics” examines international responses: Bruno Charbonneau analyses the UN Security Council failure to take action, Chantal Lavallée discusses the challenges to the European Union, Pierre Jolicoeur and Anthony Seaboyer explore China and Russia’s propaganda, Nancy Teeple and Andrew McBride look into the Canada-US defence relationship, and Cédric Jourde considers the impact on African states and policy. The final section “COVID-19: towards new trends?” includes articles from Shahar Hameiri, Mulry Mondélice and Yann Breault who evaluate continuing or emerging trends in terms of the global economy, humanitarian action and management of the crisis. TABLE OF CONTENT INTRODUCTION COVID-19 and the Future of Global Order Bruno Charbonneau and Chantal Lavallée, Royal Military College Saint-Jean COVID-19: A TEST FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES The COVID-19 Test for Canadian Democracy Christian Leuprecht, Royal Military College COVID-19 and Continuity of Constitutional Government in Canada Wesley Cunningham, Colonel, Royal Canadian Air Force No Coming Back? The Lawfulness of Restrictions on Canadians Flying to Canada Marina Sharpe, Royal Military College Saint-Jean The Power of the "Little Brothers": Surveillance and the Future of Democracy Simon Hogue, Royal Military College Saint-Jean The United States, COVID-19 and Democratic Erosion Elisabeth Vallet, Royal Military College Saint-Jean COVID-19: STATES AND GEOPOLITICS The United Nations Security Council and the COVID-19 Test Bruno Charbonneau, Royal Military College Saint-Jean The European Union in Times of Crisis Chantal Lavallée, Royal Military College Saint-Jean The Weaponization of COVID-19: A Comparison Between China and Russia Pierre Jolicoeur and Anthony Seaboyer, Royal Military College COVID-19 and the Canada-US Defence Relationship Nancy Teeple, Simon Fraser University, and Andrew McBride, Captain, Ret'd. COVID-19 and Africa Cédric Jourde, University of Ottawa COVID-19: TOWARDS NEW TRENDS? Is this the End of Globalization? Shahar Hameiri, University of Queensland Humanitarian Action in Times of COVID-19: Between Reaffirmation of Multilateralism and Coherence Issues Mulry Mondélice, Royal Military College Saint-Jean From "Soft Power" to "Sharp Power" in Times of Pandemic Yann Breault, Royal Military College Saint-Jean     ## Credibility First: Rethinking Canadian Strategy in the Face of American Hostility URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/credibility-first-rethinking-canadian-strategy-in-the-face-of-american-hostility/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Introduction: The Missing Link in Canadian Strategy The Canadian strategic debate is monopolized by rearmament, military deterrence, and alliance management. These priorities are legitimate and this paper does not challenge them: rearmament is the foundation of any credible strategic posture, and NATO commitments bind Canada to obligations that condition its access to Western decision-making circles. But this equation is incomplete. It obscures the link that conditions the effectiveness of the whole: Canada's international credibility—that is, the perception its allies (and the broader international community) have of its reliability, the consistency of its foreign policy, and the legibility of its decision-making process. The central argument of this brief is as follows: Canada's multilateral credibility directly determines how the United States perceives it as an interlocutor, which in turn conditions the quality of its bilateral diplomacy and the effectiveness of its negotiating leverage. This causal chain is reversible, volatile, and relational. A Canada perceived as reliable and consistent by its allies carries more weight in Washington. A Canada whose decision-making process is illegible simultaneously weakens itself with its partners and with the hegemon it seeks to influence. The 2024–2026 sequence offers the most striking empirical demonstration of this dynamic since 2003. Strategic Credibility as a Composite Variable: Contribution, Reciprocity, Coherence, and Identity For a middle power like Canada, whose structural military dependence on the United States is irreducible in the short term, international credibility constitutes the central strategic resource. The literature on status-seeking underscores that international recognition rests on social and intersubjective dynamics, in which diplomatic interactions and institutional participation play a central role. Within this framework, work on middle powers shows that states like Canada have historically compensated for their material limitations through niche diplomacy strategies grounded in multilateralism and mediation. Finally, the normative power approach highlights certain actors' capacity to influence international norms through the diffusion of specific values and practices. Analysis of the NATO Libya campaign confirmed this logic operationally: Canadian influence within NATO in 2011 was directly proportional to the consistency and visibility of its contribution, independent of its material power. These frameworks are necessary but insufficient to account for what distinguishes a normative posture with deterrence from one without. To complete the analysis, strategic credibility must be decomposed into three conditions that are individually necessary but insufficient, whose combination produces the indirect deterrence characteristic of a middle power. The first condition is active contribution: exerting influence through added value where great powers are absent, failing, or illegitimate. This is the instrumental dimension of credibility. To exist in other actors' strategic calculations, one must be present and useful in the spaces that great powers neglect. Contribution warfare designates this logic: not engaging merely to be visible but engaging to be indispensable—which conditions access to decision-making spaces and the capacity to influence the norms produced therein. The second condition is explicit reciprocity: signaling that certain demands carry costs and that certain positions will not be abandoned under pressure. Without this dimension, contribution amounts to cooperation rather than deterrence. As the strategic analysis of commitments shows, a declaration that entails no anticipated cost does not alter an adversary's calculations, since it can be abandoned without consequence. Conversely, a commitment becomes credible when the cost of its violation is perceived as real by the interlocutor. For a middle power confronting a coercive power, this explicit reciprocity is the condition that transforms contribution into indirect deterrence. The third condition is procedural coherence: the capacity to maintain stable, coordinated positions over time and under pressure. It concerns the internal construction of foreign and defence policy—notably coordination between the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defence—as well as the legibility of external communication. Without procedural coherence, contribution becomes inconsistent and reciprocity becomes unpredictable, which amounts, in other actors' calculations, to an effective absence of credibility. The three preceding conditions belong to a reputational strategic perspective: credibility as a tool for maintaining security and cooperative interests. But reputation also operates at a second, constitutive level: decision-makers responsible for foreign policy are concerned with their self-image and seek to avoid what the literature terms identity insecurity. This dimension explains why procedural incoherence results not only from organizational failures but from a tension between the proclaimed posture and the real constraints of the situation: decision-makers oscillate when their self-image enters into contradiction with the demands of the moment. Moreover, reputational concerns are even more determinative in deliberations when the level of cohesion within the decision-making group is high. This observation enriches the third condition by giving it a precise causal foundation: procedural coherence depends not only on formal coordination between institutions but on the identity cohesion of the group composed of the Prime Minister and his or her chief advisers—that is, their capacity to share a common resolution of the tension between the proclaimed posture and conjunctural constraints. The central causal chain of this paper can be formulated as follows: active contribution combined with explicit reciprocity and procedural coherence anchored in the identity cohesion of the decision-making group produces strategic credibility. This credibility generates predictability, which integrates Canada into its allies' calculations as a reliable actor. This integration constitutes Canada's negotiating lever in the face of American coercion, and functions as a form of indirect deterrence. The three conditions are analytically independent, and their absence produces distinct failures: a state that contributes without reciprocity is exploitable; a state that signals reciprocity without procedural coherence is unpredictable; a state whose decision-making group lacks identity cohesion will produce incoherence even with sound strategic intentions. The Causal Chain Put to the Test A Posture Without Deterrence To understand why the Trudeau-Trump sequence produced the results it did, one must identify which of the three conditions was absent. Elected in 2015 promising a return to liberal internationalism after a decade of Conservative government, Trudeau declared on the night of his victory "Canada is back." His foreign policy rested on a structurally fragile premise: cooperation as an end in itself, without any logic of reciprocity or cost imposed on actors who crossed lines. Trudeau had reportedly told NATO allies that Canada would never meet the 2% GDP defence target—a confidence revealed in April 2023 via Pentagon documents leaked to the Washington Post, eight years after his election, a belated but public admission of a posture without deterrence. The promise of "up to" 600 soldiers for UN peacekeeping missions—a deliberately capped formulation that other governments avoided—translated into a peak deployment of approximately 200 personnel in Mali for one year (2018–2019), roughly one-third of the announced ceiling, before falling back to marginal levels. Across the entire Trudeau mandate, the average monthly contribution in uniformed personnel was 78—exactly half that of the Harper government. The gap between the rhetoric of re-engagement and the effective contributions was real and documented, but it resulted as much from institutional constraints—priority given to NATO and Latvia, post-Afghanistan caution, UN missions that had become dangerous—as from a lack of political will. The resulting perception was nonetheless structural: Canada participated in institutions without paying the price. In Schelling's terms, its posture amounted to cheap talk—declarations without mechanisms of reciprocity and without a credible signal of resistance. For Trump, who operates on a transactional logic of strength, an interlocutor whose strategy rests on norms and goodwill without counterpart constitutes a structurally accessible target. On the constitutive level, Canada's progressive self-image was incompatible with the logic of reciprocity that the relationship with Trump required, and this unresolved tension translated into an inability to hold costly positions. American interference and its sovereign implications. This vulnerability was exploited with a precision rarely deployed against other allies. Beyond the tariff threats and annexation rhetoric, the Trump administration tolerated and encouraged direct interference in Canada's constitutional cohesion. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent publicly declared that Alberta would be a natural partner for the United States, while State Department officials met repeatedly with representatives of the Alberta Prosperity Project. The Walrus documented how this interference raised characterizations as grave as treason and sedition in public debate and drew a parallel with Russia's 2014 destabilization of the Donbas. Senator Paula Simons articulated the concern directly: "What I'm most worried about now is foreign interference from the United States." It was precisely because the Trudeau posture had built neither reciprocity nor procedural coherence that this exploitation was possible. The absence of credible commitment left Canada vulnerable to coercion targeting its constitutional cohesion itself. Carney and Reconstruction: Reciprocity as a Conceptual Break What Justin Trudeau's successor, Mark Carney, introduced that his predecessor had not was the second missing condition: a logic of explicit reciprocity. The formula delivered at the White House in May 2025 ("as you know from real estate, there are some places that are never for sale") is not a normative declaration: it is a cost signal in the Schelling sense. It means that certain demands have a price and that certain positions will not be abandoned. The signal was received: Trump modified his tone and declared having great respect for the new Prime Minister. This change does not mean that American pressure disappeared—Trump continued to revisit the 51st state rhetoric on several occasions, and Carney did not respond systematically. It was the passage from cheap talk to credible commitment that altered the terms of the asymmetric relationship. On the constitutive level, Carney had also resolved the identity tension that Trudeau had not managed: his profile as an international economist allowed him to simultaneously embody the image of an autonomous middle-power leader and a serious interlocutor for Washington, without these two identities entering into contradiction. A very recent event illustrates the dynamics of this mechanism in its symbolic dimension. On April 6, 2026, excerpts from a forthcoming book by British royal biographer Robert Hardman revealed that Trump had privately acknowledged the improbability of annexing Canada: "I suppose Canadians have got 200 years of history and all that, 'Oh, Canada' thing. You can't deal with that in three-and-a-half years. I guess it's not going to happen." This retreat, attributed by Hardman to Trump's respect for King Charles III and the Canadian monarchy, illustrates the mechanism in reverse: what altered Trump's calculations was not Canadian military capacity but a status signal—sovereign identity, history, the Crown. This is structural credibility. It should be noted, however, that this retreat is based on a conjunctural feasibility calculation ("three-and-a-half years") and not on a durable modification of American intentions. Carney also reconstituted the first condition by undertaking active multilateral diplomacy: a strategic partnership with China (21 agreements, first visit since 2017, reduction of tariffs on canola, objective of increasing exports by 50% by 2030); a strategic partnership with India (a $2.6 billion Cameco agreement, first bilateral visit since 2018, CEPA negotiations); a defence and security partnership with the European Union, integration into the SAFE program, 12 agreements across four continents in one year. The Davos speech of January 20, 2026 synthesizes this strategy: ad hoc coalitions by issue, a network of multilateral connections, an active middle-power posture. CIVICUS noted, however, that the approach ignored Global South voices—a genuine programmatic limitation on the strategy's reach. Furthermore, Carney's diplomatic proactivity presents a limitation that official Canadian communications reveal directly. The Prime Minister's Office uses the same term 'strategic partnership' to describe the relationship with China—a systemic competitor diplomatically supporting Russia—as it does for Qatar or South Korea, with which Canada maintains real defence agreements based on shared values. This identical designation for fundamentally incompatible relationships is not a formulation problem: it signals an absence of hierarchy among priorities in official language, which undermines the legibility of the Canadian posture and produces exactly the kind of ambiguity that the third condition seeks to avoid. March 2026: The Failure of the Third Condition The Iran crisis reveals that while Carney has rebuilt the first two conditions, the third remains the weak link. Four positions succeeded one another within a single week: initial support for the strikes; support with regret, expressed from Australia; an inability to categorically exclude military participation; then an affirmation that Canada would never participate in the offensive. These reversals were compounded by a failure of coordination: Minister Anand, speaking from New Delhi, called on all parties to respect the rules of international engagement—a signal incompatible with the Prime Minister's initial support. Experts characterized the position as a maze of contradictions, and Al Jazeera rendered the following verdict: "when Washington whistles, Ottawa salutes." In analytical terms, the absence of procedural coherence neutralized the other two conditions: the active contribution and the reciprocity signaled at Davos became illegible because the decision-making process that was meant to sustain them was failing. On the constitutive level, the diverging signals between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of National Defence reflect an insufficient degree of identity cohesion within the decision-making group when faced with a high-intensity crisis: each managed differently the tension between the image of autonomous middle power built at Davos and the constraints imposed by American pressure, without a collective resolution of that tension. The oscillating positions that result are the observable symptom of an unresolved identity insecurity at the cabinet level. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain refused to participate in the Trump administration's offensive action, maintaining a distinct position grounded in international law without breaking their alliances. This is precisely the posture that Carney had called for building at Davos. Canada had the institutional relationships to adopt a similar position. Failing to do so constitutes a cheap talk signal that simultaneously undermines reciprocity and multilateral credibility. It would, however, be analytically inaccurate to claim that this episode erased the entirety of the capital accumulated. The Iran crisis is far too recent to draw conclusions from. The diversified partnerships, Carney's personal credibility, and the international recognition of the Davos speech are not annulled by a sequence of decisional failure. What March 2026 reveals is the volatility of the third condition and the risk of recurrence whenever the identity cohesion of the decision-making group is put to the test of a high-intensity crisis. Strategic Implications: Consolidating the Three Conditions The preceding analysis generates recommendations organized around the three conditions of strategic credibility. Consolidating active contribution requires maintaining and deepening the diplomatic proactivity undertaken since 2025 but also investing structurally in spaces that remain vacant. Canada is the only G7 country without a permanent embassy in Baghdad; the funding for its Middle East Strategy expired in April 2025; and Oman occupied the mediating niche that Canada could have claimed during the Iran crisis. The $37 million in humanitarian aid for Lebanon announced in March 2026 illustrates a capacity for rapid mobilization but does not constitute a structural presence. The Asia Pacific Foundation notes that Indo-Pacific partnerships remain fragile as long as commitments are not consolidated over time. Engaging to be indispensable—this is the logic of contribution warfare that transforms presence into a genuine strategic lever. Maintaining explicit reciprocity means making the logic of cost a permanent grammar of foreign policy and not merely an attribute of the sitting Prime Minister. This requires that rearmament be accompanied by a clear doctrine on the conditions of Canadian participation in operations and coalitions, so that partners and adversaries can anticipate Canadian positions and integrate them into their calculations. Brookings notes that Carney seeks to negotiate from a position of strength, but that position assumes commitments are honored when they carry a cost—something March 2026 did not confirm. Restoring procedural coherence is the most urgent recommendation, and it implies both dimensions identified in this framework. On the organizational level, coordination between the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of National Defence must be strengthened so that Canadian positions are produced in a unified manner before being communicated. On the constitutive level, the decision-making group must share a common resolution of the tension between the proclaimed posture and structural constraints, so that American pressure does not produce observable oscillations among cabinet members. What Trudeau had as a structural defect—a posture without reciprocity—Carney risks reproducing in another form: a posture of reciprocity without the identity cohesion of the decision-making group. In both cases, the observable result is the same: a Canada that pressure can reduce to absolute loyalty. Rearmament is necessary and constitutes the foundation of any credible strategic posture. But its effectiveness is conditioned by the political credibility that gives it meaning. A Canada that rearms without coordinating its foreign policy, that delivers principled speeches without upholding them under pressure, and that aspires to middle-power coalitions without paying their cost, will not obtain from its increased military capabilities a lever proportional to the investment made. Credibility first—because it is credibility that transforms power into influence, and influence into genuine strategic autonomy for a middle power. Image Credit: CC BY 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons. ## Cyberspace: The New Battleground URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/cyberspace-the-new-battleground/ Modified: 2022-06-30 > Cyberspace is seen as a major element of the new world order. Cyber is a space that is created by global interconnection, such as a new... note:  French language video with English subtitles. Two cyber attacks targeted Ukraine in mid-January. Ukraine and its Western allies have repeatedly accused Moscow of carrying out cyber attacks against their sites and infrastructure, which Russia denies. In the past, Moscow has used cyber weapons to corner its neighbour or to prepare for military intervention. A computer virus disguised as ransomware has been detected by Microsoft. Microsoft's discovery of the cyberattack also comes a day after about 70 websites of Ukrainian institutions - such as the Foreign Ministry and the Defence and Security Council - were attacked. Cyberspace is seen as a major element of the new world order. Cyber is a space that is created by global interconnection, such as a new virtual environment. This definition was adopted by France in the second White Paper of 2012, which considers cyberspace as an environment like the land or the sea, in which strategic operations occur that are not only military or of a strategic, diplomatic and cultural nature. This new situation also changes the way of understanding action in cyberspace by considering it as a strategic space like the others (land, sea, air and outer space). Moderator: -Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, Fellow and Senior Advisor in Communications and Partnerships at CÉRIUM Speakers: -Alix Desforges: Post-doctoral researcher at GEODE since September 2018. -Stéphane Taillat: Lecturer at the IFG LAB. He is also deputy director of the specialised master's degree "Operations and Crisis Management in Cybersecurity" at Saint-Cyr. ## Defending a Country that Doesn’t Exist with a Military that Isn’t Allowed: Japan-Taiwan Relations and Potential Defense Role URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/defending-a-country-that-doesnt-exist-with-a-military-that-isnt-allowed/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This paper examines Japanese-Taiwanese relations and argues that Japan is in fact moving toward an implicit obligation to assist in the... Is war over Taiwan coming? Yes, possibly within five years. Recent statements by U.S. President Biden have reinforced an implicit U.S. security guarantee for the self-governing island democracy, such that there is little doubt that the USA will seek to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. The American commitment is real, but the USA cannot defend Taiwan alone.  For that, it needs its allies to help defend, and no ally is more important for that than Japan. This paper will examine Japanese-Taiwanese relations and argue that Japan is in fact moving toward an implicit obligation to assist in the defense of Taiwan against a Chinese attack, despite several factors that might complicate that assurance. The paper will examine the rise of China and its determination to force a unification with Taiwan, by coercion or force if necessary. Then it will examine the evolution of Japanese diplomatic and defense policy toward Taiwan in recent years.  But cautions are necessary; there are several factors that might cause Japan to waver in its implicit obligation or to be less effective than it could be. China’s Ambition Taiwan remains the elusive piece of China’s reunification. The strategy of enticing Taiwan into China’s orbit peaked in the 1990s when China was on its best behavior and sought to use the “One Country, Two Systems” policy as a way of bringing Taiwan into some sort of loose (but legal) association.  Hong Kong was supposed to be the demonstration test case of this after July 1, 1997.  Twenty years later, the mainland crackdown on civil liberties and democracy in Hong Kong makes it clear that China is systemically incapable of tolerating political pluralism and democracy. U.S. assessments of Chinese military capabilities last year projected a six-year horizon within which China will be ready to take military action. Xi Jinping in particular has taken on reunification as his grand achievement in his likely third term as head of the Communist Party. Xi needs a great achievement to justify his continuing leadership, if only to rank himself with Mao Zedong in Chinese history. But time is working against Xi in two respects: Taiwan’s public feels less and less Chinese. Second, China’s slowing economic and demographic growth, the unsustainable “zero Covid” policy, and the problems of debt, environmental damage, and corruption of the Belt and Road Initiative have begun to weigh on that grandiose vision as well.  All of this amounts to a hard domestic political reality: Xi is running out of great things to achieve. But Taiwan would be that achievement; not even Mao obtained it. Assuming the 20th National Party Congress reappoints Xi as its top leader in fall 2022, a five-year clock on Taiwan would start ticking. The Japan Self-Defense Force: The Military That Isn’t Allowed Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese constitution – written by the American Occupation authorities – explicitly prohibits Japan from having a military. Three years later, the Americans regretted that clause and created the National Police Reserve and the National Safety Agency, the precursors to the Self Defense Forces (SDF) and the Ministry of Defense. During the Cold War, American protection helped Japan, but American pressure to increase its defense contributions were constant.  Although the political opposition steadfastly opposed any change to Article 9 or any increase in SDF capabilities, the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) gradually enacted changes.  One of the most important occurred in 2015 when Japan expanded its definition of self-defense to include other countries:  “When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger […].” Japan’s SDF has already been involved in a variety of overseas activities short of combat.  It has made a number of contributions to UN PKOs. After the 9/11 attacks in the USA, Maritime SDF units operated in the Indian Ocean from 2001 to 2010, and anti-piracy patrols continue in the Indian Ocean. In 2004, the Koizumi government sent a battalion of non-combatant troops to Iraq at the American request, the “Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group,” which lasted five years. In contrast to the stagnation in the late 1990s to the 2013 period, Japan has since increased its defense spending by over 18% in constant dollar terms and over 24% in yen terms.  According to the Stockholm Institute of International Peace Research (SIPRI) it is $54.1 billion/year, comparable to Germany and France, and more than South Korea, Australia and Canada.  It has a modern fleet of non-nuclear submarines, destroyers, excellent anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and a modern Air Self-Defense Force as well. Although there are several areas in which the SDF needs to improve, the naval assets in the region show that Japan has substantial forces to supplement the USA. Source: IISS The Military Balance 2022. Perhaps most important, Japan is in the key position to cooperate with the United States over Taiwan: it hosts U.S. forces in Okinawa, as well as its own, with critical air and sea ports near the potential scene of conflict. Compared to China’s military spending, however, neither Taiwan nor Japan comes close. Source: SIPRI, 2022. Japan’s Changing Relations with a Country That Doesn’t Exist Japan severed its diplomatic ties with Taipei in September 1972 but maintained an unofficial office there which functioned as an embassy in all but name. Economic and social ties between Japan and Taiwan remained very good. Taiwanese polled report good feelings toward Japan, and the historical legacies that burden Japan’s relations with Korea, China and the Philippines are far less pronounced in Taiwan. Both Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s first directly elected president, and Tsai Ing-wen, its current president, have spoken favorably of Japan, and Tsai has a Japanese-language Twitter feed with 1.4 million followers. Japan’s relations with China have long been torn between the more bellicose “hawks” and the conciliatory “doves” in the ruling LDP.  Among the latter had been Fumio Kishida. After his election as Prime Minister in October 2021, however, most analysts see Kishida as turning into a hawk and the doves disappearing. The LDP established a “Taiwan Policy Project Team” in early 2021 for talks between legislators (not government officials) in foreign policy and defense areas. Rumors of a “Japan Taiwan Relations Act” patterned after the 1979 American law authorizing defensive arms sales to Taiwan, however, seem unlikely. By 2021, concerns about the situation in the Taiwan Strait was becoming much more “mainstream” in Japanese politics: “[…] worsening frictions across the Taiwan Strait throughout 2021 did focus Japanese media, politicians, and policymakers on the risks and potential impact on Japan of a possible conflict – perhaps to an unprecedented degree.” The shift toward a more forward thinking about Taiwan is at least partly attributed to the increased willingness of American and European states to engage with Taiwan. Japan also recognizes the common interests of the two countries: “[…] Japan now actively seeks to promote closer defense ties with liberal and democratic states in Asia as an act of strategy. Within this framework, Taiwan is a top candidate for closer relations as a fellow island democracy close with the United States and facing threats from China.” Japan’s growing resolve over Taiwan was reinforced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Japan reacted quickly and decisively against the Russian Federation, imposing sanctions along with the USA and European Union, freezing Russian assets held in Tokyo, cutting off SWIFT banking access, and freezing Russian officials’ assets as well. As Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi stated, “If the international community somehow allows or condones Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, it might send a wrong message that such actions can be tolerated in other parts of the world, including the Indo-Pacific. […] Ukraine may be East Asia tomorrow.” Policy Recommendations It is crucial to maintain and increase NATO visits and exercises in the Indo-Pacific, and further institutionalize them; China needs to see a western alliance that can watch both European and Indo-Pacific theaters simultaneously. Canada as a NATO member and a Pacific power has a special responsibility in this respect. China’s recent harassment of RCAF aircraft is meant to intimidate Canada. S. allies need to think realistically about 5-year maximum time frame and take steps accordingly. Fortunately, Ukraine has created conditions for serious policy change in Japan. Western allies need to work through joint responses “just short of war” scenarios, such as a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan masquerading as a “quarantine.” Explore strategy and arms purchase coordination with Taiwan and Japan. U.S. leaders are beginning to think seriously about a war on Taiwan, and it would be crucial to have a sense of that government’s strategy and include Japan and other allies in the consideration. Keep the “Country that Doesn’t Exist” and “Military that Isn’t Allowed” Policies. Pushing Japan to create its own Taiwan Relations Act or abolishing Article 9 carries political costs and diplomatic risks for little change in real policy.   Steven F. Jackson is professor of political science at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. After receiving his bachelor’s degree in International Relations at Stanford University in 1981, he taught English in Xi’an China from 1981 to 1983. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan and joined the faculty at Indiana University of Pennsylvania in 1994. He is author of China’s Regional Relations in Comparative Perspective (Routledge 2018), as well as numerous chapters and articles on the international relations of East Asia.  ## Democratic Resilience in the Face of the Authoritarian Groundswell URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/democratic-resilience-in-the-face-of-the-authoritarian-groundswell/ Modified: 2023-01-09 > Democratic Resilience in the Face of the Authoritarian Groundswell. Only through this refusal of relativism can liberal democracies... The prophecy for the end of history and the inevitable triumph of the democratic model is now facing a significant challenge, as the spectre of neo-authoritarianism now haunts regimes that political thinkers considered unshakeable. Not only the events on Capitol Hill have forcefully and dramatically confirmed the decline of a hegemon, but they also have above all demonstrated that the normative engine of democracy is no longer infallible and that the world certainly no longer needs American tutelage. The erosion of democracy affects all regional spaces. From India, the most populous democracy with the rise of Hindu nationalism, to the inexorable advance of populism in Eastern Europe (such as Poland and Hungary) or the authoritarian drift shown by President Erdogan in Turkey, this profound paradigm shift is tending to unravel the very foundations of the democratic brand. The threats posed by the constitution of an illiberal common front or the multiplication of offensives by state actors who do not seem to respect the rules that govern the international order are legion. They should push liberal democracies to develop a global strategy to strengthen multilateral cooperation to cure the ills of democracy and thus recover from the announced fall. Therefore, to avoid an interruption of history through erroneous predictions, the community of democracies must develop global means of resistance to enhance democratic resilience and proactive offensive strategies against those regimes that thrive on the soil of our own political contradictions and dissensions. The Irrationality of the Free World and Democratic Regression In this century, initially hailed as the century of unstoppable fervour for democratization, the evidence is clear: the least bad of all systems is beginning to show signs of weakness. With hindsight, only half of the world's population lived in a democracy in 2021. While the global pandemic and the set of restrictions on individual freedoms, it underpins are sometimes instrumental in suppressing human rights, they are no less the catalysts of a long trend of regression. Coups and unconstitutional seizures of power have increased significantly, while some bastions of this model, such as the United States and France, have become failing democracies. A diagnosis of this democratic deficit is necessary, both internally and externally. Disenchantment with democracy and the devaluation of politics seem to prevail. Confined to a minimal role, the citizen's trust in the representative system is gradually eroding. Another component is that these liberal democracies now seem to be enslaved by an exacerbated capitalism. Democracy and capitalism, originally presented as a virtuous couple, have seemed to continuously foster the growth of global inequality in the past forty years. Yet at the same time, the welfare state model that policy-makers have erected as a bulwark seems incapable of curbing deepening disparities. The scrutiny is then cast on technocratic elites perceived as ineffective since the system seems to change "leaders but not policies.” The lack of concrete impact of the vote on the daily life of voters gives rise to popular frustration and a stalling of electoral processes that are expressed through the ballot box. The ample abstention is not the only symptom. While the confrontation of ideas is becoming more and more complex, the breakdown of centrism induces a political polarization – accelerated by the sensationalist algorithms of information technologies – that is gangrenous in Western societies. The electorate seems condemned to choose between disconnected technocrats who helplessly observe their own decay and angry entrepreneurs who capitalize on empty slogans to resonate with the weariness of citizens. On the international scene, Western arrogance, the genesis of its decline, has dealt a definite blow to the democracy brand. After having brought down the Soviet world without bearing arms, the West, in the grip of euphoria, has set itself the goal of exporting its democratic model. While the intention is laudable, promoting democracy through foreign interference and missiles seems inconceivable. Driven by a messianic destiny, Western leaders have lent themselves to the exercise. Between the use of force against Milosevic in Bosnia in 1995, the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya in 2011, the abuses committed by the United States at Abu Ghraib prison during the second Gulf War; the use of power to promote regime change is a bitter failure. Totally disconnected from the realities on the ground, the West has tried to impose democracy, but has fuelled war and thwarted peace. If liberal interventionism is in decline, the hypocrisy of the free world seems to have replaced it. When France shows a certain complacency towards the new Chadian junta that emerged from an unconstitutional seizure of power, but disavows the new Malian authorities that emerged from a putsch, or when the United States takes the lead in guaranteeing Taiwan's independence, but takes a backseat to Israel's colonization process on Palestinian territory, the political message is blurred. On the ideological level, while the community of democracies must be irreproachable, Western compromise in the face of authoritarian regimes renders illegitimate the discourse on the universality of values. This strategy of irrationality dictated by divergent strategic interests offers additional levers to assert the narrative of Western imperialism and consecrate the appeal of authoritarian regimes. The Irrepressible Appeal of Authoritarianism Undermined from within, the democratic West is struggling to grasp the shift in the centrality of the world. This profound paradigm shift instills an authoritarian temptation. The conceptual vagueness around neo-authoritarianism and populism illustrates the hybridity of these illiberal variants. Nevertheless, they often use the same resources to assert themselves as radical but credible alternatives. The crisis of identity in the Western world is a reality, but it is no less instrumentalized by the detractors of democracy in order to emphasize a new doxa. From nationalism to the rejection of multilateralism and progress, the large family of populists draws on a repertoire of values centered on the return to tradition to fight against what they denounce as Western decadence. The foundations of this anti-system discourse come from this revanchist resistance against the ruling elites allegedly corrupt and at the service of the foreigner (immigration, vassalization towards foreign powers and globalized finance). The emergence of “Strongmen” who would be the standard-bearers of sovereignty and of the real people abandoned by globalization. The sacralization of the ballot box and the capacity to empty democracy of its substance through free elections (or simulacrum of free elections) are symptomatic of the permeability of our regimes. While this deleterious phenomenon seemed inconceivable, these hybrid regimes accommodate the absence of guarantees for fundamental rights. If the denaturation of the democratic ideal was a camouflaged strategy, it is now exercised in the eyes of all, following the example of Victor Orbàn, who claims to be an illiberal democracy. The comparative performance of forms of governance shows that in the context of the health crisis, effective policies to contain the pandemic were neither populist, nor authoritarian, nor liberal. However, the ability to overcome legal impossibility by breaking the rules of law provides attractive policy opportunities for anti-democratic regimes. By silencing or eliminating bureaucratic rules, safeguards and institutions of checks and balances, illiberal democracies gain flexibility and unlock the paralysis of public action to promote competitive authoritarianism. Populism then becomes a kind of launching pad for the authoritarian drift. With different degrees of alienation, an insidious shift takes place between liberal democracy, illiberal democracy and authoritarian regimes with a spectrum as wide as there are combinations. By playing with the limits of the democratic game, Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro or Erdogan legitimize the neo-authoritarian powers exercised by fossilized dictatorships and in fact remove the simplifying dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism. It goes without saying that in the context of power competition, the threats to democracy are symptomatic of this trend reversal. Awareness of this new political order and the complex nature of the neo-authoritarianisms that have adapted to the times is imperative. Defining these regimes will allow us to correctly qualify the abuses/crimes that they commit to eventually deny them the establishment of an alternative repressive regime. Asymmetric Competition: Working in an International Order Where the Rules are Breaking Down The capitalization of efforts to deprive people of power allows the emergence of an aggressive foreign policy with the mobilization of the entire state apparatus. From then on, the development of a transnational repression against democracies is exercised with unparalleled capacities of nuisance. These hybrid forms of governance combine conventional channels to assert their interests as well as authoritarian tactics outside international law that escape the West. Vilifying authoritarian regimes no longer seems sufficient to contain their incursion on the international scene. China's offensive to obtain high-level positions in international institutions is a clear demonstration of this strategy of influence to orient the system towards its interests. Its growing international involvement should be seen in the context of its own initiatives (such as the Belt and Road project, as well as extensive international infrastructure financing). The de-Westernization of the world necessarily requires a rethinking of the international order, and these regimes seem to be fully aware of this. As a collateral victim of the U.S. withdrawal, the WHO has become the preferred forum for Russia, China and North Korea to express the superiority of their model during the health crisis. Moreover, Beijing is using its economic weight, its growing soft power and its ability to manipulate information to export its model to fragile democracies. While this strategy has its limits, mainland China has managed to further isolate Taiwan on the international stage. Massive investments and dependency links in Africa have tipped the balance in Beijing's favour, with only two African countries now recognizing Taipei, compared to thirteen in 1995. Africa is experiencing an authoritarian backlash and Beijing is selling its model of authoritarian governance to Africa as democracy recedes. Beyond the diplomatic successes, the tricks of force are multiplying. Between the assassination of Jamal Kashoggi, the Skripal affair, the arrest of a political opponent with a false bomb threat in a plane fomented by Alexander Lukashenko; dissidents of authoritarian regimes have a hard time. Sanctuaries for their safety are crumbling in the face of this pattern of international repression aimed at undermining democracy and guarding against criticism. Since 2014, approximately 600 cross-border authoritarian attacks have been recorded. It is imperative for the West to end this strategy of international harassment. For this, a stronger commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is needed. Active support and protection of dissidents on the ground will sow the seeds of opposition with a destabilizing effect on these regimes as effective as the ongoing attacks on democracy. This pattern of intimidation also passes through the new platform of information technology. Cyberattacks, foreign interference and digital disinformation are part of the practice of influence that is in Russia's DNA, for example. Beyond marginalizing individuals, this destabilization strategy is part of the asymmetric military responses of hybrid warfare. The architecture of the international order limits the room for manoeuvre of democracies, which are therefore lagging in these new areas of unconventional conflict. While keeping its democratic nature, the community of democracies must develop an enhanced preventative measure with defensive and offensive means to fight in the framework of the informational war. Finally, the aggressive strategic revival of these alternative forms of governance is confirmed by the Chinese giant, which seems to have emerged from its period of hibernation, as the offensive of these warrior wolves attests. In the race for hegemony, it illustrates that adherence to democratic values is no longer necessary to compete for the position of world leader. As for Russia, it is now directly attacking democracy in its former homeland to neutralize the expansion of a model that weakens it. The ideological struggle is thus accompanied by much more concrete military incursions and the community of democracies is cornered in the face of this major strategic awakening. In the UN forum, during the vote on the resolution against the war in Ukraine, India, China, as well as many African states, abstained. This neutrality and this moderate democratic impulse are linked to the desire not to offend Russia, with which these states maintain good relations that can go as far as friendship. If this phenomenon is the result, for example, of Russian levers of influence in Africa, lines of convergence are emerging between regimes that are struggling to deepen their democratization process. Towards the Constitution of an Illiberal Common Front Beijing is comfortably observing the outcome of the war on the old continent as a life-size test of the Western reaction to its own territorial ambitions. Nevertheless, China is developing an ambiguous position by taking up the Kremlin's account of the special military operation deployed in Ukraine. If this illiberal quasi-alliance is less concrete, the new strategic impetus given by the Russian invasion will work in Joe Biden's favour for the constitution of an alliance of democracies, even if his summit for democracy lacked ambition. The logic of blocs seems to be resurfacing and this strategic reversal could confirm the renewal of the bipolarization of the international arena. Declarations of support for China's anti-terrorist policy against the Uighur minorities foreshadowed the fault lines between the liberal West and an emerging illiberal common front. The West rose to denounce cultural genocide while Beijing, leader of an anti-democratic ideal, retorted by uniting 46 countries to support its repressive policies in Xianjang. Beyond the war of influence, this rapprochement went even further during the war in Syria. When the transatlantic community was procrastinating on overthrowing Bashar al-Assad, his survival was made possible thanks to Moscow and Tehran, the financial backers of a Syrian regime on life support. The Damascus-Moscow-Tehran axis of resistance has dealt a decisive blow to Western influence and strategy in the Levant. Between the simple convergence of short-term interests and the formation of a permanent alliance, the rejection of the West is generating partnerships. However, if Bashar al-Assad expressed his support for the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the meeting between the two counterparts evokes more a rescue of the illusion of Syrian sovereignty. Dictator Assad's dependence on Vladimir Putin embodies these asymmetrical power relations that are not limited to the Syrian case. Strengthening the Alliance of Democracies to Undermine the Colossus with Feet of Illiberal Clay Hand in hand during the Olympic truce, the solidity of the "unlimited" friendship between Moscow and Beijing is now being put to the test. The neutrality of China's facade is beginning to show its limits. Beijing is wavering between saving the principle of non-interference, the pillar of its foreign policy, and strategically aligning itself with Russia in their common opposition to Western liberal democracies. In this context, the joint statement denouncing NATO's enlargement policy could have led to more active support from Beijing towards Moscow. Sino-Russian relations are fed by the American hardening towards them and the "pariatization" of the Kremlin leads it to turn towards Beijing. The request for military assistance takes the form of a call for help rather than a simple rapprochement. Anxious to restore its status as a political heavyweight, Moscow is now struggling not to appear as Beijing's vassal. Since China's economic power is not in the same category as Russia's, the formation of an alliance could lead Beijing to join Moscow in its banishment from the international scene. The axis of convenance further describes these fragile relations. For fear of being marginalized, these unbreakable bonds of friendship between the illiberal powers are more like a cascade of subservience. Solidarity between these states is hampered by the fragility of its foundations, as the renewed tensions between Ankara and Moscow attest. The "new axis of evil" disintegrates when the strategic interests of its members diverge. On the other side of the prism, in addition to the lack of consultation and the strategic divergences of the Western clan, the new global conflict situation is pushing the community of democracies to strengthen its cohesion and deepen cooperation in the fight against the offensive of authoritarianism. As anti-democratic regimes continue to dictate the international agenda, the formation of an alliance of democracies will unite the liberal West against powers that are struggling to do so. This will make it possible to overcome the paralysis of the Security Council, to curb the authoritarian contagion and to stem the incursion of these regimes into the international order that they distort. It will be a matter of not abandoning the states that fall into their lap by strengthening cooperation and always maintaining dialogue. This means not reproducing what French diplomacy did with the new Malian junta. Finally, the capacity building of such a partnership must necessarily take the form of a whole-of-government approach that does not necessarily involve direct confrontation with its adversaries. The Foundations of a Community of Democracies to Fight Against Systemic Rivals The United States assumed the role of leader of the free world until the Trump parenthesis. However, far from being confined to a single term, Trumpism could outlast him and become a permanent fixture in the American political spectrum. By reviving the idea of "power by example," Biden, the new tenant of the White House could well restore the democratic image of the world's leading power. Nevertheless, this new inconsistency in leadership raises the question of who will take on the role of champion of democracy when authoritarian movements are becoming more entrenched in the political arena. The salutary civic awakening in France and the United States to block the extremes and the populists has been salutary, but the democratic barrier is thin and a pernicious slide towards authoritarianism is fast approaching. Democratic leaders at the regional level should be valued for providing democratic shelter in the event of a state's shift to more authoritarian forms of governance. Since "democracy is best promoted collectively," with this new decentralized democratic leadership that will emerge, the transnational circulation of democratic arrangements and political regulation will be more diffused and secure. The spearheads of the European Union, France, and Germany could take on this role despite their differences on the future of Europe. As for Canada, it could be the solution to a North American continent fractured by a worrying state of American democracy.  Finally, islands of democracy such as Ghana, Costa Rica or South Korea could constitute more inspiring references of political stability for their respective regional areas. The West will find itself relieved of its self-inflicted and unfulfilled burden of exporting democracy. This hot take strives to deconstruct the antagonism between democracy and authoritarianism. The new community of democracies will also need to be flexible in applying an open-door policy. By being inclusive, this initiative will welcome efforts to continue ongoing democratization processes without offering a veneer of democratic legitimacy to those who do not deserve it. In some alliances, such as NATO, this entry policy has shown its limits, particularly regarding the relevance of the Ukrainian candidacy. To avoid such political dissensions among its members, discipline will be necessary to avoid altering the democratic foundation of this community and to overcome the first inconclusive experience carried out by Madeleine Albright in 2000. Equally disappointing, the Democracy Summit initiated by President Biden for defending against authoritarianism partially hollowed out. According to Freedom House rankings, a third of the regimes invited to the summit left something to be desired, which rekindled the spirit of clannish cowering on the part of American power. A new initiative must be carried by a group of democratic states to avoid a questionable selection of invited nations and to increase the legitimacy of such an alliance. It must also be the source of a set of incentives or support/pressure measures to move from rhetoric to action. Second, its informal nature will allow it to banish all states that make a political shift towards these alternative forms of governance that are incompatible with its ideals. The establishment of early warning mechanisms will make it possible to detect external threats and to deal with them rapidly. Second, developing unwavering support for democratic allies under threat with a credible posture of deterrence is a necessity. Through its unprecedented character, the scale of the Western response to the Russian invasion could deter many from revising borders by force. Nevertheless, this arsenal of sanctions could also have been deployed by non-Western democracies, which would have led to an even more effective embargo, thus curbing the Russian economy and its ability to absorb the sanctions. It goes without saying that Moscow is suffering. However, the fact that the sanctions are almost exclusively Western is symptomatic of this inability to widen the circle of those working against the rise of authoritarianism. With this very weak international support, the transatlantic community is strong, but effectively isolated within a Western bubble. The latent wait-and-see attitude of the global South complicates Russia's isolation. Building a collective response to the onslaught of authoritarianism is therefore the key to a resilient community of democracies in the face of a disunited illiberal common front. Fragmenting the collaboration between authoritarian leaders is a necessity to reduce their capacity to cause harm. Without necessarily encouraging a Cold War spirit or sinking into an ideological crusade, a rearrangement and strengthening of partnership networks among liberal democracies is necessary. A Democratic Course of Action as a Prerequisite for Strategic Engagement Within the member states of this alliance, both internally and externally, strategic coherence and citizen dialogue must drive policymaking to improve democratic resilience. Therefore, the fight against corruption, dirty money and influence networks is a priority. The sanctions regime developed against Russia helped to stop the German government's obstinacy in implementing the Nord Stream 2 project. If this project was abandoned by force of events, it sent a strong signal and should serve as an example to develop a democratic line of conduct whose respect must be in the DNA of our leaders and a condition for any international partnership. Since the model of democratic governance is still attractive, political leaders must capitalize on this trend to announce specific actions and commitments to promote absolute respect for the rule of law over the strategic interests of each individual. Only through this refusal of relativism can liberal democracies strengthen the authority of democracy and develop levers of discussion to counteract the illiberal temptations of many nations. Democratic attributes will be strengthened, and autocratic regimes or those that come dangerously close to them will no longer be able to co-opt the label of democracy, undermining its ideals and common values, in order to strengthen their own credibility. ## Design over default URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/design-over-default/ Modified: 2023-01-06 > Design over Default. The RAS/NSA, in the context of the defence policy update, organized a series of consultations with its... As part of the development of this annual colloquium in September 2022, the NSA held a series of consultations earlier this summer in Montreal, Ottawa, and Calgary with its researchers to propose some straightforward recommendations to the Department of National Defence. This Design Over Default report is the result of those consultations.  *** The Strategic Analysis Network (SAN), in the context of the defence policy update, organized a series of consultations with its researchers to propose some straightforward recommendations to the Department of National Defence (DND), recognizing that the year 2022 is a watershed moment in international politics. Over the past two years, NSA experts have lamented the fact that Canada lacks a clear articulation of its strategic priorities. They have criticized Canadian foreign and defence policy for being preachy, self-satisfied, and not backed up by appropriate capabilities to meet the security challenges of the next decade and beyond. Concurrently, the global pandemic, which started in 2020, and a renewed sexual misconduct crisis in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in 2021, impacted the state of national defence. In 2022, great power competition intensified dramatically with the return of conventional war in continental Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24. China’s increasingly aggressive behaviour in East Asia and greater alignment with Russia are further eroding the liberal international order that forms the basis of Western security and prosperity. With the compounding impact of these events, Canada can no longer afford to be complacent. Followership, the idea that Canada can adopt a wait-and-see approach and then adjust its posture based on what its key partners are doing, is not feasible either, especially in a context where its closest ally, the United States, is encountering domestic political turmoil. This report is the culmination of the NSA’s consultations in Montreal, Ottawa, and Calgary, and, while it is not meant to be comprehensive, it offers clear guidance on how Canada should renew its strategic priorities1 Download the Report (PDF 156kb) ## Did the Sun Finally Set? The UK’s Integrated Review on Defence and What Canada Can Learn from It URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/did-the-sun-finally-set-the-uks-integrated-review-on-defence-and-what-canada-can-learn-from-it/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > As Canada seeks to review its strategic planning, it is important that it takes note of the decisions made by one of its closest allies. The British government finally published its Integrated Review last March, a year later than expected. Heralded as the most important review of the UK's place in the world since the end of the Cold War, the document covers all aspects of international politics. The title of the policy, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age,” signals the ambition embodied in its pages. For Boris Johnson, the aim is demonstrating that leaving the European Union (EU) has given the United Kingdom all the necessary latitude to maintain its influence and to continue playing a leading role in international affairs. The document is accompanied by a Command Paper, in which the Ministry of Defence provides details on the future of the armed forces and a strategy for the defence industry. As Canada seeks to review its strategic planning, it is important that it takes note of the decisions made by one of its closest allies. To this end, Ottawa should work to integrate its defence capabilities. Rethinking acquisition programs, among other things in light of the growing importance of new technologies, also seems imperative. Canada will also have to develop a coherent and pragmatic strategy to frame its actions in the Indo-Pacific, a region which is at the heart of the return of great power rivalry. The Return of Geostrategic Competition The policy document is pessimistic about the state of the international strategic environment: multipolarity is on the rise and threats to the UK are increasing. The threat from state actors is considered to be the most significant of all, a paradigm shift from its previous defence policy. North Korea and Iran are mentioned, but Russia remains the most acute and direct threat to London, both in terms of its nuclear capabilities and its control of grey zone activities. Still, it is China that is the UK’s main concern, judging by this new strategic policy. China is described as a systemic competitor who poses the greatest threat to the economic security of the UK, with increasing power becoming a challenge to the security, values ​​and political system of London and its allies. The document nevertheless reflects the ambivalence that reigns within the political class as to what posture to adopt. Indeed, the British government ends up beating around the bush by admitting that its relationship with China is made of both confrontation and cooperation. In this, the United Kingdom takes a similar position to that of the United States. Faced with the challenges that states like Russia and China pose to the international order, the UK believes that defending the status quo is no longer enough. Consequently, the UK has announced that it wants to actively work to shape the international order of tomorrow. To achieve this, London is counting on the fact that the great and medium powers will be able to play an important role in the future if they manage to collaborate with each other. The United Kingdom therefore wishes to occupy a central place in the collective action of like-minded states, which suggests an increase in “minilateral” cooperation formats. London is seeking to assert itself as a security leader in the Euro-Atlantic region. To this end, it is pursuing the development of the UK Joint Expeditionary Force, of which 10 states are now members. The Ministry of Defence also reaffirmed that the armed forces will continue to participate in NATO’s forward presence program in Eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea. At the same time, the UK is increasing its contribution to the NATO mission in Iraq, and is sending 300 troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali. But the most important news is Britain’s return east of the Suez. The growing importance of the Indo-Pacific is reflected in a new strategy for establishing military bases, the recent signing of defence agreements with Japan and India, and the deployment of the new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth in the region. The latter will be accompanied by American and Dutch ships, in addition to participating in exercises with several European and Asian allies. Beyond this deployment, offshore patrol vessels will be stationed permanently in the region. The number of military attachés and diplomats stationed in Southeast Asia is also on the rise. Above all, the United Kingdom intends to cooperate closely with its closest ally, the United States. London is aiming for an even greater cooperation with Washington, especially within organizations like Five Eyes and NATO. The emphasis on the Atlantic Alliance and liberal democracies in British politics suggests that one of the goals of the British strategy is to reassure the Biden administration of the seriousness of its commitment to the international order. Also, it means transatlantic security will remain the UK’s top priority, regardless of its rhetoric on the Indo-Pacific. While cooperation with several European states is discussed – specifically with France, Germany and Ireland – almost no mention is made of the EU. Notwithstanding the residual acrimony linked to Brexit, the UK will have no choice but to work with the EU on the main issues put forward in its new strategic policy. So it is strange that London does not mention the EU when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, even though it has just released its own strategy for that region. The same goes for the security issue in the Euro-Atlantic region, where the EU seems to want to cooperate more, and could become a privileged interlocutor of the White House in this matter. A Defence Policy for the Information Age The UK recognizes the growing importance of new types of technological threats. It faces adversaries who, by their recourse to activities below the threshold of war, blur the traditional border between the civil and military domains, but also between war and peace. In this context, the government and the armed forces have put in place new approaches to national security, in particular by pursuing a whole-of-government approach that involves both defence and diplomacy, or even trade, development aid, and intelligence. This is already materializing by the merger between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development, decided in 2020. The Ministry of Defence continues the work started in the recent Integrated Operating Concept. As its name suggests, this new approach aims to integrate the five domains (army, navy, air force, space, and cyber) of the British Armed Forces, to associate them with the other branches of the state and achieve interoperability between the UK and its allies in defence matters. Integration refers to the joint use of naval, air, space and cyber capabilities in multi-domain operations. It is in these areas that most of the investments are made. In working to move the armed forces from the industrial age into the age of information systems, the goal remains largely to deter potential adversaries. The emphasis on below-threshold capabilities and societal resilience, however, broadens the scope of deterrence. This implies a new posture of strength, more assertive, more dynamic and an advanced and continuous deployment. All of this should allow for an adaptive capacity to enable more efficient decision-making and more timely action. The creation of the National Cyber Force (NCF) is a step towards the integration of all the branches of the state. Its uniqueness is that it brings together elements of the armed forces (including a regiment dedicated to cyber warfare), as well as intelligence and civilian departments of the state. The institutional agility of the NCF means that all resources can also be put to the service of operations, both defensive and offensive. It therefore provides an undeniable advantage by making it possible to respond effectively to the threats and challenges of the grey zone posed by states such as Russia and China. The impact of attacks on SolarWinds or more recently on Colonial Pipeline illustrates the current fragility of critical infrastructure. The key to integration and modernization is the development of enabling technological capacities. This refers to, among other things, data processing, artificial intelligence, bioengineering and quantum technologies. To achieve this, the UK’s aim is to become a leader in research and development (R&D) in which an investment of 2.4% of the GDP is planned. In the space sector, this translates into the desire to possess 10% of the world market by 2030. In both R&D and space, leaving the EU involves significant financial losses for British institutions. The investments planned by London could, in the end, only serve to fill this shortfall caused by Brexit. The new strategy for the defence industry goes in this direction. The COVID-19 pandemic is currently highlighting the importance of maintaining production capacities and sovereign control of certain technologies. As a result, the United Kingdom decides to adopt a more protectionist posture in its acquisition programs. The importance of international competition will therefore be balanced by national security considerations in awarding contracts. Who Benefits and Who Loses from the New Investments? A significant portion of the planned investments is directed to the naval forces. The Royal Navy wants to establish itself as the most powerful navy in Europe and to reconnect with its capacity to project its power globally. Its plan involves the acquisition of 13 frigates (the goal is a fleet of 24 frigates), the replacement of their class of destroyers, and the development of a new model of multi-purpose vessels that can act as a platform for the embarkation of drones. New surface-to-surface missiles and seven submarines are also in development. The key to this naval reconfiguration is the commissioning of their two new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers. The replacement of submarines dedicated to nuclear deterrence has also recently been confirmed. Importantly, the UK announces in the Integrated Review the development of new nuclear weapons and the increase in the total number of warheads it holds. The nuclear program will be carried out in close collaboration with Washington. This is a complete reversal of the British posture, which had reduced its nuclear arsenal since the end of the Cold War. The justifications for this change are very vague, with the UK content to say that it is the result of the increasing complexity of the international environment and the growth of technological threats. The development of Russian anti-missile capabilities could nevertheless be the real reason. One thing is certain, this decision is already negatively affecting the image of the United Kingdom and raising fears of a general increase in world nuclear stocks. The Royal Air Force, meanwhile, continues to acquire F-35 fighter jets. Their total number has nevertheless been reduced, so much so that American aircraft are currently on board the Queen Elisabeth aircraft carrier for its deployment in the Indo-Pacific. This situation may well continue in the future. This decision may be explained by the fact that the RAF is already working on a 6th generation fighter, scheduled to enter service in 2035, and which would be equipped with high-speed radar technologies and artificial intelligence. It is also investing in drones, as much to support fighters as to eventually replace them. In addition, a space command now exists within the RAF with the aim of becoming an important player in this field that is more contested than ever. 1.4 billion pounds will be invested in this area. London seeks, on the one hand, to protect itself from space threats using systems based on land and in space. On the other hand, it seeks to ensure autonomous access to space, which should be achieved in 2022 with the launching of satellites. With this launch capability, the development of a British satellite positioning system – which cooperated before Brexit with the European Galileo system – could see the light of day. Ultimately, London hopes to have the ability to monitor and defend British interests in and across space. All of these measures are supported by a substantial increase in the defence budget to 2.2% of GDP. The new capacity acquisition program is estimated at nearly £24 billion over four years, the largest investment since the end of the Cold War. The United Kingdom is therefore ranked 5th among states in terms of military spending. However, cuts had to be made in order to reinvest in these new programs. The army has suffered the most in the armed forces, with its numbers reduced by 10,000 members. Another sector where cuts were expected is that of development aid. The latest expenditure review reduced overseas development aid from 0.7% to 0.5% of GDP, or a budget reduction by 25 to 30 billion pounds by 2025. This last point goes against the pan-government approach, and reduces the diplomatic and political influence of London. This consequently raises the question of the capacity of the armed forces to respond to increasingly diverse and non-military issues. An Overly Ambitious Vision? The new British policy is therefore a comprehensive strategy that does not compromise on its commitments. Concretely, three points cast doubt on the feasibility of the Integrated Review. For one, London is betting that a shift to high technology will allow its armed forces to maintain an advantage over potential adversaries. This choice implies an explosion in acquisition costs and, ultimately, increased technological dependence at the operational level. In this regard, Professor Peter Roberts wonders whether the UK is preparing for the conflict it wants to wage or the one it will have to wage. Second, the corollary of the technological shift is a choice of quality over quantity. Army uniformed personnel, for example, will drop to 73,000 in strength. Although historically low – unheard of since the 18th century – the manpower problem arises when deployments increase at the same time. This issue is perhaps more glaring for the Royal Navy. Already, there is no guarantee that it will be able to make full use of its new aircraft carriers, because it does not possess the sufficient number of airplanes on board nor the necessary escort vessels. It will also be difficult to play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions at the same time. Of the three, the financial question is the one which remains the most worrying and which leads the international community to remain skeptical. The National Audit Office already found the Ministry of Defence’s plan to equip itself unaffordable. The issue of post-COVID-19 public finances also represents a major issue and the Ministry of Defence could suffer the consequences. It is difficult to know what will be kept if the means run out, because the absence of compromise is accompanied by a lack of clarity as to the priorities according to the fields (space, cyber, maritime, etc.). As such, London seems to have departed from the definition given by John Lewis Gaddis of grand strategy, “the process by which ends are linked to means, intentions to capacities, objectives to resources.” Under these conditions, it is reasonable to question how London will be able to articulate a coherent action strategy. Recommendations and Considerations for Canada The work undertaken by the United Kingdom is as comprehensive as it is ambitious, and confirms trends already observed in the latest policies of other allies of Canada, such as Australia. Ottawa must know how to learn from this in order to better apprehend the future of its international relations. First, Canada’s three closest allies – the US, UK and France – are now turning their attention to the Indo-Pacific region. Despite having become the new “center of the world,” Canada has yet to release documents outlining its role in it. Canada’s ad hoc presence in the South China Sea and the recent security cooperation agreement with Japan indicate that Canada is keen to work with its partners in the region. If Canada seems to be living its “Indo-Pacific moment,” it needs to tread carefully. Indeed, the region is at the heart of tensions between great powers and the risks of entanglement are great. Also, Ottawa has limited capacity. An increased presence in Asia is likely to jeopardize its commitments in Europe and the Far North, where Canada is in a position to play a significant role. Not making the same overcommitment error as the UK is, in this sense, imperative. Without committing too quickly to the Indo-Pacific, Canada will still have to address the issue of its difficult relationship with China. The Canadian government ambivalence increasingly looks out of place. Unable to act alone against the Chinese giant, Canada must, more than ever, join forces with other liberal democracies to face this challenge. Second, it is necessary to think about and put in place a whole-of-government approach to defence and security. The federal budget recently published by the government unfortunately remains silent on these issues. However, it is essential that Ottawa begins a proper reflection on foreign policy – the last white paper on the issue dates back to 2005 – followed by corresponding investments. The armed forces, for their part, have embarked on a welcome turn to the information age. The use of new technologies by the armed forces does not necessarily have to turn into dependence on them, which could happen in the UK. The example of France represents a relevant alternative model for the use of technology and its incorporation into military and non-military means. In the face of new cyber threats, disinformation or interference in elections, however, it is the entire state apparatus that will have to work together to defend Canadian interests. To do this, Canada will need to rely on new technologies. While it can boast of having a lead in certain areas such as artificial intelligence, in the future it will be necessary to invest in R&D and ensure to maintain sovereign production capacities, the importance of which has been reiterated many times during the pandemic. Canada can draw inspiration here from the new British industrial policy, which considers it important to support domestic industry and to retain sovereign know-how and capabilities. Australia and Germany recently made a similar choice. Third, Canada needs to review the way it conducts its procurement programs. On the one hand, the speed of current technological development is at odds with its traditionally lengthy processes of purchasing platforms designed to be in commission for decades. The risk being a quicker obsolescence of newly acquired equipment. The United Kingdom is already planning the development of the 6th generation fighter which will replace its F-35 (5th generation) while Canada is still procrastinating on the model which will replace its old 4th generation CF-18s. The Department of National Defence must focus on more flexible systems and procurement processes that will better adapt to technological advancements. On the other hand, better supervision and accountability of acquisition projects appear inevitable. In this regard, the recent report of the Parliamentary Budget Officer on the new Canadian frigate program is revealing. Now estimated at $77 billion, the total cost has tripled since its inception. The opacity surrounding the contract and the lack of accountability of decision makers undermine trust in institutions. Public finances will be under pressure following the pandemic and difficult choices will have to be made within the armed forces. Many ships and aircraft will need to be replaced in the coming years if Canada is to maintain its capabilities, especially its submarines and icebreakers. It is high time that Canada undertakes a discussion on these complex and important issues if it wishes to remain relevant on the international stage. ## Discussion – NATO and the Arctic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/discussion-nato-and-the-arctic/ Modified: 2024-06-04 > Rear Admiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN)Discussant : Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Bishop’s University.... Rear Admiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN) Discussant : Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Bishop’s University ## Does France really have a problem with the concept of Integrated Deterrence? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/does-france-really-have-a-problem-with-the-concept-of-integrated-deterrence/ Modified: 2024-02-27 > The concept of “integrated deterrence” is central to the US National Defense Strategy published by the Biden administration at the end... The concept of “integrated deterrence” is central to the US National Defense Strategy published by the Biden administration at the end of 2022. It entails “developing and combining U.S. strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power, and U.S. unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships”. In their report No I in Team, Stacie Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser design a framework to better understand and implement integrated deterrence with allies and partners. They interview a number of foreign officials about the challenges ahead to do so, quoting one of them in particular: “We have two problems with integrated deterrence—one is integration, the other is deterrence.” The authors kept the speaker’s nationality discreetly under wraps, but many readers probably guessed he was French. It is no secret that France stands out among US’ allies in the degree of concern and skepticism it has voiced about the concept of integrated deterrence. France is indeed not comfortable with the idea of integrating deterrence due to its culture of independence, its capabilities but also for a semantic concern. Admittedly, France can have “an integration problem” at the strategic level, which is not always desirable nor possible. For more than 60 years now France has indeed asserted itself as a nuclear power willing to dissociate itself from US concepts deemed incompatible with French priorities and capabilities (like the “flexible response” doctrine for example). Historically, France’s nuclear deterrent has even been built on doubts about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence in all circumstances. And yet, part of the debates also arises from a problem of interpretation steeped in semantics, that should not overshadow the fact that there are also many points of convergence between France and US strategic thinking on how to dissuade, deter and constrain potential adversaries. Most notably, the two countries acknowledge the unique value of nuclear weapons to deter strategic attacks, share the necessity of preserving calculated ambiguity in declaratory policies, and agree on the need for a better mutual support between nuclear and conventional capabilities. To move forward, they need to stop quibbling over semantics and focus on their mutual objective: how to better deter their common adversaries, better anticipate scenarios where nuclear deterrence could be by-passed from below, and ultimately better combine their efforts to control escalation in their favor during a regional conflict. The French way of deterrence The word “deterrence” describes two different things when you translate it in French. Deterrence with a capital “D” is translated as “dissuasion,” a term that refers exclusively to the nuclear realm. Meanwhile deterrence with a small “d” is generally translated as “découragement,” related to English “discouragement,” which refers to all instrument of military power in all domains. Deterrence with a capital “D” is all about nuclear and is the keystone of French defense strategy. Its purpose, as stated by President Macron in 2020, is “to protect France and its people from a State threat against our vital interests, wherever it comes from and in whatever form.” France’s doctrine is purely defensive and relies on its capacity “to inflict absolutely unacceptable damages upon that State’s centers of power,” thereby disrupting his calculation between the nature of the stakes and the value of losses. Like Schelling, France believes that “the power to hurt is more impressive than the power to oppose,” and that only nuclear weapons can inflict unacceptable damages. Finally, nuclear Deterrence is intended a no-fail mission, unlike forms of conventional deterrence whose potential failure is anticipated (which explains why France never talks about “conventional Deterrence”). Conversely, deterrence with a small “d” has no nuclear dimension. This is the reason why France prefers to use the word discouragement to mark the distinction, even if it creates misunderstanding and unnecessary debates. NATO allies due to translation in English; but also, in France where non-nuclear community regularly contest the hijacking and the confiscation of the word “dissuasion” by the nuclear community in the sense that the meaning of the word is truncated to its strictly nuclear dimension. Beyond semantics, France strategic documents acknowledge the fact that nuclear deterrence is not enough to protect and defend the full scope of France's interests. France’s autonomy also depends “on strengthening a credible, coherent and balanced armed forces model. This requires conventional forces the size and equipment of which allow for a conventional-nuclear that is sufficiently robust to preserve the President's freedom of action and avoid deterrence being by-passed from below.” In his strategic vision the French CHOD Gen Burkhard introduces the competition/dispute/ confrontation triptych (no longer referring to the peace/crisis/war continuum), emphasizing competition as the normal way to express power and a form of “war before the war” that takes place in all domains. “Win the war before the War” thus consists of signaling commitment, clarifying intentions and discouraging opponents by articulating actions in all-domain as much as possible, including by relying on all tools allowing to shape perceptions. But countries are not always in a position of prevail in a competition nor can they hope to deter every action which does not directly attack their vital interests. Stated otherwise, deterrence (with a small “d”) can fail and fails more often that we wish. Hence the need for a distinct way to protect vital interests. In France, the question of “integration” comes on top of this unique semantic distinction about deterrence. When Washington says “integrated deterrence”, Paris hears “integrated nuclear deterrence” while dodging the question of other instruments of power. At the same time, the notion of “integration” has somehow become a buzzword, becoming often too flexible to be meaningful. Ultimately, the French “integration problem” concerns more the nuclear dimension, while there are much less hesitations when referring to deterrence with a small “d” (“découragement”). French concerns on integration at the strategic level French thinkers fear that the concept of integrated deterrence risks diluting the role of nuclear weapons in the grand strategy. Non-nuclear deterrence fails regularly, and the possibility of this failure is sometimes anticipated by policymakers. If one puts both general deterrence and nuclear deterrence under the same header, how does one ensure that the routine failures of deterrence against hybrid or other limited forms of conflict, do not compromise the credibility of Deterrence? The risk is particularly real considering that integrated deterrence seeks to give the US an ability to deter any type of hostile action, whether kinetic or nonkinetic, hybrid or overt, and whether it targets the US itself, or its allies. The ambition of the task necessarily comes with a greater risk of failure. The Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine offers an interesting case study: from NATO’s point of view, it is reasonable to say that nuclear deterrence worked, since Russia refrained from attacking NATO countries, even when the Alliance set up logistical and training facilities in Ukraine’s neighboring countries to support it. Conversely, there is no doubt that the West has failed to deter Russia to attack Ukraine. The problem is that many observers have made the confusion by claiming that “deterrence” more broadly has failed. Critically, the unique value of nuclear weapons to inflict unacceptable damage probably deserves a distinct and more specific approach. Second, integrating deterrence may be confused in France with the will to establish a continuum between conventional and nuclear, idea that France totally rejects. Based on the conviction that any use of nuclear weapons would inevitably change the nature of a conflict, France aims to use its nuclear arsenal to avoid wars not win them. Avoiding the impression of a continuum is particularly important as France is also wary of trying to use red lines to provide further clarity. There is not any explicit definition of what Frances’s vital interests actually are. Thus setting a red line may be interpreted as “greenlighting” every type of aggression that remains below that threshold. A degree of imprecision supports effective deterrence by complicating calculation for any potential adversary who would try to act “under the threshold”. The idea is to cast doubts in the adversary’s brain, not in ours. Last, true integration at the strategic level between Allies (even close ones) “is rather an aspiration than reality”, as Pettyjohn and Wasser highlight. Indeed, it can raise entanglement issues which go both ways: for the United States on the one hand, and for allies vis-à-vis the US on the other hand. This is particularly true if “integrated deterrence” tends to become “integrated compellence” which could potentially drive one of the actors in a direction not consistent with its own interests. As the “precise definition of vital interest is the sole responsibility of the President, depending on circumstances”, it is a misleading to think that French nuclear deterrence can be integrated with US strategy in any circumstances. In addition, even if it was the case, it is not granted that a more strategic integration would increase the deterrence value vis-à-vis our common competitors. Within NATO for example, French independent strategic nuclear forces have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries as acknowledged since the 1974 NATO summit in Ottawa onwards. By making the exercise opaquer to the adversary, a form of “disintegration” of the nuclear deterrence postures within the P3 (France, US and UK) may thus have beneficial effects on the common ambition of deterring any nuclear aggression against them. And yet, substantive agreement remain But U.S. “integrated deterrence” considers deterrence writ large, and France should acknowledge the fact that the word embraces much more than its nuclear dimension. At the same time, it is necessary for the U.S. to clarify what is behind the word integration. “I never argue with a label, as long as I am told what it means”, wrote the French philosopher Blaise Pascal in Les Provinciales in the 17th century: ultimately, getting rid of semantic quarrels allows a more thorough examination of both French and US doctrine and policy reveals indeed a great deal of common grounds. First, the US 2022 Nuclear Posture Review claims that “for the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons will continue to provide unique deterrence effects that no other element of U.S. military power can replace.” This should be music to French ears considering the critical importance of the nuclear deterrent in the French strategy. Washington has also rejected adopting a no First Use or a Sole Purpose declaratory policy, thereby preserving the notion of calculated ambiguity. As discussed, calculated ambiguity is also part of French declaratory policy to prevent any adversary to get a leeway for strategic intimidation or aggression. Furthermore, nothing in the Nuclear Posture Review indicates that the US have established a continuum between conventional and nuclear forces. But both countries underline the contributing role of non-nuclear capabilities in deterrence plans. While France 2022 National Strategic review emphasizes that credible conventional forces will “allow for the robust backing of nuclear forces”, the NPR calls for a pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence that “leverages the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent.” The inversion of formulation is worth noting though, shedding light on where each states focuses first and foremost. For France, nuclear deterrent is “backed by credible conventional forces,” for the US, conventional forces are “backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent.” Last, at the non-nuclear level, it is worth noting that France also relentlessly promotes all-domain integration to “win the war before the war,” while still being able to prevails with allies and partners in a high-intensity conflict. This is captured in Gen Burkhard’s ambition for the French armed forces which must be able to “deliver a very wide range of military options, associating controlled effects in all confrontation domains, paying specific attention to actions in the exo-atmospheric and cyber domains as well as in the information environment, in order to bend opponent’s determination by imposing favorable force ratios.”  In short, a kind of  “integrated deterrence”. * Ultimately, even if integration at the strategic level is neither always possible nor desirable, there is still room for a better synchronization of activities and messaging under specific circumstances, while avoiding entanglement. It can only be beneficial to better tackle the real challenge: keep common adversaries at bay.   David Pappalardo (@DavPappa) is a French air force and space officer currently serving as an air attaché at the French Embassy in Washington. As a Mirage F1 and then multirole Rafale pilot, he is the former commander of the 2/30 fighter Squadron “Normandie-Niémen.” He is credited with 2,300 flight hours and 134 war missions in the Sahel, Afghanistan, Libya, and the Levant. He graduated from the French Air Force Academy and is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Command and Staff College. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the French air force, the Ministère Des Armées, or the French government.     ## Don’t Count on Us: Canada’s Military Unreadiness URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/dont-count-on-us-canadas-military-unreadiness/ Modified: 2024-05-30 Canada’s military is in a “death spiral.” This is how Minister of National Defense Bill Blair described the state of Canada’s armed forces at last month’s Ottawa Conference on Security and Defense. Blair’s comments referenced the military’s dire recruitment and retention crisis. The Canadian Armed Forces are short 16,000 people — about 15 percent of their authorized strength of 71,500 regular forces and 30,000 primary reserve forces. Despite efforts such as opening the military to permanent residents, there’s no indication that the situation will improve. Less than 1 percent of applications from permanent residents to join the regular force were accepted, with 15,000 applicants walking away amid the 18- to 24-month-long application process. While the Canadian government has signed several high-profile contractsfor new equipment such as F-35s, Predator drones, and P-8A Poseidons, at this rate, there may not be anybody to use these capabilities when they come online. Allies and critics are rightfully calling on Canada to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product spending target agreed to by NATO, but the Canadian military’s troubles are deeper than insufficient funds. Canada’s ability to meaningfully contribute to major allied operations is in doubt for the foreseeable future. Despite increased defense spending by 70percent between 2017 and 2026, an internal report on the readiness of the Canadian Armed Forces was released to the media the same week that Blair made his remarks. The report paints a bleak picture: Most of Canada’s major fleets are unavailable or unserviceable. Indeed, on average, only 45 percent of Canada’s air force fleet is operational, while the Royal Canadian Navy can operate at 46 percent of its capacity and the army at 54 percent. This means that even Canada’s minor military projection ambition — which consists of only three frigates, two fighter jet squadrons, and one mechanized brigade — is not assured. As the ninth largest economy in the world and twelfth largest per capita, Canada actually contributes little to allied security and cannot be relied upon to sustain its own limited ambition. There are few indications that things will get better soon. On 8 April 2024, the Canadian government announced more than $72 billion in new defense funding over the next two decades. This is projected to bring Canadian military expenditures to a peak of 1.76 percent of gross domestic product in 2029. This is a welcome injection of funds on top of the nearly $215 billion the Canadian government is expecting to invest in the armed forces over the next 20 years. Most of this new spending, however, is years away and won’t address the military’s immediate woes. To be blunt, Canada’s military is in an atrocious state and is barely holding on. The roots of this crisis are found in Canada’s strategic culture and decades-old decisions about defense. The way out of the crisis, meanwhile, is paved with seemingly insuperable obstacles, including a chronic shortage of personnel, an inability to spend funds quickly, a lack of bipartisan agreement on military requirements, and a culture of reactiveness and unpreparedness toward new geopolitical challenges. *** To keep reading, go to War on the Rocks. ## Donald Trump and the Coming Disintegration of the West URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/donald-trump-and-the-coming-disintegration-of-the-west/ Modified: 2024-04-05 In many respects, Donald Trump’s 100-minute rally held in Conway, South Carolina, on February 10, 2024, was just like his previous rallies. It began with Trump giving shout-outs to local Republican dignitaries in the audience. He found an opportunity to recite his favourite poem, “The Snake,” his signature parable with its anti-immigrant message. And the rally ended with his usual 20-minute monologue that he carefully read off the teleprompter, dramatic music playing in the background while he worked towards his climactic promise to “make America great again.” But like all his previous rallies, a significant portion of his speech was unscripted, with Trump riffing and ad libbing his “greatest hits” , including his “sir stories” that feature people deferentially addressing him as “sir.” But this time his ad libbing gave one of his “sir stories” an unexpected twist at the end. At the 40-minute mark, Trump started to tell one of his most-often-told stories — how he got a European leader — who, as always, deferentially called him “monsieur,” to spend more on defence by threatening that the United States would not defend his country if it were attacked by the Russian Federation.: L’un des présidents d’un grand pays s’est levé et a dit : « Eh bien, monsieur , si nous ne payons pas et que nous sommes attaqués par la Russie, allez-vous nous protéger ? »  J’ai répondu : « Vous n’avez pas payé ? Votre compte est à découvert ? » Il a dit : « Oui. Imaginons que ça arrive ». Non, je ne vous protégerai pas. En fait, je les encouragerai à faire tout ce qu’ils veulent. Vous devez payer, vous devez payer vos factures. Indeed, some of the media translations — for example, Le Parisien, Le Monde, and Le Devoir — did not fully capture the menace in Trump’s colloquial English: “In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want.” The MAGA crowd, not surprisingly, cheered loudly, as his supporters always do when Trump makes anti-NATO comments. Never before had Trump fantasized publicly about encouraging the Russians to attack America’s European allies (though in March 2023 he had mused in a speech to a conservative conference how easy it would be for Russia to destroy the new headquarters building of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  in Brussels). But it was not the first time that he had publicly attacked America’s alliances. Indeed, one of his consistent foreign policy positions going all the way back to the 1980s is that America’s allies take advantage of the United States by refusing to “pay their bills.” By the time he launched his presidential campaign in 2015, his views had hardened: as Miles Taylor revealed in his memoir of his time in the Trump White House, Trump thought that America was being “raped” by its allies. His anger was directed at NATO in Europe and the security pacts with Japan and South Korea in the western Pacific. Only the long-standing ANZUS alliance between Australia and the United States, and the AUKUS security agreement between the US, Australia, and the United Kingdom agreed to in September 2021 appear to have escaped his notice (though not surprisingly given his attacks on other American alliances, many Australians are deeply worried that if Trump ever looks carefully at these agreements, he will have the same anti-alliance reaction he has had in other parts of the world). But Trump’s view of America’s alliances has always been idiosyncratic. Most American leaders have regarded the alliances created after the Second World War as based on a shared ideological perspective on global politics that bound Western states together. Not Trump: as John Bolton, Trump’s national security adviser from 2018 to 2019, reminds us, the “civilizational foundations” of alliances like NATO “mean essentially nothing in Trump’s transactional world, where the motto is ‘What have you done for me lately?’” Rather, Trump saw America’s alliances as nothing more than the kind of protection rackets that he would have been familiar with in New York and New Jersey: if countries wanted to be protected against attack, they had to pay the United States for protection; and if the United States did not receive that “payment,” or if a country was “delinquent” in its “payments,” there would be no protection offered. Given these views, it is hardly surprising that Trump has consistently been on record as being willing to deny protection to American allies he deems “delinquent” in their “payments.” For example, during the 2016 presidential campaign, when Russia was openly threatening the Baltic states, Trump was asked whether, as president, he would come to the aid of these states if Russia actually attacked them. Trump initially responded by avoiding the question, saying that many NATO members “aren’t paying their bills,” and asserting that “they have an obligation to make payments.” But when he was asked again if the United States would protect NATO allies, Trump responded by asking: “Have they fulfilled their obligations to us? If they fulfill their obligations to us, the answer is yes.” The fact that this is not how any of America’s alliances work never bothered him. We know now that Trump was repeatedly told by his own officials that there were no “payments due,” but, as one of his senior officials admitted, “he didn’t really care. He understood , but he liked the way he explained it better.” Thus, throughout his presidency from 2017 to 2021, and in the three-year campaign for election in 2024, he just kept embracing the completely mendacious view that America’s allies had “bills” that they had to pay to the United States if they wanted American protection. But Trump also has other concerns about allies. One is a belief that America’s allies will drag the United States into war. In 2018, he was asked by Tucker Carlson of Fox News: “Why should my son go to Montenegro to defend it from attack?” Trump responded: “I’ve asked the same question. You know, Montenegro is a tiny country with very strong people … They are very aggressive people. They may get aggressive, and congratulations, you’re in World War III. But that’s the way it was set up.” His response nicely captured Trump’s willingness to signal, quite openly, that he does not regard the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 as binding on the United States to come to the assistance of allies should they be attacked. Trump was also annoyed that America’s alliances were supposedly asymmetric deals: on at least two occasions, in 2016 and 2019,  he complained about Japan not having to defend the US if it were attacked, claiming that Japanese could just sit at home and watch the attack “on a Sony television.” In short, over the years, Trump has offered us consistent evidence of his antipathy for America’s alliances in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. During his presidency he consistently was infuriated by the costs of the security treaties with Japan and South Korea, musing in June 2019 about scrapping the alliance with Japan and threatening to undermine the alliance with South Korea. . In his memoirs, Bolton reminds us that Trump once angrily yelled at him that “I don’t give a shit about NATO.” Trump was as explicit with Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission. In 2020, according to two European Union officials who were in the room, he told her: “You need to understand that if Europe is under attack we will never come to help you and to support you,” and added: “By the way, NATO is dead, and we will leave, we will quit NATO. And by the way, you owe me $400 billion, because you didn’t pay, you Germans, what you had to pay for defense.” Trump has also been clear that he puts no particular value on the continuation of these alliances. Even before he was elected, he was unconcerned about the impact of his insistence on the view of NATO as a protection racket: “If it breaks up NATO, it breaks up NATO,” he said in April 2016.  We know that during his presidency, Trump wanted to withdraw the United States from NATO, and was only dissuaded from such a course of action by the so-called “adults in the room.” And it can be argued that his views have become more radical since his defeat in 2020. When he was criticized for his comments in Conway, South Carolina, he just doubled down, promising that if he were president, the United States would not abide by the  terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, saying: “Look, if they’re not going to pay, we’re not going to protect. OK?” The latest pronouncement by Trump that he would “encourage” the Russians to “do whatever the hell they want” to America’s European allies, has, quite understandably, caused a great deal of concern among America’s allies around the world, since Trump has a plausible path to victory in the November elections, and they worry that on his return to the White House in January 2025, he will put his anti-alliance policies into place. They worry that this time, there will no “adults in the room” to dissuade the president. On the contrary, Trump already has a plan to ensure that the American national security bureaucracy that is at present spread across the world will no longer be staffed by career civil servants or military officers who are generally committed to the maintenance of American leadership, but by America-First MAGA loyalists who have the same negative view of America’s allies as Trump. The threat of withdrawal is particularly pronounced in Europe. Even though the United States now has a law that was intended to make it more difficult for a president to withdraw from NATO, it would still be possible for a president to effectively bring American contribution to NATO to an end. It is true that Section 1250A of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act states: “The President shall not suspend, terminate, denounce, or withdraw the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, DC, April 4, 1949, except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided that two-thirds of the Senators present concur, or pursuant to an Act of Congress.” However, a president could choose not to name any U.S. personnel to NATO headquarters or to alliance operations; more importantly, a president could undercut the deterrent impact of the North Atlantic Treaty by announcing — as Trump has — that the United States would simply not come to the aid of its allies. De jure suspension, termination, denunciation, or withdrawal would not be necessary for Trump to implement his anti-alliance America First agenda. Because the Europeans recognize that Trump’s candidacy poses a deep threat to the transatlantic alliance, discussions about European strategic autonomy have been reinvigorated. But many analysts fear that an American de facto withdrawal would trigger a sauve-qui-peut movement among European states that would see them selfishly scramble to find separate accommodations with the Russian Federation. As Anne Applebaum put it, “Au fil du temps, tous les alliés de l’Amérique commenceront à se couvrir. De nombreux pays européens choisiront de s’acoquiner avec la Russie. » But there is another possibility: the governments of Europe could be driven to overcome the illogic of nationalism in a western European context, and the insecurity that necessarily comes with the ability of the Russian Federation to divide and conquer western Europe without an effective American security guarantee. To be sure, it is difficult to see Europeans seriously embracing this option as long as American global leadership is still alive and well and while the administration in Washington maintains its transatlantic engagement. But if Trump wins in 2024, it is possible we will see a different result. For we know that Trump will surely abandon America’s global leadership, continuing the trajectory he started in his first term. We know he will surely try to implement his promise to bring the war in Ukraine to an end. After all, even before the 2024 election campaign started, Trump had his loyalists in the U.S. House of Representatives stop American military assistance to Ukraine; he would surely abandon Ukraine completely after his inauguration. Importantly, such an abandonment would signal an end to American support for security arrangements everywhere. We know that Trump is likely to withdraw from NATO, if not de jure then de facto, because he has told us this repeatedly. But if this happens, it is entirely possible that the Europeans would begin to take a more united approach, overcoming present national differences to forge a cohesive defence policy apparatus. Certainly the states of western Europe have the raw capabilities to project greater power if they were forced (or chose) to do so. With the United Kingdom, a more united Europe would have a population of more than 523 million; its GDP would be $19.9 trillion, roughly equal to that of the United States. Even without the United Kingdom, Europe has a population of more 450 million and a GDP of $16.6 trillion. The Russian Federation, by contrast, has 147 million people and a nominal GDP of $1.86 trillion. To be sure, it would take a massive effort to transform these raw capabilities into effective military power: the European defence industry would have to expand dramatically. Likewise, it would take a considerable political effort to transform the present nuclear arsenals of Britain, which assigns its nuclear weapons to NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, and France, which operates its nuclear forces independently, into an workable European deterrent. But the combination of the withdrawal of American security support for Europe and the very real threat of Russian domination would be the kind of dramatic change of circumstances that could readily transform European politics. As Applebaum notes, a dismantling of American support for European security will surely be accompanied by a similar dismantling of the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region. For the complaints that Trump and America First have about Europeans — that they are free-riding leeches intent on “raping” the United States with their unfair trading practices and their refusal to pay their defence “bills” — also apply to America’s Western allies in the western Pacific: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Australia, and Aotearoa New Zealand, and, to a lesser extent, its other friends and allies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Trump is unlikely to have one view of European allies and another, opposite one for the Indo-Pacific allies. And, as we learned from Trump’s presidency from 2017 to 2021, the America First movement is simply incapable of conceiving of other countries as friends to be trusted. In the Indo-Pacific, therefore, it is likely that Trump would pick up where he left off in 2021. He would continue to alienate allies and other friends in the Indo-Pacific. Needless to say, alienating these countries would be hugely counter-productive, since much of Trump’s anti-Chinese agenda actually needs friends and allies. In particular, his broad plan to disrupt Chinese power by trying to decouple the Chinese and American economies needs the support of China’s trading partners if it is to succeed. If an America First administration were to impose the huge tariffs on Chinese goods that Trump has promised — in February 2024 he floated the idea of a tariff of 60 per cent on Chinese imports — or if Washington tried to impose further disruptions to global supply chains originating in China, or tried to place further limits on Chinese access to advanced technology or education, it would force all America’s friends and allies in the Indo-Pacific to make a choice between security that depends on the United States and economic prosperity that comes from their ties to China. And judging by Trump’s first term, we should not be confident in the ability of an America First administration to deal successfully with governments grappling with that choice. However, while the Europeans might be pushed into greater strategic autonomy as a result of the victory of America First in 2024, it is unlikely that a similar dynamic will unfold in the western Pacific. On the contrary: when they are abandoned by an isolationist America First administration — as they surely will be — the countries of the West in the western Pacific will not have the luxury available to the Europeans. They will not be able to unite geostrategically to try to create a defensive posture against the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region, the People’s Republic of China. There are not enough of them, and the physical distances that separate the Western allies are too profound. Instead, we are likely to see the dynamic predicted by Applebaum: slowly, but surely, each of the Western allies of the United States in the western Pacific will make their peace with the PRC, ensuring Chinese dominance in the region. Some of the transformations in global politics that would come with a Trump victory in November would occur quickly. The abandonment of Ukraine by the United States is already happening even before the election, accelerated by what former Republican member of Congress Liz Cheney calls the “Putin wing” of the Republican Party — the Republican majority in the House of Representatives under Speaker Mike Johnson; the eleven Republican senators who voted to kill the Ukraine aid bill, including  J.D. Vance of Ohio, who has been named as a possible vice-presidential running mate for Trump in 2024; and of course Trump himself. If Trump were elected in 2024, that abandonment would likely be swiftly completed soon after the inauguration in early 2025. A de facto American withdrawal from NATO would likely follow soon after the consolidation of Russian control of all Ukraine, allowing the Trump administration to pivot to the Indo-Pacific to concentrate its attentions on the conflict with China. By contrast, the shifts in geostrategic alignment that would occur in Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, Canberra, and Wellington might take longer — but it is likely that these countries would draw logical conclusions about the dependability of the United States under an America First administration, and move to reorient their global policies. Regardless of the speed with which such geostrategic reorientations took place, they would surely bring the disintegration of the West as a dominant force in global politics. Since the 1940s, what can be called the “geostrategic West” has been a cohesive bloc of approximately fifty high-income liberal democracies in Europe, North America, and the western Pacific. While “the West” is not a singular unitary actor in global politics, the group of countries that we call the West has been more or less united in agreement on the broad geostrategic elements of a global order under the leadership of the United States. If the states of the West in western Europe and the western Pacific are forced by the abandonment of a global leadership role by the United States, that geostrategic unity would be shattered. These states would be forced to make peace with the great powers in their neighbourhoods. In the case of the Europeans, it is possible that they could refashion themselves into a united great power capable of challenging Russia, China, and even, if it was necessary, the United States. Where would the end of the West leave Canada? If Trump’s re-election eventually brings the realignments outlined above, Canada is likely to find itself slowly being isolated geostrategically, since it would lose the multilateral connections with other Western states across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, or in the circumpolar north. If the United States abandons or alienates the rest of the West, we will see a slow transformation in the Canadian government’s geostrategic links across all three of its oceans. During the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, Canada’s geostrategic links to Europe were always strong with Canada a relatively active contributor to NATO’s European operations. But those links were forged in a fundamentally North Atlantic context — in other words, involving both the United States and Europe. But if the link between the United States and Europe frays, Canada’s links with Europe will fray too. This will be particularly marked if the United States withdraws from NATO and begins to regard Europe as the “foe” that Trump asserted it was in July 2018. And if that happens, and if a geostrategic rivalry emerges between a more united Europe and the United States, there will be very little tolerance in Washington for Canada as a European partner. A similar shift is likely to emerge in the Pacific. During the presidency of Joe Biden — an administration that took Americans allies in the western Pacific seriously — Canada’s geostrategic links across the Pacific were relatively shallow and underdeveloped. If a Trump 2.0 presidency should push the countries of the West in the western Pacific into making accommodations with China, Canada’s links across the Pacific will thin considerably. Finally, the same dynamic will be at work in the circumpolar north. The present structures and institutions for multilateral engagement in the Arctic are already under stress because one of the members of the Arctic Council, the Russian Federation, held the chairmanship from 2021 to 2023, and the other members decided to “pause” all the meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies as long as Russia was at war against Ukraine. If the United States under an America First administration decided to withdraw from the Arctic Council in order to pursue a more robust unilateral policy in the Arctic, the circumpolar region would become much more politicized than it already is, with the United States, Russia, and China all contesting Arctic waters, and the multilateral forums like the Arctic Council or the Inuit Circumpolar Council might be sidelined. In short, if the American-led world order that Canadians have lived with since the 1940s is transformed as a result of a return of Trump to the presidency, Canada’s general approach to foreign policy posture will not really fit that new world order. Canadian foreign policy remains designed for a world in which the geostrategic West is a relatively united group of some fifty independent states, and the United States is an active and engaged leader of the West, willing to use its superordinate power and capabilities to help forge and maintain a global order for the anarchical society that is world politics. But if that world is transformed, Canadians will be forced to profoundly rethink their foreign and defence policies. If Trump embraces an America First foreign and defence policy that alienates other Western friends and allies, Canadians may try to dissociate their country from the United States and pursue policies designed to maintain all those transoceanic linkages with other countries we enjoyed during the American-led world order. However, Canadians will likely discover that in the kind of world order preferred by Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin, small states like Canada will simply not be permitted that degree of freedom. Instead, it is likely that Canada will be stuck geostrategically — all alone with the United States in North America. *** Kim Richard Nossal (@KimNossal) went to school in Melbourne, Beijing, Toronto, and Hong Kong and attended the University of Toronto, receiving his PhD in 1977. In 1976 he joined the Department of Political Science at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, where he taught international relations and Canadian foreign policy, serving as chair of the Department from 1989–90 and 1992-1996. In 2001, he came to Queen’s University, heading the Department of Political Studies until 2009. He served as director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy from 2011 to 2013. From 2013 to 2015, he was the executive director of the Queen’s School of Policy Studies. He has served as editor of International Journal, the quarterly journal of the Canadian International Council, Canada's institute of international affairs (1992-1997), and was president of the Canadian Political Science Association (2005-2006). He served as chair of the academic selection committee of the Security and Defence Forum of the Department of National Defence from 2006 to 2012. In 2017 he was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Royal Military College of Canada. Professor Emeritus Nossal retired from Queen's Department of Political Studies in 2020.   ## Ecological Security, Indigenous Marine Guardian Programs, and Expanding the Concept of ‘Climate Security’ URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ecological-security-indigenous-marine-guardian-programs-and-expanding-the-concept-of-climate-security/ Modified: 2026-07-09 This brief illustrates how an ecological security perspective can shed new light on the intersections between climate change, security, and the relationship between Indigenous Nations and Canadian governance structures. Climate change is threatening the security of individuals, communities, and industries across Canada and around the world. One perspective, the ecological security framework, suggests that to address threats posed by climate change, we must center and protect ecological processes themselves. Here, I examine the partnership between the Kitasoo/Xai’xais Marine Guardian Watchmen and the Government of British Columbia. This discussion demonstrates how IMGPs offer a practical and cooperative opportunity to work towards ecological security in Canada, and suggests federal and provincial governments invest in Guardian programs to support both climate security and Indigenous leadership. Introduction As the effects of a warming climate due to continued reliance on fossil fuels become more pressing, national and international institutions and organizations continue to propose high-level, top-down solutions aimed at mitigating the effects of climate change while maintaining domestic and international stability. During this time of rapid change, debates have arisen surrounding the concept of ‘security’ itself, with questions such as “security form whom?” or “security from what?” generating multiple perspectives towards an effective strategy to address climate and energy issues. One approach, the ecological security framework, suggests that security must be oriented around the biosphere itself, vulnerable communities, and future generations. An ecological security approach requires observers to reconsider our existing social, economic, and political systems in light of the existential threat of climate change and look outside narrowly institutional or top-down efforts to provide security. In the Canadian context, an ecological security perspective can shed new light on the intersections between climate change, extractive industry, and the relationship between Indigenous and Canadian governance structures. As changes to temperatures, weather patterns, and natural disasters already disproportionately affect northern and Indigenous communities, meaningful discussions of climate security in Canada need to incorporate and take seriously the needs of Indigenous peoples. In many respects, the ecological security framework provides a more accommodating perspective within which to explore options for meeting the needs of both Indigenous peoples and local environments. In this brief, I provide an overview of the ecological security framework, and argue this approach can reveal practical and viable avenues for unconventional and intersectional security practices. Specifically, the partnership between the Kitasoo/Xai’xais Marine Guardian Watchmen and BC Parks offers an example of an intersectional ecological security framework in practice. The overlapping and contested assertions of authority between federal, provincial, and Indigenous governments exemplified by this case suggests that the concept of security must be critically examined in an ecological context, and the possible range of actors understood as providing security widened. Climate Change, Environmental Threats, and Ecological Security To date, the primary venues for analysing and addressing challenges posed by climate change have been national and international-level institutions and organizations. National governments, including in Canada and the United States, have been incorporating climate change into national security strategies to differing degrees for several decades. Canada’s most recent defence policy, Our North, Strong and Free  integrates the implications of climate change into Canadian defence planning to a greater degree than ever before. Recent scholarship suggests that a significant majority of states in the world have similarly recognized the links between climate change and national security challenges, with many incorporating measures such as GHG emissions reductions, increases to disaster relief funding, and greater military-civilian cooperation on climate issues into their national security plans and documentation. In fact, 73% of all national security strategy documents  published between 2008 and 2020 referred to climate change and the effects of environmental change on national defence. At the international level, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)  has held debates around the theme of climate change and its impacts since 2007, with a 2021 resolution presented, though subsequently stalled, aimed at formalizing the UN’s role in addressing climate security . In 2024, Canada sponsored the opening of the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence, which supports allies’ ability to address, adapt to, and share knowledge regarding climate security challenges. Despite this growing interest and recognition, the framing of the relationship between climate change and security, and which responses are deemed appropriate, are highly contested. National and international institutions tend to view climate security as posing dangers to domestic and global stability through increased climate-induced migration, changing weather patterns, and resource scarcity, among other factors. Some attention has also been directed toward the impacts of climate change on individuals and communities, particularly through discourses of human security which highlight structural inequalities and vulnerabilities, including gendered, racial, and North-South dynamics. While the growing awareness and general movement towards addressing the implications of climate change on security are notable, some scholars suggest existing accounts overlook important aspects of security. In this respect, the concept of ecological security reframes the relationship between climate change and security by critically reflecting on this intersection from a perspective informed by the fields of political ecology, international political economy and environment, and ethics. Ecological security foregrounds the complex and interdependent relationship between communities and ecological processes themselves as the primary referent of security. Unlike conventional framings of climate security, ecological security primarily focuses on the stability and longevity of ecological systems, rather than on referent objects such as national borders or international systems. Conventional approaches to climate security generally locate national governments or international institutions as the ‘acting subjects’ responsible for providing security, but the expanded scope of the ecological security approach recognizes local communities as playing a role in creating conditions of increased security. This shift in focus necessitates a different range of responses and approaches, with scholars suggesting a simultaneous broadening of what constitutes ‘security’ with renewed interest in rethinking existing socioeconomic systems including fossil fuel reliance, agricultural systems, and global capitalism. Unsurprisingly, this position has attracted sharp critique with policymakers, scholars, and observers arguing that ‘security’ in this sense is utopian, unrealistic, and has few actionable prescriptions. Despite this, recent work by Matt McDonald suggests that ecological security is gaining institutional purchase, though the going remains slow. Here, I suggest that an ecological security approach already exists in practice and is not out of reach as some critics suggest. Specifically, we see a case of ecological security being enacted by Indigenous Marine Guardian Programs (IMGPs) in British Columbia (BC), which offers a glimpse into what an ecological security framework may look like in action. Indigenous Marine Guardian Programs: The Kitasoo/Xai’xais IMGP & Pilot Project Indigenous Marine Guardianship Programs (IMGPs) are professional programs established by a First Nation or coalition of Nations to conduct a variety of broadly defined environmental, educational, cultural, and enforcement activities. IMGPs are created with the goal of mobilizing Indigenous Knowledge and developing a meaningful pathway for Indigenous peoples to achieve greater autonomy over the management of their traditional territories. Guardians conduct monitoring, observation, and enforcement activities; research-related activities such as data collection, analysis, and reporting; and outreach activities including education, cultural activities, and collaboration with other Nations, or local and regional authorities. These programs are often involved in protecting local animal populations from illegal hunting or fishing, gathering data on proposed industrial projects, and providing input to various levels of government on land use planning. IMGPs are recognized as active assertions of Indigenous rights, as they provide avenues for Nations to exercise authority and self-determination within their territories. IMGPs are commonly incorporated into academic literature and policy spaces through the lens of conservation , as guardians are seen as environmental stewards, knowledge-holders, and community members invested in the preservation of their environment. However, relegating such programs to the technical sphere of land management or environmental studies can overlook the social, political, and even security-oriented dimensions of IMGPs. For many Indigenous peoples, the health and survival of their traditional territories including the land, air, water, and non-human animals is deeply connected to the security of the Nation and its people. As IMGPs are actively engaged in the protection of traditional territories, they can be understood as putting ecological security principles into action. Put simply, Indigenous guardians act to secure their local ecosystem against external threats, ensure the long-term survival of the environment and people who depend on it, and embody a politics of resistance and resurgence through the adoption of regulative, enforcement, and governance responsibilities. The Kitasoo/Xai’xais Coastal Guardian Watchmen are one such IMGP, located on the central coast of British Columbia. In June 2022, the Kitasoo/Xai’xais and Nuxalk Nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding with BC Parks to launch the Guardian Shared Compliance and Enforcement Pilot Project. This project created a partnership between the Nations and BC Parks through which 11 individual guardians from the two Nations undertook training and were assigned the same legal authorities as BC Park rangers. Interestingly, though the Kitasoo/Xai’xais Nation partnered with BC provincial authorities for the pilot program, at the same time the Nation has publicly opposed the federal government’s plans to establish an LNG facility and export route in Kitasoo/Xai’xais waters, with the Nation unilaterally declaring Kitasu Bay a Marine Protected Area in 2023 under Indigenous law. Therefore, while it may be tempting to simply view the Watchmen-BC Parks partnership as a step towards closer relationships between federal, provincial, and Indigenous authorities, the Kitasoo/Xai’xais Nation has not adopted a policy of uncritical cooperation. Rather, this case highlights the complex and contested relationships between Indigenous, provincial, and federal authorities. Discussion: Contestation, Cooperation, and Security  Considering the Kitasoo/Xai’xias Coastal Guardian Watchmen program in conjunction with other Indigenous-led environmental efforts raises interesting questions about ecological security in action, and how the delegation of authority between settler-colonial governments and First Nations governance impacts these efforts. I have argued elsewhere that direct action and civil disobedience efforts, such as Wet’suwet’en and other First Nations’ resistance to the construction of new oil and gas pipelines in BC, constitute examples of ecological security in action. Since such movements are led by local communities with a focus on directly preventing extractive projects from continuing, they embody the ecological security framework in that they consider the environment itself the subject of security, and they include a serious questioning of current socio-economic systems. As with other Indigenous-led movements against extractive projects, such as those against the Keystone XL and Dakota Access pipelines in the United States, First Nations are practicing a “generative refusal” by enacting a different way of relating to the environment, while simultaneously asserting the authority and legitimacy of Indigenous forms of governance through protest. Such examples of civil disobedience often throw into sharp relief the interconnections between First Nations struggles against federal or provincial authority, resistance to environmental degradation and extractive industry, and enactment of ecological security through direct action. ‘Security’ means something different to communities facing structural oppression at the hand of state authorities and who are experiencing real-time threats to their lands, waters, and ecosystems. Will Greaves has argued that the security claims of Indigenous peoples in Canada often go unheard by federal and provincial authorities because of the challenge to settler societies themselves posed by Indigenous claims to self-determination. Since Indigenous Nations’ claims to legitimacy and authority threaten the underlying sovereignty of Canadian governance, the security of Indigenous peoples cannot be taken seriously by the state. Just as the security of the environment itself cannot be adequately considered without questioning the dominance of capitalist socio-economic relations, the security of Indigenous peoples requires grappling with historically entrenched ideas about the legitimacy and authority of federal governance. Though this may appear to be an intractable problem, I propose the Kitasoo/Xai’xias partnership with BC Parks represents a possible way forward to consider how an intersectional ecological security can be enacted. As discussed above, the Kitasoo/Xai’xais Watchmen are providing security in practice to their local ecosystem and community through their actions as Guardians, prior to their involvement with the provincial government. The Watchmen themselves describe their conservation and monitoring activities as an embodiment of their worldview, and deeply intertwined with their identity as a Nation. However, since partnering with BC Parks, the actual and perceived authority of the Watchmen has been increased as they are now able to ticket, fine, and enforce the Parks Act independently. This is both an increase in the practical ability of the Watchmen to provide security for their territory and community, and an important shift in the Canadian government’s ability to support the security of Indigenous peoples themselves. By delegating this authority to the IMGP, the province of BC is helping to increase the security of the Kitasoo/Xai’xais Nation both by supporting the self-determination and autonomy of the Nation, and by increasing the capacity of the Watchmen to provide ecological security within their territories. Conclusion & Recommendations This brief discussion seeks to provoke a critical reflection on the notion of security within the contexts of climate change and the relationship between the Canadian state and Indigenous Nations. The case of IMGPs and the Kitasoo/Xai’xais Marine Guardians prompts us to consider how security in the face of climate change may require a multifaceted and intersectional approach, such as those which support local and Indigenous communities to provide security in small-scale yet meaningful ways. Ecological security reminds us that all systems are connected, and therefore solutions must similarly span different social locations and levels of governance. I suggest that both federal and provincial governments in Canada seriously consider the opportunities for meaningful collaboration provided by IMGPs and programs such as the Shared Compliance and Enforcement Pilot in British Columbia, and investigate potential collaborations with Nations and IMGPs across the country. This collaboration could take the form of a national network of Guardian programs, supporting and expanding the 30 existing Guardian programs across the country.  Australia’s Indigenous Rangers Program may offer an example to Canada’s federal government in this regard. From a traditional defence perspective, the federal government may consider expanding the role of Indigenous people within the Canadian Rangers  and incorporating elements of IMGPs and Indigenous governance within the Rangers. Ultimately, both the federal and provincial governments should endeavour to take up an ecological security perspective as Canada wades deeper into the climate crisis. This does not have to mean immediate, radical shifts to our political and economic landscape, but can be taken as an invitation to bring more stakeholders into the conversation around climate security and recognize the potential of Indigeous leadership across the country. About the Author  Aly Tkachenko is a PhD student in International Relations and Canadian Politics at the University of Victoria. Her research focuses on critical security studies, climate change, oceanic security, and civil disobedience. Aly is a research fellow with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN), as well as a 2024 fellowship recipient with the Climate Security Association of Canada (CSAC). Her work at UVic is supervised by Dr. Will Greaves. ## Economic Sanctions against a Global Superpower: Adequate for Deterrence and Punishment? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/economic-sanctions-against-a-global-superpower-adequate-for-deterrence-and-punishment/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy brief examines the effects of the economic sanctions imposed against Russia, and contemplate whether a non-miliary.... Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine marked a clear violation of international law. Vladimir Putin denies Ukraine’s statehood, but Russia’s war of aggression and motives for territorial conquest are blatantly illegitimate, giving the international community the right to intervene militarily. Even in the face of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s cries for international military aid, however, more countries have imposed sanctions than provided heavy weapons, and none have chosen to fight alongside Ukraine against Russia. Sanctions are a common foreign policy strategy in contemporary politics, especially when military action risks escalation, a dangerous option against a nuclear power. Still, a sanction campaign against a nation as powerful and influential as Russia is unprecedented and demands that Canada and NATO allies clearly articulate their objectives. The aim of this policy brief is to examine the effects of the economic sanctions imposed against Russia, and to contemplate whether a non-miliary interventionist strategy will inflict enough pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine. First, the paper will provide an overview of the rationale behind sanction imposition and the current policy strategies of NATO allies. It will then consider possible circumstances whereby Putin could evade the intended punitive effects of the sanctions, and conclude by highlighting possible policy avenues for Canada. Context NATO has faced criticism for its lack of direct military intervention in Ukraine and failure to implement a no-fly zone. As a defensive alliance, however, NATO’s primary task under Article 5 is to preserve peace and the safety of its member nations. Since direct military engagement with Russia risks expanding and escalating the war, NATO allies have prioritized containing the conflict within Ukraine. While negotiations with Yugoslavian President Milosevic effectively ended the Bosnian War in 1995, NATO allies are hesitant to negotiate with Putin, whose expansionist aims could result in wider territorial disputes being brought to the negotiation table. To minimize the risk of nuclear confrontation and Russian territorial gains, the alliance has turned to economic sanctions as a form of direct intervention in the active conflict. Economic Sanctions: What Purpose do they Serve? The ultimate aim behind sanction imposition is to change the calculations of conflict perpetrators through deterrence and punishment. Deterrence strategy encompasses two schools of thought: deterrence by denial, whereby actors make it unlikely or unfeasible for their opponent’s actions to succeed, and deterrence by punishment, whereby actors threaten to impose sanctions if the aggressor follows through with their threats. Deterrence by denial is considered a more reliable strategy since it works proactively to convince an opponent that their objectives cannot be met at a reasonable cost. In the case of Ukraine, however, NATO allies pursued deterrence by punishment. This strategy is cheaper, and enables NATO allies to evade military intervention on behalf of Ukraine, which is not a member of the alliance. Evidently, this strategy did not ultimately succeed in deterring Putin, who concluded that prospective territorial gains outweighed the projected costs of waging war in Ukraine. This, however, is where sanctions take on a punitive role: following Putin’s invasion, NATO allies imposed all threatened sanctions against Russia while adding even harsher measures directly targeting Russian oligarchs, reflecting an attempt to penalize Putin by making his war too costly to persist. Since it is difficult to wage war with a struggling economy, punishment through sanctions thus aims to shift the balance of economic interdependence to penalize the undesirable behavior of an opponent. By targeting the economic performance of the opponent’s state, sanctions work to convey that aggressive behaviour will not be tolerated, and cannot persist without confronting considerable costs. Despite this simple rationale, evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions is difficult. Sanctions are rarely pursued apart from other foreign policy missions, like arms supply or humanitarian relief campaigns, and often influence the decisions of key actors in tandem with ambiguous personal or political factors. Attributing foreign policy outcomes to economic strategy alone risks oversimplifying contextual realities, where overlapping or unknown factors are often considered in actors’ cost-benefit analyses. Consequently, while sanctions can be correlated to observed outcomes, there are few circumstances where causation can be explicitly established. Even with this challenge of evaluating overall sanction efficacy, it remains important to consider whether sanctions put forth by intervening actors meet their stated objectives. Current sanctions against Russia aim to end the war on Ukraine by intensifying logistical conflicts within the Russian military and amplifying anti-Putin sentiment. The following section will therefore provide an overview of the measures imposed on Russia by international actors, and consider whether these sanctions can successfully achieve their punitive aims. A Glimpse into the Unprecedented Campaign Russia’s invasion prompted a multilateral economic response unprecedented in its size, scope, and speed. Just weeks following February 24, 41 countries, including the U.S., EU, U.K., Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, implemented harsh sanctions and export control measures against Russia. Past cases have demonstrated the vitality of swift and widespread sanction application for successfully deterring or punishing opponents. The speed of this response exposes Putin’s miscalculated assumption that Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea destabilized the NATO alliance. While underlying tensions persist among allies, increased Russian aggression since 2014 has actually increased NATO’s defence spending and strengthened the response time of its allies. This is captured in decisions by Canada, the U.S., and the EU to block various Russian banks and major companies, including Sberbank, which holds 33% of the banking system’s assets as Russia’s largest bank. Most notable on the multilateral level is Russia’s cut-off from the global financial community. The decision by G7 countries to freeze Russian assets and disconnect Russia’s Central Bank (CBR) from SWIFT significantly prolongs the process of making foreign exchange payments. Since sanctions cover the US dollar, the Euro, Yen, Pound, and Franc, Putin is limited in his ability to evade these restrictions: shrinking Russian foreign currency and freezing assets prevents Russia from drawing from its $643 billion in foreign reserves, and from converting foreign assets into rubles to provide liquidity to sanctioned bank establishments. While emerging market economies like Turkey, Brazil, and India have been hesitant to condemn Russia’s actions or impose economic sanctions, this reluctance is partially offset by boycotts from major global companies, like BP and Shell, who withdrew oil and gas projects to evade political risk. The combination of national, multilateral, and corporate responses has succeeded in doubling Russia’s interest rate from 9.5% to 20%, while reducing Russia’s currency by 45%. This marks the largest decrease in Russian currency since the 1998 economic crisis. While Russia’s foreign debt is manageable, sitting at 27% of its GDP, the timeline for repaying short-term debt presents Putin with a considerable challenge: In the next year, Russian corporations will be obligated to repay over $100 billion, which will prevent many Russian borrowers from refinancing standing debts. Consequently, the government will be forced to draw from domestic savings for debt repayment in a time of negative growth. Additional sanctions on technological equipment and defence-related firms will make it impossible for Russia to produce various military products domestically, capturing the punitive effects of the current campaign. Specifically, the U.S. has imposed an embargo on semiconductor chips, using its strong grip on technology markets to target vulnerabilities in Russia’s military-industrial complex. Since Russia’s financial system is highly integrated in the global system, imposing heavy economic sanctions will have serious repercussions for the domestic economies of imposing states. This response therefore works to send a clear message to Putin: the international community condemns his actions, and, until he backs down, Russia’s economic and military performance will be targeted by strategic international policies. Are Economic Sanctions Sufficient? The figures presented above indicate that freezing Russia’s foreign reserves, implementing trade embargos, and expelling Russia from SWIFT have effectively hindered Russia’s economic capacity. Nevertheless, economic hardship should not be equated to political success, and there are still several scenarios where sanctions may prove to be ineffective for deterrence or punishment given Russia’s status as a global nuclear power. Sanctions can fall short of meeting their objectives for three main reasons. The first is when their imposition is delayed because of the dominant interests of imposing states. Before the invasion, Western powers were overwhelmingly concerned with maintaining diplomatic relations with Russia. While NATO allies warned that invading Ukraine would result in economic penalization, Western powers poorly communicated the extent of the sanctions they were willing to impose on Russia prior to the invasion. Even once evidence of Putin’s plans emerged, few immediate efforts were made to halt the NS2 pipeline or crush Russia’s energy sector. Biden’s December statement that the U.S. would not deploy military force in the case of invasion likely emboldened Putin by reducing strategic ambiguity, allowing Putin to prepare for ensuing economic consequences. So, although Putin underestimated NATO’s ability to implement a cohesive response, his accumulation of federal reserves, minimization of foreign debt, and budget balancing suggest that economic penalization was a foreseeable cost he was willing to incur. A reactionary policy may have been warranted given the risk of intervening against a nuclear force prematurely. However, the threat of sanctions did not deter Putin from military advancements, suggesting that NATO’s reactionary response may have afforded Putin enough time to prepare for a military campaign under a suffering economy. Secondly, sanctions can fail when they are inadequate for their task. While the sanctions imposed on Russia are unparalleled in comparison to former campaigns, Russia is also much more powerful than previously targeted countries. Given its vast economy and alliance network, Russia is better prepared to bear the weight of economic penalization. For instance, the targeted nature of the imposed sanctions may allow Russia to use proceeds from unaffected export sectors, like raw materials, to partially offset the impact of sanctions on oil exports and exclusion from SWIFT. With the share of Russia’s foreign currency reserves in NATO countries decreasing from 93% to 46% since 2016, Russia may be able to maintain a considerable profit margin to prop up the national budget. Even if the EU successfully reduces gas exports by 66% by the end of the year, Russia can, in the short-term, offset the type of budget crisis that would force immediate troop withdrawal. This slight flexibility also provides Russia with the chance to expand its market. Military and economic support from China offers another possible avenue for evading the intended effects of imposed sanctions. Although Beijing provided only a small amount of economic assistance to Russia during the annexation of Crimea in 2014 to evade secondary sanctions, the changing nature of Sino-American relations since Crimea could alter China’s response in the current context. In the past decade, China and the U.S. have disagreed on countless policy issues, including cyberspace and South Sea regulation. Many EU states now consider China a rival because of its decrease in outward investments. While there is no guarantee that China will offer substantial economic support to Russia, China’s dwindling engagement with the U.S. and EU means that it is ultimately less risky to engage with Russia than in previous conflicts. This factor, combined with Russia’s decreased reliance on the US dollar since 2014, could lessen the impact of the imposed measures, and must be considered by Western actors. Finally, sanctions can fail to meet their objectives when they produce unintended effects that offset their initial aims. While Western leaders tried to impose restrictions targeting Russian elites rather than the wider population, the withdrawal of firms in technology, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals, combined with the current currency crisis, are severely affecting Russia’s population. In turn, Putin is using the economic hardship created by sanction imposition to garner support for his regime. State-sponsored media outlets producing pro-Kremlin propaganda frame sanctions as the West targeting the Russian population unfairly. So, where Western sanctions aim to target Putin’s legitimacy crisis, they have also contributed to a rally-around-the-flag effect. If Putin is successful in distorting NATO’s response to convince the Russian population that sanctions are disproportionate, the campaign could have the unintended effect of reducing domestic pressure on Putin to end the war. Similarly, the lack of non-Western support for the American-led response to the war could discourage key alliances for NATO’s Indo-Pacific strategy, like India and Vietnam, from condemning Russian actions. The sanction campaign has demonstrated the West’s ability to control the global economic system, and many countries remain skeptical that Western-led responses can reflect their interests. In turn, Putin’s accusations of the West using its hegemonic position to impose a particular worldview and value system may resonate with key non-Western countries, affecting support for Western interests in other foreign policy issues. Recommendations for Canada Canada strongly supports the rules-based international order that Putin has blatantly undermined. Despite the campaign’s harsh impact on Russia’s crumbling economy, however, Putin shows no sign of backing down. If the survival of Russia’s economy and success of its war effort depend on continued indifference from key states, its capacity to shift trade alliances, and support from the Russian population, Canada must work to close economic loopholes through secondary sanctions while improving the core message that the sanction campaign is communicating internationally. Canada has already placed over 750 sanctions on key actors and organizations from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus since the start of the conflict, but there is still room to intensify existing measures. While the strategy of NATO allies has been reactive, Canada must now use sanctions offensively, and prepare to impose secondary sanctions if countries like China, India, or Brazil show a willingness to help Russia. Canada can take the lead in setting up a joint sanctions taskforce to establish a set of secondary sanctions consistent across NATO allies. In doing so, Canada can encourage countries currently demonstrating indifference to Russia’s violation of international law to boycott gas and oil imports, signalling that their implicit support for Russia will harm their long-term economic development interests. This can also help shorten the time horizon for Russia’s ability to function economically under the current measures, increasing the pressure Putin faces to withdraw Russian troops. Canada must also work to establish a clear communication plan and digital communications alliance to overcome the sanctions’ unintended effects on Putin’s domestic and international legitimacy. After the Russian Federal Service for Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media mandated that all domestic media outlets use information from official Russian sources on February 24, civilians turned to virtual private networks (VPNs) to avoid information restrictions. Since then, demand level for VPN access has been 873% higher than the average. Although most Russians continue to indicate support for Putin and blame the West for tensions in Ukraine, Canada should capitalize on this increased access to, and demand for, uncensored media and information. To generate anti-war sentiment among Russians before VPN usage is effectively stifled by Putin’s censorship tactics, Canada can set up a Digital Communications Alliance to draw on the resources and expertise of global media, communications, and technology outlets. This can work to improve the circulation of information within Russia, and convey the inaccuracy of Putin’s narrative while maintaining internet integrity. Canada must also clearly communicate to Russians and Western-Skeptic states that sanctions have been imposed to punish Putin’s violation of international law, and not to convey Western superiority. While suspended cooperation with Russia is necessary, Canada must demonstrate a willingness to include Russia in future discussions and decision-making bodies, like the Arctic Council, that are key to its economic success. By signalling that Russia’s exclusion from the global economy is a punitive, not a permanent, measure, Canada can stifle the appeal of Putin’s anti-Western rhetoric, increasing the domestic and international pressure he faces to end the war. Finally, as Putin works to divide cooperating partners, Canada must remain clear and unambiguous when communicating that the imposed sanctions will not be lifted until Russian forces are withdrawn, and that this Russian retreat be, “in effect, irreversible.” Putin is determined to demonstrate Russia’s capacity to withstand sanctions, especially since pursuing negotiations without substantial territorial gains risks his political survival. In turn, Canada should prepare to increase its budget for food, supplies shipments, and humanitarian aid to keep Ukraine in the war. Canada must show that even if NATO will not engage in direct military confrontation with Russia, it will not be subjected to nuclear coercion on the international stage. ## Egypt in the Russo-Ukrainian War: Impossible Non-Alignment? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/egypt-in-the-war-in-ukraine-impossible-non-alignment/ Modified: 2024-12-13 > Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War, two camps have rapidly emerged. Those supporting Ukraine in the defence of its territory an.. Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War, two camps have rapidly emerged. Those supporting Ukraine in the defence of its territory and existence, such as the United States and European countries, have given it unwavering rhetorical support, but more elusive material support. Meanwhile, important countries, not only in terms of economic and military power, but also population, such as China and South Africa, are supporting Russia in its conflict, but are not actively participating in it. However, a third large group of countries has chosen not to take a position in the conflict. This attitude is relatively common in the countries of the “Global South”. This list includes a number of African, Arab and South American countries. This analysis will focus on the case of Egypt. Egypt is a country in a very special position, being at the crossroads between the two great blocs. It has always tried to adopt a position of non-alignment and was even a founding member of the movement in the 1950s that refused to join either of the two geopolitical blocs of the Cold War. Moreover, Egypt is of great importance as it is Africa's leading military power, is ranked among the top 20 world powers and its arsenal is mainly made up of Russian, American and French equipment. What's more, Egypt's military budget will only amount to 1.1% of GDP in 2022 (i.e., around 5 billion), but this still places it among the African countries with the highest military spending, along with Morocco. The country's strong relations with both Russia and the United States, and their Western allies, strongly influence its position in this war. Its large population (100 million inhabitants), its socio-economic characteristics and President Al Sissi's desire to put Egypt back at the forefront of the international scene make this country an interesting case to study in order to understand the position of African countries and, more generally, of many countries of the South in this war. This text therefore examines how Egypt is trying to maintain balance in the Russo-Ukrainian War, and whether its non-alignment is still possible. Egyptian diplomatic relations Egypt's relations with Russia, the United States and Europe are as much economic, with agreements between the Egyptian government and the European Union, as they are military, with contracts for the purchase of Rafale fighter jets from France and the acquisition of Russian and American military equipment. In particular, American military aid has enabled Egypt to consolidate its position as an international military power by financing a very large proportion of its military expenditure. Relations between Egypt and Russia are not new. During the era of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and pan-Arabism, the Soviet Union, engaged in the Cold War, positioned itself as an ardent supporter of liberation movements and a crucial ally in the decolonization process in the Middle East and Egypt. This strategy was designed to counter Western influence in the region. The demise of the Soviet Union obviously distanced Egypt from Russia in the period 1992 - 2014. However, their relations developed strongly in 2014 following the coup d'état of Abdel Fattah Al Sissi. Russia took advantage of the United States' retreat from Egypt due to various criticisms of Al Sissi's coup and failure to respect human rights to offer military aid to the country. Since then, Russia (along with France) has been one of Egypt's main arms suppliers. Their relationship is not limited to a military partnership: it includes a significant economic component, particularly in the energy field. Since 2015, Egypt has been planning to build Africa's second nuclear power plant. This project came to fruition in 2022, when the building permit was awarded to the Russian company Rosatom, which was entrusted with its construction. On the economic front, their relationship is very diverse. Egypt is a favourite destination for Russian and Ukrainian tourists. Several million Russian tourists visit Egypt every year, accounting for 40% of the country's total tourism. This tourism has led to the development of Egyptian seaside resorts, and represents a significant part of the Egyptian economy. Russia is also Egypt's leading supplier of cereals. Egypt consumes 15 million tonnes of wheat, 80% of which is imported from Russia (50%) and Ukraine (almost 30%). Russia is therefore a key player in Egypt's national project, as well as in its international relations. Russia is not, however, in a dominant position in its relations and exchanges with Egypt, as it also maintains very good relations with Ukraine's allies, such as the United States and the European Union. These positive relations have grown steadily since the beginning of the war. Most of its relations with the United States are based on their military partnership. Egypt is a privileged NATO partner in the Mediterranean dialogue in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to its relationship with NATO, the United States has been providing Egypt with considerable military aid for a long time now. With no less than 1.3 billion dollars a year for almost sixty years, the total aid provided since the late 1970s amounts to 70 billion dollars, making Egypt the third most aided country by the United States, behind Israel and Ukraine since the beginning of the war. On the European side, Egypt is an integral part of the European Union's Neighborhood Policy. What's more, the region is Egypt's biggest customer, absorbing 30% of its exports. A number of countries, such as France and England, have special relations with Egypt, inherited from the colonial period. Relations with Ukraine are also important, as Egypt is Ukraine's main economic partner in Africa. Their relations are diverse and extend to the economic sphere, with substantial trade, a strong influx of tourists (several million before the war) and the presence of some one hundred Ukrainian companies in Egypt. The consequences of the conflict Although the war was confined to European territory, it affected more countries than it might appear. The consequences of the conflict are more than significant for many countries, and particularly for Egypt and Africa, given these countries' dependence on Russian-Ukrainian cereals. It has created a humanitarian crisis and intensified an already severe economic crisis in Egypt. Indeed, the outbreak of war halted wheat exports from Ukraine and Russia for a time, leaving African countries to fend for themselves. Egypt was no longer able to supply wheat to produce bread for its population, causing prices to soar. Today, the government finds itself with no real short-term solution to produce in greater quantities, given that 90% of water resources come from the Nile and 80% is already used for agriculture. Although Egypt is keen to achieve food sovereignty for its own security, it will not be able to do so for a number of years. Moreover, the economic crisis inherited from the consequences of COVID-19 has been accentuated by the Russo-Ukrainian War. The war led to the loss of a number of economic agreements, putting a strain on the Egyptian economy. To cite some of the consequences, we're talking about inflation of 33% in 2023, a currency devaluation of 50% and a debt that has exploded to 90% of GDP. What's more, the war has taken its toll on tourism in Egypt, which relied mainly on Russia and Ukraine. Against this backdrop, Egypt finds itself caught up in serious crises stemming directly from the Russo-Ukrainian War, and is trying to find a way out through what is the guiding principle of its foreign policy: positive neutrality. However, Egypt is also striving to pursue its non-alignment, while hoping not to antagonize both sides at the same time. We must therefore examine how Egypt positions itself between the two great blocs in conflict, and the support it gives to whom and how. The Egyptian position Historically, although a partner of the United States and Russia, Egypt has never hesitated to defend state sovereignty. Indeed, its role in the non-aligned community since the 1950s has strongly influenced its position. Thus, it would have been logical to think that Egypt would continue in this vein by taking a stand in defence of Ukrainian sovereignty. However, Egypt changed its doctrine. In fact, the consequences of the war and the risk to its security have led it to seek a balance between the two camps. For Egypt, this balancing act is the best way to survive the conflict, while abandoning its doctrine of sovereign equality. Egypt oscillates between the two camps. It cannot detach itself from Russia, nor can it do without the West and the international liberal system. For this reason, Egypt continues to trade with Russia in wheat imports. After the Africa-Russia summit in 2023, Egypt built up significant reserves of Russian wheat, with record imports for the country. On the diplomatic front, President Al-Sissi has kept in touch with his Russian counterparts and frequently receives their representatives. At the same time, Egypt has refused to implement sanctions against Russia because the consequences for its economy would be too great, much to the dismay of Ukraine. Furthermore, it was discovered in 2023 that an Egyptian arms delivery agreement to Russia was about to be put in place. 40,000 rockets were to be delivered. In this case, the USA and Ukraine put pressure on Egypt to reconsider its position. The pressure was successful, and Egypt agreed to deliver weapons to the USA for shipment to Ukraine. However, the war did relatively little damage to Russian-Egyptian relations, as Egypt cannot rely solely on Russia as an ally and pillar of its relations. As a result, Egypt was also forced to turn to the West. It was granted loans from the IMF and the European Union in exchange for certain concessions in a number of areas, such as respect for human rights and control of its borders.  This aid - 3 billion over 46 months to 2022, plus an additional 5 billion from the IMF and 7.5 billion from the European Union - is the second-largest after loans from the Gulf States. At the same time, Egypt is seeking to diversify its economic partners: trade with the United States and Europe has surged, while trade with Russia has simply stagnated. Trade with Europe has reached the tens of billions of dollars, and trade with the United States is double that with Russia (9 billion versus 4 billion). Finally, in its desire to see an end to the conflict, Egypt voted at the UN in favour of 3 major resolutions championed by the West. In 2023, it was one of the countries calling for an immediate halt to the fighting and the withdrawal of Russian troops. As the above point shows, Egypt's abandonment of its arms deliveries to Russia in the face of international pressure finally caused it to make a 180-degree turn, indirectly sending 152mm and 155mm shells to Ukraine via the United States to give itself room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia. Is Egypt really non-aligned? Despite its efforts to promote non-alignment and maintain a position of neutrality in the conflict, Egypt is struggling to maintain this line of conduct. The fact that its two major allies are indirectly confronting each other in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and that its internal situation is weighing heavily on its position, means that it cannot remain truly neutral. Its dependence on Russia and its need for the West to resolve its crises are fundamental to Egypt's position. It is a fervent advocate of a resolution to the conflict, regardless of the “winner”, without taking sides, as it does not wish to get bogged down, which would be highly detrimental to it. To sum up succinctly, the Egyptian government's position is limited to doing everything in its power to resolve the conflict in order to, in turn, resolve its internal crises and survive. To this end, Al-Sissi has tried to position Egypt as the mediator of the conflict in 2023. Finally, the potential big winner could be China, as it seeks to develop its relations with the Middle East. China sees Egypt as vital to its approach to the Middle East and, given its weight in the world economy, could become a major alternative for development and productive investment through the “belt and road initiative”. Lastly, although it may be an affront to the United States, Egypt's membership of the BRICS+ organization (now made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, but also recently including Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia) actually shows that Egypt is trying to maintain its position by diversifying its relations and partnerships, so as not to be caught in a dilemma between the United States and Russia. Indeed, the BRICS are not a military alliance, but rather a gathering of countries that may have profound differences of opinion on many issues. However, these countries are united in asserting the protection of their respective interests, respecting their independence, and collaborating on joint projects, without wishing to directly oppose the West. Moreover, Egypt has always maintained strong relations with the BRICS+ countries. Finally, the Russo-Ukrainian War highlights the break in Egypt's doctrine on the international stage, and the precariousness of this policy of balance in the face of increasingly pressing demands from both sides. ## Elections 2020: November 3, a Period of Unexpected Uncertainty? an Election in Disarray URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/elections-2020-november-3-a-period-of-unexpected-uncertainty-an-election-in-disarray/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Anessa Kimball analyzes in this hot take the different possible scenarios for the presidential election on November 3rd. New Vectors of Uncertainty With at least a half-dozen toss-up states and changes to the voting status quo-through larger mail-in & absentee ballot use, reductions in mail sorting machines, and changes to voting locations, the chances of a confirmed outcome of the 2020 US Presidential election may rest in the balance of unknown for several days, possibly longer. Multiple factors affect delays in the tallying procedures; notably the reduced number of mail sorting machines and mail in boxes in August 2020 combined with a substantive increase in the number of mail-in/absentee ballots requested for this election. By way of comparison, almost 93 million mail-in ballots have been requested for the 2020 election, in 2016 around 50 million were recorded and 15 states have broken record for absentee ballot requests, among them PA & OH. Mail-in ballots are requested by those living in their voting districts, previous to the pandemic only about 1 in 3 voters did not present at the polls. With 93 million mail-in ballot requests[1] and a current voting population around 200 million, approximately 47% of American will cast votes outside the polls. A substantial increase in comparison to 2016, requiring a significant increase in labor and coordination to be logistically managed in a short period of several weeks. As a reminder, mail-in ballots may arrive in the days following the election but must be postmarked no later than the election day. Democrats appear to be out requesting mail-in ballots, for example in PA and FL, but, again, they will be returned via mail. Requesting and mailing in a ballot, effectively adds a step relative to in-person voting. There are more paths to a Democratic win than a Republican win based on simulations developed from the aggregation of various polls, such as the work of Nate Silver and colleagues. Presidential candidates compete to obtain the 270 electoral college votes required to win the college and be subsequently nominated as President. Twenty-two different scenarios are under consideration including 19 paths to a Democratic presidency. A renewed Republican mandate requires FL, OH, GA, NC[2], as well as TX with AK both favored to go Republican. In particular, the coveted swing states of Ohio and Florida are necessary for a Trump win[3]. Yet, internal dynamics within each state complicate predictive modelling, this is combined with systemic level concerns due to both natural and exogenous factors exerting countervailing forces. Several systemic factors are examined: changing demography of voters, turnout among young adults in the last several presidential elections, and the direct effects of COVID19 on each party’s voter base. This analysis discusses the particularities of Florida and Ohio with an emphasis on cross-cutting factors contributing to uncertainty. Florida and Ohio are led by Republican governors facing complaints over the pandemic. Ohio also experienced a sharp increase in unemployment from 6% to 16% and has only recovered to 12%. Florida’s tourism industry has suffered major economic losses (as much as 35%) since the pandemic as well. Moreover, Florida ranks fifth nationally in income inequality. Both states serve as litmus tests for the possibilities and problems candidates face in winning 2020 election without minimal contention. Trump cannot win without both states indicating their centrality to a second term. This commentary continues with an examination of political uncertainties and bilateral regularities during a probable fragile period, followed by final points for reflection. System Level Sources of Uncertainty Turnout by different categories of demographic groups as they cut across multiple social cleavages complicate predictions on an aggregate scale. Three distinct factors are worth considering as confounding factors; how the changing electoral demography is shaped by race in the US, some challenges with predicting the turnout among those younger than 30, and the mitigated effect of COVID19 on the electoral bases of each party. The last election in 2018 indicated a change in the patterns of participation transcending across racial lines. “Turnout typically falls for all voter groups in midterm elections compared with the previous presidential race, but that falloff was much smaller than usual last year. Moreover, while turnout surged across virtually all groups, it increased most sharply among the voters who historically have participated at the lowest levels. For instance, the Census Bureau reported that turnout among voters under 30 last year jumped to about 36 percent of eligible voters, compared with just 20 percent in 2014. That still left young people far behind the turnout rate among seniors, about two-thirds of whom voted, but their rate of increase from the previous election was much greater. Similarly, the Census Bureau found that the turnout rate in 2018 increased more for Latinos and Asian Americans than it did for white people.” (Brownstein, 2019). Increasing turnout among young (under 30), non-Caucasians, favors the Democratic party, however seniors remain a consistently stable block turns out to vote for conservatives more than liberals. Additionally, there is the continual concern about youth turnout on election day, youth turnout in 2016 as expected from the two previous elections. Yet, Democrats lost support among African-American and Latino youth. Recalling the ‘youth electorate’ is more racially diverse than the ‘over-30 portion of the electorate’ at 61% compared to 73% White. Effectively, not maintaining the consistent support of the younger diverse voter is problematic as a long-term strategy for Democrats. The liberal-ticket faces challenges engaging those voters given Harris’ record as a prosecutor who enforces policies biased against minorities. Population shifts to TX by minorities after Hurricane Katrina have contributed to shifting the state closer to purple and both TX and FL are among the top 8 states in population growth since 2000. In addition, it should be noted white college educated women, increased as a proportion of the voting electorate favoring democratic candidates. If young Americans participate in the 2020 election, it should increase the chances of a Democratic win. Population demography shifted due to the COVID19 pandemic. With hundreds of thousands of deaths, Mayer & Schintler argued in August 2020, “overall, the death effect seems to give a modest boost to Republican chances. This is because Black and Hispanic voters favor Democrats at much higher rates than the white elderly favor Republicans. So, for every 10 deaths among African American voters, the Democrats lose eight or nine votes, while the Republicans lose only one or two. Among the white elderly, when 10 die, the Republicans lose six votes, and the Democrats lose four. Even though the white elderly are much more reliable voters, the turnout differential doesn’t come close to the gap in partisanship. Consequently, nationwide, we predict a roughly 22,000-vote a Trump vote.” The pandemic has been comparatively more fatal for minorities than white people for example, 1 in every 920 Black Americans have died compared to 1 in every 1840 White Americans. More succinctly, the rate of mortality for Hispanic and Black American age adjusted is 3.2 times higher than for White Americans and “nationwide, Black Americans have experienced 20.8% of all deaths of known races, but represent 12.4% of the population.” National level sources of uncertainty will have mixed effects on partisan participation. The liberals need to mobilize a solid vote from its younger supporters and those representing the diversity in the party by engaging them sufficiently in campaign issues of concern such as education, housing, and health care without provoking a cleavage on higher education versus public education or rural versus urban needs. The conservatives are positioned to benefit from strong consistent turnout among seniors, and, ironically, positive externalities from COVID19 net death are expected concerning support. Unmarried college educated females are not the stronghold of the conservatives, married (white) women and those without college educations remain distinct pools of support. For example, women now comprise 50.2% of the college-educated labor force, up from 45.1% in 2000 (Fry 2019). However, with more females of all races becoming college educated and deciding not to marry, those demographic pools are suffering from desertification. Table 1: Confounding electoral factors and expected political party favored Changing racial diversity of electorate                 Democratic Youth voting turnout strength                               Democratic COVID19 fatality effects (predicted)                     Republican FL- liberalizing suffrage (ex-felons)                       Democratic FL- increased Latino registration & turnout         Democratic FL- changed voter registrations (intra-US)           Republican OH- youth registration decline                               Republican OH- health care & COVID19 management           TIE State Level Sources of Uncertainty While there are national tendencies in motion, swing states provide dynamic environments for understanding the compound effects of the sources of uncertainty across differing levels of hierarchy. Universal indirect suffrage in US presidential elections constrains state-level votes to be filtered through the electoral college, where the final selection is made. State level dynamics can both facilitate or complicate voter participation and voter eligibility. Sub-federal level dynamics may play a mitigating, competing, or reinforcing role comparative to national dynamics conditioned on legislation at a state-level. The two states under examination in this section are not only swing states but currently lead by Republican governors. Distinctly, they serve as tests of how the current administration managed the pandemic and potential economic recovery. Florida experienced deep economic, demographic losses from the pandemic but its demographic diversity is distributed throughout the state, whereas Ohio offers a moderate level of diversity, centered in the northern portion of the state[4]. As a global tourism destination, Florida has decent chances of recovering within a few years economically from this pandemic crisis, yet the future economic vitality is not so clear for Ohio. Ohio offers a state deeply affected by the pandemic with job loss and difficulty recovering. Essentially, Ohio represents past cleavages and Florida represents future possible cleavages. Both represent difficult flips from the partisan perspective, again suggesting a need to focus attention. Cleavages on race and partisanship issues are large in Ohio representing both a rural-urban cleavage and, with the exception of Cincinnati, a north-south cleavage as the southern Ohio border sits on the extended Mason-Dixon line. Kentucky bordering the south of Ohio is solidly conservative territory and Mitch McConnell, first elected in 1984, is the longest serving senator in Kentucky history and upon election to his 7th term he will move into the top 25 longest serving Senators in US history. Ohio’s distinct geographic placement permits a unique view contrasting both cleavages due to the juncture of most racialized individuals located in the northern portion of the state. Only 25% of its congressional districts are held by Democrats, those individuals hold the urban areas, and, notably, the four individuals include the only non-males and non-Whites among the whole delegation. Ohio experienced high job losses from NAFTA generating a fertile ground for protectionist and populist discourses favoring the conservative base. Due to the complexities of the demographic terrain in Ohio, one must parse issues based on party positions in the local context to understand central tendencies. Second, Ohio youth turnout is a concern based on published research; youth failure to register is a critical signal of portending failure to participate by voting (Democratic) in the 2020 election. Finally, among states surveyed in Sept 2020 it was among those most critical of the healthcare support received for COVID but MOST supportive of Trump among all states in the survey. Ohio represents territory to lose for Republicans, i.e. the party should be able to retain it, while Florida inversely offers possible to claim for the Democratic party as it among the closest to the edge of being flipped blue. A poll done by Your Voice Ohio/Bliss Institute asked Ohioans to rank 16 issues in order of importance. The differences along gender and racial cleavages demonstrate the importance of parsing issues relative to demography. Older individuals (white & non-white) converged on COVID19 as the top priority followed by the economy and healthcare. White more educated voters highlighted the economy and health care. Income inequality, racism and education ranked top for females. Non-White voters ranked racism, criminal justice and addiction as most important. Finally, the young are heterogeneous concerning their rankings of issues, clustering on racism, education, criminal justice, mental health, environment, social services & addiction. Ohio survey data confirm the old and young do not have any shared priorities but the young, Non-white and females cross over on multiple issues. Immigration ranks last as an issue of importance in this sample of 1037 registered Ohio voters, as married male higher income voters mark it as important. The salience of cross-cutting cleavages requires electoral participation by the young and non-White voters to produce a Democratic win. An August study confirmed youth voter registration was down by 40% in OH compared to in 2016, which favors a Republican win. Nonetheless, one key issue could exert critical countervailing pressure, health care. Ohio voters are almost perfectly divided on whether Trump or Biden are most likely to address both the public health needs and economic costs of COVID-19. For these reasons, in the absence of significant youth/diverse turnout, it is expected Ohio will remain under Republican control. In fact, Ohio is the only one of 10 battleground states where the candidates are determined as equally competent for managing the pandemic crisis, Trump has a slight edge, within the margin of error (48% vs 45%). The issue of candidates and COVID19, more sharply divides Florida voters (59% vs 35%). The Democrats are favored. When it comes to diversity in the representation from Florida, again the Democratic party offers 11 of 13 candidates from under represented groups among 27 representatives. Florida’s diversity includes more Hispanic Americans relative to Ohio and that group has grown 9% over the last decade. Pew Research notes they comprise 17% of all registered voters, and critically, Latinos register as Democratic or Independent at a rate of nearly 3 to 1 relative to registering as Republican. Yet, “the recent trend in party registration among Hispanic Floridians stands in contrast to the pattern among all Floridians. More Florida residents have registered to vote as Republicans than Democrats since 2016” (Bustamante 2020).  That notwithstanding there is a significant state-level factor unique to Florida, changes in the suffrage rights of ex-felons. Amendment 4 was passed in 2018 and has been implemented requiring former felons have met all sentencing conditions (i.e. the time incarcerated plus proof of paying any fees or financial judgements required in their case). It is difficult to estimate how many individuals will participate in 2020 but data indicate as many as 1.5 million Floridians, most non-White, now have a “clearer” path to voting. Those individuals are anticipated Democratic voters. Finally, it must be noted the last state-wide election resulted in the competitive Democratic loss of a minority candidate. The forces at work on the political terrain in both Ohio and Florida are both dynamic and multilevel. Factors in Ohio show cleavages on gender, race, and age. In contrast, Floridians are divided more clearly upon racial and partisan lines with solid diverse turnout serving as a precondition for any swing towards liberal. The uncertainties on the political ground surrounding voter turnout strongly point to an examination of the compound effects of both system level and state level factors on predictions based on the information available about turnout expectations. Uncertainties on the Political Ground Predicting US Presidential election outcomes requires understanding both the aforementioned factors in combination with turnout expectations. Therefore, compound voting effects = system + state level factors, conditioned on expected turnout. Expectations for turnout among the youth and diverse groups are higher in Florida than in Ohio. If such turnout materialises (again the true effect of suffrage enlargement to ex-felons is only predicted), it should help to counteract the larger Republican registrations and the COVID19 gain the party is predicted. Participation is required for Florida to flip to the Democratic party. There are no winning scenarios for the Republicans if Florida is not defended. In contrast, Democrats can produce two winning scenarios without either state. Moreover, they benefit from 7 additional winning scenarios if they capture either state with a combination of two of the following swing states: Georgia, North Carolina & Arizona. Final Points – Delays, Recounts, & Possible Bilateral Diplomatic Shenanigans? This analysis does not address the challenges facing states with increased mail-in/absentee voting when it comes to tabulating results on election night. Logistical obstacles combined with competitive races in multiple swing states could produce possible delays. Indeed, litigation is underway in multiple states concerning the inequitable effects of changes made to voting due to the pandemic or other activities. Nonetheless, looking inside at national and state level factors combined with expectations turnout, the compound effects to result in a : FL = Democratic (flip); OH = Republican (defend)à 7 Democratic winning scenarios from that prediction all involve two of 3 swing states on the edge (GA, AZ, or NC) to win, but the fact remains Republicans must defend both FL & OH to produce a win, whereas Democrats can lose both while retaining two scenarios favors a vote convergence resulting in a liberal victory for the presidency from 2020-2024. Thus, the Democratic party is favored to win the 2020 elections after all votes are tallied. Given the state of racial tensions and the consistent “othering” discourse of Trump throughout the elections, there is a non-zero probability of protest, scenes of intimidations to circulate about polling locations and possible violence in some state. Instances of rioting could emerge. A Democratic win may come at the cost of exacerbating fundamental cleavages during a period of crisis that themselves could undermine the democracy the party seeks to protect. If Trump rejects results outright insisting on litigation pursued at state and federal levels, it will contribute to tensions. Finally, the conditions under which Trump exits the Executive physically may play a role; signaling “stand down, but stand by” to militarised supporters is a contradictory signal at best; at worst, an outright threat to the peaceful transfer of democracy over the next several months in the US. Recommendations for Canada & Other US Partners Duck and cover until the election results are confirmed.   [1] Mail-in votes are regularly tabulated, however in some states absentee ballots are only recorded if the distance between candidates is sufficiently small to warrant opening them. [2] In June, Republicans & Democrats were less than one point away in North Carolina, Trump visited NC a half-dozen times but Biden was more absent; making his second visit in September after seven months of absence. Accessed: 19 Oct 2020. [3] GA and OH are worth similar numbers of electoral votes finding themselves on the edge of swinging red or blue. Some small probability exists Texas will swing blue with its large allocation of 38 electoral votes with 3 points dividing candidates. FL’s 29 coveted electoral votes make it a required win for Republicans though multiple winning scenarios exist for Democrats without FL. [4] OH, one of the “true” swing states, failed to predict the Presidential outcome once since 1944, voting Nixon over Kennedy (1960). ## Elections 2021 – What is the future for foreign policy and national defense? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/elections-2021-future-foreign-policy/ Modified: 2021-11-02 > Face à la complexification des enjeux internationaux et au mutisme des différents partis politiques sur leurs ambitions internationales... this is a French language video with English subtitles. The 2021 elections are taking place within a unique national and international context. With the advent of a fourth wave of COVID-19 and all the systemic flaws that the pandemic has brought to the forefront, foreign policy and defence issues have been relegated to the background even as Canada's strategic position within the international community has been in constant decline for the past few years. Faced with the increasing complexity of international issues and the silence of the various political parties on their international ambitions, what future can we expect for Canadian foreign policy and national defence? Moderator: -Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, fellow et conseiller principal en communications et partenariats au CÉRIUM Guests: -Marie-Joëlle Zahar, chercheuse au CÉRIUM et directrice du Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix -Justin Massie, co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique et professeur de science politique à l’UQAM ## Emadeddin Badi, Libya Advisor at the Geneva Center URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/entretien-avec-emadeddin-badi-conseiller-pour-la-libye-au-centre-de-geneve/ Modified: 2021-10-27 In this 23rd episode of Security Tips, Thomas talks about the situation in Libya with Emadeddin Badi, Non-Resident Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, Senior Analyst at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, and Libya Advisor at the Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance. After a brief historical overview, Emadeddin Badi discusses NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011 and its aftermath, then paints a picture of the situation today. He concludes by analyzing the role of the United States, Europe, and Canada in the reconstruction of the country.Thoma ## Engaging With a New Syria URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/engaging-with-a-new-syria/ Modified: 2025-05-01 As Syria embarks on a new chapter following the end of the Assad regime, Canada reaffirms its commitment to peace, stability, inclusive governance, and reducing the global refugee crisis. This report will outline how Canada should engage with the new interim government led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The situation in Syria has many implications for Canada’s foreign and security policy including, but not limited to, the potential for the resurgence of violent extremist groups, the resettlement of refugees, and preventing any further human rights infringements. Canada faces a complex decision in navigating the evolving situation in Syria, balancing its values of human rights and global mediation with its own security and interests. While the fall of Assad aligns with Canada’s goals, the rise of HTS to leadership poses its own challenges due to its historical affiliation with Al-Qaeda and ISIS. A multilateral, strategic approach, alongside allied support and donor commitments, offers the best path to ensure a peaceful Syrian-led transition without conflict. Considering the current situation and Canada’s strategic interests, I recommend that the Government of Canada increase its intelligence collaboration in the region and develop clear policies for repatriation and rehabilitation of Canadian foreign fighters in the region. Canada’s strategies rely on its cooperation with its global and regional allies. Later in the report, I build on the European Union’s (EU) and United Kingdom’s strategies at the Annual Syria Pledge conference in March 2025. I also dive deeper into Canada’s cooperation strategies with its allies in the region, primarily Jordan and Lebanon. Finally, I consider NATO’s approach and Canada’s role in Syria. I further suggest the importance of supporting human rights efforts in the region. Finally, I advise the government to commit to diplomatic engagement with the interim government for a peaceful transition. These recommendations aim to foster stability, support democratic governance, and promote human rights in the region. Canada’s Interests in the Region As a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, Professor Thomas Juneau claimed that Canada had not done enough ten years ago in Syria. Those words are still true today. At the centre of the policy at the time was that no belligerent party winning would be in the interest of Canada’s security and prosperity. Instead, Canada’s containment policy centred around the need to “build the capacities of vulnerable regional partners; to support international counter-proliferation initiatives; and contribute to humanitarian efforts.” Canada’s current strategy for Syria is part of its whole-of-government strategy for the Middle East. Having invested over $4 billion between 2016-2022 to respond to the ongoing crisis in Iraq and Syria, Ottawa has pursued four main strategic objectives. One has been to provide gender-responsive, needs-based humanitarian assistance to crisis-affected populations. Canada has cooperated with UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the International Red Cross/Crescent Movement to help vulnerable individuals. The second has been to help communities build up their resilience in the face of protracted conflict. In Syria, Canada has contributed to livelihoods programming and ensuring the self-reliance and autonomy of female-headed households, built the capacity of women’s organizations, and raised awareness of affected communities. The third has involved supporting efforts on accountability related to war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and allegations of chemical weapons use. Ottawa’s commitment to transitional justice initiatives seeks to hold all parties of the conflict accountable for building civil society and peacebuilding initiatives while supporting the political participation of women. Fourth, and finally, Canada has supported those diplomatic initiatives that contribute to a sustainable political resolution of the conflict. Canada’s commitment to a negotiated solution by working with allies, like-minded countries, and the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria. Ottawa has reaffirmed its commitment to improved humanitarian access to civilians, a ceasefire, and respect for human rights law and international humanitarian laws. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its consolidation of power Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a coalition of Sunni Islamist insurgents based in northern Syria. It evolved from Jabhat al-Nusrah, which was al-Qaida’s former branch in Syria. HTS was formed in 2017 when the Nusrah Front merged with other anti-regime groups in northwestern Syria. The group primarily focused on attacks against the Assad regime and sought to replace it. However, the group’s focus has shifted to preserve the status quo by ending the conflict, solidifying its governance of its controlled areas, and gaining international recognition. The group has lost support from various Salafi-jihadists due to their prioritization of governance and perceived abandonment of “jihad”. HTS is the largest fighting group of Operation Deterrence of Aggression in Syria, the umbrella group formed to coordinate military operations in opposition to the Assad regime. They were formerly known as the Jabhat al-Nusra. At the start of the Arab Spring in 2011, it was formed by ISIS, which it split from to declare allegiance to al-Qaeda. The group had an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 fighters before it severed ties with  in 2017. The group subsequently changed its name to HTS and set up a new organization with several other similar groups. HTS is made up of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (the largest faction in the group), Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din, and Jaysh al-Sunna. Military analyst Michael Clarke notes that at best, “we can hope for from HTS would be some kind of ‘benevolent dictatorship’ with a tolerance of Syria’s patchwork of different peoples.” Doubts linger as to whether HTS had completely renounced al-Qaeda. However, al-Sharaa’s comments to “defend the oppressed” and promises of punishment and accountability “even among those close to us” seem to give some hope. HTS also operates and is allied with various groups under Operation Deterrence of Aggression. First is the Tavhid va Jihod (KTJ), whose previous leader was removed by HTS for supporting al-Qaeda in the region. The group is made up of 400-500 fighters specialising in sniping operations, direct assaults, and operations behind enemy lines. The second group is Xhemeti Alban (Albanian Tactical), which is composed of 50-100 Albanian fighters from Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, and southern Serbia. Mujahdin Ghuroba Division joined HTS in 2017 and was integrated as the Omar bin al-Khattab brigade of 200-400 Uzbek, Tajik, and Uyghur fighters. The Islamic Party of Turkestan (TIP) established a faction called “TIP in the Sham” composed of 1000 and 2000 Uyghur fighters. The Yurtugh Tactical joined HTS in 2024 to fight a regime supported by a Chinese oppressor and to support Turkestani groups. Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (LMA) comprises 400-500 Chechens, Tajiks, Dagestani, Azerbaijanis, Kazakh, and Ukrainian fighters and joined HTS in January 2017. LMA offer military operational support as well as media and propaganda arms. Ajnad al-Kavkaz is an exclusively Chechen group that operates in northern Syria. This group is somewhat independent of HTS and has been involved in the Ukrainian defence against Russia. On December 8th, 2024, the rebel army, led by HTS, took over Damascus and Ahmed al-Sharaa, previously known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, became interim president of the Syrian Arabic Republic. Al-Sharaa’s foreign policy has taken a shift from Assad’s anti-American, pro-Russia stance; the interim government has announced that it aims to restore ties with the United States and believes ‘that President Trump seeks peace in the area’. Al-Sharaa visited the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman ‘to support the security and stability of sisterly Syria’ and ‘to strengthen bilateral relations.’ He followed this meeting with another trip to Türkiye to resolve the Kurdish conflict peacefully. With the assignment of Mohammed Terko, a Syrian Kurd, as the minister of education, the ceasefire between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and HTS, and the public celebrations of Newroz, we are seeing signs of Syria’s new political horizon. These events represent a shift to the suppression Syrian Kurds previously experienced under Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Syria is in a period of political and social transition, and HTS faces various security threats within Syria’s borders that must be overcome before the country can achieve stability. In his first address as president, al-Sharaa vowed to “form a broad transitional government, representative of Syria’s diversity.” Putting into consideration the example of the Taliban’s authoritarian governance after the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, caution is warranted. Ezzedine al-Rayeq, a Damascus-based lawyer, stated that although he wished a more democratic approach had been used to appoint the interim president, this was the only ‘realistic and pragmatic’ way forward. Professor Ziad Majed, an expert on the Middle East at the American University of Paris, warns about the importance of avoiding any acts of revenge against the Alawite community and other supporters of the Assad regime. In an attempt to encourage patience and to signal his commitment to democracy, al-Sharaa announced his plans for elections in Syria in five years. Superficially, those plans indicate a positive and democratic turn for Syria. Alas, many internal and external threats must be confronted for a peaceful transition. One worries, however, that the rhetoric coming from Damascus only serves to appease Western governments and to continue taking up an anti-Assad stance to deflect attention away from any authoritarian processes within. Old Wounds: Syria’s Historical Divisions and Threats The various threats within and beyond Syria’s borders are ubiquitous. Internally, al-Sharaa must deal with trying to resolve conflicts that have existed long before the Arab Spring in 2011 that continue to threaten the safety and security of the region. The risk of religious violence between Sunnis and Alawites persists in Syria and if the interim government does not resolve these issues peacefully the potential for conflict increases. When a car bomb killed 19-20 people on the 3rd of February, 2025, it posed another security threat for al-Sharaa to address. The trauma and wounds cut during the civil war remain deep when a Syrian security patrol was attacked by al-Assad loyalists on 6th of March, 2025, leading to a clash estimated to have killed more than 1,000 people in two days. The removal of Assad was only the first step on a long road to a safe and secure Syria. External threats to Syria’s security and the potential for spillover into the rest of the Middle East and North Africa remain a concern for all parties involved. The clashes between Kurdish troops and Turkish militant groups continue to be a cause of concern for as Ankara wants to closely monitor any agreements between the HTS and the Kurdish armed groups. Despite Türkiye extending its role to maintaining the diplomatic channels between Syria and NATO members,  Türkiye has its own interests in maintaining a relationship with Russia and Iran. Al-Sharaa’s government must also deal with calls for Shia intervention by former Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki. With the HTS’s members and supporters being Sunni, the discourse emerging from Shia neighbours could trigger conflict and civil unrest. The tension between Sunni groups and the other military factions continue to grow as al-Sharaa denounced Iran and labelled them a regional threat. Furthermore, as Israeli outposts are being built in Syria the growing threats of conflict in the Golan heights and fears of an Israeli land grab continue. Israel’s assertive stance despite al-Assad’s presidency marked relative border stability, his removal has resulted in airstrikes in Syria due to Israel’s concerns over a political void in Syria. What meaning for Canada and what could be done The conflict in Syria has potential global security implications and Canada is no exception to this. Canada has over 44,000 Syrian refugees currently settled across its provinces. If the conflict continues, there is increased potential of a further refugee crisis, with consequences on Canada’s economy and on the refugees themselves who have expressed how hard it has been for them to adapt. Additionally, as the interim president is part of HTS, which Canada still labels a terrorist entity, has begun attempts to gain legitimacy and international recognition of his authority with international visits and shifts in alliances, the Government of Canada needs to focus on cooperation and mediation to prevent further conflicts. The shift in Syria’s alliances towards Saudi Arabia, while maintaining a relationship with Türkiye is crucial to understanding the shifting regional dynamics. If peace is to persist, there must be attempts at ensuring these regional ties with Syria and its neighbours continue to develop. Canada needs to decide on the level of diplomatic recognition and engagement with the interim Syrian government to ensure its own foreign interests and security. The power vacuum and transitional instability may provide opportunities for rival groups to regroup and to pose potential global security threats similar to what had occurred in 2013 with ISIS. These violent extremist groups were not limited by borders and their movements were seen globally. The Government of Canada also has a commitment to ensuring the safety of its population for returning ISIS fighters. Indeed, as a signatory of the Convention for the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, it has a legal obligation to prosecute returning foreign fighters. The new Syrian government’s stance on foreign nationals should concern Canadian policy makers. Foreign fighters associated with opposition groups will impact policies on repatriation and monitoring of Canadian citizens involved in the conflicts, especially if the HTS seeks to prosecute them in Syria. From a humanitarian perspective, the transition could lead to new waves of refugees, especially those concerned about the current governments policies and any prosecution of non-Sunni Muslims. The Government of Canada should be monitoring the new government’s commitment to human rights, with specific focus on religious and ethnic minorities. The humanitarian aid being provided must be adjusted to satisfy these goals. Furthermore, the sanctions policy must be evaluated and instead be replaced with providing humanitarian aid and reconstruction. Perhaps the most important commitment Canada should consider is its strategic diplomatic engagement with regional allies to have a cohesive approach towards the new Syrian government, which balances support of the democratic process against the caution necessary given HTS’s own human rights and illiberal record. The opening of an embassy or, for that matter, a consulate in Damascus remains premature, but an official delegation to Syria and some conditional intelligence sharing could improve ties. Meaningful concessions become symbolic of the relationship and make groups less likely to return to violence; providing unconditional humanitarian aid and symbolic gestures reduces the likelihood of Syria returning to a civil war under another belligerent dictator. Canada’s announcement to reduce sanctions on Syria – which were tools against the Assad regime – is a positive first step in order to allow the rebuilding of Syria; the interim government in Damascus has sought international support and Canada’s commitment to funding humanitarian assistance reflects the global sentiment of commitment to assisting the Syrian people. A Multilateral Approach Canada’s strategy in Syria largely relies on its cooperation with its international and regional allies. On February 14th, 2025, in a joint statement on Syria in preparation for the March conference, participants expressed to cooperate on ensuring the success of the post-Assad transition framework that “must be Syrian-led and Syrian-owned”. The group supported al-Shara’s commitment to representing all Syrian society as well as members of the Syrian diaspora. The joint statement further echoed its commitment to acknowledge the Syrian transitional government, provide it with support to ensure terrorist groups cannot re-establish haven in Syrian territory, cease all hostilities in Syria in support of unification, and mobilize the international community to increase humanitarian assistance and aid to Syria and its people. In March, the European Union reaffirmed its commitment to aiding Syria pledging 6 billion euros in aid to ensure a peaceful political transition of power, following the ousting of former President Bashar Assad in December. The British government has also increased their commitment to a stable Syria to ensure “security at home and abroad.” London’s Plan for Change emphasizes the United Kingdom’s commitment to playing a leading role in Syria’s post-Assad recovery. Hamish Falconer, Minister of the Middle East, pledged 160 million British pounds – to be delivered by UN and NGO partners – to provide Syrians with essential aid such as water, food, healthcare, and education. Syria’s interim leaders were present at the Annual Syria Pledge conference in Brussels, which for the first time since 2017 has included members of the Syrian government. EU have echoed the need to commitment to a fresh start, “despite the deadly violence this month that pitted the new, Islamist rulers against Assad loyalists.” The conference, despite the UN’s designation of HTS as a terrorist group, seeks to engage with the new rulers as long as they commit to inclusive and peaceful transition. NATO has also emphasized the importance of the cautious approach to the uncertainty in Syria. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has described the situation as a “moment of joy but also uncertainty”, which he called for a Syrian-led transition so long as the Syrian rebels uphold the rule of law, protection of civilians, and respecting religious minorities. However, NATO’s response has been far from a united one. Türkiye has been criticized by U.S. President Donald Trump for controlling the rebels and how President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is orchestrating an “unfriendly takeover”. Despite these criticisms Ankara has doubled down on its position and celebrated its cooperation with Syria and the HTS. Ibrahim Kalin, Türkiye intelligence chief, was praying in the Umayyad mosque with al-Sharaa and Defense Minister Yasar Guler emphasized the new opportunity to provide military training and resources to support the de facto leaders to stabilize Syria. NATO’s stance on Syria remains complex and plagued with uncertainty. Between Washington’s cooperation with Tel Aviv and Ankara’s strategic interests and agreements with Moscow, there has been no unified approach on how to deal with the HTS. The conflicting interests have left NATO without a unified strategy, despite the understanding that there needs to be a peaceful resolution. NATO’s “hands-off approach” has had negative consequences without as long as it remains representing different interests that limit NATO’s overall impact. Cooperating with regional allies could be Ottawa’s most important containment toolkit. Canada’s strategies for Jordan and Lebanon are not limited to aid, it places emphasis on strengthening border security on the Syrian border and building capacity for their security forces to prevent and counter violent extremism and reducing the flow of foreign fighters in and out of Syria. Canada’s cooperation and coordination with Jordan and Lebanon largely revolve on the security threats emerging from the Syrian civil war. Syria and Lebanon’s agreement to a ceasefire presents an opportunity for Canada to use Beirut to ensure a degree of security in the region so that Ottawa can succeed in Syria mission. Canada’s ambassador to Lebanon – Stefanie McCollum – will play a dual role as Syria’s ambassador as well to further Canada’s commitment to increasing diplomatic ties with the interim government. Canada’s special envoy to Syria’s – Omar Alghabra – visit to Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon was tasked with reiterating their commitment to contributing to peaceful and inclusive transition in Syria. Alghabra went a step beyond the traditional containment approach and instead shifted the discourse to increasing Canada’s humanitarian commitment to ensuring food security, healthcare, water and sanitation, and protection services through cooperation with their regional allies – Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Alghabra’s mission focused on enhancing cooperation with regional consultants to strengthen diplomatic ties and coordinate humanitarian response strategies. Ottawa thus can leverage international recognition and rhetorical commitments to human rights on the part of HTS to recover its role as a mediator and to build more trust with its regional allies. A Tiger Changing its Stripes? One of the main concerns for all parties involved is the potential for HTS to take the route of the Taliban when the dust settles. Similar to Syria, Afghanistan continues to face its own internal struggles after years of conflict and despite the wishful optimism of the international community, there was a significant return to their authoritarian rule. The United Nations has referred to the regime as a ‘de facto authority’ that lacks international legitimacy, with increased restrictions on women and reduced toleration of religious practices. There have been arguments however, that this lack of recognition and cooperation does nothing on the ground other than give Western politicians a moral high ground and symbolic champions of Afghan women. That is not to say that al-Sharaa is guaranteed to take the Taliban’s route and go back on all his promises since taking control of Damascus. It is important that a key component of al-Sharaa’s policies have been to expel the radicals within HTS and their separation from al-Qaeda for their goals of governance beyond the latter’s mission of a global Jihad. During 2018 HTS clashed with al-Qaeda groups to survive over their shift from Jihad to politics. HTS is also responsible for dismantling the al-Qaeda affiliated group Hurras al-Din and have shared intelligence with NATO through Turkey to expose ISIS and al-Qaeda high-value targets. In creating the Salvation Government, al-Sharaa did not impose minority status on religious minorities and has continued to emphasize his commitment to ideological and behavioural transformation. That being said, al-Sharaa has coup-proofed his rule by monitoring disputes within his inner circle and ensuring internal opposition cannot gain any traction in his ranks. HTS may not take a path of the Taliban, but that is not to imply that they would be a champion of democracy. Despite the growing pessimism and skepticism, not all groups designated as terrorist groups should remain. Though very different from HTS, not least in the use of violent tactics and human rights violations, the African National Congress, which originated as South Africa’s liberation movement, was once labelled a terrorist group and later became the group that positioned itself as a key player to end Apartheid peacefully and champion democracy. Similarly, it was Sinn Fein’s communication strategies and dissociation from the IRA that mirrors HTS’ approach. Ottawa cannot assume that HTS will return to its radical origins. Nor should it expect its immediate reform. Al-Sharaa’s policies have shifted how the group has operated over the past decade and despite the persistence of hardline elements, the leadership has strived for rule through a more inclusive and national direction rather than an ideological one. His pragmatism is itself a double-edged sword; he appears willing to moderate and combat al-Qaeda and ISIS, but he may do whatever it takes to remain in power. Conclusion The recent developments in Syria present various challenges and opportunities for Canada. It is a chance for Canada to reprise its role as a global mediator and advocate for human rights. A proactive approach is essential to navigate the complexities of the evolving situation, uphold Canadian values, and protect its ow interests and security. Canada’s allies in the region and beyond have all signalled their commitment to ensuring a peaceful Syrian-led transition under the de facto government. Although how the HTS will operate remains uncertain, much of what has been done should give some form of optimism of change. This is not wishful optimism of believing Syrian democracy will unfold over night, but a response to lessons learned from the hands-off approaches in the past and an absence of consensus in NATO and the UN. Ottawa is left with a dilemma on how to proceed about Syria. The toppling of Assad was the desired outcome but having HTS take his place – with its own history of violent radicalism – poses many problems. In assessing HTS’s trajectory considering Canada’s interest and allies in the region, a multilateral strategic approach represents the best step forward to ensure a peaceful transition of Syria and to prevent another civil war. The commitments made at the Syria International Donor pledge aims to encourage the leaders down a path of peace and Canada’s role in this should not be understated. ## Ensuring the European Union’s Economic Security: a Revolution in the European Model URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ensuring-the-european-unions-economic-security-a-revolution-in-the-european-model/ Modified: 2024-02-27 > After thirty years of quite peaceful coexistence between the economic and geopolitical spheres (1990-2020), the former is being overtaken... After thirty years of quite peaceful coexistence between the economic and geopolitical spheres (1990-2020), the former is being overtaken by the latter as competition between Great powers returns. This is taking place in a hitherto unknown context, due to two essential characteristics: firstly, an unprecedented level of global economic and technological interdependence, and secondly, the common constraint of climate transition, implying both coordination in response and increased competition for access to the necessary scarce resources. Against this backdrop, the "European Economic Security Strategy", published on June 20, 2023 by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, sets out the challenges facing the European model in the current global competition, and offers Member States guidelines for adapting the European Union to meet these challenges over the long term. The importance of this document is further underlined by the State of the Union address given by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in Strasbourg on September 13, 2023, who used the expression "economic security" for the first time in this type of speech. What is "economic security"? In the early 2000s, the term was linked to welfare economics, with work at its heart: the concept reflects the degree to which people are economically protected against the risks of losing their income (unemployment, illness, retirement). In 2004, for example, the International Labour Office (ILO) devoted a report to the subject entitled "Economic Security for a Better World", the title of which is sure to make strategic analysts smile twenty years on. The study showed a correlation between individual happiness and "the degree of income security, measured in terms of income protection and minimization of inequality". Social protection and the nature of employment contracts were at the heart of the possible response to economic insecurity. What is the current state of the debate in a context of heightened competition between major powers? We are not that far from the original definition: it simply applies to entire states, not just individuals. In fact, what is the "degree of economic protection of a State against the risks of loss of its revenues taken as the sum of the economic activities taking place on its territory"? This would be my proposed definition. But what significance does this have within the unique framework of the European Union? The European Commission is intended to deal with economic issues, which are at the heart of its exclusive and shared competences. However, while the economy is the Commission's by right, security remains the responsibility of the Member States. The Common Security and Defense Policy was developed within an intergovernmental framework, in which the Commission is not empowered to issue proposals on its own. Beyond its immediate operational consequences, this European Economic Security Strategy raises a powerful question about the European model as it exists today: is it adapted to this new situation? By integrating the economy with national security, the competition between China and the United States calls into question the balance of European construction established in 1957, and raises the issue of redefining roles and responsibilities within the European Union. We will begin by outlining the background to the drafting of this joint communication, then analyze its various elements before presenting its full implications for the European Union and its Member States. The end of the three decades of "happy globalization" is reflected in the integration of the economy within national security. Without attempting here to retrace the revival of power logic at work in recent years, and in particular the genesis of Sino-American competition, it is important to recall the context in which the European Commission's initiative in favor of economic security is taking place. On October 12, 2022, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) was released and presented by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at Georgetown University. This document concludes that the structural interweaving of national security and the economy will be the key challenge of the world to come, marking a clear break with the post-Cold War period (1990-2020). Of course, this is not a new observation, and the twin crises of COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of the Ukraine have served as an eye-opener and gas pedal. Nonetheless, the fact that the United States of America, the world's leading power, has officially taken note of this fact materializes the shift to another environment to which new rules apply, as I explained in an article from January 2023 (in French). Counter-intuitively for the European public, the NSS 2022 is a harsh assessment of the globalization of economic exchanges over the past thirty years: it denounces the existing rules on trade, designed to privilege corporate mobility over workers and the environment; the limits of free-market that is unable to respond to the sustained pace of technological change, disruptions in supply chains and the worsening climate crisis; the race to the bottom in corporate taxation at global level, which needs to be remedied by a global minimum tax. The NSS 2022 also denounces China's non-market posture: China "benefits from the openness of the international economy while limiting access to its domestic market, and it seeks to make the world more dependent on the PRC while reducing its own dependence on the world". From then on, the key issue becomes the security of supply chains, which implies, for a number of strategic products, a decoupling between China and the United States. The economy becomes an integral part of national security, through the concept of economic security. Based on this strategy, the United States has implemented a two-pronged policy: on the one hand, to decouple from China in a number of critical technologies listed in the NSS (“microelectronics, advanced computing and quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and biomanufacturing, advanced telecommunications, and clean energy technologies”) and, on the other, to convince its allies to align their practices. Sullivan's "small yard, high fence" doctrine has provoked lively debate, as its scope of application seems so vast, encompassing almost all the technologies of humanity's future around an anti-Chinese rhetoric. On March 30, 2023, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen introduced the more balanced concept of "de-risking". The term comes from the financial world, which defines it as "the phenomenon of financial institutions terminating or restricting business relationships with clients or categories of clients to avoid, rather than manage, risk”. It is this idea of risk mitigation that should be retained, although no text has officially defined the term in the context of strategic competition. As for the persuasive work of the United States' allies, it was expressed in particular through the G7 and led, at the Hiroshima Summit of May 19-21, 2023, to the establishment of a shared vision of what economic security encompasses. This "G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security" covers seven areas: supply chain resilience, critical infrastructure resilience, responding to non-market policies and practices, addressing economic coercion, countering harmful practices in the digital sphere, cooperating on international standards setting, and preventing leakage of critical and emerging technologies. It has the merit of seeking to formalize the constituent elements of economic security in order to limit its scope and avoid applying the notion to any economic situation. The notion of "de-risking" is officially included in the G7 communiqué, a sign of the consensus that has developed around it, although it is still not defined. Nevertheless, the ASML affair demonstrated, as early as January 2023, that the USA was also prepared to impose its views on its allies through coercion. Let's go back to the facts: following the introduction on October 7, 2022 of highly restrictive national measures concerning the export of semiconductor technologies to China, the United States put pressure on the Dutch government to ban the export of photolithography machines for the semiconductor industry (photolithography consists in etching integrated circuits onto silicon wafers, the raw material used by semiconductor manufacturers, and ASML is the world leader in this field). The Netherlands, reluctant at first, finally acceded to the US demand, announcing the expected export restrictions from September 1er 2023, and sparking a vigorous debate within the European Union around three issues. First, there is the issue of consistency: if this decision is taken unilaterally on the grounds of Dutch national security, any retaliatory measures taken by China will only make sense against the European Union as a whole, due to the single market. Moreover, if China files a claim at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against the introduction of this new export control, it will be the European Commission, under its exclusive trade competency, which will have to defend the Dutch national measure. Second, there is the issue of autonomy: the Netherlands has had no room for maneuver vis-à-vis the United States, and ASML has obtained nothing in exchange for the resulting loss of market share. In a seminar, Belgian Prime Minister Alexandre de Croo expressed the feeling shared by many European officials that they had been "bullied" by the United States, which had not engaged in any serious consultation process, but had imposed its views on the matter. Third, there is the issue of coordination: ASML, like all companies, has a network of suppliers in Europe, particularly in Germany (optics, lasers, chemical components), and research partners (French Atomic Energy Commission, Belgian Imec). What about direct purchases by China? How coherent is the policy pursued at European level, given that the single market favors the interweaving of companies? Whether or not we are in favor of the measure presented here, can European export control policy for semiconductors be determined by an American-Dutch agreement drawn up under pressure? The European Union, World's third economic power, is deploying an economic security strategy in in order to face the threat of "technological drip-feed restriction" The ASML case demonstrates the nonsense of Europe's disarticulation when it comes to economic security. It has led to what I would describe as a "drip-feed restriction" approach to the export of technological goods, based on extra-European injunctions. It raises the question of European decision-making autonomy in technological and trade matters. Again, technology is synonymous with security, and therefore with the responsibility of Member States, whereas trade is an exclusive competence of the European Commission, embodied by the Airbus-Boeing dispute, which demonstrated the latter's ability to defend European interests against the United States. European decision-makers, at both national and EU level, became aware of this vulnerability thanks to the two successive shocks of COVID-19 and Russia's aggression against Ukraine. The pandemic led to massive disruption of supply chains in the healthcare sector, from masks and respirators to active pharmaceutical substances and vials, a disruption that spread to other economic sectors as a result of confinement. The war in Ukraine led to the disruption of Russian gas and grain supplies, although many other products and sectors were, and still are, affected. In each case, the European Union's most massive reaction was ultimately that of the Commission, whether through joint purchases of vaccines and the lifting of competition rules for pharmaceutical companies, or the establishment of solidarity lanes to secure Ukrainian exports and diversify away from Russian energy dependency. At the European Council of December 16, 2021, the Heads of State and Government of the 27 Member States agreed on a proactive approach: "In the face of increased global instability, growing strategic competition and complex security threats, the EU will take more responsibility for its own security and in the field of defence, pursue a strategic course of action and increase its capacity to act autonomously." Two weeks after the attack on Ukraine, on March 11, 2022, the 27 Heads of State and Government of the European Union adopt the Versailles Declaration, as part of the French Presidency of the European Union. This document covers three dimensions: "a) Bolstering our defence capabilities; b) Reducing our energy dependencies; and c) Building a more robust economic base.” The aim of the third point is to reduce Europe's strategic dependence in the most sensitive sectors (critical raw materials, semiconductors, healthcare, digital technology, food products - a list that is likely to be adapted according to political orientations), and to develop industrial policy and trade defense instruments. Based on this political impetus, the Commission has set to work. At the European Conference on Defense and Security on October 11, 2022, European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton stressed that a true Defense Union “is to extend the notion of security and defence to new sectors”, explicitly pointing to four areas: cyber, space, critical infrastructures and technological superiority. The first half of 2023 saw an acceleration in the Commission's initiatives, notably with the draft European regulation on semiconductors proposed as early as February 2022, which came to fruition in April 2023 (EU Chips Act), the proposal for European legislation on critical raw materials presented on March 16, 2023 (European Critical Raw Materials Act), or the final political agreement on the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) on June 6, 2023. Nevertheless, the growing importance of responding to strategic competition and crises, as well as the multiplication of measures and their fields of application, have generated the need for a global and coherent approach. This is the aim of the European Economic Security Strategy, published on June 20, 2023 as a joint communication from the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Mentioning the concept of economic security 69 times in 17 pages, the document takes note of Europeans' inadequate preparation for the new geopolitical context and the merging of the economy and national security. The challenge is summed up in a remarkable paragraph (p. 2): "While the European Union has done a lot to respond to specific challenges in recent years, it now needs a comprehensive strategic approach to economic security, de-risking and promoting its technological edge in critical sectors. The aim is to provide a framework for a robust assessment and management of risks to economic security at EU, national and business level while preserving and increasing our economic dynamism. This is all the more important to put in place at a time when these risks are both evolving rapidly and merging with national security concerns. A prime example of this is the speed with which critical new technologies are emerging and blurring the boundaries between the civil and military sectors." The Strategy identifies four main risks: "(1) resilience of supply chains; (2) physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure; (3) technology security and technology leakage; and (4) weaponisation of economic dependencies or economic coercion. These risks can occur along the entire value chain, from knowledge creation and basic research to commercialisation and manufacturing at scale.” This has led to three areas of work designed to address these risks: a) promoting the Union's economic base, competitiveness and growth (EU Industrial Strategy, legislation on critical raw materials, European semiconductor regulation, etc.), b) protecting against economic security risks (trade defense instruments, anti-coercion instrument, foreign direct investment control regulation, export control, research security, etc.), c) developing partnerships for economic security on a multilateral basis (G7, G20, WTO, EU-specific mechanisms such as Global Gateway). The philosophy underlying these three axes is based on the principles of proportionality and precision. The founding elements of European integration are revolutionized by the shift to economic security: competition, relationship with the United States, and the State nature of security. While this European Economic Security Strategy presents an ambitious program for adapting the European Union to global strategic competition, which is an event in itself, its effects are revolutionary in three aspects. Firstly, it formally puts an end to the dogma of competition in Brussels. As the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen pointed out in her State of the Union address on September 13, 2023, "Competition is only true as long as it is fair. Too often, our companies are excluded from foreign markets or are victims of predatory practices. They are often undercut by competitors benefitting from huge state subsidies". And she cited China fifteen times to illustrate her point, denouncing unfair practices in solar panels and electric vehicles, announcing the opening of an investigation into the artificially low prices of the latter, which are endangering the European automotive industry, and welcoming the first measures taken in favor of greater independence for the European Union in critical sectors (energy, semiconductors, access to raw materials, bottlenecks in supply chains). She concluded by introducing the concept for the first time in this type of speech: " This shows why it is so important for Europe to step up on economic security." In a speech that was part of the political campaign for the European elections of June 2024, without losing sight of her own possible renewal, the emphasis on the concept of economic security is a strong message to a European public eager for protection. It helps to make the European project more acceptable in many Member States, as illustrated by the rapid evolution of the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni even if it does lead to reluctance within some Directorates-General of the European Commission. Secondly, this strategy aims to forge a third way between the Chinese model (non-market) and the American model (decoupling). As U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan succinctly put it in his October 2022 presentation: “Market access has been the orthodoxy of all trade policy for 30 years: it no longer corresponds to today's challenges.” Significantly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is not mentioned at all in the National Security Strategy 2022. Without getting into the debate on the scope of the distinction between de-risking and decoupling, which would deserve an analysis of its own, let's just note the sharp divergence between Europeans and Americans. The European approach maintains its conviction in the usefulness of traditional free-trade agreements and the functioning of multilateral institutions. This is why the European strategy emphasizes the role of the G7, the G20, the UN, the development banks and, of course, the WTO. Contrary to the President of the European Commission speech, the text of the European Economic Security Strategy does not mention any State, neither China nor the United States, as the proposed measures remain indiscriminate. Let's fully appreciate the meaning of the document (p. 14): " Even in an environment of strategic rivalry and economic competition, there is scope for international cooperation on common challenges and a need for clear rules guaranteeing fair and open trade, thus putting guardrails on the trend towards “might is right”, economic fragmentation or protectionism." What an indictment of American policy, from the Inflation Reduction Act's subsidization of electric vehicles to the ASML affair! Europe's strategy is as much about rebalancing relations with the United States as it is about protecting the European economy from Chinese aggression, which corresponds both to its own geopolitical positioning and to the expectations of many potential partners (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Canada, etc.). Thirdly, and most importantly, the introduction of economic security - the integration of the economy into national security - revolutionizes the very model of the European Union as it emerged from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Let's recall the context in which the EU was created by this Treaty: the Cold War just came to an end, offering the possibility of benefiting from the peace dividends, and opening the way to the establishment of an international system based, on the one hand, on international stability guaranteed by the United Nations and American power and, on the other hand, on economic globalization, these two elements having their own sphere between 1990 and 2020 and interacting little during these thirty years. The 1992 framework has survived in the successive European treaties to the present day. It is in accordance with the history of European construction since 1957, but above all it perfectly corresponds to the context of its time: while the European Commission has exclusive competence in matters of customs, competition, currency and trade, it has no competence in matters of security, in the sense of national security, which falls within the remit of each Member State – and therefore the Council of the European Union, acting unanimously when a debate is brought to European level. Each to his own sphere. However, the weaponization of economy for the benefit of security interests of the world's major powers is transforming this equation, blowing up the historical structuring of the division of responsibilities between the Commission and the Member States. How should we respond? At national level, in view of public opinion's growing aversion to the dangers of the vast world, and in the hope of retaining control over its decisions, but at the risk of European incoherence and the weakness of most Member States? Or at the EU level, with a further transfer of powers to the Commission? The only certainty lies in the fact that the current division of roles no longer meets the challenges of today's world, and needs to evolve rapidly. *** The coexistence of the economic and geopolitical spheres that characterized the "happy globalization" period from 1990 to 2020 enabled the development of trade by multinational companies within an institutional framework approved by States, in this case the World Trade Organization. The result has been the creation of global value chains, based on a dual rationale of optimizing production costs and specializing corporate activities to enhance their financial value. It has brought clear benefits, both in terms of reducing global poverty, and in terms of lower prices for consumers. With the return of strategic competition, governments are regaining the upper hand by increasingly subordinating the economy, and hence companies, to geopolitical imperatives. While the directions taken by China and the United States are national policy choices, this new context poses a more existential problem for the European model, which is founded on a distinct division of competences between security and economy, the former in the hands of Member States and the latter in the hands of the European Commission. The external shock of Sino-American economic, trade and technological combativeness tends to favor the Europeanization of responses, with the European Union level offering the possibility of securing the most vulnerable States. In the case of ASML, the discussion would have been of a very different nature with the Commission instead of the Netherlands on the other side of the table. While the iterative methods used to develop European solutions may seem laborious compared to the decision-making process in the United States and given the urgency of moving forward on these issues, the progress made over the past twenty years is nonetheless gigantic. At the time within European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy's cabinet, I can testify that the words "industrial policy" – which he used – were perceived at best as a lack of taste in a Commission ideologically dominated by the Directorate-General for Competition. In April 2022, the answers given by the Director General of Competition, Mr. Olivier Guersent, at his hearing before the European Economic and Social Committee as part of the referral "What ways and means for a real strategic autonomy of the EU in the economic field?" gave me the feeling I had moved into a different spacetime when I heard him utter the words "strategic autonomy", "fair treatment of our companies in foreign countries", "subsidies for European projects of common interest", "control of state aid given by foreign powers", "complementarity between competition policy and industrial policy in the service of competitiveness", "being in a world of interdependence and not overdependence". However, the relationship with the Member States is not natural on these issues, and the Commission seems to be moving faster than most of them when it comes to economic security. If all the measures proposed in the European Economic Security Strategy are implemented, this will amount to a massive transfer of national security powers to the Commission, by extending its economic and trade powers. Will this lead to greater integration or rejection? The introduction of economic security at EU level has shaken traditional lines within the Commission and the Member States, and continues to do so forcefully. The European Strategy in this area has the merit of raising the right questions to equip the EU with the tools it needs to manage Sino-American competition, in order to be a player and not a hostage.   Olivier Sueur, is consultant in strategic business and public affairs, teaching at SciencesPo Paris and Associate fellow at the Institute for Applied Geopolitical Studies (IEGA). He is a former deputy assistant secretary for NATO, the European Union and the United Nations at the French Ministry for the Armed Forces (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy – DGRIS), and previously negotiator for France at NATO’s headquarter. ## Épisode 35: Annick Goulet, l’Ambassadrice du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-35-annick-goulet-lambassadrice-du-canada-2/ Modified: 2023-02-22 > Artur et Sarah-Myriam discutent avec Annick Goulet, l'Ambassadrice du Canada en Roumanie, en République... Dans ce 35e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam présente son nouveau co-animateur, Artur Wilczynski. Artur et Sarah-Myriam discutent avec Annick Goulet, l'Ambassadrice du Canada en Roumanie, en République de Bulgarie et en République de Moldova. Ils abordent les moments clés de son parcours, les priorités et les défis liés à son mandat, l'impact de l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie sur la région et discutent du rôle du Canada dans ces pays et à l'OTAN. L'Ambassadrice nous parle de la priorité qu'elle accorde à la question des femmes notamment au sein de la diplomatie. ## Épisode 36: Wendy Hadwen, Politiques stratégiques, planification et partenariats (CA PSPP) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-36-wendy-hadwen-politiques-strategiques-planification-et-partenariats-ca-pspp/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Wendy Hadwen, chef adjointe des Politiques stratégiques, planification et partenariats (CA PSPP). Nous... Pour ce 36ième épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Wendy Hadwen, chef adjointe des Politiques stratégiques, planification et partenariats (CA PSPP). Nous discutons de sa carrière et des déflis liés au fait d'être championne ministérielle des langues officielles . Ils abordent l'utilisation du français au sein des structures de renseignement tel que le Groupe des Cinq, des moyens pris afin de sensibiliser les Canadiens francophones à ce que font le Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST) et d'autres organismes de sécurité et de renseignement ainsi que la façon dont les langues des Premières Nations s’insèrent également dans le débat sur les langues officielles au sein du CST. ## Épisode 39: Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-39-colonel-marie-christine-harvey-2/ Modified: 2023-11-08 > Pour ce nouvel épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent la Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey. La Colonel Harvey nous parle de son parcours... Pour ce nouvel épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent la Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey. La Colonel Harvey nous parle de son parcours, des défis liés aux postes qu'elle a occupés, notamment comme instructeur et lors de commandement d'opérations domestiques et internationales. Elle démantèle des mythes liés à l'armée et nous explique en quoi les Forces Armées canadieenne se distinguent des autres armées. ## Épisode 40: Guillaume Darmé URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-40-guillaume-darme-2/ Modified: 2023-11-23 > Pour ce 40ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Marie-Christine reçoivent Guillaume Darmé, Coordonnateur du Renseignement pour les Opérations... Pour ce 40ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Marie-Christine reçoivent Guillaume Darmé, Coordonnateur du Renseignement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.  Guillaume Darmé raconte son parcours et l’origine de l'unité du renseignement dans les OMP, les besoins pour lesquels son équipe a été conçue et sa mise en place.  Il explique l'évolution du mandat du renseigement au sein des missions de paix, et en identifie les principaux défis. Guillaume Darmé met en lumière l'appuie des États Membres aux efforts de son unité, et discute du rôle particulier pour le Canada. Guillaume Darmé a été nommé Coordonnateur du Renseignement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix, le 1er Juillet 2017. Il est en charge de la mise en place de la Politique de Renseignement adoptée en 2017, ainsi que de la création et de la coordination d’un système de Renseignement pour les Operations de Maintien de la Paix (OMP) des Nations Unies ainsi que de la coordination de l’alerte précoce dans les OMP. Précédemment, M. Darmé occupait la fonction de Conseiller Spécial et Chef de Cabinet du Secrétaire Général Adjoint (SGA) des Nations Unies pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix (2012 – 2017), offrant son expertise technique et stratégique au SGA sur les questions politiques et opérationnelles liées aux OMP, y compris sur le Renseignement. De 2007 à 2012, M. Darmé a occupé diverses fonctions au sein du Centre de Crise (CDC) du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Français, dans l’équipe qui a créé le CDC tout d’abord, puis en tant qu’adjoint au Chef des Opérations. Pendant cette période, Mr. Darmé a effectué de nombreuses missions de secours à l’étranger, venant en aide à des milliers de citoyens français et européens de par le monde, y compris des otages. Il a été décoré de la Médaille d’Honneur des Affaires étrangères pour services rendus à la Nation. Mr. Darmé est titulaire de deux Mastères en Gestion de crise et Négociations Internationales, et Systèmes stratégiques de défense, respectivement. ## Épisode 41: Sébastien Carrière URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-41-sebastien-carriere/ Modified: 2023-12-07 > Pour ce 41ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Marie-Christine Harvey reçoivent Sébastien Carrière, ancien Ambassadeur du Canada... Pour ce 41ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Marie-Christine Harvey reçoivent Sébastien Carrière, ancien Ambassadeur du Canada en Haïti, Chef du Protocole du Canada et Représentant personnel du Premier ministre du Canada pour la Francophonie. Ils discutent de son parcours, de l’évolution du rôle du Canada dans des dossiers aussi variés que  les mines Antipersonnel, les relations commerciales et les affaires politiques en Afrique et au Moyen-Orient.  Sébastien Carrière nous rappelle le mandat du Canada en Haïti et met en lumière la complexité des défis liés aux contextes national et international.  Il nous explique son rôle en tant que Chef du Protocole ainsi que le rôle de l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) dans les sphères francophones au Maghreb, en Afrique sub-saharienne, au Moyen Orient, en Asie, et dans les Caraïbes. ## Épisode 42: Colonel Véronique Gervais, l’Opération CALUMET URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-42-colonel-veronique-gervais-loperation-calumet-2/ Modified: 2023-12-20 > Pour ce 42ième épisode, Marie-Christine Harvey et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent la Colonel Véronique Gervais, Commandante de... Pour ce 42ième épisode, Marie-Christine Harvey et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent la Colonel Véronique Gervais, Commandante de la Force Opérationnelle CALUMET en Égypte. Elles discutent du parcours de la Colonel, du mandat de l'Opération CALUMET et de l'impact du conflit entre Israël et le Hamas. Colonel Gervais revient sur les points communs/distincts entre ses déploiements en Bosnie et en Afghanistan. Elle explique ce qui distingue les Canadiennes. au sein d'équipes multinationales et des leçons pour les Forces Armées Canadiennes. ## Épisode 43: l’Inspecteur David Shane de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-43-linspecteur-david-shane-de-la-ville-de-montreal-spvm-2/ Modified: 2024-02-21 > ...reçoivent l'Inspecteur David Shane, responsable des communications et porte-parole du Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM).. Pour ce nouvel épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey reçoivent l'Inspecteur David Shane, responsable des communications et porte-parole du Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM). L'Inspecteur Shane raconte son parcours dans la police et en tant que réserviste de l'Armée canadienne. Ils discutent de l’évolution du travail des policiers, des défis que posent les nouvelles formes de criminalité et de la façon dont le Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal s'adapte à ces nouvelles réalités. ## Épisode 44: LT.Col. Chris Labbé, CHEF, BUREAU INTERARMÉES CONTRE AÉRONEF SANS ÉQUIPAGE URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-44-lt-col-chris-labbe-chef-bureau-interarmees-contre-aeronef-sans-equipage-2/ Modified: 2024-09-04 > Dans ce 44ième épisode, Brigadier-Générale Marie-Christine Harvey et la professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le Lieutenant... Dans ce 44ième épisode, Brigadier-Générale Marie-Christine Harvey et la professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le Lieutenant Colonel Chris Labbé, CHEF, BUREAU INTERARMÉES CONTRE AÉRONEF SANS ÉQUIPAGE - CHEF DE L’INTÉGRATION DES SYSTÈMES DE COMBAT . Ils discutent de son parcours, des principales menaces pour le Canada dans le domaine aérien et spatial , du rôle du bureau interarméees canadien contre-drone, de la lutte anti-drone et de ses défis et enjeux, tant sur le plan technologique, réglementaire et éthique. Il explique la coopération avec les autres entités gouvernementales, les instituts de recherches, les entreprises ainsi que la collaboration internationale pour réguler et contrer l' utilisation des drônes. ## Épisode 45: Tjorven Bellmann, ambassadrice d’Allemagne au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-45-tjorven-bellmann-ambassadrice-dallemagne-au-canada-2/ Modified: 2025-02-12 > Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec Tjorven Bellmann, ambassadrice d'Allemagne au Canada. Dans ce nouvel épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec Tjorven Bellmann, ambassadrice d'Allemagne au Canada. Elle revient sur les moments marquants de son parcours au ministère des Affaires étrangères depuis 2013, en partageant son expérience en matière de politique de sécurité et de coopération internationale. La discussion explore plusieurs enjeux stratégiques, notamment l’Arctique, où les visions canadienne et européenne divergent entre souveraineté territoriale et liberté de navigation, soulevant des questions environnementales et géopolitiques. Le partage du fardeau au sein de l’OTAN est également abordé, en mettant en perspective les critiques adressées à l’Allemagne et au Canada quant à leurs engagements budgétaires et leur contribution à l’Alliance. L'épisode compare ensuite le rôle des centres d’excellence de l’OTAN en Allemagne avec celui du tout nouveau centre canadien sur le changement climatique et la sécurité, mettant en lumière les enseignements pouvant renforcer le rôle du Canada au sein de l’Alliance. Enfin, les invités discutent de la menace croissante de l’ingérence électorale dans les démocraties occidentales et des stratégies de coopération entre Ottawa et Berlin pour mieux faire face à ces risques. ## Épisode 46: Colonel Dariusz Niedzielski, chef d’état-major au Centre d’excellence de l’OTAN URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-46-colonel-dariusz-niedzielski-chef-detat-major-au-centre-dexcellence-de-lotan-2/ Modified: 2025-02-26 > Dans ce nouvel épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec le Colonel Dariusz Niedzielski.... Dans ce nouvel épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec le Colonel Dariusz Niedzielski, chef d’état-major au Centre d’excellence de l’OTAN pour les communications stratégiques (STRATCOM). Fort d’une vaste expérience dans les opérations d’information et la planification stratégique, il partage son expertise sur l’évolution des communications stratégiques au sein de l’OTAN face à la montée des menaces hybrides et de la désinformation. La discussion met en lumière le rôle du STRATCOM dans l’adaptation de l’OTAN aux défis modernes, notamment à travers le développement de doctrines, l’analyse des menaces informationnelles et l’intégration des technologies émergentes comme l’intelligence artificielle. Le Colonel Niedzielski explique comment le centre contribue à renforcer la résilience des démocraties face aux campagnes de manipulation numérique orchestrées par des acteurs hostiles tels que la Russie et la Chine. L’épisode explore également l’interaction entre STRATCOM et les structures alliées, soulignant comment les analyses du centre influencent les politiques de l’OTAN et de ses États membres. À ce titre, il partage des recommandations pour le Centre canadien sur le changement climatique et la sécurité, récemment créé, en insistant sur l’importance d’une approche ciblée et d’une coopération internationale renforcée. Enfin, la question cruciale des ingérences électorales est abordée, alors que plusieurs pays occidentaux s’apprêtent à organiser des élections. Le Colonel Niedzielski évoque les stratégies de protection des processus démocratiques, insistant sur le rôle fondamental de l’éducation numérique, de la responsabilité médiatique et de la vigilance citoyenne face à la propagation de la désinformation ## Épisode 47: Natascha Hryckow, conseillère principale pour l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-47-natascha-hryckow-conseillere-principale-pour-linitiative-de-la-corne-de-lafrique-2/ Modified: 2025-03-13 > Pour ce 47ᵉ épisode, Laurent et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Natascha Hryckow, conseillère principale pour l'Initiative de la Corne de l'Afrique. Pour ce 47ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Natascha Hryckow, conseillère principale pour l'Initiative de la Corne de l'Afrique. Cette entrevue nous plonge au cœur du parcours et de l’expertise de Natascha Hryckow, une figure reconnue dans la gestion des conflits, le contreterrorisme et le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles. Forte d’une expérience au sein d’organisations internationales telles que l’OMS, l’OTAN et l’Union européenne, elle a occupé des postes stratégiques dans certaines des régions les plus instables du monde. Son engagement auprès de l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique illustre la complexité des défis liés aux conflits et à la gouvernance. Nous reviendrons sur son parcours professionnel et les responsabilités qu’elle a exercées dans ces divers rôles. Elle partagera ensuite son analyse des défis communs et des particularités des crises en Afghanistan, en Irak, en Libye, en Somalie, en Syrie et au Yémen, à travers son travail au sein de l’OMS. L’entretien abordera également son rôle dans la mission européenne EUCAP Nestor ainsi que son implication au sein du Panel d’experts sur la Somalie, permettant d’évaluer l’évolution des enjeux sécuritaires et institutionnels au fil des années. Forte de son expérience en Afghanistan avec l’OTAN, elle reviendra sur les enseignements essentiels tirés de cette mission. Enfin, nous évoquerons son rôle actuel au sein de l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique, en mettant en lumière l’implication de la Banque mondiale et l’influence du financement britannique sur sa mission. Pour conclure, nous nous interrogerons sur la place qu’un pays comme le Canada peut occuper dans ces contextes de crise et les contributions qu’il pourrait apporter à la stabilité et au développement des régions en difficulté. ## Episode 47: Security – Policy Nexus of Emerging Technology URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-47-security-policy-nexus/ Modified: 2021-05-05 > In the 47th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the House Committee meetings on sexual misconduct in the CAF, Russia’s military build-up on its border with Ukraine, and President Biden’s decision to withdraw the remaining troops from Afghanistan In the 47th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the House Committee meetings on sexual misconduct in the CAF, Russia’s military build-up on its border with Ukraine, and President Biden’s decision to withdraw the remaining troops from Afghanistan. Today’s feature interview guest is with Khashayar Khorasani [29:20], Principal Investigator and Director of SPNET at Concordia. This week’s RnR segment [48:25], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: 1. A Call To Spy 2. the new John Sanford Prey novel—Ocean Prey 3. What we do the in Shadows ## Épisode 48: Amélie Zima, chercheuse au Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-48-amelie-zima-chercheuse-au-centre-des-etudes-de-securite-de-lifri-2/ Modified: 2025-03-27 > Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Amélie Zima, chercheuse au Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI. Pour ce 48ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Amélie Zima, chercheuse au Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI (Institut français des relations internationales), spécialiste de l'OTAN et de la Pologne. Docteure en science politique, lauréate du premier prix de thèse de l’IHEDN, elle a travaillé au sein de nombreuses institutions académiques et de recherche en France et à l’étranger, dont le CEFRES à Prague, l’Académie polonaise des sciences et l’Université de Varsovie. Avant de rejoindre l’IFRI, elle a exercé à l’IRSEM en tant que chercheuse sur la sécurité européenne. Elle est également l’autrice de plusieurs publications récentes sur l’OTAN et la politique de défense polonaise. Au cours de cette entrevue, nous abordons en détail le cas polonais, à partir de ses travaux sur le réarmement massif engagé par Varsovie, dont les ambitions pourraient faire de la Pologne la première puissance militaire européenne d’ici 2035. L'échange met ainsi en lumière les défis politiques, économiques et organisationnels de cette montée en puissance, ainsi que ses implications pour les équilibres internes de l’OTAN et de l’Union européenne. L’entretien porte de ce fait également sur les tensions politiques internes en Pologne, les risques de politisation de la défense et l’impact des élections présidentielles à venir. La discussion permet en outre d'aborder la question des coopérations bilatérales qu'entretient la Pologne avec les États-Unis (y compris sous les diverses administrations Trump), avec d'autres pays européens tels la France et l'Ukraine, mais aussi avec le Canada.Pour conclure, à travers cette discussion, nous nous interrogeons sur les moyens pour déconstruire les idées reçues sur l’OTAN, notamment en France et au Canada, à travers le regard d’une chercheuse engagée dans la diffusion des savoirs stratégiques auprès des décideurs et du grand public. ## Episode 48: Operation Reassurance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-48-operation-reassurance/ Modified: 2021-05-05 > Operation Reassurance - External review into sexual misconduct in the military and the new Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture In the 48th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the external review into sexual misconduct in the military, the new Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture and the latest requests for military assistance to support the country’s pandemic response efforts. Today’s feature interview guest is LCol. McCleod [25:45], Commander of Air Task Force - Romania, part of Operation Reassurance. This week’s RnR segment [53:00], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: 1. The Faculty 2. Love and Monsters 3. Superstore ## Épisode 49 : Giovanna De Maio, chargée de mission au Centre d’analyse, de prévision et de stratégie (CAPS) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-49-giovanna-de-maio-chargee-de-mission-au-centre-danalyse-de-prevision-et-de-strategie-caps-2/ Modified: 2025-04-09 Dans ce 49ème épisode du balado Conseil de sécurité, nous recevons Giovanna De Maio, spécialiste des relations transatlantiques et de la politique étrangère des grandes puissances. Docteure en relations internationales et aujourd’hui chargée de mission au sein du CAPS du ministère français de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, elle produit des analyses stratégiques sur les dynamiques américaines et leur impact sur la France, l’Europe et l’architecture transatlantique. Forte d’un parcours international, entre Rome, Moscou, Paris et Washington, Giovanna De Maio a été chercheuse au German Marshall Fund, à l’IFRI, à la Brookings Institution et à la George Washington University. Ses travaux ont notamment porté sur la désinformation russe, les rapports UE–États-Unis, les dynamiques politiques italiennes, ainsi que les ingérences étrangères dans les processus électoraux. Au cours de cet entretien, elle revient sur sa trajectoire et son rôle actuel au sein du CAPS, à la croisée de la recherche, de la diplomatie et de la prospective. Nous explorons ensuite ses recherches sur les perceptions russes de l’Ukraine depuis 2014, la construction idéologique autour de la négation de l’identité ukrainienne, et les tensions entre récits officiels, opinions publiques et propagande. La discussion se penche également sur les stratégies de désinformation russe et les fragilités narratives occidentales, questionnant la frontière entre propagande extérieure et biais internes à nos sociétés. Pour conclure, l'épisode permet d'aborder l’évolution récente de la politique étrangère américaine et l’ébranlement des fondements de l’architecture sécuritaire transatlantique. Avec notre invitée, nous revenons ainsi sur les tensions croissantes entre les États-Unis et certains alliés — dont le Canada — et les risques associés à une hypothèse de retrait américain de l’OTAN. ## Episode 49: Healthy Tension URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-49-healthy-tension/ Modified: 2021-05-26 > Interview Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence, Jody Thomas and Acting Chief of the Defence Staff Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre. In the 49th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve reflect on today’s Feature Interview with guests Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence, Jody Thomas and Acting Chief of the Defence Staff Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre. Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre also takes over this week’s RnR segment, where he provides some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Lt.Gen Eyre’s picks for the week are: 1. Frank Herbert’s Dune series 2. Susan Eisenhower’s How Ike lead 3. Ryan Holiday & Stephen Hanselman’s The Lives of the Stoics ## Épisode 50 : Brigadier-général Éric Laforest, Chef J5 au Grand Quartier général des puissances alliées en Europe (SHAPE) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-50-brigadier-general-eric-laforest-chef-j5-au-grand-quartier-general-des-puissances-alliees-en-europe-shape-2/ Modified: 2025-04-23 Pour ce 50ième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le Brigadier-général Éric Laforest, officier chevronné en opérations internationales et en planification stratégique, membre des Forces armées canadiennes depuis 1991. Tout au long de sa carrière, le Brigadier-général Laforest a exercé des responsabilités de commandement aux niveaux du peloton, de la compagnie, du bataillon et de la force opérationnelle. Il a notamment dirigé des troupes en Haïti, en Afghanistan et en Lettonie dans le cadre de l’opération REASSURANCE. Fort de plusieurs affectations stratégiques à Ottawa et dans des instances internationales, il occupe depuis juillet 2023 le poste de chef des plans militaires (J5) au SHAPE, siège opérationnel de l'OTAN en Europe. Lors de cette entrevue, il revient sur les enseignements tirés de ses expériences de commandement opérationnel dans des contextes variés. Il partage son analyse des défis rencontrés sur le terrain, notamment pour maintenir la cohésion de forces multinationales. Sarah-Myriam et Laurent évoquent également les priorités stratégiques identifiées depuis sa prise de poste au SHAPE, ainsi que son analyse de l’évolution de la menace russe, à la lumière de son expérience en Europe de l’Est. Cet épisode permet également d’aborder les défis de la coopération militaire au sein de l'OTAN et les contributions spécifiques et notables des Forces armées canadiennes à l'architecture de défense collective. ## Episode 50: The CDSN Podcast Network URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-50-the-cdsn-podcast-network/ Modified: 2021-07-21 > The discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the CAF. In the 50th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed forces and the diverted RyanAir flight in Belarus. Today’s feature interview guests are the hosts of our other Podcast, Conseils de sécurité [24:15], Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé & Thomas Juneau are here to celebrate our 50th episode! This week’s RnR segment [55:15], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Mitchells vs. the Machines; Dead Eyes podcast; Love, Death, and Robots ## Épisode 51 : Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, docteur en science politique de l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-51-romain-le-cour-grandmaison-docteur-en-science-politique-de-luniversite-paris-1-pantheon-sorbonne-2/ Modified: 2025-05-07 Dans ce 51e épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, docteur en science politique de l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne et expert senior à la Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. À la croisée de la recherche, du terrain et de la stratégie, notre invité revient sur son parcours singulier et partage ses réflexions sur la production contemporaine du savoir en matière de sécurité. Il présente également le mandat et les actions de la Global Initiative, tout en proposant une lecture renouvelée de la violence criminelle — non pas comme une rupture de l’ordre, mais comme une forme de gouvernance. L’échange aborde en profondeur la manière dont les rapports entre l’État, l’armée, la police et les groupes armés non étatiques se reconfigurent dans des contextes comme le Mexique ou Haïti. Il explore également le rôle des diasporas, des flux financiers et des dynamiques transnationales dans la consolidation de la violence, et questionne la portée — et les limites — d’une réponse multilatérale ou militaire dans un pays comme Haïti. Plus largement, la discussion s’élargit à l’impact des trafics transnationaux (armes, drogues, personnes) sur les frontières classiques de la défense et de la sécurité. Enfin, l’épisode se conclut sur une réflexion essentielle : comment sortir du prisme exclusivement répressif face à la criminalité organisée, et quelles alternatives politiques ou sociales pourraient être envisagées ? ## Episode 51: Military Justice Reform URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-51-military-justice-reform/ Modified: 2021-07-21 > The discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the CAF. In the 51st episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the terrorist attack in London, Ontario, the NATO Summit, and Lt. Gen Rouleau’s decision to play golf with Vance. Today’s feature interview guest is Dr. Leah West, [22:15], lawyer and Assistant Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. This week’s RnR segment [44:40], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: modok, Girls5Eva, We Are Lady Parts. ## Épisode 52 : Renée Larivière, directrice de la gestion des programmes chez Interpeace URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-52-renee-lariviere-directrice-de-la-gestion-des-programmes-chez-interpeace-2/ Modified: 2025-05-21 Pour ce 52ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s’entretiennent avec Renée Larivière, directrice de la gestion des programmes chez Interpeace. À ce poste, elle assure le leadership stratégique et la supervision des opérations de consolidation de la paix. Au fil de la discussion, nous abordons l’influence de sa formation en sciences de l’environnement sur son approche de la gestion des conflits, ainsi que ses expériences de terrain au Pérou, au Pakistan et en Indonésie. Renée Larivière nous présente également la mission d’Interpeace, son rôle dans la consolidation de la paix, les principaux défis auxquels l’organisation est confrontée aujourd’hui, et la manière dont son approche se distingue de celle des grandes institutions internationales comme l’ONU — en explorant les avantages et les limites de cette différenciation. Elle nous explique aussi le concept original de la "diplomatie par la nourriture", partage ses réflexions sur la montée de la polarisation, la persistance des conflits prolongés, et l’évolution des efforts internationaux en matière de consolidation de la paix. Nous concluons l’épisode en discutant du rôle du Canada sur la scène internationale en matière de paix : quelle est sa contribution actuelle et dans quels domaines pourrait-elle être renforcée ? Biographie : Renée Larivière est directrice de la gestion des programmes à Interpeace, où elle pilote le leadership stratégique et la surveillance des opérations de consolidation de la paix dans le monde. Elle est également en charge des mêmes tâches pour les politiques de l'organisation. Ayant oeuvré dans les écosystèmes complexes de sociétés fragiles, elle a une large expérience dans la collaboration avec les différents acteurs qui ont un intérêt dans la consolidation de la paix Renée est arrivée à Interpeace en 2007 avec une expérience de terrain au Pérou, au Pakistan et en Indonésie. Si son objectif a toujours été de soutenir les sociétés fragiles, son travail passé repose davantage sur des conflits liés aux ressources naturelles. Pendant son séjour au Pérou au service de Grupo GEA, Renée a également été professeur invité à l'École supérieure de l'Université nationale de La Molina. Elle a aussi travaillé pour l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI). Renée est canadienne et détient une maîtrise en sciences de l'environnement de l'Université de Sherbrooke ainsi qu'une licence de l'Université d'Ottawa. ## Episode 52: Emerging Technologies and Escalating Security Problems URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-52-emerging-technologies-and-escalating-security-problems/ Modified: 2021-07-21 > The discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the CAF. In the 52nd episode of Battle Rhythm, our guest host and Co-director, Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot and Steve talk about the new Canadian Network on Information and Security (CANIS) at University of Calgary, climate change as a security issue, localizing international events such as the Calgary Stampede and the Tokyo Olympics and the Afghanistan withdraw. Today’s feature interview guest is Political Scientist Sarah Shoker [29:10], currently a SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow. This week’s RnR segment [54:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Wellington Paranormal, Queen's Gambit, Facebook Oculus. ## Épisode 53 – Daniela Irrera, professeure au Centre des hautes études de défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-53-daniela-irrera-professeure-au-centre-des-hautes-etudes-de-defense-2/ Modified: 2025-06-04 Dans ce 53ème épisode du balado Conseil de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Daniela Irrera, professeure de science politique et de relations internationales, spécialiste reconnue des acteurs non étatiques, de la gouvernance mondiale, des conflits armés et des politiques de sécurité. Elle enseigne aujourd’hui au Centre des hautes études de défense de l’Université nationale de défense à Rome, ainsi qu’à l’Académie de l’OSCE à Bichkek, et contribue activement à la formation des futurs experts civils et militaires européens au sein du Collège européen de sécurité et de défense (CESD) à Bruxelles. Au fil de cette entrevue, Daniela Irrera revient sur ses activités d’enseignement à l’Académie de l’OSCE à Bichkek, où elle forme de jeunes experts aux enjeux de sécurité et de diplomatie. Elle présente également son jeu de simulation Game of Peace, primé au niveau européen, qui permet d’explorer de manière concrète les mécanismes de négociation, de résolution de conflits et de médiation dans les relations internationales. L’entretien revient sur plusieurs projets de recherche auxquels Daniela Irrera a contribué, portant sur des thématiques variées telles que la propagande russe hors de l’Occident, les formes contemporaines d’autoritarisme, ainsi que les liens entre commerce illicite, sécurité et durabilité. Elle évoque notamment les initiatives MORDOR, sur les dictatures actuelles, et GLITSS, sur les circuits illicites mondialisés, offrant un éclairage sur les mutations géopolitiques, technologiques et narratives qui façonnent aujourd’hui les relations internationales. La discussion se poursuit autour de ses travaux sur les ONG dans les zones de gouvernance fragile, l’usage détourné des technologies numériques par les groupes criminels, et la nécessité d’élaborer des réponses européennes adaptées à la diversité des acteurs transnationaux. Daniela Irrera revient également sur le concept de triple nexus – articulant aide humanitaire, développement et consolidation de la paix – qu’elle mobilise dans ses recherches sur les réponses internationales aux crises systémiques. Elle souligne enfin le rôle que peut jouer le Canada dans la construction d’un modèle de coordination internationale plus cohérent et efficace. Un échange riche et transversal qui permet de mieux comprendre la complexité contemporaine des menaces, la transformation des acteurs non étatiques, et les leviers encore disponibles pour faire face à un monde fragmenté, traversé par de multiples zones grises. ## Episode 53: Making the Best of It: Canadian Forces Military Police Group URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-53-making-the-best-of-it-canadian-forces-military-police-group/ Modified: 2021-07-29 > The discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the CAF. In the 53rd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about a recent Defence SMRC Roundtable, cyber attacks and Great Power Politics. Today’s feature interview guest is Canadian Forces Military Police Group’s Colonel Vanessa Hanrahan [20:15]. This week’s RnR segment [44:00], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Ben Barry, Blood, Metal, and Dust; Theo Farrell, Unwinnable; Never Have I Ever; Black Widow ## Épisode 54 – Colin Gérard, docteur en géopolitique et chef d’équipe à VIGINUM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-54-colin-gerard-docteur-en-geopolitique-et-chef-dequipe-a-viginum-2/ Modified: 2025-06-18 Dans ce 54e épisode du Conseil de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Colin Gérard, docteur en géopolitique et spécialiste reconnu des stratégies d’influence informationnelle russes dans le cyberespace francophone. Lauréat du prix spécial de l’Association pour les Études sur la Guerre et la Stratégie en 2023, il a soutenu une thèse à l’Institut français de géopolitique (Université Paris 8) consacrée aux acteurs, aux pratiques et aux récits visant à orienter l’opinion publique française. Aujourd’hui chef d’équipe à VIGINUM – le service de vigilance contre les ingérences numériques étrangères rattaché au Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) – Colin Gérard poursuit également ses recherches en tant que chercheur associé au centre GEODE (Géopolitique de la Datasphère). Ses travaux croisent méthodes géopolitiques et techniques d’OSINT pour documenter les campagnes d’influence, reconstituer les chaînes de diffusion de contenus, et analyser les reconfigurations de l’écosystème informationnel russe depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Dans cet entretien, il revient sur les mutations profondes du dispositif d’influence russe – marquées par la fragmentation, la privatisation partielle des opérations et leur redéploiement vers des terrains comme l’Afrique francophone. L’analyse des opérations Lakhta et Doppelgänger illustre la montée en puissance de dispositifs clandestins, fondés sur l’usurpation d’identité et la sous-traitance. La discussion aborde également la montée des "murs informationnels", la circulation différenciée des récits dans les démocraties libérales, et les réponses possibles. Enfin, Colin Gérard revient sur les similitudes et différences observées entre la France et le Canada face à ces menaces. Un épisode essentiel pour comprendre les formes contemporaines d’ingérence numérique, les enjeux de souveraineté informationnelle, et les défis communs posés aux démocraties. ## Episode 54: Pandemic Modelling URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-54-pandemic-modelling/ Modified: 2021-08-18 > This week: family vacations and regulations across the US border, planning a return to classes and the evolving situation in Afghanistan. In the 54th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about family vacations and regulations across the US border, planning a return to classes and the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Today’s feature interview guest is with Mathematician, Caroline Colijn [20:45]. This week’s RnR segment [51:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Jolt, Party Down, Surreal Estate. ## Épisode 55 – L’Amiral (2S) Alain Coldefy, ancien Major Général des Armées, directeur des opérations à l’État-major de la Marine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-55-lamiral-2s-alain-coldefy-ancien-major-general-des-armees-directeur-des-operations-a-letat-major-de-la-marine/ Modified: 2025-07-16 Dans cet épisode, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé accueillent l’Amiral (2S) Alain Coldefy, ancien Major Général des Armées, directeur des opérations à l’État-major de la Marine, et auteur de Le Sel et les Étoiles. Fort de plus de quarante ans de carrière, il revient sur son parcours exceptionnel, entre commandement en mer et hautes responsabilités stratégiques, en France et à l’international. L’Amiral partage ses réflexions sur la tension entre l’identité de marin et celle de stratège, et partage ses analyses des grands enjeux maritimes actuels : piraterie, sécurisation des routes commerciales, rivalités entre grandes puissances, coopération multilatérale et militarisation de l’Arctique. L’épisode explore aussi les nouvelles menaces en mer – cyberattaques, sabotage d’infrastructures, surveillance offshore – ainsi que le rôle que peut jouer le Canada, notamment dans l’espace arctique. Enfin, il adresse un message à la relève : comment préparer une nouvelle génération d’analystes et de décideurs face à un environnement naval en profonde transformation. Ce balado a été réalisé en partenariat avec France-Amériques. ## Episode 55: Canada’s top female military officer URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-55-canadas-top-female-military-officer/ Modified: 2021-09-29 > In the 55th episode, Stef and Steve talk about Afghanistan hot-takes and consultations with CAF/DND on sexual misconduct reporting. In the 55th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Afghanistan hot-takes and consultations with CAF/DND on sexual misconduct reporting. Today’s feature interview guest is with one of Canada's 100 most-powerful women, Lt.-Gen. Christine Whitecross [27:10]. This week’s RnR segment [52:10], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Restrepo/ Shadows in the Cloud, White Lotus. ## Épisode 56 – L’Amiral Xavier Païtard URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-56-lamiral-xavier-paitard-2/ Modified: 2025-07-30 Dans cet épisode, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent l’Amiral Xavier Païtard. L'Amiral revient sur un parcours exceptionnel, du cockpit d’un chasseur à la planification stratégique de l’OTAN. Nous explorons avec lui l’évolution du rôle de la France dans l’architecture de sécurité euro-atlantique, les enseignements tirés de missions de combat en zones complexes, et les défis actuels liés aux capacités futures, à la cyberdéfense et à la dissuasion à l’ère des conflits hybrides. Une conversation riche sur l’innovation navale, le rôle de la marine dans un monde polarisé, et les responsabilités partagées entre la France et le Canada en matière de sécurité collective. Ce balado a été réalisé en partenariat avec France-Amériques. ## Episode 56: Future Thinking Resilience & Sustainability URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-56-future-thinking-resilience/ Modified: 2021-09-29 > Stef and Steve talk about Afghanistan hot-takes and consultations with CAF/DND on sexual misconduct reporting. In the 56th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about personal lessons learned from 9/11 and Federal Election 2021. Today’s feature interview guest is with Capstone Laureate, Donna Dupont [24:30]. This week’s RnR segment [45:00], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Only the Murders in the Building, Dug, Shang-Chi ## Épisode 57 – Le Général Alexis Rougier URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-57-le-general-alexis-rougier-2/ Modified: 2025-10-29 Dans cet épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le général Alexis Rougier, général de brigade aérienne en charge de la Très Haute Altitude (THA) à l’état-major de l’Armée de l’Air et de l’Espace. Fort d’un parcours marqué par le commandement opérationnel et l’innovation stratégique, le général Rougier revient sur la transformation profonde des armées face à l’émergence du continuum air–espace, à l’évolution des menaces technologiques et à la redéfinition de la supériorité aérienne. L’entretien explore les enjeux de souveraineté, de sécurité et de résilience dans un environnement où les domaines terrestre, maritime, aérien, cyber et spatial sont désormais étroitement interconnectés. Le général partage également sa vision des coopérations internationales, notamment entre la France et le Canada, qui renforcent leurs liens dans les domaines de la défense aérienne, de la surveillance spatiale et de l’innovation duale. Entre intelligence artificielle, hypervélocité, robotique et guerre électronique, cet épisode questionne la manière dont les armées peuvent préserver un avantage stratégique durable tout en maintenant un ancrage humain, éthique et décisionnel au cœur du commandement militaire. Ce balado a été réalisé en partenariat avec France-Amériques. ## Episode 57: No Credible Evidence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-57-no-credible-evidence/ Modified: 2021-09-29 > n the 57th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about #Elxn44 with a recap on former General endorsements... In the 57th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about #Elxn44 with a recap on former General endorsements and the lack of foreign policy along with #AUKUS defence pact. Today’s feature interview guest is with Executive Director of Project Ploughshares, Cesar Jaramillo [25:40]. This week’s RnR segment [50:20], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Brooklyn 99, Wesley Morgan’s The Hardest Place. ## Épisode 58 – Paul Charon, directeur du domaine « Influence et Renseignement » de l’IRSEM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-58-paul-charon-directeur-du-domaine-influence-et-renseignement-de-lirsem-2/ Modified: 2025-11-12 Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam Marti-Brûlé et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos reçoivent Paul Charon, directeur du domaine Influence et Renseignement de l'Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire (IRSEM).  L’entretien aborde la structuration du champ « renseignement, anticipation et stratégies d’influence »,  le rôle croissant de la guerre cognitive, et les défis qu’elle pose aux démocraties. Ensemble, ils discutent de la tension entre secret et transparence dans les régimes démocratiques, de la centralité des récits dans les stratégies d’influence contemporaines, et des leçons tirées de la guerre en Ukraine face aux offensives narratives russes. L’épisode analyse également l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs, entreprises, plateformes, influenceurs, et les dilemmes que cela pose aux États soucieux de protéger à la fois la sécurité nationale et les libertés fondamentales. Enfin, notre invité revient sur deux ouvrages majeurs : Les mondes du renseignement, qui propose une approche pluridisciplinaire du renseignement, et Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese Information Influence Ecosystem, une étude inédite sur l’inefficacité paradoxale de certaines opérations d’influence chinoises. L’entretien se conclut sur les perspectives de coopération entre la France, le Canada et la Francophonie stratégique pour renforcer la résilience informationnelle et défendre un récit démocratique commun. Ce balado a été réalisé en partenariat avec France-Amériques. ## Episode 58: Moral Injury URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-58-moral-injury/ Modified: 2021-10-08 > In the 58th episode of Battle Rhythm, we talk about the state of Canada – China relations with the release of the two Michaels... In the 58th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the state of Canada – China relations with the release of the two Michaels, who will be the next Minister of National Defence and the United Nations General Assembly. Today’s feature interview guest is with CDSN Capstone Scholar, Stephanie Houle [25:20]. This week’s RnR segment [47:10], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Free Guy, Residential Schools Podcast, Star Wars Visions ## Épisode 59 – Mathieu Luinaud, consultant en stratégie et expert du secteur spatial URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-59-mathieu-luinaud-consultant-en-strategie-et-expert-du-secteur-spatial-2/ Modified: 2025-12-10 Pour ce nouvel épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Mathieu Luinaud, consultant en stratégie et expert du secteur spatial. Membre de l’International Institute of Space Law et chercheur associé à la chaire SIRIUS de l’Université Toulouse-1 Capitole, il enseigne aussi l’économie publique et les politiques technologiques à Sciences Po, et est élu de la ville de Paris. Il est l’auteur de plusieurs ouvrages récents, dont L’Industrie spatiale (PUF, 2023), L’Espace et Nous (Dunod, 2025) et Que sais-je ? L’Espace (PUF, 2025). Avec lui, ils explorent la place croissante du spatial dans notre quotidien et dans nos sécurités collectives : Comment l’espace recompose les rapports de puissance et la souveraineté technologique ; Quelles synergies émergent entre les politiques spatiales du Canada, de la France et de l’Australie ; Comment concilier innovation privée et exigences de sécurité nationale ; Quels leviers permettraient à l’Europe et au Canada de rester compétitifs dans un secteur dominé par les écosystèmes américain et asiatique. Ils abordent aussi le rôle du spatial dans la lutte contre les changements climatiques, la diplomatie environnementale, et les défis majeurs de gouvernance face au risque d’un « Far West » orbital. Enfin, ils discutent de l’avenir du spatial : un champ de rivalité stratégique ou un laboratoire d’interdépendance et d’innovation partagée ? Un épisode qui explore pourquoi l’espace est devenu un enjeu central de sécurité internationale. ## Episode 59: Joint Command and Staff Programme URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-59-joint-command-staff-programme/ Modified: 2021-10-22 > In the 59th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about a meeting Steve had with Gen. Eyre on personnel issues... In the 59th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about a meeting Steve had with Gen. Eyre on personnel issues, Adm. McDonald’s letter and leadership, opening of the US land border. Today’s feature interview is with a trio of impressive future CAF leaders, Maj D.E. Hogan, Maj M.R. Kieley & Maj S. Leblanc [25:45]. This week’s RnR segment [52:30], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: The Forgotten Battle, Super Eight, Squid Game. ## Episode 60: Canadian Intelligence Analysis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/br_ep_60/ Modified: 2023-03-29 > Today’s feature interview is with Stephanie Carvin & Thomas Juneau, authors of Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience In the 60th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Cabinet appointments, and Gen. Eyre’s keynote speech at KCIS. Today’s feature interview is with Stephanie Carvin & Thomas Juneau, authors of Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience [23:30]. This week’s RnR segment [56:10], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; WWZ, Happy Death Day. ## Episode 61: Hearts and Minds URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-61-hearts-and-minds/ Modified: 2023-03-29 > Today’s feature interview is with Col. (ret.) Eleanor Taylor discussing her current involvement with CAF veteran efforts to evacuate Afghan.. In the 61st episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about CoP26, Three Amigos Summit, and Belarus. Today’s feature interview is with Col. (ret.) Eleanor Taylor discussing her current involvement with CAF veteran efforts to evacuate Afghan colleagues living under Taliban rule [26:00]. This week’s RnR segment [48:50], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Kelly Greenhill’s Weapons of Mass Migration, Lovelife, Red Notice To donate: vtncanada.org To volunteer: amanlara.recovers.org To support resettlement: truepatriolove.com ## Episode 62: Feminist Solutions in the Year Ahead URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-62-feminist-solutions-in-the-year-ahead/ Modified: 2021-12-02 > In the 62nd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Throne Speech, CAF’s domestic operations in BC and our upcoming events. In the 62nd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Throne Speech, CAF’s domestic operations in BC and our upcoming events. Today’s feature interview is with feminist scholar and Year Ahead presenter, Megan MacKenzie [27:00]. This week’s RnR segment [54:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Hawkeye, Pig, the Beatles.   Battle Rhythm is hosted by Stephen Saideman and Stéfanie von Hlatky, co-produced with CGAI, and released every second Wednesday, features timely discussion on the defence and security issues of the day, as well as feature conversations with experts and graduate students. ## Episode 63: Leadership Strategy & Gendered Perspectives URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-63-leadership-strategy-gendered-perspectives/ Modified: 2021-12-20 In the 63rd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Summit of Democracies, Ukraine’s border politics and the Canadian Armed Forces apology. Today’s feature interviews are with 6 members of the 2021 Class of the Halifax Peace with Women Fellowship, discussing leadership strategy & gendered perspectives [18:50]. This week’s RnR segment [57:25], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Scrooged, The Year Without a Christmas, Die Hard Group 1: Leadership Strategy; Colonel Krista Bouckaert: Director of Canadian Forces Grievance Authority, Department of National Defence Commodore Judith Terry: Deputy Director People, British Royal Navy Colonel Katherine Lee: Assistant Chief of Army (Delivery), New Zealand Defence Force Group 2: Gendered Perspectives; Colonel Biljana Blazheska; Aide-de-camp to the Supreme Commander, Armed Forces of the Republic of North Macedonia Lieutenant Colonel Diana Morais: Senior Advisor to the Minister of National Defense, Ministry of National Defense, Portugal Colonel Jennifer de Poorter: G3 of the Operational Headquarters, Royal Marechaussee, Netherlands ## Episode 64: The 2021 Class of the Halifax Peace With Women Fellowship URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-64-the-2021-class-of-the-halifax-peace-with-women-fellowship/ Modified: 2022-02-02 > In the 64th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia. Today’s feature interviews are with... In the 64th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia. Today’s feature interviews are with The 2021 Class of the Halifax Peace With Women Fellowship, discussing education and instruction and field operations [20:40]. This week’s RnR segment [55:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Yellow Jackets, Alex Rider, Conquering Tide. • Lieutenant Colonel Monika Mertinaitė: Senior Advisor, Defense Policy Group, Ministry of National Defense, Lithuania • Brigadier General Catherine Bourdès: Deputy Director of French Higher Military Education, Directorate for Higher Military Studies • Colonel Anna Siverstig: Commanding Officer, Swedish Air Warfare Center, Swedish Air Force • Group Captain Louise desJardins: Director Joint Effects/J3E, Royal Australian Air Force • Colonel Danielle Willis: Commander 93 Air Ground Operations Wing, United States Air Force ## Episode 65: It’s Not Just 700 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-65-its-not-just-700/ Modified: 2022-02-02 > In the 65th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Civ-Mil protocol when it comes to domestic protests and Canada’s commitment... In the 65th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Civ-Mil protocol when it comes to domestic protests and Canada’s commitment in Ukraine. Today’s feature interview is with M.E. Sam Samplonius, Co-Chairperson of It’s Not Just 700, a volunteer run, non-funded organization that provides camaraderie, informal support, and advocates for those impacted by Military Sexual Misconduct and Military Sexual Trauma in the Canadian Armed Forces. [17:15]. This week’s RnR segment [43:40], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Wolf like me, Witcher, Twilight of the Gods—Pacific War book ## Episode 66: Saving Democracy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ep66-saving-democracy/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > In the 66th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the internationalization of the trucker convoy and the impending Russian... In the 66th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the internationalization of the trucker convoy and the impending Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today’s feature interview is with Ben Rowswell, president of the Canadian International Council. [20:50]. This week’s RnR segment [54:30], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Raising Dion, Reacher, Jack Reacher books. ## Episode 67: NATO (eFP) Battle Group Latvia URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-67-nato-efp-battle-group-latvia/ Modified: 2022-03-07 > The Canadian-led NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group Latvia completed an evaluation of its capabilities as a “force package” to In the 67th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today’s feature interview is with Lieutenant-colonel John Benson, (MSM, CD, A de C, Commandant 2e Bataillon Royal 22e Régiment et La Citadelle de Québec) [20:00]. This week’s RnR segment [46:35], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: All of Us Are Dead, Ms. Maisel, Resident Alien. The Canadian-led NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group Latvia completed an evaluation of its capabilities as a “force package” to meet NATO standards during Exercise Silver Arrow in September. The multinational exercise involved almost 3,000 troops and 200 vehicles from 12 NATO allies and was designed to test the battle group’s ability “to plan and conduct operations with the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade” and enhance their readiness, said its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel John Benson. ## Episode 68: Talking to the Civilian in Canada’s Civ-Mil URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-68-talking-to-the-civilian-in-canadas-civ-mil/ Modified: 2022-03-16 > In the 68th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Conference of Defence Associations Institute's annual Ottawa Conference In the 68th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Conference of Defence Associations Institute's annual Ottawa Conference, Russia, Ukraine, foreign fighters & supply convoys. Today’s feature interview is with The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence [21:45]. This week’s RnR segment [55:20], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Adam Project, Dead Eyes, Rick Atkinson.     ## Episode 69: OSCE’s special monitoring mission to Ukraine (SMMU) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-69-osces-special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-smmu/ Modified: 2022-03-30 > In the 69th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the ISA, Steve’s appearance in a parliamentary hearing with discussion... In the 69th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the ISA, Steve’s appearance in a parliamentary hearing with discussion of the military personnel announcement, highlights from the NATO summit, and the F35 purchase announcement. Today’s feature interview [20:00] is with Christophe Fortier-Guay discussing his role as OSCE’s special monitoring mission to Ukraine (SMMU).This week’s RnR segment [57:40], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: I like cake, Turning Red, Our Flag Means Death       Christophe Fortier-Guay joined the OSCE’s special monitoring mission to Ukraine (SMMU) in 2017 where he served as a lead political advisor to the mission’s leadership in war-torn Donbas (Luhansk MT). In February 2021, he was promoted acting Deputy Team Leader of the Kharkiv MT, covering Kharkiv, Poltava and Sumy Oblasts. On 1 February 2022, he was appointed acting Team Leader of Kharkiv MT. Prior to his deployment to Eastern Ukraine, he assisted the Director of international cooperation of the French Ministry of Interior. From 2012 to 2014, he was the senior advisor to the Minister of International Relations and Foreign Trade of Quebec. Earlier appointments include serving in the Cabinet of the French Minister for Budget and Spokesman of the Government; in the Political Affairs Secretariat of the Organization of American States in Washington DC; and in the Global strategy firm of Hubert Védrine, former Secretary General of the French Presidency and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is a graduate of the University of Montreal (B.A. political science), the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Master’s in international affairs, conflict and security issues) and of the French National School of Administration (ENA – Promotion Louise Weiss). In 2019, he successfully completed the Senior Executives in National and International Security program at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. ## Episode 70: Police Responses URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-70-police-responses/ Modified: 2022-04-13 > In the 70th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about NATO expectations & 2% aspirations, the defense review announcement and... In the 70th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about NATO expectations & 2% aspirations, the defense review announcement and former CDS Vance’s guilty plea. Today’s feature interview is with Temitope Oriola, Associate Professor, Sociology at the University of Alberta [20:05].This week’s RnR segment [46:15], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: The Stranger, D-Day Girls, No Way Home ## Episode 71: Eating the Elephant One Bite at a Time URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-71-eating-the-elephant-one-bite-at-a-time/ Modified: 2022-04-27 > Guest host Anessa Kimball and Steve talk about Finland, Sweden and NATO, US assurances, Ukraine’s borders along with Canada’s defence... In the 71st episode of Battle Rhythm, guest host Anessa Kimball and Steve talk about Finland, Sweden and NATO, US assurances, Ukraine’s borders along with Canada’s defence contributions and implications; finally the data within the Minister’s Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination Final Report. Today’s feature interview is with Major-General M.H.L. (Lise) Bourgon, CMM, MSC, CD, Acting Commander, Military Personnel Command [36:45]. This week’s RnR segment [1:03:30], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Russian Doll, Outcasts, Barry   Guest Biography: Major-General Lise Bourgon joined the military in 1987 under the ROTP training plan and was selected to attend Le College Militaire Royal de St-Jean where she graduated in 1992 with a Bachelor Degree in Business Administration. Following wings training in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan in 1994, she was posted to 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron in Shearwater where she served on HMCS Preserver, NCSM Ville De Quebec and HMCS Toronto. In 1998, she was transferred to 406 Maritime Operational Training Squadron, where she served as a pilot instructor. Following her promotion to Major in 2001, she was posted to Ottawa in the Directorate of Air Requirements - Maritime as a Project Director working on projects such as the Maritime Helicopter Program and the Self-Defence Program. She was posted back to 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron in 2004 to serve as the Detachment Commander on HMCS Montreal. Following her deployment, she was appointed as the Wing Plans and Tasks Officer in 2005. She graduated from the Joint Command and Staff Program at the Canadian Force College in Toronto in 2007. Following her promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel, she was appointed the Commanding Officer of 406 Maritime Operational Training Squadron in 2007 and served in Shearwater, NS until July 2009 when she was chosen to be the Executive Assistant to the Chief of the Air Staff in Ottawa. In June 2011, she was promoted to Colonel and posted as the NATO Liaison Officer at the NATO Air Headquarters in Ramstein, Germany. After only two years in Germany, she was appointed as the new 12 Wing Commander in Shearwater, Nova Scotia. Following her tour as Wing Commander, she was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-general and deployed as the Joint Task Force Commander for OP IMPACT. Upon her return from deployment, she was assigned to Canada Joint Operational Command as the Chief of Operations. In August 2016, she was transferred to the Strategic Joint Staff as Director General Operations. In 2018, she assumed the duties of Chief of Staff, Operations at the Canadian Joint Operational Command. In 2021, she completed a one-year Defence Fellowship assignment with the Centre of International and Defence and Policy at Queens’ University. Since April 21, she is assigned as the Deputy Commander of Military Personnel Command. In addition to her daily job, MGen Bourgon is the Canadian Armed Forces Women, Peace, and Security champion. ## Episode 72: Training in Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-72-training-in-ukraine/ Modified: 2022-05-19 > uest host Linna Tam-Seto and Steve talk about her recent work on military sexual trauma within the Sexual Misconduct network, as well... In the 72nd episode of Battle Rhythm, guest host Linna Tam-Seto and Steve talk about her recent work on military sexual trauma within the Sexual Misconduct network, as well as her postdoc mentorship work in relation to the recent racism report, and a report on accommodating families. Today’s feature interview is with LCol Melanie Lake, Task force Commander Operation UNIFIER [26:30]. This week’s RnR segment [58:20], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Metal Lords, Kids in the Hall, Moonknight ## Episode 73: NATO Burden Sharing URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-73-nato-burden-sharing/ Modified: 2022-05-25 > In the 73rd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about expectations for the upcoming Independent External Comprehensive Review into In the 73rd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about expectations for the upcoming Independent External Comprehensive Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, led by Madame Louise Arbour as well as Finland, Sweden and NATO expansion. Today’s feature interview is with Dr. Binyam (Ben) Solomon, Senior Defence Scientist at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC). [20:15]. This week’s RnR segment [41:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Game Night, Multiverse of Madness, The Investigators. ## Episode 74: The Military Industrial Complex URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-74-the-military-industrial-complex/ Modified: 2022-06-24 > In the 74th episode of Battle Rhythm, guest host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot and Steve talk about cases of sexual misconduct in the military.. In the 74th episode of Battle Rhythm, guest host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot and Steve talk about cases of sexual misconduct in the military and civilian justice, the new handgun regulations and #CANSEC. Today’s feature interview guest is with Executive Director of Project Ploughshares Canada, Cesar Jaramillo [19:30]. This week’s RnR segment [55:40], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Breaking Bad, Operation Mincemeat, Obi-Wan ## Episode 75: The Present of Canadian Security and Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/episode-75-the-present-of-canadian-security-and-defence/ Modified: 2022-07-12 > In the season finale of Battle Rhythm: Season 1, Steve and Stef discuss the Arbour Report as stakeholders in the project and as op-ed writers In the season finale of Battle Rhythm: Season 1, Steve and Stef discuss the Arbour Report as stakeholders in the project and as op-ed writers; the upcoming NATO Summit in Madrid, NORAD Modernization and a Q&A session with Stéfanie as this is her last episode as co-host as she steps aside for another important and exciting role as Associate Dean Research within the Faculty of Arts and Science at Queen's University. Recommends: 1. Dave Grohl's The Storyteller www.davegrohlstoryteller.com/David 2. David Foenkinos novels belgraviabooks.com/writer/david-foenkinos 3. Le Lambeau by Philippe Lançon www.worldliteraturetoday.org/2018/novem…ppe-lancon ## Épsiode 37: Caroline Xavier, chef du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/epsiode-37-caroline-xavier-chef-du-centre-de-la-securite-des-telecommunications-cst-2/ Modified: 2023-03-22 > Pour ce 37e épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Caroline Xavier, chef du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST). Pour ce 37e épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Caroline Xavier, chef du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST). Ils discutent de son parcours et des défis particuliers à son poste. Madame Xavier explique en quoi la cybersécurité est une préoccupation croissante en matière de sécurité nationale et dans quelle mesure le CST dispose des outils et des ressources nécessaires pour faire face aux principales menaces. Madame Xavier aborde le rôle des agences de sécurité nationale pour relever ce défi. Madame Xavier explique également le rôle de premier plan du CST dans la communauté canadienne de la sécurité nationale et du renseignement pour promouvoir l'équité, la diversité et l'inclusion. ## Épsiode 38: Lise Howard, professeure titulaire à l’Université de Georgetown URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/epsiode-38-lise-howard-professeure-titulaire-a-luniversite-de-georgetown-2/ Modified: 2023-05-17 > Ils parlent de l’importance et de l’efficacité des opérations de la paix et des principaux défis et atouts de l’ONU. Lise Howard décrit... Pour ce nouvel épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Lise Howard, professeure titulaire à l'Université de Georgetown, avec des nominations conjointes au Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Ils discutent de son rôle sur l’équipe Russia-Ukraine comme “Senior Fellow” en résidence au United States Institute of Peace, des accusations portées contre Vladimir Poutine devant la Cour pénale internationale de La Haye et de la façon dont la communauté internationale peut tenir la Russie et ses dirigeants responsables des crimes commis en Ukraine . Ils parlent de l’importance et de l’efficacité des opérations de la paix et des principaux défis et atouts de l’ONU. Lise Howard décrit des principaux défis qui se posent pour quelqu’un qui navigue entre ces mondes de recherche et de politiques appliquées et elle partage ses réflexions sur le rôle que le Canada pourrait jouer en partenariat avec les États-Unis , notamment face à la crise en Ukraine. ## Europe and Canada after NATO: thinking about Euro-Atlantic security without Washington URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/europe-and-canada-after-nato-thinking-about-euro-atlantic-security-without-washington/ Modified: 2026-02-17 If Trump were to abandon Europe and retreat to ‘his hemisphere’, we would have to defend a continent and an ocean without Washington. Less cumbersome than NATO but more robust in the event of a US withdrawal, a networked security architecture based on the proliferation and interconnection of voluntary coalitions could provide protection without the United States. RAS co-director Justin Massie proposes a model for strategic restructuring. Read the full text here (in French). Image Credit: AP Photo/CP/Fred Chartrand ## European Nuclear Deterrence: A Credible Project? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/european-nuclear-deterrence-a-credible-project/ Modified: 2025-10-24 Why such a project? Donald Trump's arrival in the White House in 2025 sent shockwaves through the European community. The reliability of their greatest ally was called into question, prompting them to re-evaluate their relationship with the United States. In response to the tense meeting between Zelensky and the American President and Vice-President Vance, and the United States' decision to temporarily suspend its aid to Ukraine, European countries quickly realized the need to ‘take over’ in terms of aid to Ukraine and European security. In early March, France and the United Kingdom agreed to set up a ‘coalition of the willing’ composed of themselves and other countries willing to provide major support to Ukraine in the war and in its protection, as well as in the security of the European continent. At the same time, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz highlighted the problem of American disinterest in NATO and Europe and called on European countries with nuclear weapons to consider a sovereign European alternative. As a result, France and the United Kingdom, the only nuclear powers in Europe, are considering the implementation of a common deterrence strategy that could take over from the Americans in order to reassure Europe about the lack of American commitment and their potential withdrawal. The stakes are high, as the aim is to guarantee military and economic support and provide a force capable of deterring Russia, but also to defend European partners by positioning itself as a reliable alternative to the American umbrella. The main aim of this project is to coordinate the British and French arsenals so that they can act as a credible deterrent for European allies, independent of American nuclear protection. This will require extending France's nuclear protection zone, which has so far been concentrated on its national territory and borders, to cover the much larger area represented by the European Union. One of the key issues at stake in this initiative is whether this deterrent force is capable of functioning without American support and whether its capabilities are ‘sufficient’ to defend the whole of Europe. The major question that arises is whether this Franco-British collaboration really has the capacity to deter Russia from a future invasion. Furthermore, can it also provide a nuclear deterrent force for Europe in a context where the United States is losing interest in the continent? What form could this nuclear umbrella take? This text examines the issue of deterrence and its various forms, as well as the challenge of credibility. It also reviews the fundamental question of deterrence capabilities and means in order to take stock of the European situation with regard to extended deterrence. While the Franco-British project demonstrates great credibility in terms of its nuclear aspect, it is nevertheless necessary for Europe to equip itself with a conventional force that allows for a gradual response at a time when the United States seems to be losing interest in European defence. Nuclear Deterrence: A Matter of Credibility Deterrence relies primarily on credibility. The credibility of retaliation, which, through the reaction of the person attacked, will render a potential attack irrational. But also the political credibility of deterrence, which relies on the ability to make the power of one's weapons credible. Until the end of the Cold War, the various Western and Soviet deterrence paradigms were based ‘solely’ on the manipulation of nuclear weapons. The models of use could be based on a logic of first use or not, but also on a graduated approach or assured destruction. However, they excluded the contribution of conventional means from their escalation schemes. With the progress made in precision weapons, whose success was established during the first Gulf War (Desert Storm), this classic view of nuclear deterrence proved increasingly ineffective. Since the 2000s, the focus has therefore been on developing an integrated deterrence that combines or ‘backs up’ strategic nuclear capabilities with other means. De facto, the imperative of once again having conventional forces available for high-intensity conflict has therefore been reassessed in order to avoid any coup de force or fait accompli that would bypass the threshold of nuclear deterrence. Similarly, the resilience of civil societies is impacted by the risks of disinformation and hybrid warfare. While the core logic of deterrence – the credibility of a response – remains the same, it is now broader than before. To convince an adversary that their aggression would entail costs greater than their immediate attack, it is therefore necessary not only to demonstrate the reliability of nuclear capabilities, but also to signal the preparedness of one's armed forces and civil society. In its nuclear dimension, deterrence is theoretically based, in its absolute form, on a triad composed of land, sea and air. Each component provides a means of deploying nuclear force: on land with intercontinental missiles, at sea with submarines, and in the air with bombs carried by aircraft. Although mastery of all three is important, the use of only one or two of the three aspects is sufficient to be credible. In these cases, we can think of the United Kingdom, whose deterrence relies mainly on its naval capabilities, or France, which has both air and sea capabilities. In addition, nuclear weapons can be divided into several types. There are tactical nuclear weapons, but also strategic ones, which have different objectives. The concept of tactical nuclear weapons therefore refers to targeted use with smaller nuclear warheads allowing for precise use on the battlefield, while the strategic objective is to strike and destroy the country's nerve centres, whether demographic, economic or political. Although there are differences in terms of payload, damage and type of use, the difference between tactical and strategic weapons is mainly in the context of state deterrence doctrines. Furthermore, it is essential to note that the deployment of nuclear deterrence capability does not happen in isolation. The threat of a strike or potential strike must be backed up by conventional means to carry out the operation or demonstrate resilience. Credibility: The Crux of the Matter On 10 July, the French President and British Prime Minister announced that they had signed a declaration on the coordination of their respective countries' nuclear arsenals. Beyond this important symbolic gesture, the question of the credibility of the two countries' deterrence postures, as well as their resources and capabilities, needs to be clarified in order to ensure the coherence of the European deterrence project. It is therefore necessary to examine the postures of the two main parties involved. On the French side, nuclear deterrence is based on an ‘all-out’ approach, focusing not on a single enemy, but on the defence of all its vital interests against any adversary. Consequently, French nuclear deterrence is designed to be constant and exclusively defensive. However, it is used as part of a strategy aimed at inflicting unacceptable damage on capitals, important command centres, economic and energy infrastructure, etc. Furthermore, French deterrence is intended to be independent and autonomous, emphasising the fact that it is under the sole authority of the President of the Republic and cannot therefore be used by other countries or entities allied with France. The French concept of nuclear deterrence is centred on the country's vital interests, which raises doubts about the expansion of French doctrine in its current form. Although the question of European nuclear deterrence is not a new one in France, it is difficult to assess what constitutes a vital interest outside the national territory. Since the Aachen Agreement in 2019, France has committed to protecting Germany by guaranteeing joint defence of the two nations through their military forces, without explicitly mentioning nuclear weapons. Beyond that, doubts remain about France's political will and its ability to effectively defend countries directly threatened by Russia, even though these countries are calling for nuclear protection, which they see as the only possible means of deterring their common enemy. France would therefore need to revise its entire nuclear doctrine in order to propose a model that marks a break with its past conception of nuclear deterrence. For the United Kingdom, the deterrence posture involves the use of Trident missiles on a sub-strategic scale. The logic would be to use nuclear weapons in a limited way so as not to trigger a larger-scale exchange. This posture can therefore be situated between the tactical and the strategic, hence the origin of its name. However, the British doctrine of nuclear deterrence seeks to create ambiguity about the circumstances in which the country considers its right to respond with nuclear weapons, allowing it to retain a certain amount of leeway vis-à-vis a potential aggressor. Nevertheless, certain principles are set out. The United Kingdom undertakes not to launch a nuclear strike first and to respond in a minimal but credible manner. Nuclear weapons are therefore purely for deterring potential adversaries and are not considered weapons that can be used on the battlefield. Finally, the United Kingdom has both air and sea-based nuclear forces, although its sea-based forces remain the most effective thanks to the use of its Vanguard-class submarines, which will be replaced from 2028 onwards by the Dreadnought class. However, the British arsenal is ageing and needs to be upgraded, either through the acquisition of airborne capabilities or the modernisation of its weapons. Although the combined arsenals of the two countries (290 for France and 225 for the United Kingdom) do not match the numbers of Russian nuclear weapons (5,580 warheads), the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons, when combined with the countries' postures and strategies, makes them an effective means of deterring an adversary. However, the question remains as to the political will to act as a guarantor of security for a number of states that are ultimately relatively far from their borders. The Russian perception of these European projects is also a factor to be taken into account. How do they react to these decisions? The question of a threat posed by European nuclear deterrence is simply not taken seriously in Russian think tanks or media. What emerges mainly is an attempt to discredit European efforts by portraying the British navy as outdated, incapable of fighting the Russians, and composed of immoral individuals. On the French side, the idea is the same: Macron is only looking for a pretext to enter the war and Europe is playing with fire by being a geopolitical player that is no longer serious. Thus, the idea is that Europe is not up to the task and is a bankrupt player struggling to regain its place. However, nuclear weapons still speak for themselves, and the fact that France and the United Kingdom are becoming threats to Russia is well considered. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergei Ryabkov, announced that Russia would take Franco-British efforts into account in its next military planning. It is interesting to note that Russia is seeking to highlight an anti-Russian attitude in France and Europe. In doing so, it hopes to discredit decisions taken by Europe that seek to stir up tensions in order to facilitate the acceptance of its own rearmament by its population. However, the subject of the European deterrence project is not widely discussed in the Foreign Ministry's press conferences. Nevertheless, at a press conference on 6 March 2025, its spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, mentioned the French project to create a new umbrella, stating that it was impossible due to France's lesser capacity compared to the American umbrella. However, she also mentioned that this change in doctrine would be taken into account in Russia's future military planning. Capabilities that Match Ambitions? In France, as mentioned above, nuclear deterrence can be understood in terms of two elements: airborne missiles and those installed on submarines. The submarine component is certainly the most reliable and effective, since ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are undetectable and untraceable. In addition, among the four SSBNs, there will always be at least one submarine at sea ready to use nuclear weapons, thus ensuring French deterrence. Its capacity to carry 16 M51 missiles per vessel gives it considerable striking power and enables it to fulfil its mission. Thus, the naval component of French deterrence is assured and credible in the eyes of its adversaries. However, the airborne dimension is also a major element of French doctrine. In this case, nuclear weapons are carried on Rafale aircraft stationed at Mont-de-Marsan Air Base 118 and deployed using ASMPA missiles. Nevertheless, France's airborne nuclear force is located in France in order to defend the country's vital interests. Although the airborne mission includes refuelling aircraft that allow the Rafales to cover greater distances, these are vulnerable. It is therefore essential that the airborne component be supported by conventional forces capable of defending the nuclear vector. Alternatively, or in parallel, the aircraft could be stationed elsewhere, which would allow them to be closer to the adversary to be deterred and to reach them more quickly. Finally, although we have not mentioned it, it is essential to have increased intelligence capabilities for surveillance and reconnaissance in order for the strategy to be credible. Today, almost all European countries rely on close cooperation with US intelligence, reducing their strategic ‘independence’. For such a mission to be viable, France must secure the support of these allies so that they guarantee the deterrence mission, whether through intelligence sharing (a vital component of nuclear deterrence), conventional support (backing) for carrier aircraft, or by allowing stationing at allied bases in a similar vein to NATO's nuclear sharing. A major step for France will be to agree on a common doctrine and, in this perspective, the logic of nuclear sharing remains undoubtedly the most relevant, thus allowing allies to contribute while keeping the decision within the French Armed Forces General Staff. For its part, the British army also ensures its deterrence through a submarine and, more recently, an airborne component. Similarly, the submarine mission requires that there always be at least one Dreadnought-class submarine deployed on mission. However, the nuclear arsenal is equipped with Trident D2 missiles built by the American company Lockheed Martin and capable of carrying up to 12 nuclear warheads. In terms of its air capability, the United Kingdom recently announced the acquisition of 12 F-35s in order to comply with NATO's dual-capability mission. Concerns have been raised about British deterrence due to the presence of American equipment in its nuclear deterrence capabilities. With Trump's various announcements, questions have been raised about the strategic autonomy of countries purchasing American equipment. In the case of the UK, this would directly undermine the country's nuclear capabilities due to its missiles and future aircraft, which are all American products whose margin of strategic autonomy in terms of their use remains unclear. However, the order to fire a nuclear missile rests with the commander of the missile submarine, ruling out any suggestion of American interference or validation. Nevertheless, Washington is partly responsible for maintaining the missiles, which means that cooperation between the two powers on their upkeep must be sustained in order for them to remain functional and usable. Thus, the weapons will continue to function as long as the Americans maintain them. As a result, British deterrence has less room for manoeuvre than the French model, but remains credible and effective. Despite their inferiority in terms of nuclear capability, both models are effective and capable of working together because of their strategies, which seek to strike hard where it hurts. However, conventional support is needed to carry out deterrence, which could be provided by their European allies. What Can Be Done? In conclusion, the Franco-British project for a joint European nuclear deterrent offers a solid foundation with real capabilities, characterized by the submarine and ballistic power of both countries and consistent, credible strategic postures which, despite their numerical inferiority, remain appropriate. Their credibility resonates with Russia, as the distrustful regime intends to take this new reality into account in its military planning. The aim of this initiative is to reassure European allies in the face of American disinterest, which risks increasing insecurity for Europe. Furthermore, the management of nuclear security on European territory by European countries allows for a more coherent vision of security that does not rely solely on American capabilities and will. However, the conventional dimension, mainly to support nuclear capabilities in the event of a raid, is still too weak and unreliable, despite deployments in Estonia and Romania respectively to secure the eastern flank. To this end, the coalition could be the guarantor of this force with the support of member countries, which would contribute in part to this dimension. Unfortunately, political uncertainties and a lack of willingness on the part of some countries are slowing down the progress of this project and calling into question the measures taken by the allies. What should Europe do? The United States is still very important in European defence today, and if Europe wants to be autonomous, it must be able to do without its North American ally. However, this prospect seems unrealistic given the major American involvement in European defence (intelligence, capabilities, etc.). Therefore, it would be more appropriate to see some form of rebalancing. A rise of Europe that ‘takes its destiny into its own hands’ to reduce its dependence on an American presence without completely abandoning it. To achieve this, Europe as a whole must develop its conventional forces, as some of its members are already doing, such as Poland and, more recently, Germany. But it must also demonstrate greater cohesion and coordination so as not to show any signs of confusion or lack of unity that could undermine the credibility of the project or make it appear to be an empty shell. There is also doubt about the willingness of these Western European countries to actually defend the Eastern nations under this new nuclear umbrella. If Russia were to attack a Baltic country tomorrow, what would France and the United Kingdom do? A nuclear response would obviously not be an option unless the attack itself were nuclear, but a conventional response would also present challenges, hence the need to develop this aspect and establish a relevant doctrine allowing for a gradual and appropriate response. However, the capabilities to do so are not yet in place. Furthermore, rearmament plans do not seem to be scheduled until 2030 to 2035, which is far too long to wait, given that many European actors anticipate a threat as early as 2030 (including France, the United Kingdom, Germany and, more generally, the European countries that have joined the Rearm Europe programme). Europe must therefore invest more and more quickly in its defence, with more immediate measures, as demonstrated by Emmanuel Macron, who has revised French budgets to reach £67 billion by 2027/2030 in order to make this project credible. So how would nuclear and conventional weapons operate according to this logic? The integration of tactical nuclear weapons into war plans seems unrealistic for European doctrines (unlike the Russian model). As a result, strengthening the conventional component consolidates the support for nuclear weapons, but also allows for a graduated and credible response to an enemy attack, thus enabling greater flexibility for European and transatlantic forces. However, increasing conventional spending is not enough; it is now necessary to develop deterrence models that fully integrate the conventional level alongside the nuclear dimension. The latter requires full coordination between Europeans and, to a lesser extent, with the United States and Canada. It also requires a review of existing strategic doctrines, which are still too focused on nuclear strikes. Conventional forces must therefore become a genuine form of deterrence, allowing for a certain level of gradation in the response. In this way, Europe will be able to ensure its own security. However, the electoral uncertainties hanging over certain European countries are casting a significant shadow over these plans. ## Fear of missing out: Meloni’s moderation for the stability of the international scenario. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/fear-of-missing-out-melonis-moderation-for-the-stability-of-the-international-scenario/ Modified: 2023-10-24 > The latest Italian elections, held in September 2022, represent a turning point for both the country and the international community... The latest Italian elections, held in September 2022, represent a turning point for both the country and the international community. According to several analysts, the victory of the right-wing coalition led by Giorgia Meloni represents a tipping point and a significant political shift in the domestic and international scenario. The winning coalition defended Euro-sceptic and pro-Russia stances in the past, as well as extremely conservative positions on a variety of issues, such as immigration, security, and social rights. The position of the Bel Paese within the European regional context and the broader international landscape underscores the significance of its stance in relation to both domestic and global challenges, affecting global balance. Of note is Italy’s strategic geographical location, economic strength, cultural heritage, strategic culture, diplomatic influence, remarkable soft power abilities, strong management of migration crises, and political stability. This “hot take” entry examines two of the most important foreign policy issues that the newly elected Italian government is facing: international alignment towards Moscow and security policies. Given the long-standing friendship between Italian right-wing circles and Putin, the newly elected PM Giorgia Meloni’s statements appear to advocate a re-orientation towards Brussels and NATO rather than Moscow. The new Meloni government took office at a particularly delicate time for the fate of domestic, but especially international, equilibria. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as new migration pushes from the MENA region and the Balkan route, create a challenging security landscape for Eurozone partners and Italy itself. Since her appointment in late September 2022, the new Prime Minister has publicly confirmed Italy’s support for Ukraine in the context of inseparable cooperation between NATO allies and EU members. Giorgia Meloni emphasized the importance of a common line of action among Eurozone and North Atlantic bloc countries in promoting a global, not just regional, concept of security. During the most recent summit in Vilnius in July 2023, the Prime Minister emphasized Italy’s and Western partners’ commitment to supporting the Kyiv government. Indeed, in recent months, discussions about Ukraine’s membership in NATO have reignited public and political debate about the organization’s role, the conditions for integrating new members, and the strategic tactics to be used to defend Zelensky’s government from Moscow’s protracted invasion. Most commentaries issued during the months leading up to the election, when there were already rumours of a possible Meloni victory, stressed that Italy ran the risk of becoming the weak spot in Europe, undermining NATO’s members’ unity and the “consensus” on Ukraine and Russia. To date, the evidence has disproved these apprehensions, particularly with regard to the nation’s foreign policy agenda. Against the backdrop of far-reaching consequences of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, the escalation of energy costs, and the widespread inflationary pressures affecting the entirety of the European Union, the foreign policy perspective of Italy - the third-largest economy in the Union - will assume a particularly crucial role in the forthcoming months. The preservation of European unity on sanctions and military support for Ukraine while simultaneously countering Russia’s aggression will depend heavily on Italy’s policies towards Moscow and its approach toward allies in Brussels and Washington. The question of Italy’s positioning vis-à-vis Moscow within the European regional framework is critical: while Prime Minister Meloni has already reiterated her support for Kyiv, continuing her predecessor Draghi’s choice of sending support material to Ukraine, the past of some members of the Italian governing coalition should be considered. Right-wing political elites in Italy have frequently been criticized by their European fellows for their ambiguous attitude toward President Putin. Representatives from some of the right-wing parties that now form the ruling coalition have had personal relationships with the Kremlin leader, casting Italy in a negative light, especially given the importance of the country’s regional positioning in relation to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy. These dynamics, which bring attention back to Russia’s occupation of the Donbas in 2014, have been repeatedly addressed by Italian center-right circles, which have criticized the ineffectiveness and absurdity of sanctions imposed on Moscow by Western allies. Indeed, this is a particularly difficult issue for Italy, which has limited energy resources and has relied heavily on Russian material imports. Former Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, leader of the populist Movimento 5 Stelle party, has previously criticized EU sanctions against Moscow, but he has attempted to frame his criticism in terms of energy supply rather than actual political positioning. The recently deceased former Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was widely recognized as a close ally of Vladimir Putin, and he has been embroiled in a contentious situation following the election of the new government. Despite the stakes at the international level, he did not fail to emphasize his long-standing relationship with Putin, undermining Italy’s credibility with its allies. Likewise, the ex-Interior Minister and current Vice Prime Minister Matteo Salvini represents a contentious factor in terms of Italy’s stance. He is an open supporter of Putin: he stood up for him in 2014, calling the intervention in Crimea legitimate and Western sanctions harmful to the EU and Italy; he struck a deal between his party and that of the Russian president in 2018, which is still in force today; in 2019, an investigation revealed that Russia allegedly offered a member of the League €3 million to finance the party’s election campaign in the European Parliament. Unlike Berlusconi, however, Salvini appeared to retract on his previous explicit positions regarding Russia, perhaps for the sake of government stability and Italian credibility, and prompted by Meloni’s example. After the election, Giorgia Meloni emphasized Italy’s constant and renewed commitment to the Atlantic alliance and the Western bloc in general at the new government’s inauguration. The PM met with the heads of the EU’s highest institutions on October 23rd as her first international visit. The main topics discussed were energy crisis management, with references to Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and Italy’s position, and PNRR fund management. Meloni stated that she is already working on practical solutions to assist families and businesses in dealing with the challenges of insufficient energy supplies and rising monthly utility costs. In terms of international alignment on the Ukrainian issue, Meloni reiterated her support for Kyiv, emphasizing the possibility of additional arms deployment in the event of a joint decision by NATO or EU members and expressing her desire to make Italy a regional and international stronghold. The new Italian Prime Minister has chosen to follow in the footsteps of the previous Draghi government in managing the post-pandemic recovery funds that Italy will receive from the EU. The appointment of Giancarlo Giorgetti as Minister of Economy is seen as a sign that Italy will keep its promises to Brussels. Giorgetti was, in fact, the Minister of Economic Development in the Draghi government, which was regarded as trustworthy by European institutions. Thus, one of the most important regional challenges for the Italian government will be to demonstrate its reliability as a partner for European institutions at a time when the rise of challenges in the continental framework threatens the Union’s stability and cohesion. On the other hand, in terms of public spending related to NATO alliance participation, it seems like Italy is having some issues with the organization’s budget (the notorious 2 percent of GDP to be spent on Defence, as a sign of burden-sharing within the organization). Given its very high public debt, Rome faces numerous challenges in meeting the predetermined threshold of just over 1.5 percent in 2022 (down from 1.57 percent the previous year). Guido Corsetto, Defense Minister and co-founder of the Fratelli d’Italia Party, has repeatedly emphasized Italy’s commitment to meeting the NATO-agreed-upon threshold. The 2% threshold projections published by NATO’s diplomatic division show that Italy’s GDP share of the predetermined threshold will not be fully reached until 2028. According to the Pluriannual Defense Program Document for the three-year period 2022-2024, published by the Italian Ministry of Defense, the trend has seen a value of 1.54% for 2022, which will remain unchanged in 2023, while an increase to 1.65% is expected for 2024.   The Southern Gateway to Europe The migration issue is a further compelling foreign policy priority for Italy’s new right-wing government. Italy is an arrival point for the notorious routes from the Middle East and North Africa via the Balkans or the Mediterranean itself due to its strategic location in southern Europe and in the center of the Mediterranean. Meloni promptly reiterated the agreement with Libya reached under the former Democratic Party-led government and signed by former Prime Minister Gentiloni in 2017. The agreement calls for the Italian government to provide Libyan authorities (particularly the Coast Guard) with economic and technical assistance in order to reduce migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea. Libya agreed to improve conditions in its migrant reception centers in exchange. The narrative used by Italian governments, which is supported by European partners and Washington, is one of counter-terrorism. Libya, in fact, is a country racked by a civil war that has raged since the fall of the Gaddafi regime, exacerbated over time by the radicalization of the parties on the ground and backed by a variety of international actors. Indeed, such a scenario has set the stage for the growing proliferation of terrorist groups, not just from Libya - the point of arrival from Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the point of departure due to its sea outlet. The Libyan Coast Guard’s violent and arbitrary tactics in rescuing migrants in the Mediterranean Sea and forcing them into indefinite detention in so-called detention centers have shocked international public opinion. The failure of Libya to comply with the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, as well as the impact of this situation on migrants rescued in the Mediterranean, raises serious concerns. The Italian government, which is complicit in atrocities against migrants from other Sub-Saharan countries as well as Libyans, is under fire for continuing to support Libyan authorities despite international public opinion’s knowledge of the arbitrary conditions of detention in Libyan camps. Overall, it appears that the new Meloni-led government has implemented some very clear foreign policy choices from its inception, particularly on two main vectors: on the one hand, renewed support for Brussels and NATO allies for the sake of international stability; on the other hand, renewed attention to the migration issue through agreements with the Tobruk government--officially recognized by NATO as the official post-Gaddafi Libyan government. Thus, despite pre-election speculation, it appears that the Italian government is pursuing a strategy of continuity with previous national administrations and that the convergence of political and military visions may actually materialize into concrete realpolitik.   Italy’s Strategic Foreign Policy: Navigating Security, Energy, and Global Alliances  In terms of security and energy supply, the Italian government’s focus on North Africa is another critical point in the country’s foreign policy. Indeed, the international crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed Rome to seek to strengthen other partnerships for several reasons: first, to create a highly securitized zone in the Mediterranean Sea, where Moscow has key support in the Syrian partner’s naval bases; second, to emancipate itself from Russian energy sources by requesting a greater supply of natural gas from Algiers. Furthermore, the Meloni government recently concluded rounds of meetings with the Tunisian government led by President Saied and some IMF representatives, seeking external assistance in light of the severe economic crisis and central power legitimacy. Tunisia, often cited as the only country in the MENA region to have faced and successfully overcome a period of democratic transition following the 2011 protests, is in a democratic backsliding phase due to its central power’s administration mismanagement: President Saied assumed full powers in 2021 after being elected in 2019, then revoked members of his government, and finally blocked activities in parliament, tightening his grip on power. The parliament was then permanently dissolved in summer 2022, with deputies accused by the president of trying to undermine the country’s internal security. In this situation, Saied began to work via presidential decrees. This outlined a form of pure presidentialism, giving the president the authority to appoint and dismiss premiers and ministers unilaterally. Given their geographical proximity and the strategic nature of their relationship, ties between Italy and Tunisia are historic: the country, on the frontier between the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa, is a critical crossing point for migrants from central Africa seeking alternatives in southern Europe. Tunisia, like Libya, is thus an important player in the security discourse and policy choices of Rome and the entire European bloc. Nonetheless, European choices in security and economic support for the Tunisian Republic remain problematic, fleeting, and ineffective, especially if not accompanied by conditionality demands such as redistribution, training, and development. Some academics have also emphasized this specific point, owing to Tunisia’s key role in the Mediterranean framework and partnership with Brussels. The importance of the partnership with Tunisia for Italy is also based on the issue of energy: seeking alternative partners to Moscow, Italy has been on a path of emancipation from Russia for energy sustenance for the past year and a half. The renewed partnership with Algeria entails the transport of Algerian resources via an undersea pipeline that will cross 400 kilometres of the Tunisian coast before reaching Italy. Indeed, as Prime Minister Meloni herself stated, “[...] Also in this regard, Italy did important work to ensure funding was guaranteed. This is strategic infrastructure that further links the destiny of our two nations, allowing both Italy and Tunisia to become energy supply hubs for their surrounding regions: for Europe in Italy’s case, and for the supply needs of African countries, in particular North Africa.” In general, the premier has reiterated in recent days that she is not “dissatisfied” with those who seek to defend their borders, national sovereignty, and identity, such as Poland and Hungary. Thus, it appears that the Meloni administration is displaying its nationalist and identity matrix, which is typical of alt-right choices and narratives. Issues relating to the agreements with Libya and Tunisia, as a result, reinforce the Italian government’s position as a bulwark of migration containment policies despite a lack of depth of analysis relating to the motivations behind migrants’ departures from their places of origin (often related to political, social, and climatic crises). On a global scale, the Meloni leadership has pragmatically followed in the footsteps of the previous Draghi administration in dealing with China and its Belt and Road Initiative, in stark contrast to the prerogatives on which the agreement was based. The opening towards Beijing was inaugurated by the Memorandum of Understanding on the BRI, which was unveiled in 2019 by the then-Conte I government - despite the opposing views of Matteo Salvini’s League, with which Conte’s 5-Star Movement shared the ruling coalition. The agreement, according to Giorgia Meloni, was a big mistake, and the new PM slowed its eventual formal renewal - an issue whose trajectory will only be officially known at the end of 2023. This position is thus consistent with that of Mario Draghi, who has previously expressed reservations about the Memorandum, which he believed should be carefully reviewed. As a result, the issue remains open, and Premier Giorgia Meloni has stated that Italy’s possible withdrawal from the BRI Memorandum may not necessarily coincide with a deterioration in relations between Rome and Beijing, which remains an important global partner. When the Memorandum was signed, Italy had been heavily criticized, particularly by Washington, for being the only G7 country to have officially embarked on a path of détente and agreements with Beijing. The issue of possible mergers and acquisitions of Italian companies by Chinese investors remains central to Italy-China relations. The renewed engagement of the new government with the Atlantic bloc and Western allies may lead to greater assertiveness of Italy towards Beijing in the future. ******* Overall, Italy’s international positioning does not appear to deviate much from that of previous governments, as the literature already showed, with the exception of relations with Beijing - from which the Meloni government is trying to move away. Despite fears due to ideological and political affinities between the new Italian government and the far-right Eurosceptic regional governments, it appears that PM Meloni’s leadership is destined to follow in the footsteps of the European great powers, at least in foreign policy issues. The renewed support for Ukraine in its dispute with Russia, the pro-NATO and pro-EU stance, the renewal of immigration containment and security policies, and, finally, the gradual and potential departure from the Rome-Beijing agreements all appear to highlight how Italy is attempting to maintain a prominent position in regional and international hierarchies, aided and abetted by Western allies. ## Finally: Canada buys the F-35 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/finally-canada-buys-the-f-35/ Modified: 2023-07-26 > Canada's Minister of National Defence, Anita Anand, announced that Canada would acquire a new fleet of 88 F-35 fighter jets. This is the second time Ottawa has chosen the stealth aircraft. While some degree of politicization is always inevitable in large-scale defence procurement, Canada's fighter jet saga is precisely a model that one should avoid. Canada's Minister of National Defence, Anita Anand, announced that Canada would acquire a new fleet of 88 F-35 fighter jets. The cost of that project is estimated at $19 billion, an amount also mentioned last year when the liberal government began negotiations for this purchase with US aerospace giant Lockheed Martin. This is the second time Ottawa has chosen the stealth aircraft. In 2010, the governing Conservatives said the F-35 was the only choice for the Royal Canadian Air Force. The opposition disagreed, in part because both the Parliamentary Budget Officer and the Auditor General questioned the cost estimates of the Department of Defence. As a result, the Lockheed Martin plane became an issue in the 2011 and 2015 federal elections. This history is what makes the recent announcement unedifying for the liberal government as well as for the Conservatives. While some degree of politicization is always inevitable in large-scale defence procurement, Canada's fighter jet saga is precisely a model that one should avoid. Campaigning to unseat the Conservatives in 2015, the Liberals criticized the sole sourcing of the F-35 as both unfair and misguided. To some extent, they were right. Why did the Conservatives refuse to hold a competitive tendering process, following the usual rules of defence procurement? And why not explain the superiority of the F-35 over competing aircraft? The inability of the Conservatives to answer these questions forced them to reverse their 2010 decision and conduct several studies to re-assess the F-35, including in comparison with two of its European competitors. However, the liberal criticism was itself ill-founded. In 1997, the U.S. government asked a few of its allies to participate in co-developing and co-producing a fighter jet that would become the F-35, and Canada agreed. The deal was unusual, but its logic made sense, especially to the Canadian government – liberal at the time. Why not work with its biggest economic and security partner while also giving Canadian aerospace firms opportunities to win contracts in what is sometimes referred to as the “arms deal of the century”? The scale of the program is staggering. The current lifetime cost estimate of $1.6 trillion makes it the most expensive weapons system ever built. Canada could not hope to benefit from its participation in this megaproject without purchasing the product itself. Fighter Aircraft Competition In 2017, the Trudeau government launched what it called an “open and transparent” competition for fighter jets. Designed to rigorously assess bids on elements of capability, cost, and economic benefits, this process ultimately came down to just two warplanes – the F-35 and Sweden's Saab Gripen. This virtually guaranteed victory for the F-35. The last foreign-made, non-American fighter to enter the Royal Canadian Air Force was the Vampire in 1948, manufactured by the British company de Havilland. As a general rule, Canada’s military wants platforms that offer perfect or at least a very high level of interoperability with U.S. forces - not just basic interoperability that would have been the case with the Swedish fighter. The fact that the F-35 has yet to lose to a competitor is due to both the program’s scale and U.S. influence. The more air forces that buy it - Canada's decision brings that number to 18 - the lower its operational and other costs. That’s because network effects, as economists call them, generate not only profits for contractors, but also international power and influence. Citing security concerns about the aircraft’s design details, the U.S. government is requesting every F-35 customer to remove all 5G equipment made by China's Huawei from their networks in the coming years. Those failing to comply will likely be removed from the program. Something similar happened to Turkey in 2019 after its government decided to buy a Russian missile defense system. U.S. officials said it posed risks to the F-35s, including the possibility that Russia could covertly use the system to obtain classified details on the jet. This illustrates the ability of powerful allies to control the dependent countries with “boss-client” agreements. And when it comes to alliances, Canada is just one of many customers of the United States. Strings attached The strings attached to the F-35 purchases have prompted some to call the fighter jet program “America’s One Belt, One Road” — a tongue-in-cheek reference to China's major foreign policy initiative and the Chinese tendency to strong-arm smaller states into participating. In Canadian politics, however, those strings are largely immaterial because dependence on the United States and its military power has long been a huge net benefit. But what about today, with the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, a rising China, and a radicalized U.S. Republican Party? These developments are troubling and disorienting, but the fundamentals of Canada's defence are not necessarily shifting dramatically. Whatever happens in Ukraine and in future American elections, the U.S. will almost certainly prioritize the North American homeland, keeping a close eye on both Russia and China. Accordingly, Ottawa will be expected to add capacity to Canada’s NORAD and NATO commitments, and that means investing in the new aircraft. The purchase of a new aircraft – the one that, more than 12 years ago, the Conservatives promised to buy – and the one that, 26 years ago, the Liberals supported the planning of – is a move in this direction. There is work still to be done Given the assorted risks and threats Canada could face – including from authoritarian powers, cyber warfare, another pandemic, natural disasters, and the accelerating effects of climate change – military procurement is only a small piece of the overall puzzle. The principal challenge for the federal government is assessing problems in their totality and improving Canada's own ability to tackle these issues on its own, without being overly affected or reliant on the United States. All parliamentary parties agree on this objective. This requires aligning goals and commitments with necessarily limited resources. A far-reaching and comprehensive review of the defence, security, diplomacy and development issues that Canada is facing is long overdue. If this review is soon finalized, Minister Anand and her colleagues will receive even more gratitude, coming both from Canadians and their allies. ## Firewalls and Frontlines: Canada’s Cybersecurity Leadership Potential in the Age of Foreign Information Operations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/firewalls-and-frontlines-canadas-cybersecurity-leadership-potential-in-the-age-of-foreign-information-operations/ Modified: 2025-05-07 1- Introduction Cyber threats are escalating across Canada, and NATO allied countries, evolving in both scale and sophistication. While traditional cyberattacks targeting government infrastructure and networks persist, threats to civil society and democratic institutions, such as the now infamous “fake news”, are intensifying. Yet, governments across the Alliance, including Canada, continue to lag behind these developments compared to adversaries in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and a gradually more hostile Delhi. They react to well-documented threats even as new threats emerge, driven by the rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence (AI), which enables foreign interference campaigns to be created and scaled at an exponential speed. . Canada has emerged as a key leader in strengthening global cybersecurity and combatting foreign disinformation. It played a pivotal role in the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), established in 2018 at the G7 Charlevoix Summit, and spearheading the formation of a specialized  “cyber” division within its military forces. These initiatives have enhanced collective capacities to detect cybersecurity breaches, counter disinformation campaigns, and mitigate foreign interference. . Still, much of this work remains reactive, with a limited understanding of the structure of foreign information operations—let alone how adversaries navigate complex digital ecosystems. While not inherently harmful, this approach is insufficient for addressing the rising threat of foreign interference, especially as the United States retreats from its traditional role as Canada’s strategic partner. To address this challenge, Canada must adopt an “all hands on deck” approach to cybersecurity, especially regarding foreign information operations and gradually develop a whole-of-society approach to the issue. Unlike many other areas of security and defence, Canada has a unique opportunity to assert leadership in this domain and develop a proactive framework. A truly proactive strategy should leverage existing expertise from academia and the private sector on cybersecurity and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) while simultaneously expanding the talent pool through sustained investment in research. This requires not only supporting established initiatives but also taking calculated risks in funding emerging research ventures before threats escalate beyond manageable levels. Crucially, Canada must harness cutting-edge technologies, insights, and innovations from its scholars and technology firms—particularly in artificial intelligence—to enhance threat detection, strengthen digital resilience, and stay ahead of adversarial actors operating within complex information ecosystems. To make this vision a reality, Canada must also address the political and institutional dimensions of cybersecurity and foreign information operations. A truly effective strategy requires strong political leadership, cross-partisan commitment, and a recognition that digital threats are not just technical challenges but fundamental issues of national security and democratic integrity. By doing so, Canada can position itself at the forefront of information warfare defence, bolstering both national security and the broader resilience of its democratic institutions. Looking ahead, such a strategy could propel Canada toward a leadership position among NATO allies, creating opportunities for enhanced bilateral and multilateral digital cooperation in the Atlantic. 2- The Growing Target on Canada’s Back Canada has increasingly become a focal point for foreign information operations, owing to several contributing factors. Canadian policymakers and the Foreign Interference Commission (FIC), which was established to conduct a public inquiry into electoral processes and democratic institutions targeted by foreign interference, have noted this trend. Canada’s active participation in international alliances like NATO and the G7 positions it as a strategic target for adversaries looking to undermine Western cohesion. Furthermore, Canada's multicultural society, marked by diverse diaspora communities, presents opportunities for foreign actors to leverage transnational ties for influence. Canada’s Interesting Position for Foreign Interferers Recent investigations have revealed that countries such as China, Russia, and India have sought to interfere in Canada's democratic processes. A thorough investigation led by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue found that these countries engaged in disinformation campaigns and other tactics aimed at destabilizing Canadian institutions. Although these efforts were largely ineffective in changing election outcomes, they highlight the ongoing threat that Canada faces. Heightened concerns regarding Chinese Communist Party (CCP) “spamouflage” campaigns targeting Canadian MPs and the recent exposure of Russian-funded Canadian media influencers illustrate the escalating issue that foreign information operations pose. Foreign actors are likely to use Canada more and more as a proxy to send messages to broader Western audiences, including the United States and other NATO allies. By targeting Canada, adversaries have the opportunity to test and even to refine their information warfare strategies on a NATO ally who may be perceived as easier to isolate than European countries. Moreover, Ottawa’s growing rift with Washington and lack of perceived substantive delivery on defense commitments positions Canada as an interesting target for more overt foreign operations by antagonistic states seeking a lower risk of substantive retaliation. For instance, Canada's historical unique relationship with the U.S., albeit strained at the moment, can be viewed as a convenient conduit for indirect attempts at influence. This is evident in cases such as the arrests and imprisonment of the two Michaels by Beijing, following the detention of Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou by Canadian authorities under an extradition request from the United States for fraud charges.  Likewise, the killing of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in July 2023, followed by the arrest of three Indian nationals alleged to have ties to the Indian government, sparked a tit-for-tat game of diplomatic retaliation between Canada and India, bringing the relationship to a historic low showcases the willingness of foreign countries to overtly clash with Canada to the point of conducting operations on its territory. While this alleged operation on Canadian territory had no linkage to the U.S, the fact that Washington had also accused India of similar attempts and received “full cooperation” from Delhi, led to some disappointment when support for Canada did not come with the same initial intensity and result. Foreign Weaponization of Canadian Multiculturalism Diaspora communities in Canada are often targets of foreign interference. The Canadian government, along with the latest report from the FIC, indicates that foreign governments have disseminated disinformation, harassed, intimidated, and surveilled activists and critics within the Chinese and Indian communities in Canada, with the aim of suppressing dissent and controlling narratives abroad. This transnational repression not only threatens individual freedoms but also jeopardizes Canada's social cohesion and national security. Research indicates a significant rise in Canadian publications regarding diaspora targeting within Chinese media during Canadian elections, specifically information aimed at ridings with substantial Chinese-Canadian populations. In relation to India, a CBC investigation discovered hundreds of suspicious accounts on Twitter/X resembling bots that spread misinformation about Canadian institutions. Canada Punching Above its Weight? The perception that Canada has been “punching above its weight” within the G7 and NATO, given the relatively small size of its economy and military, may increase its appeal as a target for foreign information operations. Despite its international presence, Canada currently allocates only about 1.37% of its GDP to defense, falling short of NATO’s 2% benchmark until at least 2032. This sustained underinvestment can fuel perceptions that Canada lacks the capacity or will to respond forcefully to external threats. As a result, adversaries may view Canada as a “soft target”, using it as a low-risk entry point for information campaigns amies at influencing broader Western audiences. These vulnerabilities are compounded by a weakening media landscape, marked by declining competition and vanishing local outlets, which reduces the incentives to uphold journalistic standards and counter misinformation. Similarly, Canada’s relative diffuse national identity, where regional and ethnic affiliation often take precedence, may make it more susceptible to identity-based interference designed to exploit social divisions. In other words, it is not just about actual military readiness but also about how adversaries perceive Canada’s resilience and susceptibility to interference. Compared to Canada, alternative NATO targets such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and even Finland are becoming less appealing to Russia in terms of information operations. Not only are these societies much less culturally diverse than Canada, but their historical experience under Soviet rule or occupation has instilled a deeper skepticism toward Russian narratives, making their populations more resistant to pro-Russian propaganda (except for East Germany). Unlike Canada, where diverse audiences with varying levels of awareness may be more susceptible, Baltic societies have developed a comparative collective immunity to Kremlin-backed disinformation. Furthermore, since these nations have been primary targets of Russian hybrid warfare for decades, they have built robust countermeasures and policies, including media literacy programs, stringent regulations on Russian state media, and advanced cybersecurity infrastructure that involves all levels of governance, especially in Estonia. As a result, Russia is less likely to succeed in expending resources to influence these populations, who are inherently more resistant and well-prepared. Instead, Moscow is more likely to shift its focus to a larger Canadian target, particularly at a time when disputes between Ottawa and Washington make cooperation increasingly tenuous. Overall, Canada's diverse society, strong connections with major Western powers, and perceived vulnerability within this great power circle render it an appealing target for foreign information operations. Recognizing and addressing these vulnerabilities is essential for protecting Canada's democratic institutions and preserving its role as a stable and resilient member of the international community. It is therefore unsurprising that the Canadian government has invested time and resources in its Foreign Interference Commission and led the G7 initiative against foreign meddling. In the wake of shocks such as the Trump administration’s rapid escalation of tariff tensions that strained Canada’s economic ties with the U.S, Ottawa’s middle power status appears increasingly precarious. 3- Canada’s Comparative Advantage Canada has established itself as a leader in media and information research, particularly in the areas of disinformation and information operations. Institutions such as the University of Waterloo's Cybersecurity and Privacy Institute, the University of Toronto’s Citizen’s Lab, McGill University’s Media Ecosystem Observatory, the University of Ottawa’s Information Integrity Lab, and the Canadian Digital Media Research Network are at the forefront of research on topics including online foreign interference and the weaponization of disinformation. Canada has also emerged as a global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) and technological innovation, fostering a vibrant startup and educational ecosystem that provides unique advantages compared to its U.S. and European NATO allies. Ottawa’s commitment to AI is evident through significant investments and strategic initiatives. In 2017, Canada became the first country to implement a national AI strategy, the Pan-Canadian AI Strategy, highlighting its dedication to promoting AI research and development. This strategy has resulted in the establishment of AI Chairs at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, the recruitment of over 100 researchers, and the training of more than 1,500 graduate students and post-doctoral fellows. The Canadian government has also actively developed initiatives to combat disinformation within its bureaucratic structures through the “Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants,” aiding in training civil servants to identify and address the spread of false information. Finally, the Canadian AI sector is bolstered by a robust talent pool. As of 2022-23, over 140,000 professionals were actively engaged in AI, a 29% increase from the previous year. Notably, Canada is home to 10% of the world's top-tier AI researchers, ranking second globally. This concentration of expertise has fostered a thriving startup environment, with approximately 1,500 companies developing AI solutions across various industries, including healthcare, finance, and manufacturing. In contrast, the research environment in the United States faces significant challenges due to political polarization. The Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO), known for its studies on social media abuse and disinformation, has encountered funding uncertainties and leadership changes, partly due to external political pressures. This situation highlights the difficulties U.S. institutions face in conducting disinformation research within a highly polarized political climate, as significant social media companies appear to have given up on disinformation monitoring. Meanwhile, federal policymakers are pledging to reduce funding for cybersecurity-protecting agencies. Canada's comparatively more stable political environment for education and research offers a fertile ground for disinformation research and development. Nevertheless, it remains true that most cutting-edge technological advances are performed in the U.S and that many companies from Canada and elsewhere end up moving or considering moving to the U.S to be part of those ecosystems and benefit from tax incentives, causing a significant tech “brain drain” in Canada. For instance, 64% of surveyed Canadian tech workers would consider moving for a similar job in the U.S at a time when some argue that the ongoing tariffs imposed on Canada risk escalating the brain train to the U.S by making it harder for companies to operate in both countries, thus favouring U.S markets. Still, this does not mean the end of Canada’s AI and broader tech ecosystem. Ottawa can act to increase company and workers’ retention in similar ways Quebec’s government created conditions for the establishment of a video game industry ecosystem in its province and helped propel the Canadian video game ecosystem through the introduction of a 37% tax credit for companies operating in this sector in the early 2000s.  4- A Strategic Framework for Canada’s Leadership in Cybersecurity To position itself as a leader in cybersecurity and disinformation research among the Atlantic allies, Canada must develop a “whole-of-society” approach to tackling short-to long-term goals. First, Canada needs to expand its existing academic-government partnership, including tripartite programs with the private sector. Looking ahead, Canada needs to develop its own digitalization of public services and infrastructure to enhance public trust in digital systems and the legitimacy of the government's leadership in developing a secure cybersecurity ecosystem. Short-term: Laying the Foundations for Interdisciplinary Innovation To build upon these existing strengths, Canada could establish a dedicated advanced research agency that focuses on defense-related innovation and encompasses the social sciences and humanities. Connecting the tri-agency funding program (SSHRC, CIHR, NSERC) into this framework would promote interdisciplinary research, address the multifaceted nature of misinformation and cybersecurity threats, and take advantage of a centrally administered ecosystem of already $4 billion. For example, in 2021, the Liberal Party of Canada, if re-elected, promised the establishment of the Canada Advanced Research Projects Agency (CARPA), modelled after the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which gave the planet world-changing technologies like the Internet and the GPS system to foster innovation and maintain technological leadership. However, the initiative has yet to be realized, leaving a gap in Canada's strategic research infrastructure. This approach would improve collaboration between government, academia, and the private sector, fostering innovation and ensuring that research translates into effective policies and disseminated technologies. By leveraging its existing research capabilities and expanding interdisciplinary initiatives, Canada can position itself as a leader in addressing national misinformation threats within NATO. Given the higher relative representation of social science research in federal funding in Canada compared to the United States, Ottawa has the potential to enhance the interdisciplinary academic research and training opportunities for current and future generations of disinformation and cybersecurity scholars both within and beyond STEM fields. As previously mentioned, Canada already possesses a strong foundation in universities, research centres, private section engagement, and government-backed academic funding infrastructure. What remains lacking is the political will among policymakers and executive stakeholders to activate and empower these existing institutions. Accordingly, the next federal government must prioritize the passage and implementation of key legislative frameworks—namely Bill C-27, which includes the AI and Data Act, the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, and the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act; Bill C-63 on online harms; and Bill C-26, which aims to modernize the Telecommunications Act by integrating cybersecurity provisions. Together, these measures form the essential scaffolding for a resilient and innovative ecosystem while simultaneously safeguarding the digital rights and privacy of Canadians. Long-term: Learning from Allies to Build Trust and Digital Resilience As digital threats evolve and foreign information operations grow more sophisticated, Canada must take proactive steps to bolster its digital resilience. A long-term strategy should focus on building institutional trust, enhancing cybersecurity, and improving public digital literacy. By learning from successful allies like Estonia, Canada can work on developing and implementing secure digital identity systems, expanding open-data governance, and creating pre-emptive measures against disinformation. Strengthening alliances with NATO partners will further enhance Canada’s ability to navigate emerging cyber challenges. A forward-thinking strategy will not only protect Canadian democracy but also foster trust in public institutions and ensure long-term technological leadership. The Estonian government has emerged as a leading actor in the digitization of governance, initiating the digitization of its education and healthcare systems in the late 1990s. Today, most citizen-government interactions can be conducted digitally, despite the persistent threat of Russian cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. Through a surge of political entrepreneurship and a favourable response from the private and academic sectors, Estonia has developed a comprehensive, resilient, and efficient digital governance system often referred to as “e-Estonia.” For instance, a tripartite research project involving the public, private, and academic sectors, led by scholars from TalTech and funded by government and private initiatives, resulted in the formation of the Next Gen Digital State Research Group. This research team is dedicated to advancing the discovery and implementation of new technologies through multidisciplinary collaboration. The main objective is to provide resources to innovative academic researchers while ensuring that the outcomes are accessible to both public and private audiences and can be practically implemented. One of the greatest benefits of such digital transformation has been the increased trust in government institutions and satisfaction with government effectiveness among the Estonian population. When discussing emerging threats from foreign information operations, which rely primarily on the dissemination of false information to spread political skepticism, institutional trust is paramount. Additionally, resilient digital infrastructures support the retention of this trust by mitigating the efficiency impact that cyberattacks may cause. Below are some examples that Canada can implement quite seamlessly on a medium to long-term basis. First, Canada should implement an electronic identity (e-ID) system, which provides citizens with a secure digital identity enabling access to a wide array of online services including voting, banking, and healthcare, represents a strong initiative. This system ensures that citizens can authenticate themselves online confidently, thereby reducing the risk of identity fraud and enhancing trust in digital interactions, and it has been central to Estonia’s digital infrastructure. Canada stands to benefit from adopting a similar secure, centralized digital identity system. By providing citizens with a reliable means of online identification, the government can facilitate secure access to services and foster greater trust in digital platforms. This trust is essential in countering disinformation, as citizens are more likely to rely on verified information sources when they feel confident in the security and authenticity of digital channels. Interestingly, provincial governments have already begun exploring this solution, with Ontario developing a digital identity program for online public services. Therefore, the federal government is likely to encounter less resistance from the provinces if it pairs its digital initiatives with meaningful financial support and empowers provinces to adapt emerging technologies to their specific needs. Such an approach would also help Ottawa avoid high-profile failures like the Phoenix pay system and the ArriveCan application, both of which severely undermined its digital credibility. Avoiding future missteps requires more than coordination—it requires humility. If the government cannot deliver reliable, efficient, and cost-effective digital infrastructure, it must make space for those who can. Now more than ever, Ottawa must recognize not only where its strengths lie but where they fall short—and open the door for experts with the vision and technical capacity to lead. Canada’s tech sector holds the talent and innovation needed to build a secure and responsive digital future. Government’s role should be to enable and integrate that expertise—not to stand in its way. Secondly, enhancing government data accessibility through an “open-data” governance structure is key to improving transparency and fostering trust between citizens and Canadian authorities. In the case of Estonia, the government publishes open-access data on many aspects of its operations to promote accountability and enable citizens to make more informed decisions. They are also working on implementing an API to facilitate big data collection and training on state data for public and private sector stakeholders. This approach not only increases trust in government but also reduces the scope in which misinformation can thrive. Notably, Estonia reports the highest levels of trust in national institutions among postcommunist European states, a striking outcome given the region’s historically low trust levels rooted in part experiences of repression and corruption. These results are particularly significant when considering the non-political institutions, such as those tied to public administration and service delivery, as well as political institutions. Its experience attests to the transformative potential of open-data policies in rebuilding trust, particularly in contexts marked by institutional fragility or democratic skepticism. Citizens in countries like Estonia enjoy broad digital rights: they have access to state data and can submit petitions, participate in consultations, and vote entirely online. In Canada, a promising initiative has emerged in the form of Bill C-27 and the implementation of the national “Digital Charter.” This proposed legislation draws inspiration from European efforts such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Services Act (DSA), and the Data Governance Act and Digital Markets Act—all of which have reshaped the EU’s digital governance landscape since 2018. However, as of January 2025, Bill C-27 remains unpassed, despite its potential to enhance state capacity and cultivate public trust in digital governance. At present, Canada continues to struggle with real-time data access, with outdated freedom of information laws contributing to slow response times and limited public awareness of available data. Yet, the current climate—marked by a rally-around-the-flag effect and heightened concern for national security—presents a unique political window for Ottawa. This moment should be seized not only to advance legislation expanding access to information, but also to institutionalize the integration of key stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and the tech sector, into the broader process of building digital resilience. By capitalizing on this momentum, the federal government can both modernize its information governance and reinforce democratic trust in the digital age. Third, Canada needs to develop a proactive and preventive strategy for countering disinformation that focuses on “pre-bunking” rather than solely relying on a reactive, debunking-based approach. Pre-bunking involves educating individuals about disinformation tactics before they encounter them, much like a vaccine, enhancing their resilience against the effects of disinformation. This concept is grounded in inoculation theory. In contrast, debunking aims to reverse the damage caused by disinformation after individuals have been exposed to it and have accepted some of its claims as truth. Currently, many Canadian initiatives, such as Get Cyber Safe and non-profit collaboration programs like MediaSmarts, as well as government-led and funded disinformation tracking operations like the Canadian election misinformation project and Canada’s Rapid Response Mechanisms (RRM), are excellent ideas. The issue arises from their limited reach within the general public. Canada stands to benefit by implementing a national digital literacy program directly into the educational system. Such a national curriculum would mandate digital literacy education and evaluation from elementary to secondary levels, enabling the Canadian government to provide adequate funding through its spending powers while allowing provinces to adapt the program to their regional contexts.While public campaigns and reactive mechanisms are necessary, their effectiveness is limited without preventive education and care at earlier development stages. A reform in digital and media literacy should be a priority in Canada’s medium to long-term strategy to protect its population from disinformation and position itself as a leader in this area. With a Little Help from my Friends Fortunately for Canada, NATO is increasingly committed to addressing cybersecurity issues. Ottawa has allies possessing diverse experiences to assist it in navigating its own challenges, especially when the alliance requires a proactive strategy. Canada stands to benefit from forming extensive and comprehensive partnerships and collaborative efforts with allies like Estonia, including a bilateral digital literacy initiative. This program could enable Estonian experts to help design training programs for Canadian bureaucrats, educators, journalists, and government officials. Joint workshops and training sessions between Estonian and Canadian bureaucrats, practitioners, and academics on cyber-defence, media literacy, and critical topics such as election security should be expanded to ultimately create joint research organizations integrating all levels of stakeholders. Even better, Estonia is eager to share its e-Estonia initiatives with like-minded partners. Furthermore, should Canada’s relationship with its traditional greatest ally, the US, deteriorate, increasing Canada’s involvement in European-led initiatives and networks, such as the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), offers a solid pathway to strengthen cyber-defense collaboration with European Atlantic allies in ways that extend beyond purely military means. 5- Conclusion: Canada’s Digital Vanguard As foreign information operations increasingly threaten democratic institutions across the Atlantic Alliance, Canada occupies a unique strategic position. While its reactive approaches through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and military cyber division development have laid the groundwork, they remain insufficient against evolving threats and must implement proactive countermeasures. Canada's distinctive advantages—a robust academic research ecosystem specializing in disinformation, world-class AI talent, and relative political stability for conducting sensitive research—position it for leadership where other allies face constraints. Unlike its southern neighbor, where polarization has undermined research continuity, Canada maintains the equilibrium necessary for sustained investment in digital resilience. The path forward requires immediate legislative action on pending bills addressing AI governance and telecommunications security while establishing interdisciplinary research structures bridging government, academia, and industry. Drawing lessons from Estonia's successful e-governance transformation, Canada must develop secure digital identity systems and integrate pre-bunking strategies into national digital literacy initiatives. This challenge transcends technological solutions, representing a fundamental test of democratic resilience in an era of weaponized information. By leveraging its strengths, Canada can forge a distinctive leadership role within NATO and the G7 beyond traditional military and economic contributions. In doing so, it would not only enhance its own digital sovereignty but strengthen collective democratic resilience across organizations. The integrity of democratic institutions hangs in the balance as information operations grow in sophistication. Canada's response will determine not just its national security posture but potentially the future of democratic resilience in the digital age. The opportunity for leadership is clear—he question remains whether Canada possesses the political will to seize it. ## For Greater Inclusion and Diversity in International Security: Courses of Action for the Strategic Analysis Network URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/for-greater-inclusion-and-diversity-in-international-security-courses-of-action-for-the-network-for-strategic-analysis/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The report presents a series of proposals aimed at promoting diversity, inclusion and a culture of equity in NSA activities. From academia to politics, issues of inclusion and diversity are gaining increasing importance in different spheres of Canadian society. In international security, the debate on diversity is not new. However, the field of study still struggles to adopt a reflective stance and the production of knowledge remains dominated by the Eurocentric point of view. In international security practice, while diverse and inclusive programs and policies have gained momentum in recent years, they are not, however, free from bias. Aware of these tensions, the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN), halfway between the academic world and the world of practitioners, has adopted a strategy of intersectionality for framing diversity and inclusion in its activities. In the same spirit and wanting to be complementary to this strategy, this report provides an overview of current debates on diversity and inclusion in the studies and practice of international security. The report then presents a series of proposals aimed at promoting diversity, inclusion and a culture of equity in NSA activities. In doing so, this report seeks to promote a more inclusive and accessible debate on the study and practice of international security by adopting a diverse perspective and advancing the democratization of a debate too often dominated by certain groups and perspectives. Diversity and Inclusion in International Security: State of Affairs Diversity refers to the unique dimensions and qualities of each individual. Inclusion refers to the establishment of a collective culture of fairness and respect for difference. Historically, Western white males have dominated the study and practice of international security. Even today, many biases related to Eurocentrism, race, and gender hamper the inclusion of greater diversity in international security. Eurocentrism favors the Western point of view and tends to exclude other worldviews. In the extreme, it implies the superiority of Western civilization. For example, state sovereignty and the Westphalian international system, two key concepts in international relations, are based on the idea that nineteenth-century Europe had reached a state superior to non-European regions, that were perceived as uncivilized. These problematic ideas are still found at the heart of some peacebuilding and state institution building programs of recent decades, which emphasize central state institutions at the expense of local governance mechanisms. The deconstruction of power relations around gender and race in the theory and practice of international security is at the heart of the work of feminists in international relations and specialists in critical race theory. Feminist theories in international relations explore an inclusive approach to maximize the safety of all. These approaches consider race and gender as organizing elements of international relations, essential for the perception of security threats as well as for the formulation of foreign and defense policies. However, even if feminist researchers and specialists in critical race theories seek to deconstruct binary oppositions (male/female, white/black, North/South), themes related to gender and race are seldom integrated into the more traditional and often central discussions of strategic studies. Gender and race are also rarely combined in the same analysis. While critical security studies appear to provide the space to discuss issues of diversity in research, they are not immune to the biases that make it difficult to adopt an inclusive stance. For example, critical security studies in Canada focus on the production of security-related knowledge through different themes: post-colonialism and Indigenous peoples, environmental security, immigration and borders, human security and global governance. In particular, Inuit peoples conceive of climate change and threats to social cohesion as security issues, which leads to a conception of Arctic security articulated around environmental protection, the preservation of cultural identity, and Indigenous political autonomy. However, these approaches do not always escape Eurocentrism: they tend to marginalize indigenous knowledge. For example, the strategy of resurgence, central to Indigenous self-determination, revolves around questioning the Canadian state. However, the enhancement of Indigenous traditions has gendered elements and stereotypical sexual representations that are not taken into account. Not only is it difficult to aspire to inclusion without considering the perspectives of all Canadians, but Indigenous knowledge presents conceptions of security that are complementary to existing critical discussions, particularly with respect to human security. An intersectional approach that takes into account a range of identity factors makes it possible to question some of these biases, while promoting both diversity and inclusion. Intersectionality is not just limited to research, however, and plays an important role in developing and implementing inclusive, equitable and effective practices. Diversity and Inclusion in International Security Practice The biases causing exclusion and homogeneity are also reproduced in international security practice. Although diversity is increasingly considered in the development of foreign policy objectives and in international organizations, its integration is uneven. Likewise, the various inclusion efforts within international organizations and the armed forces have focused on mainstreaming gender perspectives, sometimes neglecting other identity factors. The Concept of Human Security The concept of human security, developed in the 1990s, represents both one of the most promising avenues for an inclusive foreign policy and an obstacle to diversity. The concept offers security focused on the individual rather than the state, and revolves around traditional and unconventional threats like climate change and poverty. During the 1990s, the United Nations (UN) and countries like Canada favored an approach focused on peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and the creation of international standards promoting the protection of human rights to ensure human security. The concept ran out of steam in the 2000s, but its principles remain current. In particular, the responsibility to protect, which calls on countries to intervene to prevent crimes against humanity, justified NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011. The discourse of human security is embodied today in political, activist and research programs that put forward the protection of vulnerable populations, the consideration of children in armed conflicts, and the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. By putting individuals' experiences of conflict at the forefront, the different applications of human security make it possible to target insecurities in times of conflict that a conventional approach to security cannot capture, such as gender issues or the issues of child soldiers. Despite its inclusive potential, the concept of human security is worrying. As with human rights and other universalizing liberal norms, the danger remains that particular issues will disappear under the general label of human security. Indeed and paradoxically, the diverse experiences of different groups risk being overlooked in the pursuit of security for all. Inclusive practices are therefore those that manage to balance respect for diversity with existing standards. The Global Agenda on Women, Peace and Security The inclusive practices of international organizations and some armed forces tend to focus on gender equality, often ignoring other identity factors. Since the advent of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 and the development of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), among others, have deployed gender-based approaches that promote inclusion. These approaches combine different strategies such as gender balancing, aiming for greater representation of women, and the systemic integration of gender perspectives (gender mainstreaming). These are meant to be inclusive, but often rely on operational efficiency rather than fairness and equality as their primary rationale. Indeed, several security organizations consider that integrating more women and gender perspectives into operations improves their effectiveness. The UN, promoting gender balance, seeks to increase the number of women in peacekeeper contingents to a minimum of 15%. For its part, NATO has created gender advisory positions and considers gender at every stage of operational planning. Both organizations cite the unique qualities of women, including their communication skills and their ability to bond with local women and children, as helping to improve their effectiveness. The African Union (AU) integrates gender issues into the training of members of the Department of Peace and Security, the AU body responsible for regional peacekeeping operations. For example, raising awareness on the use of rape as a weapon of war as well as the disarmament and reintegration of male, female, and child combatants are integrated into the training of soldiers. As part of the Canadian government’s Elsie Initiative, the CAF seeks to increase the number of women in peace operations, citing both gender equality and operational effectiveness as goals. While invoking effectiveness is an influential way of convincing military commanders, this approach risks gender instrumentalization. Many feminists and peace activists are concerned that operational effectiveness, and not gender equality per se, will become the end goal. In particular, they denounce the militarization of the global agenda on women, peace and security. Other intellectuals, policymakers and military professionals argue that such militarization is necessary: gender equality can hardly be pursued if basic security conditions are not established. All in all, if the diversity strategies of these organizations have made significant progress in the area of gender, they do not give as much space to other identity factors such as ethnicity or sexual orientation, hence the importance of conceptualizing diversity by applying the concept of intersectionality. Diversity and Inclusion: Recommendations for the NSA The NSA strategy of intersectionality makes it possible to target how different aspects of a person's identity – sex, gender, religion, sexual orientation or race – create different relationships of power and subordination in their experience of reality. It seeks “to ensure that intersectionality is present in the collective work produced by researchers from the Strategic Analysis Network and that this work reflects a great diversity and the inclusion of under-represented groups”. In doing so, the NSA is better equipped to ensure greater representation in its work and activities. The rest of this section proposes a series of measures to implement this strategy in order to create an inclusive network. Beyond its intrinsic value, an inclusive and diverse approach can generate several benefits. In order to promote diversity and inclusion in research as well as in activities, the NSA should focus on the following three priorities. 1 - Favor inclusive and diversified avenues of research. Through the mobilization of defense and security research, it would be possible for the NSA to rethink research questions, favor the diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches, and balance the importance given to the different aspects of the field. First, rethinking research questions in an inclusive way involves evaluating whether the research question contributes to the consolidation of a culture of fairness and respect for difference. Does the question prioritize certain issues? Who are the groups of people targeted by the research project? Second, employing a variety of research methods and theoretical approaches promotes a greater diversity of perspectives and issues. Participatory or community-based research methods are good examples of research methods that can be more inclusive. Theoretical approaches that question the balance of power such as feminist studies, critical race theory, constructivism and postcolonialism should also be used or, at least, taken into account. In addition, ensuring a greater representation in the bibliography of the work carried out and published by the NSA and using an inclusive vocabulary are other ways of emphasizing diversity in research. Finally, the importance given to different aspects of international security should be considered. A broader definition of the field of study and practice allows for greater emphasis on issues of gender, race, intersectionality and diversity within the three axes of the NSA. In addition, the NSA should ensure representation of this work and perspectives in its main events such as the annual conference, while providing privileged spaces to discuss these issues through a series of events. Such an approach will promote greater equity in the production of knowledge and the influence enjoyed by researchers and practitioners associated with the network. Advantages: At the level of international security research, a pro-diversity and inclusive approach makes it possible to reconcile central and critical discourses. The exploration of different research methods and theoretical approaches has the potential to spark new debates, foster the production of more representative and inclusive knowledge, and generate new angles of research while reaching out to a larger community. 2 - Explore knowledge sharing formats that favor diversity and inclusion. The policy, strategy and hot spots published by the network provide a platform that has the potential to highlight under-represented groups and voices in international security in Canada and beyond. During its events, the NSA should also pay particular attention to the representation of diversity. To do this, the network could approach individuals who have particular expertise on topical issues, but who often find themselves outside the usual networks. By reaching out to individuals outside of government, academia, or industry, the NSA could expand its audience while facilitating access to publication and public debate for often marginalized groups. For example, it would be interesting to invite representatives of Indigenous communities to discuss northern and arctic security issues, or food security related to fisheries. It is also important to take into account cultural differences in the dissemination of knowledge. For example, some formats, such as an interview or a fireside chat, are better suited to disseminating the knowledge of some Indigenous leaders than a traditional academic panel. The adoption of communications mediums like video conferencing, forced by the COVID-19 pandemic, is helping democratize access to conversations about security issues. However, it remains important to make efforts to make these virtual events accessible, for example by offering subtitles or simultaneous narration. In addition, these events should be announced through different networks and be available offline. Advantages: The dissemination of research through the various activities of the NSA would benefit from prioritizing diversity and inclusion. Knowledge sharing formats that value diversity and inclusion better reflect NSA clients and audiences. Likewise, a greater representation of diversity maximizes recognition of talent and security expertise, promotes different and varied perspectives, and helps to create a positive and inclusive space where all are comfortable expressing themselves. 3 - Apply the principles of diversity and inclusion in activities with partners. The NSA should extend the principles of diversity and inclusion to its relationships with its partners, while seeking to forge partnerships with organizations that can actively contribute to a diverse and respectful debate on security issues. The NSA would thus be able to count on a broader expertise on various subjects and the organizations benefit in return from the visibility offered by the network. In addition, the NSA should ensure that the benefits arising from relations with its partners are reciprocal. Finally, the NSA should make sure to engage with partners who also promote diversity and inclusion within their own organizations. Advantages: Requiring diversity and inclusion efforts broadens and enriches the conversation between academia, politics, and the military. The NSA can position itself as a leader in diversity and inclusion in the defense and security community, thereby creating a positive ripple effect for those in this community. ## Foreign agent law in Georgia: Russia steps up to the plate URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/foreign-agent-law-in-georgia-russia-steps-up-to-the-plate/ Modified: 2024-10-07 The foreign agents law under the leadership of Bidzina Ivanichvili and the Russians Last May, the government led by the Georgian Dream party decreed that non-governmental organizations whose funding was more than 20% foreign in origin had to be entered on the register of “foreign agents”, before being banned. This means that many American and European organizations promoting democracy in Georgia are under threat: the German Marshall Fund, the Forum for Civil Society, the Open Society Foundation, and others. To understand this law, which led to numerous demonstrations in the country, and even to a veto by President Salome Zourabichvili, we need to go back to the Rose Revolution in 2003. When former Soviet diplomatic chief Eduard Shevardnadze was President of the Republic of Georgia, a large popular movement led by former minister Mikheil Saakashvili was formed, criticizing Shevardnadze for pursuing corrupt policies, for being too close to the Russian Federation and for preventing the advancement of rights in civil society. At the time, the Rose Movement was largely financed by these American and European foundations. Shevardnadze's resignation led to a new presidential election, won by Saakashvili and his United National Movement party. Saakashvili has pursued a policy of rapprochement with NATO and the European Union, much to Moscow's displeasure. Moreover, Russian support for the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the war in 2008 had definitively sealed the divorce between Russia and part of the Georgian population, convinced of the need for closer ties with the West. Indeed, in 2013, when Mikheil Saakashvili and his party were in turn accused of corruption and fell from grace, the Georgian Dream party, founded by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who had made his fortune mainly in Russia, officially continued the West-oriented foreign policy. Georgian Dream has long advocated membership of the European Union, a widely held view in Georgia. However, with the “foreign agents” law, this project is taking a turn for the worse, and this observation is also shared by the European Commission. Despite pro-European protests and President Zurabishvili's opposition, Georgia will eventually see this law implemented. The law has been referred to the Constitutional Court, but it is unlikely to be overturned. Many observers see this law as the result of the Kremlin's influence since many similar laws have already been passed in Belarus and Russia. Today, only 469 of Georgia's 30,000 NGOs (or 1.5%) have met the 20% foreign funding criterion. The debate over this law is driving the campaign for the parliamentary elections on October 26. The opposition wishes to repeal the law, but remains extremely divided, while Georgian Dream has integrated the People Power party into its coalition. This party was created in 2022 from a split in Georgian Dream, fiercely opposed to foreign aid, particularly from the USA. This split had caused Georgian Dream to lose its absolute majority in parliament and probably put pressure on the governing party to pass this law. In January 2024, Bidzina Ivanichvili, who had long remained officially out of politics but was extremely powerful because of his fortune and the success of the party he had created, made his return as Honorary Chairman of Georgian Dream. Some see the change of Prime Minister on January 29 as a return to prominence for the oligarch, no doubt keen to distance himself from Europe. Indeed, the European Commission had cited “de-oligarchization” as a priority for Georgia in 2022. Ivanishvili is also the subject of much criticism from international NGOs, which may explain his support for the Foreign Agents Act. The USA accused of fomenting a coup d'état The United States, historically an important partner of Georgia, has twice been accused by the Tbilisi government of wanting to overthrow it. As a result, military maneuvers by US armed forces scheduled to take place from July 26 to August 6, 2024, have been canceled by the Pentagon, which wants to “re-examine its overall cooperation” with Georgia. After the Foreign Agents Act, this serious blow to US-Georgian relations could also strengthen Russia's influence in the Caucasus. Historically, especially since the Rose Revolution, Washington and Tbilisi have shared very good relations, with cooperation agreements in development policy, but also in military cooperation, as part of the war on international terrorism. Georgia has been one of the biggest supporters (in per capita terms) of American-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, notably via the Georgia Train and Equip program between 2002 and 2004, followed by the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program between 2004 and 2007. The United States has also historically supported Georgia's membership of NATO. After the 2008 war with Russia, the United States continues to support Georgia. The turn taken by the Georgian Dream party since Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014 has not yet led to a full restoration of Russian-Georgian relations, but we could still say that, as things stand, Georgia is on the road to rapprochement with Moscow. In a way, Georgia is in the process of “de-Ukrainization”, i.e., it is regaining common interests with Russia and returning to the latter's geostrategic fold, as evidenced by the government's stance on European integration. For Georgia, the strategy is very difficult to explain. The divorce between the pro-European population and the Georgian Dream party seems to be a foregone conclusion. To stay in power, a transition to authoritarianism is likely and, in the medium term, a return to the russki mir (the central concept of Russian nationalism, designating Russia's sphere of historical and cultural influence) that will be favoured. The rapprochement with the European Union, which had gone as far as the recognition of Georgia's application for membership on December 14, 2023, was interrupted following the European Council of June 2024, which suspended Georgia's application because of the law on foreign agents. The recent crisis with the USA also points in this direction. Since February 2022, Georgia's geographical location and history have attracted the attention of NATO and the EU, and Georgian civil society has been vocal in its support. But on the other hand, the authoritarian turn of the Tbilisi government, its rapprochement with Moscow and the recent crisis with the United States disqualify intergovernmental cooperation, while support for the opposition has become virtually impossible, due to the law against foreign agents. Even the democratic supervision of elections looks set to be complicated. Finally, for Moscow, the Georgian crisis in 2024 is an opportunity to close a parenthesis of more than twenty years of cold relations, marked by the war in 2008. If Georgian Dream stays in power, the law on foreign agents will remain in force. This would remove the main obstacle to Georgia's re-entry into the Russian strategic space. ## Foreign Policy and the 44th General Election in Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/foreign-policy-and-the-44th-general-election-in-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > How did the political parties fare on foreign policy? An examination of the media coverage of the election campaign reveals, not surprisingly “Canada’s foreign policy is more important now than it has been in a generation,” states the Conservative Party of Canada’s election platform. Yet international issues were largely ignored in the 44th federal election campaign. This is part of a long tradition of preferring to debate national and even provincial issues rather than an area that is the exclusive responsibility of the federal government. Even at the height of the war in Afghanistan in the first decade of the new millennium, Canadians were not interested in these issues during elections. There is every reason to believe that this trend won’t come to an end this year. Foreign affairs remain far from voters’ priorities, with the pandemic and cost of living being their main concerns. Many deplore this situation, pointing out that if Canada ignores the world, the world will not ignore it back, as evidenced by the Chinese taking Canadians hostage, Russian interference in the Canadian elections, or the hundreds of Canadians still trapped in Afghanistan. Others feel that Canada has little control over international affairs and that it is difficult for opposition parties to come up with good ideas in this area because of the lack of access to classified information. However, this has not stopped party leaders from debating international policy in the past. As recently as 2015, Justin Trudeau’s Liberals stood out with their proposals to take in 25,000 Syrian refugees, end combat operations against the Islamic State, and save billions by skipping on acquiring F-35 fighters. This election is a powerful reminder that election campaigns have a significant impact on Canada’s international relations and the lives of Canadians. What about the 44th federal election? How did the political parties fare on foreign policy? An examination of the media coverage of the election campaign reveals, not surprisingly, the limited attention paid to international affairs by the major party leaders[1].  There were two notable exceptions, Afghanistan and China, which were briefly addressed during the campaign. A comparative analysis of the election platforms reveals some elements of divergence, notably on relations with China, but above all, a broad consensus on a foreign policy that emphasizes Canadian values and on major military spending. Afghanistan The election was called in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Kabul, making the issue an early priority in the campaign. Despite the interest of Canadians in the conflict and the strong desire for the majority of them that Canada does everything in its power to quickly repatriate Afghan interpreters, the subject was only partially touched upon during the campaign. While each party leader quickly expressed their concerns, unanimously agreeing that assistance should be provided to Canadian nationals and Afghan collaborators, it was more difficult for them to explain what they would have done better. The main criticism towards the Trudeau government was that its response was rather reactive than proactive, a view shared by most Canadians who were disappointed with the Liberals’ handling of the crisis. In the first leaders’ “debate,” the opposition leaders attacked the Trudeau government’s evacuation plan but did not bother to present concrete alternatives. The Liberal leader defended his withdrawal plan, saying that Canada had evacuated nearly 3,700 people, more than many other European countries. While the leaders of the NDP and CPC did not respond in force on this issue, the Bloc Québécois defended Canadian inaction based on powerlessness. He stated that Canada is not a world power and that its actions on the international stage can only be carried out in coordination with its allies. The debate in English did not allow for any further discussion on the issue, other than a repetition of the criticism of the Trudeau government for having called an election in the midst of a humanitarian crisis management. While the opposition parties seem to agree that the federal government should have acted more proactively, only the Conservative Party has articulated a concrete plan of action. In a video statement released on August 26, Erin O’Toole proposed that Canada not only continue to cooperate with its allies to evacuate Afghans, but also establish humanitarian corridors with India, and offer material and political support to the Afghan resistance against the Taliban regime. A promise that could lead to retaliation against Canada. All political parties quickly agreed on the non-recognition of the Taliban regime, although the prevarication of Minister Marc Garneau left some doubt concerning the Liberal position at the beginning of the campaign. This promise not to recognize the new Afghan regime may come back to haunt the next Canadian government. Mariam Monsef further blurred the Liberal Party’s message by calling the Taliban “our brothers” in a video advocating for the protection of women and minorities in Afghanistan – a terminology that she explained was culturally appropriate and had a particular connotation, but which caused such an uproar that it may have cost her own seat. It is counterproductive to avoid establishing diplomatic relations with despised regimes, as it deprives us of access that could be useful in defending our interests against them. This is why Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party promised to restore diplomatic relations with Iran in 2015. One of the main obstacles in implementing this promise is that Iran, like the Taliban, has been identified as a sponsor of terrorism. G7’s conditionality of international aid, by contrast, appears to be a much better way to influence the new Afghan regime. Indeed, it is difficult to identify the benefits of not having diplomatic ties beyond the self-congratulation of maintaining a so-called principled foreign policy. China The second international issue that came up during the election campaign was China. Trudeau said he was “concerned” that a Chinese state-owned shipyard would build a passenger ferry for a Canadian state-owned company, while the Conservative Party pledged to cancel the contract once elected. Then, during an interview on Radio-Canada, Trudeau was asked about his willingness to refuse to extradite former Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. He said bluntly that Canada would not bow to China’s “blackmail.” “To comply would put all Canadian travellers and workers in China and elsewhere in the world at risk if they know they can blackmail their way to political results by putting pressure on Canada through its citizens,” the Prime Minister added. The commemoration of the 1000th day of incarceration of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor was also an opportunity for the NDP leader to recall the importance of “continuing to work with our international allies to put pressure on China and allow the release of these Canadians.” The second debate in French was characterized by Erin O’Toole’s different approach to relations with China. The Conservative leader called for a “more serious approach,” particularly with respect to Huawei’s 5G technology and trade tariffs on steel and aluminum. The NDP leader also joined him in criticizing Justin Trudeau’s lack of leadership on human rights, recalling the Prime Minister’s absence during the parliamentary vote on recognizing the genocide of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. It was during the English-language debate that the Chinese-Canadian relationship was most discussed. The Liberal leader said that Canada had challenged China on both human rights and economic issues. The Conservative leader criticized him, saying that Canada’s voice has been absent on the international stage to protect both Michael. Erin O’Toole borrowed the liberal slogan from 2015, stating: “Canada is needed back on the world stage. We may be smaller than China with respect to population and economy, but we’re giant when it comes to commitment, to human rights, to dignity and to the rule of law”. The Prime Minister replied that the best way to bring the two Michaels back to Canada was through coordination with allies. “You do not simply lob tomatoes across the Pacific,” he added to illustrate the impotence of more coercive measures. The exchange on China concluded with the Bloc leader’s comments on the Prime Minister’s poor record on human rights protection. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of the electoral platforms shows that the parties share a relatively common vision on the issue, based on a so-called “principled” foreign policy[2]. For example, the CPC and the LPC may have articulated the neo-democratic position that the party “will stand up to China with a strong and coherent strategy to defend Canadian interests at home and abroad. We will work with our allies to lead a robust and coordinated international response to China’s disregard of the rule of law. New Democrats will call out human rights abuses by China, stand with Hong Kong’s pro-democracy asylum seekers, and provide coordinated support for those facing threats by Chinese entities here in Canada.” As part of their vision for “Combatting Authoritarianism and Foreign Interference,” the Liberals promise to stop procrastinating by introducing legislation to preserve the integrity and security of telecom systems, including 5G but do not affirm, as the Conservatives do, their desire to ban Huawei from Canadian infrastructure. The Conservatives do stand out for the virulence and detail of their proposals to “face down the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party,” marked by “evil and tyranny.” They consider the “communist leadership” as “a clear and rising threat to Canadian interests – and our values. They’ve abducted our citizens, targeted our economy, and intimidated members of the Chinese Canadian community.” The conservatives propose, among other things, to support the idea of a “coalition of democracies,” defended by the American president Joe Biden, to “recognize the Uyghur genocide and encouraging our allies to do the same,” to set up “a permanent task force to address foreign interference,” “impose sanctions on foreign states and foreign nationals that take Canadians hostage,” withdraw Canada from the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, to “Grant asylum to mainland Chinese proponents of freedom and persecuted minorities,” as well as trying to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) formed by the United States, India, Japan and Australia. It goes without saying that the adoption of such measures would lead to a severe reaction from China but the Conservative leader was evasive when asked, during the first debate in French, about the possibility of Chinese retaliation. Military Expenditures and Interventions A final issue came to the fore at the very end of the election campaign, with the announcement of a defence partnership between Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. This aims to deepen cooperation between the three allies in the fields of artificial intelligence, cyber security, long-range strike capabilities, and, above all, the development of nuclear-powered submarines. This announcement comes against a backdrop of growing rivalry with China, which has led the three allies to reorient their defence policies towards the Indo-Pacific. Canada has been criticized not only because it was not consulted or even warned of this announcement but especially because it still does not seem to have developed a vision for dealing with the growing tensions in the region. Canada’s absence from the tripartite agreement is thus partly explained by its historically low interest in the Indo-Pacific and its apparent difficulty in determining a path forward. And yet, the Trudeau government has been working on a strategy for the region since April 2019. Its exclusion is also likely since neither political party dares to support the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines in the ongoing process of renewing the Canadian fleet. For Mr. Trudeau, Canada won’t be in the market for nuclear-powered submarines “any time soon.” The Conservative and NDP leaders have criticized the Prime Minister for excluding Canada from the deal but have not gone so far as to suggest acquiring such technology. This is because of the relative consensus on the planned increase in military spending. Both the NDP and CPC support the current process of acquiring tens of billions of dollars in new fighters and warships. The Conservatives and Liberals are also committed to supporting the upgrade of the North Warning System as part of NORAD modernization, acquiring two polar icebreakers, and beginning the process of replacing the submarine fleet, while the NDP and the Bloc are silent on these issues, despite the billions of additional dollars this could require. The Conservatives are going further than others in proposing new initiatives, but they are not budgeted nor clarified.  For example, they intend to “build Canadian capabilities to contribute to foreign intelligence,” without specifying whether this means creating a new foreign intelligence agency. They also propose to develop a “deterrence and detection strategy” in the Arctic, without specifying its nature, and to “launch lower earth orbit satellites for telecommunications and defence in the Arctic,” without indicating whether this would be in addition to the agreement already concluded with Télésat. The same continuity is to be expected concerning military interventions. Both the Liberals and Conservatives propose strengthening Canada’s contribution to current NATO operations, particularly in Latvia and Ukraine. The Conservatives, however, add their willingness to provide lethal weapons and RADARSAT imagery to Ukraine. While the Conservatives favour the establishment of a NATO Arctic Operations Centre of Excellence, the Liberals propose the creation of a NATO Climate and Security Centre of Excellence. Curiously, no election platform mentions one of Canada’s major ongoing military operations, namely the participation in the Global Coalition against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria. The fate of the hundreds of troops deployed in the region is thus set to remain unchanged, but perhaps this omission reflects the sensitivity of U.S.-led training operations in the context of the failure in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, the NDP does not call for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Iraq and other NATO-supported missions. At most, it proposes to prioritize “multilateralism and the best interests of global peace and security.” It is unclear, then, whether the New Democrats consider only peacekeepers operating under UN command to be peacekeepers or whether troops deployed at the request of the Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, Ukrainian and Latvian governments are also peacekeepers. Even more astonishing is the total abdication of Justin Trudeau’s Liberals from supporting Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations, which was one of their key promises in 2015. The Canadian consensus that Canada’s security now rests exclusively with the United States and NATO is clear. The need for greater independence in the context of an increasingly fractured international order is largely absent from the concerns of Canadian elected officials. Conclusion Foreign policy was again one of the main absents from the Canadian election, except for a few issues imposed by current events. The low interest of Canadians in other more immediate concerns and the relative consensus among the main political parties no doubt explain this situation. Nevertheless, the election promises discussed during the campaign or set out in the platforms will lead the next government to make costly and consequential decisions, unfortunately out of sight of most voters. [1] The daily newspapers La Presse, Le Devoir, Le Journal de Montréal, The Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, National Post were systematically scrutinized, as well as the Twitter accounts of the party leaders, the three official debates, and their interviews with the CTV, CBC and Radio-Canada television networks. [2] The Bloc Québécois is in a class of its own by not taking a stand on any international issue other than the international extension of Quebec's constitutional jurisdictions and the desire to stop selling arms to Saudi Arabia, two issues ignored by all other political parties. ## Forging Northern Bonds: Strengthen the Canada-France Arctic Partnership in a Shifting Global Order URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/forging-northern-bonds-strengthen-the-canada-france-arctic-partnership-in-a-shifting-global-order/ Modified: 2026-07-09 This policy brief is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges. Introduction In just a few years, the Arctic has transformed from a preserved ‘exceptional space’ on the margins of global rivalries into an area of strategic competition. The acceleration of ice melt and the sometimes-misleading hope of new sea routes or untapped resources have revived interest in this region. But it is Russia's remilitarisation, coupled with China's growing assertiveness, that has forced NATO to reintegrate the Far North into its deterrence posture. For Ottawa, the Arctic remains the pillar of national sovereignty in the face of hybrid threats and territorial claims by competitors; for Paris, a non-coastal but committed player, it is a laboratory for military projection, scientific cooperation, and the defence of lines of communication. The Alliance, for its part, is rethinking its doctrines: the Arctic is no longer a mere secondary front but a theatre where climate challenges, conventional threats, cyberattacks and sabotage of critical infrastructure intertwine. This strategic note analyses, through a focus on NATO, Canada and France, the drivers, and limitations of Arctic deterrence strategies in response to Russia. The first step is to understand why the Arctic has become a crucial geosecurity space for the Alliance, identify the perceived threats and the actors responsible, and then question NATO's ability to establish a functional and legitimate deterrent in the region. Finally, recommendations will be made to strengthen Franco-Canadian cooperation for the benefit of collective security and stability in the Far North.  Why is the Arctic an important area of geosecurity for NATO? The Arctic is now emerging as a major area of geosecurity for NATO, catalysing a profound transformation of the international strategic balance. Long relegated to the periphery, the region is experiencing unprecedented, renewed interest, stimulated by climate change, which is opening up potential new economic opportunities (hydrocarbons, minerals, maritime routes), and by rising geopolitical tensions, particularly since the large-scale war between Russia and Ukraine in 2022. Although these possibilities should not be exaggerated due to the many constraints that remain over time, the accelerated melting of the ice cap and the predicted disappearance of summer ice by 2030 are upsetting the balance and gradually transforming the Arctic into a theatre of strategic competition between regional and extra-regional powers. However, although initially pushed by certain coastal countries (Canada among others) to remain doctrinally reserved with regard to the Arctic, NATO has increasingly seen this area become one of its central concerns, as evidenced by the enlargement of the Alliance to Finland and Sweden in 2023, the increase in joint exercises (Cold Response) and the reaffirmation of the importance of the Arctic flank in the 2022 strategic concept. For Canada, the Arctic is the vital foundation of national ambition and an area where sovereignty must be reaffirmed in the face of rising hybrid threats, Russian territorial claims, and Sino-American competition. Ottawa has long adopted a cautious stance, without pushing NATO to take part in regional security, favouring the economic and social development of the Far North, particularly through investment in infrastructure, while drawing on Indigenous knowledge to assert a federal presence that remains relatively limited today. However, the growing militarisation of the region, the modernisation of NORAD and the increase in multilateral exercises reflect a gradual awareness of the need to strengthen the Alliance's northern flank. Canada's efforts culminated in the publication in April 2024 of the "Our North, Strong and Free" strategy, symbolised by the delivery of new offshore and Arctic patrol vessels, the renewal of the submarine fleet, the modernisation of surveillance capabilities (NORAD) and a particular focus on the Rangers, although challenges in terms of capabilities and sovereignty remain, particularly in the face of American activism on the issue of the Northwest Passage. This awareness of the need for defensive reinforcement is, however, part of a broader integrated strategy. The port of Churchill, now recognised as a project of national interest and endowed with $175 million in federal funding, illustrates this convergence: it simultaneously meets defence objectives (military logistics, surveillance of the NWP) and economic autonomy objectives (export of critical minerals, resilience in the face of trade tensions). Maintained under local control via the Arctic Gateway Group, it also prevents foreign interference and consolidates Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Although France does not border the Arctic, it has established itself as a respected and committed player in the region. The Arctic is strategically important for French energy security, as 60% of imported gas and 15% of imported oil come from the region, mainly from Norway and Russia. It also has a responsibility to protect its citizens who depend on polar tourism, creating a need to master search and rescue in polar environments. The French Armed Forces are therefore the only French entity with the capacity to intervene in the Arctic, contributing de facto to the military approach to this region. France is therefore focusing its position on freedom of navigation, securing maritime routes, and protecting critical infrastructure, while promoting a European vision of sovereignty and defence. The recent French Defence Strategy for the Arctic (2025) confirms this approach around three axes: positioning, cooperation, and capabilities. Firstly, it seeks to consolidate its legitimacy through interministerial coordination and active participation in Arctic forums, while collecting intelligence and environmental data to support nuclear deterrence. Secondly, it aims to deepen its bilateral partnerships with Arctic countries and its ties with the European Union through joint exercises and increased interoperability. Finally, it is developing and adapting equipment (extreme weather gear, high-latitude satellites, relay stations) to operate effectively in this hostile environment, in order to preserve its freedom of action and secure the energy and mining supplies essential to France and Europe. For NATO as a whole, the Arctic has once again become a strategic competition front since 2022 (first explicit mention of the Arctic in doctrine) in the face of Russia, whose regional remilitarisation and Bastion strategy constitute a multidimensional challenge. The Alliance must deal with the need for deterrence and collective defence, reinforced by the integration of all the Nordic countries, while adapting its operational capabilities to an extreme environment. The increase in joint exercises (notably through the largest Arctic exercises since the Cold War over the past three years), technological innovation (icebreakers, drones, extreme cold weather equipment) and the rise of Joint Forces Command Norfolk illustrate the rise of allied cooperation in the region. On this last point, JFC Norfolk, established in 2019 in direct response to Russia's resurgence in the transatlantic space, represents a fundamental reorganisation of NATO's command architecture in the northern regions. Based in Virginia, this US joint command now has operational responsibility for all allied forces in the North Atlantic and Arctic, including coordination of Norwegian, Canadian, British, and other NATO partners' forces. Although recently established, it has proven to be strategically relevant: geopolitical events since 2019 — Russia's rise in power, tensions in the Barents Sea, increased submarine operations — have validated this unified command architecture and reinforced its role as the central pivot of Allied deterrence in the Arctic and North Atlantic areas. The Arctic is also becoming a testing ground for new hybrid threats (sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation), requiring increased vigilance and a concerted response. Finally, the multipolarisation of the region, marked by the assertiveness of China and the BRICS countries, is complicating governance, and accentuating the need for a unified NATO stance in the face of fragmented cooperation frameworks. What threats does NATO perceive/is concerned about in the Arctic, and who are the responsible actors? The Arctic is now a major security concern for NATO, at the crossroads of unprecedented strategic, technological, and environmental dynamics. The region, long perceived as a sanctuary for cooperation by the coastal states in line with Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 Murmansk speech, is now experiencing increased tensions, catalysed by Russian remilitarisation, China's gradual assertiveness and the rise of hybrid threats. Faced with these developments, the Atlantic Alliance has identified several types of threats that are disrupting the regional balance and calling for an adaptation of its doctrines and capabilities. The first threat perceived by NATO in the Arctic is military in nature and lies in Russia's strategy of remilitarisation along its northern coastline. For more than a decade, Moscow has been systematically modernising its Cold War-era infrastructure, rehabilitating bases, ports, and airfields, and equipping the region with advanced projection and defence capabilities. The Russian Northern Fleet now concentrates the majority of the country's strategic nuclear submarines, supported by S-400 air defence systems, specialised brigades, and a unique fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers. This posture aims to guarantee Russian sovereignty, protect its nuclear deterrent vectors, and secure new economic corridors, notably the Northern Sea Route. However, it is accompanied by a radicalisation of official rhetoric, which explicitly identifies NATO as the main threat, and an increase in large-scale military exercises in the region, sometimes involving extra-regional partners. This dynamic is worrying for the Alliance, which sees Russia's Bastion strategy and its ability to disrupt transatlantic lines of communication as a direct strategic challenge to freedom of navigation and collective security. The second source of concern for NATO is the rise of hybrid threats and the growing vulnerability of critical infrastructure in the Arctic. Sabotage targeting the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, potential attacks on submarine cables, energy networks and surveillance devices illustrate the ability of hostile actors to exploit the vulnerabilities of an extreme and difficult-to-control environment. Russia, in particular, is developing capabilities in electronic warfare, GPS jamming and underwater sabotage, while conducting demonstrations of technological strength, such as the simultaneous emergence of nuclear submarines from under the ice. There also remains the risk of unintended incidents during joint military exercises, which could escalate into a major crisis in a context of heightened mistrust. China, although not an Arctic coastal state, represents an emerging threat that is attracting increasing attention from NATO. Beijing is gradually asserting itself as a strategic player in the region, increasing investment in infrastructure, natural resources, and maritime routes, while developing a fleet of icebreakers and satellite surveillance capabilities adapted to high latitudes. This issue is particularly serious precisely because Arctic communities have historically suffered from structural neglect by their national governments: housing shortages in Nunavut, inadequate federal support in Alaska, underdeveloped infrastructure in Greenland. China's strategy takes advantage of these shortcomings by offering massive resources — $90 billion in Arctic projects between 2014 and 2024 — where the West remains absent. This approach creates an asymmetrical power vacuum: Chinese investments in soft power (scientific stations, civilian presence) precede lasting geopolitical influence, making Arctic communities increasingly dependent on a development architecture controlled by Beijing (as was the case nationally in Iceland following the 2008 financial crisis). Beyond soft power, these investments conceal dual ambitions: scientific stations collect sensitive oceanographic data, while port projects along the Northern Sea Route provide anchor points for future naval operations. However, Western opposition in this area remains reactive and fragmented. Officially, China presents itself as a ‘near-Arctic state’ and favours a scientific and economic approach. However, the duality of its resources, the development of polar drones and its participation in joint exercises with Russia suggest a desire for military projection in the medium term. Western intelligence services warn of the possibility that China may seek to develop operational capabilities in the Arctic, particularly in the areas of surveillance, cyberattacks and sabotage of critical infrastructure. Sino-Russian cooperation, already evident in the energy and logistics sectors, could eventually lead to increased coordination in the military sphere, putting further pressure on the Alliance's northern flank. Finally, NATO may be concerned about the increasing complexity of regional governance, marked by the rise of extra-regional actors (BRICS) and the fragmentation of traditional cooperation frameworks. The end of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, accelerated by the invasion of Ukraine, has led to increased polarisation between a ‘NATO Arctic’ and a ‘Russian Arctic’, with each side seeking to strengthen its positions and attract new partners. This multipolarisation increases the risk of deregulation, competition and conflicts of interest on maritime routes and in exclusive economic zones (e.g., continental shelves). The Alliance must therefore deal with a range of threats, from sabotage and disinformation to force projection and technological warfare, in an area where military superiority cannot be reduced to physical presence alone. Has NATO succeeded in establishing a functional and legitimate deterrence strategy in the Arctic?  As the Arctic witnesses heightened geostrategic competition, NATO finds itself at a critical crossroads. While Russia fortifies its Northern Fleet with nuclear submarines, upgraded bases, and forward operational deployments, NATO’s response remains disjointed and underpowered. The Alliance’s lack of a unified Arctic deterrence strategy leaves its collective posture fragmented. Currently, the force capacity of NATO consists of a collection of national strategies rather than a credible shield across the polar region. This fragmentation stems from an absence of a coherent vision. Countries like Canada, Norway, and the United States conduct Arctic-focused exercises and develop national plans. The assertion that the Canadian Arctic, the North Atlantic, and the European Arctic are strategically irrelevant because the climate and weather would render military operations self-defeating is misleading. Harsh environmental conditions do not eliminate military utility; they shape how force is employed. While Russia may not have an incentive to mount a large-scale ground invasion across the High Arctic, NATO should anticipant how conventional assaults can transform into limited, unconventional activity – operations designed to reduce NATO’s effective force posture by degrading readiness, dispersing assets, and drawing scarce forces into sustained Arctic commitments. In this context, weather is not a shield against conflict, but a tool that amplifies the impact of disruption and delay. Russia’s objective would not be to “invade through the north,” but to exploit the region as a permissive environment for low-intensity, unconventional actions that create temporary lodgements, impose response costs, and disrupt critical enablers. These include the covert positioning of dual-use forces, interference with air and maritime surveillance, cyber and space-enabled attacks on Arctic command-and-control nodes, and sabotage of ports, airfields, fuel depots, and undersea infrastructure that support transatlantic reinforcement. Even limited success in these domains could delay force generation and remove key forward-deployable assets from the European theatre at a decisive moment. Dismissing these risks because a traditional invasion would fail is therefore a category error. The Arctic’s strategic value lies not in its suitability for conquest, but in its vulnerability to ambiguity and disruption. Yet NATO lacks an integrated doctrine to counter such actions. The 2022 Strategic Concept acknowledges the region’s importance but offers no clear framework for preventing localized, low-visibility operations from producing disproportionate strategic effects—effects that would be felt not in the Arctic itself, but on NATO’s eastern flank. A modern Arctic defence posture must address threats along the full conflict continuum – from unconventional hybrid tactics and low-intensity grey-zone actions to high-intensity, conventional warfare. Russia’s military buildup presents a tangible conventional threat, yet NATO’s readiness for unconventional challenges is especially weak. Cyber attacks on Arctic infrastructure, unflagged maritime activity, sabotage or lodgement operations, and other sub-threshold tactics will unfold in a conflict within the Arctic. As such, NATO must recognize that the Arctic is not only a combat space for legacy defence systems, platforms, or assets, but also for civilian-flagged vessels, fishing fleets, private military contractors like the Wagner Group, unmanned drones operated by artificial intelligence, and unmarked or covert Russian special forces. NATO  countries must procure emerging technologies and weapon systems to maintain genuine lethality, mobility, and survivability. The Alliance must also find ways to limit procurement ambitions that outpace tactical value. Too often, alliances fall prey to procurement cascades, chasing hypersonics, autonomous platforms, and legacy systems, which, at the end of the day,can result in NATO becoming a hollow force. In the Arctic, where mobility and survivability often determine mission success, it is neither necessary nor efficient to invest heavily in exotic new platforms. Rather, NATO should refocus on shoring up and upgrading existing assets – ice-capable ships, and land vehicles for extreme cold, ensuring compatibility across allied forces, and reinforcing Arctic-based logistics. That kind of targeted investment – forward fuel depots, winterized airlift, and interoperable equipment – is far more tactically relevant and budget-friendly than speculative research and development. A critical component for where NATO must move towards enhancing its credible deterrence is domain awareness. The Arctic’s vast geography and harsh weather restrict surveillance, making it easy for aggressive actors to escape detection. NATO’s current watch is fragmented, relying on national sensors scattered across allied territories. Instead, the Alliance needs an integrated Arctic surveillance network – satellites, long-range UAVs, maritime acoustic sensors, and a centralized intelligence fusion centre. These capabilities would provide a real-time, Alliance-wide operational picture capable of spotting and reacting to provocations before they escalate. Finally, cold-weather combat resilience must be institutionalized. In particular, weapon systems, communications gear, and navigation aids all need Arctic-hardened standardization. These investments will not only raise combat readiness but also shape deterrence credibility. A new Arctic defence concept within NATO would signal that the Alliance views the High North as integral to its core defence responsibilities. That such a concept has not yet emerged reflects historical assumptions and political priorities more than a lack of strategic logic. For much of the post–Cold War period, the Arctic was treated as a region where cooperation could be maintained through bodies like the Arctic Council rather than framed as a core theatre of collective defence – a legacy of benign strategic assumptions that de-emphasized military planning in favour of multilateral diplomacy. Additionally, NATO’s focus for decades was squarely on collective defence in Central and Eastern Europe, leaving less bandwidth for doctrinal development specific to the High North. With the accession of Finland and Sweden, seven of the eight Arctic states now belong to NATO, fundamentally altering the strategic map and creating both an impetus and an opportunity for more formalised defence planning Today, Arctic defence initiatives are growing within NATO – such as command restructuring to strengthen northern posture and joint exercises – but they remain fragmented across national programmes. As such NATO require more ingrained and interconnected operational lines of effort to build a coherent Alliance-level Arctic concept to unite into a synchronized deterrence and defence framework that reflects the region’s rising strategic weight. If NATO delays, it risks a future in which Russia and other actors interpret Arctic opacity as permissiveness, where sub-threshold provocations or even conventional aggression become pragmatically feasible. To embrace such a strategy, NATO requires leadership and determination to signal how best to advance domain awareness, thereby closing existing and emerging commitment-capability gaps across the alliance’s northern flank – this is where Canada and France must come together and forge a northern bond. Recommendations The following recommendations build on the strengths of the Canadian and French Armed Forces, creating a foundation for stronger domain awareness, faster response times, and greater resilience in cold-weather operations. By combining Canada’s ice-capable vessels and Arctic expertise with France’s advanced maritime technologies and renowned force capacity, the partnership would deliver a persistent and capable presence in the High North – one better suited to meet the challenges of an evolving security environment. A Canadian–French Coast Guard Collaboration Agreement As the Arctic’s geopolitical tensions rise, Canada and France have an opportunity to strengthen bilateral Arctic cooperation through a formal Canadian–French Coast Guard Collaboration Agreement. Under the proposed agreement, French naval or coast guard officers would serve aboard Canadian polar and Arctic offshore patrol icebreakers, contributing to sovereignty patrols, SAR operations, and law enforcement missions. With Arctic expertise that prioritizes presence, surveillance, and operational support in the Arctic, Canada is the ideal partner for France in reinforcing Arctic situational awareness and seeking stronger bilateral and multilateral partnerships, as highlighted in Paris’ Arctic Defence Strategy. Moreover, by building up more enhanced operational readiness, domain awareness, and cold-weather interoperability, the partnership can strengthen a “deterrence by denial” posture, ensuring continuous, technologically advanced monitoring of Arctic waters and signaling to potential adversaries that the region is under persistent allied surveillance. Canadian–French co-manning and co-funding efforts can also offer a more ingrained strategic and cost-effective approach to Arctic deterrence without requiring extensive new investment. In particular, by combining Canada’s ice-capable vessels with French personnel,  the partnership could significantly improve situational awareness and operational efficiency, which are essential to deter threats, uphold Arctic security, and manage the region’s complex operational challenges.  Canada-France Arctic Maritime Technology Pact In creating an Arctic Maritime Technology Pact, Canada and France would take a significant step forward in Arctic security by reshaping how both nations approach maritime domain awareness and safety in the increasingly contested northern waters. This collaboration is about much more than sharing technology; it is about building an interoperable, resilient, and forward-looking capability that addresses the unique challenges of Arctic operations. At its core, the pact would fast-track a joint technology strategy focused on advancing key areas such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, autonomous systems, and information-sharing networks. These capabilities are crucial to overcoming the geographic vastness and complexity of the Arctic, where legacy defence systems and security structures differ, and traditional maritime safety operations face significant hurdles. By aligning their efforts, Canada and France can break down barriers that have long hindered effective coordination, improving response times and operational efficiency. One of the most pressing challenges the pact would seek to address is the threat posed by so-called “dark fleets.” These aging, unregulated vessels operate outside the bounds of international maritime standards, often evading insurance and regulations. Their activities range from risky ship-to-ship transfers to covert reconnaissance and even sabotage – actions that jeopardize Arctic maritime safety and environmental security. Recognizing these vessels as potential adversaries, the pact emphasizes the need for enhanced detection and tracking capabilities, ensuring Canada and France can respond swiftly and decisively. French defence technology brings a wealth of innovation to the table, particularly in unmanned maritime platforms. Autonomous underwater vehicles capable of deep-sea surveillance could greatly expand Canada’s reach beneath Arctic waters, where monitoring submarines and undersea infrastructure is critical. Likewise, unmanned aerial and surface vehicles extend the eyes and ears of security and defence forces without the need for constant crewed presence, offering persistent coverage over vast and challenging environments. Navigating the Arctic’s shifting ice and treacherous waters requires sophisticated tools. France’s advances in navigation and satellite-based mapping provide critical support for safer, more efficient vessel movement. Integrating these technologies will enhance Canada’s ability to operate confidently throughout its northern approaches. Beyond hardware, the pact will stress interoperability – the ability to seamlessly share and analyze data in real time through the procurement of innovative platforms like hybrid air vehicles, high-altitude surveillance balloons, and autonomous surface and underwater vehicles, all interconnected through advanced artificial intelligence and communication networks. These tools will multiply the effectiveness of joint operations, whether for search and rescue, law enforcement, escort missions, or anti-access/area denial strategies. Importantly, this partnership would not exist in isolation. By linking civilian and military sectors and feeding real-time data into coordinated command-and-control frameworks, Canada and France can build a comprehensive and dynamic Arctic maritime safety network. Such integration is essential for responding to emerging threats arriving from Russian revanchism. In a world where Arctic geopolitics is intensifying, a Canadian-French Arctic Maritime Technology Pact can offer a clear path to securing the north – combining operational experience with cutting-edge innovation. In a strategic move that not only enhances the safety and security of Arctic waters, the pact can also signal a shared commitment to safeguarding sovereignty and stability in one of the planet’s most challenging environments. Canada-France Arctic Spaceport The establishment of a Canada–France spaceport is a strategic necessity to strengthen joint and NATO defence capabilities against the growing security challenges in the Arctic, particularly those arising from Russian belligerence. France’s own Arctic Defence Strategy makes clear that Paris views capability development in the Arctic space domain –  including satellites tailored for high latitudes and associated terrestrial relay infrastructure –  as a priority for monitoring, intelligence, and security operations in the High North. The French strategy calls for investment in space assets adapted to the region, and for bilateral and NATO cooperation to strengthen surveillance and interoperability. While France does not have its own northern territory, it does seek a sustained operational presence in the region as part of its broader role within NATO and the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Paris has increasingly committed to Arctic defence engagement –  deploying forces to high-latitude environments and participating in joint exercises with Nordic allies. This reflects a genuine constituency within France for capabilities that enhance situational awareness and deterrence in the High North. Canada’s current limitations for Arctic satellite deployments poses a significant geopolitical risk to its national security. A shared Canada–France spaceport would provide a sovereign and reliable platform to deploy the kind of advanced, high-latitude surveillance satellites that both countries’ strategies recognize as essential for Arctic awareness, resilience, and deterrence – aligning national interests with NATO’s collective security needs. Space-based assets launched from this joint facility would significantly enhance the ability to monitor illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) activities across the vast and remote Arctic maritime domain. Traditional monitoring methods are often insufficient in the region, allowing adversaries to exploit jurisdictional gaps and evade detection. Persistent, high-resolution satellite imagery combined with real-time data links would enable timely identification and interdiction of illicit vessels and activities, strengthening maritime governance and enforcement. Additionally, critical Arctic infrastructure, particularly subsea communication cables and energy installations, will face an increasing threat of sabotage as the region grows and becomes more commercialized. In facilitating the deployment of specialized satellites equipped with advanced sensors capable of detecting underwater disturbances or unauthorized presence near these sensitive sites, a joint spaceport will provide Paris and Ottawa with the capability to provide early warnings and enable rapid responses to neutralize threats before damage occurs. In addition to bolstering surveillance, the spaceport collaboration would help avoid redundant and fragmented defence initiatives. Currently, uncoordinated and overlapping programs risk wasting resources and creating capability gaps. By consolidating satellite launch capabilities and harmonizing strategic priorities, Canada and France can optimize investments and foster interoperability, ensuring a more coherent and effective Arctic defence posture. Moreover, a Canada–France spaceport located in Nunavut would offer operational advantages that lower-latitude sites cannot match for Arctic security missions. The example of Andøya Spaceport in northern Norway demonstrates why high latitudes matter – its location above the Arctic Circle allows efficient access to polar and sun-synchronous orbits, essential for persistent Arctic surveillance and rapid tasking of satellites. Launching from mid-latitude sites like Nova Scotia, Canada, or equatorial sites such as French Guiana, requires additional orbital adjustments that increase cost, delay response times, and reduce operational flexibility – disadvantages for missions focused on the High North. Nunavut’s northern position offers similarly direct access to high-inclination orbits critical for Arctic domain awareness. Its remote location would also face fewer air-traffic and safety constraints, similar to Andøya, and could attract shared investment and use by Canada, France, and other NATO partners. A joint spaceport in Nunavut would enhance sovereign launch capability optimized for high-latitude needs, supporting emerging technologies – from AI-enabled threat detection to quantum communications and autonomous systems – that are essential for overcoming the environmental and operational challenges unique to the Arctic, strengthening deterrence and collective defence. Ultimately, a Canada-France spaceport would serve as a foundational asset for extending joint defence and deterrence mechanisms into the Arctic’s uncharted security environment. It would enable both nations – and by extension NATO – to maintain continuous oversight over critical maritime zones, protect vital infrastructure, and respond decisively to evolving threats. This partnership signals a strong commitment to Arctic sovereignty and collective security, ensuring the region remains stable amid intensifying geopolitical competition. ## Four observations on the Russia-Ukraine war and the prospects for peace URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/four-observations-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-the-prospects-for-peace/ Modified: 2026-03-24 This text is a transcript of a presentation given at the conference ‘Four Years of War in Ukraine: What Prospects for Peace and Transatlantic Security?’, held on 23 February 2026 at UQAM. Despite almost constant diplomatic negotiations, 2025 has not brought us any closer to peace – far from it. On the other hand, it has allowed us to clarify a number of key points. Let us begin with the war itself. Last summer, we heard the argument that the Russian advance on the Eastern Front was unstoppable. Putin subsequently reiterated this: either you hand over the rest of Donbas to us, or we will take it by force. And yet, although the army has managed to seize a further 10% of the territory of Donetsk Oblast over the past year (bringing the total to 78%), the town of Pokrovsk – with a population of 60,000 prior to 2022 – still holds out. It was, however, expected to fall by the summer of 2024. The fortified towns of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk – ironically, the cradle of the 2014 separatist uprising, but recaptured after a three-month siege – still seem far from immediate danger. Of course, war is not linear and no one can predict its outcome, but the prospect of a collapse of the Ukrainian front similar to the German rout on the Western Front in 1918 seems highly unlikely. The technology of warfare is constantly changing. Two years ago, the most serious problem appeared to be the asymmetry in artillery capabilities, with Russia at times holding a 10-to-1 advantage. But Europe, by sourcing supplies partly from stocks around the world, has managed to largely make up for this Ukrainian disadvantage. Last year, the shortcomings of Ukrainian recruitment were at the forefront. The situation remains just as critical—the new and very young defence minister revealed staggering figures last month (2 million Ukrainians who would rather hide than go to the front), but the fact remains that the supremacy of surveillance drones has outweighed the numerical inferiority of Ukrainian soldiers. Put bluntly, the fewer Ukrainian soldiers there are on the front line, the more Russian soldiers perish. The first lesson of 2025 is therefore that the Russian advance on the Eastern Front is not inevitable. Since the front line is holding, the Russian strategy has been to step up attacks on civilians. There are two ways to target civilians. The first is to attack them directly through aerial bombardment, as Russia did in Grozny in the 1990s, in Aleppo in 2015, or in Mariupol at the very start of the 2022 war. In each case, civilian casualties were considerable. But with the exception of Mariupol, Russian aircraft very quickly ceased flying over Ukrainian airspace in 2022, for fear of being shot down. Russia has resorted to artillery to pound towns near the front line, turning all the towns in the Donbas that it has captured or besieged – Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Pokrovsk, among many others – into fields of ruins. The second method is to target civilian infrastructure. As we know, in Kyiv and major cities across Ukraine, it is seeking to destroy the hydroelectric network so as to capitalise on the freezing winter. The idea is to break the resistance of the population, forcing them to put pressure on their elites to end the war at any cost and accept Russia’s terms. This is, however, an illusion. Historians will tell you that it never works. An army may decide to stop fighting – as we saw in Afghanistan in 2021 and in Syria in 2024 – but attacking civilians tends to have the opposite effect. I don’t personally know how Ukrainians manage to endure repeated, prolonged power cuts when it’s minus 20 degrees outside, but I do know that overall, based on credible polls, when asked “How long can you hold out?”, three out of four Ukrainians reply “As long as possible”. Despite the almost daily drone and missile attacks on their cities. The proportion was barely higher four years ago. Probably because the alternative is worse: Ukrainians know what is happening in the occupied territories and Russian prisons – or what happened in Bucha in 2022. Second clarification: Ukrainian resolve is not cracking. And this is despite the heavy military losses visible in every town and city across Ukraine, with the constant stream of funerals and seriously wounded soldiers returning from the front. Zelenskyy recently put the figure at 55,000 dead, but it now seems likely that the death toll is at least three times higher. A Ukrainian NGO has identified, with supporting biographical records, nearly 100,000 soldiers who have perished since 2022, and nearly another 100,000 who are missing, a large proportion of whom are likely to have died. The comparison with the first Donbas war, that of 2014–2021, is striking. The number of Ukrainian soldiers killed at that time stood at just over 4,000. The figure has therefore risen 35 to 40-fold over the past four years. The death toll on the Russian side is much higher, though not necessarily in proportion to the population. In geopolitical terms, the year 2025 will have brought about three major changes. The first was the complete cessation of US military and economic aid to Ukraine – although Europe, in partnership with Canada and other non-European countries, can purchase American weapons and send them to Ukraine. The second is the shocking realisation by NATO countries, including Canada, that they can no longer rely on the United States to defend them. The result is a massive increase in defence budgets, a shift that will have a major impact on the war in Ukraine, though not in the short term. The third change is a US break with the values underpinning the Western alliance. The most fundamental is the idea that the individual or citizen has rights vis-à-vis the sovereign, vis-à-vis the state. That they cannot be arbitrarily arrested and that they have a right to life. This is the English Bill of Rights, which has evolved into human rights. What is known as international law is based on this cardinal idea. As well as on the principle, established since the Second World War, that one state cannot unilaterally alter the borders of another state. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine flouts both these principles by seeking to destroy a state, which is also a democracy. Third clarification of 2025: the Trump 2.0 administration is indifferent to these two basic principles. In his speech at the Munich Conference, Secretary of State Rubio did not mention them once. On the subject of negotiations, the fourth clarification is that, in fact, there have been no real negotiations. The Russians and the Americans talk to each other, the Ukrainians and the Americans talk to each other, but the Russians and the Ukrainians do not talk to each other. By this I mean that the Russian delegations at bilateral meetings with the Ukrainian side never have a mandate to discuss political issues. When the delegation is led by the propagandist Vladimir Medinsky, the mandate is to impose conditions and deliver lessons in pseudo-history. When military personnel are sent, it is to discuss the terms of a unilateral withdrawal of the Ukrainian army from the Donbas. Putin does not want to negotiate, certainly not with the Ukrainians, and even less so with the Europeans. It must be understood that the so-called “root causes of the conflict”, which Russia has been hammering home since December 2021, stem from the Western coalition’s refusal to restore Russia’s status as a power equal to the United States. This is why any summit between Zelensky and Moscow appears illusory. Russia wants to negotiate only with the United States, bypassing Europe and certainly the Ukrainians, and even claims to have reached an agreement this summer in what it calls “the spirit of Anchorage”, referring to the Alaska summit between Putin and Trump in August 2025. Could a withdrawal from the Donbas not lead to a cessation of hostilities? There is the military argument: Ukraine would lose its fortifications, its front line would be exposed, leaving Kharkiv and the centre of the country vulnerable. There is the historical precedent: Putin seized Crimea without any real consequences, and in 2022 he turned his attention to the whole country. But there is also, and perhaps above all, the principle. If Ukraine were to agree to withdraw, the fundamental principle that one state cannot change the borders of another state by force would be legally flouted. Moreover, Ukraine would be agreeing, following political negotiations, to condemn hundreds of thousands of its citizens to the arbitrary rule of the Russian authorities. What is at stake is not merely a question of territory – the remaining 25% of the Donbas – but the dual principle that in fact drives the entire Ukrainian resistance: their national right to live within their own state, and their rights as citizens vis-à-vis the state. These principles are those of Europe and the free world, and their violation would have very dangerous consequences for global security. They have been abandoned by the US administration since Trump’s return, but they remain fundamental. Does this mean the prospects for peace are completely blocked? It is difficult to envisage a diplomatic breakthrough in the short term. The great fear of 2025 was that the United States would abandon Ukraine. In a sense, this has already happened, with military aid reduced to nothing, and the decision to prioritise air defence systems and munitions on the Middle Eastern front. But Trump, although still fascinated by Putin, nonetheless sees Russia as an adversary in the energy sphere. Hence the sanctions against major Russian oil exporters and also the role of CIA intelligence in helping the Ukrainians to better target oil refineries and military factories deep within Russian territory. Trump regularly puts pressure on Zelensky to accept the unacceptable, but it must be acknowledged that he has increased the pressure on Russia where it hurts most: the export of oil used to finance the war effort.[1] Russia does not want to negotiate, but over the past four years it has adapted its strategy to the realities on the ground. It withdrew from the Kyiv front, then from the Kharkiv region and the city of Kherson in 2022. It withdrew its warships from the port of Sevastopol in 2023. Each time, this was because the military situation demanded it. This has not yet happened on the south-eastern front. The chances of such an outcome occurring in 2026 are not zero. Russia has shown us that it has lost much of its ability to project power onto other continents, as in Syria, Iran and Venezuela. It remains to be seen whether this can be applied to the Ukrainian front. A ceasefire would become possible if and when Russia came to realise that its military option has been neutralised. But just as Putin was living in a bubble in 2022, believing that the Ukrainians would not resist, everything suggests, within Russia’s ultra-opaque system, that he is still living in a bubble cut off from reality. Dictatorships, however, have this peculiarity: everything that appears immutable can begin to change very quickly. The current deadlock may well not last. About the author Dominique Arel, a political scientist, holds the Chair in Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa (Canada) and is President of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN). [1] These sanctions have been suspended since the start of the war in Iran. Image credit: Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, CC-BY-SA 2.0 via Flickr. ## Four Years of War in Ukraine: What Prospects for Peace and Transatlantic Security? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/four-years-of-war-in-ukraine-what-prospects-for-peace-and-transatlantic-security/ Modified: 2026-04-20 This text is a summary of the conference ‘Four Years of War in Ukraine: What Prospects for Peace and Transatlantic Security?’, held on 23 February 2026 at UQAM. It has now been more than four years since the Russian-Ukrainian war began. During this period, Ukrainian forces have held the line against the Russian army, which has managed to capture only around 10% of the country’s territory. Many strategic positions are holding out against the invasion, whilst Russian forces are suffering heavy losses. Today, Russian advances are stalling, whilst Ukraine appears to be gradually regaining ground on its adversary. The war does not appear to be nearing an end. On both sides, the armies are maintaining their capacity to resist, and a military collapse — whether Russian or Ukrainian — does not appear to be a likely prospect in the short term. It was against this backdrop that, on 23 February 2026, the Strategic Analysis Network organised a one-day conference to examine the state of the conflict, the prospects for peace negotiations and the challenges facing transatlantic security — two of the most defining issues of 2025. The conference centred on two key questions: after four years of war and in light of the events of 2025, what are the prospects for peace in Ukraine? And what trajectories are emerging for transatlantic security and cooperation? Two thematic panels were organised to address these questions, supplemented by a presentation on the reality on the ground and the rise of drones — a veritable revolution in the conduct of modern warfare. Prospects for peace: 2025, a year that reshuffles the deck? 1. Three major upheavals in 2025 The year 2025 was marked by profound changes. Donald Trump’s rise to power reshaped support for Ukraine, the prospects for peace and the dynamics of negotiations. Dominique Arel, professor at the University of Ottawa and director of the Chair in Ukrainian Studies, identified three major upheavals characterising this year. Firstly, Donald Trump’s decision to suspend all US military aid forced Ukraine to source American weapons via Europe. Secondly, this rupture led to a realisation among NATO member states that they could no longer rely unconditionally on their American ally. Thirdly, a rupture in values has occurred between the United States and the founding principles of the Western alliance. These three transformations have profoundly shaken the stability of the transatlantic relationship and have complicated the issue of support for Ukraine. At the same time, 2025 was marked by a proliferation of peace ‘negotiation’ initiatives spearheaded by Donald Trump and the United States. 2. A sham negotiation Throughout 2025, meetings between Russian and American representatives became increasingly frequent in an effort to discuss a way out of the war. However, can these exchanges really be described as negotiations? All the panellists expressed deep scepticism on this point. For Dominique Arel, there have never been any genuine negotiations. The Russians speak to the Americans, who pass the message on to the Ukrainians, but no direct dialogue takes place between Moscow and Kyiv. Vladimir Putin appears to be seeking to negotiate by bypassing Ukraine and Europe, thereby blocking any substantial diplomatic progress. The result is a deadlock: no visible diplomatic breakthrough, a Ukraine under increasing American pressure, and a Russia that rejects any negotiation unless it is militarily constrained. Emmanuelle Rousseau, a professor at the University of Quebec in Montreal, shares this assessment. Attempts at negotiation did not begin in 2025 – they started in the very first days of the conflict – but 2025 saw a notable intensification, driven by Donald Trump’s campaign promises. Two formats have emerged: shuttle diplomacy, in which the United States acts as a messenger between Russia and Ukraine, and direct talks between the warring parties under US auspices. Several factors structurally undermine these formats. Due to its support for Ukraine, the United States cannot claim to be a neutral mediator. Furthermore, Russian attempts to influence them have made the discussions even more biased. Added to this is Donald Trump’s personality-driven strategy, geared more towards diplomatic grandstanding than towards genuine negotiating effectiveness. Finally, the delegates present have no decision-making mandate, which prevents the building of mutual trust and the capacity for commitment. In terms of relations, Russia is systematically seeking to exclude Ukraine from the discussions and to sabotage any possible progress. According to Emmanuelle Rousseau, what is unfolding is more an attempt to impose an unwanted peace than a genuine negotiation process. 3. Ukrainian public opinion: between compromise and resistance Maria Popova, a professor at McGill University, presented the results of opinion polls on the Ukrainian population’s views regarding security guarantees and prospects for peace. Compared to the start of the conflict, Ukrainians are now more inclined to consider certain compromises, notably a freeze on the front line. At the same time, they expect concrete security guarantees: the deployment of European troops, legally binding commitments, etc. However, opposition remains firm in the face of Russian demands and Russian-American negotiation plans. Territorial concessions are deemed unacceptable by a large majority of the population. According to those surveyed, rewarding Russia would risk creating a temporary lull without reducing the security risk to Ukraine or Europe. A majority of Ukrainians still believe that Russia is pursuing a genocidal objective or aiming for the total annexation of the territory and the destruction of the Ukrainian state. In this context, a significant majority remains prepared to continue resisting rather than accept a peace perceived as unfavourable or precarious. 4. Prospects for war rather than peace Vincent Tourret, a PhD candidate at UQAM, takes a similar view. Rather than speaking of prospects for peace, he suggests we should speak of prospects for war. Neither of the two belligerents is seriously considering entering into genuine negotiations, given their respective attitudes towards power and their theories of victory. Vincent Tourret points out that power can be understood on three levels: resources (manpower, industrial capacity, armaments), effective power (what the battlefield actually reveals of these capabilities), and power as a paradigm of action (the way in which war transforms mindsets and means). Russia and Ukraine are continuing the conflict because their respective paradigms of action still allow them to envisage carrying on. Ukraine’s theory of victory is based on a strategy of attrition, whilst Russia operates according to a logic of maximum pressure. As long as the war remains perceived as ‘feasible’ on both sides, peace remains a distant prospect. Drone proliferation: an inevitable phenomenon Whilst the prospects of war remain at the heart of the debate, one phenomenon has taken on considerable importance in the conflict: the rise of drones and the drone proliferation on the battlefield. Faine Greenwood, a consultant for Tarentum Consulting LLC, has offered an analysis of this unavoidable phenomenon, from which several lessons can be drawn. The war in Ukraine has seen a major paradigm shift: large, long-range drones have given way to smaller, less expensive aircraft operated in the immediate vicinity of the front line. This bottom-up approach – born of the initiative of units on the ground – has made drones versatile and indispensable tools: striking the enemy, gathering intelligence for other army corps, and providing logistical support. These aircraft, often derived from the civilian market and adapted to military needs, have transformed the dynamics of combat. Drone pilots are now priority targets, such is the decisive nature of their role. This revolution began in the early months of the conflict, with Ukraine’s use of FPV kamikaze drones, which were quickly adopted by Russia — thus ushering in a game of cat and mouse. In 2024, Russia began integrating fibre optics to circumvent electromagnetic defence systems, a development that marked the years 2025 and 2026, particularly during the Ukrainian operation Spiderweb. These technologies significantly extend the lethal zone along the front line. This phenomenon extends beyond the borders of the conflict in Ukraine: militarised drones are now being used in Syria, Sudan and Mexico for a variety of purposes. This revolution challenges the traditional paradigms of the war on terror and offers fundamental lessons for the rearmament efforts of allied nations Transatlantic security and cooperation: what are the challenges? 1. Europe Facing the Challenge of Re-armament The war in Ukraine is having profound repercussions on the European security architecture. Coupled with uncertainties regarding the US stance, it places Europe and NATO in a complex situation. David Cadier highlighted the considerable challenges facing Europe, not only during the conflict, but above all once it ends. Should the war come to an end, Russia would remain hostile towards Europe, and its military, forged by the experience of the conflict, would likely be more formidable than in 2022. Yet European countries are only at the very beginning of a rearmament effort. The challenges ahead are considerable: deterring Russia from any further aggression, ensuring Ukraine’s security by all available means, and managing the risks inherent in European rearmament itself. The regional order will evolve towards the formation of two militarised blocs, which requires precisely defining the dividing line, identifying potential violations and preparing for them. 2. US strategies and their implications for NATO Alexander Lanoszka, a professor at the University of Waterloo, outlined the various scenarios for the evolution of the US stance towards Europe. Three main options are emerging. The first is that of an autocratic partnership, in which the United States would join forces with Russia and China to divide up spheres of global influence. This option risks provoking a sense of abandonment among NATO members, pushing them to organise themselves autonomously, whilst creating rifts within the alliance. The second option is ‘wedging’ – increased cooperation between Russia and the US to put pressure on China. The risk of abandonment would be more moderate, but the concessions required for cooperation with Russia appear unrealistic, which would undermine the European rearmament project. The third option is an aggressive US stance towards China and Russia, which could turn European allies into zones of confrontation or targets. In this scenario, dependence on Washington would decrease thanks to burden-sharing, but disagreements over the strategy of confrontation could dampen the drive towards European autonomy. These three scenarios have major implications for transatlantic cooperation and will shape relations between the United States and its allies for the long term. 3. The European Union Facing a Paradigm Shift Chantal Lavallée, a lecturer at the Royal Military College of Saint-Jean, highlighted the paradigm shift currently underway at European level. The war in Ukraine has led the European Union to shift from a liberal vision to a more realistic approach to security. The need to invest in defence is being felt at both institutional and national levels: increased defence budgets, the lifting of taboos, and the reopening of fundamental debates — including in Ireland on neutrality and participation in collective rearmament. Thus, the EU is embarking on its own rearmament drive with a target date of 2030, without, however, abandoning the transatlantic trajectory, which remains crucial despite the development of autonomous capabilities. For Canada, joining the SAFE programme represents an opportunity to strengthen its ties with its European partners. 4. Canada and the reshaping of the transatlantic order Jonathan Paquin, Director of the École supérieure d’études internationales, identified four key points for understanding the future of transatlantic security from a Canadian perspective. Firstly, it is worth revisiting the systemic transformations currently underway. Before Trump, the international order was based on a logic of US-centred liberal hegemony, which had long enjoyed the support of the international community. From the moment the US president rejected this logic, the fundamental principles of the order began to crumble, creating profound uncertainty about the system’s future. In this context, NATO has been weakened. Trust between member states and Washington has eroded to such an extent that some allies doubt the robustness of the security guarantees offered by the alliance. For Canada, this development is particularly worrying: its deterrence posture has long relied on NATO and the US nuclear umbrella, in a world where the United States was perceived as benevolent. Yet the main source of uncertainty now stems from the American neighbour itself. Jonathan Paquin expresses serious doubts about the ability and willingness of NATO allies to defend Canada if necessary — the alliance’s perceived timid response to the statements on Greenland is, in his view, a telling illustration of this. Consequently, Canada must no longer view NATO as an automatic guarantee, but rather as a negotiating platform to be actively engaged with Washington to ensure it continues to serve Canadian interests. The current crisis certainly echoes the post-Cold War debates on the alliance’s relevance, but NATO has weathered similar crises in the past, and a premature collapse cannot be anticipated. Conclusion In conclusion, the panelists reiterated that the so-called “peace” talks currently underway cannot truly be considered as such. They are more akin to failed attempts, due to the absence of the necessary diplomatic conditions and the biased role played by the United States in these formats. Since both belligerents' capacity to continue the conflict remain intact, neither side seems ready to resolutely commit to peace negotiations: the logic of continued fighting prevails, and for Ukraine, the nation's survival is paramount. On a transatlantic level, the war in Ukraine has profoundly reshaped international relations, a dynamic further accelerated by the arrival of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2025. All participants agreed, however, that we are only at the beginning of a major transformation that will reshape the transatlantic and European balance of power for many years to come. ## France’s strategic challenges URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/frances-strategic-challenges/ Modified: 2022-12-21 > Get the book France's strategic challenges, the fourth volume of the new Rubicon collection! Get the book France's strategic challenges, the fourth volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in French only. A new generation of renowned experts and informed observers of the current operations delivers here their enlightened points of view, accessible to the public at large and accompanied by a rich infographic. The various contributions in this book are from the French-speaking platform of analysis of international issues Le Rubicon. Le Rubicon will publish small books aimed at the general public, which will address, clearly and precisely, the new burning issues related to international news. Each month, starting in April 2022, Les Équateurs will publish a book of approximately 128 to 144 pages, at a price of 10 to 12 euros, summarizing the work of the experts of the Le Rubicon platform. ## Franco-Canadian Industrial Defence Cooperation: Current Situation and Development Prospects URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/franco-canadian-industrial-defence-cooperation-current-situation-and-development-prospects/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > On September 26, 2024, France and Canada signed a joint declaration providing for a strengthened partnership in defence and security... This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program and the DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges. The opinions expressed or implied in this policy report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces or any agency of the Government of Canada (in the case of Erik Vouvalidis) or the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (in the case of Gaspard Schnitzler). Summary On September 26, 2024, France and Canada signed a joint declaration providing for a strengthened partnership in defence and security. While Franco-Canadian defence cooperation has gained momentum in recent years at the political-military level, it remains relatively underdeveloped at the industrial level. Indeed, with the exception of a few emblematic contracts, acquisitions of French equipment by the Canadian armed forces and of Canadian equipment by French arms remain limited. This situation can be explained by Canada's close military ties with the United States, which means that priority is given to the acquisition of American equipment. While this proximity to the US defence industry is an impediment to defence industry cooperation, there are also opportunities for cooperation between French defence manufacturers. Indeed, the major modernization process currently underway in the Canadian armed forces could lead to closer ties in the coming years, particularly in the following areas: Co-building and operating new-generation submarines by establishing a strategic partnership to replace Canada's Victoria-class submarines (as part of the CPSP program) to secure sea lanes in the Arctic and North Atlantic. Co-construction and use of ice-breaking vessels, by extending to France the trilateral ICE Pact, launched in July 2024 by Canada, the United States and Finland. Status of industrial defence cooperation between France and Canada Although relatively limited compared to other partners, Franco-Canadian defence cooperation continues to enjoy positive momentum at both strategic and operational levels. At the operational level, the latter takes the form of personnel exchanges, participation in joint exercises (notably within the NATO framework), and deployments as part of joint operations (e.g. Barkhane and MINUSMA in the past). At the strategic level, the bilateral relationship has been strengthened and institutionalized in recent years, notably through the creation in 2015 of a Franco-Canadian Defence Cooperation Council, which regularly brings together the defence ministers of both countries, and the regular holding of a Strategic Affairs Committee. In 2023, the French Defence Innovation Agency (DIA) and the Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) signed a specific arrangement in the field of defence innovation. More recently, on September 26, 2024, France and Canada signed a “Declaration on a strengthened partnership in defence and security”, which provides for enhanced cooperation in the following areas: support for Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, crisis management, modernization of the armed forces, and the fight against foreign interference and information manipulation. However, while Franco-Canadian defence cooperation seems to be gaining momentum on the political-military front, it remains relatively underdeveloped on the industrial front. Indeed, with the exception of a few emblematic contracts, such as the 2015 award to Arquus (ex-RTD) of a contract worth around 500 million euros, for the supply of 1,500 military trucks to the Canadian armed forces[1], or more recently, in September 2024, the award to Thales of a 23 million euro contract for the supply of 200 Sophie Ultima multifunction portable thermal imaging cameras, the acquisition of French equipment by the Canadian armed forces remains limited. Over the past ten years (2013-2023), with the exception of 2016[2], the volume of French arms exports to Canada has ranged from 4 to 24 million euros per year, with an average of 11 million euros. By way of comparison, over the same period, French arms exports to the USA reached an annual average of 190 million euros.[3] This situation can be explained by Canada's close ties with the United States, which have an impact on relations between the Canadian and American defence industries. Neighbors and allies, sharing a border nearly 9,000 km long, the two countries enjoy a privileged relationship, both economically and militarily, particularly as the only two non-European members of NATO. On the economic front, since the 1990s, the two countries have benefited from a free-trade agreement that facilitates the import of goods and the establishment of American companies in the country, making the United States Canada's leading trading partner. On the military front, in addition to being allies within NATO, the two countries cooperate closely within the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) - a bilateral air defence organization created in 1957 - as well as within the “Five Eyes”, an alliance between American, Australian, British-Canadian and New Zealand intelligence services. This proximity, the significant presence of American defence companies on Canadian soil, and the quest for interoperability between the two countries, largely explain the priority given by Canada to military equipment of American origin. This is particularly true in the aerospace sector, where many American companies, such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Bell Flight, have well-established subsidiaries in Canada. With the exception of the recent purchase (in 2023) of A330 MRTT tanker aircraft from Airbus, the majority of Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft are of American origin, including F-18 and F-35 combat aircraft, C-130 and CC-177 transport aircraft, P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, and CH-147 transport and CH-146 multi-role helicopters. The same applies to the land sector, which, with the exception of German Leopard 2 tanks, is essentially made up of American vehicles produced by the Canadian subsidiaries of General Dynamics Land Systems, Textron or Oshkosh Defence (i.e. VBLIII and LAV6 armored vehicles, M113 and Coyote personnel carriers, HUMVEE all-terrain vehicles, etc.). In the naval sector, the trend is slightly different, insofar as Canada has an important national industry that it intends to preserve and develop. Canada's “National Shipbuilding Strategy” limits export opportunities for the French naval industry, insofar as surface vessels must be produced in Canada as a priority, as in the case of the 15 combat ships in the NCSC program, whose construction was entrusted to Chantiers Maritimes Irving in Halifax, much to the dismay of Naval Group and Fincantieri, who had submitted a joint bid to Ottawa based on the FREMM frigate design. Despite this, French companies have been awarded a number of naval contracts in recent years, mostly as subcontractors. For example, in 2021, missile-maker MBDA was awarded a contract by Lockheed Martin Canada to equip future Canadian Surface Combat Ships (NCSC) with Sea Ceptor air defence systems. For its part, Thales Canada has been awarded a contract worth around 300 million euros in 2023 to support the Royal Canadian Navy's fleet of small warships and auxiliary vessels, which comprises some 100 ships of 24 different classes.[4] To meet Canadian procurement criteria and increase their chances of winning contracts for the Canadian Armed Forces, many French manufacturers have opened subsidiaries in Canada. These include Thales (with around 2,000 employees in the country), Safran (present with around 2,000 employees at 7 sites), Airbus (with around 4,000 employees in the country), and Naval Group (present since 2014 under the name Naval Group Technologies Canada). Nevertheless, the aforementioned American preference, as well as the repeated failures encountered by the French industry in recent campaigns, contribute to making Canada a hard-to-reach (and therefore non-priority) market for French defence manufacturers. Focus on the economic weight of the French and Canadian defence industries The economic weight of the defence industry, and the government's relationship with it, varies significantly between France and Canada. The Canadian defence industry employs around 36,000 people and is essentially organized around small companies (85% of the sector's players have fewer than 250 employees). Its economic weight remains fairly modest (sales of around €14 billion in 2022), as does its export volume (approx. $7 billion in 2022). In contrast, the French defence industry has a significant economic weight and is considered a major strategic player, generating some 200,000 direct and indirect jobs. Present in almost all segments, it is organized around a dozen major groups, combining systems integrators and equipment suppliers (i.e. Airbus, Thales, Safran, Naval Group, Dassault, MBDA, KNDS...) and around 4,000 SMEs, generating annual sales of over 30 billion euros. De facto, the weight and dependence of the two industries on exports is not comparable. In 2022, for example, the French defence industry will be taking orders worth 27 billion euros, making France the world's 3rd largest arms exporter. The same applies to the countries to which Paris and Ottawa export. While most Canadian arms exports are destined for the USA (63% in 2022), most French arms orders are for the Near and Middle East (64% in 2022). Franco-Canadian industrial defence cooperation opportunities While proximity to the American defence industry, and the limits set by the USA in terms of platform choice[5], may be a brake on defence industry cooperation, there are nonetheless opportunities for cooperation between French and Canadian defence manufacturers, which could lead to closer ties in the years ahead. Indeed, this is what the September 2024 “Declaration on a strengthened partnership in defence and security” seems to imply, with a section dedicated to cooperation in the modernization of both countries' armed forces. In addition to “sharing respective technological know-how” and “exchanges on the organization and improvement of our procurement processes”, the latter provides for enhanced cooperation “in the land, maritime, air and cyber domains”, without, however, naming specific capabilities that could be the subject of cooperation. The opportunity for enhanced cooperation lies above all in the fact that the Canadian armed forces are currently undergoing a period of major transformation, leading to several major modernization projects having recently been launched, or in the process of being launched. In its latest national defence strategy, entitled “Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for the Defence of Canada”, the Canadian government has announced an increase in the defence budget (+8.1 billion CAD over the next 5 years and +73 billion CAD over the next 20 years), as well as major investments in several sectors. In particular, Ottawa plans to acquire aircraft equipped with airborne warning and command systems (AWACS), surface combat ships (NCSC)[6], long-range missiles, surveillance and attack drones, anti-drone capabilities, new tactical helicopters and new submarines. Canada is also exploring the possibility of acquiring new ice-capable vehicles, modernizing its artillery, tank and light-armored vehicle fleets, acquiring new air defence capabilities, and launching a light-armored vehicle production program. These investments remain uncertain, however, as they will depend on the outcome of the next Canadian federal election, scheduled for October 2025. Prospects for submarine cooperation Among the opportunities for cooperation that could arise in the next few years, France and Canada could forge a strategic partnership around the issue of renewing Canadian submarines. To date, Canada has only four diesel-electric submarines, acquired second-hand from the Royal Navy (UK) in the late 1990s, which are due to be withdrawn from service by the end of 2030. The country also wishes to acquire new, more modern submarines, to enable the Canadian navy to protect Canada's approaches and sea lanes, as well as participate in NATO missions. While this need has been expressed on several occasions in recent years[7], notably in a parliamentary report by the Senate Defence Committee published in 2017 and as part of the “Canadian Patrol Submarine Program” launched in 2021 by the Royal Canadian Navy, it has so far never materialized. This may well change as Canada's latest National Defence Strategy (April 2024) mentions a desire to “explore opportunities to renew and expand our submarine fleet so that the Royal Canadian Navy continues to act as a deterrent on all three coasts with conventionally powered submarines capable of operating under ice”. Since then, this project has been refined, notably by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who announced in July 2024 that Canada would purchase “12 conventionally powered submarines capable of operating under ice”. Dubbed the “Canadian Patrol Submarine Project” (CPSP), this program, with an estimated total cost of around C$60 billion, was officially launched on July 10, 2024, with the release of a statement by the Department of National Defence, announcing the publication of a formal request for information “in the fall of 2024”. In addition to strengthening Canada's ties with its allies and partners, the statement says the program will “create an enduring relationship between Canada and its strategic partner(s) to support personnel training and information sharing”. The Royal Canadian Navy is keen to minimize lead times and costs, and is advocating the acquisition of new foreign-ready submarines, the first of which should be delivered by 2035 at the latest, in order to avoid any disruption in capability. To date, the Royal Canadian Navy has identified six models that could meet its needs, including Naval Group's French Shortfin Barracuda submarine, alongside Germany's U212CD (TKMS), Sweden's C-71 Oceanic (Saab), Spain's S-80 (Navantia), South Korea's KSS-III Batch 2 (Hanwha) and Japan's Taigei (Kawasaki and MHI). Faced with production difficulties leading to major delays, the American builders have not been called upon. However, several companies have already positioned themselves, including Germany's TKMS, taking advantage of German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius's visit to Ottawa in May 2024, during which Germany and Norway (both members of the U212CD program) proposed to Canada the establishment of a “strategic partnership” to protect Arctic and North Atlantic sea lanes. Although France has not yet taken an official position, establishing a strategic partnership around the issue of Arctic and North Atlantic defence would be an excellent opportunity to strengthen Franco-Canadian defence cooperation, and thus to relaunch long-term defence industrial cooperation between our two countries around a structuring project. Faced with increasing activity from Russia and China, France intends to invest more in this part of the world, and could offer Canada the benefit of its operational experience (oceanic submarine navigation), while Canada could provide France with its knowledge of Arctic terrain and ice navigation. In addition, Naval Group's Barracuda family of expeditionary submarines appear to meet Canada's main requirements in terms of submarine capabilities (stealth, lethality, perseverance and Arctic deployability), as they benefit from increased autonomy and endurance, inherited from their nuclear ancestry. Over and above operational capabilities and delivery times, this choice will depend in particular on France's ability to propose a structuring partnership to the Canadian naval industry (i.e. training, infrastructure, operational maintenance, etc.) that will bring the two countries' industrial bases closer together and generate positive economic spinoffs, both locally and nationally. Prospects for cooperation on icebreaking vessels Another high-potential area of Franco-Canadian cooperation concerns the production of icebreaker ships. At the NATO summit in July 2024, Canada, the USA and Finland launched a project for the joint construction of icebreaking vessels, known as the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (or ICE Pact). France would be well advised to join this project and benefit from Canada's expertise in this field, by acquiring one or more vessels of this type from the Canadian naval industry. Despite having the second largest EEZ in the world behind the United States, France currently has only one ice-breaking vessel, the “L'Astrolabe”, dedicated exclusively to Antarctic supply and EEZ surveillance missions.[8] There is no equivalent vessel for the Arctic zone. As France's need for such equipment is limited in terms of volume, unlike Canada's, purely domestic production would be pointless. Conversely, a Franco-Canadian industrial partnership for the production of this equipment will strengthen industrial collaboration between Paris and Ottawa, as well as their ability to carry out joint missions in the Arctic and Far North, in line with the desire expressed by both countries. About the Authors Gaspard Schnitzler is a senior researcher at the French Institut for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), specialising in European defence matters and defence industrial policies. He previously worked as an analyst for the French Ministry of Defence. Gaspard is a graduate of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), where he currently teaches. Erik Vouvalidis is an analyst within the Infrastructure and Environment branch of Canada's Department of National Defence. He has previously worked as an analyst with Public Safety Canada in the National and Cyber Security Branch. Erik has an MA in International Affairs from Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. [1] Via Mack Defense, the American subsidiary of the Volvo Group. [2] As a result of the above-mentioned contract [3] The financial volume of Canadian arms exports to France remains unknown. Nevertheless, France is among the top four destinations for Canadian arms export licenses in 2022 (behind the UK, Germany and Israel), with 226 licenses issued for “strategic items”. Source. [4] Including Kingston-class coastal defense vessels, Orca-class training ships and auxiliary support vessels. [5] This is due in particular to the integration of US-origin equipment on them. [6] The NCSC program calls for the acquisition of 15 combat ships to replace Iroquois-class destroyers and Halifax-class frigates. [7] It already appeared in the White Paper on Defence published in 1987. [8] Owned by the Terres australes et antarctiques françaises (TAAF) and the Institut polaire français Paul-Émile Victor (IPEV), she is armed by the French Navy. ## French Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Politics URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/french-nuclear-weapons-in-post-cold-war-politics/ Modified: 2025-03-13 > What role did French nuclear weapons play in post-Cold War politics?At first glance, this question might seem marginal or even obsolete... What role did French nuclear weapons play in post-Cold War politics? At first glance, this question might seem marginal or even obsolete. After all, since the 1990s, the “second nuclear age” has seen nuclear weapons relegated to the background of European strategic priorities. Overshadowed by threats perceived as more immediate, such as terrorism or migration crises, this issue sometimes appears rooted in a bygone era – the era of bipolar tensions during the Cold War. And yet, reducing France’s nuclear weapons to a mere strategic remnant would be a mistake. This military and political artifact holds a unique place in France’s national and institutional identity. Indissociable from presidential power, it goes beyond its deterrent function to embody a symbol of national sovereignty. As illustrated by a certain narrative of Gaullist grandeur – solemnly displayed at the Charles de Gaulle Memorial at Les Invalides or, more sarcastically, in works such as A Very Secret Service or OSS 117 – nuclear weapons in France belong as much to the realm of politics as to that of strategy. This commemorative dimension did not fade in the post-Cold War era: every president of the fifth Republic, from François Mitterrand to Emmanuel Macron, has drawn on this symbol – sometimes explicitly – to reinforce their stature. Whether through doctrinal speeches, concrete decisions or even subtle allusions, nuclear weapons remain a tool of legitimacy and credibility for the head of state, the ultimate guarantor of national integrity and security. In this analysis, I propose to explore the trajectory of nuclear weapons in French politics from 1991 to the present day. Three dynamics emerge: its gradual decline in the 1990s, a period of political and strategic adaptation, then its resurgence in response to renewed threats. These developments do not merely reflect strategic debates, they also reveal deeper transformations within republican institutions and broader shifts in French political life. The Immediate Post-Cold War Era (1991-1997) Nuclear deterrence was at the heart of France’s strategic and political concerns during the Cold War. This complex issue was not confined to the restricted circles of military or diplomatic experts; it permeated public debate, influenced presidential campaigns and embodied major issues such as national sovereignty, collective security within the Atlantic Alliance and France’s role in the world. A clear illustration of this centrality has been the 1988 presidential campaign of François Mitterrand, whose campaign video highlighted the link between the President and nuclear weapons. This period was characterized by widespread acceptance of nuclear weapons as an essential element of national defense. While disagreements existed over the precise management of France’s nuclear force – particularly regarding issues such as strategic autonomy and the relations with the United States – a majority of the population appeared to support the country’s possession of nuclear weapons. This collective adherence was accompanied by a general awareness of nuclear issues: concepts such as “second-strike capability” or “deterrence of the weak against the strong” were familiar to a significant proportion of French society, well beyond expert circles. In the final years of François Mitterrand’s presidency, following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the nuclear debate remained marked by a certain continuity with that of the Cold War. Issues such as the Hadès missile – a short-range tactical nuclear missile developed by France at the end of the Cold War – sparked controversies similar to those surrounding its predecessor, the Pluton. The debates were focused on the limited range of both missiles, which only allowed strikes against democracies. The controversy surrounding the Hadès thus illustrated the persistence of traditional issues surrounding France’s nuclear deterrent. However, a new dynamic was emerging: a renewed interest in the European dimension of deterrence, questioning the evolving role of French nuclear weapons in the continent’s security architecture. On January 10, 1992, François Mitterrand himself opened the door to discussions on the Europeanization of nuclear deterrence, initiating a reflection that would influence strategic debates in the decades to come. This period was also marked by disagreements that transcended traditional partisan divides, pitting different visions against each other even within the socialist majority itself. Some leaders, such as Pierre Joxe, advocated for a break with Mitterrand’s defense policies. They aimed to promote a more “professionalized” approach to national defense, aligning more closely with Alliance standards, where nuclear deterrence would be more integrated into a European framework. This orientation was resolutely forward-looking, emphasizing increased cooperation with European partners and the pooling of strategic efforts. In contrast, other left-wing figures, often close to the ideas of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, defended a more sovereigntist stance. On April 8, 1992, the moratorium on nuclear testing triggered an institutional controversy surrounding nuclear deterrence and its long-term viability. In France, this debate was merely a technical dispute; it raised fundamental questions about the relationship that should be established between political will and nuclear institutions, such as the Military Affairs Directorate of the Commissariat for Atomic and Alternative Energy (CEA) and the Chief of Defense Staff. The cohabitation between François Mitterrand and a right-wing majority from 1993 onwards further politicized the issue, transforming the nuclear testing moratorium into a real point of contention between parts of the left and the right. The 1995 presidential election revealed how central military nuclear issues remained in French politics. Jacques Chirac, in favor of resuming nuclear testing, directly opposed Lionel Jospin, who advocated for their ban. This divergence came to the forefront during the runoff debate between the two parties, when the issue of nuclear testing was discussed. Chirac solemnly reminded Jospin that nuclear weapons should not become a subject of explicit political discord, urging his opponent to respect the “ritualization” of this debate in the republican tradition. Ironically, this stance sharply contrasted with his actions during the 1993 cohabitation, when he exploited the same issue to criticize François Mitterrand. This paradox illustrates an implicit rule of French political life: while debate on nuclear policy is allowed, open and direct criticism remains taboo for a presidential candidate. Jacques Chirac’s decision to resume nuclear testing after his election in 1995 triggered an unprecedented controversy. It provoked massive criticism on the international scene, fueled by the mobilization of civil society and an echo in popular culture - as illustrated by the film Godzilla, which implicitly referred to these tests. Beyond the controversies surrounding the tests themselves, this period from 1995 to 1997 was marked by rich strategic debates. The press extensively covered discussions on the European dimension of deterrence and France’s relationship with the Alliance. This led to debates in Parliament, particularly regarding the Franco-German common defense concept in 1997, which emphasized the role of France’s nuclear deterrence within the Alliance. The Debate Dries Up (1997-2014) From 1997 onwards, nuclear weapons gradually lost their prominence in the French public debate. This marginalization can be attributed to a combination of factors. On one hand, the end of nuclear testing, announced by Jacques Chirac in 1996, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratified on April 6, 1998, marked a significant milestone, perceived as the closure of a historic chapter in French deterrence. On the other hand, strategic setbacks, such as France’s failure to fully reintegrate into NATO’s integrated command, reduced the impact of certain French diplomatic ambitions, making the nuclear issue less visible in public discussions. In 1995-1996, as France conditioned its reintegration into NATO’s integrated command on the appointment of a European to lead the Allied Command in the Mediterranean, the United States rejected this option, sealing the failure of French ambitions to strengthen European strategic autonomy within the Alliance. After Jacques Chirac dissolved the National Assembly, the Left’s return to power in 1997 did not challenge the strategic consensus on nuclear policy. At first glance, one might have expected the presence of an environmentalist party in government – historically critical of deterrence – to spark debates or tensions. However, no significant opposition emerged publicly, reflecting a broad, cross-party commitment to nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of national strategy. Moreover, this period was marked by a doctrinal renewal. Jacques Chirac’s speeches, notably in 2001 at the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN) and in 2006 in Brest, signaled a significant evolution in France’s nuclear posture. The president emphasized the adaptability of nuclear weapons in the face of contemporary challenges, particularly asymmetric threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These statements reflected a desire to maintain the relevance of deterrence, while modernizing it to address more complex crisis scenarios, where state and non-state actors increasingly overlap. The cross-party consensus between the left and the right on the new nuclear deterrence policy helped establish an official support that limited any challenge to this strategy. Moreover, the introduction of the five-year presidential term, combined with the fact that parliamentary elections were scheduled to coincide with the presidential calendar following the September 24, 2000 referendum, further weakened the role of the parliamentary opposition, which was often reduced to a minority position until the next presidential election. The doctrinal evolution did not prevent nuclear deterrence from disappearing from media debates. Attention shifted instead to conflicts in the Middle East and the rise of terrorism, which directly affected France. Meanwhile, financial crises and Europe’s growing indifference to strategic issues, combined with occasionally tense relations between Paris and Washington from 2003 to 2012, relegated France’s strategic agenda to the back burner. In this context, nuclear deterrence is not debated. Although it remains in the background, it no longer sparks the intense public debates that characterized previous decades. The issue is considered strategically obsolete. Despite growing disinterest in nuclear issues, nuclear weapons still hold a strong symbolic place in French political life. The 2007 runoff debate between Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy further illustrates the enduring symbolic importance of this topic, as it remains essential for presidential candidates to demonstrate knowledge of France’s nuclear capabilities. However, both candidates’ evident lack of awareness regarding the exact number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) or nuclear attack submarines (SSN) during the presidential campaign illustrates the gradual fading of nuclear deterrence from public debate. This trend is even more telling given that the interviewer himself made factual errors while correcting Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, further underscoring the limitations of public debate on nuclear policy. Yet, every elected president, from Nicolas Sarkozy to Emmanuel Macron, has consistently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear deterrence. This ritual often takes the form of a symbolic visit to the nuclear forces shortly after taking office, a gesture that underlines the close link between presidential power and deterrence. This practice reinforces a political continuity that faces no significant opposition within the five-year term framework. Although the law has evolved under Nicolas Sarkozy to introduce greater delegation in the conduct of nuclear affairs, the role of the President of the Republic has become even more central, as ministers have progressively played a diminishing role in this domain. The continuity of the discourse on nuclear deterrence in presidential addresses has led to a stagnation of the debate. Presidents no longer take risks with regard to doctrine or its application. Discussions on deterrence remain confined to expert circles, never expanding into a broader national issue. As a result, nuclear weapons remain a unique political artifact, present in official discourse, but largely absent from public concerns and media debates. The Return of the Nuclear Issue (since 2014)? The annexation of Crimea in 2014 could have been seen as a pivotal moment in the nuclear weapons debate. Although studies, notably those by Corentin Brustlein, had, very early on, highlighted Russia’s aggressive sanctuarization to secure its territorial gains, it was Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 that truly rekindled media interest in France’s nuclear status. France then found itself isolated within the European Union on nuclear matters, as later reflected in Emmanuel Macron’s 2020 speech at the École de guerre. Many European countries then perceived his assertion of the European dimension to deterrence as a challenge to the Atlantic Alliance. However, since February 2022, the war in Ukraine has amplified interest in military nuclear capabilities, reaffirming the relevance of deterrence – particularly French deterrence – in the face of Russian threats, as highlighted by the French 2022 National Strategic Review. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also revived strategic debates that had previously been pushed into the background. Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025 seems to be reinforcing this trend, reaffirming the need for France and Europe to reassess their nuclear posture in the face of the increasingly unpredictable nature of the United States. The French political discourse on nuclear weapons remains surprisingly static despite rising global tensions and growing interest in defense issues – reflected in the proliferation of specialized media and increased public debates on military strategy. Successive governments have not significantly challenged France’s nuclear posture, which has remained unchanged for nearly 20 years, even though threats have considerably evolved. Even within expert circles, where some advocate strategic adjustments, it remains difficult to translate these reflections into concrete political proposals. Although offset by a revival of defense discussions, this inertia highlights the limitations of a cautious debate still confined to highly specialized spheres. It struggles to reach the general public or drive meaningful reforms in France’s nuclear policy. This stagnation is partly due to the lack of accessible and concrete data on critical questions such as: Is it possible to develop new nuclear warheads? How much would such a program cost? How much would new delivery systems cost to develop? These questions are essential to stimulate a debate that all too often gets bogged down in doctrinal analysis with little practical impact. Nuclear weapons could become an increasingly contentious political issue in the years to come. On one hand, the proposal to enshrine nuclear deterrence in the French Constitution, submitted to the National Assembly in February 2023, already reflects a willingness to use nuclear policy as a purely political tool. On the other hand, the European dimension of French deterrence is being challenged by parties such as La France Insoumise and the Rassemblement National. Although their criticisms have not yet had a significant impact on public opinion, they could, in the long run, weaken any attempt to further integrate France’s nuclear policy within the European Union. Moreover, although nuclear issues do not yet dominate political debates, strategic concerns are beginning to influence electoral outcomes. For example, Raphaël Glucksmann’s strong performance in the European elections, compared with that of candidates from La France Insoumise, illustrates how a clear stance on major geopolitical issues, such as the war in Ukraine, can mobilize a segment of the electorate. *** Far from being a mere relic of the Cold War, France’s nuclear arsenal remains a central pillar of its defense strategy and national sovereignty. Since the end of bipolarity, it has gone through phases of decline and resurgence, reflecting both shifts in geopolitical threats and the internal dynamics of French politics. Although it has been relegated to the background of public debate, it has never ceased to symbolize power and independence for France. However, nuclear deterrence remains confined to expert circles despite its strategic and symbolic significance, limiting its engagement with public opinion and democratic debate. In a context of shifting alliances and growing strategic uncertainties, nuclear weapons could once again become a subject of political controversy. It is essential to move beyond technocratic isolation and foster a broader discussion about their future role to ensure that they remain a credible pillar of France’s strategy, without being instrumentalized for partisan conflicts. Therefore, the challenge in the coming years will be to reintegrate deterrence into a structured national debate involving decision-makers, experts and society to secure its place within a clear strategic vision. After all, effective deterrence is measured not only in terms of its strike capability, but also in terms of the support it generates among those who ensure its long-term survival. *** Photo credits: VanderWolf-Images Florian Galleri holds a Ph.D. in Contemporary History. His thesis examines the European dimension of French nuclear deterrence after the Cold War, focusing on nuclear deterrence and European defense cooperation. ## From Ambition to Action: Succeeding in Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/from-ambition-to-action-succeeding-in-canadas-defence-industrial-strategy/ Modified: 2026-04-20 This text is a summary of the conference From Ambition to Action: Succeeding in Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy held on January 26, 2026 at UQAM. On Monday, January 26, a conference was held on Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) as well as the expectations surrounding it. This initiative, launched under Prime Minister Carney’s mandate, takes place in a global context marked by a deterioration of the country’s strategic environment, characterized both by instability in the international system and growing uncertainty regarding the reliability of the American partner. In this context, the DIS appears to be an attempt at strategic repositioning for the country. The objective is to strengthen Canada’s resilience, reduce certain critical dependencies within the defence industry, and support the development of an industrial and technological base in defence that is adapted to contemporary needs and challenges. This meeting provided a forum for exchanges between academics, senior public servants, and business leaders. Participants were able to express their expectations regarding the content of the strategy, put forward recommendations, and raise concerns and reservations about the risk that it might be too ambitious, fragmented, or insufficiently grounded in the constraints specific to the Canadian context. This note provides a structured summary of the discussions and suggestions that emerged during the debates held at this meeting. In summary, there is consensus on the importance of strengthening Canadian capabilities in research and development (R&D), improving the process of converting innovation into production and export, and simultaneously contributing to Canada’s economic security. The strategy must also enable Canada to develop greater strategic autonomy while avoiding autarky. Canada cannot “do everything”: it must instead focus its efforts on areas where it already has comparative advantages, while seeking international industrial partnerships in order to diversify its dependencies. After outlining what this defence industrial strategy represents and highlighting the efforts already undertaken by the Canadian government, this note will examine the main expectations and concerns expressed, before concluding with the most frequently mentioned recommendations. The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS): A Structuring Innovation for Canada The development of a defence industrial strategy is an unprecedented initiative for Canada. Until now, the country stood out among its allies for lacking a framework document clearly defining its industrial priorities, technological objectives, and policy levers in the defence sector. Although its release has been delayed due to the global political context and reforms made to the Defence Investment Agency (DIA), the DIS is the result of a whole-of-government effort. It has successfully mobilized the defence, industry, economic development, and foreign affairs portfolios, with the objective of better aligning national security and Canadian industrial policy. Jean-François Juneau, Acting Senior Director of the industrial strategy team at the Department of National Defence, reminded us that the government did not wait until the last minute to structure the initiative: since 2024, a working team has been in place, a budget has been announced (approximately 6 billion over five years), and several preliminary measures have been introduced. Two central objectives were highlighted: Reforming military procurement, considered too slow, too cumbersome, and insufficiently compatible with industrial realities. To illustrate this, Juneau noted that it is sometimes easier for Canadian companies to contract with the Pentagon than with Ottawa. Accelerating the transition from innovation to commercialization, in order to consolidate a Canadian industrial sector capable not only of meeting national needs but also of integrating into export markets. Stéphanie Lesaux-Farmer, Acting Deputy Director of the Defence Export Division at Global Affairs Canada, presented the defence export strategy, developed to enable Canadian companies to access new markets. The DIS’s orientation reflects a structural reality in Canada: the limited size of its domestic market makes it impossible for a defence industry to rely solely on internal demand. Drawing inspiration from models implemented by its allies (dedicated export agencies, specialized committees, industrial support mechanisms), the Carney government is seeking to provide clear direction for the country. However, such ambitions come with high expectations and close scrutiny regarding the real feasibility of the strategy. First Expectation: A More Sovereign, but Realistic and Non-Autarkic Industry All participants agreed on the need for Canada to strengthen its industrial sovereignty and to protect itself against future risks vis-à-vis the United States, particularly in a context of American political volatility and potential pressures on supply chains. One major warning regarding this orientation was repeated multiple times: the strategy must remain realistic and take into account Canada’s specific constraints. In this sense, it cannot replicate a French-style model based on highly diversified industrial autonomy and the ability to structure supply chains almost entirely at the national level. The challenge for Canada is to develop selective autonomy, meaning focusing efforts on certain critical areas while continuing to strengthen cooperation with reliable allies. Several panelists suggested that Canada should work toward integration into international consortia, allowing it to participate in joint projects and share development costs with partners. Yan Cimon, Professor in the Department of Management at Université Laval, emphasized a crucial point: autonomy must not mean isolation. Canada must be able both to sustain operations in a major crisis and to remain embedded in industrial networks with its partners. In this perspective, Justin Massie, Director of the Department of Political Science at UQAM and co-director of the Strategic Analysis Network, argued that Canada should adopt a hedging posture. The goal is to preserve the relationship with the United States without becoming dependent on it. The aim is not rupture, but the development of resilience capable of limiting exposure to unpredictable American decisions. Finally, another important element emerged: the DIS should not be conceived as a short-term strategy aimed at achieving immediate political gains, but rather as a long-term process spanning 20 to 30 years—the only relevant timeframe for building a sustainable Canadian defence industrial base. Second Expectation: A Strategy Aligned with the Armed Forces and Society The second key point that reached consensus is the need for the DIS to be rooted in the real needs of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Guillaume Côté, CEO of CRIAQ, and Marc Bigaouette, Director of Canadian Government Programs for Bell Textron, emphasized that the CAF are the end users. Their trust and operational capability must remain the cornerstone of the strategy. It is therefore essential not to prioritize “made in Canada” equipment at the expense of performance, but rather to align the DIS with operational requirements. Another fundamental issue raised is coordination with the provinces. Anessa Kimball and Youri Rousseau highlighted the importance of close collaboration with provincial governments, which hold key economic and industrial levers, given Canada’s federal structure. Quebec is particularly relevant, with advantages in aerospace, advanced technologies, and AI. These assets make it a key actor in the successful implementation of the DIS, provided favourable conditions are created. However, concerns were also expressed. While collaboration with provinces is essential, the DIS must not serve short-term economic development goals or job creation driven by electoral motivations. Such a logic could lead to fragmented investments, unfeasible projects, and weakened overall effectiveness. The final point concerns social acceptability. Yan Cimon noted that while Canadians support technological development and innovation, they are less supportive when it involves explicitly lethal capabilities. To achieve its objectives, the government must engage in transparent and educational efforts to legitimize its actions in the eyes of the public. Third Expectation: Innovation as a Strategic Pivot The third major focus of the discussions was technological innovation. The conclusion is clear: Canada invests too little in defence R&D—less than 5% of the budget. This significantly limits its ability to anticipate future threats and develop sovereign responses. Without significant R&D investment, Canada will remain structurally dependent on foreign, particularly American, innovations for critical systems. A more ambitious strategy is required. The DIS should focus on sectors where Canada already has comparative advantages: artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, aerospace, drones, and surveillance systems. Pierre Seïn Pyun of Bombardier highlighted the company’s role in defence, notably through a partnership with Saab on an airborne early warning aircraft. At the same time, Youri Rousseau and Marc Bigaouette emphasized Quebec’s role in strategic technologies. A key proposal emerged: Canada should develop or strengthen an integrated approach modeled on its allies, including the creation of an agency capable of coordinating R&D investments and procurement. Innovation also requires talent. The historical case of the Avro Arrow illustrates how program failure contributed to the loss of engineers to the United States. The DIS must therefore include measures for training and retaining talent. Justin Massie also stressed the importance of developing autonomous analytical capacity to define and defend Canadian interests. However, innovation has constraints. Anessa Kimball noted that innovation and job creation do not automatically align. A focus on cutting-edge technologies may generate high value but not necessarily large employment volumes. The DIS must balance innovation, production, and economic benefits. Fourth Expectation: Exporting Our Capabilities The final key issue is exports. Canada’s defence industry cannot rely solely on domestic demand. Export capacity is essential for financial viability and industrial credibility. The defence export strategy presented by Stéphanie Lesaux-Farmer includes increasing and diversifying exports, both within NATO and beyond. Marc Bigaouette described this as a crucial aspect of the DIS. Jean-François Juneau noted that some restrictions have been eased, particularly with the Business Development Bank of Canada, but more must be done. Canada lags in political, diplomatic, and financial support for defence exports. A clear assessment and structured support mechanisms are needed. Guillaume Côté emphasized that export success also depends on diplomatic engagement. Producing is one thing; exporting is another. Conditions must be created to encourage allies to purchase Canadian equipment. Conclusion: A Welcomed Strategy Requiring Rigorous Implementation Although the DIS has been delayed, discussions revealed broad support for the initiative. It is seen as necessary for Canada’s national interests in security, defence, and sovereignty. However, implementation must be disciplined, coherent, and sustained. The DIS cannot be a symbolic announcement or a short-term political tool. It must follow a long-term path—only over 20 to 30 years can it realistically build a strong industrial base. Key Recommendations: Strengthen international cooperation: through information-sharing agreements, industrial partnerships, and participation in multinational projects. Actively support exports: develop political and financial mechanisms to promote Canadian capabilities abroad. Invest heavily in R&D: implement talent retention measures to limit brain drain. Develop centres of excellence: enable Canada to become a leader in targeted sectors. Maintain an open relationship with the United States: without excessive dependence, while adopting a hedging posture. Create or strengthen an integrated support agency: capable of coordinating investments, R&D, and procurement. Keep CAF needs central: avoid dispersing investments into projects driven by short-term political considerations. Image Credit: Robert Sullivan, Public Domain Mark via Flickr ## From Friendship Motive to Absolute Loyalty: Lessons from Canada’s Experience in NATO’s Libya Campaign URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/from-friendship-motive-to-absolute-loyalty-lessons-from-canadas-experience-in-natos-libya-campaign/ Modified: 2026-07-09 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant from the Department of National Defence’s MINDS program. Introduction Our Operation Unified Protector (OUP) study published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, along with subsequent research, revealed important features of NATO alliance politics, especially as it pertains to Canada’s interactions with bigger players within NATO. Based on original interviews with Canadian and NATO officials, we concluded that two key features drove Canada’s influence in 2011. The first was a visible, low‑caveat, top tier contribution. Canada, in particular, was part of the ‘striker group’, the small group of countries doing the bulk of the sorties. Second, a Canadian officer, Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard, commanded OUP, allowing Ottawa to shape the campaign’s day‑to‑day legal and targeting posture. For OUP, even as the big strategic calls stayed with Washington, and to a lesser extent London and Paris, Canada was the primary interlocutor with the big three, thus placing Canada above the other contributing allies in terms of access to information and having a hand in mission design and execution throughout the operation. Though we find that Canada can maximize its visibility and influence when it shows up as a contributor to military operations, we acknowledge that these benefits are ephemeral. Fast forward to the present, we can see how such dynamics have grown more complex. With President Trump’s second term and Secretary Pete Hegseth’s vision for a more lethal Department of “War”, the terms of alliance politics are being re-shaped by the Trump Administration’s profound disdain for multilateralism, which results in a more transactional burden‑sharing. As dramatic as some of the changes since 2025 appear, OUP offers important lessons about contemporary alliance politics because the United States was already eager to lead from behind then, urging other allies to do more, despite their continued dependence on American military capabilities. In our contribution to the ‘Back to the Future’ essay series, we argue that these recent shifts do not negate the lessons from OUP; rather, they amplify them. In 2011, Canada earned operational influence through strikes, caveat‑free rules of engagement, and command access, even as strategic direction sat with the big three. That bar is even higher now: influence now tracks deliverable combat power, stockpiles, and production lines and how quickly these can support NATO plans. Context: Libya and OUP In early 2011, as the Arab uprisings spread across the region, mass protests erupted in Libya against the regime of Muammar Qadhafi, in power since 1969. The government responded with escalating violence. On 26 February, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1970, demanding that Libya address protesters’ grievances while imposing sanctions, an asset freeze, a travel ban on senior officials, and an arms embargo. The next day, opposition figures formed the National Transitional Council (NTC), though it soon became evident that the NTC lacked control over the numerous militias emerging across Libya. As violence intensified, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and other partners accelerated their contingency planning. On 10 March, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates indicated that any American military role required new United Nations (UN) authorization. On 17 March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, permitting states to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, excluding occupation. Two days later, a coalition including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom launched airstrikes under Operation Odyssey Dawn, halting Qadhafi’s assaults on rebel areas and destroying much of Libya’s air defenses and heavy weaponry. NATO, despite internal disagreements and reluctance from some members such as Germany, agreed on 23–24 March to enforce the arms embargo and no-fly zone. On 31 March, NATO took over the mission, now named Operation Unified Protector (OUP). The mission’s goals were to end attacks on civilians, withdraw regime forces to barracks, and secure humanitarian access. Canada’s contribution, Operation Mobile, included seven CF-18 fighters, surveillance and refueling aircraft, and the frigate HMCS Vancouver, totaling about 630 personnel. Canadian aircraft flew roughly 6% of all NATO sorties and 9% of strike sorties, operating with comparatively permissive rules of engagement; the naval contingent conducted hundreds of hailings to enforce the embargo. Prime Minister Stephen Harper categorically refused to deploy ground troops. OUP failed to meet its initial 90-day mandate and was extended on 1 June amid a battlefield stalemate. Momentum shifted in August when rebels captured Tripoli, and on 20 October they killed Qadhafi. The UNSC ended authorization for the use of force with Resolution 2016, effective 27 October 2011. Development: Canada and OUP Though Harper’s government framed Canada’s involvement in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in value-based terms, pointing to freedom, democracy, and moral obligation, such framing served more as a narrative than as genuine decision-making drivers. Harper sought to shift Canada’s international image from that of a traditional peacekeeper to a more assertive military actor, portraying Qaddafi as a threat to global norms. Public statements and parliamentary motions emphasized protecting civilians and supporting Libya’s democratic transition, aligning with allied messaging. The concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) influenced international discourse, but Canadian officials avoided using the term publicly because of its perceived association with the Liberal Party, despite echoing its basic principles in justifying intervention. In explaining Canada’s decision to join multinational coalitions, the scholarly literature we reviewed tends to emphasize factors such as party ideology, electoral concerns, commercial interests, and threat perception. However, we found that these factors were not decisive for OUP. Instead, Canada’s involvement was primarily driven by the desire to maintain its reputation as a reliable NATO ally, especially in the eyes of Washington, rather than by direct national interests in Libya.[1] Unlike European NATO members, Canada had no significant stakes in Libya. The dominant concern was avoiding marginalization if the United States, France, and the United Kingdom acted outside NATO. As our interviews revealed, debates within government emphasized “burnishing credentials” and ensuring Canada was seen as “punching above its weight.” The government actively promoted NATO’s role and highlighted Canada’s leadership contributions, such as its air and maritime operations and the appointment of Lieutenant-General Charles Bouchard as mission commander. Officials described the intervention as discretionary and primarily about being a “good ally”. While public messaging focused on humanitarian and security rationales, speeches and testimonies openly referenced strengthening relations with allies, which we have dubbed the friendship motive. Our case study analysis also showed that Canada’s participation in OUP yielded some operational and reputational benefits, but these were limited and short-lived, with little strategic influence beyond the mission’s end. The most visible gain was the appointment of Bouchard as NATO commander, which enhanced Canada’s profile and allowed Canadian officers and analysts to occupy key positions at NATO’s operational headquarters, improving access to information, as well as mission design and execution debates. Bouchard’s autonomy in shaping the Operations Planning Directive and early mission design gave Canada influence over legal and targeting aspects, while its active participation in air and maritime operations (flying six percent of all sorties and nine percent of strike sorties) secured Canada a place in the informal “striker group,” which handled operational decisions. Its rules of engagement were among the least restrictive within the Alliance, thereby increasing operational flexibility and credibility. These advantages were constrained, however. Canada’s influence remained operational rather than strategic; major decisions, such as the timing of the mission’s termination, were dominated by larger powers. Canada lacked key assets, which limited its ability to shape outcomes and diminished its reputational gains. Canada’s leadership role and contributions temporarily elevated its standing within NATO, but these benefits did not translate into lasting influence after the mission concluded in October 2011. Policy Considerations: What’s changed since 2011, and why OUP’s lessons matter Secretary Hegseth’s confirmation in January 2025 marked a decisive shift toward a more transactional, “pay-to-play” NATO. His early tenure brought blunt demands for European primacy in continental defence, a path toward allocating 5% of GDP to defence and security, and a doctrine that placed hard power above all else. This approach reframed the “friendship motive,” which we define as the desire to be seen as a reliable ally, into a model where influence follows tangible deliverables: capability, readiness, and industrial output, all accompanied by overt praise for President Trump, or what we might call demonstrations of absolute loyalty. The Libya intervention had already exposed critical capability shortfalls among NATO allies, particularly their dependence on U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Though Washington has long urged allies to spend more on defence, enforcement was historically lax. By 2025, however, the bar is significantly higher. At the June NATO Summit in The Hague, allies endorsed an ambitious target of 5% of GDP for defence by 2035, with at least 3.5% dedicated to core military capabilities and roughly 1.5% to resilience and defence-related infrastructure. They also committed to annual national plans demonstrating credible pathways to meet these goals, transforming political rhetoric into more enforceable planning requirements subject to audits in Brussels. At the Summit, this move was framed as a decisive response to Russia and a guarantee of continued U.S. engagement under a Trump administration. The political message from Washington is clear: spend more, and spend on the right things, or risk losing standing within the Alliance. If Canada were to develop a playbook for how to engage in this evolving NATO environment, drawing lessons from its experience in Libya, then it would not only need to make visible contributions that reinforce its reputation as a reliable and capable ally, but prioritize capability development through credible spending commitments in parallel. In other words, the strategy which worked in the past whereby Canada could compensate for underinvesting in defence by making contributions to NATO military operations is over. With these new conditions in mind, we derive six key lessons from OUP that can inform how Canada might best navigate tougher alliance politics. 1. Buy Influence the OUP Way: Low Caveats, High-Value Enablers Operation Unified Protector demonstrated that Canada’s low-caveat CF-18 deployments and visible maritime role secured a seat in the striker group and shaped legal and targeting practices. Canada learned that showing up with the right equipment and platforms delivers access and influence, but doing so requires more systematic planning and integration of past lessons into force development, which is still lacking within the CAF. Adapting this lesson today means offering caveat-light air and naval packages tied to NATO’s new capability targets, such as air defence, deep strike, ISTAR[2], and stockpiles. While Canada’s contributions were on target, OUP still revealed glaring capability gaps and made painfully obvious that NATO allies are dependent on U.S. assets to fulfill operational requirements. 2. Give to get It is true that it has always been a cardinal rule of any form of multilateral cooperation, even of the most harmonious kind, that a state must “give to get” at least to some extent. Nevertheless, there is also a strong case to be made that from now on, states engaged in partnerships with the United States, including in NATO and other arrangements such as the Five Eyes, will need to give more if they want to maintain the same level of gains as in the past. Those whose contributions stagnate should expect to see decreased benefits or even costs imposed. It is possible we may even see the friendship motive pushed to the extreme, going beyond considerations of alliance burden-sharing and reliability, with Trump dictating the terms and demanding absolute loyalty. 3. Make Industrial Capacity Your New “Sortie Count” During OUP, sortie numbers and caveats shaped influence. Today, industrial output are the new currency of credibility, since the United States has little appetite for multinational military operations. Indeed, Secretary Hegseth has explicitly tied alliance influence to production capacity. To adapt, Canada should co-finance defence capabilities with allies and closely track NATO’s Ukraine Prioritized Requirements List to convert orders into deliveries. This is the most credible route to near-term influence on Ukraine and NATO stock replenishment, both appeasing the US and catering favour to European allies. 4. Treat Command Billets as Strategy, Not Optics Bouchard’s command role during OUP gave Ottawa daily leverage over campaign execution even when political decisions at the North Atlantic Council were beyond reach. Canada should now target operational command positions where rules of engagement and targeting policy are set. Building a pipeline of bilingual, joint-trained officers with legal fluency will ensure Canada can staff NATO and U.S. commands effectively and influence operational outcomes. 5. Build a Stabilization Doctrine Up Front OUP revealed that tactical precision cannot compensate for absent post-conflict planning. Libya’s collapse eroded the legitimacy of the R2P doctrine and exposed NATO’s poor track record in achieving sustainable security outcomes. Canada should ensure that any future operation includes a stabilization annex from Day 1, pairing combat with policing and governance lines to avoid a Libya-style governance gap. Canada could also propose a standing NATO Stabilization & Reconstruction cell to institutionalize this capability, given the United States’ clear disinterest in this aspect of military operations. 6. Hedge Against “Absolute Loyalty” by Building the European Pillar OUP foreshadowed a trend toward European autonomy within NATO, as the UK and France assumed leadership during periods of U.S. retrenchment, a trend accelerated under both Trump terms. Canada should continue to align with emerging EU defence industrial schemes without duplicating NATO structures. This approach hedges against U.S. volatility while reinforcing the Alliance’s centre of gravity in Europe, ensuring Canada remains relevant in a shifting transatlantic security landscape. Conclusion OUP’s core lessons of delivering low caveats, credible (top tier) contributions, command access, working more closely with European allies, and early stabilization planning, would serve Canada well in a NATO context that is more demanding, more audited, and more openly transactional. In the current bilateral context with the United States, the path to influence is simple but unforgiving: deliver hard power and capacity at speed, show annual progress toward the 5% target with capability-based plans, and fill the kind of stabilization gap (because the United States does not want to do it) that sank Libya’s post‑war trajectory. If Canada can deliver on this, it will preserve a real voice in alliance decisions. Failure to do this will result in the “absolute loyalty” model, whereby the US will dictate conditions to Canada, which will have little leverage at critical decision points. About the authors Stéfanie von Hlatky is Canada Research Chair in Gender, Security, and the Armed Forces, Full Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University, Canada, and Fellow with the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation. Thomas Juneau is a Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs with the University of Ottawa, Canada, and associate fellow with Chatham House and non-resident fellow with the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. The analysis in this contribution to the ‘Back to the Future Series’ is partly based on Stéfanie von Hlatky and Thomas Juneau, “When the coalition determines the mission: NATO’s detour in Libya,” Journal of Strategic Studies 45, 2 (2022): 258-279; and on Stéfanie von Hlatky and Thomas Juneau, “The absent are always wrong: The Friendship Motive and Canada’s participation in NATO’s Operation in Libya,” Global Studies Quarterly (forthcoming). [1] The authors conducted 27 interviews with Canadian and NATO officials, both serving and retired, civilian and military, who played a role with OUP. The analysis here is partly based on these interviews. [2] Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance. Image Credit: NATO ## From Sanctuary to Confrontation: The Arctic at the Heart of Geopolitical Tensions URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/from-sanctuary-to-confrontation-the-arctic-at-the-heart-of-geopolitical-tensions/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Introduction Long regarded as a forum for global cooperation on environmental protection and sustainable development, the Arctic – which covers an area of over 16.5 million square kilometres – has now become a new flashpoint between major powers. This interest stems from the fact that the Far North is rich in natural resources such as oil, liquefied natural gas and rare earth elements, which are essential for the development of electronic materials. The spirit of cooperation that once characterised the post-Cold War era now seems to be giving way to a logic of rivalry, driven in particular by the growing ambitions of Russia and the United States in the region. Beyond simply coveting the natural resources trapped beneath the ice, this rivalry reflects a form of strategic competition between the United States, Russia and China, as they seek to assert their operational capabilities in the Arctic Circle. These countries now view the Arctic region as a strategic and economic space of vital importance for the future, an interest driven primarily by two factors: on the one hand, the melting of the ice, which is opening up access to significant natural resources previously inaccessible; and on the other hand, the gradual opening of the shipping routes of the Far North, which offers new commercial opportunities on a global scale.  This territory, which for a long time remained on the fringes of the geopolitical rivalries between the major powers, is now at the heart of global tensions that could tip the world towards a new Cold War scenario. Added to this are relations within the Arctic Council, already weakened by economic and territorial disputes, which now appear to be sliding towards a phase of profound rupture, particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This deterioration in relations has significantly strained ties between the Arctic states and Russia, which the former accuses of violating international law. The rise in tensions in the Far North is bringing about significant changes for the Arctic nations, forcing them to strengthen their defence capabilities in order to respond to the belligerent attitudes of certain countries. Furthermore, the military and economic expansion pursued by Vladimir Putin since he came to power in 2000 now appears to give him a considerable strategic advantage. This is a delicate situation that places Arctic nations such as Canada and Denmark in a position of weakness, especially as the United States, once the undisputed ally of these nations, now appears to favour an expansionist agenda, going so far as to openly declare its intention to annex allied territories, as evidenced by Donald Trump’s recent statements regarding Greenland. It is against this backdrop that this analysis aims to demonstrate the impact of US and Russian policies on Arctic nations, and more specifically on Canada. The escalation of geopolitical tensions in the region, coupled with the bellicose attitude of certain major powers, is pushing the Arctic nations into a corner, revealing a previously unseen vulnerability. They are being forced to rethink their collective defences and partnerships with their allies in order to safeguard their long-term interests in the region. Operational advantage: a winning strategy for Vladimir Putin’s Russia Since Vladimir Putin came to power in the early 2000s, Moscow’s quest for dominance in the Arctic has intensified considerably. Whilst Russia’s economic and military ambitions for the region seemed difficult to realise at the time, they now appear to be a decisive strategic choice for the future, giving Russia a considerable lead over the other Arctic nations. So much so that the country now possesses numerous military capabilities, such as naval bases housing ballistic missile submarines, permanent military installations and long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States. Added to this is the fact that Russian icebreakers are also considered the most effective vessels for ensuring the safe passage of merchant ships using Arctic shipping routes. A military arsenal built up over the years, which could have a major impact on global geopolitics, leaving Canada and the United States vulnerable to missile strikes or Russian military incursions into their Arctic territories. The acceleration of global warming is also leading to an increase in commercial shipping traffic in the region, which could give Moscow a significant share of the global freight market. The use of waterways such as the Northeast Passage could save one to two weeks in the transport of goods between Asia and Europe. This time saving would represent a major economic advantage for shipowners, particularly as the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, considered the most important for maritime transport, now appear prone to a slowdown in traffic due to the geopolitical situation in those regions. This opportunity would allow Russia to strengthen its commercial and strategic influence in the Far North. Beyond maritime routes, the Arctic is regarded as a vast reservoir of natural resources, including rare earth elements, oil and various strategic minerals. Access to these natural resources represents a significant strategic challenge for countries such as the United States and Russia, which wish to strengthen their influence in the High North in order to secure their presence on global markets. It is indeed with this strategic development in mind that Russia has for several years been relying on the area around the city of Murmansk, which is a key hub for maritime trade, but also for Russian military strategy in the region. The city boasts one of the few deep-water ports within the Arctic Circle, allowing merchant ships to load and unload cargo all year round. It is also home to the ‘Arktika’-class nuclear-powered icebreakers, the flagship of the Russian Arctic fleet. Moscow is relying on their presence in the region to ensure the continuity of maritime trade and the export of resources, in order to offset the effects of the economic sanctions imposed by Europe following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The country is also seeking to develop its trade agreements with Asia in order to mitigate the impact of the sanctions on its economy. The Russian Arctic region is also home to numerous facilities of strategic importance to the country’s economy, such as the Yamal LNG plant, considered one of the most significant facilities for liquefied natural gas extraction in the Arctic and a pillar of the Russian energy economy. Partly funded by the French group TotalEnergies, this facility was previously heavily focused on the European market, with around 49% of Russia’s liquefied natural gas production destined for Europe. However, the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union, as well as the withdrawal of partners such as TotalEnergies, have forced Russia to review its export strategy in order to ensure the sustainability of its economy. We are thus witnessing a veritable race for dominance of the polar region, notably illustrated by initiatives from Canada and the United States aimed at extending their continental shelves in order to expand their exclusive economic zones by more than a million square kilometres. This approach also aims to protect the resources buried in the seabed, whilst claiming an additional portion of Arctic territory. From dialogue to confrontation: the Arctic, the dawn of a Cold War The exploitation of the Arctic by the major powers was once considered a pipe dream, given the climatic conditions that prevented the development of extraction and transport activities. However, global warming and the melting of the ice have brought about a major shift in countries’ ability to expand their activities in the region. Furthermore, the increase in transit times for merchant ships using the Northwest and Northeast Passages is now prompting states such as China, Russia, and the United States to review and intensify their expansion strategies in the area. The Arctic now appears to be at the heart of geopolitical tensions between allies and rivals, a paradox that was hard to imagine just a few years ago, yet the reality is stark. The United States, a long-standing ally of Canada and the Arctic nations, is now seeking to lay claim to part of this territory in order to establish its hegemony in the region. This stance by the 47th President of the United States has not gone unanswered by his allies, particularly NATO members, who view the US President’s claims regarding Greenland as a barely concealed attempt to undermine relations between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The US desire to purchase Greenland actually dates back to the 19th century, a time when there was already talk of acquiring the territory for its natural resources and geographical location. This expansionist ambition has been revived by Donald Trump, who last January declared his intention to annex the territory for its wealth of natural resources, despite strong opposition from the American public. This interest in the region’s scarce resources is also shared by the United States’ two rivals, who view the Far North as the future sphere of influence for global markets. The US president justifies his position by citing Greenland’s strategic importance for the defence of US territory, pointing out that Russia is positioning its ballistic missiles within striking range of the United States and that acquiring the island would allow the Americans to establish a security corridor to ensure the protection of the population. China, for its part, has a lesser military presence in the region, as its interests are primarily focused on scientific research, seabed mapping and investment in foreign projects in the Arctic. However, the Chinese government regularly refers to its desire to develop a Polar Silk Road that would link Asia to Europe via the maritime routes of the Far North. To achieve this, China needs powerful partners in the region. It has, in fact, drawn closer to Russia in order to develop maritime trade and the export of liquefied natural gas to Asia. This is a partnership of mutual interest, given that Russia enjoys strategic superiority and, above all, possesses nuclear-powered icebreakers capable of cutting through thick layers of ice. Against this backdrop, the other Arctic nations – such as Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland – are seeking to protect their territories and interests in the region. The idea of mutual support among Arctic nations now appears to be a priority in the face of the expansionist stance of certain leaders. NATO has, moreover, reacted to the US announcements regarding Greenland, stating that the organisation would oppose any military action by the United States. A stance that could have serious repercussions on relations between the organisation’s member states, particularly at a time of high tension. This is a geopolitical situation that is not without risks, given the US’s stance since the start of the year. Notable examples include the military operation last January and the president’s numerous aggressive stances on the international stage. His actions suggest a certain departure from his obligations towards the United Nations and respect for international law, casting doubt on the possibility that he might order military action against Greenland. Furthermore, many countries have taken offence at his attitude towards Denmark, an ally, criticizing him for failing to respect the principle of state sovereignty established by international law. Arctic nations such as Greenland and Denmark were quick to react. Indeed, they were the first to respond to the US president’s ambitions, affirming their determination to defend their territory and pointing out that Greenland remains a NATO territory. Other allies have also responded to the US stance, indicating their readiness to support the country both militarily and diplomatically, whilst strengthening their presence in the circumpolar region. Some states have even gone so far as to open consulates on the territory to demonstrate their support and commitment to the island’s security. Canada, for example, inaugurated a consulate in Nuuk in a symbolic gesture, clearly demonstrating Ottawa’s determination to strengthen the protection of the Arctic and to stand alongside its allies. This gesture is all the more significant given that the island has historical ties with the country and that Donald Trump’s expansionist ambitions could also threaten Canada’s Arctic territories. France, along with several other members of the European Union, has also taken a stand in support of Greenland by deploying military assets to the region and participating in Operation Arctic Endurance. A multinational mission launched by NATO, aimed at demonstrating the organisation’s and the participating countries’ ability to defend their interests in the region, whilst ensuring the security of Arctic territories and acting as a deterrent against pressure from Russia and the United States in the region. Beyond the geopolitical tensions specific to the Arctic region, it is the entire international architecture that could be affected by a breakdown in relations between NATO’s allied nations. This is all the more so as President Donald Trump appears ready to call into question his commitments to international organisations and his European partners in order to achieve his ends. A prospect that seems absurd given the fundamental role these institutions play in global stability, but which is increasingly making headlines, creating a climate of insecurity that could lead to serious diplomatic tensions across the world. Conclusion  The situation in the Arctic is a cause for considerable concern. Many articles on the subject suggest that the region could be at the heart of a future conflict between major powers and that a climate of tension comparable to that of the Cold War prevails there. The Arctic nations appear less inclined to defend themselves alone against the expansionist ambitions of the United States or Russia. To respond to these displays of force and the escalating tensions in the region, Arctic nations such as Greenland, Canada, Denmark, Sweden and Norway must coordinate their military operations to strengthen their position on the international stage, whilst demonstrating their ability to defend their interests in the region. They must also forge closer ties with NATO to ensure the region’s security and expand the presence of military forces in international and national waters in order to counter US demands regarding Greenland. Canada, for its part, must particularly seek to consolidate its partnerships with Arctic nations in order to protect itself against the expansionist ambitions of the major powers. Ottawa must also promote structured trade cooperation to respond to the rise in trade flows in the Far North. However, it must not be forgotten that Canada maintains close ties with the United States regarding the defence of its airspace.  Ottawa must therefore play a balancing act: on the one hand, maintaining its partnership with the United States to ensure the protection of its national territory through defence mechanisms such as NORAD or the maritime and air patrols already significantly reinforced in the region; and on the other, forging closer ties with countries in the region to protect itself from its ally, which now appears to be coveting its territory. It would also be beneficial for both Canada and Denmark to deepen their cooperation on territorial protection to ensure mutual assistance in the event of a violation of their territorial sovereignty. Added to this is the fact that both partners should strengthen their national defence agreements with France, which appears to be steering its Arctic policy towards a strategy of cohesion regarding the defence of territories within the Arctic Circle. ## From the South China Sea to the Arctic: Linking Canada’s Interests URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/from-the-south-china-sea-to-the-arctic-linking-canadas-interests/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Canada has serious stakes in the SCS, but also in the Arctic as the sea-ice is melting and uncovers lots of natural resources... The South China Sea (SCS) disputes are among the world’s most sensible and complex geopolitical questions. Three reasons render such disputes particularly complex: the number of stakeholders involved, the conflicting claims, and the economic and strategic importance related to the control of the SCS. These factors make it very hard to reach a solution successfully easing out tensions and guaranteeing the openness of the region – especially as great power competition is always in the background. In this competitive context, it is crucial for Ottawa to adopt a dynamic foreign policy, linking issues together, to strategically use all possible leverages to advance Canada’s interests, namely its sovereignty, security, and economic prosperity. In this perspective, this hot take offers a dynamic strategic analysis. First, the Royal Canadian Navy’s (RCN) operations in the SCS and diplomatic support of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are good to advance Canada’s economic and security interests in the SCS. Second, strategic cooperation with China on mutually shared interests could maximize Canada’s interests both in the SCS and in the Arctic. Ottawa’s recognition of the Qiongzhou Strait as internal Chinese waters in exchange of Beijing’s recognition of the Northwest Passage as Canadian internal waters could indeed help to secure Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic, in addition to be consistent with Ottawa’s economic interests in the SCS. What’s the problem with the South China Sea? The South China Sea (SCS) disputes oppose topographical and maritime claims made by various regional actors, namely: Brunei, China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. China wants to exercise its sovereignty over 90% the SCS according to its nine-dash-line delimitation based on historical arguments contrary to international law. The attractiveness, whether strategically or economically, of the South China Sea, is considerable. Economically, around $3.2 trillion USD in yearly trade flows through these waters. The SCS is also known to contain both significant fisheries and lucrative oil and gas reserves. Strategically, the SCS is central to China in order to project military power beyond its borders in case of conflict with rival powers. China’s assertiveness in the SCS is nothing new and has constantly been increasing since 1970. China is acting like a regional hegemon as it intends to get back what it historically enjoyed, meaning a dominant position in the region prior to be displaced by the West after the Opium Wars in the 19th century. Assertive actions are characterized by the pursuit of narrowly defined interests through bold policies that contradict other states’ reasonable and legitimate interests. Four types of assertive actions are identifiable. 1) declarative assertiveness (verbal assertions, diplomatic notes, Wolf Warrior diplomacy); 2) demonstrative actions (unilateral administration of disputed possessions); 3) coercive actions (punishment through economic sanctions, warning shots etc.) and; 4) the use of outright force (sinking vessels). In China’s case, this means the regular harassment of regional actors like the Philippines and its seismic activities; bullying foreign oil companies involved in Vietnam’s energy projects located in contested waters; the unilateral extension of Beijing’s administrative presence in the SCS through its coast guard; and the construction of artificial islands on various reefs in the Spratly and Paracel Archipelagos and the militarization of some of them. These assertive actions and China’s dominant economic position have greatly helped China’s revisionist ambitions to secure national objectives at the expense of UNCLOS. Despite legal actions attempted by regional actors to deter Chinese expansion, the situation has not improved. Worried by the invasive Chinese presence, Kuala Lumpur submitted an extended shelf claim to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, hoping to temper Chinese disturbances in the area. From December 2019 to July 2020, many reclamations and statements were publicly issued by multiple stakeholders in the SCS: one statement from Brunei’s Foreign Ministry and five notes; two notes from Malaysia; two notes from the Philippines; and three notes from Vietnam. Non-claimants took part as well, like Australia with its 2020 note verbal, which officializes its alignment with the U.S. Canberra also publicly asked for the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Ruling to be enforced. The latter ruling is the result of a previous case initiated by the Philippines in 2013 against China. Manilla argued that, according to UNCLOS, China’s historic rights and the nine-dash-line have no legal basis; that the maritime constructions used by Beijing to assert its claims are not valid islands that grant exclusive economic zone entitlement; and that China prevents the Philippines from exercising its sovereign rights. Why is the South China Sea Important for Canada? Many conflictual claims held by regional actors are clashing over the SCS. This tensed environment is particularly problematic as the region is home to the world’s second-busiest maritime route. As a group, ASEAN countries would represent Canada’s sixth largest trading partner if the free trade agreement under negotiation is signed, although China is still a far more important economic partner for Canada as it ranks second. In 2018, Canada-ASEAN trade nevertheless reached $25 billion USD. Southeast Asia is one of the world’s fastest-growing economic regions. Canada’s investments there are significant and concern many sectors such as mining, high tech, oil/gas, telecommunications and others. If regional tensions reach a climax to such an extent that a blockade on China is imposed , the openness of the region will inevitably be impacted. This will further impact the fluidity of the transit of goods and necessarily lower economic exchanges between Southeast Asia regional countries and the world. Canada’s Role in ASEAN There is a convergence of interests between Canada and those in favor of stopping Chinese regional expansionism. Regional actors fear Chinese revisionism because it threatens their sovereignty. This same revisionism also endangers the openness of the region and, by extension, Canada’s economic interests. As a result, the goal for Ottawa is to get regional actors to work in multilateral institutions to reach a code of conduct to lower regional tensions emanating from China’s territorial extension and to make sure the SCS remains an open, rules-based place. China’s prosperity is dependent on international trade to export merchandises, especially as its population is aging rapidly. So, it is unlikely that Beijing will risk a complete shutdown of maritime routes by ratcheting up its assertiveness as it would suffer tremendous economic backlashes in consequence, although accidents can go out of hands. The Chinese Communist Party’ (CCP) legitimacy is based on economic progress. Since economic growth is significantly linked to the openness of maritime routes to export goods, the CCP’s interests ultimately join those of Canada about securing the openness of the SCS. To achieve this objective, Canada must support ASEAN countries to develop consensus toward a biding code of conduct for the SCS as it is best conducive to stability and openness. However, many analysts and commentators see the reach of a code of conduct as highly unlikely. In fact, discussions for a code of conduct have first started in 1996 and have always been obstructed by China’s unilateralism and lack of cooperation. However, in the absence of a better alternative, working at the diplomatic level to get China and regional actors to agree on a code of conduct should be prioritized. But Cambodia, Brunei and Laos, all ASEAN members, always side with China on the necessity to settle SCS’s disputes bilaterally and thus render complicated the reach of a code of conduct. Beijing’s economic weight and massive importance in these countries’ development strategies explain such favorable inclinations, just like the fact that these countries have no claim in the SCS, except for Brunei. These three countries should, as a result, be the object of special attention from Canadian diplomatic services during ASEAN dialogues as they are the ones hedging the most toward China. It is in Canada’s interests to ensure that Beijing’s expansion is checked through a code of conduct agreed upon multilaterally. And that is why it is important to get ASEAN members to reach consensus on a way to regulate SCS security questions even though it is an arduous task. But if regional actors, and especially China, do not abide by international law, a legally binding code of conduct becomes pointless as it will simply not be respected. That is why Canada should push for the respect of UNCLOS as well. The respect of the rules-based order is sine qua non condition for ASEAN to finally be able to create a biding code of conduct that is not the result of one’s unilateral preferences. Thus, Canada should both foster the reach of a regional agreement about a set of guiding rules and normatively work to diffuse the importance of UNCLOS’ authority. Freedom of Navigation Operations If Ottawa must invest diplomatic efforts in ASEAN processes to foster the reach of a code of conduct, it should also keep sending its Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) in the SCS. It is important to enforce the right of innocent passage because it is what permits to de facto maintain the openness of the region, in addition to effectively build up pressure on China to make it accept an ASEAN-made, biding, and enforceable code of conduct for the SCS. But Ottawa should nonetheless be careful to distance the RCN’s navigation operations from American Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). In its most ambitious FONOPs, America goes as close as 12 nautical miles from Chinese coasts. Even though such exercises are totally legal, Canada should remain prudent not to align too closely its maritime operations on its southern neighbor by, for instance, not sailing together with the U.S. on highly sensitive areas like in the Taiwan strait. This is because cultivating some distance with the U.S. helps to avoid suffering unnecessary costs arising from entanglement in Sino-American competition. Since the newly formed AUKUS security pact does not include Canada, Ottawa should leave the heavy lifting to others. This being said, navigation operations in the SCS are useful to exercise a leverage on China. Particularly when they are, as some American FONOPs, taking place merely 12 nautical miles away from Chinese coasts. In fact, we know that China wants America, and by extension Canada, out of its backyard. So, the goal is to get China to understand that its unilateral expansion in the SCS mechanically equates to an increase of Western presence in the SCS. If Beijing really wants to see the regional presence of foreign powers diminish, then cooperating to reach a code of conduct will, at some point, become appealing. Ultimately, Beijing has no interest in elevating regional tensions to such an extent that international trade would be disrupted. A code of conduct could help to decrease chances of international trade disruption as well as to regulate Western regional presence. So, there is room for cooperation. UNCLOS, the Arctic and Issue Linkage Canada has serious stakes in the SCS, but also in the Arctic as the sea-ice is melting and uncovers lots of natural resources and several new maritime routes. Among them is the Northwest Passage. It is a narrow waterway considered by Ottawa as internal waters and as international waters by Washington. Ottawa’s juridical interests in the Northwest Passage converge with those of Beijing in the Qiongzhou Strait. Beijing considers the latter strait, located between Hainan Island and China’s mainland, as internal waters just like Canada does in the Arctic for the Northwest Passage – both countries invoke historical rights. America, on its part, opposes both claims. Canada has a legally strategic interest in backing China’s position regarding the Qiongzhou Strait to avoid a precedent that would be detrimental to Canada’s interest over the juridical status it desires for the Northwest Passage in the Arctic. The argument is also true in reverse for China. That’s where issue linkage becomes useful. Issue linkage occurs when a state links two foreign policy issues together, implying that resolution of one issue cannot happen without resolution of the other. Beijing relies on international law to secure the Qiongzhou Strait’s legal status as internal waters. At the same time, China consider UNCLOS as illegitimate when it comes to other of its claims elsewhere in the SCS. So, the Canadian recognition of Qiongzhou Strait as Chinese internal waters is a leverage that can be used to push China to recognize the authority of UNCLOS in the SCS more generally. This could help Beijing to adopt a more coherent approach toward international law. It could also encourage Beijing to reciprocate and recognize Canada’s claim on the Northwest Passage as internal waters. Relying on UNCLOS’ provisions is thus both in the interests of Canada and China to secure their respective internal waters – the Northwest Passage for the former, Qiongzhou Strait for the latter. Furthermore, if UNCLOS prevail in the SCS and that a code of conduct is agreed upon, the rules-based order is strengthened. The stronger is the rules-based order worldwide, the better it is for Canada’s interests. Important too, this convergence of interests between China and Canada constitutes an avenue to decrease tensions between the two countries. Conclusion Outcome like the closing of Southeast Asia as a result of SCS disputes would surely impact Canadian economic interests. This is because Canadian capacity to export and import goods would diminish if the flux of international trade were to be reduced. That’s why diplomatic efforts must aim to convince China to always rely on international law – and not just where it fits its interests – which includes the SCS. Ottawa should hence foster the reach of a code of conduct for the SCS. Royal Canadian Navy’s navigation operations in the SCS should also be maintained, without completely aligning such operations on American ones. Increasing Canada’s cooperation with its European allies and with other link-minded Southeast Asian partners by conducting maritime exercises together must be prioritized too. Canada and ASEAN countries share the same interest in upholding the rules-based order and in keeping the SCS open. These states, for many, fear to be forced to choose a side. They have crucial economic links with China but are at the same time dependent on Washington for their security. It follows that they have interests in securing the openness of the region because it allows them to cultivate both relationships without favoring one over the other.  Meanwhile, both Canada and China would benefit from recognizing each other’s claims that the Northwest Passage and the Qiongzhou Strait are internal waters. This convergence of interests helps to reduce Sino-Canadian tensions, to secure the openness of the SCS and Ottawa’s sovereignty on the Northwest Passage. ## Gender, Peacekeeping, and Operational Effectiveness: Recommendations for the Deployment of Women in Peacekeeping Operations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/gender-peacekeeping-and-operational-effectiveness-recommendations-for-the-deployment-of-women-in-peacekeeping-operations/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This paper surveys the operational effectiveness argument as deployed in several policies and explores the relation between gender and operational effectiveness. In the twenty years following the adoption of the first United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), the integration of women to peacekeeping operations has become a priority for several international security organisations and national armed forces. The Canadian government and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have become leaders in the implementation of the WPS Agenda. As they look for ways to increase women’s meaningful participation to peacekeeping operations, the context of every mission should be prioritised before a fixed number of women peacekeepers. Introduction United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2538, adopted unanimously in August, is the first standalone resolution on women in peacekeeping. Beyond its historic nature, the strong support for the resolution and its elaboration as a peacekeeping resolution, and not as a Women, Peace and Security (WPS) resolution, signal two important advances. First, it shows that the topic of women and peacekeeping is no longer siloed into a “women’s issues” discussion, and is instead starting to be integrated into priority Security Council matters – like peacekeeping. Second, it implies that the Security Council has widely accepted the argument that having more women peacekeepers will increase the performance and effectiveness of peacekeeping. While the integration of women and peacekeeping to mainstream discussions at the UN is laudable, the relation between the deployment of women and operational effectiveness remains mostly undefined. What is the relation between gender and operational effectiveness? The argument proposed here is that gender and sex can influence operational effectiveness in specific scenarios where women are in roles with significant human interactions. These are interactions with the local population, opposing forces, and inside the peacekeeping force. The context of every peacekeeping mission should determine how women are deployed. This paper surveys the operational effectiveness argument as deployed in several policies, including Canada’s Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations. It highlights several conceptual flaws in the operational effectiveness argument before proposing to define it differently. The article concludes with a series of recommendations for the deployment of women in peacekeeping operations. Women in Peacekeeping: the Operational Effectiveness Argument Women’s participation to peacekeeping has been tied to operational effectiveness since the 1990s. The 1995 Beijing Conference, the Windhoek Declaration, and the Namibia Plan of Action highlighted the link between the presence of women and resilience of peace, postulating that principles of gender equality are essential for the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations (United Nations, 2000). UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) materialised civil society’s advocacy in a political engagement to increase the participation of women and led the way to a series of UN Resolutions on WPS. Since then, the UN and other international security organisations have adapted their policies and practices to reflect WPS principles, and made the meaningful participation of women in all aspects of peace and security a priority. With its Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy, the UN’s Department of Peace Operations (DPO) seeks to reach 15% of women in military contingents and 30% of women in police forces in all contingents deployed by 2028. NATO adopted a policy to support the UN Resolutions on WPS in 2007, noting that “representation of women across NATO and in national forces is necessary to enhance operational effectiveness and success”. Through the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, launched at the 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in Vancouver, Canada committed to reach a UN target of 15% of women in uniform in every peacekeeping operation by 2028. The Elsie Initiative aims to increase the meaningful participation of women in peace operations and sees gender as a way to enhance operational effectiveness. Similarly, most academic research on women in peacekeeping examines the positive impact of women in blue helmets. Think-tanks and NGOs’ publications also focus on finding ways to increase women’s participation in all aspects of peace operations. In recent years, numerous research publications have proposed several ways in which women peacekeepers increase operational effectiveness. The claims can be synthesised into six categories of propositions: Women peacekeepers positively affect operational effectiveness when performing practical tasks involving other women, like body searches or caring for victims of sexual violence; Women peacekeepers are more effective at gaining local population’s trust as they are perceived as less threatening than men peacekeepers; Women peacekeepers improve the credibility of the peacekeeping force; The presence of women peacekeepers reduces instances of sexual and exploitative violence from men in the peacekeeping force; Women in peacekeeping contingents constitute role models and contribute to the empowerment of local women and girls; and Women’s aptitude to communicate with local women and girls enables the collection of more nuanced and more complete human intelligence. These propositions all share the idea that women bring something different to peacekeeping operations, therefore contributing to increasing their effectiveness. Operational Effectiveness and Peacekeeping There are several problems associated with the operational effectiveness argument. Some researchers have pointed out that an argument capitalising on the particular skills of women reinforces gender roles, promotes an essentialist view of women and places unfair expectations on deployed women. The militarisation of the WPS agenda[1] is also seen as a real danger. Crucial goals of the WPS agenda, notably gender equality and the pursuit of peace, risk being co-opted by military imperatives in service of security; this is especially so in a global pandemic context where pressing human security and health issues have put gender equality on the back burner. Another problem is the lack of empirical knowledge to substantiate claims related to the positive impact that women peacekeepers have on different aspects of a peacekeeping mission’s effectiveness. Many propositions laid out above rely on limited or anecdotal evidence. Pointing at this lack of empirical research, and at the difficulty to establish causality between gender and operational effectiveness, a growing number of scholars have reacted to current policies aimed at promoting women’s participation to peacekeeping. They question the assumption that there is a direct link between the number of women engaged in peacekeeping and the effectiveness of the mission. In addition to the limited empirical knowledge substantiating them, most propositions do not clearly indicate how gender, not just an increased presence of women, affects operational effectiveness. This points to the need to differentiate between gender and sex when analysing the deployment of women in peacekeeping missions. How do gender, femininity, and sex affect operational effectiveness? Incidentally, operational effectiveness, the other key variable to investigate the proposition that more women will influence peacekeeping missions’ effectiveness, is very rarely defined in the literature. Operational effectiveness is an important yet elusive concept which should be developed along with gender in the context of peacekeeping. Conceptualising Gender Gender, in addition to the presence of women, influences the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. Charli Carpenter’s distinction of sex appearance and gender performance is useful to characterise the different roles played by women peacekeepers. While sex appearance refers to bodily attributes such as hair or breasts, gender performance refers to the way a man or a woman interprets his or her gender and behaves. While sex appearance is generally straightforward, gender performance is more subjective. It relates to societal constructions of masculine and feminine “typical” gender roles and consequently varies according to cultural contexts.[2] Gender performance conceived as such is clearly differentiated from sex and provides a way to evaluate the impact of both sex and gender in the peacekeeping context. For example, a woman peacekeeper, despite wearing fatigues and a helmet, can most likely be easily identified as a female (sex appearance). Her behaviour (gender performance) will vary according to her personal motivations as a woman, soldier, and peacekeeper; if she wants to fit in and be “one of the boys”, or prove herself, she might adopt behaviours more typically associated with traditional masculinity, such as smoking, swearing, or being more assertive. A peacekeeper’s behaviour is in turn interpreted by the other actors with whom she interacts, creating complex gender dynamics. The appearance of sex, performance of gender, and interpretation of both thus have the potential to become equally important in the way women peacekeepers behave and are perceived. A peacekeeper’s gender performance affects the way she approaches and accomplishes tasks and influences how other interact with her. As a result, gender, conceived as both sex appearance and gender performance, is a factor susceptible to have an impact on the way a peacekeeping mission is carried out, affecting its overall effectiveness. Conceptualising Operational Effectiveness In addition to gender, operational effectiveness is the other key variable invoked in policies and claims linking the deployment of more women to better peacekeeping missions. Despite being at the core of most discussions about increasing the number of women peacekeepers, operational effectiveness remains an elusive concept. Since the 1990s, attempts to develop models to assess operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions have run into several hurdles, including the complexity of developing meaningful metrics and the difficulty of comparing different types of peacekeeping missions. A most important conceptual problem, illustrated by Diehl and Druckman, is the lack of distinction between performance and outcome. Indeed, most of the literature on peacekeeping tends to conflate operational effectiveness with mission success. Yet, operational effectiveness should clearly be distinguished from operational success. This is especially the case when looking at the performance of individual actors – women peacekeepers – punctually involved in complex, multilateral operations – like peacekeeping operations. Even if one developed a model to assess it, evaluating operational effectiveness in terms of mission success, or outcomes, cannot be fully conclusive. The peacekeeping contingent is one of many factors likely to influence peace and stability in a host country.  If the goal is peacebuilding, evaluating operational effectiveness as mission success would require finding a way to isolate the performance of individual peacekeepers among a number of complex intervening variables. If the aim is reduction of violence, assessing a negative objective would make it difficult to determine which actions contributed to the desired end state. Looking at operational effectiveness as a process is more promising. Literature on gender and peacekeeping, even if it does not clearly define it, provides insight on operational effectiveness. Researchers have argued that gender is a force multiplier, allowing for the performance of more tasks, or different type of tasks – hence contributing to enhance operational effectiveness. A study examining the performance of Female Engagement Teams (FET) in Afghanistan, even if they did not operate in a peacekeeping context, are particularly insightful. Notably, the effectiveness of US Marines and Army FET has been evaluated based on the input of tasks affected by gender. In a study of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan, Olsson et al analysed day-to-day tasks and activities which were improved, or could have been improved, by having more female soldiers. The process, more than the result, is what is examined here. This task-oriented vision of effectiveness focusses on tactical level tasks of individual peacekeepers. Consequently, it conceives operational effectiveness as the performance of tasks contributing to the realisation of a peacekeeping mission. This multilayered understanding of operational effectiveness allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the roles of women in peacekeeping missions. The tasks performed by women and the contexts in which they execute them can be broken down to isolate instances where gender performance or sex had an impact. Three Recommendations for Canada Guided by the conceptualisation of gender as performance and operational effectiveness as process, an analysis of 25 in-depth interviews with Canadian peacekeepers deployed in 1990s peacekeeping missions[3], confirmed that multiple factors, including gender, influence the performance of tasks in complex peacekeeping missions. While these results cannot be universalised, they empirically illustrate the role of gender and sex in different peacekeeping contexts, thus constituting a first step towards understanding the relation between gender and operational effectiveness. The interviews illustrated the importance of context: gender performance, sex, and sometimes both, can affect the execution of tasks depending on the operating environment, local gender norms, type of peacekeeping mission, and roles played by women peacekeepers. In particular, gender performance and sex specifically impact operational effectiveness when women peacekeepers are in roles with significant human interactions. Specifically, gender performance and sex have the most impact in interactions with the local population, combatants, and in interactions within the peacekeeping force. Three recommendations follow: There should be women in every peacekeeping contingent in roles as varied as possible. Internally, communication is facilitated and cohesion improved when women are in leadership roles, contribute to problem solving, and provide formal and informal counselling. Because it is the right thing to do, and because it improves the effectiveness of teams by making them more diverse, there should be women in every peacekeeping contingent in roles as varied as possible. The number of women deployed in peacekeeping contingents should be adapted to the operational environment and its cultural specificities, not fixed at a certain percentage. The impact of gender and sex is context-specific. Cultural norms regarding the roles of women – in families, communities, societies, politics, military institutions, etc. – as well as societal norms regarding foreign women and armed forces matter when it comes to interactions between women peacekeepers and locals. In some contexts, gender could be detrimental to interactions. It could also be completely irrelevant, or less important than factors like language or religion. In addition to the context, the type of peacekeeping should also be considered. Wider, multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions offer much more opportunities for such interactions than traditional peacekeeping, and even more so than stability interventions. Missions mandating a peacekeeping force to support civilians and humanitarian needs or to keep factions apart should dictate the need for an increased number of women in precise roles rather than an absolute percentage requirement. In order for gender and sex to have a positive influence on operational effectiveness, women peacekeepers should be employed in roles involving contact with local population or interactions with opposing forces. To be in keeping with the spirit of the WPS agenda, the roles in which women peacekeepers are employed matter. For example, having a certain percentage of women concentrated in the support tail of a mission or flying aircrafts does not contribute directly to enhancing operational effectiveness. The impact of feminine gender performance and sex depends on other actors’ perceptions and reception – local men, women and children, combatants, or peacekeepers. Gender and sex are therefore most effective in the performance of the type of tasks involving interactions with those actors: intelligence gathering, engaging local populations, negotiating with opposing forces, among others. Specific examples of tasks include presence patrols, providing medical care to women and children, and supervising civilians working for the peacekeeping force.   [1]In feminist literature, militarisation refers to the processes by which military norms and practices are extended to the civilian realm. Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives; Sjoberg and Via, Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives; Shepherd, ‘Making War Safe for Women?’ [2] This does not constitute an endorsement of fixed gender roles but a reference to archetypal Western societal gender roles. [3] The interviews were conducted in 2020 as part of the author’s Master’s research project. The participants, 17 women and 8 men, were recruited through snowball sampling. 20 were officers and 18 came from the army environment.  Interviewees were from a variety of army trades, ranging from combat arms (7) to medical (3) to logistics (3). Communications officers and technicians (3), an administration clerk and a military police officer were also interviewed. Interviewees from the air force environment were pilots (3), supply technicians (2), air weapons system technician (1), and aerospace engineer (1).  Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to two hours. In a semi-structured format, participants were asked ten questions and their answers prompted different follow-up questions. The first two questions covered contextual information about their deployment and previous operational experiences. Participants were asked to describe the types of tasks they conducted and explain what a typical day was like in theatre, if there was such a thing as a typical day. They were also questioned about their perception of the mission’s effectiveness, and the types of interactions they had with other actors like NGOs or civilian populations. Female interviewees were asked if they thought they could perform certain tasks differently, and if they received certain tasks because of their gender. Male interviewees weighed in on these questions and on the roles of the women who were deployed with them. Finally, they were asked to give their opinion on policies linking gender and operational effectiveness. ## Geopolitical Upheaval In The Post-Soviet Space: The “Near Abroad” Tested By The War In Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/geopolitical-upheaval-in-the-post-soviet-space-the-near-abroad-tested-by-the-war-in-ukraine/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The Russian invasion has shuffled the decks in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. Absorbed by the Ukrainian conflict, which tends to turn into a war of attrition, Moscow is struggling to maintain its status as a stabilizing power and its role as a regional arbiter. After the multiplication of military setbacks Russia suffered in the face of the Ukrainian armed forces’ counter-offensive, it is fashionable to say that Moscow is cornered militarily and diplomatically. While the weakening of its ability to influence Western countries is a certainty, the marginalization of Russia in the post-Soviet space is much less so. Still, the Russian invasion has shuffled the decks in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. Absorbed by the Ukrainian conflict, which tends to turn into a war of attrition, Moscow is struggling to maintain its status as a stabilizing power and its role as a regional arbiter. In the context of this rapid recomposition, the Russian imperial project has provoked strong reactions in these countries that make up Moscow’s security glacis. It is also necessary to analyze the eruption of pockets of conflict and the limited response of the Kremlin to stem the rise in regional tensions. Vladimir Putin’s security equation is becoming more complex. Several opposing or allied powers are taking advantage of the situation to develop new partnerships at the expense of Russia, which is too busy gambling its reputation in Ukraine. The war’s outcome in Ukraine will have broad consequences for maintaining or disintegrating Russia’s positions in the post-Soviet space. By snatching a victory, its credibility will be renewed. Conversely, if defeated, its influence could gradually decline, and its isolation could extend beyond the West. Russia is still perceived as the stabilizing power of the sub-region, but its military and diplomatic escalation could increase opposing powers’ attracting power. Moreover, as Russia’s supremacy is challenged in this space, Moscow is increasingly constrained when choosing its alliance system while post-Soviet states aspire to more autonomy. For now, China and Turkey want to stay away from the Kremlin’s military ambitions in the region. At the same time, a significant increase in diplomatic engagement from the E.U. and the U.S. remains unlikely. Moscow is not immune to a strategic shift from these powers that would aim to supplant Russia in the region. The use of inter-state armed violence to settle its territorial disputes has profoundly upset the regional balance and damaged Russia’s credibility as a mediator. However, the conflagration of the Caucasus and Central Asia should not be seen as a consequence of Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine.   ***** Introduction Vladimir Putin seems to have mastered the art of disguising a succession of military defeats as a political victory. By celebrating hand in hand with puppet leaders the annexation of four Ukrainian provinces bordering the Sea of Azov, Vladimir Putin is still struggling to conceal the significant setback his army is experiencing in Ukraine. By continuing its reconquest, the Ukrainian army finally managed to reverse the trend on the military field thanks to a lightning counter-offensive that allowed it to recover 63% of the territory invaded by the Russian army since February 24, 2022. While the chances of ending the conflict remain slim, its resolve seems to be receding as it evolves into a war of attrition. In addition, Vladimir Putin is now facing a wind of popular protest that has reached large sections of the population. While no critical mass is capable of shaking the foundations of power in Russia, the announcement of a partial mobilization has led to harshly repressed resistance movements, resulting in an exodus of about 700,000 Russians abroad and towards countries bordering Russia. While those regions around Russia that constitute Moscow’s security glacis have been welcoming Russian civilians, the geopolitical consequences of the war in Ukraine are starting to show. With renewed fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan, border tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the geopolitical breakthrough of foreign powers in what Moscow has often considered as its “near abroad,” the sphere of influence that the Kremlin believes to be natural is flaring up, and is gradually eroding. After a quick reminder of Russia’s ambitions for regional dominance since 1991, this paper highlights the intensification of tensions in former Soviet countries and Russia’s inability to curb them for at least three reasons. First, Moscow’s diplomatic isolation appears to spread beyond the West as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict drags on, and concerns in Eurasian countries are increasing. On the other hand, the conflagration of the Caucasus and Central Asia raises questions about the effectiveness of Moscow’s role as a regional arbiter that it has built for itself and that it is now struggling to maintain. Finally, faced with these two dynamics that are weakening Moscow, opposing powers are taking advantage of the situation and continue to gain control in the Eurasian space, to the detriment of Russia, which is too busy gambling its reputation in Ukraine. Cornered on both the military and diplomatic front, it will be a question of understanding whether the Kremlin’s strategic orientation and security choices have contributed to the deterioration of its sphere of influence (if this deterioration is confirmed). Faced with a security equation that is becoming more complex, is Russia, which seems to be suffering a loss of influence, able to ensure its role as guarantor of regional stability and preserve its geopolitical weight in the post-Soviet space? The Political Cost Of Rehabilitating The Russian Imperial Project Indeed, it is appropriate to consider the current state of decay of relations between regional actors in the Caucasus, the Baltic area, and Central Asia. However, a look at the attempts to restore Russian influence in the post-Soviet space will shed light on Russia’s current weaknesses in this same space. As it mixes nostalgia for Soviet/Tsarist greatness and Russian patriotism, Vladimir Putin’s war of conquest in 2022 can be seen as the consecration of Russia’s imperial nature. As a reminder, from 1990, the first pillar of Russian foreign policy revolved around restoring relations with its “near abroad.” This concept developed to protect the permanent interests of the former colonial power allowed the Kremlin to decree the existence of a sphere of vital interest composed of all sovereign states that were formerly part of the Soviet Empire. However, from now on, the exclusive character of this zone of Russian influence is questioned. During the implosion of the USSR, Moscow needed stability. Accordingly, it sought to institutionalize a rapprochement with neighboring countries to avoid a deterioration of the economic, cultural, and linguistic interdependence that bound them. Moreover, through organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 1992 – a NATO-modelled military alliance putting forward its own reading of the principle of collective security – Moscow has also sought to halt NATO’s expansion while strengthening its leadership in Eurasia. However, Russia’s political weight in these international organizations may have repelled several states from the Eurasian project since it could be perceived as a political process to restore “historic Russia.” In short, an attempt to restore what would constitute “an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space,” according to Vladimir Putin’s revisionist reading. In the decade following the collapse of the USSR, the Russian regional integration process was perceived as a neocolonial project by more than one state. And with good reason: the Kremlin’s double game between Armenia and Azerbaijan and its support to separatist movements in Georgia led the latter two to leave the CSTO in 1999 to seek allies elsewhere. This ouster symbolized Russia’s inability to deepen cooperation ties or settle ethnic and border tensions between the members of this military alliance. Therefore, destabilization has developed insidiously in the “Russian fold,” another formula used in the Kremlin. Understanding that Russia’s integration on the world stage would not be sufficient to guarantee its right to oversee the evolution of the post-Soviet space, Moscow has also relied on coercion and repression. Through a newfound confidence at the beginning of the Putin era characterized by a relative nostalgia for the Empire, the Kremlin has constantly exacerbated ethnic quarrels and manipulated territorial conflicts to put its expansionist project into practice. To cite just a few examples, Russia’s blitzkrieg against Georgia in  2008 to support secessionist forces in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 are the symptoms of an aggressive strategic doctrine, all of which make it de facto a less attractive ally. Moscow’s legitimization strategy, which was widely revived in 2022, was based on humanitarian intervention, using the rhetoric of the responsibility to protect. It was also based on a mimicry of Western discourse that justified NATO’s interventions –  notably in Kosovo – and which allowed Russia to demand to be treated fairly in its strategic choices by the international community. By seeking to be treated on an equal footing with the United States and, more broadly, with the transatlantic community, the Kremlin appeared anxious to restore its geopolitical role. Led to believe that the Atlantic Alliance would collapse under the weight of its political contradictions, Moscow saw a Western decline, illustrated in particular by the U.S. debacle in Afghanistan, as an incentive to put into practice its expansionist project in February 2022. A lost bet for Vladimir Putin since NATO seems to have been resurrected with the identification of a common enemy, while Russia, through the CSTO, can no longer stop the territorial disputes destabilizing the regions that revolve around it. Moscow has struggled to re-establish its backyard for three decades, but Vladimir Putin is now primarily distracted by the protracted conflict in Ukraine. Of course, diplomatic incidents and clashes in Moscow’s former satellite states have been commonplace since the break-up of the USSR. However, this military adventure of the Kremlin may have deteriorated diplomatic and political efforts to reverse the trend of “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.” The analysis of the positions taken by the former Soviet Republics on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, therefore, serves a twofold purpose. Firstly, it will make it possible to measure the emancipation aspirations of these States vis-à-vis Moscow. Secondly, it will allow grasping the responsibility of the Kremlin in these renewed tensions, which could lead to cracking of its zone of influence. Eastern Europe Caught Between Great Powers At the heart of the strategic rivalries between the West and Russia, Eastern Europe countries that were present in the shared neighborhood of these two large groups are now forced to align themselves on one side. Far from having constituted a homogeneous group in their attitude towards Russia in the years leading up to the invasion, the former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe (Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, and Ukraine) are now facing a new Iron Curtain according to Sergey Lavrov. We will not analyze Ukraine’s strategic positioning about the conflict for obvious reasons related to the Russian invasion. Nevertheless, after ten months in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the resurgence of the bloc line and the fragmentation of the European space has finally made it possible to strengthen the ranks between the European member countries of the transatlantic community, thereby increasing the pressure on Russia and its partners. Having become beholden to Vladimir Putin, Alexander Lukashenko offered Russia a rear base and a logistical platform for operations in the North, notably during the failed attempt to conquer Kyiv. Subsequently, the deluge of missiles and suicide drones that hit the main Ukrainian cities in October 2022 was launched partly from Belarusian territory. Still, Minsk’s collaboration does not stop there and tends to become more formalized. For example, the two dictators agreed on creating a “regional joint army group” of about 9,000 soldiers. Minsk was initially reluctant to intervene militarily in the conflict. Still, according to the Belarusian Ministry of Defense, allegations of Ukrainian threats on the Belarusian borders justified the creation of this “defensive” military group. In the event of direct involvement and a joint attack, Belarus would become a co-belligerent and would expose itself to heavy Western sanctions that would further weaken Alexander Lukashenko. While the rapprochement with Vladimir Putin was not a choice but more a constraint to save the faltering power of the Belarusian president, his political survival now depends on the goodwill of his Russian counterpart. On the other hand, since February 2022, the need to hedge against a possible resurgence of the Russian threat has been reinforced in the Baltic States. While the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad is now crystalizing all tensions, the Baltic countries’ voices have resonated further within the European institutions and the North Atlantic Council. They had the bitter satisfaction of being proven right about the Kremlin’s belligerent intentions. Endowed initially with limited means, the growth in those states’ capabilities began well before the beginning of the conflict, as was NATO’s deterrent posture in the East, of which they are central partners in deploying NATO’s deterrence and defence posture on its eastern flank. On the political front, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have imposed new restrictions, including banning Russian tourists from entering their territory. By going even further than its neighbouring countries, Lithuania has achieved what the E.U. has failed to do, namely to ban the import of all hydrocarbons from Russia. After the doctrinal reversal triggered by the trauma of the annexation of Crimea, the invasion of Ukraine has finally perpetuated security choices that the Baltic States had adopted since 2014. Although these strategic steps have been developed since the dual accession of these countries to NATO and the E.U. in 2004, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict constitutes a major rupture insofar as the Baltic countries have cut themselves off from Russia. Also plagued by extreme vulnerability,  Moldova is caught between Romania (E.U.) and western Ukraine. The pro-Russian secessionist region of Transnistria could be an outpost for the Kremlin to outflank the Ukrainian forces. Although Moldova became a candidate country for E.U. membership in June 2022, it does not benefit from the same security guarantees as other Eastern European countries. Since it is not part of NATO, Moldova refuses to impose the arsenal of sanctions on Russia in order to hedge against any Russian retaliation. This façade of neutrality has its limitations. Moldova is now suffering the shock wave of the war in Ukraine: the gas giant Gazprom has threatened Chisinau to reduce its gas supplies. Forced to concede a certain restraint to avoid being treated as a “hostile country” by the Kremlin, Moldova’s contradictory dynamics weaken its geopolitical situation. Regarding the Caucasus (Armenia and Azerbaijan will be treated separately due to their bilateral conflict), Georgia has also shown a renewed willingness to move closer to the E.U. For these reasons, she was quick to condemn the invasion of Ukraine while promoting her candidacy for membership of the E.U., even though it faced the reluctance of some member states. And for a good reason: by being on the front line, Georgia would face a similar fate to Ukraine’s if the conflict were to spread. Moreover, Russia’s Foreign Ministry has expressed concern about joint military exercises between Tbilisi and NATO in September 2022, saying that Western efforts to draw Georgia into its orbit threaten Russia’s national security. While Moscow-backed separatist forces still occupy 20% of its territory, Tbilisi’s priority is to prevent Georgia from being dragged into another war with Moscow. The war in Ukraine has challenged the fragile balance between European and Russian actors. Driven by security fears, the Baltic States finally chose to strengthen their policy of firmness while urging other European states to conform to their maximalist posture against Russia. However, the further the Kremlin continues its headlong rush, the more these states perpetuate the rapprochement with the West by adopting a cumulative strategy, i.e., “a dual security scheme in which alliances are security guarantees in the same way as national capabilities.” As for Moldova and Georgia, which do not benefit from the same security guarantees, the Kremlin’s capacity for influence and nuisance permanently reduces their strategic choices. It also obliges them to display relative neutrality – to avoid, for example, a  resumption of the Transnistrian conflict  – without endorsing the invasion of Ukraine, just like many countries of the former Soviet space in Central Asia and the Caucasus at the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Dissonant Voices Rise Within The Eurasian Community In the two years leading up to the war in Ukraine, Moscow had adopted a moderate foreign policy toward the former Soviet republics by demonstrating diplomatic skills to stop the rise of tensions in its historical backyard. Nevertheless, by “exposing unsuspected weaknesses,” Moscow is now struggling to assume its role as an arbitrator while preserving its position in Central Asia. Russia Faces Mistrust In Central Asia For the countries of Central Asia, defying the former colonial power required great caution in terms of rhetoric to avoid Russia’s retaliatory measures. Henceforth, with the recent developments in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the cards seem to have been reshuffled. Many international observers spoke of pro-Russian neutrality to characterize the non-alignment of many non-Western states. However, it is now the rhetorical disalignment that seems to prevail in the case of Kazakhstan. Moscow benefited from a certain gain in prestige during the military support to the Kazakh president with 3,000 Russian paratroopers and CSTO soldiers in January 2022 to crush the insurgency that threatened him. However, Kazakhstan finally decided to distance itself from Russia by cutting short “Russian attempts to use the CSTO in Ukraine (reminding, in fact) that it is a defensive alliance and not a projection force.” The cold shower did not stop there because Kazakhstan also refused to recognize the annexation of the four Ukrainian oblasts. The deterioration of relations between the two partners is increasing as Kazakhstan has prioritized bypassing the main export route for its oil. For now, this oil passes through the Russian port of Novorossiysk (this sea route currently serves as a lever of influence for Vladimir Putin to put pressure on his Kazakh counterpart). Moscow’s best ally continues to emancipate itself, and, against all expectations, President Tokayev’s critical tone and his desire to preserve his country’s autonomy are asserted. The same goes for the Tajik president, who, during a speech at the CIS summit in Astana on October 12, 2022, blamed the collapse of the USSR on Russia’s inability to take into account the interests of small Soviet republics. After this meaningful parallel, he asked Vladimir Putin to show more respect for his country. As for Kyrgyzstan, its absence from the CIS summit in St. Petersburg and its refusal to organize the CSTO’s joint military exercises raise concerns that it is distancing itself from its Russian partner. Uzbekistan has not hesitated to openly condemn the annexation of Ukrainian provinces, to defend Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and to remind Moscow of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state. For its part, however, Turkmenistan relies on Russia to prevent a significant crisis along its shared border with Afghanistan. However, as it owns the world’s fourth largest gas reserves, Turkmenistan seems more likely to get closer to Turkey, which is striving to build a “vital role” in the energy sector. However, the government in Ashgabat has never publicly expressed its position on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. On the contrary, it wants to maintain close ties with the Kremlin, which seems to be an exception in Central Asia. This renewed confidence in the Central Asian republics can mean two things. First, it may signify that new security doctrines are emerging that aim to multiply strategic partnerships to reduce dependence on the Russian tutelary power. Second, it could also have to do with the desire to reaffirm the resilience of ties of friendship with Moscow. As a result, Russia may pay more attention and consideration to those small republics that remain allies, despite the risks of geopolitical weakening of Russia: they remain allies even when others seek to gain greater independence. Still, in either case, these invectives prove that Russia’s positions in the region are waning and that a readjustment of these asymmetric partnerships is needed to prevent Moscow’s isolation from spreading durably beyond the West. This brief historical review given to Vladimir Putin aimed to reaffirm that each former Soviet republic now has its sensitivities and interests. However, this warning came during the trilateral meeting between the Russian president and his Tajik and Kyrgyz counterparts to find a diplomatic solution to the border conflict between the latter two. Finally, the strategic prudence of the states of these subregions may have given way to disapproving speeches about Russia’s imperial nature or weariness about its inaction toward the gradual deterioration of the regional security context. Russian Image Of Peace Mediator Damaged By Caucasus And Central Asia Confronted with the reactivation of two frozen conflicts in its “near abroad,” Russia is facing doubts from its allies about its ability to maintain its commitment to the idea of collective security: Moscow is, for the moment, conspicuous by its inaction. The Ineffectiveness Of The Kremlin’s Military Alliance In Curbing Internal Conflicts The first conflict in question here is between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. If the common border between these Central Asian republics has regularly been the battleground for clashes, this new eruption of violence has been the deadliest in thirty years. At the heart of this tragedy was the border division resulting from the dismemberment of the USSR. By denying a historical reality, it has participated in the fragmentation of the regional space and the rise of tensions around the Tajik enclave of Vorukh. Drawn under coercion (of the Soviet regime),  the administrative boundaries between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may have created disputes between communities that mutated into an interstate conflict when they acquired the legal status of international borders. Furthermore, “almost half of the border between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has not yet been drawn,” and an increasing border militarization has accentuated security tensions for both states. While both sides blame each other, they still expected Russia to exercise its peacemaking role through the CSTO. Moscow finally asked the parties to the conflict to find a solution through dialogue, judging that the clashes had not reached a level of intensity that would justify its intervention. Therefore, with this limited reaction, the Kremlin is adopting an ambiguous strategic posture. On the one hand, it invites Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to sit down at the negotiating table when, at the same time, Moscow settles its territorial disputes through interstate armed violence. On the other hand, the two countries are Russia’s two flagship military establishments in Central Asia. Finally, there is no provision for an open conflict between two CSTO member states in the statutes of the Russian-headed military alliance. For all these reasons, on top of Moscow’s difficulties in Ukraine, its room for maneuver is limited, and the Kremlin is being bound hand and foot. In this context, the agreements reached between the two countries were made through strictly bilateral contacts, effectively excluding Russian mediation Russia found a way out by stipulating that the CSTO was not intended to manage conflicts between the member states of the Military Alliance. Nevertheless, the risk that the CSTO becomes an empty shell is all the more significant for Moscow when a frozen conflict gets reactivated, and Russia must provide military assistance to an ally under military attack. Is The CSTO s An Empty Shell? The Kremlin’s Passivity In Meeting Its Obligations To Provide Assistance Two years after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, this thirty-year frozen conflict between Baku and Yerevan now raises questions because of the intensity of the clashes in September 2022. While the seeds of a larger-scale war have sprouted, Nagorno-Karabakh and, more recently, Armenian territory have been nibbled away by Baku. This rise in tensions happened despite the mediation efforts of European Council President Charles Michel at the tripartite meetings organized to reach a peace agreement or at least a normalization of relations between Yerevan and Baku. For its part, the Russian regional sponsor, which ended the open conflict two years ago through sustained diplomatic activism, no longer seems able to contain Azerbaijani territorial aspirations. In 2020, under pressure from Vladimir Putin, the Azerbaijani president gave up on taking Nagorno-Karabakh militarily. Today, the violation of the fragile ceasefire agreement brokered under the auspices of Moscow - and guaranteed by a 2,000 Russian soldiers interposition force – show a lack of respect towards the Kremlin’s authority. Baku is aware of this, but Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine offer a strategic opportunity to reverse the previously signed peace agreement and accelerate the negotiation pace to obtain broader concessions from Yerevan. As for Armenia, it logically turned to its allies to preserve its territorial integrity. Under the CSTO’s solidarity clause, activated for the second time ever, Russia and other member states should lend a hand to Armenia. However, Moscow faces a security dilemma as the sole judge of the level of military assistance that should be provided. Indeed, saving the CSTO as a credible alternative to NATO by providing the military aid it owes to Armenia would alienate Azerbaijan, which happens to be simultaneously an ally of Kyiv and Turkey’s protégé. A further escalation of tensions could strengthen the Turkish-Azeri coalition and ensure decisive influence for Ankara in the sub-region against its Russian competitor. At the same time, the trade agreements signed between Azerbaijan and Russia regarding the export of hydrocarbons allow Moscow to circumvent Western sanctions. Armenia, which has little weight in the competitive cooperation between the great powers, could then serve as a bargaining chip for Russia to maintain its strategic partnerships with Azerbaijan and Turkey to avoid too much rapprochement between them. It seems that “an armed conflict in the South Caucasus is not on the agenda for Russia.” In other words, Moscow will not intervene militarily in the sub-region: Russia does not have the military nor the logistical means to get involved in a second war, and more importantly, it does not want to. A multi-front war would greatly help Ukraine and disperse Russia’s military efforts. This relative disinterestedness still represents a political cost for the Kremlin. Armenia does not seem able to do without Russian support in the face of Azerbaijan’s military superiority. But the level of mistrust of Moscow peaked during the widespread protests in Yerevan against the Russian regime and at the latest CSTO meeting in this same capital. This multilateral meeting resulted in the Armenian Prime Minister’s refusal to sign the joint declaration of the Military Alliance and his abrupt ouster from the discussion table. Russia’s reluctance to take sides will affect its reliability as an ally and credibility as a guarantor of regional stability. Its reputation having also been tarnished, the CSTO has been able to prove that it is “intended more to mark the loyalty of its members to Moscow than to ensure their security.” This loss of momentum in the sub-region is also illustrated by the strategic redeployment of 1500 Russian soldiers from Tajikistan to the Ukrainian front to support the war effort. This decrease in the visibility of the Russian military presence may have left a security vacuum that could destabilize the Eurasian space. By prioritizing its strategic interests over those of its allies and proving ineffective in undermining military escalation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia has allowed other regional powers to advance their pawns. The construction of the first Chinese base on Tajik territory does not seem to be the only element that demonstrates the decline of Russian influence in Central Asia. A Strategic Vacuum Coveted By Rival Neighboring Powers Although several experts believe that Baku would never have intervened militarily in Armenia without Moscow’s approval, the Kremlin’s double game remains speculative. The fact remains that Russia must now deal with Turkey on this issue and with other regional powers that were absent from the regional game several years ago. While they provide the Kremlin with geopolitical assets in the context of the war it is waging with its neighbor, they still significantly limit its strategic independence. Meanwhile, the military one-upmanship at work offers new opportunities to revise diplomatic allegiances. A Fragile But Fruitful Balanced Position For Turkey Ankara positioned itself as a major geopolitical player in the context of the war in Ukraine, notably during the negotiation in Istanbul of the “Black Sea Grain Initiative” agreement. Therefore, Turkey has made itself indispensable for Moscow, and mediation is not its only feat of arms to achieve this. Will its strategic ambivalence allow Ankara to become a diplomatic crossroads? It seems on the right track since it is the only actor to dialogue with all the warring parties. As the Russian-Ukrainian conflict evolves, Ankara emerges as an indispensable interlocutor while projecting its influence more effectively in Central Asia, notably by establishing a Turkish outpost in Azerbaijan. Wester chancelleries appreciated Ankara’s mediation efforts and bulwark role against Moscow in the Black Sea during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. His commitment to collective security elicited warm thanks from Jens Stoltenberg. As for the strong security partnership that began with Ukraine in 2014, it has served Turkey twice. First, it allowed it to challenge Russia’s supremacy in its neighborhood and to ingratiate itself with Western leaders by strengthening the Ukrainian security apparatus. Over the same period, the sale of 32 Bayraktar TB2 drones, which have distinguished themselves on the battleground, has led to a slight readjustment of the initial balance of power and has given the Turkish armaments industry a certain aura. At the same time, Turkey is a significant ally for Russia as it tends to undermine NATO’s work from within. By keeping his options open regarding his relationship with Moscow or blocking the accession of Finland and Sweden to prioritize his strategic interests over NATO’s, President Erdogan partially harms Western cohesion by exercising strategic blackmail. In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Turkey pretends to condemn the invasion. But it also allows Moscow to circumvent Western sanctions by offering an indispensable outlet for Russian hydrocarbon exports since the European embargo. It is also a critical economic partner, with a marked increase in trade volume between the two countries since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Finally, Turkey is a crucial military partner for Russia in Syria, where, despite political dissension, their actions have been coordinated. Turkey’s in-between position favors it from all parties to the conflict. To this end, Moscow bows down with complacency when Ankara extends its sphere of influence beyond the Turkic Council. Recently renamed the Organization of Turkic States (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan), this organization could be transformed in the coming years into a political-military alliance with Turkey at its center. Ankara intends to establish itself permanently in the region by proposing a political project adapted to countries with populations that are predominantly Muslim and speak Turkic languages. These states’ heavy dependence on Russia, especially in the defense field, seems to fade as Turkey sells its heavy weapons and drones to Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Moreover, drone diplomacy extends to other countries not part of the Turkic community since Tajikistan is not Turkic-speaking. The ambiguity of relations between Russia and Turkey could be perpetuated if they wage a struggle for influence using the Central Asian landscape as a new terrain for confrontation. Despite this, Moscow needs Ankara, which has positioned itself as an irreplaceable mediator through “wide-gap diplomacy”(diplomatie du grand écart) in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. If keeping this central position between Kyiv and Moscow will undoubtedly be challenging to sustain in the long term, this lever of influence now allows President Erdogan to have the freedom to conclude military partnerships with almost any Central Asian country. Hence, Ankara is developing a third path for regional integration, an alternative to those proposed by Russia and China. Towards A Readjustment Of The Chinese Position In The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict As Sino-Russian relations thrive on U.S. hardening of them, the bonds of friendship presented as unshakable by Russian and Chinese leaders could run out of steam. Beijing hesitates between saving the principle of non-interference, a pillar of its foreign policy, and aligning itself with Russia in the “crusade” it is waging against the West. In the end, Beijing will have shown strategic caution. However, the refusal to support the Russian war effort, the recent statements of the Chinese executive, and the fact that several states are seeking closer ties with China make this informal alliance uncertain. Last October, in Astana, as the leaders of the former Soviet space and China engaged in an intense diplomatic joust with the war in Ukraine in the background, a landmark event went under the radar. By positioning itself as a bridge between West and East, Kazakhstan maintains relations with China, the E.U., and the United States, which tends to irritate many Russian officials severely. With a zeal similar to the revisionist discourse that started the conflict in Ukraine, a Duma deputy explained the need to de-Nazify Kazakhstan. Beijing responded curtly by declaring its support for Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity, a clear red line to Moscow. China’s strategic caution concerning the conflict may have given way to some exasperation towards the Kremlin’s excesses of authority. Beijing, which was confined to its role as the dominant economic power, is now meddling in sub-regional security issues – even though those were Russia’s preserve – by proposing a peace process between Kyiv and Moscow. The question then arises as to whether, in the long run, Beijing could supplant Moscow in its role as guarantor of regional stability. To answer this, we must turn our attention to another diplomatic summit. In Samarkand, Beijing has been actively courted at this annual state meeting that would determine which major players would be at the heart of the infrastructure and connectivity projects of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Chinese president recalled that he was the central economic player in the region while promoting a new axis through the countries of Central Asia that would bypass Russia. By acting on fronts other than Ukraine, the Russian president wanted to prove to the West that he was not so isolated internationally. However, this staging did not hide that he was under pressure from his allies, who sought to adopt a common position on the commercial consequences of the Kremlin’s military adventure. As evidenced by the holding of joint military exercises or the surge in Chinese exports to Russia, it will take more to undo the informal alliance between the two countries. Nevertheless, the G20 held in Bali confirmed this trend of strengthening Moscow’s diplomatic isolation as Beijing distanced itself. The latter said it was worried about the war without exerting any real pressure on Russia. But Xi Jinping’s thinly veiled criticism of his Russian counterpart - by opposing the “instrumentalization” of food and energy products - suggests some skepticism from the Chinese leader. In the future, China’s lack of a clear stance will allow it to choose sides. Beijing may position itself as an early supporter of Russia if Moscow wins this war to advance their shared vision of a new world order. However, in the event of a Russian defeat, it could permanently distance itself from Moscow so as not to be associated with the amateurism of the Russian army. Therefore, several strategic opportunities are available to Xi Jinping, which is not the case for Vladimir Putin, who is becoming more and more limited in the choice of his alliance system as his isolation deepens. Finally, the Kremlin has no alternative ally. Beijing takes advantage of this dependency to accelerate its rapprochement with the countries in the Russian orbit and organize a “new space of vassalage.” By staying away from Moscow’s military ambitions, Beijing first seeks to secure its corridors by creating a vast space for communication and trade to be connected to European markets. In short, an extension of its good neighborliness policy. But this could evolve into an expansionary policy based on the firepower of the Chinese economy as the imbalance in the Sino-Russian partnership widens, especially since Moscow has even less capacity to compensate for China’s diplomatic and economic superiority. In the future, Vladimir Putin may refuse to be short-circuited on his Asian flank by trying to maintain Russia as the great stabilizing power in managing regional conflicts. But, on the other hand, it could also refocus its war and diplomatic efforts in the Donbas to secure the territorial gain from annexing Ukrainian regions, all to the detriment of its positions in the Eurasian space. In either case, however, its unreliability could push the former Soviet states into the hands of countries that could seek to become masters of Eurasia. Can The E.U. And The U.S. Make A Difference In The Strategic Competition Taking Place In The Eurasian Space? Whatever the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and Ukraine’s E.U. accession process, “Europe and Russia are likely to be separated for a long time.” This rift will be all the more noticeable between the United States and Russia if Washington sees the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as a golden opportunity to weaken Moscow permanently. At the same time, even if they do not have the will to become the region’s policemen, the United States and Europe, by demonstrating diplomatic skills, could raise their level of geopolitical ambitions in the Caucasus and Central Asia. By recognizing that it wants to act “geopolitically,” the E.U. is betting on building deeper partnerships in these regions. In Central Asia, the European Union’s strategic ambitions have accelerated with the war in Ukraine. Strengthening these bilateral relations will enable it to move closer to the energy independence and strategic autonomy it seeks by securing new energy supply routes. As a result, central Asian countries can diversify the range of their diplomatic strategies and reduce dependence on Russia. Charles Michel’s trip to Astana during the EU-Central Asia summit and Josep Borell’s trip to the Samarkand Economic Forum attest to this European desire to assert itself in the regional game and to compete with Chinese and Russian influence. In the Caucasus, the European “civilian mission” sent along the common border between Azerbaijan and Armenia for a more precise delimitation of the border attests to the significant role played by the European Union in achieving de-escalation between the two countries. While Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Yerevan (which allowed talks between the two rival countries of the Caucasus to be held in Washington) attests to the renewed interest of the Americans in the sub-region. Nevertheless, a significant expansion of U.S. engagement or a reorientation of policies already established in Central Asia remains unlikely as South Asia remains the top U.S. strategic priority. As all the Central Asian republics and those of the Caucasus have sought a new geopolitical balance since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the E.U. and the United States have a great opportunity to strengthen economic and political ties with the countries of these highly strategic regions. Similar to the resumption of the European “Global Gateway” initiative providing for massive investments in connectivity projects, the war in Ukraine has had the merit of placing Central Asia and the Caucasus as key areas/central corridors and no longer as blind spots in the transatlantic community’s foreign policy. Conclusion Has the war in Ukraine finally dealt the final blow to Russia’s sphere of influence? Only the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will provide an answer. “If Russia wins militarily, it will have enormous psychological leverage” to weigh in regional conflicts. On the contrary, if it loses, its influence will gradually decline, and several pockets of conflict will likely erupt again. All the geopolitical recompositions at work lead us to believe that Moscow’s reputation is indeed on the line. It should be recalled, however, that Russia is still perceived as the stabilizing power in the subregion. Armenia has not left the CSTO despite the rejection of the military alliance, and many states remain dependent on Moscow in terms of security. To maintain his international stature, Vladimir Putin is active on all fronts. But he is absorbed in the war in Ukraine and therefore uses many resources to prove that he will survive in the diplomatic ballet being played out in Eurasia. While Russia is gradually becoming exhausted in this military and diplomatic one-upmanship, China and Turkey are taking advantage of the situation to expand their spheres of influence. While they are currently responding to the desire of the former Soviet countries, which wish to reduce their dependence on the Kremlin, Russia is not immune to a strategic shift on their part that would supplant it as a major military power. The increased presence of China and Turkey, and to a lesser extent that of the E.U. and the U.S., will have consequences for the “diplomatic map” and Russia’s ability to secure its geostrategic position in Central Asia. Several experts consider that one should be wary of making predictions about the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the possibility that Russia would be relegated to the rank of a middle power. However, the consequences of the Kremlin’s succession of military and diplomatic setbacks already allow us to draw several lessons. While many countries were quick to choose “balance” rather than align, it turns out that several lines of convergence seem to be emerging. For some, it will be a question of perpetuating their policies of firmness and sanctions towards Russia while seeking to get as many people as possible to join (Baltic States) or to continue their rapprochement with the European Union (Georgia, Moldova). Others will entrust their future to the Kremlin by strategically aligning with it (Belarus). The last group is progressively choosing non-alignment – to different degrees – since they now refuse a new iron curtain and therefore develop so-called multi-vectorial diplomacy (the rest of the South Caucasus and Central Asia). And the diversification of relations between the countries of the former Soviet space is not beneficial to Russia. As for the neighboring regional powers taking advantage of the new security architecture that tends to emerge (Turkey and China), they are sanctuaries free from Western sanctions. If this is not the case, Moscow runs the risk of hyper-dependence on them, ultimately weakening its position in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, as made evident by the SCO’s lack of reaction to the violent confrontations between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with the perpetuation of regional conflicts, these foreign powers will not fight to be the ones that will shoulder the “burden of security.” Regarding its stabilizer’s role, the more Russia continues its rush forwards, the weaker its credibility as a mediator becomes. However, to view the conflagration of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a consequence of Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine would mean jumping to conclusions and ignoring the regional dynamics and political agendas specific to these sovereign states. Nevertheless, these conflicts have increased in intensity (human toll, use of heavy artillery and drones, etc.) and in-depth. In contrast, Russia has responded merely with the bare minimum to prevent the escalation of violence. Even if the Ukrainian reconquest boosted by Western military assistance could stagnate on the front in the coming weeks, it constitutes a military and psychological turning point. If the ability of Ukrainians to fight has been dramatically underestimated, it is now clear that that of Russia’s armed forces has been overestimated. “Today, not only is its hard power meeting its limitations, but its soft power is now declining.” Therefore, the collapse of the myth of Russian military power has echoed beyond the Kremlin, instilling doubt and mistrust among Russian sympathizers. Thus, the countries in the post-Soviet space are taking advantage of this new degree of autonomy and the challenges to Moscow’s supremacy in this space to diversify their support. Faced with this growing isolation in the various regional platforms, the new decree signed by Vladimir Putin in September 2022 provides the Kremlin with an additional pretext to interfere in the sovereign territories of the former Soviet Union. This document unveils a new humanitarian policy aimed at defending the Russian-speaking populations in the region and the intrinsic values of the “Russian world.” Halfway between an admission of weakness linked to its decline in the area and a threat to its neighbors seeking emancipation, Russia seeks to codify its right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. Moscow’s role in cracking its security glacis is even more indicative by breaking the taboo of “interstate armed violence as an instrument serving political goals.” Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan are all taking advantage of the border blur inherited from the Soviet period to legitimize their territorial claims at the expense of neighboring countries. Finally, by attacking a sovereign state, Moscow will have provoked a weakening of the internal unity of the CSTO and a shift in the strategic balance in the region. At the same time, it opened the door for other states to extend their territorial sovereignty through uninhibited violence.   ***   Tancrède Jankowski holds a bachelor’s degree in Law and Political Science from the Catholic Institute of Paris and is completing a master’s degree in international studies with a concentration in cultures, conflicts and peace at the University of Montreal. His research interests focus on the geopolitics of the outer space, security and conflict resolution. Armel Bouvery is a bi-disciplinary master's candidate in international law and international politics at the University of Quebec in Montreal and obtained a bachelor's degree in Political Science at the University of Montreal. During his university studies, he specialized in international security in the Southeast Asian zone.   ## German Elections 2025: Scenarios for Military Aid to Ukraine and European Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/german-elections-2025-scenarios-for-military-aid-to-ukraine-and-european-defence/ Modified: 2025-02-26 > On February 23, 2025, German citizens will be called to the polls for early federal elections, a rather rare event in the country's... On February 23, 2025, German citizens will be called to the polls for early federal elections, a rather rare event in the country's political history, marking only the fourth early dissolution of the Bundestag since the Second World War. Originally scheduled for September 2025, these elections are the result of the collapse of the coalition government led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Since taking office in 2021, Scholz has governed almost entirely against a backdrop of international crisis, marked by the war in Ukraine. The Russian invasion of February 2022 triggered a Zeitenwende, a strategic turning point that forced Berlin to review its defence and security posture. Under pressure from within and from his allies, Scholz announced a special €100 billion fund to modernize the Bundeswehr and boost military support to Kyiv. The Zeitenwende led to an increase in the defense budget and the launch of new equipment orders. However, its impact remains limited due to cumbersome bureaucracy, an armaments industry ill-adapted to current needs, and the absence of an effective rearmament of the Bundeswehr. At the same time, while Germany has stepped up its support for Ukraine and accelerated its energy diversification, it is still struggling to make good the shortcomings in its army's capabilities and to define a coherent strategy in the face of Russian and Chinese threats. On the political front, the Chancellery's handling of the conflict has drawn criticism from both its coalition and opposition parties, notably the conservative CDU/CSU and the Greens, who are calling for a more robust approach. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, a member of the Greens, called the conflict “the end of German restraint in foreign and security policy”, while Christian Lindner, a member of the FDP, spoke of a “rude awakening”. The break-up of the “Tricolor Fire” coalition in November 2024 was part of a double crisis, both internal and geopolitical. Having come out on top in the 2021 elections with 25.74% of the vote, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) failed to win an absolute majority - a common occurrence in German federal elections - and was forced to form an alliance with the Greens (14.75%) and the Liberal Democratic Party (FDP, 11.45%). But this fragile alliance could not withstand the growing tensions, exacerbated by disagreements over economic policy, the energy transition and Germany's military commitment. The situation reached a breaking point in November 2024 when Scholz sacked Finance Minister and FDP leader Christian Lindner, leading to the implosion of the coalition. Deprived of a majority, Scholz submitted a motion of confidence on December 11, 2024, which was rejected five days later. President Frank-Walter Steinmeier dissolved the Bundestag on December 27, 2024, calling early elections for February 23, 2025. These elections are of strategic importance for Germany, Europe and their allies. This article examines Germany's military support for Ukraine in this electoral context. It begins by demonstrating the scale of the Zeitenwende and the challenges it raises, then traces the evolution of German commitment to Ukraine since 2014, with particular attention to the acceleration of support after 2022. It then examines the positions of the main parties on these issues and their vision of Germany's role in the conflict. Finally, it considers the post-election outlook, assessing coalition scenarios and potential strategic adjustments, particularly in relation to transatlantic relations and Donald Trump's return to the White House. Germany and the Zeitenwende The large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 came as a major shock to Germany. After seven decades of restraint in defence policy, the outbreak of a conventional war in Europe had a profound impact on the political elites in Berlin and on public opinion. We need to understand the context in which German defence policy developed in the post-World War II period. The Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955, made possible by the 1954 Paris agreements, was accompanied by strict limitations on the use of force, prohibiting all external military intervention. Subsequently, German reunification, formalized in 1991 following the 1990 Moscow Treaty, led to a significant reduction in the number of military personnel. The armed forces underwent major transformations over the following decades. The abolition of conscription in 2011, followed by structural reform between 2011 and 2012, led to a reduction in the number of soldiers and military bases. February 2022 represents a real break in the way German government and society understand their strategic environment. For Olaf Scholz, “This is a historic turning point. It means that the world after will not be the same as the world before". An analysis shared by FDP leader and Finance Minister Christian Lindner, who points out that “The war in Ukraine is waking us all up from a complacent dream”. This shift is perhaps most marked among the Greens, as illustrated by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock's statement: “Today may mark the end of Germany's particular restraint in foreign and security policy”. This shift has also taken place within German society. Recent opinion polls reveal that the majority of Germans now perceive Russia as a threat to their security. A significant proportion of the population considers that the Russian government represents a risk to national interests. Thus, 66% of respondents believe that Russia poses a threat to Germany's economic stability and security, while 54% consider support for Ukraine to be in Germany's national interest. Despite these concerns about Russian aggression, the German population remains divided on the question of stepping up military support for Ukraine. Only 44% are in favour, while 47% are against. Similarly, support for sending Taurus missiles is limited, with only 36% in favour. However, 45% of respondents believe that Ukraine should be allowed to use Western weapons to strike targets in Russia, which is one of the main points of debate concerning Taurus missile deliveries. Since the start of the conflict, support for Ukraine has been gradually eroding. A segmented analysis of opinion trends shows that the group most in favour of aid has been declining since October 2023, while segments more skeptical of such assistance have seen a slight increase. This evolution shows that the consensus in favour of greater military, economic and humanitarian commitment to Ukraine is running out of steam. This is in line with the SPD's reluctance to escalate the conflict and the risk of German involvement in the war, as well as more isolationist or pro-Russian tendencies on the far right (AfD) and anti-militarist tendencies on the left (Die Linke and BSW). German involvement in the war in Ukraine Following the illegal annexation of Crimea and military actions in the Donbass in 2014, Germany emerged as a major diplomatic player in the management of the Ukrainian crisis. Under the leadership of conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel, Berlin helped set up the Normandy format, bringing together Ukraine, Germany, France and Russia, and played a central role in the conclusion of the Minsk II agreements. At the same time, Germany helped shape European sanctions against Moscow, while strongly condemning Russia's actions. However, this diplomatic involvement contrasted with structural limits in terms of defence. Because of its energy dependence on Russia, Berlin refrained from canceling the Nord Stream project, revealing an ambivalent approach to Moscow. In addition, the Bundeswehr was facing major capability deficiencies, compromising its ability to respond to European strategic challenges. A report by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, published in 2018, pointed out that only a minority of military equipment was then in working order: 27% to 30% of fighter aircraft, 20% of transport aircraft, 22% of transport helicopters, 19% of attack helicopters, 47% of tanks, 38% of frigates and no submarines. A Ministry of Defense report published at the same time also highlighted the lack of clothing and tents, compromising the participation of German soldiers in NATO missions. Thus, despite its leading diplomatic role in managing the Ukrainian crisis from 2014 to early 2022, Germany presented a reduced military capability, illustrating a persistent gap between its international commitment and its strategic readiness. When the coalition government was formed on December 8, 2021, Germany reaffirmed its commitment to a balanced approach between dialogue and firmness towards Moscow. The government's program emphasized the need for stable bilateral relations, while strongly condemning the annexation of Crimea, the violence in eastern Ukraine and Russia's destabilizing actions. It also stipulated that any lifting of sanctions remained conditional on full implementation of the Minsk agreements. The coalition agreement did not qualify Russia as a threat to Germany's security. Indeed, despite these tensions, Berlin maintained a willingness to cooperate with Moscow on future issues, notably in the fields of hydrogen, health and climate. At the same time, Germany denounced the restrictions imposed on civil liberties in Russia and showed its support for Russian civil society, notably by facilitating the mobility of young Russians to its territory. With regard to arms exports, the German government intended to strengthen control mechanisms at both national and European level. Faced with rising tensions in late autumn 2021, however, Chancellor Olaf Scholz was soon criticized for his overly cautious and ambiguous approach, in particular his reluctance to suspend certification of the Nord Stream 2 project. This pipeline crystallized the debate on Germany's stance towards Moscow. On February 22, 2022, as Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of two separatist regions in eastern Ukraine, Scholz finally announced the suspension of the Nord Stream 2 project. This decision marked a turning point in Germany's policy towards Russia, and a hardening of its stance against Moscow's actions. This change is part of the strategic break announced by Scholz on February 27, 2022 in his Zeitenwende speech, which defined a major repositioning of Germany's defence policy and its involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Addressing the Bundestag, Scholz outlined the main thrusts of this reorientation. First and foremost, Germany is committed to actively supporting the Ukraine with military aid, including the supply of weapons, justifying this commitment by the need to defend the principles of freedom and democracy in the face of Russian aggression. At the same time, Berlin, in coordination with the European Union, adopted an unprecedented sanctions regime targeting Russian financial institutions, state-owned enterprises, strategic technology exports, and economic and political elites close to the Kremlin. On the security front, Germany has announced a stronger commitment to NATO, reaffirming its determination to defend every inch of allied territory. This is reflected in the increased deployment of troops in Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, as well as in the increased security of maritime areas in the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. On a more structural level, Berlin has undertaken a substantial modernization of its national defense. A special €100 billion fund has been allocated to the Bundeswehr to improve its operational capabilities, particularly in terms of equipment, air defence and cybersecurity. Germany is also committed to raising its defence budget to 2% of GDP, in line with NATO targets, and to strengthening European cooperation in military innovation. In the energy field, Berlin is initiating a strategic reorientation aimed at gradually reducing its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. This transition is based on the accelerated development of renewable energies, the construction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals to diversify supply sources, and the implementation of an economic aid plan designed to mitigate the impact of the energy crisis on households and businesses. However, this transformation is not without its tensions and challenges. The Zeitenwende, presented as a major turning point in Germany's defence and security policy, is struggling to materialize in any significant way. In particular, Germany has been slow to authorize the transfer of Leopard 2 tanks to the Ukraine, citing legal, strategic and diplomatic considerations. Under German law, any country acquiring these tanks must obtain Berlin's approval before re-exporting them. Under pressure from Poland and Finland, the German government is hesitating, fearing an escalation of the conflict. Berlin also wanted the USA to commit to supplying M1 Abrams tanks before sending the Leopard 2s, to ensure a concerted approach. On January 25, 2023, in the face of mounting pressure, Germany finally approved delivery of the tanks and encouraged its European partners to train Ukrainian soldiers in their use. In May 2023, Ukraine officially requested the delivery of Taurus long-range missiles. However, as early as June 2023, Olaf Scholz and Defense Minister Boris Pistorius indicated that Germany would not supply these missiles. This position was reaffirmed in January and February 2024 by the Chancellor, who maintained his refusal while approving the delivery of other long-range weapons. While this decision was supported by public opinion in favour of military aid, but more reluctant to send Taurus missiles, several political parties, including the CDU/CSU Union, the Greens and the FDP, argued in favour of sending them to Ukraine. At the same time, the government's lack of clarity on the purpose of its aid to Ukraine, notably its refusal to deliver the Taurus missiles and the absence of an explicit commitment to a Ukrainian victory, has generated tensions with its partners. Similarly, while energy diversification has been achieved with remarkable speed, it has been accompanied by new dependencies, notably on Qatar and Azerbaijan, while the pursuit of close economic relations with China raises concerns about Germany's strategic resilience. Moreover, Germany's inability to effectively mobilize the €100 billion special defence fund is a clear illustration of the bureaucratic blockages, budgetary constraints and political tensions that are hampering its ability to respond to the strategic imperatives posed by the war in Ukraine. Despite the Zeitenwende announcement, implementation of these funds remains slow and inadequate, with key military equipment - including F-35 fighters, helicopters and tanks - not expected for several years. What's more, a significant proportion of these resources has been earmarked for acquisitions already planned before 2022, limiting their impact on the immediate transformation of Bundeswehr capabilities, whose operational readiness has not improved significantly. In addition, inflation and the cost of financing the fund have reduced its real value, while the defense budget remains insufficient to guarantee a sustainable rearmament effort after it runs out in 2027. These difficulties are compounded by a lack of consensus within the government coalition, which has led to a halving of planned military aid to Ukraine and increased reliance on uncertain funding from European funds or frozen Russian assets. In the absence of a clear strategy and reformed procurement processes, Germany appears insufficiently prepared to assume its NATO commitments and play the role of military power that Chancellor Scholz had promised to embody. Despite this, Germany remains an important player in military support for Ukraine. It is one of the leading suppliers of heavy equipment, second only to the United States. Its commitment includes the delivery of 175 infantry fighting vehicles (155 already delivered), 60 tanks (52 delivered), 92 howitzers (34 delivered), 27 anti-aircraft missile systems (14 delivered) and 8 multiple rocket launchers (all delivered). Thanks to the €100 billion special fund announced at the start of the war, Germany has recently reached 2.12% of its GDP in defence spending, joining other NATO member states that have gradually increased their military budgets since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and then more markedly after 2022. Indeed, thanks to the special fund, Germany has announced spending 90.6 billion euros on defence in 2024 (budget of 51.9 billion euros + special fund). However, this special fund is expected to be exhausted by 2027. To maintain a spending level of 2% of GDP, Germany would need to allocate an additional €20-30 billion annually. Some experts and politicians argue for a more substantial increase, estimating that a defence budget equivalent to 3 to 3.5% of GDP-or around €120 billion a year-would be necessary. However, the share of the budget earmarked for defence in 2025 would amount to 53.25 billion euros, representing a modest increase of 1.2 billion compared to 2024. Against a backdrop of budgetary constraints imposed by the 2009 Debt Ceiling Law, Berlin will have to identify solutions to guarantee sustained financing of its defence effort over the long term. Chancellor Olaf Scholz is opposed to further increases in the budget for 2025, while the head of the CDU/CSU union rejects the idea of financing these increases through increased recourse to debt. Some experts put Germany's cumulative underinvestment in defense at around 600 billion euros. According to the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, at least 300 billion euros would be needed to ensure full operational readiness. Early federal election in February 2025 Gradually weakened over the course of 2022, the Tricolour coalition has seen its support erode, being gradually overtaken in the polls by the conservative CDU/CSU union and by the surging AfD. While international issues did not cause the Scholz government to collapse, James Bindenagel and Karsten Jung point out in an analysis for the German Marshall Fund that the upcoming federal election on February 23 will determine how seriously Germany takes its response to the historic turning point brought about by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Two structuring elements of the German elections are important to understand. Firstly, the mixed representation mode of the German electoral system usually imposes the formation of coalitions, with the CDU/CSU and SPD historically dominating these alliances with smaller parties such as the FDP or the Greens. On the other hand, the political exclusion of the AfD remains a major dividing line. A cordon sanitaire (Brandmauer) has so far prevented any coalition with the extreme right, despite its electoral progression. However, a recent joint vote between the CDU/CSU and the AfD in the Bundestag represents a historic break, marking the first form of parliamentary cooperation since the Second World War. The CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Greens agree on the need for continued aid to Ukraine, but differ on the extent of this aid. The SPD defends Scholz's cautious line, arguing that Germany should support Kyiv for as long as necessary without risking an escalation with Moscow. Scholz is trying to position himself as the guarantor of peace, emphasizing his ability to avoid a widening of the conflict, particularly in the face of CDU leader Friedrich Merz. The CDU/CSU, however, criticizes this cautious stance and calls for increased military assistance, including the delivery of Taurus missiles. The FDP and the Greens also support an increase in military support, emphasizing the reconstruction of Ukraine and the strengthening of its infrastructure. Conversely, the AfD criticizes under-investment in the armed forces, but opposes arms deliveries, arguing for a foreign policy focused on German national interests. The AfD also calls for eventual neutrality on the part of Ukraine. Die Linke, while critical of Russia, also rejects arms shipments and advocates a diplomatic solution to the conflict, favouring targeted sanctions against those close to the Kremlin over a generalized economic embargo. Like the AfD, the new left-wing populist party Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) blames NATO and the USA for the conflict, and rejects any military aid to Ukraine. In view of the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, the CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Greens support an increase in the defence budget. The SPD is committed to maintaining a budget of at least 2% of GDP, considering this effort to be central to European security. The CDU/CSU insists on the need for greater commitment and calls for rapid modernization of the armed forces. The FDP, for its part, stresses the need for a fully operational Bundeswehr, adapted to new threats. The Greens, historically pacifists, now advocate a sustainable strengthening of military capabilities. Annalena Baerbock believes that Germany should invest more than 2% of its GDP in defence on a stable basis, while Robert Habeck, the Greens' candidate for chancellor, calls for this contribution to be increased to 3.5%. The AfD supports the improvement of military capabilities, but rejects any European integration of defence, advocating a strictly national approach and the reinstatement of compulsory military service. Die Linke, on the other hand, advocates a reduction in military spending and an end to Germany's NATO commitments. The Russo-Ukrainian war has profoundly redefined the debate on foreign and defence policy in Germany. While there is still a majority consensus in favour of supporting Kyiv, tensions persist over the scale of aid and future strategic choices. The future of German engagement in Ukraine In light of the polls, no political party seems likely to secure an absolute majority, opening the way for various coalition configurations. A 'grand coalition' (Große Koalition, or GroKo) between the CDU/CSU and the SPD remains a possibility, although this alliance has been marked by tensions in the past. A black-green coalition, bringing together the CDU/CSU and the Greens, also appears possible, as these parties share common ground on economic governance and environmental policies, although divergences remain on social and security issues. A Jamaica coalition, composed of the CDU/CSU, the Greens and the FDP, remains another option, its name being taken from the parties’ colours, which correspond to those of the Jamaican flag. Given the CDU/CSU’s clear lead in voting intentions, a left-leaning coalition including Die Linke seems unlikely, especially since the conservative union has ruled out any alliance with this party. Similarly, a collaboration with the AfD is excluded due to the cordon sanitaire applied by all democratic parties, which refuse any cooperation with the extreme right. Consequently, post-election negotiations should mainly focus on the balances between the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the Greens and the FDP. Thus, no government should include the three parties most critical of support for Ukraine, although they represent a growing share of public opinion. Three coalition scenarios are emerging, each with implications for German defence and support policy for Ukraine. A CDU/CSU-SPD coalition would continue military aid to Kyiv, as both parties share a historic commitment to NATO, a cornerstone of German security since the FRG joined the Atlantic Alliance in 1955. The CDU/CSU has always advocated a strong commitment to the Alliance, considering the transatlantic anchorage as essential to European security. The SPD, although more nuanced, has also contributed to the consolidation of Germany’s role in NATO, notably by supporting the enlargement of the Alliance and supporting the transformation of its missions towards crisis management. However, differences persist over the extent of military support for Ukraine: while the CDU/CSU union advocates increased assistance, the SPD, committed to a more cautious approach, could moderate certain decisions, notably regarding the delivery of Taurus missiles, in order to avoid any escalation. A CDU/CSU-Green coalition would favour increased military engagement with Ukraine and increased defence spending. Robert Habeck and Friedrich Merz, respectively leaders of the Greens and the CDU/CSU, have both lobbied the Scholz government to authorize the delivery of Taurus missiles to Ukraine. Such a coalition would mark a major shift in German defence policy, placing Berlin in a more assertive position vis-à-vis Moscow. However, tensions could emerge over budgetary and fiscal issues, making the government balance fragile. A third option would be a renewal of the traffic light coalition (SPD-Greens-FDP), which would maintain limited support for Ukraine, but would remain marked by internal blockages, notably on the financing of military aid and the qualitative increase in arms deliveries, perceived as a risk factor for escalation. Regardless of the government that emerges from the elections, the growing influence of the AfD and BSW could change parliamentary dynamics. The latter, a new populist party, opposes military aid to Ukraine, could cross the 5% electoral threshold and gain seats in the Bundestag. A rise in the AfD and BSW would put additional pressure on a drastic reduction in military aid, or even an opening to negotiations with Moscow. Although they are unlikely to participate in a government, their presence in the Bundestag could influence the strategic debate. The announcement on February 17th of possible negotiations between Russia and the United States without Ukraine’s participation sparked strong reactions in Europe. In response, French President Emmanuel Macron brought together several European leaders to coordinate a common position on this US initiative. The main traditional parties in Germany (with the exception of the AfD, Die Linke and BSW) strongly criticized this approach as unacceptable. After the meeting, Chancellor Olaf Scholz reaffirmed his support for Ukraine and European military aid mechanisms, while postponing any discussion of a possible deployment of peacekeeping forces until a structured peace plan is adopted. The return of Donald Trump to the White House introduces major uncertainty regarding US support for Ukraine, which could force Europe, and Germany in particular, to assume greater responsibility for military aid. If Washington cuts its assistance, Berlin will have to make a crucial choice: to compensate for this shortfall by increasing its commitment or to encourage a negotiated settlement of the conflict. However, budgetary constraints, growing voter fatigue, and the domestic political context make any leadership in aid to Ukraine particularly delicate, both financially and politically. The future of German support for Ukraine will therefore depend on the outcome of the elections and the coalition that emerges. Scholz and the SPD will probably continue to favour a moderate approach, while the CDU/CSU and the Greens will argue for increased military engagement. At the same time, the rise of the AfD and BSW could fuel pressure for a reduction in arms deliveries and an opening to negotiations with Russia. ## Giving Meaning to Associate Membership: Canada’s Place in the EDIP URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/giving-meaning-to-associate-membership-canadas-place-in-the-edip/ Modified: 2026-10-20 In her State of the Union address on September 16, 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed paving the way for Canada to become the European Union’s first “associate member.” The following day, in an address to the European Parliament, Prime Minister Mark Carney welcomed the idea, while making clear that Canada was not seeking full membership and that any agreement would be put to a vote in the Canadian Parliament. The details of this status, for which the EU treaties make no provision, are to be worked out at the Canada-European Union Summit in Montreal on October 29 and 30. The task is particularly delicate because the initiative comes from the Commission, whose authority in defence matters is contested, to varying degrees, by several member states. Unless the national capitals, which retain control over budgets and programs, are closely involved, the status of associate membership risks joining the long list of unrealized political ambitions. What should the defence component of the Montreal agreement contain? My argument is simple: associate membership will be meaningful only if it gives Canada access to the instruments that now shape European defence, foremost among them the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and its projects of common interest. Without that access, Canada will remain a customer of European industry and an occasional partner. With such access, Canada can become a co-producer of the capabilities Europe will be funding over the next decade, in return for what it already contributes as a security provider. Associate membership should also clarify Canada’s role in other areas of the Common Security and Defence Policy, from missions and operations to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects. Canada currently participates in only one such project, on military mobility. This analysis nonetheless focuses on the industrial dimension, because European rules are most restrictive for third countries in this area, and the timeline is particularly pressing. The analysis begins with the context behind the transatlantic desire for closer Canada–Europe ties. It then examines the existing cooperation framework and its limitations, identifies five areas in which future procurement plans and operational needs are complementary, and concludes with the conditions for success and the risks of implementation. Why a Closer Partnership Now? Four dynamics explain the urgency of deepening the strategic partnership between Canada and the European Union and set the priorities for its defence component. The first is the rapid deterioration of Europe’s security environment. Russia’s campaign of sabotage, arson, cyberattacks, and jamming, long kept below the threshold likely to trigger a response, is growing in intensity and audacity. In April, London disclosed an operation in which specialized Russian submarines were monitoring British undersea cables and pipelines. In August, a drone loaded with explosives was found at Leipzig Airport, an attempt Berlin attributed to the Kremlin. Addressing the Sejm on September 17, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned, citing allied intelligence, that Moscow is preparing drone and missile strikes against countries that support Ukraine. These strikes would be presented as “accidental” in order to paralyze any invocation of NATO’s Article 5. That same week, the Polish military recovered a Russian drone carrying a military payload off its coast, and NATO fighter jets shot down a drone over Lithuania. The threat is thus moving beyond sabotage toward increasingly coercive actions against allied territory. Several European intelligence agencies even estimate that Russia could rebuild the forces needed for a regional confrontation with NATO by the end of the decade. In the meantime, Moscow is testing allied reactions and extracting concessions, shaping the environment to its advantage as confrontation gradually gives way to open conflict. The second dynamic is the increasingly evident U.S. disengagement. According to NBC News, the Pentagon is considering withdrawing roughly 25,000 troops, nearly a third of the approximately 80,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in Europe. It would follow the June 3 decision to reduce the forces the United States would make available to NATO in a conflict, including fighter jets, aerial refuelling aircraft, and surface ships, by roughly one-third to one-half. The Pentagon’s review of the U.S. posture in Europe is continuing and is expected to be completed by the end of the year. The Montreal summit will therefore take place as the United States moves toward reducing its capabilities in the European theatre and doubts grow about its security guarantee in the event of an attack. Chancellor Merz acknowledged as much on September 17, stating that the era of unconditional transatlantic friendship was “probably over” for the foreseeable future. The third trend is European rearmament, initiated in response to Russian imperialism and accelerated by the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. security guarantee. At The Hague, NATO allies committed to allocating 5% of their GDP to defence and security by 2035. Under its “Preparedness by 2030” plan, the EU aims to mobilize up to €800 billion, including €150 billion in joint loans alongside greater national budgetary flexibility. Through its defence industry program and projects of common interest, it is also building its own capability-planning framework. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has gone a step further by proposing a European Security Council, an emergency consultation clause, and an instrument dedicated to funding strategic enablers. Negotiations on the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework follow the same logic. The Commission proposes to allocate €131 billion to defence and space, five times the current amount, within a European Competitiveness Fund whose defence window would succeed the EDIP. The scale of the effort remains contested, however, between the “frugal” states and advocates of an ambitious common budget. This rearmament also constitutes an industrial policy, accompanied by a preference for European suppliers. The EDIP, adopted in December 2025, is its clearest expression. To qualify for funding, a company must be established in the European Union or in a European Economic Area (EEA) country (Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein), and its design authority must, as a general rule, be located there. A country such as Canada is therefore not excluded, but its role is limited: its companies may supply up to 35% of a system’s components, without being eligible for funding or having control over the design. The paradox, as Anand Sundar points out, is that a system designed in Europe and containing 35% American components is eligible, whereas an entirely Canadian system is not. Under the EDIP, the only exception granted so far has been to Ukraine, for which member states have made specific provisions. Canada, for its part, benefits from a special agreement under SAFE. European preference thus creates not so much a closed market as a hierarchy of roles. The fourth key dynamic is Canada’s desire to diversify its partnerships with Europe while continuing to serve as a security provider for the region. Diversification has become a necessity: trade talks with Washington broke down in August, U.S. tariffs have reached 50%, and President Trump has warned that he could view Canada’s association with the EU as a “hostile act” justifying retaliatory tariffs against Europe. Ottawa laid the groundwork for this rapprochement with the Security and Defence Partnership of June 2025, the agreement to take part in SAFE, the Defence Industrial Strategy of February 2026, and the July decision to acquire a German–Norwegian submarine. But Canada is not coming to the Montreal summit merely as a supplicant seeking market access. It leads the NATO multinational brigade in Latvia, trains and equips Ukrainian forces, and is the fourth-largest provider of economic and military aid to Ukraine. This dual role, as both a customer and a contributor, underpins its claim to a status the EU has yet to grant anyone. Its military weight, moreover, is underestimated: at 2% of GDP, its defence budget is exceeded only amongst EU member-states by those of Germany, France, Italy, and Poland, and it is set to grow significantly by the end of the decade. A European Framework to Which Canada Has Only Partial Access Three European instruments govern, or are poised to govern, third-country access to the defence industry; Canada currently has access only to the first. SAFE (Security Action for Europe) is a €150 billion loan facility for joint procurement. Adopted in May 2025, it offers member states long-term loans, backed by the EU budget, to finance joint acquisitions in priority areas (ammunition, air defence, drones, maritime capabilities). A content rule caps the share of components from third countries at 35%, unless a bilateral agreement exists with the country concerned. The bilateral agreement concluded on June 15, 2026, allows Canadian entities and products to participate in contracts financed by SAFE, either as prime contractors or subcontractors. It is the only legal channel currently available through these instruments, and a short-term one, since the funds will be largely committed by 2030. The second instrument is the EDIP, with its European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs). Regulation (EU) 2025/2643 allows the Council to designate collaborative projects that receive dedicated funding and have their own governance structure. On July 3, the Commission proposed an initial list of five projects open to member states, Norway and Ukraine. The member states’ ambassadors formally approved the list on September 28, making these projects eligible for EDIP funding. EEA countries associated with the program may participate without voting rights. Canada, however, does not have this status, and the SAFE agreement does not extend to it. The third instrument, the European Instrument for Strategic Enablers, was announced in the State of the Union address on September 16. It targets air and missile defence, strategic transport, aerial refuelling, space and cyber, in alignment with NATO. For now, it has no budget, no legal basis, and no timeline. Canada would have much to contribute: it has ordered nine CC-330 Husky refuelling aircraft and is negotiating the purchase of six Saab GlobalEye airborne early warning aircraft, the system that France and NATO have just selected to replace their AWACS. The instrument’s third-country access clause has yet to be drafted, presenting an opportunity to shape it. Given the legislative calendar, the access terms of existing instruments are unlikely to be revised before the end of the legislative term. New partnership rules can still be built into initiatives that have yet to launch. Alongside these instruments is the proposed European Security Council, a leaders’ forum that would include Canada, Norway, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, with an emergency consultation clause. It would therefore give Canada a voice at the level of heads of state and government. Combined with access to European defence programs, this political status would give substance to the idea put forward in Strasbourg. Bringing Canada into the EDIP To deepen Canada–Europe cooperation, Canada’s association with the EDIP must become central to the defence component of its associate membership. The parties should commit to negotiating an agreement governing Canada’s association with the EDIP, modelled on Norway’s participation, that would allow Canada to take part in projects of common interest without voting rights and make it eligible for funding under Article 35. There is a precedent: member states have granted Ukraine exemptions under both the EDIP and SAFE, and nothing prevents them from doing the same for an ally as trusted as Canada. The agreement should also commit the parties to including Canada in the EDIP’s successor, within the defence window of the European Competitiveness Fund, as soon as negotiations on the next financial framework begin. Otherwise, the current rules may be carried over unchanged. Failing an agreement, a Council decision could authorize Canada’s participation in designated EDPCIs as a partner country. At the same time, Canada should conclude an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency comparable to those in place for Norway, Switzerland, and the United States, providing access to capability forums, ad hoc projects, and work on energy and the environment. On the operational side, Ottawa should seek admission to new PESCO projects beyond military mobility, starting with those related to the Arctic and early warning, such as ACCESS and TWISTER. These do not fall under the Agency’s remit and therefore require no prior arrangement. This access must be reciprocal. Canada should commit to opening its major procurement programs to European suppliers on terms equivalent to those enjoyed by Canadian suppliers under SAFE, while shifting its Industrial and Technological Benefits policy toward mechanisms for co-development and qualification within European supply chains. It should also align its export control regime with the EU’s and agree, as EEA countries do, to contribute financially to the programs in which it participates. For its part, the EU should apply to Canadian entities in open programs the same content and security-of-supply rules it applies to associated countries, without discrimination based on location outside the EU. None of this will work without an adequate information security framework. The 2005 Canada-EU Agreement on Information Security should be updated to cover the information exchanges that EDPCIs require, and a permanent channel should be established between the Communications Security Establishment and the relevant European cybersecurity bodies. The agreement should also establish a Canada-EU Defence Industry Council, co-chaired by the Defence Investment Agency of Canada and the Commission’s Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space. The Council would adopt sector-specific roadmaps (space, maritime, drones, munitions, data) with targets and deadlines, and report to the annual Canada–EU summit. The lead member states of the EDPCI should be involved in its work, since most of the budgets fall under their authority rather than the Commission’s. One safeguard should underpin this planning: a clause ensuring design independence from U.S. export controls. Joint projects included in the roadmaps would be designed, wherever technically feasible, to avoid components subject to the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and the parties would consult each other before any integration decision that creates such a dependency. This clause is the cornerstone of the initiative: it alone makes Canada’s involvement compatible with European strategic autonomy, and with the strategic autonomy Canada seeks for itself. To demonstrate this, the parties could agree to jointly design at least one system free of any component subject to U.S. export controls. Launching Mature Cooperation Initiatives Without Delay The most durable cooperation builds on programs already funded on both sides and on operational needs that neither party can meet alone. Rather than draw up a wish list, the parties should align three elements: what Canada is preparing to acquire, what Europe is preparing to fund, and what the forces on both sides need to deter threats and prevail in the event of conflict. This exercise leads us to propose five main areas of cooperation. Submarine Warfare The selection of the Type 212CD, announced on July 6, 2026, brings Canada into an existing German–Norwegian program. Contract negotiations, scheduled to be completed by the end of 2027 with initial deliveries planned for 2034, will cover pricing, delivery sequencing, the division of labour, intellectual property, and in-service support. On the European side, the Integrated Maritime and Seabed Defence EDPCI has the longest horizon (through 2045) and is one of the largest (€43 billion to €72 billion). It already brings together Germany, Norway, and fifteen other countries to pool expertise in maritime operations, submarine warfare, and the protection of undersea infrastructure. The complementarity is clear: Canada brings its geography and a future fleet, and Europe brings the platform and collaborative funding. The risk is that the Canadian industrial benefits from this acquisition will take the form of national offsets rather than integration into European supply chains, and that Europe’s highly fragmented naval market will shut its doors on the newcomer. One solution is to use this multi-decade contract to position Canada as a co-producer, rather than merely a buyer, of European submarines. This could involve, for example, delegated design authority over the modules specific to the submarines supplied to Canada; a modification licence covering in-service support, upgrades, and the integration of new systems; the integration of Canadian suppliers into TKMS’s global supply chain; or the co-development of submarine-related capabilities such as missiles, sensors, and unmanned systems. In-service support is probably the most accessible option in the short term. Coordinating maintenance among the three navies and giving German and Norwegian submarines easier access to Canadian facilities during port calls would be better addressed through bilateral arrangements than through the multilateral framework, but the two will need to be coordinated. In the submarine domain, then, the agreement should formalize Canada’s participation in the Integrated Maritime and Seabed Defence EDPCI as a partner country. A Canada–Germany–Norway program committee for the 212CD class should address common configuration, heavy torpedoes, upgrades, and in-service support, to keep the three fleets from diverging too far. Canada would contribute sensors, satellite data, and its future submarines and unmanned systems. Drones and Counter-Drone Capabilities The DECODER EDPCI (€3.5 billion to €5 billion through 2033) brings together 26 member states, Norway, and Ukraine around the joint procurement of unmanned systems and counter-drone capabilities, the expansion of production capacity, and a European network of drone technology hubs. It is the most inclusive project and the least dominated by national champions. The Canadian Armed Forces, for their part, have urgent and unmet needs for tactical drones, base air defence against drones, and consumable systems. Ottawa has just launched the Defence Drone Initiative (DDI), a mechanism for rapid access to a wide range of capabilities: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drones; ground, underwater, and surface maritime systems; interceptors; munitions and explosive charges; and deep-strike precision systems. The complementarity extends to both industry and capabilities. Canadian SMEs specializing in autonomy, sensors, and onboard processing could enter European supply chains, while European firms could enter Canadian ones. This would strengthen supply-chain resilience, expand production capacity, and facilitate technology sharing. It is in this spirit that Canada has signed an agreement with Ukraine to jointly produce drones and counter-drone systems, under which one-third of the drones produced in Canada will go to Ukraine. Canada could thus join the DECODER EDPCI and have at least one Canadian test site integrated into the European network of drone technology hubs. Such a site would offer what few European centres can: the harsh climate and vast open spaces of the Far North, which allow flights that Europe’s dense territory makes difficult. It would also benefit from links to the operational experimentation networks run by the European Defence Agency. A joint procurement of counter-drone systems involving Canada and at least two member states should be launched under SAFE, with production shared between the two continents. The parties should also agree on mutual recognition of autonomy certifications and safety standards for unmanned systems, an important prerequisite for interoperability and market access. Finally, Canada would have a role to play in the Commission’s efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese suppliers and components subject to U.S. export controls in drone-subsystem supply chains (batteries, motors, flight controllers), thanks to its industrial expertise and critical raw materials. Air Defence The EU-FIAMD (Federated Integrated Air and Missile Defence including Early Warning) EDPCI, valued at €55 billion to €80 billion through 2040, aims to build a federated architecture of air and missile defence systems. Bringing together 16 countries, it covers early warning, sensors, and command-and-control systems to provide a unified air picture against cruise and hypersonic missiles. Europe’s air-defence landscape remains fragmented. The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), led by Germany, combines IRIS-T SLM, NASAMS, Patriot, and Arrow 3. France and Italy, for their part, rely on the SAMP/T NG. Paris and Berlin have also launched the JEWEL initiative to create a sovereign European early warning system against ballistic and hypersonic threats. Finally, an integrated coalition against ballistic missiles, created in July 2026 and bringing together approximately 10 countries, including Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine, aims to complement existing systems and coordinate industrial capabilities by developing a joint missile defence capability, centred notably on the Freyja system from the Ukrainian company Fire Point. Canada belongs to none of these initiatives and has no surface-to-air missile defence capability. To date, Ottawa has acquired only Saab’s short-range RBS 70 NG systems for its troops deployed in Latvia, along with an over-the-horizon radar in the Arctic as part of NORAD modernization for the defence of the North American continent. Ottawa is also exploring the possibility of participating in “Golden Dome”, a project championed by President Trump. The two architectures differ in purpose, however: the Golden Dome is aimed primarily at intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles, which may be nuclear-armed, while the European initiatives fall more traditionally under extended air defence, targeting aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and theatre ballistic missiles. They nonetheless share a need for early warning and, to some extent, interception. This is also the most sensitive area of Canada–Europe cooperation. NORAD is an aerospace warning and control command closely tied to U.S. sensors and procedures. Interceptors, by contrast, remain national assets, and Canada has had none since 2012. Because the SAMP/T NG and IRIS-T SLM are already interoperable with NATO’s integrated air and missile defence, the obstacle is primarily political rather than technical. Washington has already shown how sensitive it is on this issue. In May 2026, the Pentagon suspended its participation in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, citing Canada’s defence commitments and the prime minister’s rhetoric on diversification; several observers also saw this as pressure to favour U.S. purchases. Canada would nonetheless stand to gain as much as it risks by choosing systems interoperable with its European allies, given its long-standing commitment to European security and the interconnection of the two theatres in a confrontation with Russia. It could, like Germany, combine American and European systems, but with a particular challenge: integrating these assets into a binational chain of command in which the other partner controls the data. The U.S. administration might even contemplate withdrawing from the joint defence of North America by dismantling NORAD, although such a move would appear contrary to U.S. interests. In any case, it would be illusory to think Canadian territory is immune to the threat of air strikes by hostile states. Canada’s decision should therefore weigh how quickly these weapons can be produced and each manufacturer’s willingness to offer licensed production contracts. Air and missile defence calls for a gradual approach, given its interdependence with U.S. systems. The agreement should establish a protocol for the exchange of early-warning data between the EU-FIAMD architecture and Canadian sensors (the over-the-horizon radar, future space-based assets), designed to remain compatible with NORAD’s obligations. It should give Canada observer status within the EU-FIAMD EDPCI, with the possibility of joining work on sensors, command, and certification environments. Given the symbolic significance in Canada of any perceived loosening of ties with NORAD, Ottawa would be in a position to demand firm commitments from European manufacturers offering a complementary solution, including local production lines and adaptation of their products to Far North conditions. This would contribute to the diversification of production capabilities that Europe is seeking in order to increase its resilience and autonomy. Sovereign Command In 2025, NATO acquired Palantir’s Maven Smart System for intelligence, targeting, and decision support. Approximately 20 European countries use Palantir software, and according to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, there is still no real competitor. In June 2026, France tested Arcadia, an AI-based command-and-control system developed with Mistral AI, Safran, Thales, and Airbus. The Franco-German Defence and Security Council meeting on July 17 committed both countries to building a sovereign digital backbone and a European standard for collaborative combat. But Berlin fears exchanging dependence on the United States for dependence on France, and the Commission left the ARCADIA proposal off the first list of projects of common interest, just as it has postponed the European Defence Data Space for AI (EDDS). Canada occupies a distinctive position. It is one of the few allied countries that is home to a foundation-model provider that is neither American nor French: Cohere. In May 2026, Calian and Cohere announced a collaboration to evaluate and integrate sovereign AI, applying Cohere’s North agent-based platform in defence environments. The Canadian government has also begun deploying North. A key advantage of the platform is that it can run on customers’ own infrastructure, offering an alternative to U.S. services. Cohere has also partnered with Thales to develop AI tools for the Royal Canadian Navy. Could the Canadian company reassure Berlin that it is not swapping one dependency for another? The opportunity is particularly compelling as NATO reconsiders its options: the Alliance has awarded evaluation contracts to Anduril, Palantir, and Athea SAS for its future air command and control system. A European bid backed by Canadian models and computing power could mark a milestone in the development of sovereign command capabilities. Canada should be involved in the work on the European standard for collaborative combat, so that Canadian and European systems can interface directly without relying on a single intermediary. A common accountability framework for AI-assisted targeting (human oversight, traceability, damage assessment) could serve as a foundation for cooperation. Canada also has strengths to offer in the infrastructure layer, where European cloud service providers lack the necessary scale: its computing power, energy resources, and AI expertise strengthen the case for a European sovereign command initiative. Long-Range Strikes Deep strikes have become central to Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression. Apart from air-launched cruise missiles (SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow and Taurus), Europe largely lacks such capabilities, and the spring 2026 decision to abandon the deployment of U.S. Typhon launchers in Germany underscored the fragility of a stopgap solution that depends on Washington. Berlin has not abandoned this capability, however. On the sidelines of the Ankara summit, Chancellor Merz secured an agreement in principle to buy Typhon launchers and up to 400 Tomahawk missiles as an interim measure pending a European solution. The European response is ELSA (European Long-Range Strike Approach), an initiative launched in July 2024 by France, Germany, Italy, and Poland, later joined by the United Kingdom and Sweden, which aims to develop a land-strike capability with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometres. In February 2026, the six partners signed a letter of intent to jointly develop and acquire a low-cost, one-way effector with a range of 500 kilometres. MBDA, for its part, is proposing a land-based version of its naval cruise missile (Land Cruise Missile Mk-2), expected around 2030. Germany is funding a production line for the Taurus NEO. France, the United Kingdom, and Italy are developing STRATUS, the successor to the SCALP-EG/Storm Shadow. ELSA is not an EDPCI and is not subject to EDIP rules: it is a flexible framework in which members determine access, making participation both less predictable and more negotiable for third countries. Canada made several of its initial choices outside European cooperation frameworks. In January 2026, Ottawa finalized a deal with Washington to acquire 26 HIMARS launchers, acknowledging that no Canadian solution existed and that the system was available only through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales channel. The River-class destroyers are also set to be equipped with Tomahawk missiles, and in July Ottawa selected Norwegian manufacturer Kongsberg’s Joint Strike Missile (JSM) to arm its F-35s. For the most part, however, Canada’s strike capability will rely on munitions whose stockpiles, production rates, and re-export authorizations are controlled by the United States. This is precisely the kind of dependence Europe is trying to reduce. The complementarity here lies less in platforms than in munitions and industrial depth. Europe’s first bottleneck involves energetic materials (propellant powders and explosive charges) and rocket motors, whose production capacity has dwindled over the past three decades. Canada has one of the few propellant plants in North America and an ammunition sector it intends to revive. The second bottleneck is one-way effectors and low-cost strike drones, areas where Canada has just begun collaborating with Ukraine and where the ELSA and DECODER initiatives converge. The third bottleneck is naval strike capabilities: Germany and Norway are jointly developing the 3SM Tyrfing supersonic missile, successor to the Norwegian NSM selected for the River-class destroyers, within the same partnership that produced the 212CD. A country that joins this partnership through submarines has a natural rationale for joining it through missiles as well. For long-range strike, the agreement should include a Canadian request to join ELSA, starting with the one-way effector component, where the cost of entry is low and where Canadian production intended for Ukraine can be scaled up. It should include a joint investment project in propellants and rocket motors, open to SAFE funding and future EDIP calls for proposals, with reciprocal purchase commitments. Canada should seek to join the 3SM Tyrfing program as a third partner, in exchange for a commitment to acquire the missile for the River-class vessels and, where applicable, the 212CDs, and should ensure that the HIMARS contract does not rule out the future integration of non-U.S. munitions. Finally, the non-ITAR design clause proposed above should be a priority for this project. Otherwise, every piece of European ordnance integrated onto a Canadian platform will remain subject to Washington’s authorization. Conditions for Success and Risks The first risk stems from the U.S. response. President Trump has called the idea of associate membership “laughable” and warned that, if he saw it as a hostile act, he would impose heavy tariffs on Europe or even suspend trade. To allay these concerns, the agreement should demonstrate a commitment to interoperability with U.S. systems wherever possible, while preserving the ability to operate without U.S. support where necessary. This position should be framed to show that strengthening U.S. allies is precisely what the U.S. National Defence Strategy calls for, and that allies need the means to operate independently of the United States if they are to take primary responsibility for their own defence. Norms and standards are central here. European work on future combat standards, undertaken notably through European Defence Fund projects in a framework separate from NATO’s STANAG groups, is still at an early stage. Involving a trusted third country such as Canada from the outset would help produce more open standards, designed from the start to integrate partners outside the Union. The second challenge relates to intra-European rivalries and the fragmentation of Europe’s industrial and technological base. Europe does not speak with one voice on the role of third countries. Paris advocates a strict European preference and a restrictive conception of design authority, while Berlin, Warsaw, The Hague, and the Nordic capitals prioritize openness to trusted partners and rapid delivery. Major programs reflect this: SCAF and MGCS are bogged down in disputes over the division of labour, and efforts to develop a European rival to Palantir is held back by German fears of replacing American dependence with French dependence. The naval market is split among Naval Group, Fincantieri, TKMS, Damen, and Navantia, while the aerospace sector is even more concentrated around Dassault and Airbus. Each EDPCI is dominated by one or two lead states that control most of the budget. For Canada, the risk is twofold: being used as a pawn by one side against the other, or facing the most restrictive rules in the name of a European consensus that does not exist. The answer is to choose partners on a project-by-project basis rather than rely on a single European ally; to prioritize formats where third-country access is already guaranteed (Norway in the EDPCI, the United Kingdom in ELSA); and to emphasize that Canada’s contribution would not compete with national champions but instead fill gaps that Europe itself has identified in ammunition, Arctic sensors, AI computing and modelling, and production capacity. The third risk concerns research and development (R&D) investment. The EDPCIs and the European Defence Fund mainly finance the joint development of future capabilities, and eligibility for funding requires an in-kind or financial contribution from participants. Yet Canada devotes a very small share of its military budget to defence R&D, far less than its major allies do, and most of this effort is spread across small-scale programs. Ambition and resources must go hand in hand. Without a dedicated budget for co-development with European partners, Canada will take part in joint projects as a supplier of components and labour, not as a holder of intellectual property, and the benefits will be limited to licensed production. The agreement should therefore be accompanied, on the Canadian side, by a multi-year budgetary commitment to defence R&D. A Canadian co-funding window for European Defence Fund projects, modelled on the arrangements granted to Norway, would allow Canadian laboratories and companies to join European consortia without waiting for the regulations to be revised. A related risk must also be acknowledged: a significant share of Canadian defence research remains entangled in U.S. programs subject to ITAR, which limits what Canada can contribute to projects specifically designed to get around those restrictions. The Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank proposed by Ottawa, which Berlin and Paris would be well advised to support and which could be combined with the multilateral defence mechanism proposed by London, would provide a framework for financing such cooperation at the coalition level, bringing together the United Kingdom, Canada, and the member states. To date, associate membership is a purely political proposal. It will become an operational reality only if it is given a legal definition, and that definition must specify how an associate member can gain access to the instruments in Europe’s defence toolkit. The EDIP is its centrepiece. The EDIP channels funding to projects of common interest and will help shape the rules governing European preference in future programs. The Montreal summit should therefore establish four commitments: launching negotiations on Canada’s association with the EDIP and its successor; creating a Canada-EU Defence Industry Council tasked with preparing the roadmaps; adopting a clause ensuring design independence from U.S. export controls; and launching the five initiatives described here without delay, each of which builds on programs already funded on both sides of the Atlantic. The EU would thereby gain a model for structuring relations with other trusted partners, starting with the United Kingdom. ## Great Power Competition in the Arctic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/great-power-competition-in-the-arctic/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report explores the extent to which the concept of Arctic Exceptionalism collides with the return to great power politics. This policy report explores the extent to which the concept of Arctic Exceptionalism collides with the return to great power politics, particularly Russia’s resurgent strategic behaviour in the High North and China’s attempt to increase its influence in and access to the Arctic region. Background The Arctic is a zone of both cooperation and strategic competition concurrently. Cooperative Circumpolar relations are enabled through a number of key regional institutions and agreements, such as the Arctic Council, the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) convention,[1] the Ilulissat Declaration,[2] and the Polar Code. These institutions facilitate intergovernmental cooperation, primarily on non-security issues, focusing on matters such as resolving territorial disputes, administering the maritime domain, environmental protection, and economic development. Although the Arctic Council does manage Search and Rescue cooperation, there is no overarching regional mechanism that manages Arctic security matters in the military domain. Although the Arctic played a role in the strategic competition between the United States and Russia during the Cold War, the threats comprised strategic bomber aircraft and ICBMs coming over the pole to threaten North America, and submarine operations under the Arctic sea ice concerned deployed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and hunter-killer submarines (SSNs) that threatened them. The Arctic region was otherwise not accessible the way it has become today as a result of climate change altering the seasons so that the Arctic is ice-free for longer periods of the year, opening up the region to increased navigation, resource exploration, and scientific research. Today’s challenges are multifaceted and involve traditional and non-traditional security threats. The former concerns the increasing military activity by coastal Arctic states to defend, deter, enhance national sovereignty, and respond to emergencies; and the latter is related to the effects of climate change at the regional level on Northern peoples, infrastructure, and wildlife. The strategic dimension of Arctic security is of particular interest in this paper, with a look at how Russian Arctic military behaviour and Chinese Arctic ambitions challenge the cooperative paradigm of the region, often referred to as Arctic Exceptionalism. The emergence of a regional security dilemma does not necessarily negate cooperation in the Arctic but it does introduce challenging variables that affect how competitor states relate to one another. What is Arctic Exceptionalism? Käpylä and Mikkola describe the Arctic as being seen “as relatively encapsulated from global power politics, characterized primarily as an apolitical space of regional governance, functional co-operation, and peaceful co-existence.” They suggest that in spite of becoming an increasingly global region with uncertainty introduced by Russian and U.S. foreign policy behaviour in recent times, Arctic “exceptionalism has shown continuing resilience as Arctic actors have actively tried to maintain regional co-operation in a difficult international environment.” There is a debate among Arctic security scholars about whether Arctic Exceptionalism remains a valid concept in a changing regional context. Gjørv and Hodgson assert that Arctic Exceptionalism “describes a selective condition of security,” proposing a more appropriate analytical tool, namely Comprehensive Security, that “neither rejects processes of cooperation, nor denies areas of tension that foster increased perceptions of insecurity.” They argue that the framing of the Arctic as exceptional “owes much to the timing and the context under which Arctic regional relations were institutionalized.” Thus, a changing global and regional security context will see the emergence of new Arctic dynamics that may impact the cooperative paradigm. Whether cooperative and peaceful conditions will endure in light of the provocative military behaviour of Russia, increasing exercises in the European Arctic by NATO allies and partners, and China’s economic ambitions in the region, remains to be seen. The risk of conflict in the region is low, as it is in the interests of states with stakes in the region to maintain peaceful cooperative relations. But the potential for misunderstandings and spillover of conflicts in other regions into the Arctic creates challenges. Of particular concern is the deployment of destabilizing conventional and nuclear weapons systems by Russia in its Arctic territory, and the U.S. response to counter new technologies in all domains. Discussion The Arctic region is increasing in strategic importance and economic potential. A low to moderate security dilemma is forming in the Arctic as a result of great power competition and the tension and uncertainty it introduces among key regional actors. A security dilemma describes conditions in which a state’s attempts to increase its security through the development of defensive capabilities makes other states (particularly competitor states) perceive that state as becoming a potential aggressor. The perception of threat and resulting vulnerability causes the other states to respond with developing defenses of their own, which causes the first state to perceive those states’ military behaviour as aggressive. The resulting militarization and tension between competitor states is the outcome of those states seeking to increase their own security. The primary great powers in the region are: 1) a resurgent Russia remilitarizing its Arctic by refurbishing Cold War era base and building new ones; 2) a revisionist China seeking regional influence to advance its economic and scientific interests in the Arctic; and 3) the United States pivoting to the Arctic in response to environmental conditions resulting from climate change, as well as new strategic challenges posed by competitor states. Great power competition is occurring on a global scale and regionally as peer competitors pursue long-term economic and security interests in the Arctic. The challenges involve potentially provocative developments by the great powers and the absence of a regional organization or forum to manage military-security issues. There is the emerging challenge of the growing strategic cooperation between Russia and China; and both states are increasing their missile capability with the intention to hold at risk critical sites in the U.S. and Canada. What is the impact of great power competition on security and stability in the Arctic? As discussed, security has a range of meanings, from the non-traditional human, environmental, social, and economic dimensions, to the traditional realist political-strategic domain. Stability tends to be reinforced through formal institutions and informal arrangements, and adherence to legal regimes and norms of behaviour. Predictability is enhanced through transparency and dialogue. State (and non-state) behaviours that violate these established standards of behaviour undermine stability and security. This creates conditions of tension among actors underlined by mistrust, uncertainty, and fear, which can impact the institutions intended to maintain a cooperative order in the region. The challenges posed by global actions – such as military developments and tensions in other parts of the world - can have regional implications. Tensions could spill over into the Arctic or a confrontation could escalate to a crisis due to miscalculation and misunderstanding. The outcome could see states withdrawing from agreements, wedges driven between states, and between states and their citizens (for example, between indigenous peoples and the state, such as Greenland/Denmark), and the weakening of institutions and arrangements. For instance, the U.S. and Russia engaged in military cooperation from 2009-2012. Russia and Western nations participated in the Arctic Security Round Table (ASFR) and Northern Chiefs of Defence Conference (NCDC), which allowed them to build trust and confidence. However, after the Russian annexation of Crimea and Russia’s actions aiding separatists in Donbas (Ukraine) military cooperation between the West and Russia were suspended, as tension and mistrust increased (this was observed when Russia withdrew from participating in the Arctic Security Round Table and the Arctic Chiefs of Defence forum. China’s Arctic Reach China is a rising peer competitor to the U.S. in the world and has clearly demonstrated its ambitions to be an Arctic player. Its interests in the High North range from economic development and scientific research, to seeking to make claims in the Central Arctic Ocean. According to its 2018 Arctic Policy, China declares itself a “Near-Arctic State” – a controversial claim which has bristled true Arctic nations (as attributed by their geography, politics, people, and culture). The Arctic Strategy outlines China’s Arctic interests as economic, environmental, and strategic. China’s navigation and economic objectives as part of its Polar Silk Road (the Arctic dimension of its Belt and Road initiative) includes investment in liquid natural gas development in Russia (Yamal Peninsula), investment in the Northern Sea Route infrastructure, and investment in ports and bases in Iceland and Greenland. China’s predatory economics methodology poses potential challenges for economically vulnerable states like Iceland and Greenland, and its use of economic coercion and control brings significant political-strategic implications. Economic coercion is an instrument of competition. China’s predatory economic behaviour creates economic dependence, which can allow it to achieve a foothold in Arctic. Auerswald views China’s activity in the Arctic Council as a “foot in the door” approach to push for a greater role in Arctic governance. All of these tools are intended to increase China’s access, influence, and claims in the Arctic. In addition, a particular concern is the dual-use purpose of research vessels, ports, and bases creates the potential for future military applications of infrastructure and scientific research. Russia’s Strategic Behaviour Russia’s strategic activity in the Arctic is perceived as provocative and is one of the key behaviours that contribute to a regional security dilemma. Russia’s military activities in other parts of the world also contribute to a global strategic competition with Western powers, which tends to colour how Western analysts view Russia’s intentions in the High North. Significant problematic developments that stand out are Russia’s efforts to control the Northern Sea Route, posing a freedom of navigation challenge to the U.S., and Russian advances in offensive missile technology that involves the testing and deployment of systems in the Arctic (in addition to other strategically significant areas, such as in the Kaliningrad enclave). Russia is a superior Arctic power relative to the U.S. and other Arctic nations. It has a long history of operating in the region and has been revitalizing old Arctic bases and ports and building new ones. It has been modernizing and developing new conventional and nuclear weapons systems, with short- to medium- and long-ranges. As part of Bastion defence to protect strategic assets in the region, Russia is also deploying regional denial capabilities with air defence systems (such as the S-400 air defence missile system) and anti-ship missiles. Resurgent military activities perceived as provocative to Western, particularly NATO, nations involve strategic bomber patrols near the airspace of other Arctic states and exercises through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. This gap, as an important part of the Bastion defence concept,[3] is to protect strategic assets, such as ballistic missile submarines that patrol in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean; in addition to projecting power into the North Atlantic. In addition to military-strategic developments, Russia is increasing economic cooperation with China in LNG development on the Yamal Peninsula and other projects (LNG 2). This cooperation extends to developing the infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), in addition to the construction of an icebreaker fleet, in order to control and administer the NSR. Cooperation with China will continue as long as it serves Russia’s national interests and benefits, but this relationship should be understood as one of circumstance with mutual gains in the interim. How it will play out in the next 10-15 years is undetermined. Russia’s March 2020 release of Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2025 outlines its national interests and long-term goals in the Arctic. The document mostly addresses the economic dimension, scientific research, indigenous issues, and cooperation and dialogue through the Arctic Council; but it does indicate an interest in managing the conflict potential in the region. The United States and Western Strategic Behaviour The Arctic has become a new region of military focus for the United States. From a strategic perspective the Arctic is an “avenue of approach” for threats to the North American Homeland. The United States and Canada are evolving North American defence, including modernizing NORAD, in response to the challenges posed by great powers’ new offensive threats that may come over or through the Arctic. Modernization involves evolving defence and deterrence concepts with the continental defence architecture to counter Russian and Chinese advances in long-range missile capabilities, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, next generation cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems. US Northern Command and NORAD are proposing a shift in favour of new approaches to deterrence to enhance credibility and affordability. These include deterrence by denial and deterrence by resilience, facilitated through resilient integrated layered systems of sensors and other forms of data collection for all domain awareness, information dominance and decision superiority facilitated through rapid analysis of data by machine learning and artificial intelligence. These processes allow more time for decisionmakers to consider options available to respond to threats to the homeland. The global integration of such systems also involve the sharing of data with allies and partners at a rapid pace, which would facilitate responses to threats in the European Arctic theatre (such as around Norway, the Barents Sea, and the GIUK Gap), as well as in the North American Arctic. In response to great power, as well as non-traditional threats through, in, and from the Arctic the U.S. military branches have released Arctic strategies. What is interesting about these strategies is that although the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have released a number of Arctic strategies over the past decade, a new development is that the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army have released Arctic strategies, where they have never done so before. These strategies reinforce joint force concepts (among the military branches, other government departments, and multinational partners) for the region in order to respond to the various security threats – both traditional and non-traditional – emerging in the Arctic. The U.S. pivot to the Arctic is not only observed in the North American context, but also in the increase of NATO Arctic exercises and Nordic defence cooperation. NATO exercises in the European Arctic in and around Norway involve both NATO states and (non-NATO) partners, such as Sweden and Finland. Most notable of these is the Trident Juncture exercise in 2018, during which Russia exercised some of its own capabilities in response. NATO behaviour is already a sore point for Russia and Arctic exercises involving the Alliance is also potentially provocative to Russia. Russia perceives increasing NATO activity near its borders as a threat, and views Western militarization of the Arctic as conveying offensive intentions.[4] Considerations There is a debate among Arctic analysts whether NATO should become more involved in the Arctic. NATO has no Arctic policy or strategy at this time, but increasing exercises in and around Norway may change that in the future. NATO exercises and the deployment of NATO forces near Russia’s borders is perceived as provocative to Russia, which could increase the potential for conflict in the region. Is there an “Arctic Exceptionalism” that cannot be affected by geopolitical developments? As presented above, Arctic Exceptionalism defines the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation governed by institutions to resolve disputes. This concept assumes that the region would be unaffected by great power competition. However, current developments suggest that great power behaviour can have an impact on stability and security in the Arctic, although the extent is yet unknown. The growing uncertainty creates speculation about possible outcomes given the trajectories of activity by Russia and China. Great power competition may have different impacts on the security and stability in different parts of the Arctic, such as the North American Arctic in contrast to the European Arctic or to the West of the Bering Sea and the Aleutian Islands. Conflict in the region is unlikely, although confrontation and points of escalation may occur in the European Arctic. Russia’s intentions appear to be more transparent and predictable, given the deployment of its strategic forces and defence systems, militarization in the region, and expression of interests outlined in its policies (although its approach to grey zone conflict in multiple domains creates a sense of ambiguity). Russia intends to defend its sphere of influence, deter threats to its second-strike assets, pursue its economic interests and resource development, including controlling navigation in the Northern Sea Route. China, on the other hand, is a wild card, given its predatory economic approach, and ambitions to increase influence through international law and the Arctic Council. It has the potential to drive a wedge between states and become a security threat through dual-use Arctic capabilities in Arctic waters and through investment in infrastructure of vulnerable Arctic nations. Nevertheless, the Arctic Council will remain a cooperative forum. Whether it will diminish or become ineffectual if the Arctic cooperative regime becomes undermined is uncertain. Actions that would likely undermine the Council and other regional institutions would be those that violate the norms and rules of appropriate behaviour. On the other hand, strategic nuclear and conventional competition could impact the cooperative framework, but that may only apply to the military domain where cooperation and engagement has already been frozen following Russia’s interference in Ukraine. Cooperation on non-military matters may continue alongside different dynamics that emerge in the military-security domain. The question of the impact of the emergence of new missile technologies and the post-strategic arms control context at the regional level needs to be addressed. As the U.S. and Russia withdraw from arms control and other cooperative regimes, such as the Open Skies Treaty, stability in the region could be affected. Arms control agreements tend to have stabilizing effects that could reinforce cooperation in other areas. A post-ABM Treaty and Post-INF Treaty (and in five years possibly a post-New START)[5] world may affect security and stability in the Arctic through creating conditions for arms races and the increasing deployment of destabilizing systems in the High North, such as offensive weapons technologies and missile defences. Strategic nuclear and conventional capabilities play a significant role in great power competition. The United States, Russia, and China are building new conventional and nuclear delivery technologies that are faster, more maneuverable, stealthy, precise and accurate, which can be considered destabilizing at a global level with regional effects. Thus, the breakdown of arms control leading to arms race behaviour could have an impact in the Arctic, particularly the role of the Arctic in the deployments of offensive nuclear systems and missile defences (particularly Russia’s Northern Fleet’s air- and sea-launched platforms, and the U.S. air and missile defences in Alaska). Russia can target North America while remaining below the nuclear threshold and may attack the U.S. in the event of a conflict elsewhere to prevent or delay deployment to other theatres such as Europe. Shorter- and medium-range systems deployed in Russia’s North can reach targets in the European Arctic (for example, the Barents Sea). In addition to deployment of systems in the High North, nuclear weapon testing in the Arctic has security implications at a local/regional level, risking radiation poisoning of the people and wildlife. These developments create challenges to stability in the Arctic, however, it is difficult to determine the impact that a post-arms control security environment would have on the broader cooperative framework in the region. Conclusion Could a regional security dilemma upset the cooperative framework of Arctic relations? Lackenbauer argues that “the Arctic is neither a region of exceptional cooperation nor conflict apart from the drivers of the greater international system.” This sentiment is echoed in recent statements from the Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. What is global is also regional in the current context of increasing great power competition involving the expansion of the power projection capabilities (military and economic) of the U.S., Russia, and China to the Arctic. Nevertheless, these powers’ national interests demonstrate both cooperative and competitive characteristics. The following table demonstrates that although these great powers prefer security and stability in the Arctic, competition continues to be a significant feature. Great power competition expressed through an intensifying security dilemma introduces uncertainty and unpredictability in the Arctic. It is possible that an intensive security dilemma resulting from increasing tensions among powers can disrupt notions of Arctic Exceptionalism, but to what extent has yet to be determined. Regional fora offer opportunities to maintain cooperation and dialogue in certain areas, such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Russia’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, starting in May, may provide opportunity to enhance dialogue in non-military domains, but the gap in addressing security matters remains. Options for a separate Arctic forum to address military-security matters that would be receptive to Russia are still being explored. [1] Article 2 outlines the General Provisions of the convention: “Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its bed and subsoil.” Although the United States participates in the Law of the Sea conventions and recognizes its international legal status, it has not ratified the treaty. [2] Among the Arctic-5 circumpolar nations – the United States, Canada, Russia, Greenland (Denmark), and Norway – the Ilulissat Declaration affirms cooperation through UNLCOS and marine protection in the Arctic. [3] According to Melino et al., “Russia’s military posture in its Western Arctic reflects the Soviet legacy of bastion defense comprised of “concentric circles” designed to protect strategic territory.” They suggest that regional exercises conducted by Russia beyond the Kola Peninsula and Barents sea suggests that Russia may be expanding its bastion defence and sea denial capabilities towards the GIUK Gap. [4] According to Senior researcher Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Julie Wilhelmsen, Russia “perceives this kind of activity to be a threat to Russia and draw a kind of image of the West being about to surround them and that the West contributes to militarizing the Arctic” to which Russia tends to ascribe offensive intention. [5] The New START is the last remaining bilateral arms control treaty between the nuclear great powers – the United States and Russia. Nancy Teeple is a Postdoctoral Fellow at North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) and Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Economics of the Royal Military College of Canada. ## Growing Tensions in the Taiwan Strait and Implications for Canadian Interests URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/growing-tensions-in-the-taiwan-strait-and-implications-for-canadian-interests/ Modified: 2026-09-17 Arguably no other conflict on the planet today holds the potential of sparking the kind of superpower — and possibly nuclear — war than the Taiwan Strait. The effects of war over Taiwan, what with the high likelihood of involvement by the United States and Japan, would be truly global, costing the world economy trillions and causing disruptions to trade and supply chains that would far surpass the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. As it revises its Indo Pacific Strategy, Canada must also ensure it fully comprehends the stakes in the Taiwan Strait, and the substantial costs to its own national security should it fail to prepare accordingly to deal with a variety of future contingencies — chief among them a quarantine, naval blockade, or invasion of Taiwan by China. Until a few years ago, especially since the end of the Cold War, few people paid attention to Taiwan or could even locate it on the world map. Recent developments, from China’s often corrosive influence in our own societies and military muscle-flexing to the Covid-19 pandemic and the role that semiconductors play in our lives, have given prominence to Taiwan and what this young democracy means to our world. Growing tensions over Taiwan’s status as China becomes more self-confident and assertive are forcing regional powers and the international community to take a closer look at the situation. The risks of escalation and major armed conflict over Taiwan cannot be ignored anymore, as such a development would have dire consequences for the global economy and threaten to destabilize the world order as we know it. This paper addresses the main elements that have fueled this longstanding conflict and the measures adopted by Beijing in the past decade to increase the pressure on Taiwan. It then explores plausible escalatory scenarios and makes recommendations for possible responses by the international community, Canada included, to deter major conflict in the Taiwan Strait and, should deterrence fail, to mitigate the effects of a major contingency. Taiwan plays a pivotal, frontline role in the new cold war that is upon us, and the democratic camp cannot afford to remain unprepared for, or indifferent to, a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Turning the screws: China’s coercion against Taiwan in the past decade Beijing’s decision to increase the pressure on Taiwan dovetailed with China’s growing assertiveness on the international stage, as well as growing frustration with its inability to coerce the Taiwanese people into acquiescing to its political demands on unification. From the militarization of the South China Sea in defiance of international law to espionage and political warfare targeting countries around the world — not to mention the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its attendant elite capture — the People’s Republic of China became a new reality for states that suddenly found themselves struggling to strike a balance between the opportunities offered by engagement with China on the one hand, and the corrosive effects upon democratic institutions stemming from that relationship, on the other. By the time the Taiwan-centric Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen assumed office in May 2016, much of the international community had reached the realization that decades of engagement with China, including its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, had failed to transform the PRC into a country that respected democratic norms and international law. In fact, this engagement instead yielded a PRC that was more self-confident, increasingly assertive, and whose leadership was more willing to defy — and rewrite — international law and norms of conduct in ways that better suited its autocratic model of governance. Taiwan’s continued existence as a sovereign democratic entity stands in the way of Beijing’s growing ambitions. Not only does Taiwan’s vibrant democracy contradict the CCP’s claim (and that of various intellectuals) that democracy is incompatible with Chinese civilization — thus denying the 1.3 billion Chinese the possibility of developing their country along such lines — but Taiwan’s alignment with the U.S. and other democratic countries also threatens (or so Beijing claims) to contain China’s expansionist ambitions. As if to underscore that point, Taiwan’s location along the first island chain linking Japan to Southeast Asia is seen as an invisible line at sea that keeps China bottled up, impeding the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to expand into the Western Pacific and beyond. Therefore, since 2016 conflict in the Taiwan Strait has increasingly assumed a more regional, if not global, status, with developments there potentially affecting the entire global economy as well as international politics. While security analysts, government officials and civic groups have long emphasized the need to defend Taiwan against Chinese encroachment due to the island-nation’s status as a democracy, Taiwan’s role as the producer of a very substantial share — more than 90 percent — of the world’s most-advanced semiconductors, and therefore the capital position it occupies in fueling the global economy in the age of artificial intelligence (AI), has gained currency in recent years. (While national champions like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, or TSMC, became household names around the world, it is the ecosystem that has been created in Taiwan over decades of visionary hard work that has made possible this miracle, one that, furthermore, would be nearly impossible to replicate elsewhere.) Moreover, more than C$3.32 trillion in cargo transits use the Taiwan Strait annually, accounting for approximately one fifth of global maritime trade and 10 percent of global trade. Analyses estimate the cost of war in the Taiwan Strait to the global economy in the neighborhood of C$13.86 trillion, or approximately 10 percent of the global GDP — a greater blow to the world economy than the Covid-19 pandemic, the global financial crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine combined. No country, therefore, can afford to ignore this potential chokepoint as they develop their national strategies. More than ever, the international community has a stake in ensuring peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. None of this is purely altruistic. Politics never is. Instead, as Taiwan transforms into a frontline state in a new cold war, one that pits democracies against a number of authoritarian, revisionist powers led by Russia and China, Taipei has intensified its outreach to likeminded democracies around the world and expanded the scope and depth of the engagement it can accomplish with various countries despite the limitations imposed by their “one China” policy. During the Tsai years, Taiwan used quiet diplomacy, Track 1.5 exchanges, and other fora to deepen bilateral and multilateral ties, often sharing its substantial experience in countering PRC electoral interference, cognitive warfare, espionage, cyber warfare, “grey zone” operations and other forms of coercion with partners that were struggling to properly address the challenge of authoritarian influence in their own societies. During that time, foreign investment into Taiwan, accompanied by Taiwan’s outward investment, also flourished, creating new dependencies and further internationalizing the Taiwan “issue.” The greater the foreign presence in Taiwan, in the form of personnel, capital, investment, and real estate, and the greater the dependence on Taiwanese companies for global supply chains, the more difficult it became for Beijing to claim that Taiwan was an “internal issue,” one in which it would brook no “interference” from outside. Seeking to counter the embrace of Taiwan by the international community, Beijing redoubled its efforts to snatch some of Taiwan’s official diplomatic allies and thereby further isolate the island-nation. During the eight years of the Tsai administration (2016-2024), the PRC succeeded in poaching 11 of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, bringing the number from 23 to 12. During that same period, China used its influence at the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly to deny Taiwan the ability to join multilateral organizations, even if only as an observer. Thus, despite the important role it plays in the global economy, Taiwan did not have a seat at organizations including Interpol, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Montreal-based International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to name just a few. The dangerous blind spots that Taiwan’s continued exclusion engendered became all the more obvious in times of international crisis, such as during the Covid-19 pandemic. No amount of publicity and appeals by Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and some of the world’s most powerful countries succeeded in overturning Beijing’s political machinations at the UN. Throughout the Tsai presidency, the CCP expanded its toolkit to interfere with Taiwan’s democracy, its institutions and information environment, while redoubling its espionage efforts to steal government, military, and industrial secrets. The CCP also co-opted politicians, media moguls, religious figures, organized crime and businesspeople — often through financial incentives — to further penetrate Taiwan, weaponizing information to wage cognitive warfare on the people of Taiwan as well as Taiwan’s allies overseas. This mechanism of co-optation, and the cultivation of local proxies, became a model which China replicated in countries worldwide to deepen its ability to shape the environment in its favor. Taiwan’s ability to conjugate with this threat, and in adapting its national security laws to address this “grey zone” challenge, generated great interest worldwide as democracies sought to learn from Taiwan’s experience so that they, too, could successfully adapt to, mitigate the effects of, and counter CCP interference. Many turned to Taiwan, for example, to learn from its government and civil society in how to counter CCP electoral interference. In addition to “sharp power” instruments, Beijing also ramped up its “hard power” tools to tighten the coercive noose around Taiwan. Building on several years of double-digit investment in its military, China became increasingly willing to deploy the PLA around Taiwan, much as it did in other areas where it has territorial disputes with neighbors, such as the East and South China Sea. Gradually, Beijing increased its military presence around Taiwan and deployed a growing number of aircraft and navy vessels as part of exercises, all presented as “warnings” against Taiwan independence. Often, though not always, large-scale military exercises, and the propaganda campaigns that accompanied them, were time to coincide with announcements of major arms sales by the U.S. to Taiwan. Beijing used those to send signals to the international community that it would not countenance engagement with Taiwan, and hoped that the threatening posture would condition the Taiwanese public by reminding them of the military threat that existed on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. Much as it did in the South China Sea, the PLA’s incremental presence, along with that of the China Coast Guard (CCG), “maritime militia” and scientific vessels, constituted a strategy of incrementalism: with each little uptick, with each new fact on the ground or at sea, China was “boiling the frog” and creating a “new normal.” With growing frequency, PLA aircraft began crossing the tacit Davis, or median, line in the Taiwan Strait, which for decades had served as an unofficial boundary to avoid accidents involving military aircraft. More and more, Beijing deployed CCG vessels (China’s coast guard differs markedly from the civilian coast guards as they are understood in the West, acting more as a paramilitary organization, or a “second navy” ultimately under the command the Central Military Commission, headed by Xi Jinping) and ostensibly civilian vessels constituting a “maritime militia” to infiltrate the Taiwan Strait and waters surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen and Matsu. China is seeking to overturn the international consensus that the Taiwan Strait constitutes an international waterway; instead, it aims to convince the international community that the Strait is China’s internal waters. Beijing has filed complaints whenever foreign navies — including Canada’s — have conducted right of passage transits in the Taiwan Strait, in recent years deploying the PLA to harass the transiting flotillas. Having largely abandoned an incentives strategy (wining the “hearts and minds” of the Taiwanese has largely failed)[1] and relying mostly on coercion, the CCP was banking that, by 2020, the Taiwanese people would have been scared enough that they would elect a candidate in that year’s presidential election who was more amenable to resuming dialogue with Beijing. That is not what happened. Instead, in the wake of the crackdown in Hong Kong the year before, Tsai secured a resounding re-election with a record-breaking 8.17 million votes against her main opponent and Beijing’s favorite, the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Han Kuo-yu. The DPP also succeeded in retaining its majority of seats, albeit a slimmer one, in the Legislative Yuan. Muscle-flexing in the Taiwan Strait had failed to compel the Taiwanese to submit, just as PLA threat signals had failed to sway Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996. The outcome of the 2020 election did not deter Beijing, which further escalated with an even greater military presence, with almost daily passages by PLA aircraft and navy vessels. This escalation reached a new summit in August 2022 with the visit to Taiwan of the then-speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi. In what became the first of several large-scale, multi-day PLA live-fire exercises around Taiwan over the next three-plus years, the drills encircled Taiwan simulating a potential amphibious assault or blockade/quarantine, and featured the firing of a number of ballistic missiles. More than ever, Beijing was signaling to the international community that it would no longer accept the kind of engagement that Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan represented — even if it was not unprecedented, as then speaker of the House Newt Gingrich had done so 25 years prior. Beijing was moving the goal posts and writing new rules in an attempt to further constrain Taiwan’s ability to expand its outreach to the international community. Since August 2022, the PLA has held seven large-scale exercises around Taiwan, making them a new normal. This growing military presence around Taiwan, with each new maneuver getting ever closer to Taiwan’s 24 nautical mile territorial waters, increases the risks of accidents and miscommunication.[2] And with that, the possibility that escalation could result in major armed conflict, not by design, but rather by a series of moves and countermoves: sleepwalking into war, with untold consequences for the international community. We also cannot rule out the possibility of major armed conflict occurring by conscious decision by the CCP leadership. As Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 has demonstrated, strong authoritarian leaders do not always weigh the costs and benefits of drastic action in the way that leadership in democracies tend to do. For them, regime survival, hubris, ideology and a desire to “move history,” added to their tendency to ignore advice from the specialists around them (or their receiving advice from sycophants who are wary of contradicting the strong leader) will sometimes outweigh the expected costs of adventurism. Thus, while there is no guarantee that Xi Jinping will follow in his ally Putin’s footsteps and initiate a war against Taiwan, that prospect cannot be ruled out altogether. Nor, for that matter, does Xi need the precedent set by Putin to propel his country on a similar course. What has prevented (so far) Beijing from choosing the military option to resolve the “Taiwan question,” as the conflict is often described, is deterrence: the perdition by the leadership in Beijing that the potential costs of attempting an annexation of Taiwan by force would be too high, and too destabilizing to the CCP regime, whose chief consideration remains the ability to remain in power. There is no knowing what a failed attempt to invade Taiwan, or one that comes at too high a cost materially and in terms of casualties, would do to the Chinese people’s support for the CCP, especially as recent polling in the country shows that the majority of Chinese people are comfortable with the status quo and not highly supportive of their government resorting to force to annex Taiwan. Deterrence against a PLA attack stems from a combination of factors: Taiwan’s resolve and means to counter a PLA incursion, with promises of high casualty rates on the invader’s side; and the calculation that the U.S. military would join the fight on Taiwan’s side, perhaps with the assistance of other countries such as Japan and a handful of other allies. Continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan also plays a major role in maintaining deterrence. Strong signals of support by the international community, underscored by statements by the G7 and NATO, among others, along with freedom of navigation transits in the Taiwan Strait and alliance-led military exercises in preparation for regional contingencies, all play an important role in influencing how Beijing calculates the likelihood of success in an invasion of Taiwan. The same holds for a naval blockade or quarantine, which, given that such a gambit would not occur in a vacuum and would inevitably destabilize the global economy, could also prompt countervailing moves by the U.S. and other regional powers. The longstanding policy of the U.S. when it comes to a potential involvement in a Taiwan Strait scenario is one of “strategic ambiguity,” where Washington does not clearly declare whether, and if so, how, it would join the conflict to counter the PLA. In other words, the strategy aims to keep the Chinese leadership guessing. So far, notwithstanding Beijing’s bluster, this strategy has worked, and Beijing has not attacked Taiwan. But that calculus could be changing, which its why some experts have advocated for the U.S. to abandon its strategy of ambiguity in favor of clearer signaling that any attempt to seize Taiwan by force would compel a U.S. intervention (former president Joe Biden made a handful of references to such clarity during his presidency, only for the U.S. Department of State to walk those statements back, which suggests that U.S. policy on the matter had not changed). Two other variables are also bound to influence the Chinese leadership’s views regarding the viability of a military option for Taiwan. The first is the perception of U.S. support for Taiwan, which comes from an analysis of the signals emanating from the White House, U.S. Congress and other pillars of U.S. foreign policy. Is the American administration clearly stating its continued support for Taiwan, through policies and arms sales? Or, conversely, is it moving towards isolationism, transactionalism, or distracted and overwhelmed by major contingencies elsewhere? The second variable is the status of the PLA itself and assessments by the Chinese leadership that the Chinese military is sufficiently equipped and trained to risk a large-scale military operation against Taiwan. In other words, does the PLA have the capabilities to match intent? For decades, the CCP signaled its intent to use force against Taiwan, yet never acted on that threat in large part because the Chinese military was unprepared and ill-equipped to act upon such an order. A few years ago Xi ordered the PLA to have the means to invade Taiwan by 2027 if so ordered (the so-called “Davidson Window,” stemming from remarks made by retired admiral Philip S. Davidson of the U.S. Navy). This directive has often been misinterpreted by security analysts and media outlets as constituting a deadline — in other words, confirmation that China would use force against Taiwan in 2027. No such directive has ever been given by the Chinese leadership, and recent crackdowns on corruption within the PLA, along with technological challenges within China’s defense industry, indicate that a 2027 deadline for readiness may be too premature. This may buy Taiwan and its allies some time, but one thing is certain: after several years of heavy investment in the military, China’s PLA is both quantitatively and qualitatively in a much better position to flex its muscles than it was just a decade ago. Survival in uncertain times: Chinese assertiveness and Trump 2.0 Taiwan is now facing a new era of high uncertainty. Since May 2024 it has a new president, the DPP’s William Lai Ching-te, who succeeded Tsai after two terms in office (under the ROC constitution a president is limited to two consecutive terms). Seen as a more vocal and combative advocate of an independent Taiwan than his more cautious predecessor, Lai faces strong opposition in parliament, where the DPP lost its majority of seats in the 2024 elections, held concurrently with the election that brought him to power. Led by the KMT and the smaller Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), the opposition has used its newfound powers to destabilize the central government’s budget, water down national security laws adopted during the Tsai administration amid escalating interference by the CCP, and  dilute a NT$1.25 trillion (C$54.8 billion) special defense budget meant to increase Taiwan’s ability to deter an attack by China. Opposition lawmakers have also undermined efforts by the administration to procure and develop large numbers of unmanned vehicles. Although some opposition figures in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan’s parliament, may be acting on bad faith or as proxies of China, most are not and are ostensibly only toeing party directives and justifying their actions as politics-as-usual in a highly polarized polity. And yet, whatever their motives, this mix of disloyal and semi-loyal opposition has the same impact: a country that is seemingly split in the middle, disunited, and struggling to come together to defend itself against external aggression. Sustained over a long period, such disunity also risks sending the wrong signal to Taiwan’s allies, chief among them the U.S., whose current administration is closely watching to determine whether its partners — particularly countries that depend on the U.S. for their security — are serious and committed enough to ensuring their own national defense (President Lai’s special defense budget aims, among other things, to bring Taiwan’s defense spending to 5 percent of GDP, regarded as the “minimum” expenditure expected by Trump administration officials). China has seized upon this disunity to markedly increase its military and “grey zone” activity around Taiwan. The second source of uncertainty confronting Taiwan is the nature of the current government in Washington. Although the first Trump administration was, on the whole, beneficial to Taiwan and led to unprecedented engagement by the two sides (most of which continued under the Biden administration), Trump 2.0 is a different beast altogether. For one thing, the Trump administration’s ostensible turn against democracy and liberalism puts Taiwan in a difficult position, as much of the narrative around the need to defend Taiwan has historically centered on the fact that it is a fellow democracy. Thus, in order to gain traction with the unpredictable Trump administration and maintain its value to the U.S., Taipei has had to shift its emphasis to other areas. Semiconductors, and the multibillion-dollar investments that Taiwanese firms like TSMC have made in the U.S., is one area that has given Taiwan leverage, as is the role that Taiwan can play in maintaining peace and stability in the region, chiefly within the first island chain. And yet, Taiwan’s ability to influence decision makers in Washington — and President Trump himself more specifically — is somewhat limited. Trump 2.0 is more unpredictable, more transactional, and much less constrained by international laws and longstanding rules of international politics. Furthermore, President Trump seems to have suggested that he would be amenable to great powers enjoying greater freedom within their rightful “spheres of influence” — a division of parts of the world in which smaller powers would have little, if any, say as regards their destiny. With Trump ostensibly focusing on securing the Western Hemisphere, it is not impossible that, as part of a grand bargain, Washington could decide to abandon other parts of the world to great powers such as Russia and China. Such a future is by no means predetermined, and President Trump has demonstrated time and again that he could change his mind. (All eyes, therefore, are on his upcoming meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing in September.) But the prospect of such abandonment is a scenario that is of great concern in Taipei, Tokyo, Manila and Seoul, as it exposes them to the possibility that they may one day have to face the regional hegemon, China, on their own, without the expectations of a U.S. security umbrella. Such a prospect should not be taken lightly, or regarded as the whim of a single unusual leader: it taps into growing fatigue within the American public and the perception, right or wrong, that the West (and some allies in Asia) has been “free-riding” on U.S. largesse since the end of World War II. U.S. Congress remains a staunch ally of Taiwan, but the Trump administration’s ongoing efforts to give the executive branch unprecedented — and seemingly unchecked — powers means that Congress’ ability to influence policy making on matters of war and peace may become more constrained. Generational change in both the Republican and Democrat parties also raises uncertainty about continued commitment to Taiwan as new congressmen and -women may have other priorities. All this happens amid signs that revisionist, authoritarian regimes led by Moscow and Beijing are working more closely together to challenge the world order and overstretch the U.S.-led military alliance (an alliance that furthermore is itself under assault by the Trump administration). China and Russia may be aiming to distract and overwhelm the U.S., or security alliances such as NATO, by sparking various contingencies simultaneously, which could weaken the alliance’s ability to respond. For example, Russia and China appear to be deepening their military cooperation in Northeast Asia, with North Korea acting as a force multiplier to complicate the ability of the U.S., Japan and possibly South Korea to respond to a Taiwan contingency. China has been supplying Russia’s arms industry to sustain its war against Ukraine, while North Korea has provided matériel and soldiers to the Russian army. Taiwan and its allies must therefore pay close attention to developments around the world that risk sapping resources that are usually deployed in the Indo-Pacific, as this would reduce the alliance’s ability to sustain deterrence against the PLA. A series of major contingencies in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, or in Asia, especially if those were to occur simultaneously, could open a window of opportunity for China to use force against Taiwan. Already, the U.S.-Israel war against Iran has forced the U.S. military to shift capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater to the Middle East. Canada’s options: Preparedness, multilateralism, and deterrence Taiwan is Canada’s 15th-largest trading partner globally and its sixth-largest in the Indo-Pacific region. Overall two-way trade is estimated at C$6 billion. Taiwan is the world’s 21st largest economy by nominal GDP, and its stock market is now the world’s fifth-largest. Such figures, however, do not provide the full picture of Canada’s exposure to the Taiwan “chokepoint.” Like the rest of the world, the Canadian economy is highly reliant on the maritime trade that passes through the Taiwan Strait as well as to the advanced semiconductors and adjacent industries that center around Taiwan. Consequently, Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific Strategy cannot afford to remain complacent over Taiwan. Along with other partners, Canada must develop the wherewithal and policies that will prepare it to address various contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, among them a maritime quarantine/blockade of Taiwan — the likelier scenarios at this point and which the PLA and CCG have been rehearsing in recent years — as well as major armed conflict such as an invasion of Taiwan, decapitation strikes, or limited military operations. This policy toolkit must include the means by which to monitor indicators of a coming crisis as well as the necessary responses to mitigate the detrimental effects of a contingency on the Canadian economy and its national security (rerouting cargo, insurance, evacuation of up to 60,000 Canadian citizens, and so on). It needs the analysis capacity to identify escalation pathways, the potential duration of a quarantine/blockade, the areas of Canada’s economy that would be most affected by such scenarios, while identifying the gaps in its current diplomatic and security capabilities deployed to the region. None of this need violate Ottawa’s “one China” policy,[3] although such an exercise should nevertheless identify the potential for retaliation by Beijing in response to Canada’s position in a crisis. Cognizant of its limited resources in the region, it is also clear that Canada would benefit greatly from playing a role within a multilateral context, one that furthermore should assume a permanent, rather than ad hoc or reactive form. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy should also aim to increase Canada’s role in conflict prevention and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and the wider region by signaling to Beijing that any adventurism and attempt to change the status quo by force would trigger a countervailing response by a coalition of large economies (e.g., the G7). Moreover, Canada, along with likeminded allies, should be willing to make greater investments, diplomatic and military, and to increase their presence in the region in response to growing doubts about the continuation of U.S. commitments as a guarantor of stability in the Indo-Pacific. Even if a withdrawal were theoretical and did not materialize, the alliance would benefit from increased capacity in the region. Ottawa’s strategy must also account for the fact that the annexation of Taiwan by the PRC, especially if it were accomplished by force and coercion, would inevitably engender a less predictable and more hostile geopolitical environment. Abandoning Taiwan to its fate would send the wrong signal to revisionist powers by encouraging the perception that the community of democracies is unable, or unwilling, to hold the line. Countries like Russia would feel emboldened and could conclude that expansionism in other corners of the world — NATO allies in Europe or in the Arctic — would also go unchallenged. Given this, Canada has every advantage in ensuring that it, along with its allies do what is necessary to maintain the global status quo while continuing to strengthen their democratic institutions against foreign authoritarian interference, an area where Canada can learn precious lessons from Taiwan’s own experience. [1] An overwhelming majority of people in Taiwan support the “status quo,” or de facto independence, for the Republic of China (Taiwan). Support for unification with the PRC is in the low single-digits, and among those a substantial number insist that unification can only occur once the PRC has democratized. It is also important to note that both supporters of de jure independence for Taiwan (taidu) and those who support the continued existence of a sovereign Republic of China (huadu), Taiwan’s official name, agree in their opposition to being ruled by the PRC. Thus, one can simultaneously oppose a declaration of Taiwan independence (whereupon the ROC would cease to exist) and annexation by the PRC; in other words, opposition to Taiwan independence is not necessarily coterminous with support for unification with the PRC. [2] The number of Chinese ships detected around Taiwan proper (excluding its outlying islands) soared to a record 244 in July 2026, an average of nearly eight every day. This number does not include PLA Navy deployments in the area. Between May 2026 and the writing of this paper in September 2026, more than 1,300 Chinese vessels were operating around Taiwan proper and its outlying islands. [3] Not to be confused with Beijing’s “one China” principle. About the author J. Michael Cole is a Taipei-based Senior Non-Resident Fellow with the Global Taiwan Institute in Washington, D.C. the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Ottawa, Canada and the Taiwan Research Hub at the University of Nottingham in the UK, and a Research Fellow with the Prospect Foundation in Taipei, Taiwan. He is a former Senior Advisor on Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence with the International Republican Institute. His latest book, The Taiwan Tinderbox: The Island-Nation at the Center of the New Cold War, was published by Polity in September 2025. Before moving to Taiwan in 2005, he was an intelligence analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in Ottawa, Canada. He holds a master’s degree in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. Crédit image: modified from Al Jazeera English via Flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0. ## Hamas attack on Israel: What’s in it for Iran? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/hamas-attack-on-israel-whats-in-it-for-iran/ Modified: 2023-11-16 > Hours after the spectacular raid carried out by Hamas by crossing the Israeli border on Saturday, October 7th, the attention of many experts was already turning towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hours after the spectacular raid carried out by Hamas by crossing the Israeli border on Saturday, October 7th, the attention of many experts was already turning towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. The shock of the incursion into Israeli territory and the scale and sophistication of the operation led several of them to doubt that it could have been entirely planned and coordinated by the organization led by Ismail Haniyeh without external involvement. While Iranian authorities applauded the attacks carried out by Palestinian commandos, some experts speculated that Iran may have played a role in this unprecedented terrorist action. While it remains difficult to determine with certainty the degree of involvement of the Iranian regime in the al-Aqsa Flood operation, it is also important to consider the following questions: to what extent do the Mullahs and the Guardians have an interest in this sudden outbreak of violence in the Middle East, and what could be the long-term consequences of heightened tensions with Israel and its allies? Suspicions of direct involvement The level of planning and expertise required for such an attack has raised the question of whether Hamas acted alone – and whether the Palestinian movement received help from its long-standing supporter in the region, Iran. While the first images of the operation were being broadcast on screens around the world, The Wall Street Journal was quick to claim that officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the ideological army of the Islamic Republic, had prepared, along with Hamas, the air, land and sea incursions into Israeli territory and that they had personally given the go-ahead on the Monday before the operation. During the fateful weekend, on the sidelines of a Franco-German meeting in Hamburg, President Emmanuel Macron deemed it “likely” that Hamas had received “assistance” in its operation against Israel. However, he added: “I have no comment to make on direct Iranian involvement that we do not have formal evidence of.” In fact, Tehran was one of the very first capitals to praise the bold operation launched by Hamas, a movement that the Islamic Republic has openly supported and funded for many years. “Iran supports the self-defence of the Palestinian nation,” declared President Ebrahim Raisi the day after the attack, stating, “The Zionist regime and its supporters... must be held accountable in this matter.” As for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s highest authority, he went even further, declaring that “This usurping regime is a cancer that the Palestinian people will surely eradicate.” A week before the attack, the Supreme Leader of Iran and the President of the Republic had jointly urged Arab countries not to ally with Israel to ensure their security, adding that doing so would be “backing the wrong horse.” During his visit to Lebanon in early September, the Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, met with officials from Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The head of Iranian diplomacy then reiterated Tehran’s unwavering support to these groups within the “Axis of Resistance,” - an informal political and military alliance that is anti-Western, anti-Israel, anti-Saudi and pro-Iran. In April, Hamas’ top political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, had already travelled to Beirut to meet with Hassan Nasrallah, a long-standing ally of Tehran and the Secretary-General of the Shiite Hezbollah organization, which has been armed and financed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps since 1982. Iran’s denials and experts’ caution However, at the time this article was written, and as emphasized by Israeli military officials themselves, there is no concrete evidence of Iran’s direct involvement in the conduct of Operation al-Aqsa Flood. Despite their statements of support for Hamas, Iranian authorities have formally denied having played an active role in the October 7th offensive. The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nasser Kanani, stated, “Iran does not interfere in the decision-making of other nations, including Palestine.” Furthermore, the Islamic regime’s mission to the United Nations issued a statement describing the attack as “fiercely independent and firmly aligned with the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.” Three days after the events in Gaza, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected accusations that his country was behind the massive attack launched against Israel. “The supporters of the Zionist regime have spread rumours in the last two or three days, including those that claim Islamic Iran was behind this action. They are false,” said the Supreme Leader in a speech before a military academy, during which Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor reaffirmed Iran’s support “for Palestine.” The careful denial by Iranian authorities of their involvement in the Hamas operation shows their intention to avoid being targeted by Israel. For the time being, the hypothesis that Iran did not assist in planning this operation is also supported by international experts. Khaled Elgindy, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, said, “What role did Iran play? We don’t know. We don’t know to what extent Iran was involved in the logistical, operational part of this formation, or what kind of logistical support .” Elgindy added, “I don’t think anybody knows. Intelligence services from all countries have been kept in total ignorance, including and especially the Israelis.” There is a consensus that severe consequences would result if tangible evidence of direct Iranian involvement were to be formally established. The Iranian Big Brother and its Indirect Support for Hamas While rejecting accusations of direct responsibility for launching the operation, Iran does not hide its full solidarity with Hamas and its absolute support for the “anti-Zionist cause” championed by the Palestinian movement. This support has been symbolically but explicitly illustrated in the aftermath of the events in Gaza, with two giant banners displayed in the center of Tehran. One banner reads, “The great liberation has begun,” while the other shows the black and white pattern of the Palestinian keffiyeh gradually enveloping the white and blue Israeli flag. Beyond symbols, Iran’s long-standing ties with Hamas and its militant Palestinian partners, the Islamic Jihad, are well documented. Western intelligence estimates that Iran contributes $100 million to Hamas’  $500 million annual budget. The U.S. State Department declared in 2021 that the group was receiving substantial funding, weapons, and technical training from Iran and its various organizations, such as the IRGC and the Quds Force. Many experts believe that, in recent years, Iran has forged a genuine ideological and strategic affiliation with Hamas – despite it being a Sunni movement originating from the Muslim Brotherhood. For Gilles Kepel, there is no doubt that Hamas’ attack on Israeli territory “was made possible only through all-around assistance from Shiite Iran, which has become its auxiliary, both through the supply of equipment and the impressive preparation designed by Tehran’s intelligence services [...]”. According to the scholar, the “solidarity shots with Gaza from Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite party affiliated with the Islamic Republic, against the Galilee, and Israel’s immediate response foreshadow [...] both the expansion of the conflict and the coordination of the maneuver by the Iranian Pasdarans’ Quds Force.” Kepel concludes that, even if there is no evidence of their direct involvement, the events in Gaza can be described as “Israel’s 9/11 – Iranian version.” At the same time, many experts emphasize that, unlike Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas maintains an ambiguous and fluctuating relationship with Iran. Often allies of convenience, these two members of the “Axis of Resistance” have experienced periods of disagreement. This was notably the case at the beginning of the “Arab Spring” and the Syrian civil war, which pitted Assad and his allies, predominantly from the Alawite and Shiite minority branch, supported by the Iranian regime, against an opposition movement initially backed by Hamas and composed mainly of Sunni Muslims – the dominant Muslim branch. Nevertheless, the dispute between Iran and the Palestinian movement was eventually resolved in favour of normalizing relations between Syria, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Today, with the mitigation of inter-sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites in Syria, as well as in Iraq and Yemen, Hamas and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards once again see their strategic interests converge in the common struggle against the “Zionist entity.” Even though the details of Iranian-Palestinian cooperation remain unclear, Washington holds little doubt about the Islamic Republic’s responsibility for the October 2023 terror attack on Israel. Although it does not yet possess “direct information” linking the events in Gaza to Iranian military institutions, the United States has reiterated, through Jon Finer, Deputy National Security Advisor, its belief that Tehran is “broadly complicit” in the Hamas attacks in Israel. “What we can be quite clear about is that Iran is broadly complicit in these attacks, for having supported Hamas going back decades,” Finer said in an interview with ABC, pointing to the weapons, training and financial support provided by the Iranian regime to the Palestinian movement. He added that U.S. intelligence agencies continue to investigate the exact role of Iran in the recent events. Geopolitical Motives? Beyond the ideological convergence with Hamas in support of the Palestinian cause and the anti-Israeli struggle, there remains the question of Iran’s strategic interest in a sudden outbreak of violence in the Middle East. The day after the October 7th attacks, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken argued that Iran’s encouragement to start hostilities between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Palestinian movement, whether direct or indirect, is motivated by its desire to disrupt the process of diplomatic rapprochement between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf oil monarchies. Iranian leaders have made no secret of their opposition to the warming of Israeli-Arab relations initiated by the Abraham Accords. A close advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei, Ali Akbar Velayati, recently warned the countries that hoped to solve their problems by normalizing relations with the “Zionists” that they were seriously endangering the security of the region. In other words, this is the message conveyed by Ebrahim Raisi and Ali Khamenei when they recently criticized Arab countries tempted to ally with Israel, labelling it the “wrong horse.” Analysts also agree that Hamas and the Iranian regime have a common interest in undermining the expansion of the “Abraham Accords” (agreements negotiated in 2020 between Israel and the United Arab Emirates on the one hand and between Israel and Bahrain on the other) to Saudi Arabia. For Ismail Haniyeh’s Palestinian movement, progress made in this direction by American diplomacy could - if successful - lead to the establishment of peaceful coexistence between Israel and the Gulf monarchies, which would mean the abandonment and marginalization of the Palestinian cause. For the Islamic Republic, a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement could eventually lead to the emergence of a regional anti-Iran bloc. As noted by a French diplomat, Tehran “therefore has a dual interest in derailing this rapprochement,” the result of which would be both ideological and geopolitical isolation in the Middle East. By reigniting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran and Hamas seem to have already partially succeeded in derailing the extension of the “Abraham Accords.” Already, the massive Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip, with their civilian casualties and devastation, including the collapse of mosques, have put Arab capitals in a difficult position and obliged them to distance themselves from the Netanyahu government. With the notable exception of Morocco and the United Arab Emirates, the vast majority of Arab foreign ministries have formally accused Israel’s policy of occupying Palestinian territories as the root cause of the current crisis. “It seems obvious that Riyadh will slow down this attempt at normalization,” analyzes former diplomat Denis Bauchard. In the medium term, Saudi Arabia’s partners, Egypt and Jordan in particular, under pressure from their own public opinions, will also likely reconsider their nascent ties with the Israeli state. In the long term, the chill cast over the Israeli-Arab rapprochement process could jeopardize Washington’s strategy of isolating Iran and thus favour Chinese and Russian interests in the region. Unless, of course, all of this leads to a widespread conflagration. A risk of war? However, one might wonder whether the current crisis will inevitably result in an open conflict between the two sides. Initially, some factors do not promote optimism. Like the Balkans in the early 20th century, the Middle East is a true powder keg, and, as in 1914, the play of alliances could lead to a regional –  or even global – conflict. If Hezbollah were to launch a large number of missiles or mortar shells at towns in northern Israel, it would lead to significant retaliation, potentially escalating into a larger-scale conflagration. As for the Lebanese Hezbollah, recent estimates suggest that they have thousands of rockets capable of reaching deep into Israeli territory. Furthermore, the hallmark of this kind of “grey zone” rivalry involving this type of proxy actors is the lack of clarity and communication – leaving room for uncontrolled incidents. However, Hezbollah’s propensity to act independently and exacerbate the situation should be put into perspective. The leader of the movement, Hassan Nasrallah, is aware of the vulnerability of his organization, which, moreover, has recently been involved in a gaz-sharing agreement with Israel in the Mediterranean. Moreover, other factors suggest that a regional conflagration is not inevitable. First, all the protagonists are acutely aware of the dangers of a conflict escalation and the catastrophic consequences that direct confrontation on the conventional battlefield could bring. This is why, up to this point, they have refrained from direct confrontations, relying on proxies and indirect approaches instead. Despite the hawkish rhetoric from the protagonists, Israelis and their Western allies are hesitant to engage in a conflict that many fear could lead to a third world war. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that neither the Iranians nor the Israelis want to engage in a conflict with the potential to escalate and engulf them in regional chaos. For the time being, Iran prefers to use Hamas as an indirect leverage to exert pressure on Israel without having to intervene directly and without jeopardizing the very existence of the Palestinian movement. Ahmad Zeidabadi, a Middle East specialist, argues that “If Hamas weakens and all its political, economic and military infrastructure is destroyed, it will be a debacle for the Islamic Republic.” By depriving Iran of a virtual border with Israel, the complete dismantling of Hamas could represent a significant weakening of Iran’s advanced defence system – a luxury that its political and military leaders cannot afford. Finally, it is essential to keep in mind that the military balance of power between Iran and its regional rivals is fundamentally asymmetrical. More specifically, this balance of power is particularly disadvantageous to Iran regarding conventional military capabilities. Iran has hundreds of thousands of personnel but lacks high-tech military equipment to support their deployment. In contrast to the Iranians, the Israelis have access to state-of-the-art military technology but, for various reasons, lack the means and the legitimacy to deploy an expeditionary force on a regional scale. Aware of this situation and the advantages that can be gained from it, Iran will do everything to avoid direct confrontation with its regional rivals by continuing to rely on a hybrid and asymmetrical approach below the threshold of direct violence. As a result, an open, conventional war between the Islamic Republic and its regional adversaries, while possible, remains unlikely. Conclusion: High-Intensity Psychological Warfare Although it is suspected, and even explicitly accused, of contributing to Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the Islamic Republic denies any formal involvement in an attack that it proudly touts for its audacity and legitimacy. Whether direct or indirect, the Iranian regime’s support for Hamas nevertheless makes it one of the primary actors in the now-escalated Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The dividends of Iranian support for the Palestinian cause and Hamas are multiplied tenfold by the terrorist attack of October 7th. One of the main benefits is to derail the normalization process between the Gulf monarchies and Israel, initiated by the Abraham Accords. Even the most pragmatic Arab capitals today denounce Israel’s territorial colonization of Palestinian territories and the brutality of the bombing of Gaza’s civilian populations while hinting at a pause in their rapprochement with the Israeli state. Another benefit of the current crisis is to further establish the Islamic Republic as the “champion of the Arab street.” After the events in Gaza, Iran can indeed boast of being the only state actor to carry the banner of the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, the ground invasion of southern Israel by Hamas strengthens the so-called “Axis of Resistance” against Israel, led by Shiite Iran alongside Syria, Iraq and many pro-Iranian movements such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Hamas. Finally, the attack by Palestinian commandos under the noses of Mossad and Shin Bet and the images showing Israeli kibbutzim held by Islamist commandos allow Iran to question Israel’s technological invincibility and military supremacy. Ismail Haniyeh and his Iranian sponsors have not hesitated to mock the Israeli state for being “incapable of protecting itself.” Remaining faithful to their asymmetrical strategy, the Mullahs and the Revolutionary Guards will therefore continue to develop the theme of “humiliation” to strengthen the Islamic regime’s status on the regional stage and to improve its international image, which has been significantly tarnished by the recent “chador revolt.” In general, therefore, Iranian leaders, as they did during the 33-day war in the summer of 2006, are playing the psychological card to reshape the regional game in their favour, even though, in doing so, they are also aware that they are playing with fire. ## How can the Government of Canada address the recruitment and retention crisis in the Canadian Armed Forces? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/how-can-the-government-of-canada-address-the-recruitment-and-retention-crisis-in-the-canadian-armed-forces/ Modified: 2025-10-02 Policy Forum Politique is a publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic of national security significance to Canada. For this second edition, we ask four experts for their perspectives on Canada’s recruitment and retention crisis in the Canadian Armed Forces. Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Deakin University Contrary to what the public discourse seems to convey, the recruitment and retention crisis in the Canadian Armed Forces is not straightforward. For instance, the compensation package increase is a welcome measure, but it will not fix the problem long-term. Everything from the personnel generation process to military housing needs reform, as many of the policy layers regulating personnel management are not fit for attracting and retaining service members. We cannot only blame the military for being behind on its implementation of Strong, Secured, Engaged (2017) since many of the cards are in Cabinet’s hands. Success in retention will require changing policies around military housing (within Treasury Board), breaking down the administrative barriers between the provinces (which would benefit all Canadians), and using the remaining $600 million dedicated to personnel matters as part of the 2 per cent of GDP in defence spending to training capacity – an under-appreciated aspect of integrating new platforms such as the River-Class Destroyers or the next fighter jets (regardless of supplier). Focusing political capital and money towards those “soft” defence matters requires civilian and military leaders to take some risk, which in turn requires a shift in mindset. It will require moving away from the very faulty “tooth-to-tail” ratio mindset, which has led to dismiss personnel-related expenditures as unserious. The reality is that the successful recruitment and retention of aviators, sailors, and soldiers would require personnel to process, to train, to pay, to feed, and to manage the service members from enrollment to release. That necessitates investments in the “tail”—that is, staff and processes that are not directly involved in delivering operational effects. Charlotte Duval-Lantoine is the Vice President, Ottawa Operations and a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Triple Helix's Executive Director and Gender Advisor, and a PhD Student at Deakin University. Stéfanie von Hlatky, Queen's University This year, the CAF surpassed its recruitment target after long struggling to overcome an “existential” military personnel crisis. Although this news represents an encouraging trend reversal for the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP), it will not immediately bridge the massive personnel shortfall that has accumulated over years. As Canada increases its defence spending, it must prioritize investments in military personnel consistently, to prevent replicating the uncertainty that was characteristic of recent years, where massive cuts are followed by even more sizeable budget increases. The CAF has instituted comprehensive reforms tied to military personnel. These reforms need time and money. Leadership churn and a fiscal rollercoaster are detrimental to that progress. Many factors contributed to the CAF’s personnel shortfall and the organization responded in kind. Some factors are out of the military’s control, like the pandemic and the economy. To remedy the lag in recruitment and training incurred during the pandemic, CMP designed more permissive intake rules, assuming more risk up front to enroll candidates and instituting a probationary period to make cuts later into the process. To address the training bottleneck, which constrained the recruitment tempo and discouraged recruits waiting on qualifications, the CAF threw money at the problem, providing salary incentives for instructors. In digitizing the recruitment system, the CAF worked to improve the processes and procedures that impact new recruits the most. Left to navigate a slow and confusing system, many applicants abandoned all prospects of joining the force, giving up on a system that was unkind to them from the get-go. To be sure, the CAF does not have an attraction problem. In 2023-2024, over 70,000 applications were received but fewer than 5,000 recruits were enrolled. The CAF’s problem is in meeting expectations: it must swiftly process files, cultivate a professional culture of the highest standard while providing training and operational experiences that meet the aspirations of its members. The CAF is on the right track by pursuing reforms on multiple fronts to achieve this, but that momentum could quickly come to a grinding halt, returning to what former Defence Minister Blair recently called a “death spiral”. Stéfanie von Hlatky is the Canada Research Chair in Gender, Security and the Armed Forces, Pierre Elliot Trudeau Foundation Fellow, and a Full Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University.  Philippe Lagassé, Carleton University There is no single factor influencing recruitment and retention in the Canadian Armed Forces. One area that can contribute to improve recruitment and retention is a major investment in defence infrastructure. Simply put, military personnel and their families deserve to live and work in safe buildings, facilities, and conditions. Repairing, replacing, and modernizing Canada’s defence infrastructure would go a long way toward ensuring that safety and making the CAF a more attractive career. The Department of National Defence operates an enormous number of buildings. According to the Directory of Federal Real Property, National Defence operates 14,042 buildings, with a total square footage of 7,991,175. Despite this massive footprint, defence infrastructure has been chronically neglected and underfunded. This partially reflects the fact that Canada failed to spend an adequate amount on national defence over several decades. It further reflects past transfers of responsibility for infrastructure between environmental commands and the defence department. Infrastructure lacked a dedicated champion for far too long, until the Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure and Environment was established. Owing to the decades-long underinvestment in defence infrastructure, many of the buildings that CAF members work and live in are in states of disrepair or no longer fit for purpose. In other cases, these buildings may contain hazardous substances, such as asbestos. Although it may not be a critical factor in an individual’s decision to join or stay in the military, physical working and living conditions matter. Indeed, we tend to recognize that state of the art capabilities can play a part in recruitment and retention; it is easier to convince people to join the military when the armed forces are not saddled with equipment that is older than many senior officers. A similar logic should apply to defence infrastructure. Philippe Lagassé is associate professor and the Barton Chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.  Richard Shimooka, MacDonald-Laurier Institute Modern militaries, like the societies from which they emerge, rely on an increasingly diverse array of skillsets to conduct its various functions. With few exceptions, like cyber warfare or medicine, the CAF cannot recruit these individuals from the public at large since the skillsets are unique and require specialist training. Thus, the military must raise them organically within its own establishment and retain them for at least a decade to obtain the maximum value for the investment made. Unfortunately, this is where the next personnel policy bottleneck will arise, thereby complicating the CAF’s ability to replenish its ranks to its existing established strength as well to establish new units and functions necessary for carrying out defence policy. The hard truth is that the current system is overstretched: a toxic mix of too few personnel who fulfill too many operational functions. The result is a lack of surplus skilled personnel available to train the next generation of their trade. This lack of capacity will limit growth, potentially leading to a decades-long rehabilitation process for many key skilled occupations. The alternative is to reduce Canada’s military commitments temporarily because an operational reduction would allow the CAF to graduate many trained personnel quickly and to transition them to new equipment if necessary. This solution may be difficult for Canada’s international allies to stomach, but many will accept it if it comes with the credible promise that a much more capable CAF will develop over the medium-term. With continued strong recruitment, and some deft political handling of the defence file, it is doable. The only question is whether Ottawa is astute enough to understand the situation in which it finds itself and to implement creative policies that will rejuvenate the CAF in a timely manner. Richard Shimooka is a Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. His work covers a wide array of topics, including Canadian and American foreign and defence policy.  ## How New Delhi Views Moscow: Between Diversification and Strategic Convergences URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/how-new-delhi-views-moscow-between-diversification-and-strategic-convergences/ Modified: 2025-09-15 On August 7, India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin would make an official visit to New Delhi at the end of 2025, amid growing tensions between India and the United States. This will be his first visit to India since the start of the war in Ukraine. The announcement followed a diplomatic sequence that began in July 2024, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to Moscow—his first visit since 2019 (while he had hosted Vladimir Putin to New Delhi in 2021). This trip, coming just a month after his re-election to a third term, sparked sharp international criticism, particularly because of its timing: it coincided with a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit and came shortly after Russia bombed a children’s hospital in Ukraine. In the United States, Deputy Secretary of State for South Asia, Donald Lu, expressed “disappointment about the symbolism and timing of Indian Prime Minister Modi’s trip to Moscow. We are having those tough discussions with our Indian friends.” In this context, and with the presidential visit scheduled for the end of 2025 approaching, this article aims to assess the depth of the partnership between India and Russia, more than three years after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. It will also examine the debates this relationship has generated in New Delhi, as well as the prospects opened up by Donald Trump’s return to the White House. While the partnership rests on solid historical foundations and converging strategic interests, it is undeniable that the relationship has been—and continues to be—tested by several regional and global factors. Today, however, the partnership appears compatible with India’s vision of a multipolar world, in which it seeks to maximize its strategic autonomy, something that Russia continues to make possible. A Historic Partnership Built on Strategic Convergences In March 2025, Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar reiterated that “India immensely values its relation with Russia,” a partnership based, in his words, on a “long tradition of trust and mutual respect.” A few months earlier, during a visit to Moscow, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had used a phrase widely reported in the Indian media: “Friendship between our countries is higher than the highest mountain and deeper than the deepest ocean.” The metaphor was borrowed from former Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, who once used it to describe ties between China and Pakistan. This “special and privileged strategic partnership” rests above all on deep historical foundations, especially when compared with more recent bilateral partnerships. Past generations of Indian political and diplomatic elites remember Russia as a loyal ally, often described in interviews as having “stood by India when no one else did.” This perception is particularly pronounced in relation to the 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence. During that conflict, the United States, aligned with Pakistan, deployed Task Force 74 in the Bay of Bengal, while the Soviet Union firmly supported India. It was also in this context that the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed, a notable strategic moment in Indian history, marking, for the first time since independence, a relative departure from Nehru’s policy of non-alignment. More broadly, the Soviet Union backed India in international institutions, in a context of Indian territorial unification and recurring tensions with Pakistan and China. Between 1957 and 1971 alone, the Soviet partner cast six vetoes in the UN Security Council in favour of New Delhi. Beyond these historical ties, Russia continues to enjoy a relatively positive image among Indian public opinion. According to a Pew Research Center survey published in 2023, 57 % of respondents expressed a favourable view of Russia, and 59 % said they had confidence in Vladimir Putin. On contemporary issues, the perception is even more favourable, with 71 % of respondents considering it more important to maintain access to Russian oil and gas than to adopt a tougher stance on the war in Ukraine. At the strategic and economic level, convergences remain, though they warrant nuance. To begin with, both states share a common ambition: to enhance regional connectivity in order to expand their trade relations. In this regard, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) represents a central pillar. In 2024, the signing of a ten-year contract for the development of the Iran’s Chabahar port, combined with a doubling of trade between India and Russia along the corridor, marked a significant step forward for the project—despite persistent challenges, reinforced in particular by the new Trump administration’s announcement of its intent to roll back the sanctions waiver that India had thus far enjoyed at Chabahar. In addition, New Delhi and Moscow are considering deeper cooperation in the Arctic region, especially in the exploitation of natural resources, an objective reaffirmed by both leaders at the July 2024 summit. However, when it comes to energy trade—oil and gas—an issue at the heart of debates since the start of the war in Ukraine, many experts view it more as opportunism than “a step forward in the relationship.” At the July summit, the two countries highlighted two additional areas in which they intend to strengthen cooperation. The first concerns civil nuclear energy: to date, Russia remains the only country to have successfully built nuclear power plants at Kudankulam, just before the start of the war, and it plans to pursue similar projects. The second area is space cooperation, which dates back to the 1970s with the launch of India’s first satellite, Aryabhata, by a Soviet Cosmos-3M rocket from the Kapustin Yar base. In July 2024, Moscow and New Delhi reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening ties between the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the Russian space agency Roscosmos. Finally, and this aspect will be explored in greater detail later, the India-Russia strategic partnership still relies heavily on India’s imports of Russian weaponry and on the local co-production of platforms and ammunition. While Russia remained India’s leading arms supplier between 2020 and 2024, accounting for 36 % of the country’s imports, this share has declined significantly compared with earlier periods: 55 % between 2015 and 2019, and 72 % between 2010 and 2014. This trend reflects India’s diversification of its arms import sources, turning notably to France (33 % of Indian imports between 2020 and 2024), Israel (13 %), and the United States. Thus, despite recent developments, several strategic and political convergences persist, which explains why the partnership with Russia has been little questioned in India. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the war in Ukraine has created difficulties for the Russia-India relationship. A Relationship Put to the Test Since 2022: Reading Strategic Signals and Implications for Arms New Delhi’s stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, by choosing not to condemn Moscow explicitly, has been closely scrutinized since February 2022. Despite this, India’s official rhetoric has changed very little over the three years of war. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken minimally on the subject, merely noting that “today is not an era of war” and, more recently, during his visit to Ukraine, stating that India had “chosen the side of peace”. One of the most frequently cited arguments by the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, in response to criticism, is the geographical distance of the conflict: the war is perceived as European and would only have become global because of the sanctions. By extension, it holds little strategic importance for countries like India; thus, as Jaishankar put it, “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” The few critical voices at the start of the war have mostly fallen in line, such as parliamentarian and former Minister of State for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor, who had criticized India’s lack of condemnation in 2022. At the 2025 Raisina Dialogue, he acknowledged that India has a Prime Minister who “ can hug both the president of Ukraine and the president in Moscow two weeks apart and be accepted in both places.” More broadly, the Raisina Dialogue, the annual multilateral conference held in New Delhi under the aegis of the Indian government, which had been criticized in 2023 for giving a platform to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, reaffirmed itself this year as a showcase of India’s multipolar approach, sometimes described as a “fence-sitting” stance. With six panels addressing the issue of Ukraine and, more broadly, the future of Europe, the 2025 Raisina Dialogue was perceived by many observers as overly focused on the European continent. Another issue that could have seriously strained relations between Moscow and New Delhi, but which ultimately had “surprisingly” few diplomatic repercussions, concerns the presence of around one hundred Indian nationals fighting on the Russian front (of whom 12 are reported to have died to date). Many had gone for economic reasons, attracted by the promise of Russian naturalization after six months of service. In reality, their passports were confiscated upon arrival, and they were sent directly to the front lines. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar stated in front of the Indian Parliament that this was a priority issue that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had raised with Vladimir Putin in July 2024. Following a few reports in the Indian media, negotiations quickly led to the repatriation of 97 individuals, while 16 were declared “missing” by the Russian military. Thus, the war in Ukraine does not appear to have significantly altered India’s rhetoric toward Russia; however, the bilateral relationship has indeed been tested by the conflict for several reasons: the potential costs, particularly in the long term, associated with strategic signals perceived as favourable to Moscow, as well as the difficulties encountered in arms deliveries. Debates on Strategic Signals and Their Costs The Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow in 2024 elicited mixed reactions in India. Some praised it as a timely demonstration of India’s strategic autonomy—an autonomy that would “lose its significance if not upheld during the times of conflict.” Others, however, highlighted the limited concrete gains achieved during the visit, while questioning the rationale behind this diplomatic signal: it is unclear that “the reputational costs of Modi’s trip were outweighed by the supposed benefits of showcasing New Delhi’s ability to make independent foreign policy choices.” In contrast, Narendra Modi’s visit to Kyiv in August 2024, the first by an Indian Prime Minister to Ukraine since 1991, provoked more critical reactions in India: “Zelensky’s statements on Modi’s visit were most improper. [...] This is arrogant politics and an attempt to dictate India’s course of action.” Another comment noted: “Modi’s visit to Kyiv was not just ill-timed; India got an earful from Zelensky.” Nevertheless, the trip also helped to offset the strategic signal sent by the Moscow visit the previous month. Perceived as largely symbolic, the visit aimed to demonstrate India’s willingness to maintain the delicate diplomatic line it has upheld since 2022. Beyond the issues of strategic communication, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the long-term risks of weakening some of India’s partnerships due to its ambiguous stance. While this posture has not provoked immediate or medium-term diplomatic or official reactions, it remains a source of concern, as one interlocutor confided in an interview: it carries the risk of “winning a battle but losing the war.” This concern is compounded by the perception of a “declining utility” of the partnership with Moscow. Rajesh Rajagopalan, professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, points out that “far from driving a wedge between Russia and China, India’s Russia gambit is now possibly threatening to drive one between New Delhi and its Indo-Pacific partners.” Beyond the level of consideration expected from Western partners, the conflict in Ukraine has also underscored the lack of “drivers” or solid foundations in the relationship between India and Russia. According to analyst Happymon Jacob, it now appears to be “highly symbolic, but somewhat lacking in substance,” gradually evolving toward a more “transactional” logic. However, despite these warnings urging caution against overestimating the depth of the partnership and highlighting the potential cost of these strategic signals to India’s other partners, particularly Western ones, New Delhi appears inclined toward deepening this relationship. Moreover, the new Trump administration has reshuffled the cards by adopting a stance on the war in Ukraine that contrasts sharply with that of the previous administration. Indeed, President Trump and his team place the responsibility for the war on Ukraine, thereby creating transatlantic divisions over the approach toward Russia. These divisions are likely to influence India’s strategic calculations; India’s position could become much easier to maintain over the next four years, and the “risks” associated with deepening the partnership could be considerably lower. Concerns about Arms Deliveries The trend toward diversification of India’s military procurement, particularly its gradual distancing from Russia, is a long-term phenomenon that began well before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Some analysts had already suggested that India would avoid signing new “mega-contracts” in the future, even as the question of acquiring a fifth-generation fighter jet arises, between the Russian Sukhoi-57, highlighted at the Aero India 2025 airshow, and the American F-35, following Donald Trump’s (perhaps symbolic) offer. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, has accelerated this diversification trend and raised new concerns within India’s defence community, based on lessons learned from the battlefield. Concerns have particularly focused on the ability of Russian weapons platforms to meet the demands of modern warfare, even though, as elsewhere in the world, analysts are drawing lessons from the war and are reassured by the fact that this equipment is being tested in combat. In the shorter term, Indian concerns have focused on delivery delays and the indirect effects of Western sanctions imposed on Russia. The case of the INS Chakra III is particularly illustrative: this Akula-class nuclear attack submarine, for which the contract was signed in 2019 with an initial delivery scheduled for 2025, is now expected to reach India only in 2028. This delay could have significant consequences for India’s power-projection capabilities, especially in the context of a substantial increase in Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, even though the Indian Navy is also diversifying its sources by acquiring additional Scorpène and German submarines. Other delays have reinforced these concerns. The two Talwar-class frigates, contracted in 2018, were originally due for delivery in 2022-2023; however, the first, INS Tushil, was commissioned only in December 2024, and the second, INS Tamal, not until July 1st, 2025. Finally, it is primarily the fourth and fifth S-400 systems that are causing worry: their delivery has been postponed twice and is now expected to take place in 2026, a “major delay” that was discussed during the Indian Defence Minister’s visit to Moscow in December 2024. These systems are particularly essential in the defence of India’s land borders with its Chinese and Pakistani neighbours. Their effectiveness was in fact tested during the recent Indo-Pakistani conflict in May 2025, as were the jointly manufactured BrahMos missiles. Beyond these large contracts, difficulties and delays have also been observed in the delivery of spare parts, which have been identified as a “major problem” for India. These concerns, while important, must nonetheless be put into perspective given the many other contracts that involve production on Indian soil. The acquisition of 12 additional Su-30MKs at the end of 2024, as part of the “Super Sukhoi” modernization project, for example, allows India to produce the aircraft locally, with 62.6 % of the components sourced from Indian industry, via Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Similarly, a contract signed in 2019 provides for the local production of 464 T-90S tanks from blueprints and parts supplied by Russia, accompanied by the signing of an “Acceptance of Necessity” to acquire 1,350 additional engines intended for the modernization of existing armoured vehicles. In the same vein, the construction of two additional Talwar-class frigates (in addition to those imported from Russia, whose delivery was delayed) was launched at the Goa shipyard, with the INS Triput launched in July 2024. These acquisitions are ideal for India, which is seeking to transition toward a more autonomous defence industry while maintaining its operational capabilities; the local production model with partial technology transfer thus enabling it to maximize its strategic autonomy. It is nevertheless noteworthy that, in the framework of Operation Sindoor, launched by India in response to the Pahalgam attack in May 2025, no Russian-origin platforms, particularly the Sukhois and MiGs, were deployed to carry out strikes—only to conduct combat air patrols. The question remains as to whether this was a deliberate strategic choice or an operational constraint. Difficulties Arising from New Regional and International Dynamics The India-Russia-China Strategic Triangle A third factor weakening the Indo-Russian partnership is undoubtedly the strategic rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow, which constitutes a major irritant for New Delhi. This “no-limits friendship,” proclaimed in 2022, was highlighted by NATO members at the July 2024 summit (which coincided with Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia), whose communiqué described China as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Historically, Russia has remained neutral on Sino-Indian disputes, with Moscow consistently reiterating that border tensions were a “bilateral issue.” However, within strategic circles in New Delhi, there is growing concern about China’s ability to influence certain Russian decisions, which could block or slow down projects deemed too favourable to Indian strategic interests. This concern is all the greater given that China has been identified as India’s main long-term security challenge. This dynamic has even led some Indian military officials to adopt an unusually critical tone, such as former Chief of Army Staff General Manoj Mukund Naravane, who published an op-ed arguing for a less conciliatory stance toward Russia because of its rapprochement with China. In this context, the recent and relative improvement in Sino-Indian relations, most notably illustrated by the meeting between Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan in the fall of 2024, was welcomed by Moscow. This détente could, in the short term, help reduce certain tensions. Still, in the longer term, the evolution of this “strategic triangle” will remain a decisive factor in the depth of the Indo-Russian partnership. This India-China-Russia triangle is sometimes presented as “the most important foreign policy challenge in the coming years.” For India, this challenge lies in avoiding the strengthening of the China-Russia axis, out of fear that total isolation might push Russia into China’s arms and turn it into a “client state” of that adversary. In the longer run, New Delhi anticipates that once the war ends, Moscow will seek to rebalance its partnerships so as not to remain dependent on Beijing. This strategic triangle is also rooted in broader groupings and dynamics, whether within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS+, as well as in the competing claims of China and India to leadership of the “Global South,” each with a very specific vision of what that entails. Thus, within this strategic triangle, India may seek to exploit weaknesses in the Sino-Russian relationship, something encouraged by specific strategic signals Russia has directed toward India. As analyst Happymon Jacob explains, “from the Indian perspective, the best-case scenario would be to drive a wedge between Russian and Chinese strategies in the region; would be to ensure that their strategies do not align against Indian interests.” This triangle may therefore have reached “a precarious balance”: India is careful not to push Russia into China’s arms, while Moscow needs New Delhi as a counterweight to avoid excessive dependence on Beijing. Nevertheless, observers broadly agree that China is clearly “in the driver’s seat” in this triangle. The Pakistan Question: Some Post-Pahalgam Lessons Another point of attention for New Delhi is the discreet warming of relations between Russia and Pakistan, notably illustrated by Russian support for Pakistan’s inclusion in BRICS+. While the Russo-Pakistani partnership is in no way comparable to that of India, Russia and Pakistan have nonetheless developed their cooperation in recent years, for example, through joint exercises in October 2024 to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities, something that is obviously not welcomed in New Delhi. In April-May 2025, in response to the Pahalgam attack, India launched Operation Sindoor targeting terrorist groups based in Pakistan; this was followed by an escalation and a conflict with its Pakistani neighbour. In response to these developments, Russia immediately expressed concern and called on both sides to exercise “restraint.” The Russian Foreign Minister offered to mediate, despite India having consistently refused third-party involvement, particularly on the Kashmir issue. One can also question the influence of the China-Russia rapprochement on Russia’s measured stance in this conflict, especially given that Pakistan extensively deployed Chinese-origin military capabilities as part of its “Bunyan Marsoos” operation (in response to India). A Partnership that Continues to Fit Within India’s Vision of a Multipolar Order India continues to value its partnership with Russia, fully framing it within its vision of a multipolar international order and its broader perspective based on strategic ambiguity and autonomy. More than a deep partnership built on mutual trust, this relationship operates as a set of carefully calibrated signals, allowing New Delhi to preserve its strategic leeway while benefiting from the opportunistic advantages provided by its ties with Moscow. An analysis of arms imports reveals the compatibility of the Indo-Russian relationship with India’s preferred model of cooperation: a flexible, issue-based approach based on specific converging interests rather than systematic alignment. Aware of the risks of excessive dependence, whether on Russia or any other partner, India pursues a pragmatic diversification while preserving its ties with Moscow. At the same time, New Delhi has been pushing to expand its arms exports, particularly of more advanced technologies, which in some cases compete with long-standing Russian monopolies, as exemplified by Armenia, where 43 % of imports between 2022 and 2024 came from India. The assertion of this multipolar vision championed by New Delhi is also reflected in the way India and Russia cooperate within the BRICS(+), which India considers “a useful instrument for engendering multipolarity wherein becomes one of the several great powers in the global system.” *** As Vladimir Putin’s visit to India approaches in the fall of 2025, the Indo-Russian relationship appears as a relatively strong partnership, certainly tested in recent years, but still grounded in shared strategic interests. The return of Donald Trump to the White House could continue to reinforce this trend. As Subrahmanyam Jaishankar pointed out, “ will change a lot of things. Some may be out of the syllabus, but we have to conduct foreign policy out of the syllabus in the interest of the country.” Consequently, maintaining the Russo-Indian partnership could prove all the more relevant under Trump 2.0, insofar as Washington’s more conciliatory attitude toward Moscow would make India’s position more sustainable. In this context, New Delhi’s rhetoric on the Ukrainian issue, according to which “this is not an era of war,” seems to be reinforced by Donald Trump’s comments, which Narendra Modi welcomed during his visit to Washington in February 2025. However, this strategy is a double-edged sword. As analyst Ashley Tellis points out, while India may reap short-term tactical gains, it must not underestimate the damage inflicted on the international order by the Trump administration and by Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Contrary to India’s expectations, the “destruction of the liberal international order does not presage multipolarity, but rather consolidates the bipolarity that will subsist amid increasing entropy in global politics.” The hedging posture adopted by India, illustrated by Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s remark that “Europe’s problems are not the world’s problems,” may have allowed it to navigate international challenges and pressure from its partners. Still, there is no guarantee that this strategy will be sufficient in the face of the Sino-Russian rapprochement. The post-Pahalgam conflict has, moreover, highlighted certain vulnerabilities of this approach. Thus, the India-Russia partnership has withstood the tensions caused by the war in Ukraine, but its relevance as a deep strategic partnership, rather than merely a relationship of circumstance, could be called into question in an increasingly fractured world. ## How should Canada deploy, support, and expand its new strategy for Africa? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/how-should-canada-deploy-support-and-expand-its-new-strategy-for-africa/ Modified: 2025-11-14 Policy Forum Politique is a new publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic of national security significance to Canada. For this third edition, we ask four experts for their perspectives on Canada's new Africa strategy. Nadège Compaoré | University of Toronto Canada has the largest foreign investment presence in Africa’s mining sector, with over 37 billion dollars in mining assets on the continent. Canada’s Africa Strategy should rethink the current terms of partnerships with mineral-rich African countries, including in regions such as the Sahel region, and go beyond economics by addressing peace and security issues. With the growing importance of Africa’s critical mineral reserves for renewable energy, countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and its massive cobalt reserve are worthy of a deeper bilateral, diplomatic focus, which should prioritize the welfare of local communities. Any rethinking of the mining partnership with Africa should also involve more oversight of Canadian mining companies operating in Africa. This matter thus far has been left to the companies themselves given their voluntary abidance with  Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) frameworks when it comes to engaging in extractive sectors across the continent. Beyond generating economic returns, developing a cohesive vision and strategy for mining governance partnership with African countries should be more systematically guided by environmental and human rights considerations. Fashioning this strategic vision would require more collaboration with, and regulation of, Canadian-based corporate actors in Africa, as well close alignment with existing regional standards such as the African Union’s Africa Mining Vision. Canada’s Africa Strategy currently does not elaborate on possible mechanisms for a mining partnership. Yes, it highlights critical minerals as a priority area whose access the government seeks to facilitate for “the private sector and stakeholders”, including through a “high-level trade mission” to Africa. And indeed, the mining sector is fundamentally relevant to all five strategic areas elaborated in the overall Strategy, including national security. However, taking a Canada-Africa mining partnership seriously also means taking seriously the concept of a “home state responsibility” when it comes to Canada’s mining presence in Africa. Canada thus needs to develop a sustainable, rights-based, approach to investment. Given its past experiences with government-led  CSR strategies that were designed to promote the welfare and protection of host communities where Canadian companies operate, the Canadian government knows it plays a crucial role in shaping ethical investments abroad. Canada’s Africa Strategy is the opportunity to take ownership of this role. A home state responsibility mechanism should not be contained at the bilateral level and would be more effective when positioned at regional and global levels. Nadège Compaoré is an Assistant Professor of International Relations (IR) in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto Mississauga. Her work lies at the intersection of critical IR theory, International Law, African politics, global extractivism, gender and race in IR.  Marie-Eve Desrosiers | University of Ottawa Canada's new strategy for Africa comes at an opportune moment, as international competition between different countries to increase their influence on the continent is more palpable than ever. However, what this strategy proposes, particularly in the areas of governance, support for democratic processes, and the defense of human rights, remains timid, even outdated. The African continent has not been immune to the great democratic recession that has gripped the world for two decades. While it is home to some of the most compelling examples of a return to democracy, such as the Seychelles, it is also at the heart of a wave of coups d'état that is particularly affecting the Sahel. Elsewhere on the continent, authoritarianism continues to take root, less spectacularly than a takeover by force, but just as worrying. The number of attempts to amend the constitution to allow a president to remain in power beyond the constitutional limits has grown significantly in Africa over the past 15 years. Finally, Africa is also a context in which more and more authoritarian countries are seeking to deepen their relations, which changes the game in terms of the influence that countries like Canada can have. Times, trends, and practices have changed. Yet what Canada is proposing in its strategy is no different from the approach that pro-democracy countries have been proposing for the past ten years. Supporting electoral processes, countering disinformation, promoting gender equality, and protecting human rights—the priorities put forward under the heading of “governance” in the new strategy—are certainly major issues. But they are also the same priorities that have dominated since well before the current democratic recession took root. These priorities have also overshadowed other essential dimensions of democratic resilience, such as strengthening the justice system, parliaments, and public audit institutions, which are now underfunded. However, the main forces of resistance to the authoritarian tendencies observed in Africa in recent years have been based on the spirit of the rule of law, the independence of the courts, and citizen mobilization within coalitions that transcend class and identity. These are also priorities that Canada should place at the heart of its strategy if it wants it to be relevant to the current governance challenges in Africa. Marie-Eve Desrosiers holds the Research Chair in International Francophonie on political aspirations and movements in Francophone Africa. She is Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA).  Nicolas Klingelschmitt | UQAM The announcement of the launch of Canada's new strategy for Africa in March 2025 follows nearly two years of consultations with partners and experts. However, although it is presented as “new,” at first glance it does not appear to introduce any major innovations in Ottawa's foreign policy on the continent. While not revolutionary, in order to advance its diplomatic, economic, and peace and security objectives, it must above all be accompanied by resources, align its programs and objectives with a more targeted and distinct vision of the continent's 54 states, and emphasize strengthening ties and the visibility of opportunities on both sides. Let's start with the obvious: to have a good strategy, Canada must first finance it. By comparison, the Indo-Pacific strategy was accompanied by a budget of more than CAD 2 billion when it was launched in 2022. However, no specific additional disbursements have yet materialized following the announcement of Canada's new Africa strategy. Second, to have a good foreign policy toward its African partners, Canada must in fact have several, considering Africa in all its diversity of regions, contexts, and actors. Essentializing the continent into a single grand strategy is a mistake that carries the risk of prejudice and strategic miscalculations. Finally, and this point is essential to implementing the previous one, Ottawa must strengthen its diplomatic network across the continent. Canada has 15 embassies and nine high commissions and, for the past two years, has had a permanent representative to the African Union (AU), but it does not have equivalent emissaries dedicated entirely to any of the eight Regional Economic Communities officially recognized by the AU, or to the monetary unions of West or Central Africa. However, more of these strategic bilateral and multilateral relays are needed to strengthen local public and private partnerships and send a positive signal to potential Canadian investors by demonstrating Canada's commitment not only in words, but also in financial, material, and human terms. Nicolas Klingelschmitt is a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Quebec in Montreal and holds a bachelor's degree in law and political science as well as a master's degree in international relations - international program management from the University of Lyon 3 (France). Falk Petegou | University of Ottawa Canada's new strategy for Africa should be implemented using a differentiated approach—that is, one that takes into account differences, specificities, needs, and contexts.  This implies that Canada should develop an index to measure priority criteria. This Canadian index for cooperation in Africa could be updated annually to evaluate each partner and consist of qualitative indicators such as political stability, economic potential, diplomacy, climate commitment, social inclusion, and human security. Each African partner country could be ranked on a global score of 140, with 20 points for each indicator according to Canada's priorities. The scores would be used to determine the level of compatibility with Canada's objectives. The results would be used to determine the type of intervention. For example, Senegal and South Africa have strong economic potential and political stability, which would allow for the launch of an investment fund for local startups in partnership with Canadian companies. Priority should be considered as the consensus on compliance with the standards set out in the implementation of intervention actions. It could be measured in key intervention sectors based on an analysis of discourse related to shared and common security. Discourse refers to statements found in administrative acts, press releases, public and official positions, testimonials, briefs, and other scientific publications. It is based on the following criteria: productivity (e.g., Canada's declaration on peace and security in the Sahel with the launch of training programs for local actors in the protection of civilians and human rights), iterability (e.g., the repetition of the principles of conflict prevention, gender equality, and inclusion at the Canada-Africa Summit and the African Union), and social recognition (e.g., Canadian support for women's participation in peace processes taken up by partners in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Finally, an intervention schedule should be developed based on the priorities identified. Falk Petegou is a visiting professor at the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa and holds a Ph.D. in International Studies. He has been a visiting researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). ## How Should Canada Manage Its Relationship with China in 2026? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/how-should-canada-manage-its-relationship-with-china-in-2026/ Modified: 2026-02-19 Policy Forum Politique is a new publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic of national security significance to Canada. For this fifth edition, we ask four experts for their perspectives on the following question: Not long after Prime Minister Mark Carney's announced a rekindled 'strategic partnership' with China, a country that Canada's 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy cast as 'an increasingly disruptive global power', the United States has warned that any free trade agreement with that country could fundamentally harm Canada and jeopardize CUSMA, which is under review later this year. In your expert view, how should Canada go about managing its diplomatic and economic relationship with China in 2026? Balkan Devlen | MacDonald-Laurier Institute Prime Minister Mark Carney's "strategic partnership" with China rests on four assumptions: that China is a reliable trading partner, that Ottawa possesses meaningful leverage with Beijing, that cozying up to Washington's chief geopolitical rival will somehow strengthen Ottawa's hand in CUSMA renegotiations, and that this government can skillfully manage the attendant risks. All four assumptions are flawed. China has a long history of economic coercion, including against Canada, predating Trump 2.0. Canada's trade dependence on the United States dwarfs any leverage that a China gambit might provide. Signaling closer ties with Beijing is far more likely to provoke American backlash than extract concessions. Meanwhile, the federal government's recent track record—from foreign interference failures to the Two Michaels debacle to questionable industrial policy decisions like EV subsidies—offers little confidence in its capacity to walk this tightrope. Arguing that Carney represents a fresh start ignores that the broader team remains largely unchanged. Carney's Davos rhetoric about middle powers banding together rings hollow. As China pressures Japan to alter its policies, Ottawa remains conspicuously silent. Seeking bilateral deals with an authoritarian power that has interfered in Canadian elections, engaged in espionage, subversion, and economic coercion, and detained Canadian citizens is not how middle powers protect their interests. What should Canada do? The ideal path would see Ottawa join a coalition of like-minded democracies—the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, France—to collectively resist Chinese economic coercion while working with, not against, the United States to strengthen transatlantic economic ties. Canada should also draw a clear line: expand agricultural and energy exports to China while firmly restricting cooperation in intellectual property, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, and scientific research. Simultaneously, Ottawa must pursue robust counterintelligence operations to signal that Chinese interference in Canadian affairs will not be tolerated. Commodity trade poses manageable risks; deeper integration does not. Dr. Balkan Devlen is the Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Co-Founder and Principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory. He is a teacher, foreign policy analyst, and consultant with over two decades of experience across three continents. Yuxi Liu | ShanghaiTech University Breaking the Lens, Seeing China Anew As Canada charts its course with China in 2026, its primary challenge is not technical negotiation but a cognitive one: it must break free from mental models constrained by labels like “increasingly disruptive power” and the habitual lens of Washington. Historically, however, Canada’s most consequential China policies, from Pierre Trudeau’s rapprochement onward, were grounded in an ability to engage China on its own terms, beyond dominant geopolitical scripts. A fundamental shift is thus imperative. Canada must cultivate a new diplomatic framework that recognizes the diverse dynamics of Chinese society and the aspirations of its people, that draws on fine-grained research rather than impute intentionality, and that develops a spirit of constructive exploration for identifying mutually beneficial areas for cooperation. For this new framework to be substantive, it must be nourished by a deeper, more nuanced public understanding of China. This requires a conscious shift away from reactive, threat-centric narratives. A society that can discuss China without automatic suspicion is better equipped to make strategic, interest-based decisions. Furthermore, the immense value of Canada’s people-to-people ties – its vibrant Chinese Canadian communities, students, and sister-city relationships – must be strategically recognized and nurtured. These bonds form a crucial bridge for contact and mutual understanding, especially when official relations cool. Achieving this demands a concerted, long-term investment from government, academia, the business community, and other actors of civil society – initiatives pursued not for fleeting political gain but for foundational understanding. Canada’s path forward begins in 2026 with the courage to dismantle these cognitive barriers and to build a policy grounded in its own national interest and comprehensive and understanding of an authentic China. Only then can a stable and sustainable roadmap for bilateral relations be drawn. Dr. Yuxi Liu is Assistant Professor in ShanghaiTech University’s Institute of Humanities and an expert of Sino-Canadian relations. She holds a Ph.D from the Université du Québec à Montréal in history and previously also held research positions in Switzerland and France. Pascale Massot | University of Ottawa Carney’s visit to China needs to be situated within a broader context First, the North American context forms the immediate backdrop and established the dominant frame around economic resilience and diversification objectives. These goals are both essential and difficult to balance given Canadian provincial politics and the joint review of CUSMA scheduled for this summer. The electric vehicle (EV) agreement raises major questions about the future of the EV industry and, more broadly, the future of the automotive industry in Canada. Here, the Canadian government will have to chart a course that reconciles the various interests at stake, all the while keeping an eye on the mid- to long-term. Second, the geopolitical context also matters given the significant role that China plays internationally. Canadians must stop equating a functioning diplomatic relationship with the second economy in the world with an endorsement of that country’s policies. China is a major global power that influences a range of issues of national and international interest, and Canada must have a substantive relationship with that country. Anything short of that is not in Canada’s interests. To be sure, the relationship will not be all smooth sailing—there are areas where our interests overlap and others where they do not. This was true before and it remains true today, but this is not a return to some bygone era. This is a new era, one that must build on our bilateral history. Canada's 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy labelled China 'an increasingly disruptive global power' and while the government has been skating around whether it has shifted position on this assessment, we must get used to holding more than one idea in our heads at the same time. The fact that China’s rise has disrupted the status quo and is transforming the world is more of a descriptive statement than anything else. This diagnostic matters, but what matters even more is what we do next. Prime Minister Mark Carney showed great assertiveness by going to China ahead of President Trump’s visit in April. Yet the visit did not resolve all the tensions and contradictions inherent in our relationship that require careful management over the coming years. Pascale Massot is an Associate Professor at the School of Political Studies of the University of Ottawa. In 2022, she was a member of the Indo-Pacific Advisory Committee to the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Stephen R. Nagy | International Christian University, Tokyo Managing China in 2026: Discipline, Leverage, and Guardrails Canada should manage China in 2026 with disciplined, sequenced engagement—protecting core alliance equities with the United States while keeping narrow, interest-based channels with Beijing open. First, Ottawa must treat CUSMA and the U.S. market as structural realities, not as one option among many. With the agreement under review, Canada should remove ambiguity: no FTA track with China, full transparency with Washington on any China-related commercial understandings, and clear enforcement that Canada will not become a transshipment route for Chinese goods into the U.S. The objective is de-escalation and predictability, not Davos applause. Second, Canada should shift from “strategic partnership” language to “selective cooperation + risk management.” China is simultaneously a market and—per Canada’s own Indo-Pacific Strategy—an “increasingly disruptive global power.” Engagement should focus on non-strategic sectors (agri-food, consular cases, student mobility, climate where feasible), while erecting firm guardrails in critical minerals, advanced tech, data, and dual-use research. Third, Ottawa should build leverage before engagement by tightening partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the EU, and Southeast Asian states—on supply chains, standards, and economic security. In practice: deepen CPTPP coordination, expand minilateral resilience arrangements, and pursue “plug-in” cooperation on maritime domain awareness, sanctions evasion, and critical inputs. Fourth, Canada needs domestic democratic resilience as foreign policy: fully implement and enforce the foreign influence transparency registry, strengthen research security and university disclosure rules, and create actionable channels between intelligence assessments and political decision-making. If interference vulnerabilities persist, allies will discount Canada as a security partner, and Beijing will continue to exploit permissive seams. Finally, Ottawa should communicate a simple doctrine: engage where interests overlap, deter where interests collide, and never trade continental security for short-term market relief. In short: talk less grandly, align more carefully, diversify patiently, and engage China only where Canada can absorb coercion and still say no. Dr. Stephen Nagy received his PhD in International Relations/Studies from Waseda University in 2008. His main affiliation is as Professor at the International Christian University, Tokyo. He is also a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI); a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA); a senior fellow at the MacDonald Laurier Institute (MLI); and a senior fellow with the East Asia Security Centre (EASC). Image Credit: Fred Dufour-Pool/Getty Images ## How to Assess the Russian Military Threat on the Canadian Territory? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/how-to-assess-the-russian-military-threat-on-the-canadian-territory/ Modified: 2022-04-25 > The idea that Canadian territory could be attacked by a Russian air, ballistic or naval attack is not new. Scientific or media literature... The idea that Canadian territory could be attacked by a Russian air, ballistic or naval attack is not new. Scientific or media literature testifies to the recurrence of this concern among Canadian opinion, a fear fuelled by political friction with Russia. This tension has been particularly acute since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the resumption of air patrols by Russian bombers in the Arctic. Contrary to the behaviour of Russian forces in the Baltic or the Sea of Japan, an analysis had pointed out that the frequency of these patrols, sometimes conducted to the edge of U.S. or Canadian airspace in the Arctic, had nothing illegal in itself, presented a low risk and, above all, hardly reflected any major military pressure. In general, scenarios of Russian aggression against Canada are difficult to conceive outside the framework of an escalation triggered by either side. To date, Russia has been careful to contain the conflict to Ukraine, while sending clear political and military signals (cruise missile attacks on Ukrainian sites near the Polish border) to NATO about where the red lines should not be crossed. Ballistic Threat. As in the Cold War era, the shortest route from Russian launch sites to Canada is through the heart of the Arctic. This led to the decision to build the Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar line built in the 1950s (1954-57) and upgraded to the North Warning System (NWS) in the late 1980s. The surveillance carried out by the NWS is completed by the Canadian base of Alert (electronic listening) and by the American base of Thule in the extreme north of Greenland. Yet, any ballistic attack leaves little time for reaction: it is more the detection by satellite imagery of the preparation for launching land-based missiles (opening of silos) that can give an indication of the imminence of an attack. Furthermore, an attack could also be launched from strategic submarines stationed, given the range of their missiles, in the Atlantic or Pacific. As such, it is rather on the political level that the detection of a possible attack must be carried out: is the Russian government's discourse changing? Is there an inflection in the discourse on political thresholds? For the moment, if Russia has maintained an ambiguity on the transition between conventional and nuclear weapons, the Russian doctrine sticks to the idea that Moscow will use nuclear weapons in Ukraine only in case of an "existential threat" against Russia, as Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared on Tuesday, March 22. Knowing that the Ukrainian army does not have nuclear weapons since 1994 and no chemical weapons, what does an existential threat in Ukraine mean? Any credible political threat to the regime, from this point of view, could be interpreted by President Putin as an existential threat. In this light, displaying the fall of the Russian government as a political objective for the West could prove risky. It can be observed that Russia seems to have perfectly mastered what is called the "grammar of deterrence," while leaving ambiguity about the notion of "existential threat," which corresponds to what the West calls "vital interests." However, in this area, nuclear deterrence with mutual assured destruction (MAD) remains effective for the moment. Naval Threat. The latter is of the same order as the ballistic missile threat: submarines can fire missiles, nuclear or conventional (range of about 1,000 km for hypersonic Zircons), from many points along Canada's maritime approaches.  It is somewhat unrealistic to think that we can guard against such surprise attacks. As with possible air raids (see below), the possibility of an attack by conventional missiles fired from submarines raises the question of the usefulness of such an attack for Russia: after damaging a military base or a port, what advantage would Russia gain from knowing that it would have to deal with the retaliation? This type of threat would only make sense in the context of a conventional escalation, for example in response to NATO's entry into the conflict through a no-fly zone. Aerial Threat. A Russian aerial attack against Canada would likely come through the Arctic.  So, what assets do the Russian Air Force have? The heavy bombers (Tu-95 Bear, Tu-160 Blackjack) are based at airbases further south, Engels, Shaykovka, Belaya or Ukrainka, but it is easy to transfer them with their logistical support to Siberian airfields. This includes those that have been recently renovated (and not built ex-nihilo), such as Nagurskoye, Rogachevo, Sredny Ostrov, Temp (Kotelny) or Anadyr. The risk is that this redeployment might not be detected by satellite observation. Conversely, an escort of fighters for these bombers seems more difficult to deploy: Russian fighters such as the Sukhoi-35 Flanker E (1,800 km) or the modern Sukhoi-57 Felon (2,200 km) have insufficient range to be able to escort them to Canadian territory, unless they resort to in-flight refuelling with pre-positioned Ilyushin Il-78s, of which the Russians have only a small number. However, this would also increase the risk of advanced detection by the Thule or NWS radars because of the pre-positioning of the refuelling planes, and because the refuelling operation is carried out at medium altitude. Figure 1. Location of Russian strategic air force bases and bomber patrol routes. Source : Lasserre et Têtu, 2016. These bombers have long ranges (Tu-160: 6,100 km; Tu-95: 7,500 km), which enables them to reach the northern part of the Prairie provinces from Siberian airfields. Equipped with conventionally armed cruise missiles, such as the AS-15 Kent (2,500 km) or hypersonic semi-ballistic missiles fired from aircraft such as the Kinjal (2,000 km), the bombers could then threaten major urban centers. Assuming, of course, that they had not been intercepted beforehand after such a long incursion into Canadian territory.  The attack could also target NWS radar stations or air bases such as Cold Lake in northern Alberta, or Elmendorff in Alaska, which would allow bombers to launch their missiles shortly before their arrival over Canadian territory in the case of an attack on Cold Lake. The stand-off capability of cruise missiles makes the vulnerability of installations in the Far North very tangible, with a reduced time between detection and interception. Everything would then depend on the number of missiles fired, which could saturate the available anti-aircraft equipment, Patriot batteries or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to counter semi-ballistic hypersonic missiles like the Kinjal. Such a threat seems difficult to counter completely, especially in a first strike, as it requires airborne warning and control system (AWACS) radar aircraft and interceptors (CF18, F22, F15) to conduct combat air patrols very far from the bases.[1] It would thus be challenging, although not impossible, to offset such an attack. The farther south one goes, the more Russian aircrafts would be forced to enter deep into North American airspace to get within range, making them easier to intercept. Therefore, two questions remain: What is the effective range of NWS radars, possibly supported by flights of advanced warning aircraft (AWACS, e.g. E-3 Sentry), in case of fear of possible Russian incursions? In the media, there are statements by experts that the North Warning System is "incapable of responding to modern missile technology." North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) officers, who oversee the control of approaches to North American airspace, have surely analyzed the detection performance of NWS radars since 2007, depending on whether Russian patrols were flying at high or low altitudes. From this examination, knowing that radars must also be effective against missiles, and that hypersonic missiles are difficult to intercept without a high density of anti-aircraft assets, will come the recommendation to modernize, or not, the NWS’ detection systems. What could be the doctrine of use of such Russian attacks? After all, what would be the point of Russia destroying the Cold Lake base with a single raid if its objective is not a full-scale war against NATO?  What would be the point of such an isolated incursion, if not to trigger a retaliatory raid and then war against the West?  From a strict point of view of political or military effectiveness, such an isolated raid is therefore unlikely, that is as long as we place ourselves in the framework of a reasoning based on a shared rationality of military cost/political benefit. Answering the question of Canadian military preparedness also raises the question of intelligence on Russian government representations and posturing: are we still in the realm of the rational, or do decisions become unpredictable? We Cannot Disconnect the Political From the Military. These questions underscore that military capability issues do not adequately sum up the Canadian security equation. It is much more the question of objectives, the political context of the evolution of the conflict, that must provide the basic analytical framework: why would Russia attack Canada or a NATO country? The evolution of the conflict guides the parameters of the Russian government’s reasoning. In the context of the fog of war, one is obviously reduced to conjecture, but some elements are worth emphasizing. There seems to be no reason for Russia to strike a Canadian base unless there is a major shift in the conflict. This inflection could come from NATO, which would have intervened, through a flight ban over Ukraine for example, or because, having lost the war and seeing its army experiencing great difficulties and conscripts surrendering en masse, Vladimir Putin believes that a deliberate escalation in terror would be the best option. Black scenario, hypothetical, but not unthinkable: the Russian army has recorded, out of 200,000 soldiers engaged, losses ranging from 7,500 to 15,000 killed according to sources (the Russian army reported only 498 dead as of March 16), including 9,861 dead according to a Russian daily newspaper, and from 14,000 to 21,000 wounded, i.e., about 5% killed and losses of between 10 and 15%, which is a very high attrition rate in a month of fighting. For the record, bearing in mind that these two conflicts are not of the same nature, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan cost the Red Army some 14,500 deaths between 1979 and 1989. Localized counterattacks underline the fact that the Ukrainian army has not lost its capacity to react. The continuation of the conflict points to the cohesiveness of the Ukrainian army; to the management of ammunition, with the Russian stockpile of cruise missiles diminishing, while it appears that Western arms deliveries to Ukraine are ongoing. Will the cohesion of the Russian army be maintained? Would the tactical and logistical difficulties incite the government in a headlong rush, with massive bombings, the use of chemical weapons, or even, in case of a Russian perception of great fragility, recourse to nuclear weapons? Additionally, Vladimir Putin’s regime seems to rely increasingly on a militaristic ideology whose ultimate goal is “the victory of the Russian world” over “hostile Western forces that threaten its survival” and where war is seen as not only an acceptable, but the most effective tool for achieving geopolitical goals. This discourse underscores that the question of the weight of Russian leaders’ representations and policy objectives remains crucial. It may evolve as the war in Ukraine stalls, and even turn to Russia's possible tactical disadvantage. While it is hard to imagine a first use of force by Russia against NATO, the risks of accidental escalation or headlong rush are never zero. [1] This, incidentally, underlines the relevance of long-range fighters to protect large Arctic areas. This is not a characteristic of the F-35, whose range is very short, 1,100 km compared to 1,300 km for the F-22, and 1,800 km for the F-18. ## India’s Place in the Quad in Light of AUKUS URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/indias-place-in-the-quad-in-light-of-aukus/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > What are the effects of the announcement of AUKUS on the Quad and, more specifically, on India's role in this organization? Context The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a cooperative group, comprised of India, Japan, Australia and the United States, that was first established in May 2007. This structure was inherited from the "Core Group," which was formed after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, as a means of coordinating humanitarian assistance. The member states subsequently wanted to expand the scope of their activities, in particular by organizing joint military exercises such as the Malabar Exercises. While the group has never shown a desire to counter China's growing power in the region, Beijing's reaction has been virulent, calling the Quad a "little NATO." Ultimately, Australia's rapid withdrawal officially ended this first test in 2008. The Quad was reborn at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Manila in November 2017. Its goal is now to "promote a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region to serve the interests of all powers in the region and the world." The decision comes amid rising tensions between the United States and China under the Trump administration. For New Delhi, it also comes at a strategic moment, only months after its face-off with China's People's Liberation Army on the Doklam plateau and the official inauguration of China's permanent military base in Djibouti on August 1st, 2017. The Quad countries explicitly refused to make it an anti-China military alliance. According to some analysts, it is notably India's reluctance that limits the scope of this cooperation. However, the Quad, by allowing its members to assert their solidarity, sends a clear strategic message to China which is "sufficiently restrained to avoid significant blowback from Beijing." With the convening of the first (virtual) summit of the Quad’s heads of state in March 2021, the new U.S. president, Joe Biden, seemed to make this organization a central pillar of his strategy for a "free and open Indo-Pacific." Nevertheless, with the announcement in September 2021, a week before the first face-to-face summit of Quad leaders, of the formation of AUKUS -- a trilateral security alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, a new circle was drawn, one in which India was excluded. What are the effects of such an announcement on the Quad and, more specifically, on India's role in this organization? The creation of AUKUS raises an issue as it casts doubts in India about the reliability of the United States. Yet, despite the concerns, the alliance does not appear to be causing a weakening of strategic cooperation within the Quad. On the contrary, it would clarify the position of this security dialogue. Finally, AUKUS and its effects could even allow India to maintain its strategic autonomy. The Question of U.S. Reliability Good relations between India and the United States are recent – as India remains highly reluctant to form an alliance with the West. Indeed, the United States is perceived by many in India as a fallible partner. This image has deep roots dating back to the Cold War following American cooperation with Pakistan and India's ostracization in the international community after the 1974 nuclear tests. More recently, the Communist Party of India was vocal in its opposition to cooperation with the Americans in the 2005 nuclear deal. The birth of the Quad 1.0 has revived these criticisms. Thus, during a visit to Beijing in 2007, then Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh was forced to reaffirm India's "independent foreign policy." In the summer of 2021, the departure of the United States from Afghanistan has revived this debate in the face of a possible return of Taliban-supported terrorist groups to the India-Pakistan border. It is in this context of mistrust that the AUKUS announcement was made. This event had yet again underlined India’s existing concerns towards the reliability of the U.S. as a partner. Indeed, the announcement is accompanied by a delivery of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, causing the termination of a contract with Naval Group, a French company, signed in 2016 and which provided for the sale of twelve conventionally powered submarines. This announcement provoked strong reactions in France, including the recall of the French ambassador to Australia and the United States. This event further damaged the reputation of the American ally. China has, moreover, taken advantage of this to develop the narrative that the United States is a fallible ally, as AUKUS would show that the "America First" mentality has outlived the Trump administration. India has its own plan to develop a fleet of nuclear attack submarines to improve its deployment capabilities in the Indian Ocean as well as its second nuclear strike capability. However, the United States has emphasized the "unique" nature of this alliance and is not considering expanding the AUKUS to include India, but is rather offering occasional collaborations. There is a two-tier policy of cooperation among the Quad members, as well as the limitations of the India-U.S. Defense Trade and Technology Initiative launched in 2012, that excludes Indo-U.S. cooperation in nuclear submarines. However, the AUKUS announcement served to reinforce the dynamism of the pivot to Asia as well as the perception of the United States as a power committed to strengthening its alliances in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. Secretary of Defense, Lloyd J. Austin, also assured Indian Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh, that the United States would continue to cooperate with India in the Quad. A Weakening of Strategic Cooperation Within the Quad? According to Admiral Arun Prakash, who played an important role in bringing the Indian and U.S. navies together, AUKUS presents itself as an exclusive club that leaves India and Japan out in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad was capable of posing an alternative to China and AUKUS would have somehow diminished that capability. One concern is that the Quad would be reduced to dealing with issues such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, thereby removing its strategic interest in the region. Beyond the criticism of an indirect weakening of the Quad, AUKUS also has direct strategic consequences for India. The Indian Ocean, which stretches from the east coast of Africa to Australia, is perceived by India as an integral part of its sphere of influence. This Indian "Monroe Doctrine" causes India to be sensitive to a possible "over-crowding of Indian Ocean strategic space." The United States has already been criticized when, in April 2021, the U.S. Navy conducted a "Freedom of Navigation" operation in the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone without New Delhi's consent. Thus, even though Australia is a partner of India in the Quad, the prospect of deploying new nuclear-powered submarines in the region is not necessarily welcome. In this perspective, AUKUS effectively adds an actor capable of deploying in the eastern Indian Ocean and mathematically diminishes Indian primacy. Moreover, India is concerned about a Chinese reaction that would take the form of an expansion of its military activity beyond the South China Sea, and thus, into the eastern Indian Ocean. Indeed, in the framework of the "Two Ocean Strategy," incursions of nuclear attack submarines by the People's Liberation Army Navy in the Indian Ocean are already recurrent and could intensify. However, other voices mitigate these concerns by arguing that AUKUS and the Quad are not to be pitted against each other in a zero-sum game, but would rather be complementary. Indeed, their creation was motivated by a similar reason: to counter the rise of China's assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. The same values are put forward in the joint statements of the two groups, i.e. freedom of navigation and respect for international law. The Quad, which is a strategic partnership, focuses more on unconventional security issues such as emerging technologies, vaccination or counter-terrorism. Conversely, AUKUS, which is a true alliance, is more concerned with defence issues. The distinction between security and defence is essential here: the Quad does not lose its strategic interest, but its prerogatives are now clearer. The September 2021 summit held in Washington was intended precisely to show that the Quad would not disappear, contrary to what China might have hoped. One of the reasons India was concerned about the resurrection of the Quad in 2017 was Australia's lack of "strategic clarity" vis-à-vis China. AUKUS had the merit of sweeping away those doubts. In reference to the delivery of submarines, Philippines Foreign Secretary, Teodoro L. Locsin Jr., argues that the "enhancement of a near abroad ally’s ability to project power should restore and keep the balance rather than destabilize it." Thus, India, rather than worrying about the presence of Australian submarines in the region, should instead recognize that this development is in its interest and that of the region. More broadly, the formation of AUKUS, rather than weakening Japan and India, diversifies and strengthens the strategic architecture for partnerships in the Indo-Pacific beyond the Quad. Indeed, India is part of several other more or less active cooperations, such as the India-Japan-United States trilateral dialogues since 2011 or Australia-India-Japan since 2015. In addition, AUKUS is attracting a new player in the region, the United Kingdom, which could also work with the Quad. This multiplication of partnerships is aimed at strengthening the balance of power. The creation of AUKUS as a security alliance in the region also allows the Quad to prioritize other issues besides the military and this is in line with India’s plans. The SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) introduced by Prime Minister N. Modi in 2015, followed by the Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative in 2019, outlines India’s strategy in the region – one that is increasingly defined, albeit still lacking coherence. ASEAN was highlighted as the central organization for India's Act-East policy in the Indo-Pacific in order to emphasize the importance of cooperation and inclusiveness. The September Heads of State Summit addressed criticism from ASEAN countries that the Quad was not helping them address infrastructure needs. The implicit objective of the Quad is to offer an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative by emphasizing the "high standards" of their financing programs. India's Position in the Quad India has a particular strategic culture that values strategic autonomy. New Delhi is therefore reluctant to enter into military alliances. There are several explanatory factors: the significance of the colonial past, mistrust of the West and the strategy of non-alignment inherited from the position of Prime Minister J. Nehru during the Cold War. Furthermore, as L. Lee explains in a report by the Lowy Institute, "India shares some common interests with the other three Quad countries but is less able to withstand the costs that could be directed its way if it became a more active partner." Indeed, despite the rapid modernization of its military, India has limited military capabilities and its geographic proximity to China puts it in a special position. New Delhi does not want to provoke Chinese hostility while border problems remain unresolved, as demonstrated by the clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020 that left 20 people dead on the Indian side. At the Raisina Dialogue in April 2021, Indian Foreign Minister, S. Jaishankar, insisted that the Quad is not an "Asian NATO." Moreover, a transformation of the Quad into a military alliance would also have strategic implications for its partnership with Russia. Traditionally, therefore, India has been perceived as the "weakest link" in the Quad and as an impediment to the evolution of the dialogue into a more military organization. The AUKUS announcement could remove pressure on India in the Quad "by attracting Chinese ire." This would reduce the pressure on India to make defence commitments and allow it to maintain its strategic autonomy by not openly pursuing a policy of "balancing" against China. Similarly, the Quad has not made any joint statement on the Ukrainian crisis, thereby not compromising India in relation to its Russian partner. However, India's reluctance to take a stand on this issue could hurt it in the long run. Finally, the creation of AUKUS could represent a strategic opportunity for India if it allows it to develop cooperation with other countries. The discussions between Prime Minister N. Modi and French President E. Macron in the hours following the AUKUS announcement show that it is with France in particular that cooperation could deepen. The two heads of state stressed "the important role that the India-France partnership plays in promoting stability and security in the region." The two countries have held bilateral Varuna naval exercises since 1998 and India ordered 36 Rafales from France in 2016. As French Defense Minister, F. Parly, had mentioned in 2020, this agreement could lead to other cooperations. For example, India is in a favourable position to negotiate a possible sale of Barracuda submarines with France. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada The creation of AUKUS has raised a couple of issues for India as it questioned the reliability of the U.S. as a partner and it also seemed to weaken the Quad. However, these concerns are actually mitigated by the fact that AUKUS reinforces the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific and, to a certain extent, allows India to focus on other issues than the military within the Quad and maintain its strategic autonomy. India is a central player for the American strategy in the Indo-Pacific and its geographical position "brings a particular political legitimacy to the United States’ plans for a new Indo-Pacific balance of power," which avoids presenting the stakes in the region as a confrontation between Asia and the West. In this context, Canada is "missing in action." When AUKUS was announced, Prime Minister Trudeau recalled that Canada was not interested in American nuclear submarines. Beyond this material aspect, Canada is, unlike Australia, hardly involved in the Indo-Pacific, or only in an ad hoc manner. The evolution of the Quad does not directly involve Canadian interests either, but as a member of the Five Eyes with a maritime border on the Pacific, Canada must keep an eye on this region. While a working group within Global Affairs is currently looking at the issue, Canada does not currently have a formal strategy for the Indo-Pacific. It has more of a spectator’s role in the region, and this wait-and-see position could be problematic in the future. Indeed, Canada has an interest in defending a rule-based international order and freedom of navigation in the region. As Tsuyoshi Kawasaki stated, “far from being immune from this trans-Pacific power struggle, Canada is in the midst of it.” He believes that Canada’s strategy in the region should be an “active pro-U.S. diplomatic policy.” This would allow Ottawa to participate in “legal warfare” against China, especially in the South China Sea, without bearing the high costs of military action. Could this strategy be implemented through the Quad? The new Quad summit in Japan in 2022 opens the possibility of expanding the dialogue with a Quad Plus. In 2020, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam had already participated in a Quad meeting to discuss pandemic management and may cooperate on other issues. Canada's possible membership in the Quad is also on the table, although it could further damage its relationship with China. Canada's Department of Global Affairs has stated that as a Pacific nation, "Canada works with all four Quad members to address shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region." While the United States appears to be in favour of expanding the Quad, India and Australia are more cautious. In any case, a Quad Plus is a course of action to be seriously considered. ## Indo-Pacific: A Strategic Region URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/indo-pacific-a-strategic-region/ Modified: 2024-04-05 Get the book Indo-Pacific: A Strategic Region, the seventh volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in French only. A new generation of renowned experts and informed observers of the current operations delivers here their enlightened points of view, accessible to the public at large and accompanied by a rich infographic. The various contributions in this book are from the French-speaking platform of analysis of international issues Le Rubicon. Le Rubicon will publish small books aimed at the general public, which will address, clearly and precisely, the new burning issues related to international news. Each month, starting in April 2022, Les Équateurs will publish a book of approximately 128 to 144 pages, at a price of 10 to 12 euros, summarizing the work of the experts of the Le Rubicon platform. ## Industrialization without Emancipation: The Limits of Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/industrialization-without-emancipation-the-limits-of-canadas-defence-industrial-strategy/ Modified: 2026-03-24 Under the impetus of Prime Minister Mark Carney, the Canadian government has embarked on a major reorientation of its defence policy. According to him, the prevailing assumption “that our geography and alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security – that assumption is no longer valid.” Canada now intends to develop military capabilities so that its “defence never becomes dependent on others again.” The ambition is colossal, given that the country’s defence was historically conceived and articulated around a close relationship with the United States. The goal is clear: “Canada is moving from reliance to resilience.” It is in this perspective that the Canadian government unveiled its very first Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS). It calls for “maximiz secure strategic autonomy” by developing “sovereign capabilities,” supporting “our resilience in the event of a conflict,” and “reduc supply chain vulnerabilities” through the diversification of defence partnerships. This dual objective relies on a grim reading of ongoing geopolitical upheavals: “Long-held assumptions have been upended – about the end of imperial conquest, the durability of peace in Europe, and the resilience of old alliances. In this uncertain world, it is more important than ever that Canada possess the capacity to sustain its own defence and safeguard its own sovereignty.” In reality, this narrative is misleading, as it masks the fact that the Canadian government does not truly intend to embark on a turn toward independent defence. Despite the stated ambition to strengthen Canada’s strategic autonomy, the DIS does not question the country’s structural integration into the American military and industrial architecture. It certainly proposes a military reindustrialization, but not an emancipation from the American sphere. In the absence of a new defence policy making strategic autonomy a genuine ambition, Canada’s vast rearmament plan risks perpetuating its historical model of “plug-and-play” forces integrated with the United States. This paper develops a three-part argument. First, it shows that Canadian defence has historically been built within a framework of interoperability and complementarity with the United States, both operationally and industrially, which limits the scope of any potential sovereign reorientation. It then analyzes the government’s conception of strategic autonomy, largely reduced to a logic of domestic production and hopes for intellectual property ownership, without a clear redefinition of national security objectives. Finally, it demonstrates that, far from announcing a rupture, the DIS fits into a dynamic of continuity, where the deepening of continental integration coexists with an industrial ambition that is predominantly economic, thus revealing a partial and circumscribed autonomy. Institutionalized Alignment The stated ambition of the DIS suggests a profound paradigm shift. Indeed, the grammar of strategic autonomy has never structured reflection on Canadian defence policy, which has never previously highlighted the notion of autonomy, preferring instead the ambition of being a reliable and credible ally. Thus, Canada’s defence policy has primarily been built since the Second World War according to an approach of industrial and military integration with the United States. This integration operates at several levels, which reinforce each other and deeply shape Ottawa’s strategic choices. On the military and doctrinal level, the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is not merely a cooperation mechanism: it organizes a logic of integrated continental defence where surveillance, alert, planning, and coordination of responses to threats are organized on a North American scale. Early warning systems, intelligence sharing, aerial interception procedures, and rapid decision-making mechanisms rely on intertwined chains of command. Similarly, Canadian military acquisitions have long been determined by their compatibility with existing American architectures, whether regarding maintenance, software updates, logistics chains, or doctrines of use. The desire for interoperability acts as a mechanism for the structural alignment of Canadian acquisitions, linking technological choices, modernization schedules, industrial suppliers, and budgetary priorities to the United States. This systemic integration into the American military ecosystem is now expressed by the wish for “interchangeability,” i.e., the ability to use the same systems, munitions, or platforms as the United States. This logic favors the purchase of systems already in service within American forces to reduce logistical and doctrinal frictions. It is in this logic that Canada plans to acquire several American platforms: F-35 fighter jets, HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, Aegis combat systems, MQ-9B drones, etc. This logic of interoperability, even interchangeability, with the United States should come as no surprise: Canada still operates according to the strategic orientation set by the April 2024 defence policy. The latter notably sets as an objective investing in military capabilities enabling Canada to ensure North American security within the framework of “a renewed defence partnership with the United States that is focused on restoring continental defence and deterrence in all domains: sea, land, air, space, and cyber.” This vision of a deepened partnership with Washington remains the logic guiding the ongoing recapitalization of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) under the Carney government. As the 2026–2027 departmental plan highlights, planned defence investments will “strengthen continental defence through continued implementation of the NORAD modernization plan announced in June 2022. will enhance the CAF’s ability to detect, deter, and defeat evolving threats across domains, including through NORAD’s aerospace and maritime warning responsibilities.” This logic of integrated continental defence is intimately linked to its industrial counterpart: a significant part of defence production in Canada relies on subsidiaries of American groups or on Canadian companies inserted into North American value chains. While the majority of companies in the defence sector are owned by Canadian interests or controlled by a parent company established in Canada, companies owned by American interests account for more than half of the industry’s total sales and nearly two-thirds of Canadian exports. This strong North American integration is largely explained by the 1956 Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA). This bilateral treaty between Canada and the United States allows Canadian companies to bid on contracts from the American Department of Defence by treating them as domestic suppliers, thus fostering joint defence and integration of supply chains between the two countries. For example, Canada’s largest defence company, CAE, provides simulation and training systems for platforms used by the US Air Force and Navy, thus inserting itself into the American operational ecosystem as a strategic provider of training capabilities. Magellan Aerospace, meanwhile, manufactures components and aerospace subsystems for prime contractors like Lockheed Martin or RTX (formerly Raytheon Technologies). Héroux-Devtek, which produces landing gear for several American military aircraft, was itself sold to an American investment firm. These examples illustrate the logic of functional specialization encouraged by the DPSA: Canadian companies generally do not design entire platforms, but they provide essential subsystems integrated into American industrial architectures. Furthermore, several of the most structuring actors of the Canadian Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) are subsidiaries of large American groups, whose presence profoundly shapes the North American integration of the sector. General Dynamics is represented notably by General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada, the primary manufacturer of the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) used by the CAF and exported abroad, as well as by General Dynamics Mission Systems-Canada, a central player in C4ISR systems (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). RTX is present through Pratt & Whitney Canada, a pillar of the aerospace industry, as well as through its activities in radars and defence systems. L3Harris, via WESCAM, is a global supplier of electro-optical sensors, while Bell Textron Canada, a subsidiary of the American company Textron, is one of the few manufacturers of military aircraft present in Canada. These subsidiaries illustrate the deeply integrated and partially outsourced nature of the Canadian DITB. Strategic Autonomy Reduced to Industrialism The ambition of strategic autonomy proposed by the Carney government thus collides with profound constraints: interoperability, industrial integration, logistical dependencies, and supply structures reliant on the United States. However, this overlooks a fundamental aspect of the DIS: its ambition remains strictly economic. Indeed, military acquisitions are now explicitly conceived as instruments of economic sovereignty and resilience. The primary objective of the DIS is to “reduce overreliance on foreign suppliers, foster national champions in our defence industry, secure sovereign control of our own equipment and intellectual property, and create value across Canadian supply chains.” To achieve this, the projected share of military acquisitions from Canadian industry will rise from 43% to 70%, a relative increase of nearly 63%. At first glance, this might suggest that Canada is seeking to reduce its dependence on the American defence industry. However, such an interpretation would ignore the very definition of what “buying Canadian” entails. Despite its objective of developing a Canadian DITB, the DIS does not define what constitutes a Canadian company. Government officials have however specified that the ten “sovereign capabilities” it intends to develop to “maximize Canada’s strategic autonomy” – including aerospace technologies, missiles and munitions, communication systems, and autonomous systems – are “not defined in terms of Canadian companies or ownership.” Rather, they are “capabilities that Canada is seeking to build in Canada.” Any company “based in Canada with substantive operations there” can thus qualify, including subsidiaries of American giants like Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, which have production plants in Canada and employ Canadian workers. Industry Minister Mélanie Joly specified in this regard that the government intends to prioritize companies where at least 70% of what they produce in Canada consists of Canadian components. The very first investment announced under the DIS illustrates this interpretation of the Carney government’s “Buy Canadian” policy. It involves awarding contracts worth more than 1 billion Canadian dollars to General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, an American subsidiary established in Quebec, to “strengthen Canada’s sovereign ammunition production capacity by expanding domestic manufacturing of key artillery charge components.” This includes the construction of a nitrocellulose plant and facilities in Canada to load, assemble, and package 155mm charges and projectiles. This decision demonstrates, in the eyes of the Minister of Defence, that we are “reducing dependency on foreign suppliers.” Indeed, from the Canadian government’s perspective, any company officially registered and intending to conduct its activities in Canada qualifies as a Canadian company. Thus, American subsidiaries established in Canada are eligible to produce the “sovereign capabilities” the DIS aims to develop, without necessarily being under Canadian ownership and control. The DIS insists not only on domestic production but also on intellectual property (IP). It wishes to “prioritize Canadian IP ownership, protection, and access in defence procurement processes.” However, rather than directly investing capital in companies developing sovereign capacity so as to preserve IP, the DIS favors a modest subsidy program named ElevateIP. As one of its detractors pointed out, this is not an approach aimed at strategic autonomy. These are rather financial commitments recorded as liabilities, which do not, as such, entail a genuine development of sovereign capabilities. Moreover, it is not certain that the Canadian government will succeed in negotiating the transfer of intellectual property from large American companies. Minister Joly is currently attempting to use Saab’s offer to produce Gripen aircraft in Canada to extract concessions from Lockheed Martin in exchange for maintaining the order for 88 F-35s. According to the minister, Canada could play a larger role in the American giant’s supply chain: “I think they can definitely do more research and development in the country, and we should be able to have access to much more IP control.” It remains to be seen whether she will achieve her ends and how this negotiation will affect Prime Minister Carney’s decision to continue or not with the acquisition of a single fleet of American fighter jets. This conceptualization of sovereign capabilities shows that strategic autonomy is viewed by the Canadian government only through an industrial lens. The obligation of Canadian content, including the intellectual property of certain equipment, constitutes the foundation of Canadian sovereigntist logic. However, this approach remains incomplete with regard to strategic autonomy, understood as the capacity of a state to define and then pursue its own objectives by its own means. Indeed, strategic autonomy manifests in three decisive ways: Operational, i.e., the capacity to conduct military operations independently; Industrial and technological, i.e., the capacity to produce and master the means essential to the engagement of its forces; Political, which consists of the capacity to decide independently on the circumstances, modalities, and objectives of the use of force. By limiting itself exclusively to the second dimension, Canada’s defence industrial policy is thus deprived of a genuine ambition for strategic autonomy. It is conceived primarily as a lever for economic development, rather than as an instrument allowing the sovereign definition and pursuit of its own foreign policy and national security objectives. The DIS does not pursue the development of a DITB to achieve military objectives such as independent deterrence against attempts of aggression against its territory, or the capacity to contribute to European security without US support. Its main objective is rather the development of a DITB as an instrument of economic growth. Consequently, there is no contradiction between deepening the integration of its defence industry with that of the United States and the desire to develop sovereign capabilities, as these are conceived in a way to generate jobs in Canada rather than to enable the CAF to conduct independent operations. This explains why the only military targets contained in the DIS concern the level of operational readiness maintenance: “raise maritime fleet serviceability to 75 per cent, land fleets to 80 per cent, and aerospace fleets to 85 per cent to meet training and operational readiness requirements.” These targets, which the CAF aims to achieve by 2036, remain attached to the same objectives that structure the 2024 Canadian defence policy. This contrasts, for example, with the British defence industrial strategy, published in September 2025, which insists on requirements for operational independence in certain sectors, including nuclear deterrence, nuclear submarines, and cryptography. Strategic Continuity Behind Rhetorical Rupture From this perspective, the potential civil-military tensions between a Canadian government wishing to develop sovereign capabilities and a CAF wishing to preserve its close relations with the United States are unlikely to materialize. Certainly, Canadian senior officers adopt a logic distinct from the industrial one articulated by Minister Joly. Their priorities remain operational effectiveness and interoperability with the United States. Questioned about the alleged rupture in Canadian-American relations, the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jennie Carignan, stated in this regard: “With the United States, we share North America and it is important that we continue this work together. We cannot change our geography and, militarily speaking, it is much easier to do this together because missiles do not know borders.” For the General, the “United States will always remain a priority partner for us.” This perspective may seem contradictory to Prime Minister Carney’s, who declared in March 2025 that the time for “tight security and military cooperation” with the United States was “over,” because the American neighbor is no longer a “reliable partner.” However, contrary to what this statement and others like it suggest, Prime Minister Carney is not rejecting close collaboration with the United States on defence. Although in May 2025 he repeated that the period of economic and military “integration” between the two countries was “over,” he added forthwith that Canada would continue to collaborate with its neighbor when necessary. This is the case for the “Golden Dome,” for which Mark Carney has expressed interest in participating, as well as the modernization of NORAD, which has been underway since its launch in 2022 and will further integrate American and Canadian armed forces in the surveillance of the North American continent, command and control structures, air armament, infrastructure, and support capabilities. Thus, while Mr. Carney announced investing in military bases in the country’s North so that “Canada is taking full responsibility for defending our Arctic sovereignty,” the targeted infrastructures (aerodromes, hangars, munitions, refueling) aim to enable the deployment of F-35 fighter jets. Beyond rhetorical inflections, concrete decisions confirm the persistence of a profound strategic interdependence between Ottawa and Washington. If the decision following the ongoing review of the F-35 acquisition, announced in March 2025 in reaction to the tariff war triggered by the United States, is now linked to the renegotiation of the Canadian-American free trade agreement, there is no doubt that Canadian military personnel wish to maintain the full order of 88 F-35s. A dozen former senior officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force even wrote a confidential letter urging the government not to reduce its F-35 order. The voice of only one of them, discordant, supports the idea of a mixed fleet. The consensus in favor of the F-35 manifests even among civilians. According to Deputy Minister of National Defence Stefanie Beck: “The importance of having a fifth-generation aircraft cannot be overstated, because that is what our adversaries have, and our role of deterring them and defending Canada and Canadians means we need to have equipment that will create a dilemma in the minds of our adversaries.” Minister of National Defence David McGuinty echoes this. Attempting to explain why the review of the F-35 acquisition, which was supposed to be completed by the end of summer 2025, is still ongoing, he stated that “there are many factors in the acquisition of a fighter aircraft fleet for Canada […]. They have knock-on distributive effects on infrastructure, on training, on interoperability, on NORAD, on capacity – all these factors are part of the examination.” It is worth noting that among the factors not cited by the minister is strategic autonomy. The only dissonant voice, but barely audible, is that of the Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, Stephen Fuhr. In one of the rare statements developing an argument against the single acquisition of F-35s, Fuhr estimated that a mixed fleet of combat aircraft would “give Canada more options to handle various threats, rather than relying on one tool to solve a problem.” The decision to proceed with the acquisition of an F-35 fleet or to opt for a mixed fleet will therefore constitute a true credibility test for the Carney government. It should come as no surprise that the DIS does not question North American integration in defence. If it hardly mentions NORAD, the DIS stipulates that “Canada has a long history of working closely with the United States and looks forward to a continued strong Canada-U.S. defence relationship.” Beyond job creation and economic growth, the ambition of the DIS lies in the development of a “robust Canadian defence industry that provides technological and operational advantage to the Canadian Armed Forces and its security partners in their mission to defend Canada.” On one hand, the expression “technological and operational advantage” means for Canadian military personnel the willingness to acquire the best existing combat capabilities in the Western world, i.e., American ones. On the other hand, Philippe Lagassé estimates that the fact that this operational advantage is associated with the “mission of defending Canada” suggests that the defence of North America and operations abroad will continue to favor the purchase of American equipment. Even the crisis surrounding Greenland has not moved the Canadian position regarding the importance of preserving Canadian-American collaboration on continental defence. Despite a statement that Ottawa supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Denmark, Canada deployed no military personnel alongside European troops during the “Arctic Endurance” exercise in Greenland. Despite contingency plans provided for this purpose to the Prime Minister, he preferred to limit Canada’s engagement in Greenland to the deployment of its CF-18s alongside the United States within the framework of NORAD’s “Noble Defender” operation. It is therefore not surprising either that Prime Minister Carney declared last February 28 that “Canada supports the United States acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to prevent its regime from threatening international peace and security.” *** The Canadian Defence Industrial Strategy does not constitute a strategic rupture, but an economic adjustment within a framework of integration that remains intact. Behind the rhetoric of strategic autonomy, Canada is redefining neither its operational priorities nor its fundamental geopolitical positioning. Capacity choices, NORAD modernization, the centrality of the F-35, and persistent interoperability with the United States confirm that the continental architecture continues to structure Canadian defence policy. The invoked autonomy is above all industrial and accounting: it targets intellectual property, Canadian content, and economic spin-offs, but not the capacity to act militarily in an independent manner. In this sense, the DIS reveals less a will for strategic emancipation than an attempt to maximize the economic benefits of an assumed interdependence. There is no contradiction between the strengthening of North American integration and the development of “sovereign capabilities,” as long as these are conceived as instruments of growth rather than as foundations of operational and political autonomy. The ambition is not that of an autonomous strategic power, but that of an integrated partner intending to better leverage a system it neither wishes to leave nor radically transform. Is this choice rational in the face of the breach of trust with the United States, which led Prime Minister Carney to affirm that the United States is no longer a reliable partner? Or is it, on the contrary, a lucid choice given the geographic reality, the integrated defence industry, and the power asymmetry with the United States? If this question deserves an in-depth treatment in another paper, it is appropriate here to note the abyssal gap separating the sovereigntist rhetoric of the Canadian government and its integration practices. This contradiction could translate into failure when Canadians realize that decisions made in Ottawa do not correspond to the promises made to them, or if Washington were to instrumentalize Canadian dependence to impose politically unacceptable concessions. Then, the sovereigntist rhetoric instrumentalized for reindustrialization purposes rather than toward a true strategic inflection would reach its limits and expose the vulnerabilities of structural dependence. Photo credits: US Army photo by Sgt. Ethan Scofield via Flickr.     ## Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World: Non-American Perspectives URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/intelligence-cooperation-in-a-multipolar-world-non-american-perspectives/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report suggests a “Canadianization” of intelligence for Canada, to orient the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence... This policy report follows the conference organized by the Strategic Analysis Network entitled “Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World: Non-American Perspectives” on May 6, 2021. This conference brought together prominent intelligence and strategic studies professionals and academics including: Jill Sinclair of the Department of National Defence, Daniel Jean, former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada, Artur Wilczynski of Communications Security Establishment, Heather De Santis from Public Safety Canada, Björn Fägersten from the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Claudia Hillebrand from Cardiff University, Gustav Gressel from the European Council on Foreign Relations, Adriana Seagle from Bellevue University, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé from Bishop's University, Stephanie Carvin from Carleton University, Thomas Juneau from the University of Ottawa, Reg Whitaker from Victoria University, Nancy Teeple from the Royal Military College of Canada, Patrick F. Walsh from Charles Sturt University and Justin Massie from the University of Quebec in Montreal. Although often neglected, intelligence cooperation is not a new phenomenon. In particular, since the emergence of international terrorism, intelligence cooperation has expanded to a global level. This threat continues to pose a challenge to the intelligence services, but the current transition of power and the intensification of strategic competition between the great powers require a shift in the vision of intelligence cooperation. In this context, the conference aimed to establish a better understanding of the rise of competition between the great powers in a digital world. This phenomenon raises many challenges in a free and open society that requires intelligence cooperation to meet them. Four major themes were addressed during this conference: the challenges of intelligence cooperation, the European Union (EU) as an actor of intelligence, the role of the concept of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance on strategic stability, and the future of the Five Eyes, including Canada and Australia, in intelligence cooperation. Therefore, we can draw from this policy report the lack of international cooperation on subjects of strategic interest at a time of competition between the great powers, such as with new technologies and national reluctance to fully share essential information, except in times of emergencies. This policy report also highlights the lack of accountability and oversight of intelligence sharing activities. However, the fact remains that cooperation continues to grow, and actors like the EU will play an increasingly important role in the world of intelligence and transnational intelligence cooperation. That said, with the significant growth in cooperation needs, many challenges emerge for countries like Canada, which depend on the foreign intelligence capabilities of more powerful allies. In such a case, we must strengthen the capacity to identify our own threats and national interests, while continuing to cooperate with our allies by providing specific expertise. Finally, we recommend a “Canadianization” of intelligence for Canada, that is to say to orient the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence towards a clearer and firmer pursuit of specifically Canadian interests, as opposed to the reception of raw or finished intelligence products, which may or may not reflect Canadian needs and interests. In addition to this recommendation are several interesting initiatives, including a more robust and horizontal engagement of the national security and intelligence (NSI) community with non-traditional entities that are now being targeted by emerging threats. Actors such as innovative companies in the field of advanced technologies and centers of research and technological excellence have skills and knowledge available that could enable the NSI community to better respond to emerging threats that require a greater multidisciplinary approach. Supporting the development of knowledge and mitigation strategies in the face of threats would only make external actors more inclined to share more with the NSI community. The Challenges of Intelligence Cooperation Intelligence cooperation, also known as intelligence liaison and intelligence sharing, is one of the most secret intelligence activities and involves many evolving challenges, especially within Western democracies. First, it should be understood that any intelligence agency operates primarily in its own interests and to support its country’s foreign, security, and defence policy objectives. In this context, cooperation occurs when there is a clear benefit outweighing the costs. This is particularly the case to fill a lack of information, to seek different expertise, to reduce the costs of an operation, to fight against a common threat, or to obtain or hope to obtain something in return. However, there are many constraints, if not restrictions, on intelligence cooperation. Several elements can limit the exchange of information: different perceptions of threats; different national interests; national legal frameworks; organizational cultures; the practices of foreign intelligence agencies, particularly with regard to human rights; or the fear that the information exchanged will be leaked or communicated to a third party, compromising not only the bond of trust, but also the methods and sources of intelligence agencies. This latter concern partly explains why intelligence cooperation is one of the most secret and invisible activities of intelligence agencies and one of the most difficult to map and monitor. This invisibility of intelligence cooperation will increase as the need for cooperation increases, as has been the case through the fight against terrorism to current Great-power competition. There is then a paradox that forms, between the increase in the invisibility of intelligence activities driven by the increase in cooperation needs, and the desire and the increasingly important need to make intelligence activities democratically responsible and accountable. Yet today, we find ourselves with an increase in the volume of intelligence exchanged, an increase in the number of actors benefiting from cooperation and growing flexibility in the often ad hoc and temporary arrangements for cooperation. If we add to this the globalization of intelligence cooperation in the era of counterterrorism, then it becomes important to find mechanisms of accountability and oversight of this intelligence activity. While intelligence cooperation is pragmatically useful and necessary, history teaches us that many mistakes, harmful to citizens, have been made by intelligence exchange activities. However, current accountability and oversight mechanisms are limited by borders and national laws, making it difficult to track intelligence exchanges. We must therefore strengthen these mechanisms, or create supranational accountability and oversight mechanisms, to make the exchange of information more transparent. An intermediary model, not supranational, but institutionalized and transnational, is the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC), composed of the main national oversight bodies of the five member countries, and deals with, among other things, how to improve the transparency of intelligence activities. The European Union: Intelligence as a Vector of Strategic Autonomy For many years, the EU, pushed in particular by France and Germany, has been trying to acquire a certain strategic autonomy, that is to say to strengthen its independence, its capacities and its resilience in a number of areas like security and defence, or foreign policy in general. In a multipolar world, characterized by the reappearance of competition between the great powers, certain actors within the EU and certain member states are increasingly motivated to achieve strategic autonomy. On the one hand, to move the EU away from its dependence on the United States for security and defence matters, and on the other, to confront Russian and Chinese ambitions in Europe. It would seem that one of the vectors for achieving this objective is the creation of a genuine intelligence capacity at the EU level. Indeed, achieving strategic autonomy, that is, having the ability to act according to one’s interests, requires understanding the strategic environment. For the EU, the challenge is to define its own threats, without depending on the American threat perceptions. However, the intelligence capabilities of the EU, like the intelligence cooperation within it, are far from sufficient at present. Besides the need to strengthen the national intelligence capacities of some countries, the very structure of the EU is a challenge for the intelligence services. Based on an area of ​​free movement and free trade, it is often exploited for committing crimes or acts of espionage, and makes the work of national intelligence agencies particularly difficult. The need for cooperation is therefore indispensable. Nonetheless, the exchange of information is still limited, except when a major event occurs. At European level, there is no supranational body responsible for intelligence. There are, however, bodies facilitating cooperation at the European level, without an intelligence-gathering mandate, but that receive intelligence from EU members’ intelligence agencies, such as the Intelligence Analysis Center, the Intelligence Directorate of the EU General Staff or Europol. While intelligence cooperation has been satisfactory in the area of ​​crime and terrorism, the same is not true for the four sectors essential for strategic autonomy, namely decision-making, operational, commercial and technological autonomy. At these levels, intelligence cooperation within the EU is rather rudimentary, given diverging national interests, political will, and perceived threats. As it is not possible to create a supranational European intelligence agency without changing the treaty, the EU must focus on reinforcing intelligence cooperation between member states through joint training or joint operations to strengthen mutual trust. One example is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project to create a coordination center on cyberspace and information surveillance. Ultimately, creating a real European intelligence capability will require a certain loss of national autonomy and sovereignty. The Concept of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Strategic Opportunity or Vector of Instability? Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is a strategic concept that enables decision makers to anticipate change, mitigate risk and direct results. It is both an intelligence and an operations activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and exploitation of sensors, resources, and processing systems to directly support current and future operations. In other words, ISR is an advanced intelligence capability that provides decision-making advantage. However, the superiority of the United States in this area creates an asymmetry that could call into question strategic stability. Traditionally, strategic stability has been maintained by nuclear deterrence. Today, in the strategic doctrines of the great powers, nuclear power is incorporated with other more traditional capacities. The multiplication of areas of confrontation, particularly space and cyberspace, multidomain deterrence, especially when adversaries like Russia and China use hybrid or gray zone tactics, cyberspace or even new technologies to destabilize Western democracies. The advantage of the ISR in this complexification of the modes of confrontation is to anticipate the capacities, the intentions and the actions of the adversaries. However, there are certain risks with this strategic advantage, leading to manipulation and disinformation by inferior adversaries at best, and aggressive pre-emptive behavior at worst. First, adversaries of the United States begin to exploit vulnerabilities in American systems through asymmetric methods in space, cyberspace, and information domains. Second, it encourages countries like China and Russia to deploy capabilities to deny access to certain areas. Finally, American technological superiority is leading Russia and China to increase human intelligence operations on American territory and in allied countries, particularly in the area of espionage. The superior technological capabilities of the United States for intelligence purposes, while offering clear advantages in anticipation, detection and targeting, also result in the increasing reliance of asymmetric techniques and operations by adversaries. It is now incumbent upon the United States to cooperate more with the allies to mitigate the vulnerabilities exploited by its adversaries. The Future of Five Eyes The Five Eyes partnership, the most advanced institutionalization of intelligence sharing between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, has its share of advantages and disadvantages for less powerful partners like Canada or Australia and is faced with many challenges in the era of multipolarity. One of the most important challenges in the era of competition between the great powers is understanding new technologies and taking into account new areas of confrontation such as cyberspace. The Five Eyes and member countries at the national level have a role to play in ensuring intelligence efficiency in today’s environment. For example, Australia has established a National Intelligence Scientific and Advisory Council, tasked with providing a more strategic and structural approach to technological change and its impact on the Australian intelligence community. This type of initiative could be developed within the Five Eyes to allow new opportunities for cooperation in the fields of technology and science. An integrated approach would allow member countries of the Five Eyes to benefit from each other’s efforts. To go even further, each country could focus on one or more areas in which it can provide greater expertise and make this expertise available to its partners. This type of cooperation would save resources while filling the gaps in national intelligence apparatuses with the expertise that others have to offer. The regionalization of threats, particularly in Southeast Asia, also raises the question of cooperation between the Five Eyes and other countries, such as Japan. Without necessarily going as far as the idea of a complete and institutional integration of other countries within the Five Eyes, it would however be appropriate to think of a form of expansion, according to geographic criteria or types or nature of threats, and to introduce, without necessarily integrating, other countries for deeper and lasting cooperation on a particular subject. Japan could, for example, be brought into the Five Eyes for deeper cooperation on the Chinese threat in Southeast Asia. The “Canadianization” of Intelligence While multipolarity and great-power competition provide many opportunities for the Five Eyes, there remain some challenges in intelligence cooperation for countries like Canada. Indeed, while this brings many benefits to Canada - as a huge source of raw and finished foreign intelligence, Canada heavily relies on intelligence shared by its allies since it lacks a foreign intelligence service that collects, centralizes and covertly coordinates foreign human intelligence (HUMINT) outside its borders. This “producer bias” therefore reflects the interests and priorities of the recipient country and carries with it the considerable risk of being manipulated or of serving foreign interests rather than those of Canadians. In the world of intelligence sharing, the ability to acquire intelligence represents a form of power where information is a bargaining chip. These mutual exchanges can therefore be used as a means of persuading partners to comply with a foreign nexus. This is especially true for Canada, given that it is far more often a consumer than an author of foreign intelligence products. This lack of input has earned it a reputation, among some of its partners, of being perceived as a “free-rider” to the detriment of a more active contributor role to intelligence sharing. This feeling is fuelled by two distinct realities. From the outset, its privileged position within the Five Eyes, but also the geographical circumstances of its territory which positions it directly within the defence and security perimeter of the United States. It is therefore in Canada’s interest to develop its capabilities in this area, either through a foreign intelligence service - which, however, seems unlikely at the moment for various reasons - or through a “Canadianization” of data collection and foreign intelligence analysis. By providing a larger Canadian contribution, Canada would position itself to be taken more seriously and to demonstrate that quality is sometimes better than quantity. Recommended by Stephanie Carvin and Thomas Juneau, this “Canadianization” is defined as a “constellation of initiatives aimed at orienting the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence towards a clearer and stronger pursuit of uniquely Canadian interests, as opposed to the receipt of raw and finite information which may or may not reflect a connection to Canada.” Although nascent and scattered, this phenomenon is likely evolving within the national security and intelligence community. For the moment, this phenomenon is only the result of a series of small initiatives and not of a coherent and elaborate strategy, but it nevertheless constitutes an interesting, feasible and realistic alternative. In addition, strengthening the benefits of the latter would make it possible to produce independent assessments that are more tailored to Canadian needs which, in turn, should better support decision-making and thus lead to more efficient and coherent policy-making. The “Canadianization” of foreign intelligence is not an approach that is mutually exclusive to other alternatives, but runs parallel to the common goal of enabling Canada to better respond to its interests and priorities. Similarly, it should not be seen as an alternative that aims to undermine the process of strengthening intelligence cooperation, but rather positions Canada as a better collaborator by contributing more, in a positive and active way, to its intelligence partnerships. This new posture would provide the opportunity for Canada to shape the narrative of transnational issues by offering a distinct perspective specific to Canadian values and priorities. However, based on this observation, it would first be necessary for these Canadian values, priorities and needs to be better defined for such products to see the light of day and this is unfortunately not something that our political decision-makers seem to be interested in settling at present. Certainly, Canadian foreign intelligence capabilities are lacking at many levels, but a clearer definition of Canada’s foreign policy priorities would support “Canadianization.” The next step would be to think about what could be done to encourage the continuation of this trend in Canada. It is clear that a better integration of the efforts of the NSI community is required in order to better face the emerging threats, because the evolution of the environment of the latter no longer allows neglect and mistakes in anticipating threats without having significant consequences for the security and prosperity of Canada. Considerations for Canada in Terms of Cooperation It is with these risks in mind that the pursuit of “Canadianization” is strongly recommended for the NSI community to continue its collaborative efforts with the departments and agencies of the public service that are not traditionally involved in  national security and intelligence matters. The same is true for new nongovernmental targets, whether they be universities, centers of excellence, think tanks, private companies, or the media. Indeed, the reality is that the intelligence services no longer have a monopoly on information and that the expertise and knowledge required to face threats require a more multidisciplinary approach. These resources and skills can be made available by the various non-governmental actors through closer collaboration. Therefore, in order to better understand these new threats and the possible mitigation measures, it would be appropriate for the NSI community to invest more seriously in a continuous and horizontal engagement with new non-governmental targets in order to build and maintain a mutual and consolidated trust. Full collaboration could make civil society and the Canadian private sector more aware of emerging threats. Additionally, although it has grown in recent years, it would help build intelligence literacy across all affected sectors, as the NSI community remains nebulous for many sectors and senior officials. Therefore, through awareness-raising and transparency actions, it should be better able to convey to external actors its role, priorities, limits, what it needs to be effective and how it can be used realistically. The clarification of its needs and its real capacities remains to be better defined and could possibly address and break down the silo mentality between the Canadian population and the NSI community. An interesting line of thought for achieving this outcome is through an initiative similar to the collaborative research project Public Intelligence or the Open Source Enterprise established by the Director of US National Intelligence. Under the responsibility of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor in the Privy Council Office, this resource would act as a central database for exploiting open sources of all media - print, broadcast and online. It would also aim to bring together the collective contributions of independent researchers, universities, centers of excellence, think tanks, private companies and the media. It would also include reports and publications from various departments and agencies of the public service, such as the various strategic plans, annual review and oversight reports as well as assessments of current threats affecting different Canadian sectors. This framework would be accessible to all Canadian citizens in a public and transparent manner. The benefits of such a project seem relevant and deserve special consideration since, it would make it possible to take advantage of the expertise of actors in the public and private sector in order to make Canada and Canadian citizens more resilient to threats. Indeed, in one way it would allow the NSI community to improve its methods and potential mitigation measures and on the other hand it could foster an electorate that further supports its important work and activities. Private companies, on the other hand, would get support in achieving their goals and objectives of innovation and prosperity. Civil society would benefit from a platform that would equip them to better advocate for and protect the security, rights and freedoms of Canadians. In short, from a mutual benefit and concerted action perspective, supporting the development of knowledge in the face of emerging and constantly evolving threats would only make external actors want to share more with those in the NSI community. On the other hand, within the national security and intelligence community itself, better inter-agency cooperation and an information exchange process need to be emphasized. The divergent priorities, resources, and activities of the various stakeholders generate communication problems and misunderstandings which hinder an optimal response to requests for information, but also to decisions taken by the government. While it appears to have improved significantly, even greater coordination is needed within the community to address issues that hamper inter-agency cooperation. Indeed, bureaucratic competition, a distinct internal vocabulary, standard operating procedures, conflicting interpretations and different security clearances do not help provide an optimal response to the threats facing Canada. Therefore, an approach similar to the One Vision framework, which aims to improve cooperation and simplify the process of information exchange between CSIS and the RCMP, should be scaled up and implemented across the NSI community. Of course, this would require an unprecedented level of national and international policy coordination, but it would help foster multidimensional inter-agency cohesion. As such, it would require the full integration of the efforts of different departments and ministries to address the challenges of different organizational cultures and procedures to provide a better response to the threats facing Canadian society. Conclusion All in all, if the desire is really to better alleviate the problems associated with the emergence of new threats and to meet the many challenges arising from the current transition of power and the intensification of strategic competition between the great powers, it is necessary to call for innovation, as well as for an unprecedented fusion of knowledge, practices, planning and cultures from all affected sectors. At the same time, allies and states with similar democratic priorities and values must understand that their national interests are best served through intelligence cooperation and aligned action. Moreover, if Canada is to fully benefit from multilateral intelligence cooperation, it must be able to do more by itself and for itself. The more Canada is able to actively contribute, the more it will get in return. This “Canadianization” of intelligence would add value to Canada as a partner and allow it to serve interests that reflect its priorities and values. In conclusion, in order to make Canadian businesses and citizens more resilient in the face of threats, it is recommended that the NSI community establish a multilateral framework for cooperation and mutual assistance with various external actors. Through iterative and systemic engagements, community stakeholders must establish links with other sectors of Canadian society and draw on all of their specialized knowledge and skills to deal with the ever-increasing complexity of evolving threats.     ## Intelligence in the Face of the Chinese Threat URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/intelligence-in-the-face-of-the-chinese-threat/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The recent public statement by the Director of CSIS in Canada, naming China as a threat to the country, shows the intelligence community's challenges in dealing with China. In September 2020, the Chairman of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Adam Schiff, published a short critical article in Foreign Affairs in which he asserted that the U.S. intelligence community is unprepared to deal with the Chinese threat. While Adam Schiff is not entirely wrong, the reality is more nuanced and complex. This reality is also visible in France and Canada, where intelligence is aware of the threat posed by China, but where the redirection of intelligence to deal with this threat seems to be long overdue. The recent public statement by the Director of CSIS in Canada, naming China as a threat to the country, shows the intelligence community's challenges in dealing with China. What is the capacity of U.S. intelligence to deal with the Chinese threat? What lessons can be learned for the intelligence communities in Canada and France, which are also facing this threat? American Intelligence: Alert, But Insufficiently Prepared American intelligence, far from being blind, is well aware of the threat posed by China, and has been for a long time. Indeed, in the National Intelligence Director's 2007 Annual Threat Assessment, China was identified as one of the major "threats and challenges" to the United States in the coming years, although in 2007 the focus was on counterterrorism and nuclear proliferation. Almost 15 years ago, American intelligence was already aware of the threat posed by China's economic espionage activities and the challenges posed by its economic and military growth. Today, China has become the most significant strategic threat to the United States. In December 2020, National Intelligence Director Daniel Ratcliffe said that China is the greatest threat to freedom and democracy since World War II. It is also a position shared by FBI Director Christopher Wray, who said China is the most significant long-term threat to the future of the United States. He goes further, arguing that “the stakes could not be higher.” The National Intelligence Director's 2019 Annual Threat Assessment and the 2020 Domestic Threat Assessment both reflect the importance of the Chinese threat to U.S. security, both militarily and strategically through China's ability to target satellites in Earth’s orbit with ground-based missiles, the construction of overseas military bases, and its modernization of naval capabilities, air offensive operations and long-distance mobilization for its operations, as well as security and economic threats through cyber-attacks, political influence activities, and espionage. Yet the HPSCI report states that the US intelligence community has not sufficiently adapted to the geopolitical and technological changes caused by China's rise to power and is failing to take sufficient account of non-military threats. However, the Commission relies on a relatively narrow definition of intelligence as the collection, analysis and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to policy-makers. This view comes from the traditional view of the intelligence cycle, which does not reflect the reality of intelligence missions. For example, as early as 2016, the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission demonstrated the intelligence community's numerous efforts to counter aggressive Chinese activities, particularly in the area of espionage. In addition, the FBI has long focused on non-military threats from China, such as economic espionage and threats to the academic community. However, as Adam Schiff and the HPSCI report point out, the allocation of resources in the intelligence community to address the Chinese threat is not sufficient to allow the United States to compete with China on the international stage and guarantee its national security. The U.S. government also needs to strengthen its ability to disrupt and deter Chinese influence operations in the United States. In addition, Schiff believes that the U.S. intelligence community must continue to prioritize counterintelligence efforts against China. This is a position shared by the Biden administration and National Intelligence Director Avril Haines, who says that one of her priorities will be to devote more resources to countering the Chinese threat. She also presents herself as being in favour of an aggressive U.S. stance against China. However, China is not the only threat to U.S. interests, and intelligence therefore faces a multitude of dangers. Indeed, the HPSCI points out that U.S. intelligence continues to face many challenges. For example, the Middle East and South Asia are regions that raise a number of issues, notably because of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, in the fight against international terrorism, but also because of sensitive intelligence cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which since 2017 have been pursuing policies that run counter to U.S. regional objectives. Moreover, the threat to the United States comes not only from China, but also from Russia's nuclear proliferation, use of chemical weapons and military modernization. This is in addition to the domestic threat of violent extremism, which requires a growing investment in domestic intelligence to address it. Under these conditions, there is a real work to be done in prioritizing the threats to be addressed, in order to properly allocate the necessary resources to the intelligence community. The Chinese Threat as Seen by French and Canadian Intelligence While the United States, as a major power in direct competition with China, may be more targeted by the Chinese threat, France, has also reported several Chinese espionage incidents. Yet, in terms of homeland security as well as national security and defence, France did not, until very recently, consider the Chinese threat as one of its priorities. The latter were limited to the fight against Islamist-inspired terrorism and violent subversion. However, French intelligence is well aware of the Chinese threat, as shown by the Interior Minister's 2019 speech on Chinese espionage and economic plundering in France. He stated that the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) is investing significant resources to monitor the evolution of the Chinese threat on French territory, particularly in terms of counterintelligence. The DGSI is therefore particularly aware of the Chinese threat and is deploying its investigative arsenal to deal with it. At the politico-strategic level, China became central to French foreign intelligence with their 2021 strategic update because of its destabilizing activities and its qualification as a "strategic rival for the EU." This also leads France to focus more on new domains (cyber, space and artificial intelligence) to deal with hybrid strategies. Intelligence has become one of France’s priorities for modernizing its capabilities to manage competition with China, notably through increased investment and the modernization of intelligence resources, especially in the IT field. The General Directorate for External Security's budget was also increased by 7.8% in 2021, mainly for cyber security. In Canada, the situation is relatively similar to France. The intelligence community recognizes the scope of the Chinese threat. In February 2021 David Vigneault, the Director of CSIS, named the Chinese government as a threat to Canada, notably through its economic espionage activities targeting the pharmaceutical industry, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, aerospace or ocean technologies, and its foreign interference, notably in its hunt for Chinese political opponents on Canadian soil. The Director of CSIS thus calls for a strengthening Canada's defences. However, it appears that the government is slow to strengthen its counterintelligence and counter interference measures. David Mulroney, former Canadian ambassador to China, affirms that China is the most significant threat to Canada, particularly in terms of its ability to target Canadian elites, especially given the major economic ties of some Canadian elites with China. Through economic incentive, China is able to secure the voices of certain Canadian elites with the intention of guiding some of Canada's major decisions. According to Mulroney, Canada is a sleeping target for China. China is also specifically targeting the academic community, through research partnerships and through various Chinese student associations. Yet, for at least a decade, Canadian intelligence has been alerting the Canadian government about the rising threat of China. The situation has not improved during the pandemic. The Canadian intelligence community has been increasingly speaking out publicly to alert the public of the Chinese threat, including espionage in the pharmaceutical field. The Challenge of Threat Prioritization The United States, France and Canada face the same challenge with regard to China: the prioritization of this threat. While intelligence can warn of potential threats, only political leaders can decide to make it a national security priority, thereby redirecting intelligence resources towards the Chinese threat. However, what Adam Schiff denounces for American intelligence is the lack of resources allocated to the Chinese threat within the intelligence community, an allocation that depends on the prioritization of threats by the government. We must at all costs avoid reproducing the example of the early 1990s, when American intelligence warned of the growing threat of Al-Qaeda, but the government did not redirect intelligence resources. The situation is similar in France and Canada, where intelligence recognizes the scope of the threat posed by China, but the government has not (yet) made it a priority. The real problem, therefore, lies in the prioritization of threats by governments. If, at the political level, China is seen as a national security priority, this could lead to a redirection of intelligence capabilities. The delicate question will be to determine the nature and relative importance of the Chinese threat compared to other threats. ## International Aid in the Face of the Afghan Humanitarian Crisis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/international-aid-in-the-face-of-the-afghan-humanitarian-crisis/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This hot take offers solutions to improve the way international aid is delivered in the context of the Afghan humanitarian crisis. In 2001, the signing of the Bonn Agreement marked the beginning of a major Western investment in the cultural, economic and political reshaping of Afghanistan. Twenty years later, a weakened government has been overturned by the Taliban, leaving the international community facing a dilemma. How to support the local population that has been dependent on international aid for two decades without legitimizing an authoritarian government that has repeatedly demonstrated through its actions, that it has no intention of respecting the conditions imposed by the international community for the provision of aid?. The international community’s response to the Taliban takeover has been unanimous. On the one hand, it withdrew its active financial participation in all existing structures, forcing more than a third of the Afghan population into food and financial insecurity. On the other hand, it has made humanitarian aid conditional on a set of criteria to be met by the Taliban. However, this approach, while understandable given the climate of uncertainty in which the country finds itself, implies a reactive logic and a lack of strategic thinking about the type of engagement necessary to protect local populations and preserve international interests. Humanitarian assistance aims to meet the immediate and short-term needs of the population in the event of a major crisis. Relevant funding aims to meet the primary needs of the population and building resilience at the community level. The neutrality on which it is supposed to be based allows staff working on site to minimize the risk of reprisals. It is therefore a very small part of economic aid, but its purpose is otherwise vital. In this context, despite the risks of taxation of NGOs by the Taliban (which would underpin their access to part of the emergency humanitarian aid), it remains important for the international community to adopt an approach based on managing this risk rather than on maximizing its avoidance. However, emergency humanitarian aid, while necessary in the current crisis, is limited in the changes it can bring about. Short-term aid cannot help the population through long-term crises. Although increased economic aid would require recognition of the Taliban (which is still far from being the case), the international community will have to broaden the debate beyond negotiations on access to the local population. In this context, in order for the international community to maximize its impact on the living conditions of the population and avoid the spillover of the conflict, it will have to consider the impact of three dimensions on the effectiveness of its aid. First, the international community must make its actions long-term: in this context, it is essential to learn the necessary lessons from past mistakes. For the past two decades, the international community has made capacity building of the Afghan government an international security issue directly linked to the fight against terrorism. The resulting costs are in the hundreds of billions of dollars. While this has led to improvements in the socio-economic conditions of the population, particularly for women and girls, several reports, including SIGAR's, have highlighted the ineffectiveness of the resulting aid. One of the main reasons for this is that international engagement has often been based on short-term solutions with poorly targeted programs, inconsistent strategies and unrealistic expectations. The assistance required to bring the country out of the crisis should therefore no longer be based on reactive logics devoid of strategic planning. In this context, the major powers will have to broaden their spectrum of negotiations, particularly with regard to the severity of the sanctions imposed. For the time being, only certain humanitarian activities have been authorized through the granting of exemption licenses by the US Department of the Treasury.  In addition, although several initiatives are being undertaken, notably by the UNDP, to provide liquidity to local communities and businesses, the very effectiveness of certain humanitarian initiatives remains based on the presence of government services and basic infrastructure. This will require the development of programs and policies that allow for long-term engagement with a Taliban government. It is in this context that multilateral collaboration is required. Second, the international actors with a history of intervention in Afghanistan need to establish a common understanding of aid conditionality. This seems far from being the case at present. Russia's holding of a meeting parallel to that of the G7, including the Taliban, the countries bordering Afghanistan that are directly affected by the conflict, but not the United States, demonstrates the divergence of interests and approaches between the various countries. This leads to a fragmentation of the discourse and creates an opportunity for the instrumentalization of aid against the interests of local populations. Given the history of United Nations involvement and its experience on the ground, whether in terms of aid distribution or negotiation with the Taliban, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) could be a platform within which cooperation takes place. The renegotiation of its mandate after the Secretary General's report in January 2022 will be a difficult exercise in multilateral cooperation in which the divergent interests of the various actors must be balanced. This will demonstrate whether the international community can find a concerted strategy to address the complexity of the challenges facing Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Third, the international community needs to better understand the Taliban in order to more effectively facilitate aid decision-making. The Taliban is a disparate group that owes its survival to its diverse sources of income and its instrumentalization of the weaknesses of international intervention. Since its return to power, the group's priorities have been to maintain their internal cohesion and solidify their domestic authority. In this context, conditioning aid is unlikely to bring about political change, especially since it would imply the need to withdraw aid if the conditions for granting it are not met. Historically, this has rarely been the case. In practice, the alignment of the Taliban's actions with the demands of the international community is likely to occur only to the extent that the latter converge with the group's interests. Health and sanitation service provision remain as areas universally recognized as essential and have long been operationalized in conflict environments. They are therefore areas that the international community could consider as a starting point for negotiations with the Taliban. Given the failure of military interventions over the past several decades, coercion may have perverse effects and fail to bring about adequate change. The international community will need to find a way to engage the Taliban beyond emergency humanitarian assistance. There is a need to find a way to deliver at least some economic assistance to enable the provision of basic public services, without recognizing or legitimizing the Taliban. To this end, the conditions attached to the granting of economic support must be realistic and pragmatic, allowing improved access to certain rights while not being in flagrant contradiction with the intrinsic interests of the Taliban. The current humanitarian crisis, by its magnitude and its economic and security implications, has presented the international community with several challenges. On the one hand, it remains necessary to address the humanitarian crisis and on the other hand, it is imperative not to economically support a regime whose values are in contradiction with those of human rights. In this context, neutral, emergency humanitarian aid remains crucial, although it is nonetheless insufficient to get the country out of the crisis. The international community will have to broaden the debate on how to engage with the Taliban in the future. If the international community wishes to counteract the failures of the past two decades, it must take a preventive rather than a reactive approach. To do so, it must plan ahead and for the long term, which requires concerted action among the various stakeholders and the development of a thorough understanding of the Taliban's structural frameworks. ## Intersectionality Strategy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/intersectionality-strategy/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > In addition to this tool, the Strategic Analysis Network is committed to using an intersectional approach to achieve its objectives. Context Rooted in the Black American feminist movement of the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of intersectionality refers to the intersection of the various social, physiological and psychological identities of an individual that shape perception of the environment as well as experience of life. In 1995, in an effort to achieve parity and create a more inclusive society, the Canadian federal government committed to implementing a tool to advance gender equality in Canada as part of the ratification of the  Beijing Platform of Action (Canada, 2018a). In the early 2000s, the Canadian government launched Gender-Based Analysis (GBA), a tool to promote the inclusion of gender differences in the development of programmes and policies and the elimination of discrimination towards women. In 2011, Status of Women Canada modernized its approach by introducing Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) to take into account other identity factors along with gender (Canada, 2018b). Since 2016, memoranda to Cabinet and presentations to the Treasury Board of Canada must include a GBA+. Moreover, Status of Women Canada has developed an online course to teach the basics of the tool to all and encourage public servants to apply GBA+ in their work. In addition to this tool, the Strategic Analysis Network is committed to using an intersectional approach to achieve its objectives. Implementation of an Intersectional Analysis Gender-based analysis plus (GBA+) GBA+ "is used to assess the potential impact of policies, programmes or initiatives on various groups of people - women, men and others" (Canada, 2018). The tool proposes a series of questions to ask before undertaking any research or activity in order to challenge the researcher or the analyst’s beliefs or biases. GBA+ has seven distinct stages: identifying main issues, challenging assumptions, gathering  facts through research and consultation, formulating options and recommendations, monitoring and evaluating, and communicating (Canada, 2018). Some researchers have noted the limits of GBA+, including that the tool is primarily based on analysis according to gender and sex before it includes other identity factors (Hankivsky & Mussell, 2018). In addition, the various factors are approached as independent categories that are added to each other, which goes against the very essence of an intersectional approach (Hankivsky & Mussell, 2018; Maillé, 2018). Some also noted that the long list of questions posed often results in a box ticking exercise rather than a real reflection on the inclusion of minority groups. Finally, we add that the discriminating factors are all grouped under the category "identity factors", without any distinction as to their real nature. Although our intersectionality strategy is inspired by GBA+, it innovates and goes beyond GBA+ to ensure that intersectionality is present in the collective work produced by researchers from the Strategic Analysis Network and that this work reflects a great diversity and the inclusion of under-represented groups. Our approach to intersectionality Our intersectionality strategy holds that the perceptions and life experiences of individuals are shaped by several factors that may be discriminatory. The importance and effects of these factors may vary depending on the context and the situation. In addition, these factors do not operate independently, but interact with each other and can contribute to the formation of unique forms of discrimination. Our strategy of intersectionality differs from GBA+ in three ways : The starting point is not necessarily gender -The starting point of our intersectionality strategy is not necessarily gender, but varies depending on the nature of the project or initiative. For example, in some cases, the main discriminating factor can be a physical handicap or even language, while gender can have a secondary influence. The intersectionality strategy includes three types of discriminating factors Identity factors: Factors that define an individual's identity.  Identity factors include in particular gender, sexual identity, race, language, culture, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc. Psycho- bio-neurophysiological factors: Psychological, biological, neurological or physiological factors that affect the way people perceive or experience the external environment. Psychological bio-neurophysiological factors include biological sex, age, physical or mental disability, physical appearance, learning styles, learning disorders, etc. Socio-economic factors: Features relating to the social or economic position of an individual that influences life experiences. Socio-economic factors include income, education, place of residence (rural vs. urban , region vs. centre, etc.), economic conditions in the community where an individual lives, employment status, marital status, family status, etc. The intersectionality strategy includes taking into account the relationship between the categories of discriminating factors - The various discriminating factors are not uniform categories that can simply be added on to each other. Our intersectionality strategy focuses specifically on the intersection of various discriminating factors to understand how the relationship between them affects how people perceive or live particular situations. To go further, have a look at our video on thinking diversity of all kinds in strategic affairs. How do I apply the intersectionality strategy to my work? All the activities of the Strategic Analysis Network can be grouped under three main categories: Research and analysis activities Dissemination of research results Training activities for new researchers and new practitioners For each category, our strategy suggests answering three fundamental questions: What is the main discriminating factor? What are the other factors that influence or contribute to discrimination? How does the intersection between these factors affect analysis and research, the dissemination of results or the training of new researchers for certain individuals? These three questions will require researchers to properly identify the subgroups likely to suffer discrimination. The type of data to be collected will vary according to the category of activities carried out. Research and analysis activities The results of research and analysis are frequently tainted with the beliefs and unconscious biases of the researchers. The samples studied are often considered to be homogeneous and the results obtained are thus generalized to the whole of a population which is also often conceived as a homogeneous whole. However, before undertaking research and analysis, it is important to consider the characteristics of the sample or population studied. Take, for example, research looking at the retention of Indigenous recruits in the Canadian Armed Forces. It is possible that the reasons prompting some recruits to leave the organisation depend on various factors. In this case, the primary discriminating factor will be Indigenous origin: it will be interesting to first understand the difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous recruits’ reasons to leave the organisation. However, since the “ Indigenous ” category is not homogeneous , it is important to identify other factors that can affect the experience of recruits. For example, is there a difference between men and women? Does having lived on a reserve or not influence the recruit’s decision? Does family situation influence choice? How do these various factors interact? Are reasons for leaving the organisation the same for a single Indigenous man from an urban centre and for a single-parent Indigenous woman from a more distant region? Can other factors interact and shape the experience of these Indigenous recruits? Before undertaking a research or analysis activity, it is therefore important to note the factors likely to influence the experience of certain individuals or sub-segments of the population and to carry out more detailed and specific research in order to avoid generalisations that fail to take into account the specificity of the experiences of certain under-represented groups. Dissemination of academic research results The tools for disseminating research results are most often intended for an educated audience and are frequently not well suited to a wider audience. Before embarking on the development of media to disseminate information, it is important to understand the diversity of the target audience in order to adapt the modes of communication. For example, in the case of an information note aimed at informing practitioners of research results, the main discriminating factor will be  level of education. One might wonder whether the note is written in accessible language and free from hermetic scientific jargon. Furthermore, depending on the target audience, it is important to ask whether people with visual impairments can have access to the information note. If the note is translated, is the translation faithful and does it reflect the reality specific to the other language? Do the examples and expressions used have meaning for all individuals who will read this note so that they understand the message, or are they specific to the dominant culture? Is the format easily accessible for all? Before developing a tool for disseminating research results, it is therefore important to note the factors likely to influence or limit the understanding of recipients, in order to avoid limiting access to knowledge to certain groups who are under-represented in our society. Training activities for new researchers and new practitioners Training programs are often designed to meet the needs of an audience with little diversity. However, in order to maximize the scope of training activities for new researchers and new practitioners, it is important to clearly define the characteristics of the participants and to adapt the activities to their various needs and realities. For example, in the case of setting up a postdoctoral fellowship programme to develop the bilingual expertise of young Canadian researchers, the main discriminating factor will be language. The reality of young French-speaking researchers differs considerably from that of young English-speaking researchers since French remains a minority language in all of Canada, except in Quebec, which is likely to influence everyone's experience. How does the learning experience of an Indigenous postdoctoral trainee speaking mainly French and living in Quebec differ from that of a Black postdoctoral trainee speaking English and living in Western Canada? Finally, other factors such as neurological, physiological or psychological handicaps (e.g. dyslexia, anxiety disorders, etc.) can also shape the learning experience. Before designing training for new researchers and new practitioners, it is therefore important to identify factors that may influence learning experiences and to develop programmes that are well suited to a diverse population in order to allow participants to make the most of their experience. The following graphic illustrates our intersectionality strategy:   Evaluating the implementation of the intersectionality strategy The Strategic Analysis Network’s management team is committed to presenting an annual report on the intersectionality strategy to the Scientific Council; this assessment is to enable us to adjust our operations to ensure that they include great diversity and under-represented groups. To this end, we ask all members of the network to fill out a short form (below) to note the discriminating factors that they have identified, as well as the measures taken to consider the uniqueness of the experience of certain minority groups in our society. The form must then be sent to Isabelle Caron, responsible for implementing the intersectionality strategy for the Strategic Analysis Network. Link to the form : https://forms.gle/YyK8LBozEGmzVVaj8 To go further Canada, “What is GBA+?,” Status of Women Canada, 2018. Olena Hankivsky, “Intersectionality 101,” The Institute for Intersectionality Research and Policy, Simon Fraser University (2014).  Chantal Maillé, “Intersectionalizing gender policies: Experiences in Quebec and Canada” French Politics 16:3 (2018): 312-327.  Olena Hankivsky & Linda Mussell, “Gender-Based Analysis Plus in Canada: Problems and Possibilities of Integrating Intersectionality,” Canadian Public Policy 44:4 (2018): 303-316.  ## Interview with Artur Wilczynski, Associate Deputy Chief for Signals Intelligence – SIGNT URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-artur-wilczynski-associate-deputy-chief-for-signals-intelligence-sigint/ Modified: 2021-06-23 > The hosts interview Artur Wilczynski, Associate Deputy Chief for Signals Intelligence - SIGNT - at the CSE. In this 17th episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Artur Wilczynski, Associate Deputy Chief for Signals Intelligence - SIGNT - at the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Federal Government. Artur is also the champion for equity, diversity and inclusion within CSE. So we talk to him about these issues: has the diversity and inclusion situation improved over the years? What still needs to be done? Artur also explains why it is essential for the intelligence community to diversify its human resources. Finally, Artur talks about Canada's ongoing cooperation with its closest allies and partners to share lessons learned in promoting diversity and inclusion in the intelligence community.   ## Interview with Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, François-Philippe Champagne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-canadas-minister-of-foreign-affairs-francois-philippe-champagne/ Modified: 2020-10-01 > In the first episode of the Podcast Conseils de sécurité, the hosts interview François-Philippe Champagne, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the first episode of the Podcast Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau interview François-Philippe Champagne, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs. They discuss the future of Canada's engagement with the United Nations, as well as Canada-US relations with the upcoming US election. They then turn to Canada's relations with China and Saudi Arabia. ## Interview with Célia Bélin, Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institution URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-celia-belin-visiting-fellow-at-the-center-on-the-united-states-and-europe-of-the-brookings-institution/ Modified: 2022-03-09 > Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Célia Bélin, visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institute. For this 29th episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Célia Bélin, visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institute. We discuss the earthquake that the war in Ukraine represents, and its consequences for the transatlantic relationship: Célia analyzes the role of France and Germany, the debates within NATO, and the stakes for European defense. She concludes by addressing the consequences for other members of the Atlantic Alliance, such as Canada. ## Interview with Chantal Lavallée, Deputy Director of CRITIC at the Royal Military College of Saint-Jean URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-chantal-lavallee-deputy-director-of-critic-at-the-royal-military-college-of-saint-jean/ Modified: 2022-05-04 > For this 32nd episode, Thomas and Sarah-Myriam interview Chantal Lavallée, Assistant Professor of International Studies and Deputy Director of the Centre for Security and Crisis Governance (CRITIC) at the Royal Military College of Saint-Jean. For this 32nd episode, Thomas and Sarah-Myriam interview Chantal Lavallée, Assistant Professor of International Studies and Deputy Director of the Centre for Security and Crisis Governance (CRITIC) at the Royal Military College of Saint-Jean. They discuss the place of drones in the evolution of security issues as well as civil-military cooperation. Chantal explains to what extent the integration of drones is transforming the socio-technical imagination. They then discuss the impact of COVID-19 on the use of the technology and how this new technology influences the current context of the crisis in Ukraine. Chantal concludes with a comparison of the use of these technologies in Canada with what is being done in Europe. ## Interview with Daniel Jean, former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada (2016-18) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-daniel-jean-former-national-security-and-intelligence-advisor-to-the-prime-minister-of-canada-2016-18/ Modified: 2020-10-07 > In this episode, the hosts speak with Daniel Jean, National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada (2016-18), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2013-2016) and Deputy Minister of Canadian Heritage (2010-2013). They discuss Canada's specificity in terms of intelligence, the threats facing Canada, the consequences on the United States, and the new intelligence policy within UN peace missions. Daniel Jean also shares advice based on his experiences. In the second episode of the Podcast Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau speak with Daniel Jean, National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada (2016-18), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (2013-2016) and Deputy Minister of Canadian Heritage (2010-2013). They discuss Canada's specificity in terms of intelligence, the threats facing Canada, the consequences on the United States, and the new intelligence policy within UN peace missions. Daniel Jean also shares advice based on his experiences. Conseils de sécurité is part of the CGAI Network, a partner of the CPSN-CDSN.       ## Interview with Denis Thompson, retired Major-General of Military Operations Challenges URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-denis-thompson-retired-major-general-of-military-operations-challenges/ Modified: 2021-03-31 > In this eleventh episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas talk with retired Major-General Denis Thompson about the challenges of military operations, his role as Commander of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, the evolution of the Special Forces, the adaptation of the Canadian military to the pandemic environment, and Canada's role in peacekeeping operations. Major General Thompson concludes with advice to the new generation of commanders in the Armed Forces and to those who wish to join the Canadian military. In this eleventh episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas talk with retired Major-General Denis Thompson about the challenges of military operations, his role as Commander of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, the evolution of the Special Forces, the adaptation of the Canadian military to the pandemic environment, and Canada's role in peacekeeping operations. Major General Thompson concludes with advice to the new generation of commanders in the Armed Forces and to those who wish to join the Canadian military.   ## Interview with Djallil Lounnas, Associate Professor of International Relations at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-djallil-lounnas/ Modified: 2021-10-14 > Sarah-Myriam et Thomas recoivent Djallil Lounnas, professeur associé de relations internationales à l’Universite Al Akhawayn au Maroc. For this 22nd episode of Conseils de Sécurité, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau welcome Djallil Lounnas, Associate Professor of International Relations at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco. Djallil Lounnas holds a PhD in Political Science from Université de Montréal. He has published numerous studies and scientific articles on the subject including studies in conflict and terrorism, Political Violence and Terrorism and Foreign Policy. He is also the author of the book "Le Djihadisme en Afrique du Nord-Sahel: D'AQMI a Daech" published in 2019 by Les Presses de la fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique/L'Harmattan. He has coordinated and been part of several research teams in the framework of European H2020 research projects. He is the leader of the Al Akhawayn research team of the European H2020 research consortium Preventing Violent Extremism (PREVEX project). In this interview, Djallil Lounnas talks about his academic and professional background, his research on violent extremism in the Sahel and North Africa, the impact of external interventions, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the phenomenon of radicalization in the region and the extent to which Canada can play a role.   ## Interview with Dominic Rochon, National Security and Cyber Security Sector URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-dominic-rochon-national-security-and-cyber-security-sector/ Modified: 2022-06-15 > For this new episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, National Security and Cyber Security Sector at Public Safety Canada. For this new episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, National Security and Cyber Security Sector at Public Safety Canada. Dominic, who has also worked at the Communications Security Establishment, the Privy Council Office, and the Treasury Board Secretariat, is the government co-chair of the National Security Transparency Advisory Group. He talks about the Group's recently released report on the relationship between national security and intelligence agencies and racialized communities in Canada.   ## Interview with Dominic Rochon, National Security and Cyber Security Sector (PS) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-dominic-rochon-national-security-and-cyber-security-sector-ps/ Modified: 2021-12-20 For the 26th episode of Security Tips, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas talk about transparency in national security with Dominic Rochon, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, National Security and Cyber Security Sector at Public Safety Canada. Dominic talks about reforms over the past few years to improve transparency in the national security community. He also talks about the recently released second report of the Advisory Panel on National Security Transparency, of which he is the co-chair.       ## Interview with Emma Soubrier, Visiting Scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies, George Washington University URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-emma-soubrier-visiting-scholar-at-the-institute-for-middle-east-studies-george-washington-university/ Modified: 2022-05-18 > For this 33rd episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Emma Soubrier, a visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University. For this 33rd episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Emma Soubrier, a visiting scholar at the Institute for Middle East Studies at George Washington University, the Centre Michel de l'Hôpital at the Université Clermont Auvergne, and the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW). Emma talks about the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. She explains how bilateral tensions between the two partners are the norm, not the exception. She then analyzes initiatives led by Mohammed bin Salmane, the Saudi crown prince, seeking to increase his country's domestic arms production capacity. ## Interview with Frédéric Mérand, scientific director of the CÉRIUM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-frederic-merand-scientific-director-of-the-cerium/ Modified: 2022-02-09 > Sarah-Myriam and Thomas welcome Frédéric Mérand, professor at the University of Montreal and scientific director of the CÉRIUM. For this 28th episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas welcome Frédéric Mérand, professor at the University of Montreal and scientific director of the Centre for International Studies (CÉRIUM). Frédéric talks about the historical context that brought us to the current crisis in Ukraine, then analyzes the positions of the United States, Ukraine, and Russia. He evokes different scenarios for the coming weeks and then discusses the role of Canada.   ## Interview with Isabelle Desmartis, Assistant Deputy Minister of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) at the Department of National Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/isabelle-desmartis/ Modified: 2021-05-12 > Isabelle Desmartis, Assistant Deputy Minister of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) at the Department of National Defence. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Isabelle Desmartis, Assistant Deputy Minister of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) at the Department of National Defence. Isabelle talks about DRDC's main activities and its partnerships with the academic and private sectors. She also talks about cooperation with Canada's allies, and the particular challenges associated with research in the defence community. She also explains how DRDC balances its priorities of providing operational support to the current needs of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces with its longer-term research objectives.   ## Interview with Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, director of the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-jean-baptiste-jeangene-vilmer-director-of-the-institute-for-strategic-research-irsem/ Modified: 2022-01-26 > Sarah-Myriam and Thomas welcome Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, Director of the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council (Washington, DC). For the 27th episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas welcome Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, Director of the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council (Washington, DC). They discuss his most recent report, co-authored with Paul Charron, entitled "Les opérations d’influence chinoises. Un moment machiavélien".  They discuss the evolution and variety of these operations, the concept of the "russianization" of Chinese influence and the main challenges for Canada in the face of these operations. ## Interview with Jocelyn Coulon, Researcher at the CÉRIUM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-jocelyn-coulon/ Modified: 2021-08-31 > Discussion with Jocelyn Coulon, Researcher at the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal (CÉRIUM). In this 19th episode, Thomas Juneau and Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé welcome Jocelyn Coulon, Researcher at the Centre d'études et de recherches internationales de l'Université de Montréal (CÉRIUM). He talks about his professional background and we discuss his analysis of the evolution of Canadian foreign policy, the subject of two of his recently published books: "Un Selfie avec Justin Trudeau" and "Le Canada à la recherche d’une identité internationale", a collection of texts written between 2004 and 2020.  In it, Jocelyn Coulon presents his recommendations for the next government.   ## Interview with José Aranaz, Representative and Director at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-jose-aranaz-representative-and-director-at-the-office-of-the-united-nations-high-commissioner-for-human-rights-in-geneva/ Modified: 2020-11-12 > The hosts speak with José Aranaz, Representative and Director at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva and former Director of the Joint United Nations Office for Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He has worked in Sudan, Iraq, Bosnia, Croatia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guatemala, East Timor and Venezuela. We discuss the challenges of promoting human rights, the role of local authorities, the United States, Venezuela, Iraq, the impact of COVID and the future of human rights' promotion. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau speak with José Aranaz, Representative and Director at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva and former Director of the Joint United Nations Office for Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He has worked in Sudan, Iraq, Bosnia, Croatia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guatemala, East Timor and Venezuela. We discuss the challenges of promoting human rights, the role of local authorities, the United States, Venezuela, Iraq, the impact of COVID and the future of human rights' promotion.   ## Interview with Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, Visiting Scholar at the CÉRIUM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-laurence-deschamps-laporte-visiting-scholar-at-the-cerium/ Modified: 2021-02-17 > In this episode, the hosts discuss with Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, Visiting Scholar at the CÉRIUM, Visiting Professor at the Université de Montréal and until recently, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ms. Deschamps-Laporte holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. from Oxford University where she was a Rhodes Scholar. She is a specialist of the Middle East, the study of Islamist movements and Salafism. She is interested in the study of Canadian foreign policy, feminism in international relations, and Middle East politics and society. She has advised three Canadian foreign ministers and was formerly a consultant with McKinsey.  Professor Deschamps-Laporte discusses her professional and academic background and the development and challenges of implementing Canadian feminist foreign policy. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau discuss with Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, Visiting Scholar at the CÉRIUM, Visiting Professor at the Université de Montréal and until recently, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ms. Deschamps-Laporte holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. from Oxford University where she was a Rhodes Scholar. She is a specialist of the Middle East, the study of Islamist movements and Salafism. She is interested in the study of Canadian foreign policy, feminism in international relations, and Middle East politics and society. She has advised three Canadian foreign ministers and was formerly a consultant with McKinsey.  Professor Deschamps-Laporte discusses her professional and academic background and the development and challenges of implementing Canadian feminist foreign policy.   ## Interview with Lieutenant-General Jocelyn Paul, the most senior First Nations member of the Canadian Forces URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-lieutenant-general-jocelyn-paul/ Modified: 2021-06-09 > Interview with Lieutenant-General Jocelyn Paul, the most senior First Nations member of the Canadian Forces. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas meet Lieutenant-General Jocelyn Paul, the most senior First Nations member of the Canadian Forces. LGen Paul, now the Deputy Commander of NATO Joint Command Naples, talks about the highlights of his career. He also discusses the main challenges in the relationship between the Forces and First Nations, particularly in the area of recruitment. He then explains how his background has helped him, during his many deployments, and in particular in Kandahar, Afghanistan, to better understand the importance of local culture.   ## Interview with Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, Director of the Institute for Security Studies regional office for West Africa, Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-lori-anne-theroux-benoni-director-of-the-institute-for-security-studies-regional-office-for-west-africa-sahel-and-the-lake-chad-basin/ Modified: 2022-03-23 > For this 30th episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas welcome Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) regional office for West Africa, Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. For this 30th episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas welcome Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) regional office for West Africa, Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. They discuss the ISS mission. Lori-Anne discusses the factors behind recent coups and attempted coups in the Sahel and the role of regional and/or international organizations such as the UN in preventing or dealing with these instabilities. Lori-Anne also revisits a report published in 2019 to explain the link between violent extremism, organized crime, and local conflicts in West Africa. She identifies the mechanisms of recruitment by so-called jihadist groups in the Sahel and discusses the different factors that drive individuals to join groups that are characterized by the use of extremist violence. She explains how security issues in the Sahel can have repercussions outside the region, in Europe, Asia and the Americas. She concludes with a discussion of Canada's role in the Sahel - how and to what extent Canada should become more involved. Références :  EN2022,  Lessons must be learnt before Barkhane marches into new territory EN 2019, Violent extremism, organised crime and local conflits in Liptako Gourma EN 2016, Mali’s young ‘jihadists’: Fuelled by faith or circumstances? ## Interview with Marc-André Franche, Chief of the UN Secretary General’s Peacebuilding Fund URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-marc-andre-franche-chief-of-the-un-secretary-generals-peacebuilding-fund/ Modified: 2020-12-02 > In this episode, the hosts speak with Marc-André Franche, Head of the UN Secretary General's Peacebuilding Fund, which helps more than 40 countries prevent violent conflict, avert the recurrence of conflict, or encourage reconciliation. The Fund is the UN's instrument of first resort for providing timely, catalytic and risk-tolerant financing to keep the peace. Marc-André Franche has led his professional career in international development and conflict prevention with the United Nations. Mr. Franche and the hosts discuss the role of the Peacebuilding Fund, key issues related to UN reforms, and Canada's role and challenges within the organization. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau speak with Marc-André Franche, Head of the UN Secretary General's Peacebuilding Fund, which helps more than 40 countries prevent violent conflict, avert the recurrence of conflict, or encourage reconciliation. The Fund is the UN's instrument of first resort for providing timely, catalytic and risk-tolerant financing to keep the peace. Marc-André Franche has led his professional career in international development and conflict prevention with the United Nations. Mr. Franche and the hosts discuss the role of the Peacebuilding Fund, key issues related to UN reforms, and Canada's role and challenges within the organization.   ## Interview with Michelle Tessier, Deputy Director of Operations, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-michelle-tessier-deputy-director-of-operations-canadian-security-and-intelligence-service/ Modified: 2021-03-03 > In this episode, the hosts discuss with Michelle Tessier, Deputy Director of Operations at the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). We discuss how the Service has adapted in recent years to meet the changing threat posed by foreign interference, particularly as extremism and terrorism continue and diversify. She then discusses the benefits of diversity within an organization like CSIS. Finally, we discuss the impact of the pandemic on the Service's work, and the lessons that CSIS has learned over the past year. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas discuss with Michelle Tessier, Deputy Director of Operations at the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). We discuss how the Service has adapted in recent years to meet the changing threat posed by foreign interference, particularly as extremism and terrorism continue and diversify. She then discusses the benefits of diversity within an organization like CSIS. Finally, we discuss the impact of the pandemic on the Service's work, and the lessons that CSIS has learned over the past year. ## Interview with Mrs. Bouaré Bintou Founé Samaké, Minister for the Promotion of Women, Children and the Family of Mali URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-mrs-bouare-bintou-foune-samake-minister-for-the-promotion-of-women-children-and-the-family-of-mali/ Modified: 2021-04-14 > In this twelfth episode, Thomas Juneau and Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé interview Mrs. Bouaré Bintou Founé Samaké, Mali's Minister for the Promotion of Women, Children and the Family. They discuss the highlights of her academic and professional career and her role as Executive Director of Women in Law and Development in Africa/Femmes droits en développement en Afrique, Mali Chapter. The Minister presents the objectives and challenges of her mandate, the challenges posed by the pandemic and concludes on partnerships with countries such as Canada and with regional and international organizations such as the G5 Sahel and MINUSMA. In this twelfth episode, Thomas Juneau and Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé interview Mrs. Bouaré Bintou Founé Samaké, Mali's Minister for the Promotion of Women, Children and the Family. They discuss the highlights of her academic and professional career and her role as Executive Director of Women in Law and Development in Africa/Femmes droits en développement en Afrique, Mali Chapter. The Minister presents the objectives and challenges of her mandate, the challenges posed by the pandemic and concludes on partnerships with countries such as Canada and with regional and international organizations such as the G5 Sahel and MINUSMA.   ## Interview with Myriam Benraad, author of the book Terrorisme : les affres de la vengeance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-myriam-benraad-author-of-the-book-terrorisme-les-affres-de-la-vengeance/ Modified: 2021-11-11 This week, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Myriam Benraad, associate professor at the Institut libre d'étude des relations internationales (ILERI) and author of the book Terrorisme : les affres de la vengeance, recently published by Le Cavalier Bleu. We talk with her about the concept of revenge and its importance in understanding terrorism and counter-terrorism. We also discuss the recent U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the implications for the fight against terrorism.   ## Interview with Najat Rochdi, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon / RC/HC URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-najat-rochdi-un-resident-and-humanitarian-coordinator-for-lebanon/ Modified: 2020-10-21 > In this episode, the hosts discuss with Najat Rochdi about the humanitarian impact of the explosions at the port of Beirut in August 2020, the role of young people and entrepreneurs in the reconstruction of the country, the danger of misinformation, the role of the UN, the politicization of humanitarian aid, and other subjects. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau discuss with Najat Rochdi about the humanitarian impact of the explosions at the port of Beirut in August 2020, the role of young people and entrepreneurs in the reconstruction of the country, the danger of misinformation, the role of the UN, the politicization of humanitarian aid, the importance of access to the population, the humanitarian challenges in sub-Saharan Africa and the lessons of past epidemics, particularly Ebola and Cholera, in dealing with the current pandemic.   ## Interview with Niagalé Bagayoko, Researcher and President of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-niagale-bagayoko/ Modified: 2021-08-02 > Sarah-Myriam talks with Niagalé Bagayoko, Researcher and President of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). In this 18th episode, Sarah-Myriam talks to Niagalé Bagayoko, Researcher and President of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). A specialist in security system reform in Francophone Africa, international security policies in sub-Saharan Africa, and African conflict management mechanisms, she has directed the peacekeeping and peacebuilding program at the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, and has been a Researcher at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex (UK) and the Institut de recherche pour le développement (France), as well as a professor of International Relations at the Institut d'études politiques (IEP) in Paris. Ms. Bagayoko talks about her academic and professional background. She presents the objectives and priorities of the African Sector Security Network that she chairs and of the Citizens Coalition for the Sahel of which her network is a part. Niagalé Bagayoko provides an overview of the main security challenges in the Sahel and discusses the importance of the concept of hybridity of security systems in Africa, in order to better understand the dynamics of conflict within the Sahel countries and the region. Niagalé Bagayoko presents the challenges for the G5 Sahel, the Barkhane and Takuba operations, and MINUSMA.   ## Interview with Rosemary Barton, CBC’s chief political correspondent URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-rosemary-barton-cbcs-chief-political-correspondent/ Modified: 2020-11-18 > In this episode, the hosts discuss with Rosemary Barton the implications for Canada of the recent U.S. election. In particular, Rosemary analyzes the role of the media in the face of Donald Trump's presidency. She also discusses the political context in Canada. She explains that while the Trudeau government and the future Biden administration will agree on many issues, they may disagree on others. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas discuss with Rosemary Barton the implications for Canada of the recent U.S. election. In particular, Rosemary analyzes the role of the media in the face of Donald Trump's presidency. She also discusses the political context in Canada. She explains that while the Trudeau government and the future Biden administration will agree on many issues, they may disagree on others.   ## Interview with Séverine Autesserre, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-severine-autesserre-professor-of-political-science-at-columbia-university/ Modified: 2021-05-26 > Séverine Autesserre, Professor of Political Science-international relations and African studies, Barnard College, Columbia University (USA) In this episode, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas speak with Séverine Autesserre, a multiple award-winning Professor of Political Science, specializing in international relations and African studies, at Barnard College, Columbia University (USA), and recently named "Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Académiques". They discuss her work with humanitarian and development agencies in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nicaragua, and India, and her journey into the academic world. Séverine Autesserre talks about her books The Trouble with Congo (2010), Peaceland (2014) and introduces us to her latest work, The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider's Guide to Changing the World, published by Oxford University Press in March 2021. Based on her research in twelve conflict zones, she explains the importance of a local approach to peacebuilding.   ## Interview with Sophie Beecher and Charles Fugère, representatives of the National Security and Intelligence Review Board URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-sophie-beecher-and-charles-fugere-representatives-of-the-national-security-and-intelligence-review-board/ Modified: 2021-11-24 In this 25th episode of Security Tips, Thomas Juneau and Sarah-Myriam Martin Brûlé speak with two representatives of the Office of National Security and Intelligence Review, Sophie Beecher, Executive Director of the review and Charles Fugère, Senior General Counsel and General Counsel. Our two guests explain the activities of the OSSNR, an organization created in 2019 by the federal government. They describe the means by which the OSSNR will accomplish its broad review and investigative mandate, but also open a window into the challenges inherent in setting up the organization. ## Interview with Stéphanie Martel and Ting-Sheng Lin, two specialists of Asia URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-stephanie-martel-and-ting-sheng-lin-two-specialists-of-asia/ Modified: 2020-12-16 > In this episode, the hosts discuss with Stéphanie Martel, Assistant Professor at Queen's University and Ting-Sheng Lin, Associate Professor at UQAM, both specialists of Asia. They discuss ASEAN's contributions to multilateralism and regional order in Asia-Pacific, issues related to the military dimension of Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, the evolution of Canada's approach to these actors, and the impact of the recent U.S. elections on the relationship between Canada, ASEAN and China. In this episode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau discuss with Stéphanie Martel, Assistant Professor at Queen's University and Ting-Sheng Lin, Associate Professor at UQAM, both specialists of Asia. They discuss ASEAN's contributions to multilateralism and regional order in Asia-Pacific, issues related to the military dimension of Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, the evolution of Canada's approach to these actors, and the impact of the recent U.S. elections on the relationship between Canada, ASEAN and China.   ## Interview with the Honourable Bob Rae, Ambassador and Permanent Representative-Designate of Canada to the United Nations in New York URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-the-honourable-bob-rae-canadian-ambassador-and-permanent-representative-to-the-united-nations-in-new-york-city/ Modified: 2021-02-03 > In this 8th episode, the hosts speak with the Honourable Bob Rae, Canada's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. Mr. Rae talks about his long-standing interest in international affairs and the key challenges he faces in his new position: the pandemic in particular, but also the place of human rights, relations with China, and the Myanmar file. Mr. Rae also discuss Canada's relations with the new Biden Administration in the United States. In this 8th episode of Conseils de sécurité Podcast, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé and Thomas Juneau speak with the Honourable Bob Rae, Ambassador and Permanent Representative-Designate of Canada to the United Nations in New York. Mr. Rae talks about his long-standing interest in international affairs and the key challenges he faces in his new position: the pandemic in particular, but also the place of human rights, relations with China, and the Myanmar file. Mr. Rae also discuss Canada's relations with the new Biden Administration in the United States.   ## Interview with Thomas Mulcair, Visiting Professor at the University of Montreal URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/thomas-mulcair/ Modified: 2021-04-28 > Thomas Mulcair, Visiting Professor at the University of Montreal, leader of the NDP (2012-17) and MP and Minister for the QLP (1994-2007). Sarah-Myriam and Thomas talk with Thomas Mulcair, Visiting Professor at the University of Montreal. Mr. Mulcair was previously the leader of the New Democratic Party (2012-17) in Ottawa and an MP and Minister for the Quebec Liberal Party (1994-2007). Mr. Mulcair talks about the highlights of his career, and his interest in environmental issues over the years. He analyzes the consequences of climate change for international security and for Canada. He also discusses with us the implications that the change of administration in the United States, with the election of President Biden, may have for the fight against climate change.   ## Interview with Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, from the University of Leiden in the Netherlands URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/interview-with-yannick-veilleux-lepage-from-the-university-of-leiden-in-the-netherlands/ Modified: 2022-04-06 > In this 31st episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas talk with Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, from the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. In this 31st episode of Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam and Thomas talk with Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, from the University of Leiden in the Netherlands. Yannick talks about the evolution of the far right in Canada, and its transnational links with comparable groups in the US and elsewhere. He analyzes the role of social media in organizing protests in Ottawa, Windsor, and in Coutts, Alberta in early 2022, and then assesses the response of the Canadian government. ## Iran Under the Guardians: How China Is Adapting to the IRGC’s Growing Influence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/iran-under-the-guardians-how-china-is-adapting-to-the-irgcs-growing-influence/ Modified: 2026-05-28 The Iranian crisis is not merely a matter of airstrikes, threats, and diplomatic statements. It also plays out in the internal realignments of power in Tehran and in the way the regime’s Eurasian partners adapt to them. Among these key partners, the People’s Republic of China appears less concerned with official, institutional Iran than with operational Iran: the realm of energy flows, logistics networks, and security networks, at the heart of which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) now stands as a central actor. Several recent indications suggest a rapprochement between Beijing and structures linked to the IRGC. This should neither be overestimated—it constitutes neither a formal alliance nor a complete strategic alignment—nor ignored. It is part of a deeper transformation of the Iranian regime, marked by a relative weakening of the clerical architecture and a rise in the power of military-security structures. The central question is therefore: what does this rapprochement signify from the perspective of Chinese intentions? Is it a strategic bet on a new dominant actor, or a pragmatic adjustment to a changing internal reality in Iran? During the ceasefire agreed upon in April 2025, this question has become increasingly relevant. The Iranian issue is now more openly part of a triangular dynamic between Washington, Beijing, and Tehran: discussions regarding a potential agreement with Iran, the issue of reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and Sino-American exchanges on crisis management confirm that Beijing is no longer merely an economic partner of Tehran, but a player whose influence Washington also seeks to mobilize. The argument put forward here is that China does not seek to “bet everything” on the IRGC, but rather to adapt its partnership to an Iran in the process of redefining itself. It incorporates the IRGC as an indispensable interlocutor, while avoiding alignment and maintaining the ability to manage risk. The People’s Republic does not choose the Guardians; it acknowledges their centrality and adapts accordingly. A rapprochement rooted in concrete practices The Sino-Iranian rapprochement is based primarily on concrete and increasingly well-documented developments. More than ever, China has emerged as the main market for Iranian oil, absorbing a considerable share of Tehran’s exports—often estimated at between 80 and 90 percent—through channels that circumvent sanctions. These flows rely on sophisticated mechanisms: ghost fleets, transshipments at sea, and financial and logistical intermediaries. U.S. sanctions targeting Chinese refineries and transportation networks involved in these exchanges confirm the scale of this reality. Washington explicitly views these alternative channels as supporting the Islamic regime’s economic and strategic resilience. Beyond oil, more discreet forms of collaboration exist. Several reports mention Iran’s use of Chinese navigation and positioning systems, notably BeiDou, to enhance its military capabilities. An investigation by the Financial Times, reported by Reuters, also mentioned Iran’s use of a Chinese reconnaissance satellite to improve its surveillance of U.S. military positions in the Middle East. The information remains sensitive and must be handled with caution, but it illustrates the type of sub-threshold cooperation of interest here: not a declared military alliance, but capability contributions that could indirectly strengthen Iranian structures involved in the operational management of the crisis. Finally, joint naval exercises between China, Iran, and Russia reflect military cooperation that has been expanding rapidly since the 12-day war in June 2025. These interactions do not constitute an alliance in the strict sense, but they help establish communication channels, a dynamic of technological interoperability, and coordination practices. Taken together, these elements indicate the existence of a collaboration that is still fragmented but increasingly deepening, operating largely through networks linked to the IRGC. A transformed Iran: the IRGC as the operational center of gravity These interactions, which have been constantly evolving over the past year, take on even greater significance in the current context of a profound internal transformation of the Iranian regime. Confirming a trend observable for several years, but accelerated by U.S. strikes and the disappearance of several key regime figures, the Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enghelāb-e Eslāmi (IRGC) is asserting itself even more clearly as a cross-cutting actor, combining military, economic, and logistical functions. The Pasdaran now play an indispensable role in infrastructure, energy networks, and parallel commercial networks. This evolution does not signify the complete disappearance of clerical power, at least in its formal sense, but it de facto alters the regime’s actual structure. Against a backdrop of sanctions and confrontation, the Guardians are now the only ones capable of ensuring operational continuity—security, flows, logistics—and are thus gaining increased centrality. Having been the driving force behind the Islamic system for some fifteen years, the IRGC now controls or influences a dominant share of strategic flows, oversees critical networks, and forms the backbone of Iran’s regional projection. Initially conceived as an ideological guard tasked with protecting the revolution and ensuring the regime’s survival, it has gradually expanded beyond this role by infiltrating the economy, infrastructure, smuggling networks, parastatal foundations, and regional militia networks. Through a combination of security coercion, control of resources, capture of sanctioned markets, and institutional influence, the IRGC has established itself as one of the main operators of real power. This centrality—long-standing but further accentuated by recent shocks—makes it, from China’s perspective, an indispensable gateway for any external actor seeking to maintain functional access to the real Iran. For Beijing, this transformation requires an adjustment. It is no longer simply a matter of dealing with official institutions, but of navigating a system where real power is increasingly militarized in favour of the IRGC, rather than the regular Iranian army, the Artesh. The latter remains responsible for the conventional defence of the territory, but it remains politically subordinate and far less integrated than the Pasdaran into the regime’s economic, security, and regional networks. The rapprochement with the IRGC thus appears to be an inevitable functional adaptation to an Iran in the midst of transformation. Convergence under pressure, not alignment It should be noted, however, that the rise of the IRGC aligns with Chinese interests, albeit in an ambivalent way. On the one hand, it facilitates access to channels capable of operating under sanctions, maintaining flows despite pressure, and operating in secrecy. For a China concerned with securing its supplies, this represents an advantage. But conversely, the IRGC remains the bearer of a strategic logic that generates risks. The Sepāh-e Pāsdārān’s operational culture favors the use of indirect conflicts and the projection of coercive pressure on a regional scale. The recurring threat of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz precisely illustrates this ambivalence. For Tehran, and even more so for the security networks that shape its regional posture, Hormuz serves as a lever for asymmetric pressure against Washington and its allies. For Beijing, however, this same lever becomes a systemic risk: any major disruption of this strategic passage could undermine the energy flows on which a significant portion of its economy still depends. Yet these dynamics can directly harm China’s fundamental interests, notably the stability of the Strait of Hormuz and the continuity of energy flows. Beijing is particularly sensitive to this risk. China has repeatedly called for restraint and de-escalation in the Gulf, particularly in light of tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. It has also bolstered its strategic oil reserves, anticipating a possible deterioration of the situation. This is where the relationship with the IRGC takes on its full significance: China needs to maintain a channel with the Iranian actor most directly associated with instruments of regional coercion—not to encourage their use, but to limit the effects of an escalation that would threaten its own interests. This dual stance—economic engagement and strategic caution—reveals a central logic: China is keen to capitalize on its relationship with Iran without bearing the systemic risks. The issue of Hormuz thus provides a concrete basis for this logic: Beijing accepts the strategic utility of an Iran under pressure, but fears the moment when that pressure might lead to a disruption of the energy flows on which its own energy security depends. Engaging with the IRGC without becoming its hostage China does not seek to align itself exclusively with the IRGC. Instead, it adopts a risk management strategy: preserving the benefits of its relationship with Iran while limiting the potential costs of regional escalation. In line with this approach, Beijing maintains its economic ties with Iran and, in effect, contributes to the regime’s resilience, notably through its oil imports, certain transfers of dual-use technologies with military potential, and the maintenance of active trade channels despite sanctions. At the same time, it avoids any direct military involvement, any formal alliance, and any excessive exposure. This ambivalence is not a contradiction, but the core of China’s strategic prudence. It allows Beijing to benefit from an Iran under pressure—which diverts some of America’s resources and attention—without being drawn into confrontation with Washington. Iran thus becomes a space for indirect competition, where the costs of Sino-American rivalry are partially externalized. For the reasons analyzed so far, the IRGC occupies a central position in this equation. It enables the Iranian regime to function under constraint by maintaining energy flows, logistics networks, and the system’s security coherence. But it also embodies a logic of action based on asymmetric escalation, capable of triggering uncontrollable dynamics, particularly in the Gulf. It is this duality that compels Beijing to engage with the IRGC without becoming its captive. China must maintain a connection with the IRGC, as it constitutes one of the main interfaces of Iran’s real power; but it must simultaneously avoid being drawn into its logic of escalation. It therefore does not seek to control it—which would exceed its capabilities and run counter to its interests—but rather to manage the effects of its actions, notably through economic levers and a diplomacy of de-escalation. The challenge is therefore to preserve an active balance: keeping Iran sufficiently functional so that it remains a useful partner, while preventing the dynamics driven by the IRGC from leading to a major strategic rupture. Conclusion: convergence without alignment The growing closeness between China and the IRGC does not constitute a formal strategic alliance. It reflects an adaptation to an internal transformation of the Iranian regime that has been accelerated by the conflict with the United States and Israel. While taking care not to put all its eggs in the IRGC’s basket, Beijing recognizes that this basket has become indispensable. In a weakened Iran, subject to sanctions and engaged in a protracted confrontation, the IRGC is now a central and indispensable player in the exercise of effective power. China’s strategy therefore consists of remaining close without aligning, supporting without committing, and influencing without controlling. It aims to preserve the benefits of the relationship with Iran while limiting the risks of escalation. It is in this ability to navigate between engagement and caution that the distinctiveness of China’s stance lies. It is based neither on an alliance nor on neutrality, but on a nuanced management of dependencies and risks. In this sense, the phenomenon is less spectacular than an institutionalized alliance, but potentially more significant. It reveals a way to exert influence without direct exposure, to capitalize on a partner under pressure without fully bearing the costs, and to adapt to a changing system without becoming locked into it. China does not align itself with the IRGC. It adapts to the evolving context in which the IRGC operates—and this is precisely what makes its strategy both difficult to grasp and formidably effective. Image Credit: Tasnim News Agency via Wikimedia Commons. ## Is Canada’s Donation of 900 Drones to Ukraine an Appropriate Response to Needs on the Ground? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/is-canadas-donation-of-900-uavs-to-ukraine-an-appropriate-response-to-needs-on-the-ground/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > On February 19, the Department of National Defence issued a press release announcing a donation of more than 800 drones to Ukraine... On February 19, the Department of National Defence issued a press release announcing a donation of more than 800 drones to Ukraine. This donation is intended to meet a growing need for military technology since the start of the Russian invasion two years ago. Teledyne FLIR's SkyRanger R70 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) represents a donation of over $95 million. More recently, the April 26 press release announced an additional donation of 100 UAVs, for a total of 900 UAVs. These announcements are appropriate, as they demonstrate the adaptation of military aid to the reality on the ground. Since the Russian invasion, the increasing use of drones in warfare has been widely documented. Inexpensive commercial micro-drones have become essential artillery for the success of Ukrainian military operations. While the April 26 press release states that delivery would begin in May 2024, the delivery plan for the 900 drones has yet to be announced by the federal government. Ottawa is often criticized for the gap between its words of support for Kyiv and its lack of concrete action. For example, the donation announced over a year ago of a surface-to-air missile defense system, NASAMS, has still not materialized. The U.S. government is responsible for producing the NASAMS system, but no delivery date has been announced yet. Canada's flowery rhetoric and subsequent delivery delays affect the government's credibility. According to Kiel Institute data published in April 2024, Canada ranks tenth among the major contributors of military aid to Ukraine in terms of millions of dollars. However, this data includes military aid whose delivery date is specified but not yet completed. In this context, does Canada's supply of drones meet Ukraine's needs, and can it make a difference on the battlefield? Many argue that the quantity of drones is more important than their quality in the war in Ukraine, quantity being a quality in itself. While quantity is indeed imperative if Ukraine is to offset Russia's strategic advantage, this policy brief argues that Canada should focus on the technological superiority of its weapons rather than their quantity. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is characterized by an asymmetry of military capabilities, with Russia having the means of a great power. Drones greatly enhance information-gathering, surveillance and intelligence capabilities in warfare, making a real difference on the battlefield. The technological superiority of donations is therefore a considerable advantage for Ukraine, as emerging technologies can tip the balance of power in favor of the most innovative. However, for this strategy to be effective, production and delivery speeds need to be increased. Are SkyRanger R70s suited to Ukrainian needs? Already in use in Ukraine, SkyRanger R70 UAVs can perform a number of functions on the battlefield, including observation, targeting, data collection and transporting military loads of up to 3.5 kilograms. These drones are equipped with thermal cameras that enable them to detect potential targets emitting heat, even at night or in bad weather. These cameras are necessary, as night-time fighting has become more widespread in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. In addition, Teledyne FLIR claims that its product is able to operate in hostile environments where communication and GPS networks are impossible. This semi-autonomous flight capability enables the SkyRanger R70 to avoid jamming. Electronic warfare is indeed a feature of conflict, as GPS signals are frequently jammed. It is not uncommon for GPS signals to be modified in order to mislead drones and thus set traps for adversaries. Teledyne FLIR Black Hornet micro-UAVs have already been delivered to Ukraine, thanks to donations from the Norwegian and British governments, giving the company additional credibility as to the effectiveness of its products in the field. First-person view (FPV) drones are currently the most widely used on the front line. These kamikaze drones are remotely piloted using a built-in camera, a remote control and a helmet worn by the pilot. The helmet allows the pilot to view the drone's point of view. China's Mavic quadcopter observation drones are also making their presence felt on the battlefield. These commercial drones are easy to fly, accessible and affordable, costing between $3,000 and $6,000 depending on the model. One reason for the high cost of the SkyRanger R70 is their Western production. Having been designed for Western military markets, they are not suitable for mass production, as are Mavic quadricopters. Western defense policies tend to focus on expensive, sophisticated weapons, but the production of these is not adapted to the pace demanded by a high-intensity war of attrition involving a major power. Moreover, China's Mavic drones have certain cybersecurity shortcomings. In addition to being vulnerable to jamming, their software is encrypted due to their Chinese origin. It is therefore impossible to determine what information is collected by manufacturers in China. The drones offered by Canada are made in Ontario, which avoids this issue. The UAVs offered by Canada correspond to the reality on the ground insofar as they can perform various crucial functions, perform in night combat and avoid cyber attacks. However, production and delivery times remain much longer when compared with Ukrainian production, which can reach 150,000 UAVs per month at a more affordable cost. While the Canadian donation of 900 UAVs seems significant at first glance, it is estimated that 10,000 UAVs per month are lost at the front by Kyiv, which equates to over 300 drones per day. Although they undoubtedly include kamikaze drones, these figures underline the extent of drone use in this conflict, while also putting Canadian aid in perspective with the real need on the ground. President Volodymyr Zelensky has announced a goal of producing one million FPV drones by 2024. The donation of 900 UAVs is significant in terms of technological superiority but seems insufficient to meet Ukraine's needs. This raises the issue of drone production. Drone production and the growing role of civil society As a result of the war of attrition, Ukraine and Russia have developed a dependence on commercial drones for tactical purposes. Among the trends observable in Ukraine is a strong mobilization of civil society and private companies. Micro-UAVs are largely the product of civilian industry, with over a hundred start-ups operating in Ukraine to contribute to the war effort. Civilian mobilization is speeding up the supply of military equipment and drones. Faced with these innovations, the Ukrainian army has had to adapt, notably by implementing shorter certification processes that last almost three months. In other words, the Ukrainian government has adapted to this new production mode in order to supply its troops with sufficient military equipment in an emergency context. This accelerated certification process indicates a certain institutionalization of the drone within the government apparatus. On February 6, President Zelensky announced the creation of a new branch of the armed forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces. This gradual institutionalization of UAVs bears witness to the evolution of defense doctrine and opens the door to closer collaboration with Kyiv on this type of weaponry. The NGOs Come Back Alive and Aerorozvidka embody the extent of civil mobilization for Ukrainian defense. Come Back Alive is a socio-financing platform that supplies equipment such as drones to the Ukrainian armed forces. Aerorozvidka converts commercial drones for military use and even builds its own drone model, the R18. Many civilians build FPV drones in their homes and then offer them to the Ukrainian army. Each FPV drone has an approximate value of $400, which is considerably less than the cost announced by Canada for the SkyRanger R70 (around $100,000 per unit). FPV drones are often single-purpose, which explains their affordable cost. SkyRanger R70s, on the other hand, are intended for long-term use. Furthermore, the use of 3D printers by civilian groups to create drone parts reflects their close bond with the Ukrainian armed forces and their involvement in the war. 3D printing makes it possible to supply components much faster than delivery from NATO member states. In Ukraine, the conflict has revealed the major role of civil society and the private sector in the war effort and in the rapid production of cheap, effective drones. Large numbers of drones are essential to saturate the battlefield and to develop drone swarm systems. A drone swarm is a group of low-cost drones that work together via reliable network connections to accomplish complex tasks. Drone swarms are the result of artificial intelligence and represent a new trend in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. SkyRanger R70s are expensive and delivered in limited quantities to meet Kyiv's needs, but their use is long-term and mainly for observation and surveillance, unlike swarm systems. While civilian industry is making a major contribution to the supply of drones, Canada can help through technological innovation. Canada must focus on technological superiority The donation of 900 UAVs is a first step towards greater Canadian commitment to the conflict in Ukraine. Military support for Ukraine is essential to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and respect for international law. The federal government strongly condemns Russia's war of aggression, which represents a danger to the security of the liberal international order. For Canada's actions to be more in line with the government's rhetoric, it is essential to capitalize on Ukraine's technological superiority. A race for drone weapons and technological innovation is underway, and those who move fastest will enjoy considerable advantages. Research and development Despite substantial international support, there is a gap between the assistance provided to Ukraine and the needs on the ground. If the West wishes to keep Ukraine in the war, then it is necessary to bank on technological superiority and turn to more sustainable means. While expensive systems such as Turkey's Bayraktar TB2 drones were effective at the start of the war, Russian troops have adapted to this type of artillery. This underlines the importance of rapid technological adaptation. Moreover, this war demonstrates that the boundaries between military and civilian domains are becoming increasingly porous, which is why it is necessary to invest in research and development (R&D) into commercial drones for military use. By maximizing knowledge of Ukrainian technological innovations, it is possible to increase the effectiveness of UAVs on the front line and strengthen cyber security. Investment in R&D would enable an adaptation of Western production methods to Ukrainian ones and supply more drones at lower cost. Indeed, there is still room for improvement in the supply of military equipment, both in terms of delivery speed and production. Investing in R&D is an opportunity to take better advantage of the financial resources allocated by Canada to Ukraine's military support, while developing Canadian expertise in these emerging technologies. Artificial intelligence Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of Canada's comparative advantages. An important part of R&D is the incorporation of AI into UAVs. AI helps prevent jamming and autonomizes drones. For example, Reinforcement Learning is a simulation that enables AI to develop its autonomy by learning through trial and error until it is able to make the most optimal decisions for a given situation. In addition, the collection of flight data is essential to feed AI algorithms that can develop drone swarm systems. Drones that swarm onto a target are more difficult for air defense systems to intercept, increasing their performance. Since this type of attack will become more frequent, it is necessary to develop AI to be able to carry out such operations and to defend against them. In addition, AI and drone swarms lead to battlespace saturation. The massive use of drones is increasing the intensity of combat and making the battlefield more lethal, which in turn raises the issue of protecting drone pilots. Drones are capable of destroying the enemy's heavy and expensive artillery, such as tanks or anti-aircraft missile systems, making drone pilots major targets on the front line. This underlines the importance of ensuring their protection and developing air defense systems with AI. The private sector and the production chain The private sector plays a major role in the innovation and production of new technologies, as demonstrated by the many start-ups in Ukraine or companies like Teledyne FLIR. The Ukrainian model shows that start-ups are key players in the creation of a drone army. To support the drone production chain, collaboration between the public and private sectors needs to be strengthened. Continued collaboration with Teledyne FLIR and support for smaller innovative companies are therefore relevant for Canada. This could encourage the development of new technologies that would increase drone performance and efficiency, whether in terms of connectivity or navigation. The incorporation of 3D printing also has the potential to significantly accelerate the supply of drone parts. Drone pilot training Teledyne FLIR will be sending trainers to Kyiv to teach a number of Ukrainian armed forces pilots how to use SkyRanger R70 drones. As for the Canadian government, it is already investing in military training through Operation UNIFIER. The creation of a program dedicated to drone pilot training would be a major addition in view of the current situation at the front. In newly trained units in Ukraine, the success rate of drone strikes is often around 10-15%. In specialized units such as the Ukrainian intelligence services, the success rate can be as high as 70% or 80%. Pilot training increases drone effectiveness. KazhanFLY is a drone pilot school offering a ten-day course. KazhanFLY is also a voluntary Ukrainian civil initiative. Inspired by this type of school and in collaboration with the Unmanned Systems Forces, it could be interesting to include drone piloting training in Operation UNIFIER. While Ukrainian soldiers are learning more about handling conventional weapons, there is a gap when it comes to handling micro-drones. It is important to train a large number of pilots, given the large number of drones in the field. Investing in training, in particular through virtual reality flight simulators, will enhance the Ukrainian military's ability to deal with this field reality. Conclusion This policy brief has discussed Canada's donation of 900 UAVs to Ukraine, in order to put Canadian military support into perspective with the reality on the ground. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has brought to the fore a new trend in warfare, namely the growing use of inexpensive commercial micro-UAVs for military purposes. Political considerations have been made in this regard. R&D, AI, collaboration with the private sector and drone pilot training are considerations addressed to the government so that Canada acts more in line with its words of support. In order to offer significant assistance to Ukraine, we need to focus on technological superiority and strengthen the production chain. ## Is Canada’s Foreign Policy Really Feminist? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/is-canadas-foreign-policy-really-feminist-analysis-and-recommendations/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report suggests that Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy would be improved by more rigourously meeting GBA+ criteria. This policy report argues that, in order to deliver on its promise, the Government of Canada should carry out its Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) as a comprehensive and holistic approach, in conjunction with other cognate initiatives that pertain to security and defence., This approach should also be consistent with the intersectional lens of Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) policymaking, which has been mainstreamed across federal departments and agencies. In so doing, we assess Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy by answering three questions: “What is Canada’s FFP and what are its goals ?,” “Who participates in crafting Canada’s FFP?,” and “How is the FFP implemented?”. Our analysis suggests that, in its current state, Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy would be improved by more rigourously meeting GBA+ criteria, defined by Global Affairs Canada (2017) as an  assessment of “how diverse groups of women, men and gender-diverse people may experience policies, programs and initiatives.” While the policy report proposes concrete recommendations toward this goal, it also encourages foreign and defence actors to reflect on fundamental gender equality principles and considerations that get lost in the face of results-oriented policy approaches aimed for the short term. WHAT -  Canada’s FFP should further clarify what a “feminist” foreign policy actually entails from the Canadian government’s perspective. Canada’s FFP, as it is currently defined, is too limited in scope, and reproduces siloed, unhelpful divides between foreign policy, security and defence, human rights, and development. A feminist approach should bridge those divides, and requires a holistic, cross-sectoral approach. -  The broader aims of pursuing a feminist foreign policy are underspecified. In its current state, the focus on the link between a FFP and greater efficiency in delivering development, democracy and security has led to unintended consequences because it does not recognize the intrinsic value of diversity and inclusion. We elaborate on these points below. WHO -  The pursuit of the feminist policy is primarily deployed in official, state-to-state channels that are not conducive to the realization of its objectives at the ground level. This must be accompanied by sustained engagement with civil society organizations and in venues where the state is but one actor among many (or absent altogether). - Relatedly, Canada’s FFP does not make enough room for meaningful engagement of the variety of relevant stakeholders for this policy agenda. A FFP is by definition collaborative and inclusive but which local non-state stakeholders are consulted matters in the design of FFP initiatives. - Canada’s FFP should make more room for the recognition of diverse forms of expertise and agency. FFP objectives can lose their focus through government jargon and high-level declarations. Further academic and CSO engagement would be desirable in this regard, to better connect FFP principles with the pursuit of gender equality goals and outcomes. HOW - Canada’s FFP remains, in our view, too symbolic and performative, as well as top-down in design and implementation. - Instead, a feminist foreign policy should be designed and implemented in a way that is flexible enough to allow context-sensitive programming across various regional, national, and societal settings. - Canada’s FFP is heavily focused on the short term, paying insufficient attention to the linkages between short, medium and long-term objectives. It also stands in tension and contradiction with other aspects of our foreign and security policy, hence the need for a more holistic vision, to identify and resolve these discrepencies. As we discuss in further details below, failing to address these limitations promptly would effectively hamper the Canadian government’s ability to mitigate the risk of counterproductive effects and negative unintended consequences that will prove increasingly hard to reverse over time. Some of these potential adverse effects are directly tied to the feminist agenda; others pertain to foreign and security policy objectives where the link with feminist – and gender-sensitivity more broadly – objectives may not be self-evident but still significant. What: The Scope and Goals of Canada’s FFP Introduced in 2017 by the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Canada’s feminist foreign policy claims to take an ‘explicitly feminist approach to [...] foreign policy and international development to target gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls’ (Lamensch 2020). According to Global Affairs Canada, the feminist foreign policy “recognizes that fostering rights-based, open and inclusive societies, where all people, regardless of their gender, can fully benefit from equal participation in economic, political, social and cultural life, is an effective way to build a safer and more prosperous world” (GAC website). The Scope of Canada’s FFP   Beyond this statement, nowhere does the Canadian government explicitly define the ‘feminist’ adjective in its Feminist Foreign Policy. Where it comes closest is in Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), which states that “A feminist approach to international assistance recognizes that the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls require the transformation of social norms and power relations” (GAC website). However, the priorities that Global Affairs Canada identifies in public documents and interventions generally endorse rather than reform or challenge the neoliberal underpinnings of the international order. This introduces a fundamental tension between policy objectives from a feminist standpoint, because a FFP that does not seek to change hierarchical power relations in the international order cannot open meaningful and sustainable possibilities for transforming and overcoming inequalities and marginalizations that directly result from neoliberal practices. While such tension is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, ways to mitigate it should be seriously considered. Indeed, a focus on women’s inclusion and empowerment as individuals without more transformative global policy is unlikely to offset, let alone change, hierarchical structures that contribute to the marginalization of women and other underrepresented or disadvantaged groups. Recommendation: While working on women's inclusion and empowerment, the Canadian government should also consider changes that need to be brought to institutions that perpetuate the marginalization of women and underrepresented or disadvantaged groups. A feminist approach to diplomacy also starts by listening to those at the margins of society. Here, Canada has been at the forefront of promoting women and girls’ rights, as well as gender equality in conflict-affected countries and beyond. This is one area where the Canadian government has adopted an activist stance. It has advocated the cause of women’s rights and spoken up in defence of women at risk in their native countries, sometimes at a cost to its diplomatic relations. It has also made tangible commitments in support of this agenda.  In particular, the new Equality Fund will indeed enable local women’s organizations in conflict-affected countries to carry out their mediation and peacebuilding work. These successes can inform how Canada’s FFP is deployed in other domains, while paying attention to the specificities of each context. The Goals of a Feminist Foreign Policy Canada reckons that a feminist foreign policy will bring more efficiency and productivity to overcome poverty and to bring about sustainable development and peace. The problem with this understanding is twofold: the focus on efficiency borders on instrumentalism and does not recognise that gender equality and diversity are values worth pursuing in their own right; in so doing, Canada’s FFP as it is currently framed puts high (gendered) expectations and responsibilities on the shoulders of women and marginalized communities, unwittingly reinforcing gender stereotypes. As per Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), women and girls are powerful agents of change who “have the ability to transform their households, their societies and their economies”. Fostering gender equality, the FIAP states, will deliver strong economic growth, increasing the global gross domestic product by as much as $12 trillion in a single decade, it will also help cut down worldwide levels of extreme poverty by 12 percent and will reduce chronic hunger by as much as 17 percent, providing help and hope to as many as 150 million people around the world (GAC website). Whether this is intended or not, the FIAP thus links women’s inclusion with social and economic improvements. While the case may sometimes need to be made to convince otherwise reluctant governments and societies to consider the advantages brought about by gender equality, such an approach runs the risk of weakening the normative values of equity and diversity, which should be seen as ends in themselves. Recommendation: Canada has tended to present the case for inclusion as the smart thing to do rather than the right thing to do. While instrumental logic may be needed to convince reluctant parties, it is important for Canada's FFP not to lose sight of the importance of the normative values of equity and diversity, which should be pursued as ends unto themselves. The government of Canada frames increasing women’s participation in peacekeeping as an operational effectiveness issue. Women in peacekeeping missions are said to present practical advantages, including being able to search other women at checkpoints, to gain easier access to both local men and women, and to serve as role models to local women and girls. Yet, to date, there is no proven connection between an increase in uniformed women peacekeepers and operational effectiveness, partly because the effects are hard to trace and measure, but also because they will likely not be observable in the short term. Many of the arguments to this effect are normative and based on gendered and misleading assumptions about women’s qualities and attributes, rather than reflecting an assessment of their actual roles and functions within peace operations. Canada’s FFP puts an extra burden on the shoulders of uniformed women whose presence in peacekeeping missions is expected to help alleviate the emotional burden of dealing with survivors as well as contribute to policing the behaviour of their male colleagues, supposedly dissuading them from committing sexual misconduct by their very presence. Similarly, the emphasis on women as agents of peace in their communities, including in the context of peace processes, puts additional (and unfair) responsibility on women while lifting it away from the men, who remain the main perpetrators of gendered violence in conflict. While centering women’s agency is important, there is also a risk that doing so unwittingly reproduces gender stereotypes, and prevents transformative change at the community level. Indeed, most of these expectations are rooted in common assumptions that women are peaceful, naturally inclined to and capable of specific interpersonal tasks, notably as emotional caregivers or as systematic champions of women’s issues in general, notwithstanding the context. These assumptions ignore instances of violence perpetrated by women, and let us add, for the sake of their own interests, not merely those of manipulative men. Canada’s FFP similarly unwittingly reinforces gender stereotypes when it states  that “evidence shows that women tend to spend more of their incomes in ways that directly benefit their children, improving nutrition, health and educational opportunities for the next generation.” While data may support such statements, they fail to account for the structural conditions that create such realities and shape women’s agency, including through gendered socialization of both women and men. Most importantly, relying on such narratives to justify FFP boxes women into specific behaviours and sets conditions on their inclusion and participation, when these conditions and expectations are not imposed on men. Recommendation: As its initiatives and programs centre women's agency, Canada must take due care to avoid unwittingly reproducing gender stereotypes, thus setting conditions on their inclusion and participation. Who: Identifying and Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders A feminist foreign policy is by definition inclusive and collaborative. It is also keenly aware of power asymmetries and how they can hinder cooperation. Since 2017, the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has taken a number of steps to reestablish bridges to civil society and experts both within and outside academia. Indeed, an array of societal actors were consulted in the lead up to the launch of Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security and of the Elsie Initiative. More efforts should be deployed to engage with diverse stakeholders in various locales of the “Global South.” While we wish to acknowledge the importance of civil society consultations that occured under the banner of G7 meetings, the Women’s foreign ministers’ 2018 meeting in Montreal, the Vancouver Peacekeeping UN Conference, the Media Freedom conference and Equal Rights Coalition, the lack of consistent and sustained engagement with non-Western stakeholders in the regions and locales where this foreign policy is pursued risks overlaying Canada’s FFP with  paternalistic, Western-centric overtones, creating unnecessary and avoidable resistance that may, in some instances, have little to do with the core of a feminist agenda itself. Given Canada’s limited global engagement to date as well as the impact of decisions to close a number of Canadian embassies or reduce their staff, particularly in the Global South, attempts to deploy a FFP will require the Canadian government to bridge its expertise, resources, and programs with partners who are already invested, or are at least interested (no doubt due to a mix of strategic and normative factors) in developping and/or implementing feminist foreign policies and/or national action plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). In the Asia-Pacific, beyond “Western” champions engaged in regional discussions on WPS (such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States), Japan and Indonesia are the most vocal players, although others, such as Malaysia and Singapore, might be picking up speed. There is, however, a great deal of resistance to WPS from other governments who are wary of the implications of paintaing issues of gender equality with a security brush and perceive it as yet another Trojan horse for unwanted intervention in domestic affairs. Still, ASEAN and related institutions where it exercises “centrality”, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (where Canada is a member) have adopted statements and other initiatives on WPS that open up new entry points. A similar momentum is observable in regional non-governmental expert and civil society networks. In the Middle East, Canada has supported Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority as they took important first steps. In Africa, regional organizations such as the African Union, the East African Community, and the South African Development Community have taken the lead on the development of pro-women tools and policies, whereas some countries have been more proactive than others in the prioritization of feminist approaches to foreign, development, and security policy. The growing consensus that a gender-sensitive approach to foreign and security policy is a necessary marker of “cool kids” in the global cafeteria of international politics provides new opportunities for Canada to contribute to collective peer pressure, lead by example, and provide support to other champions and “norm entrepreneurs,” governmental and non-governmental, in constructive ways. Recommendation: Canada’s FFP must make provisions for how to best engage with states newly committed to a feminist or gender-based approach to politics, development, and security. Deepening involvement with these partners can help them chart their own way forward towards a FFP while consolidating Canada foreign policy objectives. Canada should also be more mindful of sources of resistance and concerns about the Western/liberal overtones of the FFP and related constructs such as Women, Peace and Security, and develop strategies to mitigate such concerns. The promotion and implementation of Canada’s FFP agenda abroad requires extending the scope beyond a state-centric approach. While feminist and gendered approaches to issues that inform our foreign policy remain unfamiliar, and in some cases threatening, to other states, a myriad of societal actors have been doing this work from the ground up long before Canada even considered developping a feminist foreign policy. These bottom-up efforts have played a major role in opening up mindsets and spaces at the government level so that this “new” agenda could mushroom there as well. Thus, implementing Canada’s FFP abroad necessitates the identification of and a sustained partnership with actors and spaces where the agenda can be pursued by and with non-state actors, such as experts and civil society. For the time being, Canada has mostly relied on its international NGO partners to connect with these actors and spaces. However, feminist research warns against assuming that Western- and gender-based NGOs will necessarily truthfully relay the opinions and priorities of their partners in the Global South. Canada needs to use direct formal and informal channels and have eyes and ears on the ground to identify these bottom-up, local origin points and find ways to incorporate and support these perspectives and efforts. This type of engagement is poised to change traditional power structures, which is needed to set the conditions for long-term, sustainable peace and security. Recommendation: The promotion and implementation of Canada's FFP agenda abroad necessitates the identification of, and a sustained partnership with, actors and spaces where the agenda can be pursued by and with non-state actors. Canada needs to increase its capacity to identify these local origin points, directly link up with them and find ways to incorporate and support these perspectives and efforts. The language used to specify foreign and security policy objectives is in itself constraining the realm of possible action in sometimes unpredictable and unintended ways, with implications for the kind of stakeholders that end up being included. For instance, the “Women, Peace and Security” language, while it is now familiar to civil society actors that are engaged in peacebuilding work, remains foreign and in fact, attracts suspicion from a broader array of feminist and other NGOs working on issues pertaining to human rights, climate change, maternal health, and other development issues. In addition, WPS has been taken up more naturally by elite CSO actors in Global South capitals who are already well connected with and immersed into Western networks, debates, and partnerships on security, humanitarian intervention and peacebuilding. By contrast, grassroots organizations and community actors, who take on much of the groundwork of fostering tolerance, trust in inter-communal relationships, and supporting peace processes in ways that contribute to the WPS agenda, have not adopted this language, and for two main reasons. First, UN language is often seen by these actors as elitist, paternalistic, conservative, and Western-centric. Second, many of these actors either consider “security” to be, at worse, the language of government, often used to justify policies that restrict civil liberties or even threaten the very lives of activists and the communities with whom they work or, at best, outside the scope of their expertise and mandate. In turn, many of the civil society actors that deal directly with peace and (human) security have not yet incorporated gender considerations into their advocacy and substantive work, nor do they identify as feminist organizations. This is often due not to a lack of interest, but to a lack of material and human resources. Indeed, many CSO organizations involved in this work remain male-dominated, while gender dossiers will tend to be assigned and carried, first and foremost, by women staff and activists, sometimes in addition to their previous workload. While in many cases, the realization of this gap is acknowledged, these actors are not as well-equipped (yet) to pursue explicitely feminist objectives as feminist and/or women organizations that stay away from “peace and security”. While both sides of this civil society divide are populated by relevant stakeholders, the language of “feminism”, “WPS”, and even “foreign policy” in itself, especially when these terms are used in isolation, risk preventing our ability to identify and incorporate these various perspectives into policy design and implementation. Recommendation: When engaging with stakeholders, Canada ought to pay attention to the language it uses and to conduct an assessment of the manner in which this language is likely to be received and perceived, with a view to ensuring that it does not exclude important stakeholders. Further, Canada should envision ways to support stakeholders beyond capacity-building, given that limitations often come not from a lack of interest or even expertise, but of appropriate financial and human resources. How Is Canada’s FFP Implemented? In its current form, Canada Feminist Foreign Policy is unlikely to achieve its objectives because 1) it has followed an ‘add women and stir’ approach, 2) it reproduces siloed, unhelpful divides within foreign policy domains, such as security, human rights, and development, instead of holistically, in cross-sectoral, and less Western-centric ways, and 3) it has privileged symbolism over process. Canada’s FFP Is Limited in Scope, Tilted toward an “Add Women and Stir” Approach The Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations, which aims to increase the number of women Blue Helmets, has been a flagship project of Canada’s FFP. While increasing the meaningful participation of uniformed women in UN operations is a laudable goal, a feminist security and defence policy must go beyond increasing numbers of women in uniform and dismantling barriers preventing recruitment of female bodies to security institutions. The issue is twofold: on the one hand, and as discussed above, an instrumentalist logic underpins the need to increase the number of women in uniform. Second, since most peacekeeping troops on the ground are recruited from countries of the Global South, these countries are being pressured to quickly introduce gender-sensitive policies to accommodate women at a much faster pace than countries in the Global North. The result is rather unfeminist: uniformed women from the Global South are quickly integrated in the military but assigned gendered functions where they are believed to better deliver, such as assisting female survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, and they are put under increased pressure to carry the burden of security by delivering on gender-sensitive UN mission targets. Nowhere in the process is there real appreciation of the biases and additional labour demands that women face, particularly in the military but also at home prior to being deployed, nor is there deep understanding of the local and international contexts in which troops are deployed. The GBA+ perspective implied in Canada’s Elsie Initiative should reoritent its efforts in support of socialisation and training before sending uniformed women from the Global South to serve in peacekeeping missions where they are asked to carry a double burden and typecast in gendered roles, in addition to the pressures that follow them on site when proper support systems are not in place back home. Moreover, the Canadian Armed Forces’ ongoing sexual misconduct crisis, a clear failure when it comes to gender integration and inclusion, as well as other pervasive problems that echo similar issues than those discussed here in relation to Global South partners, casts a shadow on Canada’s legitimacy as the instigator of the Elsie Initiative. Recommendation: We recommend supporting the design and implementation of  long-term gender-sensitive security sector reform through incremental changes to transform the masculine-dominated culture of the armed forces, and facilitate the integration of women and the acceptance of female military personnel’s skills and abilities at all decision-making levels. A Feminist Foreign Policy Cannot Work in Silos  A FFP is holistic in its approach and requires feminist principles to guide all foreign policy decisions. That is currently not the case in Canada. For example, while the Canada Equality Fund will provide funding for women mediators in West Africa, Canada has also supported the extractive industry sector through Export Development Canada. Several extractive industry companies have not respected the rights of indigenous populations, have put in peril the food and economic security of rural women, and have distorted the work of these women mediators. This disconnect between sectors and initiatives can result in the concurrent implementation of incompatible policies. For example, rural women in Liberia have been given negotiation skills training so that they can negotiate with extractive industries companies and engage in alternative revenue-generation workshops because they can no longer exploit and sell the cassava plantations they have been cultivating for generations. Short of reconsidering support for the expansion of extractive industries in the country, such skills training is more akin to cooptation than ‘empowerment’. Likewise, the inconsistency of Canada’s support to Yemeni women peacemakers with the Trudeau government’s decision to resume the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia has also been widely decried. Recommendation: Security and defence policies and economic development policies cannot be separated if inconsistencies and contradictions are to be avoided. Further, the peace and security components of a feminist foreign policy cannot be properly promoted and implemented abroad, and in specific regions and states, without more attention paid to prior, existing understandings of what “security” means and how it is defined in various sectors. Where the intersection between gender and security, for instance, is a relatively new and in many ways still unfamiliar focus, it is necessarily interpreted through the prism of cognate concepts. One such concept is “human security,” which carries perceived Western-centric overtones in many contexts, particularly in its more narrow (and politically sensitive) understanding as “freedom from threat” and its association with the more sensitive and interventionist elements of the “responsibility to protect” principles. Some of Canada’s partners’ resistance to gender mainstreaming in policy, or the WPS agenda specifically, has less to do with the substance of the agenda (although this is part of the equation) than a hyper vigilance to its origins and the identity of its champions. Whether this caution is legitimate or misplaced, without a proper anchoring in local security discourses and practices, combined with support to actors already involved in designing and promoting gender-based policies at the intersection of security and development, Canada’s feminist agenda abroad cannot succeed. It cannot be promoted through a one-size-fits-all approach either. Canada’s feminist foreign policy must likewise recognize the limits of the militaristic components of the WPS agenda. These primarily serve to reinforce the capacity of actors and sectors that, in many contexts, actually produce insecurity for marginalized segments of society, including women, but also indigenous peoples, the LGBTQ2 community, and other minority groups. In addition, a militarized approach to gender, peace and security will necessarily face resistance in sectors and contexts where security has traditionally been defined in “non-traditional” (from a Western perspective) and comprehensive ways that underscore its intimate relationship with development. In Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific, for instance, this connection between security and development has been central to how government, expert, and civil society milieux alike approach foreign and security policy from their very inception. While remaining cognizant of the negative connotations associated with ‘human security’ in some contexts, adopting an explicitly broader definition of security would allow Canada to include non-militarised forms of security (food security, environmental security, health security) and to take into account how different stakeholders understand (in)security, how they are tackling those insecurities, and what they need to feel more secure. For example, access to sexual and reproductive health services are key to women and girls. In developing countries with not so many resources, maternal health services are those that suffer the most from the lack of funds. In cases of a pandemic or a serious viral disease, the healthcare system gets distorted because all the local resources are transferred to combat the disease. There are studies that show how the maternal mortality rate in Sierra Leone was increasing at the same pace as the cases of Ebola as maternal healthcare services and other gynecology services were no longer available. In countries with access to resources, sexual and reproductive health can also be an important security issue as an increasing number of countries have sought or are seeking to limit access to pregnancy termination. Recommendation: Canada should pay attention to the manner in which its partners and other stakeholders understand security. It should also acknowledge and seek to offset the fact that the militaristic aspects of its WPS agenda serve to reinforce the capacity of actors and sectors that, in many contexts, actually produce insecurity for marginalized segments of society, including, but not limited to, women. A FFP Is as Much About Process as It Is About Substance   The manner in which Canada’s FFP is currently being implemented deserves critical examination. As it stands, Canada will need to clarify its approach to building partnerships at home and abroad, to clarify the temporal dimension of its FFP interventions and to reconsider the manner in which it evaluates progress. Building Partnerships When one looks at the patterns of Canada’s international involvement, these have been largely driven by alliance politics, economic interest or demands tied to its membership within international organizations. Maintaining and developing more diverse partnerships at home and abroad is a condition for success. At home, Canada’s FFP can and should serve to foster whole-of-government, but also, whole-of-society responses with the next iteration of the National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security. We should note that the appointment of an Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security with a civil society background is an encouraging development, however. Abroad, building partnerships with actors with varying degrees of respect for feminist principles is a balancing act. First, the Government of Canada will need to outline guiding engagement and intervention principles that promote and uphold human rights. This does not mean that Canada goes it alone, but that decision-making and coalitions be driven by FFP principles first and foremost. Canada may find ‘natural’ partners in Sweden, France, Mexico and Luxembourg, to start, given that they have also adopted so-called feminist foreign policies, in one form or another. Second, it will also need to step out of its established patterns to build institutionalised partnerships with partners in the Global South. Third, Canada must also articulate its feminist objectives when pursuing diplomatic relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia, as well as countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Kenya which do not respect women’s rights and gender equality. Here as well, there is a need to fund and listen to those at the margins. Fourth, Canada should not neglect engagement with countries who have expressed concerns about FFP objectives, including those that connect with WPS. Recommendation: As it builds the partnerships that are essential to the success of its FFP, Canada must outline guiding engagement and intervention principles that promote and uphold gender equality. It must also build new partnerships, particularly in the Global South and articulate its feminist objectives in engagements with countries that either express concerns about FFP objectives or simply do not respect women’s rights and gender equality. Bridging the Short, Medium and Long Term Identifying, tackling and transforming the power relations and structural inequalities that have stood in the way of women’s inclusion and gender equality takes time. Short-term initiatives to include women must be complemented with longer-term initiatives to change the mentalities of societies, including socialization programs and a focus on education. But foreign policies seldom survive changes in government. While there is generally cross-party agreement on Canada’s FFP, there remain significant differences in the ways in which different Canadian federal parties understand the priorities associated with it. In other words, care must be taken to ensure that the focus of Canada’s FFP does not drastically change with changes in government. An important step in this direction was taken when Parliament approved the principle of multi-year funding which, according to the Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada’s Official Development Assistance 2017-2018 provides Canada’s partners with a degree of assurance for planning purposes and flexibility to respond to changing conditions on the ground. Recommendation: Because women’s inclusion and gender equality require structural transformations, a FFP must cast a long temporal shadow. It must complement short-term initiatives with longer-term structural efforts. Reconsidering Performance-based Assessments Because structural changes are long-term processes, assessment methods that borrow the logic of results-based management are bound to fail both the ambitions of Canada’s FFP and the expectations of Canada’s FFP partners. The current Performance Measurement Framework Template, with its indicators and mostly quantitative measures, is ill-suited to trace change in power relations and to really assess the increase in individual empowerment of beneficiaries of Canada’s FFP programs. Performance-based assessments also illustrate the ways in which some results get quantified and therefore “count,” while other difficult to measure effects of policies go undocumented and unnoticed. What gets measured also “depends on which problems seem politically important”. The choice of quantitative measures and indicators can measure, for example, how many women were present at a certain meeting, how many uniformed women are deployed to a UN peace mission, or how many workshops on relevant topics were held. However, they do not give information as to whether and how women’s voices were taken seriously, or whether uniformed women are expected to use ‘feminised’ skills and perform ‘gendered’ tasks such as liaising with the local population, especially local women and girls. When qualitative descriptions are included in assessments, they tend to accompany, explain and illustrate with examples the “hard facts” produced by quantitative indicators. This is important because only certain practices and short-term results are made visible. Second, although the use of performance-based assessments is commonly believed to provide a neutral and impartial assessment, as well as a universal benchmark for comparison, the selection of particular indicators and measurement tools has consequences. For example, if GAC would like to measure the impact of its Feminist International Assistance Policy on “the poorest and most vulnerable people”, this category will include people as varied as widows, people with disabilities, young, elderly, etc. which are very different from each other, resulting in an analytical process which is at odds with the methodology promoted through GBA+. Furthermore, the indicators and measurements are oriented towards the designation of “best practices” and implicit performance standards through the presentation of success stories of those “vulnerable women” who outperformed the rest. These judgements will in turn be used to make decisions on which country or on which community we should invest in the future, leaving behind the foundational inclusive values upon which a FFP is enacted. Recommendation: Because results-based assessments cannot capture changes in power relations or structural inequalities, nor can they adequately assess an increase in individual empowerment, Global Affairs Canada should develop more sophisticated and appropriate ways of assessing change. In conclusion, this policy report has drawn on GBA+ analysis to review Canada’s FFP and found it wanting. Canada’s ‘add women and stir’ approach is ill-suited to address the power asymmetries and the structural inequalities that underpin women’s exclusion and gender inequity. For Canadian FFP to respond to the hopes of its supporters, a serious effort at definition, inclusivity and thoughtful implementation is required. Listed Recommendations While working on women's inclusion and empowerment, the Canadian government should also consider changes that need to be brought to institutions that perpetuate the marginalization of women and underrepresented or disadvantaged groups. Canada has tended to present the case for inclusion as the smart thing to do rather than the right thing to do. While instrumental logic may be needed to convince reluctant parties, it is important for Canada's FFP not to lose sight of the importance of the normative values of equity and diversity, which should be pursued as ends unto themselves. As its initiatives and programs centre women's agency, Canada must take due care to avoid unwittingly reproducing gender stereotypes, thus setting conditions on their inclusion and participation. Canada’s FFP must make provisions for how to best engage with states newly committed to a feminist or gender-based approach to politics, development, and security. Deepening involvement with these partners can help them chart their own way forward towards a FFP while consolidating Canada foreign policy objectives. Canada should also be more mindful of sources of resistance and concerns about the Western/liberal overtones of the FFP and related constructs such as Women, Peace and Security, and develop strategies to mitigate such concerns. The promotion and implementation of Canada's FFP agenda abroad necessitates the identification of, and a sustained partnership with, actors and spaces where the agenda can be pursued by and with non-state actors. Canada needs to increase its capacity to identify these local origin points, directly link up with them and find ways to incorporate and support these perspectives and efforts. When engaging with stakeholders, Canada ought to pay attention to the language it uses and to conduct an assessment of the manner in which this language is likely to be received and perceived, with a view to ensuring that it does not thus exclude important stakeholders. Further, Canada should envision ways to support stakeholders beyond capacity-building, given that limitations often come not from a lack of interest or even expertise, but of appropriate financial and human resources. We recommend supporting the design and implementation of long-term gender-sensitive security sector reform through incremental changes to transform the masculine-dominated culture of the armed forces, and facilitate the integration of women and the acceptance of female military personnel’s skills and abilities at all decision-making levels. Security and defence policies and economic development policies cannot be separated if inconsistencies and contradictions are to be avoided. Canada should pay attention to the manner in which its partners and other stakeholders understand security. It should also acknowledge and seek to offset the fact that the militaristic aspects of its WPS agenda serve to reinforce the capacity of actors and sectors that, in many contexts, actually produce insecurity for marginalized segments of society, including, but not limited to, women. As it builds the partnerships that are essential to the success of its FFP, Canada must outline guiding engagement and intervention principles that promote and uphold gender equality. It must also build new partnerships, particularly in the Global South and articulate its feminist objectives in engagements with countries that either express concerns about FFP objectives or simply do not respect women’s rights and gender equality. Because women’s inclusion and gender equality require structural transformations, a FFP must cast a long temporal shadow. It must complement short-term initiatives with longer-term structural efforts. Because results-based assessments cannot capture changes in power relations or structural inequalities, nor can they adequately assess an increase in individual empowerment, Global Affairs Canada should develop more sophisticated and appropriate ways of assessing change. ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-1/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report concludes that war is not inevitable and that the most likely scenario until the end of the 2020s is the continuation of Is war over Taiwan coming? If yes, how would it take place? These questions are among the most salient debates in the security studies community. While it is impossible to offer uncontested answers, we can provide elements of responses through a rational assessment of the factors that make war likely or not. The most consequential factors tilting the balance towards war is the modernization of China’s armed forces, coupled with the exasperation of the Chinese Communist Party about the status quo and its confidence in undertaking a successful military action against Taiwan. Inversely, the immense cost, whether economic, political, or reputational, of forcefully reunifying Taiwan with the Chinese mainland is the main factor that reduces its likelihood as it would threaten regime security. The most likely scenario until the end of the decade is the continuation of Chinese gray zone measures. However, if violence is used, the incentives are to display a massive use of force to impose a fait accompli on Taiwan. 1. Context After two decades of Chinese civil war, in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang party fled to Taiwan to establish the Republic of China (ROC), while the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gained control of China’s mainland and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China). Since then, the Chinese civil war has never officially ended, and one of the CCP’s most important sovereignty objectives has been to unify Taiwan with the mainland. The ROC, considered a breakaway Chinese province by Beijing, has since 1949 metamorphosed. From a dictatorial nationalist government, its government evolved from the late 1980s into a liberal democratic regime that held its first presidential election in 1996. Since 1978, the U.S. has switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC as the sole legal government of China. In 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed, which, with the U.S.’ six Assurances to Taiwan, and the three U.S.-PRC communiqués of 1972, 1978, and 1982, delineate U.S.-Taiwan relations. Although not a formal military alliance, the TRA specifies U.S. commitments to provide weapons to Taiwan. The U.S. does not officially take a stance on how the Taiwan question should be resolved as long as it is done peacefully. The U.S. ambiguity regarding its support of Taiwan in the event of war aims to deter China from attacking Taiwan just as it intends to prevent Taiwan from declaring de jure independence. This policy of dual deterrence has successfully prevented war since 1979, but there are debates over whether the U.S. should clarify its commitment to Taiwan, given that China’s power has massively increased since 1979. There has been an increasing pressure from China directed at Taiwan manifested in the recurrent violation of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) beyond the median line serving as a de facto frontier, which had not been crossed prior to 2020. Beijing has also significantly stepped up its diplomatic pressure to prevent Taiwan from entering free trade agreements, international organizations, or bilateral relationships. More generally, Beijing’s geopolitical clout resulting from its fulgurant development is used assertively to advance reunification through information warfare, cyber-attacks, economic coercion, and military demonstrations, also known as grey zone measures. The deteriorating situation over Taiwan is happening in the context of the Sino-American great power competition, where Taiwan is of strategic, technological, economic, and ideological value to both the U.S. and China. Taiwan is a flashpoint because the struggle for the island’s control has the potential to trigger a war between two foes competing for hegemonic influence in East Asia. There are enough stakes on each side for the two protagonists to fight and go to great lengths to achieve their preferred outcome over Taiwan. Given the tensions resulting from the U.S.-China strategic competition, the status quo in Taiwan is increasingly complicated to maintain. An accident could precipitate a conflict with high escalation potential. The cost of invading Taiwan is incredibly high for the CCP. Still, China could decide to use force depending on the evolution of China’s domestic situation, its perception of the balance of power, the modification of the status quo, and its assessment of the current window of opportunity. So, if war is not necessarily imminent, it is a serious possibility in the medium to long term. As such, it is essential to understand the potential factors that could cause friction and war between Taiwan, China, and the U.S. Is war over Taiwan coming? What are the Chinese red lines, and what kind of conditions could trigger the use of force by China against Taiwan? What is the most likely scenario of a Taiwan contingency? Based on the Strategic Analysis Network’ “Is War Over Taiwan Coming” symposium, held in Montreal on June 2-3, 2022, this report starts by presenting Taiwan's importance to China and the U.S., respectively. Then it lays out the conditions that could trigger a mainland attack on Taiwan prior to assessing the arguments that support the relative imminence of an attack against Taiwan. The report then turns to the arguments against an impending attack on Taiwan, highlighting that most experts think China has more to lose from a rational cost-benefit analysis in launching an attack than in enduring the unpleasant status quo. The report concludes that war is not inevitable and that the most likely scenario until the end of the 2020s is the continuation of China’s gray zone measures. 1.1. Taiwan’s Importance to China In 1992, the Consensus was signed between Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) party and the PRC, acknowledging the existence of a single China. Despite disagreement on the meaning of “China” – PRC or ROC? – the ambiguous 1992 Consensus has maintained the cross-strait status quo. But in 2016, with the arrival in power of pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Tsai Ing-Wen, and her reelection in 2020, cross-strait relations have plummeted. Tsai Ing-Wen refused to uphold Beijing’s interpretation of the 1992 Consensus in her reelection speech in 2020. This is because Beijing equates the 1992 Consensus to the “one country, two systems” arrangement under which Macau and Hong Kong are administered. When Xi Jinping arrived in power in 2012, he developed the concept of the “China Dream,” which is associated with the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It implies, among other things, reunification with Taiwan. The Chinese rejuvenation finds roots in Chinese historical traumas as an enduring theme in China's domestic discourse. There was never a precise timeline accompanying the discourse on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, but Xi mentioned 2049 as a date for the rejuvenation to be completed, which raises questions about Taiwan. Xi has increasingly allowed the discussion of a forceful takeover of Taiwan, making the theme mainstream in the CCP – a significant development in highly censored China. Xi’s multiple calls to advance on the path of reunification, and not pass the issue on from generation to generation have linked Xi’s legitimacy to the Taiwan question. Xi’s own desire to reunify with Taiwan and the fact that he provided what seems to be a date is a significant departure from previous Chinese leaders. Especially given that preparation for contingencies over Taiwan attracts one-third of China’s defence budget and is the Chinese armed forces’ primary warfighting mission for strategic, economic, and cultural reasons. Strategically speaking, conquering Taiwan would provide greater leverage to China over regional actors. Located in the first island chain, the seizure of Taiwan would allow the PLA to project power into the Western Pacific and possibly checkmate U.S. forces in the region. With Taiwan under control, China could implement blockades on local actors such as Japan or the Philippines. China would also free up “dozens of ships, hundreds of missile launchers and combat aircraft, thousands of personnel, and billions of dollars” dedicated to a Taiwan contingency. As a result, China would be able to increasingly coerce regional actors to make them comply with its preferences in the South and East China Seas, thereby strengthening regional domination. Moreover, absorbing Taiwan’s $600 billion economy and cutting-edge technology firms would be a major advantage for the PRC. Taiwan is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), one of the two leading companies with Samsung that has a near-monopoly on producing the most advanced electronic chips available on the market. Whoever controls TSMC controls a technology essential to remain ahead in artificial intelligence and hence, next-generation weapons platforms. Semiconductors are also crucial for producing many electronic products used in everyday life. China’s production of capabilities in “advanced manufacturing and digital technologies” depends on access to advanced chips from Taiwan. Consequently, controlling the source of production of higher-end semiconductors is strategic. Culturally, Taiwan’s de facto independence is seen as an egregious stigma of a dark period of Chinese history: the Century of Humiliations (1839-1949). After its defeat in the Second Opium War, China was forced to sign the first of a long list of unequal treaties which dismembered China’s territories. Seizing Taiwan would not only end the Chinese civil war and affirm the CCP’s legitimacy and authority, but it would also be a major advancement in the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. By successfully conquering Taiwan, the CCP would demonstrate that China has fully recovered from the Century of Humiliation, during which it could not defend its territorial integrity. Placing Taiwan under the CCP’s control is highly symbolic and a matter of honor, strategic thinking, and nationalist motivations closely associated with the China Dream, the CCP, and Xi’s legitimacy. Concretely, Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland under the “one country, two systems” on Beijing’s terms would mean that: “The ROC would cease to exist, and the PRC flag would replace that of Taiwan” “Taiwan would be absorbed then transformed into a special administrative region like Hong Kong or Macau” “Taiwan would no longer have a defence and foreign policy of its own” “The mainland would have a say on how Taiwan’s leaders are picked” “Taiwan would keep its army, and the PLA would not be stationed in Taiwan” “The U.S. would not be allowed to project power from Taiwan.” 1.2. Taiwan’s Importance to the U.S. If Taiwan is crucial for China’s great rejuvenation, it is also central to the U.S. dominance of the Indo-Pacific. Washington has geostrategic, geoeconomic, and ideological incentives to guarantee Taiwan’s de facto independence. Taiwan is a primary element of the U.S. capacity to project its power in East Asia and contain China. As described by General Douglas MacArthur 70 years ago, this unsinkable aircraft carrier is vital for the U.S. effort to prevent China’s regional territorial expansion behind the first island chain. According to Charles Philippe David, without Taiwan, there is no offshore balancing. Furthermore, the U.S. technological industries depend on Taiwanese higher-end semiconductor chips, just like China. There have been efforts lately to repatriate semiconductor plants to the U.S., but the most advanced technology will remain in Taiwan for the foreseeable future. Therefore, an attack on Taiwan by China would engender an economic contraction in the U.S. and threaten the U.S. technological advance in critical technologies like artificial intelligence, with dire consequences for America’s primacy. There is also the fear of losing credibility if the U.S. does not react to aggression, even though Washington has no formal defence treaty with Taiwan comparable to the ones with South Korea or Japan. The U.S. nonetheless risks reputational costs in the absence of a reaction to aggression because the language of the TRA specifies a role for the U.S. in arming Taiwan to deter an attack. Additionally, a lack of U.S. reaction in the face of external threats to Taiwan could increase the fear of abandonment in Japan and South Korea despite their defence treaties, according to Hyon Joo Yoo and Steven F. Jackson. As a result, Washington’s regional allies could either seek nuclear weapons or accommodate China’s preferences that are antithetic to the U.S. vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which would be a threatening outcome for the U.S. and other trading nations. Lastly, the U.S. has ideological stakes in keeping the Taiwanese democratic regime. It is easier and preferable for Washington to deal with fellow democracies based on common liberal political and economic principles than illiberal regimes. Taiwan is a regional political counterpoint to the PRC’s authoritarian rule, and helping Taipei resist forced reunification is beneficial to the U.S. preferred normative standards. 2. Is War Coming? 2.1. Factors Tilting the Balance Towards a Taiwan Contingency A. The Solidification of the Taiwanese Identity Very few Taiwanese would like to reunify with the Chinese mainland. According to a  survey by National Chengchi University,  64% of Taiwan’s residents identify as exclusively Taiwanese, 30% as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 3% as Chinese. Compared to 1992, 46.4% identified as Taiwanese and Chinese, 25.5% as Chinese, and 17.6% as Taiwanese.  In 2020, the reelection of Tsai Ing-Wen, who wants to keep some distance from the mainland, exemplifies this trend in Taiwanese society. However, she is not the most anti-mainland politician. Tsai Ing-Wen intends to maintain the status quo and avoids explicit references to Taiwan’s independence. That is not the case with her very popular vice president, William Lai, a likely candidate in the 2024 election who is more in favor of Taiwan’s independence. If he were to run and win the next election, it would encourage Beijing to take drastic measures. The current Taiwanese political climate worries Beijing that peaceful reunification might never happen and that the only way to reunify Taiwan with the mainland is to force it upon the Taiwanese society. B. U.S.-Taiwan Growing Links Concomitantly, we are witnessing growing U.S.-Taiwan links. Recurrent visits from U.S. lawmakers and deputy assistant secretaries to Taiwan provoke China’s ire. In reaction, the PLA’s military demonstrations have blossomed. At some point, China could launch an attack if it deems that the presence of foreign militaries in Taiwan is too important or that the links between the U.S. and Taiwanese officials have become unacceptable. Tsai Ing-Wen officially confirmed the presence of U.S. soldiers in Taiwan “to increase the islands’ defence capability,” which is a risky acknowledgment. Taiwan is one of the rare dossiers that enjoys bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress. The latter passed in 2018 the Taiwan Travel Act, establishing a framework for increased high-level U.S.-Taiwan government exchanges. In 2018, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act was signed, allowing for closer economic, political, and security links with Taiwan. In 2019, the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act was adopted to help Taiwan broaden its global diplomatic ties and partnerships. The Taiwan Assurance Act, part of the 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act, calls upon Taiwan to boost its defence spending and demands more U.S. arms transfers and sales to the island. It also intends to support Taiwan in becoming part of more international organizations. Finally, one could mention the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act. Although not passed, this bill is of paramount importance because it has provisions for the U.S. to use force to defend Taiwan under certain circumstances. If it ever becomes law, this would end the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. C. The PLA’s Modernization The most significant factor associated with aggression concerns the PLA’s modernization and the resulting modification of the balance of power between the U.S. and China in East Asia. With Xi’s arrival to power in 2012, he initiated a reform of China’s armed forces to produce a “world-class force” capable of fighting global wars by 2049 – the date of the one-hundredth anniversary of the PRC.  Military reforms include the creation of new joint theater commands, updates to hardware, better military-civilian collaboration, and the transformation of the PLA Army Navy into a maritime powerhouse. China has acquired anti-ship missiles, quiet submarines, advanced fighter aircraft, and integrated air defenses. The China-Taiwan military balance benefits China as it spends twenty-five times more on its military budget than Taiwan. China spent $3 trillion in the last three decades to develop its armed forces. Unsurprisingly, in most war games, China is capable of subjugating Taiwan before the U.S. gets a chance to intervene. China’s military capabilities, which are structurally linked to Russia, have significantly improved and allow for power projection in the South and East China Seas and over Taiwan. The PLA Navy has become the largest navy globally, with 355 ships and submarines against 293 vessels for the U.S. The U.S. Navy remains dominant in the Western Pacific regarding combat power. That said, China has the most extensive shipbuilding capacity worldwide, which is an asset for the PLA Navy’s growth. According to Indo-Pacific Command, China is expected to have an 8-to-1 advantage in regional naval vessels relative to the U.S. and similar advantages in aircraft by 2025. Not only that, but China has been catching up with the U.S. military-technological advance and hopes to exceed the U.S. by the end of the decade. China has expanded its ground-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles. Some missiles can switch between conventional and nuclear warheads, which renders difficult the identification of the type of missile being launched. China’s A2/AD seriously reduces the U.S. marge for maneuvers in East Asia if it decides to intervene to help Taiwan. Another striking feature of the PLA’s modernization is that it has primarily been conducted to prevail in the case of an amphibious invasion of “a big island,” a blockade, or a missile attack – hard not to think of Taiwan contingencies here. Although not completed yet, the successful modernization of China’s armed forces has allowed Beijing to alter the balance of power in the region, including in the Taiwan Straits, where Beijing had long been militarily disfavored. With the joint action capacity of the air force, the navy, the army, and the strategic rocket force, China theoretically has the upper hand over Taiwan. The credibility of Taiwan and American deterrence vis-à-vis China has diminished due to Taiwan's low military readiness and the eroding position of the U.S. regional forces. D. China’s Confidence in Its Armed Forces Such modernization has encouraged the belief that China has the means to destroy Taiwan’s strategic infrastructures with highly advanced ballistic and cruise missiles or that it could easily implement a blockade against Taiwan indefinitely, just as it could cut off Taiwan from the Internet and impair lines of communication through cyber-attacks. However, mounting a victorious amphibious invasion is less certain, as it is an arduous campaign to pull off. But the general feeling in Beijing is that the PLA can win a limited military confrontation against Taiwan and potentially against the U.S. The PLA believes that the balance of power favors Beijing because China cares more about and is closer to Taiwan than the U.S. According to Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, Beijing generally uses force to avoid losing territory or capitalize on a closing window of opportunity to expand its control on disputed claims. The U.S. and its partners are hardening their regional presence and are encircling China. Although Taiwan’s armed forces are currently critically understaffed, they are trying to fix this issue and increase their capabilities. Additionally, experts remark that U.S. defence investments in East-Asia and military coalitions and partnerships, like the QUAD and AUKUS, already impede China’s power projection and will increasingly do so as time passes. By 2030, China will likely face a much more difficult operational environment than it currently does. Many U.S. assets deployed in the region are old and will need to be replaced in the next decade. Thus, the 2020s is an optimal decade for a Chinese move as the balance of power will be the most in favor of China. If China waits too long, this window of opportunity will close, rendering more complicated and costly any military actions in the future. U.S. Admiral Davidson thinks 2027 is the year, while other high-ranked American and Taiwanese military officials have proposed a range of potential dates (2025, 2027, 2030 to 2049) where China could attempt armed reunification. According to Oriana Skylar Mastro, the Chinese leaders’ perception of their chances of victory matters more than their objective chances of success. And Xi is increasingly being told by advisers that the PLA could reunify Taiwan by force at a bearable cost. Consequently, it is not unthinkable for Xi to believe that the window of opportunity could soon close and that it must quickly act. The increasing publication of articles in China calling for the swift resolution of the Taiwan question while China enjoys maximum chances of success expresses a sense of urgency. This makes U.S. Admiral Michael Studeman declare that Taiwan’s invasion “is only a matter of time, not a matter of if.” And Mastro estimates the current chances of war between Taiwan and China at 60%. E. A War to Divert Attention From Domestic Issues Using force against Taiwan is as much a political decision as a military one. As the legitimacy of the CCP is increasingly based on nationalism rather than merely on economic growth, it might feel compelled to act. Especially as 70% of Chinese strongly support using force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. Given China’s domestic social, political, and financial issues, bolstering nationalism through the “Taiwan card” might be a convenient way to divert attention away from unemployment, electricity shortages, corruption, high debt, inequalities, lower growth rate, or any other domestic issues. In the words of Jennifer Chang, “[…]When China is operating from a position of internal and external weakness […] it could become emboldened to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy—and potentially use military action against Taiwan.” It is also important to note the demographic problem of China. Its population is rapidly aging. It is typical for a nation that gets wealthier, but young people are crucial to fighting wars. Such demographic decline imposes a limited timeframe for action. 2.2. Scenarios of a Taiwan Contingency There are several red lines that, if crossed, could trigger a Chinese military action against Taiwan. The first and most important red line that Taiwan must not cross if it wants to avoid a Chinese military action against it is to formally declare its independence or organize a referendum on its independence. The PRC has passed, in 2005, an Anti-Secession Law that requires China to strive for a peaceful reunification with Taiwan, while making limpid that if all peaceful avenues have been exhausted and that Taiwan is seriously moving toward independence, then “the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” A clear Taiwanese “secession,” or even serious rhetoric about independence, is likely to trigger an immediate response from the mainland. However, even if Taiwan respects the current status quo, the combination of Beijing’s power and exasperation related to the slow advancement of reunification could result in aggressive action. Below is a list of the various scenarios a Taiwan contingency could look like: Seizure of Taiwan’s Small Islands: After having imposed an unsuccessful ultimatum on Taipei to initiate the reunification process under the “one country, two systems,” Beijing could bombe Taiwan’s small islands near Chinese coasts like Taiwan's Dongsha Island, Taiping Island, Pratas Island, or Wuqiu Island. China could then seize and turn one or several of them into launching grounds, threatening future military actions if Taiwan still refuses to start the reunification process. Aerial Bombing Campaign: Starting from the same premises, a more energetic move would be joint PLA missile and airstrike campaigns against Taiwan right from the start, hitting strategic military and government targets and potentially even strategic civil infrastructures like axes of communication, roads, bridges, etc. The goal would be to force Taipei to surrender and accept some form of reunification without stepping foot on the island through shock and awe. Blockade: An aerial bombing campaign could be supplemented by a blockade to cut the island off from its vital imports. The PLA Navy can surround Taiwan and stop merchant ships from entering any of its seven major ports, four of which face China’s mainland. Taiwan imports 60% of its food and 98% of its energy. Taiwan’s food and energy reserves would last a few months without external supplies. The goal would be to strangle the island to force it to capitulate. Aerial Bombing Campaign on Taiwan and U.S. Regional Targets: In addition to bombing Taiwan, China could decide to attack U.S. forces in the region (Japan, South Korea, and even Guam) to cripple the U.S. capacity to intervene in the first stages of the conflict. The more credible the U.S. intention to intervene militarily, the more likely China could target U.S. forces in its opening salvo. This would entail a significant risk of escalation as China and the U.S. would be at war, potentially exposing China’s mainland to U.S. retaliation. According to Bruno Tertrais, China could attempt to offer Japan a deal before the bombing campaign: no Japanese assistance to the U.S. in exchange for Beijing dropping its claim on the Senkaku Islands. Amphibious invasion of Taiwan: This would be the costliest and most complex campaign to pull off. It would require a joint operation on a colossal scale with massive casualties, high risks of failure, and billions of dollars spent. Millions of Chinese service members would need to be mobilized, “including soldiers, sailors, airmen, rocketeers, marines, cyber warriors, armed police, reservists, ground militia, and maritime militia.” According to the three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders, approximately 1.35 million soldiers would need to be sent across the strait to have any chance of overwhelming the Taiwanese forces. 2.3. Factors Tilting the Balance Against a Taiwan Contingency Despite alarming factors indicating that a war over Taiwan could be imminent, there are important factors that militate against a reckless move from the PLA against Taiwan. After a relatively recent meeting between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, Beijing reaffirmed its intentions to “strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and efforts.” Xi also restrained from mentioning Taiwan in major CCP’s speeches where he concentrated on modernization and socioeconomic progress instead. Overall, China is satisfied with its steady economic growth, expanding influence, and stability. For now, economic and anti-corruption reforms are more important than Taiwan unification as developing China is the main source of CCP’s legitimacy. Legitimacy is crucial to regime security, which is the CCP’s most important objective. Therefore, Beijing is not motivated to use military force to speed up reunification as it would endanger economic growth and technological access. A. The PLA is Not Ready Yet and Lacks Combat Experience The PLA’s modernization and creation of joint theatre commands have enhanced the effectiveness of the Chinese armed forces, especially for contingencies over Taiwan. But one must remember that China’s latest battle was in 1979 against Vietnam and lacks recent fighting experience. The PLA’s modernization is not complete either, as China does not have all the necessary naval and air assets to lead a cross-strait invasion successfully. There is still ample room for progress in coordinating ground, sea, and air forces in large joint amphibious operations. According to the 2021 Pentagon report on China’s military and security development, the PLA Navy has been focusing on developing the capacity to launch “regional and eventually global expeditionary missions rather than the large number of landing ship transports and medium landing craft that would be necessary for a large-scale direct beach assault.” The Pentagon’s report also mentions the PLA’s Five Incapables, which limits the effectiveness of the Chinese armed forces, especially at the operational level: “Some commanders cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational decisions; (4) deploy forces; and, (5) manage unexpected situations.” An amphibious invasion is already a risky move for any military to undertake. It requires “air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support.” It is even riskier for a military that is not optimally prepared and that lacks recent combat experience. B. Invading Taiwan is Difficult In addition to the PLA’s lack of preparedness, capabilities, and combat experience, there is the highly challenging task of conquering an island ideally suited for defence. As Ian Easton puts it, “[Taiwan’s] coastal terrain … is a defender’s dream come true.” Only fourteen Taiwanese beaches are prone to an amphibious invasion, surrounded by cliffs and jungles. The Taiwan Strait regularly has typhoons and high waves, which would hinder the PLA’s operational effectiveness. Easton also remarks that Taiwan has granite hills that host tunnels and bunkers and that Taiwan’s highly urban setting advantages the defence. Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities like drones, sea mines, portable air defence, anti-armor systems, etc., would render the PLA’s task of landing on Taiwan’s beaches remarkably complex and costly. Not only that, but even if China were to invade Taiwan successfully, the CCP would then face tremendous local resistance and maybe guerilla. It would be a nightmare to pacify the island and incorporate it into China’s governance structures after imposing massive destruction, casualties, and suffering – Ukraine is a prime example. Given the difficulty of invading Taiwan, an amphibious invasion seems unappealing, especially if one adds the risk of an international intervention to blunt the PLA’s attempt to subjugate the island. C. Economic, Political, and Reputational Factors Constraining China’s Use of Force The U.S. provides arms and training to Taiwan’s armed forces, while most Western and regional countries sympathize with Taiwan’s de facto independence and/or democratic political system. This situation implies that Taiwan will never accept just to surrender and accept Beijing’s diktat peacefully. Taiwan has resources and support, enabling Taipei to resist. The only way for Beijing to impose its will on Taiwan is through coercion. However, the prospect of a successful blow against Taiwan is unlikely. Washington would probably throw its weight behind Taiwan in the case of Chinese aggression with the relative help of international partners and allies like Japan and Australia. Even by itself, the U.S. is already a formidable military power capable of causing consequential difficulties to China. American naval and air forces could harass and destroy Chinese supply lines. The Chinese Navy would constitute targets of choice for U.S. bombers, fighter aircraft, submarines, and other military equipment stationed in the region. The prospect, for China, of having to militarily grapple with the U.S. “throws the entire notion of deterrence on its head” given the terrible consequences of such an outcome. If China and the U.S. are at war over Taiwan, things could escalate dramatically, even though the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine constrains such an escalation. Furthermore, Taiwan is a central hub for the latest semiconductor technology. The prospect of controlling Taiwan’s cutting-edge semiconductor production capacity is attractive to Beijing as it would benefit its ambition of reducing its chip dependency on external sources and becoming a tech giant. However, if China starts a war, it is almost sure that the facilities where these precious semiconductors are produced would be damaged if not destroyed. Any abrupt disruption in the semiconductor supply chains would be costly for the global economy, leading to market shortages, inflation, higher unemployment, and social unrest. Beijing would face a semiconductor shortage, seriously crippling its technological production capacities. It would also cost China billions of dollars to reconstruct the infrastructures, re-attract talents, and re-set up the logistics needed to restart the production of semiconductors after the war. It would cost trillions of dollars to reconstruct Taiwan itself, as it would undoubtedly be annihilated by an aerial bombing campaign or an amphibious invasion. Suppose one adds the resulting sanctions, trade embargo, and suspension of commercial ties with many important countries that have been the basis of China’s economic growth. According to Charles Parton, it would amount to an existential threat. As noted by Jeangène Vilmer, the potential low Chinese social acceptability of the massive casualties that would come with a Taiwan invasion is a powerful deterrent. Not to mention the reputational damages for China that one must factor in. If Russia is any indication, the U.S. would go to great lengths to turn China into a pariah if it ever starts a war against Taiwan. China would suffer monumental isolation, albeit more complicated to implement, given China’s central position in the global economy. But China’s image in the world would be stained, complicating the country’s global leadership plans, especially in international institutions where one needs to cooperate with and get the consent of others. 2.4. The Lessons of the War in Ukraine According to Lyle Goldstein, the more worrying implication of the Russia-Ukraine war for Taiwan is that China might conclude that Russia has gone too “soft” on Ukraine and should have aggressively bombarded the country right from the start to secure a rapid victory. For Wen-Ti Sung, the current war in Ukraine has raised the required military superiority threshold to achieve victory in a cross-strait conflict. Ni Lexiong deduces that the war in Ukraine will probably reduce the temptation for China to use force to settle the Taiwan question because the PLA has not yet reached the required military threshold to prevail, which means there are high risks of failure. The Chinese army is structurally linked to Russian weapons, which have done a poor job in Ukraine. Consequently, China could doubt its operational capacity to successfully lead an invasion of Taiwan, especially as Taiwan is armed with many of the same U.S.-made weapons that have seriously damaged the Russian military. As Jeangène Vilmer puts it, “China is much less prepared to do something that is much more difficult than what Russia failed to do in Ukraine.” Anything that is not a total victory over Taiwan could formally push the island to declare independence. This would obliterate China’s credibility and make its armed forces appear as a “paper tiger,” to use the expression of Bonnie Glaser, ultimately jeopardizing the most important thing for the CCP: regime security. Historically speaking, China has used force to stop declining trends, but in today’s global context China is, overall, rising. Attacking Taiwan would just endanger Chinese progression with no guarantee of success. Most analysts think that realizing the China Dream, which necessitates continued economic growth and access to technology to develop the rest of China, is sufficient to deter Xi from attacking Taiwan. The logic is that a war would threathen China’s export markets, foreign direct investments, and access to the required technological inputs to achieve its objectives – be it the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Made in China 2025, or any developmental plan. The consequences of an aggressive move toward Taiwan would derail China’s development course when China has an advantageous situation in Asia despite domestic challenges. Conquering Taiwan would likely “result in a much firmer anti-China Coalition globally.” Not only would it “torpedo” the realization of Xi’s China Dream in 2049, but it could even shake the foundation of the CCP’s power. It makes the prospect of an outright invasion unlikely. However, “one should never underestimate what elites can talk themselves into if they really want to go to war.” Conclusion If the U.S. neither changes its policy of strategic ambiguity, nor deploys forces in Taiwan, and if Taiwan does not declare its de jure independence, China will likely stick to gray zone measures in the short to medium term. China will increasingly rely on various coercive actions ranging from espionage, maritime harassment, disinformation, and military demonstrations to cyber, space, electromagnetic, and cognitive warfare in order to signal its ability to “digitally sabotage Taiwan during a crisis” and “isolate the island across multiple domains.” Beijing’s strategy is to subdue Taiwan without fighting and impose constant pressure on Taiwan to erode its willingness to maintain de facto independence. Gray zones are “a choice for revisionist states, and the alternative is war.” Rand Corporation identified 80 types of gray zones. Just above gray zones is imposing a Chinese quarantine on Taiwan for a limited or unlimited amount of time, meaning to control Taiwan’s air and maritime spaces with intermittent or permanent interferences in what is entering and/or exiting Taiwan (American weapons, semiconductors, etc.). In such a scenario, Taiwan’s main port (Kaohsiung) and airport (Taoyuan) would be subject to maritime and air control operations conducted by the Chinese government. Unlike a blockade, a quarantine would not be considered an act of war, but a psychological measure aimed at spreading despair regarding the viability of Taiwan’s de facto independence. Faced with a quarantine, the Americans would have to choose between accepting the quarantine, contesting the Chinese quarantine by sending U.S. Navy vessels and aircraft to escort commercial airplanes and boats, or breaking the quarantine with raw military force. A quarantine is in the logical continuity of China’s gray zone measures. It corresponds to Chinese writings on escalation, which indicate that “escalatory actions should always be gradual and complement broader national goals.” However, the game-theoretical concept of “escalation ladder” explains the logic that could prevail in such a situation: “As a general matter, games are not played in single turns but in multiple iterations, the results of which set the stage for the next move. The ladder works as a metaphor because each side has choices that may take them to the next rung, which might be closer to the objective but is also further away from the ground. Being further away from the ground increases the difficulty of coming down from the ladder and also increases the danger if the climber slips.” So, a quarantine could be thought to limit escalation, while the progression expressed by the “escalation ladder” would most likely lead to massive use of force. Nonetheless, if a quarantine occurs, it will probably be between 2027 and 2030. Why? Chinese armed forces will be ready for an amphibious invasion near the decade's end. Although a quarantine is not an amphibious invasion, the escalation process could make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan inevitable once the quarantine is imposed. Thus, it is necessary for the Chinese armed forces to be capable of doing so, which will be around 2027. And after the current decade, China’s operational environment will be much more complicated for reasons presented in the report. Therefore, this 3-year window is the most likely to witness a quarantine. According to Charles Parton, it is also conceivable that China forces its commercial partners to choose between its market or that of Taiwan, pressures countries not to recognize Taiwanese passports, and uses its leverage on Middle Eastern countries to limit their energy exports to Taiwan in order to hurt Taiwan’s economy. Jeangène Vilmer evokes massive cyberattacks, trade blockades, cutting submarine cables, and even taking small Taiwanese islands near Chinese coasts. China will most likely keep violating Taiwan’s ADIZ and potentially escalate to Taiwan’s airspace before the end of the decade. The overall goal is to create entropic processes. According to Cleo Paskal, entropic warfare aims to paralyze Taiwan from the inside and gradually weaken its resolve to the point of capitulation short of military action. Even though most experts believe that massive force is unlikely, what would be the most likely scenario if China decides to use force anyway? We have seen in Ukraine that a state fighting for survival has great resolve. We know that China is generally more reactive than proactive and that the debate about abandoning the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity is gaining traction. A single blockade or a mere bombing campaign of small Taiwanese islands off its coasts would not be enough to coerce Taiwan effectively but would indeed mobilize the U.S. and Taiwan. This would complicate the Chinese operational environment for further actions, while the inherent gains of controlling small island(s) are not enough for China. That’s why a bombing campaign against Taiwan mainland would probably be favored if force is ever used. Concomitantly, the Chinese would most likely implement a blockade on Taiwan and try to establish air and maritime control to deny access to the U.S. Navy and commercial ships to isolate Taiwan and make it surrender. Furthermore, we all took a step back when Russia put its nuclear forces on high alert. China is currently increasing its number of nuclear weapons and will not slow down. So, if the bombing campaign, the blockade, and even the use of special forces to eliminate high-ranking Taiwanese officials did not suffice to subjugate Taipei, Beijing could either undertake an amphibious invasion backed by nuclear deterrence or declare an uncredible victory. Given the already incurred costs of a bombing campaign and the future costs that would come with public failure, China would probably choose to invade Taiwan. If China believes that America will intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, China could be tempted to strike Taiwan and U.S. regional forces during the PLA’s bombing campaign opening salvo simultaneously. The goal would be to compel Taiwan to start a reunification process on Beijing terms by bombing the island into submission while reducing the reaction capacity of U.S. regional forces. Regardless of whether China would strike the U.S., China is unlikely to make limited use of force. Therefore, the incentives favor massive use of force and escalation – if force must ever be used – to solve the Taiwan question on Beijing’s terms. Faced with a fait accompli, Washington would choose between incurring tremendous costs to break China’s blockade and expel it from Taiwan or back down. Hence, the U.S.'s goal is to ensure that China does not conclude that force is preferable to the status quo nor that a fait accompli is possible. But how to achieve such an objective? Making the already extremely high price of forced reunification even higher by implementing a maximalist version of deterrence by denial strategy (strategic clarity and enhanced U.S. forward presence) is one option. Keeping the current strategic ambiguity and stepping up Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities is another, while striking a grand bargain with China or abandoning Taiwan to whatever faith is awaiting it are in the realm of possibilities too. ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? – Panel 1 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-1/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Chair: Andrea Lane (Defence Research and Development Canada) James Lee (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Panel 1 - Is a Great Power War for Taiwan Inevitable? Chair: Andrea Lane (Defence Research and Development Canada)  James Lee (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Charles Parton (Council on Geostrategy) Bonnie Glaser (German Marshall Fund of the United States) Cleo Paskal (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? – Student Panel URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-student-panel/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Chair and discussant : Justin Massie (UQAM) Maxandre Fortier (UQAM)Rémy Carugati (Université Laval), Camille Raymond (UQAM), Émile... note: this video contains untranslated english and french audio. Chair and discussant : Justin Massie (UQAM) Maxandre Fortier (UQAM) Rémy Carugati (Université Laval) Camille Raymond (UQAM) Émile Lambert-Deslandes (Queen’s University) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? – Panel 2 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-2/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Chair and Discussant: Justin Massie (UQAM) Steven Jackson (Indiana University of Pennsylvania), Hyon Joo Yoo (Hankuk University of Foreign... Panel 2 - How Are Allies Handling the Taiwan Question? Chair and Discussant: Justin Massie (UQAM) Steven Jackson (Indiana University of Pennsylvania) Hyon Joo Yoo (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) John Blaxland (Australian National University) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? Panel 3 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-3/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Chair and Discussant: Guy St-Jacques (Institut d’études international de Montréal) Derek Grossman (RAND Corporation)... Panel 3 - How Are Partners Handling the Taiwan Question? Chair and Discussant: Guy St-Jacques (Institut d’études international de Montréal) Derek Grossman (RAND Corporation) Sana Hashmi (Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation) Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? Panel 4 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-4/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > What Lessons Are Allies Drawing From Ukraine for Taiwan? Chair and Discussant: Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Charles-Philippe David... What Lessons Are Allies Drawing From Ukraine for Taiwan?  Chair and Discussant: Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Charles-Philippe David (UQAM) Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer (IRSEM) Tereza Novotna (Free University Berlin) Gaëlle Rivard-Piché (Defence Research and Development Canada) ## Israel/Hamas: Strategic Surprise and the October 7th Attack URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/israel-hamas-strategic-surprise-and-the-october-7th-attack/ Modified: 2024-12-05 > Israel and Hamas - October 7, 2023 is a day marked by the launch of Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” against Israel by a coalition of terrorist... “... surprise therefore becomes the means of acquiring superiority... When it succeeds, it sows confusion and breaks the enemy's courage” - Carl von Clausewitz October 7, 2023 is a day marked by the launch of Operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” against Israel by a coalition of terrorist organizations led by the Hamas armed forces in the Gaza Strip. This attack on the Jewish territories and populations of Israel is one of the largest terrorist attacks organized by a non-state group against a territory and its people. After several months now, no fewer than 1,200 people have died in the attack, both civilians and soldiers, and to date almost 150 Israelis are still prisoners, making this event a tragedy that many compared to the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States or the November 13, 2015 attacks in France. And if we consider the consequences of this attack, we can count several tens of thousands of civilian deaths among the Gazan population as a result of the Israeli response. The events of that day brought the notion of strategic surprise back to the fore. This concept assumes that, in order to gain a strategic advantage over one's adversary, one undertakes an action that the latter did not anticipate, and which will thus advance one's own strategy. This notion, very often used in the military sphere, has undergone a semantic shift in recent years, and in particular since September 11, 2001, to the effect that it can be used by transnational combat groups outside state-sponsored military conflicts. The best-known examples of traditional strategic surprise are Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and the Egyptian offensive at the start of the Yom Kippur War. In its new definition, strategic surprise can be observed in the September 11 attacks and now in the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. From the point of view of the perpetrator, a strategic surprise is a successful action while from the point of view of the victim, it is a failure of its defence organization. Without neglecting the conditions of success of the strategic surprise, which required a great deal of meticulous preparation on the part of its perpetrators, it is interesting to consider the strategic surprise from the other point of view, i.e., to examine what errors, shortcomings or flaws in a country's defence structure transformed an attack, however significant, into a strategic surprise. Following this logic, this piece will look more specifically at the errors committed by the entity concerned by this surprise and examine a large number of factors such as the atomization of information, the lack of coordination, the presence of cognitive biases, and the important place of technology in security structures. If a strategic surprise has taken place, it means that organizational or political elements have created this surprise. In this case, it is precisely the disparity of the means and forces involved, as well as the technologies deployed, that makes this aspect particularly significant. These include “failures” in the Israeli defense system, both structural (information gathering) and cognitive (information comprehension). Following this logic, we can now turn our attention to the events of October 7. Intelligence structure: the problem of fragmentation and coordination From a structural point of view, one of the major factors behind the surprise was the problem of the atomization of intelligence and the inherent lack of coordination between surveillance and intelligence institutions. Since 1948, Israel has multiplied its defense services, which today include a large number of bodies, each with its own role and its own intelligence service. There are five main ones, such as the ISA (Israel Security Agency or Shin Bet), the Mossad, and the regular army (Israel Defence Force or Tsahal). On a purely theoretical level, these organizations have their own specialties, such as border surveillance, internal or external surveillance, and should work together. However, this increased specialization and atomization of intelligence means that, for example, the ISA only works on human intelligence (HUMINT) and military intelligence (AMAM under the jurisdiction of the Israeli army) only deals with signals and visual intelligence (SIGINT).  This dichotomy leads to a form of competition between intelligence centers, having a de facto impact on Israel's ability to anticipate crises and respond appropriately. In the same vein, Israel's absolute confidence in and growing dependence on electronic means of communication has also been a burden. Hamas, aware of this weakness, succeeded in keeping Israel in a state of total limbo by destroying its communications and targeting those responsible for monitoring Gaza on the border. As a result, the country suffered the full brunt of the attack without being able to react adequately, to such an extent that Israeli fighter planes took several hours to take off where, under normal circumstances, it takes them only a few minutes to arrive on target. In this way, Hamas disrupted the military's communication system with Tel Aviv and prevented a coordinated response from the armed forces, allowing them only to take disorganized, ad hoc action. Cognitive bias and negligence In terms of anticipating events, the Israeli services demonstrated a lack of understanding, if not a certain negligence, regarding Hamas's plans. It has been revealed that Israeli state intelligence agencies had been informed of Hamas's attack plan a year earlier. However, despite monitoring the region, the country's security personnel did not consider such a large-scale attack plausible. Yet there were many signs that such an operation was being planned, such as military exercises recreating areas of Israeli territory, and propaganda videos showing Hamas forces training. Despite all this, the Israeli security hierarchy failed to take any notice. What is more, the many experts who examined these plans all concluded that such an action seemed unfeasible by an armed force such as Hamas. Indeed, the scale of the operation and Hamas' ambitions seemed totally out of place. For the vast majority of them, the only possibility of an attack by Hamas would have been an operation on a much smaller scale, more in keeping with those it had carried out in the past, and which the security services could easily dismantle. Hamas' logistical and military capabilities were underestimated, and its ability to carry out an attack of this scale was entirely overlooked. It should also be noted that, in its surveillance strategy, Israel has left Hamas a great deal of room for manoeuvre. For a number of years, the intelligence services had been increasingly neglecting human and open-source intelligence, in favor of digital intelligence. Hamas has taken advantage of this to slip under the Israeli radar by cutting off all digital communication, so as to reveal only the bare minimum of information. Misled by overconfidence, Israeli forces ignored direct signals of a potential attack and warnings issued by border personnel in the week preceding the attack. Several weak signals were detected, such as suspicious border movements or abnormal air activity. The last alerts issued by the security services date back to just a few hours before the attack, yet meetings were postponed until the following morning, even though the operation began at 6am. In addition to the internal alerts, international alerts were issued by Egypt and the United States, announcing the imminence of a major operation, without being able to specify its timing. Other factors in the surprise? Among the other elements that had a major impact on the success of Hamas's strategic surprise was the fact that Gaza's border surveillance is largely dependent on technology. Several billion dollars have been invested in a new high-tech surveillance system which, in principle, guarantees the impassability of the wall, reinforcing the idea of Israel as an impregnable fortress. The conviction that if anyone tried to cross the border by any means, they would be detected and eliminated long before they succeeded in their deed, disarmed the vigilance of the military. It should also be noted that all automatic defence systems were based on electronic systems, including communications, so that in the event of a network problem, the entire border defence system would be null and void. By cutting off all digital systems and destroying the telecoms, Hamas annihilated Israel's entire defence system. Ultimately, the surprise lies not only in the mistakes made by the Israeli services, but also in the success of the strategy pursued by Hamas for several years. In Israel's eyes, the organization had managed to position itself as a rational political player with whom dialogue persisted, to the point where agreements had been reached on the reception of Gazan workers in Israel. In this way, Hamas was able to cover its tracks and “put the Israeli state to sleep” in order to carry out its attack. Whether it was the elaboration, meticulous preparation and implementation of a large-scale military operation leaving no room for error, or the knowledge and exploitation of its adversary's weaknesses, Hamas pulled off a major strategic surprise. What lessons can we learn from strategic surprise? Is it possible not to fall victim to strategic surprise? In theory, it is possible to completely eliminate the surprise effect, but in practice it is almost impossible. Too many factors come into play, as in the case studied, where a multitude of causes ensured that the surprise played out to the full. Anticipation therefore lies in the ability to minimize the risk of being taken by surprise by improving the coordination of security institutions, without giving way to counter-productive competition in a completely atomized intelligence field. It is also imperative not to underestimate one's adversary, not to fall into the trap of cognitive bias, and to produce a rational assessment of one's adversary that is as perfect as possible. Finally, technology is an essential element, but it must not be a source of dependency, and the importance of human and open-source intelligence must not be overlooked if adequate surveillance is to be achieved. In conclusion, the surprise that gripped the State of Israel, its government, army, and population that day was clearly linked to the many flaws in a system that was supposed to be invincible. Israel's entire strategy was turned upside down by the radical shift in the regional balance of power due to organizational and structural shortcomings. It is likely that with increased communication and a non-competitive intelligence environment, an ability to overcome or at least reduce the presence of cognitive biases without forsaking human and open-source intelligence, then Israel would have been able to react accordingly and not suffer the full force of the surprise. Strategic surprise is not only linked to the mistakes of one side, but also to the success of the other. Although the Israeli defense system showed a number of shortcomings which, taken together, were major elements of the surprise, Hamas's ability to carry out such a large-scale attack should not be overlooked. But while surprise creates a stupefying effect at the moment of its occurrence, it must also be considered that it is highly risky if used without a plan. In other words, you have to consider your adversary's foreseeable reaction and be prepared to strike back. Despite this reversal of relations on October 7, Israel proved resilient in the face of the attack, rekindling - not without controversy - a seemingly dormant regional conflict. ## Italy and the Russo-Ukrainian War: Strategic Continuity or the Impact of Populist Tensions? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/italy-and-the-war-in-ukraine-strategic-continuity-or-the-impact-of-populist-tensions/ Modified: 2025-01-13 > Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 caught many Italian political leaders off guard, including Giorgia Meloni... (Italy and the Russo-Ukrainian War: Strategic Continuity or the Impact of Populist Tensions? - Nicolas-François Perron) Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 caught many Italian political leaders off guard, including Giorgia Meloni, who has served as President of the Council of Ministers since October 2022 and leads the national-conservative, far-right Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) party. At a summit in 2023, approximately 18 months after the conflict began, Meloni openly acknowledged this: “In 2014, the magnitude of the situation was not fully grasped in the West, and we may have hoped that Moscow’s imperialist expansionism would stop there. We were wrong, and it is important to recognize that.” Since February 2022, Italy has taken significant diplomatic, humanitarian, and military measures to support Ukraine. In terms of bilateral military aid, Italy now ranks 12th globally, with contributions amounting to €1.34 billion (CAD 2.01 billion). However, in terms of heavy military assistance, it rises to 7th place with €0.84 billion (CAD 1.26 billion), notably due to the deliveries of 155 mm/152 mm howitzers, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), and an advanced surface-to-air missile system (NASAMS). For some analysts, Italy’s stance on the Ukraine conflict appears complex and challenging to fully comprehend. On the one hand, Italian public opinion is sometimes seen as more sympathetic toward Russia than other Western nations, and it would be influenced by historical, cultural, and economic ties that have fostered a more cooperative relationship between Rome and Moscow. On the other hand, the rise of pro-Russian populism within the government since 2018 has added to this complexity. Parties such as Matteo Salvini's Lega have maintained institutional and political ties with Vladimir Putin’s party in Russia. Despite Italy’s military aid being relatively less significant than that of other countries, Rome’s strong condemnation of the Russian invasion reportedly surprised Moscow, signalling a shift in Italy’s posture toward Russia. How, then, can Italy's military support for Ukraine be interpreted? This article identifies three factors explaining Italy’s stance. Firstly, Italy frames its military engagement in Eastern Europe and its support for Ukraine within a broader perspective of European and transatlantic security architecture. Thus, Rome adopts a comprehensive approach to its military involvement as a middle power. Secondly, the role of Russia in Italian strategic thinking should be relativized. Despite historical, economic, and personal ties, Russia is not central to Italy’s strategic vision. Faced with significant structural changes, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, Italy is as reluctant as its allies to pursue cooperation with Moscow. Finally, Italian populism has had a less decisive influence on defence policy than might have been expected. This is partly due to internal and external systemic pressures, as well as the evolution of Italian populism and the gradual normalization of its political movements since 2019. The Enlarged Mediterranean and Italy's Euro-Atlantic Defence Posture After World War II, Italy’s national interests were deeply shaped by the emergence of a political elite divided between a socialist left and a Catholic right. Both ideological currents shared a common opposition to war and the use of force in resolving international conflicts. This pacifism grew stronger after 1945 amidst a challenging process of de-fascistization and a reduction in Italy’s defence industrial capabilities. The influence of external actors, notably through the 1947 Peace Treaty signed between Italy and the Allies, also contributed to this trend. This peaceful orientation was institutionalized in Article 11 of the 1947 Constitution, which rejects using war as a political tool while promoting cooperation with international organizations to establish a world order based on peace and justice. During this period, Italy adopted a relatively limited role on the global stage. With the end of the Cold War, Italy’s defence posture took a new direction. Starting in the 1990s, the country became significantly more active globally, increasing its external engagements and significantly boosting the number of Italian soldiers deployed in crisis management, stabilization, and peacekeeping operations. Italy’s postwar strategic posture is based on three core pillars: (1) European integration and multilateralism, primarily within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU); (2) transatlantic relations, particularly strategic and military cooperation with the United States; and (3) the Enlarged Mediterranean, considered a zone of strategic interest due to Italy’s role as a crossroads between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. The institutional framework of NATO is a fundamental element of Italy’s Euro-Atlantic engagement. Italy’s commitment to NATO transcends internal political divisions. As described by Coticchia and Vignoli, despite changes in government, Italy has consistently prioritized participation in NATO-led missions. Since the end of the Cold War, Italy has progressively established itself as a security provider within the organization, actively participating in various NATO operations, including in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Due to its strategic geographical location, Italy plays a key role in implementing NATO’s Mediterranean strategy. Since the second half of the 2010s, Italy has refocused its external engagements toward the Enlarged Mediterranean region, gradually shifting away from its interventions in the Middle East initiated in the early 2000s. This strategic readjustment is reflected in Italy prioritizing the Balkans, the Sahel, and North Africa. This shift was solidified by the publication of the 2015 White Paper on International Security and Defence, which reaffirmed the Euro-Mediterranean region as a strategic priority for Italy’s defence institutions, enjoying broad bipartisan consensus. Consequently, despite major geopolitical events in the East, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Enlarged Mediterranean remains at the core of Italy’s strategic priorities. Indeed, nearly half of Italy’s military commitments are concentrated in this region. Recent strategic documents, such as the 2022 Mediterranean Security and Defence Strategy, describe the Mediterranean as “once again at the center of the international stage” and a “pillar for strengthening Italy’s role on the global stage.” Former Defence Minister Lorenzo Guerini (2019–2022) emphasized the region’s importance, stating that the objective is to “promote a more nuanced analysis of crises, recognizing the southern region as an integral part of global dynamics, impacting practically all areas.” This reflects Italy’s intention to reposition the Mediterranean at the heart of global issues, representing both a strategic shift toward addressing instability in North Africa and the Sahel and a cautious use of force focusing on capacity-building missions to tackle terrorism and illegal migration in the region. On the operational level, Italy seeks to position itself as a key security actor within NATO in cooperation with its southern European allies. This positioning aims to ensure regional security and to link Mediterranean geopolitics with European security through a comprehensive security architecture. In other words, while NATO’s center of gravity shifts toward the North and East due to the Russo-Ukrainian War, and as the Alliance integrates Sweden and Finland, Italy aims to demonstrate its commitment within this European security architecture as a middle power. The goal is to strengthen ties between these strategic regions to maximize European and Italian security through a comprehensive approach that integrates the geopolitical dimensions of Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, President Sergio Mattarella reaffirmed this stance by stating that “Russian aggression in Ukraine has further highlighted the geopolitical continuity and strategic importance of Italy’s and Europe’s relations with the Enlarged Mediterranean basin and the African continent as a whole, which has been particularly affected by the repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.” Rome-Moscow Axis to Be Contextualized In political and academic circles working on Italian foreign and defence policy, the idea of historical relations between Italy and Russia holds significant weight. During the Cold War, the importance of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its ties to Moscow shaped bilateral diplomatic relations. For instance, during the Berlin Crisis in 1961, despite Rome's clear Atlanticist stance, Italy sought to play a mediating role between the West and the USSR. Today, these ties are reflected in a convergence of strategic interests, important interpersonal relationships, Italy’s energy dependence, and an ideological affinity with a Russia perceived as “conservative” or “traditional” by some nationalist and conservative parties in Italy. This relationship would have facilitated dialogue and cooperation between the two countries. Firstly, as a middle power in a shifting strategic environment following the end of the Cold War, Italy reportedly sought to position itself as a “mediator” between Russia and the United States. In doing so, and in line with the behaviour typical of a middle power, it aimed to maintain its military and cultural alignment with the West while simultaneously preserving economic and energy ties with Russia. According to others, Italy sought to counterbalance NATO’s eastward shift towards Eastern Europe and Russia since 2014, instead emphasizing threats from Southern Europe, such as transnational migration and terrorism. In this way, Italy aimed to mitigate the threat posed by Russia to Europe. Italy’s Prime Minister during the 2000s, Silvio Berlusconi, reportedly sought to embody a bridge between Rome and Moscow through close personal ties with his counterpart, Vladimir Putin. For the Italian leader, Italy had a role to play in building a bridge between the two former rivals. Berlusconi was not the only Italian head of government to directly impact relations between the two countries. According to Fabrizio Coticchia and Jason Davidson, Matteo Renzi, who served as Prime Minister between 2014 and 2016, attempted to adopt a more conciliatory stance toward Russia during the Crimea crisis, allegedly driven by electoral considerations. Others point to a longstanding tradition of friendly cultural ties between the two states, as well as shared strategic affinities and inclinations. When tensions between Russia and the West arose in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea, many observers highlighted that Italy’s dependence on Russian gas limited the Italian government’s room for maneuver. As a result, economic, trade, and energy relations between the two countries would also encourage a more conciliatory stance from Rome toward Russia in the context of international tensions. Advocates of this argument point to the Italian government’s stance on sanctions at the outset of the large-scale invasion in February 2022 as evidence of this ambivalence. From the beginning of the invasion, Mario Draghi’s government supported the EU’s economic and trade sanctions against Moscow but initially refused to include Russian gas exports. Finally, there appears to be a certain appeal toward a “conservative” and “traditional” Russia among the conservative right in Europe, including in Italy. For instance, Matteo Salvini, leader of the Lega party, shared with Vladimir Putin an affinity for certain Christian and conservative values, as well as a preference for an autocratic posture. Salvini envisioned political stability through a law-and-order policy, emphasizing patriotism in contrast to globalization. This stance is similar to that of Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s Prime Minister since October 2022, who stated in 2021 that Russia defended “European values and Christian identity.” Although Italy-Russia relations are sometimes framed as complex, it is important to nuance the idea that these relations systematically lead to a more conciliatory and favourable stance toward Russia compared to other European and Western states. Gabriele Natalizia and Mara Morini argue that relations between Italy and Russia evolve depending on the stability of the international order. When this order is stable, Italy tends to adopt a cooperative stance toward Russia, but tensions are more likely to arise during periods of instability. As former Italian ambassador to Russia Sergio Romano explained, the relationship between the two states is not a deep, sincere partnership but rather a mutual attempt to secure shared benefits through alliances of convenience. On various issues in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans, Italian strategic interests directly clash with Russia’s. Thus, although Rome has historically cultivated economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow, its commitments to NATO and the EU, combined with Russia's authoritarian turn, have limited its room for maneuver, leading to a stronger alignment with the Western camp. Consequently, relations between Italy and Russia are not inherently more cooperative than those between other European states and Russia. This is further demonstrated by Fabio Battanin in 2012 through a historiography of Italy-Russia relations, which highlighted that, in reality, other European states maintain closer ties with Moscow. Limits of Populism and Italy’s Defensive Stance From the 1990s to the mid-2010s, Italian defence policy and military interventions were marked by broad bipartisan consensus. Moreover, whether combat operations or not, all military interventions were systematically framed as “peace missions,” a rhetoric supported by major political parties regardless of the operational context. However, the latter half of the 2010s saw the rise of populist parties, often anti-establishment, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration, or pro-Russian, partly due to an ideological attraction to alternatives to liberal democracy. These parties proposed platforms that diverged from traditional positions, both in domestic and foreign policy. In Italy, several political movements led to the formation of populist governments starting in 2018. The first was the Conte I Government, which lasted from June 2018 to September 2019. It was followed by the Conte II Government from September 2019 to February 2021 and then by the Draghi Government, in office from February 2021 to October 2022. Since October 2022, the country has been led by Giorgia Meloni. During these different periods, these coalitions expressed divergent positions regarding NATO, the EU, Russia, and its own defence policy, thus breaking with the bipartisan consensus that had prevailed between 1990 and 2015 — at least rhetorically. Within these coalitions, two populist parties played a central role: the Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle - M5S), an anti-establishment, catch-all party, and the Lega (League), a right-wing nationalist populist party. The M5S participated in all these coalitions, except for the one formed by Meloni in 2022, while the League did not participate in the Conte II Government. Initially advocating for an “exit from NATO,” the M5S shifted its position in 2017, instead calling for an “adjustment of the Atlantic Alliance to the new multilateral context,” emphasizing a strictly defensive approach to its activities. The party also opposed certain NATO missions and the storage of American nuclear weapons on Italian soil. The League, for its part, has long maintained close ties with Russia, as evidenced by the signing of an agreement with Vladimir Putin's United Russia party in 2017, despite allegations of corruption surrounding these relations. However, the League has adopted more clearly pro-Atlanticist positions while acknowledging the pragmatic need to maintain diplomatic relations with Russia. In his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte supported lifting international sanctions against Russia while reaffirming Italy’s commitment to NATO and the need for reforms within the organization. At the 2018 G7 summit in La Malbaie, he was the only leader to back U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal to reintegrate Russia into the group, aiming to recreate the G8. However, while the Conte I and II governments are often labelled “populist,” they upheld Italy’s membership in NATO, with the United States as its principal ally, while seeking to preserve economic relations with Russia. In terms of defence, Italy has nonetheless continued to support initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). According to Cladi and Locatelli, Italy's defence posture has remained remarkably stable due to systemic internal pressures and the need to ensure consensus among various influential groups. As a result, the Conte I and II governments had only a limited impact on Italy’s position regarding transatlantic or European relations. The arrival of Mario Draghi, a technocratic figure outside the populist parties, at the head of the government marked a shift toward more Europhile and pro-Atlantic positions. This ended the period of populist governance, signalling a return to Italy’s traditional orientations. Under his leadership, Italian foreign policy refocused on European integration and strengthening transatlantic relations, representing a clear break from the Conte era. Draghi prioritized multilateralism, European solidarity, and enhanced cooperation with key partners such as Germany and France. He also recalibrated Italy’s relations with Russia and China, aligning the country with more critical positions toward these two powers. Aware of the growing danger of an invasion from the fall of 2021, Draghi maintained until the beginning of the invasion that the EU should continue to engage in dialogue with President Putin. Thus, in the weeks leading up to the invasion of Ukraine, Draghi remained moderately optimistic about the possibility of a negotiated solution to the crisis, while Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio, a prominent figure in the M5S, refrained from explicitly condemning Putin's actions. True to Italy’s approach in past crises involving Russia, the country officially criticized Moscow, which aligns with the positions of the United States and the EU, while advocating for a moderate approach focused on dialogue rather than direct confrontation. From the outset of the conflict, the Draghi government supported Ukraine, even providing heavy weaponry for its fight against Russia. At that point, it firmly reiterated Italy’s commitment to the Euro-Atlantic framework. The government consistently emphasized the importance of continuing to support Ukraine by all available means, stressing that the provision of arms was essential to enable Ukrainians to defend themselves effectively. For his part, President Mattarella underscored the importance of unconditional support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, asserting that Italy, alongside its European allies, had a responsibility to contribute to the security and stability of the European continent. Thus, the rise of populism in Italy from 2018 onward has had only a limited impact on Italy’s defence posture. This return to a more traditional stance can be observed with the rise to power of Giorgia Meloni in October 2022. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Fratelli d’Italia party advocated improving relations with Russia while maintaining a pro-Atlanticist position. Meloni and her party had praised Vladimir Putin’s 2018 electoral victories and his defence of Western values, adopting sovereignist and Eurosceptic positions. However, since the invasion, the new Prime Minister has firmly supported military aid to Ukraine, stating that “those who support Ukraine, including militarily, are working for peace” and demanding that Russia end its occupation. She has thus reiterated Italy’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, particularly on the military front. At the NATO summit in Vilnius, Meloni emphasized that “the unity of the Atlantic Alliance […] to defend international law and common security is also the best way to protect our citizens.” Furthermore, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated that “the West is united […] we will support Ukraine until a just peace is achieved.” For Meloni, a lasting peace must include security guarantees for Ukraine, given Russia’s repeated violations of its commitments. She affirmed the “full support of the Italian government for the Ukrainian authorities […] until a durable and comprehensive peace is achieved.” FdI and Giorgia Meloni appear to be undergoing a gradual transformation, moving away from their radical and anti-establishment positions toward a form of governance more integrated within European and transatlantic institutions. Since Meloni came to power in 2022, the party has adopted a stance that, while remaining firmly conservative, protectionist, and nationalist, seeks to soften the populist elements that previously defined it. This evolution suggests an attempt at political “normalization,” a trend often observed in radical right-wing parties seeking greater legitimacy on the international stage and among the national electorate. In this sense, Fratelli d’Italia seems to align itself more closely with a conservative right-wing ideology rather than being associated with fascist positions, responding to an electorate seeking stability and continuity within established frameworks. This reflects not only a desire to maintain strong ties with the EU and transatlantic allies but also to meet the expectations of a conservative voter base while integrating into more traditional institutional mechanisms. Public opinion must also be taken into account. As demonstrated by Fabio Bordignon, Ilvo Diamanti, and Fabio Turato in a recent article, the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War significantly impacted Italians’ trust in the United States and Russia. Across all parties, whether left-wing, right-wing, or populist, there has been an increase in trust toward the United States and a significant decline in trust toward Russia. Moreover, the dissemination of images depicting the violence of the Russo-Ukrainian War appears to have shifted perceptions of political actors in Italy. The Stability of its Defence Policy Although Italy has historically maintained ambivalent relations with Russia, the Russo-Ukrainian War has highlighted a strategic continuity characterized by a strong Euro-Atlanticist commitment. The influence of populism on Italy’s defence policy has proven more limited than expected, largely due to internal institutional pressures, external geopolitical dynamics, and voter expectations. Rome has aligned itself with its European partners and NATO, firmly condemning Russian aggression while providing significant military support to Ukraine. This position, reiterated by Giorgia Meloni and her government, reflects a pragmatic adaptation by Italian political forces. Italy thus continues to play its role as a middle power, committed to ensuring stability within the European security architecture while safeguarding its strategic interests in the broader Mediterranean region. However, more than thirty months after the onset of the large-scale invasion, the growing domestic costs of the war could increase pressure for a diplomatic solution, potentially at the expense of unconditional military support. ## Japan is Back, Again? Takaichi’s Security Strategy Put to the Test of Regional Recomposition URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/japan-is-back-again-takaichis-security-strategy-put-to-the-test-of-regional-recomposition/ Modified: 2026-10-22 “The status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a nuclear-weapon state has been consolidated irreversibly and permanently.” With these words, spoken by Kim Jong-un at the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party on 23 February 2026, North Korea cemented the permanence of its nuclear arsenal. By defying every mechanism arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Pyongyang is abandoning any further negotiations on denuclearisation. A clear setback for Sanae Takaichi, the new Japanese Prime Minister elected in October 2025. Her policy speech, delivered three days before the North Korean announcement, had nonetheless given significant weight to the nuclear disarmament of the peninsula. Alongside it figured the usual suspects of Japanese security documents: Russia and its dispute over the Kuril Islands, as well as China, the great regional rival. While these three threats are nothing new to Japan’s political elites, the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party reveals the major challenge Sanae Takaichi must meet to ensure national security. North Korea now fully embraces its status as a nuclear power, partly because it no longer faces the same diplomatic constraints once imposed by Russia and China, its two great neighbours, themselves nuclear-armed. The regional balance in East Asia is undergoing a profound reconfiguration, to the detriment of a Japan increasingly encircled by threats that tend to converge into a systemic challenge. Takaichi’s response nevertheless seems misaligned. It sharpens the break with the Yoshida doctrine, which relied on the American security guarantee and constitutional pacifism, but her securitizing discourse remains marked by a strong China-centrism. Her public affirmation of the link between Japanese security and a Taiwan contingency is proof of this. The supermajority obtained in February 2026 nonetheless gives her the means to act, but against which threats, and within which alliance systems? This is the question this analysis takes up, by examining to what extent the China-centred securitization pursued by the Takaichi administration, that is, the process by which a social and public issue is transformed within the political space into a security issue justifying exceptional measures, constitutes a coherent response to the regional security challenges Japan faces. Rethinking regional threats: a new administration. Successive Japanese administrations have inherited the same regional rivals for several decades. The Russo-Japanese dispute over the Kuril Islands has fuelled tensions since 1945. North Korea’s nuclearisation, for its part, has threatened the peninsula since its first test in 2006. Japan’s main competitor in East Asia nevertheless remains China, the two powers being bound by a centuries-old rivalry. The invasion of Manchuria and the bacteriological experiments conducted there, as well as the Nanjing massacre, have indeed fed anti-Japanese rhetoric, subsequently institutionalised by the Chinese Communist Party. Takaichi inherits these historical tensions: the regional security environment is not in Japan’s favour, as it is on cold terms with three of its main neighbours. However, while these threats have long been treated as distinct challenges, they are today undergoing a structural recomposition: the growing strategic alignment between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. The 2020s have seen a dynamic of convergence flourish between their leaders, brought together by their anti-hegemonic interests. The three powers have multiplied bilateral meetings, culminating in a joint appearance in Beijing in September 2025, on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japan. On the military side, China reaffirmed its ties with North Korea by renewing in 2021 the mutual defence treaty signed sixty years earlier. The Russian and North Korean governments established a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement in 2024, materialised by the dispatch of North Korean troops to the Ukrainian front. The impact of these developments is not to be overlooked by Japan, a major ally of the West. The irreversibility of North Korea’s nuclear status illustrates this strategic isolation. The front advocating North Korean denuclearisation has crumbled in recent years, starting with Russia, which has abandoned all “denuclearisation rhetoric”. In 2024, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov indeed declared that the question of North Korea’s nuclear status is closed. The People’s Republic of China is aligning in a more discreet manner, removing any mention of a possible denuclearisation from its White Paper on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The subject was moreover not mentioned during President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Pyongyang in June 2026. Beijing nevertheless appears to be playing a double game: two weeks before that visit, the Chinese president hosted Donald Trump at a bilateral summit. According to a White House statement, the two leaders reportedly “confirmed their shared goal of the denuclearisation of North Korea”, a claim neither confirmed nor denied by the Chinese government. This silence reveals a deliberate priority. It is the alliance with Pyongyang that constitutes Beijing’s fundamental interest, whereas denuclearisation is merely a rhetorical concession made to Washington. In short, China refuses to officially shift its position on North Korea for fear of alienating this partner, even as Pyongyang is pursuing a significant rapprochement with Moscow. North Korea’s geographical position makes it a space of strategic importance for Beijing: by separating China from South Korea, where American forces are stationed, it acts as a buffer zone. It would be unwelcome to see such a critical point tip into the exclusive orbit of a rival power, and alignment, at least in practice, with Kim Jong-un remains necessary. The American position is, likewise, shot through with contradictory imperatives. The United States has indeed offered Japan its extended deterrence capabilities since the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty. As the cornerstone of this transpacific relationship, denuclearization must be defended by Washington, whose commitment was reaffirmed last March following a visit by Takaichi to the White House. But Donald Trump has at the same time signalled his openness to a diplomatic rapprochement with Kim Jong-un, even as Pyongyang makes any substantial diplomatic normalisation conditional on recognition of its nuclear status. Japan thus finds itself in a position of asymmetric vulnerability. The parallel agendas of China and the United States erode the credibility of the denuclearization front. These frictions introduce enough uncertainty to complicate Takaichi’s strategic calculations, but nevertheless open up space to undertake a deep recomposition of Japan’s security approach. Securitizing to act: Takaichi, a discursive turning point? Whereas Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy adopted a more interconnected reading of regional threats, Takaichi reorients the discourse, refocusing Japanese securitization on its Chinese neighbour. In her addresses to the Diet, the Japanese Prime Minister has indeed emphasized the destabilising role of the People’s Republic of China in the sub-region. She warns against China’s desire “to intensify its unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion”. Japan is bearing the brunt: in 2025, the PRC stepped up maritime harassment operations in the East China Sea. The coast guard presence in the disputed area around the Senkaku Islands was maintained for 357 days. The use of Type-055 destroyers has also intensified in waters neighbouring Japan. Between 25 June and 1 July, Japan’s Ministry of Defense recorded ten movements of Chinese warships through Japanese straits, including the transit of the Type-055 destroyer Nanchang through the Osumi Strait. This focus on Chinese power is characteristic of the Prime Minister’s rhetoric; she has publicly defended the centrality of the Taiwan issue since 2021, even before her election to the leadership of the LDP. It is not, however, her creation: identifying China as the principal regional competitor and challenger of the international liberal order is in line with her predecessors. The 2022 National Security Strategy of Japan, drafted under Kishida, contributed greatly to making China a central object of contemporary Japanese security concerns. China was identified there as “the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan”. Sanae Takaichi nonetheless dared to break with Japan’s traditional “strategic ambiguity”. In a statement to the Diet on 7 November 2025, she asserted that a Chinese use of military force against Taiwan would, as it stood, constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for the country. Such a scenario would allow the Japanese authorities to invoke the 2015 legal mechanism authorising military action in the name of the principle of collective self-defence. Standing up to China with a degree of frankness rarely reached, the Takaichi administration continued in this vein by removing from its Diplomatic Bluebook the description of “most important bilateral relationship” previously attached to the People’s Republic of China. Takaichi’s rhetoric thus contrasts with that of her predecessors. She places China back at the centre of Japanese concerns and publicly identifies it as a direct threat to national integrity. But the Prime Minister does not stop there: unlike her predecessors, she now holds the political levers to turn her positions into actionable programmes. Since the February 2026 elections, the LDP has held a supermajority. With more than two-thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives, the party can bypass certain blockages in the House of Councillors. This favourable situation comes with a phase of realignment among allies which, once again, suits Takaichi. The Komeito party, which entered a formal coalition with the LDP in 1999, has historically maintained privileged channels of dialogue with Beijing. It had until now acted as a buffer between the two powers and had contributed to improving their bilateral relations. The breakup of this coalition opened the way for the Nippon Ishin no Kai party, more in tune with Sanae Takaichi’s hardened position. She thus has the institutional power to turn the securitization of China into concrete security policy: the new government has already raised the defence budget to 8,800 billion yen for 2026, and announced a revision of the three security documents by December. However, while waiting to be able to carry out these structural reforms, Takaichi is refocusing on the Indo-Pacific, a sphere of Japanese influence she intends to reassert. Diplomacy and security: Japan’s response in the Indo-Pacific. True to her former mentor, Shinzo Abe, the Prime Minister wishes to bring the slogan “Japan is back” back into fashion. For Sanae Takaichi, diplomacy and regional security form a tandem crucial to preserving Japanese sovereignty. The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy, an Abe legacy aimed at guaranteeing regional stability, is the main instrument of this. In her speech to the Diet on 20 February 2026, the Prime Minister stated that the FOIP must continue to evolve, with cooperation making the region “stronger and more prosperous”5: it thus regains its function as a geopolitical counterweight to Beijing. To this end, Takaichi wishes to reaffirm the place of the Quad, the quadrilateral coordination forum and pillar of the FOIP, which mobilises three regional powers (India, Australia and Japan) alongside Washington. Its reliability has nonetheless been called into question since the start of Donald Trump’s second term, under which no leaders’ summit has yet taken place. This is one of the weak points of Japan’s alliance architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Although successive governments have worked to diversify their partnerships, they remain too centred on the United States. The “Indo-Pacific triads” – that is, the US-ROK-Japan, US-Japan-Australia and US-Japan-Philippines alliances – all include the superpower, which, given the American president’s erratic foreign policy, is not always able to ensure credible deterrence. Thus, despite a discourse marked by multilateral engagement, the Takaichi administration must for the time being rely mainly on its bilateral advances. Japan has strengthened its relations with two regional actors: Australia and the Philippines. Australian-Japanese cooperation, already formalized since the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, continues to deepen under Takaichi. On 18 April 2026, the two powers deepened their military cooperation by signing the Mogami agreement, the first major export contract for lethal arms since the new Japanese administration lifted the ban.  This progress continued in May with a summit between Takaichi and Albanese at which two “Joint Statements” were signed organizing bilateral cooperation on security, defence and economic protection. Faced with Chinese restrictions on rare earth exports and refined critical minerals, on which both countries depend, the pair is committed to securing their supply chains. The relationship with the Philippines fits into this China-oriented dynamic. The continuing Scarborough Shoal dispute indeed fuels tensions between the two countries: China still refuses to submit to the 2016 international tribunal’s arbitration ruling in favour of the Philippines. The Philippines strengthened military cooperation with the Takaichi administration by signing the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) on 15 January 2026. It adds to the Reciprocal Access Agreement, an accord promoting military cooperation by facilitating the exchange of military supplies. While Japan has found in Australia and the Philippines two allies sharing the same view of Chinese activities in the Indo-Pacific, Takaichi must also deal with a more reluctant power. South Korea, however, also faces the existential threat posed by Pyongyang, which moreover regards it as its priority target. North Korean denuclearization was in fact defined as the common agenda of the two leaders at their summit in Nara in January 2026. The urgency of the situation outweighs historical disagreements: Takaichi’s conservative character, notably marked by her visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Class A war criminals, has not prevented cooperation from continuing. It is indeed China that represents the main obstacle to this bilateral understanding. As Seoul’s leading trading partner, Beijing is able to exert considerable economic pressure on Seoul. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung thus follows the Minjoo Party’s cautious line, refusing any openly anti-Chinese position that could prove costly. South Korea indeed paid the price of its dependence in 2017. By accepting the deployment of the American THAAD missile defence system on its soil, Seoul suffered a massive campaign of economic retaliation: tourism boycotts, trade restrictions, and pressure on Korean companies present in Chinese territory. Thus, if Japan’s alliance system is designed to contain Chinese influence, China is also able to limit its reach, or even hamper its functioning. The Japanese Prime Minister is fully aware of this Chinese coercive power, an issue she securitized in her speeches to the Diet. The limits of Japanese power materialize precisely at this level. Japan cannot create a system hermetically sealed from Chinese authority, nor can it limit the rival system of understandings in the same way. The Japanese Prime Minister does not even contemplate the possibility: the growing rapprochement between Beijing, Pyongyang and Moscow escapes her securitization. This is why Russia does not appear as a point of interest within Indo-Pacific alliances. Its activities there are nonetheless not negligible: between 2019 and 2025, ten joint patrols between Russia and China took place around the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea and the Pacific. Russian activity is admittedly not concentrated in the region, all the more so as the Ukrainian conflict absorbs the vast majority of its resources. However, the real danger Moscow poses to Japan and its Indo-Pacific architecture is not military. Russia is in fact the binder of the progressive rapprochement between China and North Korea; not by design, but as an externality. By intensifying its cooperation with Pyongyang, Moscow fuelled Beijing’s concerns: letting Russia become Kim Jong-un’s privileged interlocutor would amount to ceding a fundamental geostrategic lever. It is this silent competition for diplomatic privilege that has pushed China to redouble its efforts. Xi Jinping now positions himself as the nexus of this triple convergence, as shown by his recent bilateral summits with the Russian and North Korean presidents. Thus, although Japan’s Indo-Pacific diplomatic strategy is not devoid of coherence, Takaichi’s differentiated securitisation does not allow this second-order effect to be perceived. While Russia shows no direct hostile intent towards Japan, it significantly affects the regional balance of power. This shortcoming in Japanese strategy is all the more worrying as it is compounded by a weakening of the American guarantee, in place for decades. Between dependence and diversification: transpacific alliances. Since 8 September 1951 and the signing of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the alliance with the United States has been the foundation of Japanese military strategy. This bond endures under Takaichi, who regards it as the “cornerstone of Japan’s foreign and security policy”  in her policy speech to the Diet. Its apparent robustness was illustrated at the summits of October 2025  and March 2026, from which emerged a commitment to strengthen diplomatic, defence and economic cooperation. On the military front, the United States has installed a Typhon missile launcher system on the Japanese archipelago, capable of striking targets deep within the region. Donald Trump’s recent postures nonetheless betray a weakening of this bond in favour of sometimes contrary interests. First, the American president’s desire to secure a favourable trade deal with China leads him to be more cautious in his dealings with the Takaichi administration. He had expressed no support for the Prime Minister following the Chinese pressure caused by the diplomatic crisis of 7 November. Second, the American disengagement, or at least its commitment to other theatres, is a direct consequence of Donald Trump’s foreign policy. The 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Strategy indeed refocus American attention on the “Western Hemisphere”. China remains a major concern, but its activity in the Indo-Pacific is no longer the central matrix of American strategy. The absence of a Quad leaders’ summit since 2024 and the decline in political momentum within the various trilateral architectures linking Japan and the United States are symptoms of this. The same goes for the transactional American diplomacy of “burden sharing”, which exerts considerable pressure on Japanese finances. The 2025 US-Japan trade agreement provides for a gradual investment of 550 billion dollars in the American economy, even as Japan itself faces significant domestic constraints. The US-Japan relationship is nonetheless not under threat of rupture. Its robustness was illustrated on 31 July 2026, when the American and Japanese Treasuries carried out a joint operation to prop up the yen, an operation welcomed by President Donald Trump, who stated that the United States would “always be there for Japan”. The weakening, however noticeable, of the US-Japan relationship contributes to the reconfiguration of strategic balances in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, the Takaichi administration, like many Asian partners, must fear being relegated to the status of an adjustment variable in the Sino-American rivalry. This development forces Tokyo into a strategic autonomy of unprecedented scale since the establishment of the Yoshida doctrine. The Prime Minister is aware of this recomposition and is pursuing, accordingly, the diversification of her system of strategic partnerships. Takaichi is turning her gaze across the Pacific Ocean. She has encouraged a deepening of security relations with Canada, framed since the 2010 Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Policy, Peace and Security. Takaichi and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney met on 6 March 2026, a summit at the end of which the Japan-Canada Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was established. Its first pillar emphasises strengthening security and defence cooperation, in response to the “growing complexity of security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region”. The two states had already signed, on 27 January 2026, the Defence Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement (DETA), which establishes a legal framework for the transfer of equipment with a view to joint projects. To this are added the mechanisms provided for in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, notably an enhanced bilateral dialogue with the Cyber Policy Dialogue and the Economic Security Dialogue, which aim to improve intelligence sharing and make supply networks more resilient in the face of attempts at economic coercion in the region. The rapprochement with Ottawa cannot, however, offset Washington’s relative disengagement. Canada has neither the power projection capabilities nor the extended deterrence of the United States, and itself remains dependent on the United States for its defence. The Strategic Partnership nonetheless responds to real interests: China and Japan are respectively Canada’s second and fifth largest trading partners, and Asian countries’ demand for critical minerals fuels its exports. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, focused on promoting peace, resilience and strengthening supply chains, is moreover compatible with the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific championed by successive Japanese administrations. The motivations differ, but the logic is the same. Both states seek to reduce their dependence on the United States, in security terms for Japan and in economic terms for Canada, which remains overexposed to trade with its neighbour. The resilience of a network of partners cannot, however, be measured by its diversity alone, but also depends on its coherence and operational capacity. If Takaichi sets out to reposition Japan as a central actor in the Indo-Pacific, the ability of its security architecture to respond to the growing convergence of rival powers remains uncertain. Ultimately, it is probably on the terrain of domestic politics that Japan’s response to the regional recomposition will be decided. The revision of the three documents, scheduled for December 2026, will in this respect be a decisive test for the Takaichi administration. It will make it possible to assess whether pressure from the regional environment is sufficient to strengthen Japan’s military autonomy, despite budgetary constraints and a public opinion still marked by the pacifist legacy of the post-war era. If successful, this revision would pave the way for the amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution, an objective set by Takaichi for spring 2027. The Self-Defence Forces could thus be fully constitutionalized, removing the last legal ambiguities that hold back Japanese military autonomy. The task is nonetheless not without obstacles: Takaichi must still find sufficient support in the upper house and win over a divided public. Domestic politics will now have to turn into capability what securitization has identified and what the regional recomposition has made urgent. Image Credit: Cabinet Public Affairs Office, via Wikimedia Commons. ## Keeping Canadian Policy Promises: Addressing the Myanmar Crisis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/keeping-canadian-policy-promises-addressing-the-myanmar-crisis/ Modified: 2026-07-09 In its November 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Canada identified rising violence in Myanmar following the 2021 military coup d’état as one of the most significant threats to regional peace and prosperity. Positioning itself as an active and engaged partner in the Indo-Pacific, Canada vowed to promote peace, resilience, and security within the region as a strategic objective. Canada also promised to pay particular attention to its engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Finally, the Strategy affirmed that Canada will implement its Rohingya Strategy, contributing to the alleviation of the Rohingya refugee crisis. Yet, as of writing, Canada has not appointed a Special Envoy on the Rohingya and Myanmar crises as promised. Despite acknowledging the Myanmar crisis as a serious security threat to the Indo-Pacific region, Canada failed to discuss this crisis in detail, let alone offer a comprehensive response in its Indo-Pacific Strategy. The lacklustre response to the war in Myanmar undermines Canada’s commitment to Indo-Pacific peace and security. Canada thus needs to take concrete action addressing the Myanmar crisis to establish itself as a credible ally to the region. Background Context  On February 1, 2021, the Burmese military junta overthrew the democratically elected civilian government of Myanmar and detained President Win Myint along with the country’s de facto leader and Nobel laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta, officially known as the State Administration Council (SAC), is led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for perpetrating the Rohingya Genocide in 2017. The Burmese military launched genocidal attacks against the Rohingya population, a Muslim minority group in Myanmar, including mass killings, rape, and arson, forcing many to flee their homes. Many of the forcibly displaced individuals now live in the world’s largest refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar district of neighbouring Bangladesh, another Indo-Pacific country. The 2021 coup d’état installed the perpetrators of these crimes against humanity as the ruling authorities of Myanmar. The coup violently thwarted the budding Southeast Asian democracy into a protracted civil war. In its immediate aftermath, many citizens expressed their dissent against the military regime through peaceful protests and asked for support from the international community using the hashtag #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar on social media. However, when peaceful protesters bore the brunt of a lethal crackdown, a parallel and interim government was formed in April 2021. This government, called the National Unity Government (NUG) of Myanmar, is one of the main players in Myanmar’s ongoing struggle for democracy. Today, the NUG features the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) as armed units under its command participating in militant resistance against the SAC across the country. Other prominent actors fighting against the military regime include Ethnic Revolutionary Organizations (EROs), the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) that has brought together striking students and civil servants, and pro-democracy activists in Myanmar and the diaspora. A common goal of these different actors within this broad movement, also known as the Spring Revolution, is to overthrow the junta and to rebuild Myanmar as an inclusive federal democracy. War in Myanmar: Security Consequences There is no conflict without repercussions, and the war in Myanmar is no exception. Four years of protracted political violence and civil war have resulted in an intensifying immigration crisis that endangers the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The number of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and stateless persons in and from Myanmar has risen from 2.6 million in 2021 to 5.1 million in 2024. Bangladesh, India, and Thailand bear much of the burden of this immigration crisis. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), this number is projected to reach a total of 6.8 million people by the end of 2025, a whopping 1.7 million jump from 2024. Contributing to this alarming displacement trend and increased insecurity in the region is the extent of violence that Myanmar’s military inflicts on its own civilian population. Myanmar is ranked third globally on the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) list of countries with the most fatalities resulting from political violence in 2024, immediately behind Ukraine and Palestine. It is also the second most dangerous and violent place in the world, according to ACLED’s Conflict Index 2024. Between February 2021 and December 2024, 74,951 people died because of war and political violence in Myanmar. As of March 19, 2025, documentary evidence indicates that the junta has killed 1,474 women and 737 children and arrested 5,971 women and 598 children. 170 death penalties were imposed on pro-democracy activists and their civilian supporters. In addition, the junta has been inhumanely bombing schools and universities. Since the military coup in 2021, more than 170 educational institutions have been targeted, especially in air strikes, intentionally killing many children and youths. Past and Present Canadian Policies on Myanmar  Canadian policymakers and practitioners have previously considered the consequences of political violence in Myanmar and its resulting immigration crisis in the context of Canadian foreign policy. In 2017, Ambassador Bob Rae was appointed Special Envoy to Myanmar, leading Canadian diplomatic efforts to help resolve the Rohingya crisis. The first phase of Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and Bangladesh was launched in 2018 based on the recommendations provided by Ambassador Rae in his 2018 report. In the second phase of Canada’s Strategy to respond to the Rohingya and Myanmar crises (2021-2024), the Government of Canada acknowledged that there is a need for sustained engagement and additional support to help with new challenges that have emerged after the 2021 coup. The second phase of the Strategy lists four key objectives: (i) support at-risk and crisis-affected populations in Myanmar and Bangladesh, particularly Rohingya refugees, internally displaced persons, and impacted host communities; (ii) intensify efforts to advance an inclusive and sustainable peace in Myanmar; (iii) target support to advance the restoration of democratic rule in Myanmar; and (iv) increase pressure on malign actors, including through continued pursuit of accountability for human rights violations. Canada has also vowed to increase international cooperation, including through the appointment of a Special Envoy, to achieve these objectives. Gap in the Canadian Policy Response Despite understanding the war in Myanmar and its consequences as a real security threat that affects the Indo-Pacific region, Canada’s promises remain unfulfilled. Not outlining specific action items about how Canada would address the Myanmar crisis and its resulting immigration crisis in the Indo-Pacific Strategy suggests that Canada might have been giving lip service to communities in Myanmar it intends to help. Adding salt to the wound is the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s mention that Canada will fully implement the second phase of its Rohingya Strategy, which concluded in December 2024. However, as of March 2025, there has been no appointment of a Special Envoy on the Rohingya and Myanmar crises. When asked about the appointment of a Special Envoy in November 2024, a Global Affairs Canada representative responded that there was no expectation that a special envoy would be immediately named. Regarding international cooperation to address the Myanmar crisis, Canada has reiterated its support for the ASEAN’s efforts to resolve the humanitarian situation in Myanmar. However, merely following ASEAN’s lead and backing its inefficient policy efforts does not suffice, as ASEAN has not only continued but also increased its engagement with the junta despite its war crimes. The implementation of ASEAN’s five-point consensus, a road map established in April 2021 for peace in Myanmar backed by Canada, has failed in the face of regime intransigence. Thus, Canada needs to explore additional ways to address the Myanmar crisis through diplomatic channels beyond bilateral Canadian-ASEAN relations to support peacebuilding in Myanmar, a goal outlined in the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Why Canada Should Step Up in Its Response to Myanmar A possible reason for the gap in Canadian policy response to Myanmar is the small size of the Myanmar diaspora in Canada. After all, there are only 9,235 immigrants from Myanmar in Canada, according to the 2021 Census. To echo the Asia Pacific Foundation (APF), there seems to be a disparity in the Canadian resettlement of people fleeing violent conflicts worldwide, as 298,128 Ukrainian nationals have arrived in Canada between March 17, 2022, and April 1, 2024. In contrast, the number of refugees resettled in Canada from non-Western countries remains much lower, with 44,620 refugees admitted through the Syrian refugee resettlement initiative, 55,195 Afghan nationals arriving in Canada after the 2021 Taliban takeover, and a total of only 5,675 refugees from Myanmar residing in Canada as of 2021. What is surprising is that only 1,000 Rohingya refugees have been resettled in Canada since 2006, a very low figure considering Canadian policymakers tend to highlight how committed they are to assisting Rohingya refugees quite often. With recent funding reductions from the United States, humanitarian aid efforts for Rohingya refugees are in jeopardy. The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres' recent visit to Cox's Bazar highlights the direness of the immigration crisis, and Canada needs to follow through on its promises to provide additional support to the Rohingya refugees in accordance with emerging challenges. Rohingya advocates remain frustrated as they see little impact from the purported Canadian funds allocated for displacement support, compounded with having no Special Envoy. Canada’s increased attention to Myanmar is becoming more critical now than ever following recent political and policy changes in the United States under the Trump administration. President Trump is considering a visa ban that is similar to the one implemented under his first presidency. Myanmar was affected by his first visa ban and will likely be impacted again if the second goes into effect. President Trump has also blocked $45 million that funds the Development and Inclusive Scholarship Program through which marginalized students from Myanmar are enrolled in universities across Asia. These changes in U.S. foreign policy concerning Myanmar mean that the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designated to Myanmar nationals under the Biden administration is unlikely to be renewed after it expires in November 2025. These changes also present an excellent opportunity for Canada to fill the North American leadership gap in the Myanmar crisis and reaffirm Canadian commitment to human rights, peace, and prosperity in Myanmar and the Indo-Pacific region. Policy Recommendations Appoint a Special Envoy to Myanmar as Promised Canada must appoint a Special Envoy to Myanmar as soon as possible who will actively build on Ambassador Bob Rae’s work and legacy. Having a Special Envoy dedicated to the war in Myanmar and the resulting immigration crisis will cement Canada’s role as an ally committed to better human rights and sustained stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The Special Envoy can also serve as a bridge between Canadian practitioners unfamiliar with what is happening at the frontlines in Myanmar and the marginalized populations Canada has promised to help. Implement Localization in Humanitarian Aid Practices To support communities affected by the war in Myanmar more effectively, Canada needs to take their lead in deciding how to distribute humanitarian aid. Priority must be given to small local organizations working directly with grassroots populations in Myanmar and the border regions rather than large international organizations and agencies that charge exorbitant overhead. There is also a need for transparency regarding how Canadian aid is distributed to build trust between Canadian policymakers and the communities they aim to support. Collaborate with Leaders and Civil Society in the ASEAN Member States Canada should work closely with leaders and civil society in ASEAN member states to address the war in Myanmar. This recommendation aligns with Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy as it will increase engagement between Canada and different ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries that Canada should prioritize in its diplomatic efforts to alleviate the Myanmar crisis are Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, as they host most refugees and asylum seekers in Southeast Asia.   ## Keynote – The impact of the US elections on transatlantic dynamics URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/keynote-the-impact-of-the-us-elections-on-transatlantic-dynamics/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Keynote lecture - The impact of the US elections on transatlantic dynamics with Prof. Martial Foucault, Director of IRSEM Opening: Pr. Julian Fernandez and Pr. Justin Massie, Management Committee, Le Rubicon Dr. Philippe Perchoc, Head of IRSEM Europe Keynote lecture - The impact of the US elections on transatlantic dynamics: Prof. Martial Foucault, Director of IRSEM ## Keynote Speaker – December 10, 2020: Lieutenant-General M. N. Rouleau (Department of National Defence) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/keynote-speaker-december-10-2020-lieutenant-general-m-n-rouleau-department-of-national-defence/ Modified: 2021-02-17 > Born on the 4th of July 1967 into a military family, Lieutenant General M.N. (Mike) Rouleau grew up in various locations including Montreal, Quebec City, Quetta Pakistan and Ottawa before joining the military in 1985. He retired from the CAF in 1999 to serve as an Ottawa Police Service emergency response officer until 2002, when he re-enrolled as a result of the events of 9/11. Lieutenant General Rouleau has commanded at every level, including deployed Task Forces and teams in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Africa.Lieutenant-General Rouleau was appointed as the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff on July 15, 2020. Keynote Speaker at the annual colloquium “The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada“, December 10-11, 2020. Lieutenant-General M. N. Rouleau, CMM, MSC, CD (Department of National Defence) Born on the 4th of July 1967 into a military family, Lieutenant General M.N. (Mike) Rouleau grew up in various locations including Montreal, Quebec City, Quetta Pakistan and Ottawa before joining the military in 1985. He retired from the CAF in 1999 to serve as an Ottawa Police Service emergency response officer until 2002, when he re-enrolled as a result of the events of 9/11. Lieutenant General Rouleau has commanded at every level, including deployed Task Forces and teams in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Africa. Lieutenant-General Rouleau was appointed as the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff on July 15, 2020. ## KEYNOTE SPEAKER – Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/keynote-speaker/ Modified: 2021-05-17 > Keynote Speaker : Daniel Jean, former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada Keynote Speaker at the “Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World – Non-American Perspectives“ Conference - May 6, 2021 Daniel Jean, former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada ## Keynote Speaker – Kerry Buck URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/keynote-speaker-kerry-buck/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > Kerry Buck was most recently Assistant Secretary to the Treasury Board, Economic Sector, from 2018 to 2021. Prior to that, she was Canada’s.. Kerry Buck was most recently Assistant Secretary to the Treasury Board, Economic Sector, from 2018 to 2021. Prior to that, she was Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to NATO from 2015 to 2018. Ms. Buck is a career diplomat who was Political Director and Assistant Deputy Minister for International Security and Political Affairs, and served in Assistant Deputy Minister positions on Afghanistan, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Director General for the Middle East and Maghreb. Earlier in her career she was posted to the Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. Ms. Buck led Canadian government Task Forces for Afghanistan, Russia/Ukraine, Syria, Mali, the Haiti earthquake and other foreign policy and humanitarian crises. Throughout her diplomatic career, she supported Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers at the G7 and NATO Summits and represented Canada at the UN, G7, NATO, OAS and OSCE on issues of human rights, security, disarmament, terrorism and humanitarian affairs. She represented Canada on international negotiation of Women, Peace and Security issues from 1992 to 2018, helping build international law and practice on combating gender-based violence. moderated by: Charlotte Duval-Lantoine (Ottawa Operations Manager and Fellow, CGAI) ## Keynote Speaker – The War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and the Future Political Settlement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/ Modified: 2023-03-08 > Watch the keynote speaker, Michael Kofman from the Center for Naval Analyses speak at the Ukraine Conference on Feb. 24, 2023 Keynote Speaker: Michael Kofman – Center for Naval Analyses ## Keynote Speaker – December 11, 2020: Marina Henke (Hertie School) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/keynote-speaker-december-11-2020-marina-henke-hertie-school/ Modified: 2021-03-02 > Marina Henke (Hertie School): Keynote Speaker at the annual colloquium “The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada“ December 10-11, 2020. Keynote Speaker at the annual colloquium “The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada“, December 10-11, 2020. Marina Henke (Hertie School) Marina Henke is Associate Professor at Northwestern University, Professor of International Relations at the Hertie School and Director of the Centre for International Security. She researches and publishes on military interventions, peacekeeping, and European security and defense policy. Before joining the Hertie School, she was a Lecturer at Princeton University and Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Henke holds a PhD in Politics and Public Policy from Princeton University. Her academic work has been published in International Security, Security Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Strategic Studies, International Peacekeeping, Providing for Peacekeeping, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, and Conflict Management and Peace Science among others. She is also the author of Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019). ​ ## KEYNOTE SPEECH – Canada in Afghanistan: A Political Assessment URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/keynote-speech-canada-in-afghanistan/ Modified: 2022-01-28 The End of the Afghanistan War: Its Impact on NATO and Great Power Rivalries -Keynote Speaker: Ben Rowswell Canada in Afghanistan: A Political Assessment ## L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/lautonomie-strategique-du-canada-au-21e-siecle/ Modified: 2026-09-29 L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle Évènement de lancement du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 3.0 Dans un contexte marqué par la compétition entre grandes puissances, le repli sur soi américain et la volonté du Canada de renforcer ses capacités militaires et industrielles, une question devient incontournable : que signifie réellement l’autonomie stratégique pour le Canada ? Panel 1 - L’autonomie stratégique du Canada : une feuille de route Présentation d’une étude réalisée par Philippe Lagassé et Justin Massie, suivie des commentaires de Siobhan Harty et du LGen (ret.) Yvan Blondin . Animation : Mathieu Carbasse, du journal Le Devoir. Panel 2 - L’autonomie stratégique ailleurs : quels modèles pour le Canada ? Avec Chantal Lavallée, Frédéric Mérand, Jean-François Bélanger, PhD, et Nicolas-François Perron. Animation : Emmanuelle Rousseau. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 14 – MGén Alain Forand, Ancien Colonel du R22R — Ses Mémoires : Entre feu et verglas URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-14-mgen-alain-forand-ancien-colonel-du-r22r-ses-memoires-entre-feu-et-verglas/ Modified: 2026-10-02 > Le marché canadien de la défense offre des occasions importantes aux entreprises d’ici. Mais vouloir y entrer est une chose. Comprendre comment y arriver en est une autre. Le major-général Alain Forand met actuellement la touche finale à ses Mémoires. Et quand on regarde son parcours, on comprend rapidement qu’il y a beaucoup à raconter. Dans cet épisode du Nord Stratégique, il nous parle d'une vie consacrée au métier des armes et au Royal 22e Régiment. Une histoire qui commence avec un petit gars de Farnham, bien loin d’imaginer jusqu’où l’uniforme allait le mener. Nous remontons aux débuts : son entrée dans les Forces armées canadiennes, sa découverte du métier d’officier d’infanterie, ses premières responsabilités et son attachement au Royal 22e Régiment. Puis viennent les opérations et les expériences qui vont progressivement façonner le soldat, l’officier et le commandant. Chypre, d’abord, dans le contexte des grandes missions canadiennes de maintien de la paix. Puis le Sahara occidental. Ensuite la Croatie et les Balkans, alors que les militaires canadiens sont confrontés à une réalité beaucoup plus brutale. Nous abordons également l’Afghanistan, une guerre qui marquera profondément les Forces armées canadiennes et toute une génération de militaires. Même après avoir quitté le service actif, Alain Forand demeurera étroitement lié à l’institution et à son régiment, notamment à travers ses fonctions honoraires. Mais au-delà des opérations et des postes occupés, nous parlons du leadership et du commandement, mais aussi de ce qu’on apprend réellement après des décennies passées avec des soldats. De l’importance des mentors. Des erreurs qui font grandir. Des responsabilités qui viennent avec le grade. De la nécessité de connaître ses gens et de leur donner l’espace nécessaire pour exercer leur propre leadership. Alain Forand revient aussi sur l’évolution de l’Armée canadienne qu’il a connue pendant sa carrière : les différentes générations de soldats, les transformations de l’institution, les périodes plus difficiles et ce qui, malgré tout, demeure fondamental dans le métier militaire. Il y a également dans cette conversation quelque chose de beaucoup plus personnel : l’amour du métier. Pourquoi certaines personnes restent profondément attachées à l’Armée longtemps après avoir quitté l’uniforme. À travers ses souvenirs se dessine finalement le parcours d’un homme qui aura traversé plusieurs époques de l’histoire militaire canadienne. Une longue conversation sur le métier des armes, le leadership, les soldats, les opérations et les leçons apprises. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 10 – Lt-général (ret.) Richard Evraire – Leadership, bilinguisme et une vie au service du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-10-lt-general-ret-richard-evraire-leadership-bilinguisme-et-une-vie-au-service-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et le lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard Evraire discutent sur le métier des armes, le commandement, le français, l’évolution des Forces et les leçons d’une vie passée à servir le Canada. Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard Evraire pour revenir sur une carrière militaire exceptionnelle et, surtout, sur les leçons qu’il en a tirées. Ils discutent de son parcours au sein des Forces armées canadiennes, de son accession aux plus hauts échelons de l’institution et des expériences qui ont façonné sa conception du commandement. Mais cette conversation va bien au-delà de sa carrière. Ils discutent de leadership, des qualités qui distinguent selon lui les grands leaders et de l’importance de l’empathie lorsqu’on commande des hommes et des femmes. Une réflexion particulièrement intéressante à une époque où certains présentent justement l’empathie comme une faiblesse. Ils abordent également un sujet qui lui tient profondément à cœur : le bilinguisme dans les Forces armées canadiennes. Quelle place le français occupe-t-il aujourd’hui dans l’institution? Pourquoi la maîtrise des deux langues officielles constitue-t-elle bien davantage qu’une simple obligation administrative? Et pourquoi le bilinguisme représente-t-il également un véritable atout dans nos relations avec nos alliés? Une conversation sur le métier des armes, le commandement, le français, l’évolution des Forces et les leçons d’une vie passée à servir le Canada. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 3 – Philippe Lagassé – Le système d’acquisition militaire est-il brisé? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-3-philippe-lagasse-le-systeme-dacquisition-militaire-est-il-brise-2/ Modified: 2026-07-08 Le Canada investit des milliards en défense, mais pourquoi les projets prennent-ils autant de temps? Dans cet épisode du Nord Stratégique, le professeur Philippe Lagassé explique les véritables défis du système d'approvisionnement militaire canadien, les contraintes politiques et bureaucratiques, ainsi que les pistes de solution. Une discussion essentielle pour comprendre pourquoi il est si difficile d'équiper rapidement les Forces armées canadiennes. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 4 – Marc Dauphin – la guerre en Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-4-marc-dauphin-la-guerre-en-ukraine-2/ Modified: 2026-07-30 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le Dr Marc Dauphin, médecin militaire, auteur et vétéran des Forces armées canadiennes. Au cours de sa carrière, il a notamment dirigé un hôpital multinational en Afghanistan, ce qui fera l'objet d'un épisode subséquent. Nous faisons ici le point sur la guerre en Ukraine, que Marc suit depuis longtemps. Où en est réellement le conflit? Quelles leçons les armées occidentales doivent-elles tirer de cette guerre? Les drones ont-ils révolutionné le champ de bataille? Que nous dit l'histoire sur les conflits d'aujourd'hui? Et surtout, comment cette guerre pourrait-elle se terminer? Une conversation qui met en perspective les enjeux militaires, stratégiques et géopolitiques du plus important conflit en Europe depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 5 – André Gélinas – Former la police afghane URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-5-andre-gelinas-former-la-police-afghane/ Modified: 2026-09-01 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit André Gélinas, sergent-détective retraité du SPVM et vétéran de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan, qui a participé à la formation de la Police nationale afghane. À travers son expérience sur le terrain, il explique les défis immenses de bâtir une force policière dans un pays en guerre : corruption, analphabétisme, différences culturelles, infiltration des talibans, manque de ressources et difficulté à gagner la confiance de la population. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 6 – Marc Dauphin – Médecin de guerre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-6-marc-dauphin-medecin-de-guerre/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et le Dr Marc Dauphin discutent des réalités de la médecine de guerre. Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le Dr Marc Dauphin, ancien commandant du Role 3 multinational de Kandahar et auteur du livre Médecin de guerre. En 2009, son équipe a traité un nombre sans précédent de blessés graves tout en maintenant un taux de survie de 97 %, un record historique pour un hôpital en zone de guerre. Nous discutons des réalités de la médecine de guerre : les blessures inimaginables, les « mass casualties », le commandement d’une équipe multinationale sous une pression constante, les dilemmes éthiques et le lourd impact psychologique que laisse un tel environnement. Comment soigne-t-on indistinctement des soldats alliés, des civils afghans, des femmes, des enfants et même des combattants ennemis? Comment prend-on les bonnes décisions lorsque les ressources sont limitées et que plusieurs vies sont en jeu simultanément? Un échange captivant sur le courage, le leadership, l'innovation médicale et l'humanité au cœur de l'un des conflits les plus marquants du XXIᵉ siècle. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 7 – Charlotte Duval-Lantoine – Recrutement et rétention URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-7-charlotte-duval-lantoine-recrutement-et-retention/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et Charlotte Duval-Lantoine discutent des problèmes de recrutement et de rétention au sein des Forces. % Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Fellow et vice-présidente aux opérations à l’Institut canadien des affaires mondiales (CGAI), pour une discussion franche sur les problèmes de recrutement et de rétention au sein des Forces. Pourquoi autant de militaires choisissent-ils de partir? Le problème est-il vraiment le recrutement, ou faut-il d’abord s’attaquer aux raisons qui poussent les gens à quitter l’institution? Culture organisationnelle, leadership, conditions de service, attentes des nouvelles générations : nous examinons ce qui doit changer si les Forces veulent reconstruire leurs effectifs. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 8 – André Gélinas – Une vie dans la police URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-8-andre-gelinas-une-vie-dans-la-police/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et André Gélinas discutent sur le métier de policier, ses réalités et son évolution. Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit André Gélinas, policier retraité et analyste bien connu du public québécois, pour une discussion franche sur le métier de policier, ses réalités et son évolution. André revient sur son parcours, sur ce qui l’a amené à choisir cette profession et sur certaines des expériences qui ont marqué sa carrière. Nous discutons également du travail policier tel qu’il se vit sur le terrain, de la relation avec la population, des transformations de la profession et des défis auxquels font face les policiers aujourd’hui. Une conversation sérieuse, mais ponctuée d’anecdotes et de l’humour bien caractéristique d’André Gélinas. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 9 – Charlotte Duval-Lantoine – La culture organisationnelle des Forces URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-9-charlotte-duval-lantoine-la-culture-organisationnelle-des-forces/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et Charlotte Duval-Lantoine discutent sur la culture organisationnelle des Forces armées canadiennes. Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Fellow au Canadian Global Affairs Institute et auteure de The Ones We Let Down: Toxic Leadership Culture and Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces. Leadership, discipline, identité militaire, intégration, normes sociales, changement générationnel, cheveux colorés : nous abordons plusieurs sujets qui divisent et qui soulèvent une question plus fondamentale. Quelle culture militaire voulons-nous pour les FAC de demain? Une discussion animée, parfois en désaccord, mais qui va bien au-delà des slogans et des positions faciles. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép.2 – Thomas Juneau – Iran et Moyen-Orient URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-2-thomas-juneau-iran-et-moyen-orient-2/ Modified: 2026-07-03 La guerre entre Israël, les États-Unis et l'Iran semble prendre fin. Mais les véritables conséquences stratégiques de ce conflit commencent à peine à se faire sentir. Dans cet épisode de Le Nord stratégique, Éric Sauvé reçoit Thomas Juneau, professeur à l'Université d'Ottawa et l'un des plus grands spécialistes canadiens du Moyen-Orient et de l'Iran. Thomas Juneau soutient que cette guerre a constitué une erreur stratégique majeure. Ensemble, nous analysons pourquoi. Au cours de cette conversation, nous abordons notamment : Les leçons militaires et stratégiques du conflit. Les limites de la puissance américaine. L'avenir du régime iranien et des Gardiens de la révolution. Les conséquences pour Israël et les pays du Golfe. Les répercussions sur la sécurité nationale canadienne, la diplomatie et les Forces armées canadiennes. Les grands changements géopolitiques qui pourraient façonner les prochaines années. Une discussion de fond sur l'une des crises internationales les plus importantes de notre époque. ## Le Nord Stratégique, Ép. 1 : Justin Massie, les leçons de l’Ukraine et de l’Iran URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/le-nord-strategique-ep-1-justin-massie-les-lecons-de-lukraine-et-de-liran-2/ Modified: 2026-06-29 Tirons-nous les bonnes leçons des conflits en Ukraine et au Moyen-Orient? Justin Massie, professeur à l'UQAM et directeur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique, répond sans détour. Au programme: Les leçons militaires de la guerre en Ukraine Le conflit Iran-Israël et ce qu'il révèle sur la dissuasion moderne La présence canadienne en Lettonie: sommes-nous à la hauteur? Animé par Éric Sauvé, vétéran des Forces canadiennes et président d'Innovigo. Abonne-toi pour ne pas manquer les prochains épisodes.    ## Leaving the Free-Rider Club: Lessons from Belgium URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/leaving-the-free-rider-club-lessons-from-belgium/ Modified: 2025-05-30 While tensions over unequal burden sharing within NATO are nearly as old as the alliance itself, so-called free-riders have never come under fire as harshly as they have since Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office. During the campaign trail, Trump bluntly stated that Vladimir Putin could “do whatever the hell he wants” with NATO countries that fail to meet their spending commitments. Although he has not repeated the remark since taking office, his administration has made clear that allies must step up and meet their obligations. Importantly, Trump is no longer alone in pressing for increased spending. Allies in Eastern Europe - who feel most directly threatened by Russian aggression - have started echoing this demand. Poland and Estonia, for instance, publicly endorsed the 5% target as early as January 2025. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk captured the frustration pointedly, remarking that  “right now, 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans for protection from 140 million Russians.” Similarly, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has advocated for a new NATO spending target since the start of his tenure, warning that the 2% goal is no longer sufficient to meet the security challenges ahead. As the NATO summit in The Hague approaches, momentum is building for a more ambitious spending target, likely exceeding the current 2% of GDP benchmark. A new 5% threshold is being floated, comprising roughly 3.5% in direct defence spending and another 1.5% for supporting infrastructure and broader security needs. For NATO’s traditional free-riders, the writing is on the wall: defence budgets will need to grow, and fast. But ramping up military spending in such a short timeframe comes with complex political, institutional, and logistical challenges. Belgium, our own country, has begun to take steps in that direction and in doing so, has exposed the kinds of frictions and constraints other countries, like Canada, may soon face. Did the Second Shock Wake Belgium Up? The re-election of Trump marks the second major shock to NATO allies in less than three years. The first came on February 24, 2022, when Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border. That invasion triggered a wave of geopolitical ‘wake-up calls’ and Zeitenwende declarations across Europe. But the shock had uneven effects across the alliance. Countries closest to Russia, many of which were already investing heavily in their militaries, significantly increased their defence budgets. The Baltic states are now aiming to spend 5% of GDP on defence in the near future. Poland boosted its defence spending from 2.7% in 2022 to 4.2% in 2024, with further increases expected. Northern European countries also ramped up investment and began (re)introducing comprehensive ‘total defence’ approaches. At the other end of the spectrum are NATO’s so-called free riders: allies spending only a fraction of their GDP on defence. Many of them made only modest adjustments after Russia’s 2022 aggression against Ukraine, remaining far from the 2% target. Our own country, Belgium, is one of these stubborn free riders. In Belgian policy circles, it is often said that we are ‘the worst student in NATO’s class.’ Despite hosting the Alliance’s headquarters, Belgium has long failed to meet its commitments. Last year, it spent just 1.2% of GDP on defence only a 0.2 percentage point increase from 2022. Moreover, the previous government only aimed to hit NATO’s 2% benchmark by 2035. This left Belgium even trailing behind after other traditional underperformers like Spain, Italy, and Canada, all of which pledged to meet the 2% norm by 2030 at the latest. Clearly, the war in Ukraine didn’t trigger a genuine shift in Belgian defence policy. Perhaps Belgium really was NATO’s “worst student”. But shortly after Trump returned to the Oval Office, Belgium also installed a new government. This coalition pledged to end what Minister of Defence Theo Francken described as a “period of national disgrace.” The coalition agreement initially aimed to reach the 2% target by 2029, pulling the goal forward by six years. Then, in March, the government revised its timeline again, announcing it would already meet the target this year. Was it the change in government that finally spurred Belgium into action? It certainly gave an impulse but is unlikely to be the sole explanation. Three of the four coalition parties were already part of the previous government. The only newcomer is N-VA, a centre-right Flemish nationalist party now holding the defence portfolio. But that is not a decisive break with the past: the N-VA was already in government following the 2014 Wales Summit and even held the defence ministry during a period of declining budgets. Instead, it seems that mounting transatlantic tensions delivered the final push. After all, countries like Spain and Italy have also recently pledged to meet the 2% target this year. Regardless of the precise trigger, Europe’s free-rider club may finally be shrinking. Challenges of Rapidly Increasing Military Spending The Belgian government has committed to reaching NATO’s 2% defence spending norm by the end of this year. While meeting this target may ultimately prove insufficient, it already presents considerable challenges. Those will only intensify if the target is raised further. The first challenge is straightforward: how to sustainably finance increased defence spending? Creating fiscal space is a dilemma faced by every NATO ally when the need for higher defence budgets arises. As we highlighted in a recent Policy Brief for the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, our survey of national security experts across Europe revealed a variety of fiscal strategies. Germany, France, and Poland have primarily turned to debt, a short-term solution that postpones structural decisions. Sweden and the Netherlands have opted for budgetary reallocations, while the Baltic States, facing greater threats, have shown more willingness to raise taxes. Belgium, for its part, has mainly relied on temporary measures to meet the NATO 2% target by 2025. This includes €1.2 billion from taxes on profits from frozen Russian assets held at Euroclear, a one-time €500 million dividend from the state-owned bank Belfius, €125 million by reclassifying existing expenditures as defence-related, and about €2 billion in loans, kept off the regular budget following the European Commission’s decision to loosen up the EU’s fiscal rules.  Relying mainly on short-term stopgap measures, Belgium still faces a structural fiscal challenge. With a large pre-existing budget deficit and a public debt of 107% of GDP, sustaining higher defence spending will require politically painful decisions. Such politically painful decisions will not be easy, given that defence spending has never been a priority for the Belgium public or political elites, mainly because of Belgium’s geopolitical position. Situated at the heart of Europe and surrounded by friendly nations, Belgium feels less exposed to the threat of a resurgent Russia than Eastern European countries. Even now, no consensus exists among governing parties about exceeding the 2% benchmark. Both Flemish and Walloon Christian Democrats appear opposed. The president of the Flemish Christian Democrats has already stated that 2% should be the upper limit, while Walloon Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Prévot wanted to form a “coalition of the unwilling” to resist a NATO target of 3.5% or 5%. A third and often overlooked challenge lies in effectively spending newly allocated defence budgets. Late movers in terms of ramping up defence investment now find themselves at the back of the procurement queue. Others who acted earlier have already secured production slots for critical systems. Countries like Belgium must contend with constraints in defence-industrial capacity, an issue the EU is now beginning to address through ramped-up production and industrial incentives. The Challenges of No Longer Being a Free-Rider: Lessons from Belgium Belgium's recent commitment to meet the 2% benchmark this year underscores both the urgency and the significant challenges involved in rapidly increasing military expenditure. Canada finds itself in a similar position, with limited fiscal space and public debt exceeding 100% of GDP. Achieving and sustaining higher defence spending will necessitate politically difficult decisions - be it through spending cuts, tax increases, or debt-financed investments. In Belgium, structural budgetary choices have largely been postponed. The country has relied on temporary measures to meet the 2% goal. These stopgap solutions may suffice in the short term but sidestep the crucial political conversation about embedding defence spending into long-term budgetary planning. On top of the existing fiscal hurdles, is a lack of strong perceived threats among the general public. This might make it more difficult to sustain public support for increased defence spending. Even when political will and funding align, late adopters like Belgium and Canada encounter practical challenges. Belgium's experience offers valuable lessons: limited fiscal space demands long-term structural planning, public support cannot be assumed, and industrial bottlenecks will not resolve themselves. Shedding the free-rider label involves more than just increasing spending; it's about sustaining it, justifying it, and using it effectively. About the Authors Michelle Haas is a doctoral student at the Institute for International and European Studies in Ghent. Tim Haesebrouck is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for International and European Studies at Ghent University in Belgium. ## Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Between Myths and Confusion URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/lethal-autonomous-weapons-between-myths-and-confusion/ Modified: 2023-08-15 > The rationale developed below focuses on two key aspects related to the issues posed by LAWS: the ambiguity of their definition and the... In May 2023, press reports stated that an artificial intelligence (AI)-controlled drone had killed its own instructor during a test conducted by the US military. Although it was a virtual test with no physical consequences, this event illustrated the potential dangers of this technology. During the test, the AI's objective was to neutralize an enemy defence system, with the human operator having the final approval or disapproval. The AI allegedly realized that the operator's refusal disrupted the accomplishment of his mission and thus targeted him. It should be noted that the US Air Force quickly denied the existence of such a test, emphasizing their commitment to the ethical and responsible use of AI. Whether this story is anecdotal or not, this example shows that defence strategies are constantly evolving, and that the emergence of autonomous weapons equipped with artificial intelligence raises significant concerns. These advancements generate both fantasies and apprehensions about the future of warfare and great power rivalry. In September 2017, during a speech delivered before students in Moscow, President Vladimir Putin declared that the country leading the research on artificial intelligence would become the global leader. This perspective becomes particularly relevant when considering the potential repercussions of using AI in the military domain. Lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), sometimes powered by AI, come in various forms, such as guided missiles, militarized robots, and drones of all sizes. Those drones have the potential to disrupt traditional patterns of warfare by redefining the dynamics of armed conflict through the introduction of new defence tactics and strategies. This use concerns many states and non-governmental organizations since LAWS are distinguished by their ability to select and attack targets without human intervention, as presented by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). However, the definition of LAWS is not universal. Each state adopts its own definition, which may vary in restrictiveness. Professors from the University of Oxford and the Alan Turing Institute have identified 12 definitions of LAWS provided by states or key international actors, based on official documents. Some countries, such as France and the United States,  define LAWS as machines that, once activated, are fully autonomous from humans. The British government specifies in its definition that autonomous systems can understand and interpret human intentions. Thus, the United Kingdom distinguishes itself by emphasizing the intrinsic capabilities of autonomous systems. Finally, some countries, such as Switzerland and the ICRC, focus on the nature of the tasks performed by the machine and the legal implications of autonomous action. According to them, the machine should, at all times, be capable of complying with international humanitarian law (IHL), especially during the targeting process. Therefore, there are divergent approaches from different states and key international actors when it comes to defining lethal autonomous weapons systems. The rationale developed below focuses on two key aspects related to the issues posed by LAWS: the ambiguity of their definition and the inherent challenges in establishing a normative framework. These elements shed light on preconceptions and realities concerning the use of these autonomous weapons, which are often described in the press as  "game changers" (i.e. weapons that can alter the course and dynamics of armed conflict). By extension, as we will see, these concerns raise questions about the role of the human being on the battlefield and the potential for its diminishment. Degree of autonomy and human control The multiple definitions of LAWS are explained by the inherent difficulty in precisely qualifying what autonomy means. Indeed, it is essential to distinguish between functions automated by humans and the independence of artificial intelligence systems from human control. However, the latter – achieving full autonomy – is not the current reality of LAWS. The degree of autonomy is determined by the ability of these weapons to make decisions based on their own (pre-programmed by humans) analysis of the situation. There are several levels of autonomy. For example, the Russian Navy stands out with its P-800 Onik missiles, smaller than the Granit missiles but still equipped with an artificial intelligence system. Thanks to its autonomous "fire and forget" system, this missile could, using satellite guidance, track its target in real-time and adapt its trajectory. According to Russian state media, it may even work in tandem to identify and classify targets before choosing an appropriate attack strategy. Once the main target is destroyed, the remaining missiles could be redirected toward other ships to avoid any duplication of attack. The Onik missiles are not the only autonomous weapons capable of selecting and engaging a target without human intervention, thanks to their programming. Suicide drones like the Turkish Kargu-2 and the Russian KUB are reportedly capable of operating in complete autonomy and independently targeting without human assistance. This asset, perceived as significant by several states, such as the United States and China, has led them to make considerable investments in the development of such autonomous weapons. However, defence companies tend to exaggerate the capabilities of their products, and only "confidential" sources suggest autonomous use of these weapons in the United Nations report on Libya in 2021. In addition to these mobile autonomous weapons, there are also fixed LAWS, such as the South Korean robotic sentinel SG-RA1. This weapon is deployed in the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas. Although it can spot intrusions and fire autonomously, it always sends a firing authorization request to the command post. This choice to retain human control primarily reflects South Korea's ethical consideration, as the technology does have a function that allows it to open fire without human supervision. Therefore, the primary constraint does not lie in the technology itself but rather in a government's willingness to develop or acknowledge the existence of such politically critical technology. It is crucial to differentiate between autonomy and control to avoid considering automation and human control as mutually exclusive concepts: automation can eliminate human intervention but does not render human control impossible. The absence of a normative framework These degrees of autonomy in weapons systems capable of acting without direct human supervision have led certain states, such as Austria, Brazil and Costa Rica, to seek regulation of their use. Autonomous weapons have been developed for more than 30 years, but it is only recently that the first UN commission called for a ban on LAWS until an appropriate normative framework is established. The question, therefore, arises as to whether these current autonomous weapons represent a significant departure from previous developments. It is essential to note that autonomous weapons are not an entirely new concept, as illustrated by landmines or automated missile defence systems. Therefore, autonomy in weapons has already been present in various forms for some time, and some of them are already subject to regulation. For example, the Ottawa Convention has internationally regulated anti-personnel mines since 1997. Thus, over 25 years ago, there was already an awareness of the need to limit weapons independent of human control with this convention. This perspective has been reiterated recently before the European Parliament, the United Nations and the ICRC. The problem with the evolution of autonomous weapons and the lack of regulation lies in two points. Firstly, the diversity of autonomous weapons and their varying degrees of autonomy makes it extremely complex to establish a coherent and effective definition, let alone a normative framework. It is a major challenge that the international community has not yet managed to overcome. Additionally, the current strategic context and geopolitical motivations play a significant role. Some states, notably the United States and Russia, which are developing these systems, have no interest in supporting the development of regulations as they believe they can gain a competitive advantage over their adversaries. This advantage includes more precise attack capabilities, a reduction in human casualties, and improved responsiveness on the battlefield. In this context, these states are reluctant to encourage strict regulation that could restrict their freedom of action and technological edge. LAWS: between myths and realities However, will these autonomous weapons systems revolutionize the terms of warfare? Or will they suffer the same fate as hypersonic weapons, which were expected to bring about a major revolution but have so far turned out to be mainly "press release" weapons? Indeed, one should not believe in the creation of the perfect weapon. LAWS, no matter how revolutionary, have limitations and vulnerabilities. Like any electronic technology, they are susceptible to disruption or neutralization. They will be subject to attacks fron the adversary who could, by taking control of their communication channel, jam or intercept the information or intelligence of the machine. The unpredictable and volatile nature of modern conflicts requires the use of a variety of weapons and strategies to achieve military objectives. Autonomous drones are, therefore, just one more tool in the arsenal of "Air power" available to states. While technological advancements improve the collection and sharing of information on the battlefield, artificial intelligence partly contributes to complicating matters. Among other things, autonomous systems introduce new variables and require constant adaptation. AI, when combined with hypersonic weapons, leads to ultra-fast decision-making, which can result in sudden and risky tactical situations. War, as a human activity, undeniably contains unpredictable factors and ambiguity. Therefore, despite these innovations, there will always be certain limits to the ability to fully see and understand the complex realities of a military scenario. Clausewitz's fog of war merely shifts with the emergence of these new technologies. Strategies overtly reliant on rationality and certainty are simply dangerous in the dynamic and variable environment of war. Should we believe in the reduction of human presence on the battlefield? The increasing use of drones and autonomous weapons raises questions about the future of military operations. Will we witness massive offensives with expeditionary forces, similar to the Normandy landings in 1944, or will we instead see countries be invaded by swarms of drones? In May 2022, China launched its first autonomous navigation drone carrier, the "Zhu Hai Yun." Officially presented as an oceanographic research vessel, its military functions are nevertheless evident. This vessel, which can accommodate up to 50 aerial, surface and underwater drones, becomes a strategic instrument for Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific region. In parallel, Turkey also stands out with the development of  "drone carrier vessels" equipped with Bayraktar TB2 drones. Admittedly, these drone carriers would not be able to participate in high-intensity aerial conflicts where they could not, for example, compete with light aircraft carriers equipped with Japanese or Italian F-35Bs. However, in weakly defended areas, they could change the nature of coastal battles. In this regard, the Bayraktar TB2 has demonstrated its effectiveness in recent months, whether in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh or the Russo-Ukrainian war. However, whether at a distance or on the battlefield, one should not conclude that the individual is being erased. The outcome of a conflict cannot be guaranteed by this technology alone. Indeed, even if the use of autonomous drones can be successful, the occupation of the territory remains an undeniable truth in certain operational contexts, something that LAWS cannot accomplish. Thus, LAWS have a "complementary role to that of combatants." The phases of occupation/stabilization (and, by extension, reconstruction) will always be part of conflicts and will require personnel on the ground. While the desire of any technologically advanced country is to end the war quickly, the outcome of conflicts is never certain and remains a complex political issue. The example of the situation in Ukraine illustrates that the adversary can often arm themselves with the same technologies as their opponent. Thus, even if warfare may evolve into new realms, it is a political problem that is resolved on the ground and requires troops and, therefore, human beings. **** As they are currently the subject of numerous fantasies and attempts at prohibition without a clear establishment of what constitutes a LAWS, these weapons systems will likely continue to have multiple definitions. While governments bear some responsibility for this situation, it also arises from ambiguities and confusion propagated by the media and other international actors. It is also important not to give too much credence to the theories claiming that the LAWS constitute yet another military revolution, relegating, by extension, humans to the rear front or disconnecting them from warfare altogether. The question of whether war is inherently linked to human presence on the battlefield or whether it could be replaced by new technologies finds its ultimate answer in the enlightening words of Colonel Ardant du Picq: "Man is the primary instrument of combat."   -Léa Pérémarty ## Lithuania’s Upcoming EU Council Presidency: Interests, Goals, and Implications URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/lithuanias-upcoming-eu-council-presidency-interests-goals-and-implications/ Modified: 2026-06-01 Lithuania is poised to take the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 January 2027. Although the start date appears many months away, the Baltic country has already begun preparing itself for this key role. Having the presidency offers Lithuania a major opportunity to articulate its strategic vision for Europe as well as to shape the agenda of the European Union (EU), most notably on matters relating to defence policy. After all, Lithuania faces an acute security environment, being sandwiched between the militarized Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and its satellite ally Belarus. The purpose of this piece is to highlight the interests and goals that Lithuania will have for its presidency of the Council of the European Union. To begin with, Lithuania will likely? promote efforts to improve European defence cooperation with special focus on enhancing the European defence industrial base. Though Atlanticist in its basic foreign policy orientation, Lithuania has been developing robust defence ties with Germany. It is an increasingly active player in European defence efforts. Lithuania will also attempt to use the platform of the presidency to galvanize support for Ukraine in its efforts to achieve some sort of military victory in its defensive war against Russia. This piece elaborates on these themes and describes some policy implications for Canada. To preview why the Lithuania’s upcoming presidency matters for Canada, one must bear in mind that Canada provides the military backbone to the Forward Land Forces brigade in neighbouring Latvia as its framework nation. Ottawa has also repeatedly expressed interest in developing closer defence industrial ties with European allies and companies. It is also diplomatically aligned with Lithuania with respect to Russia. Whereas Cyprus currently holds the presidency, with Ireland next in line to take it on 1 July, Canada will find much more in common with Lithuania, with the result being that the opportunities for collaboration should be more extensive. Lithuania as Atlanticist and Europeanist in Defence For six months as of 1 January 2027, Lithuania will have the presidency of the Council of the European Union, the formal body that represents member states’ governments at the EU level. Th presidency of the Council involves chairing most committees and working parties, deciding what is on the agenda in coordination with Ireland and Greece—the two other countries making up the eighteen-month triple-shared presidency—and leads negotiations on behalf of the council with the European Parliament and the Commission. The presidency does not allow the national holder to lead the EU politically nor to set EU foreign policy. It lacks executive authority despite the name and so has no ability to direct the Commission, Parliament, or even the European Council. Indeed, the European Commission is the main executive authority that serves to take a comprehensive European perspective on matters relating to trade as well as the implementation of treaties as well as legislation passed by the European Parliament, the latter of which draws representation from EU citizens. Nevertheless, the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union permits the holder to broker major legislative deals and to shape the long-term priorities on the part of the EU by way of its agenda-setting power. A major theme that one can expect from Lithuania during its presidency will concern European defence cooperation. That Vilnius would promote more European defence cooperation might surprise those observers accustomed to seeing the Baltic country as being loyal to the United States and Atlanticist in its geopolitical orientation. After all, Lithuania participated in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to the chagrin of Western European countries such as France. In addition to its efforts to join the EU, it accorded much importance to its bilateral relationship with the United States to obtain membership in NATO, which Lithuania has regarded as the sine qua non to its own long-term security. Indeed, it was Dalia Grybauskaitė who, as Lithuanian president, insisted that the Alliance finally develop concrete military plans to defend the Baltic countries. Although Lithuania did cut defence spending to less than one percent during the worst of austerity in the Great Recession, it came to prioritize buying U.S. equipment when it began rebuilding its armed forces after Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine and destabilized the Donbas region. Lithuania was the first country to offer lethal military assistance to Ukraine. Lithuania maintained positive relations with the first Trump administration, which respected the Baltic country for its efforts in recapitalizing its military and thus bearing its share of the defence burden. Yet its Atlanticist posture over the years should not obscure how Lithuania has been cultivating tighter defence linkages with more long-standing members of NATO. Though Lithuania hosts a company of U.S. forces and received significant funding through the European Deterrence Initiative, Germany has arguably become Lithuania’s most significant partner. It is easy to see why. Germany not only provides the bulk of the forward allied presence on Lithuanian territory; it also has made that presence de facto permanent in a manner that few would have anticipated when Germany’s Framework Nation status was first announced. Many had expected Germany to interpret narrowly the NATO-Russia Founding as precluding any significant stationing of combat troops on the territories of Moscow’s former satellites and colonies. Yet the establishment of the permanent presence and the necessary infrastructure to support the deployment has defied those early expectations. That Germany has finally assumed more responsibility for European security by way of its own military expenditures has brought about much positivity among Lithuanians regarding this bilateral relationship. Lithuania has also promoted European defence industrial cooperation. In fact, the first, and current, European Commissioner for Defence is the Lithuanian Andrius Kubilius. His mandate is to oversee the European Defence Industrial Strategy and to strengthen EU defence industrial capacity by way of addressing key capability gaps, barriers to military mobility, cultivating a competitive space industry, and identifying EU-wide vulnerabilities against cyber and hybrid threats. In this vein, Lithuania continues to buy from the United States, to be sure, including U.S.-made Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). As of 2025, the State Department reported that “he United States has approximately $640 million worth of active sales cases for U.S.-origin defence articles and services to Lithuania under the Foreign Military Sales program.” However, Vilnius is taking steps to diversify its suppliers and to go about collaborative efforts in procurement as well as in research and development. It participates in the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative to develop an integrated air defence on the continent. The major German defence manufacturer Rheinmetall is building a factory in Lithuania that will produce 155mm artillery ammunition. Lithuania will become the largest foreign operator of French-made CAESAR self-propelled howitzer systems by the end of this decade. Lithuania secured around €1 billion in loans from the European Investment Bank in the last year to support its defence investments for the remainder of this decade, with much of that financing going towards military infrastructure. That Lithuania balances between buying American and engaging in greater intra-European cooperation gives it much credibility across many EU governments. The problem with France, for example, when it enjoins its European allies to buy more European is that the message is often taken to mean to buy more French. Lithuania cannot be accused of such selfishness. Nor is it much like Poland, which has generally preferred to buy as much American as possible, while going about diversification by way of purchases from South Korea. Lithuania’s record is not perfect, of course. Even with the other Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia, much more could be done. Coastal defence remains an ongoing national project, and only recently has Lithuania pursued joint procurement. Still, as the 2025 results of the European Defence Fund indicate, Lithuanian innovators are playing a more visible role in the research and development of European defence technologies, doing much more than their Latvian counterparts but remaining behind their Estonian ones. Of course, Lithuania’s agenda for the presidency goes beyond matters of defence. EU enlargement, particularly with respect to Ukraine and Moldova, and competitiveness are other issues of priority to Lithuania. Nevertheless, in view of a deteriorating security environment, Lithuania is likely to place much emphasis on international security and defence cooperation. Supporting Ukraine, Containing Russia Lithuania ranks as one of Ukraine’s most significant supporters. Aside from being the first NATO country to give it lethal military assistance, Lithuania has pursued some politico-military cooperation by way of its involvement in the trinational brigade with Poland and Ukraine, which has taken part in various military exercises humanitarian operations. Lithuania also participates in the Lublin Triangle with those same two countries while being a strong advocate for Ukraine to join both the EU and NATO. Lithuania’s reasons for supporting Ukraine are straightforward. Both countries have a history of struggling with Russian occupation and domination. In historically similar but hardly identical circumstances, they have had their own aspirations for national autonomy and sovereign independence thwarted by Moscow in the past. Both countries have perceived in Russia a major security threat that must be at least contained, if not defeated outright on the battlefield. If Russia is not trying to seize territory, then it is trying to exert political control, using whatever levers that may be available, whether it is local ethnic ties, energy flows, military deployments, corruption, and other vectors of subversion. Ukraine and Lithuania share an interest in reducing Russia’s ability to extend its autocracy beyond its internationally recognized borders. Supporting Ukraine has become a major feature of the EU’s outward geopolitical orientation. To date, the EU has approved over 190 billion in macro-financial assistance and budget support to state since 2022. Aside from the military aid that member states have given Ukraine on a bilateral basis, the European Peace Facility has financed reimbursements for weapons, ammunition, and training. The EU has lent support for Ukrainian refugees as well as reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure and society. Still, with the EU comprising 27 members, internal disagreements have at times prevented even more aid to the beleaguered country. National leaders friendly towards Russia—as former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán had shown—can use institutional veto powers to obstruct EU financial and military assistance to Ukraine. Lithuania obviously cannot prevent pro-Russian forces shaping the foreign policies of other countries. Member States retain significant latitude in determining their foreign policies and military postures. Even those countries friendly towards Ukraine may feel the temptation to shift their attention inwardly to focus much more on their internal issues. However, Lithuania will use the presidency to revitalize EU support for Ukraine. As foreign minister Kęstutis Budrys noted in an interview with the Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, “ is natural that questions arise about how long this support will be needed, especially as domestic issues overwhelm national agendas in democratic cycles. But we must remind ourselves: even if there is a ceasefire or some form of peace deal, the entire European security architecture will continue to depend on a strong Ukraine.” The Implications for Canada Canada has made a point in the last eighteen months to cultivate ever closer ties with Europe. This intent is manifest in defence policy, where Canada hopes to revitalize its own armed forces in part by accessing EU financial schemes like the Security and Action For Europe (SAFE) regulation and contemplating collaborative projects with European defence firms. The two countries have much more in common than what massive differences in territorial breadth, geographical location, size, and resource endowments would suggest. Canada was one of the first to provide military assistance to post-Maidan Ukraine when many countries within NATO refrained from doing so. Canada has no troop presence in Lithuania, but it does provide the backbone to the Forward Land Forces deployed in neighbouring Latvia. Any major military contingency that involves Lithuania will implicate Latvia. Baltic militaries do exercise with one another and, in so doing, have come to include Ukraine in their activities. Commercial flows between the two countries are tiny, owing to the tyranny of trade gravity. However, in recognition of the growing security importance of Lithuania, Canada upgraded its diplomatic presence in Vilnius to have an embassy there as recently as 2023. If Canada were ever one day be able to develop its own capacity to export liquified natural gas (LNG) to Europe, it will find a buyer in Lithuania since the port city of Klaipėda is home to a major LNG terminal. If nothing else, Canada should attend to how Lithuania is promoting greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe. Both Canada and its European allies are attempting to address major capability gaps while reducing overall reliance on the United States. Rules regarding financing and procurement will limit the extent to which Canadian firms could participate in the development of certain capabilities. Nevertheless, the Canadian forces positioned in Latvia suffer from gaps in terms of artillery and munitions, to say nothing of counter-drone measures. Lithuania is similarly attentive to these vulnerabilities. As such, there may be potential to harness European defence industrial policy to allow local NATO forces to improve their deterrence and war-fighting postures. Canada can meaningfully contribute to broader discussions about capability and defence technology development along the Eastern Flank that Lithuania will surely lead. On the flip side, Lithuania’s occasional frustrations about the pace of defence procurement in Europe should instil Canadian policymakers caution over the prospects for Canada in acquiring European capabilities or co-producing military equipment with European firms. The European defence market has been, and will remain, fragmented and very protectionist. Buying American military hardware was an attractive option because it was also the more reliable option. That calculus may have changed, as of late, given the news that the Trump administration cancelled military orders to foreign buyers, including in Europe. so that it can replenish those stocks that its military campaign against Iran had engendered. Yet the near-term consequence of those cancellations is to increase demand on non-U.S. systems, which in turn may yet create more backlogs as countries start changing queuing lines. Some former Lithuanian lawmakers and producers add that Lithuania has indeed grown too reliant on foreign suppliers, with bureaucratic red tape often penalizing local manufacturers. With a major advocate for Ukraine taking over the presidency in January, Canada has an opportunity to step up its support. Of course, Canada continues to provide aid to Ukraine by way of loan guarantees and other financial instruments to help support the Ukrainian state and to pay for military assistance given via the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List. Yet Lithuania will seek to shift the narrative about Ukraine. For too long, Canada and its European allies have been content to let the United States take the initiative on matters relating to Ukraine, despite, of course, them offering significant support for that country’s EU and NATO aspirations. Rather than simply promising to support Ukraine for ‘as long as it takes’, one can expect Lithuania to push its EU partners to develop a long-term strategy to enable at last Ukrainian victory and to contain a revanchist Russia. Lithuania will use the presidency to articulate a positive strategic vision for Europe and will thus shape the agenda so that Ukraine will be better resourced whatever the thinking du jour is in Washington. Canada will be very welcome in those discussions and so should look to be the robust North American link to those efforts. Image Credit: CC-BY-4.0: © European Union 2023– Source: EP via Flickr. ## Local Aid Workers: The Often-Overlooked Pieces of the Humanitarian Puzzle URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/local-aid-workers-the-often-overlooked-pieces-of-the-humanitarian-puzzle/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This hot take highlights the important and understudied role of local aid workers within aid organizations. Most humanitarian programmes commission aid consultants at various stages of their operationalization to evaluate the efficiency of relevant programme design and implementation. In principle, such consultancy reports are crucial pieces of documents for knowledge retention – although in reality, they can be much contested by the aid professionals who live the everyday humanitarian politics of life. Undoubtedly, aid consultants are important for their valuable expertise that enables them to translate knowledge regarding an aid program to a written language that is accessible for a broader scope of audience both within and outside of the humanitarian sector. They possess the unique investigative, analytical and reporting skills allowing aid organizations to retain the operational lessons they have learned in structured, organized reports that can be shared for the considerable future, for audiences both within and outside the humanitarian aid sector. Aid professionals, in most cases, are not trained for these skills. The paradox, in this case, is that an overwhelming majority of aid consultancy reports were written by expat consultants who, although undoubtedly knowledgeable, nonetheless come from outside the crisis environment. They do not possess one crucial type of information – the detailed, continuous and up-to-date knowledge on the operational challenges and successes of the aid programs since their initial conception. On the other hand, local aid workers – having had years of frontline experience in facilitating their programs – possess this knowledge. In turn, a consultant needs to hold exceptional humility and willingness to learn from local aid workers in order to produce a useful report. The Expatriate Disconnect In general, most expat humanitarian professionals are unlikely to remain in one mission for an extensive period of time. Their contracts are often short-term, predominantly a few months to a year, meaning that turnover amongst expat aid workers can often be frequent. It is not uncommon that expatriate professionals arrive in a new country programme without familiarity towards local geographical, social and political dimensions. Similarly, expat consultants stay in the field for a short period of time (from a few weeks to a few months) and collect information through tightly arranged visiting schedules, dashing through different field offices before soon departing to produce the report elsewhere. Within this limited timeframe, they need to commit most of their presence to extensively collaborate and socialize with local aid workers in order to well-perform their own professional function. However, this often is not the case. Séverine Autesserre has long highlighted the exclusivity of expat conflict interveners that distances themselves from their local counterparts. In Peaceland, for example, she details the existence of an “interveners’ circle” in conflict environments reserved for expatriates and “a handful of local elite – usually the significant others of interveners, and sometimes wealthy businessmen, important employees of international agencies, or leaders of prominent local NGOs.” These “circles” are rarely penetrable by working class locals – including local aid workers. In turn, if an aid consultant’s local network resides predominantly in this “circle” – the analytical product that they produce may not contain the valuable, context-specific insights from local staff members. This particular logic can also be applied to understand the positions of other expatriate humanitarian professionals working in different local communities in crises. In her most recent book, The Frontlines of Peace, Autesserre further elaborates this issue in the specific context of peacebuilding, noting that often times, “as far as promotions go, most peacebuilding agencies reward the number of missions completed in different countries rather than the amount of time spent in a particular area.” In addition, she also observes that many “interveners discredit foreigners who stay too long in a specific place... as having ‘gone native’ – implying that they are too immersed in the local culture, and too close to host populations, to effectively carry out their mission.” This mindset has long encouraged the unwarranted discrediting of local expertise and increasing preference for top-down, thematic knowledge – preferred for their generalizability and simplicity in crisis environments that are, in contrast, unique and complex. It is also very likely that most expats would have arrived in “the field” with no local knowledge at least once throughout their professional career. Some expatriate humanitarian professionals disclose this reality through memoirs recounting their field experience: in Emergency Sex, Heidi Postlewait contended that she arrived in her posting as a secretary for the UN Mission in Cambodia while she “didn’t even know where Cambodia was.” Leanne Olson, through A Cruel Paradise, admitted that she “didn’t have a clue about Bosnia” when arriving for her Doctors Without Borders position. In turn, the extent to which expatriate professionals understand local situations can depend on how much they reference the knowledge of local staff in the short term and how well they assimilate to local life to perform their own observations in the long term. The Neglected Local Staff Indeed, humanitarian aid and development organizations are aware of the importance of their local staff members. After all, they know the roads, the community customs, the language and the broader domestic political landscapes that organizations need to navigate through. As Elizabeth Harrison suggests, local knowledge (again, not local staff), have seen increasing appearances amongst the operational narratives of most programmes in crises environments. However, this narrative perpetuates the reason for local staff to serve in non-leadership, support-type positions, focusing on the coordination and implementation of program decisions made by expatriate leadership. Autesserre duly suggests that in today’s peacebuilding landscape, expat professionals still “run the show”: while they largely “interact with political and military leaders, rely on external expertise and resources, and use the same kind of solutions all over the world… they don’t get immersed in complicated local issues or develop in-depth knowledge of the history, politics and cultures of the countries in which they work.” At the same time, Silke Roth notes that many local professionals would have to “train new international team members on a regular basis”, which is concerning when we take into account of Shevchenko and Fox’s observation that local aid workers themselves rarely have access to opportunities of being promoted to leadership positions that expatriate staff often occupy. In fact, Ong and Combinido indicate that even though local professionals are equipped with the mental aptitude in navigating through new and unknown circumstances and living conditions, they still have “limited professional mobility within the global organization.” In many ways, although local professionals are valued for the field-level knowledge that they possess, it does not necessarily translate to them being trusted with making administrative decisions based on their local knowledge to anchor the future trajectories of their organizations in the field. Image credits : Islamic Relief Worldwide The Frontlines of Peace is significant for Autesserre's vivid and hopeful storytelling that reminds readers how peacebuilding has always been a brick-by-brick effort, sustained by people from all walks of lives who share the same aspiration for everyday peace. While a vast amount has been written on planning, structures, and managing things — much less has been written on managing people, the one type of actors at the centre of peacebuilding and humanitarian operationalization. In fact, most of the available relevant literature, in one way or another, possess this particular characteristic, which can potentially be a main reason for their unpopularity amongst local aid workers. By focusing on broad structures and systems, we may have presumed humanitarian aid organizations as unitary actors within a larger scope of structure, discussing aid workers as almost replaceable sources of human expertise. However, in reality, local aid workers are very much unique individuals with their own names, stories and potentials that have long been overlooked and, more importantly, with unparalleled upbringings to foster peace in their home communities that we need to consistently recognize. While aid providers are often assumed to be in a place of relative privilege compared to aid recipients – this perception is brought into question by the presence of local professionals. To different extents, they are also the victim of the exact crises that they are working to relieve (which also puts them in a uniquely advantageous position of understanding the conflict that they live in). In the complex reality of conflict, as we strive to understand the vulnerability of local communities in face of hardship and devise the best way to reach them, we may have forgotten that the local aid workers – who live the everyday politics of delivering life-saving assistance to communities in crisis – are also vulnerable in their own unique ways. Stoddard, Harmer and Haver stress that local humanitarian professionals, while taking on a significant bulk of operational and implementational tasks of aid programmes, are marginally less protected and compensated compared to their international counterparts. In addition, Jackson and Zyck find that they also receive less training, livelihood benefits, security provisions and psychosocial support compared to their expatriate colleagues. For example, Sally Mohsen, a local professional who had worked for Save the Children in Egypt during the Arab Spring, recounted how the agency’s local staff members were exposed to significant security threats due to the fact that they were not able to travel with the NGO-owned vehicles and asked to take public transportation instead. The logistics policy at the time was justified on the basis of funding limitations, but Mohsen detailed that when “one of the international staff would travel would definitely assign a car.” This reality is further demonstrated by the 2019 edition of the Aid Worker Security Report produced by Humanitarian Outcomes, indicating an overwhelming majority of aid worker deaths in the past decade are local staff. Towards a More Local, People-Centered Approach to Humanitarian Aid John F. Mitchell reasonably argues that humanitarianism has been more political than ever before, making aid workers increasingly vulnerable to targeted attacks in conflict environments by local political actors. This means that looking at how programs are designed alone is not enough. In the future, as we continue to learn from new challenges, issues and failures – perhaps it would be beneficial to ask ourselves: have local aid workers been well-supported? Have we, after years of examining the structure of humanitarianism and peacebuilding at large, really recognized the capacity, knowledge and potential of local professionals? There are several corridors through which aid agencies, as well as Canadian donor institutions, can better engage local aid workers in their future humanitarian endeavors. For international aid agencies, it may be beneficial to: Encourage local decision-making. Reduce the frequency of bottom-up reporting and accept that local staff can do more than implementing and supporting aid programs. Embrace ad-hoc and long-term training for local staff members on how to analyse local information for consequent action, engage with communities and peers, and lead efficient teams. Prioritize the retention of local staff, particularly those assigned to rural and remote community offices and stations. Local staff members are often recruited based on the availability of funding for specific programs – meaning that when a certain aid program is completed, relevant local staff may face termination. Instead of recruiting local professionals for the needs of upcoming programs, aid agencies should explore how new programs can be designed to employ the skills of existing local staff members. For Canada, and particularly donor institutions such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), it is important to: Hear from local aid workers. Canada can benefit from consulting local aid workers in the process of determining areas of funding allocation. Incorporating the opinions of local aid workers will help Canada with supporting aid initiatives that better assist communities in crises. Humanitarian aid works best when it addresses the most urgent needs of its beneficiaries. Invest in local aid workers. Canada should consider not only funding aid programs, but also training and safeguarding the aid professionals who will implement them. Aid programming strategies are robust in the sector – while there are more lessons to be learned on aid planning, it is time to also assist the local aid workers who will be delivering aid in the frontlines of conflict. In the end, as we all focus on what we have assumed to be generalizable – designs of a program, structures of insecurity, causes of conflict – it can be very easy to forget that these elements are innately people-centric, and their ultimate impact is on how people live their day-to-day lives. It is important that we better understand those who work to deliver aid and keep peace in the frontlines of conflict: who they are, what they perceive, and how they think they can make a difference – to find new pathways for humanitarianism in its politicized reality. Local aid workers, in this case, can be the compass we need. ## Mackinder, Models and the New Silk Road: a Deceiving Tool? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/mackinder-models-and-the-new-silk-road-a-deceiving-tool/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Mackinder’s work on the Heartland (1904) seems to have generated a lot of interest since the advent in 2013 of the Chinese New Silk Road project, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Abstract Mackinder’s work on the Heartland (1904) seems to have generated a lot of interest since the advent in 2013 of the Chinese New Silk Road project, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With its emphasis on continental links extending across Central Asia, the similarity between the BRI and Mackinder's theory was noticed by many analysts, who now see in the Heartland model a relevant reading grid for understanding the Chinese politics of the BRI. But is this conceptual model really relevant? It appears that it does not adequately depict reality. Introduction Geopolitical modeling is a controversial scientific project. The ambition to forge a global and permanent analytical model to account for the relation between space and power gave rise to important research, including that of authors like Spykman and Mackinder. These publications, in particular Mackinder’s introduction of the Heartland theory (1904), have generated a great deal of interest since the advent in 2013 of the ambitious Chinese New Silk Road project, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With its emphasis on continental links spanning Central Asia, the similarity between the BRI and Mackinder's theory has struck many analysts, who see now in the Heartland model a relevant analytical grid to study the Chinese policy of the BRI. But is this conceptual model really relevant? This article describes how the Heartland model is mobilized in the context of the development of the Chinese BRI, and highlights the scientific risks of relying on analytical models at the expense of empirical and grounded research. For a better understanding of the BRI, it appears more relevant to rely on empirical research. Mackinder’s geopolitical theory and its timeless model The Heartland theory is the name given to a global geopolitical analysis of world history proposed by the British geographer Halford Mackinder (1861-1947). Mackinder endeavored to understand the mechanisms of world history, with a view to defining general rules describing the equilibrium of power. In the article he published in 1904, Mackinder sought to unveil “a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations” (Mackinder, 1904, p.422). Mackinder associates a pivotal area, the Heartland, with the general direction of world history. However, the existence of a pivotal region in the political history of the world is invoked but never explained. In 1919, in his book Democratic Ideals and Reality, Mackinder came up with his famous predicate: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island Who rules the World-Island commands the World. (Mackinder, 1919, p.194). Fig. 1. Location of the pivot zone or heart-land in Mackinder’s theory (1904). Source: Mackinder (1904), p.435.   In 1943, Mackinder again mobilized his Heartland theory. He warned that if, as a result of the then ongoing Second World War, Moscow could extend its territory westward, the USSR would become the “greatest land power on the globe” (Mackinder, 1943, p.601). However, this prospective reasoning is no more grounded in an empirical geographical analysis than the 1904 paper or the 1919 book. Another geographer and early thinker in geopolitics, Nicholas Spykman, came up with a diametrically opposite position on the basis of the same type of reasoning: a historical analysis, just as Eurocentric as that of Mackinder, that led him to a final conclusion that asserted the contrary to Mackinder’s mantra: Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world. (Spykman, 1944, p.43). In Spykman’s analysis, it is within the Rimland[1] that the basis of power lies, and not in the Heartland. But neither Spykman nor Mackinder provide tangible elements of demonstration to support their thesis, and fail to establish a credible causal link, an explanatory relationship between the areas they studied and historical events. The advent of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: the confirmation of Mackinder’s model? In the past few years several authors have made a direct link between Mackinder's Heartland theory and the Chinese BRI. The BRI articulates the development of major development corridors (NDRC 2015), resting on the exploitation of major trans-Asian railways that bring to mind Mackinder’s analysis: “Trans-continental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land-power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heart-land of Euro-Asia.” (Mackinder, 1904, p.434). Thus, Wey (2019) notes a strong correlation between Mackinder's theory and the maritime and continental developments of the BRI. Invoking this theory, Wey concludes that “If this geopolitical strategy is successful, China will ‘rule the Heartland’ and ‘command’ the seas” (p.3). Harper (2019) underlines the fact that Chinese expansion on the Asian continent upsets the United States’ interests: “One of the immediate implications of the BRI for the other external actors present in Eurasia is as a potential challenge… […]. It is this challenge that raises the spectre of Mackinder’s depictions of Eurasia with the BRI’s land corridors being a means to bypass maritime routes, which would adversely affect one of Washington’s primary strategic advantages in the form of its navy.” (p.117). Shukhla (2015) sees a direct parallel between the many BRI rail projects in Central Asia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and Mackinder's theory, in which the rail expansion of Russia is presented as a threat. Yu (2019, p.196) suggests that “The rivalry over the Eurasian Heartland marks a historical return of Mackinder’s Heartland theory”. Several authors thus draw a parallel between the developments of the BRI and Mackinder’s theory, seeing in this parallel the proof that China nurtures a world strategy and seeks the upheaval of the world order, a reasoning based largely on unreserved adherence to Mackinder's theory. “From a purely geographic perspective, the trajectory of the planned land-based New Silk Road (the Belt) aligns to a significant degree with Mackinder’s Heartland theory” (Shortgen, 2018, p.27). “The Eurasian heartland remains the world’s geopolitical pivot, an idea as true a hundred years ago as it is today. The Eurasian heartland is the BRI’s birthplace, a necessary corridor for the Chinese-envisioned new continental economic reality” (Yu, 2019, p.10). The Chinese strategy towards the Middle East constitutes “a global strategy designed to fulfill Chinese geopolitical ambitions”. The Chinese authorities reportedly relied on Mackinder’s pronouncements: “Lying at the heart of Mackinder’s World-Island (1904), the Middle East represents a pivot for the development of China’s sphere of influence, since ‘who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island, who rules the World-Island commands the World’ ” (Maury et al, 2019, p.61). Other authors see in China’s projects the proof of the validity of Mackinder’s theory: “China’s cooperation with Russia, its Belt and Road Initiative, its growing presence in the Indian Ocean and Africa, and its burgeoning sea power are evidence of Mackinder’s prophetic powers” (Sempa, 2019). An outdated scientific debate However, several authors have already noted the scientific lightness of Mackinder’s and Spykman’s theses. Ó Tuathail (1996) studied the mythical and oriented dimension of Mackinder's theory, aimed at proposing a model capable of legitimizing British policy in Central Asia. Venier (2010) pointed out the absence of a "rigorous demonstration" of Mackinder’s theory. The heritage of these theoretical models from the so-called materialist school no longer poses an epistemological problem for the geographic school in geopolitics, whose researchers consider the works of Mackinder or Spykman as dated moments, milestones in the history of geopolitical thinking, but with little scientific value. The political sciences and geography were, at the beginning of the 20th century, in search of a scientific respectability in the identification of laws of the political realm that clearly stated the formal mechanisms that connect space to power (Lasserre et al, 2020a). This chimera of the materialist school is outdated today, but it has left a lasting mark on reflections in geopolitics. “At a time when the principles of causality and determination are the universal references, geography thinks it can hold with domination or the struggle for space its ready-made explanation” (Dussouy, 2006, p.112). As Entin and Entina underlined (2016, p.341), “It is not a surprise that Mackinder’s theory remains popular even now. Such simple, beautiful, artificial, convenient and all-explaining teachings are always in demand and easier to accept”. However, the value of geopolitics does not lie in prediction, an often risky venture, but in analysis: “geopolitics revisited, far from all prophecy, unveils a world of possibilities” (Dussouy, 2001, p.50). A contemporary popularity, the reflection of Western fears? Why then put so much emphasis on Mackinder’s model when discussing Chinese projects, rather than that of Spykman, two equally globalizing and undemonstrated theories? Chinese authors rarely refer to Mackinder's theoretical model, but rather to Chinese authors like Sun Tzu (Boillot, 2020). In addition, the plethora of maps in circulation representing the projects of Chinese corridors enclosing Central Asia and the maritime routes in an embrace often portrayed as threatening is an approach also to be taken with caution. Most of these maps are false (Lasserre et al, 2020b) and unofficial - the Chinese government having banned the production of such approximate maps in 2017 (Jones and Zeng, 2019, p.1425). The media and several researchers, including those who are Chinese, have been deceived by these inaccurate maps. Interpreting a political strategy with a theory based on the reading of another rivalry (Russia and the British Empire), and, above all, an unproven and highly questionable theory on a scientific level, is not new. Several authors have already pointed out that Mackinder’s theory was widely used in Washington in the creation of American policy to counter the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Parker 1988, Sloan 1988; Brzezinski 1997). A similar posture seems to contribute to contemporary Western fears over the BRI's land strategy, which is consistent with: …an American tradition of focusing on map-based geopolitical and geostrategic thinking. This ‘cartohypnosis’ goes back to Halford Mackinder’s portrayal of the Eurasian landmass as the global ‘Heartland’. Stemming from Mackinder’s geopolitics, the idea of needing to prevent the Soviet Union from controlling this ‘Heartland’ […] governed much of American strategy during the Cold War […]. Thus, it is understandable that the BRI could easily be seen by Americans thinking in this tradition as a Chinese ‘great game’ intended to extend its geopolitical influence westward (Garlick, 2020, p.110). Debié agrees: Thus the success of Mackinder or Spykman during the Cold War, the renewed interest in Haushofer seem inspired by the cartographic exercise. The experts from the Pentagon or the Department of State who, on the maps of the fifties, see the red spot growing in central Eurasia and compare the cartographic models of Mackinder or Spykman, are struck by the resemblance. Soon, they are convinced of the prophetic value of the models and the genius of their authors, since the map drawn in 1904 or in 1944 predicted what is happening in the years 1947-56. (Debié, 1991). Thus, like Mackinder and Spykman, it appears that the attraction of these theoretical models and their global cartographic support is their correspondence with the concerns of the hour. Mackinder deliberately devised a model presented as eternal but which in reality rests on a reading of the British rivalry with Russia, then on the fear of the USSR. The same is true for the Spykman model, which is just as general in its discourse, but geared towards the containment of the Soviet Union. At the time of the advent of China as a new great power, it appears that the renewed interest in Mackinder's theory could reflect the fear of Westerners that their political pre-eminence is being undermined. Implications for Canada Mackinder’s model, reflecting the state of geopolitical thinking in the early 20th century, can only prove a poor tool to account for China’s projects in Asia through the BRI. It appears that even if the temptation to mobilize a geopolitical model to grapple with the complexity of the BRI is understandable, it may not provide fruitful analyses. Mackinder’s Heartland model was designed in a specific context of great power rivalry between Russia and Britain with a view to demonstrating what Mackinder perceived as the urgency of protecting Britain’s interests in South and Central Asia. The model is thus specifically and contextually oriented, if not flawed, as Mackinder built it to underline Russia’s threat. Besides, it overestimates the potential for conflict and deliberately minimizes other elements like cooperation, trade and domestic geopolitics. In order to develop a better understanding of the security implications of the BRI, one must not rely on antiquated and simplistic models that cannot account for the complexity of the present-day reality. For Canadian scientists and government analysts, an effective approach to China’s ‘New Silk Road’ development strategy must take into account the specifics of the present BRI, of 21st century Asia, and consider the following: China’s BRI does not merely boil down to transportation, but this is a major dimension of the project. However, several of the corridors and transportation axes developed by the BRI predate the 2013 announcement and were often designed by other countries or institutions (Lasserre 2019): they thus reflect the interests of several countries and not merely China’s interest. Analyzing the BRI merely through the prism of China’s interest is thus deceiving. The political parameters that orient the development of the BRI projects largely reflect local or regional geoeconomic considerations. The first development of trans-Asian railway services was largely driven by Western manufacturers and the German railway company Deutsche Bahn in order to improve their logistics and connect European and Chinese subsidiary production plants. China also holds the project dear as it considers it a tool to develop the unrest-prone Xinjiang region. A good understanding of local social, economic and political realities is a prerequisite for an effective understanding of the stakes of the BRI strategy. If the BRI is now reckoned by several researchers as having geopolitical dimensions, it would be short-sighted to consider it as a mere political tool designed to foster China’s power. The BRI is an opportunistic development strategy that integrates many economic sectors (including, for example, transportation, telecommunications, energy, health, tourism, education, and culture) in various regions according to as-yet undefined and very general criteria, several of them responding to Chinese domestic political and administrative mechanisms (Jones and Zeng, 2019) but also to partner states’ desires. Taking into account the mechanisms for the governance of the several BRI projects is thus necessary to avoid errors. The lack of systematic criteria in the governance of the BRI may reflect this strategy still being in its early stage. There is mounting pressure from China’s partner states, institutions and the media for the Chinese government and banks to be more transparent and rigorous in the adjudication of projects. The Hambantota failure[2] was not a ploy designed by China to put Sri Lanka into debt and eventually take over the port, contrary to several accounts; rather it was the result of corrupt planning by local authorities and overenthusiasm by Chinese banking authorities. For Canada to be able to take advantage of this trend, it must be part of the solution, not reject the BRI, and thus actively participate in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and suggest participation in development projects. [1] The Sri Lankan port was granted to China in 2017 on a 99-year lease after the Sri Lankan state proved unable to service its staggering debt. The port, built in the president’s home area, failed to make profits. [2] The Rimland, or Inner Crescent, is Eurasia’s littoral area, the densely populated western, southern and eastern fringes of the world open to maritime trade. References Boillot, J.-J. (2020). Les routes de la soie et le 36e stratagème. Diplomatie 101, 46. Debié, F. (1991). La géopolitique est-elle une science? Un aspect de la géographie politique de Peter Taylor. Stratégique n°50. Dussouy, G. (2001). Quelle géopolitique au XXIe siècle? Bruxelles: Complexe. Dussouy, G. (2006). Les théories géopolitiques. Traité de Relations Internationales I. Paris: L’Harmattan. Entin, M. & Entina, E. (2016). Russia's role in promoting Great Eurasia geopolitical project. Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 83(3), 331-351. Garlick, J. (2020). The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative from Asia to Europe. London: Routledge. Harper, T. (2019). China’s Eurasia: the Belt and Road Initiative and the Creation of a New Eurasian Power. The Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 5(2), 99-121. Jones, L. & Zeng, J. (2019) Understanding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: beyond ‘grand strategy’ to a state transformation analysis, Third World Quarterly, 40(8), 1415-1439. Lasserre, F. (2019). Les corridors transasiatiques: une idée ancienne opportunément reprise par la Chine. In Lasserre, F.; É Mottet and B. Courmont (eds.) (2019). Les nouvelles routes de la soie. Géopolitique d'un grand projet chinois. Québec, PUQ, 31-54. Lasserre, F., Gonon, E. and Mottet, É. (2020a). Manuel de géopolitique. Enjeux de pouvoir sur des territoires. Paris, Armand Colin. Lasserre, F.; Huang, L. and Mottet, É. (2020b). The Emergence of Trans-Asian Rail Freight Traffic as Part of the Belt and Road Initiative: Development and Limits. China Perspectives, 2020/2, 43-52. Leong Kok Wey, A. (2019). A Mackinder–Mahan Geopolitical View of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. RUSI Newsbrief 39(6), London: Royal United Services Institute, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20190705_newsbrief_vol39_no6_wey_web.pdf Mackinder, H. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal, 23(4), 421-437. Mackinder, H. (1919). Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction. London: Constable and Cie. Mackinder, H. (1943). The Round World and the Winning of the Peace. Foreign Affairs, 21(4), 595-605. Maury, B.; Struye de Swielande, T. and Vandamme, D. (2019). Les nouvelles routes de la soie au Moyen-Orient: complexité d’une région essentielle pour la Chine. Diplomatie 101, 58-61. NDRC, National Development and Reform Commission (2015). Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China. Beijing, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml. Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). Critical geopolitics: the politics of writing global space. London: Routledge. Parker, G. (1988). The Geopolitics of Domination. London: Routledge. Sempa, F. (2019). China and the World-Island. Today’s strategists should keep Mackinder in mind when looking at China’s efforts across Eurasia and Africa. The Diplomat, Jan. 26, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/china-and-the-world-island/. Shortgen, F. (2018). China and the Twenty-First Century Silk Roads: a New Era of Global Economic Leadership? In Zhang, W.; Alon, I. and Lattemann, C. (eds.), China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Changing the Rules of Globaliszation, p.17-33. Cham: Palgrave. Shukhla, A. (2015). Understanding the Chinese One-Belt-One-Road. Mackinder Redux: Struggle for Eurasia after the Cold War. Vivekananda International Foundation, Occasional Paper, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/understanding-the-chinese-one-belt-one-road.pdf. Sloan, G. (1988). Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. Spykman, N. (1944). The Geography of the Peace, ed. by Helen R. Nicholl. New York: Harcourt Brace and Co. Venier, P. (2010). Main Theoretical Currents in Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century. L'Espace Politique 12|2010-3, http://espacepolitique.revues.org/1714 Yu, S. (2019). The Belt and Road Initiative: Modernity, Geopolitics and the Developing Global Order. Asian Affairs, 50(2), 187-201.   ## Macron’s Bad History is Counterproductive URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/macrons-bad-history-is-counterproductive/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Macron’s statements regarding humiliation and Russia are counterproductive to his own stated foreign policy aims, namely, his drive for... In an interview made to all the French regional daily press, French President Emmanuel Macron asserted that " must not humiliate Russia so that the day the fighting stops, we can build a way out through diplomatic channels." He added that "I am convinced that it is France's role, to be a mediating power." Although he did emphasize in the same interview that France would step up its military and financial support for Ukraine, his remarks about humiliation provoked a strong reaction. For his part, Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kulebo tweeted that “alls to avoid humiliation of Russia can only humiliate France and every other country that would call for it. Because it is Russia that humiliates itself.” In making this argument about humiliation, which he had already articulated in the past, Macron appears to be drawing from a particular reading of the Treaty of Versailles and its potential connection to the rise of Nazism and the Second World War. According to this interpretation, the Treaty of Versailles was a humiliating peace for Germany, not least because of the inclusion of the so-called ‘war guilt clause’ (i.e., Article 231) that assigned full culpability for the conflict on Germany so as to justify massive reparations that were imposed upon it. Because the Treaty of Versailles caused deep resentment in German society, whose members had in fact expected a more lenient peace, the revanchist and militarist ideas found a fertile breeding ground. This set the stage for someone like Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists to take power and to plunge Europe into an even more calamitous world war. Macron’s statement about humiliation is as puzzling as it is infuriating for many of those in Ukraine and those NATO countries that directly border Russia in northeastern Europe. For one, it rests on a highly problematic understanding of the causes of Nazism and the Second World War. For another, it further alienates France from its own allies along NATO’s so-called eastern flank—the countries of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Indeed, Macron’s statements regarding humiliation and Russia are counterproductive to his own stated foreign policy aims, namely, his drive for European strategic autonomy and for playing a mediating role between Ukraine and Russia. Bad History Macron seems to be in very strong intellectual company in drawing the connection between a humiliating peace treaty and a subsequent major war. In his widely read The Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in 1919, John Maynard Keynes famously decried the Treaty of Versailles as an extraordinarily punitive agreement such that it would offer no hope for Germany to rebound economically. The deep-seated enmity in Germany that this hardship would entail meant that Europe was assuring itself of significant discord in the decades to come. More recent academic work has argued that feelings of humiliation can produce violent conflict, with one scholar warning in The Hill against the “folly of humiliating Russia.” Lending further plausibility to these claims in the context of interwar Germany, Hitler, the National Socialists, and right-wing political parties did blast the Treaty of Versailles as gratuitous and vindictive. Yet not everything that happened after the Treaty of Versailles was necessarily a consequence of it. It is true that the Treaty of Versailles also called for massive reparations that Germany had to pay given the devastation it inflicted. It is also true that losing the industrial regions in the west would have made it harder for Germany to make those payments. Nevertheless, the economic misfortune that Germany did indeed experience in the early 1920s – culminating in the hyperinflation seen between 1921 and 1923 – was not strictly due to reparations. The fallout of the ill-fated German revolution in 1918, the pension payments for war-wounded and widows, Berlin's decision to compensate Ruhr industrialists for their property losses, and all the accumulated debts that the German state had incurred while fighting the First World War created a number of fiscal difficulties that reparation payments had simply compounded. The much maligned ‘war guilt’ clause in fact makes no actual statement about Germany’s unique war guilt, but nevertheless became a basis for propaganda played up by German politicians. Nevertheless, after 1923, reparation payments fell to under 5 percent of net national product, with large amounts of American capital streaming into Germany following the 1924 Dawes Plan, thereby enabling the growth and prosperity of the German republic – a society known as much for its progressive policies as it is for the political polarization that eventually did kill it. And so, despite Keynes predictions, the German economic was able to rebound significantly, with Germany only paying a small fraction of those reparations in the end. By the time Hitler had come to power and suspended the obligation to make those payments, their effect on the German economy was minimal. Keynes would eventually regret his book, which in turn became the target of significant scholarly criticism precisely because its economic predictions proved to be wrong. As much as many factors played their part, what ultimately enabled the rise of Hitler was the Great Depression. Prior to 1929, the Nazi share of the vote was small. In the 1928 federal election, the NSDAP received twelve seats in the Reichstag, having received about 2.6% of the vote. It in fact lost votes from the previous election. Its biggest regional presence was in Bavaria. Two years later, in the 1930 federal elections, the NSDAP became the second biggest party in Germany after winning over 18% of the vote and thus 107 seats in the Reichstag. One economic historical study shows that in areas where austerity measures were at their strongest, the Nazi vote was much higher. The point here is that history does not move in a straight line – certainly, not in the way implied by Macron’s remarks. Nazism was hardly inevitable once German diplomats signed the Treaty of Versailles in the Hall of Mirrors. Indeed, resentment was hardly a German monopoly during the interwar period. Though they were on the side of the victors in 1918, Italy and Japan developed their own grievances against the post-Versailles international order and eventually turned away from it. Moreover, not all humiliated and defeated countries become aggressively revanchist. France, ironically, is a case in point. Its military defeat to Prussia in 1871 entailed a Prussian army victory parade in Paris, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany, and major reparations to a new German state. This humiliation unsurprisingly became a sore point for French nationalists, but it did not prevent France – under Jules Ferry’s leadership, in particular – from having rather cordial relations with Germany for a period of time after the 1870s. France only reclaimed Alsace and Lorraine because Germany lost a war in Western Europe that it had launched. France and its Eastern Allies Today A key pillar in Macron’s foreign policy is for Europe to develop ’strategic autonomy’. What precisely strategic autonomy means is up for debate, but the general understanding is that ’strategic autonomy’ would give Europe the political and military-technological capacity to act independently so as not to be vulnerable to the caprices of the United States or the depredations of other foreign powers. Although such ideas are not new – Charles de Gaulle had similar visions about European defence cooperation in the 1960s – the surprise presidential election of Donald Trump in 2016 made them a major fixture in current debates about the European security architecture. However, not all European countries bought into Macron’s vision, even with Trump’s erratic style of alliance management. Poland and the Baltic countries – those countries that worry the most about Russian aggression – voiced skepticism towards the concept of European strategic autonomy. They feared it would decouple them from the guarantees provided by the United States (and post-Brexit United Kingdom). They also feared that France – and Germany, for that matter – would have very different threat perceptions about Russia, especially as Macron had repeatedly called for dialogue with Russia. After all, France and Germany were involved in the Normandy Format. This informal arrangement served to negotiate a peace between Ukraine and Russia over the Donbas region, resulting in the two Minsk Accords concluded in September 2014 and 2015 that were supposed to end their hostilities. However, Russia never admitted openly to its own military involvement in the Donbas region and Ukraine was never able to restore control over its eastern frontier with Russia. For its part, Russia claimed that Ukraine did not provide special political rights to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as per the Second Minsk Accord. Although the Minsk Accords looked moribund for some time, France and Germany were reluctant to call out Russian misbehaviour and to provide military assistance to Ukraine, barring a few minor exceptions made by France. What finally killed the Minsk Accords was Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the so-named Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics on 21 February. Russia’s launching of the ’special operation’ on 24 February further demonstrated the failure of the Normandy Process. In some ways, one can interpret the ignominious end of the Minsk Accords as humiliating for France and Germany given their role as mediators. Russia’s renewed and bold offensive against Ukraine thus offered a unique opportunity for Macron to realize his vision of European strategic autonomy. Russia’s ’special operation’ demonstrated that it had been a bad faith partner in security negotiations and dialogues. It unshackled Paris and Berlin from the Minsk Accords, which, as problematic as it had been, did have the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council. France had already stepped up its involvement in Central-Eastern Europe, with its leadership of a reinforced Battle Group in Romania, its participation in the British-led enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Estonia, and deployed Rafale fighter jets for an air policing mission in Poland. Macron could have built on those contributions to signal credibly that it took seriously Central-Eastern European concerns about Russia while putting the problematic Minsk Accords behind him. A robust containment strategy vis-a-vis Russia could have underpinned this movement towards European strategic autonomy. Instead, Paris issued a different response. It is true that France supports the political sovereignty and the full territorial integrity of Ukraine as well as its bid for becoming a member of the European Union. However, unlike the United Kingdom and the United States, which had stepped up their provision of anti-tank weapons and other armaments in the weeks prior to 24 February, France remained hesitant to provide military assistance to Ukraine even when Russia’s massive military build-up became clearer in its implications. This hesitancy persisted after 24 February, with Macron saying at one point that the provision of tanks to Ukraine would be too escalatory to undertake. To its credit, France has claimed to be providing military assistance to Ukraine but has been explicitly withholding information for the purposes of operational security. Yet this claim is, by its nature, difficult to verify and so may be self-serving. It did, of course, eventually provide an unspecified number of CAESAR self-propelled howitzers and Milan anti-tank missiles. Nevertheless, Macron has been very active in trying to advance a diplomatic solution with dozens of calls made to Moscow and to Kyiv throughout 2022. His pre-‘special operation’ negotiating efforts, which included a personal trip to Moscow in early February, resulted in him receiving pledges from Putin that Russia would withdraw troops from Belarus and de-escalate tensions with Ukraine. When none of this obviously happened and Moscow chose instead to ratchet up the war in Ukraine, Macron acknowledged on 24 February that "there was duplicity.” He has not entirely given up on the idea that Europe would not be secure until Russia is integrated in the European security architecture in some form or another even if other European politicians have argued that the scale and brutal nature of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its civilian population call instead for a robust containment strategy to be put in place for the “long haul.” And while Zelensky has expressed support for Macron to maintain a line of communication with Putin through the war, the Ukrainian president has also said that France was "afraid of Russia." It is against this contemporary backdrop that Macron’s remarks about the need to avoid humiliating Russia must be seen. These remarks not only rest on a shaky historical premise: they are also a problem for French diplomacy. As I argue in my new book Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century, the notion that France has different interests, threat assessments and priorities than some of its NATO allies is not at all surprising. States write down their treaty commitments precisely because they know that those differences exist. They try to smooth over those disagreements because they have enough shared interests to warrant making improvements in their defence cooperation. What is, then, surprising is that the failures of the Normandy Format and the record of Putin breaking his own personal pledges do not seem to register with Macron. The impression one thus gets of Macron is that he is a leader who either lacks any capacity for introspection or is too stubborn to admit failure and to break with those past practices that produced it in the first place. For other European leaders, this talk of avoiding humiliation seems self-defeating: Russia has committed more than enough atrocities and victimized so many civilians that its feelings should be of no consequence. At a minimum, this inability to revise one’s approach and to avoid repeating such polarizing rhetoric in the face of Russian aggression alienates those front-line countries in East Central Europe that have the most to lose from a European security architecture being torn apart. Macron’s vision of European strategic autonomy will find no buyers if those key states feel that their needs are best attended by the United States and the United Kingdom. More problematically, such vague talk of humiliation risks handing the diplomatic initiative to the Kremlin because it gets to define what counts as humiliating and what does not. Considering France’s rather poor record of being a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, making this concession only strengthens Moscow’s hand at the expense of Kyiv’s. For all the fretting about Russian feelings, a clear Russian victory could just as well result in Ukrainian humiliation, which may yet be toxic for European security for the reasons that Macron intimates. If France wants to continue playing a mediating role, it will need Ukraine’s support. Thankfully, Macron may yet be learning from his discursive mistakes, having stated unequivocally in a recent phone call with Zelensky France’s support for Ukraine’s full territorial integrity and ambitions to join the European Union while avoiding talk of humiliation. Still, Kyiv might yet entrust its own security interests to Warsaw, London, and Washington more than it would to Paris. ## Managing Traditional and New Threats through International Cooperation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/whats-next-managing-traditional-and-new-threats-through-international-cooperation/ Modified: 2022-06-01 > Following its second annual colloquium, the Strategic Analysis Network has produced the compendium "What's Next? Managing Traditional and New Threats through International Cooperation." Following its second annual colloquium, the Strategic Analysis Network has produced the compendium "What's Next? Managing Traditional and New Threats through International Cooperation." The theme of the second annual Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) conference, held December 9-10, 2021, focused on transitions in international policy. At the outset, several countries have begun a post-pandemic transition, opting to ease public health restrictions. Throughout the year, our experts have noted the significant impact of COVID-19 on many security and defence activities, such as the operations of the Canadian Armed Forces in Canada and abroad. Conversely, 2021 has also seen more pronounced and disturbing trends in great power competition and a weakening of democracy worldwide. It is clear that Canada must deal with an increasingly complex security environment. As noted in this compendium by Kerry Buck, Canada's former ambassador to NATO, this environment has several challenges that have been exacerbated by the pandemic: "First, most countries have turned inward; second, democracy and social cohesion in many countries have been undermined; and third, the world order is becoming more unpredictable, with shifting power dynamics among key players and new sources of instability.” Taking these major players into account, the increased competition between great powers narrows Canada’s room for manoeuvre as a middle power. By the end of 2021, Russia's military presence near Ukraine's borders was a concern. A few months later, China expressed its "unlimited" friendship for Russia, clearing the way for its February 24, 2022 aggression. The signs of this security downturn were visible at the conference, and last-minute diplomatic efforts, whether by President Biden or President Macron, bore little fruit thereafter. Zachary Paikin's article notes that these events place even greater constraints on Canada: "The narrowing of policy options now limits Canada's ability to pursue its national interests, even as the international landscape has shifted from a gradual transition from order to outright instability and insecurity in the wake of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine." Yet, Canada's posture toward Ukraine is surely one of the few issues where foreign and defense policy had genuine strategic coherence. If, for years, we could question the effectiveness of a mission focused on military training in Ukraine, there is no longer any doubt as to the validity of this mission. Similarly, Canada's strategic alignment with NATO, and retreat from the UN, may have been the right move. However, the one area where Canada is still uncertain about its strategic direction is in the Indo-Pacific region. Although a Canadian strategy for the region is being developed, tough choices will need to be made given that Canada is not a power with global reach, despite the rhetoric that sometimes comes from Ottawa. Srdjan Vucetic furthers this point by stating that Canada's commitments are difficult to reconcile with its means: "Indeed, the alliance burden-sharing promises Canada makes to keep the Indo-Pacific 'free and open' by definition affect similar promises made in other contexts - from NORAD modernization to NATO's next Strategic Concept and the Climate Change Action Plan." At the very least, Canada must clarify its strategic orientations and make choices that are better aligned with the diplomatic, economic and military capabilities at its disposal. It is now necessary for Canada to identify who the main threats are, as its allies have done. Russia has removed any ambiguity about its status, but what about China? Identifying a threat contributes to greater strategic clarity. Beyond the threat posed by Russia, one of the first steps is to recognize, both at the governmental level and in the public sphere, that Canada is attacked below the threshold of war on a daily basis, whether in cyberspace or outer space. Indeed, the Canadian government can be counted on to provide clear direction in times of war but is unprepared for a crisis in the grey zone and the information domain. It must, therefore, improve its capacity for anticipation by clearly articulating its interests and priorities prior to crises. Now that a defence policy review has been announced, the NSA will advocate for this process to open the door to real debate and reflection on Canada's strategic direction, accompanied by public engagement, which should be heightened in the context of the war in Ukraine. The goal is to break down the walls within government between the political level and the public service, between political parties, and between government and academics, experts and the general public - a goal that is central to the NSA’s mandate. An updated defence policy is also an exercise in public diplomacy, both internationally and domestic, signaling which foreign policy issues and objectives are important to Canada. As such, it is necessary to select issues Canada has a particular interest and comparative advantage in, to arrive at a coherent government-wide approach to Canada's international engagement. There is a need to move away from a performative approach to international policy, as Canada has successfully done with the crisis in Ukraine. But in other regions, Canada's engagement does not have such credibility. For example, if Canada decides to renew its engagement on the African continent, or in the Middle East, it must offer more targeted contributions by better understanding the diversity of local contexts. It is also important to note that Canada is not immune to security threats on its own territory. On the contrary, it is increasingly the target of cyberattacks, requiring the mobilization of resources to protect critical infrastructure. Moreover, it is imperative to develop a new cybersecurity strategy, along with a reflection on the future of NORAD as part of an innovative vision to redefine continental defence. The investments are visible, and they were enhanced in the 2022 federal budget announcement, but they remain insufficient and are not supported by a coherent and clearly articulated strategic vision. Émile Lambert-Deslandes' paper develops a range of questions to inform these reflections, including "what the relationship with the United States should be, whether is prepared to invest in becoming a productive member of its alliances, and whether its values should be used as objectives of its international policy." Answering these types of questions is a significant challenge to which the NSA can contribute, as it prepares for its third annual symposium on September 22, 2022. Read the full version of the compendium here: Compendium - NSA Second Annual Conference Table of contents "Introduction," by Stéfanie von Hlatky and Justin Massie. "The Post COVID World (Dis)Order: A Playbook for Canada’s International Engagement for the Year Ahead," by Kerry Buck. "From the Atlantic to the Pacific: A new strategic posture for Canada," by Zachary Paikin. "China’s Hegemony and Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy," by Srdjan Vucetic. "In Canadian International Policy, Real Change Means Hard Choices," by Émile Lambert-Deslandes. ## Military Support for Ukraine – A Necessary Coherence Around Three Dimensions: Discourse, Material Donations, and Industrial Production URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/military-support-for-ukraine-a-necessary-coherence-around-three-dimensions-discourse-material-donations-and-industrial-production/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Western opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has undeniably had consequences for interstate diplomatic, military and economic dynamics. Among them is the development of various discussions among allies regarding the military support to be provided to the Ukrainian resistance. Western opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has undeniably had consequences for interstate diplomatic, military and economic dynamics. Among them is the development of various discussions among allies regarding the military support to be provided to the Ukrainian resistance. Faced with this new geopolitical component, some governments struggle to position themselves vis-à-vis Russia. While some states stand out with strong advocacy of the Ukrainian cause, others reveal their political reservations due to the fear of being perceived as a “co-belligerent” and, by extension, as contributing to a supposed “escalation” with Moscow. States willing to support Ukraine’s victory also sometimes find themselves confronted with their material limitations to enable them to achieve their goals. Canada strongly supported the Ukrainian cause as it immediately condemned the Russian invasion. The government has also stated that it wants to see Ukraine’s complete territorial integrity restored. While maintaining a strong position in its rhetoric, Ottawa falls short in terms of material donations. The same holds true for the increase in industrial production, not to mention its lack of will to meet NATO’s target of spending 2% of GDP on defence. Between January 24, 2022, and July 31, 2023, Ottawa ranked only twelfth in terms of contributions of heavy weapons to Ukraine, lagging behind France and the United Kingdom – with a commitment of $0.3 billion. It ranked fourteenth when accounting for the share of its national stockpiles of heavy weapons provided to Ukraine (contributing 6% of its military stockpile delivered to Kyiv). With similar political discourse, comparing Canada’s military engagement with its European allies, such as France and the United Kingdom, raises questions about the assertion that “Canada is one of Ukraine’s most generous partners.” While it is true that Canada ranks as the fifth-largest donor country in terms of aid, this support has been predominantly in the form of loans rather than the provision of lethal equipment, which is precisely what the President of Ukraine asks to pursue his military objective. President Zelensky’s recent visit to the Canadian Parliament was undoubtedly an opportunity for Justin Trudeau to demonstrate his commitment to rectifying the situation. On that occasion, the Prime Minister of Canada announced the dispatch of an additional 50 armoured vehicles to Ukraine and the donation of C$650 million for military aid. The rebalancing of Canadian support should also serve as a reminder that such criticism, formulated in Ottawa, can be addressed toward other governments and states within the transatlantic community. This note aims to underscore the level of commitment from two of Canada’s closest allies, namely the United Kingdom and France. These two countries have distinguished themselves on several occasions since the beginning of the invasion. Since February 2022, France has displayed an evolving discourse with an increasingly pronounced trend in favour of unequivocal support for Ukraine’s victory. While initial hesitations were primarily driven by the fear of “offending” Moscow, they came at a substantial reputational and political cost. To rectify this situation and bolster its diplomatic standing, Paris became the first country in 2023 to provide Kyiv with tanks of Western origin. Another notable development was the announcement of the training of Ukrainian pilots, which marked the removal of an additional barrier. Furthermore, to meet its military commitments and prepare for the future, the French government called for the intensification of its industrial production to maintain adequate stock levels.   For its part, the United Kingdom quickly emerged as a reliable partner of Ukraine. The political speeches delivered by its successive representatives have demonstrated unwavering consistency, and its military investments have followed the same trajectory. London thus appears to be one of the European “leaders,” particularly for having shown responsiveness in the first days of the conflict. Its material donations aligned with Ukrainian needs on the ground, as evidenced by the frequency and quality of its deliveries, even if it strained its existing stockpiles. However, the United Kingdom failed to anticipate the issue of its stocks by not increasing its orders and industrial production. Somewhat belatedly but surely, London sought to rectify the situation by drawing inspiration from its European ally. The recent update of the Defence Command Paper finally acknowledges the imperative of addressing the replenishing of its military stockpiles. The Need to Recalibrate French Political Discourse to Correct its Initial Ambiguity Regarding France, the analysis of the shifts in political discourse over the past nineteen months provides an overall view of the evolution of the French position. Successive statements from the French executive clearly indicated a growing commitment to supporting Ukraine. By focusing only on public statements, France has displayed – over time and in “stages” – an increasing desire for a clear victory for Ukraine. Three distinct levels can be identified in this evolution: the first level (February 2022) represents “minimal support,” which distinguishes clearly between the aggressor and the attacked while providing assistance to Ukraine without a clearly defined objective. At the second “level” (May 2022), Paris adopts a somewhat confused dialectic, refusing Russia’s victory without explicitly encouraging Ukraine’s victory. The third (February 2023) is characterized by greater coherence of France supporting both Russia’s defeat and Ukraine’s victory. After reaching a final “level” (May 2023), the French President no longer portrays Russia as merely an aggressor of Ukraine but as a global threat to European peace and security. However, a more segmented analysis of this evolution shows that France’s positioning was marked by an omnipresent ambiguity at each level crossed, although this tendency tended to disappear after that. This ambiguity was manifested through a series of diplomatically problematic missteps that interfered with the French support. These missteps were frequently fuelled by the French President’s public statements, notably when he raised concerns about the danger of “humiliating” or “crushing” Russia.   ‘Minimal’ French Support Granted to Ukraine During the First Two Months of the Conflict in Ukraine  In the wake of the Russian invasion, the French President initially limited himself to giving “minimal” support to his Ukrainian counterpart. This initial “level” was reflected in his speech on February 24, 2022, during which he immediately established that “France stands with Ukraine.” On this occasion, he clearly distinguished between the aggressor and the attacked, emphasizing the need for military and political assistance to Ukraine. However, in their immediate public declarations, French political authorities did not wish to use the terms “victory” or “defeat” about either of the belligerents.   France Does Not Support Either Ukraine’s or Russia’s Victory, But It Wants to Avoid “Humiliation”  Over two months later, during his speech to the European Parliament, Emmanuel Macron took his stance further by asserting that Russia should not emerge victorious. He also pledged that France would actively work to safeguard Ukraine’s territorial integrity without taking responsibility for delimiting and defining the said borders. Then, he also qualified his remarks by inviting people to “never give in to the temptation of humiliation or the spirit of revenge.” In doing so, Emmanuel Macron did not hesitate to draw a parallel with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, suggesting that it had "obstructed the paths to peace" (a fallacious historical analogygy that historians have since deconstructed). This reference to the concept of humiliation was reiterated in an interview with La Dépêche du Midi a month later: “Russia must not be humiliated so that, once the fighting ceases, we can explore diplomatic avenues to find a way out.” Primarily, Paris was concerned about avoiding the “risk of co-belligerence”– or at least that of “escalation” – even though the former is defined neither in law nor practice. Second, the term “humiliation,” as mentioned by the President, aligns with a Russian propaganda and strategic narrative of subjectively defining what “humiliates” them to influence Western actions. The narrative that sought to reconcile the preservation of Ukrainian integrity with avoiding the humiliation of Russia (however subjective it may be) was quickly criticized by Kyiv, sparking a wave of discontent and bewilderment within the Ukrainian government.   France Now Wants Russia to be Defeated and Ukraine to Win but Rejects the Idea of “Crushing” Russia’s Almost a year after the onset of the conflict, France progressed to its third “level” by clearly expressing its support for the “victory” of Ukraine. The French President explicitly articulated this stance on February 9, 2023, in the presence of his Ukrainian counterpart: “We stand firmly by Ukraine with the determination to support it in achieving victory and the restoration of its legitimate rights,” and added, “Russia cannot, and must not, prevail.” Similar to the previous level, this speech was once again qualified by the refusal to speak of a “crushing” of Russia during an interview held on February 18, 2023 (“ has never been the position of France and it will never be our position” according to E. Macron). In this third “level,” the desire for a clear victory for Ukraine was combined with a refusal to crush Moscow.   France Now Identifies Russia as a “Common Enemy” and Abandons Russia’s Strategic Narrative of “Humiliation” France hardened its position by crossing a final “level.” The GLOBSEC Summit in Bratislava (May 21, 2023) served as a platform for Emmanuel Macron to acknowledge that his approach (in terms of positioning during the conflict) had “lacked coherence,” both at the national and European levels. During this speech, there was a radical reformulation of France’s strategic positioning. Departing from his prior role as a “mediator” and his earlier discourse aimed at avoiding offence to Moscow (using terms like “humiliation” or “crushing”), Emmanuel Macron changed his tone by describing “fifteen years of Russian attempts to overturn the whole European security architecture, to reshape it in its own terms. “Russia then was no longer viewed merely as the aggressor of Ukraine, but as a threat to the entire European security architecture. In the same vein, France has openly sought to convince Iran – one of Moscow’s key allies –  to withdraw its support for Russia and even attempted to garner support for Ukraine from countries from the Global South.   The Evolution of the Choice of Arms Deliveries is Also Representative of the Evolution of the French Discourse France also expressed its stance in the military dimension of its support for Ukraine, i.e. through the evolution of its choice of arms deliveries. The evolution of French military commitments has generally followed the same logic as that of its political discourse since military donations have gradually intensified in “stages.” However, crossing these “thresholds” in arms deliveries has often appeared insufficient and disconnected from Ukrainian needs to repel the Russian army. From a global point of view, the French state is a relatively “weak link” regarding its military commitments to Ukraine. According to the Ukraine Support Tracker, France is ranked fifteenth in terms of the amount of bilateral military aid to Ukraine (from January 24, 2022 to July 31, 2023). For comparison, the level of French involvement over this period was twelve times less than that of its British ally and three times less than that of Canada. However, France has dedicated to Ukraine between 10 and 12% of its stocks of heavy weapons. Positioned 9th in this ranking, France commits its stocks slightly less than the United Kingdom (between 12% and 24%)[1], but much more than Canada (about 5-6%)[2].   The Minimum French “Support” Expressed by a Two-Month Waiting Period Before the First Military Deliveries to Ukraine Data from the Ukraine Support Tracker shows an initial two-month waiting period before the first French military deliveries of heavy weapons to Ukraine (February - April 2022). At the end of April 2022, France decided to take 12 CAESAR guns from its equipment in use, where other countries have drawn on their stocks of old or reserve equipment. This period separating the beginning of the Russian invasion from the first French military deliveries parallels France’s transition from its “minimal support” to its second “level,” as previously identified. It should be noted that, before that, France had officially stated that it supported a so-called “defensive” logic to justify better its reluctance to deliver, among other things, “heavy” tanks and fighter jets (a distinction that is, however, purely subjective, attributing a strictly “defensive” or “offensive” function to a weapon that does not reflect legal and military realities).   France Quickly Faced Criticism Over Insufficient Military Deliveries to Ukraine In the spring of 2022, following President Zelensky’s requests, many debates took place among Ukraine’s allies about the possibility of supplying it with “heavy” tanks. On the French side, the authorization to deliver 30 CEASARs between April and January 2023 seemed insufficient, given the French objectives of helping Ukraine push back Russia and regain its territorial integrity. As heavy weapons such as tanks can make a difference in high-intensity wars, Ukrainian forces have widely publicized and appreciated their granting by other allies. However, given the French refusal to supply Ukraine with Leclerc tanks until now and their sporadic delivery of heavy weapons, some specialists consider that the French strategic choices of the time remained insufficient and disappointing. They argued that the delivery of Leclerc tanks would have made it possible to rectify the situation by strengthening French diplomatic capital. The desired outcome of the war, as envisioned by France, appeared to be significantly disconnected from the efforts needed to achieve it. President Emmanuel Macron later justified the low level of French donations by emphasizing the importance of prioritizing the quality of weapons supplied over the quality: it is necessary to “give priority to deliveries that are useful to carry out these operations and resist, rather than commitments that will arrive very late or very far.”   To Support Ukraine’s “Victory,” France Symbolically Delivered the First Western-Designed Tanks In January 2023, however, French military aid shifted into high gear with the announcement of the shipment of fourteen AMX-10 RC light tanks, which were gradually delivered until March 2023. At the same time, France reached its third “level” in its discourse, namely by openly supporting the “victory of Ukraine” and the “defeat” of Russia. By conceding the AMX-10 RC to Ukraine, France has sent a strong signal to the transatlantic community. Although there is now a debate in Europe questioning the  AMX-10 RC’s “tank” designation, these donations represented the first Western-designed tanks supplied to Ukraine, all previous ones having been Russian-designed. With this delivery, France wanted to erase its image as a weak link in support for Ukraine. To enhance its credibility as an ally of Ukraine, France could readily accommodate this reduction in the inventory of its army since the loss of capacity affected only 5% of its fleet of AMX-10 RC (out of a stock of about 200 units still in service at the beginning of 2023) and that the latter gradually began to be replaced by the Jaguar Armored Reconnaissance and Combat Vehicles since 2020. More recently, in May 2023, France reached a significant milestone by announcing that it would train Ukrainian pilots. Similarly, this commitment has completed a further step forward in French support.   The Example of the “Nexter” is Part of a New Logic of Intensification of French Industrial Production Given the increase in its military donations to Ukraine, France had to anticipate the issue of its stocks. As it happens, the designer and manufacturer of the CAESAR howitzer Nexter has recorded a meteoric increase of almost 200% in its production, from an average production of two units per month before the conflict to six units per month in January 2023. This is mainly due to the French need to increase the level of CAESAR stockpiles due to its gradual deliveries of 30 CAESAR howitzers to Ukraine between April 2021 and January 2023. It should be noted that in July 2022, France had only 58 of these units out of the 77 required, following the format defined in the report annexed to the Military Programming Law (LPM) 2019-25. In addition, this same law provides for the financing of orders for such weapons to reduce the fleet of CAESARs in the army to its initial number, which allowed Mr. Sébastien Lecornu to place an order estimated at 85 million euros for 18 CAESARs in July 2022. This initiative addressed the question of their replacement when we know that France has taken its donations from its own Army endowment and that, in addition to the Ukrainian crisis, a number of these parts have been deployed in Djibouti, Côte d’Ivoire or the United Arab Emirates. To ensure this commitment, the Minister of the Armed Forces, Mr. Lecornu, announced in March 2023 that the production times of the CAESARs had been reduced by 60% by Nexter, from 44 months to 18 months, to respect the desire of the French executive to accelerate the industrial rate. During a bilateral meeting with international security expert Pierre Haroche, he said France has learned two main lessons from more than a year of conflict in Ukraine. First, the military means needed to achieve the goals set for itself – namely Ukraine’s “victory” and Russia’s “defeat” – bring high-intensity warfare back to the forefront. Secondly, high-intensity warfare requires an emphasis on the issue of stockpiles and ammunition masses. As Pierre Haroche says, it seems that, in its armaments policy, France is gradually tending to integrate these two lessons into the way it applies its armaments policy. As a result, France needs to rebalance its expeditionary capabilities and its high-intensity capabilities without abandoning the asymmetric expeditionary scenario. Nexter’s example would, therefore, illustrate France’s transition to an intensification of its production flows, consisting of encouraging manufacturers to produce more and faster.   British Coherence to Condemn Russian Aggression and Encourage Ukraine’s Victory On the British side, the analysis of the political discourse of the last nineteen months shows a significant coherence. The current approach of the government led by Rishi Sunak is in line with that of his predecessors, Boris Johnson and Liz Truss, as they together demonstrate the UK’s willingness to give unwavering support to Ukraine. In his few immediate public statements, former Prime Minister Boris Johnson immediately adopted a much more clear-cut discourse than his French counterpart at the same time. In a televised appearance to the British population on February 24 2022, Boris Johnson already mentioned the possibility of including a military dimension to the British response to the invasion of Ukraine. The goal was already clearly announced: Vladimir Putin’s risky venture was bound to fail. To this end, Mr Johnson assured that the United Kingdom would work with Ukraine to restore its sovereignty and independence (suggesting the desire to return to the borders before the Russian invasion of February 2022). On the same day, Boris Johnson described the Russian leader in the British Parliament as “a blood-stained aggressor who believes in imperial conquest”. He said that “Putin was always determined to attack his neighbour. “The language adopted by the Prime Minister at the time seems, in comparison, far removed from the French fears of the beginning, namely those of giving in to the temptation of “humiliation” or even “crushing”. On March 3, 2022, Ms Truss, then Foreign Secretary, stated that the United Kingdom would ensure that Vladimir Putin loses the war (“We will together ensure that Putin loses”). The UK’s dual military objective was clearly presented from the outset: firstly, that of defeating Vladimir Putin on Ukrainian soil, in particular with the help of the deployment of British defensive weapons to enable them to stop Russian tanks; secondly, that of containing Russian aggression by strengthening NATO’s presence on the eastern flank; as well as by European security via the UK-led expeditionary force. This type of speech has been repeated consistently by the next Prime Minister, Mr. Rishi Sunak, such as at the 2023 Munich Security Conference or before the British Parliament in February 2023.   The UK – A “Leader” In Supporting Ukraine, As Evidenced by Its Military Aid  In line with its political discourse, London has also shown almost exemplary military support over the overall period of the conflict. The macro analysis highlights the strong British reactivity and the importance of its material concessions to Ukraine. On the one hand, the UK has been among the most responsive countries in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine. Notably, it was one of the first countries to engage in the provision of military support and to undertake the training of Ukrainian fighter pilots and sailors. This responsiveness is far from surprising since it is part of a particular political continuity. A few months before the Russian invasion and in the face of the growing threat from Moscow, London had already announced the opening of negotiations for a British-Polish-Ukrainian trilateral pact.  On the other hand, the amount of military equipment supplied to Kyiv makes the UK one of its most important military allies. is used to compile a ranking of the largest providers of military support to Ukraine from January 24, 2022 to July 31, 2023, The United Kingdom is in third place in the world   – and second in Europe – with nearly €6.58 billion invested. The British political will, put into perspective with its military budget, which is one of the largest in Europe ($68.5 billion in 2022), explains the top ranking that the United Kingdom has. The British government has taken the Ukrainian crisis so seriously  that the average annual military support  granted to Ukraine is currently higher than that granted to the USSR during the Second World War (1941-1945) : around 6 billion euros for Ukraine in 2022 compared to the 3.5 billion on average per year during the Second World War (taking into account inflation). Where the British government stands out relatively less is precisely in its level of commitment of heavy weapons to Ukraine (5th position). At the European level, London has lost a few places on this criterion, being overtaken by Poland (2nd position) and the Netherlands (3rd position). And for good reason: the invasion of Ukraine has had the direct consequence of blowing up the defence budgets of Poland and the Netherlands. The increase in Poland’s budget is logically explained by its geographical position vis-à-vis Ukraine and Russia, which sees this invasion as a direct threat to their own sovereignty. In the second case, the Netherlands has chosen to send a strong signal to NATO allies and European partners with this increase. The move will also enable them to reach the NATO standard of 2% of GDP in 2024 and 2025, given that Amsterdam has previously been criticized for neglecting its armed forces. Ultimately, the increase in the military budgets of these states makes it possible to ensure a greater quantity of deliveries of heavy weapons to the Ukrainian forces. For its part, London had already reached the 2% recommended by NATO before the war, and proceeded with a budget extension in March 2023, probably to continue its efforts in terms of military engagement. Finally, the share of its own stocks committed to Ukraine (6th position) during the same period is also lower. Overall, the UK lags behind its Scandinavian and Baltic neighbours (Norway and Denmark), which face a more direct geographical threat. The Czech Republic and the Netherlands are in 1st and 3rd place respectively. The United Kingdom remains an important player in that it is selling a significant part of its own stocks to Ukraine. It conceded about 15% of  its FV103 Spartan armored troop vehicles in April 2022 alone, 53% of its 155mm/152mm howitzers, and 17% of its in the first year of the conflict. In addition, it has provided several air defence systems while training Ukrainian forces in the use of these systems, including Starstreak, designed to shoot down low-flying aircraft at close range. In a sense, the reading of the British posture can be twofold. The UK is falling short of the efforts of other European states, which are more directly threatened by Russia. However, it largely maintains its status as a European “leader” by making a constant effort in its military support. Following the French Model, the British Government Redefined Its Choice of Military Donations as the Conflict Evolved As mentioned earlier, as soon as the Russian invasion was launched, the British government immediately delivered weapons to Ukraine. Between February 2022 and July 2023, the United Kingdom distinguished itself by the regular delivery of military and/or heavy weapons of all kinds to Kyiv : mine countermeasures ships, armoured vehicles, possible Storm Shadow cruise missiles and various types of howitzers. However, like its Western allies, the British government was initially hesitant to give in to President Zelensky’s demands for “heavy” tanks. As the Ukrainian crisis worsens, the British government, like France, has taken it to the next level by conceding its first tanks to Ukraine. The announcement in January 2023 of the French delivery of AMX-10RC light tanks to Ukraine has visibly opened a breach. In the same month, the United Kingdom belatedly decided to part with fourteen of its Challenger-2 tanks. This decision was a turning point: the Challenger-2 was the first Western “heavy” tank (after the AMX-10 RC, whose qualification as such is debated) to have set foot on Ukrainian soil. However, the Challenger-2s are not proving to be so advantageous for the Ukrainian Armed Forces since they require a whole maintenance chain to be engaged for limited availability. In addition, its gun is not compatible with NATO ammunition. As a reminder, the United Kingdom already wanted to renovate or replace its Challenger-2 tanks still in service in 2015 under the Life Extension Program due to their obsolescence, lack of performance and incompatibility with 120mm ammunition to NATO standards.   The Absence of British Military Investments Combined with the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis Has Made it Necessary to Rebalance Its Stocks The example of the Challenger-2 shows an observation: unlike France, London has failed to invest in advance in replenishing its military stocks. The United Kingdom initially failed to calculate its available quantity of heavy weapons. While this did not initially seem to pose a major problem (its donations to Ukraine were initially mainly limited to withdrawals from its reserve stocks), it subsequently had to divest itself of part of its direct stocks to supply Kyiv with its Challenger-2s. In addition, the context of the Ukrainian crisis has, above all, highlighted the poor quality of the tanks available to the United Kingdom at the time: in 2021, before the start of the Ukrainian crisis, British MPs had already expressed their concern about the obsolescence of its heavy artillery:   “As a result, were the British Army to have to fight a peer adversary - a euphemism for Russia - in Eastern Europe in the next few years, whilst our soldiers would undoubtedly remain amongst the finest in the world, they would, disgracefully, be forced to go into battle in a combination of obsolescent or even obsolete armoured vehicles, most of them at least 30 years old or more, with poor mechanical reliability, very heavily outgunned by more modern missile and artillery systems and chronically lacking in adequate air defence.”   Following the announcement of the delivery of 14 Challenger-2s in January 2023, some British parliamentarians claimed that such a drain would deprive the British Army of 25-30% of its “operational assets”, since of the  227 units the United Kingdom had at the time of its announcement, 148 units had been set aside the previous year to be upgraded to the “Challenger 3” standard. This implies that London currently has only 42 examples “actually” available, i.e. in working order. Compared to France, which has delivered only 5% of its AMX-10 RC light tanks until March 2023; the United Kingdom seems to have committed between 25% and 30% of its inventory of Challenger-2s –  admittedly partly obsolete – which does not prevent this drain from representing a significant loss of capacity in the immediate future, especially since the total operational capability of the modernized tanks is planned for 2030. This parliamentary debate highlights the issue of the availability and sustainability of British military stockpiles, in a geopolitical context of high demand. In the case of the “Challenger 3”, the British Army welcomed the acceleration of their design in February 2023. While it is highly likely that the UK will be able to pronounce the full operational capability of these tanks by 2030, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has had to resign himself to taking greater measures to ensure that the number of orders increases. This is without taking into account the recent publication of the updated Defence Command Paper by the Ministry of Defence in July 2023, planning – among other things – to strengthen the British operational reserve. To this end, the British army has planned to reallocate £2.5 billion to increase its ammunition stockpiles. The strategy paper also highlights the future increase in the supply of weapons until 2030 to enhance the productivity of the British Army. However, the (late) responsiveness of the United Kingdom seems weaker than that of France, as shown by the rapid multiplication of orders placed by the French Minister of Defence with the manufacturer Nexter. Finally, the earlier announcement (May 2023)  of the development of a new shell –  jointly with Germany – shows that the United Kingdom is taking the issue of replenishing its stocks more and more seriously. In short, London is drawing its own lessons from the war in Ukraine while drawing inspiration from the methods of its European ally France.   Considerations and Recommendations for Canada Compared to its two closest European allies, Ottawa initially adopted only a “reactive and minimalist posture” by publicly declaring its support. As the first Western country to recognize Ukraine’s independence, Ottawa has chosen a political discourse stronger than that of France and just as ambitious as that of the United Kingdom. However, Canada is lagging behind when it comes to giving Ukraine the means to win. More than a year and a half after the start of the conflict, it appears in tenth position in the ranking of donors of heavy weapons to Ukraine and eighth in the global ranking of bilateral military commitments. Despite this, international and political pressure has forced Ottawa to deliver a certain amount of heavy artillery to Ukraine, the inventory of which can be viewed on the official website of the Canadian Department of Defence. These include eight Leopard 2 main battle tanks, 44 AIM-9 missiles, four M777 howitzer systems and 208 armoured vehicles. Canada has also remained silent on the issue of renewing its military equipment to replace these donations to Ukraine, as no announcement has been made so far. Finally, the country has been criticized (notably by the Pentagon) for the lack of a real increase in its military budget capable of devoting at least 2% of its GDP to defence, as required by the 2% rule. Despite his 2014 commitment to meet this goal, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau acknowledged in April 2023 – as a form of disavowal – that Canada would never meet the spending targets mentioned above. President Zelensky’s visit to Ottawa on September 22, 2023, provided an opportunity for the political authorities to signal a stronger willingness to increase their military contribution to the war effort of the Ukrainian forces. However, to straighten out more Shooting, Canada will have to shoot more lessons from the positioning of its close European allies so as not to tarnish its credibility. In particular, Mr. Trudeau is expected to send a strong signal by stepping up his deliveries of heavy weapons. Ottawa should also learn from its two allies across the Atlantic when managing its stockpiles. For example, the increase in the pace of British and French production will eventually allow them to “do their part” while thinking about the future of their stocks and anticipating their readjustment. To cope with its “capacity issues,” it is clear that Canada, in turn, must consider replacing its own military stockpiles. However, despite the Ukraine conflict stalemate, Canada has not yet placed any orders to replace its donations from its reserves. In these respects, such initiatives could also significantly strengthen Canada’s diplomatic capital and allow it to avoid the deprivation of its influence on the international scene. Canada has already been criticized for several years for not “doing its part” because of its 25th place in terms of military budget (out of 29 NATO member countries), logically sending Ottawa back to the bench of isolated countries within the alliance, below the 2% of GDP required.   [1] These two figures here reflect the difference between the promises made and the deliveries made to date. [2] Ibid ## MINUSMA “à la carte” or Geopolitical End Game in Mali URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/minusma-a-la-carte-or-geopolitical-end-game-in-mali/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > Ten years after establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the future of... Ten years after establishing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the future of the mission and its 15,000 military and police officers is more uncertain than ever. The peace operation, authorized in the wake of the January 2013 Franco-African military intervention by a then-united Security Council behind the French "penholder[1]," is now logically called into question in a context of mistrust between Mali's traditional partners and the country's new authorities. When renewing its mandate in June 2023, the Security Council will consider three main options submitted by the United Nations Secretary General in an internal review published this past January. These options are an increase in the number of peacekeepers, a reconfiguration with constant numbers, or a transition towards a "political mission" without troops. Mali, now governed by a military junta supported by Russia –in Bamako and in New York – no longer wants France as the "penholder" of the resolutions. Instead, it demands a MINUSMA "à la carte" and raises its voice in the face of armed movements which are reorganizing in the North. Even if the mission continues to serve some of the divergent interests of the host State, permanent members of the Council, and the UN bureaucracy, it nevertheless risks becoming the collateral victim of new power rivalries. MINUSMA's January 2023 Internal Review The first option would imply an increase in the number of peacekeepers. However, the Malian authorities already indicated they are "not convinced by the relevance" of such an increase which they had already opposed in 2021. A second option would be to reconfigure the mission by keeping the current strength but closing bases in the Timbuktu and Kidal regions to redirect peacekeepers to Ménaka and Ansongo. A third, more radical option is also being considered: replacing the peacekeeping mission with a "political mission" therefore without any peacekeeper nor presence outside the capital. These three options are not new. They largely reflect the dilemmas the UN faced when designing MINUSMA in March 2013 and then during a 2018 independent strategic review, which created controversy by dividing France and the United States. The latter questioned the relevance of the peacekeeping model in the face of terrorism and pushed for an exit strategy for the mission. The 2023 context, however, is very different. The French anti-terrorist "parallel force" left Mali last summer. A new force made of 1,000 to 2,000 men from the private military company (PMC) Wagner and Russian instructors has arrived and operates mainly in the center of the country. At the same time, the Malian authorities' pressure on MINUSMA has intensified over the past year. The Risk of an "à la carte" Mission While the question of host state consent is uncertain, it is unlikely that the Malian transitional authorities will request, in the short term, the departure of MINUSMA. Indeed, they continue to derive several benefits from it, such as the transport of members of the Malian defence and security forces to northern Mali. Moreover, in a December 4, 2022 note submitted to MINUSMA's internal review, the Malian authorities requested that the mission "give top priority to the security dimension of its mandate" and to "support on logistics, fuel, food ration, medical evacuations and intelligence to the FAMa ." They also demand that the mission refrains from what they describe as "politicizing and instrumentalizing the human rights issue." Mali's demand that MINUSMA be "more offensive" is not new. It had already led the Security Council to ask the mission to "adopt a more proactive and robust approach" in June 2016. But the main consequence of this has been to create new expectations that peacekeepers were unable to meet when they were already dedicating most of their capabilities to self-protection. As António Guterres recalled in 2018, "a peacekeeping operation is not an army, or a counter-terrorist force, or a humanitarian agency. It is a tool to create the space for a nationally owned political solution." Beyond the inflammatory rhetoric, the scenario favoured by Bamako seems to be that MINUSMA remains present, with unchanged numbers, and continues its regular flights to the North of the country –  which allow Malian administrators to go to these regions, but that it intensifies its support to constructing and rehabilitating infrastructure, including for the Malian military. In contrast, the Malian junta appears to count on a divided Security Council to prevent MINUSMA from investigating human rights violations. It also certainly expects that divisions of the "international community" will allow the (new) transition timetable agreed on in July 2022 (which scheduled a presidential election in February 2024) to slide again. The Status Quo, the Worst Option Except for All the Others? The mission faces many frustrations, and the UN Secretary-General himself acknowledged that "the status quo is not an option." Therefore, a MINUSMA with unchanged troop ceiling but somewhat reconfigured could suit themajority for good and not-so-good reasons. The mission "has helped deter insurgents from taking over cities and larger towns," even if its record on protection of civilians and stabilization is mixed. The securing of secondary towns and certain major roads by MINUSMA is certainly considered helpful by the FAMa and the PMC Wagner, who can thus concentrate their efforts elsewhere, even if insecurity persists and attacks are getting closer to the capital Bamako. Without UN bases and regular flights, the presence of the Malian state in the North and Mali's territorial integrity risk being quickly called into question. The result would be an even greater destabilization of the subregion. It is difficult to see, then, what could be the contribution of a "political mission" in Bamako that would be of no real operational use to the host State nor would have political leverage over it. Bamako would likely accuse the UN of "abandonment in mid-air," and civilian populations would be left to their own faith (even more than they already are). The experience of the Central African Republic (CAR) has shown that the presence of the PMC Wagner poses challenges to peacekeepers at both the tactical and strategic levels and to the protection of civilians but that a "deconfliction," although complicated, is still possible. Western capitals will undoubtedly ask themselves whether or not MINUSMA's presence could help curb Russian influence and keep an eye on Wagner's activities, which is already diversifying elsewhere. However, some will wonder whether this justifies a one billion euros a year operation. In addition, peacekeeping has been contracting since 2016, with the closure of UN missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Darfur, Haiti and perhaps soon in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The only new operations launched by the UN since Mali and the CAR in 2013 are "political missions" (Colombia, Yemen, Sudan). Given the current polarization of the Security Council, a new major operation is unlikely; and closing MINUSMA would mean a blow to UN peacekeeping, particularly since, with no new operation in sight, it would not be possible to "recycle" either civilian employees or military contingents. Is MINUSMA Able to Handle the Increased Pressure from the Malian Authorities? If MINUSMA is extended again in June 2023, the question will be whether it will be able to handle the increased pressure from the Malian authorities. The arrival of Russia and the PMC Wagner in Mali in late 2021 led to an escalation in tensions between the transitional government and France that led to the end of Operation Barkhane and the suspension of French development assistance. At the same time, the deliveries of Russian military equipment – including radar-guided surface-to-air missiles the American civil aviation agency (FAA) expressed concerns about - and Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones reinforce a military stabilization approach rather than the more political one advocated by the UN. In January 2022, the ruling military junta had forced MINUSMA to halt flights for several days, then imposed major no-fly zones (that covered nearly half the country) for UN aircraft in central Mali and the region South of Ménaka. Yet these are the areas where the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) operate and civilian populations are most threatened. MINUSMA flights have since resumed but now require 48 to 72 hours notice. During the last quarter of 2022, the UN reported that "237 MINUSMA flight requests have been either denied or received no response from Malian authorities," who deplore the fact that the mission "despite the commitments made, does not share the information and data collected by the drones." The rift between the mission and the Malian host state widened further when, on March 22, 2022, a Malian attack helicopter fired six rockets toward British peacekeepers south of Gao. Moreover, the host state does not allow MINUSMA human rights investigators to visit the site of the alleged massacre of several hundred civilians in late March 2022 in Moura (central Mali) during a joint Wagner-FAMa military operation. The Directorate of Information and Public Relations (DIRPA) of the FAMa claims that it has "neutralized" 203 jihadists and has shared many communiqués, suggesting an intensification of its anti-terrorist operations with impressive but not verifiable figures. On February 5, 2023, the Malian government finally expelled the director of the MINUSMA's human rights division, days after he violently denigrated the speech of a Malian human rights defender before the Security Council. On March 23, 2023 the UN reported that in 2022, civilian deaths were up by 54 percent, and recorded at least 90 human rights violations by FAMa, representing 26 percent of the total documented violence. Russia's and China's positions at the Security Council meetings also support the Malian transitional authorities. The Russian Foreign Ministry even congratulated Mali on an "important victory" against terrorism and described as "disinformation" the allegations about the massacre of civilians by the FAMa and the involvement of Russian mercenaries. However, the Malian authorities continue to deny their presence, claiming they receive "state-to-state" support. Minister Sergey Lavrov's visit to Bamako on February 7, 2023, consecrates this new security partnership. Malian transitional authorities, while denying having "taken any restrictive measures specifically targeting the Mission" and calling for "better coordination for MINUSMA's actions with the Malian State" recently blocked more UN flights and supply convoys, no longer issue visas to the UN Panel of Experts on Mali Sanctions and have turned away foreign journalists. Even if MINUSMA prefers to play appeasement and to emphasize coordinated patrols with the FAMa (81 during the last quarter, according to the January 2023 report of the Secretary General of the United Nations), many within the UN fear a scenario à la Darfur or Eritrea of decline of a peacekeeping mission “by a thousand cuts” if the host country consent continues to erode. Troop-Contributing Countries Lose Patience While these incidents are increasing, this affects the rotation of troops from some troop-contributing countries to MINUSMA. In June 2022, Mali's Foreign Minister strongly opposed the French offer to "continue its air support to MINUSMA" after the departure of the French Barkhane force. The latter constituted an essential reassurance for many peacekeepers as the UN mission lacks attack helicopters. On July 10, 2022, Malian authorities arrested on arrival at the airport a rotation of 49 Ivorian soldiers who had come to support the German MINUSMA contingent, calling them "mercenaries" and imprisoning them[2]. In addition, the MINUSMA spokesman was expelled, accused of posting "unacceptable information" on Twitter about the case. Mali has then suspended all rotations until a "coordination meeting" is held to "facilitate the coordination and regulation of rotation" of UN contingents. Sweden's announcements of the withdrawal of its last contingent of 180 peacekeepers, motivated by Bamako's use of Wagner, the early end of the 260 British and 319 Jordanian peacekeepers’ operations, as well as planned withdrawal of the 1,078 Egyptian troops, will likely be the end of the "mobile intervention force" based in Gao . Côte d'Ivoire also intends to gradually withdraw its 862 soldiers and police by the summer of 2023 and so does Benin (258). Finally, the German government is also considering the withdrawal of its 1,000 soldiers no later than May 2024. These cascading departures represent a quarter of the force,  which it will not be easy for the UN to replace, even if it has undertaken initiatives including with so-called "traditional" contributors such as Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. The 2015 Peace Agreement, a Very Unstable Foundation for the UN Presence At the end of  December 2022, the armed movements that had signed the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the June 2015 Algiers Process announced the suspension of their participation in the bodies implementing and monitoring the Agreement "until a meeting is held with international mediation and on neutral ground." At the end of  January 2023, these groups also announced their withdrawal from the commission responsible for drafting the country's new Constitution, which was supposed to officialize the end of the transition period. The armed movements gathered under the new label of the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD, made up of the Coordination of Azawad Movements – CMA – joined by the two branches of the Platform of Algiers of June 14, 2014, and the Coordination of Inclusivity Movements). They accused the transitional authorities of lacking the will to implement the agreement. The CSP-PSD also criticizes the Malian authorities' inertia in the face of the ISGS offensive that has caused hundreds of deaths and thousands of displacements. In April 2022, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, El-Ghassim Wane, reported to the Security Council that "no tangible progress was made in the peace process" and that "the past three months were marked by worrying actions and rhetoric, not in line with the spirit of the Agreement." The words of the transition Prime Minister Choguel Maïga on the need for an "intelligent and consensual rereading of the peace agreement," in which he sees the seeds of a partition of Mali, have been particularly controversial. Hopes of reviving the process with the decision-level meeting held in Bamako in  August 2022[3] and Algeria's efforts (whose President received CMA representatives on February 26) were short-lived. In a letter to the leader of the International Mediation, which leaked on March 1, 2023, the Malian Minister of National Reconciliation denounces violations of the 2015 peace agreement by former CMA rebels whom he accuses of "increasingly clear collusion with terrorist groups." Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum The Malian transitional authorities have instituted a "National Day of Regained Sovereignty" on January 14, 2023, in memory of the great mobilization against the "illegal, illegitimate and inhumane sanctions," and they promote a Mali Kura (the new Mali) and a Mali Fanga (warrior). They seem primarily concerned with basing their legitimacy on patriotic sentiment and ensuring the loyalty of armed forces whose hierarchy has just been reshuffled. At the same time, the CSP-PSD armed movements are strengthening their military coordination on the ground through joint patrols and the announcement of the fusion of the CMA movements in  Kidal in early February. They could even coordinate their efforts with those of the head of the JNIM, Iyad Ag Ghaly, against a strengthened ISGS today, but also perhaps to face the FAMa and their supporters from the PMC Wagner tomorrow. One cannot exclude that the Malian authorities would be tempted by a new military adventurism in northern Mali, as the government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta did in May 2014 in Kidal. Such adventurism took place less than a year after the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) started supporting the FAMa. But it is not certain that their Russian ally – which is also holding diplomatic meetings with CMA representatives in Bamako – is ready to follow them. Although the PMC Wagner has not reduced its manpower in Mali, it is already facing difficulties in central Mali and Ukraine. Its powerful neighbour, Algeria, which will sit on the Security Council in 2024-2025, will also not let such a scenario unfold, given the consequences it could have on southern Algeria. While MINUSMA's main strategic priority remains "to support the implementation of the [2015] Agreement by the Malian parties," a resumption of clashes, the final abandonment of the Algiers Agreement and a de facto North-South partition would call into question the primary purpose of MINUSMA. Towards a Geopolitical Endgame The year 2022 has been marked by increased polarization in the Security Council following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In this context, MINUSMA seems pushed to the background and paying the price for its relation – perceived or real – with the French stabilization strategy since 2013. At the end of June 2022, the UN extended the mission's mandate for another year, but, for the first time, Russia and China abstained rather than voted in favour, and the Council can no longer produce a joint statement on Mali for the press. France insists that "the Malian transitional authorities must also uphold their responsibilities," and the United States is alarmed by violations against civilians, including those committed by "armed terrorist groups, the Malian Armed Forces and the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group." Russia accuses Western powers of using MINUSMA “to damage the reputation” of the Malian transitional Government because they “are displeased with their independent approach to foreign policy.” MINUSMA, which has its every action scrutinized, has no choice but to learn to live with a divided Security Council and a difficult host State. It must try to preserve the necessary impartiality in implementing an ambiguous mandate resulting from compromises between powers. It should also help counter "disinformation campaigns" aimed at the mission. The head of MINUSMA, El Ghassim Wane, also visited London, Paris and Moscow at the end of 2022 to try to ensure the continued support of the permanent members of the Council. The difficulty lies in not lending oneself to accusations of being the vector of an informational war waged against one or the other, without becoming irrelevant or only a service provider for a junta in power, nor becoming an accomplice of the latter by turning a blind eye on certain actions. The mission is almost impossible. Time for MINUSMA Lessons MINUSMA will have tested the ability of a UN operation to last in an environment affected by terrorism, with mixed results. The UN and its contingents have shown unsuspected resilience, despite 168 peacekeepers killed and 692 wounded. MINUSMA has adapted by training its troops (especially regarding the risks of improvised explosive devices) and acquiring technology, sensors and specialized units, even if it also means a relative "bunkerization" that limits its ability to protect civilian populations while protecting itself. African contingents have been at the forefront and have paid the heaviest price. But the significant participation of Western contingents in MINUSMA has also helped modernize peacekeeping with new capabilities and advance issues such as medical support and the use of intelligence in peace operations. The necessary adaptation of peacekeeping to contemporary conflicts is not, however, just a question of military capabilities and posture. MINUSMA has also shown the inherent limitations of stabilization mandates focused on state-building when the central state's presence and legitimacy are contested in conflict contexts that are both more fragmented (by local dynamics and conflicts) and regionalized. Practicing the "primacy of politics" in conflict resolution is difficult for a peace operation when the parties to the conflict themselves do not believe in implementing a peace agreement signed under duress. The mission is even more complicated when the Security Council is not united behind common political objectives, and external actors favour military stabilization approaches. This de facto situation and ambiguous mandates and relations with anti-terrorist "parallel forces" (Serval then Barkhane and the G5 Sahel Joint Force) have also tended to reduce the political space in which MINUSMA operates. As a result, the impartiality of the United Nations is often eroded without these fighting forces offering any real leverage to facilitate the implementation of the mandate. Even if it continues to serve some of the divergent interests of the host State and permanent members of the Council, MINUSMA risks becoming a collateral victim of the new power rivalries. Therefore, the UN must seriously consider an exit strategy, which could involve an African force with a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII and predictable funding, an option that Antonio Guterres has advocated. Closing MINUSMA would undoubtedly turn the page of large multidimensional stabilization operations at a time the UN increasingly faces both the risk of political marginalization and challenges to the liberal norms it has traditionally promoted.     [1] The "penholder" system is an informal arrangement whereby one or more members of the Security Council (serving as a "drafter") initiate and chair the process of drafting outputs such as resolutions. [2] This is only recently, after more than six months, and thanks to Togolese mediation, that those soldiers were finally released (while being officially convicted, the release being the result of a presidential pardon). [3] Durant this meeting, The parties had agreed to’Integration of 26,000 ex-combatants in two phases into the national defence and security forces and the’public administration. More andn parallel, the Malian authorities have launched the "special recruitment" of 2 000 young people from the northern and central regions in the Malian armed forces outside the framework of the’agreement. ## Naming and Shaming and Its Consequences on Civil Conflicts URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/naming-and-shaming-and-its-consequences-on-civil-conflicts/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy brief attempts to hypothesize on what could be done to avoid the harmful consequences on civilians arising from international... When acts of violence against civilians are widely publicized, Canada is frequently rushed to join its allies in public denunciation campaigns aimed at raising the political cost for an actor to violate human rights. Canada, for example, has distinguished itself in the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa by seeking ways to sustain the global attention towards its internal race-based violence and by trying to influence its allies to impose sanctions against those responsible for civilian abuses. Confronted with images and reports of atrocities, international pleas for state officials to name and shame the perpetrators involved are understandable, regardless of their political statuses. However, as intuitive and necessary as these denunciations may seem, they nevertheless influence the trajectories of civil conflicts and the subsequent risks of political violence. Indeed, studies indicate that naming and shaming practices often fail to end violence against civilians, and sometimes even exacerbate abuses by radicalizing those who commit them. Therefore, it is necessary to reflect on how Canada and its allies should intervene publicly to ensure the protection of human rights, while preserving the political and security stability of the regions targeted by international denunciations. The purpose of this policy brief is twofold. First, it seeks to define naming and shaming practices and the different impacts they can have on civil conflicts. Then, it aims to critically examine current Canadian policies of international denunciation and to propose avenues that would minimize the risks for these campaigns to further exacerbate the exact human rights violations that they seek to highlight. To do this, this paper underlines the tragic consequences of the recent Western naming and shaming campaign targeting the Burmese military junta in the aftermath of the February 2021 coup, and then attempts to hypothesize on what went wrong and what could be done to avoid the harmful consequences on civilians arising from international denunciation campaigns. A Brief History of Naming and Shaming Practices In the aftermath of World War II, issues of human rights protection gained global prominence. The increasing number of non-governmental human rights organizations, combined with the increased global accessibility of media coverage in conflict zones, raised public awareness of these issues, while also encouraging constituents to put pressure on their representatives for international action against oppressive regimes. This resulted in the creation of a global human rights advocacy network that worked to publicize atrocities and their perpetrators (naming) and ensuring that those guilty of rights violations are socially punished (shaming). The post-Cold War context of the 1990s proved to be fertile ground for the establishment of new norms concerning the responsibility of states to protect their populations against human rights abuses and, conversely, the moral duty of the so-called international community to ensure the protection of these rights. Indeed, global attention to security challenges gradually shifted from the nuclear threat to issues of human rights protection as intrastate conflicts multiplied and became the chief source of instability in the world. Western leaders then began to adopt the idea of ​​humanitarian intervention, that is, law enforcement interventions in the service of universal humanitarian values, in order to materialize a sense of morality in the international society. In this manner, liberal globalization and American hegemony expanded the ideological and normative terrain on which intrastate disputes operate – human rights violations became a problem to be addressed internationally and, sometimes, at the expense of state sovereignty standards. Rebels would thus market their cause and suffering via mass media and international non-governmental organization (INGO) in an effort to attain international attention, which could in turn generate a moral outrage and force the international community to act against the ‘perceived’ culprit. Through this process, it often appeared both legitimate and necessary for western democracies to speak publicly against regimes accused of crimes against their own populations and, in some instances, to go so far as to intervene militarily to prevent further bloodshed. The post-Cold War normative shift in international politics therefore caused the practices of naming and shaming to become a widespread foreign policy tool in Western Europe and North America. States would thus join INGOs and transnational networks in their public denunciations of human rights violations and threaten regimes to invoke the responsibility to protect and vote for economic sanctions in the Security Council, or to take other coercive measures aimed at ending state abuses.  This sense of global awareness and moral responsibility therefore became a new force in world politics and forever changed the way in which intra-state conflicts are fought. How International Outrage Can Turn the Tide of Violence How blaming policies are likely to affect an actor's ability and willingness to violate human rights remains a matter of debate. The mechanisms generally identified are as follows. First, INGOs create knowledge about the abuses and share information with relevant journalists. The media then act as a transmission belt for the local violations to become an international controversy and spread beyond borders. Conversely, the moral outrage acts as a lever to encourage foreign actors to act against violators and show support for the victims. The benefit for states to engage in moral condemnations and economic sanctions is therefore twofold: on the one hand, they avoid the reputational damage caused by inaction toward gross human rights violations, on the other; they signal their commitment to the liberal international order and the norms it perpetuates. For those targeted by the denunciations, the consequences are major. Indeed, the international disapproval of the perpetrators makes them outcasts with whom no partner wants to do business or interact with, for fear of being in turn associated with crimes against human rights. As a result, abusers change their repressive behavior if they cannot risk the loss of power, resources, allies or legitimacy that inaction in the face of such condemnation would entail. In reality, the process is not that simple, neither is it easy for victims of human rights violations to be heard on the international stage. A struggle for the narrative is likely to take place between the perpetrators and their opposition, which risks complicating victims' efforts to publicize violations. Indeed, state violence is often reinterpreted or concealed in order to avoid any backlash that would increase dissent. Likewise, rebel groups using violence against civilians often try to portray themselves as victims, or to legitimize their violence in reaction to abuses committed by their opponents. From this angle, whether the victims succeed in making the perpetrators accountable for their crimes is highly dependent on their ability to transmit information in the days following repressive events. Dissident entrepreneurs, who mobilize supporters and ensure that information about abuses reaches as many people as possible, thus play a crucial role in turning violence against those who carry it out. Moreover, not all countries are equally likely to attract international denunciations in the wake of harsh repression. In fact, the most powerful states in the system are often partially immune to denunciation and sanction campaigns, since they can retaliate and blackmail their accusers. Similarly, states are frequently reluctant to publicly condemn their allies and economic partners, as evidenced by the very few critics from European countries Spain faced when its government used political repression against Catalan secessionists. Another point to consider about the influence of these campaigns on the use of political violence concerns the relationship between the oppressors and the group that is oppressed. When dissident movements represent minority groups, state repression is more likely to occur than when movements mobilize a larger portion of the population that political leaders must rely on to remain in power. In other words, the relationship of dependence, or the lack of dependence between perpetrators and their victims, plays a key role in the decision of states to engage in political violence to suppress their opposition, while also having an impact on the extent to which such violence will succeed in crushing dissent. This is important because in cases of minority-led resistance campaigns, third parties appear necessary to affect the dependency relationship between repressed groups and those who repress them. Indeed, by identifying and denouncing violators, foreign actors increase the cost of repressing minorities and thus bind the political fate of the oppressed to that of their oppressor. A good example of this logic is the process of independence in East Timor. Although the Indonesian invasion of East Timor led to serious abuses against the civilian population, the government in Jakarta paid little political costs until an international controversy over the Santa Cruz massacre made political repression an increasingly untenable strategy to fight the secessionist movement in East Timor. The Indonesian authorities had previously managed to portray the Timorese minority to its national population as violent and dangerous. International support and mass non-violent protests have consequently redefined this portrayal – and saw the Timorese minority become politically significant enough for the repression to cease and for negotiations to be initiated. The Unintended Consequences of Shame and Blame on Human Rights Abuses Other case studies indicate, however, that international denunciation campaigns can have effects that go beyond the intentions of those who implement them, and even undermine the original objectives of improving a government’s human rights record. For instance, the moral and social pressure exerted on a regime can paradoxically encourage it to restrict the activities of civil society organizations in order to hide noncompliance with human rights norms and commitments. This is a particularly perverse consequence since it has been shown that civil society organizations play a crucial role in ensuring the protection of human rights. In addition, when targeted by international denunciations, state perpetrators may intensify some violations, while reducing others. This is due to the varying ability of governments to improve their human rights record depending on the type of violations committed and their control over the agents of terror. Moreover, governments may substitute certain types of violations for other violations in order to avoid international blame, or even resort to pro-government militias to ‘distance themselves from the execution of violence while reaping the rewards of repression’. In fact, these findings echo other works suggesting that alternatives to military intervention such as economic sanctions have often worsened rather than improved human rights conditions in the target state, namely because they increase the political instability and affect the government capacity to control its security agents. How these campaigns influence the struggles between local political forces is also of great relevance if one’s purpose is to put an end to human rights violations. Indeed, international pressure on a government often strengthens local opposition and dissenting voices, which in turn can spur political leaders to resort to repression against their political opponents and to quell dissent. Furthermore, non-state actors sometimes benefit from international publicity generated by acts of violence against civilians, and may therefore intentionally escalate violence with their state opponent to attract foreign actors into the conflict. Worse yet, when foreign states accuse repressive governments and allude to the threat of humanitarian military intervention, they can incite minority groups to rebel and confront the state, which can lead to an increase in political violence and thus engender catastrophic consequences for civilian populations. This phenomenon has been tragically demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia, where sub-state groups have sometimes intentionally provoked genocidal violence in order to trigger Western intervention. Shaming Perpetrators in Myanmar The Tatmadaw coup that toppled the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar in February 2021 sparked widespread violence in the state. Shocking images of unarmed protesters being beaten, arrested in the middle of the street and tortured appeared in Western media, coupled with poignant images of protesters waving banners conveying a clear message: ‘We need R2P’. Denunciations and international sanctions immediately followed. Canada participated in the naming and shaming campaign against the military junta, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau even criticized the military's repressive actions on Twitter. In fact, Prime Minister Trudeau's position is in line with Canada's long-standing foreign policy towards Myanmar, as targeted sanctions against certain listed persons and entities have been in place since 2007. Neither it is new for Canada to engage in such type of statecraft or to position itself as a leading voice for global human rights. Indeed, Canada, concerned with multilateral cooperation on international security, has often followed its allies in international denunciation campaigns. For example, the crackdown on the secessionist movement in East Timor had been the subject of Canadian denunciations and sanctions against Indonesian officials, which led to anti-Suharto protests in Canada and to a scathing reply from Jakarta to Ottawa. However, Myanmar's recent naming and shaming campaign does not yet appear to have had the same success as in East Timor. Negotiations between the junta and foreign actors have repeatedly failed, while the violence has continued to escalate. Moreover, the political quagmire in which the state is now sinking is far from unrelated to the diplomatic campaign of exclusion and denunciation aimed at the junta. Indeed, international critics and sanctions have created a mirage of interventionism and undermined mediation efforts. As a result, demonstrators now expect a more sustained commitment from the international community in their favour and, consequently, dedicate a significant part of their resistance activities to the search for international support. Interviews with rebel groups also revealed that some took the risky gamble of escalating violence with the junta in order to trigger Western intervention. Even more worryingly, these condemnations have increased the pressure on the military regime, which therefore incited the junta to increase repression in order to consolidate its power. Finally, the lack of international leadership to respond to the crisis and the dimming hopes of the opposition convinced Myanmar's shadow government to call for a “people’s defensive war” against the state’s military. The worst is happening as humanitarian organizations alarm about a flood of refugees in neighbouring states. In turn, what seems to have failed in Myanmar is the possibility of finding a compromise that could bring the junta to the negotiating table. Indeed, the sanctions and denunciations originated from the desire of the international community to isolate the junta in order to force it to negotiate with the opposition and stop the violations. What was not intended, however, was the signal the international condemnations conveyed to the opposition: keep fighting and we will support you. This, in fact, hampered the likelihood of a peaceful resolution to the conflict in addition to increasing domestic violence as the belligerents felt a sense of emergency and decided to engage in an uncompromising strategy, which only paved the way for a civil war in the making. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada The weight and influence of words sometimes exceed one’s expectations. Naming and shaming practices generate consequences for civil conflicts that are difficult to predict and may change over time. Canada should thus be cautious and strategic when it engages in moral condemnations and public denunciations against abusive governments. What could be done to prevent further tragedies is not simple, but not impossible either. For Canada, there are four courses of favourable action: First, naming and shaming campaigns should always be explicit in their motivations and objectives. Canada must ensure that there is as little vagueness as possible about its intentions and future commitment to the conflict in order to avoid false hopes for groups fighting against repressive governments. It must also be clear that the condemnation of a repressive regime does not constitute de facto support for its opponents. Second, Canada should closely consult local human rights organizations before considering any public commentary on the violence that is taking place. Although the media often exert pressure for politicians to speak on the spot about international crises, Canada's words will have a more meaningful and beneficial impact if they are prepared in coordination with actors that can actually act on the ground to put an end to the violence. In addition, the links developed with these local organizations can later serve as a basis on which Canada can contribute to peacekeeping efforts. Thirdly, the diplomatic exclusion measures and the economic sanctions imposed by Canada must be designed in such a way as to facilitate (and not to prevent) a possible dialogue with the perpetrators. In fact, Canada must make it known, in its public denunciations, that the reduction of punitive measures requires concrete actions by those in power to reduce violence. Likewise, the imposition of punitive measures in response to human rights abuses must be gradual, so that the targeted regime can back down and has no interest in persisting in repressing. It is important that the perpetrators recognize the real advantage in stopping the violations and not rather have an interest in dodging the international sanctions that target them. Thus, campaigns must be designed in such a way as to offer an honorable exit to the regimes concerned so that they abandon their repressive tactics. Finally, Canada must continue to engage with its allies when widespread abuses are committed against civilian populations. Indeed, Canada's voice in a humanitarian crisis will have greater reach if it is aligned with those of its allies. In addition, by engaging in dialogue with its allies before speaking out, Canada minimizes the risks that denunciations send contradictory signals to actors on the ground. ## NATO Enlargement 20 Years On: Some Thoughts URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/nato-enlargement-20-years-on-some-thoughts/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy brief offers some arguments on which a renewed analysis of NATO enlargement should be based, almost 30 years after NATO began... Almost three decades after NATO began to open its doors to countries in Central and Eastern Europe, it is time to revisit scholarly debates about enlargement. Most of the debate on this question took place from 1995 to the beginning of the 2000s. Consequently, a new analysis is warranted and, with the benefit of hindsight, we are now in a better position to assess the most prominent arguments that were put forward at the time. We are now also in a position to react to certain claims which, twenty years ago, were only speculation. We would therefore like to offer some arguments on which a renewed analysis of NATO enlargement should be based. First, contrary to what some analyses have argued, the enlargement of the Alliance is not the act of a single state, however powerful that state may be. It is therefore wrong, as some do, to place sole responsibility for this decision on the Clinton administration or certain key players within that administration. The desire to join the Alliance reflects, above all, the collective desire of all the so-called Eastern countries – from Bulgaria to the Baltic – to return to the West and reconnect with their geopolitical, cultural, and economic heritage. As Browning notes about Finland, the roots of these countries “were perceived as lying in the West and hence […] with the break-up of the Soviet Union they were returning to these organic origins in Western civilization.” One can interpet this desire to return to the West as a kind of natural reflex. From this point of view, it is also wrong to separate the question of NATO’s enlargement from the process of European Union (EU) integration. The two processes are, more often than not, inseparable. For the countries of Central Europe, while the EU symbolizes prosperity, NATO represents protection and security. As Suzanne Nies notes: “For most of the so-called Eastern countries, integration into NATO and the EU has been motivated by a concern for protection vis-à-vis the former dominating Soviet power – a concern which results in the willingness to join the opposing alliance and seek close cooperation with the United States. This is why all NATO candidates are also candidates for the EU, which is perfectly illustrated by the words of the Lithuanian Ambassador to France, Giedrius Cekuolis: “NATO and the EU are like mom and dad, and we can't choose between the two.” The necessary linking of the two processes, from this point of view, can only suggest one conclusion: the integration of the Central European countries, both within the EU and NATO, was probably inevitable. Could the Central European countries have been prevented from joining the EU? To ask the question is to answer it. And what applies to the EU applies equally to the Alliance. Enlargement, in either case, is a fact that is better to accept than to regret. A Strategic Mistake? One of the sharpest criticisms of Alliance enlargement, put forward by renowned historians and diplomats such as John Lewis Gaddis and George Kennan, is that it was one of the “worst strategic mistakes” made by the United States and its allies. Their argument rests, in particular, on the idea that the policies adopted by the West towards Russia after 1990 would resemble those which the allies of the First World War forced the Wilhelminian Reich to accept at war’s end. Otherwise put, the United States would have imposed a leonine and humiliating peace on Moscow, the enlargement of the Alliance being the very symbol of this humiliation. This is, in our view, an erroneous comparison, because the two contexts are quite different. Russia did not have to accept an unconditional surrender, as Germany did. Moreover, contrary to Gaddis’s argument, the integration of the countries of Central Europe into the Alliance follows an obvious strategic logic. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the fragmentation of the USSR created a geopolitical vacuum in the center of Europe. Should this vacuum be allowed to continue, at the risk of seeing this region develop its own system of regional or international relations? Wasn't there a risk of recreating an unstable and conflict-ridden situation similar to the interwar years? Should we risk seeing Russia regain a foothold in a region that it has considered, for more than a century, to be its preserve as much around the Baltics as in central Europe and in the eastern Balkans? What might be called the “gray zone” or “strategic vacuum” of Central Europe had to be secured, and what better solution than to open the door to the Alliance for these countries? No other institutional arrangement – whether the OSCE or WEU – could have offered these countries the same level of protection and security. Was the process of integration of Central European countries improvised or poorly organized? Has there been any hiccups? Of course.[1] But, was it “a mistake”? Quite the contrary. As Andrew Michta notes: “Today, NATO enlargement may be seen to have been an obvious pathway to security in post-communist countries and as a means of stabilizing the ‘grey zone of Europe.’ While scholars and analysts continue to debate the actual scope and phases of the process, few seem to question its overall political utility… ”. The commitment of the United States in favor of enlargement was not a mistake, but a choice which reflected the traditions of American foreign policy since 1945. As Mira Rapp-Hooper reminds us in her last book: “The overarching purpose of alliances has not changed: They should help the United States prevent a hostile hegemon from dominating Eurasia.” However, these remarks also reflect what Henry Kissinger said at the end of the 1990s: “Our security is inextricably linked with Europe’s and now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the Continent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needs to adapt itself to the consequences of its success.” Finally, we can add that the enlargement of NATO also responded to a broader politico-strategic logic. As Canada recalled at the time, the Alliance's vocation, according to Article 2 of the Charter, is “to develop peaceful and friendly international relations, while strengthening their institutions, and ensuring a better understanding of the principles on which these institutions were founded.” In other words, far from being just a purely military organization, NATO is also a tool to promote international cooperation and the strengthening of democratic institutions, which was useful for engaging the former eastern countries in the context of post-Cold War Europe. While the geopolitical logic behind NATO enlargement is sound, the main argument against expansion still needs to be examined. According to its critics, the integration of the Central European countries into the Alliance, threatening the security of Russia in its backyard, is one, if not the main cause, of the tensions which again pit Moscow against the West. If it is true that the Russia of Vladimir Putin has once again become fundamentally hostile to the United States and to all that the West symbolizes, can we really say that the enlargement of NATO is at the source of the changes that have affected Russian politics for 20 years? Unlikely. Indeed, the humiliation represented by the liberation of the countries of Central Europe from the Soviet yoke in 1988-1989 and the breakup of the USSR in 1991 was not caused by the Alliance, nor by the the economic chaos that Russia experienced in the 1990s, nor the endemic corruption of the elites. The shift to the right in Russian opinion, including growing hostility to the West, also preceded the Alliance's enlargement by several years. This nationalist withdrawal is reminiscent of the complex and contradictory relationship that Russia has historically maintained with the West from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin, a relationship coloured by fascination and proud resentment. This is reflected by pendulum-like arc that Russian foreign policy has travelled for centuries between hostility and attraction to the West. The enlargement of the Alliance certainly played a significant role in the symbolic humiliation of the former superpower, but it must be emphasized that the causes of Russia's authoritarian turn and what some call the 'new cold war' must be sought elsewhere than in NATO enlargement. The three preceding arguments should obviously not lead us to ignore the problems raised by enlargement. Since the start of the last decade, the Alliance has indeed faced two new threats, one internal and political, the other external, and of a more military nature. Towards a Separation From NATO? The Alliance's internal political crisis is probably the most insidious. Since the early 2000s, the enthusiasm for liberalism and democracy, which characterized the first decade of the post-Cold War era, has been replaced all over Europe, especially among the countries of Central Europe and the Balkans. Integration into European institutions and globalization have often, in the eyes of of Central European public, not brought the expected prosperity and stability. The shocks that the emigration of their best talents have caused, in addition to the 2008 financial crisis and the waves of migration from the Middle East and Africa in 2015-2016, accentuated the political and social unrest. Is it any wonder that political movements that are anti-liberal, nationalist, critical of European institutions and xenophobic have taken advantage of this collective anxiety to get elected? This is what seems to have happened in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The corollary of this phenomenon has been that several of these States have adopted anti-liberal measures, attacking either the independence of the judiciary, the freedom of the press, and going, in some cases, as far as opting for unlimited emergency powers in favor of the executive. Underlining the fragility of democratization in these regions, let us also note that seven other states among the new members of NATO (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania) deserve the name of ‘hybrid regimes' or 'semi-consolidated democracies' as noted by Freedom House. Obviously, it is difficult to throw stones at these states, since the so-called populist wave has also manifested itself in the West, with varying degrees of success, not to mention the United States, with the election of Donald Trump, which also symbolizes the rejection of liberalism and internationalism in all its forms. The consequences of these populist and authoritarian impulses are extremely important for NATO and for the European Union, insofar as they threaten their cohesion as communities of values. Is it possible that the populist phenomenon could shatter the European and Atlantic community? Some advance such a position. It should be noted, however, that most of the countries of Eastern Europe, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans via Poland and Hungary, depend heavily on the European Union and the Alliance for their economic prosperity and their security. Paradoxically, Eastern Europeans are among the most fervent supporters of the EU and NATO, while electing deeply Eurosceptic governments which nonetheless benefit from the largesse of Brussels. The situation is therefore not hopeless, as central Europe remains anchored in the West by its own interests. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that for anti-liberal leaders, like Orban in Hungary or Babis in the Czech Republic, the authoritarianism and anti-Western discourse of Putin is an example to emulate. Is there a danger of a drift to the east? For sure. In fact, even China is trying to increase its influence in the region. The danger of dissociating certain members of the Alliance therefore cannot be ruled out and the recent case of Turkey does not fail to give cause for concern from this point of view. The Russian Resurgence The second threat facing the Alliance is more directly military. How can we ensure the defence of the continent, and particularly its borders to the North and the East, in the face of an increasingly aggressive Russia? Since 2008, Moscow has more and more clearly manifested its desire to re-establish zones of influence on the outskirts of its former empire, even if it means using intimidation or force, as was the case in Crimea in 2014. All means have been justified to support this goal, giving rise to the concept of ‘hybrid’ warfare, which includes diplomatic gestures as well as disinformation operations or more military posturing. NATO must therefore attempt to reestablish a relationship of deterrence against its traditional enemy, but within a larger geographic framework that is more difficult to defend. A quick glance at a map of Europe is enough to be convinced. The irony, of course, is that the Alliance for two decades endorsed the concept of collective security and emphasized the model of small expeditionary forces suited to multilateral peace operations. All European forces, with some exceptions, have therefore abandoned the territorial defence model, reducing the size of their forces proportionately. For example, in 1990 the FRG could deploy 215 battalions (infantry, armor and artillery). In 2015, that number fell to 34, a cut of 84%. The number of French battalions was reduced by 60% and that of the British army by more than 50%. The United States is going to emulate its European allies, with its forces going from 99 battalions to 14, a cut of 86% in terms of military personnel. Without even talking about budget or equipment, would the Europeans be able to defend a border that runs from the Baltics to Romania? The most serious scenarios underline, in this regard, the enormous capability gap of the Alliance in the event of a confrontation with Russia. The slope to be climbed is considerable, and it is questionable whether the collective political will of Alliance members will be sufficient to restore the balance of deterrence in the medium term. But should we accept the French President's statement that the Alliance is “brain dead”? It is perhaps worth recalling, in this context, the remarkable longevity of NATO and its ability to survive crises and changes in the international order since 1945. Why would the NATO of 2021 be less able to meet the challenges of the 21st century? It should be noted, in this sense, that European public opinion remains overwhelmingly favourable to the Alliance, and that most Alliance members have been doing their best in recent years to meet the budgetary criteria of the NATO Alliance. Faced with the new challenges in the East, NATO has also embarked on a process of transformation aimed at strengthening its deterrent capabilities against Russia. There is therefore no reason to despair, especially as the United States appears more willing, under President Biden, to once again assume its leadership role in the Alliance. A shorter version of this text was first published in English: here. [1] As Sara Moeller shows in a recent article, the process of reforming NATO's deployments and command structures was independent of the Alliance's enlargement process from 1991 to 1997, which was a major mistake. The Alliance authorities therefore did not consider the impact that enlargement would have on NATO's missions and military arrangements until 1996-1997. Roughly speaking, the Alliance's military capabilities have been cut by around 25%, and the command was restructured, while ignoring the defense missions that an enlarged NATO would have to undertake. NATO has also avoided demanding military capabilities from Central European countries to match these missions. The political criteria were sufficient. As a result, enlargement was carried out at a discount, even if all these problems were solved later. ## NATO in the Age of COVID-19: From Health Crisis to Political Crisis? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/nato-in-the-age-of-covid-19-from-health-crisis-to-political-crisis/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This hot take explores how has the current COVID-19 pandemic influenced the concrete activities of NATO? This blog post is written as part of the Cycle of Virtual Workshops on Building Capacity in the Age of COVID-19. The fourth workshop focused on NATO and defence, and involved Carla Martinez Machain, professor at Kansas State University, Stéfanie von Hlatky, professor at Queen's University and Colonel Éric Laforest, commander, Task Force Latvia . The information related in the text is a general synthesis of the ideas presented by the speakers.[1] Watch the video of the fourth panel How has the current COVID-19 pandemic influenced the concrete activities of NATO - its deployments, its exercises to develop its own capabilities, as well as its capacity building activities among its state partners (in Iraq in particular)? To answer this question, two different levels of analysis - and incidentally two alternative perspectives - can be retained: the central question of the influence of the pandemic on the effectiveness of the activities of the alliance from a strategic point of view and operational, on the one hand, or the related question of the influence of the health crisis on the legitimacy of these operations with civilians within the states receiving security assistance on the other hand. From an operational perspective, NATO deployments are conceptualized as long-term commitments. In some cases, like Iraq and Afghanistan, the goal is to train host nation troops. Other missions are more aimed at deterring potential threats by stationing armed forces abroad: Operation Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic countries in particular. If, within this framework of institutionalized and sustainable commitments, the COVID-19 pandemic did not directly lead to a “security vacuum” in the areas of intervention of the Atlantic alliance, the health crisis took the form an additional operational constraint on top of the various challenges that these missions are already facing. NATO operations face differentiated constraints depending on the context of the operation, and, within a multinational alliance, the distinct capabilities of the national armed forces specifically engaged within each mission. Consequently, the constraining effects of COVID-19 have taken different forms in different theatres of operation; disruptions in the rotation of troops, temporary cessation of certain military exercises and training, etc. In particular, some key NATO programs have been reoriented to meet immediate health security requirements. The training courses carried out by gender advisors, the aim of which is to strengthen the place of women within the alliance, to strengthen understanding of the differentiated influence of conflicts on people depending on their gender, or to fight against sexual violence within the framework of the activities of the alliance, for example, were momentarily redirected. Usually intended for both NATO members and staff of host states, these activities related to the implementation of UN Resolution 1325 have in fact been refocused, for the most part, on internal members of the alliance. Alongside the strategic dimension, one of the levels of analysis increasingly considered in the study of deployments is that of the degree of political legitimacy that results from it among civilians within the spaces of intervention. In addition to their primary geostrategic objectives, these missions are in fact often thought of as essential tools of political influence by the main state donors, allowing them pragmatically to develop their soft power with the public opinions of their allies and partners. Mobilized within the framework of long-term missions, ranging from several months to several years for some members, the foreign contingents interact with civilians on a daily basis. Having significant social and economic consequences on the geographic areas concerned, these “banal” encounters in turn affect the perception of local inhabitants concerning the merits of these interventions and their need for the development of credible national defence capabilities. Building peaceful relations between civilians and military, in particular through the conduct of transparent actions, is therefore essential from NATO's point of view. Faced with the subsequent political cost, a local challenge would lead to a likely reconsideration of the acceptance of the foreign presence by local authorities and undermine the alliance's medium and long-term objectives. This study of daily interpersonal contacts is all the more essential to analyze in a context of growing competition between several capacity building programs, which incidentally pull different underlying political models; models centered around democratic security, on the one hand, and more hierarchical and authoritarian models on the other. It is at this level of day-to-day people-to-people contact that COVID-19 has the potential to affect NATO's activities in a lasting way. While the risks for the legitimacy of foreign soldiers were significant, particularly in the hypothetical case of the perception of a health risk increased tenfold by the presence of foreign contingents deemed to be little or not sufficiently concerned with health instructions, the daily interactions between exogenous forces and civilian populations were limited to the maximum. The Canadian contingent engaged in Latvia, for example, greatly reduced the meetings of its agents with the rest of the population. A necessary balance must then be found between the necessary isolations, in order to prevent the risks of the virus spreading, and absolute social isolation, which risks lasting damage to the perception that the local population has of the foreign forces stationed within the framework of NATO. While it is still difficult to assess in the short term the influence of such necessary measures on the legitimacy of the alliance's operations, medium and long-term studies will make it possible to determine the impact of these “missed opportunities” in terms of social interactions. The alliance will no doubt maintain its deployments with the objective of deterrence. These activities remain central to the alliance. However, regardless of the level of analysis chosen, the COVID-19 pandemic ultimately seems to mark a pivotal moment for NATO and its ambitions in terms of strengthening the capacities of its strategic partners, in countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Amending certain specific programs or redefining certain priorities today seems both possible and desirable, at a time when the military alliance is affected by growing disinterest on the part of some of its central members as well as by increasingly sensitive geostrategic tensions between some of its member States. Some of the questions that arise are as follows: How to better articulate the needs of the main donors and those of the recipient countries in a mutual benefit relationship? How to improve the local perception of international operations whose central objectives and daily activities are often unrecognized? How to rethink the role of these operations in the context of major health crises or global pandemics? Defining a more resilient model in the face of inherently unpredictable crises can, in the future, improve both the operational capacities of the alliance and the acceptance of its activities by the populations it aims to protect in the first place. [1] However, the ideas presented are those of the author. ## NATO’s Pivot to China: A Challenging Path URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/natos-pivot-to-china-a-challenging-path/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > As NATO leaders meet on June 14 in Brussels, will they begin to formulate a NATO China policy? Pierre Morcos Pierre Morcos, "NATO’s Pivot to China: A Challenging Path," Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 8, 2021. ## Navigating Great Power Rivalry: Canadian Strategy for a New Decade URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/navigating-great-power-rivalry-canadian-strategy-for-a-new-decade/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > In response to the growing divergence of interests between Canada and the United States, the opportunity is ripe for Ottawa to advance its own visions of regional security and play a more active role in upholding global order. Despite periodic instances of tension and disagreement, Ottawa has leaned heavily on its relationship with Washington to anchor its foreign policy throughout the postwar era. The bipolar Soviet-American standoff provided Canada with an opportunity to entrench itself within the US-led Western bloc for security purposes. The Cold War’s unipolar aftermath further deepened the logic of Canadian dependence on the United States – not only in economic terms following the advent of free trade, but also geopolitically and psychologically as Washington sought to expand the reaches of the Western-led liberal international order across the globe. This post-Cold War effort to create a liberal world order of universal scope has now failed. Emerging in its wake is a period of uncertainty and great power rivalry likely to endure through this nascent decade if not beyond. And although rules-based multilateralism is not entirely incompatible with multipolarity, the notion of a Western-led global order rooted in liberal values manifestly is. In fact, current dynamics favour the continuation of broadly zero-sum relations between the United States and the Sino-Russian entente, whether US foreign policy reembraces alliances and liberal internationalism or continues its trend toward a more amoral defence of American global primacy. Such an outcome is inimical to Canadian interests. As a result, Canada needs to begin cultivating an increasingly independent national posture toward Europe and the Asia-Pacific, where its overriding interest remains the preservation of a stable security order. The realities of geography and power guarantee that Washington will remain Ottawa’s primary economic and security partner. However, as a trading nation that depends heavily on a rules-based international framework, Canada must provide a degree of equilibrium to its heavily US-centric post-Cold War foreign policy if it wishes to be a rule-maker and not a rule-taker. As the pressures of an increasingly rivalrous world have begun to bear direct consequences for Canada in recent years, the need for a recalibration has become evident. Canada and the US-China Cold War There is a common notion in Western policy circles that Russia and China are revisionist powers bent on overturning the international order. However, Moscow and Beijing can also be seen to have status quo aims: the Kremlin wishes to maintain Russia’s great power status after having emerged from the Cold War in a weakened state, while the Chinese Communist Party seeks to retain power in part by preserving the international conditions necessary to continue China’s economic modernization. As such, the threat to the established rules-based order does not emanate from any single power, but rather from the zero-sum nature of great power relations that is the inevitable structural outcome of the current moment. As US-China relations have grown more fraught, Canada has been caught uncomfortably in the middle. American efforts to crack down on Huawei and limit the prospects for Canada-China trade as agreed in the USMCA deal have led to the arrest of two Canadian citizens in China and the broader deterioration of ties between Ottawa and Beijing. This outcome is less the product of Canada’s specific disputes with China and more the result of Ottawa’s failure to develop a broader strategic paradigm to guide its relations with competing great powers. Canada’s inability thus far to adapt to the realities of the new world is evidenced by its declining or challenged relations not only with China, but also with India, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Examples of increasing competition in Sino-American relations predate the Trump administration. President Obama announced his country’s strategic “Pivot to Asia” and undertook efforts to prevent US allies from joining the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, while Beijing’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 aimed to elevate China above the status of regional power. The subsequent US-China trade war and COVID-19 pandemic mark the intensification and consolidation of this dynamic of open hostility. In this context, China has treated the pandemic as a dual internal-external national security crisis and has moved toward an increasingly assertive international posture. This, in turn, has led to greater alignment among members of the Quad composed of the United States, Japan, Australia and India. Although liberal internationalists have made the defence and reinvigoration of American alliances a central component of their critique of President Trump, this regional trend toward a bipolar standoff is likely to continue regardless of who occupies the White House. Ironically, although US strategy is nominally geared toward preserving a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, the consolidation of an economically weaponized Sino-American cold war threatens the open and rules-based character of regional trade. This would limit Canada’s opportunities to diversify its trading partners – a key pillar of any independent Canadian foreign policy. That said, China’s growing assertiveness and overstretched aspirations have helped to paint it into a corner. And while China’s rise followed the initial postwar emergence of Japan and the Asian Tigers as economic powers, the next wave of Asian growth favouring India and ASEAN will lead to Beijing’s relative decline. China’s current hunkering down and increasingly inflexible conduct could therefore be aimed at carving out a regional order favourable to the pursuit and preservation of its core interests before its ability to secure them becomes reduced. Regional Order in a Multipolar Europe The United States has also made a concerted effort to co-opt its European partners into its struggle for pre-eminence with China. This reveals the extent to which Washington has pivoted toward Asia since the early post-Cold War decades, prioritizing global strategic considerations ahead of the pursuit of a stable European security order. With the EU having failed to construct a Brussels-centric regulatory and political order spanning the entirety of the continent, Washington’s psychological disengagement from Europe leaves a post-Brexit EU stuck in a multipolar regional order that also includes Russia and Turkey. The US-led transatlantic alliance, which excludes the European continent’s most militarily powerful actor (Russia), cannot act as the sole guarantor of a stable regional security framework in this context. Yet despite unresolved questions surrounding the future of American leadership, Washington has not abdicated its desire to maintain regional primacy in Europe, while Moscow remains unwilling to initiate a genuine rapprochement with Brussels due to uncertainty over the EU’s potential to emerge as a truly autonomous security actor. Both of these factors guarantee the continuation of regional tensions. Moreover, growing instability in Europe cannot be attributed uniquely to a lack of US leadership. Turkey’s increasing willingness to use hard power as a means of advancing its strategic interests has been bolstered by the vacuum of power in Libya, which itself is the product of American overstretch in having brought about the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. The brief post-Cold War era of American primacy created the illusion that a Western-led international order could be global in scope and rooted in shared values. Canada has a vital interest in ensuring that the decline of this liberal order is not replaced by a world rooted in spheres of influence. Yet all three major global powers – the US, China and Russia – appear to be pursuing strategies that are in some way aimed at just that: pre-emptively carving out regional arrangements in a zero-sum contest to compensate for their internal political fragility and hedge against the possibility of their relative decline over the medium-term. The United States in particular, facing a multitude of socioeconomic and political challenges, is unlikely to be amenable to revising the fundamental tenets of its primacy-oriented international posture. Major powers only have so much influence in a world based on universal sovereign statehood, but this forthcoming decade precedes the potential future consolidation of Europe and rise of both Africa and the Asian Rimland. In the interim, the US-Russia-China triangle is likely to play a substantial role in shaping the contours of the emerging global order. Conclusion In an increasingly competitive world, Canada no longer finds itself insulated by its geographic isolation or American unipolarity. Rising tensions in Europe and the Asia-Pacific – two theatres which Canada directly abuts – threaten to impose economic and security-related pressures that constrain Canadian freedom of action. In response to the growing divergence of interests between Canada and the United States, the opportunity is ripe for Ottawa to advance its own visions of regional security and play a more active role in upholding global order. With respect to Asia, Canada should seek to paint a contrast with the Quad, backing Washington in any efforts to preserve an open regional order but resisting plans aimed at containing China. Ottawa should oppose any aggressive moves by Beijing to entrench a Chinese sphere of influence in places such as the South China Sea. However, it should welcome China’s desire to play a regional role commensurate with its growing influence, acknowledge the legitimacy of its security concerns, and help to guide it toward a global posture that is more in line with its still-fledgling capabilities. This would mark a shift from Canada’s recent China policy rooted in engagement for engagement’s sake, moving instead toward a more strategic but non-alarmist approach aimed at positioning Canada a defender of stability and a trusted interlocutor for all parties. This is not a call for equidistance between the US and China, but rather an appeal to incorporate a more conceptually developed equilibrium into Canadian foreign policy designed to adjust to new international pressures and keep open future opportunities for trade diversification. In the case of Europe, without compromising its position as a leading member of NATO or acquiescing to Russian territorial revisionism, Canada should openly indicate its preference for a stable European security order and announce its readiness to engage in dialogue with all parties to that end. The medium-term relative decline of the US has led to the re-emergence of Eurasia at the centre of global power. Even if demographic and other trends favour a renewed period of American dominance over the long term, a strategic paradigm geared toward balancing between Eurasia and the US will help ensure that Canada emerges from this period of instability as an independent player with a growing economy and a diplomatically interconnected hub capable of using its neighbour to the south as a power multiplier on a global scale. ## Network Challenge Report: COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/network-challenge-report-covid-19/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This report contains the Collaborative Network’s efforts to examine three core issues stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. In June 2020, amid the most severe global health crisis in a generation, the MINDS Program’s Collaborative Networks answered a call for papers to help the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) identify and understand the COVID-19 pandemic’s geopolitical consequences, lessons learned, and implications for the Defence Team. This report contains the Collaborative Network’s efforts to examine three core issues stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. First, the pandemic’s impact on great power competition, economic prosperity, and political stability. Second, the lessons learned at home and abroad about anticipating, responding to, and managing public health crises; and the appropriate role for military capabilities in civilian-led response efforts. Lastly, the challenges and opportunities presented by the pandemic to the defence and other government portfolios, particularly in the areas of personnel, logistics and procurement, information management and technology (IM/IT), governance, planning, and operations. Contributors The MINDS Program currently funds six Collaborative Networks, each with a unique array of academics, experts, and specialists from across Canada. The contributing authors of this report include both established and emerging voices in the Canadian defence and security community. The work presented here is their own and does not represent the policy or opinions of the Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, or Canadian Armed Forces. Key Takeaways Geopolitics of COVID-19 State Power Trip: The pandemic has increased the importance and power of states, as the only viable actors who can manage nation-wide response efforts, secure critical supply chains, and provide economic relief to their citizens. Disinformed: COVID-19-related information has become a high-value target for malicious actors seeking to sow confusion, mistrust, and politicize the pandemic, with alarming consequences for domestic and international politics. Great Power Competition: The pandemic is accelerating shifts and destabilizing the balance of great power competitors; as evident in declining international cooperation, the politicization of the pandemic, growing tension between the US and China, and increased opportunism by middle and rising powers. De-Globalization? Despite decades of rapid globalization, COVID-19 has stalled this expansion by causing borders to close, airplanes to ground, markets to contract, and international competition to rise. Alarming Spikes and Flattened Curves: Rising case numbers and a lack of leadership are weakening American soft power, leaving a vacuum to be filled by China, whose fumbled draconian response has managed to flatten the curve. Lessons Learned From Remote Work to Remote Life: Remote work has become a ‘new normal’ for millions of people, with significant disruptions to work-life culture, information technology requirements, and the security of information. Technology, Security, and Surveillance: Technologies like artificial intelligence, contact tracing, and computer modelling, are enabling both the fight against COVID-19 and efforts to encroach on individual rights and freedoms. Readiness, Resilience, and Reliance: Security forces’ support was necessary to maintain national, regional, and local resilience, but this reliance has raised questions about how and whether to call on the ‘force of last resort’ in the future. The Defence Team: People, Roles, and Relationships Choosing Battles: The COVID-19 pandemic has forced governments to make difficult trade-offs between their foreign policy interests, economic prosperity, and public health. Relying on Rangers: With the Canadian Rangers taking on new roles to address COVID-19 in Arctic regions, ways to ensure Indigenous inclusivity, autonomy, and self-sufficiency must be explored. ## New Deal with Iran: A Broken Promise? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/new-deal-with-iran-a-broken-promise/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > In the 2016 election campaign, candidate Trump pledged to negotiate “a totally different deal” with Iran. Four years later, to what extent has Donald Trump broken his promise to renegotiate a deal and what are the root reasons that really underlie his failure? In the 2016 election campaign, candidate Trump pledged to negotiate “a totally different deal” with Iran - to establish a deal that is all encompassing and goes beyond the nuclear issue alone. Four years later, with the presidential elections looming again and the current tenant of the White House aspiring to a second term, the Iranians have still not conceded to a new deal. But to what extent has Donald Trump broken his promise to renegotiate a deal and what are the root reasons that really underlie his failure? Strictly speaking, there were certainly no 'traditional' negotiations, that is to say diplomatic negotiations adopting the channels of multilateral institutions comparable to the process which had led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed between Iran and the P5 + 1 in July 2015. However, this does not mean that there was no attempt at negotiation. Often described as a collapsing bargaining technique, Trump's “maximum pressure” strategy is no fundamentally different from the “firm-deal” policy of his predecessors in that it also aims to bring the Iranians back to the negotiating table. A follower of what he himself calls “the art of the deal,” Trump only substitutes an aggressive sales technique (hard selling) for the hushed accommodations of the presidents who preceded him, and of the Obama administration in particular – but the fundamental principle and the objectives sought remain very comparable. Second, it should be noted that the failure of this negotiation is due less to the aggressive style of the current tenant of the White House than to the terms set by Washington and its Western allies. Upon assuming office, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that Washington remained willing to re-establish diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran in exchange – and this is where the shoe pinches – for complete denuclearization, for the cessation of Iranian ballistic missile program and that of the activities of influence deemed destabilizing of the Guardians and the Quds Force in the Middle East – all elements demanded not only by the other pre-Trump administrations but also by the European allies of the states United including Macron's France, Johnson's Great Britain or Merkel's Germany. The fact is that the Western requirement (of placing under supervision of nuclear and ballistic programs added to the significant decrease in regional activities in Tehran) touches on two non-negotiable imperatives of the security policy of the Islamic Republic: 1) protection of the Iranian fortress and preservation of national sovereignty; 2) promotion, around Iran, of a regional sphere of influence serving as a strategic buffer zone allowing precisely to strengthen the protection of the famous Iranian fortress. For the Iranians, these are two points on which they cannot concede simultaneously (deprive themselves of nuclear life insurance and, at the same time, of the protective sphere of influence) without weakening the internal and external sovereignty of the regime. It is therefore not for lack of having continued to negotiate (even if it was done aggressively), nor because of a fundamental divergence with its European partners (who, in short, are essentially asking for the same thing as Washington), that the Common Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has not been replaced by a more comprehensive agreement, but because what the Westerners demand cannot be met by the Iranians without, in their eyes, compromising their vital interests. As Richard Nephew, senior researcher at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy and former State Department official, explains, Western demands “are beyond Iran's willingness to even discuss.” The blocking of a new deal therefore comes from both sides. The high-profile figure of Trump tends to focus general attention and provide a universal explanation for all kinds of phenomena, but the geopolitical equation is much larger and above all much more complex. In August 2020, already in the midst of an election campaign for re-election, Donald Trump again pledged to secure a new deal with Iran if the ballot box offered him a second term. There is no indication yet that he would take a new approach to achieving this. Georgetown University professor Matthew Kroenig has no doubt that the strategy would remain the same: “exert 'maximum pressure' on the Iranian regime to force it to sit at the negotiating table.” But make no mistake: adopting a more amicable diplomatic style, while easing tensions, would have no effect. ## New Hypersonic Weapons: Same but Different URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/new-hypersonic-weapons/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Hypersonic weapons can increase pre-emption fears and dangerously alter crisis escalation scenarios by the 2030s... Hypersonic weapons can increase pre-emption fears and dangerously alter crisis escalation scenarios by the 2030s. This popular argument builds on the expectations that their unpredictable flight path create target ambiguity, radars do not cope well with their unusual altitude, and their extreme speed decrease defender’s time to react. While existing ballistic missiles do cross the hypersonic threshold of Mach 5, new hypersonic weapons – both glide vehicles and cruise missiles – are intended to fly at sustained hypersonic speeds within the atmosphere and have the agility to change their flight trajectory. However, the military utility of hypersonic weapons remains unclear, especially in case of long-range systems, and their reliability and feasibility still necessitate rigorous testing. It is likely that hypersonic weapons would create new military effects only at tactical ranges, mostly due to their speed shortening the defender’s reaction time.   The current NORAD infrastructure is not sufficient to address the widening spectrum of missile threats. The reputed invincibility of hypersonic weapons should not prevent Canada from affirming its strategic choices. Neither should it undermine its resolve to modernize NORAD. The Government of Canada should address the issue of hypersonic weapons along two policy lines. First, in coordination with the United States, Canada needs to increase the protection of the North American airspace. The North American continental area defense will need to be multilayered and integrated, linking ground and space-based sensors with ground and air-launched countermeasures for fast detection and persistent tracking, while enabling effective interception. This requires not only improving early warning coverage and upgrading command and control communication systems, but also introducing new missile interceptors. The already approved investment in NORAD modernization creates room in Canada for both adding capabilities and expanding its mandate. Second, to counter politicizing and hyping of hypersonic weapons, the Government of Canada should work with its allies towards improving the understanding of hypersonic threats. Instrumentalizing hypersonic technology for the great power competition has created exaggerated expectations regarding the military effects of hypersonic weapons. As the technological race among the United States, China, and Russia is spiraling, Canada and its allies need to speed up their efforts to update the arms control and export norms to better regulate the development and use of hypersonic technology for military purposes, as well as control its proliferation. *** Introduction The Russian missile threat has increased in Europe after the demise of the INF Treaty in 2019, with deploying Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave bordering NATO members Poland and Lithuania. In addition, the Avangard hypersonic glider system is able to hit the North American continent. Hypersonic weapon systems as new delivery vehicles for nuclear and non-nuclear warheads are also gaining importance in the context of China’s assertive policy to augment its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 warheads by the end of this decade. Exaggerated expectations – and in turn inflated budget lines securing investment in new weapons – about the military hypersonic capability are worsening the security environment. The intense technological race among the United States, Russia, and China, and to a lesser extent in Australia, South Korea, India, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan, but also North Korea and Iran, has aggravated the security dilemma. As this emerging technology has gained a reputation of an invincible and unstoppable weapon, countries are trying to build themselves out of the perception of their own vulnerability by either parading them at military shows and in ongoing conflicts or at weapon test spectacles. Once the new hypersonic technology matures by the 2030s, how effective will the North Warning System (NWS) radars be against vehicles flying at extreme speeds and unusual altitudes? The defensive role of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) currently supported by Canada will not be enough to counter advanced long-range cruise missiles and hypersonic gliders. However, exploiting the lesser-known trade-offs among speed, maneuverability, and altitude offer ways to strengthen defenses against the hypersonic threat. This piece puts forward three main points. First, claims about the military utility of hypersonic weapons are premature, especially in case of long-range systems. Second, the spectrum of missile threats – the variety of high-speed, maneuverable threats from the sky – has been widening. And third, technological competition has become politicized, with hypersonic weapons serving as a political tool to demonstrate technological prowess and great-power status, which results in increasing the risks of crisis escalation. For these reasons, it is important to tame the exaggerated expectations about the military application of hypersonic technology and rethink how Canada does air and missile defense. Hypersonic threat in making Hypersonic weapons are presented as a new class of delivery vehicles that can travel at extreme speeds (five times the speed of sound) in the Earth’s atmosphere and have an outstanding ability to maneuver. They are being advertised as weapons that combine the advantage of both existing ballistic (speed) and cruise (accuracy) missiles. Hypersonic weapons come in two main variations, relying either on air-breathing technology or boost-glide technology. First, hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) are a faster version of existing cruise missiles, as they are powered by an air-breathing supersonic combustion ramjet engine, also called a scramjet. Because air-breathing engines get the necessary oxygen directly from the atmosphere, hypersonic missiles are smaller and more maneuverable. Since scramjets operate under extreme conditions, it has been taking several decades to develop an engine that would work at a hypersonic speed within the atmosphere. Due to technical challenges, today there are no deployed weapon systems using a scramjet engine. Second, hypersonic glider vehicles (HGV) are unpowered and depend on a rocket to be lifted and released in the atmosphere at altitudes between 40-100 kilometers, after which they fly down unpowered to their target. Unlike the easily calculated bullet-like trajectory of ballistic missiles, the boost-glide concept makes the re-entry altitudes of HGV unpredictable and enables the glider to maneuver along convoluted routes. Most HGVs in development use ballistic missiles during the boost phase. In 2021, China mounted a hypersonic glider on an orbiting rocket, inspired by the Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System or FOBS (operational from 1969 to 1983). The novelty of this system does not lie with the combination of an orbiter and a hypersonic glider – this type of system has been around for decades known as a rocket-powered space shuttle that is lifted by a rocket, goes into an orbital flight mode, and then glides back – but with the fact that China allegedly attached a nuclear warhead to it. In a nutshell, the characteristics of new hypersonic weapons are thought to create a moment of surprise as they shorten the defender’s time to react, and since they can change flight direction at unusual altitudes, they can evade missile defenses and confuse the defender about their target. To spice things up, these weapons does not have to rely only on their kinetic energy to cause damage, but also can carry a warhead. Both Russia and China are developing dual-capable platforms, that is the ability to carry both nuclear and conventional warheads; for instance, Russia’s hypersonic cruise missile 3M22 Tsirkon with a range of 1,000 km and China’s 2,500-km-range ballistic missile DF-17 as well as intercontinental ballistic missile DF-41 fitted with hypersonic gliders. The offensive hypersonic capability is thus expected to bring along warhead and target ambiguities. Bending the laws of physics This all sounds rather terrifying, yet the state of technology research and the laws of physics counsel skepticism. From the technical perspective thus, mastering hypersonic capability, that is the ability to fly hyper fast within the atmosphere while retaining navigability and maneuverability, is a matter of rocket science. The scientific community estimates that HGVs and HCMs will not be operational before the 2030s and the 2040s respectively. This is because countries that wish to field these weapons still need to engineer out some important details regarding the challenge of flying hypersonic in the thick atmosphere. Namely, the heat created by the air friction at such high speeds can melt the vehicle away, mess up its navigation, or make the vehicle visible to the heat-seeking infra-red sensors that could track the missile (or glider), ruining the advertised surprise effect of hypersonic systems. At the same time, these vehicles are sensitive to any surface imperfections; for instance, the crack in the carbon panel caused the returning Columbia space shuttle to crush. Not less importantly, powered hypersonic flight is more fuel-demanding than supersonic, since the vehicle needs to perse through thick atmosphere. This increases the operational costs of the weapon system. Hypersonic business is costly in time and resources. New hypersonic weapons need further testing, but their technical requirements already make them niche capability. Flying hypersonic in the atmosphere implies important trade-offs in terms of speed, altitude, maneuverability, and accuracy. Importantly and rather surprisingly, two points are usually omitted in the public debates about hypersonic weapons: their questionable military utility and the possibility of countermeasures. Feasible and somewhat useable First, while hypersonic weapons may be technically feasible, their military utility especially at strategic ranges remains unclear. From the military perspective, the question of what problem new hypersonic weapon systems are trying to solve remains unanswered. Hypersonic missiles have been around for several decades, they are just better known as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Technically, all ballistic missiles with a range longer than a few hundred kilometers are hypersonic since they can fly faster than Mach 5. For instance, the US Minuteman III, operational since 1970, can travel over 9,600 kilometers reaching Mach 23. Studies based on computational modeling have shown that the speed and range of hypersonic gliders are comparable, if not inferior, to existing ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The strategic advantage of hypersonic weapons is therefore likely to be minimal. Depending on where you stand, hypersonic weapons either reinstate or eliminate mutual assured destruction. The argument in favor of strategic hypersonic weapons puts forward that they enhance deterrence by improving second-strike capabilities. In contrast, these weapons can erode deterrence by enabling the country to overcome missile defenses and take down the adversary’s second-strike capability. Indeed, for Russia, long-range hypersonic gliders represent a qualitatively new capability for overcoming US homeland defenses. Even though the advantage of hypersonic weapons is weakest at intercontinental ranges, for Russia they represent a hedging strategy. In contrast, China has been developing hypersonic weapons to further project its power in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, circumventing US missile defenses in the Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese fear of a US pre-emptive strike that would disable China’s nuclear capability and deprive China of its ability to retaliate seems to be the motive behind fitting its DF-41 with multiple gliders. However, both China and Russia already have the capability to reach US soil with their ICBMs and nuclear submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In addition, continental missile defenses against the existing long-range ballistic missiles have not been known for their stellar performance. Yet the obsession about outsmarting the US network of air and missile defenses led to the extreme case of China’s testing a space-based hypersonic glider. Inspired by the FOBS, China has demonstrated that it can evade US missile defenses completely by flying over the South Pole. However, this orbital boost glider system might be just China’s signaling of its access to space, and a distraction from the potentially more consequential use of hypersonic weapons at tactical ranges. Hypersonic effects will most likely be felt on the sub-strategic level. This may include the ability to frustrate local defenses and to provide rapid strike capabilities against locally deployed armed forces, especially in naval warfare, and high-value, time-sensitive, and hardened targets. Both Russia and China intend to acquire anti-ship missiles that can make even aircraft carriers vulnerable, such as Russia’s 3M22 Tsirkon and China’s Starry Sky-2 (or Xing Kong-2). These hypersonic systems may have strategic implications due to their dual-capable delivery system. Discussing whether a country deploys nuclear weapons at supersonic or hypersonic speeds misses the point: the type of warhead makes the difference, not the speed. Stopping the hypersonic threat Second, hypersonic missiles are stoppable. Although countering hypersonic threats will be challenging due to their high speeds, maneuverability, and flight altitudes, their infra-red signature and vulnerabilities of hypersonic flight in the atmosphere make especially the glide-phase interception workable. However, it would require a major improvement to the space sensor architecture and new interceptor capabilities to account for the operating altitudes (20-100 kilometers), unpredictable trajectory, and the speed of hypersonic weapons. Upgraded defense systems will need to be layered, integrated, and continent-wide, and go beyond ballistic missile defenses. Existing air and missile defense systems mostly rely on the ground- and sea-based radars for early warning, which are not equipped for persistently tracking hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic weapons are expected to fly at lower altitudes, that is below the altitude of ballistic missile interceptors and low enough that the curvature of the Earth obscures them from ground-based radar detection, but above the altitude of the lower layered air defenses. Effective air and missile defense systems would need to connect space-based, heat-seeking eyes of infra-red sensors with the upper layer intercept outside the atmosphere with the lower layer intercept within the atmosphere for a global detection and tracking capability of a hypersonic threat. Indeed, the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA), together with the Space Development Agency, has been developing a constellation of low-orbit surveillance satellites with sensors for launch indication and warning. MDA has also initiated efforts to realize a Glide Phase Interceptor, a new prototype missile to be paired with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system. Infra-red signatures and the plasma around hypersonic vehicles could already allow Patriot and THAAD defense systems to detect hypersonic weapons during the glide phase when they operate within the atmosphere and at lower speeds. Their software and propulsion adaptation may offer a capability for shorter-range glide-phase intercept. However, while these defense systems could be adapted to intercept hypersonic weapons, they can cover only small areas and it would be prohibitively expensive to use them for continental defense. Yet any effective defense against fast-flying, maneuvering missiles would likely need to be continent-wide. This will require cooperation among allies and, ultimately, with Artificial Intelligence as the new defense systems will require new software tools to process multiple and fast intelligence data to detect weapon launches and track the incoming threats. The crucial step will be to pair seamlessly the new early-warning space-based sensor layers in development, which will detect and track the heat signature in their brightest, earliest phases of flight on the one hand, with glide-phase effectors either relying on the upper-layer intercept, as provided by adapted Aegis and THAAD, or the lower layer (within the atmosphere) intercept, as provided by Patriot and SAMP/T systems on the other hand. Since hypersonic weapons operate in-between air and space domains, hypersonic weapons can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of air and missile defense systems. Enter geopolitical competition Given the persisting technological limitations, the current effect of hypersonic weapons has been mostly psychological in the form of strategic signaling, status projection, intimidation of adversaries, and propaganda. For instance, on this year’s eve of the China’s Army Day on August 1, Beijing publicly showcased for the first time a video of its DF-17 missile launch. This missile is known for its ability to carry a hypersonic glider since 2019. Although little is known about the operational status of this weapon, the launch video comes just a few days ahead of US Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, before testing the DF-17 missile system during a live-fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait. Despite (or because of) having become a fading military power stuck in a war, Russia will have the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missiles delivered to its naval forces, as announced by the Russian President. Most famously, the use of Kinzhal in Ukraine in March 2022, allegedly the first hypersonic weapon employed in wartime, demonstrated the Russian attempt at using a so-called hypersonic missile Kinzhal to fake its confidence. Kinzhal is essentially a propaganda weapon – an air-launched ballistic missile wrapped in a hypersonic cloak with no documented outstanding ability to maneuver. More accurately, it is a modified version of the surface-launched Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile, launched from a supersonic MiG-31 interceptor jet, which gives the missile a boost to reach higher speeds at an altitude that is unusual for a ballistic missile and extends its range. Hypersonic weapons, and emerging technologies in general, have become a political tool of the government for propaganda purposes thanks to their reputation of an invincible weapon destined to intimidate and coerce the opponent, inflating fears, and distorting facts about their operational readiness. Regardless of the current lack of data and verified information about the reliability and performance of hypersonic weapon systems, both China and Russia have repeatedly claimed to have deployed these weapons. Reportedly, Russia deployed its first hypersonic glider Avangard in December 2019. China declared its hypersonic glider DF-17 operational in 2020, while the United States claims to field its hypersonic weapons by 2023 and has been testing weapon prototypes only. Although the United States has been investing in hypersonics as part of the Prompt Global Strike program, the budget boost in hypersonic research in the past years from a few hundred million to a few billion USD is a reaction to the Russian and Chinese technological advances in fielding hypersonic weapon systems. This reflects the US perceived lack of advancement in the development of new offensive hypersonic weapons, rather than fulfilling an actual gap in its military capabilities. Currently, hypersonic threats are not based on real military capability and do not convey any significant advantage. While hypersonic weapons could be technically possible within the next two decades,  technical availability and technological feasibility  do not automatically translate into sound military effects without the right doctrine. Therefore, the hype about weapons is more dangerous than the technology itself mainly for two reasons. First, perpetuating the belief of invincible revolutionary weapons fuels the great power rivalry. Using the reputation of hypersonic weapons as a political tool to signal great power status, especially at times of disappearing arms control norms, creates instability. And second, hypervelocity is only one of the features that will shape future warfare in the air and space domains. The hype highlights speed, while it should be maneuverability. This thus clouds the fact that the spectrum of missile threats is widening and that there are missiles with different degrees of maneuverability. For instance, instead of sensational but poorly defined hypersonic gliders, it would be more accurate to talk in terms of a new generation of a Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle (MARV) that improve the maneuverability and extend the range of a missile while staying in the atmosphere for most of their flight. Hypersonic implications for Canada and North American Defense In contrast to technological determinism, manifested in the tech hype carrying the false promise of a revolutionary hypersonic weapon, the military needs a sensible doctrine and budget to finance hypersonic development projects , as much as the government needs a sound hypersonic technology policy. It remains vital to tame the drive for prestige and tech supremacy, which distorts countries’ threat perceptions and increases the risk of crisis escalation. All three major weaponizers are planning to acquire hypersonic war-fighting weapons, which contrasts with their most vocal deterrence mission. Once the hypersonic technology matures, allowing weapon systems to become operational and yield added-value military effects, hypersonic capability will represent a major factor in detecting and intercepting missile threats. The Government of Canada would be well-advised to address the issue of the hypersonic threat within the context of the widening spectrum of missile threats along two policy directions. 1/ Update missile defenses in coordination with the United States to protect the North American airspace. Countries like the United States and Canada should focus their investment on hypersonic missile defense at short and medium ranges, as the spread of hypersonic gliders can undermine North American continental defense. Given the climate change affecting the Arctic security region, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and the spread of emerging technologies with little-known military effects, Canada should affirm its strategic choices and its resolve to modernize NORAD. Recurrent concerns about the Russian threat in the Canadian Arctic, such as, for instance, the Russian bombers flying to the edge of the Canadian airspace, have nothing but increased since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In addition, although China is focusing on its regional supremacy, its hypersonic gliders, too, have intercontinental ranges. While the Russian and Chinese missile threats against the Canadian territory remain low, the Canadian government should rethink NORAD along the concept lines of a fully integrated air and missile defense system. Future continental defenses will need to emphasize the multilayered and integrated area defense systems, consisting of well-connected ground and space-based sensors with ground and air-launched interceptors for fast detection and persistent tracking. This is because new missile threats will travel across air and space domains, with greater maneuverability at extreme speeds and unusual altitudes. Crucially, the governments also need to invest resources into new interceptors. In addition, hit-to-kill intercept could be supplemented with electromagnetic (microwaves to damage the internal electronics of the missile) and cyber (jamming) countermeasures; yet due to the high-surface temperature of hypersonic vehicles, it is doubtful whether lasers could represent an effective means to stop the threat. Canada’s new 4.9 billion CAD investment into modernizing NORAD approved in June 2022 may include both adding capabilities and expanding its mandate. This would mean moving beyond upgrading the NWS – the over-the-horizon radar system to provide early warning coverage and threat tracking and modernizing command and control and communication systems – to include also new air-to-air missile interceptors, in addition to jets. Carefully choosing the right interceptor mechanism will be important. While targeting the launch platforms and relying on fighter interceptors have been more popular, in the case of long-range hypersonic missiles and gliders interceptors need to target the vehicle itself with missiles. Therefore, investing in active defense, not only deterrence, and including ground-based area defense to protect high-value targets should become an inevitable budget line. The current ground-based radars alone are insufficient since ballistic missiles will soon be only one of the threats against North America. Canada will need to make sure that NORAD is also able to protect against cruise missile attacks advanced in both range and speed, and gliders flying at unusual altitudes, which makes building the layers of space-based sensors crucial for their detection and tracking. The US MDA already plans to realize a glide-phase hypersonic defense by the late 2020s (at the earliest though). Although Ottawa declined twice to participate in the US midcourse ground-based missile defense, due to nuclear weapons concerns – while supporting the NATO IAMD over Europe and NORAD’s tactical warning and attack assessment role – the defense against hypersonic gliders may be more politically acceptable, not only because hypersonic gliders spend minimum time in space, but also participation would give Canada influence over decision-making in North America’s defense. 2/ Work towards a better understanding of the hypersonic military capability and control its spread. The politization of hypersonic weapons in the great power competition has created a gap in the understanding of hypersonic threats and the actual capability of hypersonic weapon systems. Great powers are not only tech mirroring each other, but purposefully exaggerating the capabilities of weapons systems still in development, as well as exploiting these distorted perceptions for propaganda. The dangerous technological race is spiraling as China tested an orbital rocket with a glider, the United States shortly after announced building multiple space-based sensor layers to detect this glider. In reaction, Russia tested an anti-satellite weapon able to shoot down US satellites. However, countries competing for a great power status tend to overstate the importance of introducing hypersonic weapons into the arsenal. Military utility remains unknown in terms of defense and at strategic ranges, while hypersonic weapons appear to be primarily useful to “the aggressive and the disadvantaged”. The Canadian government should work towards increasing the awareness and understanding of the hypersonic military capability. It should also promote controlling its spread through international arms control tools and contribute to NATO’s goal to establish EDTs governance norms. In doing so, Canada could prevent further disconnection between technical experts on the one hand and political and military representatives, on the other hand. Canada can work with its allies to better regulate the development and use of hypersonic technology for military purposes. Hypersonic gliders with strategic ranges are covered by the New START. Their proliferation is expected only among countries that already possess ballistic missiles, necessary for their booster phase. In contrast, the development of hypersonic cruise missiles is farther behind since hypersonic propulsion is costly in fuel and resources. Canada should revisit hypersonic technology and missile exports to avoid the proliferation of offensive weapon systems. The Missile Technology Control Regime tends to be the focal forum to clarify and update the regulation as missile technology evolves, together with the Wassenaar Agreement on dual-use technology and the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation. The debates are still ongoing on how these tools could restrict hypersonic gliders, building on the MARV analogy. Canada and other countries willing to introduce reforms to global missile governance would also need to factor in the dual-use character of hypersonic technology. Especially hypersonic propulsion has an immense potential to help build a more sustainable infrastructure for space exploration. Controlling the weaponization of hypersonic technology should not prevent further development of space aircraft which can also glide at hypersonic speeds (albeit without an attached warhead). ## New Technologies, Climate Change and War in Ukraine: What Impacts on NORAD Modernization? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/new-technologies-climate-change-and-war-in-ukraine-what-impacts-on-norad-modernization/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The climate emergency is growing as fast as the geopolitical context is shifting: Canada must assert its choices and demonstrate... The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought the important modernization of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) back on the agenda of the Canadian government. In response to the war, Defence Minister Anita Anand assured that while she was not able to provide plans to modernize NORAD at this time, National Defence is actively working to develop a set of new technologies in the near term. Canada finally seems inclined to prioritize homeland defence, after leaving that chapter unwritten in its 2017 defence policy. There are two main drivers that must guide Canada in the NORAD modernization process, which will be a priority over the next decade: the well-defined defence imperatives of the United States and the urgency of climate change, particularly in the Arctic region. Underlying both drivers is the international context of great power competition, in which the Arctic will be a decidedly important theatre, pushing the United States to act and creating new threats as climate change alters the geography of the territory. On the one hand, the United States must modernize its capabilities to counter new Russian and Chinese technologies, which are difficult to detect and defeat. NORAD's capabilities in this regard are very limited, especially with respect to the North Warning System (NWS), which has already been targeted as a priority in the NORAD modernization process. In turn, the United States has clear priorities for its defence strategy in this regard – which is not the case for Canada. On the other hand, climate change not only creates opportunities for new external threats through its impact on the geography of the land – such as melting ice in the Arctic – but also through threats intrinsic to climate disruptions, such as potential damage to critical defence infrastructure, or the overtaking of the operational capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Yet climate change is almost absent from NORAD discussions, despite the major impact it will have on defence activities in the coming years. The climate emergency and U.S. imperatives must push Canada to define its own priorities and choose its own avenues for concrete action – avenues that will also reflect Canadian values. This policy report provides an overview of NORAD's modernization and an assessment of Washington and NORAD's defence imperatives and priorities. The text presents the progress of Canadian Defence in the area of climate change and the various impacts that these will have on its activities and capabilities. Finally, considerations and recommendations for Canada are formulated, in light of the international context currently disturbed by the war in Ukraine. An Overview of NORAD’s Modernization Progress In January 2022, General VanHerck, Commander of NORAD and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), suggested that NORAD modernization must be completed within a five-to-six-year window. Technically, much has already been done to determine what needs to be modernized and what the priorities are. For example, the upgrade of the NWS, the importance of integrated deterrence, and the urgent need to enhance domain awareness, surveillance, and monitoring capabilities, particularly in the Arctic, are already established as priorities for the next evolution of NORAD. However, concrete actions are still pending. The Department of National Defence (DND) announced on January 31, 2022 that it has granted a contract to Nasittuq Corporation, an Inuit company, for in-service support of the NWS. This contract for maintenance and support of the current system does not include a modernization component, which has been expected for several years due to the outdated capabilities of the NWS, a system that was completed between 1986 and 1992 using available technology from the 1970s. It was designed to detect the threat of aerial bombardment from the USSR, a threat that is already 50 years old. Although listed as a priority in Canada's 2017 Defence Policy Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), NORAD and NWS modernization still lacks a concrete and specific avenue adopted by the United States and Canada. The last federal budget of 2021 allocated over $100 billion in new spending over the next several years, of which only $163 million will be allocated to NORAD modernization. All indications are that these funds will be used for research and concept development, as no concrete modernization projects have been announced in the past year. Estimates of the cost of modernization range from $10 billion to $15 billion, with Canada potentially paying 40% of the total bill. This means that spending on NORAD modernization will increase over the next decade, beyond what has been anticipated in the Trudeau government's defence policy. General VanHerck stated that the next step in this modernization is now in the hands of the politicians: “The next step in my mind is for the Secretary of Defense and the Minister of National Defense to sit down and come up with a framework that moves both Canada and the United States forward within our departments on how we would talk about fielding of these capabilities, the agreements for who’s going to pay for what, what capabilities.” The evolution of NORAD has therefore begun, but it has yet to be completed. Although the United States and Canada have been reaffirming their partnership for the past year, the details of the plan to modernize NORAD have not been revealed. This is especially problematic given that American requests to implement their vision for modernization will stimulate debate in Canada. This is likely to happen soon: Defence Minister Anita Anand recently stated that she intends to complete NORAD modernization in the short term and that “Canada will be at the table with a robust package to enhance NORAD.” Regardless of the nature of these measures, the government will be accountable to the Canadian public and must be transparent. U.S. Imperatives in the Modernization of NORAD and Its Defense Strategy In a January 2022 interview, General VanHerck clarified three of his priorities for modernizing NORAD. The first is domain awareness, which includes modernizing NWS capabilities to create an effective deterrent that enables informed decision-making. The second priority flows from the first: decision superiority, or information dominance, to ensure that information gets to the right people faster. The third priority is the implementation of an integrated deterrence of all domains, because according to the general, all the problems and issues today are global and can no longer be solved regionally or by a single domain. General VanHerck's vision extends beyond North America: “My defence plan for North America doesn’t start in North America. It starts forward with allies and partners. It starts forward with my fellow combat commanders and CJOC being able to create day to day deterrence options, and de escalation options, and if required, defeat, but not defeat in North America, defeat forward.” These priorities are clearly consistent with the March 2021 NORAD/USNORTHCOM Strategy, which details four key strategic principles: an integrated defence approach (in terms of regions, domains, and states), domain awareness, information dominance, and decision superiority. To better understand this strategy, it is important to distinguish the roles of NORAD and USNORTHCOM: NORAD conducts aerospace control and aerospace and maritime warning for the defence of North America, while USNORTHCOM defends U.S. territory – deterring, detecting, and defeating threats to the United States, conducts cooperative security activities with allies and partners, and supports civil authorities. NORAD and USNORTHCOM have been cooperating since the latter's inception in 2002. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that new U.S. defensive developments associated with aerospace or the Arctic do not necessarily have to go through NORAD: this is the case with ballistic missile defence (GMD and BMD). The United States, consistent with its defence strategy, values and prioritizes the creation of a structure for integrated deterrence and a window of opportunity for first strike/response. This deterrence is integrated in that it considers five categories: All domains (conventional, nuclear, cyber, space, information); All theatres of competition and potential conflict; All aspects of the conflict spectrum (from high-intensity warfare to the grey zone); All instruments of national power (economic sanctions, diplomatic tools, etc.); All U.S. allies and partners (Europe, Asia, Americas, etc.). The United States does not want to be in the vulnerable position like it did during the Cold War era. It fears falling behind the development of new Russian and Chinese technologies. These technologies, such as hypersonic vehicles, which Russia has been testing in the Arctic over the past year, can evade ground-based radar by hiding behind the curvature of the Earth. Because of their speed of travel and manoeuvrability to elude defensive measures, these missiles are extremely difficult to detect and defeat. The United States is pursuing two key technologies to win the race: “boost-glide” systems that place a hypersonic glide vehicle atop a ballistic missile booster, and hypersonic cruise missiles that would use “scramjet” technologies (which enable efficient operation at hypersonic speeds and supersonic combustion). Hypersonic weapons will allow the United States to be a credible deterrent against China and Russia, both of which already have functional hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic weapons are also part of the U.S. “Conventional Prompt Global Strike Program,” through which Washington seeks to acquire the capability to conduct strikes with minimal delay (no more than one hour after giving the order to strike the target) with a high degree of technical security anywhere in the world. This is a way for U.S. power to gain faster response or attack time – meaning decision superiority, one of the strategic priorities of NORAD and USNORTHCOM. In testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on March 8, General VanHerck reaffirmed the gravity of the Russian threat. He proposed two solutions to improve detection and domain awareness capabilities: an integrated underwater surveillance system and an over-the-horizon radar system. The General mentioned his intention to work in conjunction with the U.S. Navy and Canada to monitor and provide situational awareness of submarines around the globe. Finally, with regard to over-the-horizon radars, VanHerck said the system would have a range of approximately 4000 miles in the maritime, air and space domains. This new system would provide a much greater early warning capability than existing systems, overcoming the limitations of the NWS. To achieve information dominance, the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Strategy is based on the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) concept to overcome the silos between services, agencies, and countries. Artificial intelligence and machine learning will enable NORAD to rapidly process, display and disseminate data collected by the systems. Resilience of critical systems and infrastructure will also be an important theme for NORAD and USNORTHCOM in the coming years. According to Colin Kahl, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. adversaries do not intend to wage prolonged conflict against itself, but rather to blind and slow it. Yet resilience, defined as the ability of a system to prevent, respond to, and/or adapt to disruptions, has been neglected in recent years by Washington. Needless to say, this attribute is critical to the field of aerospace defence, of which NORAD is a primary custodian. Thus, in the plight of the United States in maintaining its defence superiority, NORAD can be a vehicle through which it materializes new technologies and necessary upgrades to achieve U.S. objectives. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Strategy clearly states that: “We must defend our nations should deterrence fail and our adversaries attack. Our surest path is through a globally integrated and resilient all-domain awareness infrastructure that is processed, synchronized, and presented to create information dominance, resulting in decision superiority over adversaries. Embracing these strategic principles requires a fundamental change of culture for NORAD and USNORTHCOM and our mission partners.” The full impact for Canada of this announced change of culture within NORAD is difficult to assess at this time. The fact remains that Canadian priorities are not as clearly defined and that the offensive aspect of some of the U.S. imperatives mentioned above does not align with the Canadian values that have traditionally been put forward in recent years. Climate change, on the other hand, is an obvious priority for Canadian defence, although it is not mentioned much when it comes to NORAD modernization. Climate Change and Canadian National Defence Climate change is considered, from a defence and security perspective, to be a “threat multiplier,” since climate stress increases interrelated security risks. Climate change is therefore a national security issue and should be treated as such when thinking about NORAD modernization. The DND and the CAF have, in recent years, put in place several instruments and strategies that take into consideration the impact of climate change on Canadian defence. Canada's 2017 Defence Policy identifies climate change as a predominant component of various Arctic, human, and national security issues and humanitarian disasters. This leads to “greater demand for search and rescue increased international attention and military activity.” The DND also released the 2020-2023 Defence Energy and Environmental Strategy (DEES) in 2020, which reports on the progress of DND's greening goals. Indeed, DND is recognized as the federal government's “largest user of energy and the single largest emitter of .”  The DEES has three main goals: produce less energy waste and cleaner energy, reduce climate change risks, and reduce DND's environmental footprint. It targets several subgoals, such as a 40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2025 and net zero emissions by 2050, use of cleaner energy sources for buildings and vehicles, and developing frameworks for assessing climate change risks on the CAF. However, the absolute GHG emission reduction targets (40% by 2025 and 90% by 2050) do not apply to Canada’s National Safety and Security fleet – which includes aircraft, ships and tactical land vehicles of DND, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Coast Guard. It is announced that in order to contribute to the DEES and the Greening Government Strategy's goal of zero net emissions by 2050, fleet upgrades will take into account “availability, affordability and operational feasibility.” Indeed, despite the achieved or fixed DEES 2020-2023 targets, Canada's two largest current procurement projects – the 88 fighter jets and 15 Surface Combatant ships – do not appear to be in line with the DEES, as these procurements will still use petroleum-based energy and continue to emit GHGs. In this sense, there is a contradiction between Canada's obligation to renew its capabilities in order to be a useful partner within its alliances (NATO and NORAD in particular) and to be able to ensure its sovereignty over its territory, vis-à-vis Canada's desire to reduce its ecological footprint. Certainly, national security issues cannot be separated from the challenges posed by climate change in such an uncertain international environment. However, finding a way to reconcile these imperatives is necessary, especially when DND is already aware of the impacts of climate change on its activities. Indeed, climate change has multiple major impacts on DND and CAF activities, particularly in three broad categories: their infrastructure, emerging threats in the Arctic, and military deployments. CAF and DND Infrastructures Climate change is having a significant impact on Canada's military facilities, particularly in the Arctic region. This infrastructure is potentially in need of redesign, relocation, or renovation due to climate change impacts, but also to meet DND's GHG reduction goal and its DEES 2020-2023 targets. Melting permafrost and rising water levels, in particular, could have serious consequences for NORAD facilities in the Arctic. The operating environment is particularly challenging in the Arctic, and infrastructure must be adapted to be more resilient to extreme weather conditions. And yet, climate change is barely considered in the debate surrounding NORAD's evolution. Arctic and Climate Change Climate change is increasing the geostrategic importance of the Arctic. According to DND, climate change has made “ the Arctic more navigable for everyone” and Canada needs to improve its ability to monitor activities in the Arctic. This need is included in the NORAD modernization priorities, but also in the 2019 Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. The Framework identifies two priorities: to strengthen Canada's domain awareness, surveillance and monitoring capabilities in the Arctic, including “the acquisition of new air, land, sea and space-based capabilities,” and to strengthen environmental protection in the region. Yet, aside from modernizing the CP-140 Aurora fleet, there is no investment specifically for underwater surveillance in Canada's defence policy – a critical capability in the Arctic. Human security is also particularly important, especially for the First Nations who are facing major challenges, including population displacements, floods and forest fires, due to the consequences of climate change. The CAF and the Rangers therefore play a key role in the Arctic region, both to ensure Canadian sovereignty and to ensure the safety of the inhabitants: a role that is expected to grow. Yet, the only permanent base in the Arctic region consists of about 55 people in Alert, on Ellesmere Island, and about 1,400 members of the 1rst Canadian Ranger Patrol Group scattered across the North. Military Deployments The CAF are already feeling the impact of climate change on their readiness, operations, training, exercises and facilities. The demand for CAF response to natural disasters in Canada (Operation LENTUS) is increasing, and this trend will continue to worsen due to the instability generated by climate change. This is in addition to the demand caused by domestic issues other than natural disasters, such as Operation LASER - the CAF response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, this pressure on CAF demand extends to the international arena as well. As part of the international engagement pillar reiterated in Canada's defence policy, the CAF is called on to assist in humanitarian missions in the wake of disasters – disasters that will become more frequent with climate change. The issue of increasing demand and deployments for the CAF overlaps with the issue of personnel shortages. The CAF is projected to have about 100,000 full-strength soldiers, but was about 10,000 members short at the end of November 2021. Another 10,000 members were listed as unavailable for duty due to lack of training, illness or injury. Defence Minister Anita Anand said that while the world wants to see Canada more involved around the world, DND is working to assess the CAF's ability to meet the demand simultaneously in multiple locations. The demand for CAF support is high and requires prioritization of requests and training of staff. Climate change must therefore be a priority in the modernization of NORAD, along with U.S. demands and international geopolitical considerations. The Consequences of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Geopolitical Considerations for Canada Prevention rather than (offensive) defence of North American territory has been the preferred approach of NORAD since its creation, despite the strategic ambitions of the United States. This prevention goes hand in hand with deterrence. The debate over offensive avenues of aerospace defence – part of NORAD's mandate – resurfaces from time to time, as new threats, the changing international environment and NORAD renegotiations emerge. The current NORAD modernization, now in the hands of politicians, coupled with new Russian and Chinese technologies, are enough to reignite this debate. Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24 could well pave the way for a reversal of Canada's position on missile defence. The war in Ukraine is already affecting Canadian perceptions of Russia, both at the public and political levels. The Conservative Party is also calling for Canada to take the security of its Arctic territory more seriously and stresses the importance of modernizing NORAD. Canada, home to the largest Ukrainian diaspora outside of Ukraine and Russia, has a vested interest in reacting strongly against Russia – and this is advantageous for electoral support from the Ukrainian population in the next election.  It is likely that the Russian invasion, seen by some as a moment that “inaugurates a new era in global geopolitics,” will provide sufficient impetus for Canada to re-evaluate its involvement in missile defence. As Andrea Charron notes, “Ukraine has made NORAD even more important, because we are the back door to NATO.” Since the end of the Cold War, the fear of a limited Russian attack in the Arctic has never been as real as it is now, especially if Putin feels trapped in Ukraine. In this sense, missile defence would be a way to deter such an attack, but also to effectively defend Canadian territory. The current geopolitical context leads many experts to recommend an increase in Canada's defence budget in order to improve its defence capabilities. Minister Anand is currently considering several options for the DND budget, including “aggressive” options up to exceeding 2% of GDP. In any case, the priority must be to invest in upgrading NORAD. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is an opportunity for Canada to prove itself worthy of its NATO allies, at a time when the political calculus of defence spending in Europe is changing profoundly, and to invest concretely in the enhancement of its defensive capabilities. Finally, Canada should not forget the four years of Donald Trump's presidency in the United States, during which it was much more difficult to reach consensus between the two states. The Trudeau government should capitalize on the cooperation and openness of the Biden administration, as the tides may well turn in the next U.S. election. The return to power of an administration led by the Republican Party with a potentially unpredictable president such as Trump could severely limit Canada-U.S. military cooperation and the work of NORAD modernization, as the international environment plunges ever deeper into multipolarity. In this scenario, the U.S. could decide to play the unilateralist card and stop prioritizing partnership with Canada, taking action without consultation. Canada cannot defend its territory alone and depends on cooperation with the United States, whether it likes it or not – including the U.S. nuclear weapon capacity. A Republican administration as known under President Trump would therefore not be a good omen for Canada. Given the current geopolitical environment and the polarization of the U.S. electorate, there is every reason to believe that the best time to be proactive in reaching agreements on NORAD modernization is now. Recommendations for Canada The holistic dimension of NORAD modernization (all domain awareness and integrated deterrence) involves many ramifications and grey areas at this point. What role will Canada play and what are the limits of its involvement in the new technologies coveted by the United States? These answers are in the hands of the politicians for now, but they will have to be defined. Canada and the United States agree on several elements of NORAD's modernization. There is consensus on the need for domain awareness, especially in the Arctic, and on the importance of integrated deterrence. However, Canada's participation in each of these domains (conventional, cyber, space, information), theatres and spectrums of intervention remains nebulous, as it is hardly addressed by the Canadian government and little debated in civil society. This, of course, includes the delicate issue of ballistic missile defence. Canada needs to define the capacities it wishes to prioritize on its territory. Over-the-horizon radar systems for the NWS must be one of the priorities to counter new Russian and Chinese technologies, as General Van Herck has argued. Undersea surveillance will also be a necessity, a capability that is not currently prioritized in DND investments, but which is among the U.S. priorities. The possibility of investing in cyber capabilities is not to be overlooked, and this could be a way for Canada to acquire offensive capabilities without going through missile defence. The use of drones, submarines and satellites for Arctic domain awareness should also be targeted as a priority, both for threat detection and for monitoring the consequences of climate change. Climate change and the current resurgence of the Russian threat in the Arctic also highlight the importance of investing in improved search and rescue capabilities. Added to this are the challenges associated with the DND procurement process, the lengthy time frames required to complete projects – the majority of current acquisition projects will not be ready until later in the decade – and the limited capabilities of the CAF. Canada simply has no choice but to invest in NORAD now. The impacts of climate change must also be concretely considered in the modernization of NORAD. This is not only necessary, but urgent. Canada must consider that climate change is increasing the demand on the CAF, both internationally and domestically. The current uncertain global environment will lead to U.S. requests for the protection of North American territory, not to mention the European and Asian theatres. The CAF, understaffed and overstretched, will have to review its priorities and structure in order to meet the new demands. DND should also prioritize the modernization and greening of CAF and DND infrastructures, especially in the Arctic. While consistent with DEES and SSE, this would allow for the upgrading of installations and facilities in terms of both GHG emissions and the prevention of climate change impacts on them. In addition, it would balance the environmental costs associated with the previously mentioned major Canadian procurement projects. These upgrades also include the modernization of NORAD: a modernization that must take place in order to strengthen Canada's surveillance and domain awareness capabilities. Finally, Canada must rethink its approach to collaboration with the United States. Ottawa must be proactive about the impact of climate change on its defence operational capacity instead of only reacting to the decisions of its southern neighbour. Partnership and dialogue with the United States are necessary, but that does not mean that Canada should be in a state of waiting. The climate emergency is growing as fast as the geopolitical context is shifting: Canada must assert its choices and demonstrate its leadership in modernizing NORAD. ## Nonviolence as a Strategy of Resistance in Myanmar URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/nonviolence-as-a-strategy-of-resistance-in-myanmar/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The protest campaign against the coup d'état that toppled the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar emulates many strategies... Over the past few weeks, the continued and intensified protests in Myanmar despite the intensification of state repression is representative of a more general trend of resistance movements to gain international support when state violence backfires. Inspired by other resistance movements around the world, the protest campaign against the coup d'état that toppled the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar emulates many strategies of nonviolent resistance that have borne fruit in increasing sufficient domestic and international pressure on a repressive government to overthrow it or at least force it to make certain concessions. Canada and other allied countries have condemned the use of violence by Myanmar’s armed forces against nonviolent protesters. The US Treasury Department said last March that it would impose sanctions on members of the junta, including the police chief who coordinates with the military to suppress protesters. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has also called on the international community to engage in a stronger condemnation of the junta's repressive acts against the population. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd even called for Security Council intervention. If the protest movement in Myanmar continues to gain momentum and maintains nonviolent discipline, we can expect a more sustained commitment from democratic states, including Canada, to end the violence and ensure the restoration of a democratically elected government, in particular by resorting to economic sanctions against the military junta. International outrage over violence against protesters, however, usually depends on the nonviolent nature of a campaign of resistance. Through the terror it arouses, the intensification of state repression of protests in Myanmar risks breaking the nonviolent discipline of the movement and reducing the number of protesters willing to brave state violence. How then, can the resistance movement ensure that sufficient pressure is maintained against the repressive government while maintaining a strategy of nonviolent resistance that is more likely to convince international audiences of the legitimacy of the claims and of the need to intervene? A Constantly Adapting Resistance Strategy The protest movement in Myanmar has used a wide range of nonviolent tactics, the objectives of which are inter alia to encourage local populations to join the streets as well as to draw international attention to the conflict while increasing the pressure on the military regime in place. To prevent police raids and mass arrests, the protesters have notably set up a network of civilian vigilantes whose role is to alert the arrival of the military using pots that are knocked together to signal the danger. The use of pots and pans as a tool to challenge political authority is part of the repertoire of actions generally mobilized by nonviolent movements, a method tested during the student spring of 2012 in Quebec and whose ability to bring together a wider public within the mobilization had previously been demonstrated during demonstrations against the political repression of the Pinochet regime in Chile. The protest movement in Myanmar has also shown ingenuity in using local cultural codes designed both to broaden the protest to other sections of society and to push members of police forces to defect. Women's clothes, for example, were hung over the streets to protect demonstrators from police charges, since walking beneath them is traditionally considered bad luck for men - a strategy which, however, did not prevent the military from using tear gas, rubber bullets and stun grenades to disperse the demonstrators. The strength of the protest movement in Myanmar lies in its ability to be flexible by adapting its tactics of resistance to the repressive actions that are put in place to counter dissent, thereby exerting complex and diffuse pressure on the regime. The movement has also succeeded in integrating several social groups into its ranks whose interests and demands usually diverge, a diversity in mobilization which is generally a crucial element in the success of nonviolent resistance campaigns. Several groups within the resistance movement have come together in a  General Strike Committee of Nationalities which has made it possible to better coordinate militant actions throughout the country. By limiting its resistance tactics to nonviolent actions, the movement also restricts the regime’s ability to legitimize the repressive measures it implements in the eyes of the international community. The objective of the protesters is therefore to impose a reputational cost on the junta if it decides to use violence against an opposition that is nonviolent and whose political demands echo the international norms, which are most likely to engage foreign actors. The academic literature on the subject has indeed exposed the advantage that nonviolence implies with regard to the perceptions of international audiences, in particular, because nonviolence would be perceived as a less extreme form of resistance and thus facilitate political concessions. In addition, the opposition movement has sought to appeal to the UN's responsibility to protect when a state fails to protect its population. Protesters have even used banners and shields marked “R2P”. The demonstrators thus used references to the international normative regime so that the violent actions of the junta backfired by weakening the military and stimulating popular mobilization. Canada’s Position on the Protests The case of Myanmar illustrates the influence of the international system on the practices of resistance movements. The establishment of a global network of activists advocating nonviolent methods of resistance has allowed the success of some nonviolent campaigns to spread globally. Several states, including Canada, have demonstrated particular sensitivity to nonviolent resistance movements, and have often declined support for social movements when they have resorted to violent tactics. In its statements condemning the coup and the regime's crackdown, Canada has emphasized the use of nonviolence by protesters. Justin Trudeau has personally criticized the repressive actions of the military junta. Ottawa does participate in the framing of the conflict, which affects the subsequent capacity of the junta to legitimize the repression. Canada is thereby exerting normative pressure on protest movements to use certain resistance tactics to the detriment of others. The protests against the coup that toppled the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi have so far demonstrated remarkable resilience and a strong ability to maintain nonviolent discipline despite numerous restrictions and increasingly extreme responses from the military. However, several media outlets have reported recent cases of escalating violence between protesters and police. Protesters also announced their intention to abandon nonviolent tactics and arm themselves to counter the regime’s increasingly brutal crackdown. Several studies have shown that civil resistance movements that combine nonviolent tactics with violent actions, such as the street clashes with the police currently observed, tend to diminish their ability to achieve their goals of political change. The potential radicalization of the movement towards violence also risks intensifying state repression, and even setting the stage for an even more catastrophic situation as seen in Syria where suppressed nonviolent protests have ultimately resulted in civil war. In short, the radicalization of the opposition movement to the military junta could complicate Canada’s position. In the case of violent protests, Canada will have to distance itself from the movement, so as to reaffirm Canada’s emphasis on the importance of peaceful conflict resolution and the return of a democratically elected government. On the other hand, Canada’s support for the protest movement has opened the door to further engagement. Thus, the Burmese Canadian Action Network (BCAN) sent a letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau urging them to send material resources in support of the people of Myanmar in addition to officially recognizing the Committee representing the Union Assembly, which brings together the representatives elected in the November 2020 elections. ## One year after the Iranian veil uprising: assessment and state of affairs URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/one-year-after-the-iranian-veil-uprising-assessment-and-state-of-affairs/ Modified: 2026-10-22 > September 16, 2022 - Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman arrested in Tehran because her veil was poorly adjusted, was taken to... September 16, 2022 - Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman arrested in Tehran because her veil was poorly adjusted, was taken to the police station and did not come out alive. Immediately, news of the murder spread, and Iran was set ablaze. Hordes of women, with rage in their hearts, set fires, throwing their chadors into the flames. During the Fall, the Islamic Republic went through a major crisis of unprecedented proportions since its inception. One year after these events, the question arises regarding the state of the regime: to what extent has what is now commonly referred to as the "chador revolt" weakened the Iranian theocracy? Revolt and reaction A reminder of the chain of events: in the days and weeks following Mahsa Amini's death, the clerics and the Revolutionary Guards trembled. While the latter cut off the internet, the protest spread to the inner circle of power: the Supreme Leader's own sister embraced the cause of the protesters. Iranian women cut their hair, and the song "Barāyé" ["For" in Persian], which indicted the brutality of clerical dictatorship, became the anthem of a popular revolt that resonated across the world. In October, the holiest symbols of the regime were targeted. Islamic television programs were hijacked, and Ayatollah Khamenei was accused of "spilling the blood of the youth." A few days later, the statue of Imam Khomeini was toppled, and his birthplace was set on fire. In December, the revolt, seemingly unstoppable, reached a new level: the protests turned into incidents where the religious leaders had their turbans pulled off. Photos of this ultimate taboo being broken were circulated worldwide. However, the mullahs and the Pasdars (Revolutionary Guards) quickly regained control. After being caught off guard, the authorities made numerous arrests. Leveraging many loyalists recruited abroad among Arabic-speaking Shiites, the Basij militia engaged in the bloodiest repression. Arrested protesters were crammed into the infamous Evin prison, subjected to arbitrary trials and torture sessions, with construction cranes doubling as gallows. Chilling images of hangings once again flashed across television screens. The world moves on impassively From as early as September, news of the tragedy spread beyond Iran's borders. The tune of "Barāyé" was sung in unison by Western artists, while actresses and singers cut their hair in solidarity with their Iranian counterparts. In Paris, on January 16, as night fell, the slogan of freedom seekers - Zan, Zendegi, Azād ["Woman, Life, Freedom"] - lit up the first floor of the Eiffel Tower in illuminated letters. At the same time, Charlie Hebdo dedicated a special issue to Ayatollah Khamenei, depicting him as a cockroach giving birth to a bunch of little mullahs. However, Westerners' outrage over the Iranian tragedy proved to be ephemeral and superficial. While Iranian diasporas demonstrated in Paris, New York, Berlin, or London to condemn the repression, many feminists outside Iran adopted a wait-and-see approach, which was viewed as ambivalent by Iranian women. As Masih Alinejad, an Iranian journalist and women's rights activist, wrote, "we have seen little evidence that women in Europe or North America are willing to take to the streets to show solidarity with the women's revolution in Iran." Indeed, many American and European intellectuals were concerned that the bonfires of chadors might stigmatize women wearing niqabs and hijabs in the West. As Jean Birnbaum explained, on American and Western European campuses, many saw the "universalist feminism" embodied by Iranian women as a legacy of Euro-centric colonialism. According to those who gravitate in these circles, "the solidarity of Western women with their sisters in the land of Islam often masks a condescending, even racist attitude; activists who claim universalist feminism are blinded by their Western-centric blinders and thus become complicit in 'white' domination." When they did speak out, the international community's outrage over the situation in Iran was therefore relative and explained mainly by the "grave mistake" committed by the mullahs in supporting Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine. Just hours after the start of the Russian offensive, Iranian authorities implicitly legitimized Vladimir Putin's decision by attributing the escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe to the United States and NATO. In the months that followed, as the conflict dragged on, Tehran further worsened its case by supplying Iranian-made drones to the number one public enemy. Invading the Ukrainian skies like mechanical locusts, the Shaeed-136 and Mohajer-6 drones even accompanied Vladimir Putin's New Year's wishes on January 1, 2023, with their lawnmower-like buzz. Partisans and regime resilience In Iran, despite the magnitude of the revolt, it quickly became apparent that the Islamic Republic could still rely on a core of unwavering supporters. The mullahs enjoyed the steadfast support of a fanatical proletariat estimated at a quarter of the population. Another notable fact is that most of the losses suffered by the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran were recorded in the provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan and Kurdistan, as well as in Kurdish-populated cities in the western Azerbaijan and Kermānchāh provinces. This crisis that erupted in September 2022 was essentially a revolt that took place in the peripheral areas of the Islamic Republic. Even in Tehran, the epicenter of the "chador revolt," the movement had Kurdish roots. Its first victim, Mahsa Amini, whose Kurdish name "Gina" was prohibited in the capital, was buried in Saghez, her hometown and the home of the Peshmergas, while the slogan of the revolution, the famous "Zan, Zendegi, Azad," was initially formulated in Kurdish before being translated into Persian. With the support of its unwavering supporters and the relative indifference of the international community, the regime quickly regained its footing. Although it went through a major crisis, the Iranian theocracy could consider itself out of the woods at the beginning of 2023. While the "veil revolt" shook the regime and fueled hopes of its collapse among its opponents, it gradually suffocated under the regime's henchmen. Content with releasing a few "sensitive" prisoners, emboldened and revitalized, they proudly celebrated the 44th anniversary of the Islamic revolution on February 11, 2023. During the summer, the morality police (Gasht-e Ershād) resumed its activities, and fines for Iranian women not wearing the headscarf were significantly increased. It is clear that the long-awaited political and ideological moderation of the Islamic regime is not on the horizon. The rise of the guardians Today, as the dust settles and the regime appears to have succeeded in containing the wave of protests that swept across Iran, a preliminary assessment can be made: it is horrifying, with over 500 protesters, including one-fifth children, killed by the authorities between September 16, 2022, and early 2023. Notably, clashes with rioters also resulted in about a hundred deaths among Iranian security forces. Among them, 34 were Basij militia members, accounting for 52% of the total government casualties, while the Revolutionary Guards were relatively spared from the violence of the riots, with only 18% of government casualties. Having been at the forefront of crushing the revolt, the Guards are also the political winners of this crisis. During the crisis, they did not hesitate to distance themselves from the clergy, openly criticizing the excesses of the morality police and accusing it of igniting the spark that set off the powder keg. If the four-decade-old regime is unreformable, and although the recent crisis has exposed its deep fracturation, its collapse is not imminent. Like after the popular protests of 1999, those following Ahmadinejad's contested re-election in 2009, the aborted "Persian Spring" of 2011, and the wave of protests in 2018-2019, the Iranian regime is likely, once again, to demonstrate its extraordinary - and sinister - resilience. In addition to the life insurance provided by external support (Tehran has strengthened its ties with Moscow and Beijing), the regime has developed its own antibodies to face such challenges. Far from undermining the regime, these crises that have followed one another since the beginning of the century have solidified the political base of what Iranians call the Sepāh-e Pasdaran. Denouncing the "color revolution" attempts attributed to Western powers, the Guardians have capitalized on their management of these rebellious movements to take the reins of anti-subversive reaction and, in the process, establish themselves as the true masters of Iran. Masters of counter-insurgency, they have turned Iran into a de facto military dictatorship. Like "communist" China and "democratic" Russia, behind this "theocratic facade" Iran is set to continue its institutional transformation to better integrate - and find refuge - within a new "illiberal" bloc that is taking shape around organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS, of which Tehran has recently become a member. Conclusion In Iran, if the columns of the Islamic Jericho trembled, the temple is not yet ready to collapse. The ruthless repression of the chadors’ revolt may have revealed the true face of the Mullahcracy to those who still had their eyes closed, but it remains firmly rooted in its original foundations, at least in the medium term. The Islamic Republic, pushed and sometimes staggering, has not changed one bit: it remains on the course set by its founding fathers in 1979. Neither encouragement, nor assistance, nor repeated crises have so far been enough to bend its radical trajectory or damage its dictatorial shell. On the contrary, whether motivated by naiveté or cynicism, Western chancelleries persist in making ill-advised decisions - such as Washington's recent release of $6 billion - which, by replenishing the regime's coffers, contribute to increasing its repressive capacity and prolonging its life expectancy. Iran remains one of the countries in the world where human rights (especially women's rights) are the most violated, freedom of speech is the most controlled, and freedom of the press is the most suppressed. The long-awaited Persian Spring will have to wait. ## PANEL 1 – Canada and Peacekeeping in Africa URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-canada-and-peacekeeping-in-africa/ Modified: 2021-06-23 > Canada and Peacekeeping in Africa: Engaging with the UN or building the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations? Canada and Peacekeeping in Africa: Engaging with the UN or building the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations? Panel Chair: Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé Panelists: -M. Mahamat Saleh Annadif -Dr. Bruno Charbonneau -Dr. Wane El-Ghassim -Dr. Lise Howard ## Panel 1 – Climate Challenges and Threats in the Arctic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-climate-challenges-and-threats-in-the-arctic/ Modified: 2024-06-04 > Opening Remarks - Professor Stéphane Roussel, ENAPModerator : Benjamin Boutin, Association France Canada... This is a bilingual English-French video Opening Remarks - Professor Stéphane Roussel, ENAP Moderator : Benjamin Boutin, Association France Canada Speakers : Bridget Larocque, Chair Northern Advisory Board and Co-lead, North American Arctic Defence and Security Pauline Baudu, Université du Québec à Montréal Dr Laurent Borzillo, École nationale d’administration publique (ÉNAP) Eric Laporte, Directeur exécutif de la Direction des relations de sécurité et de défense (IGR) ## PANEL 1 – December 10, 2020: The Fractured International Order URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-december-10-2020-the-fractured-international-order/ Modified: 2021-02-16 > Panel organized as part of the Strategic Analysis Network' annual colloquium "The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada", December 10-11, 2020. Panel 1 - December 10, 2020: The Fractured International Order. Moderator: Jonathan Paquin (ULaval). Panelists:- Anessa Kimball (ULaval): Adapting under Uncertainty: American Leadership and The Future of The Fractured Order- Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM): South China Sea : Military Dimension of Chinese Behavior - Thomas Juneau (UOttawa): The Middle East, Between Trump and Biden Panel organized as part of the Strategic Analysis Network' annual colloquium "The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada", December 10-11, 2020. Panel 1 - December 10, 2020: The Fractured International Order Moderator: Jonathan Paquin (ULaval) Panelists: - Anessa Kimball (ULaval): Adapting under Uncertainty: American Leadership and The Future of The Fractured Order - Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM): South China Sea : Military Dimension of Chinese Behavior - Thomas Juneau (UOttawa): The Middle East, Between Trump and Biden ## PANEL 1 – European and Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/intelligence-cooperation-in-a-multipolar-world/ Modified: 2021-05-17 > Panel 1 - European and Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation : Jill Sinclair, Björn Fägersten, Claudia Hillebrand and Gustav Gressel Panel organized as part of the “Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World – Non-American Perspectives“ Conference - May 6, 2021 Panel 1 - European and Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation - Chair and Discussant: Jill Sinclair (Department of National Defence) - Panelists: Björn Fägersten (Swedish Institute of International Affairs): The Intelligence Demands of European Strategic Autonomy Claudia Hillebrand (Cardiff University): The Spiral Loop of Intelligence Liaison: Issues for Secrecy and Accountability Gustav Gressel (European Council on Foreign Relations): Subversive Challenges to the Single European Space ## Panel 1 – The War as Seen From the South URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-the-war-as-seen-from-the-south/ Modified: 2024-09-25 > War as Seen From the South - Moderator: Justin Massie, Amélie Chalivet, Kevan Gafaïti, Rachid Chaker, Antonin Blanchard.. The War as Seen From the South Moderator: Justin Massie Amélie Chalivet: India and the War in Ukraine Kevan Gafaïti: The Russian-Ukranian war as seen from Iran: an inconclusive political and strategic test for the “Teheran-Beijing-Moscow axis”? Rachid Chaker: The war in Ukraine as seen from the Arab world Antonin Blanchard: Egyptian non-alignment in the face of the Russian-Ukrainian war Pierre-Marie Meunier: Sovereignty, balance of power and international law: China’s ridgeline of support for Russia ## Panel 1 – Trump 2.0 and transatlantic relations: what diagnosis? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-trump-2-0-and-transatlantic-relations-what-diagnosis/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Panel 1 - Trump 2.0 and transatlantic relations: what diagnosis? - Dr. Elena Lazarou, EPRS- Dr. David Cadier, researcher on European... Moderated by Pr. Justin Massie, professor of political science, Université Québec à Montréal, co-director of the Réseau d'Analyse Stratégique, co-director of Le Rubicon. - Dr. Elena Lazarou, EPRS - Dr. David Cadier, researcher on European security, IRSEM - Dr. Alexander Lanoszka, Associate Professor, University of Waterloo - Dr. Sven Biscop, Director of the “Europe in the World” program, Egmont Institute ## Panel 1 – Towards Democratic Resilience: The Post-Truth Era URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-towards-democratic-resilience-the-post-truth-era/ Modified: 2024-06-11 > The contemporary political landscape is marked by growing public distrust in the legitimacy of knowledge and public institutions... The contemporary political landscape is marked by growing public distrust in the legitimacy of knowledge and public institutions, shaped by hybrid media, disinformation and contestation. In this context, the panel aims to highlight the challenges faced by countries like Canada, and to engage in a reflection in the search for innovative solutions to address these challenges and build resilience in the face of these political and social dynamics. Moderator: Artur Wilczynski, Member of the Strategic Council Speakers: -- Alexandre Sirois, Journalist, La Presse -- Jean-Christophe Boucher, Associate Professor, University of Calgary -- David Morin, Professor, Université de Sherbrooke -- Michelle Tessier, Former Deputy Director of Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service -- Marc Doucet, Professor, St. Mary’s University ## Panel 1 : Transition of Power and Strategic Ambiguity of Washington’s Allies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-transition-of-power-and-strategic-ambiguity-of-washingtons-allies/ Modified: 2024-04-05 > Moderator: Frédérick Côté – Ph.D. Candidate, International Studies, École supérieure d’études internationales... Note: This video is is French only. Moderator: Frédérick Côté – Ph.D. Candidate, International Studies, École supérieure d’études internationales Alexander Lanoszka – Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo  Title: Are U.S. Allies and Partners Really Hedging? Pierre Colautti – Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Université Laval à Québec Title: US Allies’ Response to Washington’s Lack of Security Assurance Under the Obama and Trump Presidencies Émile Lambert-Deslandes – Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University Title: Nuclear Hedging and Latency: The Historical Cases of US Allies Nicolas-François Perron-Giroux – Doctoral Student, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Title: The Implications of Power Transition on Canadian Defence Policy: Diplomatic Signals and Military Acquisitions. ## Panel 1 (September 25): Capacity Building at Day Zero URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-september-25-capacity-building-at-day-zero/ Modified: 2020-11-23 > Over the past decade, capacity-building became a mainstay of international conflict management. But then COVID-19 arrived, disrupting capacity-building around the world. In this workshop series, we explore the consequences and the way forward. This first workshop will review the central issues in the field of capacity-building as they stood prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. What had been achieved? What worked? What criticisms or failings remained unaddressed? We will also evaluate how COVID-19 may affect these issues or leave them unaffected, and what new issues the pandemic may or may not raise. Is this a new world or do the key questions remain the same? Over the past decade, capacity-building became a mainstay of international conflict management. But then COVID-19 arrived, disrupting capacity-building around the world. In this workshop series, we explore the consequences and the way forward. This first workshop will review the central issues in the field of capacity-building as they stood prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. What had been achieved? What worked? What criticisms or failings remained unaddressed? We will also evaluate how COVID-19 may affect these issues or leave them unaffected, and what new issues the pandemic may or may not raise. Is this a new world or do the key questions remain the same? Read the summary of the first panel ## Panel 1: Developing a Multi-Domain Approach to New Areas of Confrontation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-developing-a-multi-domain-approach-to-new-areas-of-confrontation/ Modified: 2022-11-14 > Technological proliferation, emergence of new spaces, and multidimensional threats—what do these concepts mean and what do they imply? Technological proliferation, emergence of new spaces, and multidimensional threats—what do these concepts mean and what do they imply? This panel will elucidate both questions by exploring the implications of these new threats for Canada, its people, and its position in the world. With the expansion of geostrategic space toward Asia and the emergence of cyberspace as a battlefield between nations, interstate confrontations now go beyond mere economic and military fields. The experts on this panel will provide insights and analysis to help everyone better understand this reality and what a multi-domain approach for Canada would really mean. Moderator: Émile Lambert-Deslandes (Doctoral student, Queen’s University) Speakers: Gaëlle Rivard Piché (Strategic Analyst, Defence Research and Development Canada) Gregory Smith (Major-General, CAF) Stéphanie Martel (Assistant Professor, Queen’s University) Justin Massie (Full Professor, UQAM) ## PANEL 1: Europe’s strategic dilemma in a shifting URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/democratic-allies-defence-cooperation-to-counter-authoritarianism-in-a-shifting-world/ Modified: 2021-11-23 PANEL 1: Europe's strategic dilemma in a shifting Host : Jonathan Paquin (Laval University) U.S allies' defence cooperation in times of international uncertainty Chair and discussant : Alexander Lanoszka (University of Waterloo) Panelists: Olivier Schmitt ( University of Southern Denmark) The reluctant ally. France's security partnerships and transatlantic relations   Dominika Kunertova (ETH Zürich) Europe's american strategy : greater autonomy, better allies   Andrew Dorman ( King's College) Balancing military and economic needs : the United Kingdom in an uncertain world   Richard Giguère (Brigadier-General ( retired)) Surprise is a principle of war   ## PANEL 1: The Withdrawal from Afghanistan and its Impact on the Competition Between Great Powers URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-1-the-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/ Modified: 2022-01-28 > The withdrawal from Afghanistan and its impact on the competition between great powers. Moderated by Justin Massie -moderator: Justin Massie (UQAM) -Igor Delanoë (Franco-Russian Observatory -- France-Russia -- in Moscow) Russia and post-U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan -Pierre Jolicoeur (Royal Military College of Canada) Geopolitical reconfiguration in Eurasia: challenges and opportunities for Russia -Niva Yau Tsz Yan (OSCE Academy in Bishkek and Fellow at the Eurasia Program of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia) China’s Calculations in Afghanistan -Ting Sheng Lin (University of Quebec in Montreal) Will the ‘graveyard of empires’ trap China? ## PANEL 2 – Canada and Peacekeeping in Europe: Alliance Considerations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-le-canada-et-le-maintien-de-la-paix-en-europe-les-enjeux-des-alliances/ Modified: 2021-06-23 > Canada and Peacekeeping in Europe: Alliance Considerations : Stéfanie von Hlatky, Ambassador Kerry Buck and-Major-General Denis Thompson. Canada and Peacekeeping in Europe: Alliance Considerations Chair: Stéfanie von Hlatky Panelists: -Ambassador Kerry Buck -Major-General Denis Thompson ## PANEL 2 – Challenges of Intelligence Sharing URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-challenges-of-intelligence-sharing/ Modified: 2021-05-17 > Challenges of Intelligence Sharing: Artur Wilczynski, Adriana Seagle, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Stephanie Carvin and Thomas Juneau Panel organized as part of the “Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World – Non-American Perspectives“ Conference – May 6, 2021. Panel 2 -  Challenges of Intelligence Sharing - Chair and Discussant: Artur Wilczynski (Communications Security Establishment) - Panelists : Adriana Seagle (Bellevue University): Transatlantic Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Bishop’s University): Search for Trust: Challenges in UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Stephanie Carvin (Carleton University) & Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa): Don’t Hold Back: Canadianize ## Panel 2 – Equipment and Capabilities for the Arctic… URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-equipment-and-capabilities-for-the-arctic/ Modified: 2024-06-04 > Equipment and Capabilities for the Arctic: How to Promote Production and Industrial Cooperation Within the Transatlantic Community... Moderator :  Professor Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Speakers : Dr Thomas Hughes, Mount Allison University (remote) Professor Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Professor Stéphane Roussel, École nationale d’administration publique (ENAP) Gaspard Schnitzler, Researcher at l’Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) ## Panel 2 – The Evolution of the War URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-the-evolution-of-the-war/ Modified: 2024-09-25 > Panel 2 - The Evolution of the War - Alexander Lanoszka, Vincent Tourret, Marco Munier, Isabelle Delumeau... The Evolution of the War Moderator: Alexander Lanoszka Vincent Tourret: What is it All About? Lessons from the War in Ukraine for our Approach to Future Conflicts Marco Munier: How to Predict War? Isabelle Delumeau: A strategic reading of the naval aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian war Walid Ferguen: The Power of Narrative: Disinformation, Strategy and the Prediction of Future Scenarios in the Ukrainian Conflict ## PANEL 2 – The impact of the end of the war in Afghanistan on NATO URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-the-impact-of-the-end-of-the-war/ Modified: 2022-01-28 > PANEL 2 - The impact of the end of the war in Afghanistan on NATO. Moderator: Richard Giguère. With Chiara Ruffa... Moderator: Richard Giguère Chiara Ruffa (Uppsala University, Sweden) The US withdrawal from Afghanistan: what future for NATO's out of area missions? Alexander Lanoszka (University of Waterloo) Reflections on American Power and Alliance Leadership after Afghanistan Hani Nasser (Department of National Defence of Canada) Canada and NATO Heidi Hardt (University of California, Irvine) NATO's Strategic Lessons from Afghanistan in the Aftermath of Exodus ## Panel 2 – Transatlantic relations and the war in Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-transatlantic-relations-and-the-war-in-ukraine/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Panel 2 - Transatlantic relations and the war in Ukraine with Maud Quessard, Anastasiya Shapochkina, Laurent Borzillo and Camille Grand Moderated by Mr. Gurvan Le Bras, SEAE - Dr. Maud Quessard, Director of the “Europe, Transatlantic Space, Russia” Department, IRSEM - Anastasiya Shapochkina, president of the Eastern Circles think tank, lecturer in geopolitics, Sciences Po - Dr Laurent Borzillo, postdoctoral researcher at the École d'administration publique - Camille Grand, Director of the Defense Program, ECFR ## PANEL 2 – December 10, 2020: Capacity Building and Conflict Management URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-december-10-2020-capacity-building-and-conflict-management/ Modified: 2021-03-02 > Capacity Building and Conflict Management - Moderator: Théo McLauchlin (UMontréal), Panelists :Lee Seymour (UMontréal): Capacity Building and Security on The Ground, Bruno Charbonneau (Collège militaire royal de St Jean): The Return of Human Security?, Yolande Bouka (Queen's): Women, Peace and Security Panel organized as part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ annual colloquium “The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada“, December 10-11, 2020. PANEL 2 – December 10, 2020: Capacity Building and Conflict Management Moderator: Théo McLauchlin (UMontréal) Panelists : Lee Seymour (UMontréal): Capacity Building and Security on The Ground Bruno Charbonneau (Collège militaire royal de St Jean): The Return of Human Security? Yolande Bouka (Queen's): Women, Peace and Security ## Panel 2 – The Weakening of International Institutions URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-the-weakening-of-international-institutions/ Modified: 2024-06-11 > With the upcoming US presidential elections, we can anticipate a potential shift in the international order, more specifically in relation... With the upcoming US presidential elections, we can anticipate a potential shift in the international order, more specifically in relation to the United States’ disengagement from international institutions.This panel aims to explore the implications of this paradigm shift for the international community as a whole, as well as how Canada can contribute. Moderator: Alexander Lanoszka, Associate Professor, University of Waterloo Speakers: -- Arthur Boutellis, Professor, Columbia University -- Heidi Hardt, Associate Professor, University of California, Irvine -- Natascha Hryckow, Former Coordinator of the UN Group of Experts on Somalia ## PANEL 2 : Canada’s Defense cooperation: between Aukus and the EU. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-canadas-defense-cooperation-between-aukus-and-the-eu/ Modified: 2021-11-23 Host: Jonathan Paquin (Laval University) Chair and discussant : Andrea Charron ( University of Manitoba) Panelists: Stephanie Carvin (Carleton University) From Maple leaf to wallflower : Canada's declining alliance prospects   Marco Bruno Munier (Université du Québec à Montréal) Canada's national security and defence policies towards China   Jean-Christophe Boucher (University of Calgary) Canada and European defence : redundancy, opportunity, and confusion   ## Panel 2 : Understanding the Interests of Southern States in Relation to the Great Powers URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-understanding-the-interests-of-southern-states-in-relation-to-the-great-powers/ Modified: 2024-04-05 > Modérateur : Talbot Imlay – Professeur titulaire au Département des sciences historiques, Université Laval... Note: This video is in French only   Moderator: Talbot Imlay – Full Professor, Department of History, Université Laval Amabilly Bonacina, Doctoral Candidate in Political Studies, Université de Montréal Title: The Foreign Policy of Lula 3:  Between the Challenges of a Brazil in Reconstruction and a Changing World Roromme Chantal, Associate Professor of Political Science, École des hautes études publiques (HEP), Université de Moncton Title: Global China and Symbolic Power: The Case of the Indo-Pacific Region Amélie Chalivet, Joint Doctoral Student, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas et à l’Université du Québec à Montréal Title: India and the Challenges of Taiwan and the South China Sea: Case Studies of India’s Evolving Strategic Ambiguity. Jean F. Crombois, Associate Professor of European Studies, American University of Bulgaria Title: Bulgarian Foreign Policy and the War in Ukraine: towards a more assertive pro-Western Foreign Policy? ## Panel 2 (October 16): Counterinsurgency and Counter-terrorism URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-october-16-counterinsurgency-and-counter-terrorism/ Modified: 2020-11-23 > This second workshop will focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism ; two of the most high-profile areas for capacity-building, particularly in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Debates about capacity-building in these contexts often focus on the relative ethics, costs and effectiveness of direct interventions and of training local partners, problems of local legitimacy, and the difficulties in supporting troubled and unstable governments. In the wake of COVID-19, are COIN and CT still priorities for outside sponsors facing economic disaster? How has the pandemic affected cooperation and local knowledge in capacity-building operations, and reshaped capacity-building strategies, such as in contact with partner armies, awareness of gender and ethnic disparities in COVID-19 impacts, and the priority to be placed on health care? How will these changes persist? This second workshop will focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism ; two of the most high-profile areas for capacity-building, particularly in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Debates about capacity-building in these contexts often focus on the relative ethics, costs and effectiveness of direct interventions and of training local partners, problems of local legitimacy, and the difficulties in supporting troubled and unstable governments. In the wake of COVID-19, are COIN and CT still priorities for outside sponsors facing economic disaster? How has the pandemic affected cooperation and local knowledge in capacity-building operations, and reshaped capacity-building strategies, such as in contact with partner armies, awareness of gender and ethnic disparities in COVID-19 impacts, and the priority to be placed on health care? How will these changes persist? Read the summary of the second panel ## Panel 2: Leveraging International Cooperation & Canada’s Strategic Assets URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-2-leveraging-international-cooperation-canadas-strategic-assets/ Modified: 2022-11-14 > Canada’s international policy is part of a consciously multilateral approach. This panel will investigate the role Canada plays... Canada’s international policy is part of a consciously multilateral approach. This panel will investigate the role Canada plays as a “middle power” within regional and international institutions and how it can succeed in asserting its strategic interests. To understand how Canada could maintain and increase its international status, the experts on this panel will conduct a critical examination of its capacities and commitments. In short, they will aim to identify the place that cooperation can play in Canada’s foreign and defense policy. Moderator: Renée Filiatrault (Former foreign service officer) Speakers: Theodore McLauchlin (Associate Professor, Université de Montréal) Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Full Professor, Bishop’s University) Kerry Buck (Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs) ## PANEL 3 – Intelligence Cooperation under Multipolarity URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-cooperation-en-matiere-de-renseignement-dans-un-contexte-de-multipolarite/ Modified: 2021-05-17 > Intelligence Cooperation under Multipolarity : Heather De Santis, Reg Whitaker, Nancy Teeple and Patrick F. Walsh Panel organized as part of the “Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World – Non-American Perspectives“ Conference – May 6, 2021. Panel 3 - Intelligence Cooperation under Multipolarity - Chair and Discussant: Heather De Santis (Public Safety Canada) -Panelists : Reg Whitaker (University of Victoria): Intelligence Cooperation in Historical Perspective, from Cold War Bipolarity to the Multipolar Present Nancy Teeple (Royal Military College of Canada): Enhanced ISR and its Effect on Strategic Stability Patrick F. Walsh (Charles Sturt University): Australia’s National Intelligence Community: Challenges and Opportunities in a Multi-Polar World Closing Remarks - Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa) ## Panel 3 – Military Cooperation in the Arctic… URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-military-cooperation-in-the-arctic/ Modified: 2025-02-18 > Moderator : Prof. Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Speakers :United States Consul General in Montreal, Robert P. Sanders Moderator : Prof. Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Speakers : United States Consul General in Montreal, Robert P. Sanders Professeure Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Rear Admiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN) Dr. Pauline Pic, Université Laval (remote) ## Panel 3 – The transatlantic turn: from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-the-transatlantic-turn-from-the-middle-east-to-the-indo-pacific/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Panel 3 - The transatlantic turn: from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific with Dr. Bayram Balci, Elise Barandon & Amélie Chalivet Moderated by Dr. Antoine Bondaz, IDEA and FRS - Dr. Bayram Balci, researcher at CERI-Sciences Po - Elise Barandon, doctoral student, Centre Thucydide and IRSEM, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas - Amélie Chalivet, doctoral student at Centre Thucydide, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas and UQAM ## Panel 3 – Western support URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-western-support/ Modified: 2024-09-25 > Panel 3 - Western support - Laurent Borzillo, Justin Massie, Chantal Lavallée and Alexander Lanoszka take part in this discussion. Moderator: Laurent Borzillo Justin Massie: The Future of Western Support Alexander Lanoszka “The more it changes… ? ” The strategies of NATO’s eastern flank allies in the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine war Chantal Lavallée: European Support to Ukraine ## PANEL 3 – December 11, 2020: Multilateralism in Free Fall? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-december-11-2020-multilateralism-in-free-fall/ Modified: 2021-03-25 > Panel organized as part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ annual colloquium “The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada“, December 10-11, 2020.PANEL 3 – December 11, 2020: Multilateralism in Free Fall?Moderator: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (UBishops), Panelists :Marie-Joëlle Zahar (UMontréal): Back to the Future? The United Nations in Turmoil, Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s): ASEAN's Contributions to Multilateralism and Regional Order in Asia-Pacific, Costanza Musu (UOttawa): The European Union and Multilateralism Panel organized as part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ annual colloquium “The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada“, December 10-11, 2020. PANEL 3 – December 11, 2020: Multilateralism in Free Fall? Moderator: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (UBishops) Panelists : Marie-Joëlle Zahar (UMontréal): Back to the Future? The United Nations in Turmoil Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s): ASEAN's Contributions to Multilateralism and Regional Order in Asia-Pacific Costanza Musu (UOttawa): The European Union and Multilateralism ## Panel 3 (November 3): Peacekeeping URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-november-3-peacekeeping/ Modified: 2020-11-25 > This third workshop will focus on peacekeeping. In spite of their dramatic expansion at the end of the Cold War, peace operations have been challenged by problems of local ownership and sustainability and beset by the impact of resounding failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Outside actors were reluctant to commit to deployments that could not be justified in terms of national security; local actors resented what they perceived as outside interventions with little understanding of the local context and called for local solutions to local problems. To get out of this quandary, building the capacity of regional organizations and of militaries from conflict-ridden states and areas seemed to be the obvious answer. This third workshop will focus on peacekeeping. In spite of their dramatic expansion at the end of the Cold War, peace operations have been challenged by problems of local ownership and sustainability and beset by the impact of resounding failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Outside actors were reluctant to commit to deployments that could not be justified in terms of national security; local actors resented what they perceived as outside interventions with little understanding of the local context and called for local solutions to local problems. To get out of this quandary, building the capacity of regional organizations and of militaries from conflict-ridden states and areas seemed to be the obvious answer. Read the summary of the third panel ## Panel 3: Canada’s Strategic Coherence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-canadas-strategic-coherence/ Modified: 2023-01-09 > Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, gray zone conflicts, the weakening of US hegemony, and the rise of China—the world in 2022 is in turmoil. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, gray zone conflicts, the weakening of US hegemony, and the rise of China—the world in 2022 is in turmoil. Caught between its allies, their diverging interests, and its rivals, Canada finds itself faced with the return of great powers competition. Faced with this situation, it must adapt. But how to succeed coherently? This panel will assess how Canada could design a coherent foreign policy in line with its values, but also its national interests. Defining these, its overall strategic priorities, and the budget necessary for their implementation is the challenge that this panel’s experts will tackle. Panel 3: Canada’s Strategic Coherence Moderator: Laurent Borzillo (Postdoctoral Fellow, UQAM) Speakers: Philippe Beaulieu Brossard (Assistant Professor, Canadian Forces College) Chantal Lavallée (Assistant Professor, Collège militaire royal de St-Jean) Jonathan Paquin (Full Professor, Université Laval) Gordon Venner (Former Associate Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence) Introduction of the Military Deployment Index: Justin Massie (Full Professor, UQAM) Barbora Tallova (Master’s student, University of Oxford) -watch all videos on YouTube ## Panel 3: Defence cooperation among Asia-Pacific allies and their strategic relations with America and Europe. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-3-defence-cooperation-among-asia-pacific-allies-and-their-strategic-relations-with-america-and-europe/ Modified: 2021-11-23 Host: Jonathan Paquin (Laval University) Chair and discussant : Cleo Paskal ( Chatham House) Panelists : Hyon Joo Yoo ( Trinity University) The problems of trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea in addresing China   Lauren Richardson ( Australian National University) Dealing with the North Korea nuclear problem : convergence and divergence between the US, Japan and South Korea   Nick Bisley (La Trobe University) Australia's defence strategy : regidity in the face of fluidity   ## Panel 4 – Allied Strategies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-4-allied-strategies/ Modified: 2024-09-25 > Panel 4 - Allied Strategies with Chantal Lavallée, Laurent Borzillo, Nicolas-François Perron and Alexandre Courtemanche. Chantal Lavallée Laurent Borzillo: Macron’s Strategic Shift Nicolas-François Perron: Meloni’s Strategy Alexandre Courtemanche: Canada’s Military Sampling ## Panel 4 (November 20): NATO and Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-4-november-20-nato-and-defence/ Modified: 2020-12-03 > This fourth workshop focus on NATO and defence. Increasing superpower tensions since the early 2010s have put the risk of traditional, conventional interstate conflict back on the global security agenda in a major way, at the same time as states are competing in evolving domains such as cyber, space and AI. For an alliance like NATO, these issues raise the question of how well-equipped different member states are for defence, and how burdens are to be shared. Capacity-building is an important part of the alliance, manifested in military training activities and joint exercises. What challenges does COVID-19 raise for burden-sharing in NATO? How has it impeded joint activities? Has it caused member states to reconsider their commitments to investing in allies’ capacity for defence and in dimensions of capacity building, such as gender training, that often receive low priority? How has it changed the operation of capacity-building activities on the ground? This fourth workshop focus on NATO and defence. Increasing superpower tensions since the early 2010s have put the risk of traditional, conventional interstate conflict back on the global security agenda in a major way, at the same time as states are competing in evolving domains such as cyber, space and AI. For an alliance like NATO, these issues raise the question of how well-equipped different member states are for defence, and how burdens are to be shared. Capacity-building is an important part of the alliance, manifested in military training activities and joint exercises. What challenges does COVID-19 raise for burden-sharing in NATO? How has it impeded joint activities? Has it caused member states to reconsider their commitments to investing in allies’ capacity for defence and in dimensions of capacity building, such as gender training, that often receive low priority? How has it changed the operation of capacity-building activities on the ground? Read the summary of the fourth panel ## Panel 5 (December 8 ) : The CAF and Capacity-Building under COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/panel-5-december-8-the-caf-and-capacity-building-under-covid-19/ Modified: 2021-01-15 > This fifth workshop focus on the Canadian Armed Forces under COVID-19. International capacity-building activities became an increasingly large part of what the Canadian Armed Forces does in the world. They allow Canada to make a difference internationally and particularly to contribute to multilateral efforts, while recognizing the limits to Canada’s capacity to deploy large missions for long periods in violent contexts, as in Afghanistan. But the pandemic has posed considerable challenges to these missions. Some missions were suspended, others drawn down, and rotations disrupted, all while the CAF laboured to keep its members healthy and respond to increased demands at home. What has COVID-19 indicated about Canada’s defense and security priorities in capacity-building? What lessons can the CAF learn about overseas military operations under the risk of future pandemics? How have the disparate effects of the pandemic along gender and ethnic lines affected the CAF and its ability to conduct capacity-building activities abroad? This fifth workshop focus on the Canadian Armed Forces under COVID-19. International capacity-building activities became an increasingly large part of what the Canadian Armed Forces does in the world. They allow Canada to make a difference internationally and particularly to contribute to multilateral efforts, while recognizing the limits to Canada’s capacity to deploy large missions for long periods in violent contexts, as in Afghanistan. But the pandemic has posed considerable challenges to these missions. Some missions were suspended, others drawn down, and rotations disrupted, all while the CAF laboured to keep its members healthy and respond to increased demands at home. What has COVID-19 indicated about Canada’s defense and security priorities in capacity-building? What lessons can the CAF learn about overseas military operations under the risk of future pandemics? How have the disparate effects of the pandemic along gender and ethnic lines affected the CAF and its ability to conduct capacity-building activities abroad? Read the summary of the fifth panel ## Peacekeeping in the Age of COVID-19: An Opportunity to Move Forward? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/peacekeeping-in-the-age-of-covid-19-an-opportunity-to-move-forward/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > How has the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic influenced capacity building in peacekeeping? This blog post is written as part of the Virtual Workshop Cycle on Building Capacity in the Age of COVID-19. The third workshop, which took place on November 3rd, 2020 focused on peacekeeping and involved Marie-Joelle Zahar, professor at the University of Montreal, Cedric de Coning, professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Arthur Boutellis, advisor at the International Peace Institute and Mody Berethe, director of the Bamako Peacekeeping School. The information reported in the text is a general synthesis of the ideas presented by the speakers.[1] Watch the video of the third panel How has the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic influenced capacity building in peacekeeping? Answering this question seems to require a preliminary review of the changes in the UN's engagement in conflict zones in the years preceding the health crisis. Whether in Mali, the Central African Republic or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, peace operations since the end of the Cold War have gradually been reoriented towards the management of multi-party internal conflicts, gradually moving away from the objectives that had previously prevailed in the resolution of often binary state conflicts. In the absence of peace agreements and sufficient material resources to deal with unpredictable security situations, the primary objective of these new stabilization operations today is mainly to protect the civilian populations, by preventing the mutation of complex socio-political situations in high intensity civil wars. In this context of new operations – which are often thought of in a more offensive way – UN capacity-building activities have changed in recent years. In a positive way, the need to devote significant human and material resources to the continuous capacity-building of UN personnel intervening in conflict zones is now fully recognized. On the military level, training for troops operating in UN peace operations is carried out regularly during their field deployments. The goal is often to adapt units formed in heterogeneous national settings to qualitatively different operations that are conducted in conjunction with other armies. More and more training focuses, for example, on key sectors such as the evacuation of injured personnel, the management of improvised explosive devices or the protection of civilian populations, which is understood more broadly. At the civilian level, to a lesser extent, training within peace operations has also been gradually implemented, with the aim of raising civilian stakeholders' awareness of the central issues surrounding peacekeeping and, with a view to longer term, conflict resolution. In general, the planning of peace operations has received increased attention in recent years, with the aim of better coordinating the actions of the countries funding operations and the countries mainly engaged by sending troops to theatres of conflict. Major advances have also been made in the performance evaluation of various UN operations with the objective, for the organizations involved, of ensuring that the programs meet predefined efficiency criteria. In addition, one of the important advances is the growing cooperation of the United Nations with regional organizations – foremost among them the African Union – which, by promoting greater local ownership, undeniably contributes to strengthening the legitimacy of peace operations. All the same, while progress has undoubtedly been made, structural problems remain concerning the functioning of peace operations, with a direct impact on the effectiveness of capacity-building in this area. The frequently highlighted division between northern countries providing funding for peace operations and southern countries providing troops remains a central element in the sharing of responsibilities for peacekeeping, and continues to define an inevitably unbalanced model. The peace operations agenda remains determined by the strategic and operational priorities of the funding countries (supply-driven), to the detriment of the predictive capacities of operations on deployment sites. In the area of capacity-building, large-scale UN training – necessarily costly – remains the exception and suffers from a lack of institutionalization. If improved, the capacity to assess the success of operations can also be further refined and adapted to unique and changing socio-political contexts. Moreover, if the civilian dimensions are increasingly recognized as central, many current operations remain mainly centered around short-term security issues, and find it difficult to imagine the construction of peace in a longer political time within the conflicting spaces. It is in this ambiguous context – both undeniable progress and persistent challenges – that the health crisis linked to COVID-19 takes place. On the one hand, affecting countries in political crises as well as funding and troop-contributing countries, the pandemic was recognized very early as a salient issue by the UN. Already faced with several cases of major health crises – foremost among which are the cholera-related crises in Haiti as well as the management of the Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – peace operations quickly put in place the measures and health facilities necessary to mitigate the effect of the pandemic on their daily activities. Some military rotations have been suspended and many UN civilian personnel have started working from home, but the main tasks of the organization have, on the whole, been maintained. On the other hand, while the pandemic does not bring qualitatively new peacekeeping issues to the agenda, it seems to increase the salience of pre-existing tensions and debates.[2] The health crisis once again underlines the limits of an international intervention system whose operational agenda is entirely defined by the main funders. While the political and economic systems of these donors are largely impacted by the pandemic, the risk is that they will quickly decide to limit their investments to daily operations deemed strictly essential – often immediate operational security actions – to the detriment of long-term operations; for example the building of strong and inclusive political institutions in the countries of intervention. In this context, capacity-building operations risk being sacrificed as a priority. Finally, while it undeniably reinforces the centrality of pre-existing problems, the pandemic also marks a pivotal period that may, by necessity, become synonymous with incremental improvements in peace operations. The already anticipated withdrawal of certain international actors in conflict zones may, for example, be an opportunity to give more space to local peacekeeping initiatives. The shutdown of certain training programs can, in the same way, become an unprecedented opportunity to rethink them in a creative way to adapt them to changing contexts. This is especially the case in the Sahel, where political, social and security crises cannot be considered in isolation. Emphasizing the training of senior officers within the military and police hierarchies in particular can be used to better structure operations in general. UN peace operations can also be reconceptualized as a tool that can indirectly serve troop-contributing countries, through the training of their armies and police in contexts different from those they know within their national frameworks. By emphasizing issues related to respect for human rights, conflict prevention rather than their sole resolutions and the development of peaceful relations between civil and military authorities, these trainings could also strengthen a “culture of peace” beyond the sole areas of intervention of the UN. As the risks of social crises are aggravated by the pandemic and the gravity of its economic repercussions, reconsidering the way in which UN peace operations can be spaces for the transmission of knowledge and good practices seems necessary. Soon, the central question will be: how, from the crisis, can a UN intervention model be created that is more in line with contemporary constraints and issues? [1] However, the ideas presented are those of the author. [2] As previously demonstrated in the case of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. ## PJBD Suspension: What Should Canada’s Reaction Be? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/pjbd-suspension-what-should-canadas-reaction-be/ Modified: 2026-05-29 Policy Forum Politique is a publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic of national security significance to Canada. For this sixth edition, we ask three experts for their perspectives on the following question: How should Canada react to the recent announcement that U.S. Department of Defense is suspending its participation in the Permanent Joint Board of Defence? Established during WW2 between the United States and Canada with a broad mandate to advise on any continental defence and security issue, the PJBD convened civilian and military practitioners to recommend advice to the two executive branches. It was the starting point of the bilateral defence relationship between Ottawa and Washington. Nicholas Glesby | Trent University Prior to this newly announced official pause, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) was already on de-facto hiatus given that the US did not host any meeting in 2025. However, there are other binational institutions working at the daily operational level, such as the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), NORAD, and daily communication between National Defence Headquarters and the Pentagon. Canadians need more information to assess the full intentions behind the pause, beyond the historic narrative that Canada is weak on defence. Canada is now spending 2% of GDP on defence (and committed to 5% by 2035), is moving at speed to implement NORAD modernization projects such as the Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar, and RCAF pilots are training on F-35 airframes which are set to be delivered imminently. Canada is making its territory “immune from attack or possible invasion” that would threaten American security, which continues to guide Ottawa’s approach to continental defence thinking. The PJBD is an enduring symbol of the special relationship. Accordingly, the pause in such a public manner is notable. While the Board’s secretive nature keeps conversations away from the public spotlight, which means that most North Americans are unaware of its quiet existence, Canadians should consider the pause as a signal that Washington’s broader view of the relationship is evolving. The pause “could eventually be softened or quietly reversed” to grapple with “the most complicated and rapidly evolving threat environment we have seen.” Until then, Canada will need to focus on other channels to maintain its perpetual commitments with its neighbour to defend North America. Nicholas Glesby is a Ph.D. Student in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University, Administrator of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN), and Student Fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS). Justin Massie | UQAM The Trump administration’s suspension of the JDP sends a troubling political signal regarding the future of Canada-U.S. relations. The Trump administration justifies its decision by citing the lack of details surrounding Canada’s military spending plan. This criticism is not unfounded: Ottawa has still not presented a detailed plan explaining how Canada will reach 3.5% of GDP in defense spending by 2035. However, U.S. demands reflect a desire to impose Washington’s strategic and industrial choices on Canada. U.S. officials criticize Canada for lacking a credible plan that concretely outlines how Ottawa intends to align with their continental defense priorities, including the long-delayed decision regarding the acquisition of 62 F-35s. The suspension of the JBDP thus appears to be political pressure intended to remind Canada of the potential costs of greater strategic autonomy. If Ottawa rejects this logic and pursues strategic diversification—as the acquisition of Saab’s GlobalEye appears to demonstrate—tensions could spread to other areas. In the most extreme scenario, this could call into question NORAD, considered the heart of continental defense. Yielding to U.S. pressure would not, however, solve the problem. A concession would encourage new demands tomorrow. Prime Minister Carney’s idea of a “North American fortress” rests on a fragile assumption: that of a convergence of Canadian and American interests. The White House’s strategy, rather, aims at U.S. reindustrialization at the expense of its allies, combined with a desire to impose the purchase of U.S. platforms as a condition for strategic cooperation. The prospect of a North American “grand bargain” therefore seems unlikely. In this context, the best response from the Canadian government would be to release a coherent ten-year military reinvestment plan that clearly commits to the goal of diversifying its defense industrial partnerships. Justin Massie is full professor and director of the department of political science at UQAM. He is also director of the Strategic Analysis Network and co-editor of Le Rubicon. He held the Fulbright Research Chair in Canada-U.S. Relations at Johns Hopkins University in 2019. Richard Shimooka | Macdonald-Laurier Institute There is a good chance that Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby’s efforts represent an example of policy entrepreneurship on his part and may not signal a wider administration effort to change bilateral relations. The Trump administration’s interagency process has been ineffective at times, to say the least. Its priorities are clearly elsewhere: the war with Iran, the bungled troop deployment to Poland, the passage of the reconciliation budget, and the upcoming midterm elections. Given the PJBD’s low salience to existing bilateral relations between the United States and Canada, Colby may have been able to suspend it without meeting much, if any, bureaucratic resistance. We should thus not overreact to Colby’s announcement. Rather, Ottawa should try to address the roots of the problem that ostensibly provoked Colby’s decision: the government’s limited military capabilities and slow modernization process. Canada’s military capability is far below that of most other allies and relies heavily on the United States to assist in the defence of North America. Members of both parties, the U.S. national security establishment, as well as other partners and allies, take this view of Canada. Though the Carney government seems intent on bundling defence issues with trade in some sort of agreement, the unstructured nature of the Trump administration makes such an approach difficult. To it, security and defence are unlinked and remain non-negotiable aspects of bilateral relations. It would be prudent for Ottawa to work collaboratively with the Department of Defence and allay its worries about the Canadian Armed Forces in a concrete manner. Richard Shimooka is a Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. He was a Senior Fellow at the Defence Management Studies Programme at Queen’s University from 2007–2012, and a Research Fellow at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute from 2012-2017. Image Credit: “Flags over Logan Pass” by GlacierNPS, Public Domain Mark. ## Poland and the Defence of Europe Against Russia URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/poland-and-the-defence-of-europe-against-russia/ Modified: 2026-07-09 ‘They have lost a good opportunity to keep their mouths shut’. In February 2003, the French President at the time, Jacques Chirac, spoke of the support of several new member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and future members of the European Union (EU) for US policy on Iraq, with Poland in the lead. Warsaw's role in Central and Eastern Europe has changed considerably since it joined NATO in 1999, to the point where it would like to compete with the leadership of the Franco-German couple on the European continent as part of its increased credibility in defence and security matters. The illegal invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation over the last three years has plunged Europe back into a situation of high tension, where military spending is becoming crucial to ensure the security of NATO member states, and by extension the EU. Poland is ahead of the other member states of the Alliance, with an estimated 4.7% of its GDP to be spent on defence in 2025, surpassing all the Allies including the United States in terms of share of GDP, and a good economic situation that places it as the leading economy in Central and Eastern Europe and sixth in the European Union, ahead of Sweden and Belgium in particular. In 2025, the United States will upset the balance in transatlantic relations. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, was insulted at the White House, the European Union was perceived by Washington as an anti-American organisation and Canada found itself in a trade and verbal war with the United States. At the same time, the war in Ukraine is continuing and Russia is becoming an existential threat to Europe and NATO. But Europe can no longer be reduced to the economic and military powers of Germany and France. Poland is showing its desire to be a major player that has taken this Russian threat seriously by investing massively in its military capabilities and is also one of the biggest supporters of Ukraine. In this context, Canada must broaden its relations with European partners, particularly Poland, with a view to strengthening cooperation in defence and the production of military equipment. From a far-sighted but pariah state to a major player in crises As New York Times journalist Andrew Higgins pointed out in 2023, no one in Europe can tell Poland to shut up now. Warsaw is now a crucial player in Europe. Its fears about Russian threats to Central and Eastern Europe have been vindicated by the illegal invasion of Ukraine and Russian sabotage in Europe. Since 2008 and the invasion of Georgia by the Russian Federation, Warsaw had not ceased to alert its NATO and EU allies to the threat posed by Russia, criticizing the Obama administration's ‘reset’ of Russo-American relations in 2009 or President Macron's Franco-Russian rapprochement in 2019. The Allies, including Canada, can therefore no longer ignore Warsaw's opinion on the policies decided at NATO and on Ukraine. This new leadership role for Warsaw was not evident before the second phase of the war in Ukraine (the first being the invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine's Donbass region in 2014 and 2015). Indeed, since 2015, Poland has been isolated on the European stage due to the anti-democratic and even authoritarian turn of the sitting governments. In the 2015 presidential elections, Andrzej Duda was elected President, and then the parliamentary elections gave an absolute majority to his Law and Justice party (PiS), a party positioned on the centre-right of the Polish political spectrum, which remained in power until 2023. During its eight years in power, PiS introduced a series of reforms that undermined the rule of law, justice, and individual freedoms. In 2017, Poland was criticized by the European Union for these anti-democratic abuses, making it a ‘bad pupil’ within the union. However, with the start of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, relations between Poland and its European partners warmed up, as in the words of former prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki: ‘We must put an end to the conflict in the West, the real enemy is in the East’. From the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Poland firmly opposed the Russian decision, supporting the multiple sanctions, labelling the Russian Federation a state sponsor of terrorism, and has since become the logistical hub for Western military aid deliveries to Ukraine via Rzeszów-Jasionka airport and then via land and rail corridors at the border. In 2025, the security context in Europe will be called into question by the potential prospects of a full or partial withdrawal of the United States from NATO, but also from the continent. In Central and Eastern Europe in particular, fears of a Russian attack have intensified following the US administration's stance on the war in Ukraine and its relations with Moscow. At the same time, Poland took over the Presidency of the European Union for the next six months, with defence and security as its priorities. This is therefore a crucial period for Warsaw and its potential for leadership in Europe. Europe’s leading army will be Polish It is true that Warsaw has made the rearmament of its forces an important issue, even before 2022. Since the early 2000s, Poland has been committed to meeting NATO standards as quickly as possible, with the purchase of the first modern battle tanks (Leopards 2A4 and 2A5) in 2002, as well as the construction of armoured vehicles on Polish soil by the Finnish company Rosomak, followed in 2004 by the order for the first American F-16s. However, Poland's major rearmament began in the 2010s. The arrival in power of Barack Obama in the United States in 2009, with his plan to ‘reset’ US-Russian relations and his policy of pivoting towards the Indo-Pacific and competition with China, is worrying Warsaw, which already sees a degree of American disengagement from Europe. This concern is also fuelled by the US President's decision to cancel the deployment of the missile defence system in Europe in order to confirm the new positive relations between Washington and Moscow. For the Poles, this decision illustrates a certain American naivety about Russia's objectives in Europe. Indeed, in 2008 the Russian Federation had already invaded Georgia, creating two separatist regions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Faced with these concerns, Warsaw voted in 2012 for a technical modernisation plan (PMT - Plan Modernizacji Technicznej), worth 40 billion dollars and covering future military spending from 2013 to 2022. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Ukraine's Donbass region in 2015 meant that Warsaw had to step up its rearmament programme faster than expected. In 2015, Poland exceeded the threshold of 2% of GDP in military spending, while Germany was at 1.19% and France at 1.78%. Since then, successive Polish governments, while disagreeing on the amounts allocated to rearmament, have all had the same premise about the need to strengthen the armed forces in the face of the Russian threat and the hybrid threat on the border with Belarus. In 2018, the Wisla programme aimed to revise the plan drawn up in 2012 in order to adapt to changes in the defence situation. Donald Trump's first term in the White House has only reinforced the idea, for Poland, of the need to rearm itself in the face of a Russia that is increasingly active in destabilising Western democracies with cases of interference in the 2016 US election (seeking to favour Donald Trump) and the 2017 French election (seeking to favour Marine Le Pen). Between 2018 and 2022, Polish orders for equipment increased, with the purchase of American equipment in particular, combining the purchase of quality equipment with good relations with the American president. Poland acquired Patriot ground-to-air batteries, UH-60 (Black Hawk) helicopters and HIMARS multiple rocket launchers. Warsaw also hoped to convince the US President to maintain his presence in Europe as a deterrent to Russia by agreeing to a permanent presence of US troops on Polish territory, and even proposing the construction of a ‘Fort Trump’. On the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, the Polish armed forces had been considerably strengthened and met NATO standardisation criteria. Poland (797 battle tanks) outnumbered the French (222 Leclerc tanks) and German (284 Leopard tanks) fleets and had the largest air fleet in Central and Eastern Europe, but its navy was lagging slightly behind, although it was developing its capacity to secure the Baltic Sea against Russian threats. Polish budgets for military spending have grown steadily to reach 4% of GDP in 2024, rising in 10 years from $10.1 billion to $34.9 billion, representing more than half of France's spending ($64.2 billion in 2024). In 2024, the Polish armed forces were ranked 3rd in terms of strength within NATO with 216,000 personnel (compared with 204,600 for France), behind the United States and Turkey. Although these numbers were a mix of professionals, reservists, and volunteers, they illustrated Poland's desire to rely on the quality of its modern equipment and on massification to meet the challenges of high-intensity land warfare. The modernisation of the Polish armed forces has therefore been designed to meet the demands of high-intensity combat, with the development of deep strike capabilities and the construction of defensive fortifications, particularly on the borders with the Kaliningrad enclave and Belarus. In the summer of 2024, Donald Tusk's government announced funding for the $2.5 billion Eastern Shield project to build fortifications on the border with Belarus and the Russian Federation. The shield will include modern dams and surveillance fortifications. It will be carried out jointly with the Baltic States (Estonia - Latvia - Lithuania), which border the Russian Federation and Belarus. As part of their strategic communication with Russia and Belarus, Polish politicians like to present the Polish armed forces as ‘Europe's leading army’, ahead of France and Germany. After these efforts, it seems that it is on the way to becoming so, especially in terms of land capabilities. However, there are questions about Poland's economic and structural capacity to maintain these efforts over the long term. Indeed, the major efforts made by the various governments raise questions about Poland's ability to maintain these efforts over time, while ensuring clear public acceptance of this national effort. After Paris and Berlin, Warsaw is becoming a major centre of Europe In January 2025, Poland took over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for a period of six months under the slogan "Security, Europe! The Council presidency allows a trio of states, in this case Poland with Denmark and Cyprus, to define the themes and major issues to be addressed by the Council of the EU during this period. Among the seven main priorities, Poland is giving priority to the defence and security of the European Union. During this mandate, the Polish government wishes to work on strengthening the preparation of European partners in the defence of the continent and thus improve the defence industry in Europe. At an informal meeting in Brussels on 3 February between a number of European representatives, including the British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, the view was expressed that European spending on defence and aid to Ukraine should be stepped up. Poland supports the idea of easing the rules of the European Investment Bank to help finance defence projects such as the Eastern Shield. These discussions on a European agreement on the financing of projects to strengthen the defence of allies were already part of the discussions of the French Presidency of the Council of the EU in early 2022. However, Poland is also keen to reflect on improving direct cooperation between the European Union and NATO, broadening the players involved, including Canada and the United States. This Presidency allows Warsaw to be at the heart of all European discussions and to put forward its political agenda at a time when the Franco-German couple, usually the ‘leaders’ of the European Union, are experiencing a certain slowdown. Indeed, France has been in an unstable internal political situation since the dissolution of the National Assembly in June 2024 and the absence of a clear majority, which resulted in the fall of a first government last December and strong criticism of the French President, Emmanuel Macron. Nonetheless, the French President has been very active on the subject of Ukraine and the defence of the European allies since the high tensions between Washington and Kyiv following the disastrous meeting at the White House at the end of February between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky. In Germany, the break-up of the SPD, Greens and FDP coalition last November led Chancellor Olaf Scholz to lose a vote of confidence in December, forcing him to call early general elections. The conservative CDU won the election, but there was a major emergence of the far-right AFP party. Germany's future chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has said he is in favour of strengthening Germany's armed forces[1] and revising its strategic agreements, raising the possibility of opening the debate on the idea of a European nuclear umbrella, in cooperation with the continent's only two nuclear powers: the United Kingdom and France. Although France and Germany are rediscovering some form of decision to act in defence of Europe and support for Ukraine, Poland stands out for its stable line on the perception of the Russian threat since 2008, for its current political stability, and also for the investments it has made in its defence since joining NATO in 1999. Poland, which also enjoys good relations with the 47th President of the United States, wants to be seen as a key player in Europe. Poland and the US abandonment of Ukraine and Europe The large-scale invasion of Ukraine by nearly 200,000 Russian troops in 2022, as mentioned earlier, exposed the extent of the Russian Federation's border revisionist objectives in Europe. However, while the transatlantic community was able at the time to respond together to denounce this invasion and help Ukraine, three years later the situation has changed dramatically. In 2025, the new American administration is showing its desire to end the war whatever the cost, even if it means abandoning the illegally occupied territories (including Crimea). What's more, the US President has also announced that he will exclude Ukraine from NATO membership as a security guarantee, reinforcing the division between Washington and the European chancelleries over the conduct of peace negotiations. The fate of Ukraine is therefore causing great concern in Central and Eastern Europe about the support of the American ‘ally’. What's more, for several weeks now there has been concern about the prospect of an American military withdrawal from NATO and hence from Europe. Such a departure would leave Europeans with the task of reorganising themselves to deter any Russian attempt on the eastern flank of the Atlantic alliance. Although the words ‘peace’ and ‘ceasefire’ are increasingly being used to describe the war in Ukraine, the Russian Federation does not seem ready to stop its military efforts. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that Russia's military spending this year will account for 7.5% of GDP. What's more, during his speech on March 5th, French President Emmanuel Macron explained that Russia was planning to increase the ranks of its armed forces by 300,000 additional soldiers, as well as increasing its equipment. Even if the war in Ukraine were to end, the European continent would still be under direct threat from a Russia emboldened by its gains in its military campaign. So, with the risk of the US administration abandoning Ukraine and Europe, the Polish government is not wavering and is determined to demonstrate its determination to defend Europe's eastern flank. Prime Minister Donald Tusk recently announced that the government is working on a programme to provide every adult male in Poland with basic military training.[2] He also announced a target of 500,000 members of the armed forces, speaking of a ‘Race for Security’. Despite fears of a US withdrawal, the Polish government is trying to secure the transatlantic link, emerging as the state best placed to talk to the Trump administration. However, the UK and France have shown some leadership in recent weeks, notably by proposing to work on the potential deployment of European troops in Ukraine as part of a ceasefire or peace treaty, aimed at ensuring compliance with any agreement signed. Poland, for its part, has opposed any participation in this deployment, which could call into question its real determination in the face of the Russian threat. Nevertheless, this decision may be understandable given Poland's need to protect its territory, its borders with the Kaliningrad enclave and Belarus, and also to protect the Polish-Lithuanian border, which provides a land link between the Baltic States and the rest of the European continent. Political Considerations for Canada Last January, the former Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the Polish government of Donald Tusk aimed at improving Canada-Poland cooperation in the nuclear sector and energy transition. The next Canadian government must continue to deepen relations with Warsaw. What should Canada remember about the changing balance of power in Europe? Political considerations: The forthcoming elections in Poland In May 2025, the Polish people will be called to the polls. The latest polls show the party (Civic Coalition or KO) of the current Polish Prime Minister in the lead in both the presidential and parliamentary elections (36% of voting intentions for the presidential candidate, Rafal Trzaskowski, and 35% for the parliamentary candidate). The KO party is considered to be at the centre of the political spectrum in Poland. However, there is also a high level of opposition parties. On the one hand, the former ruling party (PiS), of which the current President, Andrzej Duda, is a member, is credited with 24% in the presidential elections and 31% in the parliamentary elections, with Karol Nawrocki as its candidate. The far-right Confederation of Freedom and Independence (KWOiN) is also on the rise, with 19% of voting intentions for the presidential and parliamentary elections. The positions of the various political parties on foreign policy issues are similar, and the outcome of the elections is unlikely to have a major impact on these two political issues, with a particular desire to maintain strong ties with the US ally. Security remains a major issue in these elections. However, the last time the PiS was in government, Poland was widely criticised for its respect for fundamental rights, and the party's return to power could make it difficult to deepen relations between Ottawa and Warsaw. Poland is a key player in supporting Ukraine Warsaw is one of Kyiv's most important military and humanitarian supporters. In 2025, Polish aid to Ukraine will represent the equivalent of 4.91% of Poland's GDP, including both direct aid and aid to refugees. Poland has taken in almost a million refugees since the beginning of the invasion. What's more, from a military point of view, Warsaw delivered a substantial number of resources: around 800 battle tanks, almost 500 infantry fighting vehicles and large stocks of ammunition, as well as Soviet-made fighter planes. In addition to its direct aid, Poland has become the focal point for Western military aid sent to Ukraine, thanks to its air, rail, and road infrastructures. For its part, Canada's military aid to Ukraine in terms of equipment has been more limited since 2022. However, Ottawa was very present in Ukraine before the war with Operation UNIFIER, which was ‘a military training mission to professionalise and strengthen the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in support of Ukraine’, set up in 2015. Since the war, Operation UNIFIER has moved training missions to Europe, particularly Poland, strengthening the ties between Warsaw and Ottawa in terms of cooperation in aiding Ukraine. Some 54,000 members of the Ukrainian armed forces have been trained since the start of the Operation, giving credibility to Canada's position on aid to Ukraine. Poland is a key ally in transatlantic relations and economic cooperation With constant positive growth in its military spending and investment in the defence industry, Poland is becoming a pillar in the strengthening of European capabilities. By engaging with Warsaw on these issues, Canada could facilitate bilateral industrial and strategic partnerships, serving to strengthen relations with Warsaw. In particular, this industrial rapprochement could enable Ottawa to find new ways of purchasing military equipment (see recommendation 1). Poland plays a central role in strengthening NATO's eastern flank. Its commitment to regional security makes it a strategic partner for Canada, which shares the same stability objectives in the face of Russian threats, notably through Canada's military presence in the region as part of Operation REASSURANCE. As part of this presence in Latvia, Poland has become a major partner in ensuring the protection of the Suwałki Corridor. Since 2022, this corridor has been identified as a weak point in the Alliance's posture against the risk of Russian attacks against NATO member states. Poland's growing role in European politics also offers Canada an opportunity to deepen its ties with the EU through a state that favors enhanced cooperation with North America. This is not about calling into question the role of France or Germany, but rather diversifying its relations with European partners, especially given that there is a large Polish community in Canada, with approximately 1.1 million Canadians of Polish descent. Why should Poland become a more important partner for Canada? By capitalizing on Poland's growing influence in Europe, Canada could strengthen its role within transatlantic alliances and strengthen its political activity in Eastern Europe, a key issue for global stability. However, these recommendations must be combined with Poland's priority for defence within NATO, which would increase the budget for military spending. Recommendations for the Canadian Government 1- Strengthen bilateral cooperation in defence and security As mentioned previously, Poland and Canada already cooperate in defence and security matters, notably through their participation in NATO military missions and exercises, including their joint participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 and the presence, between 2014 and 2017, of Canadian troops rotating on Polish soil (between 120 and 220 personnel) in Drawsko Pomorskie. Furthermore, with the invasion of Ukraine, Canada relocated its mission of training Ukrainian troops to Europe, particularly to Poland, as part of Operation UNIFIER. Thus, cooperation between Poland and Canada in defence and security matters is already significant, but it could be further deepened. As a first step, Canada could strengthen its bilateral agreement with Poland on general information security by including the same principles as those announced under the bilateral partnership with France. The latter aimed to strengthen cybersecurity and intelligence sharing on various fronts, including interference, espionage, and sabotage. Given the current state of Russian sabotage in Europe, Canada should begin strengthening this cooperation with these targeted states, including Poland, to better prepare for this type of threat, which could be Russian or Chinese. Second, in the spring of 2024, Poland, in collaboration with several other states bordering Russia,[3] announced an agreement to establish a "Drone Wall" along the 3,800 km border from Norway to Poland. This drone wall project aims to improve border surveillance capabilities because each drone is capable of covering a wider area than the usual fixed camera installation. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the major importance of drones in military operations, whether for combat, but also and especially for intelligence and reconnaissance. In 2023, Canada announced the acquisition of 11 remotely piloted aircraft systems, accompanied by the purchase of necessary surrounding resources (control posts, hangars, support services, etc.) acquired from the American manufacturer General Atomics Aeronautical System. Due to political and commercial tensions between Canada and the American administration, it seems necessary for Ottawa to find new alternatives in terms of acquiring military aeronautical equipment. In order to cover its airspace more widely, particularly in the Arctic North, Canada could therefore strengthen its cooperation with Poland in the "Drone Wall" project through the purchase of European drones, with, in return, an expansion of the "Wall" to Canada's northern border. This expansion would make it possible to cover an area so threatened by Russian aviation and navy. 2- Support the emergence of Polish leadership in relations with the EU Canada and Poland have maintained important bilateral relations since the end of the Cold War. Since 2022, Canada has been aiding Poland in managing refugees from Ukraine. As part of strengthening its relations with Central and Eastern European states, Canada should collaborate with Poland on transatlantic issues to promote common positions in international forums. Next, Ottawa should encourage Warsaw to play a leading role in the evolution of European policies toward stronger ties with North America. Indeed, Poland remains one of the European states most committed to maintaining good relations with the United States despite current tensions over the war in Ukraine and trade relations with the European Union. With Canada holding the G7 presidency this year, it would be appropriate to give Poland a more prominent role in an expanded meeting format, thus demonstrating the Canadian government's consideration for the emergence of Polish leadership in Europe. 3- Develop economic and energy exchanges Poland is Canada's leading economic partner in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to the nuclear cooperation agreement signed earlier this year, Canada could continue to strengthen its investments in Poland in strategic sectors such as energy. The Canadian government could support energy cooperation agreements, particularly in the areas of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and renewable energies. LNG Canada, the first large-scale LNG export facility, aims to make its first LNG exports as early as 2025. Other installation projects are planned for around 2027-2030. Poland, for its part, is seeking to diversify its gas imports, having relied on Russian gas before the 2022 invasion, and could therefore be a relevant partner for Canada and its liquefied natural gas. [1] On March 18, 2025, the Bundestag voted on a major military spending plan worth hundreds of billions of euros. [2] This training would only be offered to women on a voluntary basis. [3] Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. ## Policy Officer Recruitment Program Preparation Workshop URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/atelier-de-preparation-au-programme-de-recrutement-dagents-des-politiques/ Modified: 2020-11-17 > Preparation workshop for the Policy Officer Recruitment Program for the Department of Defense Preparation workshop for the Policy Officer Recruitment Program for the Department of Defense With Anthony Ippolito (Manager, Policy Officer Recruitment Programme – Department of National Defence) ## Potential French-Canadian Collaboration in the Face of New Security and Climate Threats in the Canadian Arctic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/potential-french-canadian-collaboration-in-the-face-of-new-security-and-climate-threats-in-the-canadian-arctic/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > While allies in numerous international organizations, France and Canada also maintain bilateral relations in many fields, including defence. This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program and the DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges. Summary While allies in numerous international organizations, France and Canada also maintain bilateral relations in many fields, including defence. Focusing on the Arctic sub-regions, this note proposes possible avenues of collaboration between Canada, an Arctic state, and France, an observer country to the Arctic Council. The identification of possible avenues for collaboration between these two states is all the more interesting given that the Canadian Arctic is facing ever-greater security and climate threats, which could require support from its allies. The updated Canadian Defence Policy, released on April 8, 2024, by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his Defence Minister Bill Blair, was in fact a response to the need to address new threats created by “the changing geopolitical environment and natural landscapes” for Canada and its population. More specifically, this new policy identifies three trends within which avenues for collaboration between Canada and France could be developed. The security threats posed by certain external powers in the Canadian Arctic crystallize around the presence of China. Since 2022, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has been warning of the risk of Chinese (and Russian) interests in the construction of commercial (mining, telecommunications) and civil (roads, houses, etc.) infrastructures in the North. The challenges linked to new technologies in Arctic sub-regions can be illustrated by the eminently strategic nature of submarine telecommunications cables. Recent cable cuts have illustrated the vulnerability of these telecommunications infrastructures and the need for digital sovereignty on the part of certain state actors. Still too often treated uniformly by the media, the impacts of climate change will be uneven across the North American, European and Russian Arctic sub-regions. The size, geology and natural environment of Inuit Nunangat make it one of the states most at risk, alongside Russia. France and Canada have already forged ties in strategic research. These could be strengthened on defence issues, both within universities and research institutes, by creating, for example, synergies between MINDS and DGRIS. A potential update of the French Polar Strategy could highlight the need to increase joint search and rescue training between the two countries. Finally, the sharing of information and scientific data on misinformation and on the multiple risks and impacts of permafrost climate change must continue to be stepped up between Canada, France, and their allies. Initial measures were announced during Emmanuel Macron's visit to Canada at the end of September 2023. Introduction The world has changed drastically since Strong, Secure, Engaged was released in 2017. Canada is facing new and evolving security threats, including climate change and its impacts on our Arctic; threats from Russia, China, and others to the international rules that keep us all safe; and accelerating changes to the character of conflict. - Bill Blair, April 8, 2024 Canada and France have long been allies and share common values. Numerous exchanges and collaborations exist in various fields: the economy, culture, education, the French-speaking world... In the face of numerous geopolitical tensions, new conflicts, the return of war to Europe, and the increase in acts of interference, it is appropriate to strengthen defence cooperation to the benefit of bilateral interests. Bilateral defence dialogue has already been institutionalized in 2015 with the establishment of the Franco-Canadian Defence Cooperation Council. With regard to the Arctic region, France wishes to maintain a high level of scientific, environmental, economic, and strategic commitment. This was reaffirmed in its national Arctic roadmap in 2016 and its polar strategy in 2022. In this context, the Ministry of the Armed Forces is developing its knowledge of the activities of state and private players in the region and refining its vision of developments that could have an impact on French interests. To this end, the Arctic Observatory, financed by the French Ministry of Defence's Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) and managed by the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS), monitors Arctic issues across the board, from national strategies to the production of standards, technological developments, and environmental aspects. In order to identify possible avenues for collaboration between France and Canada on these issues, we need to take stock of the defence challenges identified by Canada for its Arctic sub-regions. This is all the more important as Canada's defence policy has recently been revised, and bilateral collaboration between the two countries in this sector in the Arctic sub-regions is currently limited. Indeed, on April 8, 2024, the Canadian Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, and his Defence Minister, Bill Blair, issued a defence policy update in the face of the “new threats” created by the “evolving geopolitical environment and natural landscapes” for Canada and its population since 2017, when Canada's last Arctic Policy was published. While experts are more or less critical in their analysis of this update (Légion; Marquis; Massoud; Ouellette-Vézina), this new policy points to three “powerful and interconnected trends (that) are reshaping our world”. Firstly, climate change and its destabilizing and disproportionate effects on the Arctic and Canada's North are making these subregions increasingly accessible and confronting them with new security challenges. Secondly, 'autocracies and disruptive states' are challenging the international order that ensures Canada's security and prosperity, including “blatant violations of international law by Russia” and China's attempts to reshape the international order. Finally, new and disruptive technologies are rapidly redefining conflicts and disrupting Canada's security. Focusing on the Arctic sub-regions, this note will address these issues by grouping them under two banners. In the first part, we will look at the security threats posed by certain external powers on Canadian soil, and those linked to new technologies for Canada. Then, in the second part, we'll look at some of the threats, identified as the most significant, linked to the impacts of climate change in the Inuit Nunangat regions of the Canadian Arctic. Finally, recommendations and avenues for collaboration between France and Canada on the themes covered in this note will be proposed. Part 1: Security Threats Today we are confronted with a complex, generational challenge. […] Democracy, free trade, and the rules and values that underpin them are increasingly being contested by authoritarian states. In parallel, the character of conflict is changing as technology evolves rapidly. Ultimately, our closest values of democracy, freedom, peace, and fairness—which Canadians have fought and died to defend—are being challenged. - Bill Blair, April 2024 The security threats identified in the Canadian Arctic are of two kinds: the interference and presence of certain outside powers on Canadian soil, and the challenges posed by new technologies. The security threats posed by certain outside powers in the Canadian Arctic are primarily illustrated by the presence of China. Indeed, according to Mr. Laporte, Executive Director of the Security and Defence Relations Division of Global Affairs Canada, Canada is very attentive to Chinese activities and to joint military activities between China and Russia, particularly maritime exercises. While, in his view, China's ambitions and economic breakthrough in the Arctic region reflect its growing commitments to global governance, there is nonetheless a growing Canadian distrust of China. Accelerated since 2018 with the Two Michaels Affair, this distrust has crystallized in the Canadian Arctic around several events in early 2023, revealing the risks of Chinese interference through dual infrastructures or domains. In early 2023, four unidentified flying objects were spotted and shot down in North America. While only one of these balloons was formally identified as belonging to China, the Canadian Army soon afterwards detected Chinese surveillance buoys in its Arctic waters. Admittedly, this is not a new phenomenon, dating back to 2022 (Eye On the Arctic; The Globe and Mail; Eye on the Arctic), but the chain of events exacerbated the tensions already present in Sino-Canadian bilateral relations. In addition, they highlighted the challenges over domain awareness in the Arctic and the difficulty of responding to threats in the face of the distances and hostile conditions of Inuit Nunangat. They also highlighted the potential risks of using dual-use infrastructures and technologies. Indeed, although mobilized as part of a Chinese scientific research project, these buoys, “capable of mapping the seabed and measuring ice thickness”, were also “capable of monitoring underwater activity”. While military intent has not been proven in this case, it remains a possibility. In addition to research and scientific cooperation, other civilian fields in which China is a stakeholder are of concern to Canada (The Globe and Mail; Journal de Québec; Journal de Québec). These include shipping and illegal fishing by Chinese vessels in Canada's territorial waters. The lack of infrastructure in the North, whether essential (homes, hospitals, schools) or related to the economic sector (mining), also brings its own set of challenges. Firstly, it is already leading to an exodus to southern cities, as in the Northwest Territories. The Premier of the Northwest Territories, Caroline Cochrane, stated last July that “Canada will not be able to exercise its sovereignty in the Northwest Territories if its communities are not properly equipped and built”, and if these communities are emptied of their inhabitants. In the longer term, if this phenomenon becomes widespread and Inuit Nunangat becomes uninhabitable, Canada's very Arctic identity could be called into question. Secondly, the Chinese state's interest in mining and infrastructure projects in Inuit Nunangat raises issues of national security. For example, the “Gray Bays” deep-water port, essential to Nunavut's economic development, is also suspected of fostering Chinese military and surveillance activities. Since 2022, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has been warning of the risk of Chinese (and Russian) interests in the construction of commercial (mines, telecommunications) and civil (roads, houses, etc.) infrastructures in the North. CSIS even went so far as to offer its services to Inuit representatives to help them make their case to the federal government, including drafting a budget proposal to increase federal spending on infrastructure. In addition, Natan Obed, president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), asked CSIS to share more information to help him be better prepared. CSIS, for its part, is reportedly increasing its presence in the North and consolidating its relations with Inuit communities to better secure the area and counter foreign interference and espionage. In fact, according to documents consulted by Radio Canada, CSIS has identified clandestine foreign investment, attempted interference at all levels of government and in research programs and funding, as well as theft of research or data. Most recently, Canada blocked for the first time a sale of rare earths to a company based in China. The federal government does not rule out intervening again to “restrict Chinese investment in the Canadian mining sector”, as Ottawa considers rare metals to be a matter of national security and a key element in its decarbonization strategy. The challenges posed by new technologies in Arctic sub-regions can be illustrated by the eminently strategic nature of submarine telecommunications cables. Indeed, recent cable cuts have illustrated the vulnerability of these telecommunications infrastructures and the need for digital sovereignty on the part of certain states, particularly the European Union. In the Baltic Sea, three submarine cables (one Finnish, one Swedish and one Russian) and a gas pipeline were damaged on the night of October 7-8, 2023 by the anchor of a Chinese container ship, the New Polar Bear (Staalesen; Kauranen and Van Overstraeten; Sytas and Kauranen; Kauranen and Johnson). Although the deliberate nature of these cuts could not be formally demonstrated, the damage revealed the role of the Arctic as a central transit route for digital data. Finally, the threat of traditional armed conflict in the Arctic remains highly hypothetical, given the environment and isolation of certain Arctic sub-regions. It should be noted, however, that the European Arctic, made up of several sovereign states, some of which border on the Russian Federation, would theoretically be more threatened in the event of armed conflict than the North American Arctic, made up of two allied states, the USA and Canada. Part 2: Climate Threats We can no longer rely on Canada's geography — surrounded by three oceans — to protect us. - Mélanie Joly, April 2024 The impacts of climate change on the Arctic marine and terrestrial environment have been in the news for decades. However, they are often treated in a uniform manner, erasing the incredible diversity of the North American, European and Russian Arctic sub-regions. With regard to climatic threats to the marine environment, the best-known example is the opening up of navigable sea lanes, a phenomenon whose real impacts are still under-reported (Lasserre; see the 'Navigation' chapters of L'Année Arctique; Polar Navigation). Indeed, it is often claimed that the disappearance of the summer ice pack will facilitate navigation in the Arctic Ocean. However, while the Russian coasts, further away from the pack ice, could theoretically be more “accessible”, this is not the case for the Canadian archipelago, whose channels could be blocked by increasing growlers and other drift ice. Moreover, on both sides, the fragmentation of the pack ice complicates ice chart updates, increases humidity, fog, and the risk of storms - all phenomena that make navigation uncertain, slower and riskier. In Laporte's view, this opening up of sea lanes would be a double-edged sword, opening up new maritime opportunities on the one hand, but massively disrupting daily life and civil and military infrastructures on the other. For Canada, these openings would mean a necessary strengthening of surveillance capabilities in the region, particularly in the face of ecological risk, in sparsely populated areas with limited infrastructure. At circumpolar level, this increase in shipping would also mean an increase in search and rescue resources, as coastal states have a legal international obligation to come to the aid of vessels in distress in their waters. Another much-discussed topic is the likelihood of natural resources being located at sea, which needs to be put into context. It is important to remember that the United States Geological Survey (USGS) study of potential offshore hydrocarbon reserves in the Arctic, published in 2008, is based on probabilities, not proven resources. However, in the absence of more recent studies on the same scale, it remains the benchmark. Furthermore, even if this estimate is confirmed, it should be noted that most of these resources are located on the seabed of the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal states. As such, they would be the exclusive property of these states, minimizing the risk of conflicts or “resource races” (Arctic Observatory, Report 4, Note 2, non-public). When it comes to climatic threats to the terrestrial environment, the Arctic states will not all be equal. The most significant threat is the accelerated thawing of permafrost - ground composed of rock, sediment and ice whose temperature remains at or below 0°C for at least two consecutive years. The Russian Federation, for example, is 65% permafrost, making it the state most threatened by this phenomenon. According to one study, 80% of infrastructure in the Russian Arctic is built on permafrost. The North American Arctic (comprising Alaska, the Yukon, the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Nunavik, Nunatsiavut and Northern Labrador) comes second, followed by Greenland, the Scandinavian countries and Iceland. In addition to threats to marine and terrestrial environments, climate change in the Arctic can also be illustrated by its impacts on Arctic populations, and more specifically indigenous peoples. Indeed, for Bridget Larocque, former policy advisor and researcher with the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) and Executive Director of Gwich'in Council International (GCI) (2007-2012), climate threats impact first and foremost the rights and traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, intrinsically linked to the central role of the Territory (called “Nuna” in Inuktitut) for their well-being. In fact, climate change exacerbates all the threats to human security. For example, in addition to altering the migration routes of animal species due to warmer ground, air and water temperatures, thawing permafrost is increasing the discharge of freshwater into deltas, pushing marine fish and their predators out to sea, further threatening the food security of circumpolar communities. Ultimately, these combined threats are likely to exacerbate the above-mentioned phenomenon of southward migration and its impact on Canadian sovereignty in the North. The importance of these issues for Canada's North can be illustrated by the words of Stéphane Roussel, Professor at the École nationale d'administration publique. In his view, the Ministry of Defence is the only one with sufficient capacity to provide the necessary services to aboriginal populations, and should multiply human security approaches in its internal security policies - a revival that would also be desirable for NATO. This position is shared by ENAP researcher Laurent Borzillo, who argues that greater investment in Ranger patrols would help to anticipate these threats and ensure better protection for aboriginal communities (Government of Canada; Radio Canada; Lackenbauer, Vullierme & Roussel). Finally, in its Climate Change Security Impact Assessment Report, published on July 9, 2024, NATO summarizes the threats facing Allied Forces in the Arctic: “technological and logistical challenges” of Arctic theaters of operation (increasingly unpredictable harsh climate, wind speeds, strong tidal currents, long distances, darkness, remoteness, limited radar, satellite and military and critical infrastructure coverage) ; coastal erosion, permafrost degradation and flooding, risking damage to military infrastructure; flooding, snow or storms blocking supply routes; increased precipitation weakening the load-bearing capacity of soils and roads; fighting boreal forest fires; “environmental and human security”. In the face of these security and climatic threats, how can France and Canada work together? Part 3: Recommendations for French-Canadian Collaboration Before going any further, we would like to emphasize that these recommendations are to be taken for what they are, i.e., our modest contribution to a “common bilateral strategic thinking” that could lead to a better understanding of the respective perceptions of these two States concerning these sub-regions. France and Canada have already forged ties in the field of strategic research, which could be strengthened on defence issues, both within universities and research institutes. Both countries have similar funding programs. In Canada, the Department of National Defence funds the Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program. In France, the Direction générale des relations internationales et de la stratégie (DGRIS) of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces funds the ministry's strategic research support system (outsourced studies, grants, Pacte enseignement supérieur). The DGRIS also oversees the Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire (IRSEM), the strategic research arm of the Ministry of the Armed Forces. We recommend strengthening collaboration between institutional, public and private players. Following the example of the study day organized by the France-Canada “personnalités d'avenir” program on “The Arctic and transatlantic cooperation”, we recommend organizing a larger-scale annual event with the support of both States. This annual event could alternate between Canada and France. Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon's proximity to Canada could be an asset for organizing one of these study days. Panels would be made up of young researchers in the social and natural sciences, French and Canadian institutions and military personnel. This annual event will contribute to bilateral reflection on these issues and the strengthening of expert networks. Finally, the MINDS program, the DGRIS and the IRSEM could initiate discussions to co-finance a doctoral scholarship for a candidate who will benefit from the dual French-Canadian university supervision. The strengthening of these strategic research links could be achieved through a necessary update of the French Polar Strategy. By updating the new geopolitical context, notably with the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO, this update could also highlight the necessary increase in joint search and rescue training between the Canadian and French navies, and between the French Army and the Canadian Rangers. Finally, we believe it is vital to continue encouraging the sharing of scientific data and information on misinformation (particularly on Arctic infrastructures) and on the multiple risks and impacts of climate change (e.g. on the presence of viruses and bacteria in permafrost) between Canada, France and their allies, along the lines, for example, of the Takuvik international research program between Université Laval and CNRS. Initial measures have already been announced during Emmanuel Macron's visit to Canada at the end of September 2023. France and Canada called for working together to foster the development of a stronger partnership in defence and security. Several actions were announced to strengthen support for Ukraine and maritime surveillance in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries also reiterated their commitment to NATO's Action Plan on Climate Change and Security. At the end of 2023, this led to the opening in Montreal of the NATO Centre of Excellence for Climate Change and Security, staffed by Canadians, French and members of other allied countries. With regard to the Canadian Arctic, France and Canada recalled their collaboration within Operation NANOOK, with joint military exercises. Both countries wish to increase joint navigation exercises, experience sharing, interoperability and crew training in polar environments, taking advantage in particular of the expertise and support of the Canadian armed forces in the Canadian Arctic. Another point of interest on our subject is that Ottawa and Paris wish to strengthen their exchanges to respond effectively to threats of interference, a vital measure in the fight against interference in the Arctic region. This also ties in with initiatives taken at the last G7 in Italy, thanks to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism set up at the G7 in Charlevoix in June 2018. This strengthens G7-wide coordination to detect, prevent and counter threats to member countries' democracies. About the Authors Alexandre Cicard holds a bachelor's degree from Audencia Business School and a master's degree in political science from the Université du Québec à Montréal. For 3 years, he managed and coordinated the strategic studies program at the French Ministry of Defence's Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) in Paris.  Today, he is communications officer and assistant to the ambassador at France's Permanent Representation to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Montreal. Magali Vullierme, PhD in political science, is a post-doctoral researcher with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NADSN, Trent University). She is also a research associate at the Arctic Policy and Security Observatory (OPSA, University of Ottawa), CEARC (Université Paris-Saclay, UVSQ) and the Arctic Observatory (run by the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique on behalf of the French Ministry of Defence). She is also a member of the GDR Arctique (CNRS, France). Her research aims to gain a better understanding of the interrelationships between indigenous and local populations in Arctic regions, on the one hand, and multi-scalar security issues (collaboration with the armed forces, climate change risks, health security), on the other.   ## Potential Washington Strikes Against Iranian Nuclear Facilities at Natanz URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/potential-washington-strikes-against-iranian-nuclear-facilities-at-natanz/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Persistent rumors circulating about the possibility of an "external attack" against iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz by the United States and its Israeli and GCC allies. Over the past few days, several testimonies have been describing a febrile and dangerous atmosphere in Iran and, in particular, in the capital Tehran. Iranians in Tehran have reported that the Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia are particularly nervous and there were persistent rumors circulating about the possibility of an "external attack" by the United States and its Israeli and GCC allies. Two months from the end of Donald Trump's mandate, The New York Times revealed that these rumors were at least partially substantiated. According to this report, during a recent meeting in the Oval Office, the outgoing US president asked several staff members, including Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Chief of Staff Mark Milley "If he had any options to act against the Natanz nuclear site in the coming weeks". According to The New York Times, these senior officials "dissuaded the president from going ahead with a military strike", invoking the probability that it could quickly degenerate into a larger conflict. Several observations must be made. First, the idea of a strike against the Natanz nuclear installation is fully in line with the so-called “maximum pressure” strategy carried out by the United States and its Israeli and Saudi allies since 2017. The objective of this 360° strategy has been to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear capability and ballistic missile program while weakening the regime on the domestic scene, reducing its external influence and isolating it at a regional level. This multifaceted strategy was manifested by the reimposition of economic sanctions against Iran, and marked support for popular anti-regime movements in Lebanon and Iraq. This dual effort of diplomatic suffocation and economic strangulation was reinforced by military pressure from Israel (in Syria), Saudi Arabia (in Yemen) and NATO (in Iraq) climaxing, symbolically, by the elimination of General General Qassem Soleimani (January 2020). Second, it should be noted that while the floated option of a strike against Natanz fits into the so-called "maximum pressure" strategy, it also, quite possibly, marks its culmination. One of the fundamental characteristics of this multifaceted approach has been to rely on all available options ... with the notable exception of the use of force. Qualified by experts as a strategy conducted below the threshold of violence, it essentially consists in containing and stifling the regime in a brutal and systematic manner, while at all costs preventing this pressure from degenerating into direct conflict. This is the view taken by President Trump's advisers when invoking the risks of a regional conflagration to deter him from bombing Natanz. It is also worth noting that, reacting to the New York Times article, Iranian government spokesman Ali Rabiei said: "There could be attempts" to attack Iran, "but, personally, I do not foresee such a thing ”. Expressing a point of view shared in the upper echelons of the Iranian regime, Rabiei added: "I don't believe it is possible that want to increase insecurity in the world and in the region". The fact is that all of the protagonists are well aware of the dangers of a spiraling conflict and the catastrophic consequences that a clash on the traditional battlefield could have. This is why, until now, they have refrained from directly confronting each other and have instead relied on proxies. Neither Iran nor Israel and the Gulf monarchies really want to start a conflict that would escalate and engulf them in regional chaos. Despite Trump's hot-tempered rhetoric, Washington will also most likely remain reluctant to embark on an adversarial course it knows could lead to World War III. Observers also note a certain division in the White House between supporters of the hard way and realists. Everything, up to its disclosure by The New York Times, suggests that this news flash marks the swansong of the "maximum pressure" strategy. Even the Israelis, staunch supporters of this all-out approach, have started establishing contacts with Team Biden. ## Practical workshop on how to write policy briefs URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/practical-workshop-on-how-to-write-policy-briefs/ Modified: 2020-11-16 > With Cecily Pantin (Department of National Defence), Namercia Dos Santos (Department of National Defence) and Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa) Practical workshop on how to write policy briefs With : Cecily Pantin (Department of National Defence) Namercia Dos Santos (Department of National Defence) Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa) ## Protecting Canadian Elections in the Age of Interference URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/protecting-canadian-elections-in-the-age-of-interference/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Introduction The weaponization of information against democracies has become a hallmark of modern geopolitical competition. In the last decade, countries across the globe including Canada have been targeted for influence operations by authoritarian regimes seeking to undermine trust in public institutions. The tactics used to accomplish this goal vary considerably, but often employ illicit financing of campaigns, diaspora community manipulation, and propagation of online disinformation. Outcomes connected to such operations have included the elevation of polarizing rhetoric into mainstream politics, increases in ethnic tensions, and a decline in civic engagement. These conditions have impacted the public legitimacy of institutions limiting the ability of elected officials to govern effectively. Within Canada, the presence of foreign interference since 2019 has raised considerable concern among citizens of all political stripes, prompting widespread discussion and a public inquiry. Amid the controversial prorogation of parliament and widespread anger over economic issues, the Canadian federal election campaign this spring is highly likely to be targeted by malicious actors with interest in destabilizing the country. These include a revanchist Russia seeking to divide NATO, states interested in exerting influence over their diaspora such as India or the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and even populist elements based in the United States. Given the high likelihood of interference, the Government of Canada must implement a robust response to foreign influence campaigns and secure its democratic processes. This policy report will profile individual threats within a comprehensive assessment, establish political imperatives for a mitigation strategy, and enumerate several recommendations. Threat Profiles Russian Federation As a key element of its strategy, the Kremlin has pursued delegitimization of the liberal-democratic model in its so-called “near-abroad” and has extended this practice to Western states in the last decade. Thus far, its focus on Canada has been modest in comparison to its efforts in the United States and Europe. However, as the Russo-Ukrainian War is pushed into tenuous negotiations, it will undoubtedly be a Kremlin priority to target key NATO members. Tactics employed by the Putin regime generally consist of disinformation operations deployed in the Euro-Atlantic. Historically, Moscow has developed a state media apparatus to deliver content in European languages, investing substantially in enterprises such as Sputnik News and Russia Today. However, as these outlets have come under new legal restrictions due to their close affiliation with the Kremlin, Moscow has adapted by doubling down on the covert recruitment of local figures to promote pro-Kremlin narratives. Individuals with alleged Russian links include journalists, former UN representatives, and even political parties in various Western countries. Execution of disinformation campaigns by Moscow has benefited extensively from social media penetration and lack of regulation in the Euro-Atlantic. Using the former, the Kremlin has managed to propagate numerous conspiracy theories and impersonate members of U.S. civil society to amplify its narrative. This historically has been accomplished through use of synthetic social media profiles and has recently begun to incorporate generative artificial intelligence (AI) to fabricate visual evidence. Platforms of consequence for disinformation are also generally media-heavy, such as Facebook, X (Twitter), and Instagram. Given the evolving nature of the Russian threat vector, it is critical that Canada remain vigilant of its impact on the coming election. People’s Republic of China (PRC) Boasting both a Pacific presence and a large Chinese diaspora, Canada has emerged as a prime target for interference by the People’s Republic of China. Originally employing alleged cyberattacks and money laundering operations, the strategy has evolved to incorporate tools including platform instrumentalization and transnational repression. Attempts by Beijing to influence Canadian political processes have been extensively documented in a public inquiry, most notably those occurring in the federal election campaigns of 2019 and 2021. Due to restrictions in the PRC on internet usage, a state-sponsored parallel ecosystem of applications has emerged, most notably including the messaging service WeChat. As the “everything app” of choice for the Chinese population, it has remained in use among diaspora communities to retain contact with relatives on the mainland. As a result, the app has become an effective tool of influence repression for the PRC, being used in smear campaigns against several prominent Canadian politicians and to attempt electoral interference. Leveraging this widely adopted digital apparatus, Chinese intelligence services have been able to conduct covert campaigns on foreign soil to spread disinformation and silence dissent, targeting the diaspora in Canada especially. Targets of harassment and intimidation have broadly included pro-democracy and minority rights activists that vocally criticize the Communist Party. Further, the Government of Canada has raised concerns surrounding the potential extralegal pursuit of dissidents by PRC operatives on Canadian soil. Although the impact of PRC operations on Canadian elections has been minimal outside of individual ridings, it has arguably affected public opinion and political discourse. For instance, disproven allegations of treason among parliamentarians were used by Canadian politicians to attack opponents and continue to circulate on social media. Thus, though the interference may not have achieved its primary goal of shaping electoral outcomes, it has helped to undermine to some extent public confidence in political figures. Canada should therefore prioritize developing safeguards against Chinese actions in the coming federal election. Republic of India The strategy pursued by India to influence Canadian political processes shares many characteristics with that of the PRC, primarily in leveraging the diaspora. However, although the PRC aims to interfere abroad in the name of limiting, if not crushing, dissent, the Indian strategy instead aims to enhance its global position and internal security. This is accomplished through cultivation of ties with Canadian politicians and targeting nationalist groups like the Sikh Khalistan movement. As a proudly multicultural society, Canada has a long-standing political tradition of minority outreach. However, the line between outreach and cultivation has become blurred in recent years as the issue of foreign interference grew more controversial. Politicians with ties to the community often receive scrutiny for their views on Indian government policies and so face organized pro-Modi opposition. For example, allegations of interference in the 2022 Conservative Party leadership race were tied to a fallout between one candidate and the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. However, the most controversial aspect of Indian influence strategy in Canada is its approach to the Khalistan movement. With the largest population of Sikhs outside India, the presence of separatist activism in Canada remains a point of contention in their bilateral relationship. Tensions reached a boiling point in 2023, when a Sikh nationalist leader was assassinated on Canadian soil by Indian nationals allegedly connected to the government in New Delhi. This event would follow a broad pattern of anti-Sikh media campaigns on diaspora social media, which has recently inflamed tensions among Canadians with ties to the region. Given the potential for increased inflammation of sectarian tensions and covert support for political candidates, Indian foreign interference constitutes a threat to Canadian national security. Populist Elements in the United States The return of Donald Trump to the Oval Office has caused a diplomatic rift to emerge between Canada and the United States. From accusations of unfair trade practices to annexationist overtures, populist forces in the United States have taken aim at Canada in their realignment of American foreign policy. That said, it should be noted annexation efforts have gained little sincere traction and that the proposal remains unpopular with the American electorate. However, the existence of a populist media sphere supportive of President Trump presents a risk that cannot be ignored, given its extensive presence across many U.S.-based social media platforms popular in Canada. In recent years, right-wing populism in the United States has attempted to make inroads in the Canadian political environment, with modest success. Though Canadians have yet to warm up to President Trump himself, several political movements including the 2022 Freedom Convoy protest have received overt support from various U.S. politicians, including Trump. Amid the response by Canadian law enforcement to the demonstrations, some U.S. supporters of the convoy began actively discussing “liberation” of Canada through military force. Intense criticism of the Trudeau government also continued following the late-2022 acquisition of social media platform Twitter (now X) by Elon Musk, who vocally supported the convoy. In the current media environment, U.S. right-wing populists are amplifying their rhetoric against Canadian sovereignty, this time with tacit support from the executive branch. For example, the resignation of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau offered a key opportunity for those populists to imply the governing Liberals are preparing to steal the election and exacerbate political tensions. As Canada enters its election campaign, it is clear this sort of rhetoric will only become more intense, and that policymakers must immediately begin preparing for increased coercion south of the border. Such actions will likely attempt to destabilize the electoral environment in Canada to force political concessions. Policy Imperatives In designing a policy response to foreign interference, the Government of Canada must take care to avoid politicization and address the role of emerging technologies. Should they fail to do either, the policy may inadvertently intensify foreign influence, particularly among disaffected groups. To substantiate these concerns, examining the recent elections in Romania and Germany may offer insight into how policy missteps may be avoided. Romania: Inadvertent Consolidation Though mainstream political parties in Romania remain opposed to embracing Moscow, pro-Russian movements have managed to leverage anti-establishment sentiment. Most recently, its annulled presidential election offers a case of how public perception is critical to managing disinformation. Benefitting from a Russian influence campaign, independent candidate Calin Georgescu managed to win 23% of the first-round vote in a colossal upset, with most polls having expected him to perform in the single-digits. Using social media platforms such as TikTok and Telegram, Georgescu ran a reactionary campaign that promoted various conspiracy theories and opposition to Ukrainian military aid. Further, upon inspection of sources shared on his social media profiles, many of the materials shared by Georgescu were linked directly to outlets funded by the Kremlin. Following an investigation, the Constitutional Court of Romania officially annulled the results of the first round on 2 December, citing financial irregularities in the Georgescu campaign. This decision was met with mass protests and condemned even by Georgescu’s liberal second-round opponent, Elena Lasconi. In March 2025, the Romanian authorities officially barred Georgescu from participating in the fresh round of elections, drawing significant criticism from his supporters and consolidating his support around other anti-establishment political parties. As a result, one can argue that disinformation risks in Romania have increased. Learning from this case, Canadian authorities should ensure that represented political parties are given advance input in policy design. Given the currently polarized political environment, accusations of bias by state institutions will further decline the trust they enjoy from the public. Moreover, demonstrated by the Georgescu affair, retroactive measures to protect electoral processes will have a catastrophic effect, lending credence to disinformation narratives. Therefore, gaining the trust of stakeholders represented in Parliament should assist in minimizing the politicization of election security and visceral support for accused foreign agents. Germany – Tech-Driven Amplification  The recent elections in Germany offer an interesting case study into how disruptive technologies, namely generative AI, play a substantial role in foreign influence campaigns. Though U.S. populist support for the far-right was widely covered, the prevalence of AI-generated headlines and synthetic visual media poses a more substantial risk to election integrity. The use of falsified news content to influence elections is not a new phenomenon. However, the use of such content has grown more sophisticated and efficient due to artificial intelligence tools and brand falsification. In the German elections, Russian-backed efforts such as Doppelgänger actively cloned the public branding and profiles of prominent news organizations to spread false narratives. As a result, many voters were exposed to content with a veneer of credibility accusing politicians of corruption and indecency, boosting foreign-backed movements such as the Alternative für Deutschland to a historic degree. Though bans on state media have proven effective in Canada, the prevalence of these web-based disinformation vectors pose a larger challenge to regulate. Given their substantial ability to reproduce, it will not be possible to track them or restrict access in an effective manner. To counter this trend, Canadian authorities should focus on shoring up AI discernment within the electorate and the promotion of media literacy. Policy Recommendations Enhanced Public Awareness Campaigns As its first strategy, the Government of Canada should expand on its existing public relations campaigns to incorporate strategies that assist in the recognition of AI-generated content. As an emerging weapon of disinformation used by Russia and China, ensuring popular understanding of the technology and its traces is desirable for resisting foreign influence. An example of such an updated campaign could involve running standard video and deep-fake imagery side-by-side to provide an effective reference point for citizens to ascertain the difference. Doing the same for AI-generated audio, while difficult, can be demonstrated through sound clarity and tonal shifts diverging from natural speech. Moreover, collaboration with the tech sector, educational institutions, and journalists could assist in ensuring the design of campaigns that reach a broad range of citizens. Such partnerships would also have the added benefit of diversifying from government channels, which assists in appealing to disaffected demographics. By fostering maximal engagement and awareness, the Canadian electorate can enhance its protection from AI-generated disinformation. Empowering Elections Canada  As the sole authority adjudicating the electoral process, it is appropriate for any additional security authority to be provided to Elections Canada. Accountable to the House of Commons rather than the Prime Minister, the role has a unique level of popular consent among bureaucratic roles in the federal state. Providing election-centric authority to national security organizations, by contrast, would appear authoritarian and harm the legitimacy of the election security policies enacted. In essence, the Elections Canada should ensure that oversight of democratic processes is consistent across all levels of government through increased cooperation and enforcement. For instance, the establishment of a council between provincial election authorities and Elections Canada would facilitate the sharing of information relevant to election security and enable smaller-scale tracking that the federal organization may not find itself able to accomplish. Furthermore, the deepening of cooperation with the Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) to detect potential illicit financing of election campaigns would aid in identifying whether foreign actors are allocating resources to interference projects. Other benefits are possible if a federal standard for internal party processes could be established, ensuring a common security standard, and voting system for leadership elections. This system could be established with the input of provincial authorities, who would retain enforcement authorities over their own electoral activities. Civic Cohesion Measures Given the emphasis of several interference strategies on leveraging diaspora politics, the strategy pursued by government should aim to solidify the Canadian tradition of multiculturalism. More specifically, the Government should enact cooperative measures in consultation with civil society groups and diaspora-language media based in Canada. By effectively countering disinformation messaging in diaspora spheres with a pro-Canadian presence, population diversity can be approached as a protecting factor rather than a vulnerability. The cornerstone of this policy proposal is to develop translated strategic communications similar to the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) in the mother tongue of diaspora communities to facilitate both outreach and democratic involvement. This may include anything from Elections Canada advertising to translations of public information campaigns on disinformation risks into the language of targeted communities. These would include Mandarin or Hindi-language campaigns, for example. The use of Generative AI translation systems could facilitate government production of these advertisements in real-time as new narratives take hold in media spheres. Finally, it would be advisable to establish a civic engagement council with minority community leaders and cultural organizations to enhance promotion of pan-Canadian identity and multiculturalism. With branches operating in each province, coordination of strategic communications could be enhanced to address the threat of disinformation on a local level and expand the coverage of ongoing campaigns. ## Quebec and Canada’s Strategic Directions: Security & Diplomatic Challenges. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/quebec-and-canadas-strategic-directions-security-diplomatic-challenges/ Modified: 2022-04-01 > In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has many political, economic and military repercussions at both the national and.... This video is in French only. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has many political, economic and military repercussions at both the national and international levels, the Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) and the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) invite you to this event entitled “Quebec and Canada’s Strategic Directions: Security & Diplomatic Challenges”. The event took place in the form of two panels, the first with a focus on North America and the second, from an international perspective. This presentation is part of the third edition of the Rendez-vous Gérin-Lajoie. It brings together renowned and emerging academic experts, practitioners and diplomats. A number of topical questions on the challenges and strategies of Quebec and Canada will be addressed, in a context marked by a fractured international order and the return of competition between great powers. Justin Massie, professor of political science at UQAM and co-director of the RAS, and Mélanie Marquis, parliamentary correspondent in Ottawa for La Presse, moderated the event. Participants : (in alphabetical order) François Audet, Director of l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal Louise Blais, ancienne Ambassadrice et Représentante permanente adjointe du Canada à l’Organisation des Nations unies (2017 à 2021) Laurent Borzillo, stagiaire postdoctoral au sein du Département de science politique de l’UQAM et auprès du RAS Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, professeure invitée en science politique à l’Université de Montréal Justin Massie, professeur titulaire de science politique à l’UQAM et co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique David Morin, professeur agrégé à l’Université de Sherbrooke et co-titulaire de la Chaire UNESCO en prévention de la radicalisation et de l’extrémisme violents Camille Raymond, étudiante à la maîtrise au Département de science politique de l’UQAM et boursière Banque Scotia Scotia-IEIM 2021 Gaëlle Rivard Piché, analyste stratégique, Recherche et développement, pour Défense Canada Stéphane Roussel, directeur de recherche du Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Québec (CIRRICQ) et professeur titulaire à l’École nationale d’Administration publique (ENAP) ## Questioning the Form of State Support to Rebel Organizations in Civil Wars URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/questioning-the-form-of-state-support-to-rebel-organizations-in-civil-wars/ Modified: 2022-07-05 > This article first examines the benefits and risks to states of providing material support to insurgent groups, focusing not on... A question has been raised since the beginning of the fighting in Ukraine on February 24, 2022: if the government were to fall, would Western states support an irregular war against a potential pro-Kremlin regime? The conflict in Ukraine began via Russian material aid to pro-Russian insurgents in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Would the situation be reversed, this time with U.S. and European state aid to pro-Ukrainian rebels? Proxy warfare through support for irregular forces remains one of the most direct ways in which two states can confront each other without engaging their respective armies in combat. This article first examines the benefits and risks to states of providing material support to insurgent groups, focusing not on the content of the assistance – the type of resources provided to rebels – but on the form of the assistance – whether it is covert or overt. The article then presents descriptive data on the prevalence of clandestine/public state support to insurgents between 1989 and 2018. The Benefits of Covertness In this article, state sponsors include countries that provide material resources – arms, money, humanitarian resources, and/or other logistical assistance – to rebel organizations fighting in civil wars against target states: the governments of the territories in which they operate. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines an active civil war as an armed opposition resulting in at least 25 casualties in a calendar year. The assistance provided to rebels can be either covert – political leaders of the country assisting the rebels do not acknowledge or even deny the support in the public arena – or public – political leaders of the country assisting the rebels recognize and/or justify their support in official discourses. A cursory review of international relations research shows that several specific advantages may first drive states to opt for secrecy when supporting insurgent groups on the territory of another state. The first advantage of clandestinity is plausible deniability. Acting covertly, without overt claims by political representatives, allows state supporters to control information. The deniability enables them to maximize control over a potential conventional military escalation with the target state. Supporting rebels on the territory of another state is, in effect, a highly confrontational action against a rival government. The target state may respond with conventional or irregular military means to the government supporting insurgents. Supporting states that do not publicly admit to supporting the rebels can hope to avoid detection of their actions by their rivals and thus limit any risk of military retaliation by the target states. Controlling military escalation is particularly important when it comes to nuclear state power confrontations. Denial is sometimes more critical than absolute secrecy. Even if the target state learns of the existence of military support to rebels intended to fight it, it is not uncommon for it to prefer to keep this information secret in cases where the sponsors act clandestinely. In a recent book, Austin Carson studied this situation, which may seem counter-intuitive. The researcher shows that, even when detected, a target state can have no interest in publicly revealing an adversary’s clandestine belligerent support on its territory. Reacting publicly would require the target state to retaliate militarily against the support state not to appear weak to its internal political class, especially the opposition parties, and to public opinion. As a result, the risk of military escalation between the supporter and target states would become significant, which is not necessarily in the immediate interest of the targeted government. Carson highlights this phenomenon during the Spanish and Vietnam Wars and, more recently, during the Iraq War. In the latter case, the United States – the target state – knew that Iran – the supporter state – was materially supporting Shiite organizations fighting against U.S. forces. However, U.S. leaders did not immediately reveal the information to maintain complete control over the response to the Iranian affront, without internal constraints related to domestic opposition and public opinion forcing the country to engage in massive retaliation against Iran. Thus, even implausible deniability may serve state supporters’ interest in limiting the risk of military escalation with the targeted government. The clandestine nature of support for insurgent organizations, on the other hand, can be particularly attractive to state sponsors when it is difficult for them to maintain close control over the actions of supported insurgents after they transfer resources. It is not uncommon for state-supported rebel organizations to commit varying degrees of violence against civilians. Public association with violent groups can severely damage a state sponsor’s reputation and, in some cases, expose it to binding international sanctions. Denying support to armed groups abroad allows a state to avoid potential negative consequences if the supported group uses the resources to commit abuses on the battlefield. The Benefits of Overtness While clandestine support for rebel groups has definite advantages for state sponsors, particularly in terms of maximizing control over the potential negative consequences of assistance, there are sometimes advantages that can persuade states to publicize, through formal recognition, their assistance to insurgents. The first advantage is tactical. Operating openly means acting more freely. While secrecy requires specific logistics to avoid discovery of the assistance provided, publicity allows a government to avoid such practical considerations. A publicly intervening state can transfer more and better resources to rebels, especially regarding technology. Moreover, acting openly facilitates the transfer of expertise to the rebels in using complex weapons, often through training conducted within the supporting states or third countries. In turn, the transfer of more resources, and more effective equipment, maximizes the chances of success for the supported insurgents. The supporting state acting publicly is more likely to achieve its strategic objectives in a conflict. Public, rather than clandestine, support enabled the United States to provide Stinger missiles and associated training to Afghan rebels in the late 1980s, significantly increasing the military efficacy of the insurgency. A link between the content and form of assistance to the rebels emerges here: covertness poses constraints regarding what sponsors can transfer, while publicity offers freedom of action for state sponsors. In addition to the strategic advantages outlined above, acting openly offers supporting governments undeniable communicational advantages. It is sometimes beneficial for a state, especially in domestic politics, to publicly support a rebellion with which a large part of its national population shares a particular social identity, whether ethnic or religious. Iran’s public support for Hamas is just one example of this communicative process. Supporting a rebellion engaged in an armed struggle against a repressive state also allows a supportive government to communicate its position vis-à-vis that regime. Public action also carries a political message. Thus, while acting covertly allows a supporting state to maximize control over potential negative consequences of its assistance to insurgents and thus limit potential military escalation, publicly supporting rebels abroad often maximizes the effectiveness of the action – and the attribution of any rebellion’s success to the support provided by the external government. Any state wishing to intervene indirectly in an armed conflict via material support to rebels has to prioritize control over the potentially adverse effects of its assistance or the weakening, or even defeat, of the target state. Related ethical and legal issues not addressed here also arise for state supporters. The Prevalence of Covertness/Overtness in the Post-Cold War Period In an article published in the European Journal of International Relations, I estimate the prevalence of covertness/publicity concerning state support for rebel groups across civil wars from 1989 to 2018. These figures rely on current knowledge of material support to rebel groups, including that provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). However, it is very likely that, due to extreme secrecy, some cases of material support are unknown. Therefore, the estimates are imperfect and subject to change as historical studies reveal new cases of state support to rebel groups. The first observable result is that, based on current knowledge, publicity of support remains an exception within international politics. As illustrated below, most material support cases to rebel groups correspond to assistance provided clandestinely. The desire to control potential negative consequences of support seems, in most cases, to outweigh the potential tactical and communicational benefits of publicizing support. The second chart below disaggregates the data by year to highlight potential temporal shifts in the secrecy or publicity of state support for rebel groups. Three distinct temporalities appear from 1989 to 2018. The period before 1992 seems particularly prone to publicity of state support for rebels. One potential explanation is that, in the context of the end of the Cold War, states from both major blocs used publicity during this time to signal the credibility of their political and technological systems. For example, the United States openly supported the mujahideen engaged against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The period 1993-2013, on the other hand, appears less prone to publicizing support for insurgent groups. The majority of rebels receiving external material support did so in a clandestine manner. This likely reflects an emerging international system based on norms of non-intervention, which causes many states to deny their involvement in the internal affairs of other states. Finally, the period beginning in 2014 is marked by a return of publicity as a preferred policy tool in international politics. This trend potentially reflects a resurgence of strategic competition among great powers, particularly in significant conflicts such as Syria. The United States and many other countries, for example, openly support the Free Syrian Army engaged against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, which Russia openly supported. Conclusion: A Question to Consider When I wrote this article, the Ukrainian army defeated the Russian army in the Kyiv region. Its withdrawal has revealed the massacres carried out against civilians. The battle for control of the Donbas is underway, and its outcome will determine the course of the war in the coming months and years. Suppose the question of aid to a possible rebellion against a pro-Russian regime, particularly in certain Ukrainian regions, is to be raised one day. In that case, the supporting states will have to ask themselves the question of the publicity of the support. Whether to maximize control over a potential escalation versus the effectiveness of the fight against a possible pro-Russian government and its sponsor in the Kremlin will inevitably arise. The success of the insurgency will depend heavily on this decision. The original version of this text was published in French on Le Rubicon. Check it out here! ## Ready, Engaged and Informed – PANEL 1 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ready-engaged-and-informed-panel-1/ Modified: 2022-04-20 > PANEL 1 - Climate & Security Nexus: Towards a New Paradigm? Setting the context: Marie-Hélène Chayer (Executive Director, Integrated... note: This video is suggested for bilingual audiences. Voice-over and subtitle translations are not available. Ready, Engaged and Informed: Canada and the Role of Intelligence in Addressing Emerging Threats and Challenges PANEL 1 - Climate & Security Nexus: Towards a New Paradigm? Setting the context: Marie-Hélène Chayer (Executive Director, Integrated terrorism Assessment Centre) Chaired by: Bruno Charbonneau Panelists: Will Greaves (University of Victoria) Adrien Estève (Sciences Po) Diego Osorio (Centre FrancoPaix & Adler University)   ## Ready, Engaged and Informed – PANEL 2 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ready-engaged-and-informed-panel-2/ Modified: 2022-04-20 > PANEL 2 - New Technologies, New Partnerships? Collaborations and Anticipation Chaired by: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé. note: This video is suggested for bilingual audiences. Voice-over and subtitle translations are not available. Ready, Engaged and Informed: Canada and the Role of Intelligence in Addressing Emerging Threats and Challenges PANEL 2 - New Technologies, New Partnerships? Collaborations and Anticipation Chaired by: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Panelists: Walter Dorn (Canadian Forces College) Christian Leuprecht (Royal Military College Saint-Jean & Queen’s University) Colonel Yannick Michaud (Deputy Director General Intelligence Policy & Partnerships (DGIPP)) ## Ready, Engaged and Informed – PANEL 4 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ready-engaged-and-informed-panel-4/ Modified: 2022-04-20 > Canada and the Role of Intelligence in Addressing Emerging Threats and Challenges. PANEL 4 - Intelligence and multilateral collaboration. note: This video is suggested for bilingual audiences. Voice-over and subtitle translations are not available. Ready, Engaged and Informed: Canada and the Role of Intelligence in Addressing Emerging Threats and Challenges PANEL 4 - Intelligence and multilateral collaboration Chaired by: Bruno Charbonneau Panelists: Stephanie Carvin (NPSIA, Carleton University) Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa) Justin Massie (UQAM) Chantal Lavallée (Royal Military College Saint Jean) ## Reframing the Ukrainian Crisis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/reframing-the-ukrainian-crisis/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Rather than being divided over how to punish Russia, Canada and its allies could consider ways to support the reconciliation among the... ## Report on CJOC Defence Planning Project URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/report-on-cjoc-defence-planning-project/ Modified: 2022-05-25 > NSA has been tasked by the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) to conduct a comparative study on defence planning. The Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) has been tasked by the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) to conduct a comparative study on defence planning. Three sets of questions guide this report: 1) What is the regional, global and threat-based approach to operational and strategic planning? What are the pros and cons of each of them in the 21st century? 2) Who is using each of them now and why did they adopt them? How do the users of the global and threat-based approach feel about alternative frameworks? 3) What lessons can be learned for Canada? The report is divided in three parts. The first section presents the main approaches to force planning, their respective strengths and weaknesses, and illustrates them with the evolution of U.S. force planning. The second section reviews the current defence planning of seven allies and partners: Australia, France, Israel, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The last section presents some policy considerations for Canada. ## Responding to the Hardening the SHIELD: A Credible Deterrent and Capable Defense for North America URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/responding-to-the-hardening-the-shield-a-credible-deterrent-and-capable-defense-for-north-america/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Andrea Charron responds to the report of General O’Shaughnessy & Brigadier General Fesler "Hardening the SHIELD: A CredibleDeterrent and Capable Defense for North America". Andrea Charron, "Responding to the Hardening the SHIELD: A Credible Deterrent and Capable Defense for North America," Quick Impact, NAADSN, 11 September 2020. ## Rethinking Canada’s Defence Strategy: What Lessons Can We Learn From the UK and Australia? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/rethinking-canadas-defence-strategy-what-lessons-can-we-learn-from-the-uk-and-australia/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The United Kingdom and Australia are making an important update in their strategic posture : what can Canada learn from it? The mandate of Donald Trump confirmed a strong trend since the financial crisis of 2008: the American hegemon is in decline. Furthermore, the international order the United States built is threatened by the resurgence of revisionist state actors. Recognizing the implications of such a transformation, the United Kingdom and Australia, two of Canada’s close allies, are making an important update in their strategic posture. By taking similar steps, they seek, on the one hand, to revise the role they intend to play in an international system marked by a return to competition between great powers. On the other hand, they are restructuring their armed forces and associated spending to better cope with new types of threats. The British and Australian examples should serve as models for Canada. To this end, the focus must be on three areas: the navy, aerospace and cyber, but above all on their “pan-domain” integration. A reinvestment in the capabilities and an organizational review of the armed forces also appear necessary. This type of action must, however, follow from upstream reflection to develop a coherent and holistic vision of what Canada aspires to be in the 21st century. The UK and Australia’s Strategic Revision Originally scheduled for 2020, the UK Integrated Security and Defense Review will finally be released in 2021 due to the COVID-19 crisis. The broad outlines of the Review are, however, known through a report published by the parliamentary defence committee. This is the most comprehensive security document produced by the UK since the end of the Cold War. The Integrated Review combines the limited scope of defence reports published in 2010, 2015 and 2018. The aim is to define the UK's place in the post-Brexit era. Boris Johnson's vision at this level is summed up in the term Global Britain, namely the idea of categorically re-establishing its place as a great power. To achieve this, the main commitment is to increase and maintain the defence budget at 2% of GDP. Additionally, a commitment was made to spend $21.9 billion US over four years for new acquisitions. Australia published the 2020 Defense Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan last summer, following the white paper released in 2016. The latter predicted a deterioration of the international security environment, a forecast that was confirmed and explains the important process that Australia is embarking on. Indeed this is not just an update. Prime Minister Scott Morrison is clear on that point: Australia is experiencing its most important strategic realignment since 1945. The objective is threefold: to shape the regional strategic environment, to deter actions against their interests and to respond to threats with credible force. In financial terms, these ambitious goals are supported by a regular budget of 29 billion US dollars, or 2% of its GDP, which is set to increase further. Investments of 270 billion US were also announced in capacity building. The new lens through which to conceive of the use of the armed forces is the multidomain operation. For Vice Admiral Kyd of the Royal Navy, the fusion of naval, air, space, and cybernetic capabilities forms the basis of this vision. It is precisely in these areas that the measures announced by the United Kingdom and Australia are concentrated. Naval Domain A significant portion of the investments made by the UK and Australia are directed to their naval forces. This is not insignificant as several states are redefining their idea of what a balanced fleet is. For the Royal Navy, this means regaining a global power projection capacity, one where the offensive is preeminent. The British plan involves the purchase of 13 frigates (the target is a fleet of 24 frigates) and the development of a new multi-use model that can act as a platform for the boarding of drones. New surface-to-surface missiles and seven submarines are also in development. It was also recently confirmed that new submarines dedicated to nuclear deterrence should be operational within 10 years. The key to this naval reconfiguration is the commissioning of their two new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, whose eponymous ship is expected to deploy with its carrier strike group, and allied ships, starting next year in the Indo-Pacific. Deploying maritime, air, cyber and electronic capabilities, an aircraft carrier and its carrier strike group remain, for the Royal Navy, “a metaphor for a nation-state that intends to remain strategically relevant on the world stage.” Australia is going through a similar thought process. It implies the adoption of increased operational capacities for its regional theatre. Australia’s unique geographic location, and proximity to China, guides its acquisition plan. It is investing in the purchase of 9 frigates (for a total of 17) equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air drone and missile systems. There are particularly large-scale projects in the submarine warfare domain. In this area, 12 submarines, and mining, surveillance, autonomous and remotely controlled combat systems have been announced. With these acquisitions, Australia aims to develop a credible autonomous deterrence force Great emphasis is placed on the development of communications systems, satellite surveillance, electronic and cyber combat, and acoustic analysis. Everything indicates that these new capacities will be used, among other things, to increase the Australian presence in the South China Sea, in collaboration with the United States. Aerospace Domain On the aviation front, the continued acquisition of the F-35s is central to the British and Australians. However, the former could cut the number of planned purchases in half and start developing a sixth-generation fighter. A key component of the future air capabilities of both states is massive investment in unmanned vehicles. Note that they are working to incorporate artificial intelligence technologies into combat aircrafts and drones. Australia is also counting on the massive deployment of high speed and long-range missiles. The tone used in dealing with space is serious and urgent. It is now an integral part of the global commons and is emerging as a potential conflict theatre. Modern society and armed forces increasingly rely on the communication and information capabilities enabled by satellites. For the British and the Australians, these facts mean that investment must be made, on the one hand, to protect oneself from space threats using land or space based systems. On the other hand, to ensure autonomous access to space. This last element is a significant paradigm shift. On both sides, it involves the joint participation of the armed forces, space agency and private firms. The British and Australians are therefore planning increased cooperation with the United States in this area. On the Australian side, the implementation remains imprecise. In the United Kingdom, a space command has just been created with the mandate to allow the launch of rockets starting in 2022. Cyber Domain It is fair to say that the biggest changes are taking place in the cyber domain. In Australia, a cybersecurity policy was launched this summer to oversee this specific area, including a budget of $1.67 billion US. This is in addition to the measures announced in the 2020 Strategic Update, where $15 billion US is planned over the next 20 years to develop hardware and software infrastructure. Australia has never invested so much in cyber defence. The bulk of the funds go to the armed forces, the Australian Signals Directorate and the Australian Cyber ​​Security Center. Despites this, increased collaboration between the civilian and military branches of the state, as well as with the private sector is deemed necessary to respond effectively to cyber threats. As in other areas, close cooperation with the United States is already in place. The ultimate goal is to be able to conduct operations in the areas of cyber, electronics and information, both defensively and offensively. The distinction made between hardware and software infrastructures is an important one. One of the key elements to justify the government’s refusal to join Huawei's 5G network is the risk of hardware control. The risks associated with manufacturers and supply chains are real. Australia must also focus on important points such as innovation, the development of new standards, as well as access to and deployment of infrastructure. Australia recognizes all of these challenges, as well as the need to focus on higher education to achieve its goals. This is a big leap since its last strategy filed in 2016. In the UK, innovation is mostly found at the level of institutional reorganization. The creation of the National Cyber ​​Force (NCF) is a step towards greater integration of all areas affecting cybersecurity. It is unique because it brings together elements of the armed forces (including a new regiment dedicated to cyber warfare), intelligence and civilian departments of the state. It therefore provides an undeniable advantage by making it possible to respond effectively to “gray zone” threats and challenges. The institutional agility of the NCF means that all resources can also be put to the service of offensive operations. Greater importance is also attached to offensive capabilities and tactical support. The government is combining a new research centre dedicated to defence artificial intelligence with the NCF. This is all backed by an initial investment of £1.5bn to bring the armed forces up to date with the latest technological advances. Rethinking Canada's Defence and Giving itself the Means to Achieve its Ambitions Canada must conduct a similar process to those carried out in the United Kingdom and Australia. All three states currently face the same threat: the return of competition between great powers as authoritarian states threaten the international order and seek to destabilize liberal democracies. Canada took a step in the right direction last year with the release of the Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept. This document recognizes several imperatives. The first is modernizing capabilities to adapt to an age dominated by information, data and the end of a clear distinction between war and peace. The second is seeking to optimize integration. This must be applied between the civilian and military branches of state, between areas of operations, and between Canada and its allies. The third is a sustained effort on the North American continent. This does not mean to rule out participating in operations with our allies in other theatres of operation. In naval matters, Canada is currently following the same direction as Great Britain and Australia, with a project to acquire 15 frigates. All three states have selected the same Type 26 BAE System model. However, shortcomings persist with regard to the capacity to project Canadian power in its region. First, it is imperative that Canada develop a fleet of icebreakers capable of accessing the Arctic Circle in all seasons. In addition to reaffirming Canadian sovereignty over this territory, the number of new issues that are emerging in this strategic region justify moving forward on this matter which has been discussed for too long. Canada is lagging behind Russia, which has just launched a new icebreaker. The United States is also considering acquiring new ones and building a port in the Arctic. Second, Canada must renew its fleet of submarines. This process will be long and should have already started. Canada's latest defence policy only spelled out the modernization of the four Victoria-class ships so that they would remain operational until 2040. There is, however, a limit to what can be achieved overtime as updates to submarines built in the 1980s. They were all out of service in 2019 for maintenance. Canada is therefore already losing operational capacity, a phenomenon that will accelerate with the age of the fleet. Ultimately, it is impossible to ensure the integrity of our territorial waters and our commitments to our allies without the acquisition of new submarines. In the air sector, it is obvious that the fighter jet saga must end. The F-35 should be chosen because it alone provides interoperability, but most importantly because of its adequate stealth and data integration capability. Canada also adopted a space strategy in 2019 that signals the importance given to space, but its scope and related investments remain limited. Among other things, it puts forward a new regulatory framework for the private sector in order to develop the capacity for national innovations. Unlike Canada’s two allies, it does not consider developing an autonomous launch capability. This issue should be the subject of a real discussion today as our allies adopt a strategy of greater autonomy of action. The modernization of NORAD is also urgent to respond to geographic imperatives and for multi-domain and inter-allied integration. The North Warning System is now outdated and needs to be replaced. Ideally, it would be by a system integrating all existing radar capacities and capable of real-time data processing. This is the promise of the SHIELD system, and especially of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control developed by the US military. This is the path Canada should promote in modernizing NORAD. Note that Australia is pursuing a similar approach in the modernization of its own radar system. A new space component is planned and it is all supported by an industrial policy to develop sovereign radar technologies. In the area of cybersecurity, the British example should serve as a guide. The integration of elements of the armed forces, intelligence, public security and other branches of state appears to be the way forward to respond to the complex range of threats and challenges posed by the exponential growth of connectivity and of the cybernetic domain. It could overcome the tendency of public administration to work in silos. Last but not least, Canada must keep in mind that by rethinking their role, the United Kingdom and Australia have also given themselves the means to achieve their ambitions. Achieving the NATO recommended target of 2% of GDP was done despite the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis and the costs associated with Australian bushfires. The underfunding of the armed forces is a recurring subject of tension between Canada and its American ally. While a poll suggests that public opinion is in favor of investing in the military, it is time for Canada to seriously consider this option.   ## Rethinking Moderation Through an International Lens: The Case of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria Between Statecraft and International Pressure URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/rethinking-moderation-through-an-international-lens-the-case-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-in-syria-between-statecraft-and-international-pressure/ Modified: 2026-06-15 Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham's (HTS) shift from one of the most radical jihadist movements of the Syrian war to a globally acknowledged ruling authority of post-Assad Syria is one of the most extraordinary political developments of the past decade in the Middle East. When HTS forces led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) entered Damascus and deposed Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, members of the global community faced an unprecedented challenge: how should states and international organizations respond to a former al-Qaeda affiliate suddenly positioned as Syria's ruling authority? Many analysts were surprised to learn that diplomatic normalization occurred quickly and practically seamlessly: by late 2025, al-Sharaa had addressed the United Nations General Assembly, held bilateral meetings with leaders from Europe and the Middle East, and met with the President of the United States. This unprecedented acceptance of what had previously been classified as a “terrorist organization” challenges long-held notions in both scholarly and governmental debates about the conditions under which extremist groups moderate and gain legitimacy. Traditional theories of moderation, particularly the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, suggest that ideological softening is primarily due to domestic factors such as election participation, integration into legislative bodies, coalition building, and the necessity to compete for public support. These paradigms alone are insufficient to explain the trajectory of HTS, as the group did not participate in any elections, was not included in Assad's formal Syrian political process, and was completely excluded from peace talks for more than a decade. Instead, HTS moderated under the burden of long-term diplomatic isolation, strangling sanctions, and exclusion from all major multilateral negotiations or institutional forums about Syria's future. Thus, one can say that HTS reformed not because it was welcomed into the political arena, rather, because its exclusion imposed tremendous costs that could only be reduced by a major adjustment of its ideological posture and strategic activity. In this way, the international system actively shaped the emergence of HTS, rather than simply reacting to it: foreign states, multilateral organizations, and transnational institutions acted as both gatekeepers and accelerators, fostering a structural context in which moderation became the only realistic path for HTS's survival and objectives. The group's leaders appear to have realized this reality early on. Beginning in the mid-2010s and accelerating after the Islamic State's territorial defeat in 2019, HTS began an internal process of de-radicalization and political rebranding aimed not only at appeasing local communities under its control in Idlib, but also at anticipating conditions under which it might one day be treated as a legitimate actor by outside powers. This strategic moderation worked as both an internal restructuring of power and a conscious posture toward the international community's expectations. Understanding HTS's moderation and later global recognition necessitates a framework that goes beyond domestic inclusion to investigate the intersection of internal adaptability and systemic international pressure. This hot take elaborates on a complete new aspect that illustrates how HTS, originally presented as part of the global jihadist vanguard, evolved into a state-building actor capable of interfacing with the world's most powerful countries. It contextualizes the group's transition to moderation by looking at both its radical origins and the gradual internal and external influences that transformed its conduct in the decade leading up to Assad's demise. Then it examines how these preparatory processes enabled HTS to gradually become a diplomatically, recognized ruling authority in 2025, describing the unprecedented wave of international engagement, institutional transformations within Syria, and the emergence of a new foreign policy doctrine under al-Sharaa. Finally, the report considers the broader implications of HTS's trajectory for international approaches to radical non-state actors, arguing that under certain structural conditions, exclusion rather than inclusion can generate incentives for moderation and political transformation. From Jihadist Vanguard to Proto-State Actor: The Long Era of Strategic Moderation To understand the significance of HTS's rebranding, it is necessary to first examine the movement's early ideological foundation, which was firmly founded in Salafi-jihadist doctrine and international revolutionary goals. When Jabhat al-Nusra arose in 2012 as al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, its leaders saw Syria as a springboard for a larger regional transformation. Its discourse questioned the legitimacy of existing Arab states, advocated for the construction of an Islamic rule based on strict Sharia, and accepted violence as the only means of achieving political change. It saw sectarian minorities as adversarial groups that threatened its survival, condemned all forms of diplomacy with other nations, and derided Western-backed rebel forces as puppets supporting global power interests. Its early administrative decisions, including the institution of Sharia courts and religious police, revealed a rigorous theological bent that appeared unchangeable. However, beginning in the mid-2010s, HTS faced several structural challenges that gradually made its maximalist posture untenable. The group's international isolation was more severe than that of other armed non-state actors in current conflicts: for instance, unlike the Taliban, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi Sadrist movement, HTS lacked an external state patron prepared to provide diplomatic protection, as well as a formal channel into discussions. The United States, Russia, the UN, and regional states insisted on its exclusion from any negotiations. This isolation was strengthened by extensive sanctions, which made even providing humanitarian assistance to HTS-controlled territory extremely difficult. This combination of coercive and normative constraints created a political context in which HTS could not access resources, external aid, or diplomatic channels unless substantially changing its ideological position and behaviour. At the same time, HTS was going through internal adjustments prompted by the reality of territory control in northwest Syria. As the war entered a protracted stalemate after 2019, HTS was tasked with governing a heavily populated region that housed millions of internally displaced civilians. The movement realized, perhaps reluctantly, that ideological purity did not equate to administrative viability. Local populations required services, institutions, and political stability. Providing these needed technical skills, bureaucratic procedures, and collaboration with foreign humanitarian organizations was extremely difficult as all of which were incompatible with HTS's early doctrinal rigor. This domestic governance problem interacted with international influences, producing what can be defined as a "internal-external nexus" of moderation dynamics. The group's first significant ideological shift occurred with its formal separation from al-Qaeda in 2016-2017. Although hardliners within HTS resisted it, this decoupling was a critical step in separating the group from transnational jihadism and signalling a more local and pragmatic approach. Far from being a mere symbolic gesture, the division promoted a larger organizational reorganization that excluded diehard transnational jihadists, elevated pragmatic leaders, and allowed the group to frame its struggle in national rather than global terms. Again, Jerome Drevon and Patrick Haenni have identified three concurrent mechanisms at work during this period: the transition from a Salafi-jihadist doctrinal frame to a more jurisprudential and locally grounded religious discourse; the dismantling or marginalization of extremist factions within HTS ranks; and the dilution of ideological training to reduce transnational jihadist commitments among new recruits. Together, these actions changed HTS's brand and enabled the next step of strategic repositioning. A second milestone was the formation of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in 2017, which HTS backed and increasingly relied on as a civilian administrative partner. While the group retained ultimate authority, it portrayed the SSG as a technocratic organization capable of providing services, establishing institutions, and representing local communities. This guise of civilian government enabled HTS to interact indirectly with international actors and humanitarian organizations that previously refused to collaborate with declared terrorist groups. More crucially, it demonstrated HTS' readiness to distinguish between military and civilian positions, which would later prove critical in making the movement appear governable in the eyes of other powers. Over the years, HTS commanders, particularly al-Jolani, launched a systematic communication campaign to reshape the group's image: public remarks prioritized justice over vengeance, institution building over revolutionary struggle, and local priorities above global jihad. On the one hand, interviews with international media outlets depicted HTS as a Syrian movement with no plans to strike Western interests, emphasizing the importance of unified civilian government in the northwest. Such message was specifically designed to match the expectations of international audiences, assuring them that HTS did not constitute a transnational threat. Despite these narrative changes, the group was nevertheless characterized by practices such as punishments and political exclusion. On the other hand, international help was severely constrained, economic infrastructure deteriorated under the weight of embargoes, and the SSG struggled to maintain basic services. This paucity, combined with the lack of formal financial outlets, compelled HTS to embrace a more pragmatic approach: Al-Jolani began to focus on investment zones, economic diversification, agricultural self-sufficiency, and industrial reactivation rather than zakat or Islamic redistribution. He outlined a vision of ‘economic dignity’ based on productivity rather than charity, which is significantly more consistent with neoliberal development aspirations than the organization's previous ideological convictions. By the time HTS started its main assault against the Syrian regime in late 2024, the organization had spent nearly a decade building a narrative of localized control, institutional rationality, and ideological moderation. This tale was more than just superficial: while true internal ideological reform is difficult to judge, there is no doubt that HTS modified its institutions, language, and practices in order to portray itself as a legitimate political actor capable of gaining national power. These changes were not evidence of normative internalization, rather of strategic adaptation, an attempt to "perform moderation" in preparation of the international community's conditional expectations. In other words, HTS altered because remaining unmodified would have resulted in perpetual isolation. The fall of the Assad regime offered HTS with an unparalleled opportunity while also subjecting it to increased scrutiny. As soon as Damascus fell under its control, HTS had to demonstrate that the moderation it had practiced for years could be translated into statecraft obligations. The group's next stage of development - its emergence as a globally recognized governing authority - would demonstrate the extent to which its strategic moderation and rebranding have been successful. Moderation Reward: HTS as an Internationally Accepted State Actor The ousting of Assad in December 2024 marked the start of a fundamentally new political scenario in Syria, in which HTS, long denounced as a terrorist organization, unexpectedly became the major authority governing a fractured and tired country. What ensued was an unprecedented diplomatic shift in recent Middle Eastern history, considering Syria’s isolation on the international arena. Within weeks, Syria went from an international pariah to a regime courted by Arab countries, European ministries, and Western diplomats. This abrupt change was not an accident, but rather the result of years of intentional moderation that positioned HTS to meet the international community's conditions for recognition. This recognition resulted from pragmatic considerations by international governments and institutions seeking stability, influence, and cooperation in the post-Assad period, rather than normative support of HTS's ideology. After conquering Damascus, Ahmed al-Sharaa proclaimed the formation of an interim administration made up of technocrats and former HTS members. The new authorities dissolved or merged armed factions into a national army, established ministries designed to operate in accordance with international bureaucratic standards, began discussions on a constitution-writing process, and laid the ground for future elections. These efforts were aimed to show HTS as a responsible political group that adheres to global governance standards. Al-Sharaa also established transitional justice and missing persons committees, both of which have long been championed by foreign groups, sending early hints that the new administration intended to address grievances accrued over decades of war and repression. In parallel, an unprecedented flood of diplomatic activity occurred. Germany and France sent their foreign ministers to Damascus in early January 2025, marking the first official Western visits to Syria in more over ten years. Days later, Qatar's Prime Minister, as well as Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister, visited Damascus, highlighting a coordinated regional readiness to interact with the new administration. Qatar’s Emir's visit has been the first head of state visit to Damascus barely weeks after Assad's demise. This represented a symbolic endorsement of HTS's transition that would have been unthinkable even a year ago. Normalization continued in February 2025. The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons paid a visit to Damascus to restart Syria's compliance procedures, allowing the new authorities to demonstrate their adherence to international law and compliance. Meanwhile, U.S. Representatives Cory Mills and Marlin Stutzman made their first semi-official congressional visits since 2012, followed months later by a bipartisan Senate group. These encounters marked a gradual shift in Washington's stance: while the US did not instantly remove HTS from its terrorist list, it did acknowledge that Syria's political reality necessitated a pragmatic kind of engagement. The diplomatic effort peaked in late May 2025, when al-Sharaa travelled to Riyadh for a momentous meeting with the U.S. President Donald Trump. The conference sparked conversations on sanctions relief and counter-terrorism cooperation, marking the first formal presidential dialogue between the United States and Syria since 2000. In the months leading up to the summit, al-Sharaa travelled to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, France, Azerbaijan, and Russia, with Jordan's King Abdullah II hosting him in Amman. The subsequent invitation to address the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025 marked the symbolic conclusion of HTS's journey from ostracism to acceptability. This diplomatic momentum was bolstered by HTS' efforts to develop a clear foreign policy framework: in his UN speech in September 2025, al-Sharaa laid out a strategy based on balanced diplomacy, regional stability, and economic revival. He promised to cooperate with UN fact-finding missions, thanked Arab and Western countries for aiding Syria's transition, and positioned his administration as a defender of both national sovereignty and international legal obligations. His plea for an immediate suspension of hostilities in Gaza was particularly notable, as it sought to link Syria with broader international humanitarian themes while avoiding direct conflict with Western and Israeli security concerns. HTS's selective restraint mirrored the necessity to avoid upsetting important Western actors whose cooperation was vital for sanctions relief and reconstruction help. In domestic administration, HTS maintained a moderate stance to obtain international acceptance: the interim administration strengthened departments in charge of infrastructure, health, and education, and restored channels for humanitarian NGOs within controlled parameters. The SSG's previous administrative experience in Idlib served as a foundation for the development of national institutions, allowing the government to claim administrative competence. Furthermore, HTS sought to reassure minority groups that they would not fear persecution, in sharp contrast to the group's previous sectarian statements. These demonstrations of tolerance were utilitarian rather than ideological, signifying an intentional surrender of earlier traditions to fulfil international expectations of pluralistic administration. Foreign powers rewarded this moderation not because of ideological solidarity with HTS, but because the alternatives (state collapse, militia fragmentation, renewed jihadist expansion) were considerably less appealing than accepting the new ruling administration. Regional powers like Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia saw an opportunity to secure their borders, restrict refugee flows, shape Syria's destiny while re-balancing the regional international order. Western powers recognized the pragmatic value of engaging a force that had abandoned transnational jihad, exhibited internal discipline, and held strategically important territory. Even Russia changed its stance, shifting from a vehement defence of Assad to conditional acknowledgment of the new government as genuine interlocutors. These diplomatic engagements served not simply as acknowledgment but also as channels for ongoing conditionality. Each visit, conference, and institutional engagement reinforced expectations that HTS will remain moderate and follow rule-based governance. The process established what can be defined a circular feedback loop, in which moderation earned recognition, which then pushed more moderation for the sake of political survival and international legitimacy. The administration could not easily return to radical behaviour without suffering significant reputational costs and compromising the diplomatic and economic benefits it had worked to secure. Critics contend that HTS’s moderation is largely performative, driven by opportunistic calculations rather than a genuine ideological shift. This concern is not unfounded, as the group’s Salafi-jihadist roots and history of doctrinal rigidity raise doubts about the depth and durability of its transformation. However, several structural and institutional factors suggest that a return to radicalism would entail prohibitive costs. First, HTS has invested heavily in state-building measures by creating ministries, initiating constitutional processes, and integrating technocrats whose dismantlement would undermine governance and legitimacy, and signalling a potential return to radicalism which may isolate again the group and the country. Second, the new administration’s survival is now inseparable from international recognition: sanctions relief, humanitarian access, and reconstruction aid hinge on sustained moderation, making reversal economically and diplomatically self-defeating. Third, the marginalization of hardline factions and the dilution of transnational jihadist networks within HTS have reduced the organizational capacity for ideological purposes. Finally, a circular feedback loop of conditionality - where each diplomatic engagement reinforces expectations of rule-based governance - has locked the group into a path where moderation is not merely tactical but structurally “sticky.” While skepticism remains warranted, these dynamics indicate that HTS’s current posture reflects a strategic adaptation that is increasingly difficult to undo. Underneath this facade of normality is a core tension: HTS's moderation appears to be purely opportunistic, motivated by the potential benefits of international acceptability rather than a real moral shift of its intellectual worldview. Its ability to maintain this moderation will be determined by internal dynamics, specifically its ability to constrain hardline factions, manage economic crises, and meet the cultural demands of a war-traumatized populace. Meanwhile, international actors must strike a difficult balance between assisting Syria's stabilization and preventing the normalization of an armed movement with controversial ideological foundations. Conclusion The emergence of HTS from a globally isolated jihadist faction to the internationally recognized ruler of post-Assad Syria exemplifies a complex and frequently neglected political transformation mechanism. Unlike traditional moderation theories, which emphasize inclusion and domestic incentives, HTS demonstrates that exclusion, when consistent, multilateral, and materially constraining, can create the conditions for radical movements to recalibrate their ideological frameworks and institutional behaviour. The report's main point is that HTS moderated not because it accepted international rules, but because the world system made conformance a need for survival and legitimacy. This trajectory demonstrates the structural influence of the international order in defining the paths available to armed non-state actors. It demonstrates how, rather than being a natural feature of state actors, legitimacy may be extended to previously radical organizations through performative adherence to global standards. At the same time, HTS' moderation is situational, purposeful, and potentially reversible. Its long-term viability will be dependent on persistent international participation, ongoing domestic governance changes, and the group's ability to translate tactical moderation into a more profoundly institutionalized and normative political identity. HTS's example provides an important precedent for how the international community should address other armed groups operating in similarly fractured circumstances. It implies that under certain conditions—particularly when external isolation severely limits access to resources and legitimacy—radical actors may become surprisingly open to strategic moderation. However, the hazards of such interaction remain significant, and the distinction between pragmatic adaptation and real ideological transformation will need to be closely monitored in the coming years. Image Credit: European Commission, CC BY 4.0. ## Rethinking the Impact of US Military Training on Coups URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/rethinking-the-impact-of-us-military-training-on-coups/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Military training abroad is one of the main foreign policy tools deployed by a growing number of countries, including Canada. Military training abroad is one of the main foreign policy tools deployed by a growing number of countries, including Canada. In recent years, a number of officers trained within these programs have been implicated in coups d'état, raising concerns about the role that overseas training may play in these events. These concerns are most often expressed in the context of US military training. However, analysis of the training offered by the United States to foreign countries suggests that such a link to coups is far from clear. Highlights It is far from certain that US military training generally increases the likelihood of a coup. It is reasonable to assume that Canadian training is even less likely to have adverse effects, given the size of Canadian programs compared to those in the United States. Given the multilateral context in which Canada offers this type of training and the modest size of its investments in this area, policymakers should recognize the limits of the ability of Canadian trainers to reshape foreign armies. Local political conditions play a central role in triggering coups d'état, and foreign military trainers have limited impacts in the context of often unstable political systems. Rather than suspending aid to partner nations, the Canadian military should focus its efforts on areas of expertise, including the inculcation of democratic norms and standards of military professionalism. Context On August 18, 2020, a group of military officers overthrew the Malian government in a coup. In the aftermath, questions quickly arose concerning the fact that several of the officers involved participated in military training programs led by foreign countries, including the United States. In fact, Mali’s August 18 coup marked the second time in eight years that US military-trained officers ousted the Malian government. Not surprisingly, the events in Mali renewed doubts about potential links between US military training and coups d'état. Some observers have also raised questions about the impact of Canadian training, fueling debates about the need to withhold aid to foreign armies. Does military training abroad provoke coups? The data available do not allow us, for the moment, to offer a definitive answer. So, until we know more, a certain skepticism is in order. The Impact of Military Training on Coups d'Etat: An Uncertain Link From Mali (2012, 2020) to Thailand (2014), to Egypt (2013) and Zimbabwe (2017), many states have been affected by coups in recent years. Concurrently, there has been a wave of academic research on the origins and consequences of these events. One factor drawing the attention of researchers has been the military training offered by foreign countries to local armies. This interest stems in part from the fact that this type of training has become, in recent years, one of the main tools of foreign and security policy used by Western countries. From the US military training Iraqi, Afghan, or Ukrainian forces to the training programs of the French State's Directorate of Security and Defense Cooperation (DSDC) (e.g. as part of Operation Barkhane in the Sahel), many states are investing in “human capital” abroad, perceiving the transfer of expertise and standards as less risky and controversial than direct military interventions. Such training - which can cover subjects as varied as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, cybersecurity, border control, or the rule of law - allows training states to promote their strategic and security interests while advancing their soft power. Training is often also be part of the international security strategy of the great powers, who use training to create, consolidate, or extend spheres of influence on the world stage in response to the actions of rivals. Beneficiary countries can also obtain significant diplomatic and military benefits from participating in training. Recipient governments use foreign training to signal their commitment to the cooperative diplomatic relations with providers, in addition to acquiring military expertise to enable them to face security threats. Some research suggests that military training abroad can generate a number of positive outcomes, such as the development of democratic institutions, greater respect for human rights, or reducing political violence in recipient countries. However, recent events raise concerns about whether foreign training itself provides the sorts of resources, techniques, and prestige that entice officers to overthrow civilian government in fragile states. Some research - widely reported by the media in the coverage of Mali’s coup - suggests that there is indeed a link between military training offered by foreign countries and the incidence of coups d'état by trained armies. Our colleagues Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan Caverley, for example, have found that countries receiving US military training through the International Military Education & Training (IMET) program have a coup risk twice as high as countries who do not receive this training. They plausibly suggest that such training lends credibility and power to trained officers, resources these officers can then mobilize to rally their colleagues against fragile civilian governments. What commentators too infrequently note, however, is that this analysis relates primarily to a single US training program. However, the United States offers more than 34 military training programs to its foreign partners, in almost every country in the world. The program Savage and Caverley link to the impact of coups d'état - IMET - is a cornerstone of these efforts, but accounts for only 14% of US spending in foreign military training and 11% of trained personnel. When we run a similar analysis examining all of the US programs, there is no apparent relationship between military training and coups, even when looking at programs very similar to IMET. A similar study, carried out by researchers at the RAND Corporation, analyzes the links between US military training and the incidence of coups in Africa and also raises doubts about this correlation. Indeed, recent research shows that, on average, US military training in Africa has reduced the interference of national armies in the political sphere and their participation in human rights abuses. A Widespread Phenomenon There are other reasons to be skeptical of the training-causes-coups hypothesis. First, it is not particularly surprising that the instigators of the coup in Mali were involved in American programs. Between 1999 and 2016, these programs saw 2.4 million participants and cost more than $20 billion. Indeed, in a multitude of countries, a significant number of officers take part each year in the equivalent of international training pilgrimages, laying the foundations for a transnational circuit of academies, exercises and maneuvers. For these officers, participating in such training is often critical to building a successful career. Thus, even if certain high-profile examples seem to indicate the presence of a link between American military training and the incidence of coups in recipient countries, the apparent relationship might simply reflect the ubiquity of these programs within most armies. Another consideration concerns what researchers term “selection effects,” namely the fact that training is not provided on a random basis. Indeed, much training is deployed in order to improve civilian control of the military in coup-prone countries such as Mali, where coups tend to breed coups. Hence, it is possible that a training-coup relationship simply reflects the presence of training programs in countries that, for their own internal reasons, are highly vulnerable to coups. Limited Impact Another reason for skepticism is that the impact of this military training may be minimal. On the one hand, massive training programs in Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in more failures and frustration than tangible successes. In this regard, Jahara Matisek has compared the armed forces formed by foreign countries to Fabergé eggs, “expensive and easily broken.” On the other hand, several training activities are limited to a handful of soldiers and last only a few days. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that foreign military training alone generates significant changes in the relationship between civilian governments and the military in recipient countries. While we cannot draw a general conclusion about the training-coup link, perhaps it is possible to identify a correlation in some specific situations - for example, depending on the type of training given or how training interacts with local political conditions. The Place of Democratic and Professional Standards Some commentators suggest that the training focuses too much on technical and tactical expertise, to the detriment of inculcating democratic norms and standards of military professionalism. However, to the extent that improving civilian control over the military is one of the main objectives of these programs, these norms and standards tend to occupy a prominent place in training curricula. The problem appears to be related to the difficulty of "transplanting" these standards, as the United States and the European Union are now learning after years of effort and tens of millions of dollars trying to reform the security sector in Mali. It should also be noted that norms of military professionalism are ambiguous and conducive to abuse. As our colleague Risa Brooks suggests, the presence of such standards in the United States does not prevent American military personnel from entering the political arena. Worryingly, Sharan Grewal finds that the growing politicization of American officers is increasingly rubbing off on trained foreign officers. All of this does not mean that we should not evaluate training programs critically. Injecting significant resources into the armed forces of fragile states is a risky business, which can potentially lead to unwanted consequences. In seeking effective security partners, the United States and its allies have increasingly focused on elite units, such as those led by Colonel Goïta, the head of the new Malian junta. While such intensive and long-term training can help impart important skills, it can also encourage the rise of praetorian guards that threaten democratically elected civilian governments. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada Military training abroad is also an important part of the range of foreign policy tools deployed by Canada. Strengthening an army's capabilities in partner countries is indeed one of the main missions of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) within the framework of the defense policy Strong, Secure, Engaged, currently in force. The transfer of expertise and the development of capabilities allow local armies to acquire resources in order to respond more effectively to the security challenges they face, but also help to improve interoperability and strengthen relations between the CAF and its partners. As a result, questions surrounding the links between foreign military formations and coups d'état also arise for Canadian policymakers. However, it should be noted that unlike the United States, which frequently operates large-scale training programs unilaterally, the training operations carried out by the CAF abroad are much more modest and occur in the context of multilateral operations, that is to say in partnership with the armies of allied countries. Thus, if the link between American military training and coups d'état remains mixed, it seems that the impact of Canadian training will be more so, underlining the importance of maintaining realistic expectations regarding the CAF's ability to reshape the standards and practices of foreign armies. Based on what the American experience teaches us, it appears possible that training that places more emphasis on inculcating democratic and liberal norms and standards of military professionalism and governance can help. When we consider the main training missions given by Canada between 1999 and 2019, we notice that emphasis on the transmission of these norms and standards varies. While it occupies an important place in the curriculum of certain Canadian programs (e.g. in the context of Operation Crocodile in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), the objectives that most often figure at the heart of these Canadian training are linked to improving military performance and the fight against terrorism. While the CAF on its own cannot hope to produce major changes in the trajectory of foreign armies, its impact could be greater from a civil-military perspective if, within the multilateral operations and coalitions of which they are a part, they placed more direct emphasis on aspects of military professionalism. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the outbreak of coups d'état is influenced more by factors internal to a country than by the efforts of outsiders underlines the often limited impact of training activities. It is tempting to believe that military problems have technical solutions. However, here, the stakes seem above all political. They are often the product of unstable political systems, torn apart by persistent competition between political factions, and unable to respond to the grievances of a society, including those of the military officers who form part of it. Under these conditions, international military training programs, even those focused on the transmission of norms and standards, can only have a small impact. In short, even if the impact of military training on coups d'état in recipient countries remains limited and difficult to determine, Canada should maintain this foreign policy tool, but rethink it in light of what history teaches us, while recognizing its limitations. ## Revisiting Canada-Russia Relations: A New Paradigm for a Multipolar World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/revisiting-canada-russia-relations-a-new-paradigm-for-a-multipolar-world/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report explores Canada-Russia relations in the context of the emerging "multi-order" world. This paper was co-published with the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy. Consult the English version: Zachary Paikin, "Revisiting Canada-Russia Relations: A New Paradigm for a Multipolar World," Institute for Peace & Diplomacy, 5 April 2021. ## Round Table – The Changing Political and Strategic Environment URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/round-table-the-changing-political-and-strategic-environment/ Modified: 2024-06-11 > As the next U.S. election approaches, this round table brings together the directors of various Canadian research networks to engage in an... Intro by: Stéfanie von Hlatky, Associate Dean for Research and Full Professor, Queen’s University As the next U.S. election approaches, this round table brings together the directors of various Canadian research networks to engage in an in-depth reflection on the strategic issues that Canada must prepare for. In this context, it is crucial that Canada anticipates these changes to preserve its interests and principles. Moderator: Daniel Jean, Member of the Strategic Council Speakers: -- Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Director of the Peace Operations Research Network (POR) and Full Professor, Université de Montréal -- Stephen M. Saideman, Director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN) and Full Professor, Carleton University -- Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Chief Operating Officer Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) -- Guy Thibault, Chairman of the Board, Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute ## Round Table 1 : Politicization of defence issues and strategic orientation: realities and consequences URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/round-table-1-politicization-of-defence-issues-and-strategic-orientation-realities-and-consequences/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > Politicization of defence issues and strategic orientation: realities and consequences..................... Topics : Impact on decisions when the issues are publicized in the media; impact on defense decisions (opex, military procurement); defense issues, traditionally seen as consensual public policy, in a process of polarization. Moderator : Pr. Frédéric Mérand (UdeM) Jean-Charles Larsonneur (député à l’Assemblée nationale 2017-2024) Laurent Charbonneau (UdeM) Laurent Borzillo, chercheur invité (CCEAE, UdeM/ ENAP) ## Round Table 2 : Politicization at election time: can an issue of defence and/or strategic orientation become the major issue of an election/political life? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/round-table-2-politicization-at-election-time-can-an-issue-of-defence-and-or-strategic-orientation-become-the-major-issue-of-an-election-political-life/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > Politicization at election time: can an issue of defence and/or strategic orientation become the major issue of an election/political life? Topics: Elections in Moldova and Georgia (Fall 2024); the subject of the Russian-Ukrainian war in Western democracies; defence issues in elections. Moderator : Pr. Delphine Deschaux-Dutard (Université de Grenoble Alpes) Florian Galleri (Université de Nantes) Justin Massie (UQAM) Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Romain Le Quiniou (Euro Créative) ## Round Table 3 : The politicization of defence and strategic issues, a consequence of interference and the spread of fake news URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/round-table-3-the-politicization-of-defence-and-strategic-issues-a-consequence-of-interference-and-the-spread-of-fake-news/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > Round Table 3 : The politicization of defence and strategic issues, a consequence of interference and the spread of fake news Moderator : Manon Fitzpatrick (Université de Genève) Jean F. Crombois (Université américaine en Bulgarie) Maxime Audinet (IRSEM) Magdalena Dembińska (UDEM) ## Round Table 4 : What countermeasures can be taken against fake news and the negative politicization of defence issues? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/round-table-4-what-countermeasures-can-be-taken-against-fake-news-and-the-negative-politicization-of-defence-issues/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > What countermeasures can be taken against fake news and the negative politicization of defence issues? Can politicization be a solution? Moderator : Diya Jiang (Université McGill) Jean-Charles Larsonneur (député à l’Assemblée nationale 2017-2024) Cristian Preda (Université de Bucarest) Yannick Pincé (CIENS) Laurent Cordonier (Fondation Descartes) Tom Morin-Robinson (NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division) ## Roundtable – Security Challenges in Africa URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/roundtable-security-challenges-in-africa/ Modified: 2023-06-27 > On the occasion of the forthcoming publication of Volume 6 of the Rubicon by Les Equateurs, devoted to security challenges in Africa... note: this video is predominantly in French. On the occasion of the forthcoming publication of Volume 6 of the Rubicon by Les Equateurs, devoted to security challenges in Africa, this roundtable discussion brings together the authors of this new volume to delve into the various issues addressed in this book. Moderator: Marie-Eve Desrosiers Participants : Dr. Arthur Banga, Université Houphouët-Boigny Arthur Boutellis General (e. r.) Didier Castres Alexandra Lamarche Dr. Oswald Padonou, Professor and Program Director, École Nationale Supérieure des Armées (ENSA-Bénin) Raphael Parens, Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute Michael Shurkin Dr. Nina Wilén, Director of the Africa Program for International Relations at the Egmont Institute ## Roundtable 1 – The Clash of Regional and International Organizations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/2021-roundtable-1/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > This panel explores the impact of COVID-19 on regional and international organizations. While the logical response to a global issue such... This panel explores the impact of COVID-19 on regional and international organizations. While the logical response to a global issue such as COVID-19 would be to rely on multilateral efforts, the pandemic has crowded out multilateral and even regional initiatives in favour of nationalistic sentiments and self-interested responses by many states. In the post-pandemic period, states may thus invest more in self-sufficiency and in redefining their strategic priorities, including health security. The growing gap between national, regional, and multilateral responses to COVID-19 calls into question the development of global governance and regional integration, as well as the future of international organizations and their capacity for economic and political cooperation. Moderated by Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Bishop’s Univeristy) with: Jean-Christophe Boucher (University of Calgary), Daniel Jean (Advisory Board, Network for strategic analysis), Stéphanie Bélanger (Collège militaire royal du Canada) & Roromme Chantal (Université de Moncton) ## Roundtable 1 – The War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and the Future Political Settlement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/roundtable-1/ Modified: 2023-03-08 > Watch Roundtable 1: Military Lessons Learned, with Eliza Gheorghe, Hanna Shelest, Frans Osinga & Alexander Lanoszka. Roundtable 1: Military Lessons Learned Chair: Eliza Gheorghe, Bilkent University Panelists: Frans Osinga – Leiden University Hanna Shelest, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”/ Ukraine Analytica Alexander Lanoszka – University of Waterloo ## Roundtable 2 – Cooperating with Rivals in a Post-Pandemic World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/2021-roundtable-2/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > The decline of American leadership is said to be directly responsible for national governments' efforts to go it alone in the face of... The decline of American leadership is said to be directly responsible for national governments' efforts to go it alone in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. While this trend was especially salient under the Trump administration, it has not entirely disappeared with the arrival of President Joe Biden. According to Robert Kaplan, China and Russia have redefined great power competition and the classical/Western meaning of war, making the response of the West, i.e., the United States, all the more important. Arguing that the pandemic has created a global consciousness, Kaplan recommends that the West respond by strengthening its alliances. With this in mind, the second panel zeroes in on the following question: how do we cooperate with our rivals in a post-pandemic context? While the pandemic has intensified many rivalries, the fact remains that cooperation, even with rivals, is necessary to address the challenges and threats posed by the return of great power competition and the threat posed by revisionist states such as Iran. Moderated by Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Srdjan Vucetic (Université d’Ottawa) Zachary Paikin (Centre for European Policy Studies) Gaëlle Rivard-Piché (Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada) M-Gen Huddleston (Chief of Staff - Cdn Joint Operations Comd at RCAF) ## Roundtable 2 – The War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and the Future Political Settlement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/roundtable-2/ Modified: 2023-03-08 > Watch Roundtable 2: War termination and Post-War Settlement: What Does a Political Settlement Look Like? with Justin Massie, Maria Popova... Roundtable 2: War termination and Post-War Settlement: What Does a Political Settlement Look Like? Chair: Jack Porter – The Citadel Panelists:  Oxana Shevel – Tufts University Justin Massie – University of Québec in Montreal Maria Popova – McGill University ## Roundtable on Canadian Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/roundtable-on-canadian-defence/ Modified: 2022-11-14 Moderators:  Stéfanie von Hlatky (Associate Professor, Queen’s University) Justin Massie (Full Professor, UQAM) Speakers: Roland Paris (Full Professor, University of Ottawa) Kerry Buck (Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa) Jean-Christophe Boucher (Assistant Professor, University of Calgary) ## Russia in the Sahel: Towards a Worsening of Security and Political Situations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/russia-in-the-sahel-towards-a-worsening-of-security-and-political-situations/ Modified: 2022-06-01 > It is now undeniable that Russia has become an influential and dangerous actor in the Sahel, which may be deliberately exacerbating.. It is now undeniable that Russia has become an influential and dangerous actor in the Sahel, which may be deliberately exacerbating the region's problems as Sahelian countries struggle to cope with growing political and security crises. What Russia is doing is bad news for sub-Saharan Africans, but also has broader ramifications outside the continent. That said, I want to caution French readers against blaming Russia for the failures of French policy and the dominance of anti-French populist policies in Mali. What the Russians have done is cleverly exploit French failures, the failures of French-backed regimes, and anti-French sentiment already present in the Sahel. Sentiment for which France shares much of the responsibility after a long history of post-colonial interventions, not to mention colonization itself. Awareness of Russian influence should not distract French leaders and the French public from introspection about their own mistakes, and the sometimes destabilizing effects of French actions, even those with the best of intentions. One such mistake, directly related to Russian influence, is the failure to consider the full extent of hostile opinions spread across the region and their significance. As far as I know, French efforts to counter them and engage seriously in a battle of narratives have always been haphazard, to say the least. Russian Activities in the Sahel Russia's main line of action in the Sahel has been influence operations exploiting social media. Russia has also used the Wagner Group as a decoy and tool, while deploying an older form of influence in the form of advisors with direct access to key leaders. The latter has been relatively well documented in the case of the Central African Republic, where Russian individuals associated with the Wagner Group are known to be close to and likely to have influence over the president of that country. In the case of Mali, there is speculation, particularly regarding Mali's Minister of Defense, Colonel Sadio Camara, who studied in Moscow and is known to be particularly close to the Russian government. However, compared to the Central African Republic, the evidence of Russian influence on the Malian junta remains largely circumstantial. Information Warfare Russian information operations in the Sahel have been well documented by several French and American studies. They involve the use of Facebook and WhatsApp, as well as Russian state media outlets such as Russia Today and Sputnik, to generate and distribute content. The content produced tends to reinforce key discourses that denigrate France and the West in general, as well as French-backed regimes, while promoting certain forms of populist politics. These discourses include arguments that France is to blame for the country's misfortune; that nothing would have happened if France had not brought down Muammar Gaddafi; that France is seeking to divide Mali; that France is complacent toward Tuareg separatist groups; that France is not serious about fighting terrorists; and that France is even helping terrorists. Finally, France is said only to be in the Sahel to steal its natural resources. These views have found an enthusiastic audience in the Sahel, notably among a public that finds it difficult to understand how the security situation could have deteriorated so much despite nine years of French military operations, the presence of thousands of UN troops, not to mention the European Union's training missions. Of course, given their colonial history and that of multiple post-colonial French interventions, many of which have served French interests more than those of local populations, Sahelians and other West Africans have other reasons to distrust France. The fact that Operation Barkhane is fundamentally different, at least in intent, is an argument that can be made - I make it all the time - but it is a difficult argument to make to a skeptical audience. Even pointing out that French companies play little to no role in the exploitation of Mali's mineral wealth has little impact on those convinced otherwise. (On this point, it is interesting to note that Mali's commercial mining sector is in fact dominated by Canadian companies.) Anti-French sentiment combined with traditional pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist themes constitutes a powerful ideology. In the classical Marxist sense of the word, this refers to a belief system that aims not only to explain why things are going wrong, but also to justify existing power structures. In this case, it enables one to reject blaming oneself or one's own governments. In short, everything that happens is not the fault of Mali, its authorities, or its elites. There is circumstantial evidence of another possible aspect of Russian influence operations. Wagner's arrival in Mali in late December was accompanied by a change in the substance and tone of the Malian regime's messages and diplomacy. Malian officials, particularly Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop and Transitional Prime Minister Choguel Maïga, but also the Malian military, have been significantly more aggressive in their messages and interactions with Mali's Western partners. This includes France, of course, but also the United States, as when Diop responded to AFRICOM's allegation that Mali was paying Wagner $10 million a month by questioning the credibility of the U.S. government, referring to its 2003 claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. This rhetoric is motivated, in part, by inflammatory statements made by President Macron and the French foreign minister. But when combined with what appears to be a concerted propaganda effort by the Malian armed forces to encourage the belief that they have accomplished far more in recent operations than they did prior to the 2020 coup, one can see the outlines of a comprehensive strategic communications plan. Of course, the Malians themselves are capable of devising such a plan, but there is no denying that such things are a Russian specialty and, more specifically, a specialty of Yevgeny Prigozhin's empire. Wagner Wagner's presence in Mali, unlike in the Central African Republic, remains shrouded in ambiguity. The government still insists that Wagner is not in the country, while paradoxically promoting the idea that Russian assistance is already making a significant difference on the battlefield. Indeed, the ambiguity is useful, because in the absence of clear information, the scale and value of Russian involvement have been greatly exaggerated in the popular imagination. Wagner arrived in Mali at the end of December 2021. According to several sources, their strength on the ground is said to be around a thousand. Present in Timbuktu and in Bamako where they maintain a rear base, some have joined the Malian military in reconnaissance operations in central and southern Mali, specifically in the regions of Koulikoro, Mopti and Segou. They have already suffered some casualties, and a few may have been taken hostage by the al-Qaeda affiliated jihadist coalition known as JNIM (Jamāʿat nuṣrat al-islām wal-muslimīn). Interestingly, most analysts, including myself, assumed that Mali paid for Wagner by granting it sweetheart deals on mineral deposits (a practice Wagner has used in other countries). However, to date, there is no known link between Wagner and existing mining licenses in Mali. The Malian mining sector is sufficiently well governed that the issuance of mining permits is easily observable: if there were an agreement (or if there is one in the future), it would be easy to find a paper trail. The available evidence indicates that Mali is paying in cash out of its own funds. Why Partnering With the Russians Is Bad for Mali While there is, in theory, nothing wrong with enlisting the support of another provider of security assistance,  turning to Russia comes at the cost of weakening the country's bilateral relations with France and its other Western partners (notably the United States and the many members of the European Union who contribute to French military operations, European Union training missions and the United Nations mission in Mali, MINUSMA). This might be an acceptable price to pay (setting aside the fact that French, European and UN operations are free, while Mali pays the Russians) if Russian aid equaled or exceeded the combined French and European efforts in effectiveness or simply offset cuts that France and its allies might make in the weeks and months ahead. This, however, is a fantasy. Simply put, it is a matter of mathematics: It is impossible for a few hundred Russian mercenaries to do a better job than several thousand French and European soldiers supported by French military aircraft and drones. Moreover, Wagner has been credibly accused of numerous human rights abuses in the Central African Republic, where it has targeted members of the Fulani ethnic community in particular. There was every indication that such abuses would be repeated in Mali. Unfortunately, MINUSMA, Human Rights Watch, and Le Monde have linked Wagner to abuses committed by Malian armed forces against civilians, most recently the massacre of more than 200 people in Moura in late March 2022. These reports are increasingly validated by testimony that Wagner personnel were involved in the deaths of several civilians, as were Malian forces. This is not without consequence: abuses committed by either Malian security forces or government-allied militias have indeed contributed greatly to the radicalization of Malian communities. This is certainly the case for the Fulani in central Mali, where the government and government-allied forces target them for collective punishment, driving more of them into the arms of jihadist groups. In other words, Wagner contributes to insecurity in Mali more than it promotes security. Comforting Bad Governance The issue of human rights abuses is linked to a larger problem. Deploying Wagner reflects a desire for a quick fix that will solve Mali's security problems while avoiding addressing the multiple demographic, economic, environmental, political and social problems that fuel the insurgency, not to mention the Herculean task of security sector reform. It has been a habit in Mali for at least as long as the country has had a terrorism problem (i.e., since the early 2000s) to try to cut corners and find easy solutions. The belief that somehow Russian aid will make a significant difference absolves the junta from providing real solutions to the country's problems. Ironically, the reliance on Russia perpetuates the problem often decried by anti-French critics, that Africans are too dependent on foreign powers and that they are giving up their own agency. Currently, this belief in the magical powers of Russian aid emboldens the regime and the Malian public in its confrontation with France, Europe and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), particularly with regard to the length of the transition period and the holding of elections. There is a feeling that Mali cannot only afford to ignore its Western partners and ECOWAS, but that it will be better off without them, thanks to Russia. The Malian junta has clearly found in its anti-French rhetoric and defiant posture a very simple way to secure popular legitimacy at the expense of developing effective policies to secure the country and defeat jihadism. Fueling a Counterproductive Policy at the Regional Level At the same time, the anti-French populist policy promoted by Russia has found an echo throughout the region. As demonstrated by the demonstrations in Burkina Faso and Niger in late 2021, when the movement of French military convoys was blocked. Surprisingly, according to press reports, the demonstrators were convinced that the purpose of the convoys was to deliver weapons to the jihadists. In addition to posing a serious problem for the French military, which relies on ground transportation for troop movements and logistics, the wave of anti-French sentiment is putting significant pressure on the governments of Burkina Faso and Niger, both of which work closely with the French military. Indeed, after Burkina Faso's coup in January 2022, more than one analyst has identified Niger's democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum, as the next to fall. Bazoum certainly needs France, but he is walking a tightrope. As for Burkina's new strongman, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, he seems to be sticking to his country's alliance with France, but his grip on power remains fragile. He must also quickly demonstrate that he can turn Burkina Faso around. A lack of progress or even the perception of a lack of progress in the coming months will undoubtedly fuel discontent, which will likely be expressed in anti-French sentiment. We can count on Russia to facilitate such a development. Russia's Motivations Russia's calculated involvement in the Sahel is undoubtedly complex, and it is difficult to estimate the relative weight of Moscow's many potential motivations. One of them may be the most trivial of all: money. Wagner, despite its ties to the Russian government, is primarily a private company linked to an oligarch. The growing global competition for strategic minerals cannot be ruled out either. In addition to gold, Mali is rich in bauxite, copper, cobalt, lithium and uranium. Mali also has geographical features that suggest possible oil and gas deposits, although there has been little serious effort to identify them and none to exploit them. Lithium in particular looks promising. The Australian company Firefinch, in partnership with the Chinese lithium giant Ganfeng, has been investing in southern Mali since last year and is involved in the construction of a large future lithium mine. However, Russia may have other motives. One possible motivation would be to destabilize the European Union by stimulating migration from West Africa, or at least sabotaging European efforts to prevent further migration by stabilizing the Sahel. This is, after all, one of the main reasons why Europeans are present in the Sahel, and we have already seen evidence in Syria of Russia's willingness to instrumentalize migrants against Europe. Russia is accused of bombing Syrian communities to motivate residents to leave the country. It is also accused of trying to influence the migration flow in Libya against Europe. The migration movements of recent years have revealed the EU's weaknesses on this issue and their corrosive effects on the internal political life of member states, with the resulting "crises" favouring far-right parties in Europe, which are generally anti-NATO, pro-Russian and sometimes even Russian-sponsored. Another possible motive would be to undermine France's efforts to promote a unified European defence and security policy, motivated by Russia's hostility to the European Union. France has clearly wanted to Europeanize the conflict in the Sahel, in part to ease the burden on its military. However, France also has used the conflict as an opportunity to pursue its goal of promoting a European security policy in line with French interests. In doing so, Russian actions in Mali are straining the coalition that France has put in place and threaten to derail the project. Conclusion Russia now has a strong hold on the Sahel, especially on the popular imagination of local populations. It has achieved this at remarkably low cost, mainly through information operations conducted via social media. This influence is detrimental to France, of course, but especially to the Sahelian countries themselves, which are increasingly under the sway of unproductive populist policies. Any state has the right to change its patron if it wishes, and the populations have the right to associate with whomever they wish. However, in this case, the choice of Russia is more than doubtful, given the Russian motivations and their lack of consideration for the interests of the populations in question. If there is room for speculation about possible Russian gains, there is little to speculate about the real winners of this policy pursued by certain regimes in the Sahel: the jihadist groups of the Sahel. French readers should remember, however, that a full appreciation of the importance of Russian influence should not encourage them to take comfort in the idea that French failures are simply due to Russia. On the contrary, an analysis of the weaknesses that Russia has so skillfully exploited would be most appropriate. The original version of this text was published in French on Le Rubicon. Check it out here! ## Russia Misses its Exit URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/russia-misses-its-exit/ Modified: 2022-06-01 > Expressed in the brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the hubris of a dictator who still believes himself to be the head of a... When an empire bids farewell, it can do so with a certain elegance, or by leaving chaos and desolation on its trail. This second scenario accurately describes Vladimir Putin's Russia, ready to do anything to make people forget their geopolitical decline and maintain his country's rank in the concert of nations. At the price of a discordant music, and even a collapse. As the world's second-largest military and nuclear power, with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, Russia suffers from demographic decline and a gross domestic product lower than that of Canada. Since 1991, it has also lost much of its territory and sphere of influence. This gap between a past of greatness and a stunted present explains much of Moscow's foreign policy. Expressed in the brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the hubris of a dictator who still believes himself to be the head of a great power threatens not only regional peace, but also international order. Some believe that the sense of encirclement and humiliation felt by the Russian elites following NATO enlargement made this action inevitable. I do not think so. While it can be argued that Russia was pushed into the wires after the end of the Cold War, Vladimir Putin still had a choice. Coping With Geopolitical Decline In a collective book published in 2020, my co-authors and I describe eight strategies for managing geopolitical decline. These offer a menu of options for dealing with decline. They suggest that it is possible to slow it down, or at least mitigate its consequences, but also to make it worse. Some of the strategies explored in the book are aimed at the international system. While the late Byzantine Empire (1261-1453) tried to obliterate its planned obsolescence through a strategy of cultural and diplomatic engagement, Austria-Hungary chose punitive war - a form of prevention - against Serbia. Closer to home, the United States tried to boost its economic competitiveness under Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama, before beginning a disengagement from global institutions during Donald Trump's tenure. Other strategies were aimed at the domestic audience. While Diocletian (244-311) innovated to restore Rome's authority through reforms, the Japanese Shoguns implemented an isolationist policy during the Edo period (1650-1842). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Russia first chose to imitate the Western model, before turning in the 2000s to the patriotic self-strengthening of the elites and public opinion. For if the objective reality of geopolitical decline can be observed a posteriori by historians, for contemporaries it is a theatrical performance that takes place in real time. Decline is part of the stigma management theorized by Erving Gofmann. It consists in mobilizing economic, military, cultural and political resources in order to maintain social status. In a way, France using its veto of the war in Iraq in the Security Council and Turkey in its attempt to influence conflicts in its neighbourhood were staging a refusal of decline by relying on their most critical resources. Great Power Nationalism In all honesty, we wrote Coping with Geopolitical Decline with the decline of the United States in mind. Convinced that Europe held useful lessons for a soon-to-be ex-hegemonic power then being worked over by Donald Trump's antics against a backdrop of China's rise. We didn’t think so much about the trajectory, perhaps predictable, of Russia. A chapter of the book is, however, specifically dedicated to this country. Using our typology, Seçkin Köstem and Virginie Lasnier describe Vladimir Putin's strategy as a mixture of ideological self-strengthening and military prevention. This strategy has been imposed through a "great power nationalism" rallying public opinion to the revanchist position of the security elites, the siloviki. In a prescient conclusion (p. 151), Köstem and Lasnier write: “the Russian case demonstrates that relying on foreign policy aggression can pay off in the short run by boosting the public’s support for the government, especially in times of economic turmoil and acute political crisis. However, is clearly not sustainable in the long run and foreign policy revisionism cannot compensate for genuine economic and political reform.” This is the scenario we are seeing in the war in Ukraine: early on, we saw an out-of-proportion aggressiveness fuelled by a nostalgic discourse about “great Russia” and the president's assumed contempt for neighboring nations, simultaneously cajoled into their Russian identity and accused of playing into the enemy's hands. But, soon enough, we also saw disoriented elites and genuine protests in Russia elites; a stalemate on the ground that exposed the Kremlin's delusions of grandeur; and, above all, economic vulnerabilities that, worsened by unprecedented economic sanctions, will make Russia a worn-out country even after its armed forces have destroyed Ukraine. Preventive War, the Choice of a Combustible Strategy Was there an alternative scenario? Based on an extensive comparison between Byzantium, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, our book proposes two general conclusions. First, contrary to the most primitive realist theses in international relations, geopolitics is not fate. Indeed, Vladimir Putin's strategy was not the only one available. His predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, had rather emphasized the imitation of the liberal model and strategic disengagement. With little success, admittedly, but a more enlightened leader than Putin would have seized the opportunities offered by the European Union, which is more open to cooperation than NATO, or invested in the economic modernization of his country. Second, the choice of a strategy for managing decline shapes international order, for better or for worse. Of all the options listed in our book, prevention, i.e., the neutralization of potential adversaries or their allies, including through what Julian Go calls "performative warfare," is by far the most concerning for world peace. Since Thucydides' Peloponnesian War, we know that the outcome of preventive war is uncertain. Exhausting the belligerents, it probably does not slow down the decline, but it does help to inflame the international order. Unsurprisingly, preventive war is favored by authoritarian regimes that prefer the maintenance of their dominance to the welfare of their people. But here again, Vladimir Putin had a choice. Although limited and suffering from the comparison with democratic movements, especially in Ukraine, his authority was not destabilized by internal dissent. In the region, the security dilemma had never been so unworrying as in the recent period: neither Ukraine nor any of its neighbors posed a threat to the integrity of Russian territory; the likelihood of its joining NATO, which some considered "brain-dead," was almost nil; and the United States was pivoting to Asia. The decision to invade Ukraine can therefore only be attributed to a sovereign will to strike at a time when the United States, Europe and NATO seemed to be in a weaker position. And China? It is now a given that the United States and Russia have become enemies again. The United States is declining, but slowly, and it can count on Europe to form a geopolitical bloc. Russia is declining much more and much faster: will it find allies to successfully exit the scene? The most famous case of "successful decline" is that of the handover between the United Kingdom and the United States. This allowed the former British Empire to remain in the game throughout the 20th century, occupying a prominent place in the international order and institutions it had helped to create. As was the case during the aborted Suez Crisis, Washington did not always follow London in its post-colonial adventures, but it did extend its influence. Will China, economically stronger but militarily more fragile, play a similar role with Russia? Will it be tempted to support Moscow with its economic and diplomatic means with the simple aim of balancing (or putting an end to) American power, thus giving Vladimir Putin the impression of having avoided decline? Or will it remain on the sidelines, on the lookout, hesitating between the satisfaction of seeing two rivals weaken each other and the concern of weakening the economic globalization to which it is otherwise attached? Here again, both Beijing and Moscow will have a choice. The original version of this text was published in French on Le Rubicon. Check it out here! ## Russia’s ‘Low-Tech’ War on Ukraine Discredited Its Military Modernization Narrative URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/russias-low-tech-war-on-ukraine/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > The Russian leadership, government, state media, and weapon manufacturers have put much effort into constructing and maintaining a narrative.. On 29 January 2023, Dmitry Rogozin, the former head of Russian space agency and now head of the “Tsar’s Wolves” group of military advisers, claimed that four Marker robotic ground systems are being prepared to be tested by the Russian armed forces on the battlefield in Ukraine. Previously, Russian state media described the Marker as a vehicle integrating “the most advanced” autonomous driving capabilities in Russia, using artificial intelligence (AI)-based object recognition, and processing data via neural network algorithms. The system was reportedly tested in a “fully autonomous” navigation mode to patrol the Vostochny cosmodrome. Now, Rogozin asserts, the Marker will undergo a “baptism of fire” in combat and will be able to automatically detect and target Abrams and Leopard tanks, once Ukraine receives them from its allies. Such ambitious statements about Russia’s capabilities in the sphere of military AI and autonomy are not new. The Russian leadership, government, state media, and weapon manufacturers have put much effort into constructing and maintaining a narrative about Russia’s military modernization. As part of this narrative, robotic systems—especially uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones — as well as the integration of AI and autonomy into the armed forces have been considered key priorities. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, revealed the mismatch between the narrative Moscow has been promoting and the reality of Russian military technological capabilities. This gap, perhaps unexpected for what was described as the “second army of the world”, is particularly visible through the ‘low-tech’ character of the Russian armed forces and their limited use of robotics and AI in weapon systems. Moreover, the gap is likely to increasingly widen as Russia’s technological development is hampered by, among others, the overall state of the Russian economy, sanctions, and the ‘brain drain’ of information technology (IT) specialists. Although officials such as Rogozin continue to advertise Russia’s military AI capabilities, these disinformation and PR efforts about Russia’s supposedly sophisticated and indestructible army are no longer credible. AI and Autonomy in Russian UAVs As part of its self-perception of great power in competition with the US and NATO, since the 2010s Russia has tried to demonstrate that it was able to catch up with, and surpass, its rivals in military technology. Drones and AI have been an important part of the political and military leadership’s narrative. They have not only been associated with strategic advantages, but also with symbols of a modern military. To prove that its army is ready for 21st century combat, Russia has engaged in performative demonstrations via, among others, military parades, strategic exercises, and propaganda surrounding Moscow’s campaigns and operations. As Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu admitted in 2021, all latest Russian weapon systems have been tested in Syria. Russian state media particularly advertised the use of robotic ground systems such as the Uran-9 and loitering munitions in the Syrian civil war. Statements from Russian officials might have created some expectations about Russia displaying increasingly autonomous and AI-based weapons on the battlefield. In April 2020, the director of the Advanced Research Foundation, Russia’s version of the US DARPA and developer of the Marker, said that Russia, as other states, is moving towards replacing soldiers with more efficient and precise robotic systems. In May 2021, Shoigu claimed that Russia started its serial production of “combat robots capable of fighting on their own”. President Vladimir Putin stated in November 2021 that Russia has more than 2000 UAVs in service, including with the integration of AI. The information available about Russian weapon systems used in the invasion of Ukraine shows a much different picture than what advertised prior to 2022. The levels of autonomy and integration of AI in UAVs used by Russia have so far been limited. For instance, the KUB UAV – a loitering munition produced by ZALA Aero, part of the Kalashnikov Group, which is a subsidiary of the Rostec state corporation – is often referred to as part of debates surrounding weapon systems with “concerning autonomous capabilities”. Photographic evidence of the use of the KUB in Kyiv appeared in March and was followed by several media and analysis articles suggesting that Russia might have used a “killer drone” or “killer robot” – the colloquial term for autonomous weapon systems, which are capable of selecting and engaging targets, i.e., using force, without human intervention. However, Russian sources do not indicate that the KUB has autonomy in these ‘critical’ functions. Rather, it would autonomously navigate towards a target which would have been pre-selected by a human. Similarly, the Russian adapted version of the Iranian Shahed-131 and -136 UAVs (often named “suicide drones” or “kamikaze drones” as they self-destruct when attacking a target) do not seem to integrate automated target recognition algorithms or possess sensors. As Dominika Kunertova points out, these systems “provide Russia with the ability to strike targets deep in Ukrainian territory and on the cheap”. Although many of the Shahed attacks launched by Russia have reached their goals, the systems are described as “primitive” and unsophisticated “weapons for mass terrorist acts against civilians”. Meanwhile, the Lancet-3 loitering munition, also manufactured by ZALA Aero and used in Ukraine (and previously employed in Syria), has received much acclaim from Russian defense analysts. They believe this is the most efficient Russian UAV. The Lancets have been involved in some effective attacks in recent weeks, but it remains unclear how many of them Russia could produce. Lancet reportedly has a system of cameras and sensors which could allow it to “locate a target without human guidance”. Rostec officials have been promoting the Lancet as “highly autonomous”, stating that the system “carries an optical-electronic system that helps independently ferret out and destroy a target”. These drones are also said to be capable of returning back if the target has not been found. Yet, as pointed out by Zachary Kallenborn, it is challenging for outside observers to verify whether these, or any, systems have been used in a fully autonomous mode in an attack. For instance, while a UN report published in 2021 states that Kargu-2 loitering munitions had been used “to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition” in the Libyan Civil War, there are ongoing debates about the implication of this assertion. It is also difficult to evaluate manufacturers’ claims about systems’ capabilities in terms of AI and autonomy. This is further complicated by the ambiguity of the term ‘AI’, which is often used to refer to various spheres including robotics, machine leaning, and different types of algorithms. However, the vagueness surrounding the definition of AI has also allowed Russian officials to attribute AI technologies to their weapon systems as part of their ongoing information war. Official statements often refer to ‘AI’ as a monolith and coherent phenomenon without explaining the exact meaning of the term, with the ambition of portraying a system, and the whole military, as ultra-modern. Despite the visible mismatch between Russian narratives and capabilities revealed in the invasion of Ukraine, the leadership, in addition to experts, state media, and other actors, have continued to maintain the official discourse surrounding drones and AI. This information war effort seems to have two main components and objectives. AI in Russia’s Great Power Self-Portrayal First, part of the narrative, most likely oriented towards domestic consumption, seeks to maintain Russia’s self-attributed great power status by claiming to possess and use the most modern weapons. Putin often mentions (see September 2018, November 2021, August 2022) that Russia possesses many weapons, including “high-precision and robotic” systems, which are “ahead of foreign counterparts” and have “no analogues around the world”. Other officials have been saying that all military objectives will be reached or denying Russia’s visible problems with weaponry. The CEO of Rostec, Sergey Chemezov, said in an interview in October that the corporation is ready to supply the KUB and Lancet loitering munitions in the “required amounts, if there is an order” from the Ministry of Defense. In July, Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov highlighted that the production of UAVs and of “high-precision and other new types of weapons and technology” remained a special priority for the government. At a Defense Ministry Board meeting on 21 December 2022, Putin called to integrate AI technologies at “all levels of decision-making” in the armed forces, adding, “as shows experience, including from recent months, the most effective weapon systems are those that operate quickly and almost in an automatic mode”. He noted, “We have no funding restrictions. The country, the government give everything that the army asks for, everything”, in an effort to signal that Russia’s military and economic capabilities have remained unaffected by the invasion of Ukraine and its aftermath – in contrast to expert observations that both have severely deteriorated. It remains unclear to what extent the Russian population buys into this narrative. To the Ukrainian and most foreign audiences, Russian claims have been discredited by reports and observations about the state of its army and defence industry, revealing Russia’s true character of a “Potemkin superpower”. The Ukrainian armed forces were visibly more successful at acquiring and using modern technologies such as drones. When it comes to AI, Russia was already behind its own objectives due to issues such as a lack of investment, publications, cooperation with the private sector, as well as access to crucial hardware such as microchips. Sanctions, export controls, the departure of companies and IT specialists, as well as other measures affecting Russian technological capabilities, risk widening the gap between officials’ statements and the reality. AI in Russia’s International Law Violations Second, Russian officials claim to have been using weapon systems with AI and autonomous features to defend what they see as the legitimacy of their strikes on Ukraine. Drones and AI technologies are often associated with precision, efficiency, and accuracy. Militaries and governments around the world are justifying their investments into military AI by stating that they will allow for more ‘precise’ and thus more ‘ethical’ warfare. The Russian official discourse has been making use of such associations to portray its attacks as highly precise and respectful of international humanitarian law (IHL), which requires, among others, to make distinctions between civilians and combatants in warfare. As part of ongoing global debates on whether, or how, military AI can be used in compliance with IHL, such simplistic arguments have been criticized for not reflecting the state of the technology and the complexities of decision-making in warfare. In other words, algorithms are unlikely to be able to satisfy the requirement for situational awareness for legally accountable warfare. Shoigu said in April 2022 that the launching and target designation systems of “high-precision missiles” Kalibr and Kinzhal have become more efficient due to the use of modern technologies, including “the integration of AI elements”. The same Kalibr cruise missiles killed more than 20 civilians in Vinnytsia in July 2022. In August 2022 the Ministry of Defense announced the establishment of a new department for the development of AI technologies. Its newly appointed head, Vasily Yelistratov, declared that AI is “present in all weapons, especially in high-precision ones,” while the war of the future will be “a war of machines”. He has also suggested that AI makes weapons more intelligent, “and the more intelligent are weapons, the less losses will be sustained”, noting that “the most valuable thing is human life”. Such statements are contrasted with Russia’s disregard for the lives of Ukrainians. Similar claims have been made in relation to the anti-personnel mine POM-3 or “Medalion”, also used in Ukraine. It has been previously described by state media as a “smart” mine with a “nanobrain” which integrates AI technologies. The manufacturer’s representatives claimed that the foundation of this “brain” is entirely made in Russia, meaning that potential enemies could not hack into it or understand how it works. They also said the mine would be able to independently distinguish between military personnel and civilians. As noted by experts Toby Walsh and Lauren Kahn, it is highly unlikely to be technically possible. Yet, Russian officials continue to use AI in their claims to try to portray its actions as supposedly motivated by international law – although it is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Their declarations are contradicted by Russia’s constant violations of the core purpose and spirit of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which is to minimize the unnecessary and unjustifiable suffering of both civilians and combatants. Russian indiscriminate attacks on shopping malls and apartment buildings go against the very essence of international legal principles Russian diplomats affirm to care about at the UN. Russian military officials use the concept of AI and its inherent ambiguity to portray their attacks as motivated by humanitarian concerns such as only attacking military targets and not striking civilians. The actions of the Russian armed forces, however, discredit these claims of saving human lives with supposedly precise weaponry. In reality, Russian attacks have been targeting civilian objects, resulting in the deaths of civilians and the destruction of schools, hospitals, shopping malls, playgrounds and other non-military targets. Russian officials rarely seem to care for Ukrainian civilians affected by their strikes, although they task propagandists with try to justify these attacks via propaganda campaigns. Takeaways for the Study of Military AI and Autonomy Russia’s military modernization narrative, of which drones and AI are a key element, has been discredited by its ‘low-tech’ invasion of Ukraine. Russian officials’ claims to be able to be integrating AI into the military or launching a domestic production of drones are unlikely to be convincing. Their arguments of AI supposedly assisting in conducting ‘precise strikes which save lives’ are even less believable. Thinking beyond Russia, however, arguments that weapon systems with autonomy or AI-based autonomy have become a constant part of the battlefield should be treated with care. As Peter Burt writes, our understanding of such systems “is vague and based on manufacturer’s claims which are almost certainly exaggerated”. There is much ‘hype’ surrounding AI technologies and autonomy. At the same time, military AI and its integration into weapon systems are not sufficiently regulated at the global level. In their defense of their country’s sovereignty, Ukrainian officials have also shown an interest towards increasing autonomy in weapon systems. A report from the Associated Press published on 3 January 2023 quotes the Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, saying that Ukraine has been engaged in “a lot of R&D ” in “fully autonomous killer drones”. Fedorov added, “I think that the potential for this is great in the next six months”. The continuous development of weapon systems with AI and autonomy by armed forces around the world, combined with the absence of specific international regulation, calls for a closer examination of developments and state practices in that area. Efforts in debating these trends are underway and should be pursued further. Yet, as seen with observations of Russia’s capabilities and as argued by Margarita Konaev, more attention should be paid to the differences in claims made by various actors and actual practices in developing, testing, and using weapon systems, including drones, which integrate AI technologies and autonomous features.     Anna Nadibaidze (@AnnaRNad) is a PhD candidate in International Relations at the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark (SDU). She is a researcher in the AutoNorms project, funded by the European Research Council. ## S.2 Episode 16: Mitigating Risk URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-16-mitigating-risk/ Modified: 2023-03-01 > For our Feature Interview, Linna speaks with Dr. Ashley Williams about her findings on military to civilian transition and access to health.. In the sixteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN. Steve & Linna discuss the Emergency Act Inquiry - who was responsible, asset freezing, Doug Ford, US funding & PR of China activities in Canada. For our Feature Interview, Linna speaks with Dr. Ashley Williams about her findings on military to civilian transition and access to health services and some misconceptions about veteran health. She is also working on a veteran led project writing guidelines for healthcare providers project on chronic pain as well as a project on equine assisted learning for Public Safety personnel dealing with PTSD. Dr. Ashley Williams is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in Psychiatry and Behavioural Neurosciences as well as Co-Chair, Student and Post-Doctoral Engagement Committee (SPEC) with the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research/ L'Institut canadien de recherche sur la santé des militaires et des vétérans (CIMVHR). CIMVHR is a partner with the Canadian Defence and Security Network, students who would be interested in being part of CIMVHR’s Students and Postdoctoral Engagement Committee (cimvhr.ca/student-and-postdoct…ngagement-committee/). looking for candidates interested in policy making, there are opportunities to submit proposals submitted to the upcoming forum (cimvhrforum.ca/trainees interested in knowing more about SPEC outreach they are welcome to sign up for their distribution list to receive all future invitations and information. ## S.2 Episode 1: The Ones We Let Down URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-1-the-ones-we-let-down/ Modified: 2022-08-10 > For today’s feature interview, Artur speaks with our network partner Charlotte Duval – Lantoine about her newly published book... Today is the first episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Artur shares his view on the Rogers outage and protecting critical infrastructure and national security implications; Steve and Artur discuss responses to dissident Reservist James Topp, flags and you guessed it, the NATO Summit. For today’s feature interview, Artur speaks with our network partner Charlotte Duval – Lantoine about her newly published book “The Ones We Let Down.” ## S.2 Episode 11: A National Force URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-11-a-national-force/ Modified: 2022-12-15 > In the eleventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of UCalgary’s Centre for Military... In the eleventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss information sharing and other takeaways from the Emergencies Act Inquiry and implications for policing in Canada, Indo-Pacific strategy and allyship. Steve speaks with Peter Kasurak, Fellow at the Centre for International Defence Policy (CIDP) at Queen’s University about his book “A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000” ## S.2 Episode 12: Domestic Emergency Operations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-12-domestic-emergency-operations/ Modified: 2023-01-09 > Domestic Emergency Operations. In the twelfth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate... In the twelfth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN. Steve & Linna discuss highlights from the CDSN's Annual Year Ahead event, takeaways from the Arbour Report's Stakeholder Engagement event, the recent RWE coup plot in Germany as well as Peruvian President Castillo's successful self-coup. -Stephen Saideman ## S.2 Episode 13: Welcome to 2023 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-13-welcome-to-2023/ Modified: 2023-01-25 > In the thirteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military... Welcome to 2023. In the thirteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss the Brazilian election protests, Canadian purchase of a U.S.-made National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) for Ukraine and a quick summary of F-35 procurement efforts. Today's feature interview is with Conseils de sécurité podcast host, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé ## S.2 Episode 14: NATO(ish) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-14-nato-deploying-feminism/ Modified: 2023-02-07 > Stefanie and Steve discuss her new book: Deploying Feminism, The Role of Gender in NATO Military Operations. Topics include the context of... In the 14th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Anessa L. Kimball, author of the new book, Beyond 2% – NATO partners, institutions & burden management: Concepts, risks & models discuss sending offensive equipment to Ukraine, the threat of Russian cyber attacks and Turkish resistance to NATO expansion. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Stéfanie von Hlatky, the Canada Research Chair on Gender, Security, and the Armed Forces, associate professor of political studies at Queen's University, Associate Dean of Research in the Faculty of Arts and Science and co-director of the Strategic Analysis Network and the Canadian Defence and Security Network (including co-host of Battle Rhythm, season 1!) During the interview, Stefanie and Steve discuss her new book: Deploying Feminism, The Role of Gender in NATO Military Operations. Topics include the context of the project idea, the research process, and fieldwork trips leading to the book. Stefanie also explained her previous research and the importance of focusing the book’s research on Women, Peace, and security, trying to convey gender equality as a key element to more stable security outcomes. The book is available at all the usual outlets, including the publisher Oxford University Press, and on amazon. ## S.2 Episode 15: Visionary Thinking URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-15-visionary-thinking/ Modified: 2023-02-15 > Steve & Artur discuss balloon responses, U.S. Air Force Gen. Minihan's memo & Chinese "police stations" in Canada... In the 15th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss balloon responses, U.S. Air Force Gen. Minihan's memo & Chinese "police stations" in Canada. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Major-General Lise Bourgon, currently the Women Peace and Security Champion for the CAF. During the interview, Steve spoke with MGen Lise Bourgon about their Job as a Chief of Personnel, the challenges they face as CMP’s current priorities are reconstitution, recruitment, and personnel retention. MGen Bourgon also explained the housing strategy for the CAF members, their protocol for managing problematic behaviors of members in leadership positions, and their efforts to reduce movements & relocations as a way to retain personnel. ## S.2 Episode 17: Interference & Oversight URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-17-interference-oversight/ Modified: 2023-03-17 > Today's feature interview is with author of World War Z, Max Brooks and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of Valens. Steve, Daveed and.... In the seventeenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss Chinese government election interference and police stations in Canada, oversight of the RCMP in BC and across Canadian communities & concerns about lagging progress for Canadian women in international defence roles. Today's feature interview is with author of World War Z, Max Brooks and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of Valens. Steve, Daveed and Max discuss their work in national security, specializing in the simulation and gaming world. They explain the creation process of Sleeping Giants’ simulation, Valens Global’s approach to war game simulations, and the benefits and purposes of their war games aiming to develop situational research skills and negotiation abilities. Links National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians: www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca The Modern War Institute: www.mwi.usma.edu ## S.2 Episode 18: Responsible Democracy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-18-responsible-democracy/ Modified: 2023-04-06 > Our co-hosts discuss foreign interference and intelligence, government leaks vs whistle blowing & protests in Israel. Responsible Democracy.. This is the 18th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2, titled "Responsible Democracy" with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss foreign interference and intelligence, government leaks vs whistle blowing & protests in Israel. Note from the Producer: CDSN was so busy these past 2 weeks, we didn't have time for a Feature Interview! If you are thirsty for new content and perspectives, check out our YouTube Channel with new presentations via our Capstone Seminar in Calgary, feature topics including: Effective Disaster Management and Multi-Stakeholder Role: A Case of Bangladesh. (Mohammed Sadman Sakib) Next Wave of Jihadists or Deradicalized Citizens?: A Controlled Narrative From A Human Security And Social Identity Perspective. (Haval Ahmad) Trauma, Culture, and Militarism: Multidimensional Healing in the Canadian Armed Forces. (Ash Grover) Approches alternatives afin de comprendre et surveiller la culture au sein de l’Équipe de la défense (Isabelle Richer) “Functional Actors” and Canadian Defence & Security Policy: Lessons from the Arctic 1985-2010. (Ryan Dean) Cold Comfort: Threat Perception and Confidence-Building in Europe and the Arctic (Thomas Hughes) The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD): Legacy and Relevancy in the 21st Century. (Nicholas Glesby) Women, Peace & Security: Military Application and Beyond (Ye Hee (Leona) Ahn) ## S.2 Episode 19: Senator Rear-Admiral Rebecca Patterson URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-19-senator-rear-admiral-rebecca-patterson/ Modified: 2023-04-12 > For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Senator Rebecca Patterson, the first female CAF veteran to be appointed to the Senate. In the nineteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN; Steve & Linna discuss the Pope's rejection of the Doctrine of Discovery, repatriation of Canadian women and children from Syria & Star Wars Celebration weekend. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Senator Rebecca Patterson, the first female CAF veteran to be appointed to the Senate. ## S.2 Episode 2: Covering Canadian Defense & Security URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-2-covering-canadian-defense-security/ Modified: 2022-08-10 > For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with Senior political reporter for @GlobalNews, Amanda Connolly... Today is the second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Anessa Kimball, associate professor in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, director of Centre sur la sécurité internationale (CSI, Centre on International Security), and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Anessa discuss NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Canada’s turbine-related sanctions on Russia & GoC’s push for more airspace privacy. For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with Senior political reporter for @GlobalNews, Amanda Connolly about her experiences as one of Canada’s few national security and defense journalists. ## S.2 Episode 20: Canada’s NATO Burden Sharing URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode20-canadas-nato-burden-sharing/ Modified: 2023-05-11 > Canada's NATO Burden Sharing - This week's interview is with Jānis Garisons, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of... Canada's NATO Burden Sharing - In the 20th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Anessa L. Kimball, author of the new book, Beyond 2% – NATO partners, institutions & burden management: Concepts, risks & models. Steve & Anessa discuss NATO defence spending, intelligence leaks, Chinese police stations in North America and the civil war in Sudan. This week's interview is with Jānis Garisons, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia. During the interview, Steve & Jānis discuss Operation Enhanced Forward Presence, conscription and resilience. Canada's NATO Burden Sharing (Jānis Garisons is Latvia's Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defense. Prior to that he was Undersecretary of State-Policy Director in the Ministry (2013-2015), and prior to that he was the Ministry's Policy Director (2008-2013). Garisons has also held positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Director of the Security Policy Department and Head of the Regional Co-operation and Arms Control Division. He received a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College in 2014 and a Master of History from the University of Latvia in 1996.) ## S.2 Episode 21: Climate Science & Policy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-21-climate-science-policy/ Modified: 2023-05-11 > In today's feature interview, Anessa speaks with Pauline Pic about her post-doctoral research on the intersections of human... Climate Science & Policy | In the twenty-first episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss use of force amongst Canadian policing agencies, the end of the COVID emergency & the Civil War in Sudan. In today's feature interview, Anessa speaks with Pauline Pic about her post-doctoral research on the intersections of human geography and human security in the Arctic. Tracking Injustice Project: trackinginjustice.ca ## S.2 Episode 22: The Trust Factor: Chat Apps URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-22-the-trust-factor-chat-apps/ Modified: 2023-05-25 > For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Dr. Bessma Momani about her research on mal/dis and mis information shared via... In the twenty second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN; Steve & Linna discuss the External Monitor’s Report on progress of addressing the Arbour Report, university labs come under government scrutiny for national security risks. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Dr. Bessma Momani about her research on mal/dis and mis information shared via multinational chat app groups. ## S.2 Episode 24: Visiting Defence Fellow, Col Cathy Blue URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-24-visiting-defence-fellow-col-cathy-blue/ Modified: 2023-08-22 > Today's feature interview, Steve interviews Col. Cathy Blue, the CDSN/NPSIA visiting Defence Fellow for 2022/2023, about her.. In the twenty fourth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss the wildfires and climate change, protests triggered by police violence in France; Wagner vs Putin; and the upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius. Today's feature interview, Steve interviews Col. Cathy Blue, the CDSN/NPSIA visiting Defence Fellow for 2022/2023, about her experience in the program. Colonel Cathy Blue was born and raised in Hopefield, Prince Edward Island and developed her love for the Royal Canadian Air Force as an Air Cadet. Enrolling in the Canadian Forces in April 1989 as a Communication and Electronic Engineer (CELE), Lieutenant-Colonel Blue attended the University of Prince Edward Island under the Regular Officer Training Program. Colonel Blue has served in numerous operational and training positions across the Canadian Armed Forces, including positions within 8 Wing Telecommunication and Information Systems Squadron (WTISS), J6 Operations, 76 Communications Group and the Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics (CFSCE). Colonel Blue has had the honour of holding numerous command positions throughout her career as Commanding Officer 708 Communication Squadron, Commanding Officer 8 Air Communications and Control Squadron (8 ACCS) and as Commanding Officer 8 Mission Support Squadron. All were unit located on the largest Wing in the RCAF – 8 Wing Trenton. GO FLYERS! Colonel Blue has been posted to the Canadian Forces College (CFC) as Directing Staff for the Joint Command and Staff Programme (JSCP) and Programme Officer for the National Security Programme (NSP) followed by a posting to the RCAF Strategic Headquarters as Deputy Strategic A6 and Deputy Occupation Advisor for CELE. She was most recently posted to newly formed Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC) as the Special Advisor to Lieutenant-General Carignan Chief, Professional Conduct and Culture. Colonel Blue holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics and Computer Science from the University of Prince Edward Island, is a graduate of JCSP and holds a Masters in Defence Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. She is an avid hockey player, who (despite a four year posting to Toronto) remains a dedicated Ottawa Senators fan. Colonel Blue is married and the couple have two sons. ## S.2 Episode 25: Vice Admiral Angus Topshee on Canada’s Global Deployment URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-25-vice-admiral-angus-topshee-on-canadas-global-deployment/ Modified: 2023-08-22 > Today's feature interview, Steve interviews Vice Admiral Angus Topshee. The Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy answers questions... In the twenty fifth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Anessa L. Kimball, author of the new book, Beyond 2% – NATO partners, institutions & burden management: Concepts, risks & models. Steve & Anessa discuss the recent NATO summit in Vilinius: membership, arctic, expectations and Ukraine. Today's feature interview, Steve interviews Vice Admiral Angus Topshee. The Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy answers questions about personnel shortages, Canadian arctic security, human security as the heart of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the role of leadership in culture change. ## S.2 Episode 26: Transforming Military Cultures URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-26-transforming-military-cultures/ Modified: 2023-09-25 > For our feature interview Steve asks Nancy Taber, Tammy George & Maya Eichler about their experience setting up a MINDS network focused on... In the 26th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss rumors and personalities in the Defence & Public Safety cabinet shuffles; ongoing coup in Niger and civil disobedience in Israel in response to justice reforms. For our feature interview Steve asks Nancy Taber, Tammy George & Maya Eichler about their experience setting up a MINDS network focused on Transforming Military Cultures. Transforming Military Cultures is a network of Canadian and international academic researchers, defence scientists, military members, veterans, and people with relevant lived experience who are collaborating to challenge, reimagine, and transform the Canadian Armed Forces culture into one that embraces inclusivity and difference. The Network employs an anti-oppression framework in drawing on diverse critical perspectives and international lessons learned. Our activities aim to determine the root causes of the problematic military culture and provide practical insights to help transform Canadian Armed Forces culture into one that serves the future needs of Canada and Canadians. ## S.2 Episode 3: America’s Great-Power Opportunity URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-3-americas-great-power-opportunity/ Modified: 2022-08-10 > For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with @Ali Wyne, senior analyst with @Eurasia Group's Global Macro-Geopolitics practice... In the third episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss state secrets and SCIFs vis a vis Mar-a-Lago; Canada’s rising hate crime problem, and the US-Russia prisoner exchange. For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with @Ali Wyne, senior analyst with @Eurasia Group's Global Macro-Geopolitics practice about his new book "America's Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition" (Polity, 2022) ## S.2 Episode 4: Excellence Scholars URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-4-excellence-scholars/ Modified: 2022-09-06 > For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with CDSN’s 2022 Undergraduate Excellence scholars, Safia Hafid and Alex Rizkallah about their... In the fourth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN. Steve & Linna discuss the CDSN Summer Institute highlights, Veterans Affairs MAiD recommendation and the CBSA discrimination survey. For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with CDSN’s 2022 Undergraduate Excellence scholars, Safia Hafid and Alex Rizkallah about their MINDS funded projects. ## S.2 Episode 5: The Prisoners Dilemma URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-5-the-prisoners-dilemma/ Modified: 2022-09-15 > In the fifth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. In the fifth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss the mass casualty tragedy in Saskatchewan, harassment of Minister Freeland and the rise of political hate with comments on government intelligence gathering tools along with Artic Security. Steve speaks with Dani Gilbert about her article in this month’s Foreign Affairs journal, “The Prisoners Dilemma”. ## S.2 Episode 6: MINDS URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-episode-6-minds/ Modified: 2022-09-28 > Steve & Anessa discuss developments in the war in Ukraine, Germany’s obligation to meet NATO’s 2% spending target and North Korea's New Law.. In the sixth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Anessa Kimball (They/Them), Full professor at Laval University, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Anessa discuss developments in the war in Ukraine, Germany’s obligation to meet NATO’s 2% spending target and North Korea's New Law on Preemptive Use of Nuclear Weapons. For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with Ehren Edwards, Manager of the MINDS program. They talk about the vision, goals and grant fundings of the Program. ## S.2 Episode 7: Operation UNIFIER URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-7-operation-unifier/ Modified: 2022-10-07 In the seventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss the implications of the Nord Stream pipeline burst, Russian strategy in Ukraine, domestic emergency operations during Hurricane Fiona and protests in Iran. Steve speaks with LCol Gilbert about Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) mission in support of Ukraine's security forces. ## S.2 Episode 8: Researching the Middle East URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-episode-8-researching-the-middle-east/ Modified: 2022-10-25 > Today’s feature interview is with Giancarlo Franco, PhD student at Universite Laval, he speaks with Anessa about his research on the wars... In the eighth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss the Emergencies Act Inquiry, Russian targeting of energy & water infrastructure with remote weapons systems and the use of propaganda from both sides as well as the Chief of Defence Staff’s plea to the public to help with capacity building. Today’s feature interview is with Gianmarco Fontana, PhD student at Universite Laval, he speaks with Anessa about his research on the wars in the Middle East, including Iran. ## S.2 Episode 9: Leading By Example URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-2-episode-9-leading-by-example/ Modified: 2022-11-02 > This week’s Feature Interview is from the archives, revisiting a November 2020 episode with Major-General Lise Bourgon who is now Acting... In the ninth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN. Steve & Linna discuss the CDSN mid-term Conference, her research on mentorship presented at CDSN partner CIMVHR’s annual Forum; Doug Ford testifies before the Public Order Emergency Commission, rumors of a potential new Haiti Mission for Canada. This week’s Feature Interview is from the archives, revisiting a November 2020 episode with Major-General Lise Bourgon who is now Acting Commander Military Personnel Command, Canadian Armed Force Women, as well as Peace and Security Champion. ## S.3 Ep.23: Civil Wars URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s-3-ep-23-civil-wars/ Modified: 2024-12-13 > Today's feature interview is with Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security researchers Dr. Catherine Baillie Abidi and Dr. Dustin In episode 23 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve discuss the Halifax Security Forum debate about women in combat roles, Trump, Trudeau, Tariffs and US asylum seekers along with martial law in South Korea. Today's feature interview is with Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security researchers Dr. Catherine Baillie Abidi and Dr. Dustin Johnson on their recent volume of Civil Wars, Volume 26, Issue 3 (2024): www.tandfonline.com/toc/fciv20/26/3 Dr. Catherine Baillie Abidi is a scholarly practitioner in the Department of Child and Youth Study at Mount Saint Vincent University and has specialized in children and armed conflict for over two decades. She has worked in collaboration with dozens of Defence Forces and with international organizations such as the United Nations, Red Cross, and the International Labour Organization. She has over twenty publications in the field of peace and security and was the editor of Allons-y: Journal of Children, Peace and Security for five years. Dr. Baillie Abidi was awarded a Queen Diamond Jubilee Medal from the Governor General of Canada for her work in children, peace and security. At Mount Saint Vincent, she is leading research focused on conflict-related early warning, moral injury, and children and youth as agents of peace. Dr. Baillie Abidi is also the Co-Director of the Children, Peace and Security International Network, an active and collaborative group of international scholars, committed to researching inter-disciplinary, community-based, inclusive, and prevention-oriented approaches for protecting children and preventing their use in violence. Dr. Dustin Johnson is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, and he is based within the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security at the Canadian Defence Academy, where he researches child protection and gender dynamics in armed conflict and peacekeeping with a focus on Ukraine. He holds a PhD in peace and development studies from the School of Global Studies at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, and has previously published in journals such as International Peacekeeping, Civil Wars, and Global Responsibility to Protect. ## S2 Ep. 10: Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-10-canadian-forces-intelligence-command-cfintcom/ Modified: 2022-11-18 > For our Feature interview, Steve speaks with Major-General(MGen)Michael Wright, Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command... In the 10th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D. discuss messaging faux pas at the Vimy Gala, missile scare in Poland and COP27. For our Feature interview, Steve speaks with Major-General(MGen)Michael Wright, Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command and Chief of Defence Intelligence. ## S2 Ep. 27: Servicewomen’s Salute URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-27-servicewomens-salute/ Modified: 2023-09-25 In the twenty-seventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto. Steve & Linna discuss the just ended Summer Institute, the Canadian Armed Forces changing housing benefits for troops, a Survey about the Canadian public’s perception of the military, the current challenges the CAF faces due to Domestic and Emergency Operations given the increasing wildfires and Climate change events over the Summer especially the evacuation of Kelowna and Yellowknife. For our Feature Interview, Linna speaks with Rosemary Park, the founder of Servicewomen's Salute, which promotes and celebrates women's contributions to the Canadian Military. The CDSN is one of the partners helping with the upcoming Aspire & Inspire workshop series and Gala dinner organized by Servicewomen's Salute in October. ## S2 Ep. 28 – Training Exercises URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-28-training-exercises/ Modified: 2023-09-25 > For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Thomas Hughes a former postdoc for the CDSN. Thomas is currently a McKenna Postdoctoral Fellow.. In the twenty-eighth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at University of Calgary. Steve & Erin discuss the public inquiry into foreign election interference and its new commissioner Quebec Court of Appeal Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s trip to Asia for the ASEAN summit, India among the top sources of foreign interference in Canada, the break down of Trudeau’s plane in India, and China raising concerns about New Cold War. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Thomas Hughes a former postdoc for the CDSN. Thomas is currently a McKenna Postdoctoral Fellow at Mount Allison University. ## S2 Ep. 29 – Security vs. Populism URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-29-security-vs-populism/ Modified: 2023-09-27 > Steve & Artur discuss Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s revelation of intelligence that the government of India was involved in the murder... In the twenty-ninth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa. Steve & Artur discuss Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s revelation of intelligence that the government of India was involved in the murder of a prominent British Columbia Sikh leader, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, on Canadian soil and the risk of diaspora protestations being perceived as threats by home governments. The lack of vetting, which led House Speaker Anthony Rota to invite and recognize a man who fought for a Nazi unit in the Second World War during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's visit to Parliament, the diplomatic and international embarrassment as well as Russia using this incident as propaganda to justify the war in Ukraine. The final discussion focused on the weaponization of parental rights in anti-trans protests and far right involvement, which has the potential to turn violent, and its implications for security in Canada. ## S2 Ep. 30 – Resilience podcast Meaghan Wilkin and Lobna Cherif URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-30-resilience-podcast-meaghan-wilkin-and-lobna-cherif/ Modified: 2023-10-20 > For our feature interview, Steve speaks with Professors Meaghan Wilkin and Lobna Cherif (Department of Military Psychology and Leadership.. In the thirtieth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Associate Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss Anessa’s research at the NATO Centers for Excellence in Europe, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the potential cut in the defense budget, Low artillery supplies and Europe’s perception of Canada’s NATO 2% commitment. For our feature interview, Steve speaks with Professors Meaghan Wilkin and Lobna Cherif (Department of Military Psychology and Leadership Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston) about the Resilience Plus podcast that is a new addition to the CDSN Podcast Network. The Resilience podcast provides resources on responding to trauma, empowering individuals to maximize their productivity and effectiveness in pursuing personal and professional goals. ## S2 Ep. 34: Learning Lessons at the Year Ahead with Lama Mourad URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-34-learning-lessons-at-the-year-ahead-with-lama-mourad/ Modified: 2024-01-08 > Our feature interview is with Lama Mourad, who will be joining us as a panel moderator for the Year Ahead on Dec 7th. In the thirty-fourth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss the infamous legacy of Henry Kissinger, F-35 procurement and interoperability and new allegations of a toxic workplace at CSIS. Our feature interview is with Lama Mourad, who will be joining us as a panel moderator for the Year Ahead on Dec 7th. Lama is an assistant professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. Her research focuses on the intersection of forced migration, local governance, and the politics of borders, with a regional focus on the Middle East. ## S2 Ep.31: Open by Default Project URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-31-open-by-default-project/ Modified: 2023-10-27 > For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Matt Malone, Assistant Professor at Thompson Rivers University... In the thirty-first episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto. Steve and Linna discuss her presentation on how men exposed to sexual trauma in the military access support services for that trauma at CIMVHR, the Meeting of MINDS event organized by the CDSN for the nine networks and ADM Policy, the Ombudsman criticizing Ottawa for not supporting military advisers and CSIS chief raises concerns about China's interest in Canadian universities. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Matt Malone, Assistant Professor at Thompson Rivers University, and he researches the laws that protect secret information, especially trade secrecy, confidential information, access to information, privacy, data protection, and cybersecurity. They discuss Matt’s recent project, the Open by Default Project. ## S2 Ep.32: Battle Rhythm x Conseils de sécurité: Visiting Defence Fellow Colonel MC Harvey URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-33/ Modified: 2023-11-23 > Today's feature interview is in French with Conseils de sécurité hosts Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé & Artur Wilczynski interviewing this... In the thirty-third episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss an increase in hate crimes across Canada, the war in Israel/Gaza & sexual misconduct in Latvia. Today's feature interview is in French with Conseils de sécurité hosts Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé & Artur Wilczynski interviewing this year's NPSIA/CDSN Visiting Defence Fellow Colonel Marie Christine Harvey. Colonel Harvey tells us about her career path, the challenges of the positions she has held, notably as an instructor and in command of domestic and international operations. She debunks myths about the military and explains how the Canadian Armed Forces differ from other armies. ## S2 Ep.33: Throwback -> 2019 Peace with Women Fellows URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-ep-33-throwback-2019-peace-with-women-fellows/ Modified: 2023-11-23 > Our guests are the 2019 Peace with Women Fellows who discuss a wide variety of issues from leadership and learning to recruitment and... In the thirty-third episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto. Steve and Linna discuss CAF members access to benefits, the repercussion of burn pits and supressing lessons learned from Afghanistan. Our guests are the 2019 Peace with Women Fellows who discuss a wide variety of issues from leadership and learning to recruitment and retention. Fellows in order of appearance: 23:20: BG Lisa Ferris, NZ Defence Legal Services & Paz Magat, Director, Peace With Women Fellowship 29:10: Colonel Tracey Onufer, USAF, CoS SOF South & Commodore Solveig Krey, Norweigan Navy, Dep ACOS Ops 34:00: Colonel Debra Lovette, USAF, Human capital, Joint Force Space & Air Commodore Elanor Boekholt-o’Sullivan, Netherlands, Cyber Defence 38:20: LtColonel Joana Polekauskiene, Lithuania, instructor mil academy & Colonel Lysane Martel, RCAF professional development 42:30: Colonel Dr. Lale Baroschek, Germany, Recruitment & Colonel Solene le Floch, French Air Force, Human Resource manager 48:00: Captain Rachel Durbin, Australia, Navy, Future Force & Captain Fiona Shepherd, RN, ACOS Logistics, Operations and Plans ## S2 Episode 23: From Battalion to Brigade URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s2-episode-23-from-battalion-to-brigade/ Modified: 2023-06-27 > Dr Linna Tam-Seto talked with Dr. Alexandra Heber about her work on a glossary titled: “Glossary of Terms: A shared understanding of the... In the twenty third episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with special co-host, Justin Massie, Full Professor of political science at the Université du Québec à Montréal, Associate Director of the Strategic Analysis Network, and Co-director of Le Rubicon; Steve & Justin record from Riga, Latvia where they provide highlights from their Stakeholder Visit to Task Force Latvia. For our Feature Interview, Co-host Dr Linna Tam-Seto (She/Her) talked with Dr. Alexandra Heber (She/Her) about her work on a glossary titled: “Glossary of Terms: A shared understanding of the common terms used to describe psychological trauma.” Dr. Heber explained the importance of the project as a shared language around Post traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is essential and she hopes that the upcoming version will serve as a source of information and a communication tool that facilitates discussions around mental health concerns within the Defence and Security community. ## S3 Ep 1: Inside the Strategic Joint Staff URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-1-inside-the-strategic-joint-staff/ Modified: 2024-01-17 > Today's feature interview is with Brigadier-General Errington, Strategic Joint Staff Director General Plans. In the first episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss Sweden in Latvia, CAF sexual misconduct reporting increases for men and General Eyre's retirement announcement. Today's feature interview is with Brigadier-General Errington, Strategic Joint Staff Director General Plans. Brigadier-General Errington’s command experience includes two years as a Rifle Platoon Commander in 2 PPCLI followed by a year as Recce Platoon Commander. He commanded an Airborne Platoon in both the Canadian Airborne Regiments (CAR) and the PPCLI Parachute Company, before commanding Anti-Armour Platoon. As a Major, he enjoyed two years as Officer Commanding A Company (para) in 3 PPCLI, then another two years in the Operations Squadron at Dwyer Hill Training Centre (DHTC). Following his promotion to LCol, he was appointed as the Special Operations Task Force Commander in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2010–2011, earning the Meritorious Service Medal. He assumed command of 3 PPCLI in June of 2012, and held the appointment until after the Regiment’s 100th Anniversary Ottawa Commemoration in September 2014. As a Colonel, he commanded the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown from July 2017–July 2019 when he was promoted to BGen. Brigadier-General Errington is very proud and humbled to have had the opportunity to command twice at the platoon, company, and unit levels in various Light, Airborne, and Special Force units. Brigadier-General Errington held a variety of staff jobs within the Battalion. However, he has predominantly been employed in current operations from the rank of Capt to BGen (Brigade G3 Operations (Ops), J35 in Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, DHTC Ops O/COS, CA G33, Director current Ops at Strategic Joint Staff and Chief of Staff Ops for the CA). Brigadier-General Errington’s operational experience includes overseas deployments to Croatia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. His domestic operations have included those deployed to floods in Winnipeg and Medicine Hat; forest fires in British Columbia; and providing security for the G8 Summit in Kananaskis and the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010. Brigadier-General Errington has had some unique honours throughout his career, serving in the Queen’s Guard at Buckingham Palace in 1998, leading the Canadian parachute contingent to Normandy, France, in honour of the 70th Anniversary of D-Day, and commanding 3 PPCLI during the 100th Anniversary Commemoration. He has also held the appointment of Director of the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps from February 2016 to July 2019. Brigadier-General Errington was appointed Strategic Joint Staff Director General Plans in July 2022. ## S3 Ep. 10 – Domestic Politics and International Relations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-10-domestic-politics-and-international-relations/ Modified: 2024-06-10 > In the tenth episode of Battle Rhythm, season 3 – Steve and Wendy discuss ICC warrants, Canada’s decision to abstain from recognizing... In the tenth episode of Battle Rhythm, season 3 – Steve and Wendy discuss ICC warrants, Canada’s decision to abstain from recognizing Palestine in the UNSC and CSIS’s TikTok spying warning. This week, Wendy interviews Abe Newman about his new co-authored book, Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy. Professor Newman received his BA in International Relations from Stanford University and his PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He is a professor in the School of Foreign Service and Government Departments at Georgetown University. His research focuses on the ways in which economic interdependence and globalization have transformed international politics. He is the co-author of Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy (Holt/Penguin 2023); Of Privacy and Power: the Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and Security (Princeton University Press 2019), co-author of Voluntary Disruptions: International Soft Law, Finance, and Power (Oxford University Press: 2018), author of Protectors of Privacy: Regulating Personal Data in the Global Economy (Cornell University Press: 2008) and co-editor of How Revolutionary was the Digital Revolution: National Responses, Market Transitions, and Global Technologies (Stanford University Press: 2006). His work has appeared in a range of journals including Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, International Security, Nature, Science, and World Politics. ## S3 Ep. 11: Interference URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-11-interference/ Modified: 2024-07-05 > For today's feature interview, Thomas Hughes interviews Rob Clark about foreign interference in the UK and what it means to him along... In the eleventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss the Canadian business community push to reach the NATO 2% target, US security agreement with Ukraine and foreign election interference. For today's feature interview, Thomas Hughes interviews Rob Clark about foreign interference in the UK and what it means to him along with the debate around the practicalities of mandatory military service inclusion in the UK’s upcoming election. Robert Clark is Policy Director at Curia UK, Fellow at Yorktown Institute, Washington DC and director of defence and security at Civitas. Prior to this he served in the British Army for fifteen years, including deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. ## S3 Ep. 12: Authoritarian Military Careers URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-12-authoritarian-military-careers/ Modified: 2024-07-05 > Steve speaks with Christian Gläßel, principal investigator of the research project “The Anatomy of the Authoritarian Security Apparatus”... In episode 12 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University, discuss Thomas's trip to Nunavut and the civilian - military relationship implications for Canada's newest Chief of Defence Staff (and former Battle Rhythm guest), Lt. Gen Jennie Carignan. In today's feature interview, Steve speaks with Christian Gläßel, a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for International Security and principal investigator of the research project “The Anatomy of the Authoritarian Security Apparatus” (AASAP), funded by the German Research Foundation DFG. Christian obtained his PhD from the Mannheim Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences in 2020. His PhD on subversion, repression, and regime stability was awarded the Lorenz von Stein Prize. Before joining the Hertie School, Christian was a lecturer at the University of Mannheim and researcher in the ERC project "Repression and the Escalation of Violence" and the Collaborative Research Center "Political Economy of Reforms". In 2022, he substituted Nils-Christian Bormann as Professor of International Political Studies at Witten/Herdecke University. In his research, Christian investigates fundamental questions of authoritarian politics and touches new grounds on the inner workings of dictatorial regimes. His findings help us understand when autocracies develop, how they cement their rule, and why they break down. Christian’s work on autocratization processes, repressive organizations, information manipulation, and the death toll behind authoritarian soft power and sportswashing strategies has been published in all leading international political science outlets, including in the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, European Journal of International Relations, and Comparative Political Studies, among others. ## S3 Ep. 18: Military Ethics Education and Application URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-18-military-ethics-education-and-application/ Modified: 2024-09-27 > Today’s feature interview is with David Whetham, Professor of Ethics and the Military Profession in the Defence Studies Department of... In episode 18 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve testifies at the Parliamentary Defence Committee, discussion ensues. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University and Steve also discuss the submarine procurement announcement, security clearances for provincial and territorial leaders and newly released intelligence priorities from the federal agencies. Today’s feature interview is with David Whetham, Professor of Ethics and the Military Profession in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London. David Whetham is the Director of the King’s Centre for Military Ethics and delivers or coordinates the military ethics component of courses for between two and three thousand British and international officers a year at the UK’s Joint Services Command and Staff College. Before joining King’s as a permanent member of staff in 2003, David worked as a BBC researcher and with the OSCE in Kosovo, supporting the 2001 and 2002 elections. David supports military ethics education in many different countries and has held Visiting Fellowships at the Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership, US Naval Academy Annapolis, the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics at the Australian Defence College in Canberra and at the University of Glasgow. He was a Mid-Career Fellow at the British Academy in 2017-18 and is currently a Visiting Professorial Fellow at the University of New South Wales. He was appointed as the Jeffrey Grey Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence College in 2023. David is a founding member of the European Chapter of the International Society for Military Ethics (Euro ISME) which holds an annual conference for military practitioners, academics and defence policy-makers.In 2020, David was appointed as an Assistant Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force to contribute to the Afghanistan Inquiry into allegations of war crimes committed by Special Forces personnel. His contribution was published as an annex to the Brereton Report in November 2020, with all of the recommendations being accepted by the Chief of the General Staff and Prime Minister. He currently sits on the UK Defence Medical Services Ethics Committee, the UK MoD AI Ethics Panel, the 77X Ethics Advisory Panel, and the Australian Defence Force's International Standing Panel of Experts in Ethics. David is married with two children, and sits as a Magistrate on the Wiltshire Bench. In his spare time, he plays trombone with the 41º Big Band and enjoys epée fencing. ## S3 Ep. 2: When Rambo Meets the Red Cross URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-2-when-rambo-meets-the-red-cross/ Modified: 2024-02-09 > In our feature interview, Steve stays on the topic of civ-mil relations when he interviews Stanislava Mladenova about her dissertation... In the second episode of our third season, hosts Steve & Artur discuss implications for Trump's win in New Hampshire Primary, the federal ruling on inappropriate use of the Emergency Act in Ottawa and domestic political pressure to increase the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Disaster Response requires culture change and more money for CAF personnel; plus Steve and Arthur set the bar for civil discourse when discussing Israel, the ICJ and Canada's role. In our feature interview, Steve stays on the topic of civ-mil relations when he interviews Stanislava Mladenova about her dissertation turned book about the working relationships between America Special Operations Forces and International Non-Governmental Organizations in fragile states. Stanislava is a Global Fellow at Brown University’s Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies. She recently completed her doctoral research at King’s College London, Department of War Studies, where she explored the functional relationship between SOF Civil Affairs Units, NGOs, and populations, in settings affected by low-intensity conflict and state fragility. Stanislava’s operational experience includes assignments in Afghanistan, where she served as a Political Adviser to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative on economic issues, governance, corruption, disaster management, gender, humanitarian assistance, and the recruitment of child soldiers. At the US Institute of Peace, she implemented programs that established dialogue and cooperation between the police forces, gendarmerie, and local communities in six West African countries. She holds a Master’s of Public Administration from the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs at the University at Albany, New York. ## S3 Ep. 25: Canada’s National Quantum Strategy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-25-canadas-national-quantum-strategy/ Modified: 2025-01-13 > Artur and Steve Saideman discuss PM Trudeau’s surprise announcement, the looming threat of US- Canada border security and tech billionaires In episode 25 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss PM Trudeau’s surprise announcement, the looming threat of US- Canada border security and tech billionaires influence on policymaking. For today's feature interview, co-host Wendy Wong interviews a trio of Canada's Quantum experts: Kristen Csenkey, Ph.D., is a Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) Digital Policy Hub fellow. She is the Principal Investigator of multiple Department of National Defence-funded projects. Benjamin T. Johnson, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor at the University of Groningen, Netherlands, with the Department of International Relations and International Organization (IRIO). He is also a visiting Fulbright scholar at the University of Washington in Seattle, having received a Fulbright-NATO Security Studies Award for fall 2024. Greg Dick is a Co-founder and the Chief Executive Officer of Open Quantum Design. Prior to founding OQD he was a longtime senior executive at Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics. He also founded RESILIENT, an agency dedicated to helping organizations purpose build for resilience against unexpected change. doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2024.2397970 ## S3 Ep. 27 – Bridging the Gap with Visiting Defence Fellows URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-27-bridging-the-gap-with-visiting-defence-fellows/ Modified: 2025-02-07 In episode 27 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve discuss Danish defence concerns; the success of PM Trudeau’s trade war speech; the future of NATO and Defence Minister Blair’s goal of reaching 2% by 2027; plus Canadian Armed Forces changes to recruitment criteria. Today's feature interview is a fireside chat on a culture of cooperation with four Visiting Defence Fellows, hosted by producer Melissa Jennings: Col Nick Roby: VDF Carleton, 2024/2025 Gen MC Harvey: VDF Carleton. 2023/2024 Col Cathy Blue: VDF Carleton 2022/2023 Col Mike Babin: VDF Queen’s 2023/2024 ## S3 Ep. 28: Canada First, Not Canada Alone URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-28-canada-first-not-canada-alone/ Modified: 2025-02-20 > Today's feature interview Steve talks with Dr. Adam Chapnick, Professor of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and the... In episode 28 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University discuss JD Vance’s speech and subsequent reactions at the Munich Security Conference, NATO on life support, Conservative Party’s plan for a military base in Iqaluit, and a brief intro to the works of author Alistair MacLean. Today's feature interview Steve talks with Dr. Adam Chapnick, Professor of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). He is the award-winning author of Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage, among other titles, and a former editor of International Journal. ## S3 Ep. 29: After Action Report: Ukrainian Foreign Legion URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-29-after-action-report-ukrainian-foreign-legion/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Today's Feature Interview is with Major Dave Smith (retired). Dave Smith served 15 years in the Canadian Armed Forces as an infantry officer.. In episode 29 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur shares his professional opinion on the shocking exchange and fallout between two allies in the Oval Office last week as Steve looks for the silver linings. Steve and Artur also discuss France opening its nuclear umbrella and Canada’s future with the Five Eyes. Today's Feature Interview is with Major Dave Smith (retired). Dave Smith served 15 years in the Canadian Armed Forces as an infantry officer. He resigned in 2023 to join the International Legion for the Defence of Ukraine. He fought against the Russian invasion for eighteen months. ## S3 Ep. 4: A View From Finland & Germany on Defence Strategy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-4-a-view-from-finland-germany-on-defence-strategy/ Modified: 2024-03-04 > Minna Ålander’s research focuses on NATO, security in Northern Europe, Nordic defence cooperation, Arctic security, as well as... In the fourth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, Steve is joined by our new co-host and former CDSN postdoc, Dr. Thomas Hughes. Steve & Thomas discuss the motivations and implications behind a new allowance for Permanent Residents to join the Canadian Armed Forces, Hungary votes Sweden into being a NATO member & Canadian based company starts supplying drones to Ukraine. Today's feature interview is with Minna Ålander. Minna Ålander’s research focuses on NATO, security in Northern Europe, Nordic defence cooperation, Arctic security, as well as German and Finnish security and defence policy. Previously, Ålander worked at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. She holds a joint master’s degree in international relations from the Free University of Berlin, the Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Potsdam. Since August 2023, Ålander is a Non-resident Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). ## S3 Ep. 9: The Hidden Costs of War URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-9-the-hidden-costs-of-war/ Modified: 2024-05-10 > This week Steve interviews Dr. Tanisha Fazal about her new book, Military Medicine and the Hidden Costs of War. In episode 3.9 co-hosts Steve and Artur discuss the Election Interference Commission of Inquiry and legislation along with Gaza protests on university campuses and a call for empathy. This week Steve interviews Dr. Tanisha Fazal about her new book, Military Medicine and the Hidden Costs of War. Tanisha Fazal is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. Her scholarship focuses on sovereignty, international law, and armed conflict. Fazal’s current research analyzes the effect of improvements in medical care in conflict zones on the long-term costs of war. She is the author of State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton University Press, 2007), which won the Best Book Award of the American Political Science Association’s Conflict Processes Section, and Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict (Cornell University Press), which won the Best Book Award of the International Studies Association's International Law Section and the American Political Science Association's International Collaboration Section. Her work has also appeared in journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, Daedalus, Foreign Affairs, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Review, International Studies Quarterly, and Security Studies. A frequent commentator on international relations and foreign affairs, she has been a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. In 2002 she was awarded the Helen Dwight Reid Award of the American Political Science Association. From 2021-2023, she is an Andrew Carnegie Fellow. ## S3 Ep.13 – The venn diagram of policy, experience and research URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-13-the-venn-diagram-of-policy-experience-and-research/ Modified: 2024-07-29 In episode 13 of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve and Wendy (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) discuss Kamala Harris as the new Democratic presidential nominee and the implications for US foreign policy; Chief of Defence Staff Change of Command Ceremony; the CrowdStrike outage as well as Korean laser drones. Today's feature interview is with this year's CDSN postdoc, Manaswini Ramkumar. She is completing her PhD in International Relations at the School of International Service, American University in Washington DC, where she examines civil-military relations in the context of democratic erosion. She also studies postcolonial statebuilding, subnational democracy, and authoritarian resistance. Her work has been funded by American University, The Association for Documentary Editing and the American Political Science Association. She received her MPhil in IR from American University and MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore where she previously worked as an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Studies program and was a lecturer in Professional Military Education to the Singapore Armed Forces. ## S3 Ep.14: Leadership in times of crisis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-14-leadership-in-times-of-crisis/ Modified: 2024-08-14 > In episode 14 of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve asks Artur what’s going on with CSIS and the new Interim Director... In episode 14 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa, Steve asks Artur what’s going on with CSIS and the new Interim Director, they discuss sabotage at the Olympics in Paris and Canadian disaster response coordination in the wake of the devastating Jasper fire. This episode’s featured interview is a throwback to Episode 2 of Battle Rhythm from July 10, 2019, Co-Director Stéfanie von Hlatky interviews (then) Brig.-Gen. Jennie Carignan who talks about leadership and affecting change in the military. General Jennie Carignan, Chief of the Defence Staff, has had a distinguished career since commissioning into the Canadian Military Engineers in 1990. She commanded two Combat Engineer Regiments, Royal Military College Saint-Jean, and the 2nd Canadian Division. She participated in multiple international and domestic deployments, led NATO Mission Iraq and most recently held the position of Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture. General Carignan holds two master's degrees and has received several honours, including the Commander of the Order of Military Merit and an honorary doctorate. She was promoted to her current rank in July 2024. ## S3 Ep.15: Medium Risk, Medium Reward URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-15-medium-risk-medium-reward/ Modified: 2024-08-14 > Steve and co-host Thomas Hughes, discuss the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the arctic, Canadians intercepting Chinese naval... In episode 15 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University, discuss the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the arctic, Canadians intercepting Chinese naval ships sailing through Arctic international waters along with far-right riots in the UK and with a final twist, Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory. Today's feature interview is with our new Visiting Defence Fellow, Col Nick Roby. Colonel Nickolas Roby joined the Canadian Armed Forces Primary Reserves in the rank of Gunner in 1997, and was commissioned into The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery in 2002. He has since commanded at the Troop, Battery, Rifle Company, as the Commandant of The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery School, and more recently, was the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (2022-2024). Serving in a variety of key staff assignments in Ottawa, Colonel Roby served as the Canadian Army analyst at Chief of Program, Executive Assistant to Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, as the coordinator to Deputy Chief-of-Staff Operations at the Canadian Army Headquarters, and as the Senior Military Assistant to the Minister of National Defence. Colonel Roby was employed as the Director of Army Personnel Management (G1) at the Canadian Army HQ from 2020 to 2022. Operationally, Colonel Roby deployed to Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force as the Deputy Commander of Brigade Troops, and Operations Officer of Combined Team Kandahar City Brigade HQ in 2009-10. In support of the United Nations, he deployed twice with the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) in 2013 and 2016. Colonel Roby is a graduate of the Joint Command and Staff Program at the Canadian Armed Forces College, Toronto. He holds a Baccalaureate in Arts from St. Thomas University, and a Master’s Degree in Defence Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. Colonel Roby is married to Jessica, and they lead an active lifestyle racing from one sporting activity to another with their four young children: Chloé, Maëva, Félix, and Kallee. ## S3 Ep.16 – Pride and Politics URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-16-pride-and-politics/ Modified: 2024-08-29 > Steve and Wendy discuss the National Security Transparency Advisory Group’s recommendations on AI, the controversy over the new Army logo... In our sixteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, season 3 Steve and Wendy (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) discuss the National Security Transparency Advisory Group’s recommendations on AI, the controversy over the new Army logo and the US Presidential candidate’s use of pop culture. Today's feature interview is with Ottawa based freelance journalist, Dale Smith. Dale Smith is a freelance journalist in the Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery, writing about politics full-time since the 2008 federal election. He has written for the Ottawa Citizen, the National Post, Maclean’s, Canadian Business, the Canadian Press, iPolitics.ca, and the Hill Times. Dale lives in Ottawa. ## S3 Ep.17: Change Agent, Soldier-Scholar Dr. Alan Okros URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-17-change-agent-soldier-scholar-dr-alan-okros/ Modified: 2024-09-27 > Today’s feature interview is with Dr. Alan Okros, a full professor at the Royal Military College Department of Defence Studies and... In episode 17 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss the US Justice Department indictment of Russian funded media in North America (including Tenet Media in Canada), immigration backlash and hate crimes increase along with the UN campaign to provide Polio vaccines to children in Gaza. Today’s feature interview is with Dr. Alan Okros, a full professor at the Royal Military College Department of Defence Studies and has been supporting Chief Professional Conduct and Culture initiatives. He is also a co-director of the CDSN. Dr. Alan Okros holds a PhD in Industrial and Organizational Psychology from the University of Waterloo. He was appointed Associate Professor in the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership at the Royal Military College of Canada in 2004 and appointed as Full Professor to the Department of Defence Studies at CFC in 2008. In 2019, he assumed responsibilities as Deputy Director Research in the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security within the Canadian Defence Academy. ## S3 Ep.19: Conventional War & Means of Control URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-19-conventional-war-means-of-control/ Modified: 2024-10-15 > The Feature interview is with Byron Tau, an investigative and enterprise journalist who specializes in law, courts, and national security. In episode 19 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve has an agreeable discussion with David Pugliese on Canadaland’s Backbench podcast. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University and Steve discuss conventional war readiness, along with analysis of the Military’s domestic propaganda story and potential implications. Today's Feature interview is with Byron Tau. Byron Tau is an investigative and enterprise journalist who specializes in law, courts, and national security. He reports for and teaches at the Allbritton Journalism Institute, a journalism nonprofit launched in 2023 that trains and mentors early-career reporters. He previously worked at The Wall Street Journal and Politico. A native of Holliston, Massachusetts, Tau has degrees from McGill University in Montreal and Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. ## S3 Ep.20 – Development – Security Nexus URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-20-development-security-nexus/ Modified: 2024-10-29 > Steve travels to Pennsylvania, discussion on campaign spending ensues. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University.. In episode 20 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve travels to Pennsylvania, discussion on campaign spending ensues. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University and Steve also discuss New Brunswick's recent election, Canada-India relations, North Korean - Russian military cooperation and the escalation risk of US troops in Israel. Today's feature interview is with Rhonda Gossen, a former diplomat with Global Affairs Canada. The Year Ahead Event: www.cdsn-rcds.com/network-events/s…s-foreign-policy Rhonda Gossen is a former diplomat with Global Affairs Canada, assigned to Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Ghana. She is currently a senior consultant with UNDP, working on early recovery, forced displacement and refugee response, resilience, stabilization, development solutions to internal displacement and strategic planning. She worked as development advisor to the humanitarian coordinator for the Rohingya Crisis in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh and to UNHCR Lebanon on the Syrian refugee crisis. In addition to UNDP, she has undertaken assignments with the World Bank, UNICEF, UNHCR, in Pakistan, Lebanon, Nepal, Nigeria, South Sudan, Southern Africa, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan Afghanistan, and Iran. She is the author of an upcoming book with McGill-Queens University Press. ## S3 Ep.21: The Cookie Crumbles: US Election and Canadian Security URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-21-the-cookie-crumbles-us-election-and-canadian-security/ Modified: 2024-11-15 > Today’s feature interview is with co-author Stephane Leman-Langlois of “The Great Right North: Inside Far-Right Activism in Canada”... In our twenty-first episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve Saideman and Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) trade baking schedules and recipes before diving into US election campaign strategies, Canada’s 2% defence spending prospects, plus the US and China relationship. Today’s feature interview is with co-author Stephane Leman-Langlois of “The Great Right North: Inside Far-Right Activism in Canada” written by Stéphane Leman-Langlois, Aurélie Campana and Samuel Tanner. Stéphane Leman-Langlois is professor of criminology at Laval University, Québec. He holds the Canada Research Chair on Surveillance and the Social Construction of Risk. He is director of the Terrorism and Counterterrorism Research Group and of the Centre on International Security at Laval University. He is also co-director of the Observatoire sur la radicalisation et l’extrémisme violent (OSR). As a co-investigator of the Big Data Surveillance project, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Stéphane Leman-Langlois is co-leading (with Valerie Steeves) research Stream Three: Governance. This stream will examine the use of big data for policing and other forms of social control. ## S3 Ep.22: NATO Diplomacy with SNMG2 Comdr, Cmdre Matthew Coates URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-22-nato-diplomacy-with-snmg2-comdr-cmdre-matthew-coates/ Modified: 2024-11-26 > In the twenty-second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. In the twenty-second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss upcoming NATO Parliamentary meetings in Montreal, communications espionage in European waters and Canadian implications for Trump’s cabinet picks. Today's feature interview is with Cmdre Matthew Coates. A native of Halifax Nova Scotia, Cmdre Coates is a Naval Warfare Officer in the Royal Canadian Navy. He graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada Kingston, with a degree in Electrical Engineering in 1998, and from Salve Regina University in 2010 with a Masters in Management. Cmdre Coates has held numerous staff and sea-going appointments, deploying multiple times on operations around the globe. Memorable highlights include a 2011 deployment as Executive Officer in HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN in support of NATO operations off the coast of Libya, and his appointment in 2013 as the Commanding Officer of HMCS IROQUOIS, a Tribal Class Destroyer. After his time in IROQUOIS he assumed command of Sea Training Atlantic where he was responsible for at-sea ship readiness and certification training. He is a two-time graduate of the United States Naval War College in Newport Rhode Island where he attended the Naval Staff College (class of 2010) and Naval Command College (class of 2017). In July 2017, he assumed the post of Director Naval Strategy, providing Force Development guidance in support of the future Navy. During this time Cmdre Coates was selected to participate in the RIMPAC 2018 Executive Steering Committee, responsible for planning major aspects of the multi-national exercise. He then deployed with the Chilean Navy as Deputy to the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander for the exercise. In July 2019, he assumed the post of Director Human Rights and Diversity within Chief Military Personnel, working to ensure the Canadian Armed Forces, along with the Defence Team, are an inclusive, equitable and diverse organization. After two rewarding and educational years in CMP, he returned to Navy lines, moving to Victoria BC to take up the appointment as Commander, Naval Personnel and Training Group. Evolving the Naval Training System to be best positioned to meet the needs of the RCN’s future fleet, Cmdre Coates completed three busy years prior to his appointment as Commander Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, during a ceremony 1 July 2024 in Toulon, France. When not at work, Matthew and his wife Meghan, enjoy time camping with their two boys, and cheering them on at the ball park and hockey arena. ## S3 Ep.26: Stealth, Persistence and Lethality: Naval Force Development URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-26-stealth-persistence-and-lethality-naval-force-development/ Modified: 2025-01-28 > ...discuss President Trump’s inauguration, the current media and information landscape, impending Tariffs on Canada, along with thoughts... In our twenty-sixth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve joins Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) in Kelowna to discuss President Trump’s inauguration, the current media and information landscape, impending Tariffs on Canada, along with thoughts on democratic backsliding. Our Feature interview is with Commodore Jason Armstrong, Director General Naval Force Development. Captain (N) Jason Armstrong joined the Canadian Armed Forces as a Maritime Surface and Subsurface Officer in 1989 and graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a Bachelor of Arts Honours History in 1993. Captain (N) Armstrong, upon completion of MARS training has served onboard HMC Ships on both coasts conducting a number of international deployments. He had the honour of commanding three HMC Ships during his command tour and deployed onboard HMCS TORONTO as commanding officer during OP REASSURANCE in 2014-2015. Captain (N) Armstrong has served in staff positions at Maritime Pacific and in Canadian Fleet Atlantic Headquarters. He has served twice in Ottawa, once as the Underwater Warfare requirements officer in the Directorate of Naval Requirements and the second time as the Director of Naval Requirements. Capt(N) Armstrong is a graduate of both the Joint Command and Staff Program and the National Security Program from the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, and he holds a Master’s degree in Defence Studies. Captain (N) Armstrong and his bride Monica have two outstanding young teenagers, Jack and Sara, who excel in the world of academics and athletics. Captain (N) Armstrong enjoys hockey and golf, both sports he plays poorly, cycling and coaching his children. ## S3 Ep.3: Czech Future Force URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-3-czech-future-force/ Modified: 2024-02-23 > Colonel Retired Petr Tichý is the program director at the NATO Future Forces International Exhibition. He is an experienced Sales... In the third episode of our third season, hosts Steve and Linna discuss Trump's threats on the safety of NATO allies, Minister Joly's launch of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and the facts behind the National Summit on Combatting Auto Theft. Colonel Retired Petr Tichý is the program director at the NATO Future Forces International Exhibition. He is an experienced Sales Project Manager with a demonstrated history of working in the electrical and electronic manufacturing industry. Skilled in Crisis Management, Negotiation, Analytical Skills, Government, and Operational Planning. Strong sales professional with a PhD focused in management from Defence University. His other positions include the NATO AGS project manager within Retia company. He worked as an independent researcher at the Population Protection Institute and an academic researcher at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Defence University. Petr Tichý retired from a career in the Czech Airforce with an educational background from the Military Academy (Master Pilot), Kosice, Air Force University (International Studies & Leadership), USAF Air Command and Staff College (Military Science & Operational Studies) and the NATO Defence College ## S3 Ep.30: Pan-Domain and CIMIC Responses URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-30-pan-domain-and-cimic-responses/ Modified: 2025-08-28 > In the 30th episode of Battle Rhythm Steve & Anessa discuss wrapping up the MINDS Network funded research on setting up Canada’s NATO... In the 30th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval. Steve Saideman & Anessa discuss wrapping up the Department of National Defence/Ministère de la défense nationale MINDS Network funded research on setting up Canada’s NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) , the upcoming 16th UNIDEF event CSI Centre sur la sécurité internationale; PM Carney defies convention by choosing Europe for his first international engagement, NATO SG Rutte’s visit to the White House possibly undermining NATO countries to appease Trump, pivoting away from the F35 deal towards diversifying air power, as well as a review of Trump’s reign of terror so far this year including the shutdown of USIP and ignoring court orders including massive deportations and what this means for Canada accepting US refugees. Lcol Philippe-Andre Genest is today's Feature Interview. Holding a Master’s Degree in Technology Management, Philippe-André Genest has more than 20 years of experience as a member, leader, mentor and recruiter, of organizational and specialized teams for national and international projects in civilian, institutional and military contexts. He possesses excellent knowledge of project management, team management and organizational management having been team leader for a consulting-engineering firm and the Ordre des Ingénieurs du Québec as well as a commander and staff-officer in varied military operational context. He has proven leadership as a civilian manager and a military officer. His fields of expertise include liaison and coordination, organizational management, the legal, regulatory and normative framework of the engineer profession, humanitarian aid and international development. Docotral student in Military History at Unviersit. du Québec a Montréal. Member of the Groupe de Recherche en Histoire de la Guerre. Member of Ordre des Ingénieurs du Québec (#128960), he is fluent in French and English and as a basic knowledge of German. ## S3 Ep.31: Challenging Assumptions Through Systems Thinking Approaches URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-31-challenging-assumptions-through-systems-thinking-approaches/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In the 31st episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University discuss Trump’s rhetorical shift on the 51st state threat on a phone call with PM Carney, the fallout from #Signalgate including for allies and does Canada need to follow Denmark’s lead on rallying European allies? Thomas and Philippe explore the power of transformative games to empower leaders in defence and security through the work of the Archipelago of Design in Today's feature interview. As Co-President of the Archipelago of Design, a not for profit, and Professor at Canadian Forces College, Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard’s purpose is to empower leaders in shifting mindsets in national security organizations to better set conditions for evolution and address complex situations. Philippe fulfills this purpose especially by mobilizing a crowdsourcing approach to designing transformative games captured as the "hop-on hop off model". This approach proved successful, resulting in the critical and popular appraisal of Breakthrough, a strategic mystery investigation game taking place in the Canadian Arctic in 2040,  its sequel, Shadows of Byzantium, taking place in Istanbul Turkey in 2040, and Inner Alliance. Just released in 2025 collaboration with Wero Creative, Inner Alliance set conditions for players to adapt to diverse constituencies in disaster relief operations in support of the WPS agenda. Philippe is currently collaborating with the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) to co-design a game to empower the centre and its agenda. Philippe lives in Leslieville, Toronto with his wife, daughter, son, and too many games. ## S3 Ep.32: Terrorism and authoritarian regimes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-32-terrorism-and-authoritarian-regimes/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In episode 32 of season 3 (recorded on voting day), Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss Canada’s federal election and Conservative anti-woke messaging along with how the next government can improve CAF recruitment and retention issues through a focus on healthcare, housing and procurement. Today's Feature Interview is with Michael Collins – Executive Director, The Americas, Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) This year will be the 12th edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last decade. The calculation of the GTI score considers not only deaths but also incidents, hostages and injuries from terrorism, weighted over a five-year period. The report is produced using event records on terrorist attacks since 1 January 2007. The current terrorism dataset contains over 66,000 terrorist incidents for the period 2007 until today. The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years. A country’s annual GTI score is based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. ## S3 Ep.33: NATO Ambassadors and Euro-Atlantic Security URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-33-nato-ambassadors-and-euro-atlantic-security/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In episode 33 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve discuss PM Carney’s new cabinet choices for national security and defence files; David McGuinty as Minister of National Defence, Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree, Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand, and the issues they will face delivering on campaign promises including managing the US relationship, arctic defence, and procurement. Todays feature interview is with Margriet Vonno, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ottawa and Witold Dzielski, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Canada, in advance of our event to discuss NATO and Euro-Atlantic security on May 22nd at Carleton University. ## S3 Ep.34: Lessons Learned from former Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. (ret’d) Wayne Eyre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-34-lessons-learned-from-former-chief-of-defence-staff-gen-retd-wayne-eyre/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In episode 34 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss recruitment challenges for CAF’s new online system, Military Police watchdog holds a public hearing on a tragic suicide related to mishandling a sexual misconduct case, and Trump vs Harvard - what this means for higher education broadly. Steve poses questions to recently retired Gen. Wayne Eyre on lessons learned as Chief of Defence Staff and challenges ahead in defending Canada. ## S3 Ep.35: Evolving Security Strategies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-35-evolving-security-strategies/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In our thirty-fifth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman take a deep dive into the security situation in Los Angeles and the role of the National Guard along with Ukraine strikes on Russia and tech war implications. Today’s feature interview is with Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Eleanor Ross of Valens Games to discuss how simulations can better prepare decision makers in unpredictable situations. For more information on tensions in the US Civil-Military relationship watch out for CDSN in the news, including this: www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opin…vil-war-rcna212215 ## S3 Ep.36: Canada’s Defence Opportunities and Challenges within NATO and NORAD URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-36-canadas-defence-opportunities-and-challenges-within-nato-and-norad/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In the 36th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University discuss the ‘One Big Beautiful Bill’ Act and it's effects on Canadian defence, along with the complications of continental missile defence systems and nuclear deterrence. They also breakdown some of the budgeting allocations for NORAD Modernization and NATO defence commitments, and how PM Carney will have to reconcile both Trump and the Canadian public’s different expectations of behavior. Steve and former co-host extraordinaire, Stéfanie von Hlatky continue this discussion in The Hague during the NATO Summit. For analysis on the Summit from Stéfanie von Hlatky & Gaëlle Rivard Piché can be found here: cdainstitute.ca/nato-agreed-to-5-…-public-on-board/ ## S3 Ep.37: The Past, Present and Future of Canadian Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-37-the-past-present-and-future-of-canadian-defence/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In the 37th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve and Anessa discuss the challenges of teaching US Foreign Policy in the Trump 2.0 Era, Canada’s pledge on increased defence spending, recent CAF recruitment successes and persistent challenges in the midst of a culture change process to modernize the institution with a more inclusive military reflective of a liberal democracy (i.e. no more white supremacists and or extremists generally). ## S3 Ep.38: Cyber Command with Major-General Dave Yarker URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-38-cyber-command-with-major-general-dave-yarker/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In our thirty-eighth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman discuss Canada’s plans to recognize Palestine as a State while other options are still on the table (including an embargo on weapons sales to Israel); the prospects of getting to a two-state solution along with examining the lessons learned from the 2008 global economic fallout and Canada’s current guns vs butter dilemma. In today’s feature interview, Steve interviews Major-General Dave Yarker, Commander of Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Command (CAFCYBERCOM). Major General (MGen) Dave Yarker joined the Canadian Forces in 1989, graduating from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) Kingston in 1993. Following completion of Graduate studies and Signals officer Training in 1996 he served with 2 Bde as a Signals Officer in both 427 Tactical Helicopter Squadron and 2 Combat Engineer Regiment. He has been employed as staff in project management, joint, operational and strategic communications planning and deployed as the Canadian J6 to both Kosovo and Afghanistan. He has had the honour of command at 2 Canadian Mechanised Brigade Group Headquarters and Signals Squadron, the Canadian Forces Network Operations Centre, and the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group. Since 2010, he has had the good fortune to have been employed in the cyber operations field, commanding at Unit and Formation levels as well as holding key staff and liaison positions including with United States Cyber Command and Canada’s Communications Security Establishment. In 2022, he was then appointed as Director General Information Management Operations and the Joint Force Cyber Component Commander which became the Director General Cyber and Command and Control Information System Operation in 2024. On promotion to his current rank, he was appointed Cyber Force Commander He holds undergraduate degrees in Engineering Physics and History, along with master’s degrees in Engineering Physics and Defence Studies. Major General Yarker is married and the couple lives in Ottawa with their son. ## S3 Ep.39: Wicked Problems with Jody Thomas URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-39-wicked-problems-with-jody-thomas/ Modified: 2025-08-28 In episode 39 of season 3, co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss the lack of women CAF members on current Peacekeeping postings and the challenges of committing Canada’s army to additional operations. They also discuss the implications of a new story of 5 CAF members suspended for hateful behavior and the impacts this may have on recruitment targets in the future. In today's feature interview, Steve discusses oversight and procurement with former Deputy Minister of Defence, Jody Thomas. Jody Thomas recently retired from the federal public service as National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister. Jody has broad and varied experience working at senior levels in the Public Service and in a series of increasingly demanding security operations roles. She joined the naval reserves at age 17 and was among the first women to serve on a Canadian military vessel. Jody began her public service career in 1988 when she was appointed Chief of Business Planning and Administration with Public Works and Government Services Canada’s Atlantic Region. From 1995-2010, she held increasingly senior roles at Passport Canada, culminating in Chief Operating Officer. In 2010, Ms. Thomas joined the Canadian Coast Guard where she held the positions of Deputy Commissioner of Operations and Commissioner of the Coast Guard. In March 2017, she joined the Department of National Defence where she served as Senior Associate Deputy Minister. She was appointed as Deputy Minister of National Defence in October 2017, a role in which she served until January 2022. Jody holds a Bachelor of Arts from Carleton University. ## S3 Ep.5: Janice Stein, Canada’s Dean of International Relations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-5-janice-stein-canadas-dean-of-international-relations/ Modified: 2024-03-18 > Janice Gross Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management in the Department of Political Science and the Founding Director of... In episode 5 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve and our newest co-host Dr. Wendy Wong discus strudel surveys, mark the 4 year COVID pandemic anniversary, Nikki Haley vs Donald Trump & Sudan’s human rights crisis. in Today's feature interview, Wendy asks Janice Stein about how we should be thinking about the 120 year old conflict in Gaza, deterrence theory and the challenges for academics studying security in the past and today along with barriers for defence policy makers in Canada compared to its counterparts. Janice Gross Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management in the Department of Political Science and the Founding Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto. She is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and a member of the Order of Canada and the Order of Ontario. She was the Massey Lecturer in 2001 and a Trudeau Fellow. She was awarded the Molson Prize by the Canada Council for an outstanding contribution by a social scientist to public debate and has received Honorary Doctorates of Laws from universities in Canada and abroad. She is also an Honorary Foreign Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Senior Fellow of the Kissinger Center at SAIS at Johns Hopkins University. Her current research focuses on technology and public policy in the context of great power competition. Last year, she co-chaired the National Advisory Committee on Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy for the Minister of Global Affairs ## S3 Ep.6: Bridging the Gap, One Post-Doc at a Time URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-6-bridging-the-gap-one-post-doc-at-a-time/ Modified: 2024-04-04 > Steve interviews our Post-Doc, Ryan Atkinson about his research on emerging technologies and NATO Centres of Excellence... In episode 6 of BR Season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto and Steve Saideman discuss new legislation proposed to address the abuse of power crisis within DND; military to civilian transition issues for veterans transferring to public service and Tik Tok! Steve interviews our Post-Doc, Ryan Atkinson about his research on emerging technologies and NATO Centers of Excellence. Ryan Atkinson is Postdoctoral Fellow at Carleton University where his research focuses on defence policy. He previously worked at NATO and has experience in the private sector as a cybersecurity consultant. Ryan completed a PhD from Western University and an MA from the University of Toronto. ## S3 Ep.7: Is More Enough? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-7-is-more-enough/ Modified: 2024-04-12 > This week Steve interviews Roger Hilton, Canadian media presenter and research fellow at GLOBSEC in Bratislava. In the seventh episode of season three, co-hosts Anessa Kimball and Steve Saideman discuss some details from the newly released Defence Policy Update, NATO’s 75th Anniversary, Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Wayne Eyre has turned off commenting on his twitter (X) feed. This week Steve interviews Roger Hilton, Canadian media presenter and research fellow at GLOBSEC in Bratislava. GLOBSEC is a global think-tank with local offices in Bratislava, Brussels, Kyiv, Vienna, and Washington D.C. committed to enhancing security, prosperity and sustainability in Europe and throughout the world. Its mission is to influence the future by generating new ideas and solutions for a better and safer world. GLOBSEC helps to provide a better understanding of global trends and their consequences for society, economy, and security. We generate new ideas and solutions for a more stable, prosperous, and sustainable world, by: Conducting world-class research and political insight into major threats and risks to our society; Driving change by engaging esteemed policy-makers and senior leaders from different sectors in our policy initiatives; Putting together leaders and stakeholders from multiple sectors at the right time in one place. ## S3 Ep.8: Confidence Building Measures & Arms Control URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-8-confidence-building-measures-arms-control/ Modified: 2024-04-24 > In this week's feature interview Thomas speaks with William Alberque; Director of Strategy, Technology and Arms Control at the International In the 8th episode of our 3rd season, Steve and Thomas discuss NATO perspectives in Artic Security from his recent visit to the NATO Defence College in Rome, Arctic threats in the Defence Policy Update along with procurement investments and timelines PLUS FBI Director Wray’s analysis of Chinese hacker threat on critical infrastructure as well as US aid to Ukraine. In this week's feature interview Thomas speaks with William Alberque; Director of Strategy, Technology and Arms Control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies focusing on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems, as well as risk reduction and arms control. William previously served as the director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre (ACDC), with more than 25 years' experience in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. ## S3. Ep.24: Allied Military Leadership in Conversation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s3-ep-24-allied-military-leadership-in-conversation/ Modified: 2025-01-02 > co-hosts Steve and Hannah meet up with a few of the incredible leaders that make up this year’s cohort of HFX Peace With Women Fellows... We are ending the year on a positive note with this Battle Rhythm / Notes From the Field crossover episode, co-hosts Steve and Hannah meet up with a few of the incredible leaders that make up this year’s cohort of HFX Peace With Women Fellows when they reached Ottawa on their whirlwind global tour. The Peace With Women Fellowship brings together senior, active-duty, military officers from NATO member and partner countries for a 3-week executive tour of the political, military and technological centers of the United States and Canada. The Peace With Women Fellowship is designed to challenge participants by engaging with senior government, military, corporate, and academic leaders to discuss and better understand the world’s leading security issues. The program endeavours to not only ensure that the Fellows can discuss the problems and ideas they face, but also propose innovative solutions and apply what they learn in their home countries. HFX is proud to lead the security community with this unprecedented Fellowship program advancing women’s leadership in security, while fostering a dynamic network of women military leaders across the world. In order of appearance: [03:45] Gp. Capt. Elizabeth Hutchison (Defence Attaché Chile Royal Air Force, Air Ops United Kingdom) Col. Nanda Kellij (Policy Director for Material, Environment, Real Estate and Sustainability Ministry of Defence, Policy Directorate. Netherlands) Col. Sonja Fischer, MD (Chief of Branch Protocol Executive Staff FMoD Germany) [24:06] Capt. Mette Stab-Johansen (Navy Command - Head of Operations and Planning. Royal Danish Navy) Col. Alison Gonzalez (Director of Staff, United States Space Force) [36:08] Col. Angela Thomas (Director Air Plans. Royal Canadian Air Force) Capt. Carolyn Moberley (National Strike Force Commander, United States Coast Guard) Maj. Anna Novak (Head of Logistics Department (S4) 58th Detached Motorized Brigade Land Forces, Armed Forces of Ukraine) ## S4 Ep.0 : Human Security in Conflict URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-e0-human-security-in-conflict/ Modified: 2025-10-02 Welcome back to class and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss The United States president renaming the Department of Defence to the Department of War after destroying a boat in the Caribbean; the Canadian Department of National Defence is ready to spend as it commits to extend the CAF’s mission in Latvia along with deploying fighter pilots in a NATO exercise. In today's feature interview, our Post-doctoral Fellow, Dr. Manaswini Ramkumar interviews Dr. Sarah Meharg and Major-General (Retired) Craig Aitchison, co-editors of the Canadian Military Journals Special Issues on Human Security: www.journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-25.2-toc-en.html Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg is Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada and the Senior Research Associate at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Ottawa Canada. She is Canada's leading post-conflict reconstruction expert and specializes in the research and implementation of advanced technologies for reconstruction initiatives. Dr Meharg focuses on economic acceleration in regions experiencing economic transitions, including post-conflict and post-disaster environments such as Afghanistan, Haiti and the Balkans. Dr Meharg has received numerous commendations for developing her unique theory of conflict- identicide (1997) -which defines the precursor stages of genocide. Major-General (Retired) Craig Aitchison is proud to have served Canada for over 38 years. A passionate and lifelong learner, he has earned a certificate in Culinary Arts from Saint Lawrence College, an undergraduate in Business Administration from the University of New Brunswick, and master’s degrees from Royal Military College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He deployed overseas five times including Afghanistan and Iraq, and commanded the Infantry School, Combat Training Centre and the Canadian Defence Academy. He was also very fortunate to act as the Deputy Commanding General for Operations for U.S. Army Alaska, now 11th Airborne Division (Arctic Angels). In 2023 he was invested into the Order of Military Merit at the rank of Commander. He has also been twice (2019 and 2021) awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit at the rank of Officer. His extensive experience in the military training and education system has created a very strong foundation and focused energy toward leader development, strategy development and design thinking. ## S4 Ep.1 : Overseen or Overlooked? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-1-overseen-or-overlooked/ Modified: 2025-10-02 Welcome to autumn and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve discuss Russian incursions on NATO airspace, the legacy of Charlie Kirk and implications for the US, Canada and the world; along with Canada’s official recognition of the state of Palestine and the Netanyahu effect. Today's Feature Interview is with co-author of the book (with Stephen Saideman and David P. Auerswald) "Overseen or Overlooked? Legislators, Armed Forces and Democratic Accountability" Philippe Lagassé is associate professor and the Barton Chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. His research focuses on defence policy and military procurement, as well as civil-military relations and the role of institutions in international policymaking in the Westminster tradition. He teaches courses on defence policy and strategic studies. Between 2012-2014 he served as a member of the Independent Review Panel overseeing the evaluation of options to replace Canada’s CF-18 fighter aircraft, and he is currently a member of the Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition within the Department of National Defence. ## S4 Ep.10 : Buying Security with Dr. Bohuslav Pernica URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-10-buying-security-with-dr-bohuslav-pernica/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss recent Canadian public opinion on threat perception and translating this into a defence spending strategy, while Vancouver and other Canadian cities jockey to host a new NATO Bank of Investment for Security and Defence and finally who wants more NATO in the arctic and why. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss recent Canadian public opinion on threat perception and translating this into a defence spending strategy, while Vancouver and other Canadian cities jockey to host a new NATO Bank of Investment for Security and Defence and finally who wants more NATO in the arctic and why. In today’s Feature Interview, Anessa Kimball speaks with Dr. Bohuslav Pernica, Assistant professor in the Department of International Relations and European Studies at Masaryk University while he visits Quebec. Lt. Col. (ret.) Dr. Bohuslav Pernica is an adjunct professor at the Faculty of Social Studies at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic, a consultant to the Czech Ministry of Defence, and a member of the Czech anti-corruption watchdog (Kverulant). He also served in the Czech Armed Forces from 1992 to 2014. ## S4 Ep.11 : Space Lords with Commander of 3 Canadian Space Division, Brigadier-General C.J. Horner URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-11-space-lords-with-commander-of-3-canadian-space-division-brigadier-general-c-j-horner/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss perspectives on the Iran war, US Secretary of Defense’s war crimes announcement, and Canada’s role in it as an oil producing middle power. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss perspectives on the Iran war, US Secretary of Defense’s war crimes announcement, and Canada’s role in it as an oil producing middle power. The hosts also discuss PM Carney’s ‘our north, strong and free’ tour to friendly Arctic nations and what the future trade-offs may be for more alliance relationships. In today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with Canada’s Space Division Commander, Chris Horner. Brigadier-General (BGen) Christopher Horner joined the Canadian Armed Forces as an Aerospace Controller on 20 Jun 1998. After graduating from the Royal Military College of Canada and completing his initial training at Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Control Operations in 2003, he began his career as an Air Battle Manager. Over the course of the next decade, BGen Horner held various operational positions from deep within NORAD’s underground complex of Canadian Air Defence Sector, served as an Air Weapons Officer and Evaluator Senior Director with the United States Air Force E-3 AWACS Program, and finally as Mission Crew Commander and Director of Operations within 21 Aerospace Control and Warning Squadron, North Bay. Operating with Joint and Allied forces around the globe, BGen Horner amassed nearly 1,300 hours on the E-3 AWACS including over 430 combat flight hours supporting Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM, in counter-narcotics missions supporting Operation CARRIBE, and both in the air and on the ground throughout the United States and Canada actively supporting Operation NOBLE EAGLE counter-terrorism missions. Prior to assuming command of the Canadian Joint Warfare Centre in July 2022, BGen Horner was fortunate enough to command 51 Aerospace Control and Warning Squadron (2013-15) and later serve as Commandant of the Canadian Forces School of Aerospace Control Operations (2017-19). Apart from his operational focus and command appointments, BGen Horner filled various staff roles at 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters, the Strategic Joint Staff at National Defence Headquarters, and within CAF Strategic Response Team on Sexual Misconduct. Having admitted to once owning a Commodore 64, he returned to operations and was appointed Deputy Joint Force Cyber Component Commander in 2019 where he remained until his selection as Special Advisor to the Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command in 2021. BGen Horner was promoted to his current rank and assumed the role of Commander 3 Canadian Space Division in 2024. BGen Horner holds a Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration, a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in Economics and Political Science, a Master of Arts in Defence Management and a Master of Science in Leadership. He is a graduate of the Canadian Forces College Joint Command and Staff Program and the United States Air Force Air War College. ## S4 Ep.12 : Exercising Restraint and Evaluating Trade-Offs with Dr. Andrea Charron URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-12-exercising-restraint-and-evaluating-trade-offs-with-dr-andrea-charron/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University. Steve and Thomas discuss European reactions to the US demands for assistance and how this may affect the upcoming NATO Summit in Ankara as Canada meets its 2% of GDP defence investment and the New York Times reporting that the arctic may be too cold for the Canadian Armed Forces to operate in. Welcome to Spring and to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University. Steve and Thomas discuss European reactions to the US demands for assistance and how this may affect the upcoming NATO Summit in Ankara as Canada meets its 2% of GDP defence investment and the New York Times reporting that the arctic may be too cold for the Canadian Armed Forces to operate in. Today’s Feature Interview is with CDSN Co-Director and Continental Defence expert, Dr. Andrea Charron. Dr. Charron holds a PhD from the Royal Military College of Canada (Department of War Studies). She obtained a Masters in International Relations from Webster University, Leiden, The Netherlands, a Master’s of Public Administration from Dalhousie University and a Bachelor of Science (Honours) from Queen’s University. Dr. Charron worked for various federal departments including the Canadian Privy Council Office in the Security and Intelligence Secretariat. She is now Professor (IR), Political Studies and Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies. Dr. Charron has been featured in the Economist twice for her Canadian foreign policy and NORAD expertise (2019 and 2021) and on the CBC radio show Ideas (2020). She has 4 peer reviewed books (2011, 2022, 2023, 2023) on NORAD, sanctions and 9/11. She is on the editorial board of the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, the Journal, the Canadian Naval Review and the Army Journal. She has peer-reviewed articles in International Affairs, International Studies, Strategic Studies Quarterly, International Journal, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal and others. ## S4 Ep.13 : People Centered Security and Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-13-people-centered-security-and-defence/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > CDSN Podcast Producer Melissa Jennings steps in for Steve Saideman as she and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) discuss some long-term community security implications for Canadians that have been overlooked in all the defence spending news. CDSN Podcast Producer Melissa Jennings steps in for Steve Saideman as she and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) discuss some long-term community security implications for Canadians that have been overlooked in all the defence spending news. This includes the effects of budget cuts to Veterans Affairs Canada, housing availability, disaster/emergency preparedness mitigation and planning in the provinces as well as research on the health impacts of new equipment and mandates for CAF members. Steve still had time to interview CDSN/Norman Paterson School of International Affairs’ Visiting Defence Fellow, Col. Shawn Guilbault. Colonel Shawn Guilbault is currently Visiting Defence Fellow at Carleton University’s Norman Patterson School of International Affairs. An RCAF base brat, he began his military career with the Governor General’s Foot Guards in Ottawa before commissioning as an Aerospace Control Officer. His postings span mobile radar, air defence sector, and E-3 AWACS operations in Canada and the United States, including the privilege of commanding 51 Aerospace Control & Warning Squadron and the Canadian Detachment at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City. Staff tours include lead air battle management standards at 1 Canadian Air Division, Chief Combat Systems Integration and, most recently, as Director Plans North America within the Strategic Joint Staff. Shawn is a graduate of the Fighter Weapons Instructor Course and the UK’s Advanced Command and Staff Course. He is married and a proud father of three amazing daughters. ## S4 Ep.14 : Mistrusted to Serve? with Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-14-mistrusted-to-serve-with-dr-jean-christophe-boucher/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss what Canada’s military is doing in the Philippines to reinforce our Asia Pacific Strategy, while back at home the CAF is under media scrutiny after senior military leaders get caught trying out propaganda and surveillance techniques on Canadians. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss what Canada’s military is doing in the Philippines to reinforce our Asia Pacific Strategy, while back at home the CAF is under media scrutiny after senior military leaders get caught trying out propaganda and surveillance techniques on Canadians. Today’s feature interview is with CDSN Co-Director, Jean-Chritophe Boucher. Steve and JC discuss capturing Canadian attitudes on defence through survey work in advance of their co-authored paper Mistrusted to Serve? Discrimination in the Military and Its Impact on Public Support in Armed Forces & Society Jean-Christophe Boucher is an Assistant Professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary. He is currently a director of research in civil-military relations at the Canadian Defence and Security Network funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council. A fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute; a research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Security and Development at Dalhousie University; Senior Fellow at the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Québec. He holds a BA in History from the University of Ottawa, a MA in Philosophy from the Université de Montréal and a PhD in Political Science from Université Laval. He specializes in international relations, with an emphasis on Canadian foreign and defence policies, international security, and methodology. ## S4 Ep.15 : The Local Engagement Refugee Research Network (LERRN) with Dr. James Milner URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-15-the-local-engagement-refugee-research-network-lerrn-with-dr-james-milner/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-hosts Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia), Steve Saideman discusses the role of academic voices in public information spaces; along with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence suspension and what it means for US-Canada defence relations. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-hosts Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman. Steve and Wendy discuss the role of academic voices in public information spaces; along with the Permanent Joint Board on Defence suspension and what it means for US-Canada defence relations. In today’s Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Carleton University colleague and fellow SSHRC Partnership Director, Dr. James Milner of LERRN: The Local Engagement Refugee Research Network. Dr. Milner highlights the present crisis in global systems meant to protect refugees in the midst of more civilian targets and conflict induced brutality around the world in anticipation of a new co-authored book: Canada’s Role in Global Refugee Responses by Nathan Benson, James Milner, and Delphine Nakache from McGill-Queen’s University Press. Bringing together leading experts from multiple disciplines, Canada in the Global Refugee Regime explores how Canada has influenced global refugee responses and where its impact has been more muted. Chapters examine the country’s actions in international forums; its resettlement and sponsorship initiatives; its engagement in key regional contexts such as Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East; and the links between refugee policy and foreign policy. Contributors reflect on the relationship between Canada’s international leadership and its domestic practices, offering a nuanced account that moves beyond simplistic narratives of benevolence.www.mqup.ca/Recent-News/2026/05…nd-Delphine-Nakache James Milner is a Professor of Political Science at Carleton University. He is currently Project Director of LERRN: The Local Engagement Refugee Research Network, a 7-year, SSHRC-funded partnership between researchers and civil society actors primarily in Canada, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon and Tanzania. He is also Director of the Migration and Diaspora Studies program at Carleton University, Co-Chair of the Global Academic Interdisciplinary Network, and Canada’s first De Mello Chair. He has been a researcher, practitioner and policy advisor on issues relating to the global refugee regime, global refugee policy, meaningful refugee participation and the politics of asylum in the global South. He has undertaken field research in Burundi, Guinea, Kenya, India, Tanzania and Thailand, and has presented research findings to stakeholders in New York, Geneva, London, Ottawa, Bangkok, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and elsewhere. He has worked as a Consultant for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in India, Cameroon, Guinea and its Geneva Headquarters. He is author of Refugees, the State and the Politics of Asylum in Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), co-author (with Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher) of UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection (Routledge, 2012), and co-editor of Refugees’ Roles in Resolving Displacement and Building Peace: Beyond Beneficiaries(Georgetown University Press, 2019) and Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications (UN University Press, 2008). ## S4 Ep.16 : Risks, Resiliency and Defence Tradeoffs URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-16-risks-resiliency-and-defence-tradeoffs/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > Steve Saideman and Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval, discuss new NATO financial commitments for Ukraine being discussed in Europe while Canada rejects the proposal, Quebec’s new Civil Security Emergency Response Reserve (RIUSC) and NATO resiliency along with drone defence capabilities ramping up on CAF bases. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss new NATO financial commitments for Ukraine being discussed in Europe while Canada rejects the proposal, Quebec’s new Civil Security Emergency Response Reserve (RIUSC) and NATO resiliency along with drone defence capabilities ramping up on CAF bases. For today’s feature interview, Prof Anessa Kimball speaks with Federico Chaves Correa. They discuss Canada’s evolving relationship with Latin American countries in an era of constantly hemispheric security and defence issues. Federico Chaves Correa is a doctoral candidate in political science at Laval University under the supervision of Aurélie Campana and Pamela Colombo. He also holds a master’s degree in political science from Laval University and a bachelor’s degree in political science from the Universidad Nacional de Rosario. He was a doctoral researcher on the FrameNet project, co-organized by several universities in Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, funded by the Open Research Area (DFG, SSHRC, ESRC). He is currently a member of the Roméo Dallaire Chair in Leadership in Teaching Civil Conflict and Sustainable Peace. ## S4 Ep.17 : Pragmatic Flexibility in the Indo Pacific with Dr. Kai Ostwald URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-17-pragmatic-flexibility-in-the-indo-pacific-with-dr-kai-ostwald/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > Dr. Steve Saideman and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) discuss CAF setting its sights on recruiting gamers and the implication on culture change efforts; Pride Winnipeg has banned military personnel from marching in uniform in this year’s parade despite post-Purge gains for CAF members; and how the US war on Iran is exacerbating a long-term global hunger crisis. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm with Dr. Steve Saideman and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto). Steve and Linna discuss CAF setting its sights on recruiting gamers and the implication on culture change efforts; Pride Winnipeg has banned military personnel from marching in uniform in this year’s parade despite post-Purge gains for CAF members; and how the US war on Iran is exacerbating a long-term global hunger crisis. In today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with Dr. Kai Ostwald on the challenges Canada faces in pursuing its Indo Pacific Strategy including capacity, timing and perceptions. Kai Ostwald is the HSBC Chair in Asian Research and an Associate Professor at the University of British Columbia, jointly appointed in the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs and the Department of Political Science. He also serves as Director of UBC’s Institute of Asian Research and Associate Editor for Pacific Affairs. His work focuses on political economy, governance, and development in Southeast Asia, with a particular emphasis on democratization, geopolitics, and Canada’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific. Kai connects academic research with real-world policy challenges, working closely with practitioners across governments, international organizations, and think tanks. He regularly participates in Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomatic dialogues, contributing to discussions on geopolitics and regional cooperation. He has testified before Canadian parliamentary special committees and has delivered training sessions and briefings to Global Affairs Canada, the US State Department, and the Canadian Forces College on regional geopolitics and governance. Kai is a Senior Fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, an Associate Senior Fellow at Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, and a Distinguished Fellow at the Penang Institute in Malaysia. He has also conducted consulting work with organizations including the International Development Research Centre, the World Bank, and the Canada-ASEAN Business Council, among others. His research and policy commentary have been featured in leading academic journals such as the American Political Science Review, Democratization, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Political Science Research and Methods, Journal of East Asian Studies, and Asian Survey. His insights have also appeared in major media outlets, including The Atlantic, Bloomberg, CBC, Nikkei Asian Review, Globe and Mail, The Guardian, and the South China Morning Post. ## S4 Ep.18 : Unequal Dialogues with Dr. Manaswini Ramkumar URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-18-unequal-dialogues-with-dr-manaswini-ramkumar/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa, Steve Saideman discusses World Cup excitement as President Trump’s kaleidoscope of grift continues, along with deal or no deal between the US and Iran and what that means for Lebanon and Israel along with freedom of navigation and new frontiers for conflict. Welcome to summer and a new episode of Battle Rhythm with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss World Cup excitement as President Trump’s kaleidoscope of grift continues, along with deal or no deal between the US and Iran and what that means for Lebanon and Israel along with freedom of navigation and new frontiers for conflict. Finally the hosts discuss why and how to move forward on establishing a Canadian foreign human intelligence agency. For today’s feature interview, we preview our new Civil Military Relations podcast “Unequal Dialogues” with host Dr. Manaswini Ramkumar, starting this summer. ## S4 Ep.19 : The Politics of Defence and Security URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-19-the-politics-of-defence-and-security/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > Steve Saideman and Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University, discuss UK politics and the upcoming NATO Summit along with submarine procurement and the progress on a Defence, Security and Resilience Bank in Canada (or elsewhere). Today’s feature interview is with CDSN Post-Doctoral Fellow, Dr. Sanjida Amin. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm with co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University. Steve and Thomas discuss UK politics and the upcoming NATO Summit along with submarine procurement and the progress on a Defence, Security and Resilience Bank in Canada (or elsewhere). Today’s feature interview is with CDSN Post-Doctoral Fellow, Dr. Sanjida Amin. Sanjida Amin is the CDSN Postdoctoral Fellow (2025–2026) at the Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP) at Queen’s University. She is currently completing her PhD in Political Science at the University of Toronto, where her research focuses on foreign sponsorship of insurgent groups, insurgent-state relations, and the international dimensions of civil war. Her book project examines how external support from foreign states shapes internal conflict dynamics, particularly by driving insurgent fragmentation during peace negotiations. Her broader research interests include international peacebuilding, alliance politics, and Canadian foreign and defense policy. Her current postdoctoral project investigates how U.S.-Canada security relations influence Canada’s evolving engagement with UN peacekeeping, situating this within the broader context of multilateralism and shifting global security priorities. Sanjida’s research has been supported by Fulbright Canada, the Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship (SSHRC), and the Ontario Graduate Scholarship. She aims to contribute to more effective peacebuilding and mediation strategies in protracted conflicts, as well as to informed debates on Canadian international security policy. ## S4 Ep.2 : The Purge with Honourary Colonel Michelle Douglas URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-2-the-purge-with-honourary-colonel-michelle-douglas/ Modified: 2026-08-31 > Steve and Thomas discuss the US Department of War/Defence’s public GOFO lecture, National Guard deployments and Thomas reports on the reactions in Belgium as drones fly over NATO Airspace, finally what are we learning from all of this when it comes to theory? (A: the Huntingtonian model is out) Welcome to autumn and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University. Steve and Thomas discuss the US Department of War/Defence’s public GOFO lecture, National Guard deployments and Thomas reports on the reactions in Belgium as drones fly over NATO Airspace, finally what are we learning from all of this when it comes to theory? (A: the Huntingtonian model is out) Today’s feature interview is with Michelle Douglas, Michelle is a veteran, a former military officer, a survivor of Canada’s “LGBT Purge” and an activist in the movement to seek legal equality for the 2SLGBTQ+ community over the past 30 years. She is a bridge-builder. Michelle served as an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces from 1986 to 1989. Despite a distinguished service record, she was honorably discharged after being deemed “Not Advantageously Employable Due to Homosexuality.” After being fired by the military, Michelle’s landmark legal challenge in 1992 ended Canada’s formalized discriminatory policy against LGBT members of the military. This experience launched a decades-long commitment to volunteerism and activism for Michelle. She has been a part of many legal challenges to seek equality for the 2SLGBTQI+ community. Professionally, Michelle had a 30-year career in public service. She retired from the federal Department of Justice in 2019 where she held the position of Director of International Relations. She currently serves as the Executive Director of the LGBT Purge Fund. Michelle is a member of the board of directors of the Michaëlle Jean Foundation. She was awarded the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal in 2012 and was presented with the Canada Pride Citation in 2023. She was recently named an Honorary Colonel in the Canadian Armed Forces; she is assigned to the organization known as the Chief Professional Conduct and Culture. Michelle is a graduate of Carleton University. ## S4 Ep.20 : The Private Sector and National Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-20-the-private-sector-and-national-defence/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > A new episode of Battle Rhythm with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss Canadian spies and security clearances, recruitment gains for the Canadian Armed Forces and what may be motivating more Canadians to join. For today’s feature Interview, Steve speaks with Al Vigier, CEO of Caseway. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss Canadian spies and security clearances, recruitment gains for the Canadian Armed Forces and what may be motivating more Canadians to join. For today’s feature Interview, Steve speaks with Al Vigier, CEO of Caseway. Caseway was founded by Alistair Vigier, a former Canadian Army soldier turned legal-tech entrepreneur. Raised in a military family, Alistair spent seven years in the Canadian Armed Forces, including passing pre-selection for JTF2. That experience instilled a discipline-first mindset and a bias toward action—qualities that continue to define Caseway’s culture. After an injury ended his military career, Alistair transitioned into the legal world, working as a law firm business development manager. There, he helped grow a firm’s revenue to over $3.5M and earned BC Business 30 Under 30 recognition. But he also saw how resistant the legal industry was to change. That frustration led him to entrepreneurship. In 2021, Alistair founded Clearway, which became the largest lawyer-review platform in Canada and the UK, serving hundreds of thousands of users per month. That experience revealed an even bigger opportunity: legal research itself was the bottleneck. In September 2024, he founded Caseway with a clear vision—to use technology to make legal information radically more accessible. ## S4 Ep.21 : The Next Generation of Security and Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-21-the-next-generation-of-security-and-defence/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > A new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss the Canada - US trade war and its implications for defence, a review of the 2026 Summer Institute including the briefing from NDHQ, along with a NATO Summit post mortem. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss the Canada - US trade war and its implications for defence, a review of the 2026 Summer Institute including the briefing from NDHQ, along with a NATO Summit post mortem. For today’s feature interview, Anessa Interviews 4 Student Delegates about their Model NATO experience, Emma Breton-Chénier, Xavier Antonuk, Adrien Risch, Amal Belhaj share the highlights and opportunities of participating in this international learning experience. The Laval University Delegation for NATO Simulation, founded in 2007, is mandated to represent Laval University at the International Model NATO, which takes place annually in Washington DC. These events bring together around a hundred students from various universities, mainly North American, who represent the different member countries of the organization. The delegates embody the diplomats of the Member State they represent through various committees and address various topics submitted to the agenda by the organizers. This simulation presents an incredible opportunity to study the structure and functioning of NATO, as well as to better understand the various challenges and problems the organization faces. It also allows us to learn more about the states they represent. ## S4 Ep.22 : Planning for the Next Pandemic with CAF’s Surgeon General, MGen Scott Malcolm URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-22-planning-for-the-next-pandemic-with-cafs-surgeon-general-mgen-scott-malcolm/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > Steve Saideman and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) discuss updates on civil military relations from the American Political Sciences Association (APSA) Conference in Boston; why Canada is turning its back on our peacekeeping traditions; along with a lesson in leadership from Gen. Welcome to a new academic term and a new episode of Battle Rhythm, Steve Saideman and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) discuss updates on civil military relations from the American Political Sciences Association (APSA) Conference in Boston; why Canada is turning its back on our peacekeeping traditions; along with a lesson in leadership from Gen. Jennie Carignan while Hegseth leaves his troops stranded aboard the USS Lincoln along with commemorating 9/11. For today’s feature interview, Linna speaks with Surgeon General MGen Scott Malcolm about health security cooperation. Both Dr. Tam-Seto and MGen Malcolm will be speaking at CIMVHR’s Annual Forum from October 19-21, 2026 – in Halifax, Nova Scotia. ## S4 Ep.3 : Radical Pragmatism URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-3-radical-pragmatism/ Modified: 2026-08-31 > With co-hosts Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman. Steve shares insights from the German-Norweigan consortium to supply submarines to Canada and he and Wendy discuss the defence diplomacy involved along with protesting and what it means for democracy. In today’s feature interview, Wendy interviews Dr. Jessica F. Green, they discuss her book Existential Politics and her research focused on global governance, the politics of decarbonization, carbon pricing, and non-state actors. Welcome to spooky season and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-hosts Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman. Steve shares insights from the German-Norweigan consortium to supply submarines to Canada and he and Wendy discuss the defence diplomacy involved along with protesting and what it means for democracy. In today’s feature interview, Wendy interviews Dr. Jessica F. Green, they discuss her book Existential Politics and her research focused on global governance, the politics of decarbonization, carbon pricing, and non-state actors. Jessica Green is a professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto. She is also cross-appointed in the School of Environment. She has previously held positions at Case Western University (in Cleveland, OH) and New York University (in NYC). Her newly released book, Existential Politics, explains why the Paris Agreement is Failing. Governments have misdiagnosed the political problem of climate change, focusing relentlessly on measuring, reporting, and trading emissions. This technical approach of “managing tons” ignores the ways that climate change and climate policy will revalue assets, creating winners and losers. Policies such as net zero, carbon pricing, and offsets all cater to the losers—owners of fossil assets. But in reality, climate change is a political problem, not a technical one. Climate politics should be understood as existential—creating conflicts that arise when some actors face the prospect of the devaluation or elimination of their assets or competition from the creation of new ones. Fossil asset owners, such as oil and gas companies and electric utilities, stand to lose trillions in the energy transition. Thus, they are fighting to slow decarbonization and preserve the value of their assets. Green asset owners, who will be the basis of the decarbonized economy, are fewer in number and relatively weak politically. Governments should use international tax, finance, and trade institutions to create new green asset owners and constrain fossil asset owners. ## S4 Ep.4 : Defence Spending Strategies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-4-defence-spending-strategies/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss defense spending eagerness in Ottawa and beyond Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss defense spending eagerness in Ottawa and beyond along with Canada and ASEAN and two apologies, one from Prime Minister Mark Carney and another from the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jennie Carignan on behalf of the Canadian Armed Forces for Racial Discrimination and Racial Harassment of current and past current and former CAF members. In today’s Feature Interview, Steve discusses Navy procurement and recruitment strategies with Canada’s Naval Commander. Vice-Admiral (VAdm) Angus Topshee is the 38th Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). His diverse academic background includes military and civilian institutions on three continents. He has deployed in ships around the world and has accumulated countless sea stories involving pirates, sharks, terrorists, volcanoes, whales, fires, and all the other things which make life at sea a true adventure. The highlight of his time at sea was his far too brief command of Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) Algonquin in 2009-2010 and, a close second, his three years in command of Canada’s Pacific Fleet. His shore postings include two tours in the Navy’s Strategy directorate as penance for all of his sea time, three years in command of Canadian Forces Base Halifax, and two years as the Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy, and Plans at NORAD and United States Northern Command Headquarters in Colorado Springs. He also deployed to Afghanistan for all of 2011 as the director of Afghan National Police Training within the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan. Over the course of his career, he has somehow been involved in Arctic issues at every one of his shore postings (except Afghanistan). Before taking command of the RCN in May 2022, VAdm Topshee had the honour and the pleasure of commanding Maritime Forces Pacific and Joint Task Force Pacific, located in Esquimalt, B.C. VAdm Topshee’s career is enabled by his fantastically supportive wife, Audrey, and four tremendous daughters, Amy, Zoë, Charlotte, and Iris. ## S4 Ep.5 : The Army We Need with Brigadier-General (BGen) Éric Landry URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-5-the-army-we-need-with-brigadier-general-bgen-eric-landry/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss the Director of Canadian Security and Intelligence Service’s Dan Rogers public threat assessment including the intersection of polarization/radicalization and eroding social cohesion Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss the Director of Canadian Security and Intelligence Service’s Dan Rogers public threat assessment including the intersection of polarization/radicalization and eroding social cohesion, will this improve the resilience of Canadians in the face of growing global competition and risk? Our co-hosts also discuss the Reserve Force of the Future which may or may not include service for Canada’s Public Service, along with the complicated politics of making defence and security decisions for Canada and Canadians. Born in Montreal, Brigadier-General Éric Landry joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1994 and served with the Royal Canadian Hussars during his undergraduate studies in Business Administration. In 1997, following his transfer to the Regular Force, he joined the 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment in Valcartier. He served as a troop lead- er and participated in Op PALLADIUM in Bosnia and Herzegovina with D Squadron. Promoted to Major, he deployed twice to Afghanistan from July 2007 to May 2008 as J35 (Chief of Plans) of Joint Task Force-Kandahar and as the last tank squadron commander from November 2010 to June 2011. For his leadership on this deployment, he was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal. In 2015, he became the 25th Commander of the 12th Canadian Armoured Regiment. He commanded the Regiment during three domestic operations: Op NANOOK and NUNALIVUT in the Canadian North and Op LENTUS during the floods in Quebec in 2017. He was promoted to the rank of Colonel in 2018 and appointed the Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force – IMPACT. Upon his return from the Middle East, he was appointed Chief of Staff for the 1st Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg. He became the 16th Commander of the 2nd Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group on the 21st of August 2020. BGen Landry was promoted to his current rank in June 2023 and took command of 4th Canadian Division in August 2025. ## S4 Ep.6 : Why Democracies Fight Dictators with Dr. Madison Schramm URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-6-why-democracies-fight-dictators-with-dr-madison-schramm/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss high school recruitment gains for the Canadian Armed Forces as they pitch a more diverse force and plans for a big boost to numbers in the Reserves. Welcome to winter and a new episode of Battle Rhythm. Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss high school recruitment gains for the Canadian Armed Forces as they pitch a more diverse force and plans for a big boost to numbers in the Reserves while welcoming you to attend our annual Year Ahead event in Ottawa, this year focusing on 7 years of research from the CDSN on topics of security, operations, military personnel and civil-military relations. For Today’s feature interview, co-host Wendy Wong interviews our former Capstone Scholar Madison Schramm about her new book Why Democracies Fight Dictators (Oxford University Press). Madison Schramm is an Assistant Professor with the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto. She specializes in international security, the domestic politics of foreign policy, and gender and foreign policy. She is particularly interested in leader psychology and conflict decision-making; and gender and leader selection and removal dynamics. She has published manuscripts exploring gender and conflict initiation (Security Studies), democratic constitutional systems and conflict (Political Science Quarterly; Journal of Global Security Studies), and diversity and inclusion in post-conflict states (book chapter, Untapped Power, Oxford University Press). ## S4 Ep.7 : International Realism and the Rules of the Game URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-7-international-realism-and-the-rules-of-the-game/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss rollercoasters, PM Carney’s meetings in China, Qatar and Davos and what this means for Canada’s new approach to the world, with Greenland being the first test of Canada and Europe’s resolve. Welcome to 2026 and to a new episode of Battle Rhythm with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss rollercoasters, PM Carney’s meetings in China, Qatar and Davos and what this means for Canada’s new approach to the world, with Greenland being the first test of Canada and Europe’s resolve. While back on the continent, the US administration readies Alaska National Guard member troops with the Army’s 11th Airborne Division in to assist ICE’s strong-arming Minnesotans with impunity. In today’s feature interview, Steve interviews LtGen. Speiser-Blanchet on her approaches to leading and reshaping Canada’s Air Force for the future. Lieutenant-General Jamie Speiser-Blanchet enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in 1990 and graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in 1994 with a degree in Computer Engineering. Earning her pilot wings in March 1996, she served as a Rotary Wing Tactical Aviation pilot flying the CH-146 Griffon helicopter at 1 Wing Kingston. Her operational and staff postings include 430 Tactical Helicopter Squadron in Valcartier, 1 Wing Headquarters, 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters in Winnipeg, and 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron in Gagetown. Lieutenant-General Speiser-Blanchet served on multiple deployments as a helicopter pilot to include United Nations and NATO missions in Haiti and Bosnia. She also served as Deputy Commander (Operations) for Joint Task Force-IMPACT in Kuwait in 2019. In Canada, she has deployed on numerous domestic operations in response to regional emergencies and in support to other government agencies. Lieutenant-General Speiser-Blanchet has commanded at multiple levels, 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Group, and the Cadets and Junior Canadian Rangers Group. Strategic level appointments include Military Assistant to the Minister of National Defence, Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff, and Deputy Commander of the RCAF. A graduate of the Joint Command and Staff Programme and the Defence and Strategic Studies Course in Australia, she holds a Master of Defence Studies from RMC and a Master of Politics and Policy from Deakin University. Lieutenant-General Speiser-Blanchet is a Commander of the Order of Military Merit (CMM). She was promoted to her current rank in July 2025 and appointed Commander of the RCAF on July 10, 2025. ## S4 Ep.8 : Safe For Now with Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, LtGen. Speiser-Blanchet URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-8-safe-for-now-with-commander-of-the-royal-canadian-air-force-ltgen-speiser-blanchet/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss rollercoasters, PM Carney’s meetings in China, Qatar and Davos and what this means for Canada’s new approach to the world, with Greenland being the first test of Canada and Europe’s resolve. Welcome to 2026 and to a new episode of Battle Rhythm with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss rollercoasters, PM Carney’s meetings in China, Qatar and Davos and what this means for Canada’s new approach to the world, with Greenland being the first test of Canada and Europe’s resolve. While back on the continent, the US administration readies Alaska National Guard member troops with the Army’s 11th Airborne Division in to assist ICE’s strong-arming Minnesotans with impunity. In today’s feature interview, Steve interviews LtGen. Speiser-Blanchet on her approaches to leading and reshaping Canada’s Air Force for the future. Lieutenant-General Jamie Speiser-Blanchet enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in 1990 and graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) in 1994 with a degree in Computer Engineering. Earning her pilot wings in March 1996, she served as a Rotary Wing Tactical Aviation pilot flying the CH-146 Griffon helicopter at 1 Wing Kingston. Her operational and staff postings include 430 Tactical Helicopter Squadron in Valcartier, 1 Wing Headquarters, 1 Canadian Air Division Headquarters in Winnipeg, and 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron in Gagetown. Lieutenant-General Speiser-Blanchet served on multiple deployments as a helicopter pilot to include United Nations and NATO missions in Haiti and Bosnia. She also served as Deputy Commander (Operations) for Joint Task Force-IMPACT in Kuwait in 2019. In Canada, she has deployed on numerous domestic operations in response to regional emergencies and in support to other government agencies. Lieutenant-General Speiser-Blanchet has commanded at multiple levels, 403 Helicopter Operational Training Squadron, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Group, and the Cadets and Junior Canadian Rangers Group. Strategic level appointments include Military Assistant to the Minister of National Defence, Special Advisor to the Chief of the Defence Staff, and Deputy Commander of the RCAF. A graduate of the Joint Command and Staff Programme and the Defence and Strategic Studies Course in Australia, she holds a Master of Defence Studies from RMC and a Master of Politics and Policy from Deakin University. Lieutenant-General Speiser-Blanchet is a Commander of the Order of Military Merit (CMM). She was promoted to her current rank in July 2025 and appointed Commander of the RCAF on July 10, 2025. ## S4 Ep.9 : The Power Behind the Fire with HFX Forum Peace Fellows URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/s4-ep-9-the-power-behind-the-fire-with-hfx-forum-peace-fellows/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss Trump’s disrespect for Allied contributions to Afghanistan as a strategy, what Canada’s arctic security strategy means for human security in northern communities and if the Canadian Armed Forces is on track to reach it’s recruitment of women target despite a general increase in recruitment. Welcome to a new episode of Battle Rhythm. Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss Trump’s disrespect for Allied contributions to Afghanistan as a strategy, what Canada’s arctic security strategy means for human security in northern communities and if the Canadian Armed Forces is on track to reach it’s recruitment of women target despite a general increase in recruitment. Steve and Hannah Christensen (host of our Field Notes podcast and MA student at NPSIA) catch an interview with 8 of 2025’s HFX Peace With Women Fellows to discuss whole of society peace efforts, evolving security strategies and lessons learned for upholding the international rules based order as they meet with North American security and defence leaders. The Fellowship is a four-week executive study course that equips senior female military officers from NATO and NATO-partner countries for their future leadership positions. HFX launched the Fellowship in 2018 because women in leadership roles in international security leads directly to more peaceful, more equitable and simply better outcomes. The 2025 Fellows include senior officers from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Finland, France, Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Group 1: Lt. Col. Annukka Ylivaara, ASG Finnish Security Committee; Col. Marie-Eve Tremblay, Canada, Deputy JAG Group 2: Col. Eszter Skrinyár, Head of Communications of the Hungarian Defence Forces; Col. Tracy Allison, Aus, Dep Chief of Staff; Army, Capt. Maryland Ingham, UK, Lead Mil advisory for Africa, Navy Group 3: Col. Emma Thomas, NZ Chief of Staff, Joint Defence Services, Army; Air Commodore Ellen Meeuwsen-Scholten, Netherlands, Personnel, Air and Space; Col. Kim Saenen, Belgium, Director, Competence Center Mobility/Distribution, Army ## Security Challenges in Africa URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/security-challenges-in-africa/ Modified: 2023-07-12 > Get the book Security Challenges in Africa, the sixth volume of the new Rubicon collection! Get the book Security Challenges in Africa, the sixth volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in French only. A new generation of renowned experts and informed observers of the current operations delivers here their enlightened points of view, accessible to the public at large and accompanied by a rich infographic. The various contributions in this book are from the French-speaking platform of analysis of international issues Le Rubicon. Le Rubicon will publish small books aimed at the general public, which will address, clearly and precisely, the new burning issues related to international news. Each month, starting in April 2022, Les Équateurs will publish a book of approximately 128 to 144 pages, at a price of 10 to 12 euros, summarizing the work of the experts of the Le Rubicon platform. ## Security in Competition: Analyzing the Perceptions of Boko Haram in the Far North of Cameroon URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/security-in-competition-analyzing-the-perceptions-of-boko-haram-in-the-far-north-of-cameroon/ Modified: 2025-06-12 This Hot Take assesses local and international perceptions of the terrorist group Boko Haram in the Far North region of Cameroon, as well as the various responses proposed based on these perceptions. It highlights that the weight of history, community identity, and cultural ties between communities and young people affiliated with Boko Haram prevent an immediate resolution to the issue, particularly when international approaches perceive this movement as being completely isolated. On the contrary, Boko Haram is embedded in local social structures. This Hot Take then leads to how local perceptions can offer a new understanding of situations of insecurity and propose alternatives for lasting and acceptable peace in the context of Boko Haram in the Far North of Cameroon. Understanding What Boko Haram Really Is Since 2009, the Boko Haram group has posed serious problems for Cameroon's national security, but also for sub-regional security in the Lake Chad basin. Boko Haram (the faction that succeeded Abu Shekau) is responsible for kidnappings, murders, rapes, destruction of property, and attacks that have caused forced displacement of populations and misery in the far north of Cameroon. In recent years, the group has been considered the greatest threat to the security of people in Cameroon and in the countries of the Lake Chad Basin. It should be noted that Boko Haram recruits from all social strata, without excluding any category based on sex, gender or profession. It operates using an asymmetric warfare strategy and its combatants are not identifiable at first glance (as they would be if they wore uniforms), unlike a conventional army. International Perceptions of Boko Haram and Responses Conflict analysts and governments describe Boko Haram as a ‘terrorist movement’ because of its various methods of operation, such as bombings, kidnappings and targeting civilians. Most of these analysts provide their expertise to both governments (such as the United States) and international institutions (e.g., the United Nations network, which is the predominant voice in managing situations of insecurity). Thus, Boko Haram has been labelled a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This categorization is linked to the classification of Boko Haram's abuses and, above all, its methods, which correspond to those of terrorist activities. The treatment or response recommended by the international actors involved to combat terrorism therefore consists of two main components: military action and the deradicalization of local populations. Military action involves the mobilisation of national and sub-regional armed forces to locate and destroy Boko Haram's physical positions. For example, since 2016, Cameroon's Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) has been active in the far north region, conducting various search operations, surprise attacks and arrests, and protecting towns and villages through surveillance and intelligence patrols. These actions are supported by the United States (drone surveillance) and France (security intelligence). The military strategy is also based on self-defence or vigilantism, insofar as the army relies on local civilians in its operations, particularly to obtain security intelligence. This action is combined with the disarmament and demobilization of former Boko Haram militiamen. Military action is sporadic and short-term, its main purpose being the strategic defence of the political regime of President Paul Barthélemy Biya, who has been in power for 43 years. Deradicalization takes the form of various programmes, projects and actions to combat violent extremism, including: women's empowerment programmes, agro-poultry training for young people, psychosocial support through the reintegration of ex-combatants, food distribution to refugees and internally displaced persons, and the establishment of local community conflict mediation centres. These various containment strategies against Boko Haram are driven by United Nations agencies, non-governmental organisations, other intergovernmental organisations and state development agencies, such as the Danish International Development Agency, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and the French Development Agency. The approach that informs these two components is that of the fight against terrorism. However, the issue of Boko Haram cannot be reduced to terrorism alone. These responses may prove insufficient to address the full scope of the challenge. But how can the problem be identified in its entirety? It is by understanding the place that Boko Haram occupies in the local context that the group can be categorized. Local Perceptions of Boko Haram To understand the place that Boko Haram occupies, it is necessary to know what the local populations of the Far North of Cameroon think about it. It is therefore necessary to analyse local discourse on the perception of Boko Haram. This discourse is structured around two main elements: local statements about Boko Haram and coexistence with Boko Haram. These two discursive registers form the basis for reflection on a potential local security model specific to the context of the Far North region of Cameroon. On the one hand, with regard to statements, Boko Haram, contrary to international perceptions, is considered a manifestation of mistrust that is part of local practices of resilience in the face of crises, whether social, political, economic or environmental. Boko Haram is not a unique phenomenon. Although the group itself is relatively recent, its practices (kidnappings, abductions, theft, looting and ransom demands) are very old in the Far North region of Cameroon and have been actively used by groups operating in the region since at least the 18th century. However, they intensified around the 1980s through ‘zarguina controls,’ or roadblock operations, which brutalized and robbed travellers in the region. These criminal operations are carried out by young people who live in the communities and participate in their active life. Sometimes they do so in collusion with traditional chiefdoms to line their pockets. These crimes are so endemic that they could be compared to a social institution which, although not codified, is perceived as normal. This is why roadblockers live in their communities and participate in their activities without necessarily being disturbed. They are therefore a product of the communities. Moreover, many young bandits come to the aid of their communities in the event of inter-community conflicts and, to date, participate in local vigilantism. All these elements indicate that, in relation to some of its practices (theft, looting and kidnapping) and given the profile of many of the young people involved (motorcycle taxi drivers from the Far North, for example), Boko Haram is an offshoot of local communities. It is not a foreign group. Even if certain practices such as attacks or preaching jihadist radicalism are among the movement's key strategies, it should be noted that they are new or only concern the modern version of local resilience, which, of course, many local populations reject. Given Boko Haram's proximity to local communities in terms of the origins of many of the young people who have joined it, and the similarity between its terrorist practices and older, normalized practices (theft, looting, kidnapping and ransom demands), it is extremely difficult to put in place a security system that could stop this movement through military means. The weight of history, identity and cultural ties between communities and young people affiliated with Boko Haram do not allow for a military solution to the threat posed by Boko Haram. The weakness of international approaches is that they consider this movement to be completely isolated. However, it is very much part of local social structures. On the other hand, the current international approach is complicated by the coexistence between communities and Boko Haram. This coexistence has its ups and downs. It is beneficial for a community when its young people, for example, defend it in situations of inter-community conflict. However, it is detrimental when these same young people then attack members of their own communities as well as members of other communities when they suspect them of colluding with the armed forces who are monitoring their positions. Life with Boko Haram is not only violent but also filled with normal activities such as fishing, farming, trade, illicit cross-border trafficking, and negotiations for social advancement. It is also marked by the group's ideological influence, particularly through young people, street children and other curious individuals who thus avoid loneliness and find at least some social purpose. Boko Haram's presence is therefore made possible by local interconnectivity that is shaped on a daily basis, despite the insecurity. In reality, there is no real social distance between Boko Haram militiamen and the local population. This means that, contrary to the international perception of Boko Haram as an isolated phenomenon, it is in fact a movement integrated into the local context. This is why locals do not consider peace that does not include the militants, or at least the former militants, to be viable. Boko Haram's intertwining with local life therefore indicates that a different security approach is needed. This approach must not exclude the militants, must not view the movement as having no roots in local life, and must not consider it as a mere manifestation of international terrorism. Conclusion The alternative for Canada lies in developing strategies to curb the negative effects of Boko Haram, not its social ties. This means devising norms that could compete with and replace those that allow the group to thrive. This goal could be achieved through organized discussions within community-based organisations. These norms should necessarily aim to promote community cohesion while preserving the idea of group identity. They must therefore focus on the pursuit of peace by eliminating mistrust or contestation of the various forms of legitimacy (NGO, national, international) proclaimed within communities. Finally, this solution proposed by local communities requires Canada to organize intensive discussions through research programmes that directly link universities and local community-based organizations. ## Should Canada Join the Golden Dome? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/should-canada-join-the-golden-dome/ Modified: 2025-09-02 Policy Forum Politique is a new publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic of national security significance to Canada. For this inaugural edition, we ask four experts for their perspectives on Canada's potential participation in the Golden Dome, a major multi-layered missile defence project that the Trump administration proposed earlier this year. Jean-François-Bélanger, Royal Danish Defence College Canada’s decision to join the Golden Dome project should be conditional on if and only if Ottawa is able to get binational governance terms that go beyond providing sensor and warning data. If secured, this deal would likely increase the “defence against help” effect of NORAD by strengthening Canadian commitment to continental defence north of the 49th parallel, and especially over the Arctic, as well as increase sovereign control on intercepts, from ballistic to hypersonic missiles, over Canadian territory. Moreover, it would avoid the ‘asymmetrical participation’ that the Bush administration demanded in the 2005 missile defence negotiations that had discouraged Canada’s involvement. Given how unpopular missile defence and space-based weapons have historically been in Canada, negotiating an exit clause would be crucial should the United States develop any future space-deployed missiles doctrine that goes counter to Canadian policies. Canadian involvement, therefore, would be based on a doctrine where intercepts do not come from missiles located in space as these could technically be used offensively as well. One area of negotiation could involve moving missile defence command responsibility from USNORTHCOM to NORAD itself. That way, intercepts over Canadian territory requires a Canadian key, much like the dual-key arrangements used by U.S. allies did with respect to forward deployed U.S.-owned nuclear weapons in the Cold War. Doing so would require the two countries to identify the binational command process as well as agree on the use and interpretation of incoming sensor data. Canada should not simply be consulted. It would play an integral part in the process. Policy-wise, Canada should provisionally join the initial phases of the Golden Dome project, the phases having to do with sensors and data, and as a mean to influence the architecture of the project. It should only commit investments for missile interceptors, and the major part of the price tag, after Ottawa can secure a binational command and control infrastructure over Canadian territory, access to the algorithm that will power the backend of the system, and a say in cost-control in the future. Jean-François Bélanger is Assistant Professor of Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College and holds a PhD from McGill University. His research interests include nuclear weapons, deterrence, and decision-making. Andrea Charron, University of Manitoba Due to its participation in NORAD, Canada is already engaged in the detection of air-breathing and ballistic missile threats to North America, and its control mission provides assets to defeat fixed wing and cruise missile attacks. Accordingly, given the status quo, Canada would be part of Golden Dome whether formally included or not. Given the threats posed by missiles, Canada needs its own integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) architecture coordinated with US and future NATO systems. The reasons are two-fold. First, because of Canada’s geography and how the fastest avenue of approach to hit U.S.-based targets is over Canada’s Arctic, the North Warning System (a series of short and long-range radar systems) and future over-the-horizon radar systems (i.e., Arctic and Polar variants) will provide essential domain awareness data. Second, because of NORAD’s three missions sets - aerospace warning and control and maritime warning - NORAD is responsible for detecting and defeating air threats to North America that include fighters, bombers, cruise missiles (whether air or sea launched), and intercontinental cruise missiles. What NORAD is not mandated to do is defeat incoming ballistic missiles. It struggles to deal with certain types of advanced uncrewed aerial systems given current sensors. Canada’s ‘no’ in 2005 to participate in the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Missile Defense System means that NORAD warns of the incoming ballistic missiles but has no say or role to play in their defeat. This decision-making authority rests with US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The threat environment has forced Canada to rethink its future defence needs.  Canada needs to defend its critical civilian and defence infrastructure and that requires IAMD. Spaced-based interceptors are a bridge too far but there are many parts of Golden Dome and future NATO systems in which Canada will and should participate. The advantage of allies is that sensors and systems they host far from Canada can assist Canada and vice versa.  While American and European systems will not specifically focus on Canada without our participation, Canada will need both national capabilities as well as allied assistance. Andrea Charron is Professor and Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba and holds a PhD from the Royal Military College of Canada. Her research interests include NORAD, NATO, the Arctic Council, and Canadian foreign and defence policy. Paul Meyer, Simon Fraser University There are some bad ideas that, despite all logic, arise periodically.  Such an idea is the dream in the United States that an impenetrable shield can be constructed to protect them against any form of missile attack. President Ronald Reagan embraced the shield concept with his Strategic Defense Initiative. It failed, however, to field a workable ground-based system, let alone a constellation of interceptors in space. Nevertheless, the defence industry was all too willing to spend billions in pursuing this mirage and the politicians were complicit in exempting the program from the usual regulations governing military procurement. At present,  President Donald Trump’s version of the national shield delusion is "Golden Dome". He claims that it can be created in three years for only $175 billion—an outrageous pipe dream that will receive the indulgence of major U.S. defence contractors. Canada should avoid this boondoggle for three reasons. One is its ineffectiveness: the mediocre performance of the existing ground-based system does not inspire confidence, whereas the fantastical space-based system would, by some estimates, require a constellation of 40,000 interceptors. Another is that it would be destabilizing since U.S. adversaries will not allow their retaliatory forces to be negated by a future system that just might generate some technological advantage and can be expected to increase their arsenals of offensive missiles as a hedge. Golden Dome could stymie future efforts to negotiate reductions. Putting interceptors in space would also destroy the hope of preserving it as a non-weaponized environment, something that Canada has championed for decades. Finally, there are the costs. According to the Congressional Budget Office, just the space-based aspects to defend against a couple of ICBMs would cost north of $500 billion. Trump has told Canada that participation in the Golden Dome project would cost roughly $100 billion. Canada should thus steer clear of the “black hole” that is Golden Dome and stick to our existing plans to contribute to NORAD modernization. Paul Meyer is Fellow in International Security and Adjunct Professor at Simon Fraser University, the Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group, and a former career Canadian diplomat. He was Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva from 2003 to 2007. Gaëlle Rivard Piché, CDA Institute The conversation around Canada’s potential participation in the Golden Dome often obscures the most urgent reality: Canada has become increasingly vulnerable to its adversaries. Russian bombers skirting North American airspace are no longer the only concern. Drones, advanced cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons now threaten both Canadian and U.S. homelands. Challenges in the maritime, space, and cyber domains only further complicate the picture. In considering whether Canada should join the Golden Dome, one must distinguish between the project’s political undertone and the operational imperatives that originally drove the United States to develop a multilayered defence system. Successive Commanders of NORAD and USNORTHCOM have repeatedly warned about the rapid evolution of these threats, not just to the United States but to North America as a whole. Canada has been slow to acknowledge that those dangers directly affect us as well. The NORAD mission is limited to aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. In the event of a ballistic attack, it is USNORTHCOM, not NORAD, that holds sole responsibility to intercept an incoming missile. Canada does not have an air and missile defence capability, leaving the country at the mercy of our adversaries and the goodwill of the United States. In case of a complex and layered attack against North America, one cannot assume that Washington would allocate its limited missile defence resources to shield Canadian targets. Integrated air and missile defence is now critical to the defence of Canada and North America. The Golden Dome is one possible avenue. Building a sovereign Canadian air and missile defence system is another. Both options raise critical questions about sheer capacity, cost, technology, command and control, and delivery timelines. Yet, by the very nature of NORAD, any sovereign Canadian system would inevitably be intertwined with U.S. defences. Ultimately, Canada cannot allow national pride to take precedence over national security and defence. Though sovereignty in defence has significant value, it must be weighed against the urgent need to integrate seamlessly with our closest military ally in the face of rapidly evolving threats to the continent. Gaëlle Rivard Piché is the Executive Director of the Conference of the Defence Associations and the CDA Institute. She holds a PhD in international affairs from Carleton University and worked as a strategic analyst with Defence Research and Development Canada. ## Should Canada’s Defence Policy Be Revised? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/should-canadas-defence-policy-be-revised/ Modified: 2020-09-09 > In this second capsule of the Strategic Analysis Network, our experts Anessa Kimball and Jean-Christophe Boucher question the relevance and viability of Canada's defense policy. In this second capsule of the Strategic Analysis Network led by Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, our experts Anessa Kimball and Jean-Christophe Boucher question the relevance and viability of Canada's defense policy “Protection, Security, Engagement” of 2017. In a context combining the COVID-19 pandemic, the re-emergence of protectionism and nationalism, the rise of China and other regional powers and the withdrawal of the Americans, is this policy adequate to address current challenges? If not, on what and how should it be revised? ## Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum? Armenia and Azerbaijan in Search of Regional Stability After the Nagorno-Karabakh War URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/si-vis-pacem-para-bellum-armenia-and-azerbaijan-in-search-of-regional-stability-after-the-nagorno-karabakh-war/ Modified: 2026-07-09 In the autumn of 2023, Azerbaijan's armed forces completed their reconquest of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, until then controlled by the self-proclaimed republic of Artsakh (its Armenian name). This military operation a priori settles the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which began in 1988 when Azerbaijan and Armenia were still Soviet socialist republics. The casus belli at the time was inter-ethnic tensions between Armenians and Azeris in the autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, and more specifically the request to transfer the oblast to the Armenian SSR, followed by the suspension of this so-called autonomy by the Azerbaijan SSR. Armenia won the first war (1988-1994), allowing the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to control this territory, as well as occupying some neighboring territories, which enabled the defense of this secessionist republic. In 1994, under the patronage of the Russian Federation, a ceasefire was brokered. The existence of the secessionist republic of Artsakh did not, however, lead to its recognition by other states, even Armenia. In 2016, Azerbaijan, led by the son of former president Heydar Aliyev, Ilham, launched an offensive to reclaim the Armenian-controlled lands. After further offensives in 2020 and 2023, Azerbaijan succeeded in regaining control of the entire territory. What might be perceived as a conflict between two states over a small province is in fact far from trivial. Firstly, unlike other post-Soviet conflicts, this one was characterized by the fragility of the peace during the conflict freeze. Secondly, this conflict was unusual in that it fell outside the framework of traditional alliances: here, NATO was not involved. Although the conflict pitted Azeris, who are predominantly Shiite Muslims, against Armenians, who are predominantly Christians, it was more a conflict of nationalism than religion. Moreover, Armenia was supported by Iran, which is Shiite Muslim as well. Finally, this conflict and its consequences are extremely important in today's geopolitical balance. This note looks at the geopolitical changes in 2024 for these two states: Armenia, which is making a real diplomatic U-turn; and Azerbaijan, which is multiplying its partnerships and trying to emerge as a new regional player. Armenia's pro-Western turn Pashinyan's decisions Nikol Pashinyan was elected Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia in 2018, following a movement known as the “Velvet Revolution.” This movement united part of the civil society against Serzh Sargsyan, then President of the Republic, who was attempting to grant himself a term extension. Pashinyan emerged as the government’s anti-corruption candidate, which had also been heavily influenced by the army since the 1990s. His liberal, progressive policies cut across traditional divides. On the geopolitical front, he tried to ease tensions with Azerbaijan, which was a failure from the point of view of Armenian nationalists: Nagorno-Karabakh is now entirely dominated by Azerbaijan, which is more powerful than ever. He also sought appeasement after the war, ceding some land to Azerbaijan. Pashinyan has also sought rapprochement with Turkey, the other regional power in the Caucasus, as well as with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Finally, Nikol Pashinyan's foreign policy is characterized by his divorce from Moscow. The Yerevan government first announced the suspension of its participation (on February 23, 2024), then its withdrawal (on June 12) from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (or CSTO), a Kremlin-led military alliance of former Soviet republics (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan). The CSTO is supposed to defend the strategic interests of its members. From Yerevan's point of view, the CSTO failed in its mission. Against this backdrop, Armenia has drawn closer to Western countries, notably France, Greece, and Cyprus, and to a lesser extent the United States, and has even raised the possibility of applying for European Union membership. The Russian reaction For the Russians, Nikol Pashinyan's policies are to blame for the defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to former Federation President Dmitry Medvedev, relationships with the West are the reason for the deterioration in Russian-Armenian relations. This position is shared by the Moscow government, through the voice of its spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who considered that the West was behind Pashinyan's decision to suspend his participation in CSTO meetings. Armenia's pro-Western turn seems to have been digested by Russian officials. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, Russia fears the “Ukrainization” of Armenia, i.e., the estrangement of a former Soviet Union from Russia. Indeed, Ukraine, through its cooperation with its Western partners, had also distanced itself from Russia over the past three decades. Until now, Armenia had been a pillar of Russia's “near abroad” made up of international organizations run by the Kremlin. In addition to the CSTO, which it has just left, Armenia is still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States. By comparison with Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia still has many ties with Russia. Pashinyan's decision to leave the Russian fold and move closer to Europe is justified by the Russians' abandonment of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but is not supported by everyone in Armenia. The reaction of the Armenian population There are two opposing views within Armenian society on the reasons for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. For Nikol Pashinyan and his supporters, it was Russia that failed to play its role in maintaining peace in the region. For example, Russia abandoned the Lachin corridor, which served as a bridge between the territory of the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. For Pashinyan's opponents, the divorce between Armenia and Russia predates the last war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Some even go so far as to adopt Moscow's language on rapprochement with the Europeans, who are unreliable in defending the Armenians. This vision is defended by the opposition to Nikol Pashinyan: firstly, by the partisan opposition, led by Gagik Tsarukyan, who is also one of the country's wealthiest individuals, and secondly by former presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan. The last few months have also seen the rise of the “Tavush for the Fatherland” movement, which organizes demonstrations with thousands of people calling for the resignation of the government in the face of this defeat. The movement takes its name from the Tavush region in the north-east, close to the villages ceded to Azerbaijan last year as part of the normalization efforts. The movement is spearheaded by Tavush Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan and is rallying crowds against Nikol Pashinyan. Recently, the Archbishop, who also holds Canadian nationality and is supported by the Armenian Apostolic clergy, even declared his intention to become Prime Minister and stepped down from his religious duties. The clergyman is also suspected by government MPs of being a spy for Russia. Today, his popularity, his rhetoric and his status as a cleric represent a danger to the Pashinyan government. Finally, the opposition is also symbolized by Artsakhi militants. Samvel Shahramanyan, the last president of the Republic of Artsakh, who today declares himself in exile in Armenia, decreed the dissolution of the republic after the defeat in September 2023, but then declared this dissolution “illegal” as it bypassed the Artsakhi parliament. Today, he is one of the leading figures of irredentism and is opposed to Pashinyan's pacifist strategy. In this highly tense political context, there is no doubt that the parliamentary elections of 2026 will play a major role in Armenia's medium-term development. Aliyev and Erdogan: a balancing act The stability of the Ankara-Baku alliance Since Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, Turkey has been its greatest ally, both as a trading partner and a geopolitical supporter. It is Turkey that has enabled Azerbaijan to develop its economy over the last thirty years, accompanying the construction of gas pipelines such as the South Caucasus Pipeline, which extracts gas from the Caspian Sea and distributes it to Turkey via Georgia, and avoids the Armenian route. Turkey supplied many weapons to Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh war, including the Bayraktar drones, which were used extensively. Turkey was also the first nation to support Azerbaijan in its conquest of territories then under Armenian control, as in the Shusha Declaration, signed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ilham Aliyev in a town just recaptured by Azerbaijani armed forces. The declaration confirms Turkey's support for Azerbaijan as a single nation with two states. Indeed, Turkey and Azerbaijan are very much aligned when it comes to foreign relations, as witnessed by the rapprochement between Azerbaijan and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Today, this alliance is highly consolidated and is justified by two main factors. In this highly tense political context, there is no doubt that the parliamentary elections of 2026 will play a major role in Armenia's medium-term development. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan has no incentive to forge alliances with either NATO or the CSTO and can trade with the European Union as well as with members of the Eurasian Economic Union. The second reason is more ideological: the Erdogan and Aliyev regimes have clear links with Pan-Turkism, i.e., the rapprochement of the Turkic peoples from Istanbul to Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. For example, since 2009, both countries have been members of the Organization of Turkic States, an important regional organization in Central and Western Asia, which enables numerous cooperative ventures in the fields of education, culture, energy, the fight against religious fundamentalism and more. Normalizing relations with Armenia? Pan-Turkism is also symbolized by the Zangezur corridor that the two leaders want to build. This corridor would pass through the Syunik region of Armenia, even cutting the border between Armenia and Iran, while giving Azerbaijan's main territory direct access to the autonomous province of Nakhichevan, an exclave on the other side of Armenia, as well as to the border with Turkey. Armenians see this project as a threat to their territorial integrity. Today, Armenia has its back against the wall, forced to come to terms with its two neighbors, who are also its two greatest rivals. Indeed, Turkey does not recognize the Armenian genocide, making it an eternal thorn in the side for reconciliation between the two states. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan remains its foe because of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and the ultranationalism of Ilham Aliyev's discourse. In fact, during meetings between Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev, the latter demanded, as part of the normalization process between the two countries, the cession of some border territories in the Tavush region, but also to remove from the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia the reference to the Declaration of Independence, which refers to the genocide of Armenians in “Western Armenia” (i.e., the eastern territory of present-day Turkey) and Artsakh (i.e., Nagorno-Karabakh, now part of Azerbaijan). References to Mount Ararat in Armenia's national symbols are also negatively judged by Ilham Aliyev. Finally, the latter has referred to Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan”, which is awakening Armenian nationalism and plunging Yerevan into a dilemma: should it normalize relations with Baku to finally move closer to the West, or prepare for an invasion of the entire territory by the Azerbaijani army? Russia is also trying to reappear in the diplomatic game between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Vladimir Putin recently paid a visit to Baku and is trying to bring his two counterparts together around a lasting peace agreement, which would restore Russia to a major role in the region. NATO and Russia: a complicated game since the war in Ukraine and Gaza The invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army in February 2022 had an indirect effect on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, since Moscow, which had been the arbiter in the region, abandoned it and then pointed the finger at the irresponsibility of the Yerevan government. Now out of the picture in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Russia has left the leadership to other regional powers, first and foremost Turkey. Turkey is a member of NATO but does not always share the positions of Western states in the Ukraine conflict and seeks to act as an intermediary between Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, to no avail. The Ankara regime is regularly at odds with its European partners. Azerbaijan has long had a privileged relationship with Ukraine and is also a member of the Organization for Democracy and Development, a pro-European regional cooperation organization in the post-Soviet space that is supposed to counterbalance Russian influence and is also called GUAM, after the initials of its members: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Azerbaijan has also been one of the European Union's privileged energy partners since the end of trade with Russia. A gas agreement between the European Commission and Azerbaijan was signed in 2022. However, Azerbaijan also has poor relations with some European countries, such as France, and is even suspected of interference in independence movements in New Caledonia, Martinique, Corsica, and French Polynesia. Both Turkey and Azerbaijan have succeeded in distancing themselves from Russia and trading with the Europeans but are at odds with them on certain issues. This independence, which could be described as strategic ambiguity, is only possible because Turkey has succeeded in building its own area of regional cooperation. The war in Gaza also revealed the ambiguity of the Turkish and Azerbaijani regimes on the subject. Turkey has regularly denounced the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip, both in its media relays and at the United Nations. Yet Turkey is one of Israel's main partners. Azerbaijan is even more closely allied with Israel, considered a true strategic partner. Israel sold drone and missile systems to Azerbaijan, which were used in its war against Armenia in 2020. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute even quotes a figure of 69% for arms imports of Israeli origin between 2016 and 2020. The reason for this rapprochement is certainly the presence of Iran, Israel's sworn enemy and Azerbaijan's great rival.  On the other hand, Armenia has just recognized the State of Palestine. Conclusion: Security risks in the region, issues that concern other powers The South Caucasus is undergoing a major geopolitical transformation. The end of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh may have ended a thirty-five-year-old conflict, but the peace agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan are too contentious to consider the rivalry between the two countries to be over. Efforts are being made at the diplomatic level, but domestic political interests are fuelling the possibility of a non-resolution of the conflict, or even an exacerbation of tensions. It is therefore important to consider the different agendas of the countries in the region. For Nikol Pashinyan's government, the priority is to re-establish relations with its Azerbaijani and Turkish neighbors, in order to guarantee the sovereignty of the Republic of Armenia over its territory. Secondly, the Prime Minister's objective is to pursue rapprochement with the West. For him, the loss of Artsakh is certainly a tragedy for the Armenian people, but it is also an opportunity to no longer depend on the Kremlin's political orientations: withdrawal from the CSTO, end of Russian missions around Nagorno-Karabakh, alliances with European countries, application for membership of the European Union. He faces two challenges: the mistrust of an increasingly nationalistic section of the population, likely to want to re-establish the Russian security umbrella; and the extremely hard-line positions of the regime in Baku, which are not conducive to appeasement, and which, at least in terms of rhetoric, mock Nikol Pashinyan's pacifist ambitions. For Ilham Aliyev, the agenda is harder to decipher. The re-conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh was a quasi-consubstantial principle in the formation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the end of this war marks a new chapter for him. Azerbaijan aims to develop along the lines of the Arab Gulf states. Indeed, its economic model is based on energy exports, in this case gas, managed by the national company SOCAR. Anxious to present a modern image of his country, Ilham Aliyev was awarded the COP29. His next major objective is to implement the Zangezur corridor project. While Azerbaijan can count on a very good relationship with Turkey, its relations with its European partners have seriously deteriorated in recent months. The war waged to restore its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, where several NGOs have reported human rights violations and war crimes, has earned it criticism from the European Commission and the Council of Europe. France and Azerbaijan now share an appalling relationship, against a backdrop of cyberwarfare, interference in internal affairs and propaganda. Turkey, for its part, is seeking to deepen integration with Azerbaijan, and supports the Zangezur corridor project. At the same time, there has been a slight rapprochement with the government in Yerevan. Turkey's aim is to establish itself as a regional player and a key interlocutor for the great powers. This strategy is similar to that pursued in the Middle East (Syria), Africa (Libya, Somalia) and the Western Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo). Russia has clearly lost out in the geostrategic developments of recent years. Militarily, Russia has disappeared from the South Caucasus, except in the breakaway republics of Georgia. However, in parallel with its desire to exhaust Ukrainian resistance and Western support, Russia is trying to reposition itself in the South Caucasus: as it seeks to regain control in Georgia, it can also push a section of the Armenian population to sanction Nikol Pashinyan's government and install a more favorable regime in Yerevan, playing on ethnic tensions and the thirst for revenge among the Artsakhis. At the same time, Vladimir Putin is seeking a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In short, the Kremlin has a vested interest in asserting itself in the Caucasus, given the dramatic situation in its northern part, particularly in Dagestan, where Islamist and pro-independence tendencies are on the increase. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the main objective is the failure of the Zangezur corridor, which would deprive it of a real border with Armenia, an economic partner in the Caucasus. Relations with Azerbaijan have always been cold, ever since the latter's independence. Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey (1992-1993) called for the unification of all Azeris, including those living in Iran, who represent one of the country's largest minorities. This irredentist movement led Iran to take up Armenia's cause, on the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. Baku's ongoing support for Israel reinforces this rivalry, and the death in a helicopter crash of President Ebrahim Raisi on his return from a visit to Azerbaijan has not helped bilateral relations. Finally, the position of Western states remains ambiguous. While there are obviously nuances in the positions of the various states and institutions, there is one overriding trend: the United States, France and the European Union are attempting to counter the influence of other regional powers in the Caucasus. But the delicate question of their position in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has come to the fore: on several occasions, these countries have expressed their support for the Armenians, while trying to promote negotiations between Yerevan and Baku. The Western position was criticized by both sides: for the Armenians, it ignored the geopolitical imbalance and the violence; for Azerbaijan, mediation was inaudible, given its support for Nagorno-Karabakh. Now that the war is over, the West can resume its role as guarantor of regional security, particularly with a view to countering Russian ambitions. ## South China Sea: Faced with Chinese Affirmation, Which Common Front? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/south-china-sea-faced-with-chinese-affirmation-which-common-front/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > In the summer of 2020, tension can be seen in the South China Sea between China, on the one hand, and several Southeast Asian states and the United States, on the other. In the summer of 2020, tension can be seen in the South China Sea between China, on the one hand, and several Southeast Asian states and the United States, on the other. While the rise in economic and military power of China has not ceased to become clear in the region for several years, recent developments seem to reflect the Chinese desire to further assert its claims in this maritime space. On March 3, 2020, a Chinese coast guard vessel rammed and sunk a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Paracel Islands, disputed between Beijing and Hanoi, and occupied by the Chinese since 1974. On April 17, a coast guard vessel of Malaysia reported the presence in the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone of a Chinese oil exploration vessel escorted by seven Chinese Coast Guard vessels. Malaysia has not officially responded to this violation of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), but the coast guard continued to monitor the Chinese vessel. In early July, China carried out military maneuvers around the Paracel Islands, then again in August simultaneously in four seas surrounding China. Finally, at the end of August, following an overflight of the Gulf of Bohai by an American spy plane, the Chinese navy fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles in the South China Sea. In addition, the number of “freedom of navigation operations”[1] carried out by the United States in the South China Sea went from zero in 2014 to two in 2015, then three in 2016, six in 2017, five in 2018 and new in 2019. While the US Navy is not left out, renewed Chinese aggressiveness has sparked widespread disapproval in the region. Even the Philippines, which President Duterte has consistently drawn closer to China while distancing itself from the US ally, responded by showing solidarity with Vietnam. In July, breaking with its traditional position of neutrality on the issue of conflicting claims in the South China Sea, the United States firmly rejected Chinese claims. Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, has bluntly condemned what he believes reflects Beijing's desire to consider the South China Sea under its sovereignty. In April 2020, the US Navy conducted maneuvers with Australia in the South China Sea, followed by new maneuvers in July, involving, exceptionally, two aircraft carriers. Considering from both sides, is this an attempt by China to further advance its positions in the China Sea, or is it taking advantage of the economic and political difficulties of the United States and its allies caused by the pandemic? What exactly is it? Analysis - A Determined Chinese Strategy Chinese policy in the South China Sea dispute is characterized by three major points: alternating crises followed by periods of appeasement; the refusal to recognize the principles of international law of the sea while maintaining a great ambiguity on the nature of Chinese claims; a clever policy of division among the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). First, the region has already seen other episodes of heightened tension, usually as a result of Chinese initiatives. China is clever and carefully targets its interventions in order to minimize the political impact of its actions, thus gradually advancing its military positions and political interests. As the last power to occupy islets in the Spratley Archipelago, it occupied a few positions in 1988 following a naval confrontation with Vietnam alone, playing on the division caused by the alignment of Hanoi with the Soviet bloc. In 1995, China extended its positions at the expense of the Philippine sector, without a settlement being reached. China subsequently played appeasement with negotiations on a Code of Conduct, which went unheeded, then offered the possibility of joint development zones, notably in 2005 with the Philippines, then in 2013 with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin and again in 2017 with the Philippines. These projects have never come to fruition. In 2014, a severe crisis began when massive land reclamation work on the islands occupied by China was discovered, with the aim of building airfields, hangars and docks, therefore, what appears to be the construction of military support points. China is not alone in this major work; Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia also backfilled and expanded their islets to develop military installations, but the extent of the work carried out for the Chinese garrisons was beyond measure. The Pentagon estimated the backfilled areas on the sea, from December 2013 to June 2015, at 2,900 acres (1,173.6 hectares) by China, 80 (32.4 ha) by Vietnam, 70 (28.3 ha) by Malaysia, 14 acres (5.67 ha) by the Philippines and 8 acres (3.24 ha) by Taiwan. Once its positions were strengthened, China relaxed its pressure for a few years. The current crisis therefore seems to mark the recurrence of this Chinese strategy of alternating pressure and appeasement. Second, in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), seized by the Philippines, rendered a judgment invalidating any claim to maritime space from the islets of the Spratleys, as well as any claim based on the notion of historical title. The Court did not rule on the claims of sovereignty over the islets, but clarified that they could only generate territorial waters, thereby destroying any legal basis for extensive claims of sovereign rights on the part of China. Beijing refuses to recognize the judgment, while maintaining an ambiguous line, refusing to specify how the limits of its claims in the South China Sea (the famous nine dashes) were drawn, nor the nature of the waters thus defined: territorial sea, exclusive economic area, or simple maritime zone in which the islands belong to it? The behavior of China and its coast guard, intercepting foreign trawlers and drilling platforms, increasingly militates for a claim corresponding at least to an EEZ, but whose scope is in clear contradiction with the principles of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially since the PCA judgment of 2016. Third, China has skillfully played on rivalries between ASEAN players and occasional friction with the United States. Thus, the tactics of selective targeting of countries targeted by China's coups, discussed above, have enabled Beijing to avoid forming a common front. In 1988, China attacked only Vietnam, then isolated in a context of the Cold War, thus eliciting only weak reactions from the other protagonists, even though this conflict allowed China to take a military position in the Spratley Archipelago. In 1995, China occupied positions only in the Philippine sector of the Spratleys, again provoking a weak reaction from members of ASEAN, and again in 2012 with the capture of the Scarborough Reef. In 2013, when the Philippines lodged their complaint with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, other ASEAN members involved in the conflict offered little support. Providing solid political and economic support also allows Beijing to develop strong relations with certain members of ASEAN, in particular Thailand, which hardly seems to prioritize diplomatic action to counter China in the South China Sea, and especially Cambodia, whose regime and economy enjoy unwavering support from Beijing. In return, Cambodia has twice blocked ASEAN draft motions, in 2012 and 2016, addressing the political and military situation in the South China Sea. Security Implications and Strategy for Canada China seems clearly determined to deploy a long-term strategy in order to advance its interests and demands. China knows how to play with divisions between ASEAN countries to advance its positions and has been able to avoid any casus belli with the United States. The security risk, in the short term, is relatively low: it resides essentially in the gradual increase in the solidification of Chinese positions and the possibility of prevailing its claims over the disputed archipelagos and the maritime areas of the South China Sea; and in the risk of seeing American FoNoPs slip into a crisis, or even a military incident. Until the United States itself ratifies UNCLOS, any Washington argument based on the international legal order, even though China ratified UNCLOS in 1994, will be seen as very limited, if not biased. Moreover, in the eyes of an increasingly uninhibited China, the very reading of international law is becoming divergent from that of the West. Thus, for China, the military maneuvers of a third state are not acceptable in the EEZ, while the West contends that nothing of the kind is in UNCLOS. And China Persists in Dismissing 2016 PCA Judgment. Washington's unilateral display of naval power, especially if it relies on the active participation of allies in the region, may send a message of deterrence, but this arm wrestling strategy can be risky if only for friction on the ground. It will take careful multilateral diplomacy to persuade China to engage in negotiations with ASEAN to find a rules-based solution. For the moment, China rejects any multilateral negotiations. Washington's military maneuvers and bilateral security agreements must be matched by efforts to strengthen ASEAN's capacity. This capacity is up to the states of the region to find it, by silencing their differences (rivalries over the overlapping claims of maritime areas, disputes over the occupation of certain islands) to develop a common front as broad as possible, in the absence of an illusory common front from ASEAN. Thus, the Philippine President Duterte, a long time very pro-Chinese leader, approached Vietnam and Malaysia after his election in 2016, noting the rigidity of China in the dispute over the fishing zones and the occupation of Scarborough Reef. Indonesia, faced with recurring incursions by Chinese ships and trawlers into its EEZ northeast of the Natuna Islands, is ostensibly moving closer to Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi. As the Vietnamese Prime Minister said in November 2019 at the ASEAN summit, “in 2020 we want to focus on strengthening the sustainable cohesion of ASEAN by supporting solidarity and unity…” Canada has long made significant efforts to foster dialogue among the protagonists in this dispute, funding and facilitating informal discussions around the turn of the century, from the late 1980s until about 2006. Without turning its back on this openness, and while pursuing diplomatic action to moderate American action, it now seems more appropriate to work for the construction of a real consensus in maritime Southeast Asia for a strong common position against China. [1] Freedom of Navigation Operations, FoNoPs, are naval operations aimed at deliberately ignoring claims that Washington deems excessive, or at manifesting a political message. In the South China Sea, these are ships entering the territorial waters of the Paracel Islands, fully occupied by China since 1974 but claimed by Vietnam. ## Sovereignty and Security in the Canadian Arctic: Who Should We Be Wary of? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/sovereignty-and-security-in-the-canadian-arctic-who-should-we-be-wary-of/ Modified: 2025-11-17 Several articles published in September 2025 revived alarmist positions on threats to Canada's sovereignty. Their authors paint a bleak picture of a Canada unable to control its Arctic territory and facing aggressive China and Russia, which have great ambitions for its territory. These grim scenarios include Russian icebreakers sailing through the waters of the Arctic archipelago, Chinese bases built without the knowledge of Canadian authorities, and even an attack on the Canadian Arctic by the Russian military. The problem is that this bleak picture is based on highly theoretical scenarios and irrelevant observations. Worse still, it probably misses the real issues, which lie both in the need for the Canadian government to ensure a governmental presence in the North and to counter any challenges to its sovereignty in the Beaufort Sea and the Northwest Passage by the United States. Are the Bear and the Dragon Real Predators? On what basis can we claim that Russian icebreakers will ply the waters of the Northwest Passage, when they already have their hands full along the Siberian coast and are built specifically to support commercial traffic? On what basis can we claim that China could build a base in the archipelago without the work being detected? How can we claim that Chinese commercial vessels will sail through Canadian Arctic waters without asking for permission? What are these mysterious precedents of Chinese research vessels that, according to the authors, regularly dock on Canadian Arctic territory to illegally install telecommunications equipment? The only known case of a Chinese vessel approaching the Canadian Arctic coast without a planned visit is that of the icebreaker Xuelong in Tuktoyaktuk in 1999, but this request was lost in the maze of Canadian bureaucracy. There was, of course, the case of the Chinese surveillance buoys, which were found (and removed) by the Canadian Armed Forces a few years ago: however, the qualitative leap between the presence of buoys and the establishment of structures on land would be very significant. Furthermore, the fact that the Canadian military recovered the surveillance buoys is more evidence that Canada is monitoring its Arctic and can respond to intrusions than the opposite. Beyond these elements, which are more speculation than fact, proponents of the Sino-Russian scenario use generalisations to portray collusion between China and Russia, whose intentions would, of course, necessarily be hostile to Canada. Russia is aggressive in NATO countries' airspace – that is true, but in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, in the context of the war in Ukraine – and therefore poses a threat in the Arctic. However, the frequency of Russian air patrols in North American airspace remains low (1, 2, 3). Russia has not withdrawn from the Arctic Council; Russia has never contested Canada's or Denmark's claims to extended continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean, even though these claims encroach on its own, and even when Canada extended its claimed territory in 2022. It is as if, under a tacit agreement that continues despite tensions in Ukraine, the Arctic coastal states refrain from contesting their neighbours' claims [1]. Furthermore, cooperation between Russia and the other Arctic states continued after February 2022 at the Conference of the Parties to the international agreement for the prevention of unregulated fishing activities in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean. In the South China Sea, China has exerted strong military pressure to seize islands and sideline other regional players – that is correct – and therefore poses a threat in the Arctic. But what is the link between the Arctic and the China Sea? In the Arctic context, China has ratified the moratorium on commercial fishing in the central Arctic Ocean, in addition to adopting the Polar Code standards. China is increasing its polar scientific missions – that is correct – and these missions are said to have a dual civilian and military purpose – that is possible. China has begun participating in joint patrols with Russia, both aerial patrols south of the Bering Strait and naval patrols along the Northern Sea Route. Some authors conclude that China poses a short-term threat to Canada's Arctic sovereignty. These assertions are based on assumptions and geographical extrapolations without any real evidence of hostile intentions in the Arctic. Formulating a hypothesis is not the same as asserting the existence of threats. If Russia is reinvesting in its military sphere after years of rapid decline, it is notably with the aim of redeveloping its fleet and military assets, which declined significantly during the 1990s after the collapse of the USSR. We can consider, for example, the evolution of Russian naval personnel since 1983 (Figure 1). Figure 1: Change in the number of vessels in the Russian fleet, 1983-2024 It is clear that Russia's fleet is nowhere near the size it was during the Soviet era, and has continued to decline except for submarines and frigates. There have been recent modernisations, but they have been slow (13 years of construction for the latest Neustrashimny frigate; 9 years for the latest Borei-class SSBN) due to underinvestment in shipyards and a loss of expertise following the departure of many engineers. The actual modernisations and recent launches do not compensate for the withdrawals. Efforts have been made on submarines, destroyers and frigates, reflecting a defensive posture (1, 2) known as the defence of the Barents Sea stronghold. The basis of Russian doctrine remains nuclear deterrence, while the naval forces increasingly have coastal defence units (frigates, corvettes) designed to protect Siberian economic assets and, above all, the launch area for ballistic submarines. These naval units are not well suited to long-range assaults. Furthermore, Russia has only two assault ships (and several smaller landing craft). None of the ships in the Russian fleet are ice-class. Similarly, Western media widely reported on Russia's strong communication during the deployment of Bastion mobile anti-ship missiles in 2018. However, these are essentially medium-range (300 km) coastal defence systems. They therefore do not pose a direct threat to Canada. Finally, no new Russian military bases have been opened in the Arctic, except for a building housing a 250-strong battalion near the Nagurskoye air base in the Franz Josef Land archipelago. These reopenings of old bases (1, 2), which have been modernised, do not necessarily constitute a step towards an attack on Canada. Russia emphasises that it has strengthened its air defences and coastal radars, but once again, this reflects a defensive posture: Russia maintains the perception that it could be attacked by NATO forces, even though the exploitation of Arctic resources now accounts for around 10-15% of its GDP. If any theatre of operations could give rise to concern about Russia's military reinvestment efforts, it would be Norway, close to the Baltic Sea, where tensions between Russia and the West are felt. But precisely because of the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Russian naval manoeuvres in the Norwegian Sea have decreased, while the number of air patrols has remained relatively stable. In the North American Arctic, NORAD reported eight Russian patrols in the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Alaska or Canada in 2023, 12 in 2024 and eight as of 28 October 2025. This is close to the average since 2007 (around 12 patrols per year), which is fairly low, with relatively non-aggressive flight patterns: military flights in ADIZs are not illegal under international law, and NORAD considers that these patrols do not pose any danger. There is therefore clearly no aggressive military posture on the part of Russia towards other regions of the Arctic, but rather a genuine effort to modernise and increase its defence capabilities. It is clear that Canada must not allow its weak capabilities for control, observation and surveillance of its Arctic domain to become entrenched over time. Similarly, especially in a context of political tension with Russia and China, it is important to maintain real vigilance, develop contingency plans in the Arctic and preserve real operational capability. The increase in maritime traffic due to climate change requires improved control and response capabilities, not only to counter military threats, but above all to be able to prevent the risk of accidents and environmental disasters. The long delay (five weeks) in rescuing the container ship Thamesborg, which ran aground in the Northwest Passage on 6 September 2025 and received little media coverage in Canada, should be instructive in this regard. However, these shortcomings do not mean that Russia and China are seeking to take over the Canadian Arctic. Furthermore, maritime transit traffic remains very low, and the recent media buzz surrounding the transit of a container ship between China and the United Kingdom via the Northern Sea Route cannot hide the lack of interest of most shipping companies in this activity (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6): in 2024, 97 ships transited via the NSR and 31 via the Northwest Passage (including only 10 commercial vessels), compared to more than 11,000 via Panama and more than 18,000 via Suez. Meanwhile, in Washington... While some believe the threat lies with Moscow and Beijing, others are looking south instead. This is the case for Adam Lajeunesse, director of the Canadian Maritime Security Network, Stéphane Roussel and, more recently, Franklin Griffiths, professor emeritus at the University of Toronto, who express serious concerns that the United States will undermine the sovereignty and security of the Canadian Arctic. In addition to the tariffs imposed on many of its exports, Canadian society has taken note of President Trump's threats of annexation (sometimes disguised as urgent invitations) and his questioning of border demarcations. What is more, the White House tenant has also threatened to annex Greenland and the Panama Canal, even if it means using force to achieve this. It is impossible to gauge the seriousness of such threats, but the hostility, or at the very least the lack of consideration shown by the Trump administration towards Canada, may justify the formulation of more dangerous, immediate and pressing scenarios. One such scenario concerns the Canadian Arctic. There are two maritime disputes between Canada and the United States in this region: one concerns the maritime boundary (territorial sea and EEZ) between the two countries in the Beaufort Sea, the other the legal status of the Northwest Passage, considered as internal waters by Canada and as an international strait by the United States. In the latter case, fears sparked by the voyages of the SS Manhattan in 1969 and the USGC Polar Sea in 1985 were allayed following the signing of the Arctic Cooperation Agreement between the two countries in 1988, although the subject periodically resurfaces in debates on security in the Canadian Arctic. It was the first Trump administration that reawakened this old demon in 2019 when it ordered a freedom of navigation operation in the Canadian North, an operation that did not take place. This type of initiative involves sending ships into international waters that a state claims as its own in order to reaffirm the right of third parties to navigate freely in those waters. This is the scenario that Franklin Griffiths imagines in the near future, which would render the 1988 Agreement null and void. There are several reasons why the American President might take such action: to intimidate Canada into making trade, economic (such as access to certain resources) or even territorial concessions; to destabilise a government with which he is negotiating; and even, why not, to give weight to his plan to absorb Canada. Paradoxically, scenarios based on a Chinese or Russian threat could serve American aims, as they could provide the Trump administration with a pretext for action. The United States could thus justify an initiative against Canadian sovereignty by claiming to want to protect it from a takeover by Moscow or Beijing. Moreover, such action would send a signal to other powers that Washington has revived the Monroe Doctrine and that Canada, like the rest of the Americas, is once again the preserve of the United States. It is against such ‘help’ that Canadians must guard themselves, explain Lagassé and Massie (2025). The principle that Canada must guard against potentially overly intrusive assistance from the United States was first formulated in the 1970s by researcher Nils Ørvik (1973), but this is probably the first time it has been so relevant. Nevertheless, Canada has more cards in its hand than one might think. The United States is singularly poor in terms of its ability to navigate the Arctic, with only three operational icebreakers (Polar Star, Healy and Storis). The recent agreement with Finland for the delivery of four icebreakers does not provide for the delivery of the first vessel until 2028. Sending a military unit that is not designed to deal with ice would be extremely risky, to the point where American ships might need Canadian assistance – which would greatly weaken the scope of the operation. Another threat looms over the Canadian Arctic. A glance at a map of North America reveals how significant the consequences would be for Canada if the United States were to annex Greenland. Canada would find itself almost surrounded by American territory, with the United States having direct access to the Northwest Passage. Despite maintaining ocean access on the east and west coasts, Canada's geopolitical situation would become very uncomfortable. The risk of Washington launching a freedom of navigation operation will remain for the foreseeable future. The Canadian government must therefore be prepared to respond quickly to a potential crisis by symbolically deploying one or more Navy and Coast Guard units in response to the American initiative. In the medium and long term, this posture requires significant investment in equipment, infrastructure and operations. The windfall generated by the spectacular growth in the defence budget announced by the Carney government provides an opportunity to proceed with this reinforcement. In addition to the need to counter a possible American initiative, there is another reason to support the growth of resources allocated to the Canadian Forces to operate in the Arctic, namely the growing importance of the Canadian Forces' role as a constabulary and in supporting the operations of other departments in the region. The Department of National Defence is the only government organisation with the physical means to operate in the region and therefore to represent authority there. In this regard, it must ensure compliance with laws and the provision of services to local communities, as well as have the capacity to respond to emergencies. Climate change and the resulting increase in human activity in the region (resource exploitation, shipping, tourism) only serve to increase the demand for government services. Furthermore, the fulfilment of this mission complements and reinforces the mission to assert Canadian sovereignty in the region, as both require an effective and visible official presence. It can be argued that defence efforts in the Canadian Arctic are aimed at countering Russian or Chinese threats, and that these efforts are insufficient. Waving the flag of loss of sovereignty and territory may be a good slogan, but this fear is rarely the basis for a coherent and rigorous Arctic policy. In reality, by protecting its territory, Canada is primarily defending itself against American ‘help’. [1] The only exception was when Washington published its claim in 2023, which Moscow contested, not so much because of the maritime space claimed by the United States, but because, for Moscow – and this point is credible – Washington cannot invoke Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea if the US has not ratified the convention. ## Space Cooperation: Will Canada Dare to Take the Lead? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/space-cooperation-will-canada-dare-to-take-the-lead/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Canada must intensify its international cooperation in outer space to remain competitive and relevant in the global arena... Canada must intensify its international cooperation in outer space to remain competitive and relevant in the global arena. This strategic note explores Canada's current shortcomings in this area and proposes recommendations for improving its capabilities and influence, including (and especially) by positioning itself as a pioneer in the use of today's artificial intelligence (AI) in space activities. With the help of its expertise in the creation and exploitation of AI, Canada has the opportunity to strengthen its international partnerships, invest in research and development, and adopt a multidisciplinary approach. In this new paradigm of access to space, Canada can consolidate its position as a leader in the exploration and exploitation of space. Introduction Improving Canada's international cooperation in the field of outer space, with particular emphasis on the use of artificial intelligence (AI), is crucial to strengthening its position on the world stage. Canada has made several notable contributions in this field, notably with the famous Canadarm, used in space missions since the 1980s, and the design of Canadarm3, scheduled for 2024-2025, which will play a key role in the Lunar Gateway space station, the figurehead of tomorrow's space exploration. Canada's contribution to the James Webb Space Telescope, or to research using it such as the Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) or the Near-InfraRed Imager and Slitless Spectrograph (NIRISS) also illustrates its advanced technological capabilities. In addition, the NEOSSat mission, a space telescope dedicated to monitoring near-Earth objects, demonstrates Canada's commitment to space observation. The bottom line is simple: Canada has everything it takes to position itself as a leading nation in space exploration and exploitation. However, in this quest, it needs to rely more on a multilateral approach, rather than the unilateral or bilateral partnerships that currently predominate. Instead of seeking to position itself as a global leader in all aspects of space exploration, Canada can capitalize on its specific strengths, such as artificial intelligence, to become a reference partner in these precise, carefully chosen fields. By excelling in these fields of expertise, Canada would then stand out in international collaborations and become a key player, without necessarily assuming the role of total leader. It should be noted that this decision to specialize requires rigorous resource management and a sustained commitment to maintaining this strategic position. Although potentially risky, such a targeted strategy could enable Canada to maximize its influence and competitiveness on a global scale. However, despite its technical achievements, Canada remains largely dependent on NASA for most of its space activities, in the light of the ISS or the future Lunar Gateway. This dependence limits Canada's autonomy, and often positions it in the role of contributor rather than leader. Insufficient funding for Canadian space activities, compared to other OECD countries (ranking 22nd in 2021), hinders the full development of new technologies and initiatives. Thus, the lack of a clear, coherent and independent long-term national strategy prevents Canada from maximizing its potential in this field. One of the reasons for this dependence is limited financial resources. Although these partnerships strengthen Canada's position, they confine it to a role of secondary contributor. This short-term vision and the absence of solid partnerships with emerging nations (India, China, UAE among others) limit opportunities for collaboration and innovation. To bridge these gaps, Canada can fully leverage its AI capabilities to strengthen its contributions and partnerships in international space missions. Canada has already begun to integrate these technologies, notably in the development of the Lunar Gateway space station, but must continue and intensify its efforts. Developing additional strategic partnerships with emerging nations and other key players in the space sector is essential if Canada is to position itself as a key expert and leader in these fields. In short, by focusing on technological innovation (particularly AI) and strengthening its international collaborations, Canada can bridge its gaps and secure its place in global space exploration. This strategy would enable Canada to play a central role in future space missions, and ensure its international competitiveness. This strategic note will focus on three themes: Canada's current shortcomings, AI as a key asset, and four recommendations to establish Canada as a leader. Canada's shortcomings in space exploration Canadian government funding for space activities is well below that of many other OECD countries. In 2022-2023, the Canadian Space Agency's (CSA) budget was C$329.9 million, with projections of a drop to C$300.5 million in 2023-2024 and C$252.5 million in 2024-2025. As a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), Canada's space budget ranks 22nd among OECD nations. By way of comparison, investments as a proportion of GDP by countries such as the United States, France or Germany, and even some smaller countries in terms of economic size, far outstrip Canada's financial contributions to its space program. This low percentage highlights Canada's competitive gap with nations that invest more heavily and show greater ambition. The Minister of Industry also acknowledges that the funding strategy ensures that “telecommunications services are reliable, innovative, competitive and, above all, affordable”: a somewhat dissonant phrase in view of the ever-decreasing funding allocated to the CSA. In reality, this undisguised orientation reveals the government's limited ambition for the space sector. The consequences could have long-term implications for Canada's position on the international stage. As a result, this budgetary weakness limits Canada's ability to develop and deploy advanced space technologies independently. This, in turn, reduces the country's potential impact on international space missions. Insufficient investment hinders innovation and the adoption of new technologies, such as AI for space exploration, and hampers Canada's international competitiveness against nations that are investing (economically and strategically) massively in their space programs - like the new “space nations”. As a result, Canada runs the risk of potentially losing opportunities for collaboration and participation in large-scale space projects, such as the Lunar Gateway or the Artemis II mission, without adequate financial support. To continue, lack of investment hinders the CSA's ability to innovate and adopt new technologies, such as advanced propulsion systems, next-generation materials and autonomous landing techniques. This situation forces Canada to depend on technologies and infrastructures developed by other countries, de facto reducing its strategic and technological autonomy. As a result, Canada finds itself in an economically weak position, and cannot count on its investments to generate a return. In reality, lack of adequate funding and dependence on international partners limit Canada's influence in setting international space exploration agendas and standards. By being perceived as a minor contributor rather than a convincing standard-bearer, Canada doesn't carry as much weight in critical decisions and international negotiations, which can have long-term implications for its position in the global space arena. Secondly, the lack of appropriate funding is also due to the absence of a coherent, long-term national space strategy. As in a vicious circle, these two limiting factors, influencing each other and at the same time, have the effect of hindering its autonomy and global influence. This strategy is primarily aimed at strengthening Canada's participation in international initiatives such as the Lunar Gateway mission, but it lacks an integrated vision for the autonomous development of the country's space capabilities. All the solutions proposed in the CSA's “Exploration, Imagination, Innovation” plan end up being development programs that are or will be part of a larger whole dominated by other spacefaring nations. Canada thus assumes a position of follower rather than leader: the strategy put in place does not involve any vision of its own. Indeed, Canada's strong dependence on the USA and other Western international partners is reflected in significant participation in joint projects, rather than in the development of independent missions. For example, the Canadarm3, while innovative and technologically excellent, is a Canadian contribution to NASA's Artemis II mission. Canada's position as a secondary contributor enables us to benefit from the international influence of our allies, while avoiding risk-taking. This strategy, understandable in many respects, does not commit the country and its companies to emancipating themselves and proposing their own projects, which is a social, industrial, economic and political loss for the country to gain. Yet Canada itself estimates that “financial forecasts indicate that it will more than double by 2040, reaching annual revenues of $1,000 billion”, if these follow the same 70% progression observed between 2010 and 2020. This exponential growth of the global space economy contrasts sharply with Canada's cautious approach, revealing a striking dissonance between financial projections and the country's current strategy. By failing to position itself proactively in this booming sector, Canada could miss out on considerable economic and innovation opportunities. Even more alarmingly, this over-dependence could become a risk factor, especially in view of the advances in space defense being made by other countries. Furthermore, funding and support strictly limited to purely Canadian initiatives hampers the country's ability to pursue space projects independently. Canada then turns to “easy” opportunities, drastically reducing its ability to innovate and collaborate. Following on from the previous shortcomings, Canada's relative autonomy is explained by space partnerships maintained almost exclusively with its traditional allies, such as the United States and members of the European Space Agency (ESA). While these historical collaborations are beneficial, they limit the scope of Canadian partnerships to a narrow circle of technologically advanced nations. This limited approach poses two major problems. Firstly, the lack of space partnerships with emerging nations prevents Canada from benefiting from the unique perspectives and innovations these countries can offer. Emerging nations are increasingly investing in their space programs and developing innovative technologies at often lower costs. For example, countries like India and China have made significant advances in space exploration at lower cost. Also, in terms of image on the international stage, the United Arab Emirates' strategy is one to watch closely, and collaborations with Canada in this direction could be envisaged. In short, broadening our horizons could open up mutually beneficial collaboration opportunities for Canada. Opening up to more diversified collaborations must be approached with caution in the context of global strategic rivalries. The space sector, closely linked to national security interests, imposes restrictions on partnerships with nations in direct geopolitical competition with Canada's traditional allies, such as the United States. This raises crucial issues of confidentiality and technological sovereignty, calling for a measured engagement strategy capable of reconciling security imperatives while fostering beneficial collaborations. We must be careful, however, not to perpetuate this “follower” logic should these partnerships come into being. Canada must be in a position to contribute the expertise that is indispensable in international collaboration and negotiations, in order to secure its place as a leader. Secondly, by focusing solely on traditional partnerships, Canada risks missing out on opportunities for influence and leadership in new space markets. As explained above, the risk for Canada is to remain the eternal runner-up. The absence of larger-scale cooperation limits Canada's ability to diversify its collaborations and adapt to the ever-changing dynamics of the global space sector. It also reduces Canada's visibility and impact on the international stage, since partnerships with emerging nations can open up new markets and strengthen the country's global competitiveness. In other words, as well as having an impact on the country's global image, this does not encourage “new space” companies to set up long-term operations in Canada. And yet, Canada does have one major asset with which to start thinking about partnerships that match its aspirations: AI. AI is at the heart of Canada's academic, technological and industrial ambitions. Taking advantage of this technology is one way for Canada to secure a future in space exploration and exploitation. In reality, AI acts as the missing piece to fill the gaps outlined above. Despite the opportunities presented by the exploitation of this tool, the integration of AI into Canadian space projects is still marginal, even if there are good prospects for investment, especially in research and development. Initiatives such as Canadarm3 and contributions to international missions demonstrate a high, but often secondary, capacity for technologies involving AI. This is partly due to a lack of investment and to the absence of a coherent national strategy for integrating AI into the space sector. AI at the heart of the creation of Space Canada The use of AI has been in vogue in the space sector for some time now. However, with the explosion of innovation in this field, AI is becoming a must-have for any company or nation with ambitions to continue to hold an important place for the future. With the US vision increasingly focused on manned missions and space defense programs, Canada must seize the opportunity to invest in this paradigm shift and become a pillar of this new era. It is precisely in these periods of transition that it is essential to act to seize the opportunity. Canada has all the capabilities needed to meet the challenges of space exploration and exploitation. AI is becoming an indispensable part of know-how and transition, and can nurture ambitions for fairer, less unilateral cooperation. Firstly, in the face of insufficient funding, AI can optimize the use of limited resources by automating and improving the efficiency of processes, thereby reducing operational costs. For example, AI can be used for predictive management of equipment and resources, maximizing the use of existing budgets and reducing the need for unplanned maintenance. NASA, for example, uses AI to optimize the design of materials used on its aircraft, reducing costs while increasing efficiency. Becoming a pioneer in the creation of AI management tools will have a dual effect: that of guaranteeing lower costs for innovation and design, and that of saving significant amounts of time. Secondly, in the field of technology development, AI can accelerate R&D processes by rapidly analyzing large quantities of data to identify innovative materials and optimize system designs of all kinds. For example, Model Predictive Control is a technology used to calculate rocket trajectories. This technology provides a better understanding of aircraft behavior, thus facilitating access to space. With a similar approach, AI also aims to simulate complex scenarios to test new technologies efficiently before they are actually implemented, thus saving time and money. Another example is Boeing's use of AI to simulate the aerodynamics and structure of new-generation aircraft, enabling potential problems to be quickly detected and corrected before the production phase, while optimizing efficiency. Continuing on the subject of the lack of a coherent national strategy, AI plays a crucial role in the formulation and execution of a common strategy. AI systems analyze global trends, forecast future needs and propose optimized strategic plans for the Canadian space sector. By using AI for predictive analysis, Canada can better plan its long-term space investments and initiatives, ensuring a coherent and sustainable vision. In addition, to compensate for limited international partnerships, AI can facilitate more diversified collaborations by offering platforms for technological cooperation. For example, joint AI development projects with emerging nations could open up new avenues for collaboration and innovation. By demonstrating its expertise in AI exploitation, Canada has the opportunity to enter into partnerships with technologically advanced countries, thereby strengthening its position on the international stage. By integrating AI into its space initiatives, Canada can not only optimize its resources, accelerate technological development, increase its autonomy, formulate a coherent strategy and diversify its international partnerships, but also strengthen its competitiveness and overall influence in the global space sector. Finally, using AI as a tool to promote multidisciplinarity would also enable Canada to increase its capacity for innovation. AI can integrate fields as diverse as robotics, materials science, space biology and astrophysics. These integrations enable innovative, cross-disciplinary approaches. By fostering collaboration between different disciplines, the country is developing innovative space solutions tailored to the complex challenges of deep space exploration. This multidisciplinary approach, supported by AI, would strengthen Canada's position as a leader in space exploration, while maximizing synergies between sectors and stimulating the creativity and ingenuity needed to meet future challenges. Four key recommendations for the government The recommendations are designed to encourage the implementation of a Canadian-initiated international cooperation strategy, while highlighting Canada's strengths and credibility in leading this strategy. Strengthening international cooperation By expanding collaborations beyond traditional partners such as the U.S. and ESA member countries, Canada could include emerging space-faring nations such as India, China, and certain Middle Eastern countries, to strengthen both its economic and political relationships. By adopting a selective approach, Canada would prioritize collaborations with nations whose strategic interests are compatible, while preserving its traditional alliances. At the same time, positioning itself as a technology hub specializing in artificial intelligence and space robotics would attract international partners seeking advanced solutions, maximizing Canada's competitiveness in this sector. This combination of strategies offers Canada the opportunity to gradually emancipate itself from its traditional allies, without challenging their dominance on the space scene. In this way, Canada can continue to adopt a “follower” posture, while actively preparing its future and strengthening its capabilities for future challenges. This balanced positioning would enable us to preserve our technological sovereignty and respond to national security imperatives, while benefiting from the spin-offs of international collaborations. On the other hand, changing from a follower's position to one of “active neutrality” would reinforce Canada's role as a reliable mediator, facilitating international collaboration without taking sides in geopolitical rivalries. By adopting this posture, Canada could attract new partners while consolidating its image as an impartial and cooperative player, able to contribute to global initiatives in a balanced and strategic manner. In terms of research and development and multidisciplinary approach, this strategy would promote the advantages of collaborating countries while enabling them to fill their own gaps. Increased investment in research and development By creating a more ambitious grant program to address the need for investment in research and development, Canada would encourage its companies and universities to propose innovative projects related to AI and space exploration. By funding applied research projects and technological prototypes, Canada will accelerate the development of new space capabilities and reduce its dependence on foreign technologies. In addition to creating a dynamic innovation ecosystem, this program would foster collaboration between the private sector and academia, creating interesting synergies to develop Canadian creativity, cross-sector cooperation and competitiveness. Another spin-off of these programs would be the emergence of new companies and increased attractiveness for international talent. This would strengthen the “national value chain” in space exploration, and help achieve some of Canada's other major objectives outside the strict space program. These grant programs would give greater ambition to initial proposals such as the Lunar Exploration Acceleration Program (LEAP) already in place. Embracing multidisciplinarity By integrating AI as a core technology, Canada will be able to stimulate innovation in various fields essential to space exploration. AI would optimize processes, accelerate scientific discoveries and enhance technological capabilities. This approach would encourage interdisciplinary collaboration, strengthening synergies between different sectors and contributing to Canada's overall competitiveness in the space field. By positioning AI at the heart of its space strategy, Canada can prepare to meet future challenges while consolidating its role as a leader in technological innovation. The application of AI in a variety of key fields will strengthen international collaborations. In addition, this multi-disciplinary position, in line with the economic benefits forecast to 2040, will generate considerable economic benefits for Canada. The creation of highly-skilled jobs, the strengthening of the domestic technology industry, and the attraction of international investment would also enable Canada to maintain its place on the international stage in other sectors revolving around the space domain. By anticipating the growth of the global space economy, estimated at $1,000 billion, Canada will be able to secure a competitive position in this rapidly expanding market: this is where the virtuous circle of a multidisciplinary approach becomes an important lever for a flourishing economy. Drawing up a long-term national strategy This strategy should include clear, measurable objectives for the next 10 to 20 years, with a focus on AI, technological autonomy and international partnerships. Such a roadmap is intended to provide coherent direction and strategic priorities for the CSA and other key players, facilitating effective planning and resource allocation. This recommendation is undoubtedly the one that allows others to build on a solid foundation: the confidence generated by a well-constructed plan would attract investors who would de facto contribute to grants; it would demonstrate to other nations that Canada is a strong ally for effective cooperation, ready to take on challenges and realize a turning point in its ambitions; it would overcome the obstacles associated with multidisciplinary research by offering greater visibility over the time and resources required, thus fostering in-depth, long-term studies. ## Standing on Guard: Canada’s Strategic Interests in a Competitive World Order URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/standing-on-guard-canadas-strategic-interests-in-a-competitive-world-order/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Canada has long shied away from identifying and openly pursuing its strategic interests. Gaëlle Rivard Piché, "Standing on Guard: Canada’s Strategic Interests in a Competitive World Order," Vimy Paper, Volume 47, CDA Institute, March 2021. ## Strategic Blackmail And Great Power Competition: Why Did The Philippines And Turkey Threaten To Break Up With The West? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/strategic-blackmail-and-great-power-competition-why-did-the-philippines-and-turkey-threaten-to-break-up-with-the-west/ Modified: 2023-02-10 > Why have Manila and Ankara questioned their formal alliance at the risk of alienating Washington? Such public threats are relatively rare events that constitute foreign policy anomaly. Nevertheless, They require special attention, given the growing uncertainty surrounding US global leadership and the increasing polycentricity of the international system, in which China and Russia play an increasing role. In the face of Beijing’s aggressive behavior in the South and East China Seas and Moscow’s in Eastern Europe,  balance of threat argues that U.S. allies should automatically counterbalance these states by closing ranks behind Washington. However, recent events have cast doubt on this approach: two of Washington’s formal allies, the Philippines and Turkey, have openly threatened to break their defensive alliance with the United States and realign with China and Russia. Following his election as President of the Philippines in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte publicly announced his breakup with Washington and his country’s strategic realignment with China. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for his part, warned the White House in an op-ed published in the New York Times in 2018 that he had strategic alternatives to NATO. He said their partnership could be at risk and Ankara could find new allies if Washington did not prove more sensitive to Turkey’s interests. Why have Manila and Ankara questioned their formal alliance at the risk of alienating Washington? Such public threats are relatively rare events that constitute foreign policy anomaly. Nevertheless, They require special attention, given the growing uncertainty surrounding US global leadership and the increasing polycentricity of the international system, in which China and Russia play an increasing role. Strategic Blackmail Upon closer inspection, Duterte and Erdogan have exercised strategic blackmail to extract concessions from Washington. As Stephen Walt points out, “a blackmailer can threaten to do something that its patron opposes, in the hopes of persuading the patron to give it something in exchange for acceding to the patron’s preferences”. States usually use strategic blackmail when dissatisfied with their position in the international system and want to acquire more recognition. They also seek gains, such as reassurance of commitment and greater material support from their allies. As we will see thereafter, grievances against Washington, fear of abandonment, and populism help explain why Manila and Ankara resorted to strategic blackmail. These factors led them to use great power competition to blackmail Washington to obtain concessions on security and defense. Duterte Blackmails Washington by Playing the Chinese Card When Rodrigo Duterte became President in May 2016, the Philippines abandonedbalancing against China to pursue a partnership with it. This repositioning did not constitute a break away from Washington but expressed the Philippines leader’s desire to win Beijing’s confidence. In particular, he wanted loans and economic aid from China. Relations with Washington, however, took a dramatic turn during the fall. During his first visit to China in October 2016, President Duterte said: “America has lost. [...] I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow, and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to Putin and tell him there are three of us against the world: China, the Philippines, and Russia. It’s the only way.” Multiple announcements followed his statement, going against the Philippines’ defence relationship with the United States. Duterte canceled several joint military exercises and banned the U.S. military from building an arms depot and using its military bases to launch deterrence operations against China. He also threatened to terminate an agreement signed in 1999 that allowed U.S. troops to use the country’s military bases. How can we explain this sudden shift? The conjunction of Duterte’s perceptions and leadership style is critical to understanding this decision. Rodrigo Duterte had negative perceptions of the United States. For him and many Filipinos, the remaining U.S. military presence in the country – even though the country gained independence in 1946 – is an expression of neocolonialism. This perception led him to speak out in favor of an independent foreign policy. But, mainly, it is the Obama administration’s criticism of extrajudicial executions and human rights abuses committed by his administration as part of the war on drugs that triggered President Duterte’s public distrust. Not only did this criticism upset him, but the Obama administration canceled the delivery of a shipment of weapons and suspended the renewal of a $400 million development aid program in response to those violations. He responded, “Instead of helping us, the first to hit was the State Department [...] So you can go to hell, Mr. Obama, you can go to hell.” He added: “Who does think he is? I am no American puppet. I am the President of a sovereign country, and I am not answerable to anyone except the Filipino people.” From that moment on, President Duterte’s approach was decidedly hostile to the United States. Duterte also firmly believes that the U.S. would eventually abandon his country’s defence, a perception that fueled his resentment. The issue of abandonment is closely linked to the maritime conflict with China. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a decision favouring the Philippines’ claims. This decision was a significant victory for the Philippine government. However, Duterte chose to downplay it to avoid increasing tensions with China. This reaction showed that he seriously doubted Washington’s willingness to support its army in the event of a confrontation with Beijing. A year before he ran for President, the Philippine leader was already expressing disappointment over Washington’s inaction in the South China Sea. He said, “If America cared, it would have sent its aircraft carriers and missile frigates the moment China started reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing happened.” For him, it was clear that “America would never die for us .” The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States stipulated that Washington would defend the Philippines in the event of an attack. Still, it remained ambiguous regarding the defence of disputed islands. On several occasions, representatives of the U.S. executive branch had refused to clarify this point. As a result, President Duterte chose to cancel joint patrols with Washington in the China Sea, as he believed they only provoked Beijing without guaranteeing U.S. support. Thus, Manila hoped that the United States would make the following concessions: 1. Stop interfering in the country’s domestic affairs, including through coercive measures. 2. Openly commit to defending the Philippines in the event of a confrontation with China over disputed maritime areas. President Duterte’s negative perceptions of Washington probably would not have led him to publicly challenge the White House if his leadership style were not so rooted in populism. Duterte was elected in 2016 and promised to return sovereignty to the people, allegedly usurped by corrupt elites. Then he channeled the frustration of many Filipinos with what he perceived as U.S. imperialism. By criticizing his war on drugs, the White House provoked an aggressive and disproportionate response that appealed to his activist base. Duterte’s strategic blackmail was ultimately beneficial to his regime. As relations between Beijing and Manila intensified in 2016 and 2017, Washington increased its aid to the country by making its most significant contribution in nearly 20 years. Then, the Trump administration tried to revive the relationship by being more conciliatory. The U.S. president praised Duterte’s war on drugs, saying he was doing an “unbelievable job.” Then, during his visit to Manila in 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reassured the Philippine government of Washington’s commitment to defend the islands claimed by Manila in the South China Sea. In particular, he stressed that “any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual defense obligations under Article IV of our Mutual Defense Treaty.” Such a  clear commitment at a time when China was building artificial islands in the disputed territory was a first. As he played the Chinese card without ever carrying out his threat to sever ties with Washington, Duterte reminded the United States of his country’s strategic value. He ultimately obtained the desired concessions by taking the calculated risk of alienating his only official ally. He increased his country’s weight with the United States while joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative and benefiting from Beijing’s economic aid. Since the alleged announcement of its realignment with China, Manila has fully restored its defense relationship with the United States, including multiple defense agreements and joint military exercises. Erdogan Blackmails Washington by Playing the Russian Card In 2014, Turkey came to regard Kurdish militias in Syria as the most imminent threat to its territorial integrity. The problem is that Kurdish forces in Syria became U.S. partners after the capture of Kobane by Daesh. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter described the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia, as one of Syria’s most effective anti-ISIS ground forces. Erdogan saw this association as a betrayal from the United States, and he repeatedly asked Washington to cease its support to the YPG, in vain. The Turkish President considered that the United States did not take the Kurdish problem seriously, a recurring observation since the 1990s, and that Washington did not pay sufficient attention to Turkey’s interests. These factors contributed to the deterioration of relations between Ankara and Washington. President Erdogan also suspected that the United States orchestrated the attempted coup against his regime in 2016 or, at least, oversaw its execution. This suspicion poisoned the relationship between the two countries and affected their bond of trust. Influential members of the Turkish government, including Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu, even publicly accusing the U.S. of being behind the failed coup. Turkey also accuseed the Obama administration of supporting Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish cleric living in Pennsylvania, whom Ankara believed guided the coup attempt. Then, the issue of missile defense reinforced mistrust and increased grievances against Washington. Ankara was considering buying Patriot missiles from its NATO allies to meet its security needs caused by the Syrian conflict. In return, Turkey was demanding a technology transfer, which the Obama administration and NATO refused because of human rights violations and Erdogan’s authoritarian drift. In response, Turkey accused Washington and NATO of imposing an arms embargo. As for the Philippine government, the Erdogan regime’s negative perceptions of the United States – not least because it conditioned its military support on complying with democratic norms – and Washington’s sense of abandonment on the Kurdish issue would not have caused Erdogan’s rebellion if it wasn’t for his populist leadership style. Over the years, Erdogan consolidated its anti-elite and anti-pluralist stance. After the 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan used the state of emergency to crush opposition movements and arrest journalists, presented as enemies of the people, thus consolidating his grip on power. Erdogan’s populism and multiple grievances against Washington led the Turkish government to send several hostile signals to its NATO allies. First, in 2017, with the signing of the Astana agreement, Erdogan reached a strategic agreement with Russia and Iran on creating ceasefire zones in Syria. By becoming Moscow and Tehran’s partner, Erdogan believed he could better secure his border with Syria to eradicate the Kurdish threat and thus obtain greater political influence in resolving the Syrian crisis. At the same time, he was threatening to close Incirlik Air Base, which hosts U.S. nuclear weapons, as well as the Kurecik radar station, which NATO mainly operates. Erdogan was also leading the battle at the United Nations against the anti-Iranian and pro-Israel initiatives of the United States. Finally, Turkey became the first NATO member to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a ‘dialogue partner.’ Although it currently does not weigh in the decision-making process within the organization, its participation allows it to highlight its common destiny with Asian countries. In addition, tensions over the transfer of missile defence technology have contributed to Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia. Meanwhile, while the Obama administration took time to react to the attempted coup in Ankara, Russian President Vladimir Putin has given his unconditional support to Erdogan and his government. Three weeks later, the Turkish leader was in Moscow, and Putin expressed his interest in selling him his S-400 system. In early 2017, Turkey’s defense minister announced the $2.5 billion purchase of the S-400, as an autonomous weapon without interoperability with NATO. Moscow and Ankara finally concluded the agreement in September 2017. However, the fact that the S-400 contract did not include a technology transfer from Russia to Turkey indicated that this purchase was more of a political act than a strategic decision. As if that were not enough, President Erdogan’s refusal to release an imprisoned American pastor, Andrew Brunson, despite the Trump administration’s insistent request, added insult to injury. Ankara claimed that the pastor was involved in the 2016 coup attempt, which the White House denied. In response, Trump passed sanctions against two Turkish ministers and imposed tariffs on Turkey’s aluminum and steel exports, contributing to the weakening of the Turkish lira. This litany of grievances led President Erdogan to publicly express his frustrations with his American ally and plead for concessions. In the New York Times in the summer of 2018, Erdogan published a column in which he wrote: The United States has repeatedly and consistently failed to understand and respect the Turkish people’s concerns. And in recent years, our partnership has been tested by disagreements. […] Unless the United States starts respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and proves that it understands the dangers that our nation faces, our partnership could be in jeopardy. […] Before it is too late, Washington must give up the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives. Failure to reverse this trend of unilateralism and disrespect will require us to start looking for new friends and allies. This threat does not explicitly mention Russia, but it was indeed suggested, not least because of the purchase of the S-400 a year earlier. The Erdogan regime hoped the U.S. would make the following concessions: 1. To stop supporting Kurdish militias in Syria. 2. To provide military support to protect Turkey’s territorial integrity from the Kurdish threat. However, the Trump administration took Erdogan’s warning lightly since it considered that Turkey had no credible alternative to replace NATO. Whatever Erdogan says, NATO provides security guarantees to Turkey and allows it to project its influence into the Euro-Atlantic area. Even the Russians did not believe Ankara’s threat to Washington. Unlike the Philippine case, Erdogan’s blackmail only partially achieved its objectives. Ankara got guarantees from the United States that it would stop directly supporting the Syrian Kurdish militias, which it did. However, Washington maintained a firm stance towards Ankara. The White House has been maintaining pressure on Ankara through economic sanctions and trade tariffs to force Erdogan to release American pastor Andrew Brunson. This pressure finally forced Ankara to release the pastor two months after Erdogan’s op-ed in the New York Times. Then, as Turkish forces fought militias in northern Syria in response to the U.S. withdrawal, President Trump threatened the Erdogan regime with retaliation if the invasion went too far into Syrian territory. Trump’s official letter to his Turkish counterpart was unequivocal: “You don’t want to be responsible for slaughtering thousands of people, and I don’t want to be responsible for destroying the Turkish economy — and I will. I’ve already given you a little sample with respect to Pastor Brunson.” Moreover, Turkey’s diversification strategy has been proving rather costly. When the Russian S-400 missiles were delivered in the summer of 2019, the Trump administration withdrew Turkey from the F-35 fighter program. By 2020, most Turkish companies that were part of the F-35 supply chain had lost their contracts. Ankara has also been hit by the CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) for its S-400 purchase. In sum, Ankara’s strategic blackmail has generated mixed results. Since then, without having left NATO, Turkey has chosen to increase its autonomy and strategic diversification. Conclusion This analysis explored the conditions under which formal U.S. allies come to threaten to break their alliance or diversify their strategic relationship. It argued that this behavior reveals strategic blackmail and shows that grievances, fear of abandonment, and populism are the main factors that led Manila and Ankara to resort to blackmail to extract concessions from Washington on security and defense issues. If the strategic blackmail has been successful in the case of the Philippines, the results were mixed in the case of Turkey. It seems that Duterte’s threat was so sudden and vehement that Washington struggled to decode its real intentions. In the context of China representing a credible strategic alternative for the Philippines, the U.S. offered additional support to Duterte to avoid a relative strategic loss to Beijing. In the case of Turkey, on the other hand, Washington seems to have taken the threat less seriously, since, in its eyes, Russia and Iran did not represent a credible strategic alternative to NATO. Finally, the analysis shows that the White House has criticized the Duterte and Erdogan regimes for violating human rights and obstructing democracy. As a result, they both have suffered economic and military sanctions from the United States. This coercive approach on Washington’s end has fueled both their strategic blackmails. In a context of great power rivalries likely to intensify in the coming years, this raises a dilemma for the United States: should it continue to hold its allies accountable for their human rights abuses at the cost of tensions, strategic blackmail, and rupture or, on the contrary, should it turn a blind eye to their misdeeds to maintain stable relations in an uncertain international context? ## Strategic Plan URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/strategic-plan/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The purpose of the NSA strategic plan is to orient the Network’s objectives, which are mainlybased on its activities of mobilizing knowledge and developing the next generation of experts. The purpose of the NSA strategic plan is to orient the Network’s objectives, which are mainly based on its activities of mobilizing knowledge and developing the next generation of experts. This is a three-year plan (2020-2023), and its success will lay the foundations for the Network’s sustainability and consolidation. Read our strategic plan to learn more about: Our Mission; Our Vision; Our Values; Our Governance; Strategic Directions and Objectives; Summary of Achievements. ## Student Panel – Best Paper Competition URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/student-panel-best-paper-competition/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > moderated by: Renée Filliatrault (Advisory Board, Strategic Analysis Network) moderated by: Renée Filliatrault (Advisory Board, Strategic Analysis Network) ## Student Panel: BEST PAPER COMPETITION URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/student-panel-best-paper-competition-2/ Modified: 2022-11-14 > Moderated by Johanna Masse (Postdoctoral Researcher, Queen’s University). This student panel awards some of our emerging scholars... Moderator: Johanna Masse (Postdoctoral Researcher, Queen’s University) ## Supporting Security and Capacity Building Efforts in Africa – KEYNOTE URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/supporting-security-and-capacity-building-efforts-in-africa-keynote/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Re-democratizing Africa Again? Engaging emerging challenges to peace and security in a time of crises - Cyril Obi, Social Science Research... Re-democratizing Africa Again? Engaging emerging challenges to peace and security in a time of crises Keynote Event - Cyril Obi, Social Science Research Council. ## Supporting Security and Capacity Building Efforts in Africa – PANEL 1 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/supporting-security-and-capacity-building-efforts-in-africa-panel-1/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Do we have a better idea today of how to approach security challenges in an integrated way? What are some examples of especially innovative.. note: This video is in French only How to act in an innovative way in response to the security challenges in Africa? Do we have a better idea today of how to approach security challenges in an integrated way? What are some examples of especially innovative or effective security or capacity-building actions emerging from African contexts? Chair: Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal Niagalé Bagayoko, Africa Security Sector Network Mpako Foaleng, Département des Operations de Paix, ONU Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Université Bishop’s ## Supporting Security and Capacity Building Efforts in Africa – PANEL 2 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/supporting-security-and-capacity-building-efforts-in-africa-panel-2/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Capacity building is a concept that has been mobilized to address various security challenges. But what are the current issues associated... note: This video is in French only Building capacity in a multidimensional framework Capacity building is a concept that has been mobilized to address various security challenges. But what are the current issues associated with this concept? What are the most frequently addressed capacities? Whose capacities, and built by whom? How can capacities be conceived broadly and inclusively enough to take into account the multidimensionality of security challenges in the complex African contexts? Chair: Niagalé Bagayoko, Africa Security Sector Network Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal—Saint-Jean Pierre Leroux, MFO Chief Liaison, Canadian Contingent Commander ## Supporting Security and Capacity Building Efforts in Africa – PANEL 3 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/supporting-security-and-capacity-building-efforts-in-africa-panel-3/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > How do actions at one level impact other levels? The importance of including all beneficiaries of a security action in its design is... note: This video is in French only. From the international to the local: the crossroads between levels of analysis and action. How do actions at one level impact other levels? The importance of including all beneficiaries of a security action in its design is recognized, but how can this be done in practice in a credible and sustainable way? Chair: Philippe Frowd, Université d’Ottawa Arsène Brice Bado, Centre de Recherche et d’Action pour la Paix Adib Bencherif, Université de Sherbrooke Maria Martin de Almagro, Université de Gand ## Supporting Security and Capacity Building Efforts in Africa – PANEL 4 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/supporting-security-and-capacity-building-efforts-in-africa-panel-4/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > How can non-traditional tools be used to address traditional security issues, such as armed violence (terrorism, wars)? How to define... note: This video is in French only. Traditional issues, non-traditional tools How can non-traditional tools be used to address traditional security issues, such as armed violence (terrorism, wars)? How to define innovation in security support action in a way that bridges the gap between researchers and practitioners? What are the challenges and risks of initiatives that seek to bridge traditional and non-traditional approaches to security? Chair: Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal—Saint-Jean Philippe Frowd, Université d’Ottawa Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Université Carleton Virginie Tardif-Plante, Affaires Mondiales Canada Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal ## Sustaining Public Engagement on Canada’s Security and Defence Priorities URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/sustaining-public-engagement-on-canadas-security-and-defence-priorities/ Modified: 2026-07-29 This policy brief is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges. Introduction At the NATO Hague Summit in June 2025, Canada committed to increasing its defence spending to 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by spring 2026 - achieved in March 2026 - with a longer-term objective of reaching 5% GDP by 2035. This marked a historical shift in Canada's global defence posture. In the words of Prime Minister Mark Carney, “the world order is currently undergoing a period of rupture. We are witnessing not only the emergence of new threats, but also the convergence of major trends that are forcing Canada to fundamentally rethink its strategic posture.” The consequences of climate change, particularly in the Arctic, and significant technological advances – from cyberspace to artificial intelligence and hypersonic missiles – have changed the game. Nevertheless, the drastic changes in US foreign policy, combined with President Trump’s unpredictable and transactional approach, are unfolding against the backdrop of a more competitive international environment, where rivalries between major powers are intensifying, and threats are becoming more diverse. These changes have deeply shaken Canadians’ sense of security and have made them much more aware of defence issues and the need for investment in Canada’s defence. However, awareness alone will not sustain support. Maintaining public trust requires a more meaningful approach to engagement, one that builds understanding of defence priorities through clear communication, transparency, and sustained outreach. As Canada expands its defence ambitions, aligning policy with public understanding will be essential. An informed and engaged public is more likely to support the long-term investments - $33.5 billion per year in cash expenditures over the next 10 years - needed to meet NATO's spending target set at the 2025 Hague Summit. Shared Projects and Relationship Building Sustaining public engagement on Canada’s security and defence priorities requires long-term participation through shared projects and partnerships. The current geopolitical context is marked by shifting trade dynamics and increasingly volatile geopolitical conditions. Canada is renewing its international partnerships, particularly with Europe and Asia. Strategic alignment is no longer optional: as a middle power, Canada must prioritize targeted and effective alliances to advance its security and economic interests. Notably, Canada’s deeper engagement with European partners - notably as Canada being the first and only non-European to join the European Union’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Agreement  - has brought defence policy closer to the forefront of national conversation and increased public awareness of national security risks. Joint initiatives with European partners also offer a practical avenue to connect defence policy with civil society. Collaborative efforts in areas such as cybersecurity, where Canada already plays a role through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and the Canadian Armed Forces’ cyber capabilities, can be expanded to involve universities, the private sector, and research institutions. Supporting existing expertise, investing in emerging research, and developing talent pipelines will help shift Canada’s posture from reactive to proactive. These initiatives make security challenges more tangible, foster innovation, and contribute to a more informed and engaged public. The National Security & Defence Dialogues led by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute provide a scalable model for this approach. Designed as a cross-country series of locally grounded engagements, these dialogues bring discussions beyond the National Capital Region into communities across Canada. By convening local stakeholders, including defence officials, industry representatives, academics, Indigenous leaders, and community members, they create space for informed, two-way exchanges on the security challenges facing Canada and the implications of increased defence investment. This model is particularly effective because it anchors national security discussions in regional realities. Dialogues planned in locations such as Yellowknife, Vancouver, and Whitehorse highlight issues including Arctic sovereignty, northern security, and community resilience, while ensuring Indigenous perspectives are meaningfully integrated. This inclusive approach moves beyond consultation toward active participation, strengthening the legitimacy and relevance of defence policy. Community-based defence assets also play an important role in sustaining engagement. The Canadian Rangers, particularly in the North, contribute directly to sovereignty, surveillance, and emergency response, while maintaining deep ties to local communities. Their role provides a tangible link between national defence priorities and everyday security realities. Strengthening support, visibility, and engagement with the Rangers, including through dialogue platforms and public recognition, can reinforce public understanding of Canada’s security challenges and foster a stronger sense of shared responsibility. Such engagement initiatives strengthen public literacy, build trust in defence institutions, and foster a sense of shared responsibility. By creating recurring, community-based forums and linking them to broader strategic objectives, Canada can sustain interest in defence issues over the long term while ensuring that public engagement remains inclusive, regionally grounded, and connected to real policy outcomes. Public Communication and Transparency Intentional and Proactive Public Communication Strengthening Canada's security culture requires greater transparency. Increasing openness with civil society and allies would help build trust and support. Strategically declassifying carefully selected information to share could accomplish this. For example, updates on operations like Operation Reassurance could highlight the readiness and reliability of NATO forces stationed in Eastern Europe. By showcasing strengths and successes, a sense of pride could emerge among military personnel and civil society. Transparency about funding allocation would foster public understanding of its impact on national and international security, enhancing the legitimacy of defence spending. Sharing specific achievements (joint NATO exercises and community engagement initiatives) could build trust and cooperation with local populations and with missions that have not been considered successes, and could also provide lessons learned to avoid repeating them and demonstrate accountability. Such narratives and operational insights would bolster public support, encourage ongoing initiatives, and secure funding for security efforts. Digital Creators Promoting Global Security Just as social media platforms can perpetuate disinformation, effectively leveraging these digital spaces also offers opportunities for strategic communication, global engagement, and countering disinformation. As political creators mobilize online, they can foster continued democratic discourse and contribute to a more informed, connected, and empowered global community. They can also help maintain momentum for the current interest in international security topics that have risen since the last federal election, amid tariffs and presidential rhetoric regarding the annexation of Canada. Here is a critical question: If Canada does not promote its own defence and security stories, who will? What one calls propaganda, another may see as strategic communication, especially in times of insecurity and escalating threats to national and international security. With concerns about Canada’s sovereignty and role on the global stage, Canada must shape its own strategic narratives, or others will shape it for Canada. The importance of strategic communication can be seen in the case of the Sekanku/Diaoyu Islands, where Japan, China, and Korea have employed various types of strategic communication to further their respective regional and resource security interests. Digital platforms and creators have a profound influence on public discourse and improve media literacy. Select content creators are stepping up as advocates for democracy and sharing information on collective security. In the Czech Republic, Johanna Bazlerova launched Jsme v obraze, a project that shares updates on NATO and the EU while engaging with their platforms. Bazlerova’s reach now spans 198,000 Instagram followers. Supporting leaders like Bazlerova through grants or programs can empower younger, politically engaged creators. Providing resources and flexible support would enable creators to produce impactful content, improve media literacy on security topics, and strengthen public resilience against misinformation. Programs such as Protect the Future, in which youth and young content creators explore NATO's role in international security and defence. This initiative takes creators behind the scenes and to the experts to find out what NATO does. It gives young people a voice to share their perspectives on NATO and its work in their own, uncensored way. While this program is valuable, a notable gap remains in ensuring the sustainability of political content creators' evolving role in this field. Many creators must balance full-time jobs with developing, producing, and sharing their stories and insights. These grants would not involve any exchange for specific coverage or framing of challenges in the international security landscape. Leveraging Arts for International Security Leveraging the arts can unite communities and promote a shared responsibility for security. The prominent One World Film Festival in the Czech Republic showcases global human rights issues through film, sparking dialogue and raising awareness. Its model offers inspiration for Canada and non-profits to partner with One World or to launch similar initiatives in the security and defence sector. Combining storytelling, documentaries, lectures, grassroots organizing, and inclusive programming can foster cultural exchange and amplify public engagement on security issues that affect human rights. Art transcends culture and borders, making it a powerful tool for security advocacy. Stand-up comedy can engage audiences in various ways, such as blending humour with serious themes. Many comedians use their platforms to comment on social, political and historical events, breaking down complex geopolitical issues into comical insights. Comedy can raise awareness of defence and security issues and encourage audiences to think critically and stay informed about the world around them. Some comedians who already engage in political comedy include Rick Mercer, Sophie Buddle, Faris Hytiaa, Brad Semotiuk, Sammy Obeid, Dragos, and Victor . Curating a themed grant, such as one that could support producing a comedy tour or show centred on geopolitics could be an innovative way to educate the public on international security, inviting everyday people, academics, and professionals in the field to attend. This would be a publicly funded and arm’s legnth initiative. This funding would support comedians who already engage in these topics and amplify their work and opportunities without imposing constraints. Comedy, after all, thrives on authenticity. This project encourages artists to engage with these topics, helping sustain public engagement with these topics. For instance, Rick Mercer toured across Canada on the Stand-Up For Canada tour, featuring various Canadian comedians performing political comedy bits. This tour was a huge success, socializing attendees to Canadian politics. It is now available for free on CBC Gem, accessible to people across the country. Conclusion Canada’s evolving defence landscape requires strategic partnerships that sustain long-term public engagement on national security and defence priorities through shared projects, collaborative initiatives, and enduring partnerships—while also fostering a broader culture of engagement, transparency, and shared responsibility in advancing Canada’s role in international security and defence. As the global security environment grows more complex, fostering and maintaining public understanding through intentional communication, creative initiatives, and inclusive community programs is essential. By connecting policy to people, whether through dialogue, digital creators, or the arts, Canada can build sustained public support and resilience. This approach will ensure that defence priorities remain responsive and aligned with the values and interests of Canada and its allies, securing both the country’s security and its role on the world stage. Recommendations: Develop and diversify shared projects and strengthen relationship building. Provide flexible support for political creators to produce impactful content, boost media literacy on security, and build public resilience. Curate a comedy tour or show on geopolitics to increase public engagement on topics of international security and launch a film festival dedicated to topics of defence and security topics. About the Authors Gabrielle Andrychuk (she/her) is a senior policy advisor and editor with a master’s in international security studies and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Sociology. With a strong foundation in international politics, she is passionate about research, policy analysis, and strategic planning. Gabrielle is also dedicated to fostering inclusive and collaborative environments. In her spare time, she enjoys volunteering, language exchanges, and playing tennis. Emmylou Sergent is Director of Strategic Accompaniment at ADIT North America, a risk-advisory firm specializing in economic intelligence and business diplomacy. She previously served as Coordinator of events at the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute in Ottawa, where she managed national defence conferences and led the National Security & Defence Dialogues. She completed an internship at the Assemblée nationale in Paris within the Cooperation and Bilateral issues branch, where she prepared foreign policy briefings and supported the coordination of the France-Canada and France-Québec parliamentary friendship groups. She holds a master’s degree in international relations from the Université de Montréal, with a thesis on France's Indo-Pacific strategy. She is an analyst with the Young Researchers Programme at the Institute for Applied Geopolitical Studies (IEGA), a member of the Strategic Analysis Network (RAS), and an alumna of the France-Canada Future Leaders Programme. Image Credit: Billy Wilson via Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0. ## Tail Risks for 2024: Prospects for a Violent Constitutional Crisis in the United States URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/tail-risks-for-2024-prospects-for-a-violent-constitutional-crisis-in-the-united-states/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Donald Trump’s attempt to overturn the results of the 2020 election, culminating in the January 6th, 2021 uprising, have left grave questions Donald Trump’s attempt to overturn the results of the 2020 election, culminating in the January 6th, 2021 uprising, have left grave questions about the next presidential contest in 2024 and the prospects of a renewed crisis. Where do those risks stand in the wake of the midterms and the resulting power struggle in the U.S. House of Representatives? Ultimately, the overall danger has declined. But deeper challenges remain. In particular, this note analyzes the paths to a constitutional crisis leading to large-scale political violence. I propose four criteria for a violent constitutional crisis in 2024: an election-disputing presidential candidate; armed actors prepared to support that candidate’s claims of fraud; widespread popular belief in those claims; and an apparently viable tipping point for extraconstitutional pressure. The first two criteria will likely be met in 2024. The midterms have not changed much in this regard. The most worrying scenario for a constitutional crisis in the 2024 elections is one in which the crisis focuses on a single state on which the result of the election hinges. The odds have receded given the midterm results, but are still present. If several states separate the two candidates, a constitutional crisis in 2024 could still occur but would likely be less difficult to resolve than a single-state crisis. Election denialism is still well-entrenched in the Republican Party, and has received a significant boost (even if not as much as anticipated) now that the GOP controls the US House of Representatives. A violent constitutional  crisis in 2024: four criteria What are the prospects for a violent constitutional crisis in the United States in 2024? What I mean here is an episode in which the outcome of the presidential election is disputed by key political actors, and armed groups use or threaten violence to influence how the dispute is resolved. I hasten to add that it seems likely someone will dispute any Democratic Party victory to at least some degree. The issue here is really how bad a crisis could get. Is it a matter of a few cranks challenging a result but not taken seriously outside? Or is it a repeat of January 6th, 2021, but worse—with large-scale demonstrations, militias mobilizing and the outbreak of violence? And in particular, could such a crisis draw in security personnel? A severe crisis is a tail risk—unlikely but realistic enough to take seriously. A good starting point would be to consider what could lead to a "revolutionary situation", in Charles Tilly’s terms: one in which there are two claims to sovereignty at the same time, mutually opposed and with enough support to call the existing order into serious doubt. In the American case, this takes four things: two Presidential candidates claim victory in an election, that is, the apparent loser refuses to concede (the claim to sovereignty); armed actors support this claim of victory (i.e. the potential for violence); the claim looks plausible to a significant portion of the population (i.e. changing the incentives of political elites and nonviolent activists, and providing the cover of democratic politics for insurrection); it appears viable to overturn the result through a tipping point, such as pressure on a small number of people (meaning that insurrectionary action could look like a winning strategy). These conditions held, to at least a limited degree, on January 6th, 2021. Trump had refused to concede; most Republicans believed that Biden's victory was illegitimate, though there was a widespread consensus in the press and among independents that Biden had won; Trump had the support of militia such as the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys; and the strategy on January 6th was to pressure Congress and Vice President Mike Pence not to accept the result. This was a farfetched hope, but it is uncertain what would have happened had Pence bowed to the pressure. Continued Risks: Denialist Candidates, Violent Support For 2024, the first two conditions remain plausible. First, it is likely that the Republican nominee would dispute a loss. That nominee may very well be Trump again, though polling and focus groups suggest GOP voters may be moving on. As for Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, whom many believe has gained a major advantage over Trump with the midterms, he refuses to concede that Biden won the election fairly and courts denialist support. He does not do so nearly as vocally as Trump himself, and his support for denialism may simply be a strategic way of courting Trump supporters while offering a more palatable alternative. But being willing to deny the legitimacy of an election for personal gain suggests that, in comparison to a John McCain or Mitt Romney, it would be hard to have confidence that DeSantis would concede in the event of defeat. As for the second condition, violent actors, it appears true that investigations and prosecutions have done serious damage to militias. Most notably, Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes was convicted in November 2022 of seditious conspiracy. This, the over 900 indictments issued against January 6th insurrectionists, and disillusionment with January 6th itself, have challenged the ability of some militia groups to maintain themselves as organizations. This marks a major change from the Trump Administration's comparative lack of effort to combat right-wing extremism, and as Daniel Byman argues, bodes well for 2024 compared to 2020. However, right-wing extremist militia remain active. Guns are now a common sight at political demonstrations. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project found that right-wing extremist activity actually increased in 2022, compared to 2021. Moreover, it has coalesced into a smaller number of groups, suggesting greater levels of organization (though potentially more vulnerability to law enforcement). In addition to the potential for violence from militia, we must take seriously the possibility of the involvement of law-enforcement or even military personnel in a crisis, through defection or refusal to oppose violent actors. Generally, military breakdowns become much more likely in countries where the rules of the political game are not well-established. In this respect, the undermining of key democratic norms before, during, and after the Trump presidency—refusing to accept an election result, calling for the jailing of political opponents and the use of violence at rallies, attempting to second the police and armed forces as political constituencies, and making key law enforcement and military appointments with an eye to personal loyalty—look ominous. They raise the possibility of partisan action by law enforcement or military personnel in the event of a constitutional crisis. If this happens, the crisis would become much more severe. Even if the large majority of personnel did their jobs and respected their oath to the Constitution (as is highly likely), the firepower of insurrectionists could increase a great deal with relatively small-scale security-force breakdowns. Unfortunately, such a breakdown remains a possibility, if a remote one. Extremist groups actively (and increasingly) recruit serving and former police and military personnel. This still means that relatively few active-duty police officers and soldiers are also members of right-wing extremist organizations. The Department of Defence has taken some steps to address the problem, focusing on updating its definitions of prohibited activities and improving training and data collection (necessary, but progress is slow). However, the potential for a breakdown goes beyond the radical fringe, because even ordinary partisans may be willing to act on denialism. After all, Republicans do not have to be extremists to believe that Joe Biden is an illegitimate President. In turn, studies of US service personnel reveal that they increasingly identify as partisans and increasingly believe that it is acceptable for them to engage in partisan political activity, while at the same time civilian politicians (not least Trump himself) have increasingly attempted to use the armed forces at the service of partisan politics. Law enforcement personnel appear willing--at a very high rate--to pose their own authority against federal and state law. In a crisis in which many partisans believe the election is being stolen and that it is therefore unclear who legitimately holds executive power, chains of command in the police and armed forces (if deployed) could suffer. Crisis in a single state: a less-likely but still possible scenario Republican denialism in 2024 may thus have both willing leaders and followers. Will it be a viable strategy? It is here that the midterms have had an impact. One key shift is in the fourth criterion for a crisis, the plausibility of overturning the result through concerted action at a tipping point. This is especially likely in a 2024 election with a margin of a single state. In such a scenario, a Republican claim to be the real winner will look more plausible than if the margin were several states wide. Moreover, a few state-level officials could be pressured to throw doubt on the result, drag the process out, push alternate electors and shift the contest to friendly courts or to the US House (which decides elections in the absence of an Electoral College majority). The state in question would likely become a focal point for political mobilization, demonstrations, and militia deployments. The longer the result drags out before there is clarity, the more people will actually doubt any apparent result (the third criterion for a crisis); and the more protests, riots and militia will have a chance to activate. Here, the midterms have had a significant impact. Above all, with the defeat of most election-denying candidates for election-administering offices in key battleground states, a constitutional crisis concentrated in one of those states now looks less threatening. This was an especially worrying scenario: a Secretary of State in Arizona or Michigan, or a governor in Pennsylvania, abusing their power and mounting endless challenges to a Democratic victory in that state (and thus the Presidency). These officials have the means to disrupt and delay certification of election results. In a narrow election with an apparent Democratic victory by a margin of one state, these officials would then be in a position to throw the result into doubt in a concrete way. The most blatant election-denying candidates for key election-controlling offices in battleground states went down to defeat in November’s midterms. I base this assessment on the seven states with a margin less than 3% in the 2020 election, and assessments of denialism by the New York Times and the United States Democracy Center. Other election-deniers won elsewhere, but they are in states any Republican would likely win regardless. There remain some concerns in some very close states. The new governor of Nevada, Joe Lombardo, took a somewhat ambiguous stance on Biden’s victory but will be checked by a Democratic Secretary of State and Attorney General. In North Carolina, though there was no state executive election and the key offices remain in Democratic hands, twin Republican victories have tipped the state Supreme Court. This is crucial for the results of the election there. The court, in February 2022, rejected an flagrantly gerrymandered electoral map by a single vote. It has now ordered a rehearing of that case, and a second about voter identification. In other words, the North Carolina Supreme Court is plainly willing to play a partisan role. The good results for democracy do not totally remove the scenario of a crisis in a focal-point state. If it appears that the Democratic candidate is in the lead in a hinge state after election day, it is highly likely that election-denying Republicans will kick into high gear even if there are not election deniers in local election-administering offices. They can throw the result into doubt through relentless public discourse, mount legal challenges to it, and exert pressure on GOP state officials and the state judicial system to play along. Demonstrators and militia could well mobilize to add to the pressure through intimidation and even violence. The crisis scenario outlined above could still occur. With that said, however, election-deniers’ losses in 2022 remove some critical tools to delay the confirmation of the result, to throw it into official-sounding doubt, or to kick the decision to friendly courts. The shorter the length of time before a Democratic victory is publicly confirmed by election officials and the courts, the likelier it is that such an escalation would be nipped in the bud, and that these election-denying actors would effectively concede and go home. The losses among election-denying officials are thus clearly good news for avoiding violent constitutional crises. General denialism means a crisis remains on the table On the other hand, election denial now has a more general purchase in American political life. It will have a major role in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives (and with that in mind, it is hard to conclude that the midterms were an unalloyed victory for democracy; it beat expectations, but those expectations were low). During the many ballots for Speaker, Kevin McCarthy (California) caved into the most extreme GOP demands. Formerly fringe figures like Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (Georgia)—who has said that had she been in charge of the January 6th insurrection, it would have been armed and it would have won, and who has called for a “national divorce” among Republican and Democratic states—will receive major airtime to push the Big Lie that Trump won in 2020. After the fight for the Speakership, Rep. Greene is now very close to McCarthy, and her seats on the Committees on Homeland Security and on Oversight and Accountability give her a platform for disruptive action. Election denial is now more powerful among Republican members of Congress than it was in 2020. Election deniers will be able to use and abuse the investigative and oversight roles of House committees to push a narrative of Democratic corruption. Most dramatically, the House has now created a committee to investigate the “weaponization” of the federal government, claiming the power to subpoena Department of Justice documents on ongoing investigations and highly classified materials. Rep. Jim Jordan (Ohio), chair of both this committee and the House Judiciary Committee, played a prominent role in Trump’s attempts to dispute the election. This move therefore raises the worry of using the committee to obstruct DOJ investigations into insurrectionary activities. The DOJ has strongly resisted Congressional interference in ongoing investigations in the past, but it is unclear how the inevitable legal dispute will be resolved. One way or another, however, the new Jordan committee exists to push the narrative of the illegitimacy of the Biden Administration and its use of power. The midterms, in other words, have given Congressional power to election denial. It is still worth asking whether the unexpectedly poor results for the GOP will change the Republican strategy with regard to denial. Many of the losing candidates who had denied the 2020 elections conceded their defeat. This suggests that denying Biden’s victory was in some cases more of a tactic to appease Trumpists than an antidemocratic conviction (but that is not much solace, and people like defeated Arizona gubernatorial candidate Kari Lake can still build their national profile through denying their results). There were threats and disruptions to the electoral process, but not nearly as many as feared; efforts to challenge the results fizzled out. The GOP mood in the aftermath of the election was one of dejection (which implicitly accepts its defeats) rather than denial of the midterm results themselves. There is prima facie evidence that denialism itself hurt the Republican Party, particularly at the margins. By my count, of the 50 House races rated by FiveThirtyEight.com as most competitive, there were 19 Republican election deniers as defined by the Washington Post; three won. This compares badly to the 31 Republican non-deniers, of whom 14 won. Some voices have emerged against Trump in the Republican Party, regarding him—and potentially denialism, which focuses on him—as an electoral drag. This may augur a turn against denialism. This will be important to watch: if the Republican Party starts believing that Trumpist denialism will hurt more than help and adjusts its rhetoric and nominations accordingly, many of the underlying drivers of a possible constitutional crisis will recede. However, other factors indicate that denialism will continue to drive the Republican Party for some time. Republican support for the January 6th insurrectionists has increased over time. Only 22% of Republicans, as of October 2022, agreed that Biden was legitimately elected; only 40% have confidence that votes are accurately cast and counted. Analysis of these results suggests that, while these views are most present among especially ideologically driven Republicans, simply being a Republican is a strong predictor of 2020 election denialism even among moderates. This is possibly related to a similar finding, that living in a heavily Republican district is a strong predictor of denialism—an echo-chamber phenomenon. These findings do not lead to optimism about denialism’s decline. Indeed, far from concluding that denialism was a losing strategy, the GOP has proposed leaning even further into election fraud claims. This all means that even without a single-state margin in 2024, a constitutional crisis is still possible. The election-denying machine will likely start rolling in the case of any presumptive Democratic victory. Many Republican voices would likely call the result into doubt, spinning out all manner of conspiracy-minded scenarios in the states separating the two candidates. With a margin wider than one or two states, however, these doubts would be all the more farfetched than in the case of a single-state margin.  Moreover, extremist actors would potentially lack a clear tipping point to target; legal reforms have now clarified the Vice President’s role and raised the threshold for members of Congress objecting to a state’s slate of electors. American democracy is still under threat I have focused largely on a crisis in 2024 in which the GOP disputes a Democratic victory and a violent constitutional crisis emerges. However, outside of this scenario, democracy can erode in many other ways. Republican-held state legislatures are still passing bills to limit the right to vote, notably to Black Americans and other predominantly Democratic constituencies. The conservative-dominated Supreme Court could, in its ruling on the key Moore v. Harper case, approve the Independent State Legislature theory. Some fear that this theory would give a state legislature the power to overturn an election result by naming a new slate of electors, but this is highly doubtful, since states must still comply with federal law on the matter and Congress has now closed the loophole creating this scenario. However, Moore v. Harper creates other problems. Specifically, the Supreme Court could make partisan gerrymandering nonreviewable by state courts (it has already ruled that the federal constitution does not prohibit such manipulations). This would create new openings for state legislatures in Wisconsin or North Carolina to lock in Republican majorities. Finally, it is still entirely possible for a Republican candidate to outright win an election in 2024, particularly with the playing field as tilted as it is. Especially if that candidate is Trump, there is reason to suppose he would use his Presidency with greater determination to entrench his power, for example through targeting journalists or promoting loyalists in the executive (as he did towards the end of his last term). Democratic stability in the United States therefore had a better night on November 8th, 2022, than many had feared. It is not out of the woods. ## Taiwan and the “New Cold War” URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/taiwan-and-the-new-cold-war/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy brief highlights the main areas of similarity and difference in the dispute over Taiwan between the Cold War era and the.... This paper is a written version of a contribution made on 2nd June 2022 at a conference ‘Is War over Taiwan Coming?’ held at the University of Quebec at Montreal.   Introduction Great power competition has entered a new and unstable phase. With Russia launching an invasion of Ukraine and China launching military exercises around Taiwan, the risk of escalation from great power competition to great power conflict has risen markedly, inviting comparisons with the proxy wars and crises of the Cold War. A precedent for this rupture in world politics may be found in the Korean War, which decisively changed the image of international Communism from a political and ideological threat to a movement that was prepared to expand through armed aggression. But historical analogies, however suggestive, are not conclusive. The idea of the “new Cold War” has been debated extensively before, and some scholars have argued that the differences outweigh the similarities. This policy brief focuses on the Taiwan issue, which is a particularly apt case from a methodological perspective because it has persisted from the Cold War to the present day. From a policy perspective, it is also valuable to connect the debate on Taiwan’s security to the debate on the “new Cold War” because the debates have unfolded at the same time, and have focused on the same region, without much in the way of dialogue: debates on Taiwan have referred to the “New Cold War” only peripherally as a geopolitical setting, and debates on the “New Cold War” have referred to Taiwan only peripherally as one of many points of contention in the U.S.-China rivalry. This policy brief highlights the main areas of similarity and difference in the dispute over Taiwan between the Cold War era and the present day. It focuses on the periods in which the United States and the PRC were great power rivals (1949-1970 and 2016 to the present). Its finding is that the continuities are at the tactical levels, and that the discontinuities are at the strategic levels. At the tactical level, the United States has consistently feared entrapment; Taiwan has consistently feared abandonment; Washington and Taipei have consistently upheld Taiwan as the ideological rival to the PRC; Beijing has consistently tried to defend its aggression against Taiwan by making the spurious claim that it has the support of the Taiwanese people; the United States has been consistently neutral on Taiwan’s political status. At the strategic level, Taiwan has made a decisive shift away from Chinese nationalism since the Cold War; Taiwan has assumed a greater significance (in relative terms) for the PRC as Beijing has moved away from Maoism and increasingly based its legitimacy on nationalism; Taiwan has become a true democracy; and geoeconomic trends (especially the global dominance of the semiconductor industry) have made the security of Taiwan a vital interest of the United States. For policymakers, the differences outweigh the similarities. Given Beijing’s heightened sensitivity on Taiwan’s political status and the unofficial character of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, the fact that Taiwan no longer embraces the One-China principle (as it did during the Cold War) means that reviving a Cold War strategy in the Taiwan Strait would likely trigger a conflict between Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. Recent policy proposals in the United States, such as recognizing the Taiwan or adopting strategic clarity, have Cold War precedents but bear a far greater risk of escalation because they would likely be interpreted by Beijing as an attempt to bring about Taiwan’s permanent separation from China. The strategic importance of Taiwan, on the other hand, means that the national security of the United States rests on the security of Taiwan to a far greater extent than it did during the Cold War. Given the high stakes involved, the policy implication of this finding is that the United States (and the international community more generally) should adopt a status-quo, risk-averse approach that focuses on bolstering support for Taiwan within the framework of the One-China policy. Continuities In the dispute over Taiwan, the similarities between the Cold War and the present day are “tactical” in the sense that they capture how the major actors pursue their fundamental interests, rather than how they define those interests. The United States has consistently feared entrapment by Taiwan: starting in the 1950s and continuing to the present day, there has been a concern that excessively strong commitments to Taipei could lead Taipei to use the cover of U.S. support to act in a way that would trigger conflict with Beijing. During the Cold War, this concern was focused on the KMT’s preparations for a counteroffensive against the Chinese Communists, while in the period since the Cold War, this concern has been focused on the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. In both periods, the United States has practiced “dual deterrence” against Taipei and Beijing through a policy of strategic ambiguity. Taiwan, on the other hand, has feared U.S. abandonment ever since the United States ruled out the use of military force to defend Taiwan in the winter and spring of 1950. When the United States pursued rapprochement with the PRC in the 1970s, the ROC government also feared that the negotiations would come at the expense of its security. The Six Assurances were intended to address those concerns: they included, among others, the assurances that the United States “has not agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan” and “will not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC.” These concerns about abandonment have persisted, such as in the early months of the Trump administration, when Trump suggested that the United States was prepared to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip with Beijing on trade. A recent public opinion survey sponsored by the KMT (which tends to be more skeptical about U.S. support than the DPP is), found that over half of respondents did not believe that the United States would deploy forces to defend Taiwan in the event of a PRC attack. There are a number of other tactical similarities. In periods of strategic competition with Beijing, Washington and Taipei have upheld Taiwan as an alternative model to the People’s Republic of China. During the Cold War, this was the rivalry between “Nationalist China” and “Communist China,” between a political economy that preserved capitalism and traditional Chinese culture and a political economy that pursued revolutionary socialism. In the contemporary era, Washington and Taipei have been far more reserved about the influence of traditional Chinese culture in Taiwan, but they have emphasized Taiwan as the democratic alternative to the authoritarian system in the PRC, and the cultural rivalry between the two sides of the Strait can still be seen in Chinese language education. Another tactical similarity is that Beijing has tried to give its aggression against Taiwan a veneer of legitimacy by making the spurious claim that its actions are consistent with the will of the Taiwanese people. During the Cold War, Beijing claimed that 2/28 was a spontaneous uprising by the Taiwanese people in support of Communism. Today, Beijing still insists that only a small minority of people in Taiwan support independence. There is no historical evidence that Communism was the main factor behind the 2/28 uprising, and contemporary public opinion surveys in Taiwan have shown that most respondents favor the status quo, a significant minority supports independence, and a small minority supports unification. Another tactical similarity is that the United States has remained consistently neutral on Taiwan’s political status, a position that President Truman first stated on 27 June 1950 and David Stilwell repeated in August 2020. This a tactical decision because it creates a legal basis for the United States to intervene in Taiwan’s defense without violating China’s sovereignty, since the United States does not consider Taiwan to be a part of China. Discontinuities The main differences between the Cold War and the present day are “strategic” in the sense of how Washington, Taipei, and Beijing understand this dispute for their fundamental interests. Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States has risen significantly since the days when General Douglas MacArthur called it an “unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender.” The geographic aspect is still significant, of course, and discussions of Taiwan’s strategic importance invariably refer to its position in the First Island Chain. But Taiwan’s dominant position in semiconductor manufacturing and its democracy have elevated its strategic importance for the United States. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) currently earns over 50% of global revenue in contract chipmaking and almost 90% for the most advanced chips (defined as being under 10 nm). Rick Switzer at the U.S. Air Force Office of Commercial and Economic Analysis has estimated that the PRC would control almost 80% of semiconductor manufacturing capacity in the world if Taiwan were forcibly unified with the mainland. Steve Blank at Stanford University has estimated that if the PRC were to cut off the supply of chips from TSMC’s fabs, the civilian and military electronics industries in the United States would need at least 5 years to recover. As Becca Wasser, Martijn Rasser, and Hannah Kelley have written in a recent study for the Center for a New American Security, “secure access to the output of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is therefore a strategic necessity.” Moreover, unlike in the Cold War, Taiwan is now a genuine democracy, and the United States’ support for that democracy is a symbol of the United States’ commitment to the defense of the rules-based international order and to its other democratic allies. These factors mean that Taiwan’s strategic importance for the United States has risen dramatically since the Cold War. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Truman administration concluded that based on Taiwan’s geography alone, it was important, but not vital for U.S. interests. Now that Taiwan is essential for semiconductor supply chains and Taiwan is a democracy, it has arguably risen to the level of a vital interest. Taiwan’s strategic importance has also risen for Beijing in relative terms. During the period of U.S.-PRC strategic competition during the Cold War, the CCP sought to prevent Taiwan’s independence, but preventing the independence of Taiwan was arguably less important for Beijing than implementing Maoist ideology on the mainland. Evidence for this can be found in the fact that Mao chose to delay the invasion of Taiwan in June 1950 – when it likely would have succeeded – in order to support the North Korean invasion of South Korea as a way of demonstrating his support for the international Communist movement. With the sharp decline in Communist ideology after reform and opening, preventing Taiwan’s independence has risen dramatically on the list of the CCP’s priorities. Economic development is the other pillar of the CCP’s legitimacy, but under Xi Jinping, economic development has taken a back seat to national security. The dispute over Taiwan has become much more important for Beijing in recent years than it was in the early decades of the Cold War. For Taiwan, as well, there has been a strategic discontinuity in terms of how the government understands its fundamental interests. During the Cold War, the KMT-ROC party-state prioritized Chinese nationalism above all other considerations, including democracy. Since the Cold War, democratization has led to the decline of Chinese nationalism (including Chinese identity among the electorate), and there have been regular and peaceful transfers of power between a moderate KMT and a moderate DPP. The current DPP government does not maintain the One-China principle, and even the KMT’s commitment to the “1992 Consensus” (a historic and controversial formulation of the One-China principle) may be in doubt over the long term. Johnny Chiang, the former chair of the KMT, tried to remove the “1992 Consensus” from the party’s platform, and Eric Chu, the current chair, has used the evasive language of calling it a “non-consensus consensus” and “constructive ambiguity.” Taiwan no longer defines its interests in terms of Chinese nationalism, but in terms of democracy, prosperity, and anchoring itself in the rules-based international order. Policy Implications Taking into all of these continuities and discontinuities into account, the policy implications of this analysis are that the United States and its allies should not attempt to revive a Cold War strategy of containment in the Taiwan Strait. The strategic importance of Taiwan and the catastrophic consequences of a war recommend a status-quo, risk-averse approach that entails increasing support for Taiwan within the framework of the One-China policy. The combination of China’s heightened sensitivity about Taiwan’s independence and Taiwan’s resistance to the One-China principle mean that policies that were feasible during the Cold War, such as diplomatic recognition, would inflame tensions in the Taiwan Strait to the point of a crisis or even a war. Although the One-China policy has a reputation of imposing severe restrictions on U.S. and international engagement with Taiwan, it has proven remarkably flexible and adaptable in the fifty years since it was first adopted. It also provides considerable scope for increased U.S. support for Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act, for example, says that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” That means there is no statutory or theoretical limit to the weapons systems or military training that the United States can provide to Taiwan. Abandoning the One-China policy would be both unnecessary and counterproductive. Many of the recent proposals for abandoning the One-China policy have the laudable intention of strengthening Taiwan’s defenses, but they are likely to lead Beijing to test those defenses in ways that no one wants to see.     James Lee is an Assistant Research Fellow (equivalent to Assistant Professor) at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. He is also an affiliated researcher of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. ## Taiwan Facing the Loss of Diplomatic Allies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/taiwan-facing-the-loss-of-diplomatic-allies/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > As Canada works on its Indo-Pacific strategy, it must incorporate the issue of Taiwan’s status into its thinking on the future of the... The war currently raging in Ukraine has led to fears that a similar conflict could erupt in the Taiwan Strait. Tensions between Taipei and Beijing have not been this high since the 1995-96 crisis. The issue of Taiwan’s status crystallizes, in many ways, the competition between the United States and China in terms of security, ideology and technology. However, the comparison with Ukraine overlooks the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is seeking, above all, to reunify Taiwan without resorting to its armed forces. One of the Communist Party’s objectives is to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. The island currently has only formal diplomatic relations with 14 states. As Canada works on its Indo-Pacific strategy, it must incorporate the issue of Taiwan’s status into its thinking on the future of the international order. Working to have Taiwan join international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), or join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), would enhance Taiwan’s international status and be in Canada’s interest. Alternatively, Canada could seek to increase its development assistance to provide an alternative to Taiwan’s allies being courted by Beijing. An Island With a Special Status To understand Taiwan’s status, we must go back to the end of the Chinese Civil War. In 1949, when the victory of Mao’s CCP seemed inevitable, the Kuomintang (KMT), a political party led by Chiang Kai-shek, refused to recognize the CCP’s victory and found refuge on the island of Taiwan. The parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait claimed to be the true representatives of China. Several states began to recognize the CCP as the legitimate representative of China. The United Kingdom chose to do so as early as 1950. Canada waited until 1970. The Republic of China, located on the island of Taiwan, continued to sit in the United Nations (UN) as the representative of China until 1971 when the General Assembly passed by a majority vote Resolution 2758 recognizing Communist China as the holder of the Chinese seat in the United Nations. Without the legitimacy of a seat at the United Nations, Taiwan quickly lost the recognition of many states, 75 between 1971 and 2020. This is because Beijing and Taipei have long recognized the “One China Principle,” the idea that the mainland and the island are part of the same ensemble. If there is only one China, there is no agreement on who represents it. Therefore, having formal diplomatic relations with one means not having any with the other. However, following the democratization of Taiwan in the 1990s, the position on the One China Principle changed. While the KMT continues to put forward this principle, its main political opponent, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), leans towards the idea of Taiwanese independence and puts forward the use of the term “Taiwan” rather than “Republic of China” to describe the island state. Under this name, President Chen Shui-bian unsuccessfully applied to rejoin the UN in 2007. The UN objected, citing its adherence to the one-China policy agreed upon in the 1971 resolution. The current president, Tsai Ing-wen, considers Taiwan a de facto independent state that does not have legal recognition for being a full member of the international community. A More Assertive China In response to the election of Tsai Ing-wen’s DPP in 2016, who advocated challenging the status quo vis-à-vis China in seek of greater international recognition, Beijing adopted a more aggressive strategy to isolate the island. The Chinese Communist Party clearly announced that “As long as the DPP is in power, sooner or later Taiwan will have no diplomatic allies.” As a result, eight states have switched sides since 2016, the latest being Nicaragua last December. What distinguishes the present Chinese attitude from earlier periods is the intensity of Chinese Communist Party activism to steal diplomatic allies from Taiwan. This is also true of Beijing’s reaction to developing relations — even informal ones — between Taiwan and some European states. The Communist Party’s strategy seems to boil down to using its financial capabilities as leverage. To convince foreign governments to switch allegiance, Beijing guarantees to invest large sums in development aid. In 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe was the first state to end their relationship with Taiwan in what President Tsai characterizes as “chequebook diplomacy,” which she refuses to pursue. It was later revealed that Sao Tome and Principe had requested approximately $200 million in financial assistance to maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. More recently, the Solomon Islands terminated relations with Taipei for $500 million, and Kiribati did the same in exchange for infrastructure investments and the acquisition of aircraft and cargo ships. Pressure from Beijing explains why Taiwan now maintains diplomatic relations with only 14 states, mainly in the Pacific and Latin America. In 2021, the relationship between Lithuania and Taiwan angered the Chinese Communist Party. The use of the term “Taiwan” in naming the building that serves as the unofficial Taiwanese embassy in Lithuania, rather than the more neutral “Taipei,” provoked a strong reaction from Beijing. The latter cut off diplomatic and trade relations with Lithuania. In the same year, the strengthening of economic and political ties between Taiwan and other Eastern European states such as Slovenia and the Czech Republic also brought threats from the Chinese Communist Party. China’s reaction is the opposite of the one it had in 2013 when New Zealand became the first state to sign a free trade agreement with Taiwan. Since 2016, China has also blocked Taiwan’s access to observer status at the general assemblies of UN specialized agencies such as the WHO and the ICAO, which it tolerated between 2009 and 2016. Undoubtedly, heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait push the Communist Party to adopt a more aggressive strategy to isolate the island state. The Geopolitical Consequences of This Diplomatic Rivalry Mainland China is not only seeking to isolate Taiwan by convincing its diplomatic allies to switch allegiance. Its manoeuvres are also part of a broader geopolitical strategy. By convincing Panama to change its position in 2017, the Communist Party was winning a diplomatic battle and securing a privileged relationship with the government of a state controlling one of the world’s most important maritime trade passages. A similar situation is currently at work in the Solomon Islands. After recognizing Mainland China in 2019, the two governments recently signed a security agreement. A version leaked to the media indicates that Chinese warships would be allowed to dock on the islands and that Beijing could send security forces “to help maintain social order.” One of the reasons for the Solomon Islands’ appeal is the presence of a deep-water port, a rarity in the region that can accommodate large vessels. In addition, the presence of Chinese military personnel would pose a threat to U.S. strategy in the region and Australia, which lies southwest of the islands. The diplomatic strategy of Beijing and Taipei also has repercussions within the states being courted, where the geopolitical game is exacerbating local rivalries. For example, the recent elections in Honduras and Nicaragua took on an international dimension as the primary presidential candidates campaigned on whether to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The Solomon Islands remains the most egregious recent case. The state capital experienced several days of rioting in late 2021 due to tensions between key political leaders and the state’s two main islands over several issues, among them relations with China and Taiwan. Therefore, this diplomatic chess game can lead to real destabilization in the Global South. International Recognition for What? As Taiwan has lost a number of allies recently, the question of the value of these states comes to mind. What does Taiwan gain from having so few allies among countries with little economic weight? Taiwan does not indeed receive much economic benefit from having diplomatic relations with these states in terms of trade. According to Taiwan’s Foreign Trade Office, Taiwan does not trade more with its diplomatic partner states but rather with large developed economies such as the United States, Japan and China. What these allies lack in economic terms, they make up for by offering Taiwan a form of international legitimacy. There is indeed a definite advantage to having formal diplomatic allies. The ability to maintain relations with other states remains one of the criteria for statehood under international law, as evidenced by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which sets out these criteria: possessing (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a government; and (4) the ability to enter into relations with other states. Taiwan meets the first three criteria, but with only 14 diplomatic allies and unofficial relations with several other states, its claim to meet the fourth criterion is vulnerable. Thus, official diplomatic partners help Taiwan’s cause by giving legitimacy to claims that Taiwan does possess the attributes of an independent state. Since Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and has no related opportunities to participate in its specialized agencies, its diplomatic allies play a crucial role in advocating for its cause in front of the international community. St. Lucia, for example, spoke on Taiwan’s behalf at the last ICAO assembly. The picture is not all bleak, however. Taiwan is a member of international organizations such as the International Olympic Committee, the World Trade Organization, the Asian Development Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. According to the Lowy Institute Global Diplomacy Index, Taiwan also has 111 representative offices abroad, putting it ahead of states such as Malaysia, Israel and Norway. Recognizing the Chinese Communist Party’s increased diplomatic offensive since 2016, the United States has strengthened its ties with Taiwan. To this end, the two governments launched the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, a platform that mobilizes Taiwanese expertise to address global issues. Other liberal democracies have followed Washington’s lead in strengthening their relations with Taipei. There has been an increase in visits to the island by European parliamentarians and visits by Taiwan’s foreign minister to European capitals. The response of these states to the Chinese Communist Party’s strategy of isolation explains why Taiwan’s economy continues to grow and why the disengagement of its diplomatic allies is not causing any sense of panic on the island at the moment. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada The issue of Taiwan’s diplomatic status is not confined to cross-strait tensions. Beijing’s strategy to isolate Taipei is part of broader a security, ideological and technological confrontation between liberal democracies and revisionist authoritarian states. With the release of Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy, Ottawa must consider the issue of Taiwan’s status and incorporate it into its thinking. While maintaining a clear recognition of the one-China policy, the Canadian government has considerable room to strengthen its ties with Taiwan. In this sense, efforts to include Taiwan in multilateral processes within and outside the United Nations, strategies to strengthen Taiwan’s economy, and enhanced technical cooperation should all be part of Canada’s strategy towards Taiwan. It should be clear that these measures should not be taken merely to counter Beijing’s actions but because they represent real opportunities that are in Canada’s interest. The options cannot completely end Beijing’s quest to isolate Taiwan. Nonetheless, efforts to foster closer relations between Taiwan, Canada, and other states and maintain Taiwan’s existing diplomatic relations may provide it with some room for manoeuvre and serve Canadian interests. At the very least, the more extensive Taiwan’s relations with other states, the greater the risks and costs Beijing will face if it decides to use non-peaceful means to reunify the island. Canada should be more forceful in supporting Taiwan’s membership in international organizations whose statutes accept non-state entities. Taiwan’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic easily illustrates the relevance of having its expertise within the WHO. More broadly, the challenge posed by authoritarian regimes to the rules-based international order must prompt democracies like Canada to redouble their efforts to define the global norms of tomorrow. In this context, having another democracy, and one that is a champion of feminism, sit alongside Canada in international organizations would strengthen the promotion of norms based on shared values and interests. Economically, Taiwan and Canada are ideal partners, especially given the structure of their industrial base. Taiwan is Canada’s 15th largest trading partner. In a context where diversification of trading partners is an objective for Ottawa, increasing its ties with Taiwan must be high on the agenda. The two governments announced the start of negotiations on a bilateral investment agreement earlier this year. First, however, Canada should focus on bringing Taiwan into the Trans-Pacific Partnership, although this will not be easy since the entry of a new state requires consensus among stakeholders. A recent study suggests that Taiwan’s entry into the Partnership would bring $1.5 billion in benefits to the Canadian economy. It would also allow Taiwan to strengthen its ties with several Indo-Pacific states. Ottawa should also seize the opportunity to cooperate on technical matters with Taiwan. The aforementioned Global Cooperation and Training Framework, jointly established by Taipei and Washington, would be an excellent place to start. While Canada is already a partner, it could follow Japan and Australia by becoming a full member. Such a move would send a clear signal of Canadian support for Taiwan. Electoral interference and information warfare are other areas where cooperation is imperative. Taiwan possesses extensive experience in this area, and the island has been a testing ground for Chinese People’s Liberation Army tactics in these areas for decades. On the other hand, Canada is just becoming aware of its vulnerability. It is now clear that the Chinese government attempted to influence the last Canadian election and the evidence points in that direction. Canada would no doubt benefit greatly from cooperation in the fight against Chinese interference. Finally, Canada should use its development assistance in the region to offer an alternative to China and slow the rate at which Taiwan is losing diplomatic allies. The current situation in the Solomon Islands illustrates that Canada cannot continue to neglect development assistance. Ottawa allocates only 0.3% of its GDP to aid, according to Donor Tracker. Even the increase announced in the last federal budget will keep it far from the 0.7% target set by the UN, which many of our partners, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have reached. There is room for a much more ambitious development assistance plan. The West’s inability to help certain regions prosper necessarily opens the door to China. Development assistance and the national interest are not mutually exclusive, and Ottawa should recognize that it is an essential tool in achieving its international objectives. As tensions between Beijing and Taipei increase, Canada must be more than a passive witness. The proposed recommendations will necessarily have political costs in relations with Beijing, and Ottawa will need to be able to absorb the short-term costs to achieve long-term goals. This will require political will and resilience. Therefore, Canada must work with like-minded states. Its strategy will need to be based on a worldview that integrates the Chinese Communist Party’s new aggressiveness towards Taiwan in the context of its broader challenge to the world order. ## Taiwan: Invasion is not likely, but deterrence remains vital URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/taiwan-invasion-is-not-likely-but-deterrence-remains-vital/ Modified: 2022-09-06 > This paper rehearses why invasion will not happen; looks at likely measures to be taken by the CCP in coming years against Taiwan and against countries which it perceives as supporters of Taiwan; and makes suggestions as to how the governments of free and open countries should react. This paper is a written version of a contribution made on 2nd June 2022 at a conference ‘Is War over Taiwan Coming?’ held at the University of Quebec at Montreal. This paper was published in English by the Council on Geostrategy on 6th September 2022.   In May 2022, Lord Hague, the former British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, devoted his weekly column to the need to militarily deter the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from launching an invasion of Taiwan. He is not the first – or last – to worry about an imminent threat. In March 2021, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee United States (US) Admiral Philip Davidson saw the threat of invasion ‘manifesting’ itself by 2027. This Primer argues that, despite its increasingly bellicose rhetoric and its reaction to the visit of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, to Taiwan, the CCP will not invade Taiwan in the next decade. Nor will it impose sustained blockades. The main restraint upon the CCP is the economic consequences. The resultant cratering of the global and Chinese economies would go beyond ‘lifting a stone and dropping it on one’s foot’, in the Chinese expression. An economic crash would follow, leading to large-scale unemployment in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Without an adequate social security net, unemployment would lead to unrest, which would be directed against the party. So far, the CCP has always managed to keep protest confined to local issues; but the likelihood is that a post-invasion depression would lead to demonstrations on a scale which cross city and county boundaries. They might well become an existential threat to the party. This is something which the CCP, for whom survival in power is paramount, will not risk. Even if all-out blockades and invasion do not happen – but the CCP has vowed that invasion would follow a Taiwanese declaration of independence – the next decade will be witness to geopolitical typhoons across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, foreign governments would be wise to prepare for the worst, even if the chances of the worst coming to pass are small. Thus, a strategy of military deterrence is a necessary one. Necessary, but not sufficient. More important is political and economic deterrence. Yet this is an area largely neglected by policymakers. This Primer rehearses why invasion will not happen; looks at likely measures to be taken by the CCP in coming years against Taiwan and against countries which it perceives as supporters of Taiwan; and makes suggestions as to how the governments of free and open countries should react. Economic deterrence is more important than military deterrence. But both are required.   ***   To continue reading, do not hesitate to visit the Council on Geostrategy website.     Charles Parton OBE  was a long-serving career diplomat, spending 22 out of his 37 year career working in or on China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. In his final posting he was seconded to the European Union’s Delegation in Beijing as First Counsellor until late 2016. In 2017, he was chosen as the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s Special Adviser on China. He is currently a fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). ## Taking Stock of the First 100 Days of Trump’s Foreign Policy: Issues and Prospects for Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/taking-stock-of-the-first-100-days-of-trumps-foreign-policy-issues-and-prospects-for-canada/ Modified: 2025-05-06 In this closing world, the United States assumed the role of stabilizing and sometimes even benevolent power. It worked to provide a framework for the liberal international order and to defend international law wherever possible and desirable. Of course, we must not idealize the past; it is true that some administrations have departed from this role. George W. Bush's unilateralism and violation of international law during the invasion of Iraq, or the atrocities committed under the Johnson and Nixon presidencies in Indochina, justified by the fight against communism, are obvious examples. But despite these abuses, successive administrations over the past 80 years have been guided by common fundamentals: the quest for stability, a commitment to economic liberalism and the promotion of liberal democracy. Instead, Donald Trump is proposing a predatory, nationalistic and egocentric foreign policy that breaks with the ideals of his thirteen predecessors, Republicans and Democrats alike. In this new world, Trump is replacing the influence and attraction (soft power) that have made American power so successful since Harry Truman with an approach based on coercion, blackmail and force. Over the last 100 days, the entire grammar of American international action has been brutally transformed. Respect for international borders has been called into question, notably through Trump's desire to unilaterally redraw the border with Canada. The right of peoples to self-determination was ignored, as demonstrated by the contempt shown for the aspirations of the Ukrainian people. Support for international development was undermined by the dismantling of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Finally, multilateral governance of major global challenges was abandoned, with the withdrawal of organisations such as the WHO or international agreements such as the Paris climate agreement. What we are witnessing today is much more than a simple change of direction: it is a kind of revolution in the country's foreign policy, shattering the moral and strategic consensus of the last 80 years. Goodbye cooperation, hello coercion In this new world, Donald Trump sees ‘win-win’ international agreements as signs of weakness on the part of the United States. This is because his vision of the world is based exclusively on a logic of power relations, in which American power must prevail without compromise. That's why his actions over the first 100 years, including the use of economic sanctions and tariffs, are resolutely in line with the logic of a zero-sum game: an obsessive quest for indiscriminate gains at the expense of allies and adversaries alike, in defiance of established diplomatic relations and the principles of international law. Trump's stated ambition to seize strategic territories such as Greenland and the Panama Canal, as well as his desire to annex Canada by economic asphyxiation, illustrate this logic perfectly. Trump makes no secret of his willingness to use military force, if necessary, to achieve his objectives. During his State of the Union address in February, he stated bluntly that the United States would take control of Greenland ‘one way or another’. The recent visit by Vice-President J. D. Vance to this autonomous Danish territory, rich in natural resources and of growing importance in the Arctic, is further evidence of this expansionist drive. Why this expansionist drive? There are many reasons for this expansionist drive. In the case of Greenland, Trump appears to be seeking to secure direct access to strategic resources such as critical minerals and rare metals, which are essential to the US economy and defence. Trump seems to be operating under the impression that the United States is lagging behind China in controlling these resources. As if a strategic gap needed to be closed quickly in this area. The interest in Greenland and the Panama Canal also reveals a desire to strengthen strategic control of major maritime passages. The annexation of these geostrategic points would give Washington military and economic leverage in its growing rivalry with China and, to a lesser extent, Russia. This expansionist rhetoric is also a response to the prevailing discourse on the relative decline of the United States in the face of emerging powers. The acquisition of new territories is seen as a way of reinforcing America's status as a superpower, by consolidating an American ‘fortress’ capable of competing favourably with emerging powers. In his first 100 days in the White House, Donald Trump has made a radical break with the principles that have guided American foreign policy since the Second World War. Through his bellicose rhetoric and unilateral actions, he has already established himself as one of the American presidents who has done most to trivialise the use of force to achieve his objectives. His aggressive approach de facto legitimizes the territorial coercion strategies of authoritarian leaders such as Xi Jinping in Taiwan and Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. Implications for Canadian foreign policy The radical reversal in American foreign policy since 20 January does not mean that the pillars of Canadian foreign policy have collapsed. Canada remains a resolutely free-trading state, deeply committed to NATO and committed to multilateralism. Witness the Carney government's current efforts to strengthen economic exchanges with European and Asian partners, with whom Canada has already signed free trade agreements. During the federal election campaign, Prime Minister Carney said that if the Trump administration refused to assume its role as world leader, Canada was ready to take over. Although this was an electoral statement designed to mobilise Canadian nationalism rather than a commitment based on the country's real capacity to occupy such a position, it nevertheless reflected the new Prime Minister's state of mind. It reaffirmed Canada's determination to preserve the foundations of its foreign policy, even in an international context marked by instability and American coercion. Implications for Canadian sovereignty and defence Where things get dangerously complicated for Canada is in its defence policy. The Trump administration's statements about suffocating the country economically in order to annex us as the 51st state, and its desire to redraw the Canada-U.S. border, represent the most serious threats to Canadian security and sovereignty since the country was founded 158 years ago. Now is not the time for incredulity, but for contingency planning. The conclusion to be drawn from such positions is clear: far more than China or Russia, it is the current US administration that represents the greatest threat to Canada, because it is intentionally and persistently attacking our vital interests. All this in a context where the nationalist and protectionist movement on which it is based now seems to be in for the long haul. Even if Trump were to tone down his comments about Canada, the damage has already been done. His provocative statements have helped to anchor, within the American radical right, the idea that an annexation of Canada might not only be possible, but desirable, even necessary. Against a backdrop of accelerating climate change, increasing scarcity of fresh water and growing interest in strategic metals and other natural resources, Canada's vast wealth is attracting growing interest. If Trump does not actively seek to seize them this time, it is quite possible that one of his political heirs will consider this possibility more seriously in the future. Canada stands alone In this context, achieving the objective of 2% of GDP devoted to defence could certainly bring Canada greater recognition within NATO, but will in no way alter the asymmetry of power between Canada and the United States. Similarly, a strategic rapprochement with France or the United Kingdom would not significantly reduce our immense strategic vulnerability to Washington. In the event of American aggression, closer ties with Europe would remain essentially symbolic, as no European partner would risk direct confrontation with the world's leading military power to defend Canada. Moreover, the limp reaction of the European allies, like that of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, to Donald Trump's expansionist designs on Greenland and repeated threats against Canada, is revealing. In short, as long as the United States respects our sovereignty and behaves like a responsible partner, Canada can count on a wide range of allies. But as soon as an American administration adopts a hostile stance, there is radio silence. Canada then finds itself alone, entirely dependent on Washington's will. This stark observation calls for strategic thinking based on both the short and the long term. In the short term, it is essential to maintain the best possible relations with the United States because, whatever we say, it will remain our main economic partner. At the same time, we need to reduce our exposure to the economic risks caused by our over-reliance on the US market. We therefore need to ‘de-risk’ our economic security by actively diversifying our global partnerships and strengthening our domestic resilience, notably through sustained growth in interprovincial trade. In terms of our strategic autonomy, Shimooka, Lanoszka and Devlen are right to point out that the desire for closer ties with Europe is partly based on an emotional reaction to Trump. This emotional dimension tends to cloud judgement and obscure the concrete limits, and even counter-productive effects, that such an orientation could entail for Canada. There are major obstacles to Canadian industry's access to the European defence ecosystem: persistent protectionism, the unsuitability of European equipment for specific Canadian needs, and the saturation of European industrial capacities due to the war effort in Ukraine. Without dismissing the European option out of hand, it is essential to adopt a realistic and selective approach when choosing our military and technological partnerships in Europe. Canada's deterrent capability In the longer term, and given that Canada finds itself isolated, it is essential to open a lucid and responsible debate on our real capacity for deterrence. Today, our one and only lever against the Trump administration is the imposition of tariffs on certain American products, a very weak tool against an economy ten times more powerful than ours, and totally ineffective against our clearly stated territorial ambitions. If Trump or any of his successors were to adopt a more aggressive stance, Canada would have no credible means of defence. We therefore have a collective responsibility to re-evaluate, without taboos, the instruments of our sovereignty and to explore new levers of deterrence. Beyond tariff measures, there is a range of possibilities that deserve to be examined rigorously, even if this means calling into question certain values that we have upheld for decades. These options include developing credible cyber deterrence capabilities, strengthening our conventional armed forces and, controversially but necessarily, examining the relevance and feasibility of tactical nuclear means. In the new world, Canada's very survival may well depend on its ability to dissuade predatory powers, i.e. to convince them that the strategic cost of their ambitions would outweigh the expected gains. One thing is certain: by breaking with diplomatic conventions, displaying blatant contempt for international law and pursuing expansionist aims, Trump is a central player in the erosion of the foundations of global stability on which the world is closing in. This shift in American diplomacy from cooperation to coercion is creating greater instability and paving the way for a world in which only the balance of power will dictate what happens next. Faced with this reconfiguration of the strategic environment, Canada cannot remain passive: it is imperative that we draw the necessary strategic lessons. ## Targeting Ayman Al-Zawahiri: A Just Elimination or Just an Elimination? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/targeting-ayman-al-zawahiri-a-just-elimination-or-just-an-elimination/ Modified: 2023-02-27 > On August 1st, U.S. President Joe Biden announced the elimination of the leader of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, on the day before in the Afghan capital, Kabul. In declaring that justice had “been delivered,” President Biden was following in the footsteps of those who, before him – Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush – had seen in the elimination of leaders of jihadist terrorist organizations a form of justice. To what order of justice is he referring here? On August 1st, U.S. President Joe Biden announced the elimination of the leader of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, on the day before in the Afghan capital, Kabul. In declaring that justice had “been delivered,” President Biden was following in the footsteps of those who, before him – Donald Trump, Barack Obama, and George W. Bush – had seen in the elimination of leaders of jihadist terrorist organizations a form of justice. To what order of justice is he referring here? To say that something is just can refer to several distinct orders. As Amélie Férey, a researcher at the Institut Français de Relations Internationales (IFRI), points out, targeted killings of terrorist leaders are traditionally presented using four types of justification: historical, legal, strategic, and moral. Two seem particularly relevant to the treatment of Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s elimination: the legal and the moral. A first approach has thus grasped the justice of this elimination in a procedural sense. What is just is that which meets the established standards and frameworks. In “What is Justice?” Hans Kelsen unequivocally recalls that “a man is just if his behavior conforms to the norms of a social order supposed to be just.” Justice is understood here in the sense of legality. But in another, more philosophical conception, the justice of the strike can instead refer to a desirable higher order, where is just what works for the common good, for progress, for the general improvement of the conditions of coexistence between human beings, sometimes to the detriment of established norms. In this second conception, one understands justice in the sense of morality or legitimacy. In most cases, these two orders are compatible. In some cases, however, something morally right may be illegal and vice versa. The first readings, mainly academic, of the elimination of Ayman Al-Zawahiri usefully looked at his lawfulness, following a procedural reading of justice. In contrast, at the political level, in the United States, the discourse surrounding this elimination seems to have primarily considered its morality. Does it advance the common good and bring about desirable effects that are deemed just? This second type of discourse is divided into two distinct strands. First, a utilitarian component: the elimination is judged to be moral because it would have a social utility and contribute to the future common good by preventively reducing the threat. Second, there is a retributivist counterpart belonging more to the transcendent register. The elimination can also be judged as moral because it makes an act of legitimate revenge possible. Legalistic Approaches to Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s Elimination The announcement of Al-Zawahiri’s elimination on August 1st immediately generated a great deal of analyses. Lawyers, journalists, political scientists, and terrorism experts were anxious to know the technical means used, the actors involved, the state of the international jihadist nebula, and the challenges in terms of succession that this operation would pose to the Al-Qaeda organization. Among these numerous analyses, some focused on the acceptability of this operation – on whether it is just, following a legalistic reading. As early as August 3rd, 2022, Robert Chesney (University of Texas) questioned “the legality of the strike that killed Ayman Al-Zawahiri.” He argued that neither the United Nations Charter nor the law of armed conflict nor international human rights law allowed for a clear legal basis for the elimination, by drone, of for Ayman Al-Zawahiri in Kabul. In this case, Chesney explained, on D+2, that he did not have sufficient contextual information on the operation itself and wished to “lay the groundwork” for the questions of international law issues raised by the elimination of the leader. More assertive was an article from Michael Schmitt and William Casey Biggerstaff published by the Lieber Institute at West Point on August 5th, 2022. The authors believed the operation to be legal since “the al-Zawahiri strike is a textbook example of how to execute a surgical strike against a lawful target after having taken feasible precautions under the circumstances to minimize collateral damage, and in compliance with the rule of proportionality.” Later in August, Ben Saul (University of Sydney) took the opposite legal position, seeing the elimination of Ayman Al-Zawahiri as primarily illegal. Amélie Férey highlighted that targeted eliminations are subject to uncertainty in international law requiring the establishment of new ethical and normative frameworks. In the specific case of Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Ben Saul raises several aspects concerning this elimination. First, the elimination of Al-Zawahiri, like others before him, is thought to put forward a regime of extensive interpretation of self-defence and which would potentially deprive Article 51 of the U.N. Charter of its substance. In a conventional view of self-defence, Article 51 allows the use of force in the event of an “armed attack.” According to this reading, chosen by Ben Saul, what could have justified a regime of self-defence in September 2001 can no longer do so two decades later. The last Al-Qaeda attacks against the United States date back to 2009 with the failed attack on the New York subway. In sum, it would not seem possible for the United States, despite the trend in recent years to expand the regime of interpretation of self-defense, to justify the existence of armed aggresion against the country that could justify the use of force in self-defence against the Al-Qaeda organization in 2022. The American vision of self-defense nevertheless adopts a broader framework of application and intends to legitimize self-defense operations, including in an anticipatory manner. For other eliminations, Washington had put forward a preventive conception of self-defense, whereby it would be legitimate to eliminate a target before it could attack the United States or its allies. Here, Al-Zawahiri would be eliminated in order to preventively stop him from causing future damage and suffering. In French-language doctrine, however, this broad understanding of anticipatory self-defence is generally rejected and seen as an “abusive extension” of the law of self-defence (according to Olivier Corten and François Dubuisson). Second, according to Ben Saul, the law of armed conflict would not be applicable in the situation between the United States and the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. In this respect, the elimination of Al-Zawahiri would not fall within the scope of the Geneva Conventions and the law on the use of armed force. The core of the US argument is that the United States believes that Al-Qaeda is currently engaged in a non-international armed conflict against the United States. A conflict which would justify the applicability of international humanitarian law and thus provide a framework for identifying Al-Zawahiri as a legitimate target. However, legal definitions of a non-international armed conflict traditionally require a criterion of intensity and severity of hostilities. In this case, the State Department and the U.S. intelligence community have repeatedly acknowledged the declining danger of al-Qaeda to the United States. In 2021 for example, U.S. President Joe Biden declared, at the time of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, that “We delivered justice to bin Laden on May 2nd, 2011 – over a decade ago. Al Qaeda was decimated [...] The fundamental obligation of a President, in my opinion, is to defend and protect America – not against threats of 2001, but against the threats of 2021 and tomorrow.” J. Biden justified the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the absence of an ongoing threat from al-Qaeda against the United States. To claim today that such a threat would justify the elimination of Al-Zawahiri in the context of an ongoing non-international armed conflict would therefore contradict his statements of August 2021 and al-Qaeda’s geostrategic realities. Third, even if the law of armed conflict were applicable, Ayman Al-Zawahi’s non-involvement in the group’s operational and strategic activities over the past several years could, according to Ben Saul, deprive Washington of a sufficient basis to designate him as a combatant posing a direct threat, justifying his elimination. For the United States, membership in a group labeled as terrorist would be a sufficient basis for designating an individual as a legitimate target. In this sense, whether Ayman Al-Zawahiri was dangerous or not at the time of his elimination would have no impact on his status as a target; it was legitimate to target him because he was a member of Al-Qaeda. This reading is nevertheless regularly criticized for its all-encompassing and indiscriminating nature. In the U.S. president’s August 1st speech, Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s dangerousness to the United States is mentioned only in past terms, referring to September 2001. According to the intelligence community, Al-Zawahiri was not involved in planning attacks but rather helped encourage them. Fourth, the elimination of Al-Zawahiri, like others before him, questions the very possibility of a state like the United States acting in self-defense against a non-state actor. According to the narrow interpretation of the International Court of Justice, self-defense cannot be applicable against non-state actors such as al-Qaeda – a reading that is in tension with the practice of many states and the Security Council, for which self-defense also applies against non-state armed terrorist groups. Finally, the elimination, by drone, in a third country that has not a priori given its consent potentially goes against the territorial sovereignty of the Taliban regime in Kabul. It seems more legitimate to leave these important debates to international law specialists. Let us simply note here that, in the press and in academic analyses, debates about the justice of the operation against Al-Zawahiri question justice in the sense of lawfulness. In other words, these analyses use a shared normative framework – international law – to question the operation’s “respect for established norms and frameworks” (to use our initial Kelsenian formula here). This first approach to justice corresponds to the legalistic dimension of a deontological approach to ethics. Something is considered to be just if the means used to obtain it are judged to be in conformity with recognized and accepted normative frameworks, here at the legal level. The legalistic approach is interesting and necessary to grasp the practice of targeted eliminations on the international scene. In this paper, however, I wish to show that the political discourses surrounding elimination are situated at another argumentative level, seeking to justify the very cause of the strike. In other words, ,political discourses emphasizing the justice of the operation are not so much interested in its compliance with the rules, but rather in its moral desirability, both utilitarian and transcendent. Moral Approaches to the Elimination of Ayman Al-Zawahiri in the Political Arena One may be struck, when reading the political discourses surrounding Al-Zawahiri’s elimination on an Afghan balcony by an American drone, by the relative absence of international law. When he announces the strike, it is not, it seems, the UN Charter or the Geneva Conventions that underpin Joe Biden’s justification, but rather a higher moral order. Political discourses declaring that “justice has been done” refer rather to a regime of moral justification that seems to be developed, as in penal philosophy, in two versions, already found in Beccaria. First, the elimination is judged moral because it would prevent the commission of a future crime and thus contribute to a more stable and secure future (utilitarianism). Second, it is also moral, for it satisfies a vengeance that would be legitimate and just (retributivist justice or a transcendent vision of justice). A Moral Elimination Contributing To The “Common Good”: the Consequentialist Discourses In his August 1st statement, the U.S. president expressed the desirability of the strike, arguing that: “Now justice has been delivered, and this terrorist leader is no more. People around the world no longer need to fear the vicious and determined killer.” The strike is “just” because it seems to work towards the general improvement of the conditions of coexistence between human beings. In this way, the elimination would be socially useful; and therefore just. For the president: “As Commander-in-Chief, it is my solemn responsibility to make America safe in a dangerous world. The United States did not seek this war against terror. It came to us, and we answered with the same principles and resolve that have shaped us for generation upon generation: to protect the innocent, defend liberty, and we keep the light of freedom burning – a beacon for the rest of the entire world.” More than justice as the rule of action, the presidential vision is about guaranteeing founding principles: freedom, protection, and the fight against impunity. Here again, it is by the positive effects that it undoubtedly brings that the strike is considered legitimate. A senior officer in the Biden administration echoed the same conception when, in his phone brief on the operation, he explained, “In so doing, the President’s decision has made the world a safer place.” In these speeches, justice is not intended to regulate behavior by affixing norms, but it is evaluated by the social utility and desirability that an act can generate. Joe Biden is not the first U.S. president to see targeted killings of terrorist leaders as a form of moral justice working for the common good. On October 27th, 2019, Donald Trump thus rejoiced that with the elimination of Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “Last night was a great night for the United States and for the world. A brutal killer, one who has caused so much hardship and death, has violently been eliminated. He will never again harm another innocent man, woman, or child.” It is he positive consequences of the elimination that allow it to be considered just. Similarly, Barack Obama saw the killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2nd, 2011, as a measure to protect the nation: “On that day [...] we were united in our resolve to protect our nation.” George W. Bush also saw the elimination of terrorist leaders, here Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on June 8th, 2006, as a further step towards “a more peaceful world for our children and grandchildren.” To put it tautologically, in these speeches, the strike is just because it works towards justice by weakening an actor deemed evil. These political discourses invoking the justice of Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s elimination, therefore, have in common that they invoke justice not as a protocol of action that should regulate means and behaviors, but rather as an ideal to be achieved, a goal intended to improve the conditions of coexistence. But these political statements have been challenged by some analyses that have questioned the strategic effects of these eliminations and their real social utility. For IFRI researcher Elie Tenenbaum, the death of Ayman Al-Zawahiri has, it is true, had symbolic effects, as it weakened the morale of al-Qaeda. Organizationally, however, it may not have had any significant impact and will probably not contribute to a weakening of al Qaeda’s structure or functioning. Tore Hamming of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London also predicts that “al-Qaeda will survive the death of al-Zawahiri as it survived the death of bin Laden.” American researcher Bruce Hoffman also emphasizes that “a terrorist group doesn’t survive three-plus decades being dependent on one leader only.” At the strategic level – one of the justification regimes for eliminations identified by Amélie Férey – the elimination of Al-Zawahiri would therefore not bring about any immediately notable effects. Thus, the “just” effects highlighted by U.S. presidents concerning these eliminations would not be fully verified strategically. The moral regime of justification for these eliminations also raises a second problem: that of its possible semantic shift towards vengeful rhetoric. A Moral Elimination Fulfilling a Legitimate Vengeance: Transcendent Discourses It seems to me that the discourses surrounding the elimination of Ayman al-Zawahiri from a more vision are also declined in a second component – transcendent this time – whose implications are potentially more problematic. Transcendent is here understood in a philosophical sense as the reference to an external order considered superior (as opposed to immanence and the earthly). Joe Biden tells us justice has been done because America is now protected. But also because the act “is justice”, that is to say, a just return for the attacks of  September 11, 2001, a form of superior reparation, whose necessity for the moral order extends beyond the sole actors involved. Now, when ‘doing justice’ becomes a superior, transcendent injunction, required by the order of things, rhetoric of retaliation or revenge become potentially acceptable. In the case of the elimination of Al-Zawahiri, some discourses advance a conception of justice in which it seems “natural” and just to want to give a taste of their own medicine to an actor who has injured the nation. This is not surprising:  “justice” maintains a strong semantic and conceptual proximity to the rhetoric of revenge. Etymologically, “vindicare,” which gave birth to the word revenge, means to seek justice. As Rupert Brodersen of the London School of Economics has noted, revenge, like justice, is meant to repair the nomos, a higher established order where every disruption must be responded to. In other words, the order of things requires that an injury or offense be  repaired. The semantic shift towards a transcendent justice that has become vengeful (and turned to the past) can be seen in President Biden’s speech on August 1st. He invokes a logic of a price to be paid, of a just return of things, noting that “Standing at the memorial at Ground Zero, seeing the names of those who died forever etched in bronze, is a powerful reminder of the sacred promise we made as a nation: we will never forget.” For the president, it is the promise made to the victims 20 years ago to repair the 9/11 attacks that underlies the elimination, in 2021, of the leader Al-Zawahiri as a just return. Unlike President Biden’s 2021 withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan so as not to remain focused on the threats of the past, President Biden’s August 1st order of justice rather focuses on repairing the past. Similarly, a Biden Administration official saw the elimination of Al-Zawahiri as “an additional measure of closure for all of us who mourn the victims of 9/11 and other al Qaeda violence.” Donald Trump also included the need to repair a bruised past in his speech on the elimination of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declaring: “Think of James Foley. Think of Kayla. Think of the things he did to Kayla, what he did to Foley and so many others.”  Rather than working towards a moral and regulated future society, this is a question of repairing a past deemed unjust, of which Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri are the incarnations. American civil society has also regularly seized upon the rhetoric of price to pay to justify these eliminations. On May 2nd, 2011, the New York Post headlined al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s death: “Got Him. Vengeance at last. US Nails the bastard,” while the Calgary Sun wished the former leader “rot in hell.” The difficulty here is that by sliding towards vocabularies of revenge where the injunction of justice becomes emotional, these political discourses contribute to trivializing, in civil society and internationally, a term used against the United States. Jihadist terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda have made extensive use of vengeful rhetoric to recruit, mobilize or justify the political violence they promote. By making revenge an acceptable mode of action in the international arena,  these discourses therefore run the risk of reinforcing the legitimacy (ch. 33) of the vengeful rhetoric issued by these organizations. Al-Zawahiri’s death has already generated numerous calls for revenge from his supporters, reactions already observed in 2019 in the ranks of the Islamic State after the elimination of al-Baghdadi (and the loss, the same year, of the caliphate) as well as in 2011, in Al-Qaeda, after Osama bin Laden’s elimination. By presenting the reparation of a bruised past as an acceptable moral justification, the risk of this transcendent justice is thus to contribute to the normative acceptability of a mobilizing rhetoric used against the United States and others. Conclusion This paper has attempted to provide an overview of the different orders of justice that can be included in President Biden’s “justice has been delivered” statement of August 1st. To the legalistic reading questioning the means of elimination, this paper added two other, more moral readings expressed in the political speeches of successive American presidents. On the one hand, according to a utilitarian reading, the elimination is seen as just, because it would have a social utility (whose indicators and criteria must be defined), it would contribute positively to the future good of the American and international community. On the other hand, the elimination is considered moral, because it is a “just return of things,” a form of transcendent justice with vengeful logic according to which any offense must naturally be repaired. Of these three forms of justice invoked, transcendent justice is the one that potentially poses strategic and normative challenges that need to be analyzed. Talking about the elimination of Ayman Al-Zawahiri in transcendental terms could prove counterproductive both normatively – weakening the liberal demand for the rule of law – and strategically – pouring into a vengeful logic promoting security escalation and new recruitments. By highlighting the various levels of analysis mentioned for the elimination of the former al-Qaeda leader, this paper hopes to have shown the relevance of a transparent discussion, at the political level and not only at the academic level, about what “delivering justice” means and implies. Without this, the Biden administration’s “justice” runs the risk of being interpreted and understood as “vengeful justice,” fueling escalations of political violence and normative challenges to the rule of law.     Marie Robin (@Marie_Robin) holds a PhD in political science from Université de Panthéon-Assas and the University of Southern Denmark. She is currently a post-doctoral fellow at the Centre Thucydide (Université Paris Panthéon-Assas), where she coordinates the activities of the “strategic studies” pole and is one of the co-editors of the Rubicon. Her doctoral research analyzed the strategic values of the revenge narratives proposed by al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and Boko Haram. She has recently published in the Annuaire français de relations internationales and the Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness. ## Ten Years On: Assessing the U.S. Strategic Pivot (Rebalancing) to Asia – 1st Part URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ten-years-on-assessing-the-u-s-strategic-pivot-rebalancing-to-asia-1st-part/ Modified: 2021-04-23 > Panel 1 - The Strategic Pivot and the Response of Washington’s Allies, Moderator: Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s University), Panelists: Rachel Esplin Odell (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft) The US pivot then and now, Jonathan Berkshire Miller (Japan Institute of International Affairs) An East Asian Perspective on the Pivot: Japan and Korea, Natalie Sambhi (Australian National University) Australia and ASEAN states’ response to the pivot, Cleo Paskal (Chatham House) European perceptions of strategic changes in the Indo-Pacific, Keynote Speaker: Commodore Angus Topshee, OMM, MSM, CD, Naval Warfare Officer – Royal Canadian Navy Panel 1 - The Strategic Pivot and the Response of Washington’s Allies Moderator: Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s University) Panelists: - Rachel Esplin Odell (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft) The US pivot then and now - Jonathan Berkshire Miller (Japan Institute of International Affairs) An East Asian Perspective on the Pivot: Japan and Korea - Natalie Sambhi (Australian National University) Australia and ASEAN states’ response to the pivot - Cleo Paskal (Chatham House) European perceptions of strategic changes in the Indo-Pacific   Keynote Speaker: Commodore Angus Topshee, OMM, MSM, CD, Naval Warfare Officer – Royal Canadian Navy ## Ten Years On: Assessing the U.S. Strategic Pivot (Rebalancing) to Asia – 2nd Part URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ten-years-on-assessing-the-u-s-strategic-pivot-rebalancing-to-asia-2nd-part/ Modified: 2021-04-23 > Panel 2 - Reactions of Rival Powers to American Rebalancing, Moderator: Yann Breault (Royal Military College of St-Jean), Panelists: Bonnie S. Glaser (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC) China’s positioning in the face of American rebalancing, Zachary Paikin (Global Policy Institute, London) Russia’s response to the U.S. initiative, Pierre Pahlavi (Canadian Forces College) The consequences of the pivot for Iranian foreign policy and the balance of power in the Middle East Panel 2 - Reactions of Rival Powers to American Rebalancing Moderator: Yann Breault (Royal Military College of St-Jean) Panelists: - Bonnie S. Glaser (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC) China’s positioning in the face of American rebalancing - Zachary Paikin (Global Policy Institute, London) Russia’s response to the U.S. initiative - Pierre Pahlavi (Canadian Forces College) The consequences of the pivot for Iranian foreign policy and the balance of power in the Middle East ## Terrorism in South Asia and its Global Resonance Following the Pahalgam Attacks in 2025: A Diasporic Perspective URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/terrorism-in-south-asia-and-its-global-resonance-following-the-pahalgam-attacks-in-2025-a-diasporic-perspective/ Modified: 2025-11-11 The attacks on Jaffar Express, Pahalgam and Khuzdar, which took place in 2025 in South Asia, prompted several global and regional responses from states and diaspora actors calling for action against cross-border terrorism. The response has been paradoxical: authoritarian states such as China and Russia have joined India and Pakistan in shaping a global response to terrorism, presented as a “democratic” international order through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's Tianjin Declaration. At the same time, mobilisations of South Asian diasporas in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia demonstrated how democratic participation abroad can both promote solidarity against terrorism and deepen polarisation between nationalist elements that echo the grievances of their homeland. This article argues that the terrorist attacks of 2025, particularly the one in Pahalgam, not only triggered a geopolitical initiative against terrorism, such as the Tianjin Declaration, but also elicited mixed reactions among South Asian diasporas around the world. This is particularly the case in Canada, home to 2.3 million people of South Asian origin, where the diplomatic confrontation with India in 2023 and the subsequent de-escalation led to a cautious approach to sensitive issues, such as the diaspora's response to terrorist attacks in South Asia. The 2025 attacks and brief historical context On 11 March, the Jaffar Express, carrying 440 passengers from Quetta to Peshawar, was attacked and hijacked by militants from the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The hostages were subsequently rescued by Pakistani security forces in a two-day rescue operation. On 21 May, a bomb explosion targeting a school bus near Zero Point, Khuzdar, along the Quetta–Karachi motorway killed ten children and injured more than thirty-four others. Pakistani security officials said the attack was carried out by Indian agents. On 22 April 2025, five members of The Resistant Front (TRF), a branch of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), killed 26 people in Pahalgam during an excursion to the Baisaran Valley in Kashmir. Although the TRF claimed responsibility for the attack, Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif accused India, calling the attack a ‘false flag operation’ and adding, ‘We believe this was a staged attack, a false flag operation to blame another party.’ For its part, India's National Investigation Agency (NIA) claimed that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the LeT were the real perpetrators of the attack. After the attacks, diplomatic tensions between Pakistan and India quickly escalated. New Delhi declared Pakistani military diplomats personae non gratae, reduced the staff of the Pakistani High Commission and cancelled the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) visa exemption scheme for Pakistani nationals. India also closed the Attari-Wagah border between the two countries and suspended the Indus Waters Treaty. All postal services and ships flying the Pakistani flag were also banned from Indian ports. While the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered its condolences following the attacks, it adopted retaliatory measures by cancelling visas for Indian nationals, closing its airspace and suspending trade. The Indian armed forces launched Operation Sindoor, attacking nine terrorist camps in Pakistan and Kashmir, killing more than 100 militants linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Indian forces neutralized these sites, which were suspected of being training camps for these three terrorist groups considered to be jihadist organisations aiming to liberate Kashmir from Indian occupation. Pakistan retaliated with strikes against Indian military bases, prompting further missile and drone attacks by India, until the two countries agreed to de-escalate on 10 May 2025. The Jammu and Kashmir region has remained a source of contention between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. The Line of Control (LoC), one of the most militarised borders in the world, was formalised by the Simla Agreement in 1972, when the Indian and Pakistani governments demarcated their respective administrative areas of Jammu and Kashmir. Since then, Article 370 of the Indian Constitution granted this region a degree of autonomy to manage its own affairs. In 2019, Prime Minister Modi's government revoked this autonomous status, placing the region under central government control, with the intention of reorganising it into a Muslim-majority Kashmir, a Hindu-majority Jammu, and a Buddhist-majority Ladakh (the latter sharing borders with Tibet and Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan). Terrorist organisations operating in this region are deeply motivated by historical resentment over Indian government policies. Global responses and the Tianjin Declaration The three attacks triggered geopolitical reactions, notably the adoption of the Tianjin Declaration in September 2025 in China by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The declaration stated that countries must act without ‘double standards’ to prevent cross-border terrorism, referring to the attacks in Pahalgam, on the Jaffar Express and in Khuzdar. The declaration was sponsored by China, Russia, India and Pakistan, marking a rare moment of international cooperation. The SCO, which originated as the ‘Shanghai Five’ group in 2001, was founded by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It has since expanded to include Belarus, India, Iran and Pakistan as member states; Afghanistan and Mongolia as observer states; and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bahrain, Egypt, Cambodia, Qatar, Kuwait, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Sri Lanka as dialogue partners. The SCO's objectives are to strengthen trust and good-neighbourly relations, deepen cooperation in multiple sectors, preserve regional peace and security, and promote a more just and democratic international order. Although it may seem ironic that authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China are providing leadership in promoting a ‘democratic’ international order, the SCO remains one of the few regional organisations where rival nations cooperate on the same platform. In other words, it has succeeded in convincing Pakistan to reconsider the transfer of responsibility for the 2025 terrorist attacks and to negotiate with India the reinstatement of the Indus Waters Treaty. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has also expressed his willingness to prioritize diplomacy over confrontation, and even to support China's Global Governance Initiative (GGI). This position may be influenced by Pakistan's growing dependence on Chinese investment, such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the port of Gwadar, as well as pressure from mounting Chinese debt, which stands at US$26.6 billion. Pakistan's position also reflects the growing regional influence of India, which has succeeded in steering Islamabad towards greater cooperation within the SCO framework. Diasporic resonance Following the attacks in Pahalgam, the South Asian diaspora organised demonstrations in London, Copenhagen, Melbourne, Kathmandu, Toronto and Vancouver. Protests also broke out in France, Finland, Germany, Spain and the United States. On 25 April in London, pro-Indian demonstrators gathered outside the Indian High Commission chanting slogans in support of India and urging governments to declare Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. British demonstrators of Pakistani origin, meanwhile, rallied in support of the Kashmiris. A heavy police presence was deployed to prevent any violent clashes. Polarised debates also emerged on social media after the publication of a photo of a Pakistani official holding a poster of Indian Air Force pilot Varthaman while making a throat-slitting gesture. This incident, which sparked a wave of outrage, led a spokesperson for the Friends of India Society International UK to call on the British government to support India and reconsider its policy towards Pakistan. The Indian diaspora organized a protest outside the Pakistani consulate in Toronto, Canada, under the auspices of the Hindu Forum Canada, joined by the Indo-Canadian Kashmir Forum, the Baloch Human Rights Council Canada, Canadians for Human Rights Watch, the Canada India Global Forum and Nimittekam Canada. Due to the intense emotions aroused by the terrorist attacks, many nationalist protesters chanted ‘Pakistan Murdabad’ (death to Pakistan). In Federation Square in the city of Melbourne, thousands of people from the Indian community demonstrated, chanting ‘Hindu Lives Matter’ and ‘Pakistan Army Terrorist Army,’ expressing similar nationalist sentiments. However, in Toronto that same week, members of the Indian community, joined by Hindus, Jews, Balochis, Iranians and other Canadians, also held a candlelight vigil in memory of the victims of the attacks. In London, too, the Indian community held a candlelight vigil in Piccadilly Circus. The Canadian diaspora is one of the largest in the world among immigrants of South Asian origin and frequently mobilises around issues affecting their country of origin. In 2022, the Pakistani community demonstrated in Montreal in support of former Prime Minister Imran Khan when he was ousted by a motion of no confidence. In 2024, protesters gathered in Mississauga, Canada, to support the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. As a result, Canadian government officials and non-governmental actors remain cautious, fearing that conflicts on the Indian subcontinent could affect social cohesion within their diaspora. As a reflexive measure, Prime Minister Mark Carney condemned the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, while issuing a joint statement from the G7 foreign ministers that read: "We call for immediate de-escalation and encourage both countries to engage in direct dialogue towards a peaceful outcome. Statements from the Pakistan-Canada Association and the Vedic Hindu Cultural Society of British Columbia called for peaceful relations within the community in Canada. The Hindu Canadian Society also issued guidelines for Hindu Canadians to avoid aggression and promote harmonious living. Furthermore, following the Foreign Interference Commission hearings, which examined the alleged influence operations of China, India, Russia and other states, Ottawa must adopt a proactive strategy of engagement with diasporas to protect their communities from foreign manipulation. The appointments of ministers such as Anita Anand to Foreign Affairs and Gary Anandasangaree to Public Safety, who have close ties to South Asian communities and the politics of their countries of origin, are therefore positive steps in this direction. This is particularly important in the wake of the diplomatic crisis between Canada and India in 2023, following the assassination of Canadian Sikh citizen Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Canadian authorities not only accused Indian intelligence services of orchestrating the killing, but also mentioned the presence of Indian agents linked to the Bishnoi criminal gang, suspected of targeting the South Asian community in Canada. Conclusion The recent wave of terrorist attacks in South Asia has sent shockwaves around the world, prompting reactions from the diaspora, vigils of solidarity and a broader geopolitical response. The SCO's Tianjin Declaration illustrates the profound consequences of terrorism linked to Pakistan and India's diplomatic influence in the region. While the Pahalgam attacks have reignited tensions between India and Pakistan, leading to diplomatic escalation and negative emotions within the global Indian diaspora, they have also highlighted the need for solidarity among communities in the face of terrorism. The demonstrations by the global diaspora have also demonstrated the depth of the transnational ties that connect immigrants of South Asian origin to issues affecting their countries of origin. Canada, home to a large South Asian diaspora, should therefore position itself as a balanced and vigilant actor, continuing to strengthen its engagement with this community and encouraging its representation in foreign policy in order to serve Canadian interests — notably by protecting its democratic institutions from foreign interference. ## The “Freeland Doctrine” and Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Between isolation and confusion URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-freeland-doctrine-and-canadas-indo-pacific-strategy-between-isolation-and-confusion/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The “Freeland Doctrine” and Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Between isolation and confusion. For a country that has not undertaken a... For a country that has not undertaken a comprehensive foreign policy review in nearly two decades, Canada has been fortunate to have two visions for its international engagement articulated this autumn alone. The first took the form of a speech delivered by Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland to the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC on October 11. Instantly dubbed the “Freeland Doctrine”, her remarks outlined how Canada should navigate the post-post-Cold War world, which she contends is framed by competition between democracies and autocracies. Just over one month later, Canada released its long-anticipated Indo-Pacific Strategy. Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly has described the strategy as reorienting Canada’s foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific region, although Ottawa will retain its existing commitments in other theatres as well. These two visions offer separate blueprints for how Canada should position itself in a world of rivalry and change. Yet while both feature evident strong points, in both cases these threaten to be outweighed by their weaknesses. The Freeland Doctrine: A recipe for isolation Freeland’s address in Washington acknowledges a now-unavoidable reality, namely, that the liberal international order of the post-Cold War unipolar moment is gone and will not return. Although certain norms and practices traditionally associated with liberal internationalism will continue to inform interstate conduct, the conditions which sustained the fullest expression of liberal order simply no longer exist. For the past three decades, the era of liberal hegemony has allowed Canada to conduct a comfortable, values-centric foreign policy. By contrast, the emerging international order threatens to decouple some of Canada’s foreign policy imperatives from the country’s national identity. As such, Freeland should be commended for her courage to confront her country’s entrenched – and outdated – foreign policy culture. Yet while Freeland’s diagnosis is accurate, her proposed treatments are problematic. Her vision outlines three pillars of a revised Western approach to the world: relations among democracies, with authoritarian regimes, and with “in-between” states. Each pillar is beset by fundamental flaws. Together, they present a recipe for deepening – rather than reversing – Canada’s isolation on the world stage. Freeland’s first and, in her words, “most fundamental” pillar calls for a deepening of relations between the world’s democracies. While on its face one would find little to disagree with in such a proposal, the devil will be in the details. For example, the notion that “friendshoring” offers a solution to the security challenges of today encounters difficulties as soon as specifics are discussed. What would friendshoring allow us to obtain from our allies that we don’t already get from them? In which specific sectors should we decouple from adversaries? How long would such a reorientation of supply chains take and how can it be enforced? What would be the cost to consumers? And would not deeper economic ties between the United States and its European and Asian allies threaten Canada’s privileged position in relation to the US economy? While a single speech cannot be expected to address all these questions in sufficient detail, they nonetheless raise doubts over the feasibility of “friendshoring” as a framework. After the collapse of 19th-century imperial-periphery relations and 20th-century geopolitical blocs, we now inhabit the first truly global order in history. It remains unclear how friendshoring offers a path for liberal democracies to enhance their relative influence and appeal in this new order, which will inevitably be shaped by political and cultural pluralism. Indeed, the concept is divisive even within the West, with some arguing that reinvesting in the open and rules-based architecture of global trade is a more worthwhile endeavour that plays to Western strengths. Calls for decoupling risk a possible race to the bottom that Western countries – especially dependent economies such as Canada – may not win. Freeland’s second – and least conceptually developed – pillar concerns relations with so-called in-between countries, who are neither our democratic allies nor our authoritarian adversaries. Such terminology is likely to reduce our influence with these countries rather than help us to build bridges with them, if indeed we intend to undertake a substantial effort to build such bridges and branch out beyond the largely ally-centric approach which has characterized Canadian foreign policy in recent decades. These “in between” countries do not view themselves as proxies in a grand ideological struggle but as authors of their own destiny. They are sovereign states and do not need to be told what their interests are. The third – and most problematic – pillar of Freeland’s speech calls for a rethinking of our relations with authoritarian countries. This pillar is replete with assumptions which do not reflect the complex nature of the emerging international order. The very notion that today’s world is framed by a competition between democracies and autocracies is belied by numerous easily observable facts. In the case of Ukraine, democratic Western countries are turning to authoritarian Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Azerbaijan to help address the war’s energy fallout. Meanwhile, some of the world’s largest democracies such as India and Brazil have largely shied away from condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. In the Indo-Pacific, Vietnam’s Leninist political system has not prevented it from partnering with the West regarding its security concerns related to China. These facts suggest that Canada should not adopt the “democracy vs. autocracy” paradigm as a lodestar for strengthening its international engagement, given that it fails to capture the dynamics of the biggest geopolitical challenges of today (Ukraine) and tomorrow (the Indo-Pacific). The democracy-autocracy binary also lacks shades of gray in capturing the diverse array of political systems across the world, as well as the different foreign policy goals that authoritarian states may possess. While Russia is running roughshod over established norms and emerged as a loser from the Cold War, China has been a major beneficiary of the status quo and seeks to maintain economic and technological links with the West to fuel its modernization and growth. Although there are many legitimate security concerns resulting from China’s rise, the imperatives shaping Canada’s relations with China fundamentally differ from the question of how to deal with a revanchist Russia. This is especially so given the central place that Beijing occupies in global trade and multilateralism, on which Ottawa has traditionally depended. Freeland’s blanket assertion that “authoritarian regimes are fundamentally hostile to us” and “our success is an existential threat to them” would reduce Canada’s room for manoeuvre to conduct a foreign policy reflective of the national interest on a case-by-case basis. Given that cooperation is a two-way street, this must involve establishing an overall framework for relations that facilitates rather than discourages working together where our interests align. For someone whose signature address as foreign affairs minister in 2017 centred on the need to uphold the “rules-based international order”, there is shockingly little attention in Freeland’s speech paid to how an embrace of ideological competition might undermine the resilience of international rules. And while Freeland does admit that cooperation with authoritarian countries remains necessary on areas of shared interest such as climate change, such cooperation may become immeasurably harder when the paradigm for relations is focused overwhelmingly on securitized competition (if not outright containment). It is intellectually consistent to embrace a vision of Canadian foreign policy that does less – one that seeks to join fewer clubs, that avoids spreading ourselves thin, and that is more narrowly focused on Canada’s core interests. One suspects, however, that this was not Freeland’s intention. The consequences of Freeland’s vision would be for Canada to retreat within the non-geographic West, but without the benefits of a more tightly focused foreign policy. The Freeland paradigm of Canadian foreign policy is ideological in nature and global in scope. However, Canada does not have the wherewithal to be a core player in North America, Europe, Asia and multilateral fora all at the same time. Might a more geographic mentality and regional focus serve Canadian interests better? Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: A recipe for confusion Canada released its Indo-Pacific Strategy in late November. The paper has been praised as the “most substantive strategic document” on foreign policy from a Canadian government in years. Given the central role of the “North Atlantic anchor” in shaping Canada’s foreign policy since World War II, the mere exercise of crafting an Indo-Pacific strategy may help to rebalance Canada’s international priorities to account for the shift in the world’s geopolitical and economic centres of gravity. In particular, the absence of a “free and open” framing of the region in the document is a welcome development, as this may signal that Ottawa’s regional strategy will differ from Washington’s more confrontational approach. And the government’s differentiated conceptualization of the region – excluding the West Indian Ocean and carving out a special “neighbourhood” role in the North Pacific – laudably demonstrates the Strategy’s targeted focus. However, beneath the surface, three key shortcomings are visible. First, the Indo-Pacific Strategy is not couched in a more general understanding of the nature and scope of Canada’s interests across the board in a shifting international order. Without a comprehensive foreign policy review that situates Canada’s Indo-Pacific interests within an overall frame of reference, weighing the relative importance of the region against policy imperatives in other geographic theatres, there will be an absence of clarity regarding the purpose of Canada’s regional aims. This situation is exacerbated by the Strategy’s pledge to bolster Canada’s military presence in the region, suggesting an inability to target limited national resources in a more focused way. This goes against the recommendations of the Strategic Analysis Network and reflects an unwillingness to acknowledge that an increasingly securitized environment on the European continent will consume a large proportion of Canada’s attention on the military front. Even a Ukrainian victory in its current war will not eliminate the long-term challenge that Russia is likely to pose for the European security system. A token Canadian military presence in the Indo-Pacific is more likely to disorganize Canada’s overall foreign policy than it is to deter China. Second, although China is front-and-centre and takes up a significant chunk of text, the Indo-Pacific Strategy has not been used as an opportunity to pursue a detailed and calibrated China strategy. As such, the worry persists that Canada may have developed an Indo-Pacific strategy as an excuse not to come up with a comprehensive and revised approach toward China. The Strategy is clear-eyed in terms of the multifaceted nature of the challenge that China poses for Canadian security and global order. However, there is no clear statement regarding whether preventing China from dominating the Indo-Pacific as a security actor represents a vital Canadian interest, and if so, whether this could be achieved through measures short of full-blown containment and decoupling. While a symbolic nod toward the need for cooperation on some files is mentioned, no concrete platforms for cooperation are identified. On the flip side, no comprehensive delineation of where cooperation should be restricted due to security concerns has been undertaken. Whether at the domestic, bilateral, regional or multilateral levels, the focus is overwhelmingly on challenging China or defending against the negative impact of its actions. Gone is the emphasis on coexistence identified by Joly’s predecessor Marc Garneau in his “four Cs” approach toward China. The result is that Canada has failed to articulate clearly, on a basic level, whether it favours an open region or one framed by a new cold war. And, as with the Freeland Doctrine, a relationship in which the intellectual starting point is confrontation rather than coexistence may have difficulty making room for cooperation, even when this is in the interest of both sides. One cannot treat an adversary as an existential threat, pursue a strategy of confrontation across the board, and still hope to pick and choose areas for cooperation according to one’s own preference. Finally, the Strategy misses an opportunity to disentangle values and interests in a way that would clarify the scope of Canada’s regional aims. While we have become accustomed to the sort of thinking that asserts that promoting our values is akin to advancing our interests, the decline of liberalism’s hegemony in global politics ensures that these two goals have (at least partly) become decoupled. To emphasize the document’s Indo-Pacific scope, India is listed second (after China) in the description of Canada’s regional engagement. Yet the Strategy frames the desire to deepen relations with New Delhi using the language of democracy and human rights, rather than shared strategic interests, despite India’s clear and widely acknowledged democratic backsliding. The Indo-Pacific paradigm, developed in reaction to China’s rise, is by nature a strategic rather than values-based concept. Emphasis on shared values with India, when in many respects these are lacking, reveals the extent to which Ottawa still has difficulty articulating what its interests are. The Strategy also makes multiple references to forging relations with “like-minded” countries. However, several of Canada’s regional partners have abstained from criticizing Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine. Similarly, much of Southeast Asia views China as an important economic partner and not as an existential threat, irrespective of whatever territorial disputes these countries may have with Beijing. It is unclear just how “like-minded” countries such as India are. This begs the question of whether Canada is truly committed to engaging on the priorities of the region’s indigenous actors or whether Ottawa’s focus will inevitably drift toward deepening relations with its few truly “like-minded” partners such as Japan and Australia. Ultimately, Canada is paying the price for its years of holding a reactive posture toward Asia. Canada’s document comes nine months after the US and more than a year after the EU published their own strategies for the region. And Washington’s so-called pivot to Asia, for all its faults, dates to the Obama administration. We are late to the game and have failed to articulate our overall foreign policy priorities clearly. We are therefore forced to catch up on terms set by others. This includes with respect to the confrontation with China, where the US will reserve the right to advance its own interests while imposing limitations on its allies’ right to define their own interests. This will invariably reduce the potential range of Ottawa’s engagement across the region. Conclusion: Canada’s hemispheric future? On the one hand, Freeland’s conceptual shift from preserving the rules-based international order to a quasi-embrace of another Cold War should concern all Canadians who believe that a degree of global predictability is necessary for Ottawa to carve out a foreign policy that goes beyond ensuring national sovereignty and safeguarding relations with the US. If the deputy prime minister believes that Canada’s interests are largely hemispheric in scope, then she should make this case explicitly. Such an act would be of great service to Canadian foreign policy by helping it overcome decades of purposeless drift. On the other hand, despite the great anticipation surrounding the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Canada appears to have learned very little from its regional partner Australia. Canberra is far more cognizant of the targeted and geographic nature of its interests, having crafted itself into an integral player in the Indo-Pacific region while avoiding the perils of overstretch. Admittedly, Australia’s geography differs from ours – Canada is simultaneously a Western Hemispheric, Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific state. But in this century, middle power status depends in part on having a decisive presence in a regional security complex. Canada does not occupy such a position, neither in the Americas, in Europe, nor in Asia. For decades, we have refused to confront the reality that our relative global influence was in decline, largely for reasons related to our national identity and domestic politics. In doing so, we have perversely spread ourselves too thin and lost opportunities to retain middle power status. Canada is too isolated from core economic and strategic dynamics in Asia to be taken seriously as a top-tier regional player, on a par with Japan, India or Australia. Canada will also never play a role as significant as France or Germany in Europe’s political fabric. However, with a larger population, Canada could eventually come to be taken more seriously by its American neighbour. And climate change opens possibilities for Canada’s backyard in the Arctic to gain added strategic significance for actors across the globe. These facts favour a more hemispheric foreign policy for Canada as the most likely path back to middle power status over the (possibly very) long term. For all the talk surrounding Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, too little attention has been paid to the fact that strategy is about making choices, especially when faced with limited resources. ## The “Ins and Outs” of the Rapprochement Between Iran and Sudan URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-ins-and-outs-of-the-rapprochement-between-iran-and-sudan/ Modified: 2024-03-20 > In early February 2024 Ali Al Sadiq traveled to Tehran to meet his counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and Iranian President Ebrahim Raissi. In early February 2024, Sudan's acting Foreign Minister, Ali Al Sadiq, traveled to Tehran to meet his counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and Iranian President Ebrahim Raissi. Intervening in the midst of the Middle East crisis and with Sudan mired in civil war, this visit is the latest sign of a rapid warming of relations between Khartoum and Teheran. Over the past year, Sudanese and Iranian officials have agreed to speed up the process leading to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two nations, which were previously severed in 2016. A sudden rapprochement that raises many questions about the nature of bilateral relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Sudan, the interests that motivate it and its strategic implications. A Close and Ancient Relationship On a background level, it should be remembered that ties between Iran and Sudan go back a long way. Already positive at the time of the last Shah, these relations were put to the test during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), during which Khartoum lent its support to Saddam Hossein. They warmed up again with the arrival in power of Omar Al-Bashir, who was a fervent admirer of the Iranian regime and a promoter of the re-Islamization of Sudan. During the 1990s, the development of bilateral ties enabled Iran to break out of its diplomatic isolation and find a strategic ally in the Arab world and in the key region of the Horn of Africa. During this period, the Iranian Republic provided substantial financial and military assistance to the Sudanese government. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) even set up one of its first operational branches outside the Middle East in Sudan. As a result, by the turn of the 2000s, Iran and Sudan were already active partners, and both countries were considered by the US State Department to be major state sponsors of global terrorism. The Bush administration classified them both as part of the notorious "Axis of Evil". The Foundations of Strategic Cooperation Between the Two Countries After promising beginnings, the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Republic of Sudan reached maturity with the rise of the IRGC within the Iranian political system when it took over Iranian foreign policy and decided to pursue an ambitious strategy of regional influence. From 2005 onwards, the Revolutionary Guards adopted an asymmetrical doctrine, developing a vast network of proxies spread across the Muslim world and transcending the denominational divide between Shiites and Sunnis. Constituting what is today known as the "Axis of Resistance", this network includes Shiite or "Shiite-compatible" partners such as Syria's Alawite regime, Lebanon's Hezbollah and Yemen's Zaydist Houthis, as well as, on a much more opportunistic basis, Sunni-based movements such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Teheran strengthened its ties with Khartoum, which rapidly became its main strategic partner in Africa. With the signing of a major military cooperation agreement, numerous high-level visits and the establishment of the Quds Force (the IRGC's expeditionary force) on Sudanese soil, the intensification of bilateral ties aroused great concern among the adversaries of the "Axis of Resistance", led by Israel and the United States. In January 2009, the Israeli air force bombed a series of IRGC facilities on Sudanese territory, suspected of being part of a vast arms transfer network for Hamas. Thanks to the Arab Spring of 2011, Iranian-Sudanese relations continued to grow. In 2014, Khartoum's military leaders did not hesitate to present the Iranians as their best allies in the region. 2014-2020: From Zenith to Nadir From 2014 onwards, however, a number of factors converged to put an end to the honeymoon between the mullahs' Iran and Al-Bashir's Sudan. First, there was the deterioration of relations between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, which was now engaged in a systematic effort to increase Tehran's diplomatic and strategic isolation. Combined with diplomatic pressure from Riyadh, Washington's offer to lift sanctions on the Khartoum regime led to Sudan's decision to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coalition against the Iranian-backed Houthis. Finally, the deterioration in Iranian-Sudanese relations accelerated with the election of Donald Trump and the adoption of the so-called "maximum pressure" strategy against the Islamic Republic and its system of regional influence. The United States, Israel and the GCC countries then worked together to quarantine Iran and dismantle its network of intermediaries. In 2016, Sudan followed Saudi Arabia's lead and broke off diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic. As part of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement process initiated by the Abraham Accords, the Republic of Sudan went so far as to begin normalizing relations with Israel. Deprived of its strategic link with the African state, Iran faced a new risk of marginalization within the Arab-Muslim world. 2020-2023: Iran's Discreet Return to the Sudanese Scene From 2020 onwards, a number of factors combined to favor Iran's gradual return to the Sudanese scene. First, the Biden administration decided to put the "maximum pressure" strategy on hold in the hope of renewing dialogue with the Islamic Republic and reviving the 2015 nuclear agreement. Tehran immediately took advantage of this relative appeasement and the room for manoeuvre it provided to relaunch its strategy of regional influence and renew ties with partners such as Sudan. Over the next four years, the IRGC and the Al-Quds Force took advantage of the Sudanese civil war and the failure of the stabilization process overseen by the international community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to regain a foothold in the east of the country. This happened through the support of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudanese President and Commander of the Armed Forces loyal to former Islamist leader Omar al-Bashir and also through an "umbrella organization" known as "Kizan" made up of scattered elements from the regular army and paramilitary units. These various factions, which even during the period of diplomatic rupture maintained informal links with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, once again began receiving military and technical assistance from Teheran, including the delivery of Iranian-made Mohadjer-6 combat drones. The Converging Interests of Teheran and Khartoum The sudden warming of relations between Iran and Sudan benefits from the African country's entrenchment in a new civil war. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which have suffered major setbacks against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) derived from the former Janjaweed militias and now deprived of support from the United Arab Emirates, are desperate for external military support. Observers agree that one of the main reasons driving Abdel Fattah Al Burhan and the Sudanese army to re-establish relations with the Islamic Republic is the hope of obtaining from the Iranian authorities the delivery of precision weapons and, in particular, Iranian combat drones, such as the popular Mohadjer-6. Although this type of military equipment does not have the potential to alter the balance of power on the battlefield, it could help slow down the collapse of the SAF and support the counter-offensive launched in early 2024. For Iran, the delivery of its combat UAVs will reinforce its diplomatic credibility on the African stage. The resumption of cooperation between the two countries coincides with Sudan's adoption of a much more critical stance towards Israel's intervention in the Gaza Strip. For Iran, it is also a question of acquiring a significant channel of influence giving it access to Eastern Sudan and, above all, to Port Sudan, its de facto capital. Through this strategic position and the 700 km or so of maritime borders, the Iranians have a considerable asset with which to complete their disruption of the Red Sea maritime passage. Towards a New Golden Age of Iranian-Saudi Ties? So far, Tehran can boast of having recovered much of the ground lost during the 2014-2020 period. In July 2023, a few months after the announcement of plans to normalize relations between Riyadh and Tehran, the Sudanese government openly expressed its desire to renew relations with Iran "as soon as possible". The announcement came during the first high-level public meeting since 2016 between Al Sadiq and Amir-Abdollahian in Baku, the Azerbaijani capital. In a dramatic turnaround and in the midst of the crisis opened by the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Khartoum announced that Iran and Sudan "discussed the restoration of bilateral relations between the two countries and the acceleration of steps to reopen embassies". Following this, the media reported that Teheran and the Islamic "Kizan" movement had agreed to cooperate in order to "facilitate the extension of influence in the Red Sea" in return for increased Iranian military assistance to the local "Islamic resistance". In fact, these advances are victories for Iran, marking its return to the local scene. However, they should be treated with caution in view of the increased pressure exerted since the beginning of 2024 by the Iranian regime's adversaries on its network of influence and various proxies. Whether red or blue, everything seems to indicate that the next American administration will return to some form of the "maximum pressure" strategy that led to the Iranian presence’s retreat in Sudan. It remains to be seen whether Iranian-Sudanese relations will once again enter a period of cooling. What About Canada's Position? Between Disengagement and Disinterest As Sudan sinks into a civil war aggravated by foreign interference and severely affecting the civilian population, the question arises as to the position adopted by Ottawa. From the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, Canada played an active, albeit secondary, role in promoting UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations. Through its efforts in multilateral forums, Ottawa helped halt the genocide perpetrated against the ethnic population of Darfur in the west of the country. However, since the resurgence of civil war, Canada's efforts have been limited to "minimum service". So far, the most spectacular action has been a visit to neighboring Kenya last April by Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly for talks with IGAD officials. In terms of action, Canada, like other foreign countries faced with a worsening situation, was content to evacuate its citizens, allocate $71 million in humanitarian aid and call for peace. Today, when the potential for escalation is at its highest, Canada no longer has an ambassador in Sudan or a special envoy to relay information from the field to Canadian decision-makers. There are no Canadian sanctions targeting the main belligerents, local or foreign. "Frankly, we're back to almost zero," said Nicholas Coghlan, Canada's former ambassador to Sudan, "we're not in the loop”. Also symptomatic of Canada's disengagement and disinterest in this part of the world is the fact that the "Africa strategy" promised by the Liberals several years ago is still not forthcoming. ## The American Strategic Pivot in the Indo-Pacific URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-american-strategic-pivot-in-the-indo-pacific/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > What assessment can we make of the strategic pivot announced by the Obama administration a decade ago?.... Highlights The U.S. pivot to Asia strategy, launched by the Obama administration in 2011, comes in response to the significant structural change represented by China's economic and military rise. This strategy has led to a strategic rebalancing and a shift in U.S. focus in the Middle East. The pivot has allowed the United States to increase its presence in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen its level of cooperation with allies in the region. However, there are limitations to this strategy, particularly in terms of funding. At the same time, the pivot has contributed to the deterioration of relations with Beijing, which naturally feels targeted by this strategy. Canada, for fear of damaging its relations with China, has not yet announced an official response to the U.S. rebalancing strategy. This has not prevented it from increasing its actions in the Indo-Pacific without displaying them too openly. Introduction What assessment can we make of the strategic pivot announced by the Obama administration a decade ago? As a reminder, this pivot – or rebalancing – strategy was a reaction to structural changes in the international order caused by the rise of China, and more generally, of Asia. Ten years later, this Asian pivot is increasingly marked by sharp tensions between the two world powers, testing American allies and highlighting the limits of the American focus on Asia. Canada, for fear of damaging its relations with China, has not yet announced an official response to the U.S. rebalancing strategy. Nevertheless, Canada recognizes the importance of the Indo-Pacific region by quietly making it one of its major strategic and military concerns, as evidenced, for example, by the numerous deployment efforts of the Royal Canadian Navy. Even more, Justin Trudeau's Liberal government has committed to launching an Asia-Pacific strategy, which has been in the development process since April 2019, with the goal to “deepen diplomatic, economic, and defence partnerships in the region.” Context In November 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the United States’ adoption of the strategic pivot to Asia. This strategic vision – with the objective of placing “Asia at the heart of American policy” – was illustrated by a military, economic and diplomatic commitment of the United States with the aim of increasing its presence and influence within the Indo-Pacific area; but also with the aim of reinforcing its dissuasive force towards China. For Barack Obama and his successors, the Chinese threat is expressed by its dazzling growth: it is now the leading commercial and economic power with nearly 15% of the market share, has the second-largest navy and does not hide its ambitions to become the undisputed leading power by 2049. Since this announcement, the United States has pursued its strategy by investing considerable resources in this sensitive area. In particular, the U.S. has deployed 60% of its navy in the Pacific, thus strengthening its relations with Japan, India and Australia within the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). In short, the aim is to strengthen the military capabilities of its allies as well as the interoperability between them. However, the term “strategic pivot” was initially used, but was abandoned in favour of “rebalancing” because of its bellicose connotations with regard to China but also because it suggested that the United States would turn away from European and Middle Eastern issues. The 2016 conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a broad free trade agreement involving twelve Pacific states except China, further reflected such “rebalancing” as it signified the evolving trade dimension influenced by the U.S. repositioning. The strategy of rebalancing in Asia has evolved over the past decade, to say the least. From its modest foundations under the Bush administration, followed by its formal announcement by the Obama administration, it saw a radical setback by Republican Donald Trump, and then a recent reversal initiated by Joe Biden. This strategic back-and-forth has had destabilizing influences towards the American allies, whose reactions have also varied. While the United States' traditional allies, such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea, are almost perfectly aligned with the American rebalancing, the fear of sending a provocative signal to China may lead some to seek greater military and strategic independence. Thus, some states have taken a more neutral stance between two world powers by favouring multilateralism, as the cases of Indonesia and New Zealand demonstrate. Lastly, rival states to the United States, mainly Iran and Russia, see this situation as an opportunity to increase their influence and are moving towards a rapprochement with China in response. The trend among rival states of the United States – mainly Iran and Russia – is towards rapprochement with China, which sees this situation as an opportunity to increase its influence. Far from being unanimously supported, the American strategy of the pivot has, in the end, produced mixed results, since the initial objectives of the United States do not seem to have been fully achieved. Moreover, this policy has a cost that the U.S. cannot fully afford, therefore requiring a progressive disengagement that is sometimes contested in other sensitive regions of the world. The Evolution of American Strategic Repositioning Although the strategy was introduced by the Obama administration, the U.S. rebalance in Asia is not the work of a single administration, as it was already in place under George W. Bush. At that time, the term used by the republican administration was “shift” to Asia, which implied a desire to increase the military capabilities of allies in the region and to strengthen bilateral interoperability with them. It was in this sense that in 2007, the Bush administration supported a Japanese proposal to create a “quadrilateral” security dialogue (Quad) between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The U.S. Navy had also assigned 60 per cent of its nuclear-powered attack submarine to the Pacific. George W. Bush, however, decided to pause the shift to Asia in order to avoid provoking China, but also because the White House had become entangled in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which had the effect of diverting Washington's attention from geostrategic transformations in the Indo-Pacific. Upon Barack Obama's arrival in Washington, sinological experts urged the new administration to increase the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, and the 2010 National Security Strategy outlined the premises of the pivot strategy. Thus, the reframing of U.S. strategic imperatives under Obama responded to a perceived need to change the U.S. strategic narrative’s focus from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. The rebalancing towards Asia was also intended to expand U.S. access to foreign markets and bolster a relatively declining U.S. economy in a context where Barack Obama was elected on a platform of getting America out of the Middle East wars. Upon taking office, Donald Trump advocated a foreign policy in Asia based on a more or less coherent Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP). During his presidency, Trump maintained elements of continuity with his predecessor's rebalancing strategy, recognizing the need to respond firmly to Beijing's destabilizing behaviour. However, instead of relying on a cautious collective strategy like his predecessor, Trump put forward a rhetoric of confrontation with China and defiance with its allies through the use of sanctions and tariffs. Moreover, following his election promises, he announced, as early as November 2016, the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, thus destroying the economic architecture of strategic rebalancing. This decision contradicted the idea of a free and open zone in the Pacific. It affected the credibility of the United States, especially vis-à-vis its allies in the region, since the signatories had themselves taken strategic risks by adhering to Obama's strategy. For example, Japan saw the American withdrawal as a setback that disrupted its own strategy towards China. On the other hand, China was largely pleased with the decision, which allowed it to impose its own trade standards in the Indo-Pacific region through new free trade treaties, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which includes 15 states and more than two billion people. At the budgetary level, although the 2018 National Defense Strategy placed the Indo-Pacific region at the heart of the U.S. defence strategy, experts consider that the allocation of resources in the region has been insufficient to achieve U.S. strategic ambitions since the Obama presidency. The arrival of Joe Biden in office in January 2021 has reshuffled the deck, with Biden setting his sights on rebuilding relationships with his Pacific allies, which were weakened by the Trump administration, while attempting to stop China's financial abuses. Since taking office, it has been clear that Biden subscribes more to Obama's approach than Trump's and emphasizes U.S. global leadership and engagement. The new president expanded the FOIP concept at the last Quad summit to call for an Indo-Pacific region that is “free, open, inclusive ... anchored by democratic values and unconstrained by coercion.” Biden seeks to rebuild the trust that Trump had broken among allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, within weeks of taking office, he spoke by phone with leaders in Japan, South Korea, and Australia, all important U.S. allies in the region. In addition, the first diplomatic visits by members of Biden's foreign policy team were to Asia. Overall, Biden said the U.S. would cooperate with Beijing wherever possible, including on issues such as climate change. However, the United States remains at odds with China's numerous attempts at economic coercion (see, for example, the conflicts at the World Trade Organization), the many human rights violations attributed to it (recently highlighted by the Chinese Communist Party's allegations of crimes against humanity against the Uighur people), and all issues related to intellectual property and, more generally, to geopolitics. In total, it was estimated that approximately $66 billion would be invested in the Indo-Pacific region by 2022. More specifically, the Department of Defense's Pacific Deterrence Initiative includes $5.1 billion in investments to develop and acquire defence capabilities, improve allied and partner capabilities, and develop advanced technologies. In addition, President Biden's deepening focus to the pivot was confirmed on September 15 with the announcement of the AUKUS, a trilateral defence treaty between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. In an effort to counter China, the treaty calls for the sale of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by the United States. The agreement also provides for the sharing of information, technology and intelligence. Reactions to the American Rebalancing Traditional U.S. allies, concerned by China's rise, have mostly embraced the U.S. strategic rebalance since 2011. Japan, for example, views the United States as a key ally on the issue of territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. The two states have increased their security cooperation in recent years. In addition, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) language was developed by Japan before being adopted by the United States, reflecting the near-perfect alignment between the two states' policies on the Indo-Pacific issue. South Korea and India, on the other hand, are more ambivalent about the FOIP language targeting China. As China's more direct neighbours, both states are more reluctant to risk provoking Beijing. However, it can be argued that South Korea and India have aligned themselves with U.S. policy, insofar as both states support increased economic and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. As for Australia, it sees its alliance with the United States as essential to its security and seeks to deepen it, particularly through the Quad. Moreover, the recent intensification of security cooperation with the United States under the AUKUS agreement, indicates a greater alignment with U.S. policy. A second trend of “nonalignment” can be observed among states that do not adopt policies aligned with China or the United States. This posture allows them to maintain relations with both rival states, while retaining some autonomy. For example, Indonesia favours multilateralism to balance the influence of the United States and China. New Zealand, although a member of the Five Eyes, is another country that adopts a non-aligned posture, asserting its independence in foreign policy. New Zealand's friendly attitude towards China is in contrast to the position taken by other Five Eyes partners, notably Australia, which cancelled certain agreements concluded in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Conversely, the trend among U.S. rivals is towards rapprochement with China. States that do not have good relations with the United States and are therefore inclined to challenge the U.S.-dominated liberal world order, prefer to side with China in the Sino-American competition. Russia, which has seen its relationship with the West deteriorate since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, has turned to the “Greater Eurasia” initiative along these lines. This project officially aims to promote Pan-Eurasian integration, but this has been interpreted as a forced rapprochement with China by Western sanctions against Russia, and, moreover, positively received by China, which is also under Western pressure. Russia's participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization shows Russia's willingness to strengthen its ties with China. Iran is also seeking closer ties with China, which for its part sees Iran as a necessary part of building the Belt and Road Initiative. In this regard, Iran signed the 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with China in 2021. The Limits of the Strategy Ten years after the official announcement of the pivot, experts are not unanimous about this strategy. For some, the benefits of increasing U.S. strategic influence and presence in the Indo-Pacific region are inferior to the costs of the grand strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific. The first problem raised by some observers concerns the implementation of the strategy on the ground. The Budget Control Act of 2011 led to defence budget cuts through 2015, which limited the ability of the Department of Defense to pursue rebalancing. Despite Obama's promise that “budget reductions will not come at the expense of that critical region,” the lack of significant increases in the military budget for the Indo-Pacific region has been enough to thwart the strategic goals of the pivot. Moreover, by shifting its focus from the Middle East and Europe to Asia, the United States has significantly increased the vulnerability of these regions. Russian adventurism in Ukraine, the erosion of democracy in some Central and Eastern European states, including Hungary and Poland, and the establishment of a caliphate by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria are believed to be caused in part by relative U.S. neglect. Finally, the pivot strategy is accused of sending a hostile signal to China by attempting to contain it militarily. This perception has provoked an even more aggressive response from China, which has asserted its claims in the South and East China Seas and increased its coercive actions towards Taiwan. Meanwhile, Beijing continues to close the gap with the United States in military capabilities and its share of global GDP is steadily growing. While significant efforts have been made to expand U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific, it is not clear that the pivot has achieved its primary objectives in dealing with China. In sum, it is clear that the Americans have had an easier time conceptualizing the pivot than implementing it. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada The United States has not made any specific request of Canada with respect to its rebalancing strategy in Asia, and the Canadian government has never issued a formal response to the American strategy. It must be said that Canada does not have the military means necessary to exert a decisive influence in this region. Canada's exclusion from the AUKUS military agreement last September only further confirmed this fact. Canada has not yet formulated a global strategy in Asia for fear of antagonizing China and aggravating its already tense relations. Indeed, current and pre-existing tensions between the two states have recently been fuelled by the crises of the Huawei affair and Canadian citizens imprisoned in China. This has not prevented Canada from quietly deepening its economic and military ties with its Indo-Pacific allies, including increasing its participation in joint military exercises with its allies in the region. Canada has also participated in all RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise) exercises, and the level of its participation increased significantly in the early 2010s. We recommend that Canada continues to do so. In addition, Canada and the United States have signed the Canada-U.S. Asia-Pacific Defence Policy Cooperation Framework. The two states have agreed to maintain a strategic dialogue on defence, including coordinating their activities and training exercises in Asia-Pacific states. Thus, without making any sweeping announcements, it would be in Canada's interest to pursue its strategic investments in the Indo-Pacific while remaining aware of the limits of its means. Beyond the military dimension, the Obama administration's announcement of rebalancing has led many Canadian observers to put forward the role that Canada could play in the Indo-Pacific region in the event of an international crisis. The idea is that Canada could contribute effectively to crisis de-escalation by playing a mediating role, where it has important interests. To this end, Canada intends to use its limited resources to “long-term, consistent, and persistent process of building trust among countries within the region.” Canada's desire for diplomatic engagement is reflected in its willingness to become a member of the East Asia Summit and the Defence Ministers' Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, Canada has struggled to gain membership in these forums, confirming its lack of presence in the region over the past two decades. We therefore recommend that Canada work to develop deeper partnerships, particularly with ASEAN members, to increase its diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific region. ## The Arctic Continental Shelf and Canada: What Political Risks? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-arctic-continental-shelf-and-canada-what-political-risks/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The allocation of the continental shelf in the Arctic region has generated significant speculation. Some, particularly in the media, portray The allocation of the continental shelf in the Arctic region has generated significant speculation. Some, particularly in the media, portray this issue as one of the main reasons for a future Arctic conflict, emphasizing the region’s abundant resources. On the other hand, other analysts highlight the cooperative approach taken in this allocation process thus far, advocating for continued adherence to international law and cooperation in the future. It is essential to differentiate between these optimistic and pessimistic perspectives to carefully assess the potential consequences for Arctic nations, including Canada. The wording of international law does leave a notable political risk concerning the possibility of a conflict arising over the Arctic continental shelf. However, this risk is mitigated by the presence of constraining factors. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: Cooperation and Mandate The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulates that states can mutually agree to resolve overlapping (contradictory, and therefore potentially conflicting) claims. We observed this, for example, in June 2022 when Denmark and Canada reached an agreement to settle their overlapping claims, resulting in the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries in the Labrador Sea. States can also submit data to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) for the Commission’s experts to provide recommendations. Optimism regarding continental shelves often hinges on this Commission, particularly on how states respond to its recommendations. According to our analysis, most states have either implemented these recommendations or accepted them without having yet implemented them (98%). Several states have also agreed to gather additional scientific evidence to resubmit their cases at the request of the Commission’s experts. Russia is an example in this regard. These examples underscore the significant legitimacy of the CLCS among sovereign states. The adherence to the sometimes lengthy Commission procedure and the acceptance of the opinions of CLCS experts are undoubtedly optimistic signs for the resolution of these issues. However, it is important to understand that the CLCS only determines the outer limits of continental shelves where overlapping claims exist between two or more states. In other words, the Commission does not provide opinions on areas where disputes arise among the states claiming those areas. In our specific case, for example, the Commission is not tasked with deciding where the Canadian portion of the Arctic continental shelf ends and where the Russian portion of the same shelf begins; this task ultimately falls upon the concerned states to resolve through negotiations. Two observations are therefore evident. On one hand, the Commission possesses legitimacy, but it derives from avoiding contentious or conflictual issues, leaving disputes to be addressed by the states themselves. On the other hand, Arctic states must engage in negotiations to reach a resolution: Russia, Canada and Denmark all lay overlapping claims to the Lomonosov Ridge (, which must be settled through negotiations among the parties involved. This situation carries numerous implications for Canada. Negotiating the Arctic Continental Shelf The primary consequence for Canada is the inevitability of negotiations regarding the Arctic continental shelf. The agreement signed in June 2022 with Denmark, including aspects related to the continental shelf in the Labrador Sea, is an example of such negotiations yielding results. However, in the context of the Arctic continental shelf, this entails Canada engaging in negotiations with Russia, a state with which Canada has had limited direct interactions, both before and after the Ukraine invasion. It is worth noting, however, that Russia and Canada have adopted similar strategies on this issue, submitting an initial set of data before later resubmitting additional data with significantly expanded claims on the Arctic continental shelf. Thus, Canada’s claim extends to the limit of Russia’s exclusive economic zone, while Russia’s claim stretches to the limit of Canada’s exclusive economic zone. However, Russia has recently demonstrated its ability to orchestrate legal warfare (lawfare) as a means to achieve its strategic goals. Negotiations over the Arctic continental shelf could thus be influenced by this strategy on Russia’s part. Tactics such as obstructionism, the promotion of alternative interpretations, and the deployment of resources, as well as the construction of infrastructure near disputed areas, are well-established elements in the Russian lawfare toolkit. Russia is already using this type of tactic with regard to the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard and its continental shelf. In light of this, it would be wise for Canada to engage with its allies to gain a better understanding of Russian hybrid strategies. Oslo, among others, boasts a rich history of interactions with Moscow: Canada could draw lessons from the Norwegian experience with Russia, both in dealing with challenging issues (such as the Svalbard case) and achieving successes (the 2010 border agreement in the Barents Sea). Reflection and Means Of course, the issue of the Arctic continental shelf is unlikely to find resolution in the near future, and the exploitation of resources on the shelf must be considered from a long-term perspective rather than a short-term one. Ongoing discussions are focused on the establishment of common regulations for deep-sea mining activities, and all of these discussions have been postponed until 2024. The “tyranny of geography” further diminishes the appeal of resources in the central Arctic Ocean: operating costs will inevitably be higher than deposits found elsewhere on the planet. Travel within the region will also remain challenging, even with a thinner or reduced ice cover, which poses an additional limit on exploiting the continental shelf. Canada should use this extra time to reflect on the approach to be taken regarding the central Arctic Ocean. Until now, Canadian Arctic policy has focused on the Northwest Passage and continental defence. However, a comprehensive strategy will need to be developed to defend Canadian interests and play a role in this new region that is opening up. This necessitates the development of means and capabilities required for a tangible presence in this area. So far, the ships acquired or announced by Canada are not intended for the Central Arctic Ocean: offshore patrol ships are ill-suited for the environmental conditions in this ocean. The construction of two polar icebreakers announced in 2021 should partially fulfill this role. Still, these icebreakers will have numerous tasks, especially if we see increased maritime traffic through the Northwest Passage. Resources dedicated solely to the central Arctic Ocean would be necessary to demonstrate the seriousness of Canada’s commitment to this region. Reflecting on and investing in ships to monitor and maintain a presence in this zone will undoubtedly benefit Canada in its negotiations over the Arctic continental shelf. Investing in defence is always a risky endeavour in Canada. However, support for Arctic defence receives significant backing from the Canadian population, as demonstrated by a recent Ipsos poll. This is a positive sign. In this specific context, defence investments would be part of a broader framework in which the country needs to develop a coherent approach for a region that will see increased human activity. It is also a region that will introduce a challenging neighbour for Canada, Russia, which possesses considerable means and tactics with which Canada has little direct experience. It is to be hoped that deliberations on these issues will begin as soon as possible: relying solely on international organizations in this case will not provide a comprehensive solution. See Tropin at the following link: https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=971596 or Goldenziel at the following link: https://www.cornelllawreview.org/2023/01/23/an-alternative-to-zombieing-lawfare-between-russian-and-ukraine-and-the-future-of-international-law/    ## The Arctic, a Geographical Region Beset by Geopolitical Tensions with Russia URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-arctic-a-geographical-region-beset-by-geopolitical-tensions-with-russia/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Geopolitical tensions linked to the Arctic have developed as a result of Russia's hostile attitude in the region. The war in Ukraine has played an important role in accentuating this crisis. For several years, Russia has intensified the militarization of its Arctic territory, raising concerns about its intentions in the Far North. This has led to an escalation of tensions with other countries in the region, such as Canada, the United States, and several European countries, who are concerned about this military build-up. However, these diplomatic tensions over the Arctic are nothing new. The region has already been the scene of similar confrontations. In particular, the political and military tensions of the Cold War seem to be repeating themselves in our own time. What distinguishes today's situation from that of the Cold War is the interests at stake: today, they are primarily strategic, economic, and military, rather than ideological. The Arctic is an economically important region for Russia, the USA and Canada, as well as for several European countries such as Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. The Canadian Arctic Archipelago, which accounts for 40% of the country's territory, is a major strategic area for the country. It borders Russia, which claims part of the Arctic Sea as part of its internal waters, justifying this position by its attachment to the Siberian Islands. This region of the world has been the scene of diplomatic tensions for many years, compounded by global warming, which is a key factor in the area's environmental and political degradation. These recent tensions between Arctic countries have led Canada to recognize the need to modernize its capabilities in the region, in response to the political and military stakes exacerbated by the conflict in Ukraine. It is crucial to understand why Canada is reviewing its Arctic policy strategy, and to examine what is at stake. The aim of this policy brief is to demonstrate that the Arctic region is undergoing a major geopolitical shift, threatening the area's political stability. Added to this vision is the idea of a hybrid war, combining military and non-military means. Misinformation and foreign interference seem to be the new weapons of this hybrid war, propagated by Russia, they can have a significant impact on the stability of the Arctic region. For this reason, Canada must adopt a defense policy that is adapted to a Russia that is militarizing and not hesitating to use non-military means to impose its influence around the world. The Arctic: a geographical zone beset by diplomatic tensions Geopolitical tensions and the Arctic's vulnerability to global warming make it a difficult region to control. Far from being spared political disagreements between the major powers, the region has seen diplomatic tensions intensify since the start of the war in Ukraine. This has had an impact on the functioning of the Arctic Council, which has been considerably slowed down by its members, who see Russian action in Ukraine as a violation of international law and a threat to the global stability the Council strives to maintain. Global warming is both a threat and an opportunity for the major powers. This paradox now opens up access to areas of exploitation previously inaccessible due to ice. The region, rich in natural resources such as coal, iron, gold, and uranium, as well as oil and natural gas deposits, is therefore subject to an increase in industrial installations. It is estimated that around 30% of the world's oil reserves are located in the Arctic, a fact that is attracting the interest of the major powers. Some countries consider that environmental protection is essential and that the region must be protected from human action, while others see it as an opportunity for economic and military development. Such is the case of Russia, which is stepping up its military presence, justifying this stance by its desire to develop its Arctic territory, while defending the integrity of its borders against the effects of global warming and foreign interference. This scramble for the region's resources has created a climate comparable to that of the Cold War, characterized by diplomatic tensions, claims to the ocean floor and the allocation of undersea resources. This climate of tension evokes the event of 2007, when Russia planted a flag on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, claiming sovereignty over the seabed. An image perceived as a political maneuver on Moscow's part. Russia's rise to power in the Arctic The war in Ukraine has profoundly altered the global geostrategic order, plunging the world into an uncertain future, while redefining the diplomatic chessboard in the Arctic region. In particular, the adoption of sanctions against Russia by the member countries of the Arctic Council. In response to these new dynamics, Arctic countries are seeking to strengthen their military budgets in order to ensure their regional security and adapt to increased geopolitical stakes. This is what Norway and Denmark report.  They explain, however, that an armed conflict is unlikely, but that a hybrid war is conceivable given Russia's attitude in the region. The international context unfolding before our eyes is leading the major powers into a competition in which the Arctic will be at the heart of discussions. Canadian and American intelligence reports point to new military bases and assets in the Russian-controlled zone. This militarization is nothing new, however, as Moscow has already indicated its desire to increase its presence in this part of the world. The country seems to be carrying out numerous military exercises in the region, such as firing ballistic missiles into the Barents Sea. A warning sent out by Moscow to demonstrate its superiority and reaffirm its desire to monitor this part of the world. Added to this is a feeling of encirclement following the accession of several Arctic countries to NATO. Russia's changing attitude is prompting Canada to reassess its military-strategic stakes in the region, in order to ensure the protection and defense of its Arctic archipelago. The era of war in Ukraine has opened a new door to the use of disinformation to influence foreign populations. Although disinformation campaigns, integrated into the concept of hybrid warfare, have become a crucial factor in national defense and population protection, it is important to qualify them. These campaigns are used to provoke debate within national politics, exacerbate social cleavages or sow mistrust in a government. They can also disrupt a country's democratic process. The aim is to disseminate totally or partially erroneous information, via uncontrolled channels or social networks, targeting specific criteria that will have a moderate impact on national security or public opinion. Used for propaganda purposes, it can be a relatively effective weapon.  Russia seems to be adept at these methods, which cannot be associated with any one country, as they are difficult to detect and attribute, risking diplomatic tensions. However, several reports document the use of disinformation during Russia's annexation of Crimea. As far as the Arctic is concerned, Russian disinformation could harm Canadian interests, by creating discord in public opinion or influencing markets beneficial to the Russians. This approach is mentioned in Whitney Lackenbauer's policy brief. Although the Canadian government has put in place measures to limit the impact of disinformation, the challenge remains immense. In a digital world such as ours, it is extremely difficult to control the false information that is disseminated around the world. The rapid response actions established by the Canadian government are not enough to limit the impact of misinformation on communities. Military development, a necessary issue for the Canadian government Canada recently recognized the importance of remilitarizing forces in the region to prepare for any eventuality. It also spoke of its desire to improve NORAD, so as to be able to meet future challenges posed by the evolution of aviation, while protecting borders and ensuring national security. In 2015, the government launched the GBDA (ground-based air defense system) project. But this project is not sufficient in the face of new military technologies from certain countries. The Canadian armed forces are dependent on the Americans, with NORAD, which is commanded by the United States, ensuring permanent airspace security. But that's not enough: we need a territory-based system that's oriented towards the Arctic. This vision is also shared by the US Department of Defence in its new Arctic Strategy, published on June 21, 2024. The High Arctic region looks set to become the new surveillance point for the United States and its allies. Canada, the U.S. and other Arctic nations are demonstrating a willingness to step up their military presence in the region, justifying this stance by the fact that the world is going through a delicate period in which global geopolitical tensions are omnipresent.  However, Canada finds itself in a delicate situation. Its military capabilities are limited, in part due to a military funding policy which considers that the country, because of its geographical position, would not be vulnerable to direct attack. Today, this perception is being challenged as tensions in the High Arctic intensify.  Lack of resources is a major obstacle, forcing the country to modernize its forces and develop a deterrence presence in the region. Recommendations and considerations for Canada Faced with rising geopolitical tensions in the Arctic, Canada must strengthen its capabilities to protect its interests and those of its allies. The country must take into account the fact that a new geostrategic order is likely to emerge, in which the Arctic will be the scene of military and diplomatic action. Anticipation is the lifeblood of defense, and anticipating a crisis doesn't mean that it's going to happen, but that when it does, the country will be in a position to deal with it. Canada's military lag is evident in all areas. It is imperative for the country to re-evaluate its defense policy, considering funding in line with NATO recommendations, up to 2% of GDP.  At the same time, it needs to strengthen its missile and aircraft interception capability, particularly in remote and high-risk regions. This includes modernizing NORAD in agreement with the United States, acquiring ground-air defense systems and setting up forward defense bases for enhanced protection in the event of high-intensity conflict. It also needs to reassess its capacity to protect its maritime borders and ensure a deterrent military presence in the Arctic. The emergence of new methods of disinformation requires Canada to adopt a policy to combat them. The war in Ukraine has brought to light new methods of disinformation associated with artificial intelligence, and it would not be surprising to see Russia using them to destabilize the High Arctic. The rapid action program against disinformation set up by the government could be a good means of action, making it possible to contain false information that could circulate on networks or through Arctic communities. Finally, Canada could strengthen its strategic positions by opening its bases to NATO countries for collective protection. This would make military forces rapidly available, while compensating for the lack of resources currently allocated by the government to the protection of Arctic territory. What's more, Canada has solid expertise in polar military operations and strategies adapted to the region's extreme conditions. This approach could be in line with the common desire of Arctic countries to strengthen their means of preventing any eventuality in this part of the world. ## The Case Against Canadian Nuclear Weapons URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-case-against-canadian-nuclear-weapons/ Modified: 2025-03-21 A Changing Non-Proliferation Paradigm?  Should Canada build its own nuclear weapons? While self-evidently against the country’s own non-proliferation and disarmament commitments, this question has been recurrently raised by Canadian commentators and media personalities in reaction to U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated rhetorical attacks against Canadian sovereignty. With the United States allegedly going about democratic backsliding and its current leader(s) eying Canada’s vast resources for the ostensible purpose of territorial expansion, the suggestion is that Ottawa should build, operate, and command its own nuclear deterrent. The goal? To prevent Washington, Moscow, or any other hostile capital to meddle in its affairs. A Canadian nuclear deterrent appears initially attractive for a variety of reasons. It might preserve the country’s autonomy by deterring hostile acts from the United States. It could also protect it from foreign interventions made possible by the potential loss of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Additionally, it may even restore Canada’s status on the world stage and secure its role as a sovereign power—much like it did for France and the United Kingdom after World War II. Finally, it could be a cost-effective way of compensating for the country’s relative military weakness. As some of Canada’s European allies appear to tentatively consider this option, why not Canada too? These arguments are wrong for practical reasons. Proponents of a Canadian nuclear weapons both underrate the difficulties that their development would encounter and overrate the benefits that they could offer. They also overestimate the chances of new European proliferation. Although there certainly exists a feasible route toward a Canadian bomb, it would be costly, much longer than imagined, unsustainable, impossible to keep secret, insufficient and ill-designed to solve the problems the country faces and damaging to its standing with its allies and the wider international community. In other words: Canada could choose to build nuclear weapons, but at a staggering cost with no guarantee of success. It is this very cost that makes this option inappropriate, even when faced with President Trump’s stated desires for a “fifty-first” state. The Case for a Canadian Nuclear Deterrent Acquisition The argument in favour of Canadian nuclear weapons rests on two problematic assumptions. First, it presupposes that nuclear deterrence works by default. In other words, it subscribes to the belief that simply having nuclear weapons—even just one bomb—would be sufficient to reap their full deterrence benefits. Yet the reality is far more complicated. Successful nuclear deterrence requires multiple elements: sufficient warheads to inflict proportional harm, appropriate delivery mechanisms, and second-strike capability through first-strike survivability. Put in simpler terms, a Canadian arsenal would need to be capable of damaging the United States enough to dissuade an attack, require some type of missile or jet fighter technology to be used, and be capable of surviving a first massive strike by the United States. These requirements mean that ‘a few nuclear bombs’ (such as the six that South Africa once had) would not suffice. After all, South Africa did not have to deter a nuclear-armed neighbour, let alone a continental great power with a massive suite of military capabilities. To deter effectively a nuclear-armed attacker, such as the United States, an arsenal of a scale equivalent to that of the United Kingdom, France, or even China, would be more suitable, with more than one delivery vehicle. This operational necessity, of course, dramatically increases the cost of nuclear weapons acquisition. Nuclear deterrence is not intrinsic; it is a practice—and an expensive one at that. Second, it assumes that Canada would begin the journey toward the bomb not very far from completion. Indeed, Canada is one of the few ‘nuclear latent’ states in the world, those states that could ‘easily’ assemble a nuclear weapon relatively quickly. According to most studies on the subject, that much is true. Canada does have access to uranium as one of its main exporters and has an easy supply of plutonium because of its important civilian nuclear industry. Yet the key word in that sentence is relatively. It is true that when compared to other nations, Canada would have an easier path toward nuclear acquisition than most. But that does not mean it would be capable of building a bomb in a matter of hours, days, weeks, or even months. Going down the plutonium route would still necessitate adapting existing facilities, which would take time and money. Even by optimistic estimates, it could take years to reach that stage—by which point it would, arguably, be already too late because the current U.S. president might not even live long enough to see it. History tells us that a Canadian attempt at nuclear proliferation could invite the very thing that it is trying to forestall—an American intervention. Certainly, the suggestion that Washington would simply stand by and step aside while a state dances with the atom is itself fanciful. The Many Costs of Nuclear Proliferation When considering whether Canada should build nuclear weapons, it is important to understand the many costs of proliferation. Throughout this piece, I have so far insisted that building a Canadian nuclear deterrent would be expensive. I mean that both financially and diplomatically. The direct costs of nuclear proliferation are fairly straightforward and easy to predict. They include research and development (which remain required even after successfully building a bomb), testing, production, control, and communications, as well as the cost of the weapon systems used to deliver them. In the case of France, which has around 290 nuclear warheads, this includes three different delivery mechanisms—land-based airplanes, carrier-based airplanes, and submarines. The Observatory of Armament estimates that France has spent over 357 billion euros between 1945 and 2010 on its nuclear deterrent. According to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, France spent 5.3 billion euros in 2022 on its nuclear-related activities. In the case of the United Kingdom, its House of Commons reported that the cost for its nuclear deterrent over a ten-years period (2023 to 2033) could be forecasted at 117.8 billion pounds. What these numbers show is that building and supporting a nuclear arsenal is extremely costly—and not something any country can commit itself to easily. The investments required to build a program in secret and then sustain it over decades is massive. The United States spends more on a yearly basis to maintain its nuclear deterrent than Canada does on its entire military. For Canada to develop an appropriate delivery mechanism capable of targeting the United States—without the help of any of its other allies—would also present a considerable challenge. There is also a personnel cost: handling a nuclear deterrent demands the training and retention of operators capable to steward it securely at a time when the Canadian Armed Forces are in the midst of a recruitment crisis. Furthermore, it requires an independent research and development industry that would have to be maintained through government investments, without the collaboration (and, indeed, with the active opposition) of Canada’s erstwhile closest ally, the United States. In light of Canada’s chronic procurement military challenges, is a nuclear bomb even a possibility? Still, there are also indirect costs to nuclear proliferation—costs that could prove even more difficult for Canada to bear. From a diplomatic perspective, Canada pursuing a nuclear deterrent would mean reneging on its ratification of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The NPT has the widest membership of any arms control agreement in the world, and only one country has ever withdrawn from it: North Korea. For Canada to abandon its non-proliferation commitments would mean risking diplomatic isolation, and a wide swathe of painful economic sanctions from the entire international community. Nuclear weapons are unpopular with South American, African, and Asian governments. At a time when the hostility from the United States pushes Canada toward economic diversification, to seek the bomb would mean alienating all the potential partners it might need. The hypocrisy of the move, of course, could also deliver a crushing blow to the country’s moral credibility and be the source of long-term damages to its international reputation. While some have highlighted the fact that some German and Polish officials have openly pondered about the nuclear option to justify Canada following suit, I believe that doing so amounts to ‘jumping the gun’. Germany appears more likely to seek the protection of the French nuclear umbrella than constructing its own, and so does Poland. That a few leaders publicly muse about owning bombs without any serious investments or strategic development does not negate decades of non-proliferation norms and signal an end to the stigma that surround the acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent. There is a chance that the international response could be more muted than what I predict. The United States’, however, would not. By building a nuclear bomb on its northern border, Canada could invite the very thing this weapon is supposed to prevent: a direct intervention. Indeed, research shows that would-be nuclear proliferators have to go through a ‘danger zone’ right before they reach a working atomic bomb. Since they are running afoul of the international community, but do not yet enjoy the benefits of nuclear deterrence, they are completely exposed. This vulnerability period can be exploited by their rivals or opponents—and certainly would be by the United States. As such, seeking a nuclear deterrent amounts to a game of Russian roulette that could very well blow up in Canada’s face. Simply put, when a country is threatened with annexation by a nuclear-armed power, it is already too late to assemble its own nuclear weapons. What if Canada Kept the Bomb in the Basement? An alternative to overt nuclearization could be what can be called the ‘Israeli’ option—that is, building a nuclear deterrent without testing it or publicly announcing its existence. Such an approach was also similarly employed by Pakistan during the Reagan administration, as the United States then looked the other way in exchange for collaboration and the absence of a blatant proclamation. This strategy could amount to simply enhancing Canada’s latent status, thus keeping the bomb “in the basement”. Such an approach is also unlikely to yield the expected benefits. First, because the historical cases of secret nuclearization were accomplished with the United States’ tacit approval. The two culprits chose this option precisely because it was endorsed by the successive American administrations. That the United States would tolerate such a development on its northern border, accomplished by the very country it is trying to annex, is dubious. Second, because this approach still necessitates a certain degree of moves toward proliferation, which would inevitably trigger a response from the international community. It is not credible to expect a passive reaction from international institutions when we look at Iran’s own nuclear edging. Likewise, the same challenges regarding costs and investments still apply. Third, since the target of any Canadian deterrence strategy is a nuclear-armed United States (unlike Israel’s targets, which are weaker non-nuclear neighboring states), having a Canadian nuclear open secret could hardly be sufficient. Furthermore, conventional clashes between (overt or hidden) nuclear powers are possible—as shown by India and Pakistan since the 1990s. Whatever the situation, nuclear weapons are not a trump card that would solve all of Canada’s problem—on the contrary. Nuclear Weapons: Deterring Who, What, When and Why? Nuclear weapons appear to provide a feeling of invulnerability. Yet they are inappropriate for Canada’s current strategic situation. An additional assumption that frames the case of Canadian nuclear weapons is that the greatest threat to its sovereignty is a potential American invasion of its territory. This belief misses the forest for the tree: since the two countries’ economies are so intertwined, Washington does not even have to conquer Canada military—it could probably attempt to achieve the exact same aim through simple (and more devastating) economic coercion. It is conceivable that an annexation-inclined U.S. President (such as Donald Trump) could attempt to use the trade levers at his disposition to induce Canada to join the United States. According to former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, that is exactly what is currently happening. By using tariffs and other means, the goal seems to be to weaken the Canadian economy to such an extent that its people will eventually call for annexation. However, it should be mentioned that punishment strategies tend to backfire and galvanize those bearing their brunt in lieu of inducing their compliance. While also painful to private citizens in the United States, the approach has the advantage of being militarily ‘cheap’. Against it, nuclear weapons would have little deterrence benefits. A threatened nuclear strike would not fix the woes of the Canadian lumber and aluminium industries. Even in the case of a full-on conventional invasion, Canada would have to commit to a first-strike policy in the case of any infringement on its territory. Such a move could only result in international condemnation. Thus, even if Canada had developed its own nuclear weapons when it had the opportunity to do so after the Second World War, they would not currently protect it from the Trump administration’s antics. Simply put, they could be the solution to a different problem, but not to the one Ottawa presently faces. Some might argue that the United States could benefit from a nuclear-armed Canada. According to this scenario, in which the two nations have restored their amicable relationship and Washington no longer seeks to coerce Ottawa through economic means, a Canadian nuclear deterrent could enhance continental defence by increasing the strength of the overall joint deterrent. This perspective amounts to wishful thinking. It has long been the U.S. policy that the less of its allies are operationally independent, the better—especially in the case of nuclear capability. Introducing an autonomous bomb outside of the United States’ control, thus, would increase risks since Canadian decision-makers could pull the trigger regardless of American assessments and wishes. Whether Canada is the United States’ friend or not, the latter will always seek to prevent the former from acquiring nuclear weapons. Canadian Nukes: A Fake Solution to a Complicated Problem Canada feels and is threatened by the Trump administration’s tariffs, flippant rhetoric, and annexation overtures. Yet reneging on its nuclear non-proliferation commitments is not a solution. A Canadian nuclear weapon makes little strategic, financial, and diplomatic sense. It could worsen Canada’s standing and result in its international isolation. Instead of being an easily obtainable ace card, a Canadian nuclear deterrent would instead be a tremendously risky gamble, with very limited rewards. Canada would be better served building up its conventional capacities, increasing its strategic autonomy, and cultivating its economic resilience and diversification. ## The Challenges for Canada of Global Warming in the Arctic URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-challenges-for-canada-of-global-warming-in-the-arctic/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > This hot take highlights some direct impacts of climate change on Canada as both a threat and an opportunity, as well as the impacts arising from the increasing attractiveness of the Arctic Climate change, due to an increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in Earth’s atmosphere, is affecting all aspects of life in the Arctic. It particularly impacts the region very sensitive climate and its hydro and ecological systems. One of the peculiarities of global warming is that it becomes stronger as it moves closer to high latitudes, and therefore to the poles of both hemispheres of the planet. These regions are said to be warming at twice the rate of the rest of the world; they are the climate regulator of the entire globe. As a result, global warming is impacting each Arctic country, including Canada. Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates the certainty of global warming resulting in a temperature 1.5°C higher than the pre-industrial era, and the high probability of the temperature being 2°C higher. In all cases, and even more so in the case of the Arctic, this poses risks to "health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, human security and economic growth." The primary consequence of this warming in the region is the melting of the sea ice and the thawing of the permafrost, which sets in motion a number of chain reactions with disastrous consequences. The paradox of this region is that these changes are both a threat and an opportunity. On the one hand, it is an environmental disaster threatening all countries in multiple ways (leading, for example, to fires, floods, epidemics, famines, and migration). On the other hand, it also creates many new strategic opportunities, especially for the Arctic countries, as well as those claiming to be "near Arctic" (e.g. China). This hot take therefore highlights some direct impacts of climate change on Canada as both a threat and an opportunity, as well as the impacts arising from the increasing attractiveness of the Arctic (such as through economic opportunities). The Differing Ways in Which the Effects of Global Warming in the Arctic Impact Canada Given the extent of global warming, the Arctic is a high-stake area for Canada. First, the melting sea ice facilitates access to the natural resources of the Arctic region and, therefore, also facilitates their exploitation. This region is known to be abundant in minerals (including diamonds, gold, lead, zinc, nickel, uranium, iron, and rare earths), but hypothetical figures on hydrocarbon reserves in arctic subsoil, such as gas and oil, were also mentioned. The North Pole is believed to be home to 13% of the world's oil reserves and 30% of the world’s gas reserves. In addition, the Arctic Sea is rich in fish, and this resource will become easier to access and exploit. It is normally necessary to use special boats as well as icebreakers to fish in this region. However, the reduction of the ice and its possible disappearance during the summer months by the end of the 2030s will allow easier access and lead to a greater number of actors engaging in fishing. Nonetheless, increased intensive fishing in this region can greatly contribute to the scarcity of resources, causing serious environmental damage and harming the supply available to local populations (including Canadian populations). The problems of variation of the thermohaline circulation of water, responsible for the circulation of water currents on the planet (the density of water is affected both by its temperature and by its salinity rate) will affect, among other things, fishery resources and all other arctic fauna. It will also make access to food more difficult for local Canadian populations. Thus, initially, fishery resources will be more accessible to Canadian fishing thanks to the reduction in ice. However, in a second step, the harmful effects mentioned above will make it difficult for these local populations to feed themselves and to be self-sufficient with the available resources, as well as rendering access to these resources by land or ice more difficult. This phenomenon of resource scarcity in Canadian waters will also contribute to the probable intensification of international fishing activities in the region. The direct impact of global warming and the environmental crisis on resources, along with the enthusiasm it generates for the exploitation of Arctic natural resources, is causing adverse effects. These factors simultaneously contribute to the accelerated degradation of the Arctic environment, while also altering the renewal of natural resources (such as marine and terrestrial flora and fauna), in a vicious self-sustaining circle. Given their diffuse nature, these effects do not stop at national barriers. In addition, these changes make it more difficult for local populations to meet their basic needs, impacting their way of life and, indeed, their ability to survive. Logically, we also know that this melting ice gives rise to several potential national and international sea routes, in particular the Northwest Passage on the Canadian and United States sides, and the Northern Sea Route on the Russian side (northeast) between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. A third, lesser-known passage is the Arctic Bridge connecting the ports of Moscow (Russia) and Churchill (Canada), useful for bringing Russian oil to North American markets. Finally, a transpolar route crossing the Arctic Ocean is also considered. Maritime traffic will, for different reasons, experience a great increase thanks to these routes: firstly, for the exploitation of different resources mentioned earlier. Then, the incentive grows to take advantage of the shortcuts offered by these sea routes. For example, these routes connect, in the case of the Northwest Passage on the Canadian side, Europe and Asia. This route is, in fact, 30% to 40% shorter than routes passing through the Suez Canal or the Panama Strait. In addition to these prospects for commercial and industrial navigation facilitating trade, there is also the possibility of growth in tourist cruises in the region. It is therefore easy to see the potential for more crossings in the territorial waters of Canada that are not subject to "the rights of innocent passage and transit". It should also be noted that the facilitation of access to these maritime routes paradoxically makes navigation even more dangerous and uncertain in these areas because of the multiplication of icebergs and polar lows (unpredictable cyclones forming over ice-free areas of seawater). This increases the risk of boats having accidents, and of natural disasters resulting from these accidents depending on the cargo (for example, the risk of oil spill or extreme pollution). Furthermore, the development of floating nuclear power plants, as Russia produced for the first time in 2019, can cause severe environmental damage if there are accidents. Notwithstanding, navigation in the Arctic also presents strong commercial constraints which impact the profitability of transport. Although the distances are shorter, they require more effort from the boats (and therefore a significant amount of fuel consumption) and they travel at slower speeds towards their destination. Moreover, the few, if not complete absence of, secondary port destinations in this area makes travelling such long distances less economically profitable. Likewise, there are also high additional costs such as insurance costs (driven by the difficulties of operating in Arctic conditions and high-risk maritime regions), or icebreaker services for which Russia requires payment. Climate change therefore allows Canada to see potential new maritime routes being formed and become more accessible, but also makes such routes dangerous because of the uncertainties associated with drifting icebergs. This therefore implies an intensification of navigation in its territorial waters. For now, Canada can continue to deny the passage of foreign vessels through the Northwest Passage if such vessels are seen to pose a risk to the environment. Indeed, ships are in themselves an increased risk, representing potential sources of pollution (linked to crossings or goods in the event of an accident), accidents of all kinds (collisions, damage caused by ice, capsizing, grounding, shipwrecks), and raising the possibility of offenses relating to the rules of navigation or delimitation of Canadian territory. Climate change also makes it possible to navigate a road bordering the coast, allowing access to a greater number of areas that are remote and hitherto very difficult to reach. It will therefore be possible to reach them in order to supply local Canadian populations, as well as making it easier to develop maritime trade with them. It should be noted that these new routes will be accessible to a greater number of types of boats due to less extreme navigation conditions (for example, the more limited need for icebreakers). Arctic populations, including those of Canada, are also affected by global warming. One of the many concerns is the melting sea ice and permafrost. The Arctic is a great source of drinking water, and ice has been an excellent trap for capturing toxic agents that have circulated in the water for decades. The melting sea ice is therefore endangering part of the drinking water reserves while freeing these previously imprisoned toxic agents. Consequently, these agents contaminate the fresh water that circulates in this region and is used and consumed by the Canadian populations. Melting glaciers and permafrost also raise water levels, which can cause inhabited and built-up coastal areas to fall below sea level and thus be destroyed. The thawing of the permafrost is also having a negative impact on Arctic populations. Its ice gave it its insulating and waterproof property, it allowed the natural freshwater lakes to be maintained, and the land to be solid enough to accommodate the construction of the infrastructure necessary for the development of life in the region. With the disappearance of their ice layer, the soils lose their solidity and waterproof properties. As a result, the reserves of fresh water contained in the lakes will disappear, making access to this basic resource even more difficult for people to find. The soils will become unstable and swampy. This calls into question any strategic construction or construction linked to the development of the region (such as bridges, rails, roads, and buildings). Greenhouse gas emissions hitherto trapped in the ground will also escape, fuelling global warming and its consequences. Policy Considerations and Recommendations for Canada Regarding the first environmental concern related to resources and pollution, Canada could consider instituting or renewing the rules concerning fishing quotas for state-driven fishing in Canadian Arctic waters. But it should also try to propose preventive regulation of activities to the Arctic international governance bodies of which it is a member, such as the Arctic Council or the Northern Dimension (where it is an observer member). Checking the dissuasive nature of sanctions for breaking the rules and tightening them up if necessary is also an interesting avenue for ensuring the effectiveness of the rules. It is also possible to envisage the creation of a successful regulation on the type of fuel used by maritime transport, which is currently still too polluting. We could also think of the delimitation of protected areas in the form of land or sea parks, as well as maintaining an inventory of flora and fauna inhabiting the environment in order to ensure that they are maintained. In terms of facilitating the exploitation of resources, as well as their channeling and distribution, this can help, to a certain extent, in the commercial development of the region. It could then be judicious to think of a port development project with multiple objectives (as outlined below), along the Canadian territorial coast. Recommendations that can be made about roads and marine traffic are as follows: Canada may need to establish surveillance cooperation with the United States with respect to its northern archipelago, for which it is more difficult to maintain surveillance for proper compliance with maritime rules. It is also likely that the Canadian government will have to prepare to accept the navigation of foreign vessels in these waters when the ice makes navigation fully possible. The Canadian government could invest in more equipment and intervention and rescue groups to optimize their effectiveness in the event of an accident, as well as strengthen international cooperation to ensure the safety of maritime routes (including more rescue teams and better logistics to bring aid and assistance to boats in distress). Increased monitoring of the water may be necessary to enhance knowledge of the traffic, ensure compliance with national and international boundaries, and provide better guidance to boats. The construction of ports along the coasts would serve to secure the passage of boats through providing possible stops along the way, while facilitating the delivery of supplies to the Canadian populations in these regions. With the changes occurring in the natural Arctic environment in Canada, the living conditions of Canadian populations in the Arctic are therefore seriously endangered (including through contamination, depletion of freshwater reserves, or even an unstable soil that is not conducive to existing infrastructure remaining functional). Although certain persistent organic pollutant (POP) contaminants such as PCBs (chlorinated biphenyls) and DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) are no longer used in industrialized countries, they are still common in certain regions of the world, such as Africa or South America. To this, can be added the general rise in sea level which will obviously affect Canada's territorial coasts. Nevertheless, 46% of the Arctic population is living in these coastal areas. The problem of access to safe water for Canadians is of great concern. As a first step, recommending more tests on the quality of the local water can allow inhabitants to adopt a behavior adapted for their health (providing the choice of the consumption of boiled or bottled water). It is then important to act preventively. Canada could perhaps present to international governing bodies (for example, the UN, or Arctic bodies) a request to tighten the rules for the use of contaminants in the same way as was the case for mercury. Canada could also propose an extension of the list of those contaminants to be banned completely in order to prevent their appearance in water and the future contamination of the environment, as well as of the resources consumed by the Canadian Arctic populations. Finally, it makes sense to continue to think about potential solutions and new visions of the appropriate occupation of the Arctic region, given the changing reality of the soils. It is therefore important to invest in research and development in order to reflect on and develop new types of adequate infrastructure. In the meantime, it is also important to be proactive and move populated areas as far as possible away from the coast. It is possible to think of the use of new infrastructures on stilts integrating the expensive "thermosyphons" technology in order to avoid the heating of the ground caused by heated buildings. ## The crisis in Mali and its international dimensions – Roundtable URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-crisis-in-mali-and-its-international-dimensions-roundtable/ Modified: 2022-10-21 > Mali has been at the center of conflicts in the Sahel for a decade now. It is at a turning point: political crises, transformations in... note: this video is only available in French Mali has been at the center of conflicts in the Sahel for a decade now. It is at a turning point: political crises, transformations in international interventions, profound questions regarding the MINUSMA peace operation. How can we understand these changes? What are the consequences for Mali, the region, international interventions and peace operations? Participants : Adib Bencherif, University of Sherbrooke Bruno Charbonneau, Royal Military College – Saint-Jean Ousmane Diallo, Amnesty International Dirk Druet, McGill University Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Bishop’s University Mamoudou Gazibo, Université de Montréal Chair: Marie-Joëlle Zahar ## The Development of 5G and the Impact of Donald Trump’s Presidency on Intelligence Sharing Within the Five Eyes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-development-of-5g-and-the-impact-of-donald-trumps-presidency-on-intelligence-sharing-within-the-five-eyes/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Trump's particular governance and the security character of 5G upset the unity of the Five Eyes, but member countries can adapt to these challenges if they do not want it to be problematic in the long term. The development of 5G technology poses a new challenge within the informal alliance of the "Five Eyes". This new technology dramatically improves data throughput speed, network interoperability and is setting the new standard in wireless telecommunications. Its development is concentrated in the hands of a small number of players, including Huawei, one of the largest manufacturers of telecommunications equipment. The closeness between the Chinese government and Huawei is leading to concerns about the possibility of China hijacking this technology for political purposes. Illegal use of the 5G network poses significant threats to the security devices of Western states. President Trump has strongly opposed Huawei's development of 5G and has gone so far as to indicate that the United States will stop sharing intelligence with countries that do not exclude Huawei from their telecommunications. The development of 5G and the presidency of Trump therefore pose new challenges for the future of the Five Eyes, of which Canada is a member. President Trump's particular governance and the security character of 5G upset the unity of the alliance, but member countries can adapt to these challenges if they do not want it to be problematic in the long term. The Interweaving of Technology and Security The development of 5G poses a new challenge for the Five Eyes alliance, as it is the first time for member countries that a tool for technological modernization has been perceived as such a high threat to internal security. 5G can improve the efficiency of many areas such as transport, communications and defence. This technological revolution brings, at the same time, new threats to the cyberspace of member countries and therefore makes it a considerable security issue. To control the effects, it is necessary to put in place control mechanisms, but the development of these is struggling to catch up with that of 5G technology itself. The cyber threat represents a new international issue and requires increased and effective intelligence sharing in order to counterbalance the vulnerability of infrastructure. Also, the threat represented by 5G is amplified by the monopoly that Huawei has on its development. In China, the private sector is intrinsically linked to government. The active funding of the Huawei group by the Chinese government suggests that it has significant interests in its activities. In addition, two laws regarding intelligence sharing in China require Huawei to participate in Chinese government intelligence activities. For China, national security objectives are inextricably linked with the participation of actors from all branches of society. The lack of clarity in the legal language of the two laws suggests that it would be straightforward for China to invoke security concerns in order to use 5G technology to infiltrate the infrastructure of these enemies. In the context of the development of 5G, by establishing itself as a disruptor of the established international order, China is crystallizing its relationship with the Western powers. The members of the Five Eyes have therefore set up committees within their respective countries to determine the potential danger that Huawei represents in the installation of 5G and all highlight the risk associated with it. However, not everyone has yet made a decision about Huawei's involvement in the development of 5G networks. This suggests that there is not a uniformly accepted approach to the subject, which is surprising, as the field of communication technologies is rather a factor of alignment within the alliance. The Special Intelligence Status of the United States The United States is, within the alliance and globally, the largest provider of intelligence to the international system. The US intelligence community is made up of a multitude of agencies that work independently, but in collaboration with one another. One of the main missions of these is to prevent the theft of American secrets by countering the espionage efforts of other states and by acquiring information to assess the intelligence services of these actors in order to counteract those who may be hostile. It is in this dynamic that Huawei's surveillance is developing. The country is positioned as one of the main detractors of Huawei. Since Obama’s presidency, concerns have been conveyed about the potential danger Huawei poses to the telecommunications industry. In 2018, these concerns were formalized by a declaration from the three major US intelligence agencies not to use the company's products. This was followed, in 2019, by the signing of an executive order by President Trump that placed Huawei on a list of ‘foreign enemies’ and prevented it from marketing products in the United States. As such, the US sought to completely exclude Huawei from its commercial apparatus in order to protect its national security. The fact that the United States is the largest intelligence provider within the alliance gives it authority status among member countries, and its positioning against Huawei must be shared in order to maintain a stable relationship within the Five Eyes. The influence of the US is such that some member countries have changed their decision following pressure from the Americans. Britain initially chose to allow Huawei access to some means of communication by setting certain restrictions on access to more sensitive parts of the network. The United States expressed its disagreement with the move and threatened the future of intelligence sharing between the two actors. These pressures led Britain to revise its decision and eliminate all Huawei technologies from its networks by 2027. The same is true for Canada. Although no official decision has yet been made, the country has been warned several times of the possible disastrous consequences if Canada were to compromise its network. The specific case of Huawei and 5G therefore highlights the presence of asymmetries and bilateral tensions that member countries have every interest in addressing if they want the alliance to continue. Trump's Presidency and Amplified Tensions Donald Trump’s presidency of the United States has amplified tensions within the alliance. In relation to Huawei, Trump is influenced by the US’s strategic rivalry with China, and this rivalry has been exacerbated since Trump came to power. When it comes to intelligence sharing, the President demonstrates unpredictable behavior, leading to breaches of trust among the allies. For example, sharing information with Russia about the Manchester bombings has altered the relationship between Britain and the United States. Indeed, the special relationship that Trump has with Russia creates tensions within the alliance. The implications of the relationship between Trump and Putin on the US security apparatus and that of its allies are difficult to identify. However, there is a multitude of links between the two leaders. This ambivalence has led Britain to seek reassurance from the US intelligence community that President Trump will not compromise espionage operations in Russia. Also, Trump has a delicate relationship with his intelligence community, frequently publicly criticizing the community’s espionage practices. He has repeatedly pressured the intelligence community to present analyses in accordance with his views. These internal divisions have implications for the ability of the United States to be seen as a trusted actor with whom to share intelligence. Trust is an essential component of the maintenance and effectiveness of the Five Eyes. Its member countries share a common strategic culture as well as a significant amount of confidential information. It is a complex sharing network, the success of which has been guaranteed by maintaining trust and transparency among the allies. Trump's presidency and his relationship with the leaders of member countries threaten the alliance's initial balance of trust. However, it is important to note that this is not the first time that there has been a breach of trust within the alliance. For example, the case of Canadian Second Lieutenant Jeffery Delisle, accused of sharing classified intelligence with Russia, had an impact on the level of trust among the allies. Policy Considerations and Recommendations The development of 5G in the context of Trump’s presidency brings many challenges that will continue even if the United States changes administration. The country's position on Huawei is clear and is unlikely to change. Canada is heavily dependent on intelligence provided by the alliance and therefore must actively participate in the alliance's efforts to address these challenges. First, to mitigate and better control the security issues associated with the development of 5G, Canada and the rest of the alliance must take a proactive and collective stance on the issue of cybersecurity. Intelligence activities and military operations, on an international scale, will soon be conducted using 5G. Regardless of the vendor, 5G poses a significant threat to national security if the government does not have the means to control it. The alliance must therefore set an example by ensuring that security is a priority for all in the acquisition of 5G. Decryption is a prime intelligence concern within the alliance and is highly relevant to the issue of cybersecurity. Each country must therefore ensure that it has the necessary means to mobilize this type of intelligence to protect cyberspace. In Canada, initiatives must be put in place to improve intelligence sharing on this issue. This requires a further orientation of strategic priorities towards cybersecurity. As with the fight against terrorism, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service must develop an integrated centre made up of experts to analyze this type of threat. Canada can also take this opportunity to assert itself in non-traditional security by developing formalized standards on good conduct in 5G. If the members of the Five Eyes participate in this standardization work, which is necessary for the entire international community, it helps to realign the interests of each member to this collective interest. Second, with respect to US dominance in the alliance, Canada has an interest in aligning itself with the US decision to ban Huawei from its 5G network first. A choice has to be made between the security protection the United States provides and the lucrative Chinese commercial market. It is necessary for Canada to maintain a strong relationship with the United States. As a middle power, the country is particularly vulnerable to state and transnational threats, not having as many intelligence capabilities as its southern neighbour. To maintain a beneficial partnership with the Five Eyes member countries, Canada must ensure that it always presents itself as a relevant partner in the eyes of others. To do this, Canada must continue its efforts to overhaul its surveillance and intelligence-sharing process. Since 2016, the country has worked to propose reforms that aim to modernize and energize the Canadian intelligence community. This includes the creation of the Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security and Intelligence, responsible for overseeing all the activities of the various agencies. This modernization effort will allow Canada to reaffirm its relevance in the eyes of member countries and even perhaps grant it a more prominent place within the alliance. Also, Canada must remind the United States that it is in its national security interest to protect American interests. It is therefore important to move beyond the differences of opinion among leaders and to continue to align with the American interest. Finally, Trump's presidency crystallized the balance of power with China. The Five Eyes members' security apparatuses are closely linked, particularly that of Canada with the United States. If a Chinese threat is perceived by the United States, it directly applies to the rest of the allies. To moderate the effects of these diplomatic tensions and regain a spirit of unity, Canada and the rest of the alliance must reorient the strategic priorities of the Five Eyes towards the common threat posed by China. Each country in the alliance has strategic or diplomatic issues to settle with China. A clear orientation of the alliance's priorities towards containing the Chinese threat sends a strong message to the latter. This strategic orientation requires a broadening of the interest of the alliance beyond signals intelligence. Uniting unilaterally against a threat will help to reaffirm the unity and trust that exists among members. Also, by making the Chinese threat a priority, the alliance sets an example and sends a message to supporters of the established international order. This leadership position can, on its own, remedy the breach of trust caused by Trump's presidency and the development of 5G. ## The Election of Joe Biden: Implications for Democratic Allies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-election-of-joe-biden-implications-for-democratic-allies/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > President Biden’s coming to power may not bring about the long-awaited break with his predecessor and may increase the pressure on democratic allies in the areas of security and defence. The U.S. presidential election demonstrated the tenacity of President Donald J. Trump's ideas, policies and leadership style. The conservative nationalism and populism that marked his presidency continues to enjoy broad popular support and will not disappear with the inauguration of a Democratic president. U.S. allies will need to continue to consider the implications of this trend for U.S. foreign policy, the alliance system, and the future of the liberal international order. President Biden’s coming to power may therefore not bring about the long-awaited break with his predecessor and may increase the pressure on democratic allies in the areas of security and defence. Continuity from Trump to Biden President Trump has put forward a foreign policy marked by “conservative nationalism”, populism and protectionism, as well as a disdain for multilateral institutions and a transactional approach linking U.S. trade and security interests. These factors build on a long intellectual tradition in the U.S. and have been supported by many Republicans; it is now clear that these ideas remain popular among the American electorate. Although President-elect Biden campaigned on an approach that was diametrically opposed to Trump's, based on the return of liberal internationalism and American leadership, it will be difficult for him to make a profound break with the foreign policy of his predecessor. First, he may have to contend with a Republican-majority Senate, which could constrain him in his choice of cabinet, and with the left wing of the Democratic Party in Congress, which could limit his international security ambitions. This faction aligns with the conservative nationalist movement’s promotion of the U.S. withdrawal from overseas conflicts and prioritization of domestic socio-economic needs, although it diverges on how to address these issues. This prioritization of domestic affairs, combined with the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, socio-economic anxiety, racial tensions and widespread fatigue over “endless wars”, will lead President Biden to continue the U.S. military withdrawal begun under Barack Obama and continued by Donald Trump toward the end of his term. Thus, we can expect the continuation of the American military disengagement from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a reluctance to embark on new military ventures. The concept of the defence of human rights and democracy by military force does not seem ready to regain the upper hand in Washington. In this context, U.S. allies will continue to be called upon to compensate for the U.S. withdrawal, as evidenced by the strengthening of NATO's military presence in Iraq. Second, the political polarization and hyper-partisanship that marked the U.S. presidential election will lead the Biden administration to look inward to bridge the deep rifts that divide Americans and fuel political dysfunction. How can such a divided country forge consensus and provide global leadership? How can we not fear the transience and reversal of U.S. commitments, which vary with the U.S. electoral cycle? The U.S. political divide will undermine U.S. international leadership, which depends on the credibility and sustainability of U.S. engagement, particularly in terms of security assurances to its allies. Third, some continuity is expected between the Biden and Trump administrations due to deepening geostrategic shifts. Despite growing polarization, a strong bipartisan consensus exists on the desire to maintain U.S. primacy in an era of intensified competition among major powers. The president-elect has expressed concern about the threat posed by China. He will therefore pursue a policy of competition towards Beijing and maintain a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, as far as China is concerned, there seems to be a bipartisan consensus strong enough for the U.S. to push back. The American public is in agreement, since a majority of Americans have a negative opinion of China. However, Washington will need allies in order to be able to credibly influence, contain or deter China in the Asia-Pacific region. This is an area where the U.S. generally has the advantage: it has more friends in the world than both Russia and China. If Trump did not see this clearly, his newly fired Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, understood it well: “Our global constellation of allies and partners remain an enduring strength that our competitors and adversaries simply cannot match”. A Change in Leadership Style These elements of continuity should not obscure the fact that a 180-degree break in style is to be expected in American management and leadership style under a Biden administration. Other than a friendlier and more conciliatory tone and the ability to engage in dialogue with counterparts, the biggest break that can be anticipated with Biden coming to power is the importance it will place on repairing bridges with America's allies. In short, unilateralism will give way to multilateralism. With Biden's victory, the U.S. will quickly benefit from a radical shift in international public opinion. A recent survey by the Pew Research Centre found that ratings of the U.S. are at their lowest level in two decades. The situation can only get better. But will world leaders also be forgiving? Looking back to the immediate post-Bush period, when Barack Obama came to power, experts were not very optimistic about the restoration of good relations with allies. The U.S. succeeded, however, despite the transatlantic rift that had existed since the beginning of the Iraq war in 2003. That said, while the allies can deal with disagreements, they do not respond well to surprises and unpredictability, which is what they have experienced over the past four years. Biden's approach to China's containment will be based on concerted action with allies in the region and the U.S. will share with them a desire to avoid escalating tensions and the instrumentalization of multilateral institutions in order to foster sectoral cooperation with China. This approach, which will be articulated at a Summit of Democracies, will seek stronger commitments from U.S. allies to mobilize and coordinate their efforts to curb Chinese authoritarianism and aggression. With respect to Russia, the Biden administration will seek to reaffirm U.S. security commitments within NATO, take a firm stance vis-à-vis Ukraine, and continue the focus on collective defence that began in 2014. That said, President Biden will quickly seek avenues for cooperation with Russia, beginning with the extension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires in February 2021. While Trump is often credited for the fact that NATO allies have increased their total defence spending by $130 billion since 2016, his tolerance of authoritarianism has also allowed for democratic backsliding in Poland, Hungary and Turkey. This ultimately erodes NATO's political cohesion and, by extension, the credibility of its deterrence posture. While NATO's military strength remains impressive, the credibility of its signalling to Russia and other adversaries is undermined by political disunity. The current tensions surrounding Turkey illustrate the possible dangers of a breakdown of cohesion within the alliance. While Trump has shown disdain for traditional alliances, he has fared much better with allies of convenience, which are transactional in nature, like his diplomatic style. However, the most important adjustment will not be with the U.S.’ traditional allies, who will at least be enthusiastic about strengthening international institutions through greater U.S. engagement, but with rivals such as Russia and China. President Trump has even encouraged these regimes, at times expressing admiration for Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping's leadership styles. How will Biden restore the credibility of the U.S. and succeed in deterring opponents? The firm and concerted approach that Biden will prioritize in a context of increased competition among major powers will require greater input from U.S. allies and closer ties with emerging democracies such as India and Indonesia. This will require renewed efforts to increase joint military exercises, pooling of military procurement, a sustained increase in defence budgets and level of preparedness of military forces, as well as more equitable burden-sharing in an uncertain economic context due to the pandemic. While it will be easier for allies to work with a Biden administration, it will also be harder to say no to the expression of renewed American leadership and the requests for support that will come with it. Biden's U.S. foreign policy will have to convey an uncompromising stance on the principles and values enshrined in the Washington Treaty, NATO's founding treaty. By leading by example, the U.S. will have at its disposal one of the best strategies to counter Russian and Chinese rhetoric. It may also be necessary to reaffirm ad nauseam the argument for international institutions and multilateral diplomacy, since the forces of nationalism, protectionism and right-wing populism in the U.S. will not disappear overnight. Policy Considerations and Recommendations In the past four years, have Canadians become desensitized to Trump's threats and intimidation? When Biden arrives at the White House, the Trudeau government or any successor will have the task of restoring the country's status as a close ally and partner of the U.S. Canada has had to hedge or stall because of Trump's mercantilist tendencies, but there are important decisions ahead that can no longer be postponed, from intelligence cooperation to continental defence, with the modernization of NORAD. The silver lining of dealing with the Trump administration for four years and surviving monumental diplomatic challenges such as the renegotiation of NAFTA is that Canada's negotiating capabilities have been sharpened. There is no doubt that important lessons have been learned from this process, as well as the establishment of important contacts between Ottawa and Washington. This, Ottawa can continue to capitalize on. With Biden at the helm, Canada and the U.S. will not be perfectly aligned - they never have been - but Canada will benefit from a more predictable bilateral relationship (at least for four years) and this will be a huge victory in and of itself. Some issues will remain difficult to resolve regardless of who holds the White House, such as Canada's bilateral relationship with China. On other issues, Canada should build on what has worked well in the past. Leading NATO missions has been one such example, and Canada should consider doing the same in the context of the United Nations. Taking on command positions allows for greater control over the parameters of intervention and greater visibility within these institutions. It is more important for Canada to make a significant contribution, with tangible impact, and receive the recognition that comes with it, than sending symbolic contributions across many missions in what is often called contribution warfare, which means displaying your flag in as many places as possible rather than leading. The impending end of the Canadian command of the NATO mission in Iraq also provides an opportunity to invest in a UN mission to enhance Canada's peacekeeping credibility. Finally, it should be easier to promote Canada's feminist foreign policy now that its closest ally is no longer led by a misogynist and a racist. Above all, it is time for Canada to update its foreign policy vision by undertaking the same type of consultations it conducted in 2016 for defence policy. The political transition in the U.S., combined with the global pandemic and a more antagonistic China, should be reason enough to undertake this exercise.   ## The End of Illusions: Towards an Independent Foreign Policy in a Disorderly World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-end-of-illusions-towards-an-independent-foreign-policy-in-a-disorderly-world/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The failure of the Trudeau government to get Canada elected to the United Nations Security Council was an unprecedented affront in Canadian history. The failure of the Trudeau government to get Canada elected to the United Nations Security Council was an unprecedented affront in Canadian history. It was humiliating both for Canada – which invested considerable money, time and political capital – and for the Prime Minister himself. After all, it was his idea to compete against Ireland and Norway for a seat during his time as Prime Minister. Two diametrically opposed conclusions have been drawn from this stinging setback. Some argue that the defeat in New York is not significant and does not diminish the relevance of Canada’s current foreign policy. Canadians, after all, do not seem to care in general, while failure is mainly attributed to a matter of timing, a dearth of resources invested in peace operations and international aid, or a lack of coherence and readability. In short, the issue is simply one of enhancing and funding the policy already in place to ensure Canada is “back” to the international arena. Others see this demeaning defeat as the ultimate proof that the foundations of foreign policy should be entirely rethought. Beyond conjunctural causes, Canada's defeat at the UN is symptomatic of structural deficiencies in its foreign policy. Canada's role as a unifying force hit the wall of a harsh reality: the international community does not wish to grant Canada more influence. It has favoured less wealthy and less populous states that openly proclaim themselves as independent. Unfortunately, Canada has the reputation of being too soft to confront the major powers and too weak to defend principled positions. Canada needs to break out of its state of vassalage in order to establish itself as an influential international player. This is all the more necessary as Canada must now navigate in an increasingly hostile international environment, marked by a fractured liberal international order. The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated and intensified at least three fundamental geopolitical shifts: the aggressive and multidimensional rivalry between major powers, the dysfunction of multilateral institutions, and the withdrawal of the United States. This deadly combination is unprecedented and calls for a fundamental rethinking of Canada's international policy, as two of its main pillars – multilateralism and the special relationship with the United States – have been weakened. The Third Option To address the extraordinary challenges facing Canada, Justin Trudeau might find the foundations of a credible alternative in his father's foreign policy. Dubbed the third option, this alternative is based on the uncompromising defence of the country’s national interests and the assertion of its independence on the international scene. The adoption of such an independent foreign policy would require a paradigm shift for Canada, which is accustomed to relying on others to make difficult choices on the international stage. In concrete terms, an independent foreign policy means abandoning the old reflexes of dependency, which are to delegate Canada’s strategic orientations to the UN, NATO and Washington. It must first and foremost think for itself. To do so, a difficult but necessary process of reflection is required to better define the country’s national interests. Canada has three vital interests to defend in an increasingly hostile world: ensuring the security of its territory and its population, supporting the prosperity of its economy and avoiding being entangled in a global conflict. These interests have long been ensured by the protection and superpower of the United States and by an international order governed by liberal rules and standards. In a context of rising protectionism, nationalism and revisionism, combined with climate change, these guarantees are no longer effective. Defending National Interests To defend its national interests, Canada must free itself from its state of vassalage and define ambitions in line with the means it is willing to commit. To defend its territory and its people, Canada must have the means to detect, deter and defeat any threat, whether it be cyber security, hypersonic missiles or foreign traffic near its coasts. While it is impossible for Canada to defend its territory without the cooperation of the United States, the fact remains that Canada can no longer rely entirely on its neighbour to the south to ensure that it has the intelligence and the support needed to guarantee its national security. Greater strategic autonomy is thus required. Canada would benefit from looking to Australia, which has just undergone a major overhaul of its defence policy in order to develop a more independent strategic posture. While Canberra is not questioning its alliance with the United States, it nevertheless wishes to develop its own autonomy and its own means in order to guard against ambivalent support from Washington. Adopting such a strategic autonomy posture would be difficult in Canada, given its proximity to the United States, but it is now vital. The United States’ inward-looking attitude, combined with its great political volatility, does not allow us to assume that our neighbour to the south will be at our side, including to defend Canada’s vast Arctic territory, which is coveted by great powers. In addition, the current pandemic has clearly demonstrated, from the lack of military personnel to support Canadian civilian authorities to U.S. attempts to prevent the delivery of masks to Canada, that Canada needs to increase its domestic capabilities and reduce its dependence on the U.S. It would be naive to believe that all will return to normal following the American presidential election. Candidate Joe Biden advocates a protectionist and anti-Chinese posture similar in many ways to Trump’s. It’s not likely that the domestic discontent marked by deep economic and social distress will suddenly disappear in the aftermath of a possible Democratic victory. To prosper in an era of protectionism and persistent rivalry with China, Canada requires an industrial policy capable of supporting greater self-reliance in key sectors such as emerging technologies, agri-food, strategic resources and renewable energy. At the same time, Canada must aim at doubling its population in an effort to benefit from a substantial domestic market. In addition, Canada must continue its attempts to preserve a rules-based economic order, such as the WTO reform initiative. With respect to international security, the prevention of global crises remains a priority, as it would certainly bring Canada into disarray. Two issues are particularly salient: the potential escalation of regional conflict (for example, in Eastern Europe or the South China Sea) into a war between great powers; and mass migration due to climate change, civil wars and increased inequalities. Possible Courses of Action To prevent such disaster scenarios, Canada must adopt a multidimensional strategy, supported by deterrence, punishment, persuasion and upstream prevention. Canada should not confine itself to either of these roles, nor should it simply follow the United States’ lead. Strategic partnerships with key countries should be established to leverage Canada’s international influence while ensuring maximum flexibility. Specifically, Canada must look beyond NATO to become more involved with a handful of key partners in Asia-Pacific whose interests converge with ours. It must favour coalitions of like-minded states on key issues that require international cooperation, such as climate change, cyber security and autonomous weapons. It must also refocus its attention on the Arctic, a central geostrategic hub for Canada, and develop a concerted and firm strategy vis-à-vis China, particularly in the area of protecting strategic information and resources. It is time for Canada to abandon its sanctimonious rhetoric and its tendency to walk away from the table when it is time to pay the bill. Rather than talking big and doing little, Canada needs to do more and speak more clearly. Reviewing Foreign Policy Defending Canada’s national interests and asserting its independence requires a major overhaul of its foreign policy. Two conditions are necessary for this to be achievable: a consensus among the major political parties on Canada’s strategic reorientation and the provision of adequate budgetary resources. Without political consensus, foreign policy will remain a source of partisanship, division and reversal after each election. Without adequate resources, Canada will be condemned to follow its allies or pay the costs of their indifference to our interests. This will be particularly painful in the context of the post-COVID recession, because in every past period of fiscal restraint, regardless of the political party in power, budgets for defence, diplomacy and international aid have been cut. It is imperative to prevent such a scenario from happening again by fostering the aspiration of Canadians to equip themselves with the means necessary to ensure their security and prosperity in a belligerent environment. To this end, a panel of experts should be mobilized to develop a picture of the current geostrategic environment, to define the contours of a more independent posture for Canada, and to engage Canadians in working together to lay the groundwork for a new strategic consensus. ## The End of the Assad Era in Syria: Between International Pressure and Domestic Challenges URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-end-of-the-assad-era-in-syria-between-international-pressure-and-domestic-challenges/ Modified: 2025-01-13 > The End of the Assad Era in Syria: Between International Pressure and Domestic Challenges. By: Gianmarco Fontana. (The End of the Assad Era in Syria: Between International Pressure and Domestic Challenges - Gianmarco Fontana) After years of stalemate, the Syrian civil war has once again taken center stage in international discussions. Over the past two weeks, the country has witnessed an unprecedented sequence of events that has disrupted its political landscape, culminating in the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on the night of Sunday, December 8. Capitalizing on the instability and uncertainty, a diverse coalition of rebels launched an offensive that began in northern urban centers—Idlib and Aleppo—and rapidly advanced to Damascus. The swift collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government signals the end of more than five decades of centralized, coercive rule by the Assad family. These unexpected developments are part of a broader context that encompasses domestic, regional, and international dimensions. A thorough analysis of these factors is essential to understand the implications of this upheaval and what the future may hold as Syria embarks on a potential transition toward a new governance model. This report examines the geopolitical and domestic factors that led to these transformative events, which have disrupted fifty years of autocratic rule and more than 14 years of conflict. This new domestic path for the country must be analyzed through the issues of regional and international order, as the intertwining of the domestic and international dimensions represent the uniqueness of the Syrian case. From the domestic setting… The Assad regime, established after Hafiz al-Assad’s 1970 coup and led by Bashar al-Assad since 2000, has been characterized by both continuity and change compared to its predecessor. Hallmarks of this regime include strong personalism, carefully selected elites loyal to the president, an extensive apparatus of control and repression, the exclusion of minorities from governance, and a disregard for human rights. Economic and social reforms have been largely absent, fueling widespread dissatisfaction in the country. Bashar al-Assad’s ascent to power in 2000 initially raised hopes for reform. Following thirty years of Hafiz al-Assad’s unchallenged rule, many viewed the younger Assad, with his Western education and modern image, as a potential catalyst for change. Early in his tenure, Bashar managed to position Syria between two blocs: the "Western bloc," represented by France—the country’s former colonial ruler—and the United States, and the “Eastern bloc,” composed of longstanding partners like Russia and Iran. This diplomatic balancing act was short-lived, with hopes of modernization fading by the mid-2000s after the so-called “Damascus Spring”. The optimism that briefly emerged during the "Damascus Spring" gave way to renewed public frustration, setting the stage for the 2011 uprisings. This dissatisfaction reached a tipping point in March 2011 when civilian protests erupted as part of the broader wave of uprisings across the region. The so-called “Arab Spring” — a term often discarded by scholars for oversimplifying and overlooking the longstanding political struggles in Arab societies well before 2011 — provided the backdrop for Syrians to demand reform. … To the international factors: the internationalization of conflict The 2011 protests against the Assad regime, driven by widespread grievances over corruption, economic stagnation, sectarian divides, and political exclusion, were swiftly met with brutal repression. This response fragmented the opposition and prevented coordinated nationwide mobilization. The regime’s strategy of divide-and-rule proved critical in suppressing dissent. By the summer of 2011, cracks began to appear within Assad's security forces. Significant defections within the Syrian army led to the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a coalition of armed opposition groups. Initially focused on protecting civilians from government forces, the FSA gradually transitioned to liberating key urban centers, including Homs, Suwayda, Idlib, and Aleppo. However, a lack of unified leadership and coherent strategy hindered their efforts, leaving the opposition vulnerable to internal divisions and external manipulation. The fragmented opposition soon became a battleground for regional and international interests. While the Assad regime received consistent military and financial support from Moscow and Tehran, the opposition garnered backing from a range of external actors. The United States and European countries provided limited financial and diplomatic support but avoided direct military involvement, wary of repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), or contemporary Libya (post 2011). Meanwhile, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar supported opposition factions, albeit inconsistently due to internal rivalries. Turkey, a major regional player, capitalized on the conflict to pursue its strategic interests, particularly in northern Syria. The emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) between 2014 and 2019 added a new layer of complexity to the conflict, prompting an international US-led coalition to intervene under the banner of counterterrorism. By 2020, a tenuous agreement between Russia and Turkey brought relative calm to northern Syria. Efforts at normalization, including Syria’s reintegration into the Arab League in 2023, seemed to signal a détente among regional powers. However, the outbreak of violence in October 2023, sparked by renewed tensions between Israel and Palestinian resistance groups, reignited regional instability. This volatile environment has distracted Assad’s allies, further weakening his regime’s hold on power. Russia remains embroiled in its war against Ukraine, Hezbollah has a fragile truce with Israel, and Iran is preoccupied with its broader regional agenda – mainly focused on preserving the influence zone that connects it to Syria, Lebanon and Hezbollah in an effort to deter the Israeli rival. These shifting dynamics illustrate the deep interconnection between domestic upheavals and international geopolitics in the Middle East, where state actors’ interests and identities are inextricably intertwined. The Domino Effect: The Swift Fall of Bashar al-Assad   The peak of domestic instability and shifting regional dynamics set the stage for a decisive series of events over the past two weeks. Rebel groups based in the northern cities of Aleppo and Idlib launched an offensive against the Syrian army, which was weakened by years of conflict and lacked the necessary support from its Russian ally. The insurgents swiftly captured key urban centers in the north, including Aleppo and Idlib, before advancing south along the M5 highway, Syria’s principal north-south route. Within days, they seized control of Hama and Homs, arriving in Damascus between December 7 and 8. The rapid fall of Damascus marked the end of Bashar al-Assad’s rule. The president fled to Russia, seeking asylum from his strongest ally. This dramatic development was facilitated by Turkey, which had long maintained a "buffer zone" in northern Syria. Since 2020, anti-government cells in Idlib and Aleppo, many supported by Turkey, had established de facto control over the region. This proximity to the Turkish border, combined with Ankara’s concerns over the Kurdish presence in northeastern Syria and the burden of hosting more than three million Syrian refugees, made northern Syria a focal point of Turkey’s foreign policy. The composition of anti-government forces underscores the complexity of the opposition. Although the term "rebels" is often used as a blanket descriptor, these groups are far from homogeneous. In Idlib and Aleppo, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist group formerly affiliated with al-Qaeda, played a prominent role alongside Turkish-backed factions such as the Free Syrian Army. Despite their divergent ideologies and goals, these groups temporarily united to achieve a common objective: the ousting of the Assad regime. Following Assad’s departure, Syria faces significant uncertainty. While insurgents and civilians celebrated the fall of the regime that had ruled with an iron fist for over five decades, doubts remain about the country’s ability to construct an inclusive and stable governance model. Seeking to mitigate the risk of chaos, former Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali and other ministers have stayed in Syria, assuring members of the public that state institutions will continue to function during the transition. In coordination with Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader of HTS, al-Jalali appointed Mohammed al-Bashir to head a transitional government. Al-Bashir, who previously led the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib, is tasked with overseeing the transition until conditions allow for free and inclusive elections. Al-Bashir's political trajectory remains uncertain, as do his connections to the HTS leadership that spearheaded the offensive from the north. Previously, he held a managerial role at the state-owned Syrian Gas Company, part of the petroleum ministry. However, since 2022, he has served as development minister and later as prime minister within the HTS-controlled Idlib administration. Now, Al-Bashir faces the formidable challenge of navigating Syria's future. His role demands fostering dialogue not only among the country's diverse domestic factions but also with international stakeholders invested in shaping Syria’s trajectory. His ability to mediate these complex dynamics will be critical to the country's prospects for stability and reconstruction. The current Syrian Transitional Government includes those same ministers who served within the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), the governing body in the northern region of the country that has remained outside the control of the Assad regime for several years. This institution is affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group responsible for launching recent special operations two weeks ago. The Transitional Government is tasked with maintaining the functionality of state institutions for at least 18 months, including 6 months to draft a new constitution, until new elections. Despite widespread celebrations among Syrians at home and abroad, the challenges ahead are immense. The return of nearly six million refugees will be crucial for shaping the country’s governance. Reforming state institutions, which have long been hollowed out to serve a narrow circle of power, will require reforms to foster inclusivity and representation. Moreover, dismantling the sectarianism entrenched by decades of Alawite dominance will be critical to establishing a unified and equitable society. The Alawite community, a branch of Shi'ism, constitutes a minority within Syria, where approximately 70 percent of the population is Sunni. Other groups, including Druze, Kurds, Christians, and Shi'a, further contribute to the country's diverse social fabric. The Assad family, part from the Alawite community, has historically leveraged its minority status to escape the marginalization typically faced by this group within Syria's social hierarchy. Since Hafiz al-Assad's presidency, the regime has systematically exploited sectarian tactics to fragment and weaken the opposition, consolidating its hold on power. This strategy, however, does not imply broad benefits for the Alawite community as a whole. Instead, Instead, the Assad regime has selectively co-opted elites from various communities, including Sunni economic elites, to secure its rule. These alliances reveal how sectarian divisions were less about communities’ empowerment and more about pragmatic power consolidation. The regime’s resilience relied not on sectarian favoritism alone but on the strategic inclusion of individuals whose political or economic clout could bolster its survival, irrespective of their sectarian affiliation. Thus, sectarianism and co-optation in Syria have functioned as two interdependent pillars of the Assad regime's strategy, illustrating how identity politics were instrumentalized to maintain power rather than to promote the interests of any specific community. The road to rebuilding Syria as a cohesive, democratic, and prosperous state will be arduous, demanding careful navigation of deep-rooted political, social, and economic divisions. What’s Next for Syria and the MENA Region: The Future of the Geopolitical Context Under the current circumstances, it is imperative to critically analyze the factors leading to the end of the Assad era while considering their implications for Syria and the broader Middle East. Although geopolitical predictions are inherently uncertain, exploring potential regional consequences provides valuable insights. Among regional actors, Turkey appears to have emerged as a significant beneficiary of Assad’s fall. Leveraging its unique position as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, Ankara has adeptly advanced its foreign policy objectives throughout the Syrian conflict. The creation of a buffer zone within northern Syria, the hosting of over three million Syrian refugees, and its opposition to both the Assad regime and Kurdish aspirations in northeastern Syria have allowed Turkey to consolidate its influence. This approach has bolstered Ankara’s role as an indispensable actor in Syria’s transition process. Moreover, Turkey’s involvement in moderating factions such as HTS during the Astana Process highlights its ability to navigate the complexities of the conflict while safeguarding its strategic interests. In recent years, Turkey has adeptly positioned itself between two blocs: its NATO allies and Assad’s international backers, Russia and Iran. Ankara’s strategic acumen lies in its ability to advance its foreign policy objectives in Syria and the broader region by capitalizing on the indecision and ambiguity of its Western allies while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic ties with Moscow and Teheran. Through its participation in negotiations aimed at stabilizing Syria, Turkey has managed to mediate between these divergent actors, a role that underscores its complex motivations and foreign policy choices. This balancing has, at times, placed Turkey at odds with its NATO allies, especially as Kurdish troops have been backed by the US to fight ISIS, bolstering tensions instead of a common plan for stability in the region. Moreover, Ankara notably focused (and still focuses) on weakening Kurdish forces in northern Syria, which are supported by the United States as key partners in the anti-ISIS campaign. This divergence highlights Turkey’s prioritization of its national security concerns, particularly regarding the Kurdish issue, over alignment with broader NATO objectives. Turkey’s dual positioning has solidified its role as a pivotal actor in the Syrian conflict. Ankara’s influence now extends not only to shaping Syria’s domestic dynamics but also to maintaining diplomatic channels between Assad’s international sponsors, its own strategic interests, and those of NATO allies, including the United States. The latter remains intent on preserving its presence in the region as a counterbalance to Russian and Iranian influence. The situation in northeastern Syria presents a critical challenge. Rich in natural resources like oil and water, this region remains under the influence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-majority coalition that has maintained semi-autonomous governance. Ankara views the SDF’s affiliation with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), a group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey and several Western countries, as a direct threat. Managing this tension will be central to Turkey’s regional strategy. To the south, Israel has taken a more assertive stance, penetrating Syrian territory for the first time since 1973 (excluding the contested Golan Heights). According to reports from some Israeli media outlets, Assad’s fall poses a significant question mark for Tel Aviv, as 'for better or worse, Assad was the devil Israel knew.' While Syria and Israel have long maintained strained relations, Bashar al-Assad’s presidency was marked by decades of relative border stability. His removal thus introduces both opportunities and risks for Israel’s strategic interests. On the one hand, Assad’s departure could weaken the ties between Iran and its regional allies, including Syria, Iraq, and Hezbollah. Over the last days, Israel has conducted over 300 airstrikes targeting Syrian military facilities to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of extremist groups. Thus, Assad’s fall represents an opportunity to weaken Iran’s regional influence, particularly its support for Hezbollah in an effort to undermine the so-called ‘axis of evil’ — an imaginary line of continuity linking Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Hezbollah within a strategically area influencing regional and international stability. On the other, the transition in Syria could pave the way for Islamist rebel factions to gain a foothold in the country’s new governance structure. Israel has consistently voiced concerns over a political void in Syria, viewing such developments as a potential threat to its security and regional position. Russia, a longtime ally of Assad, now faces the challenge of recalibrating its position. While providing asylum to Assad, Moscow remains deeply invested in maintaining its strategic foothold in Syria, particularly its naval base in Tartus – Russia’s only outpost in the Mediterranean See - and airbase in Latakia. The Kremlin has assured its readiness to engage with Syria’s new leadership, aiming to preserve its military settlements and prevent further destabilization in the region. Western countries have adopted a cautious approach. European nations have voiced support for the Syrian people in their efforts to transition away from Assad’s dictatorship, but direct involvement remains limited. Meanwhile, newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump has reiterated an isolationist foreign policy stance, emphasizing that Syria’s future is a matter for Syrians to resolve, while blaming the Kremlin for abandoning its main partner in the region. Throughout the Syrian crisis, the United States has maintained an ambiguous and fluctuating role. While its most notable intervention occurred during the campaign against the Islamic State, where it provided military support—including airstrikes and training—to Kurdish militias, this backing was later curtailed during the first Trump presidency. The subsequent reduction in U.S. involvement granted Turkey greater room for maneuver in northern Syria. In recent days, coinciding with the final stretch of his presidency, Biden remarked that the U.S. approach had influenced the regional balance, prompting the administration to reassess its engagement in Syria. However, there is no evidence of direct support or coordination between Washington and the HTS-led rebel groups responsible for the recent offensive. Despite its cautious stance, the United States has not remained passive. Shortly before the rebel operations, Washington carried out airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Syrian militias in response to an attack on the Shaddadi base. Additionally, U.S. forces conducted special operations against remnants of the Islamic State, seeking to prevent the group from exploiting the power void created by Assad's fall. The U.S. strategy appears to navigate a middle ground between Biden’s and Trump’s policies. This approach aims to simultaneously weaken Iran’s regional influence and Russia’s global positioning, protect its Israeli ally, and sustain some degree of leadership in the region. Conclusion The situation in Syria remains extraordinarily complex. The country is grappling with the enduring consequences of a civil conflict that has spanned over a decade, while simultaneously transitioning towards a new phase of political, social, and economic reconstruction after more than fifty years of governance by the Assad family. Central to this process is the need to foster dialogue among key domestic actors, including civilians, various rebel factions, and the entrenched institutional establishment. In this context, the reintegration of millions of refugees and internally displaced people is particularly crucial, as they constitute a significant portion of the Syrian population and must be empowered to contribute to the creation of a free and more inclusive society. Equally critical is the role of international actors who have intervened to varying degrees throughout the conflict. Their continued engagement and dialogue are essential in preventing the emergence of a power vacuum, which could exacerbate radicalization and threaten the stability of the broader region. As Syria enters a new phase of uncertainty, its future remains tied to the interplay of regional and international forces. Addressing longstanding grievances, fostering inclusive governance, and rebuilding the social fabric will require a delicate balance of domestic and foreign cooperation. For the MENA region, the fall of Assad signals not only a shift in Syrian politics but also a potential realignment of regional power dynamics, the outcomes of which will reverberate for years to come. ## The European and Transatlantic Awakening URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-european-and-transatlantic-awakening/ Modified: 2023-01-09 > European and Transatlantic Awakening. Get the book The New Forms of War, the second volume of the new Rubicon collection! Get the book The European and Transatlantic Awakening, the third volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in French only. A new generation of renowned experts and informed observers of the current operations delivers here their enlightened points of view, accessible to the public at large and accompanied by a rich infographic. The various contributions in this book are from the French-speaking platform of analysis of international issues Le Rubicon. Le Rubicon will publish small books aimed at the general public, which will address, clearly and precisely, the new burning issues related to international news. Each month, starting in April 2022, Les Équateurs will publish a book of approximately 128 to 144 pages, at a price of 10 to 12 euros, summarizing the work of the experts of the Le Rubicon platform. European and Transatlantic Awakening ## The Failed Attempt to Withdraw Canadian Troops From NATO and the Lessons for Mark Carney URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-failed-attempt-to-withdraw-canadian-troops-from-nato-and-the-lessons-for-mark-carney/ Modified: 2026-07-09 This brief is part of the Strategic Analysis Network’ special Back to the Future essay series, which was financed through a grant from the Department of National Defence’s MINDS program. Introduction On 20 April 1968, following the resignation of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, Pierre Elliott Trudeau took the helm of the Canadian government with the explicit intention of challenging the foundations of the foreign policy inherited from his predecessors. Just three days after taking office, he called a general election and swiftly announced the launch of a comprehensive review of Canadian foreign policy. This initiative went far beyond a mere administrative reorganisation: it aimed to challenge the fundamental assumptions that had guided Canada’s international policy for nearly two decades, notably the maintenance of a military contingent of around 10,000 troops deployed in Europe on a continuous basis since 1951 and membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). For Trudeau, defence policy should stem from foreign policy priorities, and not the other way round. In other words, it is not Canada’s commitment to NATO that should determine the general direction of its foreign policy, but rather a prior definition of national interests and capabilities. During the election campaign of May–June 1968, Trudeau described NATO as a ‘relic of the 1950s’ and publicly questioned the relevance of maintaining a ‘strong military presence’ in Europe. He argued for a reorientation of Canada’s strategic priorities towards North America and for greater decision-making autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. However, in December 1969, following eighteen months of in-depth review, the Trudeau government adopted a policy that instead confirmed the continuation of Canada’s commitment to NATO, whilst nevertheless announcing a reduction in troop numbers from 10,000 to 5,000. This policy brief examines Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s attempt at strategic autonomy, which sought to free Canadian defence policy from its structural dependence on NATO and the United States. Despite a majority government and considerable political capital, this endeavour yielded only modest results: a reduction in troop numbers from 10,000 to 5,000, well short of the radical transformation initially envisaged. Its legacy, however, is best assessed over the longer term. More than half a century later, Canada has still not undertaken a comprehensive review of its foreign policy, limiting itself to exercises confined to defence policy. This institutional trajectory suggests that the Trudeauist vision—which involves subordinating defence commitments to national interests rather than alliance imperatives—has gradually become the implicit assumption of the Canadian government apparatus, without ever having been fully translated into action in the short and medium term. Nevertheless, structural dependence on the United States and NATO remains a key issue in 2026. At a time when Prime Minister Mark Carney, in turn, aspires to reshape Canada’s strategic relationship with the United States and consolidate Canadian decision-making autonomy against a backdrop of growing bilateral tensions, Trudeau’s experience nevertheless constitutes an instructive precedent. The obstacles to a reorientation of defence policy in the short and medium term are structural in nature, persistent, and capable of eroding even the most robust mandates. An analysis of the bureaucratic, allied and political constraints that limited Trudeau’s room for manoeuvre thus helps to identify the pitfalls to be avoided and the preconditions for the feasibility of a genuine strategic reorientation. Internationalist Orthodoxy and its Challengers Canada’s post-war foreign policy coalesced around a dominant consensus, developed under the government of Prime Minister Louis St Laurent between 1948 and 1951, with Lester B. Pearson serving as Secretary of State for External Affairs. This internationalist orthodoxy was based on several central principles: active engagement within multilateral institutions, notably NATO; the conviction that Canada’s security was inextricably linked to that of the international community; and the belief that Canada could exert disproportionate influence through its role as a mediator and ‘middle power’ on the world stage. This approach is also based on the observation that the national territory remains relatively sheltered from direct threats, at least those over which Canada would have any agency. Canadian foreign policy after the Second World War was firmly rooted in a transatlantic axis (NATO), an internationalist commitment (UN) and a significant bilateral continental relationship (or integration) with the United States. This consensus is supported and perpetuated by a particularly cohesive bureaucracy. The Department of External Affairs, comprising some 200 civil servants from largely homogeneous social and educational backgrounds, thus exercised a decisive and rarely challenged influence over the formulation of foreign policy. Although John Diefenbaker’s Progressive-Conservative government (1957–1963) challenged certain elements of this orthodoxy, its attempts at reform remained limited and did not undermine the fundamental assumptions of this internationalism. Pearson’s return to power in 1963, this time as Prime Minister, revitalised this framework, although the constraints of a minority government and the changing strategic environment limited his room for manoeuvre. The arrival of Pierre Elliott Trudeau marked an intellectual and political break with this tradition. His education, shaped in particular by his time in Paris after the Second World War, exposed him to European debates on the emergence of a ‘third force’ seeking to transcend the binary logic of the Cold War. At the Institut d’études politiques and in circles associated with journals such as Esprit and Le Monde, Trudeau developed a conceptual critique of this ideological dualism. He rejected both communism and orthodox anti-communism, refusing, in his own words, to “be enlisted in either of the totalitarianisms” and denouncing the “dangerous” division of humanity into antagonistic blocs. These convictions were already evident during his time at the Privy Council Office between 1949 and 1951. Under the Louis St. Laurent government, Trudeau opposed Canadian participation in the Korean War and the rapid deployment of Canadian forces to Europe from 1951 onwards, which he interpreted as manifestations of an automatic alignment with US leadership. Elected as an MP in 1965 and appointed Minister of Justice in 1967, he quickly became one of the most articulate critics of this defence orthodoxy, questioning ‘the futility of much of our military effort’. Trudeau was not, however, alone in this challenge. A left-wing faction within the Liberal Party, led by former Finance Minister Walter Gordon, mounted the most serious challenge to the post-war consensus. This group included members of Pearson’s cabinet, such as Allan MacEachen and Edgar Benson, as well as Quebec MPs Jean Marchand and Gérard Pelletier, close associates and personal friends of Trudeau. Together, they argued that Canadian defence policy needed to be reassessed in order to reduce its dependence on the United States and to rethink Canada’s participation in NATO and NORAD. In 1967, Gordon brought together Trudeau, Marchand and senior civil servants, including Marcel Cadieux and Basil Robinson, to argue that the economic recovery in Europe now rendered Canada’s military presence on the continent excessive.  Reform and Bureaucratic Resistance On 15 May 1968, three weeks after Trudeau came to power and in the midst of the election campaign, the Cabinet endorsed a recommendation from the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning to launch a comprehensive review of Canadian Armed Forces policy. The directive called for an examination of alternative force structures, their costs and the available strategic options, with a report due by mid-July. This decision established the institutional framework for the reorientation sought by the new Prime Minister. The election victory of 25 June 1968, which gave the Liberals a comfortable majority of 155 seats out of 264, considerably strengthened Trudeau’s political mandate. He argued that the international strategic environment had changed profoundly since the Second World War and that Europe no longer required the maintenance of a ‘strong military presence’ by Canada to ensure its security. Some observers, particularly in academic circles, believed that Canada’s military commitment in Europe had little real influence among allies, given the lack of particularly close economic or cultural ties with the continent. This view is also widely echoed in public opinion, although popular support varies depending on the issues at stake. Polling data indicates that a clear majority of Canadians, nearly 74 per cent, want a foreign policy that is more independent of the United States, a sentiment that is particularly pronounced among Liberal voters. A comparable proportion opposes maintaining US access to Canadian bases and airspace, revealing a nationalist current on which Trudeau can legitimately rely to justify his review process. The issue of European military disengagement, however, elicits more divided responses: around a third of respondents say they favour the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Europe and consider the level of military forces excessive, whilst a majority remain committed to these commitments. Trudeau thus had a real base of support, but one insufficient to claim an unequivocal popular mandate in favour of withdrawal from NATO, even though, here again, Liberal voters were significantly more receptive to this stance than the electorate as a whole. Trudeau’s political vision, however, met with marked institutional resistance within the Department of External Affairs. As early as the beginning of 1968, even before Trudeau’s election as leader of the Liberal Party, the department produced an internal study explicitly recommending the retention of Canadian forces in Europe. Its author, Norman Robertson, was no ordinary observer. A senior career civil servant and one of the principal architects of Canada’s post-war internationalist stance, he embodied precisely the orthodoxy that Trudeau sought to challenge. Robertson concluded that neutrality was impractical and that Canada’s international influence depended on its commitment to NATO. His reasoning is based on a logic of reciprocity: Canada’s military presence in Europe constitutes the bargaining chip that gives Ottawa a seat at the table of the major Western powers and enables it to exert influence on issues extending far beyond the strictly military sphere. Withdrawing these forces would therefore amount to voluntarily depriving Canada of the levers of influence upon which its international status has rested since 1949. This analysis reflects a deeply rooted conviction within the Canadian bureaucracy, namely the idea that European military engagement is not an end in itself, but the structural foundation of Canada’s diplomatic clout on the world stage. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Marcel Cadieux, plays a central role in this resistance. A career civil servant closely associated with internationalist and Atlanticist orthodoxy, Cadieux viewed Trudeau’s positions as excessively idealistic, even dangerous. Using his privileged access to the Prime Minister and his control over the flow of information, he helped to slow down and steer the review process. The documents submitted to Trudeau systematically highlighted the diplomatic risks of a withdrawal, the political costs vis-à-vis allies, and the resulting loss of international influence. This resistance, discreet but persistent, forced the Prime Minister to operate within a bureaucratic environment largely hostile to his reform objectives. Allied Pressure and the Constraints of Alliances At the same time, NATO partners, in particular the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, were exerting sustained diplomatic pressure to ensure Canada remained committed. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 significantly strengthened the case for maintaining Western forces in Europe. It should be noted, however, that this event was only able to exert such a decisive influence because the review process was still ongoing at the time of the crisis. Bureaucratic resistance and external pressures are therefore not independent factors: it was precisely the institutional slowdown of the process, fuelled by the discreet opposition of the Department of External Affairs, that opened a window of opportunity in which international events were able to shift the political balance of power in favour of the status quo. The ability of bureaucratic apparatuses to delay reforms thus constitutes, in itself, a mechanism of resistance to change. Washington made it clear to Ottawa that a Canadian withdrawal would be interpreted as a signal of Western disengagement likely to encourage other allies to reduce their contributions, at a time when the US military effort was heavily tied up in the Vietnam War. Germany expressed similar concerns, stressing that a Canadian withdrawal would weaken its defensive posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. London, engaged in its own force reductions for budgetary reasons, feared a knock-on effect among European allies. This pressure manifested itself through various diplomatic channels: bilateral exchanges, interventions at NATO meetings and informal contacts between senior officials. The Trudeau government thus found itself faced with a strategic dilemma: a withdrawal risked isolating Canada within the Alliance and reducing its influence on other issues, whilst maintaining the commitment contradicted the Prime Minister’s election promises and intellectual vision. Internal Divisions and Parliamentary Opposition Tensions were not confined to the international arena. Within the Cabinet, divisions ran deep. A faction led by Walter Gordon, Jean Marchand and Gérard Pelletier continued to advocate a substantial reduction, or even a complete withdrawal, of Canadian forces from Europe, whilst other ministers, notably those responsible for defence and foreign affairs, favoured continuity. Mitchell Sharp, appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1968, gradually adopted a cautious stance, warning of the diplomatic consequences of a rapid withdrawal. In the House of Commons, opposition was vigorous and cross-party. Robert Stanfield’s Progressive Conservative Party denounced any reduction as a weakening of Western security and a dereliction of Canada’s international responsibilities, arguing that NATO remained ‘the West’s best instrument of collective defence’. Even the New Democratic Party, though critical of the Atlantic Alliance, was reluctant to support a complete withdrawal, favouring instead a gradual transition towards a more inclusive and political collective security system in the context of détente between the two blocs. The parliamentary debates of April 1969, following the announcement of the reduction of Canadian forces from 10,000 to 5,000 troops, once again highlighted these divisions. The Conservatives described the decision as “one of the gravest errors in Canadian foreign policy”, arguing that it came at an inopportune moment. Although the Liberal majority made any institutional challenge unlikely, the debate imposed real political costs by publicly framing the reduction in forces as a strategic error, thereby restricting the Prime Minister’s room for manoeuvre. The Compromise: A Reduction, But the Commitment Remains Faced with bureaucratic, allied and political constraints, Trudeau accepted a compromise that fell well short of his initial ambitions. On 3 April 1969, he announced that Canada would remain a member of NATO, ruling out any option for neutrality or non-alignment. This decision was accompanied by a reordering of defence policy priorities, in which national sovereignty and continental defence took precedence over the commitment to NATO and peacekeeping missions. This prioritisation aimed to reconcile the desire to reduce costs and strategic dependence with the need to preserve Canada’s international credibility. The publication in 1970 of the document Foreign Policy in the Service of Canadians institutionalised this approach. Structured around six priorities—sovereignty and independence, peace and security, social justice, quality of life, harmony with the environment and economic prosperity—the document presents NATO as an important but not exclusive pillar of Canadian security policy. It states in particular that ‘Canada can contribute effectively to international peace and security only if it preserves its independence of judgement and action’, signalling a persistent desire to maintain a critical distance from Atlantic orthodoxy. Trudeau sought to subordinate policy towards NATO to foreign policy rather than the other way round. In practice, however, Canada remains closely integrated into NATO structures. Admittedly, Trudeau has managed to achieve other significant breaks, notably the withdrawal of US nuclear missiles from Canadian soil. However, on the specific issue of Canada’s stance within the Atlantic Alliance—which is the subject of this analysis—Trudeau’s experience illustrates the structural limitations faced even by a Prime Minister with a strong mandate and a reformist agenda when seeking to fundamentally transform Canada’s collective defence commitments. Lessons From Trudeau’s Failure for the Carney Government Rapidly institutionalizing public support Trudeau’s failure shows that even a majority mandate and high levels of public support are not enough to transform defence policy unless political capital is swiftly converted into irreversible institutional decisions. The publication, on 17 February 2026, of Canada’s first Defence Industrial Strategy reflects, in part, a willingness to learn this lesson. Indeed, whilst a significant proportion of the support for this rapid increase in military capabilities is linked to the polarising figure of Trump, 89% of Canadians believe that the defence industry can benefit the wider economy. In doing so, by linking rearmament to the creation of local jobs—notably through the target of increasing the share of procurement awarded to Canadian companies to 70% and the promise of 125,000 jobs over ten years—the Carney government is seeking to build a coalition of sustainable economic interests in favour of military investment. The creation of the Defence Investment Agency, designed to centralise and accelerate procurement, also aims to establish an institutional reality. This approach, however, faces a tension that Trudeau’s experience has made all too familiar. Whilst the Carney government professes a desire to reduce Canada’s dependence on the United States and to diversify defence partnerships, the Canadian Armed Forces remain deeply integrated into the bilateral relationship with Washington, on which interoperability, access to cutting-edge capabilities and the conduct of major operations depend. The cautious wording of the Strategy, which simultaneously affirms the priority given to Canadian suppliers and the desire to maintain a strong Canada-US defence relationship, betrays this unresolved tension. This defence policy under Carney thus suggests a civil-military tension that could hinder the implementation of the government’s objectives. The risk is that this ambiguity, comparable to that which paralysed Trudeau’s review between reformist zeal and institutional resistance, will gradually dilute the initial political momentum. Anticipating allied pressure to avoid diplomatic isolation In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Trudeau found himself largely isolated in the face of a united Western front, unable to anticipate the pressure from Washington, London and Bonn, which was intensified by the Czechoslovak crisis. Today, Carney finds himself in a markedly different context: the United States will seek to maintain Canadian dependence through trade and interoperability requirements, but unlike in the 1960s, the sustained erosion of transatlantic trust is leading many European and Indo-Pacific allies to seek to diversify their own defence partnerships and supply chains. Canada’s participation in the European Union’s Readiness 2030 programme, the signing of further defence partnerships, and the consideration of a mixed fleet of F-35 and Gripen fighters all illustrate this approach to diversification through concrete commitments. More broadly, the development of targeted mini-lateral coalitions, notably with the United Kingdom, the Nordic and Baltic countries, or certain Indo-Pacific partners, would enable Canada to wield collective leverage and create faits accomplis. This convergence offers Canada a window of opportunity that Trudeau did not have: the chance to embed its diversification within a collective movement rather than appearing to act alone. Image Credit: Chiloa, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons ## The Future of Cooperation with Russia: Challenges and Opportunities URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-future-of-cooperation-with-russia-challenges-and-opportunities/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > The relationship between Russia and the West has often been articulated under several prisms ranging from cooperation... The relationship between Russia and the West has often been articulated under several prisms ranging from cooperation, mistrust and in some areas competition. For the past decade, we have witnessed a re-engagement of Russia in several geographical areas that are not particularly part of its traditional zone of influence, as well as a greater proactivity in the field of hybrid warfare. In a context where the international community is struggling to put up a united front in the face of these multiple issues, what are the challenges and opportunities for the West, and Canada in particular, in articulating its cooperation with Russia? Hosted by: -Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, fellow et conseiller principal en communications et partenariats au CÉRIUM Guest Speakers: Igor Delanoë, Directeur adjoint de l'Observatoire franco-russe Emmanuelle Rousseau, Doctorante, Département de science politique, Université de Montréal ## The geopolitical future of La Francophonie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-geopolitical-future-of-la-francophonie/ Modified: 2022-06-02 > In the era of globalisation, cultural uniformity around Anglo-Americanism is perceived as a guarantee of modernity... note: French language with English subtitles. In the era of globalisation, cultural uniformity around Anglo-Americanism is perceived as a guarantee of modernity. The relative domination of the Anglo-Saxon model or, in reaction, that of China, seems to leave no room for the emergence of an alternative model that could fully compete with them. Unsuspected, the "vocation of La Francophonie is essentially geopolitical". Despite what its name suggests, the International Organisation of La Francophonie is an institution whose vocation goes beyond the mere fact of having French in common. With its 88 member states and governments, the OIF is also a geopolitical space and is formally involved in economic, political, peace and security issues. But to ensure its leadership on the international scene, La Francophonie must define new priorities and develop new strategies in order to go beyond the framework of a cultural union and develop its other vocations. Moderator: -Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, Fellow and Senior Advisor in Communications and Partnerships at CÉRIUM Speakers : -André Abel Barry, Head of the "Peace and Stability" Unit, Political Affairs and Democratic Governance Directorate at the OIF; member of the RAS Scientific Council -Niagalé Bagayoko, President of the African Security Sector Network and RAS collaborator. She previously led the OIF's Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Programme. In conjunction with the CÉRIUM (Centre for International Studies and Research)   English Subtitles translated by: Marie Paquin ## The Geopolitical Impacts of COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-geopolitical-impacts-of-covid-19/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > COVID-19 has geopolitical impacts, including strengthening the state and its vulnerabilities, great power competition and disinformation operations. The COVID-19 pandemic has considerable geopolitical impacts. It acts as a catalyst on several security and defence issues. This strategic note focusses mainly on three of them: 1) strengthening the state and its vulnerabilities in a context of de-globalisation, 2) accelerating competition between major powers, 3) as well as aggressive disinformation operations. We conclude with a series of recommendations for Canada. Strengthening the State and its Vulnerabilities The pandemic is helping to strengthen the traditional role of the state as protector of its people against external threats. By viewing COVID-19 as a source of insecurity and a lethal threat to its citizens, the state has had less difficulty in justifying and imposing extraordinary measures to deal with it, whether democratic or not. Its sovereign prerogatives were thus reinforced. On the other hand, the pandemic has exacerbated the internal vulnerabilities already faced by some states. In several federal states, disputes have arisen between different levels of government over the allocation of protective equipment. This tension between vulnerability and reinforcement is particularly felt in Europe. The European Union (EU) has suffered from its weaknesses, including risky decision-making and health policies depending exclusively on the member states. On the other hand, the EU could just as easily emerge strengthened after the COVID-19 pandemic. It could prove particularly effective in putting together a comprehensive response to the pandemic. Faced with the United States disengaging from multilateralism, including from the WHO in full pandemic management, the EU would be well advised to promote multilateral mechanisms to deal with the pandemic. By proposing an integral and interstate approach to crisis management, the EU could take advantage of this opportunity to re-establish its legitimacy in a new era of international cooperation. More generally, the whole model of neoliberal globalisation is challenged by the pandemic. In these times of health crisis, the interdependence underlying globalisation is perceived as contrary to essential national interests. Faced with this concern, we could expect a relocation of certain production sites deemed essential, as well as an increase in measures to control human travel at the borders. Health security, and biosecurity more broadly, will emerge as key sectors of national security. Like 9/11, the pandemic is treated as an existential threat and has fueled warlike rhetoric to confront it; it also legitimized a number of exceptional measures restricting individual freedoms. Heightened Great Power Politics The COVID-19 pandemic has not changed the nature of strategic competition between the major powers. On the contrary, it has fueled more aggressive rivalry between the blocs, by exacerbating existing tensions and by introducing new forms of competition. On the one hand, the inconsistent handling of the pandemic in the United States and its abdication from its traditional leadership role has eroded international trust in the country. On the other hand, China and Russia present themselves as having the situation under control while resorting to increased cyber and industrial espionage. However, China’s inability to manage the epidemic on its territory and the aggressiveness of its actions risk undermining its soft power. In addition, increased Chinese influence in the Pacific could be compromised by China’s economic difficulties after COVID-19, resulting in a decrease in Chinese aid and presence in the Pacific and beyond. America’s disengagement and the rise of China pose serious challenges for democracies. They must adopt a common approach to manage American unilateralism and the increasingly assertive rise of China, while maintaining a certain flexibility to preserve international stability. Aggressive Disinformation Operations Disinformation has played a significant role during the pandemic. For example, disinformation about how to protect and care for oneself poses significant health risks, as it feeds the drug trade or can lead to shortages of certain essential drugs for certain conditions. Disinformation can further undermine the stability of a society and the authorities' efforts to fight the pandemic, in particular by discrediting government and scientific authorities. These disinformation operations have led to the emergence of many conspiracy theories on the origins of the virus, challenges to containment measures, mistrust of Western democracies, future vaccines or the process of collecting personal information and other measures linked to contact tracing. The strengthening of ties between Russia, China and Iran in this type of disinformation operation is indeed noticeable. Finally, the pandemic could represent a major turning point for intelligence. Health risks have been considered as security issues by intelligence services for many years, without making them their priority. Intelligence services are therefore relatively ill-prepared to prevent and respond to these health risks. This is bound to change. Intelligence has the potential to provide an early warning of health risks, enabling effective and informed decision-making. By redirecting operational intelligence, valuable information can be accessed. Recommendations for Canada The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified American national sovereignty. Combined with heightened Sino-American competition and an increased domestic role for the CAF, this leads to a rethinking of Canada’s stance in an increasingly multipolar world. Canada must adopt a position more independent from that of the United States, by seeking to rally the international community around common positions and to defend its interests resolutely. This involves exercising diplomatic leadership alongside democratic allies who share the same interests as Canada in order to preserve the liberal international order, as well as to avoid being trapped between Washington and Beijing. In particular, Canada should increase its defence cooperation with key partners such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. Canada also needs to reassess its force structure and national defence priorities. On the one hand, the pandemic led to a lull in CAF operations abroad, the cancellation of several exercises on the national territory and a redeployment to Canada to assist civil authorities. However, a lack of resources seems to limit the ability of the CAF to meet all domestic needs, whether related to COVID-19, floods or forest fires. The necessary prioritisation of domestic needs leads to a review of the allocation of CAF resources and operations. This must include challenging some of the assumptions that have guided Canadian defence policy to date, including the maintenance of multi-purpose forces. The budgetary austerity that will follow the COVID-19 crisis will require choices to be made; these must be strategic and well thought out. To this end, a foreign and defence policy review is needed, ideally led by a joint (House and Senate) parliamentary committee, with the input of experts, stakeholders and Canadians. A new foreign policy statement – and the defence policy that will follow from it – must seek to rally Canadians around a new consensus on Canada’s strategic orientation. Canada has not been spared from the information struggles linked to the search for pandemic cures and vaccines and to the disinformation efforts of the major powers. An additional effort must be placed on collection and analysis of health information capacities to improve prevention and provide relevant information for decision-making. The disinformation also impacted the CAF, suggesting an increased risk of the virus spreading among military personnel. Canada must therefore rethink its defence strategy to include health and pandemic risks and review its post-COVID-19 strategic positioning. Disinformation risks increasing the Canadian public’s distrust of political and scientific authorities by provoking movements against lockdowns, vaccination or medication related to the coronavirus, for example. To limit the effects of disinformation, the Defence Team should continue to use different social media platforms to inform Canadians about the pandemic, as well as increase its information verification capabilities or fund a third party to do it.   ## The Info War in Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-info-war-in-ukraine/ Modified: 2022-06-01 > This hot take argues that there is a Western vulnerability in the information space, and that learning from the war in Ukraine and its... Constructed as a heroic pilot, the ability of the Ghost of Kiev to make the Russian air force falter won over the minds of Western civilians. Surrounded by mystery, this avenging soldier was ultimately a myth constructed through images diverted from a video game. Nevertheless, in a society of immediacy, the message was viral enough to rekindle the resistance of the Ukrainian people. This communication strategy of the Ukrainian armed forces is symptomatic of an offensive use of information. The gradual transition to the information society has shifted the center of gravity of strategic action from the material terrain to the informational terrain. Thus, the fifth battlefield is becoming a privileged terrain for capitalizing on tactical successes, whether fabricated or real, in order to transform them into political victories. The war in Ukraine has nothing innovative on this point. Nevertheless, it has demonstrated the durability of the informational domain during armed conflicts and a very strong awareness of the strategic aspect of information. If the example of the Ukrainian aviator is anecdotal, the battle being played out on social networks and traditional media is much more concrete. The Kremlin, which had become a master in the art of informational manipulation in the framework of hybrid warfare, is now cornered on all fronts of this unconventional conflict space. As the invasion continues, informational maneuvers are raging in parallel with physical fighting. Facing the operational impasse and the failure of the blitzkrieg, the strategic redeployment of the Russian army on the Eastern Front could lead to a reversal of the moral balance of power. With this change in narrative, which is not without operational consequences, the scenario of the conflict reaching a stalemate could become a reality as Ukraine manages to convince the international community. If the outcome of the conflict remains more than uncertain, the information war led by the Kremlin is already a failure. After all, this is not Russia's first move into the information space. Moscow has very well understood that the use of unconventional instruments below the threshold of warfare, such as cognitive operations, overwhelms and weakens Western democracies. However, the recent strategic failures of the Russian informational machine provide a means to understand the changing political and informational ecosystem. Thus, there is a Western vulnerability in the information space, and learning from the war in Ukraine and its extension into the informational field will reduce the permeability of democratic regimes to digital interference. This text will conclude by proposing a set of recommendations for the community of democracies to respond effectively while preserving democratic values. The Vulnerability of the Transatlantic Community to the New Psychological Warfare The advent of information technology and cyberspace has redefined the nature of cognitive operations today. The control of images and information has always been part of conflicts, but the appearance of cyberwarfare, which supports more traditional instruments, provides an additional means to act on the physical world. From now on, far from being the sole responsibility of armies, cyberspace is prey to intangible wars that can be divided into two main categories. While cyberattacks aim at tapping into information systems or leaking data, information warfare stimulates a psychological struggle that is spreading like wildfire on social networks. Since the battlefield is no longer limited to the capture of key areas on the ground and direct confrontation with the Kremlin has been ruled out, it will be up to the transatlantic community to grasp all the foundations of information warfare. Russia has managed to enter the information space with flying colors. At the same time, NATO member states have also been significantly developing their strategic communications capabilities for several years. However, in the face of informational manipulation, the openness of Western democracies and the permeability it induces are still just as damaging. Therefore, democracies and its citizens are particularly vulnerable targets of this new kind of war. Between the interference in electoral processes and the digital manipulation that proliferates via the foot soldiers of disinformation, the public debate is poisoned. The digital revolution profoundly alters democracy and constitutes a powerful ferment of disruption. However, the dissemination of divisive information to destabilize and direct strategic decision-making towards one's own interests is as old as the Trojan horse. What is innovative are the technical possibilities that social networks offer for the proliferation of "weapons of mass distraction.” Eventually, democracy and its attributes should be considered as critical infrastructures in the same way as defence operators in the face of digital maneuvers. The Russian footprint in foreign interference against the electoral processes for the Brexit referendum or even during the U.S. presidential elections attests to the Kremlin's highly effective nuisance capabilities in cyberspace. Unlike these cyber-superpowers, Western intelligence entities have the responsibility to develop offensive capabilities within democratic beacons. This is obviously not the case for Chinese or Russian cyber commands, which operate without such boundaries. A strategic failure is emerging as democratic states develop cyber resilience capabilities to respond to relentless attacks by adversary states. The consensus among Western institutions is that “it is counterproductive to fight propaganda with propaganda.” Despite the efforts of NATO member states, through this defensive posture and offensive capabilities limited by democratic imperatives, the transatlantic community seems destined to fall behind in the conduct of influence operations. A New Security Situation: The Permanent War In the military domain, by avoiding the heavy toll of blood, disinformation allows for the personalization of the conflict and the narrative surrounding it. For example, the War on Terror is structural and justifies a certain operational course of action. At the same time, the emotional space is invested to arouse strong reactions from public opinion and create a state of irrationality. The images of Islamic State torture committed in the Levant helped to get the West on board with the global response in 2014. Yet the organization had been rampaging through a terrain it had dominated since the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. Finally, disinformation is part of a global logic of maintaining confusion and directing information flows for strategic purposes. However, this cognitive war, which aims to distort the vectors of information transmission, is not confined to periods of war and the West is struggling to grasp the scale of this challenge. A logic of permanent war then follows. Cyber aggression is not only deployed during conflicts, as attested by the manipulation of information during the Western elections. The methods of confrontation are evolving, targeted hostile acts are developing significantly in cyber space and finally blurring the distinction between peacetime and wartime. Informational manipulations format the receptivity of public opinion to create favorable conditions on the ground and thus improve the conduct of military operations. "The supreme weapon of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” To a certain extent, they make it possible to make the enemy bend before the use of lethal weapons. The psychological weapon has become central to this facet of hybrid warfare, which has found itself a perfect concretization in the conflict in Ukraine. However, since the war in Syria, the Maiden revolution in 2013 or the annexation of Crimea, Western regimes have a better understanding of the digital manipulation strategies and regular features of Russian media coverage. During the war in Syria, Russia positioned itself as the last bastion against Islamism. This civilizational narrative has thus been transformed into a narrative of the fight against Nazism in Ukraine, but the rationales are the same and aim to legitimize a major intervention abroad. A Russian Narrative Contradicted by the Stalemate in the Conflict The first lesson of the war in Ukraine was that Russia intended to dictate on the international scene what the conflicts of tomorrow would become, but found itself trapped in its own game in the end. The special military operation, according to Moscow's rhetoric, was met with Ukrainian resistance that it largely underestimated. If the balance of power on the ground is totally unbalanced, against all odds, the Ukrainian opposition has skilfully taken over from Russia in the informational field. The confrontation of narratives is fed by the streaming of information overload and the informational ecosystem seems more than unfavorable to Russia. The propaganda campaign that it meticulously prepared did not find the expected echo internationally. With a failed entry into the war, the narrative of the liberation of the Ukrainian people still struggles to stand. Russia has made a major strategic error. By imposing an overly ambitious military agenda with a tactically flawed blitzkrieg, time is now against it. The longer the war drags on, the more the Russian narrative will be contradicted by an ever-growing death list. The death of at least a third of the Russian high command is an illustration of this reality. For the Kremlin, the priority will therefore be to change the narrative which, because of the strategic redeployment on the Eastern Front, no longer corresponds to the initial discourse of the special operation. In the long run, this strategic setback could paralyze the Russian incursion and offer informational levers to Kiev to discredit the Russian army. The Limited Effects of a Single Official Communication Strategy for Several Audiences If Ukraine is far from winning war, it has already largely won the cognitive battle in the West. Now isolated, Vladimir Putin is perceived there as an evil invader. While Moscow had initially tried to fragment the response of the transatlantic community, the outbreak of the invasion has finally cemented the cohesion of the Western clan through an unprecedented strategic awakening. Nevertheless, on the international scene, its support in Africa is not weakening. Moreover, Russia's future participation in the G20 irritates the transatlantic community. This decision to maintain Moscow's presence attests to the refusal of part of the international community to marginalize Russia. However, the Chinese president, who had initiated a diplomatic rapprochement during the Olympic Games and who has every interest in seeing Russia win as much as possible, is now struggling to sustain his unlimited friendship and to respond to the Russian president's call for help, at least in an official manner. While condemnation is unanimous in the West, statements of support for Ukraine are ultimately more limited in the global South. Internationally, the lack of condemnation by certain states, which can sometimes be likened to "pro-Russian neutrality" driven by economic interests, is profitable for the Kremlin, which wishes to keep many of its partners at bay. If the operation to seduce the transatlantic community was a profound failure, the objective of uniting Russian public opinion around the war was a clear success. Popular support for the war in Russia has reached 60%. Vladimir Putin has managed to raise his popularity in Russia to a similar percentage because he has not been able to improve his international image. By highlighting the heroic resistance of the people, the Ukrainian authorities have played a large part in shaping this new international political situation, but have not managed to reach the Russian information bubble. The Lessons of the Ukrainian David Against the Russian Goliath The question is now to know how Ukraine, a geopolitical dwarf, managed to fight effectively against Russia on the informational terrain that it mastered better. Kiev has managed to develop a warlike iconography that fits into a "micromythology.” The Ukrainian authorities have grasped the virality issue very well. The images of mothers preparing Molotov cocktails for their husbands, or the photographs of Javelin launchers presented as the Achilles heel of the Russian army have made it possible to mobilize foreign opinions, some of them very young. A whole new generation of unarmed soldiers is using social networks as a weapon. If the war in Ukraine is not the first conflict to spread on these platforms, it is nevertheless the one that has led to the largest virtual citizen mobilization, especially via the Ukrainian diaspora that instantly relays the news. The blind spot of this youth awakening is the near absence of Russia. By locking itself into the narrative of the special operation, Moscow is no longer able to strategically adapt its narrative to the immediacy of the information since it hides the very nature of the conflict from its population. Finally, the sacrosanct of all Ukrainian iconography is the actor who became a warlord by force of events, namely President Zelensky. By taking the risk of appearing with his soldiers in the streets of Kiev, he positions himself as a Man of the People. While his Russian counterpart places himself during crisis meetings in the Kremlin at the opposite table from his staff, reinforcing the image of isolation. In a belated attempt to save his image and since the battle of communication escapes him, Vladimir Putin celebrated the annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in a stadium packed with 80,000 people. The Shift from a Dictatorship of Manipulation to a Dictatorship of Fear This type of staging does not appeal internationally. Nevertheless, in a society where autarkic infrastructures are constantly being consolidated, it can reinforce the weakened aura of a leader. For this, tightening the stranglehold of censorship was imperative to impose its narrative without any possible challenge. It is done. If the phenomenon is not new in Russia, the extent to which society has been placed under a bell is striking. In a historic reversal of the Duma, the adoption of a law has confirmed the end of independent media. Russians can now face up to 15 years in prison if they challenge government information. After Facebook and Twitter, it was the turn of Instagram to be blocked by the Russian authorities in an almost desperate attempt to prevent any possibility of access to alternative sources of information. While many Russians wanted to stay away from the conflict, the banning of these digital platforms will lead them to a brutal politicization that could backfire on Vladimir Putin. As the latest macabre event, the discovery of the massacres in the town of Bucha, has led to a wave of misinformation. The theory that this carnage was staged is widely relayed by the pro-Russians. This rhetoric of staging is not in its infancy. During the destruction of a hospital during the conflict, the Russian authorities accused some of the victims of being actors. As the accusations of war crimes become clearer, the scope of the sprawling network of the Russian (dis)information machine is being exposed to support the Kremlin's fragile narrative. The Russian informational maneuvers succeed in sowing doubt with each sequence. In turn, for a master of manipulation, Moscow is not the only one working in immorality. The Risks of an Asymmetric Information Battle The situation of Ukraine – the aggressed aggressor – is drastically different, yet it manages to compete with and undermine the Russian narrative by using the same semantic tactics as its invader. Without necessarily sinking to the extent of Russian machinations, Kiev is walking a dangerous path by opting for misinformation. On the verge of a possible collapse, the Ukrainian authorities are putting forward partially true or erroneous information. However, there have been numerous backtracking and requests for internal investigations into possible abuses. Western leaders have gone to the front to denounce Moscow's authoritarian excesses, but they seem to be much less careful when the disinformation comes from the allied camp. The accusations of war crimes are not limited to the Russian military. Images of Russian prisoners being tortured by the Ukrainian army have embarrassed the Ukrainian government and its international supporters. With an astonishing defence not unlike that of the Kremlin, the Ukrainian army denounced the staging of the events by the rival camp. Ukraine's sympathy capital and credibility could be undermined by this strategy. This disinformation waltz questions the capacity of Ukraine and the West to fight against the Russian informational strategy while keeping their democratic nature. Increasing Broad Domain Cooperation by Empowering Digital Platforms Faced with Moscow's headlong rush, Europe has developed an arsenal of sanctions that has affected Russian audiovisual channels. Thus, the news channels RT and Sputnik were banned from broadcasting on all digital media thanks to a historic decision by the European Union. Social networks have followed suit. Tiktok, Facebook and its subsidiary Instagram have suspended the content broadcast by these media, all of which endorses the phenomenon of politicization of these platforms. The directives adopted by the EU seem drastic, but taken certainly too late. Russia's cyber advantages must lead to a major strategic leap forward by strengthening the funds and means provided to the anti-disinformation taskforces of each state. While efforts to clean up social networks have been intensified since the annexation of Crimea, strengthening cooperation with the tech giants is in order. These companies will have to be willing to collaborate in the field of content moderation. If not, pressuring them to remove conspiracy accounts before conflicts arise will be a priority. Finally, getting to the root of the problem by rethinking the harmful business model of these platforms is also necessary. The Big Tech play a role in the propagation of misinformation by placing on the same level the dissemination of fake news and facts. To fight against this phenomenon, the automation of fact-checking must be deepened. With this new algorithmic responsibility that will emerge, digital citizenship will be preserved and the informational terrain will not be left at the mercy of adverse powers to prepare future operations. Improving Framing in the Fight Against Misinformation It goes without saying that there is a problem of framing to grasp the Western vulnerability. This is visible through the array of Russian instruments to jump into this breach and the recent failures of the Russian informational machine. On the one hand, Western governments will have to prioritize the fight against the hacking of the human mind through informational networks, with the war in Ukraine being an excellent barometer. On the other hand, a distinction between the falsification of voluntary information and information aimed at promoting Russian interests is also necessary in order to strategically target threats and not sink into counter-propaganda. Moreover, cyberspace is cross-border in nature, whereas the question of armies is intrinsically linked to sovereignty. Therefore, this area of conflict cannot be approached in the same way as conventional threats. A purely governmental response will have its limits, while falling into techno-solutionism will not be sufficient. In cooperation with the industry, the right solution requires a whole-of-government approach. Better coordination in the fight against these digital interferences could be achieved through the action of the OECD and, via relays at the state level, in the form of inter-ministerial governance of the digital environment. The awareness of digital pedagogy from the earliest age must become a national cause for all liberal democracies. With this digital learning work that will irrigate the whole society, the detection and decoding of disinformation will be simplified, and citizens will no longer be a critical target during adverse digital maneuvers. Only through this better understanding of the stakes underlying info war, legislation on digital services will be able to evolve in parallel with a greater perception of threats by the public. Strengthening the Global Means of Response Within the Limits of Democratic Guidelines By developing its own alternative platforms to bypass the Western stranglehold on these technologies, Russia has set up a real iron curtain on the web. Locked in its own network, this strategy could turn against Moscow. By relying on this phenomenon of withdrawal, Western countries could confine the Russians to their network. This device would intensify the isolation of the Russians and thus put in place an effective information embargo. While many of these social networks are treated as "extremist organizations" by the Kremlin, the restriction of their activities could continue after the conflict. However, these platforms are important economic relays for Russian merchants. This restriction could reinforce social discontent with the Kremlin. If the lead cover that is falling on the Russian Internet could be just as profitable as it has been for China in order to increase control over its population, it would still reduce the permeability of our regimes to Russian interference by limiting access to the relays of influence. This offensive strategy could also take the form of encouraging the formation of independent Russian-speaking media that do not answer to any partisan organization. Western governments will have to work to trace the funding of these opaque structures in the service of anti-Western propaganda. The proliferation of Russian false information is a fruitful enterprise. Advertising on this type of content, through platforms such as Google which would distribute more than two thirds of it, should be prohibited in order to reduce the transmission of false information on the war in Ukraine and on future conflicts. It will also be necessary to deconstruct the methods rather than the false facts since "in the informational war, the side that tells the truth loses.” Rebuttal has time limitations while responsiveness is imperative, and civilians are saturated with information. The systemic approach will help deal with the continuous spread of misinformation. Finally, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer sums up the undeniable assets of many Western regimes : "It is by strengthening these democratic attributes that we will be able to continue to embody an alternative model for the Russian populations" and thus destabilize the very foundations of the empire of lies. By reducing the divisions within our societies to improve their resilience or by reinforcing the transparency of our information vectors, the goals of democracy can be achieved with methods compatible with it. Temporarily violating our values for the sake of efficiency is counterproductive. As has been demonstrated, many tools are available to liberal democracies to fight effectively in the context of info war. Respecting democratic imperatives will help to avoid feeding the opposing discourse. However, the Russian elites are not fooled by the rout of the army, which has pushed Moscow to return to its original project of concentrating on the occupation of Eastern Ukraine. When the soldiers come back and tell that they did not fight against neo-Nazis to liberate enslaved people, it will be the turn of Russian civilians to grasp the scope of the information bubble that will then burst. ## The Iranian Naval Withdrawal from the Red Sea: Abdication or Strategic Repositioning? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-iranian-naval-withdrawal-from-the-red-sea-abdication-or-strategic-repositioning/ Modified: 2025-09-05 While Iran has suffered its most severe attack since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in the context of Israeli and U.S. strikes against its nuclear program, and with the Islamic regime appearing to falter, another major development, largely overshadowed by Operation Rising Lion, raises questions about Tehran’s strategic repositioning in the region: the withdrawal of its navy from the Red Sea. Confirmed in April 2025, this move marks a significant turning point in the regional maritime balance. Having maintained an intermittent yet notable presence there since 2008, Iran is now leaving a key area without clarifying its intentions, sparking debate about the true nature of this move: is it an admission of weakness, a temporary tactical maneuver, or a long-term strategic adjustment? Tehran’s lack of clear communication quickly gave way to an interpretive void, one that some actors—notably the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Saudi Arabia—were quick to fill by portraying this disengagement as a success of their military and diplomatic pressure. These interpretations, widely echoed by international media and influenced by Western think tanks such as the International Crisis Group and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also serve the regional agendas of these powers, which view this withdrawal as a sign of the Iranian regime’s strategic weakening. This article aims to demonstrate that Iran’s naval withdrawal from the Red Sea, occurring in a context of heightened tensions—culminating notably in the June 2025 clashes—should not be interpreted as a definitive retreat. Rather, this decision is part of a cautious and adaptive strategy aimed at avoiding the risks of escalation in a region of major importance, where the United States has significantly reinforced its presence by deploying two carrier strike groups, while Tehran’s Houthi allies continue to suffer repeated strikes. Faced with the erosion of its naval capabilities, growing logistical constraints, limited budgetary resources, and now increased pressure on the regime itself, Iran is adopting a posture of tactical withdrawal, intended to preserve its forces while maintaining its freedom of action in the long term. Far from signalling an irrevocable abandonment, this operational pause reflects a broader strategic logic grounded in the avoidance of direct confrontation, the use of asymmetric tools, and the support of non-state actors. Iran’s naval withdrawal thus appears to be a strategic respite: a temporary adjustment allowing Tehran to reposition itself while awaiting a more favourable regional context for its maritime ambitions. An Overview of the Current Situation in the Red Sea A Tactical Maneuver in the Face of Urgency: The Immediate Reasons Behind Iran’s Naval Withdrawal Several specific and circumstantial factors converge to explain this short-term withdrawal. First, the undeniable U.S. military superiority in the Red Sea serves as a significant deterrent. The deployment of two carrier strike groups, built around Ford- or Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, provides the United States with a powerful mobile strike capability. These groups are supported by AEGIS destroyers equipped with long-range missiles (SM-2, Tomahawk), as well as an advanced surveillance system incorporating MQ-9 Reaper drones, P-8 Poseidon aircraft, and satellite assets. This superiority is reinforced by coordination with allied navies within the Combined Maritime Forces, ensuring a rapid multinational response. By contrast, the Iranian navy remains constrained by aging equipment, fragile logistics, and constant exposure to detection. Under these conditions, a tactical withdrawal appears to be a rational response to a clearly unbalanced balance of power. Secondly, the operational cost of maintaining a presence in the Red Sea has become increasingly difficult for Iran to justify in the eyes of a public that is growing ever more hostile toward the adventurism of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the financial burden it entails—a hostility likely to deepen after the Israeli and U.S. strikes of 2025. Domestically, Iran faces a series of major economic challenges: persistent sanctions, rampant inflation, and the chronic depreciation of its national currency have significantly reduced its ability to sustain prolonged deployments. Not to mention corruption and mismanagement of rent distribution in the allocation of national wealth. In 2025, the budget allocated to the Iranian armed forces increased significantly, reaching approximately US$8.19 billion, a 200% increase over the previous year. The Iranian government had to resort to borrowing from the National Development Fund to cover part of these deficits, highlighting the financial constraints that weigh on its military capabilities. Iran’s naval capabilities, divided between the regular navy (Nedaja) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), rely heavily on aging vessels that require extensive maintenance. Keeping them away from their home ports imposes an increasingly heavy logistical burden. Furthermore, the war in Yemen—a central theatre of Iranian influence via the Houthis —is intensifying, marked by increased U.S. strikes. This development forces Iran to reconsider its strategy, as it seeks to minimize its visibility to avoid any direct military reaction. This does not prevent the regime’s authorities from maintaining the option of indirect support to the Houthis (despite attempts at ceasefires with the Americans) and continuing to portray Iran as an emerging global maritime power, while, in the longer term, discreetly preparing to return to this theatre, which is essential for its strategic ambitions. An Influence that Persists Through Other Channels It should be noted that the naval withdrawal does not entail the end of Iranian influence in the region. Tehran, faithful to its forward-defence doctrine, continues to favour indirect and asymmetric methods to project power, i.e., without significant on-site intervention or troop deployment. Although less visible, its support for the Houthis remains active: arms transfers, intelligence sharing, and technical assistance via clandestine maritime or land channels. Iran’s influence does not stop at Yemen. Further west, across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Iran is reviving its ties with Sudan under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. After a long period of rupture, Tehran is reestablishing relations with Khartoum, notably by supplying military drones. This equipment strengthens Sudan’s operational capabilities, while providing Iran with a strategic foothold to maintain an (indirect) presence along the shores of the Red Sea. The port of Port Sudan, in particular, could become a logistical anchor point for its future maritime ambitions. This dual approach—visible withdrawal, but continued engagement—already tested in practice, allows Iran to maintain a valuable strategic ambiguity. As in a game of chess, Tehran pulls back a piece not to concede ground, but to reposition itself while awaiting a more favourable configuration. This posture prevents its enemies from anticipating its next moves, allowing Iran to set the pace. For example, during the apparent withdrawal of some Iranian forces from Syria in 2020 under Israeli pressure, Iran simultaneously strengthened its logistical networks and its foothold through local militias, such as Hezbollah and the Liwa Fatemiyoun, thereby consolidating its strategic depth without direct confrontation. At first glance, Iran’s withdrawal in response to the increased involvement of Western powers in the Red Sea might seem paradoxical, as it coincides with a renewed affirmation of Tehran’s strategic initiative. In reality, this withdrawal represents a calculated shift, allowing Iran to transition from a reactive posture to a more proactive one, relying on indirect and less confrontational modes of action. This dynamic is not unprecedented: historical analysis shows that Iran has repeatedly managed to turn apparent setbacks into levers of influence, reorienting situations perceived as unfavourable to its advantage. Ambitions that Span the Long Term A Maritime Ambition Rooted in History... To understand Tehran’s ambitions in the Red Sea, it is necessary to situate them within the historical context of Iran’s naval presence in this strategic region. Even before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Pahlavi dynasty was already considering equipping Iran with a navy capable of projecting power to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean. Although the nature of the two regimes is fundamentally different and the missions of their naval forces are not the same, this geographically grounded ambition already reflected a desire for regional influence—consistent, moreover, with the Persian imperial legacy. Under the rule of Iran’s last Shah, the country’s naval policy in the Red Sea was part of a broader strategy of regional power projection. In the 1970s, fueled by rising oil revenues, the Shah invested heavily in modernizing the navy, with the ambition of making Iran a maritime power capable of securing the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. The last Shah sought to strengthen Iran’s presence in the Indian Ocean and to forge strategic alliances with coastal states, such as Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, by securing access to ports like Assab (now in Eritrea). This approach aimed to counter Soviet influence and the naval ambitions of the Arab petromonarchies, while asserting Iran’s role as regional enforcer with the support of the United States. However, this ambitious naval policy was profoundly disrupted by the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the Shah and, initially, refocused Iran’s military strategy on the defence of its national territory, particularly in the context of the Iran-Iraq War, at the expense of its maritime power projection. ... in Line with the Naval Strategy of Monarchical Iran... Despite its ideological break with the monarchical regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran has gradually reintegrated some aspects of the Shah’s strategic vision. As Farideh Farih noted, despite its overt hostility towards the former regime, it has adopted “certain fundamental orientations of Iranian defence policy, particularly with regard to the strategic role of the Persian Gulf and the need to assert itself militarily there.” This hypothesis is supported by a study from the Washington Institute, which emphasizes that “the development of Iran’s naval capabilities forms part of a regional deterrence strategy largely inherited from the monarchy.” As the Islamic regime consolidated its power and in response to geopolitical dynamics that transcended ideological divides, Tehran’s naval strategy gradually focused on a central and long-term objective: securing its interests in strategic maritime areas, such as the Strait of Hormuz—through which nearly 20% of the world’s oil transits—but also in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. To achieve this, the Iranian Republic has strengthened its navy, both the regular navy and the IRGC, and increased its military presence in several key areas, such as the Gulf of Aden. This naval posture aims as much to project power as to counterbalance American, Israeli, and Saudi influence in the region. Although there is a degree of continuity in power projection, it should be noted that the approaches differ in certain respects. Under the Shah, Iran’s maritime ambitions aimed at developing a blue-water navy capable of projecting power as far as the Indian Ocean, within a logic of regional stabilization and recognition as a responsible power. The Islamic Republic, by contrast, has adopted a naval orientation based on asymmetric tactics and a destabilization strategy extending from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb. This strategic shift marks a notable break: whereas the imperial navy sought to ensure regional security, the Islamic Republic’s navy leverages instability as a tool of influence. In the 2000s, taking advantage of the growing role of the IRGC in shaping the Islamic regime’s foreign policy, Tehran strengthened its fleet to extend its influence beyond the Strait of Hormuz, notably toward the Horn of Africa. The regular navy thus increased its missions in the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as the Red Sea. Iranian strategists viewed this area as crucial for monitoring maritime trade, supporting their allies (as they would do with the Houthis in Yemen from 2012-2013) and indirectly challenging Israel and the United States. After the Arab uprisings of 2011, a major milestone was reached when Egypt, under Mohamed Morsi, allowed Iranian vessels to transit the Suez Canal. Iran thus marked its symbolic return to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, thereby asserting the resilience of its maritime doctrine. Iran has also made use of allied bases, notably in Sudan before 2014, to secure a logistical presence. Thus, although transformed by Islamist ideology and the post-revolutionary geopolitical context, the Islamic Republic continues to leverage the maritime legacy of the pre-revolutionary period while adapting its operations and regional objectives to its “resistance” doctrine. This historical continuity sheds light on the nature of the current withdrawal: not an abdication, but a temporary pullback dictated by adverse conditions. Tehran has not abandoned the long-term objectives outlined above—including control over strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb—but remains in an active waiting posture, ready to seize any favourable opportunity to reassert its presence or expand its influence. ... in Line with the Fundamentals of Iranian Strategic Culture To assess and put into perspective the true scope of the current withdrawal, it is also necessary to consider Iran’s strategic culture. Deeply scarred by the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and constrained by its limited military capabilities, the Islamic Republic has always sought to avoid open confrontation (although this principle has been somewhat eroded since October 7, 2023, particularly in the context of its ballistic confrontation with Israel). Instead, it prefers to operate in the “grey zone”—that uncertain space between war and peace, where hybrid tactics, information warfare, and the use of proxy forces prevail. Before its 2024-2025 withdrawal, Iran’s maritime presence in the Red Sea was based mainly on regular missions carried out by the Iranian navy, as part of a strategy of power projection and regional deterrence. A few concrete examples should be presented here. Between 2020 and 2024, Iran’s presence took shape through the deployment of warships that patrolled the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Tehran justified these missions by citing the need to escort its merchant vessels and combat piracy; however, they were also part of a broader strategy aimed at demonstrating its strength to regional and Western powers. In 2021, for example, the Makran and the Sahand were sent as far as the Atlantic before returning via the Red Sea, symbolically underscoring Iran’s determination to showcase its power-projection capabilities. In 2023, Iran was regularly accused of using its naval presence to provide logistical support to the Houthis in Yemen, although Tehran denied any direct involvement. In February 2023, the Royal Navy, supported by U.S. forces, intercepted a vessel coming from Iran carrying anti-tank missiles and components for ballistic missiles intended for the Houthis; shortly afterwards, French forces seized a boat carrying 3,000 assault rifles and anti-tank missiles. Experts and intelligence agencies asserted that Iranian ships such as the MV Behshad were operating in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, not as ordinary cargo vessels, but to “collect real-time intelligence” for the Houthis. In January 2024, the Iranian destroyer Alborz crossed the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to enter the Red Sea, a key artery of international maritime trade. This operation was part of a series of deployments aimed at asserting Iran’s presence in the region. Nevertheless, this presence in the Red Sea remained essentially postural and political, intended to challenge the naval dominance of Western powers and their regional allies—particularly the United States and Israel—while showcasing Iran’s capabilities to conduct naval operations far from its territory. Understanding Iran’s Post-“Rising Lion” Maritime Strategy in Light of the Country’s Opportunistic Historical Culture At first glance, the Israeli strikes carried out as part of Operation Rising Lion, combined with the U.S. bombings of June 2025, might suggest that Iran’s naval strategy, based on the principles of flexibility and opportunism, is being seriously and irrevocably undermined. The damage inflicted on military and logistical infrastructure, coupled with the regime’s internal weakening, paints a picture of an Iran forced to retreat. However, there is still no evidence that this dynamic is fundamentally changing the strategic logic that has guided Iran’s actions for several decades. Unless the regime were to collapse suddenly—a scenario that is now conceivable but still highly uncertain—Iran’s posture appears to be more of a tactical retreat than an abandonment. The pattern remains the same: disengage when faced with an unfavourable balance of power, reorganize, and return as soon as conditions become more favourable. This opportunistic flexibility, already observed in the past, could once again enable Iran to reassert its presence in the Red Sea if external pressure were to ease. Despite its current withdrawal, Iran’s strategy in the Red Sea remains consistent and vigorous. It is based on time-tested principles—patience, adaptability, and indirect influence—that have allowed Iran to exert influence in the region beyond its conventional capabilities for more than two decades. Even when it lacks the necessary naval or financial resources, the Islamic Republic does not abandon its maritime ambitions; it adjusts them according to the context. This opportunistic approach has already manifested in several instances. In 2011, at the height of the Arab uprisings, Tehran took advantage of the security vacuum in Egypt and Syria to send two warships into the eastern Mediterranean via the Suez Canal—a first since 1979. In 2016, following the partial lifting of sanctions under the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), Iran briefly increased the frequency of its missions in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. More recently, between 2020 and 2022, the Iranian navy demonstrated its resilience by maintaining regular rotations in the Sea of Oman and the Red Sea, despite the economic and health tensions caused by the pandemic. In 2021, the transoceanic mission of the Makran and the Sahand to the Atlantic illustrated this ability to symbolically assert its presence, even under constraints. Even today, despite heavy setbacks and significant deterioration of its military capabilities, Iran continues to rely on local proxies—most notably the Houthis in Yemen—as well as on asymmetric means such as missiles, naval drones, and cyberattacks. Its tactical alliances with various state and non-state actors remain an important lever for regenerating, over the long term, its capabilities and maritime presence. Despite recent setbacks, the Islamic regime’s determination to disrupt the regional balance of power via the sea remains intact—even if, for now, it must operate with limited means and under a clearly unfavourable balance of power. In the longer term, it remains unrealistic to believe that Iran will renounce its power-projection ambitions onto the strategic shores of the Indian Ocean, especially since this maritime zone is becoming increasingly central in great power competition. The growing presence of China, through the Maritime Silk Road initiative, and that of India, via its strategy to secure its western flank, reinforce the geostrategic importance of this area. In this context of heightened rivalries, Iran must maintain some form of naval presence, however modest, to avoid being sidelined in a maritime theatre that has become pivotal to the regional balance of power. Whether through its regular navy, its proxy forces, or its regional partners, Tehran will continue to pursue its maritime influence—a pursuit driven both by geopolitical logic and a quest for strategic recognition. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is constantly monitoring Iran’s naval repositioning, seeing it as much more than a mere military maneuver. Every Iranian movement at sea is analyzed as a strategic signal, revealing deep objectives and long-term calculations. For CENTCOM, it constitutes a discreet yet structured language, aimed at testing the red lines of Western powers, asserting a lasting regional presence, and strengthening Tehran’s levers of influence without engaging in direct confrontation. Not fooled by Iran’s temporary naval withdrawal, CENTCOM has stated that Iran’s ballistic capabilities, drones, and arms deliveries “present a sophisticated multi-axis threat” and that every move of the Iranian navy is closely monitored, as it is seen as part of a broader strategic continuum. For U.S. officials, each Iranian naval repositioning conveys a coded message, revealing long-term strategic intentions. They view these movements as calculated attempts to test the tolerance thresholds of Western powers, maintain latent influence, and prepare for a return to the theatre as soon as political and military conditions allow. In short, CENTCOM monitors Iran’s naval repositioning with constant vigilance, perceiving in this apparent retreat not an end, but a controlled transition in Iran’s naval posture. *** All evidence therefore suggests that, despite recent setbacks, the withdrawal of the Iranian navy from the Red Sea should not be interpreted as an irreversible capitulation, even in light of the Israeli and U.S. strikes carried out in June 2025, which severely damaged its military infrastructure. Rather, it represents a meticulously planned repositioning, conceived not as an end but as a strategic pause within a broader trajectory. This move, marked by tactical caution and strategic consistency, follows a logic of preventive defence aimed at preserving the Islamic Republic’s military and diplomatic capabilities while waiting for more favourable conditions to reassert its presence in this crucial area. Far from signalling a renunciation or loss of influence, this withdrawal resembles a natural oscillation within the strategic cycle of an actor well versed in the art of geopolitical patience. This approach fits within a strategic continuity and is based on a clear history of Iranian flexibility: naval missions adjusted according to regional and international constraints, the consistent use of local proxies such as the Houthis, and the ability to offset conventional limitations with asymmetric means (drones, cyberattacks, missiles). Tehran’s deep objectives—ensuring lasting access to strategic straits, strengthening its regional depth, and maintaining a presence, even if limited, along vital maritime trade routes—remain unchanged, despite shifts in regime and context. It is true that the Iranian political-military system is based on a complex architecture, marked by the coexistence of multiple decision-making centers—between the Supreme Leader, the Supreme National Security Council, the Revolutionary Guards, and the regular army (Artesh)—which are sometimes in tension. This fragmented functioning gives the impression of an absence of a clear strategic line. However, despite these internal rivalries and institutional duality, one constant emerges: the determination to preserve national sovereignty and to extend regional influence, even at a lower cost. As the International Crisis Group notes: “The Iranian system, although opaque and pluralistic, manages to produce coherent decisions when it comes to its fundamental security priorities.” Within this framework, the current naval withdrawal should not be interpreted as a definitive renunciation, but rather as a strategic pause—a tactical adjustment in a game where every move is calculated in light of external pressure and available resources. Far from structural incoherence, this is a form of strategic flexibility, shaped by decades of experience surviving under sanctions and engaging in asymmetric competition. ## The Iranian Presidential Election: The Regime Is Hardening URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-iranian-presidential-election-the-regime-is-hardening/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Out of these seven “elected,” six of them are ultimately only extras whose sole function is to serve as a foil to legitimize the election... With the Iranian presidential elections on June 18, 2021 looming, the Islamic Republic of Iran appears to be more frozen than ever. There is no doubt it would be premature, as some analysts do, to talk about the imminent death of the regime, as it has demonstrated, in the past and until recently, its extraordinary capacity for resilience. Nonetheless, the conditions of the presidential candidate selection process so far demonstrate the Iranian institution is growing more rigid. In previous elections, Iranians have grown accustomed to seeing the ruling power disqualify the most “reformist” contenders. Placed under the control of conservatives of all stripes, the powerful Council of Guardians of the Constitution – whose function is notably to validate candidates – has always had the habit of marginalizing the most anti-establishment applicants. But this year, the Council has made it a greater point of honor than ever to dismiss the less orthodox candidates. The disqualification of Ali Laridjani is in this respect, quite evidential. The former president of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran, yet a man of the seraglio and a historical figure of the conservative camp, was dismissed because of his stance in favor of a revival of the economy, of a more conciliatory position on the nuclear issue and some form of resumption of dialogue with the United States. His brother, Sadegh Larijani, head of the Iranian judicial system and influential member of the Discernment Council (another key institution in the Islamic system), himself protested against this decision, which he described as unjust and untenable. Other leading figures in the conservative clan, including former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Vice President Eshagh Djahanguiri, have also been deemed unfit to compete in the next election. An Unrivaled Candidacy Of the 600 candidates initially registered on the electoral rolls, the vast majority of whom were conservatives, only seven regime-loyal figures have been allowed to run in the presidential elections, including Saeed Djallili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mohsen Rezaei, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and current secretary of the Discernment Council. Most analysts agree, however, that out of these seven “elected,” six of them are ultimately only extras whose sole function is to serve as a foil to legitimize the election of the one and only true suitor of the regime: Hodjatoleslam Ebrahim Raisi, director of the foundation (or Bonyad) Astan-e Quds-e Razavi, head of the Iranian judicial system and vice-president of the Assembly of Experts. The process is so blatantly corrupt that the Iranian press no longer hesitates to label Raisi “an unrivaled candidate.” As a favorite of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, this ultraconservative candidate is a staunch supporter of the application of Sharia law and the theocratical principle of Velayet-e faghih, inherited from Ayatollah Khomeini to the detriment of the promotion of freedoms public and individual rights. 60-year-old Ebrahim Raisi is close to Ali Khamenei, where he studied at the seminary. A highly controversial figure both in Iran and abroad, Ebrahim Raisi is, among other things, notorious for the central role he played, at the very end of the Iran-Iraq war, in the mass execution of prisoners and political dissidents (1988). As chief justice, this Iranian Fouquier-Tinville also bears a leading responsibility in preserving the extremely repressive character of the Iranian justice system. In fact, only China executes a greater number of political prisoners each year than the Iran. Institutional Radicalization Some people speculate that, in addition to Ebrahim Raisi’s likely election this June, there are strong predictions that he could become the next Supreme Leader of the Islamic Regime. His position as Vice-President of the Assembly of Experts is a real asset in this regard, since it is this body that is responsible for choosing the appointments to this coveted position. Aging and ill, Ayatollah Khamenei also has every reason to see Raisi as an ideal successor – likely to prolong Khamenei’s own reign and perpetuate the Islamic regime. In this sense, Raisi’s current ascendancy to the Iranian political scene is indicative that the Iranian regime will withdraw into itself in a process of institutional radicalization. For now, the position as the President of the Iranian Republic could constitute a stepping stone to access this sovereign function in the event of the death of Ali Khamenei (who is 82 years old). While waiting to continue his ascent within the Iranian political system, Ebrahim Raisi promises, if he is elected president, to bring a far more intransigent orientation to the Iranian Islamic Republic’s relations with Westerners than that of his predecessor, Ayatollah Rouhani. Certainly and contrary to what we are used to believing in North America and Europe, the President of the Republic enjoys very limited powers within the Iranian political system. The 1979 Constitution considerably restricts the prerogatives of the head of the Iranian executive, whose role is most often reduced to that of “secretary” in the service of the Supreme Leader – the latter being, in fact, the real commander of the foreign and security policy of the Islamic Republic. This is why Ayatollah Khamenei has traditionally made sure that only candidates who are known for their loyalty and docility to the regime’s non-elective institutions, and to the Supreme Leader in particular, get to this position. Hardening of the Anti-Western and Pro-Asian Posture Notwithstanding his limited role if elected, it should be noted that candidate Raisi has campaigned on the subject of intransigence vis-à-vis the United States and the Western chancelleries. Hodjatoleslam Raisi, a member of the lower Shiite clergy, makes no secret about his hostile position towards the idea of warming relations with Western governments or towards the resumption of negotiations for a new extended nuclear agreement with the P5+1 countries. Referring to the extreme economic difficulties that Iran is currently facing and the need to find a solution to get out of this rut, Raisi echoed the Supreme Leader’s statement that Iranian leaders should not “lose a single moment” in their efforts to lift US sanctions. In this same perspective, Raisi also declared: “Instead of seeking to negotiate with the enemy, we must solve the economic problems of the country by correctly managing the human and natural capacities of the country.” Consequently, the election, moreover very likely, of Ebrahim Raisi will not only lead to a hardening of Iranian-Western relations, but will also lead to a certain level of “bunkerization” of the Islamic regime. Overall, the outcome of the upcoming presidential elections promises to confirm the anti-Western and pro-Asian orientation of the Iranian regime as well as its growing connection to the block of countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. ## The Islamic Republic Under Pressure and on the Brink of Collapse URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-islamic-republic-under-pressure-and-on-the-brink-of-collapse/ Modified: 2024-11-14 In many ways, the events of fall 2024 represent a significant setback and a major turning point for Tehran's influence in the Middle East. The spectacular sabotage of Hezbollah's telecommunications system by Mossad, followed by Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon, the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah and militia leaders, along with the death of Yahya Sinwar, the military leader of Hamas, mark a notable weakening of Tehran's non-state allies operating near Israel. The Iranian ballistic missile attack against Israel on October 1 and Tsahal’s response on October 26 indicate that the Islamic Republic, previously reliant on an indirect strategy, now finds itself on the front line. These events, far from being trivial, redefine the strategic dynamics between Iran and Israel in the Levant, further limiting options for Iranian leaders. Overview of a Year of Asymmetric Conflict Hezbollah remains the cornerstone of Iran’s strategy in the Middle East, a carefully armed and funded asset since 1982 designed to confront its Israeli and American enemies indirectly. As of September 2024, this Lebanese Shiite militia, with around 150,000 missiles and 80,000 fighters, serves as Iran’s primary deterrent against Israel, securing a strategic foothold in southern Lebanon and exerting pressure along Israel’s northern border. However, the destruction of a significant portion of its military capabilities in recent months — nearly 50%, according to Israeli sources — and the loss of its military and political leaders are altering the Israeli-Iranian equation. Hezbollah can no longer serve effectively as a strategic shield for the Iranian regime, and Tehran’s demonstrations of solidarity have been restrained, as evidenced by the limited scope of its recent ballistic response against Israel. The crippling of Hezbollah’s operational capacity and the disruption of its decision-making processes compound the losses suffered by Hamas, another long-standing ally of Tehran in its rivalry with Israel. After nearly a year of warfare with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas faces existential threats. The organization’s leadership structure has been critically undermined following the removal of key political and military figures, including the assassination of its political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in central Tehran, and the death of Yahya Sinwar, its political chief and primary strategist behind the Al-Aqsa Flood operation of October 7. This leadership decapitation has been accompanied by a comprehensive and systematic effort by the IDF to dismantle its military capacities within the Gaza Strip. It may be premature to declare Hamas and Hezbollah entirely out of the game. Both groups, with operational bases near Israeli territory, remain significant actors in the ongoing hostilities with Israel. Although they have suffered sustained aerial strikes targeting their command centers in Gaza and southern Lebanon, they continue to harass Israel through rocket attacks and other “gray zone” tactics. Despite substantial setbacks, Hezbollah and Hamas continue to receive external support, including weapons from Iran and other non-state partners. However, while these organizations remain active and retain some regenerative capacity, their operational strength and influence on the power balance with Israel have nonetheless been seriously undermined, diminishing — at least in the short term — Iran’s potential influence in the Levant. More so than Yemen’s Houthis, Syria’s Zainabiyoun and Fatemiyoun brigades, Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi, and other pro-Iranian militias throughout the region, Hezbollah and Hamas are central to the “axis of resistance.” This proxy network has, for decades, enabled Tehran to operate as a “strategic disruptor” against the interests of Israel and its Western partners. Carefully woven during the past four decades by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Quds Force, formerly led by General Qassem Soleimani, this “strategic rhizome” has relied heavily on Hamas and Hezbollah. These groups provide Tehran with a virtual border with what Iranian leaders call the “Zionist entity,” allowing it to encircle Israel. Hezbollah and Hamas have been the primary tools of Iran’s indirect warfare strategy, carried out below the threshold of interstate conflict. Iran’s strategy involves granting its proxies sufficient autonomy to act independently while preserving plausible deniability. Under the banner of anti-imperialism, these entities of the “Axis of Resistance”, remotely directed by Tehran, harass and provoke U.S. forces and their regional allies, enabling Iranians to evade potential direct retaliation. Increasingly Limited Options With Hezbollah and Hamas neutralized, the Islamic Republic of Iran faces a rapidly shrinking set of strategic options. As noted by Trita Parsi, an Iranian expert in the U.S., Tehran is now left with “only poor choice”. In 2024, the ballistic duel between Iran and Israel highlighted the limitations of Tehran’s conventional military capabilities. On the night of April 13–14, 2024, Iran launched 170 drones, 120 ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles at Israel in retaliation for the destruction of an annex of its embassy in Damascus. This attack killed several high-ranking Iranian officials. On October 1st, Tehran launched yet another salvo of over 180 ballistic missiles, including the Fattah-1, in response to the targeted elimination of senior Hezbollah, Hamas, and IRGC leaders. These offensives were intended to showcase the Islamic regime’s resolve toward Israel, re-establish a minimum level of deterrence, and reassure the various components of the “Axis of Resistance,” concerned by Iran’s relative inaction. However, in both instances, Israel’s air defense system, bolstered by Western allies, intercepted a significant portion of the Iranian projectiles. Following the April episode, the IDF retaliated by striking an air base in Isfahan tasked with safeguarding the Natanz nuclear facility, which was responsible for protection, further exposing the Islamic regime’s vulnerability. On October 26, Israel launched a retaliatory airstrike targeting Iranian military assets: Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether this operation marks a peak or the initial phase of a broader anti-regime campaign, Israel has once again demonstrated its conventional military superiority. Moreover, Iran’s repeated yet futile displays of ballistic capabilities primarily reveal its dwindling strategic options. Iran’s leaders now recognize that their deterrence system, reliant on ballistic missiles and proxy networks, is no longer adequate to safeguard the country. Faced with Israel’s strategy of containing the Iranian regime by dismantling its asymmetric warfare capabilities, Iranian officials are increasingly aware of the erosion of their strategic depth. Acknowledging this growing pressure, they are driven to seek ways to offset this loss through other means. In this case, they are logically inclined to turn inward and attempt to secure the Iranian stronghold ... by hastening the development of their nuclear program. Over the past year, particularly since the events of October 7, 2023, the Islamic regime has significantly intensified its nuclear activities, particularly uranium enrichment, to levels approaching those needed for nuclear weapons production. In early 2024, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raised alarms about Iran’s acceleration of uranium enrichment to 60%, which abruptly increased from 3 to 9 kg per month. This rapid increase represents a significant concern, as 60% enrichment can quickly be converted to the 90% threshold required for nuclear warhead production. Throughout 2024, Iran’s production rate has continued to grow amid escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. This summer, further heightening international concerns, Kamal Kharrazi, a close adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, even mentioned a possible “shift in the nuclear doctrine,” though he specified that it would be contingent on renewed Israeli attacks on Iranian interests. However, reports from the IAEA and U.S. intelligence do not yet confirm, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that Iran has decisively opted for nuclear weapon production. Nor is it certain that possessing such a weapon would suffice to ensure the regime’s survival. On the diplomatic front, Iranian leaders find themselves facing two equally unsatisfactory options, both carrying negative implications for national sovereignty. The first option involves attempting to restore ties with Western powers. President Massoud Pezechkian, a “moderate” elected in June, stated at the United Nations that his country aims to rebuild relations with liberal democracies, including by resuming negotiations on the nuclear issue. Some believe that Iran might even be willing to make concessions, such as “sacrificing” its partnership with Lebanon’s Shiites and Hezbollah. Yet, deep-seated mutual mistrust remains considerable, and many obstacles hinder the possibility of Tehran and Western governments warming their relations — especially with the potential election of a new Republican administration in the United States. The alternative path, one that Tehran has increasingly pursued in recent years, would mean advancing the so-called “Look East” strategy. In recent years, Tehran has aligned more closely with Beijing and Moscow. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a comprehensive economic and security agreement, marking a significant step toward deeper cooperation. In September 2021, Iran began the process of joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional bloc led by Russia and China. Since February 2022, Tehran has refrained from condemning the invasion of Ukraine, even providing logistical and military support to Moscow. At the SCO summit in September 2022, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping officially welcomed Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, signalling Iran’s growing inclusion in what many see as a bloc countering Western influence. In January 2023, Iran became a full member of the BRICS organization, and more recently, Tehran and Moscow have strengthened their military cooperation, particularly in ballistic missile technology, sparking concerns among some observers about a possible collaboration in the nuclear domain. However, this Iranian “Ostpolitik” also comes at a considerable price: it raises questions about Iran’s sovereignty by increasingly tying the regime’s political fate to the heavyweight Russian and Chinese powers in the Eurasian arena. This scenario aligns poorly with Iranians’ nationalism and the country’s strong desire to preserve its independence. The Moment of Existential Choices Confronted with a diminishing geopolitical maneuvering space on the international stage, the Islamic Republic is also undergoing a severe economic crisis and grappling with a growing internal challenge to its political legitimacy. In every respect, the regime finds itself at a crossroads, a decisive turning point that could destabilize its political foundations. In the past, Tehran has demonstrated remarkable resilience, consistently navigating complex challenges by maintaining a multifaceted policy across all fronts and utilizing every available means. Militarily and economically disadvantaged, the Iranian “outsider” has implemented an asymmetric approach with surprising success, skillfully avoiding direct confrontations and striking where least expected. In doing so, the Iran of the mullahs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has managed, in the words of Henry Kissinger, to “win by not losing.” However, the once-unquestioned ability of the Islamist leaders to overcome significant challenges and maintain control over the country now appears to be faltering. Growing threats, combined with a narrowing range of strategic options, place the regime in a precarious position, especially as its adversaries increasingly make no secret of their desire to overthrow it. It is no longer certain that the tactics and solutions previously employed — which often helped preserve the system's stability — will now be sufficient to guarantee the survival of the political and ideological regime established in 1979. ## The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Catalyst for a New Regional Order URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-catalyst-for-a-new-regional-order/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > In this policy report, Pierre Jolicoeur revisits the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and examines various political considerations for Canada. On November 9, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed an end-of-hostilities agreement, under the aegis of Russia. This ceasefire, which enshrines a military victory for Azerbaijan, will have many repercussions on regional security and beyond. The changing framework of the peace process surrounding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – from a Euro-Atlantic enterprise to a regional enterprise – indicates that neither Russia nor Turkey continue to view the West as a relevant actor in their backyard. This dynamic, which we had already observed in other theatres of conflict in recent months, in particular following the military withdrawal of the United States from Syria, is indicative of a paradigm shift in the management of the course of international affairs, even in the world order. This paradigm shift is encouraged by a certain disengagement of the United States and a “revival” and an alliance of circumstance of the two main regional powers. As of the time this article was written, a Russian-sponsored ceasefire has ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The latest official reports speak of more than 2,300 soldiers and 50 civilians dead on the Armenian side, but this figure is incomplete since Azerbaijan has still not communicated its military losses, while reporting 93 civilians dead as a result of the conflict. Both sides claim to have killed “thousands” of soldiers on the other side. Russian sources indicate, two weeks before the establishment of the ceasefire, casualties were around 5,000, making it one of the deadliest conflicts of the year. In the course of military operations, many sources have indicated important territorial acquisitions made by Azerbaijan, including Armenian sources who tend to minimize their losses. After the initial stupors and fears that this belligerent escalation would entail regional actors, notably Turkey and Russia, and their allies by extension, these external actors have shown a certain restraint. It is still not possible to envisage what the solution to this conflict will be, but it is however already possible to affirm that this war will have consequences beyond the number of victims or the destruction on the ground. A new regional security framework developed alongside the fighting, potentially heralding a new international order. The awakening of the “frozen conflict” in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan has dragged on for months: after border skirmishes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in July 2020, the autumn fighting has undoubtedly been the most violent since the establishment of a ceasefire in 1994. This sudden resumption of hostilities contrasts with the encouraging signs of agreement between the two camps which seemed to be emerging in 2018, in particular with the establishment of a direct alert line between the leaders of the two camps. Frozen conflicts are often referred to as those secessionist conflicts in the former USSR, where secessionist parties have made military gains on the ground without gaining international recognition. These conflicts then get bogged down in interminable peace processes that end up falling into a state of dormancy due to the lack of progress in the negotiations. The term “frozen,” however, does not characterize so much the conflicts themselves, which often see the episodic resumption of violence, but rather the peace processes aimed at resolving them. This is particularly true in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which to date has not benefited from any peacekeeping force to enforce ceasefire agreements. It is important to remember that this conflict is essentially a three-actor struggle – Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR, called Artsakh by the Armenians) – and has a dual nature: it is both an internal secessionist struggle in Azerbaijan and an international conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, although the fighting took place almost exclusively in Azerbaijan. The fights of fall 2020 have taken on existential proportions for the main protagonists. Karabakh Armenians have been defending lands they have considered theirs for three millennia and, by analogy with the Armenian genocide of 1915, claim to risk outright elimination. For its part, Azerbaijan seeks to restore its territorial integrity by restoring sovereignty over the self-proclaimed secessionist territory. Not only had secessionist forces freed themselves from Baku rule since the early 1990s, but they also occupied significant Azerbaijani territories, seven districts in fact, beyond what constituted the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Soviet times. The secessionist forces intended to use these occupied territories as a bargaining chip in their negotiations with the Azerbaijani authorities, while restitution has been demanded by four UN resolutions (Resolutions 822, 853, 974 and 884) since 1993. Gradually, the possession of these territories turned into an occupation, with the construction of infrastructure to link Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Azerbaijan, frustrated and humiliated to see UN resolutions ineffective, and to be forced to absorb a large population of refugees and displaced people, has been seeking revenge since the conflict erupted there thirty years ago. Although the NKR has survived independently from Azerbaijan since 1994, it is a de facto state that no other state has recognized, not even neighboring Armenia or Russia. The latter, however, recognized two other secessionist territories having acquired their de facto independence from neighboring Georgia in a similar context, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, following the war it waged against Georgia in August 2008. Since these events, Russia continues to intervene in the political life of this small republic of the Caucasus. Like the secessionist territories in Georgia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict challenges international law, which is faced with the dilemma of having to decide between two diametrically opposed principles: that of the right of peoples to self-determination and that of the right of States to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty. The humanitarian crisis and the play of regional powers also challenge the international community and, could eventually require its intervention. Given the warring parties' dissatisfaction with their respective insecurity, the outbreaks over the summer clearly set the stage for the fall war. On the occasion of the 75th United Nations General Assembly in September 2020, speeches delivered by the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders just days before the start of large-scale military operations on September 27 already bore the seeds of escalation. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev both used equivocal language: the former promoted the right to self-determination while denouncing Turkey's growing involvement, the latter lamented the lack of diplomatic progress in the resolution of this conflict and accused the Armenian side of intransigence. In fact, since the early 1990s, negotiations to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been anchored in the Minsk process, which is part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), from which a contact group co-chaired by the United States, France and Russia emerged: the Minsk Group. This group was formed in 1992, when the OSCE was still the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Despite its Euro-Atlantic framework, the Minsk Group includes all interested states and important regional state actors, including Turkey, with the notable exception of Iran. However, during the almost thirty years of its existence, this contact group has continued its work without achieving tangible results. There is a growing impression, especially in Azerbaijan, that the Minsk Group is unable or unwilling to provide an effective solution to the conflict. In early July 2020, President Aliyev openly attacked the peace process and questioned the need to negotiate with Armenia. Only a few days later the attacks on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border broke out. This coincidence, if it is indeed a coincidence, is reminiscent of similar criticisms made by the Azerbaijani authorities in February and March 2016, shortly before the resumption of hostilities – in what some have called the “April War” or the “Five-Day War” – which resulted in nearly 200 casualties and Azerbaijan's reconquest of some positions on the edge of Nagorno-Karabakh. What Changed in 2020 It is not unusual that we are witnessing a resumption of armed hostilities in this “hardly frozen” conflict. What distinguishes the current escalation from previous outbreaks, however, is Turkey's much more active role, Russia's more reserved role, and the absence of the United States. The analysis of the official reactions of these external actors gives observers a glimpse of the consequences that this violent resumption of conflict could have: it could be the prelude to a transformation of the peace process from a Euro-Atlantic process into a more “regional process”. Since the summer of 2020, Turkey – which has never been neutral on this issue due to its cultural proximity to Azerbaijan, but which has always avoided getting too heavily involved for fear of incurring the wrath of Moscow – seems to have abandoned its neutrality facade. Beyond criticism directed at Armenia during the July outbreaks, Ankara stepped up its rhetoric against Armenia in August, on the centenary of the Treaty of Sèvres. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stepped up criticism of Armenia following joint Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercises in late July and early August this year. As early as September, observers reported increased diplomatic support from Turkey to Baku and the transfer of Turkish military equipment to Azerbaijan. Without this being officially confirmed, testimonies have accumulated to the effect that Turkey is using hundreds of pro-Turkish armed fighters coming from Syria to support Baku, although this is strongly denied by the political and intellectual authorities of the country. Contrary to expectations, the unequivocal support from Turkey and its military presence in Azerbaijan was not met with a strong reaction from Russia, which for almost ten days contented itself with appealing restraint towards belligerents – a very unvocal position which gave the impression that Russia, despite being Armenia’s strategic ally within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), is not very interested in getting involved in this conflict. After ten days, Moscow bustled into piloting peace talks, even after one of its helicopters was mistakenly shot down by Azerbaijani forces over Armenian territory. Several analysts in Moscow and elsewhere even questioned whether the involvement of Russian diplomacy in this conflict would generate too high a cost for Moscow to derive benefits from it. Russia succeeded in negotiating a ceasefire on October 9, a humanitarian truce on October 17 and another on October 26, three agreements that were ignored on the ground. The agreement of November 9 seems to have had more echo: a ceasefire was signed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, in particular an agreement which includes a peacekeeping role for Russia. This is a first, as the previous ceasefire, which suspended most of the armed hostilities between 1994 and 2020, was not accompanied by an interposition force deployed in the region. Note that the agreement makes no mention of the role of the Minsk Group or the OSCE. Towards a Turkey-Russia Tandem in the Caucasus? Although tacit, Turkey's participation in a conflict in a region that Russia sees as its backyard can be seen through the prism of a foreign policy synergy from Moscow and Ankara on several fronts. So even as Turkey and Russia stand on opposite sides in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars, they have both found common ground in their respective estrangement from Western political and even military paradigms. For Turkey, this estrangement lends itself to criticism from its NATO partners, a phenomenon whose magnitude grows as Ankara multiplies unilateral provocative gestures, whether in Syria, Libya or, more recently in the eastern Mediterranean. President Erdogan's regime increasingly openly displays an unapologetic nationalist foreign policy, which some qualify as irredentist, but which is more focused on political and security considerations and is said to be closer to a certain “Turkish Gaullism”. Many are now questioning whether Turkey is still a reliable partner in the Atlantic Alliance, which undermines the climate of trust that is essential between allies as Turkey seeks to make its mark on the regional scene. On the side of Moscow, this change in approach could be explained by an attempt to revive the Primakov doctrine (named after the former Russian foreign minister and prime minister Yevgeny Primakov), wanting Russia to form regional alliances in order to resist the world hegemony of the United States. Many observers believe that the resumption of armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is a new chapter in the centuries-old proxy war between Moscow and Ankara in the Caucasus. However, after a closer examination of the current geopolitical situation, it seems rather that the two parties have developed a certain agreement, even a pragmatic collaboration in certain files in the Caucasus rather than using every pretext to reignite their historical rivalry. This renewed conflict appears to provide them with an opportunity to work together to exert influence in the region while excluding the Western powers. The Turkish-Russian love-hate relationship became most evident when, on November 24, 2015, Turkish F-16 fighters shot down a Russian Sukhoi SU-24 plane over the Turkey-Syria border. The incident, which could have been used by Moscow to escalate tensions with Ankara, simply resulted in a momentary diplomatic chill that was already forgotten in mid-2016, when the two countries announced the resumption of diplomatic relations. By 2017, Turkish-Russian relations had already become friendly enough again for the two countries to sign a military cooperation agreement paving the way for Ankara's purchase of Russian-made surface-to-air missiles. In view of the undeniable security problems posed by the purchase of Russian military equipment by Turkey for the latter's partners in NATO, the fear that Turkey will fall into Russia's camp in a climate reminiscent of that of the Cold War, provoked the ire of Washington, which canceled certain cooperation programs with Ankara, including the F-35 program, and even started to think about the possibility of excluding Turkey from the Atlantic Alliance. Ankara does not seem to care, pursuing openly, provocatively in the eyes of the West, an agreement with infrequent regimes – Iran, Venezuela and Russia – while adopting an increasingly nationalist policy on the regional scene. It must be said that NATO member countries can hardly exclude Turkey from the Atlantic Alliance, a strategic impossibility according to several analysts, because this would mean for NATO to cut itself off from the Bosphorus Strait, which is essential for its ships and would lead to the complete isolation of the Romanian and Bulgarian fleets, in addition to destroying the possibility of one day seeing Georgia join NATO. Aware of his strategic position, Erdogan mocks the concerns of his NATO partners by deciding to test his new Russian missile systems on October 16, 2020, in the midst of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, a gesture that will probably be followed by exclusion of Turkey from other NATO programs, even sanctions, without leading to its expulsion. Besides their suspicion and oppositional stance towards the West, Russia and Turkey have both taken advantage of several developments over the past two years to increase their cooperation, especially in the South Caucasus. The increased isolationism of US foreign policy in recent years and the declining interest of European countries in the region provide an opportunity for Russia and Turkey to “hijack” the Nagorno-Karabakh dossier from the OSCE Minsk Process by converting it into a regional enterprise. This act of conversion is even accelerated by the gestures of defiance posed by Turkey, which no longer hesitates to offend Western countries. After months of stormy relations between Ankara and Paris, over Libya or oil exploration in the Mediterranean, Erdogan now blames French President Emmanuel Macron for his plan to fight radical Islamism in France. Faced with very little diplomatic criticism from Erdogan, who questioned Macron's “mental health” by inviting him “to seek treatment,” France had no other choice but to recall the Turkish ambassador. On the same occasion, the Turkish president accused France of being “responsible for the occupation of part of the territory of Azerbaijan by pro-Armenian separatists,” which obviously aims to undermine the credibility of France, which is home to a large population of Armenian origin, in her potential role as a neutral mediator in this conflict and as co-chair of the Minsk Group with the United States and Russia. The severing of Franco-Turkish diplomatic relations can only further limit the pressure that Paris is able to exert on the actors in this conflict, while Turkey is showing its participation more and more openly. With the United States completely absorbed in the presidential campaign and its aftermath, only Russia remains to deal with the Minsk peace process. In this context, it is not surprising that Turkey is calling for the establishment of a new negotiating framework for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, a framework which would henceforth be made up of four: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey. The consequences of transposing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from a multilateral OSCE framework into a more regional Russian-Turkish framework (with a possible Iranian role, but that is not yet clear) could be major and lasting. In this context, Russia’s initial “wait and see” approach, followed by its involvement in negotiating a ceasefire between the protagonists, is bearing fruit. Indeed, Russia has cleverly used its various pressure levers to impose its alternative peace process to that of the Minsk Group. Moreover, the cease-fire negotiated on November 9 provides for the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force made up of 1,960 soldiers, a prospect that had never been accepted by the protagonists (especially Azerbaijan), until now. Turkey is given a role as supervisor of the implementation of the agreement. Another consequence of this agreement is the complete evacuation of the prospect of Nagorno-Karabakh: indeed, until now, Armenia has always refused to sign any agreement without the NKR being a party. The fact that Armenia signed this disadvantageous ceasefire agreement not only indicates its extreme geopolitical vulnerability, but also gives credence to the Azerbaijani thesis which for decades has asserted that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not so much a secessionist conflict on its territory as an interstate conflict between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. So, while it is clear that Azerbaijan has gone on the military offensive in recent weeks, this state likes to project a self-image as being the victim of Armenian intransigence for thirty years. From Turkey's point of view, the recent conflict and the possible regional diplomacy working with Russia to resolve it brings a double benefit: the opportunity for Erdogan to claim a military and diplomatic victory and, more importantly, the strengthening of Turkey's “mentoring” on Azerbaijan. These two elements allow Turkey to advance its program of affirmation on the regional and international stage. Despite the UN Security Council's call, launched on September 29, to contain the conflict and continue its mediation within the framework of the OSCE, it has become clear that the Minsk process is no longer a viable option for the actors involved in the conflict. This means the final burial of the dying process, which had already been abandoned by Armenia long ago. The shift of a peace process from a multilateral framework – the OSCE Minsk Group – to a more regional Russian-Turkish framework indicates that the West is an increasingly irrelevant actor in the backyard of Russia and Turkey. Whether by choice or by accidental convergence, the two regional powers are ready to define and implement their own security strategies in the South Caucasus bilaterally, with only symbolic and timid objections on the part of the West. The Minsk process appears to be the latest victim of this trend as well as of the American disengagement from the course of world affairs. Political Considerations for Canada The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict concerns Canada in many ways. First, Turkey's increasingly documented support for Azerbaijani forces is of concern, as this NATO partner delivered Canadian technology to the Azerbaijani armed forces, who used it in their military operations in the fall. In response, Canadian firm BRP has suspended deliveries of drone engines to Turkey, and a full review of Canadian military products that may have been used on the Caucasian battlefield is being conducted by Canadian authorities to see if there is a need to expand the embargo. Second, as a middle power, Canada has always favored the diplomatic work of international organizations. This is a Canadian way of having a voice on the international stage, a voice generally little heard outside of these organizations due to Canada's historic alignment with the geopolitical positions of the United States. However, the failure of the Minsk Group and the virtual absence of Western mediation in this conflict is a lost opportunity. Being widely perceived as a relatively neutral state on issues in the Caucasus, Ottawa would have been well positioned to try to bridge the gap between the protagonists. Such a diplomatic initiative could eventually help Canada in its ambitions to obtain a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Finally, Ottawa must take a stand on the issue of recognizing – or not recognizing – the independence of the NKR. This is a sensitive issue for Canada, which is home to a small population of Armenian origin that includes many artists, intellectuals and public figures. This community has a much greater visibility than people of Azerbaijani origin, who are far less numerous in the country, which allows it to benefit from a certain capacity to influence Canadian political authorities. This is how Armenia was able to convince Canadian lawmakers to recognize the genocide of 1915, despite threats of retaliation from Turkey, a NATO ally. This influence also explains the initiative of Senator Leo Housakos, who tabled a motion calling for recognition of the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Canada is not the only country to be challenged by the Armenian diaspora community, because a real movement has been launched for the international recognition of the NKR. Uruguay, as so often with this kind of issue – after all, it was the very first state in the world to recognize the Armenian genocide of 1915 – opens the ball by explicitly discussing the possibility of recognizing the independence of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, even if this is done on a diminished territory. Its capital, Montevideo, has formally recognized it. For Canada, however, it is advisable to be careful before embarking on such a process of state recognition. Nagorno-Karabakh is an entity that seceded from a sovereign state, Azerbaijan, which Canada recognized within its borders inherited from the Soviet era. However, apart from colonial situations, international law generally does not recognize a right to secession, except in very rare specific situations – such as foreign occupation (as in Kuwait in 1990) or in the event of state dissolution (such as the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1991 and Czechoslovakia in 1993) – conditions which are not applicable in Karabakh. Certainly activist jurists have been trying to develop a new right to secession for some twenty years, namely in the case of populations that would be subjected to severe and long-term repression. The only case that has been able to benefit from it so far is that of Kosovo, yet a case that is far from unanimous. Still contested by Serbia, Kosovo's independence is only recognized by a hundred states and the entity fails to gain the support it needs to join the UN. At the time of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, most states that recognized it as a new independent state, such as Canada, took the trouble to point out that this was a unique case that would not set a precedent. However, whatever the Canadian authorities think, and despite the warnings of specialists, such a uniqueness is untenable in international law and the recognition of Kosovo does indeed constitute a precedent, which has also served as a model for the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia and a few other states in 2008. If Canada engages in such a new recognition, it risks reproducing what has always been presented as unique. It is a dangerous game which could, on the one hand, destabilize the international order by trivializing interference in the internal affairs of states while promoting the proliferation of states and, on the other hand, haunt Canada if ever a Canadian province sought to secede and obtained foreign support in its secessionist efforts. Ottawa cannot expect restraint from other states if it allows itself to support an approach that blatantly undermines the sovereignty of others. ## The Narratives War in the Arctic: Between Russian Disinformation and International Rivalries URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-narratives-war-in-the-arctic-between-russian-disinformation-and-international-rivalries/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Disinformation - the intentional dissemination of false or manipulated information - has become a preferred tool for certain states... This policy brief is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges. Disinformation - the intentional dissemination of false or manipulated information - has become a preferred tool for certain states, enabling them to extend their influence without resorting to military means. These skilfully constructed campaigns aim to shape perceptions and orient public narratives in favor of the strategic objectives of state actors. Russia exploits these techniques to control discourse around key issues in sensitive regions such as the Arctic, where a direct military confrontation would compromise its economic interests. Long perceived as an exceptional territory, sheltered from international outbursts, the Arctic is the scene of profound transformations due to global warming and changing geopolitical dynamics. This context of upheaval and uncertainty is conducive to power struggles and misinformation. Against this backdrop, it is essential for Canada to take a close look at these communication strategies in order to quickly refute false information and offer convincing counter-narratives. Russian communication strategies on NATO in the Arctic In recent years, NATO's presence in the Arctic has become a prime target for Russian disinformation campaigns. Russian communication strategies towards NATO in the Arctic have highlighted a series of narratives designed to undermine the alliance's image and divert attention from Russian actions in the region. Researchers P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Troy Bouffard and Adam Lajeunesse have highlighted Russian communications tactics associated with NATO in the region. Using this analytical framework, a study of articles published by TASS and Sputnik between 2020 and 2023 reveals that 80% of content mentioning the keywords “NATO” and “Arctic” incorporates at least one of the six themes identified by the researchers. Three of these themes are central to the press articles studied. Firstly, at the heart of the Russian press's communication strategy is the idea that NATO acts as a destabilizing force, threatening the balance of the Arctic and fuelling perceptions of regional disruption. In 205 articles, the circumpolar region is presented as a space where geopolitical tensions are intensifying due to the significant increase in NATO's presence and exercises. This theme is frequently associated with the absurdity of the Russian threat, aimed at discrediting concerns about the power's military activity. Moscow's muscular presence is deliberately reduced to harmless gestures. For example, the articles emphasize Russia's military activities as non-threatening or in compliance with international law, while stressing the superior number of NATO military installations compared with those of Russia.  However, observations by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Reuters point to a strategic reality favorable to Moscow, whose military presence in the Arctic Circle notably exceeds that of NATO by around a third in terms of bases. A third major theme highlights the idea that the Arctic states are under the direct influence of the United States, describing these countries as pawns in a power game where Washington imposes its interests. In this vision, NATO members, including Canada, are depicted as lacking autonomy and entirely subject to American hegemony. This simplistic but recurring hierarchical framework (72 articles) denounces the subordination of NATO allies to Washington's will, creating a clear opposition between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and Russia on the other. In press articles, the three themes are frequently juxtaposed and combined to offer a coherent image of the Arctic: a space where NATO, as an external actor, exacerbates tensions and where Russian initiatives are systematically demined and legitimized. Added to this are three secondary themes: sanctions by Arctic states harm their own interests, the USA and NATO are poor guests, and American colonialism. These are combined with the three main themes and serve to accentuate the idea that NATO, led by the USA, is the instigator of unjustified regional escalation. Thus, the sanctions imposed by the Arctic countries on Russia are portrayed as being dictated by the USA and unjustified due to the absence of a Russian threat. Similarly, the Russian press links the theme of Arctic states' subordination to Washington to the idea that the US and NATO are bad hosts, accusing the White House of imposing military installations on the territory of their allies and worsening environmental degradation. The impact of the invasion of Ukraine on Russian communications strategies Russia's invasion of Ukraine has profoundly transformed international relations, also impacting Arctic regional dynamics. In response to Russia's military aggression, Western states suspended their cooperation with Russia within the Arctic Council and other regional organizations. Against this backdrop, Russia has stepped up its efforts to denounce NATO. The theses of the military Alliance as a destabilizing element and of Russia's non-threatening presence are gaining prominence in press articles. In addition to attempting to discredit the Finnish and Swedish candidacies, accusations of the expansion of the Western military coalition are reflected in the denunciation of the multiplication of its activities and military infrastructures in the polar region. In response to growing isolation in the North, news agencies multiplied stories about “the idea of a Russian threat is absurd” and “the Arctic states are pawns of the United States” in the period following the invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, this Russian isolation is accompanied by a novelty in terms of narrative. Indeed, in its media discourses, Russia demonstrates that it is seeking to diversify its partnerships in the Arctic by engaging with a wide range of countries. Analysis of press articles also highlights a Russian strategy that relies on exploiting geopolitical tensions in other regions to reinforce a sense of solidarity with its non-Western partners. By linking issues in the Arctic to those in other areas, such as the Indo-Pacific, Russian communications seek to project an image of a responsible, non-threatening global player, while criticizing the actions of the United States and NATO. Russian media develop narratives in which Western military forces are portrayed as agents of destabilization, while Russia is presented as a peaceful actor. This discourse, reminiscent of Cold War tensions, stages an alliance between Russia and China in opposition to the United States and its allies. The aim is to draw a binary picture in which the West appears as the aggressor, while Russia and its partners pose as defenders of an equitable international order. To support these narratives, the Russian media, while omitting their own flagrant violation of international law, denounce, for example, the aggressive posture of the United States and its refusal to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, presenting these actions as contrary to international law, hostile and destabilizing. Policy considerations and recommendations for Canada By amplifying the Western threat while minimizing the scale of Russian actions, disinformation constitutes a major strategic challenge for Canada, as it can disrupt the way the country and its allies perceive Arctic security and orient their policies. This phenomenon jeopardizes international efforts to counter Russian geopolitical ambitions and undermines the stability of the Arctic region. It risks diverting attention from regional challenges, making it more difficult to develop common defense and governance strategies. What's more, this misinformation can divide Canadian public opinion and manipulate markets to Russia's advantage, creating internal tensions and disrupting Canada's strategic priorities. Although Canada has certain tools at its disposal to counter disinformation, such as rapid response mechanisms, these are not sufficient to deal with this destabilizing threat as a whole. Faced with a rapidly changing Arctic, marked by competing interests and accessibility challenges, informed decision-making depends on access to quality information. It is therefore essential that Canada work with its allies to develop monitoring tools to detect and respond to Russian disinformation campaigns in real time. Mechanisms must also be developed to rapidly provide accurate and verifiable information, particularly on military deployments or NATO activities in the region. The creation or reinforcement of rapid response teams dedicated to disseminating reliable information during key moments of tension, such as deployments or visits to the Arctic, is essential. Such transparency would limit the impact of misinformation and maintain a coherent strategic position for Canada. About the authors Julie Renaud is a researcher at the Observatoire de la politique et de la sécurité de l'Arctique (OPSA) and at the Observatoire de géopolitique of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies. Her research focuses on strategic, security and defense issues in the Arctic.  Mathieu Landriault is the director of the Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique (OPSA). He is lecturing in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa and the School of Conflict Studies at Saint Paul University. ## The Network at a Glance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-network-at-a-glance/ Modified: 2020-10-13 > Here is the Strategic Analysis Network promotional video! Discover the promotional video of the Strategic Analysis Network. ## The New Forms of War URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-new-forms-of-war/ Modified: 2022-10-24 > Get the book The New Forms of War, the second volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in French only. Get the book The New Forms of War, the second volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in French only. A new generation of renowned experts and informed observers of the current operations delivers here their enlightened points of view, accessible to the public at large and accompanied by a rich infographic. The various contributions in this book are from the French-speaking platform of analysis of international issues Le Rubicon. Le Rubicon will publish small books aimed at the general public, which will address, clearly and precisely, the new burning issues related to international news. Each month, starting in April 2022, Les Équateurs will publish a book of approximately 128 to 144 pages, at a price of 10 to 12 euros, summarizing the work of the experts of the Le Rubicon platform. ## The Origins and Ulterior Consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Barometer of Russia’s Relations With Turkey URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-origins-and-ulterior-consequences-of-the-nagorno-karabakh-war-barometer-of-russias-relations-with-turkey/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report examines the origins and consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, a conflict that has been frozen for twenty-two years. The Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which began on September 27, lasted nearly two months and is said to have claimed more than 10,000 lives, twice as many on the Azeri side. It took the whole world by surprise. Yet, there is nothing surprising about it. It was a conflict frozen for twenty-two years and therefore practically forgotten, except of course, by the two small states involved. If it has had significant media coverage, it is because of the current international situation and the dimension of the new issues that it reveals in the international policy of post-Soviet Russia and the search for its place in the world. Russia's Apparent Weakness During the first month of the war, and beyond, Russia appeared hesitant and even incapable of supporting and defending Armenia, which was and remains its military ally. It is indeed part of the CSTO (Organization of the Collective Security Treaty), the alliance set up by Vladimir Putin in 2002, which he saw as the hard core of Russia's allies and which is wrongly compared to a NATO from the east. It has six of the former Soviet republics and Armenia has a Russian military base. It is understandable why Azerbaijan never joined. It was partially dismembered by Armenia soon after the end of the USSR. Dismembered on the one hand by the capture of Nagorno-Karabakh which was an autonomous region comprising 80% of Armenians, and on the other hand by the conquest of territories which extend far beyond the Armenian enclave. Azerbaijan thus lost 14% of its territory; Karabakh accounting for 9%. In the chaos that reigned in Moscow in 1992, public opinion was clearly in favor of Armenia. Russian military groups still poorly controlled by Yeltsin lent a hand to the Armenian fighters. In 1993 after the end of hostilities, 800,000 Azeris had left the conquered territories and 400,000 Armenians had emigrated to Armenia in the wake of two pogroms which were assimilated to the Armenian genocide. Russia's military passivity during Azerbaijan's reconquest of most of the territories lost at the turn of the century, including part of Karabakh, was justified by Vladimir Putin on grounds of international law. He argued, as if to justify himself, that the self-proclaimed independence of Nagorno-Karabakh had never been recognized either by Russia or even by Armenia; which is strictly correct. However, he forgets to say that if Armenia did not do it, it was at the request and even at the request of Boris Yeltsin's Russia after the 1994 ceasefire. History explains things well. We were then in the midst of inter-ethnic wars of secession in the former Yugoslavia with their procession of horrors that would have been unthinkable in Europe a few years earlier. Mainly responsible for these wars, Serbia has been ostracized from the nations. As a result, the revision of the borders of the post-Soviet states was a taboo subject in Moscow for ultra-Westernists in Yeltsin's entourage whose primary objective was to see Russia “join the ranks of the civilized world,” to use their terms.[1] On November 17th, shortly after the cessation of hostilities in Azerbaijan, Vladimir Putin gave a very long interview to explain and justify Russia's behavior during the conflict. Speaking as if he had been a neutral arbiter between the two sides, however, he criticized Armenia, but not Azerbaijan at all.[2] To do so, he referred to the Minsk Group which had been established in 1994 and jointly chaired by the United States, Russia and France (in the spirit of the end of the Cold War) to find a solution to the conflict which would be acceptable to both parties and which has never been able to succeed despite several attempts. Putin underlined that in 2013 he had proposed, with the agreement of the two other co-presidents of the Group, a restitution by Armenia of seven Azeri districts to ease the situation and to be able to settle the status of Karabakh more easily. Yerevan was opposed to it to keep an important means of pressure in order to obtain the renunciation of this territory. In other words, according to him, it was Armenia's intransigence that was blocking a thaw of the situation. Putin also claimed that a few weeks after the start of the war in October, the President of Azerbaijan had agreed to conclude a ceasefire on the sole condition that former Azeri citizens, especially those of the city of Shusha, could return to Karabakh. He said he was surprised that the Armenian president refused to take up this proposal. If throughout the armed conflict Russia appeared to be losing influence and incapable of influencing the course of events, we subsequently saw that this was a deliberate choice. We were going to witness a major recovery in its role with the end of hostilities. The Military Successes of Azerbaijan Backed by Turkey Even before the first Karabakh war, Azerbaijan's relations with Russia were already very bad and only worsened thereafter, even if Moscow was not responsible for it. The economic collapse, one of the worst in the former USSR, and the absence of armed forces worthy of the name largely explain its defeat. The political chaos began to end soon after the 1994 ceasefire, with the rise to power of a high-caliber political figure: Heydar Aliyev. Along with Mikhail Gorbachev, Aliyev had been one of two members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the USSR that Yuri Andropov was considering in 1984 to succeed him as Party Secretary-General. After his death in 2003 he was replaced by his son Ilham Alyev, still in place. In the years following their accession to power, Azerbaijan's economic recovery was quite spectacular, thanks to the completion of several large projects to export oil to Turkey, which benefited greatly, both as a consumer and as a consumer. transit route to Europe. We think here of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline which covers a route of 1,768 kilometers to arrive on the Mediterranean and of that of 1,300 kilometers from Baku to Russia at the port of Novorossiysk for export to Europe. It is not necessary to insist on the very heavy dependence of Turkey for its imports of Russian gas. These major economic ties have necessarily fostered important political ties, but vary between the three countries. In October 2009, after years and years of hostility, two memoranda of understanding were signed between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The first aimed to establish diplomatic relations between the two States, to recognize their common border as definitive and thus to allow commercial exchanges. The second aimed to seek compromises on the issues that separated them. In Yerevan, consideration was given to diluting the demand for recognition of the genocide of 1915 by a project for a joint study of the events that took place then. Another commission was to seek a compromise on the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. The event sparked an uproar in Baku, where there were threats to suspend relations with Ankara and to cancel plans for new oil agreements. But, almost a year later, under pressure from the Armenian diaspora, the Yerevan Parliament rescinded the signed protocols. The common hostility of Azerbaijan and Turkey towards Armenia was markedly reinforced. It is somewhat astonishing that the new war for Nagorno-Karabakh was not foreseen long before the outbreak of hostilities despite constant and strong tension. The balance of power, both military and economic, between the two parties had nothing to do with that of the first war. Azeri soldiers under the flag numbered 67,000 and Armenia numbered 45,000. As for tanks and other armed vehicles, Armenia had 529 and 1,000, respectively, while Azerbaijan had 665 and 1,637. The total number of combat planes and helicopters was 127 on the Azeri side and 65 on the Armenian side. In 2019, Yerevan's defense budget was $1.8 billion and Baku's was $645 million. Despite all this superiority, Ilham Aliyev considered it prudent both politically and militarily to ask for direct aid from Turkey. As we know, it was Turkey, which provided the drones which proved to be very effective and which sent very high-level officers to coordinate if not even direct the operations. There were also reports of mercenaries from the Turkish minority of Syria who fought the Assad regime before they had to take refuge in Turkey. Russia's Decisive Comeback Throughout the Forty-Four Day War, Putin called for a ceasefire. He succeeded in obtaining it, or possibly imposing it, after Azerbaijan had recaptured almost all the territory surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and a not insignificant part of it. We do not know the content of the many talks he had with Aliyev and Erdogan. However, based on various signs one can believe that they were very harsh and stormy. Three weeks after the start of hostilities, during a meeting in Istanbul between Ukrainian President Zelensky and his counterpart Erdogan, the latter reaffirmed to him that Turkey refused to recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia. We know that he openly supports the claims of the Tatar minority who accounts for 12% of the population of the peninsula. With his provocative bent, Erdogan went further and even told Zelensky, in a joint statement, that he would help Ukraine join the ranks of NATO. He knows very well that it is in order to block such an eventuality that Putin supports the rebellion of Donbass which is still going on. Putin succeeded in imposing the ceasefire before Armenia totally lost Karabakh. It is certain that it is Azerbaijan which chose to accept the ceasefire and which had to put Turkey in front of its decision. In doing so, Ilham Alyiev has shown that he gives a clear geopolitical preference to Russia. By asking him to agree not to completely restore the territorial integrity of his country, Putin wanted to avoid a total and catastrophic defeat of his Armenian ally. He will be indebted to his Azeri counterpart. And that's not all he owes him. To guarantee the cease-fire, the agreements require the deployment of a Russian military contingent of 2,000 men in Azeri territory, around the small area of ​​Karabakh, for a renewable period of five years. For the first time since the end of the USSR, Russian military forces will be stationed in Azerbaijan. Before the publication of the terms of the ceasefire, it was announced in Istanbul that Turkish military personnel would join the peacekeeping forces. It has not happened. At most, a few Turkish observers could be accommodated in a cease-fire monitoring center. Note that this agreement says nothing at all about the future of Karabakh. The cease-fire is renewable after five years. Putin's skill in securing such a compromise is quite remarkable. Armenia's access to Karabakh is now guaranteed by the Russian military forces. In return, and this is a major concession for Armenia, which has accepted the construction of a road on its territory which will allow Azerbaijan to reach Nakhichevan, which is an important part of its landlocked territory between Armenia and Iran. Until now, land communications from Azerbaijan to its autonomous region needed to pass through Iran. Azerbaijan would thus obtain an exit towards Turkey with which it has no border.[3] It was certainly a very difficult concession for Putin to obtain. However, it remains to be seen when and how this route can be taken. Source: Map of Azerbaijan with Nagorno-Karabakh and the zone controlled by the Armenian army until November 2020. Check out the original file here. A few words stand out about Iran’s attitude during the conflict. It should be noted first of all that there are more than twice as many Azeris in Iran as in Azerbaijan; or 23 million compared to 10 million. On both sides, the vast majority of these are Shia, as are the vast majority of Iran's population. Relations between the two states have often been difficult. Notably due to the fact that Israel accounted for 60% of Azerbaijan's arms purchases between 2015 and 2019 according to SIPRI figures; the rest coming from Russia and Turkey. It was after much hesitation and because of the weight of its Azeri population that Tehran supported Azerbaijan. If the war had lasted a few more days, Azerbaijan would have reconquered all of its territory, unless Russia entered the war. Did Putin have to threaten to do so? We may find out one day. Anyway, during his very long press conference of November 17, and contrary to his comments about Armenia, he showed great deference to Aliyev and even Turkey. In response to journalists' questions regarding the major support given by Turkey to Azerbaijan, he replied: “Azerbaijan is an independent and sovereign state and it has every right to choose its allies as it wishes.” He would certainly not say the same thing with regard to Georgia and Ukraine. You could say that Turkey has a very special status in its relations with Russia. Given that the ceasefire of 9 November says absolutely nothing about the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, there is a serious risk of returning to the conflict that was frozen for 25 years. How long would a new one last? If the road link planned in Armenia between the two pieces of Azerbaijan can be made, it should lead to a relaxation between the two states. The best to be hoped for in these conditions would be a formula of dual membership of Karabakh with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Is it possible? The future will tell. The Difficult Good Relations Between Russia and Turkey In the simplest terms, what explains these good relations are their disappointments and disillusions. Most recent in the case of Turkey, with the Western world. These disappointments and disillusions concern Europe more in the case of Turkey, and more the United States in the case of Russia. With the annexation of Crimea and above all because of the Donbass war and its thousands of deaths, Russia was ostracized from the entire Western world. As for Turkey, it must be remembered that during the first years of his power in Ankara in 2003, Erdogan made many efforts to meet the demands of the European Union so that Turkey could join, only to eventually be refused. He subsequently cultivated nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire as well as for Islam to give Turkey an international mission, without of course wanting to reconstitute it. Geography and history therefore ensure that there is a partial, but not negligible, overlap of what Moscow calls the “sphere of legitimate interests” of the two states; the term sphere of influence having become politically incorrect. Despite all the friction that has arisen between them, Russia attaches great importance to Turkey because it sees it as a very important factor of multipolarity in the current international situation. We touch here on what has become the central objective of Russia's international policy since it was taken over in January 1996 by Yevgeny Primakov, an eminent scholar and great master of geopolitics, in the context and due to the second enlargement of NATO to the East. It was with China that Russia founded in 2001 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), one of whose first objectives was to promote multipolarity in the world by strengthening their economic, political and military ties. It is in this context, we see major military maneuvers took place between China, Russia and some of its allies in Central Asia[4]. With varying statuses, several other states have joined the SCO, which has become the main focus and promoter of multipolarity. In 2012, Turkey applied to become a full member of the SCO. Erdogan obtained a special status there, Turkey being a member of NATO; a unique case. In November 2016, a few days after the Parliament in Strasbourg suspended its negotiations with Ankara for its accession to the European Union, the SCO entrusted it with the presidency of a consultation group on energy issues. With strong support from Moscow, it was the first time that the SCO gave such a mandate to a special status member. Turkey's geopolitical importance to Russia is also, and perhaps even more, due to its purchase of Russian S-400 air defense missiles, which are among the most sophisticated weaponry Moscow has. This is an unprecedented event in the history of NATO. Erdogan resisted numerous pressures on this from the United States, including the application sanctions. Despite this, a second purchase contract was concluded last August. Because of the resulting disruptive effects on NATO cohesion, Russia can only hope that Turkey will remain in the alliance. In conclusion, it should be noted that Russia is currently paying a fairly low political price compared to what Turkey could be worth in terms of multipolarity. It is within the Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle which seeks to restore the territorial integrity of Syria that Russia takes more account of the interests of Turkey which wants to establish a buffer zone on its borders to prevent a possible passage of Kurdish forces. For Erdogan, both internal and external Kurdish demands are the main danger facing Turkey. What Can Canada Do from So Far Away? On October 22, in the context of the events mentioned above, but not directly related to them, Vladimir Putin addressed a large audience of foreign academics and editorial writers from the United States, Canada, and others as part of its annual meeting which is called the “Valdai Discussion Club.” He made remarks of much more arrogance than usual: Let me assure you dear friends that we objectively assess our potentialities: our intellectual, territorial, economic and military potential. I am referring here to our current options and our overall potential. As we strengthen this country and look at what is happening in the world and in other countries, I would like to say to those who still expect to see Russia's strength gradually decline, the only thing that worries us is to catch a cold at your funeral. We see in these words a compensatory reflection of the banishment of Russia in the Western world and the multiple sanctions to which it has been subjected in recent years. If Putin has not yet hailed Joe Biden's electoral victory, it is certainly not out of deference to Donald Trump. The reason is that he expects worse and that he seeks, as we sometimes say, “to raise the bar” for compromise. Canada has already been able to help facilitate a significant easing of tensions between the United States and Russia. It is not clear that it still has the capacity. [1] It should be noted for this reason that in 1992, Yeltsin refused to follow up on a very majority resolution of what was still called the Supreme Soviet of Russia concerning Crimea. This resolution demanded its return to Russia, arguing that its transfer to Ukraine by Khrushchev in 1954 was illegal because the Soviet Constitution demanded that a change of borders be agreed with the republics concerned and not just a decision of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; which had not been respected. Crimea’s populations was more than 70% Russian then. [2] The text of his remarks deserves to be read in full, click here. [3] We can clearly see in the map all this arbitrariness of the borders established by Stalin. [4] It is worth noting the recent and colossal "Vostok-2018" maneuvers, both land and naval, conducted last September in the Far East by Russia with a very important participation of China. They mobilized more than 300,000 people. ## The Perils of Attractiveness: Small States on NATO’s Eastern Flank Facing American Uncertainty URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-perils-of-attractiveness-small-states-on-natos-eastern-flank-facing-american-uncertainty/ Modified: 2025-07-17 Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House for a second term presents a significant challenge to the security approach of the countries on the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While these states have begun to review their strategic priorities following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, they now face uncertainties regarding the future commitment of the United States to their security, not to mention the possibility of a hypothetical rapprochement between the United States and Russia. This contribution proposes to address these issues through a comparative study of the national security strategies adopted by four small nations on NATO’s eastern flank following Russia’s aggression in February 2022: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia. These nations are part of the so-called Bucharest format, a group of nine countries established in 2015 through a joint initiative by Poland and Romania. In addition to these two countries, the group includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia. Their selection is justified by the fact that these nations have revised their national security strategies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Their geographical distribution along NATO’s eastern flank, as well as the different trajectories their relations with Russia have taken, make it possible to analyze them through the lens of both differences and similarities in their strategic approaches. Finally, they can be examined through the analytical category of small states. As such, these small states are not in a position to lead strategic discussions within NATO and the European Union (EU), but their voices cannot be entirely ignored. Indeed, they play a role in decision-making processes within both institutions, which operate by consensus, especially given their vulnerability to external influences that could undermine any form of unity. This contribution proposes, in a first part, to compare the content of their new national security strategies, and in a second part, to discuss the implications of possible changes in the foreign policy orientation of a second Trump administration with regard to European security. This article suggests that such changes, if confirmed, could place these small NATO eastern flank states in an extremely delicate security position; moreover, these countries currently lack credible alternatives to the commitment of the United States and NATO. Indeed, all of them have pursued a policy of cultivating U.S. engagement to ensure their security, without having yet seriously considered a broader diversification of their security cooperation within the EU. National Security Strategies The practice of making national security strategies public is relatively recent. It was established in the U.S. in 1986, when Congress required each president to publish a national security strategy. In Europe, the practice is not yet uniformly widespread. For example, Germany published its very first national security strategy in 2023. In other countries, there is no systematic tradition of developing such strategies. Typically, the need for a national security strategy is triggered by significant developments at the international level. For example, the 2014 Russia-Ukraine crisis, followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, led several EU member states to adopt new national security strategies. These strategies were adopted by governments and are generally subject to a vote in national parliaments. Among the strategies analyzed in this contribution, only Bulgaria’s 2025 national strategy has not yet been approved by the National Assembly. Although the relevance of these documents is sometimes questioned, they nevertheless serve important functions. First, they provide a common framework for understanding national security objectives across all levels of government and bureaucracy. Second, they enable national security priorities to be communicated to allies, as well as to potential adversaries and enemies. Third, they share these priorities with various non-state actors, such as analysts, experts, and academics, although these documents rarely attract public attention. Small States: Between Attractiveness and Hedging The concept of small states is the subject of much debate among international relations specialists. One approach defines them based on quantitative criteria linked to their economic and military resources. Another approach favors more qualitative criteria stemming from their behavior on the international stage. By “small states,” we refer to those that combine an awareness of their limited status, rooted in their historical experiences of dependence on major powers, with a sense of vulnerability on the international stage. As such, these states have few strategic options. When part of an alliance system backed by a patron power, such as the Atlantic Alliance, they can choose to either strengthen military coordination with the United States, seek greater strategic autonomy, or combine both approaches over the short and long term. For example, faced with the Russian threat, Poland has pursued a policy of attractiveness, multiplying gestures of support towards the United States during Donald Trump’s first term and prioritizing purchases of American weapons over European alternatives. An intermediate solution for these states could lie in a strategy of internal hedging consisting of varying their security options within their own alliance system. In the case of NATO, this strategy would involve prioritizing arms purchases from other member countries of the Alliance, not solely from the United States. In other words, small states on NATO’s eastern flank can choose between these different strategies. The choice of the attractiveness logic, which would consist of betting everything on the United States, may prove risky if they begin to doubt the reliability of their protector, as was already the case during Donald Trump’s first term. These doubts have significantly deepened with the arrival of the new Trump administration. Faced with the Russian threat, these small states on NATO’s eastern flank might therefore opt instead for a strategy of internal hedging  – or even consider a combination of both approaches: one in the short term, the other in the long term. This path could lead them, for example, to invest more political capital in a security system anchored in the European Union. However, it must be noted that these strategic choices are proving more difficult for some countries, especially those that have decided to prioritize their relationship with the United States by reinforcing their military dependence on it, at the expense of a deeper commitment to promoting an autonomous European defence. Comparative Analysis of National Security Strategies The four documents analyzed here are: Estonia’s National Security Concept, the Czech Republic’s Security Strategy, Latvia’s National Defense Concept, and Bulgaria’s National Defense Strategy. The Estonian concept, adopted in 2023, follows the one from 2017. The Latvian and Czech documents also date from 2023 and replace the previous strategies adopted in 2015 for both countries. Bulgaria’s new security strategy is the most recent: it was published in March 2025 and replaces the one adopted in 2011. With the exception of the Bulgarian case, where the strategy has not yet been debated in parliament, these documents were adopted by a broad majority in the respective national assemblies. In Estonia’s case, the new national security strategy was published on the eve of the 2023 parliamentary elections. The campaign thus provided an opportunity for the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE, a far-right populist party) to highlight its disagreements with the country’s security priorities, even though these remain fairly consensual. In general, with the exception of Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, these national strategies confirm the priorities established in previous versions, with significant nuances mainly concerning the rise of the Russian threat, the emergence of the Chinese threat, and the resurgence of conventional threats. Differences and Threat Identification The documents differ in how they prioritize their areas of focus. The Bulgarian document emphasizes defense capabilities and military modernization, highlighting the importance of the Black Sea region and cooperation with NATO and EU allies. The Czech strategy places strong emphasis on internal security, economic security, and cybersecurity. It underscores the need to counter hybrid threats, disinformation, and extremism. The Estonian document emphasizes social cohesion and resilience, economic security, and international cooperation, highlighting the importance of energy independence, a digital society, and cybersecurity, while explicitly identifying the risks of hybrid warfare waged by Russia, which could justify invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Latvian document prioritizes defense of the entire national territory, public participation in national defense, and strengthening the armed forces. It emphasizes resilience, the capacity to act, and the will to defend the state. In summary, although the four strategies share a comprehensive approach, a commitment to collective defense, an emphasis on resilience, and acknowledgment of major threats, they differ in the prioritization of their strategic pillars and in the relative importance they attach to the roles of the EU and NATO in their security frameworks. Regarding threat identification, all four documents consider Russia to be the primary threat. It is viewed as a direct threat to the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia, affecting the European security architecture, while Bulgaria mentions the possibility of a confrontation between Russia and NATO. The identification of Russia as a threat is a new development in both the Czech and Bulgarian security strategies. In the former, the previous document was still framed within the post-9/11 counterterrorism paradigm. In the latter, the shift is equally as notable: in 2014, in an interim document drafted ahead of the NATO summit in Wales, the Bulgarian government had to downplay the importance of the Russian threat compared to an earlier version of the text. At the time, Bulgarian foreign policy was still focused on maintaining good relations with Russia, especially in the area of gas and oil supplies. In second place in the hierarchy of threats, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia cite China, though far behind Russia, while the Bulgarian strategy merely mentions Chinese activities in the Indo-Pacific region and its influence in the Western Balkans. Bulgaria has indeed pursued a policy of strengthening political and economic ties with China. This policy was formalized in 2019 by the signing of a strategic partnership between the two countries. It’s worth noting that the mention of the Chinese threat is a new addition in both the Czech and Bulgarian strategies, having been absent from their previous national strategies. Other threats mentioned include: cyber threats (Czech Republic), migration and terrorism (Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Bulgaria), risks to economic security (Czech Republic), and economic dependence on authoritarian regimes (Estonia). Latvia also mentions hybrid threats. Regarding the prioritization of threats, all four strategies agree on giving precedence to conventional threats over hybrid ones, although with some nuance. The Bulgarian strategy recognizes hybrid threats but emphasizes military preparedness, collective defense within NATO, and the development of national armed forces. The Czech strategy highlights the danger of armed conflict while also stressing the persistent threat of cyber warfare, requiring a multifaceted and comprehensive approach. The Latvian document also prioritizes military threats, although these are viewed as part of Russia’s broader strategy. It even describes a potential scenario in which Russia launches a sudden military attack to seize a specific territory, followed by threats to use nuclear weapons to deter NATO reinforcements. The Roles of the United States, NATO, and the European Union Although all four strategies emphasize the importance of NATO and the European Union for their security, NATO is prioritized as the main source of deterrence. The role of the EU is widely seen as secondary; only the Czech and Bulgarian strategies explicitly mention the EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defense. All four national strategies consider the partnership with the U.S. as crucial for their security. This importance is primarily expressed through NATO membership and the strength of the transatlantic bond. The Latvian strategy places particular emphasis on its bilateral strategic partnership with the U.S., including the need for a continued U.S. military presence. Bulgaria and Estonia also underline the critical role of the U.S. within NATO and in broader allied cooperation. The Czech Republic emphasizes transatlantic unity, within both NATO and the EU, as being vital to its security interests. With regard to deterrence, all strategies highlight the superiority of NATO’s deterrent capability compared to that of the EU. In this regard, the presence of NATO troops on their territories is unanimously recognized as essential. Only the Latvian strategy places additional emphasis on the importance of the presence of US and Canadian troops stationed on its soil. All strategies underscore the need to increase military spending, with some setting specific targets: Czech Republic: 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024, with further increases planned, up to 3% in 2030 Estonia: at least 3%, with a target of 5% by 2026 Latvia: 2.5% in 2025, 3% in 2027, then 4% the following year. These targets were increased to 5% following the NATO summit held in The Hague on June 25, 2025, though following different trajectories. The Czech Republic announced an increase in defense spending to 3% by 2030, aiming to reach 5% by 2032 at the earliest. Estonia and Latvia both announced plans to reach 5% as early as 2026. Bulgaria, initially reluctant to commit to specific figures, had to balance its public deficit reduction goals – a condition for joining the eurozone – with its defense ambitions. In this context, the new government led by Rossen Jelyazkov announced a trajectory aiming for 2.5% of GDP by 2028, rising to 5% by 2035. Strategic Autonomy and Dependence Although strategic autonomy has been a central theme in EU defense and security discourse since 2020, none of the four countries fully embrace this concept in their national strategies. The Czech Republic and Estonia instead emphasize reducing their dependence on authoritarian states, particularly in the economic and energy sectors. Bulgaria focuses on energy diversification and independence, while Latvia highlights economic resilience and the development of its defense industry. Regarding military procurement, Bulgaria and Latvia show a stronger preference for U.S.-made weapons over European ones, due to their strategic partnerships and participation in financial assistance programs. For example, in 2024, Latvia received a total of $80 million USD for the purchase of military equipment, including HIMARS systems and Black Hawk helicopters, not including the acquisition of coastal defense missile systems worth $105 million USD. Bulgaria is not far behind: in 2019, it acquired eight F-16 Block 70 fighter jets for its air force. In March 2025, the Bulgarian parliament approved the purchase of Javelin anti-tank missiles worth $82 million USD. For Estonia and the Czech Republic, no procurement source has been explicitly prioritized. In Estonia’s case, the country has notably diversified its military purchases. In 2024, Germany was Estonia’s leading arms supplier, well ahead of the United States and France. In the Czech case, the national security strategy emphasizes domestic defense production while also recognizing the importance of interoperability of acquired equipment. Consequences of a Shift in the U.S. Approach to European Security Donald Trump’s stances on NATO, the US presence in Europe, and the resolution of the war in Ukraine have caused a major shock in the countries on NATO’s eastern flank. These states now find themselves in a doubly delicate situation. On the one hand, their deliberate dependence on the U.S. makes any serious investment in a European defense extremely complicated. On the other hand, in the event of a major divergence between the U.S. and the EU, regarding Russia or even China, these small states would face dilemmas of dual loyalty. In truth, the consequences of a shift in the U.S. approach to European security must be examined on two levels: the strategic level and the level of national policies. At the strategic level, the emphasis placed on NATO (and secondarily on the U.S.) as the cornerstone of their security, places the small NATO eastern flank states before a considerable challenge. Donald Trump’s recent statements about the U.S. nuclear umbrella have cast doubt on NATO’s nuclear deterrence in the region. Announcements of potential American troop withdrawals in the context of peace talks with Russia would only deepen the security challenges for the four states studied. Worse still, the need to maintain good relations with the U.S., particularly for Estonia and Latvia, could place them in a position where they may be forced to choose sides if major political or strategic differences arise. This already happened in July 2021 when Lithuania agreed to open a Taiwanese representative office in its capital, as a sign of support for the U.S. administration’s policy, at the expense of the EU’s “One China” stance. By contrast, EU-provided deterrence is not considered sufficient or capable of replacing NATO’s. The EU is recognized for its contribution to security, but its role is generally considered complementary to that of NATO. Its strengths lie in its ability to address a broad range of security threats through both civilian and military tools, promote regional stability, and encourage cooperation among member states. However, the influence of Donald Trump’s policy is felt not only at the strategic level, but it also affects public opinion and domestic policies in these small eastern NATO countries. National cohesion on security issues is far from solid, and “Trumpist” rhetoric resonates with a significant portion of leaders and public opinions in Central and Eastern European countries. Latvia and Estonia both have right-wing populist parties: National Alliance in the former and EKRE in the latter. EKRE, which finished second in the March 2023 elections, has taken increasingly Kremlin-aligned positions, while supporting increased defense spending and opposing Estonia’s participation in a potential European reassurance force in Ukraine. In Latvia, the National Alliance, founded by oligarch Ainārs Šlesers, embraces many of the ideas promoted by the new Trump administration, despite maintaining anti-Russian positions. In the Czech Republic, research indicates that the broadly pro-European and international orientation that dominated between 1990 and 2013 is no longer as consensual or accepted since 2014. For example, the ANO party (“Yes” in Czech), led by former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has adopted rhetoric similar to Trump’s regarding the resolution of the war in Ukraine. In Bulgaria, the situation is more complex. While the country has reoriented its foreign policy towards Russia since 2021, this shift remains incomplete and has not taken hold in public opinion. Furthermore, recent statements by leading political figures, including former Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, show increased support for positions advocated by Washington, rather than those promoted by Paris or Berlin. *** The small states on NATO’s eastern flank are particularly vulnerable to a shift in the U.S. approach to European security. All of them share the perception of a direct military threat from Russia, one that would only be emboldened by a U.S. disengagement and a weakening of the Atlantic Alliance. This highlights the limitations of their strategic choice, which relies almost exclusively on NATO and the U.S. to ensure their security. At the same time, as reflected in their respective strategies, none of these countries has yet considered the possibility of internal hedging within the NATO system. Such hedging could include, for example, increased political investment in a security system based on the European Union. So far, only Estonia has demonstrated some degree of hedging, at least in terms of its military procurement. Regarding the EU, none of these countries views it as a viable alternative to NATO for guaranteeing their security, but solely as a complementary entity. Furthermore, it is not certain that these countries are even in a position to fully support initiatives aimed at strengthening a European defense system, particularly if such projects involve deviating from the core strategic priorities of the United States. In other words, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal from European security and a weakening of NATO, any alternative is currently perceived by these small eastern-flank NATO states as likely to leave them in a situation of increased insecurity in the face of the Russian threat. This clearly illustrates the dangers of the logic of attractiveness towards the U.S. that these countries have so far adopted in terms of security. ## The Polysemy of the Security Community: Towards a “People-Centered” Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-polysemy-of-the-security-community-towards-a-people-centered-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-asean/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > In her article published in the International Studies Quarterly, Stéphanie Martel maintains that the construction of a security community can be understood as a process of discursive performance based on constant negotiation between competing conceptions of security and community. In her article published in the International Studies Quarterly, Stéphanie Martel maintains that the construction of a security community can be understood as a process of discursive performance based on constant negotiation between competing conceptions of security and community. This process, in other words, is inherently polysemic, omnidirectional, and contested. For the benefit of the Strategic Analysis Network, whose mandate includes the mobilization of research expertise for the Canadian defense community, she develops this original approach, taking ASEAN as a case study. Introduction On December 31, 2015, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) officially announced the establishment of its security community, despite not meeting its own criteria for forming one. Indeed, ASEAN has called itself a “security community” on numerous occasions since the start of the 21st century and remains an example often used by researchers of a “nascent” security community. However, it also departs from the way in which this concept is generally understood in International Relations, as a group of states having renounced the use of force as a legitimate means of conflict settlement. In the Asia-Pacific, as elsewhere in the world, building a security community today encompasses much more than the mere absence of war between states. Non-military and transnational challenges are an inescapable part of the mandate of security institutions around the world, not least due to the continued “securitization” of a growing number of issues previously considered to be outside the bounds of security governance. On the other hand, non-state actors play an increasingly active role in global governance, including in security. In other words, security governance is becoming increasingly diverse, both in the scope of its mandate and in the identity of its participants. In view of this diversification, a broader definition of the concept of security community is required. A security community can in fact be conceived as a collective in which members collaborate in order to protect a common referent against one or more sources of insecurity. By the same token, I argue that the construction of a security community can be understood as a process of discursive performance based on constant negotiation between competing conceptions of security and community. This process, in other words, is inherently polysemic, omnidirectional, and contested. First, the construction of a security community is influenced by distinct interpretations of (1) what the pursuit of security means for a given community and (2) where the boundaries of the community lie, thus making it polysemic. In other words, the security community holds several meanings at the same time for actors, and they are not easily reconciled. Second, this process is omnidirectional, as these distinct interpretations also lead the security community on different paths, pursued simultaneously. This situation can result in policy inconsistency, but otherwise helps to justify the relevance of institutions that embody the community on several fronts at the same time. Third, social agents draw on these competing interpretations to question how their counterparts participate in building the security community, making it a deeply contested process, which also has effects on the policies that end up being adopted. This contestation takes two distinct but interdependent forms, which I call “external” and “internal.” On the one hand, actors involved engage in an “external” form of contestation when proposing distinct, relatively coherent, but potentially incompatible versions of the security community as they participate in its construction. On the other hand, even when social agents converge on a single version of the security community, they still participate in an “internal” form of contestation by debating the specific meaning, limits, and political and security solutions associated with that version. To illustrate my argument, I draw on the case of ASEAN as a prime example of an institution that defines itself as a security community “in the making,” while grappling with the diverse nature of security governance in the 21st century. A better understanding of the spectrum of competing positions on regional security and the role of ASEAN in its pursuit is necessary to understand the policies adopted by actors in the region and to ensure effective participation of ASEAN’s “dialogue partners,” including Canada, in security governance in the Asia Pacific. Furthermore, it is necessary to take seriously the fundamental role that discourse plays in the development of this security community. Indeed, discourse has real political effects on the kind of policy responses developed and implemented by actors in this region to deal with insecurity, in the South China Sea as in Myanmar, or in the context of discussions on the Indo-Pacific regional order or the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or “Quad”). In this article, I am particularly interested in the effects on human security policies, but the impacts of this reality are observable across the spectrum of regional security issues. Polysemy in the security community ASEAN's attempt to form a security community has several objectives, with no clear hierarchy between them. Its main components are (1) an indirect, dialogue-based approach to the management of interstate conflict among states in the region, (2) an emphasis on “non-traditional” threats to the security of its member states, and (3) a limited overture to a “human dimension” of security, as part of a broader objective to transform itself into a “people-centered” community. The delineation of these distinct - and competing - objectives results from the diverse nature of security governance in the Asia-Pacific region, characterized by, on the one hand, a sustained process of securitization of non-military and transnational issues that goes back to the organization' formative years and, on the other hand, the increasing participation of a variety of non-state actors in regional governance - ex. experts and non-governmental organizations. Three “discourse strands” interact in the debate on ASEAN’s security community. Each strand conveys a particular version of the security community, which consists of a relatively coherent set of positions on the main source of regional insecurity, the referent object (s) (i.e., what needs to be secured), and the role of ASEAN in the pursuit of regional security. While these versions of the security community confront each other in the same context, they also support the (re)production of ASEAN’s identity as a security community “in the making.” In a first (non-traditional) version of the security community, regional insecurity is conceived as being mainly of transnational origin, undermining the capacity of states to exercise control over their borders. In this version, the regional community includes the ASEAN member states in accordance with its “One Southeast Asia” vision. The transnational domain from which the danger originates is located outside, but can sneak into the community, which needs to pool its resources to protect the sanctity of the common, national and regional territory against a variety of issues, mainly related to transnational crime (eg illicit trafficking, piracy, terrorism, cybercrime, etc.), but which have more recently extended to pandemics and environmental disasters. In this first version, the nature of insecurity is also presented as having fundamentally changed as a result of globalization, with the risk of interstate war being considered a thing of the past. A second (traditional) version of the security community suggests that regional insecurity stems primarily from the re-emergence of “traditional” security concerns, in the context of new tensions in the South China Sea (and the Korean Peninsula), as well as heightened rivalry between the United States and China. ASEAN is presented as having a particular role to play in fostering the conditions for peace between regional states, by acting as an “honest broker” of major power relations, by promoting dialogue on strategic challenges that affect the region, and by supporting the development of cooperation on non-sensitive security and defense issues. It is within this framework that ASEAN has developed its own “outlook” on the Indo-Pacific, in the face of a proliferation of external initiatives that are perceived as challenging its “centrality” in the regional security architecture. In a third (people-centered) version of the ASEAN security community, insecurity is presented as stemming from the pervasiveness of daily challenges to the survival, well-being, and dignity of the people of South East Asia. A great deal of mistrust still surrounds the notion of “human security” within ASEAN, which has, however, shown an increasing openness towards the recognition of a human dimension to security, which is notably visible in its recent adoption of the UN-led “Women, Peace and Security” agenda. This version presents human beings, collectively described as “the people,” as a referent object of regional security alongside the state. This concern manifests itself, more generally, in the extension of the group's objective of transforming into a “people-centered” community, which informs its position on various issues, such as the protection of victims of trafficking in persons, de-radicalization or, more recently and timidly, peacekeeping, according to a truncated and less controversial version of the responsibility to protect (R2P) principle. In what follows, I focus on this third version of the ASEAN security community to discuss how “internal” contestation operates between actors of different “tracks” of regional multilateralism (formal, informal and non-governmental). ASEAN's identity as a 'people-centered' community under challenge Participants in the debate on ASEAN’s security community who adhere to the “people-centered” version strongly believe that the organization should strive to better address challenges that affect the security of the people of Southeast Asia on a daily basis, and that the more ASEAN does on this front, the better. However, these actors openly disagree on the extent to which ASEAN should make room for “the people” in its security approach, whether on the identity of the populations included as well as their role in developing and implementing security policies. The clearest opposition to the official discourse of ASEAN comes from regional NGOs, which increasingly engage the regional process, in part because ASEAN itself makes space for them. NGO participation in the debate on the “people-centered community” takes place in three main ways, in which these actors face varying degrees of resistance from the government sector. First, NGOs advocate for a definition of regional security that leaves more room for a human referent object in ASEAN's approach to security in relation to the state, while governments favor the latter. Second, NGOs are also leveraging sources of discursive power to push ASEAN towards more substantive forms of civil society participation. Third, NGOs can often participate directly in the debate on the ASEAN security community even if they remain excluded from spaces sanctioned by the organization. When they encounter too much resistance, they fall back on ”taking it outside”, by organizing demonstrations or boycotts, as well as other, more confrontational and public modes of engagement that put the reputation of the organization at risk and push it to act. These discursive practices are observable in three specific issue areas. The first area sees NGOs advancing alternative positions on the nature of insecurity through their engagement of ASEAN on the issue of trafficking in persons. The second area concerns their promotion of a “people-driven” approach to the security community in order to reconfigure its boundaries as well as to ensure that civil society is involved in decision-making. The third area is reflected in advocacy work on the Rohingya crisis, which mainly takes part outside spaces organized or sanctioned by the organization. Together, these examples illustrate how NGOs claim the role of “meaning architects” in building a security community despite significant constraints to their participation in this process. This participation cannot be understood without taking the role that discourse plays in this story more seriously. Conclusion The construction of a security community can be understood as a polysemic, omnidirectional, and contested process, founded on meaning-making, the finality of which is always in motion. Discourse is not just rhetoric but structures the “realm of possibilities” in terms of security policies. Its mobilization in practice has concrete and real political and policy effects. Contestation plays a central part in this process. Distinguishing between external and internal forms of discursive contestation on the meaning of security and the boundaries of the community allows us to better understand how the construction of a security community takes place in practice, even when it remains a work in progress, including from the point of view of its own members. Several conceptions of security and adequate cooperative responses to “danger” co-exist and collide in Southeast Asia and within ASEAN. This reality remains poorly understood by ASEAN’s “dialogue partners,” including Canada, which seek to enhance their participation in security multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region while the implicit codes of regional governance continue to elude them. Effective participation in these processes requires a better understanding of the range of positions that exist in this region on the nature of insecurity, the boundaries of the regional community, and the role of ASEAN in security governance. It involves the recognition that these divergent positions, which are not reducible to “national” or coherent group positions, but sometimes co-exist within the same group or state, are legitimate, and can be reconciled.  The key here is not to determine which “version” of the security community is most representative of the region's security “reality” - they all are. These divergent positions constitute a collective but highly diversified repertoire from which the actors involved draw from when they devise, negotiate and implement security policies. Canada's effective participation in multilateralism in this region, its ability to offer a constructive contribution to regional security, and to promote Canadian interests and positions on Asia-Pacific security issues require better taking into account the polysemic character of this aspiring security community. ## The Power of Narrative: Disinformation, Strategy, and Prediction of Future Scenarios in the Russo-Ukrainian War URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-power-of-narrative-disinformation-strategy-and-prediction-of-future-scenarios-in-the-russo-ukrainian-war/ Modified: 2024-12-13 > The Russian-Ukrainian war, triggered by the Russian invasion of 2022, is not limited to military confrontations. At the heart of this... The Russian-Ukrainian war, triggered by the Russian invasion of 2022, is not limited to military confrontations. At the heart of this modern war lies an invisible but decisive battlefield: that of information. Narrative management, to mobilize both domestic and international public opinion, has become a central weapon for both Ukraine and Russia. The significant growth of social networks, and the use of disinformation as a political strategy, raise major questions for countries like Canada. How can we preserve our digital sovereignty in the face of foreign interference? What strategies can be adopted to protect citizens from information manipulation and strengthen their resilience in the face of fake news? Understanding how Ukraine secured its digital space, while thwarting Russian disinformation campaigns, offers crucial lessons on digital sovereignty and the protection of informational space. Narratives in conflict: facing international opinion Ukrainian narratives are articulated around Ukrainian defense and communication strategies. A striking example of how contemporary leaders use rhetoric to influence public opinion and strengthen their position is that of Volodymyr Zelensky, who made innovative use of social networks, exploiting communication centered on three key elements: personalization of the message, use of emotional rhetoric and mastery of global media space. On the one hand, by broadcasting short, emotional messages to the Ukrainian public, he consolidated his country's domestic resilience. On the other, a constant presence in the international media, while adapting his discourse to the cultures and historical references of foreign parliaments. The global media narrative has thus positioned Ukraine as a legitimate victim in need of international support. In military manuals, the principle of surprise is fundamental: revealing offensives in advance diminishes their impact. In Ukraine, however, communication about offensives seems to be part of a political strategy. Dependent on Western support, Ukraine uses these announcements to secure the continued support of its partners by showing that it retains prospects of success. Although the Russian General Staff is probably aware of these operations thanks to its intelligence capabilities, these statements are primarily aimed at public opinion and international partners. Russia, for its part, has developed a narrative centered on the defense of its strategic interests and the protection of certain Russian-speaking populations, thus justifying its actions in Ukraine. This narrative has been disseminated both at home and abroad, in an attempt to win the sympathy, or at least the neutrality, of other nations. It is important to note that Russia presents its actions as a “special operation”, seeking to minimize the scale of the offensive. This choice of terminology also aims to avoid the legal implications that the term “war” could entail, both domestically and internationally. It has also exploited historical references, such as the fight against Nazism during the Second World War, to legitimize its actions in the eyes of its own population and certain segments of international opinion. In particular, the Russian government denounces the association of Ukrainian forces with controversial figures such as the Azov Regiment, or the popularity of certain personalities such as Stepan Bandera. The war in Ukraine bears striking similarities to other conflicts, notably the situation in Gaza. In both cases, governments use narrative as a central element of their military strategy, seeking international support for their actions, despite criticism of international law. In Gaza, as in Ukraine, the narrative is built around the legitimacy of national defense in the face of a perceived threat, thereby justifying controversial military actions. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a recent example of disinformation emerged after the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Unverified claims by the Israeli media that “40 decapitated babies” had been discovered in a severely hit area. Although this story was relayed by various media and widely circulated internationally, it was later proven to be unfounded. Using images or stories of children in war is a powerful strategy, as it taps into a universal emotional register and symbolizes innocence. By portraying the enemy as insensitive to this innocence, these stories aim to demonize him in the eyes of the public, reinforcing the idea that he represents such an extreme threat that he does not even respect the lives of the most vulnerable. This kind of discourse is reminiscent of past examples, such as the “babies ripped from incubators” in Kuwait before the Gulf War in 1990, when dramatic testimonies were used to influence public opinion in favor of military intervention. Thus, the information warfare surrounding these children's stories not only attracts empathy, but also serves to dehumanize the enemy by reinforcing the international public's sense of moral urgency. The conflict in the Middle East has largely captured the attention of the American media, relegating the war in Ukraine to the background. This discrepancy contributed to a gradual loss of public interest in the situation in Ukraine, already present in political and media debates. While strategic analyst Jacques Baud argues that narratives directly shape military strategies, other analysts, such as British military historian Lawrence Freedman, suggest that the manipulation of information can sometimes fail to influence the outcome of conflicts. For example, Freedman points out that despite intense US propaganda prior to the Iraq war, the rapid collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime did not unfold as strategists had predicted. This phenomenon is a good illustration of how war communication can be exploited to shape the perception of reality in a conflict context, reinforcing the idea that “it's not so much what people think, but what they think about”, as Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw point out in their theory of agenda-setting. Controlling and protecting Ukrainian information space This apocryphal quotation from Rudyard Kipling remains pertinent: “The first casualty of war is always the truth.” Since the 1990s, Ukraine has been a playground for Russian influence, particularly through the media and digital infrastructures. However, it was after the events of 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbass, that Ukraine began to perceive its informational space as a domain to be protected, on a par with its physical territory. Since 2017, Ukraine has blocked Russian resources such as Yandex and VKontakte, considering them to be disinformation vectors. This policy intensified after 2022, with measures to secure the digital infrastructure against cyberattacks, including the relocation of public databases to servers in neighboring countries.  This blockade enabled Ukraine to limit Russian influence on its own digital territory and reduce the spread of pro-Russian narratives among the Ukrainian population. Under the martial law introduced on February 24, 2022, a decree signed by Volodymyr Zelensky consolidated the national TV channels into a single platform for streaming war news. This was followed by a ban on the broadcasting of the Sputnik and RT channels, a decision taken by the European Union in support of this blocking of Russian influence, despite the fact that the channels are only a few clicks away on the Internet. The development of an online Ukrainian cultural space, such as Ukraine.ua, aims to counter the historical domination of Russian content in Ukraine and build digital sovereignty. The creation of independent Ukrainian media and the promotion of local culture have helped build a distinct Ukrainian narrative, strengthening national resilience in the face of external influences. Disinformation and digital sovereignty: the battle of the social networks in Ukraine Social networks have played a crucial role in disseminating and amplifying these narratives. Ukraine has used Twitter, TikTok and other platforms to maintain international support, spread narratives of resilience, denounce war crimes, and reach a younger audience. The phenomenon of fake accounts used to propagate pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian messages is a concrete but small example of the complex structure of the media in our era. According to the Kiev Institute of Sociology, in October 2023, 44% of Ukrainians used Telegram as their primary source of information, surpassing television, used by 43% of citizens. Curiously, Ukraine has just recently banned the use of Telegram on all government personnel devices.  The principle of freedom of expression, advocated by digital media such as X (formerly Twitter), can lead to ambiguity about the impact of disinformation. The situation in Brazil is a case in point. In August 2024, the Brazilian Supreme Court ordered the suspension of the X platform, criticizing it for failing to comply with judicial injunctions aimed at combating disinformation. The decision was prompted by X's refusal to block accounts accused of disseminating false information, particularly in connection with supporters of former president Jair Bolsonaro. In response, X took steps to comply with Brazilian legal requirements, including blocking the offending accounts and paying the fines imposed. These actions led the Supreme Court to lift the platform's suspension in October 2024, allowing X to resume operations in Brazil.  This case highlights the tensions between freedom of expression and the responsibility of digital platforms in managing misinformation, as well as the challenges faced by governments in regulating online content while respecting fundamental rights. Initiatives such as StopFake.org, which aim to verify information and denounce fake news, illustrate how Ukraine is trying to reclaim its informational space, counting over 7,000 verified articles on the platform. Another innovative example is the use of the Diia application, initially designed to simplify administrative procedures. Since the Russian invasion, Diia has become a civilian intelligence tool, with Ukrainian citizens able to submit geotagged photos and videos of Russian military movements. This has enabled the population to actively participate in national defense by reporting suspicious events. In a context of information warfare, who has the power to determine what is true? How can fact-checking initiatives avoid becoming propaganda tools themselves? Fact-checking often relies on the use of processes, metadata analysis, or the detailed examination of visual evidence. These methods are reinforced by specialized editing software. However, the question of the objectivity of fact-checking organizations is frequently raised, as they are sometimes accused of serving political interests. The once fundamental role of the journalist, who acted as a filter for information before it was disseminated to the public, has weakened in the digital age. Any individual can now produce and distribute content online, facilitating the spread of false information. In March 2022, a deepfake showing President Zelensky calling on Ukrainians to lay down their arms circulated on social networks, although it was quickly denied by the Ukrainian authorities. The complexity of predicting future scenarios The use of SIGINT (signals intelligence) and CYBER has not been absent from the Ukrainian conflict. According to the Institut Français de Géopolitique, electromagnetic flows play a crucial role in the conduct of modern military operations.  With NATO support, Ukraine has gained access to advanced communications surveillance technologies, giving it a considerable advantage in the field. In 2022, Ukraine used artificial intelligence tools, notably with the help of Palantir and its Gotham project, which enabled the aggregation of SIGINT. For its part, Starlink contributed with its satellite support and network coverage of Ukrainian territory. This made it possible to analyze Russian troop movements and predict future conflict zones. These predictions enabled the Ukrainian army to prepare for offensives, limiting human and material losses. However, Starlink's reliability has sometimes been called into question. In some cases, the company restricted or interrupted its network, citing security concerns or strategic considerations. The Ukrainian army reported outages in areas taken over from Russia, provoking debates about reliance on private companies for critical military operations. At the same time, Russia itself has attempted to disrupt the Starlink connection in Ukraine, making access to the network unstable at times. These interruptions have fuelled concerns about the company's ability to provide constant support in wartime. Other sources indicate that Starlink's performance in Ukraine, in terms of speed and coverage, also varies, posing additional challenges. In this sense, the situation highlights issues of Ukraine's digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy, raising the risk that a private company could directly influence the availability of critical resources in times of conflict. The “Discord leaks” revealed that the Russian Ministry of Defense had been infiltrated by US intelligence, reinforcing the idea that the Russian invasion had been anticipated long before it began. Not all European countries, notably Germany, France and Italy, anticipated the Russian invasion of Ukraine because of their economic ties with Russia. Germany was dependent on Russian gas, France was aiming for strategic cooperation, and Italy, also energy-dependent, had important trade links. The war revealed the risks of this blind trust in Moscow. The right framework: military doctrine Military doctrine is a strategic framework designed to align available resources with the specific objectives of each nation. Comparison with other conflicts provides lessons on how predictions can be distorted by misinformation. Prediction errors during the 2003 Iraq war, based on false information about weapons of mass destruction, show the extent to which strategic decisions can be influenced by narratives constructed to justify military action. Similarly, the misinterpretation of the situation in Ukraine by certain experts shows the limits of strategic forecasting in a fog of war. It is essential to recognize that each army operates according to its own logic, dictated by its national doctrine, and yet some specialists from NATO countries are astonished that Russia does not use the same techniques to wage war. Attempting to understand the armed forces of one country based on the concepts of another's military doctrine can lead to misinterpretation. Others have shown that their assessments of battles or the performance of military equipment are often influenced by their own experiences, without considering the specific context of the adversary. Knowing the strengths and weaknesses of one's own side is important, but Sun Tzu reminds us that it is just as crucial to understand how the enemy thinks, reacts and mobilizes resources. This point has been neglected in many military analyses, leading to inaccurate conclusions. Using various tools such as intelligence and reconnaissance, accurate information must be obtained. The battlefield must not be imagined but based on concrete facts. Claims that Russia was too weak to carry out its special mission, or to prolong the war, have proved totally unrealistic. Voices such as that of Michael Kofman, also emphasize that the Russian army, despite its logistical shortcomings, remains a force not to be underestimated, calling into question over-optimistic analyses of a rapid Russian collapse. Is Russia in a position of strength? With high production and falling consumption, it doesn't seem ready to capitulate any time soon. Regardless of the fog of war created by the narrative, whether in the media or the public sphere, an armed corps must trust the skills acquired during its training. This implies respecting its duties, within a framework provided by national military doctrine. In the event of major misinformation, this framework helps to maintain clarity in the psychological environment of soldiers, captains, and commanders, without exposing them to the fluctuating influences of misinformation. They are not distracted by outside stories but rely on concrete observations and first-hand knowledge of the field, a knowledge built up through experience and analysis of facts in the field. In this way, the information passed on to decision-makers is more reliable and less exposed to the distortions of external narratives, enabling more appropriate decision-making rooted in reality. ## The Presidential Elections in the United States: What Impact on Iranian-American Relations? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-presidential-elections-in-the-united-states-what-impact-on-iranian-american-relations/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The results of the next US presidential election are unlikely to fundamentally change the Iranian-American relationship. Even before Donald Trump took office four years ago, the media prophesied a major break in relations with Iran. For months, in the event of a Democratic victory in the 2020 presidential elections, this same media has promised us another 180-degree turn. And yet, the results of the next US presidential election are unlikely to fundamentally change the Iranian-American relationship. Regardless of the outcome of the ballot box, one should not expect a “revolution” in Washington's policy towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is no indication as of yet that Donald Trump is considering revisiting his “maximum pressure” strategy in the event of a second term. If he were to replace him as President of the United States, Joe Biden promises to take a more moderate approach - without calling into question the basic assumptions that underlie the Iranian policies of his predecessors. Oscillating on the surface, this policy can indeed give the impression of incessant ruptures and contradictions. But a more in-depth analysis shows that, beyond the differences in styles and means, it remains surprisingly constant - guided by structural factors that go beyond the inflections given to it by successive tenants of the White House. Let us return here to the reasons for this continuity and to some of its potential implications. The first reason, arguably the most important on the American side, has to do with the permanent geopolitical parameters that invariably set the axis of Washington's policy vis-à-vis Iran. To realize this, one must step back from history, take a “macro” perspective and look at the direction that this policy has drawn over the past four decades. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Washington has been in “recovery” mode - which translates into double-speed play. On the one hand, it is about re-engaging the Islamic Republic through dialogue and some form of economic, diplomatic and military bargaining. On the other hand, it is a matter of limiting the Iranian regime's capacity for nuisance on the regional and continental scene. Despite the hot and cold periods, the various American administrations have all composed around this geopolitical partition and its binary logic. The only difference is that: Democrats generally favor negotiation, international consultation and multilateral approaches - without, however, abandoning the use of coercion. As for the Republicans, they favor unilateralism, interventionism, force and intimidation without ever giving up on bringing the Iranians back to the negotiating table. Beyond the formal variations in style and tone, all administrations have practiced with Iran the policy of “firm-openness” and “negotiation-neutralization.” This two-tiered approach is found in various forms in the Carter Doctrine, in the more or less uncompromising posture of Reagan and the Bush father and son, in Clinton's Dual Containment or in Obama's Outstretched Hand option - but in the end it always obeys the same underlying logic dictated by immutable structural factors. Adept at what he himself calls “the art of the deal,” Trump has only substituted aggressive sales techniques for the muffled haggling of those ahead of him in the Oval Office. A head-on, if not brutal approach, which, however, is not fundamentally different from the "firm-deal" policies of its predecessors in that it also aims to bring the Iranians back to the negotiating table. As Dombrowski and Reich point out, “ as to be alarming for his supporters and reassuring for his detractors, everything so far suggests that President Trump […] has also adopted, and will continue to adopt, that which President Obama had ironically called the ‘Washington Playbook.’” At the end of Trump's first term and despite these spectacular reversals, experts tend to relativize the thesis of a “revolution.” In their eyes, while Trumpism is undeniably giving a new tone to American diplomacy, it nonetheless continues to reinforce pre-existing tendencies. Some stress that the changes observable at the tactical level and characterized by the use of new “means” should not be confused with structural changes relating to the “ends” of American foreign policy which, for their part, remain essentially perennial. Others conclude that, behind the accents of rupture, the Iranian policy of the Trump administration is in line with that of the Obama administration with regard to its guiding principles, namely to reduce the regional influence of the Islamic Republic while preventing it from falling into the hands of the great Eurasian powers. As for Joe Biden, while he irrevocably condemns Trump's “maximum pressure,” he fully embraces the foundations of the “firm-deal” policies of his other predecessors. On the surface, everything about the Democratic candidate's rhetoric points to a major shift in Washington's Iranian policy. "We urgently need to change course" he declared in an interview given to CNN, adding in particular that: "By any objective measure, Trump's "maximum pressure" has been a boon to the regime in Iran and a bust for America's interests.” However, a close reading of this speech reveals that these disagreements displayed with the Trump doctrine lie more in form than in substance. In the same interview, Joe Biden specifies: “there is a smart way to be tough on Iran, and there is Trump's way. "While he advocates reconsidering the means used over the past four years, he remains extremely conventional, even conservative, with regard to the objectives pursued. Not only is it a matter of preventing Iran from acquiring atomic weapons, but also of bringing its leaders back to the negotiating table to obtain - what is more - an agreement more inclusive and more binding than the JCPOA signed in 2015 - an agreement expanded to end the Revolutionary Guards' “destabilizing activities” in the region and to suspend Iran's ambitious ballistic missile program. So many clauses of a new agreement that the Democratic candidate intends to impose on Tehran and which touch on essential aspects of Iranian sovereignty while echoing the policy of "firmness-openness" and "negotiation-neutralization" practiced by Washington over the past four decades. The other major reason why the result of the US presidential elections is unlikely to fundamentally change Iranian-American relations is that in Tehran, the Islamic leaders do not expect much and, frankly, they even display the greatest skepticism. A democratic victory would certainly allow the Iranian regime to catch its breath and hope for a relaxation of the effort of political, economic and military strangulation undergone for almost four years. But, exercised in a more diplomatic way, they know full well that American pressure would not completely cease. Importantly, the "Biden Doctrine" would, despite everything, continue to threaten Iran's vital strategic imperatives - imperatives which, even approached with the greatest courtesy, will remain non-negotiable in the eyes of the Iranians. Indeed, the placing under supervision of nuclear and ballistic programs added to the significant decrease in regional activities in Tehran presents the disadvantage of touching on crucial points on which the Iranians cannot concede simultaneously (depriving themselves of nuclear life insurance and , at the same time, of the protective sphere of influence) without risking weakening the internal and external sovereignty of the regime. In other words, red lines. As Richard Nephew, senior researcher at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and former State Department official, explains, the demands previously made by Westerners and now taken up by Biden "are beyond Iran's willingness to even discuss." Added to this is an additional reason why it would be naive to think that a Democratic mandate would automatically translate into an improvement in Iranian-American relations: the last few years have been accompanied by a major strengthening of the “hardliners” who, already given winners in the next Iranian elections, are more reluctant than ever to make further concessions to Washington. The final reason, but certainly not the least, for why Iran will not accept the new conditions offered by a different president is because of Tehran’s strategic positions in recent years - including some even before the election of Donald Trump. Among these strategic positions, the most important is undoubtedly the major reconciliation made with the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), foremost among them Russia and China. Eurasian powers which, in addition to promoting a more multipolar world order, share with Iran a fiercely Westphalian posture that does not suffer any questioning of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference - including in the field of human rights. This is proven by Iran's candidacy for the SCO and the new 25-year strategic partnership being negotiated between Tehran and Beijing. Certainly, the Iranian leaders, eminently pragmatic and opportunist, would not shy away from the possibility of garnering some economic or diplomatic gains if the West offered them the chance, but they would do so with caution and restraint as the regime is now wary of this West, in which, to use the words of the Iranian foreign minister, Iran "never really had any hope." In the same interview, this same Zarif, however from the camp of moderates, declared in 2019, that Iran has resolutely turned towards the "Eurasian bloc" and that "the future of our foreign policy lies in that direction." So that beyond the political changes and ad hoc decisions to which its development is often wrongly linked, the Iranian-American relationship, much less fluctuating than it seems, obeys above all the deep forces of the game of big powers and its inexorable geopolitical logic. ## The Proliferation of Militarized Civilian Drones in Ukraine: a Lesson from the War for Western Military Staffs URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-proliferation-of-militarized-civilian-drones-in-ukraine-a-lesson-from-the-war-for-western-military-staffs/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > The media scene hastily portrayed the Bayraktar TB-2 drone as "Kyiv's aerial asset" to fight incursions by the Russian invader... The media scene hastily portrayed the Bayraktar TB-2 drone as "Kyiv's aerial asset" to fight incursions by the Russian invader, overestimating its military effectiveness in a high-intensity conflict. However, the "drone war" in Ukraine is not limited to TB-2s: it also features other types of civilian systems used for military purposes that have produced notable tactical results on both sides. The amplification of the battlefield's "dronization", already noticeable in Syria and during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, is now challenging in its magnitude. The use, in Ukraine, of militarized and inexpensive civilian drones, on a broader spectrum of missions, is one of the highlights of the evolution of air conflict. With the massive arrival of these light drones in the military field, the techno-capability equation of war has been turned upside down. The military procurement strategies undertaken since 2014 have allowed Kyiv to show great flexibility to better exploit civilian technologies for military purposes and thus supplant Russia in quality and quantity in this domain. The ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to innovate to compensate for greater enemy firepower is an inspiring lesson for our army models. Given the operational experience accumulated by the parties to the conflict concerning the use of these unconventional technologies, recommendations should be made for the benefit of Western armed forces so that they can also modify their own doctrine regarding drones. Since 2014, Two Arms Trends in Ukraine and Russia That Have Had Far-reaching Strategic Consequences During the first Donbas War in 2014, Russian anti-aircraft systems significantly reduced Ukraine's air capabilities. However, by demonstrating the full extent of their ability to overcome intelligence deficiencies, Kyiv quickly grasped that the combination of operational uses for drones could be a real tactical asset. For these reasons, in addition to the low cost of producing these platforms, Ukraine invested between 2014 and 2022 in developing a local drone industry while benefiting from the support of several NATO members to improve its defence infrastructure. The revival of the Ukrainian Air Force has therefore gone through the acquisition of a complete fleet of aerial systems (attack drones, tactics, contact, etc.) while parting with some of its oldest fighters. Eight years later, to prevent its military's air potential from being undermined again, Kyiv demonstrated tactical flexibility by combining different types of systems to temporarily and locally challenge Russia's air superiority. According to several estimates, the UAF's arsenal of non-military drones was around 6,000 in the summer of 2022. In this respect, drones are, for the latter, a real alternative to light aviation. Aware of the balance of power that favors them in the sky (4 against 1 for Russian aviation), the opposing camp has innovated only a little in this segment since the fall of the USSR. Lagging behind its Western competitors, the Russian intervention in Syria has nevertheless constituted a laboratory for the operational use of drones that could shed light on the structural weaknesses of the Russian arms industry. However, even if the Syrian feedback has allowed the "(Russian) Ministry of Defense [...] to develop appropriate tactical and technical requirements for drones", multiple technological barriers remained. Over the past decade, Moscow has significantly strengthened its air component by emphasizing the modernization of its fighters and other aircraft. Nonetheless, Russia has underinvested in drones: Western sanctions deployed in 2014 have also permanently restricted Moscow's room for maneuver to acquire foreign-made optics and electronic components that are essential to their manufacture. On top of it, the Kremlin struggles to formulate precise industrial demands and the multiple bottlenecks for Russian manufacturers, preventing them from meeting production deadlines. This phenomenon has accentuated the dependence on external producers and, by extension, the lack of investment in R&D regarding drones. As a result, the lack of a sufficient national industrial base may have produced a lack of confidence in domestic technologies from the outset of the conflict. In this particular sector, the transformation of the conflict into a war of attrition does not bode well for Moscow. In the Orlan family of Russian military drones alone, there have been more than 140 destructions or confirmed captures. With this high level of attrition, Moscow will face difficulties repairing its drones due to the tightening of the embargo on critical technologies. Shortage situations could therefore multiply in the coming months if MANPADS or laser guidance systems offered by Western countries to Ukraine continue to play a significant role in the attrition of Russian aircraft. The purchase of 2,000 Iranian Shahed-type programmed munitions highlights Moscow's willingness to cope with the depletion of its ballistic missile stocks – up to 85% – thanks to rustic and budget-accessible technologies. Finally, the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 seems to have confirmed Kyiv's capability choices adopted since 2014 in terms of air power. The Western-supported UAF's capability recovery has made it possible to develop a holistic approach to drones and to fully exploit the added value of a diversified use of drones. With the unfulfilled promises of the campaign to suppress enemy air defences, Russia's control of the airspace is widely contested. As a result, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) can only claim local and temporary air superiority. The lack of air-ground coordination and the lack of engagement in the 3rd dimension (a Russian air activity below the minimum activity required to ensure credible coverage of Ukrainian airspace) seem to largely be the causes of this inability to maintain an impenetrable protective bubble against Ukrainian aircraft. Deprived of this essential asset and facing significant logistical refuelling problems to ward off the mess, surprise and confusion generated by Ukrainian drone operators, the Russian armed forces were quickly exposed to new threats. As they can operate in a contested environment, the small drones (Ukrainians and, to a lesser extent, Russians) conducting intelligence and harassment operations are the most eloquent demonstration of this new situation in the military field. The Convertibility and Adaptability of the Civilian Drone: a Multiplied Use Valuing the Combination of Combat Platforms. Micro-drones are generally not exceeding $10,000, are available in commerce, and are implemented directly in the field by human operators. Between obtaining information, preparing ambushes, designating targets for artillery and tracking troop movements and fighter take-offs, these drones seem to allow a vast extension in the range of potentialities. The range of these aircraft can reach several kilometres or even tens of kilometres for the most enduring. They can also fly at very high altitudes and discreetly. Furthermore, thanks to their electric motor, these drones emit no heat and have a very low acoustic signature. Therefore, they are hardly perceptible, drastically reducing the probability of an interception. Many MANPADS (Stinger, Strela, etc.) used during the clashes in Ukraine must hook their infrared target to reach the identified heat source. These electric vehicles, therefore, escape the least sophisticated MANPADS. Moreover, by producing a reduced signature vis-à-vis the various sensors, these civilian drones make it possible to delay the detection of a device by the radars of the opposing defences, and this at a lower cost – an aerial stealth in a low-cost version to a certain extent. Although Russian air defence is a reference in this area, the ability of some Ukrainian drones to penetrate temporary protective bubbles raises questions about the resistance to denial of access devices. For example, for a region that does not exceed Brittany in terms of area, Crimea has more ground/air defence means than the entire French metropolitan territory. This very high concentration induces, more generally, the destruction of 90% of the drones used by the UAF. But it turns out that several of these devices still manage to penetrate advanced air defences to "marginally strike Russian territory" and Crimea. Thus, despite a very high interception rate, these commercial drones make it possible to create security breaches in the enemy's defence systems and force Russia to "devote capabilities to its sites’ defence." In addition to testing the detection capabilities of the most advanced radars, drones alter the cost-benefit calculations of operations. For the same mission, the overall cost of deploying and maintaining drones is much lower than that of a large majority of other aircraft. As a reminder, the average price of an anti-aircraft missile is around several hundred thousand euros. Individually, a French-designed MISTRAL anti-aircraft missile costs 169,000 euros. Given the low price of a civilian drone, complete airspace protection would quickly deplete surface-to-air missile stocks and create an unsustainable cost for both sides. It seems that "very different drones may have to perform identical missions just as identical models may have to perform very different missions." The tight mesh setup, thanks to MANPADS and other Ukrainian air defence systems, has made it possible to intercept 85% of Iranian SHAHED 136 drones. If the interception rate is much higher than at the beginning of the conflict (about 30%), it turns out that there is indeed penetration in the Ukrainian multi-layered defence. Moreover, the massive use of drones in military terrain creates a configuration where the balance between offensive and defensive and economic balance often favours offensive means. Another proof of "adaptability in operational concepts of use," this differential widens even further when these devices are transformed into a weapon of war. Militarized Civilian Drones: a Destructive Role at the Center of Techno-Guerrilla Warfare Between grenades fixed with cups on commercial drones and the use of 3D printers to add anti-tank bombs on octocopter drones, there was nothing to suggest that the diversion of low-cost civilian means would significantly increase the military capabilities of the parties to the conflict. It has happened now: "drones become full-blow attack systems." As these drones proved capable of permanently threatening mobile infantry units and logistics lines, the practice quickly spread to almost all Ukrainian units. Also lagging behind in this subcategory of militarized civilian drones, the Russian armed forces reacted quickly in the summer of 2022 by investing in the "professionalization of drone operators". However, Russia has been struggling to catch up with operational know-how developed by Ukrainian civilian defence groups since 2014. The case of the Aerorozvidka unit is probably the most convincing example of the integration of military volunteering and civilian technologies within the Ukrainian army. The operational experience gained during eight years of sporadic fighting in Donbas now allows this squadron to conduct more ambitious air-land operations as part of the techno-guerrilla warfare that is playing out in Ukraine. While relying on a NATO-powered intelligence centre, the Aerorozvidka unit uses irregular air forces and budget-effective technology to map enemy movements in real-time. This squadron is ultimately symptomatic of the UAF's ability to demonstrate agility and inventiveness. This element seems to contrast with the rigidity of the Russian chain of command. The Major Role of Drones in Psychological/Informational Warfare In addition to being highly technological, drones and their onboard cameras have proved very useful in the context of informational and psychological warfare played out in parallel with combat. The constant threat of drones profoundly destabilizes the troops' morale by creating a climate of terror. On the informational side, the image capture they produce allows decentralized communication that is widely relayed on social networks. Thanks to these images, the Ukrainian and Russian governments could opt for vast disinformation campaigns capable of reviving the battle of perceptions. Rethinking Procurement Strategies: Towards a New Trade-Off Between Operational Mass Requirements and Technological Superiority Between the strengthening of the anti-drone fight, the acquisition of these systems by non-state actors and the challenge of attrition for defence strategies, this large-scale drone war raises a set of security risks whose consideration must be a strategic priority for Western military staffs. Moreover, the phenomenon of massification of cheap drones will foreshadow the conflicts of tomorrow. Still, unlike in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, drones are not the main aerial phenomenon in Ukraine since their actions are also combined with those of more traditional aerial platforms. In this regard, the resilience of UAF against what has been described as the Russian "steamroller" already allows us to draw several lessons to develop adequate countermeasures. Develop Less Expensive Integrated Anti-Drone Systems On the defensive side, the mesh and the layering offer a higher level of protection to deal with threats in the 3rd dimension. Inspired by the less expensive countermeasures developed by Russia, our army models will have to invest in developing several defence systems to avoid being helpless in the face of this increasingly stealthy and evolving threat. As for the UAF's renewed interest in Soviet-era "Flak" short-range anti-aircraft guns, it recalls the dangers of "over-specifying" and perfecting weapons systems at all costs in the context of anti-drone warfare. To reduce the significant disparity between drone models and guidance methods, hybridizing the action of old and modern air defence systems is just as relevant as combining the action of the civilian and the military on the offensive side. An integrated air defence network doesn't just need up-to-date advanced technologies to be effective, especially when drones operate at low altitudes and in saturating attacks. Because drones rely on the electromagnetic spectrum, Russia's electronic warfare has been effective in "generating enormous attrition of Ukrainian drones." Still, it has also had notable weaknesses in producing the effect of these systems on its own troops. In addition, the range of jamming systems remains limited. Far from being a solution to obtain an impenetrable iron dome for the protection of our sensitive areas, electromagnetic jamming systems could be an appropriate response to break the GPS link between the drone and the human operator when there is one. To better support our forces on the ground, anti-drone rifles operating as directional jammers, laser/microwave directed energy weapons and interceptor and jamming drones are all integrated means of defence that deserve special attention from armies. Furthermore, regarding surface/air defence, the development of short-range mini-anti-aircraft missiles and the production, in large numbers, of fast gun systems (ground/air artillery) capable of dealing with saturating attacks would make the fight against drones economically viable. Increase the Interoperability of Offensive Systems by Integrating Drones at the Operational Level On the offensive side, it must be the same. Since the drone is not a miracle weapon, its combined use in maneuvers could be understood as a privileged vector to accelerate multi-medium / multi-field integration. In addition, drones fit perfectly into a "maneuver by fatigue" ("manœuvre par lassitude") described by General Beaufre since they pose "a disproportionate threat compared to the means invested." To achieve such a saturation effect, opting for synchronizing the impacts of various systems to maximize results in the military field is necessary. Like the dronification, the popularization of civilian technologies risks restoring a certain parity to the benefit of our competitors. The strengthening of the combined approach will make it possible to be proactive in the face of the planned obsolescence of air supremacy. The performance of small drones is multiplied if they are deployed in addition to electronic warfare and ground/air defence means. This approach will consider the limitations of these technologies and their inability to deal with more hardened objectives or missions that are in-depth and duration. If the benefits of autonomous and remotely operated systems (AS) are no longer to be proven to Western staffs, the experimentation of these devices seems to be confined to tactical units. When we look in detail at recent orders of the French armed forces, the capacity building of land forces in this segment seems marginal. The operational advantage they represent and their affordable cost should lead to a democratization of so-called "consumable" drones to all conventional forces. Creating mixed units would make it possible to achieve military objectives without mobilizing all of its traditional military assets. Provided that the reconciliation of mass requirements and operational superiority is respected and that the multiple technological barriers are overcome (liaison difficulties, strengthening of management and mobility capabilities, etc.). Monitor Technological Innovations and the Dynamism of the Private Sector Recent developments in Ukraine have amply demonstrated that the simplifying dichotomy between civilian and military drones is no longer relevant. Since scientific advances regarding the miniaturization of drones are also outside the military world, the private sector ecosystem is a hotbed of innovation that can inspire the military. Therefore, a constant technological watch is necessary to stay informed of developments in defence procurement. The slow pace of bureaucratic rules within the military apparatus could lead many armies to no longer be able to keep up with developments in this sector in Ukraine and elsewhere. While many countries – such as African states that constitute the largest emerging market for such capabilities – and non-state actors outside the heavy artillery market could quickly – if they haven't already – integrate large numbers of micro-drones into their concepts of operations. The Adoption of a Technological Approach at Controlled Cost: Breaking with the Quest for Total Versatility for our Army Models The question of the rapid adaptation of our armed forces to this new strategic situation remains unresolved. While the concept of a war economy is making a smashing comeback on the political and media scene, European states are still far from it, with an average of 2% of their GDP allocated to defence (around 40% during the Second World War). Nevertheless, it seems that the Western military staffs wish to prepare for it. The ramp-up of arms production, which the proliferation problem and the fight against malicious drones perfectly illustrate, requires translating the consequences of the war in Ukraine into deeds and "concrete contracts." Beyond the announcement effects and the pressures exerted on defence manufacturers, a real recalibration of the entire productive tool (supply chain, suppliers, human resources, etc.) is imperative. It would allow for a power increase that would restore a qualitative thickness to our armed forces without excessive budgetary inflation. An "assumed renunciation in terms of innovations" and the transition to a mix of high-tech capabilities and more rustic devices could lead our armies to favour specific equipment such as consumable drones. Conclusion Engaged in high-risk operations in a major conflict, militarized civilian drones have found their place between conventional aircraft and ground forces. And for a good reason, as their low cost saves considerable resources while posing a constant physical and psychological threat to troops from the front to the rear lines. Would acquiring a wide range of drones make it possible to ward off Norman Augustine's prediction about the soaring costs of fighter jets? While they cannot replace existing weapon systems, these so-called "expendable" drones can now strengthen air forces (in numbers), enhancing the observation capabilities of small infantry units and transforming the dynamics of lower airspace while optimizing the use of other existing weapon platforms. All this provided that they are engaged in multi-domain operations with other environments and fields thanks to an agile and adaptative C2 (command and control). For all these reasons, the military potential and the combined effect of small drones will have to be quickly integrated into the acquisition strategies of Western armies in order to create mixed capability models capable of adapting to "the extension of the domains of conflict." The UAF's inventiveness and tactical flexibility will eventually lead them to reconsider a significant increase in civilian drone purchases for the lower military echelons.     The author thanks Lt. Col. David Pappalardo, Deputy Air and Space Defense Attaché at the France Embassy in Washington, D.C., for his expert advice while writing this article. ## The Renewal of the U.S. Strategic Planning URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-renewal-of-the-u-s-strategic-planning/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy brief examines the security priorities of the Biden administration, its positioning vis-à-vis the European Union, the U.S.... Without turning away from counterterrorism, U.S. defense seems to be increasingly orienting its focus on China in an era of great power competition. Yet China is not the only challenge the United States faces in a multipolar world. The United States, a world power in relative decline, wishes to preserve the status quo that favors its hegemony. This is evident in the Biden administration's desire to undo Donald Trump's policies and restore U.S. leadership and reputation on the world stage. The United States, a power with global ambitions, is currently seeing a renewal of its strategic planning. However, what are the foreseeable changes to the strategic planning? And do they have the means to achieve their ambition? This policy brief examines the security priorities of the Biden administration, its positioning vis-à-vis the European Union, the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and the one-war concept that the United States seems to favor. National Security Priorities of the Biden Administration A key national security priority of the new Biden Administration is to defend American primacy, to deter and prevent adversaries from directly threatening the United States or its allies, as well as to prevent their domination of key regions. To do this, the United States intends to lead and support a stable and open international system based on strong democratic alliances, multilateral institutions, and rules. The Biden administration emphasizes that the United States cannot achieve these goals alone and must rely on its allies and partners around the world, including NATO, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam and ASEAN. While it appears that these national security priorities are heavily weighted toward the Indo-Pacific region, the new national security strategic direction also mentions a strong re-engagement with the European Union while continuing the fight against terrorism and deterring Iran with regional partners. For its part, the Department of Defense identifies China as its primary challenge against which it wishes to develop the appropriate concepts, capabilities and operational plans to strengthen deterrence and maintain U.S. competitive advantage. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's new 2021 Annual Threat Assessment also identifies China, as well as Russia, as significant threats, emphasizing China's global ambitions and Russia's provocative actions. Europe, the Indispensable Partner If competition with China becomes increasingly central to U.S. grand strategy, it is likely that the United States will view other regions of the world through this competitive lens, and then seek support from its partners and allies in its rivalry with China. The Trump administration had already sought to engage European countries in its opposition to China, including pushing for the banning of Chinese company Huawei from European countries' 5G telecom infrastructure. According to Simon, Desmaele and Becker of the Institute in European Studies at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, the United States faces two important challenges in Europe regarding its rivalry with China. First, U.S. resources are not unlimited. If it makes China its strategic priority, it will have fewer resources to play a proactive role in Europe, leaving regional actors to exert their influence. However, since the United States wants to maintain a certain balance in Europe, especially vis-à-vis Russia, it will have to rely on the United Kingdom and France to help it maintain balance on the European continent. Second, the United States wants to expand its strategic considerations in Europe to counter the growing influence of China. To do this, the United States must ensure that European partners and allies do not overreach China, that China and Russia do not divide European countries, and that European countries support U.S. strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific. The question remains as to how European countries will behave in the face of Sino-American competition. While the European Union's recent strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific suggests a consensus on an Asian pivot for the EU, the reality is that there are different opinions on the role of the Indo-Pacific in the EU's international policy. Thus, while France, Germany and the Netherlands are ready to commit themselves militarily to the Indo-Pacific region, this is not the case for other European countries that prefer neutrality. Moreover, the differences are also felt between France and Germany. While France openly wishes to counteract Chinese hegemony and stabilize the region, Germany places more emphasis on economic opportunities. U.S. Military and Strategic Planning in the Face of Great Power Competition Whereas U.S. defense prepared for several decades to defeat multiple regional adversaries in succession in medium-sized wars, it now plans a single standard of war aimed at defeating a rival great power capable of matching U.S. power. This new strategy prepares the United States to confront one great power, such as China or Russia, rather than several weaker opponents such as Iran and North Korea. This is the most significant change in U.S. strategic planning since the end of the Cold War. This new strategy also requires new force planning and, more importantly, new capabilities to defeat the enemy. The United States appears to be focusing on capabilities of deterrence by denial, either to deter the adversary from launching an attack if it is unlikely to succeed, or to destroy the enemy's attack capabilities before they are used. This would include, for example, the ability to strike multiple targets within the adversary's territory to destroy its force projection capabilities. This is the Third Offset strategy, developed since the Obama administration, which emphasizes superiority through new technologies and deterrence. This strategy is designed to address several operational challenges such as Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), guided munitions, undersea warfare, cyber warfare, and technological warfare. It specifically targets Russian and Chinese capabilities, especially in A2/AD. In theory, the strategy of deterrence by denial is very effective against a revisionist power. The ability to protect its territory and allies, and the ability to destroy the opponent's force projection capabilities would be more effective than alternatives, such as punishment deterrence or strategic withdrawal. Abandoning Control of the Indo-Pacific Seas? Faced with the budgetary constraints inherent in any public action, some suggest that the United States should abandon control of the seas in the Indo-Pacific and concentrate on a less costly strategy. First, the reason that the United States is seeking maritime superiority in the Indo-Pacific is because otherwise China would fill the space left by the U.S. withdrawal. However, it is not clear that China will fill the void left by an American withdrawal. Second, there is a strategic risk for the United States in seeking maritime control of the Indo-Pacific – a risk of distance. When its maritime power is projected to be of great distance from U.S. shores, U.S. forces are particularly vulnerable against measures designed to increase access costs, making the United States dependent on allied territories to support deployed forces through bases, infrastructure, and logistics. Second, as the costs and risks of maintaining access increase, the asymmetric issues become more defined for the United States. This is especially true now that China can inflict heavy costs on the United States through the development of sea, submarine, air, sea, and land ballistic missile capabilities enabling an A2/AD strategy. It would then be easier, less risky, and less costly to ensure that control of the seas is denied rather than exercised. The ambition for primacy in this region would then have to be abandoned. The Vulnerabilities of the One-War Strategy Despite the advantages of the one-war strategy based on deterrence by denial discussed above, there are many risks, challenges and grey areas. The first risk is obviously if the United States is faced with two or more wars at the same time. The United States would then face a dilemma in distributing the war effort across multiple theaters of operation. It may be argued that if the United States demonstrates its ability to win the first war quickly, it will deter the second adversary from attacking, or advancing its interests. However, any war has its share of uncertainties and there is no guarantee of a quick and decisive victory. Second, even in the event of a quick and decisive victory by the United States, the U.S. modus operandi will be revealed, as well as potential vulnerabilities that an adversary could exploit in a second theater of operation. Finally, it is important to remember that a country that starts a war is a country that believes it can win it. Overconfidence bias can alter or even diminish the supposed deterrence of a quick and decisive victory over the first adversary. The second U.S. strategy for dealing with a second theater of operation would be to delay retaliation until the first war is won. However, this may allow the second adversary to change the status quo to its advantage in a particular region, reshuffling the deck, which highlights the need to rely on regional allies. The second limitation of the one-war strategy of deterrence by denial is the willingness of a policymaker to respond to an adversary's initial use of force. The United States might be reluctant to respond to a show of force if it is unsure of the adversary's motivations. The United States should clearly define the type of military action to which it will respond by destroying the enemy's offensive capabilities. Finally, an important challenge remains the credibility of the United States to use force when it is not directly targeted. How willing is the United States to go to war to protect a partner when it is difficult to distinguish between a provocation, an isolated attack, or the beginning of a series of military attacks? For example, China might begin maritime military maneuvers near Taiwan or use force against a foreign ship. The response to such maneuvers or attack will depend on whether they are correctly interpreted. It will have to be determined whether they are simply provocations, an isolated attack, or whether the naval maneuvers or use of force against a ship are the beginning of a larger military engagement. Intelligence Capacities as an Indispensable Tool The United States cannot implement its new strategy without first developing its intelligence capability to support that strategy. Intelligence is required to understand and anticipate adversary doctrines, prevent tactical and operational surprises, and ensure that U.S. military capabilities are not compromised before going into action. In the face of Chinese and Russian technological capabilities, intelligence must now more fully integrate the cyber, digital, and space domains, while being appropriately assimilated into command-and-control functions to ensure rapid decision-making. More than ever, intelligence cooperation must also be facilitated not only for intelligence sharing, but also for joint action. This is especially true within the Five Eyes, the most institutionalized of intelligence partnerships. For example, in the cyber and space domains, the ability of the Five Eyes signals intelligence (SIGINT) agencies to monitor, analyze and penetrate adversaries will prove a critical asset in future conflicts. Beyond this closed circle, intelligence agencies need to strengthen their collaboration with other countries, such as Japan and Germany, particularly in support of U.S. strategy in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Recent statements about the creation of two mission centers on China by the Central Intelligence Agency reflect the importance of intelligence in American strategy to counter China. Considerations for Canada One of the most important questions in the face of current U.S. strategic positioning is where Canada fits into the U.S. strategy and what role Canada should or could play. While it is relatively certain that the U.S. will seek some form of support from Canada in its new strategic direction, the Canadian position is far from clear at this time. Canada should therefore rethink its foreign policy in light of new developments on the international scene and the strategic repositioning of its main ally. Canadian foreign policy must reflect Canada's national interests, but also alliance interests, particularly those of the United States and NATO. Clear strategic directions, consistent with Canadian foreign policy, will also have to be formulated. On the intelligence front, David Vigneault, Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), reiterated that China is one of the primary threats to Canada's national security. In this area, Canada could increase its cooperation with allies in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the area of cyber intelligence. While the United States uses intelligence as one of its preferred tools to deal with China, Canada should not fall into the trap of relying solely on American intelligence, which may be useful but does not necessarily reflect Canadian interests. The development of Indo-Pacific intelligence expertise would be the best way for Canada to have an understanding of the environment and to act on its interests. It is unlikely that Canada will play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific soon. Traditionally, this region has not been of primary interest to Canada. However, Canada must be prepared to contribute in some way to American efforts in the region. These contributions, which can be of various kinds, may include strengthening Canada's military presence in the Indo-Pacific, enhancing diplomatic relations with certain countries in the region, or engaging with existing forums such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). However, any contribution in the Indo-Pacific should not be at the expense of Canadian national interests. For example, the U.S. proposal to expand the role of the Five Eyes in the Asia-Pacific to better contain China does not appear to be an option that Canada should support. Indeed, New Zealand has recently stated that it does not support an expanded role for the Five Eyes to pressure China. The possibility of retaliation by China is likely to hit middle powers like Canada the hardest. For example, China's ban on the import of Canadian canola would be a retaliation against Canada for the strained relations between Beijing and Ottawa, just as the arrest of two Canadians in China would be a retaliation for Huawei's Meng Wanzhou case. Besides, the two Canadians, as well as two Americans, were released after an agreement between the American justice system and Meng Wanzhou, which suggests at first glance that hostage diplomacy has worked. Moreover, Canada does not have unlimited resources, and an increase in defence budgets for a contribution in the Indo-Pacific is not currently being considered. Thus, if a significant contribution were to be made in the Indo-Pacific, it would be at the expense of other commitments or national priorities, such as the Arctic or Eastern Europe. ## The Resurrection of Lazarus, or the Second Youth of NATO: The Consequences of the Russian Invasion on NATO URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-resurrection-of-lazarus-or-the-second-youth-of-nato-the-consequences-of-the-russian-invasion-on-nato/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report analyzes the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the transatlantic security architecture. On February 24, 2022, when most experts believed that a significant but limited Russian attack on Eastern Ukraine was likely – at least in terms of war aims – the Russian government launched an invasion of Ukraine with the aim of taking Kyiv and installing a client regime. This Russian decision caused a number of upheavals in Europe and in the transatlantic community (e.g., massive increase in defence budgets; referendum on the Danish opt-out, speech of the German Chancellor in the Bundestag on February 28, creation of new international NATO battalions in Eastern Europe, etc.). We are thus witnessing changes/evolution within the European and transatlantic structures, particularly within the EU and NATO. The objective of this policy report is hence to analyze more precisely the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the transatlantic security architecture. Although many tweets on the subject underline the irony of the situation and the obvious failure of the Russian president to weaken or even dislocate NATO, it remains true that Vladimir Putin has resurrected NATO, and this for several years, if not at least one or two decades. One could almost speak of a miracle here, since the situation was so bleak, even desperate, in recent years, especially under the Trump administration. At the beginning of the 2010s, deeply involved in Afghanistan, then partially in Libya, NATO was looking for a new raison d'être, as the Cold War and the end of the USSR were almost twenty years old. The explicit conquest of Crimea and the implicit conquest (through the establishment of pro-Russian secessionist movements) of a portion of the Donbass regions by Russia in 2014, however, offered a new impetus and breath of fresh air to NATO, particularly following the decisions taken at the Wales Summit. In addition to doubling the size of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) comprising 5,000 troops that can be deployed in two to five days was created. In addition, it was decided to deploy four battalion-level multinational battle groups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland on a rotating basis through the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence. But Donald Trump's inauguration into office ushered in four years of turmoil for the Alliance, with the Alliance fearing that its 70th anniversary in 2019 would turn into its funeral. It must also be recognized that the actions of Erdogan's Turkey during this period (in Syria against the Kurds, allies of the international coalition against Daesh; against the EU, using migrants as a pressure tool; and against Greece in the Mediterranean) contributed equally to NATO's acute state of strategic and political decay, to the point that French President Macron spoke provocatively of its brain death. If the election of Biden gave glimmers of hope, these were quickly obscured by the Afghan debacle and the surprise announcement of AUKUS in the summer of 2021. In short, as NATO was sinking, an "unexpected saviour" appeared, Russian President Vladimir Putin. This resurrection is manifested in terms of cohesion, but also on certain issues such as the amount of defence budgets or the deployment of troops on the eastern flank of the Alliance. Although tensions remain, the Russian invasion succeeded in creating a strong understanding and coordination between the Allies, even contributing to the emergence of consensus (still precarious, however) on the internal political scenes of the member states (Part I). Several measures to strengthen NATO's capabilities were thus quickly decided and implemented (Part II), such as increases in the defence budgets of several countries and the deployment of new troops in Eastern Europe. Moreover, we are witnessing the definitive settlement of the question of the 2% of GDP to be invested in defence: this amount can no longer be contested, at least not without significant political risks for its opponents. The developments at work will therefore bring about possible changes within NATO, more precisely with regard to its military hierarchy and the different positions that make it up (Part III). This does not, however, negate certain risks (Part III) in the short and medium term for the organization, in particular in the event of a prolonged conflict. Since the invasion also has repercussions for the EU and China, given the Alliance's links with the former and its concerns about the latter, although the focus is on NATO, this report will deal with these two aspects in a final part (Part IV). NATO's return to strength is undeniable, including vis-à-vis other organizations such as the European Union. It is part of a new context created by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, that of a new "Cold War" rather than a Third World War. Certainly, several characteristics differ between this new "Cold War" and the political and international context that prevailed between 1949 and 1989. Nevertheless, it remains true that there is once again a power across the Arctic and east of Europe that clearly represents a threat to the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of its immediate neighbours. 1. A Newfound Cohesion Although there have been a few false notes since February 24, it is quite surprising to see how harmonious the orchestra played by the members of the Alliance is, especially when one analyzes the behaviour of certain countries such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. Even if certain rivalries remain, most of the major countries – especially those that have distinguished themselves in recent years by controversial or even questionable actions or measures – are each taking their share of responsibility and are succeeding for the moment in acting in concert (or at least in giving this impression for the most part). This newfound cohesion is also present in the national political scenes of the member states. In more than one country, the political positions of certain anti-NATO, anti-American or pro-Russian political parties have been greatly attenuated. Other political movements that were not previously suspected of being sympathetic to the EU and NATO are tending to take public positions in favour of them. A Faded American Leadership While the debacle in Afghanistan and the AUKUS affair revealed an absence of leadership on the part of the United States and the new Biden administration, the Russian-Ukrainian war constitutes in this respect a reactivation of the latter within the transatlantic community. Although one cannot speak of Leading from Behind, the management by the United States and the strong roles it is leaving in this crisis to some of its allies – in particular the United Kingdom, France, and Poland – is quite singular. While Washington naturally remains the primus inter pares within the Alliance, its current management favours the prominence of London, Paris, and Warsaw on this issue, and in so doing succeeds in increasing the effects of drive and cohesion within the Alliance. While the United States has been pursuing its strategy of pivoting towards the Pacific for more than ten years, the Russian invasion has clearly suspended this movement, with troops once again being sent to Europe. Over the past month, several American statements have helped to reaffirm the American commitment to the defence of Europe in the face of the threat posed by Moscow. For its part, contrary to its long-standing reputation as a reluctant ally within NATO, Paris has taken several measures in favour of the Alliance. Taking advantage of the French presidency of the Council of the European Union, President Macron has taken on the role of coordinating the Europeans with the Ukrainian president, but also, at Zelensky's request, a contact role with the Russian president. Although some voices continue to criticize the French position, although still advocating for European strategic autonomy, Paris has so far managed to avoid distinguishing itself negatively from its allies, while assuming a leadership role on a European scale in partnership with other capitals. However, this role is somewhat neglected in the final phase of the campaign for the French presidential election. Yet, it is likely to become stronger again after the election (if Emmanuel Macron is re-elected). At the same time, the war in Ukraine offers Boris Johnson the opportunity to put forward London's leadership on an issue it has championed since 2014. The agreement between the UK, Poland and Ukraine reached days before the British invasion (though still in the making) is a demonstration of Britain's commitment to remain, in the words of the Integrated Review, "the key European ally in NATO." The case of Turkey further illustrates the return of strong cohesion within NATO. An ambivalent ally, Turkey had been under U.S. sanctions since 2019 following the purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft systems, as well as under European sanctions for humanitarian reasons and because of its positioning in Syria. Strong tensions and incidents had even occurred with Paris and Athens in recent years. However, without supporting Western sanctions against Russia, Turkey has strongly condemned the Russian invasion and reiterated its support for the physical integrity and independence of Ukraine, but also for NATO's "open door" policy. Ankara has also blocked the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits to Russian warships in accordance with the Montreux Convention of 1936. Even more surprisingly, the French president announced on March 25 the launch of a humanitarian operation to evacuate civilians from Mariupol in close coordination with Turkey and Greece. However, the operation could not take place due to the decisions taken by Moscow. Persistent Tensions Whether on the issue of arms and equipment deliveries to Ukraine or on the issue of sanctions, there is still a great deal of cohesion among the allies. While the European Union has already pledged one and a half billion euros in military supplies, the United States has just pledged a package of 14 billion dollars for the Ukrainian crisis, although half of it is intended for the deployment of American troops in Europe. Coordination on economic sanctions, however, involves more intensive exchanges between the allies, with some differences remaining, although much has already been accomplished in the space of a few weeks. For example, Germany has taken the symbolic decision to suspend the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, which was intended to increase Russian gas deliveries to Germany. However, some European countries, including Germany and Italy, remain heavily dependent on Russian imports. While Berlin, Paris and London are still reluctant to deprive themselves of Russian hydrocarbons, Washington has ordered an embargo on American imports of Russian oil and gas. The United States is thus pushing Europeans to reopen the debate on energy independence. While even countries such as Germany and Italy, which traditionally showed understanding or even leniency towards Moscow, have since changed their stance, one country still stands out as regards both sanctions and arms deliveries: Victor Orban's Hungary. However, its capacity for influence is limited and for the moment it is not in a position to block the measures taken by other countries. Its position could change, however, as a result of pressure from its usual allies in the Visegrad Group, and the risk of complete isolation for Budapest is not without danger, both within the EU and in NATO. A New Consensus A certain consensus is also emerging on the Russian threat and the need to maintain NATO. Despite the strength of the Trumpist current, support for Ukraine is one of the rare points where there is still consensus in the United States, even if the modalities of this support remain debated. In France, the Russophile and pro-Kremlin rhetoric – including that of several major candidates in the presidential election – tends to be forgotten, masked, or at least strongly attenuated, the entire political class condemning Russian aggression. Traditionally, Germany had always been a reliable and faithful member of the Alliance. However, the arrival in power of a government comprising the SPD and the Greens raised fears that this position would change, with some members of these two parties being fiercely critical of both NATO and nuclear weapons. Although there are still dissenting voices, the Russian invasion has put an end to any strong questioning of this characteristic feature of German defence policy in recent decades. Thus, a strong consensus in favour of the Alliance is now returning, despite the absence of the Christian Democrats of the CDU/CSU in government. Similarly, Italy, which used to be ambivalent about its relationship with Russia, has now become aware that Russia can no longer be a reliable partner on the international scene, and now seems to be fully asserting its Europeanist and transatlantic identity, which guides its foreign policy and defence choices. If initially the main pro-Russian and anti-militarist party, the 5-Star Movement, did not want to explicitly name Russia as responsible at the beginning of the conflict, it now fully supports the government on sanctions against the country as well as on the increase of military personnel within NATO on the eastern front. 2. Towards A Strengthening of NATO's Capabilities However, the rediscovered cohesion is only one illustration of NATO's resurrection, and the current developments in armaments budgets are another eloquent example, as is the deployment of troops on the eastern flank. The Programmed End of the Burden-Sharing Debate The war in Ukraine is indeed accelerating the increase in defence spending in many Alliance member countries. It also marks the likely end of the nearly 20-year-old debate over the 2% defence spending within NATO. Dating back to NATO's 2006 Riga Summit, this less binding commitment by allies to spend 2% of their GDP on defence has been a regular bone of contention between Europeans and Americans. Given the generally low estimate of the Russian threat in recent years and U.S. pressure – especially under Donald Trump's tenure – for some states the issue simply came down to buying new F-35 fighter jets. The Russian invasion, however, mostly puts an end to this procrastination and debate. In fact, it is likely that in the near future the debate will no longer be about 2% that almost all states will have reached, but rather about the reality of each state's military power, given the expenses incurred. Among the major NATO states, three groups seem to be forming at the moment: those that have radically changed their position; those that are not changing their spending forecasts; and those that are increasing their spending a little, or for whom this is beginning to be considered. Germany and Italy best illustrate the change of position on this issue in some states. The Russian invasion caused an electroshock on the question of the means allocated to the Bundeswehr, and the public statements of the Chief of Staff of the Army indicating that the army he was leading was running dry, completed the disillusionment of a number of officials in Germany. The most obvious illustration of this shock was the Chancellor's speech to the Bundestag on 27 February, announcing a sustainable increase in the military budget to exceed the 2% of GDP allocated to defence, as well as the creation of a restructuring and acquisition fund for the Bundeswehr worth 100 billion euros. However, as a reminder, the three parties in the government coalition have until now contested – even vigorously in their political program – the objective of 2% of GDP for the defence budget. Some are now even talking about a return to the military service that was abolished under Merkel's second government a decade ago. Although it has more resources than Canada for a defence budget and a GDP comparable to Canada's, Italy has until now been one of the countries reluctant to increase its spending on defence, which represents only 1.4 per cent of Italian GDP. Now, however, the Italian Prime Minister is calling for an "unprecedented" increase in the defence budget, as well as for a European consultation on future security investments. Alongside Berlin and Rome, Warsaw and Ankara stand out for the absence of any change or even a hint of change in their forecasts. This can be explained, however, by the fact that their defence spending is already well above 2%. Even before the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Warsaw had decided to increase its military budget and had planned to double the number of its troops in order to become more autonomous in security matters. For Turkey, its defence budget was also already a priority and should reach 17.5 billion dollars (USD) in 2025. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and Canada form the third group, where there has been a slight increase (United States and Canada) or the first indicators of a desire to further increase the defence budget, which is close to 2% (France) or even higher (United Kingdom). The announcement of planned investments by Germany will most certainly trigger this increase in France and the United Kingdom in the short/medium term. Indeed, it is unlikely that the two countries behind the European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) will accept being outclassed militarily by Berlin. Within this group, however, Canada stands out, with announcements of increases in the defence budget remaining very modest (at best only 1.4% of GDP). The Russian invasion has provoked a change of the Canadian perception of the international environment, both at the public and political levels. Many experts have called in recent weeks for an increase in the Canadian defence budget to improve defence capabilities. The Conservative Party is also pushing for the Trudeau government to accelerate its own arms strategy. Conversely, the leader of the NDP, who now supports Justin Trudeau's minority Liberal government, continues to challenge the 2% target for the time being. Thus, while the invasion is profoundly changing the political calculus of defence spending in Europe, Canada could be isolated among its allies because of its low defence budget, especially if the debate shifts from the amount of spending to the effectiveness of the means available. Strengthening NATO on Its Eastern Flank On the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 400,000 troops from NATO countries were stationed in West Germany (60 per cent of them American), plus Bundeswehr forces, as well as 60,000 U.S. troops deployed elsewhere in Europe. While it is unlikely that NATO will deploy a comparable number of troops to its eastern flank (including the three Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania), there has been a significant increase in the number of troops in these countries. Since the Russian invasion, the Pentagon has acknowledged that it must change its defence posture in Europe to increase permanent troop stationing, but also rotational deployments to deal with Russia. An additional 14,000 U.S. troops have been sent to the Baltics, Poland and Hungary, for a total of 100,000 U.S. troops in Europe, up from 80,000 before the war. The Pentagon also repositioned troops and equipment: 800 soldiers left Italy for the Baltics, 20 Apache helicopters went from Germany to the Baltics, 12 from Greece to Poland and 8 F-35s were transferred from Germany to Lithuania, Estonia and Romania. This is in addition to the 12,000 U.S. troops on alert as part of NATO's 40,000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF). In terms of deployment, Britain has almost doubled the number of troops in Estonia from 900 to 1,700. The number of armoured vehicles will increase to 48 and tanks to 24. Also, 350 soldiers will be added to the 100 already present in Poland. Two British ships also joined the eastern Mediterranean in February to conduct monitoring operations alongside other NATO members. France, which is leading the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) this year, has announced that it will lead a new NATO battalion in Romania. To this end, 250 French soldiers (the final number is expected to be twice as many) have recently taken up position on a Romanian base near the Ukrainian border. At the end of February 2022, Italy confirmed the deployment of about 1,350 military personnel in Hungary and Latvia within the framework of NATO, the dispatch of 130 military personnel and 12 combat aircraft to Romania, as well as 235 personnel, 2 ships and a combat aircraft in the Black Sea. In recent days, Berlin has also announced the upcoming deployment of several hundred troops to the Alliance's eastern flank: 350 soldiers are to join the 500 German troops already present in Lithuania; several ships are to be deployed in the Baltic Sea in the near future; a Patriot missile battery will be deployed in Slovakia and integrated into a NATO battle group similar to those in the Baltic States. Germany also plans to deploy half a dozen Eurofighter aircraft to Slovakia. As for Canada, on February 22, before the invasion began, Prime Minister Trudeau had already announced the deployment of 460 additional troops to reinforce the alliance in Eastern Europe. This includes an artillery unit of about 100 soldiers in Latvia, which will join 540 other members of the Armed Forces leading a NATO battle group (Operation REASSURANCE), as well as a second frigate – the HMCS Halifax – and a CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft. Currently, there are nearly 25,000 military personnel from NATO member countries deployed on the Alliance's eastern flank, not counting the national armies of the eight countries that make up the Alliance. A year ago, however, there were barely half that number. This number is likely to increase in the coming months, especially if the conflict continues. This, together with the desire of Sweden and Finland to join NATO, raises the question of a possible reorganization of the Alliance's structures. 3. Likely Reforms and Risks In addition to possible changes in NATO's internal structure, NATO's resurrection is still threatened by certain risks of tension and divergence. New plans for the defence of the Alliance's territory – especially in the event of its enlargement into Scandinavia – are likely to emerge and may be accompanied by negotiations on the military hierarchy within the Alliance (more specifically, on the automatic allocation of this or that position to certain countries). Moreover, a new Trump administration in 2025 could bring this new youthfulness of the Alliance to a premature end, especially if it were to take up Donald Trump's erratic positioning on European defence issues or relations with Moscow. Towards Reforms of the NATO Structure? While the last major structural reform of NATO dates back to the 2002 Prague Summit, it is not impossible that a new restructuring will take place both in terms of command and in terms of the nationalities occupying a given position. Several factors already militate in favour of this, not to mention those that could be added (for example, the accession of Sweden and Finland, which would mean that their territory would be taken into account in the Alliance's defence plans): the increase in the number of troops stationed in Eastern Europe; the major role played by Poland in Eastern defence; and the Brexit and its consequences on the so-called Berlin + arrangements between the EU and NATO. Indeed, the so-called Berlin + agreements of 2003 strengthened the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), making him a key player in NATO-EU cooperation, the position having been held almost continuously since 1949 by a British national. The United Kingdom's membership in both organizations and its strong ties with Washington argued for keeping this position in the hands of a Briton. However, the Brexit changes this. A first French attempt to take this position would have taken place as early as 2017. It is likely that others will follow, especially in the event of a partial weakening of the United Kingdom if Scotland were to become independent. It is also possible that the position of DSACEUR will be duplicated or split into two functions: this was the case in the 1980s, when for more than ten years there were two DSACEURs, one British and one German. The question of the future nationality of the next NATO Secretary General could be another issue, as the current Secretary General's term is coming to an end, although it has recently been extended for a few months in view of the war. Some want to see a woman appointed to the post for the first time. At the same time, however, other countries may insist that the position be given to a European from an EU member state participating in CSDP, which has not been the case since 2009. Risks of Fractures and Potential Tensions The longer the conflict continues, the more it potentially risks undermining NATO's cohesion. For the time being, the scenario of a direct military response has been ruled out by the allies because of the absence of a legal obligation to intervene and because of the risks of a direct confrontation with Russia. If this attitude can be explained by Russia's status as a nuclear power (and is comparable to the behaviour of Western countries during the Budapest uprising of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, or the Russian invasion of Afghanistan during the Cold War), indirectly it may encourage an increase in war crimes committed by Russia. Therefore, it is not certain that this position of non-intervention will hold if Moscow uses chemical weapons, especially because of public pressure in the West. In view of the arms deliveries, not to mention the influx of volunteers transiting the border between Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland, Slovakia and Romania on the other, Russian actions against convoys cannot be ruled out either, which again would entail the risk of both escalation with NATO military involvement and disunity over such an escalation among Alliance members. Moreover, overwhelming Ukraine with weapons could facilitate non-state violence, arms trafficking and terrorism in the long term in Europe. Consequently, there may be short/medium term dissension over the right way to deter Russia and support Ukraine. The Polish attempt to transfer MIG-29s to the Ukrainian armed forces, the debate on a no-fly zone over Ukraine, or the unilateral U.S. embargo on Russian hydrocarbons are all signals of potential future divergence in this regard. In the medium term, cohesion within the alliance both on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and beyond remains dependent on American domestic politics. In the event of a Trumpist Congress in 2022, or even a Trumpist president in January 2025, NATO's resurrection could then be seriously compromised, especially in the event of an American exit from the Alliance, even if this no longer seems to be discussed in the United States, at least for the moment. 4. Consequences of the War on the EU and China The war in Ukraine is also provoking developments and reactions both within the EU, NATO's close partner in Europe, and in China, and by extension raises the question of the division of tasks between NATO and the EU in Europe, but also of NATO's possible involvement in the Indo-Pacific. A Surprising European Union, But Still a Military Dwarf Although territorial defence in Europe is not yet a real part of its competences – and this despite the presence of Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty, which is the reinforced counterpart of NATO's Article 5 of the now defunct WEU – the EU has surprised more than one expert by its reaction since the beginning of the invasion. The extent of the EU's reaction has indeed been surprising, whether on the issue of economic sanctions or, more strikingly, on the issue of arms supply. This point is most surprising given the activation by the EU of the European Peace Facility mechanism created less than a year earlier and not initially designed for this type of expenditure. Thanks to this mechanism, the EU contributed with 500 million euros to the Ukrainian war effort in the early days. This amount has now been tripled. Is the EU putting an end to the capabilities-expectation gap from which it suffers? While it has just adopted its Strategic Compass, the process of validating it, which was initially accelerated following a French desire to take advantage of it for the presidential campaign, may in the end be detrimental to the EU, as the fallout from the Russian-Ukrainian war is far from over. Nevertheless, there is a certain coordination and understanding among member states, as well as an easing of tensions on certain issues, such as the reform of the rule of law in Poland. Indeed, just as within NATO – despite strong initial differences on Nord Stream 2 and sanctions – it is surprising to note the existence of a fairly strong cohesion between EU member states (with the exception of Hungary). The measures mentioned in relation to arms deliveries and the use of the European Peace Facility for this purpose, one of the most recent instruments and initially designed for African armies, demonstrate the effectiveness of coordination between EU states. Although logical given the context, we are also witnessing a return to grace of Poland among the Member States, this one being by its geographical position, but also its commitment to Ukraine, passed from pariah state, archetype of what some call illiberal democracies, to the model of a state defender of democracy. As a reminder, relations between Poland and other states – with the particular exception of Hungary – have deteriorated since the crisis of the rule of law in Poland and the contested reforms carried out by the ruling party. Now, in the words of the Polish president, “the priority is the security of the continent, the security of the Western world, the security of Ukraine and the security of Poland.” At the same time, since the invasion, the EU and its policies are certainly experiencing a new attraction. While in just a few days three new countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – have applied for EU membership, Denmark may also give up its derogation from the Common Security and Defence Policy after 30 years of attachment to it. The next few months could also see the end of Austrian and Irish neutrality, even though Vienna and Dublin have always vigorously reiterated their attachment to their neutrality (even though they participate in the CSDP). However, given the situation and the context, it is likely that the EU's military capabilities will remain relatively weak, with NATO remaining the preferred forum for most European states. The early adoption of the strategic compass has prevented it from truly taking into account the ongoing and future consequences of the war in Ukraine. The latest version of the project for a new European rapid reaction force is indicative of this gap. Based on the existing European Union battle groups, it provides for only a limited number of troops (around 5,000), far from reaching the initial CSDP objectives set in Helsinki (around 50,000). Moreover, everything seems to indicate that its field of action would remain outside the national territory of the EU member states. It is true that the CSDP is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), not the internal one. However, refusing to change the possible theatres of operation of the rapid reaction force amounts to condemning it, as the Eastern European states give priority to their territorial defence over external operations in Africa or the Middle East. This position of the Eastern Europeans, which existed before the Russian invasion, can only be strengthened following it. By extension, it is likely that this will also affect the development of the EU's military headquarters, a headquarters developed from the current Military Planning and Conduct Capability. Better coordination and understanding with NATO could avoid this scenario, but would require Paris to propose closer collaboration between the two institutions. However, the supply of arms to Ukraine shows that the EU is beginning to become aware of its indirect military resources, the first of which is precisely its financial resources. The forthcoming increase in the overall defence budgets of the EU member states to 2% or more of their GDP will also give the EU a military budget roughly equivalent to half that of the United States and equal to or greater than that of China. Paradoxically, this financial windfall risks undermining cooperation projects in the field of armaments within the EU, with certain industrial players hoping to escape what they consider to be an unpleasant constraint at best. This financial contribution could, however, encourage the development of a strong defence industrial capacity in Europe, provided that this contribution is not sucked in by American industries. An EU developing its capabilities and power is not impossible. Fortunately for the EU, the Russian invasion follows Donald Trump's tenure in the United States and the events of the summer of 2021, which were the AUKUS pact and the debacle in Afghanistan. These have diminished the desire for absolute dependence among some European leaders on Washington. Will they be able to avoid falling back into this trap? That is the question now. The EU still benefits from the attraction it exerts beyond its borders, as illustrated by the membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Finally, it has another as yet untapped advantage, namely that of also potentially being a military alliance thanks to Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty. The fact that the current negotiations between Russia and Ukraine seem to automatically exclude Ukraine's membership in NATO, but not in the EU, could once again allow Ukraine to assert itself as a key player, including from a security point of view, thanks to this same article. However, here again, judicious use of this article will not be possible without closer coordination on the military level between the EU and NATO. In this respect, the choice of the future NATO Secretary General could be a major issue in the future, as well as the nationality of the next DSACEURs. Consequences for NATO's Role in the Indo-Pacific Although considered to be Russia's great "ally", China has adopted an ambiguous position since the beginning of the conflict. It is likely that it will maintain this position in order to favour its position at the international level. In economic terms, Russia's growing isolation could enable it to acquire Russian oil and gas at lower cost despite very high international prices. On the diplomatic front, China's position was reflected in its abstention from the United Nations General Assembly vote to denounce Russian aggression in Ukraine. China will not do more to support its neighbour, fearing that it will be isolated on the international stage and that Xi Jinping's reputation will be tarnished in the way that Putin's is now – both at home and abroad. Xi Jinping's statement on February 4 that "China's friendship with Russia has no limits" now seems a long way off. On the military front, China is also in observer mode. It is taking note of the blind spots in Russia's strategy and the operational difficulties it is encountering in the face of a Ukrainian army that no one thought capable of such a performance on the ground. The question is whether events in Ukraine will serve as a warning against the prospect of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. During a Congressional Intelligence Committee hearing on March 8, 2022, the CIA Director noted that China was surprised by the turn of events in the Ukrainian crisis, both in terms of the West's coordinated response and the poor performance of Russian forces on the ground. By fostering a rapprochement between Western states, Russian aggression is greatly undermining Beijing's long-standing efforts to drive a wedge between Washington and the European Union. Following a series of interviews with Pentagon officials, Bloomberg concluded that Russia's difficulty with its offensive, its isolation from the global economy and the anti-war protests among the Russian population would certainly give the Chinese Communist Party pause in its plans to invade Taiwan. The way China tacitly approves of Russia's conduct, however, should ring alarm bells in Western chancelleries, especially in Europe. All Alliance members must be prepared to make Beijing understand that supporting Moscow will come at a cost. This may mean revising the way NATO members conceive of their presence in the Indo-Pacific region or limiting the interconnections between European and Chinese technological systems. Events in Ukraine, however, are likely to have two consequences for NATO and U.S. engagement in the Pacific. Much to Washington's displeasure, the other members of the Alliance could push for a refocusing of NATO strictly on its immediate environment – especially on the Russian threat – much to Beijing's delight. However, this could go hand in hand with an increased ability of the other Allies to provide for their own security and defence against Moscow. The political authorities in Moscow in 2022 no longer have the firepower of their Cold War counterparts. In the medium term, the forces of the allies on the eastern flank could potentially do without the 100,000 American troops in Europe, making it easier than in the past to refocus the majority of American forces in the Indopacific. Moreover, the scale of European rearmament could even, in the medium term, allow the other allies to take their share of the burden in the Indo-Pacific as well, since the Russian threat is no longer – by far – equivalent to that posed by the USSR. Conclusion If speaking of a Third World War is largely exaggerated – not to say erroneous – current events mark the beginning of what could be called a second Cold War. It is in this context that we are witnessing a second youthfulness in NATO, a youthfulness that is taking the form of renewed cohesion and strong measures to strengthen its capabilities, including defence spending and deployments on the eastern flank. However, there are still risks of divergence and tension between the allies in the event of an escalation in the conflict, but also on the issue of economic sanctions. Moreover, although isolated, the case of Victor Orban's Hungary remains problematic for cohesion within the Alliance. The major risk in the medium term, however, lies in the domestic policies of the member states, and more particularly in the United States, in the event of a Trumpist victory in Congress or in the next presidential election. It is not impossible that NATO will evolve in its structures, while deepening its ties with the European Union, which even if it remains a military dwarf for the moment, has several assets. Alliance involvement in the China Sea or in Indo-Pacific issues is now unlikely, at least in the short and medium term. However, all members of the Alliance (including Europeans) will have an interest in paying attention to Beijing's behaviour in the Russian-Ukrainian war – and if necessary, sanctioning it – as China and Russia's actions are aimed at challenging the current international order, which for the time being remains fundamentally influenced by the liberal democracies. The author would like to thank Maria Aftimos, Rémy Carugati, Maxandre Fortier, Tancrède Jankowski, Marco Munier and Camille Raymond for their contributions and research efforts. ## The Risks of Ambiguity: Taiwanese Public Opinion, US Credibility, and Effective Deterrence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-risks-of-ambiguity-taiwanese-public-opinion-us-credibility-and-effective-deterrence/ Modified: 2023-11-09 > The United States’ policy toward Taiwan has been a source of continuing controversy. Amid warnings that Beijing may be preparing to use... The United States’ policy toward Taiwan has been a source of continuing controversy. Amid warnings that Beijing may be preparing to use force against Taiwan by 2027, or even 2025, scholars and analysts are divided about whether U.S. actions are deterring or provoking the PRC. Arms sales and transits of U.S. warships through the Taiwan Strait are par for the course. But declarations of strategic clarity, proposed changes to the name of Taiwan’s de facto embassy in the United States, proposed invitations for Taiwan to join the RIMPAC exercises, and high-level visits of U.S. officials to Taiwan have been far more controversial. While much of the debate has centered on Beijing’s reaction to U.S. policy, it is no less important to consider Taiwan’s reaction. On the one hand, Raymond Kuo has argued that it is difficult to convince Taiwan’s government to implement an asymmetric defense strategy if there is doubt about the United States’ willingness to intervene. On the other hand, Bonnie Glaser contends that changing U.S. policy to strategic clarity could trigger the PRC to use force, making it important to convey U.S. resolve through signaling. The second wave of the American Portrait Survey (APS) carried out in Taiwan reveals that the United States faces a problem of credibility among the public, but also shows that the public is responsive to U.S. signals. When asked if the United States was a “credible” country, only 34% indicated that they agreed (though this was far more than the 9.4% who agreed with the statement that the PRC was a credible country). The results did not reflect anti-Americanism or a generally negative view of the United States: when asked to rate U.S. democracy on a 1-10 scale, 84.4% gave the United States a 5 or above, and 60.1% disagreed with the statement that the PRC would surpass the United States in the next ten years. Taiwanese respondents have a generally positive image of the United States, but they also harbor significant doubts about U.S. credibility. Even more worrying is the fact that these doubts have grown, even though U.S. policy toward Taiwan has generally been consistent: between the first and second waves of the survey (administered in September 2021 and November 2022 respectively), the belief in U.S. credibility among Taiwanese respondents declined by over 10% (from 45.3% to 34%).   U.S./China Credibility U.S. Democracy Level What explains these doubts about the United States? Given that the two waves of the survey were administered before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the public may have been responding to misleading comparisons between Taiwan and Ukraine in terms of the United States’ willingness to directly intervene. Moreover, cross-tabulation of the data shows that the fault lines in perceptions of the United States correspond with the other fault lines in Taiwan’s society: independence and unification, national identity, and partisanship. A substantially higher proportion among independence supporters believed that the United States was credible (50.3%) than among unification supporters (21.1%). Among status quo supporters, more of those who wanted to “maintain the status quo forever” (30.6%) considered the United States to be credible compared to those who wanted to “maintain the status quo now and decide later on unification or independence” (24.9%). There is a correlation between how closely respondents lean toward independence and how credible they consider the United States to be. On national identity, a significantly higher proportion of those who identified as Taiwanese (44.1%) considered the United States to be credible compared to those who identified as both Chinese and Taiwanese (16.3%). On partisanship, a substantially higher proportion of DPP supporters (60.2%) believed that the United States was credible compared to KMT supporters (17.9%). Overall, belief in the credibility of the United States tends to be associated with Taiwanese identity, DPP partisanship, and support for independence, while skepticism about the credibility of the United States tends to be associated with Chinese identity, KMT partisanship, and support for unification. Given that a substantial part of the Taiwan public exhibits doubts about the United States, it is important to consider what types of U.S. signals are effective in Taiwan. Even though there is some characterization of the combination of President Biden’s assurances and the White House’s subsequent denials about a change in policy as “strategic confusion,” evidence from the American Portrait survey shows that the Taiwan public focuses on the assurances: 62% of respondents indicated that a public commitment by the U.S. president to defend Taiwan raised the likelihood of U.S. intervention in Taiwan’s defense. The signaling effect of these visits and presidential statements was even higher than the signaling effect of arms sales, which 56.1% of respondents believed would raise the likelihood of U.S. intervention. Finally, 60.2% of respondents said that visits by high-level U.S. officials­ raised the likelihood that the United States would intervene in Taiwan’s defense. This last finding seems to be at odds with the finding by Alastair Iain Johnston, Tsai Chia-hung, and George Yin that “respondents overwhelmingly believed that Pelosi’s trip and the large-scale People’s Liberation Army exercises created a serious threat to Taiwan.” But the strongest evidence for their argument comes from a September 2022 survey in which there was a potential issue of compounding in the phrasing of the question: “In August this year, U.S. Congress Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, and China immediately held large-scale military exercises around Taiwan. Do you think this is a serious threat to Taiwan’s security?” For respondents who said yes, it’s not clear if they thought Pelosi’s visit created a threat to Taiwan, or if they were focusing on the Chinese military exercises. Some of those respondents may have believed that one caused the other, but it can’t be assumed that all of them thought so. Just before the exercises started, John Kirby, spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council, accused China of using Pelosi’s visit as a pretext for aggression against Taiwan, and it’s quite possible that some of Taiwanese respondents surveyed by Johnston, Tsai, and Yin believed so as well. The second wave of their survey (from January 2023) resolved the issue of compounding by asking “Do you think Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan made Taiwan more or less secure?” But it appears that this second wave only had a sample size of 576. Using a much larger sample size (1,035), the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation found that 52.9% of respondents welcomed Pelosi’s visit, which is consistent with our findings in the American Portrait Survey (which had an even larger sample size of 1,234). The results of the American Portrait survey indicate that U.S. signals are effective in addressing concerns over U.S. credibility in Taiwan. While scholars and analysts tend to focus on the tradeoffs between threats and assurances in U.S. relations with the PRC, they tend to overlook tradeoffs in U.S. relations with the PRC and U.S. relations with Taiwan. Actions to bolster assurances to Taiwan may erode assurances to the PRC; by the same token, actions to assure the PRC can undercut assurances to Taiwan. U.S. behavior is often read with far more care and scrutiny in Asia for what they may signal and imply than observers in the United States, situated far across the Pacific, may fully realize. Assuming that Taiwan is more constrained due to its relative size and therefore less consequential overlooks the fact that public convictions can affect important steps that Taiwan takes toward conflict prevention, deterrence, and self-defense. Thomas Christensen, Taylor Fravel, Bonnie Glaser, Andrew Nathan, and Jessica Chen Weiss recently argued that “avoiding war in the Taiwan Strait requires all sides to be deterred.” If this claim is correct, then the U.S.-Taiwan component of this dynamic is no less important than its U.S.-PRC leg. A Taiwan that is confident about U.S. support—especially in the face of an unprovoked PRC attack—is more likely to implement the new asymmetric defense strategy that the United States now encourages. Otherwise, Taiwanese who will bear the brunt of any aggression may feel less sure about moving away from more familiar, traditional approaches to defense despite their growing limitations in the eyes of experts. Such conditions must be considered as part of efforts to avert conflict and avoid the use of cross-Strait relations as a cudgel in U.S. domestic politics that could spark a crisis. The fact that over 80% of Taiwanese steadfastly prefer the status quo in some form should allay concerns about assurances prompting Taiwan to incite Beijing through a unilateral declaration of independence or some other form of adventurism. Preference for the status quo has remained stable across the population for over a decade, as shown in repeated polling conducted by the Election Study Center on behalf of Taiwan’s cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council. This orientation is probably as close to a consensus as possible in a democracy, particularly one as lively as Taiwan’s. Taiwan today differs substantively from the early 2000s, when less bridled populist nationalism, a less institutionalized political system, and the uncertainties associated with democratization may have created more cause for worry. Taiwanese treasure their autonomy, but they recognize the costs of confrontation with the PRC, whatever the outcome. The strength and clarity of these widely shared sentiments will restrain any Taiwanese politician from behaving recklessly. Any politician or political party that goes against the prevailing position will be held accountable by the Taiwanese public, which is not afraid of making the strength of its views known. Giving Taiwan confidence without triggering the PRC to use force or coercion presents the United States with a dilemma. This tension will remain a persistent feature in Washington’s relations with Taipei and Beijing so long as the PRC insists on a right to use force to exert control over Taiwan and makes active preparations to do so. Since the abrogation of the U.S.-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980, successive U.S. administrations approached the matter through a studied “strategic ambiguity.” That is, to simultaneously deter Beijing and Taipei from engaging in provocative behavior by convincing both sides of the uncertainty over U.S. intervention in a potential Taiwan crisis. Given Taiwan’s maturing democracy, a cautious Taiwanese electorate to which politicians must answer, as well as a PRC whose capabilities and appetite for risk are growing, asking whether the old U.S. approach to “strategic ambiguity” remains fit-for-purpose is both reasonable and relevant. Managing the evolving situation across the Taiwan Strait means actively adjusting to evolving material and political circumstances. The United States’ own changing capabilities as well as domestic and international commitments too are important considerations in this regard. So far, it seems that the United States has chosen to navigate that dilemma by resisting formal changes in declaratory policy while informally calibrating policy implementation, such as by providing verbal assurances and increasing engagement with Taiwan as permitted under the Taiwan Relations Act and supplemented by the Taiwan Travel Act. Sending clear but limited signals of assurance simultaneously to Taipei and Beijing seeks to square the circle by recognizing that while Washington can help shape key conditions, it is unable to fundamentally change minds in either Taiwan or the PRC. Imperfect as this approach may be, it can buy time for Taiwan and the United States to update their ability to more effectively deter the PRC from escalating coercion and the use of force. This position may also help Washington to demonstrate the seriousness of its commitment to maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond to allies, partners, friends, and others.   Technical Note The second wave of the American Portrait Survey (APS) was sponsored by the Institute of European and American Studies (IEAS) at Academia Sinica in Taiwan and conducted by the Election Study Center (ESC) at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. It was based on a sample of 1,234 Taiwanese adults, who were interviewed via landline (708) and mobile phone (526) between November 15 and November 20, 2022. With a 95% confidence level, the maximum possible random sampling error is 2.79%.   James Lee is an assistant research fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. His research in strategic studies focuses on U.S. foreign policy and the security of Taiwan. Ja Ian Chong is a Non-Resident Scholar at Carnegie China. He works on security issues in East Asia, including coercive diplomacy, external intervention, contentious politics, and major power competition. Chong has published widely on these topics. Hsin-Hsin Pan is associate professor of sociology at Soochow University in Taipei. Her research interests include political sociology, survey methods, and cross-Strait relations. Chien-Huei Wu is Research Professor in Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. His research interests cover EU-Asia relations and US-Taiwan-China relations. He has published Law and Politics on Export Restrictions: WTO and Beyond (CUP 2021). Wen-Chin Wu is an associate research fellow of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. His research interests focus on political economy, comparative democratization, and Chinese politics. He has published in China Quarterly, International Studies Quarterly, Political Communication, among others. ## The Russian Navy and the Arctic: A New Reality, Old Challenges URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-russian-navy-and-the-arctic-a-new-reality-old-challenges/ Modified: 2023-09-01 > With the most extensive Arctic coastline stretching over 14,000 kilometres from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait, Russia will now face... While the Baltic Sea is becoming a “NATO lake” with Finland’s entry into NATO and Sweden’s upcoming integration, the Alliance seeks to increase its involvement in its Arctic flank. The Arctic region lies at the northern end of the fault line that separates Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community, from the North Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. Although there currently isn’t a NATO strategy for the Arctic, integrating those two new Nordic members should nevertheless bring greater coherence and enhanced flexibility to NATO’s posture on its northern flank. In the new reality of the confrontation below the threshold of conflict between Russia and Western powers, the Arctic region now serves as a secondary theater where extra-regional tensions from the Black Sea and Ukraine are projected. The western outlet of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) could, however, regain its role as a containment and control line for Russian naval activity, structured by NATO around the imaginary maritime line connecting Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom (GIUK), much like during the Cold War. With the most extensive Arctic coastline stretching over 14,000 kilometres from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait, Russia will now face a “NATO” Arctic Council. The principal naval force in the Arctic, the Russian Northern Fleet – boasting around 25 submarines and approximately twenty surface vessels (aircraft carrier, cruisers, frigates and amphibious ships) – has its headquarters in Severomorsk (within the Murmansk region). Before the conflict, it had undergone a modernization program devised in the late 2000s and implemented since the early 2010s as part of the 2011-2020 armament plan aimed at revamping its surface and submarine capabilities. What is the current status of the situation? Given the altered geopolitical landscape post-February 24, 2022, and the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, how does the Russian Navy now position itself in the Arctic region? What interests is it supposed to promote and protect in this region? What stance does it adopt amid this context of tensions, and to what extent might the conflict in Ukraine thwart or modify the plans for modernizing the Northern Fleet that Moscow embarked upon nearly a decade ago? An Arctic Fleet, For What Purpose? Stakes and Perceptions From Moscow’s Viewpoint The Northern Fleet is one of the five components that constitute the Russian Navy, along with the Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets and the Caspian Flotilla. Together with the Pacific Fleet, it constitutes one of the two strategic naval components responsible for implementing the strategic nuclear deterrence posture. They accomplish this posture through their continuous operational presence at sea, facilitated by their nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Furthermore, since January 1st, 2021, the Northern Fleet’s organizational status has been organically elevated as it has become a full-fledged military district, and it is on its basis that the Northern Fleet’s Joint Strategic Command has been formed. This regional strategic command is thus added to the existing Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Strategic Commands. However, it is difficult to assess the consequences of the war in Ukraine on this new military district at this time. Last spring, some reports indicated the possibility of placing all Russian naval formations back under the direct command of the Navy General Staff, as was the case until the early 2010s. The integrated commands of the military districts would then lose “control” over the fleet, raising questions about the coordination of ground and air assets for the implementation of the Northern strategic “bastion,” which safeguards the Russian maritime approaches in the Barents Sea. Nevertheless, this development reflects a Russian awareness, prior to the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, of the centrality of the maritime factor in the context of renewed geopolitical competition and conflict that was already taking shape in the region. It is worth recalling that the Arctic was a theater of competition and silent confrontation during the Cold War between American and Soviet nuclear submarines. The Russian doctrinal corpus on the Arctic has expanded in recent years with the publication of several official documents: the “Strategy of Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation for the period to 2035” (October 2020) and, more recently,  the Russian “Maritime Doctrine” (July 31st, 2022) and the new “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” (March 31st, 2023). In addition to these documents, there is the older version of Russia’s “Foreign Policy Concept” dating back to 2016, the comparison of which with the recent March 2023 update reveals an elevation in the Arctic’s status among the regional priorities of Russian foreign policy. Finally, let us mention the 2014 “Military Doctrine,” which will likely undergo an update in the near future. Other strategic master plans accompany these documents and focus on key industrial sectors (such as shipbuilding or the energy sector), crucial for developing Russia’s Arctic regions. Reading these texts highlights a series of challenges Russian authorities identified on the country’s northern flank. One of these challenges involves ensuring free access to what is referred to in Russia as the “world ocean.” This term, with its Anglo-Saxon connotation, refers to bodies of water beyond “near maritime zones” (inland and territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone) and “distant maritime areas” (such as the Mediterranean Sea, for example). This first concern echoes a geopolitical perception prevalent among political and security elites in a landlocked Russian territory. Through its network of bases and naval deployments, NATO would exert pressure on the western outlet of the NSR, which Russian military and merchant vessels inevitably pass through to reach the North Atlantic. In this regard, the geopolitical theory of the “heartland” developed by British geographer Halford John Mackinder in the early 20th century seems to resonate particularly in Moscow. Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, quoted it in an interview on Izvestia in early May 2023 to describe what he believes are Western plans and ambitions concerning Russian territory and its resources. This brings us to the second challenge identified in these official documents: the assertion of Russian sovereignty over the Arctic region. The Russian “sovereignty complex” is manifested in the Arctic, notably with tensions regarding the modalities of circulation for foreign vessels along the NSR. This posture of Russian sovereignty was reaffirmed during the strategic exercise “Umka-2021” conducted in March 2021, during which three nuclear submarines surfaced on the ice near the Franz Josef Land Archipelago, Russia’s northernmost territory, to the east of the Norwegian Svalbard. Challenges related to the development of Russian Arctic coastal zones are also clearly identified, for instance, in the “Strategy of development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation for the period to 2035”. Apart from the military and energy sector companies, few actors can attract investment and contribute to job creation in these remote and harsh climate areas. The development of the NSR, facilitated by underlying infrastructure projects, is also seen as a means to counteract the depopulation of the Russian Arctic. For example, territories like Primorye in the Russian Far East have lost nearly 16.8% of their population between 1991 and the late 2010s. Finally, the militarization of the Arctic and the importation of extra-regional conflict are regarded as significant security challenges. From Moscow’s perspective, their relevance has been amplified by the repercussions of the war in Ukraine, especially with the entry of new Nordic members into NATO. Ranked third among regional priorities in the 2016 “Foreign Policy Concept,” the Arctic now takes the second position in the new version of this text published in 2023, just after Russia’s “near abroad.” It is a region where Moscow envisions interests considered vital and where, especially given the substantial energy investments made there and the projects related to the development of the NSR, it adopts a geopolitical posture characterized mainly by maintaining the status quo. This preference for geopolitical conservatism in the Arctic translates into a defensive military posture involving offensive actions, even extending beyond the Arctic region. The Northern Fleet Before the War: a Compelled Yet Determined and Persistent Modernization Effort The Northern Fleet has an extensive area of responsibility that encompasses not only Arctic waters but also the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Its units are also occasionally deployed in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, as was the case in 2023 for the Admiral Gorshkov frigate, which visited Cape Town, South Africa (in February), and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (in April). The renewal of its capabilities began with the 2011-2020 armament program, which revitalized the submarine component (with the new Project 955 SSBNs and the new Project 885 cruise missile submarines – or SSGN), while the Project 22350 frigates are expected to form the new backbone of surface capabilities. To this date, the Northern Fleet has received: Two new SSBNs from Project 955 and derivative, out of the six admitted to active service since 2013; Two SSGNs from Project 885, out of the three admitted to active service since 2014; Two frigates from Project 22350. Simultaneously, the ex-Soviet offshore platforms – the cruiser Admiral Ustinov from Project 1164, the large anti-submarine warfare vessels from Project 1155, the SSGNs from Project 949, the SSNs from Project 971 – are undergoing a rather sluggish modernization program, intended to equip some of them with cruise missile capabilities. Additionally, the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov is also supposed to undergo a minimal modernization that has, however, turned into quite an ordeal. Its return to active commissioning is still scheduled for 2024. Project 885’s new frigates and SSGNs are equipped with long-range Kalibr cruise missiles, and the Admiral Gorshkov frigate even served as a test platform for the hypersonic Tsirkhon missile, which underwent intensive testing during multiple firing campaigns in 2020-2021. This proliferation of cruise missiles – referred to as the “Khalibrization” of the fleet – is one of the structural directions of the new 2018-2027 armaments program, which continues a trend already observed with the implementation of the 2011-2020 plan that prioritized disruptive technologies, especially for the Navy. Indeed, in addition to the nuclear strategic deterrence carried out by the Delta IV-class SSBNs with their Sineva missiles and the next-generation Borei-class submarines with the intercontinental Bulava ballistic missiles, the Northern Fleet vessels also play a role in the non-nuclear strategic deterrence posture. This role is achieved by the aforementioned platforms carrying long-range cruise missiles (Kalibr, Tsirkon). The growing significance of these munitions deployed on new Russian surface and submarine platforms throughout the 2010s is particularly evident in their involvement during strategic exercises. Thus, during the annual “Grom” strategic exercises, where the nuclear triad is tested, the Russian Navy also conducts cruise missile launches in addition to intercontinental ballistic missile launches. In the 2019 edition of these exercises, the K-560 Severodvinsk (the lead vessel from Project 885) launched a Kalibr cruise missile while submerged. This launch marked the first use of this ammunition in this type of maneuver. This combination illustrates the pre-strategic use of these cruise missiles, which are intended to equip an increasing number of Russian naval platforms. The reduced geographic reach of surface vessels, which is a consequence of challenges encountered in Russian shipyards when producing high tonnage surface vessels, is partially compensated by the extended range of these cruise missiles (up to 2,500 km for the Kalibr). These munitions and their carrying ships also contribute to Russia’s anti-access and area denial strategy in the western outlet of the NSR, where the Northern Fleet is fully integrated. The War in Ukraine: What Consequences for the Russian Naval System in the Arctic? Considering the turn of events in Ukraine since February 24th, 2022, the Northern Fleet could face a series of structural challenges. As the war in Ukraine primarily remains a land-focused issue, the Navy should continue to bear the brunt of unfavourable financial trade-offs, which was already the case with the 2018-2027 armament plan. Additionally, Euro-Atlantic sanctions will directly or indirectly impact the defence industrial and technological base, potentially causing delays in program implementation. However, the monopolization and attrition of conventional forces in Ukraine could prompt the Kremlin to rely more on nuclear capabilities in the balance of power with NATO. If this choice were to materialize, it should– at least politically – benefit the Northern Fleet and result in the maintenance of expenditures for its reinforcement. As the war in Ukraine is, in the opinion of Russian officials themselves, expected to continue, the Northern Fleet is likely to witness an expansion of its mission scope. Thus, on the political level, it appears more crucial for Moscow than ever to “show the flag” on the “world ocean,” particularly among the so-called “Global South.” This mission naturally falls to the Northern Fleet, equipped with high-sea capabilities (former Soviet vessels, Project 22350 frigates such as the lead ship Admiral Gorshkov), enabling it to project its presence as far as Africa and the Middle East, where Moscow’s partners are located (Sudan, Syria, Algeria, etc.) Its role in this mission becomes even more critical due to the confinement of the Black Sea Fleet within the Pontic Basin since the closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits to military navigation by Ankara on February 28th, 2022 (Turkey invoked Articles 19 and 21 of the Montreux Convention on that dates, allowing it to close the Straits to military navigation in times of conflict). Usually, however, the Black Sea Fleet also contributes to Russian naval diplomacy. The frigate Admiral Gorshkov, for example, took part in the trilateral maritime exercise “Mosi” organized by South Africa with the Chinese Navy in February 2023. Furthermore, due to the closure of the Turkish Straits, the Northern Fleet will be more heavily relied upon to maintain the operational Russian naval detachment in the Eastern Mediterranean (typically consisting of about a dozen ships of various types). This detachment usually relies heavily on units from the Black Sea Fleet, which no longer have the capacity to take turns in the Eastern Mediterranean. The involvement of the Northern Fleet appears to be even more crucial, considering that the Baltic Fleet – whose units are also traditionally associated with the Russian Mediterranean squadron’s order of battle – has a low availability rate. Finally, the Northern Fleet ships will likely be tasked with accompanying, or even escorting, several tankers from what the press has dubbed the Russian “ghost fleet.” The vessels in this fleet transport Russian crude oil under Western sanctions and could, if necessary, be subject to interception attempts or, at the very least, intimidation maneuvers by allied navies. In any case, this is a scenario that the Russian Navy could certainly prepare for. This broadening of the mission spectrum, against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine and capabilities that are evolving qualitatively, but not necessarily quantitatively, is expected to impact the duration and extension of deployments, which will be required to increase. For example, the frigate Admiral Kassatonov, the second unit of Project 22350, returned to its homeport on March 25th after having been deployed for 422 days. Alongside these challenges related to tensions over the availability of vessels, several persistent technological and capability barriers could qualitatively hinder the missions of the Northern Fleet. The Russian industry continues to work on developing an extender to increase underwater endurance capability for its conventional submarines (the Project 677 submarines are expected to be equipped with such an extender in the future). However, the recent announcement of the order for a new flotilla of 6 Project 0636.3 conventional submarines for the Northern Fleet tends to confirm that the availability of this type of extender is sufficiently doubtful in the medium term. Therefore, the Russian Navy likely feels the need to “bridge the gap” by ordering this type of platform, certainly proven – the Black Sea and Pacific fleets each received a similar batch over the past ten years – but technologically quite dated compared to its potential competitors in the area (the future Norwegian submarines derived from the German Type 212,  expected to be operational in the middle of this decade, are of a more recent generation). Furthermore, there are still shortcomings in anti-submarine warfare (ASM), with ex-Soviet platforms undergoing modernization – the Il-38N “Novella” aircraft, equipped with upgraded onboard electronics, and the Ka-27M helicopter. The future of new programs – such as the Ka-65 Minoga helicopter – remains uncertain. In addition, the proposed directions considered for the new airborne platform, based on the Tu-142 equipped with the “Novella” suite, do not appear realistic before the end of the decade. In short, the Northern Fleet will have to do more with the same resources: safeguard the northern approaches to Russian territory, stand up to NATO in the Arctic, secure navigation along the NSR, and project itself towards the “world ocean” to fulfill an even more demanding range of missions. In other words, its ubiquity will be further called upon, putting the ships and their crews to the test. Such a challenge could lead Russia to consider with greater interest the necessity of having naval footholds – or alternatively, having access facilities to ports for light operations (crew rest, minor maintenance, refilling of fresh water tanks, refuelling, etc.) – in areas it deems of interest (Red Sea, Indian Ocean) to support its fleet’s activities there. ## The Russian Occupation of Georgia and the Questioning of its Territorial Integrity URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-russian-occupation-of-georgia-and-the-questioning-of-its-territorial-integrity/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > In the context of parliamentary elections in Georgia, slated for October 31, 2020, Russian pressure on this small Caucasian state continues, both through increasing land seizures and massive propaganda campaigns. In the context of parliamentary elections in Georgia, slated for October 31, 2020, Russian pressure on this small Caucasian state continues, both through increasing land seizures and massive propaganda campaigns. As the spotlight turns to Nagorno-Karabakh, a secessionist territory of Azerbaijan whose dormant conflict was revived in September 27, 2020, there are other secessionist territories nearby in the Caucasus, Georgia, which deserve media attention just as much. It has now been more than twelve years since Russian forces invaded Georgia and occupied 20% of its territory. Russia continues to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia with its aggressive “moving border” policy, a strategy that involves the gradual annexation of small segments of Georgian territory through the expansion of its already illegally occupied areas. The timid Western response to this blatant violation of international law may have encouraged Moscow to annex Crimea in a similar land grab in 2014. The mobility of borders in a context of what many have called a “frozen” conflict shows, on the one hand, that the conflict is precisely not “frozen” and, on the other hand, that it continues to cause human losses. Indeed, the suspicious death of a 29-year-old Georgian, Mr. Kvaratskhelia while visiting Gali in March 2019, is one example. Although the Abkhaz authorities alleged his suicide, examinations of the remains clearly show indications of torture. On March 17, 2019, just a few days after the death of Mr. Kvaratskhelia, another Georgian, Givi Beruashvili, was arrested by the occupying forces in Ditsi, a village bordering the Tskhinvali region, for visiting his elders. -parents who live 500 metres from the contact line. The absence of an international monitoring mandate makes these abuses invisible, as secessionist groups and their Russian backers continue to employ extra-legal methods of coercion with impunity. Since the occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia and the latter's recognition of their independence, a so-called administrative border separates the seized territories from the rest of Georgia. Behind these scarcely veiled secessionist territories hides Moscow's hand without which it would be impossible for them to maintain their artificial independence. Having achieved the status of de facto states, i.e., without recognition from the international community, but with the support of their Russian sponsor, the two secessionist territories maintain territorial claims on plots of land in their autonomous territory, such as it was limited to the Soviet regime which had disappeared for thirty years, which still eludes their control. The mobile nature of this "border" allows Russia to scavenge more small chunks of territory as it sees fit, thus expanding its area of ​​occupation. The territorial claims of the secessionist authorities are up to Moscow, which thus increases its territorial control indirectly. This policy of border mobility is based on an elastic understanding of Soviet law (and in particular of the Constitution of 1977), which would allow these entities to recover all of the territories they enjoyed during their Soviet autonomy. This mobile border takes on the appearance of a real front - i.e. a non-definitive administrative border which temporarily separates territorial entities such as empires, a concept which is also at the origin of the word border. Georgians are being evicted from the newly occupied lands and risk kidnapping if they cross the new administrative border which has been arbitrarily established with the blessing of Moscow. This border, the course of which is often changed without warning, further increases the insecurity of the Georgian population. Stories like that of Dato Vanishvili, whose land was incorporated into South Ossetia overnight in May 2015, nearly seven years after the 2008 war, are multiplying. Between 2008 and 2018, it is estimated that Russia unilaterally changed the border to the detriment of Georgia 56 times. Other researchers arrive at the count of 54 unilateral border changes by Russia between 2011 and 2018. This moving border policy exploits Tbilisi’s concern about the lasting loss of a large segment of its territory, pushing the Georgian government to the negotiating table with the Kremlin. In 2015, border markers were moved to the village of Tsitelubani, which hosts a small 1,605-meter section of the 830-km Baku-Supsa pipeline, operated by the BP oil company in a territory that Russia now partially occupies. Despite its very small size, this small segment of the pipeline is enough to allow those in control of the area to disrupt the flow of oil as needed. The occupation of the area thus acts as a sword of Damocles on the managers of this strategic infrastructure. Similarly, the advance of the mobile border towards the only highway that connects western Georgia with the rest of the country allows Moscow to exert greater pressure on Georgia by threatening to disconnect Tbilisi from a portion of the Georgian territory. The border is currently only 400 metres from this highway. Illegal arrests by the occupation forces have become more and more frequent in recent years. Between 2017 and 2019, 327 Georgians were arrested for “illegally crossing the border.” Such cases show not only a continued hostile intention by Russia against the Georgians, but also the violation of the 2008 ceasefire agreement negotiated by the European Union (EU) and the maintenance of an illegal presence of Russian troops on Georgian soil, all measures which prevent Georgia from restoring its territorial integrity. Georgia’s pro-Western foreign policy - including deepening relations with the United States and the popular plan to join NATO and the EU - is obviously generating frustration in Moscow. Yet the choices made by a large majority of Georgians remain unshakeable. Recent polls compiled by the US National Democratic Institute (NDI) show that 83% of Georgian respondents support Georgia's membership of the EU and 78% support NATO membership. These two organizations cleverly maintain the hope of eventual membership, without however seeking to upset Russia head-on. Moscow's tactic of creating enough trouble for Georgia to put its foreign policy ambitions on hold therefore seems to be working. Designed to undermine this desire for integration, this strategy also aims to show that the Euro-Atlantic community is not very willing to integrate Georgia quickly, nor to intervene to prevent Russia from expanding its area of ​​occupation. At the same time, Russia thus makes it impossible for Georgia to regain its territorial integrity and to fulfill the essential conditions for its accession to both the EU and NATO, that is to say the establishment of harmonious relations with its minorities and the mutual recognition of borders with its neighbours. The indefinite waiting of Georgia's coveted membership of these Western organizations and the territorial predation that continues with impunity illustrate that, through these mobile border policies, Moscow has succeeded, for the moment, in dissuading both the EU and NATO to expand their influence in the region. Yet this Russian deterrence strategy does not work perfectly. Georgia's strategic partnership with the United States reached new heights when in 2017 the US State Department authorized a military sale to Georgia of Javelinman portable anti-tank missiles and Javelin command launch units (CLU), equipment that had been on Georgia's wish list for many years. Likewise, Washington's plan to sell FIM-92 Stingers, a portable air defense system to Georgia, underscores the United States’s commitment to continue close cooperation in defense and security. Georgia is advancing in cooperation with NATO as it is currently the largest non-NATO contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the third total country contributor. Another example is the joint NATO-Georgia 2020 exercise held last month. These intensified relations between Tbilisi and Washington fuel Georgia's hopes of one day joining the Transatlantic Alliance, which can be seen as a certain failure of Russia's efforts to get the Georgian people to reject Western values ​​by causing social disruption in Georgia. Information Operations Apart from physical and military threats, Russia continues to use more subtle methods to exert its influence over Georgia and the Georgian people. In recent years, Russian interference in the elections and political processes of other countries has become a major concern in the West. In the immediate vicinity of Russia, however, this phenomenon is not new. Along with its direct military action, the Kremlin has embarked on a continuing information war campaign aimed at undermining democracy and destabilizing the political situation in these countries. It is therefore no surprise that Georgia is among the countries subject to operations of Russian influence aimed at derailing its foreign policy and increasing political polarization at the national level. Georgia is indeed a prime target for cyber-attacks and propaganda from Russia. Since the breakup of the USSR, many phases of tension between the two countries have given rise to various information campaigns by Moscow in a multitude of forms. The Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 was certainly the most obvious form of such attacks characterized by the ingenious coordination of traditional military operations on the physical ground with cyber-attacks and information operations. Moscow's disinformation campaigns against Georgia have never really stopped since. It is not uncommon for these campaigns to directly involve senior officials in Russia's foreign and defense ministries as well as President Vladimir Putin himself. More recently, for example, Moscow launched an information operation against the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research, based in Tbilisi and funded by the United States, on September 11, 2018. The Lugar Center is a part of the laboratory of Georgia's public health care system. Russian commander of radiological, chemical and biological defense troops, Igor Kirilov, alleged that the Lugar Center was a laboratory where the United States carried out illegal experiments on humans, killing more than 73 people there. Moscow also accused Washington of developing biological weapons at the Lugar Center. It is entirely plausible that such a high-profile attack such as the one on Lugar's laboratory constitutes a strategic move aimed at arousing Georgian and international public mistrust of the United States in an attempt to undermine Georgia's integration into the transatlantic community. As the Georgian parliamentary elections approach on October 31, 2020, it is no wonder that Tbilisi is on the alert. After all, Russia has quite a long history of intervening in electoral and referendum campaigns in foreign countries, including the US presidential election in 2016, but especially in the former Soviet republics. As for the Georgian elections, disinformation campaigns from Russia began in 2019 by supporting pro-Russian groups in Georgia, such as the Alliance of Patriots, and disseminating ideas that Azerbaijan and Turkey are enemies of Georgia, while Russia is a good neighbour who can support friendly countries. As is the case elsewhere, the Russian propaganda campaign in Georgia seeks to exploit existing vulnerabilities in society. Traditional values, religion, and land disputes are some of the issues that provide fertile ground for voter manipulation in Georgia. To advance its interests, the Russian government supports various pro-Kremlin actors, such as political parties, media, NGOs, and radical extremist groups, which often act as vehicles for disseminating anti-Western narratives. The country's most influential institution - the Georgian Orthodox Church - is also subject to significant Russian influence, and the Orthodox clergy often serve as sources or amplifiers of pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives. However, not all of these actors have direct and open ties to Russia, and some may act as natural amplifiers or "useful idiots," contributing to the pro-Kremlin narrative, conveyed through soft power and propaganda, that spreads conspiracy theories and divisive fake news. A Media Development Foundation (MDF) study on anti-Western propaganda observed that anti-Western narratives take a three-tiered approach: sowing fear, instilling despair, and offering alternative solutions. According to the MDF report, Russian anti-Western propaganda points to the risk of war and loss of territory, as well as the threat of an erosion of national identity to promote fears in Georgian society. The main messages used to instill despair center on skepticism about the willingness of the EU and NATO to support Georgia and the narrative of "liberal decline" in the West. In this context, direct dialogue with Russia and political and military neutrality are offered as solutions to territorial problems and a pro-Russian orientation is presented as a means of protecting Georgian identity and ensuring economic stability. Russia's propaganda ecosystem has relied heavily on Facebook, Georgia's most popular social network. Pro-Kremlin actors have extensively exploited the infrastructure of social media to spread disinformation and fake news. As part of its social media monitoring, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) - a Georgian watchdog of elections and democracy - says it has discovered organized networks on Facebook that are said to work in a coordinated fashion to artificially amplify and disseminate pro-Russian content from News-Front and Sputnik. News-Front, an open and aggressive Russian disinformation vehicle, established in occupied Crimea in 2014, was launched in Georgian in October 2019, engaging in news operations on Facebook soon after. More precisely, according to the results of the ISFED survey: News-Front has attempted to arouse antagonism and aggression among Georgian Facebook users, dividing society, creating political polarization [...] and employing a range of tactics to spread anti-Western and pro-Russian messages. As part of its operation, News-Front used fake accounts that shared News-Front content in a secret, organized, and targeted manner with at least 31 open Facebook groups with a combined audience of over half a million . In addition to promoting anti-Western and pro-Russian content, this network targeted both pro-government and pro-opposition Facebook groups "with tailored provocative messages that could have served to divide society into two camps and ignite confrontation. It is certainly no coincidence that the Georgian News-Front service was launched a year before the October 2020 parliamentary elections in Georgia. It is highly likely that a fabricated Facebook network has been set up to influence pre-election rhetoric and further fuel polarization in Georgia, where political debate is already very heavy. However, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing global health crisis provided an opportune time for News-Front to launch a new information offensive in Georgia. News-Front and its Facebook network quickly mobilized to spread disinformation, conspiracy rumours and anti-Western messages in Georgia. Russian disinformation related to COVID-19 in Georgia has attempted to distort reality and promote the view that Georgia should distance itself from the West while implicitly attacking state institutions and measures taken to contain the virus. Once again, Russian disinformation has attempted to discredit the Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research, accusing it of being involved in the spread of the virus and undermining confidence in its efforts to fight the coronavirus epidemic. ISFED also claimed that, like News-Front, another Russian media outlet, Sputnik, also used fake Facebook accounts to artificially amplify the content of this propaganda in Georgia. Facebook removed News-Front's global infrastructure from its platform in April 2020, barring the organization from relocating to the network. The fake accounts associated with Sputnik found by ISFED were also deleted around the same time. This may have limited some of the capabilities of the Russian disinformation infrastructure on Facebook ahead of the parliamentary elections in Georgia, but these investigations demonstrate that Russia is and will continue to harness the capabilities of social media to influence public discourse and elections in Georgia. Georgia’s Place in Putin’s Strategy Russia's use of the "salami tactic" is not new. In recent years, however, Moscow has more proactively used violent means to undermine Georgian sovereignty. Putin's recent decline in opinion polls about how satisfied Russians are with him may be one factor behind the increase in such provocations. Putin's approval ratings have fallen to their lowest level since 2006, with just 33.4% of those polled in Russia saying they trust his regime, according to a recent survey by Russian polling institute the Levada Center. Unpopular proposals, like increasing the retirement age and sluggish economic growth, frustrate the public. It was precisely the military intervention in Chechnya and the economic miracle of the early 2000s that won Putin's broad popular support and it cannot be ruled out that he tries to repeat this feat by betting on Russian nationalism and adopting a certain adventurism in foreign policy: the occupation of Georgian territories and, more importantly, the annexation of Crimea raised its popularity ratings which had already experienced a certain decline. Obviously, this is a dangerous gamble on Putin's part, because in doing so he adds to the sanctions directed against the Russian oligarchs, who also are among his most important supporters. However, while these interventions may be seen as simple geopolitical policies that have succeeded, this concern of Putin's declining popularity cannot be dismissed out of hand. Although less problematic under international law, as Russia is intervening at the invitation of Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, the military intervention in Syria could follow this same logic. So far, Kremlin strategists have skillfully entertained audiences by presenting exploits of Russian military force abroad. As ordinary Russians begin to question Putin's efforts to restore Russia's "past greatness," the loss of domestic confidence and political isolation infuriates Putin. Georgia appears to be the preferred location to achieve its goals, being the most overtly pro-Western country in the region, yet without being protected by the NATO umbrella. Also, there is no need to invade the country again to have an effect, it suffices to enlarge the territories which are already occupied, an inexpensive measure which Georgia cannot afford to oppose. ## The Russo-Ukrainian War as Seen from the Arab World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-russo-ukrainian-war-as-seen-from-the-arab-world/ Modified: 2025-05-13 In February 2025, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting between American and Russian envoys to agree on the terms for initiating direct Russo-American negotiations over the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, which has lasted three years. The choice of the Saudi capital was no coincidence: Riyadh maintains privileged diplomatic relations with both the Trump administration (dating back to his first term in office, during which his first official foreign visit was to Saudi Arabia) and Moscow. The choice of Saudi Arabia as the host illustrates the position taken by several Arab states since the start of the war in February 2022 – states which, far from severing ties with Moscow, have instead maintained or even strengthened their relations with Vladimir Putin’s regime. For instance, in June 2023, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune paid a state visit to Russia at Vladimir Putin’s invitation, more than a year after the launch of the Russian offensive against Kyiv. A few weeks later, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi met with President Putin in Saint Petersburg in July of the same year. Moreover, beyond maintaining diplomatic relations, certain stances taken by Arab states have at times surprised Western analysts. In the Gulf region, for example, during the February 25, 2022, vote at the United Nations (UN) Security Council on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates – a non-permanent member and an ally of both the United States and France – abstained from the vote. As for Saudi Arabia, it has at times been accused of coordinating with Russia since the start of the Ukrainian conflict, to maintain high hydrocarbon prices, on which both Saudi and Russian economies are particularly dependent. These few examples illustrate the complex, and at times ambiguous, positions that several Arab states have taken regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Far from unequivocally condemning the attack launched on February 24 2022, some member states of the Arab League – including some that are particularly close allies of the United States – have distanced themselves from the legitimacy-based stance asserted by Western powers. This has created the impression that they do not automatically align themselves with international law and the values upheld by the UN system. Such a position may seem all the more surprising at first glance, given that countries like Algeria have long made the fight against imperialism and the defence of peoples’ right to self-determination the cornerstone of their foreign policies and have done so for several decades. The contribution aims to analyze the positions of several Arab states, grouped into three categories, regarding the Russian aggression; to shed light on the underlying factors shaping these positions; and to draw conclusions about the stance of states located in a region marked by intense rivalries among major powers on the international stage. It demonstrates that several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have adopted distinctive positions, guided both by the pursuit of their direct interests and by a careful effort not to confront the United States and other Western powers openly. Finally, it seeks to determine whether, as Maurice Gourdault-Montagne suggests, the Russia-Ukraine war is perceived by countries of the Mediterranean rim and the Middle East as merely a “regional conflict between Whites,” lacking fundamentally decisive importance. Russia’s Allies: The Special Case of Algeria In the wake of the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, several North African and Middle Eastern states have adopted measured – or even accommodating – stances toward Moscow. In addition to Syria, then led by Bashar al-Assad, and Sudan, whose ties with Moscow were well-known and long-standing, the case of Algeria is particularly noteworthy. For years, Algeria’s rhetoric has positioned the country as a staunch defender of the principle of the people’s right to self-determination. Its support for the Polisario Front, which advocates for the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, is well established. In the Middle East, historically and even more strongly since October 7, 2023, Algiers has shown strong diplomatic support for the Palestinian cause. Just days after the Hamas attacks, Algeria called for an “immediate international intervention” against Israeli “aggression”. President Tebboune reaffirmed his country’s “unwavering support for the Palestinian people” a few months later. One might have expected Algeria to express firm support for Ukraine, given that Kyiv’s resistance appears to echo the very struggles that Algeria has supported in the past – and continues to support today. Yet, far from condemning Moscow’s actions, Algiers – particularly its military, the People’s National Army (ANP) – has continued cooperating with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. In addition to the aforementioned visit of the Algerian President to Russia in June 2023, the two countries conducted bilateral naval exercises off the Algerian coast in October 2022, a sign of strengthened friendship. At the institutional level, Algeria, alongside countries such as Iran and Syria, voted against a proposal to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council in April 2022. Similarly, in March 2022, Algeria once again found itself with Sudan, Iraq, and Iran in abstaining from a UN General Assembly vote that called for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. How can one explain Algeria’s seemingly “unnatural” stance on the Ukrainian crisis? It is important to highlight that Algiers and Moscow have maintained deep cooperative ties for several decades. Militarily, Russia accounts for nearly three-quarters of Algeria’s arms imports. Moscow supplies fighter jets, anti-ship missiles, transport helicopters, air surveillance radars, and other military equipment. The Algerian military may even perceive this support as essential to remain in power. From a political point of view, Moscow has officially backed Algeria’s bid to join the BRICS+ group, which has recently undergone a phase of expansion. These various political and military interests help explain Algeria’s position on the Ukrainian conflict: with long-standing and multifaceted ties to Russia, the Algerian regime has little incentive to jeopardize its relationship with Moscow over the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, a shift was observed in the spring of 2023, when Algeria supported a UN General Assembly resolution condemning “Russian aggression” against Ukraine. This change, though limited, as Algeria abstained again in July 2024 during a vote demanding an end to Russian aggression, could indicate a desire on Algeria’s part not to appear systematically aligned with Russia, especially as Algiers presents its political independence as a key marker on its international identity. The Algerian case also illustrates the stance of certain Arab states, which, far from immediately aligning themselves with the core principles of international law, have continued their cooperation with Moscow, likely considering that the Russo-Ukrainian War did not constitute a disruption significant enough to fundamentally challenge their bilateral relations. Conversely, other states in the region have opted for more balanced strategies. The “Tightrope Walkers”: A Predominant Strategy in the Arab World Aside from the very specific cases of Algeria, Sudan, and Syria (under Bashar al-Assad), the majority of Arab states have adopted a stance condemning the Russian attack launched in February 2022, without, however, fully severing ties with Moscow. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s Egypt – and more broadly, the North African states (except for Algeria) – represent interesting cases in this regard. Closely aligned with the United States, Egypt voted in favour of the March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. However, what might initially have appeared to be a participation in the policy of isolating Russia on the international stage ultimately gave way to a much more balanced policy. Notably engaged in a partnership with Russia to develop a civilian nuclear program, Egypt subsequently sought to preserve its relationship with Moscow. For instance, Cairo abstained from voting for or against Russia’s exclusion from the UN Human Rights Council. Moreover, far from boycotting Vladimir Putin, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi travelled to Saint Petersburg in 2023 to meet him, despite the Russian president being the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. Putin even took part via videoconference in pouring concrete for the fourth block of the first Russian nuclear power plant designed in Egypt in January 2024. Later, in the summer of the same year, Egypt abstained from the July 2024 General Assembly vote demanding that Russia “immediately cease its aggression”. At the same time, however, Egypt committed in 2023 to supplying Ukraine with a number of munitions that were initially intended for Russia – symbolizing a policy aimed at avoiding clear alignment with either side in the conflict. Egypt is not the only state that has demonstrated such an ambiguous policy. The Kingdom of Morocco also abstained from the March 2022 vote regarding the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, while reiterating during the Ukrainian Foreign Minister’s visit to Rabat in May 2023, “Morocco’s consistent position on respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states”. Officially, Morocco’s stance is based on the premise that it “maintains good relations with both Russia and Ukraine and promotes a peaceful resolution to the conflict”, thus avoiding alienating either side. Under this officially claimed position of neutrality, Rabat extended its “congratulations” to the Russian Federation for Vladimir Putin’s re-election in March 2024. It is worth noting that the King of Morocco and the Russian President had previously met in Moscow in 2016, where they established a number of partnerships. Tunisia finds itself in a similar position. Although it voted in favour of the Russian withdrawal from Ukraine in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, it abstained from supporting the exclusion of Russia from the Human Rights Council. In 2024, Tunisia moved closer to Moscow politically (and likely militarily), as reflected in its vote in July 2024. We describe the position adopted by several Arab states - the majority, in fact - as “balance”. It should be understood in light of these states’ geopolitical interests. While expressing a form of political solidarity with Ukraine by publicly affirming the importance of preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty, many Arab states have nonetheless continued – or even deepened – their relations with Russia. In fact, long before the outbreak of the conflict in February 2022, many of them had established various types of partnerships with Moscow, particularly strategic ones. Turning to Russia allows these states to diversify their alliances and avoid relying solely on Western technologies or expertise, especially in key sectors such as armaments and civil nuclear energy. Thus, while most Arab states support, in principle, Ukraine’s resistance and its struggle for territorial integrity and sovereignty, several MENA-region capitals have shown themselves unwilling to sacrifice the direct interests stemming from their partnerships with Moscow. They have therefore opted for a balanced stance: reaffirming Ukraine’s right to sovereignty, while opposing efforts to marginalize Russia on the international stage (such as in the Human Rights Council), and continuing both economic and political exchanges with the Kremlin. The “Opportunists”? The Case of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia The United Arab Emirates’ abstention during the United Nations Security Council vote on February 25, 2022, on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stands out as a significant development, especially since the UAE held the presidency of the Council at the time. Abu Dhabi, a former British protectorate that hosts several Western military bases (including a French one), distanced itself from its Western allies and refused to take an explicit stance on Russia’s blatant violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The official statement accompanying this vote was equally surprising: while the UAE acknowledged that “the evolution of the conflict undermines international peace and security” and reiterated the importance of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, it called on “all parties to immediately cease all hostilities” and urged for “de-escalation” – thus avoiding any direct condemnation of Moscow and effectively sending Ukraine and Russia back to back. Similarly, Abu Dhabi, like many other Arab states, abstained a month later from voting to exclude Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, and, in December 2023, condemned drone attacks against Russian territory. How can one explain the positioning of such a key Western ally in the Arabian Peninsula? It is reasonable to suggest that the UAE may have viewed the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War as a window of opportunity. First, Abu Dhabi has sought to preserve its pre-existing collaborations with Moscow, particularly in the military domain – the two states once considered jointly developing a fifth-generation fighter jet and signed a strategic partnership in 2018 – as part of a broader effort to diversify partnerships. Moreover, the Russian Federation may have seen the Russo-Ukrainian War as likely to generate significant opportunities, especially on the economic front. It has often been reported that a number of oligarchs left Russia in the first weeks of the conflict to seek refuge in Dubai, engaging in forms of money laundering amidst the wave of international sanctions imposed on Russia’s economic elites. The economic hub of the UAE is described as a particularly well-suited platform, given its ability to discreetly host foreign capital, effectively making it a form of “safe haven”. There were also reports of potential (and numerous) gold transfers to the UAE, as well as an increase in the transit of Russian oil through the country. Additionally, the UAE is said to have ramped up exports of various goods to Russia, in the context of the war that followed the February 24 2022, invasion. Thus, beyond the desire to maintain strong bilateral relations with Moscow, the UAE also appears to have sought to seize the opportunities created by the wartime context to derive economic benefits. Similar criticisms have been directed at Saudi Arabia, Washington’s principal ally in the Gulf. In October 2022, the White House accused the kingdom of helping to finance the Russo-Ukrainian War by keeping oil prices high. This statement came just days after the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) member countries, including Saudi Arabia and Russia, cut their daily oil production by 2 million barrels. In a context of ongoing modernization – and in a country still heavily dependent on oil revenues – Riyadh may have seen the Russo-Ukrainian War as an opportunity to increase its financial income, which could then be used to fund various infrastructure projects outlined in the Vision 2030 plan. This is all the more relevant given that relations between Riyadh and Washington have deteriorated under the Obama and Biden administrations. Obama was criticized for his refusal to bomb Syria in the summer of 2013, for his 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), and for his perceived intent to scale back U.S. military involvement in the Gulf. As for Biden, his earlier statements on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, whom he once referred to as “a pariah,” did little to foster a warming of relations. The Gulf Arab States’ Russian Dilemma: Dealing with Pressure from Washington Unlike its reactions toward other Arab countries, the United States was much more forceful in responding to the positions of its two Gulf allies regarding the Ukrainian conflict. Abu Dhabi’s initial stance during the first UN Security Council vote in February 2022, along with the UAE’s early reluctance to implement effective sanctions against Russia, its entities, or its nationals, led the United States and Europeans to exert strong pressure on Abu Dhabi to distance itself from Moscow. In November 2023, the United States announced the adoption of sanctions against Emirati companies due to their activities with Russia, particularly the supply of components allegedly used on the battlefield in Ukraine. Regarding Saudi Arabia, following the OPEC+ decision in October 2022, Joe Biden declared that the U.S. needed to “rethink” its relationship with Riyadh, announcing “consequences” and mentioning possible congressional action to reconsider American arms deliveries to the kingdom. Faced with the rapid deterioration of relations between the two historic allies, Riyadh sought to reassure its American partner. On October 12, 2022, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir gave a lengthy interview to CNN, stating that Saudi Arabia did not “support Russia”. Two days later, Saudi Arabia announced it would provide Ukraine $400 million in humanitarian aid, a move intended to demonstrate the kingdom’s genuine support for Kyiv. Finally, on October 15, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Volodymyr Zelensky held a telephone conversation to discuss the situation in Ukraine. These various elements highlight the narrow room for manoeuvre available to Gulf Arab states in conducting their foreign policy in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. However, while Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have since sought to present themselves as neutral actors, both states have refused to turn their backs on Russia. Both capitals abstained once again from supporting the July 2024 resolution reiterating the condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It is worth noting, however, that this Gulf position later became an asset for Saudi Arabia following Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025. Having never openly taken a stance against Russia since the start of the conflict – and being a long-standing partner of the United States – the kingdom found itself in an ideal position to act as a mediator and neutral ground. This culminated in its hosting of negotiations between Washington and Moscow on Ukraine in February 2025, at the request of the new U.S. president, bringing significant diplomatic benefit to Riyadh. A “Distant” Conflict from an Arab Perspective While the conflict that began in October 2022 has reshaped the security stakes for Europe and the United States, the Arab world as a whole perceives this event differently, tending to relativize the central importance that Europe assigns to it. While most states in North Africa and the Middle East remain, in principle, committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the conflict is generally seen as secondary (and not central enough) to justify undermining their ties with Russia or the interests derived from those relations. While not all MENA states have adopted identical postures, a majority have advocated a form of balance, condemning the Russian aggression in principle but refusing to sever ties with Moscow. In the Gulf, however, the stance of its two major allies – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – did not go unnoticed by Washington, which did not hesitate to exert pressure or even impose sanctions in response to positions seen as contrary to U.S. interests, albeit with mixed results. The war in Gaza, and the perceived “selective” commitment of Western powers to international law, particularly when it comes to actions carried out by Israel, despite the same powers having made respect for international law a cornerstone of their stance toward Russia, can only amplify this phenomenon. In the words of Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, former diplomatic adviser to Jacques Chirac, “others do not think like we do”. Each state defines its objective interests and evaluates every situation through that lens. This is, in fact, probably the only true point of convergence among all actors on the international scene. About the Author Rachid Chaker (@Rachid_Chak) is an Associate Professor in international relations at the Catholic University of Lille and a research associate at the Centre Thucydide at the Université Paris Panthéon-Assas. ## The Russo-Ukrainian War from Iran’s Perspective: An Inconclusive Political and Strategic Test for the “Tehran-Beijing-Moscow Axis”? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-russo-ukrainian-war-from-irans-perspective-an-inconclusive-political-and-strategic-test-for-the-tehran-beijing-moscow-axis/ Modified: 2024-11-14 Are Iran and Russia truly allies? This sensitive and timely question finds substantial answers in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, especially since February 2022. It also reflects a broader shift on the international stage toward a strategic restructuring into multiple power poles, where Western Europe and the United States no longer solely dominate. Since the early 2000s, China’s rapid rise as the world’s leading economic power and main U.S. rival has become undeniable, as has Russia’s re-engagement on the international scene following the end of the American unipolar moment after the 2003 Iraq invasion. Added to this is Iran’s abandonment of efforts to seek favourability with Europe and the United States following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPoA, the Iran nuclear deal, which President Donald Trump officially announced on May 8, 2018. Consequently, analysts and media have increasingly discussed the formation of a “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis,” potentially forming an “anti-hegemony” coalition — a scenario Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, warned against. This tripartite “axis” seemingly solidified further when, on July 4, 2023, Iran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an economic and political cooperation body established by China and Russia, and when Iran became a member of the BRICS (now BRICS+) on January 1, 2024, a forum that seems to mirror the G7. These developments appear to consolidate a “Global South,” uniting countries that challenge the perception of Western imperialism or self-imposed supremacy on the international stage from Western Europe and North America. The Russo-Ukrainian War intensified on February 24, 2022, and was expected to confirm the existence of this “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis,” as these states are often depicted as constantly striving to restore their respective empires. The Russia-Ukraine war thus serves as a real-world test of this “axis” and, more specifically, the Russia-Iran relationship. Are they true allies, solid partners, merely powers with momentarily compatible interests or even companions in adversity on the international scene? This article will examine Iran’s perception of the Russia-Ukraine conflict since 2022 and Tehran’s role in it. It will also study its stance on the war and its international implications. In terms of discourse and diplomacy, Iran has remained cautious, refraining from assigning any principled blame to Russia and instead attributing responsibility to the U.S. for sparking the Eastern European crisis while calling for an end to ongoing hostilities. Economically, notable rapprochement has occurred between Tehran and Moscow since the beginning of the war, though significant obstacles to deepened cooperation remain. Strategically, Iran benefits from Russia’s increasing isolation but seems in no rush to become more involved in the conflict, despite U.S. and Ukrainian claims of Iran’s co-belligerence. These elements all point to an undeniable conclusion: the Russo-Ukrainian War reveals itself as a politically and strategically inconclusive test for the “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis.” The Russia-Ukraine War from Iran’s Perspective: Reinforcing a U.S.-Blaming Narrative From the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamenei (the first and primary source of power in the Islamic Republic), has avoided attributing any responsibility for the conflict to Russia. Iran never mentions Russian accountability or Moscow’s initial armed assault on Ukrainian territory as an explanatory factor for the conflict. Tehran adheres strictly to a diplomatic and political stance that never hints at Russian fault, avoiding terms like “aggression,” “Russian attack,” or “war.” In this respect, a statement from Iran’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN) on October 12, 2022, is particularly illuminating, highlighting Iran’s cautious and evasive position: calling for a resolution to a conflict it cannot expressly name to avoid acknowledging Russia’s undeniable armed invasion of Ukraine. The statement to the UN employs only the terms “crisis in Ukraine” or “conflict in Ukraine,” never once mentioning “Russia” or “Russian,” thereby erasing Moscow’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict. It refers to “war” only in much later statements. This Iranian stance also manifested on March 2, 2022, during the 11th Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, where Tehran (alongside Beijing) abstained from voting on a non-binding resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine. However, it did not vote against the resolution (unlike Damascus, Minsk, or Pyongyang). In contrast, Iranian statements accusing the United States of causing this “crisis” are prolific and frequent. On March 1, 2022, just a week after the conflict began, Ayatollah Khamenei explicitly stated that “the root of the crisis in Ukraine are the U.S. policies,” adding that “the US regime is a regime that generates crises. It feeds on crisis.” Blaming Western imperialism, Iran points to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and increased containment of Russia as underlying U.S. objectives. NATO, founded in 1949 at the initiative of the United States during the Cold War, aimed to create a defensive military alliance to protect European and North American territories against Soviet expansionism in practice. Although NATO’s original mission would seemingly lose its relevance with the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, and Russia’s subsequent decline, the organization paradoxically persisted and even strengthened. On July 9, 1997, a NATO-Ukraine commission was even established, and the organization’s strategic relationship with Kyiv regularly manifested in joint military exercises, such as the Sea Breeze 2021 naval exercises in the Black Sea on June 28, 2021. Echoing the Russian stance, in which President Vladimir Putin declared on November 30, 2021, that Moscow would react if Kyiv crossed a “red line” in its rapprochement with NATO, Tehran places the responsibility for the Ukraine conflict solely on the United States (and more broadly on “Western policies”) and the perception of NATO’s relentless expansion. Iranian media does not hesitate to label the Ukraine-Russia war as a U.S.-Russia proxy conflict, skillfully appropriating terminology often applied to Iran’s influence network in the Middle East. Ayatollah Khamenei even suggested that the United States is the primary beneficiary of the Ukraine war due to arms sales to Kyiv, indicating a lack of interest in seeing the conflict resolved quickly at the expense of the Ukrainian people. In its rhetoric and politics, Iran thus crafts a narrative that reverses the usual perspective in Europe and North America on the Russia-Ukraine conflict that emphasizes Russia’s initial armed attack as the sole explanatory factor for the conflict. This complete reversal allows Iran not only to shield Russia from any attribution of blame but also to bolster a broader discourse portraying the United States as decadent and a creator of international crises. This first aspect appears to support a coherent, united “axis,” presenting a common front against a shared adversary: Washington and its allies. The Increase in Trade Ties and Russia’s Blockage of Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Mixed Economic Outcomes for Russia-Iran Relations If the “Tehran-Beijing-Moscow axis” might seem a reality, united by an international narrative denouncing the United States and Europe, the strengthening of economic ties between Russia and Iran has become noticeably evident since the start of the Ukraine war. In this regard, it is worth noting that Iran and Russia have been stable economic partners in recent years, and this commercial relationship has deepened since the war in Ukraine began. It is thus possible to identify both bilateral economic developments since the war and arrangements instituted as a result of it. The first notable economic development since February 2022 is the North-South International Transport Corridor project. The agreement on the North-South Corridor was signed in September 2017 by Russia, India, and Iran, aiming to create a rail and maritime route between Russia and India, passing through Iran. This North-South Corridor offers substantial advantages for each state: India expects improved commercial connectivity, especially for its port of Nhava Sheva; Iran envisions reinforcing its position as an intercontinental logistics hub while creating new outlets for its Persian Gulf ports. Since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia, for its part, hopes to bypass the sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe while avoiding seas where its ships face difficult relations with coastal states (Baltic Sea states in northeastern Europe, states in southeast Europe, Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine in the Black Sea). However, this project appears mirage-like, as it must also confront American sanctions, among other obstacles delaying its full activation for many years. Similarly, the second significant development in Russia-Iran economic relations concerns an interregional structure, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which unites Russia and four former USSR countries. Iran signed a free trade agreement with the EEU in December 2023, replacing the 2019 agreement. This economic area has seen its trade volume with Tehran increase by 150% over three years. Iran aims to secure observer status in this union, with the long-term goal of establishing a comprehensive free trade agreement. In addition to increased energy cooperation between the two countries since the start of the war, despite competition for the title of leading gas exporter, a third economic priority since 2022 has been the shared goal of de-dollarizing their exchanges. American sanctions notably aim to restrict the use of the U.S. dollar and penalize third parties trading with these states in dollars (thus broadening the reach of US sanctions, commonly referred to as the extraterritoriality of American sanctions). Since 1979 (the year of its Islamic Revolution, as well as the institution of US economic sanctions following the hostage crisis at the American Embassy during the revolution), Iran has sought to bypass US sanctions—a priority Russia has also embraced since its annexation of Crimea in 2014. With the Ukraine war starting in February 2022 and the imposition of numerous sanctions, Russia has become the country most keen to avoid using the US dollar in its transactions to circumvent these sanctions. Consequently, Mohsen Karimi, Vice President of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran for International Affairs, highlighted in May 2023 the symbolism of VTB, Russia’s second-largest bank, opening a permanent office in Iran to de-dollarize their exchanges. At the end of December 2023, the heads of the Iranian and Russian central banks announced the completion of an agreement to conduct their trade in national currencies. Pleased to see another state working even more actively than itself to avoid using the dollar, Iran has since 2024, following its full integration into BRICS+, sought to promote among its members the complete abandonment of the U.S. currency in their exchanges. However, it seems unrealistic, even in the long term, that BRICS+ members would stop using the dollar, as it remains the cornerstone of the global economy unless there is a paradigm shift in the world economic order. The only significant economic dimension between Iran and Russia instituted due to the Ukraine war is Iranian assistance to Russia in circumventing the sanctions imposed on it. While Iran is one of the most economically sanctioned countries globally, Russia took the top spot in February 2022. With its expertise in circumventing sanctions since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran began holding confirmed meetings between Iranian and Russian officials and bankers in November 2022. Establishing a unique form of economic cooperation, Iran revealed its legal and economic mechanisms to Russia to help it circumvent the sanctions imposed on it. In reality, it seems the Ukraine war is more of a catalyst for Russia-Iran economic relations than a peak in improvement. While there have been notable advances in economic aspects between the two states, it is important to remember that these advances are linked to economic issues predating the February 2022 war in Ukraine. No significant concrete progress has materialized between the two states, and it will take many more years to fundamentally strengthen their economic ties beyond the aforementioned announcements and developments. Worse still, the Russia-Iran economic relationship has even taken on a particularly negative aspect in a supra-commercial context: Russia’s blocking of nuclear negotiations with Iran. On July 14, 2015, the Iran Nuclear Agreement, or JCPoA, was signed to regulate Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a gradual and substantial lifting of economic sanctions. Following the U.S. withdrawal under Donald Trump, a renewed hope and willingness to renegotiate emerged with Joe Biden’s arrival in the White House. However, since February 2022, Russia has completely blocked the potential conclusion of a new nuclear agreement with Iran, as it opposed Iran mastering the complete uranium cycle during the 2015 JCPoA negotiations. Russia has become the most sanctioned state in the world and would not accept the lifting of sanctions for Tehran, as this would offer a breath of fresh air to the Iranian economy, while Russia’s is on the brink of suffocation. Thus, the Russian president has intertwined the Iranian nuclear issue with the Ukraine war and the economic sanctions on Iran and Russia. How, then, could one justify the term “alliance” (understood as a formal or informal agreement between at least two states in the security or defence domain) or an “axis” between two states with existing but modest economic ties when one state blocks an agreement beneficial to the other at the risk of overshadowing itself? Between Iranian Military Sales and Allegations of Co-Belligerence: the Opacity of Iranian Involvement in the Conflict The martial dimension is the most conducive to studying the reality of the “Tehran-Beijing-Moscow axis,” as it provides a framework for states claiming to be partners to test their relationship in an open war situation. The military dimension of Iranian involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has a specific characteristic: it is potentially the most significant compared to the political and economic fields while remaining hypothetical due to the opacity maintained by Iran and Russia. Iran consistently denies any involvement in the conflict and refutes any arms sales to Russia, while the latter remains conspicuously silent on possible military imports. The United States, the European Union, and Ukraine, however, vigorously claim that from April 2022, Iran has been supplying Russia with missiles (in September 2024, U.S. intelligence services asserted that Iran was also selling Russia Fath 360 missiles, a model developed in April 2022 that can carry an explosive charge of 150 kg over more than 100 km) and drones (notably the Shahed 136 attack model, inexpensive and designed to carry an explosive charge). An advanced form of co-belligerence is also asserted, especially by the United States and Ukraine, which, based on statements from their intelligence and security services, claim that Revolutionary Guards (the Islamic Revolution’s armed forces, distinct from the regular Iranian army) are present on the Ukrainian battlefield to assist and advise Russian forces. On October 20, 2022, U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby stated, “We assess that Iranian military personnel were on the ground in Crimea and assisted Russia in these operations.” Likewise, on November 24, 2022, Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, claimed that Ukrainian forces had eliminated Iranian military advisors in Crimea. While co-belligerence has no legal basis in international law, if this circumstance were proven, it would indicate, on the one hand, Iran’s increasingly advanced military expertise (to the extent of assisting a military power like Russia) and, on the other hand, a concrete operational reality of an “axis.” The opacity surrounding Iran’s strategic involvement makes one thing clear: this “axis” is neither formal nor openly declared. It is difficult to attribute a strong, well-defined Iranian support for Russia in the war against Ukraine, as statements and counterstatements from multiple actors operate within frameworks extending beyond the Ukraine conflict alone. For Ukraine, establishing the internationalization of the war on its soil further legitimizes its appeals for support from Europe and the United States; for the United States, it confirms Iran’s “rogue state” status, ostracized from the international community and deemed unworthy of international engagement; for Iran, it presents a potential opportunity to benefit from this conflict that does not directly concern Tehran, while avoiding any accountability or involvement. The Russia-Ukraine War: a Striking Symbol of the Inconsistency of the “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow Axis” Discursive, political, economic, and strategic elements from the Ukraine war undoubtedly reflect a relative convergence of shared interests between Iran and Russia. However, the formal, tangible, and robust existence of a “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis,” actively operational in the context of the Ukraine war, cannot be substantiated. Numerous elements support this assertion. First and foremost, if this “axis” were a formal alliance like NATO or the European Union (where Article 42, paragraph 7 of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty notably specifies that “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”), China, Iran, and Russia would explicitly claim it as an international defensive structure. However, this is not the case, and no official declaration from any of these states suggests such a position. The denial of this “axis” by its potential members implies two scenarios: in the first case, this alliance is informal, and these states do not claim it (then the reason for this denial should be identified: it may not yet be fully organized and ready, it may be too weak compared to Western European and North American defence architectures, or it may hinder distinct national policies and objectives of China, Iran, and Russia). In the second case, this alliance or “axis” simply does not exist. This latter scenario seems more credible, as Iran’s alleged strategic involvement is likely opportunistic, allowing it to export its military production and increase revenue. Tehran may further benefit from Russia’s isolation, which has approached or even surpassed its own at the international level: on March 17, 2023, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin (theoretically requiring the 124 states party to the Rome Statute to arrest Putin if he were to visit their territory), a grave event that has never occurred against an Iranian president or Supreme Leader. Added to this, China’s apparent lack of knowledge about Russia’s attack plans during the February 4, 2022, meeting between Putin and Xi, Iran’s 2024 presidential election of Massoud Pezeshkiân, who is open to dialogue with the “West,” but also Russia’s de facto permission for Israel to carry out airstrikes on Iranian interests in Syria (as Moscow controls Syrian airspace), and Russia’s obstruction of nuclear negotiations with Iran; all of which definitively undermine the concept of a “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis.” *** Kevan Gafaïti, a PhD candidate and associate researcher at the Centre Thucydide of the University Paris Panthéon-Assas, is currently working on a political science dissertation under the supervision of Professors Jean-Vincent Holeindre and Serge Sur. His research focuses on France’s foreign policy toward Iran since 1995. He also teaches at Sciences Po Paris. ## The Sino-Russian Partnership and the Bipolarization of the World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-sino-russian-partnership-and-the-bipolarization-of-the-world/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy report argues that the current war in Ukraine is unlikely to break the Chinese-Russian unlimited partnership and will accelerate This policy report argues that the current war in Ukraine is unlikely to break the Chinese-Russian unlimited partnership and will accelerate the world's bipolarization. China has political, energetic, and strategic interests in collaborating with Russia. China will not lose sight of its strategic partnership with Russia until reunification with Taiwan is accomplished, further polarizing the international system in the process. However, China has too much to lose economically were it to embrace Russia’s cause in Ukraine unambiguously. This constitutes leverage that the West could use to draw a wedge between China and Russia. The West, most especially the U.S., should also balance its strategic competition with China by increasing cooperation on shared interests like climate change, nuclear proliferation, and pandemic prevention. Lastly, Washington should reduce Chinese fears about regime security and Taiwan because such fears are driving China’s closeness to Russia and exacerbate an already tensed U.S.-China strategic competition. *** Today, there are clear signs, such as export restrictions or financial restraint, demonstrating the People’s Republic of China’s (China) unwillingness to align with the Russian Federation (Russia) in the current war in Ukraine completely. Other signs, however, indicate China’s implicit backing of Russia’s actions: the coverage of the war by pro-Russia Chinese state-controlled media; and China’s absence of condemnation of Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty despite the importance of sovereignty in Chinese foreign policy. To be sure, Beijing has no appetite for war in Ukraine as the latter is an important transit hub part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Nor has China any interest in seeing the return of war in Europe which could seriously destabilize its primary export market and impede China’s economic interests in various ways. This being said, on February 4, 2022, China issued a joint statement with Russia unveiling a new strategic partnership with no limits. Although not a formal military alliance, it’s just like it. This partnership reflects China-Russia's long-term strategic collaboration reaching new heights as both countries acknowledge, for the first time, each other’s crucial concerns: NATO’s eastward expansion and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Is the war in Ukraine a turning point sealing a bipolar order where China and Russia form a geopolitical block and the West another? This analysis sheds light on the evolution of the Sino-Russian partnership from the 2000s to this day to answer this question. China and Russia share an ideological affinity for authoritarianism, and their partnership is based on three central pillars. The first is political and diplomatic opposition to the U.S., particularly at the United Nations (UN). China and Russia both want political security for authoritarian regimes against what is perceived as the U.S. hegemonic liberal threat. The second pillar concerns Sino-Russian defence cooperation and encompasses military exercises and arms sales. The third pillar is about economic complementarity: China needs commodities, while Russia needs export markets for its commodities. This analysis is structured as follows: First, I trace the evolution of the Sino-Russian partnership from the 2000s to the present in order to illustrate the partnership’s continued solidification with a dramatic acceleration starting in 2014. Based on this analysis, I argue that the bipolarization of the world is underway, prior to formulating a few recommendations for the Western block to drive a wedge between China and Russia to attenuate this phenomenon. The Sino-Russian Bilateral Relationship From 2000 to 2014: Political and Diplomatic Cooperation The USSR and China have had a complicated history throughout the 20th century. At the beginning of the Cold War, in 1950, both countries signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. This alliance significantly impacted the balance of power during the Cold War but was short-lived for various reasons. The alliance lasted only nine years and ended in 1959 with the Sino-Soviet split. The Soviet Union and China went from allies to acrimonious rivals. In 1985 started the Sino-Soviet rapprochement where both camps tried to work with each other to set up a modus vivendi. With the fall of the USSR in 1989, another period of Sino-Russian normalization was initiated. On the eve of the 21st century, we started to see serious political and diplomatic convergence between China and Russia. In March 1999, Russia sponsored a resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) during the Kosovo war, demanding the immediate cessation of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. China voted in favor of this resolution even though it did not cosponsor it. This event is an important moment in China-Russia diplomatic collaboration. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo War by the U.S. shifted China’s vision of Washington’s motives, still believing that the bombing was intentional. Since that event, China and Russia have increasingly become annoyed of what they see as the threat of Washington’s military superiority and willingness to advance its interests independently of international law and regardless of the legitimate interests of other states. Such suspicion is the political bedrock of the Sino-Russian UNSC cooperation. Since the beginning of the 2000s, China and Russia have politically managed to fix many of their long-standing issues. In 2001, both countries signed the Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (renewed in 2021). This was a significant advancement in the normalization of the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship initiated in 1989. The normalization process culminated in 2005, with China and Russia settling a border dispute that had caused skirmishes between China and the USSR in 1969. In 2003, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established by China and Russia with other Central Asian countries. The SCO is the principal multilateral organization that China and Russia rely on to advance their security interests in Central Asia, especially coordinating military exercises between its members. Despite enduring mutual suspicions, China and Russia have increasingly worked together in international bodies. In 2003, China and Russia, among other countries, vigorously opposed the Iraq War and the U.S. “Coalition of the Willing,” denouncing U.S. unilateralism which circumvents the UN to launch a preemptive war with the objective of regime change. Later on, in 2007, China and Russia cast a joint veto on a U.S.-sponsored UNSC resolution regarding human rights violations and political repression in Myanmar. This vote was the first of an enduring strategic Sino-Russian diplomatic cooperation manifested in jointly vetoing UNSC resolutions. Since normalization, the 2008 Georgian War was the first significant turbulence in the Sino-Russian partnership. When Russia invaded the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, China’s vision of Russia was negatively impacted. Moscow recognized these two territories as independent states, while it failed to get China and other SCO states to recognize these new pro-Russia entities during a summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, a few weeks after the Russian invasion. Nevertheless, Russia at least managed to secure China’s abstention on voting a UN resolution condemning its actions. However, China never fully endorsed Russia and was arguably quite unhappy with Moscow’s actions in Georgia. This is unsurprising given China’s insistence on respect for sovereignty and its own separatism problems (Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan). On the other hand, this friction did not stop the two countries from 2007 to 2012 from jointly casting five more vetoes in the UNSC. And since this period, the Sino-Russian partnership tractions the emerging economies grouping named BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), advocating for an economic and political multipolar international order. Military Cooperation and Arms Sales With the normalization of the Sino-Russian relationship, both countries have considered defence and security ties as crucial areas of cooperation, in addition to the political-diplomatic collaboration. Defence cooperation, the second pillar of Sino-Russian cooperation, stands on two legs: military exercises and arms sales. This focus is reflected in the 1996 “Partnership of Strategic Coordination Based on Equality and Benefit and Oriented Towards the 21st Century.” In 2011, this mechanism was elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. These documents have facilitated the Sino-Russian high-level cooperation on various topics, such as joint military exercises, arms sales, and regional and global security discussions. The “China-Russia Staff Headquarters Strategic Consultation” has been held every year since 1997 and is a central meeting to manage cooperation between the two militaries. Military exercises joining Chinese and Russian armies are either bilateral or multilateral. In 2003, Chinese and Russian armed forces organized their first combined military exercise under the SCO framework. In 2005, a peace mission was organized under the SCO and the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. Another significant step was taken in 2012 with an annual bilateral Joint Sea exercise. From 2003 to 2014, China and Russia participated in 20 military exercises of all sorts, both conducted bilaterally or multilaterally. These joint exercises have increased the Chinese and Russian armies’ interoperability, even though both armed forces are not as interoperable as NATO’s members. Such exercises have nonetheless been effective for increasing operational capabilities, mutual trust, and a common defence culture (in the last two decades, many Chinese and Russian military officers have been formed in Russia and China, respectively). The other leg of defence cooperation is arms sales. The early to mid-2000s were great years for the Sino-Russian defence business: China imported 87% of its arms from Russia. China was thirsty for non-Western foreign arms imports because of the sanctions resulting from the Tiananmen Square crackdown and a desire to upgrade its military. And Russia was eager to export outdated military technology and licenses to compensate for its lack of internal absorption as the country was going through economic hardships. However, Russia was unwilling to export its most sophisticated technology because of the Chinese reverse engineering of Russian higher-end military systems and because of security concerns. China’s military imports from Russia have helped it improve its own defence industry as well as power projection (especially over Taiwan) and defensive capabilities. Such procurements comprised jet fighters (Su-27 and Su-30), surface-to-air missile defence systems (S-300), Sovremennyy-class guided-missile destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. From 2002 to 2007, China imported around $2.3 billion of military equipment from Russia on average. After peaking at $3.2 in 2005, there was a significant reduction from 2006 to 2014, with revenues averaging $600 million annually. Economic Cooperation On the economic side, more broadly, which is the third pillar of the Sino-Russian partnership, total bilateral goods trade was relatively modest, although the trend was increasing: $7.1 billion on average between 1997-2002, $15.5 between 1997-2007 and 73.6 between 2007-2017. In the early 2000s, around 60% of Russian exports to China were chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery, transport equipment, and manufactured goods. In contrast, China’s exports to Russia were mainly low capital-intensive and high labor-intensive manufactured goods. There were also minimal services and foreign direct investments (FDI). This started to change from 2007 to 2012. Russian exports of fuels and minerals reached 75% of the country’s total exports to China. As for China, it kept exporting manufactured goods to Russia, although more sophisticated ones. And for energy cooperation, the only significant project, the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline, was announced in 2006 and funded by China. The pipeline opened in 2011 and was the first of its kind to link the two countries, allowing for increased energetic integration. From the 2000s to 2014, the Sino-Russian relationship was characterized by moderate economic complementarity. From the 2000s to 2014, the three pillars of Sino-Russian cooperation – political-diplomacy, defence, and economy – were deepening, although they remained constrained by various factors. On the military and political aspects, Russia was still uneasy about exporting sophisticated arms systems to China because of long-lasting fears regarding China’s ambitions in Russia’s Far East and the potential use China could do against Russia of its exported advanced military systems. However, military-to-military links and joint military exercises have blossomed during this period (2000-2014) and have helped increase mutual trust and interoperability. This rapprochement was translated diplomatically with similar votes to counter the U.S. in the UNSC. On the other hand, energetically speaking, the infrastructures required for deep energy cooperation were lacking as most Siberian gas fields were connected to Europe by pipelines. But China’s growing energy needs were to be increasingly met by Russia after the Kremlin’s foreign policy reorientation in 2014 with Crimea’s annexation. 2014-2022: The Acceleration of the Sino-Russian Partnership Political-diplomatic Cooperation Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia and China have become closer in all aspects of their relationship. Just like China did in 2008 after Russia attacked Georgia, Beijing abstained from voting in favour of UNSC resolutions invalidating the results of a referendum separating Crimea from Ukraine to make it part of the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, China did not publicly endorse Russia’s position, even though Xi admired Russia’s 2014 operation in Crimea because Putin boosted his domestic popularity and secured his country “a large piece of land and resources.” Despite Xi’s admiration, Chinese financial institutions have demonstrated strict compliance with the sanction regime because of fear of secondary sanctions, even though China always rhetorically opposes Western sanctions. As a result, Russia has struggled to issue debt or equity on the Chinese stock market. Only a handful of Chinese political banks – the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China – have provided funds to Russia’s sanctioned entities. These banks are less connected to the global economy than other Chinese banks and, by extension, less subject to secondary sanctions. In any case, Beijing has always managed to provide financing for crucial political bilateral deals. Furthermore, a year after Crimea’s annexation, Xi and Putin managed to sign an agreement to frame what were initially competing transnational political-economic projects as complementary: China’s BRI and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Russia reevaluated China’s ambitions in Central Asia, which had previously been understood as competitive with minor areas of cooperation, given Russia’s willingness to maintain its preponderance in the post-Soviet sphere. Moscow did not like the growing Chinese presence in Central Asia but had to compromise with Beijing because of Western sanctions resulting from Crimea’s annexation. This new reassessment paved the way for deeper cooperation and became a turning point in the two countries’ relationship. This political cooperation translated into the diplomatic level, especially at the UNSC. In 2017, China and Russia used for the sixth time their vetoes to block a UNSC resolution supported by the West to sanction Bashar al Assad’s regime regarding its use of chemical weapons in Syria. In 2021, China and Russia supported the suppression of economic sanctions against Afghanistan. They called for the unfreezing of the country’s assets by vetoing a UNSC resolution to hold accountable the Taliban regime. One could also mention the Sino-Russian cooperation to attenuate sanctions imposed on North Korea and Iran. China and Russia have closely worked in multilateral institutions like the G20, APEC, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, Xianghsan Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, and the Shangri-La Dialogue. The expansion of such multilateral meetings related to security matters has proven to be occasions for high-level military officers from China and Russia to meet and coordinate on the side of the events. Economic Cooperation Another significant Sino-Russian rapprochement since 2014 pertains to the economic and technological realms. After Crimea’s annexation, Russia decided to reorient the Russian economy towards China. The goal was to facilitate Chinese investments in large infrastructures and energy-related projects to exploit Russia’s natural resources and massively sell hydrocarbons and agricultural products to China. A megadeal of $400 billion was signed in 2014 for Russian gas exports to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline (pumping 38 billion cubic metres of gas annually), which was completed in 2019. In 2014, the Russian and Chinese central banks set up a 150-billion-yuan ($24 billion) swap line, renewed every three years to facilitate bilateral commerce despite sanctions. This is part of a de-dollarizing effort by the two countries to reduce the U.S. dollar’s share in bilateral trade. Today, the U.S. dollar represents 40% of Russia’s exports to China compared to almost 100% in 2013. Russia’s dependence on China for export markets and credit lines has kept increasing because only China has the economic wherewithal to provide massive loans to Russia and absorb its energy production. China represents 17.3% of the global GDP, while Russia accounts for only 1.7%. Moreover, there are major ongoing technological projects and collaborations. In 2014, China and Russia created the “China Russia Commission on Important Strategic Satellite Navigation Cooperation.” The China National Space Administration and Russia’s Federal Space Agency have jointly worked, since 2015, on developing space components for their respective satellite navigation systems: Beidou and GLONASS. We can also see cooperation taking place on aero-engine technology. In 2017, the China Aviation Research Institute signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia’s Central Institute of Aviation Motors. In 2020, China and Russia agreed to enhance such collaborations by establishing a roadmap for science, technology, and innovation until 2025. As part of this initiative, there is, among other things, a joint investment fund for high-tech projects to develop cooperation on critical domains like artificial intelligence research. This list is far from exhaustive as collaboration also involves nuclear power generation, high-speed rail, and other infrastructure development. Technological cooperation has dramatically expanded since 2014. On top of that, in 2020, Russia became China’s most significant source of oil imports, displacing Saudi Arabia. And Gazprom, Russia’s biggest gas company, ambitions to triple its gas exports to provide for half of the Chinese demand. Russia also took advantage of the 2018 Sino-American trade war to boost its exports of minerals and foods to China. On February 4, 2022, Putin and Xi signed two additional agreements to expand gas and oil cooperation representing $117.5 billion. That same day, the two leaders also signed dozens of other deals on trade and investment, anti-monopoly, sports, satellites, digitalization, and other areas of cooperation. And a month before this meeting, China had already lifted a ban on wheat coming from certain Russian regions to increase agricultural imports. Last but not least, China and Russia announced in January 2022 that they would jointly build a new gas pipeline, Power of Siberia 2, which should start operating in 3 years to carry up to 50 bcm annually. To give a few numbers, the China-Russia trade reached $146 billion in 2021 compared to $68 billion in 2015. Chinese main exports to Russia centered around telecommunications, aviation, media industry, and stuffed toys, while Russia mainly exports hydrocarbons and agricultural products to China. The dollar’s share of Sino-Russian total economic exchanges was under 50% for the first time recorded in 2020, while it constituted around 90% of such interactions in 2014. In 2021, 17% of bilateral trade was conducted in yuan. Russia detains $140 billion in Chinese debt (four times bigger than in 2018), while China holds 14.2% of Russia’s foreign-exchange reserves. In 2021, the dollar represented merely 16% of Russia’s $640 billion in foreign reserves against 46% in 2017. The yuan accounted for 13% ($77 billion) of such reserves in 2021. China exported $70 billion of goods to Russia in 2021, significantly more than in the 2000s. However, it remains small relative to Chinese exports to the European Union and the United States, totalling around $1 trillion. Since 2014 and Crimea’s annexation, Sino-Russian trade increased by roughly 50%, and China has become Russia’s primary export market. Military Cooperation and Arms Sales Crimea’s annexation has also triggered deeper military-to-military cooperation, especially in 2017 with the signing of a new roadmap for military cooperation. Since 2014, Joint Sea exercises  (organized for the first time in 2012) have taken place in each other’s regions of interest. For example, the 2014 Sino-Russian naval drills took place in the East China Sea near the contested Senkaku Islands, while in 2017, China returned the favor and accepted to train in the Baltic Sea. In 2016, China and Russia conducted for the first time an Aerospace Security Exercise. This maneuver was centered around Sino-Russian “air, and missile defence, operational and mutual fire support, and ballistic and cruise missile strikes.” Very important too, China has been included in Russia’s Annual Strategic Command-staff Exercise since 2018. This is a major solidification of Sino-Russian defence ties. Historically, only former Soviet states have participated in this exercise which mobilizes Russia’s four strategic commands to simulate a major power war. In 2019, the People Liberation Army Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Force organized a joint strategic aviation patrol for the first time. As part of this exercise, several Chinese H-6K and Russian Tu-95 bombers did not shy away from entering the South Korean and Japanese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for training purposes. Other military exercises include Apprehension of Illegal Border Crossing Exercise, Disaster Relief Exercise, Antiterrorist Exercise, and River Port Emergencies Exercises. The two countries also regularly engage in international military events like tank biathlons or the International Army Games. China and Russia have conducted 28 military exercises since 2003, with the variety and complexity of such exercises expanding since 2014, which expresses mutual friendly intentions. Joint military exercises are valuable to ameliorate interoperability and improve mutual understanding, notably overcoming linguistic and cultural obstacles. They also provide the Chinese and Russian military leaderships a chance to interact and collect intelligence on the other army’s capabilities, defence culture, and combat methods. Moving forward, the next logical step of Sino-Russian military exercises will probably concern cyber, drones, electronic warfare, outer space, and the use of artificial intelligence in military systems to guide hypersonic missiles and other weapons. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, arms sales are not left out either.  Russia concluded that since China's industrial-military production is catching up fast, it should take advantage of the window to sell arms while it can. Thus, the decision to suspend the de facto ban on selling specific advanced military technology to China was taken. For instance, China was able to acquire, in 2015, twenty-four advanced Russian fighter jets “Su-35,” six air defence systems “S-400,” and four “Lada-class submarines.” These acquisitions have allowed China to seriously alter the balance of power in the South and East China Seas and over Taiwan in particular. Not only that, Putin and Xi signed in 2015 a contract for jointly producing 200 next-generation heavy-lift helicopters by 2040. According to SIPRI, from 2016 to 2020, 77% of all Chinese arms imports, representing $5.1 billion, came from Russia, which amounted to 18% of Russia’s total arms exports. This is a 49% increase in arms sales compared to 2011-2016. China is Russia’s best client for arms sales, just behind India. One can wonder, however, if the poor military performance of Russia in Ukraine will not reduce its arms sales. The survivability and efficiency of Russian armoured vehicles, air defence systems, radar warning systems, and other military equipment have indeed been seriously compromised in Ukraine. China also sells arms to Russia thanks to the rapid progression of its industrial-military complex, especially in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) technology, I.T. systems, and shipbuilding. For example, because of sanctions, Moscow cannot buy specific equipment from Western countries, such as diesel engines that it needs for its Buyan-M corvettes project. So, Moscow relies too on Chinese engines plus other electronic components to compensate for its non-access to Western military technology. The Sino-Russian De facto Alliance, the War in Ukraine, and the World’s Bipolarization From the 2000s to 2014, the Sino-Russian partnership gradually strengthened with an apparent acceleration starting in 2014 in all areas: political-diplomatic cooperation at the UN; economic complementarity; and defence cooperation based on geopolitical convergence. With the current war in Ukraine, there have been a lot of questions about the extent to which China would support Russia and if Beijing was aware of Moscow’s belligerent intentions. Given the depth of Sino-Russian military-to-military cooperation and Xi-Putin's close personal relationship, it seems unlikely that China did not know that Russia was bent on attacking Ukraine. However, this does not mean that Beijing is willing to suffer full-effect secondary sanctions for Russia’s sake. Today, just like in 2014, China denounces the Western sanctions against Russia but simultaneously makes sure to comply with the sanction regime broadly. Beijing’s conundrum is that it cannot afford to completely sacrifice its economic exchanges and trade surpluses with the EU and the U.S., nor can it completely abandon its Russian partner. We’re seeing clear signs of prudence on China’s part: Beijing called for all parties involved exerting restraint in Ukraine; Chinese businesses have refused to provide airplane parts to Russia; and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank stopped working with Belarus and Russia to “safeguard their financial integrity.” Other Chinese banks like the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China reduced funds available to buy Russian commodities to comply with the sanction regime for fear of being cut off from the dollar. Huawei also rolled back some of its activities in Russia for that same reason. Not to mention China’s frustration with the disrupted global supply chains. Does it mean that Beijing will accept to fully isolate Russia because it does not want to suffer economic and reputational costs? Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, visited Beijing on March 30th and met with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, on the margins of the Third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on the Afghan Issue Among the Neighboring Countries of Afghanistan. This is a clear sign that China has no intention to turn its back on Russia when the West is increasingly pressuring Russia. Xi has already decided that he will not abandon Putin. As demonstrated throughout this analysis, China has invested a lot of resources and efforts in its relationship with Russia, whether in energy, technology, and defence. China has currency swap lines established with Russia allowing it to proceed with trade in its currencies, which lowers the risks of secondary sanctions. China has also politically oriented banks less connected to the dollar-based financial system and willing to provide Russia's economic assistance. China has been doing it since 2014 and will keep doing it. China is suspected of having helped Russia stash dollar-denominated securities in offshore accounts in the Caymans and Belgium. If China is indeed creating a financial scheme to help Moscow access and hide liquidity ($77 billion in yuan reserves are in China), China will suffer repercussions. But Beijing is ready to accept some degree of economic pain for geostrategic reasons. These geostrategic reasons consist in energy security and Taiwan. China is a net energy importer, meaning that it must secure such strategic imports to fuel its economic growth. Moscow is a reliable energy exporter that is eager to connect its gas and oil reserves to China through pipelines. Moscow is a strategic partner for China because it is linked to its energy security. And such energy security will increasingly become a central preoccupation of China’s foreign policy, given the intensification of the Sino-American contest in East Asia. As a matter of fact, Washington has been adding weight to its Indo-Pacific strategy (QUAD, AUKUS) and actively tries to mobilize its allies in the region to contain China. The U.S. is also very vocal about its willingness to guarantee Taiwan’s right to choose its destiny free of Chinese coercion. However, we know that Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland is non-negotiable and a matter of territorial integrity and honour from the Chinese point of view. Thus, Russia’s brute force method is something China could emulate against Taiwan if Beijing’s gray-zone measures fail to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. We also know that in the case of an attack on Taiwan, the U.S. would most likely implement a blockade against China on the Strait of Malacca, where 70% of Chinese petroleum and LNG imports depend. In such a scenario, Russia’s inland exports of commodities to China would become crucial as maritime routes would, in all likelihood, be blocked. So, as long as the Taiwan question is not settled, China will not abandon its Russian partner even if it implies economic and reputational costs. China needs Russia’s energy in the event of a war with Taiwan. Russia is one of the few countries able to provide China with much-needed energy exports that it would need during turbulent times. If abandoned, Beijing would lose the benefits from Moscow’s military technology, which has a role in the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Depending on forecasts, the PLA will be able to lead a successful amphibious invasion of Taiwan by 2027 or 2049. In the meantime, China needs Russia’s military expertise. And if China invades Taiwan, securing Russian abstention on a potential UNSC resolution against China will also be crucial. Therefore, China has every incentive to support Russia in Ukraine while expecting Russia’s reciprocity in the case of a Chinese war against Taiwan – scratch my back; I’ll scratch yours. For these reasons, the Sino-Russian partnership will resist the current war in Ukraine and even strengthen, pushing further the bipolarization of the world. Implications and Recommendations The transatlantic unity has been robust in helping Ukraine and punishing Russia. It might not necessarily remain if the West has to sanction China because it would be a lot more painful to implement. Washington would struggle to get Europeans to significantly reduce trade with China unless the U.S. managed to compensate for the economic contraction that secondary sanctions would entail for the West. However, with the rise of protectionism in the U.S. and the increasing domestic polarization that impacts the stability of Washington’s foreign policy, it is unlikely that the U.S. could successfully do such a thing. The renewed transatlantic unity can quickly turn into transatlantic disunity. So, what should the West do about it? The West should learn the lessons of the Ukrainian war not to replicate them over China. From 2015 to 2022, the West failed to give Putin hope that the Minsk II agreement could be implemented. In particular, Paris and Berlin did not pressure Kyiv in the Normandy Format to grant autonomy and amnesty to Donbas as they could have. This would have held Russian horses. One could also argue that if NATO had offered a Membership Action Plan to Ukraine in 2008, the current war might not exist. In any case, the West should give hope to Beijing that peaceful reunification with Taiwan is still possible, or at least that the status quo is safe, and that the One-China Policy still stands. At the same time, it is necessary to provide Taiwan with asymmetrical capabilities to increase the cost of a Chinese attack against the island.  Joe Biden’s declaration explaining that the U.S. is ready to defend Taiwan militarily is counterproductive. As said above, Beijing knows its energy imports would be in jeopardy if a conflict over Taiwan breaks out because the maritime routes would most likely be closed off. Consequently, the current situation increases the value of Russia as a reliable energy, political, and defence partner for China. However, China has tremendously benefited from globalization and does not want to revolutionize the international system but merely to legitimize its political regime and values on the world stage. A good part of the political-diplomatic dimension of the Sino-Russian partnership is based on a shared willingness to counter Western liberal meddling in their domestic affairs. Whether it is about human rights violations, democracy promotion, or outright calls to regime change, such Western interferences ultimately push China and Russia together. But, unlike Russia, China has interests in preserving the stability of the globalized economy. The more economic exchanges between the West and China, the more costly it is for China to damage its trading relations with Western countries for Russia’s sake. The U.S.-China decoupling would greatly reduce these costs. If China and the U.S. could perceive one another not so much as ideological threats but as strategic competitors for structural reasons, then the basis of the ideological pillar of the Sino-Russian cooperation would erode. There is nothing the West can do to stop defence and energy cooperation between China and Russia, while it can certainly attenuate China’s fears about regime survival. And for that it is necessary to agree to disagree on ideology – neither will China liberalize nor the U.S. embrace one-party state capitalism. The only constructive way forward is to cooperate, when possible, while accepting competition when it is inevitable – which does not have to be about ideology. Thus, instead of rhetorically flexing its muscles, Washington should uphold its strategic ambiguity and accentuate the cooperation with China on business, climate change, nuclear proliferation, and pandemic prevention to balance a bilateral relationship defined by strategic competition. Doing that could induce China to hedge its bets a little more than it currently does. Finally, looking at history, another way to put some distance in the China-Russia relationship relates to India. In the 1950s, a significant source of Sino-Soviet tensions was Russia’s closeness to India. The West should try to exacerbate this enduring Sino-Indian rivalry to fissure the Sino-Russian partnership. One way to do that involves arms sales. India is Moscow’s number one arm buyer, and both countries share a “special relationship,” while the Sino-Indian relationship is acrimonious. In 2018, India ordered $5 billion worth of Russian S-400 missile systems to deter China and Pakistan. India should receive most of the S-400s by 2023. If Moscow delivers the S-400s to India, as it intends to do, this will inevitably trigger Chinese ire. Beijing does not want the balance of power vis-à-vis New Delhi negatively altered because of its “Russian unlimited partner” arming its regional rival, India. On the other hand, if Washington tries to prevent India from getting these S-400s through the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, it could cut short Chinese grievances against Russia. Therefore, the U.S. could turn a blind eye to the deal in order to sow Sino-Russian discord by exploiting power dynamics. Moreover, the S-400 will be aimed at China and Pakistan and hence does not threaten Washington or its allies.  If conditions arise, this methodology can be applied to Vietnam and other countries which share a close relationship with Russia and are under serious pressure from China. *** The Sino-Russian partnership has strengthened since the 2000s with a clear acceleration after Crimea’s annexation in 2014. It is based on three pillars: political-diplomatic cooperation, defence cooperation, and economic complementarity. China did not abandon Russia in 2008 nor 2014 and will not abandon Russia in its Ukrainian war today. Russia plays a role in one of Beijing’s most important foreign policy objectives: energetic security. In the case of war for Taiwan, China would greatly rely on Russian inland commodities exports as the U.S. would most likely bloc the Strait of Malacca, where most Chinese sea energy imports transit. Despite China’s dazzling military progression, China still needs Russia’s military technology to modernize the PLA to be capable of leading a successful invasion of Taiwan. Beijing will also need Russia’s diplomatic abstention at the UN if war breaks out over Taiwan. Therefore, as the West is sanctioning and isolating Russia, China will remain a reliable partner of Russia. Beijing will not use its leverage over Russia to stop the war. China’s position will increasingly irritate the West, and the bipolarization of the system will deepen, even more so if secondary sanctions are imposed on China. To drive a wedge between China and Russia it is necessary to 1) temper ideological rhetoric aimed at China; 2) balance the inherent tensions of the Sino-American rivalry through cooperation on climate change, nuclear proliferation and pandemic prevention; 3) reaffirm the One-China Policy; 4) use power dynamics to exacerbate Sino-Russian contradictions; and 5) incentivize China to favor its economic exchanges with the West relative to its strategic partnership with Russia. ## The Space Occupied by International Law in the Dynamics of Sino-American Competition URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-space-occupied-by-international-law-in-the-dynamics-of-sino-american-competition/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The purpose of this policy brief is to assess the space that international law occupies in the competitive dynamic between Washington &... Law proves to be omnipresent in international relations today, notably acting as a regulator of interstate activities or as a vector of legitimization. Although it has a universal vocation, the approach of states towards international law is neither homogeneous nor systematic. In this regard, the major powers have repeatedly demonstrated that the pursuit of political interests is sufficient to limit, or even ignore, certain principles of international law.  Paradoxically, the law is recurrently used by states when they consider that it can serve the pursuit of their strategic objectives. Ultimately, it is established that politics and law are intrinsically linked; this is further demonstrated at the level of the international system, where it is primarily the same actors who act as legislators, interpreting and enforcing it. As a result, the opportunities for the instrumentalization of international law in the pursuit of political objectives have multiplied in parallel with the development of the legal network. Finally, the Sino-American rivalry is not unrelated to this phenomenon. The purpose of this policy brief is to assess the space that international law occupies in the competitive dynamic between Washington and Beijing. It begins with an analysis of the relationship accorded to international law by each of the two state governments. It then touches on the semantic debate surrounding the conceptualization of the phenomenon of “lawfare,” recognized as a type of instrumentalization, which is perceptible within the present dynamic. Subsequently, cleavages bearing legal ramifications are addressed, namely, Chinese revisionism of the international law of the sea, the legalization of autonomous lethal weapons and, finally, the grey zone of cyberspace. Lastly, the brief concludes with recommendations for the Canadian government. The Respective Relationship of the United States and China Towards International Law The United States is recognized as the instigator of the international system. Notwithstanding the recent “Trumpist” anomaly, U.S. presidencies have generally positively influenced the development and maintenance of international organizations, in addition to acting as leaders within them. However, the commitment to the establishment of these institutions has proven to be preeminent to the respect of the rules that have emerged from them. Theoretically dualist, the various interpretations of international law in the United States converge to varying degrees on the notion of exceptionalism; granting Washington a special status and, thereby, justifying it a singular margin of autonomy on the international scene. Although this view, when combined with its history of instrumentalization of international law, undermines the coherence of U.S. discourse, it does not prevent the United States from repeatedly appealing to the importance of the rule of law in international affairs.  This rhetoric is illustrated on several occasions, as was the case during President Barack Obama's (2009-2017) trip to Australia in 2011 or, more recently, by President Joe Biden's statement on the role of the United States in the world. While this exceptionalist sentiment is legally questionable, Washington still seeks to defend the liberal international order it has actively constructed and, consequently, the rule of law that applies to it. China's relationship with international law does not share this history. Indeed, it is recognized that law serves a different function within Chinese culture. For many senior Chinese officials, the liberal international order is the object of conflict and unfair competition. This rhetoric is rooted in the so-called “century of humiliation.” During this era, Chinese authority claims to have been subjugated by Western powers. Effectively, several “unfair treaties” were imposed on China, impacting its territorial integrity and sovereignty. As a result of this history, China has developed some resentment towards the West and international law, the latter having become identified as an instrument of domination. Consequently, the imprint of Chinese leadership in international organizations has long been marginal. The liberal international order, as well as the norms and values that have been developed and that are conveyed by it today, do not have the same resonance with the Asian state. Although China has developed in parallel with this systemic evolution, international law is nonetheless important to the Chinese government, both as a vehicle of international legitimacy and as a strategic instrument. The Chinese government has long been on the sidelines and is now seeking to play an active role in the legal environment. Nevertheless, Beijing remains limited in the scope of its normative legitimacy because of the ideological gap between its paradigmatic positioning and that of the liberal international order. Today, Beijing perceives its rise as a “rejuvenation,” which, interrupted by the West, tends to restore it to its former glory. In part, this perception comes from the re-emergence of the ancient Chinese belief of Tianxia. The latter, which trades the equality between nations of the UN model for a Sinocentric hierarchical structure, is diametrically opposed to the liberal international order. Beyond the competition in which each seeks to promote a narrative frame and direct normative proliferation, both states perceive a strategic utility in international law. However, they do not conceive it in the same way. While Washington defers considering an alternative of a more offensive use of international law, Beijing explicitly identifies the law as a “military” instrument that can be used to defend its interests. Recognized by the expression “Falu zhan,” and better translated by the English term “lawfare,” this conceptualization of law as an instrument of war was codified in 2003 by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a document entitled “Political Work Regulations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.” For Beijing, the law is a tool that allows it to maintain a strategic advantage over its adversary either before, during or after a conflict. Semantic Complexity Law and politics cannot be separated and interact on a multitude of levels. One possible interpretation of law is that it can be defined as a goal, a means, or an obstacle in its relationship to politics. In this respect, the activities of instrumentalization and “lawfare” are consistent with this conception. The conceptualization of a legal operation as a war operation became relevant again following the War on Terror in 2001.  Popularized by U.S. Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., the term “lawfare” originally referred as “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.” Although some consider the term to be pejorative, Dunlap conceptualizes it as neutral and identifies it as an indispensable dimension of modern conflict. While retaining this notion of use in the pursuit of strategic interests, the term has gradually expanded to include areas of activity outside the traditional battlefield. Nevertheless, limitations persist, whether in relation to the applicability of the term to activities outside the military or to the sometimes complex dissociation of “lawfare” from current legal practices. This ambiguity supports the idea that the concept will continue to evolve and that not all of its ideals will reach a consensus. Furthermore, it is relevant to note that this form of instrumentalization of international law has developed almost in tandem with the concept of hybrid warfare, resulting in a mutual reinforcement of the two concepts. Although there is a semantic blurring of the conceptualization of “lawfare,” there is every reason to believe that the avenues for instrumentalizing international law and “lawfare” will only increase. Given the volatility of its definition, this brief will use “lawfare” in its broadest sense, as the use of law in pursuit of strategic objectives, without confining the phenomenon to the military framework. South China Sea: Chinese Revisionism of the International Law of the Sea Since the beginning of the 20th century, the South China Sea has been the site of multiple claims. The most notorious of these claims relates to Beijing's drawing of the “nine-dash line,” which was originally mapped in 1947. The legal debate on this controversial issue gained momentum in 2009, following a statement by Beijing that it has “unquestionable” sovereignty over the islands and adjacent waters in the region. The delineation, which was the subject of arbitration proceedings by a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration following a 2013 initiative by the Philippines, was declared to have no legal basis under international law. Although the decision was in favour of the Philippines, China rejected it, arguing that the ruling will have no effect on “territorial sovereignty and marine rights” in the region. And it continues to act as if it were de facto. As such, Beijing seeks to consolidate its extensive territorial claim in the region through political, economic and military factors, rather than through direct confrontation. To this end, the law is identified as a central component of the CCP's strategy for achieving this objective. For example, a recent law passed by the Chinese government, the China Coast Guard (CCG) Law, grants Chinese authority a coercive power in the South China Sea that systematically violates several articles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This legislation, which is intended to regulate the activities of the Chinese Coast Guard, extends to the entirety of “waters under the jurisdiction of China.” The drafting of this law, as well as recent Chinese enforcement activities within the Philippines's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), tend to substantiate the fears of many that Beijing is seeking to expand its legislative activities in the disputed maritime area in order to consolidate its sovereignty claims. Firmly arguing that it is not in the wrong, China is seeking to modulate the acceptability of its actions in the region. Having significantly disrupted the regional geopolitical environment, Beijing aims to institute a legal order to crystallize its gains; relying on a reconception of the perceived “illegality” surrounding its behaviour. By perpetuating maritime activities on the basis of a decidedly erroneous interpretation of UNCLOS' provisions, Beijing is attempting to manipulate customary international law. Through repetition and tacit acceptance, or in this case, through the existence of an implicit deterrent to opposition, China seeks to reshape the legal environment in the South China Sea with the aim of increasing its control. For Washington, this region is of particular importance. In addition to sharing many interests with its allies in the South China Sea periphery, the latter also have a long-standing commitment to the liberal international order established by the United States. Nevertheless, although the previous U.S. administration firmly asserted that China's actions violated international law and declared its support for the arbitration tribunal's verdict in 2016, the scope of Washington's rhetoric remains limited. Essentially, the U.S.’s call to respect the international law of the sea is significantly undermined by its failure to ratify UNCLOS. In this regard, the history of U.S. policies toward the applicability of the international law of the sea exemplifies Washington's ambivalent attitude toward the use of the rule of law in its management of international affairs. The U.S.'s failure to ratify the treaty also adds to China's argument, as well as expanding its range of possible actions. Furthermore, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken's reassertion of U.S. support for the 2016 verdict earlier this year is also expected to have a modest impact. Given that the U.S. treatment of various international courts is clearly ambiguous, this diplomatic posture is easily underscored by Beijing in its defence. For the United States, which shares economic and security interests in addition to counterbalancing Chinese influence, future actions in the South China Sea are of key strategic importance to Washington. Autonomous Lethal Weapons and International Law The development of new military technologies, such as lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), is accompanied by significant legal concerns. In this regard, U.S. ambivalence about possible LAWS legislation creates a window of opportunity for Beijing. Although both the United States and China participated in expert group meetings addressing the topic between 2014 and 2019 under the UN Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the two rivals are adopting a nuanced, but oppositional, discourse.  In 2019, while Washington considered the drafting of a binding legal instrument on the subject to be premature and deemed that it was necessary to avoid stigmatizing the use of this type of military equipment, Beijing positioned itself in favour of a ban. Indeed, China has openly stated the importance of legislating these new technologies in order to act complementarily with existing international humanitarian law. However, the definition proposed by its diplomatic team is deliberately flawed. Moreover, the lack of further clarification of its conceptualization of future legislation is telling. This stance is identified as an instrumentalization of the legal discourse on the subject in order to delegitimize the position maintained by the United States. China is taking advantage of U.S. ambivalence to portray itself as the actor advocating for the creation of a binding instrument, while at the same time pursuing research and development activities in the field. The U.S.’s position, based on the logic of avoiding granting a strategic advantage to an adversary by denying it to oneself, if maintained, will perpetuate the CCP's strategic advantage. Recent developments in this regard have only confirmed that the Americans prefer the adoption of a code of conduct rather than binding legal principles. Beijing's continued doublespeak must lead to a strategic review in Washington. From the outset, the United States must stop using rhetoric aimed at reducing the risks associated with the use of this type of military equipment in order to consolidate its position on the development of non-binding principles. In the absence of such principles, Washington's discourse does more harm than good to U.S. strategic interests, as China can maintain this doublespeak without real fear of repercussions. Cyberspace: A Grey Zone Cyberspace is also of particular importance in the Sino-American rivalry. The fact that states are not positioned in the same way in cyberspace has an impact on their enthusiasm for normative development. In a report by the group of governmental experts tasked with examining developments in information and telecommunications in the context of international security in 2013, participating states – including China and the United States – had agreed on the applicability of the United Nations Charter in cyberspace. Two years later, China rejected the new expert report in which the importance of international humanitarian law principles within cyberspace was recognized. However, in the summer of 2021, China accepted the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace in the case of armed conflict. For the Americans, the use of declaratory principles is in line with their cyber strategy. However, the latter is strongly criticized for its focus on deterrence, which has proven to be progressively ineffective. Indeed, while the United States is committed to respecting international humanitarian law across the entire spectrum of its military activities, China's engagement in this regard is more symbolic than sincere. Although China has demonstrated its support for the rule of law on global security issues, its stance on the application of international law, particularly on international humanitarian law in cyberspace, remains wavering. It is, in turn, reasonable to question whether China truly intends to formally commit to this support, either through binding treaty or customary law development. Moreover, the stigmatization of Chinese behaviour in cyberspace, which is explicitly described as malicious by Washington and its allies, reinforces this doubt. Finally, even if states seem to agree on the applicability of international law in cyberspace, a problem persists. The principles elaborated by the UN Charter, as well as those emanating from customary international law, are strongly colored by the environment in which they have evolved. As a result, these principles were conceived within a logic where states could alter international stability through coercion or brute force; a logic that is more nuanced in cyberspace. Prior to the creation of binding rules, it is useful to compare the position of states vis-à-vis the maintenance of the status quo. For the CCP, cyberspace is the intersection of three major concerns: maintaining regime legitimacy, national security and technological-economic dependence. In their view, existing norms are not intended to regulate activities in cyberspace and it is for this reason that China is attempting to play a role in normative proliferation. In this sense, although it has participated in the discussions on the subject, China can hope to continue its cyber activities, known as offensive, as these are orchestrated under the qualitative criteria of an “armed conflict.” As for Washington, its continued passive stance puts it at a disadvantage in the face of the status quo, a consequence of its inadequate deterrence strategy. Although the United States has recently supported France's move to encourage dialogue on norms in cyberspace, it is refraining from leading the effort to move beyond declaratory principles. Paradoxically, history has shown that the creation of binding international instruments regulating activities in an area prone to an arms race is one of the best ways to restore dialogue and reduce tensions.  While President Biden has reiterated the importance of norms and institutions in his cyber strategy, much remains to be done. What Can Canada Do? Canada is not entirely unfamiliar with the phenomenon of instrumentalization of international law. Although it is not known for diligently engaging in this activity, it has resorted to this strategy in the past. However, the dynamics of great power competition in the international system must lead Canada to reconsider the strategic use of international law. The idea that a state can advance its strategic interests or harm another state by using international law is no longer in question. While this is not new, it is necessary for Canada to reassess this threat. Today, we must consider “lawfare” as a type of activity whose existence is integrated with that of hybrid conflicts. In this regard, a state adhering to the rule of law, such as Canada, cannot hope to engage in the same tactics as authoritarian states that view international law almost exclusively as a strategic tool. Nevertheless, Ottawa can hope to play a significant role in the American response to Beijing's manoeuvres. Despite its unquestionably selective behaviour, the American approach to international law, if it were to become homogenized, could significantly undermine Chinese activities. 1. The Canadian Government Must Encourage the U.S. Congress to Change its Approach to UNCLOS. As a member of UNCLOS, Canada should seek to persuade the U.S. Congress to join the treaty. As mentioned earlier, Washington is a key player in the development of new standards. While the U.S. Congress is undecided on the scope of UNCLOS ratification, Canada should seek to reorient the U.S. discussion to the symbolic significance of ratification, rather than its short-term strategic use. By demonstrating its unconditional support for international law, the United States would enhance the legitimacy of its call for compliance with the rule of law. Moreover, Canada should encourage the U.S. government to be more supportive of other states in the region that wish to undertake legal initiatives with respect to Chinese activities in the South China Sea, in addition to reiterating its own support for such efforts. 2. Canada Must Focus on Adopting a Definition of LAWS that is Consistent with its Interests and those of its Allies. The lack of a universal definition of such equipment could present an opportunity for Ottawa and Washington, as well as a thorn in Beijing's side. While the United States may not be called upon to condemn its current strategic direction entirely, a more precise definition of LAWS would force the Chinese leadership to re-evaluate its commitment to the legalization of this type of weapon. Given its highly anachronistic conceptualization of LAWS, one can bet that Beijing would refuse to recognize such a definition, undermining the credibility of its legal push. As the instigator of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Canada could replicate this approach which has previously proven effective in ensuring that the legal framework for these weapons is consistent with its strategic interests and those of its allies. Moreover, this type of initiative would be all the more beneficial for Ottawa, since it could be carried out without direct support from Washington, as was the case in 1997. This type of initiative could help break the current impasse and revitalize Canada's image on the international scene. 3. Canada Must Diversify its Approach to the Development of Best Practices in Cyberspace. Strategic competition in cyberspace is characterized by exploitation rather than coercion. Canada, being already relatively active on the subject of cybersecurity at the national level through the adoption of its National Strategy on Cybersecurity, could take the lead in normative development by furthering its desire to put in place standards for best practice in cyberspace. Although Canada stated in 2020 that it considers international law and the standards developed by the previous work of the working group on the subject to be sufficient, it would benefit from nuancing its discourse. For example, Ottawa could learn from the U.S.’ strategic orientation of “initiative persistence.” The latter comprises a defensive and offensive facet based on the exploitation of vulnerabilities and is part of a continuum of activities. Through “tacit bargaining” approaches, Canada could hope to pursue its national interests while participating in the development of best practices in cyberspace.   ## The Taiwan Problem to the U.S.-South Korean Alliance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-taiwan-problem-to-the-u-s-south-korean-alliance/ Modified: 2023-01-06 > There is no denying that no one in the Indo-Pacific region wants to see a cross-strait conflict. Especially the Republic of Korea. While tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States have intensified over Taiwan for the past several months, the risk of war in the region looms large. After the U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August this year, Beijing conducted live-fire military drills intensively around the island, which was followed by the Taiwanese military exercises. The Chinese government does not renounce the use of force to unify Taiwan and the U.S. side promises to protect the island in case of China’s attack. There is no denying that no one in the Indo-Pacific region wants to see a cross-strait conflict. Especially the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) is concerned about the problem of Taiwan for at least two reasons. The first reason has to do with a possibility in which the United States would devote its military forces to fending off aggression against Taiwan and leave South Korea alone to deal with the security problem in the peninsula. The second reason involves South Korea’s entrapment in a war as a U.S. ally and fight against the PRC. The two elements are not mutually exclusive and present the ROK government with an acute dilemma in the making of foreign policy. This article does not assume that a war between the United States and Taiwan on the one hand and China on the other hand looks highly likely. Nor does it argue that a war among them is unavoidable. However, envisaging how the South Koreans would respond to a worst-case scenario (a war over Taiwan) may help us assess the value and utility of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Main Security Problem in the Korean Peninsula First off, if a war comes to the Taiwan Straits, South Korea might have to be in charge of the main task of defense and deterrence in the peninsula. Since the 1953 armistice agreement paused heavy fighting in the Korean war, the ROK has been technically at war against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) and the U.S.-South Korean alliance has played a significant role in maintaining the stability of the Korean peninsula. Washington’s involvement in a cross-strait war does not necessarily mean that the state would forsake its Korean ally. However, the United States would want to use its forces in Korea (USFK) to deal with a war with China even if it would go beyond the core mission of defending the Korean peninsula. There is a lack of coordination between the United States and South Korea regarding the role of USFK in regional contingencies and only a nominal agreement exists between the two allies to “preserve the peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.” Nevertheless, Seoul does not rule out the possibility of confronting North Korea without the U.S. presence in case war over the democratic island takes place. In his interview with CNN in September this year, the South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol stated that the North Korean nuclear capability poses an imminent threat to the South. He also evinced concern for the North’s possible aggression should tensions over the Taiwan Straits turn into a conflict. The reasoning behind his apprehension is that the Pyongyang regime may be emboldened to take military action when the United States would focus on the problem of Taiwan while paying less attention to the Korean peninsula. North Korea might coordinate with China to launch military attacks against the South in order to distract the United States into two front wars in Northeast Asia. This has something to do with a notion developed in the early Cold War that the fate of the ROK was closely tied with that of Taiwan. For this reason, a historical record shows that the United States neutralized the area of Taiwan two days after the breakout of the Korean war by deploying the seventh fleet to the straits. Similarly important was the increasing number of discussions among the South Korean people about the on-going war in Ukraine and how North Korea would take advantage of this crisis for its own benefit. After the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February, it was expected that Pyongyang was more likely to initiate provocations vis-à-vis South Korea, as a political division among the United States, China and Russia would make it difficult for the international community to respond to such activities. Indeed, the North Korean regime conducted ballistic missile tests every month this year and the number and frequency of tests drastically increased compared with the previous year. For the ROK government, the main security problem is associated with how to confront the enhanced capability and the augmented number of North Korea’s ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear warheads and whether or not Seoul’s current military strategy, called “system to respond to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction,” or “three-axis system,” could stave off threats from Pyongyang. Therefore, the majority of the ROK forces would focus on deterring North Korea and preparing for a war in the peninsula upon the failure of deterrence while a war over Taiwan would continue. Entrapment in a War with China Second, South Korea is anxious about a possibility in which the state would be entrapped in a war between the United States and China. A critical question is if Seoul would fight actively along with Washington against Beijing in the crisis. If so, it means that South Korea would fulfill its commitment as a reliable alliance partner to assist the U.S. military operations abroad. However, such a decision would run the risk of placing major military assets in Korea under Chinese attack. Unlike North Korea, China has enhanced military capability with substantial resources invested in research and development programs for the past thirty years and Seoul may not be ready to face a situation in which Beijing, a fierce military power, would turn its back against the South. By contrast, if the ROK decides not to face off against the PRC, its seventy-year-old alliance relationship with the United States would be put in danger. The decision would be considered as choosing China over the United States and, therefore, engender the termination of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Nevertheless, Seoul would be placed in the state of conflict with Beijing even if it refuses to provide assistance to Washington because the U.S. forces and bases in Korea would be the target of the Chinese military. All in all, because the consequences of choosing the abovementioned two options would be detrimental, a cost-benefit analysis is likely to cause the ROK government to avoid such choices for the time being. This means that South Korea’s response to the regional conflict would include verbal support for the United States without actual military assistance. South Korea’s Approach to the Taiwan Issue It is important to discuss Seoul’s view on Taiwan. Upon formalizing bilateral relations with China in August 1992, the South Korean government recognized the PRC instead of Taiwan, pledging its support of a ‘one China’ policy. On a regular basis, the ROK government confirmed this principle in an effort to reassure its Chinese counterpart. Recently, South Korea issued a ritual statement in response to a newly developed confrontation between the United States and China after Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. A spokesperson in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) noted that Korea would adhere to the one China policy irrespective of the U.S. position, which seemed a sympathetic expression to the Chinese side. He then highlighted that the peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits were important to promoting the regional security and prosperity, warning the two large powers against hostile activities to one another. Beneath the surface, however, there exists an ambiguity in South Korea’s position. The ROK government acknowledges that the People’s Republic is the only legal government of China and Taiwan is part of it. That is, Seoul does not recognize Taipei as a sovereign entity. However, the former and the latter have dispatched a diplomatic representative office to maintain ‘informal’ bilateral relations. Economic interactions between the two remained important for the past thirty years and Taiwan constituted the fifth largest trade partner for the ROK in 2021 and the sixth largest partner in the first half of 2022. Moreover, people to people contacts increased drastically for the past several years and more than 1.26 million Taiwanese visited South Korea in a year before the COVID-19 pandemic. With democratic values and economic interests shared between the two, would the Seoul government be driven to defend Taiwan? The answer is unclear. In fact, the South Koreans have been careful not to displease the Chinese with respect to the issue of Taiwan. For example, the Taiwanese were not invited to the inauguration ceremonies of the South Korean presidents (except President Park Geun-hye) after the termination of diplomatic ties in 1992. A recent incident also indicates Seoul’s cautious approach. After her high-profile trip to Taiwan, Pelosi paid a visit to South Korea. Naturally, considerable attention was paid to how the Republic would greet the U.S. high-ranking politician. Coincidentally, the Korean President went on a summer vacation ‘at home’ in Seoul and he talked to her on the phone instead of meeting her in person. Later, the presidential office announced that it was a decision carefully made on the basis of national security, causing some suspicion that the South contemplated the China factor. It is notable that South Korea started to address Taiwan in the context of the regional security recently. In the past, the ROK avoided discussing the issue in public with respect to the bilateral alliance with the United States. Last year, the president of South Korea for the first time in history emphasized preserving “peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits” in the joint statement with the U.S. counterpart. It came out when Seoul was reticent for quite a while about the U.S. encouragement to participate in new multilateral frameworks, such as Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Quad plus, combining the U.S. allies and ‘like-minded’ democratic partners together. Although the United States openly argued that the new architecture was not designed to antagonize the PRC, it was viewed as Washington’s effort to re-establish its leadership challenged by Beijing’s growing economic and political influence. While staying lukewarm in joining the U.S.-led networks, South Korea decided to include the problem of Taiwan in the structure of bilateral relations with the United States, which, some people believe, was a compromise between the two alliance partners. South Korea’s statement on Taiwan by far keeps a low profile in contrast to Japan’s. The Japanese publicly state that Taiwan is an important partner sharing the fundamental values in democracy and that “the peace and stability of Taiwan is directly connected to Japan.” The Japanese defense white paper provides a careful analysis about the Chinese advanced military capability and strategy and studies a possible conflict between China and Taiwan. By contrast, the ROK defense white paper, published biennially, places the focus mostly on investigating the North Korean threat while it has never addressed the issue of Taiwan even when assessing regional security problems. Washington understands that Tokyo and Seoul differ on this matter. When President Joe Biden had a trip to Asia in May this year, he was committed to defending Taiwan against the Chinese aggression. Putting a debate aside regarding whether or not the United States gave up the long-kept position of strategic ambiguity in the cross-strait relations, it is worth noting that such a commitment came out after Biden’s summit meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister, not with the South Korean leader. Conclusion: Showdown So, what does it mean to the Republic’s position regarding a war over Taiwan? The South Korean government fears both abandonment and entrapment if the United States gets involved in a cross-strait conflict. The South is worried about being left alone and realizes that the state should rely on its own capability for survival. Although the United States does not discard the ROK, Seoul would fear abandonment regardless. Such concern is rooted in Seoul’s experience that the United States changed its alliance policy to withdraw forces without reflecting the ally’s concern in the past. In particular, the U.S. government under President Donald Trump demanded South Korea and other allies contribute more to the cost of stationing U.S. troops and threatened to withdraw forces if the demand is not accommodated. Also, South Korea would fear entrapment because it might be entangled in the battlefield in which the United States would fight against the PRC. The fear of entrapment will increase among the South Korean people as the U.S.-China rivalry intensifies and a war looks more likely. The combination of abandonment and entrapment fears was reflected in the important agreement between Seoul and Washington about the role of USFK in 2006. While the United States sought to quickly move and deploy the U.S. strategic assets in Korea to another place, South Korea was reluctant to agree on the flexible use of USFK. After a painful negotiation process, a consensus was reached between the two on the strategic flexibility and South Korea’s intent was manifested in the content of the agreement. It said, “The United States respects the ROK’s position that it shall not get involved in a regional conflict against the will of the Korean people.” If push comes to shove, Seoul would be engrossed in handling Pyongyang’s military threats and preparing for a war with the DPRK while seeking ways to delay the Chinese attack on the peninsula. Even if the Republic decides to provide assistance to the United States, it would be solely declaratory due to Seoul’s incapacity and reluctance to fight a war beyond the peninsula. If economic sanctions are imposed against China at the early stage of fighting, Seoul might be hesitant about participating given the high economic interdependence with Beijing. Therefore, it is plausible to expect that the Chinese government might instrumentalize these challenges to disrupt the U.S.-ROK collaboration should a cross-strait conflict occur.     Dr. Hyon Joo Yoo is an associate professor in the department of political science at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea. Yoo was a tenured faculty member at Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas, a Northeast Asia fellow at the East West Center, Washington, D.C., an East Asia Institute (EAI) Fellow, and a Korea Foundation Fellow.  Her research interests include the U.S. alliance, East Asian security, China’s foreign policy, Korean politics, and international relations theory.   ***   This paper is a written version of a contribution made on 2nd June 2022 at a conference ‘Is War over Taiwan Coming?’ held at the University of Quebec at Montreal. The original version of this text was published in French on Le Rubicon. Check it out here!     ## The Taliban and the Uyghur Dilemma: Where to Stand? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-taliban-and-the-uyghur-dilemma-where-to-stand/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > ...of the War on Terror, it also marks the adoption of a stigmatizing rhetoric by the Chinese state towards its Muslim minority, the Uyghurs While the 20th anniversary of September 11 terrorist attack is a reminder of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and the beginning of the War on Terror, it also marks the adoption of a stigmatizing rhetoric by the Chinese state towards its Muslim minority, the Uyghurs. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) approach has proven to be exponentially oppressive and intrusive, raising concerns among many in the international community. This was amplified following the leak of the China Cables. These documents, produced by the Chinese government, shed light on the CCP's massive structure of oppression of ethnic minorities in the western region of the country. Although the CCP still systematically detaches itself from attacks on the Uyghur community, developments in Xinjiang and the multiple human rights violations are now widely documented. The recent Taliban takeover in Afghanistan brings regional stability and security concerns to the forefront for both the United States and neighbouring states. China is also reluctantly concerned about developments in Afghanistan. Sharing a border with Afghanistan, China's Xinjiang province is a sensitive area for the Chinese government. It offers significant economic, political, and strategic advantages to the CCP, and is an essential part of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Given the importance of the province to China, the latter is particularly anxious about the re-emergence of cross-border terrorism in Afghanistan, which could have a significant impact on Xinjiang. The relationship between the two entities appears to be conditioned by two factors. The first being economic ties, and the second being mutual restraint in interfering in each other's internal affairs. Without a doubt, the economy will be a central concern for the new Afghan government. Faced with relentless inflation, a very high poverty line and the interruption of Western financial flows, economic support maneuvers are proving to be particularly limited. Faced with a lack of options and conditional aid from G7 members, China quickly identified itself as the best avenue for significant financial assistance. By offering aid “implicitly” conditional on the adoption of strict policies towards anti-Chinese jihadist movements, the CCP is trying to avoid any possible spillover into Xinjiang province. However, for the Uyghur population in Afghanistan, the rapprochement between the Taliban and the Chinese government raises a number of concerns, not without foundation. The power of Chinese economic leverage in Arab countries is so significant that it perpetuates an almost total silence on CCP policies in Xinjiang, even in states that generally tend to defend Muslim rights. Moreover, some states have already taken steps to allow an extension of China's policy, as in the case of Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, the economic factor, if isolated, seems to be enough to doom any hope of a change of discourse among Arab countries towards the situation of the Uyghurs. Nonetheless, it cannot be fully isolated. In seeking to secure promises from the Taliban government, China is looking to safeguard its border with Afghanistan to avoid any repercussions for its activities in Xinjiang. However, to ensure that its promises to prevent the re-emergence of international terrorism are kept, the Afghan government must have the “monopoly of violence,” which is not currently the case. Indeed, the existence of free electrons in various parts of Afghanistan makes it difficult to ensure that the integrity of Chinese territory is fully respected. Moreover, although China would like to see this, a stance by the Taliban regime against the Turkestan Islamic Party could significantly undermine the new government’s legitimacy. Besides, despite President Xi Jinping's call for “concerned parties” to eradicate the terrorist threat, the UN monitoring team has ruled that the Taliban regime still has strong links with Al-Qaeda.  Furthermore, most regional actors, as well as the West in general, hope to achieve stability in Afghanistan and emphasize the importance of the fight against terrorism. In the face of a relatively homogeneous message from the international community, the call to control radicalization is unanimous. However, in order to achieve this, the Taliban will need to ensure that extremist groups such as ISIS-K, one of their main opponents, are contained. While this was possible with the American presence, their departure leaves uncertainty about the Taliban's ability to keep this growing threat at bay. For the Islamic State, the Taliban's dithering over the handling of the Uyghur issue is unacceptable; it was even used as a motive for the terrorist attack in Kunduz on October 8, 2021. For these reasons, the worth of the new Afghan government's promises may be questioned. The balance between the actors remains fragile. While recently taking action on the Sino-Afghan border to demonstrate its intention to honour its agreement with the CCP, the new Afghan government remains vague about its desire to import Chinese practices towards the Uyghur minority. Beijing's concern, which stems in part from the fact that the rise of the Taliban fundamentalist regime has already had echoes in Xinjiang, seems to be coming to the fore. While the extreme extrapolation of this fear has led Beijing to implement draconian policies in Xinjiang Province and is attempting to mobilize the Taliban government to follow suit, the CCP may soon find itself at an impasse should the Afghan government be unable or unwilling to deliver on its promises. If this happens, Beijing would be paralyzed by its dedication to the principle of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of another state.  In this sense, developments in Afghanistan could have a significant effect on Chinese behaviour in the region and on its overall strategic positioning. On the other side of the Atlantic, Canada is still considering whether it will recognize the new Afghan government. The fact is that Canada's decision is likely to be similar to the decisions of its allies, such as Britain and the United States, whereby recognition is granted subject to multiple conditions, including that Afghanistan does not again become a haven for international terrorism. However, as mentioned earlier, faced with opposition as strong as the Islamic State and with little effective control over its entire territory, the Taliban regime could quickly find itself backed into a corner. ## The Transatlantic Security Architecture and the Potential of the Franco-Canadian Alliance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-transatlantic-security-architecture-and-the-potential-of-the-franco-canadian-alliance/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The transatlantic security architecture, based on the NATO and the European Union (EU), is critical to European and North American stability. This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program and the DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges. Summary The transatlantic security architecture, based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), is critical to European and North American stability, but it faces increasing problems in confronting Russian and Chinese threats. NATO's reinforced Eastern European defences and financial contributions to Ukraine's military operations demonstrate its responsiveness, but the EU's reliance on US leadership highlight continuing weaknesses. France has taken the lead in advocating for European sovereignty and greater NATO-EU cooperation. Meanwhile, Canada's own commitments shows its strategic potential, particularly in the Arctic, despite shortcomings in national defence. However, concerns remain about NATO's coherence, the reliability of US assistance, and Europe's willingness to take greater responsibility for its security. With NATO and Europe potentially facing the most severe “hot war” crisis since World War II, the central question is: What’s next for transatlantic security? Key Recommendations: Focus NATO investments on strategic areas like cybersecurity, Arctic surveillance, and hybrid warfare. Reinforce a culture of shared responsibility within NATO, promoting a balanced alliance where each country’s contributions align with their strengths and capabilities. Strength partnerships between France, Canada, and other allies now to help NATO hedge against future volatility in U.S. foreign policy allowing to ensure a robust and more autonomous transatlantic security architecture regardless of American political shifts. Secure NATO’s Arctic interests by leveraging Canada’s Arctic expertise. Create a NATO Logistics Command Center to streamline troop movements and supply routes, with Canada and France leading by example in logistical efficiency. Establish a Transatlantic Task Force on Hybrid Threat Resilience to counter cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic coercion. Introduction The “transatlantic security architecture” refers to the complex network of defence and diplomatic alliances, primarily NATO and the EU, that ensures collective security and stability across Europe and North America, deterring threats from adversarial powers like Russia and China. It represents both a strategic foundation and a platform to reinforce regional stability, allowing these Member States to lead collaborative defence initiatives and uphold shared democratic values. Although France and Canada have very different military capabilities, they can both be considered middle powers among NATO members when economic and diplomatic impact are considered. The importance of the transatlantic security architecture has only grown in recent years. For instance, NATO currently considers the Russian Federation's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine to be the most serious and immediate threat to Europe. This issue is at the heart of NATO's agenda, as Russia attempts to continue its violent westward expansion and direct authority by force, subversion, invasion, and annexation. The ongoing conflict also touches on broader global security issues, including the rise of China, the new geopolitical battleground of the Arctic, and the failures of post-Cold War deterrence in the European theater. Amid such tensions, Europe cannot afford to be solely reactive in its alliances and strategic planning. Faced with Russia's growing violations of the international system and the ongoing threat of Putin’s use nuclear weapons, NATO has updated its military strategies, consolidating its presence in Eastern Europe with the establishment of battle-ready formations. The organization has also reinforced aerial surveillance missions and the presence of its naval forces in the waters of the Baltic and the Mediterranean. Despite French President Emmanuel Macron infamously described NATO's work as “brain dead" in 2019, the invasion of Ukraine seems to have given NATO renewed relevance to France leadership. The conflict has also led traditionally neutral countries like Sweden and Finland to join NATO, adding a critical 1,300 kilometers of security buffer along Finland’s border with Russia. Indeed, the tradition of neutrality has become less relevant since the war in Ukraine, furthering the fact that the traditional diplomatic tenets of neutrality and non-engagement are becoming increasingly obsolete in 21st century Europe. For its part, the European Union (EU) continues to play the leading geopolitical role in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite the organization’s general lack of strategic power, it is making a significant financial contribution to military training in Ukraine, even surpassing the United States. The EU has also been grappling with non-military challenges, in particular the continent's heavy economic and resource dependence on Russian gas, which limits Europe's room to maneuver and makes it impossible to implement a full embargo against the Russian state. Since then, steps have been taken to reduce these security vulnerabilities, but European energy independence will take time and require significant policy alignment among Member States - if it is ever achieved. It is surmised that both NATO and the EU have shown greater responsiveness than Russian president Putin anticipated, although both organizations recognize the challenges that the "intensified strategic competition” of our times poses. NATO and the EU confirm the importance of a stronger and more effective European defence which contributes effectively to global and transatlantic security, complements NATO's action, and provides cross-continent interoperability. U.S. Political Instability and NATO Cohesion Despite NATO and the EU's robust response, the long-term role of the United States in European security remains uncertain. During Donald Trump’s first presidency, U.S. commitment to NATO was openly questioned, with criticism primarily focused on European members’ failure to meet the 2% defence spending target—a concern echoed during the Obama administration. 23 out of 32 NATO members now meet this target. However the U.K., Germany, and the U.S., which collectively account for approximately 85% of NATO defence spending, have done so since 2024, debates over NATO burden-sharing persist in U.S. political discourse and threaten deeper divisions within the alliance. This tension will likely continue particularly as the Arctic becomes a strategic battleground between Russia and the West, with Alaska playing a pivotal geographic role. At the same time, the U.S. faces mounting challenges from two powerful adversaries, Russia, and China, splitting its focus and resources. To counter China’s rise, the United States has shifted attention to the Indo-Pacific, strengthening alliances through initiatives like the AUKUS tripartite agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom and engaging New Zealand’s interest in joining AUKUS’s second pillar. Although these moves bolster U.S. influence in the eastern hemisphere, they raise concerns about Washington’s ability—or willingness—to respond decisively to a potential escalation in Ukraine. A reduced U.S. role in European security would leave Europe vulnerable, potentially enabling Russia to advance in Ukraine. Although some experts advocate for greater European autonomy, the EU remains reliant on its American ally to navigate the conflict on its borders. As NATO faces increasingly complex and diverse security challenges, the organization is forced to give priority to the quality and strategic value of emerging partnerships, rather than traditional tactics which experts argue are increasingly outdated traditional  tactics and alliances in the contemporary security environment. Indeed, the word “sharing” in the term “burden sharing” traditionally associated with the Alliance has become largely inadequate. We are no longer in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the European continent is no longer a “burden” whose security depends solely on its American ally. NATO represents an alliance with benefits for each participant, and 2% target has for a time weakened the Alliance's credibility and cohesion, with challenges to the efficacy and attainability of this target dating back as early as the Wales Summit of 2014. Moreover, there is new research indicating that spending predicts defence outputs and disaggregating defence spending is likely to improve results. While equitable burden-sharing may be an unrealistic model for all NATO partners, this issue demonstrates the importance of developing key bilateral defence relationships on pressing funding concerns. France: An Emerging Leader In a conflict involving Russia, the world's second largest nuclear power, the worst-case scenario is the use of weapons of mass destruction. This is why mutual deterrence of all-out war remains a major objective. In this respect, two players who were previously middle-ranking powers are becoming increasingly significant: France and Canada. Since the departure of long-time German leader Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron has emerged as one of the more credible political bulwarks against Russian military victory. Although Macron has not always held an explicitly pro-Ukraine position and has repeatedly argued for a diplomatic solution with Russia, his stance has hardened in 2024, declaring in Prague in March 2024 that Europeans cannot be “cowards” when countering Moscow. This change in Macron’s posture is particularly significant as France continues to be a leading defence power in NATO and Europe due to its significant defence funding, cutting-edge military technology, and assertive political leadership. With one of the largest military budgets in Europe—projected to exceed €413 billion from 2024-2030—France is modernizing its capabilities, notably in cyber and nuclear technology, and increasing its operational readiness across Europe. Politically, President Macron has championed European "strategic autonomy," advocating for a stronger EU defence role to complement NATO and reduce dependence on the United States, positioning France at the center of defence policy in Europe. Faced with the continuing weakening the transatlantic link, France is being forced to take on additional continental leadership, both politically and defensively. Despite France traditionally urging caution on full support of NATO, France's 2017 strategic review nevertheless defined Europe's strategic autonomy as crucial of its defence policy and is increasingly urging a more aggressive European stance. Within the strategy, France is committed to strengthening European defence within the EU framework, and particularly stresses the need for a common strategic culture. Since 2017, France has implemented a number of policy measures to strengthen European defence, such as the European Response Initiative, which aims to foster a shared European strategic culture. Strategic autonomy has been an official objective of the Union since the Strategy and, as a result, the EU has equipped itself with a permanent European “defence package” under the European Defence Fund. This package comprises a number of initiatives designed to improve European military capabilities and effectiveness. It includes a coordinated annual defence review (CARD), which identifies capability shortfalls, permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and aims to progressively deepen defence cooperation between EU members and endowed the European Defence Fund (EDF) with eight billion euros between 2021 and 2027 to help member states develop defence equipment, research, and technologies. The EU states that the aim of this ambitious package is “to be in a position to act quickly and decisively when a crisis breaks out, with partners if possible and alone if necessary.” This desire for autonomy corresponds to the needs of the transatlantic security architecture, as “increasing European capabilities will also contribute to strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, a key element in European security.” Increased collaboration between the EU and NATO through a European pillar therefore appears to be a tangible possibility for strengthening and balancing the tensions inherent in current transatlantic defence. And although historically the development of European autonomy in security matters was not welcomed on the other side of the Atlantic, this trend changed when Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin declared in 2021 that the U.S. supported a joint EU defence plan that strengthened NATO. Of course, the project of European strategic autonomy must acknowledge political and military realities, and the construction of a European defence will not be achieved immediately. However, the ongoing establishment of European strategic autonomy, difficult as this goal may be, may be the only safety net Europeans have to maintain the transatlantic security architecture and deal with emerging threats. Indeed, the path to effective strategic autonomy involve further development of a European pillar within NATO to balance transatlantic relations and maintain a security equilibrium on the continent during the ongoing Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. Recent dialogue recognizing the need for better NATO/EU collaboration, instead of inter-organization competition, has also been growing in the field. Canada: An Unlikely Ally The second state of interest at this crucial time is Canada, whose role in the defence space is closely linked to that of France. In September 2024, France clarified its future intentions by signing the Canada-France Declaration on a Strengthened Partnership in Defence and Security. This agreement highlighted the value of select non-European partners in France’s broader defence realignment. Building on a history of cooperation shaped by two world wars, the partnership aims to develop a “more ambitious strategic partnership,” focusing on emerging threats such as cyberattacks and foreign digital interference, Indo-Pacific security, and support for Ukraine. President Macron’s visit to Ottawa in September 2024 further emphasized the deepening ties between the two nations, as discussions with Prime Minister Trudeau encompassed defence, support for Haiti, combating climate change, and addressing the rise of artificial intelligence. While Canada is not typically seen as a leading force in NATO, its partnership with France underscores the strategic potential of middle powers to fill key capability gaps and enhance NATO’s agility in addressing modern challenges. This collaboration gains importance against a backdrop of multilateral commitments, including the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein Group), the Tallinn Mechanism, and the 2024 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine by the G7. France and Canada’s shared history, language, and values further provide a solid foundation for coordinated operations that supplement NATO’s efforts, offering a more flexible, multilateral approach that complements U.S. leadership within the alliance. However, Canada’s defence capabilities face significant challenges that limit its ability to consistently project influence. Chronic underfunding and an overly complex procurement system have hindered the modernization of Canadian defence infrastructure. For example, the Canadian Department of Defence recently spent $34.8 million on new sleeping bags for a joint northern exercise in Alaska, which were later deemed unsuitable for typical Canadian winters. Such missteps underscore persistent vulnerabilities in Canada’s defence planning and resourcing, which can impede its contributions to allied operations. Despite these domestic hurdles, Canada remains a strategically valuable partner for France, offering unique advantages that bolster transatlantic security. Beyond NATO, their longstanding cooperation through trade, La Francophonie, and defence initiatives such as the Franco-Canadian Defence Cooperation Council and the Global Coalition to Defeat Da’esh reflects a reliable partnership with global reach. Canada’s aligned approaches with France in regions such as Haiti, Lebanon, the Indo-Pacific, and the Sahel demonstrate a shared commitment to stability in areas of vital transatlantic interest. Although Canada’s standing within NATO is not currently ascending, its steady commitment to shared values, political reliability, and focus on multilateralism make it a useful partner for addressing evolving geopolitical challenges. For France, Canada provides a dependable ally that complements its strategic priorities within NATO, particularly in regions where French influence is critical to maintaining stability. This partnership reinforces the transatlantic security architecture, offering a counterbalance to the fluctuating role of the United States and underscoring the value of non-European allies in an increasingly complex global landscape. Recommendations To safeguard the transatlantic link, policy should reflect the distinct capabilities that each ally brings to the table, recognizes the changing value of the United States to NATO, and considers the rapidly changing security environment. Based on a review of existing proposals from relevant stakeholders, we recommend the following: 1) Prioritize capabilities with a significant defence impact NATO should recognize defence investments by strategic value rather than traditional contributions alone. Emerging threats in cybersecurity, Arctic surveillance, and hybrid warfare necessitates strengthening the transatlantic partnership between France and Canada. Strengthening this alliance will increase accessibility of specialized technologies and regional expertise and ensure Member States are prioritized for high-impact, regional operations. Planning for joint Franco-Canadian initiatives in areas like cyber defence and Arctic readiness demonstrate the strategic value of such focused partnerships. To solidify this partnership, NATO could establish dedicated joint task forces or technology-sharing agreements that facilitate collaboration on specific high-impact projects, allowing for deeper integration of Canada and France’s defence capabilities in both regional and NATO-led operations. Additionally, expanding joint military exercises in Arctic and cybersecurity domains would strengthen operational readiness and interoperability, providing a proactive defence posture against adversarial advances. 2) Rebuilding NATO solidarity With the rise of radical groups and increased political polarization in both Europe and the United States, NATO’s cohesion is under threat, undermining the alliance’s ability to operate effectively as a unified front. the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance is under serious threat. For NATO to function optimally, it must rely on the political stability and democratic resilience of its member nations, which is critical for mutual trust and operational synergy within the transatlantic security architecture. To this end, France and Canada play pivotal roles in fostering solidarity within NATO by advocating for democratic values and supporting joint defence initiatives that emphasize equality among Member States. To restore confidence among allies and reduce reliance on any single member, NATO should prioritize initiatives that require active contributions from multiple countries to increase political buy-in and decrease capacity limits. This particularly applies to areas such as cyber defence, intelligence-sharing, and counter-radicalization programs. For example, a Canada-France-led coalition focused on strengthening cyber defence and counter-radicalization measures could serve as a model for equitable collaboration, drawing on France’s robust intelligence networks and Canada’s advanced cyber capabilities. This approach would reinforce a culture of shared responsibility within NATO, promoting a balanced alliance where each country’s contributions align with their strengths and capabilities. Ultimately supporting programs that foster joint responsibility, NATO can build a more resilient alliance, less vulnerable to shifting political climates in any one Member State, and position stronger regional contingents like France and Canada to maximize their existing expertise to lead in key areas. 3) Engaging under-utilized allies The United States's perceived lack of reliability as an ally has highlighted the risks of viewing NATO as a purely “transactional” alliance, a stance emphasized during the 2016-20220 Trump administration. Faced with issues as important as the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction, security alliances cannot depend on the outcome of a single country's elections, or on the political will of isolated players to engage in a decision-making process based on consensus. Therefore, for NATO to maintain its integrity, it must look beyond sole reliance on the United States, and instead actively integrate contributions from other allies. France, as a European defence leader, can play a critical role by engaging traditionally “underutilized” allies such as Spain, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and especially Canada, to establish new strategic points of contact in critical areas of presure. Moreover, Canada’s involvement offers a unique opportunity for France to foster collaboration in areas where both countries excel, such as Arctic sovereignty and cyber resilience. Canada’s recent doubling of its NATO contingent, the launch of the NATO Centre on Climate Change and Security in Montreal, and Canada’s commitment to NATO-led training on sovereign cyber effects underscore Canada’s strategic value as a steadfast and capable ally. Enhancing the French-Canada transatlantic partnership should also involve joint military exercises focused on Arctic readiness and expanded intelligence-sharing agreements to strengthen regional capabilities against the variables of cyber and environmental threats. In consideration of the 2024 election, the impacts of the forthcoming second Trump presidency are not yet fully understood, yet it is reasonable to assume it could amplify challenges within NATO, potentially leading to even greater reductions of the U.S.’s support or a renewed emphasis on financial burden-sharing that may strain transatlantic ties. Strengthening partnerships between France, Canada, and other allies now would help NATO hedge against future volatility in U.S. foreign policy, ensuring a robust and more autonomous transatlantic security architecture regardless of American political shifts. 4) The High Arctic battlefield The Arctic is widely regarded by experts as the “next perpetual flashpoint for great powers,” and the ongoing conflict with Russia only heightens its strategic importance. With NATO’s expansion northward, Europe and Canada can no longer afford to overlook Arctic sovereignty, especially as climate change reshapes traditional, ice-covered routes, making the region more accessible to potential adversaries. Russia’s increasing partnership with China adds to the urgency, altering the Arctic's power dynamics. Canada, a longstanding NATO leader in Arctic capabilities, offers France and other European partners a critical advantage in securing this region. Canada is among the few NATO members equipped with ice-breaking vessels—a capability even the United States lacks—enabling it to support year-round access and patrols in the North. Unlike the United States, Canada’s longstanding commitment to Arctic defence through NORAD has enabled it to develop resilient infrastructure and relationships with local communities, which are critical to deterring foreign influence. Canada’s ongoing re-tendering for submarines, following a survey of international suppliers, coupled with its experience and readiness for Arctic operations, provides a strategic edge that could be leveraged in collaboration with France. To strengthen Arctic defence, NATO should prioritize joint Franco-Canadian training exercises in Arctic warfare and invest in shared infrastructure projects. France and Canada could also collaborate on developing climate-resilient technologies and joint surveillance programs, ensuring a robust, NATO-aligned presence in the Arctic. Such initiatives would not only bolster transatlantic security but would reinforce NATO’s collective sovereignty in a rapidly changing and increasingly contested region. 5) Enhancing logistical interoperability As NATO prepares to address evolving threats across multiple regions, logistical interoperability—standardized procedures, shared infrastructure, and coordinated supply chains—has become a critical factor in maintaining operational readiness. Increasing logistical compatibility among NATO members would allow for quicker mobilization and reduce the logistical burden on frontline states, particularly in Eastern Europe, where rapid deployment is essential. Improving interoperability across the alliance could involve investments in shared transport hubs, streamlined supply networks, and unified digital infrastructure that allows NATO forces to operate seamlessly across borders. For example, creating a ‘NATO Logistics Command Center’ under the NATO Logistics Committee to specifically oversee shared transport resources, coordinate troop movements, and manage supply routes would significantly enhance response times during crises. While France and Canada bring substantial logistical expertise—France’s experience in European and African deployments, and Canada’s proficiency in Arctic supply lines—successfully addressing NATO’s logistical challenges requires active leadership and input from Eastern Flank members. These members, particularly those in the Baltic region and Poland, face the gravest logistical challenges due to their proximity to potential conflict zones and the complexities of infrastructure beyond Germany. Explicitly integrating their strategic perspectives and infrastructure realities into the proposed logistics center would ensure that operational plans are grounded in the most pressing regional needs. By jointly leading efforts to establish standardized protocols and multi-national logistical networks in collaboration with Eastern Flank allies, France and Canada could set a model of efficient, cooperative logistics that enhances NATO’s overall agility and readiness, particularly in its most vulnerable areas. Investing in logistical interoperability not only strengthens the transatlantic alliance by enabling faster, coordinated action but also reduces dependency on any single NATO member’s logistical infrastructure. A united logistics strategy would ensure that NATO’s ability to respond swiftly to threats in regions like the Arctic, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean remains robust, and reinforces a transatlantic security architecture that is prepared to meet the demands of modern warfare. 6) Building resilience against hybrid threats  Hybrid threats—including non-traditional tactics like cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion—are increasingly used by state and non-state actors to destabilize NATO member states from within. Enhancing resilience against these threats is essential for maintaining both national and collective security. NATO should prioritize developing a coordinated defence against hybrid warfare, equipping allies with the tools and resources needed to detect, mitigate, and respond to attacks on critical infrastructure, information networks, and public opinion. A Transatlantic Task Force on Hybrid Threat Resilience could lead NATO’s efforts in this area, drawing on Canada’s expertise in cyber defence and France’s leadership in counter-disinformation initiatives. The task force would focus on strengthening NATO’s hybrid threat detection capabilities and establishing rapid response protocols for both physical and digital incursions. To avoid duplication of efforts, the Task Force would work in close coordination with the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki, leveraging its existing research, frameworks, and expertise. By building on the Helsinki center’s work, the Task Force could serve as a bridge between NATO’s operational requirements and the strategic insights developed by the Centers of Excellence. For instance, the creation of a shared intelligence hub for hybrid threat data, accessible to all NATO members, would complement the Helsinki center’s focus on best practices by operationalizing those insights into pre-emptive action. This collaborative approach would ensure a unified strategic framework while maximizing the utility of existing NATO resources and avoiding redundancies. Additionally, conducting regular joint hybrid threat simulations involving NATO Member States would enable NATO forces to practice collaborative responses to cyber, information, and economic attacks. Such initiatives would not only deter adversaries by displaying NATO’s readiness but also ensure that member states are less susceptible to the internal destabilization that hybrid threats can provoke. By prioritizing resilience against these tactics, NATO can uphold a secure transatlantic alliance that is equipped to protect its member states from both traditional and unconventional challenges in today’s security landscape. Conclusion As the Russian-Ukrainian war continues to destabilize Europe, the transatlantic security architecture faces mounting pressure to adapt, prioritizing resilience and responsiveness to emerging threats. Addressing the advancing Russian threat is essential but doing so effectively will require NATO and the EU to think beyond traditional alliances and deepen partnerships that can offer lasting strategic value. The new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, inherits a challenging role, particularly in managing EU-NATO coordination to build a stronger, more unified European defence framework. Rutte’s leadership will be pivotal in guiding NATO’s evolution, and his success will depend heavily on leveraging the distinct strengths of key partnerships—especially those like the burgeoning 21st century strategic alliance between France and Canada. Indeed, the ongoing France-Canada partnership provides a model of collaboration for middle powers that combines regional expertise, technological capacity, and a commitment to transatlantic security goals. From Canada’s Arctic capabilities and cyber resilience to France’s military technology and leadership in European strategic autonomy, this partnership exemplifies the potential of middle powers to contribute substantial value to NATO, filling critical operational gaps that larger allies alone cannot address. By prioritizing high-impact capabilities, rebuilding alliance solidarity, engaging underutilized allies, and securing the High Arctic, France and Canada demonstrate how targeted collaborations can enhance NATO’s reach and responsiveness in the rapidly evolving security landscape that the transatlantic community faces. About the Authors Leah Schmidt is a PhD student at the University of Cambridge’s Department of Politics and International Studies, specializing in women, peace, and security research, posthumanist theory, and feminist security studies. She holds an MPhil in Gender Studies from Cambridge as the Canadian Chevening Scholar and Rotary Trust Global Grant Recipient, along with dual BA degrees in Women’s Studies (First Class Honours) and International Relations (Distinction) from the University of Calgary. Léa Pérémarty holds a master's degree in international law and politics from the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM), where she specialized in international security issues and the law of armed conflict. Her research focuses on the concept of lawfare and its application to the war in Ukraine. She also completed an internship at the Réseau d'Analyse Stratégique, contributing to research on contemporary defence and security issues. ## The Ukraine Wake-Up Call: Adapting Canada’s Defence Posture to Meet Strategic Objectives URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-ukraine-wake-up-call-adapting-canadas-defence-posture-to-meet-strategic-objectives/ Modified: 2025-05-20 Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Canada has provided incremental, yet relatively modest military assistance compared to its Western allies. This paper advances two key arguments. First, Canada’s limited contribution to the on-going conflict reflects a perception of an indirect threat posed by Russia to its national interests, with Ottawa framing the conflict primarily as a challenge to the international order rather than an immediate risk to national security. This contrasts sharply with the approach of Ukraine’s neighbouring states, which perceive the war as an existential threat necessitating substantial military engagement. Now over three years into the war, shifting strategic dynamics are reshaping the conflict’s trajectory. In Ukraine, public opinion increasingly favours negotiations to expedite its resolution, while Donald Trump’s election in the United States introduces uncertainties regarding the sustainability of Western military support and the postwar settlement. Our second argument posits that Canada has yet to anticipate the challenges posed by a potential transition to a negotiated peace, particularly the role NATO and its member states may be required to play in post-conflict stabilization. Canada’s ability to contribute to NATO and Ukraine in the postwar settlement is constrained by its current military capabilities. As such, Canada risks – once again – being surprised by the military requirements to safeguard European security against a resurgent Russia. Canada’s military assistance to Ukraine reflects indeed both a lack of political will and limited operational capacity. Despite strong rhetoric and bipartisan support, Canada ranks 21st out of 33 donor countries in military assistance to Ukraine relative to the size of its economy. Compared to its closest allies, Ottawa has allocated a significantly smaller share of its stockpiles to Ukraine. The 2024 Defence Policy Update—published more than two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion—further illustrates a lack of urgency. Nearly 90 percent of the newly announced funding is scheduled for disbursement between 2030 and 2044. In contrast to most NATO allies, Ottawa exhibits little urgency in positioning itself as a reliable and capable member of the Alliance in response to the current security challenges regarding security in Europe and the transatlantic area. Newly-elected Liberal leader Mark Carney vows to reach 2% of GDP by 2030, rather than 2027, as suggested by Chrystia Freeland and Bill Blair. *** To keep reading, head over to the CDA Institute's website. ## The Ukrainian Crisis: What Kind of Transatlantic Unity? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-ukrainian-crisis-what-kind-of-transatlantic-unity/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > While there is unity in the condemnation of Russian revisionism, differences are discernible among the allies due to domestic political... While Russia and the United States are in high tension over the imminence of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the prevention of Russian aggression rests on two pillars on which the West can weigh: diplomacy and deterrence. The West’s prospects in altering Russian calculations are contingent upon the overcoming of its divisions and speak in unison. The very high level of coordination among allies in their responses to Russia is evidence of this imperative. The watchword is clear: unity. Yet, while there is unity in the condemnation of Russian revisionism, differences are discernible among the allies due to domestic political considerations, as well as varying degrees of exposure to the Russian threat and the consequences of a robust response to Russian aggression. Indeed, despite strong solidarity, disparities remain on four critical issues: support for Ukraine’s membership in the Atlantic Alliance, material support for Ukraine, deployment of military contingents on NATO’s eastern front, and support for sanctions against Russia. These fault lines are likely to be further exposed in the event of significant concessions to Russia or robust retaliation for Russian aggression. Support for Ukraine’s Membership in NATO The transatlantic community has reiterated its full support for the protection of Ukraine's territorial integrity and for the open-door policy enshrined in Article 10 of the Alliance's founding document. The European Union rejects the idea of a new Yalta, pitting the blocs of influence against each other, and proposes instead a new Helsinki, guaranteeing sovereignty and inviolability of borders. Russia's demands for a buffer zone between itself and the Alliance and for Ukraine's neutrality were therefore deemed unacceptable by Washington, NATO and the EU. However, the promise of Ukraine's membership in NATO offered at the 2008 Bucharest Summit has left several Western states perplexed. Officially, Russia's demand that NATO's eastern enlargement be halted, in line with the Kremlin's red line, has been brushed aside by the Alliance's members. Nevertheless, in practice, there are contrasting diplomatic approaches to the issue. The strongest diplomatic support for Ukraine's membership in NATO comes from Poland and the Baltic states. The latter are ready to support an accelerated integration of Ukraine into the Alliance, which they see as an additional security guarantee against Russia. Romania also supports Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, as does Canada, which strongly supports Ukraine's candidacy. Washington is taking a more cautious approach. President Biden insists that Moscow will not be able to stifle Ukraine's desire to join the Alliance. However, Ukraine's membership is not a priority for his administration, which instead wants to focus its energy on the Indo-Pacific. In addition to not wanting to exacerbate Russian animosity, Washington believes that Ukraine is far from a NATO eligibility, especially with regards to corruption. Similarly, London supports, through a declaration of support, Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO. However, this support is conditional on the implementation of several political, economic and defence reforms. Ukraine’s accession to NATO is not on the agenda either for the Minister of Foreign Affairs José Manuel Albares, in line with the position of Spain, which had opposed NATO’s roadmap for quick membership to Ukraine in 2008. As for Italy, its economic interests and heavy dependence on Russian gas (46%) represent an important counterweight to Rome's active support for the Ukrainian candidacy. While Italy supports Ukraine's membership in the EU, it remains evasive when it comes to NATO. Both Paris and Berlin also opposed Ukraine's integration into NATO in 2008, and they are currently negotiating with Kiev and Moscow in the Normandy format, which tends to limit their diplomatic support for further discussion with Russia. President Macron openly questions whether the ambiguity surrounding Ukraine's possible membership “is not to our disadvantage.” Similarly, the German Foreign Minister considers Ukraine's entry into the Alliance as unrealistic, while the German Chancellor considers that the issue is not on the agenda. More forcefully, Hungary, through its Minister of Defence, has officially opposed Ukraine's membership in the Alliance. Despite the seriousness of the Ukrainian crisis, Viktor Orban seems to favour maintaining his relationship with Moscow. Hungary is not alone in its camp. Croatia is also opposed to Ukraine’s NATO membership. Ukraine seems to be considering some concessions to avoid war. This could include the possibility of giving up the application for NATO membership, which is enshrined in its constitution.  “Maybe the question of open doors is for us like a dream,” said the Ukrainian president. On this crucial issue in Moscow's eyes, a strong consensus among the allies remains on the principle of the open-door policy, but divisions persist over whether Kiev should join the Alliance in the short to medium term. Material Support to Ukraine A second aspect of Western support for Ukraine is material. Since the West fears war, strengthening Ukraine's military capabilities could dissuade Russia from taking action. However, here too are differences over the nature and extent of the support offered. The United States, Ukraine's largest donor, is providing significant support to Kiev, despite its refusal, for the time being, to deploy offensive ground-based missile delivery systems on Ukrainian territory. Two American shipments of 80 tons and 200 pounds of lethal weaponry have been delivered. This assistance is part of a broader U.S. strategy to strengthen Ukraine's defence capabilities to mitigate the Russian military advantage. The U.S. approved the transfer of $650 million in weapons to Ukraine, the highest amount in a single year since international assistance began in 2014. With U.S. support, the Baltic states have accelerated the flow of U.S.-made weapons to Ukraine. Lithuania and Latvia are offering Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, while Estonia will provide Javelin anti-tank missile systems. The Czech Republic will provide Ukraine with dozens of artillery shells and related equipment worth $1.7 million. Warsaw, which directly fears for its security with troop movements on the Belarusian border, also made the decision to provide defensive ammunition as well as anti-aircraft missiles and light mortars. Denmark has also announced $25 million in aid to help modernize the Ukrainian armed forces. The United Kingdom has pledged to provide light weapons and anti-tank defence systems. According to London, these short-range weapons will increase the Ukrainian army's capacity for self-defence in the event of an invasion. Anti-ship weaponry should also be sent to Ukraine to help the country confront Russia in the Black Sea and Azov. Finally, special forces are training the Ukrainian armed forces, particularly in the use of equipment. France considers that direct support and greater investment would diminish its chances of playing a central role in de-escalating the conflict. However, arms contracts for the delivery of 20 patrol boats to Ukraine will be honored by the French company Ocea. Romania has not mentioned sending arms to Ukraine, but an agreement to boost military-technical cooperation with Kiev was recently signed. The same is true for Ankara. However, the Turkish government's proposal to become a mediator in the conflict is undermined by the sale of drones, which greatly increases Ukraine's military capabilities. Bayraktar drones are one of the most sophisticated weapons of the Ukrainian forces. Other countries are content with non-lethal military support. Germany, for example, has offered 5,000 helmets for Ukrainian soldiers, judging that arms deliveries would not contribute to defusing the crisis. With this in mind, Berlin went so far as to block the shipment of German-made weapons from Estonia. Similarly, Canada initially limited its support to non-lethal military equipment such as body armour. After much consideration, it committed to providing $7.8 million worth of small weapons as well. Ottawa also agreed to deploy dozens of additional troops to increase the training of the Ukrainian military. The Canadian troops, who were to remain in western Ukraine, where the “risks are lowest,” were withdrawn, however, along with American and British troops, in anticipation of an imminent attack by Russia. The allies thus differ on the nature and extent of their support for Ukraine. Maximalists have offered lethal military equipment, while the more cautious have provided non-lethal support, and many others have not taken position on the transfer of weapons. Military Deployments In response to the deteriorating European security environment, some Alliance members are moving to increase their military presence in countries bordering Ukraine. While the United States has ruled out an increased military deployment to Ukraine in the event of a Russian invasion, it has instead decided to deploy about 3,000 troops to Poland and Romania. These troops are in addition to the 8,500 U.S. military personnel on stand-by. Similarly, the United Kingdom has announced the deployment of a 350-strong contingent to Poland, in addition to the 100 troops already there, while the HMS Prince of Wales, leading a maritime rapid response detachment, is still on alert. Denmark has also deployed a frigate to the Baltic Sea and four fighter aircraft to Lithuania. The Netherlands will send two F-35 fighter jets to Bulgaria as part of NATO's air policing missions in the Black Sea region. The French Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, was in Bucharest to recall the possibility of a deployment of several hundred French soldiers to reinforce NATO's deterrent posture in Romania, while proposing the French candidacy to be the executive state of this force to be deployed. Germany, which had initially refused to send troops to Eastern Europe, eventually decided to provide a contingent of 350 troops to reinforce the 500 already there in Lithuania, in addition to the sale of Howitzer artillery systems. Despite a political struggle over the state’s role in NATO's capability building, the Spanish government chose to send six Eurofighter aircrafts and a frigate with 220 troops to the Black Sea and Bulgaria to support NATO's deterrence effort. Canada, which commands one of NATO's four multinational battle groups aimed at reassuring allies and deterring Russia, continues to ponder increasing its military presence in Latvia. Similarly, Italy has not contributed to NATO's military build-up on its eastern flank, but has gone even further, saying Europe lacks the military capability to deter Russia. Both countries could therefore be called upon to contribute further to the Alliance's capabilities in Eastern Europe. While NATO is increasing its troops on its eastern flank, this is contested within some of the countries involved. Hungary opposes the deployment of NATO troops on its territory. According to its defence minister, Hungary does “not agree with the Cold War rhetoric that is being used, the threats and the show of force,” and does “not require the deployment of additional NATO forces” on its soil. Bulgaria and Slovakia are more equivocal. The Bulgarian defence minister was rebuffed by his prime minister after declaring his opposition to the redeployment of NATO troops to Bulgaria. Slovakia's foreign minister, for his part, thinks it unlikely that parliament would support the deployment of a 1,000-strong NATO contingent on its territory. These misgivings undermine the consensus within NATO on the possibility of "positioning additional battle groups in the southeast of Alliance territory.” Sanctions Against Russia Virtually all Western countries are promising tough sanctions against Russia if it invades Ukraine. However, while the U.S. and the U.K. can impose sanctions against Russia unilaterally, the 27 EU member states must agree on common sanctions. The divergent interests of member states could complicate the development of a common sanction regime. Neither the EU, the U.K. nor the U.S. has unveiled a sanctions regime to date, despite Ukraine's request for one. The U.S. Senate is considering a set of sanctions that vary in intensity and could theoretically target the assets of individuals close to the Kremlin, exports of certain technologies to Russia, Russian financial institutions, the Russian extractive sector, external financing of Russian debt, the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline or the banning of Russia from the SWIFT banking system. While Germany opposed the latter option, Berlin has nevertheless moved on NS2 without being clear on the subject. The German Foreign Minister said that Germany was prepared to suffer serious economic costs if Russia were to attack Ukraine. Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that Germany would remain "absolutely united" with its partners to take appropriate sanctions, without naming NS2. The U.S. President has openly stated that the pipeline would never be opened in the event of a Russian invasion. In addition to the German ambiguity, the French government stated that "sanctions are not the alpha and omega of the response" and “must not lead to aftershocks that would have a boomerang cost for us.” A sanctions regime that is intended to be effective will necessarily be economically painful for the old continent and potentially destabilizing for the global economy because of the size of the Russian economy. Austria opposes the inclusion of NS2 in the EU's sanctions regime against Moscow in retaliation for an invasion of Ukraine. Hungary has also stated that further sanctions on Russia would fail and that Russian security demands are reasonable. In addition, there have been recent discussions between President Putin and Italian businessmen, despite a request by the Italian Prime Minister and parliamentarians to cancel the meeting. This reflects the difficulty that economic interests represent for the implementation of a tough sanction regime. We should also expect a Russian retaliation in case of heavy sanctions, probably in a hybrid way: instrumentalization of migrants, cyber-attacks, blackmail with gas, etc. Therefore, despite promises of severe and coordinated sanctions in the event of Russian aggression, the costs to Europe's economy or energy stability (40% of its gas imports come from Russia) are likely to complicate the establishment of a common sanction regime. Several allies, including Germany, “need constant coaxing.” Moreover, the required threshold of Russian aggression that could lead to the adoption of the “mother of all sanctions” remains to be defined. While a full-scale invasion of Ukraine would undoubtedly federate a strong Western response, what about a hybrid attack? Would it be enough to impose drastic sanctions? Moreover, robust measures that could hurt Russian authorities, such as preventing the acquisition of property in the West and banning Russian funding of Western political parties, are not being considered. Conclusion The Atlantic Alliance and the European Union are united in the face of possible Russian aggression. However, a fault line divides allies based on domestic politics and whether they fear the use of Russian force or sanctions against Russia. The first camp includes Poland, the Baltic States and, to a lesser extent, the United States and the United Kingdom, which favour maximalist policies: they support Ukraine's membership in the Alliance, provide lethal weapons to Ukraine, favour increased military deployments, and support the imposition of severe sanctions in the event of a Russian invasion. A second camp brings together ambivalent allies who combine maximalist positions on some issues and more timid ones on others. France proposes a significant military deployment in Romania but remains hesitant on other issues. Canada strongly supports Ukraine's membership in NATO but is reluctant to make a significant military contribution. Germany remains cautious on all issues, although it seems increasingly willing to abandon NS2 in the event of a Russian invasion. A third group of allies comprise the troublemakers. While Italy is wavering on all issues, it is Hungary that is taking the most critical stance. It opposes Ukraine's membership in NATO and sanctions against Russia and does not offer any military support to Ukraine. Worse, it intends to increase its cooperation with Russia. Nonetheless, the minority of allies who remain skeptical about the desirability of a firm response to Russia may be under strong pressure to join the majority. This is particularly true of NATO's troop build-up on its eastern flank, where a Russian invasion of Ukraine would amplify Euro-Atlantic solidarity. Greater divergence is likely to occur on economic and financial sanctions, due to differential cost exposure, and on military support for Ukraine, which unlike other areas, is not subject to transatlantic coordination. At the moment, the most divisive issue remains to be Ukraine's (theoretical) membership in NATO. Seen by some as the keystone of a peaceful way out of the crisis, the offer of a neutral status for Ukraine is seen by others as a call for further Russian aggression. The strong reactions to the "Finlandization" of Ukraine show the sensitivity of the subject in the Euro-Atlantic community. However, a Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine would render this issue obsolete. It would signal that only NATO membership is a guarantee of security. In other words, Russia can hope to extract more from the West by maintaining its threat to invade without acting on it. Once the war begins, the allies will see that deterrence has failed and will coalesce on a punitive posture, centred on sanctions and a stronger military presence on Russia's borders. Despite their varying intensity, these retaliatory measures will be accompanied by an outpouring of solidarity like that which followed the annexation of Crimea in 2014.   ## The Vance Allegations : Next Steps for Culture Change in the Canadian Armed Forces URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-vance-allegations-next-steps-for-culture-change-in-the-canadian-armed-forces/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Can a large organization like the Canadian Armed Forces transform its culture in five years, guided by an external review, and driven by an order to eradicate sexual misconduct within the ranks? This text was originally a statement to the Standing Committee on National Defence on February 26 2021, in the context of the allegations of sexual misconduct against former Chief of Defence Staff Jonathan Vance. Can a large organization like the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) transform its culture in five years, guided by an external review, and driven by an order to eradicate sexual misconduct within the ranks? It might seem impossible, but in many ways, the military, as a total organization, might be better suited than most when it comes to adapting quickly in the face of adversity. CAF personnel are trained to make and carry out decisions in complex environments, so why is this reputation for operational excellence not carrying over organizationally? That’s because military culture can have unintended consequences, it can also be gamed by predators and it can be idealized and made to look untouchable by routines, traditions and rigidly hierarchical command structures. At this time, military leaders need to re-engage with the External Review Authority (ERA) report, also known as the Deschamps report, and think more boldly about implementing its recommendations fully. Five years might not be enough time to implement deep transformative cultural change, but it is certainly long enough to uncover the failings of the current approach. Here are four specific issues that require our attention: There should be a greater focus on abuses of power. What I am referring to here is a social dynamic that is interlinked with sexual misconduct in highly asymmetric professional relationships. This kind of implicit or explicit pressure is far more endemic and engrained in the culture than is currently acknowledged. While the Survey on Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces has provided useful data, more is needed to examine how sexual misconduct interacts with consent in asymmetric professional relationships. A woman, or any harassed person, not speaking out against behaviour that is inappropriate does not mean that behaviour is welcome or that she is providing consent. There are many legitimate reasons for going along with these unwelcome interactions and staying silent, many of these reasons are outlined in the Deschamps report. People who are more junior or in more precarious employment conditions fear for their job, they might fear other types of consequences at work, like not being believed by their peers or being socially ostracized for speaking out. Another reason for not coming forward is not trusting the reporting process or not believing that you’ll secure a fair outcome. The next step is to have this more nuanced talk about consent and about consent when power dynamics are at play. Some of those power dynamics are inherent to military culture and some of those dynamics are about rank and translate into abuses of power. Both types of power dynamics disproportionally impact women. Training. Op HONOUR training should be improved to pull data from the Stats Can surveys to tailor the content to those receiving the training. The information in the training should be personalized, by making clear that sexual misconduct affects friends and colleagues in the armed forces. Service members should engage and practice difficult scenarios, so they know when to intervene and how. The resentment of (mostly) male service members, who feel they are unfairly targeted by Op Honour, is common and unfortunate. At the same time, the training is too focused on the perpetrator, while it could engage with military culture, militarized masculinity, the under-representation of women, consent, the needs of victims/survivors, empowering bystanders in small, interactive sessions led by someone who can speak in an authentic way about the content. External experts can help in this regard, if only to provide a peer-review function for the training materials. The SMRC: One of the most talked about ERA recommendations was that a reporting line outside of the Chain of Command was needed, which prompted the creation of the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre (SMRC) as an independent body. There is an inherent tension in the SMRC’s work because of the nature of its mandate: on the one hand, the SMRC needs to hold the CAF accountable, but it also needs a good working relationship with the CAF, including with the chain of command, which might undermine perceptions of the SMRC’s independence. Constant review and oversight of the SMRC, both through internal self-assessments and external audits, might be needed as the protection of the SMRC’s independence in the face of its growing mandate is paramount. The Path to Dignity and Respect. The Path is a promising approach because it puts culture and climate front and centre (thereby making cultural change everyone’s business). But while it makes sense for this document to define culture and climate, along with a series of indicators, it should dedicate more attention to describing the problem at hand: sexual misconduct and how it ties to culture and climate. Basically, the scope of the problem needs to be crystal clear before jumping into the solutions. A journey of culture change needs to convey shared responsibility for sexual misconduct. The percentage of CAF members who have witnessed sexual misconduct is pretty astounding, but how many people intervene, speak up, report? If one does not engage in sexual misconduct, it does not mean you perform your duty with honour. The standard of performance is much higher than that if you want to get to Zero Tolerance. It is the notion of collective responsibility that should be stressed more forcefully throughout the document because EVERYONE can do better on this front. This is not about the duty to report, it is a standard of daily conduct. The challenge moving forward is not simply about how to eradicate sexual misconduct within the military, but entails identifying positive steps to create a culture of equality for women in the CAF and a culture centered around respect for all. ## The West’s Afghan Refugee Failure: A Symptom of Risk-Transfer War URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/the-wests-afghan-refugee-failure-a-symptom-of-risk-transfer-war/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > When the Biden Administration announced its unilateral withdrawal, it plainly had no plan in place for the logistics of evacuating its own... With Kabul fallen, Canada, the United States and their allies are now attempting to salvage what dignity they can from an utter debacle. Above all, there is the need to save Afghan refugees. And there will be many. The Taliban are making reassuring noises, and analysts will debate about just how much they have changed, but the risk of reprisals and repression is plainly great enough to warrant immediate, large-scale effort. Canada certainly put such an effort off for long enough. So did its allies. When the Biden Administration announced its unilateral withdrawal, it plainly had no plan in place for the logistics of evacuating its own allies, let alone refugees more generally – and Canada was even slower. Now the Americans control Hamid Karzai International Airport alone, the Taliban are not making access easy. This is not for lack of warning. The idea has been around for years. Canada created a special program for Afghan interpreters in 2009, however inadequate it was. While the Taliban’s victory blindsided many in the West, it was clear that the insurgents were on the rise: this was the case well before the Biden Administration confirmed American withdrawal. This inaction is not an accident; it is symptomatic of the Western approach to the conflict. The transfer of risk away from the West is a systematic element of contemporary war. This is an essential concept for understanding policy towards Afghan refugees. Essentially, the Trump and Biden Administrations put risk transfer front and center. The priority for the Biden Administration was to get its people out, with “its people” defined in such a way as to include U.S. military personnel and American civilians (and, indeed, dogs), but to relegate its local allies and Afghan civilians to an afterthought. Canada left seven years ago, and then largely ignored the legacy of risk its mission had created in Afghanistan itself. Risk-transfer war comes with distancing and depersonalization, to keep one’s own soldiers as far out of harm’s way as possible while still making war. Drones are one manifestation. The shift to capacity-building missions is another. In a different way, so is the hiring of contractors: the distance comes, here, from the arm’s-length relationship. A government owes its uniformed soldiers a pension and benefits (such as they are), but deems itself exempt from such obligations to contractors. Often, Canada and the United States don’t seem to know who worked for their war efforts. It is up to the contractor to prove it, through lonely appeals to their companies’ HR departments. Depersonalization, though, could only go so far, as Kristian Kristensen argues in the Danish case. It is no accident that across the West, the issue of Afghan refugees begins with interpreters. During active combat, they forged deep ties with Canadian, American and other NATO soldiers, who depended on them to stay alive and do their missions. It is with great pain that NATO soldiers contemplate the fate of their comrades. These battlefield bonds gave interpreters a resonant moral claim and energetic and influential allies in the West, and even that wasn’t enough for timely action. But NATO countries hold much broader ethical obligations, including to thousands of Afghans who were never part of a band of comrades with Western troops but who worked for and with external forces and are coming under threat because of it. The Taliban has attacked contractors who built roads for external forces, and local government officials who supported the American and NATO missions but were never formal employees. Though any former employee is eligible for the Canadian and American visa program, the impetus to resettle interpreters is strongest, and the American program explicitly puts them at the top of the list (see p. 5 here). Whether that will carry on in Kabul’s chaos remains to be seen. More broadly, we have an obligation, as we always do, to assist any refugee in need of aid, whether they worked for us or not. Efforts to clamp down on Afghan migration (such as those of French President Emmanuel Macron) are beneath contempt. They are, again, a transfer of risk: the political risks to Western politicians translate into physical risks to Afghans. Macron’s statement was flagrant, but the same logic applies to the lower-profile bureaucratic efforts to limit visa programs that Canada, the United States and others have applied to Afghanistan (excluding those who worked fewer than twelve months for a mission, requiring applicants to be in Afghanistan, including minor children but not adult children of contractors, or—even now—requiring passports). More generally it applies to the chronically cumbersome refugee-claims process. In short, the evacuation efforts are critical if we are to recognize where the risk of our wars lies and to reduce those risks to vulnerable individuals as much as possible. The risks that came from associating with Canada deserved our government’s efforts years ago. It now deserves Ottawa’s full attention. It is well indeed that Canada will accept 20,000 refugees from Afghanistan and will go beyond those who worked for this country. Canadians can help in resettlement. But it is hard to ignore the inattention and delay. Many will now perish who cannot make it to the airport, and even that option may not long remain open. The Government of Canada—Department of National Defence, Global Affairs Canada, and Immigration & Citizenship above all—have to act well beyond Afghanistan as well: our military operations abroad rely on locals. But while the overall focus on capacity-building rather than on combat makes it easier to ignore the risks, those risks do not disappear. It does not stretch credulity to imagine Islamic State, separatists in Ukraine, or al-Qaeda targeting those who worked with and for external forces like Canada’s. We must not transfer those risks away as we please. We must rapidly assess the risks for our other operations in progress and recently concluded. We must keep far better track of who works for us. We must plan for what they may suffer, and what they will need from us, in virtue of having worked for this country’s missions. Further, as a country that never conducts military missions in conflict zones on its own, the protection of local allies and the terms of withdrawal must be major part of how Canada negotiates the terms of its participation with its allies and coalition partners. These kinds of practical measures, meant to lessen the risk of military interventions in conflict zones to local allies, are necessary because of Canada’s ongoing operations. But it would compound the disgrace if the legacy of Afghanistan was simply to find better ways to avoid embarrassment at the end of wars that we should never have fought in the first place. The broader lesson must be to approach the use of force with the wariness it deserves—not just because of the risks to us, but because of the risk to everyone concerned. It must be to finally stop treating lives in conflict-affected places as though they were cheaper than ours. ## The Women, Peace and Security Agenda at NATO in Light of the War in Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/women-peace-security-agenda-nato/ Modified: 2023-10-10 > For the first time in its history, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is mentioned in NATO’s Strategic Concept. As discussed... The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finally updated its Strategic Concept in 2022, a few months after Russia invaded Ukraine. Although this document reaffirms the importance of collective defence and deterrence, it also identifies a range of other security challenges while describing the principles and values that shape the discussions at NATO and in the capitals of its member states. For the first time in its history, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is mentioned in NATO’s Strategic Concept. As discussed in my book Deploying Feminism: The Role of Gender in NATO Military Operations, the significance of diversity lies at the heart of NATO’s public diplomacy efforts. However, can these emerging norms have a tangible impact on the practices of an organization that remains predominantly male and militarized? The standards derived from the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda are promoted by several international organizations (United Nations, European Union, African Union, etc.), including NATO, which develop initiatives aimed at increasing women’s participation – including in military operations – and conducting conflict analyses that are sensitive to gender issues. While feminist activism on the sidelines of world conferences on women has contributed to the emergence of these norms regarding the gendered dimension of conflict, it is through the Women, Peace and Security agenda that they have been institutionalized, an agenda that was initially adopted at the UN in 2000 with Security Council Resolution 1325. Beyond the diplomatic efforts that have endorsed these norms, the armed forces are often at the forefront of these changes in conflict zones, integrating gender considerations into the planning and execution of missions and training activities within the framework of peace operations. For troops deployed as part of NATO missions, this often means actively seeking women as interlocutors in their area of operation to enhance intelligence-gathering activities. Within NATO, the achievements of the Women, Peace and Security agenda have been solidified through the creation of new positions and several policies, both on the civilian and military side. However, little attention has been paid to the relevance of these ideas for collective defence. This issue can be better understood by clarifying the context in which the Women, Peace, and Security agenda has been implemented within NATO and in the context of its operations. NATO’s Women, Peace and Security Agenda The Strategic Concept, a cornerstone document that identifies the Alliance’s threats and objectives,  discusses “integrating […] the Women, Peace and Security agenda across all our core tasks”. This theme is also highlighted in the framework of cooperation between the European Union and NATO and in humanitarian challenges related to NATO’s activities. In another paragraph concerning resilience, the WPS agenda is also mentioned, along with the more specific objective of “advance gender equality as a reflection of our values.” While the immediate connection to resilience may not be clear, it is nevertheless fundamental. As the Alliance recognizes in the Strategic Concept that national and collective defence depends on the resilience of the entire society, women must necessarily contribute to defining security issues and participate in their resolution. As we have seen with the pandemic, resilience matters cannot exclude 50% of the population from the processes of developing equitable and sustainable solutions. Returning to the Strategic Concept, the final highlighted WPS goal is conflict-related sexual violence. Ultimately, this document fairly accurately reflects the commitments of NATO members in various policies concerning diversity, integrating a gender perspective into military operations, and preventing sexual violence. That being said, how do NATO’s civilian and military actors implement these policies? In Deploying Feminism, I trace NATO’s journey from its first WPS policy in 2007 to the daily work of gender advisors supporting NATO’s military commands at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. On the civilian side, NATO has established the position of Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security in its International Staff since 2012. The Office of the Special Representative remains underfunded. Still, it leads several initiatives within NATO, such as updating WPS policies and action plans, developing tools for civilian and military personnel like NATO’s Gender-Inclusive Language Manual, and a range of public diplomacy activities and consultations with civil society (specialized workshops, press conferences, annual meetings with civil society representatives, etc.). Although, as noted in the Strategic Concept, NATO asserts that the Women, Peace and Security agenda must be an integral part of its three core tasks (deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security), it must be acknowledged that the implementation of the WPS agenda has primarily been associated with crisis management and cooperative security tasks. Conversely, the implications of the gender dimension for collective defence and deterrence have not been as well articulated. Yet, NATO’s experience (and that of many other international actors) in Afghanistan highlighted the importance of understanding the operational environment through a gender lens, as a lack of engagement with Afghan women had biased previous assessments. These initial deployments of gender advisors and all-female or mixed units have provided a better understanding of the differentiated impacts of conflict on the population and contributed to the refinement of NATO’s approach to gender issues in operational contexts. These examples have been echoed in high-level speeches and military training documents. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg even co-authored an op-ed with Angelina Jolie titled “Why Women Must Defend Women’s Rights,” in which they argue that “stronger awareness of the role that gender plays in conflict improves military operational effectiveness and leads to improved security.” However, gender issues often remain confined to such examples as Afghanistan or Iraq. When addressing a threat like Russia, there are very few details in the document – published in 2018 – NATO/EAPC Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan to shed light on the matter. There are three main points under the banner of collective defence, as quoted below: “Nations have the primary responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the UNSCRs on Women, Peace and Security and gender equality. The provision of trained troops and experts on gender issues, as well as a better gender balance in NATO-led forces depend entirely on national decisions.” “Nations are, however, encouraged to make WPS an integral part of their defence and security policies and activities.” “National initiatives, including through the development and implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs) and other strategic national initiatives, are essential for making progress in this regard.” It is clear that this excerpt from NATO’s Women, Peace, and Security policy does not provide any clear directive on how to make the agenda relevant to the logic of collective defence and deterrence. Nevertheless, these issues have become much more apparent with the Russian invasion in 2022. A Gendered Analysis of the Russian Invasion NATO was established in 1949 as a military alliance to ensure collective defence and deterrence against the Soviet Union. Even in the post-Cold War era, as countries on the Eastern flank were concerned about Russia’s resurgence, it was within the context of increased great power competition, which could threaten their territorial integrity over time. This competition, however, was governed, if not constrained, by several confidence-building and security measures, bilateral and multilateral treaties, and common diplomatic engagement platforms like the NATO-Russia Council. Russia was seen both as a partner and a potential adversary but distant from other threats that proliferated in the 1990s and 2000s related to intra-state conflicts, terrorism, and rogue states. Now, given Russian President Putin’s attempts to redraw international borders through force, his frequent use of poison against political opponents, and his policy normalizing rape and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence, it is time to recognize that the post-Cold War principles that underpinned diplomatic dialogue between Russia, the United States and NATO are outdated. A gender-based analysis is necessary to understand better the dynamics of the ongoing war, a necessity acknowledged by the Ukrainian armed forces, which are also deploying gender advisors. First, let’s acknowledge that the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led to a massive mobilization of Ukrainian men to fight on the front lines. Still, it also resulted in a dramatic increase in the participation of women in the armed forces, including 5,000 in combat roles. Due to this existential threat, the door to military service suddenly swung open for women. Even in 2016, when they were on the contact line in Donbas, women took up arms without any official recognition of the risks they were undertaking. By 2022, the proportion of women in the Ukrainian armed forces had risen to 22%, while the average within NATO countries is only 12%. However, women also make up 90% of those who have left the country, as men are required to stay in Ukraine due to the martial law imposed following the Russian invasion. The military and humanitarian assistance offered by NATO countries must consider these socio-demographic realities to be effective. On the Russian side, the gendered implications of the war are also evident and significant for the training activities that NATO countries undertake with Ukraine. Not only is Putin attempting to redraw international borders through force, but he also employs rape and other forms of conflict-related sexual violence as tools of war, with long-term repercussions for civilian and military populations in Ukraine. On the national level, feminist and LGBTQ groups advocate against the war in Ukraine and find themselves even more vulnerable than before, targeted by a violent repression orchestrated by Vladimir Putin. The Putin regime, which has decriminalized domestic violence, presents itself as a defender of traditional and patriarchal values, going so far as using this stance as a casus belli in  Ukraine and a mantra in its propaganda efforts that are also targeting NATO. NATO’s WPS Policy: An Essential Tool It is essential to uphold the norms that underpin the Women, Peace and Security agenda, not only because Russia threatens them but also due to the undeniable link between gender equality and peace. As stated in NATO’s Official Policy, there is “a strong correlation between gender equality and a country’s stability.” This empirical analysis is demonstrated, notably, in the work of Valerie M. Hudson. Just as Russia’s male-dominated and patriarchal model causes insecurity within and beyond its borders, it also causes disorder on a global scale. This model is profoundly ineffective across the board. In fact, as discussed in the latest book by Hudson, Bowen and Nielson: “The general subjugation of women also means men have to live in societies that, generally speaking, are violent, dysfunctional, insecure, unstable, and poor.” Gender equality is the cornerstone of lasting security, necessary for achieving greater stability on regional and international scales. While far from perfect, NATO’s Women, Peace and Security Policy represents an indispensable reference tool for addressing the increasing threats outlined in the new Strategic Concept. ## Thinking About the Modernization of NORAD URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/thinking-the-modernization-of-norad/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The modernization of NORAD is no longer up for debate. What are the modernization processes that are underway and what should Canada's priorities be? As the world shifts from unipolarity to great power competition, the new technological and military capabilities of China and Russia are real threats to the security of North America. The modernization of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is therefore no longer up for debate. It is necessary, especially as the lifespan of many of its facilities, including the North Warning System (NWS), is coming to an end. What are the modernization processes that are underway and what should Canada's priorities be? Three observations emerge. First, there is a consensus on several NORAD modernization processes within the Canadian military apparatus, Canadian industry and the Canadian scientific community. Second, the United States appears to be stressing the need for NORAD to have offensive capabilities in the future, but Canada historically has supported NORAD only for its defensive capabilities. Finally, obstacles to the modernization of NORAD are to be expected in Canada, even though Canadian public opinion currently seems to be receptive to greater investment in defence. The Multiple Avenues of Modernization The modernization of NORAD has been an issue that has preoccupied Canadian experts for several years, and many options are being studied. The context of new Chinese and Russian capabilities, however, puts Canada and the United States in a race against time to modernize North American defence facilities. First, there is a consensus among Canadian experts on the modernization of the NWS in the Arctic. Designed at the end of the Cold War to detect low-flying planes and missiles, the NWS is no longer able to detect the new generation of Russian and Chinese missiles. US General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, former commander of NORAD, has been warning for several years that new nuclear-armed cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles go undetected by the NWS. Several experts are of the opinion that the new system, in order to be effective, should be based on a combination of radars combining air, space and even submarine and marine capabilities (in a 360-degree approach). Since the NWS's detection capabilities are already inadequate, but time and money are scarce to replace it, its modernization could involve an upgrade to new capabilities and a more integrated system. There is also a consensus among the military hierarchy, industry and the academic community on the need to implement detection capabilities that cover all domains. Indeed, the new Chinese and Russian weapons exploit the lack of interaction (the “seams”) between the various detection networks of NORAD, namely the NWS, the anti-ballistic missile defense system (BMD) of US Northern Command, and the maritime detection network. To overcome these threats, Brigadier General Peter Fesler suggests that the new system will have to combine infrared radars with radio frequencies and acoustics. An important capability of a modernized NWS will be to detect the threat at its source and be able to track it afterwards. The majority of the technologies that will make it possible to develop these all-domain detection capabilities are under development and Canadian industry can easily participate in the development of these technologies, in particular through its expertise in artificial intelligence and machine learning. Canadian defence experts believe that offensive capabilities are needed to modernize NORAD and respond to new threats. NORAD could thus be modernized by adding capabilities to destroy the platforms of its adversaries even before the launch of missiles. The current context of the return of competition between great powers is, moreover, reminiscent of the beginning of the Cold War. Since its inception in 1958, NORAD must continually adapt to an ever-changing geostrategic and technological context. Whether developing a first-strike capability, or a conventional or nuclear response capability, NORAD's role has always evolved to meet new threats. The present situation therefore updates the debate on NORAD's offensive capabilities. In particular, Canadian industry sees opportunities to develop non-kinetic defence mechanisms, but some experts are skeptical of Canada's ability to do so. An Offensive NORAD? In their September 2020 report, US General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy and US Brigadier General Peter M. Fesler suggest that a new approach to defence is needed to deal with threats to North American territory. Faced with China's capabilities, ranging from cyberattacks to hypersonic glide vehicles, and Russia's conventional long-range precision strike capabilities, the purely offensive US strategy of projecting power outside US territory is no longer sufficient to deal with extant threats. The United States itself has signaled, in numerous recent documents, that it feels more vulnerable. NORAD therefore takes on particular importance in developing a new North American approach. The siloed operation of the current approach is a significant weakness already exploited by China and Russia, which have designed strike forces capable of acting simultaneously. NORAD and Northern Command have therefore developed the SHIELD strategy (Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defense), an ecosystem that provides a multi-layered threat detection capability. Protection in all areas and data analysis are at the heart of this new system, which is already starting to be tested with the "Pathfinder" initiative. The O'Shaughnessy and Fesler report therefore suggests a more offensive, and no longer exclusively defensive, NORAD command, as evidenced by their use of the terms “engage the archer instead of the arrow”, that is to say, “target launch vehicles rather than missiles”. However, Canada supports participation in a purely defensive NORAD, which contributes to warning, and has refused in the past to participate in the anti-ballistic missile defense program (BMD), the only significant effort to modernize North American defence over the past two decades. As mentioned, a number of experts are calling for NORAD to develop deterrent capabilities to deal with new Chinese and Russian weapons. Canada, however, has never encouraged this type of positioning and it is likely that a disagreement will arise between the two countries. Experts note, however, that Canada would have every interest in joining the BMD programme. In the same vein, the Joint All Domain Awareness Command and Control (JADC2) is an initiative of the US Department of Defense to connect all the sensors of all its military domains – Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy, Space Force – in order to quickly detect threats and alert decision makers. As Lee Obst argues, Canada has technical capabilities (such as artificial intelligence) that it could use for the development of this system. However, Canadian political will, as well as its procurement practices, prevent Canadian industry from participating in JADC2. JADC2 could be an advantage for NORAD and continental defence, but also an infrastructure project that would promote connectivity to the remotest corners of the North. The new 2019 Arctic strategy of the US Department of Defense therefore emphasizes the importance of deterrence, but also the competition between great powers in the Arctic, especially in relation to new Russian capabilities. It recognizes the importance of modernizing NORAD capability in all areas, but also of cooperating with Canada to ensure the defence of the continent. Despite this, the strategy emphasizes the need to build an Arctic deterrent independent of its allies, again signaling the US offensive will in the defence of the Arctic. Several American initiatives are therefore underway to modernize continental defence and NORAD, demonstrating a more offensive turn, which hardly represents the Canadian strategic position. Considerations for Canada Several obstacles will have to be overcome in order to modernize NORAD, the most notable being the high financial costs and the lack of time. Likewise, the Arctic also poses constraints, whether in order to respect the wishes of the Indigenous peoples who inhabit it, its hostile environment, or the melting ice and permafrost. The need to replace radars and to act in all domains poses the challenge of a series of different platforms to be managed (one can assume at the maritime, air, land, space and cyber levels) in addition to an extraordinary effort to upgrade radars in an almost non-existent timeframe. Canada does not have the budget right now to do this. Canadian political will and domestic concerns could also be a barrier to modernizing NORAD, especially if it turns out to be more offensive than defensive. According to a survey conducted last August by Nanos Research and a group at the University of Calgary, Canadians recognize China as the main threat to Canada's security. Additionally, 41% believe Canada should increase spending on national defence and 39% believe the budget should stay the same. This poll shows a shift in Canadian public opinion, which seems more inclined than before to see their government investing in defence. The Canadian government could thus test the waters with its constituents in order to establish an adequate budget for the modernization of NORAD. Recommendations for Canada In light of these findings, Canada must invest in NORAD's defensive capabilities. The lack of budget allocated to its modernization, despite the allusion of this need repeatedly in Canada's defence policy of 2017, Strong, Secure, Engaged, will have to be revised, because, in light of the Chinese and Russian threats, Canada can no longer escape this modernization. The result of the US elections of November 2020 certainly has an impact on the way forward for this modernization. Indeed, Canada opted for a more low-key approach during President Trump’s tenure, especially as Canada only contributes 40% of NORAD spending. Following the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States, Canada may opt for a more open strategy. Even before the new president takes office in January, Canada should take a stand and commit to its electorate to invest heavily in NORAD's defensive capabilities. Biden is known for his respect for democracy and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Canada, by engaging with its constituents, will be held to this promise and the United States will be under pressure to keep it. However, the costs of maintaining the current defence policy are too demanding for a middle power like Canada. The limited capacities of the Canadian defence budget, linked to a difficult economic context caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, will force Canada to review its priorities. In this sense, and taking into consideration the obsolescence of Canadian defence arsenals and the Chinese and Russian threats, Canada should prioritize its own protection for the years to come. Although Canada projects that its total defence spending, as a percentage of GDP, will increase to 1.48% by 2024-2025, these targets do not yet take into account future spending on NORAD modernization. Thus, in order to truly implement this modernization, Canada will need to consider cutting other portions of its defence budget. ## Thinking Diversity of All Kinds in Strategic Affairs URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/penser-la-diversite-en-tous-genres-dans-les-affaires-strategiques/ Modified: 2020-08-17 > Hosted by Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, this first capsule of the Strategic Analysis Network presents the Gender-based Analysis Plus tool, its advantages and its limitations. Hosted by Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, this first capsule of the Strategic Analysis Network presents the Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+) tool, its advantages and its limitations, with scholars Isabelle Caron and Gaëlle Rivard-Piché. ## Towards a Canadian Strategy in the Indo-Pacific: What to Learn From the American and European Examples? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/towards-a-canadian-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific-what-to-learn-from-the-american-and-european-examples/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > The authors explore what the United States and some European allies have developed as a strategy in order to provide guidance on... All indicates that the Trudeau government will soon publish its strategy for the Indo-Pacific. Very little has been leaked from the document that Global Affairs Canada has been working on for the past few years, other than a desire to ensure a naval presence in the region, a yet-to-be-defined role in cybersecurity, and the diversification of investment and trade in Asia. As Sino-American rivalry increasingly exacerbates and militarizes tensions in the Indo-Pacific, to the point where some envision an armed conflict within six years, it is imperative for Canada to develop its own strategy for the region. In the meantime, looking at what the United States and some of its European allies – the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the European Union (EU) – have themselves developed as a strategy provides valuable insight into what Canada should focus on. In light of the various approaches taken with regards to the Indo-Pacific, it is clear that Ottawa will need to clearly define how it intends to mobilize the concept, both in geographic and sectoral terms. It is also important to articulate an inclusive and multidimensional strategy that builds on existing regional initiatives and brings together its various partners. Above all, Canada must make efforts to avoid an escalation of tensions between the United States and China, while taking into consideration that the Indo-Pacific region is one, but not the first, region to be prioritized. The United States and the Containment of China The Biden administration's approach to China and the Indo-Pacific region is largely consistent with the previous administration's approach. However, while Trump's priority was economic competition, Biden's emphasis seems to be on regional security and more broadly on individual rights, without neglecting the economic and commercial sphere. The new U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy emphasizes "integrated deterrence," i.e., relying on a multitude of domains (technology, economy, space, cyberspace, etc.) that the United States must master. By early 2021, the Department of Defense already considered China its primary challenge, against which it wants to develop the appropriate concepts, capabilities, and operational plans to strengthen deterrence and maintain the U.S. competitive advantage. U.S. intelligence mentioned, in its 2021 threat assessment, that China poses a significant threat, emphasizing its global ambitions. Indeed, U.S. intelligence has begun a shift toward China, with the formation of a China mission office within the CIA. However, in the last few months, the United States has begun to define the contours of its strategy for the Indo-Pacific. While the new U.S.-U.K.-Australian partnership, AUKUS, showcased the U.S. willingness to invest militarily in the region, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken’s tour of Asian countries and his meetings with Japan and South Korea have anchored the desire to contain China and preserve the status quo in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States, thus, defends a "free and open" Indo-Pacific region, with freedom of navigation on the one hand, but also freedom from coercive policies of China. “Our objective is not to change but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.” The action plan for this new strategy is based on a dozen key objectives. Deploying new resources to the region is the first objective and will be achieved through greater security assistance to enhance allies' maritime capabilities and domain awareness. Second, the United States plans to launch a new partnership in early 2022 that will aim to, among other things, promote and facilitate high-level trade, regulate the digital economy, strengthen supply chain resiliency and security, focus investment in transparent and high-level infrastructure, and enhance digital connectivity. Enhanced deterrence, the third objective, is intended to deter military aggression against the United States and its allies and partners, including in the Taiwan Strait. Next, the United States wants to expand cooperation with Japan and South Korea beyond security to include infrastructure development, the strengthening of critical supply chains, and trilateral coordination of regional strategies. The last objectives of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy action plan target investments, both economic and political, in enhancing selected regional institutions, including ASEAN and the Quad, supporting India's rise, building resilience in the Pacific Islands, promoting good governance, and strengthening and promoting open, secure, resilient, and trustworthy technologies. Finally, the United States wants to rely on the broadest and most effective coalition possible in order to “to tackle any challenge, to seize any opportunity, to work toward any goal.” At the military level, in December 2021, the United States and Japan carried out two major joint exercises, which enhanced the coordination and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese ground forces. In January 2022, the United States also conducted a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea, aimed in part at deterring aggressive Chinese assertions near Taiwan or Vietnam. Finally, in early 2022, at the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, the two countries reiterated the importance of deterring, as well as responding to, any destabilization of the region by China. While the primary U.S. objective in the area is the prevention of conflict, this does not mean that the United States “will not be prepared for conflict,” as stated by Brigadier General Ellison, commander of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The issue of Taiwan's status crystallizes, in many ways, the competition between the United States and China regarding security, ideology and technology. Tensions surrounding Taiwan were already heightened during Trump's presidency, when he exchanged  a phone call with the island's president, which went against the protocol followed by the United States since 1979. He also granted record arms sales to Taiwan while increasing both the number of transits through the Taiwan Strait and of military exercises conducted in the South China Sea. These measures have all continued under Biden. It was also reported that U.S. soldiers were on the island as part of a training program and that the United States was helping Taiwan, along with other Western states, to develop its new submarines. Biden also invited Taiwan to the Democracies Summit last December. For months now, China has signaled its displeasure with the rapprochement between Washington and Taipei by intruding into the air defense identification zone. The issue has sparked a debate about the risks of China taking action against Taiwan in order to "reunify" the island, which it considers to be an integral part of its territory. Questions are being raised about the nature of a potential attack and which solution the United States should use to protect the island. Since 1979, the U.S. has maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan, which means that it has been vague about how exactly it would respond to an attack on the island, all the while promising China that it would not support a Taiwanese declaration of independence. Biden's 2021 remarks on live television seemed to make it clear that the United States would defend Taiwan, provoking China's ire. Although a statement was issued to correct the White House's position, many wonder whether the strategic ambiguity has been unofficially abandoned. The merits of such a change are still strongly contested. After one year in the White House, it should be noted that Joe Biden has not deviated much from his predecessor's policy regarding the Indo-Pacific region. On the relationship with China and the Taiwan question, the administration is being pressed by a Congress where these issues are perhaps the last to achieve consensus in an America that is more polarized than ever. In terms of strategy, the United States is seeking to put forward an integrated deterrent against China. However, the question remains as to whether the United States has the capacity to focus on the Indo-Pacific, in a context where there is much at stake in Europe. The British Pivot The return of the United Kingdom to the "East of Suez" has been taking shape since the publication of the Integrated Re view in March 2021. London's objective is to become "the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence” in the Indo-Pacific. This project has been cherished for some time by Boris Johnson, who declared in 2016 that the British policy of disengagement from the region in the 1960s and 70s had been a mistake. The British strategy is expressed in several strands: diplomatic, economic and security. As a whole, it is part of the concept of Global Britain, whose ambition is to allow the United Kingdom to maintain its influence and continue to play a leading role in international affairs. On the diplomatic front, the U.K. signalled the beginning of its pivot to the Indo-Pacific by gaining dialogue partner status with ASEAN. The country also took advantage of its presidency of the G7 to invite Australia, India, and South Korea to participate in the summit last June, a sign that London wishes to strengthen its ties with the states of the region. The diplomatic shift is reflected on the ground, with an increase in the number of military attachés and diplomats posted in the region. On the economic front, London's activism is explained by its need to counterbalance the effects of Brexit. Indeed, the United Kingdom opt-out of 40 trade agreements covering 70 states when it left the EU. Since then, treaties have been re-signed with 63 of them, including Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam. In addition, new agreements have been concluded with Australia and New Zealand. Negotiations are also underway with India and members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership to join. In addition to signing defence agreements with India and Japan - the relationship between London and Tokyo is even described as a "quasi-alliance," - Britain has reinvest to expand its network of military bases throughout the region. It will also increase its cooperation with the members of Five Power Defence Arrangements. The deployment of the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth and its carrier battle group, accompanied by U.S. and Dutch vessels, is an important signal of Britain's ability to project power in the region. Beyond this one-time deployment, offshore patrol ships will be permanently stationed in the region for five years. Beginning in 2023, there are plans to add two Littoral Response Groups, including a frigate, an amphibious assault ship and a support ship. Another important element is the signing of a new trilateral defence partnership between the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom (AUKUS). At first glance, this partnership seems to fulfill the ambitions behind the Global Britain concept and confirms that this strategy will have an even more important maritime dimension than expected. Described by Prime Minister Johnson as "vital for defending interests around the world," AUKUS is seen by China as "seriously undermin regional peace and stability." While it aims to counterbalance China, its primary objective is to provide Australia with a fleet of nuclear submarines. London is likely to provide the nuclear technology, and future vessels could be based on the Royal Navy's Astute design. AUKUS is thus one out of several initiatives aimed at positioning the United Kingdom as a major player in the Indo-Pacific. The exclusion of Taiwan from Britain's latest strategy paper was noted by many observers who were surprised that Britain was silent on the region's most salient security issue. London maintains informal ties with Taipei, with several visits by British ministers in recent years. Most recently, the Minister for International Trade visited to advance work on a trade agreement with the island. The economy appears to be a promising area for cooperation, as both countries are potential members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and could work together. Furthermore, the British foreign secretary promised to support Lithuania in its trade dispute with China over the Baltic state's growing relationship with Taiwan. When asked in parliament about the implications of the AUKUS pact for London's response to a possible invasion of Taiwan, Boris Johnson mentioned that AUKUS was not envisioned in that sense. The Prime Minister went on to say that in the case of China-Taiwan tensions, “backing the U.S. is the only way forward.” Nevertheless, Washington is becoming increasingly clear about its intention to defend the island in the event of a Chinese attack, and everything suggests that Australia has decided to do the same. The question arises, then: What would London do if its two closest allies asked it to join them? If the Global Britain concept and AUKUS are indeed about maintaining an "open" and "free" Indo-Pacific region, it is not incongruous to think that this includes the security of Taiwan. Thus, the new British strategy for the Indo-Pacific comes with numerous commitments. Although Johnson wants to establish the Royal Navy as Europe's premier navy and to revive its ability to project power globally, the feasibility of this pivot to the Indo-Pacific is questionable. Indeed, it will be difficult for London to play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions at the same time. France's Indo-Pacific Power    “France is a nation of the Indo-Pacific,” asserts the French Ministry of the Armed Forces. During a speech in Sydney in 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron said that France was now fully engaged in the Indo-Pacific region. About 1.6 million French people live in the region, and 7,000 French soldiers are constantly present there. Macron's starting point is that China is now a global player that wants to redefine its strategic environment. According to him, France does not wish to oppose China, but rather to work with its partners to define the rules of the game in the region and position itself as a stabilizing force. China, conducting a power policy in Asia, and especially in the South China Sea, increases tensions and weakens regional balances. In the 2019-2025 military programming law, France argues that new forms of conflicts and operating modes, based on ambiguous intentions and the combination of military and non-military means of action, promote high risks of escalation by contributing to maintaining a state of endemic tension that affects relations between the powers. Its in this context that France published its 2019 Indo-Pacific defense strategy. As mentionned, France's main security and defense objectives in the region are to ensure the protection of French territories, which represents more than two-thirds of its exclusive economic zone, to contribute to the regional security, particularly through defense cooperation (ASEAN, Australia, Japan, India, United States), to preserve access to common spaces in a context of strategic competition between the United States and China, and above all, to ensure the maintenance of strategic stability and military balance. It is with these objectives in mind that France is pursuing the deepening of interoperability with the armed forces of its main partners, the United States, Australia, Japan and India, strengthening its presence in ASEAN security forums and regularly participating in military exercises with the Quad countries, the United States and Japan. France's defence posture in the Indo-Pacific is supported by five higher commands covering the entire zone: The command of the South Indian Ocean Armed Forces (FAZSOI) enables the projection of French military forces in a region where allies and partners have little capacity for action; the command of armed forces in New Caledonia (FANC) and the command of armed forces in French Polynesia (FAPF) enable France to secure its territories and exclusive economic zone, in addition to extending its arrangements for carrying out regional missions beyond sovereign zones in cooperation with Australia, the United States and New Zealand. These three sovereignty commands are reinforced by two presence commands: The command of French forces in the United Arab Emirates (FFEAU) and the command of French forces in Djibouti (FFDj). In total, France has 12 bases with naval units, 12 transport and surveillance aircraft, 17 helicopters and 10 combat aircraft to cover the entire Indo-Pacific area. Nonetheless, France lacks a permanent presence in the North Pacific Ocean. While France does not further specify its intentions for deploying its forces in the region, other than its willingness to transit the South China Sea twice a year since 2014, it has been conducting numerous military exercises with partners in the region for the past few years, as well as occasionally deploying additional assets from the mainland. In particular, the country dispatched fighter and refuelling aircrafts with transit stops to Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore and India in 2018. Subsequently, in 2019, it deployed its Clémenceau aircraft carrier to the Indian Ocean, and in 2021, it stationed a nuclear attack submarine and a support ship to the South China Sea, as well as fighter jets and bombers to the Indian Ocean for a simulation of ground strikes. In October 2021, France unveiled a military ship specializing in signals intelligence in the Taiwan Strait. These ad hoc deployments are part of France's strategy to reinforce its presence in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition to this, there have been multinational exercises, such as Pitch Black in 2018 with Australia, or ARC21 in 2021 with the United States, Japan and Australia. These exercises, according to the French military staff, help strengthen the capabilities of allied countries to work together for a free and open Indo-Pacific. Like its British ally, the Taiwan issue is absent from French strategy. The issue of Taiwan is raised only once, in connection with university cooperation, and is therefore absent from discussions on security. It is mainly through France's actions that its position on this issue emerges. Apart from occasional deployments to ensure, according to the Minister for the Armed Forces, the defence of freedom of navigation and respect for international law in the region; it is rather the parliamentarians who express, perhaps silently, their positions on the issue. For instance, French parliamentarians, including a former Minister of Defense, visited Taiwan in October 2021, and the vice-president of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Armed Forces, who favored the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, stated that Taiwanese parliamentarians wanted official French support for the island's security. Thus, if Taiwan is absent from French strategic documents on the Indo-Pacific, it is highly likely that France will not remain neutral in the face of a potential military conflict between Taiwan and China, although the degree of France's commitment to the island's protection has yet to be determined. Finally, France's primary objective in the Indo-Pacific region is to support the emergence of a regional maritime security architecture by focusing on bilateral and multilateral cooperation and the development of regional knowledge and information sharing capabilities. It is in this context that France is now a member of the South Pacific Defense Ministers' Meeting and has applied for observer status in the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus working groups. German Ambivalence In 2020, Germany published its “guidelines for the Indo-Pacific.” The use of the term "guideline" in lieu of "strategy" can be understood as a choice meant to pander to Beijing. The use of the Indo-Pacific concept had itself been at the center of a debate within the German government, which was reluctant to use it because it was considered too hostile towards China. While the document ultimately weighs the pros and cons of China’s rise, the publication of this document nevertheless signals a change in Germany's approach to the Indo-Pacific region. Motivated by important developments in the region like the rapidly changing distribution of power and growing disputes that threaten stability, Germany wants to work to protect the rules-based international order through multilateralism. The source of this destabilization is, among others, China "that, to some extent, calls the rules of the international order into question." The German position, however, focuses on the diversification of partners and the inclusiveness of initiatives. Berlin rejects the use of containment and economic decoupling strategies. The German guidelines cover many areas, with a notable emphasis on trade and economy. As one of the world's leading exporters, Germany understands that its future prosperity is closely linked to the stability and development of the Indo-Pacific region. The objective of strengthening and diversifying economic partnerships is a response to this need and will ultimately lead to less dependence on China. The fight against climate change is also an important part of the German policy. For Germany, diversification, both political and economic, means strengthening its relationship with ASEAN, which is mentioned 66 times in the document. Notwithstanding Berlin's sincerity, the strategy is a shrewd one, for ASEAN has always seen itself as the central forum for the region while firmly rejecting undue interference by the great powers. By moving closer to it, Germany can hope to influence the future of the region. The relationship with China and security issues are still the main subjects of the guidelines. Regarding the former, it is worth noting the evolution of German discourse. Up until now, Germany's China policy has been almost exclusively economic. Indeed, the country was the main actor to push for the EU-China investment agreement, signed in December 2020, which was poorly received by Washington. On security, while it does not blame Beijing for the tensions in the China Sea, the German initiative has articulated a clear imperative to invest in the maintenance of freedom of navigation and cooperation with like-minded democracies and partners on security issues. Among other things, it emphasizes the role that NATO and the EU must play in this regard. Most tellingly, the document never mentions Taiwan, even though the United States places it at the heart of its regional agenda. Moreover, there is no reflection on previous shortcomings in the Sino-German relationship, at a time when former Chancellor Merkel admitted that the country had been "naive" about China. Germany's recent actions in the region nevertheless indicate that the country is ready to take concrete action. The signing of a collaborative intelligence partnership with Japan represents the first example of their willingness to do so. In addition, Germany has deployed the frigate Bayern during 2021, the first time in 20 years that a German ship has done so. By calling on several states and participating in missions and exercises in the region, this deployment signals to Germany's partners, especially the United States, that it is serious about engaging in the region. The choice to deploy the ship alone, and thus not to include it in a multinational group alongside France or Great Britain, for instance, indicates that Berlin wished to minimize the coercive signal it sent to China. The latter nevertheless refused the German vessel entry to the port of Shanghai to protest against its passage through the South China Sea. While in Japan with the frigate, the head of the German navy announced that the country planned to have a permanent presence in the region, with aircraft deployed next year and a fleet in the next two years. Nevertheless, reading the document makes us question Berlin's willingness to really change the basis of its relationship with Beijing, even if its recent deployment plans may indicate otherwise. What kind of signals does this send to the two great powers? The outcome is ambivalent, to say the least. One thing is certain: It will be difficult for the country to reconcile its intention to reassure Washington of its support without antagonizing Beijing. Liberal Internationalism in the Netherlands Defined, like its German neighbor, as "guidelines" rather than a "strategy," the document articulates an ideal of inclusiveness while clearly putting forward the values by which the country intends to act and cooperate in the Indo-Pacific region. More specifically, the promotion and defence of democracy and human rights, as well as the liberal international order, lie at the forefront of their agenda. The Netherlands recognizes the pressure these values face from authoritarian states. The country says it wants to cooperate more with like-minded states in the region in this regard. This group includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, India and ASEAN. While the importance of strengthening bilateral ties is mentioned, it is repeatedly stated that the multilateral framework will be favored by the Netherlands. The publication of the Dutch guidelines should be understood as Amsterdam's willingness to contribute to the development of an official EU strategy. The Netherlands clearly sees its actions in the region under the umbrella of an overarching European strategy. The latter is intended to be a separate vision from that of the United States. Still, the document elaborates on the ways in which the country will attempt to act on its own. The sectors where its actions will be focused include maritime security and connectivity. This last one will be implemented by cooperating in the development of digital technologies with its regional partners. Overall, the aim is to better integrate the Dutch economy with those of the region and to address cyber security threats. With respect to maritime security, the militarization of the South China Sea figures prominently in the guidelines, as does the importance of enforcing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The firmness with which the Dutch directive speaks of China's role in rising regional tensions stands in contrast to the more conciliatory German document. Yet, this does not imply unwavering alignment with the United States. In this sense, the Netherlands seeks to "prevent the Indo-Pacific region from becoming a pawn of one of the great powers or spoils in the conflict between them." The participation of a Dutch frigate in the battle group of the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, deployed this year to the Indo-Pacific, demonstrates that the Dutch position goes beyond mere rhetoric on the subject of maritime security. Taiwan does not appear in the Dutch directive either. Nevertheless, the two countries maintain informal relations. The name change of the Dutch Office in Taipei, described by the official representative as meaning "a lot more," was strongly criticized by Beijing. In addition, the Dutch parliament recently declared its support for Taiwan and Lithuania in their dispute with China. The question remains, however, as to how The Hague would react to Chinese action against Taiwan. A 2021 report outlines the problem the Netherlands faces: Rejecting a U.S. call to support its defense of Taiwan could lead to a challenge to NATO's Article 5, whereas accepting a U.S. request could be seen by Beijing as a declaration of war. Caught in a dilemma, it is difficult to predict what the Netherlands will do. European Union: Could a Third Way be Possible? Given the national diversities and national interests within the European Union, developing a comprehensive European strategy for the Indo-Pacific is no small task. The recent EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific reflects this difficulty in getting 27 countries to adopt a common understanding of the challenges in this region. The strategy encompasses a wide range of areas of interest, such as sustainable and inclusive prosperity, a green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, defense and human security. The publication of this document signals the EU's recognition of the importance of the Indo-Pacific region and its desire to participate in the shift already underway by several of its members and allies. However, the EU's security and defence strategy remains vague. While it insists on preserving the strategic status quo in the region, i.e. maintaining the freedom of navigation and respect for international law provided by the U.S. Navy, it remains elusive on how to achieve its objectives. Thus, the EU seeks to increase its naval presence in the region, notably by participating in joint exercises with regional partners on counter-piracy and the protection of freedom of navigation and by developing its "naval diplomacy." Additionally, the EU wants to strengthen its relations with regional partners through the ASEAN security architecture, or through its enhanced security cooperation in Asia, particularly to cover the areas of counter-terrorism, cyber security, crisis management, maritime security, and information handling and foreign interference. While the security of the Taiwan Strait has a direct impact on the security and prosperity of the EU, according to the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy, Taiwan is primarily considered as an economic partner. The EU also has a very cautious view of China, reflecting the diversity of interests among member countries. 41% of member countries support the inclusion of China in any regional free trade economic arrangement or global agreement, compared to 48% who are skeptical of a free trade agreement with China and support the expansion of economic ties beyond China. In addition, it should be remembered that 18 EU countries are members of China's New Silk Road Initiative (Belt and Road Initiative) and that in 2016, Greece, Hungary and Croatia opposed an EU statement strongly condemning China's maritime claims. In the European strategy, China is seen both as an indispensable partner with whom to cooperate on issues of common interest by encouraging it to play a peaceful role in the region's development, while at the same time affirming disagreements with it, particularly on the issue of human rights. This is a posture described as "multifaceted engagement." Yet, the EU's strategy for the Indo-Pacific is not guaranteed to hold in the long term, especially in terms of security and defense. This is primarily because this European strategy is largely based on France, Germany and the Netherlands. While all three countries want to strengthen security in the region, this is not a position shared by most EU countries. Indeed, of all the EU countries, only 12 are in favour of contributing to operations ensuring freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. In short, if the EU expresses the ambition to offer a third way between Beijing and Washington, its difficulty to speak and act as one poses the real risk that it will become strategically irrelevant. This does not mean, however, that European unity must come at the cost of emptying its Indo-Pacific strategy of all substance. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada The strategies outlined by the Europeans and Americans can serve as a reference for the development of a Canadian strategy. Given the importance of the region to its key allies, it seems inconceivable that Canada would not make a minimal contribution to regional security efforts. First, Canada's action in the Indo-Pacific region must focus on the objective outlined by the Netherlands, namely to prevent a much-feared conflict between Washington and Beijing, the possibility of which should not be underestimated. As a middle power, Canada benefits greatly from global stability and respect for international law. However, the main driver of this conflict is Xi Jinping's diplomacy intended to assert dominance over Taiwan, the South China Sea and other disputed areas, including the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Accordingly, Taiwan represents the most contentious issue between the two superpowers. Beijing has been conducting grey zone attacks against Taiwan, including the deployment of a record number of military aircraft over the island, and China has expressed its readiness to invade Taiwan by force on several occasions. Moreover, China is challenging U.S. domination of strategic sea lanes in the region, putting it in direct competition with Washington. Given this situation, Canada has a vested interest in ensuring that these tensions do not erupt into armed conflict, which would destabilize the entire international system. More importantly, unlike its European allies, Canada does not have the same room for manoeuvre to distance itself from its southern neighbor in the event of armed conflict with China. As such, two concrete actions should be considered. Namely, working with Taipei and regional allies to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, including the Pratas Islands, and adopting an inclusive and multidimensional strategy for the region to preserve a rules-based order. One of the obstacles Canada faces in defining a strategy is that its key allies are divided in their approach. Both established organizations, such as NATO and the EU, and new partnerships, such as QUAD and AUKUS, have their own objectives. The creation of the latter illustrates the divide between Canada's closest allies, the U.S., the UK and France. In this regard, Canada must avoid the temptation to choose sides, since both deterrence and strategic dialogue require speaking with one voice. Thus, Canada must favour an inclusive strategy that brings together its traditional allies and regional partners. This is how Canada has historically played a constructive role on the international stage: by working with like-minded countries to solve problems through multilateralism. But times have changed. To do so today, Canada will have to prove that it can walk the talk. Only when it has regained its credibility on the world stage will it be able to influence them. To do so, Canada must invest in certain critical areas. To respond effectively to China's rise, it must recognize that military means are not a panacea. It is essential to decouple strategic sectors of the economy from China's (rare earths, high technology, etc.) and redirect supply chains to safer countries such as Vietnam, new trading partners such as Taiwan, but also the United States, so as to overcome their protectionist backlash. This also means investments in cybersecurity and artificial intelligence, areas where Canada already has significant potential. Obviously, Canada cannot counter China's grey zone activities alone. That is why it is also crucial to increase intelligence sharing and capacity building with like-minded countries.  For example, proposing an expanded QUAD that would include France and Canada would strengthen allied deterrence against China and help mitigate disagreements among its allies. At the same time, Canada will need to clearly define what constitutes the "Indo-Pacific." While the concept is now a frame of reference for many of Canada's partners, each differs in terms of the geographic boundaries they assign to it, the emphasis they place on various sectors of intervention and multilateral approaches, and especially the place of China within it. For many states, the Indo-Pacific concept is indeed about managing China's rise, but for Canada it cannot be only about that. In order to develop a relevant strategy and to intervene constructively, Canada would need to clearly delineate, in geographic and sectoral terms, what it means by the Indo-Pacific and what it intent to do there. It could go even further and compartmentalize the Indo-Pacific space into geographic sub-areas, for which Canada would develop distinct interests and objectives. This would add substance and credibility to Canada's strategy, as well as help guide its actions in this immense region. Canada will also need to be clear about the areas in which it wishes to intervene. The country already has expertise in a range of sectors (fisheries management, infrastructure building, institutional development and resilience, capacity building, cybersecurity) that would be welcomed by states in the region. To remain effective, the Canadian strategy should target areas where Canada can add value to its allies, notably through existing regional partnerships, or seek to add to them when they align with its interests. The Japan, Australia and India Production Chain Resilience Initiative and the Blue Dot Network for infrastructure development are interesting avenues in this regard. Finally, Canada must remember that strategy is the process of linking means to ends. In this sense, it must be careful not to overestimate its means. Clearly, there will be choices to be made. Canada must put its commitments in the Indo-Pacific region into perspective with its limited resources and the two regions that remain priorities: North America, which includes the Arctic, and the Euro-Atlantic region. A division of responsibilities should therefore be developed with our allies to optimize burden sharing and clarify expectations for allies' commitments outside their primary regions of interest. The development of the European Union's Strategic Compass and NATO's new Strategic Concept represent opportunities for Canada in this respect. Any resources invested in the Indo-Pacific must be spent only if the needs to protect Canada's national interests in the Arctic and Europe have been met. The stakes for Canada could not be higher, and time is running out. Indeed, the country is facing increasing costs by sailing blindly. If it can adapt to the new strategic environment and meet the challenges it faces, Canada can protect its national interests and carry its share of the burden to preserve peace and the liberal international order. Otherwise, it will prove to be a source of vulnerability on one of the most critical issues of our time. ## Towards A European Rapid Reaction Force: Another Paper Tiger? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/towards-a-european-rapid-reaction-force-another-paper-tiger/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Given the current state of affairs of the pre-constituted multinational European forces, it is to be feared that the 5,000-strong rapid... In its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, contrary to the Biden administration’s initial messages that claimed to make the Trump era an incident of history, Washington has done little to distinguish itself by its regular exchanges with its allies and even less by the coordination of its actions with them. The defeat of the West in Afghanistan calls into question NATO’s involvement in “out-of-area” interventions and American reliability for a number of Washington's partners. It is therefore hardly surprising that during the meeting of European defence ministers at the beginning of September, the idea of a European army reappeared. Of course, the term European army was not directly mentioned, as the discussion was about the creation of a European rapid reaction force of the size of a brigade (5,000 men). Yet this is what it is all about, whether it is called “European army,” “European rapid reaction force,” “European Union battle groups” or, if we go back to the 1990s, “European corps.” However, this new proposal for a European rapid reaction force does not date from this meeting. It actually dates back to May 2021, during a previous meeting of European defence ministers, and was discussed on the basis of an informal diplomatic note suggesting the idea, signed by fourteen member states, including France and Germany. Although Paris is presented as one of the initiators and supporters, it is not known at this time whether the idea initially came from its services, possibly in connection with the upcoming French presidency of the European Union (EU) scheduled for the first half of 2022. Little publicized over the summer, this idea has naturally gained renewed publicity in the wake of what is perceived in Europe as the fiasco – or even defeat – in Afghanistan. Configured to resemble a brigade and potentially including air and maritime components, this force could be deployed anywhere, but a priori only outside the European Union and NATO. Among the cases of use mentioned, there would be, as an example, a scenario of a call for help from a government in case of a threat to its stability and security. While the countries that signed the diplomatic note, the EEAS (European External Action Service) and the head of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell, seem to be more or less in favour of the idea, this is less the case for the member states of Eastern and Northern Europe. In addition, some member states fear that this new unit will lead to the end of the European Union's battlegroups, troops that some states have attached themselves to over the years. For the time being, it is not yet certain that the proposal to create a rapid reaction force is a real project in itself. Indeed, it is not impossible that the idea will be put forward first and foremost in order to promote a dynamic within the framework of current projects aimed at strengthening the European Union's defence capabilities. In view of the previous European multinational forces that have been set up (Franco-German brigade, European Union battlegroups, European corps, etc.) as well as the characteristics and functions of this potential military unit, if the idea were to evolve into a concrete project, it is likely that it would be subject to the same failures as its predecessors. Without going into the full history of the various projects, declarations and units formed by the member states of the European Union, the latest example of the European Union Battlegroups (EUBG) demonstrates quite clearly the weaknesses and shortcomings of this type of proposal and military troops. The battalion sized EUBGs, with a strength of 1,500 troops, were created by decisions taken in 2004. Intended to be “credible and coherent, rapidly deployable, and capable of conducting autonomous operations or the initial phase of larger operations,” they are on call for six months and are composed of several countries. Two EUBGs are supposed to be on standby every six months, and this mechanism is considered operational and has been in place since 2007. As a result, the proposed 5,000-strong rapid reaction force can legitimately be considered a more robust version of the EUBGs. However, in the nearly fifteen years of their existence, they have never been used, despite the opportunities that have arisen (DRC in 2006, Chad in 2008, Mali in 2013, Central African Republic in 2014, etc.). The purpose here is not to enumerate or analyze these failures, but rather to highlight the paradox of thinking that what has not worked for nearly 15 years with only battalion-sized units should succeed with the equivalent of a brigade without profound changes in the characteristics of these units, in decision-making processes, and especially without the regular presence of a willingness to use them during crises. Indeed, finding the will to use them during summits or meetings to set up these units is easy in the recent history of the EU. This is less the case when the EU is directly confronted with a crisis, especially in countries that have troops in European standby units at the time of the crisis. In the context of the current discussions within the European Union, some are proposing changes to the decision-making process when discussing a troop deployment, the idea being to lighten it or even to put an end to the unanimous vote. Similar failures with the Franco-German brigade (FGB), which involves only two states, do not give reason for optimism, even if the decision-making process within the European Union is lightened. Indeed, the FGB has never been deployed with its regiments in its 30-year history. Moreover, for several years now, the EUBGs six-monthly alert schedule has increasingly included empty or half-full semesters. EU member states are now not only unable to deploy battalions on an emergency basis, but simply to provide two battalions per semester, or about 3,000 troops. It is therefore difficult to imagine that they will be able to provide a permanent rapid reaction force of around 5,000 men. Even if this first obstacle were overcome, employing it and avoiding a fate similar to that of previous European units ever deployed would not be an easy task. This proposal for a European rapid reaction force naturally took advantage of the debates that followed the debacle in Afghanistan to be publicized. For some of its new supporters, if such a troop had existed last July and August, it would have allowed Europeans to be independent of American decisions during evacuations. However, this reasoning forgets that at the same time, in theory, two EUBGs were on alert, the equivalent of at least 3,000 troops. However, at no time was the deployment of one or two EUBGs on alert mentioned. In concrete terms, deploying two EUBGs would have been impossible, with only one EUBG on standby for the second half of 2021. Moreover, even for these permanent missions and operations, whether they are maritime police (cf. Eunavfor Atalanta) or aimed at assisting in military training (cf. EUTM), the EU is regularly confronted with difficulties in terms of manpower, with long months of negotiations often necessary to gather even a few dozen individuals, and this is true for missions or operations that do not involve combat. While the Afghan fiasco is a source of bitterness and regret, Europeans, and especially those in the West and South, should not forget that its importance is only relative for Eastern European states facing the Russian threat. As the perception of this threat grows, these states are unlikely to invest much in the idea of a brigade-sized rapid reaction force that would operate several thousand kilometers from their borders, borders that are seen as directly threatened by Moscow. If the EU wishes to become a major security actor in the world in the coming years, solving the problem of manpower for permanent missions and operations would be preferable to launching a theoretical and chimerical new rapid reaction force. A decade ago, a Dutch military man said that the EUBGs were "a great Ferrari, but a Ferrari that was left in the garage”. Given the current state of affairs of the pre-constituted multinational European forces, it is to be feared that the 5,000-strong rapid reaction force is not only a new Ferrari that will be left in the garage, but that it will even remain at the stage of construction plans. ## Towards an Easing of Tensions Between the United States and Turkey? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/towards-an-easing-of-tensions-between-the-united-states-and-turkey/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The arrival of Joe Biden in the American presidency raises doubts about the future foreign policy towards Turkey. A few days after Biden’s election, the Turkish president promised democratic and economic reforms in Turkey. The ongoing diplomatic crisis between the United States and Turkey will have a significant impact on Canadian defence policy. While some strategic issues remain contentious, there is currently common ground between the two countries, such as the containment of Iranian and Russian influence and the renewal of the Iranian nuclear agreement. Canada could take advantage of the change in the U.S. administration to facilitate discussions between Turkey and the United States. Even a partial resolution of this crisis would be beneficial to the strategic prospects of the Canadian government. Context The arrival of Joe Biden in the American presidency raises doubts about the future foreign policy towards Turkey. A few days after Biden’s election, the Turkish president promised democratic and economic reforms in Turkey. However, before the presidential race, Biden had described Erdogan as autocratic and wanted to support the official opposition in Turkey instead. The new Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, was more moderate in his remarks. On 19 January 2021, he declared that Turkey remained an ally, even if it did not behave as such. Could this change in the American administration facilitate relations between the United States and Turkey? What are the obstacles and facilitators to easing tensions between the two countries? Why and how can Canada intervene in this matter? Incompatible a priori Positions Between Turkey and the United States Since the failed coup d’état in Turkey on 15 July 2016, diplomatic relations between the two countries remain very tense. Ankara accuses Washington of being complicit in this failed coup. This attempted putsch is said to be the work of a Turkish religious movement: the Gülenists. However, the spiritual leader of this movement, Fetthulah Gülen, was exiled in the United States. The American government refuses to comply with the Turkish government’s demands for his expatriation. All individuals affiliated with the Gülen movement are considered terrorists in Turkey. Turkey’s acquisition of Russian anti-missile systems (S-400) is also a source of conflict. In reaction to this military transaction, the White House cancelled the sale of the F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey in July 2019 and then sanctioned the Turkish defence sector in December 2020. These anti-missile systems have the capacity to transmit military information to the Russian army. Given the current tensions between Russia and NATO, this purchase is perceived as an agreement with a political opponent of the United States. Finally, in 2019, the Federal Court of the Southern District of New York accused Turkey of circumventing the economic sanctions imposed on Iran. In 2013, the US Treasury Department had banned money transfers in order to launder the Iranian government’s transactions. The findings of the trial establish links between the Turkish National Bank (Halk bank) and the Iranian government. They found that senior Turkish officials were involved in the scheme. According to John Bolton, Trump’s former strategic adviser, the former US president had interfered to influence the legal proceedings because he had close relations with Erdogan. Under the new US administration, there is no guarantee that this issue will not resurface. Considering only these three political disagreements, the Turkish and American positions seem irreconcilable. Yet Turkish foreign policy seems to have difficulty in aligning itself with the regional aspirations of Russia and Iran. In order to maintain its spheres of influence in the Middle East and the Caucasus, Turkey must necessarily limit the gains of these two countries by cooperating with the United States. The Purchase of the S-400s: Proof of a “Russian-Turkish alliance”? The Turkish army’s acquisition of two S-400 anti-missile systems shows its military proximity to Russia. In the current context, it is understandable that the American leadership remains suspicious of Turkey’s political intentions. The Turkish government justifies the military transaction by referring to the free choice of self-defence. The S-400s, the latest generation of technology, are capable of detecting air threats and neutralizing them with missiles of varying ranges. These anti-missile systems thus make it possible to modernize Turkish defence. Nevertheless, this self-defence strategy implies the collaboration of Russia, a staunch political adversary of the United States. The Turkish leaders are aware of this. On 8 February 2021, the Turkish Ministry of Defence proposed deactivating the S-400s and reactivating them only in the event of an attack, referring to the S-300 clause in Greece. Although the US Government is intransigent, the Turkish Government seems to want to negotiate a way out of the conflict. The context is important, as Russian-Turkish relations remain problematic. In all the regional conflicts in which Turkey and Russia are involved, both countries support opposing camps, whether in Syria, Libya or, to a lesser extent, Nagorno-Karabakh. Collaboration therefore seems to follow this logic: “It is better to cooperate with one’s opponent than to become one’s enemy,” because Turkey has been able to obtain gains while limiting those of Russia. Operation Euphrates Shield conducted by the Turkish army in Syria is the culmination of this strategy. Nevertheless, this effort to constrain Russia was based on a fragile balance. In October 2020, Turkey signed a memorandum favouring military cooperation with Ukraine. This decision to once again support a Russian political rival highlights the strategic incompatibility between the two countries. To act as a counterweight to Russia, Turkey must cooperate with the United States. This is probably why the Turkish army was reluctant to activate the Russian anti-missile systems. The Iranian Nuclear Agreement: the Next American-Turkish Common Ground The Halk bank scandal exposed other problematic Turkey’s problematic links with Iran. Although the event is critical, it is part of a certain strategic continuity between the two countries since the 2000s. In fact, two regional issues unite Iran and Turkey: curbing the Kurdish autonomist movements and defending the Palestinian cause. However, these common objectives do not guarantee the absence of rivalry. Ankara and Tehran support opposing Kurdish factions in Iraq. The Turkish government cooperates with Kurdish political parties affiliated with the Kurdistan Regional Government (the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdish National Council), while the Iranian government instead endorses a Kurdish federal party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The Palestinian cause also allows both countries to promote their leadership in the Middle East, but both compete for the same role. Finally, Iran and Turkey defend two different sectarian communities in Syria (Alevi for Iran and Sunni for Turkey). Although the talks in Astana have reduced tensions between the two countries, these rivalries persist. To settle political disputes with Tehran, Ankara still prefers diplomacy. This peaceful approach was opposed to the American policy under Trump, which aimed to weaken the Iranian regime. In addition to the withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement in 2018 and the renewal of sanctions against the country, the American administration supported anti-Iran demonstrations and assassinated the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 2020. Most NATO countries, including Turkey, have criticized the “maximum pressure” exerted against Iran. The lack of support from NATO allies and the resilience of the Iranian regime explain the failure of this strategy. Biden proposes instead to renew the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme. Instead of using mainly force, Washington wants to limit Iranian power again by diplomatic means. In this respect, Ankara and Washington want to curb Iranian influence, without resorting only to hard power. This reciprocity could facilitate the resumption of talks between the two countries. Considerations and Recommendations for Canada Although their strategies differ, the United States and Turkey wish to limit Russian and Iranian influence. Both countries also want a resumption of a constructive dialogue on Iran’s nuclear issue. However, some Turkish and American positions are difficult to reconcile, such as the de-installation of the S-400s by the Turkish army or the extradition of Gülen. For these reasons, it is too early to predict normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The next few months are likely to be critical for US-Turkish relations. There were already sanctions against the Turkish Defence Minister just one month before Biden’s inauguration. In addition to endorsing these sanctions, the new US President remains inflexible on the S-400 issue. These pressures will force Turkey to clarify its intentions. For the time being, the Turkish government is promising democratic reforms and has begun discussions with European countries and the United States, but nothing concrete has yet materialized. The continuing diplomatic crisis between the United States and Turkey is undermining the optimal functioning of NATO. Since 2019, Turkey has been blocking a defence project in Poland and the Baltic States using its veto power. In exchange, Turkey demands that the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) be recognized as a terrorist entity. The Turkish government’s failure to respect human rights, especially since the failed coup, also tarnishes NATO’s democratic image. With the rise of the BRICS countries, it is important for the collective defence organization to send a clear and unified message. Cohesion within NATO countries seems to be a priority of the new US administration. Biden’s promises break from Trump’s isolationist approach. For example, the resumption of the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan (JCPOA) is intended to be a multilateral diplomatic effort. This return to multilateralism is more in line with Canadian interests. By drawing inspiration from Germany’s role during the Mediterranean crisis, Canada could try to ease tensions between the United States and Turkey. Canada’s persuasive capacities are more modest, but the Canadian government could take advantage of this period of conflict to facilitate dialogue between the two countries. The United States is in the best position to persuade Turkey to respect the NATO mission. Any action that could lead to the resumption of discussions or lower tensions would be beneficial to Canadian defence policy. The easing of tensions would send a strong signal of the political unity within NATO that is necessary to negotiate with Russia. A positive resolution of the crisis would also lend credibility to the new US administration for future problematic negotiations such as Iran’s military nuclear issue. ## Towards Russian Recognition of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/towards-russian-recognition-of-the-turkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus/ Modified: 2024-04-05 Cyprus, a divided island "Peace is not the absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a will to benevolence, to trust, to justice." This quotation from Spinoza highlights the situation in Cyprus, caught between war and peace. An island state in the eastern Mediterranean and a former British colony, Cyprus has been independent since the signing of the Treaty of Guarantee of the Constitution on August 16, 1960, which entrusted the island's political stability to three countries: the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey. However, breaking the British yoke did not herald the advent of peace on the island. Some Greek nationalist circles supported Enosis ("union" in Greek) and wanted the island to be united with Greece. In 1964, violent ethnic clashes between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots led to the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The two communities were physically separated by a demilitarized buffer zone administered by the UNFICYP. In the summer of 1974, President Makarios III, whose mandate applied de jure to the whole island, expressed the wish that Greek officers should leave the Cypriot National Guard. In response, some of the latter, aided by EOKA-B, a Greek-Cypriot paramilitary group, and the dictatorship of the Athens colonels, launched an attempted coup d'état in Cyprus. On July 20, Turkey launched a military intervention in the north of the island, justifying its action on the basis of Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, which states that "Insofar as joint or concerted action should prove impossible, each of the three Guarantor Powers reserves the right to act with the sole aim of re-establishing the order created by the present Treaty." The fall of Athenian power, already weakened when the Cyprus crisis emerged, condemned the coup to failure. Turkey reacted by refusing to leave the now-liberated territory. Intervention then turned to occupation: 37% of the de jure territory administered by Nicosia came under de facto Turkish authority, before the proclamation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in November 1983. In addition to this fragmentation of Cypriot territory, there are the sovereign British military bases of Dhekelia and Akrotiri, installed since 1959 and considered by Nicosia to be another form of occupation. However, this territorial division has not prevented Cyprus from joining the European Union (EU) and becoming a member state in 2004. Forty years have passed since then. Although the island is no longer at war, peace is not assured. Firstly, it does not exist at the same time on any scale (local, regional, national, international). Secondly, conflict prevention is only partially achieved (the recent clashes surrounding the illegal road-building project in Pyla are a case in point). Thirdly, the peace achieved does not suit any of the parties involved, with both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots feeling aggrieved by the situation. The island is thus frozen in an interstitial space between war and peace. In this context, the “TRNC”'s recent diplomatic contacts call this immobility into question, notably by highlighting a possible rapprochement between the occupying authorities and the Kremlin, all under Turkish influence. The increasingly relative isolation of the “TRNC” Although Ankara immediately recognized the “TRNC” as sovereign, such a proclamation of independence was not met with unanimous approval in the Turkish world. For example, the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani enclave between Armenia, Turkey, and Iran, immediately recognized the sovereignty of the “TRNC”, but Baku did not. As a result, the “TRNC” was not included in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), founded in 2009 by Azerbaijan in Nakhchivan. Despite the emergence of dissenting voices from the Muslim world (Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan and Somalia) when Resolution 541 was adopted on November 18, 1983, calling on "all States not to recognize any other Cypriot State than the Republic of Cyprus", the “TRNC”'s only lasting diplomatic link to date has been with Ankara. However, the current warming of relations between the “TRNC” and Aliyev's Azerbaijan - a circumstantial ally of Erdoğan's Turkey - reinforces rhetoric opposed to a lasting settlement of the Cyprus question on the basis of a federal state, which is the position adopted by the United Nations (UN). The current Turkish-Cypriot "leader", the conservative nationalist Ersin Tatar, is firmly committed to a two-state solution for Cyprus. He is more broadly vassalized and aligned with all of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's international positions. Northern Cyprus is therefore a bridgehead for Turkish gas exploitation in the eastern Mediterranean. Following Ankara's lead, Tatar is fully involved in the process of consolidating diplomatic ties with Baku. This is illustrated by the Turkish and Azerbaijani desire to strengthen the Turkish-Cypriot presence within cooperation organizations, whether regional (OTS) or international (Organization of Islamic Cooperation). In this respect, the statements made by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the "multilateral political consultations" held in Istanbul at the beginning of October in the run-up to the 10th OTS summit, affirming that the “TRNC” flag would be flown at the events to be held in Azerbaijan, are a powerful indicator of the strengthening of this relationship. This diplomatic development coincides with the end of a certain balance of power in the region. This had been established between Armenia, Cyprus, and Greece on the one hand, and Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the “TRNC” on the other. A game of mutual threats reigned between the parties present, one of the keystones of which was the threat of recognition of the Republic of Artsakh in the face of that of the “TRNC”. This logic was broken by Baku's offensive against Armenian separatist positions in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 19, 2023. Although the Cypriot Parliament unanimously condemned this military operation, it demonstrated that the threat of recognizing the Armenian secessionist territories no longer intimidated Aliyev-son, who was determined to avenge his father, who had been forced to accept the ceasefire of May 16, 1994, that confirmed the Armenian victory in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. Everything now seems to point to Baku's imminent recognition of the “TRNC”. The Cypriot-Turkish authorities are delighted (their Foreign Affairs "minister" stressing that the "recognition process" for the regime has begun). Moscow could accordingly see in this sequence of geopolitical reconfiguration an opportunity to intensify its Mediterranean presence, while destabilizing the Western camp. The Russian game in the Eastern Mediterranean Situated the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is both an observation point and a gateway to the Near and Middle East, whose strategic importance has long been recognized by the Kremlin. The Russian Navy's logistics base at Tartous in Syria (less than 110 nautical miles from the Cypriot coast) is the contemporary physical legacy of Russia's determination to control its economic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this respect, the development of a major policy of influence in the region is a central issue. While the doctrinal basis of this policy is not new, its means of deployment are. Russia's involvement in Syria demonstrated the Kremlin's willingness to interact and become involved in a non-border conflict. This policy was also deployed in Libya, leading Moscow to interact with Ankara. Combining confrontation and cooperation, this relationship was established in the spaces left empty by the Western camp and should also be studied in the light of the ad hoc agreement between the Russian and Iranian powers. Alongside these two theaters of operation, Russia has continued to develop its influence in Cyprus, mainly in the military and economic fields. The Cypriot National Guard has historically been equipped with Russian equipment (T-80s, BMP-3s, S-300s, etc.). At the same time, the signing of a defense cooperation agreement in 2015 increased cooperation between the two countries' armed forces. In particular, the text opened Cypriot ports to Russian ships, which were at the gateway to the Syrian theater at the time. On the economic front, the introduction of a "citizenship through investment" program played a major role in attracting Russian investors to the island. This allowed any individual investing a minimum of two million euros in the real estate sector to obtain Cypriot citizenship. Although this was denounced and attacked by the European Commission, it enabled a large number of Russian businessmen (nearly 3,000) to obtain a "golden passport", bringing in around seven billion euros in investments for the Cypriot banking sector. On a macroeconomic scale, in 2018, 33% of Russia's total inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock came from Cyprus; in mirror terms, in the same year, 40% of Russia's total outward FDI stock was based in Cyprus, representing a sum of $189 billion. However, February 24, 2022, marked a turning point in the relationship between the two countries. Nicosia turned away from its historical partner in favor of Brussels and Washington. In this respect, the ambiguity of some Eastern European and Middle Eastern states - condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine but not imposing economic sanctions on the Kremlin - does not prevail in Cyprus. The government is resolutely committed to cleaning up its financial image and standing "on the right side of history". Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, a fervent Europhile, recently asserted that "Relations with the Russian Federation are determined within the framework of our status as an EU member state. There is an illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, just as there was in Cyprus in 1974." The disintegration of this Russian-Cypriot relationship, coupled with the diplomatic gestation of the “TRNC”, could prompt Moscow to give ever more serious consideration to reversing its position on the Cyprus question. The stakes in a Russian recognition of the “TRNC” Politically, Russian power could take advantage of this frozen European legal space to destabilize a region that is a "component of the European security architecture". The consequences would include the disruption of the European and Atlantic legitimacy acquired in Nicosia. In operational terms, however, such recognition would not have any major consequences: with the Tartous naval base, Russian ships are already close neighbors of Western operations Noble Shield (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) and EUNAVFOR MED (EU), as well as the US 6th Fleet. However, the Russian stronghold would extend from the Syrian canal to the north and north-west of Cyprus. In strategic terms, this would be a serious blow to Europe's indecision on Cyprus, with Brussels giving only timid support to the resolution of the occupation of more than a third of the sovereign territory of one of its member states by a foreign power. While President Christodoulides' diplomatic exercise in New York on the occasion of the 78th General Assembly of the United Nations enabled him to exchange views with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, the Cyprus question is still not on the European political agenda: in her September 13 "State of the Union" speech, Ursula Von der Leyen made no mention of the island, nor of the need to resolve the Cyprus problem. Europe's geopolitical apathy towards Cyprus is therefore well established. But by not getting involved in resolving the Cyprus problem, the EU runs the risk of finding itself faced with a fait accompli, trapped both morally and politically. Faint signals, broadcast by the Cypriot-Turkish "power" at Ankara's behest, indicate the beginnings of a diplomatic rapprochement between Russia and the “TRNC”, including plans to set up a consular office in occupied territory and flights to Russia. While the Turkish President was in Sochi at the beginning of September, this diplomatic issue was discussed. Erdoğan announced that the Turkish government was "delighted that Russia is opening an office in the “TRNC”". While the latter immediately stressed that the opening of such consular representation would not entail immediate recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot government by Moscow, the project is indicative of the gradual turn Russia is taking on the island. The limits of Moscow's action over the “TRNC” with a losing Europe in every case Although recognition of secessionist governments is customary for Moscow, such an initiative entails a major risk for the Kremlin. It could lead the United States to increase its already substantial military presence on the island. Determined to fill the gap left by the deterioration in Russian-Cypriot relations, Washington has become a major partner of Nicosia. At the instigation of US Senators Bob Menendez, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Marco Rubio, Congress passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act in 2019, lifting the 35-year-old arms embargo on Cyprus for one year. The Senate is even studying the possibility of ending the annuality principle, in favor of a renewal every three years, in order to strengthen the US strategic partnership on a lasting basis and definitively remove the Russian player from the Cypriot scene. On the other hand, not all Turkic states share Baku's or Ankara's vision. Kazakhstan supports the Cypriot government and is in favor of finding a solution to the Cyprus question "in accordance with the UN Charter and the relevant Security Council resolutions". The OTS website, where the “TRNC” has been an observer member since 2022, presents the latter in a caricatured way, in a rough mix between geographical data relating to the Republic of Cyprus and those of the “TRNC”, and even goes so far as to assert that one of Cyprus' "neighboring countries" is... "the Greek Cypriot administration". Conclusion: the potential Turkish game Undoubtedly, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is seeking to break out of its isolation in order to achieve the status of a fully-fledged sovereign state. At the same time, Baku's lightning offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh reversed the balance of power that had been established vis-à-vis Cyprus, demonstrating that Greek threats to recognize the Republic of Artsakh no longer frightened Aliyev. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan's efforts to include the “TRNC” in regional and international cooperation bodies (OTS, OCI) seem to indicate a forthcoming recognition of the Cypriot-Turkish occupation regime. This sequence could serve Russian interests, to the detriment of the UN, the EU and NATO. The Kremlin could therefore become involved in this strategic turning point: its warships would then call at de jure ports in the territory of the Union, highlighting Europe's political and moral slap in the face on the Cyprus question. The fact remains that nothing will be done in Cyprus without the agreement of Ankara, in a position of strength in this context. While a form of Panturquism can of course be observed, this "unity in language" is for the moment slowed down by the position of the Turkish government, which prefers to maintain the fog that reigns around Cyprus, in order to guarantee the continuity of its interests in this vague legal area. Moreover, from a military point of view, Turkey has no interest in seeing Russian soldiers in the occupied territories. Finally, the religious factor, which partly explains the Russian-Chypriot rapprochement via the Orthodox Church, could slow down Russian integration in the “TRNC” if Moscow were to recognize the latter. In any case, the real threat to the European camp comes not from Moscow, but from Ankara. It is in Erdoğan's interest to continue to threaten the international recognition of the “TRNC”. Relying on its status as a guarantor power and NATO member, Turkey is gradually placing its pawns on the island. The stakes lie in the potential of this recognition of the “TRNC”, which Erdoğan is well aware of. By emphasizing NATO's territorial expansion through the pure and simple integration of the “TRNC” into Turkey's borders, Ankara can counter a hypothetical Russian threat and find new supporters within the Alliance. This scenario would put an end to the current Cypriot in-between situation and ensure that the Turkish side obtains what it seeks in Cyprus: territorial expansion and lasting access to gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean. It therefore seems necessary to denounce this maneuver, so that Europeans and Atlanticists do not find themselves trapped in Cyprus. ## Training workshop focused on the SSHRC scholarship programs, for MA and PhD students URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/training-workshop-focused-on-the-sshrc-scholarship-programs-for-ma-and-phd-students/ Modified: 2020-11-13 > Training workshop focused on the SSHRC scholarship programs, for MA and PhD students. Training workshop focused on the SSHRC scholarship programs, for MA and PhD students With : Véronique Gilbert (Policy Officer – Department of National Defence); Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal).   ## Transatlantic Relations During a Pandemic: Cooperation or Competition? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/transatlantic-relations-during-a-pandemic-cooperation-or-competition/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated the dynamics of contemporary transatlantic relations, which oscillate between cooperation and rivalry at a time of competition between great powers. The COVID-19 pandemic has accentuated the dynamics of contemporary transatlantic relations, which oscillate between cooperation and rivalry at a time of competition between great powers. As the United States (US) continues on the path of unilateralism, the European Union (EU) is torn between an historic opportunity to develop its strategic autonomy and its traditional lack of cohesion. In this context, several experts have studied the future of transatlantic relations as part of conferences organised by the Brookings Institute during summer of 2020. This “hot take” presents an overview. The European Union at the heart of great power competition The EU has been hit hard by the pandemic as competition between great powers increases. The EU is trying to send a clear message to China in the face of the aggressiveness of its international policy while seeking strategic autonomy at a time when the US continues its questioning of multilateralism. The EU, whose unity was weakened at the height of the pandemic, is wedged between the US and China in an increased competition between great powers. However, at the moment, the EU is far from having all the cards in hand to assert itself as a major player in the midst of this competition. The beginning of the pandemic has highlighted one of the biggest weaknesses of the EU, namely its disunity, with a management of COVID-19 more national than multilateral, and a lack of solidarity towards its most affected members. China then took advantage of this open door to criticize the European management of the pandemic while offering to help where the EU was lacking. However, the EU subsequently recovered by providing logistical aid, liquidity reserves to local banks, essential medical and pharmaceutical equipment, as well as  by increasing European production of protective equipment for health workers and by strengthening regional surveillance of the pandemic. Moreover, the EU perceives China less and less as a partner and more as a rival . This change of position follows the many aggressive actions from China, especially in cyberspace, but also reacts to the nature of its political and economic development and its human rights record. Yet the Sino-European relationship is complex and far from a simple friend-foe dichotomy. Indeed, as recalled  by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the relationship between the EU and China is simultaneously one of the most strategically important and one of the most politically difficult. This is not to mention the strong economic ties that unite the two players, in particular the numerous Chinese investments in ports, railways, telecommunications and other essential investments that certain countries, such as Italy, Greece, and Portugal greatly need. In this regard, Italy has also concluded a multi-billion-dollar contract with China, thus strengthening its relationship with Beijing. The pandemic has only reaffirmed the importance of the Chinese presence in Europe. As Brookings Institute associate researcher Giovanna De Maio highlights, Italian public opinion is beginning to see China more like a friend, and to distrust increasingly other European countries like France and Germany. Thus, even if Italian foreign policy has not seen a major turning point with regard to China, given its strong transatlantic position, pro-China and anti-EU movements are beginning to develop. This position is shared by Fiona Hill, also a researcher at the Brookings Institute, when she says that China, or Russia, can become an alternative to traditional partners for countries like Italy. Faced with these challenges, German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer argues that despite disagreements within member countries, the EU must respond collectively, in particular by asserting its values ​​of fundamental freedoms, equality and human rights against China. She adds that it is important to continue to invest in defence, despite a drop in defence budgets accentuated by the pandemic. For Charles Fries, Deputy Secretary General for Common Security and Defense Policy of the European External Action Service, it will be important after the pandemic that the EU develops a strategic autonomy, enabling it to respond as a producer of security, while at the same time being ready to respond to threats on their own. It will also be important to reduce dependence on the security and technology sectors, while pushing the EU's defence agenda further by developing its own defence capabilities. Claudio Graziano, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, adds that the EU needs to develop its intelligence capabilities as well as a new approach to cyber defence and cyber intelligence. On this last point, the EU very recently imposed its first sanctions against cyber attacks from countries like China and Russia. However, while most European actors do not question the EU’s transatlantic ties, Timo Pesonen, director-general for the space and defence industry of the European Commission, says that the EU depends too much on the US and that it must be less transatlantic and more European. Even if the beginnings of the pandemic have exposed the weaknesses of the EU, the latter seems to want to emerge strengthened from this pandemic. The EU is thus working to strengthen its strategic autonomy while implementing a Defence Europe to move away from dependence on the United States. The United States: Ally or Rival?  Since Donald Trump's arrival at the White House, the US’ relations with Canada and the EU have eroded and the US unilateralist attitude has been exacerbated during the pandemic, be it the attempt to block sales of protective masks to Canada or the attempt to have the exclusivity on a potential vaccine against COVID-19 at the expense of its allies. The “America First” doctrine indeed poses many challenges to the traditional allies of the US and reflects the American disengagement from the international sphere and its withdrawal from multilateralism. For Julianne Smith, a researcher at the Center for a New American Security and former Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, it is the first time in the history of EU-US relations US President shows regular and open contempt for the European project. Donald Trump indeed sees no value in the relationship between the US and the EU and even thinks that the EU was created to have an advantage over the US. Transatlantic relations have also deteriorated during the COVID-19 pandemic, as Donald Trump’s United States are perceived as unreliable and unpredictable. In question, the unilateralist attitude of the US and its disengagement from the EU. While the US administration has decided to ban Europeans from traveling in the US without diplomatic consultations at the beginning of the pandemic, it now plans on  a national option instead of a multilateral solution for securing its supply chains. Ellen Lord, the US undersecretary of defence for acquisitions and support, says that securing the supply chains requires a national approach and to be specifically made in the US. On the European side, the American attitude is ambiguous to say the least and reinforces the perception that the US is no longer a reliable ally of the EU. Indeed, while the Trump administration appears to be taking a stand in favour of the United Kingdom in the Brexit affair, it recently decided to withdraw a large part of its troops in Germany. President Trump justifies this decision by saying that Germany does not pay its 2% contribution to NATO and tries to take advantage of the US. However, the German Minister of Defence recalled that her country had always been a reliable NATO ally, and that given the increased aggressiveness of Moscow, Europe's security also guarantees US  security. She adds that it is unfortunate that the US is withdrawing its troops and that the redeployment of American troops will be a clear message to the EU. If the redeployment does not take place in Europe, this will be another sign of the abandonment of the EU by the United States. However, for Mark Esper, US Secretary of Defence, it is not about making a choice between Europe and Asia, but instead trying to find a balance between the two regions representing the interests and security challenges for the United States. The important thing for Washington is to optimize its positions to prepare itself over the long term for competition between the great powers. Addressing common threats by strengthening transatlantic cooperation In order to cope with the pandemic as well as with the rivalry with Russia and China, it is essential for the West to maintain solid transatlantic ties. On Covid-19 , it would be appropriate to coordinate approaches to diversify supply chains and reduce the dependence on China, to promote cooperation in the regulation of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, to liberalise transatlantic restrictions on equipment medical, or to strengthen scientific exchanges, joint medical research, and cooperation in public health innovation. However, all of this is being undermined by President Trump's selfish approach. In the face of China, full cooperation between the US and the EU would create more levers to try to put in place more friendly policies. Transatlantic cooperation is also needed to protect the rules-based international liberal system challenged by China. Whatever the competitions and tensions, transatlantic cooperation must emphasize the values ​​to be protected and promoted. Moreover, as Charles Fries reports , there seems to be discussions between the EU and the United States on the issue of China, a sign of a degree of cooperation. In addition, there are other signs of transatlantic cooperation, in particular the adoption by NATO and the EU of two joint declarations in 2016 and 2018 acting on 74 joint actions, as well as the meeting last June to discuss the common security implications of COVID-19 and the convergence of interests between the two organisations. NATO must also successfully address its weaknesses in terms of cooperation to deal with the growing threat from China and Russia, according to Clark Cooper, assistant secretary for military affairs and policies at the US State Department. Moreover, the tactics of China and Russia to divide the NATO countries are not working because they share common values. According to him, the concept of security must be extended to the security of infrastructure and telecommunications. Finally, for the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Mircea Geoana, the EU and NATO must bring together their identification of threats to foster a common approach. According to him, there is no place for a EU acting alone in defence and NATO remains key to international stability. Moreover, NATO seems to seek to achieve a higher level of cooperation, particularly with regards to intelligence, with the development of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division, as noted by James Appathurai, NATO’s deputy assistant secretary-general for Political Affairs and Security Policy. This, the first civil-military division of NATO Headquarters, helps provide consistent estimates for decision-making within NATO. This division also permits, thanks to the information shared by all allies, some important decisions from NATO, including the deportation of about 150 undeclared Russian intelligence officers following the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in the UK. Even though the last few months have shown a resurgence of transatlantic competition, with a unilateralist US and divided European positions, cooperation for all that has not been abandoned. Even though the pandemic has accentuated certain tensions, transatlantic relations remain solid all the same, thanks to common values ​​and an institutionalized security community with NATO. The latter must redouble its efforts to address its weaknesses and increase cooperation amid great powers competition. For its part, the EU must not replace NATO, but supplement it, according to the German Minister of Defence. Finally, even if the transatlantic relations are in a turbulent period, with the rise of competition between the great powers and President Trump’s negative vision of Europe, there is a real potential to strengthen these relations that depends only on the will of the actors concerned. Much of that will could be found with the election of Joe Biden as President of the United States. ## Transparency and Norm Cultivation in the Space Domain: Canada’s Contribution URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/transparency-and-norm-cultivation-in-the-space-domain-canadas-contribution/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The international community has thus far failed to create consensual and legally-binding rules for the use of outer space. What can Canada do? The international community has thus far failed to create consensual and legally-binding rules for the use of outer space beyond those specified in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Such rules would reduce ambiguity and help to ensure that the future of space is secure, peaceful and used for the benefit of all. Ambiguity plagues the matters of who is using space and to what ends, as well as the nature of objects in space. This is partly due to current technological limits, but also the lack of voluntary transparency on the part of space actors themselves. The result is uncertainty that causes anxiety, provides avenues for hostility and fuels insecurity. Such ambiguity, in the absence of rules and norms, has led powerful actors and spacefaring nations to declare space “a new operational domain.” The current situation, if unchecked, is poised to undermine the great collective dreams of how space can benefit the entire human family. Canadian Leadership Canada can decisively act in response to this ambiguity, and contribute to securing this new and ever-expanding frontier for peaceful purposes. Canada was the third nation to begin spacefaring activities, is one of the first members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), and a partner in the International Space Station initiative, all of which is undergirded by Canada’s advanced and pioneering commercial space industry. Canada has been a leader in space and related technologies, and is well positioned to be a leader in peaceful space security. Canada can achieve this leadership by taking practical measures domestically, bi-laterally and outside of the formal multilateral instruments to further promote peace and security in space, and in so doing build upon its current international obligations in this arena in pursuit of a peaceful space domain. Actions to Be Taken In an environment of intense mistrust, benign activities can seem hostile. Thus, transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) are an important bulwark against proliferating potential threats. Yet, when the process of multilateral TCBMs stalls, Canada should shoulder its responsibility as a leading spacefaring nation though unilateral and bi-lateral actions, in addition to taking steps to create the environment for progress. The Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines developed and adopted by COPUOS could be implemented via legislation to create clear standards for, inter alia, sustainable space utilization and pre-launch conjunction assessments. This approach has the benefit of requiring domestic commercial actors to come into compliance with the Guidelines, thereby contributing to the formulation and strengthening of norms related to outer space. Domestically codifying some of these Guidelines – a commitment to, for example, developing Canadian space capabilities in a manner that avoids harm in outer space and to the safety of space operations – would be valuable. Such a commitment would clarify what Canada considers as acceptable behavior and underscore its commitment to meeting legal norms. The Guidelines could be implemented in a piecemeal strategy by topical area all while tailoring them to the Canadian context. In addition to releasing transparent technical information, Canada should also formulate a comprehensive space doctrine with associated policies so as to provide greater context to its space activities. By providing and adhering to a public space policy, Canada will build the confidence of other space actors – a crucial matter in cases of dual use technology (i.e. co-orbital objects). In the absence of internationally established standards and norms, it is of great value if individual states clearly outline their standards of action, especially in regard to actions that may be easily mistaken as hostile (i.e. approaching another orbiting object). Canada, in disclosing its standards, would make a valuable contribution to the foundation of international norms in this area. This doctrine would, among other things, define what Canada understands to be the weaponization of space, a generally contested concept at present, and what Canada would deem to be a threat or constitute the use of force against one of its space objects (i.e. what activities would contravene the UN Charter and the Outer Space Treaty). Spatial Security An ongoing destabilizing factor is the development and testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. Should Canada ever wish to pursue ASAT capabilities, it should make clear commitments through domestic legislation. Such commitments could follow those formulated and proposed by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR): no debris, low debris and notification. Such legislation, in addition, would clarify how Canada would respond to an ASAT threat or attack, again reducing ambiguity and developing norms. To further thwart ambiguity in the nature of Canada’s space activities, Canada should disclose the payloads of all its launches and make available for inspection any dual-use technology. This could be done unilaterally or arranged through bi-lateral agreements and understandings with the idea of laying the foundation for an international monitoring regime building on the decades old proposal for the International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA). Canada, moreover, should make domestic efforts to broaden participation in the discussion and formulation of policies for the peaceful use of outer space. Development in space technology is being driven by commercial actors and academia as much as by governments. Private commercial entities exacerbate security concerns through the further development of suspicious dual-use technologies, but these entities can also advance development of space situational awareness capabilities and thereby support verifying compliance and building trust through a cooperative security arrangement for activity in outer space. It is essential that commercial actors be included in the conversation so they can understand the norms that are being developed, contribute to them, obey them, and develop technology in line with them. To be a leader in the peaceful use of outer space Canada must harness and direct its powerful commercial actors. By expanding the range of actors involved in space security, there is a higher likelihood for generating meaningful, accurate, and effective solutions to space-security questions. This is also a recognition that space-based security dilemmas in the near future will not strictly be inter-state, but will likely include, or originate from, commercial space actors. These actions will build trust among space actors by defusing ambiguities in the nature and scope of space operations. While technology is rapidly advancing in this field, it remains difficult to track and monitor objects in space. Thus, it is necessary for states at this point to voluntarily provide information regarding their space activities so as to ensure clarity of intent and action. Proposals for Courses of Action These, and related actions, are outlined in the following proposals: Canada should make domestic efforts to broaden participation in the discussion and formulation of policy regarding peaceful uses of outer space. Canada should develop and publicly release a space doctrine with associated policies so as to provide greater context and clarity to its space activities.[1] The COPUOS Long Term Sustainability Guidelines should be implemented via legislation.[2] Canada should conclude more bi-lateral framework agreements on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, mirroring the current agreement between Canada and the US.[3] Bi-laterally, Canada should offer technological aid and capacity building projects to developing countries’ space programs to ensure that they have the resources necessary for transparency and compliance with the norms of responsible use. Canada should undertake bi-lateral and multi-lateral advocacy for the establishment of an ISMA. Canada should commit to voluntarily disclosing the contents of its launches (payloads) so as to certify their non-weapon character. Domestic promotion of the linkage between the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and space technology, which will aid norm cultivation and domestic sensitivity to how space is conceptualized and practically used.[4] Foster domestic space defence expertise so as to leverage it when devising policies through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and in conjunction with European partners, through such initiatives as Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS). As a NATO member, Canada should advocate for the development and promulgation of shared commitments for the peaceful use of satellites among NATO members. This would build support for the European Union’s draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC). Canada should continue to lead in acts of voluntary transparency through multi-lateral institutions. Canada has been one of the few States to report its space activities via an annual report to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS. The Canadian government should resume its annual voluntary contributions to UNIDIR[5] and specifically support UNIDIR-led conferences on space security, in conjunction with domestic NGOs. These proposals, though not sweeping, are pragmatic and are based on sound technical foundations. Such specific changes can be intensified over time, all the while contributing to the formulation of norms and a clear organizational culture which can be leveraged. These specific steps are drawn from the identification of high priority threats that can be mitigated by incremental steps. Such an approach avoids the now well-defined stumbling blocks of establishing multilateral space security: the promotion of comprehensive agreements despite an absence of international consensus and the pursuit by some Sates of geostrategic goals that extend into outer space. Please note that this article was originally prepared for the 2019-2020 Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, an annual competition hosted by The Simons Foundation in partnership with the International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) of Global Affairs Canada. The author was one of four winners in 2019. The article was originally published at: https://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/highlights/2019-2020-graduate-research-awards-disarmament-arms-control-and-non-proliferation-award [1] Space is sporadically mentioned in Canada’s 2017 Defence policy “Strong, Secure, Engaged” but the references do not amount to a comprehensive public space policy. [2] Canada is already complying with some COPUOS guidelines through the Canadian Remote Sensing Space Systems Act (2005) and its associated Regulations (2007) which make a clear method of disposing of remote sensing products a pre-condition for obtaining a satellite license, and the Canadian Space Agency adoption of the IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (2012). [3] Framework Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes (2009). [4] “A New Space Strategy for Canada: exploration, imagination, innovation” (2019) is a good start. [5] The Canadian government has not made a voluntary contribution to UNIDIR since 2015. Canada made frequent, although not always yearly, voluntary contributions to UNIDIR between 1991 and 2015. UNIDIRs funding is outlined in its annual Directors report.   ## TRIPP: A Genuine Path to Peace Between Armenia and Azerbaijan? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/tripp-a-genuine-path-to-peace-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan/ Modified: 2025-11-25 Analysis of Donald Trump's plan for Armenia and Azerbaijan On 8 August 2025, Donald Trump welcomed Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to the White House and assured them of his support for the process of resolving the conflict between the two countries, which has been ongoing for more than thirty years. The two former Soviet socialist republics have clashed several times during this period over control of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region then populated mainly by Armenians and enclaved within Azerbaijan. In September 2023, the Azerbaijani army regained full control of this enclave and its capital Stepanakert, renamed Khankendi and reintegrated into the Republic of Azerbaijan. Its Armenian population was forced to flee to Armenia, but the end of this armed conflict raises several questions that continue to fuel tensions between the two countries: the fate of Armenian prisoners of war, the preservation of cultural heritage in the region, the repopulation of the region under the authority of the Baku government, and the reception of Karabakh refugees in Armenia. While war was the most decisive factor in the political and geopolitical landscape in the region, lasting peace is now the goal that all these actors are calling for, in line with the principle of ‘peace through deal-making’ dear to the President of the United States. But the construction of this peace also faces conflicting interests. In this hotspot, the objectives of regional and external actors who claim to support appeasement in the Caucasus will be analyzed. Karabakh, Aliyev's government's new showcase Firstly, it is important to consider the conflict itself and its resolution. On the Azerbaijani side, it is said that the issue has been closed with the reintegration of the Karabakh region, while on the Armenian side, there is regret at the lack of measures in favour of the civilian population, particularly with regard to the thorny issue of the ‘right of return’. Indeed, a large part of this population living in the breakaway republic of Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) already resided there before the first war in 1988. Conversely, the Azeri populations who were exiled to other regions of Azerbaijan after the Armenians took control are now being encouraged to return to the region, even though most Azeri villages have been abandoned for three decades. Through incentives and infrastructure development, President Aliyev is attempting to make the region attractive to his citizens, offering them, among other things, the opportunity to live in new towns built by the government at low cost, in order to boost his popularity. Aliyev's goal is to turn the page on the war, despite accusations of ethnic cleansing, and he is calling on Armenia to amend its constitution by removing references to Artsakh and to end the OSCE Minsk Group, which was a platform for a peace process monitored by Russia, the United States and France. However, President Aliyev's demands continue to fuel resentment in Armenia, which is torn between the desire to find lasting peace and the trauma of this lost land. The political crisis in Armenia Pashinyan's government is indeed under pressure. The Prime Minister, who came to power following a velvet revolution in 2018, is now in open conflict with the parliamentary opposition, as well as with the Armenian Apostolic Church, which wields moral authority among the population, and with Samuel Karapetian, the country's richest man and owner of the largest energy company. The Prime Minister claims to have escaped a coup organized by Karapetian and Bishop Bagrat Galstanian, who is the spokesperson for opponents of the peace process with Baku. The rift between the government and these actors is also very deep and divides Armenian society. Against the backdrop of this new divergence lies an older, more geopolitical divergence between those who favour closer ties with the West, embodied by Pashinyan, and those who are nostalgic for the very strong relationship with Russia. Indeed, following the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Yerevan went further than ever in its divorce from Moscow, indirectly linked to Vladimir Putin's strategic isolation since 24 February 2022.This Russian withdrawal, deplored by Armenia, has been interpreted by experts as a blank cheque given to Ilham Aliyev to wage the latest war, for fear of damaging their relations with him. For example, Armenia suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a political-military alliance led by the Kremlin, and passed a law in parliament in favour of a potential application for membership of the European Union. This move by the Armenian government revealed Russia's loss of influence in the South Caucasus, a region it considers its ‘near abroad’. Russia is struggling to maintain close relations with Armenia, which has long been one of its favourite allies in the region. But relations have also deteriorated between Russia and Azerbaijan, with the arrest of multiple Azeris in Russia and Russians in Azerbaijan in recent months and the closure of pro-Russian media outlets in the former SSR. Relations between Baku and Moscow are strained, and other actors could take advantage of this. Normalisation(s)? Armenia realizes that it cannot afford to depend on Russia militarily, strategically and commercially. That is why the issue of normalisation with Turkey is back on the table. The Turkish-Armenian border has been closed since the first war in 1994, and Ankara has imposed a trade blockade in solidarity with its ally in Baku. But Prime Minister Pashinyan met with President Erdogan in Istanbul, which is a rare event in the history of relations between the two countries. Turkey seems more open than before to opening its borders, which would be beneficial for the border regions, and even to normalisation. However, this normalisation seems to depend on normalisation between Yerevan and Baku, as Turkey remains loyal to its alliance with Azerbaijan, despite certain fundamental disagreements, particularly on the Middle East. For its part, Armenia is trying to capitalise on a project called ‘Crossroads of Peace’, which would open the borders between the countries of the Caucasus. This seems necessary, given that Georgia, which had remained neutral in this dispute and was therefore a transit route for many, appears to be increasingly unreliable due to the policies of its new government, which is not recognized by part of the international community. "Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity"   Source One of Azerbaijan's conditions for signing a definitive peace agreement with Armenia is the creation of a corridor that would cross the Syunik region in southern Armenia and connect the autonomous region of Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan. At present, Azeris from Nakhchivan must pass through Iran to reach it. Furthermore, this autonomous region borders Turkey for several kilometres: the dream of Azeri nationalists is to link these two parts of the Turkic world. Azerbaijan is already Turkey's leading energy partner, which is supplied by Georgia. These corridor projects are considered dangerous for the Armenians, firstly because they would undermine their territorial sovereignty, and secondly because the Baku government has already shown that it cannot be trusted. Armenia is keen to hold on to its southern region of Syunik, as well as its narrow border with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which remains a significant economic partner. While the Armenian Prime Minister wants above all to prevent Azerbaijan from occupying this narrow strip of land a few kilometres wide, which would give it access to Nakhichevan and the border with Turkey, President Aliyev wants to avoid a corridor controlled by the Armenians, who could impose transit fees on their territory. Aliyev calls this corridor the ‘Zangezur corridor’, referring to the Azeri name for the Syunik region, which is considered provocative by the Armenian side, as this name disregards Yerevan's sovereignty over this valley. This is where President Trump comes in. His goal: to thwart Russian and Iranian influence in the Caucasus. The 47th president is continuing his project of making peace at any cost through deals, and no longer hides his intention to win the Nobel Peace Prize for this reason. Among the six or seven peace agreements he claims to have established, he includes the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, even though the countries have not been in armed conflict since 2023. Trump has thus offered to act as an intermediary for the two leaders of the South Caucasus. He is proposing an American long-term lease on the Syunik road, renamed TRIPP, for Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which would connect Nakhichevan to Baku. This American control would last for a hundred years, but raises several questions: first, is Armenia's national sovereignty truly respected? Second, does it put an end to Baku's ambitions and establish stable peace? Finally, does this corridor open up the region, where many borders remain completely closed in the absence of genuine diplomatic normalisation? A geostrategic turning point to open up the region Armenia and Azerbaijan must take advantage of this new situation to transform their bilateral relations. For a long time, these two countries have been in Moscow's orbit, which has continued to fuel tensions between them for decades. Armenia has always been highly dependent on Russia because, unlike Azerbaijan, it does not have its own energy resources. The latter has maintained its historic relationship with Turkey, even though disagreements on certain issues are becoming increasingly vocal (notably on the relationship between these two countries and Israel, Ankara's strategic rival but Baku's unfailing military and energy partner). Georgia, which maintained cordial ties with both countries, is itself facing unprecedented instability, forcing everyone to rethink relations throughout the region. Iran was Armenia's traditional ally by default, due to its rivalry with Azerbaijan. Now greatly weakened by its war against Israel, Tehran views the TRIPP project with suspicion, in an area that was influenced much more by Moscow than by Washington. But the United States is not a sufficient partner, and Armenia and Azerbaijan need to develop partnerships in Eurasia. This is where China appears as a new option: unlike Russia, it does not have a bad image with the respective governments and is offering to include these countries in its new Silk Roads. Azerbaijan is seen as essential in the establishment of the famous Trans-Caspian corridor, also known as the Middle Corridor, which connects the China Sea to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caucasus (bypassing Armenia) and Turkey. Armenia and Azerbaijan, like Turkey, participated as dialogue partners in the Tianjin summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which brings together China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran, among others, and seeks to offer Asian countries an alternative alliance to American hegemony. It was in this context that Nikol Pashinyan met with Xi Jinping. Between the American TRIPP and dialogue with the East, Armenia and Azerbaijan seem, in various respects, to be trying to play on several fronts to ensure their geostrategic transition. Yerevan has also taken advantage of the end of the war to forge relations with the SCO countries, particularly India, with which it has already been close in recent years. It should be noted that Yerevan has established diplomatic relations with Pakistan, which was the only UN member state that did not recognize the independence of the Caucasian country due to its support for Baku. Armenia is now recognised by the entire international community. Rapprochement with the EU And what about the European Union? The EU is an important partner for both countries, including them in its neighbourhood policy, but opting for a relationship tailored to each government. While the relationship with Azerbaijan is mainly commercial, due to Baku's energy exports to Europe, Armenia is considered an essential relay in the region, particularly since Georgia's new government seems to be abandoning its desire for EU integration. The EU has therefore had a civilian mission in Yeghenadzor, Armenia, since 2023. The European Union has always supported the peace process between the two countries and welcomed the efforts made by Yerevan and Baku during the meeting at the White House. The European Union also encourages the normalisation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as between Armenia and Turkey. Some EU member states have historically been more supportive of Armenia, particularly France and Greece, while others have generally shown closer ties with Baku. What does the future hold for Europe's presence in this region? In Armenia, the government wants to show its desire for closer ties with Europe through a bill passed by parliament in March 2025, ‘initiating the EU accession process’, although this is not binding at the diplomatic level. No official application for membership has been submitted, unlike Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. While this pro-European stance by Pashinyan's cabinet is unprecedented for an Armenian government, it remains subject to nuances. Firstly, Yerevan has also developed numerous ties with India and China, as well as with certain Gulf countries; secondly, its domestic policy plays a very important role in this regard. Indeed, in June 2025, the country will hold parliamentary elections, which will certainly be decisive in determining Armenia's direction. Pashinyan is currently relatively unpopular, particularly because of his disputes with the Apostolic Church, but he is also exposed to disinformation campaigns by Russia, as well as in Moldova in the run-up to the September 2025 elections. If he is re-elected as Prime Minister, he will also have to put to a referendum the question of constitutional changes demanded by Azerbaijan for a peace treaty, which is far from certain. All these domestic political issues make Pashinyan's government highly vulnerable to foreign interference and could, in the future, weaken Euro-Armenian relations. In conclusion, it could be said that although Armenia and Azerbaijan are on the verge of concluding a lasting peace, the situation remains very tense. The next key milestone for the future of this region will be the Armenian parliamentary elections in 2026, which are likely to be marked by intense political tensions, unprecedented attempts at interference and considerable uncertainty among the population. The fate of neighbouring Georgia is equally uncertain, and seems to demonstrate that lasting regional stability is not on the cards for 2025 or 2026. However, Armenia's efforts to normalise relations with its western and eastern neighbours are not insignificant. Nor is the decline of Russian influence. Moscow has undoubtedly not given up on this region, which it considers highly strategic due to its geography, history and trade links. For Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey, the Caucasus is gaining strategic importance and contributing to its consolidation in the great geopolitical game, while domestically, the government is facing new challenges. The diagnosis for Westerners is ambivalent: on the one hand, peace is being encouraged, including following Trump's plan, and Russia seems to have backed down; on the other, this situation has favoured the emergence of Turkey as a new regional power and Azerbaijan as a strategic partner, even though the latter has shown an unprecedented authoritarian retreat and put an end to any multilateral solution to the conflict with Armenia. As things stand, Armenia appears to be the EU's new privileged ally in the region, at a time when Georgia is drifting towards authoritarianism and falling back into Vladimir Putin's beloved ‘near abroad’. It remains to be seen whether this trend is sustainable and whether the promises made by Donald Trump through his famous TRIPP will be followed by real diplomatic progress. ## Trouble in Paradise? Germany’s Incoming “Traffic Light” Coalition and its Potential Impacts on NATO’s Security URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/trouble-in-paradise-germanys-incoming-traffic-light-coalition-and-its-potential-impacts-on-natos-security/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > As the three future governing parties have concluded their negotiations for the terms of their coalition, they seem bound to change... After being ruled by Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its junior coalition partners since 2005, Germany is set for Vice-Chancellor and Finance minister Olaf Scholz to become its first Social Democratic Chancellor in 16 years. As the Social Democrats (SPD), the Green and the FDP came out of the 2021 federal election with enough seats in the Bundestag to form a new cabinet, they have announced a “traffic light” coalition, with Green Party co-leader Annalena Baerbock in the position of Foreign minister. Even though the SPD and the FDP have at various times been members of some of Merkel’s cabinets, they will now be able to set Germany’s foreign policy without being constrained by the CDU’s strong and inflexible commitment to NATO. As the three future governing parties have concluded their negotiations for the terms of their coalition, they seem bound to change some elements of what had previously been Merkel’s careful and stable security strategy. But could they really go as far as impacting NATO’s—and Canada’s—security? Since the SPD wishes for a more independent European Union in regard to security and the Greens desire an “overhaul of NATO,” this hot take aims to review the potential changes that could or will be introduced by the “traffic light” coalition to Germany’s foreign policy and how they could impact NATO’s cohesion on issues such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), nuclear sharing, and the 2% NATO defence-spending goal. In doing so, it argues that the main impact Scholz’s incoming cabinet will have on Canada’s security could be to initiate new rifts within the trans-Atlantic alliance. The FDP’s presence in the coalition, and internal disagreements within the SPD, however, force the two main partners toward moderation and the status quo, by preventing the implementation of their more radical campaign diplomatic proposals. The Looming Rift Over the TPNW The TPNW is the first legally binding agreement that bans nuclear weapons and seeks their total elimination. Adopted on July 7th, 2017, by the United Nations General Assembly, it became effective on January 22nd, 2021, and currently has 86 signatories and 56 states that are considered parties. While it is backed by a significant portion of the international community, the treaty has yet to receive support from members of NATO: indeed, it is considered by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and German’s outgoing government as being “a distraction from arms control talks that actually include nuclear powers.” The trans-Atlantic alliance has so far completely rejected the treaty as “it does not reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture” and it considers itself, as long as nuclear weapons exist, to be a nuclear alliance. NATO’s “corporate line” is straightforward: the TPNW is not productive and should not be signed. The “traffic light” coalition will, however, choose to ignore this and join the treaty as an observer. Joining the TPNW was part of both the SDP and the Greens’ election platforms; the Greens have even previously introduced in the Bundestag a motion to call on the government to do exactly that. This was in sharp contrast with the outgoing CDU-dominated government, which criticized “the ban treaty’s inherent weaknesses” and its “alleged incompatibility with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” For this reason, the incoming coalition’s agreement on joining the TPNW as an observer is set to initiate a new rift within NATO. To start, as an observer of the prohibition treaty, the country’s “nuclear deterrent role would seem to be precluded” at least in principle, which could in the future impact nuclear sharing. As NATO works by consensus, it might also immobilize the alliance on this issue, while giving cover for other members to follow suit, such as Norway and even, potentially, the Netherlands, which had voted against the treaty. Those countries have strong anti-nuclear domestic sentiments that have so far been ignored by their ruling governments. It follows that a German signature will also significantly increase the treaty’s value and influence, which were previously “diminished by the fact that the nine nuclear states — and all Washington’s European allies — have refused to endorse it.” In any case, beyond the Western split it will initiate within NATO, it will also considerably increase the pressure on Canada both to follow suit or to stay the course. Canada has so far called the treaty “premature,” even with a poll indicating that 73% of Canadians believe their country should join the treaty despite U.S. opposition. Conceivably, this could be an occasion for Canada to strengthen its commitment to its American ally. NATO unity is one of the Liberal government’s main objectives in the face of authoritarianism. The loss in cohesion within the trans-Atlantic alliance, and the associated weakening of its deterrent power and its members’ security, mean that there would be significant consequences for Canada’s security if the new German government does go forward on this issue. Will Germany Eventually Abandon NATO’s Nuclear Sharing? Germany, along with Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, is part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement and hosts up to 20 of the United States’ B-61 nuclear gravity bombs at Büchel Air Base. Those can be carried by German Tornado IDS dual-capable aircrafts in case of a crisis and are considered to be an integral part of NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture. This posture is, fundamentally, the “supreme guarantee” of security for the alliance’s members. Repeatedly, allies and NATO members have stressed the importance of Germany’s participation in this defence compact, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg published an opinion piece affirming that its “support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom,” and “for the security of the whole alliance, for Germany, its neighbours, friends and Allies, who all have legitimate security concerns and who are all protected by NATO’s nuclear deterrent.” More recently, he has affirmed that nuclear sharing also “gives also a country like Germany a seat at the table.” This public relations campaign is directly linked to the incoming government’s nuclear policies. While the result of the coalition talks was a new commitment to preserving nuclear sharing, it remains questionable whether or not this will hold in the future. In 2010, the Bundestag passed a nonpartisan resolution requesting that the government work toward removing all nuclear weapons from the country’s territory. Since then, Russian hostility and the CDU’s hold on power—and commitment to nuclear sharing—had previously prevented such a move from being a serious possibility. The Greens and the SPD’s 2021 election platforms, however, did call for the “removal of the U.S. bombs from German soil.” This had led to growing concerns from Germany’s allies. These concerns might be momentarily appeased by the coalition’s decision to maintain the status quo, but they will only be reignited by Germany’s accession to the TPNW, as it bans countries from stationing foreign nuclear weapons on their countries. It thus creates a fundamental tension within Germany’s foreign policy that will eventually have to be resolved. Furthermore, the rejection of nuclear sharing is embraced by a growing number of politicians in Germany, such as Rolf Mützenich, chairman of the SPD in the Bundestag, and many others, meaning that its potential consequences need to be assessed as domestic support increases. A state withdrawing from nuclear sharing is not without precedent: the last American warheads were removed from Canada in 1984. The current context in the case of Germany, however, is different. NATO’s nuclear sharing serves two twin goals: the “protection of allies” and the “projection of military power.” As it has become perceived as being key in deterring aggression from Russia due to the importance of nuclear weapons in Russian strategic thinking, the abandonment of nuclear sharing could seriously harm Germany’s standing within the coalition, incite divisions between countries that are perceived to contribute to the shared defence and those who are accused of not contributing enough, and diminish its influence. Three great concerns trump all others. First, there is a fear that it could lead to other nuclear sharing countries also requesting the weapons’ removal as the arrangement was in great part due to Germany’s role in NATO. This would cripple the trans-Atlantic alliance’s capabilities. Second, in reaction to the potential pursuit of this policy by the incoming coalition, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has also declared that “U.S. nuclear weapons may end up in Eastern Europe if Germany rejects them.” The extension of the nuclear sharing to states such as Poland and the Baltic countries would antagonize Russia even more by bringing more nuclear weapons to its doorstep. Third, it would mean that the alliance is divided and weakened due to resentment against Germany for not doing enough. Within that context, such a possibility would have significant security implications for Canada. As a member of NATO, the alliance’s relationship with Russia and other neighbours directly affects its foreign policy. As an ally of the United States, secured by its nuclear umbrella, Canada has a direct stake in ensuring that NATO remains a unified and stable partnership—for its own good. While the result of the coalition talks means that Germany will remain, for now, in nuclear sharing, a future hypothetical exit remains of great potential consequence for NATO’s cohesion as it would certainly be perceived by Washington—and a hypothetical second Trump White House—as a betrayal. Thus, the coalition agreement’s recommitment to nuclear deterrence, designed to dissipate allies’ concerns, is significant in itself as a positive development for Canada’s security. Giving Up the 2% Defence-Spending Goal Since 2014, NATO members are committed to a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in spending being dedicated to defence costs “to ensure the Alliance’s military readiness.” It is said that the guideline “serves as an indicator of a country’s political will to contribute to NATO’s common defence efforts.” Germany has yet to meet this target, but the previous Merkel cabinets had all reaffirmed their commitment to reaching that goal by 2031. Likewise, Canada has not met the target yet, while the United States, Greece, the United Kingdom, Romania, Estonia, Slovakia Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, France, and Norway are all in compliance. During the previous Republican administration, President Trump had repeatedly feuded with its NATO allies and pressured them to reach the target, even momentarily floating the idea of a 4% spending target. The prospect of a potential new Republican administration following the next 2024 presidential election means that this issue could return to the forefront of NATO internal discussions. Despite the fact that the FDP “stands by the NATO target” and “seeks to spend 3% of output on defence, development and diplomacy,” the SPD does not support the 2% goal and neither do the Greens. Before the coalition, members of both parties “repeatedly questioned NATO’s 2% financing target and instead called for a disarmament policy.” Yet, the coalition agreement did commit the new government to an ambitious 3% spending goal on  “international action,” without specifically mentioning the 2% defence goal. As such, there is a real ambiguity about whether or not Germany will ever truly meet it, which is a change from Merkel’s repeated reassurances that it would. Abandoning the goal would, of course, draw the ire of Washington and probably lead to profound vexation from a hypothetical Republican administration. Again, this would weaken the alliance by diminishing Germany’s buy-in, notwithstanding its goal of modernizing its military forces, and could serve as a precedent for other countries to also give up the goal. Indeed, while Canada’s position on the matter has been that it would reach it eventually, a German refusal could give it diplomatic and political cover to imitate it. If more members of NATO divested themselves of their shared spending responsibilities, it is the trans-Atlantic alliance’s military capability that would be affected and it would become more dependent than ever on the United States’ forces. The FDP is sure to oppose this proposal within the coalition—yet, the Greens’ control of the Foreign Ministry and the SPD’s own ambivalence on the question mean they are probably not the most influential players. Even though the coalition agreement did include a commitment for a 3% spending goal for its “international” actions (which is not limited to defence), the ambiguity over a possible German abandonment of the 2% goal could, again, impact the alliance’s cohesion and Canada’s security. A Useful Reminder of NATO’s Blind Spots As a collective, collaborative and consensual defensive military alliance, NATO—and its internal balance—is bound to be affected by the domestic politics of its member states. In the context of novel forms of aggression through the instrumentalization of migrants by Belarus against Poland, and of continued animosity from Russia, its cohesion is fundamental to its capacity to deter conflicts and guarantee its members’ security. Canada is not exempt from this: its security is directly linked with the strength of the trans-Atlantic alliance as it is a “cornerstone of Canada’s international security and defence policy.” This means that Germany’s incoming “traffic light” coalition and the changes it is bound to make to its country’s foreign policy are sure to impact, through NATO, Canada’s. While this hot take does not argue that the highlighted potential policy shifts— joining the TPNW, withdrawing from nuclear sharing, or abandoning the 2% spending goal—will all happen (indeed, only joining the TPNW has so far been confirmed, while exiting nuclear sharing was set aside as an option), it nonetheless sought to underline NATO’s blind spots in regard to domestic considerations and how they could result in the creation of new rifts within the alliance. While the FDP has moderated some of the SPD and the Greens’ more radical and transformational positions, the 16-years Merkel stability in German foreign policy is over. Conversely, the Greens, the FDP and parts of the SDP had been calling for more stringent opposition to Russia and China, something that the future Foreign minister is set to do. To maintain their security, the United States, Canada, and all of the alliance’s other members will have no choice but to adapt to the new reality of a Scholz chancellorship. ## Trump’s High-Stakes Game: Pressuring Iran and Countering China’s Rise URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/trumps-high-stakes-game-pressuring-iran-and-countering-chinas-rise/ Modified: 2025-05-12 In a March 30 interview, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened Iran with bombing and secondary tariffs if Tehran did not agree to a new nuclear deal with Washington. He mentioned that talks were ongoing between U.S. and Iranian officials but did not provide specific details. Trump stated that if no agreement is reached, he would consider reimposing secondary tariffs similar to those imposed four years ago. In response, Iran rejected direct negotiations under U.S. pressure and military threats but reiterated its willingness to engage in indirect talks. Trump also indicated that he would decide on secondary tariffs in a couple of weeks if no progress is made. This came after his 2017 decision to withdraw the U.S. from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. A week later, on April 8, adopting a somewhat less aggressive stance, President Trump announced that U.S. officials would meet directly with Iranian leaders to discuss the country's nuclear ambitions. He warned that if the talks failed, "Iran is going to be in great danger." He further stated that if the negotiations were unsuccessful, the U.S. might take military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, emphasizing that Iran must not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons. Since the start of his second term, President Trump has been fluctuating between hardline and more indirect approaches toward Tehran. Given these constant shifts, it raises the question of the underlying logic behind the Trump administration's Iran policy. This article argues that beneath these oscillations lies a strategic objective: using maximum pressure not only to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions but also to disrupt its deepening alliance with China—thereby reaffirming U.S. dominance in the region and countering Beijing’s growing global influence. Is Trump serious about the bombing threat? The first question that arises is whether the U.S. president is serious when he discusses the possibility of attacking Iran. Trump's administration has pushed for more aggressive sanctions and military pressure on Iran, particularly since he withdrew the U.S. from the 2015 nuclear deal during his first term. He recently extended the deployment of U.S. military forces in the Middle East and has threatened military strikes if Iran doesn't reach a deal. Some critics, including conservative media commentator Tucker Carlson, have urged against military conflict, citing the potential for significant loss and harm to the U.S. If recent history has taught us anything, it's that nothing President Trump announces should be taken lightly. Recently, Vladimir Putin stated that one of his most outlandish declarations, such as the idea of taking control of Greenland, must be taken seriously. That said, President Trump’s approach, particularly in relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran, has always been transactional. Despite the bold decisions he has made since the start of his second term, it seems likely that he is opting to resume his maximum pressure strategy toward the Iranian regime—pressuring Iranian leaders to make as many concessions as possible, particularly regarding the nuclear program. On this matter, it is worth noting that his non-proliferation strategy is widely supported by most of his allies and, to some extent, by Putin’s Russia, which, despite its support for Tehran, is not entirely comfortable with the idea of a nuclear Iran. While a full-scale U.S. war with Iran remains unlikely, the possibility of targeted strikes against Iranian infrastructure and nuclear facilities cannot be dismissed—particularly given the precedent set by Israel’s successful strike on Syria’s now-defunct nuclear reactor in 2007. That operation demonstrated both the willingness and capability of regional allies to act decisively against perceived nuclear threats. In this context, the United States could choose to delegate such action to Israel, providing varying degrees of logistical or intelligence support. The underlying strategy would be to exert calibrated military pressure as a means of drawing Iran back into negotiations, especially concerning its nuclear program. Is Iran’s Weakening Position Pushing It to Negotiate with Trump? Another important question is whether the resumption of the maximum pressure strategy and the use of military threats will be enough to convince Iranian authorities to sit at the negotiating table and engage in direct talks with representatives of the Trump administration. It is important to note that the U.S. has not held direct talks with Iran since the Obama administration. While Iran has rejected direct negotiations with the U.S. under Trump's leadership, it has expressed willingness to engage in indirect talks. In response to Trump's announcement, Nour News, aligned with Iran's Supreme National Security Council, criticized it as a psychological operation aimed at influencing public opinion. The Islamic Republic of Iran has long refused direct negotiations with the United States due to ideological and political reasons, viewing such talks as a legitimization of U.S. policies that it perceives as harmful to its sovereignty and regional stability. Even when dialogue might seem beneficial from an international perspective, officials may refuse direct U.S. talks due to internal regime rivalries, nationalist rhetoric, and fear of losing domestic legitimacy. Iran believes direct negotiations could compromise its core principles, including its stance on regional influence, nuclear development, and resistance to Western dominance. Instead, Iran prefers multilateral talks, which it sees as a more balanced way to address issues with the U.S. without isolating its positions. On April 7, it was no surprise that Tehran confirmed the resumption of dialogue on Iran's nuclear program, while specifying that it would take the form of indirect talks. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the talks would be mediated by Oman, with the US envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, participating. This follows an earlier announcement by President Trump about "direct" talks with Iran, although Tehran has rejected the idea of direct negotiations. Interestingly, Russia has recently offered to mediate between Tehran and Washington, particularly concerning Iran's nuclear program. This move signals Russia's growing role in international diplomacy, especially as tensions between Iran and the U.S. remain high. The Kremlin's mediation offer reflects both its strategic interests and its desire to promote multilateralism, potentially reducing the likelihood of unilateral U.S. actions. Russia’s overture also builds on the Trump administration’s conciliatory stance allowing Moscow to expand its influence, especially in areas like the Middle East where U.S. leadership had waned. However, recent developments in the Levant, including the weakening of Iran's proxy forces and its asymmetric military capabilities, have significantly diminished Iran’s regional strategic depth. This loss, combined with sanctions and diplomatic isolation, could push Tehran to reconsider its refusal of direct talks with the U.S. While Iran has been ideologically opposed to such negotiations, changing regional dynamics and the economic and political costs of its current strategy may make engaging with the U.S. a more viable option to de-escalate tensions and protect its interests. Beyond the Madman: The Silk thread Although it may appear disordered and improvised, the international policy of the Trump administration finds coherence in its goal of limiting China’s global influence—whether in Panama, Greenland, the global economic arena, or the South China Sea. The U.S. Vice President confirmed the existence of an anti-China thread in Washington's policy, stating that since taking office, the Trump administration has been seeking an antidote to the "globalist economy," which, according to American policymakers, would systematically benefit Chinese interests. Regarding Iran, Washington is particularly concerned about Iran falling under China’s influence. In March 2021, Tehran and Beijing signed an ambitious strategic partnership covering economic, technological, and military sectors. The 25-year agreement between China and Iran marks a strategic rapprochement seen by the U.S. as a direct threat to its interests. This cooperation manifests through military exchanges, including arms sales, joint exercises, and technological sharing, thus strengthening Iran's defensive and offensive capabilities. Economically, this alliance extends to energy, infrastructure, and broader economic sectors, integrating Iran into China’s "Belt and Road" (BRI) initiative and further binding the Islamic Republic to China. For China, Iran’s position at the crossroads of the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia makes it an essential part of their geopolitical and economic strategies. Washington fears that this partnership could turn Iran into a strategic pivot, weakening its efforts to limit China’s influence in the Middle East and Asia. In the medium term, China’s diplomatic activism, aimed at bringing Iran closer to regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), is seen as a way for Beijing to establish itself as a key political and economic player, thereby marginalizing American influence. In the long run, this tripartite cooperation could facilitate the emergence of an Eurasian bloc, with Iran as a key link, potentially serving as a counterbalance to American hegemony. These elements offer a broader context for understanding Washington's approach to Iran, especially in light of the resurgence of the "maximum pressure" strategy and the ongoing threats of military action. Instead of resorting to military strikes that would devastate Iran's economy and infrastructure, the United States aims to achieve a more strategic goal: detaching Iran from China's growing influence. By doing so, Washington hopes to gradually reestablish Iran within the U.S. sphere of influence, where it can be more easily managed and influenced politically and economically. The U.S. strategy seeks to draw Iran away from its deepening ties with China and encourage Tehran to return to a framework where its economic and political activities are aligned more closely with U.S. interests. At a minimum, Washington hopes to bring Iran into a trading system that remains under U.S. oversight and regulations, ensuring that American influence continues to shape the region's economic landscape, and that Iran remains somewhat constrained in its global dealings. This approach reflects a long-term vision of reasserting U.S. dominance in the Middle East and reducing China's expanding footprint in the region. Conclusion In conclusion, the ongoing U.S.-Iran tensions reflect a complex and fluctuating policy landscape, with President Trump's strategy shifting between aggressive pressure tactics and diplomatic overtures. Despite his threats of military action and reimposition of secondary tariffs, the likelihood of full-scale war remains slim, though targeted strikes could still be on the table as bargaining tools. Iran's resistance to direct negotiations underscores its ideological stance, but changing regional dynamics and increasing pressure may force Tehran to reconsider its position. Meanwhile, Washington’s concerns about Iran’s growing ties with China add another layer of urgency to the situation, as the U.S. seeks to limit China's influence in the region. Ultimately, the U.S. strategy aims not just at nuclear containment but at reasserting its dominance in the Middle East by reshaping Iran’s alliances and economic framework. As the geopolitical chess game unfolds, one thing is certain: the stakes are high, and the balance of power in the region could shift dramatically in the coming years. ## Turkey’s Disputed Role in NATO URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/turkeys-disputed-role-in-nato/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Since the fall of the USSR, the Turkish government has contested the usefulness of NATO. How is Turkey acting against NATO, and what are the strategic interests of Turkey? Since the fall of the USSR, the Turkish government has contested the usefulness of NATO. This challenge has increased following the recent decisions of the Turkish government: procuring Russian S- 400s, collaborating with the military in Iran, and competing with other members of NATO in the Mediterranean region. How is Turkey acting against the organization, and what are the strategic interests of Turkey? Turkey’s Acquisition of Russian S-400s: More Than a Military Transaction Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, military tensions have intensified between NATO and Russia. The latest Russian military doctrine, published in 2014, qualifies NATO as a threat to Russia's territorial security. Yet, in 2019, the Turkish government procured two Russian anti-missile systems (S–400s). The US Congress immediately blocked the delivery of F35 fighter jets to the Turkish army. This acquisition has greatly complicated NATO's strategy because these systems reveals disclose military information to the Russian government. This military purchase calls into question Turkey's political intentions. Traditionally, Turkey has been viewed as the “western world's forward sentinel” against Russia. In the event of a Russian offensive against another NATO country, would the Turkish military still be a reliable partner? Turkey appears to be getting political concessions from Russia. One of the Russian strategies is to combine sales of military equipment with political negotiations in order to increase its influence in the Middle East. The Russian-Turkish negotiations seem to follow this logic, since a only a few months separate the signing of the Astana talks (May 2017), and the Turkish government’s announcement to obtain S-400s (September 2017). The purchase of the S-400s by the Turkish military has probably resulted in political gains, especially in the Syrian conflict. The Talks in Astana and the Importance of the “Kurdish Issue” for Turkey    We can observe one constant in Turkish military strategy in Syria, namely to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region controlled by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). This strategic imperative explains: The last military cooperation between Turkey, Iran and Russia (the Astana and Sochi talks); The many criticisms made by the Turkish government against the US army for supporting the Kurdish fighters; Turkish attempts to obtain military assistance and guarantees from NATO. On the one hand, Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Iranian collaborations against the PKK took root at the turn of the new millennium. In 1993, 1994 and 1995, Iran and Turkey signed security protocols, demanding that they no longer support the PKK. In 2000, the Russian and Turkish prime ministers also signed agreements in principle to facilitate the fight against separatists in Russia and Turkey. The Astana talks are also a military coordination to, among other things, fight the PKK in Syria. On the other hand, during the Iraq war in 2003, Turkey refused to join the Anglo-Saxon coalition on the pretext that the intervention would facilitate the creation of a Kurdistan. During the Syrian conflict, the US military trained and equipped the YPG, a Syrian branch of the PKK. Thus, the military agreements between Turkey, Iran, and Russia aimed to thwart the military objectives of the US government. These agreements remain problematic for NATO, even though the US government no longer appears to support the PKK. Turkey is working with two countries targeted by EU and US sanctions. At the same time, in 2012, 2015 and 2020, Turkey demanded emergency meetings (under article 4 of the treaty) over the Syrian conflict. This approach has contradictions, since Turkey wants to obtain military support from NATO, while negotiating separately with Iran and Russia. Turkish Energy Independence at the Center of Tensions in the Mediterranean  Given the strategic importance of the Mediterranean region, Turkey is adopting a risky military strategy: Byconducting rival military exercises against France and Greece in the Mediterranean; Hasused aggressive rhetoric towards these two NATO countries; Bycompeting with Russian strategic objectives in Libya. In fact, control of the eastern Mediterranean and northern Libya is essential for the country's energy security. The Turkish economy depends on a constant supply of energy. Not having sufficient energy production capacities for their demand, the Turkish government has to import massive amounts of Russian and Iranian natural gas and oil. In Libya, Turkey supports the Government of National Accord (GNA). The latter controls Sirte, a port city and the majority of Libyan oil wells. Recently, a gas field in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea was discovered by a Turkish company. With control over these two territories, the country could reduce its energy imports and develop an energy policy more independent of Russia and Iran. Achieving these goals, however, comes at the expense of regional stability. Turkey competes with Greece and France for the same sea areas. The Turkish government has called these two countries imperialist, comparing current interventions to colonial conquests. Without easing tensions, Turkey risks going to war with two allies, in addition to being marginalized within NATO. The Turkish government also competes with Russia in Libya. On the one hand, the Russian army is supporting a coalition led by Marshal Haftar. On the other hand, the Turkish army is training GNA soldiers and Libyan militias. In short, to secure strategic areas, Turkey appears ready to sacrifice its involvement in NATO and to be inflexible towards Greek, French and Russian positions. The COVID-19 Crisis and Turkey: Economic Recovery and Aggressive Policies  Turkey’s economic situation was already precarious before the Covid-19 Crisis: The Syrian and Libyan conflicts, the failed coup d'etat, and the influx of refugees have destabilized the country; Since 2018, the Turkish market is considered speculative and risky according to stock market indices; The health crisis caused a global economic slowdown, accentuating Turkey's economic and political problems. The significant decrease in global tourism and exports has had a significant impact on the Turkish economy. The latest military actions in the Mediterranean are probably taken to revive the economy and to divert attention to their internal difficulties. However, Turkey is acting against Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as it endangers regional stability and uses force without the consent of the UN. Recommendations for the Canadian Armed Forces Turkey appears to view NATO as inadequate for all of its security needs. The country is developing a security policy that includes NATO, Russia and Iran. It participated in the Astana talks, bought Russian S-400s and continued to cooperate with NATO. This security strategy carries significant risks with rising tensions within NATO, against Russia and against Iran. Turkey's military intentions remain ambiguous. Some tactics fall below the threshold of war, such as the training of militias in Libya. The Turkish government is arguing with France and Greece, two of Canada's strategic partners. Finally, Turkey is joining forces with Iran and Russia to change the international order. Canadian Defense must therefore act prudently: To the extent possible, Turkey's strategic interests should be reconciled with NATO's overall vision; Joint efforts to deter Turkey's actions can encourage the country to collaborate more with Russia and with Iran; At the same time, Canada must demand a dialogue excluding the threat of armed intervention; The resumption of discussions between Turkey, Greece and France is necessary, whether within NATO or in a less formal framework. ## Turkey’s And Iran’s Drone Supply In The War In Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/turkeys-and-irans-drone-supply-in-the-war-in-ukraine/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Turkey’s and Iran’s military supply to the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces has been evidenced by the presence of TB2, Mohajer, and Shahed 136 drones on the battlefield. This strategic and military support disavowed by Tehran and Ankara is not exclusively a symptom of a security alliance or military cooperation. Turkey’s and Iran’s military supply to the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces has been evidenced by the presence of TB2, Mohajer, and Shahed 136 drones on the battlefield. This strategic and military support disavowed by Tehran and Ankara is not exclusively a symptom of a security alliance or military cooperation. The supply of drones reflects actual political and geopolitical bets for Erdogan and Raisi. Both leaders face situations of internal fragility in their countries. Turkey because of its criticized political authoritarianism and the unprecedented economic crisis it is facing; Iran because of its international isolation coupled with the recent revolt movement emanating from its civil society. The support that the Turkish and Iranian authorities provide to both Kyiv and Moscow allows them to capitalize politically on these drones in order to see their geopolitical and economic interests prevail on the regional and international scene. Through its supply of TB2 drones to Ukrainian forces, Ankara is securing its so-called balancing act that is necessary to confirm its alignment with NATO and counter Russian influence in the Black Sea, while keeping the dialogue open with Russia for economic and geopolitical reasons. With the legislative and presidential elections of June 2023 in mind, Erdogan's balancing act aims to strengthen the Turkish president's position internally by improving his image. The Iranian Mohajer and Shahed 136 drones supplied to the Russian forces allow Tehran to hope to obtain counterparts both in Syria – where Iran seeks to establish a direct corridor between Tehran and Beirut – and in Central Asia – where the Iranian power is destabilized by Azerbaijan and its allies. This support provided to the Russian forces allows Iran not only to develop its drone technologies but also, more broadly, to restore the balance of power with its regional opponents (Israel in particular) and thus strengthen its axis of resistance in the Middle East.   Introduction Iran’s and Turkey’s involvement in the Ukrainian conflict through a supply of military drones to the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces has been highly publicized. It questions the Turkish and Iranian incentives behind their respective support of the two belligerents. Initiated in 2016 with a military cooperation agreement, the strategic rapprochement accelerated in 2019 with the signing of a $69 million contract between Baykar Marina and Ukrspetsproekt for the purchase of drones: Ukraine then became one of the main importers of Bayraktar TB2 drones. These exchanges allowed Ukraine to have an initial fleet of 24 combat drones at the beginning of the Russian invasion in February 2022. On the Russian side, according to information provided by the United States, the first delivery of Iranian Shahed-136 and Mohajer drones has taken place at the end of August 2022. The international community monitored their appearance on the Ukrainian battlefield in September. Iranian drones are not very sophisticated, but their low cost (about $ 20,000) represents an obvious advantage for the Russians: wear down the Ukrainian rear front and benefit from a relative rebalancing at a lower cost[1]. Indeed, through cumulative effects, the Russians hope to weaken the Ukrainian rear front, following a logic of attrition. This dual supply from Iran and Turkey follows economic logic: indeed, the deployment of these technologies in a conflictual theater allows them to be perfected while allowing the two providers to acquire greater credibility as exporters of drones and ultimately increase their market share. However, the Turkish desire to distance itself from the export of drones to Ukraine since February 2022 and the non-recognition from the Iranians that they have supplied the Russians during the war show that the decision of whether or not to supply a belligerent state entails several (geo)political issues. Therefore, apart from economic considerations, what are the political incentives that determine the supply of Iranian and Turkish drones to Ukraine? To what extent do the political strategies that determined Turkish and Iranian supplies differ? In the first part, we will discuss the Turkish political incentives, but also the geopolitical gains that Erdogan hopes to gain in view of the June 2023 elections. In the second part, we will focus on the Iranian motivations for supplying Russia with drones. We will show that Iran's external priorities have favored its support to Russian armed forces in the conflict in Ukraine. Turkey’s Motivations Behind Its Supply Of TB2 To Ukraine During the first months of the war in Ukraine, the Bayraktar TB2 quickly gained popularity and those drones were promoted as a symbol of Ukrainian resistance because of their feats of arms. Indeed, the surprising disorganization of Russian troops and the absence of a real Russian air campaign (that would have aimed at establishing dominance in the airfield at the beginning of the war) allowed these drones to distinguish themselves while reducing the Kremlin’s military arsenal.  These drones are not the Ukrainians’ “secret weapon” and will not, on their own, drive the Russians out of Ukrainian territory. However, they helped slow the advance of Russian troops while supporting the Ukrainian counteroffensive. This military success allows Turkey to strengthen its technological and political credibility in several respects. Indeed, the results of the TB2 on the Ukrainian battlefield attract new customers, but, above all, allow Ankara to capitalize politically on this technology. The supply of TB2 corroborates a strategic proximity between Kyiv and Ankara despite the latter’s fluid relationship with Russia. Turkey’s cooperative relations with both Russia and Ukraine have imposed a so-called “balancing act” and responded to an internal political interest: the re-election of Erdogan and the AKP in the next presidential and legislative elections in June 2023. Erdogan's desire to ensure the continuity of his authoritarian power in 2023 requires him to accommodate both Ukrainian and Russian interests for geopolitical and economic reasons. Firstly, cooperation between Turks and Ukrainians responds to a common concern, that of potential Russian supremacy in the Black Sea. The access this sea offers to the Mediterranean Sea makes it a strategic matter, particularly because of the amount of exports of hydrocarbons and agricultural products that come from the bordering countries and then transit through it. Ukraine and Russia are the two largest exporters of cereals, sunflowers, and fertilizers and use the Black Sea to convey their exports. Therefore, Turkey, which derives many economic and political benefits from its control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles Straits, is concerned about recent Russian maneuvers around this maritime area. Those maneuvers aim at opening up Moscow by providing an access to the “warm seas” (in particular the Mediterranean) by strengthening Russia's position in the Black Sea. Indeed, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 provided Russia with a sea area three times larger in the Black Sea. Its destabilizing operations in Georgia, both its military intervention in 2008 in South Ossetia and its massive propaganda campaigns during parliamentary elections in 2020, show its interest in destabilizing another coastal state in the area. For Ankara, this revisionism foreshadows a relative encirclement and Russian supremacy over this hydrocarbon-rich space. Now, the additional acquisition of Ukrainian coastal territories could grant Moscow supremacy in the Black Sea and impose a quasi-bipolar situation (except for Romania and Bulgaria) that will not be in favor of Turkish security and economic interests. Cooperation between Kyiv and Ankara is therefore strengthened by the struggle against Russian aspirations in the Black Sea, but also by the Turkish expression of sensitivity towards the Crimean Tatars, particularly since 2014. This rapprochement has facilitated the intensification of armament cooperation that became, in 2019, a strategic partnership essentially based on Turkish drones. These exchanges have enabled Ukraine to strengthen, for a time, its deterrent and defensive capabilities in the face of Russia's aggressiveness. It has also allowed Kyiv to enjoy Turkish support in its bid to join NATO. For Turkey, this rapprochement strengthens its position within NATO. It also potentially allows it to assert its interests despite its aggressive foreign policy in Syria or certain tensions with the United States following Ankara's purchase of Russian S-400 air-defense missile systems and the purchase of Russian gas in rubles. Thus, Turkey manages to ensure its alignment with its NATO allies through its drone supply while maintaining its economic ties with Russia. Indeed, Ankara has been able to maintain the dialogue with the Kremlin despite the invasion of Ukrainian territory as of February 2022. This so-called “equilibrist” positioning is all the more surprising since Turkey and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated significant geopolitical divergences in Syria, Libya, but also in the Caucasus. This paradox regarding Turkish-Russian ties is a pragmatic connivance. More concretely, Turkey and Russia cultivate ties that are neither binding nor costly alliances, but allow them “to control the international agenda for a while, to influence the world diplomatic stage, to constrain others and to achieve immediate results". Secondly, Erdogan's current positioning allows him to maintain his economic ties with Russia, Turkey's third-largest trading partner. This strong economic activity between the two countries does not allow Turkey to risk losing this trading partner by applying Western sanctions against Russia, especially given the current Turkish economic slump characterized by inflation exceeding 80% over one year and a 44% decline of the Turkish lira against the dollar in 2021. From a geopolitical point of view, Turkey needs to maintain its ties with Russia, the power dominating Syrian airspace, to establish its 30-km-wide “safe zone” along its southern border in Syria. Indeed, although the Russian projection in Syria is threatened by the balance of forces in Ukraine, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) still have a stronghold in northeastern Syria. The Russian desire to establish a defense system in the Qamishli region (the Kurdish area) confirms Russia's presence in the long term and ultimately gives Putin leverage over Erdogan. Between 2016 and 2019, Turkey launched three operations in northern Syria against the Kurds, mainly against the coalition of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Those were backed by Washington and, previously, by an international coalition that aimed at retaking Kobane from the Islamic State in 2015. Russia has tolerated those Turkish military interventions in northern Syria even as the Kremlin seeks to avoid dividing Syrian territory into areas of influence. On November 13, 2022, an attack in Istanbul has been attributed by the Turkish government to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and the YPG (People's Protection Units). Erdogan has since launched the “Claw-Sword” offensive in northern Syria and Iraq. The Kurds, despite being Washington’s allies, are calling on the Russians and not the Americans to contain the Turks and their desire for a ground offensive. In other words, if Turkey wishes to continue its attacks on the SDF to ensure the establishment of a “safe zone” on its southern flank, it must first ensure that Russia does not oppose it in order to avoid the Russian bombing of Turkish troops. Turkish involvement in Ukraine has therefore responded to internal political interests. With his so-called balancing act, Erdogan is trying to obtain economic and security gains in the Black Sea and Syria to restore his image on the Turkish internal scene and promote his and his party’s re-election. Indeed, Turkey's civil opposition is growing and public opinion is exasperated both by the economic slump and political authoritarianism, which could threaten Erdogan’s and the AKP's power base in future elections. Iranian Motives Behind The Supply Of Mohajer And Shahed 136 Iran's willingness to supply drones to Russia mainly responds to geopolitical considerations. It is about strengthening Iran externally, both by developing its “Shiite axis of resistance” in the Middle East and by protecting its interests in Central Asia. Those regional aspirations are intended to thwart any external attempt to destabilize the regime, all the while having its power internally weakened. Iran has every interest in supporting the Russians in their war in Ukraine both to prevent the Russian government from suffering a setback that would be politically costly, and to confirm a strategic rapprochement between the two countries. Historically, Iranian support has been linked to obvious ideological proximity with Russia. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, officials have been perceiving the international environment as hostile and therefore as a threat to its survival. This perception is fed and fostered by virulent anti-Westernism. However, after decades of isolation on the international scene due to its “Neither East nor West” strategy, Iran opted in 2005 for a “Look to the East Policy” (Nagah be Shargh) formulated by Ari Larijani[2]. Despite attempts under President Rouhani to move closer to the West with the establishment of the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) from 2015 on, Iran has never really abandoned its desire to foster its ties with the “East[3]”, and to demonstrate its Eurasian sense of belonging, something that Iran and Russia have in common. The long process of Iran's accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where it obtained permanent membership in September 2022, is a good illustration of this desire. Moreover, Iran has not hesitated to violate Security Council Resolution 2231, which prohibited it from supplying military weapons until 2023 (one of the founding rules of the JCPOA) even though negotiations for the restoration of the agreement had resumed in April 2021. Thus, delivering military equipment to Russia shows an undeniable Iranian anchoring in the “East”. It also means that Iran overlooks the risk of abandoning its reintegration into the international system once and for all. In addition to the ideological proximity between the two states, the strengthening of their cooperation also responds to Iranian security and strategic interests. The supply of drones to Russia allows Tehran to secure a Russian ally, to avoid isolation on the international scene, and to circumvents Western sanctions that are aimed at suffocating the Iranian economy. At the same time, this cooperation offers Iran potential levers of pressure vis-à-vis Russia on the Syrian issue and promotes the implementation of its Eurasian strategy[4]. Indeed, Russia is historically the hegemon in Central Asia. However, China has been developing its influence for several years, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative. In this context, and given the rapprochement between Baku and Tel Aviv, Tehran is forced to base its Eurasian strategy on Russia in order to promote its interests, including, by extension, in the Caucasus, a region where frozen conflicts are being revived (a tendency that dates back a couple of years). As early as 2020, when the war in Karabakh broke out, an indirect confrontation started between Azerbaijan and Iran. Yerevan was supported by the Iranian armed forces and Baku by Turkey, but also by Israel. The lightning Azeri victory over Armenia was made possible mainly by the supply of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones and was experienced as a humiliation by both Armenians and the Iranian power. Thus, the current supply of drones to Russia in the context of the conflict in Ukraine sends a clear signal of deterrence towards Turkey and Israel: that of an undeniable technological catch-up in terms of drones. The Russian shipment of captured Western military equipment on Ukrainian ground is part of the Iranian plan for military modernization and comes as compensation for its drones. At the same time, tensions with Baku have recently intensified, following Ilham Aliyev's statements regarding the establishment of the Zangezur corridor, which will directly connect Azerbaijan to Turkey (via the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan, but also through Armenian territory) de facto excluding Iran from the itinerary. This project is all the more considered dangerous by the Iranians because of the economic and military ties between Israel and Azerbaijan. Tehran suspects that Israeli troops are present on Azeri soil and this reinforces the feeling of a “citadel besieged”[5] among the Iranian authorities. To put pressure on Baku and limit its rapprochement with Israel, Iran wants to thwart the Zangezur corridor project (still under construction) by promoting the Persian Gulf-Black Sea International Transport Corridor (ITC). The exclusion of Azerbaijan from this corridor would prevent it from benefitting significantly from international transport and trade in Central Asia and it would probably have heavy political costs. To strengthen the pre-eminence of the ITC and its credibility over the future Zangezur, the Iranians must benefit from Russian support. Indeed, Moscow holds greater pressure on Turkey and Israel, the two main countries that support Baku in its plan to isolate Iran in Central Asia. The recent supply of drones also allows Iran to ask for counterparties and put pressure on Russia in Syria, an area over which the strategies of these two allies can be very different. On one hand, Moscow became involved in Syria in 2015 with the main objectives of safeguarding the Al-Assad regime and amplifying its presence in the Middle East. On the other hand, Iran seeks, through its involvement, to preserve its security interests, but also to project power in the Middle East. Since the 1980s, Tehran has sought to influence Syrian spheres of power, and the 2011 civil war represented an opportunity for Iran to promote its administrative control over a part of Syrian territory and the country's officials. Tehran is therefore pursuing its “proxy war” strategy by supporting pro-Iranian militias and deploying a part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria and more broadly in the Middle East. Ensuring its influence over the failed Syrian state would enable Iran to establish a direct territorial corridor between Tehran and Beirut via Iraq and Syria. Iran's increased presence in Syria thus makes it possible to strengthen its “axis of resistance” and to modify a balance of forces that is currently to its disadvantage in the Middle East because of the economic and military superiority of its regional rivals, the main one being Israel. In an effort to counter Iran's growing influence in the Middle East and particularly in Syria, Tel Aviv has established a “deconfliction mechanism” following Russia's involvement on the ground and in the air, in 2015, during the Syrian war. This mechanism aims at ensuring military coordination with Moscow to avoid indirect clashes with the Russian armed forces when Israel conducts its air raids and operations against Iranian deployments. Of course, this mechanism is not in favor of Iran's interests and demonstrates the absence of Russian support for Tehran’s geopolitical ambitions – tinged with confessionalism – in Syria and more broadly in the Middle East. Indeed, while the Russians and Iranians have agreed to keep Assad in power, they have two distinguished political solutions in mind. Russia seeks to stabilize Syria to ensure a foothold and does not perceive the presence of pro-Iranian non-state armed groups as being advantageous for them. Moscow does not approve of Iran's desire to strengthen a Shiite axis in the region and to influence the Syrian government to develop its influence in the region. Indeed, Iran's proxy war strategy results in increased support for the presence of these militias in Syria and it undermines the strengthening of the Syrian central power (and this is not in Russia’s interests). Nowadays, Russia is, therefore, in a delicate situation. The war it is waging in Ukraine is weakening its strategic positions in other areas, particularly in Syria. This war effort effectively foreshadows an “economy” for the Russians in the deployment of their military capabilities in Syria. Tehran could take advantage of this new need to develop its drone sales, but also acquire a greater lever of pressure on Moscow. The supply of drones is therefore a way for Iran to strengthen its alliance with Russia in order to obtain its support in Central Asia, but also represents an opportunity to develop levers of pressure on Moscow that will allow it to obtain concessions on the Syrian issue. ***** This analysis showed that the political strategies of the two countries differ in several respects. Indeed, Ankara seems to be guided by political rather than geopolitical considerations. Erdogan's desire to strengthen his power and ensure his re-election in June 2023 partly explains his strong diplomatic dynamism on the Ukrainian issue. Its links with Ukraine and Russia allow Turkey to extend its influence on the international sphere through its capacity to mediate between the belligerent states despite having aggressive behavior in its regional environment (Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, etc.). The desire to secure its position in the Black Sea through a rapprochement with Kyiv and its need to preserve its links with Russia for economic and security reasons (especially in Syria) could allow it to improve its image in order to strengthen its position internally. As for Iran's supply of drones to Russia, the focus is on responding to geopolitical dynamics and protecting the Iranian regime from Israeli destabilization attempts in its direct regional environment: The Middle East and Central Asia. The power asymmetry between Tehran and Tel Aviv undermines the development of Iran's “axis of resistance” and consequently threatens its internal security and its projection of power on the regional scene. To change this unfavorable balance of power, Iran favors a strategic rapprochement with Russia, a rapprochement needed to support its Eurasian strategy and develop its deterrence capabilities against Baku and in Syria against Israel.  This dependence on Russia is intensified in the context of a weakening Iranian political power due to the internal revolt movement. The supply of drones for the war in Ukraine represents an economic opportunity for both countries but therefore responds to different pressures and interests. These military supports can be seen as risky bets for Ankara and Tehran. By providing these drones, both countries are encouraging the continuation of the conflict, but the stalemate that could result from this military support would be counterproductive: given the current balance of forces on the battlefield, a continuation of the conflict would contribute to the weakening of Russia (even if Moscow resumes the initiative on the battlefield). For Turkey, this weakening would undermine its double game between NATO and Moscow and would certainly reduce the economic gains it derives from Russia's circumvention of international sanctions. For Iran, the likelihood that the Russian government will sideline Iranian interests to ensure its survival will also increase with Moscow's potential weakening in Ukraine. Indeed, Iran would pay a high price for a strong positioning in the “East” and without Russia’s power, it would be extremely vulnerable to Israeli destabilization operations and the general pressure of the international community.   [1] Dr. Delanoë's interview conducted on November 16, 2022, on Russia-Iran relations in the context of the war in Ukraine and a growing supply of Iranian drones.  [2] Interview with Professor Pahlavi conducted on November 9, 2022, on Iranian diplomatic strategy in general and in the Ukrainian conflict. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. ## Ukraine and Taiwan: Not the Same Fight URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ukraine-and-taiwan-not-the-same-fight/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > As the war is raging in Ukraine, shock waves reverberate in East Asia, where many in Taiwan fear they could be next. As the war is raging in Ukraine, shock waves reverberate in East Asia, where many in Taiwan fear they could be next. The Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, has never made a secret of his ambition to reunify Taiwan with the mainland, preferably peacefully, but without ruling out the deployment of military force if necessary. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has become increasingly assertive, routinely violating Taiwan’s airspace. The return of interstate war engenders vivid security concerns, provoking major foreign policy ruptures worldwide. Germany has announced a Є100-billion envelope to modernize its military and pledge to spend 2% of its GDP on defence in response to Russia’s aggression, while influential former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called for an end to the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity over Taiwan. Abe also expressed favorable views for hosting and sharing nuclear weapons with the U.S. Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China (PRC/China) and Russia have denounced for the first time, in a joint statement, NATO's enlargement, and the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, and affirmed a shared world view. Despite Chinese media and officials explaining that the comparison between Ukraine and Taiwan is wrong, there are fears that war in Ukraine could impact China's calculus over Taiwan and enhance conflict escalation in East Asia. Analysts interpret Russia's aggression against Ukraine as another hit on the liberal world order, further fragilizing U.S. credibility, and encouraging authoritarian regimes to rely on force. Western intelligence agencies, experts, and pundits have expressed concerns that China could capitalize on the West being busy in Ukraine to increase pressure on Taiwan. This begs the question: What parallels and lessons can be drawn from the war in Ukraine for a possible conflict in Taiwan? First, U.S. diplomatic and military support to Taiwan results from America's geostrategic and geo-economic interests associated with the island's defence. Such interests are absent in Ukraine, which means U.S. credibility in East Asia shares no relation with Ukraine. Second, China is unlikely to change its short-term calculations regarding Taiwan because the PLA remains unprepared to conduct a difficult amphibious invasion successfully. Unlike Russia, China has time on its side, a broader toolkit to coerce Taiwan, and a need for global stability. U.S. Security Commitments to Taiwan Are Stronger Than to Ukraine The United States has been far more implicated in Taiwan's defence since 1954 than it has ever been in Ukraine since 1991, making one commitment incomparably stronger than the other. During the first and second Taiwan Strait Crises (1954 and 1958), the U.S. actively supported its ally, the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan). The U.S. Congress passed the "Formosa Resolution," giving President Eisenhower full authority to defend Taiwan and its small islands. The third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-96) witnessed another American display of forces supporting the ROC to deter the PRC, even though the U.S.-ROC alliance had been replaced in 1979 by the Taiwan Relation Act: While not a formal security alliance, it nonetheless has provisions for the U.S. to supply weapons so Taiwan can defend itself. Furthermore, the U.S policy of strategic ambiguity has never stopped Washington from arming Taiwan with technologically advanced weapons (including fighter jets, drones, artillery). In comparison, Ukraine has only received defensive weapons such as Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger air defence missiles, ammunition, and military hardware since the beginning of the crisis and then of the war. President Biden's supportive declaration reaffirming U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan is completely different than the unambiguous statement that no U.S. soldier will ever step foot on Ukrainian soil to defend Kyiv against Moscow. However, it is interesting to note that not only U.S. military instructors have been in Taiwan to train its army – they were also already present in Ukraine before Russia’s invasion. Even though there has been no official U.S.-Taiwan policy shift, Biden's supportive declaration to Taiwan is accompanied by the introduction of the Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, the Taiwan Defense Act, and the Arm Taiwan Act to the U.S. Congress. Although not adopted yet, these bills contrast with  the $14 billion in emergency funding Congress authorized to help Ukraine and especially with the newly introduced 2022 Defending Ukraine Sovereignty Act, which has no provision for the use of U.S. military force in defence of Ukraine, while it is increasingly discussed in the case of Taiwan even though it is under specified circumstances. Moreover, the Taiwan Travel Act, which encourages the U.S. and Taiwanese officials to visit each other, was signed into law in 2018, while the TAIPEI Act, which reinforces trade and economic relations with Taiwan and other nations, was adopted in 2020. As such, U.S. credibility is more at stake in Taiwan than in Ukraine. A new version of the 1941 Lend-Lease Act could allow the U.S. to lend more sophisticated military equipment to Ukraine. But even if Washington further extends its support to Ukraine, Kyiv does not have anything remotely similar to the Taiwan Relation Act. As Jake Sullivan, U.S. National Security Adviser, emphasizes, this policy decision constitutes a significant legal difference between Ukraine and Taiwan. From a diplomatic standpoint, the significant and long-lasting U.S. support to Taiwan makes its retrieval highly complex and reputationally costly. U.S. actions or non-actions in Ukraine will not fundamentally change this situation. U.S. Interests in East Asia The significant U.S. geo-economic and geostrategic interests in Taiwan's defence mirrors the strong diplomatic and military support Taipei has received from Washington. Taiwan is located in the First Island Chain, which stretches from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south, bordering strategic maritime sea lanes in the East and South China Seas. A PRC-seized Taiwan would give its missiles a 150 nautical miles extension to the east. This would increase Chinese control on strategic sea lanes and place parts of Japan and Guam within the Chinese missile range. It would seriously undermine, if not shatter, the credibility of U.S. commitments to other allies, potentially pushing Japan, South Korea, and others to go nuclear. Taiwan represents a crucial link of the U.S. security network, as indicated in Washington's latest Indo-Pacific strategy. Economically, Taiwan is the U.S.’s 9th-biggest commercial partner totalling $105.9 billion in goods and services (two-way). In comparison, Ukraine was the United States’ 67th trading partner with merely $3.7 billion in economic exchanges between the two countries in 2019. Taiwan is widely integrated into the global economy and has strategic importance for semiconductors. It is home to TSMC, one of the world's biggest semiconductor companies, representing 50% of the total global market share. It even goes to 90% of dominance on specific market segments. Semiconductors are crucial for electronic devices used in military systems and other non-military industries on which the modern economy depends. By ensuring the global supply of a product indispensable to manufacture strategic goods, Taiwan has a geo-economic value that Ukraine lacks. China's Calculus Over Taiwan is Different than Russia's Over Ukraine If Russian adventurism in Ukraine is like a barometer for Beijing to gauge the costs of using military force, it is unlikely that China finds it appealing to invade Taiwan. China has time on its side. Russia is in a hurry and has little leverage outside its military to coerce its geopolitical competitors, except for oil and gas exports. It results in Russia relying on its military to secure vital interests through disruption because it lacks other means. China, on the contrary, has more tools (lawfare, psychological and economic warfare, and the use of force under the threshold of war) at its disposal to engineer Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. Russia is challenging the international system by reordering the European borders through brute force. China intends to modify the international system by creating new norms and institutions reflecting its world vision, values, and interests. Russia’s aggression is a source of instability, which is not good for Xi Jinping who wants to secure his coming renomination. In the longer term, China wants economic flows unaltered so its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) can thrive and enhance world connectivity. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – a significant connector for China’s BRI – puts Xi Jinping in a very uncomfortable situation. Russia’s denial of Ukraine’s sovereignty runs counter to China’s foreign policy principles. China’s position is cautious – and its non-actions demonstrate a willingness to minimize backlash against its interests. Were China to attack Taiwan tomorrow, the current instability that Beijing wants to avoid would instead be spurred. 60% of China’s exports go to the U.S. and its allies. In the case of a sudden Chinese invasion of Taiwan, many of China’s trade surpluses would shrink due to sanctions, which would shake the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy, undermine its BRI, and potentially complicate Xi Jinping’s renomination for a third term. Last but not least, militarily speaking, Taiwan is an island, making it more difficult to invade than Ukraine. Putin "just" had to cross land borders and face – on paper – a relatively weak Ukrainian army. In contrast, China would have to mount a sophisticated and costly amphibious invasion against a well-armed island closely backed by the U.S. and Japan. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the war in Ukraine could precipitate a full-scale Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the short term. China's broader toolbox, stability interests, and relation to time do not incentivize adopting Russia's brute-force method. It is preferable for China to rely on its hybrid strategy and grey-zone tactics to work its way toward reunification. In 2025, however, the modernization of the PLA will reach a point where an invasion of Taiwan is feasible. According to a U.S. military commander, China could invade Taiwan by 2027 to mark the 100th anniversary of the PLA. Another sensitive date is 2049 because it is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, where national rejuvenation must be achieved. Taiwan’s reunification is tightly linked to China’s rejuvenation. The latter is part of the Chinese Dream, along with the already-attained status of being a moderately well-off society. If the war in Ukraine might not immediately trigger a Chinese move on Taiwan, it does not mean it won’t happen in the medium and long term. Still, this supposes China’s hybrid strategy would not yield satisfactory results. In that case, a blockade might seem more appropriate than an all-out military invasion as it would theoretically limit material damages, human casualties, and the severity and unity of Western retaliation. Conclusion The first lesson of this analysis is that assessing a state's underlying material interests is a sound way to gauge the credibility of associated security guarantees. China would be ill-advised to draw parallels between the U.S. response to the Ukrainian war and the potential U.S. response in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It is a mistake to assume U.S. resolve must be at its maximum on all issues. States prioritize objectives depending on their interests and Taiwan tops the list of U.S. security interests, while Ukraine does not. This is reflected by the significant U.S. military and diplomatic support to Taiwan. Not only is linking the credibility of U.S. security guarantees in East Asia to peripheric stakes counterproductive, but it could even turn dangerous. In the last months, calls to end U.S. strategic ambiguity in favor of a clear commitment to Taiwan's defence have intensified. Fearing for its credibility, the U.S. might end its long-time policy of strategic ambiguity and adopt a clear commitment to defend Taiwan. This might consequentially push Taiwan to proclaim independence as a clear U.S. commitment would boost Taipei's confidence. This, in return, might accelerate Chinese assertiveness and even Taiwan's invasion. The second lesson is that “invasions are not contagious.” China is unlikely to alter its immediate plans and decide to invade Taiwan because of the war in Ukraine. China has global ambitions and is interested in preserving the fluidity of economic exchanges as its BRI intends to increase connectivity, for which it needs stability. The amphibious nature of a military invasion of Taiwan makes it very unsettling and costly for China to go down that path. China is better off leveraging its power through a hybrid strategy mixing diplomatic, economic, cyber, psychological, legal, and semi-military measures to coerce Taiwan into reunification over time. On the other hand, this does not mean China will never use force, especially as the PLA’s modernization will soon make it capable of invading Taiwan. As we get closer to important anniversaries, the temptation to use force will increase, particularly if the CCP has nothing to brandish to demonstrate progress on Taiwan’s reunification. But if anything, the Ukrainian crisis, since its beginning, has shown a solid transatlantic unity and willingness to impose massive economic costs on Russia. Whether China is willing to bet on facing similar costs (is the world ready to impose such costs on China in case of an invasion of Taiwan?) and a U.S. military intervention to counter a Chinese invasion is hard to say. What is certain, however, is that invading Taiwan is different from invading Ukraine, both militarily and in terms of the consequences for world stability as well as for American and Chinese interests. ## Ukraine, one year later: first lessons and perspectives URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ukraine-one-year-later-first-lessons-and-perspectives/ Modified: 2023-03-23 > Get the book Ukraine one year later first lessons and perspectives the fifth volume of the new Rubicon collection! Get the book Ukraine, one year later: first lessons and perspectives, the fifth volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in French only. A new generation of renowned experts and informed observers of the current operations delivers here their enlightened points of view, accessible to the public at large and accompanied by a rich infographic. The various contributions in this book are from the French-speaking platform of analysis of international issues Le Rubicon. Le Rubicon will publish small books aimed at the general public, which will address, clearly and precisely, the new burning issues related to international news. Each month, starting in April 2022, Les Équateurs will publish a book of approximately 128 to 144 pages, at a price of 10 to 12 euros, summarizing the work of the experts of the Le Rubicon platform. ## Ukraine: The Shock of War URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ukraine-the-shock-of-war/ Modified: 2022-04-27 > Get the book Ukraine: Le choc de la guerre, the first volume of the new Rubicon collection! Get the book Ukraine: Le choc de la guerre, the first volume of the new Rubicon collection! Please note that this book is available in French only. A new generation of renowned experts and informed observers of the current operations delivers here their enlightened points of view, accessible to the public at large and accompanied by a rich infographic. The various contributions in this book are from the French-speaking platform of analysis of international issues Le Rubicon. Le Rubicon will publish small books aimed at the general public, which will address, clearly and precisely, the new burning issues related to international news. Each month, starting in April 2022, Les Équateurs will publish a book of approximately 128 to 144 pages, at a price of 10 to 12 euros, summarizing the work of the experts of the Le Rubicon platform. ## Ukraine: Why NATO Must Make Concessions URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/ukraine-why-nato-must-make-concessions/ Modified: 2026-03-19 > NATO's current half-support is insufficient to deter Russia, and it even encourages a Russian intervention to stop Ukraine's steady military Russia has been massing troops near Ukraine’s borders for months. Over 100,000 Russian troops have been reported lately, including ballistic missile systems and other military equipment. Units from Siberia as well as from Southern and Western Russia have been mobilized. Military cooperation between Russia and Byelorussia is deepening as troop movements and military exercises intensify, directly menacing Kyiv. U.S. Secretary of State Blinken is expected to provide a written answer addressing some of Russia’s demands soon and putting “new ideas on the table.” Experts and former diplomats believe America will need to concede something substantial, whether before or after an invasion. Russia must choose between two unpleasant options: humiliation or war. Putin made his intransigent demands public. Severe credibility costs are pending if he does not obtain at least one of his demands. For experts like Anatol Lieven and Paul Robinson, the goal is to go beyond Ukraine’s proposal of half-provisional, temporary autonomy for separatist regions and to grant them full autonomy in exchange for a peace agreement and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the conflictual areas. They also suggest relying on an international military deployment to ensure effective demilitarization of the Donbas region. Solidifying NATO’s deterrence posture by increasing incursions in the Black Sea or boosting material support to Ukraine merely solidifies Putin’s belief that it is only possible to secure his objectives militarily. An alternative solution would require NATO to declare a moratorium on all new memberships and pressure Ukraine to implement the Minsk II agreement. NATO members are divided concerning Ukraine’s integration in the Alliance, making its membership highly unlikely. Thus, it would not be a significant strategic loss since NATO has no severe intentions to accept Ukraine anyway. Western Support to Ukraine Russian current tenseness is in direct reaction to continuous Western support of Ukraine forces fighting Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – collectively known as the Donbas. NATO’s support to Kyiv is channeled through the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. Since 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization in Eastern Ukraine, NATO’s goal has been to increase capacity building and provide military training to allow Ukrainian forces to resist Russian-backed militias in the Donbas. The Biden administration has equipped Ukraine with arms and military equipment totaling $650 million in the last fiscal year alone. The U.K. signed a Memorandum of Implementation on naval contracts with Kyiv in 2021, while the U.S. signed a Strategic Defense Framework and a Charter on Strategic Partnership with Ukraine. 200 Canadian soldiers are deployed in Ukraine as part of Operation Unifier, and Ottawa has provided $700 million worth of aid to Ukrainian forces since 2014. As part of broader efforts to augment its deterrence posture following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has increased its deployments in the Black Sea (naval and air patrols) and reinforced the Alliance’s forward presence in Eastern and Southern Europe. More recently, France has declared it would send troops to Romania as part of NATO's “Enhanced Advanced Presence” missions. A strengthening of NATO’s military posture can also be seen in the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe. Russia’s Grievances and Resolve All of this triggers great security concerns in Russia. Putin is suspicious of NATO’s defensive rhetoric, notably because of NATO’s interventions in Kosovo and Libya and its post-Cold War Eastern European expansion. For Russia, U.S. support to Ukraine equates to a de facto integration of Ukraine – short of the article 5 provision – in NATO. U.S.’ stated willingness to increase interoperability between Ukraine and NATO is unacceptable for Moscow, for security and ideological reasons. Ukraine’s insistence on joining NATO and NATO’s firm support of its Open-Door policy (article 10) is at the core of Russian grievances against the West. There is no way the Kremlin will ever allow Ukraine to move forward with its ambition of joining NATO, nor will NATO ever fight to help Ukraine do so. In contrast with its previous military build-up in April 2021, Russia has this time been limpid in its public demands. The Kremlin wants to roll back NATO’s expansion in Europe to a 1997-type European security architecture, obtain written guarantees that NATO will not expand in the post-Soviet sphere, and stop NATO’s military assistance to former Soviet states. The urgency of Russia’s public demands and the threat of meeting non-compliance with “retaliatory military-technical measures” expresses Moscow’s determination. Russia cannot just back down after its multiple failed attempts at deterring NATO-Ukraine cooperation, because its credibility is at stake. During recent talks between Blinken and Lavrov, the U.S. agreed to provide a written answer to address Russia’s demands and express its own concerns. More talks are scheduled, but they won’t be many more if Russia does not get something substantial soon. Experts believe a military intervention – if one must happen – will most likely take place after February 20th (the date of the end of the Russian-Byelorussian exercise and China’s Olympics). The pressure could significantly decrease if the U.S.’ expected written response goes beyond risk-reduction measures related to military activities and arms control. Concessions on missile deployments or maneuvers in Europe would not restrain Russia from attacking Ukraine. Confidence-building measures and other subterfuges of the sort will not lure Russia into forgetting about the steady advancement of “American intelligence structures into key branches of the Ukrainian government, and the deployment of America’s military infrastructure .” Capacity Building and Deterrence Russia-backed militias in Donbas are meant to prevent NATO’s local progression. Sending more aid and arms to Kyiv pushes Putin to rely on force to counter the solidification of a trend that he sees as increasingly threatening. Putin believes Ukraine is inevitably drifting westward and that only force can stop this bascule. Ukraine’s intention of ameliorating its military equipment could soon result – particularly if the U.S. decides to speed up the process – in Kyiv having capabilities to impose painful costs on Russia. If Ukraine obtains arms that can alter the balance of power, a Russian attack to alleviate Moscow’s costs of inaction (reduced military leverage/increased vulnerability) becomes rational. It is indeed a risk for Russia that Ukraine’s military modernization ultimately alters Russian capacity to coerce Kyiv at reasonable costs if the latter obtain long-range missiles or defence missile systems. The longer Russia waits to stop NATO’s progression in Ukraine by force, the higher the costs of military intervention are. That is why increasing arms transfers to Ukraine is a dangerous slippery slope. On the other hand, one might suggest that Washington’s expected written response could better prevent further Russian aggression by clearly specifying countermeasures addressing various scenarios. These countermeasures do not include sending troops, as a direct military intervention has been ruled out by the United States. The maximum-pressure options, short of war that the West could threaten Russia with, are threefold: First, Germany could suspend the certification of Nord Stream 2 (NS2) as a retaliatory measure either for the current massive Russian build-up or in the case of further aggression. Second, the United States could impose more sanctions on Russian oligarchs and even ban all American-made technologies that Russia heavily relies on. Third, all Russian financial institutions could be banned from the SWIFT banking system, isolating Russia from the global economy. The third option is unrealistic: it implies energy-related severe logistical and economic costs for many actors other than Russia. It is clear that Russia anticipates these countermeasures. They are painful and constitute NATO’s central deterrence, although using any of these measures before a Russian attack would likely precipitate it. Implementing any of these measures must be in retaliation for an unsuccessful attempt at stopping a Russian intervention. The West Has No Interest in War If Western countries decided to implement harsh sanctions to respond to a massive Russian intervention, such sanctions would not be costless for them. America needs Russia to hedge between it and Beijing, not wholly align on its systemic rival. This would inevitably happen if America gave the necessary impulse to effectively ban Russian financial institutions from the SWIFT banking system. China would indeed most likely not comply with ultra-strict sanctions that would seriously damage its economy. This situation would accelerate the development of currency alternatives – “dedolarization” – circumventing the U.S. dollar for commercial activities at the expense of its influence worldwide. Germany is going through an energy crisis and needs Russian gas for its energy transition, while Russia needs Germany for its technology. The European Union is significantly dependent on Russia for its energy imports: 41% of its natural gas, 27% of its oil, and 47% of its solid fossil fuels. If German Foreign Minister Baerbock has declared that NS2 is at stake depending on the Ukrainian crisis escalation, Berlin is not willing to send arms to Ukraine. Moreover, NS2 is a contentious issue. Many have been reluctant to politicize the pipeline. Macron recently declared he wants to initiate talks with Russia independently of the U.S.-Russia diplomatic consultation. If Macron is serious about that, he should coordinate with Germany to offer Russia peace terms that reflect Europe’s voice and interests. Giving hope to Russia that it is still possible to get Ukraine to concede a special status to the Donbas is the best way to avoid an intensification of the conflict. By taking this path, the EU, under Macron’s leadership, could have a more significant say in Europe’s security under the Minsk II agreement and prove that the E. U’s geopolitical ambitions are serious. On the other hand, it might be uneasy for countries like Canada to make a foreign policy U-turn regarding Ukraine. The Canadian-Ukrainian diaspora, and its main lobby, would undoubtedly oppose such a move. Upholding Ukraine’s sovereignty is fundamental to Canada for many reasons. But what’s also very important for Canada is the prospect of averting a war between Russia and Ukraine that would aggravate international polarization and make the world more volatile and less stable. Chamberlain Dilemma What would be Russia’s next steps if NATO accommodates it in Eastern Ukraine? It is unlikely that Russia would keep expanding if the Ukrainian crisis were resolved on terms that Moscow could live with. First, because Russia’s economy would endure massive costs to sustain the war effort just to hold Kyiv, not to mention other holds in Russia's near-abroad. The maximum-pressure scenario – Russia’s exclusion from the global economy – would make it near impossible for Russia to finance expansionist policies in the long run, not to mention the local resistance Russia would face. Furthermore, Russia has high stakes in protecting the status of the Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainization of Russian minority areas in Ukraine, and Kyiv’s indigenous law excluding Russian minorities (as well as Ukrainian), directly affects Russia’s identity as the protector of Russian minorities. This Russian emotional involvement favors Russian irredentism in Eastern Ukraine and militates against the idea that Russia contemplates expansionist aims. Ukraine’s ideational importance to Russia plays a significant part in motivating Russia’s revisionist policy towards Ukraine. Moscow ideational interests elsewhere in the post-Soviet sphere are not as salient as they are in Ukraine. Therefore, Russian expansion is unlikely, as not all land is equally valuable from an emotional (and security) standpoint. America’s One-Time Pressure Card As briefly mentioned, implementing harsh sanctions against Russia and asking everybody to comply would exacerbate tensions within NATO. While the Baltic and other Eastern European states might be pleased to impose severe sanctions on Russia, getting other European countries happily on board seems more complicated. Increasing costs on Russia would probably require America to use a pressure card to obtain Western coordination. The 2011 Pivot to Asia and the redirection of major resources to the Indo-Pacific indicate Washington’s main strategic focus. If America were to pressure the Europeans to do something, it would seem strategically unwise to do so over the conflict in Ukraine. After the Afghan retreat and AUKUS, America needs to preserve the already damaged cohesiveness of its primary NATO allies. America’s reckless and unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan to free its hands from an unwinnable war reinforces that point. To declare massive sanctions against Russia or to seriously strengthen military support for Ukraine, and ask everyone to respect this course of action, would be to waste a useful “pressure card” for U.S. interests that are ultimately non-strategic. In order for America not to be in a position where it has to choose whether or not to pressure the Europeans over Ukraine, it is necessary to prevent a Russian invasion, as this would force the West to react. By giving Russia hope that a legal solution to secure autonomy and amnesty in Donbas is achievable, that a moratorium on all NATO new memberships is reachable, and that arms transfers can stop, one could hold off what seems to be an imminent Russian intervention. Conclusion: NATO’s New Strategy Defusing a Russian intervention and getting out of this crisis implies pressuring Ukraine to implement the constitutional reforms necessary to grant autonomy and amnesty to the Donbas republics. These separatist republics have significant support from the local population and are backed by a major power. They have thousands of civil servants, especially soldiers, who are more determined to fight – and die – than NATO. Ultimately, the main driver of Russian-Western tensions is Ukraine. Kyiv's desire to join NATO is in direct opposition to Russia's conception of national and territorial security. Russia is ready to fight to secure its interests, as are the Ukrainians. However, Ukrainians have no real chance of winning against Russia without Western support. The Atlantic Alliance lacks the cohesion and interest to pay the costs associated with real support for Ukraine. The current half-support is insufficient to deter Russia, and it even encourages a Russian intervention to stop Ukraine's steady military modernization. To truly deter Russia, NATO would have to provide assets and endure costs that its members do not want to bear. This is why implementing a strategy that corresponds to NATO’s accurate means and interests would help to avoid crisis escalation. And such strategy entails convincing Moscow that a legal way out exists in the Donbas by reorienting Western pressure from Moscow to Kyiv.   ## Understanding the Five Eyes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/understanding-the-five-eyes/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > The term Five Eyes typically refers to a unique signals intelligence pooling club of three or four-letter acronymed agencies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The term Five Eyes typically refers to a unique signals intelligence pooling club of three or four-letter acronymed agencies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. But FVEY, as it is also known, is now also attached to a large and growing number of “special relationships” and transgovernmental policy networks that bind these five states in virtually all areas of defence, intelligence, and security. Strong, Secure, Engaged – Canada’s reigning defence policy document – describes the Five Eyes as a “community,” as do numerous similar documents currently circulating in Canberra, London, Wellington, and even Washington. Viewed from Beijing, however, the Five Eyes is essentially a major anti-China alliance – a view now shared by Chinese Communist Party mouthpieces, Chinese embassies, and Chinese International Relations scholars alike. Despite its centrality to many aspects of global politics – from defence diplomacy and emerging technology to the evolving role of major powers –  the Five Eyes alliance remains relatively under-studied. At one level, this has to do with a deeply institutionalized level of secrecy. Indeed, before the Snowden disclosures in 2013, the community was of interest mainly to intelligence scholars and select journalists; for everyone else, the Five Eyes hovered between a known-unknown and unknown-unknown – that is, as an object of inquiry that was either utterly opaque or completely invisible. In fact, this once included the member states’ top leaders. As Desmond Ball and Jeffrey T. Richelson, two Five Eyes Studies pioneers, argued in their 1985 book, The Ties That Bind, it was only in 1973 that Australian prime ministers learned about this alliance – and their country’s participation in it. Another reason behind the relative lack of scholarship is the object’s informal nature. As politicians and bureaucrats attached the term “security” to more and more “intermestic” issues, Five Eyes transgovernmental and transnational ties in policy, law, technology and science, grew in range and sophistication. But these network forms of organizations remain uncoordinated; the meetings of the “Five Nations Passport Group”, for example, have little to do to the Five Eyes’ defence ministers conferences, and vice versa. Together, however, all these quintuple ties produce powerful dynamics in contemporary security politics – not just in terms of relations between states, as Tim Legrand’s work has shown, but also within states and between non-state actors and assorted socio-technical settings. The Five Eyes has also long been subject to generally unquestioned assumptions about the positive value of Five Eyes cooperation – assumptions rooted in the collective imagination of the vast majority of the publics in the member countries. So, while Snowden-style crises can and do break this trend somewhat, the “we-feelings” tend to re-establish themselves rather quickly. This, too, might have contributed to the alliance’s relative invisibility. It is therefore only by making the familiar – and the feel-good – strange that we can situate the Five Eyes with the temporal and spatial coordinates of “the Anglosphere,” let alone critically examine the ideological assumptions that underpin some of the categories and discourses we use to talk about these phenomena in world politics. To find out more, visit the Centre for International Policy Studies website: Twitter Conference: Understanding the Five Eyes       ## United States: the difficult task of rebuilding alliances URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/united-states-the-difficult-task-of-rebuilding-alliances/ Modified: 2021-02-12 > In this capsule, hosted by Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, our experts Maud Quessard and Jonathan Paquin discuss the difficult task for the United States of rebuilding alliances. Donald Trump's doctrine was "America First". It could not be clearer: the needs and interests of Washington's historic allies were relegated to the lower ranks of its foreign policy. Today, Joe Biden assures that "America is back" and that it is "sitting at the end of the table", ready to order the world's affairs. In what state is he regaining relations with allies and what can he do about it? In this capsule, hosted by Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, our experts Maud Quessard and Jonathan Paquin discuss the difficult task for the United States of rebuilding alliances. Donald Trump's doctrine was "America First". It could not be clearer: the needs and interests of Washington's historic allies were relegated to the lower ranks of its foreign policy. Today, Joe Biden assures that "America is back" and that it is "sitting at the end of the table", ready to order the world's affairs. In what state is he regaining relations with allies and what can he do about it?   ## What is Grey Zone Deterrence? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/what-is-grey-zone-deterrence/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This policy brief shed light on what the grey zone is and is not, the leading concerns of present grey zone conflicts, the challenges of grey zone deterrence, and conclude with several ways to deter grey zone conflict. The types of conflict states aim to deter have evolved since the Cold War, presenting new challenges each time. Deterrence theory became popular during the Cold War, with nuclear capabilities dissuading the United States and the Soviet Union from engaging in direct conflict. After the Cold War, and especially during the early 2000s with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, western states struggled to navigate how to deter terrorist attacks, especially by non-state actors. Around 2010, the focus on intense large-scale counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations began to wane, and attention shifted to the return of great-power competition. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have increased the rate at which they challenge the rules-based international order through provocative and harmful actions that do not cross the threshold as actions of war. Most of their actions are conducted covertly with the aim of disrupting western hegemony while avoiding overt acts that could result in criticism or retaliation. Aggression against western countries is increasing, and the ambiguity of these threats challenges traditional deterrence concepts. While traditional deterrence theory and practices are thoroughly understood, there is a lack of consensus amongst academics, practitioners, and international law on what constitutes aggression or appropriate response in the grey zone. The lack of a concrete understanding of the grey zone makes it harder to develop theories and policies for grey zone deterrence. This paper will review the literature on basic deterrence theory, definitions of what the grey zone is and is not, the leading concerns of present grey zone conflicts, the challenges of grey zone deterrence, and conclude with several ways to deter grey zone conflict. Deterrence Theory At its core, deterrence is about preventing war. It is not a long term solution to a hostile security environment but takes a threat-based approach to convince opposing states that aggressive action is not in their best interest. Deterrence can be conceptualized in a few ways: the first is by deterring states through denial or through punishment. Deterrence by denial occurs when a state has robust capabilities that an enemy attack would not be able to overcome or that the impact of the attack would be significantly diminished or delayed. Deterrence by punishment occurs when an aggressor state chooses not to attack because they believe that even if they achieve their objective, they would be subject to punishment such as sanctions or a counter-attack that would be more costly than what was gained from the initial attack. In the perfect scenario, a state's defence capabilities would be strong enough to achieve both, but this is not the case for many states. An alternative but complementary way to conceptualize deterrence is as a pyramid. As a pyramid, nuclear deterrence is at the top, followed by punishment through armed forces and traditional hard power. Next would be deterrence by denial. Last is extended deterrence, where a state is able to deter threats because one or more other states would defend it. A prime example of extended deterrence is NATO's Article 5. Unfortunately, nuclear deterrence, deterrence by punishment, and even extended deterrence have a limited effect when it is hard to determine the nature of foreign attacks in the grey zone. What is the Grey Zone? Grey zone actions are often interchangeably labelled as “hybrid” or “unconventional” warfare. Grey zone conflict is any confrontation that is beyond standard and diplomatic competition but that does not cross the threshold of war. It is the area between distinct war and peace. It often occurs through various domains such as economic, financial, cyber, policy, and others, where conventional conflict is focused on the strategic use of violence. It can also be conducted by states, non-state actors, or proxies. Grey zone conflicts can incorporate conventional and unconventional approaches. Grey zone attacks are often intentionally covert, which makes it difficult to attribute blame, and they are usually just below the threshold to warrant a military response. Thus conventional deterrence does not work when it is unclear who conducted the attack, what the intention of the attack was, and at what point an attack goes beyond the grey zone and is damaging enough that a violent response is appropriate. Grey Zone vs. Hybrid Warfare Despite the conceptual overlap of the “grey zone” and “hybrid warfare,” they are not synonymous. Hybrid warfare is the combined use of conventional and unconventional tactics that do cross the line of warfare. Some of the hybrid tactics used, such as disinformation, may be in the grey zone. Grey zone conflict is only the tactics that do not cross the line of formalized state-level aggression. Hybrid warfare is focused on events at the tactical level, while the grey zone encompasses the long-term strategic considerations of international competitions. Figure 1 from Frank G. Hoffman provides a visual representation of the spectrum of conflict and clearly demonstrates a difference between the grey zone and hybrid warfare, where both fall under the spectrum of conflict in unconventional warfare. This is why unconventional tactics of aggression are often discussed as a means of grey zone conflict and hybrid warfare. Contemporary Grey Zone Aggressions Grey zone conflict has become a topic of interest predominantly because of the actions of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea over the past ten years. All four states have used disinformation and engaged in cyber-attacks through hackers and proxies to penetrate security systems and cause low-level damages. Russia and China have both made creeping territorial expansions but through different means. In 2014, Russia used disinformation to aggravate tensions in Crimea, leading to its annexation. In 2015 and 2016, a Kremlin-linked hacker, Sandworm, infected Ukrainian utilities with malware and left thousands of Ukrainians without power. In 2017, Russia was also linked to a virus that rendered the IT system of Maersk, a Danish shipping company, useless for a week, costing 300 million USD in losses. This is in addition to countless cases of disinformation and media control targeted against western alliances and NATO operations. The strategy is labelled as “simmering borscht,” where Russia tries to expand its influence without triggering a western response. Since 2014, China has been building bases on islands in the South China Sea to extend and solidify its territorial claims. China's behaviour has been referred to as the “salami-slicing tactic” where it slowly erodes the international order and norms, divides alliances, and tries to assert its preferred interpretation of existing international laws. China's use of fishery and maritime security to expand its control of the South China Sea through deliberate and deniable acts of aggression are the perfect example of grey zone conflict. The ties between Chinese companies and the government have also proven to be a point of grey zone conflict with Huawei leading to concerns amongst the Five Eyes. Tensions with China have contributed to a detainee stand-off with Canada holding executive Meng Wanzhou and China holding Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. While Iran and North Korea are not recognized as key players in great power competition, they have been noted for increased grey zone aggression through political, economic, cyber, and military actions since 2016. Challenges of Grey Zone Deterrence The paradox of grey zone conflict is that it is more prominent when all-out war is successfully deterred. This is why grey zone conflict was also frequent during the Cold War. The first challenge is that the grey zone is inherently ambiguous, and deterrence, especially deterrence by punishment, depends on clearly defined responses to identifiable attacks. Attacks on civil society and that are below the threshold of NATO's Article 5 leave it unclear if the solution should be state-on-state military actions. Furthermore, traditional deterrence is based on direct and violent attacks, usually targeted at military infrastructure, or resulting in direct violence against civilians. Yet, damage to power grids and cyber networks runs the risk of being just as damaging. Extended interruption to power and cyberinfrastructure could result in the loss of life in the case of hospitals, traffic control, and food safety, and can result in significant financial damage as economies are put on pause. A recent cyber-attack on a water supply facility in Florida demonstrates the vulnerability of essential public sector services. Cyber-attacks are particularly difficult to deter because they are conducted by state-level actors, non-state groups, and individuals, making it hard to trace and attribute blame in a timely manner. They are also aimed at private and civilian sectors more frequently than conventional military aggression, requiring coordination between the attacked organization and their national security services. Democratic states that choose to play by the rules-based international order are at a disadvantage when it comes to grey zone conflict. States like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have highly centralized governments that are able and willing to employ propaganda, target civilian entities, push boundaries on legal norms, and employ non-state proxies to their advantage compared to liberal-democratic states. Aggressor states use democratic states' commitment to international norms and bureaucratic approval processes for retaliation to their advantage, reducing the impacts of deterrence by punishment. Democratic states are in a tough spot because these bureaucratic procedures and the importance of civilian oversight of the military uphold the central values of their liberal identity. What Deterrence Looks Like in the Grey Zone Just because deterrence is more challenging in the grey zone does not mean it has no value. Politicians and academics need to be cognizant of the limitations of grey zone deterrence and how to shift their strategic approaches. Clearly defined red lines for acts of aggression, particularly in the case of cyberspace, and triggers for escalation of force for non-military attacks can aid in grey zone deterrence by punishment. In the case of conventional grey zone aggression, rapid reaction forces are one of the best hard power deterrents the West could further invest in. In the case of Russia's annexation of Crimea – where disguised paramilitary and military forces were used – rapidly deployable troops would have raised the stakes for Russia's actions and been able to respond faster the second Russia crossed the line from grey zone to hybrid warfare. When it comes to cyber-attacks, retaliatory cyber-attacks or even the use of the military when a line is crossed could be effective. The link between cybersecurity and conventional military responses is poorly defined, which presents a window of ambiguity and opportunity for attackers. Furthermore, the secrecy of offensive cyber capabilities undermines their deterrent value, as conventional deterrence partially relies on a show of strength so the enemy can understand the potential consequences for their actions. Deterrence by denial, however, seems to be the most strongly advocated route to improve grey zone deterrence. The first part of this is through enhanced investment and training in cybersecurity to mitigate vulnerability to attacks. The second part of grey zone deterrence by denial is resilience. This means the resilience of cyberinfrastructure as well as societal resilience. At the 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO presented seven baseline requirements for civil preparedness: Assured continuity of government and critical government services; Resilient energy supplies; Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people; Resilient food and water resources; Ability to deal with mass casualties; Resilient civil communications systems; Resilient civil transportation systems. Recommendations for Canada Canada has regularly employed methods of hybrid warfare during its interventions in failed and fragile states, even if it is not described that way. Canada’s interventions employ civilian and military co-operation as well as economic and political elements that involve training, interacting with, and influencing security forces, politicians, and the public. Democratic states like Canada tend to perform well to immediate security threats, but poorly to grey zone threats that are below the threshold and do not trigger public concern that leads to political action. While we are not at war, there is a lack of public knowledge that Canada is targeted daily by grey zone attacks against its cyber space, public information, military, and even against Canada’s physical territory. Canada must expand its intentional and strategic engagement with hybrid warfare, and prepare for grey zone threats. The first step to enhancing our defence against grey zone conflict is understanding it. The literature shows that we need a clearer definition of the grey zone and how states ought to respond. This should be supported by bodies like NATO. Canada and its allies must understand what they are deterring, where they draw the line for aggressive actions, and how they will respond. Canada must clearly define and draw a line for grey zone aggression for domestic purposes. Canada should also work within NATO to build a consensus on what kinds of attacks the alliance will responded to under Article 5, and how the alliance will respond when an act of aggression does not cross the threshold of war. One of the most important aspects of deterrence by punishment is a timely reaction.  Canada must continue to ensure its military is up to the task for rapid response when an act of aggression goes beyond the grey zone. A larger gap exists in Canada’s retaliatory, or offensive cyber capabilities. Canada should develop its cyber security and defence capabilities to conduct counter attacks – a way of retaliating through the same means, and remaining in the grey zone. Finally, the most peaceful and reassuring way to protect Canadians from grey zone aggressions is through denial and resilience. Because grey zone conflict can be targeted at anyone, the critical and challenging part of denial and resilience are that they require extensive engagement with the general population and private sector. The Canadian government will need to regulate and promote higher standards of cyber security and resilient infrastructure in the public and private sectors. Crisis management will need to occur between cabinet ministers and CEOs. Public education campaigns for how to detect disinformation and cyber vulnerabilities will also be important. Grey zone conflict requires a whole-society approach for successful deterrence and to keep aggression in the grey zone and away from all-out war. ## What Is the Future for French Intervention in the Sahel? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/what-is-the-future-for-french-intervention-in-the-sahel/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Faced with this pace of recomposition of the regional order, France must find its way to continue the fight against terrorism in order to.. Is the conflict in the Sahel on its way to becoming yet another failure in the total war on terror? After months of tirade, the walls have finally fallen, as the loss of mutual trust has led to a divorce between Paris and Bamako. The new Malian junta has crossed all the red lines drawn by the French government, which had already opted, beyond the narrative of transformation, for a gradual military disengagement by 2023. Between the political alternation by putsch, the seizure of power by the military elites and the proliferation of nuisance activities by the Islamist nebula, Mali, and more broadly the Sahel, are in the grip of a security crisis coupled with chronic political instability. Faced with political chaos and a security stalemate, France and its allies have just officially announced a coordinated withdrawal from Mali. Weary of the presence of the French operation, whose counter-terrorism bias quickly showed its limits, the Malian military junta exacerbated popular anti-French sentiments to push the former colonizing power out. It is done. Now, to diversify its alliances and at the risk of losing its traditional partners, Bamako is turning to the mercenary company Wagner, the Kremlin's gun without a number. Faced with this pace of recomposition of the regional order, France must find its way to continue the fight against terrorism in order to extend its military involvement in the Sahelian strip. Understanding the strategic mistakes that have been made by France, as a framework nation of the international military alliance, will allow for a better definition of the possible new parameters for the establishment of a military device that revives the strategic impetus of its mission in the sub-region. A Record Tarnished by the Failure to Stabilize the Sahel President Emmanuel Macron made it clear at the African Union summit that he would not compromise on the security of French forces during this four-to-six-month transition period. However, more than nine years after the start of French operations in Mali, Paris is being ordered by the authorities in Bamako to leave the territory without delay. Welcomed in 2013 as liberators, the French military is now being driven out of Mali. While the rupture is sealed, the setback is significant for the French government, which is trying to save the merits of its military involvement. Difficult efforts when violence against civilians increased by 25% between April and June 2021 while the French military was fully operational. Ahead of the French presidential elections, President Emmanuel Macron denied the idea that Operation Barkhane has failed. After the end of the third European operation to fight jihadism in the Sahel. However, the spokesman for the M5-RFP movement appointed by the transitional Malian prime minister points to the lack of concrete results, which in his opinion attested to the failure of the French operation in the state. Eradicating the Jihadist Groundswell in Vain The very foundations of Operation Barkhane may provide the clues that led the French army to the strategic quagmire from which it is now struggling to escape. In 2013, Operation Serval was based on precise and credible objectives, namely, to halt the jihadist breakthrough in northern Mali and regain control of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu while avoiding a capture of the capital. The euphoria after this strategic success led the French authorities to define the ambitious contours of the new military operation. Much more ambiguous, Operation Barkhane was intended to contain the terrorist threat, which has now become regionalized, while strengthening the security apparatus of the G5 Sahel states. With this multidimensional and cooperative approach, tactical successes were achieved with the elimination of several  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leaders, while the entrenchment of these armed terrorist groups (ATG) was halted for a time. The territorialization of jihadist groups was avoided, but in a region where there is uneven coverage by Malian state security forces, the political, economic, and social entrenchment of the Islamist hydra was not undermined by the killing of these key targets. The attractiveness of these groups cannot be fully understood by the counterterrorism approach. Community dynamics prior to the conflict have been obscured by the French army, leading to a major strategic analysis error. Intra- and inter-community conflicts, clan and family logics, and the system of statutory allegiance are intrinsically linked to the rise of radicalization and offer recruitment levers for the ATGs. The war on terrorism is structuring. It induces parameters that constitute blinkers for the French government, which has difficulty grasping all the local dynamics. Since war is a political phenomenon and terrorism is one of the variants that blurs the lines between peace and conflict, it seems inconceivable that the rise of violent extremism can be eradicated only through military victories, which have certainly multiplied for the French army. The military instrument must support a holistic political approach focused on conflict resolution. The Neglect of Governance Issues The disintegration of post-independence states, of which Mali is a part, and their numerous failures in terms of security and the difficulty of deepening democratic processes have fuelled the questioning of these models of governance. The dependence on the military path and the disastrous economic situation provides fertile ground for both the multiplication of putsches and the establishment of a zone of influence for the ATGs, who propose a political alternative to ensure minimum services and protect civilians abandoned by the central government. The inability to provide security for the population gives successive coups d'état broad popular support, as Mali has experienced two in less than a year, while the structural weaknesses of the state reinforce a spiral of violence that benefits the ATGs. In order to stop this cyclical dynamic, the French army has opted for a counter-insurgency strategy that aims to secure strategic spaces in order to establish political solutions and transform tactical successes into political victories. On the one hand, despite the positive annual military balance sheet, this framework establishes a logic of perpetual war. On the other hand, for fear of being accused of foreign interference, Paris made the mistake of not doing any state building and of entrusting this process to the Malian authorities, who have neither the financial means nor the political will to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict. Externalizing the militarization of the region may comfort certain corrupt and wait-and-see elites who do not implement the necessary reforms, particularly those stemming from the 2015 Algiers Agreement, to re-establish governmental authority and rebuild the social fabric of Mali. The structural weaknesses of the Malian state and the resulting resistance to reform make the French intervention an ineffective military mechanism. The French president repeated that "France cannot substitute itself for the return of the state and political stability.” The problem of global governance cannot be fought with arms. The French army is fighting in vain against a disparate threat from terrorist groups. A UN report also points to the responsibility of the Malian military for the increase in violence and the many abuses that plague its ranks. "Over the past three years, civilian casualties related to terrorism in the Sahel have accounted for between 30 and 40 percent of all casualties, with the remainder being killed by vigilante groups and repression by national armies.” This phenomenon is a clear demonstration of the failures of the Malian security apparatus. One of the pillars of Operation Barkhane and European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) was to train, advise and strengthen the Malian armed forces (FAMa) and more broadly the joint forces of the G5 Sahel in order to empower them to take ownership of their own security. After years of training, the Malian army still seems unable to constitute a credible force capable of curbing the jihadist threat. Unwilling to undertake the security sector reform necessary to abandon the clientelism and co-optation that suffocated the Malian security apparatus, the French state injected a great deal of cash into support programs that were often disconnected from the realities on the ground for the construction of a real military institution. There were many obstacles to building Malian military capacity, including the difficulty of reconciling rival factions and the deep-seated differences that developed between Malian and international actors. Operational Errors and the Breakdown of Mutual Trust  At the root of this decade-long conflict was the Tuareg secessionist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), which ignited a revolt against Mali's legitimate military authorities in 2012. In the north of the state, terrorist groups seized this window of opportunity by ousting the movement. Their incursion triggered the start of the French Operation Serval. Against all odds, the French army coordinated its military action with that of the NMLA in order to cooperate in the liberation of French hostages in northern Mali. France saw this rebel group as a potential ally, even though it is the hereditary enemy of the regular armed forces, which have been fighting a fratricidal war among themselves since Mali's independence. This close collaboration with ethnic militias has tarnished relations with Bamako, since France, instead of being a supporting force for the FAMa, seemed to operate like a lone cavalier. This questionable tactical choice may have contributed to the Malian perception that the French military was an army of occupation. Similarly, Malian nationalism may have been exacerbated by the French army's refusal to allow Malian special forces to enter Kidal when it was liberated from the jihadists in 2013. While the fear of reprisals by the FAMa against civilians was credible, it nevertheless rekindled anti-French feelings, thus widening the gap between the two partners. The point of no return was reached when the MINUSMA investigation report concluded that the air strike conducted by the French anti-jihadist force near the village of Bounti had led to the death of 22 civilians in January 2021. This incident confirmed the rupture of the bond of trust that had been steadily eroding between the French government and the Malian population. Part of the French political class refutes the accusation of foul play, however, demonstrations demanding the departure of the French have increased significantly. A Lost War in the Information Field France's diplomatic mistakes have reinforced Malians' patriotic and sovereigntist sentiment, and the transitional government has not been shy about capitalizing on this hostile public opinion toward the former colonizer. The new Malian junta's attempt to extend the transition period by five years despite its commitment to hold free elections in February 2022 has had serious consequences. An arsenal of sanctions has been deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to isolate Mali on the international scene, weakening its economy and exacerbating internal pressure from the Malian population against the transitional government. In the wake of ECOWAS, France opted for a punitive approach by advocating the adoption of sanctions. The junta was quick to accuse Paris of fomenting the embargo on Mali. By reacting firmly to this coup d'état within a coup d'état, France is sending contradictory signals, since it carried a wait-and-see attitude during the first putsch in Mali and has shown a certain complacency toward the new Chadian junta that emerged from an unconstitutional takeover. The French government has been accused of hypocrisy, supporting repressive regimes when it is in line with its regional strategy to maintain them and disavowing the Malian military junta when it is openly hostile to the French presence. If strategic incoherence is the order of the day, Paris has nonetheless become the scapegoat for all of Mali's ills. France has seen all the symbols of its presence attacked by movements from African civil society. Accusations of the perpetuation of France-Africa or neo-colonialism are spreading like wildfire across the Sahel. Part of the Malian population does not understand the objectives of Operation Barkhane, and public opinion in the Sahel is sensitive to anti-colonial discourse. However, the disinformation is nonetheless partly orchestrated by rival states trying to project their power in the subcontinent. Fake news finds a particular echo on social networks, and the French government struggles to assert the defamatory nature of these mostly unfounded rumors. The French army is lagging behind in this sometimes-asymmetrical informational struggle because of the anti-democratic nature of its opponents' regime. In addition to discrediting the French army, this propaganda is fed by the Kremlin as part of its hybrid strategy in Africa. The arrival of the Wagner group in Mali crystallized tensions between Paris and Bamako, and the political one-upmanship tragically pushed these paramilitaries into the arms of Assimi Goita, the new strongman of the junta. In a crossroads unfavorable to France, Russia's auxiliary army will not be able to fill the security vacuum that has emerged with the departure of 5,000 French soldiers. This costly military force for the Malian regime is too weak and the strategic interests are quite different. The private mercenary company Wagner was initially intended to protect key figures in the regime, but their presence has now grown to 350 paramilitaries with the new objective of fighting terrorism, which is proliferating in central Mali. Reducing the French army's footprint in the region has been a strategic priority since the announcement of the transformation of Operation Barkhane. Nevertheless, the inability to develop a structuring diplomacy with Bamako, the rise of anti-French sentiment, and the Wagner group's new resurgence in Mali is a slap in the face for Paris. The loss of influence is undeniable, but it is a way for France to rethink its intervention in the region. A Window of Opportunity for a Necessary Strategic Redeployment The juxtaposition of several military devices in the Sahel has led to the formation of a security bottleneck. With this new security situation, France could subcontract the management of Malian insecurity to the Wagner group, which seems to want to contain a jihadist threat that a military force of about 5,000 soldiers has not been able to do. Paris now estimates that the contingent of Russian paramilitaries has reached 1,000 individuals.  While the links between this private company and the Kremlin are not official, the Malian junta is nonetheless moving dangerously close to Moscow while it has just unilaterally denounced bilateral defence agreements with France. Would this emerging partnership make it possible to contain the ATG in Mali and in the tri-border region without allowing them to destabilize the entire Sahelo-Saharan band?  France could then focus its energies on Eastern Europe, where Ukraine is undergoing a large-scale invasion. However, the Russian system seems to be insufficient today to achieve such an objective. Moreover, faced with the failure of Barkhane and once again with its colonial past, France does not wish to abandon its historical territory so easily. Finally, the operating methods of this private militia, particularly in the Central African Republic where numerous abuses have been recorded, are contrary to the rules of engagement and the ethics of the French army. Faced with the reaction of the Malian junta, the European Takuba mission deployed in this advanced frontier of the old continent is finally stillborn. Anxious to consolidate French leadership, Emmanuel Macron, as the representative of the state that holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the next six months, could keep the diplomatic effort that gave birth to this international multidimensional force. The member states of this coalition wish to "remain engaged in the region," which is an undeniable asset for the preservation of this first large-scale experiment in a Europe of defence so dear to the French presidency. A redeployment of the European Takuba force to strategic border areas in Mali is still possible. Beyond the fallback solution, even if the possibility for the repositioning of the forces involved could lead to violent popular demonstrations, Niger could become the new pivotal state to save the new international military arrangement. France could also extend its support to states in the Gulf of Guinea that share more of its strategic orientation and are increasingly exposed to the nuisance activities of ATGs moving south. Working in conjunction with its European and African partners, this new posture could strengthen the defensive postures of other G5 Sahel member states. It would contain ATG so that terrorists no longer threaten the entire region – but at what cost to the neighboring Mali? After the expulsion of the French ambassador, re-establishing diplomatic channels with Bamako must be a priority for Paris. The withdrawal of the Barkhane force could provide an opportunity for the junta to reactivate a constructive bilateral dialogue with armed terrorist groups for a more inclusive Algiers 2.0 agreement, despite the red line drawn by the French government. An amnesty agreement along the lines of the Algerian dialogue of the 1990s could emerge from the opportunity presented by the departure of the French. Conclusion The French operation in Mali is a colossus with feet of clay. As the conflict landscape in the Sahel continues to shift, the accelerated withdrawal of French troops is the perfect opportunity for the government to continue the re-articulation of its involvement in the sub-region. The new strategic orientation that is being developed will necessarily have to strengthen the political underpinnings of this intervention to ensure its acceptability. Paris could take advantage of bilateral relations with neighboring countries that are less degraded than those with Bamako to develop less asymmetric military partnerships. A less politically exposed French external operation that induces a lighter footprint via air assets and a reinforcement of capabilities in the information domain are necessary. To face this growing competition, France must reactivate the dialogue with Bamako to avoid leaving the field open to Russia. With the Kremlin's growing ambitions, Paris is obliged to offer a credible alternative to fill the security vacuum and to respond to the dynamics of diversifying the relations of West African countries. Only through this new strategic leap forward can the much-feared French retreat be avoided. ## What lessons can be drawn from the “Second Russo-Ukrainian war”? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This strategic note examines the initial lessons that can be drawn from the “second Russo-Ukrainian war”. Contrary to what some experts... This strategic note examines the initial lessons that can be drawn from the war in Ukraine. It is primarily based on two seminars organized on this topic by the Strategic Analysis Network and its partners in February and March 2023. Contrary to what some experts predicted, and although part of its territory is still occupied, Ukraine has managed to resist and even recapture several territories – even though this can be partly attributable to Western support and assistance from other states such as Japan – as the last significant Russian territorial gains date back to the winter of 2022. While these same experts emphasized the glaring asymmetry between Kyiv and Moscow in terms of economics, demographics, and military power, an asymmetry that seemingly destined Ukraine to the status of the defeated and Russia to that of the victor, the past 16 months have demonstrated the limited relevance of such superficial interpretations. Moreover, the Vietnam and Afghan wars in the last century, not to mention the 21st-century Afghan war, have regularly exposed the emptiness of this kind of analysis. Furthermore, this lesson dates back several centuries and had already been demonstrated by the Greco-Persian Wars in the 5th century BCE. Overwhelming numerical superiority, even between an authoritarian regime and a democratic one – that is, between a system that can quickly mobilize its resources due to the near absence of checks and balances and debates and another one where these two elements constitute the very essence of the system – will by no means guarantee a victory. Highlights The past sixteen months have revealed numerous significant strategic and tactical mistakes by Russia. These stem from the prevalence of its ideology in planning its war effort. In parallel, Ukraine has quickly adapted to the aggression on its territory due to its moral advantage, the collaboration between civilians and the army, and the strength of its military software[1]. Although it has been given little attention since the beginning of the invasion, the importance of the maritime domain should not be underestimated. The structural weaknesses of Ukraine in this area, resulting from the 2014 war and other factors, have greatly facilitated Russia’s preparation before the invasion and have economically weakened Kyiv, as Ukraine heavily relies on maritime trade. The current stalemate and the prolonged nature of the war on the operational front can be primarily attributed to the absence of established air superiority from either side. This demonstrates the importance of the aerial domain and the need for NATO allies to reinvest rapidly and intensively in their air capabilities to ensure clear and deterrent air superiority on the northern flank of the Alliance. Such an investment is also necessary for drones and all weapon systems and detection capabilities that are essential for anti-access / area denial strategies.   ******   Introduction Over a year after Russia unjustifiably initiated the second Russo-Ukrainian war[2], and as we have witnessed the beginning of a new Ukrainian offensive in recent weeks, this paper highlights specific lessons that can be drawn from the conflict, particularly in the military realm. The arguments presented in this note are primarily based on two seminars organized by the Strategic Analysis Network and its partners in February and March 2023, addressing these two aspects of the conflict. The first seminar consisted of two roundtable discussions and a conference (featuring Michael Kofman) focusing on the strategic lessons that could be drawn regarding Russian military effectiveness in Ukraine. The first roundtable aimed to draw military lessons by analyzing the performances of Ukraine, Russia, and, indirectly NATO, in various domains (the speakers included Eliza Gheorghe, Frans Osinga, Hanna Shelest, and Alexander Lanoszka). The second roundtable facilitated an exchange between several experts on post-war perspectives (with Jack Porter, Maria Popova, Oxana Shevel, and Justin Massie). The second seminar, held on March 16, 2023, involved a broad discussion between ten experts[3], focusing on conflict resolution scenarios for 2023, as well as the strategic weaknesses and strengths of both belligerents. Several military and strategic observations can be made more than a year after the conflict started. These observations extend beyond the battlefield and the tactical level. The dominant or sometimes limited, yet occasionally variable, roles of certain military domains (maritime, aerial, cyber) reveal the extent to which this conflict provides lessons for future high-intensity wars. Furthermore, this war demonstrates how the military software of both belligerents, as well as the resilience of Ukrainian society, are crucial variables that shape its course. It highlights that numerical inferiority and asymmetry with regard to firepower do not necessarily determine the outcome of a conflict in many respects. The reasons behind the Russian stalemate and the Ukrainian surprise Following the first conference, it became evident that a biased perception of Ukraine influenced the Russian strategy. Russia’s self-proclaimed leadership role in its regional environment and the vassal status it attributed to Ukraine influenced the planning of this war. Those prevented the Kremlin from accurately assessing Ukrainian resistance capabilities. While it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the Russian stalemate on the battlefield, it seems that ideology took precedence over the effective planning of their war effort. According to the panellists in the second roundtable of the seminar on February 24, the Russian side underestimated the preparedness of Ukrainian forces for a new invasion between 2014 and 2022 (following the annexation of Crimea and Donbas). In addition to the military defence writings it had developed, Ukraine adopted the concept of national resistance and resilience in 2021 and had already begun strengthening its information security. These measures prepared society for the possibility of an attack and ultimately enhanced the resilience of the Ukrainian system and society. By underestimating Ukraine and its people, Moscow falsely believed it could conquer Kyiv in two weeks. Over fifteen months after the invasion, it is evident that Russia formulated imperialistic ambitions beyond its military capabilities. Despite the scale of the offensive and the pre-war reforms in the Russian military, Moscow failed to break through the Ukrainian frontlines. The ambiguous strategic planning of its military effort and the lack of preparedness of its troops made the offensive arduous and inconclusive on the ground. Structural deficits caused by a reduction in tactical groups within their armed forces and the absence of air superiority[4] prevented Moscow from destroying Ukraine’s strategic centers of gravity. The experts in the conference and the first roundtable on February 24 also emphasized the surprise factor stemming from the Ukrainian resistance. Unlike the Russian forces, the Ukrainian army demonstrated true coordination between its forces as well as flexibility, allowing it to quickly adapt to the Russian aggression. Two fundamental reasons can explain the resilience of Ukrainian resistance. While the Ukrainian people certainly did not expect an offensive of this magnitude, they had gradually adapted to an atmosphere of insecurity after the annexation of Crimea and part of the Donbas in 2014, followed by a low-intensity war and Russian destabilization operations that occurred between 2014 and 2022. As mentioned earlier, this acclimatization to risk was manifested by adopting the concept of national resistance and resilience in 2021. Because Ukrainians have been the clear victims of the aggression, some experts explain that this position allows them to display unwavering motivation and resilience. Indeed, the war initiated by Russia was in no way provoked: in this sense, Kyiv holds a moral advantage over Moscow. It enables them to mobilize the majority of their population in the face of the unprovoked aggression they have endured and to obtain unequivocal support from most of their allies. By comparison, narratives surrounding the 2008 war in Georgia also highlighted the Georgian government’s share of responsibility in triggering the conflict, as they initiated military operations in South Ossetia (although it can be legitimately argued that it was their territory and not a Russian region). Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war, it is crucial to note that this conflict is existential for the survival of Ukraine and its people, which has de facto made its military software more robust. The Ukrainian military and political authorities have benefited from the contribution of civilians to the war effort from the outset of the war. Michael Kofman highlighted the fact that civilians did not hesitate to defend their cities while awaiting the organized deployment of Ukrainian troops at the beginning of the invasion. Such a war effort allowed the Ukrainian military software to strengthen and develop rapidly. It continued to benefit from the contribution of civilians, especially in the intelligence field, demonstrating genuine cooperation between the armed forces and the Ukrainian population in a total war context. For some experts, this configuration made a difference against disorganized and less motivated Russian troops. Moreover, accounts from Russian prisoners of war indicate that many Russian soldiers were unaware of their destinations/objectives, even a few days or hours before the invasion. At a minimum, they only had misleading briefings promising them to be welcomed as liberators by the Ukrainians. According to Alexander Lanoszka, this is a significant strategic lesson to consider: this war highlights the importance of military software, which is just as essential, if not more, than military hardware. However, as the experts demonstrated in the final roundtable of the first seminar, Russian tactical and strategic mistakes, as well as the lack of capabilities and equipment on the Ukrainian side, have led to a stalemate in the war. The second phase of the conflict illustrates this, as the Kremlin decided to compensate for its lack of troops through repeated bombardments to weaken Ukrainian resistance by targeting their rear positions. This strategy of attrition, previously observed in Syria, has resulted in a significant human cost for Ukrainians but has not allowed Russia to make significant territorial gains. According to Michael Kofman, the Russian strategic and tactical errors have ultimately led to a crisis of confidence within its army. Although information is difficult to access, there are suspicions of a resistance and desertion movement within the Russian military apparatus. The recent failed raid by the leader of Wagner, citing betrayals within the Russian military high command and demanding the resignations of the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov and the Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, publicly demonstrated the level of loss of trust and mistrust within the Russian forces (including the regular army as well as private armies such as Yevgeny Prigozhin’s or Ramzan Kadyrov’s). These forces appear to be demoralized in the face of a committed Ukrainian society ready to defend itself against the aggressor to survive. Oxana Shevel points out that after a year of confrontation, nearly 90% of the Ukrainian population declared their willingness to continue fighting despite the regular threats of nuclear strikes issued by Putin. As of June 12, this figure remains almost unchanged, standing at 84%. Indeed, Russia holds an undeniable demographic advantage, as discussed in the second seminar. However, Ukraine clearly and significantly holds the advantage in terms of morale. As some have argued during the March 16 roundtable, one of Russia’s strengths is its demographics compared to Ukraine. In a war of attrition, Moscow has the advantage due to the number of troops it can mobilize. However, the disparity in terms of motivation between the two sides is clear. For various reasons, Ukraine, including its elites and population, clearly demonstrates its willingness to continue the fight. Despite this moral advantage, it remains difficult to determine whether the Ukrainian motivations will be enough to definitively repel the Russian armed forces given Moscow’s demographic advantage and its disregard for its own losses, as Ekaterina Piskunova points out. The conduct of the war and the respective importance of certain military domains (maritime, aerial, and cyber) As emphasized by Hanna Shelest, although the Russo-Ukrainian war has primarily been a ground war, the maritime domain is far from a theatre of secondary strategic importance in the conflict. The maritime domain’s significance in Russia’s preparation for the offensive in February 2022 is particularly noteworthy. Due to significant losses in maritime military capabilities in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine could not ensure comprehensive protection and efficient threat assessment on its maritime coast. The shipment of maritime equipment by Ukraine’s allies that started only in 2019 was too late and did not allow Ukraine to overcome its defence and security deficit on its maritime coast. As Ukraine is heavily economically dependent on maritime trade (70% of its exports come from the sea), this capacity deficit has had significant consequences. The Russians were able to capitalize on this strategic weakness and economic dependence: one month before the February 2022 offensive, Ukrainian ports were blocked by the Russians. This event highlights the importance of studying the preparation phase preceding the invasion, which reveals weaknesses on the Ukrainian side. For Hanna Shelest, Ukraine’s deficiencies in the maritime domain and the delayed supply of military equipment should therefore prompt the expert community to consider strengthening Ukrainian capabilities in this area. However, the importance of the maritime domain in the conflict’s preparation phase should not overshadow the predominance of the aerial domain. According to Frans Osinga, the aerial domain has proven decisive for the balance of power in this war. It explains the ongoing stalemate resulting from the absence of established air superiority from either side. As highlighted by Michael Kofman, the reasons why Moscow refrained from targeting Ukrainian infrastructures at the beginning of the offensive remain somewhat unclear. It appears that the belief in a swift takeover of Ukraine and its capital city did not prompt the Russian high command to consider establishing aerial dominance that would have weakened Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. Furthermore, the lack of offensive capabilities in the aerial domain (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses, SEAD/DEAD), as well as a shortage of experienced pilots, would explain the absence of Russian dominance in the aerial domain and thus the stalemate between the two belligerents on the battlefield. In this regard, Frans Osinga tends to believe that, with a few exceptions, the impact of the aerial domain on the strategic situation in Ukraine has not been sufficiently studied, despite its decisive potential for ending the conflict and potentially resolving the crisis. According to one of the experts, this observation should serve as a strategic lesson, especially for NATO allies supporting Ukraine. According to Frans Osinga, the strategic importance of this domain demonstrates that most allies need to rapidly and intensively reinvest in their aerial capabilities after decades of neglecting them. NATO’s air superiority on its northern flank must be restored as quickly as possible to deter any spillover from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict or any further Russian destabilization attempts. The importance of the aerial domain also means that NATO members should significantly develop their drone capabilities, regardless of their size or function. The war has indeed demonstrated the significant role played by drones, although they are not decisive on their own, for intelligence, transportation, combat, or suicide functions. It is equally necessary to build a defence system against them, as Russia now regularly employs drones. Such development makes the development and implementation of anti-access / area denial strategies, relying on various weapon and detection systems, even more necessary. As Alexander Lanoszka points out, cyber has been of lesser importance in the conflict. This observation should lead to a nuanced understanding of the importance of new technologies in modern warfare. Despite the emergence of disruptive technologies and their impact on global stability, their secondary role in this war helps to relativize their strategic importance. There are certainly lessons to be learned from integrating these new technologies into the Ukrainian communication and control system, for example. However, they only serve as a palliative to the “classic” domains of military strategy. According to the experts in this roundtable, the cyber domain cannot replace them. However, cyber tools allow for the development of offensives and defences related to these traditional domains. The limited role of cyber ultimately confirms the traditional nature of this war, in contrast to modern warfare that mobilizes hybrid strategies on highly localized and delineated fronts. As mentioned by some experts, the Russo-Ukrainian war has proved to be a war of attrition with the characteristics of an all-out war that has relied on nuclear deterrence, heavy artillery, and ideology. In a certain way, it echoes the modalities of 20th-century conflicts. Conclusion While it is, unfortunately, more than likely that this war will continue beyond the current year, the analysis of the conflict allows us to identify specific lessons that can be useful for Western countries and their allies (including in other regions of the world, such as the South China Sea). It is evident in this regard that Russian imperialist ideology has driven Russian elites and the government to formulate political ambitions that exceed their military capabilities. Due to this blindness, the lack of organization and planning in the Russian war effort quickly turned the “special operation” into a protracted war, where stagnation and attrition became realities. Alongside the detrimental influence of Russian imperialist ideology, it is worth noting the surprise that the Ukrainian national resistance posed for many experts. This highlights the importance of a society’s and a state’s military mindset, which is just as crucial as the available weapon systems. From a tactical perspective, several lessons can also be drawn from the conflict. While the maritime domain was crucial in the preparation and initial phase of the war, the significance of the aerial domain grew as the conflict evolved. Although the importance of the maritime and aerial domains should be emphasized, it is also important to note the more limited role of cyber, contrary to predictions and discussions about future conflicts. Can we, therefore, assume that this will be the case in future wars? For example, the new French military programming law indicates that within the French armed forces and elite circles, the analysis tends to consider cyber as a significant element of future conflicts, hence the increase in funding in this area. However, these initial lessons and observations must be regarded for what they are: preliminary analyses. The war is far from over, and as the experts mentioned in the second seminar, given the Russian motivations behind the war, prospects for peace in the coming months are highly unlikely. Furthermore, it is still too early to hope that the internal turmoil in Russia, including the mutiny of Wagner against the Russian military high command, will positively impact establishing either a negative or positive peace. The divisions within the Russian political-military apparatus will certainly have battlefield effects that could favour the Ukrainians. But returning to the lessons that can be drawn from this conflict, as illustrated by the aerial domain, the importance of specific sectors can vary during a conflict, as can the will to resist and the mobilization of society. Therefore, these initial analyses/lessons should be taken into account, but they should not be regarded as definitive lessons from this war.   [1] The term “military software” refers to all the mechanisms and programs implemented to plan and launch an offensive or defense against an adversary in wartime. [2] The term "second Russo-Ukrainian war" is used to highlight the rupture caused by the illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022. While the war in eastern Ukraine has not truly ceased since 2014 despite the Minsk agreements of 2015, February 2022 represents a turning point in Russo-Ukrainian conflict. [3] The speakers were : Dominique Arel, Laurent Borzillo, Yann Breault, Magdalena Dembinska, Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, Heidi Hardt, Justin Massie, Falk Ostermann, Ekaterina Piskunova and Olivier Schmitt. [4] Air superiority is considered by military strategists in the West as a prerequisite for all extraterritorial offensives. ## What Multilateral Strategy for Canada in the Arctic? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/what-multilateral-strategy-for-canada-in-the-arctic/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Canada faces four types of threats in its Arctic region: the climate crisis, which has severe consequences for the security of local... Russia’s warmongering and revisionist behaviour in Ukraine raises questions about its position in the Arctic, given the region’s strategic importance for Russia. Moscow has the world’s longest maritime border there and has deployed its nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula, giving the region a vital role in Russia’s deterrent capabilities. From a tactical point of view, the exercises “Kavkaz-2012”, “Zapad-2013,” and “Kavkaz-2016” revealed that, despite the low probability for a conflict in the Arctic, Russia could open up a front there in the event of a regional conflict elsewhere. However, Russia’s strategic objectives remain defensive: maintaining its status as the leading Arctic power, preserving a strong and credible deterrent capability, and protecting its economic interests in the region. Yet one of the most deleterious consequences for Russia after its invasion of Ukraine is the intensification of a sense of encirclement with the eventual accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO. NATO’s presence will undoubtedly be strengthened in the Arctic and weaken Moscow’s regional dominance. This new strategic situation could push Russia to act in an unpredictable and warmongering manner. To avoid this scenario, it is in the interest of allies to strengthen their deterrence and reassurance capacity in the region to prevent the worst. In this context, it is necessary to reflect on what is needed to adapt Canada’s Arctic posture – which has significant vulnerabilities – and to question Canada’s multilateral strategy in the region. With this in mind, the Strategic Analysis Network conducted a series of interviews and organized a roundtable with experts and practitioners to analyze Canada’s vulnerabilities in the Arctic and the prospects for security cooperation in the region in an uncertain and volatile strategic environment. This report presents their synthesis.[1] What Threats in the Canadian Arctic? Canada faces four types of threats in its Arctic region: the climate crisis, which has severe consequences for the security of local populations; Canada’s legal posture regarding the Northwest Passage, which is not internationally recognized; hybrid destabilization operations coming from third countries in the region; and the lack of Canadian capabilities to conduct surveillance and control of its air and maritime space. The Arctic region is experiencing global warming three times faster than the global average. The lack of Canadian infrastructure in the region and the international community’s mixed efforts to control global warming threaten Canada’s northern populations by progressively degrading their living conditions. The Observatory for Arctic Policy and Security (OPSA) report showed that the climate crisis and lack of infrastructure in 2022 had worsened food, economic, environmental, health, personal, and political security in Canada’s Arctic. The modification of ecosystems linked, in particular, to the thawing of permafrost not only has a substantial impact on food independence in the region but also causes the degradation of already underdeveloped infrastructure, coastal erosion, and the scarcity of drinking water. There is consensus among experts about the acuteness of the environmental threat. However, the lack of federal projects to effectively address and manage these challenges increases Canada’s vulnerability in its Arctic space. In addition, global warming allows for increased tourism, commercial activities and, more broadly, the presence of private actors who do not have a good knowledge of the region and can contribute to the weakening of ecosystems. Even though global warming can only be managed globally, Canada must quickly address its structural flaws, which could reinforce social cleavages and exacerbate social frustration. Indeed, this social context facilitates the interference of various state actors, such as Russia or China, who resort to hybrid operations (especially informational ones). While Arctic countries have so far not notified any Arctic-related disinformation operations, the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO will potentially impact Russia’s framing of the region and could lead to an increase in disinformation campaigns. At the same time, the projection of increased commercial activity in the Arctic due to accelerated ice melting reinforces the need for the Canadian government to maintain its legal posture on the Northwest Passage (NWP). While neither Russia nor China has yet challenged Canada’s claims on the NWP, the geostrategic upheaval caused by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine confirms Canada’s interest in preserving its posture on the Strait. Claiming Canada’s sovereignty over the NWP aims to control navigation in a fragile environment in a non-discriminatory manner. While allies such as Japan and South Korea recognize Canadian aspirations on the NWP, Ottawa still faces the refusal of its close American ally and, to a lesser extent, its European allies. Washington refuses to set a precedent on sea passages. Still, it remains essential for Canada to obtain the support of the United States on this issue to definitively eliminate the risk of the NWP legally becoming an international maritime strait. While the climate threat and its associated risks enjoy a consensus among experts, there are debates about the acuteness of conventional threats in the Canadian Arctic space. For some, it is possible to avoid conventional threats because of the geography of the Canadian Arctic (the great distances and difficult climate reduce the likelihood of a successful third-country offensive). Moreover, Russia and China have so far expressed no strategic interest in the Canadian Arctic. From this perspective, a conflict in the North of the country is unlikely. For others, the lack of Canadian investment in the Arctic creates significant risks to national security. Canada continues to face significant gaps in monitoring and detecting conventional and hybrid threats in the region. While political rhetoric has contributed to the region’s securitization, persistent strategic vulnerabilities could ultimately undermine Canada’s credibility with allies and render its deterrence ineffective against rivals. On the other hand, this lack of resilience and capabilities fosters the development of hybrid threats due to the traditional attribution problem specific to the nature of these threats. Although it is challenging to communicate the acuteness of destabilization operations publicly because of their sensitive nature, those are real challenges in the region. Canada must develop effective mechanisms to counter them for the sake of security and sovereignty. European Allies in the Arctic The worsening security environment in the Arctic since the annexation of Crimea by Russia has led to the strengthening of Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and Finnish postures in the region. The war in Ukraine did not lead to a fundamental break in their positions in the Arctic, except for Sweden’s and Finland’s applications for NATO membership. However, as the circumpolar cooperation is on hold due to the suspension of the Arctic Council’s regular work, it creates uncertainty in governance, security and cooperation. Since 2014, Russia has been explicitly identified as a threat in the Arctic strategies of the Nordic countries. That said, if in terms of deterrence the dynamics of military acquisition and modernization continue to follow the strategies developed before February 2022, they have been relatively accelerated with the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian “second war.” The upward trend in military budgets and investment in Arctic capabilities began in 2014 and is currently intensifying. Since February 2022, Norway has increased its defence budget by 7.3% in 2023 and announced a hardware investment of around US$500 million. In addition, the number of armed forces posted in Finmark and at the Ramsund naval base will increase and Norway will set up funds to strengthen the armed forces in the North to undertake a major modernization. Indeed, Oslo wants this new defence budget to prioritize the North to prepare the country for the possibility of a direct conflict with Russia. Denmark has ended its derogation clause within the EU on the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) to strengthen its security cooperation with its European allies. It also recently recalled that the Arctic remains the country’s most important security priority. In May 2022, the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland agreed to expand military education programs, increase the size of the armed forces and establish an airborne radar surveillance post on the Faroe Islands. The project is valued at US$13 million. As early as 2014, Finland announced its desire to remilitarize in the face of Russian warmongering behaviour. In 2020, it announced a 54% increase in its defence budget, and the country has since demonstrated a continued willingness to strengthen its deterrence capabilities in the Arctic. However, the war in Ukraine greatly upset its threat perception in the Far North. Indeed, its October 2022 report on the Arctic cancelled its 2021 strategy and signalled a dramatic geopolitical shift in the region. As a result, Finland is accelerating its remilitarization process and strengthening its military alliances. In November 2022, Finland acquired 80 U.S. precision missiles worth about US$323 million and made a declaration of intent with Norway and Sweden to strengthen cooperation in the High North. After the Cold Response exercise in March 2022, the country announced, for the year 2023, 89 international military exercises to develop security coordination with its allies in the Far North. At the end of 2022, Helsinki announced a 20% increase in its 2023 defence budget, representing 2.25% of Finland’s GDP. Sweden has been following the same remilitarization dynamic since 2014. The country is continuing its Total Defence 2021-2025 programme established in 2017; it aims at preparing Sweden for the possibility of war. Its application for NATO membership led it to accelerate the remilitarization and modernization of its armed forces. While Sweden has a traditional security interest in the Arctic, its new government declared in December 2022 that it would focus on developing drones and satellites to obtain more developed surveillance capabilities (in the Arctic and elsewhere). Indeed, Prime Minister Kristersson said that the war in Ukraine showed the need to develop capabilities to better understand Russian intentions (in the Arctic and elsewhere). Its defence budget follows the same trends as its European neighbours’: while it was about US$5 billion in 2021, the 2023 budget amounts to roughly US$9 billion. The strengthening of the Arctic defence posture of these four countries relies on increased ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities, inter-allied interoperability and equipment modernization. This aims to protect their critical infrastructure in the Baltic and Barents Seas and, more broadly, to strengthen their sovereignty in the region. This offers opportunities for Ottawa to buttress its military investments through, notably, the joint development of capabilities to reduce its vulnerabilities in its Arctic region. Like its European allies, Canada forecasts an increase in military spending of about US$5 billion in 2023. Indeed, the war in Ukraine strengthened the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance and consolidated a consensus on identifying the imminent threat – a revisionist and warmongering Russian Federation – for Canada and its allies. On the other hand, the Canadian government does not plan to meet its commitment to NATO, which would mean increasing its military spending to 2% of its GDP. At best, it intends to reach 1.59% in 2026. This goal contrasts with the other nations’ projections to reach the 2% target: 2026 for Sweden, 2028 for Norway and 2033 for Denmark. Thus, Canada is the only Arctic state that does not plan to spend 2% of its GDP on defence over the next decade. Recommendations for Canada Given its significant vulnerabilities in the Arctic region, Canada must rethink its engagement within its alliances (NORAD and NATO) to maximize its national security. Indeed, despite a political will to develop multilateralism in the North American Arctic, efforts in this area remain insufficient to address the strategic vulnerabilities that risk being reinforced by the uncertainty and instability caused by Russian aggression in Ukraine. In this context, Canada must prioritize and accelerate the NORAD modernization. Even though in June 2022, the Canadian government announced a US$4.9 billion investment to modernize NORAD over the next six years, the recent Chinese air surveillance operation is a reminder of the need for and delay in modernizing NORAD. For example, while the recent acquisition of maritime surveillance drones in the Arctic is a step in the right direction, the acquisition of armed drones is not expected until the end of the decade, after more than 20 years of discussions. In addition, despite the desire to replace the submarine fleet in the 2030s, no budget has yet been allocated to this costly project. Finally, unlike the Europeans and Americans, Canada has not developed plans for increased investment in its defence industry to increase the production of munitions and military equipment needed to wage high-intensity warfare. Beyond public statements, a gap is therefore widening in defence posture vis-à-vis its allies in the context of the return of great power competition. The new geostrategic context imposed by Russia could allow Ottawa to bridge this capability gap. Indeed, even if in 2020, the declared refusal to provide NORAD with offensive capabilities showed a strategic disagreement with the United States, Canada needs to strengthen its credibility and deterrence capacity in the Arctic and obtain Washington’s support on the NWP file. Therefore it should encourage it to reconsider the development of offensive capabilities for NORAD and intensify its niche investments in the defensive capabilities of SRI. The deepening of the alliance with the United States is necessary. It could be institutionalized through the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence to advance its needs and interests more actively within NATO. Indeed, the future integration of Sweden and Finland will give greater visibility to Nordic defence cooperation (NORDEFCO) within the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, Washington and Ottawa have a mutual interest in coalescing their Arctic strategies to counterbalance a strictly northern European security approach. Strengthening North American positioning would allow Ottawa to work towards a clearer division of the maritime and air burden with its European allies in return for its investment in securing the North Atlantic and the Canadian Arctic. To do this, Canada and the United States must identify and implement NORAD’s role as NATO’s northwestern flank. Deepening security cooperation between NATO’s Arctic states would also be an opportunity for Ottawa to gain support from its European allies on the NWP file and consider better coordination for detecting hybrid threats, intelligence sharing and joint acquisitions. For some, it remains difficult to grasp the idea of circumpolar coordination in terms of ISR due to geographical and geostrategic divergences between European and North American Arctic spaces. However, while Canada’s Arctic differs in many ways from that of Europe, Canada, the United States, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden share a common imperative need for threat identification, surveillance and reconnaissance. Differences in strategic cultures, political contexts and socio-economic dynamics should not discourage these allies from developing joint capabilities, better coordinating their Arctic initiatives and facilitating greater integration of their defence postures. [1] The roundtable discussions took place on 19 January 2023 and the series of interviews was conducted from 1 to 3 February 2023. ## What Peace for Ukraine? Understanding the Causes of the War to End It URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/what-kind-of-peace-for-ukraine-understanding-the-causes-of-the-war-to-end-it/ Modified: 2023-01-06 > The prospects for peace in Ukraine are currently the subject of vigorous discussion. Three main positions structure the debate... The prospects for peace in Ukraine are currently the subject of vigorous discussion. Three main positions structure the debate. On the one hand, some argue that the best way to achieve peace is by offering Russia a way out through negotiations and mutual concessions. This view is shared by John Mearsheimer, who believes that the war in Ukraine is the United States’ fault and that the latter should put an end to its support to the Ukrainians. Other voices, both progressive and conservative, believe that the United States should enter into direct negotiations with Russia to find a peace settlement, which would necessarily involve compromising Ukraine's territorial integrity. This idea seems to have the moral upper hand since its advocates claim to be in favor of imminent peace. It is all the more attractive as the risk of an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict could lead to a direct or even nuclear confrontation between the United States and Russia. In the words of two experts: "Forcing a cornered nuclear-armed state led by a man who sees his misguided war as an existential struggle into a complete and humiliating retreat poses far greater risks than the benefits of trying to recapture every square mile of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian forces. A negotiated cease-fire, with strong enforcement, is the best option." Others argue that there can be no negotiation whatsoever with President Putin, given his neo-colonial war aims in Ukraine. From this point of view, the only possible way to end the war is by reaching a total military defeat for Russia and provoking a regime change in Moscow. President Zelensky expressed this maximalist position by declaring that his government was ready to dialogue with Russia, "but with another Russian president," and that his war goals included the liberation of the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea. President Biden momentarily supported this view by declaring that Putin "cannot stay in power," before his aides later clarified that Washington was not seeking regime change in Russia. The Deputy Prime Minister of Canada also echoed calls for regime change. A third way is to be found in the joint position of Western countries: peace will potentially be negotiated, when Russia agrees to end its aggression, and respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The G7 member states agreed to demand that Russia "immediately and unconditionally ceases all hostilities" and withdraws from the entire Ukrainian territory, "delimited by its internationally recognized [1991] borders." While some question the need for the liberation of Crimea and a part of Donbas, Germany considers this position to be naïve. President Macron supports this position, saying that "Vladimir Putin must stop this war, respect Ukraine's territorial integrity and return to the table." Therefore, the Western strategy is to provide Ukraine, thanks to its successes on the battlefield, with the means to impose the best possible terms in any peace negotiations. Who is right? What is the best hope for peace in Ukraine?  The best way to answer this question is by understanding the origins of the conflict and by relying on the theories of war termination. On this basis, the best chance for lasting peace in Ukraine should include a thorough review of Russia's imperial ambitions, the development of a credible Ukrainian deterrent, or even the external imposition of such a deterrent force. Otherwise, the conflict is likely to be protracted at a higher or lower level of intensity. Russia's Neocolonial Revanchism The origins of the war in Ukraine are debated, but two main causes stand out. The first one is the Kremlin's neo-colonial vision, which views Ukraine as a fake and illegitimate state. As President Putin stated in July 2021: "true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia […] Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people." This vision is ingrained in the thinking of the Russian president; he stated it during the NATO-Russia Council at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008;  he invoked it in the lengthy speech that preceded the invasion; and he repeated it in the eighth month of the war, affirming that "Russia, which created today's Ukraine, could have been the only real and serious guarantor of Ukraine’s statehood, sovereignty, and territorial integrity." This denigration of Ukraine is part of a neo-imperial vision from Russia that deplores the break-up of the Soviet Union and wants to restore Russia's great power status by subjecting its neighbor to its domination and imposing itself militarily to better redefine Europe’s security architecture. This revanchist neo-imperialism feeds on a deep sense of humiliation. As Joslyn Barnhart argued in The Consequences of Humiliation, great powers that feel they have been treated unfairly by  ill-intentioned third parties are likely to use military force to try and restore their status, for example by seeking to restore their spheres of influence on weaker states. There is no doubt that the Russian leadership feels that it has been flouted and that it deserves a sphere of influence over Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly accused the West of mistreating Russia, complaining that a   "humiliated" Russia had been forced to accept the West's will against its own interests. As he said in 2014: "It is impossible to keep humiliating one's partners forever in such a way.  That kind of relationship eventually breaks down". The invasion of Ukraine is therefore above all the result of a revanchist sentiment that is deeply rooted in Russian imperial nationalism. This revanchism is at the heart of Putin's livid reaction to NATO's open-door policy and the Maidan uprising in 2014. As Mearsheimer argues, these events are catalysts rather than causes of the Russian aggression. The possible candidacies of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 fueled Russian revanchism.  Similarly, NATO's military operations as well as the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq have stirred Russian resentment. Russia also criticizes what it views as a so-called legal universalism that has different requirements depending on the country. The Kremlin justified the war in Georgia and the consequent secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the illegal annexation of Crimea with the precedents of Kosovo, East Timor, and South Sudan, and drew many parallels between its invasion of Ukraine and that of Iraq. However, these catalysts should not be mistaken for causes of Russian neo-imperialism, which was evident long before these events in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia’s war goals go beyond Ukraine's potential NATO membership. Rather than seeking to impose its veto power, the Kremlin could have been content with the French and German opposition to the accession of Ukraine and Georgia, arguing that the "two countries are not yet ripe", a position implicitly reiterated by President Macron on the eve of the invasion. By annexing Crimea and supporting the secession of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, Putin had already ruled out any possibility of Ukraine's accession to NATO, given that obtaining the MAP is conditional upon the peaceful settlement of any existing international territorial dispute. Thus, when President Zelensky committed to neutrality in his proposal for a peace agreement last March, the Russian president rejected it, as he did another similar proposal at the beginning of the invasion. Because its goal is to absorb Ukraine into the Russian Empire, and not just prevent it from joining NATO. Incidentally, the five conditions set by President Zelensky to negotiate peace do not include any reference to NATO. Russian revanchism, however, makes Moscow unlikely to compromise on its neo-colonial war aims. President Putin does not see his invasion as aggression, but rather as resistance to Western imperialism. He has thus flouted the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership by violating Ukrainian sovereignty and has continued to escalate the conflict in Ukraine, going so far as to annex territories it does not control, strike civilian targets, conduct sabotage operations and cyberattacks in Europe, and threaten to use nuclear weapons. This escalation justifiably raises fears of the worst but giving in to Russian demands for territorial concessions and regime change in Kyiv would only fuel the revanchism that underpins them and perpetuate the aggression. Instead, it is necessary to act on the revision of Moscow's neo-colonial objectives in order to find a peaceful solution to the war. The Failure of Deterrence The second most important cause of the war in Ukraine is the failure of deterrence. When Moscow made its demands in December 2021, it affected both Ukraine and other Eastern European states. Moscow has insisted that Ukraine should not join NATO, but also that NATO troops and weapons be withdrawn from Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Balkan states. On February 24, however, Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine and not that of NATO members. The difference between the latter countries and Ukraine, of course, is that they enjoy the security guarantees provided by the United States in case of external aggression. If Ukraine had possessed such guarantees, it is hard to imagine that President Putin would have launched an invasion against it. President Biden virtually gave the green light for the invasion of Ukraine when he said that the US would not defend Kyiv if it was attacked. In December, Biden ruled out the deployment of US combat troops, instead preferring to bolster NATO's military presence on the eastern flank, arm Ukrainian forces, and punish Russia with economic sanctions. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the primacy accorded to the Chinese strategic threat may explain this reluctance. However, it was mainly due to the lack of defense obligations towards Ukraine, its limited geostrategic importance to the United States, and the fear that it would start an open war with nuclear power for a secondary national interest. It is impossible to assess exactly what might have happened if Ukraine had received a MAP in 2008 or if, on the contrary, NATO had formally denied it possible membership. But if Kyiv had benefited from a US security guarantee, or more plausibly from a policy of strategic ambiguity similar to that of the US towards Taiwan, deterrence against a Russian invasion would have been greater. Instead, President Biden withdrew US troops that were training Ukraine's armed forces, signaling that the US would not use military power to oppose aggression. As Kori Schake argued two weeks before the invasion, "Russia knows it won't confront US forces if it invades Ukraine, and we have effectively conceded to Russia a sphere of influence to prey on countries beyond NATO's boundary." President Biden could have maintained ambiguity about his security commitments to Ukraine. He could also have threatened to provide Kyiv with the weapons and training it needed to stop a Russian invasion ahead of it. These instruments would have strengthened American deterrence. They would have also better prepared Western capitals for the massive amounts of weapons and ammunition needed to wage a protracted war of attrition against a great power. The Biden administration and its allies have severely underestimated the Ukrainians’ ability and willingness to fight, and they overestimated the Russians’. As a result, the White House signaled its willingness to negotiate with Moscow, said it would not send troops to evacuate Americans stranded in Ukraine, and reaffirmed that it had "no intention of fighting Russia.” This confirmed to the Kremlin that it would not have to confront the US military if it invaded Ukraine. It was only after the unexpected successes of the Ukrainian army and the astonishment in the face of Russia's weaknesses that the United States and its allies considerably increased the supply of weapons and training to Kyiv. For deterrence to work, this should have been done or threatened to be, before Russian aggression. In the absence of a revision of Russian ambitions, Ukraine's security, therefore, depends on establishing deterrence to avoid future aggression. How Wars End The prospects for peace in Ukraine depend not only on the causes of the war but also on the circumstances under which the belligerent parties can reach a peace agreement. In How Wars End, Dan Reiter proposes a negotiation model for assessing how, when and why belligerents agree to end wars, providing a better understanding of how the war in Ukraine might end. Put simply, wars end either with a victory when one of the parties is militarily forced to give in or, more frequently, with a settlement when a third party forces the belligerents to respect a peace agreement. First of all, it must be agreed that a total victory on either side is very unlikely. On the one hand, the war exposed the weaknesses of the Russian military, unable to defeat the Ukrainian military for a multitude of reasons related to capabilities, strategy, manpower, logistics, intelligence, leadership, and morale. Russia, therefore, falls back on increased conflict costs, whether through popular mobilization, the use of strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructures, or the threat of nuclear weapons. The first two options seem unlikely to bend the Ukrainian resistance; they even accelerate its external military support, including the provision of air defense systems and aid for energy infrastructure. The use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, even a tactical one, could lead to direct US involvement in the war. Biden warned Moscow that there would be a "decisive" US response, without elaborating, but both EU’s chief diplomat and the former CIA director said that the allies would annihilate Russian forces in Ukraine. A Russian nuclear strike on an uninhabited territory, on the other hand, would send a signal that the conflict is existential in Russia’s eyes. This could have a very strong divisive effect on the West, but would further isolate Russia on the international stage. This would not allow the Russians to have a better chance of defeating the Ukrainians on the battlefield. A total victory for the Ukrainian side is similarly implausible. For Clausewitz, absolute victory means the annihilation of enemy armies, forcing the total surrender of the adversary. Kyiv does not have the ability, let alone the will, to crush the Russian military beyond its borders. The ultimate objective is limited to the liberation of its territory to recover the 1991 borders. The West refuses to provide the Ukrainians with weapons capable of reaching the depths of Russian territory (medium- or long-range missiles, fighter jets, etc.). Therefore, Ukraine does not have the capacity to completely defeat Russia. At most, Kyiv can hope for the liberation of the entirety of its territory if the external support it enjoys is maintained until then –  a very uncertain scenario given the possible fatigue of the West if the war drags on for a long time and their probable divisions if the Ukrainian forces are able to liberate Crimea, which would raise fears of escalation. Regardless, even if the entire Ukrainian territory were liberated, Russia would retain the ability to rebuild its forces and attack again. In the absence of a total victory for either of the belligerents, a negotiated peace is therefore the most feasible outcome of the war. However, the conditions are not currently ripe for a peaceful settlement. Both Kyiv and Moscow believe they can achieve battlefield gains during the coming year, and the costs of a defeat for both countries are considered to be exorbitant. This explains their current reluctance to negotiate. The prolongation of the war of attrition may eventually lead to a situation where Kyiv or Moscow would see it more costly to continue the fight than to concede. Such an outcome could be accelerated by the erosion of Western support, fears of survival in Vladimir Putin's regime, or the use of nuclear weapons. The Kremlin thus multiplies the threats of escalation, feeds disinformation, and supports pro-Russian Western political parties in order to divide the West. Kyiv, for its part, relies on the successes of its counter-offensive to demand the supply of increasingly sophisticated weapons and counts on the training of its troops elsewhere in Europe to continue its military successes. Both belligerents hope to negotiate a possible peace from a position of strength. However, any negotiated peace would be highly fragile given the absence of credible commitments on either side to ensure its implementation. Neither Moscow nor Kyiv can trust the credibility of the other when it comes to respecting a ceasefire that would seal the conflict below their respective objectives. Moscow would not be credible if it committed to respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity given its neo-colonial revanchism and its many violations in the past, while Kyiv would not be credible if it committed to avoiding moving closer to the West. In fact, both sides have so far promised exactly the opposite, one by annexing territories outside its control, the other by advocating for joining the EU and NATO. Whether the conflict ends with the December 2, 1991 borders, the February 23, 2022 ones, or otherwise, the Ukrainians will have no guarantee that the Russians will not attack it again, and the Russians can no longer hope that Ukraine does not fall into the Western camp. Post-war Ukraine will seek prosperity in the EU and security from the United States. In the absence of a total victory or credible commitments, any negotiated peace, therefore, requires the intervention of a third party capable of guaranteeing its terms. This third party can be neutral, like the UN, or partial, like NATO. While it is hard to imagine the Kremlin accepting a UN peace operation preventing it from further aggression, an international force could save face by consolidating some territorial gains – provided that Kyiv accepts them. Nothing is less certain in this regard, with Ukrainian forces maintaining the ascendancy on the ground and the Kremlin refusing to make any concessions. For Lawrence Freedman, President Putin calculates that only the continuation of the war will ensure the survival of his regime. The alternative to a peace mission agreed to by both belligerents is a peace enforcement operation led by an external force. Since Russia has no formal ally capable of such a thing, only Kyiv could hope for an international force, under the aegis of NATO or a US-led coalition, to guarantee the inviolability of its borders. This international force should be such as to deter any further aggression, thus requiring massive military capabilities. For such a situation to be possible, the risk of escalation into a direct confrontation with Russia would have to be considerably mitigated, with a prior local military defeat of Russia for example. While this prospect may seem implausible, it is nonetheless possible given the way wars are concluded. The alternatives are no less uncertain:  a substantial and credible revision of Russia's war objectives – in other words, a new regime in Moscow that would abandon neo-colonial designs on Ukraine – or the development of a Ukrainian military capability able to single-handedly deter further Russian aggression. In the absence of external security guarantees, such a force would require unconventional weapons or considerable asymmetric capabilities, similar to the Israeli model, making any external attack prohibitive. Without these alternatives, the problem of costs and credibility inherent to conflict resolution will persist. Conclusion There is no easy path to peace in Ukraine. The three discussed scenarios – a dramatic revision of Russia's neo-colonial war aims, the development of credible deterrence capabilities by Ukraine, or the intervention of a third party capable of guaranteeing the inviolability of Ukraine's borders – appear to be all equally implausible. Nevertheless, an examination of the root causes of war and of the conditions that lead to peace does not allow us to foresee more realistic alternatives. In these circumstances, the West must now prepare for the post-war period. Because the implementation of any of these three scenarios will have significant consequences for the European security architecture. Regime change in Moscow could lead to great internal instability, would not necessarily end the war nor Russian imperialism, and could even push the US to support pro-democracy forces in Russia. The development of a Ukrainian deterrent force would necessarily require major support from Western allies, as well as military intervention in Ukraine, whether under peacekeeping or peace-enforcement force. The status quo, meanwhile, will continue to drain Western military capabilities as the war of attrition continues, while reducing this support would pave the way for continued Russian aggression and the  endorsement of an international order that flouts the right of a people to self-determination and the territorial integrity of states. Thus, while it is agreed to highlight the trap into which President Putin has plunged Russia, the consequences of his war of aggression will require a redoubling of Western efforts in order to achieve an unlikely peace.   The original version of this text was published in French on Le Rubicon. Check it out here! ## What security benefits or risks should the Government of Canada consider when thinking about AI? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/what-security-benefits-or-risks-should-the-government-of-canada-consider-when-thinking-about-ai/ Modified: 2026-08-05 Policy Forum Politique is a publication format that aims to stimulate debate by presenting a wide range of expert opinion on a topic of national security significance to Canada. For this seventh edition, we ask four experts for their perspectives on the following question: In June 2026, Canada unveiled its new artificial intelligence (AI) strategy. Although the strategy makes much mention of the economic benefits that come with adopting AI, it is silent when it comes to security or military considerations despite calling for certain sovereign capabilities. What security benefits or risks should the Government of Canada consider when thinking about AI? Matthew da Mota (Canadian Shield Institute) Canada's new AI strategy promises opportunity and calls for sovereign capabilities, but it treats sovereignty as an industrial question with focus on compute, chips, models, and data centres. That perspective mistakes ownership for control. The sovereignty that matters is epistemic, and it rests on governance: the capacity to set terms on how AI enters the institutions that hold Canada's knowledge, and to preserve the human judgment that verifies the quality of that knowledge. Generative AI erodes both. Disinformation and deepfakes are cheap to produce, individuals can retreat to private sycophantic feedback machines, and poisoning a widely used AI model takes startlingly few malicious inputs. Trust in information itself is at stake. An adversary need not defeat Canada on some AI-enabled battlefield; it need only make Canadians distrust their own knowledge. Yet the models upon which this environment depends with a few foreign, private firms, outside of Canadian governance. More sovereign compute would not change that. The military is not exempt. As AI is introduced into the decision loop, it has the potential to degrade the judgment it is meant to support through bias, skills atrophy, and blurred accountability when decisions are informed, or made, by non-human actors. An even deeper danger is succumbing to the temptation to replace hard-won, tested knowledge systems with automated ones before we grasp what we are trading away. Compounding this problem is how we do not understand how AI will reshape the battlespace. We thus cannot judge how far to lean on it. Over-commit and Canada invites these risks; under-commit and it cedes strategic ground. The greatest security risk, and opportunity, from AI is its potential to irreversibly transform the knowledge environment. Sovereign capability must mean governing the knowledge pipeline and deliberately preserving independent human judgment—a knowledge infrastructure that is resilient enough to support AI and thus would not be undermined by it. Concretely, Ottawa should invest in trusted public research and data infrastructure—secure repositories with verifiable provenance and integrity safeguards—and set governance terms for how AI is procured and admitted into public institutions, balancing research security against open science. Building that foundation first lets AI be layered onto a knowledge base Canadians can trust, rather than adopting AI and only afterward trying to make sense of the hybrid human-AI systems it creates." Matthew da Mota is Research Director, Emerging Technology and National Security at the Canadian Shield Institute. His research examines how emerging technologies and shifting geopolitical dynamics reshape governance, knowledge, and sovereignty — with a particular focus on the national security implications of AI and digital infrastructure. Balkan Devlen (Montreal Institute for Global Security) Ottawa's new AI strategy is a competent document about a narrow problem. It wants more firms adopting AI, more compute on Canadian soil, fewer dependencies running through foreign clouds. However, its notion of exposure stops at data centres and supply chains, and its notion of protecting Canadians stops at privacy and online harms. Surely, those are all real concerns but they are not the ones keeping the security and intelligence communities, in Canada and among our allies, awake. The risks that make advanced AI a national security question rather than an industrial policy file are the ones that may prove irreversible. The Institute for AI Policy and Strategy groups them into three: loss of control, where capable systems slip human oversight; extreme concentration of power, where whoever first commands such systems entrenches an advantage no rival or electorate can later contest; and great power war, where the race itself — through miscalculation, pre-emption, or arms-race instability — turns kinetic. Others add a fourth concern; catastrophic or malicious misuse - think AI-enabled bioweapons or mass subversion via hyper-individualized political warfare at scale. These are not science fiction stories imported into policy. Three out of four of these risks (with the exception of loss of control) can become reality even before AI systems supersede human-level intelligence. The Privy Council Office co-hosted a scenario exercise with CIGI that walked officials through such risks and concluded governments must prepare now for human-level or superhuman systems within five years. More than thirty MPs and senators across party lines have called superintelligence a national security priority. The obvious objection — Canada will not build Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), so why plan for it? — has the logic backwards. Precisely because we will not build it, we have every reason to shape the rules and the outcomes while we still can. A 360-degree strategy would have named these four risks as Canadian security interests and assigned them a mandate and a budget. States that treat advanced AI solely as an adoption file will be governed by decisions made elsewhere. Let’s hope the long-awaited National Security Strategy addresses these issues. Balkan Devlen is Senior Fellow for Strategic Foresight at the Montreal Institute for Global Security (MIGS), Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI), and Adjunct Research Professor at Carleton University. Jennifer Irish (Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory) & Dave McMahon (Clairvoyance Corp) The rapid advancement of AI is transforming Canada’s security, intelligence and defence enterprise. AI is both an enabler and a disruptor, and Canada's ability to maximize its benefits while reducing risks will depend not only on its AI strategy, but also on complementary investments in security, information integrity, resilience and trusted partnerships. AI offers significant opportunities to advance further in big data analytics, intelligence curation and assessment, cybersecurity, defence operations, and risk-informed decision-making. At the same time, Canada faces an increasingly complex threat environment where technology is a defining feature of geopolitical competition and conflict. Generative AI enables deepfakes, synthetic media, and large-scale disinformation campaigns that undermine public trust. It can also facilitate transnational repression, online exploitation, financial manipulation, and increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks. There is considerable untapped potential to leverage AI to detect cyber threats, counter foreign information manipulation and interference, strengthen critical infrastructure resilience and improve Canada's ability to respond to these emerging threats.  A credible AI strategy must balance innovation with measures to counter AI-enabled disinformation and information manipulation. A first priority is for Canada to build a secure, sovereign AI capabilities by expanding trusted domestic data, compute capacity and digital infrastructure, along with a sovereign intelligence collection capacity. These investments will reduce reliance on foreign technologies for critical national security applications while strengthening resilience and economic competitiveness. International collaboration, including federated approaches with trusted partners such as those in Europe, can be of benefit in complementing (not replacing) Canadian sovereign capability as long as internet openness is not sacrificed. Success also depends on close collaboration to counter cyber and information attacks among governments, industry, academia, civil society and allies, supported by common threat methodologies and standards, shared secure information-sharing platforms and harmonized mitigation strategies and playbooks.  We should continue to pursue options to regulate the development of AI without stifling innovation. Canada’s AI strategy provides a good foundation. The next challenge is translating strategic objectives into operational capability through sustained investment, dedicated counter-disinformation initiatives, stronger research security, coordinated cyber defence, and enduring partnerships that ensure AI enhances both Canada’s security and long-term prosperity. Jennifer Irish is Adjunct Professor, University of Ottawa (Telfer) and Principal, Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory. She is a former Canadian diplomat and was the Founding Director of the University of Ottawa’s Information Integrity Lab.     Dave McMahon is CEO Clairvoyance Corp and Chief Intelligence Officer at Sapper Labs. Dave also served in various leadership positions with the Canadian Armed Forces, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Image Credit: Planetmiko via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0. ## What Strategy for the West in Ukraine? Renunciation after Default URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/what-strategy-for-the-west-in-ukraine-renunciation-after-default/ Modified: 2024-03-20 > The year 2023 has been one of consolidation and structuring of aid, upon which Ukraine is now dependent militarily and economically. One year ago, Le Rubicon honoured me by publishing an article entitled “Ukraine-Russie : une guerre de 20 ans” (Ukraine-Russia: a 20-year war), developing the idea that we were then halfway through this conflict. This perspective stemmed from intrinsic factors related to the specific characteristics of this confrontation that began in late 2013, and extrinsic factors derived from applying the managerial concept of the change curve to the trajectory of wars in general. What is the situation one year later? The year 2022 was marked by the short-termism of the military operations, from Ukraine’s unexpected initial resistance to its victorious autumn counteroffensive, accompanied by circumstantial aid from the United States and Europe in the primary sense of “related to circumstances”: Ukrainians largely held their destiny in their hands. The year 2023 has been one of consolidation and structuring of aid, upon which Ukraine is now dependent militarily and economically. This situation resulted in a more limited margin of maneuver, as demonstrated by President Zelensky’s diplomatic activism and the political-mediatic pressure in favour of the summer counteroffensive. The year 2024 will be about the sustainability of the war for Ukraine, a nation now dependent on Western strategic choices that oscillate between mobilization and renunciation. These oscillations give rise to a wavering stance, naturally favourable to a Russia that stands by its choices and manages to have them accepted by its public opinion, to the point that the question has shifted in four months from “Will Ukraine reconquer Crimea?” to “Can Russia win the war?”. However, after investing so much in Ukraine and making this conflict an illustration of the struggle between democracies and autocracies, can the United States and Europeans afford a setback? Rationality would dictate a negative answer, but the facts are stubborn: all the available evidence indicates a renunciation by default from the West for lack of adequate mobilization. To discuss this issue, we will contextualize the politico-military situation before exploring the constraints that weigh on the dynamics of the conflict and finally analyzing the resulting political orientations of the various actors. 1/ “The probability of a Ukrainian victory [...] is not high, militarily.” It is now possible to distinguish two phases of the war in Ukraine: the first one from February 24 to early November 2022 and the second one that has since begun. The symbolic rupture was the evacuation of the Kherson pocket organized by Russia, west of the Dnieper, between November 9 and 11, 2022, under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces’ counteroffensive. 1.1/ Ukrainian Successes Are a Strategic Surprise The first phase of this war was marked by the failure of the Russian armed forces to achieve their objectives, namely to overthrow President Zelensky and his government and bring Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence. It was a resounding failure due to the magnitude of human and material losses: 100,000 killed and wounded compared to approximately 180,000 men initially engaged, 1,450 tanks, i.e. half of the existing fleet, 450 artillery pieces, 70 helicopters, 65 aircraft, and thousands of vehicles. It was also a resounding failure at the operational level: initial errors in analyzing the expected resistance, ineptitude in joint (land, air, navy) and combined arms combat, limited impact of cyber attacks, absence of drones, and inability to exploit intelligence. Finally, it was a resounding failure in terms of reputation: consistently presented as the second military power in the world behind the United States of America (U.S.) with the fifth largest military budget in the world in 2021, while Ukraine ranked 36th , Russia has largely lost its conventional military credibility as a great power. The uninformed reader must be well aware of the surprise it represented among specialists: I remember numerous discussions with French and foreign military personnel about the large Russian exercises Zapad and Vostok. During the Vostok 2018 exercise, Russia claimed the participation of 300,000 men, including probably 100,000 combatants, 36,000 armoured vehicles and other vehicles, 1,000 planes and helicopters, and 80 ships. It saw the participation of the People’s Liberation Army of China for the first time. The Zapad 2021 exercise brought together 200,000 men, including Belarusian forces, and employed modern equipment (next-generation armoured vehicles, drones and even robots within combat units). Even though the demonstration was far from perfect, all Western specialists agreed on the observation of a gradual improvement in the capabilities of the Russian armed forces in terms of equipment and training. Those deserved a serious consideration: “serious games.” Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the researcher Dimitri Minic, the Russian failure is primarily that of its strategic thinking, which focused on the theory of circumventing the armed struggle and aimed to obtain the desired results by avoiding military confrontation. It led to conceptualizing the invasion of Ukraine as a simple police operation, believing the population was sufficiently supportive of the Russian cause within the framework of a “typical mirage of Russian political-military elites.” On the other hand, the resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces has exceeded all expectations. As pointed out by Rose Gottemoeller, former NATO Deputy Secretary General, “We underestimated the Ukrainians,” as Western officials expected a swift military defeat and the collapse of the government. This success is naturally the result of extensive efforts undertaken after the 2014 military defeat against Russia. The adoption of a National Security Strategy in 2015, followed by a Defence Transformation Roadmap in 2016, aimed at adopting NATO standards and interoperability with NATO by 2020. This effort encompassed various dimensions: the reorganization of the armed forces, a ten-year equipment acquisition plan, reserve reforms, transfers of equipment by the United States ($2.7 billion between 2014 and January 2022), an artillery modernization, and the purchase of Bayraktar TB2 drones from Turkey. It was accompanied by NATO, which adopted a comprehensive set of assistance measures during the Warsaw Summit on July 9, 2016. However, no one imagined that the Ukrainians would reach such a level of preparedness, considering the low results achieved with the Afghan National Army – even if the context was different. 1.2/ The Return of Russian Rationality from November 2022 Onward The second phase of the war saw Russia returning to a more “rational” decision-making process in the conduct of the war under the pressure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive initiated in late August 2022. I use quotation marks because this rationality reflects the point of view of the aggressor, and the decisions stemming from it contributed to the perpetration of war crimes. After the announcement by the Russian President of a partial mobilization of 300,000 reservists on September 21, 2022, and the replacement of the commander in charge of the “special military operation” in Ukraine (appointment of General Surovikin on October 8, 2022), this change of approach crystallized with the evacuation by Russian forces of the Kherson pocket, west of the Dnieper River, between November 9 and 11, 2022. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, this allowed them to save 30,000 men from potential annihilation and, therefore, regain maneuverability while re-establishing a solid defensive line behind the river. It is naturally a political decision by Vladimir Putin himself, demonstrating a better flow of real operational information to the Kremlin and the Russian leader’s ability to acknowledge this reality. If doubts had been expressed in the media about the Russian President’s mental health, they are no longer relevant. Three other decisions were made in October 2022: 1/ the only partial engagement of mobilized reservists to ensure their training with instructors withdrawn from the front, 2/ the launch of a massive bombing campaign from October 10 onward, targeting electrical, heating and water infrastructure, and therefore Ukrainian civilians, 3/ the mass enlistment of common law prisoners in combat via the Wagner Group. Finally, V. Putin employed clever communication towards the Russian public opinion to downplay his responsibility for the initial failures of the war: thus, on January 31, 2023, he staged a television interview with the Prosecutor-General of the Russian Federation, during which the latter outlines the dysfunctions encountered during the partial mobilization, publicly expressing what the population is thinking privately. The Russian President could thus present himself above the fray and designate others as responsible for the failures, not himself. The appointment of General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, as head of the “special military operation” on January 11, 2023, similarly aims to hold military leaders accountable for the conduct of the war. In parallel, Ukraine accepted a battle of attrition around the city of Bakhmut, which, although it began in August, took on a new dimension in mid-November 2022, becoming the main focal point of the entire front and causing high losses due to the extensive use of artillery. This military choice to abandon the maneuver that had been so successful for Ukraine since the beginning of the war has been widely discussed in the United States: it was deemed an error due to its excessive human cost for Kyiv. However, it is important to contextualize this decision: the recapture of a significant portion of its national territory by Ukraine during the September-October 2022 counteroffensive highlighted the intensity of Russian atrocities committed against Ukrainian civilians (executions, widespread use of torture and rape, and arrests are now extensively documented, for example, in Izium or Kherson). In the legitimate concern to protect its population, the political power has thus been compelled to reject any further territorial loss, risking its military effectiveness. However, as we will elaborate later, accepting attrition warfare is more costly for the Ukrainians than for the Russians due to the population differential and, therefore, the capacity to replace the losses suffered. The first semester of 2023 has been dedicated, on the one hand, to the Ukrainian consolidation in terms of Western military and economic support – with President Zelensky’s hero’s welcome in Washington on December 21, 2022; the agreement for the supply of heavy tanks in January 2023; the 24th Summit between the European Union and Ukraine in Kyiv on February 3; the surprise visit to the United Kingdom and France on February 8; the ovation from the European Parliament on February 9; finally the surprise visit by President Biden to the Ukrainian capital on February 20. On the other hand, there were ongoing fights for Bakhmut, which eventually fell into Russian hands in the last week of May. Ultimately, preceded by Russia’s preventive destruction of the Kakhovka dam on June 6, the Ukrainian counteroffensive was launched on June 8, 2023. Despite the episode of the Wagner Group rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 23 and 24, destabilizing Vladimir Putin’s regime, the heavily fortified Russian front has so far resisted Ukrainian attacks. In an interview given on November 1, 2023 to The Economist, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Zaluzhnyi, acknowledged that the counteroffensive was in a triple deadlock: a strategic deadlock (“Russia has lost at least 150,000 dead. In any other country such casualties would have stopped the war”), a technological deadlock (“Just like in the first World War, we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate”), and a human deadlock (“Because sooner or later we are going to find that we simply don’t have enough people to fight”). This triple deadlock had been articulated as early as January 2023 during the press conference held by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and General Mark Milley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, following the meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group held in Ramstein on January 20, 2023. This group, co-chaired by the United States and Ukraine, coordinates the support contributions of 54 states, with the United States acting as the lead nation in this support coalition. On that occasion, General Milley had stated: “From a military standpoint, I still maintain that for this year it would be very, very difficult to military eject the Russian forces from all, every inch of Russian-occupied Ukraine.” He reiterated his November 16, 2022, statement in the same format: “The probability of a Ukrainian military victory – defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine, to include what they claim is Crimea – the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily.” The insistence of the now-retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States still deserves consideration, as it raises questions about the Western strategy towards the Ukrainian conflict based on what is achievable. 2/ The Conflict Dynamics are Constrained by Three Limiting Parameters Based on this military deadlock, three key parameters limit the options regarding the evolution of the conflict. The first is political, involving the stakes of Ukrainian stability and the American orientation as the main provider of military aid. The second is human, characterized by a scarcity of resources on the Ukrainian side. The third is material, involving insufficient production of weapons and ammunition on the Western side. 2.1/ Political Limitations in Ukraine and the United States After a year and a half of national unity, Kyiv’s first cracks are beginning to show regarding the conduct of the war and its prospects. Not only did the aforementioned interview with General Zaluzhnyi lack coordination with the Ukrainian presidency, but an article from Time released on the same day paints a picture of a Volodymyr Zelensky affected by the prolonged duration of the war, dissatisfied with Western support, and persisting in a costly strategy of immediate territorial reconquest. To my knowledge, this is the first article in Western media that tarnishes the heroic image carefully crafted by the Ukrainian President since February 2022. During his visit to Kyiv on November 20, 2023, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin felt compelled to declare: “It also gave us the opportunity [...] to make sure that we maintain alignment between the operations on the ground and President ’s objectives,” evidence that the question is being raised. Adding to this is the issue of the 2024 Ukrainian elections: the presidential elections, theoretically scheduled for March 31, 2024, cannot take place as the country is under martial law due to the war. This situation is not exceptional: for example, the United Kingdom did not hold an election between 1935 and 1945 due to the outbreak of World War II. Nevertheless, 2024 presents an unfortunate conjunction with elections in Russia in March, for the European Parliament in June, and in the United States in November. This succession of elections generates a subtle discourse on the need for Ukraine both not to give up its democratic nature by following suit with others (the United States and the European Union) and to antagonize the Russian electoral farce through an exemplary process (Russia will likely see the re-election of Vladimir Putin with an overwhelming percentage – bets are open, 76.69% in 2018). The proposal is undoubtedly intellectually appealing, but the practical organization of elections proves to be quite unfeasible and, above all, could destabilize Ukraine. The other primary political constraint lies in the position of the United States. While the European Union plays a crucial role in maintaining the Ukrainian state and economy, as I have demonstrated in a previous article, the military dimension primarily falls under the purview of the United States. The U.S. co-chairs the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, represents the majority of military aid, and decides for all contributors on upgrading transferred equipment (tanks, aircraft, long-range missiles), all while providing intelligence and counsel to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, if support for Ukraine initially enjoyed bipartisan consensus, it is no longer the case today, neither in public opinion nor in Congress. By becoming a divisive issue between Democrats and Republicans, support for Ukraine is entangled in the presidential campaign leading up to the November 2024 elections, risking decision-making paralysis. Thus, on October 20, 2023, the Biden administration felt compelled to present a joint package of military aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan totalling $105 billion, with $61.4 billion allocated to the first, supported by a rare televised address from the U.S. president in the Oval Office. The new Speaker of the House and vocal supporter of Donald Trump, Republican Mike Johnson, only emphasized aid to Israel ($14.5 billion), deferring the question of Ukraine to a new bill contingent upon obtaining concessions on other issues. He also denounced the lack of clarity in the strategy pursued by Washington. The evolution of American public opinion tends to deepen the partisan divide, as illustrated by the Gallup poll of November 2, 2023: 41% of Americans believe their country is “doing too much to support Ukraine,” compared to 24% in August 2022. Among voters declaring themselves Republicans, this figure reaches 62%. It also increases among Independents (44% compared to 28% in August 2022), a crucial category for winning presidential elections in the United States, as it is prone to shifting between the two major parties from one election to the next. 54% of Americans still express readiness to support the Ukrainian territorial reconquest, while 43% wish for a quick end to the conflict even if it means that Russia retains the conquered territories. Nevertheless, the gap has been steadily narrowing since August 2022 (66% versus 31%). Among Republican voters, this figure stands at 55% in favour of a quick peace accompanied by Ukrainian territorial concessions, while reaching 49% among independents, a significant increase since August 2022 (34%). It is important to emphasize that a U.S. election is primarily won on domestic policy issues rather than foreign policy. Nevertheless, the pursuit of alignment between the sentiments of “Independents” and partisan orientations constitutes a significant challenge in any campaign. In this case, the Republican discourse on not giving Ukraine a blank check voiced during the November 2022 midterm elections and sometimes caricatured in Europe is increasingly resonating with the opinion of the Independent electorate that will be decisive for the 2024 election: American money for Americans. The Biden administration is well aware of this risk and seeks to manage it by promoting the narrative that aiding Ukraine represents an excellent security-to-cost ratio against Russia. Additionally, it is formulating strong demands on Kyiv regarding the fight against corruption (resulting in the departure of Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov in September 2023). However, a positive narrative implies achieving military victories to win conviction, and, at this stage, Russia has gained more territory than Ukraine in 2023. The second element faces real challenges, as highlighted by the Time article quoting “a top presidential adviser in early October” in Kyiv: “People are stealing like there is no tomorrow,” evoking to American decision-makers the spectre or their experience in Afghanistan in this regard. 2.2/ Human Limitations in Ukraine As the aforementioned Time article states, “One of Zelensky’s close aides tells me that even if the U.S. and its allies come through with all the weapons they have pledged, ‘we don’t have the men to use them,’” statement corroborated by General Zaluzhny’s remarks to The Economist. Furthermore, while former British Defense Minister Ben Wallace mentioned in an op-ed on October 1, 2023, that the average age of Ukrainian soldiers was over 40, the Time article specifies that this average would be 43 years old, which is particularly high. According to the United Nations, Russia had a population of 145 million in 2020, compared to 44 million for Ukraine (within its internationally recognized borders). Ukraine must subtract the population of territories occupied by Russia since 2014, approximately 2 million for Crimea and 3.8 million for the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, leaving about 38 million people under the control of the Ukrainian government as of January 2022. Following the initiation of Russian military operations, 8 million people sought refuge abroad, and 6.4 million were still displaced as of December 2023, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. An undetermined number of Ukrainians live in the newly occupied areas (at least 1.5 million). Considering the significant population flows entering and leaving the national territory, Ukraine practically relies on a population of no more than 30 million inhabitants directly under government control, including over 5 million internally displaced persons (according to the UNHCR). In comparison, Poland had a population of 38 million in 2021, and Spain had 47 million. On the Russian side, while it is challenging to gauge accurately, approximately 1.2 million people have left the country since the beginning of the war. Ultimately, in terms of population, we are dealing with a ratio ranging between 1 to 4 and 1 to 5 in favour of Russia on a comparable Soviet-era age pyramid. This imbalance raises the question of the sustainability of human losses. The accurate figures in this matter are, of course, at best inaccessible and at worst unknown. Still, according to various statements from the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Army, General Milley, in November 2022, the number of killed and wounded was equivalent between Russians and Ukrainians: 100,000 on each side (with a higher proportion of fatalities on the Russian side) in addition to 40,000 civilians killed and wounded (on the Ukrainian side). In August 2023,  the New York Times reported on the U.S. administration’s internal assessments of casualties: 300,000 men for Russia (including 120,000 killed), 180,000 men for Ukraine (including 70,000 killed) and 40,000 civilians. This 1 to 1.5 ratio in the human toll of the conflict is unsustainable for Ukraine, given the disproportion between the two population reservoirs and the exposure of the Ukrainian civilian population to war. It sheds new light on Ukraine’s repeated requests for the supply of advanced equipment, as such weaponry has the potential to mitigate this disadvantage. 2.3/ Material Limitations in the West Regardless of the courage of the soldiers, inter-state conflicts have tended, since the 20th century, to be won by the belligerent capable of producing the most equipment and ammunition, as exemplified by the United States, which became the “arsenal of democracies” during World War II, to borrow President Roosevelt’s expression used on December 29, 1940. The issue of equipment and ammunition provided to Ukraine has been the subject of countless articles since February 2022, ranging from Javelin and Stinger missiles in the beginning to multiple-launch rocket systems (such as HIMARS), artillery (like the CAESAR cannon), tanks, long-range missiles (ATACMS type), and cruise missiles (SCALP type), culminating with aircraft, with the United States approving on August 17, 2023, the transfer of F-16s by Denmark and the Netherlands. This topic is extensive, and it is easy to get lost in its technicalities, which are nonetheless very real. Let’s attempt to pinpoint the primary concerns. Firstly, Ukraine entered the conflict with predominantly Soviet-era equipment, which remains the majority. In February 2022, it had 1150 pieces of artillery from that era and has since received the delivery of 450 to 500 pieces of Western models. However, the former have 152 and 122 mm calibres, while the latter are 155 and 105 mm. Soviet-era ammunition and spare parts are primarily produced in Russia and China and are, therefore, inaccessible to Ukraine. Ukraine must rely on the residual production of certain countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Republic) and purchases worldwide. Thus, the United States had acquired 45,000 shells of 152 mm and 20,000 of 122 mm (a relatively low amount) at the end of January 2023, nearly a year into the conflict. The Ukrainian army faces the challenge of managing two incompatible logistics chains, one following Soviet-era standards and the other adhering to NATO standards. Complicating matters further, Ukraine is also forced to undertake a transformation towards a Western equipment model even while at war. It is noteworthy that this transition remains incomplete for Eastern European countries that joined NATO fifteen years ago, signifying a substantial effort in terms of training, adaptation, and supply – a formidable task even in times of peace. Secondly, Western stocks of equipment and ammunition are low. The end of the Cold War allowed for a reduction in military spending under the “peace dividend,” and the asymmetric nature of the terrorist threat over the last thirty years has not led to the replenishment of inventories. The 2011 military intervention in Libya had already shown the limits of European capabilities, with a reliance on the United States due to the rapid depletion of certain stocks. With the war in Ukraine, there is a shift, returning to large-scale and highly consumptive conventional operations against a modern military. Thus, Ukraine fires between 4000 and 7000 shells per day, totalling between 1.5 and 2.5 million shells in a year, compared to approximately 20,000 per day for Russia. In this context, the transfer of one million shells by the United States in 2022 is both significant and insufficient. Regarding Stingers, the American short-range surface-to-air missile launcher, the U.S. transferred a quarter of its existing stock to Ukraine in the first months of the conflict. One last example: the focus in January 2023 was on the issue of the supply of Western tanks, from France’s announcement on January 4, 2023, regarding the delivery of AMX-10 RC light battle tanks to the coordinated decision on January 25 by Germany and the United States to authorize the shipment of respectively Leopard 2 tanks and M1 Abrams tanks; at this point, the primary concern was the scarcity of available tanks. After two years of conflict, the consequence of these low stocks is that Western countries have little left to transfer to Ukraine without jeopardizing their security. A senior British officer recently stated, “We’ve given away just about as much as we can afford.” For the United States, stock levels are now considered critical in absolute terms across several segments, and they are insufficient given the risks in other theatres, such as the Indo-Pacific with Taiwan. As mentioned by the Pentagon on December 14, 2023, “We have to start to make decisions about our own readiness.” Thirdly, the question of stocks is closely tied to production capacity: depleting the former is only a temporary concern and thus manageable if the latter allows for a quick replacement – a matter of taps and bathtubs, so to speak. However, for the same reasons that stocks are low, production capacities have significantly diminished since the end of the Cold War simply because demand has collapsed. For example, in the United States, the production of 155 mm shells was 3,250 per month in 2022, compared to 4,000 to 5,000 firings of this calibre per day on the Ukrainian side. Production increased to 20,000 per month in 2023, with a goal of 40,000 per month by 2025, considering the necessary investments to create new production lines and the time required to train the workforce. Nevertheless, this production of around 500,000 shells per year in 2025 would take two years to replenish U.S. stocks before any could be provided to anyone, even though the minimum Ukrainian requirement is three times that (1.5 million). Indeed, the structural increase in weapons and ammunition production requires significant investments from companies, hence firm orders from states, and ultimately, time to build the production facilities, recruit and train the workforce, as well as organize the supply chain. For example, the M777 howitzers supplied by the United States are no longer produced by their manufacturer, BAE Systems, with the last order dating back to 2017 (for India). Provided a contract for at least 150 units is signed to ensure the profitability of the company, reconstituting the production chain would take 30 to 36 months before starting to produce the first cannon. Finally, the example of Stingers mentioned above was cited by Ellen Lord, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, during her hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services on April 26, 2022. Her remarks caricature our subject: “In the past two months, the United States sent more Stinger missiles to Ukraine than we have manufactured in the last 20 years. The Stinger program is in its eighth restart. I will repeat. Eight times, we have restarted this program. This missile has not been modernized in 30 years.” Due to not paying the contractor to maintain a hot production line, components no longer exist, test equipment has become obsolete, the workforce has retired, and the supply chain needs to be rebuilt. If the U.S. Department of Defense placed an order for 1,700 Stingers in May 2022, it would take, at best, until October 2025 for the first one to enter production. This lengthy industrial production time, coupled with public procurement, is underestimated. 3/ Sustaining Support for Ukraine Does Not Constitute a Strategy: Possible Political Orientations of the Conflicting Parties Given their Strengths and Weaknesses So far, Western policy towards Ukraine can be summed up with a statement from the last NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11, 2023: “We will continue our support for as long as it takes.” While the declaration of intent is commendable, it does not constitute a strategy. And considering the elements presented earlier, the trajectory of Ukraine and its Western supporters is precisely unsustainable due to a gap between means and ends that is too large. Therefore, what options are available to us? Four points: 1/ The United States is the weak link due to its crucial role in military aid to Kyiv, and the November 2024 elections limiting their short-term perspective – Donald Trump is right to declare, “I will have that war settled in one day, 24 hours”, as it would only require announcing the suspension of American assistance. 2/ Russia is playing the long game of wearing down Ukraine in terms of combatants and the West in terms of weapons and ammunition while also working to fatigue public opinion. 3/ Ukraine no longer has the human resources to be on the offensive but can defend itself if Americans and Europeans provide the material means to do so. 4/ The Europeans, whose security is directly affected by the Russian posture and who have responded economically (sanctions, gas, economic aid), have no more strategy than the Americans and they fail to ramp up their capabilities in terms of weapons and ammunition. 3.1/ The Post-2024 Election American Solution: a Defensive Posture Until a Ceasefire is Reached In a resounding article published on November 17, 2023, in Foreign Affairs, titled “Redefining Success in Ukraine,” Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan proposed a new strategy “centered on Ukraine’s readiness to negotiate a ceasefire with Russia and to simultaneously switch its military emphasis from offense to defense”. Such a strategy would mean acknowledging that the primary goal is no longer the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity but rather the defence and reconstruction of the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. According to these authors, even if Russia rejects the ceasefire proposal, Ukraine would benefit, at the very least, from the diplomatic initiative. It is imperative to implement a shift in military strategy, ensuring that Russian forces exhaust themselves against Ukrainian defence lines, reversing the current situation where the strain is predominantly on the Ukrainian side. At the negotiating table, the United States and some NATO allies individually would provide security guarantees to what remains of Ukraine, and the European Union would expedite its accession process. While this article is the work of think tank experts and not an official position of the U.S. administration, which has not formalized a strategy per se, it is particularly significant because its authors, who have served at high-level positions in both Republican and Democrat administrations, participated in secret discussions with Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in April 2023. Indeed, the authors articulate the state of the American debate and propose an exit strategy for the future U.S. administration, whether Democrat or Republican: Ukraine is at an impasse, and a strategic reorientation is necessary, contrary to what the usual discourse suggests. For instance, Secretary of Defense Austin, during his visit to Kyiv on November 20, 2023, said, “I wanted to reassure the leadership that the United States of America will continue to support Ukraine.” Or NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, on August 17, 2023: “It is the Ukrainians, and only the Ukrainians, who can decide when there are conditions in place for negotiations, and who can decide at the negotiating table what is an acceptable solution.” The shift to a defensive military posture is not only necessary but inevitable due to the attrition of Ukrainian capabilities: it acknowledges the battlefield’s reality. However, while firmly closing NATO’s door to Ukraine and being very generous with European Union’s membership to which they do not belong, the authors, in their search for a solution, notably neglect to scrutinize Russia’s war objectives and the ensuing implications for Ukraine. 3.2/ Russia, is Total Victory a Possible Option? Indeed, from a Russian perspective, conditions are more favourable than in the spring of 2023. The Russian front holds militarily, and Ukrainian losses are high enough to allow for costly local offensives, as seen in Avdiivka. The winter of 2023-2024 has reignited the campaign of strikes against Ukrainian civilian energy facilities, which were already damaged the previous year and not fully repaired. The circumvention of sanctions, initially challenging, is now in full swing, and the Russian defence industry has shifted to a wartime economy. Moreover, the prospects appear promising with the three key elections of the year 2024: 1/ the Russian elections in March – a mere administrative formality after the explosive death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 24, 2023, sending a message of restraint to any ambition other than that of Vladimir Putin; 2/ the European elections in June, anticipating a rise in far-right influence, which is more receptive to Russian discourse – this sensitivity is also facilitated by actions of influence and disinformation, such as the tagging of David stars in Paris in November 2023, even though the European electoral rules do not favor significant political shifts; 3/ the U.S. elections in November, presenting for Russia a real opportunity to secure gains in Ukraine within the context of a political shift favouring the Republicans, - the U.S. electoral system proving to be conducive to external interference. Therefore, by early 2025, Russia has no interest in any ceasefire whatsoever; on the contrary, the continuation of the conflict as it stands suits its leaders perfectly, as they have not lost sight of their initial intention to overthrow the government in Kiyv in favour of a regime under their control. From the Russian perspective, not only is victory plausible, but total victory has become a conceivable option again. The only question revolves around maintaining the population’s loyalty based on the dual promise of stability and prosperity, as presented by researcher Anna Colin Lebedev during a November 21, 2023, conference entitled “At what stage of the long war in Ukraine are we?”. If economic elites find new opportunities through military orders and the recovery of Western companies, political and administrative elites face fewer career prospects, and the state must bear the high cost of supporting the families of combatants. Nevertheless, as Russian historian Sergei Chernyshev points out, “In the end, the people lost nothing. Because they have nothing special to lose. On the other hand, what have they gained? Well, they have gained a lot. And first of all, a lot of money. [...] Moreover, they feel like they’re part of something big.” In the longer term, beyond early 2025, Russia will reassess its strategic objectives based on the U.S. political reality and the Ukrainian situation. 3.3/ Ukraine, a Sustainable Defensive Strategy? On the Ukrainian side, if victory was a real option before the June 2023 counteroffensive, it is no longer on the agenda if victory means the reconquest of lost territories. However, it is still relevant if the goal is to maintain a free country by resisting Russian aggression. Such a goal requires a defensive strategy that spares both manpower and equipment. President Zelensky has started to adjust his stance on this point with his statements on December 1, 2023 (“enough mines and concrete”). What can one expect for 2024? The continuation of the Russian air strikes campaign and fighting at specific points on the front before a possible Russian spring offensive, and a long wait for the results of the European and then American elections. An internal political crisis, simmering at the end of 2023, cannot be ruled out in 2024, especially given the human losses suffered and the inevitable sense of stagnation that will emerge. The other key credibility issue of this defensive strategy lies in sustaining military support for Ukraine over time. However, it is clear that the Western countries have, at this stage, lost the battle of arms and munitions production against Russia and its supporters. Unless risking national capabilities, the arsenals are empty and cannot be replenished for years, given the current production pace. On the American side, one can identify three levels of difficulty: the first one is economic, with insufficient production and significant delays in establishing new industrial capacities, subject to government orders; the second is political, since aid to Ukraine now constitutes a secondary but still divisive element in the 2024 electoral campaign, preventing, for the moment, the approval of new funding and therefore the issuance of orders to the industry; the third is strategic, with a heated debate in Washington on the adequacy between the ends and means of U.S. policy – according to the latest report from the RAND Corporation, “the U.S. defence strategy and posture have become insolvent.” This report shows that the expected tasks of the U.S. military forces and other elements of national power at the international level from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific exceed the available means to accomplish them. Choices must, therefore, be made. For Europeans, the situation is worse, as we will see next. One thing is sure, however: without weapons and ammunition, a defensive posture is not much more credible over time than an offensive posture against a rearming adversary. At best, it would offer the possibility of getting through 2024 and its electoral deadlines. 3.4/ Exceeding the Limits of Boundaries or Confining Oneself to the Limits: the European Union Mobilises, but to What Extent? On the European side, the existence of a border between the E.U. and both Ukraine and Russia makes this conflict an immediate priority, as demonstrated by the unprecedented mobilization of European institutions and Member States: an unprecedented level of sanctions, extensive use of the European Peace Facility for military aid, substantial financial assistance, trade facilities and a solidarity corridor to ensure the survival of the Ukrainian state and economy. However, Europe faces two levels of difficulty, which are industrial and strategic. On the industrial front, the peace dividends following the end of the Cold War have been more pronounced in Europe than in the United States. As an example, but indicative of a general trend, defence spending represented 3% of Germany’s GDP in 1981, 1.5% in 1995 and reached a minimum of 1.07% in 2005. Thirty years under this dry regime have naturally atrophied the European defence industry, whose production capacities are now weak, much more so than the United States’. Thus, the commitment made by the European Union in March 2023 to provide one million 155 mm shells to Ukraine within a year cannot be fulfilled, with only 300,000 delivered by the end of November. Debates on E.U. taxonomy and the sustainability of the defence industry reduce access to funding necessary for investments. Moreover, industry stakeholders need visibility on orders through state announcements regarding the long-term level of their stocks, as recommended by researcher Camille Grand. By the end of 2023, the European Union and its Member States are not in the position to rapidly increase the production of weapons and ammunition, let alone compensate for a U.S. decline in this regard. On the strategic front, it is undoubtedly in Europe’s interest for Ukraine to win, or at the very least, not to lose. Nevertheless, the European Union and its Member States offer no more strategy than the United States to do so in the short and medium term. In the long term, the objective is more apparent, as the 27 Heads of State and Government of the European Union unanimously decided on June 23, 2022, to grant Ukraine the status of a candidate country for accession. The launch of negotiations was agreed upon during the European Council on December 14 and 15, 2023. After lengthy twists and turns, the Member States and the Commission managed, on February 1, 2024, to force Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to relent and unlock the €50 billion aid package that will allow the Ukrainian state to function for the next four years. Nevertheless, accession negotiations will last for decades, and all E.U. member states must ratify this accession. Let’s recall that the E.U. has a collective security clause (Article 42.7 TEU): are Member States prepared to embrace Ukraine’s accession to the E.U. while NATO refuses it? What would public opinions think? What would be the strategic and military credibility of this commitment? How can Europeans organize themselves to ensure its effectiveness? Finally, a word on the trend of asserting that a defeat for Ukraine would have an existential consequence for the European Union. Even though the subject is highly sensitive, it is essential to remain level-headed: On the evening of February 24, 2022, all Western countries had written off Ukraine, and it was only after the Russian failure became apparent in mid-March that an alternative became possible. Russia, which already shares land borders with six NATO countries and five European Union countries (Norway outside the E.U., Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland), would have expanded its buffer zone, bumping against a NATO that now includes Finland and soon Sweden. Russia continues to undermine the foundations of the European Union through hybrid operations, such as the recent sending of migrants to the Finnish border. A victorious Russia in Ukraine would be all the more dangerous due to the intoxication of success combined with production capacities superior to those of Europe, or even the West. However, attacking a military alliance like NATO is not comparable to subjugating a country not covered by a defence agreement like Ukraine, and I would be much more worried about Georgia, Russia’s next designated victim, due to its newly granted E.U. candidate status. In this case, for European countries, the two essential issues are 1/ the sustainability and credibility of the American security guarantee, which could be undermined following the November 2024 elections, and 2/ the European ability to fully rebuild a deterrent conventional forces structure with its substantial industrial and, consequently, public funding implications. It’s worth noting that this second point would incidentally allow supporting Ukraine. In short, the European free-rider posture on American power is no longer a credible option, given the level of strategic uncertainty. *** In summary, in the face of a determined Russia intent on achieving its objectives, Ukraine is no longer the master of its destiny. It depends entirely on the will and/or capacity for assistance from the United States and Europe (European Union, United Kingdom, Norway): it is condemned to suffer the consequences of their decisions; hence the key issue well understood by President Zelensky of moral influence over his donors. The increasingly insistent reassertion of Ukraine’s decision-making autonomy by the Western powers now borders on hypocrisy. The key question is how Americans and Europeans envision their role in this conflict in the medium term: what is their strategy? For the United States, the cold analysis is as follows: 1/ Military, Ukrainians will no longer be able to go further in terms of territorial reconquest, and there is no question of admitting into NATO a country of which 17% of the territory is occupied indefinitely by a Russia that remains the world’s leading nuclear power; 2/ Strategically, the Americans have no specific interest in Ukraine, especially now that Russia has depleted its conventional capabilities (men, equipment, economy), and this conflict is diverting their finite means from their real priorities (the Indo-Pacific); 3/Nevertheless, it would be appropriate to establish conditions for an honourable end, because, given the investment made, one can question the lesson learned by the rest of the World: deterrence of other ambitions or confirmation of their feasibility? To what extent can the United States let it be believed that they would abandon the defence of the free world and the international order it has forged? There are precedents: South Vietnam was abandoned in 1975 after a much more painful involvement for the Americans; similarly, Afghanistan in 2021. Haass and Kupchan’s article subtly proposes a compromise solution potentially acceptable to Russia, involving armed defensive neutrality within a reduced perimeter for Ukraine – a variant reminiscent of Finland during the Cold War, with or without a peace treaty. However, it is essential to note that the U.S. decision-making process can be abrupt and that the presidential election in November 2024 will be a decisive factor in this regard. Ultimately, the American posture is leaning towards an acceptance of renunciation. For Europe, the issue boils down to one question: followership or autonomy? Now, it’s straightforward: Europe, lacking both the stockpiles and the production capacity to compensate for the anticipated American withdrawal in terms of weapons and ammunition and incapable of supporting Ukraine autonomously, will have to align with the political solution that the United States will present sooner or later. This outcome is all the more poignant because the European Union had never responded with such strength and unity to an international crisis, and its public opinion feels that much has been done to support Ukraine, yet this awakening falls far short of the required level. Since the American solution will exclude any NATO membership, the enlargement of the European Union to Ukraine will be bogged down in a very long-term process, similar to that of Turkey, as no European country will want to risk a confrontation with Russia without the certainty of American participation. “And faced with this return of tragedy in history, Europe must arm itself, not out of distrust of other powers, no, but to ensure its independence in this world of violence, not to suffer the choice of others, to be free,” President Emmanuel Macron presciently declared before the European Parliament on January 19, 2022, at the launch of the French presidency of the European Union. In this context, do the Europeans want to provide the means for this rearmament, including its financing? There is no evidence of this at present, and as it cannot accompany the escalation, Europe is condemned to renounce. Ultimately, the American institutional paralysis leads to the progressive asphyxiation of Ukrainian military capabilities and the development of favourable prospects for a determined Russia unless there is a European political and industrial mobilization to offer an alternative solution. This deadlock raises once again the question of the ability of European countries to act independently of American choices to preserve their security interests, in a word, their “strategic autonomy”: let us hope that the impending trauma will have this cathartic virtue in the service of the defence effort of the Old Continent. *** Olivier Sueur (@SueurOlivier) is a strategic business and public affairs consultant, teaching at SciencesPo Paris and an Associate fellow at the Institute for Applied Geopolitical Studies (IEGA). He is a former deputy assistant secretary for NATO, the European Union and the United Nations at the French Ministry for the Armed Forces (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy – DGRIS) and previously negotiator for France at NATO’s headquarters. ## What to Expect from the War in Ukraine? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/what-to-expect-from-the-war-in-ukraine/ Modified: 2023-03-23 > After a year of war, this round-table aims to analyze the prospects of temporary (e.g., ceasefire) and durable peace in the war and Ukraine.. note: This video is in French only. Prospects for peace, fears of escalation, and the future of European security architecture After a year of war, this round-table aims to analyze the prospects of temporary (e.g., ceasefire) and durable peace in the war and Ukraine, as well as the future of Europe’s security architecture. ## What’s Plan B? Rebuilding Foreign Policy in Response to the Predatory Policies of the Trump Administration URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/whats-plan-b-rebuilding-foreign-policy-in-response-to-the-predatory-policies-of-the-trump-administration/ Modified: 2026-04-20 This text is a summary of the conference What Plan B? Reshaping Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Trump Administration’s Predatory Policies held on April 7, 2025, at UQAM. Donald Trump's return to the US presidency in January 2025 raises important questions about the future direction of US foreign policy and its impact on the international order established after the Second World War. This re-election, unprecedented in contemporary US political history, goes beyond the scope of a simple democratic change of government. It calls into question the nature of the ‘Trump phenomenon’, which is increasingly seen not as a temporary blip but as a lasting ideological and institutional turning point that could profoundly redefine the international stance of the United States. Moreover, this strategic uncertainty directly affects Washington's traditional democratic allies, prompting them to thoroughly rethink their diplomatic and security orientations. It was in this context that a conference bringing together Canadian and European researchers and diplomats was held on 7 April 2025 at the University of Quebec in Montreal to explore alternatives to continued dependence on US leadership. Plan A, which involves strong alignment with the United States, now appears obsolete. The very foundations of foreign policy are being called into question, forcing the development of a genuine Plan B. There are two dimensions to this issue. The first is temporal: does the second Trump administration represent a lasting break or a transitional episode? The answer to this question determines the choice between ad hoc adjustments and a structural redefinition of alliances. The second dimension is strategic: how can allied democracies both preserve their ties with the United States and develop a form of strategic autonomy? This summary note, based on discussions at the April 2025 conference, aims to shed light on possible ways of reshaping the international order in the face of the uncertainties raised by the current trajectory of US foreign policy. The analyses converge on several key findings: Trump's policy represents a systemic break with the post-war liberal order, methodically challenging democratic values, multilateral institutions and international law norms, rather than a mere temporary blip; traditional allies are now exploring various strategies for adaptation, from balancing for attractiveness to European strategic autonomy and diversification of partnerships, revealing the heterogeneity of responses to the same challenge; Europe and Canada are being forced to redefine their diplomatic and security foundations, developing new tools of influence and strengthening their autonomous capacities to preserve their interests in a world where US leadership has become unpredictable, transactional and structured around asymmetrical bilateral relations; Finally, the Ukrainian issue crystallizes these tensions, testing the allies' ability to maintain their cohesion in the face of Washington's repositioning while assuming new continental responsibilities. What does Trump want? The second Trump administration is marked by a profound break with the foundations of the liberal international order established after 1945. As many analysts have pointed out, this shift is not simply a matter of tactical or circumstantial adjustments, but rather a systemic rejection of the principles that have structured the contemporary international architecture. It reflects the affirmation of an alternative vision of the world order, championed by President Trump and supported by a consolidated electoral base. According to Karine Prémont, this ideological foundation is set to endure thanks to the existence of a ‘critical mass’ of voters, revealing a lasting breakdown of trust in the norms and institutions of liberal multilateralism. Julien Toureille identifies a methodical challenge to all the pillars of this order. This challenge targets democratic values and the rule of law, as well as the fundamental norms of international law, in particular the prohibition of the use of force and respect for sovereignty. Major multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and NATO, are also being called into question, as is the post-war economic architecture. According to Toureille, this global questioning is part of a revisionist reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine: far from advocating isolationist withdrawal, this renewed doctrine aims to reaffirm US hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, breaking with the principles of international cooperation. This ideological shift is accompanied by a transformation in modes of government, marked by a strong personalization of decision-making. Theodore McLauchlin describes the emergence of an informal system, structured around direct access to the president, where interpersonal dynamics take precedence over formal institutional processes. This configuration, similar to a ‘court of Versailles,’ is based on the distribution of presidential ‘favour’ — understood as the granting of resources, appointments or recognition — which has become a strategic resource contested by various internal factions. For Henri-Paul Normandin, this personalization of power is also expressed on a symbolic level: foreign policy becomes a stage for presidential authority, where the projection of power takes precedence over institutional deliberation or normative adherence. Three axes structure the objectives of this foreign policy. The first lies in a reconfiguration of relations with traditional allies, based on questioning historical commitments and demanding greater reciprocity in security partnerships. The second is based on a neo-mercantilist logic, focused on priority access to strategic resources and the defence of US economic interests in a context of bilateral competition. The third aims to restructure the international system around a concert of major powers, marginalising multilateral mechanisms in favour of asymmetrical and hierarchical bilateral relations. Finally, this strategic reorientation is part of an ideological reconfiguration of the Western camp. As Normandin points out, it introduces a growing divide within liberal democracies themselves, pitting a pole faithful to the principles of political liberalism — embodied in particular by Canada and part of Europe — against an illiberal pole, represented by states such as Hungary and, to a certain extent, the United States. This divide calls into question the normative and strategic cohesion of the democratic bloc as it had been constituted since the end of the Cold War. What options are available to allies? Faced with the profound redefinition of the United States' international posture under the Trump administration, traditional allies are confronted with the need to rethink their national and collective strategies. In this context, Jonathan Paquin proposes a typology of strategic responses based on two axes: internal balancing and the management of strategic ambiguity. This analytical framework makes it possible to identify several models of behaviour. Some states choose balancing for attractiveness, such as Japan and Poland, which aim to maintain US engagement by promoting their own strategic role within the alliance. Others favour balancing for self-sufficiency, a strategy clearly illustrated by Turkey, but also considered by Canada, which consists of reducing dependence on Washington by strengthening national capabilities. A more nuanced approach, internal balancing, consists of diversifying partnerships while maintaining the main alliance — a stance adopted by Japan and, to a certain extent, by Canada. Finally, ‘hard hedging,’ of which Turkey is the archetype, involves deliberate diversification, including towards non-Western partners. However, this typology reaches its limits in more constrained geopolitical contexts. The small states of Central and Eastern Europe, as Jean Combrois points out, illustrate this difficulty. Due to their recent history, their geographical proximity to Russia and their security dependence on NATO, these countries have little room for manoeuvre. They remain structurally dependent on the United States, with no real strategic alternatives in the event of a US withdrawal. Added to this vulnerability is potential internal instability, fuelled by the rise of populist movements, which Trumpian rhetoric could indirectly encourage, thereby weakening their Euro-Atlantic anchoring. Western Europe, for its part, is exploring another path: that of strategic autonomy. As Chantal Lavallée analyses, this aspiration is manifested in a series of national responses, including increased defence budgets, the revival of French and German strategic ambitions, and a renewed debate on the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe. At the institutional level, several European initiatives are emerging: the drafting of a white paper on defence, the launch of the ReArm Europe initiative, and the attempt to structure a European pillar within NATO. However, these dynamics are hampered by persistent difficulties in reconciling national priorities, European ambitions and the requirements of transatlantic solidarity. Strategic autonomy therefore remains a work in progress, marked by tension between the desire for emancipation and the need for cohesion. In this uncertain landscape, the case of Ukraine is a decisive indicator. As Frédéric Labarre points out, Ukraine is testing the allies' ability to respond to Washington's repositioning. The perception of convergence between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is fuelling fears of US disengagement, leaving Europeans with the responsibility of ensuring, alone if necessary, continued support for Kiev. The French and British responses illustrate an attempt to reaffirm leadership through promises of increased military and political engagement. Paradoxically, this situation has also highlighted Ukraine's extraordinary resilience, particularly in industrial and technological terms. Under pressure, Ukraine has managed to innovate significantly in the field of defence, demonstrating an ability to adapt that exceeds the expectations of its partners. European adaptation Faced with profound changes in US foreign policy under the second Trump administration, Europe is being forced to redefine the very foundations of its Atlantic ties. This reassessment stems from a clear break with the traditional transatlantic paradigm, now weakened by Washington's selective disengagement and growing strategic indifference to European priorities, as Maude Quessard points out. Far from stable leadership, the United States embodies, according to Laurent Borzillo, a hegemony that has become unstable and unpredictable, compared to a ‘predatory child king’ whose decisions fall outside the traditional frameworks of cooperation. However, this instability is not only a loss: it also represents a strategic opportunity, according to Nicolas-François Perron, by offering Europe — possibly — greater room for manoeuvre than at the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Europe is now forced to position itself as an autonomous strategic player, fully assuming its continental responsibilities. National responses to this reshaping of the transatlantic relationship remain heterogeneous, however. According to Borzillo, France is adopting a dual stance: it is engaging in discreet co-leadership with the United Kingdom, while maintaining calculated strategic ambiguity regarding a possible extension of its nuclear umbrella. Its measured support for Ukraine can be explained in part by its desire to preserve its diplomatic freedom of action on other fronts. Germany, for its part, is struggling to translate the momentum of the Zeitenwende into concrete structural changes due to persistent institutional and political constraints. Nevertheless, Friedrich Merz's arrival in power in early 2025 could mark a potential turning point in German security policy, notably through a more assertive approach to international commitments. In this context, the idea of European strategic autonomy is gaining ground, based on three complementary pillars, according to Quessard. The capability pillar aims to strengthen Europe's technological and military sovereignty through the development of the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (BITD) and investment in drones, cybersecurity and satellite systems. The organizational pillar is based on flexible and responsive formats, such as the Weimar Triangle (France, Poland and Germany) or the formation of agile coalitions capable of rapidly deploying capabilities outside rigid institutional frameworks. Finally, the diplomatic pillar is marked by a ‘pragmatism of principle’, combining the defence of values with adaptation to geopolitical realities. This stance is manifested in active management of grey areas, a strengthened strategy of influence, and an ability to navigate between moral imperatives and structural constraints. All of these dynamics illustrate the growing tension between European strategic autonomy and Atlantic solidarity, and underscore the need for Europeans to build an independent capacity for action without breaking existing frameworks for cooperation. This redefinition could ultimately form the basis of a new intra-Western ‘strategic contract’ better suited to a world marked by multipolarity and the unpredictability of traditional alliances. Canadian adaptation Donald Trump's return to the presidency forces Canada to recognize the structural and lasting nature of the change in Washington. As various researchers and diplomats have pointed out, current US foreign policy does not reflect a mere partisan interlude, but a redefinition of national priorities, now focused on domestic economic interests rather than global strategic commitments. This transformation goes beyond Trump's personality alone: it is rooted in a profound reshaping of the foundations of US foreign policy. According to David Morin and Justin Massie, Canada can no longer assume automatic alignment with Washington, even under a future Democratic administration. This new reality requires a thorough review of the principles that have guided Canadian diplomacy since the Second World War. This realignment particularly affects Canada's position in the Western security architecture. Stéphane Roussel insists that Ottawa must rethink its levers of influence in an environment now structured by a bilateral and transactional logic, rather than by multilateralism and institutions. To address this shift, Massie calls for a more proactive stance: Canada can no longer be content to follow, it must be a force for proposals, initiatives and ideas. The issue of reciprocity in security thus becomes central. As Massie and Yan Cimon put it, Canada is prepared to ‘shed blood’ for collective security in Europe, but can it still count on equivalent reciprocity from the United States? In this context, strengthening Canada's strategic manoeuvring room requires several approaches. First, it requires the capacity for independent thinking, particularly in the area of industrial and technological policy. Second, it requires economic and strategic resilience, which calls for a rethinking of supply chains and diversification of trade dependencies. Finally, diversifying alliances is an essential lever: Morin and Massie argue in favour of actively seeking alternative coalitions, particularly with Europe and Asia, in order to reduce exclusive dependence on the United States. Adapting Canadian diplomacy to this new US configuration also requires an evolution in the tools and methods of influence. Roussel stresses the importance of capturing the attention of President Trump, whose priorities, sensitivities and modus operandi break with traditional presidential norms. This implies mobilizing personal ties between leaders as a privileged channel of influence — an approach that marks a significant break with Canadian diplomatic tradition, historically based on institutional channels, bureaucratic relations and norms of multilateral cooperation. Rethinking the democratic order beyond US hegemony The proceedings of the conference held on 7 April 2025 converged on a clear twofold diagnosis: the second Trump administration embodies a structural and lasting transformation of US foreign policy, marking the end of the presumption of stable and predictable transatlantic leadership. For allied democracies, this development requires a profound redefinition of the foundations of Euro-Atlantic cooperation. Since then, national responses to this strategic realignment have taken contrasting paths. In Canada, the new Prime Minister, Mark Carney, announced that the target of spending 2% of GDP on defence would be met ahead of schedule, as well as a strengthening of security partnerships with European allies and the European Union — marking an attempt to shift Canada's stance. However, several uncertainties remain regarding the concrete implementation of these commitments, particularly with regard to Canada's ability to develop real strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. In Germany, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has committed to making the Bundeswehr the most powerful armed force in Europe through a massive long-term investment plan. This ambition, although in line with the logic of European strategic autonomy, could come up against growing internal tensions: already weakened, Merz faces criticism from within his coalition partner, the SPD, several influential members of which recently published an open letter denouncing the risks of an ‘arms race’ and calling for a more balanced approach. In France, President Emmanuel Macron has shifted his position from that of the previous Trump administration, strongly reaffirming the importance of NATO for European security — a break from his 2019 diagnosis of ‘brain death’ — while remaining constrained by limited budgetary margins. Conversely, Spain had indicated even before the June 2025 NATO summit that it would not meet the new 5% defence spending target, struggling even to reach the 1.3% threshold. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has adopted a balanced stance, positioning herself as a bridge between Europe and the United States — a moderation that reflects internal tensions within her coalition, a fringe of which remains sceptical of Franco-German military ambitions and favours a traditional Atlanticist alignment. A comparative analysis of national trajectories thus reveals a plurality of responses to Donald Trump's return and the reshaping of the international order. In Europe and Canada, discourse on strategic autonomy is gaining visibility, but several countries remain constrained by structural dependencies. However heterogeneous they may be, these dynamics converge towards a common conclusion: the status quo ante is no longer tenable. Traditional coordination mechanisms, centred on US pre-eminence, are no longer sufficient to guarantee the defence of allies' interests in the long term. This climate of cautious adaptation was eloquently illustrated at the NATO summit held in The Hague in June 2025. This summit crystallized the tensions identified during the conference panels, particularly with regard to the management of a partner that has become both unpredictable and domineering. The entire organisation of the meeting seemed to be guided by an implicit priority: to preserve the apparent cohesion of the Alliance and to spare President Trump's sensibilities. Before his arrival, Trump had cast doubt on the scope of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, suggesting that there were several possible definitions of this fundamental guarantee. This statement, far from being insignificant, rekindled member states' doubts about the reliability of collective deterrence, already weakened by the president's previous positions. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte adopted a particularly conciliatory stance, going so far as to say that Trump ‘deserves all the praise’ — a statement widely perceived as a diplomatic attempt to avoid confrontation. The final communiqué, which was particularly laconic on support for Ukraine, revealed persistent divisions within the Alliance, both on the stance to adopt towards Russia and on the institutional future of NATO itself. In this context, the formal goal of increasing defence spending to 5% of GDP seems difficult to achieve for many member states, even as the transatlantic relationship remains largely structured by a transactional and fluctuating logic. The summit episode thus reinforces one of the central findings of the April conference: the long-term resilience of the international democratic order can no longer rely on stable US leadership. It requires a profound transformation of existing frameworks for cooperation, a redistribution of responsibilities among allies, and the affirmation of credible strategic autonomy — now the only conditions for lasting collective security. Ultimately, the question is no longer whether partial emancipation from US leadership is desirable, but how to achieve it without compromising the transnational democratic and security architecture. It is this ability to combine strategic autonomy, solidarity among allies, and institutional resilience that will determine whether Western democracies can continue to play a structuring role in a changing international order. List of participants: Opening remarks: Justin Massie, Director of the Department of Political Science (UQAM), Co-Director, Strategic Analysis Network (RAS), Le Rubicon François Audet, Director of IEIM Panel 1: What does Trump want? Karine Prémont (University of Sherbrooke) Julien Toureille (Raoul-Dandurand Chair) Theodore McLauchlin (University of Montreal) Henri-Paul Normandin (IEIM) Panel 2: What options are available to allies? Jean Crombois (American University in Bulgaria) Jonathan Paquin (Laval University) Chantal Lavallée (Royal Military College of Saint-Jean) Frédéric Labarre (Royal Military College of Canada) Panel 3: European adaptation Laurent Borzillo (ÉNAP) Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Nicolas-François Perron (UQAM) Panel 4: Canadian adaptation Stéphane Roussel (ÉNAP) Justin Massie (UQAM) David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke) Yan Cimon (Université Laval) Closing remarks: Daniel Jean (former advisor to the Prime Minister on national security) ## Who will be NATO’s next secretary general? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/who-will-be-natos-next-secretary-general/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > While NATO has confirmed the departure next autumn of former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, who has been in office since 201... February 2023: Nearly twelve months after Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, and while Kyiv’s allies continue, for some, quibble over the type of heavy weaponry that can or cannot be delivered to Ukraine, the main structures of the security architecture in Europe – NATO and the EU – continue their profound transformation. Given the immediate challenges that NATO faces (NATO’s resurrection; the future integration of former neutral countries; the risk of a new Trumpist administration, including a Trumpian epigone …), the choice of the next NATO Secretary General is all the more relevant to analyse. Quite traditionally – and unlike the European Union – NATO’s internal structures were not seen as a powerful bureaucracy seeking to increase its autonomy. In this respect, scholars rather analyzed decisions relating to the Alliance based on theoretical approaches highlighting the role of the States and their internal actors. However, the latest published work from John Deni, Heidi Hardt, and Leonard August Schuett, focusing mainly on the 2017-2021 period (i.e., Trump’s four years tenure), underlines the leading role played by the Alliance’s Secretary General, as well as several Alliance officials, in the maintenance and development of NATO in recent years.  While NATO has confirmed the departure next autumn of former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, who has been in office since 2014, who will take over as the head of the organisation? In recent months, several articles in the American, Canadian, British, Italian, Belgian, and French press have addressed this issue of the succession of the current NATO Secretary General. As a reminder, there has been a strong desire for several months for the person who will succeed him to be the first woman appointed to this position. However, this article is not concerned with relaying the rumors circulating within state and international institutions concerning the future NATO Secretary General. Conversely, considering three initial criteria, it aims to list methodically the candidates that can be selected for this position. First, I take it for granted that the person chosen will be a woman rather than a man. Second, it is inevitable that she would have held high positions over the past decade (either as Head of State or Government or as Minister of Foreign Affairs or Defence) in one of the Alliance member states. The third criterion is the nationality of potential candidates. Indeed, several nationalities can be excluded among the 30 member states composing NATO because of certain existing constraints and informal rules. In the light of these three criteria, out of the thirty or so potential personalities remaining, there are only three candidates who have a high probability of becoming NATO Secretary General: the current Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová, the former Dutch Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert and the former Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. A Female European Secretary-General Questioning the identity of the future Secretary General of NATO ultimately boils down to asking the question of her nationality among the thirty Allied states. Assuming that this person will be the first woman ever appointed and taking into account the need for this person to have held certain responsibilities – Head of State, Head of Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence –  this immediately prevents the nomination of a future Secretary General from Grece, Luxembourg or Turkey. Indeed, these countries have not had any women appointed/elected to these positions in the last decade. It is possible to cross out nine other nationalities, despite what some press reports may state: Norwegian, Danish, Icelandic, American, Canadian, British, Albanian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian. As far as Denmark and Norway are concerned, the current Secretary General is Norwegian and his direct predecessor was the former Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen; this eliminated them from the outset. Regarding Iceland, a member of the Alliance with a special status (a state without an army) in the context of a “new Cold War,” it is more than unlikely that an Icelandic candidate would be selected, even though many Icelandic female politicians have held high positions. What about American and Canadian candidates? The American and Canadian political classes do not lack female politicians who are a priori suitable for this position. Regarding the US, any candidacy can be directly rejected because of the tacit division –  in effect since 1952 – between the two highest positions within NATO. Per this tradition, the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) should automatically be an American General; in return, the position of NATO Secretary General should go to a European. Since it is not provided for in the 1949 Treaty or subsequent official documents approved by the North Atlantic Council, there isn’t any legal obstacle that could prevent anyone from questioning this division. Nevertheless, unless a European military officer happens to be appointed as SACEUR, it is chimeric to believe that there will ever be an American NATO Secretary General. This distribution also explains why it is equally illusory to believe that the current Canadian Deputy Prime Minister, Chrystia Freeland, would have a chance to become head of the Alliance. It is implausible that the current American SACEUR Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli would give up his seat to a European within the next three years. Therefore, the “Freeland” option, or even any other Canadian candidacy, can be eliminated, contrary to what many articles on this subject may suggest (regardless of Chrystia Freeland’s qualities or personal journey). The British option is equally implausible for two main reasons. First, the possibility of Minister Ben Wallace or former Prime Minister Boris Johnson can be dismissed given their gender, on top of Boris Johnson’s past mistakes when he was at 10 Downing Street. However, the option of former Prime Minister Theresa May could have been considered. Nonetheless, it is equally unlikely; the first significant reason relates to the position of DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe). With one exception (between 2001 and 2004), at least one British general officer has always held this position. However, the DSACEUR and Secretary General functions have always been held by persons who do not have the same nationality. This informal rule has known only two exceptions: during the tenure of Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General, and when the Alliance had two DSACEUR (from 1978 to 2001). It was precisely during the mandate of the last British Secretary General, George Robertson (1999 to 2003), that the DSACEUR position was held solely by a German for the first time (2001 and 2004). Therefore, appointing a British woman as Secretary General would probably require abandoning the DSACEUR position. Given the fears expressed in recent years by the British press about the loss of this military post to the French, this makes it even less likely that a Briton would succeed Stoltenberg. The second major reason for ruling out the British hypothesis is twofold. On the one hand, there is Brexit – i.e., the fact that the United Kingdom left the European Union. On the other hand, neither of the last two NATO Secretaries General came from a country that is part of the EU’s Common Defence and Security Policy (CSDP) (Denmark opted out only last June). Since 2009, when Anders Rasmussen took office as Secretary General, the EU has significantly developed its defence policies. Admittedly, the  EU is far from being a major geopolitical player despite the speeches its representatives may give. However, given the strengthening of the EU on defence issues and the desire from many EU members to develop an EU pillar within NATO, it is more than likely that the next Secretary General will come from an EU Member State. Admittedly, as Stoltenberg acrimoniously pointed out in 2021 in response to calls for European strategic autonomy, states that are both EU and NATO members account for only about 20% of defence funds as a whole (this proportion is, however, about to increase with the forthcoming accessions of Sweden and Finland). However, while EU member states account for only 20% of defence budgets, the US alone accounts for 70% of defence spending. These numbers mean that countries such as the UK, Canada, Turkey, Norway, Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Iceland invest half as much in defence as EU countries. Under these conditions, despite British activism in favour of Kyiv, it would be quite surprising if the other European member countries of the EU accepted the appointment of a Briton. This same reason also explains why the appointment of an Albanian, Montenegrin or Macedonian Secretary General would be just as unlikely, despite the many experienced politicians from these countries who could claim the position, including Radmila Šekerinska,  Milica Pejanović-Đurišić, Mimi Kodheli, and Olta Xhaçka. A Unifying Secretary General From the EU Five of the remaining 16 nationalities can be considered unlikely, given the risky political signal it could send: Polish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Slovenian and Croatian. Several press reports in recent months have mentioned the name of former Croatian President and former NATO Assistant Secretary General Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. Three other Croatian politicians are equally excellent candidates: Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor and former Foreign Ministers Vesna Pusić and Marija Pejčinović Burić. The present Estonian and Lithuanian Prime Ministers, Kaja Kallas and Ingrida Šimonytė, former Estonian and  Lithuanian  Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid and Dalia Grybauskaitė, and former Lithuanian Defence Minister Rasa Juknevičienė could also claim the post. However, choosing a Baltic politician would be a strong gesture towards Moscow. It would undoubtedly alarm many Alliance politicians (some current government members) who vainly hope for a quick return to peaceful relations with Russia. Choosing a Croat or a Slovenian could also be perceived as risky regarding the current tensions in the Balkans with Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the event of an escalation of tensions requiring, for example, NATO intervention, the Slovenian or Croatian origin of a NATO Secretary General could become a handicap and negatively affect NATO’s image in the region, regardless of the correctness and relevance of the actions taken by the Alliance. It is, therefore, unlikely that one of these women would be appointed to take over from Stoltenberg. In the end, the future NATO Secretary General could come from one of the following countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, or the Czech Republic. Within these countries, no less than thirty women have held senior positions over the past decade. Nevertheless, among these candidates, several can be quickly rejected. Some were in office for only a few months (such as the former Czech - Karla Šlechtová - and German - Christine Lambrecht - Defence Ministers) or have only been in office for 18 months or less (e.g. the German, French and Belgian Foreign Ministers or the Portuguese Minister of Defence). Others have faced scandals that have sometimes ended their political careers (for example, the former Spanish Defence  Minister María Dolores de Cospedal and the former Romanian Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă). Less than three German women could have been candidates given their careers: the current European Commission President and former Defence Minister (2013 to 2019), Ursula von der Leyen; her successor Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (in office from 2019 to 2021); and former Chancellor Angela Merkel. Given the criticism, in recent months, of the Bundeswehr’s current state, however, it would be somewhat surprising if the Allies’ choice was one of these three politicians, who are considered to be partly responsible for the deplorable state of the German army. In the case of Ursula von der Leyen, her term as European Commission President ends in the spring of 2024, a few months after the end of Stoltenberg’s NATO term. It is unlikely that EU member states would want to create some kind of vacancy, even temporary, for this post. Former Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer’s unkind remarks about European strategic autonomy also make it difficult to imagine that states would validate her candidacy when they wish to strengthen the EU’s weight in defence issues. Finally, choosing Angela Merkel would undoubtedly have been approved by many before February 2022. However, it seems more difficult now, given her strategic errors vis-à-vis Russia and her lack of repentance since the Russian invasion regarding her political choices during her mandates. In this perspective, the choice of the future Secretary General of NATO will come down to a priori eight profiles: Zuzana Čaputová, Federica Mogherini, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Sophie Wilmès, Elisabetta Trenta, Roberta Pinotti, Margarita Robles, and Florence Parly. Three candidates stand out: the current Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová, Federica Mogherini, and finally, the former Dutch Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert. President since June 2019, Zuzana Čaputová, has been mentioned several times in the press as an option seriously considered. Appointing her would also mean having a person from Central Europe at the head of NATO for the first time without sending a message of too much firmness to Moscow (unlike appointing someone from the Baltic countries). Although she stepped down as High Representative in 2019, it was under Federica Mogherini’s tenure that many CSDP developments took place, alongside the development of EU-NATO relations. As General Javier Solana, the first EU High Representative, was a former NATO Secretary, the appointment of a former High Representative as NATO Secretary General (in a context where some want to strengthen NATO’s EU pillar) would be far from damaging for the EU and its desire to gain autonomy/sovereignty. Coming from a country known for its strong Atlanticism, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert has been Minister of Defence for nearly five years. In addition, she has been head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) since 2018, making her a candidate of interest. Former Belgian Prime Minister Sophie Wilmès could also be an option. However, given her voluntary withdrawal and subsequent resignation from the Belgian government for family reasons in 2022, this is unlikely to be the case. Former Italian Defence Ministers Elisabetta Trenta and Roberta Pinotti are also credible candidates. However, Federica Mogherini’s profile being more experienced, it would be surprising if one of them were chosen over her in the event of a Secretary General of Italian origin. The Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles faces an obstacle: her compatriot Josep Borrell is the current EU High Representative. It would be surprising if the two positions, High Representative and Secretary General, were occupied by individuals of the same nationality. Finally, regarding Florence Parly, former French Minister of the Armed Forces, although some have put forward her name following the AUKUS “affront” and the termination by the Australians of the contract with Naval Group, her nationality makes such an appointment not credible. In addition to the old mistrust from many Alliance partners toward Paris because of its vision of NATO, Emmanuel Macron’s statements on the need not to “humiliate Russia” or about giving “security guarantees” to Russia make the prospect of such an appointment unlikely. Moreover, Turkey would certainly not favour such an appointment, given the tense relations between Paris and Ankara. Conclusion The likely appointment of Zuzana Čaputová, Federica Mogherini or Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert will confirm the willingness of both EU and NATO members to have their weight recognised within the Alliance. However, whether this will necessarily mean strengthening the EU’s military skills and capabilities in cooperation with the Alliance is unclear. Nevertheless, choosing Federica Mogherini will certainly generate such expectations, given her former position in the EU. Such a development of relations between the two organizations is not impossible even if Zuzana Čaputová or Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert becomes Secretary General. Appointing Zuzana Čaputová would be a strong symbol of consideration for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as no NATO Secretary General has so far come from this region out of the 13 people who have held this position to date. If she is not chosen, it is certain that, out of a desire to balance and compensate, people from those countries should receive in priority the probably-soon-to-come military commands in the context of NATO’s structural reorganization in Northern and Eastern Europe. This restructuring could also affect the next personalities elected/appointed within the EU in the upcoming 2024 European elections. Although Zuzana Čaputová, Federica Mogherini and Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert are the politicians most likely to be chosen, Stoltenberg’s successor may ultimately come from a Baltic state or Croatia. However, this would show a willingness from all the allies to send a strong signal vis-à-vis the Russian or Serbian governments. A different choice (Canadian or British, for example) would necessarily imply a significant change in some structures and attributions within NATO, which would deserve more attention than the very name of the future Secretary General. Jens Stoltenberg could also be extended by a few more months – for the third time, after 2019 and 2022 – depending on the state of discussions and the situation in Central and Eastern Europe in the coming months. Finally, the Allies may also refrain from appointing a woman to the position. Such a development would multiply the number of potential candidates. Still, it would also entail a certain political cost, given the regular announcements in recent months regarding the appointment of a woman. ## Why ‘Brave Little Belgium’ Yet Again Sends Its F-16s to Iraq and Syria URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/why-brave-little-belgium-yet-again-sends-its-f-16s-to-iraq-and-syria/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > On October 1st 2020, Belgium resumed its participation in Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led international coalition against ISIL, with four F-16 fighter jets and military support personnel. Why does a small country like Belgium once again decide to go to war in this seemingly never-ending conflict? On October 1st 2020, Belgium resumed its participation in Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led international coalition against ISIL, with four F-16 fighter jets and military support personnel. Just like previous contributions in 2014-2015 and 2016-2017, Belgian F-16s will be based in Jordan and are mandated to participate in the full spectrum of activities, including carrying out reconnaissance flights, providing air support to ground troops and conducting air strikes. Why does a small country like Belgium once again decide to go to war in this seemingly never-ending conflict? The question is particularly puzzling considering the domestic background against which this deployment was decided upon. Not only is the COVID-19 virus still raging throughout the country, the decision was also taken without having a full power government and no clear perspective of having one any time soon. That explains why deployment was made subject to prior parliamentary approval – granted on June 25th - which in normal circumstances is not a constitutional requirement nor common practice in Belgium. It is only at the time of writing this blogpost, three months later, that a 493-day long government formation was concluded. Despite the somewhat odd timing, there are multiple reasons why this engagement should not come as a surprise. What remains to be seen, however, is how long it will enjoy domestic support. More than a matter of (inter)national security Belgium’s deployment is obviously geared towards the coalition’s ambition to prevent an ISIL resurgence in the region. That motivation also dominated parliamentary debates back in June, with repeated emphasis on the need to “keep the pressure high.” ISIL was framed as a threat to not only international but also national security. This is nothing new. Earlier deployments were also justified in that way. While threats to the Yazidi population, ISIL propaganda and the foreign fighter problem created an international sense of urgency, the shooting at a Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014 and, most crucially, the Brussels bombings of March 2016 added a clear national security dimension. Yet, it is hard to believe that security considerations were the government’s only motivation for responding positively to the request from the U.S. Central Command to re-deploy its fighter jets. Forceful contributions like these seem to have become part of Belgium’s DNA as an international partner. Earlier contributions to Operation Inherent Resolve and the air strikes in the Libya intervention of 2011 attest to that. This active participation furthermore ensures a seat at the table of the core group of military contributors to Inherent Resolve and in that way a voice in the future of the region. But much more important is that the country’s identity is unquestionably intertwined with the principles of multilateralism, which take a prominent place in nearly every government agreement of the past decades. Belgium not only hosts NATO’s HQ and several of the EU institutions, it is also one of the most frequently elected non-permanent members of the UN Security Council - its sixth term is currently ongoing. Multilateralism simply gives Belgium a stronger voice internationally. Yet, promoting the principles of multilateralism does not come without responsibilities and expectations. Actively contributing to Inherent Resolve should also be read from that perspective. On the one hand, it is a continuation of the ambitions and policy set by the previous government(s), aimed at showing Belgium’s commitment to actively contribute to maintaining international peace and security. The rumour that this contribution was already agreed upon much earlier with core members of the U.S.-led coalition adds further weight to this argument. On the other hand, there is also the transatlantic elephant in the room. How can a country credibly host NATO’s Headquarters and present itself as a loyal ally when still being nowhere near meeting the ambition of spending 2% its GDP on defence? Actively contributing to coalition air strikes is one way to meet the expectations and is obviously not without risks. But one wonders for how long this approach can satisfy Belgium’s allies. National defence staff have already been urging for years to credibly increase the ambition level, also in terms of cash and capabilities. Domestic support The new mission is set to last until October 2021. However, several questions hanging over the incoming centre-left government led by PM Alexander De Croo cast doubts over the durability of this contribution. The first key question is how the leftist governing parties will deal with the mission. In June, both the green and socialist parties voted against the parliamentary resolution that legitimized the mission, outing their concern about the lack of a legal justification for military activities over Syrian territory. The new government agreement emphasizes the need for foreign military missions to have a “conclusive international legal mandate”. It is not yet clear how this tension will pan out in the future, for instance in the context of a debate around an eventual extension of the mission. The second question is how long Belgium’s fighter jets will be capable of living up to the expectations amidst a modernization of the country’s weapon systems. It is only in October 2018 that the government decided to buy 34 F-35 fighter jets and it will take some time before they will actually replace the ageing F-16 fleet. Moreover, previous contributions to Inherent Resolve took place in a rotating partnership with the Netherlands. The Dutch commitment now remains limited to the deployment of a 35-member military protection force. Without any prospect of being alternated by Dutch F-16s, it remains to be seen how long the Belgian Air Force can keep its fighter jets in the air. Finally, there is the question of domestic public support. Massive anti-war protests seem to be a distant memory in Belgium. The COVID-19 crisis will furthermore occupy most citizens’ minds for at least a few more months. But the longer this forceful contribution is to last, the higher the risk of controversy. Dark clouds already gathered in the Netherlands, after the Dutch government had to admit that one of its fighter jets killed up to 70 civilians in Hawija in Iraq, leading to a motion of no confidence against the Minister of Defence. Already in 2017, the international NGO Airwars, which monitors the coalition’s air campaign, linked Belgium to some cases of civilian casualties. Although these accusations have been formally denied, questions will be raised again. Equipping Belgian fighter jets with new high precision bombs will not completely eradicate that risk. Belgium has so far been among the least transparent members of the coalition. As the incoming government formally committed itself to increase transparency about its military missions, it will be interesting to see how this might affect domestic support. For now, Brave little Belgium is back in action, but it is not without reservations. The author is grateful to the Defence officials who shared their insights as part of the research for this post.   ## Why Fear Russia in the Arctic? Contemplating Scenarios as an Exercise in Assumption-Testing and “Red Teaming” URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/why-fear-russia-in-the-arctic-contemplating-scenarios-as-an-exercise-in-assumptiontesting-and-red-teaming/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > This Strategic Perspective is intended as a series of modest reflections prompted by discussions and debates with colleagues during conferences and workshops over the past two years. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Why Fear Russia in the Arctic? Contemplating Scenarios as an Exercise in Assumption-Testing and 'Red Teaming'," Strategic Perspectives, NAADSN, 4 May 2020. ## Why Not Canadian Nuclear Submarines? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/why-not-canadian-nuclear-submarines/ Modified: 2026-06-22 Canada’s submarines are running out of time. Built over thirty years ago for service with the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy, the four-boat Victoria-class was acquired by Canada in the 1990s and has never quite lived up to its advertised potential. It now needs replacement, and submarine procurement programs can be long and uncertain ordeals. However, ever since former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canada planned to pursue a fleet of up to twelve submarines in the summer of 2024, Canada’s submarine procurement is one project that has actually moved extremely quickly. Requirements were set, industry feedback sought, and the down-selection to two potential builders all took place in just over a year. By March 2026, both builders had submitted detailed bids, with Canada now potentially just weeks away from making its final selection. The first submarine contending for the Canadian submarine contract is Hanwha Ocean’s KSS-III-class, already in service with the South Korean Navy. The second submarine in contention is TMKS’ Type 212CD-class, being built for Germany and Norway. The Government of Canada has stated that, notwithstanding the differences in their capabilities, sizes, and systems, both designs meet the Royal Canadian Navy’s needs, and the final decision will be based on how well the competing bids serve Canada’s industrial, diplomatic, and economic needs. One thing that both designs have in common is that they are diesel-electric submarines with an integrated air independent propulsion system—not nuclear powered. Nuclear-powered submarines have a reputation for being the most advanced, most capable, submarines in the world. Nuclear submarines have real advantages over diesel-electric submarines that are relevant for Canada. Hence the question: why does the Government and Military of Canada appear to have no interest in nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Canadian Navy? The answer to this question comes down to what tasks are the highest priority for Canadian submarines and the real-world challenges of procuring nuclear-powered options. However, that does not mean nuclear-submarines do not have advantages. The Advantages of Nuclear over Diesel-Powered Submarines Generally speaking, nuclear submarines' advantages are that they have enormous range without the need to refuel, can operate at higher top-speeds than conventional submarines, don’t sacrifice range to operate at those higher speeds, and that they can stay submerged for months without needing to exchange air with the surface. Discussions of submarines for Canada often centre around the Arctic, and all of these advantages of nuclear submarines are relevant to maintaining a persistent presence there. Operating diesel-electric submarines is very difficult in the North because they need to exchange air with the surface to run their diesel generators that recharge their batteries. This air exchange is usually, and most safely, done with a snorkel, but sea ice makes this process a liability as snorkels cannot penetrate solid ice sheets and can be damaged in areas with loose ice chunks. Nuclear submarines do not have these concerns. Canada’s Arctic also has no facilities capable of supporting submarines, and building such facilities has proven to be an immense challenge. Without support facilities in the North, the distances that Canadian submarines must transit—independent from support—to and from the Arctic can actually be greater than the distance to friendly ports in Asia or Europe, even if they never leave Canadian waters. The distances involved makes long range a requirement. The range necessary to patrol over these distances is possible for diesel-electric submarines, but only by working around limitations that do not exist for nuclear submarines. Nuclear submarines’ higher speeds are also beneficial because it can increase patrol efficiency. More speed means less time transiting to a patrol area and more time where the submarine is needed, potentially allowing fewer nuclear submarines to provide equivalent coverage within the Arctic when compared to a diesel-electric fleet. The advantages of nuclear submarines also apply beyond the Arctic. One of the main capabilities these submarines offer is the ability to threaten another country’s sea lines of communication—that is, the routes used by its trade and naval vessels. If Canada needed to threaten another country’s sea lines—unless that country were to be its long-standing treaty ally, the United States—geography dictates that it would be doing so a long way from Canadian shores. Significant range is thus a requirement for Canada to have this capability, with speed providing another benefit because it makes that threat more immediate. Nuclear submarines are better suited to this task than non-nuclear submarines. A similar logic applies to using submarines to threaten targets on land. Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Canada’s Procurement Record These advantages have historically been well understood within the Royal Canadian Navy and the Government of Canada. The current procurement project is only the third time Canada has sought to acquire new submarines since the first nuclear submarine, operated by the United States Navy, sailed in 1954. Although other options were executed in the end, one should note in both of the previous submarine procurement projects, the intention was, at least for a time, to acquire nuclear submarines. In the 1950s, the Royal Canadian Navy selected the US Navy’s nuclear-powered Skipjack-class before the government overruled that plan and selected the United Kingdom’s non-nuclear Oberon-class in 1960 instead. In the 1980s, the Government of Canada under Brian Mulroney’s leadership announced that it would replace the Oberon-class with nuclear-powered submarines in its 1987 Defence White Paper. It would go on to reverse that decision in 1989, eventually acquiring the currently serving Victoria-class. Despite the result, in both cases, the advantages of nuclear submarines featured prominently in discussion and debate. Nuclear submarines’ advantages of speed and range still exist today, and Canadians in and out of Government service show awareness of them. Public discourse on military subjects in Canada is often limited, but interest in nuclear submarines spiked after the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia announced the AUKUS pact in 2021. This agreement aimed to transfer several American nuclear submarines to Australia in the near term, with the goal of Australia one day being able to build its own nuclear submarines domestically. Many Canadians wondered why Canada could not be included in this agreement. A small, but loud, segment of public and academic Canadian defence communities have persisted in advocating nuclear submarines for the sake of their operational effectiveness as well as for deepening cooperation with such partners. Nonetheless, there have been no public indications that nuclear submarines were seriously considered by the RCN or the Government in this procurement. Cost is undoubtedly a factor in this decision, but it is not a sufficient explanation on its own. Australia’s planned acquisitions under AUKUS gives us a good cost benchmark for Canada. That project is expected to cost up to $368 billion over the first 30 years—an average of $12 billion annually. This sum is enormous; it would consume nearly half of the defence budgets that Canadians are used to supporting. However, Prime Minister Mark Carney recently committed to increasing Canada’s defence spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2035. Based on current GDP figures, that represents $52.5 billion of additional annual defence spending over 2024 levels. Although some priorities will compete with one another, a $12 billion annual program is not inconceivable in that context, especially if it addresses a core need. Rather than cost, Canada’s continued official disinterest in nuclear-powered submarines appears rooted in something Canadian defence discourse is not used to seeing: decision makers have today a deeper understanding of strategic and industrial considerations than in past procurement cycles. Misunderstood Priorities Canada’s nuclear submarine pursuit in the 1980s was based on an understanding of the advantages of nuclear submarines, but a misunderstanding of strategic priorities. The immediate catalyst that led to the decision to procure nuclear submarines was when an American Coast Guard icebreaker, the USCGC Polar Sea, sailed through the Northwest Passage without Canadian permission. The United States claimed the Passage as an international strait, giving it a right to transit. In response to public concern, the Mulroney Government quickly made it clear that Canada viewed the waters through its Arctic Archipelago as internal waters, with the implication being that permission was always needed for passage. This position created a quandary for Canada since it did not have the ability to monitor violations of—much less enforce—these claims. Persistently monitoring the entire Canadian Arctic with ships, satellites, planes, or ground stations was impractical for technical reasons, and other countries would always know when these assets were absent. Submarines would have been an appealing solution as they could monitor ships without being detected themselves, forcing those ships to always act as if they may be surveilled even if the actual coverage was intermittent. Since it would have been extremely difficult to operate diesel-electric submarines of the time in the Arctic, using “submarines” for the purpose of monitoring the Arctic meant acquiring “nuclear submarines”. Alongside some extremely optimistic estimates of the cost of the program and the likely interest of allies in assisting Canada, the Government demonstrated an understanding of this technical reality when it announced in its 1987 defence white paper that it would be acquiring nuclear submarines, distinguishing between them being the “best way to achieve the required operational capabilities in the vast Pacific and Atlantic oceans” and “the only vessel able to exercise surveillance and control in Northern Canadian ice-covered waters”. While the technical judgement that nuclear submarines were the only tool to surveil and control Arctic waters was sound, the strategic decision to prioritize that goal was not. While there are justifications for a country to want to monitor and control all its territory, there is always going to be a hierarchy of priority based on different areas economic value, proximity to population and industrial centres, strategic utility, and diplomatic alternatives to military presence. For example, in any conflict with a major naval power, the first priority for Canada’s submarine force is unlikely to be the Arctic. The protection of shipping in the Gulf of St Lawrence, the Strait of Juan de Fuca near Vancouver, and the seas around Saint John, Halifax and Prince Rupert—near all of Canada’s largest ports—would almost certainly be a much higher priority. This prioritization reflects a fundamental concept in military strategy referred to as a “centre of gravity”—which is the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends” according to famed strategist Carl von Clausewitz, and the "point against which all energies should be directed" in order to gain advantage and win in any conflict. None of Canada’s centres of gravity—none of its most vital capital, industrial, resource, population, strategic, or trade centres—are in the Arctic. That is not to say that the Arctic does not have value in several of these areas, but the Arctic is not a hub that Canada relies on for its prosperity, ability to project military power overseas, or existence as a nation. Canada’s major ports, on the other hand, are its centres of gravity, at least when it comes to conducting war on or across the ocean. Canada depends on the sea lines of communication that must start at its ports. Because these sea lines pass through very few chokepoints—and none that are likely to be unfriendly—except at entry points to the Indian Ocean, threatening Canada’s use of them can most efficiently be done close to these ports. Hunting vessels, even civilian vessels, in the high seas is resource intensive. The result is that Canada should expect them to be a high priority target for its adversaries. History reinforces this perspective. During the Second World War, German U-boats operated near all of Canada’s major East Coast ports, as well as in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and even into the St. Lawrence River. A future adversary would likely seek to do the same with modern submarines on both coasts. Canadian military planners should take this seriously. Taking the threat of enemy submarines in these areas seriously means prioritizing platforms which can deal with those threats most effectively. The best counter to a submarine is another submarine and, despite the advantages of nuclear submarines in other areas, diesel-electric submarines have the advantage here. That advantage comes down to noise profiles. Nuclear-powered submarines are always generating noise because they cannot shut down their reactors—they are always quiet, but never silent. Diesel-electric submarines, by contrast, can operate on batteries in near silence, giving them an advantage. This advantage is lost when they must periodically use diesel generators to recharge, to be sure. However, this is less of a liability near home, where they can return to port or arrange support from other assets during this time of vulnerability. Without another solution to the Arctic monitoring issue, perhaps one can argue that a nuclear submarine that was less capable in providing security near Canadian ports, but could be used in the Arctic—as opposed to a diesel-electric submarine that was the best submarine for maintaining security near ports, with very little Arctic utility—would be a reasonable trade-off. Nevertheless, the Arctic issue was primarily one that should have been addressed through diplomatic means, as evidenced by the fact that it eventually was. In 1988, the United States and Canada agreed that American ships would not transit through the Northwest Passage without Canadian permission, even as the United States would not recognize Canada’s claim that it was internal waters. With few other countries having the means or interest to sail through the area—the Soviet Union, being the main contender, actually supported Canada’s claims—the matter was settled. Canada could thus abandon its nuclear submarine plans the following year. The Current State of Play Today, with receding ice sheets and greater industrialization around the world, more countries may have both the means and interest in using the Northwest Passage for passage. However, Canada has made real progress in having its claims recognized internationally, while new technologies provide options other than nuclear submarines for monitoring the area. Cheaper satellites, and modern over-the-horizon radars are two such technologies. A third is the air independent propulsion (AIP) systems found on many modern diesel-electric submarines—including the two Canada is considering. AIP systems began being used on naval submarines in the 1990s, not long after the Victoria-class was completed without them. They come in a number of varieties, but their commonality is that they give diesel-electric submarines the ability to generate electricity for extended periods of time without relying on their diesel generators and without exchanging air at the surface—sometimes extending the time a diesel-electric submarine can remain fully submerged from a few days to several weeks. This largely addresses the main barrier to diesel-electric submarines operating in the Arctic: the need to frequently snorkel. With the ability to remain submerged for weeks, they can confidently enter ice-covered areas and return to ice-free ones when required. The technology does not make them the equal of nuclear submarines in every respect. Their sustained speed while using AIP is limited, for example. However, since noise considerations force even nuclear submarines to primarily operate at low speeds, with the option to sprint at higher ones in emergency, and diesel-electric submarines with AIP can mimic this behaviour by idling to charge their batteries and sprint by drawing them down, this is less of a tactical difference than it may appear. AIP systems do have the disadvantage that they cannot be regenerated at sea. A ship with 21 days of AIP when it leaves port only has those 21 days to use until it refuels. Once that time is used up, they must rely on more frequent charging cycles until they return to port or refuel from another ship carrying specialized re-agents. However, even at the reduced speeds AIP is limited to, 21 days is enough for a submarine to patrol from the most southerly winter extent of the Arctic ice sheet to the most northern point of Canadian territory and back. This will rarely, if ever, be done since the ability of nuclear submarines to harm Canada from these locations is limited, and nothing else is likely to be present. But just having the option accomplishes many of Canadian goals that previously only nuclear submarines could achieve, as other countries will need to guard against the possibility. More commonly, when deployed to the Arctic, Canadian AIP submarines will be used along the shipping channels that open in the Arctic during the winter, monitoring traffic and, in conflict, hunting belligerent submarines that are actually a threat to that shipping. Their under-ice capability will mostly be used to transit from one area of open water to another or deprive nuclear submarines of the safety they might otherwise find under ice near these shipping channels. These are the highest priority activities in the Arctic. Submarines with these systems are also capable of other roles. The presence of diesel-electric U-boats on Canada’s East coast during the Second World War shows that threatening shipping on the far side of oceans has long been within diesel-electric submarines’ capabilities. AIP systems just make them more survivable when far from home. Diesel-electric submarines may not be able to independently threaten shipping as persistently as nuclear submarines, but that can be addressed by accessing nearby friendly ports, and Canada is unlikely to be intercepting shipping except in support of allies. Similar logic applies to the option to attack high-value land targets with submarines. AIP equipped submarines may still be at a disadvantage in this work compared to nuclear submarines, but they have a basic capability that meets Canada’s needs. The reason Canada can accept a lesser capability when operating in the Arctic, disrupting shipping, or attacking land targets is because these are all secondary considerations for Canada’s submarine fleet. The most important missions for Canadian submarines will happen near major ports, where diesel-electric submarines already had an arguable advantage over nuclear submarines. The ability that AIP submarines have to go for weeks without recharging after leaving port amplifies this advantage over nuclear submarines significantly. Put together, the increased advantage of diesel-electric submarines with AIP systems over nuclear submarines in Canada’s most critical area of need, and their ability to perform a wide range of secondary tasks, eliminates most of the strategic arguments that could be made for Canada to acquire nuclear submarines in the present-day. The nail in the coffin today for a Canadian acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, however, remains what it was in the 1980s: Canada has no option that will allow it to acquire them. Not on the necessary timelines, at least. Among Canada’s three allies who operated nuclear submarines in the 1980s, the United Kingdom and France were, at best, luke-warm to the idea of Canada acquiring them, while the United States was outright hostile. America’s hostility had three basic causes. First, it was clear that Canada’s desire for nuclear powered submarines was in response to US actions—treating the US as a potentially hostile nation—and it’s natural that they wouldn’t want to provide their own foil. The US also believed that Arctic waters held modest strategic importance, and worried that Canadian investment in nuclear submarines would impact the force that it could afford to sustain in the more strategically important European theatre. Finally, while the Northwest Passage was not of huge strategic importance as an international strait at the time, other international straits held and hold enormous strategic importance, and the precedent of one international strait becoming internal waters could open the door to the owners of other straits being similarly reclassified. The United Kingdom and France’s lukewarm attitude was a result both of their disbelief that Canada would follow through, and of the concerns of the United States. The United Kingdom, in particular, operated its nuclear submarine program in close cooperation with the United States and couldn’t export its submarines or expertise without American approval. America’s disapproval was less of a binding constraint—but still a factor for consideration—for France. However, their submarines of the time were significantly inferior in capability and not truly suitable to Arctic operations in any case. This lack of an enthusiastic partner posed a major challenge to Canadian ambitions. Nuclear submarine technology has only truly been developed independently once—by the United States. All other operators were assisted in their acquisition either through espionage (USSR), open cooperation (United Kingdom and China), secret cooperation (France), or a lease arrangement (India). It is an extremely difficult technology to develop. Nevertheless, Canada did consider developing its own nuclear submarine. One novel proposal was for a submarine that operated off of batteries, like a conventional submarine, but had a low-power Slowpoke-2 nuclear reactor onboard to recharge those batteries during periods of low activity without surfacing. It wouldn’t be able to operate continuously at full power like other nuclear submarines, but it also wouldn’t need to surface to charge its batteries like a conventional submarine. This may have been the kernel of a good idea—it’s very similar in concept to how modern air independent propulsion systems work—and can be lauded for realistically acknowledging some of Canada’s technical limitations, but it still wasn’t very realistic. Canada not only had no experience building nuclear submarines, it had no experience building any sort of submarine; not since it had assembled a few for the United Kingdom during World War One. Modern submarines rely on a number of highly specialized systems—such as acoustic sensors and noise suppressions systems—that are immense engineering challenges which Canada would need to overcome on its own. Even with a less ambitious reactor concept, it could take decades and multiple iterations before a submarine that satisfied Canadian needs could be built domestically. As a point of comparison, France commissioned their first nuclear submarine in 1971. But their designs were consistently viewed as being behind their contemporaries until their fourth blank-sheet design—the Suffren-class—entered service in 2020. That 50-year timespan is a realistic expectation for a newcomer to develop competitive nuclear submarines. In the end, this would always have made it impossible for Canada to acquire nuclear submarines in the 1980s. No other operator of nuclear submarines wanted to, and was capable, of giving Canada the assistance required. And developing the capability independently over decades did not meet Canada’s needs. Similar dynamics apply to Canada’s position with its allies today, with time pressure being created by the fact that Canada needs a replacement in service by the time the Victoria-class will be retired in 2035, and no one with both the willingness and capability to help. Why not, then, partner with the United States and the United Kingdom? After all, those two countries are both working with Australia to meet its nuclear ambitions through AUKUS—with the first submarines expected to be in service in the early 2030s. Canada is a similar sized nation to Australia, with similar (or even closer) relationships with the United Kingdom and United States. This could suggest that Canada might pursue a similar arrangement and timeline. However, this concept falls apart on closer examination. The logic behind AUKUS is built on Australia’s location. It is not just an agreement for the United States and United Kingdom to sell nuclear submarines to Australia in the near term, and help Australia build its own nuclear submarines in the long-term. It also includes the right to base their own nuclear submarines in Australia—with Australia bearing the cost. Australia is much closer to where the United States and United Kingdom want to deploy their submarines in the Indo-Pacific than their own shores are. Basing their submarines in Australia reduces transit time, allowing their submarines to sustain similar “on-station” time even if they are operating fewer of them. Both the United States and United Kingdom have severe limits on their capacity to build nuclear submarines, arguably not even having sufficient capacity for their own needs. It’s only through the fact that this basing agreement reduces the number of submarines they need to operate that any of their submarines are freed up for sale to Australia. Canada does not have this leverage. Nothing Canada can do reduces the number of submarines the United States or United Kingdom require. Australia is also expected to contribute significantly to the design process of a new AUKUS-class of submarine, which will be the United Kingdom’s next nuclear submarine and will serve as the design that’s eventually built in Australia. Australia can contribute to this because it gained significant experience building, and later upgrading, its current class of submarines—the Collins-class—in the 1990s and early 2000s. The Collins-class incorporated some truly world-beating innovations, and sustained a capable submarine industry. Canada, as an operator of submarines that were originally designed and built in the United Kingdom, can’t provide a similar contribution. The reasons why Canada could not rely on the United States or United Kingdom to develop a nuclear submarine capability in the 1980s remain operative. At best, Washington still views the acquisition of nuclear submarines by Canada as a project that will drain resources from areas where they would prefer for us to invest. At worst, they still view it as a hostile action targeted directly at their interests. The United Kingdom is too integrated in the US program to support Canada independently. Even if London and Washington were convinced to help Ottawa to acquire nuclear submarines, the timing is impossible. AUKUS was created in 2021. Even if Canada could proceed on the same timeline, starting now would likely push receipt of the first submarine past the 2035 deadline. A similar timeline could only be achieved if AUKUS was abandoned and Canada effectively took Australia’s place in a similar agreement on an aggressive timetable. Otherwise, American and United Kingdom capacity to assist Canada will not exist until after much of what AUKUS promises has been delivered, well into the 2040s. That is too long for Canada to wait. That leaves France as a potential partner. However, while France’s nuclear submarines are no longer significantly handicapped compared to those of the United States or United Kingdom, their ability to help Canada meet its timelines is no stronger. France’s capacity for building nuclear submarines domestically is limited and appears entirely utilized for their own purposes well past 2035. If Canada were to pay for it, new capacity could plausibly be built. That would be a decade-long project itself, and with the typical construction time of a nuclear submarine in France of over nine years, that also pushes the first delivery well into the 2040s. One might consider the possibility of France helping Canada build nuclear submarines at home, but that has even longer timelines. Brazil is currently pursuing the domestic construction of a nuclear submarine with France’s assistance. That submarine was ordered in 2008. It is currently expected to launch in 2037, a 29-year delivery timeline. Far too long for Canada to consider that route for its next generation of submarines. Conclusion Canada’s decision not to pursue nuclear submarines is not the result of a single constraint, but the convergence of several. Canada’s highest priority missions for submarines, the raison d’etre of its fleet, are best served by diesel-electric submarines with integrated air independent propulsions systems—exactly what it is pursuing. The technologies that once made nuclear propulsion uniquely suited to Arctic operations are no longer the only way to operate in that environment. Though nuclear submarines still offer advantages in range, speed, and endurance, those advantages are most relevant when operating independently far from home, while Canada is only likely to act in those places with allies. Simply put, there is no viable path to acquiring nuclear submarines on the timelines Canada requires, whether through allies or domestic development. Canada thus has a clear choice. Rather than pursuing the most capable submarine in abstract terms, Canada is pursuing the most appropriate one for its real-world purposes—aligned with its geography, its alliances, and its strategic priorities. Nuclear submarines remain powerful and, in some respects, unmatched tools. However, they are tools designed for a different set of problems than the ones Canada faces. The absence of a nuclear option in Canada’s current procurement is not an oversight. It is the result of a clear-eyed assessment of what Canada needs its submarine force to do, and what it can realistically deliver. Image Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Josh Thompson. ## With Waning Media Attention, External Monitor Keeps Focus on Military Culture Change URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/external-monitor-keeps-focus-on-military-culture-change/ Modified: 2024-03-20 > In the wake of the 2021 sexual harassment and assault crisis, the Canadian Armed Forces have promised change. In the wake of the 2021 sexual harassment and assault crisis involving allegations against high-ranking officers, including two Chiefs of the Defence Staff, the Canadian Armed Forces  (CAF) have promised change. The Independent External Comprehensive Review by former Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour spelled out how it should be done. At the heart of Arbour’s recommendations is a focus on better oversight and accountability, but is public attention waning? Enter the appointment of Jocelyne Therrien, the external monitor tasked with overseeing progress, as set out in recommendation 48 of the Arbour Report. Therrien has now released two monitoring reports, which, combined with the last Statistics Canada Survey of 2022 on Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces (released in December 2023), demonstrate that change is visible, yet uneven. The survey revealed a concerning rise in sexual assaults, with only about 20% of affected members reporting their experiences, but it also showed an increase in general awareness tied to culture change, as well as improved trust in leadership. However, there remains a disconnect between new Department of National Defence (DND) and CAF policies and their expected results. We argue that piecemeal change based on individual recommendations from the Arbour Report can undermine effective and comprehensive culture change. Below, we focus on terminology, leadership, and academic engagements, to illustrate the point. The Term “Sexual Misconduct” Is Useless. The latest report has shown that the CAF is removing sexual misconduct from its lexicon, to align with the Labour and Criminal Codes’ definitions of sexual harassment and assault. In her report, Arbour had observed that the term “sexual misconduct” lacks coherence and clarity, leading to a lot of confusion. Arbour recommended abolishing this broad term and establishing proper, distinct definitions for sexual harassment, fraternization, and adverse personal relationships. In his recent statement, Minister Bill Blair emphasized the importance of refining and clarifying definitions related to sexual misconduct, stating that “the first two recommendations in Madam Arbour’s report which call for the removal of the term sexual misconduct from our official policies and the use of sexual assault as a standalone item”. The use of the term ‘sexual misconduct’ has been fraught from the get-go, it is vague and poorly understood, therefore not useful in support of specific policies. Another important recommendation involves refining the concept of ‘adverse personal relationships’. These relationships are characterized by their potential to create power imbalances, particularly when undisclosed. Under the current definition, CAF member are required in accordance with DAOD 5019-1 to disclose personal relationships only when they directly impacts evaluations, postings, and training. However, it’s essential to recognize that undisclosed relationships can foster unseen dynamics that may affect unit cohesion, discipline and morale. For example, consider a scenario in which a superior officer engages in a romantic relationship with a subordinate but chooses not to disclose it. This could not only result in fraught professional dynamics for both members, but can also breed distrust among peers and superiors. For instance, the lack of transparency may lead to suspicions of favoritism or unfair treatment within the unit, ultimately undermining morale and operational effectiveness. Additionally, the reluctance to disclose personal relationships can lead to unintended consequences. A member may fear social stigma or ostracization based on the nature of the relationship that they disclose. For example, individuals in same-sex relationships may hesitate to reveal their status due to concerns about prejudice or discrimination within the military community. The proposed change carries significant consequences and might not lead to the desired shift in behaviour that the recommendation aims to achieve. Requiring members to disclose their relationship before potential adverse complications arise does not eliminate the possibility of a power imbalance, especially when a higher-ranking individual has authority over another member, or when other factors such as gender, race, and class contribute to power imbalances. While these definition changes are crucial, they will require proper communication by leadership and socialization across the ranks. Meanwhile, many changes to policies, as well as training and education materials, have already been made, which do not reflect these updates. Overcoming the Leadership Crisis, Through Better Recruitment, Training and Promotion Systems In terms of leadership, while members note improvements in the way sexual harassment and assault are handled, major systemic change is being undertaken and tangible results will realistically only be felt over the span of several years. For example, the CAF has improved its screening tools for recruitment in areas such as cognitive capacity, judgment, and character, which is in-line with DND’s new approaches of focusing on character more than merit and technique. Another striking example is the implementation of psychometric tests and a 360-degree assessment for candidates being considered for promotion to General and Flag Officer ranks, or the inclusion of external advisors in the promotion process, as recommended by the IECR. In the CDS and CAF CWO end-of-year message to the Canadian Armed Forces, General Eyre addressed the commitment of the CAF toward cultural evolution. However, among Regular Force members, the most frequent reasons for intending to leave the CAF were the direction in which senior leadership is steering the CAF (25%), while 33% reported that the culture is one of ‘negative masculinity’. While there is an overall awareness among CAF members regarding training and policy changes aimed at combating sexual harassment and assault, the Statistic Canada survey outcomes suggest that these efforts have not yet translated into the desired results. Reforms to the personnel management process have not been far-reaching enough and, while a character-driven merit assessments might be an improvement, they only impact a small number of CAF members. Academic expertise as a form of external oversight to enhance accountability within the forces External civilian involvement in CAF processes is another pathway to monitor progress on culture change. To this end, academic researchers provide much needed expertise that complement research efforts and policy development that are conducted within the DND/CAF system. However, as it stands, academics must submit themselves to a DND ethics review processes, in addition to the ones they face in their own institution, something Arbour argued should change. To this end, recommendation 46 of the IECR led to a review of the Social Science Research Review Board (SSRRB) to focus solely on approving technical portions of the proposal, while the ethics review piece could be waived if a researcher’s organization was already approved. The challenge with the distinction between technical and ethical review however is not clear, something the external monitor should flag. The issue is that one cannot clearly distinguish between technical (falls under CAF/DND) and ethical (academic institution purview). In the end, DND/CAF can still exercise a lot of discretion in terms of the academic research that is or is not allowed to proceed. Academics being denied access to DND/CAF participants would have no appeals process, in addition to suffering important delays or a reorientation of their research, which is problematic. Another key challenge identified in the IECR was the requirement for external researchers to seek Level One (L1) endorsement for their research, which means an organization that either reports to the Deputy Minister of National Defence (DM) or the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Essentially, this mounts to not only approval but some form of supervision from a very high-level DND/CAF sponsor for their research. From a capacity standpoint too, it may be best to have a DND/CAF sponsor only if applicable and not a mandatory step within the SSRRB process. Ideally, the SSRRB group could simply match the researcher with an appropriate DND/CAF subject matter expert, whether to provide insight, guidance or potential networks for the researcher. Additionally, part of the IECR recommendation 45 included capturing an online database from the Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC) to ensure that academics and external experts have access to research conducted within DND/CAF on “sexual misconduct, diversity, inclusion and women in the military”. Although the online database is live, several links are not open access, which is delaying signifant improvements on what remains a crucial recommendation of the Arbour Report. While steps toward bridging the gap of civilian oversight of the military is underway, research effort and policy development need to be clear and simple in order to facilitate the research process within DND/CAF. Once more, clear definitions and procedures are needed in order to execute a streamlined process of conducting research. When it comes to recommendation #45, the database should have open access to all listed material and potentially look at expanding the resources to not only topics aforementioned but research on leadership, training, promotions and more. The scope of research should be comprehensive, not limited to only certain subjects. While the undertaking to digitize these files may take time, it is a necessary effort to improve monitoring and accountability around culture change. What’s Next? This second report shows improvement in terms of concrete actions taken in response to the Arbour Report, but the leadership churn at the ministerial level and DND/CAF represents a complicating factor to an already piecemeal approach to culture change. Moreover, all new initiatives require important resources, notably personnel and funds. This strain will worsen with continued underfunding of the CAF, recent budget reduction to the organizations’ travel budgets and spending on professional services starting in 2023-24, and a phased in 3% reduction of eligible spending by departments and agencies starting in 2024-25. Even in a constrained resource environment, there is a need to have a clear strategic plan to avoid having these policies fall into a “graveyard” to quote Arbour. As highlighted in the second external review, Therrien argues that “the organization lacked a multi-year plan to delineate the prioritization and sequencing of activities in the response to the recommendations”. To enforce culture change, the focus needs to shift toward addressing behaviour and conduct as a guiding principle for the institution, rather than focus solely on sexual harassment and assault as a symptom of a bad culture. For this to happen, a comprehensive approach and clearly articulated vision is needed, rather than viewing the recommendations as a long checklist of individual items. ## (Re)thinking Canada’s role in Peacekeeping URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/rethinking-canadas-role-in-peacekeeping/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Dans un monde en changement où le multilatéralisme est profondément mis à l’épreuve, le maintien de la paix demeure un outil essentiel de la gestion multilatérale des questions de paix et de sécurité internationale. Mais l’outil fait face, depuis plusieurs années, à des défis majeurs dont, notamment, l’appui inconstant des membres du Conseil de sécurité, les moyens limités mis à disposition, les difficultés liées à la protection des civils et l’imbrication des conflits internes avec des dynamiques de terrorisme transnational.   Report: (Re)Thinking Canada’s Role in Peacekeeping Authors: Chloé Berland, Junru Bian and Corinne Dory This event will be held in French; however, a bilingual real-time interpretation throughout the event will be available. The event will be held on Friday, January 22, 2021. To participate in the conference, click on the following link to register :  https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_tZKuJygQTFWdsu1W1milTQ In a changing world where multilateralism is deeply tested, peacekeeping remains an essential tool for the multilateral management of international peace and security issues. However, for several years now, this tool has been facing major challenges, including, in particular, the inconsistent support of Security Council members, the limited means made available, the difficulties related to the protection of civilians and the intertwining of internal conflicts with the dynamics of transnational terrorism. In this context, various organizations have nevertheless seized the tool. In Africa, where the UN has long been the main peacekeeping actor, the ambitions and achievements of regional (African Union) and sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS, G-5 Sahel, ECCAS) have enabled several of these actors to carve out an important place for themselves in the management of peace and security issues at the continental level. In Europe, NATO's involvement in peacekeeping, which was relatively unproblematic in the 1990s and 2000s, is now complicated by the deep tensions between alliance members and Russia. Present in both of these geographic areas, Canada is a country closely associated with the birth of peacekeeping; its current government is also a strong supporter of multilateralism. Yet Ottawa has been criticized for its absence from certain geographic areas, for its "limited" contributions and for the choices it has made in its re-engagement. How does Canada position itself in the peacekeeping arena? To what extent is participation in peace operations a priority for the Canadian government? Why should it be or not? If it is, where should Canada be involved and how? To answer these questions and to assess the extent to which and how Canada can distinguish itself in the field of peacekeeping, stakeholders will be invited to discuss the evolving strategic policies of international, regional and sub-regional organizations active in the field, their needs, and ways to align Canadian contributions with their expectations. Program ## 2024 Colloquium – The Strategic Implications of the American Presidential Election URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-strategic-implications-of-the-american-presidential-election/ Modified: 2024-05-24 *The conference will be held in English and French, with live interpretation available via headsets provided during the event. With the upcoming U.S. elections and the possible implications of a change in leadership, a reflection on Canada's strategic stakes is in order. The colloquium seeks to analyze the strategic implications of the upcoming U.S. presidential elections on the landscape of international relations, with a focus on Canada's position and strategies. At a time of significant political change in the U.S., we will explore how the election results could reshape global alliances, foreign policies, and international security frameworks by exploring different possible scenarios. Panels will address the challenges of institutional distrust, the rise of misinformation and the repercussions of a potential American withdrawal from international structures, with the aim of analyzing the consequences for the international community and the role of countries like Canada in this new paradigm. Finally, in a context where the evolution of U.S. policy could lead to a significant shift in global leadership, the last panel will explore the actions to be considered to counter the absence of the U.S., highlighting the need for international cooperation and diplomacy to ensure global stability and security. Download the Program (PDF 6.7mb) Conference Agenda: 9:00 - 9:15: Opening remarks Stéfanie von Hlatky, Associate Dean for Research and Full Professor, Queen's University 9:15 - 10:15: Keynote speaker: Larisa Galadza, Former Canadian Ambassador to Ukraine Moderator: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Co-Director and Full Professor, Bishop's University 10:15 - 10:30: Health Break 10:30 - 12:00: Round Table - The Changing Political and Strategic Environment As the next U.S. election approaches, this round table brings together the directors of various Canadian research networks to engage in an in-depth reflection on the strategic issues that Canada must prepare for. In this context, it is crucial that Canada anticipates these changes to preserve its interests and principles. Moderator: Daniel Jean, Member of the Strategic Council Speakers: Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Director of the Peace Operations Research Network (POR) and Full Professor, Université de Montréal Stephen M. Saideman, Director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN) and Full Professor, Carleton University Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Chief Operating Officer Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) Guy Thibault, Chairman of the Board, Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute 12:00 - 13:00: Lunch 13:00 - 14:30: Panel 1 - Towards democratic resilience: The post-truth era The contemporary political landscape is marked by growing public distrust in the legitimacy of knowledge and public institutions, shaped by hybrid media, disinformation and contestation. In this context, the panel aims to highlight the challenges faced by countries like Canada, and to engage in a reflection in the search for innovative solutions to address these challenges and build resilience in the face of these political and social dynamics. Moderator: Artur Wilczynski, Member of the Strategic Council Speakers: Alexandre Sirois, Journalist, La Presse Jean-Christophe Boucher, Associate Professor, University of Calgary David Morin, Professor, Université de Sherbrooke Michelle Tessier, Former Deputy Director of Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service Marc Doucet, Professor, St. Mary's University 14:30 - 14:45: Health break 14:45 - 16:15: Panel 2 - The Weakening of International Institutions With the upcoming US presidential elections, we can anticipate a potential shift in the international order, more specifically in relation to the United States' disengagement from international institutions.This panel aims to explore the implications of this paradigm shift for the international community as a whole, as well as how Canada can contribute. Moderator: Alexander Lanoszka, Associate Professor, University of Waterloo Speakers: Arthur Boutellis, Professor, Columbia University Heidi Hardt, Associate Professor, University of California, Irvine Natascha Hryckow, Former Coordinator of the UN Group of Experts on Somalia 16:15 - 16:30: Closing remarks and Thanks Justin Massie, Co-Director and Full Professor, UQAM 17:00 - 18:30: Networking cocktail at the Novotel Hotel ## Annual Colloquium | Can Canada Enhance Its Autonomy in Defence? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/annual-colloquium-can-canada-enhance-its-autonomy-in-defence/ Modified: 2025-12-03 The liberal world order is gradually fading, giving way to a more conflictual international environment in which power politics, and technological competition are reshaping strategic balances. China, the United States, and Russia are now pursuing more assertive, often revisionist, foreign policies, while the race for armaments, artificial intelligence supremacy, and access to critical minerals is intensifying great-power rivalries. In this uncertain and dangerous context, Canada’s sovereignty and security are directly being put to the test. The country is compelled to rethink the foundations of its defence policy to better adapt to these rapid transformations. Amid so much uncertainty, a central question arises: Does Canada have the means to strengthen its defence autonomy? Four expert panels will address this question from various angles, examining the conditions, constraints, and opportunities for greater Canadian strategic autonomy. The first panel will focus on industrial cooperation and strategic diversification, exploring how Canada can enhance its defence autonomy while maintaining close ties with its allies and diversifying its international partnerships. The second panel will examine the dilemma posed by Canada’s integration into the North American missile defence system, questioning how to reconcile participation in continental security with the preservation of national sovereignty. The third panel will address Canada’s digital autonomy in the face of cyber threats and dependence on foreign tech giants, identifying the conditions required for the emergence of autonomous digital capabilities. Finally, the last panel will consider what a distinctly Canadian approach to deterrence might look like, exploring how Canada can rethink its strategic posture amid rising global tensions. This event is organized in collaboration with the CDA Institute and supported by the MINDS program. Program 8:30 | Opening remarks Jonathan Paquin, Director of the Network for strategic analysis 8:40 – 10:15 | Panel 1: Industrial Cooperation and Strategic Diversification. Defense autonomy relies on a coherent industrial, technological, and diplomatic ecosystem. However, Canada remains heavily dependent on its allies, particularly the United States, for the supply, research, and production of military equipment. In a context of increased rivalry among major powers, this dependence presents significant strategic challenges. How can Canada strengthen its strategic autonomy, deepen industrial cooperation with certain allies, and diversify its strategic partnerships? This panel will examine the political, institutional, and economic levers available to Canada to consolidate its defense base and increase its strategic flexibility. Chair: Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Director of the CDA Institute ; Yan Cimon, Full Professor, Université Laval ; Philippe Lagassé, Associate Professor, Carleton University ; Justin Massie, Co-director of the Network for strategic analysis, Full professor, UQAM ; Jacob Tuckey, master's degree student, University of Waterloo. 10:15 – 10:30 | Health Break 10:30 – 12:00 | Panel 2: Missile Defence: Reconciling Canadian Autonomy and North American Integration Canada's possible integration into the North American missile defense system raises a strategic dilemma: how can we participate fully in continental security without relying entirely on the United States for the protection of our territory? President Trump's “golden dome” project crystallizes the tensions between dependence and autonomy. This panel will discuss Canada's room for maneuver in this sensitive area and the conditions necessary to ensure that increased participation does not result in a loss of decision-making sovereignty. Chair: Steve Saideman Full Professor, Carleton University ; Lieutenant-general (ret.) Yvan Blondin ; Andrea Charron, Professor, University of Manitoba ; Paul Meyer, Associate Professor, Simon Fraser University ; Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Director of the CDA Institute. 12:00 – 13:00 | Lunch 13:00 – 14:30 | Panel 3: Enhancing Canada's Digital Autonomy? In the face of cyber threats, Artificial Intelligence, and dependence on American tech giants, digital autonomy is becoming an essential dimension of our national security. Does Canada have the means to develop sovereign capabilities in cybersecurity, data management, and critical digital infrastructure? This panel will explore the place of digital technology in Canada's defense strategy and the conditions required for true technological autonomy in an environment dominated by the United States and China. Chair: Sarah Sharma, Co-director of the Strategic Analysis Network and Associate Professor, University of Ottawa ; Jean-Christophe Boucher, Associate Professor, University of Calgary ; Stéphanie Carvin, Associate Professor, Carleton University ; Leah West, Associate Professor, Carleton University. 14:30 – 14:45 | Health break. 14:45 – 16:15 | Panel 4: Conceptualizing Deterrence in Canada In an international context marked by renewed rivalries between major powers, threats made by Donald Trump, and the modernization of nuclear arsenals, the concept of deterrence has regained significant importance. As a non-nuclear power and NATO ally, Canada must rethink its stance in the face of hybrid, cyber, and conventional threats. What does “deterrence” mean for a country whose strategy is based on the credibility of alliances rather than the possession of strategic weapons? This panel will examine the relevance and possible contours of a “Canadian-style” deterrence, between collective engagement and the assertion of increased strategic autonomy. Chair: Daniel Jean, Advisory Board of the Strategic Analysis Network, Former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada ; Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor, Mount Allison University ; Emile Lambert-Deslandes, PhD Candidate, Queen’s University ; Eric Ouellet, Full Professor, Canadian Forces College ; Nancy Teeple, Strategic Analysis, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis (CORA). 16:15 – 16:30 – Closing remarks Justin Massie, Co-director of the Network for strategic analysis, Full professor, UQAM   Access the full program: EN - NSA Annual Colloquium 2025 ## Call for Applications: Climate Security Association of Canada Research Fellowship URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/call-for-applications-climate-security-association-of-canada-research-fellowship/ Modified: 2023-10-24 > The Climate Security Association of Canada/l’Association canadienne sur la sécurité climatique (CSAC-ACSC) is pleased to announce the... The Climate Security Association of Canada/l’Association canadienne sur la sécurité climatique (CSAC-ACSC) is pleased to announce the inaugural call for applications for its Research Fellowship program. CSAC-ACSC (https://www.csac-acsc.org) is a professional association for scholars and practitioners of climate change and security that offers a forum to support the development of research, government policy, knowledge mobilization, and public outreach in this field. Understanding the links between climate change and security is an urgent global priority for policymakers, scholars, civil society, and security and defence practitioners. Complex relationships exist between the unfolding crisis of human-caused environmental changes and phenomena such as armed conflict, violent extremism, migration, displacement, poverty, resource scarcity, political instability, economic prosperity, energy security, and community resilience. Effectively addressing these issues requires interdisciplinary and multi-method theorization, analysis, and policy development. The security and defence policy challenges associated with climate change encompass changes in the international and domestic threat environments, political and operational pressures to decarbonize defence and national security activities, and dynamic tensions between and among competing national security priorities, domestic electoral considerations, and engagement with a diverse range of social movements. As climate-related hazards increase over the coming years, it will be increasingly important to identify and support emerging leaders in the field of climate change and security whose work helps address these concerns. CSAC-ACSC’s goal is to foster a professional network of scholars, analysts, and professional practitioners committed to understanding and responding to the inter-related social, political, economic, and ecological security challenges of our time associated with human-caused climate change. The goal of the CSAC-ACSC Research Fellowship is to provide financial support and promote professional development for graduate students and early career researchers working in the field of climate change and security, broadly defined, in or related to Canada. Each Fellowship consists of three components: A $3000 stipend. A research paper that the Fellow’s must write by the end of the Fellowship and which will be published with one of our supporting MINDS research networks. Training and professional development opportunities. These include mentorship from an experienced or senior scholar active in the field of climate and security, networking opportunities with expert practitioners, and full travel expenses to participate in CSACACSC’s Pacific Climate Security Conference and Career Development Workshop on February 1-2, 2024 in Victoria, British Columbia. Fellows are expected to: Participate in the professional and scholarly activities organized by CSAC-ACSC during 2024. Attend the Pacific Climate Security Conference and Career Development Workshop on February 1-2, 2024. Complete a first full draft of their research paper by the end of September 2024. Encouraged to support the work of fostering a professional community related to climate change and security in Canada. The CSAC-ACSC Research Fellowship is organized and administered by the Climate Security Association of Canada/L’Association canadienne de la sécurité climatique. It is supported and funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and three Department of National Defence Mobilizing Insights into Defence and Security (MINDS) research networks: the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network/Réseau sur la defense et la sécurité nord-américaines et arctiques (NAADSN/RDSNAA), Réseau d’analyse stratégique/Strategic Analysis Network (RAS/NSA), and the Canadian Defence and Security Network/Réseau canadien de défence et de sécurité (CDSN/RCDS).   APPLICATION INSTRUCTIONS Eligibility Requirements: The CSAC-ACSC Research Fellowship is open to: All graduate (Master’s or PhD) students enrolled at a university in Canada whose research is related to the area of climate change and security. Early career professionals working in the field of climate change and security in or related to Canada who completed their post-secondary education not more than seven years before the application date. Applicants must demonstrate a research interest and/or professional, service, or volunteer experience related to climate change and security. Fellows must be able to communicate verbally in English, but may produce written work in either English or French. Please note that full-time employees of the Government of Canada and Class-B and C Reservists in the Canadian Armed Forces are ineligible for this funding. Class-A reservists are eligible for this funding. Application Requirements: Applicants must provide the following materials: Completed application information below. Applicant CV. A cover letter outlining the applicant’s suitability for the Fellowship. A 2-page proposal for the research project/paper related to climate change and security to be supported by the Fellowship (should outline the area of inquiry, research question(s), methodology, general timeline, and progress to date). All materials must be received by email at fellowship-bourse@csac-acsc.org by 5 pm PT on December 1, 2023. Please direct questions about the CSAC-ACSC Research Fellowship to  fellowship-bourse@csac-acsc.org The CSAC-ACSC Research Fellowship is organized and administered by: The CSAC-ACSC Research Fellowship is supported by: ## Call for applications: France-Canada Future Leaders Program on defense and diplomacy issues URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/call-for-applications-france-canada-future-leaders-program-on-defense-and-diplomacy-issues/ Modified: 2025-01-09 > This program aims to deepen Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges and beyond, given the threats and challenges currently encountered by... Description This program aims to deepen Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges and beyond, given the threats and challenges currently encountered by France, Canada and other members of the EuroAtlantic community. The latter are raised in terms of deterrence (nuclear, conventional, subthreshold) following Russia's revisionist behavior and in view of the challenges posed by China. In particular, the program targets three aspects of deterrence: 1) the strategies needed to establish between allies, depending on the region (Europe, the Arctic, the China Sea, etc.); 2) the measures (including diplomatic ones) to be taken to ensure the solidity of these strategies, particularly as regards public opinion; 3) the emerging technologies to be prioritized. Related themes will also be addressed in the course of the program, with several links to the issues identified: Francophonie, the Women's Agenda for Peace and Security, etc. In concrete terms, following on from the 2024 edition, this program aims to continue building a network of emerging leaders (mainly Franco-Canadian, but also with people from the EuroAtlantic community) making regular contacts. The group (10 people at least) will take part in two stays of around 4/5 days each, one in France (in Paris and at the naval base in Brest) and the other in Canada (Ottawa, Montreal and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu). During these visits, a number of private events will be organized (workshops in restricted groups with certain political, military, diplomatic, academic or industrial leaders) and events open to the public (colloquia, conferences; a hybrid format allowing remote monitoring and re-broadcasting on You Tube preferred). Between the two visits (scheduled for March 2025 and May 2025), a workshop between the participants and one or two guests will be held online, focusing on the program’s topics. Participants’ contribution Participants will be invited to jointly draft 5 strategic notes during the project (1, Deterrence strategies in Europe and the Arctic facing Russia; 2, Managing and deterring sub-threshold aggression; 3, What kind of leadership as a middle power can Canada play in these deterrence measures? 4, How to raise public awareness on defense issues; 5, What are the main emerging and disruptive technologies essential for effective deterrence, and how can we foster their development through public-private partnerships?). These 5 notes will form the framework of a collective publication linked to the program's issues. Speakers taking part in the public events will also be invited to submit a policy brief related to their presentation, which may be integrated into the publication. The strategy and policy briefs - and potentially the collective publication - will be published and made available in English and French. Applications for this program are now open until January 19, 2025. To apply, please complete the application form below, attach a CV and send it to the following addresses: info@forumdefense-strategie.org, bbpfrancecanada@gmail.com. Application Form      Preliminary Program The eligibility criteria are as follows The program aims to build a network of emerging leaders: it is therefore exclusively aimed at applicants aged under 40 on 1st of February 2025. The program is open to French and Canadian nationals (or permanent residents in Canada), but also to those from the transatlantic/European community ( holding the nationality of one of its member states). As the program activities take place in French and/or English, a good mastery of at least one of the two languages (C1, C2) and a good passive understanding (oral and written comprehension) of the other is required. Further details  No specific professional background or academic field is targeted: the selection process will seek to ensure a diversity of profiles within the intake. Around ten auditors will be selected. The organising associations will cover the costs of the various network activities (transport, accommodation) for all participants. Investment in the program (participation in the two stays and workshops, interaction with other members, writing of publications) is expected on penalty of non-award of the commitment, attendance and publication prize, or even exclusion from the program. At the end of the program (including the publications mentioned: strategic notes and collective publication), a commitment, attendance and publication prize of 150 euros will be paid to participants (subject to compliance with the previous point). The inaugural online meeting of network members will take place in February 2025. Participation fees for selected candidates Once selected and informed, candidates have 15 days to confirm or withdraw their applications. 900 euros, this amount including the sum paid out (150 euros) at the end of the program to participants in the form of a commitment, attendance and publication prize ; Once the selected candidates have been informed, they will have 15 days to proceed with the payment of their participation fees by bank transfer. Failure to pay after this deadline may result in exclusion. Participation fees are non-refundable. For further information, please contact info@forum-defense-strategie.org, bbp.francecanada@gmail.com. ## Call for Applications: Programme de personnalités d’avenir France-Canada sur les enjeux de Défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/call-for-applications-programme-de-personnalites-davenir-france-canada-sur-les-enjeux-de-defense/ Modified: 2023-12-14 > This program is designed to deepen Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges, given the challenges that both allies are currently facing... This program is designed to deepen Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges, given the challenges that both allies are currently facing, mainly in Europe and the Arctic, as a result of Russia's revisionist behavior.   For more information on how to apply (en français), visit the FORUM DE DEFENSE ET DE STRATEGIE ## Call For Communications – Student Competition for 2023 Colloquium URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/call-for-communications-student-competition-for-2023-colloquium/ Modified: 2023-10-03 > You are invited to submit a 200-word abstract (including a title) on one of the following themes: (1) inter-state competition/collaboration... The RAS/NSA is pleased to announce its student competition for its 2023 Colloquium, to be held on December 12 and 13, through this Call for Communications. This call is open to all Emerging Scholars of the Network, as well as doctoral or master’s students who are not yet members* but whose work is related to the themes listed below. You are invited to submit a 200-word abstract (including a title) on one of the following themes: (1) inter-state competition/collaboration over natural resources, (2) the role of non-aligned states in great power competition, and (3) the emergence of new technological and governance frontiers. Submissions will be reviewed by the Network’s team and three finalists will be selected. These finalists will be invited to present at the annual colloquium in Ottawa, as part of the panels on the themes mentioned. The presentations will be evaluated by the Network's executive team, and will be eligible for the following prizes: 1st place: 500$ 2nd place: 300$ 3rd place: 200$ Finalists will then be invited to transform their paper into a paper to be published by the RAS/NSA. Proposals will be received and reviewed by the RAS team on an ongoing basis until October 31, 2023. If you have any questions, please contact Émile Lambert-Deslandes (21eld6@queensu.ca). Please submit your proposal to:info@ras-nsa.ca. * If you are not yet an Emerging Scholar within the RAS/NSA but wish to submit a proposal, please attach a short statement of interest and your CV in addition to your abstract. You do not need to be an Emerging Scholar to apply, but your membership of the Network is conditional on your proficiency in French. ## Call for Papers – Quebec Undergraduate Security Conference URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/call-for-papers-quebec-undergraduate-security-conference/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Submit your 300-400 word abstract to: isge.undergraduate@gmail.com before November 16, 2020 on one of the following four topics for the chance to win $200 and to present at a multi-university conference to distinguished international security scholars on February 6, 2021. Submit your 300-400 word abstract to: isge.undergraduate@gmail.com before November 16, 2020 on one of the following four topics for the chance to win $200 and to present at a multi-university conference to distinguished international security scholars on February 6, 2021. 1. Institutions and the Accommodation of Rising Powers; 2. Geopolitical Decline and International Institutions; 3. The New Security Agenda of the United Nations; 4. Challenges to Regional Institutional Architecture. While it is our preference to hold the conference in person, at present, the circumstances created by the COVID-19 pandemic make this difficult. We therefore will tentatively plan to hold the conference online. If circumstances become more permissive, we would seek to hold the conference at a private location in Montreal. With appropriate public health measures in place. A final determination will be made on 1 January 2021, and we would advise to you to wait until this date to make any travel arrangements. ## Call for papers – The State and National Defence in a Disorderly World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/call-for-papers-the-state-and-national-defence-in-a-disorderly-world/ Modified: 2022-07-28 The journal Études Canadiennes/Canadian Studies is pleased to announce a special issue on “The State and national defence in a disorderly world: a comparison between France and Canada” directed by Guest Editor Jean-Christophe Boucher (University of Calgary), in association with Editor-in-Chief Laurence Cros (Université de Paris). Western states now face a new security environment, characterized by change and uncertainty. First, from a systemic point of view, we are witnessing an upsurge of great power competition, with a withdrawal of the United States from the international stage and a willingness by China, and, to a lesser extent, Russia, to establish themselves as rivals. In addition, new actors, such as terrorist groups or regional powers, confront US power and threaten international security in specific regions. Secondly, the defence organizations that characterized international cooperation in security matters in the last decades, such as NATO or European defence, are going through crises in terms of identity and legitimacy. Lastly, the security environment has become more complex, due to the emergence of new threats, such as cyber security, hybrid war, information warfare, climate change, migrations, the automation and development of artificial intelligence, or pandemics. As a whole, these new threats create a disorderly security environment, making the management of defence by Western countries such as Canada and France more complex. In this special issue, bringing together scholars from both sides of the Atlantic, we will examine the way Canada, but also France (in comparative perspective) develop its defence and security policies in order to take into account the new factors and threats of a changing security environment. This issue will focus on four major themes: The new challenges of international security: cyber security, information warfare, hybrid war, automation and artificial intelligence, migrations, climate change, pandemics; How (or whether) national identity structures and influences Canadian defence policy and how security issues are addressed; The management of national defence: military acquisitions, defence budgets, recruitments, inclusion and diversity within the armed forces; Military interventions and foreign operations. Proposals are to be sent as a single document (Word format), to the guest editor Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher (jc.boucher@ucalgary.ca), with copy to the journal’s editor-in-chief, Dr. Laurence Cros (laurence.cros@u-paris.fr) and should contain: - a working title and an abstract (250 to 300 words) - a brief biography (no more than 100 words) The deadline for submission is December 1, 2020. Notification of decisions will follow shortly afterwards. Full articles (about 8,000 words) will need to be submitted by July 1, 2021. After a double peer-review process, selected articles will be published in printed form in issue 91 (December 2021) of Études Canadiennes/Canadian Studies, followed by an electronic publication (open access) one year later on http://journals.openedition.org/eccs/ In addition, if possible, the contributors will be invited to present their work in Paris in Fall 2021. ## Call for Papers-“(Re)thinking Canada’s role in Peacekeeping” URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/call-for-papers-rethinking-canadas-role-in-peacekeeping/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Call for papers for graduate students for NSA's first annual conference-Axis 2.Present your research at this international conference entitled "(Re)thinking Canada's role in Peacekeeping". Call for papers for graduate students for NSA's first annual conference-Axis 2. Present your research at this international conference entitled "(Re)thinking Canada's role in Peacekeeping". The deadline for submitting an abstract is December 22, 2020 and the conference will be held on January 22, 2021.   See the complete information for this call for papers ## Canada’s Fight for Purpose: The Challenges of Talking and Walking our way to Peace URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/canadas-fight-for-purpose-the-challenges-of-talking-and-walking-our-way-to-peace/ Modified: 2024-01-25 > This conference proposed to explore how Canada can position itself by optimally engaging both with International Organizations and... Canada's Fight for Purpose: The Challenges of Talking and Walking our way to Peace Canada has been at the forefront of the creation and functioning of International organizations as platforms and forums of discussions amongst states, and to hone tools of intervention, to mitigate conflicts, protect populations and enhance national security. Yet strategic competition between major power complicates interventions and jeopardizes both the tools and their impact on conflicts around the world.  This conference proposed to explore how Canada can position itself by optimally engaging both with International Organizations and non-EU/non-NATO countries. It will explore how the information environment factors in Canadian's understanding of its role as members and partners of international organizations/institutions and address the risks and opportunities of burden sharing while maintaining the country's operational readiness.  The conference is designed to inform debate and advance knowledge in the field through in-depth analysis on defense policy priorities. The conference will create a well-rounded environment for discussion by tapping into research and expertise from academia, government, the armed forces, the private sector, and NGOs. Download the Full Program (PDF 974kb)   *This event is free to attend and open to all, no registration necessary.   Programme Agenda 09:15 - 09:20 Land Acknowledgement: Camilla Rizzi (Bishop’s University) and Laurie Van Herk (Bishops’ University) 09:20 - 09:30 Introduction:  Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Bishop’s University, Co-Director Strategic Analysis Network 09:30 - 10:30 Panel 1: Local Perception of Peace - In Canada and Abroad   Chair:  Sasha Kardos-Machado (Bishop’s University) and Irma Susset  (Bishop’s University) Yvan Yenda Ilunga, Salve Regina University Maj (Ret) Nicolas Boucher, Consultant, Calian, former U2 MINUSMA Fifi Edu-Afful, Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)Visiting Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence American University School of International Service and University of Maryland Depart of Gov’t & Politics Simon Delorme-Chalifoux, Consultant (Deloitte) /Lecturer (Université Laval), former  Deputy Chief to ICRC in Syria 10:30 - 10:45 : Break 10:45 - 12:00 Panel 2: Canada’s Role in Disasters’ Prevention and Humanitarian Responses Chair: Regan Simpson (Bishop’s University) and Christina Lépine (Bishop’s University) Junru Bian, PhD Candidate , University of Ottawa Kai Schafer, Canadian Kimberley Process Office Marie-Pier Allard-Caron, PhD Candidate, Queen’s University Alexandra Vargas, Global Affairs Canada 12:00 - 13:30 : Lunch 13:30 - 15:15: Panel 3 :  Talking the Walk and Walking the Talk: Diplomacy Fireside chat : Chair: Irmah Alao (Bishop’s University) And Angus Whyte (Bishop’s University) Vincent Pouliot, McGill University Ambassador Sébastien Carrière, Chief of Protocol of Canada 15:15 - 15:30 : Break 15:30 - 17:00 Panel 4 : Canada’s Readiness for  (Climate) Change Chair:  Mikael-Benedict Worku (Bishop’s University) and Gabrielle Liu (Bishop’s University) Pauline Baudu, PhD Candidate, Université du Québec à Montréal,  Research Fellow, Centre FrancoPaix de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand, non-resident Research Fellow Center for Climate and Security,  Fellow at at CDA Institute  Nicolas Hubert, Post-doctoral researcher, Visiting researcher, Centre FrancoPaix Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey, CAF-CDSN Fellow 17:00 - 17:15: Conclusion - Dr Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé 18:00 - 19:30 Keynote Speaker: The Role of Youth Dr. Graeme Simpson, Columbia University/Interpeace - Interpeace’s Senior Peacebuilding Advisor and Principal Representative Graeme Simpson is the Principal Representative of Interpeace (NY) and Senior Peacebuilding Adviser at Interpeace, Independent Lead Author on the UN Security Council-mandated “Progress Study” on Youth, Peace and Security, Adjunct Lecturer in Law at Columbia University School of Law in New York City, Professor at the African Leadership Center at Kings College in London,  former Civilian Adviser to the Minister of Safety and Security in the first Mandela cabinet, and in that capacity was one of the primary authors of the South African National Crime Prevention Strategy. ## Canada’s Strategic Autonomy in the 21st Century URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/canadas-strategic-autonomy-in-the-21-st-century/ Modified: 2026-09-09 > The launch conference for the Strategic Analysis Network 3.0 will be held in a hybrid format on September 14, 2026, at UQAM. This event will bring together academic researchers and experts to discuss Canada’s strategic autonomy and examine models inspired by other countries. This event will be held in French and recorded for later viewing Canada’s Strategic Autonomy in the 21st Century 13:15 — Welcoming & registration Registration and coffee 13h45 — Opening remarks: Launch of the Strategic Analysis Network 3.0 Justin Massie, Professor, Department of Political Science, UQAM; Director, Strategic AnalysisNetwork 14:00 — Panel 1 — Canada’s Strategic Autonomy in the 21st Century: A Roadmap Presentation of the Study, available here Philippe Lagassé, Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University Justin Massie, Professor, Department of Political Science, UQAM Comments Siobhan Harty, Visiting Scholar, Max Bell School of Public Policy, McGill University LGen (ret.), Yvan Blondin, Former Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force Jeffrey Collins, Director, Palmer Institute for Canadian Leadership Moderator : Mathieu Carbasse, Journalist, Le Devoir 15:30 — Break 15:45 — Panel 2 : Strategic Autonomy Elsewhere: What Models for Canada? How have other states—large and small, allies and partners—defined and operationalized their strategic autonomy? What lessons, transposable or not, can Canada draw from them? Chantal Lavallée, Associate Professor and Director of CRITIC, Royal Military College Saint-Jean Frédéric Mérand, Professor, Department of Political Science, and Scientific Director of CÉRIUM, Université de Montréal Jean-François Bélanger, Assistant Professor, Institute for Military Operations, Royal Danish Defence College Nicolas-François Perron, Emerging Scholar, Strategic Analysis Network, UQAM Moderator : Emmanuelle Rousseau, Professor, Department of Political Science, UQAM 17:00 — Closing remarks   *Visual designed using artificial intelligence. ## CANADIAN DIPLOMACY IN A TURBULENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/canadian-diplomacy-in-a-turbulent-international-system/ Modified: 2025-02-05 Closed Seminar : 9h-12h Exchanges between young researchers and practitioners from the world of diplomacy and defence. Morning seminar venue : 3744 rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal - Local 6420 (6th floor) Seminar registration (free and mandatory) Click Here to Register for the Closed Seminar 9h-10h15 - Seminar 1 : Rethinking Youth and Multilateralism: State of the Field and Methodological Tools 10h15-10h45 : Coffee Break 10h45-12h - Seminar 2:  Strategic Competition Revisited: the State of Research and Methodological Reflections 12h: Lunch Break Colloquium : Canadian Diplomacy in a Turbulent International System - 13h-18h No Registration Required Location : HEC Montréal - Édifice Côte-Sainte-Catherine. 3000 Chem. de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, QC H3T 2A7 13h00: Opening Remarks Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Co-Director, Strategic Analysis Network and Professor, Department of Politics and International Studies, Bishop’s University 13h10 : Introduction 13h30-14h50 - Panel 1: The Imprint of Canadian Values in Global Diplomacy Moderator: Frédéric Mérand, Professeur et directeur du département de  science politique à l'Université de Montréal Henri-Paul Normandin, Fellow at Institut d'Études Internationales de Montréal Renée Larivière, Senior Director of Programmes at Interpeace Cat Evans, Director of European and African Affairs at Independent Diplomat 14h50-15h00: Coffee Break 15h00-16h20 - Panel 2 : Respect For International Law and Responsibility to Protect in the Face of Contemporary Conflicts Moderator: Nicolas Klingelschmitt, Chercheur émergent - Réseau d'Analyse Stratégique Jennifer Welsh, professeure en relations internationales à McGill, directrice de la Maxswell Bell school of public policy Marie-Joëlle Zahar, professeure en science politique, et directrice du Réseau de recherche sur les Opérations de Paix (ROP) - Université de Montréal Graeme Simpson, Principal Representative & Senior Peacebuilding Advisor, Interpeace USA; Adjunct Lecturer in Law, Columbia University School of Law 16h20-16h30: Coffee Break 16h30-17h50 - Panel 3 : Emerging Practices and New International Priorities: (Dis)information, the Importance of Youth, Competition, and Diplomatic Sabotage  Moderator: Andrew Abou Mourad, Cofondateur de United Nations Youth of Canada Lieutenant-Colonel Carl Chevalier, Commandant du Centre de formation pour le soutien de la paix (PSTC) Michael Eaton, Executive Director of the National Model United Nations Daniel Jean, professionnel en résidence à l’École d’affaires publiques et internationales de l’Université d’Ottawa, membre émérite de l’École de la fonction publique du Canada, membre associé de l’Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand à l’UQAM et membre du Conseil stratégique du Réseau d’Analyse Stratégique Natascha Hryckow, Associate Fellow within the Global Fellowship Initiative of the GCSP and Former Coordinator, United Nations Panel of Experts on Somalia Ali Altiok, Former Youth, Peace and Security Project Officer at Interpeace Event Organizers Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Professor, Bishop’s University   Nicolas Klingelschmitt, PhD candidate - Université du Québec à Montréal   Andrew Abou Mourad, Cofounder United Nations Youth of Canada (UNYC) ## Capacity Building at Day Zero – Virtual Workshop Panel 1 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/capacity-building-at-day-zero-virtual-workshop-panel-1/ Modified: 2022-07-28 VIEW VIDEO Panel 1 (September 25): Capacity Building at Day Zero Speakers : • Théodore McLauchlin, University of Montreal • Renanah Miles Joyce, MIT • Linnéa Gelot, Folke Bernadotte Academy Series of Virtual Workshops In the past decade, in a world with many different security challenges, the disastrous failures of direct interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and straitened budgets after the financial crisis of 2008, capacity-building became an increasingly important tool in international security. As states, international organizations and NGOs sought to bolster their partners’ abilities to deal with security problems in many different domains, including defence, counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism, and peace-building, capacity building was not only regarded as more sustainable over the long term than international intervention, it was also deemed useful to achieve better burden sharing. The COVID-19 pandemic puts the requirements for and the uses of capacity-building in question. Moving personnel around and working side-by-side with partners now poses new health risks; the economic calamity which has ensued from the pandemic raises searching questions over how states and organizations will change their policy tools. Have states reconsidered their engagement in what were often treated as low-priority missions? Will they, instead, turn all the more to capacity-building so that others can take on security burdens? How have capacity-building needs and mission operations changed with the new emphasis on health security? Are these reversible or likely permanent changes? Will the difficulties of international cooperation be felt in this domain? This series of virtual workshops will address these and related questions. We will explore the state of capacity-building before the pandemic; assess its impacts on capacity-building operations in defence, COIN/CT, and peacekeeping operations; and analyze the challenges posed for the Canadian Armed Forces. The panels will bring together academic experts and policy-making practitioners to learn from each other. Organizers Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## Counterinsurgency and Counter-terrorism – Virtual Workshop Panel 2 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/counterinsurgency-and-counter-terrorism-virtual-workshop-series-panel-2/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are two of the most high-profile areas for capacity-building, particularly in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. VIEW VIDEO Panel 2 (October 16): Counterinsurgency and Counter-terrorism Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are two of the most high-profile areas for capacity-building, particularly in the wake of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Debates about capacity-building in these contexts often focus on the relative ethics, costs and effectiveness of direct interventions and of training local partners, problems of local legitimacy, and the difficulties in supporting troubled and unstable governments. In the wake of COVID-19, are COIN and CT still priorities for outside sponsors facing economic disaster? How has the pandemic affected cooperation and local knowledge in capacity-building operations, and reshaped capacity-building strategies, such as in contact with partner armies, awareness of gender and ethnic disparities in COVID-19 impacts, and the priority to be placed on health care? How will these changes persist? Speakers : • Major-General Jennie Carignan, Commander of the NATO Mission in Iraq • Marc-André Boisvert, Independent researcher • Louis-Alexandre Berg, Georgia State University & United States Institute for Peace • Presidency : Bruno Charbonneau, Royal Military College Saint-Jean Capacity-Building in the Age of COVID-19 – Virtual Workshop Series In the past decade, in a world with many different security challenges, the disastrous failures of direct interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and straitened budgets after the financial crisis of 2008, capacity-building became an increasingly important tool in international security. As states, international organizations and NGOs sought to bolster their partners’ abilities to deal with security problems in many different domains, including defence, counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism, and peace-building, capacity building was not only regarded as more sustainable over the long term than international intervention, it was also deemed useful to achieve better burden sharing. The COVID-19 pandemic puts the requirements for and the uses of capacity-building in question. Moving personnel around and working side-by-side with partners now poses new health risks; the economic calamity which has ensued from the pandemic raises searching questions over how states and organizations will change their policy tools. Have states reconsidered their engagement in what were often treated as low-priority missions? Will they, instead, turn all the more to capacity-building so that others can take on security burdens? How have capacity-building needs and mission operations changed with the new emphasis on health security? Are these reversible or likely permanent changes? Will the difficulties of international cooperation be felt in this domain? This series of virtual workshops will address these and related questions. We will explore the state of capacity-building before the pandemic; assess its impacts on capacity-building operations in defence, COIN/CT, and peacekeeping operations; and analyze the challenges posed for the Canadian Armed Forces. The panels will bring together academic experts and policy-making practitioners to learn from each other.   Organizers Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER RECRUITMENT PROGRAM (DIORP) Info Session URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/defence-intelligence-officer-recruitment-program-diorp-info-session/ Modified: 2022-08-17 > Interested in a career with Canada's National Defence? Civilian Defence Intelligence Officers provide decision making information... Note: This event is in French Only and will not be recorded. Interested in a career with Canada's National Defence? Civilian Defence Intelligence Officers provide decision making information, assess information, and conduct challenging work to ensure Canada's security. This information session is aimed at graduate students that are interested in a career in Canada's National Defence. The DIORP manager and selected DIORP graduates will deliver a presentation followed by a question and answer period. The presentation will cover details of the program, the different directorates within CFINTCOM for employment of graduates, and a synopsis of being an analyst from the perspective of an alumni. CIVILIAN DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS Provides decision making information to MND, CDS, and Commanders; Assesses foreign political, military, scientific and technical information; Professional growth opportunities; and Challenging work with a variety of assignments DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER RECRUITMENT PROGRAM (DIORP) Recruits, develops and train talented individuals as defence intelligence officers from entry to working-level – three year program; Produces defence intelligence officers who are collaborative, adaptable, diverse, have a broad set of experiences, and who are able to deliver on departmental mandate with excellence; and Invests in the development of defence intelligence officers with a view to building a whole-of-government intelligence capability DIORP INTAKE PROCESS Advertised competition; Online Screening; Exam; Interview; Selection Board; and Appointment to the DIORP ## Democratic Allies’ Defence Cooperation to Counter Authoritarianism in a Shifting World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/defence-cooperation-against-authoritarianism/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Current inter-allied tensions come three years before the next U.S. presidential elections, which could very well bring a Trumpist... This is a bilingual event with simultaneous translation U.S. President Joe Biden has called for greater cooperation among democratic allies in the face of authoritarianism. Following his election, he was quick to reassure East Asian and NATO allies of his administration’s determination to strengthen U.S. engagement with them. However, it is doubtful that this was enough to overcome the trauma of the Trump years. President Biden’s decision to act unilaterally in the withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the surprising creation of a strategic partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom (AUKUS) behind the backs of other democratic allies, notably France, undermined his initial attempt to pick up the pieces. Current inter-allied tensions come three years before the next U.S. presidential elections, which could very well bring a Trumpist Republican, or Donald Trump himself, to power. In this context, tough questions must be asked: 1) Do democratic allies share sufficient strategic interests and trust to keep in check revisionist powers like China and Russia? 2) Do they have a sufficiently coherent defensive force to deter them? 3) In the event that America should, again, turn inward in 2025, would U.S. allies be sufficiently coordinated to present a common front to defend the established international order? The purpose of this virtual workshop, is to focus on the state of U.S. allies’ defence cooperation. As threats multiply and diversify, what are the political dynamics driving the relationship between democratic allies in 2021? Are allies strengthening their cooperation and, if so, is this translating into policy convergence? Are allies siding with America to balance against China and Russia’s ambitions? Where is defence cooperation between U.S. allies occurring and how far is it being taken? Is this cooperation mainly regional (e.g., within the EU or among Indo-Pacific allies) or is it truly global (e.g., encompassing Tokyo, Canberra, London and Berlin)? Is there evidence of the opposite dynamic, that is, toward policy divergence and strategic autonomy? If so, why, in what area(s) and to what extent? This virtual workshop will tackle these questions using a comparative analysis of how European, Asian and North American allies--Australia, South Korea, Japan, Canada, France, Germany and the UK—are addressing these specific defence issues. Program and biographies    ## FINDING OUR WAY BACK: Defining a Coherent International Strategy for Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/finding-our-way-back-defining-a-coherent-international-strategy-for-canada/ Modified: 2022-09-19 > Where is Canada going? What should be its place on the international scene? At the crossroads of global change, Canada faces new threats... Free Registration - Registration Now Open (note: this is a hybrid event with registration options to attend in-person or online. In-person space is limited, so register early to reserve your spot) Programme (PDF 1.2mb) Where is Canada going? What should be its place on the international scene? At the crossroads of global change, Canada faces new threats, but also many opportunities. As we question how Canada should defend itself and how best to ensure its security, join experts and practitioners to understand the current environment through in-depth discussions on Canada's international policy. With two consecutive failures to win a United Nations Security Council seat and declining military capabilities, Canada's place on the international stage is in question. While the changing role of the great powers and the weakening of international norms are debated, a significant decline in Canadian diplomatic activism is observable. At the same time, Canadian defense policy also sometimes suffers from a lack of clarity. Developing a proactive strategy to reposition Canada on the international scene could, however, change the situation. To become aware of the rapid evolution of the global security environment, this colloquium reviews the state of the international environment and its new threats. Its roundtables focus on Canada's strategic assets as well as its interests and priorities. The colloquium goal is to better identify how Canada’s international strategy could become more coherent and proactive, and to predict what path it should choose. As part of the development of this colloquium, the NSA held a series of consultations earlier this summer in Montreal, Ottawa, and Calgary with its researchers to propose some straightforward recommendations to the Department of National Defence. This report is the result of those consultations. Click the button to download the full report. NSA Report (PDF 160kb) Day 1 – Sept 22, 2022. Open to the public, National Art Centre 9:00 – 9:15 – Welcoming remarks Stéfanie von Hlatky (Associate Professor, Queen’s University) and Justin Massie (Full Professor, UQAM) 9:15 – 10:15 – Roundtable on Canadian Defence Moderators: Stéfanie von Hlatky (Associate Professor, Queen's University) and Justin Massie (Full Professor, UQAM) Speakers: Roland Paris (Full Professor, University of Ottawa) Kerry Buck (Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa) Jean-Christophe Boucher (Assistant Professor, University of Calgary) 10:15 – 10:30 - Break 10:30 – 12:00 – Panel 1: Developing a Multi-Domain Approach to New Areas of Confrontation Technological proliferation, emergence of new spaces, and multidimensional threats—what do these concepts mean and what do they imply? This panel will elucidate both questions by exploring the implications of these new threats for Canada, its people, and its position in the world. With the expansion of geostrategic space toward Asia and the emergence of cyberspace as a battlefield between nations, interstate confrontations now go beyond mere economic and military fields. The experts on this panel will provide insights and analysis to help everyone better understand this reality and what a multi-domain approach for Canada would really mean. Moderator: Émile Lambert-Deslandes (Doctoral student, Queen’s University) Speakers: Gaëlle Rivard Piché (Strategic Analyst, Defence Research and Development Canada) Gregory Smith (Major-General, CAF) Stéphanie Martel (Assistant Professor, Queen’s University) Justin Massie (Full Professor, UQAM) 12:00 – 13:00 - Lunch 13:00 – 14:30 – Panel 2: Leveraging International Cooperation & Canada's Strategic Assets Canada's international policy is part of a consciously multilateral approach. This panel will investigate the role Canada plays as a “middle power” within regional and international institutions and how it can succeed in asserting its strategic interests. To understand how Canada could maintain and increase its international status, the experts on this panel will conduct a critical examination of its capacities and commitments. In short, they will aim to identify the place that cooperation can play in Canada's foreign and defense policy. Moderator: Renée Filiatrault (Former foreign service officer)  Speakers: Theodore McLauchlin (Associate Professor, Université de Montréal) Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Full Professor, Bishop’s University) Kerry Buck (Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs) 14:30 – 14:50 – Break 14:50 – 15:10 – Student Panel: BEST PAPER COMPETITION Moderator: Johanna Masse (Postdoctoral Researcher, Queen’s University)  15:10 – 16:40 – Panel 3: Canada's Strategic Coherence Russia's invasion of Ukraine, gray zone conflicts, the weakening of US hegemony, and the rise of China—the world in 2022 is in turmoil. Caught between its allies, their diverging interests, and its rivals, Canada finds itself faced with the return of great powers competition. Faced with this situation, it must adapt. But how to succeed coherently? This panel will assess how Canada could design a coherent foreign policy in line with its values, but also its national interests. Defining these, its overall strategic priorities, and the budget necessary for their implementation is the challenge that this panel’s experts will tackle. Moderator: Laurent Borzillo (Postdoctoral Fellow, UQAM) Speakers: Philippe Beaulieu Brossard (Assistant Professor, Canadian Forces College) Chantal Lavallée (Assistant Professor, Collège militaire royal de St-Jean) Jonathan Paquin (Full Professor, Université Laval) Gordon Venner (Former Associate Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence) 16:40 - 16:55: Introduction of the Military Deployment Index Justin Massie (Full Professor, UQAM) and Barbora Tallova (Master's student, University of Oxford) 16:55 – 17:00 – Closing Remarks Stéfanie von Hlatky (Associate Professor, Queen’s University) and Justin Massie (Full Professor, UQAM) 17:00 – 18:30 – Networking Activity at the National Art Centre   ## From Measuring to Anticipating Conflict: An Early Warning System for Africa and the World URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/from-measuring-to-anticipating-conflict-an-early-warning-system-for-africa-and-the-world/ Modified: 2026-10-14 > Presentation of The CYSAN Prototype and the p-CSI Predictive Framework, by Étienne Emboussi and Stéphane Akaba Africa remains one of the world’s most dynamic regions, offering vast economic opportunities while facing persistent risks of violent conflict, political instability and security threats. Early warning has moved from expert judgement to data-driven forecasting: they perform best where violence is already under way. Sudden escalation remains the hard case, where even sophisticated models are still caught by surprise. Combining conflict modelling, machine learning and media analysis, CYSAN starts from one research question: can we anticipate how severe a conflict will become, early enough for prevention to act? CYSAN, a Canadian startup based in Gatineau, has developed a proof-of-concept early warning system that monitors conflict in Africa using Tableau dashboards and publicly available conflict event data, and is designed to adapt to other regions. CYSAN’s co-founders will present the prototype, then the conceptual framework of p-CSI (Predictive Conflict Severity Index). The framework aims to forecast the severity of conflict, not only the number of events, by combining four dimensions of severity with signals from the media environment to estimate, region by region, the probability of escalation. The session aims to: introduce the prototype and the p-CSI framework to the security and conflict prevention research community and practitioners; invite researchers to critically assess the expected value of p-CSI, framed as hypotheses to be tested; gather feedback on empirical validation, data limitations and ethical issues; prepare a follow-up session demonstrating the p-CSI proof of concept. Speakers Étienne Emboussi, Eng., M.Sc., President and Co-founder, CYSAN Stéphane Akaba, Vice-President and Co-founder, CYSAN; Part-time Professor and Doctoral Candidate, University of Ottawa ## From the Margins and Outside the Box: New Perspectives on Researching the Military URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/from-the-margins-and-outside-the-box-new-perspectives-on-researching-the-military/ Modified: 2024-06-12 > Often called out for its lack of diversity and inclusion, it is not only the military institution that needs to change, but also the way... This is a bilingual event. Live interpretation will be available to all attendees. Often called out for its lack of diversity and inclusion, it is not only the military institution that needs to change, but also the way it is studied. For far too long, research on the military has been siloed. Few dialogues and consultations among researchers were taken place, either because their research field was distinct (political science, sociology, anthropology, history, applied ethics, and so forth) or because they were working for different institutions (academic or governmental). Now more than ever, marginalized approaches and perspectives in the study of international security need to be heard and seen as they can bring answers to some of the challenges the military institution is currently facing. By bringing together researchers – virtually and in-person – from different countries, this conference aims to delve into how the military institution can be researched from more perspectives than we usually imagine when we think of the military. It is about paying attention to what underrepresented researchers, researchers using underrepresented approaches or working on underrepresented topics, can bring to the table. But it is also about opening a space for researchers – and the public – to share and learn from each other. The conference is hybrid. Public is welcomed either in person or virtually Download the Programme & Bios (PDF 2.8mb) PROGRAMME AGENDA: 8:30 am - Opening words – conference’s structure 8:45 am - Panel #1 : Participatory Research within the Military Institution: From Observation to Action-Research in the Service of Servicemembers This panel focuses on how participatory research offers an original and relevant perspective when it comes to the analysis of the military institution and its members. Using different perspectives (sociology, anthropology, applied ethics, etc.) and relying on different case studies (France, the Netherlands and Canada), the four researchers in this panel will present their work, as well as how they used this methodological approach in their respective research. Participative research contributes to a better understanding of issues such as the integration of women into the armed forces, the psychological suffering suffered by certain members, or more generally the ways to improve the situation of active members, veterans, and their relatives. As such the contributions of participatory research should not be overlooked. Panelists: Marguerite Déon Léa Ruelle Elizabeth Suen Amber S. Spijkers 10:00 am - BREAK 10:15 am - Panel #2: Lived Experiences Under Scrutiny: Learning from the Servicemembers Themselves This panel is about lived experiences, and how a better understanding of what is happening at the individual level can potentially help to better understand – and thus ultimately improve – what is occurring at the institutional level. Lived experiences make it possible to better understand the trajectory of individuals and how they are coping when confronted with obstacles at certain points of their lives. Soldiers’ lives courses in particular are known to be chaotic. Learning for instance about their experiences on the battlefield, or their transition out of the military, can enable the armed forces to better prepare its members when, or if, they face these situations. Panelists: Dr. Jennifer O’Neil Dr. Michelle Jones 10:55 am - BREAK 11:00 a.m. - Panel #3: Representation of Gendered and Sexual Identities: Toward a More Inclusive and Diverse Military Institution This panel addresses the question of gender and sexual identities – as well as their integration – within the military, and how this issue has become central to most armed forces in democratic countries. Indeed, the military institution has long been synonymous with hyper-masculinity and heteronormativity. Those who did not match to the expected image and qualities of a soldier did not necessarily find their place within the institution, and were sometimes the target of inappropriate behaviour, harassment or violence. If today’s and tomorrow’s military wants to pursue the agenda of inclusion and diversity that it has set itself, it requires a better understanding of what some of its members are going through as well as the implications this has for them, as shown by the researchers on this panel. Panelists: Dr. Pooja Gopal Dr. Linna Tam-Seto Dr. Rachel Yon & Major Rex Steel 12:00 pm - LUNCH 1:00 pm - BOOK PRESENTATION: Dr Grazia Scoppio & Dr Sarah Greco The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces. International Perspectives on Immigrant Participation in the Military While countries throughout the world rely on immigrants to support their populations and economies, access to the military is limited, denied to those who have not yet acquired citizenship. Precluding immigrants from serving in their host country’s armed forces is an issue of moral equity and operational effectiveness. Allowing immigrants to enlist ensures that the military represents the population it serves and encourages inclusivity and cultural change within the institution, while also creating a more effective military force. The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces investigates how different countries approach the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants in their armed forces and offers immigrant military participation as a pathway to citizenship and a way to foster greater societal integration and achieve a more equitable, diverse, and inclusive military. By surveying international perspectives on immigrant and non-citizen military participation in twelve countries, The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces introduces and examines a new way to unlock the power of diversity in military organizations globally. 1:40 pm - BREAK 1:45 pm - Panel #4 : For a Culture Change: Capturing the Military’s Institutional Evolution This panel tackles the question of military culture, and the difficulties that lie not only in analyzing it, but specifically in changing it. Having become a matter of importance, particularly in Canada, due to the problematic behaviours associated with it, military culture nonetheless remains complex to approach as an object of study. The researchers on this panel approach the issue from different but complementary angles. Panelists: Dr Isabelle Richer Major (retired) Marshall Gerbrandt Dr. Tamir Libel & Dr. Krystal Hackey 2:40 pm - BREAK 2:55 pm - Panel #5 : State Power and Military Force: A Complex and Changing Relationship This panel focuses on the relationship between the state and the armed forces, a relationship that has evolved over time and space, and which influences the way power and strength are more generally apprehended. As the researchers on this panel will demonstrate, this relationship evolves depending on the context, including when a country is in a period of conflict, even if a state claims to be neutral. Nationalist discourses can also influence this relationship, as the presence of third actors, who do not always recognize one or even both institutions. Finally, and despite the possibilities offered by new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, we must remain cautious about the transformative potential of these new technologies, as it will be shown in this panel. Panelists: Arthur Servier Manaswini Ramkumar Benjamin Toubol Jacob Gateau 4:05 pm - BREAK 4:10 pm - KEYNOTE: Dr. Maria Rost Rublee The State of Diversity in Canadian Studies In this presentation, Dr. Rublee explore the state of diversity in Canadian security studies, including demographic representation, methodological choices, and topics. Based on a multi-method investigation, she argues that Canadian security studies do not reflect the diversity of scholars and students studying it, nor the diversity of the Canadian population. 4:55 pm - Closing remarks ## Future Zones of Conflict and Tension by 2030 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/future-zones-of-tension-and-conflict-by-2030/ Modified: 2024-04-24 Note: This Conference will be in French only. Moderator: Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Canadian Global Affairs Institute Speakers: Peter Hammerschmidt, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National Defence Prof. Costanza Musu, Professor, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa His Excellency Michel Miraillet, Ambassador of France to Canada Her Excellency, Mrs. Trine Jøranli Eskedal, Ambassador of Norway to Canada Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Bishop's University   *In-person conference only. Limited seating (60) ## Geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/geopolitical-shifts-in-the-south-caucasus/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Geopolitical shifts in the South Caucasus One year after the Karabakh war On November 10, 2020, after 44 days of fighting and more than 6,000 dead, a ceasefire negotiated by Russia was concluded between the belligerents. Armenians and Azeris have halted the fighting, but Karabakh’s legal status remains unclear, and the increased role of rival regional powers in the region complicates matters. What prospects for peace for the South Caucasus? ## Global Tensions, Local Wars? The Changing International Politics of Civil Conflict URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/global-tensions-local-wars-the-changing-international-politics-of-civil-conflict/ Modified: 2023-03-01 > This is a preliminary workshop for scholars to share their understanding of trends and local responses. It is a first step in a larger... Attendance to this workshop is by invite only, please contact the organizer directly for more information. The global order is changing, international tensions are on the rise and there are renewed fears of international confrontation. At the same time, civil wars remain the dominant form of organized political violence. These wars are increasingly internationalized. But what are the patterns of international involvement in civil wars, and how are they changing as the international order changes? How are local actors exercising their own agency and responding to these shifts, and how are they participating in broader international changes? This workshop sets the stage for a project aiming to take stock of these issues. First, a set of presentations will discuss overviews of trends in which actors support armed groups in civil conflicts, and how (overt vs. covert intervention; escalation in response). Second, country experts will analyze how armed groups respond to and try to navigate, manipulate, and shape these trends, and the narratives around them, to their benefit, focusing on cases that seem to herald major shifts and cases at the interstices of different trends in world order. We aim to better understand today's conflicts at the intersection of the global and the local. This is a preliminary workshop for scholars to share their understanding of trends and local responses. It is a first step in a larger project, setting the agenda for more completed work to be presented at a second workshop in summer 2023, and an edited volume. Workshop Programme   8:45 Welcome 9:00 Introduction - Agenda | Théodore McLauchlin (Université de Montréal) - Trends 9:30 Configurations of External Support | Noel Anderson (University of Toronto) 10:00 Overt and Covert Interventions | Arthur Stein (Université de Montréal) 10:30 Coffee Break 10:45 Escalation of Interventions | Giuseppe Spatafora (University of Oxford) 11:15 Wrapup discussion on Trends 12:00 Lunch - Local Strategies 13:30 Ukraine | Tetyana Malyarenko (National University Odesa Law Academy) 14:00 Abkhazia | Anastasia Shesterinina (University of Sheffield) 14:30 Syria | Ora Szekely (Clark University) 15:00 Coffee Break 15:15 Mali | Tatiana Smirnova (UQÀM) 15:45 Wrap-up discussion on Local Strategies 16:30 General wrap-up Discussion: Moving forward on follow-up workshop and edited volume. 17:00 Workshop ends 18:30 Dinner Additional discussion participants : Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Lee Seymour, Alexandra Lamarche, Abdou Rahim Lema Mohamed, Aboubacar Maiga, Marion Zahar (Université de Montréal) Attendance to this workshop is by invite only, please contact the organizer directly for more information. ## Hedging in a Transforming World Order: Looking at the Strategic Ambiguity of Washington’s Allies and Partners URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/hedging-in-a-transforming-world-order-looking-at-the-strategic-ambiguity-of-washingtons-allies-and-partners/ Modified: 2024-03-15 Download the Program (PDF 985kb) Many question the ability of the United States to maintain its global leadership in the face of the relative decline of its power and the emergence of the BRICS, particularly China. In recent years, an increasing number of Washington’s allies have displayed strategic ambiguity (or hedging) regarding their strategic behaviour in a changing world. For instance, France has favored a Europe « neither aligned nor vassalized before any power », to borrow Emmanuel Macron’s words. Other allies, such as Italy and Hungary, have developed close relations with China and Russia, which raises concerns in Washington. Finally, like the Philippines and Turkey have even threatened to sever their alliance with the United States to realign with China and Russia. The aggression of Russia against Ukraine appears to have accelerated the transformation of the global order. Many observers characterize this system as a « multi-order world » or post-American, where allies have more latitude to express their divergences and interests. For example, Turkey abstained from joining the Western regime of sanctions against Moscow, and Hungary refused to condemn the Russian aggression, despite both being NATO members. This conflict has also revitalized the Non-Aligned Movement, which refuses to choose between the United States on one side and Russia and China on the other. This is evidenced by the United States’ inability to rally a majority of countries from the Global South to its policy of support for Ukraine, as well as the resistance of some states to adopt restrictive measures towards China in the context of Sino-American competition. In this context, this conference, co-organized by the NSA and the Graduate School of International Studies, has two main objectives. First, to identify and explain the ambiguous behaviors of some of Washington’s allies and evaluate the reaction of the United States to these behaviors. Second, this conference aims to shed light on the Non-Aligned States, primarily those in the Global South, and the various geopolitical realities that drive their strategies.   Agenda: 10h00 - 10h10: Opening Remarks Jonathan Paquin, Co-director - Strategic Analysis Network 10h10 - 12h00: Panel 1 : Transition of Power and Strategic Ambiguity of Washington's Allies Moderator: Frédérick Côté - Ph.D. Candidate, International Studies, École supérieure d’études internationales Alexander Lanoszka - Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo Title: Are U.S. Allies and Partners Really Hedging? Pierre Colautti - Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Université Laval à Québec Title: US Allies’ Response to Washington’s Lack of Security Assurance Under the Obama and Trump Presidencies Émile Lambert-Deslandes - Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University Title: Nuclear Hedging and Latency: The Historical Cases of US Allies Nicolas-François Perron-Giroux - Doctoral Student, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Title: The Implications of Power Transition on Canadian Defence Policy: Diplomatic Signals and Military Acquisitions. 12h00 - 13h15: Lunch 13h15 - 15h15: Panel 2 : Understanding the Interests of Southern States in Relation to the Great Powers Moderator: Talbot Imlay - Full Professor, Department of History, Université Laval Amabilly Bonacina, Doctoral Candidate in Political Studies, Université de Montréal Title: The Foreign Policy of Lula 3:  Between the Challenges of a Brazil in Reconstruction and a Changing World Roromme Chantal, Associate Professor of Political Science, École des hautes études publiques (HEP), Université de Moncton Title: Global China and Symbolic Power: The Case of the Indo-Pacific Region Amélie Chalivet, Joint Doctoral Student, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas et à l’Université du Québec à Montréal Title: India and the Challenges of Taiwan and the South China Sea: Case Studies of India’s Evolving Strategic Ambiguity. Jean F. Crombois, Associate Professor of European Studies, American University of Bulgaria Title: Bulgarian Foreign Policy and the War in Ukraine: towards a more assertive pro-Western Foreign Policy? 15h15 - 15h25: Closing Remarks Jonathan Paquin, Co-director - Strategic Analysis Network ## Information at the Speed of Trust: (dis/ill/mis) Information and Security Issues URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/information-at-the-speed-of-trust-dis-ill-mis-information-and-security-issues/ Modified: 2023-03-14 > The challenges related to (dis/ill/mis) information are not new yet the scope and pace of the flow of information is now unprecedented... Information at the Speed of Trust: (dis/ill/mis) Information and Security Issues This is an English language event. The event will not be recorded. The challenges related to (dis/ill/mis) information are not new yet the scope and pace of the flow of information is now unprecedented. Mis/dis/ill information is now recognized as a key security challenge by governments and international institutions alike. United Nations (UN) peace operations have encountered a myriad of challenges on the nature of their practices, mandates, and missions at doctrinal, conceptual, and operational levels. These challenges have mobilized extensive reflections on how missions should approach the changing security and political dynamics prevalent in local communities within which missions are deployed for the purposes of peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement.  In addition, relevant debates have also generated (re)considerations related to strategic, tactical, logistical, collaborative, and cooperative challenges at the ground operational level that missions must overcome on a daily basis. While doctrinal debate and challenges related to the conceptualization, interpretation, and implementation of peace operations continue to be assessed and widely analyzed those on local perceptions and (dis/ill/mis) information are under-researched and studied.  Only within the past four years, the challenge of coping with the (dis/ill/mis) information has been introduced in the mandates of peacekeeping missions. The conference will convene scholars, practitioners and experts to discuss the complex and substantial ways in which mis-/dis-/ill- information impact security on a local, national and international level. Agenda 09:15 - 09:30 : Introduction Remarks Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Dr. Yvan Ilunga 09:30 - 11:30 : How information flows in local communities within which peace operations are present, and how they impact both quotidian and long-term dynamics of peace missions/national initiatives? Chair : Dr. Bruno Charbonneau Dr. Yvan Ilunga and Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Dr. Fifi Edu-Afful Master Warrant Officer Edwin Pinaroc Dr. Delphine Bonnardot Sebastian Fasanello 11:30 - 13:00: Lunch 13:00 - 15:00 : How disinformation is identified by international institutions and which policies/strategies are put in place to tackle the issue from a UN perspective? Chair : Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Dr. Cedric De Coning Albert Trithart Pernilla Ryden Naomi Miyashita 15:15 - 17:15 : How disinformation is a security issue on a national basis threatening the security and safety of national population? Chair : Dr. Frédérick Gagnon Dr. Adriana Seagle Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher Dr. Mark Duerksen Dr. Dani Madrid-Morales 17:15 - 17:30 : Closing remarks Bios: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé is Full Professor at Bishop’s University and Non-Resident Fellow at the International Peace Institute, New York. She is the Deputy Director of the Centre FrancoPaix.  In 2018–2019, she was the Canada Fulbright Research Chair for Peace and War Studies.  In 2021, she was awarded the 3M National Teaching Fellowship. She is an associate faculty member of the Center for International Peace and Security Studies (CIPSS) and of the Montreal Center for International Studies (CERIUM). Her research focuses on peacekeeping-intelligence, peace operations and security issues related to intra-state wars.  Her most recent publications include “Competing for Trust: Challenges in UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence“.  Author of the first UN guidelines on Gender and Peacekeeping-intelligence, she is also co-author of the first United Nations Field Handbook on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (United Nations, 2018), she recently conducted fieldwork at the MINUSCA (Central African Republic), MINUSMA (Mali), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo), UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire) and UNMISS (South Sudan). She is co-hosting the podcast “Conseils de sécurité” a co-production of the CDSN-RCDS and RAS-NSA. Dr. Yvan Ilunga is Assistant Professor at Salve Regina University, and have taught at Central State University, Providence College and James Madison University, and was a visiting scholar in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of North Carolina Greensboro. He is also the deputy director of Joint Civil-Military Interaction, a research and education network, and have published a number of articles on Africa. Dr. Ilunga is fluent in French, English and Swahili. Bruno Charbonneau (PhD Queen’s University) is Full Professor of International Studies, and Director of the Centre for Security and Crisis Governance (CRITIC) at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean. He is also founder and Director of the Centre FrancoPaix in Conflict Resolution and Peace Missions of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair at the Université du Québec à Montréal. Since 2015, he has been an editorial board member of the academic journal International Peacekeeping. His work examines the power politics of and interactions between international interventions and armed conflicts. In particular, he analyses the regional and international dynamics of conflict management and resolution in the Francophone West African Sahel. Fiifi Edu-Afful (PhD) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). He has over 10 years’ experience authoring, teaching and facilitating on conflict, peace and security. Between 2013 and 2014, he served as an Advisory Team Member for the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN peacekeeping. He is currently an Advisory Board Member, Gender, Justice and Security, UKRI GCRF Hub. He has also served as a lead facilitator for the African Centre for the Study & Research on Terrorism (ACSRT/CAERT). He is the 2019 Winner of the Inaugural Peace Studies Section-Lynne Rienner Publishers Global South Grant for the International Studies Association. Master Warrant Officer Edwin Pinaroc has twenty-six years of military service in the Canadian Armed Forces and has worked in Information Operations and Influence Activities since 2003. He has held various positions in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), NATO and the UN, including as an instructor at the Peace and Support Training Centre (PSTC) and Joint Targeting & Effects (JTE) Analyst at Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). Currently, he is the Squadron Sergeant Major at the PSTC, overseeing training to include the United Nations Military Observer Course (UNMO) and Hazardous Environment Training (HET) for other government departments and Heads of Missions. Dr Delphine Bonnardot joined the Canadian Armed Forces as a Naval Combat Officer and later transferred to Public Affairs. She deployed numerous times, in Canada and abroad, including in Eastern Europe, as part of NATO assurance and deterrence measures. As an international specialist in the issue of gender and security, Dr Bonnardot has advised capacity building in many countries in Asia Pacific and Africa in the field of Women, Peace and Security. Highlighting the topic of empowering women, promoting peace and sharing her operational and strategic experience have always been at the center of her life and her personal interests. Sebastian Fasanello is Senior Information Analyst at the Chief Joint Mission Analysis Center for United Nations Stabilization Mission for the Democratic Republic of the Congo-MONUSCO. He has served for more than fifteen years with the United Nations, in MONUC and then MONUSCO. He served in the Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) in different capacities between 2006 and present day. He deployed to MONUC as Military Observer, being posted to JMAC during his Tour of Duty as Military Analyst. He returned to MONUC few months later to serve as Information Analyst after having retired from the Army. He was appointed Chief JMAC in July 2015, and is responsible for the team generating integrated, forward-looking analysis in support of the decision-making process by MONUSCO leadership. Dr. Cedric de Coning is a Research Professor in the Research group on peace, conflict and development at NUPI. He co-directs the NUPI Center on United Nations and Global Governance, and the Climate, Peace and Security Risk project. He coordinates the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) and contributes to the Training for Peace programme, the UN Peace Operations project (UNPO) and several others. He is also a senior advisor for ACCORD. He tweets at @CedricdeConing. Albert Trithart is Editor and Research Fellow at the International Peace Institute (IPI), he is involved with editing and producing IPI books, policy reports, issues briefs, and research publications. He has authored the most recent IPI report on disinformation against UN peacekeepers and coauthored an additional report focusing on the strategic communications in UN peace operations. Before joining IPI, Albert was a program officer at Conflict Dynamics International (CDI), where he conducted research and engagement related to governance and peacebuilding in Sudan. Pernilla Rydén is Director of the Challenges Forum International Secretariat. She has served in numerous United Nations (UN) peace operations, both large multidimensional missions as well as special political missions and offices. Most recently Ms. Rydén held the position as Chief of Staff of the UN Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) in Yemen, delivering on the relevant parts of the Stockholm Agreement (2018). Previous she served as Head of the Regional and Multilateral Section of the Political Affairs Department in United Nations Stabilisation Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) where she led the mission’s work on strategic guidance on developments in the African Great Lakes region, as well as on the DRC international relations. Naomi Miyashita is the Project Manager who currently leads a new workstream in the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) at the United Nations on addressing mis- and disinformation in peacekeeping settings. She previously managed the Policy Planning Team in DPO’s Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), which is responsible for policy analysis on emerging strategic and operational challenges. Before that, Naomi has overseen protection, civil affairs and sustaining peace policy in DPET. She has served with UN agencies and peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, DRC, Chad, Sri Lanka, Haiti. Frédérick Gagnon is the Raoul-Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, Director of the Observatory on the United States and Director/Founder of the Observatory on Multidimensional Conflicts within the same Chair. A full professor in the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal, where he teaches U.S. politics, he was awarded a Fulbright scholarship from the U.S. Department of State for a post-doctoral seminar on American politics at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 2005, a visiting scholar at the Canada Institute of the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and at the Center for American Politics and Citizenship at the University of Maryland in the summer of 2006, and a visiting professor/researcher at Western Washington University in Bellingham in 2008. Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher is an Associate Professor at the School of Public Policy and at the department of political science at the University of Calgary. His current work focuses on applied machine learning to understand how the digital world shapes our society. He is currently responsible for projects funded by the Department of National Defence (DND) to study information operations; the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) to understand civil-military relations in Canada; and holds grants from Alberta Innovates and the Vaccine Confidence Fund, and Merck to study vaccine hesitancy on social media to develop better communications strategies and tools to increase vaccine uptake. Dr. Mark Duerksen is a research associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. His research focuses on Africa’s unparalleled urbanization and the security challenges and opportunities this shifting landscape presents. His current work includes analysis of Nigeria’s diverse security threats as well as the growing impact of disinformation campaigns on the continent’s rapidly changing information systems. Trained as a historian, he brings deep knowledge of the underlying material, governance, social, and developmental dynamics driving current tensions and conflicts in and around the continent’s cities. Dr. Dani Madrid-Morales is a Lecturer in Journalism and Global Communication at the Department of Journalism Studies, The University of Sheffield. Prior to this, he was an Assistant Professor at the Valenti School of Communication, University of Houston, and a Hong Kong PhD Fellow, at City University of Hong Kong. He studies global political communication, with a focus on the impact of new digital technologies on the production of State-sponsored news, global public opinion, and misinformation in the Global South. His latest co-edited book is Disinformation in the Global South (Wiley). Madison Pestey is a third-year Political Science Major and History Minor at Salve Regina University in Newport, RI, USA. With an expressed interest in studying the United Nations, peace operations, humanitarianism, and international security, Madison has been working alongside Dr. Yvan Ilunga of the Salve Regina University Political Science and International Relations Department as a research assistant during the 2022-2023 school year. Given her particular interest in United Nations Peacekeeping, Madison has been focusing on active peacekeeping operations, specifically in Africa, and acts of violence committed against both UN and NGO personnel. ## Information Session on the Department of National Defence Policy Officer Recruitment Program URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/information-session-on-the-department-of-national-defence-policy-officer-recruitment-program/ Modified: 2022-07-28 Interested in joining the Policy Officer Recruitment Program at the Department of National Defence ? This information session on the Policy Officer Recruitment Program (PORP) at the Department of National Defence will provide information on our three-year professional development program and explain why and how to apply. There will be plenty of time to ask questions of a former program member after the 30-35 min presentation. The PRAP may be of interest to you if you: Hold Canadian citizenship or permanent residency Have a Master's degree from a recognized university (completed by July 31, 2022) in the social sciences, humanities, arts or other security and defence related discipline Have experience researching, analyzing, and writing on issues related to international affairs, defense, or public policy Participating in this event will allow you to: Learn more about the PRAP, what it entails, why and how to apply Get helpful tips on each step of the application process Position yourself for a dynamic career that will not only shape your future, but shape Defense. For more information on the Policy Officer Recruitment Program, please visit www.canada.ca/defense-prap ## Information Warfare: Strategies, Rules and Challenges URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/information-warfare-strategies-rules-and-challenges/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > L'objectif de la conférence est d'en apprendre davantage sur le Centre d’excellence en communications stratégiques de l’OTAN... This event is in French only The Laboratory on Influence and Communication (Labfluens), the Political Communication and Public Opinion Analysis Laboratory (LACPOP) and the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) invite you to the conference on influence communication "Information Warfare: Strategies, Rules and Challenges" by Lieutenant-Colonel Yves Desbiens. The objective of the conference is to learn more about the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, disinformation, strategic narratives, new information and communication technologies (bots, trolls, AI, digital training platform), hybrid warfare and more. When? Tuesday March 15, from 12:30 to 2:00 pm Where? The location at UQAM will be communicated to you by email, along with the Zoom link if you wish to attend the conference online Lieutenant-Colonel Desbiens is a project manager at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Communication, Social Communication program from UQTR. Download the Presentation (PPT 7.2mb) ## Intelligence Cooperation in a Multipolar World – Non-American Perspectives URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/intelligence-cooperation-in-a-multipolar-world-non-american-perspectives-2/ Modified: 2022-07-28 PROGRAM (PDF) and BIOGRAPHIES VIEW VIDEOS OF THE EVENT Program 10:15 – Opening Remarks Justin Massie (University of Quebec in Montreal) 10:30 – European and Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation (view video) Chair and Discussant: Jill Sinclair (Department of National Defence) Björn Fägersten (Swedish Institute of International Affairs): The Intelligence Demands of European Strategic Autonomy Claudia Hillebrand (Cardiff University): The Spiral Loop of Intelligence Liaison: Issues for Secrecy and Accountability Gustav Gressel (European Council on Foreign Relations): Subversive Challenges to the Single European Space 12:00 – Keynote Speaker (view video) Daniel Jean, former National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada 12:45 - Lunch 13:30 – Challenges of Intelligence Sharing (view video) Chair and Discussant: Artur Wilczynski (Communications Security Establishment) Adriana Seagle (Bellevue University): Transatlantic Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Bishop’s University): Search for Trust: Challenges in UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Stephanie Carvin (Carleton University) & Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa): Don’t Hold Back: Canadianize 15:00 - Break 15:30 – Intelligence Cooperation under Multipolarity (view video) Chair and Discussant: Heather De Santis (Public Safety Canada) Reg Whitaker (University of Victoria): Intelligence Cooperation in Historical Perspective, from Cold War Bipolarity to the Multipolar Present Nancy Teeple (Royal Military College of Canada): Enhanced ISR and its Effect on Strategic Stability Patrick F. Walsh (Charles Sturt University): Australia’s National Intelligence Community: Challenges and Opportunities in a Multi-Polar World 17:00 – Closing Remarks Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa) ## Invisible Invasion? Russia’s Hybrid Warfare and Europe’s Evolving Countermeasures URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/invisible-invasion-russias-hybrid-warfare-and-europes-evolving-countermeasures/ Modified: 2025-11-04 The Jean Monnet Center Montréal (JMCM) welcomes Mikhail Polianskii (PRIF – Leibniz-Institut), who will give a talk entitled "Invisible Invasion? Russia’s Hybrid Warfare and Europe’s Evolving Countermeasures." Hybrid operations that blur the line between peace and war have evolved into one of Europe’s most pervasive security challenges, exploiting legal and normative gaps while remaining below the thresholds that trigger conventional defense responses. This lecture will deconstruct the modern Russian toolkit—from GPS interference and infrastructure sabotage to weaponized migration and social media influence operations—explaining why traditional deterrence frameworks struggle to respond effectively. Using case studies from the Baltic states, Poland, and Western Europe, the presentation examines emerging EU counter-hybrid initiatives and resilience strategies, assessing their effectiveness against increasingly sophisticated gray-zone campaigns. The lecture concludes by exploring whether the EU and its member states can preserve their open, democratic model while developing the proactive capabilities necessary to raise the costs of hybrid aggression—addressing the fundamental tension between security imperatives and liberal democratic values. The discussion will be moderated by Emmanuelle Rousseau (Université du Québec à Montréal). Date: Wednesday, November 19, 2025 Time: 12:30 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. Location: UQAM, Department of Political Science, Room R-3540 More informations. ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-2/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > Sponsored by Canada’s Department of National Defence, this symposium brings together experts from around the world to exchange ideas on... Sponsored by Canada’s Department of National Defence, this symposium brings together experts from around the world to exchange ideas on the security situation in Taiwan, which increasingly proves one of the most salient security issues in the Indo-Pacific region and a focal point in the strategic competition between the United States and China. As such, there is a need for a thorough discussion about China’s intentions, the capacity of the United States to prevent a war, and regional partners and allies’ handling of the Taiwan question. The first panel gauges the likelihood of war, assess contingencies scenarios, and evaluate factors to prevent a conflict. In the second and third panels, the goal is to look at the best strategies for allies and partners to handle the Taiwan Question. Finally, the fourth panel concentrates on the lessons from the war in Ukraine for Taiwan, the allies’ assessment of the imminence of a conflict, and their potential reactions if war ever broke out in Taiwan. A fifth panel, dedicated to graduate students working on these issues, closes the conference. The conference will be conducted in a hybrid format: participants will be in-person and the audience online. The event will be held in English, expect for the student panel, which will be held in French. 2 June 2022 9h15-9h30 Opening Remarks Justin Massie (UQAM) 9h30-11h30 - Is a Great Power War for Taiwan Inevitable? Chair and Discussant: Andrea Lane (Defence Research and Development Canada) James Lee (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation) Charles Parton (Council on Geostrategy) Bonnie Glaser (German Marshall Fund of the United States) Cleo Paskal (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) 11h30-13h00 - Lunch 13h00-15h00 - How Are Allies Handling the Taiwan Question? Chair and Discussant: Justin Massie (UQAM)  Steven Jackson (Indiana University of Pennsylvania) Hyon Joo Yoo (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) John Blaxland (Australian National University) 15h00-15h15 - Break 15h15-17h15 - How Are Partners Handling the Taiwan Question? Chair and Discussant: Guy St-Jacques (Institut d’études international de Montréal)  Derek Grossman (RAND Corporation) Sana Hashmi (Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation) Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM) 17h15-17h30 - Closing Remarks 3 June 2022 9h15-9h30 - Opening Remarks Justin Massie (UQAM) 9h30-11h30 - What Lessons Are Allies Drawing From Ukraine for Taiwan?  Chair and Discussant: Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval)  Charles-Philippe David (UQAM) Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer (IRSEM)  Tereza Novotna (Free University Berlin) Gaëlle Rivard-Piché (Defence Research and Development Canada) 11h30-13h00 Lunch 13h00-15h00 - Panel des chercheurs émergents Présidence et commentaire : Justin Massie (UQAM)  Maxandre Fortier (UQAM) Rémy Carugati (Université Laval) Camille Raymond (UQAM) Émile Lambert-Deslandes (Queen’s University) 15h00-15h15 – Closing Remarks ## Journée Transatlantique & la Patrouille de France URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/journees-transatlantiques/ Modified: 2026-09-29 > Join international leaders for Transatlantic Days in Paris. Explore full program details on security, defense technology, and Franco-Canadian alliances. L’air des alliances : recomposition des puissances et nouvelles interdépendances La présence exceptionnelle de la Patrouille de France, dans le cadre de la mission Liberté 250, donnera à cet après-midi de la Journée transatlantique une portée particulière. Symbole d’excellence, d’innovation et de confiance collective, elle incarne la profondeur des liens entre la France et les Amériques autant que la nécessité de repenser les alliances face aux transformations du monde. Dans un contexte marqué par la recomposition des puissances, les rivalités technologiques et les nouvelles interdépendances, les échanges porteront sur l’avenir de la gouvernance internationale, de la coopération transatlantique et de la sécurité collective. Son Excellence Nathalie G. Drouin, ambassadrice du Canada en France, apportera le regard du Canada sur ces mutations et sur les perspectives d’un approfondissement de la coopération franco-canadienne. Diplomates, responsables militaires, chercheurs et représentants de l’industrie croiseront leurs perspectives avant l’accueil de la Patrouille de France et l’allocution du général de brigade aérienne Pierre Gaudillière. Réunissant responsables militaires, diplomates, chercheurs, représentants de l’industrie et acteurs institutionnels, cet après-midi mettra ainsi en dialogue les transformations de l’ordre international et les réponses concrètes que peuvent leur apporter les alliances, l’innovation et les partenariats transatlantiques. PROGRAMME 14h30 – 14h45 | Accueil Mot d’introduction : Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos 14h45 – 15h00 | Allocution d’honneur : son Excellence Nathalie G. Drouin, Ambassadrice du Canada en France 15h00-16h00 : Table ronde – Le Monde après les certitudes Recomposition des puissances, nouvelles interdépendances et avenir de la gouvernance internationale Modération : Aubin Gonzalez Lapos Les bouleversements géopolitiques des dernières années ont remis en question les cadres d’analyse qui ont longtemps structuré notre compréhension des relations internationales. Les chaînes d’approvisionnement se reconfigurent, les rivalités technologiques s’intensifient, les politiques industrielles reviennent au premier plan et les institutions internationales sont appelées à se transformer. Comment penser ces mutations ? Sommes-nous face à une fragmentation du monde ou à une recomposition de ses interdépendances ? À partir des travaux du groupe Mondialisation sous tension, cette discussion croisera les regards de la science politique, de la sociologie, de l’économie politique internationale et des études stratégiques afin de mieux comprendre les transformations en cours. Dr. Miriam Cohen, professeure de droit à l’Université de Montréal, et directrice du Centre de recherche en droit public (CRDP) Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, professeure à Bishop’s University, et directrice du Centre FrancoPaix de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques Dr. Walter Kemp, directeur de la stratégie mondiale de l’Initiative mondiale contre la criminalité transnationale organisée Général Fabien Kuzniak, conseiller militaire du groupe Safran 16h00 PM – 16h20 | Pause 116h20 – 17h40 | Accueil de la Patrouille de France Mission Liberté 250 Allocution d’honneur: général de brigade aérienne Pierre GAUDILLIERE, sous-chef d’état-major « activité » de l’état-major de l’armée de l’air et de l’espace. Nous aurons le privilège de découvrir les coulisses de la Patrouille de France avec une démonstration exceptionnelle de « la musique », cette répétition au sol qui permet aux pilotes de préparer et de synchroniser chaque geste, chaque ordre et chaque enchaînement avant leur exécution en vol. Une véritable partition aérienne, orchestrée par le leader, où précision, coordination et confiance entre les pilotes sont essentielles. 17h40 | Mot de clôture  Conclusion de la journée : Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Quels enseignements tirer de cette journée ? De la diplomatie des connaissances aux alliances stratégiques, les échanges auront montré combien les savoirs, les technologies, les industries et les partenariats internationaux sont désormais intimement liés. Cette conclusion ouvrira également les perspectives des prochaines initiatives de France-Amériques. 18h00 – 20h30 |  Verre amical Un moment privilégié de rencontre entre les intervenants, les membres de France-Amériques, les représentants des milieux diplomatique, militaire, industriel, académique et institutionnel afin de prolonger les discussions, favoriser les échanges et faire émerger de nouvelles coopérations franco-canadiennes. Remerciements Ce colloque a été construit en écho avec une année 2025/26 de rencontre transocéanique, dont notamment: le colloque transatlantique qui s’est déroulé à France-Amériques le 29 septembre 2025, le colloque transpacifique le 21 janvier 2026, et le colloque transarctique le 11 mai 2026. Nos remercions tout particulièrement la Patrouille de France et le général Pierre Gaudillière pour leur contribution essentielle à la co-construction de ces journées, ainsi que: l’équipe de l’Ambassade du Canada en France, le Centre FrancoPaix, l’armée de l’Air et de l’Espace et le CESA. Les administrateurs Romain Bethoux et Nicolas Renard ont également apporté leur concours à la construction de cette journée. L'événement se déroulera uniquement en présentiel à Paris. ## Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/making-sense-of-the-poly-crisis-a-view-from-down-under/ Modified: 2026-08-25 A presentation by John Blaxland. Registration online (Zoom). Location in person: Université du Québec à Montréal Département de science politique  315, rue Sainte-Catherine Est Pavillon des Sciences de la gestion, Local R-3540 Montréal (Québec)  H2X 3X2 ## NATO and Defence – Virtual Workshop Panel 4 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/nato-and-defence-virtual-workshop-panel-4/ Modified: 2022-07-28 VIEW VIDEO This event is organized as part of the Capacity-Building in the Age of COVID-19 Virtual Workshop Series. This fourth workshop will focus on NATO and defence. Increasing superpower tensions since the early 2010s have put the risk of traditional, conventional interstate conflict back on the global security agenda in a major way, at the same time as states are competing in evolving domains such as cyber, space and AI. For an alliance like NATO, these issues raise the question of how well-equipped different member states are for defence, and how burdens are to be shared. Capacity-building is an important part of the alliance, manifested in military training activities and joint exercises. What challenges does COVID-19 raise for burden-sharing in NATO? How has it impeded joint activities? Has it caused member states to reconsider their commitments to investing in allies’ capacity for defence and in dimensions of capacity building, such as gender training, that often receive low priority? How has it changed the operation of capacity-building activities on the ground? This event will be in English with simultaneous interpretation. Participants will be able to ask questions in French. Capacity Building in the Age of COVID-19: Virtual Workshop Series In the past decade, in a world with many different security challenges, the disastrous failures of direct interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and straitened budgets after the financial crisis of 2008, capacity-building became an increasingly important tool in international security. As states, international organizations and NGOs sought to bolster their partners’ abilities to deal with security problems in many different domains, including defence, counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism, and peace-building, capacity building was not only regarded as more sustainable over the long term than international intervention, it was also deemed useful to achieve better burden sharing. The COVID-19 pandemic puts the requirements for and the uses of capacity-building in question. Moving personnel around and working side-by-side with partners now poses new health risks; the economic calamity which has ensued from the pandemic raises searching questions over how states and organizations will change their policy tools. Have states reconsidered their engagement in what were often treated as low-priority missions? Will they, instead, turn all the more to capacity-building so that others can take on security burdens? How have capacity-building needs and mission operations changed with the new emphasis on health security? Are these reversible or likely permanent changes? Will the difficulties of international cooperation be felt in this domain? This series of virtual workshops will address these and related questions. We will explore the state of capacity-building before the pandemic; assess its impacts on capacity-building operations in defence, COIN/CT, and peacekeeping operations; and analyze the challenges posed for the Canadian Armed Forces. The panels will bring together academic experts and policy-making practitioners to learn from each other. Organizers Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## Operation IMPACT: Capacity building and fight against terrorism URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/operation-impact-capacity-building-and-fight-against-terrorism/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > International operations in the context of armed conflict are currently not only about combat. Indeed, an often overlooked way in which Canada attempts to contribute to international security is capacity building. What are the objectives of these operations? How do they work in the context of the fight against terrorism? How do these operations cope with the challenges of collaboration with host countries and the sustainability of their interventions? This event will address these issues in the context of the fight against Daesh in the Middle East. International operations in the context of armed conflict are currently not only about combat. Indeed, an often overlooked way in which Canada attempts to contribute to international security is capacity building. What are the objectives of these operations? How do they work in the context of the fight against terrorism? How do these operations cope with the challenges of collaboration with host countries and the sustainability of their interventions? This event will address these issues in the context of the fight against Daesh in the Middle East. Major General Michel-Henri Saint-Louis recently served as the commander of JTF-IMPACT, the largest joint force in the Canadian Armed Forces, which provides Kuwait's national command and control element to strengthen Canadian Forces capabilities in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan. During his career in the Canadian Armed Forces, MGen St-Louis was deployed on several missions in the Baltic States and the Middle East and holds three master's degrees focused on war, defense and strategy. He is one of the most experienced leaders in the Canadian Forces. This event is organized by the  Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) and the Center for Studies on Peace and International Security (CEPSI). ## Pacific Climate Security Conference and Career Development Workshop URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/pacific-climate-security-conference-and-career-development-workshop/ Modified: 2024-01-25 > Climate-related hazards will increase in coming years, making it vital to identify and support emerging leaders in the field of climate... Understanding the multifaceted links between climate change and security across the global, national, and human levels of analysis is an urgent priority for policymakers, scholars, civil society, and security and defence practitioners. Complex relationships exist between the unfolding crisis of human-caused environmental change and phenomena such as armed conflict, violent extremism, migration, poverty, resource scarcity, political instability, economic prosperity, energy security, and community resilience, requiring interdisciplinary and multi-method analysis and policy development. Climate-related security challenges encompass changes in the international and domestic threat environments, the need to decarbonize defence and national security activities, and tensions among competing security priorities, electoral politics, and a range of social movements. Climate-related hazards will increase in coming years, making it vital to identify and support emerging leaders in the field of climate change and security, and to foster connections between scholars, analysts, and practitioners committed to addressing these inter-related social, political, economic, and ecological challenges. Download the Program (PDF 3.5mb) The agenda for Day 1 is the following: 8:30-8:45 - Welcome and Territorial Acknowledgement 8:45-9:00 - Opening Remarks - Dr. Will Greaves 9:00-10:30 - Panel 1: Climate and Security in a Changing World Order Panel 1 explores the connections between climate change and other political, geostrategic, and geo-economic changes occurring concurrently. Panelists provide expert perspectives on the inter-related stressors driving structural changes to the contemporary international order. 10:30-10:45 - Break 10:45-12:15 - Panel 2: Regional Climate Security Impacts Panel 2 examines specific impacts of climate change and their associated security concerns in different global regions. Panelists provide expert perspectives on climate security impacts in Northern Africa, Northern Canada, the North Atlantic region, and South Asia. 12:15-130 - Lunch 1:30-3:00 - Panel 3: Climate and Security in Western North America Panel 3 examines specific impacts of climate change and their associated security concerns in Western North America. 3:00-3:15 - Break 3:15-4:45 - Panel 4: Intersections of Climate, Security, and Justice in Canada Panel 4 examines intersections of climate change impacts, security concerns, and considerations of justice and equity in Canada. Panelists provide diverse and interdisciplinary perspectives on issues such as decarbonization and the clean energy transition, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, migration, displacement, and community resilience.   The agenda for Day 2 is the following: 8:30-9:00 - Coffee and Refreshments 9:00-10:15 - Panel 1: Canada Climate Security Fellows This panel will feature presentations from two Canada Climate Security Fellows. Fellows will present their research projects, receive feedback from an assigned discussant/ mentor, and participate in questions and answers with the other fellows and participating scholars and practitioners in the field. 10:15-10:45 - Break 10:45-12:00 - Panel 2: Canada Climate Security Fellows This panel will feature presentations from two Canada Climate Security Fellows. Fellows will present their research projects, receive feedback from an assigned discussant/ mentor, and participate in questions and answers with the other fellows and participating scholars and practitioners in the field. 12:00-1:00 - Lunch 1:00-2:30 - Expert Practitioner Panel, Part 1 - Q&A 2:30-3:00 - Break 3:00-4:15 - Expert Practitioner Panel, Part 2 – Q&A 4:15-5:00 - Closing Discussion and Next Steps ## Panel Discussion – Drones and new military technologies: what lessons were learned from the Russian-Ukrainian war? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/table-ronde-la-guerre-russo-ukrainienne/ Modified: 2022-11-08 > This panel discussion aims to discuss the role and place of drones and new military technologies (e.g.: hypersonic missiles) on the... This Panel Discussion will be conducted in French only. This panel discussion aims to discuss the role and place of drones and new military technologies (e.g.: hypersonic missiles) on the battlefield given the lessons that can be drawn from the clashes in Ukraine following the Russian invasion in February 2022. While in response to aggressive and threatening Russian behavior, we are seeing an increase in arms budgets within NATO member countries, given the choices in terms of future spending for Canada, we have to ask ourselves what the real contributions are (but potentially more limited than expected) these new tools in the conduct of war. Speakers Dr. Ulrike Franke, researcher at European Council on Foreign Relation Dr. Dominika Kunertova, researcher at ETH Zürich - Center for Security Studies Anna Nadibaidze, Ph.D Student, Center for War Studies University of South Danmark Colonel David Pappalardo, Air and Space Attaché at the French Embassy in Washington Moderator Dr. Chantal Lavallée, Assistant Professor, Royal Military College Saint-Jean     ## Peacekeeping – Virtual Workshop Panel 3 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/peacekeeping-virtual-workshop-panel-3/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > In spite of their dramatic expansion at the end of the Cold War, peace operations have been challenged by problems of local ownership and sustainability and beset by the impact of resounding failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. VIEW VIDEO This event is organized as part of the Capacity-Building in the Age of COVID-19 Virtual Workshop Series. This third workshop will focus on peacekeeping. In spite of their dramatic expansion at the end of the Cold War, peace operations have been challenged by problems of local ownership and sustainability and beset by the impact of resounding failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Outside actors were reluctant to commit to deployments that could not be justified in terms of national security; local actors resented what they perceived as outside interventions with little understanding of the local context and called for local solutions to local problems. To get out of this quandary, building the capacity of regional organizations and of militaries from conflict-ridden states and areas seemed to be the obvious answer. But two decades later, capacity-building efforts are still underway and their achievements increasingly questioned. On the African continent, for instance, foreign-trained militaries continue to face challenges in the areas of human rights and sexual and gender-based violence. And, in spite of longer-term commitments and of a more robust posture, African militaries still have to achieve sustainable results in settings such as Somalia or the Sahel. With the pandemic reducing resources and circulation, how has capacity-building for peacekeeping adapted? How have capacity-building operations sought to identify and address the specific challenges of the pandemic, particularly along gender and ethnic lines? What challenges has it faced and will it face into the future? This event will be in English. Participants will be able to ask questions in French. Panellists: • Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal • Cedric de Coning, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs • Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute • Mody Berethe, Director of the Peacekeeping Training School Capacity Building in the Age of COVID-19: Virtual Workshop Series In the past decade, in a world with many different security challenges, the disastrous failures of direct interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and straitened budgets after the financial crisis of 2008, capacity-building became an increasingly important tool in international security. As states, international organizations and NGOs sought to bolster their partners’ abilities to deal with security problems in many different domains, including defence, counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism, and peace-building, capacity building was not only regarded as more sustainable over the long term than international intervention, it was also deemed useful to achieve better burden sharing. The COVID-19 pandemic puts the requirements for and the uses of capacity-building in question. Moving personnel around and working side-by-side with partners now poses new health risks; the economic calamity which has ensued from the pandemic raises searching questions over how states and organizations will change their policy tools. Have states reconsidered their engagement in what were often treated as low-priority missions? Will they, instead, turn all the more to capacity-building so that others can take on security burdens? How have capacity-building needs and mission operations changed with the new emphasis on health security? Are these reversible or likely permanent changes? Will the difficulties of international cooperation be felt in this domain? This series of virtual workshops will address these and related questions. We will explore the state of capacity-building before the pandemic; assess its impacts on capacity-building operations in defence, COIN/CT, and peacekeeping operations; and analyze the challenges posed for the Canadian Armed Forces. The panels will bring together academic experts and policy-making practitioners to learn from each other. Organizers Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## Peacekeeping-Intelligence: Challenges and Opportunities URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/peacekeeping-intelligence-challenges-and-opportunities/ Modified: 2023-09-26 Peacekeeping-Intelligence: Challenges and Opportunities - A discussion with the Chief of the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Team Guillaume Darmé. This event is being hosted by Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Bishops' University   This is a bilingual event | by invitation only bio: Guillaume Darmé is the Chief of the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Team in the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, a position he has been holding since 2017. He is responsible for the implementation of the Peacekeeping-Intelligence Policy, the creation of a global peacekeeping-Intelligence system, and the coordination of Peacekeeping-Intelligence and Early Warning across Peacekeeping, in missions and at Headquarters. Prior to his current position, Mr. Darmé was the Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Peacekeeping Operations (2012 – 2017), providing technical and strategic advice to the USG on policy, political and operational matters. From 2007 to 2012, Mr. Darmé worked at the Crisis Center of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was part of the team which created the Crisis Center in 2007 and he participated in and led the rescue of thousands of French and European citizens from dangerous situations everywhere in the world, including hostages. He was awarded the Medal of Honor of the French Foreign Affairs for his service to the Nation. Mr. Darmé holds two Master’s Degrees in International Affairs and Negotiations, and Strategic Systems of Defense, respectively. ## Preventing Violent Extremism: Using a Pan Disciplinary Approach URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/preventing-violent-extremism-using-a-pan-disciplinary-approach/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Violent Extremism is a present and growing threat in Canada and around the world. As with so many complex problems, we need to tap into... Event Time Online: 9:00am-12:30pm EDT (UTC-4) In Person: 9:00am-17:00pm EDT (UTC-4) The purpose of this conference is to present current research and expertise in a PVE panel. About this event Violent Extremism is a present and growing threat in Canada and around the world. As with so many complex problems, we need to tap into expertise across disciplines and look for ways to prevent violent extremism that takes creative and collaborative approaches. This conference will include a morning of panels from experts in the field of PVE in the field of Psychology and Political Science. The first panel will examine the theories and contextual factors that need to be taken into account when addressing violent extremism. The second panel will identify key lessons learned from those working in the field of PVE and how they can inform our theoretical lenses. This conference brings together experts from social sciences and theatre, shares the latest knowledge on the prevention of violent extremism and will offer an engaging and interactive way to mobilize knowledge to a larger audience to combat violent extremism in Canada. If attending in-person at Bishop's University, please complete this form ahead of time: https://forms.gle/YiTw5mVf2T47mt3M7 Please note: proof of vaccination against COVID-19 (two does) and the wearing of masks in-doors is a requirement of attending in-person conferences at Bishop's University at this time. Download Programme (2.6mb) Agenda (Online and in Person) 9:00-10:30 : How Theory informs the Field Chaired by: Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin Brûlé (Bishop's University) Dr. Djallil Lounnas (Al Akhawayn university) Dr. Adib Bencherif (Université de Sherbrooke) Mr. André Abel Barry (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie) 10:30-11:00 : Health Break 11:00-12:30 : How the Field informs Theory Chaired by: Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin Brûlé (Bishop's University) Dr. Ghayda Hassan & Dr. Sebastien Brouillette Alarie (Université du Québec à Montréal & CPN-PREV) Mr. Micah Clark (Carleton University) & Mr. Andrew Pel (Moonshot CVE) Dr. Heather Lawford (Bishop's University): Who I am and what I leave behind: Framing Life Stories of Former Extremists in Identity and Legacy Work (In Person Only) 12:30-14:00 : Lunch 14:30-16:30 : Interactive Forum Theater 16:30-17:00 : Closing Remarks   With the generous support of: Bishop’s University, The Students Commission of Canada, The Community Resiliency Fund, Public Safety Canada, and The Strategic Analysis Network. ## Quebec and Canada’s Strategic Directions: Security & Diplomatic Challenges. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/quebec-and-canadas-strategic-directions-security-diplomatic-challenges-2/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > À l’heure de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, qui laisse présager de nombreuses répercussions politiques, économiques et militaires tant Event time : 9:00AM - 12:30PM EDT (UTC-1) This is a French Language Event In the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which has many political, economic and military repercussions at both the national and international levels, the Institut d'études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) and the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) invite you to this event entitled "Quebec and Canada's Strategic Directions: Security & Diplomatic Challenges". The event will take place on March 23, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. (Montreal time), in the form of two panels, the first with a focus on North America and the second, from an international perspective. This presentation is part of the third edition of the Rendez-vous Gérin-Lajoie. It brings together renowned and emerging academic experts, practitioners and diplomats. A number of topical questions on the challenges and strategies of Quebec and Canada will be addressed, in a context marked by a fractured international order and the return of competition between great powers. Justin Massie, professor of political science at UQAM and co-director of the RAS, and Mélanie Marquis, parliamentary correspondent in Ottawa for La Presse, will moderate the event. The event is free and is open to the university community and the general public. Participants : (in alphabetical order) François Audet, Director of l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal Louise Blais, ancienne Ambassadrice et Représentante permanente adjointe du Canada à l’Organisation des Nations unies (2017 à 2021) Laurent Borzillo, stagiaire postdoctoral au sein du Département de science politique de l’UQAM et auprès du RAS Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, professeure invitée en science politique à l’Université de Montréal Justin Massie, professeur titulaire de science politique à l’UQAM et co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique David Morin, professeur agrégé à l’Université de Sherbrooke et co-titulaire de la Chaire UNESCO en prévention de la radicalisation et de l’extrémisme violents Camille Raymond, étudiante à la maîtrise au Département de science politique de l’UQAM et boursière Banque Scotia Scotia-IEIM 2021 Gaëlle Rivard Piché, analyste stratégique, Recherche et développement, pour Défense Canada Stéphane Roussel, directeur de recherche du Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Québec (CIRRICQ) et professeur titulaire à l’École nationale d’Administration publique (ENAP) Check out the recording of the event! ## Quebec Facing Global Rearmament URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/quebec-facing-global-rearmament/ Modified: 2026-10-22 > This full-day conference brings together experts and practitioners to address three interconnected questions: What role can Quebec industry play in this rearmament? Under what conditions will Quebec society support it? And how will the new Quebec government transform Quebec's relations with Canada, the United States, and Europe? This event will be held in French and recorded for later viewing Canada has embarked on its most significant rearmament since the end of the Cold War: a rapid increase in defence spending, its very first Defence Industrial Strategy, the creation of the Defence Investment Agency, closer ties with Europe, and a redefinition of its relationship with the United States. This turning point comes just as a new government, elected on October 5, 2026, takes office in Quebec. This full-day conference brings together experts and practitioners to address three interconnected questions: What role can Quebec industry play in this rearmament? Under what conditions will Quebec society support it? And how will the new Quebec government transform Quebec's relations with Canada, the United States, and Europe? 8:30 — Welcoming & registration Registration and coffee 9:00 — Opening remarks Justin Massie, Professor, Department of Political Science, UQAM; Director, Strategic AnalysisNetwork 9:15 — Panel 1 — Quebec Industry Facing Canadian Rearmament Presentation of the Study Justin Massie, Professor, Department of Political Science, UQAM Maya Bouton, emerging scholar, Master’s student in Political Science at UQAM and Sciences Po Grenoble Walid Ferguen, emerging scholar, Master’s student, Political Science at UQAM Moderator : TBA 10:45 — Break 11:00 — Panel 2 : The Social Acceptability of Canadian Rearmament Anessa Kimball, Professor, Department of Political Studies, Laval University Jean-Christophe Boucher, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary Stéphane Roussel, Professor, École nationale d’Administration publique Moderator : Justin Massie, Professor, Department of Political Science, UQAM 12:30 — Lunch 13:30 — Panel 3 : Quebec's New Government and International Relations for Quebec and Canada Daniel Beland, Professor, McGill University David Morin, Associate Professor, École de politique appliquée, University of Sherbrooke Jean-François Payette, Scientific Director, OPSA, École nationale d’Administration publique Stéphane Paquin, Professor, École nationale d’Administration publique Moderator : Anessa Kimbal, Professor, Department of Political Studies, Laval University 15:00 — Break 15:15 — Informal Talk: Quebec in the World Speakers to be announced 16:15 — Closing remarks 16:30 — Networking Cocktail Photo credit :  Christian Chomiak, Unsplash ## Québec Undergraduate Security Conference, 5th Edition URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/quebec-undergraduate-security-conference-5th-edition/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Organized by Bishop’s University and the Centre for Security and Crisis Governance (CRITIC) of the Royal Military College St. Jean, and supported by the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) and the International Security in the Globalization Era (ISGE), the Quebec Undergraduate Security Conference (QUSC) is currently calling for proposals from undergraduate students as part of the fifth Annual Security Conference for Undergraduate Students. This conference aims to provide undergraduate students a platform to present their research, in English or in French, to high-profile practitioners and scholars in the field of International Security, as well as enable them with an opportunity to network with peers, professors, and experts in the field. The conference will take place at Bishop’s University on Saturday, April 9, 2022. This conference aims to provide undergraduate students a platform to present their research, in English or in French, to high-profile practitioners and scholars in the field of International Security, as well as enable them with an opportunity to network with peers, professors, and experts in the field. The conference will take place at Bishop’s University on Saturday, April 9, 2022. Conference Themes (PDF 182kb) Organized by Bishop’s University and the Centre for Security and Crisis Governance (CRITIC) of the Royal Military College St. Jean, and supported by the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) and the International Security in the Globalization Era (ISGE), the Quebec Undergraduate Security Conference (QUSC) is currently calling for proposals from undergraduate students as part of the fifth Annual Security Conference for Undergraduate Students. This year, the conference will be focusing on the following four themes (more details in the conference themes document above): Climate and Environment Security Gender, Peace, and Security Globalization, Technology, and International Security The Implications of COVID-19 on Peace and Security Students who wish to participate to the conference are required to submit a 300-400-word abstract in English or French focused on one of the four topics above to qusc.bu@gmail.com before December 16, 2021. Students whose abstracts are approved by the QUSC project will be then informed by December 21, 2021, to proceed with the completion of their paper. The full research paper will be expected before January 25, 2022, and is to be at a minimum of 3,000 words. A 100$ prize will be awarded to each of the best four papers selected at the end of the conference. Winners’ papers will also be published on the website of the NSA. In addition, each student will receive a participation certificate. Financial support for transportation and accommodation will be provided. Download Programme (PDF 2.3mb) Student Coordinators Junru Bian - Doctoral Student, University of Ottawa Lily Schricker - Undergraduate Student, Bishop's University Zachary Griffiths-Julien - Undergraduate Student, Bishop's University Areg Aprahamian - Officer Cadet, Royal Military College, Saint-Jean Athena Pucovsky - Officer Cadet, Royal Military College, Saint-Jean Stefan Bobu - Officer Cadet, Royal Military College, Saint-Jean The organization of the fifth edition of the QUSC is made possible by the generous support of Bishop's University, the Royal Military College Saint-Jean, as well as the sponsorship of the Centre Franco- Paix. The QUSC is also organized in collaboration with the Strategic Analysis Network (SAN), the International Security in the Globalization Era project (ISGE), as well as the MINDS Initiative. ## RAS-NSA’s Intensive Professional Development Retreat for Emerging Scholars URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/ras-nsas-intensive-professional-development-retreat-for-emerging-scholars/ Modified: 2024-03-28 The RAS-NSA is happy to host its Intensive Professional Retreat for Emerging Scholars at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, from May 27 to May 29, 2024. Participants will get the occasion to hone their skills related to research development and execution, knowledge mobilization, outreach, and communications, while at the same time receiving concrete briefings and trainings through modules about what researching in the field of Canadian security and defence truly entails. Over the course of two days, they will participate in a series of modules that touch every step of the research enterprise, from start to finish. On the third, they will engage in training familiarizing at CFB-Kingston before traveling to the RAS-NSA’s annual colloquium, taking place on May 30, 2024.     Preliminary Schedule Day 1 – May 27, 2024 9:30 am – 10:30 am: Intro and Icebreaking Welcoming remarks and goal setting. 10:30 am – 10:45 am: Health Break 10:45 am – 12:15 pm: Module 1, Military Operations and the Defence Community How does research and strategic analysis inform military operations and defence activities? This session focuses on the interaction between research and practice with this important question in mind. Through the MINDS program, the integration of external expertise is encouraged, but there are both opportunities and challenges to academic-military engagement. This session is designed to provide examples of how research and military affairs can connect, as well as strategies to improve communication across professional divides. 12:15 pm – 13:15 pm: Lunch Break Speed mentorship. 13:45 pm – 15:15 pm: Module 2, Research Ethics and Challenging Fieldwork Environments How should students approach the ethical and safety aspects of their research? How can they prepare effectively for the more complicated and challenging aspects of fieldwork? This module is designed to give an overview of what considerations should keep in mind when given sensitive information, traveling to more volatile areas, and navigating unpredictable local contexts. 15:15 pm – 15:30 pm: Health Break 15:30 pm – 17:00 pm: Module 3, Organizing/Logistics of Field Work A sometimes neglected, but equally important component of a successful research project ties in to planning and logistics. Knowing who to contact, how to approach them, and what steps a researcher should take when organizing fieldwork is essential. This module is designed to equip Emerging Scholars with realistic expectations of what doing fieldwork entails on a practical level and provides tips on how to develop research networks beyond academia to advance their research agenda to the next step. 18:00 pm – 20:00 pm: Welcome Dinner   Day 2 – May 28, 2024 9:30 am – 10:30 am: Module 4, Military 101 To the uninitiated, military operations are shrouded by complicated concepts and inaccessible terminology (and acronyms!). This module is designed to familiarize Emerging Scholars with military terminology and experiences, as well as to provide them with the knowledge needed to work and study within the defence community in Canada. 10:30 am – 10:45 am: Health Break 10:45 am – 12:15 pm: Module 5, Taking Your Project Further: Publications, Outreach, and Spin-Off Projects What comes after data collection and analysis? How can Emerging Scholars make the most of their research and intellectual work? This module is designed to equip Emerging Scholars with ideas on how to take their projects further through new publications, outreach to the general public, and spin-off projects. 12:15 pm – 13:15 pm: Lunch Break Headshot photo station. 13:45 pm – 15:15 pm: Module 6, Part 1, Media Training An essential aspect of the academic enterprise is now the ‘public-facing’ work scholars have to do. An important component of this are Op-Eds and short pieces written to address and inform the general public while being responsive to the news of the day. This module is designed to train Emerging Scholars in identifying where and how to pitch their ideas, how to write quickly, and how to cultivate their reputation as a public intellectual with journalists and different media. 15:15 pm – 15:30 pm: Health Break 15:30 pm – 17:00 pm: Module 6, Part 2, Media Training Giving interviews on the radio and on television can be daunting, yet more and more, universities and the government value the public-facing work their researchers do in order to publicize research to the general public. This module seeks to train Emerging Scholars in how to prepare for such an interview, anticipate questions, decide the key messages they wish to convey, and make sure to stay on message in the moment. 18:00 pm – 20:00 pm: Dinner   Day 3 – May 29th 9:30 am – 2:00 pm: Training familiarization at CFB-Kingston   ## Ready, Engaged and Informed: Canada and the Role of Intelligence in Addressing Emerging Threats and Challenges URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/ready-engaged-and-informed/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Speakers will be invited to discuss the evolving role of intelligence in Canada, international organizations and allies, and to assess how... Event Time : 8:45am-5:15pm EDT (UTC-4) / 2:45pm-11:15pm CEST (UTC+2) This conference is funded by the MINDS program of the Canadian Department of National Defence, in partnership with the Centre for Security and Crisis Governance (CRITIC) of the Royal Military College Saint-Jean and the Centre Franco-paix. This second annual colloquium will focus on the role of intelligence in responding to emerging challenges: climate change, the pandemic and the rise of new technologies, as well as the integration of a gendered approach to intelligence. This conference will thus address two questions.  First, how does Canadian intelligence anticipate and respond to these new challenges, both domestically and in collaboration with our allies?  On the other hand, what opportunities and constraints do these challenges create for improving national and international intelligence practices in order to enhance this capacity to anticipate and react in Canada and internationally? Speakers will be invited to discuss the evolving role of intelligence in Canada, international organizations and allies, and to assess how Canada can distinguish itself by meeting their expectations and advancing innovative and uniquely Canadian approaches, including a feminist approach to intelligence. This conference will be bilingual and will combine the reflections and research of professors, practitioners and experts with those of graduate students.  The symposium will share analysis of global trends, best practices, opportunities and implications for Canada in relation to the issues discussed.  It will showcase the latest research on these issues.  This format will also allow the networking of the next generation of defence and security experts. It will also foster the development of new and young researchers.  Deliverables will be written and created by researchers and students to optimize the knowledge and research mobilized. The recordings of the April 8 conference are now available! Panel 1 : Climate & Security Nexus: Towards a New Paradigm? Panel 2 : New Technologies, New Partnerships? Collaborations and Anticipation Panel 4 : Intelligence and multilateral collaboration Download the Programme (PDF 2.1mb) Student Coordinators Chloé Berland - Master's Student, Department of Political Science, University of Montréal   Junru Bian – Doctoral Student, University of Ottawa ## Roundtable – Security Challenges in Africa URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/roundtable-security-challenges-in-africa/ Modified: 2023-06-07 > For too long, Africa has been essentialized and often reduced to perpetual conflict and its accompanying humanitarian needs. Today, the... On the occasion of the forthcoming publication of Volume 6 of the Rubicon by Les Equateurs, devoted to security challenges in Africa, this roundtable discussion brings together the authors of this new volume to delve into the various issues addressed in this book. For too long, Africa has been essentialized and often reduced to perpetual conflict and its accompanying humanitarian needs. Today, the African continent encompasses many of the political and strategic challenges faced by the international community as a whole. The need to take a fresh look at this collection of 54 states is more crucial than ever. Moderator: Marie-Eve Desrosiers Participants : Dr. Arthur Banga, Université Houphouët-Boigny Arthur Boutellis General (e. r.) Didier Castres Alexandra Lamarche Dr. Oswald Padonou, Professor and Program Director, École Nationale Supérieure des Armées (ENSA-Bénin) Raphael Parens, Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute Michael Shurkin Dr. Nina Wilén, Director of the Africa Program for International Relations at the Egmont Institute ## RUBICON COLLOQUIUM – The multidimensional challenges of foreign interference URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/rubicon-colloquium-the-multidimensional-challenges-of-foreign-interference/ Modified: 2024-01-16 > The multidimensional challenges of foreign interference. With the participation and support of the French Embassy in Canada. *note: This conference will be in French only Thursday January 18, 2024 17:30 -19:30 : Reception at the French Embassy Friday January 19, 2024 8:30-9:00 : Opening Remarks - Rubicon Year 2 Ambassador Michel Miraillet (Ambassade de France au Canada) Professor Julian Fernandez (Université Panthéon-Assas/Université Galatasaray) Ambassador Jean-Baptiste Jeangène-Vilmer (Ambassade de France au Vanuatu) Professor Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) 9-10:30 : L’ingérence dans la recherche scientifique Moderator : Professor Julian Fernandez (Université Panthéon-Assas/Université Galatasaray) Speakers : Professor Magdalena Dembinska (Université de Montréal) Dr. Céline Marangé (IRSEM) Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché (Recherche et développement pour la Défense Canada) Dr. Marie Robin (Université Panthéon-Assas) Professor David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke) 10:30-11:00 : Break 11:00-12:30 : Interference in the Information Field Moderator : Professor Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) Speakers : Associate Professor Jean-Christophe Boucher (Université de Calgary) Dr. Colin Gérard (Institut français de géopolitique) Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin Brûlé (Université Bishop’s) Charles Thepaut, deputy director - veille et stratégie (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères) Alexis Rapin (Chercheur en résidence à l'Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels de la Chaire Raoul Dandurand) 12:30-14:00 : Lunch 14:00-15:30 : Electoral Interference Moderator : Ambassador Jean-Baptiste Jeangène-Vilmer (Ambassade de France au Vanuatu) Speakers : Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau, Doctoral Student (Université d'Ottawa) Associate Professor Aengus Bridgman (Unviersité McGill) Professor Thomas Juneau (Université d’Ottawa) Marco Munier, Doctoral Student (UQAM) Isabelle Poupart, General Director, European Affairs (Affaires Mondiales Canada)   Details to attend the colloquium: If you would like to take part in the conference in person, please identify yourself and complete the following form: Form 1 If you would like to attend the remote panel discussions, please complete the following form: Form 2 Participation in the symposium is by invitation only. Once you have registered (Form 1 or Form 2), subject to space, you will receive confirmation from Rubicon and an official invitation by the second week of January at the latest. Please note that without an invitation from Rubicon, you will not be able to access this event (either in person or online). For those taking part in person, it will be necessary to carry proof of identity (national identity card or passport). ## Strategic Analysis Network’ 2021-2022 Doctoral Scholarship URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/network-for-strategic-analysis-2021-2022-doctoral-scholarship/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > The NSA offers a scholarship of $10,000 to a graduate student. The candidate will receive a doctoral intern position at the NSA for 2021-22. ## Summer School – Computational Analysis of Texts on the War in Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/summer-school-computational-analysis-of-texts-on-the-war-in-ukraine/ Modified: 2023-05-12 > The course will develop these skills in relation to a specific research problem: the war in Ukraine, which is causing great tension in the... Presentation The Strategic Analysis Network (SAN) is organizing a summer school on computational text analysis methods in the field of security and defense. The goal of the summer school is to train a new generation of researchers on computer-assisted text analysis to develop their capacity to process vast quantities of texts on security and defense issues. Specifically, the summer school will train students in the collection, management, analysis, and visualization of textual data. To do this, the training will employ R and Python software. The course will develop these skills in relation to a specific research problem: the war in Ukraine, which is causing great tension in the international community. Students will be asked to examine the nature of perceptions, within a country of their choice, of the war in Ukraine, to identify dominant frames and the degree of internal contestation. The work of the summer school will culminate in a collective work that will allow for the comparison of research findings and enrich our understanding of the ongoing fragmentation of the liberal international order. The summer school offers students the opportunity to deepen their empirical and methodological knowledge of these issues. It is also an excellent opportunity for knowledge sharing and networking within the NSA. Preliminary Programming Day 1: Data collection Day 2: Data labeling Day 3: Data processing and computational modeling Day 4: Data analysis Eligibility This intensive training is offered to a small group of students to provide individualized support and personalized learning. Students working under the supervision of one of the members of the Strategic Analysis Network are eligible. No experience is necessary; knowledge of R or Python is not a prerequisite. The training will be conducted in French and English, so a good knowledge of both languages is required. Application deadline: May 24, 2023 Please submit your application, by May 24, 2023, to info@ras-nsa.ca with the subject line Summer School and copied to the NSA expert supervising your studies, with the following two documents attached:  Curriculum vitae: previous training, research experience, methodological skills, etc.;  Letter of motivation: why attend the NSA Summer School? We encourage applications from Indigenous people, people of color, LGBTQ2I and people with disabilities. We promote equity and encourage you to indicate in the application if you belong to one of the designated groups. Only successful applicants will be contacted. Terms and Conditions The summer school is offered free of charge and will be held full-time from July 4-7, 2023 at UQAM. Only those who are fully available during this period are eligible. Living expenses are included for all, as well as transportation and lodging expenses for those coming from outside Montreal. ## Summer School in Strategic Studies: “Thinking About Conflicts in the 21st Century” URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/summer-school-in-strategic-studies-thinking-about-conflicts-in-the-21st-century/ Modified: 2026-06-23 This event was held in French The first edition of the Summer School in Strategic Studies, “Thinking About Conflicts in the 21st Century,” was held in Paris from June 8 to 13, 2026. Over the course of six days, 35 students from France and Canada participated in an intensive program focused on the major strategic challenges of our time. Discussions centered on the evolution of transatlantic relations, the return of power politics, the broadening scope of conflict, the resurgence of nuclear issues, conventional rearmament, and the pursuit of greater European strategic autonomy. This French-language summer school is the result of a collaboration between several leading institutions in the field of strategic studies. It brings together the Institute for Strategic Research at the École Militaire (IRSEM), the centers of excellence “Organizing Strategic Surprise” and “Strategy and Conflicts Bordeaux Campus,” as well as Laval University and the Strategic Analysis Network. Through lectures, workshops, and discussions, participants were able to deepen their understanding of international security issues while forging lasting ties with their counterparts across the Atlantic. Held alternately in France and Quebec, the Summer School will continue to grow with a second edition scheduled for 2027 at Laval University’s École supérieure d’études internationales (ESEI) in Quebec City. Photo credit: momo11353 ## Supporting Security and Capacity Building Efforts in Africa URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/supporting-security-and-capacity-building-efforts-in-africa/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > With this broader notion of “capacity building” in mind, how do we design responses to security challenges in an innovative, coherent, and... Event time: 8:45-18:30 EST (UTC-5) / 14h45-00h30 CET (UTC+1) There is a clear consensus today on the multidimensional nature of security issues and of the responses they require. Issues as diverse as climate change, gender-based violence, armed conflicts, and terrorism are in reality often interconnected. Responding to them – or at least effectively and appropriately supporting the response developed by our partners – therefore requires a comprehensive approach, understood in terms of links and bridges to be made across issues, as well as across levels of action. Though the African continent is not alone in facing these multidimensional security challenges and response efforts, it has nevertheless been at the forefront of the most recent reflections on how to best address them. The workshop aims to explore the innovative approaches that have been deployed to support peace and security efforts by various actors–local, national, regional, and international–and the linkages across some of these practices to showcase and assess the multidimensional efforts currently underway in Africa. How do we design responses to security challenges in an innovative, coherent, and comprehensive manner? How do we respond to the multidimensionality of security challenges and the fact that they tend to be multi-layered, while ensuring that the responses are based on and strengthen national and local initiatives, skills, and capacities? Answering these questions necessarily involves bridging sectors and communities of actors. The workshop aims to develop recommendations that can serve the work of researchers and practitioners alike. Download the Programme (3.6mb) Conference Agenda 8:45am - 9:00am: Introduction – Marie-Eve Desrosiers, Université d’Ottawa 9:00am - 10:15am: How to act in an innovative way in response to the security challenges in Africa? Do we have a better idea today of how to approach security challenges in an integrated way? What are some examples of especially innovative or effective security or capacity-building actions emerging from African contexts? Chair: Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal Niagalé Bagayoko, Africa Security Sector Network Mpako Foaleng, Département des Operations de Paix, ONU Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Université Bishop’s Check out the recording of the panel! 10:15am - 10:45am: Coffee break 10:45am - 12:00pm: Building capacity in a multidimensional framework Capacity building is a concept that has been mobilized to address various security challenges. But what are the current issues associated with this concept? What are the most frequently addressed capacities? Whose capacities, and built by whom? How can capacities be conceived broadly and inclusively enough to take into account the multidimensionality of security challenges in the complex African contexts? Chair: Niagalé Bagayoko, Africa Security Sector Network Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal—Saint-Jean Pierre Leroux, MFO Chief Liaison, Canadian Contingent Commander Check out the recording of the panel! 12:00pm - 1:00pm: Lunch 1:00pm - 2:15pm: From the international to the local: the crossroads between levels of analysis and action. How do actions at one level impact other levels? The importance of including all beneficiaries of a security action in its design is recognized, but how can this be done in practice in a credible and sustainable way? Chair: Philippe Frowd, Université d’Ottawa Arsène Brice Bado, Centre de Recherche et d'Action pour la Paix Adib Bencherif, Université de Sherbrooke Maria Martin de Almagro, Université de Gand Check out the recording of the panel! 2:15pm - 3:30pm: Traditional issues, non-traditional tools How can non-traditional tools be used to address traditional security issues, such as armed violence (terrorism, wars)? How to define innovation in security support action in a way that bridges the gap between researchers and practitioners? What are the challenges and risks of initiatives that seek to bridge traditional and non-traditional approaches to security? Chair: Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal—Saint-Jean Philippe Frowd, Université d’Ottawa Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Université Carleton Virginie Tardif-Plante, Affaires Mondiales Canada Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal Check out the recording of the panel! 3:30pm - 4:00pm: Coffee break 4:00pm - 5:00pm: Round table discussions: Look back at the central issues What have we learned about multidimensional security interventions in Africa? What avenues for action have been identified? What new avenues for research? 5:00pm - 6:30pm: Keynote event, Cyril Obi, Social Science Research Council. Re-democratizing Africa Again? Engaging emerging challenges to peace and security in a time of crises Check out the recording of the Keynote event! ## Ten Years On: Assessing the U.S. Strategic Pivot (Rebalancing) to Asia URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/ten-years-on-assessing-the-u-s-strategic-pivot-rebalancing-to-asia/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > The Obama administration announced its strategic pivot to Asia in 2011. Over the last decade, the pivot has evolved, from strategic rebalancing under Obama, to the Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy. But has the centre of gravity of U.S. diplomacy and defence shifted to the Indo-Pacific as initially planned? The Obama administration announced its strategic pivot to Asia in 2011. Over the last decade, the pivot has evolved, from strategic rebalancing under Obama, to the Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy. But has the centre of gravity of U.S. diplomacy and defence shifted to the Indo-Pacific as initially planned? By removing the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and accelerating the American retreat from world affairs at a time when China was consolidating its position in the Indo-Pacific, did the Trump administration compromise the American strategy on Asia? How did America’s allies react to the U.S. pivot and what impact did it have on rival powers, such as China, Russia and Iran? Finally, what lessons should Canada learn from this strategy and what are the strategic and defensive implications for Ottawa?   This workshop is being organized by the Strategic Analysis Network, created by the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program of Canada’s Department of National Defence. The workshop will bring together academic and military experts to take stock of this strategic issue in the context of increased rivalry between major powers. VIEW VIDEOS OF THE EVENT Colloquium Program   Preliminary program   9:30-9:35: Opening remarks by Jonathan Paquin, Research Leader, Axis 1 (Université Laval)   9:35-11:15: Panel 1 (view video) The Strategic Pivot and the Response of Washington’s Allies Moderator: Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s University) Rachel Esplin Odell (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft)           The US pivot then and now Jonathan Berkshire Miller (Japan Institute of International Affairs)           An East Asian Perspective on the Pivot: Japan and Korea Natalie Sambhi (Australian National University)          Australia and ASEAN states’ response to the pivot Cleo Paskal (Chatham House)          European perceptions of strategic changes in the Indo-Pacific   11:00-12:00: Keynote Speaker (view video) Commodore Angus Topshee, OMM, MSM, CD, Naval Warfare Officer - Royal Canadian Navy   12:00-13h00: Lunch   13:00-14:15: Panel 2 (view video) Reactions of Rival Powers to American Rebalancing Moderator: Yann Breault (Royal Military College of St-Jean) Bonnie S. Glaser (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC)          China’s positioning in the face of American rebalancing Zachary Paikin (Global Policy Institute, London)          Russia’s response to the U.S. initiative   Pierre Pahlavi (Canadian Forces College)        The consequences of the pivot for Iranian foreign policy and the balance of power in the Middle East   14:15-14:30: Closing Remarks ## The Arctic: Between the Reshaping of Alliances and the Consolidation of Sovereignty URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-arctic-between-the-reshaping-of-alliances-and-the-consolidation-of-sovereignty/ Modified: 2026-04-10 Conference: The Arctic: Between the Reshaping of Alliances and the Consolidation of Sovereignty   This event will be held in French   This special event, designed to foster collaboration between Montreal and Paris in a shared commitment to strengthening ties between Canada and France, provides an opportunity to welcome Ms. Nathalie G. Drouin, Canada’s new Ambassador to France. This symposium is co-organized by Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Executive Secretary General of France-Amériques, and Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Director of the FrancoPaix Center. Objective: To provide a forum for high-level strategic reflection on the Arctic, bringing together European and North American perspectives on issues of sovereignty, hybrid threats, and climate challenges, in order to identify concrete avenues for reshaping alliances, strengthening defense capabilities, and protecting critical infrastructure, while integrating Indigenous partnerships and multilateral cooperation frameworks.   PROGRAM: 2:30 PM – 2:40 PM | Opening Remarks, Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Director of the FrancoPaix Center, and Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Executive Secretary General of France-Amériques. 2:40 PM – 3:00 PM | KEYNOTE SPEAKER: Canada’s Ambassador to France and Monaco – Ms. Nathalie G. Drouin 3:00 PM – 4:20 PM | Stories from the Far North: Two Explorers Facing a Changing Arctic This panel aims to bring together the perspectives of two explorers dedicated to the Arctic to better understand the rapid transformations of the Far North in the face of climate change, sovereignty issues, and new geopolitical dynamics. Through their presentations, Jean-Louis Étienne and Jean Lemire will share their field experience and their insights into the changes underway, followed by a joint discussion and a Q&A session with the audience. Fireside chat between Dr. Étienne and Mr. Lemire, followed by Q&A Dr. Jean-Louis Étienne, physician, polar explorer, writer, and IUCN Ambassador for the Poles and the Ocean Jean Lemire, Envoy for Climate Change and Northern and Arctic Issues for the Government of Quebec Moderators: Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Director of the FrancoPaix Center, and Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Executive Secretary General of France-Amériques. 4:20 PM – 4:40 PM | Coffee Break 4:45 PM – 5:30 PM | Panel I – Capabilities, Innovation, and Multi-Domain Security in the Arctic A discussion bringing together policymakers, military leaders, and industry representatives to examine operational and technological responses to Arctic security challenges in a pan-domain environment, covering submarine, land, air, high-altitude, and space domains, including the growing role of satellite capabilities in surveillance, communications, and Arctic security. Moderator: Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Executive Secretary General of France-Amériques Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Executive Director, Conference of Defense Associations (CDA) and CDA Institute Air Corps General Dominique Tardif, Major General of the Air and Space Force Robert Sinclair Canadian Ambassador to Sweden 5:45 PM – 6:30 PM | Panel II – Sovereignty, Hybrid Threats, and Disinformation in the Arctic An expert discussion focused on sovereignty challenges, emerging forms of strategic competition, and hybrid threats shaping the Arctic security environment, with particular attention to implications for European, Canadian, and broader transatlantic/transarctic security. Moderator: Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Director of the FrancoPaix Center Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher, Associate Professor at the University of Calgary Mikaa Blugeon-Mered, researcher in the geopolitics of the energy transition and polar specialist, lecturer at Sciences Po, the University of Quebec at Trois-Rivières, and Mohammed VI Polytechnic University Dr. Florian Krampe, Director of Studies, Peace and Development, at SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Director of the SIPRI Climate Change and Risk Programme Admiral Hervé de Bonnaventure, Defense Advisor to the CEO of the MBDA Group (to be confirmed) 6:30 PM – 6:40 PM | Closing Remarks 6:45 PM | Reception Our thanks go to the President of France-Amériques, Admiral Alain Coldefy, the team at the Canadian Embassy in France, and the Centre FrancoPaix. We also acknowledge the support of the Strategic Analysis Network. Finally, we extend our warmest thanks to Colonel Romain Bethoux of the Air and Space Force for his essential contribution to this initiative. This symposium was organized in conjunction with the Transatlantic Symposium held at France-Amériques on September 29, 2025, and the Transpacific Symposium on January 21, 2026.   The event will take place in-person only in Paris ## The CAF and Capacity-Building under COVID-19 – Virtual Workshop Panel 5 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-caf-and-capacity-building-under-covid-19-virtual-workshop-panel-5/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > This fifth workshop will focus on the Canadian Armed Forces under COVID-19. International capacity-building activities became an increasingly large part of what the Canadian Armed Forces does in the world. They allow Canada to make a difference internationally and particularly to contribute to multilateral efforts, while recognizing the limits to Canada’s capacity to deploy large missions for long periods in violent contexts, as in Afghanistan. But the pandemic has posed considerable challenges to these missions. Some missions were suspended, others drawn down, and rotations disrupted, all while the CAF laboured to keep its members healthy and respond to increased demands at home. What has COVID-19 indicated about Canada’s defense and security priorities in capacity-building? What lessons can the CAF learn about overseas military operations under the risk of future pandemics? How have the disparate effects of the pandemic along gender and ethnic lines affected the CAF and its ability to conduct capacity-building activities abroad? VIEW VIDEO This event is organized as part of the Capacity-Building in the Age of COVID-19 Virtual Workshop Series. This fifth workshop will focus on the Canadian Armed Forces under COVID-19. International capacity-building activities became an increasingly large part of what the Canadian Armed Forces does in the world. They allow Canada to make a difference internationally and particularly to contribute to multilateral efforts, while recognizing the limits to Canada’s capacity to deploy large missions for long periods in violent contexts, as in Afghanistan. But the pandemic has posed considerable challenges to these missions. Some missions were suspended, others drawn down, and rotations disrupted, all while the CAF laboured to keep its members healthy and respond to increased demands at home. What has COVID-19 indicated about Canada’s defense and security priorities in capacity-building? What lessons can the CAF learn about overseas military operations under the risk of future pandemics? How have the disparate effects of the pandemic along gender and ethnic lines affected the CAF and its ability to conduct capacity-building activities abroad? This event will be in French. Participants will be able to ask questions in English.   Panelists: • Stéphanie Bélanger, Royal Military College Saint-Jean • LCol Pierre Leroux, Canadian Armed Forces • Theodore McLauchlin, University of Montreal • Major Audrey Hudon, Canadian Armed Forces   Capacity Building in the Age of COVID-19: Virtual Workshop Series In the past decade, in a world with many different security challenges, the disastrous failures of direct interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and straitened budgets after the financial crisis of 2008, capacity-building became an increasingly important tool in international security. As states, international organizations and NGOs sought to bolster their partners’ abilities to deal with security problems in many different domains, including defence, counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism, and peace-building, capacity building was not only regarded as more sustainable over the long term than international intervention, it was also deemed useful to achieve better burden sharing. The COVID-19 pandemic puts the requirements for and the uses of capacity-building in question. Moving personnel around and working side-by-side with partners now poses new health risks; the economic calamity which has ensued from the pandemic raises searching questions over how states and organizations will change their policy tools. Have states reconsidered their engagement in what were often treated as low-priority missions? Will they, instead, turn all the more to capacity-building so that others can take on security burdens? How have capacity-building needs and mission operations changed with the new emphasis on health security? Are these reversible or likely permanent changes? Will the difficulties of international cooperation be felt in this domain? This series of virtual workshops will address these and related questions. We will explore the state of capacity-building before the pandemic; assess its impacts on capacity-building operations in defence, COIN/CT, and peacekeeping operations; and analyze the challenges posed for the Canadian Armed Forces. The panels will bring together academic experts and policy-making practitioners to learn from each other. Organizers Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, ext. 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, ext. 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## The crisis in Mali and its international dimensions – Roundtable URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-crisis-in-mali-and-its-international-dimensions-roundtable/ Modified: 2022-09-30 > Mali has been at the center of conflicts in the Sahel for a decade now. It is at a turning point: political crises, transformations in... note: this event is only available in French Mali has been at the center of conflicts in the Sahel for a decade now. It is at a turning point: political crises, transformations in international interventions, profound questions regarding the MINUSMA peace operation. How can we understand these changes? What are the consequences for Mali, the region, international interventions and peace operations? Participants : Adib Bencherif, University of Sherbrooke Bruno Charbonneau, Royal Military College - Saint-Jean Ousmane Diallo, Amnesty International Dirk Druet, McGill University Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Bishop's University Mamoudou Gazibo, Université de Montréal Chair: Marie-Joëlle Zahar ## The End of the Afghanistan War: Its Impact on NATO and Great Power Rivalries URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/axis-i-end-of-afghanistan-war/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > The American withdrawal from Afghanistan raises many questions, both in the United States and in other NATO countries The American withdrawal from Afghanistan raises many questions, both in the United States and in other NATO countries. What impact has it had on the dynamics of cooperation within NATO? We know that the Biden administration’s unilateral withdrawal created tensions within the alliance. The UK and France, for instance, expressed their frustrations and concluded that they were too dependent on the United States for their own security. More broadly, what does the end of the Afghanistan war mean for NATO? Is this the end of its out-of-area operations? The American withdrawal also raises questions about great power rivalries. Do Beijing and Moscow see it as further proof that the United States is in decline? Now five months since the withdrawal, have China and Russia taken advantage of the American departure to increase their influence and make geostrategic gains in Central Asia? This conference organized by the Strategic Analysis Network in partnership with the Institut militaire de Québec will address these key questions. Download Programme Hourly Schedule Jan 21, 2022 9:30 am - 9:35 am Opening remarks 9:35 am - 11:30 am The withdrawal from Afghanistan and its impact on the competition between great powers Moderator: Justin Massie (UQAM) 11:30 am - 12:30 pm Keynote Speaker - Ben Rowswell Canada in Afghanistan: A Political Assessment 12:30 pm - 1:30 pm Lunch Break 1:30 pm - 3:30 pm The impact of the end of the war in Afghanistan on NATO Moderator: Richard Giguère 3:30 pm - 3:40 pm Closing Remarks ## The Evolution and future of NATO’s relationship with the Arctic in a context of (non)-politicization of defence issues URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-evolution-and-future-of-natos-relationship-with-the-arctic-in-a-context-of-non-politicization-of-defence-issues/ Modified: 2025-02-27 The conference will take place in English and French Agenda: 8h30 : Opening Remarks Professor Stéphane Roussel, ENAP Alexandre Courtemanche, UQAM 9h00-10h45 : Climate challenges and threats in the Arctic Moderator : Benjamin Boutin, Association France Canada Speakers : Bridget Larocque, Chair Northern Advisory Board and Co-lead, North American Arctic Defence and Security (remote) Pauline Baudu, Université du Québec à Montréal (remote) Dr Laurent Borzillo, École nationale d’administration publique (ÉNAP) Eric Laporte, Directeur exécutif de la Direction des relations de sécurité et de défense (IGR) 10h45-11h15 : Break 11h15-12h30 : NATO and the Arctic Rear Admiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN) Discussant : Professor Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Bishop's University 12h30-13h45 : Lunch 13h45-15h15 : Equipment and Capabilities for the Arctic: How to Promote Production and Industrial Cooperation Within the Transatlantic Community Moderator :  Professor Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Speakers : Dr Thomas Hughes, Mount Allison University (remote) Professor Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Professor Stéphane Roussel, École nationale d’administration publique (ENAP) Gaspard Schnitzler, Researcher at l’Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) 15h15-15h45 : Break 15h45-17h15 : Military Cooperation in the Arctic in a Context of Risks Linked to the Politicization/Non-Politicization of Defence Issues in Democratic Societies Moderator : Prof. Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Speakers : United States Consul General in Montreal, Robert P. Sanders Professeure Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Rear Admiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN) Dr. Pauline Pic, Université Laval (remote) 17h15 – 17h30 : Closing Remarks Benjamin Boutin, Director, Association France Canada, and Teodora Morosanu, Forum de Défense et de Stratégie ## The Fractured International Order: Implications for the Defence of Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-fractured-international-order-implications-for-the-defence-of-canada/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Canada must adapt to an unpredictable international environment, defined by increased great power competition and the proliferation of regional conflicts to which it is often called upon to respond. The Strategic Analysis Network’ annual colloquium will examine the theme of a fractured international order by considering the adaptation of different regions to this new international architecture, the viability of multilateralism as a model for interstate cooperation, and the more visible role of capacity building in conflict management. Join us live on December 10 and 11, 2020: https://video.ibm.com/channel/DFPzEGZDkRG Canada must adapt to an unpredictable international environment, defined by increased great power competition and the proliferation of regional conflicts to which it is often called upon to respond. The Strategic Analysis Network’ annual colloquium will examine the theme of a fractured international order by considering the adaptation of different regions to this new international architecture, the viability of multilateralism as a model for interstate cooperation, and the more visible role of capacity building in conflict management. VIEW VIDEOS OF THE EVENT Colloquium Program   DAY 1 - December 10th 9:30 - 9:45 Welcoming Remarks by Co-Directors 9:45 - 10:45 The Fractured International Order (view video) Moderator: Jonathan Paquin (ULaval) Adapting under Uncertainty: American Leadership and The Future of The Fractured Order: Anessa Kimball (ULaval) South China Sea : Military Dimension of Chinese Behavior : Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM) The Middle East, Between Trump and Biden: Thomas Juneau (uOttawa) 11:00 - 12:00 Keynote Speaker (view video) Lieutenant-General M. N. Rouleau, CMM, MSC, CD (Department of National Defence) 12:00 - 13:00 Lunch 13:00 - 14:00 Capacity Building and Conflict Management (view video) Moderator: Théo McLauchlin (UMontréal) Capacity Building and Security on The Ground: Lee Seymour (UMontréal) The Return of Human Security? Bruno Charbonneau (Collège militaire royal de St Jean) Women, Peace and Security: Yolande Bouka (Queen's)   DAY 2 - December 11th 9:30 - 9:40 Welcoming Remarks by Co-Directors 9:40 – 10:40 Multilateralism in Free Fall? (view video) Moderator: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (UBishops) Back to the Future? The United Nations in Turmoil: Marie-Joëlle Zahar (UMontréal) ASEAN's Contributions to Multilateralism and Regional Order in Asia-Pacific: Stéphanie Martel (Queen's) The European Union and Multilateralism: Costanza Musu (UOttawa) 11:00 - 12 :00 Keynote Speaker (view video) Marina Henke (Hertie School)   ## The invasion of Ukraine: 3 Years On URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-invasion-of-ukraine-3-years-on/ Modified: 2025-01-31 > Le 24 février 2025 marquera les trois ans depuis le début de l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie. À cette occasion... *this event will take place in French February 24, 2025 will mark three years since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. On this occasion, the Chaire Raoul-Dandurand will bring together renowned experts for a round table discussion that will provide different perspectives on this ongoing armed conflict, analyze its evolution, examine its consequences and discuss prospects for ending the crisis. Programme Introductory remarks by François Audet, Director of the Institut d'études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) Round table with: Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa Frédérick Gagnon, holder of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair and professor in the Department of Political Science at UQAM Simon Hogue, researcher at the Raoul-Dandurand Chair's Observatory of Multidimensional Conflicts and professor at UQAM's Department of Political Science Ekaterina Piskunova, lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Studies Faculty Program, Université de Montréal Louis Vachon, partner at J.C. Flowers & Co Hosted by Fanny Tan (researcher in residence at the Raoul-Dandurand Chair's Observatory of Multidimensional Conflicts and master's student in UQAM's Department of Political Science), this event is organized by the Raoul-Dandurand Chair, in collaboration with IEIM and the Strategic Analysis Network. ## The Politicization of Defence and Strategic Issues URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/politicization-of-defence-and-strategic-issues/ Modified: 2024-12-09 This event is in French only. Monday - Dec. 9, 2024 09h00-9h10 : Opening Remarks Dr. Laurent Borzillo, chercheur invité (CCEAE, UdeM/ENAP) 09h10-10h30 - Round Table 1 : Politicization of defense issues and strategic orientation: realities and consequences Topics : Impact on decisions when the issues are publicized in the media; impact on defense decisions (opex, military procurement); defense issues, traditionally seen as consensual public policy, in a process of polarization. Moderator : Pr. Frédéric Mérand (UdeM) Jean-Charles Larsonneur (député à l’Assemblée nationale 2017-2024) Laurent Charbonneau (UdeM) Laurent Borzillo, chercheur invité (CCEAE, UdeM/ ENAP) 10h30-10h45 - Break 10h45-12h00 - Round Table 2 : Politicization at election time: can an issue of defense and/or strategic orientation become the major issue of an election/political life? Topics: Elections in Moldova and Georgia (Fall 2024); the subject of the Russian-Ukrainian war in Western democracies; defence issues in elections. Moderator : Pr. Delphine Deschaux-Dutard (Université de Grenoble Alpes) Florian Galleri (Université de Nantes) Justin Massie (UQAM) Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Romain Le Quiniou (Euro Créative) Tuesday - Dec. 10, 2024 09h00-10h15 - Round Table 3 : The politicization of defense and strategic issues, a consequence of interference and the spread of fake news Moderator : Manon Fitzpatrick (Université de Genève) Jean F. Crombois (Université américaine en Bulgarie) Maxime Audinet (IRSEM) Magdalena Dembińska (UDEM) 10h15-10h30 - Break 10h30-11h50 - Round Table 4 : What countermeasures can be taken against fake news and the negative politicization of defense issues? Can politicization be a solution? Moderator : Diya Jiang (Université McGill) Jean-Charles Larsonneur (député à l’Assemblée nationale 2017-2024) Cristian Preda (Université de Bucarest) Yannick Pincé (CIENS) Laurent Cordonier (Fondation Descartes) Tom Morin-Robinson (NATO's Public Diplomacy Division) 11h50-12h00 - Closing Comments ## The Prevalence and Degree of Infiltration of Russian Disinformation on the Russian-Ukrainian War in the Western Information Space URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-prevalence-and-degree-of-infiltration-of-russian-disinformation-on-the-russian-ukrainian-war-in-the-western-information-space/ Modified: 2025-08-15 > The Prevalence and Degree of Infiltration of Russian Disinformation on the Russian-Ukrainian War in the Western Information Space *This event will take place in French only 9:15 am   Opening Remarks and Presentation of Research and Data for the NATO Dyad Countries Surveyed Research team lead by Laurent Borzillo, Ph.D. Pr. Stéphane Roussel (ENAP) 9:30 am  Narratives Related to the Russian-Ukrainian War in Democratic Societies: Content and Arguments Used / Comparison with Other Themes Moderator : Professeure Magdalena Dembińska (Université de Montréal) ; POL-CAN *tbc* Pr. Florian Töpfl (Université de Passau) Pr. Justin Massie (UQAM) Marco Munier (UQAM) Balthazar Stengelin (McGill) Susanne Aschi-Glesius, consule générale d’Allemagne Megan Minnion (OTAN) *tbc* 11:00 am  Coffee Break 11:30 am  Vectors of Pro-Russian Discourse in the West / The Receptiveness of Democratic Societies to Russian Narratives and Fake News Moderator : Zachary Lemyre (Université de Montréal) Anthony Seaboyer, directeur du Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society (CSAFS; RMC) Nicolas-François Perron (UQAM) Maud Quessard, directrice du domaine Espace Euratlantique (IRSEM) Pr. Anatoliy Gruzd (Toronto Metropolitan University) Aurélie Bonal, cheffe de la délégation européenne au Canada *tbc* Julie Renaud (UQAM) *tbc* 1:00 pm  Lunch 2:00 pm  Possible Measures and Actions to Counter the Proliferation of pro-Russian Narratives, of Both Russian and non-Russian Origin Moderator: Mathieu Gariepy, (Université Laval) *tbc* Pr. Nicole Jackson (Université Simon Fraser) Khrystyna Holynska, Ph.D. (RAND) Pr. David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke Oana Goga, Ph.D (INRIA) Franziska B. Keller, Ph.D. (University of Bern) Pr. Reihaneh Rabbany (McGill) *tbc* 3:30pm  Closing Remarks Laurent Borzillo, Ph.D (ENAP) ## The Ukraine Invasion, Two Years Later URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-ukraine-invasion-two-years-later/ Modified: 2024-02-09 > À l’occasion du deuxième anniversaire du début de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, déclenchée le 24 février 2022... note: This event will take place in French only. On the second anniversary of the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, this event will bring together renowned experts to provide different perspectives on this tragic, ongoing armed conflict. What are the prospects for 2024? Is a way out of the crisis possible? With : Dominique Arel, titulaire de la Chaire d’études ukrainiennes à l’Université d’Ottawa Charles-Philippe David, fondateur de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM Ekaterina Piskunova, chargée de cours au Département de science politique et au programme facultaire Études Internationales de l’Université de Montréal Louis Vachon, associé chez J.C. Flowers & Co Justin Massie, codirecteur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM Simon Hogue, chercheur à l’Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels à la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM Moderated by Frédérick Gagnon (holder of the Raoul-Dandurand Chair and professor in the Department of Political Science at UQAM), this round table is organized by the Raoul-Dandurand Chair, in collaboration with the Institut d'études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) and the Réseau d'analyse stratégique, as part of the fourth edition of the Rendez-vous Gérin-Lajoie.   ## The War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and the Future Political Settlement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/ Modified: 2023-02-21 > The War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and the Future Political Settlement. The conflict in Ukraine marked the return of major interstate war... The conflict in Ukraine marked the return of major interstate wars on the European continent. After one year of brutal battles and heavy losses, this conference takes stock of the main military lessons learned from the War in Ukraine and evaluates the possible future political settlements that may emerge from such conflict. To do so, it leverages the unique networks offered by the European Initiative for Security Studies (EISS), the Canadian Strategic Analysis Network (SAN), and the Citadel’s Department of Intelligence and Security Studies to bring together scholars and experts from the United States, Canada, and Europe, in a truly transatlantic endeavour. The conference is organized in two roundtables. The first one focuses on the key military lessons learned from the analysis of Russian, Ukrainian, and NATO’s military performances across a wide range of domains, including military operations, training, logistics, intelligence, and nuclear deterrence. It provides a fine-grained analysis of the main areas of strength and weakness of both Russian and Ukrainian armed forces on the battlefield as well of NATO’s support in the war effort. Building on the findings of such analysis, the second roundtable examines the prospects for a future political settlement between Ukraine and Russian and the role of US and European powers therein. The contours of such settlement will likely revolve around key issues such as the allocation of territories occupied by Russia, Ukraine’s relation with NATO, security guarantees for Ukraine, the status of Russophile minorities in Ukraine, war reparations, and the lifting of Western sanctions on Russia, among others. Building on the scholarly literature on war termination, conflict resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction, this roundtable will evaluate the possible diplomatic settlements and scenarios that may emerge from this war. Thereby, this conference hopes to enrich our understanding of the past war effort, its current trajectory, and the prospects for a peaceful political settlement in Ukraine. Download Programme (PDF 1.8mb )   Program 8:00-8:15AM (EST) / 2:00-2:15PM (CET): Opening Remarks Larry Valero, Director of the Citadel’s Department of Intelligence and Security Studies Hugo Meijer, Sciences Po & Director of the European Initiative for Security Studies Jonathan Paquin, Laval University & Strategic Analysis Network 8:15-9:00AM (EST) / 2:15-3:00PM (CET): Keynote Speaker Michael Kofman – Center for Naval Analyses 9:00-10:15AM (EST) / 3:00-4:15PM (CET): Roundtable 1: Military Lessons Learned Chair: Eliza Gheorghe, Bilkent University Panelists: Frans Osinga – Leiden University Hanna Shelest, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”/ Ukraine Analytica Alexander Lanoszka – University of Waterloo 10:30-11:45AM (EST) /4:30-5:45PM (CET)  Roundtable 2: War termination and Post-War Settlement: What Does a Political Settlement Look Like?  Chair: Jack Porter –  The Citadel Panelists: Oxana Shevel – Tufts University Justin Massie – University of Québec in Montreal Maria Popova – McGill University 11:45AM-12:00PM (EST) / 5:45-6:00PM (CET) Closing Remarks Jonathan Paquin, Laval University & Strategic Analysis Network Hugo Meijer, Sciences Po & Director of the European Initiative for Security Studies   ## Training Workshop for Graduate Students and Emerging Scholars URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/training-workshop-for-graduate-students-and-emerging-scholars/ Modified: 2022-07-28 VIEW VIDEOS OF THE EVENT This training workshop is intended for graduate students and emerging scholars in the field of security and defence. Please note that the workshop will be conducted in French. A video recording with English subtitles will be made available shortly after the event. The event has three main interactive sessions: 1- Workshop on how to best prepare for the Department of National Defence’s Policy Officer Recruitment Program (10:30 am-12:00pm) (view video) Speaker – Anthony Ippolito (Manager, Policy Officer Recruitment Programme - Department of National Defence) 2- Training workshop focused on the SSHRC scholarship programs, for MA and PhD students (1:00 pm-2:30pm) (view video) Speakers - Véronique Gilbert (Policy Officer - Department of National Defence) - Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) 3- Practical workshop on how to write policy briefs (3:00-4:30pm) (view video) Speakers - Cecily Pantin (Department of National Defence) - Namercia Dos Santos (Department of National Defence) - Thomas Juneau (University of Ottawa) Facilitator Stéfanie von Hlatky (Queen’s University) Biographies ## Trump après les midterms: quelle géopolitique mondiale au lendemain du 3 novembre? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/trump-apres-les-midterms-quelle-geopolitique-mondiale-au-lendemain-du-3-novembre/ Modified: 2026-10-14 Trump après les midterms: quelle géopolitique mondiale au lendemain du 3 novembre? Rarement les élections de mi-mandat américaines auront suscité autant d’attention dans le monde. Deux jours après le scrutin, quel verdict sur la politique étrangère de Trump? Et comment le nouveau rapport de force à Washington pourrait-il changer la donne? Iran et Moyen-Orient, Ukraine, OTAN, Chine, guerre commerciale, Canada: tour d’horizon des dossiers à surveiller. Cette conférence est organisée par l'Observatoire sur les États-Unis de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et le Réseau d'analyse stratégique. ## Understanding the Five Eyes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/understanding-the-five-eyes-2/ Modified: 2022-07-28 The term Five Eyes typically refers to a unique signals intelligence pooling club of three or four-letter acronymed agencies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. But FVEY, as it is also known, is now also attached to a large and growing number of “special relationships” and transgovernmental policy networks that bind these five states in virtually all areas of defence, intelligence, and security. ## What Lessons Can We Take From the War in Ukraine? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/what-lessons-can-we-take-from-the-war-in-ukraine/ Modified: 2024-09-16 *This event will take place in both English and French   9h00 – Opening Remarks 9h15-10h45 : The War as Seen From the South Moderator: Justin Massie Amélie Chalivet: India and the War in Ukraine Kevan Gafaïti: The Russian-Ukranian war as seen from Iran: an inconclusive political and strategic test for the “Teheran-Beijing-Moscow axis”? Rachid Chaker: The war in Ukraine as seen from the Arab world Antonin Blanchard: Egyptian non-alignment in the face of the Russian-Ukrainian war Pierre-Marie Meunier: Sovereignty, balance of power and international law: China's ridgeline of support for Russia 10h45-11h00 : Coffee Break 11h00-12h30 : The Evolution of the War Moderator: Alexander Lanoszka Vincent Tourret: What is it All About? Lessons from the War in Ukraine for our Approach to Future Conflicts Marco Munier: How to Predict War? Isabelle Delumeau: A strategic reading of the naval aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian war Walid Ferguen: The Power of Narrative: Disinformation, Strategy and the Prediction of Future Scenarios in the Ukrainian Conflict 12h30-14h00 : Lunch 14h00-15h30 : Western support Moderator: Laurent Borzillo Justin Massie: The Future of Western Support Alexander Lanoszka “The more it changes... ? ” The strategies of NATO's eastern flank allies in the shadow of the Russia-Ukraine war Chantal Lavallée: European Support to Ukraine Maud Quessard: The United States and Europe: The Impossible Disengagement? Frédérick Gagnon : The Future of American Support Beyond the November 5 Elections 15h30-15h45 : Coffee Break 15h45-17h15 : Allied Strategies Moderator: Chantal Lavallée Laurent Borzillo: Macron's Strategic Shift Nicolas-François Perron: Meloni's Strategy Alexandre Courtemanche: Canada's Military Sampling 17h15-17h30 : Closing Remarks ## What Plan B? Reshaping Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Trump Administration’s Predatory Policies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/what-plan-b-reshaping-foreign-policy-in-the-wake-of-the-trump-administrations-predatory-policies/ Modified: 2025-07-07 > This conference, devoted to security and defence issues, will provide an opportunity to take stock of Canada's period of historic crisis *This event will take place in French only. Conference organized jointly by the Institut d'études internationales de Montréal (IEIM), the Réseau d'analyse stratégique and Le Rubicon, as part of the Rendez-vous Gérin-Lajoie. This one-day conference, devoted to security and defence issues, will provide an opportunity to take stock of Canada's period of historic crisis, when its sovereignty is under direct threat. A written summary of the event's proceedings and discussions is available here.   Preliminary program 8:30 am - Welcome 9:00 am - Opening Remarks Justin Massie, Director, Department of Political Science (UQAM), Co-Director, Strategic Analysis Network (SAR), Le Rubicon François Audet, Director, IEIM 9:15 am to 10:30 am - What Does Trump Want? Moderator: Justin Massie (UQAM) Karine Prémont (Université de Sherbrooke) Julien Toureille (Raoul-Dandurand Chair) Theodore McLauchlin (Université de Montréal) Henri-Paul Normandin (IEIM) 10:30 am to 11:00 am - Coffee Break 11:00 am to 12:30 pm - What are the Options for Allies? Moderator: Laurent Borzillo (ÉNAP) Jean Crombois (American University in Bulgaria) Jonathan Paquin (Laval University) Chantal Lavallée (Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean) Frédéric Labarre (Royal Military College of Canada) 12:30 to 1:30 pm - Lunch 1:30 to 3:00 pm - European Adaptation Moderator: Jonathan Paquin (Laval University) Laurent Borzillo (ÉNAP) Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Nicolas-François Perron (UQAM) 3:00 pm to 3:30 pm - Coffee Break 3:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. - Canadian Adaptation Moderator: Laura-Julie Perreault (La Presse) Stéphane Roussel (ÉNAP) Justin Massie (UQAM) David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke) Yan Cimon (Laval University) 5:00 pm - Closing Remarks Daniel Jean (former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister) The event is free and open to the public and the entire university community - UQAM students in particular are invited to attend in large numbers. ## What to Expect from the War in Ukraine? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/what-to-expect-from-the-ukraines-war/ Modified: 2023-03-10 > After a year of war, this round table aims to analyze the temporary/precarious (cf. ceasefire) and sustainable prospects for peace... What to Expect from the War in Ukraine? Prospects for peace, fears of escalation, and the future of European security architecture note: This event will be in presented in French only. After a year of war, this round-table aims to analyze the prospects of temporary (e.g., ceasefire) and durable peace in the war and Ukraine, as well as the future of Europe's security architecture. Moderator : Prof. Justin Massie (UQAM) Speakers : Prof. Dominique Arel (University of d'Ottawa) Dr. Laurent Borzillo, (UQAM) Prof. Yann Breault (Royal Military College of St-Jean) Prof. Magdalena Dembinska (University of Montreal) Prof. Delphine Deschaux-Dutard (University of Grenoble Alpes) Prof. Heidi Hardt (University of California, Irvine) Dr. Falk Ostermann (Kiel University) Dr. Ekaterina Piskunova (University of Montreal) Prof. Olivier Schmitt (University of South-Denmark) Register Here to follow the roundtable on Zoom   ## What’s next? Managing traditional and new threats through international cooperation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/whats-next/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Upcoming Event! Dec. 9-10, 2021. What's Next? Managing traditional and new threats through international cooperation What’s Next? Managing Traditional and New Threats through International Cooperation. December 9-10, 2021, livestreamed from Ottawa   2021 was a year of transition: some countries entertained the idea of a post-pandemic turn, while others have not. Throughout the pandemic crisis, however, traditional security challenges have persisted, albeit in unique ways. This colloquium will grapple with this challenging transition: on the one hand, through the uneven impact of the pandemic and vaccine diplomacy, and on the other hand, with an international diplomacy that must deal with an increasingly complex security environment and tenser relations among the great powers. It will address these topics through two public roundtables and a public keynote lecture on Day 1 and a closed-door roundtable on Day 2. Download Programme [1.3mb] Hourly Schedule Day 1 - From 9am to 5pm 9:00 am - 9:15 am Welcoming remarks 9:15 am - 9:20 am Launch Rubicon Platform “a unique platform in the francophone research world”, Jean-Baptise Jeangène Vilmer (Institute for Strategic Research, IRSEM), Ryan Evans (War on the Rocks), and Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) 9:20 am - 11:15 am Roundtable 1 - The Clash of Regional and International Organizations This panel explores the impact of COVID-19 on regional and international organizations. While the logical response to a global issue such as COVID-19 would be to rely on multilateral efforts, the pandemic has crowded out multilateral and even regional initiatives in favour of nationalistic sentiments and self-interested responses by many states. In the post-pandemic period, states may thus invest more in self-sufficiency and in redefining their strategic priorities, including health security. The growing gap between national, regional, and multilateral responses to COVID-19 calls into question the development of global governance and regional integration, as well as the future of international organizations and their capacity for economic and political cooperation. 11:15 am - 11:30 am Coffee Break 11:30 am - 12:30 pm Keynote Speech: Kerry Buck (Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (NATO)) moderated by: Charlotte Duval-Lantoine (Ottawa Operations Manager and Fellow, CGAI) 12:30 pm - 1:00 pm Student Panel Best Paper Competition, moderated by Renée Filliatrault) (Advisory Board, Strategic Analysis Network) 1:00 pm - 2:00 pm Lunch 2:00 pm - 4:00 pm Roundtable 2 - Cooperating with Rivals in a Post-Pandemic World The decline of American leadership is said to be directly responsible for The decline of American leadership is said to be directly responsible for national governments' efforts to go it alone in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. While this trend was especially salient under the Trump administration, it has not entirely disappeared with the arrival of President Joe Biden. According to Robert Kaplan, China and Russia have redefined great power competition and the classical/Western meaning of war, making the response of the West, i.e., the United States, all the more important. Arguing that the pandemic has created a global consciousness, Kaplan recommends that the West respond by strengthening its alliances. With this in mind, the second panel zeroes in on the following question: how do we cooperate with our rivals in a post-pandemic context? While the pandemic has intensified many rivalries, the fact remains that cooperation, even with rivals, is necessary to address the challenges and threats posed by the return of great power competition and the threat posed by revisionist states such as Iran. 4:00 pm - 5:30 pm Networking Activity by invitation DAY 2 : Private workshop invitation only 9:00 am - 9:15 am Opening remarks 9:15 am - 12:30 pm Private round table – Chatham house rules (coffee break 10:30-10:45) Inspired by the points raised during the first day's workshops, the second day of the symposium aims to create a space for discussion between practitioners, researchers, and other security experts. It is also an opportunity to outline recommendations to the Department of National Defence. Designed as a closed-door discussion, the workshop will provide an opportunity to assess the prospects of multilateral cooperation in a (post)-pandemic context, as well as the challenges and opportunities that underlie it. In a changing international political landscape, it will address how Canada, through its foreign and defence policy, could adapt to new global realities. Questions related to several pertinent issue areas deserve extensive reflection: those related to cooperation in (post)-pandemic situations, those addressing the evolution of capacity building and its adaptability to a changing security context, and those related to the balance between great powers in a context of retreating American interventionism and a more offensive Chinese foreign policy. The results of the discussions will form the basis for the Network’s recommendations to the Department of National Defence and will be compiled in a reference document. 12:30 pm - 2:30 pm Lunch-Networking activity ## WORLD POLITICS IN LIMBO: Non-Alignment, Hybrid Challenges, and New Frontiers URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/en/event/world-politics-in-limbo-non-alignment-hybrid-challenges-and-new-frontiers/ Modified: 2023-12-08 > Great powers. Allies and Friends. Rivals, or lately even enemies. These are the labels we typically use to refer to countries we... Download the Program (PDF 4.3mb) This is a bilingual event. On-demand French-English interpretation will be available. Great powers. Allies and Friends. Rivals, or lately even enemies. These are the labels we typically use to refer to countries we care about the most for our defence and security. As talk of a “new Cold War” abounds in policy discourse, the world seems once again like it can be divided into rival, competing blocs. There are those we cooperate with, and others we compete with. Yet most countries of the world do not fall neatly within these categories. Instead, they are often located in-between (or even outside) such binaries. Their non-alignment concerns us, and we fear the implications of them choosing the “other” (wrong) side. In the current geostrategic context, international institutions are a prime venue of competition as major powers vie for support but are met with resistance against attempts to force “the Rest” to pick sides. Friendshoring, through the reinforcement of existing alliances or the launching of new ones among the “like-minded,” also presents new opportunities for cooperation. It also results in fragmentation, closure and exclusion, perceived by some as provocations that increase the likelihood of conflict. In addition, rising threats below the threshold of war, in cyber, informational or AI domains, but also in the “new frontiers” of space and the deep sea, can lead to new types of conflict we are ill-prepared to face. Against this volatile backdrop, the security implications of climate change, from rising sea levels, disasters, food insecurity, and displacement, are increasingly salient. They beg for a kind of cooperation that is proving more challenging against the backdrop of fraught major power relations, and lead to tensions in the Arctic, the South China Sea, Africa, and elsewhere. This colloquium investigates why and how these various “in-betweens” of security and defence matter for Canada. It deals with a broad range of issues and geographical areas where cooperation and conflict unfold in tandem, straddling divides between “us” and “them.” It showcases that Canada should actively centre these actors, issues, and spaces in its defence and security policy if it is to approach the current global security environment with open eyes. Speakers: Marc De Bellefeuille, Deputy Director Cyber, Space and Emerging Technologies Policy, National Defence Victoria Breda, Senior Analyst - PCO Nadège Compaoré, Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Jean Daudelin, Associate Professor, Carleton University Gen. Wayne Eyre, Chief of the Defence Staff Philippe Frowd, Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor, University of Waterloo Frédéric Lasserre, Full Professor, Laval University Marion Laurence, Assistant Professor, Canadian Forces College Michael Manulak, Assistant Professor, Carleton University Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Network Co-Director and Professor, Bishop’s University Pascale Massot, Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa Justin Massie, Full Professor, UQAM Jonathan Paquin, Network Co-Director and Professor, Laval University Sarah Sharma, Network Co-Director and Assistant Professor, University of Victoria Emerging Scholars: Amélie Chalivet, PhD Student, UQAM David Dubé, PhD student, Mcgill University Emmanuelle Rousseau, PhD Student, Université de Montréal Programme: 9:00 – 9:15: Opening Remarks: Justin Massie, Network Co-Director and Full Professor, UQAM 9:15 – 10:15: Keynote Speaker: General Wayne Eyre Moderator: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Network Co-Director and Full Professor, Bishop’s University 10:15 – 10:30: Health Break 10:30 – 12:00: Panel 1 - Cooperation In An Era of Emergence: The New Frontiers The security implications and the rising threats in the cyber, information and AI domains, including the “new frontier” of space, beg for more governance, the design of new rules, and a kind of cooperation that is becoming increasingly more challenging as interstate competition makes these issues matters of national interest and zero-sum. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation remains elusive as this same competition has brought back rearmament to the fore. This panel will investigate the challenges and opportunities for cooperation on these various emerging security domains as well as their implications for Canada and the world. Chair: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Full Professor, Bishop’s University Speakers: Alexander Lanoszka, Assistant Professor, University of Waterloo Michael Manulak, Assistant Professor, Carleton University Marc De Bellefeuille, Deputy Director – Cyber, Space and Emerging Tech, Domains and Technology Policy, National Defence David Dubé, PhD Student, McGill University 12:00 – 13:00: Lunch 13:00 – 14:30: Panel 2 - Beyond Allies and Enemies: Non-Aligned Actors in World Politics  Shifts in global and regional balances of power have fostered a more complex environment, granting an expanding number of actors the capacity to wield varying degrees of influence. Existing international institutions have adapted to new realities as rising powers continue to gain prominence with the expansion of organisations such as the BRICS. This panel explores the impact of increasing multipolarity on the global environment, in a context where certain states require change in the rules-based order, some more assertively than others, while other actors act outside of its formal bodies to secure their own interests. This panel discusses an often-neglected aspect of world politics: the resurgence of non-alignment, motivations behind this phenomenon, and strategic implications for Canada.  Chair: Jonathan Paquin, Network Co-Director and Full Professor, Laval University Speakers: Marion Laurence, Assistant Professor, Canadian Forces College Philippe Frowd, Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa Jean Daudelin, Associate Professor, Carleton University Emmanuelle Rousseau, PhD Candidate, Université de Montréal Amélie Chalivet, PhD Student, UQAM 14:30 – 14:45: Health Break 14:45 – 16:15: Panel 3 - Cooperation or Competition? The Case of Natural Resources Natural resources are distributed unevenly around the world. The rise of geopolitical pressures and the return of economic nationalism means that states—and industries—are positioning themselves to compete with neighbors, rivals, and even partners to secure access. Oil, ores, and even water are the objects of covert or overt interstate and intrastate conflicts. This fact is only made more complex—and worrisome—by the durable impact of climate change on their distribution and (un)ethical extraction. This panel will discuss how the drive for natural resources is affecting different regions of the world, how actors compete over them, and how they might potentially cooperate. Chair: Sarah Sharma, Network Co-Director and Assistant Professor, University of Victoria Speakers: Nadège Compaoré, Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Pascale Massot, Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa Frédéric Lasserre, Full Professor, Laval University Victoria Breda, Senior Analyst - PCO 16:15 – 16:30: Closing Remarks 17:00 – 18:30: Networking Cocktail, Novotel Ottawa ## Accueil URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > Réseau d'analyse stratégique - Incubateur de l’expertise canadienne et mondiale sur l’actualité géostratégique, nous offrons en temps réel... Réseau d'analyse stratégique Dernières nouvelles Fin des résultats. Publications Vidéos Vidéos L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle Justin Massie September 29, 2026 L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle Évènement de lancement du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 3.0 Dans un contexte marqué par… Vidéos Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under Justin Massie April 16, 2026 Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under Une présentation de John Blaxland avec la collaboration du professeur… Vidéos Colloque Rubicon 2026 | Tribune 3 – Industries de défense et chaînes d’approvisionnement Anessa Kimball March 31, 2026 Colloque annuel du Rubicon 2026 | Tribune 3 - Industries de défense et chaînes d’approvisionnement Modération : Anessa L. Kimball,… Page 1 / 3412345…102030…»Dernière page » Balados Balado Le Nord Stratégique Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 13 – La vision de la commandante de l’Aviation royale canadienne, LGen Jamie Speiser-Blanchet October 2, 2026 L’AVIATION ROYALE CANADIENNE À UN POINT TOURNANT | LGen Jamie Speiser-Blanchet F-35, drones, intelligence artificielle, défense du Nord, NORAD, nouvelles… Balado Le Nord Stratégique Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 12 – F-35 ou Gripen-E avec Bruno Aviation September 25, 2026 Une entrevue passionnante avec Bruno Aviation, un journaliste français spécialisé en aviation militaire, pour plonger au cœur d'un débat qui… Balado Le Nord Stratégique Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 11 – Accompagner les entreprises dans le marché défense, Eric Chocron-AXEO September 25, 2026 Le marché canadien de la défense offre des occasions importantes aux entreprises d’ici. Mais vouloir y entrer est une chose. Comprendre… Page 1 / 6012345…102030…»Dernière page » Événements à venir Trump après les midterms: quelle géopolitique mondiale au lendemain du 3 novembre? Le Québec face au réarmement mondial ## Actualités URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/actualites/ Modified: 2020-06-12 ## Balados URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/balados/ Modified: 2026-09-08 Retrouvez nos balados associés au Réseau d'analyse stratégique. Le Nord Stratégique Créé et animé par Éric Sauvé, Le Nord Stratégique est un podcast francophone portant sur la défense, la géopolitique et la sécurité. Un podcast francophone haut de gamme consacré à la géopolitique, à la défense et aux enjeux de sécurité contemporaine, destiné à un public cultivé, professionnel et influent. Le projet vise à combler un vide important dans l’espace médiatique canadien francophone. Très peu de plateformes offrent une analyse crédible ancrée dans une véritable expérience opérationnelle. Balado Le Nord Stratégique Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 14 – MGén Alain Forand, Ancien Colonel du R22R — Ses Mémoires : Entre feu et verglas October 2, 2026 Le major-général Alain Forand met actuellement la touche finale à ses Mémoires. Et quand on regarde son parcours, on comprend… Balado Le Nord Stratégique Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 13 – La vision de la commandante de l’Aviation royale canadienne, LGen Jamie Speiser-Blanchet October 2, 2026 L’AVIATION ROYALE CANADIENNE À UN POINT TOURNANT | LGen Jamie Speiser-Blanchet F-35, drones, intelligence artificielle, défense du Nord, NORAD, nouvelles… Balado Le Nord Stratégique Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 12 – F-35 ou Gripen-E avec Bruno Aviation September 25, 2026 Une entrevue passionnante avec Bruno Aviation, un journaliste français spécialisé en aviation militaire, pour plonger au cœur d'un débat qui… Page 1 / 512345» Conseils de sécurité Présenté par Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Laurent Borzillo, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Artur Wilczynski et Col Marie-Christine Harvey, Conseils de Sécurité traite de questions de sécurité et de défense en français. Coproduit avec le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), le Réseau canadien sur la défense et la sécurité et France-Amériques, Conseils de Sécurité est l’un des premiers balado transatlantique. Balado Conseils de sécurité Épisode 59 – Mathieu Luinaud, consultant en stratégie et expert du secteur spatial December 10, 2025 Pour ce nouvel épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Mathieu Luinaud, consultant en stratégie et expert du… Balado Conseils de sécurité Épisode 58 – Paul Charon, directeur du domaine « Influence et Renseignement » de l’IRSEM November 12, 2025 Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam Marti-Brûlé et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos reçoivent Paul Charon, directeur du domaine Influence et Renseignement de l'Institut de… Balado Conseils de sécurité Épisode 57 – Le Général Alexis Rougier October 29, 2025 Dans cet épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le général Alexis Rougier, général de brigade aérienne en charge de… Page 1 / 2012345…1020…»Dernière page » Battle Rhythm Le balado Battle Rhythm (offert en anglais seulement), coanimé par Stephen Saideman et un coanimateur invité chaque semaine, est coproduit par le CDSN et le CGAI. Le balado paraît un mercredi sur deux et propose des discussions d'actualité sur les enjeux de défense et de sécurité du moment, ainsi que des entretiens de fond avec des universitaires et des praticiens. CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.4: Defence Spending Strategies with Canada's Naval Commander Angus Topshee Balado Battle Rhythm S4 Ep.22 : Planning for the Next Pandemic with CAF’s Surgeon General, MGen Scott Malcolm Stephen Saideman September 18, 2026 Welcome to a new academic term and a new episode of Battle Rhythm, Steve Saideman and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department… CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.3: Radical Pragmatism with Dr. Jessica F. Green Balado Battle Rhythm S4 Ep.3 : Radical Pragmatism Stephen Saideman September 18, 2026 Welcome to spooky season and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-hosts Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science… CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.2: The Purge with Honourary Colonel Michelle Douglas, 33rd Vimy Award Laureate Balado Battle Rhythm S4 Ep.2 : The Purge with Honourary Colonel Michelle Douglas Stephen Saideman, Thomas Hughes August 31, 2026 Welcome to autumn and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University. Steve… Page 1 / 3612345…102030…»Dernière page » ## Bannière des opérations militaires URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/banniere-des-operations-militaires/ Modified: 2022-02-04 La bannière des opérations militaires est un outil mis en place par le Réseau d’analyse stratégique afin de centraliser les données disponibles sur les opérations militaires auxquelles prennent part les Forces armées canadiennes à travers le monde. Les données ont été colligées en ayant recours à la base de données Military Balance de l’International Institute for Strategic Studies et aux informations disponibles sur le site web du ministère de la Défense nationale. Nous remercions également le personnel du Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada (COIC) pour leur appui. Pour toute question, veuillez nous contacter à cette adresse courriel : info@ras-nsa.ca. FR CAF design Infogram   Par opération: ACCIUS Année: 2009 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 2 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de commandement: Type: Mission d'assistance Équipement:  Année: 2008 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 2 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de commandement: Type: Mission d'assistance Équipement:  Année: 2005 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 1 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de commandement: Type: Consolidation de la paix de la UNAMA Équipement:  Année: 2003 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 1 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de commandement: Type: UNAMA consolidation de la paix Équipement:  ACTIVE ENDEAVOR Année: 2008 Emplacement: Mer mediterrannée Personnel: Éléments: Marine Autorité: Direction de commandement: Type: Équipement: Missile guidé de frégate ALTAIR Année: 2008 Emplacement: Golfe Persique, Mer d'Oman Personnel: Éléments: Marine Autorité: Force opérationnelle combinée 150 Direction de commandement: Canada Type: Force opérationnelle combinée 150 Équipement: Le NCSM Iroquois de Halifax est déployé avec les NCSM Protecteur et Calgary d'Esquimalt. ALTAIR / ENDURING FREEDOM Année: 2007 Emplacement: Afghanistan, Moyen Orient, Corne d'Afrique Personnel: 237 Éléments: Marine Autorité: Direction de commandement: Type: Sécurité, antiterrorisme et lutte contre la piraterie Équipement: NCSM Charlottetown Année: 2006 Emplacement: Corne d'Afrique, Djibouti Personnel: 237 Éléments: Marine Autorité: Direction de commandement: Type: Sécurité, antiterrorisme et lutte contre la piraterie Équipement: NCSM Ottawa ALTHEA Année: 2004 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 650 Éléments: Armée Autorité:  Union Européenne Direction de commandement: Type: Force de l'Union européenne (EUFOR) Équipement:  ARCHER / ATHENA Année: 2010 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 2922 Éléments: Armée de terre( 1 chef de brigade, 1 groupement tactique d'infanterie avec (1 chef de bataillon d'infanterie légère ; 3 compagnies d'infanterie légère ; 1 escadron armé d'infanterie légère, 1 escadron armé, 1 escadron de reconnaissance armé, 1 batterie d'artillerie, 1 vol de drones, 1 escadron d'engins de combat)) ; 1 compagnie de police militaire ; Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité (NTM-A) Équipement: 20 chars de combat Leopard C2 ; quelques LAV III Kodiak ; quelques LAV-25 Coyote ; 6 M-777 ; 6 CH-47 Chinook (CH-147) ; 8 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) ; Heron (CU-170) ARCHER Année: 2009 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 12 Éléments: Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité Équipement:  Année: 2008 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 12 Éléments: Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité Équipement:  ARGUS Année: 2007 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 15 Éléments: Armée de terre (Équipe consultative stratégique Afghanistan - petit élément de commandement et de soutien, deux équipes de planificateurs stratégiques, un analyste de la défense, un conseiller en communication stratégique, et un expert en développement Autorité: Bilatérale Direction de commandement: Type: planification militaire stratégique Équipement:  Année: 2006 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 15 Éléments: Armée de terre (Équipe consultative stratégique Afghanistan - petit élément de commandement et de soutien, deux équipes de planificateurs stratégiques, un analyste de la défense, un conseiller en communication stratégique, et un expert en développement Autorité: Bilatérale Direction de commandement: Type: planification militaire stratégique Équipement:  ARTEMIS Année: 2020 Emplacement: Mer Rouge, Golfe d'Aden. Golfe de Oman, Bahrein Personnel: 80 Éléments: 30 ARC, s.o. NCSM Calgary, 30 FAC et 1 MDN au QG à Bahreïn. Autorité: Forces Maritimes Combinées (FMC) Direction de commandement: Canada Type: Force opérationnelle combinée 150: Sécurité Lutte contre la piraterie et le terrorisme Équipement: CP-140 Aurora, NCSM Calgary Année: 2014 Emplacement: Mer d'Arabie, Golfe d'Aden Personnel: 250 Éléments: Marine Autorité: Forces Maritimes Combinées (FMC) Direction de commandement: Type: Groupe de force multinationale 150 : Sécurité et contre-terrorisme Équipement: NCSM Regina, CH124 Sea King et Scan Eagle, des véhicules aériens sans pilote. Année: 2013 Emplacement: Mer d'Oman, Golfe d'Aden Personnel: Éléments: Marine Autorité: Forces Maritimes Combinées (FMC) Direction de commandement: Type: Groupe de force multinationale 150 : Sécurité et contre-terrorisme Équipement: Frégate à missiles guidés avec un hangar et des missiles surface-air & NCSM Toronto & CH-124 Sea king Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Année: 2012 Emplacement: Mer d'Arabie, Golfe d'Aden Personnel: 250 Éléments: Marine Autorité: Forces Maritimes Combinées (FMC) Direction de commandement: Canada Type: Groupe de force multinationale 150 : Sécurité et contre-terrorisme Équipement: Frégate à missiles guidés avec un hangar et des missiles sol-air & NCSM Regina & HCMS Charlottetown ATHENA Année: 2009 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 2830 Éléments: Armée (1 Groupement tactique d'infanterie). Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité Équipement: 20 chars de combat Leopard C2 ; quelques LAV III Kodiak ; quelques LAV-25 Année: 2008 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 2500 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 Groupement tactique d'infanterie avec 1 QG de bataillon d'infanterie, 2 escouades d'infanterie, 1 escouade d'artillerie, 1 escouade de reconnaissance d'artillerie, 1 escouade d'artillerie, 1 escouade de drones, 1 escouade d'enrôlement Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité Équipement: 20 Leopard C2 MBT ; quelques LAV III Kodiak ; quelques LAV-25 Coyote ; 6 M-777 ; quelques drone Sperwer" Année: 2006 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 2286 Éléments: Armée Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité Équipement:  Année: 2005 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 2300 Éléments: Armée Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité Équipement:  Année: 2004 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 1576 Éléments: Armée de terre (Chaque groupement tactique comprend un escadron de reconnaissance blindé, une compagnie de soutien des services de santé et des ingénieurs - tous soutenus par un élément de contrôle national et un élément de soutien national). Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité Équipement:  Année: 2003 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 1576 Éléments: Armée Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité Équipement:  ATTENTION / ATHENA Année: 2011 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 529 Éléments: Armée de terre (un quartier général, un groupement tactique et des unités de soutien pour la Task Force Kandahar, une formation de la taille d'une brigade placée sous le commandement régional (Sud) de la FIAS et dont le quartier général se trouve à l'aérodrome de Kandahar, unité médicale multinationale de rôle 3). Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité (NTM-A) Équipement: 1 unité aérienne avec CC-130J ATTENTION Année: 2013 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 950 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 bataillon d'infanterie à des fins de formation) Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Canada Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité (NTM-A) Équipement: Année: 2012 Emplacement: Afghanistan Personnel: 529 Éléments: Armée Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Force internationale d'assistance à la sécurité (NTM-A) Équipement: AUGURAL Année: 2007 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 11 Éléments: Obsevateurs Autorité: Union afriquaine Direction de commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités Équipement: 100 APC(W) Grizzly et Husky Veh de récupération prêtés à l'UA. Année: 2006 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 12 Éléments: Obsevateurs Autorité: Union afriquaine Direction de commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités Équipement: BRONZE Année: 2009 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 8 Éléments: Soutien du personnel des quartiers généraux et des tâches opérationnelles (contre-terrorisme, soutien au TPIY, partage du renseignement). Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Assistance à la réforme de la défense Équipement: Année: 2008 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 8 Éléments: Soutien du personnel des quartiers généraux et des tâches opérationnelles (contre-terrorisme, soutien au TPIY, partage du renseignement). Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Assistance à la réforme de la défense Équipement: Année: 2007 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 8 Éléments: Soutien du personnel des quartiers généraux et des tâches opérationnelles (contre-terrorisme, soutien au TPIY, partage du renseignement). Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Soutien à la paix Équipement: Année: 2006 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 9 Éléments: Soutien du personnel des quartiers généraux et des tâches opérationnelles (contre-terrorisme, soutien au TPIY, partage du renseignement). Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: soutien à la paix Équipement: Année: 2005 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 69 Éléments: Soutien du personnel des quartiers généraux et des tâches opérationnelles (contre-terrorisme, soutien au TPIY, partage du renseignement). Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Consolidation de la paix Équipement: CALUMET Année: 2020 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 55 Éléments: 1 équipe de police militaire Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2019 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 55 Éléments: 1 équipe de police militaire Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2018 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 68 Éléments: 1 équipe de police militaire Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2017 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 70 Éléments: 1 équipe de police militaire Autorité:Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2016 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 70 Éléments: 1 Force Multinationale & Observateurs (FMO) Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2015 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 70 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2014 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: 1 Force Multinationale & Observateurs (FMO) Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2013 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2012 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2011 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2010 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2009 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2008 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2007 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2006 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2005 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 29 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2004 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 29 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2003 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 29 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2002 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 29 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2001 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 29 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 2000 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 1999 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 1998 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 1997 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: Année: 1996 Emplacement: Egypte Personnel: 28 Éléments: Autorité: Mission indépendante de maintien de la paix Direction de commandement: Type: Force Multinationale et Observateurs (FMO) Équipement: CARRIBE Année: 2020 Emplacement: Mer des Caraïbes Autres régions: Océan pacifique Est, Golfe du Mexique Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Marine et air Autorité: Opérations renforcées de lutte contre les stupéfiants dirigées par les États- Unis Direction de commandement: Type: Opérations de lutte contre les stupéfiants Équipement: NCSM Shawinigan CP 140 Aurora Année: 2019 Emplacement: Mer des Caraïbes Autre Régions: Océan pacifique Est, Golfe du Mexique Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Air & Marine Autorité: Opérations renforcées de lutte contre les stupéfiants dirigées par les États-Unis Direction de commandement: Type: Opération de lutte contre les stupéfiants Équipement:  2 navire de défense côtière de Classe Kingston et 1 CP-140 Année: 2018 Emplacement: Mer des Caraibes Autres Régions: Océan Pacifique Est, Golfe du Mexique Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Marine & Air Autorité: Opérations renforcées de lutte contre les stupéfiants dirigées par les États-Unis Direction de commandement: Type: Opération de lutte contre les stupéfiants Équipement:  Année: 2017 Emplacement: Mer des Caraibes Autre Régions: Océan Pacifique Est, Golfe du Mexique Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Marine & Air Autorité: Opérations renforcées de lutte contre les stupéfiants dirigées par les États Unis Direction de commandement: Type: Opération de lutte contre les stupéfiants Équipement:  CHAPERON Année: 2000 Emplacement: Croatie Personnel: 1 Éléments:  Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix UNMOP Équipement:  Année: 1999 Emplacement: Croatie Personnel: 1 Éléments:  Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 1998 Emplacement: Croatie Personnel: 1 Éléments:  Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 1997 Emplacement: Croatie Personnel: 1 Éléments:  Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 1996 Emplacement: Croatie Personnel: 1 Éléments:  Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix (UNMOP) Équipement:  CONSTABLE Année: 1997 Emplacement: Haïti Personnel: 754 Éléments: Armée de terre (un bataillon d'infanterie, logistique, génie, personnel médical et police militaire) , Air Autorité: ONU Direction de commandement: Type: transition support mission UNTMIH Équipement: 5 CH-146 CROCODILE Année: 2020 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 7 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Maintien de la Paix Équipement:  Année: 2019 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Équipement:  Année: 2018 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Équipement:  Année: 2017 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Équipement:  Année: 2016 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 9 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Équipement:  Année: 2015 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 7 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Équipement:  Année: 2014 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2013 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2012 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2011 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2010 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 10 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2009 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 11 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2008 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 10 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2007 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 10 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2006 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 9 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2005 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 9 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2004 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2003 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2002 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 8 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2001 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 6 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2000 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 6 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 1999 Emplacement: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 3 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  DANACA Année: 2004 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 185 Éléments:  Armée (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 2003 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 186 Éléments:  Armée (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 2002 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 190 Éléments:  Armée (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 2001 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 189 Éléments:  Armée (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 2000 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 191 Éléments:  Armée (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 1999 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 186 Éléments:  Armée de terre (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 1998 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 188 Éléments:  Armée de terre (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 1997 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 189 Éléments:  Armée de terre (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 1996 Emplacement: Golan, Syrie, Israel Personnel: 189 Éléments:  Armée de terre (unité logistique et soutien d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Force des Nations Unies chargée d'observer le désengagement Équipement:  ECLIPSE Année: 2002 Emplacement: Éthiopie, Erythrée Personnel: 6 Éléments:  Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: pays bas Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2001 Emplacement: Éthiopie, Erythrée Personnel: 6 Éléments:  Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: pays bas Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2000 Emplacement: Éthiopie, Erythrée Personnel: 6 Éléments:  Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: pays bas Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  EDIFICE Année: 2019 Emplacement: Tunisie Personnel: 14 Éléments:  Marine Autorité: Bilaterale Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Renforcement des capacités Équipement:  Année: 2018 Emplacement: Tunisie Personnel: 11 Éléments:  Marine Autorité: Bilatérale Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Renforcement des capacités Équipement:  FREQUENCE Année: 2020 Emplacement: Niger Personnel: 5 Éléments: Air Autorité: Direction de Commandement: France Type: Appui aérien - déplacement de matériel militaire et de personnel Équipement: Avions C-177 Globemaster III  CC-130J Hercules. Année: 2019 Emplacement: Niger Personnel: 5 Éléments: Air Autorité: Direction de Commandement: France Type: Air support - moves military equipment and personnel Équipement: Avions C-177 Globemaster III CC-130J Hercules. Année: 2018 Emplacement: Niger Personnel: 5 Éléments: Air Autorité: Direction de Commandement: France Type: Support aérien- déplacement de matériel militaire et de personnel Équipement:  Avions C-177 Globemaster III aircraft CC-130J Hercules Année: 2015 Emplacement: Niger Personnel: 5 Éléments: Air Autorité: Direction de Commandement: France Type:  Support aérien- déplacement de matériel militaire et de personnel Équipement:  GLADIUS Année: 2011 Emplacement: Golan Personnel: 3 Éléments: Armée (officiers d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force d'observation des Nations Unies pour le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 2010 Emplacement: Golan Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée (officiers d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force d'observation des Nations Unies pour le désengagement Équipement: Année: 2009 Emplacement: Golan Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée (officiers d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force d'observation des Nations Unies pour le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 2008 Emplacement: Golan Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée (officiers d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force d'observation des Nations Unies pour le désengagement Équipement: Année: 2007 Emplacement: Golan Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée (officiers d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force d'observation des Nations Unies pour le désengagement Équipement:  Année: 2006 Emplacement: Golan Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée (officiers d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force d'observation des Nations Unies pour le désengagement Équipement: HAMLET Année: 2016 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 4 Éléments: Armée (agents du personnel) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH Équipement:  Année: 2015 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée (Agents du personnel) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH Équipement:  Année: 2014 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 7 Éléments: Armée (officiers d'état-major) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH Équipement:  Année: 2013 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 39 Éléments: Armée de terre (5e groupe-brigade mécanisé canadien) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH Équipement:  Année: 2012 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH Équipement:  Année: 2011 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 11 Éléments: Armée Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH Équipement:  Année: 2010 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 8 Éléments: Armée Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH Équipement:  Année: 2009 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2008 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2007 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 4 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2006 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2005 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 6 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2004 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 4 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2003 Emplacement: Haiti Personnel: 2 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: MINUSTAH maintien de la paix Équipement:  IMPACT (IRAQ) Année: 2020 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 100 Éléments: 1 groupe d'entrainement des forces spéciales; 1 unité médicale; Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement:  Année: 2019 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 120 Éléments: 1 groupe d'entrainement des Forces Spéciales ; 1 unité médicale; Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Capacity Building/Counter Terrorism Équipement:  Année: 2018 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 370 Éléments: 1 groupe d'entrainement des forces spéciales, 1 unité médicale Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Renforcement des Capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement: 1 vol en hélicoptère avec 4 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) hel, Réflecteur aérien CC-150 Polaris Année: 2017 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 280 Éléments:           Autorité:  1 groupe d'entrainement des forces spéciales, 1 unité médicale    Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre terrorisme Equipment:  1 vol d'hélicoptère avec 4 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) Année: 2016 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 207 Éléments: Équipe de formation Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement: 3 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) hel Année: 2015 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 70 Éléments: Équipe de formation Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement:  Année: 2014 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 70 Éléments: Équipe de formation Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Étas-Unis Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement:  IMPACT (KUWAIT) Année: 2020 Emplacement: Koweit Autres Régions: Irak, Jordanie, Liban Personnel: Éléments: Autorité: Coalition mondiale contre Daesh Direction de Commandement: France Type: Capacity Building/Counter Terrorism Équipement: 2 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J) Année: 2019 Emplacement: Koweit Autres Régions: Irak, Jordanie, Liban Personnel: Éléments: Autorité: Coalition Mondiale contre Daesh Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement: 1 A310 MRTT (C-150T), 2 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J) Année: 2018 Emplacement: Koweit Autres Régions: Irak, Jordanie, Liban Personnel: Éléments: Autorité: Coalition Globale contre Daesh Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités/ Contre terrorisme Équipement:  A310 MRTT (C-150T); 2 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J) Année: 2017 Emplacement: Koweit Autres Régions: Irak, Jordanie, Liban Personnel: Éléments: Autorité:  Coalition Globale Coalition contre Daesh Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement: 1 P-3 Orion (CP-140M); 1 A310 MRTT (C-150T); 1 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J) Année: 2016 Emplacement: Koweit Autres Régions: Irak, Jordanie, Liban Personnel: Éléments: Autorité: Coalition Globale contre Daesh Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement:  2 P-3 Orion (CP-140M), 1 A310 MRTT (C-150T) Année: 2015 Emplacement: Koweit Autres Régions: Irak, Jordanie, Liban Personnel: 530 Éléments: Autorité: Coalition Globale contre Daesh Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement:  6 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18AM); 2 P-3 Orion (CP-140M); 1 A310 MRTT (C-150T) Année: 2014 Emplacement: Koweit Autres Régions: Irak, Jordanie, Liban Personnel: 530 Éléments: Autorité: Coalition Globale contre Daesh Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités/Contre Terrorisme Équipement:  6 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18AM); 2 P-3 IOLAUS Année: 2007 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 1 Éléments: Observateurs (conseillers militaires adjoints) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  UNAMI mission d'assistance Équipement: Année: 2006 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 1 Éléments: Observateurs (conseillers militaires adjoints) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  UNAMI mission d'assistance Équipement: Année: 2005 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 1 Éléments: Observateurs (conseillers militaires adjoints) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  UNAMI mission d'assistance Équipement: JADE Année: 2020 Emplacement: Liban/Golan Autres Régions: Moyen-Orient Personnel: 6 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement:  Type: Supervision de la trêve par l'ONU Équipement:  Année: 2019 Emplacement: Liban/Golan Autres Régions: Moyen-Orient Personnel: 4 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve par l'ONU Équipement:  Année: 2018 Emplacement: Liban/Golan Autres Régions: Moyen Orient Personnel: 4 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve par l'ONU Équipement:  Année: 2017 Emplacement: Liban/Golan Autres Régions: Moyen-Orient Personnel: 4 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve par l'ONU Équipement:  Année: 2016 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Moyen-Orient Personnel: 4 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve par l'ONU Équipement:  Année: 2015 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Moyen-Orient Personnel: 4 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve par l'ONU, Équipement:  Année: 2014 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2013 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2012 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2011 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 7 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2010 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2009 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 7 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2008 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 7 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2007 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2006 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 7 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2005 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2004 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2003 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2002 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 8 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2001 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 6 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 2000 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 10 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 1999 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golfe Personnel: 10 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 1998 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 11 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 1997 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 11 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  Année: 1996 Emplacement: Liban Autres Régions: Golan Personnel: 12 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Supervision de la trêve des Nations Unies (ONUST), les Canadiens servent d'observateurs militaires des Nations Unies (OMNU). Équipement:  JAGUAR Année: 2012 Emplacement: Jamaique Personnel: 65 Éléments: Air ( force opérationnelle Jamaique) Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Type: Soutien à la recherche et au sauvetage Equipement: 3 CH-146 Griffon  Année: 2011 Emplacement: Jamaique Personnel: 65 Éléments: Air ( force opérationnelle Jamaique) Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Type: Soutien à la recherche et au sauvetage Equipement: 3 CH-146 Griffon  Aucun KINETIC Année: 2000 Emplacement: Yougoslavie, Monténégro Personnel: 800 Éléments:  Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Opération de soutien de la paix menée par l'OTAN Equipement: Année: 1999 Emplacement: Yougoslavie, Monténégro Personnel: 800 Éléments:  Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Opération de soutien de la paix menée par l'OTAN Equipement KOBOLD Année: 2020 Emplacement: Kosovo Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Equipement:          Année: 2019 Emplacement: Kosovo Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Equipement:  Aucun Année: 2018 Emplacement: Kosovo Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée (logistique et support du quartier général ) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement:  Aucun Année: 2017 Emplacement: Kosovo Personnel: 6 Éléments: Armée (logistique et support du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement: Aucun Année: 2016 Emplacement: Kosovo Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée (logistique et support du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement:  Aucun Année: 2015 Emplacement: Serbie Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée (logistique et support du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement:  Aucun Année: 2014 Emplacement: Serbie Personnel: 4 Éléments: Armée de terre (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement:  Année: 2013 Emplacement: Serbie Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée de terre (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement: Année: 2012 Emplacement: Serbie Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée de terre (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement:  Année: 2011 Emplacement: Serbie Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée de terre (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement: Année: 2010 Emplacement: Serbie Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée de terre (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement:  Année: 2009 Emplacement: Serbie Personnel: 6 Éléments: Armée de terre (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement:  Année: 2008 Emplacement: Serbie Personnel: 3 Éléments: Armée de terre (logistique et soutien du quartier général) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Opération de soutien de la paix dirigée par l'OTAN Équipement:  NEON / PROJECTION Année: 2020 Emplacement:  Corée du Nord Personnel: Éléments: Marine & Air Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Mise en oeuvre des sanctions du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU imposées à la Corée du Nord Équipement: (Octobre 2020) NCSM Winnipeg déployé avec un CP-140 Aurora Année: 2019 Emplacement: Corée du Nord Personnel: Éléments: Marine & Air Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Mise en oeuvre des sanctions du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU imposées à la Corée du Nord Équipement: ( Juin 2019) NCSM Régina et l'unité de réapprovisionnement de la marine (NRU) Asterix sont déployés avec un CP-140 Aurora ; (septembre 2019) le NCSM Ottawa est déployé avec un CP-140 Aurora Année: 2018 Emplacement: Corée du Nord Personnel: Éléments:  Marine & Air Autorité:  ONU Direction de commandement: Type: I Mise en oeuvre des sanctions du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU imposées à la Corée du Nord Équipement:   (mai 2018) le NCSM Vancouver déployé avec un CP-140 Aurora ; (octobre 2018) le NCSM Calgary déployé avec un CP-140 Aurora. NMI Année: 2020 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 250 Éléments: Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Danemark Type:  Renforcement des capacités et formation militaire Équipement: 1 vol d'hélicoptère avec 3 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) hel Année: 2019 Emplacement: Irak Personnel: 250 Éléments: Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Danemark Type:  Renforcement des capacités et formation militaire Équipement: 1 vol d'hélicoptère avec 3 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) hel NOBLE Année: 2000 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée (1 conseiller en assurance qualité et un conseiller financier) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  déminage, formation et sensibilisation Équipement: Année: 1999 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 6 Éléments: Armée (3 sous-officiers et 3 officiers) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  déminage, formation et sensibilisation Équipement Année: 1998 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 6 Éléments: Armée (3 sous-officiers et 3 officiers) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  déminage, formation et sensibilisation Équipement: Année: 1997 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzegovine Personnel: 7 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 major + 6 militaires chargés du déminage) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  déminage, formation et sensibilisation Équipement PALLADIUM Année: 2003 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzégovine Personnel: 800 Éléments: Armée de terre Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de stabilisation (SFOR) Équipement:  Année: 2002 Emplacement: Bosnie Herzégovine Personnel: 1600 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 bataillon d'infanterie, 1 régiment de reconnaissance, 1 équipe d'enrôlement) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de stabilisation Équipement:  Année: 2001 Emplacement: Bosnie Personnel: 1600 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 bataillon d'infanterie, 1 régiment de reconnaissance, 1 équipe d'enrôlement) Autorité: OTAN (force de stabilisation) Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2000 Emplacement: Bosnie Personnel: 1200 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 bataillon d'infanterie, 1 régiment de reconnaissance, 1 équipe d'enrôlement) Autorité: OTAN (Force de stabilisation) Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 1999 Emplacement: Bosnie Personnel: 1350 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 bataillon d'infanterie, 1 régiment de reconnaissance, 1 équipe d'enrôlement) Autorité: OTAN (force de stabilisation) Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 1998 Emplacement: Bosnie Personnel: 1380 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 bataillon d'infanterie, 1 régiment de reconnaissance, 1 équipe d'enrôlement) & Air Autorité: OTAN (Force de stabilisation) Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: 6 CF-18 Année: 1997 Emplacement: Bosnie Personnel: 960 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 bataillon d'infanterie, 1 régiment de reconnaissance, 1 équipe d'enrôlement) & Air Autorité: OTAN (force de stabilisation) Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 1996 Emplacement: Bosnie Personnel: 982 Éléments: Armée de terre (1 bataillon d'infanterie, 1 régiment de reconnaissance, 1 équipe d'enrôlement) & Air Autorité: OTAN (Force de stabilisation) Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: CC-130 PRESENCE (MALI) Année: 2020 Emplacement: Mali Personnel: 4 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  Maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2019 Emplacement: Mali Personnel: 5 Éléments: Air (transport logistique et support médical) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Maintien de la paix Équipement: 1 escadron d'hélicoptères avec 3 CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook; 5 Bell 412 (CH-145 Griffon) Année: 2018 Emplacement: Mali Personnel: 138 Éléments: Air (transport logistique et support médical) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  Maintien de la paix Équipement: 1 escadron d'hélicoptères avec 3 CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook; 5 Bell 412 (CH-145 Griffon) PRESENCE (UGANDA) Année: 2020 Emplacement: Ouganda Autres Régions: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 25 Éléments: Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  Maintien de la paix Équipement: CC-130J Hercules Année: 2019 Emplacement: Ouganda Autres Régions: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 25 Éléments: Air Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  Maintien de la paix Équipement: CC-130J Hercules Année: 2018 Emplacement: Ouganda Autres Régions: République Démocratique du Congo Personnel: 25 Éléments: Air Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  Maintien de la paix Équipement: CC-130J Hercules PROJECTION (ASIA PACIFIC) Année: 2020 Emplacement: Asie Pacifique Personnel: 240 Éléments: Marine Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Type: Équipement:  NCSM Winnipeg Année: 2019 Emplacement: Asie Pacifique Personnel: 240 Éléments:  Marine Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Type: Stabilité et exercices multinationaux Équipements: NCSM Ottawa, NCSM Régina and NM Asterix Année: 2018 Emplacement: Asie Pacifique Personnel: 240 Éléments: Marine Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Type: Stabilité & Exercices Multinationaux Equipment: NCSM Calgary, NCSM Vancouver PROJECTION (EURO-ATLANTIC) Année: 2018 Emplacement: Euro-Atlantique Personnel: Éléments: Marine Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Équipement: NCSM Windsor (Sous marin) PROJECTION (GULF OF GUINEA) Année: 2020 Emplacement:  Golfe de Guinée Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Marine Autorité:  Direction de Commandement: Type:  Équipement: NCSM Shawnigan, NCSM Glace Bay Année: 2019 Emplacement: Golfe de Guinée Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Marine Autorité:  Direction de Commandement: Type:  Équipement: NCSM Shawnigan, NCSM Kingston Année: 2018 Emplacement: Golfe de Guinée Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Marine Autorité:  Direction de Commandement: Type:  Équipement: NCSM Kingston, NCSM Summerside PROJECTION (NORTH AFRICAN COAST) Année: 2020 Emplacement: Cote Nord Africaine Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Marine Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Type: Équipement:  NCSM Shawnigan, NCSM Glace Bay Année: 2019 Emplacement: Cote Nord Africaine Personnel: Change avec le temps Éléments: Marine Autorité: Direction de Commandement: Type:  Équipement:  NCSM Shawnigan, NCSM Kingston PRUDENCE Année: 1998 Emplacement: République centrafricaine Personnel: 45 Éléments: Armée de terre ( officiers d'état-major du personnel de soutien et détachement de communication) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Maintien de la paix MINURCA Équipement:  Année: 1997 Emplacement: République centrafricaine Personnel: 29 Éléments: Armée de terre ( officiers d'état-major du personnel de soutien et détachement de communication) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Maintien de la paix MINURCA Équipement: PROTEUS Année: 2009 Emplacement: Israel / Jerusalem Personnel: 9 Éléments: Autorité: Direction de Commandement: États- Unis Type: USSC, multilatéral (Canada Pays-Bas Turquie Royaume-Uni Danemark, Finlande, Allemagne et Grèce) Équipement: Année: 2008 Emplacement: Israel / Jerusalem Personnel: 3 Éléments: Autorité: Direction de Commandement: États- Unis Type: USSC, multilatéral (Canada Pays-Bas Turquie Royaume-Uni Danemark, Finlande, Allemagne et Grèce) Équipement:  NCSM Shawnigan, NCSM Kingston Année: 2007 Emplacement: Israel / Jerusalem Personnel: 3 Éléments: Autorité: Direction de Commandement: États- Unis Type: USSC, multilatéral (Canada Pays-Bas Turquie Royaume-Uni Danemark, Finlande, Allemagne et Grèce) Équipement: Année: 2006 Emplacement: Israel / Jerusalem Personnel: 3 Éléments: Autorité: Direction de Commandement: États- Unis Type: USSC, multilatéral (Canada Pays-Bas Turquie Royaume-Uni Danemark, Finlande, Allemagne et Grèce) Équipement:  NCSM Shawnigan, NCSM Kingston REASSURANCE (LATVIA) Année: 2020 Emplacement: Lettonie Personnel: 527 Éléments: Armée de terre (quartier général de la force opérationnelle et d'un groupement tactique), une compagnie d'infanterie en véhicules blindés légers, une compagnie d'appui au combat (renseignement et communications) et une compagnie de soutien (transport, approvisionnement et soins médicaux). Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Assurance & Dissuasion  Équipement:  M777 et 6 véhicules blindés légers Année: 2019 Emplacement: Lettonie Personnel: 525 Éléments:  Armée de terre (quartier général de la force opérationnelle et d'un groupement tactique), une compagnie d'infanterie en véhicules blindés légers, une compagnie d'appui au combat (renseignement et communications) et une compagnie de soutien (transport, approvisionnement et soins médicaux). Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Assurance & Dissuasion  Équipement:  Année: 2018 Emplacement: Lettonie Personnel: 350 Éléments: Armée de terre (quartier général de la force opérationnelle et d'un groupement tactique), une compagnie d'infanterie en véhicules blindés légers, une compagnie d'appui au combat (renseignement et communications) et une compagnie de soutien (transport, approvisionnement et soins médicaux). Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Assurance & Dissuasion Équipement:  M777 et 6 véhicules blindés légers Année: 2017 Emplacement: Lettonie Personnel: 450 Éléments:  Armée de terre (quartier général de la force opérationnelle et d'un groupement tactique), une compagnie d'infanterie en véhicules blindés légers, une compagnie d'appui au combat (renseignement et communications) et une compagnie de soutien (transport, approvisionnement et soins médicaux). Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Assurance & Dissuasion  Équipement:  REASSURANCE (LITTUANIE) Année: 2014 Emplacement: Littuanie Personnel: Éléments: Air Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Police de l'air de l'OTAN Équipement:  4 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18AM) REASSURANCE (MEDITERRANEAN) Année: 2020 Emplacement:  Mer Méditerranée Personnel: 240 Éléments: Marine (force opérationnelle maritime) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Canada Type: Assurance & surveillance Equipement:  Navire canadien de Sa Majesté (NCSM) Fredericton Année: 2019 Emplacement:  Mer Méditerranée Personnel: 240 Éléments: Marine Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Assurance & surveillance Équipement:  Deuxième groupe maritime permanent de l'OTAN, frégate à missiles guidés avec un hangar et des missiles surface-air. Année: 2018 Emplacement: Mer Méditerannée Personnel: 240 Éléments: Marine Autorité: OTAN Direction de commandement: Type: Assurance & surveillance Équipement:  Deuxième groupe maritime permanent de l'OTAN, Frégate à missiles guidés avec hangar et missiles sol-air Année: 2017 Emplacement: Mer Méditerranée Personnel: 240 Éléments: Marine Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Assurance & surveillance Equipement: Deuxième groupe maritime permanent de l'OTAN, Frégate à missiles guidés avec hangar et missiles sol-air Année: 2016 Emplacement: Mer Méditerranée Personnel: 240 Éléments:  Marine Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Assurance & surveillance Équipement:   Deuxième groupe maritime permanent de l'OTAN, frégate à missiles guidés avec un hangar et des missiles surface-air. Année: 2014 Emplacement: Mer Méditerranée Personnel: 240 Éléments:  Marine Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Assurance & surveillance Équipement:   Standing Nato Maritim group, Guided missile frigate with a hangar and surface-to-air missiles REASSURANCE (POLOGNE) Année: 2016 Emplacement: Pologne Personnel: 220 Éléments: Armée (1 compagnie d'infantrie) Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commadnement: Type: Assurance & Dissuasion Équipement:  Année: 2014 Emplacement: Pologne Personnel: 220 Éléments: Force opérationnelle terrestre Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commadnement: Type: Assurance et surveillance Équipement:  RECORD Année: 2000 Emplacement: Irak, Koweit Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: Mission d'observation des Nations Unies pour l'Irak et le Koweït Équipement:  Année: 1999 Emplacement: Irak, Koweit Personnel: 6 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: Mission d'observation des Nations Unies pour l'Irak et le Koweït Équipement:  Année: 1997 Emplacement: Irak, Koweit Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: Mission d'observation Équipement:  Année: 1996 Emplacement: Irak, Koweit Personnel: 4 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: Mission d'observation Équipement:  REPTILE Année: 2004 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: MINUSIL maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2003 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: MINUSIL maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2002 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: MINUSIL maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2001 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: MINUSIL maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 2000 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: MINUSIL maintien de la paix Équipement:  Année: 1999 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 5 Éléments: Observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commadnement: Type: MINUSIL maintien de la paix Équipement:  REASSURANCE (ROUMANIE) Année: 2020 Emplacement: Roumanie Personnel: 135 Éléments:  Force Opérationnelle aérienne Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type:  Police aérienne renforcée par l'OTAN Équipement:  6 CF-188 Hornet Année: 2019 Emplacement: Roumanie Personnel: 135 Éléments: Air Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Police aérienne renforcée par l'OTAN Equipment:  6 CF-188 Hornet Year: 2018 Emplacement: Roumanie Personnel: 135 Éléments: Air Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Police aérienne renforcée par l'OTAN Équipement:  6 CF-188 Hornet Année: 2017 Emplacement: Roumanie Personnel: 135 Éléments: Air Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Police aérienne renforcée par l'OTAN Équipement:  4 CF-188 Hornet Year: 2014 Emplacement: Roumanie Personnel: Éléments: Air Autorité: OTAN Direction de Commandement: Type: Assurance et surveillance Équipement:  1 CF-188 Hornet SAFARI Année: 2011 Emplacement: Soudan de Sud Personnel: 8 Éléments: Armée de terre (force opérationnelle Soudan) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNMISS (maintien de la paix) Équipement: Année: 2010 Emplacement: Soudan de Sud Personnel: 27 (20 observateurs) Éléments: Armée de terre (force opérationnelle Soudan) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNMISS (maintien de la paix) Équipement: Année: 2009 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 29 Éléments: Force opérationnelle de l'armée et observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNMISS (maintien de la paix) Équipement: Année: 2008 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 30 Éléments: Force opérationnelle de l'armée et observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNMISS (maintien de la paix) Équipement: Année: 2007 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 30 Éléments: Force opérationnelle de l'armée et observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNMISS (maintien de la paix) Équipement: Année: 2006 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 29 Éléments: Force opérationnelle de l'armée et observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNMISS (maintien de la paix) Équipement: Année: 2005 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 32 Éléments: Force opérationnelle de l'armée et observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNMISS (maintien de la paix) Équipement: Année: 2004 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 11 Éléments: Force opérationnelle de l'armée et observateurs Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNMISS (maintien de la paix) Équipement: SATURN Année: 2011 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 4 Éléments: Armée (force opérationnelle Darfur) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNAMID Équipement: Année: 2010 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 5 Éléments: Armée (force opérationnelle Darfur) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: UNAMID Équipement: Année: 2008 Emplacement: Soudan Personnel: 5 Éléments: Autorité: ONU & UA Direction de Commandement: Type: UNAMID maintien de la paix Équipement: SCULPTURE Année: 2012 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 10 Éléments: Armée de terre (conseil militaire et soutien à la formation) Autorité: Effort multinational Direction de Commandement: Grande bretagne Type: Équipe internationale de conseil et d'entraînement militaire (IMATT) Équipement: Année: 2011 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 9 Éléments: Armée de terre (conseil militaire et soutien à la formation) Autorité: Effort multinational Direction de Commandement: Grande bretagne Type: Équipe internationale de conseil et d'entraînement militaire (IMATT) Équipement: Année: 2010 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 8 Éléments: Armée de terre (conseil militaire et soutien à la formation) Autorité: Effort multinational Direction de Commandement: Grande bretagne Type: Équipe internationale de conseil et d'entraînement militaire (IMATT) Équipement: Année: 2009 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 7 Éléments: Armée de terre (conseil militaire et soutien à la formation) Autorité: Effort multinational Direction de Commandement: Grande bretagne Type: Équipe internationale de conseil et d'entraînement militaire (IMATT) Équipement: Année: 2006 Emplacement: Sierra Leone Personnel: 11 Éléments: Armée de terre (conseil militaire et soutien à la formation) Autorité: Effort multinational Direction de Commandement: Grande bretagne Type: Équipe internationale de conseil et d'entraînement militaire (IMATT) Équipement: SEXTANT Année: 2009 Emplacement: Océan atlantique et mer méditérannée Personnel: Éléments: Marine (frégate à missiles guidés) Autorité: OTAN (1er groupe maritime permanent OTAN) Direction de Commadnement: Type: Force de réaction de l'OTAN Équipement: NCSM winnipeg Année: 2008 Emplacement: Océan atlantique et mer méditérannée Personnel: Éléments: Marine (frégate à missiles guidés) Autorité: OTAN (1er groupe maritime permanent OTAN) Direction de Commadnement: Type: Force de réaction de l'OTAN Équipement: NCSM Ville de Québec Année: 2007 Emplacement: Océan atlantique et mer méditérannée Personnel: 235 Éléments: Marine (frégate à missiles guidés) Autorité: OTAN (1er groupe maritime permanent OTAN) Direction de Commadnement: Type: Force de réaction de l'OTAN Équipement: NCSM Toronto SNOWGOOSE Année: 2020 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2019 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2018 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2017 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2016 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2015 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2014 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2013 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2012 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2011 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2010 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2009 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2008 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2007 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2006 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2005 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2004 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2003 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2002 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2001 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 1 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2000 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 1999 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 1998 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 1997 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 1996 Emplacement: Chypre Personnel: 2 Éléments: Armée de terre, cellule des opérations d"information Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: SOPRANO Année: 2020 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 9 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2019 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 11 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2018 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 5 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2017 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 5 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2016 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 5 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2015 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 5 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type:  Force de maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2014 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 5 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2013 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 5 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Maintien de la paix Équipement: Année: 2012 Emplacement: Soudan du Sud Personnel: 5 Éléments: N/A (Observateurs) Autorité: ONU Direction de Commandement: Type: Maintien de la paix Équipement: UNIFIER Année: 2020 Emplacement: Ukraine Personnel: 200 Éléments: Armée de terre (formation aux armes de combat, génie militaire, formation de la police militaire, formation médicale de combat et renforcement des capacités maritimes) Autorité: Commission Multinationale Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités et formation militaire Equipement: Année: 2019 Emplacement: Ukraine Personnel: 200 Éléments:  Armée de terre (formation aux armes de combat, génie militaire, formation de la police militaire, formation médicale de combat et renforcement des capacités maritimes) Autorité:  Commission Multinationale Direction de Commandement: Type:  Renforcement des capacités et formation militaire Équipement: Année: 2018 Emplacement: Ukraine Personnel: 200 Éléments:  Armée de terre (formation aux armes de combat, génie militaire, formation de la police militaire, formation médicale de combat et renforcement des capacités maritimes) Autorité: Commission Multinationale Direction de Commandement: Type: Renforcement des capacités et formation militaire Equipement: Année: 2017 Emplacement: Ukraine Personnel: 200 Éléments: Armée de terre (formation aux armes de combat, génie militaire, formation de la police militaire, formation médicale de combat et renforcement des capacités maritimes) Autorité:  Commission Multinationale Direction de Commandement: Type:  Renforcement des capacités et formation militaire Equipement: Année: 2016 Emplacement: Ukraine Personnel: 200 Éléments:  Armée de terre (formation aux armes de combat, génie militaire, formation de la police militaire, formation médicale de combat et renforcement des capacités maritimes) Autorité:  Commission Multinationale Direction de Commandement: Type:  Renforcement des capacités et formation militaire Equipement: Année: 2015 Emplacement: Ukraine Personnel: 200 Éléments: Armée de terre (formation aux armes de combat, génie militaire, formation de la police militaire, formation médicale de combat et renforcement des capacités maritimes) Autorité:  Commission Multinationale Direction de Commandement: Type:  Renforcement des capacités et formation militaire Équipement: ## Battle Rhythm URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/battle-rhythm/ Modified: 2026-09-08 > The Battle Rhythm podcast features timely discussion on the defence and security issues of the day, as well as feature conversations... Le balado Battle Rhythm (offert en anglais seulement), coanimé par Stephen Saideman et un coanimateur invité chaque semaine, est coproduit par le CDSN et le CGAI. Le balado paraît un mercredi sur deux et propose des discussions d'actualité sur les enjeux de défense et de sécurité du moment, ainsi que des entretiens de fond avec des universitaires et des praticiens. Animateur Stephen M. Saideman: Director of the CDSN-RCDS and Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University. His research focuses on NATO, civil-military relations, and international security. CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.4: Defence Spending Strategies with Canada's Naval Commander Angus Topshee Balado Battle Rhythm S4 Ep.22 : Planning for the Next Pandemic with CAF’s Surgeon General, MGen Scott Malcolm Stephen Saideman September 18, 2026 Welcome to a new academic term and a new episode of Battle Rhythm, Steve Saideman and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department… CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.3: Radical Pragmatism with Dr. Jessica F. Green Balado Battle Rhythm S4 Ep.3 : Radical Pragmatism Stephen Saideman September 18, 2026 Welcome to spooky season and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-hosts Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science… CDSN-RCDS Podcast Network · Episode 4.2: The Purge with Honourary Colonel Michelle Douglas, 33rd Vimy Award Laureate Balado Battle Rhythm S4 Ep.2 : The Purge with Honourary Colonel Michelle Douglas Stephen Saideman, Thomas Hughes August 31, 2026 Welcome to autumn and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University. Steve… Balado Battle Rhythm S4 Ep.1 : Overseen or Overlooked? Stephen Saideman, Artur Wilczynski, Philippe Lagassé September 30, 2025 Welcome to autumn and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada… Balado Battle Rhythm S4 Ep.0 : Human Security in Conflict Stephen Saideman, Anessa Kimball September 16, 2025 Welcome back to class and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval;… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.39: Wicked Problems with Jody Thomas August 27, 2025 In episode 39 of season 3, co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.38: Cyber Command with Major-General Dave Yarker August 6, 2025 In our thirty-eighth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.37: The Past, Present and Future of Canadian Defence July 23, 2025 In the 37th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve and… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.36: Canada’s Defence Opportunities and Challenges within NATO and NORAD July 9, 2025 In the 36th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.35: Evolving Security Strategies June 18, 2025 In our thirty-fifth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.34: Lessons Learned from former Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. (ret’d) Wayne Eyre May 28, 2025 In episode 34 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.33: NATO Ambassadors and Euro-Atlantic Security May 14, 2025 In episode 33 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.32: Terrorism and authoritarian regimes April 30, 2025 In episode 32 of season 3 (recorded on voting day), Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.31: Challenging Assumptions Through Systems Thinking Approaches March 31, 2025 In the 31st episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.30: Pan-Domain and CIMIC Responses Stephen Saideman, Anessa Kimball March 19, 2025 In the 30th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval. Steve Saideman &… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep. 29: After Action Report: Ukrainian Foreign Legion March 6, 2025 In episode 29 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep. 28: Canada First, Not Canada Alone February 20, 2025 In episode 28 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University discuss JD… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep. 27 – Bridging the Gap with Visiting Defence Fellows February 7, 2025 In episode 27 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.26: Stealth, Persistence and Lethality: Naval Force Development January 22, 2025 In our twenty-sixth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve joins Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep. 25: Canada’s National Quantum Strategy January 8, 2025 In episode 25 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow… Balado Battle Rhythm S3. Ep.24: Allied Military Leadership in Conversation December 18, 2024 We are ending the year on a positive note with this Battle Rhythm / Notes From the Field crossover episode, co-hosts Steve… Balado Battle Rhythm S.3 Ep.23: Civil Wars December 5, 2024 In episode 23 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.22: NATO Diplomacy with SNMG2 Comdr, Cmdre Matthew Coates November 20, 2024 In the twenty-second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss upcoming… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.21: The Cookie Crumbles: US Election and Canadian Security November 7, 2024 In our twenty-first episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve Saideman and Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.20 – Development – Security Nexus October 24, 2024 In episode 20 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve travels to Pennsylvania, discussion on campaign spending ensues. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.19: Conventional War & Means of Control October 10, 2024 In episode 19 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve has an agreeable discussion with David Pugliese on Canadaland’s Backbench podcast. Co-host Thomas… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep. 18: Military Ethics Education and Application September 26, 2024 In episode 18 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve testifies at the Parliamentary Defence Committee, discussion ensues. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.17: Change Agent, Soldier-Scholar Dr. Alan Okros September 12, 2024 In episode 17 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.16 – Pride and Politics August 28, 2024 In our sixteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, season 3 Steve and Wendy (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the… Balado Battle Rhythm S3 Ep.15: Medium Risk, Medium Reward August 14, 2024 In episode 15 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University, discuss the impacts… Page 1 / 41234» ## Conseils de sécurité URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conseils-de-securite/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > The Conseils de sécurité podcastcovers security and defence issues in French.  Le balado Conseils de sécurité traite de questions de sécurité et de défense en français. Présenté par Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Laurent Borzillo, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Artur Wilczynski et Col Marie-Christine Harvey, Conseils de Sécurité traite de questions de sécurité et de défense en français. Coproduit avec le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), le Réseau canadien sur la défense et la sécurité et France-Amériques, Conseils de Sécurité est l'un des premiers balado transatlantique. Animateurs Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé  est professeure titulaire à l’Université Bishop’s et Fellow non-résidente au International Peace Institute, New York. Elle est directrice adjointe du Centre FrancoPaix . En 2018–2019, elle détient la Canada Fulbright Research Chair for Peace and War Studies. Elle est membre associée du Centre d’études pour la paix et la sécurité internationale et du Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal (CERIUM). Laurent Borzillo est Chercheur postdoctoral à l’École Nationale d’Administration Publique. Fondateur de l’association française Forum de Défense et de Stratégie, il est titulaire d’un doctorat en science politique obtenu en cotutelle de thèse entre l’Université de Montréal et de l’Université de Montpellier. Aubin Gonzalez Lapos est juriste, entrepreneur et enseignant, actif à la croisée du droit, de l’innovation technologique et des relations internationales. Il est actuellement Secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques, où il conçoit et pilote des projets de diplomatie économique et culturelle visant à renforcer les partenariats entre l’Europe et les Amériques. Artur Wilczynski est professionel en résidence à  l'École supérieure d'affaire publiques et internationales à l'Université d'Ottawa et conseiller stratégique sénior chez Samuel Associates. Artur a travaillé au Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST) de 2018 à 2022, notamment à titre de chef adjoint associé du SIGINT – le renseignement électromagnétique – de 2020 à 2022. Col Marie-Christine Harvey s’est joint aux Forces armées canadiennes en 1996, initialement en tant que réserviste et membre du rang au sein du Régiment du Saguenay. Son parcours opérationnel comprend des déploiements domestiques et internationaux en Bosnie, Afghanistan et au Kuwait. Plus récemment elle a commandée le 5e Groupe-Brigade mécanisée du Canada de 2021 à 2023. Merci à David Côté pour la musique thème de notre balado ! ## Événements à venir URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenements/ Modified: 2023-03-29 > Événements à venir - Le Réseau d'analyse stratégique. Nous organisons de nombreux événements qu'il s'agisse d'ateliers, de tables rondes... De la mesure à l’anticipation des conflits : un système d’alerte précoce pour l’Afrique et le monde Trump après les midterms: quelle géopolitique mondiale au lendemain du 3 novembre? Le Québec face au réarmement mondial Événements passés Recherche Catégories Catégories Appel à candidatures  (5) Appel à communications  (4) Ateliers  (9) Bourses  (1) Colloque  (17) Journée Transatlantique & la Patrouille de France L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle Ecole d’été en études stratégiques : « Penser les conflits au XXIe siècle » L’Arctique entre refonte des alliances et consolidation des souverainetés Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under 4 ans de guerre en Ukraine : Quelles perspectives de paix pour la sécurité transatlantique ? La Stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada : promesses, angles morts et arbitrages De l’ambition à l’action : réussir la stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada Université Laval Colloque | Le fardeau militaire entre alliés : du partage au transfert ? Journées Transpacifiques Préparer la Guerre. Comment transformer les forces armées Colloque annuel | Le Canada peut-il accroître son autonomie en défense ? S’allier et résister dans un monde en reconfiguration : le Canada à l’heure des choix Colloque | Canada–Europe : entre convergence stratégique et contraintes systémiques Zoom | Ambassade de France à Ottawa Sensibiliser les sociétés aux enjeux de défense Zoom | UQAM Comment renforcer la Défense du Canada en période d’incertitude stratégique ? Zoom | Salon Orange, Centre Pierre-Péladeau, UQAM Quel plan B ? Refonder la politique étrangère face à la politique prédatrice de l’Administration Trump Inscription en ligne (Zoom) | Université de Montréal Prévalence et degré de pénétration de la désinformation russe relative à la guerre russo-ukrainienne dans l’espace informationnel en Occident Zoom (inscription requis) | UQAM - Pavillon Athanase-David (D), salle D-R200 L’invasion de l’Ukraine: 3 ans après Université Laval Atelier de recherche sur les enjeux de sécurité internationale en 2025 Amphithéâtre Banque Nationale du campus, Côte Ste-Catherine, HEC Montréal LA DIPLOMATIE CANADIENNE DANS LES TURBULENCES DU SYSTEME INTERNATIONAL IRSEM-Europe La relation transatlantique : enjeux, perspectives et contestations Appel à candidatures : Programme de personnalités d’avenir France-Canada sur les enjeux de Défense et de Diplomatie La politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique l’Ecole militaire – Amphithéâtre Des Vallières Colloque international de « l’Observatoire De la Politique Extérieure Américaine » Zoom (inscription requis) | R-3465, Pavillon des Sciences de la gestion, UQAM Quelles leçons tirer de la guerre en Ukraine ? Pavillon Demarais (DMS) 4101, Université d'Ottawa Colloque 2024 – Les retombées stratégiques de l’élection présidentielle américaine Queen's University Retraite intensive de développement professionnel pour les chercheur.e.s émergent.e.s Zoom (inscription requis) | ENAP, salle 4045 Evolution et avenir de la relation entre l’OTAN et l’Arctique dans un contexte de (non)-politisation des questions de défense Ambassade de France Les futures zones de tensions et de conflits d’ici 2030 Théâtre de poche - POL 2113, Pavillon Maurice-Pollack, Université Laval L’ambiguïté stratégique des alliés et partenaires de Washington face à la mutation de l’ordre international Salon orange (Centre Pierre-Péladeau, UQAM) L’invasion de l’Ukraine, deux ans après Bishop's University La lutte réfléchie du Canada: Les défis de la délibération et de la démarche vers la paix University Club, University of Victoria Conférence sur la sécurité climatique dans la région du Pacifique et atelier de développement professionnel Zoom | Ambassade de France COLLOQUE DU RUBICON – Les défis multidimensionnels de l’ingérence étrangère Appel à candidatures : Programme de personnalités d’avenir France-Canada sur les enjeux de Défense University of Ottawa - Faculty of Social Sciences Building, Salle 4007 LES MÉANDRES DE LA POLITIQUE MONDIALE: Non-alignement, défis hybrides, nouvelles frontières Appel à candidatures : Bourse de recherche de l’Association canadienne sur la sécurité climatique Appel à communications – Colloque 2023 concours étudiant University of Ottawa Renseignement dans le maintien de la paix: défis et opportunités École d’été – Analyse computationnelle de textes sur la guerre en Ukraine Zoom Table ronde – Les défis sécuritaires en Afrique Zoom | Université du Québec à Montréal À quoi s’attendre de la guerre en Ukraine ? Hotel Monville L’information à la vitesse de la confiance Centre d’études sur la paix et la sécurité internationale Tensions mondiales, guerres locales ? L’évolution de la politique internationale des conflits Zoom | Pavillon Altman Center, The Citadel, Charleston, Caroline du Sud. La Guerre en Ukraine : Quelles leçons à tirer et quelles perspectives de paix ? Diffusion simultanée en visioconférence et sur la chaîne YouTube du Centre Thucydide | Patio d’Assas Le Rubicon – Saison 1 : promouvoir les études stratégiques francophones Symposium international Zoom | Queen's University, Robert Sutherland Hall - Room 202 Hors des sentiers battus: nouvelles directions dans la recherche sur le militaire Zoom | UQAM, Pavillon des Sciences de la gestion, Table ronde – Drones et nouvelles technologies militaires : quels enseignements tirés de la guerre russo-ukrainienne ? Zoom | Université de Montréal La crise au Mali et ses dimensions internationales – Table ronde Centre national des Arts RETROUVER NOTRE CHEMIN : Définir une stratégie internationale cohérente pour le Canada Zoom PROGRAMME DE RECRUTEMENT DES OFFICIERS DU RENSEIGNEMENT DE LA DÉFENSE – Séance d’information Symposium annuel IRSEM-RAS : Guerres de l’information et Alliances stratégiques Zoom Is War Over Taiwan Coming? Zoom | Université Bishops Colloque québécois sur la sécurité internationale des étudiants au premier cycle, 5ème édition Zoom | Université Bishop’s Prêt, engagé et renseigné : Le Canada et le rôle du renseignement face aux menaces et défis émergents Zoom Les orientations stratégiques du Québec et du Canada : enjeux sécuritaires, enjeux diplomatiques Université Bishop’s Prévenir l’extrémisme violent : Une approche pan-disciplinaire UQAM Guerre de l’information : stratégies, règles et enjeux L’appui à la sécurité et au renforcement des capacités en Afrique Zoom La fin de la guerre en Afghanistan : Quel impact pour l’OTAN et les rivalités entre grandes puissances ? Le monde d’après ? La coopération internationale et la gestion des menaces traditionnelles et émergentes Zoom Séance d’information sur le Programme de recrutement d’agent.e.s des politiques au ministère de la Défense nationale Zoom Changements géopolitiques dans le Caucase du Sud Zoom Coopération des démocraties en matière de défense contre l’autoritarisme Opinion publique et dépenses militaires au Canada Bourse doctorale 2021-2022 du Réseau d’analyse stratégique Zoom Coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire – Perspectives non-américaines Zoom Dix ans plus tard : bilan de la stratégie du pivot (rééquilibrage) américain vers l’Asie L’Opération IMPACT : Renforcement des capacités et lutte antiterroriste Zoom (Re)penser le rôle du Canada dans le maintien de la paix Appel à communications-« (Re)penser le rôle du Canada dans le maintien de la paix » Zoom L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada Zoom Les Forces armées canadiennes à l’ère de la COVID-19 – Atelier virtuel 5 Appel à contributions : L’État et la défense nationale dans un monde désordonné Zoom L’OTAN et la défense – Atelier virtuel 4 Appel à communications – Quebec Undergraduate Security Conference Zoom Maintien de la paix – Atelier virtuel 3 Zoom Contre-insurrection et contre-terrorisme – Atelier virtuel 2 Sur Twitter Comprendre l’Alliance des Cinq yeux (Five Eyes) Zoom Ateliers de formation pour étudiants et chercheurs émergents Zoom Renforcement des capacités au jour zéro – Atelier virtuel 1 ## Experts URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/experts-fr/ Modified: 2020-06-04 Recherche Affiliation au réseau Affiliation au réseau Chercheurs  (66) Chercheurs associés  (39) Chercheurs émergents  (75) Comité d’orientation stratégique  (7) Équipe de direction  (10) Praticiens  (31) André Abel Barry Praticien Maria Aftimos Chercheure émergente Tetede Babatunde François Akilatan Chercheur émergent Marie-Pier Allard-Caron Chercheure émergente Isabella Aung Chercheure émergente Niagalé Bagayoko Chercheure associée Pauline Baudu Praticienne Daphné Beaudoin Chercheure émergente Kim Beaulieu Chercheure émergente Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard Chercheur Stéphanie Bélanger Chercheure Jeanne Bélanger Chercheure émergente Jean-François Bélanger Chercheur Hager Ben Jaffel Chercheure associée Adib Bencherif Chercheur Chloé Berland Chercheure émergente Junru Bian Chercheur émergent Marc Bigaouette Comité d’orientation stratégique Louise Blais Praticienne Fabrice Blais-Savoie Praticien Tehya Blake Chercheure émergente Antonin Blanchard Coordonnateur | Site web et communications Yvan Blondin Comité d’orientation stratégique Alice Bonardi-Igout Chercheure émergente Antoine Bondaz Chercheur associé Laurent Borzillo Praticien Jean-Christophe Boucher Chercheur Yolande Bouka Chercheure Guillaume Boulianne Chercheur émergent Arthur Boutellis Chercheur associé Maya Bouton Chercheure émergente Yann Breault Chercheur Camille Brugier Chercheure associée Kerry Buck Praticienne Amélie Chalivet Chercheure émergente Roromme Chantal Chercheur Bruno Charbonneau Chercheur Laurent Charbonneau Chercheur émergent Daphné Charotte Chercheure émergente Andrea Charron Chercheure Stéphanie Chouinard Chercheure Judith Clech Chercheure émergente Pierre Colautti Chercheur émergent J. Michael Cole Chercheur associé Jeffrey F. Collins Chercheur associé W. R. Nadège Compaoré Chercheure Jérémie Cornut Chercheur Isabelle Côté Chercheure Alexandre Courtemanche Chercheur émergent Jean F. Crombois Chercheur associé Satcha de Henning Michaëlis Chercheure émergente Marie-Christine De Tilly Comité d’orientation stratégique Igor Delanoë Chercheur associé Laurence Deschamps-Laporte Chercheure Delphine Deschaux-Dutard Chercheure associée Marie-Eve Desrosiers Chercheure Emma Donnaint Chercheure émergente Corinne Dory Chercheure émergente Marc Doucet Chercheur Dirk Druet Chercheur associé David Dubé Chercheur émergent Alexane Dumoulin Chercheure émergente Caroline Dunton Chercheure émergente Charlotte Duval-Lantoine Praticienne Emilie El Khoury Chercheure Mohamed Elgayar Chercheur émergent Sarah Elimam Chercheure émergente Ralf Emmers Chercheur associé Walid Ferguen Coordonnateur | Evénements Renée Filiatrault Praticienne Gianmarco Fontana Chercheur émergent Jacob Fortier Chercheur émergent Maxandre Fortier Praticien Michel Fortmann Chercheur Philippe M. Frowd Chercheur Danny Gagné Chercheur Frédérick Gagnon Co-directeur Brigadier-Général Richard Giguère (ret.) Praticien Aubin Gonzalez Lapos Comité d’orientation stratégique Will Greaves Chercheur Marianne Grenier Chercheure émergente Zachary Griffiths-Julien Chercheur émergent Heidi Hardt Chercheure associée Siobhan Harty Comité d’orientation stratégique Ronald Hatto Chercheur associé Marina Henke Chercheure associée Stéfanie von Hlatky Chercheure Stephanie C. Hofmann Chercheure associée Thomas Hughes Co-directeur Charline Hutin Chercheure émergente Anvesh Jain Chercheur émergent Tancrède Jankowski Chercheur émergent Daniel Jean Comité d’orientation stratégique Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer Praticien Joseph T. Jockel Chercheur associé Pierre Jolicoeur Chercheur Thomas Juneau Chercheur Anessa Kimball Chercheure Nicolas Klingelschmitt Chercheur Michael Kofman Chercheur associé Page 1 / 3123» ## Le Nord Stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique/ Modified: 2026-09-01 > Balado Conseils de sécurité traite de questions de sécurité et de défense en français. Coproduit avec le Réseau... Le balado francophone sur la défense, la géopolitique et la sécurité. Le Nord stratégique est un podcast francophone haut de gamme, animé par Éric Sauvé, consacré à la géopolitique, à la défense et aux enjeux de sécurité contemporains, qui s’adresse à un public cultivé, professionnel et influent, tout en répondant à un vide important dans l’espace médiatique canadien francophone grâce à des analyses crédibles fondées sur une véritable expérience opérationnelle. Pourquoi maintenant Les enjeux de défense, de sécurité et de géopolitique occupent aujourd'hui une place sans précédent dans l'actualité : guerre en Ukraine, compétition entre grandes puissances, sécurité de l'Arctique, intelligence artificielle militaire, résilience des infrastructures critiques et évolution rapide des menaces. Pourtant, peu d'espaces francophones offrent une analyse sérieuse et approfondie de ces questions. Animateur Eric Sauvé est président d'Innovigo Inc. et possède plus de trente ans d'expérience dans les domaines de la défense, du renseignement et de la sécurité. Ancien officier des Forces armées canadiennes, il a servi au sein des communautés de l'infanterie, des opérations spéciales et du renseignement, notamment lors de déploiements en Bosnie-Herzégovine et en Afghanistan. Il a également collaboré avec des partenaires internationaux, dont la US Defence Intelligence Agency et d'autres organisations alliées du renseignement. Titulaire d'un baccalauréat en histoire et d'une maîtrise en études de la guerre, il enseigne, conseille des organisations publiques et privées et intervient régulièrement dans les médias sur les questions de défense, de géopolitique et de sécurité nationale. Son parcours combine expérience opérationnelle, réflexion stratégique et capacité à rendre accessibles des enjeux complexes à un large public. ## Le Réseau URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-reseau/ Modified: 2026-08-24 > Mobiliser le savoir. Former la relève. Incubateur de l’expertise canadienne et mondiale sur l’actualité géostratégique, nous offrons... Mobiliser le savoir. Former la relève. Le Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS) est un pôle de recherche bilingue, indépendant et non partisan spécialisé dans les questions de défense et de sécurité internationale. Son mandat consiste à fournir à l'Équipe de la Défense une expertise rigoureuse, rapide et pertinente sur la transformation de l'ordre international et ses répercussions sur la politique de défense du Canada. Les travaux du Réseau sur concentrent sur : L'analyse de la concurrence stratégique et des menaces pandomaines, notamment les stratégies des adversaires du Canada, les leçons tirées des conflits contemporains, l'évolution des stratégies de dissuasion, l'adaptation de l'OTAN et les nouvelles initiatives de sécurité alliées; L'étude des enjeux liés à la défense de l'Arctique, du Nord et de l'Amérique du Nord, incluant l'évolution des relations canado-américaines en matière de défense, les changements dans la posture stratégique des États-Unis et leurs implications pour la sécurité continentale; L'examen de la base industrielle et technologique de défense du Canada, notamment les questions liées à l'acquisition de capacités, à l'interopérabilité avec les alliés, au développement de capacités souveraines et à la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada. Objectifs Dans ce cadre, le Réseau poursuit trois objectifs : Mobiliser – en français et en anglais – la recherche innovante et multidisciplinaire dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité de manière à développer des synergies et faire rayonner la voix des experts ; Diffuser auprès du gouvernement du Canada, des organismes partenaires et du grand public les fruits de l’analyse stratégique de manière à informer les décisions politiques et éclairer le débat public ; Former la prochaine génération d’experts en matière de sécurité et de défense par l’intégration des étudiants au développement et à la diffusion des connaissances et par le perfectionnement des jeunes chercheurs, avec un souci particulier accordé à l’équité, à la diversité et à l’inclusion. Le RAS est un incubateur de recherche qui a à cœur la liberté académique et le caractère non partisan de ses analyses. Ces valeurs guident la mission du RAS et orientent ses activités par l’entremise d’une approche inclusive. Notre stratégie d’intersectionnalité, conçue par notre responsable ACS+, Isabelle Caron, structure l’ensemble de nos activités de mobilisation, de diffusion et de formation. La diversité des points de vue et des membres du RAS est fondamentale à l’atteinte de sa mission. Le pluralisme est une vertu reconnue comme telle par le Réseau. Un souci particulier est accordé à l’inclusion d’idées et de personnes marginalisées et/ou en statut minoritaire. Dirigé par Justin Massie (UQÀM) et codirigé par un comité de direction composé de Frédérick Gagnon (UQÀM), Thomas Hughes (Mount Allison University), Alexander Lanoszka (Waterloo), Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Bishop’s) et Jonathan Paquin (uLaval), le Réseau rassemble plus de 80 chercheurs de renom et praticiens aguerris. Outre ses chercheurs travaillant sur au moins l’un des trois défis stratégiques susmentionnés, le Réseau mobilise l’expertise de collaborateurs internationaux, d’un Comité d’orientation stratégique et de chercheurs émergents. Membres Le RAS comporte cinq catégories de membres pour représenter ses membres professionnels, professeurs, étudiants gradués ou de premier cycle. Nos membres sont bilingues, ayant la capacité de comprendre les deux langues officielles du Canada, le français et l’anglais. Tout membre est libre de s’exprimer dans la langue officielle de son choix. En sus du bilinguisme, chaque catégorie de membres dispose de ses propres critères d’admissibilité, dont vous trouverez les détails ci-dessous. Chercheur Professeur dans une université canadienne ou chercheur dans un centre canadien Expert d'au moins une des thématiques de recherche du RAS Collaborateur Praticien d’expérience en fonction Expert d'au moins une des thématiques de recherche du RAS Chercheur associé  Professeur dans une université étrangère ou chercheur dans un centre étranger Expert d'au moins une des thématiques de recherche du RAS Chercheur émergent Étudiant des cycles supérieurs ou jeune professionnel Supervisé ou sponsorisé par un chercheur ou un collaborateur du RAS Travaille activement sur au moins une des thématiques de recherche du RAS Stagiaire Étudiant crédité par son institution universitaire Participe à l’organisation des activités du RAS Supervisé par l’un des membres de l’équipe de direction du RAS Pour une candidature spontanée, contactez-nous à info@ras-nsa.ca. Publications Le RAS est fier de mobiliser la recherche dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité par l'entremise de cinq types de publications bilingues (Analyses, Rapports stratégiques, Forums politiques et Comptes rendus). Consultez nos modalités de publication ici : Publications RAS. Le programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) a pour objet de faciliter la collaboration et de mobiliser les connaissances entre le ministère de la Défense nationale, les Forces armées canadiennes, le milieu universitaire et d'autres experts sur les questions de défense et de sécurité. Par l’entremise de ses subventions de coopération ciblées, ses réseaux de collaboration, ses bourses et ses conférences d’experts, le programme MINDS travaille et collabore avec des partenaires clés pour renforcer les assises de l'élaboration de politiques de défense fondées sur les faits. Ces partenariats stimulent l'innovation en encourageant de nouvelles analyses des occasions, des crises et des événements mondiaux émergents, tout en soutenant un meilleur dialogue en matière de défense et de sécurité avec les Canadiens. Canada.ca/minds-defense Justin Massie Directeur Frédérick Gagnon Co-directeur Thomas Hughes Co-directeur Alexander Lanoszka Co-directeur Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Co-directrice Jonathan Paquin Co-directeur Nos partenaires   ## Nous joindre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/nous-joindre/ Modified: 2026-07-28 > Nous joindre - Réseau d'analyse stratégique. Vous avez une suggestion ? Notre équipe est prét à répondre a vos questions. Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) Université du Québec à Montréal Pavillon R, Local R3490 315 rue Sainte-Catherine Est Montréal (Québec) H2X 3X2 Canada info@ras-nsa.ca Équipe de direction Crédit: Site web développé par [ ZAA.CC ] Desigh web ## Politique de confidentialité URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/politique-de-confidentialite/ Modified: 2023-03-29 > Politique de confidentialité. Nous expliquons ici comment nous collectons, utilisons et traitons vos informations lorsque naviguer... Politique de confidentialité du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) Date de publication : 27 mai 2020 Nous expliquons ici comment nous collectons, utilisons et traitons vos informations lorsque vous naviguer et utiliser les fonctionnalités de notre site Web (navigation, liste de diffusion, inscription aux événements) (ci-après les "Services"). Cette politique s'applique à nos clients, membres, partenaires et les visiteurs  (ci-après les "Clients"). L'adresse de notre site Web est: https://ras-nsa.ca. Données collectées et raisons de cette collecte Nous collectons et utilisons les informations suivantes afin d'assurer, d'améliorer et de protéger les Services : Compte. Nous collectons et associons à votre compte des informations telles que vos noms, adresses courriel, numéros de téléphone, adresse postale. Contenu intégré provenant d'autres sites Web. Les articles de ce site peuvent inclure du contenu intégré (par exemple, des vidéos, des images, des articles, etc.). Le contenu intégré provenant d'autres sites Web se comporte exactement de la même manière que si le visiteur avait visité l'autre site Web. Ces sites Web peuvent collecter des données vous concernant, utiliser des cookies, intégrer un suivi tiers supplémentaire et surveiller votre interaction avec ce contenu intégré, y compris le suivi de votre interaction avec le contenu intégré si vous avez un compte et êtes connecté à ce site Web. Statistiques de visites. Par l'intermédiaire des cookies, notre site Web collecte des données anonymes concernant vos préférences de navigation. Partage des données collectées Nous pouvons partager des informations comme indiqué plus bas, mais nous ne les vendons pas aux annonceurs publicitaires ni à d'autres tiers. Tierces parties travaillant pour le Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS). Le Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS) a recours aux services de sociétés tierces de confiance qui nous aident à assurer, améliorer, protéger et promouvoir nos Services. Ces sociétés tierces n'ont accès à vos informations que pour réaliser des tâches en notre nom et conformément à cette Politique de confidentialité. Sécurité publique. Nous pouvons divulguer vos informations à des tiers si nous estimons que cela est raisonnablement nécessaire afin de (a) respecter la loi ; (b) protéger toute personne contre des dommages corporels graves, voire la mort ; (c) lutter contre la fraude ou les atteintes portées au Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS) ou à nos Clients; ou (d) protéger les droits de propriété du Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS). Nous accordons une grande importance à la bonne gestion de vos données et assumons pleinement la responsabilité de celle-ci. Nous respectons les Principes relatifs aux demandes émanant des autorités suivantes lorsque nous recevons, examinons et répondons aux demandes d'accès aux données de nos Clients : Faire preuve de transparence Lutter contre les demandes non ciblées Protéger tous les Clients Garantir la sécurité des Services fournis Modalités de la collecte de données Sécurité. Les données de votre Compte sont chiffrées. Conservation. Nous conservons les informations aussi longtemps que cela est nécessaire pour le bon fonctionnement des Services. Lors d'une cessation de Services, si vous en faites la demande, nous supprimons ces informations. Nous conservons, au maximum, ces informations 5 ans après la cessation de Services. Veuillez noter toutefois les éléments suivants : (1) la suppression de ces informations sur nos serveurs et nos systèmes de stockage de secours peut prendre un certain temps ; et (2) nous pouvons conserver, si nécessaire, ces informations afin de respecter nos obligations légales, de résoudre des litiges et de mettre en application nos accords. Champ d'application Le monde entier. Afin d'assurer la prestation de nos Services, nous pouvons stocker, traiter et transmettre les informations un peu partout dans le monde, y compris en dehors de votre pays. Des données peuvent également être stockées localement sur les appareils que vous utilisez pour accéder aux Services. Modifications En cas de réorganisation, de fusion, d'acquisition ou de vente de nos biens, vos informations peuvent être transférées dans le cadre de cette opération. Nous vous préviendrons (en envoyant un message à l'adresse courriel associée à votre compte, par exemple) de telles opérations et nous vous indiquerons les options qui vous sont alors offertes. Nous pouvons être amenés à réviser la présente Politique de confidentialité. La version la plus récente sera alors publiée sur notre site Web. Dans le cas où une révision limiterait de manière conséquente vos droits, vous serez informé. Nous contacter Si vous avez des questions sur le Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS), nos Services et la confidentialité, contactez-nous à l'adresse info@ras-nsa.ca.   ## Publications URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/publications/ Modified: 2020-06-08 Recherche Types de publications Types de publications Comptes rendus  (3) Forums politiques  (7) Livre  (8) Plan stratégique  (1) Rapports stratégiques  (89) Experts Experts   (1) Alexander Lanoszka  (4) Alexandra Lamarche  (1) Amélie Chalivet  (2) Anaïs El-Amraoui  (1) Andrea Charron  (3) Anessa Kimball  (1) Anik Dupuis  (1) Antonin Blanchard  (6) Anvesh Jain  (1) Arthur Boutellis  (1) Arthur Stein  (4) Brian Wu  (1) Bruno Charbonneau  (1) Camille Laty  (1) Camille Raymond  (4) Chantal Lavallée  (1) Charlotte Duval-Lantoine  (1) David Dubé  (1) Dominika Kunertova  (1) Emmylou Sergent  (1) Fabrice Blais-Savoie  (1) Falk Petegou  (2) Frédéric Lasserre  (5) Frédéric Mérand  (1) Gaëlle Rivard Piché  (3) Gianmarco Fontana  (3) Hannah Hollander  (3) Igor Delanoë  (1) Isabella Aung  (1) Jacob Fortier  (2) Jacob Tuckey  (2) Jacques Lévesque  (1) James Lee  (1) Jean F. Crombois  (1) Jean-Christophe Boucher  (1) Jeanne Milot-Poulin  (1) Jonathan Mayne  (1) Jonathan Paquin  (5) Junru Bian  (1) Justin Massie  (23) Laurent Borzillo  (5) Lee Seymour  (1) Louis-Benoit Lafontaine  (4) Louise Blais  (1) Ludwine Tchatat  (2) Léa Pérémarty  (2) Magali Vullierme  (2) Marco Munier  (11) Maria Martin de Almagro  (1) Marie-Eve Desrosiers  (1) Marie-Joëlle Zahar  (1) Marie-Pier Allard-Caron  (1) Mathieu Landriault  (4) Maxandre Fortier  (6) Maxime Philaire  (2) Michael Shurkin  (1) Michel Fortmann  (1) Michelle Marcus  (2) Mohamed Elgayar  (1) Nicolas Klingelschmitt  (1) Nicolas-François Perron  (7) Olivier Schmitt  (1) Pascale Massot  (1) Pauline Baudu  (1) Pauline Pic  (2) Philippe Lagassé  (5) Pierre Colautti  (1) Pierre Jolicoeur  (2) Pierre Morcos  (2) Pierre Pahlavi  (12) Private: Cindy Cruz  (1) Private: Isabelle Caron  (1) Private: Jessy Benoit  (2) Private: Marianne Bouchard  (1) Private: Rémy Carugati  (6) Quentin Martel  (1) Rachel Sarfati  (2) Rhita Ronda  (1) Sarah E. Sharma  (1) Sarah Pedneault  (1) Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé  (1) Satcha de Henning Michaëlis  (3) Srdjan Vucetic  (3) Stéfanie von Hlatky  (11) Stéphane Roussel  (2) Stéphanie Chouinard  (1) Stéphanie Martel  (3) Tancrède Jankowski  (6) Tetede Babatunde François Akilatan  (1) Theodore McLauchlin  (6) Thomas Juneau  (2) W. R. Nadège Compaoré  (1) Walid Ferguen  (2) Whitney Lackenbauer  (1) Yann Breault  (1) Yf Reykers  (2) Yolande Bouka  (1) Zachary Paikin  (3) Émile Lambert-Deslandes  (3) Analyses Japan is Back, Again ? La stratégie sécuritaire de Takaichi à l’épreuve de la recomposition régionale Axel Reybard October 22, 2026 « Le statut de la République Populaire Démocratique de Corée en tant qu'État doté de l'arme nucléaire a été consolidé de manière… Analyses Donner un sens au statut de membre associé : l’adhésion du Canada à l’EDIP Justin Massie October 22, 2026 Ce passage est un extrait d’une analyse publiée par Justin Massie  dans Le Rubicon.  Dans son discours sur l’état de… Rapports stratégiques Les postures de politique étrangère canadienne après la crise du canal de Suez de 1956 : leçons pour les débats actuels Antonin Blanchard September 18, 2026 Ce texte fait partie de la série spéciale d’essais Retour vers le futur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, financée par une subvention du programme MINDS… Rapports stratégiques Les tensions croissantes dans le détroit de Taïwan et leurs répercussions sur les intérêts canadiens J. Michael Cole September 17, 2026 On peut affirmer qu’aucun autre conflit sur la planète aujourd’hui ne présente un risque aussi élevé de déclencher une guerre entre superpuissances… Rapports stratégiques L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21ème siècle : une feuille de route Justin Massie, Philippe Lagassé September 9, 2026 Sommaire Exécutif Pour la première fois de son histoire, le Canada fait de l’autonomie stratégique un principe structurant de sa politique de… Forums politiques Quels avantages ou risques en matière de sécurité avec l’IA? Matthew da Mota, Balkan Devlen, Jennifer Irish et Dave McMahon August 5, 2026 Policy Forum Politique est une série de publications visant à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’avis d’experts sur un… Analyses Le Canada devrait viser davantage qu’un statut d’observateur au sein du GCAP Brian Wu July 15, 2026 Cette collaboration multilatérale représente une occasion sans précédent pour le Canada de contribuer à l'essor de la prochaine génération de puissance aérienne.… Rapports stratégiques Maintenir l’engagement du public à l’égard des priorités du Canada en matière de sécurité et de défense Emmylou Sergentet Gabrielle Andrychuk July 14, 2026 Cette note politique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et… Analyses Acheteur ou coproducteur ? Le Canada doit choisir ce qu’il fera de l’acquisition de nouveaux sous-marins Justin Massie July 9, 2026 En choisissant ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) comme fournisseur privilégié pour le Projet canadien de sous-marins de patrouille, le gouvernement Carney a tranché… Rapports stratégiques Coopération dans l’Arctique et l’Atlantique Nord : les rôles que doivent jouer le Canada, la France et le Portugal dans un ordre maritime en mutation Céline Rodrigues et Homa Azodi July 7, 2026 Cette note politique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et… Analyses L’engagement envers l’Alliance et les limites de la réorientation stratégique au Canada Nicolas-François Perron June 29, 2026 La dissuasion en collaboration avec des partenaires : sur quels partenariats le Canada devrait-il mettre l’accent, et dans quel but? Sur quoi… Analyses Pourquoi pas des sous-marins nucléaires canadiens? Jonathan Cassels June 22, 2026 Les sous-marins du Canada sont en fin de vie. Construits il y a plus de trente ans pour la Marine royale britannique,… Rapports stratégiques La crédibilité d’abord : repenser la stratégie canadienne face à l’hostilité américaine Walid Ferguen June 19, 2026 Introduction : le maillon manquant de la stratégie canadienne Le débat stratégique canadien est monopolisé par le réarmement, la dissuasion militaire et la… Analyses Repenser la modération dans une perspective internationale: le cas de Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham en Syrie entre gouvernance étatique et pression internationale Gianmarco Fontana June 15, 2026 La transformation de Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), passé de l’un des mouvements djihadistes les plus radicaux de la guerre syrienne à une… Analyses La prochaine présidence lituanienne du Conseil de l’UE : enjeux, objectifs et implications Alexander Lanoszka June 1, 2026 La Lituanie s’apprête à assumer la présidence tournante du Conseil de l’Union européenne pour une période de six mois à compter du… Forums politiques Suspension du PJBD : quelle devrait être la réaction du Canada ? Justin Massie, Nicholas Glesby et Richard Shimooka May 29, 2026 Forum politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur un… Analyses L’Iran des Gardiens : comment la Chine s’ajuste à la prise de contrôle croissante du CGRI Pierre Pahlavi May 28, 2026 La crise iranienne ne se joue pas seulement dans les frappes, les menaces et les communiqués diplomatiques. 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Antonin Blanchard March 25, 2026 Ce texte est un compte-rendu de la conférence 4 ans de guerre en Ukraine : Quelles perspectives de paix pour la sécurité… Analyses Quatre observations sur la Guerre russo-ukrainienne et ses perspectives de paix Dominique Arel March 24, 2026 Ce texte est un compte-rendu d'une intervention tenue lors de la conférence 4 ans de guerre en Ukraine : Quelles perspectives de… Analyses Industrialisation sans émancipation : les limites de la stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada Justin Massie March 23, 2026 Sous l’impulsion du Premier ministre Mark Carney, le gouvernement canadien s’est engagé dans une réorientation majeure de sa politique de défense. Selon lui,… Rapports stratégiques La tentative avortée de retirer les troupes canadiennes de l’OTAN et les leçons pour Mark Carney Nicolas-François Perron March 23, 2026 Ce texte fait partie de la série spéciale d'essais Retour vers le futur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique, financée par une subvention du… Rapports stratégiques De l’amitié à la loyauté absolue : leçons de l’expérience du Canada dans la campagne de l’OTAN en Libye Stéfanie von Hlatky, Thomas Juneau March 4, 2026 Ce texte fait partie de la série spéciale d'essais Retour vers le futur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique, financée par une subvention du… Analyses L’Europe et le Canada après l’OTAN : penser la sécurité euro-atlantique sans Washington Justin Massie February 17, 2026 Si Trump lâchait l'Europe en se repliant sur « son hémisphère », il faudrait défendre un continent et un océan sans Washington. Moins lourde… Forums politiques L’orientation de la relation Sino-Canadienne en 2026 Pascale Massot, Yuxi Liu, Balkan Devlen et Stephen R. Nagy February 16, 2026 Policy Forum Politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur… Rapports stratégiques Forger des liens nordiques : renforcer le partenariat Canada-France dans l’Arctique dans un ordre mondial en mutation Theo Urvoy et Andrew Erskine January 27, 2026 Cette note politique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et… Analyses Le Canada se voit-il vassal ou souverain ? Justin Massie, Srdjan Vucetic January 21, 2026 Le Canada s’apprête à publier sa première Stratégie de sécurité nationale depuis 2004. Vingt-deux ans… une éternité s’est écoulée depuis la… Forums politiques Le Canada en 2025: Quels échecs, quelles améliorations ? Louise Blais, Alexander Lanoszka, Sarah E. Sharma December 23, 2025 Quelle question de politique étrangère et de défense du Canada a connu le moins d'améliorations au cours de la dernière année, et… Analyses La TRIPP, un vrai chemin vers la paix entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan ? Martin de La Garanderie November 25, 2025 Analyse du plan de Donald Trump pour l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan Le 8 août 2025, Donald Trump reçoit à la Maison Blanche le… Analyses La souveraineté et la sécurité de l’Arctique canadien : de qui se méfier ? Frédéric Lasserre, Mathieu Landriault, Pauline Pic, Stéphane Roussel November 17, 2025 Plusieurs articles parus en septembre 2025 ont renoué avec des postures alarmistes sur les menaces qui pèseraient sur la souveraineté du Canada.… Forums politiques Comment le Canada devrait-il déployer, soutenir et étendre sa nouvelle stratégie pour l’Afrique ? W. R. Nadège Compaoré, Marie-Eve Desrosiers, Nicolas Klingelschmitt, Falk Petegou November 14, 2025 Policy Forum Politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur… Analyses Le terrorisme en Asie du Sud et sa résonance mondiale à la suite des attentats de Pahalgam en 2025 : une perspective diasporique Natasha Fernando November 11, 2025 Les attaques de Jaffar Express, Pahalgam et Khuzdar, qui ont eu lieu en 2025 en Asie du Sud, ont suscité plusieurs réponses… Rapports stratégiques « Not an inch » : la mise à l’épreuve de l’OTAN par la Russie Maxime Philaire November 6, 2025 Introduction « Nous ferons tout ce qui est en notre pouvoir pour protéger et défendre chaque allié. Et chaque centimètre carré du territoire… Analyses Dissuasion nucléaire européenne : un projet crédible ? Antonin Blanchard October 24, 2025 Pourquoi un tel projet ? L’arrivée en 2025 de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche a créé un véritable électrochoc pour la communauté… Forums politiques Comment le Canada peut-il remédier à la crise du recrutement et de la rétention au sein des Forces armées canadiennes ? Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Stéfanie von Hlatky, Philippe Lagasséet Richard Shimooka October 1, 2025 Policy Forum Politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur… Rapports stratégiques La sécurité écologique, les programmes autochtones de protection marine et l’élargissement du concept de « sécurité climatique » Aly Tkachenko September 22, 2025 Ce document illustre comment une perspective de sécurité écologique peut apporter un éclairage nouveau sur les liens entre le changement climatique, la… Analyses Le partenaire russe vu de New Delhi : entre logique de diversification et convergences stratégiques Amélie Chalivet September 15, 2025 Le 7 août dernier, le conseiller indien à la Sécurité nationale, Ajit Doval, confirmait que le président russe Vladimir Poutine effectuerait une… Analyses Le retrait naval de l’Iran de la mer Rouge : abdication ou repositionnement stratégique ? Pierre Pahlavi September 5, 2025 Alors que l’Iran vient de subir la plus grave attaque depuis la guerre Iran-Irak (1980-1988) dans le contexte des frappes israéliennes et américaines… Forums politiques Le Canada devrait-il rejoindre le « Dôme doré » ? Andrea Charron, Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Jean-François Bélanger et Paul Meyer September 2, 2025 Policy Forum Politique est un nouveau format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d'opinions d'experts… Analyses Pour le Canada, l’indépendance ne passe que par un seul chemin : investir dans sa défense Ross O'Connor August 19, 2025 Au cours des derniers mois, les menaces du président américain Donald Trump d’en faire le « 51e État » ont ravivé un… Analyses Les périls de l’attractivité : les petits États du flanc oriental de l’OTAN face à l’incertitude américaine Jean F. Crombois July 17, 2025 L’arrivée de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche pour un second mandat représente un défi majeur pour l’approche sécuritaire des pays du flanc… Comptes rendus Quel plan B ? Refonder la politique étrangère face à la politique prédatrice de l’administration Trump Nicolas-François Perron July 7, 2025 Ce texte est un compte-rendu de la conférence Quel plan B ? Refonder la politique étrangère face à la politique prédatrice de… Analyses Le Canada et « ReArm Europe » : plus d’argent, plus d’impact ? Jacob Tuckey, Alexander Lanoszka June 30, 2025 Alors que le monde devient « de plus en plus dangereux et divisé », le premier ministre Mark Carney a déclaré son… Analyses Sécurité en concurrence : Analyse des perceptions de Boko Haram dans l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun Falk Petegou June 12, 2025 Ce point chaud évalue les perceptions locales et internationales liées au groupe terroriste Boko Haram dans l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun ainsi que les… Analyses Quitter le club des profiteurs : Leçons de la Belgique Michelle Haas et Tim Haesebrouck May 30, 2025 Si les tensions liées au partage inégal des charges au sein de l'OTAN sont presque aussi anciennes que l'alliance elle-même, les «… Rapports stratégiques 2025, une année charnière pour la défense nationale au Canada Quentin Martel May 28, 2025 Durant plusieurs décennies, le Canada, allié privilégié des États-Unis, a dépendu de son hégémonie pour assurer sa protection. Toutefois, la réélection de… Rapports stratégiques Le Canada doit se défendre contre l’aide américaine en développant des capacités souveraines Philippe Lagassé, Justin Massie May 26, 2025 Comment le Canada doit-il adapter sa politique de défense pour faire face aux réalités du nouvel environnement géopolitique ? Plusieurs experts ont proposé,… Analyses Le réveil ukrainien : adapter la posture de défense du Canada Justin Massie, Nicolas-François Perron May 20, 2025 Depuis l’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par la Russie en février 2022, le Canada a progressivement accru son aide militaire au gouvernement… Analyses La guerre d’Ukraine vue du monde arabe Rachid Chaker May 13, 2025 En février 2025, l’Arabie saoudite accueillait une rencontre entre émissaires américains et russes afin de s’entendre sur les modalités d’engagement de négociations russo-américaines directes… Analyses Le jeu dangereux de Trump: Faire pression sur l’Iran et contrer la montée en puissance de la Chine Pierre Pahlavi May 12, 2025 Dans une interview accordée le 30 mars, le président américain Donald Trump a menacé l'Iran de bombardements et de droits de douane… Analyses Pare-feu et lignes de front: Le potentiel de leadership du Canada en matière de cybersécurité à l’ère des opérations d’information à l’étranger David Dubé May 7, 2025 1- Introduction Les cybermenaces se multiplient au Canada et dans les pays alliés de l'OTAN, évoluant à la fois en termes d'ampleur… Analyses Bilan des 100 premiers jours de la politique étrangère de Trump : enjeux et perspectives pour le Canada Jonathan Paquin May 5, 2025 Dans ce monde qui se referme, les États-Unis endossaient le rôle de puissance stabilisatrice et parfois même de puissance bienveillante. 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Au cours de la dernière… Rapports stratégiques La Pologne et la défense de l’Europe face à la Russie Maxime Philaire April 11, 2025 « Ils ont perdu une bonne occasion de se taire. » C’est ainsi qu’en février 2003, le Président français de l’époque, Jacques Chirac, parlait… Rapports stratégiques Tenir ses promesses et répondre à la crise du Myanmar : Feuille de route pour le Canada Isabella Aung April 8, 2025 Dans sa stratégie indo-pacifique de novembre 2022, le Canada a identifié la montée de la violence au Myanmar à la suite du… Analyses Construire une arme nucléaire canadienne est une fausse bonne idée Émile Lambert-Deslandes March 21, 2025 Le paradigme de non-prolifération est-il en mutation? Le Canada devrait-il fabriquer ses propres armes nucléaires ? Bien qu'elle aille évidemment à l'encontre… Rapports stratégiques Sensibilité aux conflits : Une approche clé pour l’adaptation climatique Amanda Makosso March 17, 2025 Cette note stratégique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et… Analyses Le Canada doit se préparer à la coercition américaine Justin Massie March 15, 2025 Si le Canada entretient depuis longtemps des relations étroites et stables avec son voisin américain, les menaces d’asphyxier l’économie canadienne afin de… Analyses L’arme nucléaire française dans la vie politique de l’après-Guerre froide Florian Galleri March 12, 2025 Quelle était la place de l’arme nucléaire française dans la vie politique après la Guerre froide ? À première vue, cette question pourrait sembler… Analyses Élections allemandes 2025 : Quels scénarios pour l’aide militaire à l’Ukraine et la défense européenne ? Nicolas-François Perron February 21, 2025 Le 23 février 2025, les citoyens allemands seront appelés aux urnes pour des élections fédérales anticipées, un événement plutôt rare dans l’histoire politique… Rapports stratégiques La coopération franco-canadienne en matière industrielle de défense : État des lieux et perspectives de développement Gaspard Schnitzler et Erik Vouvalidis February 4, 2025 Cette note stratégique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et… Rapports stratégiques L’Arctique et la guerre des narratifs : Désinformation russe et rivalités internationales Mathieu Landriault, Julie Renaud January 14, 2025 Cette note politique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et… Rapports stratégiques L’architecture de sécurité transatlantique : potentialité de l’alliance franco-canadienne Léa Pérémarty, Leah Schmidt December 21, 2024 Cette note stratégique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et… Rapports stratégiques Les pistes de collaboration canado-française face aux nouvelles menaces sécuritaires et climatiques dans l’Arctique canadien Magali Vullierme, Alexandre Cicard December 19, 2024 Cette note stratégique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et… Analyses La fin de l’ère Assad en Syrie : Entre pressions internationales et défis intérieurs Gianmarco Fontana December 16, 2024 (La fin de l'ère Assad en Syrie : Entre pressions internationales et défis intérieurs - Gianmarco Fontana) Après des années d'impasse, la… Analyses L’Italie et la guerre en Ukraine : continuité stratégique ou impact des tensions populistes ? 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Cette interrogation, aussi sensible qu’actuelle, trouve des éléments capitaux de réponse dans le conflit qui… Analyses La République islamique sous pression et au bord du gouffre Pierre Pahlavi November 14, 2024 À maints égards, l’élimination d’Hassan Nasrallah, tué lors d’une frappe israélienne sur son quartier général en banlieue de Beyrouth, constitue un grave… Analyses « Peut-être cette nuit, peut-être demain, peut-être dans une semaine » : Entre dissuasion et guerre limitée entre Israël et le Hezbollah Benjamin Toubol October 21, 2024 Le 5 août 2024, le secrétaire général du groupe politico-militaire chiite libanais Hezbollah (ar. 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Tetede Babatunde François Akilatan November 9, 2023 À la suite de l'invasion russe de l'Ukraine, la Finlande et la Suède ont annoncé en mai 2022 leur intention de rejoindre… Analyses Les risques liés à l’ambiguïté : l’opinion publique taïwanaise, la crédibilité des États-Unis et l’efficacité de la dissuasion James Lee, Ja Ian Chong, Hsin-Hsin Pan, Chien-Huei Wu et Wen-Chin Wu November 6, 2023 La politique des États-Unis à l’égard de Taïwan a été une source de controverse continue. Alors que des avertissements suggèrent que Pékin… Rapports stratégiques Le soutien militaire à l’Ukraine. Une cohérence nécessaire autour de trois dimensions : discours, dons en matériel et production industrielle Rachel Sarfati October 25, 2023 Les oppositions occidentales à l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie ont indéniablement entraîné des conséquences sur les dynamiques diplomatiques, militaires et économiques… Rapports stratégiques Le plateau continental arctique et le Canada : quels risques politiques? Mathieu Landriault October 17, 2023 L’allocation du plateau continental dans la région arctique a fait l’objet de moult spéculations. Certains, particulièrement dans les médias, présentent cet enjeu… Page 1 / 3123» ## Publier avec nous URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/publier-avec-nous/ Modified: 2026-10-22 > Les types de publications comprennent les notes politiques, les notes stratégiques, les "Hot Takes" et les articles... Types de publications Analyses Blogues sur des sujets d’actualité Pas de limite ni de gabarit précis Références en hyperliens (pas de bibliographie) Rapports stratégiques Analyse approfondie visant à exposer des considérations politiques, analyser des options politiques et recommander des pistes d’action au gouvernement du Canada Voir les directives ci-bas Exposés Courts essais présentant des monographies académiques et des livres de presse universitaires en études de sécurité, de politique étrangère et de défense du Canada, en relations internationales, en études de sécurité et en études stratégiques. Voir les directives ci-bas Forums politiques Courts essais de plusieurs experts invités par l'équipe éditoriale à se prononcer sur un enjeu de politique étrangère ou de défense canadienne. Natasha Fernando  coordonnatrice des publications | natasha.fernando01@gmail.com Alexander Lanoszka  co-directeur - publications Télécharger le guide (PDF 318kb) Procédure de soumission Pour soumettre un texte à l’une ou l’autre de ces catégories de publications, communiquer avec notre coordonatrice des publications Natasha Fernando (natasha.fernando01@gmail.com) au préalable pour faire approuver le sujet et l’angle proposé. Les propositions de textes doivent s’inscrire dans l’un ou l’autre des trois axes de recherche du RAS. Une fois approuvés, les textes seront révisés, traduits et publiés en ligne par le Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Honoraires Les contributions sont volontaires et non-rémunérées. Toutefois, le Réseau d’analyse stratégique peut, de manière discrétionnaire, offrir un modeste cachet à des auteurs sollicités afin de répondre à des demandes spécifiques. Plus de détails par type de publication Analyses Analyses – Réseau d’analyse stratégique Qu’est-ce qu’une « Analyse » ? Une « analyse » est un court essai informé qui traite d’une question ou d’un problème politique particulier. Il doit présenter une argumentation claire, fournir au maximum deux paragraphes de contexte et faire une déclaration percutante, voire une provocation, destinée à (a) stimuler la réflexion sur une question parmi les membres de la communauté canadienne de sécurité ; (b) sensibiliser à un aspect sous-étudié de cette question ; et/ou (c) transmettre à un public averti une recommandation politique particulière. La prise de position doit s'appuyer sur une expertise scientifique ou analytique, mais elle doit être exempte de jargon. Il est à noter que les « Analyses » sont examinées en double aveugle. Quel peut être le sujet d'une « Analyse » ? Un article peut porter sur n'importe quel sujet lié à la sécurité internationale et à la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada. Toutefois, en raison de sa brièveté, il doit être aussi précis et concret que possible. Par exemple, plutôt que d'examiner l'impact de la nouvelle mise à jour de la politique de défense, un « point chaud » devrait se concentrer sur son impact sur le NORAD - c'est-à-dire un programme particulier, un arrangement international, etc. Format Utiliser le modèle du RAS Références hyperliées : pas de notes de bas de page ou de références à la date de l'auteur, pas de bibliographie ou de liste de références. Structure La structure des « Analyses » est ouverte, mais l'auteur ou les auteurs doivent transmettre l'argument de base (ou la provocation) au plus tard trois paragraphes après le début de l'essai. Les titres sont utiles pour signaler le texte, mais ils doivent être suffisamment précis pour indiquer aux lecteurs le contenu de l'essai, voire des parties de l'argumentation. Style d'écriture Utilisez des phrases courtes. Évitez de faire étalage de vos connaissances. Allez à l'essentiel. Évitez le jargon académique. Utilisez un style plus direct, qui peut être compris par les non-spécialistes. Veillez à ce que les faits, les idées et les arguments correspondent clairement aux conclusions et, le cas échéant, aux recommandations de l'article. Rapports stratégiques Rapports stratégiques – Réseau d’analyse stratégique  Qu’est-ce qu’un rapport stratégique ? Les rapports stratégiques constituent des analyses d'actualité et novatrices sur des sujets qui intéressent et préoccupent les décideurs politiques, les analystes, les chercheurs et le grand public dans le domaine de la sécurité. En explorant un sujet plus en détail qu'une note politique traditionnelle, les rapports stratégiques sont basées sur des recherches et des analyses fondées sur des preuves qui fournissent aux lecteurs des informations critiques sur le contexte et les principales caractéristiques d'un sujet ou d'une situation, ainsi que des recommandations axées sur le Canada et ses politiques. Dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense, le champ des sujets potentiels est vaste et les auteurs sont encouragés à utiliser les rapports stratégiques pour éclairer les décisions politiques et le débat public sur tous les sujets qu'ils estiment mériter un examen plus approfondi – pas seulement ceux qui ont dominé le discours récent – et à mobiliser des perspectives conventionnelles ou non conventionnelles de la sécurité. Quels sont les objectifs d’un rapport stratégique ? Les rapports stratégiques doivent répondre aux objectifs suivants : Présenter des recherches, des informations et des analyses fondées sur des faits probants sur des sujets d'intérêt afin d'amplifier la voix des experts et de fournir une base plus solide pour la prise de décision; Mettre en évidence les approches et les domaines d'intérêt pour la communauté de la sécurité qui ont été insuffisamment étudiés et qui nécessitent une plus grande attention; Promouvoir l'innovation et encourager une approche multidisciplinaire et synergique de la recherche et de l'analyse; Présenter des recommandations et des considérations politiques claires et opportunes afin de contribuer de manière productive à la discussion, au débat et à la prise de décision. Les rapports stratégiques du Réseau d’analyse stratégique doivent s’inscrire dans l’un ou plusieurs des défis stratégiques qui guident le RAS : L’évolution du rôle des grandes puissances dans un contexte de remise en question de l’ordre mondial; La coopération multilatérale en matière de sécurité internationale; L’avenir du renforcement des capacités de défense des partenaires mondiaux. Format Utilisez le gabarit du Réseau d’analyse stratégique Longueur : 8 pages maximum La note stratégique doit inclure un résumé d’environ 150 mots Références en hyperliens : pas de références en notes de bas de page ou de type auteur-date, pas de bibliographie ou de liste de références. Structure Les rapports stratégiques sont divisées en trois parties : L’introduction Décrire le sujet, l'énigme ou le problème qui s'y rattache et l'argument de l'auteur. Développement Fournir des informations générales et contextuelles sur le sujet. Fournir une analyse de ces informations et exposer les implications potentielles, en notant les débats/points de vue existants. Utilisez les titres et sous-titres pour structurer la note et guider le lecteur dans vos analyses. Considérations politiques ou recommandations Procéder logiquement à des recommandations ou des considérations politiques cohérentes, centrées sur le Canada. Considérations pour les auteurs La note stratégique doit fournir un argument clair sur un sujet facilement identifiable parmi les trois défis stratégiques du RAS. Les recommandations sont essentielles. Le rapport devrait fournir des recommandations politiques axées sur le Canada qui s'inspirent de l'analyse qui précède et qui sont étayées par une justification claire et des résultats attendus. Le rapport doit être basé sur des recherches et des analyses fondées sur des preuves, en s'appuyant sur l'expertise du sujet pour fournir une base aux recommandations. Le rapport peut contribuer à un débat existant ou ouvrir un nouveau sujet de discussion. Style d’écriture Assurez-vous que l'objectif du sujet traité dans le rapport est clair : le lecteur doit savoir pourquoi ce sujet est important et quelles sont ses implications. La note stratégique est plus longue qu'une note politique. Cet espace supplémentaire doit être utilisé pour fournir des informations et des analyses plus approfondies. Évitez le jargon universitaire. Préférez un style plus direct, qui pourra être compris par des non spécialistes. Assurez-vous que les faits, les idées et les arguments correspondent clairement aux conclusions et recommandations de la note politique. Gardez les différents publics à l'esprit. Bien que les informations, les analyses et les recommandations politiques doivent présenter un intérêt particulier pour le gouvernement du Canada et certains ministères, notamment le MDN/CAF, la note stratégique doit également être utile à d'autres organisations, institutions et au grand public. Exposés Exposés – Réseau d’analyse stratégique Les Exposés sont de Courts essais qui servent à présenter des monographies académiques et des livres de presse universitaire récemment publiés dans le domaine des études de sécurité, de la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada, des relations internationales, des études de sécurité et des études stratégiques. Ces articles s'apparentent à des comptes rendus de livres, mais ne doivent pas être confondus avec ceux-ci. Ils n'ont pas pour but de faire une analyse académique ou de louanger un auteur. Il s'agit plutôt de résumer l'argument principal de l'ouvrage en question, d'expliquer l'importance de ses conclusions pour les praticiens et les publics informés intéressés par la sécurité nationale, d'appliquer le cadre théorique de l'ouvrage pour éclairer des événements récents ou actuels, et/ou de souligner les implications pour la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada. Les Exposés servent à traduire, ainsi qu'à mettre en lumière, la pointe de la recherche académique auprès d'un public plus large qui n'est peut-être pas familier avec les travaux ou qui n'a pas le temps de les lire dans leur intégralité. Format Utiliser le modèle du RAS Longueur : 2000 mots maximum Références hyperliées : pas de notes de bas de page ni de références à la date de l'auteur, pas de bibliographie ni de liste de références. Structure La structure des Exposés est ouverte, mais l'auteur ou les auteurs doivent transmettre l'argument de base dans les deux premiers paragraphes. Les sous-titres sont utiles pour signaler le texte, mais ils doivent être suffisamment précis pour indiquer aux lecteurs le contenu de l'essai, voire des parties de l'argumentation. Style d'écriture Utilisez des phrases courtes. Évitez de faire étalage de vos connaissances. Allez à l'essentiel. Évitez le jargon académique. Utilisez un style plus direct, qui peut être compris par les non-spécialistes. Restez fidèle à l'argument original. Reprenez-le bien sans le rendre sensationnel pour faire de l'effet ou sans ignorer les mises en garde qui l'accompagnent. De nombreux auteurs doivent faire des affirmations audacieuses dès le départ, mais les assortir ensuite de réserves importantes. Forums politiques Forums politiques – Réseau d’analyse stratégique Les forums politiques visent à stimuler des débats en présentant un large éventail d'opinions d'experts sur un sujet important pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Chaque édition comprendra plusieurs courts essais d'une longueur maximale de 300 mots chacun. Les contributions doivent être exemptes de jargon autant que possible et présenter une position claire sur la question posée. Les hyperliens permettant d'étayer les affirmations clés sont souhaitables, mais ne sont pas obligatoires. Les contributeurs rédigeront leurs essais à l'aveugle, sans connaître les autres arguments. Ceux-ci seront ensuite uniquement examinés par l'équipe éditoriale du RAS. ## Ressources pour chercheurs émergents URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/releve-etudiante/ Modified: 2026-08-04 > Cette section, destinée aux étudiants, a pour objectif de partager un nombre d’opportunités et ressources offertes par le RAS et nos... Pour les étudiants Cette section, destinée aux étudiants, a pour objectif de partager un nombre d’opportunités et ressources offertes par le RAS et nos partenaires.   Nos vidéos de formation étudiante Atelier de formation Les concours de bourses du CRSH, à la maîtrise et au doctorat Atelier pratique L’écriture de notes politiques Atelier de préparation Programme de recrutement d’agents des politiques Séance d’information Le PRAP au ministère de la Défense nationale Devenir membre étudiant ou stagiaire au sein du RAS Le RAS offre aux étudiants la possibilité de devenir chercheur émergent ou collaborateur étudiant. Les critères d’adhésion sont disponibles ici. Les étudiants membres du RAS sont encouragés à analyser les enjeux dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense à travers quatre types de publications bilingues (points chauds, notes politiques, notes stratégiques et articles). Pour en savoir plus sur les modalités de publication, veuillez cliquer ici. Le RAS propose une variété de stages étudiants. Ces postes permettent d’acquérir des compétences professionnelles comme l’initiative, l’organisation, la rigueur et l’esprit analytique. Pour une candidature spontanée, contactez-nous à info@ras-nsa.ca. Nos partenaires étudiants Vous trouverez ici quelques organisations étudiantes dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité qui pourraient vous intéresser. ## Universités URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/universites-et-partenaires/ Modified: 2026-06-22   ## “Spécial élections et politique de défense au Canada” URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/special-elections-et-politique-de-defense-au-canada-2/ Modified: 2021-09-29 > For this 21st episode of "Conseils de sécurité", a special on elections and defence policy in Canada. Podcast. For this 21st episode of "Conseils de sécurité", a special on elections and defence policy in Canada. Thomas Juneau and Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé welcome Stéfanie von Hlatky and Justin Massie. Stéfanie von Hlatky is Canada Research Chair in Gender, Security and the Armed Forces, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University, Director of the Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP) and Co-Director of the Strategic Analysis Network. Justin Massie is a full Professor of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal and co-director of the Strategic Analysis Network. His research focuses on multinational military interventions, global power transition, paradiplomacy and Canadian foreign and defence policy. Our guests introduce us to the Strategic Analysis Network. We discuss the Liberal government's record on defence and identify its key challenges for this new mandate.     ## « Il ne faut pas humilier la Russie ». La formule et ses implications politico-stratégiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/il-ne-faut-pas-humilier-la-russie-la-formule-et-ses-implications-politico-strategiques/ Modified: 2022-11-17 > Que veut dire « ne pas humilier la Russie » dans le contexte stratégique actuel ? Et comment comprendre l’origine de ce discours ? Dans un entretien à la dépêche du Midi, le président Emmanuel Macron déclarait début juin : « Il ne faut pas humilier la Russie pour que le jour où les combats cesseront, nous puissions bâtir un chemin de sortie par les voies diplomatiques. Je suis convaincu que c’est le rôle de la France, d’être une puissance médiatrice. […] Je pense, et je lui ai dit, que a fait une erreur historique et fondamentale pour son peuple, pour lui-même et pour l’Histoire. La Russie n’en demeure pas moins un grand peuple ». Ces passages sont intéressants, car ils contribuent à révéler partiellement les préférences du président, en particulier sa compréhension des enjeux stratégiques liés à la nouvelle agression russe contre l’Ukraine, sa vision du rôle international de la France et la relation à établir avec la Russie. Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’Emmanuel Macron souhaite éviter « d’humilier la Russie », ce qui a le don de fortement agacer de nombreux alliés de la France au sein de l’UE et de l’OTAN, ainsi que Kyiv, mais signale de ce fait une conviction forte de sa part, qu’il s’agit donc de prendre au sérieux. Alexander Lanoszka a déjà expliqué ici pourquoi les analogies historiques sont fallacieuses, et que l’image de la France en était fortement dégradée. Mais il reste une question : que veut dire « ne pas humilier la Russie » dans le contexte stratégique actuel ? Et comment comprendre l’origine de ce discours ? ... Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur la site du Rubicon ! ## « Le fond qui remonte à la surface » ? Questionner la forme du soutien étatique aux organisations rebelles lors des guerres civiles URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-fond-qui-remonte-a-la-surface-questionner-la-forme-du-soutien-etatique-aux-organisations-rebelles-lors-des-guerres-civiles/ Modified: 2022-07-05 > Cet article propose premièrement de revenir sur les avantages et les risques d’un soutien matériel à des groupes insurrectionnels... Une question se pose dès le début des combats en Ukraine le 24 février 2022 : si le gouvernement venait à tomber, les États occidentaux soutiendraient-ils une guerre irrégulière contre un éventuel régime pro-Kremlin ? Le conflit en Ukraine a commencé via une aide matérielle russe aux insurgés prorusses dans l’est du pays en 2014. La situation allait-elle s’inverser, avec, cette fois, une aide étatique américaine et européenne, à des rebelles pro-ukrainiens ? La guerre par procuration (de l’anglais proxy war), notamment via le soutien à des forces irrégulières, demeure l’un des moyens les plus directs par lequel deux États peuvent s’affronter sans engager un combat entre leurs armées respectives. Cet article propose premièrement de revenir sur les avantages et les risques d’un soutien matériel à des groupes insurrectionnels pour des États, s’attardant non pas sur le contenu de l’assistance — le type de ressources fournies aux rebelles — mais sur sa forme — à savoir si le soutien est opéré clandestinement ou, au contraire, publiquement. L’article présente ensuite des données descriptives sur la prévalence de la clandestinité/publicité du soutien étatique à des groupes insurgés dans la période 1989-2018. ... Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## « Le Yémen en guerre » URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-yemen-en-guerre/ Modified: 2021-09-15 > Sarah-Myriam parle avec Thomas de son nouveau livre, « Le Yémen en guerre », publié récemment aux Presses de l'Université de Montréal. Dans ce nouvel épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam parle avec Thomas de son nouveau livre, « Le Yémen en guerre », publié récemment aux Presses de l'Université de Montréal. Il explore les causes et les conséquences de la guerre qui fait rage au Yémen depuis 2015. Il analyse en particulier l’internationalisation de cette guerre, ou comment des puissances extérieures ont profité de la faiblesse de l’état central pour faire du pays un théâtre de leurs affrontements. Thomas explique de quoi il s'agissait initialement ; d’un conflit domestique entre le mouvement houthiste et le gouvernement central. Mais ce conflit s'est internationalisé en 2015, lorsque l’Arabie saoudite et ses partenaires interviennent afin de contrer les Houthistes, eux-mêmes proches de l’Iran. ## « Not an inch » : la mise à l’épreuve de l’OTAN par la Russie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/not-an-inch-la-mise-a-lepreuve-de-lotan-par-la-russie/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Introduction « Nous ferons tout ce qui est en notre pouvoir pour protéger et défendre chaque allié. Et chaque centimètre carré du territoire de l'OTAN », déclara l’ancien Secrétaire Général de l’OTAN alors en fonction, Jens Stoltenberg, le 25 février 2022 lors d’une conférence de presse faisant suite aux débuts de l’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par la Russie de la veille. Depuis, l’expression « Not an inch » est devenue le slogan des dirigeants de l’Alliance atlantique pour afficher leur détermination à honorer leur engagement à l’image de l’ancien président américain, Joe Biden, qui déclara durant le sommet extraordinaire de l’OTAN du 24 mars 2022 que « nous défendrons chaque centimètre du territoire de l’OTAN. Pas un pouce ne sera cédé à l’agression ». Cette guerre ayant fait renaître les craintes d’un conflit plus grand en Europe, elle amena l’OTAN à se reconcentrer sur sa mission première : la défense du territoire de l’ensemble de ses États membres. Depuis sa création en 1949, l’OTAN a eu recours à l’article 5 du Traité de Washington qu’à une seule reprise, après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 aux Etats-Unis par Al-Qaïda. Dès lors, jamais cet article n’a eu besoin d’être invoqué pour faire face à une attaque armée conventionnelle. En multipliant les exercices militaires conjoints, l’OTAN cherche à améliorer l’interopérabilité des forces alliée et à dissuader toute attaque potentielle contre l’un de ses membres en démontrant la crédibilité de l’engagement de chacun. Durant la Guerre froide, l’OTAN aurait donc su se montrer suffisamment crédible face à la menace soviétique pour éviter un conflit direct. Cependant, depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine en 2022, la Fédération de Russie multiplie ses actions négatives à l’encontre de plusieurs pays membres de l’OTAN : campagnes de désinformation, sabotages d’infrastructures ou encore actes de vandalisme dont l’objectif est de faire accroitre la division dans les sociétés occidentales. L’année 2025 marque aussi un tournant dans les provocations russes. Les relations entre les alliés et l’administration Trump sont rendues difficiles, le président américain considérant maintenant qu’ils doivent augmenter leurs dépenses militaires pour assurer eux-mêmes leur sécurité et laissant planer un doute sur un potentiel retrait américain du vieux continent. La Russie est, depuis cet été, passée à un niveau de provocation supérieure en violant de manière répétée sur le mois de septembre l’espace aérien de plusieurs États membres (e.g., Pologne, Estonie, Lituanie et Roumanie). Ces violations répétées montrent une évolution dans les provocations russes contre la crédibilité de l’Alliance. En effet, il y avait eu, avant même 2022, des incursions limitées, mais ces derniers mois montrent une intensification et un changement de méthode (l’usage de drones). L’Alliance se doit de réagir à ces provocations et renforcer sa dissuasion si elle veut prendre le contrôle de l’initiative de la situation et éviter que la Russie ne conserve sa mainmise sur l’évolution de la situation. L’armée russe se rapproche du flanc Est Cela fait plus de trois ans et demi que la Russie a lancé son invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine et bien que l’on ait conscience du coût humain très important des deux côtés, il reste difficile de l’établir avec précision. Les renseignements occidentaux ont estimé qu’environ 790.000 pertes[1] sont à enregistrer côté russe, faisant de cette guerre la plus meurtrière pour l’armée russe depuis les pertes soviétiques de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Parallèlement les gains territoriaux russes sont restés relativement faibles car depuis 2022, la Russie n’a pas beaucoup avancé et ne contrôle toujours « que » 20% du territoire ukrainien (Crimée comprise). Les avancées russes dans la région ukrainienne du Donbass depuis 2023 comptent certes de nombreuses localités mais elles restent à un niveau tactique et aucune grande percée n’a permis à la Russie de faire des gains stratégiques. Cependant, il est à noter que la Russie semble s’adapter aux efforts de guerre en Ukraine et est aujourd’hui en mesure d’inquiéter les différents pays de l’OTAN en étant active sur l’ensemble du flanc Est de l’Alliance. D’une part, cette rentrée 2025 est caractérisée par le grand exercice militaire russe biennal « Zapad ». Le dernier exercice militaire russe à l’ouest datait de 2021, quelques mois avant l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Celui prévu pour 2023 n’avait pas finalement eu lieu et certains occidentaux, à l’image du ministère de la défense britannique, estimaient que cela était en raison d’un manque de troupes et d’équipements militaires. Du 12 au 15 septembre 2025, Zapad-2025 s’est donc organisé en Russie et au Bélarus. Le président russe, Vladimir Poutine, a expliqué que cet exercice se déroule sur 41 terrains d’entrainement différents, regroupant environ 100.000 soldats. Cet exercice, qui est aussi une démonstration de force faite aux membres de l’OTAN, a suscité les craintes de nombreux pays alliés proches de la frontière russe, car en 2021 les troupes ayant participé à l’exercice étaient restées près de la frontière ukrainienne et avaient participé aux opérations. Plusieurs alliés ont donc participé à différents exercices militaires comme l’exercice « Tarassis 25 » qui regroupe une dizaine de pays d’Europe du nord et membres de l’OTAN, l’exercice lituanien de défense nationale annuel « Thunder Strike » ou encore l’exercice polonais « Iron Defender-25 » impliquant environ 30.000 soldats. D’autre part, le flanc du Nord-Est de l’OTAN connait lui aussi un regain d’activité. Depuis le 4 avril 2023, pourtant toujours restée à l’écart de l’alliance transatlantique depuis sa création en 1949, la Finlande a rejoint l’alliance militaire en réponse à l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine un an auparavant. Depuis cette adhésion, l’alliance travaille en collaboration avec les responsables finlandais. Quelques jours avant le sommet de La Haye à l’été 2025, la Finlande a fait savoir son souhait d’accueillir un groupe de Forces terrestres avancées sur son sol au format d’une brigade (5.000 soldats) provenant d’environ six pays dont notamment la Suède, le dernier État à avoir rejoint l’alliance. Le 3 octobre 2025, Antti Häkkänen, ministre de la Défense finlandais, a inauguré le Commandement interarmées terrestre (MCLCC) de l'OTAN à Mikkeli, illustrant la pleine intégration d’Helsinki dans l’alliance. Cependant, de l’autre côté de la frontière, en Carélie russe, on observe depuis plusieurs mois un renforcement militaire. Les forces armées russes ont redéployé des moyens dans des bases militaires abandonnées depuis la fin de la Guerre froide et ont aussi annoncé une nouvelle base militaire servant de plateforme opérationnelle pour les théâtres balte et arctique. Le gouvernement finlandais a annoncé suivre de près l’évolution de la situation, craignant une hausse des tensions dans la région. Alors que les deux premières années de la guerre en Ukraine ont obligé Moscou à mobiliser une grande partie de ses effectifs sur le théâtre d’opérations, on constate que l’armée russe se renforce aux frontières des États membres faisant craindre des provocations contre eux. Or, après les exercices militaires et la construction d’infrastructures, il semble que la Russie décide d’aller de l’avant dans ses tentatives d’évaluer la solidité du dispositif otanien. La multiplication des violations du territoire des Alliés Le mois de septembre 2025 a été marqué par une hausse significative des actions russes contre les alliés de l’OTAN. D’une part, cette multiplication des actions inquiètent grandement les alliés en Europe. D’autre part, le président américain se montre de plus en plus impatient avec le manque d’engagement russe dans des discussions de paix, ou du moins de cessez-le-feu, en Ukraine. Dans la nuit du 9 au 10 septembre, l’espace aérien polonais est en alerte après avoir identifié une incursion massive de drones russes (entre 19 et 23 drones) en provenance du Bélarus au même moment qu'une attaque sur l’Ukraine par la Russie. Cette incursion, trop importante pour être une simple erreur ou défaillance des systèmes, a entrainé une réaction de la Pologne et de ses alliés. Ainsi, plusieurs avions de combat et de reconnaissance[2] ont décollé et les radars et systèmes de défense antiaérienne sur le sol ont été mis en alerte maximale pour surveiller l’itinéraire de ces drones et les abattre si nécessaire. La Pologne a aussi fermé son espace aérien oriental à la frontière de l’Ukraine et du Bélarus, ainsi que plusieurs de ses aéroports. À la suite de cet évènement, Varsovie a invoqué l’Article 4 pour se réunir avec ses alliés de l’OTAN, affirmant que la sécurité de la Pologne était menacée. Quelques jours seulement après cette incursion (19 septembre 2025), une nouvelle alerte est émise, cette fois en Estonie. Tallinn a dénoncé la violation de son espace aérien par trois avions de chasse russes (MiG-31) près de l’île de Vaindloo dans le Golfe de Finlande. Cette violation, qui a duré environ 12 minutes, a été jugée très sérieuse en raison de plusieurs facteurs : transpondeurs éteints, pas de plans de vol et aucun contact radio avec le contrôle aérien estonien. Bien que cette incursion ne soit pas la première de l’année, elle reste la plus longue. Comme pour la Pologne quelques jours auparavant, l’Estonie a déclenché l’Article 4 pour réunir les Alliés et évoquer la menace sur sa sécurité. Enfin, depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, on constate une multiplication des violations de l’espace aérien des membres de l’OTAN (voir Figure 1). Les faits les plus marquants sont au Danemark où pendant plusieurs nuits, de multiples drones non identifiés ont survolé des aéroports (Copenhague, Billund, Aalborg), mais aussi et surtout des bases militaires à Skrydstrup et Karup. Ces survols ont poussé le gouvernement danois à fermer son espace aérien et ses aéroports pendant plusieurs heures à chaque alerte. Sans accuser directement la Russie, Copenhague a dénoncé une « attaque hybride » possible sur son territoire. Dans la même région, l’archipel de Karlskrona en Suède, où se trouve une base navale de la marine, a aussi été survolé par des drones semblables à ceux identifiés au Danemark. Des drones ont aussi été identifiés dans d’autres pays comme la Belgique, l’Allemagne ou encore la France. Bien qu’il ne soit pas possible d’identifier ces drones comme faisant partie d’opérations menées par la Russie, certains doutes peuvent être émis en raison des lieux sensibles auprès desquels ces vols ont été détectés. Par exemple, en France, une alerte a été émise au-dessus de la base militaire de Mourmelon-le-Grand fin septembre. Cette base militaire du 501e régiment de chars de combat a assuré notamment la formation de la Brigade ukrainienne Anne de Kyiv en 2024. Figure 1 - Carte illustrant les pays membres de l'OTAN en Europe ayant alerté publiquement une violation de leur espace aérien par des drones depuis le 24 février 2022. Les multiples violations russes des espaces aériens des pays de l’OTAN démontrent une intention claire du côté de Moscou. Du point de vue militaire, on peut estimer que ces incursions servent à tester les défenses alliées et leur réactivité en cas d’attaque ou de menace directe. Du point de vue politique, ces incursions servent à évaluer le niveau de soutien entre les membres de l’OTAN, alors que l’administration américaine ne cesse de critiquer ses alliés européens. Moscou semble aussi tester la détermination des alliés à défendre l’ensemble de leurs territoires et de mettre en application le « not an inch ». La réponse ferme des Alliés Face à la multiplication des provocations russes, les membres de l’OTAN ont tenu à réagir par des déclarations fortes, mais aussi des actions concrètes. Les alliés de l’OTAN ont tenu a alerté de la gravité de la situation en s’exprimant à tour de rôle durant le mois de septembre devant le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU à New York. Lors d’une réunion d’urgence le 12 septembre 2025, la délégation polonaise a dénoncé une vingtaine d’incursions, dont certaines ayant causé des dommages matériels mineurs. La Pologne a qualifié cette action de provocation délibérée. Le 22 septembre, le ministre des affaires étrangères estonien a, à son tour, dénoncé une dangereuse escalade par la Russie après l’incursion de MiG-31 dans son espace aérien. Durant la même séance, Tallinn a reçu l’appui des Etats-Unis qui ont rappelé que toute violation de l’espace aérien d’un allié était une menace à la sécurité collective, appelant donc Moscou à la retenue. La délégation française a aussi dénoncé un modèle de provocations répétées contre les États orientaux de l’OTAN. Elle a rappelé la solidarité indéfectible de la France auprès de ses partenaires baltes et polonais. Enfin, une déclaration nordique (Danemark, Finlande, Islande, Norvège et Suède) a été faite le même jour par la ministre suédoise des affaires étrangères condamnant la violation de l’espace aérien estonien. Ces interventions sont suivies, le 23 septembre, par une déclaration du Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord réaffirmant la détermination collective de l’OTAN à défendre l’intégrité territoriale de ses membres de manière coordonnée. Entre les déclarations à New York et celle de l’ensemble de l’OTAN, les alliés affichent un visage d’unité indéfectible qui se traduit aussi, et surtout, pas des actions concrètes. Le 12 septembre, l’OTAN annonce le déclenchement de l’Opération Eastern Sentry qui vise à renforcer la posture de défense sur le flanc Est de l’Alliance. L’opération prévoit notamment la mobilisation des forces alliées avec des avions de combat et des systèmes de défense aérienne supplémentaires déployés. Dans le cadre de cette opération, plusieurs pays alliés ont donc rapidement déployé des moyens en Pologne. Le Royaume-Uni a déployé des Typhoons de la RAF et la France des chasseurs Rafale directement en Pologne. L’annonce française a d’ailleurs fait l’objet d'une observation particulière puisqu’il a été possible d’identifier la provenance de ces chasseurs. Les trois chasseurs déployés en Pologne font partie de l’Escadron de Chasse 2/4 La Fayette, basé sur la base aérienne 113 (BA 113) de Saint-Dizier Robinson où se trouve notamment une partie des Forces Aériennes Stratégiques (FAS) de la dissuasion nucléaire française. Le déploiement de chasseurs provenant des forces de la dissuasion nucléaire est un message stratégique fort envoyé à la Russie sur la détermination française dans la défense de ses alliés en Europe. D’autres alliés comme le Danemark (F-16) et l’Allemagne (Eurofighter Typhoon) ont aussi envoyé des moyens pour renforcer la couverture aérienne du flanc oriental de l’OTAN. Enfin, plusieurs membres de l’OTAN et de l’UE[3] ont décidé de créer une nouvelle initiative pour établir un « mur de drones » le long du flanc Est appelé Eastern Flank Watch. L’objectif de cette initiative est d’améliorer la détection et l’intervention contre les incursions russes dans les espaces aériens alliés. Les membres de l’OTAN ont su répondre à l’unisson pour dénoncer les agissements russes sur le flanc Est de l’alliance. Au-delà des prises de paroles, ce sont des actes qui se sont concrétisés dans le renforcement opérationnel au travers du déclenchement de l’Opération Eastern Sentry. De son côté, le Canada a multiplié les déclarations politiques pour rappeler son soutien plein et entier à ses alliés, mais aucune n’action concrète en réponse n’a pu être observé faisant d’Ottawa un acteur périphérique à la crise. Cependant, malgré ce visage d’unité entre les Alliés, il existe aujourd’hui un enjeu majeur sur le soutien américain, restant une épine dans le dos de l’Alliance. En effet, les alliés restent principalement dépendants des Etats-Unis sur le plan militaire. Les alliés européens sont encore incapables d’égaler Washington dans les capacités logistiques, industrielles et matérielles, que ce soit pour assurer la chaîne de ravitaillement, le transport stratégique ou encore le soutien aérien et maritime. Le retour du président américain Donald Trump met l’Alliance face à un sérieux défi qui est la remise en cause de l’engagement américain qui pourrait éventuellement entrainer une reconfiguration de l’OTAN. Donc malgré les images d’unité, l’OTAN et sa capacité de dissuasion face à la menace russe reste dépendante aux décisions du gouvernement américain et il n’est pas certain que les Alliés soient en mesure d’assurer leur sécurité si l’engagement américain se réduisait. Les difficultés militaires et économiques du Kremlin Ces multiples provocations du mois de septembre par Moscou cachent une situation militaire et économique plus difficile que le Kremlin ne le laisse paraitre. Sur le plan militaire, les forces russes en Ukraine peinent à réaliser des avancées conséquentes. Les pertes russes continuent d’être de plus en plus importantes avec une estimation de 59 pertes par kilomètre carré conquis en 2024. En septembre 2025, les pertes russes moyennes étaient estimées à environ 950 soldats par jour pour environ 332.000 pertes depuis le début de l’année 2025 selon le ministère de la défense britannique. Les années 2024 et 2025 sont les plus meurtrières pour l’armée russe depuis le déclenchement de l’invasion, représentant pas moins le double des pertes russes dans ses autres guerres depuis 1991 (voir Figure 2), avec des pertes moyennes par jour entre 1000 et 1500 soldats contre 400 à 530 en 2022. A titre de comparaison, la guerre d’Afghanistan de l’URSS, très impopulaire dans les mémoires des Russes notamment, de 1979 à 1989 a causé la perte d’environ 13 833 soldats « seulement ». Le régime russe n’a pas connu de guerre avec une mortalité aussi élevée depuis 1945 si bien que le gouvernement a décidé de ne plus publier les données démographiques par son agence Rosstat à l’été 2025. Une façon de cacher le niveau des pertes. On peut aussi ajouter à ces pertes humaines des pertes matérielles conséquentes en Ukraine poussant Moscou à devoir mobiliser une grande partie de sa capacité industrielle dans la production militaire. Figure 2 - Graphique comparant les pertes russes estimées en Ukraine, depuis 2022, par rapport aux autres conflits auxquels la Russie a participé depuis 1991[4]. Sur le plan économique, la Russie voit son atout premier pour financer sa guerre en Ukraine (pétrole et gaz) être fortement endommagé par des frappes en profondeur de Kyiv contre ses infrastructures énergétiques. Ce n'est qu'en septembre 2025 que l’Ukraine a été en mesure d’intensifier ses attaques contre les installations pétrolières russes dans différentes villes telles que Volgograd, Ryazan ou encore Saratov. Ces frappes ont entrainé des fermetures temporaires et une réduction de la production. En août 2025, on compte environ 20 frappes, c’est le double en septembre 2025. Bien que le gouvernement russe ne publie aucune donnée sur la situation de sa production pétrolière, certains indicateurs permettent de voir qu’une crise de la distribution du carburant en Russie émerge. En effet, en septembre 2025, les recherches internet sur Yandex (équivalent russe de Google) sur le pétrole dans le pays ont connu un pic à 114.000 contre 79.000 deux ans auparavant. En plus de ces dégâts des infrastructures, la Russie se trouve aussi en difficulté pour trouver des acheteurs énergétiques puisque les Etats membres de l’Union européenne ont débuté leur réduction d’importations de gaz russe qui devraient d’être nulles en 2027. Alors qu’elle intensifie sa guerre en Ukraine et mène des actions de plus en plus agressives envers les membres de l’OTAN, la Russie fait face à d’importantes difficultés militaires et économiques. La projection d’une image de force et de détermination cache une situation plus critique que le Kremlin ne veut admettre, moquée par le président américain qui qualifie la Fédération de Russie de « Tigre de papier ». Considérations politiques pour le Canada Les tensions croissantes restent encore loin du territoire canadien mais elles entraînent des conséquences sérieuses pour la défense collective de l’OTAN, dont le Canada est membre. Il est important pour le gouvernement actuel de continuer à suivre la situation et de maintenir son discours de soutien indéfectible aux alliés européens. Que doit retenir le Canada au sujet de ces incursions russes dans l’espace aérien de l’OTAN ? Les considérations politiques à retenir : La présence canadienne en Lettonie Le Canada joue un rôle de premier plan dans le dispositif de défense de l’OTAN en Europe, notamment dans la région balte où elle est la nation-cadre de la brigade multinationale en Lettonie dans le cadre de son Opération Réassurance. Cette mission, lancée en 2014, constitue l’engagement militaire à l’étranger le plus important pour les Forces armées canadiennes. En août 2025, le gouvernement Carney a prolongé son opération jusqu’en 2029, marquant la détermination canadienne à apporter sa contribution à la sécurité collective. En 2026, les capacités du niveau de brigade devrait être entièrement accomplies avec environ 2200 soldats canadiens présents. Cependant, ce prolongement amène Ottawa à devoir fournir un effort militaire conséquent pour assurer sa mission, délaissant les autres théâtres d’opération potentiels comme l’Arctique. La vulnérabilité de la défense arctique canadienne Malgré ce rôle actif en Europe, le Canada reste militairement vulnérable dans la région Arctique, une région stratégique pour les ressources premières du Canada menacée par plusieurs puissances et notamment la Russie. Les capacités de défense canadiennes dans le Nord sont encore limitées comme l’indique un rapport du Sénat de 2023 avec un nombre insuffisant de brise-glaces et une infrastructure de surveillance sous-développée. Les Forces armées canadiennes travaillent sur le renforcement de leur présence dans cette région avec l’objectif de déployer une présence presque permanente. Des relations complexes avec l’administration américaine Depuis le début du nouveau mandat de Donald Trump, les relations entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis sont marquées par des tensions en raison de politiques commerciales protectionnistes et des divergences sur les priorités de défense. Cette tension met à mal la coordination nord-américaine au sein de l’OTAN. Le Canada tente alors de manœuvrer entre l’amélioration de ses relations bilatérales avec Washington sur les questions commerciales et le renforcement de la coopération dans le cadre de la défense collective tant à l’OTAN qu’au travers du NORAD. Recommandations pour le gouvernement du Canada 1) Soutenir la fermeté de la réponse alliée aux incursions Le gouvernement du Canada devrait appuyer publiquement la position de plusieurs alliés européens qui appellent à abattre tout aéronef russe (drone ou avion de combat) violant l’espace aérien de l’OTAN. Une déclaration publique du Premier Ministre pourrait apporter un poids conséquent dans la posture canadienne au sein de l’OTAN. Il serait aussi possible de déployer des aéronefs de l’Aviation Royale canadienne sur le flanc Est et notamment pour la reconnaissance maritime avec les CP-140 Aurora, renforçant la présence canadienne dans la défense collective. Ce soutien enverrait donc un signal clair sur la détermination de l’Alliance, dissuadant Moscou de tester davantage les limites de la défense collective. Une position ferme, exprimée de manière coordonnée renforcerait la crédibilité de la posture de dissuasion et réduirait potentiellement les risques de nouvelles provocations. En effet, la crainte pourrait être que si les alliés ne réagissent pas suffisamment, les forces canadiennes déployées en Lettonie dans le cadre de l’Opération Réassurance pourraient être la cible de drones. 2) Renforcer la protection du territoire et des infrastructures critiques Le Canada devrait accroître la coopération technique et militaire avec ses alliés et l’Ukraine afin d’améliorer la défense des infrastructures sensibles contre les menaces de drones. Cette coopération renforcée permettrait le co-développement de capacités anti-drones et la formation de personnels pour cela. Cette coopération permettrait donc d’améliorer la défense interne pour les infrastructures militaires (bases navales, aériennes ou terrestres) mais aussi toutes les infrastructures civiles sensibles (aéroports, ports, centrales énergétiques, logistique ferroviaire, et cetera). Les moyens actuels de défense anti-aérienne au sein de l’alliance ont démontré leur difficulté à intercepter les drones russes type Geran (version russe du Shahed iranien), mais surtout un rapport de coût financier très défavorable. Après les incursions en Pologne, l’Ukraine a proposé son aide à la formation des soldats polonais pour abattre ces menaces. Le Canada pourrait donc imaginer établir une formation de membres des forces armées canadiennes avec les partenaires ukrainiens notamment. 3) Intensifier la coopération arctique avec les alliés nordiques Le Canada pourrait aussi renforcer sa coopération militaire et stratégique dans l’Arctique avec les pays nordiques membres de l’OTAN (Norvège, Danemark, Finlande et Suède), afin de mieux anticiper et contrer les potentielles menaces russes (aériennes et/ou navales). Il existe d’ailleurs déjà des ententes avec la Finlande notamment, mais cette coopération pourrait inclure une coordination accrue des patrouilles aériennes et maritimes ou même penser à un programme de surveillance de drone de la région Arctic Flank Watch comme le Eastern Flank Watch mentionné précédemment qui viserait à établir un système de surveillance intensif interarmes. La signature l’ICE Pact entre le Canada, la Finlande et les Etats-Unis illustre ce renforcement de la coopération en Arctique avec la production commune de brise-glaces. [1] Ce chiffre comprend les soldats morts ou blessés. [2] F-16 polonais, F-35 néerlandais et AWACS italiens. [3] Bulgarie, Danemark, Estonie, Hongrie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Pologne, Roumanie, Slovaquie et Finlande. [4] Les pertes : Première Guerre de Tchétchénie, Deuxième Guerre de Tchétchénie, Guerre de Géorgie, Intervention russe en Syrie, Guerre d’Ukraine. ## « Peut-être cette nuit, peut-être demain, peut-être dans une semaine » : Entre dissuasion et guerre limitée entre Israël et le Hezbollah URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/peut-etre-cette-nuit-peut-etre-demain-peut-etre-dans-une-semaine-entre-dissuasion-et-guerre-limitee-entre-israel-et-le-hezbollah/ Modified: 2024-10-21 Le 5 août 2024, le secrétaire général du groupe politico-militaire chiite libanais Hezbollah (ar. Parti de Dieu) tweetait en hébreu : « Peut-être cette nuit, peut-être demain, peut-être dans une semaine ». Il faisait référence à l'attaque anticipée du Hezbollah et de l'Iran contre Israël en représailles aux assassinats d’Ismail Hanyeh, chef du bureau politique du Hamas palestinien, à Téhéran et de Fouad Shukr, chef d’état-major du Hezbollah, à Beyrouth. Certains médias ont annoncé un embrasement imminent de la région, une régionalisation du conflit de Gaza impliquant cette fois ci les Gardiens de la Révolution iranienne et les miliciens du Hezbollah contre la frontière Nord d’Israël entrainant un conflit généralisé entre les États-Unis et l’Iran. Le 27 septembre 2024, Hassan Nasrallah, leader du groupe chiite depuis 1992 est tué dans une frappe contre un complexe militaire souterrain à Beyrouth. En somme, le conflit entre Israël et le groupe satellite iranien est certes meurtrier et extrêmement volatile, mais les protagonistes auront évité soigneusement l’escalade de la violence et ce jusqu’à la mi-septembre 2024. Comment comprendre cet équilibre qui fait fit de l’évolution de la guerre à Gaza ? L'assassinat coordonné du chef d'état-major du Hezbollah, Fouad Shukr, à Beyrouth le 30 juillet 2024 ciblé par un raid aérien israélien ainsi que celui du chef de la branche politique du Hamas le lendemain, Ismail Haniyeh, alors en déplacement à Téhéran, avaient déjà gravement ébranlé la crédibilité de l'axe de Téhéran-Damas au Proche-Orient. L’assassinat de Nasrallah fin septembre 2024 et de ses successeurs quelques semaines après a fini de déstabiliser la chaine de commandement du groupe chiite. Mais si l'assassinat du chef du Hamas porte un coup symbolique à l'establishment du groupe islamiste palestinien à Gaza, notamment en ce qui concerne ses liens avec l'Iran et le Qatar, il n'a pas en soi influencé l'évolution du conflit dans l'enclave palestinienne. Yahya Sinwar, chef militaire du Hamas et cerveau de l'attentat du 7 octobre 2023 en Israël, reste quant à lui introuvable dans le réseau de tunnels du groupe terroriste, bien que ces derniers aient été en grande partie détruits. En revanche, l'élimination de Fouad Shukr suivi de celle d’Hassan Nasrallah représente une victoire symbolique -plus que tactique- majeure pour les renseignements militaires israéliens contre le groupe chiite au Liban. Conseiller militaire du secrétaire général du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, Shukr était considéré comme l'un des principaux responsables de l'attentat contre la force multinationale à Beyrouth, qui avait coûté la vie à plusieurs centaines de militaires américains et français dans la capitale libanaise le 23 octobre 1983. Dans l'organigramme du Hezbollah, la photo de Shukr se trouvait donc très près de celle de Nasrallah. À la suite de la confirmation de la mort d'Haniyeh, le parti chiite libanais a annoncé qu'il répliquerait en temps et en heure fermement contre Israël. Cet engrenage sans équivoque, téléguidé par le régime islamique iranien auquel le Hezbollah est affilié, répondaient non pas tant à la mort du chef du Hamas qu'à l'humiliation d'avoir été frappé en plein cœur de la capitale iranienne quelques heures après une rencontre au sommet entre l'ayatollah Ali Khamenei et le chef de la branche politique du Hamas. Après le bombardement du système de défense radar d'une installation nucléaire à Ispahan en avril dernier, l'élimination de l' « invité privilégié » du guide suprême a remis en question toute la crédibilité de l'Iran dans la région. Cette contextualisation permet de saisir la régionalisation des tensions entre le Hezbollah et Israël. Il est inexact de considérer que ce conflit dépend uniquement de la guerre à Gaza. L’existence du Hezbollah s’inscrit dans l’expression régionaliste chiite et iranienne à la suite du vide politique laissé par la guerre civile libanaise de 1975 à 1990. Il s’inscrit aussi dans une réponse d’une frange de la population libanaise qui a mené à la fin de l’occupation du Sud-Liban par l’armée israélienne du Sud-Liban pour limiter l’activité de groupes palestiniens dans la région. Le parti chiite libanais est donc jusqu’à aujourd’hui l’élément clef de la politique régionaliste de l’Iran dans un projet d’ « arc chiite » de l’Irak à la Syrie. Nous verrons en revanche que la cause palestinienne et plus récemment la guerre à Gaza alimentent la rhétorique guerrière du parti shiite ainsi qu’une certaine vision du nationalisme libanais. On aurait pu penser que cibler la capitale libanaise, qui jusqu'à présent représentait une ligne rouge implicite entre les deux belligérants, aurait enflammé le conflit. Pourtant, l'élimination de Shukr à Dahieh, bastion du Hezbollah dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth en réponse à l'attaque au drone qui avait tué une dizaine d’enfants druzes à Majdal Shams, dans le Golan israélien, n'a enflammé que la rhétorique des belligérants. Une des raisons pour lesquelles l'axe irano-libanais persiste dans la guerre d'usure au nord d'Israël est qu'il en tire un avantage stratégique. Depuis un an, cette situation a forcé 90 000 civils israéliens à fuir leurs foyers, devenant ainsi des déplacés internes dans le centre du pays. Du côté libanais plusieurs milliers de civils ont fui vers le centre du pays, laissant derrière eux, à l’instar d’Israël, une terre soumise aux bombardements de caches de la milice libanaise. Ce contexte met en lumière une deuxième problématique : les lacunes apparentes de l'approche stratégique du cabinet de guerre israélien. En effet, malgré une série de victoires tactiques ayant considérablement réduit les capacités du Hamas à Gaza et ciblé des sites et figures clés du Hezbollah libanais, aucune avancée stratégique à long terme ne semble se concrétiser. Depuis la rédaction de cette analyse, la guerre opposant l’Israël au groupe chiite a certes pris une tournure rapide. Aujourd’hui dépourvu de sa chaine de commandement, le Hezbollah perd du terrain au Sud Liban au profit de l’armée israélienne renforcée par des renseignements accumulés depuis la dernière guerre au Liban de 2006. Il n’empêche que l’analyse proposée ici a gardé son intérêt dans la perception du conflit et des enjeux. Surtout, elle nuance le lien systématique entre la guerre à Gaza et celle au Sud-Liban permettant ainsi de saisir des enjeux locaux plutôt que régionaux. Hamas-Hezbollah : Les non-frères ennemis Il est important de rappeler que la guerre à Gaza n’est pas directement reliée au conflit à la frontière israélo-libanaise. Le Liban n’a pas fini de panser les plaies d’une guerre civile qui avant même l’invasion de sa frontière sud par Tsahal le 6 juin 1982 était le théâtre de combats destructeurs entre factions palestiniennes du Fatah, armée libanaise et milices chrétiennes depuis 1975. Les Palestiniens depuis lors ont souffert d’une forte discrimination dans toutes les strates de la société libanaise. De plus, la deuxième guerre du Liban qui a éclaté en 2006 à la suite des enlèvements de soldats israéliens à la frontière laissé de profondes blessures aux deux sociétés. Le principe de « guerre juste » avancé alors par le premier ministre israélien Ehud Olmert s’est fracturé pour ouvrir la voie à un establishment militaire désorganisé. Du côté du Liban, le Hezbollah a misé sur les réminiscences de l’occupation du Sud-Liban pour accentuer son rôle d’acteur majeur de l’ « axe de la Résistance ». Ce traumatisme pour les deux acteurs que sont Tsahal et la milice chiite est une des raison expliquant l’attentisme des deux protagonistes. Déjà fragmenté par de multiples tensions ethniques et religieuses le Liban est progressivement devenu le laboratoire d’une hybridité politique (le confessionalisme) basé sur une réalité démographique dépassée issue d’un recensement de 1932.  Parler d’une solidarité entre les deux groupes, le Hamas d’obédience sunnite issue de la confrérie des frères musulmans, et le Hezbollah chiite soutenu par le clergé chiite iranien, c’est faire fî de la réalité régionale. L’Iran n’a en réalité financé et armé le Hamas que du fait de la prédominance de ce dernier au Sud d’Israël et présentant la seule menace pour Israël disposant d’une ouverture sur la Méditerranée. En tant qu'organisation sunnite, le Hamas ne partage pas le lien religieux chiite avec l'Iran qui caractérise le Hezbollah et la plupart des groupes proxies de l'Iran. Ainsi l’Iran ne risquerait pas de déclencher une guerre régionale en usant de son bras armé au Liban, le Hezbollah, pour sauver le Hamas dans sa guerre à Gaza. La doctrine iranienne se résume à mener une guerre de harcèlement contre Israël via ses proxies, à préserver ainsi son volet militaire et surtout son influence créant ainsi un arc shiite encerclant Israël et l’Arabie Saoudite, autre grand rival du régime des mollahs. Le Liban est donc vital pour l’influence iranienne et justifie l’extrême militarisation du Sud du Liban, bastion de la milice chiite, devenu un État dans l’État. D’un autre côté, le narratif de la cause palestinienne alimente la rhétorique du Hezbollah qui trouve ainsi une audience dans le monde sunnite, entre autres. L’attaque terroriste de grande ampleur du 7 octobre 2023 suivie par l’invasion de l’enclave palestinienne par Tsahal a donné l’opportunité au groupe chiite de renforcer son influence à la frontière israélienne. Pourtant il n’a pas profité de la sidération en Israël pour menacer à son tour l’intégrité territoriale du Golan ou de la Galilée et n’a tiré aucun profit des tirs de barrage de centaines de missiles et drones tirés principalement d’Iran et d’Irak dans la nuit du 13 avril 2024. En somme, la régionalisation du conflit de Gaza n’est pas recherchée par le Hezbollah conscient de ses capacités importantes mais limitées. Cette retenue relative vient aussi de l’Ayatollah Khamenei lui-même. Troisième président d’Iran lors de la guerre dévastatrice Iran-Irak (1981-1988), le guide suprême a tissé des liens étroits avec les Gardiens de la Révolution, la principale branche armée iranienne. Le conflit sanglant contre l’Irak a fait de lui un administrateur réaliste aux faits de la guerre, loin de l’image d’un idéologue fanatique. Fidèle à sa doctrine de diviser la région pour mieux y régner, il est ainsi l’architecte de l’implantation du Hezbollah au Liban et le principal instigateur du développement de proxies shiites au Moyen-Orient. En ce sens, il alimente via le Hezbollah une vision du nationalisme libanais spécifique à l’agenda régional iranien qui ne fait pas du groupe chiite l’expression d’une libération nationale mais d’une emprise iranienne pour sécuriser l’accès à la méditerranée. Ainsi, par la nature des acteurs impliqués et la réalité régionale, le conflit à la frontière israélo-libanaise n’est pas un prolongement de la guerre contre le Hamas ni un nouveau front dans la guerre mais une problématique radicalement différente à laquelle les libanais et les israéliens doivent faire face. Gaza est une guerre locale, la frontière israélo-libanaise représente quant à elle un enjeu régional. Si un accord de paix passant par la libération des otages israéliens encore à Gaza devait avoir lieu, il est fort peu probable que suivrait une cessation des hostilités avec le Hezbollah car Gaza et la cause palestinienne ne sont qu’un élément rhétorique dans le discours régionaliste iranien. Le conflit d’attrition entre le groupe satellite de l’Iran et Israël s’inscrit donc dans la durée et échappe dans les faits à toute avancée dans le conflit avec le Hamas dans la bande de Gaza. C’est un conflit se maintenant grâce à un certain équilibre de la terreur et qui s’illustre pleinement le développement des moyens de dissuasion. Le front arrière et l’attrition civile La journée du 25 aout 2024 fut la plus tendue depuis l’élimination de Shukr à Beyrouth un mois auparavant. À l’instar des tirs de missiles iraniens en avril dernier, l’objectif d’Hassan Nasrallah était de saturer les systèmes d’alerte israéliens au Nord en déclarant viser les bases militaires et le quartier général du Mossad dans la banlieue de Tel Aviv. Une grande partie de l’arsenal de la milice chiite prévu fut détruit de manière préventive par un raid israélien et que la majorité des missiles tirés furent interceptés par la défense aérienne israélienne. Nasrallah déclara qu’il ne chercherait pas une plus grande escalade après un « succès d’envergure » et que ses militants « pouvaient se reposer » . Encore une fois, cette interruption étonnante de ce qui devait être une offensive majeure afin de venger la mort de Shukr sans aucun objectif atteint pose question et illustre une division parmi les leaders chiites libanais et iraniens. Une partie de réponse réside dans le fait que l’objectif et tout d’abord médiatique. Le Hezbollah et l’Iran occupent le terrain de l’information en se posant comme les seuls légitimes acteurs de « l’axe de la résistance » contre Israël et inondent les médias libanais.  Là encore, la doctrine de Khamenei s’illustre par la contention de l’Iran dans ce conflit au profit de groupes satellites comme la milice chiite. « La guerre prend de nombreuses formes […], Il s'agit de penser correctement, de parler correctement, de comprendre les choses avec précision et d'atteindre la cible avec exactitude » L’objectif n’est donc pas d’évoluer vers une guerre ouverte, dont les responsables iraniens savent que l’Iran n’en a pas les capacités économiques ni militaires mais de se tourner vers une guerre d’attrition au Nord avec le Hezbollah qui lui aussi doit composer avec un ressentiment contre sa politique de plus en plus forte[1]. Du côté israélien, le ressentiment de la population contre le gouvernement persévère. En plus d’une guerre plus tactique que stratégique, les reproches portent sur l’absence de résultats concluants quant au retour des otages israéliens et l’impossible neutralisation du chef de la branche militaire du Hamas Yahya Sinwar, qui a désormais succédé à Hanyie. L’image de réfugiés internes fuyant les missiles au Nord se rajoute à celle des cercueils d’otages revenant de Gaza et contribuent à plomber la crédibilité du gouvernement Netanyahu déjà empêtré dans ses déboires judiciaires. Il est donc très probable que le ressentiment du public israélien à l’égard du gouvernement ne pousse celui-ci à briser le plafond de verre de la chaine de commandement en Israël, laissant plus de marge de manœuvre à la Kyria (siège de la défense israélienne). Herzl Halevi, chef d’État-major a plusieurs fois exprimé des critiques sur le manque de stratégie à long terme à Gaza et dans le Nord d’Israël et la sclérose de la chaine de commandement dans la suppression de la menace du Hezbollah contre les localités au nord du pays. Conclusion temporaire La guerre à la frontière israélo-libanaise n’est pas une escalade, mais la continuation et le reflet de tensions régionales profondes. L'Iran, à travers le Hezbollah, a plusieurs fois exprimé sa réticence à intensifier les violations de l'intégrité territoriale d'Israël. De son côté, l'État hébreu a affirmé être prêt à tout type d'intervention, y compris une incursion terrestre, tout en soulignant que l'aggravation du conflit ne servait pas ses intérêts. Cette stratégie, cependant, est à double tranchant : elle laisse les populations israéliennes et libanaises déplacées dans un sentiment d'abandon et met en péril le gouvernement israélien, davantage que le conflit à Gaza. Cette crise de légitimité s’exprime par ailleurs par d’importantes manifestations dans le pays mais encore cantonnées dans la région de Tel-Aviv, historiquement de gauche. L'axe chiite ne viendra pas en aide au Hamas encore actif à Gaza, car les coûts d'une telle intervention dépasseraient les bénéfices dans le cadre du conflit contre Israël. En revanche, la continuation du harcèlement contre le Nord d’Israël a comme objectif de diviser les ressources militaires israéliennes et de prolonger le sentiment de siège aux frontières. Au final, s’il est probable qu’une guerre ouverte de la même intensité qu’à Gaza entre la milice chiite et par procuration l’Iran ait lieu au Sud Liban, il n’en reste pas moins que les objectifs restent radicalement différents dû à l’environnement socio-politique et l’engrenage que représenterait une telle guerre dans la dynamique de rivalité entre l’Iran et Israël. L’incursion de l’armée israélienne débutée en octobre n’a pour l’instant comme objectif de désaturer la frontière de la menace des incursions de la milice en territoire israélien ainsi que de neutraliser les tirs de missiles sur les localités du Nord d’Israël. Pour autant, l’objectif de repousser la présence du Hezbollah au nord du fleuve Litanie (à vingt kilomètres de la frontière) bien qu’envisagé par le cabinet de guerre israélien impliquerait qu’Israël se relance (à l’instar de la guerre du Liban de 2006) dans une campagne qui engendrerait une occupation du territoire libanais sur le long terme et raviverait les traumatismes libanais et israélien d’une guerre de position qu’aucun des deux états ne souhaitent revivre. [1] La journaliste libanaise Nancy Lakiss, opposée au Hezbollah a posté un sondage réalisé par le magazine américain Foreign Affairs démontrant que 70% des Libanais ne font pas confiance au Hezbollah. Elle a ajouté le hashtag "#Lebanon_doesn't_want_war" (compte X de Nancy Nessrine Lakiss, 4 août 2024). ## « Spécial élections et politique de défense au Canada » URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/special-elections-politique-defense-canada/ Modified: 2021-10-13 > Pour ce 21e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, un spécial élections et politique de défense au Canada. Balado. Pour ce 21e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, un spécial élections et politique de défense au Canada. Thomas Juneau et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Stéfanie von Hlatky et Justin Massie. Stéfanie von Hlatky est détentrice de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur le genre, la sécurité, et les forces armées, professeure agrégée au département d’études politiques de l’Université Queen’s, directrice du Centre for International and Defence Policy (CIDP) et co-directrice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Justin Massie est professeur titulaire de science politique à l’Université du Québec à Montréal et co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Ses recherches portent sur les interventions militaires multinationales, la transition mondiale de la puissance, la paradiplomatie et la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada. Nos invités nous présentent le Réseau d'analyse stratégique. Nous discutons du bilan du gouvernement libéral en matière de défense et identifions ses principaux défis pour ce nouveau mandat. Faits saillants - Épisode 21 ## 2025, une année charnière pour la défense nationale au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/2025-une-annee-charniere-pour-la-defense-nationale-au-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Durant plusieurs décennies, le Canada, allié privilégié des États-Unis, a dépendu de son hégémonie pour assurer sa protection. Toutefois, la réélection de Donald Trump et sa politique axée sur les priorités nationales ont mis en évidence des tensions dans l’unité et l’alliance entre les deux nations. Le Canada et les États-Unis partagent de nombreux avantages en matière de défense, tels que le NORAD et la protection des intérêts internationaux dans l’Arctique.  Pourtant, l’année 2025 s’ouvre sur des tensions croissantes entre les deux voisins, alimentées par la posture interventionniste du 47e président des États-Unis, en particulier sur la question de l’immigration. La victoire de Donald Trump à l’élection présidentielle américaine de 2024 a marqué un tournant majeur dans la politique de défense des États-Unis, avec une détermination renouvelée à réduire l’engagement militaire américain envers les alliés qui ne remplissent pas leurs obligations financières, mais également une volonté annexionniste à l’égard du Canada. L’objectif principal de la manœuvre politique de Donald Trump sur le sujet est simple.  Il souhaite que tous les pays membres de l’OTAN consacrent au moins 2 % de leur PIB aux dépenses militaires. En 2024, le Canada était l’un des deux seuls pays, avec la Belgique, à ne pas avoir atteint cet objectif. Le pays affichait un taux de participation de 1,37 % de son PIB, soit 0,73 % de moins que la moyenne. Cet investissement considérable, représentant environ 16 milliards de dollars sur les 2 168 milliards du PIB canadien, survient dans un contexte national marqué par l’annonce de la démission du Premier ministre, Justin Trudeau, le 4 janvier 2025, et l’arrivée au pouvoir de son successeur, qui semble vouloir redéfinir la relation entre les  deux pays. C’est une nouvelle ère semble s’ouvrir pour le pays, marqué par une volonté d’indépendance du Canada à l’égard de son plus proche allié. L’année 2025 s’annonce être un défi majeur pour le Canada, qui a dû faire face dès février aux conséquences du protectionnisme américain imposé par le président élu. Ce dernier n’a pas arrêté de montrer sa volonté de réduire l’engagement des États-Unis dans la défense des intérêts étrangers. La pression exercée par le président américain renforce l’incertitude quant à l’avenir de la coopération bilatérale. Celui-ci a également évoqué à plusieurs reprise le fait qu’il souhaitait faire du Canada le 51ème état américain, révélant ainsi une volonté d’annexion à peine dissimulée à l’égard de son plus proche allié. Pour assurer cette manœuvre politique, le président américain n’a pas hésité à employer des sanctions économiques, une forme de coercition économique ayant pour objectif de contraindre le canada à accepter la requête du président américain. Le Canada n’a pas tardé à riposter en imposant à son tour des droits de douane de 25 % sur certains produits en provenance des États-Unis. Cette détérioration des relations internationales fait peser un risque sur la défense nationale canadienne, notamment en ce qui concerne le « NORAD », système radar crucial pour la surveillance et la protection du ciel au-dessus de l’Amérique du Nord, sur lequel le Canada continue de compter fortement. Cette note politique a pour objectif d’analyser les défis de sécurité nationale soulevés par la réélection de Donald Trump à la présidence des États-Unis. Elle mettra en évidence les enjeux clés auxquels le gouvernement canadien devra faire face au cours des quatre prochaines années. Dans un contexte géopolitique en mutation constante, caractérisé par des changements dans les relations de force entre les grandes puissances. Le Canada doit s’attendre à ce que les États-Unis adoptent une politique commerciale plus isolationniste, en privilégiant leurs propres intérêts aux dépens de la coopération internationale. L’heure est à l’état des lieux des capacités opérationnelles de la nation Le Canada a longtemps ralenti le développement de sa puissance militaire en estimant que les menaces pour son territoire et ses intérêts nationaux étaient minimisées grâce à l’engagement accru des États-Unis en sa faveur. Cependant, l’année 2025 marque un changement important dans les relations bilatérales entre les deux pays. L’arrivée au pouvoir de Donald Trump ainsi que sa politique visant à privilégier les intérêts de son propre pays, entraine une dégradation des relations historiques établies entre les deux pays. Cette dégradation vient s’ajouter aux nombreux défis auxquels le Canada doit faire face, ce qui amène le gouvernement canadien à revoir sa politique en matière de défense afin d’assurer la protection de sa souveraineté et de sa population. Dans un article récemment écrit par Justin Massie et Philippe Lagassé et publié dans le Rubicon, il est souligné que les forces armées canadiennes (FAC) font face à des défis importants en termes de capacités opérationnelles. Le pays manque de 16 000 soldats réguliers, tandis que l’état de préparation du matériel militaire est préoccupant : seuls 45 % de la flotte aérienne serait apte à combattre, contre 46 % pour la flotte navale. Ces chiffres inquiétants s’inscrivent dans un contexte où la détérioration des relations avec Washington pourrait renforcer la pression sur le Canada afin que le pays assure un meilleur entretien du NORAD. Un système de protection, considéré comme étant la pierre angulaire de la défense nord-américaine. Le manque de personnel, le déficit capacitaire et les pressions internationales font ressortir une certaine vulnérabilité dans les aptitudes qu’ont les Forces armées canadiennes à défendre les intérêts de la nation. D’après un tableau interne du ministère de la Défense nationale, seuls 58 % des forces armées canadiennes seraient prêtes à répondre à une demande d’aide des pays de l’OTAN. Toutefois, l’ancien gouvernement canadien prévoyait d’investir des sommes considérables dans la mise à niveau de ses forces. Le document intitulé « Les dépenses d’investissement prévues dans le cadre de la politique de défense du Canada » révèle une augmentation significative de 51,5 milliards de dollars depuis 2022, faisant passer le budget total de 163,3 milliards à 214,8 milliards de dollars sur les vingt prochaines années. Cette hausse est principalement due au renouvèlement et à la mise à niveau des équipements terrestres, aériens et maritimes de l’armée, ainsi qu’au projet de modernisation du NORAD. Cette dynamique budgétaire est observable dans le budget principal des dépenses de l’exercice 2024-2025, qui prévoit une enveloppe de 30,6 milliards de dollars pour la modernisation du matériel. Un investissement qui semble assuré, étant donné les prises de positions du nouveau premier ministre canadien sur la question de la sécurité nationale. La défaillance des forces armées canadiennes passe également par l’accumulation  des retards dans la livraison des nouveaux équipements. En effet, annoncés en 2017, plusieurs véhicules attendus par les FAC n’avaient toujours pas été livrés en 2024, laissant le matériel dans un état préoccupant. Désormais, il faut attendre 2025 pour commencer à étudier les appels d’offres visant à moderniser les véhicules blindés légers de l’infanterie canadienne. La livraison serait prévue pour 2030. Le Canada doit concilier l’impératif de rénovation avec les exigences accrues de ses partenaires. Un défi majeur pour le nouveau gouvernement en place qui va devoir travailler sur le sujet, afin d’assurer la protection de la souveraineté du pays et la défense de ses frontières. La menace des États-Unis et l’impact qu’elle pourrait avoir sur la sécurité nationale L’année 2025 pourrait marquer un tournant dans les relations diplomatiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Le Président américain a récemment mis à exécution ses menaces à l’égard du gouvernement canadien, menaces que le président américain justifie par la mauvaise gestion du flux migratoire et des opiacés de la part du Canada. Cette manœuvre politique de la part du 47ème président des États-Unis alimente les inquiétudes déjà présentes sur les tensions futures entre les deux pays. D’autant que Donald Trump a évoqué l’hypothèse de se retirer de l’OTAN ainsi que  de faire un état des lieux de la participation des forces américaines à la protection des pays alliés, tel que le Canada. Bien que cette mesure ne soit pas encore concrétisée, l’imprévisibilité du nouveau locataire de la Maison-Blanche laisse croire qu’elle pourrait devenir une réalité. Le retrait possible des États-Unis de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord aurait un impact direct sur le Canada, notamment dans la région stratégique du Grand Nord arctique, où les tensions géopolitiques se sont exacerbées depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine. C’est ce que montre Kim Richard Nossal dans un article récent. Le Canada entretient des liens étroits en matière de défense avec les États-Unis, notamment par le biais du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord, mieux connu sous son acronyme « NORAD ». À cela s’ajoutent les demandes de l’administration américaine en matière de financement des infrastructures nécessaires à la protection des intérêts internationaux, en particulier pour le « NORAD. D’autant plus qu’il est crucial que les États-Unis continuent à assurer la présence du NORAD, puisque, sans eux, ce système pourrait devenir obsolète, compte tenu des contraintes budgétaires et matérielles qu’il entraine. L’ancien gouvernement de monsieur Justin Trudeau avait lancé un plan ambitieux de financement pour la modernisation des moyens permettant d’assurer une protection contre les nouvelles technologies développées par des puissances étrangères, telles que la Russie ou encore la Chine. Ce plan a d’ailleurs fait l’objet d’une intervention de la part du nouveau Premier ministre canadien, afin d’annoncer le développement d’un radar transhorizon en partenariat avec l’Australie. Cependant, le bilan des forces armées canadiennes reste le même, indiquant une stagnation des compétences militaires, mettant en lumière « l’impossibilité » pour le pays de se protéger de manière autonome face à ces menaces croissantes. Un défi organisationnel se pose pour le pays, d’autant que celui-ci doit assurer sa participation aux missions interarmées de protection du Grand Nord arctique ainsi qu’aux intérêts internationaux liés à l’OTAN. Une transition vers une autonomie en matière de défense comme solution face à une politique protectionniste américaine Malgré d’importants investissements en matière de défense, le Canada accuse un retard significatif en raison d’une politique moins soutenue fondée sur la perception que les menaces pour la sécurité nationale et la souveraineté du pays n’étaient que modérées. Cette approche se justifie entre autres par les liens diplomatiques solides qu’entretient le pays avec plusieurs grandes puissances mondiales, dont quelques-unes sont des hégémons internationaux. Les Canadiens ont toujours considéré la défense nationale comme secondaire. Selon des enquêtes ou des opinions exprimées sur le sujet, il est clair que les Canadiens ont historiquement dépendu de la puissance militaire des États-Unis pour garantir leur sécurité. Toutefois, la situation a radicalement changé. Aujourd’hui, la menace pour la souveraineté du Canada ne provient plus seulement de l’extérieur des frontières nord-américaines, mais de l’intérieur. Son allié de longue date semble vouloir réduire son engagement, laissant au Canada la responsabilité croissante de sa propre défense. Face à une convergence accrue de pressions internationales sur le Canada, notamment les exigences de l’OTAN, les attentes des États-Unis, l’escalade des tensions dans l’Arctique et la présence omniprésente de la Russie dans la région circumpolaire. Il ne fait aucun doute que le Canada soit obligé de renforcer son autonomie en matière de défense afin d’assurer et d’assumer ses engagements nationaux et internationaux. Toutefois, le rapport annuel du ministère de la Défense nationale et des Forces armées canadiennes relatif à l’activité des forces armées canadiennes pour l’année 2023-2024, met en évidence une amélioration des capacités opérationnelles et la réalisation de plusieurs objectifs stratégiques. Cependant, il souligne aussi les failles structurelles persistantes, telles qu’un déficit de personnels, des équipements vieillissants et un manque de ressources financières adaptées aux ambitions du pays. Le Canada doit continuer à investir et à diversifier ses engagements internationaux, au-delà de sa relation historique avec les États-Unis, afin de garantir une transition durable vers une autonomie militaire qui semble désormais nécessaire. La situation actuelle et les tensions diplomatiques entre les deux pays laissent penser que les États-Unis pourraient réduire leurs participations à la défense du territoire canadien. Ce récent revirement dans les relations diplomatiques entre les deux nations devrait permettre au Canada de renforcer ses alliances militaires en matière de défense avec d’autres pays, ce qui lui permettrait de se distancer des États-Unis et de garantir une certaine indépendance militaire. L’Europe, la France et le Royaume-Uni pourraient être des partenaires de premier plan dans ce projet de grande envergure en raison de leur capacité dans le domaine de l’industrie de la défense et de leur indépendance vis-à-vis de la domination américaine. Recommandations L’année 2025 représente un tournant décisif pour la sécurité nationale du Canada, obligeant le nouveau gouvernement à trouver le bon équilibre entre les politiques budgétaires et les investissements considérables dans la défense du pays. Le pays doit devenir plus autonome sur le plan militaire afin de préserver sa souveraineté et de conserver sa place sur la scène internationale. Le gouvernement de Monsieur Carney doit impérativement respecter les engagements pris par ses prédécesseurs envers le ministère de la Défense nationale. Cela nécessite de renforcer les capacités opérationnelles des forces armées canadiennes en tenant compte des investissements nécessaires permettant de garantir la modernisation des équipements. De plus, il faudrait lancer un plan d’investissement afin d’acquérir  de nouveaux brise-glaces. Cela permettrait de renforcer la flotte actuelle et d’assurer ses engagements en matière de protection des frontières nationales dans la région du Grand Nord arctique, une région qui est soumise à de fortes tensions géopolitiques. Il serait également pertinent de relancer l’étude sur l’implantation du bouclier antimissile dans les zones nécessaires de façon à assurer une protection durable et efficace de la population canadienne face aux nouvelles menaces. Une idée qui pourrait voir le jour à la suite de l’annonce du nouveau partenariat entre le Canada et l’Australie portant sur le développement d’un nouveau radar transhorizon, comme l’a annoncé le nouveau Premier ministre lors de son déplacement au Nunavut. Pour garantir son autonomie militaire vis-à-vis des États-Unis, le gouvernement canadien doit renforcer son industrie d’armements en soutenant les entreprises nationales. Cela permettrait de stimuler la production d’armes sur son territoire et de développer son industrie de productions d’armements afin d’assurer un approvisionnement permanent sans être dépendant de l’industrie américaine ou européenne. Le Canada devrait également renforcer sa collaboration avec d’autres pays alliés afin de se détacher de la domination américaine sur le sujet de la défense du territoire nord-américain. Cette collaboration pourrait inclure l’acquisition d’équipements militaires européens ainsi que le développement d’une coopération internationale en matière de défense des frontières maritimes, notamment dans la région du Grand Nord arctique. Une diversification des moyens matériels de l’armée permettrait d’éviter que le pays soit soumis aux États-Unis, une hypothèse qui permettrait au canada de se tourner vers les marchés européens. Une autre idée serait d’assembler les avions dans les usines du pays, permettant une réduction des coûts ainsi que le développement de l’économie locale en matière d’armement et de défense, une idée qui a été émise par le Premier ministre canadien. Si cette démarche venait à se concrétiser cela serait une véritable avancée vers l’autonomie militaire recherchée par le canada, mais aucunes informations ne nous permettent à ce stade d’affirmer que cela va se réaliser. ## 4 ans de guerre en Ukraine : Quelles perspectives de paix pour la sécurité transatlantique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/4-ans-de-guerre-en-ukraine-quelles-perspectives-de-paix-pour-la-securite-transatlantique/ Modified: 2026-04-20 Ce texte est un compte-rendu de la conférence 4 ans de guerre en Ukraine : Quelles perspectives de paix pour la sécurité transatlantique ? tenue le 23 février 2026 à l’UQAM. Cela fait désormais plus de quatre ans que la guerre russo-ukrainienne a débuté. Durant cette période, les forces ukrainiennes ont tenu le front face à l’armée russe, qui n’est parvenue à conquérir qu’environ 10 % du territoire national. De nombreuses positions stratégiques résistent à l’agression, tandis que les forces russes subissent de lourdes pertes. Aujourd’hui, les avancées russes s’essoufflent, alors que l’Ukraine semble regagner progressivement du terrain sur son adversaire. La guerre ne semble pas près de s’achever. Des deux côtés, les armées maintiennent leur capacité de résistance, et un effondrement militaire — russe ou ukrainien — n’apparaît pas comme une perspective probable à court terme. C’est dans ce contexte que, le 23 février 2026, le Réseau d’analyse stratégique a organisé une journée de conférence afin d’examiner l’état du conflit, les perspectives de négociation de la paix et les enjeux de la sécurité transatlantique — deux des sujets les plus structurants de l’année 2025. Cette journée s’est articulée autour de deux questions centrales : après quatre ans de guerre et au regard des événements de 2025, quelles sont les perspectives de paix pour l’Ukraine ? Et quelles trajectoires se dessinent pour la sécurité et la coopération transatlantiques ? Deux panels thématiques ont été organisés pour y répondre, auxquels s’est ajoutée une présentation sur la réalité du terrain et sur l’essor des drones — véritable révolution dans la conduite de la guerre contemporaine. Perspectives de paix : 2025, une année qui rebat les cartes ? Trois bouleversements majeurs en 2025 L’année 2025 a été marquée par de profonds changements. L’arrivée au pouvoir de Donald Trump a reconfiguré le soutien à l’Ukraine, les perspectives de paix et la dynamique des négociations. Dominique Arel, professeur à l’Université d’Ottawa et directeur de la Chaire d’études ukrainiennes, a identifié trois bouleversements majeurs caractérisant cette année. Premièrement, la décision de Donald Trump de suspendre intégralement l’aide militaire américaine a contraint l’Ukraine à s’approvisionner en armements américains par l’intermédiaire de l’Europe. Deuxièmement, cette rupture a provoqué une prise de conscience au sein des pays membres de l’OTAN, désormais confrontés à l’impossibilité de compter inconditionnellement sur leur allié américain. Troisièmement, une rupture de valeurs s’est consommée entre les États-Unis et les principes fondateurs de l’alliance occidentale. Ces trois transformations ont profondément ébranlé la stabilité de la relation transatlantique et ont complexifié la question du soutien à l’Ukraine. En parallèle, l’année 2025 a été marquée par une multiplication des initiatives de « négociations » de paix portées par Donald Trump et les États-Unis. Des négociations de façade Tout au long de l’année 2025, les rencontres entre représentants russes et américains se sont multipliées afin de discuter d’une sortie de guerre. Cependant, peut-on réellement qualifier ces échanges de négociations ? L’ensemble des panélistes s’est montré profondément sceptique à cet égard. Pour Dominique Arel, il n’a jamais existé de véritables négociations. Les Russes s’adressent aux Américains, qui relaient aux Ukrainiens, mais aucun dialogue direct n’a lieu entre Moscou et Kyiv. Vladimir Poutine semble chercher à négocier en contournant l’Ukraine et l’Europe, bloquant ainsi toute avancée diplomatique substantielle. Il en résulte une impasse : pas de percée diplomatique visible, une Ukraine soumise à une pression américaine croissante, et une Russie qui rejette toute négociation tant qu’elle n’est pas contrainte militairement. Emmanuelle Rousseau, professeure à l’Université du Québec à Montréal, partage ce diagnostic. Les tentatives de négociation ne datent pas de 2025 — elles ont débuté dès les premiers jours du conflit —, mais l’année 2025 en a vu une intensification notable, sous l’impulsion des promesses de campagne de Donald Trump. Deux formats ont émergé : la diplomatie de la navette, dans laquelle les États-Unis jouent le rôle de transmetteur de messages entre Russie et Ukraine, et des pourparlers directs entre les belligérants sous égide américaine. Plusieurs facteurs fragilisent structurellement ces formats. En raison de leur soutien à l’Ukraine, les États-Unis ne peuvent prétendre à une médiation neutre. Par ailleurs, les tentatives d’influence russes à leur égard ont rendu les discussions encore plus biaisées. À cela s’ajoute la stratégie personnaliste de Donald Trump, davantage orientée vers le coup d’éclat diplomatique que vers une efficacité négociatrice réelle. Enfin, les délégués présents n’ont aucun mandat décisionnel, ce qui empêche la construction d’une confiance mutuelle et d’une capacité d’engagement. Sur le plan relationnel, la Russie cherche systématiquement à exclure l’Ukraine des discussions et à saboter toute avancée possible. Selon Emmanuelle Rousseau, ce qui se déroule relève davantage d’une tentative d’imposer une paix non désirée que d’une démarche de négociation authentique. L’opinion publique ukrainienne : entre compromis et résistance Maria Popova, professeure à l’Université McGill, a présenté les résultats de sondages d’opinion portant sur les positions de la population ukrainienne quant aux garanties de sécurité et aux perspectives de paix. Par rapport au début du conflit, les Ukrainiens se montrent aujourd’hui plus enclins à envisager certains compromis, notamment un gel de la ligne de front. Parallèlement, ils attendent des garanties de sécurité concrètes : déploiement de troupes européennes, engagements juridiquement contraignants, etc. Toutefois, l’opposition demeure ferme face aux exigences russes et aux plans de négociation russo-américains. Les concessions territoriales sont jugées inacceptables par une large majorité de la population. Récompenser la Russie risquerait, selon les sondés, de créer une pause temporaire sans pour autant réduire le risque sécuritaire pour l’Ukraine ou l’Europe. Une majorité d’Ukrainiens considère encore que la Russie poursuit un objectif génocidaire ou vise l’annexion totale du territoire et la destruction de l’État ukrainien. Dans ce contexte, une majorité significative reste prête à continuer à résister plutôt qu’à accepter une paix perçue comme défavorable ou précaire. Les perspectives de guerre plutôt que de paix Vincent Tourret, candidat au doctorat à l’UQAM, adopte une perspective similaire. Plutôt que de parler de perspectives de paix, il invite à parler de perspectives de guerre. Aucun des deux belligérants n’envisage réellement de s’engager dans des négociations sérieuses, eu égard à leur rapport respectif à la puissance et à leur théorie de la victoire. Vincent Tourret rappelle que la puissance se comprend selon trois paliers : la ressource (effectifs, capacités industrielles, armements), la puissance effective (ce que le terrain révèle réellement de ces capacités), et la puissance comme paradigme d’action (la manière dont la guerre transforme les mentalités et les moyens). La Russie et l’Ukraine poursuivent le conflit parce que leurs paradigmes d’action respectifs leur permettent encore d’envisager de continuer. La théorie de la victoire ukrainienne repose sur une stratégie d’attrition, tandis que la Russie opère selon une logique de pression maximale. Tant que la guerre demeure perçue comme « faisable » des deux côtés, la paix demeure un horizon lointain. La dronisation, un phénomène inévitable Si les perspectives de guerre restent au cœur des débats, un phénomène a pris une importance considérable dans le conflit : l’essor des drones et la dronisation du champ de bataille. Faine Greenwood, consultante pour Tarentum Consulting LLC, a proposé une analyse de ce phénomène incontournable, dont plusieurs enseignements s’imposent. La guerre en Ukraine a vu un changement de paradigme majeur : les grands drones à longue portée ont cédé la place à des appareils plus petits, moins coûteux et opérés à proximité immédiate du front. Cette approche ascendante — née de l’initiative des unités sur le terrain — a fait des drones des outils polyvalents et indispensables : frappe de l’adversaire, collecte de renseignements pour les autres corps d’armée, soutien logistique. Ces appareils, souvent dérivés du marché civil et adaptés aux besoins militaires, ont transformé la dynamique du combat. Les pilotes de drones sont désormais des cibles prioritaires, tant leur rôle est devenu décisif. Cette révolution a débuté dès les premiers mois du conflit, avec l’utilisation par l’Ukraine de drones FPV kamikazes, rapidement adoptés par la Russie — inaugurant ainsi une situation de jeu du chat et de la souris. En 2024, la Russie a commencé à intégrer la fibre optique pour contourner les systèmes de défense électromagnétique, une évolution qui a marqué les années 2025 et 2026, notamment lors de l’opération ukrainienne Spiderweb. Ces technologies étendent considérablement la zone mortelle sur la ligne de front. Ce phénomène dépasse les frontières du conflit ukrainien : on observe désormais l’utilisation de drones militarisés en Syrie, au Soudan et au Mexique, à des fins variées. Cette révolution remet en cause les paradigmes traditionnels de la guerre contre le terrorisme et impose des enseignements fondamentaux pour les efforts de réarmement des pays alliés Sécurité et coopération transatlantiques : quels enjeux ? L’Europe face au défi du réarmement La guerre en Ukraine a des répercussions profondes sur l’architecture européenne de sécurité. Couplée aux incertitudes de la posture américaine, elle place l’Europe et l’OTAN dans une situation complexe. David Cadier a rappelé les enjeux considérables qui pèsent sur l’Europe, non seulement pendant le conflit, mais surtout à son issue. Si la guerre devait prendre fin, la Russie demeurerait hostile à l’Europe, et son armée, forgée par l’expérience du conflit, serait vraisemblablement plus redoutable qu’en 2022. Or, les pays européens n’en sont qu’aux prémices d’un effort de réarmement. Les défis à relever sont considérables : dissuader la Russie de toute nouvelle agression, assurer la sécurité de l’Ukraine par tous les moyens disponibles, et maîtriser les risques inhérents au réarmement européen lui-même. L’ordre régional évoluera vers la constitution de deux blocs militarisés, ce qui impose de définir avec précision la ligne de démarcation, d’identifier les violations potentielles et de s’y préparer. Les stratégies américaines et leurs conséquences sur l’OTAN Alexander Lanoszka, professeur à l’Université de Waterloo, a exposé les différents scénarios d’évolution de la posture américaine vis-à-vis de l’Europe. Trois grandes options se dessinent. La première est celle d’un partenariat autocratique, dans lequel les États-Unis s’associeraient à la Russie et à la Chine pour se partager des sphères d’influence mondiales. Cette option risquerait de provoquer un sentiment d’abandon chez les membres de l’OTAN, les poussant à s’organiser de manière autonome, tout en créant des fractures au sein de l’alliance. La deuxième option est celle du wedging — une coopération accrue entre Russes et Américains pour faire pression sur la Chine. Le risque d’abandon serait plus modéré, mais les concessions nécessaires à une coopération avec la Russie apparaissent irréalistes, ce qui fragiliserait le projet de réarmement européen. La troisième option est celle d’une posture agressive des États-Unis face à la Chine et à la Russie, susceptible de transformer les alliés européens en zones de confrontation ou en cibles. Dans ce scénario, la dépendance envers Washington diminue grâce au partage du fardeau, mais les désaccords sur la stratégie de confrontation pourraient réduire l’impulsion vers l’autonomie européenne. Ces trois scénarios ont des implications majeures sur la coopération transatlantique et façonneront durablement les relations entre les États-Unis et leurs alliés. L’union européenne face à un changement de paradigme Chantal Lavallée, professeure au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, a souligné le changement de paradigme à l’œuvre au niveau européen. La guerre en Ukraine a conduit l’Union européenne à passer d’une vision libérale à une approche plus réaliste en matière de sécurité. La nécessité de s’investir dans la défense se fait sentir aussi bien au niveau institutionnel que national : augmentation des budgets de défense, levée de tabous, réouverture de débats fondamentaux — y compris en Irlande sur la neutralité et sur la participation au réarmement collectif. Ainsi, l’UE s’engage dans sa propre course au réarmement avec un horizon fixé à 2030, sans pour autant abandonner la trajectoire transatlantique, qui demeure cruciale malgré le développement de capacités autonomes. Pour le Canada, l’intégration au programme SAFE représente une opportunité de renforcer ses liens avec ses partenaires européens. Le Canada face à la recomposition de l’ordre transatlantique Jonathan Paquin, directeur de l’École supérieure d’études internationales, a dégagé quatre points essentiels pour appréhender le futur de la sécurité transatlantique du point de vue canadien. En premier lieu, il convient de revenir sur les transformations en cours au niveau systémique. Avant Trump, l’ordre international reposait sur une logique d’hégémonie libérale centrée sur les États-Unis, qui avait longtemps recueilli l’adhésion de la communauté internationale. À partir du moment où le président américain rejette cette logique, les principes fondamentaux de l’ordre s’effritent, créant une incertitude profonde sur l’avenir du système. Dans ce contexte, l’OTAN est fragilisée. La confiance entre les membres et Washington s’est érodée, à tel point que certains alliés doutent de la solidité des garanties de sécurité offertes par l’alliance. Pour le Canada, cette évolution est particulièrement préoccupante : sa posture de dissuasion a longtemps reposé sur l’OTAN et sur le parapluie nucléaire américain, dans un monde où les États-Unis étaient perçus comme bienveillants. Or, la principale source d’incertitude provient désormais du voisin américain lui-même. Jonathan Paquin exprime de sérieux doutes quant à la capacité et à la volonté des alliés de l’OTAN de défendre le Canada en cas de besoin — la réaction jugée timide de l’alliance face aux déclarations sur le Groenland en est, selon lui, une illustration éloquente. Dès lors, il ne s’agit plus pour le Canada de considérer l’OTAN comme une garantie automatique, mais comme une plateforme de négociation à mobiliser activement avec Washington pour qu’elle continue à servir les intérêts canadiens. La crise actuelle rappelle certes les débats de l’après-guerre froide sur la pertinence de l’alliance, mais l’OTAN a su traverser des crises similaires par le passé, et un effondrement prématuré ne saurait être anticipé. Conclusion En conclusion, les panélistes ont rappelé que les discussions dites « de paix » en cours ne peuvent véritablement prétendre à ce titre. Elles s’apparentent davantage à des tentatives avortées, en raison de l’absence des conditions diplomatiques nécessaires et du rôle biaisé joué par les États-Unis dans ces formats. La capacité des deux belligérants à poursuivre le conflit demeurant intacte, aucun des deux camps ne semble en mesure de se tourner résolument vers une négociation de paix : la logique de continuation des combats prévaut, et du côté ukrainien, c’est avant tout la survie de la nation qui est en jeu. Sur le plan transatlantique, la guerre en Ukraine a profondément reconfiguré les relations internationales, une dynamique encore accélérée par l’arrivée de Donald Trump à la tête des États-Unis en 2025. Tous les intervenants s’accordent toutefois à dire que nous n’en sommes qu’au début d’une transformation d’ampleur, qui redessinera les équilibres transatlantiques et européens pour de nombreuses années à venir. Crédit image: Ministère de la défense de l'Ukraine CC BY-SA 2.0, via Flickr ## Acheteur ou coproducteur ? Le Canada doit choisir ce qu’il fera de l’acquisition de nouveaux sous-marins URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/acheteur-ou-coproducteur-le-canada-doit-choisir-ce-quil-fera-de-lacquisition-de-nouveaux-sous-marins/ Modified: 2026-07-29 En choisissant ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) comme fournisseur privilégié pour le Projet canadien de sous-marins de patrouille, le gouvernement Carney a tranché le plus important dossier d’approvisionnement militaire de l’histoire du pays. La décision, annoncée à Halifax à la veille du sommet de l’OTAN, est défendable au regard des critères que le gouvernement s’était lui-même fixés. Mais il faut le dire clairement : la sélection d’un fournisseur était l’étape la plus facile. Le véritable test — celui qui déterminera si le Canada sera un simple acheteur ou un coproducteur — commence maintenant et se déroulera à la table des négociations. Un choix cohérent avec les critères d’évaluation Ottawa évaluait les deux finalistes — le Type 212CD germano-norvégien et le KSS-III sud-coréen de Hanwha Ocean — selon une grille de pondération révélée par les instructions de soumission : le soutien en service comptait pour 50 % de la note, la plateforme elle-même pour 20 %, la capacité financière du soumissionnaire pour 15 % et les partenariats stratégiques et économiques pour 15 %. Cette grille dit l’essentiel : le gouvernement n’achetait pas d’abord un sous-marin, il achetait 50 ans de disponibilité opérationnelle. Une pondération, certes, ne révèle qu’imparfaitement les priorités réelles d’un programme : celles-ci se logent dans les exigences détaillées, rarement publiques, et lorsque les offres se valent sur les critères les plus lourds, ce sont les critères secondaires qui départagent. La grille n’en demeure pas moins révélatrice des arbitrages qu’Ottawa a choisi d’afficher. C’est la leçon, apprise à la dure, de la classe Victoria, dont un seul exemplaire est aujourd’hui (parfois) opérationnel. Or, c’est sur le critère dominant que l’offre allemande présentait ses avantages les plus structurels. TKMS, qui fournit environ 70 % des sous-marins en service dans l’OTAN, proposait de répliquer sur nos deux côtes le modèle d’installation de maintenance qu’elle bâtit avec la Norvège à Bergen, adossé à un programme trilatéral avec l’Allemagne et la Norvège où systèmes de combat, chaînes d’approvisionnement et doctrines sont déjà normalisés au sein de l’Alliance. Hanwha pouvait certes opposer à cette architecture l’échelle de son chantier de Geoje, une chaîne d’approvisionnement concentrée et l’expertise de Babcock Canada, titulaire du contrat de soutien des Victoria. Mais le pari d’Ottawa semble être qu’un soutien garanti par deux gouvernements alliés vaut davantage, sur un demi-siècle, qu’une chaîne concentrée à un océan de distance. Sur la plateforme (20 %), le 212CD offre des atouts réels pour les besoins canadiens : coque en acier amagnétique, dessin en losange optimisé pour la discrétion acoustique, propulsion anaérobie éprouvée et conception pensée pour les eaux froides. La Corée du Sud, malgré la démonstration convaincante du transit transpacifique du ROKS Ahnmu jusqu’à Victoria, ne pouvait compenser sur les 20 % de la plateforme ce qu’elle concédait sur les 50 % du soutien. En ce qui concerne les partenariats (15 %), TKMS a corrigé le tir après des offres initiales jugées insuffisantes, promettant des retombées équivalentes à la valeur du contrat, une vingtaine de protocoles d’entente avec des entreprises canadiennes (dont CAE et Marmen au Québec) et des investissements connexes, du gaz naturel liquéfié au port de Churchill. Rappelons que cette évaluation bureaucratique ne constituait que l’une des étapes du processus : la décision finale revenait au cabinet. Or, autant la ministre Mélanie Joly que le secrétaire d’État Stephen Fuhr ont insisté sur l’importance qu’ils accordaient aux retombées industrielles et technologiques au Canada. Enfin, les instructions de soumission exigeaient un programme de livraison accéléré : des unités initiales de série éprouvées, livrées au plus tard en 2035, suivies de livraisons intégrant un contenu canadien croissant.  Berlin et Oslo ont à cet égard comblé leur principal retard sur Hanwha par un geste politique fort : céder des sous-marins de leurs propres commandes pour permettre la livraison des quatre premières unités dès 2034. En acceptant de passer après le Canada dans leur propre file d’attente, Berlin et Oslo ont donné un avant-goût de ce que signifie appartenir à un programme trilatéral. Ce à quoi le Canada renonce Toute décision d’approvisionnement est un arbitrage, et celui-ci comporte des renonciations qu’il serait malhonnête de passer sous silence. La plus visible est capacitaire : le KSS-III était doté d’un système de lancement vertical (VLS) offrant des cellules dédiées au tir de missiles de croisière à longue portée. Le 212CD, lui, repose exclusivement sur ses six tubes de 533 mm. Une nuance mérite toutefois d’être précisée : la plateforme est conçue pour mettre en œuvre par ses tubes des missiles antinavires et de frappe terrestre, dont le Naval Strike Missile en version sous-marine (NSM-SL), capable d’engager aussi bien des navires que des cibles côtières, et à terme le missile supersonique 3SM Tyrfing que développent conjointement la Norvège et l’Allemagne. Le Canada ne renonce donc pas à toute capacité de frappe sous-marine, mais à sa profondeur : chaque missile embarqué occupe la place d’une torpille dans un magasin partagé, là où le VLS coréen ajoutait des cellules dédiées permettant le tir en salve — et cela au moment même où les doctrines alliées misent sur la dispersion des feux à longue portée et où nos futurs destroyers de classe River ne compteront que 24 cellules VLS chacun. Cet arbitrage découle de la grille elle-même, dans laquelle Ottawa n’a accordé que 20 % du poids à la plateforme. Un choix assumé par le gouvernement Carney, qui semble avoir privilégié les retombées économiques à la puissance de feu. La seconde renonciation est le risque de développement : le KSS-III est en service actif dans la marine sud-coréenne, avec une chaîne de production chaude. Le 212CD, malgré sa filiation avec le 212A, demeure une conception nouvelle dont aucun exemplaire n’a encore été livré. Le Canada accepte un risque technique et calendaire que l’option coréenne aurait réduit. Ce risque n’a rien d’abstrait : vu l’état opérationnel précaire des Victoria, tout glissement du calendrier de TKMS pourrait interrompre la continuité même des opérations sous-marines canadiennes. L’échéancier accéléré consenti en fin de course devra d’ailleurs être surveillé à l’aune des capacités réelles des chantiers. Enfin, Ottawa renonce à un instrument de diversification vers l’Indo-Pacifique. Un partenariat de plusieurs décennies avec Hanwha aurait arrimé le Canada à la première puissance industrielle de défense de l’Asie démocratique et donné une colonne vertébrale navale à sa Stratégie indopacifique. Le choix allemand consacre plutôt une hiérarchie des théâtres : l’Atlantique Nord et le Pacifique Nord, c’est-à-dire les approches maritimes du continent et l’Arctique, avant la projection lointaine. Cette priorisation n’a rien d’étonnant. C’est dans le corridor Groenland–Islande–Royaume-Uni et sous la banquise que la menace sous-marine russe est la plus directe pour le territoire canadien ; et c’est précisément là que Washington, qui concentre ses propres moyens sur l’Indo-Pacifique, demande à ses alliés de prendre le relais. En préférant un sous-marin conçu pour les hautes latitudes à une plateforme au long rayon d’action pensée pour les ransits océaniques, le Canada assume d’être d’abord une puissance de l’hémisphère nord. C’est d’ailleurs une hiérarchie d’intérêts autant que de théâtres : acheter européen, c’est aussi acquérir du capital politique auprès d’alliés dont Ottawa attend des contreparties, de la sécurité économique à l’accès aux programmes du réarmement européen. Il faut ainsi en mesurer la conséquence : la présence canadienne dans l’Indo-Pacifique reposera davantage sur les frégates (trois navires de guerre déployés par année en rotation, soit rarement plus d’un ou deux sur zone à la fois), quelques avions de patrouille et la diplomatie que sur la flotte sous-marine, un signal que Tokyo, Séoul et Canberra sauront lire. Le revers infligé à une offre coréenne que plusieurs jugeaient imbattable comporte ainsi un coût réputationnel dans la région. Ces renonciations sont réelles, mais elles sont le prix d’avantages tout aussi réels : l’interopérabilité de plein droit avec les marines européennes, une plateforme optimisée pour l’Arctique, et surtout l’arrimage du Canada à l’écosystème de défense européen à un moment où la diversification de nos dépendances stratégiques hors des États-Unis est devenue un impératif national. Le plus difficile reste à négocier Le gouvernement a été clair : TKMS est un fournisseur privilégié, pas encore un contractant. S’ouvrent maintenant de six à dix-huit mois de négociations, et c’est là que se jouera la valeur réelle de cette décision. Car le PDG de TKMS l’a confirmé sans détour : la production des sous-marins se déroulera entièrement en Allemagne, à Kiel et à Wismar. Si le Canada s’en tient à ce point de départ, il aura signé le plus gros chèque de son histoire militaire pour demeurer un client. Or, le gouvernement Carney souhaite faire de cette acquisition un instrument de développement économique. Le principal enjeu des négociations réside donc dans le contenu. Rien ne garantit que le contrat final maximisera le contenu canadien si Ottawa ne l’exige pas. La politique fédérale des retombées industrielles et technologiques (RIT) a montré ses limites. Le Vérificateur général constatait en 2024 que, sur plus de 36 milliards de dollars d’obligations, la Politique était appliquée sans règles claires et que ses retombées précises comme son coût total demeuraient inconnus. Le Directeur parlementaire du budget notait pour sa part que près de la moitié des transactions RIT n’avaient aucun lien avec les approvisionnements concernés et que les PME n’en captaient qu’une part marginale. La prudence s’impose d’autant plus que la littérature sur les compensations industrielles est sévère : leurs retombées économiques déçoivent souvent, même si les investissements de défense peuvent générer des externalités positives dans les économies avancées comme le Canada. Il est donc impératif de renverser la logique : ce n'est pas au fournisseur de choisir où créditer ses obligations, c’est au Canada d’exiger, dès le contrat, les capacités qu’il entend bâtir. Des RIT saupoudrées au gré des intérêts de l’industriel achètent de la conformité, alors que des RIT ciblées ont le potentiel de produire une base industrielle. Deux chantiers sont prioritaires. D’abord, les transferts de production : au-delà des segments de coque confiés à Marmen et des torpilles promises, il faut sécuriser une part croissante de travail réalisé au Canada en la concentrant là où elle est réaliste : insérer des fournisseurs dans une chaîne d’approvisionnement déjà établie relève de l’exception en cours de production. Mieux vaut viser le soutien en service, les mises à niveau de mi-vie et les articles à forte consommation (dont les munitions) qu’un partage de travail artificiel. Ensuite, les transferts technologiques : l’engagement de TKMS à rendre disponibles des « éléments essentiels » de sa propriété intellectuelle sous structures souveraines doit être traduit en droits de données complets, en licences et en capacités d’ingénierie domestiques. Sans naïveté, toutefois : la propriété intellectuelle qu’un industriel consent à céder est rarement sa plus précieuse, et elle ne vaut que si le Canada se dote de la capacité et de la volonté de l’exploiter. C’est ici que le Canada peut transformer une renonciation en occasion. Puisque nous n’assemblerons pas les coques, investissons comme partenaires de développement plutôt que sous-traitants tardifs les créneaux où se joue la guerre sous-marine de demain et où notre base industrielle et scientifique a des atouts : les drones sous-marins autonomes, indispensables à la surveillance de l’Arctique et de nos trois océans ; les capteurs et réseaux d’écoute sous-marins, où l’expertise canadienne en acoustique est reconnue ; les effecteurs et missiles : l’intégration, puis la production sous licence, du NSM-SL et du Tyrfing, où la présence de Kongsberg au cœur du programme ouvre une voie naturelle pour compenser en volume ce que l’absence de VLS coûte en cellules dédiées ; et les systèmes de communication et de commandement fondés sur une intelligence artificielle souveraine, condition de notre autonomie décisionnelle au sein même de l’Alliance. Ces créneaux serviraient doublement le pays : ils renforceraient la défense de notre territoire et positionneraient nos entreprises dans les chaînes de valeur du programme trilatéral et, au-delà, du réarmement européen. *** Le choix de TKMS est un pari raisonné sur l’Europe et sur l’Arctique. Mais un pari ne vaut que par son exécution. Si Ottawa négocie ces contrats avec la même détermination qu’il a mise à courtiser les soumissionnaires, le Canada sortira de ce programme non pas comme un acheteur de douze sous-marins, mais comme un coproducteur doté de créneaux d’expertise durables. C’est à cette aune qu’il faudra juger cette décision historique. Crédit image: JustSomePics via Wikimedia Commons. ## Affaire Vance : pistes de réflexion pour un changement de culture au sein des Forces armées canadiennes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/affaire-vance-pistes-de-reflexion-pour-un-changement-de-culture-au-sein-des-forces-armees-canadiennes/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Une grande organisation comme les Forces armées canadiennes peut-elle transformer sa culture en cinq ans, guidée par un examen externe et animée par un ordre visant à éradiquer l’inconduite sexuelle dans ses rangs? Ce texte est à l'origine un témoignage devant le Comité permanent de la Défense nationale le 26 février 2021, dans le cadre des allégations d'inconduites sexuelles auxquelles fait face l'ancien chef d'état-major de la défense Jonathan Vance. Une grande organisation comme les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) peut-elle transformer sa culture en cinq ans, guidée par un examen externe et animée par un ordre visant à éradiquer l’inconduite sexuelle dans ses rangs ? Cela peut sembler impossible, mais à bien des égards, l’armée, en tant qu’organisation globale, pourrait être mieux adaptée que la plupart des autres organisations lorsqu’il est question de s’adapter rapidement face à l’adversité. Le personnel des FAC est formé pour prendre et exécuter des décisions dans des environnements complexes, alors pourquoi cette réputation d’excellence opérationnelle ne se perpétue-t-elle pas sur le plan organisationnel ? C’est parce que la culture militaire peut avoir des conséquences involontaires, qu’elle peut aussi être exploitée par des prédateurs et qu’elle peut être idéalisée et rendue intouchable par des routines, des traditions et des structures de commandement rigidement hiérarchisées. À l’heure actuelle, les chefs militaires doivent reprendre contact avec le rapport de la responsable de l’examen externe (REE), également connu sous le nom de rapport Deschamps, et réfléchir avec plus d’audace à la mise en œuvre complète de ses recommandations. Cinq ans ne suffisent peut-être pas pour mettre en œuvre un changement culturel profond et transformateur, mais c’est certainement assez long pour révéler les lacunes de l’approche actuelle. À cette fin, voici quatre enjeux spécifiques qui requièrent notre attention : Une plus grande attention portée aux abus de pouvoir. Je fais ici référence à une dynamique sociale qui est liée à l’inconduite sexuelle dans des relations professionnelles très asymétriques. Ce type de pression implicite ou explicite est beaucoup plus endémique et ancré dans la culture que ce qui est actuellement reconnu. Bien que le Sondage sur l’inconduite sexuelle dans les Forces armées canadiennes ait fourni des données utiles, il est nécessaire d’examiner plus en profondeur la manière dont l’inconduite sexuelle est en interaction avec le consentement dans les relations professionnelles asymétriques. Le fait qu’une femme, ou toute personne harcelée, ne s’exprime pas contre un comportement inapproprié ne signifie pas que ce comportement est le bienvenu ou qu’elle donne son consentement. Il existe de nombreuses raisons légitimes de se plier à ces interactions non souhaitées et de garder le silence, dont beaucoup sont exposées dans le rapport Deschamps. Les personnes qui sont plus jeunes ou dans des conditions d’emploi plus précaires craignent pour leur emploi, et elles peuvent craindre d’autres types de conséquences au travail, comme ne pas être crues par leurs pairs ou être socialement ostracisées pour s’être exprimées. Une autre raison de ne pas dénoncer est de ne pas faire confiance au processus de dénonciation ou de ne pas croire que vous obtiendrez un résultat équitable. L’étape suivante consiste à avoir ce discours plus nuancé sur le consentement et aussi sur le consentement lorsque des dynamiques de pouvoir sont en jeu. Certaines de ces dynamiques de pouvoir sont inhérentes à la culture militaire et d’autres concernent le grade et se traduisent par des abus de pouvoir. Ces deux types de dynamique de pouvoir ont un impact disproportionné sur les femmes. Formation. La formation de l’opération HONOUR devrait être améliorée afin d’utiliser les données des sondages de Statistique Canada pour adapter le contenu aux personnes qui suivent la formation. Les informations présentées dans la formation devraient être personnalisées, en indiquant clairement que l’inconduite sexuelle touche des amis et des collègues des forces armées. Les membres des forces armées devraient s’engager et s’entraîner à des scénarios difficiles, afin de savoir quand et comment intervenir. Le ressentiment des militaires (principalement des hommes), qui ont le sentiment d’être injustement visés par l’opération HONOUR, est fréquent et regrettable. En même temps, la formation est trop axée sur l’auteur des faits, alors qu’elle pourrait aborder la culture militaire, la masculinité militarisée, la sous-représentation des femmes, le consentement, les besoins des victimes/survivants, l’autonomisation des spectateurs dans le cadre de petites séances interactives dirigées par une personne qui peut parler de manière authentique du sujet. Des experts externes peuvent apporter leur aide à cet égard, ne serait-ce que pour assurer une procédure d’examen par les pairs des matériels de formation. Le Centre d’intervention sur l’inconduite sexuelle (CIIS). L’une des recommandations les plus discutées de la REE était la nécessité d’une ligne hiérarchique en dehors de la chaîne de commandement, ce qui a conduit à la création du Centre d’intervention sur l’inconduite sexuelle (CIIS) en tant qu’organe indépendant. Il existe une tension inhérente au travail du CIIS en raison de la nature de son mandat : d’une part, le CIIS doit tenir les FAC responsables, mais il doit également avoir de bonnes relations de travail avec les FAC, y compris avec la chaîne de commandement, ce qui pourrait nuire à la perception de l’indépendance du CIIS. Un examen et une surveillance constants du CIIS, à la fois par le biais d’auto-évaluations internes et d’audits externes, pourraient être nécessaires, car la préservation de l’indépendance du CIIS face à son mandat croissant est primordiale. La voie vers la dignité et le respect. Cette stratégie est une approche prometteuse, car elle met la culture et le climat au premier plan (faisant ainsi du changement culturel l’affaire de tous). Bien qu’il soit logique que ce document définisse la culture et le climat, ainsi qu’une série d’indicateurs, il devrait accorder plus d’attention à la description du problème en question : l’inconduite sexuelle et ses liens avec la culture et le climat. Essentiellement, l’ampleur du problème doit être clairement définie avant de se lancer dans les solutions. Un changement de culture doit se traduire par un partage des responsabilités en matière d’inconduite sexuelle. Le pourcentage de membres des FAC qui ont été témoins d’abus sexuels est assez effarant, mais combien de personnes interviennent, prennent la parole, font des rapports ? Si une personne ne commet pas d’inconduite sexuelle, cela ne signifie pas qu’elle accomplit son devoir avec honneur. Le standard de performance est bien plus élevé que cela si vous voulez atteindre la tolérance zéro. C’est la notion de responsabilité collective qui devrait être soulignée avec plus de force tout au long du document, car TOUT LE MONDE peut faire mieux sur ce plan. Il ne s’agit pas de l’obligation de rendre des comptes, mais d’une norme de conduite quotidienne. Le défi à relever ne consiste pas simplement à savoir comment éradiquer l’inconduite sexuelle au sein de l’armée, mais à identifier des mesures positives pour créer une culture d’égalité pour les femmes au sein des FAC, une culture centrée sur le respect de tous et toutes. ## America’s Allies and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/americas-allies-and-the-decline-of-the-u-s-hegemony/ Modified: 2020-10-01 > America's allies and the decline of the U.S. hegemony Il y a 4 ans, Donald Trump promettait de rendre sa grandeur aux États-Unis, « Make America Great Again ». Mais alors qu'il postule pour un nouveau mandat, les experts notent que la perception d'un déclin relatif de l’hégémonie américaine déjà constatée sous le mandat d’Obama s’est accentuée sous la présidence Trump. 14 chercheurs internationaux ont donc analysé comment les alliés des USA anticipaient cette perte d’hégémonie relative. America’s Allies and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony publié en anglais aux éditions britanniques Routledge, est co-dirigé par Justin Massie et Jonathan Paquin. Sylvie Noël s’entretient avec Jonathan Paquin, professeur de science politique à l’Université Laval. Écoutez l'entrevue de Jonathan Paquin sur les ondes de RFI     ## Après AUKUS, des relations franco-américaines à nouveau en ordre de marche ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/apres-aukus-des-relations-franco-americaines-a-nouveau-en-ordre-de-marche/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Si AUKUS a dans sa forme inutilement érodé les liens unissant la France aux États-Unis, cette crise diplomatique aura malgré... « Il y a une forte amitié, un sentiment de loyauté et d'engagement envers la France. Et il n'y a aucun endroit au monde où nous ne pouvons pas travailler ensemble ». Lors d’un échange ouvert à la presse avec le président Macron en amont d’une rencontre attendue à Rome le 29 octobre dernier, le président Biden a employé des mots forts afin de marquer sa volonté de raviver des relations franco-américaines fortement affaiblies. Les deux pays ont traversé des semaines de crise diplomatique après l'annonce surprise, le 15 septembre, de l'AUKUS, un partenariat de sécurité entre les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et l'Australie. La France s’est sentie trahie par un partenariat négocié dans le secret au détriment de ses intérêts dans l'Indopacifique. Paris a réagi fermement en rappelant pour la première fois ses ambassadeurs aux États-Unis et en Australie. Alors que les relations de la France avec Canberra et Londres sont toujours au point mort, Paris et Washington ont toutefois réussi à sortir par le haut de cette crise. Des consultations de haut niveau entre les deux capitales ont permis d’aboutir à une feuille de route ambitieuse ouvrant la voie à une coopération bilatérale et transatlantique renforcée dans des domaines clés allant de l'Indopacifique à la lutte contre le terrorisme et à la sécurité européenne. Si AUKUS a dans sa forme inutilement érodé les liens unissant la France aux États-Unis, cette crise diplomatique aura malgré tout permis de servir d’électrochoc en mettant en lumière certains dysfonctionnements dans la relation transatlantique. La page n’est toutefois pas entièrement tournée. Ces bonnes intentions devront encore se traduire en résultats tangibles et durables. Washington et Paris ont réussi à renverser la vapeur L'annonce de l'AUKUS a entraîné une crise diplomatique sans précédent entre Washington et Paris. Si la colère de la France a d'abord été perçue comme la simple manifestation d’un ego meurtri par la perte d'un contrat lucratif de sous-marins avec Canberra, Washington a rapidement compris que la situation était en réalité bien plus grave. Paris a vécu AUKUS comme une « rupture majeure de confiance », pour reprendre les termes employés par le ministre français des Affaires étrangères, principalement en raison de l'absence totale de consultation de Washington, Canberra et Londres alors même que ce partenariat avait un impact direct sur la stratégie de la France dans la région indopacifique. La Maison-Blanche a pris la mesure de la gravité de la crise et a décidé de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour rétablir une relation de confiance avec la France. À la différence du Royaume-Uni et de l'Australie, l'administration Biden a admis que les discussions relatives à AUKUS auraient dû être gérées différemment à l’égard de la France. À l’issue un premier appel téléphonique le 22 septembre, le président Biden et le président Macron ont convenu que « des consultations ouvertes entre alliés […] auraient permis d’éviter cette situation ». De la même manière, lors de la réunion bilatérale à Rome, le président Biden a reconnu que son administration avait été « maladroite » dans sa gestion d'AUKUS et a ajouté qu'il « avait eu l'impression que la France avait été informée bien en amont ». De son côté, le président français a expliqué que les deux pays ont été en mesure de « clarifier ensemble ce que nous devions clarifier ». Washington a également compris que des engagements tangibles étaient nécessaires pour démontrer sa volonté réelle de réparer et d'améliorer son partenariat avec la France. Au lieu de s'entendre sur des mesures compensatoires éphémères, la France et les États-Unis se sont engagés dans des consultations de haut niveau pendant plusieurs semaines afin d'élaborer des initiatives de long cours. Le secrétaire d'État Antony Blinken et le conseiller à la sécurité nationale Jake Sullivan se sont ainsi rendus à Paris, tandis que le secrétaire à la défense Lloyd Austin a rencontré son homologue française, la ministre des Armées Florence Parly en marge de la ministérielle défense de l’OTAN. La vice-présidente Kamala Harris a également effectué une longue visite de quatre jours en France début novembre à l’occasion du Forum de Paris sur la Paix. Plus de consultations, plus de coopération Ces consultations ont abouti à une déclaration conjointe entre la France et les États-Unis, dans laquelle les deux pays ont souligné le besoin de « mener des consultations et coordonner leurs efforts de manière systématique et approfondie » sur « les mesures et initiatives qui servent leurs intérêts respectifs ». Cet engagement est particulièrement important à la lumière de l’expérience d’AUKUS mais plus généralement compte tenu de la faiblesse des consultations de l’administration Biden à l’égard de ses alliés européens sur des décisions de politique étrangère pourtant stratégiques, comme ce fut le cas pour le retrait américain d'Afghanistan. Cet engagement vers plus de transparence va naturellement dans les deux sens. Comme le souligne la déclaration commune, Paris tiendra les États-Unis « bien informés » de ses priorités pour sa présidence du Conseil de l'Union européenne au cours du premier semestre 2022. Sur la base de cette approche, Paris et Washington ont lancé une série d'initiatives conjointes sur les énergies propres (« Partenariat bilatéral entre la France et les États-Unis sur les énergies propres »), les nouvelles technologies (dialogue bilatéral sur les technologies émergentes), l'espace (dialogue inter-agence sur l’espace), la cybersécurité (avec l'adhésion de Washington à l’«Appel de Paris pour la confiance et la sécurité dans le cyberespace »), et l'accès au marché de la défense et les questions d'exportation (« dialogue stratégique en matière de commerce militaire »). Ces différents dialogues ouvrent des espaces de consultation nécessaires non seulement pour éviter de nouvelles surprises stratégiques comme AUKUS mais surtout pour donner de l’épaisseur et de la substance au partenariat franco-américain. Les deux pays ont également convenu d'intensifier leur coopération militaire au Sahel, au Levant et dans la région indopacifique. Au Sahel, Washington engagera des « ressources supplémentaires » pour soutenir les efforts de lutte contre le terrorisme menés par la France et ses partenaires européens. Au Levant, Paris et Washington poursuivront leurs « efforts militaires en Irak et en Syrie permettant de garantir une défaite durable de Daech ». Ce point est particulièrement important compte tenu de la résilience d’ISIS en Irak. Le président Macron a déjà annoncé en août dernier que les forces françaises resteraient en Irak quel que soit le volume de la présence militaire américaine. Enfin, les États-Unis s’engagent à « accroître leur soutien » aux futurs déploiements aériens et maritimes français et européens dans l'Indopacifique. Un résultat positif pour la France... et l'Europe ? Même si la déclaration est par définition bilatérale, son contenu va au-delà de la relation franco-américaine. Les termes « Europe » ou « européen » sont mentionnés 12 fois dans le texte, presque autant de fois que le mot « France » (14 fois). Si les deux pays soulignent leur soutien inconditionnel à l'OTAN en tant que pilier de la sécurité euro-atlantique, Washington « reconnaît l'importance d'une défense européenne plus forte et plus opérationnelle, qui contribue positivement à la sécurité mondiale et transatlantique et qui soit complémentaire avec l'OTAN ». Washington reconnaît notamment la valeur ajoutée du « renforcement des capacités militaires européennes » et de l’« engagement [opérationnel] des partenaires européens », en particulier au Sahel.  Cette prise de position de l’administration Biden en faveur de l’Europe de la défense est notable alors que Washington a traditionnellement été réticent à soutenir activement et ouvertement les efforts européens en matière de défense de crainte d’une duplication, voire d’une exclusion de l’OTAN. Cette ambiguïté a contribué à alimenter des divisions parmi les Européens, limitant par là leur ambition collective. La déclaration commune reconnaît également l'importance d'une plus grande coopération transatlantique dans la région indopacifique. Alors que le rôle et les intérêts de l'Europe dans la région ont jusqu’à présent été mis au second plan par l'administration Biden comme en témoigne AUKUS, la déclaration souligne la nécessité d'une « solide collaboration » non seulement entre la France et les États-Unis, mais aussi avec les Européens au sens large. Les États-Unis « saluent » en particulier la stratégie indopacifique de l'Union européenne, publiée le lendemain de l'annonce de l'AUKUS. Washington et Bruxelles ont par ailleurs récemment convenu de tenir des consultations pour explorer les moyens d'approfondir leur coopération dans l'Indopacifique. Encore un long chemin à parcourir La réunion Biden-Macron a réussi à tourner la page de la crise provoquée par AUKUS et a abouti à une feuille de route solide pour renforcer les relations franco-américaines. Cependant, ce succès pourrait être éphémère s'il n'est pas suivi de résultats tangibles et d’une coordination soutenue entre Paris et Washington. Comme l'a souligné le président français, la rencontre de Rome constitue « l’amorce d’un processus de confiance que nous bâtissons ensemble et qui va se traduire par une coopération renforcée ». Ces liens franco-américains plus forts doivent également s'inscrire dans une dynamique plus large visant à accroître la coopération transatlantique par le biais de l'OTAN ou de la coopération entre l’UE et les États-Unis. Ceci est d'autant plus important que les deux organisations sont actuellement en train de travailler à une nouvelle déclaration conjointe et développent leurs stratégies pour les années à venir avec la boussole stratégique de l’UE et l’actualisation du concept stratégique de l’OTAN. La boussole stratégique, dont l’adoption est prévue en mars 2022, fixera le niveau d’ambition des Européens en matière de sécurité et de défense, y compris lorsqu’il s’agit de la coopération UE-OTAN. Dix ans après Lisbonne, le nouveau concept stratégique de l’OTAN, attendu pour le sommet de Madrid en juin 2022, devra également prendre en compte la montée en puissance européenne et penser l’articulation de son action avec celle de l’UE. Une dernière condition de réussite sera la relance des relations entre la France, le Royaume-Uni et l'Australie. Il sera essentiel de rétablir des rapports de confiance ainsi qu’une coopération solide en matière de défense et de sécurité entre ces pays. C'est une tâche difficile au regard des tensions politiques vives entre ces pays, tout particulièrement lorsqu’il s’agit de la relation franco-britannique. Mais ce travail est essentiel compte tenu des défis communs que ces pays doivent affronter. La sortie de crise réussie engagée par Paris et Washington pourrait servir d’inspiration. Ce texte est inspiré d’un article de l’auteur publié en anglais par le Center for Strategic and International Studies : cliquez ici pour le consulter. Pierre Morcos est chercheur invité au Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington DC). ## Assurer la sécurité économique de l’Union européenne : une révolution du modèle européen URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/assurer-la-securite-economique-de-lunion-europeenne-une-revolution-du-modele-europeen/ Modified: 2024-02-27 > Après trente années de coexistence somme toute pacifique entre la sphère économique et la sphère géopolitique (1990-2020), la première est... Après trente années de coexistence somme toute pacifique entre la sphère économique et la sphère géopolitique (1990-2020), la première est rattrapée par la seconde du fait du retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances. Celle-ci se déroule dans un cadre jusqu’alors inconnu du fait de deux caractéristiques essentielles : premièrement un niveau d’interdépendance économique et technologique mondial jamais atteint et deuxièmement une contrainte commune de transition climatique impliquant à la fois coordination pour yrépondre et concurrence accrue pour l’accès aux ressources rares nécessaires. Dans ce contexte, la « stratégie européenne en matière de sécurité économique », publiée le 20 juin 2023 par la Commission européenne et le Haut représentant pour les affaires étrangères et de sécurité, pose les enjeux de la compétition mondiale en cours pour le modèle européen, et offre aux États membres les axes d’une adaptation de l’Union européenne pour y répondre dans la durée. L’importance de cette stratégie est encore renforcée par le discours sur l’état de l’Union prononcée par la présidente de la Commission européenne, Madame Ursula von der Leyen, à Strasbourg, le 13 septembre 2023, qui a employé l’expression de « sécurité économique » pour la première fois dans ce type d’intervention. Qu’est-ce que la « sécurité économique » ? Au début des années 2000, l’expression est liée à l’économie du bien-être, avec, en son centre, le travail : la notion reflète le degré de protection économique des personnes contre les risques de perte de leurs revenus (chômage, maladie, retraite). Ainsi, en 2004, le Bureau international du travail (BIT) consacrait à la question un rapport intitulé « La sécurité économique pour un monde meilleur », dont le titre ne manquera pas de faire sourire l’analyste stratégique vingt ans plus tard. L’étude montrait une corrélation entre bonheur des individus et « degré de sécurité du revenu, mesuré en termes de protection du revenu et de minimisation des inégalités ». Protection sociale et nature des contrats de travail étaient au cœur de la réponse possible à l’insécurité économique. Qu’en est-il des débats actuels dans un contexte de compétition accrue entre grandes puissances ? Nous ne sommes pas si éloignés que cela de la définition d’origine : elle s’applique simplement à des États entiers et non plus seulement à des individus. En fait, quel est le « degré de protection économique d’un État contre les risques de perte de ses revenus pris comme la somme des activités économiques se déroulant sur son territoire » ? Telle est ma proposition de définition. Mais quelle signification prend-t-elle dans le cadre unique de l’Union européenne ? La Commission européenne a vocation à se saisir des questions économiques, placées au cœur de ses compétences exclusives et partagées. Toutefois, si l’économie lui revient de droit, la sécurité reste le domaine de compétence des États membres, la politique de sécurité et de défense commune s’étant développée dans un cadre intergouvernemental au sein duquel la Commission n’est pas habilitée à émettre des propositions seule. Cette stratégie de sécurité économique européenne, au-delà de ses conséquences opérationnelles immédiates, soulève donc une puissante interrogation sur le modèle européen tel qu’il existe aujourd’hui : est-il adapté à cette nouvelle donne ? En intégrant l’économie à la sécurité nationale, la compétition sino-américaine remet en cause les équilibres de la construction européenne établis en 1957 et pose la problématique de la redéfinition des rôles et des responsabilités au sein de l’Union européenne. Nous développerons dans un premier temps le contexte dans lequel s’inscrit l’élaboration de cette communication conjointe, puis nous en analyserons les différents éléments avant d’en présenter la pleine portée pour l’Union européenne et ses États membres. ...   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## Atelier de formation pour les concours de bourses du CRSH, à la maîtrise et au doctorat URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/atelier-de-formation-pour-les-concours-de-bourses-du-crsh-a-la-mai%cc%82trise-et-au-doctorat/ Modified: 2020-11-13 > Atelier de formation pour les concours de bourses du CRSH, à la maîtrise et au doctorat Atelier de formation pour les concours de bourses du CRSH, à la maîtrise et au doctorat Avec : Véronique Gilbert (Agente de politique au Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) ; Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal). ## Atelier de préparation au programme de recrutement d’agents des politiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/atelier-de-preparation-au-programme-de-recrutement-dagents-des-politiques/ Modified: 2020-11-17 > Atelier de préparation au programme de recrutement d’agents des politiques du Ministère de la Défense. Atelier de préparation au programme de recrutement d’agents des politiques du Ministère de la Défense Avec Anthony Ippolito (Gestionnaire, Programme de recrutement d’agents des politiques au Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) ## Atelier pratique sur l’écriture de notes politiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/atelier-pratique-sur-lecriture-de-notes-politiques/ Modified: 2020-11-16 > Avec Cecily Pantin (Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada), Namercia Dos Santos (Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) et Thomas Juneau (Université d’Ottawa) Atelier pratique sur l’écriture de notes politiques Avec : Cecily Pantin (Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) Namercia Dos Santos (Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) Thomas Juneau (Université d’Ottawa) ## Attaque du Hamas contre Israël : qu’est-ce que cela rapporte à l’Iran ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/attaque-du-hamas-contre-israel-quest-ce-que-cela-rapporte-a-liran/ Modified: 2023-11-16 > Quelques heures à peine après la spectaculaire razzia menée par le Hamas en franchissant la frontière israélienne le samedi 7 octobre, les yeux de nombreux experts se tournaient déjà vers la République islamique d’Iran. Quelques heures à peine après la spectaculaire razzia menée par le Hamas en franchissant la frontière israélienne le samedi 7 octobre, les yeux de nombreux experts se tournaient déjà vers la République islamique d’Iran. Le choc de l’incursion dans le territoire israélien, l’ampleur et la sophistication de l’opération ont amené plusieurs d’entre eux à douter qu’elle ait pu être entièrement planifiée et coordonnée par l’organisation dirigée par Ismail Haniyeh, sans intervention extérieure. Alors que les autorités iraniennes applaudissaient les attaques menées par les commandos palestiniens, plusieurs ont émis l’hypothèse que l’Iran pouvait être derrière cette action terroriste sans précédent. Au-delà du degré d’implication du régime iranien dans l’opération « Déluge d’Al-Aqsa », qu’il est encore difficile de déterminer avec certitude, il convient aussi de se poser les questions suivantes : dans quelle mesure les Mollahs et les Gardiens ont-ils intérêt à cette brusque flambée de violence au Proche-Orient et quelles pourraient être les conséquences à plus long terme d’un regain des tensions avec Israël et ses alliés ? Soupçons d’implication directe Le niveau de planification et d’expertise requis pour une telle attaque a soulevé la question de savoir si le Hamas a agi seul – et celle de savoir si le mouvement palestinien a reçu de l’aide de son soutien de longue date dans la région, l’Iran. Alors que les premières images de l’opération défilaient sur les écrans du monde entier, le Wall Street Journal s’empressait d’affirmer que des officiers du Corps des Gardiens de la révolution islamique (CGRI), l’armée idéologique de la République islamique, avaient préparé, avec le Hamas, les incursions aériennes, terrestres et maritimes sur le territoire israélien et qu’ils avaient personnellement donné le feu vert le lundi précédent l’opération. Au cours du week-end fatidique, en marge d’une rencontre franco-allemande à Hambourg, le président Emmanuel Macron a estimé « vraisemblable » que le Hamas ait bénéficié d’« aides » dans son opération contre Israël. « Je n’ai pas de commentaire à faire sur une implication directe de l’Iran dont nous n’avons pas la trace de manière formelle », a-t-il néanmoins ajouté. De fait, Téhéran a été l’une des toutes premières capitales à saluer l’audacieuse opération lancée par le Hamas, un mouvement que la République islamique défend et finance ouvertement depuis de nombreuses années. « L’Iran soutient la légitime défense de la nation palestinienne », a déclaré dès le lendemain de l’attaque le président Ebrahim Raïssi : « Le régime sioniste et ses partisans [...] doivent être tenus pour responsables dans cette affaire ». Pour sa part, l’ayatollah Ali Khamenei, la plus haute autorité du pays, a surenchéri en déclarant que : « Ce régime usurpateur est un cancer qui sera sûrement éradiqué par le peuple palestinien ». Une semaine avant l’attaque, le Guide suprême iranien et le président de la République avaient conjointement conjuré les pays arabes de ne pas pactiser avec Israël pour assurer leur sécurité en ajoutant que le faire reviendrait à « miser sur le mauvais cheval ». Lors de sa visite au Liban au début du mois de septembre, le ministre des Affaires étrangères iranien, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, avait rencontré des responsables du Hezbollah libanais, du Hamas et du Djihad islamique palestinien. Le chef de la diplomatie iranienne avait alors réitéré à ces forces de l’« axe de la résistance » - une alliance politique et militaire informelle anti-occidentale, anti-israélienne, anti-saoudienne et pro-iranienne - la promesse de l’appui indéfectible de Téhéran. En avril, le haut dirigeant politique du Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, s’était déjà rendu à Beyrouth pour rencontrer Hassan Nasrallah, allié de longue date de Téhéran et secrétaire général de l’organisation chiite Hezbollah lui-même armé et financé depuis 1982 par les Gardiens de la révolution islamique. ... Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## Au-delà de l’approbation de l’adhésion de la Finlande et de la Suède à l’OTAN : que comprendre de l’approche instable de la Turquie vis-à-vis de l’Alliance ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/au-dela-de-lapprobation-de-ladhesion-de-la-finlande-et-de-la-suede-a-lotan-que-comprendre-de-lapproche-instable-de-la-turquie-vis-a-vis-de-lalliance/ Modified: 2023-11-10 > À la suite de l'invasion russe de l'Ukraine, la Finlande et la Suède ont annoncé en mai 2022 leur intention de rejoindre l'OTAN... À la suite de l'invasion russe de l'Ukraine, la Finlande et la Suède ont annoncé en mai 2022 leur intention de rejoindre l'OTAN. Ces candidatures historiques avaient rencontré une forte opposition de la part de la Turquie, qui accusait les deux pays nordiques d'abriter des personnes ayant des liens avec le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), qu’Ankara a qualifié de « groupe terroriste ». Comme condition supplémentaire à son soutien, la Turquie a également exigé que les deux pays mettent fin à leurs « embargos sur les armes » contre Ankara. Ils n’ont pas officiellement interdit l'exportation d'équipements militaires vers la Turquie, mais aucun des deux pays n'a délivré de licences d'exportation après qu’Ankara ait lancé une offensive terrestre contre la milice kurde syrienne YPG en 2019. Toutefois, l’année dernière, la Suède et la Finlande ont signé un mémorandum trilatéral avec la Turquie dans le but de répondre à ses préoccupations. En conséquence, seule la Finlande a réussi à obtenir la ratification par Ankara de son adhésion à l'OTAN plus tôt cette année. La Suède, en revanche, a continué de faire face à l'opposition de la Turquie jusqu'à ce qu'Erdogan annonce lors du sommet de l'OTAN à Vilnius qu'Ankara soutiendrait sa demande d'adhésion à l'alliance. Mais avant ce changement de décision, il a déclaré que Bruxelles devait ouvrir la voie à l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union européenne avant qu’elle n’approuve la demande de la Suède d’adhésion à l'OTAN. Ce lien soudain entre la candidature de la Suède à l'OTAN et l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'UE pourrait-il être le véritable motif derrière la position initiale d'Ankara à l'égard des deux pays ? Si c’est le cas, comment ce motif aide-t-il à comprendre la dynamique des positions de la Turquie au sein de l'alliance ? Et quelles sont ses implications pour l'avenir de l'alliance ? Le revirement d'Erdogan au sujet de la candidature de la Suède à l'OTAN Outre la signature de l'accord trilatéral, la Suède a déployé d’importants efforts pour répondre aux préoccupations d'Ankara. Ces efforts vont de l’extradition d’un partisan du PKK à l’ouverture d’enquêtes sur le financement du terrorisme et à la coopération avec les forces de l'ordre turques afin de suivre les activités des personnes ayant des liens avec le PKK en Suède. Malgré ces efforts, la Turquie a continué de s’opposer à l'adhésion de la Suède jusqu'à ce qu'Erdogan sorte une nouvelle carte dans son jeu en exhortant ses alliés à « d'abord, ouvrir la voie à la Turquie au sein de l'Union européenne, puis nous ouvrirons la voie à la Suède, comme nous l'avons fait pour la Finlande ». Cela peut être considéré comme un chantage stratégique duquels Erdogan est un habitué, étant donné qu’il a rapidement changé d'avis et a annoncé son soutien à la Suède après avoir obtenu certaines assurances des États-Unis concernant les F-16 et du Canada concernant les embargos sur les armes. Selon Middle East Eye, l'accord d'Ankara avec les États-Unis comprenait « 40 nouveaux avions et kits pour rénover 79 des F-16 existants de la Turquie, ainsi que 900 missiles air-air et 800 bombes ». Le Canada n'a pas encore décidé de lever ses mesures de contrôle des exportations à l’encontre de la Turquie, mais a accepté de rouvrir les pourparlers qui pourraient conduire à leur levée. Bien que ces assurances soient importantes pour Ankara, elles sont loin d'être son objectif. Et le revirement rapide au sujet de l’adhésion de la Suède montre que les problèmes liés au terrorisme pourraient ne pas être le véritable motif de l'objection de la Turquie depuis le début. Ce que la Turquie voulait, c'était mettre en lumière ses problèmes d'adhésion à l'UE, même si elle n'exigeait pas une reprise immédiate des négociations d'adhésion (qui sont au point mort depuis 2018) en échange de l'adhésion de la Suède. En d'autres termes, ce que la Turquie essayait probablement d'insinuer, mais qu'elle n'avait pas admis dès le départ, c'est qu'elle ne pouvait pas accepter la Finlande et la Suède au sein de l'OTAN à moins d'obtenir des concessions à la hauteur de la frustration qu'elle « ressent » concernant son adhésion à l'UE qui est au point mort. La raison pour laquelle Ankara n'a pas évoqué ce motif au début de son opposition aux deux pays, c'est, qu'en faisant cela, elle risquerait de ne pas être prise au sérieux ou de ne pas pouvoir obtenir de concessions de la part des différentes parties. Selon Asli Aydintasbas, membre d’« European Council on Foreign Relations » (cité par Wall Street Journal), « qu'il s'agisse de quelque chose que les Européens donnent, que les États-Unis donnent ou que la Suède donne, j'ai l'impression qu'Erdogan ne laissera pas passer cela sans obtenir quelque chose en retour ». Même une députée suédoise, Amineh Kakabaveh, semble avoir compris le motif d'Ankara en déclarant en 2022 qu’« Erdogan veut avoir des contacts avec Biden. Il veut avoir des contacts avec les pays de l'UE ». Ankara pourrait également craindre, en avançant prématurément ce motif qui sous-tendait sa réaction, de susciter des réactions de désapprobation ou qui rendraient sa préoccupation illégitime, comme celles (après la déclaration précédente d'Erdogan) de Dana Spinant, porte-parole de la Commission européenne, qui a déclaré « Vous ne pouvez pas lier les deux processus », ou le secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg, qui a souligné que les relations de la Turquie avec l'UE n’étaient « pas une question qui concern l'OTAN, mais une question qui concern l'Union européenne ». Donc, si Ankara a fini par jouer la carte de l'UE sans craindre de réactions, c'est parce qu'elle avait progressé dans ses négociations avec les États-Unis pour obtenir des concessions sur les F16, et il serait devenu nécessaire d’évoquer ce motif pour rendre ces négociations plus concluantes. En d’autres termes, la Turquie a fait le choix stratégique de mettre en avant en premier lieu ses préoccupations concernant le terrorisme et les embargos sur les armes dans le but d'obtenir des concessions, d'abord de la Finlande et de la Suède par le biais de leur mémorandum trilatéral, puis des États-Unis et du Canada, avant de revenir au véritable motif qui est la question d'adhésion à l'UE. Ankara a même fait en sorte que la Suède montre son « soutien » aux « efforts visant à revitaliser le processus d'adhésion de la Turquie à l'UE, y compris la modernisation de l'union douanière UE-Turquie et la libéralisation des visas ». Mais comment l’objection initiale d’Ankara s'enracine-t-elle dans une sorte de frustration qu'elle a rencontrée dans ses relations avec l'Occident et/ou l'UE ? La vocation occidentale de longue date de la Turquie et sa frustration Les relations de la Turquie avec l'Occident, si elles ne sont pas encore stériles, tardent à être profitables. En réalité, selon un sondage réalisé par Metropoll en janvier 2022, la Chine et la Russie ont dépassé les États-Unis et l'Union européenne dans les sondages évaluant la sympathie du peuple turc vis-à-vis de ces différents États. Même à la suite de l'invasion russe de l'Ukraine, un autre sondage en mars a montré que 33,7% des Turcs estimaient que la Russie était responsable de la guerre, tandis que 48,3% tenaient les États-Unis et l'OTAN pour responsables. Ce fait pourrait résulter du sentiment anti-occidental qui règne dans le pays. La montée de ce sentiment a été attribuée aux discours anti-occidentaux d'Erdogan présentant l'Occident comme complotant contre l'ensemble du pays. Pendant ce temps, la question de l'occidentalisation de la Turquie, en particulier son adhésion à l'UE, reste un objectif majeur pour l'opinion publique et les élites politiques turques. D'après le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères turc, « le peuple turc continue de soutenir fortement l'adhésion à l'UE. Le soutien de l'opinion publique est le véritable moteur de nos efforts de réforme. » La plupart des jeunes Turcs bénéficieraient de l’adhésion de la Turquie à l'UE. Pour certains d'entre eux, cette intégration dans l'UE, si elle est accompagnée d’une adhésion à l'espace Schengen, serait une solution intéressante au chômage dans le pays, car ils pourraient se rendre sans visa dans les pays de l'Union Schengen offrant de meilleures opportunités d'emploi. Le processus d'adhésion de la Turquie à l'UE est plus long pour de nombreuses raisons, principalement en raison de la législation nationale qui devrait être adoptée après les réformes initiales, ce qui constitue paradoxalement un obstacle à l'intégration. De plus, on peut s'attendre à ce que certains membres de l'UE, comme la France et l'Allemagne, ne souhaitent pas que la Turquie rejoigne l'UE car cela pourrait s'opposer à la promotion de leurs préférences politiques. Une autre raison est que certains pays de l'UE pourraient envisager de bloquer l'adhésion de la Turquie pour protéger leur économie d'une « main-d'œuvre bon marché ». Mais lorsqu’on sait que la Turquie a officiellement demandé de pouvoir adhérer à l'UE en 1987, l'attente et l’incertitude sont susceptibles de créer de la frustration. Cette frustration peut être un élément clé pour comprendre la raison derrière la position initiale de la Turquie à l'égard de la Suède et de la Finlande, qui ne sont pas la cible directe. La Turquie instrumentalise l'adhésion des deux pays pour obtenir davantage d'attention et de concessions de la part de l'Occident et/ou de l'OTAN qui négligent les intérêts (de sécurité) nationaux turcs. Par exemple, la Turquie a été confrontée à l'opposition de certains pays occidentaux et/ou alliés de l'OTAN sur des questions clés liées à son adhésion à l’UE, aux litiges maritimes avec la Grèce, aux conflits en Syrie, en Libye et dans le Haut-Karabakh, etc. Un autre objectif lié à la tentative turque de bloquer les deux pays nordiques était d’obtenir des concessions des États-Unis, en particulier l'achat d'avions de combat, y compris le programme F35 duquel elle avait été exclue. Tous ces développements ont façonné la politique étrangère compétitive actuelle de la Turquie d'une manière qui a un impact important sur ses relations avec l'Occident et ses alliés de l'OTAN. Ces ambitions concurrentielles sont essentiellement ancrées dans une vision « néo-ottomane ». Bien loin d'être une illusion, cette vision pourrait être un autre moyen de croire qu'une Turquie moderne reflétant la gloire de l'Empire ottoman est encore possible. Depuis les années 2000, Ankara a renforcé son influence économique, diplomatique et socioculturelle à travers le Moyen-Orient, les Balkans, le Caucase, l'Amérique latine, l'Asie centrale, l'Afrique, etc. Cette augmentation de son influence internationale constitue un changement de cap par rapport aux efforts de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, qui visaient principalement à institutionnaliser une Turquie moderne ancrée dans un système de valeurs « occidental ». En revanche, au cours des dernières années, la Turquie s’est concentrée sur son engagement dans son environnement proche, au Moyen-Orient, en restaurant ses relations avec les États arabes. Cet engagement « néo-ottoman » dans la politique étrangère turque peut être attribuée à l’identité « islamiste » du parti au pouvoir d'Erdogan, ainsi qu’à certaines idées avancées par Ahmet Davutoğlu, un universitaire devenu ministre des Affaires étrangères (2009-2014), puis Premier ministre (2014-2016). Son livre de 2001 intitulé « Profondeur stratégique » continue de façonner la politique étrangère de la Turquie, même s'il est plus modéré qu'Erdogan et qu’il ne fait plus partie du régime. Davutoğlu a proposé une expansion de l'influence turque dans le monde entier, en particulier dans les zones d'influence précédentes de l'Empire ottoman. Il souhaitait que la Turquie retrouve sa place de choix et occupe une position centrale dans le système international digne de ses jours de gloire de l'Empire ottoman. Il voulait également que la Turquie considère le Moyen-Orient comme sa sphère d'influence pour s'affirmer progressivement comme une grande puissance sur la scène politique internationale. Cette trajectoire de politique étrangère, tout en aidant la Turquie à réaliser qu'elle a perdu son enthousiasme de l'époque de la « guerre froide » avec l'Occident, incite Ankara à adopter une approche concurrentielle et presque sans négociation avec ses alliés occidentaux. Ankara peut acquérir les capacités nécessaires pour faire avancer son programme, comme dans le cas de l'acquisition du système S-400 russe. Ainsi, l'Occident et/ou l'OTAN doivent repenser leurs relations avec la Turquie pour éviter le risque d'un éventuel cheval de Troie au sein de l'alliance. La réhabilitation des relations turco-occidentales/européennes : une opportunité pour une Turquie plus « alliée » au sein de l'OTAN Malgré certaines de ses positions controversées, la Turquie reste un membre important de l'OTAN, non seulement en ce qui concerne ses potentialités géographiques, mais aussi en ce qui concerne sa capacité à coopérer avec les « rivaux » de l'Alliance. Il est important que les alliés de l'OTAN ne perdent pas de vue l'atout incroyable que la Turquie pourrait représenter pour permettre à l'Alliance de s'engager et de réussir certaines négociations ou coopération potentielles avec des pays tels que la Russie, l'Iran, etc. Il convient de souligner le rôle joué par la Turquie aux côtés des Nations Unies dans la signature de l'accord sur l'exportation de céréales ukrainiennes par la mer Noire, un exploit que l'Occident ou l'OTAN n'aurait peut-être pas été capable de réaliser en raison de leur position claire dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne. Cela dit, l'Occident ou les alliés de l'OTAN, y compris les décideurs politiques canadiens, doivent repenser leurs relations avec la Turquie de manière à donner la priorité à la recherche d'un compromis et à l’engagement mutuel avec Ankara. La réorientation de cette relation implique également de prendre en compte les préoccupations pertinentes et nécessaires susceptibles de déclencher le mécontentement de la Turquie au sein de l'Alliance. Cela peut ouvrir la voie à une sorte d'équité qui aiderait Ankara à atteindre certains de ses objectifs et, essentiellement, à raviver des sentiments plus positifs envers l'OTAN et/ou l'Occident. Autrement dit, le soutien des alliés européens à ce changement de cap sera très important pour l'Occident et/ou l'OTAN afin d'éviter cinq années supplémentaires de tensions avec le régime d'Erdogan. Cela s’applique également à la Turquie, car l'UE a de sérieuses préoccupations concernant la détérioration continue de la démocratie, de l'État de droit, des droits fondamentaux et de l'indépendance de la justice, auxquelles Ankara n'a pas encore remédié. La Turquie doit profiter d'une réorientation de ses relations avec l'Occident pour améliorer sa réputation actuelle et renforcer la confiance des investisseurs occidentaux dans son économie en difficulté, afin de pouvoir accélérer son processus d'adhésion à l'UE et attirer davantage l'attention de ses homologues alliés de l'OTAN, en particulier les Européens. Cela implique également de faire preuve de bonne foi et de coopérer davantage que chercher la compétition au sein de l'alliance.   Remerciements Cette recherche a été soutenue par une subvention du programme « Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) » du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada.     ## AUKUS : Un nouveau partenariat de l’anglosphère pour développer des capacités sous-marines nucléaires URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/aukus-un-nouveau-partenariat-de-langlosphere-pour-developper-des-capacites-sous-marines-nucleaires/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Un nouveau partenariat conjoint en matière de défense liera les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et l’Australie dans ce qui est déjà appelé... Un nouveau partenariat conjoint en matière de défense liera les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et l’Australie dans ce qui est déjà appelé l’AUKUS (Australie-UK-US). L’objectif poursuivi par les trois alliés est de permettre le partage d’informations, de technologies et de savoir-faire dans des domaines comme l’intelligence artificielle, la cyber sécurité, les systèmes sous-marins et les capacités de frappes longue distance. L’objet central du partenariat est cependant le domaine nucléaire, principalement le développement de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. Les États-Unis ont depuis longtemps fait le choix de posséder une flotte sous-marine non conventionnelle, qui jouit de plusieurs avantages sur les modèles conventionnels propulsés au diesel. Ils possèdent un plus grand rayon d’action, sont plus silencieux et peuvent transporter une charge utile plus importante. La Grande-Bretagne a aussi procédé à ce changement dans les années 1960. Elle prévoyait d’ailleurs récemment le renouvellement d’une partie de sa flotte. Jusqu’à maintenant, seule l’Australie n’opérait donc pas cette technologie. C’est un changement significatif de sa politique de défense et qui risque d’alimenter la course aux armements dans la région. Canberra justifie justement le passage à une flotte non conventionnelle par la détérioration de l’environnement stratégique, même si l’annonce tripartite ne mentionne pas explicitement la Chine. Nul doute que la perspective d’une plus grande interopérabilité avec ses alliés motive grandement ce choix. Cette annonce signifie que Canberra annulera le projet d’acquisition de 12 sous-marins conventionnels qu’elle avait signé avec le Groupe Naval français. En planification depuis 2009, l’achat avait été vivement critiqué, entre autres pour ses dépassements de coûts, dans ce qui s’avérait comme le plus coûteux achat d’armement de l’histoire de l’Australie — 90 milliards de dollars. Des négociations avaient d’ailleurs eu lieu l’hiver dernier entre les gouvernements australien et français afin de sauver l’entente. La source du problème s’avérait être la volonté de voir les sous-marins être construits en Australie, elle qui avait mis sur pied des infrastructures dédiées afin de construire sa flotte précédente. Des spéculations avançaient que le choix du modèle français s’expliquait parce que celui-ci était la version conventionnelle du sous-marin nucléaire opéré par la marine française, laissant donc la possibilité à Canberra d’opter pour ce même modèle durant le projet. L’Australie acquerra plutôt au moins huit sous-marins, dont le type n’a pas encore été divulgué. Il est probable qu’il s’agisse de sous-marins d’attaque polyvalents, mais l’importance accordée par l’Australie au développement de capacités de frappes longue distance pourrait signifier qu’elle cherchera aussi à se procurer des sous-marins lanceurs de missiles balistiques. Les alliés ont par ailleurs confirmé que la flotte sera construite dans le sud de l’Australie. Ce choix amène plusieurs questions. Par exemple, on ne connait toujours pas la chronologie du projet, alors que la flotte de sous-marins australiens actuellement en service doit être décommissionnée dans la décennie 2030. Afin d’éviter une perte de capacités de défense sous-marine, Canberra et Washington se seraient entendus pour stationner des sous-marins américains à la base navale de Perth. La manière dont les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne entendent partager la technologie nucléaire avec leur allié demeure également ouverte. Rien de précis n’a été dévoilé, mais cet aspect représente un défi de taille pour l’Australie. Bien qu’elle soit la troisième exportatrice mondiale d’uranium, le pays ne possède aucune centrale nucléaire et reste le seul État du G20 où cette énergie est bannie par une loi fédérale. Le développement des infrastructures nécessaires à une flotte nucléaire fera nécessairement augmenter le coût total du programme, sur lequel rien n’a été dit. Bien que la Chine soit pour l’instant absente des annonces officielles, la nouvelle s’inscrit dans une stratégie de contrepoids face à cette dernière et se veut une réponse à sa récente diplomatie vindicative dans la région. La montée en puissance de la Chine motivait d’ailleurs autant la mise à jour de la stratégie de défense australienne que le basculement britannique vers la région Indopacifique. Cette annonce fait également suite à une montée des tensions entre Beijing et Washington, entre autres sur la question de l’indépendance de Taiwan, qui serait symptomatique d’une nouvelle guerre froide. Quoi qu’il en soit, ce partenariat annonce un changement important dans l’équilibre des forces en Indopacifique. L’absence du Canada dans ce nouveau partenariat en a fait sourciller plusieurs, qui considèrent que le pays s’est fait mettre de côté. Effectivement, Ottawa coopère déjà étroitement avec Washington, Londres et Canberra à travers le Groupe des cinq. Par ailleurs, le Canada vient de lancer le programme de renouvellement de ses sous-marins, et aurait donc pu profiter de ce genre de collaboration. Comment alors expliquer la situation ? Du côté canadien déjà, le pays a historiquement évité de s’engager de cette manière dans la région Indopacifique. Si les gouvernements canadiens aiment rappeler le caractère « pacifique » du Canada, la présence et les investissements soutenus que demandera le nouveau partenariat dépassent sa position traditionnelle en matière de défense, qui se concentre premièrement sur la région euro-atlantique. La politique partisane est peut-être également en cause, puisque le gouvernement Trudeau a évité de prendre position dans les tensions croissantes entre Beijing et Washington. Adhérer à l’AUKUS aurait donc été à l’encontre de cette tendance. Par contre, il est à noter que les conservateurs ont été plutôt enclins à rejoindre ce genre d’initiative de l’anglosphère par le passé. Rappelons également les difficultés que le Canada a souvent eues dans ses projets d’acquisitions militaires, surtout ceux concernant les sous-marins. Selon des sources au sein du renseignement et de la défense, l’absence canadienne pourrait surtout s’expliquer par une perte de confiance de ses proches alliés quant au sérieux des engagements d’Ottawa en matière de défense et de relations avec la Chine. Le Canada n’aurait ainsi été averti qu’au tout dernier moment de l’existence de la nouvelle entente. L’AUKUS signale donc qu’un cercle restreint se crée au sein du Groupe des cinq, cercle restreint duquel seraient exclus le Canada et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Reste donc à voir si ce nouveau partenariat s’inscrira effectivement dans la durée et débouchera sur le développement et la mise en service conjointe de nouvelles capacités au-delà des sous-marins. Dans ce cas, le Canada fera piètre figure vis-à-vis ses trois alliés qui auront alors drastiquement augmenté l’intégration et l’interopérabilité de leurs forces armées et de leurs industries de la défense. Dans l’état actuel des choses, force est de constater que la présente mouture du partenariat relève autant d’une faible perception de la fiabilité d’Ottawa que de la peur grandissante de la menace chinoise au sein de l’AUKUS. ## Avec une attention médiatique réduite, une contrôleuse externe continue de scruter le changement de culture militaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/avec-une-attention-mediatique-reduite-une-controleuse-externe-continue-de-scruter-le-changement-de-culture-militaire/ Modified: 2024-03-20 > In the wake of the 2021 sexual harassment and assault crisis, the Canadian Armed Forces have promised change. À la suite de la crise du harcèlement et des agressions sexuelles de 2021 impliquant des allégations contre des officiers de haut rang, dont deux chefs d'état-major de la défense, les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) se sont engagé à changer. L'examen externe exhaustif indépendant (EEIC) réalisé par l'ancienne juge de la Cour suprême, Louise Arbour, a indiqué la marche à suivre. Les recommandations de Mme Arbour mettent l'accent sur l'amélioration de la surveillance et de la responsabilité, mais l'attention du public s’affaiblie-t-elle ? C'est là qu'intervient la nomination de Jocelyne Therrien, la contrôleuse externe chargée de surveiller les progrès accomplis, conformément à la recommandation 48 du rapport Arbour. Mme Therrien a publié deux rapports de suivi qui, combinés à la dernière enquête de Statistique Canada de 2022 sur l'inconduite sexuelle dans les Forces armées canadiennes (publiée en décembre 2023), démontrent que des changements sont visibles, mais inégaux. L'enquête statistique a révélé une augmentation préoccupante des agressions sexuelles, avec seulement environ 20 % des membres concernés qui ont signalé leur expérience, mais elle a également montré une augmentation de la sensibilisation générale liée au changement de culture, ainsi qu'une amélioration de la confiance dans le leadership. Cependant, il subsiste un décalage entre les nouvelles politiques du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) et des FAC et les résultats escomptés. Nous soutenons que des changements fragmentaires fondés sur des recommandations individuelles du rapport Arbour peuvent nuire à un changement de culture efficace et complet. Nous nous concentrerons ci-dessous sur la terminologie, le leadership et les engagements académiques afin d'illustrer notre propos. Le terme « inconduite sexuelle » est inutile Le dernier rapport a montré que la CAF cherche à supprimer le terme « inconduite sexuelle » de son lexique, afin de s'aligner sur les définitions du harcèlement et de l'agression sexuelle figurant dans le code du travail et le code pénal. Dans son rapport, Mme Arbour avait observé que le terme « inconduite sexuelle » manquait de cohérence et de clarté, ce qui entraînait une grande confusion. Mme Arbour avait recommandé d'abolir ce terme général et d'établir des définitions appropriées et distinctes pour le harcèlement sexuel, la fraternisation et les relations personnelles préjudiciables. Dans une récente déclaration, le ministre Bill Blair a souligné l'importance d'affiner et de clarifier les définitions relatives à l'inconduite sexuelle, s’appuyant sur « les recommandations 1 et 2, qui demandent une révision de la terminologie clé, en commençant par l’abolition de la définition du terme inconduite sexuelle dans les politiques ». L'utilisation du terme « inconduite sexuelle » était problématique dès le départ, car il est vague et mal compris, et n'est donc pas utile pour justifier des politiques spécifiques. Une autre recommandation importante consistait à affiner le concept de « relations personnelles préjudiciables ». Ces relations se caractérisent par leur capacité à créer des déséquilibres de pouvoir, en particulier lorsqu'elles ne sont pas divulguées. Selon la définition actuelle, les membres des CAF ne sont tenus de divulguer leurs relations personnelles que lorsque celles-ci ont une incidence directe sur les évaluations, les affectations et la formation, conformément à la DOAD 5019-1. Toutefois, il est essentiel de reconnaître que les relations non divulguées peuvent favoriser des dynamiques invisibles susceptibles d'affecter la cohésion, la discipline et le moral de l'unité. Prenons l'exemple d'un officier supérieur qui entretient une relation amoureuse avec un subordonné, mais qui choisit de ne pas la divulguer. Cette situation peut non seulement entraîner une dynamique professionnelle difficile pour les deux membres, mais aussi susciter la méfiance des pairs et des supérieurs. Par exemple, le manque de transparence peut donner lieu à des soupçons de favoritisme ou de traitement inéquitable au sein de l'unité, ce qui finit par saper le moral et l'efficacité opérationnelle. En outre, la réticence à divulguer des relations personnelles peut avoir des conséquences inattendues. Un membre peut craindre d'être stigmatisé ou ostracisé en raison de la nature de la relation qu'il révèle. Par exemple, les personnes ayant une relation homosexuelle peuvent hésiter à révéler leur statut en raison de craintes de préjugés ou de discrimination au sein de la communauté militaire. La modification proposée a des conséquences importantes et pourrait ne pas entraîner le changement de comportement souhaité par la recommandation. Le fait d'exiger des membres qu'ils divulguent leur relation avant que des complications négatives potentielles ne surviennent n'élimine pas la possibilité d'un déséquilibre de pouvoir, en particulier lorsqu'une personne de rang supérieur a autorité sur un autre membre, ou lorsque d'autres facteurs tels que le sexe, la race et la classe sociale contribuent à un déséquilibre de pouvoir. Bien que ces changements de définition soient cruciaux, ils nécessiteront une communication adéquate de la part de la direction et une socialisation dans les rangs. Entre-temps, de nombreux changements ont déjà été apportés aux politiques, ainsi qu'au matériel de formation et d'éducation, qui ne tiennent pas compte de ces mises à jour. Surmonter la crise du leadership grâce à de meilleurs systèmes de recrutement, de formation et de promotion En termes de leadership, bien que les membres des forces armées notent des améliorations dans la manière comment le harcèlement et les agressions sexuelles sont traités, un changement systémique majeur est en cours et les résultats tangibles ne se feront sentir qu'au bout de plusieurs années. Par exemple, les FAC ont amélioré leurs outils de sélection pour le recrutement dans des domaines tels que la capacité cognitive, le jugement et la personnalité, ce qui est conforme aux nouvelles approches du MDN, qui se concentre sur la personnalité plutôt que sur le mérite et la technique. Un autre exemple frappant est la mise en œuvre de tests psychométriques et d'une évaluation à 360 degrés pour les candidats à la promotion aux grades de général et d'officier d'état-major, ou l'inclusion de conseillers externes dans le processus de promotion, comme le recommande l'EEIC. Dans le message de fin d'année du CEMD et de l'Adjudant Chef des Forces armées canadiennes, le général Eyre a parlé de l'engagement des FAC à l'égard du changement culturel. Cependant, parmi les membres réguliers, les raisons les plus fréquentes pour lesquelles ils ont l'intention de quitter les FAC sont la direction que prend leur haute direction (25 %), alors que 33 % ont déclaré que la culture en était une de « masculinité négative ». Bien que les membres des FAC soient globalement sensibilisés à la formation et aux changements de politique visant à lutter contre le harcèlement et les agressions sexuelles, les résultats de l'enquête de Statistique Canada suggèrent que ces efforts ne se sont pas encore traduits par les résultats escomptés. Les réformes du processus de gestion du personnel n'ont pas été suffisamment profondes et, bien qu'une évaluation du mérite fondée sur la personnalité puisse constituer une amélioration, elles n'ont d'incidence que sur un petit nombre de membres des FAC. L'expertise académique comme forme de contrôle externe pour renforcer l’imputabilité au sein des forces armées La participation de civils externes aux processus des FAC est un autre moyen de mesurer les progrès réalisés en matière de changement de culture. À cette fin, les chercheurs universitaires pourraient fournir l'expertise nécessaire pour compléter les efforts de recherche et l'élaboration des politiques qui sont menés au sein du système MDN/FAC. Cependant, dans l'état actuel des choses, les universitaires doivent se soumettre à un processus d'évaluation éthique du MDN, en plus de ceux auxquels ils sont confrontés dans leur propre institution, ce qui, selon Mme Arbour, devrait changer. À cette fin, la recommandation 46 de l’EEIC a conduit à une révision du Conseil d’examen de la recherche en sciences sociales (CERSS) afin qu'il se concentre uniquement sur l'approbation des parties techniques de la proposition, tandis que l'évaluation éthique pourrait être supprimée si l'organisation d'un chercheur l’avait  déjà conduite. La distinction entre l'examen technique et l'examen éthique n'est toutefois pas clair, ce que le contrôleur externe devrait signaler. Le problème est qu'il n'est pas possible de faire une distinction claire entre l'aspect technique (qui relève du MDN/CAF) et l'aspect éthique (qui relève de l'institution universitaire). En fin de compte, le MDN/CAF peut encore exercer un grand contrôle en ce qui concerne la recherche universitaire qui est ou n'est pas autorisée dans son environnement. Les universitaires qui se verraient refuser l'accès aux participants du MDN/CAF ne disposeraient d'aucune procédure d'appel, en plus de subir d'importants retards ou une réorientation de leurs recherches, ce qui est problématique. Un autre défi majeur identifié dans l'EEIC est l'obligation pour les chercheurs externes d'obtenir une approbation de niveau 1 (L1) pour leur recherche, ce qui signifie l’implication d’un bureau qui relève soit du sous-ministre de la Défense nationale (SM), soit du chef d'état-major de la Défense (CEMD). En fait, il s'agit non seulement d'une approbation, mais aussi d'une certaine forme de supervision de la part d'un commanditaire de très haut niveau du MDN et des FAC pour la recherches. Du point de vue des capacités également, il serait préférable que le parrainage par le MDN/FAC n'intervienne qu'en cas de besoin et ne soit pas une étape obligatoire du processus du CERSS. Dans l'idéal, le CERSS pourrait simplement mettre en relation le chercheur avec un expert en la matière du MDN/CAF, que ce soit pour lui donner un aperçu, des conseils ou des réseaux potentiels. En outre, la recommandation 45 de l'EEIC prévoyait la création d'une base de données en ligne par le chef de la conduite professionnelle et de la culture (CCPC) afin de garantir que les universitaires et les experts externes aient accès aux recherches menées au sein du MDN/des FAC sur « l'inconduite sexuelle, la diversité, l'inclusion et les femmes dans l'armée ». Bien que la base de données en ligne soit opérationnelle, plusieurs liens ne sont pas en libre accès, ce qui retarde d’importants progrès sur ce qui reste une recommandation cruciale du rapport Arbour. Bien que des mesures soient prises pour améliorer la surveillance civile des forces armées, les efforts de recherche et l'élaboration des politiques doivent être clairs et simples afin de faciliter le processus de recherche au sein du MDN et des FAC. Une fois de plus, des définitions et des procédures claires sont nécessaires pour rationaliser le processus de recherche. En ce qui concerne la recommandation 45, la base de données devrait offrir un accès libre à tous les documents répertoriés et envisager d'étendre son contenu non seulement aux sujets susmentionnés, mais aussi à la recherche sur le leadership, la formation, les promotions, etc. L'étendue de la recherche devrait être complète et ne pas se limiter à certains sujets. Bien que la numérisation de ces dossiers puisse prendre du temps, il s'agit d'un effort nécessaire pour améliorer le suivi et la responsabilité en matière de changement de culture. Quelles sont les prochaines étapes ? Ce deuxième rapport montre une amélioration en termes d'actions concrètes prises en réponse au rapport Arbour, mais le changement de leadership au niveau ministériel et au sein du MDN/FAC représente un facteur de complication pour une approche déjà fragmentaire vis-à-vis le changement de culture. En outre, toutes les nouvelles initiatives nécessitent des ressources importantes, notamment en termes de personnel et de fonds. Cette tension s'aggravera avec le sous-financement chronique des FAC, la réduction récente des budgets de voyage des organisations et des dépenses en services professionnels à partir de 2023-24, et la réduction progressive de 3 % des dépenses admissibles des ministères et des organismes à partir de 2024-25. Même dans un contexte de ressources limitées, il est nécessaire de disposer d'un plan stratégique clair pour éviter que ces politiques ne tombent dans un « cimetière », pour citer Madame Arbour. Comme le souligne le deuxième examen externe, Mme Therrien affirme que « l’organisation n’avait pas de plan pluriannuel pour la priorisation et l’enchaînement des activités en réponse aux recommandations ». Pour faire évoluer la culture, il faut s’engager à faire du comportement et de la conduite des priorités pour l'institution, plutôt que de se concentrer uniquement sur le harcèlement et les agressions sexuelles comme simples symptômes d'une mauvaise culture. Pour ce faire, il est nécessaire d'adopter une approche globale et une vision clairement articulée, plutôt que de considérer les recommandations comme une longue liste de points individuels. ## Avenir de la Coopération avec la Russie : Défis et opportunités URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/avenir-de-la-cooperation-avec-la-russie-defis-et-opportunites/ Modified: 2021-12-06 > La relation entre la Russie et l’occident s’est souvent articulée sous plusieurs prismes allant de la coopération, la méfiance et sur... La relation entre la Russie et l’occident s’est souvent articulée sous plusieurs prismes allant de la coopération, la méfiance et sur certains domaines la compétition. Depuis une décennie, nous assistons d'ailleurs à un ré-engagement de la Russie sur plusieurs espaces géographiques ne faisant pas particulièrement partie de sa zone traditionnelle d'influence ainsi qu'à une plus grande pro activité dans le domaine de la guerre hybride. Dans un contexte où la communauté internationale , peine à faire front commun face à ces multiples enjeux, quels sont les défis et opportunités pour l'occident et notamment le Canada dans l'articulation de sa coopération avec la Russie ? Animation: -Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, fellow et conseiller principal en communications et partenariats au CÉRIUM Intervenants: Igor Delanoë, Directeur adjoint de l'Observatoire franco-russe Emmanuelle Rousseau, Doctorante, Département de science politique, Université de Montréal ## Bâtir un Nord plus sûr : risques, lacunes et opportunités pour la sécurité climatique dans l’Arctique canadien URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/batir-un-nord-plus-sur-risques-lacunes-et-opportunites-pour-la-securite-climatique-dans-larctique-canadien/ Modified: 2024-08-29 « Ce qui se passe dans le Nord a des conséquences pour le reste du monde, et lorsque l’on traite des questions de sécurité et de changement climatique, le monde est plus attentif que jamais, » avait déclaré la gouverneure générale du Canada, Mary Simon, lors d'un événement au Centre des sciences Arktikum à Rovaniemi, en février 2023. Ses propos soulignent les profondes répercussions de la nouvelle invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie, depuis février 2022, sur la sécurité dans l’Arctique, ayant entraîné un regain d’attention mondiale pour la région. Cette attention s’est davantage intensifiée au Canada avec l’incident du ballon-espion chinois, lequel a rappelé le rôle crucial de l’Arctique canadien dans la défense continentale. Les remarques de la gouverneure générale Simon illustrent également la manière dont les réalités climatiques et sécuritaires sont interconnectées, dans une région où la géopolitique actuellement en état de gel se mêle au dégel des paysages. L’Arctique canadien se réchauffe au moins trois fois plus vite que le reste du globe, entraînant des impacts physiques significatifs sur la région. Parmi ceux-ci figurent la fonte du pergélisol, la diminution de la couverture neigeuse, la réduction de la glace de mer estivale, et l'élévation du niveau de la mer, laquelle a pour conséquences érosion côtière et inondations. Dans la mer de Beaufort, par exemple, le niveau de la mer a augmenté de près de deux centimètres et demi par an au cours des deux dernières décennies. Le changement climatique transforme également les écosystèmes de l’Arctique canadien, entraînant notamment le verdissement de la toundra, le déplacement de la limite de la forêt boréale en raison de l'intensification des feux de forêt, l'acidification des océans, et l'augmentation des précipitations. Le changement climatique est de plus en plus reconnu comme un multiplicateur de menaces (ou de risques), car ses effets interagissent avec des menaces préexistantes et d'autres facteurs d'instabilité, contribuant ainsi à l’exacerbation et l’accroissement des risques sécuritaires. Afin de sensibiliser le Canada à ces risques, le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité a rendu publique, en mars 2023, une analyse détaillant la manière dont le changement climatique aggrave et accélère d'autres enjeux de sécurité. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## Bilan des 100 premiers jours de la politique étrangère de Trump : enjeux et perspectives pour le Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/bilan-des-100-premiers-jours-de-la-politique-etrangere-de-trump-enjeux-et-perspectives-pour-le-canada/ Modified: 2025-05-05 Dans ce monde qui se referme, les États-Unis endossaient le rôle de puissance stabilisatrice et parfois même de puissance bienveillante. Ils œuvraient à encadrer l’ordre international libéral et à défendre, lorsque cela était jugé possible et souhaitable, le droit international. Bien sûr, il ne faut pas idéaliser le passé; il est vrai que certaines administrations se sont écartées de ce rôle. L’unilatéralisme de George W. Bush et la violation du droit international lors de l’invasion de l’Irak, ou encore les atrocités commises sous les présidences Johnson et Nixon en Indochine, justifiées par la lutte contre le communisme, sont des exemples évidents. Mais malgré ces dérives, les administrations qui se sont succédé depuis 80 ans ont été guidées par des fondamentaux communs, à savoir : la recherche de stabilité, l’attachement au libéralisme économique et la promotion de la démocratie libérale. En lieu et place, Donald Trump propose une politique étrangère prédatrice, nationaliste et égocentrée en rupture avec l’idéal qui fut porté par ses treize prédécesseurs, républicains comme démocrates. Dans ce monde qui s’ouvre, Trump remplace l’influence et le pouvoir d’attraction (le soft power), qui ont fait le succès de la puissance américaine depuis Harry Truman, par une approche fondée sur la coercition, le chantage et la force. Au cours des 100 derniers jours, c’est toute la grammaire de l’action internationale américaine qui a été brutalement transformée. Le respect des frontières internationales fut remis en cause, notamment à travers la volonté de Trump de redessiner unilatéralement la frontière avec le Canada. Le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes fut ignoré, comme en témoigne le mépris affiché envers les aspirations du peuple ukrainien. Le soutien au développement international fut mis à mal par le démantèlement de l’Agence américaine pour le développement international (USAID). Enfin, la gouvernance multilatérale des grands défis mondiaux fut délaissée, par le retrait d’organisations comme l’OMS ou d’accords internationaux tels que l’accord de Paris sur le climat. Ce à quoi nous assistons aujourd’hui, c’est bien plus qu’un simple changement d’orientation : c’est une sorte de révolution de la politique étrangère du pays qui fait voler en éclat le consensus moral et stratégique des 80 dernières années. Adieu coopération, bonjour coercition Dans ce monde qui s’ouvre, Donald Trump considère les accords internationaux « gagnant-gagnant » comme des signes de faiblesse de la part des États-Unis. C’est que sa vision du monde repose exclusivement sur une logique de rapports de force, où la puissance américaine doit prévaloir sans compromis. C’est pour cette raison que les actions qu’il a posé au cours des 100 premiers, pensons à l’utilisation de sanctions économiques et de tarifs douaniers, s’inscrivent résolument dans une logique de jeu à somme nulle : une quête obsessionnelle de gains faits sans discernement aux dépens des alliés comme des adversaires, au mépris des relations diplomatiques établies et des principes du droit international. L’ambition affichée par Trump de s’emparer de territoires stratégiques, comme le Groenland et le canal de Panama, de même que sa volonté d’annexer le Canada par asphyxie économique, illustrent parfaitement cette logique. Trump ne cache pas sa volonté de recourir, si nécessaire, à la force militaire pour atteindre ses objectifs. Lors de son discours sur l’état de l’Union en février dernier, il a affirmé sans détour que les États-Unis prendraient le contrôle du Groenland « d’une manière ou d’une autre ». Puis, la visite récente du vice-président J. D. Vance sur ce territoire autonome danois, riche en ressources naturelles et d’une importance croissante dans l’Arctique, témoigne une fois de plus de cette volonté expansionniste. Pourquoi cet élan expansionniste ? Les motivations derrière cette volonté expansionniste sont multiples. Dans le cas du Groenland, Trump semble chercher à s’assurer un accès direct à des ressources stratégiques telles que les minéraux critiques et les métaux rares, éléments indispensables à l'économie et à la défense des États-Unis. Trump semble opérer sous l’impression que les États-Unis accusent un retard sur la Chine dans le contrôle de ces ressources. Comme si un fossé stratégique devait être comblé rapidement dans le domaine. L’intérêt pour le Groenland et le Canal de Panama révèle également une volonté de renforcer le contrôle stratégique des passages maritimes majeurs. L’annexion de ces points géostratégiques offrirait à Washington un levier militaire et économique dans l’optique d’une rivalité croissante avec la Chine et, dans une moindre mesure, avec la Russie. Cette rhétorique expansionniste répond aussi au discours ambiant sur le déclin relatif des États-Unis face aux puissances émergentes. L’acquisition de nouveaux territoires est perçue comme un moyen de renforcer le statut de superpuissance américaine, en consolidant une « forteresse » américaine capable de rivaliser avantageusement avec les puissances en émergence. Au cours de ses 100 premiers jours à la Maison-Blanche, Donald Trump a rompu radicalement avec les principes qui ont guidé la politique étrangère américaine depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Par sa rhétorique belliqueuse et ses actions unilatérales, il s’impose déjà comme l’un des présidents américains ayant le plus contribué à banaliser le recours à la force pour atteindre ses objectifs. Son approche agressive légitime, de facto, les stratégies de coercition territoriale de dirigeants autoritaires comme Xi Jinping, concernant Taïwan, et Vladimir Poutine, en l’Ukraine. Implications pour la politique étrangère du Canada Le renversement radical de la politique étrangère américaine depuis le 20 janvier dernier ne signifie pas pour autant l’effondrement des piliers de la politique étrangère canadienne. Le Canada demeure un États résolument libre-échangiste, profondément engagé envers l’OTAN et attaché au multilatéralisme. En témoignent les efforts actuels du gouvernent Carney pour renforcer ses échanges économiques avec des partenaires européens et asiatiques, avec lesquels le Canada a déjà conclu des accords de libre-échange. Lors de la campagne électorale fédérale, le premier ministre Carney déclarait d’ailleurs que si l’administration Trump refusait d’assumer son rôle de leader mondial, le Canada, pour sa part, était prêt à prendre le relais. Bien qu’il s’agisse d’une déclaration électorale visant à mobiliser la fibre nationaliste canadienne plutôt que d’un engagement fondé sur les capacités réelles du pays à occuper une telle position, elle traduisait néanmoins l’état d’esprit du nouveau premier ministre. Elle réaffirmait la volonté du Canada de préserver les fondements de sa politique étrangère, même dans un contexte international marqué par l’instabilité et la coercition américaine. Implications pour la souveraineté et la défense du Canada Là où les choses se compliquent dangereusement pour le Canada, c’est au niveau de sa politique de défense. Les déclarations de l’administration Trump sur l’asphyxie économique du pays pour mieux nous annexer comme 51e État, ou encore sa volonté de redessiner la frontière canado-américaine représentent les menaces les plus sérieuses à la sécurité et à la souveraineté canadienne depuis la fondation du pays il y a 158 ans. L’heure n’est plus à l’incrédulité, mais bien aux plans de contingence. De telles prises de position appellent une conclusion claire : bien plus que la Chine ou la Russie, c’est l’administration américaine actuelle qui représente la plus grande menace pour le Canada car elle s’attaque de manière intentionnelle et persistante à nos intérêts vitaux. Tout cela dans un contexte où le mouvement nationaliste et protectionniste sur lequel elle s’appuie semble désormais s’inscrire dans la durée. Même si Trump venait à modérer ses propos à l’égard du Canada, le mal est déjà fait. Ses déclarations provocatrices ont contribué à ancrer, au sein de la droite radicale américaine, l’idée qu’une annexion du Canada pourrait être non seulement possible, mais aussi souhaitable, voire nécessaire. Dans un contexte marqué par l’accélération des changements climatiques, la raréfaction de l’eau douce et l’intérêt grandissant pour les métaux stratégiques et autres ressources naturelles, les vastes richesses canadiennes suscitent une convoitise croissante. Si Trump ne cherche pas à s’en emparer activement cette fois-ci, il est fort possible que l’un de ses héritiers politiques envisage cette possibilité avec davantage de sérieux dans l’avenir. Le Canada est seul Dans ce contexte, atteindre l’objectif des 2 % du PIB consacré à la défense pourrait certes valoir au Canada une reconnaissance accrue au sein de l’OTAN, mais ne modifiera en rien l’asymétrie de puissance entre le Canada et les États-Unis. De même, un rapprochement stratégique avec la France ou le Royaume-Uni, ne saurait atténuer de manière significative notre immense vulnérabilité stratégique face à Washington. En cas d’agression américaine, un resserrement des liens avec l’Europe resterait essentiellement symbolique car aucun partenaire européen ne risquerait une confrontation directe avec la première puissance militaire mondiale pour défendre le Canada. D’ailleurs, la réaction molle des alliés européens, tout comme celle, embarrassée, du secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Mark Rutte, face aux visées expansionnistes de Donald Trump sur le Groenland et aux menaces répétées à l’endroit du Canada, est révélatrice. En somme, tant que les États-Unis respectent notre souveraineté et se comportent en partenaires responsables, le Canada peut compter sur un large éventail d’alliés. Mais dès qu’une administration américaine adopte une posture hostile, c’est le silence radio. Le Canada se retrouve alors seul, entièrement tributaire de la volonté de Washington. Ce constat brutal appelle une réflexion stratégique articulée à la fois sur le court et le long terme. À court terme, il est essentiel de maintenir les meilleures relations possibles avec les États-Unis, car, quoi qu’on en dise, ils demeureront notre principal partenaire économique. En parallèle, il est impératif de réduire notre exposition aux risques économiques causés par notre dépendance excessive au marché américain. Il nous faut donc « dérisquer » notre sécurité économique en diversifiant activement nos partenariats à l’échelle mondiale et en renforçant notre résilience nationale, notamment par une croissance soutenue du commerce interprovincial. Sur le plan de notre autonomie stratégique, Shimooka, Lanoszka et Devlen ont raison de souligner que le désir d’un rapprochement avec l’Europe repose en partie sur une réaction émotive à l’égard de Trump. Cette dimension affective tend à brouiller le jugement et à occulter les limites concrètes, voire les effets contre-productifs, qu’une telle orientation pourrait entraîner pour le Canada. Des obstacles importants à l’accès de l’industrie canadienne à l’écosystème européen de la défense existent : protectionnisme persistant, inadéquation des équipements européens aux besoins spécifiques canadiens, et saturation des capacités industrielles européennes en raison de l’effort de guerre en Ukraine. Sans pour autant écarter l’option européenne du revers de la main, il est essentiel d’adopter une approche réaliste et sélective dans le choix de nos partenariats militaires et technologiques en Europe. La capacité de dissuasion du Canada À plus long terme, et puisque le Canada se retrouve isolé, il devient indispensable d’ouvrir un débat lucide et responsable sur notre capacité réelle de dissuasion. Aujourd’hui, notre seul et unique levier face à l’administration Trump réside dans l’imposition de tarifs douaniers sur certains produits américains, un outil bien mince face à une économie dix fois plus puissante que la nôtre, et totalement inefficace face à des ambitions territoriales clairement affichées. Si Trump ou l’un de ses successeurs devait adopter une posture plus agressive, le Canada serait dépourvu de moyens de défense crédibles. Il nous incombe donc collectivement de réévaluer, sans tabous, les instruments de notre souveraineté et d’explorer de nouveaux leviers de dissuasion. Au-delà des mesures tarifaires s’ouvrent un éventail de possibilités qui mérite d’être examiné avec rigueur, même si cela suppose de remettre en question certaines valeurs que nous avons portées depuis des décennies. Parmi ces options figurent le développement de capacités crédibles de dissuasion cybernétique, le renforcement de nos forces armées conventionnelles, et, de manière controversée mais nécessaire, l’examen de la pertinence et de la faisabilité de moyens nucléaires tactiques. Dans le monde qui s’ouvre, la survie même du Canada pourrait bien dépendre de sa capacité à dissuader les puissances prédatrices, c’est-à-dire à les convaincre que le coût stratégique de leurs ambitions surpasserait les gains escomptés. Chose certaine, en rompant avec les conventions diplomatiques, en affichant un mépris flagrant pour le droit international et en ayant des visées expansionnistes, Trump est un acteur central de l’érosion des fondements de la stabilité mondiale sur lesquels reposait le monde qui se referme. Cette transformation de la diplomatie américaine, privilégiant la coercition au détriment de la coopération, engendre une instabilité accrue et ouvre la voie à un monde où seuls les rapports de force dicteront la marche à suivre. Face à cette reconfiguration de l’environnement stratégique, le Canada ne peut rester passif : il lui faut impérativement tirer les leçons stratégiques qui s’imposent.   ## Chantage stratégique et rivalités entre grandes puissances : pourquoi les Philippines et la Turquie ont-elles menacé de rompre avec l’Occident ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/chantage-strategique-et-rivalites-entre-grandes-puissances-pourquoi-les-philippines-et-la-turquie-ont-elles-menace-de-rompre-avec-loccident/ Modified: 2023-02-10 > Pourquoi Manille et Ankara ont-elles remis en cause leur alliance formelle au risque de s’aliéner Washington ? De telles menaces publiques sont relativement rares et constituent en quelque sorte des anomalies en politique étrangère. Elles requièrent une attention particulière étant donné l’incertitude entourant le leadership des États-Unis et la polycentricité croissante du système international. Face au comportement agressif de Pékin en mer de Chine méridionale et orientale et à celui de Moscou en Europe orientale, l’approche classique de l’équilibre de la menace soutient que les alliés des États-Unis devraient automatiquement faire contrepoids à ces États en serrant les rangs derrière Washington. Or, des événements récents ont remis en doute cette approche puisque deux alliés formels de Washington, les Philippines et la Turquie, ont ouvertement menacé de rompre leur alliance défensive avec les États-Unis et de se réaligner sur la Chine et la Russie. À la suite de son élection à la présidence des Philippines en 2016, Rodrigo Duterte annonçait publiquement sa rupture avec Washington et le réalignement stratégique de son pays sur la Chine. Le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan, pour sa part, avertissait la Maison-Blanche dans une tribune publiée dans le New York Times en 2018 qu’il disposait d’alternatives stratégiques à l’OTAN et que, si Washington ne se montrait pas plus sensible aux intérêts de la Turquie, leur partenariat pourrait être compris et Ankara pourrait se trouver de nouveaux alliés, sous-entendant ici la Russie et l’Iran. Pourquoi Manille et Ankara ont-elles remis en cause leur alliance formelle au risque de s’aliéner Washington ? De telles menaces publiques sont relativement rares et constituent en quelque sorte des anomalies en politique étrangère. Elles requièrent une attention particulière étant donné l’incertitude entourant le leadership des États-Unis et la polycentricité croissante du système international. Le chantage stratégique En y regardant de plus près, Duterte et Erdogan ont tous deux exercé un chantage stratégique dans le but d’obtenir des concessions de Washington. Comme le souligne Stephen Walt, « un maître chanteur peut menacer de poser une action à laquelle son allié s’oppose, dans l’espoir de le persuader de lui donner quelque chose en retour de son adhésion à ses préférences ». Le chantage stratégique est généralement employé par des États insatisfaits de leur position dans le système international afin d’obtenir plus de reconnaissance ainsi que des gains tels que la réassurance d’un engagement et un plus grand soutien matériel de la part de leurs alliés. Comme nous le verrons ci-dessous, les griefs à l’égard de Washington, la peur de l’abandon et le populisme permettent d’expliquer pourquoi Manille et Ankara ont eu recours au chantage stratégique. Ensemble, ces facteurs les ont poussés à recourir à la rivalité entre grandes puissances afin de faire chanter Washington dans l’espoir d’obtenir des concessions en matière de sécurité et de défense. … Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur la site du Rubicon ! ## Cibler Ayman Al-Zawahiri : élimination juste ou juste une élimination ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/cibler-ayman-al-zawahiri-elimination-juste-ou-juste-une-elimination/ Modified: 2023-02-27 > Le 1er août dernier, le président américain Joe Biden annonçait l’élimination, la veille, du dirigeant de l’organisation terroriste Al-Qaïda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, dans la capitale afghane, Kaboul. En déclarant que justice avait ainsi « été rendue (justice has been delivered) », le président Biden s’inscrivait dans la continuité de ceux qui, avant lui, Donald Trump, Barack Obama et George W. Bush, avaient vu dans les éliminations de dirigeants d’organisations terroristes jihadistes, une forme de justice. À quel ordre de justice est-il ici fait référence ? Le 1er août dernier, le président américain Joe Biden annonçait l’élimination, la veille, du dirigeant de l’organisation terroriste Al-Qaïda, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, dans la capitale afghane, Kaboul. En déclarant que justice avait ainsi « été rendue (justice has been delivered) », le président Biden s’inscrivait dans la continuité de ceux qui, avant lui, Donald Trump, Barack Obama et George W. Bush, avaient vu dans les éliminations de dirigeants d’organisations terroristes jihadistes, une forme de justice. À quel ordre de justice est-il ici fait référence ? Dire qu’une chose est juste peut correspondre à plusieurs ordres distincts. Comme le souligne la chercheuse de l’Institut français de relations internationales Amélie Férey, les éliminations ciblées de dirigeants terroristes sont traditionnellement présentées sous quatre régimes de justification : historique, légal, stratégique et moral. Deux me semblent ici particulièrement pertinents dans le traitement de l’élimination d’Ayman Al-Zawahiri : le légal et le moral. Une première approche a ainsi saisi la justice de cette élimination dans un sens procédural. Y est juste ce qui respecte les normes et cadres établis. Cela est rappelé sans équivoque par Hans Kelsen dans « Qu’est-ce que la justice ? », « un homme est juste si son comportement est conforme aux normes d’un ordre social supposé juste ».  La justice y est ici entendue au sens de légalité. Mais dans une autre conception, plus philosophique, la justice de la frappe peut renvoyer plutôt à un ordre supérieur désirable, où est juste ce qui œuvre au bien commun, au progrès, à l’amélioration générale des conditions de coexistence entre êtres humains, parfois au détriment des normes établies. La justice, dans cette seconde conception, y est entendue au sens de moralité ou de légitimité. Dans la majorité des cas, ces deux ordres sont compatibles. Dans certains cas néanmoins, une chose moralement juste peut être illégale et inversement.  Les toutes premières lectures, principalement universitaires, de l’élimination d’Ayman Al-Zawahiri se sont utilement penchées sur sa licéité, suivant une lecture procédurale de la justice. Par opposition, sur le plan politique aux États-Unis, les discours entourant cette élimination semblent avoir prioritairement envisagé la moralité de cette élimination. Fait-elle avancer le bien commun et apporte-t-elle des effets désirables, jugés justes ? Ce second type de discours se décline en deux volets distincts. Un volet utilitariste d’abord. L’élimination y est jugée morale, car elle aurait une utilité sociale et contribuerait au bien commun futur en diminuant, préventivement, la menace. Un pendant rétributiviste appartenant davantage au registre transcendant ensuite. L’élimination peut aussi y être jugée morale, car elle permet d’assouvir une vengeance légitime. … Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur la site du Rubicon !     Marie Robin (@Marie_Robin_) est docteure en science politique de l’Université Paris Panthéon-Assas et de l’Université du Sud-Danemark. Elle est actuellement post-doctorante au Centre Thucydide de l’Université Paris Panthéon-Assas, où elle coordonne les activités du pôle « études stratégiques » et est l’une des co-éditrices du Rubicon. Ses recherches doctorales ont analysé les valeurs stratégiques des discours de vengeance proposés par Al-Qaïda, l’État islamique et Boko Haram. Elle a récemment publié dans l’Annuaire français de relations internationales et dans le Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness. ## Colloque 2023 – Conférencier d’honneur: Gén. Wayne Eyre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/colloque-2023-conferencier-dhonneur-gen-wayne-eyre/ Modified: 2024-01-08 > Conférencier d’honneur: Gén. Wayne Eyre (CEMD, FAC)Modératrice: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Codirectrice du réseau et... Discours d’ouverture : Justin Massie, Codirecteur du réseau et professeur titulaire, UQAM Conférencier d’honneur: Gén. Wayne Eyre (CEMD, FAC) Modératrice: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Codirectrice du réseau et professeure titulaire, Université Bishop’s ## Colloque 2023 – Panel 1 – La coopération lors d’une ère de renouveau : Les nouvelles frontières URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/colloque-2023-panel-1-la-cooperation-lors-dune-ere-de-renouveau-les-nouvelles-frontieres/ Modified: 2024-01-11 > This panel will investigate the challenges and opportunities for cooperation on these various emerging security domains as well as their... Panel 1 – La coopération lors d’une ère de renouveau : Les nouvelles frontières Les implications sécuritaires et les menaces croissantes dans les domaines de la cybernétique, de l’information et de l’intelligence artificielle, y compris la « nouvelle frontière » de l’espace, exigent davantage de gouvernance, la conception de nouvelles règles et un modèle de coopération qui devient de plus en plus difficile à établir, car la concurrence entre les États transforme ces questions des questions d’intérêt national en un jeu à somme nulle. L’objectif de non-prolifération nucléaire reste insaisissable et cette même concurrence a ramené le réarmement au premier plan. Ce panel examinera les défis et les opportunités de coopération dans ces différents domaines de sécurité émergents, ainsi que leurs implications pour le Canada et le monde. Modératrice: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Codirectrice du réseau et professeure titulaire, Université Bishop’s Intervenants: - Alexander Lanoszka, Professeur agrégé, Université de Waterloo - Michael Manulak, Professeur agrégé, Université Carleton - Marc De Bellefeuille, Directeur adjoint – Cybernétique, espace and technologies émergentes, domaines opérationnels et politiques de technologie, défense nationale - David Dubé, Étudiant en doctorat, Université Mcgill ## Colloque 2023 – Panel 2 – Au-delà des alliés et des ennemis: Les acteurs non-alignés dans la politique mondiale URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/colloque-2023-panel-2-au-dela-des-allies-et-des-ennemis-les-acteurs-non-alignes-dans-la-politique-mondiale/ Modified: 2024-01-12 > This panel discusses an often-neglected aspect of world politics: the resurgence of non-alignment, motivations behind this phenomenon... Panel 2 – Au-delà des alliés et des ennemis: Les acteurs non-alignés dans la politique mondiale L’évolution de l’équilibre des pouvoirs mondiaux et régionaux a favorisé l’avènement d’un environnement plus complexe, accordant à un nombre croissant d’acteurs la capacité d’exercer une influence plus ou moins grande. Les institutions internationales se sont adaptées aux nouvelles réalités à mesure que les puissances émergentes continuent de gagner en importance avec l’expansion d’organisations telles que les BRICS. Ce panel explore l’impact de la multipolarité grandissante sur l’environnement mondial, dans un contexte où certains États exigent que l’ordre international fondé sur des règles change, certains avec plus d’assurance que d’autres, tandis que d’autres acteurs agissent à l’extérieur de ces organes formels afin de garantir l’aboutissement de leurs propres intérêts. Ce panel aborde un sujet souvent négligé de la politique mondiale : la résurgence du non-alignement, les motivations qui se trouvent derrière ce phénomène et les implications stratégiques pour le Canada. Modérateur: Jonathan Paquin, Codirecteur du réseau et professeur titulaire, Université Laval Intervenants: - Marion Laurence, Professeure adjointe, Collège des Forces canadiennes - Jean Daudelin, Professeur agrégé, Université Carleton - Emmanuelle Rousseau, Étudiante en doctorat, Université de Montréal - Amélie Chalivet, Étudiante en doctorat, Université du Québec à Montréal ## Colloque 2023 – Panel 3 – Coopération ou compétition ? Le cas des ressources naturelles URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/colloque-2023-panel-3-cooperation-ou-competition-le-cas-des-ressources-naturelles/ Modified: 2024-01-12 > Ce panel discutera de l’impact de la quête des ressources naturelles sur différentes régions du monde, de la rivalité entre les acteurs... Panel 3 – Coopération ou compétition ? Le cas des ressources naturelles Les ressources naturelles sont inégalement réparties dans le monde. L’essor des pressions géopolitiques et le retour du nationalisme économique signifient que les États – et les industries – se positionnent pour concurrencer avec leurs voisins, leurs rivaux, voire leurs partenaires, afin d’en garantir l’accès. Le pétrole, les minerais et même l’eau font l’objet de convoitise, menant à des conflits interétatiques et intraétatiques, qu’ils soient clandestins ou déclarés. Cette réalité est d’autant plus complexe et inquiétante considérant le fait que le changement climatique a un impact durable sur la distribution et l’extraction (non) éthique de ces ressources. Ce panel discutera de l’impact de la quête des ressources naturelles sur différentes régions du monde, de la rivalité entre les acteurs pour les obtenir et de la manière dont ils pourraient éventuellement coopérer. Modératrice: Sarah Sharma, Codirectrice du réseau et professeure agrégée, Université de Victoria Intervenants: - Nadège Compaoré, Professeure agrégée, Université de Toronto - Pascale Massot, Professeure agrégée, Université d’Ottawa - Frédéric Lasserre, Professeur titulaire, Université Laval - Victoria Breda, Senior Analyst, PCO ## Colloque Rubicon 2026 | Tribune 1 – Partage et transfert du fardeau URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/colloque-rubicon-2026-tribune-1-partage-et-transfert-du-fardeau/ Modified: 2026-03-31 Colloque annuel du Rubicon 2026 | Tribune 1 - Partage et transfert du fardeau Modération : Jonathan Paquin, professeur de science politique et directeur de l’École supérieure d’études internationales de l’Université Laval, directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS). « Les dilemmes du partage et transfert du fardeau au sein de l’Alliance atlantique : le cas des petits pays d’Europe centrale et de l’Est », par Jean F. Crombois, maitre de conférences en politique européenne à l’Université américaine en Bulgarie ; « Avant le partage ou le transfert – comprendre les fardeaux de l’OTAN en matière de “contrôle de l’air” ? : Examiner le cas critique de transfert de fardeau dans la région baltique », par Anessa L. Kimball, membre du corps professoral en science politique à l’Université Laval et responsable de la direction du Canadian Defence & Security Network et Maxime Philaire, doctorant à l’Université Laval et chercheur émergent au RAS ; « Partage du fardeau : Quels indicateurs économiques pour quelle sécurité collective ? », par Renaud Bellais, conseiller institutionnel du CEO de MBDA et chercheur associé à l’ENSTA Bretagne et à l’université Grenoble-Alpes. ## Colloque Rubicon 2026 | Tribune 2 – Transformation de l’OTAN URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/colloque-rubicon-2026-tribune-2-transformation-de-lotan/ Modified: 2026-03-31 Colloque annuel du Rubicon 2026 | Tribune 2 – Transformation de l’OTAN Modération : Richard Giguère, professeur invité à l’Université Laval et ancien brigadier-général des Forces armées canadiennes. « L’action associative : un moyen pour pérenniser la relation transatlantique et un enjeu d’adaptation des structures et fonctionnements de l’Alliance », par Alexis Kummetat, consultant et membre fondateur de l’Association française pour la communauté euro-atlantique (AFCEA) ; « André Beaufre, l’OTAN et l’Europe : quand les failles juridiques deviennent un levier stratégique », par Élise Bernard, docteure en droit public et enseignante-chercheure à l’ESSEC, Centre européen de droit et économie, Chaire Géopolitique et Business ; « L’OTAN et le changement de paradigme américain. Vers un pilier européen de l’OTAN – sans les États-Unis ? », par Maud Quessard, maîtresse de conférences en science politique et directrice du domaine « Europe, Espace Transatlantique, Russie » à l’IRSEM. ## Colloque Rubicon 2026 | Tribune 3 – Industries de défense et chaînes d’approvisionnement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/colloque-rubicon-2026-tribune-3-industries-de-defense-et-chaines-dapprovisionnement/ Modified: 2026-03-31 Colloque annuel du Rubicon 2026 | Tribune 3 - Industries de défense et chaînes d’approvisionnement Modération : Anessa L. Kimball, membre du corps professoral en science politique à l’Université Laval et responsable de la direction du Canadian Defence & Security Network. « Les freins juridiques à l’établissement d’une BITD européenne prospère et autonome », par Rachid Chaker, chercheur en science politique à l’Université catholique de Lille et chercheur associé au Centre Thucydide ; « L’industrie de défense turque entre autonomie et interdépendance : un acteur-clé pour la réduction de la dépendance américaine ? », par Albert Kandemir, doctorant en science politique et ATER à l’université Paris-Panthéon-Assas ; « L’émergence du complexe militaro-tech : une souveraineté sous dépendance et des armées à l’épreuve de la startupisation », par Sylvain Munger, chargé de cours à l’Université de Montréal et chercheur associé à l’OBVIA ; « Économie de guerre et économie de paix », par Jean Belin, maître de conférences HDR à l’université de Bordeaux (BSE UMR – CNRS 6060). ## Combler le fossé entre la communauté universitaire et le milieu des politiques de la défense au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/combler-le-fosse-entre-la-communaute-universitaire-et-le-milieu-des-politiques-de-la-defense-au-canada/ Modified: 2023-03-31 > Les auteurs ont évalué la nature et les causes des divergences entre la communauté universitaire et le milieu des politiques de la défense au Canada, sur la base de leur expérience personnelle et d’entretiens auprès de fonctionnaires de la Défense. Dans un article publié dans la revue Canadian Public Administration, les auteurs ont évalué la nature et les causes des divergences entre la communauté universitaire et le milieu des politiques de la défense au Canada, sur la base de leur expérience personnelle et d’entretiens auprès de fonctionnaires de la Défense. Pour le bénéfice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, dont le mandat inclut la mobilisation de l’expertise de recherche pour la communauté de défense canadienne, ils reviennent ici sur des pistes d’action pouvant permettre de rapprocher ces deux communautés. Les universitaires et les praticiens de la défense entretiennent une relation complexe et souvent antagoniste, en raison des incitatifs et des objectifs divergents de leurs professions. Il n’en demeure pas moins qu’ils ont intérêt à réduire l'écart entre eux et que des mesures peuvent être prises pour assurer la réussite du nouveau programme de sensibilisation universitaire du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN). Depuis les années 1960, le MDN a soutenu des programmes de sensibilisation et de soutien universitaires qui ont contribué à combler le fossé entre les universitaires et les praticiens, mais aussi à promouvoir l'étude des questions de défense au sein de la communauté universitaire. Avec la mise en place du nouveau programme du MDN, Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS), il est nécessaire d’interroger la nature de l’écart entre le milieu universitaire et le milieu des politiques afin de ne pas répéter les erreurs des programmes passés, tel que le Forum de sécurité et de défense (FSD), éliminé en 2011. En effet, l’impression chez les praticiens de la défense était que le FSD manquait de dynamisme, de diversité intellectuelle et d’innovation, mais aussi qu’il manquait de résultats eu égard à l’investissement du MDN. En 2019, au moment où le MDN a annoncé la mise en place de MINDS, le Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines (CRSH) a accordé une subvention de 2,5 millions de dollars au Réseau canadien sur la défense et la sécurité. Ce réseau reprend le flambeau du défunt FSD en rassemblant la communauté canadienne en matière de défense et de sécurité et en finançant la recherche sur les questions militaires canadiennes. De son côté, le programme MINDS vise des spécialistes universitaires et non-universitaires. De plus, en raison des délais plus courts du monde politique, il repose sur un mécanisme de réponse rapide. Cela permet au MDN de mobiliser à très court préavis l’expertise des chercheurs travaillant sur des enjeux évolutifs à propos desquels les connaissances internes font défaut. Ceci représente cependant un objectif ardu pour le MDN : il lui a toujours été difficile de cerner les problèmes rapidement et de gérer le processus de sous-traitance du travail de manière efficace. Les défis du programme MINDS Un premier défi pour le MINDS relève de sa structure. Concrètement, l’objectif du MINDS est de bâtir neuf réseaux triennaux sur une base continue (trois réseaux ont été créés en 2019 de même qu’en 2020 et trois autres devraient être créés en 2021). Le financement non permanent de ces réseaux se veut une manière d’encourager leur performance. Or, cela interroge la capacité sur le long terme de ces réseaux. Il n'est pas évident de prévoir comment la communauté relativement restreinte d'experts en matière de défense et de sécurité au Canada peut soutenir ce rythme, même si les réseaux mobilisent la participation de spécialistes qui n’œuvrent pas seulement sur des questions de défense canadienne au sens stricte. Pour ainsi dire, il se peut qu'il n'y ait pas assez de d’experts pour doter et soutenir neuf réseaux de recherche. Cela soulève un risque important, soit que dans quelques années, parce que les experts seront trop dispersés entre neuf groupes, il y aura une perception croissante au MDN que les réseaux sont sous-performants et que le ministère n'obtient pas un bon retour sur son investissement. Le risque, à notre avis, est que la conception du programme lui-même conduise, encore une fois, à une répétition du résultat décevant du FSD. Un deuxième défi pour le MINDS sera de définir précisément ses objectifs, puis ensuite de les communiquer clairement aux membres actuels et éventuels des réseaux. Cela va de pair avec un troisième défi, qui est crucial pour le succès du programme à long terme, soit d’identifier un chevauchement entre les attentes du MDN (la production des réseaux) et les structures d'incitation du milieu universitaire. De notre point de vue à la fois de praticiens et d'universitaires, s'il n'y a pas de chevauchement, ou si ce chevauchement est trop petit, les universitaires ne seront pas suffisamment incités à investir beaucoup de temps au sein des réseaux. L'incitation la plus importante serait le soutien, financier ou autre, pour la recherche et les publications scientifiques, notamment par l’embauche d’assistants de recherche ou le soutien pour la recherche-terrain. En outre, le MINDS semble principalement mis en place pour aider le MDN et les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) à obtenir ce dont ils ont besoin. Si cette impression s'avère exacte, le risque est que certains universitaires, estimant que les retours sur leur investissement (c'est-à-dire leur temps) sont limités, hésitent à mettre une énergie significative au sein des réseaux. Afin d’assurer son succès, le MINDS pourrait se distinguer et contribuer à réduire l’écart entre les chercheurs et les praticiens en fournissant aux chercheurs des expériences et des informations qui approfondiraient leur compréhension du « monde réel » de la défense. Cela profiterait non seulement à la recherche des universitaires et au débat public, mais cela aiderait peut-être à apaiser les tensions qui surgissent lorsque les chercheurs proposent des solutions politiques qui ne correspondent pas aux contraintes et aux réalités auxquelles fait face le MDN. Combler le fossé Selon nous, deux initiatives concrètes permettraient d’approfondir la compréhension universitaire du monde des praticiens : des affectations temporaires et des séances d’information de haut niveau. Premièrement, dans le cadre d’un programme d’affectation temporaire, le MINDS prendrait en charge le salaire d’un universitaire pendant un an et lui confierait les fonctions de conseiller spécial ou de consultant sur un dossier particulier. Bien qu'ils ne pourraient pas publier sur les questions sur lesquelles ils ont travaillé au sein du gouvernement, les universitaires ayant bénéficié de ces affectations retourneraient dans le milieu universitaire avec une meilleure compréhension du fonctionnement du MDN et des processus politiques. Deuxièmement, les séances d’information de haut niveau sont une autre initiative que le MINDS pourrait mettre de l’avant. Le MINDS pourrait faciliter l’organisation de séances d'information plus régulières et plus approfondies avec un large éventail de chercheurs, y compris par vidéoconférence pour les universitaires à l’extérieur d'Ottawa. Au-delà de ces deux initiatives, nous estimons que le MINDS serait bien placé pour faciliter des événements visant spécifiquement à réduire l'écart entre les praticiens et les universitaires. Reconnaissant que les chercheurs ont tendance à répondre à des questions à long terme avec des approches théoriques, des séminaires pourraient être organisés entre chercheurs et praticiens pour identifier des problèmes de défense qui se prêtent à ce type d'étude. Le MINDS pourrait aussi être chargé de mettre en relation les participants avec des fonctionnaires et des agents qui pourraient fournir des données non classifiées pour soutenir ce type de recherche. Plus encore, il faudrait que le MDN reconnaisse que la réciprocité est nécessaire pour favoriser une relation fructueuse avec le milieu universitaire. Au-delà du MINDS, il est tout aussi important de rappeler aux universitaires de la défense qu’ils ont eux aussi un rôle important à jouer pour réduire l’écart avec le monde politique. Cela implique notamment d'apprécier les forces du travail universitaire, tout en reconnaissant qu'il existe de nombreux problèmes et sujets que les fonctionnaires sont mieux à même de comprendre et d’analyser. En somme, la recherche universitaire offre aux praticiens des perspectives alternatives, une expertise et une analyse stratégique qui peuvent être plus rares au sein du gouvernement. Bien que ce type de travail puisse ne pas être pertinent pour les problèmes quotidiens et les questions politiques traitées par les praticiens, il fournit un contexte important et une appréciation des considérations futures qui peuvent s'avérer utiles au fil du temps. Les chercheurs, quant à eux, tirent profit de la compréhension du fonctionnement des processus politiques, de la façon dont le gouvernement comprend les questions de défense, mais aussi des facteurs qui façonnent les décisions en matière de défense. Par conséquent, tant les universitaires que les praticiens ont à gagner de combler cet écart. ## Comment évaluer la menace militaire russe sur le territoire canadien ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/comment-evaluer-la-menace-militaire-russe-sur-le-territoire-canadien/ Modified: 2022-04-25 > L’idée que le territoire canadien puisse être attaqué par une attaque aérienne, balistique ou navale russe n’est pas nouvelle. L’idée que le territoire canadien puisse être attaqué par une attaque aérienne, balistique ou navale russe n’est pas nouvelle. La littérature scientifique ou des médias témoigne de la récurrence de cette inquiétude au sein de l’opinion canadienne, inquiétude alimentée par les frictions politiques avec la Russie, surtout depuis l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014, mais aussi par la reprise des patrouilles aériennes de bombardiers russes dans l’Arctique. Une analyse avait permis de souligner que la fréquence de ces patrouilles, parfois menées jusqu’à la limite des espaces aériens américain ou canadien en Arctique, n’avait rien d’illégal en soi, présentait un risque faible et, surtout, ne traduisit guère de pression militaire majeure, à la différence du comportement des forces russes en Baltique ou en mer du Japon. D’une manière générale, les scénarios d’agression du Canada par la Russie se conçoivent difficilement en dehors du cadre d’une escalade déclenchée par l’une ou l’autre des parties. À ce jour, la Russie a pris soin de contenir le conflit à l’Ukraine, tout en envoyant des signaux politiques et militaires (attaques de missiles de croisière sur des sites ukrainiens proches de la frontière polonaise) clairs à l’OTAN sur les lignes rouges à ne pas franchir. Menace balistique. Comme à l’époque de la guerre froide, le chemin le plus court entre les sites de lancement russes et le Canada passe à travers le cœur de l’Arctique. C’est de ce constat qu’est venue la décision de construire la ligne de radars d’alerte avancée de la DEW (Distant Early Warning) construite dans les années 1950 (1954-57), puis modernisée en Système d’alerte du Nord (North Warning System (SAN)) à la fin des années 1980. La veille de surveillance effectuée par le SAN est complétée par la base canadienne d’Alert (écoute électronique) et par la base américaine de Thulé dans l’extrême nord du Groenland. Toute attaque balistique laisse peu de temps de réaction : c’est davantage la détection par imagerie satellite de la préparation au lancement de missiles terrestres (ouverture des silos) qui peut donner un indice de l’imminence d’une attaque, sachant qu’une attaque peut également être lancée depuis des sous-marins stratégiques stationnés, vu la portée de leurs missiles, dans l’Atlantique ou le Pacifique. C’est davantage sur le plan politique que la détection d’une possible attaque doit être effectuée : le discours du gouvernement russe change-t-il ? Y a-t-il une inflexion dans les discours sur les seuils politiques ?  Pour le moment, si la Russie a entretenu une ambiguïté sur la transition entre conventionnel et nucléaire, la doctrine russe s’en tient à l’idée que Moscou n’utilisera l’arme nucléaire en Ukraine qu’en cas de « menace existentielle » contre la Russie, comme l’a déclaré mardi le 22 mars, le porte-parole du Kremlin Dmitri Peskov. Que signifie une menace existentielle en Ukraine, sachant que l’armée ukrainienne ne dispose plus d’armes nucléaires depuis 1994 et pas d’armes chimiques ?  Toute menace politique crédible envers le régime, de ce point de vue, pourrait être interprétée par le président Poutine comme une menace existentielle.  Dans cette optique, afficher comme objectif politique pour les Occidentaux, la chute du gouvernement russe pourrait se révéler risquée. On peut observer que la Russie semble maîtriser parfaitement ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler la « grammaire de la dissuasion » en laissant planer l’ambiguïté sur la notion de « menace existentielle » qui correspond à ce que les Occidentaux appellent les « intérêts vitaux ». Mais en la matière, la dissuasion nucléaire avec destruction mutuelle assurée (mutual assured destruction, MAD) fonctionne pour le moment. Menace navale. Elle est du même ordre que la menace balistique : des sous-marins peuvent tirer des missiles, nucléaires ou conventionnels (portée d’environ 1 000 km pour les Zircon hypersoniques), depuis de nombreux points des approches maritimes du Canada.  Il est un peu illusoire de penser pouvoir se prémunir de telles attaques-surprises. Comme pour d’éventuels raids aériens (voir ci-dessous), l’éventualité d’une attaque de missiles conventionnels tirés depuis des sous-marins pose la question de l’utilité d’une telle attaque pour la Russie : après avoir endommagé une base militaire ou un port, quel avantage la Russie en tirerait-elle sachant qu’il lui faudrait faire face à la riposte ? Ce type de menace ferait sens uniquement dans le cadre d’une escalade conventionnelle, par exemple en réponse à une entrée de l’OTAN dans le conflit par le biais d’une zone d’interdiction aérienne. Menace aérienne. Une attaque aérienne russe contre le Canada passerait vraisemblablement par l’Arctique.  De quels actifs l’armée de l’air russe dispose-t-elle ?  Les bombardiers lourds (Tu-95 Bear, Tu-160 Blackjack) sont basés sur des bases aériennes plus au sud, Engels, Shaykovka, Belaya ou Ukrainka, mais il est aisé de les transférer avec leur soutien logistique vers des aérodromes sibériens, dont ceux qui ont été récemment rénovés (et non pas construits ex-nihilo), Nagurskoye, Rogachevo, Sredny Ostrov, Temp (Kotelny) ou Anadyr notamment. Le risque est que ce redéploiement ne soit détecté par observation satellite. Une escorte de chasseurs pour ces bombardiers parait plus difficile à déployer : les chasseurs russes comme le Sukhoi-35 Flanker E (1 800 km) ou le moderne Sukhoi-57 Felon (2 200 km) ont des rayons d’action trop faibles pour pouvoir les escorter jusqu’au territoire canadien, sauf à recourir au ravitaillement en vol avec des Iliouchine Il-78 prépositionnés – dont les Russes ne possèdent qu’un nombre réduit –, ce qui accroit le risque de détection avancée par les radars de Thulé ou du SAN du fait de ce pré-positionnement des avions de ravitaillement, et du déroulement de l’opération de ravitaillement à moyenne altitude. Figure 1. Emplacement des bases aériennes stratégiques russes et itinéraires des patrouilles de bombardiers. Source : Lasserre et Têtu, 2016. Ces bombardiers ont de longs rayons d’action (Tu-160 : 6 100 km ; Tu-95 : 7 500 km), ce qui, au départ d’aérodromes sibériens, leur permet d’atteindre le nord des provinces des Prairies. Équipés de missiles de croisière à charges conventionnelles comme les AS-15 Kent (2 500 km) ou encore de missiles hypersoniques semi-balistiques tirés d’avions comme les Kinjal (2 000 km), les bombardiers pourraient alors menacer les grands centres urbains, en supposant bien entendu qu’ils n’aient pas été interceptés auparavant après une aussi longue incursion en territoire canadien.  L’attaque pourrait aussi viser les stations de radar du SAN ou des bases aériennes comme Cold Lake dans le nord de l’Alberta, ou Elmendorff en Alaska, ce qui permettrait aux bombardiers de lancer leurs missiles un peu avant leur arrivée au-dessus du territoire canadien dans le cas d’une attaque contre Cold Lake. La capacité de tir à distance (stand-off) des missiles de croisière rend tout à fait réelle la vulnérabilité des installations dans le Grand Nord, avec un délai réduit entre détection et interception. Tout dépendrait alors du nombre de missiles tirés qui pourraient saturer les équipements antiaériens disponibles, batteries Patriot ou THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) pour contrer les missiles hypersoniques semi-balistiques comme le Kinjal. Il parait difficile de contrer complètement une telle menace, surtout en 1ère frappe, car cela impose aux avions radar AWACS (airborne warning and control system) et aux intercepteurs (CF18, F22, F15) des patrouilles d’interception (combat air patrol) très loin des bases[1]. Difficile, mais pas impossible. Plus on s’éloigne vers le sud, plus les aéronefs russes seraient forcés d’entrer profondément dans l’espace aérien nord-américain pour se mettre à distance de tir, ce qui les rend plus faciles à intercepter. Deux questions demeurent alors : Quelle est la portée efficace des radars du SAN, éventuellement appuyés par des vols d’avions de détection avancée (AWACS, par exemple des E-3 Sentry) en cas de crainte d’éventuelles incursions russes ? On lit dans les médias des déclarations d’experts selon lesquelles le Système d’alerte du Nord serait « incapable de répondre à la technologie des missiles modernes ». Les officiers du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD), qui supervisent le contrôle des approches de l’espace aérien de l’Amérique du Nord, ont sûrement analysé les performances de détection des radars du SAN depuis 2007, selon que les patrouilles russes volaient à haute ou basse altitude. De cet examen, sachant qu’il faut de plus que les radars soient efficaces contre les missiles également – et sachant également par ailleurs que les missiles hypersoniques sont difficiles à intercepter sans une forte densité de moyens antiaériens – découlera ou non la recommandation de la modernisation des systèmes de détection du SAN. Quelle pourrait être la doctrine d’emploi de telles attaques russes ? Car enfin, quelle serait l’utilité pour la Russie de détruire la base de Cold Lake avec un raid unique, si son objectif n’est pas une guerre complète contre l’OTAN ?  À quoi servirait une incursion isolée de ce type, sinon à déclencher un raid de représailles et ensuite la guerre contre les Occidentaux ?  D’un strict point de vue de l’efficacité politique ou militaire, un tel raid isolé est donc peu probable – tant que l’on se place dans le cadre d’un raisonnement basé sur une rationalité partagée du rapport coût militaire/avantage politique. Répondre à la question de la préparation militaire du Canada pose aussi la question du renseignement sur les représentations et la posture du gouvernement russe – demeure-t-on dans le domaine du rationnel, ou les décisions deviennent-elles imprévisibles ? On ne peut déconnecter le politique du militaire. Ces questions soulignent que les questions capacitaires militaires ne résument pas adéquatement l’équation de la sécurité du Canada. C’est bien davantage la question des objectifs, du contexte politique de l’évolution du conflit qui doivent donner la grille d’analyse de base : pourquoi la Russie attaquerait-elle le Canada ou un pays de l’OTAN ? L’évolution du conflit oriente les paramètres de raisonnement du gouvernement russe. Dans le contexte du brouillard de la guerre, on en est bien entendu réduit à des conjectures, mais des éléments méritent d’être soulignés. Il ne semble y avoir aucune raison pour la Russie de venir frapper une base canadienne, sauf si le conflit connait une inflexion majeure. Cette inflexion pourrait venir de l'OTAN qui serait intervenue, à travers une interdiction de vol au-dessus de l’Ukraine par exemple, ou encore parce que, ayant perdu la guerre, voyant son armée en train de connaitre de grandes difficultés et les conscrits se rendant en masse, donc grande fragilité de l'outil militaire, Vladimir Poutine estime que l'escalade délibérée dans la terreur serait la meilleure option. Scénario noir, hypothétique, mais pas impensable : l’armée russe a enregistré, sur 200 000 soldats engagés, des pertes allant de 7 500 à 15 000 tués selon les sources (l’armée russe ne rapportait que 498 morts au 16 mars), y compris 9 861 morts selon un quotidien russe et de 14 000 à 21 000 blessés, soit environ 5% de tués et des pertes comprises entre 10 et 15%, c’est un taux d’attrition très élevé en un mois de combat. Pour mémoire, et bien sûr sachant que ces deux conflits ne sont pas de même nature, l’occupation soviétique de l’Afghanistan avait coûté environ 14 500 morts à l’Armée Rouge de 1979 à 1989. Des contre-attaques localisées soulignent que l’armée ukrainienne n’a pas perdu sa capacité de réaction. La suite du conflit renvoie à la cohésion de l’armée ukrainienne ; à la gestion des munitions, le stock de missiles de croisière russe diminuant, alors qu’il semble que les livraisons d’armes occidentales à l’Ukraine semblent se poursuivre. La cohésion de l’armée russe sera-t-elle maintenue ? Les difficultés tactiques et logistiques inciteraient-elles le gouvernement dans une fuite en avant, bombardements massifs, emploi d’armes chimiques, voire, en cas de perception russe d’une grande fragilité, recours au nucléaire ? Par ailleurs, le régime de Vladimir Poutine semble s’appuyer de plus en plus sur une idéologie militariste dont le but ultime serait « la victoire du monde russe » sur les « forces hostiles occidentales qui menacent sa survie » et où la guerre est considérée comme un outil non seulement acceptable, mais le plus efficace pour atteindre les objectifs géopolitiques. Ce discours souligne que la question du poids des représentations des dirigeants russes et leurs objectifs politiques, demeure cruciale et peut évoluer au fur et à mesure que la guerre en Ukraine s’enlise et peut tourner au possible désavantage tactique de la Russie. On imagine mal un emploi en premier de la force de la part de la Russie contre l’OTAN, mais les risques d’escalade accidentelle ou de fuite en avant ne sont jamais nuls. [1] Ce qui, incidemment, souligne la pertinence de chasseurs à long rayon d’action pour protéger les grands espaces arctiques. Ce n’est pas une caractéristique du F-35, dont le rayon d’action est très court, 1 100 km contre 1 300 km pour le F-22, et 1 800 km pour le F-18. ## Comment le Canada devrait-il déployer, soutenir et étendre sa nouvelle stratégie pour l’Afrique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/comment-le-canada-devrait-il-deployer-soutenir-et-etendre-sa-nouvelle-strategie-pour-lafrique/ Modified: 2025-11-17 Policy Forum Politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur un sujet important pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Pour cette troisième édition, nous avons demandé à quatre experts leur point de vue sur la nouvelle stratégie canadienne pour l’Afrique. Nadège Compaoré | Université de Toronto Le Canada est le plus grand investisseur étranger dans le secteur minier africain, avec plus de 37 milliards de dollars d'actifs miniers sur le continent. La stratégie du Canada sur l’Afrique devrait repenser les termes actuels des partenariats avec les pays africains riches en minerais, notamment dans des régions telles que le Sahel, et aller au-delà des considérations économiques en abordant les questions de paix et de sécurité. Compte tenu de l'importance croissante des réserves minérales essentielles de l'Afrique pour les énergies renouvelables, des pays comme la République démocratique du Congo et ses énormes réserves de cobalt méritent une attention diplomatique bilatérale plus approfondie, qui devrait donner la priorité au bien-être des communautés locales. Toute réflexion sur le partenariat minier avec l'Afrique devrait également impliquer une surveillance accrue des sociétés minières canadiennes opérant en Afrique. Jusqu'à présent, cette question a été laissée à l'appréciation des entreprises elles-mêmes, compte tenu de leur adhésion volontaire aux cadres de responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE) lorsqu'il s'agit de s'engager dans les secteurs extractifs à travers le continent. Au-delà de la génération de revenus économiques, l'élaboration d'une vision et d'une stratégie cohérentes pour le partenariat avec les pays africains en matière de gouvernance minière devrait être guidée de manière plus systématique par des considérations environnementales et relatives aux droits humains. La mise en place de cette vision stratégique nécessiterait une collaboration et une réglementation accrues avec les entreprises canadiennes présentes en Afrique, ainsi qu'un alignement étroit sur les normes régionales existantes, telles que la Vision minière africaine de l'Union africaine. La stratégie africaine du Canada ne précise pas actuellement les mécanismes possibles pour un partenariat minier. Elle met certes l'accent sur les minéraux critiques comme domaine prioritaire dont le gouvernement cherche à faciliter l'accès pour « le secteur privé et les parties prenantes », notamment par le biais d'une « mission commerciale de haut niveau » en Afrique. Et en effet, le secteur minier est fondamentalement pertinent pour les cinq domaines stratégiques élaborés dans la stratégie globale, y compris la sécurité nationale. Cependant, prendre au sérieux un partenariat minier entre le Canada et l'Afrique signifie également prendre au sérieux le concept de « responsabilité de l'État d'origine » en ce qui concerne la présence minière du Canada en Afrique. Le Canada doit donc élaborer une approche durable et fondée sur les droits en matière d'investissement. Compte tenu de ses expériences passées avec les stratégies de RSE menées par le gouvernement et conçues pour promouvoir le bien-être et la protection des communautés d'accueil où opèrent les entreprises canadiennes, le gouvernement canadien sait qu'il joue un rôle crucial dans l'élaboration d'investissements éthiques à l'étranger. La stratégie africaine du Canada est l'occasion de s'approprier ce rôle. Un mécanisme de responsabilité de l'État d'origine ne devrait pas se limiter au niveau bilatéral et serait plus efficace s'il était mis en place aux niveaux régional et mondial. Nadège Compaoré est professeure adjointe en relations internationales à l'Université de Toronto. Ses recherches actuelles portent sur les revendications de souveraineté des États et des communautés touchés par l'extraction des ressources naturelles en Afrique. Marie-Eve Desrosiers | Université d’Ottawa La nouvelle stratégie canadienne pour l’Afrique arrive à point nommé dans un contexte où la compétition internationale entre différents pays pour accroitre leur influence sur ce continent est plus palpable que jamais. Or, ce que propose cette stratégie, en particulier dans le domaine de la gouvernance, de l’appui aux processus démocratiques et de la défense des droits de la personne, demeure timide, voire dépassé. Le continent africain n’est pas en marge de la grande récession démocratique que connaît le monde depuis deux décennies. S’il abrite certains des cas les plus probants de retour à la démocratie, comme les Seychelles, il se trouve aussi au cœur d’une vague de coups d’État qui frappe tout particulièrement le Sahel. Ailleurs sur le continent, l’enracinement autoritaire se poursuit, de manière moins spectaculaire qu’une prise de pouvoir par la force, mais tout aussi préoccupante. Le nombre de tentatives de modifications de la constitution pour permettre à un président de rester au pouvoir au-delà des limites constitutionnelles permises a en effet cru de manière significative en Afrique depuis quinze ans. Enfin, l’Afrique est également un contexte où de plus en plus de pays autoritaires cherchent à approfondir leurs relations, ce qui change la donne quant à l’influence que des pays comme le Canada peuvent avoir. Les temps, les tendances et les pratiques ont changé. Pourtant, ce que le Canada propose dans sa stratégie ne diffère pas de l’approche proposée par les pays pro-démocratie depuis déjà dix ans. Appuyer les processus électoraux, contrer la désinformation, promouvoir l’égalité des genres et protéger les droits de la personne – les priorités mises de l’avant sous le vocable « gouvernance » de la nouvelle stratégie – constituent certes des enjeux majeurs. Mais ce sont aussi les mêmes priorités qui dominent depuis bien avant l’enracinement de la récession démocratique actuelle. Ces priorités ont également éclipsé d’autres dimensions essentielles de la résilience démocratique, telles que le renforcement de la justice, des parlements et des institutions d’audit public, désormais sous-financées. Or, les principales forces de résistance aux dérives autoritaires observées en Afrique ces dernières années ont reposé sur l’esprit de l’État de droit, l’indépendance des cours de justice et la mobilisation citoyenne au sein de coalitions traversant classes et identités. Ce sont également des priorités que le Canada devrait centrer au cœur de sa stratégie s’il souhaite que celle-ci soit adaptée aux défis actuels de gouvernance en Afrique. Marie-Eve Desrosiers est titulaire de la chaire de recherche en francophonie internationale sur les aspirations et les mouvements politiques en Afrique francophone. Elle est professeure à l'École d'Affaires Publiques et Internationales. Nicolas Klingelschmitt | UQAM L’annonce du lancement de la nouvelle stratégie du Canada pour l’Afrique en mars 2025 fait suite à près de deux années de consultations de partenaires et d’expert-e-s. Pourtant, si elle est présentée comme « nouvelle », elle ne semble pas à première vue introduire des innovations majeures dans la politique étrangère d’Ottawa sur le continent. Sans être révolutionnaire, pour avancer ses objectifs diplomatiques, économiques ou encore d’appui à la paix et la sécurité, elle doit surtout s’accompagner de moyens, inscrire ses programmes et objectifs dans une vision plus ciblée et distincte des 54 États du continent, et mettre l’accent sur le renforcement des liens et la visibilité des opportunités de part et d’autre. Commençons par l’évidence : pour avoir une bonne stratégie, le Canada doit d’abord la financer. En comparaison, la stratégie Indopacifique fut accompagnée lors de son lancement en 2022 d’une enveloppe budgétaire de plus de deux milliards de $CAD. Cependant, aucun décaissement spécifique supplémentaire n’a pour l’instant concrétisé l’annonce de la nouvelle stratégie africaine du Canada. Ensuite, Pour avoir une bonne politique étrangère vis-à-vis de ses partenaires africains, le Canada doit en réalité en avoir plusieurs, en considérant l’Afrique dans la diversité de ses régions, de ses contextes et de ses acteurs. L’essentialisation du continent en une seule grande stratégie est une erreur qui entraine des risques de préjugés et mauvais calculs stratégiques. Enfin, et ce point est essentiel pour mettre en œuvre le précédent, Ottawa doit renforcer son maillage diplomatique à travers le continent. Le Canada compte quinze ambassades et neuf hauts-commissariats et a depuis deux ans un représentant permanent auprès de l’Union Africaine (UA), sans néanmoins avoir des émissaires équivalents entièrement dédiés à l’une des huit Communautés Économiques Régionales officiellement reconnues par l’UA, ou encore auprès des unions monétaires d’Afrique de l’Ouest ou Centrale. Ces relais stratégiques bilatéraux et multilatéraux doivent pourtant être plus nombreux pour renforcer les partenariats publics et privés locaux et envoyer un signal positif aux investisseurs canadiens potentiels en montrant l’engagement canadien non seulement en parole, mais également sur le plan financier, matériel et humain. Nicolas Klingelschmitt est candidat au doctorat en science politique à l’Université du Québec à Montréal et titulaire d’une licence en droit et en science politique ainsi que d’un master en relations internationales - gestion de programmes internationaux de l’Université Lyon 3 (France). Falk Petegou | Université d’Ottawa La nouvelle stratégie du Canada pour l’Afrique devrait s’implémenter à partir d’une approche différenciée—c’est-à-dire, qui tienne compte des différences, des particularités, des besoins, des contextes.  Ceci implique la mise sur pied par le Canada d’un indice de mesure des critères de priorité. Cet indice canadien de coopération en Afrique pourraient être mis à jour annuellement pour évaluer chaque partenaire et composé d’indicateurs qualitatifs dont, la stabilité politique, le potentiel économique, la diplomatie, l’engagement pour le climat, l’inclusion sociale, la sécurité humaine. Chaque pays partenaire africain pourrait être classé sur un score global de 140 à raison de 20 points pour chaque indicateur selon les priorités du canada. Les scores permettent de déterminer le niveau de comptabilité avec les objectifs du Canada. Les résultats permettront de déterminer le type d’intervention. Par exemple, le Sénégal et l’Afrique du Sud ont un fort potentiel économique et une stabilité politique, ce qui permet le lancement d’un fonds d’investissement pour les startups locales en partenariat avec des entreprises canadiennes. Il faut considérer la priorité comme le consensus sur le respect des normes édictées dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des actions d’intervention. Elle pourrait se mesurer dans les secteurs clés de l’intervention à partir de l’analyse des discours en lien à la sécurité partagée et commune. Les discours sont des déclarations repérées dans les actes administratifs, les communiqués, les positions publiques et officielles, les témoignages et les mémoires et autres publications à caractères scientifiques. Ils reposent sur les critères suivants : la productivité (par exemple, la déclaration du Canada sur la paix et la sécurité au Sahel avec le lancement de programmes de formation des acteurs locaux en matière de protection des civils et des droits humains), l’itérabilité (par exemple, la répétition des principes de prévention des conflits, d’égalité de genres et d’inclusion au sein du sommet Canada-Afrique, l’Union africaine), la reconnaissance sociale (par exemple, l’appui canadien à la participation des femmes dans les processus de paix repris par les partenaires en République Démocratique du Congo). Il faudrait enfin élaborer un calendrier d’intervention en fonction des priorités déterminées. Falk Petegou est professeur invité à l'École d'Affaires Publiques et Internationales de l'Université d'Ottawa et détenteur d'un Ph.D. en Études Internationales. Il a été chercheur invité à l'Institut pour la Recherche de la Paix de Francfort (PRIF). ## Comment le Canada peut-il remédier à la crise du recrutement et de la rétention au sein des Forces armées canadiennes ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/comment-le-canada-peut-il-remedier-a-la-crise-du-recrutement-et-de-la-retention-au-sein-des-forces-armees-canadiennes/ Modified: 2025-10-01 Policy Forum Politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur un sujet important pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Pour cette deuxième édition, nous avons demandé à quatre experts leur point de vue sur la crise du recrutement et de la rétention toujours en cours dans la Forces armées canadiennes au moment où le gouvernement tente d'augmenter ses dépenses militaires. Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Université Deakin  Contrairement à ce que semble laisser entendre le discours public, la crise du recrutement et de la rétention au sein des Forces armées canadiennes n'est pas simple. Par exemple, l'augmentation de la rémunération est une mesure bienvenue, mais elle ne résoudra pas le problème à long terme. Tout doit être réformé, du processus de génération du personnel aux logements militaires, car bon nombre des politiques régissant la gestion du personnel ne sont pas adaptées pour attirer et retenir les militaires. Nous ne pouvons pas seulement blâmer l'armée pour son retard dans la mise en œuvre du plan « Fort, sûr, engagé » (2017), car beaucoup de cartes sont entre les mains du Cabinet. Pour réussir à retenir le personnel, il faudra modifier les politiques relatives au logement militaire (au sein du Conseil du Trésor), éliminer les obstacles administratifs entre les provinces (ce qui profiterait à tous les Canadiens) et utiliser les 600 millions de dollars restants consacrés aux questions de personnel dans le cadre des 2 % du PIB consacrés aux dépenses de défense pour renforcer les capacités de formation – un aspect sous-estimé de l'intégration de nouvelles plateformes telles que les destroyers de classe River ou les prochains avions de combat (quel que soit le fournisseur). Concentrer le capital politique et les fonds sur ces questions de défense « non sensibles » exige des dirigeants civils et militaires qu'ils prennent certains risques, ce qui nécessite à son tour un changement de mentalité. Il faudra s'éloigner de la mentalité très erronée du ratio « dents-queue », qui a conduit à considérer les dépenses liées au personnel comme peu sérieuses. En réalité, pour réussir à recruter et à fidéliser des aviateurs, des marins et des soldats, il faut du personnel pour traiter, former, rémunérer, nourrir et gérer les militaires, de leur enrôlement à leur libération. Cela nécessite des investissements dans la « queue », c'est-à-dire dans le personnel et les processus qui ne sont pas directement impliqués dans la réalisation des effets opérationnels. Charlotte Duval-Lantoine est vice-présidente des opérations à Ottawa du Canadian Global Affairs Institute,  directrice générale et conseillère en matière d'égalité des sexes chez Triple Helix et doctorante à l'université Deakin. Stéfanie von Hlatky, Université Queen's  Cette année, les FAC ont dépassé leur objectif de recrutement après avoir longtemps lutté pour surmonter une crise « existentielle » en matière de personnel militaire. Bien que cette nouvelle représente un renversement de tendance encourageant pour le chef du personnel militaire (CPM), elle ne comblera pas immédiatement le déficit massif en personnel qui s'est accumulé au fil des ans. Alors que le Canada augmente ses dépenses de défense, il doit donner la priorité aux investissements dans le personnel militaire de manière cohérente, afin d'éviter de reproduire l'incertitude qui a caractérisé ces dernières années, où des coupes massives ont été suivies d'augmentations budgétaires encore plus importantes. Les FAC ont mis en place des réformes globales liées au personnel militaire. Ces réformes nécessitent du temps et de l'argent. Les changements fréquents à la tête de l'organisation et les fluctuations budgétaires nuisent à ces progrès. De nombreux facteurs ont contribué au manque de personnel des FAC, et l'organisation a réagi en conséquence. Certains facteurs échappent au contrôle de l'armée, comme la pandémie et l'économie. Pour remédier au retard pris en matière de recrutement et de formation pendant la pandémie, le CMP a conçu des règles d'admission plus souples, en prenant plus de risques dès le départ pour recruter des candidats et en instaurant une période d'essai afin de procéder à des coupes plus tard dans le processus. Pour remédier au goulot d'étranglement de la formation, qui freinait le rythme du recrutement et décourageait les recrues en attente de qualifications, les FAC ont investi massivement dans ce domaine, en offrant des incitations salariales aux instructeurs. En numérisant le système de recrutement, les FAC se sont efforcées d'améliorer les processus et les procédures qui ont le plus d'impact sur les nouvelles recrues. Confrontés à un système lent et confus, de nombreux candidats ont abandonné toute perspective de rejoindre les forces armées, renonçant à un système qui leur était hostile dès le départ. Il est certain que les CAF n'ont pas de problème d'attractivité. En 2023-2024, plus de 70 000 candidatures ont été reçues, mais moins de 5 000 recrues ont été enrôlées. Le problème des FAC réside dans leur capacité à répondre aux attentes : elles doivent traiter rapidement les dossiers, cultiver une culture professionnelle du plus haut niveau tout en offrant une formation et des expériences opérationnelles qui répondent aux aspirations de leurs membres. Les FAC sont sur la bonne voie en poursuivant des réformes sur plusieurs fronts pour y parvenir, mais cet élan pourrait rapidement s'essouffler, revenant à ce que l'ancien ministre de la Défense Blair a récemment qualifié de « spirale mortelle ». Stéfanie von Hlatky est titulaire de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur le genre, la sécurité et les forces armées, boursière de la Fondation Pierre Elliot Trudeau et professeure titulaire au département d'études politiques de l'Université Queen's. Philippe Lagassé, Université Carleton Il n'y a pas un seul facteur qui influence le recrutement et la rétention dans les Forces armées canadiennes. Un domaine qui peut contribuer à améliorer le recrutement et la rétention est un investissement important dans les infrastructures de défense. En termes simples, le personnel militaire et leurs familles méritent de vivre et de travailler dans des bâtiments, des installations et des conditions sûrs. La réparation, le remplacement et la modernisation des infrastructures de défense du Canada contribueraient grandement à garantir cette sécurité et à rendre la carrière dans les FAC plus attrayante. Le ministère de la Défense nationale gère un nombre considérable de bâtiments. Selon le Répertoire des biens immobiliers fédéraux, la Défense nationale gère 14 042 bâtiments, d'une superficie totale de 7 991 175 pieds carrés. Malgré cette empreinte massive, les infrastructures de défense ont été chroniquement négligées et sous-financées. Cela reflète en partie le fait que le Canada n'a pas consacré suffisamment de fonds à la défense nationale pendant plusieurs décennies. Cela reflète également les transferts de responsabilité passés entre les commandements environnementaux et le ministère de la Défense en matière d'infrastructures. Les infrastructures ont trop longtemps manqué d'un défenseur dédié, jusqu'à la création du poste de sous-ministre adjoint chargé des infrastructures et de l'environnement. En raison du sous-investissement dans les infrastructures de défense pendant des décennies, de nombreux bâtiments dans lesquels les membres des FAC travaillent et vivent sont en mauvais état ou ne sont plus adaptés à leur usage. Dans d'autres cas, ces bâtiments peuvent contenir des substances dangereuses, telles que l'amiante. Bien que cela ne soit pas nécessairement un facteur déterminant dans la décision d'une personne de s'engager ou de rester dans l'armée, les conditions de travail et de vie physiques ont leur importance. En effet, nous avons tendance à reconnaître que des capacités de pointe peuvent jouer un rôle dans le recrutement et la fidélisation ; il est plus facile de convaincre les gens de s'engager dans l'armée lorsque les forces armées ne sont pas encombrées d'équipements plus anciens que de nombreux officiers supérieurs. Une logique similaire devrait s'appliquer aux infrastructures de défense. Philippe Lagassé est professeur agrégé et titulaire de la chaire Barton à la Norman Paterson School of International Affairs de l'Université Carleton. Richard Shimooka, Institut Macdonald-Laurier Les armées modernes, à l'image des sociétés dont elles sont issues, s'appuient sur un éventail de compétences de plus en plus diversifié pour mener à bien leurs diverses missions. À quelques exceptions près, comme la cyberguerre ou la médecine, les FAC ne peuvent recruter ces personnes au sein du grand public, car ces compétences sont uniques et nécessitent une formation spécialisée. L'armée doit donc les former de manière organique au sein de son propre effectif et les conserver pendant au moins une décennie afin d'optimiser l'investissement. Malheureusement, c'est là que surgira le prochain goulot d'étranglement de la politique du personnel, ce qui compliquera la capacité des FAC à reconstituer leurs effectifs et à créer les nouvelles unités et fonctions nécessaires à la mise en œuvre de la politique de défense. La dure réalité est que le système actuel est surchargé : un mélange toxique de personnel insuffisant remplissant trop de fonctions opérationnelles. Il en résulte un manque de personnel qualifié excédentaire disponible pour former la prochaine génération de professionnels. Ce manque de capacité limitera la croissance, ce qui pourrait entraîner un processus de réhabilitation qui prendra plusieurs décennies pour de nombreux métiers clés. L'alternative consiste à réduire temporairement les engagements militaires du Canada, car une réduction opérationnelle permettrait aux FAC de former rapidement de nombreux militaires qualifiés et de les faire passer à de nouveaux équipements si nécessaire. Cette solution pourrait être difficile à accepter pour les alliés internationaux du Canada, mais beaucoup l'accepteront si elle s'accompagne de la promesse crédible que des FAC beaucoup plus performantes se développeront à moyen terme. Avec un recrutement soutenu et une gestion politique habile du dossier de la défense, c'est réalisable. La seule question est de savoir si Ottawa est suffisamment perspicace pour comprendre la situation dans laquelle il se trouve et pour mettre en œuvre des politiques créatives qui revitaliseront les FAC en temps opportun. Richard Shimooka est chercheur à l'Institut Macdonald-Laurier. Ses travaux portent sur des sujets variés qui incluent les politiques étrangères et de défense du Canada et des États-Unis. ## Comment ouvrir le dialogue avec la nouvelle Syrie? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/comment-ouvrir-le-dialogue-avec-la-nouvelle-syrie/ Modified: 2025-04-30 Alors que la Syrie entame un nouveau chapitre après la fin du régime Assad, le Canada réaffirme son engagement en faveur de la paix, de la stabilité, de la gouvernance inclusive et de la réduction de la crise mondiale des réfugiés. Ce rapport décrit comment le Canada devrait s'engager auprès du nouveau gouvernement intérimaire dirigé par Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). La situation en Syrie a de nombreuses implications pour la politique étrangère et de sécurité du Canada, y compris, mais sans s'y limiter, le potentiel de résurgence des groupes extrémistes violents, la réinstallation des réfugiés et la prévention de toute nouvelle violation des droits de l'homme. Le Canada est confronté à une décision complexe dans l'évolution de la situation en Syrie, en conciliant ses valeurs en matière de droits de l'homme et de médiation mondiale avec sa propre sécurité et ses propres intérêts. Si la chute d'Assad correspond aux objectifs du Canada, la montée en puissance du HTS pose ses propres problèmes en raison de son affiliation historique à Al-Qaïda et à ISIS. Une approche multilatérale et stratégique, ainsi que le soutien des alliés et les engagements des donateurs, constituent le meilleur moyen d'assurer une transition pacifique, sans conflit, dirigée par les Syriens. Compte tenu de la situation actuelle et des intérêts stratégiques du Canada, je recommande au gouvernement du Canada d'accroître sa collaboration en matière de renseignement dans la région et d'élaborer des politiques claires pour le rapatriement et la réadaptation des combattants étrangers canadiens dans la région. Les stratégies du Canada reposent sur sa coopération avec ses alliés mondiaux et régionaux. Plus loin dans le rapport, je m'appuie sur les stratégies de l'Union européenne (UE) et du Royaume-Uni lors de la conférence annuelle « Syria Pledge » en mars 2025. J'approfondis également les stratégies de coopération du Canada avec ses alliés dans la région, principalement la Jordanie et le Liban. Enfin, j'examine l'approche de l'OTAN et le rôle du Canada en Syrie. Je souligne en outre l'importance de soutenir les efforts en matière de droits de l'homme dans la région. Enfin, je conseille au gouvernement de s'engager diplomatiquement auprès du gouvernement intérimaire pour une transition pacifique. Ces recommandations visent à favoriser la stabilité, à soutenir la gouvernance démocratique et à promouvoir les droits de l'homme dans la région. Les intérêts du Canada dans la région Spécialiste des affaires du Moyen-Orient, le professeur Thomas Juneau a affirmé que le Canada n'en avait pas fait assez en Syrie il y a de cela dix ans. Ces propos sont toujours d'actualité. À l'époque, la politique était axée sur le fait qu'aucune victoire d'un belligérant ne serait dans l'intérêt de la sécurité et de la prospérité du Canada. Au contraire, la politique d'endiguement du Canada s'articulait autour de la nécessité de « renforcer les capacités des partenaires régionaux vulnérables, de soutenir les initiatives internationales de lutte contre la prolifération et de contribuer aux efforts humanitaires ». La stratégie actuelle du Canada pour la Syrie fait partie de sa stratégie pangouvernementale pour le Moyen-Orient. Ayant investi plus de 4 milliards de dollars entre 2016 et 2022 pour répondre à la crise actuelle en Irak et en Syrie, Ottawa a poursuivi quatre objectifs stratégiques principaux. L'un d'entre eux a consisté à fournir aux populations touchées par la crise une aide humanitaire fondée sur les besoins et tenant compte des sexospécificités. Le Canada a coopéré avec des agences de l'ONU, des organisations non gouvernementales et le Mouvement international de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge pour aider les personnes vulnérables. Le deuxième objectif est d'aider les communautés à renforcer leur résilience face à un conflit prolongé. En Syrie, le Canada a contribué à la programmation des moyens de subsistance et à la garantie de l'autosuffisance et de l'autonomie des ménages dirigés par des femmes, a renforcé les capacités des organisations de femmes et a sensibilisé les communautés touchées. Le troisième volet a consisté à soutenir les efforts de responsabilisation liés aux crimes de guerre, au génocide, aux crimes contre l'humanité et aux allégations d'utilisation d'armes chimiques. L'engagement d'Ottawa en faveur des initiatives de justice transitionnelle vise à tenir toutes les parties au conflit responsables de la mise en place de la société civile et des initiatives de consolidation de la paix, tout en soutenant la participation politique des femmes. Enfin, le Canada a soutenu les initiatives diplomatiques qui contribuent à une résolution politique durable du conflit. L'engagement du Canada en faveur d'une solution négociée en travaillant avec les alliés, les pays partageant les mêmes idées et l'envoyé spécial des Nations unies pour la Syrie. Ottawa a réaffirmé son engagement en faveur d'un meilleur accès humanitaire aux civils, d'un cessez-le-feu et du respect des droits de l'homme et du droit international humanitaire. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham et sa consolidation du pouvoir Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) est une coalition d'insurgés islamistes sunnites basée dans le nord de la Syrie. Elle est issue de Jabhat al-Nusrah, qui était l'ancienne branche d'Al-Qaïda en Syrie. Le HTS a été formé en 2017 lorsque le Front Nusrah a fusionné avec d'autres groupes anti-régime dans le nord-ouest de la Syrie. Le groupe s'est principalement concentré sur les attaques contre le régime d'Assad et a cherché à le remplacer. Toutefois, le groupe s'est orienté vers la préservation du statu quo en mettant fin au conflit, en renforçant sa gouvernance dans les zones qu'il contrôle et en obtenant une reconnaissance internationale. Le groupe a perdu le soutien de divers salafistes-djihadistes en raison de la priorité qu'il accorde à la gouvernance et de l'abandon perçu du « djihad ». HTS est le plus grand groupe combattant de l'opération « Dissuasion de l'agression en Syrie », le groupe de coordination formé pour coordonner les opérations militaires dans l'opposition au régime d'Assad. Il était auparavant connu sous le nom de Jabhat al-Nusra. Au début du printemps arabe en 2011, il a été formé par l'ISIS, dont il s'est séparé pour déclarer son allégeance à Al-Qaïda. Le groupe comptait, selon les estimations, entre 10 000 et 30 000 combattants avant de rompre ses liens avec en 2017. Le groupe a ensuite changé de nom pour devenir HTS et a mis en place une nouvelle organisation avec plusieurs autres groupes similaires. HTS est composé de Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (la plus grande faction du groupe), Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din et Jaysh al-Sunna. L'analyste militaire Michael Clarke note qu'au mieux, « nous pouvons espérer de HTS une sorte de “dictature bienveillante” qui tolère la mosaïque de peuples différents de la Syrie ». Des doutes subsistent quant au fait que HTS ait complètement renoncé à Al-Qaïda. Toutefois, les propos d'al-Sharaa, qui s'est engagé à « défendre les opprimés » et a promis de punir et de rendre des comptes « même à nos proches », semblent donner un peu d'espoir. Le HTS opère également et est allié à divers groupes dans le cadre de l'opération « Dissuasion de l'agression ». Le premier est le Tavhid va Jihod (KTJ), dont le chef précédent a été démis de ses fonctions par HTS pour avoir soutenu Al-Qaïda dans la région. Le groupe est composé de 400 à 500 combattants spécialisés dans les opérations de sniping, les assauts directs et les opérations derrière les lignes ennemies. Le second groupe, Xhemeti Alban (Tactique albanaise), est composé de 50 à 100 combattants albanais originaires du Kosovo, de Macédoine, d'Albanie et du sud de la Serbie. La division Mujahdin Ghuroba a rejoint HTS en 2017 et a été intégrée en tant que brigade Omar bin al-Khattab, composée de 200 à 400 combattants ouzbeks, tadjiks et ouïghours. Le Parti islamique du Turkestan (TIP) a créé une faction appelée « TIP in the Sham » composée de 1 000 et 2 000 combattants ouïghours. La tactique ouïghoure a rejoint le HTS en 2024 pour lutter contre un régime soutenu par un oppresseur chinois et pour soutenir les groupes turcs. Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (LMA) comprend 400 à 500 combattants tchétchènes, tadjiks, daghestanais, azerbaïdjanais, kazakhs et ukrainiens et a rejoint HTS en janvier 2017. La LMA offre un soutien opérationnel militaire ainsi que des moyens de communication et de propagande. Ajnad al-Kavkaz est un groupe exclusivement tchétchène qui opère dans le nord de la Syrie. Ce groupe est quelque peu indépendant de HTS et a participé à la défense de l'Ukraine contre la Russie. Le 8 décembre 2024, l'armée rebelle, dirigée par le HTS, s'empare de Damas et Ahmed al-Sharaa, précédemment connu sous le nom d'Abu Mohammad al-Julani, devient président par intérim de la République arabe syrienne. La politique étrangère d'Al-Sharaa s'est éloignée de la position anti-américaine et pro-russe d'Assad ; le gouvernement intérimaire a annoncé qu'il visait à rétablir les liens avec les États-Unis et qu'il croyait « que le président Trump cherchait la paix dans la région ». Al-Sharaa a rendu visite au prince héritier d'Arabie saoudite Mohammed bin Salman « pour soutenir la sécurité et la stabilité de la Syrie sœur “ et ” pour renforcer les relations bilatérales ». Il a suivi cette rencontre par un autre voyage en Turquie pour résoudre pacifiquement le conflit kurde. Avec la nomination de Mohammed Terko, un Kurde syrien, au poste de ministre de l'éducation, le cessez-le-feu entre les Forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS) dirigées par les Kurdes et les HTS, et les célébrations publiques du Newroz, nous voyons des signes du nouvel horizon politique de la Syrie. Ces événements marquent un tournant par rapport à la répression dont les Kurdes syriens ont été victimes sous le régime de Bachar el-Assad. La Syrie se trouve dans une période de transition politique et sociale, et les HTS sont confrontés à diverses menaces sécuritaires à l'intérieur des frontières syriennes, qui doivent être surmontées avant que le pays ne parvienne à la stabilité. Dans son premier discours en tant que président, al-Sharaa s'est engagé à « former un large gouvernement de transition, représentatif de la diversité de la Syrie ». Si l'on considère l'exemple de la gouvernance autoritaire des talibans après le retrait américain d'Afghanistan, la prudence est de mise. Ezzedine al-Rayeq, un avocat basé à Damas, a déclaré que même s'il aurait souhaité une approche plus démocratique pour nommer le président intérimaire, c'était la seule façon « réaliste et pragmatique » d'aller de l'avant. Le professeur Ziad Majed, expert du Moyen-Orient à l'Université américaine de Paris, met en garde contre l'importance d'éviter tout acte de vengeance à l'encontre de la communauté alaouite et des autres partisans du régime d'Assad. Dans une tentative d'encourager la patience et de signaler son engagement en faveur de la démocratie, al-Sharaa a annoncé qu'il prévoyait des élections en Syrie dans cinq ans. Superficiellement, ces plans indiquent un tournant positif et démocratique pour la Syrie. Hélas, de nombreuses menaces internes et externes doivent être affrontées pour assurer une transition pacifique. On peut toutefois craindre que la rhétorique de Damas ne serve qu'à apaiser les gouvernements occidentaux et à continuer à adopter une position anti-Assad afin de détourner l'attention de tout processus autoritaire à l'intérieur du pays. Vieilles blessures : Les divisions et les menaces historiques de la Syrie Les diverses menaces à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur des frontières de la Syrie sont omniprésentes. Sur le plan interne, al-Sharaa doit tenter de résoudre des conflits qui existaient bien avant le Printemps arabe de 2011 et qui continuent de menacer la sécurité de la région. Le risque de violence religieuse entre sunnites et alaouites persiste en Syrie et si le gouvernement intérimaire ne résout pas ces questions de manière pacifique, le potentiel de conflit augmente. Lorsqu'une voiture piégée a tué 19 à 20 personnes le 3 février 2025, il s'agissait d'une nouvelle menace pour la sécurité à laquelle al-Sharaa devait faire face. Le traumatisme et les blessures causés par la guerre civile sont restés profonds lorsqu'une patrouille de sécurité syrienne a été attaquée par des loyalistes d'Al-Assad le 6 mars 2025, ce qui a conduit à un affrontement dont on estime qu'il a tué plus de 1 000 personnes en deux jours. La destitution d'Assad n'était que la première étape d'un long chemin vers une Syrie sûre et sécurisée. Les menaces extérieures qui pèsent sur la sécurité de la Syrie et le risque de contagion au reste du Moyen-Orient et à l'Afrique du Nord restent une source d'inquiétude pour toutes les parties concernées. Les affrontements entre les troupes kurdes et les groupes militants turcs continuent d'être une source d'inquiétude, Ankara souhaitant surveiller de près tout accord entre le HTS et les groupes armés kurdes. Bien que la Turquie étende son rôle au maintien des canaux diplomatiques entre la Syrie et les membres de l'OTAN, elle a ses propres intérêts dans le maintien d'une relation avec la Russie et l'Iran. Le gouvernement d'Al-Sharaa doit également faire face aux appels à l'intervention chiite lancés par l'ancien Premier ministre irakien, Nouri al-Maliki. Les membres et les partisans du HTS étant sunnites, le discours émanant des voisins chiites pourrait déclencher des conflits et des troubles civils. La tension entre les groupes sunnites et les autres factions militaires ne cesse de croître depuis qu'al-Sharaa a dénoncé l'Iran et les a qualifiés de menace régionale. En outre, la construction d'avant-postes israéliens en Syrie fait peser la menace d'un conflit sur le plateau du Golan et la crainte d'un accaparement des terres par Israël. La position affirmée d'Israël malgré la présidence d'Al-Assad a marqué une relative stabilité frontalière, sa destitution a entraîné des frappes aériennes en Syrie en raison des préoccupations d'Israël concernant un vide politique en Syrie. Ce que cela signifie pour le Canada et ce qui pourrait être fait Le conflit en Syrie a des répercussions potentielles sur la sécurité mondiale et le Canada ne fait pas exception à la règle. Plus de 44 000 réfugiés syriens sont actuellement installés dans les différentes provinces du Canada. Si le conflit se poursuit, le risque d'une nouvelle crise des réfugiés augmente, avec des conséquences sur l'économie du Canada et sur les réfugiés eux-mêmes, qui ont fait part de leurs difficultés d'adaptation. En outre, comme le président intérimaire fait partie du HTS, que le Canada considère toujours comme une entité terroriste, et qu'il a commencé à tenter d'obtenir la légitimité et la reconnaissance internationale de son autorité par des visites internationales et des changements d'alliances, le gouvernement du Canada doit se concentrer sur la coopération et la médiation afin de prévenir d'autres conflits. L'évolution des alliances de la Syrie vers l'Arabie saoudite, tout en maintenant une relation avec la Turquie, est cruciale pour comprendre l'évolution de la dynamique régionale. Si l'on veut que la paix perdure, il faut s'efforcer de faire en sorte que ces liens régionaux avec la Syrie et ses voisins continuent de se développer. Le Canada doit décider du niveau de reconnaissance diplomatique et d'engagement avec le gouvernement intérimaire syrien afin de garantir ses propres intérêts étrangers et sa sécurité. La vacance du pouvoir et l'instabilité transitoire peuvent permettre à des groupes rivaux de se regrouper et de constituer des menaces potentielles pour la sécurité mondiale, à l'instar de ce qui s'est produit en 2013 avec ISIS. Ces groupes extrémistes violents n'étaient pas limités par les frontières et leurs mouvements étaient visibles dans le monde entier. Le gouvernement du Canada s'est également engagé à assurer la sécurité de sa population pour les combattants de l'ISIS qui reviennent. En effet, en tant que signataire de la Convention pour la répression et la prévention du crime de génocide, il a l'obligation légale de poursuivre les combattants étrangers de retour. La position du nouveau gouvernement syrien à l'égard des ressortissants étrangers devrait préoccuper les décideurs canadiens. Les combattants étrangers associés aux groupes d'opposition auront un impact sur les politiques de rapatriement et de suivi des citoyens canadiens impliqués dans les conflits, en particulier si le HTS cherche à les poursuivre en Syrie. D'un point de vue humanitaire, la transition pourrait entraîner de nouvelles vagues de réfugiés, en particulier ceux qui s'inquiètent des politiques des gouvernements actuels et des poursuites éventuelles à l'encontre des musulmans non sunnites. Le gouvernement du Canada devrait surveiller l'engagement du nouveau gouvernement en matière de droits de l'homme, en accordant une attention particulière aux minorités religieuses et ethniques. L'aide humanitaire fournie doit être ajustée pour répondre à ces objectifs. En outre, la politique de sanctions doit être évaluée et remplacée par la fourniture d'une aide humanitaire et la reconstruction. L'engagement le plus important que le Canada devrait peut-être envisager est son engagement diplomatique stratégique avec les alliés régionaux afin d'avoir une approche cohérente envers le nouveau gouvernement syrien, qui équilibre le soutien au processus démocratique avec la prudence nécessaire compte tenu des droits de l'homme et des antécédents illibéraux du HTS. L'ouverture d'une ambassade ou d'un consulat à Damas reste prématurée, mais une délégation officielle en Syrie et un échange conditionnel de renseignements pourraient améliorer les liens. Des concessions significatives deviennent un symbole de la relation et rendent les groupes moins susceptibles de revenir à la violence ; la fourniture d'une aide humanitaire inconditionnelle et des gestes symboliques réduisent la probabilité que la Syrie retourne à une guerre civile sous la direction d'un autre dictateur belliqueux. L'annonce par le Canada de la réduction des sanctions contre la Syrie - qui étaient des outils contre le régime Assad - est un premier pas positif pour permettre la reconstruction de la Syrie ; le gouvernement intérimaire à Damas a demandé le soutien international et l'engagement du Canada à financer l'aide humanitaire reflète le sentiment mondial d'engagement à aider le peuple syrien. Une approche multilatérale La stratégie du Canada en Syrie repose en grande partie sur sa coopération avec ses alliés internationaux et régionaux. Le 14 février 2025, dans une déclaration commune sur la Syrie en préparation de la conférence de mars, les participants ont exprimé leur volonté de coopérer pour assurer le succès du cadre de transition post-Assad, qui « doit être dirigé et pris en charge par les Syriens ». Le groupe a soutenu l'engagement d'al-Shara à représenter l'ensemble de la société syrienne ainsi que les membres de la diaspora syrienne. La déclaration commune a également réitéré son engagement à reconnaître le gouvernement syrien de transition, à lui apporter un soutien pour empêcher les groupes terroristes de rétablir leur refuge en territoire syrien, à cesser toutes les hostilités en Syrie en soutien à l'unification, et à mobiliser la communauté internationale pour accroître l'aide humanitaire et l'aide à la Syrie et à son peuple. En mars, l'Union européenne a réaffirmé son engagement à aider la Syrie en promettant une aide de 6 milliards d'euros pour assurer une transition politique pacifique du pouvoir, après l'éviction de l'ancien président Bachar al-Assad en décembre. Le gouvernement britannique a également renforcé son engagement en faveur d'une Syrie stable afin d'assurer « la sécurité intérieure et extérieure ». Le Plan pour le changement de Londres souligne l'engagement du Royaume-Uni à jouer un rôle de premier plan dans le redressement de la Syrie après le départ d'Assad. Hamish Falconer, ministre du Moyen-Orient, a promis 160 millions de livres sterling – à fournir par l'ONU et des ONG partenaires – pour fournir aux Syriens une aide essentielle, notamment en eau, en nourriture, en soins de santé et en éducation. Les dirigeants syriens par intérim étaient présents à la conférence annuelle « Syria Pledge » à Bruxelles, qui, pour la première fois depuis 2017, incluait des membres du gouvernement syrien. L'UE a réitéré la nécessité d'un engagement pour un nouveau départ, « malgré les violences meurtrières qui ont opposé ce mois-ci les nouveaux dirigeants islamistes aux fidèles d'Assad ». La conférence, malgré la désignation de HTC comme groupe terroriste par l'ONU, vise à dialoguer avec les nouveaux dirigeants, à condition qu'ils s'engagent à une transition inclusive et pacifique. L'OTAN a également souligné l'importance d'une approche prudente face à l'incertitude en Syrie. Le secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Mark Rutte, a qualifié la situation de « moment de joie, mais aussi d'incertitude », appelant à une transition menée par la Syrie, à condition que les rebelles syriens respectent l'État de droit, la protection des civils et les minorités religieuses. Cependant, la réponse de l'OTAN est loin d'être unanime. La Turquie a été critiquée par le président américain Donald Trump pour son contrôle des rebelles et pour la manière dont le président Recep Tayyip Erdoğan orchestre une « prise de pouvoir inamicale ». Malgré ces critiques, Ankara a réaffirmé sa position et salué sa coopération avec la Syrie et le HTS. Ibrahim Kalin, chef du renseignement turc, priait à la mosquée des Omeyyades avec al-Sharaa, et le ministre de la Défense Yasar Guler a souligné la nouvelle opportunité de fournir une formation et des ressources militaires pour soutenir les dirigeants de facto afin de stabiliser la Syrie. La position de l'OTAN sur la Syrie reste complexe et en proie à l'incertitude. Entre la coopération de Washington avec Tel-Aviv et les intérêts stratégiques d'Ankara et les accords avec Moscou, il n'existe pas d'approche unifiée sur la manière de gérer le HTS. Les conflits d'intérêts ont laissé l'OTAN sans stratégie unifiée, malgré la nécessité d'une résolution pacifique. L'approche non interventionniste de l'OTAN a eu des conséquences négatives tant qu'elle continue de représenter des intérêts divergents qui limitent son impact global. La coopération avec les alliés régionaux pourrait constituer le principal outil d'endiguement d'Ottawa. Les stratégies du Canada pour la Jordanie et le Liban ne se limitent pas à l'aide humanitaire. Elles mettent l'accent sur le renforcement de la sécurité à la frontière syrienne et sur le renforcement des capacités de leurs forces de sécurité afin de prévenir et de contrer l'extrémisme violent et de réduire le flux de combattants étrangers entrant et sortant de la Syrie. La coopération et la coordination du Canada avec la Jordanie et le Liban portent principalement sur les menaces à la sécurité découlant de la guerre civile syrienne. L'accord de cessez-le-feu entre la Syrie et le Liban offre au Canada l'occasion d'utiliser Beyrouth pour assurer un certain degré de sécurité dans la région afin qu'Ottawa puisse réussir sa mission en Syrie. L'ambassadrice du Canada au Liban, Stefanie McCollum, jouera un double rôle en tant qu'ambassadrice de la Syrie et renforcera l'engagement du Canada à renforcer les liens diplomatiques avec le gouvernement intérimaire. L'envoyé spécial du Canada pour la Syrie, Omar Alghabra, a effectué une visite en Égypte, en Jordanie et au Liban pour réitérer leur engagement à contribuer à une transition pacifique et inclusive en Syrie. Alghabra est allée au-delà de l'approche traditionnelle d'endiguement et a plutôt réorienté son discours vers un renforcement de l'engagement humanitaire du Canada pour assurer la sécurité alimentaire, les soins de santé, l'eau et l'assainissement, ainsi que les services de protection, grâce à la coopération avec ses alliés régionaux – l'Égypte, la Jordanie et le Liban. La mission d'Alghabra s'est concentrée sur le renforcement de la coopération avec les consultants régionaux afin de consolider les liens diplomatiques et de coordonner les stratégies d'intervention humanitaire. Ottawa peut ainsi tirer parti de la reconnaissance internationale et des engagements rhétoriques de HTC en matière de droits de la personne pour retrouver son rôle de médiateur et instaurer une plus grande confiance avec ses alliés régionaux. Le tigre aura-t-il toujours les mêmes rayures?  L’une des principales préoccupations de toutes les parties concernées est la possibilité que HTS suive la voie des talibans une fois la situation retombée. À l’instar de la Syrie, l’Afghanistan continue de faire face à ses propres luttes internes après des années de conflit et, malgré l’optimisme optimiste de la communauté internationale, on a assisté à un retour significatif à son régime autoritaire. Les Nations Unies ont qualifié le régime d’« autorité de fait » dépourvue de légitimité internationale, avec des restrictions accrues à l’égard des femmes et une tolérance réduite des pratiques religieuses. Certains ont cependant avancé que ce manque de reconnaissance et de coopération ne fait rien d’autre sur le terrain que de donner aux politiciens occidentaux une position morale supérieure et des défenseurs symboliques des femmes afghanes. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’al-Sharaa suivra la voie des talibans et reviendra sur toutes ses promesses depuis sa prise de contrôle de Damas. Il est important de noter qu'un élément clé de la politique d'al-Sharaa a consisté à expulser les radicaux au sein de HTS et à les séparer d'al-Qaïda, dans le but de garantir une gouvernance dépassant la mission de djihad mondial de ce dernier. En 2018, HTS s'est heurté aux groupes d'al-Qaïda pour survivre à leur transition du djihad à la politique. HTS est également responsable du démantèlement du groupe Hurras al-Din, affilié à al-Qaïda, et a partagé des renseignements avec l'OTAN via la Turquie afin de démasquer les cibles privilégiées de Daech et d'al-Qaïda. En créant le gouvernement du salut, al-Sharaa n'a pas imposé le statut de minorité aux minorités religieuses et a continué de souligner son engagement en faveur d'une transformation idéologique et comportementale. Cela étant dit, al-Sharaa a protégé son pouvoir contre les coups d'État en surveillant les conflits au sein de son cercle proche et en veillant à ce que l'opposition interne ne puisse gagner du terrain dans ses rangs. HTS ne s'inspire peut-être pas des talibans, mais cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu'il se fera le champion de la démocratie. Malgré le pessimisme et le scepticisme croissants, tous les groupes qualifiés de terroristes ne devraient pas perdurer. Bien que très différent de HTS, notamment par son recours à la violence et ses violations des droits humains, le Congrès national africain (ANC), mouvement de libération sud-africain, fut autrefois qualifié de groupe terroriste avant de s'imposer comme un acteur clé pour mettre fin pacifiquement à l'apartheid et défendre la démocratie. De même, les stratégies de communication du Sinn Fein et sa dissociation de l'IRA reflètent l'approche de HTS. Ottawa ne peut présumer que HTS reviendra à ses origines radicales. Il ne faut pas non plus s'attendre à une réforme immédiate. Les politiques d'Al-Sharaa ont modifié le mode de fonctionnement du groupe au cours de la dernière décennie et, malgré la persistance d'éléments radicaux, ses dirigeants ont œuvré pour un gouvernement plus inclusif et national plutôt qu'idéologique. Son pragmatisme est en soi une arme à double tranchant : il semble disposé à modérer et à combattre Al-Qaïda et Daech, mais il est prêt à tout pour se maintenir au pouvoir. Conclusion Les récents développements en Syrie présentent divers défis et opportunités pour le Canada. C'est l'occasion pour le Canada de reprendre son rôle de médiateur mondial et de défenseur des droits de la personne. Une approche proactive est essentielle pour naviguer dans les complexités de la situation en constante évolution, défendre les valeurs canadiennes et protéger ses propres intérêts et sa sécurité. Les alliés du Canada dans la région et au-delà ont tous manifesté leur engagement à assurer une transition pacifique dirigée par la Syrie sous le gouvernement de facto. Bien que le fonctionnement du HTS demeure incertain, une grande partie des actions entreprises devraient susciter un certain optimisme quant au changement. Il ne s'agit pas d'un optimisme aveugle consistant à croire que la démocratie syrienne s'installera du jour au lendemain, mais d'une réponse aux leçons tirées des approches passives du passé et de l'absence de consensus au sein de l'OTAN et de l'ONU. Ottawa se retrouve face à un dilemme quant à la marche à suivre concernant la Syrie. Le renversement d'Assad était le résultat souhaité, mais sa prise de place par le HTS – avec son propre historique de radicalisme violent – ​​pose de nombreux problèmes. En évaluant la trajectoire du HTS compte tenu des intérêts du Canada et de ses alliés dans la région, une approche stratégique multilatérale représente la meilleure mesure à prendre pour assurer une transition pacifique en Syrie et prévenir une nouvelle guerre civile. Les engagements pris lors de la Déclaration des donateurs internationaux pour la Syrie visent à encourager les dirigeants à s'engager sur la voie de la paix, et le rôle du Canada à cet égard ne doit pas être sous-estimé. ## Comment renforcer La Défense du Canada en période d’incertitude stratégique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/comment-renforcer-la-defense-du-canada-en-periode-dincertitude-strategique/ Modified: 2025-05-15 Conférence du jeudi 8 mai 2025 | Comment renforcer La Défense du Canada en période d'incertitude stratégique ?   ## Compétition et jeux de pouvoirs en Arctique – Réalités, fictions et implications pour le Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/competition-et-jeux-de-pouvoirs-en-arctique-realites-fictions-et-implications-pour-le-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Frontières entre les États-Unis et la Russie, entre pays membres et non-membres de l’OTAN ou de l’Union européenne, les sous-régions arctiques font de plus en plus l’objet d’une rhétorique souvent alarmiste, parfois agressive, faisant la part belle aux enjeux de compétition entre (grandes) puissances. Entre fictions et réalités, quelles sont les conséquences de cette rhétorique pour le Canada ? Frontières entre les États-Unis et la Russie, entre pays membres et non-membres de l’OTAN ou de l’Union européenne, les sous-régions arctiques font de plus en plus l’objet d’une rhétorique souvent alarmiste, parfois agressive, faisant la part belle aux enjeux de compétition entre (grandes) puissances. Entre fictions et réalités, quelles sont les conséquences de cette rhétorique pour le Canada ? Nous pouvons établir trois constats. Premièrement, les jeux d’influence et les positionnements des grandes puissances se limitent à deux sous-régions arctiques, l’Arctique russe et le Groenland, dans lesquelles les grandes puissances sont déjà bien présentes, ce qui limite l’aspect compétitif. Deuxièmement, il faut nuancer la mise en pratique de ces rhétoriques. Nombreuses d’entre elles attisent les tensions et les compétitions, mais ne sont pas forcément suivies d’une réelle mobilisation, faute de moyens. Enfin, le Canada a peu d’options pour peser sur ces jeux d’influence, bien que le renforcement de partenariats régionaux avec ses alliés puisse constituer une piste d’action intéressante Les jeux de pouvoirs au sein de sous-régions arctiques Deux sous-régions arctiques illustrent les compétitions entre puissances : le Groenland et l’Arctique russe. Depuis quelques années, le Groenland est au centre de jeux de puissance et d’influence entre les États-Unis et la Chine. Sa position géographique et son potentiel de ressources minières, notamment de terres rares, sont autant d’atouts qui donnent à l’île un caractère hautement stratégique pour les États-Unis comme pour la Chine. Ces jeux ont été mis sous le feu des projecteurs à l’été 2019, lorsque le Président Trump, dans un gazouillis, a indiqué la volonté des États-Unis d’acheter le Groenland (une proposition déjà effectuée en 1867 et en 1946). L’intérêt stratégique des États-Unis pour le Groenland s’est matérialisé dans le passé par l’ouverture de la base aérienne de Thulé, située au nord-ouest de l’île. Or, depuis quelques années, la Chine essaie de se faire une place au Groenland. En 2018, China Communication Construction Company (CCCC), détenue par l’État chinois, avait remporté un contrat de construction d’aéroports à Nuuk et à Ilulissat. Sous la pression des États-Unis, arguant du risque que ces aéroports soient utilisés à des fins militaires, ces contrats ont été annulés fin 2019 au nom d’impératifs de sécurité. En parallèle de ces actions de barrages, les États-Unis ont annoncé plusieurs rapprochements avec le Groenland : ouverture d’un consulat permanent à Nuuk à l’été 2020 et versement de 12,1 millions de dollars pour soutenir le Groenland après la crise de la COVID-19 dans le secteur des ressources naturelles et de l’éducation. En somme, les États-Unis font obstacle à la Chine au Groenland, cadrant résolument l’île dans l’espace et la défense de l’Atlantique Nord. Le développement de l’Arctique russe représente la deuxième sous-région arctique d’intérêt. Plutôt qu’un territoire à la recherche de partenaires, d’investissements et de capacités, l’État russe possède des moyens militaires et industriels imposants, une flotte de brise-glaces inégalée, ainsi qu’une vision stratégique à long terme pour son territoire. Les sanctions américaines et occidentales imposées à la Russie (post-crise ukrainienne) ont amené cette dernière à se tourner vers d’autres partenaires pour développer ses ressources naturelles. Elles ont ainsi contribué au renforcement du partenariat sino-russe dans l’Arctique russe, qui s’est intensifié à partir de 2014, notamment au sein des projets de développement des ressources de gaz naturel, pétrole et charbon de la péninsule du Yamal (Centre-Nord), l’un des projets le plus ambitieux et stratégique de la Fédération. Actionnaire du projet Arctic LNG 1 via la China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) à 20% et le Silk Road Fund à 9,9 %, la Chine est en train de développer une « route de la soie arctique », qui passe par la Sibérie. Même chose pour la participation à hauteur de 20% par la CNPC et la China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) dans le projet Arctic LNG 2. Deux observations s’imposent toutefois pour cadrer cette implication chinoise. De un, ces deux projets ont aussi vu une participation française (le groupe énergétique Total) et japonaise (par l’entremise entre autres de Mitsubishi). Dans les deux cas, ces partenaires ont investi autant que les investisseurs chinois, ce qui en fait des initiatives résolument multinationales. Le projet Vostok Oil de la firme russe Rosneft, quant à lui, verrait l’implication de partenaires indiens. De deux, ces projets, et d’autres en développement, restent contrôlés majoritairement par des entités russes (Rosneft, Novatek), soulignant le contrôle russe sur ces projets. L’exploitation de ces ressources et le renforcement de la présence militaire russe (surtout dans le nord-ouest de la Fédération) sont intimement liés à l’objectif stratégique russe de développer la Route maritime du Nord (RMN) comme route maritime viable. Le discours patriotique russe, véhiculé par une certaine presse en Russie, ne doit pas faire oublier ces objectifs plus pragmatiques. Ainsi, au regard de ces développements, il est périlleux d’y voir une compétition entre superpuissances dans l’Arctique russe, tellement les États-Unis y jouent un rôle très marginal, voire carrément absent. Entre rhétorique et mise en pratique réelle Au regard des positionnements des différents acteurs, des prises de position plus marquées ont également été affichées ces dernières années dans les régions arctiques. Toutefois, elles doivent être remises en perspective avec la capacité réelle des États à les mettre en oeuvre. Lors de la 11e réunion ministérielle du Conseil de l'Arctique à Rovaniemi (Finlande), le 6 mai 2019, un discours de Mike Pompeo a marqué un tournant dans l’histoire du Conseil. En effet, celui-ci a récusé le concept d’État presque arctique utilisé par la Chine, tout en contestant les intentions réelles chinoises et le développement de la route de la soie polaire. Il a également dénoncé la modernisation des infrastructures militaires russes dans l'Arctique, et remis en cause le statut du passage du Nord-Est (PNE) et du passage du Nord-Ouest (PNO). Cette nouvelle ligne dure est également présente dans les derniers documents orientant la stratégie militaire américaine dans la zone (USCG Arctic Strategy Outlook d’avril 2019, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy de juin 2019, National Defense Authorization Act 2020 de juin 2019, Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions de juin 2020, Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy de juillet 2020). Bien que rappelant la coopération en vigueur dans la région, ces documents désignent la Chine et la Russie comme des adversaires agressifs et dangereux en Arctique. Il faut toutefois nuancer la mise en pratique de cette nouvelle ligne rhétorique américaine. En effet, les États-Unis y accusent un sérieux déficit capacitaire, en particulier avec une flotte de brise-glaces et des infrastructures portuaires réduites au strict minimum. Ce décalage entre rhétorique et mise en pratique réelle peut notamment être illustré par les déclarations, faites à l’été 2019, soulignant la volonté américaine de mener des opérations de liberté de navigation (Freedom of Navigation Operation, FONOP) dans la RMN et le PNO. Outre les conséquences sécuritaires que cela impliquerait, la garde côtière américaine (USCG) n’a tout simplement pas la capacité de mener ces FONOP. Bien que l’USCG ait un brise-glace lourd et un brise-glace moyen, aucun n'est disponible pour ce type d’opération. Le Polar Star, brise-glace lourd, est mobilisé pour le réapprovisionnement des stations de recherche antarctiques environ sept mois par an. Le reste du temps, il est en cale sèche pour réparations et réaménagement. Le Healy, brise-glace moyen, est, lui, mobilisé le long de la côte de l'Alaska pendant les mois d'été navigables pour les opérations de recherche et de sauvetage et de soutien des missions scientifiques arctiques. En termes capacitaires, seules deux annonces ont été effectuées par les États-Unis en 2019 : celle d’une étude pour la localisation de futur(s) port(s) en eaux profondes en Arctique (programmée dans le National Defense Authorization Act 2020 en juin), et celle de la construction d'un premier brise-glace lourd, sur les six programmés dans l’USCG Arctic Strategy Outlook d’avril 2019. Tout récemment, le 9 juin 2020, l’Administration Trump a semblé se positionner plus concrètement en publiant un « Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions ». Celui-ci, entièrement axé sur un programme d'acquisition d’une flotte de brise-glaces pour l’année fiscale 2029, demande à cinq agences fédérales d’évaluer, dans les soixante jours, les risques et les opportunités de l’acquisition d’une telle flotte. Malgré le titre de ce mémorandum, notons qu’il ne s’agit, à ce jour, que d’une autre demande d’étude ne contenant pas de budget précis – du moins jusqu’à l’issue de cette période de soixante jours. Conséquences pour le Canada Pour le Canada, ces jeux de puissances et ces rhétoriques ont des conséquences sécuritaires potentielles. D’une part, dans son discours du 6 mai 2019, Mike Pompeo a ouvertement revendiqué la liberté de navigation en qualifiant d’illégitime la position canadienne, qui considère le PNO comme faisant partie de ses eaux intérieures. Notons par contre que les États-Unis dépendent des garde-côtes canadiens pour déglacer la voie de leurs navires ravitaillant la base de Thulé au Groenland et n’ont donc pas intérêt à voir une montée des tensions entre les deux alliés. De plus, malgré la déclaration de Pompeo et les signes du secrétaire américain à la Marine de l’époque favorables à des FONOP dans la région arctique, ces opérations ne se sont pas matérialisées jusqu’à maintenant. Il est difficile de voir comment un affaiblissement de la relation canado-américaine et une remise en question de la souveraineté arctique du Canada pourraient permettre aux États-Unis d’atténuer l’influence russe et/ou chinoise dans la région. Une telle action, au contraire, constituerait un irritant significatif entre le Canada et les États-Unis, en plus de justifier une présence accrue chinoise dans le PNO. Il n’y a donc pas lieu de réorienter la politique arctique canadienne sur ce point. De toute façon, peu d’alternatives s’offrent au Canada sur ce plan : l’Accord sur l’Arctique de 1989 entre le Canada et les États-Unis constitue toujours le consensus bilatéral sur les déplacements dans le PNO, jusqu’à preuve du contraire. Dans ses orientations futures, le Canada devra notamment se pencher sur la question de la modernisation du Système d’alerte du Nord (SAN). En effet, le gouvernement fédéral n’a pas alloué de fonds dans son budget 2020 pour cette modernisation. Or, plusieurs voix se sont élevées au Canada et aux États-Unis pour alerter de la désuétude du SAN, qui ne serait plus en mesure de détecter les nouveaux missiles russes. Le général O’Shaugnessy, commandant du NORAD, a fait part de ces inquiétudes relatives au vieillissement du SAN à plusieurs reprises devant des commissions du Sénat américain depuis 2019. Étant donné les vols russes répétés près de l’espace nord-américain, un système de détection efficace représente un investissement stratégique, qui, de surcroit, prendra plusieurs années avant d’être opérationnel. Par ailleurs, le Canada devra prendre position sur un éventuel renforcement de la présence de l’OTAN en Arctique. La montée de l’activisme militaire russe sur son flanc nord-ouest a suscité des craintes côté norvégien, entre autres. De ce fait, le Canada a participé à l’exercice militaire de l’OTAN Trident Juncture, organisé en Norvège à l’automne 2018. En revanche, le Canada n‘était pas censé participer à l’exercice Cold Response (prévu en mars 2020 et annulé suite à la crise sanitaire). Menés par les forces norvégiennes, les exercices Cold Response réunissent les forces armées de nombreux partenaires occidentaux, membres de l’OTAN et alliés. Côté canadien, il faudra donc se demander quel rôle peut jouer l’OTAN dans la région. À l’heure actuelle, l’exercice Trident Juncture semble représenter une exception, un événement unique auquel le gouvernement canadien n’a pas donné suite. La participation aux exercices annuels Cold Response pourrait constituer une solution mitoyenne intéressante. Une plus grande synergie entre les exercices militaires canadiens en Arctique et celles de partenaires occidentaux (comme la Norvège) contribuerait à renforcer les partenariats avec des alliés traditionnels. Recommandations pour le Canada Les déclarations musclées de l’Administration Trump pourraient avoir des impacts sur la coopération et le mode de fonctionnement du Conseil de l’Arctique. À l’image d’autres théâtres internationaux, la politique arctique des États-Unis semble maintenant reposer sur deux fondamentaux : l’unilatéralisme et l’imprévisibilité. Bien que l’ensemble des États arctiques semblent souhaiter garder l’Arctique comme une zone de coopération et d’échange, cette nouvelle approche américaine sème le doute. Pour le Canada, l’incertitude autour de la position américaine quant au PNO constitue la menace la plus importante, bien que ceux-ci n’aient pas entamé d’actions pour remettre en doute l’Accord de 1989 sur le PNO. La modernisation du NORAD et du Système d’alerte du Nord représente une piste collaborative intéressante entre les deux pays. Le sujet est consensuel et pourrait constituer un renforcement du partenariat stratégique canado-américain. D’autre part, les jeux d’influence dans l’Arctique russe ne devraient pas avoir de conséquences directes sur le Canada. La présence accrue de l’OTAN dans la région, surtout en Norvège, doit être perçue comme une opportunité pour le Canada de développer des partenariats plus approfondis avec des alliés, démocraties libérales de surcroit. De plus, cet engagement renforcerait les pratiques multilatérales et la cohésion entre pays occidentaux, mises à mal par l’antagonisme de l’administration Trump. La participation canadienne à des exercices militaires en Norvège devrait constituer un élément permanent de sa politique arctique. La participation d’effectifs français, norvégiens, suédois et finlandais à l’exercice militaire canadien NANOOK 2019 représente à cet égard une initiative à répéter et approfondir. Pour sa part, le Groenland suscite les convoitises américaines et chinoises, mais les potentielles répercussions sur le Canada sont faibles : le pays n’a pas les outils ou la volonté de rivaliser avec ces puissances. Par contre, il existe pour le Canada un potentiel de coopération important avec le Groenland. En effet, la coopération régionale dans l’est de l’Amérique du Nord (Nunavut, Nunavik, Labrador et Groenland) est peu développée. Une coopération transfrontalière axant sur des enjeux d’intérêts communs et techniques (pêches, transport, économie) pourrait constituer un axe diplomatique intéressant et peu risqué pour le Canada dans ses interactions avec le Groenland. Ce type de coopération n’est certes pas aussi spectaculaire que les investissements de grandes puissances, mais pourrait créer un effet d’entrainement et favoriser la coopération dans cette sous-région arctique. ## Comprendre l’Alliance des Cinq yeux (Five Eyes) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/comprendre-lalliance-des-cinq-yeux-five-eyes/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le terme Cinq yeux fait généralement référence à un club unique de mise en commun du renseignement électromagnétique composé d’agences de trois ou quatre lettres acronymes d’Australie, du Canada, de Nouvelle-Zélande, du Royaume-Uni et des États-Unis. Le Groupe des cinq fait généralement référence à un club unique de mise en commun du renseignement électromagnétique composé d’agences de trois ou quatre lettres acronymes d’Australie, du Canada, de Nouvelle-Zélande, du Royaume-Uni et des États-Unis. Mais FVEY, comme on l’appelle aussi, est désormais également attaché à un nombre grand et croissant de « relations spéciales » et de réseaux politiques transgouvernementaux qui lient ces cinq États dans pratiquement tous les domaines de la défense, du renseignement et de la sécurité. Protection, Sécurité, Engagement – le document de politique de défense en vigueur au Canada – décrit le Groupe des cinq comme une « communauté », tout comme de nombreux documents similaires qui circulent actuellement à Canberra, Londres, Wellington et même Washington. Vu de Pékin, cependant, le Groupe des cinq est essentiellement une alliance anti-Chine majeure – un point de vue désormais partagé par les porte-parole du Parti communiste chinois, les ambassades chinoises et les spécialistes des relations internationales chinoises. Malgré sa centralité dans de nombreux aspects de la politique mondiale – de la diplomatie de la défense et des technologies émergentes à l’évolution du rôle des grandes puissances – le Groupe des cinq reste relativement sous-étudiée. À un certain niveau, cela a à voir avec un niveau de secret profondément institutionnalisé. En effet, avant les révélations de Snowden en 2013, la communauté intéressait principalement les spécialistes du renseignement et certains journalistes; pour tout le monde, le Groupe des cinq oscillait entre un inconnu connu et un inconnu inconnu – c’est-à-dire en tant qu’objet d’enquête qui était soit totalement opaque, soit complètement invisible. En fait, cela incluait autrefois les principaux dirigeants des États membres. Comme Desmond Ball et Jeffrey T. Richelson, deux pionniers des études du Groupe des cinq, l’ont fait valoir dans leur livre de 1985, The Ties That Bind, ce n’est qu’en 1973 que les premiers ministres australiens ont découvert cette alliance – et la participation de leur pays à celle-ci. La nature informelle de l’objet est une autre raison pour le manque relatif d’études. Au fur et à mesure que les politiciens et les bureaucrates associaient le terme « sécurité » à de plus en plus de questions « intermestiques », les liens transgouvernementaux et transnationaux du Groupe des cinq en matière de politique, de droit, de technologie et de science se sont étendus et sophistiqués. Mais ces formes d’organisations en réseau ne sont pas coordonnées; les réunions du « Groupe de passeport des Cinq nations », par exemple, n’avaient pas grand-chose à voir avec les conférences des ministres de la Défense du Groupe des cinq, et vice versa. Ensemble, cependant, tous ces liens quintuples produisent une dynamique puissante dans la politique de sécurité contemporaine – non seulement en termes de relations entre États, comme l’a montré le travail de Tim Legrand, mais aussi au sein des États et entre des acteurs non étatiques et des contextes sociotechniques divers. Le Groupe des cinq a également longtemps fait l’objet d’hypothèses incontestées quant à la valeur positive de la coopération de l'Alliance – hypothèses enracinées dans l’imaginaire collectif de la grande majorité des publics dans les pays membres. Ainsi, alors que les crises à la Snowden peuvent briser quelque peu cette tendance et le font effectivement, les « sentiments de nous » ont tendance à se rétablir assez rapidement. Cela aurait pu aussi contribuer à la relative invisibilité de l’Alliance. Ce n’est donc qu’en rendant étrange le familier – et le bien-être – que nous pouvons situer le Groupe des cinq avec les coordonnées temporelles et spatiales de « l’Anglosphère », et encore moins examiner de manière critique des hypothèses idéologiques qui sous-tendent certaines des catégories et discours que nous utilisons pour parler de ces phénomènes dans la politique mondiale. Pour en savoir plus, rendez-vous sur le site du Centre d'études en politiques internationales : Conférence sur Twitter : Comprendre l’Alliance des Cinq yeux (Five Eyes)             ## Conférence | Préparer la Guerre. Comment transformer les forces armées URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conference-preparer-la-guerre-comment-transformer-les-forces-armees/ Modified: 2026-01-12 Conférence du jeudi 8 janvier 2026, avec le Dr. Olivier Schmitt. Modération du Professeur Justin Massie. Préparer la Guerre. Comment transformer les forces armées. Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM). ## Conférence d’honneur – Les incidences des élections américaines sur les dynamiques transatlantiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conference-dhonneur-les-incidences-des-elections-americaines-sur-les-dynamiques-transatlantiques/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Conférence d’honneur – Les incidences des élections américaines sur les dynamiques transatlantiques Conférence d’honneur – Les incidences des élections américaines sur les dynamiques transatlantiques Ouverture: Pr. Julian Fernandez et Pr. Justin Massie, Comité de direction, Le Rubicon Dr. Philippe Perchoc, Direction d’IRSEM Europe Conférence d’honneur – Les incidences des élections américaines sur les dynamiques transatlantiques: Pr. Martial Foucault, directeur de l’IRSEM ## CONFÉRENCIER D’HONNEUR – Coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conferencier-dhonneur/ Modified: 2021-05-17 > Daniel Jean, ancien conseiller en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement auprès du Premier ministre du Canada Conférencier d'honneur dans le cadre de la conférence « Coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire – Perspectives non-américaines », le 6 mai 2021. Daniel Jean, ancien conseiller en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement auprès du Premier ministre du Canada ## Conférencier d’honneur – 10 décembre 2020 : Lieutenant-général M. N. Rouleau (ministère de la Défense nationale) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conferencier-dhonneur-10-decembre-2020-lieutenant-general-m-n-rouleau-ministere-de-la-defense-nationale/ Modified: 2021-02-16 > Né le 4 juillet 1967 au sein d’une famille de militaires, le lieutenant-général M.N. (Mike) Rouleau a grandi dans divers endroits, dont Montréal, Québec, Quetta (Pakistan) et Ottawa, avant de s’enrôler dans les forces militaires, en 1985. Il a pris sa retraite des FAC en 1999 pour exercer les fonctions d’officier d’intervention d’urgence au Service de police d’Ottawa jusqu’en 2002, au moment où il a réintégré les rangs des forces militaires, dans la foulée des événements du 11 Septembre. Le lieutenant-général Rouleau a assumé des fonctions de commandement à tous les échelons; il a notamment commandé des forces opérationnelles et des équipes déployées en Afghanistan, dans les Balkans et en Afrique.Le lieutenant-général Rouleau a été nommé vice-chef d’état-major de la Défense le 15 juillet 2020. Conférencier d'honneur dans le cadre du colloque annuel « L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada », les 10 et 11 décembre 2020. Lieutenant-général M. N. Rouleau, C.M.M., M.S.C., C.D (ministère de la Défense nationale) Né le 4 juillet 1967 au sein d’une famille de militaires, le lieutenant-général M.N. (Mike) Rouleau a grandi dans divers endroits, dont Montréal, Québec, Quetta (Pakistan) et Ottawa, avant de s’enrôler dans les forces militaires, en 1985. Il a pris sa retraite des FAC en 1999 pour exercer les fonctions d’officier d’intervention d’urgence au Service de police d’Ottawa jusqu’en 2002, au moment où il a réintégré les rangs des forces militaires, dans la foulée des événements du 11 Septembre. Le lieutenant-général Rouleau a assumé des fonctions de commandement à tous les échelons; il a notamment commandé des forces opérationnelles et des équipes déployées en Afghanistan, dans les Balkans et en Afrique. Le lieutenant-général Rouleau a été nommé vice-chef d’état-major de la Défense le 15 juillet 2020. ## Conférencier d’honneur – La Guerre en Ukraine : Quelles leçons à tirer et quelles perspectives de paix ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conferencier-dhonneur-la-guerre-en-ukraine-quelles-lecons-a-tirer-et-quelles-perspectives-de-paix/ Modified: 2023-03-17 > Michael Kofman – Director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses and a Fellow at the Kennan Institute, AXE I - La Guerre en Ukraine : Quelles leçons à tirer et quelles perspectives de paix ? Conférencier d’honneur: Michael Kofman – Director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses and a Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C. ## CONFÉRENCIER D’HONNEUR – Le Canada en Afghanistan : un Bilan de l’exercice du pouvoir URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conferencier-dhonneur-le-canada-en-afghanistan/ Modified: 2022-01-28 > Ben Rowswell (conférencier d’honneur)Le Canada en Afghanistan : un Bilan de l’exercice du pouvoir. La fin de la guerre en Afghanistan: Quel impact pour l’OTAN et les rivalités entre grandes puissances ? Ben Rowswell (conférencier d’honneur) Le Canada en Afghanistan : un Bilan de l’exercice du pouvoir ## Conférencière d’honneur – 11 décembre 2020 : Marina Henke (Hertie School) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conferenciere-dhonneur-11-decembre-2020-marina-henke-hertie-school/ Modified: 2021-03-02 > Marina Henke (Hertie School) : Conférencière d’honneur dans le cadre du colloque annuel « L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada », le 11 décembre 2020. Conférencière d’honneur dans le cadre du colloque annuel « L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada », les 10 et 11 décembre 2020. Marina Henke (Hertie School) Marina Henke est professeure agrégée à la Northwestern University, professeure de relations internationales à la Hertie School (Berlin) et directrice du ​Hertie Centre for International Security. Ses intérêts de recherche portent sur les interventions militaires, le maintien de la paix, la sécurité nucléaire et les politiques de défense européenne. Avant de joindre la Hertie School, elle était chargée d’enseignement à l’Université Princeton et chercheure postdoctorale au Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Henke détient un doctorat en politique et politique publique de l’Université Princeton. Ses travaux ont été publiés dans les revues International Security, Security Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Strategic Studies, International Peacekeeping, Providing for Peacekeeping, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, et Conflict Management and Peace Science. Elle est aussi l’auteure de Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions (NY: Cornell University Press, 2019). ## Construire une arme nucléaire canadienne est une fausse bonne idée URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/construire-une-arme-nucleaire-canadienne-est-une-fausse-bonne-idee/ Modified: 2025-03-21 Le paradigme de non-prolifération est-il en mutation? Le Canada devrait-il fabriquer ses propres armes nucléaires ? Bien qu'elle aille évidemment à l'encontre des engagements canadiens en matière de non-prolifération et de désarmement, cette question a été soulevée de manière récurrente par des commentateurs et des personnalités médiatiques canadiens en réaction aux attaques rhétoriques répétées du président américain Donald Trump contre la souveraineté de leur pays. Alors que la démocratie américaine est prétendument en train de faire marche arrière et que son dirigeant actuel lorgne les vastes ressources du Canada dans le but ostensible d'une expansion territoriale, il est suggéré qu'Ottawa construise, exploite et commande sa propre force de dissuasion nucléaire. L'objectif? Empêcher Washington, Moscou ou toute autre capitale hostile de s'immiscer dans ses affaires. Une force de dissuasion nucléaire canadienne semble attrayante à première vue pour diverses raisons. Elle pourrait préserver l'autonomie du pays en dissuadant les États-Unis d'agir de manière hostile à son encontre. Elle pourrait également le protéger des interventions étrangères rendues possibles par la perte potentielle du parapluie nucléaire américain. Elle pourrait même rétablir le statut du Canada sur la scène internationale et garantir son rôle de puissance souveraine, comme ce fut le cas pour la France et le Royaume-Uni à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Enfin, il pourrait s'agir d'un moyen rentable de compenser pour la faiblesse militaire relative du pays. Alors que certains alliés européens semblent envisager timidement cette option, pourquoi le Canada n'en ferait-il pas autant? Ces arguments sont erronés pour des raisons pratiques. Les partisans d'une arme nucléaire canadienne sous-estiment les difficultés que son développement rencontrerait et surestiment les avantages qu'elle pourrait offrir. Bien qu'il existe certainement une voie possible vers une bombe canadienne, celle-ci serait coûteuse, plus longue qu'imaginée, non viable, impossible à garder secrète, insuffisante et mal conçue pour résoudre les problèmes auxquels le pays est confronté et impactrait négativement sa position vis-à-vis de ses alliés et de la communauté internationale dans son ensemble. En d'autres termes, le Canada pourrait choisir de fabriquer des armes nucléaires, mais seulement à un coût faramineux et sans garantie de succès. C'est ce coût même qui rend cette option inappropriée, même face aux désirs déclarés du président Trump d'un « cinquante-et-unième » État. Arguments en faveur de l'acquisition d'une force de dissuasion nucléaire canadienne L'argument en faveur des armes nucléaires canadiennes repose sur deux prémisses problématiques. Premièrement, il présuppose que la dissuasion nucléaire fonctionne par défaut. En d'autres termes, il souscrit à la croyance selon laquelle il suffirait de disposer d'armes nucléaires - même d'une seule bombe - pour en tirer tous les avantages dissuasifs. Or, la réalité est bien plus complexe. Une dissuasion nucléaire réussie requiert de multiples éléments : des ogives en nombre suffisant pour infliger des dommages proportionnels, des vecteurs appropriés et un arsenal capable de survivre à une première frappe hostile et donc d'infliger des représailles. En termes plus simples, un arsenal nucléaire canadien doit être capable d'endommager suffisamment les États-Unis pour dissuader leur attaque, nécessite l'utilisation d'un certain type de technologie de missiles ou de chasseurs et être capable de survivre à une première frappe massive de la part des États-Unis. Ces exigences signifient que « quelques bombes nucléaires » (comme les six que possédait autrefois l'Afrique du Sud) ne suffiraient pas. Après tout, l'Afrique du Sud n'avait pas à dissuader un voisin doté de l'arme nucléaire, et encore moins une grande puissance continentale disposant d'un ensemble massif de capacités militaires. Pour dissuader efficacement un agresseur doté de l'arme nucléaire, tel que les États-Unis, un arsenal d'une ampleur équivalente à celui du Royaume-Uni, de la France, voire de la Chine, serait plus approprié, avec plus d'un vecteur. Bien entendu, cette nécessité opérationnelle augmente considérablement le coût d'acquisition des armes nucléaires. La dissuasion nucléaire n'est pas intrinsèque; il s'agit d'une pratique, qui plus est coûteuse. Deuxièmement, il suppose que le Canada débute la course vers la bombe en étant proche de ligne d'arrivée. En effet, le Canada est l'un des rares États en « latence nucléaire » au monde, c'est-à-dire des États qui pourraient « facilement » fabriquer une arme nucléaire relativement rapidement. D'après la plupart des études sur le sujet, c'est vrai. Le Canada a accès à de l'uranium, dont il est l'un des principaux exportateurs, et dispose d'un approvisionnement facile en plutonium grâce à son importante industrie nucléaire civile. Mais le mot clé de cette phrase est « relativement ». Il est vrai que, comparé à d'autres pays, le Canada aurait plus de facilité à acquérir des armes nucléaires. Mais cela ne signifie pas qu'il serait capable de fabriquer une bombe en quelques heures, jours, semaines ou même mois. La voie du plutonium nécessiterait toujours l'adaptation des installations existantes, ce qui prendrait du temps et de l'argent. Même en se basant sur des estimations optimistes, il faudrait des années pour atteindre ce stade, et il serait alors déjà trop tard, car l'actuel président des États-Unis ne vivrait peut-être même pas assez longtemps pour le voir. L'histoire nous apprend qu'une tentative de prolifération nucléaire de la part du Canada pourrait provoquer ce qu'il tente justement d'éviter, à savoir une intervention américaine. L'idée que Washington se contenterait de rester les bras croisés pendant qu'un autre État sur sa frontière danse avec l'atome est en soi fantaisiste. Ce que coûte la prolifération nucléaire Lorsque l'on se demande si le Canada devrait se doter d'armes nucléaires, il est important de comprendre les nombreux coûts associés à la prolifération. Tout au long de cet article, j'ai insisté sur le fait que la construction d'une force de dissuasion nucléaire canadienne serait coûteuse. Et ce, tant sur le plan financier que sur le plan diplomatique. Les coûts directs de la prolifération nucléaire sont assez simples et faciles à prévoir. Ils comprennent la recherche et le développement (qui restent nécessaires même après avoir réussi à fabriquer une bombe), les tests, la production, le contrôle et les communications, ainsi que le coût des systèmes d'armes (ou vecteurs) utilisés pour les déployer contre une cible. Dans le cas de la France, qui possède environ 290 ogives nucléaires, cela comprend trois mécanismes de lancement (ou vecteurs) différents: les avions basées au sol, les chasseurs basés sur les porte-avions et les sous-marins. L'Observatoire des armements estime que la France a dépensé plus de 357 milliards d'euros entre 1945 et 2010 pour sa dissuasion nucléaire. Selon le Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, la France aura dépensé 5,3 milliards d'euros en 2022 pour ses activités liées au nucléaire. Dans le cas du Royaume-Uni, sa Chambre des communes a indiqué que le coût de sa dissuasion nucléaire sur une période de dix ans (2023 à 2033) pouvait être estimé à 117,8 milliards de livres. Ces chiffres montrent que la construction et le soutien d'un arsenal nucléaire sont extrêmement coûteux et qu'aucun pays ne peut s'y engager facilement. Les investissements nécessaires à la mise en place d'un programme secret et à son maintien pendant des décennies sont colossaux. Les États-Unis dépensent chaque année davantage pour maintenir leur force de dissuasion nucléaire que le Canada pour l'ensemble de ses forces armées. La mise au point par le Canada d'un vecteur approprié capable de cibler les États-Unis - sans l'aide d'aucun de ses autres alliés - représenterait également un défi considérable. Il y a également un coût en termes de personnel : la gestion d'une force de dissuasion nucléaire exige la formation et la fidélisation d'opérateurs capables de la gérer en toute sécurité, à un moment où les forces armées canadiennes sont en pleine crise de recrutement. En outre, cela nécessite une industrie de recherche et de développement indépendante qui devrait être maintenue grâce aux investissements du gouvernement, sans la collaboration (et, en fait, avec l'opposition active) de l'ancien plus proche allié du Canada, les États-Unis. Compte tenu des difficultés chroniques du Canada en matière d'approvisionnement militaire, une bombe nucléaire est-elle réellement envisageable ? La prolifération nucléaire a également des coûts indirects qui pourraient s'avérer encore plus difficiles à supporter pour le Canada. D'un point de vue diplomatique, se doter d'une force de dissuasion nucléaire reviendrait pour le Canada à renier sa ratification du traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP). Le TNP est l'accord de contrôle des armements qui compte le plus grand nombre de membres au monde et un seul pays s'en est à ce jour retiré : la Corée du Nord. Si le Canada abandonnait ses engagements en matière de non-prolifération, il risquerait l'isolement diplomatique et un large éventail de sanctions économiques douloureuses de la part de l'ensemble de la communauté internationale. Les armes nucléaires sont impopulaires auprès des gouvernements sud-américains, africains et asiatiques. À l'heure où l'hostilité des États-Unis pousse le Canada à diversifier son économie, chercher à se doter de la bombe reviendrait à s'aliéner tous les partenaires potentiels dont il pourrait avoir besoin. L'hypocrisie de cette démarche pourrait également porter un coup fatal à la crédibilité morale du pays et nuire durablement à sa réputation internationale. Si certains ont mis en avant le fait que des responsables allemands et polonais ont ouvertement réfléchi à l'option nucléaire pour justifier que le Canada leur emboîte le pas, je pense que cela revient à s'avancer trop vite. L'Allemagne semble plus encline à rechercher la protection du parapluie nucléaire français qu'à construire son propre arsenal, pareillement pour la Pologne. Le fait que quelques dirigeants songent publiquement à posséder des bombes sans avoir réalisé d'investissements sérieux ou de développer une stratégie concrète n'annule pas des décennies de normes de non-prolifération (soutenues par le Canada) et ne marque pas la fin de l'opprobre qui entoure l'acquisition d'une force de dissuasion nucléaire indépendante. Il est possible que la réaction internationale soit plus discrète que ce que je prédis. Celle des États-Unis, en revanche, ne le serait pas. En construisant une bombe nucléaire à sa frontière septentrionale, le Canada pourrait provoquer précisément ce que cette arme est devrait empêcher : une intervention militaire américaine directe. En effet, les proliférateurs nucléaires potentiels doivent traverser une « zone de danger » juste avant d'atteindre la possession d'une bombe atomique opérationnelle. Étant donné qu'ils se mettent à dos la communauté internationale, mais qu'ils ne bénéficient pas encore des avantages de la dissuasion nucléaire, ils sont complètement exposés. Cette période de vulnérabilité peut être exploitée par leurs rivaux ou leurs adversaires, et le serait certainement par les États-Unis. Ainsi, chercher à se doter d'une force de dissuasion nucléaire revient pour le Canada à jouer à la roulette russe, ce qui pourrait très bien lui exploser au visage. En d'autres termes, lorsqu'un pays est menacé d'annexion par une puissance nucléaire, il est déjà trop tard pour qu'il se dote de ses propres armes nucléaires. Et si le Canada gardait la bombe au sous-sol? Une alternative à la nucléarisation ouverte pourrait être ce que l'on peut qualifier d'option « israélienne », c'est-à-dire la mise en place d'une force de dissuasion nucléaire sans la tester ni en annoncer publiquement l'existence. Cette approche a également été employée par le Pakistan sous l'administration Reagan, les États-Unis ayant alors détourné le regard en échange d'une collaboration et de l'absence d'une proclamation flagrante. Cette stratégie pourrait se résumer à renforcer le statut latent du Canada, gardant ainsi la bombe « au sous-sol ». Il est peu probable qu'une telle approche produise les avantages escomptés. D'abord, parce que les cas historiques de nucléarisation secrète ont été accomplis avec l'approbation tacite des États-Unis. Les deux coupables ont choisi cette option précisément parce qu'elle fut approuvée par des administrations américaines successives. Il est douteux que les États-Unis tolèrent une telle évolution à leur frontière nord, réalisée par le pays qu'ils tentent d'annexer. Deuxièmement, parce que cette approche nécessite toujours un certain degré d'avancée vers la prolifération, ce qui déclencherait inévitablement une réaction de la part de la communauté internationale. Il n'est pas crédible de s'attendre à une réaction passive de la part des institutions internationales lorsque l'on voit l'exemple de la réaction à l'Iran jouant avec l'option nucléaire. De même, les défis concernant les coûts et les investissements restent d'actualité. Troisièmement, étant donné que la cible de toute stratégie de dissuasion canadienne est un État doté de l'arme nucléaire (contrairement aux adversaires d'Israël, qui sont des États voisins plus faibles et non dotés de l'arme nucléaire), un secret de polichinelle nucléaire canadien pourrait difficilement être suffisant. En outre, des affrontements conventionnels entre puissances nucléaires (déclarées ou cachées) sont possibles, comme l'ont montré l'Inde et le Pakistan depuis les années 1990. Quelle que soit la situation, les armes nucléaires ne sont pas un atout qui résoudrait tous les problèmes du Canada, bien au contraire. Armes nucléaires: dissuader qui, quoi, quand et pourquoi ? Les armes nucléaires donneraient au Canada un sentiment d'invulnérabilité. Pourtant, elles ne sont pas adaptées à sa situation stratégique actuelle. Une autre hypothèse qui soutien l'argument en faveur d'armes nucléaires canadiennes est que la plus grande menace pour la souveraineté du Canada est une invasion potentielle de son territoire par les États-Unis. Cette croyance manque de perspective: étant donné que les économies des deux pays sont si étroitement liées, Washington n'a même pas besoin de conquérir le Canada militairement - il pourrait probablement tenter d'atteindre exactement le même objectif par le biais d'une simple (et plus dévastatrice) coercition économique. Il est concevable qu'un président américain enclin à l'annexion (comme Donald Trump) tente d'utiliser les leviers commerciaux à sa disposition pour inciter le Canada à rejoindre les États-Unis. Selon l'ancien Premier ministre Justin Trudeau, c'est exactement ce qui se passe actuellement. En utilisant les droits de douane et d'autres moyens, l'objectif semble être d'affaiblir l'économie canadienne à un point tel que sa population finira par demander l'annexion. Il convient toutefois de préciser que les stratégies punitives ont tendance à se retourner contre ceux qui les infligent et à galvaniser ceux qui les subissent au lieu de les inciter à abandonner. Bien qu'elle soit également douloureuse pour les citoyens américains, cette approche présente l'avantage d'être militairement « bon marché ». Face à elle, les armes nucléaires n'auraient que peu d'effets dissuasifs. Une menace de frappe nucléaire ne résoudrait pas les problèmes des industries canadiennes du bois et de l'aluminium. Même dans le cas d'une invasion conventionnelle totale, le Canada devrait s'engager à appliquer une politique de première frappe en cas d'atteinte à son territoire. Une telle démarche ne pourrait qu'entraîner une condamnation internationale. Ainsi, même si le Canada avait développé ses propres armes nucléaires lorsqu'il en avait l'occasion après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, elles ne le protégeraient pas actuellement des frasques de l'administration Trump. En clair, elles pourraient être la solution à un problème différent, mais pas à celui auquel Ottawa est actuellement confronté. Certains pourraient faire valoir que les États-Unis pourraient tirer profit d'un Canada doté de l'arme nucléaire. Selon ce scénario, dans lequel les deux nations ont rétabli leurs relations amicales et où Washington ne cherche plus à contraindre Ottawa par des moyens économiques, une force de dissuasion nucléaire canadienne pourrait renforcer la défense continentale en augmentant la puissance de la force de dissuasion commune globale. Cette perspective revient à prendre ses désirs pour des réalités. Les États-Unis ont depuis longtemps pour principe que moins leurs alliés sont indépendants sur le plan opérationnel, mieux c'est - en particulier dans le cas de la capacité nucléaire. L'introduction d'une bombe autonome échappant au contrôle des États-Unis augmenterait donc les risques, puisque les décideurs canadiens pourraient appuyer sur la gâchette sans tenir compte des souhaits des Américains. Que le Canada soit ou non l'ami des États-Unis, ces derniers chercheront toujours à l'empêcher de se doter d'armes nucléaires. Des armes nucléaires canadiennes : une fausse solution pour un problème bien plus complexe Le Canada se sent et est menacé par les tarifs douaniers et la rhétorique désinvolte d'annexion de l'administration Trump. Pourtant, revenir sur ses engagements en matière de non-prolifération nucléaire n'est pas une solution. Une arme nucléaire canadienne n'a guère de sens sur les plans stratégique, financier et diplomatique. Elle risquerait d'aggraver la situation du Canada et de l'isoler sur la scène internationale. Au lieu d'être un atout facile à obtenir, une dissuasion nucléaire canadienne serait au contraire un pari extrêmement risqué, dont les bénéfices seraient limités. Le Canada ferait mieux de renforcer ses capacités conventionnelles, d'accroître son autonomie stratégique et de cultiver sa résilience et sa diversification économiques. ## Contre-insurrection et contre-terrorisme : repenser des modèles contestés à l’ère de la COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/contre-insurrection-et-contre-terrorisme-repenser-des-modeles-contestes-a-lere-de-la-covid-19/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Dans ce point chaud, Arthur Stein revient sur le deuxième panel du Cycle d’ateliers virtuels portant sur le Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Ce point chaud est écrit dans le cadre du Cycle d’ateliers virtuels portant sur le Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Le deuxième atelier portait sur la contre-insurrection et le contre-terrorisme, et a fait intervenir la Major-Général Jennie Carignan, Commandante de la Mission de l’OTAN en Irak, Bruno Charbonneau, professeur au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, Louis-Alexandre Berg, professeur à la Georgia State University et Marc-André Boisvert, chercheur indépendant sur les armées sahéliennes. Les informations relatées dans le texte sont une synthèse générale des idées présentées par les conférenciers.[1] Visionnez la vidéo du deuxième panel Comment l’actuelle pandémie de COVID-19 a-t-elle influencé le renforcement des capacités dans les domaines de la contre-insurrection et du contre-terrorisme ? Beaucoup d’observateurs internationaux semblaient initialement voir dans la situation sanitaire un moment charnière pour les opérations menées par les forces étatiques conventionnelles au Moyen-Orient (Irak, Syrie) ou au Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso). D’un côté, affectant prioritairement les franges les plus défavorisées de la population, la crise sanitaire aggravait sensiblement les tensions sociales au sein des pays receveurs d’assistance internationale. D’un autre côté, face à d’importantes contraintes logistiques pour protéger leur personnel, la majorité des bailleurs internationaux hautement impliqués dans ces espaces géographiques réduisaient leurs activités opérationnelles immédiates et mettaient en suspens leurs activités de formation militaire. Dans ce cadre, il était présagé un regain d’engagement de la part des différents groupes armés. Ceux-ci pourraient en effet profiter du « vide » opérationnel croissant et de la perte de légitimité des autorités étatiques pour regagner du terrain et de l’influence auprès des populations civiles. Dans les faits, ces prédictions se sont cependant peu vérifiées sur le terrain ; les groupes insurrectionnels n’ont pas démontré de réelle résurgence dans leurs activités face aux autorités étatiques locales. Certains acteurs internationaux impliqués dans des opérations de sécurité — tels que l’OTAN en Irak — ont certes réduit drastiquement leurs activités, mais les armées locales ont jusqu’à présent efficacement pris le relais en termes de présence opérationnelle. Les forces de sécurité irakiennes se sont par exemple rapidement adaptées au contexte pandémique, et ont permis d’éviter une rupture de présence dans des espaces géographiques contestés. Si la pandémie de COVID-19 n’a pas drastiquement altéré le rapport de force immédiat sur le terrain entre insurgés et contre-insurgés, elle semble tout de même replacer au centre du débat un paradoxe saillant des activités de renforcement des capacités en termes de contre-insurrection et de contre-terrorisme : la recherche permanente, pour les bailleurs de fonds internationaux, d’un compromis entre investissements opérationnels de court terme pour épauler les armées locales face à des menaces imminentes et renforcement à moyen et long terme de l’aptitude matérielle et organisationnelle des armées locales à faire face aux menaces entendues plus largement. En effet, la redéfinition des objectifs stratégiques en temps de pandémie des principaux bailleurs de fonds (États-Unis, Canada, Union européenne, etc.), et les réorganisations budgétaires qui risquent d’en découler vont très certainement altérer les priorités de ces acteurs. Il est probable que les principaux pourvoyeurs d’opérations de renforcement des capacités priorisent des aspects tangibles et facilement quantifiables de l’assistance sécuritaire (fourniture de matériel militaire ou envoi de formateurs militaires) aux dépens d’activités moins tangibles, mais essentielles ; le développement de la responsabilité juridique des armées locales, le respect des droits humains et la lutte générale contre la corruption et la politisation des forces de sécurité. Alors que la majorité des « crises sécuritaires » en Afrique et au Moyen-Orient sont avant tout des crises de gouvernance démocratique, comme en atteste le récent coup d’État au Mali d’août 2020, cette redéfinition des priorités risque d’être hautement contre-productive. Après les échecs notoires en Afghanistan et en Irak, les opérations de contre-insurrection et de contre-terrorisme ne peuvent être considérées comme des « panacées, » et il est aujourd’hui essentiel que les bailleurs de fonds s’éloignent des solutions uniquement sécuritaires qui ont prévalu par le passé. Ces acteurs doivent tenter d’agir de concert avec des entités multilatérales (Nations unies notamment) pour rediriger les ressources investies vers des programmes de renforcement des capacités non seulement militaires, mais également civiles. Cela doit notamment passer par la construction de relations interpersonnelles de confiance avec les acteurs institutionnels locaux. Une question centrale qui devrait indéniablement être mieux prise en compte par les bailleurs de fonds internationaux est celle de l’appréciation de l’efficacité globale de leurs opérations de renforcement des capacités. Quels indicateurs souhaitent-ils prioriser pour évaluer le renforcement des structures locales ? Souhaitent-ils privilégier la situation sécuritaire et voir dans une seule paix « négative » une réussite certaine ? Veulent-ils au contraire mettre au cœur de l’évaluation le renforcement du niveau de vie des populations locales, avec l’objectif plus ambitieux de favoriser le développement d’une réelle paix dite « positive » ? Les investissements réalisés par le passé ont peu été suivis de réelle évaluation de leur influence, notamment pour s’assurer qu’ils soient réellement traduits en fourniture de services essentiels pour les populations civiles. Mieux assurer le suivi des opérations menées est crucial pour éviter que les organisations insurrectionnelles ne profitent d’éventuels vides institutionnels pour développer leurs propres contre-modèles de gouvernance. C’est également déterminant dans un contexte de compétition géopolitique croissant, où plusieurs pôles d’influence — États-Unis, Europe, Russie ou Chine — sont en concurrence pour fournir leurs propres assistances de sécurité. S’ils doivent repenser la direction et le suivi de leurs actions de renforcements des capacités, les bailleurs internationaux doivent finalement éviter de calquer des priorités stratégiques exogènes à des espaces politiques disposant de caractéristiques locales déterminantes. La réflexion sur la place de l’armée au sein des structures institutionnelles, par exemple, ne peut être que menée localement et correspondre aux menaces, dilemmes et spécificités historiques propres à chaque espace. Le renforcement de la légitimité des armées locales ne peut se faire que par une réappropriation réellement politique de la question de la sécurité, à travers le développement de réels mécanismes de contrôle civil des instances militaires. Si la sécurité institutionnelle ne peut être construite aux dépens de la sécurité humaine, la question à laquelle il devient essentiel de répondre pour beaucoup de pays en crise est : comment créer une sécurité plus démocratique ? [1] Les idées présentées n’engagent cependant que son auteur. ## Coopération dans l’Arctique et l’Atlantique Nord : les rôles que doivent jouer le Canada, la France et le Portugal dans un ordre maritime en mutation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/cooperation-dans-larctique-et-latlantique-nord-les-roles-que-doivent-jouer-le-canada-la-france-et-le-portugal-dans-un-ordre-maritime-en-mutation/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Cette note politique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) avec le soutien du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada, qui vise à développer des échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens. Introduction Les changements climatiques rendent l’Arctique plus accessible, transformant cette région en un théâtre de concurrence stratégique. Plus que jamais, l’Arctique suscite l’intérêt de nombreux États et acteurs non arctiques qui aspirent à jouer un rôle plus important dans les affaires arctiques. Dans l’Atlantique Nord, la sécurité des câbles sous-marins, le trafic maritime et l’influence croissante de la Russie et de la Chine nécessitent une coordination renforcée avec les acteurs non arctiques. En tant que membres de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) disposant d’importants territoires d’outre-mer et/ou d’intérêts stratégiques, la France et le Canada ont tout intérêt à approfondir leur coopération avec d’autres alliés de l’OTAN moins évidents, comme le Portugal. Le Canada, la France et le Portugal sont des alliés de l’OTAN partageant les mêmes valeurs, qui coopèrent dans le cadre d’opérations atlantiques, du partage d’équipement et des priorités communes de l’Alliance. La Déclaration du G7 de mars 2025 sur la sécurité et la prospérité maritimes engage les membres et les partenaires à renforcer leur coordination face aux risques posés par les navires « fantômes » insuffisamment assurés, qui menacent des écosystèmes fragiles tels que l’Arctique, et appuie une coopération élargie entre les gardes côtières par le biais de forums tels que le Forum mondial des gardes côtières de 2025 et le Forum des gardes côtières de l’Arctique (Gouvernement du Canada, 2025a). En juin 2025, le Canada a signé un partenariat en matière de sécurité et de défense avec l’Union européenne (UE), renforçant ainsi la collaboration en matière de sécurité maritime, de cybersécurité et de lutte contre la désinformation, tout en ouvrant des possibilités pour l’industrie canadienne dans le cadre d’initiatives européennes d’approvisionnement conjoint en matière de défense, telles que « Readiness 2030 » (CBC News, 2025, et Gouvernement du Canada, 2025b). Le Canada a encore renforcé ses liens avec le Portugal en septembre 2025 grâce à un accord général sur la sécurité de l’information, améliorant ainsi la coopération en matière de défense (Gouvernement du Canada, 2025c), l’accès aux marchés et l’échange sécurisé de renseignements classifiés, y compris les renseignements de défense et les données techniques sensibles. Comment le Canada, la France et le Portugal peuvent-ils contribuer à façonner un ordre maritime stable et fondé sur des règles alors que l’Arctique et l’Atlantique Nord deviennent de plus en plus interconnectés? Dans cette note stratégique, nous illustrons comment des puissances non arctiques peuvent devenir des acteurs arctiques influents grâce à la politique d’alliances, aux réseaux commerciaux, à la coopération scientifique et à des engagements juridiques et normatifs communs. Leurs relations ne sont pas fortuites, mais stratégiquement complémentaires, puisque la coopération dans l’Arctique renforce la stabilité dans l’Atlantique Nord et soutient la résilience d’un ordre maritime fondé sur des règles qui régit également les eaux arctiques. Nous démontrons ainsi que l’avenir de la gouvernance et de la sécurité dans l’Arctique sera de plus en plus façonné non seulement par la géographie, mais aussi par des réseaux de coopération qui relient les alliés par le biais d’intérêts stratégiques, de normes et de vulnérabilités communs. Importance des changements climatiques pour l’Arctique et les voies maritimes Les changements climatiques constituent un « multiplicateur de menaces » qui accentue les vulnérabilités sociales, économiques et politiques (CNA, 2007; Rodrigues, 2025a, 2025b). Ce constat est particulièrement frappant dans l’Arctique, où le réchauffement est près de quatre fois plus rapide que la moyenne mondiale, ce qui confirme les projections scientifiques d’Arrhenius datant de 1896 (Hendricks, 2018; Favier, 2019; Rodrigues, 2025a). La transformation environnementale qui en résulte est indissociable des changements géopolitiques : la fonte de la glace de mer ouvre de nouvelles routes maritimes et donne accès à des ressources, tout en soulevant des préoccupations en matière de sécurité pour les acteurs régionaux et mondiaux. Les chercheurs soutiennent que la glace elle-même est devenue un enjeu de sécurité, car sa disparition menace les écosystèmes, le niveau de la mer et la stabilité atmosphérique (Kristensen et Mortensgaard, 2024). Depuis le rapport de la CNA de 2007 et sa mise à jour de 2014, les changements climatiques ont été fermement intégrés au discours sur la sécurité, Goodman identifiant trois effets clés : l’exacerbation des facteurs de stress existants, les répercussions directes sur les opérations militaires et l’élargissement des priorités en matière de sécurité pour y inclure la résilience et la protection des infrastructures (Goodman, 2024). Cette approche a été institutionnalisée par l’UE (2008), l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (A/64/350) et l’OTAN par le biais de son Plan d’action 2021 sur le changement climatique et la sécurité et de son Concept stratégique 2022, qui identifie l’Arctique comme une région critique. Malgré les débats sur la militarisation et les appels en faveur d’approches axées sur la sécurité écologique, le changement climatique est désormais largement considéré comme un enjeu de sécurité mondiale nécessitant une action internationale coordonnée (Rodrigues, 2025a). Défini géographiquement comme la région située au nord du 66°33´N, l’Arctique s’étend sur huit États (le Canada, la Russie, les États-Unis par l’intermédiaire de l’Alaska, la Norvège, le Danemark par l’intermédiaire du Groenland, la Suède, la Finlande et l’Islande) et abrite environ quatre millions de personnes, y compris des communautés autochtones. Il recèle environ 13 % des réserves mondiales de pétrole non découvertes et 30 % de ses réserves de gaz naturel inexploitées. Le réchauffement accéléré a déjà entraîné la perte de plus de 40 % de la glace de mer estivale depuis 1979 (GIEC, 2021), une augmentation des émissions de méthane due au dégel du pergélisol (NOAA, 2023) et des risques croissants pour les écosystèmes, les infrastructures et les moyens de subsistance des Autochtones, tout en ouvrant simultanément de nouvelles routes maritimes (Rantanen et al., 2022). L’océan Arctique, officiellement reconnu en 1921 par l’Organisation hydrographique internationale (Sörlin, 2017), acquiert une importance stratégique croissante à mesure que ces routes évoluent. Le passage du Nord-Ouest offre une liaison plus courte entre l’Atlantique et le Pacifique, mais demeure dangereux et politiquement sensible (Marine royale canadienne, 2023), tandis que l’« atlantification » réduit l’isolement historique de la région et renforce son importance géopolitique (Sörlin, 2017; Rodrigues, 2025b). La Route maritime du Nord, qui longe la côte sibérienne de la Russie, peut réduire les temps de transit entre l’Europe et l’Asie jusqu’à 40 %, mais elle est strictement réglementée par des permis et des exigences relatives aux brise-glaces (Stratégie russe pour l’Arctique, 2020). Une future route maritime transpolaire pourrait voir le jour d’ici le milieu du siècle, posant d’importants défis sur les plans de l’environnement et de la gouvernance (Bennett et al., 2020). Ensemble, ces développements soulignent le besoin croissant d’une coopération réglementaire internationale renforcée, en particulier dans le cadre de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM), afin de garantir que la navigation dans l’Arctique évolue de manière sûre, sécuritaire et durable. La concurrence stratégique dans l’Arctique et l’Atlantique Nord De nombreux pays envisagent de plus en plus l’océan Arctique sous l’angle de la sécurité, à mesure que la glace de mer recule et que des voies de transit telles que la Route maritime du Nord et le Passage du Nord-Ouest deviennent plus accessibles. Ces évolutions ont des répercussions sur le transport maritime mondial, l’exploitation des ressources et les revendications de souveraineté. Le « couloir GIUK » (Groenland-Islande-Royaume-Uni), ancien goulot d’étranglement de la Guerre froide, est redevenu un point d’intérêt pour les opérations de surveillance et de lutte anti-sous-marine de l’OTAN (Childs, 2022). La coopération bilatérale entre le Canada et la Russie, notamment en ce qui concerne les questions arctiques, restera difficile. En décembre 2022, le Canada a déposé un addendum à sa revendication relative au plateau continental étendu de l’océan Arctique afin de contrer l’addendum de la Russie de 2021, qui avait considérablement élargi sa revendication et triplé le chevauchement avec le plateau continental canadien (Marine royale canadienne, 2023). La soumission du Canada a rééquilibré ce chevauchement. Le Canada demeure déterminé à résoudre les différends relatifs au plateau continental de manière pacifique et conformément au droit international. La Russie représente un défi géopolitique majeur dans l’Arctique. Elle contrôle géographiquement 50 % de la région (Marine royale canadienne, 2023) et a intensifié ses activités tant militaires qu’économiques. En 2020, la Russie a lancé une initiative de 300 milliards de dollars visant à accélérer le développement de sa région arctique, en mettant l’accent sur de nouveaux ports, des infrastructures industrielles et des projets pétroliers et gaziers. Cette stratégie économique va de pair avec un renforcement militaire parallèle, comprenant la modernisation de la Flotte du Nord, l’expansion des bases arctiques et un déploiement accru de capacités conventionnelles et nucléaires. Les sanctions occidentales ont accentué la dépendance de la Russie envers la Chine, qui s’est proclamée « État quasi-arctique » en 2018. En réalité, Pékin est situé à environ 5 580 km du pôle Nord, mais à seulement 4 420 km de l’équateur (Zellen, 2019). Ces chiffres suggèrent que la Chine est, d’un point de vue géographique, plus proche d’un État quasi-équatorial que d’un État quasi-arctique. La Chine est désormais un partenaire clé dans la recherche arctique, le développement énergétique, la construction portuaire et les infrastructures essentielles au sein de la zone arctique russe, notamment les voies maritimes arctiques et l’exploitation des ressources (Byers, 2013). Cette coopération s’étend désormais aux activités militaires, y compris des exercices conjoints dans le Grand Nord russe, s’appuyant sur un engagement bilatéral de 2022 en faveur de la coopération arctique. Les changements climatiques attirent l’attention sur l’Arctique en tant que source durable et fiable de minéraux essentiels, tels que le lithium, le graphite, le nickel, le cobalt, le cuivre et les éléments des terres rares, qui sont vitaux pour la transition vers une économie à faibles émissions de carbone. De plus, des recherches indiquent (NASA, 2025) qu’à mesure que les températures augmentent dans les océans du Sud, les stocks mondiaux de poissons migrent vers l’océan Arctique, ce qui pose des défis importants pour la sécurité alimentaire mondiale. En 2022, la société pétrolière d’État russe Rosneft a annoncé une importante découverte de pétrole dans la mer de Pechora, située dans les eaux territoriales arctiques de la Russie. La découverte a eu lieu dans la zone de concession de Medynsko-Varandeyskoye, où Rosneft avait précédemment effectué des forages d’exploration. Les réserves nouvellement identifiées sont estimées à environ 82 millions de tonnes de pétrole (Nilson, 2022). Le rapprochement croissant entre la Chine et la Russie (Rodrigues, 2026a) fait naître de nouveaux risques pour la gouvernance de l’Arctique, la liberté de navigation et la stabilité régionale. En conséquence, les partenaires non arctiques ayant des intérêts maritimes et géopolitiques, comme le Portugal, jouent un rôle de plus en plus important dans l’architecture de sécurité Arctique-Atlantique au sens large. À l’avenir, les États devront investir dans de nouveaux partenariats et consolider ceux qui existent déjà afin de renforcer la résilience stratégique de l’Arctique. Le Canada et la France prônent tous deux la non-militarisation de l’Arctique et défendent l’autorité d’institutions multilatérales telles que le Conseil de l’Arctique et l’Organisation maritime internationale. Leur coopération est renforcée par le biais du Conseil de coopération franco-canadien en matière de défense (CCFCD), et les deux pays restent attachés à la gouvernance multilatérale dans le cadre du Conseil de l’Arctique, de la CNUDM et de l’Accord de Paris. Le Canada et la France devraient identifier d’autres instances de discussion et faire un usage novateur des mécanismes actuels pour faire progresser le dialogue et la coopération dans l’Arctique, dans le but de contrebalancer et de limiter l’influence croissante de la Russie et de la Chine dans la région. Le lien de sécurité entre les bassins de l’Atlantique Nord et de l’Arctique Des analyses stratégiques et universitaires récentes conceptualisent l’Atlantique Nord et l’Arctique comme un espace géostratégique continu et interdépendant, plutôt que comme des régions maritimes distinctes (Rodrigues, 2026b). Cette évolution est motivée par les transformations environnementales, l’évolution des routes maritimes et l’intensification de la concurrence géopolitique. L’intégration de l’Arctique dans le système de l’Atlantique Nord a plusieurs implications clés dans différents secteurs. Premièrement, des transformations économiques et logistiques sont en cours. Les routes arctiques peuvent réduire les distances de transit entre l’Europe et l’Asie de 30 à 40 %, redéfinissant ainsi les schémas mondiaux du transport maritime et renforçant le rôle de l’Atlantique en tant que porte d’entrée vers les routes polaires émergentes, qui posent encore certains défis en matière de navigation. Cela signifie que les États non arctiques ont désormais l’occasion d’améliorer leurs capacités et de s’inscrire dans le nouveau contexte géopolitique en train de se dessiner. Deuxièmement, l’interdépendance en matière de sécurité s’est intensifiée. Les menaces provenant de l’Arctique, telles que la militarisation, l’activité sous-marine ou les opérations hybrides, peuvent affecter directement les infrastructures de l’Atlantique Nord, y compris les câbles de communication sous-marins essentiels. Cela crée un espace de vulnérabilité commun aux deux bassins. Troisièmement, la région reflète une continuité et une concurrence géopolitiques croissantes. Le système Arctique-Atlantique se caractérise désormais par une rivalité entre grandes puissances, impliquant notamment la Russie, dont la posture stratégique s’étend explicitement aux deux régions. Enfin, ces développements nécessitent une coopération multilatérale renforcée, y compris une coordination entre les mécanismes de gouvernance régionaux tels que les cadres des gardes côtiers de l’Arctique et de l’Atlantique Nord (Rodrigues, 2026b). La sécurité maritime au 21ème siècle, pour le Canada et nombre de ses alliés, est désormais façonnée par l’intégration fonctionnelle des bassins de l’Atlantique Nord et de l’Arctique, qui forment ensemble un environnement de sécurité continu et en constante évolution. Traditionnellement considérés comme des régions distinctes, ces espaces maritimes sont aujourd’hui mieux compris comme un seul théâtre opérationnel, où les risques, les menaces et les défis de gouvernance transcendent les frontières géographiques. L’Atlantique Nord comprend également les Açores, un archipel portugais situé au milieu de l’Atlantique, qui constitue un atout stratégique multidimensionnel dont l’importance s’étend aux domaines géopolitique, économique, environnemental et scientifique. Leur position centrale dans l’Atlantique Nord en fait un nœud essentiel des réseaux maritimes mondiaux, tandis que leur vaste domaine maritime soutient le développement économique et la gestion des ressources. L’importance des Açores évolue à la lumière des transformations mondiales et géopolitiques en cours. De leur rôle en matière de sécurité et de défense maritimes à leur contribution à l’économie bleue et à la recherche scientifique, l’archipel constitue un élément central de l’identité stratégique du Portugal. À une époque caractérisée par l’interconnexion et les défis environnementaux, les Açores offrent à la fois des possibilités et des responsabilités. Une stratégie maritime globale et tournée vers l’avenir est essentielle pour exploiter pleinement leur potentiel et garantir leur pertinence continue sur la scène internationale (Rodrigues, 2025c). Les Açores, et plus particulièrement la base de Lajes, ont également retrouvé une importance stratégique en tant que plateforme logistique et centre de surveillance (Borges, 2026). Leur position permet d’observer et de gérer l’augmentation du trafic maritime entre l’Atlantique et l’Arctique, renforçant ainsi le rôle potentiel du Portugal dans la gouvernance internationale et la coopération au sein de ces régions. Les priorités du Canada dans l’Arctique Le Canada est l’un des huit États circumpolaires, l’Arctique représentant 40 % de son territoire et plus de 70 % de son littoral (Gouvernement du Canada, 2025d). Cette région est essentielle à l’identité, à la sécurité et aux intérêts économiques du Canada. En tant que membre fondateur du Conseil de l’Arctique, le Canada joue un rôle de premier plan dans la gouvernance et la coopération arctiques. Les priorités du Canada s’articulent autour de la mise en œuvre du Cadre stratégique pour l’Arctique et le Nord de 2019 et de la Politique étrangère pour l’Arctique de 2024, qui mettent tous deux l’accent sur la souveraineté, le partenariat avec les peuples autochtones, le leadership scientifique et une diplomatie pragmatique. Ces priorités visent notamment à positionner le Canada comme chef de file mondial en matière de science arctique, à renforcer la coopération multilatérale, à accroître les possibilités commerciales et économiques pour les collectivités nordiques et à approfondir l’engagement auprès des peuples autochtones. Parmi les principales initiatives figurent la nomination d’un ambassadeur pour l’Arctique, l’ouverture de nouveaux consulats en Alaska et au Groenland, le lancement de dialogues sur la sécurité dans l’Arctique et la poursuite des négociations relatives aux frontières. Dans le cadre de l’effort de modernisation du NORAD entrepris en 2022, le Canada renforce également sa posture de défense dans l’Arctique en développant les capacités et les opérations des Forces armées canadiennes. Cela comprend le renforcement des Rangers canadiens, qui jouent un rôle central dans l’affirmation de la souveraineté du pays. Les dépenses de défense devraient presque tripler d’ici 2030 en réponse aux pressions géopolitiques croissantes. Le Canada poursuit également ses démarches visant à faire reconnaître l’extension de son plateau continental dans le cadre des processus prévus par la CNUDM (UNCLOS) et demeure résolument engagé en faveur de la gouvernance multilatérale par l’entremise du Conseil de l’Arctique et de l’Organisation maritime internationale (Rodrigues et Azodi, 2026). Le leadership scientifique du Canada repose sur Savoir polaire Canada et la Station canadienne de recherche dans l’Extrême-Arctique, située au Nunavut. Ces institutions intègrent les savoirs autochtones à la recherche multidisciplinaire afin de favoriser l’adaptation et la résilience. Savoir polaire Canada dirige la recherche arctique nationale en coordonnant les programmes scientifiques, en collaborant avec les collectivités nordiques et en formant la prochaine génération de chercheurs spécialisés dans les régions polaires, en accordant une attention particulière aux jeunes du Nord. L’engagement polaire de la France Bien que la France ne soit pas un État arctique, elle dispose d’une politique arctique solide et d’une longue tradition de recherche polaire. Elle se considère comme une nation polaire. Depuis 1963, la France affirme sa présence scientifique dans l’Arctique grâce à l’établissement d’une base de recherche au Svalbard, aujourd’hui exploitée conjointement avec l’Allemagne au sein du village scientifique international de Ny-Ålesund. Elle maintient également la station Jean Corbel, consacrée à la recherche en physico-chimie de l’atmosphère et en glaciologie (Ministère des Armées de la France, s.d.). Membre observateur du Conseil de l’Arctique depuis 2000, la France s’appuie sur ce forum de coopération régionale pour renforcer sa diplomatie scientifique. Elle a contribué à la structuration de la recherche polaire par le lancement de l’Observatoire scientifique de l’Arctique en 2010, qui coordonne environ 400 chercheurs dans les domaines des sciences de la Terre, des sciences de l’environnement et des sciences sociales. L’ensemble des infrastructures et de la logistique polaires est géré par l’Institut polaire français Paul-Émile Victor (IPEV), qui assure la présence opérationnelle de la France dans les régions polaires (Ministère des Armées de la France, s.d.). Dans l’Atlantique et l’Arctique, la Stratégie de sécurité pour l’Arctique de 2025 de la France souligne le lien stratégique entre l’Atlantique Nord et l’Arctique et réaffirme son engagement en faveur de la coopération et de la sécurité maritime (Rodrigues, 2026c). Cette orientation est renforcée par la Stratégie polaire 2030, première feuille de route globale de la France pour les régions polaires, lancée en avril 2022. Pilotée par le comité interministériel CIMER-POLES, cette stratégie vise à tripler les ressources consacrées à la recherche arctique, à établir une nouvelle base de recherche au Groenland, à mettre en service un nouveau navire océanographique polaire, à renforcer le rôle de la France au sein des instances de gouvernance de l’Arctique, à créer une fondation polaire française et à promouvoir Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon comme plateforme scientifique. Le projet de loi de programmation polaire ainsi que le One Polar Summit de 2023 constituent deux étapes clés dans la concrétisation de ces ambitions. Le rôle du Portugal comme porte d’entrée de l’Atlantique Le Portugal occupe une position stratégique au carrefour de l’Atlantique Nord, reliant l’Europe aux Amériques et à l’Afrique. Son littoral continental, combiné aux archipels des Açores et de Madère, place le Portugal au cœur de routes maritimes, de corridors aériens et de réseaux de câbles sous-marins essentiels au commerce mondial, aux communications et à la mobilité militaire. Bien que le Portugal ne soit pas un État arctique et ne soit donc pas membre du Conseil de l’Arctique, sa géographie atlantique et sa vocation maritime lui confèrent un intérêt indirect, mais de plus en plus important, dans les dynamiques maritimes liées à l’Arctique. Façonné par son histoire maritime et son identité atlantique, le Portugal a conservé une expertise navale importante, des infrastructures portuaires développées et une solide capacité en matière de gouvernance des océans. En tant que membre fondateur de l’OTAN et membre de l’Union européenne depuis 1986, le Portugal joue un rôle central dans la surveillance maritime de l’Alliance, la lutte anti-sous-marine et la protection des voies de communication maritimes dans l’Atlantique Nord. Les Açores, en particulier, demeurent un centre logistique et de surveillance d’une importance stratégique entre l’Amérique du Nord et l’Europe, renforçant la capacité de l’OTAN à sécuriser les voies de renforcement transatlantiques, lesquelles sont de plus en plus étroitement liées à la sécurité de l’Arctique et du Grand Nord (Rodrigues, 2025b; 2025c; 2025d). D’un point de vue stratégique, le Portugal joue le rôle de porte d’entrée atlantique pour les nouvelles routes maritimes de l’Arctique. À mesure que les changements climatiques modifient progressivement les schémas de navigation, les futurs flux de trafic en provenance de l’Arctique, qu’ils empruntent la Route maritime du Nord ou une éventuelle Route maritime transpolaire, convergeront ultimement vers les ports et les infrastructures de l’Atlantique Nord. Les ports et les services maritimes du Portugal sont donc bien placés pour bénéficier de ces flux commerciaux liés à l’Arctique et contribuer à leur résilience, même en l’absence d’un accès direct à l’océan Arctique. Ce rôle de porte d’entrée s’étend également à la protection des infrastructures sous-marines essentielles, notamment les pipelines énergétiques et les câbles de données, qui sont de plus en plus considérés comme des vulnérabilités stratégiques tant dans l’environnement sécuritaire de l’Atlantique Nord que dans celui de l’Arctique. L’importance stratégique du Portugal découle également de son rôle au sein de l’Union européenne. Par l’intermédiaire des initiatives européennes en matière de sécurité maritime, des cadres de gouvernance des océans et des programmes de recherche, le Portugal contribue indirectement à façonner l’engagement européen dans l’Arctique, notamment sur les questions de sécurité maritime, de protection de l’environnement et de gestion durable des pêches. Bien que le Portugal ne dispose pas encore d’une politique nationale consacrée à l’Arctique, il manifeste un intérêt croissant pour la recherche polaire, les sciences océaniques et la gouvernance climatique. La science portugaise est présente dans l’Arctique, même si cette présence demeure insuffisamment soutenue sur le plan diplomatique et peu reconnue dans les documents officiels (Rodrigues, 2025c; 2025d; 2025e). Dans l’ensemble, le Portugal illustre la manière dont un État européen non arctique peut exercer une influence stratégique dans les affaires arctiques grâce à son positionnement atlantique (plus particulièrement les îles Açores), à ses engagements au sein de l’OTAN et de l’Union européenne, à ses infrastructures maritimes et à sa connectivité interocéanique. En agissant comme passerelle stabilisatrice entre l’Arctique et les latitudes plus méridionales, le pays renforce la résilience des systèmes maritimes transatlantiques et liés à l’Arctique, tout en soutenant un ordre maritime multilatéral fondé sur le droit. Son rôle complète ceux du Canada et de la France, renforçant ainsi l’idée que la gouvernance et la sécurité de l’Arctique sont de plus en plus façonnées par des réseaux interconnectés de puissances non arctiques opérant à l’échelle du monde atlantique. Par comparaison, le rôle du Portugal complète ceux du Canada et de la France au sein d’une architecture de sécurité Atlantique–Arctique différenciée, mais cohérente. Alors que le Canada assure la souveraineté territoriale et une présence opérationnelle dans l’Arctique, et que la France projette une continuité stratégique entre l’Arctique et l’Atlantique grâce à sa posture navale mondiale, le Portugal renforce le pilier méridional de ce système atlantique. Par la surveillance maritime de l’OTAN, la protection des voies de communication maritimes et la sécurisation des infrastructures sous-marines, le Portugal contribue à assurer la résilience du lien transatlantique qui sous-tend la dissuasion et le renforcement des capacités dans l’Arctique. L’opération Brilliant Shield poursuivait précisément cet objectif en mobilisant les capacités des alliés du Sud, notamment celles du Portugal, par l’emploi d’un sous-marin conventionnel, démontrant qu’il est possible d’opérer sous les eaux couvertes de glace. Cette mission, menée d’avril à juillet 2024, a été exécutée avec succès par la Marine portugaise. Ensemble, ces trois États illustrent la manière dont des acteurs géographiquement distincts, mais fonctionnellement interconnectés, contribuent à la stabilité de l’Arctique en sécurisant différentes composantes d’un espace maritime intégré reliant le Grand Nord au reste de l’Atlantique. Conclusion et recommandations Une logique stratégique commune unit le Canada, la France et le Portugal. Le Canada constitue l’ancrage arctique en tant qu’État circumpolaire responsable de la souveraineté, de la gouvernance et du leadership scientifique dans le passage du Nord-Ouest. La France agit comme puissance maritime mondiale reliant structurellement l’Arctique et l’Atlantique Nord grâce à ses territoires d’outre-mer, à ses déploiements navals et à sa diplomatie polaire. Le Portugal, situé au carrefour de l’Atlantique Nord, joue le rôle de passerelle essentielle pour la sécurité maritime, la protection des infrastructures sous-marines et la connectivité atlantique au sein de l’OTAN et de l’Union européenne. Les nouvelles routes maritimes offrent la perspective de raccourcir les itinéraires du commerce mondial, mais elles soulèvent également d’importants défis, notamment des lacunes en matière d’infrastructures, des risques environnementaux et la nécessité d’une gouvernance internationale capable de gérer les enjeux de sécurité et de souveraineté. L’océan Arctique est déjà régi par un cadre juridique étoffé, principalement la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM), qui définit les compétences, les droits et les obligations des États dans les différentes zones maritimes. Ces règles couvrent notamment la délimitation du plateau continental, la navigation, la gestion des ressources naturelles, la protection du milieu marin et les autres usages de la mer. Tous les États disposent de droits et de responsabilités en matière d’utilisation des océans, qui s’appliquent également à l’Arctique. Ainsi, en vertu de la CNUDM, les États non arctiques ne peuvent mener des recherches scientifiques marines dans la zone économique exclusive (ZEE) d’un autre État qu’avec le consentement de celui-ci. À mesure que l’ordre maritime évolue sous l’effet des changements climatiques, de la compétition entre grandes puissances et des contestations juridiques, le Canada, la France et le Portugal assument des rôles de plus en plus importants et complémentaires. Ils partagent un engagement en faveur du multilatéralisme, du droit international et de la stabilité maritime. Leur coopération s’exerce dans le cadre de l’OTAN, de l’Union européenne, des Nations Unies et, lorsque pertinent, du Conseil de l’Arctique. Ensemble, ils apportent des contributions complémentaires : Le Canada assure les opérations dans l’Arctique, notamment dans le passage du Nord-Ouest, et exerce un leadership scientifique; La France établit un pont stratégique entre l’Arctique et l’Atlantique Nord grâce à sa diplomatie de défense et à sa recherche polaire; Le Portugal renforce la sécurité de l’axe Atlantique Nord–Arctique grâce à ses patrouilles sous-marines, à la protection des infrastructures maritimes et à la recherche régionale en matière de défense, tout en constituant un point d’ancrage essentiel de la connectivité atlantique en Europe par l’intermédiaire des Açores. Collectivement, ces trois États illustrent la manière dont les dynamiques océaniques liées à l’Arctique convergent avec les connexions maritimes mondiales pour façonner les alliances stratégiques et les postures de sécurité maritime. Que ce soit par les opérations de l’OTAN dans l’Atlantique Nord ou par la diplomatie scientifique dans l’Arctique, ces États démontrent comment des puissances moyennes peuvent favoriser la stabilité et la coopération dans plusieurs espaces maritimes. Le renforcement des partenariats trilatéraux et quadrilatéraux entre eux sera essentiel pour relever les défis d’une période marquée par l’incertitude en mer. En travaillant de manière collaborative et inclusive, ces États peuvent contribuer à faire respecter l’état de droit en mer, à atténuer les menaces liées aux changements climatiques et à désamorcer les tensions géopolitiques, tout en renforçant leur propre sécurité maritime et leur prospérité. Cette analyse démontre que la géographie ne détermine plus, à elle seule, la pertinence d’un État dans les affaires arctiques. Désormais, ce sont la connectivité, l’alignement sur le droit international et la capacité à bâtir des coalitions qui façonnent l’influence. Ensemble, le Canada, la France et le Portugal montrent que l’engagement des États non arctiques n’est ni opportuniste ni déstabilisateur lorsqu’il repose sur le multilatéralisme et le droit international. Le Canada apporte la légitimité et le leadership en matière de gouvernance arctique; la France assure la continuité stratégique entre les espaces océaniques; et le Portugal sécurise les portes d’entrée atlantiques ainsi que les infrastructures critiques. La présente note stratégique répond à la question directrice en démontrant que l’engagement des puissances non arctiques est non seulement possible, mais également nécessaire au maintien d’un ordre maritime stable dans des bassins océaniques interconnectés. Ces États agissent comme des connecteurs stratégiques : ils atténuent la polarisation entre les grandes puissances, renforcent les régimes juridiques et accroissent la résilience des chaînes d’approvisionnement ainsi que des architectures de sécurité. Dans ce contexte, les recommandations présentées ci-dessous visent à renforcer le multilatéralisme et la coopération entre les pays concernés, afin de promouvoir la stabilité, de réduire les tensions et de favoriser des résultats positifs dans la région arctique : Établir un réseau multilatéral de connaissance du domaine maritime (Maritime Domain Awareness – MDA); Approfondir la coopération entre les océans et le climat en matière de sécurité au moyen de groupes de travail spécialisés; Développer des modèles de gouvernance maritime inclusifs intégrant pleinement les peuples autochtones; Collaborer au sein de l’Union européenne, de l’OTAN et des organismes des Nations Unies afin d’élaborer des cadres de gouvernance maritime interrégionale. En définitive, l’avenir de l’Arctique sera façonné autant par des réseaux de coopération inclusifs que par la géographie polaire elle-même. En mobilisant les puissances non arctiques (petites et moyennes) dans le cadre de l’OTAN, de l’Union européenne, des institutions fondées sur la CNUDM et de la diplomatie scientifique, le Canada, la France et le Portugal offrent un modèle de gouvernance maritime coopérative capable d’atténuer les rivalités tout en s’adaptant aux transformations induites par les changements climatiques. Crédit image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jimmy C. Pan. ## Coopération spatiale : le Canada osera-t-il en prendre la tête ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/cooperation-spatiale-le-canada-osera-t-il-en-prendre-la-tete/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Le Canada doit intensifier sa coopération internationale dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique pour rester compétitif et pertinent dans... Le Canada doit intensifier sa coopération internationale dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique pour rester compétitif et pertinent dans l'arène mondiale. Cette note stratégique explore les lacunes actuelles du Canada dans ce domaine et propose des recommandations pour améliorer ses capacités et son influence, y compris (et surtout) en se positionnant comme pionnier de l'utilisation de l'intelligence artificielle (IA) actuelle dans les activités spatiales. Avec l’aide de son expertise sur la création et l’exploitation de l’IA, le Canada a la possibilité de renforcer ses partenariats internationaux, d’investir dans la recherche et le développement, et d’adopter une approche multidisciplinaire. Dans ce nouveau paradigme de l’accès à l’espace, le Canada peut consolider sa position en tant que leader dans l'exploration et l'exploitation de l'espace. Introduction L'amélioration de la coopération internationale du Canada dans le domaine de l'espace extra-atmosphérique, avec un accent particulier sur l'utilisation de l'intelligence artificielle (IA), est cruciale pour renforcer sa position sur la scène mondiale. Le Canada a fait plusieurs contributions notables dans ce domaine, notamment avec le célèbre Canadarm, utilisé dans les missions spatiales depuis les années 1980, et la conception du Canadarm3, prévue pour 2024-2025, qui jouera un rôle clé dans la station spatiale Lunar Gateway, figure de proue de l’exploration spatiale de demain. La contribution du Canada au télescope spatial James Webb, ou aux recherches l’utilisant comme le Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) ou encore au Near-InfraRed Imager and Slitless Spectrograph (NIRISS) illustre également ses capacités technologiques avancées. De plus, la mission NEOSSat, un télescope spatial dédié à la surveillance des objets proches de la Terre, montre l'engagement du Canada dans l'observation spatiale. Le constat est simple : le Canada possède tous les atouts pour se positionner comme une grande nation de l'exploration et de l'exploitation spatiales. Cependant, dans cette quête, il doit s'appuyer davantage sur une approche multilatérale, plutôt que sur des partenariats unilatéraux ou bilatéraux, qui prédominent actuellement. Au lieu de chercher à se positionner en tant que leader global dans tous les aspects de l'exploration spatiale, le Canada peut capitaliser sur ses atouts spécifiques, comme l'intelligence artificielle, pour devenir un partenaire de référence dans ces domaines précis, préalablement minutieusement choisis. En excellant dans ces champs d'expertises, le Canada se distinguerait alors dans les collaborations internationales et deviendrait un acteur incontournable sans nécessairement assumer le rôle de leader total. À noter que cette décision de se spécialiser exige une gestion rigoureuse des ressources et un engagement soutenu pour maintenir cette position stratégique. Bien que comportant de potentielles risques, une telle stratégie ciblée pourrait permettre au Canada de maximiser son influence et sa compétitivité à l’échelle mondiale. Toutefois, malgré ses réalisations techniques, le Canada reste largement dépendant de la NASA pour la plupart de ses activités spatiales, à la lumière de l’ISS ou de la future Lunar Gateway. Cette dépendance limite l'autonomie du Canada et le positionne souvent dans un rôle de contributeur plutôt que de leader. Le financement insuffisant des activités spatiales canadiennes, comparé à celui des autres pays de l'OCDE (se classant 22e sur l’année 2021) freine le plein développement de nouvelles technologies et initiatives. Ainsi, le manque d'une stratégie nationale claire, cohérente et indépendante à long terme, empêche le Canada de maximiser son potentiel dans ce domaine. La dépendance s'explique notamment par des moyens financiers limités. Bien que ces partenariats renforcent la position du Canada, ils le confinent dans un rôle de contributeur secondaire. Cette vision à court terme et l'absence de partenariats solides avec les nations émergentes (Inde, Chine, EAU entre autres) limitent les opportunités de collaboration et d'innovation. Pour combler ces lacunes, le Canada peut exploiter pleinement ses capacités en matière d’IA pour renforcer ses contributions et partenariats dans les missions spatiales internationales. Le Canada a déjà commencé à intégrer ces technologies, notamment dans la mise en place de la station spatiale Lunar Gateway, mais il doit poursuivre et intensifier ses efforts. Le développement de partenariats stratégiques supplémentaires avec des nations émergentes et d'autres acteurs clés du secteur spatial est essentiel pour que le Canada se positionne comme un expert incontournable et un leader dans ces domaines. En résumé, en misant sur l’innovation technologique (particulièrement l’IA) et en renforçant ses collaborations internationales, le Canada peut combler ses lacunes et assurer sa place dans l’exploration spatiale mondiale. Cette stratégie permettrait au Canada de jouer un rôle central dans les futures missions spatiales et de garantir sa compétitivité internationale. Cette note stratégique s’articulera autour de trois thèmes : les lacunes actuelles du Canada, l’IA comme atout essentiel, et quatre recommandations pour asseoir le Canada en tant que leader.  Les lacunes du Canada en matière d’exploration spatiale Le financement alloué aux activités spatiales par le gouvernement canadien est nettement inférieur à celui de nombreux autres pays membres de l'OCDE. En 2022-2023, le budget de l'Agence Spatiale Canadienne (ASC) était de 329,9 millions de dollars canadiens, avec des projections de baisse à 300,5 millions en 2023-2024 et à 252,5 millions en 2024-2025. En termes de pourcentage du produit intérieur brut (PIB), le Canada se classe 22ème parmi les nations de l'OCDE pour son budget spatial. À titre comparatif, les investissements en proportion de leurs PIB par des pays comme les États-Unis, la France ou l’Allemagne et même certains pays plus petits en termes de taille d’économie, surpassent largement les contributions financières du Canada à son programme spatial. Ce faible pourcentage met en évidence l’écart de compétitivité du Canada face aux nations qui investissent plus massivement et montrent une ambition plus marquée. Le ministre de l’Industrie reconnait par ailleurs que la stratégie de financement veille à ce que « les services de télécommunication soient fiables, innovateurs, concurrentiels et, surtout, abordables » : une phrase quelque peu dissonante au regard des financements de plus en plus faibles alloués à l’ASC. En réalité, cette orientation non dissimulée révèle une ambition limitée du gouvernement pour le secteur spatial. Les conséquences pourraient avoir des implications à long terme pour la position du Canada sur la scène internationale. De ce fait, cette faiblesse budgétaire limite la capacité du Canada à développer et à déployer des technologies spatiales avancées de manière indépendante. Ainsi, cela réduit l'impact potentiel du pays dans les missions spatiales internationales. Les investissements insuffisants freinent l'innovation et l'adoption de nouvelles technologies, comme l’IA pour l'exploration spatiale, et entravent la compétitivité internationale du Canada face à des nations qui investissent (économiquement et stratégiquement) massivement dans leurs programmes spatiaux – à l’instar des nouvelles « nations spatiales ». Par conséquent, le Canada prend le risque de potentiellement perdre des opportunités de collaboration et de participation à des projets spatiaux de grande envergure, tels que la Lunar Gateway ou la mission Artémis II, sans un soutien financier adéquat. Pour continuer, le manque d'investissements freine la capacité de l'ASC à innover et à adopter de nouvelles technologies, comme des systèmes de propulsion avancés, des matériaux de nouvelle génération, et des techniques d'atterrissage autonomes. Cette situation force le Canada à dépendre des technologies et des infrastructures développées par d'autres pays, réduisant de facto son autonomie stratégique et technologique. Le Canada se retrouve alors en position de faiblesse économique et ne peut pas compter sur ses investissements pour percevoir un retour sur ceux-ci. En réalité, le manque de financement adéquat et la dépendance à l'égard des partenaires internationaux limitent l'influence du Canada dans la définition des agendas et des normes internationales en matière d'exploration spatiale. En étant perçu comme un contributeur mineur plutôt qu'un porte-étendard convaincant, le Canada ne pèse pas autant dans les décisions critiques et les négociations internationales, ce qui peut avoir des implications à long terme sur sa position dans l'arène spatiale mondiale. Ensuite, le manque de financement approprié s’explique aussi par une absence de stratégie nationale cohérente à long terme dans le domaine spatial. Comme dans un cercle vicieux, ces deux facteurs limitants, s’influençant l’un et l’autre et par la même occasion, ont pour effet d’entraver son autonomie et son influence globale. Cette stratégie vise principalement à renforcer la participation du Canada dans des initiatives internationales comme la mission Lunar Gateway, mais elle manque de vision intégrée pour le développement autonome des capacités spatiales du pays. Toutes les solutions proposées dans le plan « Exploration, Imagination, Innovation » de l’ASC se retrouvent à être des programmes de développement qui font ou feront partie d’un ensemble plus vaste et dominé par d’autres nations spatiales. Le Canada assume ainsi une position de suiveur plutôt que de leader : la stratégie mise en place n’engage aucune vision propre au pays. En effet, la forte dépendance du Canada envers les États-Unis et d'autres partenaires internationaux occidentaux se manifeste par une participation significative à des projets conjoints, plutôt que par le développement de missions indépendantes. Par exemple, le Canadarm3, bien qu'innovant et technologiquement excellent, est une contribution canadienne à la mission Artémis II, menée par la NASA. La position de contributeur secondaire du Canada est une position qui permet au Canada de profiter du rayonnement international de ses alliés tout en évitant la prise de risque. Cette stratégie, compréhensible sur bien des aspects, n’engage pas le pays et ses entreprises à s’émanciper et à proposer ses propres projets, ce qui est un manque social, industriel, économique et politique à gagner pour le pays. Pourtant, le Canada lui-même estime que « les prévisions financières indiquent qu’elle aura plus que doublé d’ici 2040, atteignant des revenus annuels de 1 000 milliards de dollars », si celles-ci suivent la même progression de 70 % observé entre 2010 et 2020. Cette croissance exponentielle de l’économie spatiale mondiale contraste fortement avec l’approche prudente du Canada, révélant une dissonance frappante entre les projections financières et la stratégie actuelle du pays. En négligeant de se positionner de manière proactive dans ce secteur en pleine expansion, le Canada pourrait passer à côté d’opportunités économiques et d’innovation considérables. Encore plus alarmant, cette dépendance excessive peut devenir un facteur de risque surtout à la vue des avancées en défense spatiale d’autres pays. Par ailleurs, le financement et le soutien strictement limités aux initiatives purement canadiennes entravent la capacité du pays à mener des projets spatiaux de manière autonome. Le Canada se tourne alors vers des opportunités de « facilité », réduisant ainsi drastiquement sa capacité à innover et à collaborer. Faisant suite aux précédentes lacunes, l’autonomie relative du Canada s’explique par des partenariats spatiaux entretenu presque exclusivement avec ses alliés traditionnels, comme les États-Unis et les membres de l'Agence Spatiale Européenne (ESA). Bien que ces collaborations historiques soient bénéfiques, elles limitent la portée des partenariats canadiens à un cercle étroit de nations technologiquement avancées. Cette approche limitée pose deux problèmes majeurs. Premièrement, le manque de partenariats avec des nations émergentes dans le domaine spatial empêche le Canada de bénéficier des perspectives et des innovations uniques que ces pays peuvent offrir. Les pays émergents investissent de plus en plus dans leurs programmes spatiaux et développent des technologies novatrices à des coûts souvent inférieurs. Par exemple, des pays comme l'Inde et la Chine ont fait des avancées significatives dans l'exploration spatiale à moindre coût. Également, en termes d’image sur la scène internationale, la stratégie des Émirats Arabes Unies est à suivre de près et des collaborations avec le Canada dans ce sens pourraient être envisagées. En bref, élargir ses horizons permettrait au Canada de s’offrir des opportunités de collaboration qui pourraient être mutuellement bénéfiques. L’ouverture à des collaborations plus diversifiées doit être abordée avec prudence dans le contexte de rivalités stratégiques mondiales. Le secteur spatial, étroitement lié aux intérêts de sécurité nationale, impose des restrictions quant aux partenariats avec des nations en compétition géopolitique directe avec les alliés traditionnels du Canada, comme les États-Unis. Cela soulève des questions cruciales de confidentialité et de souveraineté technologique, exigeant ainsi une stratégie d’engagement mesurée, capable de concilier les impératifs de sécurité tout en favorisant des collaborations bénéfiques. Attention toutefois à ne pas perpétuer cette logique de suiveur si ces partenariats venaient à se créer. Le Canada doit pouvoir être en mesure d’apporter une expertise qui se veut indispensable dans les collaborations et négociations internationales afin de garantir sa place de leader. Deuxièmement, en se concentrant uniquement sur les partenariats traditionnels, le Canada risque de manquer des opportunités d'influence et de leadership dans les nouveaux marchés spatiaux. Comme expliqué précédemment, le risque pour le Canada est de rester l’éternel second. L'absence d’une coopération à plus large échelle limite la capacité du Canada à diversifier ses collaborations et à s'adapter aux dynamiques en constant changement du secteur spatial global. Cela réduit également la visibilité et l'impact du Canada sur la scène internationale, car les partenariats avec des nations émergentes peuvent ouvrir de nouveaux marchés et renforcer la compétitivité globale du pays. En d’autres termes, en plus d’avoir une influence sur l’image globale du pays, cela n’incite pas les entreprises du « new space » à s’installer de manière durable sur le territoire national. Pourtant, le Canada dispose d’un atout de taille pour déjà penser à des partenariats à la hauteur de ses aspirations, à savoir l’IA. L’IA est au cœur des ambitions universitaires, technologiques et industrielles du Canada. Tirer avantage de cette technologie est un moyen pour le Canada de s’assurer un avenir dans l’exploration et l’exploitation spatiales. L’IA agit en réalité comme la pièce manquante pour combler les lacunes exposées précédemment. Malgré les opportunités que représente l’exploitation de cet outil, l'intégration de l'IA dans les projets spatiaux canadiens est encore marginale même si de bons espoirs d’investissements sont à noter, spécialement dans la recherche et le développement. Les initiatives comme le Canadarm3 et les contributions aux missions internationales démontrent une grande capacité, mais souvent secondaire, des technologies impliquant l’IA. Cela s’explique en partie par un manque d'investissement et à une absence de stratégie nationale cohérente pour intégrer l'IA dans le secteur spatial. L’IA au cœur de la création d’un Canada spatial L’utilisation des IA est déjà en vogue dans le domaine spatial depuis longtemps. Cependant, avec l’explosion des innovations dans ce domaine, l’IA devient un incontournable pour toute entreprise ou nation ayant l’ambition de continuer à garder une place importante pour le futur. Avec la vision des États-Unis de plus en plus orientée vers les missions habitées et les programmes de défense spatiale, le Canada doit saisir l'opportunité d'investir dans ce changement de paradigme et de devenir un pilier de cette nouvelle ère. C’est précisément dans ces périodes de transitions qu’il est essentiel d’agir pour profiter de l’occasion. Le Canada dispose de toutes les capacités nécessaires pour répondre présent face aux défis que représentent l’exploration et l’exploitation spatiale. L’IA devient un indispensable du savoir-faire et de la transition et peut nourrir les ambitions d’une coopération plus juste et moins unilatérale. D’abord, face au financement insuffisant, l'IA peut optimiser l'utilisation des ressources limitées en automatisant et en améliorant l'efficacité des processus, réduisant ainsi les coûts opérationnels. Par exemple, l'IA peut être utilisée pour la gestion prédictive des équipements et des ressources, permettant de maximiser l'utilisation des budgets existants et de réduire les besoins en maintenance non planifiée. Par exemple, la NASA utilise l'IA pour l’optimisation du design des matériaux utilisés sur ses appareils, permettant de réduire les coûts tout en augmentant l’efficacité. Devenir pionnier dans la création d’outils d’IA de gestion aura un effet double : celui de garantir des coûts plus faibles en matière d’innovations et de créations et celui d’un gain de temps important. Ensuite, dans le domaine du développement technologique, l'IA peut accélérer les processus de recherche et développement en analysant rapidement de grandes quantités de données pour identifier des matériaux innovants et optimiser les conceptions des systèmes de tous types. Par exemple, le « Model Predictive Control » est une technologie qui est utilisée pour calculer les trajectoires des fusées. Cette technologie permet de mieux appréhender les comportements des appareils et ainsi faciliter l’accès à l’espace. Avec une approche similaire, l'IA a aussi pour but de simuler des scénarios complexes pour tester de nouvelles technologies de manière efficace avant leur mise en œuvre réelle, ce qui permet de gagner du temps et de l'argent. Un autre exemple est l'utilisation de l'IA par Boeing pour la simulation de l'aérodynamique et la structure des nouvelles générations d’appareils, permettant de détecter et de corriger avec rapidité, les problèmes potentiels avant la phase de production tout en optimisant leur efficacité. Pour continuer, à propos de l'absence de stratégie nationale cohérente, l'IA joue un rôle crucial dans la formulation et l'exécution d’une stratégie commune. Les systèmes d'IA analysent les tendances globales, prévoient les besoins futurs et proposent des plans stratégiques optimisés pour le secteur spatial canadien. En utilisant l'IA pour des analyses prédictives, le Canada peut mieux planifier ses investissements et initiatives spatiales à long terme, assurant ainsi une vision cohérente et durable. De plus, pour pallier les partenariats internationaux limités, l'IA peut faciliter des collaborations plus diversifiées en offrant des plateformes de coopération technologique. Par exemple, des projets conjoints de développement d'IA avec des nations émergentes pourraient ouvrir de nouvelles avenues de collaboration et d'innovation. En démontrant son expertise en exploitation de l’IA, le Canada à l’opportunité de conclure des partenariats avec des pays technologiquement avancés, renforçant ainsi sa position sur la scène internationale. En intégrant l'IA dans ses initiatives spatiales, le Canada peut non seulement optimiser ses ressources, accélérer le développement technologique, augmenter son autonomie, formuler une stratégie cohérente et diversifier ses partenariats internationaux, mais aussi renforcer sa compétitivité et son influence globale dans le secteur spatial mondial. Enfin, utiliser l'IA comme un outil pour promouvoir la multidisciplinarité permettrait également au Canada d'accroître sa capacité d'innovation. L'IA peut intégrer des domaines variés comme la robotique, la science des matériaux, la biologie spatiale ou encore l'astrophysique. Ces intégrations permettent des approches novatrices et transversales. En favorisant la collaboration entre différentes disciplines, le pays développe des solutions spatiales innovantes et adaptées aux défis complexes de l'exploration de l'espace profond. Cette approche multidisciplinaire, soutenue par l'IA, renforcerait la position du Canada en tant que leader dans l'exploration spatiale, tout en maximisant les synergies entre les secteurs et en stimulant la créativité et l'ingéniosité nécessaires pour relever les défis futurs. Les quatre grandes recommandations à destination du gouvernement Les recommandations ont pour but d’inciter à la mise en place d’une stratégie de coopération internationale initiée par le Canada, tout en mettant en avant les atouts et la crédibilité du Canada a mené cette stratégie. Renforcement de la coopération internationale En élargissant les collaborations au-delà des partenaires traditionnels comme les États-Unis et les pays membres de l’ESA, le Canada pourrait inclure des pays émergents dans le domaine spatial, tels que l’Inde, la Chine, et certains pays du Moyen-Orient, pour renforcer ses relations tant économiques que politiques. En adoptant une approche sélective, le Canada prioriserait les collaborations avec des nations dont les intérêts stratégiques sont compatibles, tout en préservant ses alliances traditionnelles. En parallèle, se positionner comme un hub technologique spécialisé en intelligence artificielle et en robotique spatiales permettrait d'attirer des partenaires internationaux en quête de solutions avancées, maximisant ainsi la compétitivité du Canada dans ce secteur. Cette combinaison de stratégies offre au Canada l'opportunité de s’émanciper progressivement de ses alliés traditionnels, sans pour autant contester leur domination sur la scène spatiale. Ainsi, le Canada peut continuer à adopter une posture de suiveur, tout en préparant activement son avenir et en renforçant ses capacités pour les défis futurs. Ce positionnement équilibré lui permettrait de préserver sa souveraineté technologique et de répondre aux impératifs de sécurité nationale, tout en bénéficiant des retombées des collaborations internationales. Dans une autre mesure, revoir la position du suiveur en position de « neutralité active » aurait pour vocation de renforcer le rôle du Canada en tant que médiateur fiable, facilitant des collaborations internationales sans prendre parti dans les rivalités géopolitiques. En adoptant cette posture, le Canada pourrait attirer de nouveaux partenaires tout en consolidant son image d'acteur impartial et coopératif, apte à contribuer aux initiatives mondiales de manière équilibrée et stratégique. En matière de recherche et développement et d’approche multidisciplinaire, cette stratégie favoriserait les avantages des pays collaborateurs tout en leur permettant de combler leurs propres lacunes. Augmentation des investissements en recherche et développement En créant un programme de subvention plus ambitieux pour répondre au besoin d’investissement en matière de recherche et développement, le Canada encouragerait ses entreprises et ses universités à proposer des projets innovants liés à l'IA et à l'exploration spatiale. En finançant des projets de recherche appliquée et des prototypes technologiques, le Canada accélérera le développement de nouvelles capacités spatiales et réduira sa dépendance aux technologies étrangères. En plus de permettre la mise en place d'un écosystème dynamique d'innovation, ce programme favoriserait la collaboration entre le secteur privé et le milieu universitaire, créant des synergies intéressantes pour développer la créativité, la coopération intersectorielle et la compétitivité canadiennes. Une autre retombée de ces programmes serait l’émergence de nouvelles entreprises et une attractivité accrue pour les talents internationaux. Cela renforcerait la “chaîne de valeur nationale” en matière d'exploration spatiale et permettrait d’atteindre certains autres grands objectifs canadiens, en dehors du strict programme spatial. Ces programmes de subventions donneraient plus d’ambitions aux propositions initiales comme le programme d’accélération d’exploration lunaire (PAEL) déjà en place. Adoption de la multidisciplinarité En intégrant l'IA comme technologie centrale, le Canada saura stimuler l'innovation dans divers domaines essentiels à l'exploration spatiale. L'IA permettrait d'optimiser les processus, d'accélérer les découvertes scientifiques, et d'améliorer les capacités technologiques. Cette approche encouragerait une collaboration interdisciplinaire, renforçant ainsi les synergies entre différents secteurs et contribuant à la compétitivité globale du Canada dans le domaine spatial. En positionnant l'IA au cœur de sa stratégie spatiale, le Canada peut se préparer à répondre aux défis futurs tout en consolidant son rôle de leader en innovation technologique. Proposer une application de l’IA dans une variété de domaines clefs aura pour conséquence de renforcer les collaborations internationales. Également, cette position multidisciplinaire, tout en s’alignant avec les prévisions de retombées économiques d’ici à 2040, aurait pour conséquence de générer des bénéfices économiques considérables pour le Canada. La création d’emplois hautement qualifiés, le renforcement de l’industrie technologique nationale, et l’attraction d’investissements internationaux permettrait au Canada de garder aussi sa place sur la scène internationale dans d’autres secteurs gravitant autour du domaine spatial. En anticipant cette croissance de l’économie spatiale mondiale, estimée à 1 000 milliards de dollars, le Canada s’assurera dès lors une place compétitive dans ce marché en pleine expansion : c’est en cela que l’approche multidisciplinaire, par son cercle vertueux, devient un levier important d’une économie florissante. Élaboration d’une stratégie nationale à long terme Cette stratégie devra inclure des objectifs clairs et mesurables pour les 10 à 20 prochaines années, en mettant l'accent sur l'IA, l'autonomie technologique, et les partenariats internationaux. Une telle feuille de route à l’ambition de fournir une direction cohérente et des priorités stratégiques pour l'ASC et d'autres acteurs clés afin de faciliter une planification et une allocation de ressources efficaces. Cette recommandation est sans doute celle qui permet aux autres de se construire avec des bases solides : la confiance générée par un plan bien construit attirerait les investisseurs qui contribueraient de facto aux subventions ; cela prouverait aux autres nations que le Canada est un allié de taille pour une coopération efficace, prêt à relever les défis et à réaliser un tournant dans ses ambitions ; elle permettrait de surmonter les obstacles liés à la recherche multidisciplinaire en offrant une meilleure visibilité sur le temps et les ressources nécessaires, ce qui favoriserait des études approfondies et à long terme. ## COVID-19 et l’avenir de l’ordre mondial URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/covid-19-et-lavenir-de-lordre-mondial/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Ce rapport est le début d’une conversation et une contribution aux débats sur la signification et l’importance de la COVID-19 pour la gouvernance mondiale, la géopolitique, la sécurité nationale, la démocratie et la gestion des crises. Ce rapport a été réalisé par le Centre sur la gouvernance sécuritaire et de crise (CRITIC), fondé en 2020 au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean. Le CRITIC vise à produire et à promouvoir une recherche de pointe qui contribue aux débats sur les politiques publiques et à la mission du CMR de Saint-Jean. Il est dirigé par deux membres du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, le professeur Bruno Charbonneau et la professeure Chantal Lavallée, respectivement directeur et directrice adjointe du CRITIC. Résumé COVID-19 et l’avenir de l’ordre mondial est le début d’une conversation et une contribution aux débats sur la signification et l’importance de la COVID-19 pour la gouvernance mondiale, la géopolitique, la sécurité nationale, la démocratie et la gestion des crises. La collection d’articles offre une vue d’ensemble des défis multiformes et multidimensionnels que pose la COVID-19 pour l’ordre mondial. Elle cherche à donner un sens à la fois à la pandémie et au bruit analytique et public qui l’entoure. Dans la première section « COVID-19 : un test pour les démocraties libérales », Christian Leuprecht, Wesley Cunningham, Marina Sharpe, Simon Hogue et Élisabeth Vallet soulignent comment la gestion de la pandémie a remis en question les lois internationales et nationales en plus de soulever des questions cruciales pour la gouvernance démocratique. La deuxième section « COVID-19 : États et géopolitique » examine les réponses internationales : Bruno Charbonneau analyse l’inaction du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, Chantal Lavallée aborde les défis auxquels est confrontée l’Union européenne, Pierre Jolicoeur et Anthony Seaboyer explorent la propagande de la Chine et de la Russie, Nancy Teeple et Andrew McBride se penchent sur les relations en matière de défense entre le Canada et les États-Unis et Cédric Jourde étudie les effets sur les États africains et leurs politiques. Dans la dernière section « COVID-19 : vers de nouvelles tendances ? », Shahar Hameiri, Mulry Mondélice et Yann Breault évaluent les tendances présentes ou émergentes concernant l’économie mondiale, l’action humanitaire et la gestion de crise. TABLE DES MATIÈRES INTRODUCTION COVID-19 et l'avenir de l'ordre mondial Bruno Charbonneau et Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean COVID-19: UN TEST POUR LES DÉMOCRATIES LIBÉRALES COVID-19 : le test pour la démocratie canadienne Christian Leuprecht, Collège militaire royal COVID-19 et continuité du gouvernement constitutionnel au Canada Wesley Cunningham, Colonel, Aviation royale canadienne Pas de retour? La légalité des restrictions imposées aux Canadiens qui prennent l’avion pour le Canada Marina Sharpe, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Le pouvoir des « Little Brothers »: la surveillance et le futur de la démocratie Simon Hogue, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Les États-Unis, la COVID-19 et l’érosion démocratique Elisabeth Vallet, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean COVID-19: ÉTATS ET GÉOPOLITIQUE Le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et le test de la COVID-19 Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean L'Union européenne dans tous ses états Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean COVID-19, une arme politique : une comparaison de la Chine et de la Russie Pierre Jolicoeur et Anthony Seaboyer, Collège militaire royal L'impact de la COVID-19 sur les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis en matière de défense Nancy Teeple, Université Simon Fraser, et Andrew McBride, Capitaine, Ret’d COVID-19, Afrique et politique Cédric Jourde, Université d'Ottawa COVID-19: VERS DE NOUVELLES TENDANCES ? Est-ce la fin de la mondialisation? Shahar Hameiri, Université du Queensland L'action humanitaire au temps de la COVID-19: entre réaffirmation du multilatéralisme et enjeux de cohérence Mulry Mondélice, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Du « Soft Power » au « Sharp Power » en temps de pandémie Yann Breault, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean ## COVID-19 et renforcement des capacités : Rapport final URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/covid-19-et-renforcement-des-capacites-rapport-final/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique examine comment le renforcement des capacités, mais surtout l'assistance à la sécurité et les opérations de... Au cours de l'automne 2020, le Réseau d'analyse stratégique a tenu une série d'ateliers en ligne sur les liens entre la COVID-19 et les activités de renforcement des capacités. Dans cette note stratégique, je mets à jour mes précédents travaux sur la base des leçons tirées de ce cycle. Comment le renforcement des capacités, mais surtout l'assistance à la sécurité et les opérations de formation militaire, a-t-il été affecté par la COVID-19 ? À quoi faut-il s'attendre pour l'avenir ? La pandémie a entraîné une réduction des lieux où se déroulent les opérations de renforcement des capacités, certaines missions étant suspendues ou réduites. Le schéma des répercussions semble refléter un équilibre entre les priorités de santé publique et de politique étrangère, réduisant la présence tout en maintenant les opérations considérées comme étant les plus importantes. En même temps, les opérations de renforcement des capacités ont réduit l'étendue de leurs activités, y compris dans des endroits qui sont des priorités de politique étrangère. Cela peut indiquer qu'une opération de renforcement des capacités est importante pour l'État expéditeur et qu'elle sera de retour à sa pleine capacité lorsque la pandémie sera terminée. Étant donné que les opérations de renforcement des capacités du Canada s'inscrivent dans des cadres multilatéraux, une question clé pour le Canada est de savoir comment la pandémie affectera les opérations de renforcement des capacités des alliés. À court et à moyen terme, la pandémie semble limiter la portée des opérations, mais elle n'a pas le dernier mot sur les lieux où se déroulent les opérations de renforcement des capacités. Les alliés du Canada continuent de réagir à des circonstances changeantes ; leurs priorités quant aux endroits où mener des opérations au début de la pandémie ne sont pas les mêmes qu'aujourd'hui. À plus long terme, les dommages économiques et les limites qui en découlent pour les budgets de défense peuvent rendre le renforcement des capacités moins attrayant (s'il est considéré comme inessentiel) ou plus attrayant (s'il est considéré comme un bon moyen de poursuivre des intérêts géostratégiques à un coût relativement faible, par rapport à des interventions plus robustes). Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, les déploiements alliés sont susceptibles de se recentrer sur des missions essentielles dans des environnements stratégiquement importants, en particulier ceux qui sont axés sur la compétition entre grandes puissances. Cela signifie probablement, entre autres, qu'il y aura une négligence du renforcement des capacités pour les opérations de paix, malgré un besoin évident. L’assistance en matière de sécurité avant la pandémie L'assistance à la sécurité a été une activité clé pour les Forces armées canadiennes, de plus en plus depuis la fin de son rôle majeur de combat en Afghanistan. Ce changement s'est fait à l'unisson des alliés du Canada au cours des dix dernières années. Soumis à des contraintes budgétaires après la crise financière de 2008, et réagissant à l'épuisement des déploiements à grande échelle et des opérations de combat au sol, les États-Unis ont particulièrement recentré la façon dont ils abordent la lutte contre l'insurrection, le terrorisme et d'autres défis de sécurité, en cherchant à moins utiliser leurs propres forces et à renforcer davantage les forces des partenaires. Dans le même temps, la Russie et la Chine ont fait sentir de plus en plus leur présence dans le renforcement des capacités, notamment en Afrique subsaharienne. Dans le domaine du maintien de la paix, le renforcement des capacités est devenu une approche de plus en plus attrayante dans les années 2000. Les États du Nord global sont devenus beaucoup moins disposés à envoyer des troupes de maintien de la paix, surtout après plusieurs missions ayant donné lieu à des controverses très médiatisées et coûteuses. Le développement de l'intérêt pour le renforcement des capacités a également reflété le sentiment que les organisations régionales comme l'Union africaine et leurs membres feraient un meilleur travail de gestion des opérations de maintien de la paix, avec une plus grande adhésion locale et une meilleure compréhension des problèmes de conflits locaux. Une division nord-sud du travail est apparue : les États du Sud fournissent des troupes, tandis que les États du Nord assurent le financement et d'autres types de soutien. Le renforcement des capacités des États du Sud à contribuer aux opérations de paix en fait partie ; par exemple, l'Initiative mondiale pour les opérations de paix des États-Unis a formé quelque 139 000 personnes entre 1999 et 2016, selon la International Military Training Activities Database-USA. Malgré ces chiffres, un degré important de préoccupation a été exprimé quant au fait que les activités de renforcement des capacités existantes étaient trop à court terme et de portée limitée pour s'attaquer à la complexité des opérations de paix contemporaines. L'impact de ces activités de renforcement des capacités n'est pas clair. Certaines recherches existantes suggèrent que la formation façonne effectivement les normes et les valeurs dominantes des armées locales. D'autres recherches soulignent ses conséquences involontaires, comme le lien entre la participation au programme international d'éducation et de formation militaire des États-Unis et les coups d'État (bien que le jury ne se soit pas encore prononcé sur ce lien). Cependant, encore d'autres recherches suggèrent que le renforcement des capacités n'a probablement que peu d'effet dans la contre-insurrection et le contre-terrorisme en particulier, car tout gain tactique peut être annulé par des problèmes au niveau politique. Cela inclut les conflits entre factions et les autorités locales qui détournent la formation, les armes et les fournitures au profit de loyalistes politiques ou qui ne permettent pas aux officiers et soldats formés d'exercer réellement leur formation. Indépendamment de ces préoccupations, le renforcement des capacités a toutefois été un outil politique populaire, en partie parce qu'il signale une volonté de faire sa part sans assumer un fardeau excessif. Le renforcement des capacités en période de pandémie : entre santé publique et politique étrangère La pandémie a ralenti la popularité croissante du renforcement des capacités. Elle a entraîné des changements à la fois dans les lieux où se déroulent les opérations de renforcement des capacités et dans les activités auxquelles elles se livrent. Chacun de ces changements a été motivé par une combinaison de considérations relatives à la santé publique et de priorités de politique étrangère. La COVID-19 a conduit à un report de certaines activités de renforcement des capacités et à une réduction d'autres. Le Canada est loin d'être seul dans ce cas. Les FAC, aux côtés de leurs alliés de l'OTAN, ont suspendu leurs activités de formation en Irak (NATO Training Mission-Iraq). Le Canada a également réduit ses effectifs en Ukraine (UNIFIER) et a reporté une session de formation au Niger (NABERIUS). De la même manière, les États-Unis ont annulé des exercices dans le monde entier, y compris avec des partenaires clés comme la Corée du Sud et Israël, et le Royaume-Uni a suspendu ses activités de formation au Kenya. Dans le même temps, d'autres États ont maintenu leurs activités de renforcement des capacités, la France ayant notamment gardé l'opération Barkhane au Sahel pleinement opérationnelle, et la Chine ayant souligné qu'un exercice de formation au Cambodge en mars et avril s'était déroulé comme prévu. Deux facteurs ont sous-tendu ces décisions : la santé publique et les priorités de la politique étrangère. Premièrement, les conditions locales de la pandémie de coronavirus ont motivé bon nombre de ces décisions. Un exemple extrême a été la décision de l'armée américaine, fin mars 2020, de suspendre toutes les activités de formation dans tout pays désigné comme niveau d'alerte 2 ou 3 par les Centers for Disease Control (CDC). En fait, en situation d'urgence, elle a adopté un critère de santé publique général, délégué à une agence de santé publique, plutôt que de tenir compte des intérêts de politique étrangère pays par pays. Dans de nombreux contextes, les conditions de santé publique ont en fait permis aux opérations de renforcement des capacités de se poursuivre avec peu de perturbations. L'impact direct relativement limité de la COVID-19 au Sahel a été très remarqué, et comme le souligne Marc-André Boisvert, certaines opérations ont pu se poursuivre avec relativement peu de changements, notamment au Mali. Deuxièmement, cependant, ces décisions reflètent dans une large mesure les priorités des États formateurs. Une comparaison entre les opérations de renforcement des capacités et les déploiements de dissuasion permet d'illustrer ce point. L'OTAN a suspendu ses activités de formation en Irak le 20 mars 2020. Dans le même temps, elle a maintenu actifs ses déploiements réguliers de présence avancée rehaussée dans les États baltes et en Pologne. La fonction essentielle de l'alliance, après tout, est la dissuasion à l'égard de la Russie, tandis que le renforcement des capacités d'une armée partenaire dans un lieu « hors zone » comme l'Irak est une priorité importante, mais secondaire. Les forces américaines en Somalie, selon Louis-Alexandre Berg, se sont concentrées sur leurs opérations cinétiques qui semblaient d'importance immédiate, tout en suspendant leurs activités de renforcement des capacités à long terme. Par conséquent, le fait de maintenir certaines missions de renforcement des capacités essentiellement inchangées a démontré un engagement. Dans certains cas, il semble que c’était voulu ainsi. La Chine a montré assez publiquement qu'elle maintenait son opération de formation au Cambodge, alors même qu'une grande partie de son propre pays était fermée en raison de la pandémie. Cela a eu deux effets : montrer son engagement envers un partenaire et montrer qu'elle — et le Cambodge — n'étaient pas particulièrement préoccupés par le virus. Certains des choix du Canada ont montré ses propres priorités. Par exemple, le 26 mars 2020, le jour de l'annonce du retrait de l'opération UNIFIER, la Lettonie comptait plus de cas confirmés de COVID-19 que l'Ukraine. En maintenant REASSURANCE en Lettonie tout en réduisant temporairement UNIFIER en Ukraine, le Canada a indiqué que le renforcement des capacités en Ukraine n'était pas aussi important pour lui que la dissuasion et la préparation en Lettonie. Quelle que soit l'intention, le signal est vraisemblablement le suivant : une interprétation simple, qui reflète l'engagement du Canada envers la Lettonie en tant que membre de l'OTAN. Dans une version plus sombre d'une logique similaire, cependant, de nombreuses activités de formation à court terme pour les opérations de maintien de la paix se sont arrêtées avec la pandémie, comme le souligne Arthur Boutellis : pour les pays donateurs du Nord, c'était un risque de trop. Mais le fait que d’autres déploiements pour le renforcement des capacités—en dehors du domaine des opérations de paix—ont été maintenus suggère que les États étaient prêts à prendre certains risques et à adapter leurs efforts si la priorité était suffisamment forte. La conclusion désolante est que le renforcement des capacités des opérations de maintien de la paix n'a pas souvent été retenu, ce qui reflète la tendance pré-pandémique au court terme et au déclin du soutien à ce type d'opérations. Cela permet également de rappeler que les considérations centrales des opérations de renforcement des capacités du Canada sont ce que font ses partenaires multilatéraux. Ces opérations se déroulent presque toujours dans un cadre plus large, qu'il s'agisse de l'ONU, de l'OTAN ou d'un partenariat ad hoc. La décision du Canada en Irak s'inscrivait dans une décision plus large de l'OTAN. Cela reflète le poids des engagements au sein des alliances dans les décisions du Canada de participer à des opérations de renforcement des capacités; l'établissement de relations avec des pays hôtes spécifiques comme l'Irak est moins important. Adapter les opérations de renforcement des capacités Parallèlement à la réduction des effectifs de certaines missions, les opérations de renforcement des capacités se sont partout adaptées à la pandémie en modifiant leurs pratiques quotidiennes. Les considérations de santé publique ont modifié ce que les opérations étaient en mesure de faire. Comme le souligne le Lcol Pierre Leroux, l'opération UNIFIER, par exemple, a établi un système de code de couleurs pour indiquer l'état de la pandémie dans différents sites en Ukraine, ce qui a influencé ses décisions quant aux endroits où envoyer le personnel des FAC afin de limiter leur exposition. Selon la Mgén Jennie Carignan, la mission d'entraînement de l'OTAN en Irak a dû apprendre rapidement à s'adapter à l'impact du virus, et a développé un plus grand degré d'efficacité au fil du temps en apprenant de meilleures pratiques de santé publique. Enfin, comme l'explique le Maj Audrey Hudon, les FAC dans leur ensemble ont dû adapter leur approche en matière de santé mentale à leur personnel pour faire face aux nouvelles réalités du déploiement dans le cadre de la COVID-19, par exemple avec la gestion de la suspension des congés à mi-déploiement et les difficultés de la quarantaine avant et après le déploiement pour le personnel et leurs familles. Une grande partie du soutien en matière de santé mentale a également dû être assurée par des plateformes numériques. Le personnel féminin des FAC a, en particulier, été confronté à des défis découlant de la pression exercée sur elles pour qu'elles jouent un rôle d'organisatrices du milieu familial dans le contexte d'une perturbation importante des routines domestiques pendant la pandémie. L'une des conséquences les plus importantes pour les déploiements des FAC a été la limitation des contacts en personne. Tout déploiement doit essayer de se faire accepter par la population locale du pays hôte ; cela est aussi vrai pour un déploiement axé sur la dissuasion comme l'opération REASSURANCE en Lettonie que pour une mission de formation comme l'opération UNIFIER. En général, le contact direct en personne peut y contribuer. Toutefois, en cas d'urgence sanitaire, la limitation des contacts peut améliorer la confiance en montrant clairement qu'une mission ne constitue pas une menace pour la santé publique. Comme l'explique Carla Martínez Machain, les éclosions de COVID-19 sur deux bases des Marines américains à Okinawa, par exemple, ont suscité des inquiétudes locales quant au déploiement. Cependant, dans le cadre des opérations de renforcement des capacités, les contacts face à face limités ont également rendu plus difficile l'établissement de relations entre les FAC et les forces armées partenaires. Sous cette contrainte, les opérations de renforcement des capacités ont changé de cap pour se concentrer sur ce qu'elles sont en mesure de faire. Le Lcol Leroux note que l'opération UNIFIER s'est réorientée pour se concentrer sur l'aspect administratif, par exemple sur les standards de formation. Selon Stéfanie von Hlatky, la formation en matière de genre à l'OTAN s'est recentrée de la formation de ses armées partenaires, comme l'armée irakienne, vers l'amélioration des pratiques de genre de l'alliance elle-même. Mody Berethe, directeur de l'École de maintien de la paix de Bamako, explique que son organisation s'est tournée vers l'enseignement à distance et a proposé davantage de cours aux forces armées et policières locales afin d'améliorer leurs propres pratiques pour les opérations nationales, en adaptant le programme pour y inclure des cours sur le terrorisme et les droits humains. Le souci, bien sûr, est que les opérations de renforcement des capacités finissent par dénaturer les activités d'une mission, en empêchant certaines activités importantes et en concentrant les efforts sur les activités restantes. Mais d'un autre point de vue, il n'y a tout simplement pas beaucoup de choix. En d'autres termes, dans les domaines qui les concernaient le plus, les États formateurs, dont le Canada, ont tenté de maintenir leurs opérations dans la mesure du possible, mais ont été limités dans ce qu'ils pouvaient faire. Les officiers qui ont fait des présentations lors des ateliers sur le renforcement des capacités ont laissé entendre que la bonne volonté accumulée au fil du temps se poursuivra probablement, envoyant un signal aux pays bénéficiaires que les FAC sont présentes malgré la pandémie et qu'elles reprendront leurs opérations à pleine capacité avec toute la gamme d'activités de renforcement des capacités lorsque ce sera sécuritaire de le faire. Il s'agit d'un signal d'engagement nuancé, mais compte tenu des préoccupations très réelles en matière de santé publique liées aux déploiements, c'est probablement le signal le plus efficace à envoyer. Le corollaire est qu'avec la course permanente entre les campagnes de vaccination et les taux d'infection, en particulier avec les nouvelles variantes de la COVID-19 et dans les zones où l'infrastructure sanitaire est fragile, les opérations auront la délicate tâche de déterminer jusqu'où elles peuvent s'ouvrir. Il s'agit d'un processus qui devra être guidé par la négociation entre le Canada, ses partenaires multilatéraux et les bénéficiaires afin de maintenir une confiance mutuelle. Les impacts de la COVID-19 sur le renforcement des capacités à court et moyen terme Étant donné que les efforts de renforcement des capacités du Canada s'inscrivent dans le cadre d'efforts multilatéraux plus vastes, la question clé pour l'avenir est de savoir ce que vont faire ses partenaires en formation, comme ses alliés de l'OTAN. Pour se faire une idée de la situation, il faut poser quelques hypothèses sur la pandémie et ses effets globaux. Les propositions suivantes semblent être des hypothèses raisonnables : La pandémie va perturber le monde pendant des années. Il y a la course entre les déploiements de vaccins et les nouvelles infections, et la distribution de vaccins dans le monde en développement risque d'être très lente alors que les pays riches comme le Canada et les États-Unis s'arrachent les stocks. Les responsables politiques du monde entier tenteront de trouver des moyens de prévenir la prochaine pandémie et de s'y préparer, par exemple en faisant preuve d'une plus grande vigilance, en faisant plus attention aux voyages et aux chaînes d'approvisionnement, et en étant plus disposés à adopter des restrictions d'urgence plus rapidement lorsqu'une nouvelle épidémie se déclare. Il existe en outre la sinistre possibilité que la COVID-19 et ses variantes deviennent endémiques, d'autant plus que certaines variantes sont résistantes aux vaccins actuellement disponibles et que la circulation du virus est telle que de nouvelles mutations sont inévitables. Ce que les gouvernements vont faire pour répondre à cette situation n'est pas clair. Beaucoup d'entre eux pourraient décider de s'en accommoder : avec la perspective que les restrictions de santé publique ne peuvent pas mettre fin à la crise, ils pourraient simplement renoncer à essayer. Mais le caractère endémique de la COVID-19 pourrait signifier une incertitude permanente pour les années à venir. Ces suppositions impliquent que la préoccupation concernant les opérations de renforcement des capacités ne disparaîtra pas. Il pourrait bien y avoir à l'avenir des vagues de suspension d'opérations et de réduction des activités pour les missions existantes. Il existe des mesures d'atténuation que le Canada et d'autres États ont déjà mises en place et peuvent appliquer plus largement, comme la mise en quarantaine avant le déploiement, les contrôles sanitaires intensifs et la limitation de certaines activités de formation. Mais une grande partie de ces mesures dépendront de la confiance entre l'État formateur et le gouvernement hôte, et de l'assurance que chacun suivra des pratiques de santé publique rigoureuses. Le Canada devra négocier les termes des protocoles sanitaires de ses missions avec les partenaires locaux afin de maintenir la confiance des pays bénéficiaires et des partenaires multilatéraux. Sinon, le soutien à ces déploiements diminuera tant au Canada que dans le pays bénéficiaire. Même dans ce cas, rien ne garantit qu'une opération de renforcement des capacités sera mise en œuvre. Les voyages et les interactions apparemment inutiles se heurteront à un scepticisme généralisé pendant un certain temps. En cas d'épidémie locale, les opérations futures pourraient facilement être suspendues à tout moment. Quel sera le schéma général du renforcement des capacités au cours de l'année à venir ? Dans la version précédente de cet article, je prévoyais que le renforcement des capacités serait moins important dans un avenir proche et qu'il serait concentré sur les priorités essentielles. Plus précisément, je prévoyais que l'OTAN se détournerait du renforcement des capacités dans des contextes de contre-insurrection comme l'Irak, afin de mieux concentrer ses capacités sur ses missions essentielles. Je prévoyais également quelques exceptions, comme le fait que la France maintiendrait son attention sur le Sahel. J'ai fondé ces prédictions sur la suspension des activités de formation de l'OTAN en Irak et sur le maintien de l'opération Barkhane malgré la pandémie. J'avais tort sur les deux points. La France cherche à réduire sa présence dans le Sahel, tandis que l'OTAN a annoncé une expansion spectaculaire en Irak, passant de 500 à 4 000 personnes. Cela suggère soit que mon analyse initiale de ces décisions en tant que signaux de priorité était erronée, soit qu'elle était globalement correcte, mais pas particulièrement utile pour prédire comment les priorités allaient changer à l'avenir. Quoi qu'il en soit, ma prédiction audacieuse n'est pas aussi utile que je le pensais. Il semble au contraire que la pandémie soit désormais un facteur parmi d'autres à prendre en compte, plutôt qu'une force qui pousse les États à se concentrer uniquement sur leurs objectifs les plus importants. La tâche immédiate du Canada est de décider du renouvellement de l'opération IMPACT après la fin mars 2021, date à laquelle elle doit prendre fin. L'opération IMPACT permet au Canada de poursuivre son rôle dans la coalition contre l'État islamique et surtout dans la mission de l'OTAN en Irak, étant donné les nouveaux plans d'expansion de l'alliance. Le Canada perdrait certainement sa crédibilité au sein de l'alliance s'il ne parvenait pas au moins à renouveler une mission déjà en cours. Toutefois, compte tenu de la menace persistante de la pandémie, la probabilité d'une nouvelle demande importante de renforcement des capacités après cela n'est probablement pas très élevée. Du moins, c'est probablement ce qui est souhaité à Ottawa - que l'on ne demande pas au Canada d'en faire beaucoup plus. La pandémie a créé des tensions générales importantes sur le personnel. Les opérations LASER et VECTOR sont devenues une préoccupation majeure des Forces armées canadiennes, exigeant beaucoup d'efforts de la part des FAC : quelque 24 000 militaires étaient disponibles à différents moments pour l'opération LASER, à divers titres. Comme le conclut l'étude de Stéphanie Bélanger, l'opération LASER a posé des défis uniques au personnel des FAC. De plus, la COVID-19 a fait reculer la formation et le recrutement, laissant les FAC à court de troupes. Le gouvernement du Canada pourrait être confronté à des choix encore plus difficiles que d'habitude, à savoir s'il doit dire non à ses alliés ou si les FAC sont trop sollicitées. Conséquences à plus long terme des pandémies : le renforcement des capacités et la COVID-19 dans un contexte géostratégique changeant L'analyse des impacts probables de la COVID-19 à plus long terme nécessite des hypothèses plus larges. Les propositions suivantes semblent réalistes : Avec les conséquences économiques et sociales de la COVID-19, il y aura une pression importante et croissante pour réduire les budgets militaires, bien que ces réductions puissent être reportées pendant un certain temps grâce à un financement déficitaire en raison des faibles taux d'intérêt. La concurrence géopolitique entre la Chine, la Russie et les États-Unis va s'aggraver. Malheureusement, ces hypothèses ne permettent pas encore de prédire clairement comment les autres États s'engageront dans le renforcement des capacités. Deux scénarios sont plausibles, découlant des deux premières hypothèses. Premièrement, les réductions peuvent affecter les opérations de renforcement des capacités de manière disproportionnée, car elles peuvent être considérées comme non essentielles par rapport à d'autres fonctions de défense (en plus des risques pour la santé publique de mettre les membres des services armés de différents pays en étroite proximité les uns avec les autres). Cependant, les opérations de renforcement des capacités pourraient au contraire gagner en popularité au cours des prochaines années, en particulier si la rivalité géostratégique s'intensifie et que les intérêts des États-Unis et d'autres États se heurtent dans un grand nombre de pays différents. Les préoccupations relatives aux budgets de la défense pourraient en fait épargner le renforcement des capacités, voire le rendre plus attrayant, tout comme les limites des ressources ont contribué à faire passer les missions anti-insurrectionnelles à grande échelle au renforcement des capacités dans les années 2000 et 2010. Les grandes puissances qui poursuivent des rivalités géopolitiques peuvent chercher des moyens relativement peu coûteux, qui n'engagent pas leurs forces dans des interventions directes coûteuses, dangereuses et potentiellement déstabilisantes. Le renforcement des capacités des mandataires locaux pourrait être un tel outil politique, attrayant pour des États comme la Chine, la Russie, les États-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni qui cherchent à affirmer leur pertinence et leur influence dans divers pays. Dans ce scénario, les alliés du Canada sont susceptibles de demander au Canada de faire davantage de renforcement des capacités. Cela place le Canada dans une situation difficile, car sa propre capacité de renforcement des capacités souffrira de budgets limités dans les années à venir. Malheureusement, le renforcement des capacités des opérations de maintien de la paix risque de souffrir d'un intérêt et de contributions limités. Comme indiqué, avant la pandémie, le renforcement des capacités faisait partie d'une division du travail nord-sud plus large. Cependant, il était de plus en plus difficile de savoir si le Nord tenait sa part de ce qui était déjà un arrangement profondément critiqué : le financement des opérations de maintien de la paix de l'ONU avait diminué au cours des années précédant la pandémie, comme le note Linnéa Gelot. Compte tenu des fortes contraintes budgétaires, il est malheureusement probable que les opérations de paix poursuivent leur déclin. Cela pourrait également avoir un impact sur les investissements nécessaires à la formation et au renforcement des capacités en matière de maintien de la paix, notamment pour passer au type de modèle à long terme que nous avons vu dans les activités de renforcement des capacités avec des partenaires bien établis dans d'autres contextes. Si l'un des effets de la récession mondiale est d'aggraver les difficultés, les inégalités et les tensions sociales dans les pays en développement, les problèmes auxquels les opérations de maintien de la paix sont confrontées pourraient s'aggraver en même temps que leur capacité à y répondre diminuerait. ## De l’amitié à la loyauté absolue : leçons de l’expérience du Canada dans la campagne de l’OTAN en Libye URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/de-lamitie-a-la-loyaute-absolue-lecons-de-lexperience-du-canada-dans-la-campagne-de-lotan-en-libye/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Ce texte fait partie de la série spéciale d'essais Retour vers le futur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique, financée par une subvention du programme MINDS du ministère de la Défense nationale. Introduction Notre étude sur l'opération Unified Protector (OUP), publiée dans le Journal of Strategic Studies, ainsi que les recherches ultérieures, ont révélé des caractéristiques importantes de la politique de l'alliance de l'OTAN, en particulier en ce qui concerne les interactions du Canada avec les grands acteurs au sein de l'OTAN. Sur la base d'entretiens originaux avec des responsables canadiens et de l'OTAN, nous avons conclu que deux caractéristiques clés ont déterminé l'influence du Canada en 2011. La première était une contribution visible, sans réserve et de premier plan. Le Canada, en particulier, faisait partie du « groupe d'attaque », le petit groupe de pays qui effectuait la majeure partie des sorties. La deuxième caractéristique était qu'un officier canadien, le lieutenant-général Charles Bouchard, commandait l'OUP, ce qui permettait à Ottawa de définir la posture juridique et les objectifs quotidiens de la campagne. Pour l'OUP, même si les grandes décisions stratégiques restaient du ressort de Washington et, dans une moindre mesure, de Londres et de Paris, le Canada était le principal interlocuteur des trois grands, ce qui le plaçait au-dessus des autres alliés contributeurs en termes d'accès à l'information et de participation à la conception et à l'exécution de la mission tout au long de l'opération. Bien que nous constations que le Canada peut maximiser sa visibilité et son influence lorsqu'il se présente comme un contributeur aux opérations militaires, nous reconnaissons que ces avantages sont éphémères. Si l'on se projette dans le présent, on constate que cette dynamique est devenue plus complexe. Avec le second mandat du président Trump et la vision du secrétaire Pete Hegseth d'un département de la « guerre » plus meurtrier, les termes de la politique d'alliance sont en train d'être redéfinis par le profond mépris de l'administration Trump pour le multilatéralisme, ce qui se traduit par un partage des charges plus transactionnel. Aussi spectaculaires que puissent paraître certains des changements intervenus depuis 2025, l'OUP offre des enseignements importants sur la politique d'alliance contemporaine, car les États-Unis étaient déjà désireux de diriger depuis l'arrière à l'époque, exhortant les autres alliés à en faire davantage, malgré leur dépendance continue à l'égard des capacités militaires américaines. Dans notre contribution à la série d'essais « Retour vers le futur », nous soutenons que ces changements récents ne remettent pas en cause les enseignements tirés de l'OUP, mais les amplifient plutôt. En 2011, le Canada a acquis une influence opérationnelle grâce à des frappes, des règles d'engagement sans réserve et un accès au commandement, même si l'orientation stratégique restait entre les mains des trois grands. La barre est encore plus haute aujourd'hui : l'influence dépend désormais de la puissance de combat disponible, des stocks, des chaînes de production et de la rapidité avec laquelle ceux-ci peuvent soutenir les plans de l'OTAN. Contexte : la Libye et OUP Au début de l'année 2011, alors que les soulèvements arabes se propageaient dans toute la région, des manifestations de masse ont éclaté en Libye contre le régime de Mouammar Kadhafi, au pouvoir depuis 1969. Le gouvernement a réagi par une escalade de la violence. Le 26 février, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU) a adopté la résolution 1970, exigeant que la Libye réponde aux revendications des manifestants tout en imposant des sanctions, un gel des avoirs, une interdiction de voyager pour les hauts fonctionnaires et un embargo sur les armes. Le lendemain, des figures de l'opposition ont formé le Conseil national de transition (CNT), mais il est rapidement apparu que le CNT n'avait aucun contrôle sur les nombreuses milices qui émergeaient à travers la Libye. Alors que la violence s'intensifiait, les États-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni et d'autres partenaires ont accéléré leurs plans d'urgence. Le 10 mars, le secrétaire américain à la Défense, Robert Gates, a indiqué que toute intervention militaire américaine nécessitait une nouvelle autorisation des Nations unies (ONU). Le 17 mars, le Conseil de sécurité a adopté la résolution 1973, autorisant les États à prendre « toutes les mesures nécessaires » pour protéger les civils, à l'exception de l'occupation. Deux jours plus tard, une coalition comprenant les États-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni a lancé des frappes aériennes dans le cadre de l'opération Odyssey Dawn, mettant fin aux attaques de Kadhafi contre les zones rebelles et détruisant une grande partie des défenses aériennes et des armes lourdes de la Libye. Malgré des désaccords internes et la réticence de certains membres tels que l'Allemagne, l'OTAN a accepté, les 23 et 24 mars, d'appliquer l'embargo sur les armes et la zone d'exclusion aérienne. Le 31 mars, l'OTAN a pris le relais de la mission, désormais baptisée « Opération Unified Protector » (OUP). Les objectifs de la mission étaient de mettre fin aux attaques contre les civils, de ramener les forces du régime dans leurs casernes et de garantir l'accès humanitaire. La contribution du Canada, l'opération Mobile, comprenait sept chasseurs CF-18, des avions de surveillance et de ravitaillement, ainsi que la frégate HMCS Vancouver, pour un total d'environ 630 personnes. Les avions canadiens ont effectué environ 6 % de toutes les sorties de l'OTAN et 9 % des sorties de frappe, opérant selon des règles d'engagement relativement permissives ; le contingent naval a effectué des centaines d'interceptions pour faire respecter l'embargo. Le premier ministre Stephen Harper a catégoriquement refusé de déployer des troupes terrestres. L'OUP n'a pas réussi à remplir son mandat initial de 90 jours et a été prolongée le 1er juin dans un contexte d'impasse sur le champ de bataille. Le vent a tourné en août lorsque les rebelles ont pris Tripoli, puis tué Kadhafi le 20 octobre. Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a mis fin à l'autorisation d'utiliser la force avec la résolution 2016, entrée en vigueur le 27 octobre 2011. Développement : le Canada et OUP Bien que le gouvernement Harper ait présenté la participation du Canada à l'opération Unified Protector (OUP) de l'OTAN en termes de valeurs, en mettant l'accent sur la liberté, la démocratie et l'obligation morale, cette présentation a davantage servi de discours que de véritable facteur de décision. Harper a cherché à faire évoluer l'image internationale du Canada, passant d'un rôle traditionnel de gardien de la paix à celui d'un acteur militaire plus assertif, en présentant Kadhafi comme une menace pour les normes mondiales. Les déclarations publiques et les motions parlementaires mettaient l'accent sur la protection des civils et le soutien à la transition démocratique en Libye, s'alignant ainsi sur le message des alliés. Le concept de responsabilité de protéger (R2P) a influencé le discours international, mais les responsables canadiens ont évité d'utiliser ce terme publiquement en raison de son association perçue avec le Parti libéral, bien qu'ils aient repris ses principes fondamentaux pour justifier l'intervention. Pour expliquer la décision du Canada de se joindre à des coalitions multinationales, la littérature scientifique que nous avons examinée tend à mettre l'accent sur des facteurs tels que l'idéologie des partis, les préoccupations électorales, les intérêts commerciaux et la perception des menaces. Cependant, nous avons constaté que ces facteurs n'étaient pas déterminants pour l'OUP. Au contraire, l'implication du Canada était principalement motivée par le désir de maintenir sa réputation d'allié fiable de l'OTAN, en particulier aux yeux de Washington, plutôt que par des intérêts nationaux directs en Libye.[1] Contrairement aux membres européens de l'OTAN, le Canada n'avait pas d'enjeux importants en Libye. La principale préoccupation était d'éviter la marginalisation si les États-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni agissaient en dehors de l'OTAN. Comme l'ont révélé nos entretiens, les débats au sein du gouvernement ont mis l'accent sur la nécessité de « redorer le blason » et de veiller à ce que le Canada soit perçu comme « jouant dans la cour des grands ». Le gouvernement a activement promu le rôle de l'OTAN et mis en avant les contributions du Canada en matière de leadership, telles que ses opérations aériennes et maritimes et la nomination du lieutenant-général Charles Bouchard au poste de commandant de la mission. Les responsables ont décrit l'intervention comme discrétionnaire et visant principalement à être un « bon allié ». Alors que les messages publics mettaient l'accent sur les raisons humanitaires et sécuritaires, les discours et les témoignages faisaient ouvertement référence au renforcement des relations avec les alliés, ce que nous avons appelé le « motif de l'amitié. » Notre analyse de l'étude de cas a également montré que la participation du Canada à l'OUP a apporté certains avantages opérationnels et en termes de réputation, mais ceux-ci ont été limités et de courte durée, avec peu d'influence stratégique au-delà de la fin de la mission. Le gain le plus visible a été la nomination de Bouchard au poste de commandant de l'OTAN, qui a renforcé la visibilité du Canada et permis à des officiers et analystes canadiens d'occuper des postes clés au quartier général opérationnel de l'OTAN, améliorant ainsi l'accès à l'information et les débats sur la conception et l'exécution de la mission. L'autonomie dont a bénéficié M. Bouchard dans l'élaboration de la directive de planification des opérations et la conception initiale de la mission a permis au Canada d'exercer une influence sur les aspects juridiques et les cibles, tandis que sa participation active aux opérations aériennes et maritimes (6 % de toutes les sorties et 9 % des sorties de frappe) lui a assuré une place dans le « groupe de frappe » informel, qui prenait les décisions opérationnelles. Ses règles d'engagement étaient parmi les moins restrictives de l'Alliance, ce qui a accru sa flexibilité opérationnelle et sa crédibilité. Ces avantages ont toutefois été limités. L'influence du Canada est restée opérationnelle plutôt que stratégique ; les décisions importantes, telles que le moment de la fin de la mission, ont été dominées par les grandes puissances. Le Canada manquait d'atouts clés, ce qui a limité sa capacité à influencer les résultats et a diminué les gains en termes de réputation. Le rôle de leader et les contributions du Canada ont temporairement rehaussé son statut au sein de l'OTAN, mais ces avantages ne se sont pas traduits par une influence durable après la fin de la mission en octobre 2011. Considérations politiques : ce qui a changé depuis 2011 et pourquoi les leçons de l’OUP sont importantes La confirmation du secrétaire Hegseth en janvier 2025 a marqué un tournant décisif vers une OTAN plus transactionnelle, fonctionnant selon le principe « pay-to-play » (payer pour jouer). Au début de son mandat, il a exigé sans détour la primauté européenne en matière de défense continentale, la voie vers l'allocation de 5 % du PIB à la défense et à la sécurité, et une doctrine qui plaçait la puissance militaire avant tout. Cette approche a redéfini le « motif d'amitié », que nous définissons comme le désir d'être considéré comme un allié fiable, en un modèle où l'influence découle de résultats tangibles : capacités, état de préparation et production industrielle, le tout accompagné d'éloges ouverts à l'égard du président Trump, ou de ce que nous pourrions appeler des démonstrations de loyauté absolue. L'intervention en Libye avait déjà mis en évidence des lacunes critiques dans les capacités des alliés de l'OTAN, en particulier leur dépendance à l'égard des moyens de renseignement, de surveillance et de reconnaissance des États-Unis. Bien que Washington ait longtemps exhorté ses alliés à dépenser davantage pour la défense, l'application de cette mesure a toujours été laxiste. D'ici 2025, cependant, la barre sera nettement plus haute. Lors du sommet de l'OTAN qui s'est tenu en juin à La Haye, les alliés ont approuvé un objectif ambitieux de 5 % du PIB pour la défense d'ici 2035, dont au moins 3,5 % consacrés aux capacités militaires de base et environ 1,5 % à la résilience et aux infrastructures liées à la défense. Ils se sont également engagés à présenter des plans nationaux annuels démontrant des voies crédibles pour atteindre ces objectifs, transformant ainsi la rhétorique politique en exigences de planification plus faciles à appliquer et soumises à des audits à Bruxelles. Lors du sommet, cette mesure a été présentée comme une réponse décisive à la Russie et une garantie de l'engagement continu des États-Unis sous l'administration Trump. Le message politique de Washington est clair : dépenser plus, et dépenser pour les bonnes choses, sous peine de perdre sa place au sein de l'Alliance. Si le Canada devait élaborer un plan d'action pour s'engager dans cet environnement OTAN en pleine évolution, en tirant les leçons de son expérience en Libye, il devrait non seulement apporter des contributions visibles qui renforcent sa réputation d'allié fiable et compétent, mais aussi donner la priorité au développement des capacités grâce à des engagements financiers crédibles. En d'autres termes, la stratégie qui a fonctionné dans le passé, selon laquelle le Canada pouvait compenser son sous-investissement dans la défense en contribuant aux opérations militaires de l'OTAN, est révolue. Compte tenu de ces nouvelles conditions, nous tirons six enseignements clés de l'opération Unified Protector qui peuvent éclairer la manière dont le Canada pourrait naviguer au mieux dans une politique d'alliance plus difficile. 1. Acheter de l'influence à la manière de l'opération Unified Protector : peu de restrictions, des facilitateurs de grande valeur L'opération Unified Protector a démontré que le déploiement de CF-18 avec peu de réserves et le rôle maritime visible du Canada lui ont assuré une place dans le groupe d'attaque et ont façonné les pratiques juridiques et de ciblage. Le Canada a appris que le fait de se présenter avec le bon équipement et les bonnes plateformes lui donne accès et influence, mais que cela nécessite une planification plus systématique et l'intégration des leçons du passé dans le développement des forces, ce qui fait encore défaut au sein des FAC. Adapter cette leçon aujourd'hui signifie offrir des ensembles aériens et navals à faibles restrictions liés aux nouveaux objectifs de capacité de l'OTAN, tels que la défense aérienne, les frappes en profondeur, l'ISTAR[2] et les stocks. Bien que les contributions du Canada aient été à la hauteur, l'opération Unified Protector a tout de même révélé des lacunes flagrantes en matière de capacités et a mis en évidence de manière douloureuse que les alliés de l'OTAN dépendent des ressources américaines pour répondre aux exigences opérationnelles. 2. Donner pour recevoir Il est vrai que cela a toujours été une règle fondamentale de toute forme de coopération multilatérale, même la plus harmonieuse, qu'un État doit « donner pour recevoir », au moins dans une certaine mesure. Néanmoins, il y a également de bonnes raisons de penser qu'à partir de maintenant, les États engagés dans des partenariats avec les États-Unis, y compris dans le cadre de l'OTAN et d'autres accords tels que les Five Eyes, devront donner davantage s'ils veulent conserver le même niveau d'avantages que par le passé. Ceux dont les contributions stagnent doivent s'attendre à voir leurs avantages diminuer, voire à se voir imposer des coûts. Il est même possible que le motif de l'amitié soit poussé à l'extrême, au-delà des considérations de partage des charges et de fiabilité de l'alliance, Trump dictant les conditions et exigeant une loyauté absolue. 3. Faites de la capacité industrielle votre nouveau « nombre de sorties » Pendant l'OUP, le nombre de sorties et les réserves ont façonné l'influence. Aujourd'hui, la production industrielle est la nouvelle monnaie de crédibilité, car les États-Unis sont peu enclins à mener des opérations militaires multinationales. En effet, le secrétaire Hegseth a explicitement lié l'influence de l'alliance à la capacité de production. Pour s'adapter, le Canada devrait cofinancer les capacités de défense avec ses alliés et suivre de près la liste des besoins prioritaires de l'OTAN en Ukraine afin de convertir les commandes en livraisons. C'est la voie la plus crédible pour exercer une influence à court terme sur l'Ukraine et le réapprovisionnement des stocks de l'OTAN, ce qui apaiserait les États-Unis et favoriserait les alliés européens. 4. Considérer les postes de commandement comme une stratégie, et non comme une question d'image Le rôle de commandement de M. Bouchard pendant l'opération OUP a donné à Ottawa un levier quotidien sur l'exécution de la campagne, même lorsque les décisions politiques du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord étaient hors de portée. Le Canada devrait désormais viser les postes de commandement opérationnel où sont fixées les règles d'engagement et la politique de ciblage. La constitution d'un vivier d'officiers bilingues, formés conjointement et maîtrisant le droit, permettra au Canada de pourvoir efficacement les postes de commandement de l'OTAN et des États-Unis et d'influencer les résultats opérationnels. 5. Élaborer une doctrine de stabilisation dès le départ L'opération OUP a révélé que la précision tactique ne peut compenser l'absence de planification post-conflit. L'effondrement de la Libye a érodé la légitimité de la doctrine R2P et mis en évidence les mauvais résultats de l'OTAN en matière de sécurité durable. Le Canada devrait veiller à ce que toute opération future comprenne dès le premier jour une annexe sur la stabilisation, associant les combats à des mesures de maintien de l'ordre et de gouvernance afin d'éviter un vide de gouvernance comme en Libye. Le Canada pourrait également proposer la création d'une cellule permanente de stabilisation et de reconstruction de l'OTAN afin d'institutionnaliser cette capacité, compte tenu du désintérêt manifeste des États-Unis pour cet aspect des opérations militaires. 6. Se prémunir contre la « loyauté absolue » en construisant le pilier européen L'OUP a laissé présager une tendance à l'autonomie européenne au sein de l'OTAN, le Royaume-Uni et la France ayant pris le relais pendant les périodes de repli des États-Unis, une tendance qui s'est accélérée sous les deux mandats de Trump. Le Canada devrait continuer à s'aligner sur les nouveaux programmes industriels de défense de l'UE sans reproduire les structures de l'OTAN. Cette approche permet de se prémunir contre l'instabilité des États-Unis tout en renforçant le centre de gravité de l'Alliance en Europe, garantissant ainsi que le Canada reste pertinent dans un paysage de sécurité transatlantique en mutation. Conclusion Les grands enseignements tirés par l'OUP, à savoir limiter les réserves, apporter des contributions crédibles (de premier ordre), contrôler l'accès, travailler plus étroitement avec les alliés européens et planifier la stabilisation dès le début, seraient très utiles au Canada dans un contexte OTAN plus exigeant, plus contrôlé et plus ouvertement transactionnel. Dans le contexte bilatéral actuel avec les États-Unis, la voie à suivre pour exercer une influence est simple mais impitoyable : fournir rapidement une puissance et des capacités militaires, montrer des progrès annuels vers l'objectif de 5 % avec des plans basés sur les capacités, et combler le type de lacune en matière de stabilisation (car les États-Unis ne veulent pas le faire) qui a fait sombrer la trajectoire de l'après-guerre en Libye. Si le Canada parvient à tenir ces engagements, il conservera une voix réelle dans les décisions de l'alliance. S'il n'y parvient pas, il en résultera un modèle de « loyauté absolue », dans lequel les États-Unis dicteront leurs conditions au Canada, qui n'aura que peu d'influence sur les décisions cruciales. À propos des auteurs Stéfanie von Hlatky est titulaire de la Chaire de recherche du Canada sur le genre, la sécurité et les forces armées, professeure titulaire d'études politiques à l'Université Queen's, au Canada, et membre de la Fondation Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Thomas Juneau est professeur à l'École supérieure d'affaires publiques et internationales de l'Université d'Ottawa, au Canada, membre associé de Chatham House et membre non résident du Centre d'études stratégiques de Sanaa. L'analyse présentée dans cette contribution à la série « Retour vers le futur » s'appuie en partie sur Stéfanie von Hlatky et Thomas Juneau, « When the coalition determines the mission: NATO’s detour in Libya », Journal of Strategic Studies 45, 2 (2022) : 258-279 ; et sur Stéfanie von Hlatky et Thomas Juneau, « The absent are always wrong: The Friendship Motive and Canada’s participation in NATO’s Operation in Libya », Global Studies Quarterly (à paraître). [1] Les auteurs ont effectué 26 entrevues avec des représentants du Canada et de l’OTAN, encore en service ou à la retraite et civils comme militaires, qui ont joué un rôle dans OUP. L’analyse présentée dans ce texte est basé en partie sur ces entrevues. [2] Renseignement, surveillance, acquisition de cibles et reconnaissance (acronyme en anglais). Crédit image: OTAN ## De l’ambition à l’action : réussir la stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/de-lambition-a-laction-reussir-la-strategie-industrielle-de-defense-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-04-20 Ce texte est un compte-rendu de la conférence De l’ambition à l’action : réussir la stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada tenue le 26 janvier 2026 à l'UQAM. Lundi 26 janvier, une conférence a été donnée sur la stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada (SID) ainsi que sur les attentes qu’elle suscite. Cet exercice mis en place sous le mandat du Premier ministre Carney s’inscrit dans un contexte mondial de dégradation de l’environnement stratégique du pays, marqué à la fois par l’instabilité du système international et par l’incertitude croissante quant à la fiabilité du partenaire américain. Dans ce contexte, il semble que la SID soit une tentative de repositionnement stratégique du pays. L’objectif étant de renforcer la résilience canadienne, mais aussi de réduire certaines des dépendances critiques de l’industrie de défense ainsi que de soutenir le développement d’une base industrielle et technologique dans le domaine de la défense tout en étant adaptés aux besoins et enjeux contemporains. Cette rencontre a offert une tribune d’échanges entre universitaires, hauts fonctionnaires et dirigeants d’entreprises. Les participants ont pu exprimer leurs attentes quant au contenu de cette stratégie, formuler des recommandations, mais aussi soulever des inquiétudes et des réserves concernant les risques que celle-ci soit trop ambitieuse, fragmentée ou insuffisamment ancrée aux contraintes propres au contexte canadien. Cette note résume de manière structurée les discussions et suggestions qui ont surgi lors des débats tenus pendant cette rencontre. En résumé, il y a un consensus sur l’importance de renforcer les capacités canadiennes en recherche et développement (R&D), d’améliorer le processus de conversion de l’innovation en production et d’exportation et de contribuer simultanément à la sécurité économique canadienne. Elle doit également permettre au Canada de développer une autonomie stratégique accrue, en évitant de se retrouver en autarcie. Le Canada ne peut pas « tout faire » : il doit plutôt concentrer ses efforts sur les domaines où il dispose déjà d’avantages comparatifs, tout en recherchant des partenariats industriels à l’international dans le but de diversifier ses dépendances. Après avoir rappelé ce que représente cette stratégie industrielle de défense et mis en avant les efforts déjà entrepris par le gouvernement canadien, cette note examinera les principales attentes et préoccupations exprimées, avant de conclure par les recommandations les plus récurrentes qui ont été exprimées. La Stratégie Industrielle de Défense (SID) : Une nouveauté structurante pour le Canada L’élaboration d’une stratégie industrielle de défense est une initiative inédite pour le Canada. Jusqu’ici, le pays faisait figure d’exception parmi ses alliés en ne disposant d’aucun document-cadre définissant clairement ses priorités industrielles, mais aussi ses objectifs technologiques et ses leviers d’action en matière de défense. Bien que sa divulgation ait été reportée en raison du contexte politique mondial et des réformes apportées à l’Agence d’investissement pour la défense (AID), la SID est le fruit d’un travail pangouvernemental. Celui-ci a réussi à mobiliser les portefeuilles de la défense, de l’industrie, du développement économique et des affaires étrangères en ayant pour objectif de mieux articuler la sécurité nationale et la politique industrielle canadienne. Jean-François Juneau, Directeur principal par intérim de l’équipe de la stratégie industrielle pour le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada, nous a rappelé que le gouvernement n’a pas attendu le dernier moment pour structurer la démarche : depuis 2024, une équipe de travail a été mise à l’œuvre, un budget a été annoncé (aux alentours de 6 milliers sur cinq ans) et plusieurs mesures préliminaires ont vu le jour. Deux objectifs centraux ont été soulignés : Réformer l’approvisionnement militaire, jugé trop lent, trop lourd et insuffisamment compatible avec les réalités industrielles. Pour imager le tout, Juneau a noté qu’il était parfois plus simple pour des entreprises canadiennes de contracter avec le Pentagone qu’avec Ottawa. Accélérer le passage de l’innovation à la commercialisation, afin de consolider une filière industrielle canadienne capable non seulement de répondre aux besoins nationaux, mais aussi de s’insérer dans des marchés d’exportation. Stépagine Lesaux-Farmer, Directrice adjointe p.i. de la Direction des exportations en matière de défense pour Affaires mondiales Canada, nous a présenté la stratégie d’exportation de défense, développée pour permettre aux entreprises canadiennes d’accéder à de nouveaux marchés. Le choix de la SID de s’orienter de cette manière reflète une réalité structurelle du Canada : la taille restreinte de son marché national rend impossible pour une industrie de la défense de dépendre uniquement des demandes internes. En s’inspirant des modèles mis en place chez ses alliés (agences dédiées aux exportations, comités spécialisés, dispositifs d’accompagnement industriel), le gouvernement Carney cherche à donner un cap clair pour le pays. Cependant, toutes ambitions s’accompagnent d’attentes élevées, mais aussi d’une vigilance quant à la réelle faisabilité d’une telle stratégie. Première Attente : Une industrie plus souveraine, mais réaliste et non autarcique Tous les intervenants s’accordaient sur la nécessité, pour le Canada, de renforcer sa souveraineté industrielle et de se prémunir des risques à venir face aux États-Unis, d’autant plus dans un contexte de volatilité politique américain et de pressions potentielles sur les chaînes d’approvisionnement. Un des principaux avertissements quant à cette orientation est revenu à multiple reprises : cette stratégie doit rester réaliste et doit prendre en compte les différentes contraintes de la situation canadienne. En ce sens, il ne peut reproduire un modèle à la Française, fondé sur l’idée d’une autonomie industrielle très diversifiée et sur sa capacité à structurer des chaines d’approvisionnement construite presque totalement au niveau national. Ici, le défi pour le Canada est de développer une autonomie sélective, c’est-à-dire de concentrer ses efforts dans certains domaines considérés comme critiques, tout en continuant à renforcer sa coopération avec des alliés fiables. Plusieurs des panélistes ont apporté l’idée que le Canada devrait travailler vers une intégration dans des consortiums internationaux, qui lui permettrait de participer à des projets communs, mais aussi à partager le coût de développements avec des partenaires. Yan Cimon, Professeur titulaire au département de management de l'Université Laval, a rappelé un point crucial pour le développement de la SID : l’autonomie ne doit pas signifier l’isolement. Ainsi, le Canada doit être capable, à la fois, de soutenir ses opérations en cas de crise majeure et de rester ancré à des réseaux industriels avec ses collaborateurs. Dans cette perspective, Justin Massie, Directeur du Département de science politique à l’Université du Québec à Montréal et codirecteur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, a défendu l’idée que le Canada doit adopter une posture de hedging. Le but étant de préserver la relation avec le voisin étatsunien sans avoir à dépendre de celui-ci. On ne veut pas la rupture, mais plutôt le développement d’une capacité de résilience capable de limiter l’exposition du pays aux décisions américaines imprévisibles. Finalement, un autre élément important a émergé des discussions : le projet mis en place par le gouvernement Carney pour la SID ne doit pas être conçu comme une stratégie à court terme qui viserait à obtenir des gains politiques immédiats. Mais bien comme un processus ayant des perspectives sur les 20 et 30 prochaines années. Cette échelle étant la seule pertinente pour songer à construire une base industrielle canadienne durable dans le domaine de la défense. Deuxième attente : une stratégie arrimée aux Forces armées et à la société Le deuxième point crucial qui a fait l’unanimité est la nécessité pour la SID de s’enraciner dans les besoins réels des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC). Guillaume Côté, Président-directeur général du Consortium de recherche et d’innovation en aérospatiale au Québec (CRIAQ), mais aussi Marc Bigaouette, Directeur des programmes gouvernementaux canadiens pour Bell Textron, nous ont rappelé que ce sont bien les FAC qui sont les utilisateurs finaux. De ce fait, leur confiance ainsi que leur capacité opérationnelle doivent demeurer la pierre angulaire de ce projet. Il ne faut donc pas privilégier le développement de matériel « made in Canada » au détriment de la performance. Il faut plutôt aligner la SID avec les exigences et attentes opérationnelles. Un autre des points fondamentaux soulevés se trouve dans l’importance de la coordination avec les provinces. Anessa Kimball, professeure du département de sciences politiques de l’Université Laval, et Youri Rousseau, sous-ministre adjoint aux politiques économiques et aux affaires extérieures au ministère de l’Économie, de l’Innovation et de l’Énergie, ont souligné l’importance d’une collaboration étroite avec les gouvernements provinciaux, qui détiennent les leviers économiques et industriels, pour mettre en œuvre la SID, compte tenu de la structure fédérale canadienne. Le cas du Québec est très pertinent, car il possède un certain nombre d’avantages comparatifs dans l’aérospatiale, en technologie avancée, mais aussi en IA. Ces atouts font d’eux des acteurs clé de la bonne implémentation de la SID à condition que celle-ci leur crée des conditions favorables. Cependant, des craintes ont aussi été formulées par les intervenants. Bien que la collaboration avec les provinces soit essentielle et que des efforts soient déployés, la SID ne doit pas servir à des fins de développement économique à court terme ou pour créer des emplois locaux en réponse à des motivations électorales. Si une telle logique devait s’appliquer, elle pourrait entraîner la dispersion des investissements, la prolifération de projets irréalisables et l’affaiblissement global des efforts déployés par la SID, tout en réduisant son efficacité globale. Le dernier point repose sur la question de l’acceptabilité sociale, qui reste une problématique à gérer pour cette stratégie. Yan Cimon a souligné que, même si la population canadienne est favorable au développement technologique et à l’innovation, elle l’est nettement moins quand il s’agit de produire des plateformes ou des capacités explicitement létales. Pour que la SID atteigne ses objectifs, le gouvernement devra s’engager dans des démarches pédagogiques, transparentes et visant à légitimer son action auprès du public. Troisième attente : l’innovation comme pivot stratégique Le troisième axe majeur des discussions a été l’enjeu de l’innovation technologique. Le constat est clair :  le Canada investit trop peu dans la recherche et développement (R&D) dans le domaine de la défense. Moins de 5% du budget y est consacré. Cela limite grandement les capacités nationales à anticiper les menaces futures, mais surtout à développer des réponses souveraines et adéquates. Si le Canada ne met pas d’effort significatif en R&D, celui-ci restera structurellement dépendant des innovations étrangères et surtout américaines, principalement pour les systèmes jugés critiques. Il faut une stratégie plus ambitieuse selon certains intervenants. En ce sens, la SID doit aller plus loin, mais aussi se concentrer sur les secteurs où le pays possède déjà un avantage comparatif : intelligence artificielle, quantique, aérospatiale, drones ou encore systèmes de surveillance en sont des exemples concrets. Pierre Seïn Pyun, Vice-président pour les Affaires gouvernementales et industrielles de Bombardier, nous a rappelé le rôle majeur que joue Bombardier dans des segments de la défense. Le développement d’un avion de détection et de commandement aéroporté en partenariat avec Saab en est un cas pertinent. En parallèle, Youri Rousseau et Marc Bigaouette ont aussi rappelé le rôle important du Québec et de ses capacités dans des domaines technologiques stratégiques. Dans ce sujet, une proposition structurante est apparue : Le Canada doit développer ou renforcer une approche intégrée calquée sur les modèles de ses alliés. Les intervenants ont plaidé pour la création d’une agence capable de coordonner à la fois les investissements en R&D ainsi que les acquisitions (ici, les références sont la DGA en France, le FMV en Suède ou le DAPA en Corée du Sud). Évidemment, l’innovation ne peut se faire sans des compétences disponibles. Youri Rousseau nous a rappelé le cas marquant et historique de l’Avro Arrow : l’échec du programme pour la création d’un avion de chasse canadien a entrainé, ou a accéléré, la fuite des ingénieurs vers les États-Unis. Ainsi, si on veut faire de l’innovation, la SID doit inclure une dimension focalisée sur la formation et la rétention de talents, que ce soit des ingénieurs, des chercheurs ou des spécialistes. Sur cette même idée, Justin Massie, a également exprimé l’importance que le Canada développe une capacité de réflexion autonome jugée indispensable pour définir et défendre les intérêts canadiens. Malgré tout, l’innovation possède son lot de contrainte. Anessa Kimball a introduit une nuance importante à faire : innovation et emplois ne se recoupent pas mécaniquement. Une stratégie qui est principalement focalisée sur les technologies de points peut générer une forte valeur ajoutée, mais pas nécessairement créer un plus gros volume d’emploi. En ce sens, la SID devra trouver un équilibre entre l’innovation, la production et les retombées économiques. Quatrième attente : exporter notre travail   Le dernier point, mais non le moindre, est celui de l’exportation. Tous ont reconnu que l’industrie de défense canadienne ne peut pas être autosuffisante et ne peuvent donc ainsi reposer sur son propre marché et sa base de commandes nationales. Ainsi, une capacité à s’exporter est primordiale, voire indispensable, pour assurer la viabilité financière des entreprises et pour consolider la crédibilité industrielle canadienne face aux alliés. La stratégie d’exportation de défense présentée par Stéphanie Lesaux-Farmer prévoit notamment une augmentation, mais surtout une diversification des exportations. Cette nouvelle direction se ferait au sein de l’OTAN, mais aussi surtout au-delà de ce cadre. Marc Bigaouette définit cette dimension comme un aspect crucial de la SID. Jean-François Juneau a rappelé que certaines restrictions ont déjà été assouplies, notamment en lien avec la Banque de développement du Canada. Toutefois, ce n’est pas suffisant. Le Canada connait un retard important dans l’accompagnement politique, diplomatique et financier des exportations de défense. Il est donc vital de réaliser un diagnostic des capacités exportables et de structurer des mécanismes de soutien en s’inspirant par exemple du modèle suédois. Guillaume Côté a souligné aussi le fait que la réussite des exportations dépend aussi fortement de l’engagement diplomatique du Canada. Produire est une chose, exporter en est une autre. Il est donc nécessaire de créer des conditions politiques, industrielles et stratégiques favorables à l’achat de matériel produit par le Canada par ses alliés. Conclusion : Une stratégie acclamée qui nécessite une exécution rigoureuse. Bien que la SID ait pris du retard, les discussions ont révélé un consensus positif à l’égard de l’initiative du gouvernement Carney. Tous ont reconnu qu’il s’agit d’une prise d’initiative nécessaire dans les intérêts nationaux canadiens en matière de sécurité, de défense et de souveraineté. Cependant, les discussions ont montré la nécessité d’une mise en œuvre qui soit disciplinée, cohérente et soutenue. La Sid ne peut être une stratégie d'annonce, ni une démarche visant des bénéfices politiques à court terme. Elle a besoin de s’engager sur une voie à long terme. Ce n’est que dans une perspective à long terme, entre 20 et 30 ans, que la SID demeure une option réaliste pour édifier une base industrielle solide. Principales recommandations formulées Renforcer la coopération internationale : notamment par des accords de partage d’information, des partenariats industriels et une participation accrue à des projets multinationaux. Soutenir activement l’exportation : structurer des mécanismes politiques et financiers permettant de vendre les capacités canadiennes à l’étranger. Investir massivement en R&D : mettre en place des mesures de rétention des talents afin de limiter la fuite des cerveaux. Développer des pôles d’excellence : permettre au Canada de devenir leader dans certains domaines ciblés. Maintenir une relation ouverte avec les États-Unis : sans dépendance excessive tout en adoptant une posture de hedging. Créer ou renforcer une agence de soutien intégrée : être capable de coordonner investissements, R&D et acquisitions. Garder centraux les besoins des FAC : éviter la dispersion des investissements dans des projets motivés par des considérations politiques de court terme. Crédit image: Robert Sullivan, Public Domain Mark via Flickr ## De l’orage dans l’air ? La future coalition en « feu tricolore » de l’Allemagne et ses conséquences potentielles sur la sécurité de l’OTAN URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/de-lorage-dans-lair-la-future-coalition-en-feu-tricolore-de-lallemagne-et-ses-consequences-potentielles-sur-la-securite-de-lotan/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Alors que les trois futurs partis au pouvoir ont terminé leurs négociations sur les termes de leur coalition, ils semblent vouloir... Après avoir été dirigée depuis 2005 par l'Union chrétienne-démocrate (CDU) d'Angela Merkel et ses partenaires de la coalition junior, l'Allemagne s’apprête à ce que le vice-chancelier et ministre des Finances Olaf Scholz devienne son premier chancelier social-démocrate en 16 ans. Alors que les sociaux-démocrates (SPD), les Verts et le parti libéral-démocrate (FDP) sont sortis des élections fédérales de 2021 avec suffisamment de sièges au Bundestag pour former un nouveau cabinet, ils ont annoncé une coalition en « feu tricolore», avec la co-leader des Verts, Annalena Baerbock, au poste de ministre des Affaires étrangères. Même si le SPD et le FDP ont été à plusieurs reprises membres de certains cabinets de Mme Merkel, ils seront désormais en mesure de définir la politique étrangère de l'Allemagne sans être limités par l'engagement fort et inflexible de la CDU envers l'OTAN. Alors que les trois futurs partis au pouvoir ont terminé leurs négociations sur les termes de leur coalition, ils semblent vouloir modifier certains éléments de ce qui était jusqu'alors la stratégie de sécurité prudente et stable de Mme Merkel. Mais pourront-ils vraiment aller jusqu'à avoir un impact sur la sécurité de l'OTAN et du Canada ? Étant donné que le SPD souhaite une Union européenne plus indépendante en matière de sécurité et que les Verts souhaitent une « refonte de l'OTAN », ce point chaud vise à examiner les changements potentiels qui pourraient être ou qui seront introduits par la coalition en « feu tricolore » dans la politique étrangère de l'Allemagne et la manière dont ils pourraient avoir un impact sur la cohésion de l'OTAN sur des questions telles que le Traité sur l'interdiction des armes nucléaires (TIAN), le partage nucléaire et l'objectif de 2% des dépenses de défense de l'OTAN. Ce faisant, il soutient que le principal impact du cabinet entrant de Scholz sur la sécurité du Canada pourrait être d'initier de nouvelles fractures au sein de l'alliance transatlantique. La présence du FDP dans la coalition et les désaccords internes au sein du SPD contraignent toutefois les deux principaux partenaires à la modération et au statu quo, en empêchant la mise en œuvre de leurs propositions diplomatiques de campagne plus radicales. Les désaccords potentiels autour du TIAN Le TIAN est le premier accord juridiquement contraignant qui interdit les armes nucléaires et vise leur élimination totale. Adopté le 7 juillet 2017 par l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies, il est entré en vigueur le 22 janvier 2021 et compte actuellement 86 signataires et 56 États considérés comme parties. Bien qu'il soit soutenu par une partie importante de la communauté internationale, le traité n'a pas encore reçu le soutien des membres de l'OTAN. En effet, il est considéré par les États-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni et le gouvernement allemand sortant comme étant « une distraction par rapport aux pourparlers sur le contrôle des armes qui incluent réellement les puissances nucléaires ». L'alliance transatlantique a jusqu'à présent complètement rejeté le traité, car « il ne reflète pas l'environnement de sécurité internationale de plus en plus complexe et est en contradiction avec l'architecture existante de non-prolifération et de désarmement », mais aussi car l’OTAN se considère, tant que les armes nucléaires existent, comme une alliance nucléaire. La « ligne de conduite » de l'OTAN est simple : le TIAN n'est pas productif et ne doit pas être signé. La coalition en « feu tricolore » choisira toutefois de ne pas en tenir compte et d'adhérer au traité en tant qu'observateur. L'adhésion au TPNW faisait partie des programmes électoraux du SDP et des Verts; ces derniers ont même déjà présenté une motion au Bundestag demandant au gouvernement de faire exactement cela. Cette position contraste fortement avec celle du gouvernement sortant dominé par la CDU, qui critiquait « les faiblesses inhérentes au traité d'interdiction » et sa « prétendue incompatibilité avec le traité de non-prolifération (TNP) ». C'est pourquoi l'accord de la nouvelle coalition sur l'adhésion au TIAN en tant qu'observateur devrait provoquer un nouveau clivage au sein de l'OTAN. Tout d'abord, en tant qu'observateur du traité d'interdiction, le « rôle de dissuasion nucléaire du pays semble exclu », du moins en principe, ce qui pourrait à l'avenir avoir un impact sur le partage nucléaire. Comme l'OTAN travaille par consensus, cela pourrait également immobiliser l'alliance sur cette question, tout en donnant une couverture à d'autres membres pour suivre le mouvement, comme la Norvège et même, potentiellement, les Pays-Bas, qui ont voté contre le traité. Ces pays ont un fort sentiment national antinucléaire qui a jusqu'à présent été ignoré par les gouvernements en place. Il s'ensuit qu'une signature allemande augmentera également de manière significative la valeur et l'influence du traité, qui étaient auparavant « diminuées par le fait que les neuf États nucléaires et tous les alliés européens de Washington ont refusé de l'approuver ». Quoi qu'il en soit, au-delà de la scission occidentale que ce traité provoquera au sein de l'OTAN, il augmentera aussi considérablement la pression sur le Canada, autant pour qu'il suive le mouvement que pour qu'il garde le cap. Jusqu'à présent, le Canada a qualifié le traité de « prématuré », même si un sondage indique que 73% des Canadiens pensent que leur pays devrait adhérer au traité malgré l'opposition des États-Unis. On peut imaginer que ce pourrait être l'occasion pour le Canada de renforcer son engagement envers son allié américain. L'unité de l'OTAN est l'un des principaux objectifs du gouvernement libéral face à l'autoritarisme. La perte de cohésion au sein de l'alliance transatlantique, et l'affaiblissement associé à son pouvoir de dissuasion et à la sécurité de ses membres signifient qu'il y aurait des conséquences importantes pour la sécurité du Canada si le nouveau gouvernement allemand va de l'avant dans ce dossier. L'Allemagne finira-t-elle par abandonner le partage nucléaire de l'OTAN ? L'Allemagne, tout comme la Belgique, l'Italie, les Pays-Bas et la Turquie, fait partie de l'accord de partage nucléaire de l'OTAN et accueille jusqu'à 20 bombes à gravité nucléaire B-61 appartenant aux États-Unis sur la base aérienne de Büchel. Elles peuvent être transportées par les avions allemands Tornado IDS à double capacité en cas de crise et sont considérées comme faisant partie intégrante de la posture de dissuasion nucléaire de l'OTAN. Cette posture est, fondamentalement, la « garantie suprême » de sécurité pour les membres de l'alliance. À plusieurs reprises, les alliés et les membres de l'OTAN ont souligné l'importance de la participation de l'Allemagne à ce pacte de défense, et le secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg, a publié un article d'opinion affirmant que son « soutien au partage nucléaire est vital pour protéger la paix et la liberté » et « pour la sécurité de l'ensemble de l'alliance, pour l'Allemagne, ses voisins, ses amis et ses alliés, qui ont tous des préoccupations légitimes en matière de sécurité et qui sont tous protégés par la dissuasion nucléaire de l'OTAN ». Plus récemment, il a affirmé que le partage du nucléaire « donne également à un pays comme l'Allemagne un siège à la table ». Cette campagne de relations publiques est directement liée aux politiques nucléaires du nouveau gouvernement. Si les négociations de coalition ont abouti à un nouvel engagement en faveur de la préservation du partage nucléaire, on peut se demander si cet engagement sera maintenu à l'avenir. En 2010, le Bundestag a adopté une résolution non partisane demandant au gouvernement d'œuvrer au retrait de toutes les armes nucléaires du territoire national. Depuis lors, l'hostilité de la Russie et l'emprise de la CDU sur le pouvoir ainsi que son engagement en faveur du partage des armes nucléaires ont empêché qu'une telle mesure soit sérieusement envisagée. Les programmes électoraux des Verts et du SPD pour 2021 demandaient toutefois le « retrait des bombes américaines du sol allemand ». Cela avait suscité des inquiétudes croissantes de la part des alliés de l'Allemagne. Ces inquiétudes pourraient être momentanément apaisées par la décision de la coalition de maintenir le statu quo, mais elles ne seront que ravivées par l'adhésion de l'Allemagne au TIAN, car celui-ci interdit aux pays de stationner des armes nucléaires étrangères sur leur territoire. Cela crée donc une tension fondamentale au sein de la politique étrangère de l'Allemagne qui devra éventuellement être résolue. En outre, le rejet du partage nucléaire est adopté par un nombre croissant d'hommes politiques en Allemagne, tels que Rolf Mützenich, président du SPD au Bundestag, et bien d'autres, ce qui signifie que ses conséquences potentielles doivent être évaluées à mesure que le soutien interne augmente. Un État qui se retire du partage nucléaire n'est pas sans précédent : les dernières ogives américaines ont été retirées du Canada en 1984. Le contexte actuel dans le cas de l'Allemagne est toutefois différent. Le partage nucléaire de l'OTAN sert deux objectifs jumeaux : la « protection des alliés » et la « projection de la puissance militaire ». Étant donné qu'il est désormais perçu comme un élément clé de la dissuasion d'une agression de la part de la Russie en raison de l'importance des armes nucléaires dans la pensée stratégique russe, l'abandon du partage nucléaire pourrait non seulement gravement nuire à la position de l'Allemagne au sein de la coalition et diminuer son influence, mais aussi susciter des divisions entre les pays qui sont perçus comme contribuant à la défense partagée et ceux qui sont accusés de ne pas y contribuer suffisamment. Trois grandes préoccupations l'emportent sur toutes les autres. Tout d'abord, il est à craindre  que d'autres pays partageant l'arme nucléaire ne demandent également le retrait de ces armes, car cet arrangement est dû en grande partie au rôle de l'Allemagne dans l'OTAN. Cela paralyserait les capacités de l'alliance transatlantique. Deuxièmement, en réaction à la poursuite potentielle de cette politique par la nouvelle coalition, le secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Jens Stoltenberg, a également déclaré que « les armes nucléaires américaines pourraient se retrouver en Europe de l'Est si l'Allemagne les rejette ». L'extension du partage nucléaire à des États tels que la Pologne et les pays baltes contrarierait encore plus la Russie en apportant davantage d'armes nucléaires à sa porte. Troisièmement, cela signifierait que l'alliance est divisée et affaiblie en raison du ressentiment envers l'Allemagne qui serait perçue comme ne faisant pas suffisamment d'efforts. Dans ce contexte, une telle éventualité entraînerait des répercussions importantes sur la sécurité du Canada. En tant que membre de l'OTAN, les relations de l'alliance avec la Russie et d'autres voisins ont une incidence directe sur sa politique étrangère. En tant qu'allié des États-Unis, protégé par leur parapluie nucléaire, le Canada a un intérêt direct à ce que l'OTAN reste un partenariat unifié et stable pour son propre bien. Si le résultat des pourparlers de coalition signifie que l'Allemagne restera, pour l'instant, dans le partage nucléaire, une future sortie hypothétique reste d'une grande conséquence potentielle pour la cohésion de l'OTAN, car elle serait certainement perçue par Washington et une hypothétique deuxième administration Trump, comme une trahison. Ainsi, le réengagement de l'accord de coalition en faveur de la dissuasion nucléaire, conçu pour dissiper les inquiétudes des alliés, est significatif en soi en tant que développement positif pour la sécurité du Canada. Renoncer à l'objectif de 2% des dépenses de défense Depuis 2014, les membres de l'OTAN s'engagent à consacrer un minimum de 2% de leur produit intérieur brut (PIB) en dépenses aux frais de défense « afin de garantir l’état de préparation militaire de l'Alliance ». Il est précisé que cette ligne directrice « sert d'indicateur de la volonté politique d'un pays de contribuer aux efforts de défense commune de l'OTAN ». L'Allemagne n'a pas encore atteint cet objectif, mais les précédents cabinets Merkel avaient tous réaffirmé leur engagement à atteindre cet objectif d'ici 2031. De même, le Canada n'a pas encore atteint l'objectif, alors que les États-Unis, la Grèce, le Royaume-Uni, la Roumanie, l'Estonie, la Slovaquie, la Lettonie, la Pologne, la Lituanie, la France et la Norvège sont tous en conformité. Au cours de la précédente administration républicaine, le président Trump s'était à plusieurs reprises querellé avec ses alliés de l'OTAN et avait fait pression sur eux pour qu'ils atteignent l'objectif, allant même jusqu'à lancer momentanément l'idée d'un objectif de dépenses de 4%. La perspective d'une éventuelle administration républicaine après la prochaine élection présidentielle de 2024 signifie que cette question pourrait revenir au premier plan des discussions internes de l'OTAN. Bien que le FDP « s'en tienne à l'objectif de l'OTAN » et « cherche à consacrer 3% de la production à la défense, au développement et à la diplomatie », le SPD ne soutient pas l'objectif de 2%, pas plus que les Verts. Avant la coalition, les membres des deux partis « ont remis en question à plusieurs reprises l'objectif de financement de l'OTAN de 2% et ont plutôt appelé à une politique de désarmement ». Pourtant, l'accord de coalition engage le nouveau gouvernement à atteindre un objectif ambitieux de 3% de dépenses pour « l'action internationale », sans mentionner spécifiquement l'objectif de 2% pour la défense. En tant que tel, il existe une réelle ambiguïté quant à savoir si l'Allemagne atteindra réellement cet objectif, ce qui constitue un changement par rapport aux assurances répétées de Merkel. L'abandon de cet objectif susciterait, bien entendu, l'ire de Washington et entraînerait probablement une profonde contrariété de la part d'une hypothétique administration républicaine. Là encore, cela affaiblirait l'alliance en diminuant l'adhésion de l'Allemagne, malgré son objectif de modernisation de ses forces militaires, et pourrait servir de précédent pour que d'autres pays renoncent également à cet objectif. En effet, bien que la position du Canada sur la question ait été qu'il finirait par l'atteindre, un refus de l'Allemagne pourrait lui donner une couverture diplomatique et politique pour l'imiter. Si davantage de membres de l'OTAN se défaisaient de leurs responsabilités en matière de dépenses partagées, c'est la capacité militaire de l'alliance transatlantique qui serait affectée et elle deviendrait plus dépendante que jamais des forces des États-Unis. Il est certain que le FDP s'opposera à cette proposition au sein de la coalition. Cependant, le contrôle du ministère des Affaires étrangères par les Verts et l'ambivalence du SPD sur la question font qu'ils ne sont probablement pas les acteurs les plus influents. Bien que l'accord de coalition comprenne un engagement de dépenses de 3% pour ses actions « internationales » (qui ne se limitent pas à la défense), l'ambiguïté d'un éventuel abandon par l'Allemagne de l'objectif de 2% pourrait, là encore, avoir une incidence sur la cohésion de l'alliance et la sécurité du Canada. Un rappel utile des angles morts de l'OTAN En tant qu'alliance militaire défensive collective, collaborative et consensuelle, l'OTAN, ainsi que son équilibre interne, est forcément affectée par la politique intérieure de ses États membres. Dans le contexte de nouvelles formes d'agression, avec l'instrumentalisation des migrants par la Biélorussie contre la Pologne, et de l'animosité persistante de la Russie, sa cohésion est fondamentale pour sa capacité à dissuader les conflits et à garantir la sécurité de ses membres. Le Canada n'y échappe pas : sa sécurité est directement liée à la force de l'alliance transatlantique, car elle est une « pierre angulaire de la politique internationale de sécurité et de défense du Canada ». Cela signifie que la nouvelle coalition en « feu tricolore » de l'Allemagne et les changements qu'elle ne manquera pas d'apporter à la politique étrangère de son pays auront certainement un impact, par le biais de l'OTAN, sur celle du Canada. Si ce point chaud ne prétend pas que les changements de politique potentiels mis en évidence, soit l’adhésion au TIAN, le retrait du partage nucléaire ou l’abandon de l'objectif de 2% des dépenses, se produiront tous (en fait, seule l'adhésion au TIAN a été confirmée jusqu'à présent, tandis que la sortie du partage nucléaire a été écartée comme option), il cherche néanmoins à souligner les angles morts de l'OTAN en ce qui concerne les considérations intérieures et la manière dont ils pourraient entraîner la création de nouveaux clivages au sein de l'alliance. Si le FDP a modéré certaines des positions plus radicales et transformationnelles du SPD et des Verts, la stabilité de 16 ans de Merkel en matière de politique étrangère allemande est terminée. Au contraire, les Verts, le FDP et certaines parties du SDP ont appelé à une opposition plus stricte face à la Russie et à la Chine, ce que le futur ministre des Affaires étrangères s'apprête à concrétiser. Pour maintenir leur sécurité, les États-Unis, le Canada et tous les autres membres de l'alliance n'auront d'autre choix que de s'adapter à la nouvelle réalité d'une chancellerie Scholz. ## De la mer de Chine du Sud à l’Arctique : Lier les intérêts du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/de-la-mer-de-chine-du-sud-a-larctique-lier-les-interets-du-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le Canada a de sérieux intérêts dans la mer de Chine du Sud, mais aussi dans l’Arctique, où la glace de mer fond et révèle de nombreuses... Les contentieux relatifs à la mer de Chine du Sud comptent parmi les questions géopolitiques les plus sensibles au monde. Trois raisons rendent ces différends particulièrement complexes : le nombre de parties prenantes impliquées, les revendications contradictoires et l’importance économique et stratégique liée au contrôle de la mer de Chine du Sud. Ces facteurs font qu’il est très difficile de trouver une solution permettant d’apaiser les tensions et de maintenir l’ouverture de la région, d’autant plus que la compétition entre grandes puissances est toujours en arrière-plan. Dans ce contexte concurrentiel, il est crucial pour Ottawa d’adopter une politique étrangère dynamique, reliant les questions entre elles, afin d’utiliser stratégiquement tous les leviers possibles pour promouvoir les intérêts du Canada, à savoir sa souveraineté, sa sécurité et sa prospérité économique. Dans cette perspective, ce point chaud propose une analyse stratégique dynamique. Premièrement, les opérations de la Marine royale du Canada (MRC) dans la région du Sud-Est et le soutien diplomatique de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM) permettent de promouvoir les intérêts économiques et sécuritaires du Canada dans cette région. Deuxièmement, la coopération stratégique avec la Chine sur des intérêts mutuellement partagés pourrait maximiser les intérêts du Canada tant dans la région côtière que dans l’Arctique. La reconnaissance par Ottawa du détroit de Qiongzhou en tant qu’eaux intérieures chinoises en échange de la reconnaissance par Pékin du passage du Nord-Ouest en tant qu’eaux intérieures canadiennes pourrait contribuer à garantir la souveraineté du Canada dans l’Arctique, en plus d'être compatible avec les intérêts économiques d’Ottawa en mer de Chine du Sud. Quel est le problème en mer de Chine du Sud ? Les différends relatifs à la mer de Chine du Sud opposent les revendications topographiques et maritimes de divers acteurs régionaux, à savoir : Brunei, la Chine, les Philippines, Taiwan, la Malaisie, l'Indonésie et le Vietnam. La Chine veut exercer sa souveraineté sur 90% de la mer de Chine du Sud conformément à la Ligne à neuf traits, basée sur des arguments historiques contraires au droit international. L’attrait de la mer de Chine du Sud, que ce soit sur le plan stratégique ou économique, est considérable. Sur le plan économique, environ 3,2 milliards de dollars américains de commerce annuel transitent par ces eaux. La mer de Chine du Sud est également connue pour abriter d’importantes pêcheries et des réserves lucratives de pétrole et de gaz. D’un point de vue stratégique, la mer de Chine du Sud est essentielle à la Chine pour projeter sa puissance militaire au-delà de ses frontières en cas de conflit avec des puissances rivales. L’assertivité de la Chine dans la région de l’Asie du Sud-Est n’est pas nouvelle et n’a cessé de croître depuis 1970. La Chine agit comme un hégémon régional, souhaitant récupérer ce dont elle a bénéficié historiquement, à savoir une position dominante dans la région avant d’être délogée par l’Occident après les guerres de l’opium au XIXe siècle. Les actions assertives se caractérisent par la poursuite d’intérêts étroitement définis au moyen de politiques audacieuses qui contredisent les intérêts raisonnables et légitimes des autres États. Quatre types d’actions assertives sont identifiables. 1) l’assertivité déclarative (affirmations verbales, notes diplomatiques, diplomatie du loup guerrier); 2) les actions démonstratives (administration unilatérale de possessions contestées); 3) les actions coercitives (punition par des sanctions économiques, des coups d’avertissement, etc.) et; 4) l’utilisation de la force pure et simple (couler des navires). Dans le cas de la Chine, cela se traduit, entre autres choses, par le harcèlement régulier d’acteurs régionaux comme les Philippines et leurs activités sismiques, par l’intimidation des compagnies pétrolières étrangères impliquées dans les projets énergétiques du Vietnam situés dans les eaux contestées, par l’extension unilatérale de la présence administrative de Pékin dans la mer de Chine du Sud par le biais de ses garde-côtes, ou encore par la construction d’îles artificielles sur divers récifs dans les archipels Spratly et Paracel ainsi que la militarisation de certaines d’entre elles. Ces actions assertives et la position économique dominante de la Chine ont grandement favorisé ses ambitions révisionnistes visant à atteindre des objectifs nationaux au détriment de la CNUDM. Malgré les actions juridiques initiées par les acteurs régionaux pour dissuader l’expansion chinoise, la situation ne s’est pas améliorée. Inquiète de la présence envahissante de la Chine, Kuala Lumpur a soumis une revendication de plateau étendu à la Commission des limites du plateau continental de l’ONU, dans l’espoir de tempérer les perturbations chinoises dans la région. De décembre 2019 à juillet 2020, de nombreuses réclamations et déclarations ont été publiquement émises par de multiples parties prenantes dans la mer de Chine du Sud : une déclaration du ministère des Affaires étrangères de Brunei et cinq notes, deux notes de la Malaisie, deux notes des Philippines, et trois notes du Vietnam. Des pays non revendicateurs ont également participé, comme l’Australie avec sa note verbale de 2020, qui officialise son alignement sur les États-Unis. Canberra a également demandé publiquement l’application de la décision du tribunal arbitral de 2016. Cette dernière décision est le résultat d’une précédente affaire initiée par les Philippines en 2013 contre la Chine. Manille a fait valoir que, selon la CNUDM, les droits historiques de la Chine et la Ligne à neuf traits n’ont aucune base juridique, que les constructions maritimes utilisées par Pékin pour faire valoir ses revendications ne sont pas des îles valides qui donnent droit à une zone économique exclusive et que la Chine empêche les Philippines d’exercer ses droits souverains. Pourquoi la mer de Chine du Sud est-elle importante pour le Canada? De nombreuses revendications conflictuelles portées par des acteurs régionaux s’affrontent au sujet de la mer de Chine du Sud. Cet environnement tendu est particulièrement problématique puisque la région abrite la deuxième route maritime la plus fréquentée au monde. En tant que groupe, les pays de l’ANASE (ASEAN) représenteraient le sixième partenaire commercial du Canada si l’accord de libre-échange en cours de négociation est signé, même si la Chine reste un partenaire économique bien plus important pour le Canada puisqu’elle occupe la deuxième place. En 2018, les échanges commerciaux entre le Canada et l’ANASE ont néanmoins atteint 25 milliards de dollars américains. L’Asie du Sud-Est est l’une des régions économiques dont la croissance est parmi les plus rapides au monde. Les investissements du Canada y sont importants et concernent de nombreux secteurs tels que les mines, la haute technologie, le pétrole/gaz, les télécommunications, et plusieurs autres. Si les tensions régionales atteignent leur paroxysme et qu’un blocus devait être imposé sur la Chine, l’ouverture de la région en serait inévitablement affectée. Cela aura un impact négatif sur la fluidité du transit des marchandises et réduirait nécessairement les échanges économiques entre les pays de la région de l’Asie du Sud-Est et le monde. Le rôle du Canada auprès de l’ANASE Il existe une convergence d’intérêts entre le Canada et ceux qui sont en faveur de l’arrêt de l’expansionnisme régional chinois. Les acteurs régionaux craignent le révisionnisme chinois parce qu’il menace leur souveraineté. Ce même révisionnisme met également en danger l’ouverture de la région et, par extension, les intérêts économiques du Canada. Par conséquent, l’objectif d’Ottawa est d’amener les acteurs régionaux à travailler au sein d’institutions multilatérales pour parvenir à un code de conduite afin d’atténuer les tensions régionales découlant de l’extension territoriale de la Chine et de s’assurer que la mer de Chine du Sud reste un espace ouvert, basé sur le respect de règles. La prospérité de la Chine dépend du commerce international pour exporter des marchandises, d’autant que sa population vieillit rapidement. Il est donc peu probable que Pékin prenne le risque d’une fermeture complète des routes maritimes en renforçant son assertivité, car il subirait des contrecoups économiques sévères. Cependant, les accidents arrivent et peuvent dégénérer en dépit de la volonté de Pékin. La légitimité du Parti communiste chinois (PCC) repose sur le progrès économique. Comme la croissance économique est étroitement liée à l’ouverture des routes maritimes pour l’exportation de marchandises, les intérêts du PCC rejoignent in fine ceux du Canada pour ce qui est de garantir l’ouverture de la mer de Chine du Sud. Pour atteindre cet objectif, le Canada doit soutenir les pays de l’ANASE afin qu’ils parviennent à un consensus en vue de l’adoption d’un code de conduite pour la mer de Chine du Sud, car il s’agit du meilleur moyen de favoriser la stabilité et l’ouverture. Toutefois, de nombreux analystes et commentateurs considèrent que la création d’un code de conduite est très improbable. En fait, les discussions en vue d’un tel accord ont débuté en 1996 et ont toujours été entravées par l’unilatéralisme et le manque de coopération de la Chine. Néanmoins, en l’absence d’une meilleure alternative, la priorité devrait être donnée aux efforts diplomatiques visant à amener la Chine et les acteurs régionaux à se mettre d’accord sur un code de conduite. Mais le Cambodge, le Brunei et le Laos, tous membres de l’ANASE, se rangent toujours du côté de la Chine sur la nécessité de régler les différends relatifs à la mer de Chine du Sud de manière bilatérale, ce qui complique la création d’un code de conduite. Le poids économique et l’importance massive de Pékin dans les stratégies de développement de ces pays expliquent ces inclinations favorables, tout comme le fait que ces pays n’ont aucune revendication dans la mer de Chine du Sud, à l’exception du Brunei. Ces trois pays devraient, par conséquent, faire l’objet d’une attention particulière de la part des services diplomatiques canadiens lors des dialogues avec l’ANASE, car ce sont eux qui penchent le plus vers la Chine. Il est dans l’intérêt du Canada de veiller à ce que l’expansion de Pékin soit freinée par un code de conduite convenu de manière multilatérale. Et c’est pourquoi il est important que les membres de l’ANASE parviennent à un consensus sur la manière de régler les questions de sécurité relatives à la mer de Chine du Sud, même si la tâche est ardue. Néanmoins, si les acteurs régionaux, et en particulier la Chine, ne respectent pas le droit international, un code de conduite juridiquement contraignant devient inutile, car il ne sera tout simplement pas respecté. C’est pourquoi le Canada devrait également faire pression pour le respect de la CNUDM. Le respect de l’ordre fondé sur les règles de droit est la condition sine qua non pour que l’ANASE soit enfin en mesure de créer un code de conduite contraignant et qui ne soit pas le résultat des préférences unilatérales de l’un de ses membres. Ainsi, le Canada devrait à la fois favoriser la conclusion d’un accord régional sur un ensemble de règles directrices et travailler sur le plan normatif à insister sur l’importance de l’autorité de la CNUDM. Les opérations de liberté de navigation Si Ottawa doit faire des efforts diplomatiques dans les processus de l’ANASE pour favoriser l’adoption d’un code de conduite, il devrait également continuer à envoyer sa Marine royale canadienne (MRC) dans la région de l’Asie du Sud-Est. Il est important de faire respecter le droit de passage inoffensif, car c’est ce qui permet de maintenir de facto l’ouverture de la région, en plus d’exercer une pression efficace sur la Chine pour qu’elle accepte un code de conduite élaboré par l’ANASE, contraignant et exécutoire pour la mer de Chine du Sud. Ottawa devrait néanmoins veiller à distinguer les opérations de navigation de la MRC des opérations américaines de liberté de navigation (« Freedom of Navigation Operations », ou FoNoP). Dans ses FoNoPs les plus ambitieuses, l’Amérique s’approche jusqu’à 12 milles nautiques des côtes chinoises. Même si de tels exercices sont tout à fait légaux, le Canada doit rester prudent et ne pas aligner trop étroitement ses opérations maritimes avec celles de son voisin du sud en évitant, par exemple, de naviguer avec les États-Unis dans des zones très sensibles comme le détroit de Taïwan. En effet, le fait de cultiver une certaine distance avec les États-Unis permet d’éviter de subir des coûts évitables découlant d’un enchevêtrement dans la compétition sino-américaine. Puisque le nouveau pacte de sécurité AUKUS n’inclut pas le Canada, Ottawa devrait laisser le gros du travail à d’autres. Cela étant dit, les opérations de navigation dans la mer de Chine du Sud sont utiles pour exercer un effet de levier sur la Chine. Surtout lorsqu’elles se déroulent, comme c’est le cas pour certaines FoNoPs américaines, à seulement 12 milles nautiques des côtes chinoises. En fait, nous savons que la Chine veut que les États-Unis, et par extension, le Canada, sortent de son arrière-cour. L’objectif est donc de faire comprendre à la Chine que son expansion unilatérale dans la mer de Chine du Sud équivaut mécaniquement à une augmentation de la présence occidentale dans la mer de Chine du Sud. Si Pékin souhaite réellement voir la présence régionale des puissances étrangères diminuer, alors coopérer pour parvenir à un code de conduite deviendra, à un certain moment, attrayant. Ultimement, Pékin n’a aucun intérêt à accroître les tensions régionales au point de perturber le commerce international. Un code de conduite pourrait contribuer à réduire les risques de perturbation du commerce international et à réguler la présence occidentale dans la région. Il y a donc possibilité de coopérer. La CNUDM, l’Arctique et le regroupement d’enjeux Le Canada a de sérieux intérêts dans la mer de Chine du Sud, mais aussi dans l’Arctique, où la glace de mer fond et révèle de nombreuses ressources naturelles et plusieurs nouvelles routes maritimes. Parmi elles figure le passage du Nord-Ouest. Il s’agit d’une étroite voie navigable considérée par Ottawa comme des eaux intérieures et par Washington comme des eaux internationales. Les intérêts juridiques d’Ottawa dans le passage du Nord-Ouest convergent avec ceux de Pékin dans le détroit de Qiongzhou. Pékin considère ce dernier détroit, situé entre l’île d’Hainan et le continent chinois, comme des eaux intérieures, tout comme le Canada le fait dans l’Arctique pour le passage du Nord-Ouest – les deux pays invoquent des droits historiques. L’Amérique, pour sa part, s’oppose à ces deux revendications. Le Canada a un intérêt stratégique sur le plan juridique à soutenir la position de la Chine concernant le détroit de Qiongzhou afin d’éviter un précédent qui serait préjudiciable aux intérêts du Canada concernant le statut juridique qu’il souhaite pour le passage du Nord-Ouest dans l’Arctique. L’argument est également valable en sens inverse pour la Chine. C’est là que le regroupement d’enjeux (« issue linkage ») devient utile. On parle de regroupement d’enjeux lorsqu’un État associe deux questions de politique étrangère, ce qui implique que la résolution d’une question ne peut se faire sans la résolution de l’autre. Pékin s’appuie sur le droit international pour garantir le statut juridique du détroit de Qiongzhou en tant qu’eaux intérieures. Parallèlement, la Chine considère la CNUDM comme illégitime lorsqu’il s’agit d’autres de ses revendications ailleurs dans les eaux côtières. Ainsi, la reconnaissance par le Canada du détroit de Qiongzhou en tant qu’eaux intérieures chinoises est un levier qui peut être utilisé pour pousser la Chine à reconnaître l’autorité de la CNUDM dans la mer de Chine du Sud de manière plus générale. Cela pourrait pousser Pékin à adopter une approche plus cohérente du droit international, mais aussi à encourager Pékin à rendre la pareille et à reconnaître la revendication du Canada sur le passage du Nord-Ouest comme des eaux intérieures. S’appuyer sur les dispositions de la CNUDM est donc à la fois dans l’intérêt du Canada et de la Chine pour sécuriser leurs eaux intérieures respectives – le passage du Nord-Ouest pour le premier, le détroit de Qiongzhou pour le second. En outre, si la CNUDM prévaut dans les eaux de la mer de Chine du Sud et qu’un code de conduite est convenu, l’ordre fondé sur des règles est renforcé. Plus l’ordre fondé sur des règles est fort à l’échelle internationale, mieux ce sera pour les intérêts du Canada. Autre élément important, cette convergence d’intérêts entre la Chine et le Canada constitue un moyen de réduire les tensions entre les deux pays. Conclusion Un résultat tel que la fermeture de l’Asie du Sud-Est en raison des différends relatifs à la mer de Chine du Sud aurait un impact négatif sur les intérêts économiques canadiens. En effet, la capacité du Canada à exporter et à importer des marchandises diminuerait si le flux du commerce international était réduit. C’est pourquoi les efforts diplomatiques doivent viser à convaincre la Chine de toujours s’appuyer sur le droit international – et pas seulement là où cela correspond à ses intérêts – ce qui inclut la mer de Chine du Sud. Ottawa doit donc soutenir l’élaboration d’un code de conduite pour la mer de Chine du Sud. Les opérations de navigation de la Marine royale du Canada dans la mer de Chine du Sud devraient également être maintenues, sans pour autant s’aligner complètement sur les opérations américaines. La priorité doit également être accordée au renforcement de la coopération du Canada avec ses alliés européens, mais aussi avec ses partenaires d’Asie du Sud-Est, en organisant des exercices maritimes conjoints. Le Canada et les pays de l’ANASE partagent le même intérêt pour le maintien de l’ordre fondé sur des règles et pour l’ouverture de la mer de Chine du Sud. Pour beaucoup, ces États craignent d’être contraints de choisir un camp. Ils ont des liens économiques cruciaux avec la Chine, mais sont en même temps dépendants de Washington pour leur sécurité. Il s’ensuit qu’ils ont intérêt à préserver l’ouverture de la région, car cela leur permet de cultiver les deux relations sans privilégier l’une par rapport à l’autre. Enfin, le Canada et la Chine auraient intérêt à reconnaître leurs revendications respectives selon lesquelles le passage du Nord-Ouest et le détroit de Qiongzhou sont des eaux intérieures. Cette convergence d’intérêts permet de réduire les tensions sino-canadiennes, de garantir l’ouverture de la mer de Chine du Sud et la souveraineté d’Ottawa sur le passage du Nord-Ouest. ## Défendre un pays qui n’existe pas avec une armée non autorisée : Les relations entre le Japon et Taïwan et le potentiel en défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/defendre-un-pays-qui-nexiste-pas-avec-une-armee-non-autorisee/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note politique examine les relations entre le Japon et Taïwan et soutient que le Japon s’oriente vers un engagement implicite... Une guerre dans le détroit de Taïwan est-elle imminente ? Oui, éventuellement dans les cinq prochaines années. Les récentes déclarations du président américain Biden ont renforcé les garanties de sécurité implicites américaines en faveur de la démocratie autonome insulaire qu’est Taïwan, de sorte qu’il ne fait guère de doute que les États-Unis chercheront à défendre Taïwan contre une attaque chinoise. L’engagement américain est réel, mais les États-Unis ne peuvent pas défendre Taïwan seuls. Ils ont besoin de leurs alliés pour les aider à défendre Taïwan, et l’allié le plus important dans cette perspective est sans aucun doute le Japon. Cette note politique examine les relations entre le Japon et Taïwan. Elle soutient que le Japon s’oriente vers un engagement implicite qui consisterait à aider à la défense de Taïwan dans le cas d’une attaque chinoise, et ce malgré la présence de plusieurs facteurs qui pourraient remettre en question cette garantie. Cette note politique examine aussi la montée en puissance de la Chine et sa détermination à imposer l’unification à Taïwan, par la coercition ou par la force si nécessaire. Ensuite, cette note retrace l’évolution de la politique diplomatique et de défense japonaise à l’égard de Taïwan ces dernières années. Toutefois, des précautions s’imposent : plusieurs facteurs pourraient faire vaciller le Japon sur la question de cet engagement implicite ou le rendre moins efficace qu’il ne pourrait l’être. Les ambitions chinoises Taïwan reste la pièce manquante insaisissable de la politique de réunification chinoise. La stratégie visant à attirer Taïwan dans l’orbite de la Chine culminait dans les années 1990 lorsque la Chine cherchait à adopter une bonne conduite et à utiliser la politique « un pays, deux systèmes » pour intégrer Taïwan dans une sorte d’association informelle, mais légale. Après le 1er juillet 1997, Hong Kong devait être un test pour montrer qu’une telle association pouvait fonctionner. Vingt ans plus tard, la répression continentale des libertés individuelles et de la démocratie à Hong Kong montre clairement que la Chine est systématiquement incapable de tolérer le pluralisme politique et la démocratie. En 2021, les évaluations américaines des capacités militaires chinoises prévoyaient un horizon de six ans au cours duquel la Chine serait capable d’intervenir militairement. Xi Jinping, en particulier, a fait de la réunification son grand projet pour le troisième mandat, qu’il va probablement décrocher à la tête du Parti communiste. Xi a besoin d’un succès de taille pour justifier la continuation de son leadership, ne serait-ce que pour se positionner aux côtés de Mao Zedong dans l’histoire chinoise. Toutefois, le temps joue contre Xi à deux égards. Tout d’abord, la population taïwanaise se sent de moins en moins chinoise. Ensuite, le ralentissement de la croissance économique et démographique de la Chine, la politique insoutenable du « zéro Covid » ainsi que les problèmes de dette, de dégâts environnementaux et de corruption dans le cadre de la Nouvelle route de la soie (Belt and Road Initiative) ont également commencé à peser sur ces ambitions grandioses. Tout cela révèle une dure réalité de politique intérieure : Xi est à court de grandes choses à accomplir. Ainsi, Taïwan pourrait être cette réalisation, et même un succès dont Mao n’a pas pu se vanter. En supposant que le XXe Congrès national du Parti renomme Xi à sa tête à l’automne 2022, c’est un compte à rebours de cinq ans qui se déclenche pour Taïwan. Les Forces japonaises d’autodéfense : L’armée qui n’est pas autorisée à agir L’article 9 de la Constitution japonaise de 1947 – rédigée par les autorités d’occupation américaines – interdit explicitement au Japon d’avoir une armée. Les Américains ont regretté cette clause trois ans plus tard et ont créé la Réserve de police nationale et l’Agence nationale de sécurité (National Safety Agency), précurseurs des Forces japonaises d’autodéfense (FJA) et du ministère de la Défense. Pendant la guerre froide, la protection américaine a aidé le Japon, mais les États-Unis ont maintenu une pression constante pour que le Japon augmente sa contribution à la défense. Bien que l’opposition politique se soit fermement opposée à toute modification de l’article 9 ou à toute augmentation des capacités des FJA, le Parti libéral-démocrate (PLD) dominant a progressivement adopté des modifications. L’une des plus importantes a eu lieu en 2015 lorsque le Japon a élargi sa définition de la légitime défense pour inclure d’autres pays : « lorsque le Japon subit une attaque armée ou lorsqu’un pays étranger qui entretient une relation étroite avec le Japon subit une attaque armée qui menace par conséquent la survie du Japon et constitue un danger évident [...] ». Les FJA ont déjà été impliquées dans diverses activités à l’étranger sans toutefois combattre. Le Japon a contribué à un certain nombre d’opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies. À la suite des attaques du 11 septembre aux États-Unis, les unités maritimes des FJA se sont déployées dans l’océan Indien de 2001 à 2010, et des patrouilles de lutte contre la piraterie se poursuivent dans l’océan Indien. En 2004, le gouvernement Koizumi a envoyé en Irak, à la demande des États-Unis, le « Groupe japonais de reconstruction et de soutien à l’Irak », un bataillon de troupes non combattantes qui a opéré pendant cinq ans. Si les dépenses de défense japonaises ont stagné lors de la période de la fin des années 1990 à 2013, le Japon les a, depuis, augmentées de plus de 18% en dollars constants et de plus de 24% en yens. Selon l’Institut international de recherche sur la paix de Stockholm (SIPRI), ces dépenses s’élèvent à 54,1 milliards de dollars par an, ce qui est comparable à l’Allemagne et à la France, et qui dépasse les dépenses de la Corée du Sud, de l’Australie et du Canada. Le Japon dispose d’une flotte moderne de sous-marins non nucléaires, de navires de guerre, d’excellentes capacités de lutte anti-sous-marine et d’une Force aérienne d’autodéfense moderne. Bien qu’il y ait plusieurs domaines dans lesquels les FJA doivent s’améliorer, ses moyens navals dans la région montrent que le Japon dispose de forces substantielles pour compléter les moyens américains. Source : IISS The Military Balance 2022. Il est peut-être plus important encore de souligner que le Japon est dans la position optimale pour coopérer avec les États-Unis à propos de Taïwan : il héberge les forces américaines à Okinawa, aux côtés des siennes, au sein de ports aériens et maritimes cruciaux qui sont proches de ce qui sera peut-être bientôt le théâtre d’affrontements. Toutefois, les dépenses militaires de Taïwan et du Japon ne sont pas comparables à celles de la Chine. Source : SIPRI, 2022. L’évolution de la relation entre le Japon et un pays qui n’existe pas Le Japon a rompu ses relations diplomatiques avec Taipei en septembre 1972, mais y a maintenu un bureau non officiel qui fonctionnait comme une ambassade sans en porter le nom. Les liens économiques et sociaux entre le Japon et Taïwan sont restés très bons. Les Taïwanais interrogés font état de bons sentiments envers le Japon, et l’héritage historique qui pèse sur les relations entre Japon et la Corée, la Chine ou les Philippines est beaucoup moins prononcé pour Taïwan. Lee Teng-hui, le premier président directement élu de Taïwan, et Tsai Ing-wen, sa présidente actuelle, ont parlé favorablement du Japon et continuent de le faire. Tsai a même un fil Twitter en japonais qui compte 1,4 million d’abonnés. Les relations entre le Japon et la Chine ont longtemps déchiré le PLD au pouvoir, entre les « faucons » les plus belliqueux et les « colombes » conciliantes. Au sein de ce deuxième groupe se trouvait Fumio Kishida. Cependant, après son élection au poste de premier ministre en octobre 2021, la plupart des analystes estiment que Kishida s'est transformé en « faucon » et que les « colombes » sont en voie de disparition. Le PLD a mis en place une « équipe de projet pour une politique taïwanaise » au début de l’année 2021 pour organiser des pourparlers entre des législateurs (et non des représentants du gouvernement) dans les domaines de politique étrangère et de défense. Il semble toutefois peu probable que les rumeurs à propos d’un « Japan Taiwan Relations Act » qui serait calquée sur la loi américaine de 1979 autorisant les ventes d’armes défensives à Taïwan soient avérées. En 2021, les préoccupations concernant la situation dans le détroit de Taïwan sont devenues beaucoup plus « courantes » dans la politique japonaise : « [...] L’aggravation des frictions dans le détroit de Taïwan tout au long de 2021 a poussé les médias, les politiciens et les décideurs japonais à s’inquiéter des risques et de l’impact potentiel qu’un éventuel conflit aurait sur le Japon – et ce, à un degré peut-être sans précédent. » L’évolution vers une vision plus avant-gardiste à propos de Taïwan est au moins en partie attribuée à la volonté accrue des États américains et européens de collaborer avec Taïwan. Le Japon reconnaît également les intérêts communs des deux pays : « À présent, le Japon cherche activement à promouvoir des liens de défense plus étroits avec les États libéraux et démocratiques d’Asie, un comportement qui est devenu partie intégrante de sa stratégie. Dans ce cadre, Taïwan est l’un des principaux candidats avec lequel le Japon pourrait développer des relations plus étroites, étant donné qu’il s’agit d’une démocratie insulaire proche des États-Unis et menacée par la Chine. » La détermination croissante du Japon à l’égard de Taïwan a été renforcée par l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine en février 2022. Le Japon a réagi rapidement et résolument contre la Fédération de Russie, imposant des sanctions dans la lignée des États-Unis et de l’Union européenne, gelant les avoirs russes détenus à Tokyo, coupant l’accès bancaire à SWIFT et gelant également les avoirs de responsables russes. Comme l’a déclaré le ministre de la Défense, Nobuo Kishi , « si la communauté internationale autorise ou tolère d’une manière ou d’une autre l’agression de la Russie contre l’Ukraine, cela pourrait envoyer un message erroné selon lequel de telles actions pourraient être tolérées dans d’autres parties du monde, y compris dans l’Indopacifique. [...] L’Asie de l’Est pourrait être l’Ukraine de demain. » Recommandations politiques Il est crucial de maintenir et d’accroître les visites et les exercices de l’OTAN dans l’Indopacifique, ainsi que d’en approfondir l’institutionnalisation. Il est fondamental que l’OTAN constitue, face à la Chine, une alliance occidentale capable de surveiller simultanément le théâtre européen et celui de l’Indopacifique. Le Canada, en tant que membre de l’OTAN et puissance du Pacifique, a une responsabilité particulière à cet égard. Le récent harcèlement des avions de l’Aviation royale canadienne par la Chine visait à intimider le Canada. Les alliés des États-Unis doivent envisager de façon réaliste ce délai maximum de cinq ans et prendre des mesures en conséquence. Heureusement, l’Ukraine a créé les conditions d’un changement de politique sérieux au Japon. Les alliés occidentaux doivent élaborer des réponses conjointes dans le cadre de scénarios « à la limite de la guerre », par exemple un blocus naval chinois de Taïwan déguisé en « quarantaine ». Explorer les stratégies et la coordination des achats d’armes avec Taïwan et le Japon. Les dirigeants américains commencent à réfléchir sérieusement à la possibilité d’une guerre dans le détroit de Taïwan, et il serait crucial d’avoir une idée de la stratégie du gouvernement taïwanais et d’inclure le Japon et d’autres alliés dans ce processus. Conserver les politiques du « pays qui n’existe pas » et de la « force militaire interdite ». Pousser le Japon à créer son propre Taiwan Relations Act ou abolir l’article 9 de la constitution comporte des coûts politiques et des risques diplomatiques qui n’entraîneraient que peu de changements dans la réalité.   Steven F. Jackson est professeur de science politique à la Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Après avoir obtenu sa licence en relations internationales à l'Université de Stanford en 1981, il a enseigné l'anglais à Xi'an en Chine de 1981 à 1983. Il a obtenu son doctorat à l'Université du Michigan et a rejoint le corps enseignant de l'Université de Pennsylvanie en 1994. Il est l'auteur de China's Regional Relations in Comparative Perspective (Routledge 2018), ainsi que de nombreux chapitres et articles sur les relations internationales de l'Asie de l'Est.  ## Discussion – L’OTAN et l’Arctique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/discussion-lotan-et-larctique/ Modified: 2025-02-18 > Contre-amiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN)Discutante : Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Université de Bischop’sThèmes potentiels... Contre-amiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN) Discutante : Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Université de Bischop’s Thèmes potentiels : La place de l’Arctique au sein de l’OTAN Le rôle de l’OTAN dans l’Arctique La question du partage du fardeau dans le cadre des actions en lien avec l’Arctique ## Dissuasion nucléaire européenne : un projet crédible ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/dissuasion-nucleaire-europeenne-un-projet-credible/ Modified: 2025-10-24 Pourquoi un tel projet ? L’arrivée en 2025 de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche a créé un véritable électrochoc pour la communauté européenne. La fiabilité de leur plus grand allié est remise en cause, ce qui les pousse ainsi à revoir leur relation avec la puissance étatsunienne. En réaction à la rencontre tendue entre Zelensky et le président américain ainsi que son vice-président Vance, et à la décision des États-Unis de suspendre temporairement leur aide à l’Ukraine, les pays européens ont rapidement compris la nécessité de « prendre le relais » en matière d’aide à l’Ukraine et de sécurité européenne. Au début du mois de mars, la France et le Royaume-Uni s'accordent sur la mise en place d’une « coalition des volontaires » composée d’eux-mêmes, mais d’autres pays étant prêts à assurer un soutien majeur envers l’Ukraine dans la guerre et dans sa protection ainsi que dans la sureté du continent européen. En parallèle, le chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz a pointé du doigt la problématique du désintérêt américain vis-à-vis de l’OTAN et de l’Europe et a appelé les pays européens détenteur d’arme atomique a songé à une alternative souveraine et européenne. De ce fait, la France et le Royaume-Uni, les seuls détenteurs de l’arme nucléaire en Europe, réfléchissent à la mise en place d’une stratégie de dissuasion commune qui pourrait venir prendre le relais des Américains afin de rassurer l’Europe du manque d’engagement américain et de leur potentiel retrait. L’enjeu est de taille puisque l’objectif est de garantir le soutien militaire et économique et de fournir une force capable de dissuader la Russie, mais aussi de défendre les partenaires européens en se plaçant comme une alternative de confiance face au parapluie américain. Le but principal de ce projet est de venir coordonner les arsenaux britannique et français afin qu’ils soient capables d’être une force de dissuasion crédible pour les alliés européens, indépendante de la protection nucléaire américaine. Ainsi, cela passe par un élargissement de la zone de protection nucléaire de la France, qui, pour l’instant, était concentré sur son territoire national et ses frontières à une zone largement plus vaste que représente l’Union européenne.  Un des enjeux prépondérants de cette initiative est aussi de savoir si cette force dissuasion est capable de fonctionner sans la contribution américaine et si les capacités sont « suffisante » pour défendre l’Europe tout entière. La question majeure qui se pose est de savoir si cette collaboration franco-britannique a réellement la capacité de dissuader la Russie d’une future invasion. De plus, peut-elle aussi assurer une force de dissuasion nucléaire à l’Europe dans un contexte où les États-Unis se désintéressent du continent ? Quelle forme ce parapluie nucléaire pourrait-il prendre ? Ce texte examine la question de la dissuasion et ses diverses formes ainsi que l’enjeu de la crédibilité. Il passe aussi en revue la question fondamentale des capacités et moyens dans la dissuasion pour faire un état de la situation européenne concernant la dissuasion élargie. Alors que le projet franco-britannique fait preuve d’une grande crédibilité sur son aspect nucléaire cependant, il est nécessaire pour l’Europe de se doter d’une force conventionnelle qui permet une réaction graduelle à un moment où les États-Unis semblent les plus désintéressés de la défense européenne. La dissuasion nucléaire : une affaire de crédibilité Dissuader repose principalement sur la question de la crédibilité. La crédibilité de la riposte qui, par la réaction de la personne attaquée, rendra irrationnelle une potentielle agression. Mais aussi la crédibilité politique de la dissuasion qui repose sur la capacité à rendre crédible la puissance de son armement. Jusqu’à la fin de la guerre froide, les différents paradigmes de la dissuasion occidentaux ou soviétiques ont reposé « uniquement » sur la manipulation de l’armement nucléaire. Les modèles d’emplois pouvaient être construits sur une logique d’usage en premier ou non, mais aussi sur une approche graduée ou de destruction assurée. Cependant, ils excluaient de leurs schémas d’escalades la contribution de moyens conventionnels. Avec les progrès réalisés dans les armes de précision dont le succès a été établi lors de la première guerre du Golfe (Desert storm), cette vision classique de la dissuasion nucléaire s’est révélée de plus en plus inopérante. Depuis les années 2000, il s’agit donc de réfléchir à une dissuasion intégrée qui rassemble ou « épaule » les moyens nucléaires stratégiques aux autres. De facto, l’impératif de disposer à nouveau de force conventionnelle pour la haute intensité a donc été réévalué pour éviter tout coup de force ou état de fait qui contournerait le seuil de la dissuasion nucléaire. De la même manière, la résilience des sociétés civiles est impactée avec les risques de désinformation et de guerre hybride. Si le cœur de la logique de la dissuasion - crédibilité d’une riposte - demeure la même, elle est donc plus élargie qu’auparavant. Pour convaincre un adversaire que son agression entrainerait des frais supérieurs à son attaque immédiate, il faut donc non seulement démontrer la fiabilité des moyens nucléaires, mais également signaler la bonne préparation de ses forces armées et de la société civile. Dans sa dimension nucléaire, la dissuasion repose théoriquement, dans sa forme absolue, sur une triade composée de la terre, de la mer et de l’air. Dans chaque composante, il y a un moyen de déployer sa force nucléaire : sur terre avec les missiles intercontinentaux, dans les mers grâce aux sous-marins et dans les airs par bombardements avec des charges embarqués sur des avions. Bien que la maîtrise des trois soit importante, l’utilisation de seulement un ou deux des trois aspects reste suffisante pour être crédible. Dans ces cas-ci, nous pouvons penser au Royaume-Uni, dont la dissuasion repose principalement sur le penchant naval ou la France qui possède le doublé air et mer. De plus, l'armement nucléaire peut se décliner en plusieurs types. On parle de nucléaire tactique, mais aussi stratégique dont l’objectif diffère. La notion de tactique se rapporte donc à une utilisation ciblée avec des  têtes nucléaires de plus petit format permettant une utilisation précise sur le champ de bataille, alors que le stratégique se voit avoir pour but de venir frapper et détruire les centres névralgiques du pays, que ce soit démographique, économique ou politique. Bien qu’il existe une différence que ce soit sur la charge, les dégâts ou le type d'utilisation, la différence entre tactique et stratégie se fait surtout dans le cadre des doctrines étatiques de dissuasion. De plus, il est essentiel de noter que le déploiement de la capacité de dissuasion nucléaire ne se fait pas seul. La menace d’une frappe ou la potentielle frappe doit être couverte par des moyens conventionnels permettant de mener à bien l’opération ou de démontrer une capacité de résilience. La crédibilité : le nerf de la guerre Le 10 juillet, le président français et le Premier ministre britannique ont annoncé avoir signé une déclaration sur la coordination des arsenaux nucléaires de leurs deux pays respectifs. Au-delà de ce geste symbolique important, la question de la crédibilité des postures de dissuasion des deux pays, mais aussi de leurs moyens et capacités, est importante à clarifier pour assurer la cohérence du projet de dissuasion européen. Ainsi, il faut venir étudier directement les postures des deux principaux intéressés. Du côté de la France, la dissuasion nucléaire repose sur une logique de “tous azimuts” ne mettant ainsi pas l'emphase sur un seul ennemi, mais sur la défense de ses tous intérêts vitaux vis-à-vis de n’importe quel adversaire. Par conséquent, la dissuasion nucléaire française est conçue pour être constante et exclusivement défensive. Cependant, elle est utilisée selon une stratégie visant à infliger des dommages inacceptables aux capitales, centres de commandements importants, infrastructures économique et énergétique, etc. De plus, la dissuasion française se veut indépendante et autonome, mettant en avant le fait qu’elle ne relève que du pouvoir du président de la République et ne peut donc être utilisée par d’autres pays ou entités alliés de la France. La conception française de la dissuasion nucléaire a pour cœur les intérêts vitaux du pays, ce qui vient poser un doute sur un élargissement de la doctrine française dans sa construction actuelle. Bien que la question d’une dissuasion européenne nucléaire ne soit pas récente en France, il est compliqué de mesurer ce qui relève de l'intérêt vital en dehors du territoire national. Depuis l’accord d’Aix-la-Chapelle en 2019, la France s’est engagée à protéger l’Allemagne en garantissant une défense conjointe des deux nations grâce à leurs forces militaires, sans toutefois évoquer explicitement l’arme nucléaire. En dehors de cela, le doute réside sur la volonté politique française et la possibilité de réellement défendre les pays menacés directement par la Russie alors que ceux-ci appellent à une protection nucléaire qu’ils perçoivent comme le seul moyen possible pour dissuader leur ennemi commun. Il faudrait ainsi que la France révise l’intégralité de sa doctrine nucléaire afin de proposer un modèle marquant une rupture avec sa conception passée de la dissuasion nucléaire. Du côté du Royaume-Uni, la posture de dissuasion prévoit l’utilisation de missiles Trident à une échelle substratégique. La logique serait l’emploi de l’arme nucléaire de manière limitée afin de ne pas déclencher un échange de plus grande ampleur. Ainsi, on peut situer cette posture entre le tactique et le stratégique, d’où l’origine de son nom. Toutefois, la doctrine britannique de dissuasion nucléaire cherche à créer un flou sur les circonstances dans lesquelles le pays considère son droit de répondre nucléairement, ce qui lui permet de se garder une certaine marge de manœuvre vis-à-vis d’un potentiel agresseur. Cependant certains principes sont énoncés. Le Royaume-Uni n’engage à ne pas lancer une frappe nucléaire en premier et à répondre de manière minimale, mais crédible. L’arme nucléaire est donc purement pour dissuader l’adversaire potentiel et n’est pas considérée comme une arme utilisable sur un champ de bataille. Enfin, le Royaume-Uni possède une force nucléaire à la fois aérienne et maritime, bien que sa dimension maritime demeure la plus efficace par l’utilisation de ses sous-marins de classe Vanguard, qui seront remplacés à partir de 2028 par la classe Dreadnought. Toutefois, l’arsenal britannique est vieillissant et doit passer par une phase de remise à niveau, que ce soit par l’acquisition des moyens aéroportés ou par la modernisation de ses armes. Bien que les arsenaux des deux pays réunis (290 pour la France contre 225 pour le Royaume-Uni) n'atteignent pas les chiffres des armes nucléaires russes (5580 têtes), la capacité de l’arme nucléaire à dissuader d'elle-même, lorsque combinés aux postures des pays et à leur stratégie, en fait un moyen tout de même efficace de dissuader un adversaire. Toutefois, la question demeure concernant la volonté politique de se porter comme garant de la sécurité d’un nombre d'États au final relativement éloignés de leurs frontières. La perception des Russes de ces projets européens est aussi un élément à prendre en compte. Comment réagissent-ils à ces décisions ? La question d’une menace posée par une dissuasion nucléaire européenne n'est tout bonnement pas prise au sérieux dans les think tanks ou médias russes. Ce qui ressort principalement est une tentative de discréditer les efforts européens en présentant la marine britannique comme étant dépassée, incapable de se battre contre les Russes, et composée d’individus immoraux. Du côté français, l’idée est la même : Macron ne cherche qu’un prétexte pour entrer dans la guerre et l’Europe joue avec le feu en étant un acteur géopolitique qui n’est plus sérieux. Ainsi, l’idée est que l’Europe n’est pas à la hauteur et est un acteur en faillite qui peine à retrouver sa place. Toutefois, l’arme nucléaire parle toujours pour elle-même et le fait que la France et le Royaume-Uni deviennent des menaces pour la Russie est bien considéré. Le vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie, Sergueï Ryabkov, a annoncé que la Russie prendrait en compte les efforts franco-britanniques dans leur prochaine planification militaire. Il est intéressant de noter que la Russie cherche à mettre en évidence une attitude antirusse en France et en Europe. Elle souhaite ainsi discréditer les décisions prises par l’Europe qui chercherait à attiser les tensions pour faciliter l’acceptation de son propre réarmement par sa population. Le sujet du projet européen de dissuasion n’est cependant pas quelque chose de grandement discuté dans les conférences de presse du ministère des Affaires étrangères. Toutefois, lors d’une conférence de presse le 6 mars 2025, sa porte-parole, Maria Zakharova, mentionna le projet français de créer un nouveau parapluie en l’affirmant impossible en raison de la capacité moindre de la France par rapport au parapluie américain. Néanmoins, elle mentionna aussi que ce changement de doctrine serait pris en compte dans la programmation militaire russe à venir. Des capacités à la hauteur des ambitions ? En France, comme cela a été mentionné, l’exécution de la dissuasion nucléaire peut être comprise en deux éléments : les missiles aéroportés, ceux installés sur des sous-marins. La composante sous-marine est certainement la plus fiable et la plus efficace, puisque les sous-marins lanceur d'engins (SNLE) sont indétectables et intraçables. En outre, il y aura toujours, parmi les quatre SNLE, au moins un sous-marin en mer prêt à employer l’arme nucléaire, assurant ainsi la dissuasion française. Sa capacité d’emport de 16 missiles M51 par appareil lui laisse une grande force de frappe considérable et capable de remplir sa mission. Ainsi, la composante marine de la dissuasion française est assurée et est crédible aux yeux de ses adversaires. Cependant, la dimension aéroportée est aussi un élément majeur de la doctrine française. Dans ce cas-ci, l’arme nucléaire est embarquée sur des Rafales, stationnés sur la base aérienne 118 de Mont-de-Marsan, et déployée grâce aux missiles ASMPA. Néanmoins, la force nucléaire aéroportée française se trouve en France dans la logique de défendre les intérêts vitaux du pays. Bien que la mission aéroportée prévoie des ravitailleurs permettant aux Rafales de parcourir de plus grandes distances, ceux-ci sont vulnérables. Par conséquent, il est essentiel que la composante aéroportée soit soutenue par des forces conventionnelles pouvant défendre le vecteur nucléaire. À défaut ou en parallèle, les avions pourraient être stationnés ailleurs, ce qui leur permettrait d’être plus près de l’adversaire à dissuader et de l’atteindre plus rapidement. Enfin, bien que nous ne l’ayons pas mentionné, il est primordial de posséder une capacité accrue de renseignement pour la surveillance et la reconnaissance afin que la stratégie puisse être crédible. Aujourd’hui, la quasi-totalité des pays européens repose sur une coopération étroite avec le renseignement américain diminuant leur « indépendance » stratégique. Pour qu’une telle mission soit viable, la France doit s’assurer le soutien de ces alliés afin que ceux-ci garantissent la mission de dissuasion, que ce soit par un partage de renseignement (composante vitale de la dissuasion nucléaire), mais aussi pour un soutien conventionnel (épaulement) aux avions porteurs ou bien en permettant le stationnement dans des bases alliés dans une logique similaire à celle du partage nucléaire de l’OTAN. Une étape majeure pour la France sera de s’accorder sur une doctrine commune et, dans cette perspective, la logique de partage nucléaire reste sans doute la plus pertinente, permettant ainsi de mettre les alliés à contribution en gardant la décision au sein de l’État-Major des armées françaises. De son côté, l’armée britannique assure aussi sa dissuasion par une composante sous-marine et plus récemment aéroportée. Pareillement, la mission sous-marine prévoit qu’il y ait toujours au moins un sous-marin de classe Dreadnought déployé en mission. Cependant, en ce qui concerne l’arsenal nucléaire, celui-ci est équipé sur des missiles Trident D2 construit par l’américain Lockheed Martin et capable d’embarquer jusqu’à 12 têtes nucléaires. Dans sa capacité aérienne, le Royaume-Uni a tout récemment annoncé l’acquisition de 12 F-35 afin de se conformer à la mission de l’OTAN à double capacité. Une problématique a été émise concernant la dissuasion britannique en raison de la présence de matériel américain dans ses capacités de dissuasion nucléaire. Avec les diverses annonces de Trump, la question s’est posée quant à l’autonomie stratégique des pays achetant du matériel américain. Dans le cas britannique, cela viendrait directement mettre à mal les capacités nucléaires du pays en raison de ses missiles et de ses futurs avions qui sont tous des produits américains dont la marge d’autonomie stratégique sur leur emploi reste encore flou. Seulement, l’ordre de tirer un missile nucléaire revient au commandant du sous-marin lanceur d’engin, laissant ainsi dehors toute supposition d’une interférence ou d’une validation américaine. Toutefois, c’est dans la maintenance des missiles que Washington fait sa part du travail, ce qui veut dire que la coopération entre les deux puissances pour leur entretien doit être pérennisée afin que ceux-ci demeurent fonctionnels et utilisables. Ainsi l’armement fonctionnera toujours tant que les Américains entretiennent celui-ci. De ce fait, la dissuasion britannique a moins de marge de manœuvre que le modèle français, mais demeure crédible et efficace. Malgré leur infériorité en termes de capacité nucléaire, les deux modèles sont efficaces et capables de travailler ensemble en raison de leurs stratégies qui cherchent à taper fort là où ça fait mal. Toutefois il est nécessaire d’avoir cet épaulement conventionnel pour mener à bien la dissuasion, épaulement qui pourrait être assuré par leurs alliés européens. Que faire ? Pour conclure, le projet franco-britannique d’une dissuasion nucléaire commune et européenne propose une base solide avec des capacités réelles qui se caractérise par la puissance sous-marine et balistique des deux pays et des postures stratégiques cohérentes et crédibles qui, malgré leur infériorité numérique, reste appropriée. Leur crédibilité résonne du côté russe puisque le régime, méfiant, compte prendre en compte de cette nouvelle réalité dans son plan de programmation militaire. Cette initiative a pour but de venir rassurer les alliés européens face à un désintérêt américain qui fait courir le risque d’une insécurité croissante pour l’Europe. De plus, la gestion de la sécurité nucléaire du territoire européen par des pays européens permet une vision plus cohérente de la sécurité qui ne repose pas simplement sur les capacités et la volonté américaine. Toutefois, la dimension conventionnelle, principalement pour l’épaulement des capacités nucléaires dans le cas d’un raid, est encore trop faible et manque de fiabilité malgré des déploiements respectivement en Estonie et Roumanie afin de sécuriser le flanc est. Pour cela, la coalition pourrait être le garant de cette force avec le soutien des pays membres qui contribuerait en partie à cette dimension. Malheureusement, les incertitudes politiques et le manque de volonté pour certains pays viennent freiner l’avancement de ce projet et remettre en cause les mesures prises par les alliés. Que doit faire l’Europe ? Les États-Unis sont encore aujourd’hui très importants dans la défense européenne et, si l’Europe souhaite être autonome, elle doit pouvoir être capable de se passer de leur allié nord-américain. Toutefois, cette perspective semble irréaliste au vu de l’implantation américaine majeure dans la défense européenne (renseignement, capacités, etc.). De ce fait, il serait plus pertinent de voir une forme de rééquilibrage. Une montée de l’Europe qui « prend son destin en main » pour diminuer la dépendance d’une présence américaine sans pour autant faire une croix dessus. Pour cela, l’Europe dans son ensemble doit développer sa force conventionnelle comme certains de ses membres le font déjà, à l’image de la Pologne ou plus récemment de l’Allemagne. Mais elle doit aussi faire preuve d’une meilleure cohésion et coordination afin de ne pas montrer de signe de confusion et de manque d’unité qui pourrait décrédibiliser le projet ou le faire paraître comme une coquille vide. Le doute réside aussi dans la volonté de ces pays de l’Ouest européen de vouloir réellement défendre les nations de l’Est sous ce nouveau parapluie nucléaire. Si demain la Russie attaquait un pays balte, que feraient la France et le Royaume-Uni ? Une riposte nucléaire ne serait évidemment pas envisageable à moins que l’attaque elle-même soit atomique, mais une riposte conventionnelle présenterait aussi des enjeux, d’où la nécessité de l’élaboration de cet aspect et de la mise en place d’une doctrine pertinente permettant une réponse graduelle et adéquate. Cependant, les capacités ne sont pas encore là pour le permettre. De plus, les plans de réarmement ne semblent être prévus que pour les années 2030 à 2035, soit une échéance beaucoup trop lointaine, alors que de nombreux acteurs européens prévoient plutôt une menace dès 2030 (on peut citer la France, le Royaume-Uni ou encore l’Allemagne ou plus généralement les pays européens ayant adhéré au programme Rearm Europe. L’Europe doit donc investir davantage et plus rapidement dans sa défense, avec des mesures plus immédiates, comme l’a démontré Emmanuel Macron, qui a revu les budgets français pour qu’ils atteignent 67 milliards d’ici 2027/2030 afin de rendre crédible ce projet. Ainsi, comment le nucléaire et le conventionnel agiraient suivant cette logique ? L’intégration d’armes nucléaires tactiques aux plans de guerres semblent être irréaliste pour les doctrines européennes (contrairement au modèle russe). De ce fait, le renforcement de la composante conventionnel vient consolider l’épaulement de l’arme nucléaire, mais aussi permettre une réponse graduée et crédible face à une attaque ennemie, permettant ainsi une meilleure flexibilité des forces européennes et transatlantiques. Toutefois, l’augmentation des dépenses conventionnelles n’est pas suffisante ; il est maintenant nécessaire de développer des modèles de dissuasion intégrant pleinement l’échelon conventionnel en parallèle de la dimension nucléaire. Cette dernière passe par une coordination complète entre Européens et, dans une autre mesure, avec les États-Unis et le Canada. Elle passe aussi par la révision des doctrines stratégiques existantes, dont la focalisation est encore trop concentrée sur la frappe nucléaire. Ainsi, le conventionnel doit devenir une forme véritable de dissuasion permettant un certain niveau de gradation dans la réponse. De cette façon, l’Europe pourra assurer sa propre sécurité. Cependant, les doutes électoraux qui planent sur certains pays d’Europe viennent porter une ombre conséquente sur ces plans. ## Dix ans plus tard : bilan de la stratégie du pivot (rééquilibrage) américain vers l’Asie – 1re partie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/dix-ans-plus-tard-bilan-de-la-strategie-du-pivot-reequilibrage-americain-vers-lasie-1re-partie/ Modified: 2021-04-22 > Panel 1 - Le pivot/rééquilibrage et les réponses des alliés de Washington : Rachel Esplin Odell (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft) The US pivot then and now, Jonathan Berkshire Miller (Japan Institute of International Affairs) An East Asian Perspective on the Pivot: Japan and Korea, Natalie Sambhi (Australian National University) Australia and ASEAN states’ response to the pivot, Cleo Paskal (Chatham House) Les perceptions européennes des changements stratégiques dans l’indo-pacifique, Commodore Angus Topshee, OMM, MSM, CD, Officier de guerre navale – Marine royale canadienne Panel 1 - Le pivot/rééquilibrage et les réponses des alliés de Washington Modératrice : Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s University) Panélistes : - Rachel Esplin Odell (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft) The US pivot then and now - Jonathan Berkshire Miller (Japan Institute of International Affairs) An East Asian Perspective on the Pivot: Japan and Korea - Natalie Sambhi (Australian National University) Australia and ASEAN states’ response to the pivot - Cleo Paskal (Chatham House) Les perceptions européennes des changements stratégiques dans l’indo-pacifique   Conférencier d’honneur : Commodore Angus Topshee, OMM, MSM, CD, Officier de guerre navale – Marine royale canadienne ## Dix ans plus tard : bilan de la stratégie du pivot (rééquilibrage) américain vers l’Asie – 2e partie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/dix-ans-plus-tard-bilan-de-la-strategie-du-pivot-reequilibrage-americain-vers-lasie-2e-partie/ Modified: 2021-04-22 > Panel 2 - Réactions des puissances rivales au rééquilibrage américain, Modérateur : Yann Breault (Collège militaire royal de St-Jean), Panélistes : Bonnie S. Glaser (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC) Le positionnement de la Chine face au rééquilibrage américain, Zachary Paikin (Global Policy Institute, London) La réponse de la Russie à l’initiative américaine, Pierre Pahlavi (Collège des forces canadiennes) Les conséquences du pivot pour la politique étrangère iranienne et l’équilibre des puissances au Moyen-Orient Panel 2 - Réactions des puissances rivales au rééquilibrage américain Modérateur : Yann Breault (Collège militaire royal de St-Jean) Panélistes : - Bonnie S. Glaser (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC) Le positionnement de la Chine face au rééquilibrage américain - Zachary Paikin (Global Policy Institute, London) La réponse de la Russie à l’initiative américaine - Pierre Pahlavi (Collège des forces canadiennes) Les conséquences du pivot pour la politique étrangère iranienne et l’équilibre des puissances au Moyen-Orient ## Donald Trump et la désintégration de l’Occident URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/donald-trump-et-la-desintegration-de-loccident/ Modified: 2024-04-05 À bien des égards, le rassemblement d’une heure vingt de Donald Trump qui s’est tenu à Conway, en Caroline du Sud, le 10 février 2024, ressemblait à ses évènements précédents. Trump a débuté en félicitant les dignitaires républicains locaux présents dans l’assistance. Il a ensuite saisi l’occasion de réciter son poème préféré, « Le Serpent », sa parabole « signature » qui porte son habituel message anti-immigration. Ensuite, le rassemblement s’est conclu par son habituel monologue de vingt minutes, qu’il a attentivement lu sur le prompteur, avec une musique dramatique en toile de fond, alors qu’il s’efforçait de renouveler sa promesse de « rendre sa grandeur à l’Amérique ». Toutefois, à l’instar de ses rassemblements précédents, une partie importante de son discours n’était pas scriptée, Trump improvisant et faisant des digressions sur ses « plus grands succès » y compris ses « histoires de Monsieur », mettant en scène des individus qui s’adressent à lui avec déférence en l’appelant « Monsieur ». Mais cette fois-ci, son improvisation a donné à l’une de ses « histoires de Monsieur » une tournure inattendue. Après quarante minutes, Trump a commencé à raconter l’une des anecdotes qu’il répète le plus souvent : comment il a persuadé un dirigeant européen – qui, comme toujours, le traitait avec déférence en l’appelant « Monsieur » – d’accroître ses dépenses en matière de défense en le mettant en garde contre le fait que les États-Unis ne défendraient pas son pays en cas d’attaque de la part de la Fédération de Russie. L’un des présidents d’un grand pays s’est levé et a dit : « Eh bien, Monsieur , si nous ne payons pas et que nous sommes attaqués par la Russie, allez-vous nous protéger ? » J’ai répondu : « Vous n’avez pas payé ? Votre compte est à découvert ? » Il a dit : « Oui. Imaginons que ça arrive ». Non, je ne vous protégerai pas. En fait, je les encouragerai à faire tout ce qu’ils veulent. Vous devez payer, vous devez payer vos factures. Effectivement, certaines traductions des médias, telles que celles du Parisien, du Monde et du Devoir, n’ont pas véritablement capté la menace sous-jacente dans le langage familier employé par Trump : « In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. » Comme on pouvait s’y attendre, la foule « Make America Great Again » (MAGA) a applaudi bruyamment, comme elle le fait systématiquement lorsque Trump critique l’OTAN. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## Donner un sens au statut de membre associé : l’adhésion du Canada à l’EDIP URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/donner-un-sens-au-statut-de-membre-associe-ladhesion-du-canada-a-ledip/ Modified: 2026-10-22 Ce passage est un extrait d’une analyse publiée par Justin Massie  dans Le Rubicon.  Dans son discours sur l’état de l’Union le 16 septembre 2026, la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, a proposé d’ouvrir la voie à ce que le Canada devienne le premier « membre associé » de l’Union européenne. Que devrait contenir le volet défense de l’accord de Montréal ? Mon argument est simple : le statut de membre associé n’aura de sens que s’il donne au Canada accès aux instruments qui structurent désormais la défense européenne, au premier chef le Programme européen pour l’industrie de la défense (EDIP) et ses projets d’intérêt commun. Sans cet accès, le Canada restera un client des industries européennes et un partenaire de circonstance. Avec lui, il peut devenir un coproducteur des capacités que l’Europe finance pour la prochaine décennie, en contrepartie de ce qu’il apporte déjà comme producteur de sécurité. Le statut de membre associé devrait aussi préciser l’association du Canada aux autres volets de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune, des missions et opérations aux projets de la Coopération structurée permanente (CSP), dont il ne rejoint pour l’instant que celui sur la mobilité militaire. Cette analyse se concentre toutefois sur le volet industriel, parce que c’est là où les règles européennes sont les plus contraignantes pour un pays tiers et que le calendrier est le plus pressant. Pour lire la suite, rendez-vous sur Le Rubicon ## Du sanctuaire à la confrontation : l’Arctique au cœur des tensions géopolitiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/du-sanctuaire-a-la-confrontation-larctique-au-coeur-des-tensions-geopolitiques/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Introduction Longtemps perçu comme un espace de coopération mondiale en matière protection de l’environnement et de développement durable, l’Arctique dont le territoire couvre plus de 16,5 millions de kilomètres carrés, est aujourd’hui devenu le nouveau point de friction entre grandes puissances. Un intérêt qui s’explique par le fait que la région du Grand Nord regorge de ressources naturelles telles que du pétrole, du gaz naturel liquéfié ou encore des terres rares nécessaires au développement de matériaux électroniques. L'esprit de coopération qui caractérisait autrefois la période post-guerre froide semble désormais laisser sa place à une logique de rivalité, portée notamment par les ambitions croissantes de la Russie et des États-Unis dans la région. Au-delà du simple fait de convoiter les ressources naturelles emprisonnées sous les glaces, cette rivalité traduit une forme de compétition stratégique entre les États-Unis, la Russie et la Chine, afin d’affirmer leur capacité opérationnelle sur le cercle polaire. Ces pays perçoivent désormais la région arctique comme un espace à la fois stratégique et économique incontournable pour l'avenir, un intérêt qui s'explique principalement par deux facteurs : d’une part, la fonte des glaces qui permet l’accès à d'importantes ressources naturelles jusqu'alors inaccessibles, et d’autre part, l’ouverture progressive des routes maritimes du Grand Nord qui offre de nouvelles perspectives commerciales à l'échelle mondiale.  Ce territoire longtemps resté en marge des rivalités géopolitiques entre les grandes puissances, est aujourd’hui au cœur de tensions mondiales susceptibles de faire basculer le monde vers une logique de nouvelle guerre froide. À cela s’ajoutent les relations au sein du Conseil de l’Arctique, déjà fragilisées par des enjeux économiques et territoriaux, qui semblent désormais basculer vers une phase de rupture profonde et ce depuis l'invasion russe en Ukraine. Une dégradation des relations qui a considérablement détérioré les liens entre les États arctiques et la Russie, que ces derniers accusent d'avoir violé le droit international. La montée des tensions dans le Grand Nord entraine des changements considérables pour les pays arctiques, les obligeant à renforcer leurs positions en matière de défense de façon à répondre aux attitudes belliqueuses des certains pays. De plus, l’expansion militaire et économique mise en place par Vladimir Poutine depuis son arrivée au pouvoir en 2000 semble désormais lui conférer un avantage stratégique considérable. Une situation délicate qui place les pays de l’Arctique tels que le Canada ou le Danemark, dans une position de faiblesse, d’autant que les États-Unis autrefois alliés incontestés de ces pays, semblent désormais privilégier une logique expansionniste, allant jusqu'à revendiquer ouvertement leur volonté d’annexer des territoires alliés, comme en témoignent les récentes déclarations de Donald Trump au sujet du  Groenland. C’est dans ce contexte que cette analyse vise à démontrer l’impact des politiques américaines et russes sur les pays arctiques, et plus particulièrement sur le Canada. L’accentuation des tensions géopolitiques dans la région ajoutée à l’attitude belliqueuse de certaines grandes puissances, pousse les pays arctiques dans leurs retranchements, laissant paraître une forme de vulnérabilité inédite. Ces derniers se voient contraints de repenser leurs défenses collectives et leurs partenariats avec leurs alliés afin d’assurer la pérennité de leurs intérêts dans la région. L’avance opérationnelle : Une stratégie gagnante pour la Russie de Vladimir Poutine Depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir au début des années 2000 de Vladimir Poutine, la quête de la domination en Arctique par Moscou s’est considérablement intensifiée. Si l’ambition économique et militaire de la Russie pour la région semblait difficile à concrétiser à l’époque, elle apparaît désormais comme un choix stratégique déterminant pour l’avenir, offrant à la Russie une avance considérable sur les autres pays arctiques. À tel point que le pays dispose aujourd’hui de nombreuses capacités militaires telles que des bases navales abritant les sous-marins lanceurs d’engins, des installations militaires permanentes ou encore des missiles balistiques longue portée capables de frapper les États-Unis. À cela s’ajoute le fait que les brise-glaces russes sont également considérés comme les navires les plus efficaces pour assurer la traversée en toute sécurité des navires de commerce qui empruntent les routes maritimes de l’Arctique. Un arsenal de guerre constitué au fil des années, qui pourrait avoir un impact majeur sur la géopolitique mondiale, rendant le Canada et les États-Unis vulnérables à des tirs de missiles ou à des incursions militaires russes sur leurs territoires arctiques. L’accélération du réchauffement climatique entraîne également une intensification des passages de navires commerciaux dans la région, ce qui pourrait offrir à Moscou une part significative du marché de fret mondial. L’utilisation des voies navigables telles que le passage du Nord-Est pourrait permettre de gagner une à deux semaines dans le transport de marchandises entre l’Asie et l’Europe. Ce gain de temps représenterait un avantage économique majeur pour les armateurs, d’autant que le canal de Panama ou le canal de Suez, considérés comme les plus importants en matière de transport maritime, semblent aujourd’hui enclins à un ralentissement des passages du fait de la situation géopolitique dans ces régions. Cette opportunité permettrait à la Russie de renforcer son influence commerciale et stratégique dans le Grand Nord. Au-delà des routes maritimes, l’Arctique est considéré comme un immense réservoir de ressources naturelles dans lequel on trouve notamment des terres rares, du pétrole et divers minerais stratégiques. L’accès à ces ressources naturelles représente un enjeu stratégique important pour des pays tels que les États-Unis ou la Russie, qui souhaitent renforcer leur influence dans la région du Grand Nord de façon à assurer leurs présence sur les marchés mondiaux. C’est d’ailleurs dans cette optique de développement stratégique que la Russie s’appuie depuis plusieurs années sur les environs de la ville de Mourmansk, qui constitue un point névralgique du commerce maritime, mais également de la stratégie militaire russe dans la région. La ville possède l’un des rares ports en eau profonde du cercle polaire, permettant aux navires marchands de charger et de décharger du fret durant toute l’année. On y trouve également les brise-glaces nucléaires de classe «Arktika», fleuron de la flotte arctique russe. Moscou mise en effet sur leur présence dans la région afin d’assurer la continuité du commerce maritime et sur l’exportation des ressources afin de compenser les effets des sanctions économiques imposées par l’Europe à la suite de l’invasion de l’Ukraine en 2022. Le pays cherche également à développer ses accords commerciaux avec l’Asie de façon à atténuer l’impact des sanctions sur son économie. On retrouve également dans la région arctique russe de nombreuses installations stratégiques pour l’économie du pays telles que la plateforme Yamal LNG considérée comme l’une des installations les plus importantes en matière d’extraction de gaz naturel liquéfié en Arctique et l’un des piliers de l’économie énergétique russe. En partie financée par le groupe français TotalEnergies, cette installation était autrefois fortement orientée vers le marché européen, puisqu’environ 49% de la production de gaz naturel liquéfié russe était destinée à l’Europe. Cependant, les sanctions économiques imposées par l’Union Européennes ainsi que le retrait de partenaires tels dont TotalEnergie, ont contraint la Russie à revoir sa stratégie d’exportation afin d’assurer la pérennité de son économie. On observe ainsi une véritable course à la domination du territoire polaire, notamment illustrée par les initiatives du Canada et des États-Unis visant à étendre leurs plateaux continentaux de façon à élargir leur zone économique exclusive de plus d’un million de kilomètres carrés. Cette démarche vise également à protéger les ressources enfouies dans les fonds marins, tout en s’appropriant une partie supplémentaire du territoire arctique. Du dialogue à la confrontation : l’Arctique, la naissance d’une guerre froide L’exploitation du territoire arctique par les grandes puissances était autrefois considérée comme une utopie, compte tenu des conditions climatiques qui empêchaient le développement des activités d’extraction et de transport. Cependant, le réchauffement climatique et la fonte des glaces ont entraîné un changement majeur dans la capacité des pays à développer leurs activités dans la région. De plus, l’augmentation des périodes de transit pour les navires marchands empruntant les passages du Nord-Ouest et du Nord-Est pousse désormais des États tels que la Chine, la Russie ou les États-Unis à revoir et à intensifier leurs stratégies d’expansion dans la zone. L’Arctique semble désormais être au cœur de tensions géopolitiques entre alliés et rivaux, un paradoxe difficilement imaginable il y a encore quelques années et pourtant le constat en est accablant. Les États-Unis, alliés de longue date du Canada et des pays arctiques, cherchent désormais à s’approprier une partie de ce territoire afin d’asseoir leur hégémonie dans la région. Cette posture de la part du 47ème président des États-Unis n’est pas restée sans réponse de la part de ses alliés, notamment des membres de l’OTAN, qui voient les revendications du président américain au sujet du Groenland, comme une forme de fragilisation à peine dissimulée des relations entre les membres de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord. La volonté des États-Unis d’acheter le Groenland remonte en réalité au XIXème siècle, époque à laquelle il était déjà question d’acquérir le territoire pour ses ressources naturelles et son emplacement géographique. Une ambition expansionniste relancée par Donald Trump qui en janvier dernier a affiché sa volonté d’annexer le territoire pour la richesse de ses ressources naturelles et cela malgré une forte opposition de l’opinion publique américaine. Cet attrait pour les ressources rares de la région est également partagé par les deux rivaux des États-Unis, qui voient le Grand Nord comme la future zone d’influence des marchés mondiaux. Le président américain justifie sa position par l’importance géographique du Groenland pour la défense du territoire américain, invoquant le fait que la Russie place ses missiles balistiques à portée de tir des États-Unis et que l’acquisition de l’île permettrait aux Américains de constituer un corridor de sécurité afin d’assurer la protection de la population. La Chine, quant à elle, est moins présente sur le plan militaire dans la région, car ses intérêts s’orientent surtout vers la recherche scientifique, la cartographie des fonds marins et l’investissement dans des projets étrangers situés en Arctique. Cependant, le gouvernement chinois évoque régulièrement sa volonté de développer une route de la soie polaire qui permettrait de relier l’Asie à l’Europe en passant par les routes maritimes du Grand Nord. Pour ce faire, la Chine a besoin de partenaires puissants dans la région. Elle s’est d’ailleurs rapprochée de la Russie afin de développer le commerce maritime et l’exportation du gaz naturel liquéfié vers l’Asie. Un partenariat d’intérêt, tenant compte du fait que la Russie dispose d’une supériorité stratégique et surtout de brise-glaces nucléaires capables de se frayer un chemin à travers d’épaisses couches de glace. Face à tout cela, on retrouve les autres pays de l’Arctique, tels que le Canada, la Finlande, la Norvège, la Suède, le Danemark ou encore l’Islande, qui cherchent à protéger leurs territoires ainsi que leurs intérêts dans la région. L’idée d’un soutien mutuel des pays de l’Arctique semble aujourd’hui prioritaire face à l’attitude expansionniste de certains dirigeants. L’OTAN a d’ailleurs réagi aux annonces américaines concernant le Groenland, déclarant que l’organisation s’opposerait à toute action militaire de la part des États-Unis. Une prise de position qui pourrait avoir de lourdes répercussions sur les relations entre les pays membres de l’organisation surtout dans une époque de fortes tensions. Une situation géopolitique qui n'est pas sans risques, au vu de l’attitude des États-Unis depuis le début de l’année. On peut notamment évoquer l’opération militaire en janvier dernier et les nombreuses prises de position agressives sur la scène internationale de la part du président. Les actions de celui-ci témoignent d'une certaine rupture dans ses obligations vis-à-vis de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies et du respect du droit international, laissant planer un doute quant à la possibilité qu'il ordonne une action militaire contre le Groenland. De plus, de nombreux pays se sont offusqués de son attitude envers le Danemark, pays allié, lui reprochant de ne pas respecter le principe de souveraineté des États établi par le droit international. Les pays arctiques telles que le Groenland et le Danemark n’ont pas tardé à réagir. Ils ont d’ailleurs été les premiers à répondre aux ambitions du président américain, affirmant leur volonté de défendre leur territoire et rappelant que le Groenland demeure un territoire de l'OTAN. D'autres alliés ont également répondu aux prises de positions américaines, indiquant leur mise à disposition afin de soutenir le pays que ce soit sur le plan militaire ou diplomatique, tout en renforçant leur présence dans la région circumpolaire. Certains États sont même allés jusqu'à ouvrir des consulats sur le territoire de façon à marquer leur soutien et leur engagement envers la sécurité de l’île. Le Canada, par exemple, a inauguré un consulat à Nuuk dans une mise en scène symbolique, affichant clairement la volonté d'Ottawa de renforcer la protection de l'Arctique et de se tenir au côté de ses alliés. Un geste d'autant plus significatif que l'île entretient des liens historiques avec le pays et que les ambitions expansionnistes de Donald Trump pourraient également menacer les territoires arctiques canadiens. La France ainsi que plusieurs autres membres de l'Union européenne ont également pris position en faveur du Groenland en déployant des moyens militaires dans la région et en participant à l'opération « Arctic Endurance ». Une mission multinationale lancée par l’OTAN qui vise à démontrer la capacité de l’organisation ainsi que des pays concernés à défendre leurs intérêts dans la région, tout en garantissant la sécurité des territoires arctiques et en exerçant une forme de dissuasion face aux pressions de la Russie et des États-Unis dans la région. Au-delà des tensions géopolitiques propres à la région arctique, c'est l'ensemble de l'architecture internationale qui pourrait être affectée par une rupture dans les relations entre les pays alliés de l’OTAN. D’autant que le président Donald Trump semble prêt à remettre en question ses engagements envers les organisations internationales et ses partenaires européens afin de parvenir à ses fins. Une perspective qui paraît absurde au regard du rôle fondamental que jouent ces institutions dans la stabilité mondiale, mais qui apparaît de plus en plus dans l’actualité, laissant planer un climat d’insécurité qui pourrait conduire à de fortes tensions diplomatiques à travers le monde. Conclusion La situation de l'Arctique est relativement préoccupante. De nombreux articles sur le sujet évoquent le fait que la région pourrait être au cœur d'un futur conflit entre grandes puissances et qu'il y règne un climat de tension comparable à celui de la guerre froide. Les pays arctiques apparaissent moins enclins à se défendre seuls face aux ambitions expansionnistes des États-Unis ou de la Russie. Pour répondre à ces démonstrations de force et à l'intensification des tensions dans la région, les nations arctiques telles que le Groenland, le Canada, le Danemark, la Suède ou encore la Norvège doivent coordonner leurs opérations militaires afin de renforcer leur position sur la scène internationale, tout en démontrant leur capacité à défendre leurs intérêts dans la région. Ils doivent également se rapprocher de l'OTAN afin d’assurer la sécurité de la région et étendre la présence des forces militaires dans les eaux internationales et nationales de façon à répondre aux injonctions américaines à l’égard du Groenland. Le Canada quant à lui, doit particulièrement chercher à consolider ses partenariats avec les pays arctiques dans le but de se protéger contre les ambitions expansionnistes des grandes puissances. Ottawa doit également promouvoir une coopération commerciale structurée afin de répondre à la hausse des flux commerciaux dans le Grand Nord. Cependant, il ne faut pas oublier que le Canada entretient des liens étroits avec les États-Unis en matière de défense de son espace aérien.  Ottawa doit donc jouer sur un double tableau : d’un côté celui de maintenir le partenariat avec les États-Unis de façon à assurer la protection de son territoire national grâce aux moyens de défense tels que le NORAD ou les patrouilles maritimes et aériennes déjà fortement renforcées dans la région, et de l’autre, celui de se rapprocher des pays de la région afin de se protéger de son allié qui semble désormais convoiter son territoire. Il serait également intéressant pour le Canada ainsi que pour le Danemark d’approfondir leurs échanges en matière de protection de leurs territoires de façon à s’assurer une aide mutuelle en cas de violation de leur souveraineté territoriale. À cela s’ajoute le fait que les deux partenaires devraient renforcer les accords en matière de défense nationale avec la France qui semble vouloir orienter sa politique arctique vers une logique de cohésion en matière de défense des territoires du cercle polaire. Crédit image: “Sea Ice” par Johannes Zielcke, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. ## Élection américaine du 3 novembre 2020 : une période d’incertitude inattendue ? Une élection en déroute URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/election-americaine-du-3-novembre-2020-une-periode-dincertitude-inattendue-une-election-en-deroute/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Anessa Kimball revient dans ce point chaud sur les différents scénarios possibles pour l'élection présidentielle du 3 novembre prochain. De nouveaux vecteurs d’incertitude Avec au moins une demi-douzaine d'États pivots et des changements au statu quo du vote par une plus grande utilisation des bulletins de vote par correspondance, la réduction des machines de tri du courrier et les changements de lieux de vote, les chances que le résultat confirmé de l’élection présidentielle américaine de 2020 reste dans la balance de l'inconnu pendant plusieurs jours, peut-être plus, sont grandes. De multiples facteurs affectent les retards dans les procédures de dépouillement, notamment le nombre réduit de machines de tri du courrier plus importantes que les réductions normales des machines de tri du service postal et du courrier en août 2020, combiné à une augmentation substantielle du nombre de bulletins de vote par correspondance demandés pour cette élection. À titre de comparaison, près de 93 millions de bulletins de vote par correspondance ont été demandés pour l'élection de 2020, alors qu’en 2016, environ 50 millions avaient été enregistrés et 15 États avaient battu le record de demandes de vote par correspondance, parmi lesquels la Pennsylvanie et l’Ohio. Les bulletins de vote par correspondance sont demandés par les personnes vivant dans leur circonscription électorale et avant la pandémie, seulement environ 1 électeur sur 3 ne se présentait pas aux urnes. Avec 93 millions de demandes de vote par correspondance et une population électorale actuelle d'environ 200 millions, environ 47% des Américains voteront en dehors des urnes[1]. Il s’agit d’une augmentation substantielle par rapport à 2016 et cela nécessite une augmentation significative de la main-d'œuvre et de la coordination à gérer de manière logistique en une courte période de plusieurs semaines. Pour rappel, les bulletins de vote par la poste peuvent arriver dans les jours suivant l'élection, mais doivent être oblitérés au plus tard le jour de l'élection. Les démocrates semblent demander des bulletins de vote par correspondance, par exemple en Pennsylvanie et en Floride, mais, encore une fois, seront-ils retournés par la poste ? Demander et envoyer un bulletin de vote ajoute effectivement une étape par rapport au vote en personne. Selon les simulations développées à partir de l’agrégation de divers sondages, il y a plus de chemins vers une victoire démocrate qu'une victoire républicaine basé (voir les travaux de Nate Silver et de ses collègues). Les candidats présidentiels concourent pour obtenir les 270 votes du collège électoral requis pour remporter le collège et être par la suite nommé président. Vingt-deux scénarios différents sont à l'étude, dont 19 voies vers une présidence démocrate. Un mandat républicain renouvelé nécessiterait la Floride, l’Ohio, la Géorgie, la Caroline du Nord[2], ainsi que le Texas et l’Alaska, tous deux favorisés pour aller républicain. En particulier, les États pivots convoités de l'Ohio et de la Floride sont nécessaires pour une victoire de Trump[3]. Pourtant, la dynamique interne de chaque État complique la modélisation prédictive, combinée à des préoccupations au niveau systémique dues à des facteurs à la fois naturels et exogènes exerçant des forces compensatoires. Plusieurs facteurs systémiques sont examinés : l’évolution de la démographie des électeurs, le taux de participation des jeunes adultes aux dernières élections présidentielles et les effets directs de la COVID-19 sur la base électorale de chaque parti. Ensuite, cette analyse examine les particularités de la Floride et de l'Ohio en mettant l'accent sur les facteurs transversaux contribuant à l'incertitude. La Floride et l'Ohio sont dirigés par des gouverneurs républicains confrontés à des plaintes concernant la pandémie. L'Ohio a également connu une forte augmentation du chômage de 6% à 16% et n’a diminué qu'à 12%. L’industrie touristique de la Floride a également subi des pertes économiques importantes (jusqu’à 35%) depuis la pandémie. De plus, la Floride se classe cinquième au niveau national pour l'inégalité des revenus. Les deux États servent de test décisif pour les possibilités et les problèmes auxquels les candidats sont confrontés pour remporter les élections de 2020 sans contestation minimale. Enfin, Trump ne peut pas gagner sans que les deux États indiquent leur centralité pour un second mandat. Ce commentaire se poursuit par un examen des incertitudes politiques et des régularités bilatérales pendant une période probable de fragilité, suivi de derniers points de réflexion. Sources d’incertitude systémiques Le taux de participation de différentes catégories de groupes démographiques, entrecoupées de multiples clivages sociaux, complique les prévisions à une échelle agrégée. Trois facteurs distincts méritent d'être considérés comme facteurs de confusion : comment l'évolution de la démographie électorale est façonnée par la race aux États-Unis, certains défis liés à la prédiction du taux de participation des moins de 30 ans, et l'effet mitigé de la COVID-19 sur les bases électorales de chaque parti. Les dernières élections de 2018 ont indiqué un changement dans les schémas de participation transcendant les lignes raciales. « Turnout typically falls for all voter groups in midterm elections compared with the previous presidential race, but that falloff was much smaller than usual last year. Moreover, while turnout surged across virtually all groups, it increased most sharply among the voters who historically have participated at the lowest levels. For instance, the Census Bureau reported that turnout among voters under 30 last year jumped to about 36 percent of eligible voters, compared with just 20 percent in 2014. That still left young people far behind the turnout rate among seniors, about two-thirds of whom voted, but their rate of increase from the previous election was much greater. Similarly, the Census Bureau found that the turnout rate in 2018 increased more for Latinos and Asian Americans than it did for white people » (Brownstein 2019). Le taux de participation croissant parmi les jeunes (moins de 30 ans), non caucasiens, favorise le parti démocrate, mais les ainés restent un bloc constamment stable qui vote pour les conservateurs plus que pour les libéraux. En outre, il y a la préoccupation constante concernant la participation des jeunes le jour des élections, les jeunes ayant agi en 2016 comme lors des deux élections précédentes. Pourtant, les démocrates ont perdu le soutien de la jeunesse afro-américaine et latino-américaine. Rappelant que « l’électorat des jeunes » est plus diversifié sur le plan racial que la « portion des plus de 30 ans de l’électorat » à 61% contre 73% de Blancs. En effet, ne pas conserver le soutien constant des jeunes électeurs diversifiés est problématique en tant que stratégie à long terme pour les démocrates. Et les libéraux font face à des défis pour engager ces hommes étant donné le bilan de Harris en tant que procureur appliquant des politiques biaisées contre les minorités. Les déplacements de population vers le Texas par les minorités après l'ouragan Katrina ont contribué à rapprocher l'État du violet et le Texas et la Floride sont parmi les 8 premiers États en croissance démographique depuis 2000. En outre, il convient de noter que les femmes blanches formées à l'université ont augmenté en tant que proportion de l'électorat votant en faveur des candidats démocratiques. Si les jeunes Américains participent aux élections de 2020, cela devrait augmenter les chances d'une victoire démocrate. La démographie de la population a changé en raison de la pandémie de la COVID-19. Avec des centaines de milliers de morts, Mayer & Schintler ont fait valoir en août 2020, « overall, the death effect seems to give a modest boost to Republican chances. This is because Black and Hispanic voters favor Democrats at much higher rates than the white elderly favor Republicans. So, for every 10 deaths among African American voters, the Democrats lose eight or nine votes, while the Republicans lose only one or two. Among the white elderly, when 10 die, the Republicans lose six votes, and the Democrats lose four. Even though the white elderly are much more reliable voters, the turnout differential doesn’t come close to the gap in partisanship. Consequently, nationwide, we predict a roughly 22,000-vote a Trump vote. » La pandémie a été comparativement plus mortelle pour les minorités que pour les Blancs; par exemple, 1 Américain noir sur 920 est mort contre 1 Américain blanc sur 1 840. Plus succinctement, le taux de mortalité des Hispaniques et des Afro-Américains ajustés en fonction de l'âge est 3,2 fois plus élevé que pour les Blancs américains et « à l'échelle nationale, les Afro-Américains ont connu 20,8% de tous les décès de race connue, mais représentent 12,4% de la population ». Les sources d'incertitude au niveau national auront des effets mitigés sur la participation partisane. Les libéraux doivent mobiliser un vote solide de la part de leurs plus jeunes partisans et de ceux qui représentent la diversité du parti en les engageant suffisamment dans les questions de campagne préoccupantes telles que l'éducation, le logement et les soins de santé, et ce, sans provoquer un clivage entre l'enseignement supérieur et l'enseignement public, ou encore entre les besoins ruraux et urbains. Les conservateurs sont en position de bénéficier d'une forte participation constante chez les ainés et, ironiquement, des externalités positives des décès de la COVID-19 sont attendues et devraient augmenter le soutien. Les femmes célibataires diplômées de l'université ne sont pas le bastion des conservateurs, mais les femmes mariées (blanches) et celles qui n'ont pas fait d'études universitaires restent des bassins de soutien distincts. Par exemple, les femmes représentent désormais 50,2% de la population active ayant fait des études collégiales, contre 45,1% en 2000. Cependant, avec un plus grand nombre de femmes de toutes races qui font des études universitaires et décident de ne pas se marier, ces groupes démographiques souffrent de la désertification. Tableau 1: Facteurs électoraux confondants et parti politique favorisé Changement dans la diversité raciale de l’électorat                                         Démocrate Hausse du taux de participation électorale des jeunes                                    Démocrate Effets (prédits) de la mortalité de la COVID-19                                                Républicain Floride- libéralisation du suffrage (ex-criminels)                                             Démocrate Floride- hausse des inscriptions et du taux de participation latino              Démocrate Floride- changement d'inscription des électeurs (intra États-Unis)             Républicain Ohio- baisse d’inscriptions des jeunes électeurs                                               Républicain Ohio- Soins de santé et prise en charge de la COVID-19                                 Serré Sources d'incertitude au niveau des États Bien qu'il y ait des tendances nationales en mouvement, les États pivots fournissent des environnements dynamiques pour comprendre les effets composés des sources d'incertitude à différents niveaux de hiérarchie. Le suffrage universel indirect lors des élections présidentielles américaines contraint les votes au niveau des États à être filtrés par le collège électoral, où la sélection finale est effectuée. La dynamique au niveau de l'État peut à la fois faciliter ou compliquer la participation et l'éligibilité des électeurs. La dynamique au niveau infra fédéral peut jouer un rôle d'atténuation, de concurrence ou de renforcement par rapport à la dynamique nationale conditionnée par la législation au niveau de l'État. Les deux États examinés dans cette section ne sont pas seulement des États pivots, mais aussi actuellement dirigés par des gouverneurs républicains. En particulier, ils servent de tests pour la façon dont l’administration actuelle a géré la pandémie et la reprise économique potentielle. La Floride a subi de profondes pertes économiques et démographiques dues à la pandémie, mais sa diversité démographique est répartie dans tout l'État, tandis que l'Ohio offre un niveau modéré de diversité, centré dans la partie nord de l'État[4]. En tant que destination touristique mondiale, la Floride a de bonnes chances de se remettre économiquement en quelques années de cette crise pandémique, mais la vitalité économique future n'est pas si claire pour l'Ohio. L'Ohio offre un état profondément affecté par la pandémie avec des pertes d'emplois et des difficultés à se remettre. Essentiellement, l'Ohio représente les clivages passés et la Floride représente les futurs clivages possibles. Les deux représentent des retournements difficiles du point de vue partisan, ce qui suggère à nouveau la nécessité d’y porter attention. Les clivages sur les questions de race et de partisanerie sont importants dans l'Ohio, ce qui représente à la fois un clivage rural-urbain et, à l'exception de Cincinnati, un clivage nord-sud puisque la frontière sud de l'Ohio se trouve sur la ligne élargie Mason-Dixon. Le Kentucky bordant le sud de l'Ohio est un territoire solidement conservateur et Mitch McConnell, élu pour la première fois en 1984, est le sénateur le plus ancien de l'histoire du Kentucky et son élection pour son 7e mandat le fera entrer dans les 25 sénateurs les plus anciens de l'histoire des États-Unis. Le placement géographique distinct de l’Ohio permet une vue unique contrastant les deux clivages en raison de la jonction de la plupart des individus racialisés situés dans la partie nord de l’État. Seuls 25% de ses districts du Congrès sont détenus par des démocrates, détenant les zones urbaines, et, notamment, ces quatre élus comprennent les seuls non-hommes et non-blancs parmi toute la délégation. L'Ohio a connu des pertes d'emplois élevées à cause de l'ALÉNA, créant un terrain fertile pour les discours protectionnistes et populistes en faveur de la base conservatrice. En raison de la complexité du terrain démographique de l'Ohio, il faut analyser les problèmes en fonction des positions des partis dans le contexte local pour comprendre les tendances centrales. Ensuite, la participation des jeunes de l'Ohio est une préoccupation basée sur des recherches publiées; le non-enregistrement des jeunes est un signal critique de l'échec présumé de la participation de votants (démocrates) aux élections de 2020. Enfin, parmi les États interrogés en septembre 2020, l’Ohio faisait partie de ceux qui critiquaient le plus le soutien en matière de santé reçu pour la COVID-19, mais qui soutenait le plus Trump parmi tous les États de l'enquête. L'Ohio représente un territoire à perdre pour les républicains, c'est-à-dire que le parti devrait être en mesure de le conserver, tandis que la Floride offre à l'inverse la possibilité de revendiquer le parti démocrate, car il est parmi les plus proches du bord du bleu. Un sondage réalisé par Your Voice Ohio/Bliss Institute a demandé aux habitants de l'Ohio de classer 16 questions par ordre d'importance. Les différences selon le sexe et les clivages raciaux démontrent l'importance de l'analyse des problèmes par rapport à la démographie. Les personnes âgées (blanches et non blanches) ont convergé en nommant la COVID-19 comme priorité absolue, suivi de l'économie et des soins de santé. Les électeurs blancs plus instruits ont mis l'accent sur l'économie et les soins de santé. L'inégalité des revenus, le racisme et l'éducation sont au premier rang des femmes. Les électeurs non blancs ont classé le racisme, la justice pénale et la toxicomanie comme les plus importants. Enfin, les jeunes sont hétérogènes en ce qui concerne leur classement des enjeux, regroupant le racisme, l'éducation, la justice pénale, la santé mentale, l'environnement, les services sociaux et la toxicomanie. Les données d'enquête de l'Ohio confirment que les personnes âgées et les jeunes n'ont pas de priorités communes, mais les jeunes, les non-blancs et les femmes se croisent sur de multiples questions. L'immigration occupe le dernier rang en tant que question d'importance dans cet échantillon de 1037 électeurs inscrits de l'Ohio, mais les électeurs mariés de sexe masculin à revenu élevé la considèrent comme importante. La saillance des clivages transversaux nécessite la participation électorale des jeunes électeurs non blancs pour produire une victoire démocrate. Une étude d'août a confirmé que l'inscription des jeunes sur les listes électorales était en baisse de 40% en Ohio par rapport à 2016, ce qui favorise une victoire républicaine. Néanmoins, un enjeu clé pourrait exercer une pression compensatoire critique, à savoir les soins de santé. Les électeurs de l'Ohio sont presque parfaitement divisés sur la question de savoir si c’est Trump ou Biden qui est le plus susceptible de répondre à la fois aux besoins de santé publique et aux coûts économiques de la COVID-19. Pour ces raisons, en l'absence d'une participation importante des jeunes et de la diversité, l'Ohio devrait rester sous contrôle républicain. En fait, l'Ohio est le seul des 10 États pivots où les candidats sont déterminés comme également compétents pour gérer la crise pandémique, Trump ayant un léger avantage, dans la marge d'erreur (48% contre 45%). La question des candidats et de la COVID-19 divise plus fortement les électeurs de Floride (59% vs 35%). Les démocrates sont favorisés. En ce qui concerne la diversité de la représentation de la Floride, le parti démocrate propose à nouveau 11 candidats sur 13 issus de groupes sous-représentés parmi 27 représentants. La diversité de la Floride comprend plus d’Américains hispaniques par rapport à l’Ohio et ce groupe a augmenté de 9% au cours de la dernière décennie. Pew Research note qu'ils représentent 17% de tous les électeurs inscrits et, de manière critique, les Latinos s'inscrivent comme démocrates ou indépendants à un taux de près de 3 pour 1 par rapport à l'enregistrement en tant que républicain. Pourtant, « la tendance récente pour l'enregistrement des partis parmi les Floridiens hispaniques contraste avec la tendance observée chez tous les Floridiens. Plus de résidents de Floride se sont inscrits pour voter en tant que républicains que démocrates depuis 2016 » (Bustamante 2020). Malgré cela, il existe un facteur important au niveau de l'État qui reste propre à la Floride, c’est-à-dire des changements dans les droits de suffrage des ex-criminels. L'amendement 4 a été adopté en 2018 et a été mis en œuvre, exigeant que les anciens criminels remplissent toutes les conditions de détermination de la peine (c'est-à-dire la durée d'incarcération et la preuve du paiement des frais ou des jugements financiers requis dans leur cas). Il est difficile d'estimer le nombre de personnes qui participeront en 2020, mais les données indiquent que jusqu'à 1,5 million de Floridiens, la plupart non blancs, ont désormais un chemin plus « clair » pour voter. Ces personnes sont des électeurs démocrates anticipés. Enfin, il faut noter que la dernière élection à l'échelle de l'État a abouti à la défaite compétitive démocrate d'un candidat minoritaire. Les forces à l'œuvre sur le terrain politique en Ohio et en Floride sont à la fois dynamiques et à plusieurs niveaux. Les enjeux importants en Ohio montrent des clivages sur le sexe, la race et l'âge. En revanche, les Floridiens sont plus clairement divisés sur des lignes raciales et partisanes avec une forte participation diversifiée servant de condition préalable à tout basculement vers le libéral. Les incertitudes sur le terrain politique entourant la participation électorale pointent fortement vers un examen des effets composés des facteurs au niveau du système et au niveau de l'État sur les prévisions fondées sur les informations disponibles en lien avec les attentes de participation. Incertitudes sur le terrain politique Prédire les résultats des élections présidentielles américaines nécessite de comprendre les facteurs susmentionnés en combinaison avec les attentes en matière de participation. Par conséquent, les effets de vote composés = facteurs au niveau du système + de l'État, conditionnés par le taux de participation attendu. Les attentes en matière de participation des jeunes et des divers groupes sont plus élevées en Floride qu'en Ohio. Si un tel taux de participation se concrétise (encore une fois, le véritable effet de l'élargissement du suffrage aux ex-criminels n'est que prédit), cela devrait aider à contrer les enregistrements républicains plus importants et le gain de la COVID-19 prévu pour le parti républicain. La participation est requise pour que la Floride revienne au parti démocrate. Il n'y a pas de scénario gagnant pour les républicains si la Floride n'est pas défendue. En revanche, les démocrates peuvent produire deux scénarios gagnants sans aucun État. De plus, ils bénéficient de sept scénarios gagnants supplémentaires s'ils capturent l'un ou l'autre des États avec une combinaison de deux des États pivots suivants: Géorgie, Caroline du Nord et Arizona. Points finaux - Retards, recomptage et éventuelles manigances diplomatiques bilatérales ? Cette analyse n'aborde pas les défis auxquels sont confrontés les États avec l'augmentation du vote par correspondance lorsqu'il s'agit de compiler les résultats le soir des élections. Des obstacles logistiques combinés à des courses compétitives dans plusieurs États pivots pourraient entraîner des retards. En effet, des litiges sont en cours dans plusieurs États concernant les effets inéquitables des changements apportés au vote en raison de la pandémie ou d'autres activités. Néanmoins, en examinant les facteurs nationaux et étatiques combinés aux attentes de participation, les effets composés devraient résulter en : Floride = Démocrate (changement); Ohio = Républicain (défendu) à 7 scénarios de victoire démocrate à partir de cette prédiction impliquent tous deux des 3 États pivots en périphérie (Géorgie, Arizona ou Caroline du Nord) pour gagner, mais le fait demeure que les républicains doivent défendre à la fois la Floride et l’Ohio pour produire une victoire, alors que les démocrates peuvent perdre les deux tout en conservant deux scénarios. Cela favorise donc une convergence des voix se traduisant par une victoire libérale pour la présidence de 2020-2024. Ainsi, le parti démocrate est favorisé pour remporter les élections de 2020 une fois tous les votes comptés. Compte tenu de l'état des tensions raciales et du discours soutenu « altérant » de Trump tout au long des élections, il y a une probabilité de protestation, de scènes d'intimidations sur les lieux de scrutin et de possibles violences dans certains États. Des cas d'émeutes pourraient apparaître. Une victoire démocrate peut se faire au prix d'exacerber les clivages fondamentaux pendant une période de crise qui eux-mêmes pourraient saper la démocratie que le parti cherche à protéger. Si Trump rejette catégoriquement les résultats insistant sur des poursuites engagées au niveau des États et au niveau fédéral, cela contribuera aux tensions. Enfin, les conditions dans lesquelles Trump quitte physiquement l'exécutif peuvent jouer un rôle; signaler aux partisans militarisés de « se retirer, mais se tenir prêt » est au mieux un signal contradictoire; au pire, une menace pure et simple au transfert pacifique de la démocratie au cours des prochains mois aux États-Unis. Recommandations pour le Canada et les autres partenaires américains Restez à couvert jusqu’à ce que les résultats des élections soient confirmés.     [1] Les votes par correspondance sont régulièrement compilés, mais dans certains États, les bulletins de vote par correspondance ne sont enregistrés que si la distance entre les candidats est suffisamment petite pour justifier leur ouverture. [2] En juin, les républicains et démocrates étaient à moins d'un point en Caroline du Nord, Trump s'est rendu en Caroline du Nord une demi-douzaine de fois mais Biden était plus absent; effectuant sa deuxième visite en septembre après sept mois d'absence. [3] La Géorgie et l’Ohio valent un nombre similaire de votes électoraux se trouvant à la limite du rouge ou du bleu. Il existe une faible probabilité que le Texas vire au bleu avec sa grande allocation de 38 votes électoraux avec 3 points de division des candidats. Les 29 votes électoraux convoités de Floride en font une victoire obligatoire pour les républicains bien que plusieurs scénarios gagnants existent pour les démocrates sans la Floride. [4] L’Ohio, l'un des « vrais » États pivots, n'a pas réussi à prédire le résultat présidentiel une seule fois depuis 1944, votant Nixon sur Kennedy (1960).   ## Élections 2021- Quel avenir pour la politique étrangère et la défense nationale ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/politique-etrangere-defense-nationale/ Modified: 2021-11-02 > Face à la complexification des enjeux internationaux et au mutisme des différents partis politiques sur leurs ambitions internationales... Les élections de 2021 s’inscrivent au sein d’un contexte national et international particulier. Avec l’avènement d’une quatrième vague de la COVID-19 et toutes les failles systémiques que la pandémie a mises de l’avant les questions de politique étrangère et de la défense ont été reléguées au second plan alors même la position stratégique du Canada au sein de la communauté internationale est en constant déclin depuis quelques années. Face à la complexification des enjeux internationaux et au mutisme des différents partis politiques sur leurs ambitions internationales, quel avenir peut-on espérer pour la politique étrangère et la défense nationale canadiennes? Animation: -Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, fellow et conseiller principal en communications et partenariats au CÉRIUM Invités : -Marie-Joëlle Zahar, chercheuse au CÉRIUM et directrice du Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix -Justin Massie, co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique et professeur de science politique à l’UQAM ## Élections allemandes 2025 : Quels scénarios pour l’aide militaire à l’Ukraine et la défense européenne ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/elections-allemandes-2025-quels-scenarios-pour-laide-militaire-a-lukraine-et-la-defense-europeenne/ Modified: 2025-02-26 > Le 23 février 2025, les citoyens allemands seront appelés aux urnes pour des élections fédérales anticipées, un événement plutôt... Le 23 février 2025, les citoyens allemands seront appelés aux urnes pour des élections fédérales anticipées, un événement plutôt rare dans l’histoire politique du pays, marquant seulement la quatrième dissolution précoce du Bundestag depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Initialement prévues pour septembre 2025, ces élections résultent de l’effondrement de la coalition gouvernementale dirigée par le chancelier Olaf Scholz. Depuis son arrivée à la chancellerie en 2021, Scholz a gouverné presque entièrement dans un contexte de crise internationale marqué par la guerre en Ukraine. L’invasion russe de février 2022 a provoqué un Zeitenwende, un tournant stratégique qui a contraint Berlin à revoir sa posture en matière de défense et de sécurité. Sous pression interne et de ses alliés, Scholz a annoncé un fonds spécial de 100 milliards d’euros pour moderniser la Bundeswehr et renforcer le soutien militaire à Kyiv. Le Zeitenwende a conduit à une augmentation du budget de la défense et au lancement de nouvelles commandes d’équipements. Toutefois, son impact demeure limité en raison de lourdeurs bureaucratiques, d’une industrie de l’armement inadaptée aux besoins actuels et de l’absence d’un réarmement effectif de la Bundeswehr. Parallèlement, si l’Allemagne a renforcé son soutien à l’Ukraine et accéléré sa diversification énergétique, elle peine encore à résorber les insuffisances capacitaires de son armée et à définir une stratégie cohérente face aux menaces russes et chinoises. Au niveau politique, la gestion du conflit par la chancellerie a suscité des critiques, tant au sein de sa coalition qu’auprès de l’opposition, notamment chez les conservateurs de la CDU/CSU et les Verts, qui plaident pour une approche plus robuste. La ministre des Affaires étrangères, Annalena Baerbock, membre des Verts, a estimé que ce conflit marque « la fin de la retenue allemande en politique étrangère et de sécurité », tandis que Christian Lindner, membre du FDP, a lui parlé d’un « réveil brutal ». L’éclatement de la coalition « feu tricolore » en novembre 2024 s’inscrit dans une double crise, à la fois interne et géopolitique. Arrivé en tête aux élections de 2021 avec 25,74 % des suffrages, le Parti social-démocrate d’Allemagne (SPD) n’a pas obtenu de majorité absolue, une situation courante lors des élections fédérales allemandes, et a dû s’allier aux Verts (14,75 %) et au Parti libéral-démocrate (FDP, 11,45 %). Mais cette alliance fragile n’a pas résisté aux tensions croissantes, exacerbées par des désaccords sur la politique économique, la transition énergétique et l’engagement militaire de l’Allemagne. La situation atteint un point de rupture en novembre 2024 lorsque Scholz limoge Christian Lindner, ministre des Finances et chef du FDP, entraînant l’implosion de la coalition. Privé de majorité, Scholz soumet une motion de confiance le 11 décembre 2024, rejetée cinq jours plus tard. Le président Frank-Walter Steinmeier dissout alors le Bundestag le 27 décembre 2024, fixant les élections anticipées au 23 février 2025. Ces élections revêtent une importance stratégique pour l’Allemagne, l’Europe et leurs alliés. Cet article examine le soutien militaire de l’Allemagne à l’Ukraine dans ce contexte électoral. Il commence par démontrer l’ampleur du Zeitenwende et des défis qu’il soulève, puis retrace l’évolution de l’engagement allemand envers l’Ukraine depuis 2014, avec une attention particulière à l’accélération du soutien après 2022. Il examine ensuite les positions des principaux partis sur ces enjeux et leur vision du rôle de l’Allemagne dans le conflit. Enfin, il envisage les perspectives postélectorales, en évaluant les scénarios de coalition et les ajustements stratégiques potentiels, notamment en lien avec les relations transatlantiques et le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche. L’Allemagne face au Zeitenwende L’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine en février 2022 a constitué un choc majeur pour l’Allemagne. Après sept décennies de retenue en matière de politique de défense, le déclenchement d’une guerre conventionnelle en Europe a profondément marqué les élites politiques à Berlin et l’opinion publique. Il faut comprendre le contexte dans lequel la politique de défense allemande s’est développée dans la période de l’après-Seconde Guerre mondiale. L’adhésion de la République fédérale d’Allemagne (RFA) à l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) en 1955, rendue possible par les accords de Paris de 1954, s’était accompagnée de strictes limitations sur l’usage de la force, interdisant toute intervention militaire extérieure. Par la suite, la réunification allemande, officialisée en 1991 à la suite du traité de Moscou de 1990, a entraîné une réduction significative des effectifs et de militaires. Les forces armées ont connu d’importantes transformations au cours des décennies suivantes. L’abolition de la conscription en 2011, suivie d’une réforme structurelle entre 2011 et 2012, a conduit à une réduction du nombre de soldats et de bases militaires. Février 2022 constitue une véritable césure dans la façon dont le gouvernement et la société allemande comprennent leur environnement stratégique. Pour Olaf Scholz, « Nous vivons un tournant historique. Cela signifie que le monde d’après ne sera plus le même que celui d’avant. » Une analyse partagée par le chef des FDP et ministre des Finances, Christian Lindner, qui souligne que « La guerre en Ukraine nous réveille tous d’un rêve complaisant ». Ce changement est sans doute le plus marqué chez les Verts, comme l’illustre la déclaration d’Annalena Baerbock, ministre des Affaires étrangères : « Aujourd’hui marque peut-être la fin de la retenue particulière de l’Allemagne en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité ». Ce virage s’est aussi opéré au sein de la société allemande. Les récents sondages d’opinion révèlent que la majorité des Allemands perçoivent désormais la Russie comme une menace à leur sécurité. Une proportion significative de la population considère que le gouvernement russe représente un risque pour les intérêts nationaux. Ainsi, 66 % des répondants estiment que la Russie constitue une menace pour la stabilité économique et la sécurité de l’Allemagne, tandis que 54 % jugent que le soutien à l’Ukraine relève de l’intérêt national allemand. Malgré ces préoccupations relatives à l’agression russe, la population allemande demeure divisée quant à l’intensification du soutien militaire à l’Ukraine. Seuls 44 % des citoyens y sont favorables, contre 47 % qui expriment une opinion contraire. De même, l’envoi de missiles Taurus bénéficie d’un soutien restreint, avec seulement 36 % d’opinions favorables. Toutefois, 45 % des répondants estiment que l’Ukraine devrait être autorisée à utiliser des armes occidentales pour frapper des cibles en Russie, ce qui constitue l’un des principaux points de débat concernant les livraisons de missiles Taurus. Depuis le début du conflit, le soutien à l’Ukraine tend à s’éroder progressivement. L’analyse segmentée des tendances d’opinion indique une diminution du groupe le plus favorable à l’aide depuis octobre 2023, tandis que les segments affichant davantage de scepticisme à l’égard de cette assistance connaissent une légère progression. Cette évolution témoigne d’un essoufflement du consensus en faveur d’un engagement militaire, économique et humanitaire accru en faveur de l’Ukraine. Cet essoufflement rejoint certains discours au sein du SPD plus réticent à une escalade du conflit et au risque d’engagement allemand dans la guerre, mais aussi de tendances plus isolationnistes ou prorusses à l’extrême droite (AfD) et antimilaristes à gauche (Die Linke et BSW). L’engagement allemand dans la guerre en Ukraine À la suite de l’annexion illégale de la Crimée et des actions militaires dans le Donbass en 2014, l’Allemagne s’est affirmée comme un acteur diplomatique majeur dans la gestion de la crise ukrainienne. Sous l’impulsion de la chancelière conservatrice Angela Merkel, Berlin a contribué à l’instauration du format Normandie, réunissant l’Ukraine, l’Allemagne, la France et la Russie, et a joué un rôle central dans la conclusion des accords de Minsk II. Parallèlement, l’Allemagne a contribué à l’élaboration des sanctions européennes contre Moscou, tout en condamnant fermement les actions russes. Toutefois, cette implication diplomatique contrastait avec des limites structures en matière de défense. En raison de sa dépendance énergétique à la Russie, Berlin s’est abstenue d’annuler le projet Nord Stream, révélant une approche ambivalente vis-à-vis de Moscou. De plus, la Bundeswehr faisait face à des déficiences capacitaires majeures, compromettant son aptitude à répondre aux enjeux stratégiques européens. Un rapport de la Commissaire parlementaire aux forces armées, publiée en 2018, soulignait que seulement une minorité des équipements militaires était alors en état de fonctionnement : 27 à 30% des avions de chasse, 20% des avions de transport, 22% des hélicoptères de transport, 19% des hélicoptères d’attaque, 47% des chars d’assaut, 38% des frégates et aucun sous-marin. Un rapport du ministère de la Défense publié à la même période soulignait également le manque de vêtements et de tentes, compromettant la participation des soldats allemands aux missions de l’OTAN. Ainsi, malgré son rôle diplomatique de premier plan dans la gestion de la crise ukrainienne de 2014 au début 2022, l’Allemagne présentait une capacité militaire réduite, illustrant un décalage persistant entre son engagement international et sa préparation stratégique. Lors de la formation de la coalition gouvernementale le 8 décembre 2021, l’Allemagne a réaffirmé son engagement à adopter une approche équilibrée entre dialogue et fermeté à l’égard de Moscou. Le programme gouvernemental soulignait la nécessité de relations bilatérales stables, tout en condamnant fermement l’annexion de la Crimée, les violences dans l’est de l’Ukraine et les actions de déstabilisation menées par la Russie. Il stipulait également que toute levée des sanctions restait conditionnée à la mise en œuvre intégrale des accords de Minsk. L’accord de coalition ne qualifiait pas la Russie de menace à la sécurité de l’Allemagne. En effet, malgré ces tensions, Berlin maintenait une volonté de coopération avec Moscou sur des enjeux d’avenir, notamment dans les domaines de l’hydrogène, de la santé et du climat. Parallèlement, l’Allemagne dénonçait les restrictions imposées aux libertés civiles en Russie et affichait son soutien à la société civile russe, en facilitant notamment la mobilité des jeunes Russes vers son territoire. Sur le plan des exportations d’armements, le gouvernement allemand entendait renforcer les mécanismes de contrôle, tant à l’échelle nationale qu’européenne. Face à cette montée des tensions à la fin de l’automne 2021, le chancelier Olaf Scholz est toutefois rapidement critiqué pour son approche jugée trop prudente et ambiguë, notamment en raison de son hésitation à suspendre la certification du projet Nord Stream 2. Ce gazoduc cristallise les débats sur la posture allemande vis-à-vis de Moscou. Le 22 février 2022, alors que la Russie reconnaît unilatéralement l’indépendance de deux régions séparatistes de l’est de l’Ukraine, Scholz annonce finalement la suspension du projet Nord Stream 2. Cette décision marque un tournant dans la politique allemande à l’égard de la Russie et témoigne d’un durcissement de sa position face aux actions de Moscou. Ce changement s’inscrit dans la rupture stratégique annoncée par Scholz le 27 février 2022 lors de son discours du Zeitenwende, qui définit un repositionnement majeur de l’Allemagne en matière de défense et d’engagement dans le conflit russo-ukrainien. S’adressant au Bundestag, Scholz expose les grandes lignes de cette réorientation à travers différents axes majeurs. L’Allemagne s’engage tout d’abord à soutenir activement l’Ukraine par une aide militaire incluant la livraison d’armements, justifiant cet engagement par la nécessité de défendre les principes de liberté et de démocratie face à l’agression russe. En parallèle, Berlin adopte, en coordination avec l’Union européenne, un régime de sanctions sans précédent visant les institutions financières russes, les entreprises d’État, les exportations de technologies stratégiques, ainsi que les élites économiques et politiques proches du Kremlin. Sur le plan sécuritaire, l’Allemagne a annoncé renforcer son engagement au sein de l’OTAN, réaffirmant sa détermination à défendre chaque centimètre du territoire allié. Cela se traduit par un déploiement renforcé de troupes en Lituanie, en Roumanie, et en Slovaquie, ainsi que par une sécurisation accrue des espaces maritimes en mer du Nord et en mer Baltique. Dans une perspective plus structurelle, Berlin a entrepris une modernisation substantielle de sa défense nationale. Un fonds spécial de 100 milliards d’euros est alloué à la Bundeswehr pour améliorer ses capacités opérationnelles, notamment en matière d’équipement, de défense aérienne et de cybersécurité. L’Allemagne s’engage également à porter son budget de défense à 2 % du PIB, conformément aux objectifs fixés par l’OTAN, et à renforcer la coopération européenne en matière d’innovation militaire. Dans le domaine énergétique, Berlin amorce une réorientation stratégique visant à réduire progressivement sa dépendance aux hydrocarbures russes. Cette transition repose sur l’accélération du développement des énergies renouvelables, la construction de terminaux de gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) pour diversifier les sources d’approvisionnement et la mise en place d’un plan d’aide économique destiné à atténuer l’impact de la crise énergétique sur les ménages et les entreprises. Cette transformation ne se fait cependant pas sans tensions et défis. La Zeitenwende, présentée comme un tournant majeur de la politique de défense et de sécurité de l’Allemagne, peine à se concrétiser de manière significative. L’Allemagne tarde notamment à autoriser le transfert de chars Leopard 2 à l’Ukraine, invoquant des considérations juridiques, stratégiques et diplomatiques. Selon la législation allemande, tout pays ayant acquis ces chars doit obtenir l’approbation de Berlin pour les réexporter. Sous pression de la Pologne et de la Finlande, le gouvernement allemand hésite, redoutant une escalade du conflit. Berlin souhaite également que les États-Unis s’engagent à fournir des chars M1 Abrams avant d’envoyer les Leopard 2, afin de garantir une approche concertée. Le 25 janvier 2023, face aux pressions croissantes, l’Allemagne approuve finalement la livraison des chars et encourage les partenaires européens à former les soldats ukrainiens à leur utilisation. En mai 2023, l’Ukraine sollicite officiellement la livraison de missiles de longue portée Taurus. Toutefois, dès juin 2023, Olaf Scholz et le ministre de la Défense Boris Pistorius indiquent que l’Allemagne ne fournira pas ces missiles. Cette position est réaffirmée en janvier et février 2024 par le chancelier, qui maintiennent leur refus tout en approuvant la livraison d’autres armements à longue portée. Si cette décision est soutenue par une opinion publique favorable à l’aide militaire, mais plus réticente à l’envoi de missiles Taurus, plusieurs partis politiques, dont l’Union CDU/CSU, les Verts et le FDP, plaident pour leur envoi à l’Ukraine. En parallèle, le manque de clarté du gouvernement sur la finalité de l’aide à l’Ukraine, notamment le refus de livrer les missiles Taurus et l’absence d’un engagement explicite en faveur d’une victoire ukrainienne, a généré des tensions avec ses partenaires. De même, si la diversification énergétique a été réalisée avec une rapidité remarquable, elle s’est accompagnée de nouvelles dépendances, notamment envers le Qatar et l’Azerbaïdjan, tandis que la poursuite de relations économiques étroites avec la Chine soulève des préoccupations quant à la résilience stratégique de l’Allemagne. De plus, l’incapacité de l’Allemagne à mobiliser efficacement le fonds spécial de 100 milliards d’euros pour la défense illustre très bien les blocages bureaucratiques, les contraintes budgétaires et les tensions politiques qui entravent sa capacité à répondre aux impératifs stratégiques posés par la guerre en Ukraine. Malgré l’annonce du Zeitenwende, la mise en œuvre de ces fonds demeure lente et insuffisante, les principaux équipements militaires - notamment les chasseurs F-35, les hélicoptères et les chars - n’étant pas attendus avant plusieurs années. De surcroît, une part significative de ces ressources a été affectée à des acquisitions déjà prévues avant 2022, limitant leur impact sur la transformation immédiate des capacités de la Bundeswehr, dont l’état de préparation opérationnelle n’a connu aucune amélioration notable. Par ailleurs, l’inflation et le coût du financement du fonds ont réduit sa valeur réelle, tandis que le budget de la défense reste insuffisant pour garantir un effort de réarmement durable après son épuisement en 2027. À ces difficultés s’ajoute un manque de consensus au sein de la coalition gouvernementale, qui a conduit à une réduction de moitié de l’aide militaire prévue pour l’Ukraine et à une dépendance accrue à des financements incertains issus des fonds européens ou des avoirs russes gelés. En l’absence d’une stratégie claire et d’une réforme des processus d’acquisition, l’Allemagne apparaît insuffisamment préparée à assumer ses engagements au sein de l’OTAN et à jouer le rôle de puissance militaire que le chancelier Scholz avait promis d’incarner. Malgré tout, l’Allemagne demeure un acteur important du soutien militaire à l’Ukraine. Elle se classe parmi les principaux pays fournisseurs d’équipements lourds, occupant la deuxième place après les États-Unis. Son engagement comprend la livraison de 175 véhicules de combat d’infanterie (dont 155 déjà livrés), 60 chars (dont 52 livrés), 92 obusiers (34 livrés), 27 systèmes de missiles antiaériens (14 livrés) et 8 lance-roquettes multiples (tous livrés). Grâce au fonds spécial de 100 milliards d’euros annoncé dès le début de la guerre, l’Allemagne a récemment atteint 2,12 % de son PIB en dépenses de défense, rejoignant d’autres États membres de l’OTAN ayant progressivement augmenté leur budget militaire depuis l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014, puis de manière plus marquée après 2022. En effet, grâce au fonds spécial, l’Allemagne a annoncé dépenser 90.6 milliards d’euros en défense en 2024 (budget de 51.9 milliards d’euros + fonds spécial). Toutefois, ce fonds spécial devrait être épuisé d’ici 2027. Pour maintenir un niveau de dépenses de 2 % du PIB, il faudrait que l’Allemagne alloue annuellement entre 20 et 30 milliards d’euros supplémentaires. Certains experts et responsables politiques plaident pour une augmentation plus substantielle, estimant qu’un budget de défense équivalent à 3 à 3,5 % du PIB—soit environ 120 milliards d’euros par an—serait nécessaire. Or, la part du budget prévu en défense pour 2025 s’élèverait à 53.25 milliards d’euros, représentant une hausse modeste de 1,2 milliard par rapport à 2024. Dans un contexte marqué par les contraintes budgétaires imposées par la loi de 2009 sur le plafonnement de la dette, Berlin devra identifier des solutions pour garantir un financement soutenu de son effort de défense à long terme. Le chancelier Olaf Scholz s’oppose à une augmentation plus conséquente du budget pour 2025, tandis que le chef de l’Union CDU/CSU rejette l’idée de financer ces hausses par un recours accru à l’endettement. Pour certains experts, le sous-investissement cumulé de l’Allemagne en matière de défense s’élèverait à environ 600 milliards d’euros. Selon la Commissaire parlementaire aux forces armées, il faudrait au moins 300 milliards d’euros pour assurer un état opérationnel complet. Élection fédérale anticipée en février 2025  Progressivement affaiblie au cours de l’année 2022, la coalition du feu tricolore a vu son soutien s’effriter, étant graduellement dépassée dans les sondages par l’union conservatrice CDU/CSU et par l’AfD, en forte progression. Si les enjeux internationaux n’ont pas provoqué l’effondrement du gouvernement Scholz, James Bindenagel et Karsten Jung soulignent, dans une analyse pour le German Marshall Fund, que l’élection fédérale à venir, le 23 février, déterminera à quel point l’Allemagne prend au sérieux sa réponse au tournant historique provoqué par l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie. Deux éléments structurants des élections allemandes sont importants à comprendre. Tout d’abord, le mode de représentation mixte du système électoral allemand impose habituellement la formation de coalitions, la CDU/CSU et le SPD dominant historiquement ces alliances avec des partis plus petits comme le FDP ou les Verts. D’autre part, l’exclusion politique de l’AfD demeure une ligne de fracture majeure. Un cordon sanitaire (Brandmauer) a jusqu’ici empêché toute coalition avec l’extrême droite, malgré sa progression électorale. Toutefois, un récent vote commun entre la CDU/CSU et l’AfD au Bundestag constitue une rupture historique, marquant une première forme de coopération parlementaire depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. La CDU/CSU, le SPD, le FDP et les Verts s’accordent sur la nécessité de poursuivre l’aide à l’Ukraine, mais divergent sur son ampleur. Le SPD défend la ligne prudente de Scholz, affirmant que l’Allemagne doit soutenir Kyiv aussi longtemps que nécessaire sans risquer une escalade avec Moscou. Scholz tente de se positionner comme le garant de la paix, mettant en avant sa capacité à éviter un élargissement du conflit, notamment face à Friedrich Merz, leader de la CDU. La CDU/CSU critique toutefois cette prudence et appelle à une assistance militaire renforcée, notamment par la livraison des missiles Taurus. Le FDP et les Verts soutiennent également une augmentation du soutien militaire, mettant l’accent sur la reconstruction de l’Ukraine et le renforcement de ses infrastructures. À l’inverse, l’AfD critique le sous-investissement des forces armées, mais s’oppose aux livraisons d’armes, plaidant pour une politique étrangère centrée sur les intérêts nationaux allemands. L’AfD appelle aussi à une éventuelle neutralité de la part de l’Ukraine. Die Linke, bien que critique à l’égard de la Russie, rejette également l’envoi d’armes et préconise une solution diplomatique au conflit, privilégiant des sanctions ciblées contre les proches du Kremlin plutôt qu’un embargo économique généralisé. À l’instar de l’AfD, le nouveau parti populiste de gauche, Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW), attribue la responsabilité du conflit à l’OTAN et aux États-Unis et rejette toute aide militaire à l’Ukraine. Face aux défis posés par la guerre en Ukraine, la CDU/CSU, le SPD, le FDP et les Verts soutiennent une augmentation du budget de la défense. Le SPD s’engage à maintenir un budget d’au moins 2 % du PIB, considérant cet effort comme un élément central de la sécurité européenne. La CDU/CSU insiste sur la nécessité d’un engagement accru et appelle à une modernisation rapide des forces armées. De son côté, le FDP met l’accent sur la nécessité d’une Bundeswehr pleinement opérationnelle et adaptée aux nouvelles menaces. Les Verts, historiquement pacifistes, défendent aujourd’hui un renforcement durable des capacités militaires. Annalena Baerbock estime que l’Allemagne doit investir de manière stable plus de 2 % de son PIB en défense, tandis que Robert Habeck, candidat des Verts à la chancellerie, appelle à porter cette contribution à 3,5 %. L’AfD soutient l’amélioration des capacités militaires, mais rejette toute intégration européenne de la défense, prônant une approche strictement nationale et le rétablissement du service militaire obligatoire. Die Linke, à l’inverse, plaide pour une réduction des dépenses militaires et la fin des engagements de l’Allemagne au sein de l’OTAN. La guerre Russo-Ukrainienne a profondément redéfini le débat sur la politique étrangère et de défense en Allemagne. Si le consensus en faveur du soutien à Kyiv reste majoritaire, des tensions persistent sur l’ampleur de l’aide et les choix stratégiques à venir. Futur de l’engagement allemand en Ukraine À la lumière des sondages, aucune formation politique ne semble en mesure d’obtenir une majorité absolue, ouvrant la voie à diverses configurations de coalition. Une grande coalition (Große Koalition, ou GroKo) entre la CDU/CSU et le SPD demeure une possibilité, bien que cette alliance ait été marquée par des tensions par le passé. Une coalition noir-vert, réunissant la CDU/CSU et les Verts, apparaît également envisageable, ces partis partageant des points de convergence sur la gouvernance économique et les politiques environnementales, bien que des divergences subsistent sur les questions sociales et sécuritaires. Une coalition Jamaïque, composée de la CDU/CSU, des Verts et du FDP, reste une autre option, son appellation étant issue des couleurs des partis, qui correspondent à celles du drapeau jamaïcain. Compte tenu de la nette avance de la CDU/CSU dans les intentions de vote, une coalition orientée à gauche incluant Die Linke semble peu probable, d’autant plus que l’union conservatrice a exclu toute alliance avec ce parti. De même, une collaboration avec l’AfD est exclue en raison du cordon sanitaire appliqué par l’ensemble des partis démocratiques, qui refusent toute coopération avec l’extrême droite. Par conséquent, les négociations postélectorales devraient principalement s’articuler autour des équilibres entre la CDU/CSU, le SPD, les Verts et le FDP. Ainsi, aucun gouvernement ne devrait inclure les trois partis les plus critiques envers le soutien à l’Ukraine, bien qu’ils représentent une part croissante de l’opinion publique. Trois scénarios de coalition se dessinent, chacun ayant des implications pour la politique allemande de défense et de soutien à l’Ukraine. Une coalition CDU/CSU-SPD poursuivrait l’aide militaire à Kyiv, les deux partis partageant un attachement historique à l’OTAN, pierre angulaire de la sécurité allemande depuis l’intégration de la RFA à l’Alliance atlantique en 1955. La CDU/CSU a toujours défendu un engagement fort au sein de l’Alliance, considérant l’ancrage transatlantique comme essentiel à la sécurité européenne. Le SPD, bien que plus nuancé, a également contribué à la consolidation du rôle de l’Allemagne dans l’OTAN, notamment en appuyant l’élargissement de l’Alliance et en soutenant la transformation de ses missions vers la gestion de crises. Toutefois, des divergences persistent quant à l’ampleur du soutien militaire à l’Ukraine : alors que l’union CDU/CSU plaide pour une assistance renforcée, le SPD, attaché à une approche plus prudente, pourrait modérer certaines décisions, notamment en ce qui concerne la livraison de missiles Taurus, afin d’éviter toute escalade. Une coalition CDU/CSU-Verts favoriserait un engagement militaire accru envers l’Ukraine et une augmentation des dépenses de défense. Robert Habeck et Friedrich Merz, respectivement chefs de file des Verts et de la CDU/CSU, ont tous deux exercé des pressions sur le gouvernement Scholz pour autoriser l’envoi de missiles Taurus. Une telle coalition marquerait une inflexion majeure de la politique de défense allemande, inscrivant Berlin dans une posture plus affirmée face à Moscou. Cependant, des tensions pourraient émerger sur les questions budgétaires et fiscales, rendant l’équilibre gouvernemental fragile. Une troisième option serait une reconduction de la coalition du feu tricolore (SPD-Verts-FDP), qui maintiendrait un soutien limité à l’Ukraine, mais resterait marquée par des blocages internes, notamment sur le financement de l’aide militaire et l’augmentation qualitative des livraisons d’armements, perçue comme un facteur de risque d’escalade. Quel que soit le gouvernement issu des élections, l’influence croissante de l’AfD et du BSW pourrait modifier les dynamiques parlementaires. Ce dernier, nouveau parti populiste, s’oppose à l’aide militaire à l’Ukraine, pourrait franchir le seuil électoral de 5 % et obtenir des sièges au Bundestag. Une montée en puissance de l’AfD et du BSW exercerait une pression supplémentaire en faveur d’une réduction drastique de l’aide militaire, voire d’une ouverture à des négociations avec Moscou. Bien qu’il soit peu probable qu’ils participent à un gouvernement, leur présence au Bundestag pourrait influer sur le débat stratégique. L’annonce, le 17 février, d’éventuelles négociations entre la Russie et les États-Unis sans la participation de l’Ukraine a suscité de vives réactions en Europe. En réponse, le président français Emmanuel Macron a réuni plusieurs dirigeants européens afin de coordonner une position commune face à cette initiative américaine. Les principaux partis traditionnels en Allemagne (à l’exception de l’AfD, Die Linke et BSW) ont fermement critiqué cette approche, la jugeant inacceptable. À l’issue de la rencontre, le chancelier Olaf Scholz a réaffirmé son soutien à l’Ukraine et aux mécanismes européens d’aide militaire, tout en repoussant toute discussion sur un éventuel déploiement de forces de maintien de la paix avant l’adoption d’un plan de paix structuré. Le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche introduit une incertitude majeure quant au soutien américain à l’Ukraine, ce qui pourrait contraindre l’Europe, et en particulier l’Allemagne, à assumer une plus grande responsabilité en matière d’aide militaire. Si Washington réduit son assistance, Berlin devra faire un choix décisif : compenser ce manque par une augmentation de son engagement ou encourager un règlement négocié du conflit. Or, les contraintes budgétaires, la lassitude croissante des électeurs et le contexte politique interne rendent toute prise de leadership dans l’aide à l’Ukraine particulièrement délicate, tant sur le plan financier que politique. L’avenir du soutien allemand à l’Ukraine dépendra donc du résultat des élections et de la coalition qui émergera. Scholz et le SPD continueront probablement à privilégier une approche modérée, tandis que la CDU/CSU et les Verts plaideront pour un engagement militaire renforcé. Parallèlement, la montée de l’AfD et de BSW pourrait alimenter des pressions en faveur d’une réduction des livraisons d’armes et d’une ouverture aux négociations avec la Russie. ## En garde ! Les intérêts stratégiques du Canada dans un ordre mondial compétitif URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/en-garde-les-interets-strategiques-du-canada-dans-un-ordre-mondial-competitif/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique explore les principaux intérêts stratégiques du Canada, alors que l'environnement international devient rapidement... Le Canada a longtemps évité d'identifier et de poursuivre ouvertement ses intérêts stratégiques. Maintenant que l'environnement international devient rapidement plus complexe et que la géographie n'offre plus au pays le sanctuaire qu'il avait autrefois, il est essentiel de jeter un regard sobre et pragmatique sur ce qui est essentiel pour le Canada. Un Canada fort, souverain et uni, agissant aux côtés de ses partenaires et dans le cadre de l'ordre international fondé sur les règles, est moins susceptible de voir sa sécurité et sa défense nationales menacées. Dans un environnement stratégique complexe et en prévision des conséquences financières durables de la pandémie, il sera essentiel d'établir des priorités pour poursuivre et défendre ces intérêts stratégiques : la souveraineté, l'intégrité et l'indépendance nationales, l'alliance avec les États-Unis, la préservation de l'ordre international fondé sur des règles et le positionnement avantageux du Canada dans ses relations avec les autres grandes puissances. Le retour des intérêts stratégiques au centre de la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada devrait commencer par une conversation nationale sur les menaces et les défis qui se profilent à l'horizon. Introduction Le Canada a énormément bénéficié de l'ordre international libéral qui a émergé au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Sous le leadership mondial des États-Unis, le Canada a récolté les fruits d'alliances stables et d'institutions internationales favorisant le libre-échange, la démocratie et le multilatéralisme. Au pays, les Canadiens ont connu une sécurité et une stabilité remarquables, du moins en ce qui concerne l'absence de menace à la sécurité et la défense nationales[1]. Par conséquent, et dans l'esprit des mots de feu John McCain, les valeurs canadiennes ont souvent défini les intérêts canadiens. Le monde change, cependant, et le Canada ressent ces transformations de manière directe. Les postulats sur lesquels la sécurité du Canada a traditionnellement reposé, du multilatéralisme incontesté aux garanties de sécurité des États-Unis, sont maintenant remis en question. La compétition stratégique croissante entre les grandes puissances et le recalibrage de Washington face à ses adversaires laissent le Canada vulnérable, comme l'illustre la détention de Michael Kovrig et Michael Spavor par la Chine en représailles à l'arrestation de la dirigeante de Huawei, Meng Wanzhou. Le différend diplomatique avec l'Arabie saoudite au sujet des droits humains, l'écrasement du vol PS752 près de Téhéran avec 57 Canadiens à bord quelques jours après l'assassinat du général iranien Qassem Soleimani, et les conséquences dramatiques de la pandémie sur la santé publique, l'économie et la politique étrangère sont autant d'exemples de défis croissants pour le Canada et sa population. Assurer sécurité et prospérité – les intérêts nationaux persistants et explicites du Canada – sera plus important et plus difficile que jamais dans ce nouvel environnement. Pour ce faire, une évaluation plus pragmatique et plus réfléchie de ce qui est essentiel à la sécurité et à la prospérité du Canada est nécessaire. Pour assurer la sécurité et la prospérité du pays, il faudra avoir une vision forte et réaliste des intérêts stratégiques canadiens, entendus comme les facteurs du système international qui influencent la probabilité d'une attaque contre le Canada. En outre, un environnement stratégique de plus en plus exigeant et les conséquences financières durables de la pandémie exerceront une pression sans précédent sur le gouvernement canadien et ses organisations de sécurité et de défense nationales. Une priorisation implacable sera essentielle à la sécurité et à la défense des intérêts stratégiques canadiens. En l'absence d'une articulation claire des intérêts stratégiques du Canada par les gouvernements successifs, ce document fournit un cadre pour mieux comprendre les tendances stratégiques actuelles et la façon dont celles-ci façonneront probablement l’évolution des intérêts canadiens. Après avoir défini le concept d’intérêt stratégique, cette note stratégique présente les principaux intérêts stratégiques du Canada : la souveraineté, l'intégrité et l'indépendance, l'alliance Canada-États-Unis, l'ordre international actuel fondé sur des règles et la force du Canada dans ses relations avec d'autres États, en particulier la Chine et la Russie. Ce document adopte la terminologie australienne d'intérêts stratégiques plutôt que d'intérêts nationaux, et il s'intéresse particulièrement au rôle des forces armées dans la poursuite et la défense des intérêts stratégiques. Il se concentre donc sur les aspects les plus susceptibles d’utiliser la puissance militaire afin de faire face aux menaces qui pèsent sur le Canada à travers la promotion et la défense d'un Canada fort, souverain et uni, assumant sa part du fardeau aux côtés de ses partenaires et au sein de l'ordre libéral international. Que sont les intérêts stratégiques ? En juin 2017, Chrystia Freeland, alors ministre des Affaires étrangères, a demandé à la Chambre des communes : « Le Canada est-il un pays essentiel, à ce moment de la vie de notre planète ? » Sans doute, la question faisait référence à la place du Canada dans le monde et aux nombreux moyens par lesquels le pays peut tirer parti et maximiser sa position sur la scène internationale. Toutefois, lorsqu'on définit l'intérêt national canadien, pierre angulaire de la politique étrangère, la question devrait plutôt être : qu'est-ce qui est essentiel pour le Canada ? Selon le stratège Colin S. Gray, « l'état du monde n'a pas d'implications inhérentes pour le Canada; un "discriminateur" d'intérêt national canadien doit être appliqué aux événements et aux tendances ». Déterminer les intérêts d'un pays est intrinsèquement politique. C'est au gouvernement en place de les identifier, de prioriser certaines questions au dépens d'autres et d'allouer les ressources nécessaires à la protection de ces intérêts. Pourtant, il est notoirement difficile de cerner les intérêts canadiens, généralement associés à une vision plus pugnace de la politique étrangère et des affaires internationales. Les gouvernements successifs ont préféré parler de valeurs canadiennes plutôt que d'intérêts canadiens. En effet, du maintien de la paix à la responsabilité de protéger et du libéralisme économique à l'égalité des genres, les principes moraux ont été au cœur de la politique étrangère canadienne sans que l'on se demande pourquoi ces valeurs étaient si essentielles à la sécurité et à la prospérité du Canada. La politique de défense et les intérêts stratégiques du Canada Même dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense, les gouvernements canadiens ont évité de définir les intérêts stratégiques canadiens de manière très détaillée. En fait, les objectifs de la politique de défense canadienne n'ont pratiquement pas changé au cours des 80 dernières années. Défendre le Canada contre les menaces extérieures, défendre l'Amérique du Nord en partenariat avec les États-Unis et contribuer à la paix et à la sécurité internationales sont devenus des axiomes de la communauté de défense et de sécurité du pays. Protection, Sécurité, Engagement (PSE), la politique de défense du Canada, porte elle-même le nom de ces intérêts : fort au pays, en sécurité en Amérique du Nord et engagé dans le monde. PSE présente la sécurité et la prospérité du Canada comme les principaux intérêts stratégiques du pays, soutenus par la stabilité mondiale, l'ordre international fondé sur des règles et la défense collective. Généraux, ces intérêts ne fournissent qu'une direction limitée aux planificateurs militaires, de même qu’aux analystes et aux chercheurs sur les priorités canadiennes en matière de sécurité et de défense. En outre, si cette constance reflète la stabilité des alliances canadiennes et la remarquable géostratégie du Canada, l'absence de menace directe pour le Canada a entraîné un manque de sérieux dans la politique de défense. Les questions de sécurité et de défense ne sont que des sujets marginaux dans le débat public. Même PSE ne parvient pas à identifier les menaces spécifiques qui pèsent sur le pays, bien qu'elle aborde le contexte mondial et les grandes tendances stratégiques. Toutefois, l’environnement stratégique change rapidement et la géographie seule pourrait bientôt ne plus suffire à maintenir les adversaires du Canada à l’écart. De nouveaux domaines d'opérations – le cyberespace, l'espace et l'information – et les progrès rapides de la technologie signifient que le Canada peut maintenant être atteint plus facilement. Ces tendances en constante évolution forcent maintenant un changement de ton dans la communauté de la sécurité nationale et de la défense. En février 2020, le commandant du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD) a signalé que le Canada et les États-Unis avaient alors perdu leur avantage militaire contre la Russie dans l'Arctique. Quelques jours plus tard, le chef d'état-major de la Défense Jonathan Vance a annoncé que la Russie représentait désormais la menace militaire la plus immédiate pour le Canada. L’ancien général en chef du Canada a également mis en garde quant au risque important que représentent les tactiques diplomatiques coercitives et les activités malicieuses de la Chine, notamment dans le domaine cyber. En fait, avant les élections fédérales de 2019, le Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications a publié un rapport sur les cybermenaces qui ciblent le processus démocratique. Depuis, la détention des deux Michaels a sensibilisé les Canadiens aux défis que pose la Chine au pays. Malgré cette prise de conscience, le Canada n'arrive toujours pas à identifier clairement ses intérêts stratégiques. Définir les intérêts stratégiques : Regards sur l'Australie En ne définissant pas les menaces et en ne détaillant pas ses intérêts stratégiques, tout gouvernement peut vraisemblablement s’assurer une plus grande souplesse en période d'incertitude. Toutefois, dans le contexte actuel, un environnement complexe de menaces et des prévisions financières difficiles en raison de la pandémie de COVID-19 exigent une plus grande priorisation. Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire, le Canada et l'Australie sont souvent comparés en matière de sécurité et de défense, étant donné qu'ils sont tous deux des puissances moyennes, des membres du Commonwealth et de proches partenaires au sein du Groupe des cinq. L'Australie est souvent présentée comme mieux préparée et plus consciente des facteurs stratégiques lorsqu'il s'agit de défendre la nation. Toutefois, les deux pays sont confrontés à des voisinages très différents. Alors que le Canada a grandement bénéficié de sa proximité avec les États-Unis et de son isolement géographique des crises géopolitiques des dernières décennies, l'Australie se trouve plutôt au premier rang de la montée de la Chine dans la région Asie-Pacifique. Compte tenu de sa position géographique stratégique, l'Australie a pris conscience, dès les années 1990, des conséquences potentielles de certains changements systémiques survenant dans sa région immédiate et, plus largement, dans la région Asie-Pacifique. Son livre blanc sur la défense de 2000 louait la suprématie des États-Unis et l'ordre mondial qui en résultait, mais reconnaissait également la montée en puissance de la Chine et ses conséquences potentielles sur la dynamique régionale, en évaluant explicitement le risque associé à différentes menaces. Parmi les facteurs qui contribuaient à l'époque à la sécurité de l'Australie – géographie, forces armées puissantes, bonnes relations avec les États-Unis et faible probabilité de conflit régional – seul le premier était considéré comme immuable. Deux décennies plus tard, la Mise à jour stratégique de la défense 2020 a sonné l'alarme. L'Australie est désormais particulièrement préoccupée par la modernisation militaire rapide en cours dans la région indo-pacifique, par l'intensification de la compétition entre grandes puissances et ses répercussions régionales, et par la multiplication des activités en zone grise dans la région. En réponse, l'Australie revoit la structure et le dispositif de ses forces afin d'assurer une dissuasion crédible, de façonner l'environnement stratégique et de mieux réagir lorsque ses intérêts sont menacés. Pour ce faire, l'Australie définit les intérêts stratégiques comme suit : « les éléments de l'ordre international qui affectent, directement ou indirectement, la probabilité ou la gravité d'une attaque contre nous. Ils reflètent les façons dont notre vulnérabilité aux attaques pourrait être augmentée ou diminuée par des changements dans le système international, la distribution du pouvoir et de l'influence, et les équilibres des capacités militaires. » Des intérêts stratégiques clairs aident à clarifier les objectifs stratégiques, ou ce qu'un pays entend faire avec ses forces armées. En conséquence, la force militaire doit être utilisée de manière à réduire la probabilité ou la gravité des menaces militaires. D'autres outils, comme l'aide internationale ou la diplomatie, peuvent également contribuer à la protection de certains intérêts et objectifs stratégiques, voire même être mieux adaptés à leur avancement. Par exemple, l'aide étrangère à la démocratisation repose, du moins en partie, sur le précepte selon lequel les démocraties ne se font pas la guerre entre elles. Cette définition peut être adaptée pour identifier les intérêts stratégiques du Canada, qui ne devraient pas être uniquement concernés par une attaque militaire conventionnelle. Compte tenu de l'évolution actuelle de l'environnement opérationnel, les attaques contre le Canada peuvent également inclure des activités hostiles, des moyens non conventionnels et d'autres mesures sous le seuil de la guerre. En effet, si une invasion militaire conventionnelle dans le Nord canadien est peu probable, une cyberattaque contre les infrastructures canadiennes ou encore l'usage de la désinformation pendant les campagnes électorales pour miner le processus démocratique sont parfaitement envisageables. Ainsi, quels sont les intérêts stratégiques canadiens ? Les intérêts stratégiques canadiens Les principaux intérêts stratégiques du Canada sont la souveraineté, l'intégrité et l'indépendance nationales, l'alliance Canada-États-Unis, le maintien de l'ordre international fondé sur les règles et le maintien d'une position de force par rapport aux adversaires dans le système international. En effet, un Canada fort, souverain et uni, agissant aux côtés de ses partenaires et dans le cadre de l'ordre international fondé sur les règles, est moins susceptible de faire face à une attaque contre le pays. Ces intérêts sont dynamiques ; ils s'influencent mutuellement et leur importance relative variera au fur et à mesure qu’évoluera l'environnement stratégique. Cette section présente chacun des intérêts stratégiques du Canada et examine les facteurs susceptibles d'influencer leur importance relative. Au final, la poursuite et la défense de ces quatre intérêts stratégiques fondamentaux permettront au Canada d'être en sécurité et bien défendu dans plusieurs scénarios futurs, qu'il s'agisse d'un statu quo prolongé sous le leadership américain ou d'un ordre multipolaire où les États-Unis ne sont plus en mesure de projeter leur puissance à l'échelle mondiale. Plus fondamentalement, les intérêts deux, trois et quatre devraient être poursuivis et équilibrés afin de préserver l'intérêt stratégique le plus fondamental et existentiel du Canada : la souveraineté, l'intégrité et l'indépendance du pays. 1) La souveraineté, l'intégrité et l'indépendance du Canada Les États sont par définition souverains. Toutefois, un rapide coup d'œil à l'histoire récente montre que la définition de la souveraineté varie. De plus, la souveraineté des États modernes a révélé des lacunes et des limites au cours des dernières années, qu'il s'agisse de l'importance de reconnaître et de consulter les peuples autochtones ou de l'émergence de nouveaux domaines comme le cyberespace. Néanmoins, le Canada a la responsabilité de garantir son intégrité territoriale, d'assurer la sûreté, la sécurité et le bien-être de sa population, et de maintenir son indépendance politique. La concurrence stratégique croissante, combinée aux nouveaux domaines d'opération et à l'évolution rapide de la technologie, réduit l'avantage géographique qui a longtemps assuré la souveraineté, l'intégrité et l'indépendance du Canada. Trois grands objectifs stratégiques prendront une importance particulière dans les années à venir. Tout d'abord, et de manière fondamentale, le Canada doit pouvoir dissuader et se défendre contre une attaque armée conventionnelle. Déjà, PSE a demandé aux Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) d'accroître leur portée et leur présence dans l'Arctique canadien et de renouveler l'engagement du pays au sein du NORAD. Les investissements dans la défense continentale ont un coût important dans un contexte de crise budgétaire qui risque de perdurer bien au-delà de la pandémie de la COVID-19. Deuxièmement, le Canada doit dissuader et se défendre contre les activités hostiles. Du moins dans un avenir rapproché, le succès de la dissuasion conventionnelle et stratégique menée par les Américains continuera de forcer les adversaires à opter pour des mesures autres que la guerre. En même temps, ces mesures offrent un avantage significatif aux acteurs hostiles puisqu'elles peuvent générer un effet stratégique tout en restant relativement bon marché et en offrant une possibilité de déni suffisante pour empêcher l'escalade et les représailles. Malgré la publication de rapports annuels par les agences canadiennes de renseignement, ces défis à la sécurité canadienne restent encore sous le radar du grand public. Troisièmement, l'ingérence étrangère dans les affaires canadiennes menace également l'indépendance politique, l'unité nationale et la cohésion au pays. La polarisation intérieure aux États-Unis et les tendances autoritaires dans certains pays européens constituent d’importantes mises en garde. Le Canada n'est pas à l'abri des campagnes de désinformation ou d’autres mesures hostiles qui peuvent miner la crédibilité des autorités, instrumentaliser et intensifier les clivages sociaux et politiques, et cultiver l'angoisse et la méfiance au sein de la population. La pandémie n'a fait qu'accélérer la désinformation, les Canadiens devant composer avec un manque de connaissances scientifiques, des rumeurs infondées et des théories du complot. 2) L'alliance avec les États-Unis Son partenariat privilégié avec les États-Unis a bien servi le Canada dans le passé, et il ne fait aucun doute que le maintien de cette alliance sera crucial pour la sécurité et la prospérité futures du pays. Comme l’avance judicieusement Roland Paris, « en vertu de l'histoire, de la situation géographique, des impératifs économiques, des exigences de sécurité, des valeurs et des liens culturels du Canada. Les [États-Unis] resteront le plus proche allié et partenaire commercial du Canada – même si l'administration américaine ne voit pas le Canada exactement de la même manière » . Ottawa a certainement poussé un soupir de soulagement avec l'élection de Joe Biden. Jusqu'à présent, ses nominations aux postes de sécurité nationale et de politique étrangère suggèrent une préférence pour un retour au leadership et à l'engagement mondial, un renversement de la politique étrangère « America First » de Trump. Sous l'administration Trump, « Make America Great Again » signifiait poursuivre une politique étrangère plaçant l'Amérique au premier plan. Cela s'est traduit par un désengagement en matière de garantie de sécurité, de même que par une rhétorique plus dure à l'égard des alliés traditionnels, notamment le Canada et l'OTAN. Cependant, malgré un réengagement attendu sous la présidence de Biden, la pandémie et l'extrême polarisation intérieure vont probablement obliger la nouvelle administration à se concentrer sur son propre terrain. Les conséquences économiques de la COVID-19 auront également des conséquences à long terme sur les finances américaines et les futurs budgets de défense, obligeant les États-Unis à revoir leurs priorités. En outre, la concurrence sino-américaine croissante exigera probablement une réaffectation des efforts, des ressources et des capacités des États-Unis vers la Chine. En raison de ces deux tendances, les États-Unis sont susceptibles de demander davantage à leurs alliés, quel que soit le président. Pour protéger cette relation, il incombe au Canada de démontrer sa crédibilité en tant qu'allié et partenaire. Sur le plan militaire, cela signifie qu'il doit se montrer à la hauteur en ce qui concerne la défense continentale, la dissuasion stratégique et les principales alliances. Il sera particulièrement important de contribuer de manière significative à la défense continentale par le biais du NORAD, à la fois en termes de capacités de détection et de capacités cinétiques. En outre, le développement des cyber capacités, le renforcement de la collecte et de l'analyse du renseignement, l'élaboration d'outils et d'une expertise en matière de communication stratégique et l'augmentation de la capacité des FAC à opérer dans la zone grise par le biais d'autorités et de mécanismes de surveillance appropriés contribueraient tous à faire du Canada un précieux partenaire. Si les FAC ne peuvent pas s’agrandir, elles doivent devenir meilleures, en se concentrant sur une politique militaire agile en coordination avec d'autres outils du pouvoir de l'État. 3) Maintenir un ordre international fondé sur les règles Le Canada a énormément bénéficié de l'ordre international libéral établi suite à la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Pour le meilleur ou pour le pire, Ottawa s'est souvent présenté comme un modèle de valeurs libérales et de démocratie. La promotion de ces idéaux dans les forums internationaux a aussi certainement profité au Canada en termes de visibilité et d'influence. Toutefois, on peut se demander si les gouvernements successifs ont réellement consacré suffisamment de ressources pour soutenir ce discours. Les critiques constantes autour des dépenses de défense dans le cadre de l'OTAN, ou encore l'échec récent du gouvernement Trudeau à obtenir un siège au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, suggèrent que le pays n'a en réalité pas toujours respecté ses engagements. Néanmoins, il ne fait aucun doute que le système actuel d'institutions, de règles et de normes a avantagé le Canada, comme en témoigne d’ailleurs le siège du pays à la table du G7. Bien que l'on ne sache pas encore si l'ordre international libéral peut survivre à une concurrence stratégique croissante, la préservation de ses institutions et le maintien du multilatéralisme sont essentiels aux intérêts stratégiques canadiens. D'une part, l'ordre actuel soutient le rôle des États-Unis en tant que leader mondial, ce qui profite au Canada. D'autre part, et particulièrement dans l'éventualité d'un désengagement américain accru, le maintien d'un ordre international fondé sur des règles offre au Canada un cadre pour continuer à favoriser les coalitions et les solutions multilatérales aux problèmes internationaux. Bien que ces arrangements n'offrent pas la même couverture que les garanties de sécurité des États-Unis, les institutions et le multilatéralisme offrent une certaine protection face à des États adverses. Par conséquent, le maintien des alliances et des partenariats traditionnels, que ce soit par le biais du Groupe des cinq et de l'OTAN, mais aussi de l'ONU, de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce et des accords économiques régionaux tels que l'Accord économique et commercial global entre le Canada et l'Union européenne (connu sous le nom d'AECG), sera crucial pour la sécurité et la prospérité du Canada. Le Canada devrait également soutenir activement la réforme des institutions internationales afin de remédier aux inégalités qui désavantagent les pays en développement, tout en préservant l'esprit de ces accords. De plus, le Canada devrait explorer de nouveaux partenariats avec des pays aux vues similaires dans des régions d'importance stratégique pour le Canada, notamment l'Amérique latine et l'Asie-Pacifique. En définitive, l'union fait la force et le Canada doit être perçu comme un partenaire fiable et non comme un « free rider ». Les coalitions ont un fort effet dissuasif et offrent un avantage comparatif essentiel face à des pays comme la Russie et la Chine qui sont notoirement incapables de se faire des amis. En effet, le Canada a des amis, alors que les États autoritaires ont des clients. 4) La force du Canada dans un ordre mondial compétitif Malgré la confiance dans le leadership mondial américain et l'ordre international libéral, l'avenir de la sécurité et de la prospérité du Canada dépendra de la capacité du pays à éviter d'être inutilement ciblé par ses adversaires. Les différends récents avec la Chine et l'Arabie saoudite montrent comment Ottawa a fait face à des représailles pour ses actions, subissant les conséquences de mesures diplomatiques coercitives dans les deux cas. Le désengagement des États-Unis est au moins en partie responsable de l’aplomb des États autoritaires qui ne craignent plus de répliquer de façon agressive. À l'avenir, le Canada devrait examiner sa politique étrangère de manière pragmatique, en cherchant activement à se positionner de manière à éviter de provoquer inutilement ses adversaires. Cette approche implique de laisser tomber les positions de principe qui ne servent pas les intérêts stratégiques canadiens. En particulier, une approche plus nuancée à l'égard de la Chine et de la Russie pourrait contribuer à éviter ce que Pascale Massot appelle « un conflit vif des cœurs et des esprits [...], qui ne servirait pas les intérêts canadiens ». Les actions canadiennes ne devraient pas nuire aux intérêts stratégiques du pays. Par ailleurs, et peut-être plus fondamentalement, le Canada devrait s’habituer à l'idée d'avoir des concurrents. Les concurrents ne sont pas nécessairement des ennemis, et les affaires étrangères ne sont pas un jeu à somme nulle. L'idéalisme doit être équilibré par le pragmatisme dans la conduite de la politique étrangère canadienne, ce qui signifie qu'il faut cultiver des relations qui permettent le dialogue, ce qui pourrait bien à terme éviter certaines escalades et conflits inutiles. Miser sur la coopération et le dialogue sur des questions et des domaines d'intérêt commun peut aider à gérer des questions plus difficiles. Par exemple, la gouvernance de l'Arctique offre à Ottawa une occasion unique de se hisser au niveau de la Russie et d'engager Moscou sur le plan diplomatique. Un échec à cet égard ne peut qu’affaiblir les liens entre les deux pays, déjà mis à rude épreuve par le conflit en Ukraine. Cela risque également d'isoler la Russie sur les questions arctiques et de créer en bout ligne les conditions idéales à une coopération stratégique officielle entre Pékin et Moscou au nord du 60e parallèle. Assurer la force du Canada dans un environnement stratégique plus compétitif signifie également accroître la capacité des FAC à repousser, signaler et même punir lorsque les lignes rouges canadiennes sont franchies – ou sur le point de l'être. D'un point de vue stratégique, cela signifie accroître la capacité du pays à dissuader les attaques et les activités néfastes dirigées contre le Canada, que ce soit par l'interdiction ou la punition. Cela signifie également travailler main dans la main avec nos partenaires et alliés pour adapter les règles et normes internationales à la réalité de la rivalité entre États au XXIe siècle. Conclusion : Une conversation nationale essentielle Le sanctuaire dans lequel le Canada s'est trouvé depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale s'érode. L'environnement stratégique complexe auquel le pays est confronté, aggravé par les conséquences financières et stratégiques de la pandémie, exigera une priorisation drastique. Pour ce faire, il est essentiel de comprendre comment l'environnement international façonne les intérêts stratégiques canadiens, et ce qui peut être fait pour les préserver et les faire progresser. Dans un premier temps, le gouvernement canadien, soutenu par la communauté de la défense, le milieu universitaire, les médias et la société civile, devrait favoriser une conversation nationale sur les menaces et les défis à venir. Trop souvent, ces conversations ont lieu derrière des portes closes et dans des cercles restreints. Il est temps d'ouvrir ces débats. Les communications stratégiques seront essentielles dans les années à venir et devraient s'appuyer sur des faits, des analyses solides, la transparence et la responsabilité. Des Canadiens informés sont plus susceptibles de comprendre l'importance de ces questions et de soutenir les représentants du gouvernement dans la prise de décisions difficiles pour la sûreté et la sécurité du pays. En fin de compte, si les valeurs canadiennes ne sont pas nécessairement des intérêts, ces mêmes valeurs – démocratie, transparence et responsabilité – seront essentielles à la préservation et à la défense d'un Canada fort, souverain et uni, assumant sa part du fardeau en agissant aux côtés de ses partenaires et au sein de l'ordre international libéral.   [1] Une perspective de sécurité humaine jetterait très certainement un éclairage différent sur les questions de sûreté et de sécurité pour certains Canadiens, notamment les peuples autochtones et les groupes minoritaires, mais ce rapport se concentre sur les menaces extérieures à la sécurité et à la défense du Canada. Gaëlle Rivard Piché est analyste stratégique à Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC). Les opinions exprimées sont celles de l'auteure et ne représentent pas RDDC, le ministère de la Défense nationale, les Forces armées canadiennes ou le gouvernement du Canada. La version anglaise de ce texte a été publiée par le CDA Institute : cliquez ici pour la consulter. ## Enfin : Le Canada achète le F-35 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/enfin-le-canada-achete-le-f-35/ Modified: 2023-07-26 > La ministre canadienne de la Défense nationale du Canada, Anita Anand, a annoncé que le Canada allait acquérir une nouvelle flotte de 88 avions de chasse F-35. C'est en fait la deuxième fois qu'Ottawa choisit l'avion furtif. Si un certain degré de politisation est toujours inévitable dans les achats de défense à grande échelle, la saga des avions de chasse du Canada est précisément un modèle à éviter. La ministre canadienne de la Défense nationale du Canada, Anita Anand, a annoncé que le Canada allait acquérir une nouvelle flotte de 88 avions de chasse F-35. Ce projet est estimé à 19 milliards de dollars, montant également cité l’année dernière lorsque le gouvernement libéral a entamé des négociations pour cet achat avec le géant aérospatial américain Lockheed Martin. C'est en fait la deuxième fois qu'Ottawa choisit l'avion furtif. En 2010, les conservateurs au pouvoir ont déclaré que le F-35 était le seul choix possible pour l'Aviation royale canadienne. L'opposition n'était pas d'accord, en partie parce que le directeur parlementaire du budget et le vérificateur général ont tous deux mis en doute les estimations des coûts du ministère de la Défense. En conséquence, l'avion de Lockheed Martin est devenu un enjeu lors des élections fédérales de 2011 et de 2015. Cette histoire est ce qui rend la récente annonce peu édifiante pour le gouvernement libéral ainsi que pour les conservateurs. Si un certain degré de politisation est toujours inévitable dans les achats de défense à grande échelle, la saga des avions de chasse du Canada est précisément un modèle à éviter. En faisant campagne pour détrôner les conservateurs en 2015, les Libéraux ont critiqué l'attribution d'un contrat unique pour le F-35 comme étant à la fois injuste et malavisée. Dans une certaine mesure, ils avaient raison. Pourquoi les conservateurs refusaient-ils d’organiser un appel d’offres compétitif, conformément aux règles habituelles en matière de marchés publics de la défense ? Et pourquoi ne pas expliquer la supériorité du F-35 sur les appareils concurrents ? L'incapacité des conservateurs à répondre à ces questions les a contraints à revenir sur leur décision de 2010 et à réaliser un certain nombre d'études évaluant à nouveau le F-35, notamment par rapport à deux de ses concurrents européens. Mais la critique libérale était elle-même mal fondée. En 1997, le gouvernement des États-Unis a demandé à quelques-uns de ses alliés de participer au codéveloppement et à la coproduction d'un avion de chasse qui allait devenir le F-35, et le Canada a accepté. L'accord était inhabituel, mais sa logique était acceptable, surtout pour le gouvernement canadien – libéral à ce moment-là. Pourquoi ne pas collaborer avec son principal partenaire économique et sécuritaire tout en donnant aux entreprises aérospatiales canadiennes la possibilité de remporter des contrats dans le cadre de ce que l'on appelle parfois « l'affaire d'armement du siècle » ? L'ampleur du programme est stupéfiante. Le coût actuel de 1 600 milliards de dollars pour toute la durée de vie de l'appareil en fait le système d'armement le plus coûteux jamais construit. Le Canada ne pouvait espérer tirer profit de sa participation à ce mégaprojet sans acheter le produit lui-même. Concours d'avions de chasse En 2017, le gouvernement Trudeau a lancé ce qu'il a appelé une compétition « ouverte et transparente » pour les avions de chasse. Conçu pour évaluer rigoureusement les offres sur des éléments de capacité, de coûts et d'avantages économiques, ce processus a finalement abouti à seulement deux chasseurs – le F-35 et le Saab Gripen de la Suède. Cela a pratiquement garanti la victoire du F-35. Le dernier chasseur de fabrication étrangère et non américain à entrer dans l’Aviation royale canadienne était le Vampire en 1948, fabriqué par l'entreprise britannique Havilland. En règle générale, les militaires canadiens veulent des plates-formes qui offrent une interopérabilité parfaite ou du moins très importante avec les forces américaines, et non une simple interopérabilité de base, comme cela aurait été le cas avec le chasseur suédois. Le fait que le F-35 n'ait pas encore perdu une compétition est dû à la fois à l'ampleur du programme et à l'influence des États-Unis. Plus les forces aériennes qui l'achètent sont nombreuses - la décision du Canada porte ce nombre à 18 - plus les coûts opérationnels et autres sont bas. En effet, les effets de réseaux, comme les économistes les appellent, génèrent non seulement des profits pour les entrepreneurs, mais aussi du pouvoir et de l'influence au niveau international. Invoquant des problèmes de sécurité liés aux détails de conception de l'avion, le gouvernement américain demande à tous les clients du F-35 de retirer de leurs réseaux tous les équipements 5G fabriqués par la société chinoise Huawei dans les années à venir. Ceux qui ne se conformeront pas seront probablement retirés du programme. C’est ce qui s’est produit avec la Turquie en 2019 après que son gouvernement eut décidé d'acheter un système de défense antimissile russe. Les responsables américains ont déclaré alors que cela posait des risques pour les F-35, notamment la possibilité que la Russie utilise secrètement le système pour obtenir des détails classifiés sur le jet. Cela illustre la capacité des Etats puissants à gérer dans le cadre d'accords « patron-client » leurs relations avec leurs alliés fortement dépendants d’eux. Et en matière d'alliances, le Canada n'est qu'un client parmi d’autres des États-Unis. Les conditions d'achat Les conditions liées à l'achat des F-35 ont incité certains à qualifier le programme d'avions de chasse de « One Belt, One Road » des États-Unis - une référence ironique à la principale initiative de politique étrangère de la Chine et à la tendance chinoise à forcer les petits États à y participer. Dans la politique canadienne, cependant, ces ficelles sont en grande partie sans importance, car la dépendance à l'égard des États-Unis et de leur puissance militaire a longtemps été perçue un énorme avantage net. Mais qu'en est-il aujourd'hui, avec la poursuite de l'invasion russe en Ukraine, la montée en puissance de la Chine et la radicalisation du parti républicain américain ? Ces développements sont troublants. Toutefois les fondements de la défense du Canada ne changent pas nécessairement de façon spectaculaire. Quoiqu'il arrive en Ukraine et lors des futures élections américaines, il est presque certain que les États-Unis donneront la priorité au continent nord-américain, en surveillant de près la Russie et la Chine. Par conséquent, on s'attendra à ce qu'Ottawa contribue davantage à ses engagements dans le cadre du NORAD et de l'OTAN, ce qui signifie investir dans les nouveaux aéronefs. L'achat d'un nouvel avion - celui que les conservateurs ont promis d'acheter il y a plus de 12 ans – et celui dont les Libéraux ont appuyé la planification il y a 26 ans – s’inscrit dans cette direction. Il reste encore du travail à faire Compte tenu de l'éventail des risques et des menaces - notamment de la part de puissances autoritaires - auxquels le Canada pourrait être confronté (cyberguerre ; pandémie ; catastrophes naturelles ; accélération des effets du changement climatique), les achats militaires ne sont qu'une petite pièce du casse-tête global. Le principal défi pour le gouvernement fédéral est d'évaluer les problèmes dans leur ensemble et d'améliorer la capacité du Canada à s'attaquer à ces questions par lui-même, sans être trop affecté ou dépendant des États-Unis. Tous les partis parlementaires sont d'accord sur cet objectif. Il faut pour cela aligner les objectifs et les engagements sur des ressources nécessairement limitées. Un examen approfondi et complet des questions de défense, de sécurité, de diplomatie et de développement auxquelles le Canada est confronté est attendu depuis longtemps. S'il s’achève bientôt, la ministre Anand et ses collègues recevront encore plus de remerciements, tant de la part des Canadiens que de leurs alliés. ## Entre alignement et éloignement : le dilemme stratégique des alliés de Washington à l’ère Biden URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entre-alignement-et-eloignement-le-dilemme-strategique-des-allies-de-washington-a-lere-biden/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Les alliés de Washington font face à un dilemme central : renforcer leur alignement stratégique sur l’Amérique ou, au contraire, accroître leur autonomie stratégique. Points saillants  Le mandat de Donald Trump a érodé la confiance des principaux alliés démocratiques envers les États-Unis. À tel point que ces derniers doutent désormais de la fidélité de Washington et de leur engagement à assurer leur sécurité à moyen et à long terme. La crainte de l’abandon par Washington a provoqué des réactions diverses dans les capitales alliées allant de la volonté de renforcer leur alignement sur les États-Unis à un éloignement stratégique assumé. Si l’élection de Joe Biden a rassuré les alliés sur les intentions des États-Unis d’ici 2025, elle ne peut effacer l’héritage de Donald Trump, pas plus qu’elle ne peut stopper le déclin relatif des États-Unis et le déplacement de la puissance vers l’Orient. La présidence Biden aura sûrement un effet apaisant sur les relations avec les alliés, mais elle ne pourra résoudre leur dilemme stratégique. Contexte Les alliés démocratiques des États-Unis peuvent aujourd’hui se réjouir de l’assermentation de Joe Biden à la présidence. Durant la campagne présidentielle, Biden a répété sa volonté de ramener les États-Unis au centre du jeu international en renforçant les liens de confiance avec ses alliés de l’Europe et de la région indopacifique tout en favorisant une approche multilatérale dans la gestion des enjeux internationaux. Cette réjouissance pourrait toutefois être de courte durée puisqu’il est improbable que les États-Unis reprennent leur rôle d’hégémon incontesté auquel ils nous ont habitués par le passé. D’abord, les conditions exceptionnelles qui ont favorisé le « moment unipolaire » appartiennent au passé. Les rivalités entre grandes puissances et la conclusion du Partenariat économique régional global nous rappellent qu’une transition de puissance est en marche de l’Occident vers l’Orient et que la présidence Biden n’y changera rien. Ensuite, les 74 millions d’électeurs américains qui ont voté pour Donald Trump en novembre dernier ont confirmé que le trumpisme n’est pas une erreur de parcours, mais une force politique avec laquelle les alliés de Washington devront composer à l’avenir. L’assaut contre le Capitole le 6 janvier dernier nous rappelle d’ailleurs jusqu’où certains éléments radicaux du mouvement sont prêts à aller. Enfin, les États-Unis font face à de nombreux défis en politique intérieure dont la crise sanitaire, la récession économique, mais aussi les divisions politiques profondes qui auront pour effet de plomber les initiatives américaines à l’international. En somme, ce contexte tendu et incertain souligne le dilemme central auquel font face les alliés de Washington à l’aube d’une administration Biden : renforcer leur alignement stratégique sur l’Amérique ou, au contraire, accroître leur autonomie stratégique, voire privilégier leur éloignement de Washington, afin d’anticiper le retour possible d’une administration hostile au multilatéralisme dès janvier 2025. Trump et la peur de l’abandon Au cours des quatre dernières années, la rhétorique du président Trump et l’incompétence stratégique de son administration ont encouragé les alliés traditionnels à envisager les États-Unis comme un risque plutôt qu’une source de sécurité. D’une part, le 45e président s’est évertué à remettre en cause les alliances conclues avec les alliés. Aucune alliance n’a été épargnée puisqu’aussi bien l’OTAN que les alliances avec le Japon, la Corée ou l’Australie ont été dénigrées pendant son mandat. D’autre part, l’administration Trump s’est désengagée de plusieurs traités internationaux, tels l’Accord de Paris sur les changements climatiques ou le Partenariat transpacifique, mais également de plusieurs institutions internationales, telles que l’UNESCO ou l’OMS. Tant et si bien qu’en quatre ans, Trump a érodé la confiance de ses alliés et, ce faisant, il a considérablement accru leur crainte d’être abandonné par Washington en cas de besoin. C’est pourquoi, malgré leur attachement à l’ordre international libéral, les alliés historiques des États-Unis ont dû sérieusement anticiper la possibilité de devoir assurer leur sécurité et leur défense sans l’aide de Washington. Les faits suggèrent toutefois que ces alliés ont réagi de manière disparate depuis 2017 en adoptant des stratégies variées pour faire face à ce risque. Entre alignement et éloignement stratégique L’éventail des stratégies adoptées par les alliés traditionnels de Washington peut être résumé par quatre principaux comportements stratégiques qui se sont manifestés au cours des dernières années. Le premier correspond à un renforcement de l’engagement envers les États-Unis. Certains alliés, comme la Pologne ou le Japon, ont maintenu, voire approfondi, leurs relations de sécurité avec Washington. Face à des menaces externes réelles et en absence d’une alternative stratégique viable, ces États ont signifié leur volonté d’intensifier leur alignement stratégique sur Washington afin de démontrer leur fidélité, espérant ainsi réduire les risques d’abandon de la part de Washington. La couverture de risque est la seconde attitude observée chez plusieurs alliés. Celle-ci consiste à réduire le risque et les pertes associés à l’incertitude causée par Trump et par le déclin relatif des États-Unis en diversifiant ses stratégies. Elle s’incarne souvent par une augmentation des capacités de défense, c’est-à-dire la volonté de développer une certaine autonomie en matière de politique étrangère et de défense, sans pour autant perdre le lien privilégié avec Washington. L’Allemagne et l’Australie, qui en sont de bons exemples, estiment ainsi qu’il est illusoire de se passer complètement des États-Unis pour se défendre. C’est pourquoi la ministre de la Défense allemande, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, a déclaré que « L’Europe reste dépendante de la protection militaire américaine, tant nucléaire que conventionnelle, mais les États-Unis ne pourront pas porter seuls la bannière des valeurs occidentales ». En ce qui concerne l’Australie, le gouvernement envisage de construire une armée plus importante tout en se déclarant attaché à l’alliance de sécurité qui unit l’Australie et les États-Unis depuis 1951. Par conséquent, ces pays ne souhaitent pas se distancer des États-Unis, mais demeurent cependant conscients qu’ils sont responsables d’assurer la stabilité de leur environnement régional. Le troisième comportement observé, notamment en France, est celui de la quête d’une autonomie stratégique. La finalité de celle-ci est double. D’abord, l’objectif est de peser davantage dans la résolution des enjeux internationaux. L’initiative française du Forum pour la paix en est un bel exemple. Ensuite, cette autonomie a pour but de se préparer à l’éventualité où les États-Unis n’honoreraient plus leurs engagements. Pour les tenants de cette approche, il est nécessaire de construire une défense européenne et d’œuvrer ainsi pour une autonomie dans les domaines technologiques et stratégiques. Telle est notamment la volonté du président français Emmanuel Macron. Enfin, la dernière stratégie adoptée par certains alliés est celle d’un éloignement, voire d’un changement d’alliance au profit de puissances concurrentes. C’est le cas de la Turquie qui s’est distancée de Washington en se rapprochant de Moscou et de Pékin et qui œuvre à mettre sur pied une industrie de la défense pleinement indépendante. Ankara se montre en effet de plus en plus antagoniste envers ses partenaires de l’OTAN, notamment en achetant des systèmes de défense S-400 à la Russie, mais aussi par son engagement militaire en Syrie, en Irak, en Libye, dans le Caucase ou en Méditerranée. Le président Erdogan a également conclu de nouveaux partenariats stratégiques avec le Kazakhstan et l’Ouzbékistan, des alliés de la Russie. Ces nouveaux accords favorisent le partage de renseignements, la collaboration entre les industries de défense et les exercices militaires conjoints. La Turquie compte finalement sur la Chine pour diversifier ses relations économiques et diplomatiques. Avec la conclusion de 10 accords depuis 2016, la Chine est devenue le second partenaire commercial d’Ankara après la Russie. Erdogan privilégie ainsi les opportunités économiques et stratégiques à sa relation historique avec les États-Unis. Joe Biden peut-il atténuer le dilemme stratégique des alliés ?   C’est un truisme que d’affirmer que la présidence Biden est attendue avec impatience dans les capitales alliées. D’autant que le 46e président des États-Unis souhaite insuffler une nouvelle dynamique dans l’action et la coopération internationale. La nomination d’Anthony Blinken au poste de Secrétaire d’État envoie d’ailleurs un signal clair à cet égard. Biden s’est notamment engagé à organiser un Sommet mondial sur la démocratie au cours de sa première année de mandat afin de renouveler l’esprit et les objectifs communs des nations démocratiques. Il compte également solidifier les organisations internationales qui ont été endommagées par l’administration Trump et affiche une loyauté indéfectible à l’égard de l’Alliance atlantique. Joe Biden pourra d’ailleurs s’appuyer sur des États volontaires comme la France en Europe ou l’Australie et le Japon dans l’Indopacifique afin de réaliser ces objectifs. Ces États partagent en effet l’idée que la Chine est un concurrent systémique capable de déstabiliser l’ordre international. Ils soutiennent également que les alliés doivent se responsabiliser en matière de défense et participer activement à la gestion de leur environnement. La France intervient ainsi en Afrique dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme tandis que le Japon et l’Australie multiplient les initiatives multilatérales pour façonner l’architecture de sécurité asiatique. Ce sont finalement des États qui sont capables d’évoluer, par leur haut niveau de technologie et d’interopérabilité, de manière conjointe avec les forces militaires américaines en cas de crise majeure. Ainsi, à l’inverse de son prédécesseur, le style de Joe Biden devrait stimuler la coordination et l’échange d’information entre les États-Unis et ses alliés. À en croire Joe Biden, l’Amérique serait donc de retour. Mais cela sera-t-il suffisant pour atténuer le dilemme stratégique auquel font face de nombreux alliés ? Il semble à première vue peu probable que les alliés reviennent en arrière en effaçant en quelque sorte les années Trump. Dans un contexte de déclin relatif des États-Unis, la diversification des liens économiques, diplomatiques et stratégiques se poursuivra tout comme la volonté des alliés de s’autonomiser davantage par rapport à Washington. En 2021, les Européens s’accordent sur l’idée qu’ils doivent se responsabiliser pour assurer leur propre défense. Cela se traduit par une augmentation de leur budget de défense, la coopération entre les industries de défense de chaque pays, ainsi que par l’institutionnalisation d’une défense européenne. La diversification et l’autonomisation sont également des volontés partagées par les proches alliés de l’Indopacifique. La récente signature d’un pacte de défense entre le Japon et l’Australie indique que ces deux pays souhaitent continuer leur autonomisation tout en maintenant un lien fort avec Washington. Finalement, l’effet apaisant d’une nouvelle administration Biden ne fera pas disparaître de profondes divergences existantes entre les États-Unis et leurs alliés. Elles sont d’ordre économique et financier (agriculture, taxation des entreprises du numérique, régulation de la vie privée en ligne), mais surtout stratégique. La politique étrangère américaine priorise en effet la rivalité avec la Chine tandis que l’Europe souhaite que l’attention se porte principalement sur le terrorisme et la résurgence de l’agressivité russe. La nature des réponses à apporter à ces menaces reste également problématique. Il existe une certaine réticence au sein des alliés à suivre aveuglément la stratégie américaine de confrontation avec la Chine. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada Alors que les alliés européens et indopacifiques ont adopté des stratégies mixtes en réponse aux actions de l’administration Trump, le Canada a pour sa part privilégié sa relation avec les États-Unis, interdépendance et géographie obligent, malgré les tensions et les différends avec le président Trump. Le Canada devrait profiter de l’arrivée de l’administration Biden et de la stabilité relative qu’elle devrait procurer durant les quatre prochaines années pour mettre de l’avant les initiatives suivantes. D’abord, le Canada devrait participer activement au renforcement des liens de confiance au sein de l’OTAN tout en maintenant sa contribution militaire aux mesures de dissuasion en Europe de l’Est et dans les pays baltes. Ensuite, le Canada aurait intérêt à se doter d’une stratégie claire pour l’Asie. Ottawa a été incapable jusqu’à maintenant de définir une telle stratégie. Le Canada pourrait accroître sa participation aux différents mécanismes multilatéraux visant à prévenir les crises et atténuer les risques dans cette région. Ces forums sont des lieux privilégiés pour défendre les valeurs jugées essentielles. Il pourrait également approfondir ses relations avec les « like-minded states » de l’Indopacifique comme l’Australie, le Japon et la Corée du Sud. Plus précisément, renforcer l’intégration des industries de défense ainsi que la collaboration entre les forces armées pourrait être une avenue à privilégier. Cela pourrait aussi se traduire par la signature de partenariats stratégiques avec ces pays. Encore faut-il qu’il y ait une volonté politique et l’allocation de ressources supplémentaires, ce qui est loin d’être évident en temps de crise sanitaire et économique. ## Entre engagement et contrainte : leçons de la guerre de Corée pour la politique de défense canadienne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entre-engagement-et-contrainte-lecons-de-la-guerre-de-coree-pour-la-politique-de-defense-canadienne/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Ce texte fait partie de la série spéciale d’essais Retour vers le futur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, financée par une subvention du programme MINDS du ministère de la Défense nationale. Résumé En juin 1950, l’invasion de la Corée du Sud place le Canada face à un dilemme stratégique entre impératifs de sécurité collective et contraintes militaires internes. L’impréparation des Forces armées réduit la marge de manœuvre d’Ottawa, contraignant le gouvernement à une réponse graduée façonnée davantage par la nécessité matérielle que par une stratégie préétablie. Les pressions états-uniennes, les considérations parlementaires et l’exigence d’un mandat onusien se combinent pour produire un engagement conditionnel dont la majeure partie est finalement réorientée vers l’OTAN en Europe. Trois enseignements structurants en découlent pour la politique de défense canadienne contemporaine : l’impréparation militaire contraint fondamentalement les options politiques en temps de crise ; la gestion des pressions extérieures exige des principes directeurs articulés en amont ; et une hiérarchisation explicite des engagements entre théâtres d’opérations est indispensable pour maintenir à la fois la crédibilité alliée et la cohérence stratégique nationale. Introduction Lorsque, le 26 juin 1950, les forces de la République populaire démocratique de Corée franchissent le 38e parallèle et envahissent la République de Corée, le Cabinet canadien porte sur la crise un jugement ambivalent : si l’événement revêt une « grande importance politique », il ne présente, selon les ministres, qu’une « importance stratégique mineure ». Sur le plan politique, la crise constitue un test décisif pour le système de sécurité collective de l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) et la crédibilité du Canada comme partenaire fiable. Sur le plan stratégique, toutefois, la péninsule coréenne présente un intérêt limité pour la sécurité canadienne directe, l’Europe demeurant, selon le secrétaire aux Affaires extérieures, « le front principal exigeant une défense ». À peine deux mois plus tard, le gouvernement libéral annonce pourtant la création d’une Force spéciale de 4 485 militaires destinée au théâtre coréen. Cette force doublera rapidement à près de 10 000. Au total, ce sont un peu moins de 27 000 Canadiens qui serviront en Corée. La crise catalyse en outre un réarmement accéléré : les dépenses de défense atteignent un sommet de plus de 7 % du produit intérieur brut en 1953, tandis qu’Ottawa amorce dès 1951 un déploiement militaire en Europe qui se maintiendra jusqu’en 1993. Ce revirement rapide soulève une question centrale : par quels mécanismes le Canada est-il parvenu à décider l’envoi de troupes en Corée et quels facteurs ont déterminé le calendrier, l’ampleur et les modalités de cet engagement ? Cette note stratégique examine le processus décisionnel du gouvernement canadien entre juin et décembre 1950. Elle met en évidence la manière dont les pressions exercées par les États-Unis, les contraintes militaires internes, les considérations parlementaires et les principes du multilatéralisme onusien se sont combinés pour produire une réponse graduelle, prudente et conditionnelle à la crise coréenne. L’analyse souligne une tension persistante entre trois impératifs concurrents : répondre aux attentes des alliés, préserver l’autonomie décisionnelle canadienne et maintenir des capacités militaires suffisantes afin d’assurer la défense continentale et européenne. Cette étude de cas fournit ainsi trois enseignements structurants pour la politique de défense canadienne contemporaine. Premièrement, l’impréparation militaire contraint fondamentalement les options politiques disponibles en temps de crise, réduisant la capacité d’Ottawa à répondre de manière autonome aux demandes alliées. Deuxièmement, la gestion des pressions extérieures exige des principes directeurs articulés en amont, afin d’éviter l’improvisation et de préserver une marge de manœuvre stratégique. Troisièmement, dans un contexte de ressources limitées et de priorités divergentes entre théâtres d’opérations, une hiérarchisation explicite des engagements est indispensable pour maintenir à la fois la crédibilité alliée et la cohérence stratégique nationale. L'impréparation militaire comme contrainte décisionnelle fondamentale Lorsque le Cabinet se réunit le 26 juin 1950, les ministres constatent que le Canada ne dispose d’aucune force immédiatement déployable. Au même moment, les responsables de la Défense nationale et des Affaires extérieures avertissent que, sans intervention extérieure, le gouvernement de la République de Corée pourrait rapidement tomber. Le premier ministre canadien, Louis St Laurent, souligne cependant qu’un déploiement de la brigade aéroportée affaiblirait dangereusement les défenses du pays. Cette contrainte matérielle fondamentale, soit l’absence de capacités expéditionnaires prêtes à l’emploi, va structurer l’ensemble du processus décisionnel canadien au cours des mois suivants. Lester B. Pearson, secrétaire d’État aux Affaires extérieures, formule le dilemme stratégique central : une intervention états-unienne comporte le risque d’une conflagration plus générale, tandis que l’inaction pourrait entraîner l’effondrement rapide de la République de Corée. Face à cette alternative, le Cabinet reconnaît l’importance politique considérable de la crise, sans pour autant prendre de décision opérationnelle. Cette hésitation initiale traduit l’absence d’options militaires immédiatement viables qui existe au début du conflit pour le Canada. Le 28 juin, le Cabinet adopte trois mesures initiales, soit l’envoi de deux officiers à titre d’observateurs, la consultation des autres membres des Nations Unies sur leurs contributions prévues et l’évaluation de l’utilité de destroyers canadiens dans les opérations navales du Pacifique. Ces décisions permettent au Canada de signaler son engagement politique et multilatéral sans recourir à un déploiement terrestre, tout en se donnant le temps nécessaire afin d’évaluer l’évolution de la situation militaire et les attentes des alliés, en particulier des États-Unis. Lors du débat parlementaire du 26 juin, le chef de l’opposition officielle, George Drew (Progressiste conservateur), souligne l’urgence de la crise en notant que la Corée est plus proche du Canada, en temps de transport, que ne l’était la Pologne en septembre 1939. Malgré ce consensus émergent sur la gravité de la menace, les options concrètes demeurent limitées. Les déclarations ultérieures de Pearson devant le Parlement, en août 1950, mettent en lumière l’ampleur de l’impréparation canadienne. Il reconnaît que la planification de défense antérieure reposait sur une petite armée régulière hautement entraînée, conçue principalement pour la défense continentale, et que la possibilité d’un déploiement expéditionnaire rapide n’avait pas été envisagée. Les chefs d’état-major confirment cette réalité lors de la réunion du Comité de défense du 19 juillet, déconseillant tout déploiement terrestre supplémentaire, indiquant que tout envoi immédiat nécessiterait le démantèlement de la Force de frappe mobile, seul actif de défense continentale du Canada. Résister aux pressions états-uniennes tout en préservant l’autonomie décisionnelle Dès les premiers jours de la crise, le processus décisionnel canadien est aussi fortement influencé par les pressions états-uniennes, tout en étant encadré par la volonté explicite d’Ottawa de préserver son autonomie politique. Le 27 juin, l’ambassadeur des États-Unis à Ottawa, Stanley Woodward, soumet à Pearson un projet de déclaration du président Truman concernant l’attaque par la République populaire démocratique de Corée. Pearson s’oppose fermement à deux éléments clefs : la référence à l’« impérialisme communiste » et l’intention états-unienne d’agir militairement avant d’obtenir une autorisation formelle des Nations Unies. Il estime que Washington prend l’initiative, en s’attendant à ce que les autres pays le soutiennent de force par la suite. Il ne s’agissait pas d’un attachement abstrait au multilatéralisme, mais d’une condition politique essentielle au maintien du consensus parlementaire et de l’appui de l’opinion publique. En effet, la question de la structure de commandement cristallise cette tension lorsque Washington propose le 4 juillet que les forces onusiennes opèrent « sous un commandement unifié sous les États-Unis », Pearson objecte vigoureusement, affirmant que le Canada attache « la plus grande importance aux auspices des Nations Unies » pour toute participation. Le compromis du 7 juillet, autorisant un commandement unifié sous une direction états-unienne, tout en affirmant le caractère onusien de l’opération, permet de concilier temporairement ces positions. En juillet, à mesure que la situation militaire se détériore, les pressions états-uniennes s’intensifient. Le 14 juillet, le secrétaire général de l’ONU, Trygve Lie, lance un appel public à des contributions supplémentaires, y compris des forces terrestres. Pearson apprend cet appel par les médias, ce qui suscite l’irritation du Cabinet. Lors de la réunion du 19 juillet, plusieurs ministres dénoncent le caractère unilatéral de cette démarche, tandis que St Laurent déplore l’initiative du secrétaire général. La correspondance privée de Pearson révèle sa frustration face aux tactiques diplomatiques états-uniennes, notant que les diplomates états-uniens semblent avoir reçu instruction de déployer tous les efforts pour pousser le Canada à envoyer des forces terrestres. Le processus décisionnel canadien apparaît ainsi comme une tentative constante de concilier deux objectifs en tension, soit répondre aux attentes des alliés tout en conservant une marge de manœuvre stratégique. Le basculement vers l’engagement terrestre Avant même que la décision relative aux forces terrestres ne soit arrêtée, le Cabinet adopte le 19 juillet une série de mesures intermédiaires révélatrices de l’approche incrémentale canadienne : le déploiement d’un escadron d’avions de transport North Star, l’accélération des programmes de défense pour un montant estimé entre quarante et cinquante millions de dollars et la publication d’une déclaration publique sur la position du Canada. Le Cabinet examine également quatre options pour une contribution élargie : des unités nationales constituées, des forces de volontaires recrutés au pays, des volontaires pour une division onusienne, ou des volontaires individuels pour une formation de type légion étrangère. Le processus décisionnel entre dans une phase critique à la fin juillet 1950. Lors de la réunion extraordinaire du Cabinet du 27 juillet, Pearson soutient que le Canada devrait amorcer le recrutement d’une brigade de volontaires destinée aux Nations Unies, afin de renforcer la position des États-Unis dans la lutte contre le communisme. Le ministre de la Défense nationale, Brooke Claxton, évoque la décision britannique de déployer une brigade malgré les réserves militaires, créant un précédent politique que le Canada ne peut ignorer. Tout comme Ottawa, Londres fait alors face à des limites importantes dans la possibilité de déployer des troupes de cette façon. D’autres ministres canadiens insistent sur l’importance de soutenir les États-Unis. C.D. Howe (Ministre du Commerce) prédit que l’engagement d’autres États du Commonwealth rendra la pression irrésistible, tandis que R.W. Mayhew (Ministre des Pêches) soutient que le Canada ne peut « honorablement manquer » d’assister les États-Unis. La décision formelle intervient le 7 août 1950. Le Cabinet approuve la création d’une Force spéciale de 4 485 militaires comprenant un quartier général de brigade, trois bataillons d’infanterie, de l’artillerie et des unités antichars, du génie, des transmissions, des services médicaux et d’intendance, ainsi qu’environ 900 renforts, pour un coût additionnel estimé à 90 millions de dollars. Dès le 15 août, 3 027 engagements sont enregistrés, dont près de la moitié d’anciens combattants. Le recrutement procède rapidement, et le gouvernement accepte une nouvelle cible. Le 18 août, la Force spéciale atteint pratiquement son plein effectif avec 9 979 personnes incluant les renforts. L’allocution radiodiffusée de St Laurent révèle toutefois une certaine ambiguïté. Pour Ottawa, la Force spéciale pourrait être affectée à la guerre de Corée ou intégrée à la structure de défense collective de l’OTAN en Europe. La priorisation stratégique : l’Europe avant la Corée Une fois la décision d’août arrêtée, le processus décisionnel canadien se concentre sur les modalités de déploiement et sur la gestion des pressions visant à élargir l’engagement. Le 24 août, Ottawa insiste auprès du haut-commissaire britannique sur le caractère exclusivement onusien de sa contribution, refusant toute interprétation comme un engagement dans le cadre impérial ou intergouvernemental du Commonwealth. Le Canada rejette explicitement l’idée d’une « division du Commonwealth », suggérant plutôt une désignation alternative telle que « Première division des Nations Unies ». Après le succès du débarquement d’Inchon en septembre 1950 et l’avance rapide des forces onusiennes, le contexte se modifie. L’évolution rapide de la situation amène le gouvernement à réévaluer la pertinence d’un déploiement de combat. Des rapports du brigadier Fleury avertissent que le Canada est « cruellement condamné à un rôle d’occupation » qui deviendra un problème de moral majeur, et recommandent de limiter la participation à la force minimale acceptable. Le général Bradley informe pour sa part le général Foulkes que les chefs d’état-major états-uniens ont approuvé une recommandation de ne pas déployer la Force spéciale en Corée. Le Cabinet opte pour une approche conditionnelle, soit le déploiement d’un bataillon en Corée pour des missions limitées et envoyer le reste de la Force spéciale aux États-Unis pour compléter l’entraînement en vue d’un déploiement en Europe. L’intervention massive des forces chinoises en novembre 1950 bouleverse toutefois ces calculs, mais le cadre décisionnel fondamental reste inchangé. En décembre, Pearson soutient que le front principal exigeant une défense est l’Europe occidentale. Cette évaluation s’ancre dans une analyse stratégique plus large. En effet, Pearson avertit que la « période de plus grand danger », initialement projetée pour 1953-1954, est déjà arrivée. Selon lui, le soutien soviétique à l’intervention chinoise suggère une disposition à risquer un conflit global, menaçant de placer la quasi-totalité de l’Asie et de l’Europe sous domination communiste. C’est dans ce cadre que la majorité de la Force spéciale est dirigée vers l’OTAN, tandis qu’un engagement limité, soit le 2e Bataillon du Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, est maintenu en Corée. Ce réarmement culmine avec l’adoption, le 15 janvier 1951, du « Programme B », doté d’un budget d’environ 140 millions de dollars. La Marine reçoit l’ordre de racheter vingt-trois navires et de construire onze bâtiments neufs ; l’Armée standardise son équipement sur le modèle états-unien et élargit ses régiments antiaériens à 20 000 personnes ; l’Aviation accélère la production de F-86 à cinquante appareils par mois et établit des installations d’entraînement pour 1 100 équipages de l’OTAN. Si la crise coréenne catalyse cette expansion, c’est bien la défense européenne qui constitue la priorité stratégique principale. Leçons de la guerre de Corée pour la politique de défense canadienne contemporaine En 2026, le Canada se trouve confronté à un trilemme stratégique d’une nature comparable : la perspective d’un conflit majeur dans le détroit de Taïwan à très brève échéance, l’agression russe persistante en Europe depuis plus d’une décennie, et la gestion de la sécurité continentale et du pays, notamment par l’Arctique. À l’instar de la conjoncture de 1950, Ottawa doit aujourd’hui réagir à une dégradation rapide de l’environnement sécuritaire international depuis une réelle position d’impréparation structurelle, tout en consentant des investissements militaires substantiels dans des délais contraints. De même que le Canada avait dû constituer de toutes pièces une force expéditionnaire en quelques semaines, le gouvernement canadien est aujourd’hui appelé à reconstruire des capacités militaires considérablement atrophiées par plusieurs décennies de sous-investissement, tout en répondant simultanément aux demandes pressantes de ses alliés, dans le cadre d’une relation stratégique avec les États-Unis en pleine recomposition. L’examen du processus décisionnel canadien face à la guerre de Corée offre ainsi un cadre analytique éclairant afin de saisir les contraintes structurelles (matérielles, institutionnelles et politiques) qui conditionnent aujourd’hui une éventuelle remise à niveau rapide de la politique de défense canadienne dans un contexte international en détérioration. L’impréparation militaire limite fondamentalement les options politiques en temps de crise Tout d’abord, l’impréparation militaire limite fondamentalement les options politiques en temps de crise. Les lacunes révélées en 1950 ont contraint le Canada à adopter une réponse graduée non par choix stratégique, mais par nécessité matérielle. Certes, la préservation de l’autonomie décisionnelle, l’exigence d’un mandat onusien et le maintien du consensus parlementaire auraient vraisemblablement conduit Ottawa à privilégier une approche incrémentale. Toutefois, l’impréparation a transformé cette prudence, d’une éventuelle préférence politique, en contrainte structurelle. Un gouvernement disposant de capacités déployables conserve la possibilité de moduler son engagement et dispose ainsi d’un levier diplomatique face aux pressions alliées, alors qu’un gouvernement dépourvu de telles capacités perd cette flexibilité. Les données du Plan ministériel 2025-2026 confirment la persistance de cette contrainte. Avec environ 63 500 militaires réguliers et 23 000 réservistes en 2024-2025, les FAC accusent un déficit par rapport à l'effectif autorisé de 71 500 réguliers et 30 000 réservistes. La disponibilité opérationnelle est tout aussi déficiente : en 2023-2024, seulement 29 % des objectifs de disponibilité planifiés étaient atteints pour les missions essentielles et 67 % des éléments de force étaient prêts à exécuter les opérations. Comme le démontre le dernier Plan ministériel, l'état de l'équipement accentue ces lacunes, avec des taux de disponibilité de 45,73 % pour les flottes maritimes, 49 % pour les parcs terrestres et 48,9 % pour les flottes aérospatiales. Pour y remédier, le gouvernement a porté les investissements en défense à 2 % du PIB en 2025-2026, soit environ 63 milliards de dollars, avec l'objectif d'atteindre 5 % du PIB d'ici 2035. Cependant, ces investissements mettront des années à produire leurs effets, limitant entre-temps les options stratégiques du Canada. Articuler des principes clairs pour équilibrer les pressions alliées et l’autonomie stratégique Il est aussi nécessaire d’articuler des principes clairs pour équilibrer les pressions alliées et l’autonomie stratégique. La guerre de Corée a souligné l’asymétrie structurelle des relations canado-états-uniennes et la nécessité de fixer à l’avance des limites et des modalités de contribution. Dans le contexte actuel de recomposition géopolitique et de redéfinition profonde de la relation bilatérale avec Washington, cette leçon revêt une acuité particulière, d’autant que l'expérience de 1950 illustre les coûts d'une absence de cadre décisionnel préétabli : les modalités de contribution canadienne ont été définies sous pression et au fil des événements, privant Ottawa de la capacité de négocier ses engagements depuis une position de cohérence plutôt que de réaction. Les deux courants dominants de la pensée stratégique états-unienne, qu’ils priorisent la compétition avec la Chine ou le recentrage sur le continent américain, actent de fait un désengagement relatif envers les alliés traditionnels. Pour Ottawa, cela exige le développement de capacités militaires et industrielles de défense suffisantes pour faire du Canada un acteur doté d’une réelle autonomie d’action. Sans ces capacités, celui-ci demeure structurellement dépendant de Washington et se trouve contraint d’accepter des conditions d’engagement qui ne reflètent pas nécessairement ses propres priorités. La Stratégie industrielle de défense publiée en février 2026 constitue un premier jalon, mais les tensions persistantes entre impératifs opérationnels et objectifs économiques au sein même de l’appareil gouvernemental suggèrent que l’arbitrage entre autonomie stratégique et accès aux capacités alliées de haut niveau demeure pour l’instant irrésolu. Le Canada devrait par ailleurs privilégier le développement de cadres d’engagement minilatéraux sur des enjeux stratégiques précis, en consolidant des partenariats ciblés, notamment avec le Royaume-Uni, les pays nordiques et baltes, ou certains alliés indopacifiques, afin de disposer de leviers d’influence collectifs capables d’équilibrer la relation asymétrique avec les États-Unis. De telles coalitions à géométrie variable, fondées sur des intérêts convergents et des capacités complémentaires, offrent un cadre plus agile que les grandes structures d’alliance pour développer des consortiums industriels, coordonner les acquisitions et structurer une coopération de défense résiliente face à l’incertitude du soutien états-unien. Hiérarchiser explicitement les engagements entre théâtres d’opérations Enfin, la guerre de Corée démontre la nécessité d’une hiérarchisation explicite des engagements entre théâtres d’opérations. Dès l’été 1950, le gouvernement canadien fait face à des demandes simultanées et concurrentes : défense continentale, engagement en Corée sous mandat onusien et contribution à la défense européenne par l’OTAN. L’opposition parlementaire avait clairement identifié ce risque de dispersion. Victor Quelch (Crédit Social), avertissait contre la dissipation de forces limitées à travers de multiples théâtres alors que les engagements sous le Traité de l’Atlantique Nord demeuraient non honorés, tandis que Douglas Harkness (Progressiste Conservateur) prévenait que l’Union soviétique pourrait exploiter de multiples petits conflits pour affaiblir l’Occident. La réponse du gouvernement, soit un bataillon en Corée et le gros de la Force spéciale redirigé vers l’OTAN en Europe, représentait une priorisation de fait. Cette leçon revêt une pertinence directe dans le contexte stratégique actuel. Tant sous l'impulsion de ses alliés que de ses propres ambitions stratégiques, le Canada s'efforce simultanément de renforcer sa présence en Europe de l'Est dans le cadre de l'OTAN, de contribuer à la dissuasion dans l'Indopacifique, de moderniser la défense continentale par l'intermédiaire du NORAD et d'accroître sa posture dans l'Arctique. Or, malgré une hiérarchie de priorités explicite allant de la défense territoriale à la sécurité continentale puis aux engagements internationaux, la persistance de capacités limitées impose des arbitrages que la politique de défense actuelle n'opère pas pleinement. Afin d’éviter de reproduire l'improvisation de 1950, le gouvernement devrait définir en amont des critères d'engagement (conditions de déploiement, plafonds de contribution, mécanismes de réévaluation) pour différents scénarios de crise, afin de disposer d'un cadre structuré face aux sollicitations alliées. Le risque identifié en 1950, celui de disperser des ressources insuffisantes en réponse aux sollicitations alliées, demeure. Dans ce contexte, le Canada aurait intérêt à concentrer ses efforts sur la défense de l'Arctique, théâtre où convergent souveraineté nationale et obligations envers l'Alliance. Ancrer la contribution canadienne à l'OTAN dans la défense du flanc nord permettrait non seulement de rationaliser l'allocation des ressources, mais aussi de renforcer l'autonomie stratégique du Canada vis-à-vis des États-Unis. Une telle hiérarchisation, assumée et communiquée aux alliés, renforcerait plutôt qu'elle n'affaiblirait la crédibilité canadienne au sein de l'Alliance, en substituant à une dispersion symbolique sur tous les fronts une contribution fiable et prévisible dans un créneau stratégique défini. Crédit image: Jim Hoffman, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 via Flickr ## Entre l’ouest et l’est : la position ambigüe de l’Italie dans un monde en transformation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entre-louest-et-lest-la-position-ambigue-de-litalie-dans-un-monde-en-transformation/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Dans un contexte d’augmentation de la compétition entre les grandes puissances, ce point chaud a pour objectif d’informer sur la position italienne dans cette compétition. Dans un contexte d’augmentation de la compétition entre les grandes puissances et d’un déclin relatif des États-Unis, ce billet a pour objectif d’informer sur la position italienne dans cette compétition. L’Italie alimente en effet une certaine forme d’ambiguïté quant à ses intentions en défendant en même temps un engagement euro-atlantique fort et un rapprochement avec la Russie et la Chine. Ce désalignement apparent de l’Italie d’avec ses principaux alliés occidentaux risque de fragiliser les relations transatlantiques, ce qui pourrait entraîner plusieurs conséquences pour le Canada et l’OTAN. Un euro-atlantisme fort L’engagement euro-atlantique de l’Italie n’a jamais faibli ni été remis en question. L’Italie demeure un pays profondément euro-atlantique, tant dans sa posture stratégique que dans son identité. Le Livre blanc de la défense italienne de 2015, la plus importante réflexion stratégique de l’Italie depuis plusieurs décennies, insiste sur les valeurs communes de la communauté euro-atlantique qui transcendent les frontières. Cette communauté s’est forgée dès la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale pour devenir l’un des piliers les plus solides de la stabilité internationale. À partir d’une alliance militaire, la communauté euro-atlantique a évolué vers une relation plus profonde et plus étendue. Dans ce contexte, l’Italie conçoit la sécurité internationale conjointement avec l’Union européenne (UE) et l’OTAN. Lors d’une allocution au Parlement en juillet 2018, le ministre italien de la Défense a placé la relation avec l’OTAN et l’UE comme l’une des premières priorités en matière de défense. L’OTAN, plus que l’UE, représente l’alliance de référence de l’Italie pour garantir la sécurité de la région euro-atlantique et pour dissuader les potentielles menaces. À cet égard, le ministre de la Défense s’engage à promouvoir toutes les initiatives pour renforcer les engagements de l’OTAN, notamment en Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient et de continuer à fournir une importante contribution aux missions de l’alliance. Il est toutefois important de souligner que les contributions italiennes aux missions de l’OTAN sont variables. Cette identité atlantiste italienne explique pourquoi, traditionnellement, l’Italie a toujours aligné ses politiques de défense sur ses principaux alliés, les États-Unis en tête. Récemment, l’actuel ministre italien de la Défense Lorenzo Guerini a rappelé la relation privilégiée qu’entretient l’Italie avec les États-Unis et l’importance de s’appuyer sur l’OTAN pour faire face aux menaces émergentes. D’ailleurs, au niveau de la défense, l’Union européenne est conçue par l’Italie comme devant complémenter l’OTAN, en reprenant le postulat de la non-duplication et de la non-compétition entre une Europe de la défense et l’OTAN. Cependant, cet activisme atlantiste commence à s’effriter depuis l’arrivée de Donald Trump à la présidence des États-Unis. L’Italie fait en effet face à des États-Unis plus en retrait, sceptiques envers les arrangements institutionnels libéraux et remettant en question l’OTAN. Ces incertitudes quant à la position de son principal allié sont perçues par l’Italie comme un risque pour ses intérêts de politique étrangère et pour le cadre institutionnel global. Malgré cela, le ministre de la Défense italien Lorenzon Guérini a réaffirmé le 22 octobre 2020 lors d’une réunion des ministres de la Défense de l’OTAN l’engagement constant et concret de l’Italie au sein de l’alliance. Une position pro-russe assumée De l’autre côté, depuis la Guerre froide, l’Italie s’est toujours perçue comme un médiateur entre l’OTAN et l’Union européenne à l’ouest et la Russie à l’est. L’Italie avait notamment proposé de servir d’intermédiaire entre l’OTAN et la Russie après l’invasion de la Géorgie en 2008 ou encore durant la crise syrienne récente. L’Italie s’est également souvent opposée à l’imposition de nouvelles sanctions contre la Russie. Ces positions amicales envers la Russie sont une constante de la politique étrangère italienne contemporaine, et semblent partagées par l’ensemble de la classe politique. Cependant, certains partis politiques actuellement au gouvernement ou ayant déjà été au gouvernement récemment semblent partager plus que des positions stratégiques amicales envers la Russie. C’est le cas notamment du Mouvement 5 Étoiles et de la Ligue du Nord, deux partis politiques de droite qui possèdent des assises solides dans l’électorat italien. Matteo Salvini, actuel sénateur appartenant à la Ligue du Nord et ancien ministre de l’Intérieur, voue une véritable admiration pour la Russie de Poutine et parle de la Crimée comme d’un territoire russe libéré en attente de reconnaissance internationale. On peut également voir dans les positions pro-russes de ces deux partis les symptômes du scepticisme envers l’Union européenne. Ces partis politiques italiens vont jusqu’à appeler pour la formation d’une coopération intime en matière de renseignement entre les deux pays, mais aussi pour le soutien de la Russie dans la résolution des crises au Moyen-Orient. De son côté, la Russie reste prudente envers ces déclarations d’amour dans la mesure où ces deux partis politiques se rapprochent parfois de mouvements néo-nazis ou islamophobes. De plus, la Russie est consciente de l’aspect surtout rhétorique du discours populiste italien et que l’Italie dispose de peu d’influence dans la sphère euro-atlantique. En réalité, le discours pro-russe des partis populistes italiens est d’abord dirigé vers les Italiens, qui semblent de plus en plus pro-russes et de moins en moins pro-américains et pro-européens. Dans un sondage réalisé en mai 2020, 32% des Italiens sondés considèrent la Russie comme un pays ami, pour seulement 17% pour les États-Unis. En avril 2020, la confiance envers l’Union européenne était seulement de 27%. Il y aurait alors une perception chez les Italiens que les relations avec la Russie seraient plus profitables pour l’Italie. Toutefois, ces politiques étrangères amicales envers la Russie ne doivent pas surprendre. En effet, dès 2015, l’Italie affirme explicitement dans son Livre blanc de la Défense qu’elle allait développer de nouvelles relations avec les puissances émergentes, tout en renforçant ses relations avec ses alliés de l’OTAN et de l’UE. Sur le continent européen, cette position n’a pas changé lorsqu’en 2019, le ministre de la Défense italien affirme que l’objectif de l’Italie est de développer une « double voie », en réaffirmant son engagement envers l’OTAN et la dissuasion sur le front est, tout en ouvrant le dialogue avec la Russie pour amener des relations moins compétitives. Cette posture sera réaffirmée en février 2020 lorsque le ministre italien de la Défense stipule que la Russie est l’un des acteurs clés pour la sécurité coopérative et la protection des intérêts stratégiques de l’Italie. Le ministre en a profité pour rappeler son intention de développer la coopération entre les deux pays, notamment en Arctique et dans la lutte contre la piraterie maritime. L'acceptation de l'influence chinoise Le 30 octobre 2019, devant le Parlement italien, le ministre de la Défense affirmait que la croissance rapide de la Chine au niveau militaire représentait une menace pour la sécurité du pays. Pourtant, ce discours est contrasté par les rapports étroits qu’entretiennent l’Italie et la Chine depuis de nombreuses décennies. Si les relations sino-italiennes remontent à la Guerre froide, ce n’est vraiment qu’à partir de 2019 que la politique étrangère italienne s’est véritablement tournée vers l’est. L’Italie est ainsi le premier pays du G8 à appuyer et participer à la nouvelle route de la soie (Belt and Road Initiative) de la Chine, malgré les réticences des États-Unis. L’Italie est maintenant coincée entre Washington et Beijing, entre des garanties de sécurité et des opportunités économiques. En effet, maintenant que les États-Unis semblent exercer un certain retrait du système international et développent une position plus négative envers l’UE, la Chine revient au centre de la carte en Italie. En 2019, le premier ministre Giuseppe Conte affirmait que la Chine allait exercer une influence de plus en plus importante dans le monde, tant au niveau économique que politique. C’est d’ailleurs ce que craignent les États-Unis. Mike Pompeo a récemment affirmé que l’augmentation des liens économiques et politiques sino-italiens servait la stratégie d’influence globale de la Chine et que celle-ci était en train de profiter de l’Italie. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand a par ailleurs accusé l’Italie de choisir Beijing au détriment de ses alliés occidentaux. Cependant, c’est sur un autre sujet que les rapprochements avec Beijing risquent de déstabiliser les relations transatlantiques. L’Italie n’a en effet pas banni officiellement l’entreprise Huawei de son réseau 5G. Tout d’abord, Huawei est déjà bien implantée en Italie dans le secteur de la 4G et impliquée dans plusieurs essais pour la 5G. Cependant, l’Italie n’est pas aveugle quant au risque que pose la technologie de l’entreprise chinoise. Le comité sur la sécurité et le renseignement du Parlement italien a d’ailleurs recommandé en décembre 2019 de sérieusement considérer un bannissement de Huawei de l’infrastructure 5G. Par contre, même si l’Italie dispose d’un cadre législatif lui permettant de protéger ses infrastructures essentielles, dont les télécommunications, son application à l’entreprise chinoise dépend largement des volontés politiques qui semblent absentes pour le moment. Or, les principaux alliés de l’Italie, soit la France, l’Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis ont fortement insisté sur l’importance de protéger les infrastructures de télécommunications de la 5G de Huawei pour des raisons de sécurité nationale. Conclusion Il est difficile de percevoir les intentions de l’Italie dans cette ère de compétition entre les grandes puissances. D’un côté, elle affiche un euro-atlantisme fort, mais de l’autre, elle souhaite des rapprochements avec la Russie et la Chine. Il semblerait que l’Italie alimente l’ambiguïté et cela se perçoit au sein de l’administration américaine. Un officiel américain a en effet affirmé qu’il était difficile de prévoir le comportement de l’Italie. Or, le désalignement apparent de l’Italie pour se rapprocher de pays illibéraux de l’est risque d’avoir des conséquences importantes sur les relations transatlantiques et pour le Canada. L’Italie, tout comme le Canada, est un contributeur important au sein de l’OTAN, un défenseur de l’alliance et potentiellement un acteur engagé dans l’émergence d’une soi-disant alliance des démocraties sous le leadership des États-Unis de Biden. Un désalignement italien risquerait de fragiliser l’alliance qui est déjà mise à rude épreuve par un désengagement américain et par des frictions internes en Méditerranée. Même si l’arrivée de Biden à la présidence des États-Unis pourrait réconcilier l’Italie avec son activisme atlantiste, le rapprochement italien vers la Russie et la Chine va se poursuivre, confirmant son ambivalence entre l’ouest et l’est. Plus important encore, l’implication de Huawei dans la 5G italienne risque de fragiliser la coopération en matière de renseignement ou la coopération militaire si le commandement militaire italien utilise la technologie Huawei. Enfin, l’Italie peut devenir le centre de la propagande et de la désinformation chinoise ciblant l’Occident, notamment par la présence de l’influence chinoise sur le territoire italien, mais aussi par l’accointance de certains partis politiques influents avec les idées illibérales. L’Italie deviendrait alors le maillon faible des liens euro-atlantiques. ## Entretien avec Artur Wilczynski, chef adjoint associé pour le renseignement électromagnétique – le SIGINT URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-artur-wilczynski/ Modified: 2021-06-23 > Les animateurs rencontrent Artur Wilczynski, chef adjoint associé pour le renseignement électromagnétique – le SIGINT – au CST. Dans ce 17e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas s'entretiennent avec Artur Wilczynski, chef adjoint associé pour le renseignement électromagnétique – le SIGINT – au Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST), au gouvernement fédéral canadien. Artur est aussi le champion pour l’équité, la diversité et l’inclusion au sein du CST. On parle donc de ces enjeux avec lui : la situation en matière de diversité et d’inclusion s’est-elle améliorée au cours des années ? Que reste-t-il encore à faire ? Artur nous explique également en quoi il est essentiel pour la communauté du renseignement de diversifier ses ressources humaines. Enfin, Artur nous parle de la coopération que poursuit le Canada avec ses plus proches alliés et partenaires afin de partager des leçons apprises au niveau de la promotion de la diversité et de l’inclusion au sein du monde du renseignement. Faits saillants - 17e épisode ## Entretien avec Célia Bélin, chercheure invitée au Centre sur les États-Unis et l’Europe de l’Institut Brookings URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-celia-belin-chercheure-invitee-au-centre-sur-les-etats-unis-et-leurope-de-linstitut-brookings/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Sarah-Myriam et Thomas reçoivent Célia Bélin, chercheure invitée au Centre sur les États-Unis et l’Europe de l’Institut Brookings. Pour ce 29e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas parlent avec Célia Bélin, chercheure invitée au Centre sur les États-Unis et l’Europe de l’Institut Brookings. On discute du séisme que représente la guerre en Ukraine, et de ses conséquences pour la relation transatlantique : Célia analyse le rôle de la France et de l’Allemagne, les débats au sein de l’OTAN, et les enjeux en matière de défense européenne. Elle conclut en abordant les conséquences pour les autres membres de l’Alliance Atlantique, comme le Canada. Faits saillants - Épisode 29 ## Entretien avec Chantal Lavallée, directrice adjointe du CRITIC au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-chantal-lavallee-directrice-adjointe-du-critic-au-college-militaire-royal-de-saint-jean/ Modified: 2022-05-17 > Pour ce 32ième épisode, Thomas et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Chantal Lavallée, professeure adjointe en études internationales et directrice... Pour ce 32ième épisode, Thomas et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Chantal Lavallée, professeure adjointe en études internationales et directrice adjointe du Centre sur la gouvernance sécuritaire et de Crise (CRITIC) au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean.  Ils discutent de la place des drones dans l’évolution des enjeux de sécurité ainsi que de la coopération entre civils et militaires. Chantal explique dans quelle mesure l’intégration des drones transforme l’imaginaire sociotechnique.  Ils abordent ensuite l’impact de la COVID-19 sur l’utilisation de la technologie  et la façon dont cette nouvelle technologie influence le  contexte actuel de la crise en Ukraine. Chantal conclut sur une comparaison de l’utilisation de ces technologies au Canada vis-à-vis de ce qui est fait en Europe. Faits saillants - Épisode 32 ## Entretien avec Daniel Jean, ancien conseiller auprès du Premier Ministre du Canada en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement (2016-2018) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-daniel-jean/ Modified: 2021-06-02 > Dans cet épisode, les animateurs discutent avec Daniel Jean, conseiller auprès du Premier Ministre du Canada en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement (2016-2018), sous-ministre des Affaires étrangères (2013-2016) et sous-ministre de Patrimoine canadien (2010-2013). Ils s'entretiennent sur la spécificité canadienne en matière de renseignement, les menaces auxquelles fait face le Canada, les conséquences aux États-Unis, et la nouvelle politique de renseignement au sein des missions de paix à l'ONU. Dans le deuxième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau discutent avec Daniel Jean, conseiller auprès du Premier Ministre du Canada en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement (2016-2018), sous-ministre des Affaires étrangères (2013-2016) et sous-ministre de Patrimoine canadien (2010-2013). Ils s'entretiennent sur la spécificité canadienne en matière de renseignement, les menaces auxquelles fait face le Canada, les conséquences aux États-Unis, et la nouvelle politique de renseignement au sein des missions de paix à l'ONU. Daniel Jean partage aussi des conseils à la lumière de ses expériences. Faits saillants - 2e épisode ## Entretien avec Denis Thompson, Major-General des défis des opérations militaires à la retraite URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-denis-thompson-major-general-des-defis-des-operations-militaires-a-la-retraite/ Modified: 2021-03-31 > Dans cet onzième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas discutent avec Denis Thompson, Major-General des défis des opérations militaires qui est à la retraite, de son rôle en tant que Commandant de la Force Multinationale et d'Observateurs au Sinaï, de l'évolution des Forces Spéciales, de l'adaptation de l'armée canadienne au contexte pandémique et du rôle du Canada dans les opérations de maintien de la paix. Le Major Général Thompson conclut avec des conseils à la nouvelle génération de commandants au sein des Forces armées et à celles et ceux qui souhaitent s’engager dans l’armée canadienne. Dans cet onzième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas discutent avec Denis Thompson, Major-General des défis des opérations militaires qui est à la retraite, de son rôle en tant que Commandant de la Force Multinationale et d'Observateurs au Sinaï, de l'évolution des Forces Spéciales, de l'adaptation de l'armée canadienne au contexte pandémique et du rôle du Canada dans les opérations de maintien de la paix. Le Major Général Thompson conclut avec des conseils à la nouvelle génération de commandants au sein des Forces armées et à celles et ceux qui souhaitent s’engager dans l’armée canadienne. ## Entretien avec Djallil Lounnas, professeur à l’Universite Al Akhawayn au Maroc URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/ep-22-djallil-lounnas/ Modified: 2021-10-14 > Sarah-Myriam et Thomas recoivent Djallil Lounnas, professeur associé de relations internationales à l’Universite Al Akhawayn au Maroc. Pour ce 22e épisode de Conseils de Sécurité, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau recoivent Djallil Lounnas, professeur associé de relations internationales à l’Universite Al Akhawayn au Maroc. Djallil Lounas détient un doctorat en science politique de l'Université de Montréal. Il a publié de nombreuses études et articles scientifiques sur le sujet notamment dans Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Political Violence and Terrorism et Politique Étrangère. Il est également l'auteur du livre « Le Djihadisme en Afrique du Nord-Sahel : D'AQMI à Daech », publié en 2019 aux Éditions Les Presses de la fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique/L'Harmattan. Il a coordonné et fait partie de plusieurs équipes de recherche dans le cadre de projets de recherche européen H2020. Il est responsable de l'équipe de recherche d'Al Akhawayn du Consortium Européen H2020 de recherche Preventing Violent Extremism (PREVEX project). Dans cette entrevue, Djallil Lounnas nous parle de son parcours académique et professionnel, il discute de ses recherches sur l'extrémisme violent au Sahel et en Afrique du Nord, sur l'impact des interventions extérieures, des effets de la pandémie COVID-19, du phénomène de radicalisation dans la région et dans quelle mesure la Canada peut y jouer un rôle. Faits saillants - Épisode 22 ## Entretien avec Dominic Rochon du secteur de la sécurité nationale et de la cybersécurité à Sécurité publique Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-dominic-rochon-du-secteur-de-la-securite-nationale-et-de-la-cybersecurite-a-securite-publique-canada/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Pour ce 34e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas parlent avec Dominic Rochon, Sous-ministre adjoint principal, Secteur... Pour ce nouvel épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas parlent avec Dominic Rochon, Sous-ministre adjoint principal, Secteur de la sécurité nationale et de la cybersécurité à Sécurité publique Canada. Dominic, qui a également travaillé au Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications, au Bureau du Conseil privé, et au Secrétariat du Conseil du trésor, est co-président gouvernemental du Groupe consultatif sur la transparence de la sécurité nationale. Il nous parle donc du rapport récemment publié par le Groupe, portant sur les relations entre les agences de sécurité nationale et de renseignement et les communautés racisées au Canada. Faits saillants - Épisode 34 ## Entretien avec Dominic Rochon, Secteur de la sécurité nationale et de la cybersécurité (SP) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-dominic-rochon-secteur-de-la-securite-nationale-et-de-la-cybersecurite-sp/ Modified: 2021-12-20 Pour le 26e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas parlent de transparence en matière de sécurité nationale avec Dominic Rochon, Sous-ministre adjoint principal, Secteur de la sécurité nationale et de la cybersécurité à Sécurité publique Canada. Dominic nous parle des réformes au cours des dernières années visant à améliorer la transparence dans le milieu de la sécurité nationale. Il nous parle aussi du deuxième rapport, publié récemment, du Groupe consultatif sur la transparence de la sécurité nationale, dont il est le co-président. Faits saillants – Épisode 26 ## Entretien avec Emadeddin Badi, conseiller pour la Libye au Centre de Genève URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-23-emadeddin-badi-libya-advisor-at-the-geneva-center-2/ Modified: 2021-12-20 Dans ce 23e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Thomas parle de la situation en Libye avec Emadeddin Badi, chercheur principal non-résident pour le Moyen-Orient au Conseil de l'Atlantique, analyste principal à l'Initiative mondiale contre la criminalité transnationale organisée, et conseiller pour la Libye au Centre de Genève pour la gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité. Après un bref survol historique, Emadeddin Badi nous parle de l’intervention de l’OTAN en Libye en 2011 et de ses conséquences, puis il dresse un portrait de la situation aujourd’hui. Il conclut en analysant le rôle des États-Unis, de l’Europe, et du Canada dans la reconstruction du pays.     Faits saillants - Épisode 23 ## Entretien avec Emma Soubrier de l’Institut d’études du Moyen-Orient de l’Université George Washington URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-emma-soubrier-de-linstitut-detudes-du-moyen-orient-de-luniversite-george-washington/ Modified: 2022-05-19 > Pour ce 33ième épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas parlent avec Emma Soubrier, chercheure à l’Institut d’études du Moyen-Orient de l’Université George Washington. Pour ce 33ième épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas parlent avec Emma Soubrier, chercheure à l’Institut d’études du Moyen-Orient de l’Université George Washington, au Centre Michel de l’Hôpital de l’Université Clermont Auvergne, et au Arab Gulf States Institute de Washington (AGSIW). Emma nous parle de la relation entre les États-Unis et l’Arabie saoudite. Elle nous explique, notamment, en quoi les tensions bilatérales entre les deux partenaires représentent la norme, et non pas l’exception. Elle analyse ensuite les initiatives pilotées par Mohammed ben Salmane, le prince héritier saoudien, cherchant à augmenter la capacité domestique de production d’armes de son pays. Faits saillants – Épisode 33 ## Entretien avec Frédéric Mérand, directeur scientifique du CÉRIUM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-frederic-merand-directeur-scientifique-du-cerium/ Modified: 2022-03-23 > Sarah-Myriam et Thomas reçoivent Frédéric Mérand, professeur à l'Université de Montréal et directeur scientifique du CÉRIUM. Pour ce 28e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas reçoivent Frédéric Mérand, professeur à l'Université de Montréal et directeur scientifique du CÉRIUM. Frédéric nous parle du contexte historique qui nous a amené à la crise actuelle en Ukraine, puis il analyse les positions des États-Unis, de l'Ukraine, et de la Russie. Il évoque différents scénarios pour les prochaines semaines, puis il discute avec nous du rôle du Canada. Faits saillants - Épisode 28 ## Entretien avec Isabelle Desmartis, sous-ministre adjointe de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) au ministère de la Défense nationale URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/isabelle-desmartis/ Modified: 2021-06-02 > Isabelle Desmartis, sous-ministre adjointe de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) au ministère de la Défense nationale. Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas parlent avec Isabelle Desmartis, sous-ministre adjointe de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) au ministère de la Défense nationale. Isabelle nous parle des activités principales de RDDC et de ses partenariats avec les secteurs académique et privé. Puis, elle parle également de coopération avec les alliés du Canada, et des défis particuliers associés à la recherche dans le milieu de la défense. Elle nous explique aussi comment RDDC trouve un équilibre entre ses priorités en matière de soutien opérationnel aux besoins actuels du ministère de la Défense nationale et des Forces armées canadiennes et ses objectifs de recherche à plus long-terme. Faits saillants - 14e épisode ## Entretien avec Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, directeur de l’Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire (IRSEM) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-jean-baptiste-jeangene-vilmer-directeur-de-linstitut-de-recherche-strategique-de-lecole-militaire-irsem/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Sarah-Myriam et Thomas reçoivent Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, directeur de l’Institut de recherche stratégique de l’Ecole militaire (IRSEM) et nonresident Senior Fellow à l’Atlantic Council (Washington, DC). Pour le 27e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas reçoivent Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, directeur de l’Institut de recherche stratégique de l’Ecole militaire (IRSEM) et nonresident Senior Fellow à l’Atlantic Council (Washington, DC). Ils discutent de son plus récent rapport, co-écrit avec Paul Charron, intitulé « Les opérations d’influence chinoises. Un moment machiavélien ».  Ils abordent l’évolution et la variété de ces opérations, le concept de « russianisation » de l'influence chinoise et des principaux défis pour le Canada face à ces opérations.  Faits saillants – Épisode 27 ## Entretien avec Jocelyn Coulon, chercheur au CÉRIUM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-jocelyn-coulon-chercheur-au-cerium/ Modified: 2021-09-03 > Discussion avec Jocelyn Coulon, chercheur au Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal (CÉRIUM). Dans ce 19e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Thomas Juneau et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Jocelyn Coulon, chercheur au Centre d’études et de recherches internationales de l’Université de Montréal (CÉRIUM). Il nous parle de son parcours professionnel et nous discutons de son analyse de l'évolution de la politique étrangère canadienne, sujet de deux de ses livres publiés récemment : « Un Selfie avec Justin Trudeau » et « Le Canada à la recherche d’une identité internationale », un recueil de textes écrit entre 2004 et 2020.  Jocelyn Coulon y présente alors ses recommendations pour le prochain gouvernement.  Faits saillants - Épisode 19 ## Entretien avec José Aranaz, représentant et directeur au Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux Droits de l’homme à Genève URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-jose-aranaz-representant-et-directeur-au-haut-commissariat-des-nations-unies-aux-droits-de-lhomme-a-geneve/ Modified: 2020-11-12 > Les animateurs discutent avec José Aranaz, représentant et directeur au Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux Droits de l’homme à Genève et ancien directeur du Bureau conjoint des Nations Unies aux droits de l’Homme en République démocratique du Congo. Il a travaillé notamment au Soudan, en Iraq, en Bosnie, en Croatie, au Burkina Faso, au Burundi, au Guatemala, au Timor-Oriental et au Vénézuela. Nous discutons des défis liés à la promotion des droits humains, du rôle des autorités locales, des États-Unis, du Vénézuela, de l'Irak, de l'impact de la COVID et de l'avenir de la promotion des droits de la personne. Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau discutent avec José Aranaz, représentant et directeur au Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux Droits de l’homme à Genève et ancien directeur du Bureau conjoint des Nations Unies aux droits de l’Homme en République démocratique du Congo. Il a travaillé notamment au Soudan, en Iraq, en Bosnie, en Croatie, au Burkina Faso, au Burundi, au Guatemala, au Timor-Oriental et au Vénézuela. Nous discutons des défis liés à la promotion des droits humains, du rôle des autorités locales, des États-Unis, du Vénézuela, de l'Irak, de l'impact de la COVID et de l'avenir de la promotion des droits de la personne. ## Entretien avec l’honorable Bob Rae, Ambassadeur et Représentant Permanent désigné du Canada auprès des Nations Unies à New York URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-lhonorable-bob-rae-ambassadeur-et-representant-permanent-du-canada-aupres-de-lorganisation-des-nations-unies-a-new-york/ Modified: 2021-02-03 > Dans ce 8e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, les animateurs s'entretiennent avec l'Honorable Bob Rae, Ambassadeur et Représentant permanent du Canada auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies à New York. M. Rae nous parle de son intérêt de longue date pour les affaires internationales et des principaux défis auxquels il fait face dans le cadre de ses nouvelles fonctions : la pandémie, en particulier, mais aussi la place des droits de la personne, les relations avec la Chine, et le dossier du Myanmar. M. Rae aborde aussi la question des relations du Canada avec la nouvelle Administration Biden aux États-Unis. Dans ce 8e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau s'entretiennent avec l'honorable Bob Rae, Ambassadeur et Représentant Permanent désigné du Canada auprès des Nations Unies à New York. M. Rae nous parle de son intérêt de longue date pour les affaires internationales et des principaux défis auxquels il fait face dans le cadre de ses nouvelles fonctions : la pandémie, en particulier, mais aussi la place des droits de la personne, les relations avec la Chine, et le dossier du Myanmar. M. Rae aborde aussi la question des relations du Canada avec la nouvelle Administration Biden aux États-Unis. ## Entretien avec Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, chercheure invitée au CÉRIUM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-laurence-deschamps-laporte-chercheure-invitee-au-cerium/ Modified: 2021-02-17 > Dans cet épisode,  les animateurs reçoivent Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, chercheure invitée au CÉRIUM, professeure invitée à l’Université de Montréal et jusqu’à tout récemment, Chef de cabinet du Ministre des Affaires étrangères. Madame Deschamps-Laporte détient un doctorat et une maîtrise de l’Université d’Oxford où elle était boursière Rhodes. Elle est spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, de l’étude des mouvements islamistes et du salafisme. Elle s’intéresse à l’étude de la politique étrangère canadienne, au féminisme au sein des relations internationales, ainsi qu'à la politique et aux sociétés du Moyen-Orient.  Elle a été chef de cabinet de trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères et anciennement, consultante chez McKinsey.  La professeure Deschamps-Laporte discute de son parcours professionnel et académique, du développement ainsi que des défis de la mise en œuvre de la politique étrangère féministe canadienne. Dans cet épisode,  Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau reçoivent Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, chercheure invitée au CÉRIUM, professeure invitée à l’Université de Montréal et jusqu’à tout récemment, Chef de cabinet du Ministre des Affaires étrangères. Madame Deschamps-Laporte détient un doctorat et une maîtrise de l’Université d’Oxford où elle était boursière Rhodes. Elle est spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, de l’étude des mouvements islamistes et du salafisme. Elle s’intéresse à l’étude de la politique étrangère canadienne, au féminisme au sein des relations internationales, ainsi qu'à la politique et aux sociétés du Moyen-Orient.  Elle a été chef de cabinet de trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères et anciennement, consultante chez McKinsey.  La professeure Deschamps-Laporte discute de son parcours professionnel et académique, du développement ainsi que des défis de la mise en œuvre de la politique étrangère féministe canadienne. ## Entretien avec le lieutenant-général Jocelyn Paul, membre des Premières Nations le plus haut-gradé au sein des Forces armées canadiennes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-le-lieutenant-general-jocelyn-paul/ Modified: 2021-06-09 > Entretien avec le lieutenant-général Jocelyn Paul, membre des Premières Nations le plus haut-gradé au sein des Forces armées canadiennes. Dans cet épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas rencontrent le lieutenant-général Jocelyn Paul, membre des Premières Nations le plus haut-gradé au sein des Forces armées canadiennes. Le Lgén Paul, aujourd’hui le commandant-adjoint du Commandement interarmées de l’OTAN à Naples, nous parle des moments marquants de sa carrière. Il analyse également les défis principaux dans les relations entre les Forces et les Premières Nations, notamment en matière de recrutement. Il nous explique ensuite en quoi ses origines l’ont aidé, lors de ses nombreux déploiements, et en particulier à Kandahar en Afghanistan, à mieux comprendre l’importance de la culture locale. Faits saillants - 16e épisode ## Entretien avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, François-Philippe Champagne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/conseils-de-securite-1-le-ministre-des-affaires-etrangeres-francois-philippe-champagne/ Modified: 2020-12-02 > Dans le premier épisode du Podcast Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas s'entretiennent avec François-Philippe Champagne, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada. Ils discutent de l'avenir de l'engagement du Canada au sein des Nations Unies, puis des relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis alors que les élections américaines approchent. Ils abordent ensuite les relations du Canada avec la Chine et l'Arabie Saoudite. Dans le premier épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau s'entretiennent avec François-Philippe Champagne, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada. Ils discutent de l'avenir de l'engagement du Canada au sein des Nations Unies, puis des relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis alors que les élections américaines approchent. Ils abordent ensuite les relations du Canada avec la Chine et l'Arabie Saoudite. Points saillants Sur la non-obtention du siège au CS de l’ONU, le Canada n’a pas perdu, mais d’excellents pays ont gagné. Le Canada a mis de l’avant des principes consensuels, et cela a permis de renouveler les liens et de reconnecter avec les ministres des Affaires étrangères des autres pays ainsi qu’amplifier la voix des pays plus vulnérables au sein du G7. Le Canada doit demeurer ambitieux. Le Canada doit se réengager dans les missions de maintien de la paix au sein de l’ONU et innover. Le Canada est d’ailleurs impliqué au Mali et se tient aux côtés du peuple malien. Le Canada veut un retour à la stabilité et doit continuer son implication. Concernant les relations Canada-États-Unis, le Canada a toujours entretenu de bonnes relations avec les États-Unis, que le parti au pouvoir soit démocrate ou républicain, car les relations canado-américaines sont au cœur de la politique étrangère du Canada. Il faut avoir confiance en les relations profondes qui unissent les deux pays. Le Canada va toujours trouver un terrain d’entente. Il est prêt à travailler avec qui sera élu à la Maison-Blanche, en favorisant les intérêts du Canada, en travaillant sur les intérêts mutuels des deux pays. L’unité transatlantique est ferme car il y a des intérêts pour chaque pays. L’OTAN favorise une unité, même si les institutions internationales vivent des moments difficiles. Vis-à-vis de la Chine, le rôle du Canada est de défendre ses intérêts. La relation sino-canadienne est complexe et multidimensionnelle, il faut donc un nouveau cadre basé sur des intérêts et des principes, notamment sur les droits de la personne. Quoi qu’il en sera, il va falloir coexister, avec parfois de la compétition, et parfois de la coopération. La priorité à court terme pour le Canada est d’obtenir la libération de Michael Koverig et Michael Spavor. Le Canada fait face à un monde en changement, avec une Chine plus coercitive dans ses relations diplomatiques. Sur la question des droits de la personne, le Canada est au premier rang et à l’initiative de plusieurs actions, comme la suspension de l’accord d’extradition entre le Canada et Hong Kong ou encore la déclaration du G7 sur l’empoisonnement. Le Canada doit bâtir de nouvelles alliances, notamment avec des pays avec lesquels il n’a pas de relations régulières. ## Entretien avec Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, directrice du bureau régional de l’Institut d’études de sécurité pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest, le Sahel et le bassin du lac Tchad URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-lori-anne-theroux-benoni-directrice-du-bureau-regional-de-linstitut-detude-de-securite-pour-lafrique-de-louest-le-sahel-et-le-bassin-du-lac-tchad/ Modified: 2022-04-26 > Pour ce 30ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas reçoivent Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, directrice du bureau régional de l’Institut d’étude de sécurité pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest, le Sahel et le bassin du lac Tchad. Ils discutent de la mission de l'ISS. Pour ce 30ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas reçoivent Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, directrice du bureau régional de l’Institut d’études de sécurité (ISS) pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest, le Sahel et le bassin du lac Tchad. Ils discutent de la mission de l'ISS. Lori-Anne aborde les facteurs explicatifs des récents coups d'État et des tentatives de coups d'État au Sahel et du rôle des organisations régionales et/ou internationales comme l’ONU pour prévenir ou faire face à ces instabilités. Lori-Anne revient également sur un rapport publié en 2019 pour expliquer le lien entre extrémisme violent, criminalité organisée et conflits locaux en Afrique de l'Ouest. Elle identifie les mécanismes de recrutement par les groupes dits djihadistes au Sahel et discute des différents facteurs qui poussent les personnes à s’engager dans des groupes qui se caractérisent par l’utilisation de violence extrémiste. Elle explique comment les enjeux de sécurité au Sahel peuvent avoir des répercussions à l’extérieur de la région, en Europe, en Asie et en Amérique. Elle conclut sur le rôle du Canada au Sahel, soit dans quelle mesure et de quelle façon le Canada devrait  davantage s’y investir. Faits Saillants - Épisode 30 Références :  FR 2022, Des leçons doivent être tirées avant que barkhane ne s'engage sur de nouveaux fronts FR 2019, Extrémisme violent, criminalité organisée et conflits locaux dans le Liptako Gourma FR 2016, Jeunes 'djihadistes' au Mali: Guidés par la foi ou par les circonstances? ## Entretien avec Madame Bouaré Bintou Founé Samaké, Ministre de la Promotion de la Femme, de l’Enfant et de la Famille du Mali URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-madame-bouare-bintou-foune-samake/ Modified: 2021-06-02 > Dans ce douzième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Thomas Juneau et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Madame Bouaré Bintou Founé Samaké, Ministre de la Promotion de la Femme, de l'Enfant et de la Famille du Mali. Ils discutent des moments marquants de son parcours académique et professionnel et de son rôle comme Directrice Exécutive de Women in Law and Development in Africa/Femmes droits en développement en Afrique, section Mali. La Ministre présente les objectifs et les défis liés à son mandat, les enjeux que posent la pandémie et conclut sur les partenariats avec des pays comme le Canada et avec des organisations régionales et internationales telles que le G5 Sahel et la MINUSMA. Dans ce douzième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Thomas Juneau et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Madame Bouaré Bintou Founé Samaké, Ministre de la Promotion de la Femme, de l'Enfant et de la Famille du Mali. Ils discutent des moments marquants de son parcours académique et professionnel et de son rôle comme Directrice Exécutive de Women in Law and Development in Africa/Femmes droits en développement en Afrique, section Mali. La Ministre présente les objectifs et les défis liés à son mandat, les enjeux que posent la pandémie et conclut sur les partenariats avec des pays comme le Canada et avec des organisations régionales et internationales telles que le G5 Sahel et la MINUSMA. Faits saillants - 12e épisode   ## Entretien avec Marc-André Franche, Chef du Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix du Secrétaire général de l’ONU URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-marc-andre-franche-chef-du-fonds-pour-la-consolidation-de-la-paix-du-secretaire-general-de-lonu/ Modified: 2020-12-02 > Dans cet épisode, les animateurs s'entretiennent avec Marc-André Franche, Chef du Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix du Secrétaire général de l’ONU, qui aide plus de 40 pays à prévenir les conflits violents, éviter la reprise de conflits ou encourager à la réconciliation. Le Fonds est l’instrument de premier recours des Nations Unies qui fournit un financement ponctuel, catalytique et tolérant les risques, afin de maintenir la paix. Marc-André Franche a mené sa carrière professionnelle dans le développement international et la prévention des conflits avec les Nations Unies. M. Franche et les animateurs discutent du rôle du Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix, des principaux enjeux liés aux réformes de l'ONU, du rôle et des défis pour le Canada au sein de l'organisation. Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau s'entretiennent avec Marc-André Franche, Chef du Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix du Secrétaire général de l’ONU, qui aide plus de 40 pays à prévenir les conflits violents, éviter la reprise de conflits ou encourager à la réconciliation. Le Fonds est l’instrument de premier recours des Nations Unies qui fournit un financement ponctuel, catalytique et tolérant les risques, afin de maintenir la paix. Marc-André Franche a mené sa carrière professionnelle dans le développement international et la prévention des conflits avec les Nations Unies. M. Franche et les animateurs discutent du rôle du Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix, des principaux enjeux liés aux réformes de l'ONU, du rôle et des défis pour le Canada au sein de l'organisation. ## Entretien avec Michelle Tessier, sous-directrice aux opérations au Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-michelle-tessier-sous-directrice-aux-operations-au-service-canadien-du-renseignement-de-securite/ Modified: 2021-03-03 > Pour ce dixième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas rencontrent Michelle Tessier, sous-directrice aux opérations au Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS). Nous discutons avec elle de l'adaptation du Service au cours des dernières années face à l'évolution de la menace posée, notamment, par l'ingérence étrangère, alors que l'extrémisme et le terrorisme continuent et se diversifient. Pour ce dixième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas rencontrent Michelle Tessier, sous-directrice aux opérations au Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS). Nous discutons avec elle de l'adaptation du Service au cours des dernières années face à l'évolution de la menace posée, notamment, par l'ingérence étrangère, alors que l'extrémisme et le terrorisme continuent et se diversifient. Elle nous parle ensuite des bénéfices qu'apporte la diversité au sein d'une organisation comme le SCRS. Enfin, nous discutons de l'impact de la pandémie sur le travail du Service, et des leçons que le SCRS a apprises au cours de la dernière année. ## Entretien avec Myriam Benraad, auteure du livre Terrorisme : les affres de la vengeance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-myriam-benraad-auteure-du-livre-terrorisme-les-affres-de-la-vengeance/ Modified: 2021-12-20 Cette semaine, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas parlent avec Myriam Benraad, professeure associée à l’Institut libre d’étude des relations internationales (ILERI) et auteure du livre Terrorisme : les affres de la vengeance, récemment publié aux éditions Le Cavalier Bleu. Nous parlons avec elle du concept de la vengeance et de son importance pour bien comprendre le terrorisme et le contre-terrorisme. Nous discutons aussi du retrait récent des États-Unis de l’Afghanistan et des implications pour la lutte contre le terrorisme.   Faits saillants - Épisode 24 ## Entretien avec Najat Rochdi, Coordonnatrice spéciale adjointe des Nations Unies pour le Liban et Coordonnatrice résidente et humanitaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-najat-rochdi-coordonnatrice-speciale-adjointe-des-nations-unies-pour-le-liban-et-coordonnatrice-residente-et-humanitaire/ Modified: 2020-10-21 > Dans cet épisode, les animateurs discutent avec Najat Rochdi de l'impact humanitaire des explosions au port de Beyrouth au mois d'août 2020, du rôle des jeunes, des entrepreneurs dans la reconstruction du pays, du danger de la désinformation, du rôle de l'ONU, de la politicisation de l'aide humanitaire, entre autres. Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau discutent avec Najat Rochdi de l'impact humanitaire des explosions au port de Beyrouth au mois d'août 2020, du rôle des jeunes, des entrepreneurs dans la reconstruction du pays, du danger de la désinformation, du rôle de l'ONU, de la politicisation de l'aide humanitaire, de l'importance de l'accès à la population, des défis humanitaires en Afrique sub-saharienne et des leçons des épidémies passées, notamment de l'Ebola et du Choléra, pour faire face à la pandémie actuelle. ## Entretien avec Niagalé Bagayoko, chercheure et présidente de l’African Security Sector Network (ASSN) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-18-niagale-bagayoko-chercheure-et-presidente-de-lafrican-security-sector-network-assn/ Modified: 2021-08-02 > Sarah-Myriam rencontre Niagalé Bagayoko, chercheure et présidente de l’African Security Sector Network (ASSN). Dans ce 18e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam s’entretient avec Niagalé Bagayoko, chercheure et présidente de l’African Security Sector Network (ASSN). Spécialiste de la réforme des systèmes de sécurité en Afrique francophone, des politiques de sécurité internationales menées en Afrique subsaharienne, ainsi que des mécanismes africains de gestion des conflits, elle a dirigé le programme « maintien et consolidation de la paix » de l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie après avoir a été chercheure à l’Institute of Development Studies de l’Université du Sussex (Royaume-Uni) et à l’Institut de recherche pour le développement (France), ainsi qu’enseignante en relations internationales à l’Institut d’études politiques (IEP) de Paris. Madame Bagayoko nous parle de son parcours académique et professionnel. Elle présente le objectifs et priorités du African Sector Security Network qu’elle préside et de la Coalition citoyenne pour le Sahel dont son réseau fait partie. Niagalé Bagayoko dresse un tableau des principaux enjeux de sécurité au Sahel et discute de l’importance du concept d’hybridité des systèmes de sécurité en Afrique, pour mieux saisir les dynamiques de conflits au sein des pays du Sahel et dans la région. Niagalé Bagayoko présente les défis pour le G5 Sahel, les opérations Barkhane et Takuba ainsi que pour la MINUSMA. Faits saillants - 18e épisode ## Entretien avec Rosemary Barton, correspondante politique en chef, CBC URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-rosemary-barton-correspondante-politique-en-chef-cbc/ Modified: 2020-11-18 > Dans cet épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, les animateurs discutent avec Rosemary Barton des implications pour le Canada des élections récentes aux États-Unis. Rosemary analyse en particulier le rôle des médias face à la présidence de Donald Trump. Elle discute également du contexte politique au Canada. Elle explique aussi que, si le gouvernement Trudeau et la future administration Biden vont se trouver en accord sur plusieurs dossiers, ils risquent tout de même d’être en désaccord sur d’autres. Dans le 5e épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas discutent avec Rosemary Barton des implications pour le Canada des élections récentes aux États-Unis. Rosemary analyse en particulier le rôle des médias face à la présidence de Donald Trump. Elle discute également du contexte politique au Canada. Elle explique aussi que, si le gouvernement Trudeau et la future administration Biden vont se trouver en accord sur plusieurs dossiers, ils risquent tout de même d’être en désaccord sur d’autres. ## Entretien avec Séverine Autesserre, professeure de sciences politiques à l’Université de Columbia URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/severine-autesserre/ Modified: 2021-06-02 > Séverine Autesserre, professeure de sciences politiques, relations internationales et études africaines - Université de Columbia (États-Unis) Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas discutent avec Séverine Autesserre, professeure de sciences politiques, spécialisée en relations internationales et les études africaines, à la faculté Barnard de l’Université de Columbia (États-Unis), multiple fois primée et récemment nommée « Chevalier dans l'Ordre des Palmes Académiques ». Ils discutent de son travail au sein d'agences humanitaires et de développement en Afghanistan, au Kosovo, en République Démocratique du Congo, au Nicaragua et en Inde et de son parcours dans le monde académique. Séverine Autesserre parle des ses livres The Trouble with Congo (2010), Peaceland (2014) et nous présente son dernier ouvrage, The Frontlines of Peace: An Insider’s Guide to Changing the World, paru aux éditions Oxford University Press en mars 2021. À la lumière de ses recherches dans douze zones de conflit, elle explique notamment l'importance de privilégier une approche locale à la consolidation de la paix. Faits saillants - 15e épisode ## Entretien avec Sophie Beecher et Charles Fugère, représentants de l’Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-sophie-beecher-et-charles-fugere-representants-de-loffice-de-surveillance-des-activites-en-matiere-de-securite-nationale-et-de-renseignement/ Modified: 2021-12-20 Dans cet 25e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Thomas Juneau et Sarah-Myriam Martin Brûlé s'entretiennent avec deux représentants de l’Office de surveillance des activités en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement, Sophie Beecher, directrice générale de l'examen et Charles Fugère, avocat général principal et directeur général des services juridiques. Nos deux invités expliquent les activités de l'OSSNR, organisation créée en 2019 par le gouvernement fédéral. Ils décrivent les moyens déployés pour permettre à l'OSSNR d'accomplir son large mandat d’examen et d’enquête mais ouvrent également une fenêtre sur les défis inhérents à la mise en place de l'organisation. Faits saillants - Épisode 25 ## Entretien avec Stéphanie Martel et Ting-Sheng Lin, deux spécialistes de l’Asie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-stephanie-martel-et-ting-sheng-lin-deux-specialistes-de-lasie/ Modified: 2020-12-16 > Dans le 7e épisode, les animateurs reçoivent Stéphanie Martel, professeure adjointe à l’Université Queen’s et Ting-Sheng Lin, professeur agrégé à l’UQAM, tous deux spécialistes de l’Asie. Ils discutent des contributions de l’ASEAN au multilatéralisme et à l’ordre régional en Asie-Pacifique, des enjeux liés à la dimension militaire des comportements chinois en mer de Chine méridionale, de l’évolution de l’approche canadienne envers ces acteurs et l’impact des récentes élections américaines sur la relation entre le Canada, l’ASEAN et la Chine. Dans le 7e épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Thomas Juneau reçoivent Stéphanie Martel, professeure adjointe à l’Université Queen’s et Ting-Sheng Lin, professeur agrégé à l’UQAM, tous deux spécialistes de l’Asie. Ils discutent des contributions de l’ASEAN au multilatéralisme et à l’ordre régional en Asie-Pacifique, des enjeux liés à la dimension militaire des comportements chinois en mer de Chine méridionale, de l’évolution de l’approche canadienne envers ces acteurs et l’impact des récentes élections américaines sur la relation entre le Canada, l’ASEAN et la Chine. ## Entretien avec Thomas Mulcair, professeur invité à l’Université de Montréal URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/thomas-mulcair/ Modified: 2021-06-02 > Thomas Mulcair, professeur invité à l’Université de Montréal, ancien chef du NPD (2012-2017) et député et ministre pour le PLQ (1994-2007). Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas discutent avec Thomas Mulcair, professeur invité à l’Université de Montréal. M. Mulcair a été, auparavant, chef du Nouveau Parti Démocratique (2012-2017) à Ottawa et député et ministre pour le Parti Libéral du Québec (1994-2007). M. Mulcair nous parle des faits saillants de sa carrière, et de son intérêt pour les questions environnementales au fil des années. Il analyse les conséquences des changements climatiques pour la sécurité internationale et pour le Canada. Il discute aussi avec nous des implications que le changement d’administration aux États-Unis, avec l’élection du Président Biden, peut avoir sur la lutte contre les changements climatiques. Faits saillants - 13e épisode ## Entretien avec Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, de l’Université de Leyde aux Pays-Bas URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/entretien-avec-yannick-veilleux-lepage-de-luniversite-de-leyde-aux-pays-bas/ Modified: 2022-04-26 > Dans ce 31e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas discutent avec Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, de l’Université de Leyde aux Pays-Bas. Dans ce 31e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam et Thomas discutent avec Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, de l’Université de Leyde aux Pays-Bas. Yannick nous parle de l’évolution de l’extrême droite au Canada, et de ses liens transnationaux avec des groupes comparables aux États-Unis et ailleurs. Il analyse le rôle des médias sociaux dans l’organisation des protestations à Ottawa, Windsor, et Coutts en Alberta au début 2022, puis évalue la réponse du gouvernement du Canada. Faits Saillants - Épisode 31 ## Épisode 35: Annick Goulet, l’Ambassadrice du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-35-annick-goulet-lambassadrice-du-canada/ Modified: 2023-02-22 > Artur et Sarah-Myriam discutent avec Annick Goulet, l'Ambassadrice du Canada en Roumanie, en République... Dans ce 35e épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Sarah-Myriam présente son nouveau co-animateur, Artur Wilczynski. Artur et Sarah-Myriam discutent avec Annick Goulet, l'Ambassadrice du Canada en Roumanie, en République de Bulgarie et en République de Moldova. Ils abordent les moments clés de son parcours, les priorités et les défis liés à son mandat, l'impact de l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie sur la région et discutent du rôle du Canada dans ces pays et à l'OTAN. L'Ambassadrice nous parle de la priorité qu'elle accorde à la question des femmes notamment au sein de la diplomatie. ## Épisode 36: Wendy Hadwen, Politiques stratégiques, planification et partenariats (CA PSPP) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-36-wendy-hadwen-politiques-strategiques-planification-et-partenariats-ca-pspp/ Modified: 2023-03-22 > Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Wendy Hadwen, chef adjointe des Politiques stratégiques, planification et partenariats (CA PSPP). Nous... Pour ce 36ième épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Wendy Hadwen, chef adjointe des Politiques stratégiques, planification et partenariats (CA PSPP). Nous discutons de sa carrière et des déflis liés au fait d'être championne ministérielle des langues officielles . Ils abordent l'utilisation du français au sein des structures de renseignement tel que le Groupe des Cinq, des moyens pris afin de sensibiliser les Canadiens francophones à ce que font le Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST) et d'autres organismes de sécurité et de renseignement ainsi que la façon dont les langues des Premières Nations s’insèrent également dans le débat sur les langues officielles au sein du CST. ## Épisode 39: Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-39-colonel-marie-christine-harvey/ Modified: 2023-11-08 > Pour ce nouvel épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent la Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey. La Colonel Harvey nous parle de son parcours... Pour ce nouvel épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent la Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey. La Colonel Harvey nous parle de son parcours, des défis liés aux postes qu'elle a occupés, notamment comme instructeur et lors de commandement d'opérations domestiques et internationales. Elle démantèle des mythes liés à l'armée et nous explique en quoi les Forces Armées canadieenne se distinguent des autres armées. ## Épisode 40: Guillaume Darmé URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-40-guillaume-darme/ Modified: 2023-11-23 > Pour ce 40ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Marie-Christine reçoivent Guillaume Darmé, Coordonnateur du Renseignement pour les Opérations... Pour ce 40ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam et Marie-Christine reçoivent Guillaume Darmé, Coordonnateur du Renseignement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.  Guillaume Darmé raconte son parcours et l’origine de l'unité du renseignement dans les OMP, les besoins pour lesquels son équipe a été conçue et sa mise en place.  Il explique l'évolution du mandat du renseigement au sein des missions de paix, et en identifie les principaux défis. Guillaume Darmé met en lumière l'appuie des États Membres aux efforts de son unité, et discute du rôle particulier pour le Canada. Guillaume Darmé a été nommé Coordonnateur du Renseignement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix, le 1er Juillet 2017. Il est en charge de la mise en place de la Politique de Renseignement adoptée en 2017, ainsi que de la création et de la coordination d’un système de Renseignement pour les Operations de Maintien de la Paix (OMP) des Nations Unies ainsi que de la coordination de l’alerte précoce dans les OMP. Précédemment, M. Darmé occupait la fonction de Conseiller Spécial et Chef de Cabinet du Secrétaire Général Adjoint (SGA) des Nations Unies pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix (2012 – 2017), offrant son expertise technique et stratégique au SGA sur les questions politiques et opérationnelles liées aux OMP, y compris sur le Renseignement. De 2007 à 2012, M. Darmé a occupé diverses fonctions au sein du Centre de Crise (CDC) du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Français, dans l’équipe qui a créé le CDC tout d’abord, puis en tant qu’adjoint au Chef des Opérations. Pendant cette période, Mr. Darmé a effectué de nombreuses missions de secours à l’étranger, venant en aide à des milliers de citoyens français et européens de par le monde, y compris des otages. Il a été décoré de la Médaille d’Honneur des Affaires étrangères pour services rendus à la Nation. Mr. Darmé est titulaire de deux Mastères en Gestion de crise et Négociations Internationales, et Systèmes stratégiques de défense, respectivement. ## Épisode 41: Sébastien Carrière URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-41-entretien-avec-sebastien-carriere/ Modified: 2023-12-07 > Pour ce 41ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Marie-Christine Harvey reçoivent Sébastien Carrière, ancien Ambassadeur du Canada... Pour ce 41ième épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Marie-Christine Harvey reçoivent Sébastien Carrière, ancien Ambassadeur du Canada en Haïti, Chef du Protocole du Canada et Représentant personnel du Premier ministre du Canada pour la Francophonie. Ils discutent de son parcours, de l’évolution du rôle du Canada dans des dossiers aussi variés que  les mines Antipersonnel, les relations commerciales et les affaires politiques en Afrique et au Moyen-Orient.  Sébastien Carrière nous rappelle le mandat du Canada en Haïti et met en lumière la complexité des défis liés aux contextes national et international.  Il nous explique son rôle en tant que Chef du Protocole ainsi que le rôle de l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) dans les sphères francophones au Maghreb, en Afrique sub-saharienne, au Moyen Orient, en Asie, et dans les Caraïbes. ## Épisode 42: Colonel Véronique Gervais, l’Opération CALUMET URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-42-colonel-veronique-gervais-loperation-calumet/ Modified: 2024-01-02 > Pour ce 42ième épisode, Marie-Christine Harvey et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent la Colonel Véronique Gervais, Commandante de... Pour ce 42ième épisode, Marie-Christine Harvey et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent la Colonel Véronique Gervais, Commandante de la Force Opérationnelle CALUMET en Égypte. Elles discutent du parcours de la Colonel, du mandat de l'Opération CALUMET et de l'impact du conflit entre Israël et le Hamas. Colonel Gervais revient sur les points communs/distincts entre ses déploiements en Bosnie et en Afghanistan. Elle explique ce qui distingue les Canadiennes. au sein d'équipes multinationales et des leçons pour les Forces Armées Canadiennes. ## Épisode 43: l’Inspecteur David Shane de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-43-linspecteur-david-shane-de-la-ville-de-montreal-spvm/ Modified: 2024-02-22 > ...reçoivent l'Inspecteur David Shane, responsable des communications et porte-parole du Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM).. Pour ce nouvel épisode, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey reçoivent l'Inspecteur David Shane, responsable des communications et porte-parole du Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM). L'Inspecteur Shane raconte son parcours dans la police et en tant que réserviste de l'Armée canadienne. Ils discutent de l’évolution du travail des policiers, des défis que posent les nouvelles formes de criminalité et de la façon dont le Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal s'adapte à ces nouvelles réalités. ## Épisode 44: LT.Col. Chris Labbé, CHEF, BUREAU INTERARMÉES CONTRE AÉRONEF SANS ÉQUIPAGE URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-44-lt-col-chris-labbe-chef-bureau-interarmees-contre-aeronef-sans-equipage/ Modified: 2024-09-04 > Dans ce 44ième épisode, Brigadier-Générale Marie-Christine Harvey et la professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le Lieutenant... Dans ce 44ième épisode, Brigadier-Générale Marie-Christine Harvey et la professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le Lieutenant Colonel Chris Labbé, CHEF, BUREAU INTERARMÉES CONTRE AÉRONEF SANS ÉQUIPAGE - CHEF DE L’INTÉGRATION DES SYSTÈMES DE COMBAT . Ils discutent de son parcours, des principales menaces pour le Canada dans le domaine aérien et spatial , du rôle du bureau interarméees canadien contre-drone, de la lutte anti-drone et de ses défis et enjeux, tant sur le plan technologique, réglementaire et éthique. Il explique la coopération avec les autres entités gouvernementales, les instituts de recherches, les entreprises ainsi que la collaboration internationale pour réguler et contrer l' utilisation des drônes. ## Épisode 45: Tjorven Bellmann, ambassadrice d’Allemagne au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-45-tjorven-bellmann-ambassadrice-dallemagne-au-canada/ Modified: 2025-02-12 > Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec Tjorven Bellmann, ambassadrice d'Allemagne au Canada. Dans ce nouvel épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec Tjorven Bellmann, ambassadrice d'Allemagne au Canada. Elle revient sur les moments marquants de son parcours au ministère des Affaires étrangères depuis 2013, en partageant son expérience en matière de politique de sécurité et de coopération internationale. La discussion explore plusieurs enjeux stratégiques, notamment l’Arctique, où les visions canadienne et européenne divergent entre souveraineté territoriale et liberté de navigation, soulevant des questions environnementales et géopolitiques. Le partage du fardeau au sein de l’OTAN est également abordé, en mettant en perspective les critiques adressées à l’Allemagne et au Canada quant à leurs engagements budgétaires et leur contribution à l’Alliance. L'épisode compare ensuite le rôle des centres d’excellence de l’OTAN en Allemagne avec celui du tout nouveau centre canadien sur le changement climatique et la sécurité, mettant en lumière les enseignements pouvant renforcer le rôle du Canada au sein de l’Alliance. Enfin, les invités discutent de la menace croissante de l’ingérence électorale dans les démocraties occidentales et des stratégies de coopération entre Ottawa et Berlin pour mieux faire face à ces risques. ## Épisode 46: Colonel Dariusz Niedzielski, chef d’état-major au Centre d’excellence de l’OTAN URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-46-colonel-dariusz-niedzielski-chef-detat-major-au-centre-dexcellence-de-lotan/ Modified: 2025-02-26 > Dans ce nouvel épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec le Colonel Dariusz Niedzielski.... Dans ce nouvel épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s'entretiennent avec le Colonel Dariusz Niedzielski, chef d’état-major au Centre d’excellence de l’OTAN pour les communications stratégiques (STRATCOM). Fort d’une vaste expérience dans les opérations d’information et la planification stratégique, il partage son expertise sur l’évolution des communications stratégiques au sein de l’OTAN face à la montée des menaces hybrides et de la désinformation. La discussion met en lumière le rôle du STRATCOM dans l’adaptation de l’OTAN aux défis modernes, notamment à travers le développement de doctrines, l’analyse des menaces informationnelles et l’intégration des technologies émergentes comme l’intelligence artificielle. Le Colonel Niedzielski explique comment le centre contribue à renforcer la résilience des démocraties face aux campagnes de manipulation numérique orchestrées par des acteurs hostiles tels que la Russie et la Chine. L’épisode explore également l’interaction entre STRATCOM et les structures alliées, soulignant comment les analyses du centre influencent les politiques de l’OTAN et de ses États membres. À ce titre, il partage des recommandations pour le Centre canadien sur le changement climatique et la sécurité, récemment créé, en insistant sur l’importance d’une approche ciblée et d’une coopération internationale renforcée. Enfin, la question cruciale des ingérences électorales est abordée, alors que plusieurs pays occidentaux s’apprêtent à organiser des élections. Le Colonel Niedzielski évoque les stratégies de protection des processus démocratiques, insistant sur le rôle fondamental de l’éducation numérique, de la responsabilité médiatique et de la vigilance citoyenne face à la propagation de la désinformation ## Épisode 47: Natascha Hryckow, conseillère principale pour l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-47-natascha-hryckow-conseillere-principale-pour-linitiative-de-la-corne-de-lafrique/ Modified: 2025-03-13 > Pour ce 47ᵉ épisode, Laurent et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Natascha Hryckow, conseillère principale pour l'Initiative de la Corne de l'Afrique. Pour ce 47ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Natascha Hryckow, conseillère principale pour l'Initiative de la Corne de l'Afrique. Cette entrevue nous plonge au cœur du parcours et de l’expertise de Natascha Hryckow, une figure reconnue dans la gestion des conflits, le contreterrorisme et le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles. Forte d’une expérience au sein d’organisations internationales telles que l’OMS, l’OTAN et l’Union européenne, elle a occupé des postes stratégiques dans certaines des régions les plus instables du monde. Son engagement auprès de l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique illustre la complexité des défis liés aux conflits et à la gouvernance. Nous reviendrons sur son parcours professionnel et les responsabilités qu’elle a exercées dans ces divers rôles. Elle partagera ensuite son analyse des défis communs et des particularités des crises en Afghanistan, en Irak, en Libye, en Somalie, en Syrie et au Yémen, à travers son travail au sein de l’OMS. L’entretien abordera également son rôle dans la mission européenne EUCAP Nestor ainsi que son implication au sein du Panel d’experts sur la Somalie, permettant d’évaluer l’évolution des enjeux sécuritaires et institutionnels au fil des années. Forte de son expérience en Afghanistan avec l’OTAN, elle reviendra sur les enseignements essentiels tirés de cette mission. Enfin, nous évoquerons son rôle actuel au sein de l’Initiative de la Corne de l’Afrique, en mettant en lumière l’implication de la Banque mondiale et l’influence du financement britannique sur sa mission. Pour conclure, nous nous interrogerons sur la place qu’un pays comme le Canada peut occuper dans ces contextes de crise et les contributions qu’il pourrait apporter à la stabilité et au développement des régions en difficulté. ## Episode 47: Security – Policy Nexus of Emerging Technology URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-47-security-policy-nexus-of-emerging-technology/ Modified: 2021-04-23 > In the 47th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the House Committee meetings on sexual misconduct in the CAF, Russia’s military build-up on its border with Ukraine, and President Biden’s decision to withdraw the remaining troops from Afghanistan In the 47th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the House Committee meetings on sexual misconduct in the CAF, Russia’s military build-up on its border with Ukraine, and President Biden’s decision to withdraw the remaining troops from Afghanistan. Today’s feature interview guest is with Khashayar Khorasani [29:20], Principal Investigator and Director of SPNET at Concordia. This week’s RnR segment [48:25], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: 1. A Call To Spy 2. the new John Sanford Prey novel—Ocean Prey 3. What we do the in Shadows ## Épisode 48: Amélie Zima, chercheuse au Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-48-amelie-zima-chercheuse-au-centre-des-etudes-de-securite-de-lifri/ Modified: 2025-03-27 > Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Amélie Zima, chercheuse au Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI. Pour ce 48ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Amélie Zima, chercheuse au Centre des études de sécurité de l’IFRI (Institut français des relations internationales), spécialiste de l'OTAN et de la Pologne. Docteure en science politique, lauréate du premier prix de thèse de l’IHEDN, elle a travaillé au sein de nombreuses institutions académiques et de recherche en France et à l’étranger, dont le CEFRES à Prague, l’Académie polonaise des sciences et l’Université de Varsovie. Avant de rejoindre l’IFRI, elle a exercé à l’IRSEM en tant que chercheuse sur la sécurité européenne. Elle est également l’autrice de plusieurs publications récentes sur l’OTAN et la politique de défense polonaise. Au cours de cette entrevue, nous abordons en détail le cas polonais, à partir de ses travaux sur le réarmement massif engagé par Varsovie, dont les ambitions pourraient faire de la Pologne la première puissance militaire européenne d’ici 2035. L'échange met ainsi en lumière les défis politiques, économiques et organisationnels de cette montée en puissance, ainsi que ses implications pour les équilibres internes de l’OTAN et de l’Union européenne. L’entretien porte de ce fait également sur les tensions politiques internes en Pologne, les risques de politisation de la défense et l’impact des élections présidentielles à venir. La discussion permet en outre d'aborder la question des coopérations bilatérales qu'entretient la Pologne avec les États-Unis (y compris sous les diverses administrations Trump), avec d'autres pays européens tels la France et l'Ukraine, mais aussi avec le Canada.Pour conclure, à travers cette discussion, nous nous interrogeons sur les moyens pour déconstruire les idées reçues sur l’OTAN, notamment en France et au Canada, à travers le regard d’une chercheuse engagée dans la diffusion des savoirs stratégiques auprès des décideurs et du grand public. ## Episode 48: Operation Reassurance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-48-operation-reassurance-2/ Modified: 2021-05-05 > Operation Reassurance - External review into sexual misconduct in the military and the new Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture In the 48th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the external review into sexual misconduct in the military, the new Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture and the latest requests for military assistance to support the country’s pandemic response efforts. Today’s feature interview guest is LCol. McCleod [25:45], Commander of Air Task Force - Romania, part of Operation Reassurance. This week’s RnR segment [53:00], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: 1. The Faculty 2. Love and Monsters 3. Superstore ## Épisode 49 : Giovanna De Maio, chargée de mission au Centre d’analyse, de prévision et de stratégie (CAPS) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-49-giovanna-de-maio-chargee-de-mission-au-centre-danalyse-de-prevision-et-de-strategie-caps/ Modified: 2025-08-28 Dans ce 49ème épisode du balado Conseil de sécurité, nous recevons Giovanna De Maio, spécialiste des relations transatlantiques et de la politique étrangère des grandes puissances. Docteure en relations internationales et aujourd’hui chargée de mission au sein du CAPS du ministère français de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, elle produit des analyses stratégiques sur les dynamiques américaines et leur impact sur la France, l’Europe et l’architecture transatlantique. Forte d’un parcours international, entre Rome, Moscou, Paris et Washington, Giovanna De Maio a été chercheuse au German Marshall Fund, à l’IFRI, à la Brookings Institution et à la George Washington University. Ses travaux ont notamment porté sur la désinformation russe, les rapports UE–États-Unis, les dynamiques politiques italiennes, ainsi que les ingérences étrangères dans les processus électoraux. Au cours de cet entretien, elle revient sur sa trajectoire et son rôle actuel au sein du CAPS, à la croisée de la recherche, de la diplomatie et de la prospective. Nous explorons ensuite ses recherches sur les perceptions russes de l’Ukraine depuis 2014, la construction idéologique autour de la négation de l’identité ukrainienne, et les tensions entre récits officiels, opinions publiques et propagande. La discussion se penche également sur les stratégies de désinformation russe et les fragilités narratives occidentales, questionnant la frontière entre propagande extérieure et biais internes à nos sociétés. Pour conclure, l'épisode permet d'aborder l’évolution récente de la politique étrangère américaine et l’ébranlement des fondements de l’architecture sécuritaire transatlantique. Avec notre invitée, nous revenons ainsi sur les tensions croissantes entre les États-Unis et certains alliés — dont le Canada — et les risques associés à une hypothèse de retrait américain de l’OTAN. ## Episode 49: Healthy Tension URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-49-healthy-tension-2/ Modified: 2021-05-26 > Interview Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence, Jody Thomas and Acting Chief of the Defence Staff Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre. In the 49th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve reflect on today’s Feature Interview with guests Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence, Jody Thomas and Acting Chief of the Defence Staff Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre. Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre also takes over this week’s RnR segment, where he provides some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Lt.Gen Eyre’s picks for the week are: 1. Frank Herbert’s Dune series 2. Susan Eisenhower’s How Ike lead 3. Ryan Holiday & Stephen Hanselman’s The Lives of the Stoics ## Épisode 50 : Brigadier-général Éric Laforest, Chef J5 au Grand Quartier général des puissances alliées en Europe (SHAPE) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-50-brigadier-general-eric-laforest-chef-j5-au-grand-quartier-general-des-puissances-alliees-en-europe-shape/ Modified: 2025-08-28 Pour ce 50ième épisode du balado Conseils de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le Brigadier-général Éric Laforest, officier chevronné en opérations internationales et en planification stratégique, membre des Forces armées canadiennes depuis 1991. Tout au long de sa carrière, le Brigadier-général Laforest a exercé des responsabilités de commandement aux niveaux du peloton, de la compagnie, du bataillon et de la force opérationnelle. Il a notamment dirigé des troupes en Haïti, en Afghanistan et en Lettonie dans le cadre de l’opération REASSURANCE. Fort de plusieurs affectations stratégiques à Ottawa et dans des instances internationales, il occupe depuis juillet 2023 le poste de chef des plans militaires (J5) au SHAPE, siège opérationnel de l'OTAN en Europe. Lors de cette entrevue, il revient sur les enseignements tirés de ses expériences de commandement opérationnel dans des contextes variés. Il partage son analyse des défis rencontrés sur le terrain, notamment pour maintenir la cohésion de forces multinationales. Sarah-Myriam et Laurent évoquent également les priorités stratégiques identifiées depuis sa prise de poste au SHAPE, ainsi que son analyse de l’évolution de la menace russe, à la lumière de son expérience en Europe de l’Est. Cet épisode permet également d’aborder les défis de la coopération militaire au sein de l'OTAN et les contributions spécifiques et notables des Forces armées canadiennes à l'architecture de défense collective. ## Episode 50: The CDSN Podcast Network URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-50-the-cdsn-podcast-network-2/ Modified: 2021-06-04 > The discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the CAF. In the 50th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed forces and the diverted RyanAir flight in Belarus. Today’s feature interview guests are the hosts of our other Podcast, Conseils de sécurité [24:15], Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé & Thomas Juneau are here to celebrate our 50th episode! This week’s RnR segment [55:15], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Mitchells vs. the Machines; Dead Eyes podcast; Love, Death, and Robots ## Épisode 51 : Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, docteur en science politique de l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-51-romain-le-cour-grandmaison-docteur-en-science-politique-de-luniversite-paris-1-pantheon-sorbonne/ Modified: 2025-08-28 Dans ce 51e épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, docteur en science politique de l’Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne et expert senior à la Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. À la croisée de la recherche, du terrain et de la stratégie, notre invité revient sur son parcours singulier et partage ses réflexions sur la production contemporaine du savoir en matière de sécurité. Il présente également le mandat et les actions de la Global Initiative, tout en proposant une lecture renouvelée de la violence criminelle — non pas comme une rupture de l’ordre, mais comme une forme de gouvernance. L’échange aborde en profondeur la manière dont les rapports entre l’État, l’armée, la police et les groupes armés non étatiques se reconfigurent dans des contextes comme le Mexique ou Haïti. Il explore également le rôle des diasporas, des flux financiers et des dynamiques transnationales dans la consolidation de la violence, et questionne la portée — et les limites — d’une réponse multilatérale ou militaire dans un pays comme Haïti. Plus largement, la discussion s’élargit à l’impact des trafics transnationaux (armes, drogues, personnes) sur les frontières classiques de la défense et de la sécurité. Enfin, l’épisode se conclut sur une réflexion essentielle : comment sortir du prisme exclusivement répressif face à la criminalité organisée, et quelles alternatives politiques ou sociales pourraient être envisagées ? ## Episode 51: Military Justice Reform URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-51-military-justice-reform-2/ Modified: 2021-06-18 > The discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the CAF. In the 51st episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the terrorist attack in London, Ontario, the NATO Summit, and Lt. Gen Rouleau’s decision to play golf with Vance. Today’s feature interview guest is Dr. Leah West, [22:15], lawyer and Assistant Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. This week’s RnR segment [44:40], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: modok, Girls5Eva, We Are Lady Parts. ## Épisode 52 : Renée Larivière, directrice de la gestion des programmes chez Interpeace URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-52-renee-lariviere-directrice-de-la-gestion-des-programmes-chez-interpeace/ Modified: 2025-08-28 Pour ce 52ᵉ épisode, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé s’entretiennent avec Renée Larivière, directrice de la gestion des programmes chez Interpeace. À ce poste, elle assure le leadership stratégique et la supervision des opérations de consolidation de la paix. Au fil de la discussion, nous abordons l’influence de sa formation en sciences de l’environnement sur son approche de la gestion des conflits, ainsi que ses expériences de terrain au Pérou, au Pakistan et en Indonésie. Renée Larivière nous présente également la mission d’Interpeace, son rôle dans la consolidation de la paix, les principaux défis auxquels l’organisation est confrontée aujourd’hui, et la manière dont son approche se distingue de celle des grandes institutions internationales comme l’ONU — en explorant les avantages et les limites de cette différenciation. Elle nous explique aussi le concept original de la "diplomatie par la nourriture", partage ses réflexions sur la montée de la polarisation, la persistance des conflits prolongés, et l’évolution des efforts internationaux en matière de consolidation de la paix. Nous concluons l’épisode en discutant du rôle du Canada sur la scène internationale en matière de paix : quelle est sa contribution actuelle et dans quels domaines pourrait-elle être renforcée ? Biographie : Renée Larivière est directrice de la gestion des programmes à Interpeace, où elle pilote le leadership stratégique et la surveillance des opérations de consolidation de la paix dans le monde. Elle est également en charge des mêmes tâches pour les politiques de l'organisation. Ayant oeuvré dans les écosystèmes complexes de sociétés fragiles, elle a une large expérience dans la collaboration avec les différents acteurs qui ont un intérêt dans la consolidation de la paix Renée est arrivée à Interpeace en 2007 avec une expérience de terrain au Pérou, au Pakistan et en Indonésie. Si son objectif a toujours été de soutenir les sociétés fragiles, son travail passé repose davantage sur des conflits liés aux ressources naturelles. Pendant son séjour au Pérou au service de Grupo GEA, Renée a également été professeur invité à l'École supérieure de l'Université nationale de La Molina. Elle a aussi travaillé pour l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI). Renée est canadienne et détient une maîtrise en sciences de l'environnement de l'Université de Sherbrooke ainsi qu'une licence de l'Université d'Ottawa. ## Episode 52: Emerging Technologies and Escalating Security Problems URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-52-emerging-technologies-and-escalating-security-problems-2/ Modified: 2021-07-14 > The discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the CAF. In the 52nd episode of Battle Rhythm, our guest host and Co-director, Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot and Steve talk about the new Canadian Network on Information and Security (CANIS) at University of Calgary, climate change as a security issue, localizing international events such as the Calgary Stampede and the Tokyo Olympics and the Afghanistan withdraw. Today’s feature interview guest is Political Scientist Sarah Shoker [29:10], currently a SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow. This week’s RnR segment [54:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Wellington Paranormal, Queen's Gambit, Facebook Oculus. ## Épisode 53 – Daniela Irrera, professeure au Centre des hautes études de défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-53-daniela-irrera-professeure-au-centre-des-hautes-etudes-de-defense/ Modified: 2025-08-28 Dans ce 53ème épisode du balado Conseil de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Daniela Irrera, professeure de science politique et de relations internationales, spécialiste reconnue des acteurs non étatiques, de la gouvernance mondiale, des conflits armés et des politiques de sécurité. Elle enseigne aujourd’hui au Centre des hautes études de défense de l’Université nationale de défense à Rome, ainsi qu’à l’Académie de l’OSCE à Bichkek, et contribue activement à la formation des futurs experts civils et militaires européens au sein du Collège européen de sécurité et de défense (CESD) à Bruxelles. Au fil de cette entrevue, Daniela Irrera revient sur ses activités d’enseignement à l’Académie de l’OSCE à Bichkek, où elle forme de jeunes experts aux enjeux de sécurité et de diplomatie. Elle présente également son jeu de simulation Game of Peace, primé au niveau européen, qui permet d’explorer de manière concrète les mécanismes de négociation, de résolution de conflits et de médiation dans les relations internationales. L’entretien revient sur plusieurs projets de recherche auxquels Daniela Irrera a contribué, portant sur des thématiques variées telles que la propagande russe hors de l’Occident, les formes contemporaines d’autoritarisme, ainsi que les liens entre commerce illicite, sécurité et durabilité. Elle évoque notamment les initiatives MORDOR, sur les dictatures actuelles, et GLITSS, sur les circuits illicites mondialisés, offrant un éclairage sur les mutations géopolitiques, technologiques et narratives qui façonnent aujourd’hui les relations internationales. La discussion se poursuit autour de ses travaux sur les ONG dans les zones de gouvernance fragile, l’usage détourné des technologies numériques par les groupes criminels, et la nécessité d’élaborer des réponses européennes adaptées à la diversité des acteurs transnationaux. Daniela Irrera revient également sur le concept de triple nexus – articulant aide humanitaire, développement et consolidation de la paix – qu’elle mobilise dans ses recherches sur les réponses internationales aux crises systémiques. Elle souligne enfin le rôle que peut jouer le Canada dans la construction d’un modèle de coordination internationale plus cohérent et efficace. Un échange riche et transversal qui permet de mieux comprendre la complexité contemporaine des menaces, la transformation des acteurs non étatiques, et les leviers encore disponibles pour faire face à un monde fragmenté, traversé par de multiples zones grises. ## Episode 53: Making the Best of It: Canadian Forces Military Police Group URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-53-making-the-best-of-it-canadian-forces-military-police-group-2/ Modified: 2021-07-29 > The discovery of the Kamloops Residential School burial site, latest revelations and reviews regarding sexual misconduct in the CAF. In the 53rd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about a recent Defence SMRC Roundtable, cyber attacks and Great Power Politics. Today’s feature interview guest is Canadian Forces Military Police Group’s Colonel Vanessa Hanrahan [20:15]. This week’s RnR segment [44:00], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Ben Barry, Blood, Metal, and Dust; Theo Farrell, Unwinnable; Never Have I Ever; Black Widow ## Épisode 54 – Colin Gérard, docteur en géopolitique et chef d’équipe à VIGINUM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-54-colin-gerard-docteur-en-geopolitique-et-chef-dequipe-a-viginum/ Modified: 2025-08-28 Dans ce 54e épisode du Conseil de sécurité, Laurent Borzillo et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Colin Gérard, docteur en géopolitique et spécialiste reconnu des stratégies d’influence informationnelle russes dans le cyberespace francophone. Lauréat du prix spécial de l’Association pour les Études sur la Guerre et la Stratégie en 2023, il a soutenu une thèse à l’Institut français de géopolitique (Université Paris 8) consacrée aux acteurs, aux pratiques et aux récits visant à orienter l’opinion publique française. Aujourd’hui chef d’équipe à VIGINUM – le service de vigilance contre les ingérences numériques étrangères rattaché au Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN) – Colin Gérard poursuit également ses recherches en tant que chercheur associé au centre GEODE (Géopolitique de la Datasphère). Ses travaux croisent méthodes géopolitiques et techniques d’OSINT pour documenter les campagnes d’influence, reconstituer les chaînes de diffusion de contenus, et analyser les reconfigurations de l’écosystème informationnel russe depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Dans cet entretien, il revient sur les mutations profondes du dispositif d’influence russe – marquées par la fragmentation, la privatisation partielle des opérations et leur redéploiement vers des terrains comme l’Afrique francophone. L’analyse des opérations Lakhta et Doppelgänger illustre la montée en puissance de dispositifs clandestins, fondés sur l’usurpation d’identité et la sous-traitance. La discussion aborde également la montée des "murs informationnels", la circulation différenciée des récits dans les démocraties libérales, et les réponses possibles. Enfin, Colin Gérard revient sur les similitudes et différences observées entre la France et le Canada face à ces menaces. Un épisode essentiel pour comprendre les formes contemporaines d’ingérence numérique, les enjeux de souveraineté informationnelle, et les défis communs posés aux démocraties. ## Episode 54: Pandemic Modelling URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-54-pandemic-modelling-2/ Modified: 2021-08-18 > This week: family vacations and regulations across the US border, planning a return to classes and the evolving situation in Afghanistan. In the 54th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about family vacations and regulations across the US border, planning a return to classes and the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Today’s feature interview guest is with Mathematician, Caroline Colijn [20:45]. This week’s RnR segment [51:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Jolt, Party Down, Surreal Estate. ## Épisode 55 – L’Amiral (2S) Alain Coldefy, ancien Major Général des Armées, directeur des opérations à l’État-major de la Marine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-55-lamiral-2s-alain-coldefy-ancien-major-general-des-armees-directeur-des-operations-a-letat-major-de-la-marine-et-auteur-de-le-sel-et-les-etoiles/ Modified: 2025-08-28 Dans cet épisode, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé accueillent l’Amiral (2S) Alain Coldefy, ancien Major Général des Armées, directeur des opérations à l’État-major de la Marine, et auteur de Le Sel et les Étoiles. Fort de plus de quarante ans de carrière, il revient sur son parcours exceptionnel, entre commandement en mer et hautes responsabilités stratégiques, en France et à l’international. L’Amiral partage ses réflexions sur la tension entre l’identité de marin et celle de stratège, et partage ses analyses des grands enjeux maritimes actuels : piraterie, sécurisation des routes commerciales, rivalités entre grandes puissances, coopération multilatérale et militarisation de l’Arctique. L’épisode explore aussi les nouvelles menaces en mer – cyberattaques, sabotage d’infrastructures, surveillance offshore – ainsi que le rôle que peut jouer le Canada, notamment dans l’espace arctique. Enfin, il adresse un message à la relève : comment préparer une nouvelle génération d’analystes et de décideurs face à un environnement naval en profonde transformation. Ce balado a été réalisé en partenariat avec France-Amériques. ## Episode 55: Canada’s top female military officer URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-55-canadas-top-female-military-officer-2/ Modified: 2021-08-25 > In the 55th episode, Stef and Steve talk about Afghanistan hot-takes and consultations with CAF/DND on sexual misconduct reporting. In the 55th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Afghanistan hot-takes and consultations with CAF/DND on sexual misconduct reporting. Today’s feature interview guest is with one of Canada's 100 most-powerful women, Lt.-Gen. Christine Whitecross [27:10]. This week’s RnR segment [52:10], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Restrepo/ Shadows in the Cloud, White Lotus. ## Épisode 56 – L’Amiral Xavier Païtard URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-56-lamiral-xavier-paitard/ Modified: 2025-08-28 Dans cet épisode, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent l’Amiral Xavier Païtard. L'Amiral revient sur un parcours exceptionnel, du cockpit d’un chasseur à la planification stratégique de l’OTAN. Nous explorons avec lui l’évolution du rôle de la France dans l’architecture de sécurité euro-atlantique, les enseignements tirés de missions de combat en zones complexes, et les défis actuels liés aux capacités futures, à la cyberdéfense et à la dissuasion à l’ère des conflits hybrides. Une conversation riche sur l’innovation navale, le rôle de la marine dans un monde polarisé, et les responsabilités partagées entre la France et le Canada en matière de sécurité collective. Ce balado a été réalisé en partenariat avec France-Amériques. ## Episode 56: Future Thinking Resilience & Sustainability URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-56-future-thinking-resilience-sustainability/ Modified: 2021-09-09 > Stef and Steve talk about Afghanistan hot-takes and consultations with CAF/DND on sexual misconduct reporting. In the 56th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about personal lessons learned from 9/11 and Federal Election 2021. Today’s feature interview guest is with Capstone Laureate, Donna Dupont [24:30]. This week’s RnR segment [45:00], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Only the Murders in the Building, Dug, Shang-Chi ## Épisode 57 – Le Général Alexis Rougier URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-57-le-general-alexis-rougier/ Modified: 2025-10-30 Dans cet épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent le général Alexis Rougier, général de brigade aérienne en charge de la Très Haute Altitude (THA) à l’état-major de l’Armée de l’Air et de l’Espace. Fort d’un parcours marqué par le commandement opérationnel et l’innovation stratégique, le général Rougier revient sur la transformation profonde des armées face à l’émergence du continuum air–espace, à l’évolution des menaces technologiques et à la redéfinition de la supériorité aérienne. L’entretien explore les enjeux de souveraineté, de sécurité et de résilience dans un environnement où les domaines terrestre, maritime, aérien, cyber et spatial sont désormais étroitement interconnectés. Le général partage également sa vision des coopérations internationales, notamment entre la France et le Canada, qui renforcent leurs liens dans les domaines de la défense aérienne, de la surveillance spatiale et de l’innovation duale. Entre intelligence artificielle, hypervélocité, robotique et guerre électronique, cet épisode questionne la manière dont les armées peuvent préserver un avantage stratégique durable tout en maintenant un ancrage humain, éthique et décisionnel au cœur du commandement militaire. Ce balado a été réalisé en partenariat avec France-Amériques. ## Episode 57: No Credible Evidence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-57-no-credible-evidence-2/ Modified: 2021-09-22 > n the 57th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about #Elxn44 with a recap on former General endorsements... In the 57th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about #Elxn44 with a recap on former General endorsements and the lack of foreign policy along with #AUKUS defence pact. Today’s feature interview guest is with Executive Director of Project Ploughshares, Cesar Jaramillo [25:40]. This week’s RnR segment [50:20], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Brooklyn 99, Wesley Morgan’s The Hardest Place. ## Épisode 58 – Paul Charon, directeur du domaine « Influence et Renseignement » de l’IRSEM URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-58-paul-charon-directeur-du-domaine-influence-et-renseignement-de-lirsem/ Modified: 2025-11-12 Dans cet épisode, Sarah-Myriam Marti-Brûlé et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos reçoivent Paul Charon, directeur du domaine Influence et Renseignement de l'Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire (IRSEM).  L’entretien aborde la structuration du champ « renseignement, anticipation et stratégies d’influence »,  le rôle croissant de la guerre cognitive, et les défis qu’elle pose aux démocraties. Ensemble, ils discutent de la tension entre secret et transparence dans les régimes démocratiques, de la centralité des récits dans les stratégies d’influence contemporaines, et des leçons tirées de la guerre en Ukraine face aux offensives narratives russes. L’épisode analyse également l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs, entreprises, plateformes, influenceurs, et les dilemmes que cela pose aux États soucieux de protéger à la fois la sécurité nationale et les libertés fondamentales. Enfin, notre invité revient sur deux ouvrages majeurs : Les mondes du renseignement, qui propose une approche pluridisciplinaire du renseignement, et Baybridge: Anatomy of a Chinese Information Influence Ecosystem, une étude inédite sur l’inefficacité paradoxale de certaines opérations d’influence chinoises. L’entretien se conclut sur les perspectives de coopération entre la France, le Canada et la Francophonie stratégique pour renforcer la résilience informationnelle et défendre un récit démocratique commun. Ce balado a été réalisé en partenariat avec France-Amériques. ## Episode 58: Moral Injury URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-58-moral-injury-2/ Modified: 2021-10-06 > In the 58th episode of Battle Rhythm, we talk about the state of Canada – China relations with the release of the two Michaels... In the 58th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the state of Canada – China relations with the release of the two Michaels, who will be the next Minister of National Defence and the United Nations General Assembly. Today’s feature interview guest is with CDSN Capstone Scholar, Stephanie Houle [25:20]. This week’s RnR segment [47:10], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: Free Guy, Residential Schools Podcast, Star Wars Visions ## Épisode 59 – Mathieu Luinaud, consultant en stratégie et expert du secteur spatial URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-59-mathieu-luinaud-consultant-en-strategie-et-expert-du-secteur-spatial/ Modified: 2025-12-10 Pour ce nouvel épisode de Conseils de sécurité, Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé reçoivent Mathieu Luinaud, consultant en stratégie et expert du secteur spatial. Membre de l’International Institute of Space Law et chercheur associé à la chaire SIRIUS de l’Université Toulouse-1 Capitole, il enseigne aussi l’économie publique et les politiques technologiques à Sciences Po, et est élu de la ville de Paris. Il est l’auteur de plusieurs ouvrages récents, dont L’Industrie spatiale (PUF, 2023), L’Espace et Nous (Dunod, 2025) et Que sais-je ? L’Espace (PUF, 2025). Avec lui, ils explorent la place croissante du spatial dans notre quotidien et dans nos sécurités collectives : Comment l’espace recompose les rapports de puissance et la souveraineté technologique ; Quelles synergies émergent entre les politiques spatiales du Canada, de la France et de l’Australie ; Comment concilier innovation privée et exigences de sécurité nationale ; Quels leviers permettraient à l’Europe et au Canada de rester compétitifs dans un secteur dominé par les écosystèmes américain et asiatique. Ils abordent aussi le rôle du spatial dans la lutte contre les changements climatiques, la diplomatie environnementale, et les défis majeurs de gouvernance face au risque d’un « Far West » orbital. Enfin, ils discutent de l’avenir du spatial : un champ de rivalité stratégique ou un laboratoire d’interdépendance et d’innovation partagée ? Un épisode qui explore pourquoi l’espace est devenu un enjeu central de sécurité internationale. ## Episode 59: Joint Command and Staff Programme URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-59-joint-command-and-staff-programme/ Modified: 2021-10-22 > In the 59th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about a meeting Steve had with Gen. Eyre on personnel issues... In the 59th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about a meeting Steve had with Gen. Eyre on personnel issues, Adm. McDonald’s letter and leadership, opening of the US land border. Today’s feature interview is with a trio of impressive future CAF leaders, Maj D.E. Hogan, Maj M.R. Kieley & Maj S. Leblanc [25:45]. This week’s RnR segment [52:30], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Steve’s RnR picks for the week are: The Forgotten Battle, Super Eight, Squid Game. ## Episode 60: Canadian Intelligence Analysis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-60-canadian-intelligence-analysis/ Modified: 2021-11-03 > Today’s feature interview is with Stephanie Carvin & Thomas Juneau, authors of Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience In the 60th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Cabinet appointments, and Gen. Eyre’s keynote speech at KCIS. Today’s feature interview is with Stephanie Carvin & Thomas Juneau, authors of Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience [23:30]. This week’s RnR segment [56:10], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; WWZ, Happy Death Day. ## Episode 61: Hearts and Minds URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-61-hearts-and-minds-2/ Modified: 2021-11-17 > Today’s feature interview is with Col. (ret.) Eleanor Taylor discussing her current involvement with CAF veteran efforts to evacuate Afghan.. In the 61st episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about CoP26, Three Amigos Summit, and Belarus. Today’s feature interview is with Col. (ret.) Eleanor Taylor discussing her current involvement with CAF veteran efforts to evacuate Afghan colleagues living under Taliban rule [26:00]. This week’s RnR segment [48:50], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Kelly Greenhill’s Weapons of Mass Migration, Lovelife, Red Notice To donate: vtncanada.org To volunteer: amanlara.recovers.org To support resettlement: truepatriolove.com ## Episode 62: Feminist Solutions in the Year Ahead URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-62-feminist-solutions-in-the-year-ahead-2/ Modified: 2021-12-01 > In the 62nd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Throne Speech, CAF’s domestic operations in BC and our upcoming events. In the 62nd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Throne Speech, CAF’s domestic operations in BC and our upcoming events. Today’s feature interview is with feminist scholar and Year Ahead presenter, Megan MacKenzie [27:00]. This week’s RnR segment [54:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Hawkeye, Pig, the Beatles.   Battle Rhythm is hosted by Stephen Saideman and Stéfanie von Hlatky, co-produced with CGAI, and released every second Wednesday, features timely discussion on the defence and security issues of the day, as well as feature conversations with experts and graduate students. ## Episode 63: Leadership Strategy & Gendered Perspectives URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-63-leadership-strategy-gendered-perspectives-2/ Modified: 2021-12-15 In the 63rd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Summit of Democracies, Ukraine’s border politics and the Canadian Armed Forces apology. Today’s feature interviews are with 6 members of the 2021 Class of the Halifax Peace with Women Fellowship, discussing leadership strategy & gendered perspectives [18:50]. This week’s RnR segment [57:25], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions; Scrooged, The Year Without a Christmas, Die Hard Group 1: Leadership Strategy; Colonel Krista Bouckaert: Director of Canadian Forces Grievance Authority, Department of National Defence Commodore Judith Terry: Deputy Director People, British Royal Navy Colonel Katherine Lee: Assistant Chief of Army (Delivery), New Zealand Defence Force Group 2: Gendered Perspectives; Colonel Biljana Blazheska; Aide-de-camp to the Supreme Commander, Armed Forces of the Republic of North Macedonia Lieutenant Colonel Diana Morais: Senior Advisor to the Minister of National Defense, Ministry of National Defense, Portugal Colonel Jennifer de Poorter: G3 of the Operational Headquarters, Royal Marechaussee, Netherlands ## Episode 64: The 2021 Class of the Halifax Peace With Women Fellowship URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-64-the-2021-class-of-the-halifax-peace-with-women-fellowship-2/ Modified: 2022-01-19 > In the 64th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia. Today’s feature interviews are with... In the 64th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia. Today’s feature interviews are with The 2021 Class of the Halifax Peace With Women Fellowship, discussing education and instruction and field operations [20:40]. This week’s RnR segment [55:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Yellow Jackets, Alex Rider, Conquering Tide. • Lieutenant Colonel Monika Mertinaitė: Senior Advisor, Defense Policy Group, Ministry of National Defense, Lithuania • Brigadier General Catherine Bourdès: Deputy Director of French Higher Military Education, Directorate for Higher Military Studies • Colonel Anna Siverstig: Commanding Officer, Swedish Air Warfare Center, Swedish Air Force • Group Captain Louise desJardins: Director Joint Effects/J3E, Royal Australian Air Force • Colonel Danielle Willis: Commander 93 Air Ground Operations Wing, United States Air Force ## Episode 65: It’s Not Just 700 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-65-its-not-just-700-2/ Modified: 2022-02-02 > In the 65th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Civ-Mil protocol when it comes to domestic protests and Canada’s commitment... In the 65th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about Civ-Mil protocol when it comes to domestic protests and Canada’s commitment in Ukraine. Today’s feature interview is with M.E. Sam Samplonius, Co-Chairperson of It’s Not Just 700, a volunteer run, non-funded organization that provides camaraderie, informal support, and advocates for those impacted by Military Sexual Misconduct and Military Sexual Trauma in the Canadian Armed Forces. [17:15]. This week’s RnR segment [43:40], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Wolf like me, Witcher, Twilight of the Gods—Pacific War book ## Episode 66: Saving Democracy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-66-saving-democracy/ Modified: 2022-02-16 > In the 66th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the internationalization of the trucker convoy and the impending Russian... In the 66th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the internationalization of the trucker convoy and the impending Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today’s feature interview is with Ben Rowswell, president of the Canadian International Council. [20:50]. This week’s RnR segment [54:30], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Raising Dion, Reacher, Jack Reacher books. ## Episode 67: NATO (eFP) Battle Group Latvia URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-67-nato-efp-battle-group-latvia-2/ Modified: 2022-03-02 > The Canadian-led NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group Latvia completed an evaluation of its capabilities as a “force package” to In the 67th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today’s feature interview is with Lieutenant-colonel John Benson, (MSM, CD, A de C, Commandant 2e Bataillon Royal 22e Régiment et La Citadelle de Québec) [20:00]. This week’s RnR segment [46:35], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: All of Us Are Dead, Ms. Maisel, Resident Alien. The Canadian-led NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group Latvia completed an evaluation of its capabilities as a “force package” to meet NATO standards during Exercise Silver Arrow in September. The multinational exercise involved almost 3,000 troops and 200 vehicles from 12 NATO allies and was designed to test the battle group’s ability “to plan and conduct operations with the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade” and enhance their readiness, said its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel John Benson. ## Episode 68: Talking to the Civilian in Canada’s Civ-Mil URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-68-talking-to-the-civilian-in-canadas-civ-mil-2/ Modified: 2022-03-16 > In the 68th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Conference of Defence Associations Institute's annual Ottawa Conference In the 68th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the Conference of Defence Associations Institute's annual Ottawa Conference, Russia, Ukraine, foreign fighters & supply convoys. Today’s feature interview is with The Honourable Anita Anand, Minister of National Defence [21:45]. This week’s RnR segment [55:20], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Adam Project, Dead Eyes, Rick Atkinson.     ## Episode 69: OSCE’s special monitoring mission to Ukraine (SMMU) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-69-osces-special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-smmu-2/ Modified: 2022-03-30 > In the 69th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the ISA, Steve’s appearance in a parliamentary hearing with discussion... In the 69th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about the ISA, Steve’s appearance in a parliamentary hearing with discussion of the military personnel announcement, highlights from the NATO summit, and the F35 purchase announcement. Today’s feature interview [20:00] is with Christophe Fortier-Guay discussing his role as OSCE’s special monitoring mission to Ukraine (SMMU).This week’s RnR segment [57:40], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: I like cake, Turning Red, Our Flag Means Death       Christophe Fortier-Guay joined the OSCE’s special monitoring mission to Ukraine (SMMU) in 2017 where he served as a lead political advisor to the mission’s leadership in war-torn Donbas (Luhansk MT). In February 2021, he was promoted acting Deputy Team Leader of the Kharkiv MT, covering Kharkiv, Poltava and Sumy Oblasts. On 1 February 2022, he was appointed acting Team Leader of Kharkiv MT. Prior to his deployment to Eastern Ukraine, he assisted the Director of international cooperation of the French Ministry of Interior. From 2012 to 2014, he was the senior advisor to the Minister of International Relations and Foreign Trade of Quebec. Earlier appointments include serving in the Cabinet of the French Minister for Budget and Spokesman of the Government; in the Political Affairs Secretariat of the Organization of American States in Washington DC; and in the Global strategy firm of Hubert Védrine, former Secretary General of the French Presidency and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is a graduate of the University of Montreal (B.A. political science), the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Master’s in international affairs, conflict and security issues) and of the French National School of Administration (ENA – Promotion Louise Weiss). In 2019, he successfully completed the Senior Executives in National and International Security program at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. ## Episode 70: Police Responses URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-70-police-responses-2/ Modified: 2022-04-13 > In the 70th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about NATO expectations & 2% aspirations, the defense review announcement and... In the 70th episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about NATO expectations & 2% aspirations, the defense review announcement and former CDS Vance’s guilty plea. Today’s feature interview is with Temitope Oriola, Associate Professor, Sociology at the University of Alberta [20:05].This week’s RnR segment [46:15], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: The Stranger, D-Day Girls, No Way Home ## Episode 71: Eating the Elephant One Bite at a Time URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-71-eating-the-elephant-one-bite-at-a-time-2/ Modified: 2022-04-27 > Guest host Anessa Kimball and Steve talk about Finland, Sweden and NATO, US assurances, Ukraine’s borders along with Canada’s defence... In the 71st episode of Battle Rhythm, guest host Anessa Kimball and Steve talk about Finland, Sweden and NATO, US assurances, Ukraine’s borders along with Canada’s defence contributions and implications; finally the data within the Minister’s Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination Final Report. Today’s feature interview is with Major-General M.H.L. (Lise) Bourgon, CMM, MSC, CD, Acting Commander, Military Personnel Command [36:45]. This week’s RnR segment [1:03:30], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Russian Doll, Outcasts, Barry   Guest Biography: Major-General Lise Bourgon joined the military in 1987 under the ROTP training plan and was selected to attend Le College Militaire Royal de St-Jean where she graduated in 1992 with a Bachelor Degree in Business Administration. Following wings training in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan in 1994, she was posted to 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron in Shearwater where she served on HMCS Preserver, NCSM Ville De Quebec and HMCS Toronto. In 1998, she was transferred to 406 Maritime Operational Training Squadron, where she served as a pilot instructor. Following her promotion to Major in 2001, she was posted to Ottawa in the Directorate of Air Requirements - Maritime as a Project Director working on projects such as the Maritime Helicopter Program and the Self-Defence Program. She was posted back to 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron in 2004 to serve as the Detachment Commander on HMCS Montreal. Following her deployment, she was appointed as the Wing Plans and Tasks Officer in 2005. She graduated from the Joint Command and Staff Program at the Canadian Force College in Toronto in 2007. Following her promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel, she was appointed the Commanding Officer of 406 Maritime Operational Training Squadron in 2007 and served in Shearwater, NS until July 2009 when she was chosen to be the Executive Assistant to the Chief of the Air Staff in Ottawa. In June 2011, she was promoted to Colonel and posted as the NATO Liaison Officer at the NATO Air Headquarters in Ramstein, Germany. After only two years in Germany, she was appointed as the new 12 Wing Commander in Shearwater, Nova Scotia. Following her tour as Wing Commander, she was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-general and deployed as the Joint Task Force Commander for OP IMPACT. Upon her return from deployment, she was assigned to Canada Joint Operational Command as the Chief of Operations. In August 2016, she was transferred to the Strategic Joint Staff as Director General Operations. In 2018, she assumed the duties of Chief of Staff, Operations at the Canadian Joint Operational Command. In 2021, she completed a one-year Defence Fellowship assignment with the Centre of International and Defence and Policy at Queens’ University. Since April 21, she is assigned as the Deputy Commander of Military Personnel Command. In addition to her daily job, MGen Bourgon is the Canadian Armed Forces Women, Peace, and Security champion. ## Episode 72: Training in Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-72-training-in-ukraine-2/ Modified: 2022-05-12 > uest host Linna Tam-Seto and Steve talk about her recent work on military sexual trauma within the Sexual Misconduct network, as well... In the 72nd episode of Battle Rhythm, guest host Linna Tam-Seto and Steve talk about her recent work on military sexual trauma within the Sexual Misconduct network, as well as her postdoc mentorship work in relation to the recent racism report, and a report on accommodating families. Today’s feature interview is with LCol Melanie Lake, Task force Commander Operation UNIFIER [26:30]. This week’s RnR segment [58:20], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Metal Lords, Kids in the Hall, Moonknight ## Episode 73: NATO Burden Sharing URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-73-nato-burden-sharing-2/ Modified: 2022-05-25 > In the 73rd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about expectations for the upcoming Independent External Comprehensive Review into In the 73rd episode of Battle Rhythm, Stef and Steve talk about expectations for the upcoming Independent External Comprehensive Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, led by Madame Louise Arbour as well as Finland, Sweden and NATO expansion. Today’s feature interview is with Dr. Binyam (Ben) Solomon, Senior Defence Scientist at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC). [20:15]. This week’s RnR segment [41:45], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Game Night, Multiverse of Madness, The Investigators. ## Episode 74: The Military Industrial Complex URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-74-the-military-industrial-complex-2/ Modified: 2022-06-08 > In the 74th episode of Battle Rhythm, guest host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot and Steve talk about cases of sexual misconduct in the military.. In the 74th episode of Battle Rhythm, guest host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot and Steve talk about cases of sexual misconduct in the military and civilian justice, the new handgun regulations and #CANSEC. Today’s feature interview guest is with Executive Director of Project Ploughshares Canada, Cesar Jaramillo [19:30]. This week’s RnR segment [55:40], where we will provide some levity in these trying times with entertainment reviews and suggestions: Breaking Bad, Operation Mincemeat, Obi-Wan ## Episode 75: The Present of Canadian Security and Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/episode-75-the-present-of-canadian-security-and-defence-2/ Modified: 2022-06-22 > In the season finale of Battle Rhythm: Season 1, Steve and Stef discuss the Arbour Report as stakeholders in the project and as op-ed writers In the season finale of Battle Rhythm: Season 1, Steve and Stef discuss the Arbour Report as stakeholders in the project and as op-ed writers; the upcoming NATO Summit in Madrid, NORAD Modernization and a Q&A session with Stéfanie as this is her last episode as co-host as she steps aside for another important and exciting role as Associate Dean Research within the Faculty of Arts and Science at Queen's University. Recommends: 1. Dave Grohl's The Storyteller www.davegrohlstoryteller.com/David 2. David Foenkinos novels belgraviabooks.com/writer/david-foenkinos 3. Le Lambeau by Philippe Lançon www.worldliteraturetoday.org/2018/novem…ppe-lancon ## Épsiode 37: Caroline Xavier, chef du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/epsiode-37-caroline-xavier-chef-du-centre-de-la-securite-des-telecommunications-cst/ Modified: 2023-03-22 > Pour ce 37e épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Caroline Xavier, chef du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST). Pour ce 37e épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Caroline Xavier, chef du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST). Ils discutent de son parcours et des défis particuliers à son poste. Madame Xavier explique en quoi la cybersécurité est une préoccupation croissante en matière de sécurité nationale et dans quelle mesure le CST dispose des outils et des ressources nécessaires pour faire face aux principales menaces. Madame Xavier aborde le rôle des agences de sécurité nationale pour relever ce défi. Madame Xavier explique également le rôle de premier plan du CST dans la communauté canadienne de la sécurité nationale et du renseignement pour promouvoir l'équité, la diversité et l'inclusion. ## Épsiode 38: Lise Howard, professeure titulaire à l’Université de Georgetown URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/epsiode-38-lise-howard-professeure-titulaire-a-luniversite-de-georgetown/ Modified: 2023-05-17 > Ils parlent de l’importance et de l’efficacité des opérations de la paix et des principaux défis et atouts de l’ONU. Lise Howard décrit... Pour ce nouvel épisode, Artur et Sarah-Myriam reçoivent Lise Howard, professeure titulaire à l'Université de Georgetown, avec des nominations conjointes au Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Ils discutent de son rôle sur l’équipe Russia-Ukraine comme “Senior Fellow” en résidence au United States Institute of Peace, des accusations portées contre Vladimir Poutine devant la Cour pénale internationale de La Haye et de la façon dont la communauté internationale peut tenir la Russie et ses dirigeants responsables des crimes commis en Ukraine . Ils parlent de l’importance et de l’efficacité des opérations de la paix et des principaux défis et atouts de l’ONU. Lise Howard décrit des principaux défis qui se posent pour quelqu’un qui navigue entre ces mondes de recherche et de politiques appliquées et elle partage ses réflexions sur le rôle que le Canada pourrait jouer en partenariat avec les États-Unis , notamment face à la crise en Ukraine. ## États-Unis : la difficile tâche de rebâtir les alliances URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/etats-unis-la-difficile-tache-de-rebatir-les-alliances/ Modified: 2021-02-12 > Dans cette capsule du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, animée par Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, nos experts Maud Quessard et Jonathan Paquin discutent de la difficile tâche, pour les États-Unis, de rebâtir les alliances. Donald Trump avait pour doctrine « America First ». Ça ne pouvait être plus clair: les besoins et intérêts des alliés historiques de Washington étaient relégués aux rangs inférieurs de sa politique étrangère. Aujourd’hui, Joe Biden assure que l’« Amérique est de retour » et qu’elle est « assise au bout de la table », prête à ordonner les affaires du monde. Dans quel état retrouve-t-il les relations avec les alliés et que peut-il bien faire à cet égard? Dans cette capsule du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, animée par Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, nos experts Maud Quessard et Jonathan Paquin discutent de la difficile tâche, pour les États-Unis, de rebâtir les alliances. Donald Trump avait pour doctrine « America First ». Ça ne pouvait être plus clair: les besoins et intérêts des alliés historiques de Washington étaient relégués aux rangs inférieurs de sa politique étrangère. Aujourd’hui, Joe Biden assure que l’« Amérique est de retour » et qu’elle est « assise au bout de la table », prête à ordonner les affaires du monde. Dans quel état retrouve-t-il les relations avec les alliés et que peut-il bien faire à cet égard ? ## Faut-il réviser la politique de défense du Canada ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/faut-il-reviser-la-politique-de-defense-du-canada/ Modified: 2020-10-07 > Dans cette deuxième capsule du RAS, nos experts Anessa Kimball et Jean-Christophe Boucher interrogent la pertinence et la viabilité de la politique de défense du Canada. Dans cette deuxième capsule du Réseau d'analyse stratégique animée par Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, nos experts Anessa Kimball et Jean-Christophe Boucher interrogent la pertinence et la viabilité de la politique de défense du Canada « Protection, Sécurité, Engagement » de 2017. Dans un contexte jumelant la pandémie de COVID-19, la réémergence du protectionnisme et du nationalisme, le montée de la Chine et d'autres puissances régionales, le repli des Américains, cette politique permet-elle de répondre aux défis actuels ? Sinon, sur quoi et comment faudrait-il la réviser ?   ## Forces armées canadiennes et COVID-19 : à l’étranger comme au Canada, s’adapter en temps de crise URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/forces-armees-canadiennes-et-covid-19-a-letranger-comme-au-canada-sadapter-en-temps-de-crise/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Ce point chaud est écrit dans le cadre des ateliers virtuels portant sur le renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Tout au long de l’automne 2020, les professeurs Theodore McLauchlin et Marie-Joëlle Zahar de l’Université de Montréal ont organisé avec le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) des ateliers virtuels portant sur le renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Pour clôturer cette série, un cinquième atelier s’intéressait aux Forces armées canadiennes, à leurs défis et adaptations à l’ère de la COVID-19. Celui-ci mettait en avant Stéphanie Bélanger, professeure au Collège militaire royal du Canada et réserviste des forces armées canadiennes; LCol Pierre Leroux, J5(i) au Quartier général des opérations interarmées du Canada; Theodore McLauchlin, professeur à l’Université de Montréal; ainsi que la Major Audrey Hudon, travailleuse sociale au sein des Forces armées canadiennes[1]. Visionnez la vidéo du cinquième panel Actuellement déployées sur une vingtaine d’opérations à l’étranger et sur le territoire canadien, les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) ont dû revoir et adapter leurs interventions dans un contexte de pandémie mondiale. Les FAC sont formées à travailler dans des contextes exceptionnels, qu’il s’agisse de catastrophes naturelles, de crises politiques ou encore d’aide humanitaire. Il ne s’agit d’ailleurs pas de la première fois que celles-ci doivent intervenir dans un contexte sanitaire lié à une épidémie.  Offrir de l’aide aux collectivités isolées et aux citoyens, travailler dans des conditions sanitaires strictes, gérer les morgues : ce sont toutes des activités que les forces armées sont capables d’effectuer. Néanmoins, dans le contexte actuel de la pandémie du coronavirus, deux tendances en termes d’effet semblent se dessiner : l’effet de la pandémie sur les interventions des FAC à l’étranger et l’influence que celle-ci a eue sur la mobilisation nationale de ces forces. Renforcement des capacités à l’étranger : naviguer dans un nouveau contexte international et sanitaire Les missions des forces armées à l’étranger et leurs objectifs n’ont pas changé, mais la manière dont elles sont menées, notamment la manière dont le renforcement des capacités est géré, a été fondamentalement affectée par la pandémie et les nombreuses mesures sanitaires à respecter. Les FAC n’ont pas eu le choix d’ajuster leurs interventions à l’internationale et de réévaluer le déploiement des quelque 2 000 militaires déployés à l’étranger. Les ajustements apportés à l’opération Unifier en Ukraine illustrent bien l’influence que la pandémie a eue sur la manière de « faire » le renforcement des capacités. Nécessairement, la situation a obligé le gouvernement à se questionner sur les priorités des FAC en matière de renforcement des capacités dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité. L’opération Unifier fait partie des opérations qui ont été mises sur pause pendant un moment au cours de l’été avant de reprendre à l’automne 2020. Sur le terrain, toute une logistique a été mise en place au cours des derniers mois afin de limiter les risques sanitaires pour les FAC : délimitation des zones à risque – de rouges (haut risque d’infection/ environnement non contrôlable) à vertes (risque d’infection contrôlé) –, mesures de mitigations, troupes retirées de certaines régions… Le renforcement des capacités repose essentiellement sur la création de liens, d’une proximité et d’une confiance mutuelle entre les différents acteurs présents – des éléments qui, en temps de pandémie, peuvent difficilement être maintenus. Il nécessite une coopération entre des acteurs détenant une expertise et des acteurs qui seront récipiendaires de celle-ci et dépend donc de la manière dont les forces formatrices sont perçues par les forces locales des pays hôtes. Néanmoins, créer une relation de proximité et des liens de confiance peut s’avérer difficile lorsque les contacts humains doivent être réduits. Le travail du renforcement des capacités en temps de pandémie est donc plus difficile, mais les FAC trouvent des alternatives pour s’adapter aux obstacles de la distanciation sociale avec des activités qui ne nécessitent pas un face-à-face. Certes, les relations avec les forces locales sont différentes, moins chaleureuses, en temps de pandémie, mais il est toujours possible de travailler sur les éléments structurels à améliorer en se concentrant notamment sur les normes d’entrainement ou sur l’encadrement des interventions. Les services de santé mentale disponibles pour les FAC ont également dû être adaptés à la situation. Des préparations virtuelles ont pris la place des classiques rencontres d’évaluation « Pré-déploiement – pendant le déploiement – post-déploiement ». Autant au Canada qu’à l’étranger, des plateformes numériques ont été fortement mobilisées. Dans le cas des isolements obligatoires en déploiement, le contact était maintenu tous les jours via une plateforme ou par un appel téléphonique avec les membres des FAC en isolement. L’étude des conséquences de la pandémie sur les FAC, devra être faite à deux niveaux : au niveau de l’organisation pour comprendre comment celle-ci s’est adaptée, mais également au niveau individuel pour explorer les conséquences personnelles de la pandémie pour les membres des FAC. Au Canada : une nouvelle réalité pour les militaires mobilisés sur l’opération Laser L’influence de la pandémie sur les activités militaires canadiennes semble avoir été plus grande sur le territoire national qu’à l’étranger. L’opération Laser a nécessité un effort d’adaptation impressionnant de la part des FAC avec 24 000 troupes prêtes à réagir et à être déployées sur la grandeur du Canada à tout moment : des troupes régulières, des réservistes, des Rangers canadiens. En trois objectifs, l’opération Laser c’est : sauver des vies; aider les partenaires fédéraux, provinciaux, territoriaux et régionaux; et maintenir l'état de préparation, l'efficacité et la résilience des FAC. Cette opération a nécessité beaucoup d’efforts d’adaptation de la part des FAC sur leur propre territoire, mais les militaires mobilisés ont pour la majorité beaucoup appris de leur expérience. Ils ont pu gagner en humilité, mettre en avant leur éthique professionnelle, et découvrir un autre aspect de leur travail, qui répond toutefois bien aux raisons pour lesquelles ils s’engagent : s’engager pour leur nation et sa sécurité. D’ailleurs, dans la continuité de l’opération Laser, les FAC sont désormais mobilisées au sein de l’opération Vector depuis décembre 2020 avec pour objectif d’appuyer la distribution du vaccin contre la COVID-19 sur le territoire canadien. À la question de la santé mentale et du maintien du lien entre les travailleurs sociaux et les militaires déployés, s’ajoute la question de l’ennui lors du déploiement et des longues périodes d’isolement. Afin de respecter les mesures sanitaires, les congés de mi-déploiement ont été mis sur pause et l’ennui peut s’installer pour les troupes mobilisées sur une longue période. Néanmoins, cette nouvelle façon de fonctionner a également un avantage logistique pour les militaires qui ne sont pas obligés de perturber leur organisation familiale avec des aller-retour en temps de COVID-19. Au retour, il était difficile pour les membres des FAC d’être aussi près de chez eux, mais de ne pas pouvoir y aller avant d’avoir terminé leur quarantaine obligatoire. Il était aussi difficile pour les militaires déployés sur l’opération Laser d’intervenir si proche de leur environnement, mais de ne pouvoir s’y rendre. Cette opération a également remis sur le plateau la question des réservistes, à la fois en ce qui concerne leur formation, mais aussi au soutien qui leur est apporté. Alors qu’ils ont répondu en grand nombre, une crainte était que les réservistes passent dans la maille du filet suite à leur participation aux actions. La réserve vient avec son propre lot de défis – les liens relationnels entre les troupes ne sont pas les mêmes que pour une équipe formée à travailler ensemble sur le long terme, les soutiens sociaux ne sont donc pas aussi présents. En plus, en ce moment, compléter un entrainement au sein de la réserve des FAC peut prendre jusqu’à 5 ans, cela pose donc des enjeux sur le plan opérationnel. Par ailleurs, l’impact de la pandémie sur la mobilisation des forces sur le territoire national semble être devenu une préoccupation importante du gouvernement canadien, ainsi que pour l’Institut canadien de recherche sur la santé des militaires et des vétérans (ICRSMV). Celui-ci s’est investi dans plusieurs recherches longitudinales pour étudier l’impact de la COVID-19 sur le personnel des FAC au cours des derniers mois, et ce notamment au travers de leur mobilisation sur l’opération Laser. Le ICRSMV propose également un numéro spécial du Journal of Military, Veteran and Family Health (JMVFH) « Addressing the needs of military members, Veterans and their families during the COVID-19 pandemic ». Conclusion  Les ajustements opérationnels et stratégiques des forces armées en réponse à la pandémie du coronavirus ont soulevé de nombreux enjeux et questionnements qui devront être pris en compte à court, moyen et long terme. À court terme, comment protéger les effectifs des FAC du virus dans un contexte où les opérations se font de plus en plus nombreuses dans des zones nationales très à risque? Dans quelle mesure la pandémie et ses conséquences budgétaires risquent-elles de nuire à la capacité de déployer et maintenir des opérations de renforcement à l’étranger sur le long terme? D’une manière plus générale : quelles vont être les priorités des forces armées canadiennes dans les prochaines années? Dans un monde changeant dans lequel les forces armées doivent s’adapter et se réinventer, de plus vieilles questions sont réitérées comme celle de la rétention des militaires réguliers et des réservistes, ou bien celle du soutien mental qui leur est accordé. Encore plus en cette période, le soutien moral et psychologique offert aux effectifs des FAC est crucial. Comment les FAC peuvent-elles alors s’assurer de maintenir des effectifs au meilleur de leurs capacités, tout en augmentant la rétention de ces derniers dans un contexte aussi particulier que la pandémie du coronavirus? Quant à l’utilisation de plus en plus systématique des technologies – pour maintenir un lien avec les militaires et réaliser les préparations nécessaires à leur déploiement – leur mobilisation accrue implique des questionnements face aux enjeux de sécurité qui peuvent y être associés (fuites d’informations, identification des militaires, etc.). Le renforcement des capacités offert par les FAC répond à un besoin d’appuyer des partenaires étrangers en proie à des défis de sécurité partagés, comme la lutte contre le terrorisme ou dans le cadre de soutien à des opérations de paix dans des régions instables. Ce genre d’activité comporte donc son lot de défis. Il y a toujours un risque que les opérations n’aboutissent pas aux résultats attendus et soient considérées comme un gaspillage d’effort, que le contexte politique ne soit pas clément au bon déroulement des activités, ou encore que des effets inattendus soient perçus (par exemple que la formation reçue par les forces locales ne soit pas utilisée à bon escient). Comme cela a pu être discuté tout au long du cycle d’ateliers offert par le Réseau d’analyse stratégique, la pandémie a augmenté les défis qui s’imposent à cette pratique avec des conséquences directes sur la manière dont le renforcement des capacités est offert par les FAC à l’étranger, mais aussi en créant un contexte dans lequel les FAC sont de plus en plus en demande sur le territoire national. À moyen terme, le risque sera de faire face à des moyens budgétaires limités suite aux impacts économiques de la pandémie. Étant donné que les efforts liés au renforcement des capacités s’inscrivent dans un contexte multilatéral – typiquement les opérations sont menées par plusieurs forces au sein d’une coalition – les conséquences futures de la pandémie sur le renforcement des capacités devront donc être analysées comme faisant partie d’un tout, et une attention devra être portée à la coopération internationale et aux institutions militaires. [1] Bien qu’écrit dans le cadre de cette série d’ateliers, ce point chaud n’engage cependant que les idées de son auteur.   ## Forger des liens nordiques : renforcer le partenariat Canada-France dans l’Arctique dans un ordre mondial en mutation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/forger-des-liens-nordiques-renforcer-le-partenariat-canada-france-dans-larctique-dans-un-ordre-mondial-en-mutation/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Cette note politique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) avec le soutien du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada, qui vise à développer des échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens. Introduction L’Arctique s’est transformé, en quelques années, d’« espace d’exception » préservé en marge des rivalités globales à un espace de compétition stratégique. L’accélération de la fonte des glaces et l’espoir — parfois trompeur — de nouvelles voies maritimes ou de ressources inexploitées ont ravivé l’intérêt pour cette région. Mais c’est la remilitarisation russe, doublée de l’affirmation grandissante de la Chine, qui a contraint l’OTAN à réintégrer le Grand Nord au cœur de sa posture de dissuasion. Pour Ottawa, l’Arctique demeure le pilier de la souveraineté nationale face aux menaces hybrides et aux prétentions territoriales des compétiteurs ; pour Paris, non-riveraine mais engagée, c’est un laboratoire de projection militaire, de coopération scientifique et de défense des lignes de communication. L’Alliance, quant à elle, y repense ses doctrines : l’Arctique n’est plus un simple front secondaire mais un théâtre où s’entremêlent défis climatiques, menaces conventionnelles, cyberattaques et sabotages d’infrastructures critiques. Cette note stratégique analyse, à travers une focale sur l’OTAN, le Canada et la France, les ressorts et les limites des stratégies de dissuasion arctique en réponse à la Russie. Il s’agira d’abord de comprendre pourquoi l’Arctique est devenu un espace de géosécurité crucial pour l’Alliance, d’identifier les menaces perçues et les acteurs responsables, puis d’interroger la capacité de l’OTAN à mettre en place une dissuasion fonctionnelle et légitime dans la région. Pour finir, des recommandations seront formulées pour renforcer la coopération franco-canadienne, au bénéfice de la sécurité collective et de la stabilité du Grand Nord. Pourquoi l’Arctique est-il un espace de géosécurité important pour l’OTAN L’Arctique s’impose aujourd’hui comme un espace de géosécurité majeur pour l’OTAN, catalysant une transformation profonde des équilibres stratégiques internationaux. Longtemps reléguée au rang de marge périphérique, la région connaît un regain d’intérêt sans précédent, stimulé par les bouleversements climatiques qui ouvrent de potentielles nouvelles perspectives économiques (hydrocarbures, minerais, routes maritimes) et par la montée des tensions géopolitiques, notamment depuis la guerre à grande échelle entre la Russie et l’Ukraine en 2022. Bien qu’il ne faille pas exagérer ces possibilités du fait de nombreuses contraintes demeurant dans le temps, la fonte accélérée de la banquise et la disparition annoncée de la glace estivale à l’horizon 2030 bouleversent les équilibres et transforment peu à peu l’Arctique en un théâtre de compétition stratégique entre puissances régionales et extrarégionales. Pourtant poussée à l’origine par certains pays riverains (le Canada entre autres) a demeurer dans une réserve doctrinale vis-à-vis de l’Arctique, l’OTAN a vue de manière croissante cet espace intégrer ses préoccupations centrales, comme en témoignent l’élargissement de l’Alliance à la Finlande et à la Suède en 2023, la multiplication des exercices conjoints (Cold Response) et la réaffirmation de l’importance du flanc arctique dans le concept stratégique de 2022. Pour le Canada, l’Arctique constitue le socle vital de l’ambition nationale et un espace où la souveraineté doit être réaffirmée face à la montée des menaces hybrides, aux revendications territoriales russes et à la compétition sino-américaine. Ottawa a longtemps adopté une posture prudente, sans pousser l’OTAN à prendre part à la sécurité régionale, privilégiant le développement économique et social du Grand Nord, notamment via l’investissement dans les infrastructures, tout en s’appuyant sur les savoirs autochtones pour affirmer une présence fédérale demeurant encore relative aujourd’hui. Toutefois, la militarisation croissante de la région, la modernisation du NORAD et l’augmentation des exercices multilatéraux témoignent d’une prise de conscience progressive de la nécessité de renforcer la défense du flanc nord de l’Alliance. Les efforts canadiens se sont traduit par la publication en avril 2024 de la stratégie « Our North, Strong and Free », symbolisée par la livraison de nouveaux navires de patrouille extracôtiers et arctiques, le renouvellement de la flotte de sous-marins, la modernisation des moyens de surveillance (NORAD) et une attention particulière portée aux Rangers, bien que des défis capacitaires et de souveraineté persistent, notamment face à l’activisme américain sur la question du Passage du Nord-Ouest. Cette prise de conscience du renforcement défensif s'inscrit toutefois dans une stratégie intégrée plus large. Le port de Churchill, désormais reconnu comme projet d'intérêt national et doté de 175 millions de dollars fédéraux, illustre cette convergence : il répond simultanément à des objectifs de défense (logistique militaire, surveillance du PNO) et d'autonomie économique (export de minéraux critiques, résilience face aux tensions commerciales). Maintenu sous contrôle local via l'Arctic Gateway Group, il prévient aussi l'ingérence étrangère et consolide la souveraineté canadienne dans l'Arctique. La France, bien que non riveraine de l’Arctique, s’affirme comme un acteur respecté et engagé dans la région. L’Arctique revêt une dimension stratégique pour la sécurité énergétique française, puisque 60% du gaz et 15% du pétrole importés proviennent de la région, essentiellement de Norvège et de Russie. Elle est par ailleurs garante de ses ressortissants dépendant du tourisme polaire, engendrant une nécessité de maitriser le Search and Rescue en milieu polaire. Ainsi, l’Armée est la seule composante française possédant les capacités à intervenir dans l’Arctique, contribuant de facto à l’approche militaire de cette région. La France axe donc sa posture sur la liberté de navigation, la sécurisation des routes maritimes et la protection des infrastructures critiques, tout en promouvant une vision européenne de la souveraineté et de la défense. La récente Stratégie française de défense pour l’Arctique (2025) entérine cette approche autour de trois axes : positionnement, coopération et capacités. D’abord, elle souhaite consolide sa légitimité par une coordination interministérielle et une participation active aux forums arctiques, tout en collectant renseignement et données environnementales pour soutenir la dissuasion nucléaire. Ensuite, elle vise un approfondissement de ses partenariats bilatéraux avec les pays arctiques et ses liens avec l’Union européenne via des exercices conjoints et une interopérabilité accrue. Enfin, elle développe et adapte des équipements (matériels extrêmes, satellites hautes latitudes, stations relais) pour opérer efficacement dans ce milieu hostile, afin de préserver sa liberté d’action et sécuriser les approvisionnements énergétiques et miniers essentiels à la France et à l’Europe. Pour l’OTAN dans son ensemble, l’Arctique est redevenu un front de compétition stratégique depuis 2022 (première mention explicite de l’Arctique dans la doctrine) face à la Russie, dont la remilitarisation régionale et la stratégie du Bastion constituent un défi multidimensionnel. L’Alliance doit composer avec la nécessité de dissuasion et de défense collective, renforcée par l’intégration de la totalité des pays nordiques, tout en adaptant ses capacités opérationnelles à un environnement extrême. La multiplication des exercices conjoints (notamment via les plus grands exercices otaniens dans l’Arctique depuis la guerre froide ces trois dernières années), l’innovation technologique (brise-glaces, drones, équipements grand froid) et la montée en puissance du Joint Forces Command Norfolk (illustrent la montée en puissance de la coopération alliée dans la région. Sur ce dernier point, le JFC Norfolk, établi en 2019 en réponse directe à la résurgence russe dans l’espace transatlantique, représente une réorganisation fondamentale de l'architecture de commandement OTAN en régions septentrionales. Basé en Virginie, ce commandement interarmées américain assume désormais la responsabilité opérationnelle de toutes les forces alliées dans l'Atlantique Nord et l'Arctique, incluant la coordination des forces norvégiennes, canadiennes, britanniques et d'autres partenaires otaniens. Son établissement, bien que récent, s'est avéré stratégiquement pertinent : les événements géopolitiques depuis 2019 — montée en puissance russe, tensions en mer de Barents, opérations sous-marines accrues — ont validé cette architecture de commandement unifiée et renforcé son rôle de pivot central de la dissuasion alliée dans les espaces arctiques et nord-atlantiques. L’Arctique devient également un laboratoire de nouvelles menaces hybrides (sabotages, cyberattaques, désinformation), exigeant une vigilance accrue et une réponse concertée. Enfin, la multipolarisation de la région, marquée par l’affirmation de la Chine et des BRICS, complexifie la gouvernance et accentue la nécessité d’une posture unifiée de l’OTAN face à la fragmentation des cadres de coopération.  Quelles menaces l'OTAN perçoit-elle/préoccupe-t-elle dans l'Arctique et quels sont les acteurs responsables L’Arctique s’impose aujourd’hui comme un espace de préoccupations sécuritaires majeures pour l’OTAN, au croisement de dynamiques stratégiques, technologiques et environnementales inédites. La région, longtemps perçue comme un sanctuaire de coopération par les États riverains dans la lignée du discours de Mourmansk prononcé par Mikhaïl Gorbatchev en 1987, est désormais traversée par des tensions accrues, catalysées par la remilitarisation russe, l’affirmation progressive de la Chine et la montée en puissance des menaces hybrides. L’Alliance atlantique, confrontée à ces évolutions, identifie plusieurs types de menaces qui bouleversent l’équilibre régional et appellent à une adaptation de ses doctrines et de ses capacités. La première menace perçue par l’OTAN dans l’Arctique est d’ordre militaire et réside dans la stratégie de remilitarisation menée par la Russie tout au long de son littoral nord. Moscou a entrepris, depuis plus d’une décennie, une modernisation systématique de ses infrastructures héritées de la guerre froide, réhabilitant bases, ports et aérodromes, et dotant la région de capacités de projection et de défense avancées. La flotte du Nord russe concentre aujourd’hui la majorité des sous-marins nucléaires stratégiques du pays, appuyée par des systèmes de défense antiaérienne S-400, des brigades spécialisées et une flotte unique de brise-glaces à propulsion nucléaire. Cette posture vise à garantir la souveraineté russe, à protéger les vecteurs de sa dissuasion nucléaire et à sécuriser les nouveaux corridors économiques, notamment la Route maritime du Nord. Toutefois, elle s’accompagne d’une radicalisation du discours officiel, qui désigne explicitement l’OTAN comme principale menace, et d’une multiplication d’exercices militaires d’ampleur dans la région, impliquant parfois des partenaires extrarégionaux. Cette dynamique inquiète l’Alliance, qui voit dans la stratégie du Bastion et la capacité de la Russie à perturber les lignes de communication transatlantiques un défi stratégique direct à la liberté de navigation et à la sécurité collective. La deuxième source de préoccupation pour l’OTAN réside dans la montée des menaces hybrides et la vulnérabilité croissante des infrastructures critiques en Arctique. Les sabotages ciblant les gazoducs Nord Stream en mer Baltique, les attaques potentielles contre les câbles sous-marins, les réseaux énergétiques et les dispositifs de surveillance illustrent la capacité des acteurs hostiles à exploiter les fragilités d’un environnement extrême et difficilement contrôlable. La Russie, en particulier, développe des capacités de guerre électronique, de brouillage GPS et de sabotage sous-marin, tout en menant des démonstrations de force technologique, comme l’émergence simultanée de sous-marins nucléaires sous la banquise. Il demeure également le risque d’incidents involontaires lors des exercices militaires croisés, susceptibles de dégénérer en crise majeure dans un contexte de méfiance exacerbée. La Chine, bien que non riveraine de l’Arctique, représente une menace émergente qui suscite une attention croissante de l’OTAN. Beijing s’affirme progressivement comme un acteur stratégique dans la région, multipliant les investissements dans les infrastructures, les ressources naturelles et les routes maritimes, tout en développant une flotte de brise-glaces et des capacités de surveillance satellitaire adaptées aux hautes latitudes. Cet enjeu revêt une gravité particulière précisément parce que les communautés arctiques ont historiquement souffert d'une négligence structurelle de leurs gouvernements nationaux : pénurie de logements au Nunavut, déficience du soutien fédéral en Alaska, infrastructures sous-développées en Groenland. La stratégie chinoise tire parti de ces lacunes en proposant des ressources massives — $90 milliards en projets arctiques entre 2014 et 2024 — là où l'Occident demeure absent. Cette approche crée un vide de pouvoir asymétrique : les investissements chinois en soft power (stations scientifiques, présence civile) précèdent une influence géopolitique durable rendant les communautés arctiques progressivement dépendantes d'une architecture de développement contrôlée par Beijing (cas à l’échelle nationale de l’Islande suite à la crise financière de 2008). Au-delà du soft power, ces investissements dissimulent des ambitions duales : les stations scientifiques collectent des données océanographiques sensibles, tandis que les projets portuaires le long de la Route du Nord offrent des points d'ancrage pour des opérations navales futures. Les blocages occidentaux en la matière demeurent toutefois réactifs et fragmentés. Officiellement, la Chine se présente comme un « neararctic state » et privilégie une approche scientifique et économique. Pourtant, la dualité de ses moyens, le développement de drones polaires et la participation à des exercices conjoints avec la Russie laissent entrevoir une volonté de projection militaire à moyen terme. Les services de renseignement occidentaux alertent sur la possibilité que la Chine cherche à se doter de capacités opérationnelles dans l’Arctique, notamment en matière de surveillance, de cyberattaque et de sabotage d’infrastructures critiques. La coopération sino-russe, déjà perceptible dans le domaine énergétique et logistique, pourrait à terme se traduire par une coordination accrue dans le domaine militaire, accentuant la pression sur le flanc nord de l’Alliance. Enfin, l’OTAN peut s’inquiéter de la complexification de la gouvernance régionale, marquée par la montée en puissance d’acteurs extra-régionaux (BRICS) et par la fragmentation des cadres de coopération traditionnels. La fin de l’« exceptionnalisme arctique », accélérée par l’invasion de l’Ukraine, a conduit à une polarisation accrue entre un Arctique « otanien » et un Arctique « russe », chaque camp cherchant à renforcer ses positions et à attirer de nouveaux partenaires. Cette multipolarisation accroît le risque de dérégulation, de compétition et de conflits d’intérêts sur les routes maritimes et les zones économiques exclusives (cas des plateaux continentaux). L’Alliance doit ainsi composer avec une palette de menaces allant du sabotage à la désinformation, en passant par la projection de forces et la guerre technologique, dans un espace où la supériorité militaire ne saurait se résumer à la seule présence physique. L'OTAN a-t-elle réussi à mettre en place une stratégie de dissuasion fonctionnelle et légitime dans l'Arctique ? Alors que l'Arctique est le théâtre d'une concurrence géostratégique accrue, l'OTAN se trouve à un tournant décisif. Alors que la Russie renforce sa flotte du Nord avec des sous-marins nucléaires, des bases modernisées et des déploiements opérationnels avancés, la réponse de l'OTAN reste disparate et insuffisante. L'absence de stratégie de dissuasion unifiée de l'Alliance dans l'Arctique fragilise sa position collective. Actuellement, la capacité militaire de l'OTAN consiste en un ensemble de stratégies nationales plutôt qu'en un bouclier crédible couvrant toute la région polaire. Cette fragmentation résulte de l'absence d'une vision cohérente. Des pays comme le Canada, la Norvège et les États-Unis mènent des exercices axés sur l'Arctique et élaborent des plans nationaux. L'affirmation selon laquelle l'Arctique canadien, l'Atlantique Nord et l'Arctique européen sont stratégiquement sans importance parce que le climat et les conditions météorologiques rendraient les opérations militaires vouées à l'échec est trompeuse. Les conditions environnementales difficiles n'éliminent pas l'utilité militaire ; elles déterminent la manière dont la force est employée. Si la Russie n'a peut-être pas intérêt à lancer une invasion terrestre à grande échelle dans le Haut-Arctique, l'OTAN doit anticiper la manière dont les assauts conventionnels peuvent se transformer en activités limitées et non conventionnelles, c'est-à-dire des opérations visant à réduire l'efficacité des forces de l'OTAN en dégradant leur état de préparation, en dispersant leurs ressources et en mobilisant leurs forces limitées dans des engagements prolongés dans l'Arctique. Dans ce contexte, les conditions météorologiques ne constituent pas un bouclier contre les conflits, mais un outil qui amplifie l'impact des perturbations et des retards. L'objectif de la Russie ne serait pas « d'envahir par le nord », mais d'exploiter la région comme un environnement propice à des actions non conventionnelles de faible intensité qui créent des points d'ancrage temporaires, imposent des coûts de réponse et perturbent les facteurs critiques. Il s'agit notamment du positionnement secret de forces à double usage, de l'interférence avec la surveillance aérienne et maritime, des cyberattaques et des attaques spatiales contre les nœuds de commandement et de contrôle de l'Arctique, et du sabotage des ports, des aérodromes, des dépôts de carburant et des infrastructures sous-marines qui soutiennent le renforcement transatlantique. Même un succès limité dans ces domaines pourrait retarder la constitution de forces et retirer des ressources clés pouvant être déployées à l'avant du théâtre européen à un moment décisif. Il serait donc erroné de rejeter ces risques au motif qu'une invasion traditionnelle échouerait. La valeur stratégique de l'Arctique ne réside pas dans son aptitude à être conquis, mais dans sa vulnérabilité à l'ambiguïté et aux perturbations. Or, l'OTAN ne dispose pas d'une doctrine intégrée pour contrer de telles actions. Le Concept stratégique 2022 reconnaît l'importance de la région, mais n'offre aucun cadre clair pour empêcher des opérations localisées et peu visibles de produire des effets stratégiques disproportionnés, effets qui se feraient sentir non pas dans l'Arctique lui-même, mais sur le flanc est de l'OTAN. Une posture de défense moderne dans l'Arctique doit prendre en compte toutes les menaces tout au long du continuum des conflits, depuis les tactiques hybrides non conventionnelles et les actions de faible intensité dans la zone grise jusqu'à la guerre conventionnelle de haute intensité. Le renforcement militaire de la Russie représente une menace conventionnelle tangible, mais la préparation de l'OTAN face aux défis non conventionnels est particulièrement faible. Les cyberattaques contre les infrastructures arctiques, les activités maritimes sans pavillon, les opérations de sabotage ou d'infiltration et d'autres tactiques sous-seuil se dérouleront dans le cadre d'un conflit dans l'Arctique. À ce titre, l'OTAN doit reconnaître que l'Arctique n'est pas seulement un espace de combat pour les systèmes, les plateformes ou les moyens de défense traditionnels, mais aussi pour les navires civils, les flottes de pêche, les entrepreneurs militaires privés comme le groupe Wagner, les drones sans pilote pilotés par l'intelligence artificielle et les forces spéciales russes non identifiées ou secrètes. Les pays de l'OTAN doivent se procurer des technologies et des systèmes d'armes émergents afin de conserver une véritable létalité, mobilité et capacité de survie. L'Alliance doit également trouver des moyens de limiter les ambitions d'acquisition qui dépassent la valeur tactique. Trop souvent, les alliances sont victimes d'une cascade d'achats, à la recherche d'hypersoniques, de plateformes autonomes et de systèmes traditionnels, ce qui, en fin de compte, peut conduire l'OTAN à devenir une force creuse. Dans l'Arctique, où la mobilité et la capacité de survie déterminent souvent le succès des missions, il n'est ni nécessaire ni efficace d'investir massivement dans de nouvelles plateformes exotiques. L'OTAN devrait plutôt se recentrer sur le renforcement et la modernisation des moyens existants – navires capables de naviguer dans les glaces et véhicules terrestres adaptés au froid extrême –, en veillant à la compatibilité entre les forces alliées et en renforçant la logistique dans l'Arctique. Ce type d'investissement ciblé – dépôts de carburant avancés, transport aérien adapté à l'hiver et équipements interopérables – est beaucoup plus pertinent sur le plan tactique et plus économique que la recherche et le développement spéculatifs. La connaissance du terrain est un élément essentiel pour permettre à l'OTAN de renforcer sa dissuasion crédible. La vaste géographie et les conditions météorologiques difficiles de l'Arctique limitent la surveillance, ce qui permet aux acteurs agressifs d'échapper facilement à la détection. La surveillance actuelle de l'OTAN est fragmentée et repose sur des capteurs nationaux dispersés sur les territoires alliés. L'Alliance a plutôt besoin d'un réseau intégré de surveillance de l'Arctique – satellites, drones à longue portée, capteurs acoustiques maritimes et centre de fusion des renseignements centralisé. Ces capacités permettraient d'obtenir une image opérationnelle en temps réel à l'échelle de l'Alliance, capable de repérer les provocations et d'y réagir avant qu'elles ne s'aggravent. Enfin, la résilience au combat par temps froid doit être institutionnalisée. En particulier, les systèmes d'armes, les équipements de communication et les aides à la navigation doivent tous être normalisés pour résister aux conditions climatiques de l'Arctique. Ces investissements permettront non seulement d'améliorer la préparation au combat, mais aussi de renforcer la crédibilité de la dissuasion. Un nouveau concept de défense de l'Arctique au sein de l'OTAN indiquerait que l'Alliance considère le Grand Nord comme faisant partie intégrante de ses responsabilités fondamentales en matière de défense. Le fait qu'un tel concept n'ait pas encore vu le jour reflète davantage des hypothèses historiques et des priorités politiques qu'un manque de logique stratégique. Pendant une grande partie de la période qui a suivi la guerre froide, l'Arctique a été considéré comme une région où la coopération pouvait être maintenue par le biais d'organismes tels que le Conseil de l'Arctique, plutôt que comme un théâtre central de la défense collective – un héritage d'hypothèses stratégiques bienveillantes qui ont minimisé la planification militaire au profit de la diplomatie multilatérale. De plus, pendant des décennies, l'OTAN s'est concentrée exclusivement sur la défense collective en Europe centrale et orientale, laissant moins de place au développement d'une doctrine spécifique au Grand Nord. Avec l'adhésion de la Finlande et de la Suède, sept des huit États arctiques appartiennent désormais à l'OTAN, ce qui modifie fondamentalement la carte stratégique et crée à la fois une impulsion et une opportunité pour une planification de défense plus formalisée. Aujourd'hui, les initiatives de défense de l'Arctique se multiplient au sein de l'OTAN, telles que la restructuration du commandement pour renforcer la posture nordique et les exercices conjoints, mais elles restent fragmentées entre les programmes nationaux. L'OTAN a donc besoin de lignes d'action opérationnelles plus ancrées et interconnectées afin d'élaborer un concept cohérent au niveau de l'Alliance pour l'Arctique, qui s'inscrive dans un cadre synchronisé de dissuasion et de défense reflétant le poids stratégique croissant de la région. Si l'OTAN tarde à agir, elle risque de voir la Russie et d'autres acteurs interpréter l'opacité de l'Arctique comme une permissivité, où des provocations sous le seuil ou même des agressions conventionnelles deviendraient pragmatiquement envisageables. Pour adopter une telle stratégie, l'OTAN a besoin de leadership et de détermination afin de montrer comment améliorer au mieux la connaissance du domaine, comblant ainsi les lacunes existantes et émergentes en matière d'engagement et de capacités sur le flanc nord de l'Alliance. C'est là que le Canada et la France doivent s'unir et forger un lien nordique. Recommandations Les recommandations suivantes s'appuient sur les forces des armées canadienne et française, créant ainsi les bases d'une meilleure connaissance du domaine, de temps de réponse plus rapides et d'une plus grande résilience dans les opérations par temps froid. En combinant les navires brise-glace et l'expertise arctique du Canada avec les technologies maritimes de pointe et la capacité militaire renommée de la France, le partenariat permettrait d'assurer une présence permanente et efficace dans le Grand Nord, mieux adaptée pour relever les défis d'un environnement sécuritaire en constante évolution. Un accord de collaboration entre les garde-côtes canadiens et français Alors que les tensions géopolitiques s'intensifient dans l'Arctique, le Canada et la France ont l'occasion de renforcer leur coopération bilatérale dans cette région grâce à un accord officiel de collaboration entre les garde-côtes canadiens et français. Dans le cadre de l'accord proposé, des officiers de la marine ou des garde-côtes français serviraient à bord des brise-glaces de patrouille offshore polaires et arctiques canadiens, contribuant ainsi aux patrouilles de souveraineté, aux opérations de recherche et sauvetage et aux missions de maintien de l'ordre. Fort de son expertise dans l'Arctique, qui privilégie la présence, la surveillance et le soutien opérationnel dans cette région, le Canada est le partenaire idéal de la France pour renforcer la connaissance de la situation dans l'Arctique et rechercher des partenariats bilatéraux et multilatéraux plus solides, comme le souligne la stratégie de défense de l'Arctique de Paris. De plus, en renforçant la préparation opérationnelle, la connaissance du domaine et l'interopérabilité par temps froid, ce partenariat peut renforcer une posture de « dissuasion par le déni », garantissant une surveillance continue et technologiquement avancée des eaux arctiques et signalant aux adversaires potentiels que la région est sous la surveillance constante des alliés. Les efforts conjoints du Canada et de la France en matière de cogestion et de co-financement peuvent également offrir une approche stratégique et rentable plus ancrée pour la dissuasion dans l'Arctique, sans nécessiter de nouveaux investissements importants. En particulier, en combinant les navires brise-glace du Canada avec le personnel français, le partenariat pourrait améliorer considérablement la connaissance de la situation et l'efficacité opérationnelle, qui sont essentielles pour dissuader les menaces, maintenir la sécurité dans l'Arctique et gérer les défis opérationnels complexes de la région. Pacte Canada-France sur les technologies maritimes dans l'Arctique En créant un pacte sur les technologies maritimes dans l'Arctique, le Canada et la France feraient un pas important vers la sécurité dans l'Arctique en redéfinissant la manière dont les deux pays abordent la connaissance et la sécurité du domaine maritime dans les eaux nordiques de plus en plus disputées. Cette collaboration va bien au-delà du simple partage de technologies ;  il s'agit de mettre en place une capacité interopérable, résiliente et tournée vers l'avenir qui réponde aux défis uniques des opérations dans l'Arctique. Fondamentalement, le pacte permettrait d'accélérer la mise en place d'une stratégie technologique commune axée sur le progrès dans des domaines clés tels que la cybersécurité, l'intelligence artificielle, les technologies quantiques, les systèmes autonomes et les réseaux de partage d'informations. Ces capacités sont essentielles pour surmonter l'immensité géographique et la complexité de l'Arctique, où les systèmes de défense et les structures de sécurité hérités du passé diffèrent et où les opérations traditionnelles de sécurité maritime se heurtent à des obstacles importants. En alignant leurs efforts, le Canada et la France peuvent lever les obstacles qui ont longtemps entravé une coordination efficace, améliorant ainsi les temps de réponse et l'efficacité opérationnelle. L'un des défis les plus urgents que le pacte chercherait à relever est la menace posée par les « flottes fantômes ». Ces navires vieillissants et non réglementés opèrent en dehors des normes maritimes internationales, échappant souvent aux assurances et aux réglementations. Leurs activités vont des transferts risqués de navire à navire à la reconnaissance secrète, voire au sabotage, des actions qui mettent en péril la sécurité maritime et environnementale de l'Arctique. Reconnaissant ces navires comme des adversaires potentiels, le pacte souligne la nécessité de renforcer les capacités de détection et de suivi, afin de garantir que le Canada et la France puissent réagir rapidement et de manière décisive. La technologie française en matière de défense apporte une multitude d'innovations, en particulier dans le domaine des plateformes maritimes sans pilote. Les véhicules sous-marins autonomes capables d'assurer la surveillance en eaux profondes pourraient considérablement étendre la portée du Canada sous les eaux arctiques, où la surveillance des sous-marins et des infrastructures sous-marines est essentielle. De même, les véhicules aériens et terrestres sans pilote prolongent les yeux et les oreilles des forces de sécurité et de défense sans nécessiter la présence constante d'équipages, offrant une couverture permanente sur des environnements vastes et difficiles. Naviguer dans les eaux instables et dangereuses de l'Arctique nécessite des outils sophistiqués. Les progrès réalisés par la France en matière de navigation et de cartographie par satellite apportent un soutien essentiel pour une navigation plus sûre et plus efficace. L'intégration de ces technologies renforcera la capacité du Canada à opérer en toute confiance dans ses approches nordiques. Au-delà du matériel, le pacte mettra l'accent sur l'interopérabilité, c'est-à-dire la capacité de partager et d'analyser de manière transparente des données en temps réel grâce à l'acquisition de plateformes innovantes telles que des véhicules aériens hybrides, des ballons de surveillance à haute altitude et des véhicules autonomes de surface et sous-marins, tous interconnectés grâce à des réseaux avancés d'intelligence artificielle et de communication. Ces outils multiplieront l'efficacité des opérations conjointes, qu'il s'agisse de recherche et de sauvetage, d'application de la loi, de missions d'escorte ou de stratégies de déni d'accès/de zone. Il est important de noter que ce partenariat n'existerait pas de manière isolée. En reliant les secteurs civil et militaire et en alimentant en temps réel des cadres de commandement et de contrôle coordonnés, le Canada et la France peuvent mettre en place un réseau complet et dynamique de sécurité maritime dans l'Arctique. Une telle intégration est essentielle pour répondre aux menaces émergentes liées au revanchisme russe. Dans un monde où la géopolitique de l'Arctique s'intensifie, un pacte franco-canadien sur les technologies maritimes dans l'Arctique peut offrir une voie claire pour sécuriser le nord, en combinant l'expérience opérationnelle et l'innovation de pointe. Dans le cadre d'une initiative stratégique qui renforce non seulement la sûreté et la sécurité des eaux arctiques, ce pacte peut également signaler un engagement commun à préserver la souveraineté et la stabilité dans l'un des environnements les plus difficiles de la planète. Port spatial arctique Canada-France La création d'un port spatial Canada-France est une nécessité stratégique pour renforcer les capacités de défense conjointes et celles de l'OTAN face aux défis croissants en matière de sécurité dans l'Arctique, en particulier ceux liés à l'agressivité de la Russie. La stratégie française de défense de l'Arctique indique clairement que Paris considère le développement des capacités dans le domaine spatial arctique, notamment les satellites adaptés aux hautes latitudes et les infrastructures terrestres de relais associées, comme une priorité pour les opérations de surveillance, de renseignement et de sécurité dans le Grand Nord. La stratégie française préconise d'investir dans des moyens spatiaux adaptés à la région et de renforcer la coopération bilatérale et au sein de l'OTAN afin d'améliorer la surveillance et l'interopérabilité. Bien que la France ne dispose pas de territoire nordique propre, elle cherche à maintenir une présence opérationnelle durable dans la région dans le cadre de son rôle plus large au sein de l'OTAN et de l'architecture de sécurité euro-atlantique. Paris s'engage de plus en plus dans la défense de l'Arctique, en déployant des forces dans des environnements de haute latitude et en participant à des exercices conjoints avec ses alliés nordiques. Cela reflète un véritable intérêt au sein de la France pour les capacités qui améliorent la connaissance de la situation et la dissuasion dans le Grand Nord. Les limites actuelles du Canada en matière de déploiement de satellites dans l'Arctique constituent un risque géopolitique important pour sa sécurité nationale. Un port spatial commun au Canada et à la France offrirait une plateforme souveraine et fiable pour déployer le type de satellites de surveillance avancés à haute latitude que les stratégies des deux pays reconnaissent comme essentiels pour la connaissance, la résilience et la dissuasion dans l'Arctique, alignant ainsi les intérêts nationaux sur les besoins de sécurité collective de l'OTAN. Les ressources spatiales lancées depuis cette installation commune amélioreraient considérablement la capacité à surveiller les activités illégales, non déclarées et non réglementées (INN) dans le vaste domaine maritime arctique, très éloigné. Les méthodes de surveillance traditionnelles sont souvent insuffisantes dans la région, ce qui permet aux adversaires d'exploiter les lacunes juridictionnelles et d'échapper à la détection. Des images satellites persistantes à haute résolution, combinées à des liaisons de données en temps réel, permettraient d'identifier et d'intercepter en temps utile les navires et les activités illicites, renforçant ainsi la gouvernance et l'application de la loi en matière maritime. En outre, les infrastructures critiques de l'Arctique, en particulier les câbles de communication sous-marins et les installations énergétiques, seront confrontées à une menace croissante de sabotage à mesure que la région se développe et se commercialise. En facilitant le déploiement de satellites spécialisés équipés de capteurs avancés capables de détecter les perturbations sous-marines ou les présences non autorisées à proximité de ces sites sensibles, un port spatial commun permettra à Paris et à Ottawa de fournir des alertes précoces et de réagir rapidement pour neutraliser les menaces avant que des dommages ne se produisent. Outre le renforcement de la surveillance, la collaboration en matière de port spatial contribuerait à éviter les initiatives de défense redondantes et fragmentées. À l'heure actuelle, les programmes non coordonnés et qui se chevauchent risquent de gaspiller des ressources et de créer des lacunes en matière de capacités. En consolidant leurs capacités de lancement de satellites et en harmonisant leurs priorités stratégiques, le Canada et la France peuvent optimiser leurs investissements et favoriser l'interopérabilité, garantissant ainsi une posture de défense plus cohérente et plus efficace dans l'Arctique. De plus, un port spatial franco-canadien situé au Nunavut offrirait des avantages opérationnels que les sites situés à des latitudes plus basses ne peuvent égaler pour les missions de sécurité dans l'Arctique. L'exemple du port spatial d'Andøya, dans le nord de la Norvège, montre pourquoi les hautes latitudes sont importantes : son emplacement au-dessus du cercle arctique permet un accès efficace aux orbites polaires et héliosynchrones, essentielles pour une surveillance continue de l'Arctique et une mise en service rapide des satellites. Les lancements à partir de sites situés à des latitudes moyennes, comme la Nouvelle-Écosse au Canada, ou à des latitudes équatoriales, comme la Guyane française, nécessitent des ajustements orbitaux supplémentaires qui augmentent les coûts, retardent les temps de réponse et réduisent la flexibilité opérationnelle, ce qui constitue un inconvénient pour les missions axées sur le Grand Nord. La position septentrionale du Nunavut offre un accès tout aussi direct aux orbites à forte inclinaison, essentielles pour la connaissance du domaine arctique. Son éloignement géographique lui permettrait également d'être moins soumis aux contraintes liées au trafic aérien et à la sécurité, à l'instar d'Andøya, et pourrait attirer des investissements et une utilisation partagée par le Canada, la France et d'autres partenaires de l'OTAN. Un port spatial commun au Nunavut renforcerait la capacité de lancement souveraine optimisée pour les besoins des hautes latitudes, en soutenant les technologies émergentes – de la détection des menaces par l'IA aux communications quantiques et aux systèmes autonomes – qui sont essentielles pour surmonter les défis environnementaux et opérationnels propres à l'Arctique, renforçant ainsi la dissuasion et la défense collective. En fin de compte, un port spatial canado-français servirait d'atout fondamental pour étendre les mécanismes de défense et de dissuasion conjoints à l'environnement sécuritaire inexploré de l'Arctique. Il permettrait aux deux nations – et par extension à l'OTAN – de maintenir une surveillance continue des zones maritimes critiques, de protéger les infrastructures vitales et de répondre de manière décisive aux menaces en constante évolution. Ce partenariat témoigne d'un engagement fort en faveur de la souveraineté et de la sécurité collective de l'Arctique, garantissant la stabilité de la région dans un contexte de concurrence géopolitique croissante. ## Frappes (envisagées) par Washington contre les installations nucléaires iraniennes de Natanz URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/frappes-envisagees-par-washington-contre-les-installations-nucleaires-iraniennes-de-natanz/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Plusieurs rumeurs circulaient sur la possibilité d’une « attaque extérieure » en Iran de la part des États-Unis et de leurs alliés israéliens. Qu'en est-il réellement? Au cours des derniers jours, plusieurs témoignages faisaient état d’une ambiance très délétère en Iran et, en particulier, dans la capitale Téhéran. Les Iraniens habitant sur place rapportaient que les Gardiens de la révolution et la milice des Basidjs étaient particulièrement nerveux et plusieurs rumeurs circulaient sur la possibilité d’une « attaque extérieure » de la part des États-Unis et de leurs alliés israéliens. À deux mois de la fin du mandat de Donald Trump, le New York Times révèle qu’une partie de ces rumeurs était fondée. Selon le quotidien, lors d'une réunion dans le Bureau ovale, le président américain sortant aurait demandé à plusieurs de ses proches collaborateurs, dont le vice-président Mike Pence, le secrétaire d'État Mike Pompeo et le chef d'état-major Mark Milley « s'il avait des options pour agir contre le site nucléaire de Natanz dans les prochaines semaines ». Ces hauts responsables « ont dissuadé le président d'aller de l'avant avec une frappe militaire », invoquant le risque que de telles frappes ne dégénèrent en un conflit plus vaste, dit le quotidien. Plusieurs remarques s’imposent. D’abord, l’idée d’une frappe contre l’installation nucléaire de Natanz s’inscrit pleinement dans la continuité de la stratégie dite de « pression maximale » conduite par les États-Unis et leurs alliés israéliens et saoudiens depuis 2017. L’objectif de cette stratégie à 360 degrés a été d'empêcher l'Iran de développer sa capacité nucléaire et son programme de missiles balistiques tout en affaiblissant le régime sur la scène domestique, en réduisant son influence externe et en l’isolant sur la scène régionale. Cette stratégie multifacette s’est manifestée par la réimposition des sanctions économiques contre l’Iran, un soutien marqué aux mouvements populaires anti-régime au Liban, en Irak et, sur le plan symbolique, par l’élimination du général Qassem Soleimani (janvier 2020). Ce double effort d’étouffement diplomatique et de strangulation économique a été renforcé par une pression militaire israélienne (en Syrie), saoudienne (Yémen) et de l’OTAN (Irak). Ensuite, il convient de noter que, si l’option d’une frappe contre Natanz s’inscrit dans la stratégie dite de « pression maximale », elle en est aussi, très probablement, le point culminant. L’une des caractéristiques fondamentales de cette stratégie multifacette a été de s’appuyer sur toutes les options disponibles… à l’exception notable de l’usage de la force. Qualifiée de stratégie conduite sous le seuil de la violence, elle consiste essentiellement à contenir et à étouffer le régime de manière systématique, mais en évitant à tout prix que cette pression ne dégénère en un conflit direct. C’est le point de vue adopté par les conseillers du président Trump qui ont fait valoir les risques d’un embrasement régional pour le dissuader de bombarder Natanz. À noter que, pressé de réagir à l'article du New York Times, le porte-parole du gouvernement iranien, Ali Rabii, a déclaré : « il pourrait y avoir des tentatives » d'attaquer l'Iran, « mais, personnellement, je ne prévois pas une telle chose ». Exprimant un point de vue partagé dans les hautes sphères du régime iranien, Raabi a ajouté : « Je ne crois pas possible que puissent vouloir augmenter l'insécurité dans le monde et dans la région ». Le fait est que tous les protagonistes sont parfaitement conscients des dangers d'une spirale conflictuelle et des conséquences catastrophiques que pourrait avoir un affrontement sur le champ de bataille traditionnel. C'est pourquoi ils se sont jusqu'à maintenant gardés de s'affronter frontalement en privilégiant pour cela des approches indirectes et l’usage des proxies. Ni Israël, ni les pétromonarchies, ni l'Iran ne veulent déclencher un conflit qui s'envenimerait et les engouffrerait dans un chaos régional. Malgré la rhétorique belliciste de Trump, les États-Unis vont demeurer réticents à s'embarquer dans un conflit sachant qu’il pourrait déboucher sur la troisième guerre mondiale. Les observateurs notent d'ailleurs une certaine division à la Maison-Blanche entre les partisans de la manière forte et les réalistes. Tout, jusqu’à sa divulgation par le New York Times, suggère que cette nouvelle marque le chant du cygne de la stratégie de « pression maximale ». Même les Israéliens, piliers de cette approche tous azimuts, ont commencé à établir des liens avec l’équipe Biden. ## Genre, maintien de la paix et efficacité opérationnelle : recommandations pour le déploiement des femmes dans les opérations de maintien de la paix URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/genre-maintien-de-la-paix-et-efficacite-operationnelle-recommandations-pour-le-deploiement-des-femmes-dans-les-operations-de-maintien-de-la-paix/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique examine l'argument de l'efficacité opérationnelle tel qu'utilisé dans plusieurs politiques et la relation entre le genre et l'efficacité opérationnelle. Au cours des vingt années qui ont suivi l'adoption de la première résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité (FPS), l'intégration des femmes aux opérations de maintien de la paix est devenue une priorité pour plusieurs organisations internationales de sécurité et forces armées nationales. Le gouvernement canadien et les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) sont devenus des leaders dans la mise en œuvre du programme FPS. Alors qu'ils cherchent des moyens d'accroître la participation significative des femmes aux opérations de maintien de la paix, ce n’est pas l’atteinte d’un nombre fixe de femmes soldats de la paix, mais bien le contexte de chaque mission qui devrait être priorisé. Introduction La résolution 2538 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (ONU), adoptée à l'unanimité en août, est la première résolution autonome sur les femmes dans le maintien de la paix. Au-delà de sa nature historique, le fort soutien en appui à la résolution, de même que son élaboration en tant que résolution de maintien de la paix – et non en tant que résolution sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité – signalent deux avancées importantes. Premièrement, le thème des femmes et du maintien de la paix n'est plus cloisonné dans une discussion sur les « enjeux relatifs aux femmes », mais commence plutôt à être intégré dans les questions prioritaires du Conseil de sécurité, comme le maintien de la paix. Deuxièmement, cela implique que le Conseil de sécurité a largement accepté que le fait d'avoir plus de femmes au sein des forces de maintien de la paix augmentera la performance et l'efficacité du maintien de la paix. Si l'intégration des femmes et du maintien de la paix dans les discussions générales de l'ONU est louable, la relation entre le déploiement des femmes et l'efficacité opérationnelle reste essentiellement indéfinie. Quelle est la relation entre le genre et l'efficacité opérationnelle ? L'argument proposé ici est que le genre et le sexe peuvent influencer l'efficacité opérationnelle dans des scénarios spécifiques où les femmes occupent des rôles comportant plus d'interaction humaine, qu'il s'agisse d'interactions avec la population locale, les forces adverses ou au sein de la force de maintien de la paix. Le contexte de chaque mission de maintien de la paix devrait déterminer la manière dont les femmes sont déployées. Cette note stratégique examine l'argument de l'efficacité opérationnelle tel qu'utilisé dans plusieurs politiques, y compris l'Initiative Elsie pour la participation des femmes dans les opérations de paix. Ce texte met en évidence plusieurs failles conceptuelles de l'argument de l'efficacité opérationnelle avant de proposer de le définir différemment. L'article se conclut par une série de recommandations pour le déploiement des femmes dans les opérations de maintien de la paix. Les femmes dans le maintien de la paix : l'argument de l'efficacité opérationnelle La participation des femmes au maintien de la paix est liée à l'efficacité opérationnelle depuis les années 1990. La Conférence de Pékin de 1995, la Déclaration de Windhoek et le Plan d'action de Namibie ont mis en évidence le lien entre la présence des femmes et la résilience de la paix, en postulant que les principes d'égalité des sexes sont essentiels à l'efficacité des opérations de maintien de la paix (Nations unies, 2000). La résolution 1325 (2000) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies a concrétisé le plaidoyer de la société civile dans un engagement politique visant à accroître la participation des femmes et a ouvert la voie à une série de résolutions des Nations unies sur la FPS. Depuis lors, les Nations unies et d'autres organisations internationales de sécurité ont adapté leurs politiques et leurs pratiques pour refléter les principes de la FPS, et ont fait de la participation significative des femmes dans tous les aspects de la paix et de la sécurité une priorité. Avec sa Stratégie de parité hommes-femmes en uniforme, le Département des opérations de paix des Nations unies (DPO) cherche à atteindre un ratio de 15 % de femmes dans les contingents militaires et 30 % de femmes dans les forces de police dans tous les contingents déployés d'ici 2028. En 2007, l'OTAN a adopté une politique de soutien aux résolutions de l'ONU sur la FPS, notant que la « representation of women across NATO and in national forces is necessary to enhance operational effectiveness and success ». Par le biais de l'Initiative Elsie pour les femmes dans les opérations de paix, lancée lors de la réunion ministérielle de l'ONU sur le maintien de la paix à Vancouver en 2017, le Canada s'est engagé à atteindre l'objectif de l'ONU du ratio de 15 % de femmes en uniforme dans chaque opération de maintien de la paix d'ici 2028. L'Initiative Elsie vise à accroître la participation significative des femmes aux opérations de paix et considère le genre comme un moyen d'améliorer l'efficacité opérationnelle. De même, la plupart des recherches universitaires sur les femmes dans le maintien de la paix examinent l'impact positif des femmes casques bleus. Les publications des groupes de réflexion et des ONG cherchent également à trouver des moyens d'accroître la participation des femmes dans tous les aspects des opérations de paix. Ces dernières années, de nombreuses publications académiques ont proposé plusieurs façons par lesquelles les femmes améliorent l’efficacité opérationnelle des missions de maintien de la paix. Ces affirmations peuvent être synthétisées en six catégories de propositions : Les femmes soldats de la paix ont un effet positif sur l'efficacité opérationnelle lorsqu'elles accomplissent des tâches pratiques impliquant d'autres femmes, comme les fouilles corporelles ou la prise en charge des victimes de violences sexuelles ; Les femmes soldats de la paix sont plus efficaces pour gagner la confiance de la population locale car elles sont perçues comme moins menaçantes que les hommes soldats de la paix ; Les femmes soldats de la paix améliorent la crédibilité de la force de maintien de la paix ; La présence de femmes soldats de la paix réduit les cas de violence sexuelle et d'exploitation de la part des hommes dans la force de maintien de la paix ; Les femmes dans les contingents de maintien de la paix constituent des modèles et contribuent à l'autonomisation des femmes et des filles locales ; et L'aptitude des femmes à communiquer avec les femmes et les jeunes filles locales permet de recueillir une intelligence humaine plus nuancée et plus complète. Ces propositions partagent toutes l'idée que les femmes apportent quelque chose de différent aux opérations de maintien de la paix, contribuant ainsi à accroître leur efficacité. Efficacité opérationnelle et maintien de la paix Plusieurs problèmes sont associés à l'argument de l'efficacité opérationnelle. Certains chercheurs ont fait remarquer qu'un argument tirant parti des compétences particulières des femmes renforce les rôles des hommes et des femmes, promeut une vision essentialiste des femmes et place des attentes injustes sur les femmes déployées. La militarisation de l'agenda FPS[1] est également considérée comme un réel danger. Des objectifs cruciaux de l'agenda FPS, notamment l'égalité des sexes et la poursuite de la paix, risquent d'être cooptés par des impératifs militaires au service de la sécurité ; cela est particulièrement vrai dans un contexte de pandémie mondiale où les questions urgentes de sécurité humaine et de santé ont mis l'égalité des sexes en veilleuse. Un autre problème est le manque de connaissances empiriques pour étayer les affirmations relatives à l'impact positif que les femmes soldats de la paix ont sur différents aspects de l'efficacité d'une mission de maintien de la paix. De nombreuses propositions présentées ci-dessus reposent sur des preuves limitées ou anecdotiques. Soulignant ce manque de recherche empirique et la difficulté d'établir une causalité entre le genre et l'efficacité opérationnelle, un nombre croissant de chercheurs ont réagi aux politiques actuelles visant à promouvoir la participation des femmes au maintien de la paix. Ils remettent en question l'hypothèse selon laquelle il existe un lien direct entre le nombre de femmes engagées dans le maintien de la paix et l'efficacité de la mission. Outre les connaissances empiriques limitées qui les étayent, la plupart des propositions n'indiquent pas clairement comment le genre, et pas seulement une présence accrue des femmes, affecte l'efficacité opérationnelle. Cela souligne la nécessité de faire la différence entre le genre et le sexe lors de l'analyse du déploiement des femmes dans les missions de maintien de la paix. Comment le genre, la féminité et le sexe affectent-ils l'efficacité opérationnelle ? Incidemment, l'efficacité opérationnelle, l'autre variable clé pour étudier la proposition selon laquelle l’inclusion de plus de femmes influence l'efficacité des missions de maintien de la paix, est très rarement définie dans la littérature. L'efficacité opérationnelle est un concept important, mais compliqué, et il devrait être développé en association avec le genre dans le contexte du maintien de la paix. Conceptualiser le genre Le genre, et non seulement la présence des femmes, influence l'efficacité des missions de maintien de la paix. La distinction faite par Charli Carpenter entre l'apparence sexuelle et la performance de genre des femmes est utile pour caractériser les différents rôles joués par les femmes soldats de la paix. Alors que l'apparence sexuelle fait référence aux attributs corporels tels que les cheveux ou les seins, la performance de genre fait référence à la façon dont un homme ou une femme interprète son genre et se comporte. Alors que l'apparence sexuelle est généralement simple, la performance de genre est plus subjective. Elle se rapporte aux constructions sociétales des rôles masculins et féminins « typiques » et varie donc en fonction des contextes culturels[2].  La performance de genre comprise comme telle se différencie clairement du sexe et permet d'évaluer l'impact du sexe et du genre dans le contexte du maintien de la paix. Par exemple, une femme soldat de la paix, bien qu'elle porte un uniforme et un casque, peut très probablement être facilement identifiée comme une femme (apparence sexuelle). Son comportement (performance de genre) variera en fonction de ses motivations personnelles en tant que femme, militaire et soldat de la paix ; si elle veut s'intégrer ou faire ses preuves, elle pourrait adopter des comportements plus typiquement associés à la masculinité traditionnelle, comme fumer, jurer ou s'affirmer davantage. Le comportement d'une casque bleu est à son tour interprété par les autres acteurs avec lesquels elle interagit, créant ainsi une dynamique complexe entre les sexes. L'apparence du sexe, la performance du genre et l'interprétation des deux ont donc le potentiel de devenir tout aussi importants dans la façon dont les femmes soldats de la paix se comportent et sont perçues. La performance de genre d'un ou d’une soldat de la paix affecte la façon dont elle aborde et accomplit ses tâches et influence la façon dont les autres interagissent avec elle. En conséquence, le genre, conçu à la fois comme l'apparence et la performance de genre, est un facteur susceptible d'avoir un impact sur la façon dont une mission de maintien de la paix est menée, affectant son efficacité globale. Conceptualiser l'efficacité opérationnelle Avec le genre, l'efficacité opérationnelle est l'autre variable clé invoquée dans les politiques et les revendications liant le déploiement d'un plus grand nombre de femmes à de meilleures missions de maintien de la paix. Bien qu'elle soit au cœur de la plupart des discussions sur l'augmentation du nombre de femmes dans les missions de maintien de la paix, l'efficacité opérationnelle reste un concept indéfini. Depuis les années 1990, les tentatives de développement de modèles pour évaluer l'efficacité opérationnelle des missions de maintien de la paix se sont heurtées à plusieurs obstacles, notamment la complexité de l'élaboration de mesures significatives et la difficulté de comparer différents types de missions de maintien de la paix. Un des problèmes conceptuels les plus importants, illustré par Diehl et Druckman, est le manque de distinction entre la performance et le résultat. En effet, la majorité de la documentation sur le maintien de la paix tend à confondre l'efficacité opérationnelle et le succès de la mission, qui devraient pourtant être distingués. C'est particulièrement le cas lorsqu'on examine la performance des acteurs individuels – les femmes soldats de la paix – qui participent ponctuellement à des opérations complexes et multilatérales, comme les opérations de maintien de la paix. Même si l'on développait un modèle pour la mesurer, l'évaluation de l'efficacité opérationnelle en termes de succès de la mission, ou de résultats, ne pourrait être totalement concluante. Le contingent de maintien de la paix est l'un des nombreux facteurs susceptibles d'influencer la paix et la stabilité dans un pays hôte.  Si l'objectif est la consolidation de la paix, l'évaluation de l'efficacité opérationnelle en tant que succès de la mission nécessiterait de trouver un moyen d'isoler la performance individuelle des soldats de la paix parmi un certain nombre de variables complexes. Si le but est la réduction de la violence, l'évaluation d'un objectif négatif rendrait difficile la détermination des actions qui ont contribué à l'état final souhaité. Il est plus prometteur de considérer l'efficacité opérationnelle comme un processus. La littérature sur le genre et le maintien de la paix, même si elle ne la définit pas clairement, donne un aperçu de l'efficacité opérationnelle. Des chercheurs ont fait valoir que le genre est un multiplicateur de force, permettant la performance d'un plus grand nombre de tâches, ou de différents types de tâches – contribuant ainsi à améliorer l'efficacité opérationnelle. Une étude examinant la performance des Équipes d'engagement féminines (EEF) en Afghanistan, même si elles n'ont pas opéré dans un contexte de maintien de la paix, est particulièrement éclairante. En particulier, l'efficacité des EEF des Marines et de l'armée américaine a été évaluée sur la base de l'apport des tâches affectées par le genre. Dans une étude sur la mise en œuvre de la résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies en Afghanistan, Olsson et al ont analysé les tâches et activités quotidiennes qui ont été améliorées, ou auraient pu l'être, en ayant davantage de femmes soldats. C'est le processus, plus que le résultat, qui a été examiné en l'espèce. Cette vision de l'efficacité axée sur les tâches se concentre sur les tâches de niveau tactique des soldats de la paix. Par conséquent, elle conçoit l'efficacité opérationnelle comme l'exécution de tâches contribuant à la réalisation d'une mission de maintien de la paix. Cette compréhension à plusieurs niveaux de l'efficacité opérationnelle permet une analyse plus complète des rôles des femmes dans les missions de maintien de la paix. Les tâches accomplies par les femmes et les contextes dans lesquels elles les exécutent peuvent être décomposés pour isoler les cas où les performances de genre ou encore le sexe ont un impact. Trois recommandations pour le Canada Guidée par la conceptualisation du genre comme performance et la compréhension de l'efficacité opérationnelle comme un processus, une analyse de 25 entretiens avec des soldats de la paix canadiens déployés dans des missions de maintien de la paix dans les années 1990[3] a confirmé que de multiples facteurs, dont le genre, influencent la performance des tâches dans les missions complexes de maintien de la paix. Bien que ces résultats ne puissent être universalisés, ils illustrent de manière empirique le rôle du genre et du sexe dans différents contextes de maintien de la paix, constituant ainsi un premier pas vers la compréhension de la relation entre le genre et l'efficacité opérationnelle. Les entretiens ont illustré l'importance du contexte : les performances en matière de genre, le sexe, voire parfois les deux, peuvent affecter l'exécution des tâches selon l'environnement opérationnel, les normes locales en matière de genre, le type de mission de maintien de la paix et les rôles joués par les femmes soldats de la paix. En particulier, les performances de genre et le sexe ont un impact spécifique sur l'efficacité opérationnelle lorsque les femmes soldats de la paix jouent des rôles comportant des interactions humaines importantes. En particulier, les performances de genre et le sexe ont plus d'impact dans les interactions avec la population locale et les combattants, et dans les interactions au sein de la force de maintien de la paix. Trois recommandations en découlent : Il devrait y avoir des femmes dans chaque contingent de maintien de la paix, dans des rôles aussi variés que possible. À l’interne, la communication est facilitée et la cohésion améliorée lorsque les femmes occupent des postes de direction, contribuent à la résolution des problèmes et fournissent des conseils formels et informels. Parce que c'est la bonne chose à faire, et parce que cela améliore l'efficacité des équipes en les rendant plus diversifiées, il devrait y avoir des femmes dans chaque contingent de maintien de la paix dans des rôles aussi variés que possible. Le nombre de femmes déployées dans les contingents de maintien de la paix devrait être adapté à l'environnement opérationnel et à ses spécificités culturelles, et non fixé à un certain pourcentage. L'impact du genre et du sexe est spécifique au contexte. Les normes culturelles concernant les rôles des femmes – dans les familles, les communautés, les sociétés, la politique, les institutions militaires, etc. – ainsi que les normes sociétales concernant les femmes étrangères et les forces armées sont importantes lorsqu'il s'agit d'interactions entre les femmes soldats de la paix et les populations locales. Dans certains contextes, le sexe peut être défavorable aux interactions. Il peut aussi être totalement insignifiant, ou moins important que des facteurs comme la langue ou la religion. Outre le contexte, le type de maintien de la paix doit également être pris en compte. Des missions de maintien de la paix plus larges et multidimensionnelles offrent beaucoup plus de possibilités pour de telles interactions que le maintien de la paix traditionnel, et encore plus que les interventions de stabilité. Les missions mandatant une force de maintien de la paix pour soutenir les civils, pour répondre aux besoins humanitaires ou pour maintenir la séparation des factions devraient dicter la nécessité d'un nombre accru de femmes dans des rôles précis plutôt qu'une exigence absolue en termes de pourcentage. Pour que le genre et le sexe aient une influence positive sur l'efficacité opérationnelle, les femmes soldats de la paix devraient être employées dans des rôles impliquant un contact avec la population locale ou encore des interactions avec les forces adverses. Pour être fidèle à l’esprit de l’agenda FPS, les rôles dans lesquels les femmes soldats de la paix sont employées sont importants. Par exemple, le fait qu'un certain pourcentage de femmes soit concentré dans le soutien d'une mission ou dans les avions ne contribue pas directement à améliorer l'efficacité opérationnelle. L'impact de la performance de genre et du sexe féminin dépend de la perception et de la réception des autres acteurs – hommes, femmes et enfants locaux, combattants ou soldats de la paix. Le genre et le sexe sont donc plus efficaces dans l'exécution du type de tâches impliquant des interactions avec ces acteurs : collecte de renseignements, engagement des populations locales, négociation avec les forces adverses, entre autres. Les patrouilles de présence, la fourniture de soins médicaux aux femmes et aux enfants, et la supervision des civils travaillant pour la force de maintien de la paix ne sont que quelques exemples de telles tâches concrètes. [1] Dans la littérature féministe, la militarisation fait référence aux processus par lesquels les normes et pratiques militaires sont étendues au domaine civil. Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives; Sjoberg and Via, Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives; Shepherd, "Making War Safe for Women?". [2] Cela ne constitue pas une approbation des rôles sexospécifiques fixes, mais une référence aux rôles sexospécifiques archétypaux de la société occidentale. [3] Les entretiens ont été réalisés en 2020 dans le cadre du projet de recherche de maîtrise de l'auteur. Les participants, 17 femmes et 8 hommes, ont été recrutés par échantillonnage en boule de neige. 20 étaient des officiers et 18 venaient de l'environnement de l'armée.  Les personnes interrogées provenaient de divers métiers de l'armée, allant des armes de combat (7) au secteur médical (3) et à la logistique (3). Des officiers et techniciens des communications (3), un commis d'administration et un officier de police militaire ont également été interrogés. Les personnes interrogées dans l'environnement des forces aériennes étaient des pilotes (3), des techniciens d'approvisionnement (2), des techniciens de systèmes d'armes aériennes (1) et des ingénieurs aérospatiaux (1).  Les entretiens ont duré entre 45 minutes et deux heures. Dans un format semi-structuré, dix questions ont été posées aux participants et leurs réponses ont donné lieu à différentes questions de suivi. Les deux premières questions portaient sur des informations contextuelles concernant leur déploiement et leurs expériences opérationnelles antérieures. Les participants ont été invités à décrire les types de tâches qu'ils ont effectuées et à expliquer ce qu'était une journée typique sur le lieu d'opérations, si tant est qu'il y ait eu une journée typique. Ils ont également été interrogés sur leur perception de l'efficacité de la mission et sur les types d'interactions qu'ils ont eues avec d'autres acteurs comme les ONG ou les populations civiles. Il a été demandé aux femmes interrogées si elles pensaient pouvoir accomplir certaines tâches différemment, et si elles recevaient certaines tâches en raison de leur sexe. Les hommes se sont aussi exprimés sur ces questions et sur le rôle des femmes qui ont été déployées avec eux. Enfin, ils ont été invités à donner leur avis sur les politiques liant le genre et l'efficacité opérationnelle. ## Indo-Pacifique, région stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/indo-pacifique-region-strategique/ Modified: 2024-04-05 Nous avons actuellement les yeux rivés sur les guerres en Europe et au Moyen-Orient. Mais une autre poudrière est à l’œuvre en Indo-Pacifique. Cette méta-région concentre tous les superlatifs : elle recouvre près de la moitié de la surface du globe, héberge les trois quarts de la population mondiale, génère près de 40 % du PIB global, abrite l’écrasante majorité des matières premières critiques. L’Indo-Pacifique est à l’évidence éminemment stratégique. Au moins trois crises potentiellement nucléaires y couvent : Chine contre Taïwan, Corée du Nord contre Corée du Sud et Inde contre Pakistan. Dans cet espace, également, la pression chinoise sur l’ordre international et la contestation de ses normes s’avèrent très fortes. Ce volume réunit des contributions des meilleurs chercheurs sur ce sujet, des analyses inédites, captivantes, qui témoignent de la diversité et de l’importance des enjeux stratégiques en Indo-Pacifique où la France possède des intérêts majeurs pour sa souveraineté. Procurez-vous le livre L’Indo-Pacifique, région stratégique, le septième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Une nouvelle génération d’experts renommés, d’observateurs avisés des opérations en cours livre ici ses points de vue éclairés, accessibles au plus grand nombre et accompagnés d’une riche infographie. Les différentes contributions de ce livre sont issues de la plateforme francophone d’analyse de questions internationales Le Rubicon. SOMMAIRE Introduction – L’Indo-Pacifique, région stratégique par Antoine Bondaz Vers une nouvelle ère de militarisation (et d’instabilité ?) en Indo-Pacifique par Lionel Fatton Le yuan numérique : un péril pour l’hégémonie du dollar ? par Clara Dragnev La mer de Chine méridionale, l’autre versant de la rivalité sino-américaine en Asie par Yann Roche et Raïhan Cherrouk Les risques liés à l’ambiguïté : l’opinion publique taïwanaise, la crédibilité des États-Unis et l’efficacité de la dissuasion par James Lee, Ja Ian Chong, Hsin-Hsin Pan, Chien-Huei Wu et Wen-Chin Wu L’enjeu de Taïwan dans l’alliance entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Sud par Hyon Joo Yoo Chantage stratégique et rivalités entre grandes puissances : pourquoi les Philippines et la Turquie ont-elles menacé de rompre avec l’Occident ? par Jonathan Paquin La France et les États-Unis : partenaires pour le Pacifique sud ? par Mathieu Droin, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Zack Cooper et Céline Pajon L’AUKUS par-delà ses sous-marins : l’Australie face à ses choix capacitaires par Didier Rafidiarimanda Une coopération efficace avec l’Inde nécessite de la traiter pour ce qu’elle est : un État pivot par Sharinee L. Jagtiani et Ameya Pratap Singh La politique de la Russie vis-à-vis des « petits États » par Aleksandra Bolonina Date de parution : 20 mars 2024   Le Rubicon publie désormais de petits livres destinés au grand public, qui permettent d’aborder, clairement et précisément, les nouvelles questions brûlantes liées à l’actualité internationale. Les Équateurs publient, de manière régulière et depuis avril 2022, un ouvrage d’environ 128 à 144 pages, au prix de 10 à 14 euros, synthèse du travail des experts de la plateforme Le Rubicon. Vous pouvez retrouver le reste de la collection ici ! ## Industrialisation sans émancipation : les limites de la stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/industrialisation-sans-emancipation-les-limites-de-la-strategie-industrielle-de-defense-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-03-23 Sous l’impulsion du Premier ministre Mark Carney, le gouvernement canadien s’est engagé dans une réorientation majeure de sa politique de défense. Selon lui, la conception dominante « selon laquelle notre position géographique et nos alliances nous garantissaient automatiquement la prospérité et la sécurité ne tient plus ». Le Canada entend désormais développer des capacités militaires afin que « sa défense ne dépende jamais plus des autres ». L’ambition, colossale, tant la défense du pays était conçue et articulée autour d’une relation étroite avec les États-Unis, est nette : « Le Canada passe de la dépendance à la résilience. » C’est dans cette perspective que le gouvernement canadien a dévoilé sa toute première stratégie industrielle de défense (SID). Elle appelle à « maximiser l’autonomie stratégique » du pays en développant des « capacités souveraines », ainsi qu’à soutenir « notre résilience en cas de conflit » et à « réduire les vulnérabilités de la chaîne d’approvisionnement » par la diversification de partenariats de défense. Ce double objectif repose sur une lecture sévère des bouleversements géopolitiques en cours : « Les hypothèses de longue date ont été bouleversées – sur la fin de la conquête impériale, la durabilité de la paix en Europe et la résilience des anciennes alliances. Dans ce monde incertain, il est plus important que jamais que le Canada ait la capacité de soutenir sa propre défense et de sauvegarder sa propre souveraineté. » Dans les faits, ce récit est trompeur, car il masque la réalité que le gouvernement canadien n’entend pas réellement amorcer un virage vers une défense indépendante du Canada. Malgré l’ambition affichée de renforcer l’autonomie stratégique du Canada, la SID ne remet pas en question l’intégration structurelle du pays à l’architecture militaire et industrielle américaine. Elle propose certes une réindustrialisation militaire, mais pas une émancipation du giron étatsunien. En l’absence d’une nouvelle politique de défense faisant de l’autonomie stratégique une réelle ambition, le vaste plan de réarmement du Canada risque de perpétuer son modèle historique de forces « plug and play » intégrées aux États-Unis. Cet article développe un argumentaire en trois temps. D’abord, il montre que la défense canadienne s’est historiquement construite dans un cadre d’interopérabilité et de complémentarité avec les États-Unis, tant sur le plan opérationnel qu’industriel, ce qui limite la portée d’une éventuelle réorientation souverainiste. Il analyse ensuite la conception gouvernementale de l’autonomie stratégique, largement réduite à une logique de production en sol canadien et d’espoir de propriété intellectuelle, sans redéfinition claire des objectifs de sécurité nationale. Enfin, il démontre que, loin d’annoncer une rupture, la SID s’inscrit dans une dynamique de continuité, où l’approfondissement de l’intégration continentale coexiste avec une ambition industrielle à dominante économique, révélant ainsi une autonomie partielle et circonscrite. *** Pour lire la suite, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. Crédits photo : US Army photo by Sgt. Ethan Scofield via Flickr. ## Invitée de marque – Kerry Buck URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/2021-colloque-kerry-buck/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > Kerry Buck était dernièrement secrétaire adjointe au Conseil du Trésor, secteur économique, de 2018 à 2021. Auparavant, elle a... Kerry Buck était dernièrement secrétaire adjointe au Conseil du Trésor, secteur économique, de 2018 à 2021. Auparavant, elle a été ambassadrice et représentante permanente du Canada auprès de l’OTAN de 2015 à 2018. Mme Buck est une diplomate de carrière qui a été directrice politique et sous-ministre adjointe pour la sécurité internationale et les affaires politiques, et a occupé des postes de sous-ministre adjointe pour l’Afghanistan, l’Afrique, l’Amérique latine et les Caraïbes et de directrice générale pour le Moyen-Orient et le Maghreb. Plus tôt dans sa carrière, elle a été affectée à la Mission permanente du Canada auprès des Nations Unies à New York. Mme Buck a dirigé les groupes de travail du gouvernement canadien pour l’Afghanistan, la Russie et l’Ukraine, la Syrie, le Mali, le tremblement de terre en Haïti et d’autres crises humanitaires et de politique étrangère. Tout au long de sa carrière diplomatique, elle a appuyé les premiers ministres et les ministres des Affaires étrangères aux sommets du G7 et de l’OTAN et a représenté le Canada aux Nations Unies, au G7, à l’OTAN, à l’OEA et à l’OSCE sur les questions de droits de la personne, de sécurité, de désarmement, de terrorisme et d’affaires humanitaires. De 1992 à 2018, elle a représenté le Canada dans le cadre des négociations internationales sur les questions relatives aux femmes, à la paix et à la sécurité, contribuant ainsi à l’élaboration du droit international et de la pratique en matière de lutte contre la violence fondée sur le genre. modérée par : Charlotte Duval-Lantoine (Directrice des opérations (Ottawa) et Fellow, CGAI) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? – Panel 1 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-1/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Chair: Andrea Lane (Defence Research and Development Canada) James Lee (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Veuillez noter que cette vidéo est en anglais seulement. Panel 1 - Is a Great Power War for Taiwan Inevitable? Chair and Discussant: Andrea Lane (Defence Research and Development Canada) James Lee (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation) Charles Parton (Council on Geostrategy) Bonnie Glaser (German Marshall Fund of the United States) Cleo Paskal (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? – Panel 2 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-2/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Chair and Discussant: Justin Massie (UQAM) Steven Jackson (Indiana University of Pennsylvania), Hyon Joo Yoo (Hankuk University of Foreign... Veuillez noter que cette vidéo est en anglais seulement. Panel 2 - How Are Allies Handling the Taiwan Question? Chair and Discussant: Justin Massie (UQAM) Steven Jackson (Indiana University of Pennsylvania) Hyon Joo Yoo (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) John Blaxland (Australian National University) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? – Panel 3 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-3/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Chair and Discussant: Guy St-Jacques (Institut d’études international de Montréal) Derek Grossman (RAND Corporation)... Veuillez noter que cette vidéo est en anglais seulement. Panel 3 - How Are Partners Handling the Taiwan Question? Chair and Discussant: Guy St-Jacques (Institut d’études international de Montréal) Derek Grossman (RAND Corporation) Sana Hashmi (Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation) Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? – Panel 4 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-4/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > What Lessons Are Allies Drawing From Ukraine for Taiwan? Chair and Discussant: Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Charles-Philippe David... Veuillez noter que cette vidéo est en anglais seulement. What Lessons Are Allies Drawing From Ukraine for Taiwan?  Chair and Discussant: Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Charles-Philippe David (UQAM) Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer (IRSEM) Tereza Novotna (Free University Berlin) Gaëlle Rivard-Piché (Defence Research and Development Canada) ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? – Panel des chercheurs émergents URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/is-war-over-taiwan-coming-panel-des-chercheurs-emergents/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > Chair and discussant : Justin Massie (UQAM) Maxandre Fortier (UQAM)Rémy Carugati (Université Laval), Camille Raymond (UQAM), Émile... Présidence et commentaire : Justin Massie (UQAM) Maxandre Fortier (UQAM) Rémy Carugati (Université Laval) Camille Raymond (UQAM) Émile Lambert-Deslandes (Queen’s University) ## Israël/Hamas : la surprise stratégique dans l’attaque du 7 octobre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/israel-hamas-la-surprise-strategique-dans-lattaque-du-7-octobre/ Modified: 2024-12-05 > Israël et Hamas | Le 7 octobre 2023 est une journée marquée par le déclenchement de l’opération “déluge d’Al-Aqsa” contre Israël par... « … surprise devient par conséquent le moyen d’acquérir la supériorité… Lorsqu’elle réussit, elle sème la confusion et brise le courage de l’ennemi » - Carl von Clausewitz Le 7 octobre 2023 est une journée marquée par le déclenchement de l’opération “déluge d’Al-Aqsa” contre Israël par une coalition d’organisations de terroristes dirigée par les forces armées du Hamas dans la bande de Gaza. Cette attaque contre les territoires et populations juives d’Israël est une des plus grandes attaques terroristes organisées par un groupe non étatique contre un territoire et son peuple. Après maintenant plusieurs mois, l’on ne compte pas moins de 1200 personnes décédées lors de l'attaque, qu’il s’agisse de civils ou de militaires, et à ce jour près de 150 israéliens encore prisonniers, faisant de cet événement un drame que beaucoup comparent aux attaques du 11 septembre 2001 pour les États-Unis ou aux attentats du 13 novembre 2015 en France. Et si nous prenons en compte les conséquences de cette attaque, on peut dénombrer plusieurs dizaines de milliers de civils décédés dans la population gazaouie à la suite de la riposte israélienne. Les événements ayant eu lieu ce jour-là ont remis au-devant de la scène la notion de surprise stratégique. Ce concept suppose, qu’afin d’obtenir un avantage stratégique sur son adversaire, l’on entreprenne une action qu’il n’a pas anticipée, et qui de ce fait fera progresser sa propre stratégie. Cette notion, très souvent utilisée dans le domaine militaire, connaît depuis plusieurs années, et en particulier depuis le 11 septembre 2001, un glissement sémantique suivant lequel elle peut être utilisée en dehors de conflits militaires étatiques par des groupes de combats transnationaux. Les exemples les plus connus de surprises stratégique traditionnelles sont l’attaque de Pearl Harbor par le Japon et l’offensive égyptienne dans la guerre du Yom Kippour. Dans sa nouvelle définition, la surprise stratégique se manifeste lors des attentats du 11 septembre et maintenant à propos de l’attaque du Hamas le 7 octobre 2023. Il s’agit donc à la fois, du point de vue de son auteur d’une action réussie, et du point de vue de la victime d’un échec de son organisation de défense. Sans négliger pour autant les conditions de la réussite de la surprise stratégique, qui a demandé de la part de ses auteurs une grande et minutieuse préparation, il est intéressant d’envisager la surprise stratégique selon l’autre point de vue, c’est-à-dire d’examiner quelles sont les erreurs, les lacunes ou les failles de la structure de défense d’un pays qui ont transformé une attaque aussi importante soit elle en une surprise stratégique. En suivant cette logique, on se penchera donc plus spécifiquement sur les erreurs commises par l'entité concernée par cette surprise en examinant un grand nombre de facteur tels que l’atomisation de l’information, le manque de coordination, la présence de biais cognitifs, la place conséquente de la technologie dans les structures de sécurité. Si une surprise stratégique a eu lieu, cela veut dire que des éléments organisationnels ou politiques ont créé cette surprise. Dans le cas qui nous occupe c’est justement la disparité tant des moyens et des forces en présence que des technologies mises en œuvre qui rend cet aspect particulièrement significatif. Parmi ceux-ci on peut noter tout particulièrement des “défaillances” dans le système de défense israélien que ce soit d’ordre structurel (collecte de l’information) ou sur un plan cognitif (compréhension de l’information). C’est en suivant cette logique que nous pouvons nous intéresser aux faits ayant eu lieu le 7 octobre. Structure du renseignement : la problématique de l’atomisation et de la coordination Sur le plan structurel, un des éléments majeurs ayant causé ce phénomène de surprise relève de la problématique de l'atomisation du renseignement et du manque de coordination inhérent entre les institutions de surveillance et de renseignement. Israël a, depuis 1948, multiplié ses services de défense qui comptent aujourd’hui un grand nombre d'organes dont chacun possède un rôle propre et est doté de son propre service de renseignement. On en dénombre cinq principaux tels que l’ISA (Israel Security Agency ou Shin bet), le Mossad et l’armée régulière (Israel Defence Force ou Tsahal). Sur le plan purement théorique ces organismes possèdent donc leur spécialité telle que la surveillance frontalière, la surveillance intérieure ou extérieure et devraient travailler de concert. Cependant, cette spécialisation accrue et cette atomisation du renseignement font par exemple que l’ISA ne travaille que sur du renseignement Humain (HUMINT) et que le renseignement militaire (AMAM sous la juridiction de l’armée israélienne) ne traite que le renseignement électromagnétique (SIGINT ou signals and visual intelligence).  Cette dichotomie amènera même une forme de concurrence entre les centres de renseignement, impactant de facto la capacité d'Israël à prévoir des crises et y répondre de façon appropriée. Dans cette même logique, la confiance absolue et la dépendance croissante aux moyens de communication électroniques a aussi été un poids pour Israël. Le Hamas, conscient de cette faiblesse, a réussi à plonger Israël dans un flou total en détruisant ses moyens de communications et en ciblant les responsables de la surveillance de Gaza situés à la frontière. De ce fait le pays a subi de plein fouet l’attaque sans pouvoir réagir de manière adéquate à tel point que les avions de chasse israéliens ont mis plusieurs heures avant de décoller là où, en temps normal, il leur faut seulement quelques minutes pour arriver sur cible. Ainsi le Hamas a désorganisé le système de communication des militaires vers Tel-Aviv et empêché la mise en place d’une réponse coordonnée des forces armées, ne leur permettant que des actions désordonnées et ponctuelles. La question des biais cognitifs et de la négligence S'agissant de l’anticipation des événements, les services israéliens ont fait preuve d’incompréhension sinon d’une certaine négligence concernant les plans du Hamas. Il a été dévoilé que les organes de renseignements de l’Etat israélien avaient été informés une année auparavant du plan de l’attaque du Hamas. Cependant, malgré la surveillance de la région, le personnel de la sécurité du pays n’a pas jugé plausible une attaque d’une telle envergure. Pourtant, de nombreux signes laissaient paraître l’organisation d’une telle opération telle que la mise en place d’exercice militaire reconstituant des zones du territoire israélien ou encore des vidéos de propagande montrant l’entraînement des forces du Hamas. Malgré tout, ces signes n’ont trouvé aucune résonance dans la hiérarchie sécuritaire israélienne. De plus, les nombreux experts qui se sont penchés sur ces plans ont tous conclu que cette action semblait irréalisable par une force armée telle que le Hamas. Effectivement, l’envergure de cette opération et les ambitions du Hamas leur semblaient totalement hors de propos. Pour la grande majorité d’entre eux, la seule possibilité d’une attaque envisageable par le Hamas aurait été une opération d’une échelle bien moindre, plus en adéquation avec celles qu’il avait pu exécuter par le passé et que les services de sécurité pourraient aisément démanteler. Il y a eu une sous-évaluation des capacités logistiques et militaires du Hamas négligeant entièrement ses compétences dans la faisabilité d’une attaque de cette envergure. Il faut aussi noter que dans sa stratégie de surveillance, Israël a laissé une marge de manœuvre majeure au Hamas. Depuis un certain nombre d’années les services de renseignement négligeaient de plus en plus le renseignement humain et en source ouverte pour ne favoriser, voire ne prendre majoritairement en compte, que le renseignement numérique. Le Hamas a su se servir de cette particularité pour passer sous les radars israéliens en coupant toute communication numérique afin de ne laisser transparaître que le strict minimum d’information. Trompés par un excès de confiance, les forces israéliennes ont mis de côté les signaux directs d’une potentielle attaque et les alertes émises par le personnel frontalier la semaine précédant l’attaque. Plusieurs signaux faibles ont été détectés tels que des déplacements suspects aux frontières ou encore une activité aérienne anormale. Les dernières alertes émises par les services de sécurité remontent à quelques heures à peine avant l’attaque, cependant les réunions furent reportées au lendemain matin alors que l’opération a débuté à 6h du matin. Mis à part les alertes internes, des alertes internationales ont été émises par l’Egypte ainsi que par les Etats-Unis qui annonçaient l’imminence d’une opération importante sans pouvoir en préciser la temporalité, ces alertes ont elles aussi été négligées par Israël. D’autres facteurs de la surprise ? Parmi les autres éléments qui ont eu un impact majeur dans la réussite de la surprise stratégique du Hamas, il faut signaler le fait que la surveillance frontalière de Gaza dépend en grande partie de la technologie. Plusieurs milliards de dollars ont été investis dans un nouveau système de surveillance de haute technologie garantissant, en principe, l’infranchissabilité du mur et renforçant ainsi l’idée de la forteresse imprenable israélienne. Ainsi la conviction que si quelqu’un tentait de franchir la frontière, par n’importe quel moyen, il serait détecté et éliminé bien avant de réussir son acte, a désarmé la vigilance des militaires. Il faut aussi noter que tous les systèmes automatiques de défense reposaient sur des systèmes électroniques, y compris les moyens de communications, faisant qu’en cas de problème sur le réseau, toute la défense frontalière serait caduque. En coupant tout système numérique par la destruction des télécoms le Hamas a annihilé tout le dispositif de défense d’Israël. Finalement la surprise ne relève pas seulement des erreurs commises par les services israéliens mais aussi de la réussite de la stratégie suivie depuis plusieurs années par le Hamas. L’organisation a su se placer aux yeux d'Israël comme un acteur politique rationnel avec lequel le dialogue persistait au point que des accords sur l’accueil de travailleurs gazaouis en Israël avaient eu lieu. Ainsi le Hamas a su brouiller les pistes et “endormir” l'État israélien pour mettre en œuvre son attaque. Que ce soit dans l’élaboration, la préparation minutieuse, et la mise en œuvre d’une opération militaire de grande envergure ne laissant aucune place à l’erreur ou bien par la connaissance et l’exploitation des failles de son adversaire, le Hamas a mené à bien une surprise stratégique majeure. Quelles leçons peut-on tirer de la surprise stratégique ? Peut-on ne pas être victime d’une surprise stratégique ? En théorie il est possible d’éliminer complètement l’effet de surprise, mais en pratique cela se révèle presque impossible, trop de facteurs entrent en jeu à l’image du cas étudié où une multitude de causes ont fait que la surprise a joué à plein. Ainsi le travail d'anticipation réside dans l’aptitude à minimiser le risque de se faire prendre par surprise en améliorant la coordination des institutions sécuritaire sans laisser place à une concurrence contre-productive dans un domaine du renseignement complètement atomisé. Il est aussi impératif de ne pas sous-estimer son adversaire, de ne pas tomber dans le piège des biais cognitifs et de produire une évaluation rationnelle et le plus parfaite possible de son adversaire. Enfin, la technologie qui est un élément essentiel ne doit pas être source de dépendance et l’importance du renseignement humain et en source ouverte n’est absolument pas à négliger si l’on veut avoir une surveillance adéquate. En conclusion du cas qui nous occupe, la surprise qui a saisi ce jour-là l'État d'Israël, son gouvernement, son armée et sa population est clairement liée aux multiples failles d’un système qui se voulait invincible. Toute la stratégie d'Israël en a été bouleversée par la modification radicale du rapport de force régional en raison de manquement organisationnel et structurel. Il est probable qu’avec une communication accrue et un environnement non concurrentiel dans le renseignement, une aptitude à passer outre ou du moins à réduire la présence des biais cognitifs sans délaisser le renseignement humain et en sources ouvertes, alors Israël aurait su réagir en conséquence et ne pas subir la surprise de plein fouet. La surprise stratégique n’est pas seulement liée aux erreurs de l’un mais aussi à la réussite de l’autre. Bien que le système de défense israélien fît preuve d’un certain nombre de défaillances qui, mis bout à bout, on était des éléments majeurs de la surprise, il ne faut pas négliger la capacité du Hamas à mener à bien une attaque d’une si grande envergure. Mais si la surprise crée un effet de sidération au moment de sa survenue, il faut toutefois prendre en considération que celle-ci est hautement risquée si elle est employée sans plan prévu a posteriori. Autrement dit, il faut prendre en compte la réaction prévisible de l’adversaire et se préparer à la riposte. Malgré cette inversion des rapports engendrée le 7 octobre, Israël a fait preuve de résilience face à cette attaque, relançant, non sans polémique, un conflit régional qui semblait endormi. ## Japan is Back, Again ? La stratégie sécuritaire de Takaichi à l’épreuve de la recomposition régionale URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/japan-is-back-again-la-strategie-securitaire-de-takaichi-a-lepreuve-de-la-recomposition-regionale/ Modified: 2026-10-22 « Le statut de la République Populaire Démocratique de Corée en tant qu'État doté de l'arme nucléaire a été consolidé de manière irréversible et permanente. » . Sur ces mots, prononcés par Kim Jong-un au 9ème Congrès du Parti des travailleurs du 23 février 2026, la Corée du Nord entérine la pérennisation de son arsenal nucléaire.  En défiant tous les mécanismes issus du Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire, Pyongyang renonce à de nouvelles négociations sur la dénucléarisation. Un revers certain pour Sanae Takaichi, la nouvelle Première ministre japonaise élue en octobre 2025. Son discours de politique générale, prononcé trois jours avant l’annonce nord-coréenne, accordait pourtant une place importante au désarmement nucléaire de la péninsule. À ses côtés figuraient également les habitués des documents sécuritaires japonais : la Russie et son contentieux des îles Kouriles ainsi que la Chine, grand rival régional. Si ces trois menaces ne sont pas nouvelles pour les élites politiques japonaises, le 9ème Congrès du Parti des travailleurs révèle le défi majeur que Sanae Takaichi doit relever pour assurer la sécurité nationale. La Corée du Nord assume désormais pleinement son statut de puissance nucléaire, en partie parce qu’elle ne fait plus face aux mêmes contraintes diplomatiques qu’imposaient la Russie et la Chine, ses deux grands voisins, eux-mêmes dotés de l’arme nucléaire. Les équilibres régionaux en Asie de l’Est sont en pleine reconfiguration, au désavantage d’un Japon de plus en plus cerné par des menaces qui tendent à converger en un défi systémique. La réponse de Takaichi semble pourtant décalée. Elle accentue la rupture avec la doctrine Yoshida, qui s’appuyait sur la garantie sécuritaire américaine et le pacifisme constitutionnel, mais son discours sécuritisant demeure marqué par un fort sino-centrisme. Son affirmation publique du lien entre sécurité japonaise et contingence taïwanaise en est la preuve. La supermajorité obtenue en février 2026 lui donne toutefois les moyens d’agir, mais sur quelles menaces, et au sein de quels systèmes d’alliances ? C’est à cette question que cette analyse s’attaque en examinant dans quelle mesure la sécuritisation sino-centrée de l’administration Takaichi, à savoir le processus de transformation dans l’espace politique d’un enjeu social et public au rang d’enjeu sécuritaire justifiant des mesures d’exception, constitue une réponse cohérente aux défis sécuritaires régionaux auxquels fait face le Japon. Une nouvelle administration pour réinterpréter les menaces régionales. Les administrations japonaises successives héritent des mêmes rivaux régionaux depuis plusieurs décennies. Le contentieux russo-japonais des îles Kouriles nourrit les tensions dès 1945. La nucléarisation de la Corée du Nord menace quant à elle la péninsule à partir du premier essai en 2006. Le compétiteur majeur du Japon en Asie de l’Est demeure néanmoins la Chine, les deux puissances étant liées par une rivalité séculaire. L’invasion de la Mandchourie et les expériences bactériologiques qui y ont été conduites ainsi que le massacre de Nankin ont en effet alimenté la rhétorique anti-japonaise, institutionnalisée par la suite par le Parti Communiste Chinois. Takaichi hérite de ces tensions historiques : l’environnement sécuritaire régional n’est pas à l’avantage du Japon, en froid avec trois de ses principaux voisins. Toutefois, si ces menaces ont longtemps été traitées comme des défis distincts, elles connaissent aujourd’hui une recomposition structurelle : l’alignement stratégique croissant entre Pékin, Moscou et Pyongyang. Les années 2020 ont en effet vu fleurir une dynamique de convergence entre leurs dirigeants rassemblés par leurs intérêts anti-hégémoniques. Les trois puissances ont multiplié les rencontres bilatérales, culminant avec une apparition conjointe en septembre 2025 à Pékin, à l’occasion du 80ème anniversaire de la victoire contre le Japon. Du point de vue militaire, la Chine a réaffirmé ses relations avec la Corée du Nord en renouvelant en 2021 le traité de défense mutuelle signé soixante ans auparavant. Les gouvernements russe et nord-coréen ont mis en place un accord de partenariat stratégique global en 2024, matérialisé par l’envoi de troupes nord-coréennes sur le front ukrainien. L’impact de ces évolutions n’est pas à négliger pour le Japon, grand allié des Occidentaux. L’irréversibilité du statut nucléaire nord-coréen illustre cet isolement stratégique. Le front prônant la dénucléarisation nord-coréenne s’est effrité ces dernières années, à commencer par la Russie qui a abandonné toute « rhétorique dénucléarisante ». En 2024 le ministre des Affaires étrangères Sergueï Lavrov déclare en effet que la question du statut nucléaire de la Corée du Nord est close. La République Populaire de Chine s’aligne d’une manière plus discrète, supprimant toute mention d’une éventuelle dénucléarisation de son Livre blanc sur le contrôle des armements, le désarmement et la non-prolifération. Le sujet n’a par ailleurs pas été mentionné lors de la récente visite du président Xi Jinping à Pyongyang en juin 2026. Pékin semble pourtant engagé dans un double-jeu : deux semaines avant cette visite, le président chinois accueillait Donald Trump lors d’un sommet bilatéral. D’après un communiqué de la Maison Blanche, les deux dirigeants y auraient « confirmé leur objectif commun de dénucléarisation de la Corée du Nord », une affirmation ni validée, ni démentie par le gouvernement chinois. Ce silence révèle une priorité assumée. C’est l’alliance avec Pyongyang qui constitue l’intérêt fondamental de Pékin, quand la dénucléarisation n’est qu’une concession rhétorique faite à Washington. La Chine refuse en somme d’infléchir officiellement sa position à l’égard de la Corée du Nord par crainte de s’aliéner ce partenaire, alors même que Pyongyang opère un rapprochement significatif avec Moscou. La position géographique de la Corée du Nord en fait un espace d’importance stratégique pour Pékin : en séparant la Chine de la Corée du Sud, où sont stationnées des forces américaines, elle agit comme zone tampon. Il serait malvenu de voir basculer un tel point critique dans l’orbite exclusive d’une puissance concurrente, et l’alignement, du moins en pratique, avec Kim Jong-un demeure nécessaire. La position américaine est, elle aussi, traversée par des impératifs contradictoires. Les États-Unis offrent en effet leurs capacités de dissuasion élargie au Japon depuis le Traité de sécurité nippo-américain de 1951. Pierre angulaire de cette relation transpacifique, la dénucléarisation se doit d’être défendue par Washington, dont l’engagement a été réaffirmé en mars dernier à la suite d’une visite de Takaichi à la Maison Blanche. Mais Donald Trump a dans un même temps signalé sa disponibilité pour un rapprochement diplomatique avec Kim Jong-un, alors même que  Pyongyang conditionne toute normalisation diplomatique substantielle à une reconnaissance de son statut nucléaire. Le Japon se trouve dès lors dans une position de vulnérabilité asymétrique. Les agendas parallèles de la Chine et des États-Unis érodent la crédibilité du front de dénucléarisation. Ces frictions introduisent une incertitude suffisante pour compliquer les calculs stratégiques de Takaichi, mais ouvrent néanmoins un espace pour engager une recomposition en profondeur de l’approche sécuritaire japonaise. Sécuritiser pour agir : Takaichi, un tournant discursif ? Alors que la National Security Strategy japonaise de 2022 adoptait une lecture plus interconnectée des menaces régionales, Takaichi réoriente le discours, recentrant la sécuritisation japonaise sur son voisin chinois. Durant ses interventions à la Diète, la Première ministre japonaise a en effet mis l’accent sur le rôle déstabilisateur de la République Populaire de Chine dans la sous-région. Elle met en garde contre la volonté chinoise  « d’intensifier ses tentatives unilatérales de modifier le statu quo par la force ou la coercition ». Le Japon en fait les frais : en 2025, la RPC a multiplié les opérations de harcèlement maritime en mer de Chine orientale. La présence de garde-côtes dans la zone disputée des îles Senkaku a été maintenue sur une durée de 357 jours. L’utilisation de destroyers Type-055 s’est également accentuée dans les eaux voisines du Japon. Entre le 25 juin et le 1er juillet, le ministère de la Défense japonais a recensé dix mouvements de navires de guerre chinois au travers de détroits japonais, dont le transit du destroyer Type-055 Nanchang par le détroit d’Osumi. Cette focalisation sur la puissance chinoise est caractéristique de la rhétorique de la Première ministre, qui défend publiquement la centralité du dossier taïwanais depuis 2021, avant même son élection à la tête du PLD. Elle n’est toutefois pas son produit : l’identification de la Chine comme compétiteur régional et contestataire principal de l’ordre libéral international s’inscrit dans la lignée de ses prédécesseurs. La National Security Strategy of Japan de 2022, rédigée sous Kishida, a fortement contribué à faire de la Chine un objet central des préoccupations sécuritaires japonaises contemporaines. Cette dernière y était alors identifiée comme  « le plus grand défi stratégique au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité du Japon ». Sanae Takaichi a toutefois osé rompre avec la traditionnelle « ambiguïté stratégique » japonaise. Lors d’une déclaration à la Diète le 7 novembre 2025 elle a affirmé qu’un recours chinois à la force militaire contre Taïwan constituerait en l’état une « situation menaçant la survie » du pays. Un tel scénario permettrait aux autorités japonaises d’invoquer le mécanisme juridique de 2015 autorisant une action militaire au nom du principe de légitime défense collective. Se dressant contre la Chine avec un degré de franchise rarement atteint, l’administration Takaichi a continué sur cette lancée en retirant de son Diplomatic Bluebook le qualificatif de « relation bilatérale des plus importantes » jusque-là apposé à la République Populaire de Chine. Le discours de Takaichi tranche ainsi avec celui de ses prédécesseurs. Elle replace la Chine au centre des problématiques japonaises, et l’identifie publiquement comme menace directe à l’intégrité nationale. Mais la Première ministre ne s’arrête pas là : contrairement à ses prédécesseurs, elle possède désormais les leviers politiques pour transformer ses positionnements en programmes applicables. Depuis les élections de février 2026, le PLD dispose d’une supermajorité. Totalisant plus des deux tiers des sièges de la Chambre des représentants, le parti peut contourner certains blocages de la Chambre des conseillers. Cette situation favorable s’accompagne d’une phase de recomposition des alliances qui, encore une fois, sied à Takaichi. Le parti Komeito, entré en coalition formelle avec le PLD en 1999, entretient historiquement des canaux de dialogue privilégiés avec Pékin. Il agissait jusqu’à présent comme un tampon entre les deux puissances, et avait contribué à l’amélioration de leurs relations bilatérales. La rupture de cette coalition a ouvert la voie au parti Nippon Ishin no Kai, plus en phase avec la position durcie de Sanae Takaichi. Cette dernière dispose dès lors du pouvoir institutionnel pour transformer la sécuritisation de la Chine en politique de sécurité concrète : le nouveau gouvernement a d’ores et déjà augmenté le budget de la défense à 8 800 milliards de yens pour l’année 2026, et annoncé une révision des trois documents sécuritaires d’ici décembre. Toutefois, en attendant de pouvoir conduire ces réformes structurelles, Takaichi recentre sa focale sur l’Indo-Pacifique, espace d’influence japonais qu’elle entend réaffirmer. Diplomatie et sécurité : la réponse japonaise dans l’Indo-Pacifique. Fidèle à son ancien mentor, Shinzo Abe, la Première ministre souhaite remettre le slogan « Japan is back » au goût du jour. Pour Sanae Takaichi, la diplomatie et la sécurité régionale forment un tandem crucial à la conservation de la souveraineté japonaise. La stratégie de « Free and Open Indo-Pacific », héritage d’Abe visant à garantir la stabilité régionale, en est l’instrument principal. Durant son discours à la Diète du 20 février 2026, la Première ministre affirme que le FOIP doit continuer d’évoluer, la coopération permettant de rendre la région « plus forte et prospère »5 : il retrouve ainsi sa fonction de contre-balancier géopolitique face à Pékin. À ces fins, Takaichi souhaite réaffirmer la place du Quad, forum de coordination quadrilatéral et pilier du FOIP, mobilisant trois puissances régionales (Inde, Australie et Japon) aux côtés de Washington. Sa fiabilité est toutefois remise en cause depuis le début du second mandat de Donald Trump, sous lequel aucun sommet de leaders n’a encore eu lieu. C’est là l’un des points faibles de l’architecture d’alliances japonaises en Indo-Pacifique. Si les gouvernements successifs ont travaillé à diversifier leurs partenariats, ils demeurent encore trop centrés autour des États-Unis. Les « triades indo-pacifiques » – soit les alliances US-ROK-Japon, US-Japon-Australie et US-Japon-Philippines – comportent toutes en leur sein la superpuissance, qui, au regard de la politique étrangère erratique du président américain, n’est pas toujours en mesure d’assurer une dissuasion crédible. Ainsi, malgré un discours marqué par l’engagement multilatéral, l’administration Takaichi doit pour l’instant miser majoritairement sur ses avancées bilatérales. Le Japon a renforcé ses relations avec deux acteurs régionaux : l’Australie et les Philippines. La coopération australo-japonaise, déjà formalisée depuis la Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation de 2007, continue de se renforcer sous Takaichi. Le 18 avril 2026, les deux puissances ont approfondi leur coopération militaire par la signature de l'accord Mogami, le premier grand contrat d'exportation d'armements létaux depuis la levée de l'interdiction par la nouvelle administration japonaise.  Cette avancée s’est poursuivie en mai, par un sommet entre Takaichi et Albanese à l’issue duquel ont été signés deux « Joint Statements » organisant la coopération bilatérale en matière de sécurité, de défense et de protection économique. Face aux restrictions chinoises sur les exportations de terres rares et minéraux critiques raffinés, dont les deux pays dépendent, le binôme s’engage à sécuriser leurs chaînes d’approvisionnement. La relation avec les Philippines s’inscrit dans cette dynamique sino-orientée. La poursuite du contentieux du récif de Scarborough entraîne en effet des tensions entre les deux pays : la Chine refuse toujours de se soumettre à la décision d’arbitrage du tribunal international de 2016 donnant raison aux Philippines. Ces dernières ont renforcé la coopération militaire avec l’administration Takaichi par la signature de l'Accord d'acquisition et de services croisés (ACSA) le 15 janvier 2026. Il vient s’ajouter au Reciprocal Access Agreement, accord promouvant la coopération militaire en facilitant l’échange de fournitures militaires. Si le Japon a trouvé auprès de l’Australie et des Philippines deux alliés partageant le même regard sur les activités chinoises en Indo-Pacifique, Takaichi doit également composer avec une puissance plus réticente. La Corée du Sud fait pourtant elle aussi face à la menace existentielle posée par Pyongyang, qui la considère de plus comme sa cible prioritaire. La dénucléarisation nord-coréenne a de fait été définie comme agenda commun des deux leaders lors de leur sommet à Nara en janvier 2026. L’urgence de la situation surpasse les dissensions historiques : le caractère conservateur de Takaichi, marqué notamment par sa visite au sanctuaire de Yasukuni, glorifiant des criminels de guerre de classe A, n’a pas empêché le maintien d’une coopération. C’est en effet la Chine qui représente l’obstacle principal de cette entente bilatérale. En tant que premier partenaire commercial de Séoul, Pékin est capable d’exercer une pression économique considérable sur Séoul. Le président sud-coréen, Lee Jae-myung, suit ainsi la ligne prudente du parti Minjoo, refusant toute position frontalement anti-chinoise qui pourrait s’avérer coûteuse. La Corée du Sud a effectivement payé le prix de sa dépendance en 2017. En acceptant le déploiement du système antimissile américain THAAD sur son sol, Séoul a subi une campagne massive de représailles économiques : boycott du tourisme, restrictions commerciales, ou encore pressions sur les entreprises coréennes présentes sur le territoire chinois. Ainsi, si le système d’alliances japonais est conçu pour contenir l’influence chinoise, cette dernière est également en mesure d’en limiter la portée, voire d’en entraver le fonctionnement. La Première ministre japonaise a pleinement conscience de ce pouvoir coercitif chinois, un enjeu sécuritisé lors de ses discours à la Diète. Les limites du pouvoir japonais se matérialisent précisément à ce niveau. Le Japon ne peut créer un système hermétique à l’autorité chinoise, et ne peut non plus limiter le système d’entente concurrent de la même manière. La Première ministre japonaise n’envisage même pas la possibilité : les rapprochements croissants entre Pékin, Pyongyang et Moscou échappent à sa sécuritisation. C’est pourquoi la Russie n’apparaît pas comme un point d’intérêt au sein des alliances indo-pacifiques. Ses activités n’y sont pourtant pas négligeables : entre 2019 et 2025, dix patrouilles conjointes entre la Russie et la Chine se sont déroulées autour de la mer du Japon, la mer de Chine orientale et le Pacifique. L’activité russe n’est certes pas concentrée dans la région, d’autant plus que le conflit ukrainien mobilise la très grande majorité de ses ressources. Cependant, le danger réel que pose Moscou vis-à-vis du Japon et de son architecture Indo-pacifique n’est pas militaire. La Russie est en effet le liant du rapprochement progressif de la Chine et de la Corée du Nord ; non par dessein, mais par externalité. En intensifiant sa coopération avec Pyongyang, Moscou a alimenté les inquiétudes de Pékin : laisser la Russie devenir l’interlocuteur privilégié de Kim Jong-un reviendrait à céder un levier géostratégique fondamental. C’est cette compétition silencieuse pour le privilège diplomatique qui a poussé la Chine à redoubler d’efforts. Xi Jinping se positionne désormais comme le nexus de cette triple convergence, en témoignent ses récents sommets bilatéraux avec les présidents russe et nord-coréen. Ainsi, bien que la stratégie diplomatique japonaise en Indo-Pacifique ne soit pas dénuée de cohérence, la sécuritisation différenciée de Takaichi ne permet pas de percevoir cet effet de second ordre. Si la Russie ne présente pas d’intention hostile directe envers le Japon, elle impacte de manière significative la balance régionale des pouvoirs. Cet écueil dans la stratégie japonaise est d’autant plus préoccupant qu’il se double d’un affaiblissement de la garantie américaine, en place depuis des décennies. Entre dépendance et diversification : les alliances transpacifiques. Depuis le 8 septembre 1951 et la signature du Traité de sécurité nippo-américain, l’alliance avec les États-Unis constitue la fondation de la stratégie militaire japonaise. Ce lien perdure sous Takaichi, qui le considère comme la « pierre angulaire de la politique étrangère et sécuritaire du Japon »  dans son discours de politique générale à la Diète. Son apparente robustesse s’est illustrée lors des sommets d'octobre 2025  et de mars 2026, desquels a émergé un engagement à renforcer la coopération diplomatique, défensive et économique. Sur le plan militaire, les États-Unis ont installé un système de lance-missiles Typhon sur l’archipel japonais, capable de frapper des cibles en profondeur dans la région. Les récentes postures de Donald Trump trahissent néanmoins une fragilisation de ce lien au profit d’intérêts parfois contraires. En premier lieu, la volonté du président américain d’obtenir un accord commercial avantageux avec la Chine l’invite à être plus précautionneux dans son rapport avec l’administration Takaichi. Il n’avait exprimé aucun soutien envers la Première ministre à la suite de la pression chinoise causée par la crise diplomatique du 7 novembre. En second lieu, le désengagement américain, ou du moins son engagement sur d’autres théâtres, est une conséquence directe de la politique étrangère de Donald Trump. La National Security Strategy de 2025 et la National Defense Strategy de 2026 recentrent en effet la focale américaine sur « l’hémisphère occidental ». La Chine demeure une préoccupation majeure, mais son activité dans l’Indo-Pacifique n’est plus la matrice centrale de la stratégie américaine. L’absence de sommet des leaders du Quad depuis 2024 et la diminution de l’impulsion politique au sein des différentes architectures trilatérales associant le Japon et les États-Unis en sont les symptômes. Il en va de même pour la diplomatie transactionnelle américaine de « burden sharing » (partage du fardeau), qui exerce une pression conséquente sur les finances japonaises. L’accord commercial nippo-américain de 2025 prévoit un investissement progressif de 550 milliards de dollars dans l’économie américaine, alors que le Japon fait lui-même face à d’importantes contraintes domestiques. La relation nippo-américaine n’est toutefois pas menacée d’une rupture. Sa robustesse s’est illustrée le 31 juillet 2026, lorsque les Trésors américains et japonais ont mené une opération conjointe pour relever le yen, une opération saluée par le président Donald Trump qui a affirmé que les États-Unis “seront toujours présents pour le Japon”. L’affaiblissement, bien que sensible, de la relation nippo-américaine contribue à la reconfiguration des équilibres stratégiques en Indo-Pacifique. Dans ce contexte, l’administration Takaichi doit, à l’instar de nombreux partenaires asiatiques, redouter d’être reléguée au rang de variable d’ajustement dans la rivalité sino-américaine. Cette évolution contraint Tokyo à une autonomie stratégique d’ampleur sans précédent depuis la mise en place de la doctrine Yoshida. La première Ministre est au fait de cette recomposition, et poursuit en cela la diversification de son système de partenariats stratégiques. C’est par-delà l’océan Pacifique que Takaichi tourne son regard. Elle a encouragé un approfondissement des relations sécuritaires avec le Canada, encadrées depuis la Déclaration conjointe sur la coopération en matière de politique, de paix et de sécurité de 2010. Takaichi et le Premier ministre canadien Mark Carney se sont rencontrés le 6 mars 2026, sommet à l'issue duquel a été mis en place le Partenariat stratégique global nippo-canadien. Le premier pilier met l’accent sur le renforcement de la coopération en matière de sécurité et de défense, en réponse à la “complexité croissante des enjeux de sécurité dans la région indo-pacifique”. Les deux États avaient déjà signé le 27 janvier 2026 l’Accord de Transfert d’Équipement et de Technologie de défense (ATET), qui instaure un cadre juridique pour le transfert d’équipement dans l’optique de projets conjoints. À cela viennent s’ajouter les mécanismes prévus dans le Partenariat stratégique global, notamment autour d’un dialogue bilatéral renforcé avec le Cyber Policy Dialogue et l'Economic Security Dialogue, qui visent à améliorer le partage d’intelligence et à rendre les réseaux d’approvisionnement plus résilients face aux tentatives de coercition économique dans la région. Le rapprochement avec Ottawa ne peut toutefois compenser le désengagement relatif de Washington. Le Canada ne dispose ni des capacités de projection de puissance ni de la dissuasion élargie américaines, et reste lui-même tributaire des États-Unis pour sa défense. Le Partenariat stratégique n’en répond pas moins à des intérêts réels : la Chine et le Japon sont respectivement les deuxième et cinquième partenaires commerciaux du Canada et la demande des pays asiatiques en minerais critiques alimente ses exportations. La Stratégie du Canada pour l'Indo-Pacifique, axée sur la promotion de la paix, la résilience et le renforcement des chaînes d'approvisionnement, est par ailleurs compatible avec la vision du Free and Open Indo-Pacific défendue par les administrations japonaises successives. Les motivations diffèrent, mais la logique est la même. Les deux États cherchent en effet à réduire leur dépendance envers les États-Unis, sécuritaire pour le Japon et économique pour le Canada, qui reste surexposé aux échanges avec son voisin. La résilience d’un réseau de partenaires ne saurait pour autant se mesurer à sa seule diversité, mais dépend également de sa cohérence et de sa capacité opérationnelle. Si Takaichi entreprend de repositionner le Japon comme un acteur central de l’Indo-Pacifique, la capacité de son architecture de sécurité à répondre à la convergence croissante des puissances rivales demeure encore incertaine. En définitive, c’est probablement sur le terrain de la politique intérieure que se jouera la réponse japonaise à la recomposition régionale. La révision des trois documents, prévue en décembre 2026, constituera à cet égard un test décisif pour l’administration Takaichi. Elle permettra d’évaluer si la pression de l’environnement régional est suffisante pour renforcer l’autonomie militaire du Japon, en dépit des contraintes budgétaires et d’une opinion publique encore marquée par l’héritage pacifiste de l’après-guerre. En cas de réussite, cette révision ouvrirait la voie à l’amendement de l’article 9 de la Constitution, objectif fixé par Takaichi au printemps  2027. Les Forces d’autodéfense pourraient ainsi être pleinement constitutionnalisées, levant les dernières ambiguïtés juridiques qui freinent l’autonomie militaire japonaise. La tâche n’est toutefois pas sans obstacles : Takaichi doit encore trouver un soutien suffisant au sein de la Chambre haute, et conquérir l’opinion publique divisée. La politique intérieure devra désormais transformer en capacité ce que la sécuritisation a identifié, et que la recomposition régionale a rendu urgent. Crédit image: Cabinet Public Affairs Office, via Wikimedia Commons. ## L’architecture de sécurité transatlantique : potentialité de l’alliance franco-canadienne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/larchitecture-de-securite-transatlantique-potentialite-de-lalliance-franco-canadienne/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > L'architecture de sécurité transatlantique, fondée sur l'OTAN et l'UE, est essentielle à la stabilité de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord... Cette note stratégique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) avec le soutien du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada et de la DGRIS (Ministère des Armées, France), qui vise à développer des échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens. Résumé L'architecture de sécurité transatlantique, fondée sur l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et l'Union européenne (UE), est essentielle à la stabilité de l'Europe et de l'Amérique du Nord, mais elle est confrontée à des problèmes croissants pour faire face aux menaces russes et chinoises. Le renforcement des défenses de l'Europe de l'Est par l'OTAN et les contributions financières aux opérations militaires de l'Ukraine démontrent sa réactivité, mais la dépendance de l'UE à l'égard du leadership américain met en évidence des faiblesses persistantes. La France a pris l'initiative de plaider en faveur de la souveraineté européenne et d'une plus grande coopération entre l'OTAN et l'UE. Quant au Canada, ses propres engagements montrent son potentiel stratégique, en particulier dans l'Arctique, malgré les lacunes de sa défense nationale. Toutefois, des inquiétudes subsistent quant à la cohérence de l'OTAN, à la fiabilité de l'aide américaine et à la volonté de l'Europe d'assumer une plus grande responsabilité en matière de sécurité. L'OTAN et l'Europe étant potentiellement confrontées à la plus grave crise de « guerre chaude » depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, la question centrale est la suivante : quelle est la prochaine étape pour la sécurité transatlantique ? Recommandations clés : Concentrer les investissements de l'OTAN sur des domaines stratégiques tels que la cybersécurité, la surveillance de l'Arctique et la guerre hybride. Renforcer une culture de responsabilité partagée au sein de l'OTAN, en promouvant une alliance équilibrée où les contributions de chaque pays correspondent à ses forces et à ses capacités. Renforcer dès maintenant les partenariats entre la France, le Canada et d'autres alliés afin d'aider l'OTAN à se prémunir contre la volatilité future de la politique étrangère des États-Unis, ce qui permettra de garantir une architecture de sécurité transatlantique robuste et plus autonome, indépendamment des changements politiques américains. Garantir les intérêts de l'OTAN dans l'Arctique en tirant parti de l'expertise du Canada dans ce domaine. Créer un centre de commandement logistique de l'OTAN afin de rationaliser les mouvements de troupes et les itinéraires d'approvisionnement, le Canada et la France donnant l'exemple en matière d'efficacité logistique. Créer un groupe de travail transatlantique sur la résilience aux menaces hybrides pour contrer les cyberattaques, la désinformation et la coercition économique. Introduction L’« architecture de sécurité transatlantique » désigne le réseau complexe d'alliances diplomatiques et de défense, principalement l'OTAN et l'UE, qui garantit la sécurité collective et la stabilité en Europe et en Amérique du Nord, en dissuadant les puissances adverses telles que la Russie et la Chine de faire peser une menace sur elles. Elle représente à la fois un fondement stratégique et une plateforme pour renforcer la stabilité régionale, permettant à ces États membres de mener des initiatives de défense en collaboration et de défendre des valeurs démocratiques communes. Bien que la France et le Canada aient des capacités militaires très différentes, ils peuvent tous deux être considérés comme des puissances moyennes parmi les membres de l'OTAN si l'on tient compte de l'impact économique et diplomatique. L'importance de l'architecture de sécurité transatlantique n'a fait que croître ces dernières années. Par exemple, l'OTAN considère actuellement que la guerre d'agression menée par la Fédération de Russie contre l'Ukraine constitue la menace la plus grave et la plus immédiate pour l'Europe. Cette question est au cœur de l'agenda de l'OTAN, car la Russie tente de poursuivre son expansion violente vers l'ouest et son autorité directe par la force, la subversion, l'invasion et l'annexion. Le conflit en cours touche également à des questions de sécurité mondiale plus larges, notamment la montée en puissance de la Chine, le nouveau champ de bataille géopolitique de l'Arctique et les échecs de la dissuasion de l'après-Guerre froide sur le théâtre européen. Face à ces tensions, l'Europe ne peut se permettre d'être uniquement réactive dans ses alliances et sa planification stratégique. Face aux violations croissantes du système international par la Russie et à la menace permanente de l'utilisation d'armes nucléaires par Poutine, l'OTAN a mis à jour ses stratégies militaires, consolidant sa présence en Europe de l'Est avec la mise en place de formations prêtes au combat. L'organisation a également renforcé ses missions de surveillance aérienne et la présence de ses forces navales dans les eaux de la Baltique et de la Méditerranée. Bien que le président français Emmanuel Macron ait tristement qualifié le travail de l'OTAN de « mort cérébrale » en 2019, l'invasion de l'Ukraine semble avoir redonné de l'importance à l'OTAN aux yeux des dirigeants français. Le conflit a également conduit des pays traditionnellement neutres comme la Suède et la Finlande à rejoindre l'OTAN, ajoutant un tampon de sécurité critique de 1 300 kilomètres le long de la frontière de la Finlande avec la Russie. En effet, la tradition de neutralité est devenue moins pertinente depuis la guerre en Ukraine, ce qui confirme que les principes diplomatiques traditionnels de neutralité et de non-engagement sont de plus en plus obsolètes dans l'Europe du XXIe siècle. Pour sa part, l'Union européenne (UE) continue de jouer le rôle géopolitique principal dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne. Malgré son manque général de puissance stratégique, elle apporte une contribution financière importante à la formation militaire en Ukraine, dépassant même les États-Unis. L'UE a également été confrontée à des défis non militaires, en particulier la forte dépendance économique et en ressources du continent à l'égard du gaz russe, qui limite la marge de manœuvre de l'Europe et rend impossible la mise en œuvre d'un embargo total contre l'État russe. Depuis lors, des mesures ont été prises pour réduire ces vulnérabilités sécuritaires, mais l'indépendance énergétique de l'Europe prendra du temps et nécessitera un alignement politique important entre les États membres - si elle est un jour atteinte. On peut supposer que l'OTAN et l'UE ont fait preuve d'une plus grande réactivité que ce que le président russe Poutine avait prévu, bien que les deux organisations reconnaissent les défis que pose la « concurrence stratégique intensifiée » de notre époque. L'OTAN et l'UE confirment l'importance d'une défense européenne plus forte et plus efficace, qui contribue effectivement à la sécurité mondiale et transatlantique, complète l'action de l'OTAN et assure l'interopérabilité entre les continents. L’instabilité politique américaine et la cohésion interne de l’OTAN  Malgré la réponse robuste de l'OTAN et de l'UE, le rôle à long terme des États-Unis dans la sécurité européenne reste incertain. Au cours de la première présidence de Donald Trump, l'engagement des États-Unis envers l'OTAN a été ouvertement remis en question, les critiques se concentrant principalement sur l'incapacité des membres européens à atteindre l'objectif de 2 % des dépenses de défense - une préoccupation reprise sous l'administration Obama. 23 des 32 membres de l'OTAN atteignent désormais cet objectif. Bien que le Royaume-Uni, l'Allemagne et les États-Unis, qui représentent collectivement environ 85 % des dépenses de défense de l'OTAN, le fassent depuis 2024, les débats sur le partage du fardeau de l'OTAN persistent dans le discours politique américain et menacent d'aggraver les divisions au sein de l'alliance. Cette tension devrait perdurer, d'autant plus que l'Arctique devient un champ de bataille stratégique entre la Russie et l'Occident, l'Alaska jouant un rôle géographique central. Dans le même temps, les États-Unis sont confrontés à des défis croissants de la part de deux adversaires puissants, la Russie et la Chine, qui divisent leur attention et leurs ressources. Pour contrer la montée en puissance de la Chine, les États-Unis se sont tournés vers l'Indopacifique, renforçant leurs alliances par le biais d'initiatives telles que l'accord tripartite AUKUS avec l'Australie et le Royaume-Uni et suscitant l'intérêt de la Nouvelle-Zélande pour rejoindre le deuxième pilier d'AUKUS. Bien que ces mesures renforcent l'influence des États-Unis dans l'hémisphère oriental, elles soulèvent des inquiétudes quant à la capacité - ou à la volonté - de Washington de réagir de manière décisive à une escalade potentielle en Ukraine. Une réduction du rôle des États-Unis dans la sécurité européenne rendrait l'Europe vulnérable, ce qui pourrait permettre à la Russie de progresser en Ukraine. Bien que certains experts plaident en faveur d'une plus grande autonomie européenne, l'UE reste tributaire de son allié américain pour gérer le conflit à ses frontières. Alors que l'OTAN est confrontée à des défis sécuritaires de plus en plus complexes et diversifiés, l'organisation est contrainte de donner la priorité à la qualité et à la valeur stratégique des partenariats émergents, plutôt qu'aux tactiques traditionnelles qui, selon les experts, sont de plus en plus dépassées dans l'environnement sécuritaire contemporain. En effet, le mot « partage » dans l'expression « partage du fardeau » traditionnellement associée à l'Alliance est devenu largement inadéquat. Nous ne sommes plus au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et le continent européen n'est plus un « fardeau » dont la sécurité dépend uniquement de son allié américain. L'OTAN représente une alliance qui présente des avantages pour chaque participant, et l'objectif de 2 % a, pendant un certain temps, affaibli la crédibilité et la cohésion de l'Alliance, les remises en question de l'efficacité et de la possibilité d'atteindre cet objectif remontant au sommet du Pays de Galles de 2014. En outre, de nouvelles recherches indiquent que les dépenses prédisent les résultats en matière de défense et que la désagrégation des dépenses de défense est susceptible d'améliorer les résultats. Bien qu'un partage équitable des charges puisse être un modèle irréaliste pour tous les partenaires de l'OTAN, cette question démontre l'importance de développer des relations bilatérales clés en matière de défense sur des questions de financement urgentes. La France comme meneur émergent   Dans un conflit impliquant la Russie, deuxième puissance nucléaire mondiale, le pire scénario est l'utilisation d'armes de destruction massive. C'est pourquoi la dissuasion mutuelle d'une guerre totale reste un objectif majeur. À cet égard, deux acteurs qui étaient auparavant des puissances moyennes prennent de plus en plus d'importance : La France et le Canada. Depuis le départ de la dirigeante allemande Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron s'est imposé comme l'un des remparts politiques les plus crédibles contre une victoire militaire russe. Bien que Macron n'ait pas toujours eu une position explicitement pro-Ukraine et qu'il ait plaidé à plusieurs reprises pour une solution diplomatique avec la Russie, sa position s'est durcie en 2024, déclarant à Prague en mars 2024 que les Européens ne peuvent pas être « lâches » lorsqu'ils contrent Moscou. Ce changement d'attitude de M. Macron est d'autant plus important que la France reste une puissance de défense de premier plan au sein de l'OTAN et en Europe, grâce à son important financement de la défense, à sa technologie militaire de pointe et à son leadership politique affirmé. Avec l'un des budgets militaires les plus importants d'Europe - qui devrait dépasser 413 milliards d'euros entre 2024 et 2030 - la France modernise ses capacités, notamment dans les domaines de la cybernétique et de la technologie nucléaire, et accroît sa disponibilité opérationnelle dans toute l'Europe. Sur le plan politique, le président Macron s'est fait le champion de l'« autonomie stratégique » européenne, plaidant pour un renforcement du rôle de l'UE en matière de défense afin de compléter l'OTAN et de réduire la dépendance à l'égard des États-Unis, positionnant ainsi la France au centre de la politique de défense en Europe. Face à l'affaiblissement continu du lien transatlantique, la France est contrainte d'assumer un leadership continental supplémentaire, tant sur le plan politique que défensif. Bien que la France ait traditionnellement incité à la prudence en soutenant pleinement l'OTAN, la revue stratégique 2017 de la France a néanmoins défini l'autonomie stratégique de l'Europe comme un élément crucial de sa politique de défense et préconise de plus en plus une position européenne plus agressive. Dans le cadre de cette stratégie, la France s'engage à renforcer la défense européenne dans le cadre de l'UE et insiste particulièrement sur la nécessité d'une culture stratégique commune. Depuis 2017, la France a mis en œuvre un certain nombre de mesures politiques visant à renforcer la défense européenne, telles que l'Initiative européenne d'intervention, qui vise à favoriser une culture stratégique européenne partagée. L'autonomie stratégique est un objectif officiel de l'Union depuis la Stratégie et, en conséquence, l'UE s'est dotée d'un « paquet défense » européen permanent dans le cadre du Fonds européen de défense. Ce paquet comprend un certain nombre d'initiatives destinées à améliorer les capacités et l'efficacité militaires européennes. Il comprend un examen annuel coordonné de la défense (CARD), qui identifie les lacunes en matière de capacités, la coopération structurée permanente (PESCO), qui vise à approfondir progressivement la coopération en matière de défense entre les membres de l'UE, et a doté le Fonds européen de défense (FED) de huit milliards d'euros entre 2021 et 2027 afin d'aider les États membres à développer des équipements, de la recherche et des technologies en matière de défense. L'UE précise que l'objectif de ce paquet ambitieux est « d'être en mesure d'agir rapidement et de manière décisive lorsqu'une crise éclate, avec des partenaires si possible et seul si nécessaire ». Cette volonté d'autonomie correspond aux besoins de l'architecture de sécurité transatlantique, car « l'augmentation des capacités européennes contribuera également au renforcement de l'Alliance atlantique, élément clé de la sécurité européenne ». Une collaboration accrue entre l'UE et l'OTAN par le biais d'un pilier européen apparaît donc comme une possibilité tangible de renforcer et d'équilibrer les tensions inhérentes à la défense transatlantique actuelle. Et bien qu'historiquement le développement de l'autonomie européenne en matière de sécurité n'ait pas été bien accueilli de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique, cette tendance a changé lorsque le secrétaire à la Défense Lloyd Austin a déclaré en 2021 que les États-Unis soutenaient un plan de défense conjoint de l'UE qui renforçait l'OTAN. Bien sûr, le projet d'autonomie stratégique européenne doit tenir compte des réalités politiques et militaires, et la construction d'une défense européenne ne se fera pas immédiatement. Cependant, l'établissement en cours de l'autonomie stratégique européenne, aussi difficile que soit cet objectif, pourrait être le seul filet de sécurité dont disposent les Européens pour maintenir l'architecture de sécurité transatlantique et faire face aux menaces émergentes. En effet, la voie vers une autonomie stratégique effective implique la poursuite du développement d'un pilier européen au sein de l'OTAN afin d'équilibrer les relations transatlantiques et de maintenir un équilibre sécuritaire sur le continent pendant la guerre d'agression russe en cours en Ukraine. Un dialogue récent reconnaissant la nécessité d'une meilleure collaboration entre l'OTAN et l'UE, au lieu d'une concurrence entre les organisations, s'est également développé dans ce domaine. Le Canada comme allié improbable Le deuxième État d'intérêt à ce moment crucial est le Canada, dont le rôle dans l'espace de défense est étroitement lié à celui de la France. En septembre 2024, la France a clarifié ses intentions futures en signant la Déclaration Canada-France sur un partenariat renforcé en matière de défense et de sécurité. Cet accord a mis en évidence la valeur de certains partenaires non européens dans le cadre du réalignement plus large de la France en matière de défense. S'appuyant sur une histoire de coopération façonnée par les deux guerres mondiales, le partenariat vise à développer un « partenariat stratégique plus ambitieux », en se concentrant sur les menaces émergentes telles que les cyberattaques et l'ingérence numérique étrangère, la sécurité indopacifique et le soutien à l'Ukraine. La visite du président Macron à Ottawa en septembre 2024 a encore souligné l'approfondissement des liens entre les deux nations, les discussions avec le Premier ministre Trudeau ayant porté sur la défense, le soutien à Haïti, la lutte contre le changement climatique et la prise en compte de l'essor de l'intelligence artificielle. Alors que le Canada n'est généralement pas considéré comme une force de premier plan au sein de l'OTAN, son partenariat avec la France souligne le potentiel stratégique des puissances moyennes pour combler les lacunes capacitaires essentielles et renforcer l'agilité de l'OTAN face aux défis modernes. Cette collaboration prend de l'importance dans le contexte des engagements multilatéraux, notamment le groupe de contact pour la défense de l'Ukraine (groupe de Ramstein), le mécanisme de Tallinn et la déclaration conjointe de soutien à l'Ukraine du G7 en 2024. L'histoire, la langue et les valeurs communes de la France et du Canada constituent en outre une base solide pour des opérations coordonnées qui complètent les efforts de l'OTAN, offrant une approche multilatérale plus souple qui complète le leadership des États-Unis au sein de l'alliance. Toutefois, les capacités de défense du Canada sont confrontées à d'importants défis qui limitent son aptitude à exercer une influence constante. Un sous-financement chronique et un système d'acquisition trop complexe ont entravé la modernisation de l'infrastructure de défense canadienne. Par exemple, le ministère canadien de la défense a récemment dépensé 34,8 millions de dollars pour l'achat de nouveaux sacs de couchage destinés à un exercice nordique conjoint en Alaska, qui ont ensuite été jugés inadaptés aux hivers typiques du Canada. De tels faux pas soulignent les faiblesses persistantes de la planification de la défense et des ressources du Canada, qui peuvent entraver sa contribution aux opérations alliées. Malgré ces obstacles internes, le Canada reste un partenaire stratégiquement précieux pour la France, offrant des avantages uniques qui renforcent la sécurité transatlantique. Au-delà de l'OTAN, leur coopération de longue date par le biais du commerce, de la Francophonie et d'initiatives de défense telles que le Conseil de coopération franco-canadien en matière de défense et la Coalition mondiale pour vaincre Da'esh témoigne d'un partenariat fiable de portée mondiale. Les approches alignées du Canada sur celles de la France dans des régions telles que Haïti, le Liban, l'Indopacifique et le Sahel témoignent d'un engagement commun en faveur de la stabilité dans des zones d'intérêt transatlantique vital. Bien que la position du Canada au sein de l'OTAN ne soit pas en pleine ascension, son engagement constant en faveur de valeurs communes, sa fiabilité politique et l'importance qu'il accorde au multilatéralisme en font un partenaire utile pour faire face à des défis géopolitiques en constante évolution. Pour la France, le Canada est un allié fiable qui complète ses priorités stratégiques au sein de l'OTAN, en particulier dans les régions où l'influence française est essentielle au maintien de la stabilité. Ce partenariat renforce l'architecture de sécurité transatlantique, offrant un contrepoids au rôle fluctuant des États-Unis et soulignant la valeur des alliés non européens dans un paysage mondial de plus en plus complexe. Recommandations Pour préserver le lien transatlantique, la politique doit refléter les capacités distinctes que chaque allié apporte, reconnaître l'évolution de la valeur des États-Unis pour l'OTAN et tenir compte de l'évolution rapide de l'environnement de sécurité. Sur la base d'un examen des propositions existantes des parties prenantes concernées, nous recommandons ce qui suit : 1) Donner la priorité aux capacités ayant un impact significatif sur la défense L'OTAN devrait reconnaître les investissements en matière de défense en fonction de leur valeur stratégique plutôt qu'en fonction des seules contributions traditionnelles. Les menaces émergentes en matière de cybersécurité, de surveillance de l'Arctique et de guerre hybride nécessitent le renforcement du partenariat transatlantique entre la France et le Canada. Le renforcement de cette alliance augmentera l'accessibilité des technologies spécialisées et de l'expertise régionale et garantira que les États membres sont prioritaires pour les opérations régionales à fort impact. La planification d'initiatives conjointes franco-canadiennes dans des domaines tels que la cyberdéfense et la préparation à l'Arctique démontre la valeur stratégique de ces partenariats ciblés. Pour consolider ce partenariat, l'OTAN pourrait mettre en place des groupes de travail conjoints spécialisés ou des accords de partage de technologies qui faciliteraient la collaboration sur des projets spécifiques à fort impact, permettant ainsi une intégration plus poussée des capacités de défense du Canada et de la France dans les opérations régionales et dirigées par l'OTAN. En outre, l'élargissement des exercices militaires conjoints dans les domaines de l'Arctique et de la cybersécurité renforcerait l'état de préparation opérationnelle et l'interopérabilité, ce qui permettrait d'adopter une posture de défense proactive face aux avancées de l'adversaire. 2) Rebâtir la solidarité au sein de l'OTAN Avec la montée des groupes radicaux et la polarisation politique accrue tant en Europe qu'aux États-Unis, la cohésion de l'OTAN est menacée, ce qui compromet la capacité de l'alliance à opérer efficacement en tant que front unifié. la cohésion de l'alliance transatlantique est gravement menacée. Pour fonctionner de manière optimale, l'OTAN doit s'appuyer sur la stabilité politique et la résilience démocratique de ses pays membres, ce qui est essentiel pour la confiance mutuelle et la synergie opérationnelle au sein de l'architecture de sécurité transatlantique. À cette fin, la France et le Canada jouent un rôle central dans la promotion de la solidarité au sein de l'OTAN en défendant les valeurs démocratiques et en soutenant les initiatives de défense conjointe qui mettent l'accent sur l'égalité entre les États membres. Pour rétablir la confiance entre les alliés et réduire la dépendance à l'égard d'un seul membre, l'OTAN devrait donner la priorité aux initiatives qui requièrent des contributions actives de plusieurs pays afin d'accroître l'adhésion politique et de réduire les limites de capacité. Cela s'applique en particulier à des domaines tels que la cyberdéfense, le partage du renseignement et les programmes de lutte contre la radicalisation. Par exemple, une coalition dirigée par le Canada et la France, axée sur le renforcement de la cyberdéfense et des mesures de lutte contre la radicalisation, pourrait servir de modèle de collaboration équitable, en s'appuyant sur les solides réseaux de renseignement de la France et les capacités avancées du Canada en matière de cybernétique. Cette approche renforcerait une culture de responsabilité partagée au sein de l'OTAN, en favorisant une alliance équilibrée où les contributions de chaque pays correspondent à ses forces et à ses capacités. En soutenant des programmes qui favorisent la responsabilité conjointe, l'OTAN peut construire une alliance plus résiliente, moins vulnérable aux changements de climat politique dans l'un ou l'autre des États membres, et positionner des contingents régionaux plus forts comme la France et le Canada pour maximiser leur expertise existante afin de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans des domaines clés. 3) Augmenter l’engagement des alliés sous-utilisés Le manque de fiabilité perçu des États-Unis en tant qu'alliés a mis en évidence les risques liés au fait de considérer l'OTAN comme une alliance purement « transactionnelle », une position mise en avant pendant la période 2016-20220 de l'administration Trump. Face à des enjeux aussi importants que la menace potentielle des armes de destruction massive, les alliances de sécurité ne peuvent pas dépendre du résultat des élections d'un seul pays, ni de la volonté politique d'acteurs isolés de s'engager dans un processus décisionnel fondé sur le consensus. Par conséquent, pour que l'OTAN conserve son intégrité, elle doit aller au-delà de la seule dépendance à l'égard des États-Unis et intégrer activement les contributions d'autres alliés. La France, en tant que leader européen en matière de défense, peut jouer un rôle essentiel en engageant des alliés traditionnellement « sous-utilisés » tels que l'Espagne, l'Italie, l'Allemagne, le Royaume-Uni et surtout le Canada, afin d'établir de nouveaux points de contact stratégiques dans des domaines de pression critiques. En outre, la participation du Canada offre à la France une occasion unique de favoriser la collaboration dans des domaines où les deux pays excellent, tels que la souveraineté dans l'Arctique et la cyber-résilience. Le récent doublement du contingent canadien à l'OTAN, le lancement du Centre de l'OTAN sur le changement climatique et la sécurité à Montréal et l'engagement du Canada à l'égard d'une formation dirigée par l'OTAN sur les effets cybernétiques souverains soulignent la valeur stratégique du Canada en tant qu'allié inébranlable et compétent. Le renforcement du partenariat transatlantique franco-canadien devrait également impliquer des exercices militaires conjoints axés sur l'état de préparation dans l'Arctique et des accords élargis de partage du renseignement pour renforcer les capacités régionales contre les variables que sont les cybermenaces et les menaces environnementales. Dans la perspective de l'élection de 2024, les conséquences de la seconde présidence Trump ne sont pas encore totalement connues, mais il est raisonnable de supposer qu'elle pourrait amplifier les défis au sein de l'OTAN, ce qui pourrait conduire à des réductions encore plus importantes du soutien des États-Unis ou à un nouvel accent mis sur le partage du fardeau financier qui pourrait mettre à rude épreuve les liens transatlantiques. Le renforcement des partenariats entre la France, le Canada et d'autres alliés aiderait l'OTAN à se prémunir contre la volatilité future de la politique étrangère américaine, en garantissant une architecture de sécurité transatlantique robuste et plus autonome, indépendamment des changements politiques américains. 4) Le champ de bataille du Haut-Arctique L'Arctique est largement considéré par les experts comme le « prochain point d'ignition perpétuel pour les grandes puissances », et le conflit actuel avec la Russie ne fait qu'accroître son importance stratégique. Avec l'expansion de l'OTAN vers le nord, l'Europe et le Canada ne peuvent plus se permettre de négliger la souveraineté de l'Arctique, d'autant plus que le changement climatique remodèle les routes traditionnelles couvertes de glace, rendant la région plus accessible à des adversaires potentiels. Le partenariat de plus en plus étroit entre la Russie et la Chine ajoute à l'urgence et modifie la dynamique du pouvoir dans l'Arctique. Le Canada, leader de longue date de l'OTAN en matière de capacités arctiques, offre à la France et à d'autres partenaires européens un avantage décisif pour sécuriser cette région. Le Canada est l'un des rares membres de l'OTAN à disposer de navires brise-glace, une capacité dont même les États-Unis sont dépourvus, ce qui lui permet d'assurer l'accès et les patrouilles dans le Nord tout au long de l'année. Contrairement aux États-Unis, l'engagement de longue date du Canada en faveur de la défense de l'Arctique par l'intermédiaire du NORAD lui a permis de développer des infrastructures résistantes et des relations avec les communautés locales, ce qui est essentiel pour dissuader toute influence étrangère. L'appel d'offres en cours du Canada pour des sous-marins, à la suite d'une enquête auprès de fournisseurs internationaux, associé à son expérience et à son état de préparation pour les opérations dans l'Arctique, constitue un avantage stratégique qui pourrait être mis à profit dans le cadre d'une collaboration avec la France. Pour renforcer la défense de l'Arctique, l'OTAN devrait donner la priorité aux exercices d'entraînement conjoints franco-canadiens sur la guerre dans l'Arctique et investir dans des projets d'infrastructure partagés. La France et le Canada pourraient également collaborer au développement de technologies résistantes au climat et de programmes de surveillance conjoints, afin d'assurer une présence robuste et alignée sur l'OTAN dans l'Arctique. De telles initiatives permettraient non seulement de renforcer la sécurité transatlantique, mais aussi la souveraineté collective de l'OTAN dans une région qui évolue rapidement et qui est de plus en plus contestée. 5) Renforcer l'interopérabilité logistique Alors que l'OTAN se prépare à faire face à des menaces en constante évolution dans de multiples régions, l'interopérabilité logistique - procédures normalisées, infrastructures partagées et chaînes d'approvisionnement coordonnées - est devenue un facteur essentiel du maintien de l'état de préparation opérationnelle. L'amélioration de la compatibilité logistique entre les membres de l'OTAN permettrait une mobilisation plus rapide et réduirait la charge logistique pesant sur les États de première ligne, en particulier en Europe de l'Est, où un déploiement rapide est essentiel. L'amélioration de l'interopérabilité au sein de l'Alliance pourrait impliquer des investissements dans des plateformes de transport partagées, des réseaux d'approvisionnement rationalisés et une infrastructure numérique unifiée permettant aux forces de l'OTAN d'opérer en toute transparence par-delà les frontières. Par exemple, la création d'un « Centre de commandement logistique de l'OTAN » sous l'égide du Comité logistique de l'OTAN, chargé de superviser spécifiquement les ressources de transport partagées, de coordonner les mouvements de troupes et de gérer les itinéraires d'approvisionnement, permettrait d'améliorer considérablement les délais de réaction en cas de crise. Si la France et le Canada apportent une expertise logistique substantielle - l'expérience de la France dans les déploiements en Europe et en Afrique, et la compétence du Canada dans les lignes d'approvisionnement de l'Arctique -, relever avec succès les défis logistiques de l'OTAN exige un leadership actif et la contribution des membres du flanc oriental. Ces membres, en particulier ceux de la région balte et de la Pologne, sont confrontés aux défis logistiques les plus graves en raison de leur proximité avec des zones de conflit potentielles et de la complexité des infrastructures au-delà de l'Allemagne. L'intégration explicite de leurs perspectives stratégiques et des réalités de l'infrastructure dans le centre logistique proposé garantirait que les plans opérationnels sont fondés sur les besoins régionaux les plus urgents. En dirigeant conjointement les efforts visant à établir des protocoles normalisés et des réseaux logistiques multinationaux en collaboration avec les alliés du flanc oriental, la France et le Canada pourraient établir un modèle de logistique efficace et coopérative qui renforcerait l'agilité et l'état de préparation de l'OTAN dans son ensemble, en particulier dans ses zones les plus vulnérables. Investir dans l'interopérabilité logistique ne renforce pas seulement l'alliance transatlantique en permettant une action plus rapide et coordonnée, mais réduit également la dépendance à l'égard de l'infrastructure logistique d'un seul membre de l'OTAN. Une stratégie logistique unifiée garantirait que la capacité de l'OTAN à répondre rapidement aux menaces dans des régions telles que l'Arctique, l'Europe de l'Est et la Méditerranée reste solide, et renforcerait une architecture de sécurité transatlantique préparée à répondre aux exigences de la guerre moderne. 6) Renforcer la résilience face aux menaces hybrides Les menaces hybrides, qui comprennent des tactiques non traditionnelles telles que les cyberattaques, les campagnes de désinformation et la coercition économique, sont de plus en plus utilisées par des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques pour déstabiliser les États membres de l'OTAN de l'intérieur. Il est essentiel de renforcer la résilience face à ces menaces pour maintenir la sécurité nationale et collective. L'OTAN devrait donner la priorité au développement d'une défense coordonnée contre la guerre hybride, en dotant les alliés des outils et des ressources nécessaires pour détecter, atténuer et répondre aux attaques contre les infrastructures critiques, les réseaux d'information et l'opinion publique. Un groupe de travail transatlantique sur la résilience face aux menaces hybrides pourrait diriger les efforts de l'OTAN dans ce domaine, en s'appuyant sur l'expertise du Canada en matière de cyberdéfense et sur le leadership de la France dans les initiatives de contre-désinformation. Ce groupe de travail se concentrerait sur le renforcement des capacités de détection des menaces hybrides de l'OTAN et sur l'établissement de protocoles de réaction rapide en cas d'incursions physiques et numériques. Pour éviter les doubles emplois, la task force travaillerait en étroite coordination avec le Centre d'excellence européen pour la lutte contre les menaces hybrides d'Helsinki, en tirant parti de ses recherches, de ses cadres et de son expertise. En s'appuyant sur les travaux du centre d'Helsinki, la task force pourrait servir de passerelle entre les besoins opérationnels de l'OTAN et les idées stratégiques développées par les centres d'excellence. Par exemple, la création d'un centre de renseignement partagé pour les données sur les menaces hybrides, accessible à tous les membres de l'OTAN, compléterait l'accent mis par le centre d'Helsinki sur les meilleures pratiques en opérationnalisant ces informations dans le cadre d'une action préemptive. Cette approche collaborative garantirait un cadre stratégique unifié tout en maximisant l'utilité des ressources existantes de l'OTAN et en évitant les redondances. En outre, l'organisation régulière de simulations conjointes de menaces hybrides impliquant les États membres de l'OTAN permettrait aux forces de l'OTAN de s'entraîner à des réponses collaboratives aux cyberattaques, aux attaques informatiques et économiques. De telles initiatives ne dissuaderaient pas seulement les adversaires en démontrant l'état de préparation de l'OTAN, mais garantiraient également que les États membres soient moins sensibles à la déstabilisation interne que les menaces hybrides peuvent provoquer. En donnant la priorité à la résilience face à ces tactiques, l'OTAN peut maintenir une alliance transatlantique sûre, équipée pour protéger ses États membres contre les défis traditionnels et non conventionnels du paysage sécuritaire actuel. Conclusion Alors que la guerre russo-ukrainienne continue de déstabiliser l'Europe, l'architecture de sécurité transatlantique est soumise à une pression croissante pour s'adapter, en donnant la priorité à la résilience et à la réactivité face aux menaces émergentes. Il est essentiel de faire face à l'avancée de la menace russe, mais pour y parvenir efficacement, l'OTAN et l'UE devront aller au-delà des alliances traditionnelles et approfondir les partenariats susceptibles d'offrir une valeur stratégique durable. Le nouveau secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Mark Rutte, hérite d'un rôle stimulant, notamment en ce qui concerne la gestion de la coordination entre l'UE et l'OTAN en vue de construire un cadre de défense européen plus fort et plus unifié. Le leadership de M. Rutte sera essentiel pour guider l'évolution de l'OTAN, et son succès dépendra fortement de l'exploitation des forces distinctes des partenariats clés, en particulier de ceux tels que l'alliance stratégique naissante du XXIe siècle entre la France et le Canada. En effet, le partenariat actuel entre la France et le Canada constitue un modèle de collaboration pour les puissances moyennes, qui allie l'expertise régionale, la capacité technologique et l'engagement en faveur des objectifs de sécurité transatlantiques. Qu'il s'agisse des capacités arctiques et de la résilience cybernétique du Canada ou de la technologie militaire et du leadership de la France en matière d'autonomie stratégique européenne, ce partenariat illustre le potentiel des puissances moyennes à apporter une valeur ajoutée substantielle à l'OTAN, en comblant des lacunes opérationnelles critiques que les alliés plus importants ne peuvent combler seuls. En donnant la priorité aux capacités à fort impact, en reconstruisant la solidarité de l'Alliance, en faisant appel à des alliés sous-utilisés et en sécurisant le Haut-Arctique, la France et le Canada montrent comment des collaborations ciblées peuvent renforcer la portée et la réactivité de l'OTAN dans le paysage sécuritaire en évolution rapide auquel la communauté transatlantique est confrontée. À propos des auteurs Leah Schmidt est doctorante au département de politique et d'études internationales de l'Université de Cambridge, spécialisée dans la recherche sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité, la théorie posthumaniste et les études féministes sur la sécurité. Elle est titulaire d'une maîtrise en études sur le genre de Cambridge en tant que boursière canadienne Chevening et récipiendaire d'une subvention mondiale du Rotary Trust, ainsi que d'une double licence en études féminines (avec mention) et en relations internationales (avec distinction) de l'Université de Calgary. Léa Pérémarty est titulaire d'une maîtrise en droit international et politique de l'Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM), où elle s'est spécialisée dans les questions de sécurité internationale et le droit des conflits armés. Ses recherches portent sur le concept de lawfare et son application à la guerre en Ukraine. Elle a également effectué un stage au Réseau d'Analyse Stratégique, contribuant à la recherche sur les enjeux contemporains de défense et de sécurité. ## L’Arctique et la guerre des narratifs : Désinformation russe et rivalités internationales URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/larctique-et-la-guerre-des-narratifs-desinformation-russe-et-rivalites-internationales/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > La désinformation, soit la diffusion intentionnelle d'informations fausses ou manipulées, est devenue un outil privilégié pour... Cette note politique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) avec le soutien du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada, qui vise à développer des échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens. La désinformation, soit la diffusion intentionnelle d'informations fausses ou manipulées, est devenue un outil privilégié pour certains États, leur permettant d’étendre leur influence sans recourir à des moyens militaires. Ces campagnes, habilement construites, visent à modeler les perceptions et à orienter les récits publics en faveur des objectifs stratégiques des acteurs étatiques. La Russie exploite ces techniques pour contrôler les discours autour d’enjeux clés dans des régions sensibles comme l'Arctique, où un affrontement militaire direct compromettrait ses intérêts économiques. Longtemps perçu comme un territoire exceptionnel et à l’abri des débordements internationaux, l'Arctique est le théâtre des transformations profondes dues au réchauffement climatique et à des dynamiques géopolitiques changeantes. Cette conjoncture de bouleversements et d’incertitudes favorise les luttes de pouvoir et crée un contexte propice à la désinformation. Dans ce contexte, il est essentiel que le Canada examine de près ces stratégies communicationnelles afin de réfuter rapidement les fausses informations et de proposer des contre-récits convaincants. Les stratégies de communication russes sur l’OTAN en Arctique Au cours des dernières années, la présence de l’OTAN en Arctique est devenue une cible privilégiée des campagnes de désinformation russes. Les stratégies de communication russes à l'égard de l'OTAN en Arctique ont mis en lumière une série de récits destinés à fragiliser l’image de l’alliance et à détourner l’attention des actions russes dans la région. Les chercheurs P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Troy Bouffard et Adam Lajeunesse ont mis en évidence les tactiques de communication russes associées à l’OTAN dans la région. En s’appuyant sur ce cadre d’analyse, l’étude des articles publiés par TASS et Sputnik entre 2020 et 2023 révèle que 80 % des contenus mentionnant les mots-clés « OTAN » et « Arctique » intègrent au moins l’un des six thèmes identifiés par les chercheurs. Parmi ces thèmes, trois sont centraux aux articles de presse étudiés. D’abord, au cœur de la stratégie communicationnelle de la presse russe se trouve l’idée que l'OTAN agit comme une force déstabilisatrice, menaçant l'équilibre de l'Arctique et alimentant la perception d'une perturbation régionale. Dans 205 articles, la région circumpolaire est présentée comme un espace où les tensions géopolitiques s’intensifient en raison de l’accroissement significatif de la présence et des exercices de l’OTAN. Cette thématique est fréquemment associée au thème de l’absurdité de la menace russe, visant à discréditer les préoccupations concernant l’activité militaire de la puissance. La présence musclée de Moscou est ainsi sciemment réduite à des gestes inoffensifs. Les articles insistent par exemple sur les activités militaires russes dénuées de menace ou conformes au droit international, tout en insistant sur le nombre supérieur d’installations militaires de l’OTAN par rapport à celles de la Russie.  Cependant, les observations de l’International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) et de Reuters indiquent une réalité stratégique favorable à Moscou, dont la présence militaire dans le cercle arctique dépasse notamment celle de l’OTAN d’environ un tiers en termes de bases. Un troisième thème majeur met en avant l'idée que les États arctiques sont sous l’influence directe des États-Unis, décrivant ces pays comme des pions dans un jeu de pouvoir où Washington impose ses intérêts. Dans cette vision, les membres de l’OTAN, y compris le Canada, sont représentés comme dépourvus d'autonomie et entièrement soumis à l'hégémonie américaine. Ce cadre hiérarchique, simpliste, mais récurrent (72 articles), permet de dénoncer la subordination des alliés de l’OTAN aux volontés de Washington, créant ainsi une opposition nette entre les États-Unis et leurs alliés d’une part, et la Russie d’autre part. Dans les articles de presse, les trois thèmes sont fréquemment juxtaposés et combinés pour offrir une image cohérente de l'Arctique : un espace où l’OTAN, en tant qu’acteur extérieur, exacerbe les tensions et où les initiatives russes sont systématiquement déminées et légitimées. À cela s’ajoutent trois thèmes secondaires, soit : les sanctions des États arctiques nuisent à leurs propres intérêts, les États-Unis et l'OTAN sont de pauvres invités et le colonialisme américain. Ces derniers sont conjugués aux trois principaux thèmes et servent à accentuer l'idée que l'OTAN, sous la houlette des États-Unis, est l’instigatrice d’une escalade régionale injustifiée. Ainsi, les sanctions imposées par les pays arctiques à la Russie sont dépeintes comme étant dictées par les États-Unis et injustifiées en raison de l’absence de menace russe. Similairement, la presse russe lie le thème de la subordination des États arctiques à Washington à l’idée que les États-Unis et l’OTAN sont de mauvais hôtes, en accusant la Maison-Blanche d’imposer des installations militaires sur le territoire de leurs alliés et d’aggraver la dégradation environnementale. L'impact de l’invasion de l’Ukraine sur les stratégies communicationnelles russes L'invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie a profondément transformé les relations internationales, impactant également les dynamiques régionales arctiques. En réponse à l’agression militaire russe, les États occidentaux suspendent leur coopération avec la Russie au sein du Conseil de l’Arctique et d’autres organisations régionales. Dans ce contexte, la Russie a intensifié ses efforts pour dénoncer l’OTAN. Les thèses de l'Alliance militaire comme élément déstabilisateur et de la présence russe dénuée de menace gagnent en importance dans les articles de presse. En plus de tenter de discréditer les candidatures finlandaise et suédoise, les accusations quant à l’expansion de la coalition militaire occidentale se traduisent par une dénonciation de la multiplication de ses activités et de ses infrastructures militaires dans la région polaire. Pour répondre à un isolement croissant au Nord, les agences de presse multiplient les récits évoquant « l’idée d’une menace russe est absurde » et « les États arctiques sont les pions des États-Unis » dans la période suivant l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Par ailleurs, cet isolement russe s’accompagne d’une nouveauté en termes de narratif. En effet, dans ses discours médiatiques, la Russie démontre qu’elle cherche à diversifier ses partenariats dans l'Arctique en s'engageant avec un large éventail de pays. L’analyse des articles de presse met également en lumière une stratégie russe qui s’appuie sur l’exploitation des tensions géopolitiques dans d’autres régions pour renforcer un sentiment de solidarité avec ses partenaires non-occidentaux. En établissant des liens entre les enjeux en Arctique et ceux d’autres zones, comme l’Indopacifique, les communications russes cherchent à projeter une image d’un acteur global responsable et non menaçant, tout en critiquant les actions des États-Unis et de l’OTAN. Les médias russes élaborent des narratifs où les forces militaires occidentales sont décrites comme des agents de déstabilisation, tandis que la Russie est présentée comme un acteur pacifique. Ce discours, qui rappelle les tensions de la Guerre froide, met en scène une alliance entre la Russie et la Chine opposée aux États-Unis et à leurs alliés. L’objectif est de dessiner un tableau binaire où l’Occident apparaît comme l’agresseur, tandis que la Russie et ses partenaires se posent en défenseurs d’un ordre international équitable. Pour appuyer ces récits, les médias russes, tout en omettant leur propre violation flagrante du droit international, dénoncent, par exemple, la posture agressive des États-Unis et leur refus de ratifier la Convention des Nations unies sur le droit de la mer, présentant ces actions comme contraires au droit international, hostiles et déstabilisatrices. Considérations politiques et recommandations pour le Canada En amplifiant la menace occidentale tout en minimisant l'ampleur des actions russes, la désinformation constitue un enjeu stratégique majeur pour le Canada, car elle peut perturber la manière dont le pays et ses alliés perçoivent la sécurité en Arctique et orientent leurs politiques. Ce phénomène met en danger les efforts internationaux visant à contrer les ambitions géopolitiques russes et fragilise la stabilité de la région arctique. Cela risque de détourner l’attention des défis régionaux, rendant plus difficile l'élaboration de stratégies de défense et de gouvernance communes. De plus, cette désinformation peut diviser l’opinion publique canadienne et manipuler les marchés au profit de la Russie, créant ainsi des tensions internes et perturbant les priorités stratégiques du Canada. Bien que le Canada dispose de certains outils pour contrer la désinformation, tels que des mécanismes de réponse rapide, ceux-ci ne sont pas suffisants pour faire face à cette menace déstabilisatrice dans son ensemble. Face à l’évolution rapide de l’Arctique, marquée par des intérêts concurrents et des défis d’accessibilité, la prise de décisions éclairées est tributaire d’accès à de l’information de qualité. Il est donc primordial que le Canada collabore avec ses alliés pour développer des outils de surveillance afin de détecter et de répondre aux campagnes de désinformation russes en temps réel. Des mécanismes doivent également être développés pour fournir rapidement des informations précises et vérifiables, notamment sur les déploiements militaires ou les activités de l’OTAN dans la région. La création ou le renforcement d’équipes de réponse rapide dédiées à la diffusion d’informations fiables pendant les moments clés de tension, tels que les déploiements ou les visites en Arctique, s'avère essentiel. La transparence ainsi instaurée permettrait de limiter l'impact de la désinformation et de maintenir une position stratégique cohérente pour le Canada. À propos des auteurs Julie Renaud est chercheuse à l'Observatoire de la politique et de la sécurité de l'Arctique (OPSA) ainsi qu'à l'Observatoire de géopolitique de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques. Ses recherches se concentrent sur les questions stratégiques, sécuritaires et de défense en Arctique. Mathieu Landriault est directeur de l'Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l'Arctique (OPSA). Il enseigne à l'École d'études politiques de l'Université d'Ottawa et à l'École d'études des conflits de l'Université Saint-Paul. ## L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lautonomie-strategique-du-canada-au-21e-siecle/ Modified: 2026-09-29 > Évènement de lancement du Réseau d'analyse stratégique 3.0 et présentation de l'étude L'autonomie stratégique du Canada : une feuille de route L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle Évènement de lancement du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 3.0 Dans un contexte marqué par la compétition entre grandes puissances, le repli sur soi américain et la volonté du Canada de renforcer ses capacités militaires et industrielles, une question devient incontournable : que signifie réellement l’autonomie stratégique pour le Canada ? Panel 1 - L’autonomie stratégique du Canada : une feuille de route Présentation d’une étude réalisée par Philippe Lagassé et Justin Massie, suivie des commentaires de Siobhan Harty et du LGen (ret.) Yvan Blondin . Animation : Mathieu Carbasse, du journal Le Devoir. Panel 2 - L’autonomie stratégique ailleurs : quels modèles pour le Canada ? Avec Chantal Lavallée, Frédéric Mérand, Jean-François Bélanger, PhD, et Nicolas-François Perron. Animation : Emmanuelle Rousseau. ## L’échec de l’Occident en matière de réfugiés afghans : Un symptôme des guerres de transfert de risques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lechec-de-loccident-en-matiere-de-refugies-afghans-un-symptome-des-guerres-de-transfert-de-risques/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Lorsque l'administration Biden a annoncé son retrait unilatéral, elle n'avait manifestement aucun plan en place pour la logistique de... Avec la chute de Kaboul, le Canada, les États-Unis et leurs alliés tentent maintenant de préserver toute la dignité possible de cette véritable débâcle. Par-dessus tout, il est nécessaire de sauver les réfugiés afghans. Et ils seront nombreux. Les talibans font des déclarations rassurantes, et les analystes débattront de la mesure dans laquelle ils ont changé, mais le risque de représailles et de répression est manifestement assez grand pour justifier un effort immédiat et à grande échelle. Le Canada a certainement repoussé un tel effort trop longtemps. Ses alliés aussi. Lorsque l'administration Biden a annoncé son retrait unilatéral, elle n'avait manifestement aucun plan en place pour la logistique de l'évacuation de ses propres alliés, sans parler des réfugiés en général – et le Canada a été encore plus lent. Maintenant que les Américains contrôlent à eux seuls l'aéroport international Hamid Karzai, les talibans ne rendent pas l'accès facile. Ce n'est pas par manque d'avertissement. L'idée existe depuis des années. Le Canada a créé un programme spécial pour les interprètes afghans en 2009, aussi inadéquat soit-il. Si la victoire des talibans a aveuglé beaucoup d'Occidentaux, il était évident que les insurgés étaient en pleine ascension : c'était le cas bien avant que l'administration Biden ne confirme le retrait américain. Cette inaction n'est pas un accident; elle est symptomatique de l'approche occidentale vis-à-vis du conflit. Le transfert systématique des risques hors de l'Occident fait partie intégrale des guerres contemporaines. C'est un concept essentiel pour comprendre la politique à l'égard des réfugiés afghans. Essentiellement, les administrations Trump et Biden ont placé le transfert de risque au premier plan. La priorité de l'administration Biden était de faire sortir son peuple, ce dernier étant défini de manière à inclure le personnel militaire et les civils américains (et même les chiens), mais à reléguer ses alliés locaux et les civils afghans au second plan. Le Canada est parti il y a sept ans, puis a largement ignoré les risques que sa mission avait créés en Afghanistan. La guerre de transfert de risques s'accompagne d'une distanciation et d'une dépersonnalisation, afin de maintenir ses propres soldats aussi loin que possible du danger tout en continuant à faire la guerre. Les drones en sont une manifestation. Le passage à des missions de renforcement des capacités en est une autre. D'une autre manière, l'embauche de contractants l'est aussi : le rapport établi par un contrat est plus distant que celui créé avec le soldat. Un gouvernement doit à ses soldats en uniforme une pension et des avantages sociaux (tels qu'ils sont), mais il se considère exempt de telles obligations envers les contractants. Souvent, le Canada et les États-Unis ne semblent pas savoir qui a travaillé pour leurs efforts de guerre. C'est à l’employé de le prouver, en faisant appel personnellement au service des ressources humaines de son entreprise. La dépersonnalisation, cependant, a ses limites, comme l'affirme Kristian Kristensen dans le cas du Danemark. Ce n'est pas un hasard si, dans tout l'Occident, la question des réfugiés afghans commence par les interprètes. Pendant les combats actifs, ils ont tissé des liens profonds avec les soldats canadiens, américains et des autres pays membres de l'OTAN, qui dépendaient d'eux pour rester en vie et accomplir leurs missions. C'est avec une grande douleur que les soldats de l'OTAN contemplent le sort de leurs camarades. Ces liens tissés sur le champ de bataille ont donné aux interprètes une légitimité morale sans faille, en plus de fournir des alliés dynamiques et influents à l'Occident, et même cela n'a pas suffi pour que des mesures soient prises en temps utile. Mais les pays de l'OTAN ont des obligations éthiques beaucoup plus larges, notamment envers des milliers d'Afghans qui n'ont jamais fait partie d'une bande de camarades avec les troupes occidentales, mais qui ont travaillé pour ou avec des forces extérieures et qui sont menacés pour cette raison. Les talibans s'en sont pris à des entrepreneurs qui construisaient des routes pour les forces extérieures, ainsi qu'à des fonctionnaires locaux qui soutenaient les missions des Américains et de l'OTAN sans jamais être des employés officiels. Bien que tout ancien employé soit éligible au programme de visa canadien et américain, l'élan pour réinstaller les interprètes est le plus fort, et le programme américain les place explicitement en tête de liste (voir p. 5 ici). Reste à savoir si cela se poursuivra dans le chaos de Kaboul. Plus largement, nous avons l'obligation, comme nous l'avons toujours fait, de secourir tout réfugié ayant besoin d'aide, qu'il ait travaillé pour nous ou non. Les efforts visant à réprimer la migration afghane (comme ceux du président français Emmanuel Macron) sont méprisables. Ils constituent, une fois de plus, un transfert de risques : les risques politiques pour les politiciens occidentaux se traduisent par des risques physiques pour les Afghans. La déclaration de Macron était flagrante, mais la même logique s'applique aux efforts bureaucratiques moins médiatisés visant à limiter les programmes de visa que le Canada, les États-Unis et d'autres pays ont appliqués à l'Afghanistan (en excluant les personnes ayant travaillé moins de douze mois pour une mission, en exigeant que les demandeurs soient en Afghanistan, en incluant les enfants mineurs, mais pas les enfants adultes des contractants, ou – même maintenant – en exigeant des passeports). Plus généralement, cela s'applique au processus de demande de statut de réfugié, dont la lourdeur est un problème chronique. En bref, les efforts d'évacuation sont essentiels si nous voulons reconnaître où se situent les risques de nos guerres et réduire autant que possible ces risques pour les personnes vulnérables. Les risques liés à l'association avec le Canada méritaient les efforts de notre gouvernement il y a déjà plusieurs années. Ils méritent maintenant toute l'attention d'Ottawa. Le Canada acceptera 20 000 réfugiés d'Afghanistan et ne s'arrêtera pas à ceux qui ont travaillé pour ce pays et c'est une bonne chose. Les Canadiens peuvent aider à la réinstallation. Mais il est difficile d'ignorer l'inattention et le retard. De nombreuses personnes qui ne peuvent se rendre à l'aéroport périront, et même cette option pourrait ne pas subsister longtemps. Le gouvernement du Canada – la Défense nationale, Affaires mondiales et le ministère de l'Immigration et Citoyenneté surtout – doit également agir bien au-delà de l'Afghanistan : nos opérations militaires à l'étranger reposent sur les populations locales. Si l'accent général mis sur le renforcement des capacités plutôt que sur le combat permet d'ignorer plus facilement les risques, ceux-ci ne disparaissent pas pour autant. Il n'est pas exagéré d'imaginer l'État islamique, les séparatistes en Ukraine ou Al-Qaïda ciblant ceux qui ont travaillé avec ou pour des forces extérieures comme celles du Canada. Nous ne devons pas transférer ces risques à notre guise. Nous devons rapidement évaluer les risques pour nos autres opérations en cours ou récemment terminées. Nous devons assurer un bien meilleur suivi des personnes qui travaillent pour nous. Nous devons prévoir ce que ces personnes pourraient subir, et ce dont elles auront besoin de notre part, pour avoir travaillé aux missions de ce pays. En outre, en tant que pays qui ne mène jamais seul des missions militaires dans des zones de conflit, la protection des alliés locaux et les conditions de retrait doivent constituer une partie importante de la façon dont le Canada négocie les conditions de sa participation avec ses alliés et ses partenaires de coalition. Ce genre de mesures pratiques, destinées à atténuer le risque des interventions militaires dans les zones de conflit pour les alliés locaux, est nécessaire en raison des opérations canadiennes en cours. Mais le déshonneur serait encore plus grand si l'héritage de l'Afghanistan consistait simplement à trouver de meilleures façons d'éviter l'embarras à la fin de guerres que nous n'aurions jamais dû mener en premier lieu. La leçon la plus importante doit être d'aborder le recours à la force avec la prudence requise, non seulement en raison des risques pour nous, mais aussi en raison des risques pour toutes les personnes concernées. Il faut cesser une fois pour toutes de traiter la vie des populations touchées par les conflits comme si elle était moins importante que la nôtre. ## L’engagement envers l’Alliance et les limites de la réorientation stratégique au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lengagement-envers-lalliance-et-les-limites-de-la-reorientation-strategique-au-canada/ Modified: 2026-06-29 La dissuasion en collaboration avec des partenaires : sur quels partenariats le Canada devrait-il mettre l’accent, et dans quel but? Sur quoi le Canada devrait-il axer ses alliances, et dans quel but? La question semble tournée vers l’avenir, mais y répondre honnêtement exige de s’attaquer à un problème antérieur. Je soutiens que le Canada a rarement eu pour habitude de se poser précisément cette question. Mon argumentation se déroule en deux étapes. Premièrement, l’engagement du Canada envers l’OTAN est passé, au fil du temps, d’une délibération active à un consensus réflexe. Aujourd’hui, les engagements sont peut-être maintenus davantage par l’inertie institutionnelle que par un calcul stratégique. Deuxièmement, et ce qui importe davantage pour ce panel, l’histoire montre qu’il est structurellement difficile de rompre avec ce schéma, même lorsque les conditions politiques semblent favorables. L’examen de la défense mené par le gouvernement Trudeau en 1968-1969 demeure la tentative la plus sérieuse de réorientation stratégique de l’après-guerre, et son échec partiel offre un diagnostic précis des contraintes auxquelles le Canada est confronté aujourd’hui. De la délibération au consensus Pierre Elliott Trudeau est arrivé au pouvoir en 1968 muni d’une critique intellectuelle cohérente de la posture d’alliance du Canada. Selon lui, la politique de défense en était venue à dicter la politique étrangère plutôt que l’inverse : les engagements du Canada envers l’OTAN façonnaient son identité stratégique et son comportement, plutôt que de découler d’une définition préalable des intérêts nationaux. Il n’était pas le seul à partager ce point de vue. Une faction au sein du Parti libéral, dirigée par l’ancien ministre des Finances Walter Gordon, avançait des arguments comparables depuis le milieu des années 1960, soutenant que le redressement de l’Europe de l’Ouest après la guerre avait rendu l’ampleur de la contribution militaire du Canada à ce continent à la fois inutile et coûteuse. En dehors du gouvernement, un certain nombre d’universitaires conféraient une légitimité intellectuelle à cette remise en question. Il ne s’agissait pas de voix marginales; elles représentaient une véritable tentative de soumettre un postulat fondamental de la politique étrangère canadienne à un examen rationnel. La nature de ces débats a son importance. À la Chambre des communes, au cours du printemps et de l’été 1969, la question de l’OTAN a donné lieu à de véritables conflits idéologiques. Ces conflits n’étaient pas simplement partisans. En effet, ils ne se limitaient pas aux partis, mais s’exprimaient également au sein même du Parti libéral au pouvoir. Par exemple, le député libéral Warren Allmand a réclamé le retrait complet des forces canadiennes d’Europe; son collègue libéral Norman Cafik s’est fermement opposé à toute réduction. Les progressistes-conservateurs soutenaient que la menace soviétique, à l’origine de la création de l’OTAN, n’avait pas diminué; le NPD affirmait, selon les mots de Tommy Douglas, que la logique de la position de Trudeau lui-même conduisait à un retrait complet. Il s’agissait là de désaccords de fond sur la stratégie, les intérêts et l’objectif de l’adhésion à l’alliance. En bref, c’était exactement le genre de débat qu’exige une politique de défense solide. Comparons cela aux débats parlementaires canadiens depuis 2022. À la suite de l’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par la Russie, le soutien à l’OTAN et à l’aide militaire à l’Ukraine a été, selon les mots d’un député libéral, marqué par une « unanimité » frappante. Les progressistes-conservateurs étaient depuis longtemps favorables à une aide militaire complète; les libéraux leur ont emboîté le pas; même le Bloc québécois et le NPD, initialement hésitants, se sont alignés quelques semaines après l’invasion de février 2022. En 2023, ce qui avait brièvement été une question controversée était devenu un fait politique établi. La récente dépolitisation du débat est, en soi, révélatrice. Le consensus n’est pas synonyme de stratégie. Lorsque les engagements au sein de l’alliance cessent d’être contestés, ils cessent également d’être examinés. Soyons clairs : l’argument avancé ici n’est pas que le Canada devrait se désengager de l’OTAN ou refuser son soutien à l’Ukraine. Ces deux engagements peuvent être pleinement justifiés en fonction de leurs mérites. La préoccupation porte plutôt sur le processus de raisonnement, ou plutôt sur son absence. Un engagement pris par défaut, parce qu’il n’a jamais été sérieusement remis en question, est fragile. Il ne peut être calibré, maintenu ou adapté aux circonstances changeantes avec une quelconque cohérence. Une adhésion active et engagée à l’OTAN, ainsi qu’un soutien significatif à l’Ukraine, sont plus défendables et plus durables lorsqu’ils sont compris comme des instruments au service d’objectifs canadiens identifiables, et non comme des fins en soi. Les limites structurelles d’une réorientation Si le diagnostic concernant les habitudes est exact, la question la plus importante pour ce groupe d’experts est de savoir si cette situation peut être corrigée, et dans quelles conditions. À cet égard, le cas de Trudeau est instructif, et donne plutôt à réfléchir. Trudeau est arrivé au pouvoir avec un capital politique considérable : un gouvernement majoritaire, un mandat personnel clair et une faction du Cabinet disposée à le soutenir. À cette époque, l’opinion publique était largement favorable à un réajustement de l’engagement du Canada au sein de l’OTAN et de ses relations bilatérales avec les États-Unis. L’examen officiel de la défense qu’il a lancé en mai 1968 était exhaustif, et la directive qui l’instituait autorisait explicitement à remettre en question l’ensemble des engagements stratégiques que le Canada avait accumulés depuis 1949. À tous égards, les conditions pour une réorientation significative étaient aussi favorables qu’elles pouvaient l’être. Ce qui s’ensuivit fut néanmoins bien en deçà d’une véritable transformation. Le résultat, qui se traduisait par une réduction des effectifs des Forces canadiennes en Europe de 10 000 à 5 000 soldats, était réel mais modeste. Il ne fut obtenu qu’au terme d’un long conflit interne et au prix d’un coût politique considérable. Trois catégories de contraintes expliquent l’écart entre l’ambition et le résultat. La première était d’ordre bureaucratique. Le ministère des Affaires extérieures avait produit des études internes recommandant le maintien des forces canadiennes en Europe avant même que Trudeau ne remporte la direction du Parti libéral. L’une d’entre elles est particulièrement révélatrice. Son auteur, Norman Robertson, comptait parmi les principaux architectes du consensus internationaliste d’après-guerre. Il soutenait que la présence militaire du Canada en Europe était la monnaie d’échange qui permettait à Ottawa d’avoir sa place à la table des consultations occidentales. À ce titre, le retrait des forces reviendrait à renoncer volontairement au levier diplomatique dont dépendait l’influence internationale du Canada. Cette logique était profondément ancrée dans l’institution et s’est révélée remarquablement résistante aux directives politiques venant d’en haut. La deuxième contrainte était liée aux alliés. Washington et les capitales européennes ont exercé une pression soutenue tout au long du processus d’examen. Les responsables américains ont clairement fait savoir qu’ils s’attendaient à ce que le Canada maintienne son engagement en Europe. Les gouvernements alliés, confrontés à leurs propres pressions nationales en faveur d’une réduction des dépenses de défense, étaient réticents à accepter un précédent canadien de désengagement. Une séance du Cabinet tendue, en décembre 1968, a révélé toute l’ampleur du conflit : la remise en question par Trudeau des prémisses stratégiques de l’OTAN a conduit son ministre de la Défense, Léo Cadieux, à craindre qu’il ne rejette complètement la menace soviétique, tandis que le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Mitchell Sharp, aurait envisagé de démissionner. Le compromis conclu lors de la réunion du Cabinet de mars 1969 reposait sur l’expression « réduction planifiée et progressive » plutôt que sur le retrait, préservant ainsi l’unité du Cabinet précisément en restant suffisamment ambigu pour avoir des significations différentes selon les ministres. Troisièmement, Trudeau a bel et bien proposé un cadre alternatif bien défini : le Livre blanc sur la défense de 1971 établissait une hiérarchie explicite des priorités, plaçant la protection de la souveraineté canadienne au premier rang, la défense de l’Amérique du Nord au deuxième, les engagements envers l’OTAN au troisième et le maintien de la paix au quatrième. La politique de défense, affirmait-il clairement, doit refléter et servir les intérêts nationaux plutôt que de les dicter. C’était précisément le type de cadre stratégique préalable dont l’examen avait été critiqué pour son absence. Pourtant, même cet ordre relativement clair s’est avéré insuffisant pour remodeler durablement le comportement institutionnel. Au milieu des années 1970, Trudeau était devenu un fervent défenseur de l’OTAN et la hiérarchie établie par le Livre blanc s’était discrètement érodée. Les gouvernements suivants n’ont pas renouvelé l’exercice. Plus de cinquante ans plus tard, le Canada n’a toujours pas mené d’examen complet et intégré de sa politique étrangère d’une portée comparable. Ce que cet épisode révèle, ce n’est donc pas l’absence d’un cadre, mais le fait qu’en élaborer un n’équivaut pas à l’institutionnaliser. La bureaucratie, les alliés et la logique des engagements accumulés se sont avérés plus durables que le document d’orientation destiné à les réorganiser. Qu’est-ce que cela signifie pour les alliances et les partenariats du Canada? Sur quoi le Canada devrait-il concentrer ses alliances et dans quel but? Le Canada doit retrouver l’habitude d’une réflexion stratégique mûrement réfléchie, dont les débats de la fin des années 1960, quelle qu’en ait été l’issue, constituaient au moins un exemple. La situation actuelle rend cela d’autant plus urgent. Le désengagement américain de ses engagements en matière de sécurité européenne, la croissance rapide des dépenses de défense européennes et la guerre en cours en Ukraine ont modifié les conditions structurelles de la relation transatlantique. L’aide militaire apportée par le Canada à l’Ukraine a été substantielle en termes absolus et n’a fait l’objet d’aucune contestation politique à l’échelle nationale; toutefois, lorsqu’on la mesure par rapport à sa capacité économique, elle se classe parmi les contributions les plus modestes de l’OTAN. Plus important encore, les conditions politiques qui ont rendu cette aide incontestée – c’est-à-dire un consensus multipartite, une faible couverture médiatique et un climat public favorable – ont également supprimé toute incitation à réfléchir attentivement à ce que le Canada cherche à accomplir et à se demander si les engagements actuels sont adaptés pour y parvenir. L’épisode Trudeau met en lumière ce qu’exigerait une approche plus réfléchie : une articulation préalable des intérêts que les alliances du Canada sont censées servir; une hiérarchie explicite des engagements lorsque les priorités s’opposent; et une préparation institutionnelle et politique suffisante pour maintenir le cap choisi face aux pressions prévisibles liées aux attentes des alliés et à l’inertie bureaucratique. Crédit image: OTAN via Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.   ## L’enjeu de Taïwan dans l’alliance entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Sud URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lenjeu-de-taiwan-dans-lalliance-entre-les-etats-unis-et-la-coree-du-sud/ Modified: 2023-01-06 > Alors que les tensions entre la République populaire de Chine et les États-Unis se sont intensifiées à propos de Taïwan... Alors que les tensions entre la République populaire de Chine (RPC) et les États-Unis se sont intensifiées à propos de Taïwan au cours des derniers mois, le risque d’une guerre dans la région augmente. À la suite de la visite de la présidente de la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis, Nancy Pelosi, à Taipei en août 2022, Pékin a procédé à des exercices militaires intensifs et à tir réel autour de l’île, et des exercices militaires taïwanais s’en sont ensuivis. Alors que le gouvernement chinois ne renonce pas à la possibilité d’utiliser la force pour rattacher Taïwan à la RPC, les États-Unis promettent de leur côté de protéger l’île en cas d’attaque de la Chine. Il est indéniable que personne dans la région indopacifique ne souhaite voir un conflit qui opposerait les deux côtés du détroit. La République de Corée (ROK, Corée du Sud) est particulièrement préoccupée par le problème de Taïwan et ce, pour au moins deux raisons. Tout d’abord, Séoul s’inquiète du fait que les États-Unis pourraient consacrer leurs forces militaires à repousser une agression contre Taïwan, laissant ainsi la Corée du Sud seule face à l’insécurité dans la péninsule. La deuxième raison a trait au fait que la Corée du Sud pourrait être piégée dans une guerre en tant qu’alliée des États-Unis et devrait donc lutter contre la RPC. Ces deux éléments ne s’excluent pas mutuellement et placent le gouvernement de la République de Corée face à un dilemme épineux dans l’élaboration de sa politique étrangère. Cet article ne part pas du principe qu’une guerre entre Taïwan (et les États-Unis) et la Chine est hautement probable. Il ne prétend pas non plus qu’une telle guerre est inévitable. Toutefois, envisager la manière dont les Sud-Coréens réagiraient dans le pire des scénarios (une guerre dans le détroit de Taïwan) peut nous aider à évaluer la valeur et l’utilité de l’alliance entre les États-Unis et la Corée. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur la site du Rubicon !   Cet article est la version écrite d’une contribution faite le 2 juin 2022 lors d’une conférence « Is War over Taiwan Coming? » tenue à l’Université du Québec à Montréal.   Dr. Hyon Joo Yoo est professeure associée au département des sciences politiques de l'université Hankuk à Séoul. Hyon Joo Yoo a été membre permanent du corps enseignant de l'université Trinity à San Antonio, au Texas et boursière pour l'Asie du Nord-Est au East West Center à Washington, D.C. Elle a également été boursière de l'East Asia Institute (EAI) et de la Korea Foundation. Ses recherches portent sur l'alliance avec les États-Unis, la sécurité en Asie de l'Est, la politique étrangère de la Chine, la politique coréenne et la théorie des relations internationales. ## L’Ukraine et Taïwan : Pas le même combat URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lukraine-et-taiwan-pas-le-meme-combat/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Alors que la guerre fait rage en Ukraine, des ondes de choc se répercutent en Asie de l'Est, où de nombreux Taïwanais craignent d'être les... Alors que la guerre fait rage en Ukraine, des ondes de choc se répercutent en Asie de l'Est, où à Taïwan, nombreux craignent d'être les prochains. Le dirigeant chinois, Xi Jinping, n'a jamais caché son ambition de réunifier Taïwan avec le continent, de préférence pacifiquement, mais sans exclure la force militaire si nécessaire. L'Armée populaire de libération (APL) s'affirme de plus en plus et viole régulièrement l'espace aérien de Taïwan. Le retour de la guerre interétatique engendre de vives inquiétudes en matière de sécurité, provoquant des ruptures majeures de politique étrangère à travers le monde entier. L'Allemagne a annoncé une enveloppe de 100 milliards d’euros pour moderniser son armée et s'est engagée à consacrer 2 % de son PIB à la défense en réponse à l'agression de la Russie, tandis que l'influent ancien premier ministre japonais Shinzo Abe a demandé la fin de la politique d'ambiguïté stratégique des États-Unis à l'égard de Taïwan. Abe s'est également montré favorable à l'accueil et au partage d’armes nucléaires avec les États-Unis. Dans le même temps, la République populaire de Chine (RPC/Chine) et la Russie ont dénoncé pour la première fois, dans une déclaration commune, l'élargissement de l'OTAN, la stratégie indopacifique des États-Unis, et ont affirmé une vision commune du monde. Bien que les médias et les responsables chinois expliquent que la comparaison entre l'Ukraine et Taïwan est erronée, certains craignent que la guerre en Ukraine n'ait un impact sur les calculs de la Chine concernant Taïwan et ne favorise l'escalade des conflits en Asie de l'Est. Des analystes interprètent l'agression de la Russie contre l'Ukraine comme un nouveau coup porté à l'ordre international libéral, fragilisant davantage la crédibilité des États-Unis et encourageant les régimes autoritaires à recourir à la force. Des agences de renseignement, des experts et des observateurs occidentaux ont exprimé leurs inquiétudes quant au fait que la Chine pourrait profiter que l'Occident soit occupé en Ukraine pour accroître la pression sur Taïwan. Cela soulève la question suivante : quels parallèles et quelles leçons peut-on tirer de la guerre en Ukraine pour un éventuel conflit à Taïwan ? Premièrement, le soutien diplomatique et militaire des États-Unis à Taïwan résulte des intérêts géostratégiques et géoéconomiques de l'Amérique liés à la défense de l'île. Ces intérêts sont absents en Ukraine, ce qui signifie que la crédibilité des États-Unis en Asie de l'Est n'a aucun rapport avec l'Ukraine. Deuxièmement, il est peu probable que la Chine modifie son calcul à court terme concernant Taïwan, car l'APL n'est pas encore prête à mener avec succès une invasion amphibie difficile. Contrairement à la Russie, la Chine a le temps de son côté, dispose d'une boîte à outils plus large pour contraindre Taïwan et a besoin de la stabilité mondiale. Les engagements de sécurité des États-Unis envers Taïwan sont plus forts que ceux envers l'Ukraine Les États-Unis ont été beaucoup plus impliqués dans la défense de Taïwan depuis 1954 qu'ils ne l'ont été en Ukraine depuis 1991, ce qui rend le premier soutien incomparablement plus fort que le second. Lors des premières et deuxièmes crises du détroit de Taïwan (1954 et 1958), les États-Unis ont soutenu activement leur allié, la République de Chine (RDC, Taïwan). Le Congrès a adopté la « résolution Formose », qui donnait au président Eisenhower les pleins pouvoirs pour défendre Taïwan et ses petites îles. Lors de la troisième crise du détroit de Taïwan (1995-1996), les États-Unis ont à nouveau déployé leurs forces pour soutenir la RDC afin de dissuader la RPC, même si l'alliance entre les États-Unis et la RDC a été remplacée en 1979 par le Taiwan Relation Act qui n'est pas officiellement une alliance de sécurité, mais qui prévoit que les États-Unis fournissent des armes pour que Taïwan puisse se défendre. En outre, la politique américaine d'ambiguïté stratégique n'a jamais empêché Washington d'armer Taïwan avec des armes technologiquement avancées (avions de chasse, drones, artillerie, etc.). En comparaison, l'Ukraine n'a obtenu que des armes défensives telles que des missiles antichars Javelin, des missiles de défense aérienne Stinger, des munitions et autre matériel militaire depuis le début de la crise, puis de la guerre. La déclaration de soutien du président Biden réaffirmant l'engagement des États-Unis à défendre Taïwan est tout à fait différente de la déclaration sans ambiguïté selon laquelle aucun soldat américain ne mettra jamais les pieds sur le sol ukrainien pour défendre Kiev contre Moscou. Toutefois, il est intéressant de noter que des instructeurs militaires américains se trouvent à Taïwan pour former l'armée taïwanaise. Des instructeurs américains étaient également présents en Ukraine avant l'invasion de la Russie. Même si aucun changement de la politique américano-taïwanaise n'a officiellement eu lieu, la déclaration de soutien de Biden à Taïwan s'accompagne de l'introduction au Congrès américain des lois Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, Taiwan Defense Act et Arm Taiwan Act. Bien qu'ils n'aient pas encore été adoptés, ces projets de loi contrastent avec les 14 milliards de dollars de financement d'urgence que le Congrès a autorisés pour aider l'Ukraine et surtout avec le projet de loi 2022 sur la défense de la souveraineté de l'Ukraine qui ne prévoit pas le recours à la force militaire américaine pour défendre l'Ukraine, alors qu'il en est de plus en plus question dans le cas de Taïwan, même si c'est dans des circonstances précises. De plus, la loi Taiwan Travel Act, qui encourage les responsables américains et taïwanais à se rendre mutuellement visite, a été promulguée en 2018, tandis que la loi TAIPEI Act, qui renforce les relations commerciales et économiques avec Taïwan et d'autres nations, a été adoptée en 2020. À ce titre, la crédibilité des États-Unis est davantage en jeu à Taïwan qu'en Ukraine. Une nouvelle version de la loi de 1941 du Lend-Lease Act pourrait permettre aux États-Unis de prêter des équipements militaires plus sophistiqués à l'Ukraine. Mais même si Washington renforce son soutien envers l’Ukraine, Kiev n'a rien de similaire au Taiwan Relation Act. Comme le souligne Jake Sullivan, conseiller à la sécurité nationale des États-Unis, ce document constitue une différence juridique importante entre l'Ukraine et Taïwan. D'un point de vue diplomatique, le soutien considérable et durable des États-Unis à Taïwan fait qu'il est très compliqué et coûteux en termes de réputation de faire marche arrière. Les actions ou non-actions américaines en Ukraine ne changeront pas fondamentalement cette situation. Intérêts des États-Unis en Asie de l'Est Les intérêts géoéconomiques et géostratégiques significatifs des États-Unis associés à la défense de Taïwan ne sont pas étrangers au fort soutien diplomatique et militaire que Taipei a reçu de Washington. Taïwan est situé dans la première chaîne d'îles, qui s'étend du Japon au nord aux Philippines au sud, bordant des voies maritimes stratégiques dans les mers de Chine orientale et méridionale. Si la RPC s'emparait de Taïwan, ses missiles disposeraient d'une extension de 150 milles marins vers l'est. Cela renforcerait le contrôle chinois sur les voies maritimes stratégiques et placerait certaines parties du Japon et de Guam dans le rayon d'action de la Chine. La crédibilité des engagements des États-Unis envers leurs autres alliés s'en trouverait sérieusement ébranlée, voire anéantie, ce qui pourrait pousser le Japon, la Corée du Sud et d'autres pays à opter pour le nucléaire. Taïwan représente un maillon essentiel du réseau de sécurité des États-Unis, comme l'indique la dernière stratégie indopacifique de Washington. Sur le plan économique, Taïwan est le 9e partenaire commercial des États-Unis, avec 105,9 milliards de dollars de biens et services (bilatéraux). En comparaison, l'Ukraine était le 67e partenaire commercial de l'Amérique avec seulement 3,7 milliards de dollars d'échanges économiques entre les deux pays en 2019. Taïwan est largement intégrée à l'économie mondiale et revêt une importance stratégique pour les semi-conducteurs. C'est là que se trouve TSMC, l'une des plus grandes entreprises de semi-conducteurs au monde, qui représente 50 % de la part totale du marché mondial. Elle atteint même 90% de domination sur des segments de marché spécifiques. Les semi-conducteurs sont essentiels pour les dispositifs électroniques utilisés dans les systèmes militaires et d'autres industries non militaires dont dépend l'économie moderne. En assurant l'approvisionnement mondial d'un produit indispensable à la fabrication de biens stratégiques, Taïwan possède une valeur géoéconomique qui fait défaut à l'Ukraine. Le calcul de la Chine sur Taïwan est différent de celui de la Russie sur l'Ukraine Si l'aventurisme russe en Ukraine est comme un baromètre permettant à Pékin de mesurer le coût du recours à la force militaire, il est peu probable que la Chine trouve attrayant d'envahir Taïwan. La Chine a le temps de son côté. La Russie est pressée et dispose de peu de moyens de pression en dehors de son armée pour contraindre ses concurrents géopolitiques, à l'exception des exportations d’hydrocarbures. Il en résulte que la Russie s'appuie sur son armée pour garantir ses intérêts vitaux par la déstabilisation, car elle ne dispose pas d'autres moyens. La Chine, au contraire, dispose d'un plus grand nombre d'outils (guerre juridique, guerre psychologique et économique, et recours à la force sous le seuil de la guerre) pour organiser la réunification de Taïwan avec le continent. La Russie remet en question le système international en réorganisant les frontières européennes par la force brute. La Chine entend modifier le système international en créant de nouvelles normes et institutions reflétant sa vision du monde, ses valeurs et ses intérêts. L'agression de la Russie est une source d'instabilité, ce qui n'est pas bon pour Xi Jinping qui veut assurer sa prochaine nomination. À plus long terme, la Chine souhaite que les flux économiques perdurent afin que son initiative des « Nouvelles routes de la soie » (Belt and Road Initiative – BRI) puisse prospérer et améliorer la connectivité mondiale. L’agression russe contre l’Ukraine place Xi Jinping dans une situation très inconfortable. L'Ukraine est un connecteur important de la BRI, et le déni de sa souveraineté par la Russie est contraire aux principes de la politique étrangère chinoise. La position prudente et l'absence d'action de la Chine témoignent de sa volonté de limiter les réactions négatives contre ses intérêts. Si la Chine attaquait Taïwan demain, l'instabilité actuelle que Pékin veut éviter serait au contraire stimulée. 60 % des exportations chinoises sont destinées aux États-Unis et à leurs alliés. Dans le cas d'une invasion soudaine de Taïwan par la Chine, de nombreux excédents commerciaux de la Chine se réduiraient en raison des sanctions, ce qui ébranlerait les fondements de la légitimité du Parti communiste chinois (PCC), compromettrait sa BRI et compliquerait potentiellement la nomination de Xi Jinping pour un troisième mandat. Enfin, d'un point de vue militaire, Taïwan est une île, ce qui la rend plus difficile à envahir que l'Ukraine. Poutine a « seulement » dû franchir des frontières terrestres et affronter – en théorie – une armée ukrainienne relativement faible. En revanche, la Chine devrait organiser une invasion amphibie sophistiquée et coûteuse contre une île bien armée, soutenue de près par les États-Unis et le Japon. Par conséquent, il semble peu probable que la guerre en Ukraine puisse précipiter une invasion chinoise à grande échelle de Taïwan à court terme. La panoplie d'outils plus large de la Chine, ses intérêts en matière de stabilité et son rapport au temps ne l'incitent pas à adopter la méthode de la force brute de la Russie. Il est préférable pour la Chine de s'appuyer sur sa stratégie hybride et ses tactiques de zone grise pour progresser vers la réunification. En 2025, cependant, la modernisation de l'APL atteindra un stade où une invasion de Taïwan sera envisageable. Selon un commandant militaire américain, la Chine pourrait envahir Taïwan en 2027 pour marquer le 100e anniversaire de l'APL. Une autre date sensible est 2049, car c'est le 100e anniversaire de la fondation de la RPC, où le rajeunissement national doit être achevé. La réunification de Taïwan est étroitement liée au rajeunissement de la Chine. Ce dernier fait partie du rêve chinois, tout comme le statut déjà atteint d’être une société moyennement aisée. Si la guerre en Ukraine ne déclenche pas immédiatement une action chinoise contre Taïwan, cela ne signifie pas qu'elle ne se produira pas à moyen et long terme. Cela supposerait néanmoins que la stratégie hybride actuelle de la Chine ne donne pas de résultats satisfaisants. Dans ce cas, un blocus pourrait sembler plus approprié qu'une invasion militaire totale, car cela limiterait théoriquement les dommages matériels, les pertes humaines, ainsi que la sévérité et l'unité des représailles occidentales. Conclusion La première leçon de cette analyse est que l'évaluation des intérêts matériels sous-jacents d'un État est un bon moyen de mesurer la crédibilité des garanties de sécurité associées. La Chine serait mal avisée de faire des parallèles entre la réponse américaine à la guerre en Ukraine et la réponse américaine potentielle en cas d'invasion chinoise de Taïwan. C'est une erreur de supposer que la détermination des États-Unis doit être à son maximum sur tous les dossiers. Les États hiérarchisent leurs objectifs en fonction de leurs intérêts et Taïwan figure en tête de liste des intérêts de sécurité des États-Unis, contrairement à l'Ukraine. Cela se traduit par l'important soutien militaire et diplomatique américain envers Taïwan. Non seulement lier la crédibilité des garanties de sécurité des États-Unis en Asie de l'Est à des enjeux périphériques est contre-productif, mais cela pourrait même devenir dangereux. Ces derniers mois, les appels à mettre fin à l'ambiguïté stratégique de l'Amérique en faveur d'un engagement clair pour la défense de Taïwan se sont intensifiés. Craignant pour sa crédibilité, les États-Unis pourraient mettre fin à leur politique d'ambiguïté stratégique de longue date et adopter un engagement clair en faveur de la défense de Taïwan. Cela pourrait pousser Taïwan à proclamer son indépendance, car un engagement américain renforcerait la confiance de Taipei. En retour, cela pourrait amplifier l'agressivité de la Chine et même bousculer l'invasion de Taïwan. La deuxième leçon est que « les invasions ne sont pas contagieuses ». Il est peu probable que la Chine modifie son calcul immédiat pour envahir Taïwan à cause de la guerre en Ukraine. La Chine a des ambitions mondiales et est intéressée par la préservation de la fluidité des échanges économiques, car sa BRI entend accroître la connectivité, pour laquelle elle a besoin de stabilité. En raison de la nature amphibie d'une invasion militaire de Taïwan, il serait très déstabilisant et coûteux pour la Chine de s'engager dans cette voie. La Chine a plutôt intérêt à tirer parti de sa puissance pour faire avancer la réunification par le biais d'une stratégie hybride mêlant des mesures diplomatiques, économiques, cybernétiques, psychologiques, juridiques et semi-militaires pour contraindre Taïwan à se réunifier lentement. D'un autre côté, cela ne signifie pas que la Chine n'utilisera jamais la force, d'autant que la modernisation de l'APL la rendra bientôt capable d'envahir Taïwan. À mesure que nous nous rapprochons d'anniversaires importants, la tentation de recourir à la force augmentera, en particulier si le PCC n'a rien à brandir pour démontrer des progrès sur la réunification de Taïwan. Mais la crise ukrainienne, depuis son début, a montré une solide unité transatlantique et la volonté d'imposer de robPointsustes coûts économiques à la Russie. Il est difficile de dire si la Chine est prête à risquer des coûts similaires (le monde est-il d’ailleurs prêt à imposer à la Chine de tels coûts en cas d’invasion de Taïwan ?) et une intervention militaire américaine pour contrer une invasion chinoise. Toutefois, ce qui est certain, c'est qu'envahir Taïwan revient à une opération différente de l'invasion de l'Ukraine, aussi bien sur le plan militaire qu’au niveau des conséquences pour la stabilité du monde ainsi que pour les intérêts américains et chinois.   ## L’actualisation de la planification stratégique des États-Unis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lactualisation-de-la-planification-strategique-des-etats-unis/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note politique décortique les priorités de sécurité nationale de l’administration Biden, son positionnement face à l’Union européenne.. Sans pour autant tourner le dos au contre-terrorisme, la défense américaine semble de plus en plus orienter son regard vers la Chine à l’heure de la compétition entre grandes puissances. Pourtant, la Chine n’est pas le seul défi que les États-Unis doivent affronter dans un monde multipolaire. Les États-Unis, puissance mondiale en déclin relatif, souhaitent préserver le statu quo favorable à leur hégémonie. Cela se remarque d’ailleurs dans le désir de l’administration Biden de défaire les politiques de Donald Trump et de restaurer le leadership et la réputation des États-Unis sur la scène mondiale. Les États-Unis, puissance aux ambitions globales, entrevoient actuellement une actualisation de leur planification stratégique. Toutefois, quels sont les changements prévus à la planification stratégique ? Et ont-ils les moyens de leur ambition ? Cette note politique décortique les priorités de sécurité nationale de l’administration Biden, son positionnement face à l’Union européenne, la stratégie américaine en Indopacifique ainsi que le concept de guerre unique que semblent privilégier les États-Unis. Les priorités en matière de sécurité nationale de l’administration Biden L’une des principales priorités en matière de sécurité nationale de la nouvelle administration Biden est de défendre la primauté américaine pour dissuader et prévenir les adversaires de menacer directement les États-Unis ou leurs alliés, et d’empêcher leur domination de régions clés. Pour ce faire, les États-Unis entendent diriger et soutenir un système international stable et ouvert, fondé sur des alliances démocratiques fortes, des institutions multilatérales et des règles. L’administration Biden insiste sur le fait que les États-Unis ne peuvent atteindre ces objectifs seuls et qu’ils doivent s’appuyer sur leurs alliés et partenaires à travers le monde, notamment avec l’OTAN, l’Australie, le Japon, la Corée du Sud, la Nouvelle-Zélande, Singapour, le Vietnam et l’ASEAN. S’il semble que ces priorités de sécurité nationale soient fortement orientées vers la région Indopacifique, la nouvelle orientation stratégique en matière de sécurité nationale mentionne également un réengagement solide avec l’Union européenne tout en continuant la lutte contre le terrorisme et la dissuasion envers l’Iran à l’aide de partenaires régionaux. De son côté, le département de la Défense définit la Chine comme son principal défi face auquel il souhaite développer les concepts, les capacités et les plans opérationnels appropriés pour renforcer la dissuasion et maintenir l’avantage concurrentiel des États-Unis. La nouvelle évaluation annuelle de la menace du Bureau du directeur national du renseignement de 2021 estime également que la Chine, mais aussi la Russie, constituent des menaces importantes, insistant sur les ambitions globales de la Chine et les actions provocatrices de la Russie. L’Europe, le partenaire indispensable Si la compétition avec la Chine devient de plus en plus centrale dans la grande stratégie américaine, il est probable que les États-Unis envisagent les autres régions du monde sous ce même angle compétitif, et cherchent alors du soutien de ses partenaires et alliés dans leur rivalité avec la Chine. L’administration Trump avait déjà cherché à engager les pays européens dans son opposition à la Chine, notamment en faisant pression pour le bannissement de l’entreprise chinoise Huawei des infrastructures de télécommunication 5G des pays européens. Selon Simon, Desmaele et Becker de l’Institut en études européennes de l’Université Vrije de Bruxelles, les États-Unis font face à deux importants défis en Europe concernant leur rivalité avec la Chine. Tout d’abord, les ressources des États-Unis n’étant pas illimitées, s’ils font de la Chine leur priorité stratégique, ils auront moins de ressources pour jouer un rôle proactif en Europe, laissant les acteurs régionaux exercer leur influence. Toutefois, les États-Unis souhaitant conserver un certain équilibre en Europe, notamment vis-à-vis de la Russie, ils vont devoir compter sur le Royaume-Uni et la France pour les aider à maintenir l’équilibre sur le continent européen. Deuxièmement, les États-Unis souhaitent étendre leurs considérations stratégiques en Europe afin de contrer l’influence grandissante de la Chine. Pour cela, les États-Unis doivent s’assurer que les partenaires et alliés européens ne fassent pas trop de place à la Chine, que celle-ci et la Russie ne divisent pas les pays européens, et que ces derniers soutiennent les objectifs stratégiques américains dans l’Indopacifique. La question reste de savoir quel sera le comportement des pays européens face à la compétition sino-américaine. Si la récente stratégie de l’Union européenne pour la coopération en Indopacifique laisse penser à un consensus sur un pivot asiatique de l’UE, la réalité est qu’il existe des divergences sur la place que l’Indopacifique doit occuper dans la politique internationale de l’UE. Ainsi, si la France, l’Allemagne et les Pays-Bas sont prêts à s’engager militairement dans la région Indopacifique, ce n'est pas le cas d’autres pays européens qui préfèrent la neutralité. D’ailleurs, les divergences se font également sentir entre la France et l’Allemagne. Si la France souhaite ouvertement contrecarrer l’hégémonie chinoise et stabiliser la région, l’Allemagne met davantage l’accent sur les opportunités économiques. La planification militaire et stratégique des États-Unis face à la compétition entre grandes puissances Alors que la Défense américaine s’était préparée pendant plusieurs décennies à vaincre plusieurs adversaires régionaux successivement dans des guerres de tailles moyennes, elle prévoit maintenant une norme de guerre unique visant à vaincre une grande puissance rivale capable d’égaler la puissance américaine. Cette nouvelle stratégie prépare les États-Unis à confronter une grande puissance, comme la Chine ou la Russie, plutôt que plusieurs adversaires plus faibles comme l’Iran et la Corée du Nord. Il s’agit là du plus important changement de la planification stratégique américaine depuis la fin de la Guerre froide. Cette nouvelle stratégie demande également une nouvelle planification des forces et surtout des capacités pour vaincre l’ennemi. Les États-Unis semblent privilégier les capacités de dissuasion par interdiction, soit pour dissuader l’adversaire de lancer une attaque si elle a peu de chance d’aboutir, ou de détruire les capacités d’attaques de l’ennemi avant que celui-ci ne les utilise. Il s’agira par exemple de la capacité de frapper plusieurs cibles à l’intérieur du territoire de l’adversaire pour détruire ses capacités de projection de la force. C’est la stratégie du troisième contrebalancier (Third Offset), développée depuis l’administration Obama et qui met l’accent sur la supériorité par les nouvelles technologies et la dissuasion. Cette stratégie est conçue pour faire face à plusieurs défis opérationnels comme le déni d’accès et l’interdiction de zone (Anti-Access/Area Denial, A2/AD), les munitions guidées, la guerre sous-marine, la cyberguerre et la guerre électronique. Elle cible spécifiquement les capacités de la Russie et de la Chine, surtout au niveau de l’A2/AD. En théorie, la stratégie de la dissuasion par interdiction est très efficace face à une puissance révisionniste. La capacité de protéger son territoire et ses alliés, et la capacité de détruire les capacités de projection de force de l’adversaire seraient plus efficaces que les alternatives, comme la dissuasion par punition ou le repli stratégique. Abandonner le contrôle des mers en Indopacifique ? Face aux contraintes budgétaires inhérentes à toute action publique, certains proposent que les États-Unis abandonnent le contrôle des mers en Indopacifique, pour se concentrer sur une stratégie moins coûteuse. Tout d’abord, si les États-Unis cherchent la supériorité maritime en Indopacifique, c’est parce qu’autrement, la Chine remplirait la place laissée par le retrait américain. Or, il n’est pas certain que la Chine remplisse le vide laissé par un retrait américain. Ensuite, il y a un risque stratégique pour les États-Unis à chercher le contrôle maritime de l’Indopacifique, celui de la distance. Lorsque la puissance maritime est projetée à une grande distance des côtes américaines, les forces américaines sont particulièrement vulnérables aux mesures destinées à augmenter les coûts d'accès, tout en rendant les États-Unis dépendants des territoires alliés pour le soutien des forces déployées par le biais des bases, des infrastructures et de la logistique. Ensuite, plus les coûts et les risques liés au maintien de l’accès augmentent, plus les enjeux asymétriques deviennent contraignants pour les États-Unis. C’est particulièrement vrai maintenant que la Chine est capable d’affliger de lourds coûts aux États-Unis par le développement de capacités maritimes, sous-marines, de missiles balistiques air, mer et terre permettant une stratégie A2/AD. Il serait alors plus facile, moins risqué et moins coûteux de faire en sorte d’interdire le contrôle des mers plutôt que de l’exercer. Il faudrait alors abandonner l’ambition de primauté dans cette région. Les vulnérabilités de la stratégie de guerre unique Malgré les avantages de la stratégie de guerre unique fondée sur la dissuasion par interdiction évoqués plus haut, celle-ci comporte de nombreux risques, défis et zones d’ombre. Le premier risque est évidemment si les États-Unis sont confrontés à deux guerres ou plus au même moment. Les États-Unis feraient alors face à un dilemme pour la répartition de l’effort de guerre sur plusieurs théâtres d’opération. On peut rétorquer que si les États-Unis montrent leur capacité à gagner rapidement la première guerre, cela dissuadera le deuxième adversaire d’attaquer, ou de faire avancer ses intérêts. Cependant, toute guerre comporte son lot d’incertitudes et rien ne garantit une victoire rapide et décisive. Ensuite, même en cas de victoire rapide et décisive par les États-Unis, le mode opératoire des États-Unis sera révélé, ainsi que les potentielles vulnérabilités qu’un adversaire pourrait exploiter sur un second théâtre d’opération. Enfin, il ne faut pas oublier qu’un pays qui déclenche une guerre est un pays qui pense être sûr de pouvoir la gagner. Le biais de la confiance en ses capacités de gagner une guerre (overconfidence bias) peut altérer, voire diminuer la supposée dissuasion d’une victoire rapide et décisive sur le premier adversaire. La deuxième stratégie des États-Unis face à un second théâtre d’opération serait de repousser la riposte le temps de gagner la première guerre. Cependant, cela peut permettre au deuxième adversaire de changer le statu quo à son avantage dans une région particulière, rebattant les cartes, d’où le besoin de s’appuyer sur les alliés régionaux. La deuxième limite de la stratégie de la guerre unique par la dissuasion par interdiction est la volonté d’un décideur de répondre à une première utilisation de la force par un adversaire. Les États-Unis seraient peut-être réticents à répondre à une démonstration de force s’ils ne sont pas certains des motivations de l’adversaire. Les États-Unis devraient définir clairement le type d’action militaire pour lequel ils riposteront en anéantissant les capacités offensives de l’ennemi. Enfin, un important défi reste la crédibilité des États-Unis à utiliser la force lorsqu’ils ne sont pas directement ciblés. À quel point les États-Unis sont-ils prêts à déclencher une guerre pour protéger un partenaire lorsqu’il est difficile de faire la distinction entre une provocation, une attaque isolée, ou le début d’une série d’attaques militaires ? Par exemple, la Chine pourrait débuter des manœuvres militaires maritimes près de Taïwan ou faire usage de la force contre un navire étranger. La réponse à ces manœuvres ou à cette attaque dépendra de leur bonne interprétation. Il faudra alors déterminer s’il s’agit simplement de provocations, d’une attaque isolée, ou si les manœuvres navales ou l’usage de la force contre un navire sont le début d’un plus vaste engagement militaire. Les capacités de renseignement comme outil indispensable Les États-Unis ne peuvent pas implanter leur nouvelle stratégie sans au préalable développer leur capacité de renseignement pour soutenir cette stratégie. Le renseignement est requis pour comprendre et anticiper les doctrines des adversaires, prévenir les surprises tactiques et opérationnelles et s’assurer que les capacités militaires américaines ne sont pas compromises avant d’entrer en action. Face aux capacités technologiques de la Chine et de la Russie, le renseignement doit aujourd’hui intégrer davantage le domaine cybernétique, numérique et spatial, tout en étant convenablement assimilé aux fonctions de commandement et de contrôle pour assurer une prise de décision rapide. La coopération en renseignement doit être également, plus que jamais, mise de l’avant, non seulement pour partager les renseignements, mais aussi pour agir conjointement. C’est d’autant plus vrai au sein du Groupe des cinq, le plus institutionnalisé des partenariats en renseignement. Par exemple, dans les domaines cybernétique et spatial, la capacité des agences de renseignement électromagnétique (SIGINT) du Groupe des cinq à surveiller, analyser et pénétrer les adversaires s’avèrera un atout déterminant dans les futurs conflits. Au-delà de ce cercle fermé, les agences de renseignement doivent renforcer leur collaboration avec d’autres pays, comme le Japon et l’Allemagne, pour notamment soutenir la stratégie américaine en Europe et dans l’Indopacifique. Les récentes déclarations concernant la création de deux centres de missions sur la Chine par la Central Intelligence Agency reflètent l'importance du renseignement dans la stratégie américaine pour contrer la Chine. Considérations pour le Canada Une des questions les plus importantes face au positionnement stratégique américain actuel est quelle est la place du Canada dans la stratégie américaine et quel rôle devrait ou pourrait jouer le Canada. S’il est relativement certain que les États-Unis demanderont un quelconque appui du Canada dans leur nouvelle orientation stratégique, la position canadienne est loin d’être claire pour le moment. Le Canada devrait donc repenser sa politique étrangère compte tenu des nouveaux développements sur la scène internationale et du repositionnement stratégique de son principal allié. La politique étrangère canadienne doit refléter les intérêts nationaux du Canada, mais aussi les intérêts d’alliance, notamment ceux des États-Unis et de l’OTAN. Des orientations stratégiques claires, cohérentes avec la politique étrangère canadienne, devront également être formulées. Au niveau du renseignement, le directeur du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS) David Vigneault a de nouveau rappelé que la Chine est une des premières menaces à la sécurité nationale du Canada. Dans ce domaine, le Canada pourrait accroître sa coopération avec des alliés de la région Indopacifique, notamment en matière de cyber-renseignement. Si les États-Unis font du renseignement un de leurs outils privilégiés pour faire face à la Chine, le Canada ne devrait pas tomber dans le piège de dépendre uniquement des renseignements américains, certes utiles, mais ne reflétant pas nécessairement les intérêts canadiens. Le développement d’une expertise Indopacifique en matière de renseignement serait la meilleure façon pour le Canada d’avoir une connaissance de l’environnement et d’agir selon ses intérêts. Il est peu probable que le Canada soit amené, dans un avenir proche, à jouer un rôle prépondérant en Indopacifique. Traditionnellement, cette région n’est pas d’un intérêt primordial pour le Canada. Toutefois, le Canada doit se préparer à contribuer d’une façon ou d’une autre aux efforts américains dans la région. Ces contributions, qui peuvent être de différentes natures, peuvent passer par un renforcement de la présence militaire canadienne en Indopacifique, un renforcement des relations diplomatiques avec certains pays de la région ou par un rapprochement avec des forums déjà existant comme le Dialogue quadrilatéral sur la sécurité (Quad). Cependant, toute contribution en Indopacifique ne devrait pas se faire au détriment des intérêts nationaux canadiens. Ainsi, la proposition des États-Unis d’étendre le rôle du Groupe des cinq en Asie-Pacifique pour mieux contenir la Chine ne semble pas être une option que devrait soutenir le Canada. La Nouvelle-Zélande a d’ailleurs récemment affirmé ne pas être en faveur d’une expansion du rôle du Groupe des cinq pour faire pression sur la Chine. La possibilité de représailles de la Chine risque de toucher plus durement les puissances moyennes comme le Canada. Par exemple, l’interdiction de l’importation de canola canadien par la Chine serait une mesure de représailles contre le Canada suite aux relations tendues entre Pékin et Ottawa, tout comme l’arrestation de deux Canadiens en Chine serait une représaille à l’affaire Meng Wanzhou de Huawei. D’ailleurs, les deux Canadiens, ainsi que deux Américains, ont été libérés après une entente entre la justice américaine et Meng Wanzhou, ce qui laisse penser à première vue que la diplomatie des otages a fonctionné. De plus, le Canada n’a pas des moyens illimités, et une augmentation des budgets de la défense pour une contribution en Indopacifique n’est pour l’heure pas envisagée. Donc, si une contribution importante devait se faire en Indopacifique, cela se ferait au détriment d’autres engagements ou priorités nationales, comme l’Arctique ou l’Europe de l’Est. ## L’Agenda Femmes, Paix et Sécurité à l’OTAN à la lumière de la guerre en Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lagenda-femmes-paix-et-securite-a-lotan-a-la-lumiere-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2023-10-10 > Pour la première fois de son histoire, l’agenda Femmes, Paix et Sécurité (FPS) est mentionné dans le Concept stratégique de l’OTAN... L’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) a enfin mis à jour son Concept stratégique en 2022, quelques mois après que la Russie ait envahi l’Ukraine. Même si ce document réaffirme l’importance de la défense collective et de la dissuasion, il identifie aussi une panoplie d’autres défis sécuritaires, tout en décrivant les principes et valeurs qui façonnent le cours des discussions à l’OTAN et dans les capitales de ses États membres. Pour la première fois de son histoire, l’agenda Femmes, Paix et Sécurité (FPS) est mentionné dans le Concept stratégique de l’OTAN. Tel qu’évoqué dans mon livre Deploying Feminism : The Role of Gender in NATO Military Operations, l’importance de la diversité est au cœur des efforts de diplomatie publique de l’OTAN, mais ces normes émergentes peuvent-elles avoir un impact tangible sur les pratiques d’une organisation qui demeure majoritairement masculine et militarisée ? Les normes tirées de l’agenda Femmes, Paix et Sécurité sont promues par plusieurs organisations internationales (Organisation des Nations Unies, Union européenne, l’Union africaine, etc.), dont l’OTAN, qui développent des initiatives visant à accroître la participation des femmes – y compris dans les opérations militaires – et à réaliser des analyses de conflits qui soient sensibles aux questions de genre. Si l’activisme féministe en marge des conférences mondiales sur les femmes a contribué à l’émergence de ces normes sur la dimension genrée des conflits, celles-ci ont été institutionnalisées par le biais de l’agenda Femmes, paix et sécurité, initialement adopté à l’ONU en 2000, avec la Résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité. Au-delà des efforts diplomatiques qui ont entériné ces normes, les forces armées sont souvent à l’avant-garde de ces changements dans les zones de conflit, donc elles intègrent ces considérations de genre dans la planification et l’exécution des missions ou encore dans les activités de formations dans le cadre des opérations de paix. Pour les troupes déployées dans le cadre des missions de l’OTAN, cela signifie souvent qu’on recherche des femmes comme interlocutrices dans leur zone d’opération afin d’améliorer les activités de collecte de renseignements. Au sein de l’OTAN, les acquis de l’agenda Femmes, Paix et Sécurité ont été solidifiés par le biais de nouveaux postes et de plusieurs politiques, tant du côté civil que militaire. Cependant, la pertinence de ces idées pour la défense collective n’a été que peu abordée, un enjeu que l’on peut mieux comprendre en précisant le contexte dans lequel l’agenda Femmes, Paix, et Sécurité a été mis en œuvre au sein de l’OTAN et dans le cadre de ses opérations. L’agenda Femmes, Paix et Sécurité à l’OTAN Le Concept stratégique, document phare qui identifie les menaces et objectifs de l’Alliance, parle de « la thématique ‘femmes, paix et sécurité’, qu’il nous faut prendre en considération dans nos tâches fondamentales ». Cette thématique est aussi mise de l’avant dans le cadre de la coopération entre l’Union européenne et l’OTAN, ainsi que des défis humanitaires qui touchent aux activités de l’OTAN. Dans un autre paragraphe sur la résilience, l’agenda FPS est aussi mentionné et on y ajoute l’objectif plus spécifique de « promouvoir l’égalité des genres, conformément à nos valeurs ». Si le lien avec la résilience n’est pas immédiatement clair, il est pourtant fondamental. L’Alliance reconnaissant dans le Concept stratégique que la défense nationale et collective dépend de la résilience de l’ensemble de la société, les femmes doivent nécessairement contribuer à définir les enjeux de sécurité et participer à leur résolution. Comme nous l’avons vu avec la pandémie, les questions de résilience ne peuvent écarter 50% de la population dans le cadre des processus d’élaboration de solutions équitables et durables. …   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## L’aide internationale face à la crise humanitaire afghane URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/laide-internationale-face-a-la-crise-humanitaire-afghane/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Ce point chaud propose des pistes de solutions pour mieux encadrer l'octroi de l'aide internationale dans le cadre de la crise humanitaire... En 2001, la signature de l’accord de Bonn marque le début d’un investissement important de l’Occident dans la refonte culturelle, économique et politique de l’Afghanistan. Vingt ans plus tard, un gouvernement affaibli a été renversé par les talibans laissant la communauté internationale face à l’échec de son intervention et devant répondre à un dilemme : comment soutenir les populations locales qui sont depuis deux décennies dépendantes de l’aide internationale sans légitimer un gouvernement autoritaire qui, par ses actions, a démontré à maintes reprises qu’il n’avait aucunement l’intention de respecter les conditions imposées par la communauté internationale en vue de l’octroi de l’aide. La réponse de la communauté internationale face à la reprise du pouvoir par les talibans a été unanime. D’un côté, elle a retiré sa participation financière active à toutes les structures existantes, plongeant plus du tiers de la population afghane dans l’insécurité alimentaire et financière. De l’autre côté, elle a conditionné l’aide humanitaire à la nécessité pour les talibans de respecter un ensemble de critères. Cependant, cette approche, bien que compréhensible considérant le climat d’incertitude dans lequel le pays se trouve, sous-entend une logique réactive et un manque de réflexion stratégique sur le type d’engagement nécessaire à la protection des populations locales et à la préservation des intérêts internationaux. En ce qui a trait à l’assistance humanitaire, elle concerne essentiellement la réponse aux besoins immédiats et à court terme de la population à l’avènement d’une crise majeure. Les fonds qui y sont alloués visent essentiellement l’assouvissement des besoins primaires des populations et à construire une résilience au niveau communautaire. La neutralité sur laquelle elle est censée se baser permet au personnel travaillant sur place de minimiser les risques de représailles. Elle représente donc une partie infime de l’aide économique, mais dont l’objectif est autrement vital. Dans ce contexte, malgré les risques de taxation des ONGs par les talibans (ce qui sous-tendrait leur accès à une partie de l’aide humanitaire d’urgence), il reste important pour la communauté internationale d’adopter une approche basée sur la gestion de ce risque au lieu de miser sur la maximisation de son évitement. Cependant, l’aide humanitaire d’urgence, bien que nécessaire considérant la crise actuelle, reste limitée dans les changements qu’elle peut induire. Aider la population à survivre aux prochains mois est certes essentiel, mais reste insuffisant pour sortir de la crise. Bien que l’octroi d’une aide économique accrue impliquerait la reconnaissance des talibans (ce qui est encore loin d’être le cas), la communauté internationale se devra d’élargir le débat au-delà des négociations relatives au droit d’accès aux populations locales. Dans ce contexte, afin que la communauté internationale puisse maximiser son impact sur les conditions de vie de la population et éviter le débordement du conflit, elle va devoir, dans l’articulation de l’octroi de l’aide, appréhender l’impact de trois dimensions sur son efficacité. Premièrement, la communauté internationale doit inscrire son action sur le long terme. Dans ce contexte, il est donc primordial de tirer les leçons nécessaires des erreurs passées. Depuis les deux dernières décennies, la communauté internationale a fait du renforcement des capacités du gouvernement afghan une question de sécurité internationale liée directement à la lutte contre le terrorisme. Les coûts qui en ont découlé se chiffrent en centaines de milliards de dollars. Bien que cela ait permis l’amélioration des conditions socio-économiques de la population, notamment pour les femmes et les filles, plusieurs rapports, notamment ceux du SIGAR, ont souligné l’inefficacité de l’aide qui en a découlé. L’une des raisons principales étant que l’engagement international s’est souvent fait sur une base favorisant des solutions à court terme, les programmes développés étant mal ciblés, les stratégies incohérentes et les attentes irréalistes. L’assistance requise afin de sortir le pays de la crise ne devrait donc plus se faire selon des logiques réactives dénuées de planification stratégique. Dans ce contexte, il sera question pour les grandes puissances d’élargir leur spectre de négociation notamment en ce qui concerne la sévérité des sanctions imposées. Pour le moment, seules certaines activités humanitaires ont été autorisées par l’octroi de licences d’exemptions par le Conseil du trésor américain.  De plus, bien que plusieurs initiatives soient entreprises notamment par le PNUD afin de faire parvenir de la liquidité aux communautés et entreprises locales, l’efficacité même de certaines initiatives humanitaires reste basée sur la présence de services gouvernementaux et infrastructures de base. Ceci devra impliquer l’élaboration de programmes et politiques qui permettent un engagement à long terme avec un gouvernement taliban. C’est donc dans ce contexte qu’une collaboration multilatérale est de mise. Deuxièmement, les puissances internationales, et essentiellement les pays ayant un historique d’intervention en Afghanistan, se doivent de trouver un front commun quant au contenu des conditions de l’aide. Cela semble loin d’être le cas actuellement. La tenue par la Russie d’une rencontre parallèle à celle du G7 incluant les talibans, les pays limitrophes à l’Afghanistan directement affectés par le conflit, mais pas les États-Unis, démontre la divergence d’intérêts et de perspectives d’approche entre les différents pays. Ceci mène à une fragmentation du discours et crée une opportunité d’instrumentalisation de l’aide allant à l’encontre des intérêts des populations locales. Considérant l’historique de l’implication des Nations unies et son expérience sur le terrain, que ce soit en termes de distribution de l’aide ou de négociation avec les talibans, la Mission d’assistance des Nations unies en Afghanistan (UNAMA) pourrait constituer une plateforme pour coopérer. La renégociation de son mandat dès le dépôt par le Secrétaire général de son rapport en janvier 2022 constituera un exercice de coopération multilatérale difficile au sein duquel il sera question de mettre en balance les intérêts divergents des différents acteurs. Ceci démontrera si la communauté internationale sera capable de trouver une stratégie concertée apte à répondre à la complexité des défis auxquels l’Afghanistan gouverné par les talibans fait face. Troisièmement, la communauté internationale doit appréhender plus globalement les dynamiques existantes au sein du mouvement des talibans en ce qui concerne son processus de prise de décision. Les talibans forment un groupe disparate qui doit sa survie à l’instrumentalisation des faiblesses de l’intervention internationale et à la diversité de ses sources de revenus. Depuis leur retour au pouvoir, les priorités du groupe s’illustrent dans le maintien de leur cohésion interne et de leur autorité au niveau domestique. Dans ce contexte, conditionner l’aide a peu de chances d’induire un changement politique, d’autant plus que ceci impliquerait la nécessité de retirer cette dernière si les conditions d’octroi ne sont pas respectées. Historiquement, cela a rarement été le cas. En pratique, l’alignement des actions des talibans avec les exigences de la communauté internationale risque de se faire uniquement dans la mesure où ces dernières convergent avec les intérêts du groupe. La santé et l’assainissement restent des domaines dont le caractère non discriminatoire a permis leur maintien dans les zones de conflits; c’est donc des domaines que la communauté internationale pourrait envisager comme point de départ d’une négociation avec les talibans. Considérant l’échec des interventions militaires au courant des dernières décennies, la coercition risque d’avoir des effets pervers et ne pas induire les changements adéquats. La communauté internationale devra trouver un moyen d’engager les talibans, et, au-delà d’une aide humanitaire d’urgence, devra trouver comment acheminer au moins partiellement une aide économique en vue de permettre la fourniture de services publics de base, sans pour autant reconnaitre ou légitimer le gouvernement. À cette fin, les conditions liées à l’octroi d’un support économique se doivent d’être réalistes et pragmatiques, permettant l’amélioration de l’accès à certains droits tout en n’étant pas en contradiction flagrante avec les intérêts intrinsèques des talibans. La crise humanitaire actuelle par son ampleur et ses implications économiques et sécuritaires a placé la communauté internationale face à plusieurs défis. D’un côté, il reste nécessaire de faire face à la crise humanitaire, mais de l’autre côté il est impératif de ne pas soutenir économiquement un régime dont les valeurs sont en contradiction avec les droits de la personne. Dans ce contexte, l’aide humanitaire d’urgence et la neutralité qui la sous-tend restent nécessaires. Cependant, cette dernière est insuffisante afin de sortir le pays de la crise. Dans ce contexte, la communauté internationale devra élargir le débat quant aux modalités d’engagement futur avec les talibans. Si elle souhaite contrecarrer les manquements des deux dernières décennies, inscrire ses actions selon une perspective préventive et non réactive est de mise. Pour cela, la planification doit se faire sur le long terme, ce qui implique une action concertée entre les différentes parties prenantes et le développement d’une compréhension approfondie des cadres structurels des talibans. ## L’appui à la sécurité et au renforcement des capacités en Afrique – DISCOURS D’HONNEUR URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lappui-a-la-securite-et-au-renforcement-des-capacites-en-afrique-discours-dhonneur/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Re-democratizing Africa Again? Engaging emerging challenges to peace and security in a time of crises - Cyril Obi, Social Science Research... note, cette vidéo est uniquement en anglais Redémocratiser l’Afrique ? Relever les nouveaux défis de la paix et de la sécurité en période de crise Discours d’honneur : Cyril Obi, Social Science Research Council ## L’appui à la sécurité et au renforcement des capacités en Afrique – PANEL 1 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lappui-a-la-securite-et-au-renforcement-des-capacites-en-afrique-panel-1/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Sait-on mieux répondre de manière intégrée aujourd’hui? Si oui, comment? Quels sont des exemples d’action en matière de sécurité ou de... Comment agir de manière innovante en réponse aux défis sécuritaires en Afrique? Sait-on mieux répondre de manière intégrée aujourd’hui? Si oui, comment? Quels sont des exemples d’action en matière de sécurité ou de renforcement des capacités particulièrement innovantes ou efficaces émergeant de contextes africains? Présidente : Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal Niagalé Bagayoko, Africa Security Sector Network Mpako Foaleng, Département des Operations de Paix, ONU Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Université Bishop’s ## L’appui à la sécurité et au renforcement des capacités en Afrique – PANEL 2 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lappui-a-la-securite-et-au-renforcement-des-capacites-en-afrique-panel-2/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Le concept de ‘renforcement des capacités’ – capacity-building – est un concept mobilisé pour faire face à divers défis de la sécurité. Renforcer les capacités dans un cadre multidimensionnel Le concept de ‘renforcement des capacités’ – capacity-building – est un concept mobilisé pour faire face à divers défis de la sécurité. Quelles sont les problématiques et débats actuels en lien avec ce concept? Quelles sont les capacités les plus souvent traitées? Les capacités de qui, et un renforcement par qui? Comment concevoir des capacités de manière assez large et inclusive pour prendre acte de la multi-dimensionnalité des enjeux de sécurité en Afrique? Présidente : Niagalé Bagayoko, Africa Security Sector Network Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal—Saint-Jean Pierre Leroux, MFO Chief Liaison, Canadian Contingent Commande Adam Sandor, Université du Québec à Montréal ## L’appui à la sécurité et au renforcement des capacités en Afrique – PANEL 3 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lappui-a-la-securite-et-au-renforcement-des-capacites-en-afrique-panel-3/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Comment les actions à un niveau se répercutent-elles à d’autres niveaux ? L’importance d’inclure tous les bénéficiaires d’une action... De l’international au local: les croisements entre niveaux d’analyse et d’action Comment les actions à un niveau se répercutent-elles à d’autres niveaux ? L’importance d’inclure tous les bénéficiaires d’une action sécuritaire dans la conception de celle-ci est reconnue, mais comment le faire en pratique de manière crédible et durable? Président : Philippe Frowd, Université d’Ottawa Adib Bencherif, Université de Sherbrooke Arsène Brice Bado, Centre de Recherche et d’Action pour la Paix Maria Martin de Almagro, Université de Gand ## L’appui à la sécurité et au renforcement des capacités en Afrique – PANEL 4 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lappui-a-la-securite-et-au-renforcement-des-capacites-en-afrique-panel-4/ Modified: 2022-03-17 > Comment utiliser des outils non-traditionnels, pour faire face à des problématiques traditionnelles de la sécurité, comme la violence armée.. Le croisement de problématiques traditionnelles et non-traditionnelles Comment utiliser des outils non-traditionnels, pour faire face à des problématiques traditionnelles de la sécurité, comme la violence armée (terrorisme, guerres)? Comment définir l’innovation en matière d’action d’appui sécuritaire de manière à faire le pont entre chercheurs et praticiens? Quels sont les défis et les risques posés par des initiatives qui visent mettre en dialogue la sécurité traditionnelle et d’autres secteurs? Président : Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal—Saint-Jean Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Université Carleton Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal Virginie Tardif-Plante, Affaires mondiales Canada Philippe Frowd, Université d’Ottawa ## L’Arctique, une zone géographique en proie à des tensions géopolitiques avec la Russie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/larctique-une-zone-geographique-en-proie-a-des-tensions-geopolitiques-avec-la-russie/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Les tensions géopolitiques liées à l’Arctique se sont développées à la suite de l’attitude hostile de la Russie dans la région. La guerre en Ukraine joue un rôle important dans l’accentuation de cette crise. Depuis plusieurs années, la Russie a intensifié la militarisation de son territoire arctique, suscitant des préoccupations quant à ses intentions dans le Grand Nord. Cette situation a conduit à une escalade des tensions avec d'autres pays de la région, tels que le Canada, les États-Unis, ainsi que plusieurs pays européens, qui s'inquiètent de cette montée en puissance militaire. Cependant, ces tensions diplomatiques au sujet de l’arctique ne sont pas nouvelles. La région a déjà été le théâtre de confrontations similaires. On peut notamment évoquer les tensions politiques et militaires issues de la guerre froide, qui semblent se répéter à notre époque. Ce qui distingue la situation actuelle de celle de la guerre froide, ce sont les intérêts en jeu : aujourd'hui, ils sont principalement stratégiques, économique et militaires, et non plus idéologiques. L'Arctique constitue une région d'importance économique pour la Russie, les États-Unis, le Canada, ainsi que pour plusieurs pays européens comme la Finlande, la Norvège, la Suède et le Danemark. L'archipel arctique canadien, qui représente 40 % du territoire national, est un espace stratégique majeur pour le pays. Celle-ci est frontalière avec la Russie qui revendique qu’une partie de la mer arctique relève de ses eaux intérieures, justifiant cette position par son rattachement aux îles Sibériennes. Cette région du monde est depuis de nombreuses années le théâtre de tensions diplomatiques, auxquelles s’ajoute le réchauffement climatique, un facteur clé dans la dégradation environnementale et politique de la zone. Ces récentes tensions entre les pays arctiques, ont conduit le Canada à prendre conscience de la nécessité de moderniser ses capacités dans la région, en réponse aux enjeux politiques et militaires exacerbés par le conflit en Ukraine. Il est crucial de comprendre les raisons qui poussent le Canada à revoir sa stratégie politique en Arctique et d'en examiner les enjeux. L'objectif de cette note politique est de démontrer que la région arctique subit un changement géopolitique majeur, menaçant la stabilité politique de la zone. À cette vision s’ajoute l'idée d'une guerre hybride, mêlant moyens militaires et non militaires. La désinformation et l’ingérence étrangère semble être les nouvelles armes de cette guerre hybride, propagées par la Russie, elles peuvent avoir un impact significatif sur la stabilité de la région arctique. C'est pour cela que le Canada doit se prévaloir d’une politique de défense adaptée à une Russie qui se militarise et qui n’hésite pas à employer des moyens non militaires Pour imposer son influence à travers le monde. L’Arctique : une zone géographique en proie à des tensions diplomatiques Les tensions géopolitiques et la vulnérabilité du territoire arctique face au réchauffement climatique en font une région difficile à contrôler. Loin d'être épargnée par les désaccords politiques entre les grandes puissances, la région a vu ses tensions diplomatiques s’intensifier depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine. Cette situation se ressent sur le fonctionnement du Conseil de l’arctique, considérablement ralenti par ses membres, qui considèrent l’action russe en Ukraine comme une violation du droit international et une menace à la stabilité mondiale que le Conseil s’efforce de maintenir. Le réchauffement climatique est une menace et une opportunité pour les grandes puissances. Ce paradoxe ouvre désormais l’accès à des zones d’exploitations auparavant inaccessible à cause de la glace.  La région, riche en ressources naturelles, telles que les le charbons, le fer, l’or, l’uranium ainsi que les gisements de pétrole et de gaz naturel, est donc soumise à un accroissement des installations industrielles.  Il est estimé qu’environ 30% de la réserves mondiales de pétroles se trouve en arctique, une information qui suscite l’intérêt les grandes puissances. Certains pays considèrent que la protection de l’environnement est essentielle et que la région doit être protégée des actions humaines, tandis que d’autres y voient une opportunité de développement économique et militaire. C'est le cas de la Russie, qui intensifie sa présence militaire, justifiant cette posture par sa volonté de développer son territoire arctique, tout en défendant l’intégrité de ses frontières face aux effets du réchauffement climatique et à l’ingérence étrangère. Cette ruée vers les ressources de la région, créé un climat comparable à celui de la guerre froide, caractérisé par des tensions diplomatiques, des revendications sur les fonds océaniques et des attributions des ressources sous-marines. Ce climat de tension évoque l’évènement de 2007, lorsque la Russie avait planté un drapeau au fond de l’océan arctique, revendiquant sa souveraineté sur ces fonds marins. Une image perçue comme une manœuvre politique de la part Moscou. La montée en puissance de la Russie en Arctique La guerre en Ukraine a profondément modifié l'ordre géostratégique mondial, plongeant le monde dans un avenir incertain, tout en redéfinissant l'échiquier diplomatique de la région arctique. Notamment, à cause de l'adoption des sanctions contre la Russie, par les pays membres du conseil de l’arctique. En réponse à ces nouvelles dynamiques, les pays arctiques cherchent à renforcer leurs budgets militaires de façon à assurer leur sécurité régionale et à s'adapter aux enjeux géopolitiques accrus. C’est ce que rapportent la Norvège et le Danemark.  Ils expliquent, cependant, qu’un conflit armé est peu probable, mais qu’une guerre hybride serait envisageable compte-tenu de l’attitude de la Russie dans la région. Le contexte international qui se déroule sous nos yeux, entraine les grandes puissances dans une compétition au cours de laquelle l’Arctique sera au cœur des discussions. Les renseignements canadiens et américains font état de nouvelles bases et de nouveaux moyens militaires dans la zone contrôlée par la Russie. Cette militarisation n’est cependant pas nouvelle puisque Moscou avait indiqué sa volonté d’accentuer sa présence dans cette partie du monde. Le pays semble mener de nombreux exercices militaires dans la région, tels que des tirs de missiles balistiques en mer de Barents. Un avertissement envoyé par Moscou pour montrer sa supériorité et réaffirmer sa volonté de surveiller cette zone du monde. À cela s‘ajoute, un sentiment d’encerclement à la suite de l’adhésion de plusieurs pays arctiques à l’OTAN. Le changement d’attitude de la Russie, incite le Canada à réévaluer ses enjeux militaro-stratégiques dans la région, afin d’assurer la protection et la défense de son archipel arctique. L’ère de la guerre en Ukraine a ouvert une nouvelle porte à l’utilisation de la désinformation dans le but d’influencer les populations étrangères. Bien que les campagnes de désinformation, intégrées dans le concept de guerre hybride, soient devenues un facteur crucial en matière de défense nationale et de protections des populations, il est important de les nuancer. Ces campagnes servent à provoquer des débats au sein de la politique nationale, exacerber les clivages sociaux ou semer de la méfiance envers un gouvernement. Elles peuvent également perturber le processus démocratique d’un pays. L’objectif est de diffuser des informations totalement ou partiellement erronées, par le biais de canaux non contrôlés ou des réseaux sociaux, en ciblant des critères bien précis qui auront un impact modéré sur la sureté nationale ou sur l’opinion public. Utilisée à des fins de propagande, elle peut se révéler être une arme relativement efficace.  La Russie semble être une adepte de ces méthodes, qui ne peuvent être associées à un pays, car elles sont difficiles à détecter et à attribuer, risquant d’entrainer des tensions diplomatiques. Cependant, plusieurs rapports documentent l’usage de la désinformation lors de l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie. En qui concerne l’arctique la désinformation russe pourrait nuire aux intérêts canadiens, en créant des discordes dans l’opinion publique ou en influençant des marchés bénéfiques aux Russes. Cette approche est évoquée dans la note stratégique de Whitney Lackenbauer. Bien que le gouvernement canadien ait mis en place des mesures pour limiter l’impact de la désinformation, le défis reste immense. Dans un univers numérique comme le nôtre, il est extrêmement difficile de contrôler les fausses informations qui sont diffusées à travers le monde. Les actions rapides de réponse établie par le gouvernement canadien ne suffisent pas à limiter l’impact de celle-ci sur les communautés. Le développement militaire, un enjeu devenu nécessaire pour le gouvernement canadien Le Canada a récemment reconnu l’importance d’une remilitarisation des forces dans la région afin de se préparer à toute Éventualité. Il a également évoqué sa volonté d’améliorer le NORAD, afin de pouvoir répondre aux problèmes futurs posés par l’évolution de l’aviation, tout en protégeant les frontières et en assurant la sécurité nationale. En 2015, le gouvernement a lancé le projet GBDA (système de défense aérienne basée au sol). Mais ce projet n’est pas suffisant face aux nouvelles technologies militaires de certains pays. Les forces armées canadiennes sont dépendantes des Américains, le NORAD qui est commandé par les États-Unis assure la sécurité permanente de l’espace aérien. Mais ce n’est pas suffisant, il faut prévoir un système basé sur le territoire et orienté vers l’Arctique. Cette vision est également partagée par le ministère de la défense des États-Unis à travers une nouvelle stratégie pour l’arctique, publié le 21 juin 2024. La région du grand nord arctique semble devenir le nouveau point de surveillance pour les États-Unis et ses alliés. Le Canada, les États-Unis, ainsi que d’autres pays arctiques démontrent une volonté d’accentuer leurs présences militaires dans la région, justifiant cette prise de position par le fait que le monde traverse une période délicate au cœur de laquelle les tensions géopolitiques mondiales sont omniprésentes.  Cependant le Canada se trouve dans une situation délicate. Ses capacités militaires sont limitées, en partie à cause d’une politique de financement militaire qui considère que le pays, en raison de sa position géographique, ne serait pas vulnérable à une attaque directe. Aujourd’hui, cette perception est remise en question à mesure que les tensions dans le Grand Nord arctique s’intensifient.  Le manque de moyen est un obstacle majeur, obligeant le pays moderniser ses forces et à développer une présence dissuasive dans la région. Recommandations et considérations pour le Canada Le Canada, confronté à la montée des tensions géopolitiques en Arctique, doit renforcer ses capacités pour protéger ses intérêts et ceux de ses alliés. Le pays doit prendre en considération le fait qu’un nouvel ordre géostratégique risque de voir le jour, dans lequel l’Arctique sera le théâtre d’actions militaires et diplomatiques. L’anticipation est le nerf de la défense, il faut anticiper une crise, cela ne veut pas dire qu’elle va arriver, mais que lorsqu’elle arrivera, le pays sera en mesure de faire face à celle-ci. Le retard militaire du Canada se remarque dans tous les domaines. Il est impératif pour le pays de réévaluer sa politique de défense, en considérant un financement conforme aux recommandations de l‘OTAN, à hauteur de 2% du PIB.  En parallèle Il doit renforcer sa capacité d’interception des missiles et des aéronefs, particulièrement dans les régions éloignées et à risque. Cela inclut, la modernisation du NORAD en accord avec les États-Unis, l’acquisition de système de défense sol-air et l’implantation de bases de défense avancée pour une protection renforcée en cas de conflit de haute intensité. Il doit également réévaluer sa capacité de protection de ses frontières maritimes et assurer une présence militaire dissuasive en Arctique. L’émergence des nouvelles méthodes de désinformations, oblige le Canada à se doter d’une politique de lutte contre celles-ci. La guerre en Ukraine a mis en lumière de nouvelles méthodes de désinformation associées à l’intelligence artificielle, et il ne serait pas surprenant de voir la Russie les utiliser pour déstabiliser le Grand Nord arctique. Le programme d’actions rapides contre la désinformation établie par le gouvernement pourrait être un bon moyen d’action, permettant de contenir les fausses informations qui pourraient circuler sur les réseaux ou à travers les communautés de l’arctique. Enfin, Le Canada pourrait renforcer ses positions stratégiques en ouvrant ses bases à des pays de l’OTAN pour une protection collective. Cela permettrait d’avoir des forces militaires rapidement disponible, tout en compensant le manque de moyens actuels alloués par le gouvernement à la protection du territoire arctique. De plus le Canada bénéficie d’une solide expertise en matière d’opérations militaire en milieu polaire et de stratégies adaptées aux conditions extrêmes de la région. Cette approche pourrait s’inscrire dans la volonté commune des pays de l'arctique de renforcer leurs moyens pour prévenir toute éventualité dans cette région du monde. ## L’arme nucléaire française dans la vie politique de l’après-Guerre froide URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/larme-nucleaire-francaise-dans-la-vie-politique-de-lapres-guerre-froide/ Modified: 2025-03-13 > Quelle était la place de l’arme nucléaire française dans la vie politique après la Guerre froide ? À première vue, cette question pourrait... Quelle était la place de l’arme nucléaire française dans la vie politique après la Guerre froide ? À première vue, cette question pourrait sembler marginale, voire obsolète. Après tout, depuis les années 1990, le « second âge nucléaire » a vu une relégation de l’arme nucléaire au second plan des priorités stratégiques européennes. Éclipsée par des menaces perçues comme plus immédiates, telles que le terrorisme ou les crises migratoires, cette thématique paraît parfois ancrée dans une époque révolue, celle des tensions bipolaires de la Guerre froide. Et pourtant, réduire l’arme nucléaire française à un reliquat stratégique serait une erreur de perspective. Cet artefact, à la fois militaire et politique, occupe une place unique dans l’identité nationale et institutionnelle de la France. Indissociable du pouvoir présidentiel, il dépasse sa fonction dissuasive pour incarner un symbole de souveraineté nationale. Comme l’illustre une certaine vulgate de la geste gaullienne – que l’on peut admirer dans toute sa solennité à l’historial Charles de Gaulle aux Invalides ou, plus sarcastiquement, dans des œuvres telles qu’Au service de la France ou OSS 117 –, l’arme nucléaire en France relève autant du politique que du stratégique. Cette dimension mémorielle ne s’est pas figée lors de l’après-Guerre froide : chaque président de la Ve République, de François Mitterrand à Emmanuel Macron, a mobilisé ce symbole, parfois de manière explicite, pour asseoir sa stature. Qu’il s’agisse de discours doctrinaux, de décisions concrètes ou même d’allusions subtiles, l’arme nucléaire reste un outil de légitimation et de crédibilité pour le chef de l’État, garant ultime de l’intégrité et de la sécurité nationales. Dans cette analyse, je propose d’explorer la trajectoire de l’arme nucléaire dans la vie politique française de 1991 à nos jours. Trois dynamiques se dégagent : son effacement progressif dans les années 1990, une période d’acculturation politique et stratégique, puis son retour en grâce dans le cadre de menaces renouvelées. Ces évolutions ne se contentent pas de refléter les débats stratégiques, elles révèlent aussi des mutations plus profondes des institutions républicaines et des évolutions de la vie politique française en général. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21ème siècle : une feuille de route URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lautonomie-strategique-du-canada-au-21eme-siecle-une-feuille-de-route/ Modified: 2026-09-09 Sommaire Exécutif Pour la première fois de son histoire, le Canada fait de l’autonomie stratégique un principe structurant de sa politique de défense. Or, le gouvernement n’en a formulé ni définition concrète ni cibles permettant d’en évaluer la réalisation, au risque d’en faire un slogan mobilisateur mais peu opératoire. Cette étude comble cette lacune : elle définit l’autonomie stratégique canadienne (ASC), en identifie les dimensions, les intérêts vitaux et les menaces qui la justifient, puis propose une feuille de route capacitaire et institutionnelle pour la réaliser. L’ASC y est entendue comme la capacité de mener des opérations militaires avec les États-Unis si possible, mais sans leur soutien si nécessaire. Il s’agit d’une logique de dérisquage plutôt que de découplage, déclinée en trois dimensions : décisionnelle, opérationnelle, ainsi qu’industrielle et technologique. Elle constitue un objectif de moyen et de long terme, à l’horizon 2035-2040 a minima. Principaux faits saillants Deux intérêts vitaux. La défense de l’intégrité territoriale du Canada, incluant l’Arctique et les infrastructures critiques, et celle de l’intégrité territoriale des alliés, auxquelles s’ajoute la préservation de la liberté de navigation pour le commerce international. Trois menaces principales. La menace conventionnelle et hybride russe, incluant un test possible de l’article 5 d’ici trois à cinq ans; la fin du soutien indéfectible des États-Unis, qui doit devenir l’hypothèse directrice de planification; et la montée en puissance de la Chine, dont les effets toucheraient le Canada même sans confrontation directe. Trois contraintes structurantes. Budgétaire : les dépenses de défense de base devront atteindre 159,1 milliards de dollars en 2035-2036 selon le directeur parlementaire du budget. Capacitaire : seuls 61,3 % des éléments de force sont prêts pour les opérations et les FAC accusent un déficit d’environ 16 000 membres. Politique : l’incohérence entre la rhétorique gouvernementale et les décisions d’acquisition. Défendre le territoire. Les priorités sont, dans l’ordre : le maintien des infrastructures, la cyberdéfense et la lutte anti-drone, un commandement et contrôle souverain complémentaire au NORAD, la surveillance et les communications spatiales, la surveillance aérienne et maritime, puis une défense aérienne acquise auprès de fournisseurs non américains. Une flotte mixte de plus de 130 avions de combat. Compléter la mise en service des 88 F-35 d’ici 2034, puis y adjoindre, à partir de 2035, une cinquantaine d’appareils de prochaine génération, acquis dans le cadre d’un programme allié non américain et associés à des drones de combat collaboratifs. Une capacité souveraine de frappe en profondeur. Diversification alliée (missiles JSM, programme européen ELSA), filière souveraine d’effecteurs à bas coût, vecteurs sous-marins et maîtrise de bout en bout de la chaîne de ciblage, en appui au projet de Capacité canadienne de frappe de précision en profondeur (CCFPP). Défendre les alliés. Fournir la masse attritionnelle (munitions, intercepteurs, drones) et les facilitateurs (porter la flotte de ravitailleurs à 12 ou 15 appareils et celle des GlobalEye à 8 ou 10), compléter les douze sous-marins de type 212CD par des véhicules sous-marins autonomes et la flotte d’avions de combat par des drones de combat collaboratifs et bâtir une contribution terrestre d’environ 50 000 militaires à disponibilité échelonnée. Quatre recommandations. Élaborer une nouvelle politique de défense définissant explicitement les intérêts vitaux; publier un plan décennal d’investissements validé par le directeur parlementaire du budget; porter la recherche et le développement à au moins 3 % du budget de défense; et financer de manière structurelle un écosystème analytique indépendant. Des risques assumés. L’ASC exige une constance politique d’une génération, expose le Canada à une coercition américaine qu’un dérisquage transparent et progressif permet de gérer, et ouvre une fenêtre de vulnérabilité prolongée : l’autonomie de commandement est atteignable en une décennie, l’autonomie de déni en quinze à vingt ans et l’autonomie de frappe en profondeur au-delà de 2040. Le Canada dispose, pour la première fois depuis 1987, des ressources financières et de la volonté politique nécessaires pour construire une autonomie stratégique crédible. La feuille de route proposée vise à transformer cette ambition en réalité avant que cette fenêtre ne se referme. Lire l'étude complète ici. Crédit Image: Virginia Guard Public Affairs via Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0. ## L’avenir géopolitique de la Francophonie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lavenir-geopolitique-de-la-francophonie/ Modified: 2022-04-26 > À l’ère de la globalisation, l’uniformisation culturelle autour de l’anglo-américanisme est perçue comme un gage de la modernité. À l’ère de la globalisation, l’uniformisation culturelle autour de l’anglo-américanisme est perçue comme un gage de la modernité. La relative domination du modèle anglo-saxon ou encore en réaction celui de la Chine semble ne pas laisser de place à l’émergence d’un modèle alternatif pouvait pleinement les concurrencer. Insoupçonnée, la « vocation de la francophonie est essentiellement géopolitique ». Malgré ce que suggère son nom, l’Organisation internationale de la Francophonie est une institution dont la vocation dépasse le seul fait d’avoir le français en commun. Avec ses 88 États et gouvernements membres, l’OIF est aussi un espace géopolitique et s’investit formellement dans les enjeux économiques, politiques, de paix et de sécurité. Mais pour assurer son leadership sur la scène internationale, la Francophonie doit définir de nouvelles priorités et développer de nouvelles stratégies afin de justement dépasser le seul cadre d’une union culturelle et développer ses autres vocations. Animation: -Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, fellow et conseiller principal en communications et partenariats au CÉRIUM Intervenants : -André Abel Barry, Chef du pôle « Paix et Stabilité », Direction des Affaires politiques et de la Gouvernance démocratique à l’OIF ; membre du Conseil scientifique du RAS -Niagalé Bagayoko, présidente du African Security Sector Network et collaboratrice du RAS. Elle a déjà dirigé le programme « Maintien et consolidation de la paix » de l’OIF.   en collaboration avec le CÉRIUM (Centre d'études et de recherches internationales) ## L’Égypte dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne : un non-alignement impossible ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/legypte-dans-la-guerre-en-ukraine-un-non-alignement-impossible/ Modified: 2024-12-13 > Depuis le début de la guerre russo-ukrainienne, deux camps ont rapidement émergé. Ceux soutenant l’Ukraine dans la défense de son... Depuis le début de la guerre russo-ukrainienne, deux camps ont rapidement émergé. Ceux soutenant l’Ukraine dans la défense de son territoire et de son existence à l’image des États-Unis et des pays européens lui ont apporté un soutien rhétorique indéfectible, mais avec un soutien matériel plus élusif. Pendant ce temps, des pays importants, non seulement en termes de puissance économique et militaire, mais aussi de population, comme la Chine et l’Afrique du Sud, apportent leur soutien à la Russie dans son conflit sans toutefois y participer activement. Cependant, un troisième large groupe de pays a choisi de ne pas prendre position dans ce conflit. Cette attitude est relativement commune dans les pays du “Sud global”. Dans cette liste, nous pouvons évoquer un certain nombre de pays africains, arabes ou d’Amérique du Sud. Cette analyse se concentrera sur le cas de l’Égypte. L’Égypte est un pays ayant une position très particulière car se trouvant au croisement entre les deux grands blocs. Elle a toujours essayé d’adopter une position de non-alignement et a même été un membre fondateur du mouvement des années 50 qui refusait une quelconque adhésion à l’un ou l’autre des deux blocs géopolitiques de la Guerre froide. De plus, l’Égypte est d’une grande importance car elle est la première puissance militaire africaine, est classée dans les 20 premières puissances mondiales et son l’arsenal est principalement constitué d’équipements russes, américains et français. De plus, le budget militaire égyptien s’élève seulement à 1,1% du PIB en 2022 (soit avoisinant les 5 milliards) mais lui permet tout de même de se situer parmi les pays africains ayant les dépenses les plus importantes dans le domaine militaire avec le Maroc. Le fait que ses relations soient très fortes tant avec la Russie qu'avec les États-Unis et leur allié occidentaux influence fortement sa position dans cette guerre. Sa grande population (100 millions d’habitants), ses caractéristiques socio-économiques et le désir du président Al Sissi de remettre l’Égypte au-devant de la scène internationale font de ce pays un cas intéressant à étudier pour comprendre la position des pays africains et d’une façon générale de nombreux pays du Sud dans cette guerre. Ce texte examine donc comment l’Égypte tente de maintenir l’équilibre dans la Guerre russo-ukrainienne et si son non-alignement est toujours possible. Relations diplomatiques égyptiennes L’Égypte entretient des relations avec la Russie, les États-Unis et l’Europe autant sur le plan économique, avec des accords passés entre le gouvernement égyptien et l’Union Européenne, que militaire, avec des contrats pour l’achat de Rafale en France ou encore l’acquisition de matériel militaire russe ou américain. Tout particulièrement, les aides militaires américaines lui permettant d'asseoir sa place de puissance militaire internationale en finançant une très grande partie de ses dépenses militaire. Les relations entre l’Égypte et la Russie ne datent pas d’hier. Pendant l’ère du président égyptien Gamal Abdel Nasser et du panarabisme, l’Union soviétique, engagée dans la Guerre froide, se positionnait comme un ardent partisan des mouvements de libération et un allié crucial du processus de décolonisation au Moyen-Orient et en Égypte. Cette stratégie visait à contrecarrer l’influence occidentale dans la région. La disparition de l’Union soviétique a évidemment éloigné l’Égypte de la Russie dans la période 1992 – 2014. Cependant, leurs relations se sont fortement développées en 2014 à la suite du coup d’État d’Abdel Fattah Al Sissi. La Russie a tiré profit du recul des États-Unis en Égypte en raison des différentes critiques envers le coup de force d’Al Sissi et le non-respect des droits de l’homme pour proposer son aide militaire au pays. Depuis ce moment, la Russie est (avec la France) l’un des principaux fournisseurs d'armes de l'Égypte. Leur relation ne se limite pas à un partenariat militaire : elle comporte un important volet économique, tout particulièrement dans le domaine énergétique. En effet, l’Égypte a pour projet depuis 2015 de construire la deuxième centrale nucléaire africaine. Ce projet se concrétisa en 2022 lorsque le permis de construire fut attribué à la compagnie russe Rosatom, qui fut ainsi chargée de sa construction. Sur le plan économique, leur relation est très diverse. L’Égypte est la destination favorite des touristes russes et ukrainiens. On compte plusieurs millions de touristes russes par année en Égypte, soit 40% du tourisme total dans le pays. Ce tourisme a permis le développement de stations balnéaires égyptiennes et représente une part importante dans l’économie égyptienne. De plus, la Russie est la première pourvoyeuse de céréales en Égypte. Ainsi la consommation égyptienne de blé s’élève à 15 millions de tonnes dont 80% proviennent des importations provenant à 50% Russie et quasiment 30% d’Ukraine. Ainsi la Russie est un acteur très important pour l’Égypte dans son projet national, mais aussi dans ses relations internationales. La Russie n’est cependant pas en position dominante dans ses relations et échanges avec l’Égypte car elle entretient aussi de très bonnes relations avec des alliés de l’Ukraine comme les États-Unis et l'Union européenne. Ces relations positives ne cessent pas de croitre depuis le début de la guerre. L’essentiel de ses relations avec les États-Unis repose surtout sur leur partenariat militaire. L’Égypte se trouve être un partenaire privilégié de l’OTAN dans le cadre du dialogue méditerranéen au le Moyen-Orient et l’Afrique du Nord. En plus de sa relation avec l’OTAN, les Etats-Unis lui fournissent une aide militaire considérable depuis maintenant bien longtemps. Avec pas moins de 1,3 milliard de dollars par an depuis quasiment soixante ans, l’aide totale qui est fourni depuis la fin des années 70 s’élève à 70 milliards de dollars, faisant de l’Égypte le troisième pays le plus aidé par les États-Unis, derrière Israël et l’Ukraine depuis le début de la guerre. Du côté des Européens, l’Égypte fait partie intégrante de la politique de voisinage de l’Union européenne. De plus, la région est la première cliente de l’Égypte en absorbant 30% de ses exportations. Un certain nombre de pays entretiennent avec l'Égypte des relations particulières héritées de la période coloniale telles que la France ou l’Angleterre. Les relations avec l’Ukraine sont aussi importantes car l'Égypte est le principal partenaire économique de l’Ukraine en Afrique. Leurs relations sont diverses et s’étendent sur le plan économique avec des échanges importants, un fort afflux de touristes (plusieurs millions avant la guerre) et la présence d’une centaine d'entreprises ukrainiennes en Égypte. Les conséquences du conflit Bien que la guerre soit cantonnée sur le territoire européen, elle touche, par contrecoup, plus de pays qu’il n’y paraît. Les conséquences du conflit sont plus qu’importante pour de nombreux pays et particulièrement pour l’Égypte et l’Afrique, du fait de la dépendance de ces pays aux céréales russo-ukrainiennes. Elle a créé une situation de crise humanitaire et a intensifié en Égypte une crise économique déjà très importante. En effet, le début de la guerre a stoppé pendant un moment les exportations de blé de l’Ukraine et de la Russie, laissant ainsi les pays africains livrés à eux-mêmes. L’Égypte n’était plus en mesure de fournir du blé pour la production de pain à sa population, entraînant une flambée des prix. À l’heure d’aujourd’hui, le gouvernement se trouve sans réelle solution à court terme pour produire en plus grande quantité, du fait que 90% des ressources en eau proviennent du Nil et que déjà 80% sont utilisés pour l’agriculture. Bien que l’Égypte ait un désir de souveraineté alimentaire pour sa sécurité, elle ne peut pas l’envisager avant un certain nombre d’années. De plus, la crise économique héritée des conséquences de la COVID-19 a été accentuée par la Guerre russo-ukrainienne. La guerre a entraîné la perte d’un certain nombre d'accords économiques mettant à mal l’économie égyptienne. Pour citer certaines conséquences, nous parlons ici d’une inflation à hauteur de 33% en 2023, d’une dévaluation de la monnaie de 50% et d’une dette qui a explosé à 90% du PIB. De plus, la guerre a mis à mal le tourisme en Égypte qui reposait principalement sur la Russie et l’Ukraine. Dans ce contexte, l'Égypte se trouve prise dans de graves crises issues directement de la guerre russo-ukrainienne et tente de tout faire pour en sortir par ce qui est le fil conducteur de sa politique étrangère : la neutralité positive. Cependant, l’Égypte s’efforce aussi de poursuivre son non-alignement tout en espérant ne pas contrarier les deux camps à la fois. Il faut donc examiner comment l’Égypte prend position entre les deux grands blocs en conflit et le soutien qu'elle apporte à qui et comment. La position égyptienne Historiquement, bien qu’elle soit partenaire des États-Unis et de la Russie, l’Égypte n’a jamais hésité à défendre la souveraineté des États. Son rôle auprès de la communauté des non-alignés depuis les années 50 a d’ailleurs fortement influencé sa position. Ainsi, il aurait été logique de penser que l’Égypte poursuivrait dans cette lignée en prenant parti de défendre la souveraineté ukrainienne. Cependant, l’Égypte a modifié sa doctrine. En effet, les conséquences de la guerre et le risque pour sa sécurité ont fait qu’elle cherche davantage le balancement entre les deux camps. Ce balancement est pour elle le meilleur moyen de survivre face au conflit en délaissant ainsi sa doctrine d’égalité souveraine. L’Égypte oscille entre les deux camps. Elle ne peut se détacher de la Russie et ne peut pas se passer de l’Occident et du système libéral international. Pour cette raison, l'Égypte poursuit ses échanges avec la Russie concernant les importations de blé. Après le sommet Afrique-Russie de 2023, l’Égypte a constituée des réserves importantes de blé russe en réalisant des importations records pour le pays. Dans le domaine diplomatique, le président Al-Sissi est resté en contact avec ses homologues russes et reçoit fréquemment leurs représentants. En parallèle, l’Égypte a refusé la mise en place de sanction à l’égard de la Russie en raison des trop grandes conséquences pour son économie, au grand dam de l’Ukraine. De plus, il a été découvert en 2023 qu’un accord de livraison d’armement égyptien à destination de la Russie allait se mettre en place. 40 000 roquettes devaient être livrées. Dans ce cas-ci, les États-Unis ainsi que l’Ukraine ont fait pression sur l'Égypte afin que celle-ci revoie sa position. Avec succès la pression imposée a fait que l’Egypte s’est engagé à livrer des armes aux Etats-Unis pour les envoyer en Ukraine. Cependant, la guerre a tout de même relativement endommagé les relations russo-égyptiennes car l’Égypte ne peut se contenter de compter uniquement sur la Russie comme allié et pilier de ses relations. Ainsi, l'Égypte est aussi obligée de se tourner vers l’Occident. Elle se fit octroyer des prêts du FMI et de l’Union européenne en échange de certaines concessions dans plusieurs domaines comme le respect des droits de l’homme et contrôle de ses frontières.  Ces aides, 3 milliards sur 46 mois en 2022 en plus d’une rallonge de 5 milliards par le FMI et 7,5 milliards de l’Union européenne, sont les plus importantes accordées derrière les prêts des pays du Golfe. À côté de cela, l'Égypte cherche à diversifier ses partenaires économiques : ses échanges avec les États-Unis ainsi que l’Europe ont bondi là où ceux avec la Russie ont simplement stagné. Les échanges avec l’Europe atteignent les dizaines de milliards de dollars et les échanges avec les États-Unis correspondent au double de ceux réalisés avec la Russie (9 milliards contre 4 milliards). Finalement, dans son désir de voir le conflit s'arrêter, l’Égypte vota à l’ONU en faveur de 3 grandes résolutions défendues par l’Occident. Elle fit partie en 2023 des pays demandant l’arrêt immédiat des combats et le retrait des troupes russes. Comme le démontre le point mentionné plus haut et l’abandon de l’Egypte de sa livraison d’armes à la Russie à la suite de pressions internationales a finalement fait faire à l’Égypte un virage à 180 degrés entrainant l’envoie indirect en Ukraine d’obus de 152mm et 155mm en passant par les Etats-Unis pour se laisser une marge de manœuvre vis-à-vis de la Russie. L’Égypte est-elle réellement non-alignée ? Ainsi, malgré qu’elle cherche à promouvoir son non-alignement et à tenir une position de neutralité dans le conflit, l’Égypte peine fortement à conserver cette ligne de conduite. Le fait que ses deux grands alliés s’affrontent indirectement dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne et que sa situation interne pèse très fortement sur sa position ne lui permet pas de rester réellement neutre. Sa dépendance à la Russie et son besoin de l’Occident pour régler ses crises sont fondamentaux dans la position égyptienne. Elle est une fervente défenderesse d’une résolution du conflit, peu importe le « gagnant », sans pour autant prendre parti car elle ne souhaite pas l’enlisement qui lui nuirait fortement. Pour résumer succinctement, la position du gouvernement égyptien se limite à tout faire pour résoudre le conflit afin d’ensuite, par ricochet, résoudre ses crises internes et survivre. À cette fin, Al-Sissi a essayé de positionner l’Égypte comme médiateur du conflit en 2023. Finalement, la potentielle grande gagnante pourrait être la Chine puisqu’elle cherche à développer ses relations avec le Moyen-Orient. La Chine considère l’Égypte comme vitale pour approcher le Moyen-Orient et elle pourrait devenir, en raison de son poids dans l’économie mondiale, une alternative majeure dans une perspective de développement et d'investissements productifs à travers le projet “belt and road initiative”. Enfin, bien qu’il puisse s’agir pour les États-Unis d’un affront, l’adhésion de l’Égypte à l’organisation des BRICS+ (constitué aujourd’hui du Brésil, de la Russie, de l’Inde, de la Chine de l’Afrique du Sud mais aussi récemment de l’Iran, des Emirats Arabes Unis et de l’Ethiopie) montre en réalité que l’Égypte tente de maintenir sa position en essayant de diversifié ses relations et ses partenariats pour ne pas être coincé dans un dilemme entre Etats-Unis et Russie. En effet, les BRICS ne sont pas une alliance militaire mais plutôt un rassemblement de pays qui peuvent avoir, sur de nombreux sujets, des divergences profondes. Cependant, ces pays se rejoignent sur l’affirmation de la protection de leurs intérêts respectifs, le respect de leur indépendance, et la collaboration dans des projets communs, sans pour autant vouloir s’opposer directement à l’Occident. De plus, l’Égypte a toujours entretenu de fortes relations avec les pays membres des BRICS+. Finalement, la guerre russo-ukrainienne met en avant la rupture dans la doctrine de l’Égypte sur la scène internationale et la précarité de cette politique d’équilibre face aux sollicitations de plus en plus pressantes des deux camps. ## L’élargissement de l’OTAN 20 ans après : Quelques réflexions URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lelargissement-de-lotan-20-ans-apres-quelques-reflexions/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note politique propose quelques arguments sur lesquels une nouvelle analyse de l’élargissement de l’OTAN devrait se fonder, presque... Il est opportun de revenir sur la question de l’élargissement de l’OTAN presque trois décennies après que les institutions européennes et atlantiques aient commencé à entrouvrir la porte aux pays d’Europe centrale et de l’Est. L’essentiel du débat sur cette question s’est, en effet, déroulé de 1995 au début des années 2000. Un nouveau regard n’est donc certainement pas inutile, car avec un peu de recul, nous pouvons maintenant mieux évaluer certains arguments avancés à l’époque. Nous sommes également en mesure de réagir maintenant à certaines affirmations qui, il y a vingt ans, n’étaient que des spéculations. Nous aimerions donc proposer quelques arguments sur lesquels une nouvelle analyse de l’élargissement de l’OTAN devrait se fonder. En premier lieu, contrairement à ce que certaines analyses ont voulu faire valoir, l’élargissement de l’Alliance n’est pas seulement le fait d’un État, aussi puissant soit-il. Il est donc erroné, comme le font certains, de faire reposer la responsabilité unique de cette décision sur l’administration Clinton ou certains acteurs clés au sein de cette administration. La volonté de joindre l’Alliance reflète, aussi et surtout, le désir collectif de tous les pays dits de l’Est – de la Bulgarie jusqu’à la Baltique – de revenir vers l’Occident et de renouer avec leur héritage, à la fois culturel, économique et géopolitique. Comme le note Browning à propos de la Finlande, les racines de ces pays « were perceived as lying in the West and hence […] with the break-up of the Soviet Union they were returning to these organic origins in Western civilization ». On peut assimiler ce désir de revenir vers l’Occident à une sorte de réflexe naturel de ces sociétés. De ce point de vue, il est également erroné de distinguer la question de l’élargissement de l’Alliance et l’intégration de ces pays à l’Union européenne (UE). Les deux processus sont, plus souvent qu’autrement, inséparables. Pour les pays d’Europe centrale, si l’UE symbolise la terre promise de la prospérité, l’OTAN représente la protection et la sécurité. Comme le note Suzanne Nies : « Pour la plupart des pays dits de l’Est, l’intégration à l’OTAN et l’UE a été motivée par un souci de protection vis-à-vis de l’ancienne puissance dominatrice soviétique – souci qui se traduit par la volonté de rejoindre l’alliance opposée et de chercher une coopération étroite avec les États-Unis. C’est pourquoi tous les candidats à l’OTAN le sont également à l’UE, ce qu’illustrent parfaitement les propos de l’ambassadeur de Lituanie en France, Giedrius Cekuolis : “L’OTAN et l’UE sont pour nous comme papa et maman, et nous ne pouvons choisir entre les deux”. » La liaison nécessaire des deux processus, de ce point de vue, ne peut suggérer qu’une conclusion : l’intégration des pays d’Europe centrale, autant au sein de l’UE que l’OTAN, était probablement inévitable. Aurait-on pu empêcher les pays d’Europe centrale d’intégrer l’Union européenne ? Poser la question, c’est y répondre. Et ce qui s’applique à l’UE s’applique de la même façon à l’Alliance. L’élargissement, dans l’un et l’autre cas, est un fait qu’il vaut mieux assumer que regretter inutilement. Une erreur stratégique ? L’une des critiques les plus acerbes à l’égard de l’élargissement de l’Alliance, critique formulée par des historiens et des diplomates de renom comme John Lewis Gaddis ou George Kennan, est qu’il s’agit de l’une des « pires erreurs stratégiques » commises par les États-Unis et leurs alliés. Leur argument repose, en particulier, sur l’idée selon laquelle les politiques adoptées par les Occidentaux vis-à-vis de la Russie après 1990 ressembleraient à celles que les alliés de la Première Guerre ont forcé le Reich wilhelminien à accepter en 1919. Autrement dit, les États-Unis auraient imposé à Moscou une paix léonine et humiliante, l’élargissement de l’Alliance étant le symbole même de cette humiliation. Ceci est, selon nous, une comparaison erronée, les deux contextes étant tout à fait différents. En effet, la Russie n’a pas eu à accepter une reddition inconditionnelle, comme cela a été le cas de l’Allemagne. En outre, contrairement à l’argument de Gaddis, l’intégration des pays d’Europe centrale à l’Alliance atlantique répond à une logique stratégique évidente. La dissolution du Pacte de Varsovie et la fragmentation de l’URSS créaient un vide géopolitique au centre de l’Europe. Fallait-il laisser ce vide perdurer, au risque de voir cette région développer son propre système de relations régionales ou internationales ? Ne risquait-on pas, ainsi, de recréer une situation instable et conflictuelle semblable à l’entre-deux-guerres ? Fallait-il risquer de voir la Russie reprendre pied dans une région qu’elle considère, depuis plus d’un siècle, comme sa chasse gardée autant autour de la Baltique, qu’au centre de l’Europe et dans l’Est des Balkans ? Ce qu’on pourrait appeler la « zone grise » ou le « vide stratégique » de l’Europe centrale devait être sécurisé, et quelle meilleure solution que d’ouvrir à ces pays la porte de l’Alliance ? Aucun autre arrangement institutionnel – qu’il s’agisse de l’OSCE ou de l’UEO – n’aurait pu offrir à ces pays le même degré de protection et de sécurité. Le processus d’intégration des pays d’Europe centrale a-t-il été improvisé ou mal organisé ? A-t-il connu des ratés ? C’est évident[1]. Mais, était-ce « une erreur » ? Bien au contraire. Comme le note Andrew Michta : « Today, NATO enlargement may be seen to have been an obvious pathway to security in post-communist countries and as a means of stabilising the ‘grey zone of Europe’. While scholars and analysts continue to debate the actual scope and phases of the process, few seem to question its overall political utility…». L’engagement des États-Unis en faveur de l’élargissement n’est pas, non plus, une faute, mais bien un choix qui reflète les traditions de la politique étrangère américaine depuis 1945. Comme le rappelle Mira Rapp-Hooper dans son dernier ouvrage : « The overarching purpose of alliances has not changed: They should help the United States prevent a hostile hegemon from dominating Eurasia ». Or, ces remarques reflètent également ce que disait Henry Kissinger à la fin des années 1990 : « Our security is inextricably linked with Europe’s and now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the Continent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needs to adapt itself to the consequences of its success ». Finalement, à tous ces arguments, on peut ajouter que l’élargissement de l’OTAN répondait également à une logique politico-stratégique plus large. Comme l’a rappelé à l’époque le Canada, la vocation de l’Alliance, selon l’article 2 de la Charte, est de « développer des relations internationales pacifiques et amicales, tout en renforçant leurs institutions, et en assurant une meilleure compréhension des principes sur lesquels ces institutions étaient fondées ». En d’autres termes, loin d’être uniquement une organisation purement militaire, l’OTAN est aussi un outil destiné à promouvoir la coopération internationale et le renforcement des institutions démocratiques. Or, n’était-ce pas devenu une priorité en ce qui concerne les anciens pays de l’Est dans le cadre de l’Europe post-guerre froide ? Si la logique géopolitique qui sous-tend l’élargissement de l’OTAN est saine, il n’en demeure pas moins que l’argument principal contre l’expansion doit être examiné. Selon ses critiques, l’intégration des pays d’Europe centrale à l’Alliance, en menaçant la sécurité de la Russie dans sa cour arrière, est une, sinon la cause principale, des tensions qui opposent à nouveau Moscou à l’Occident. S’il est vrai que la Russie de Vladimir Poutine est redevenue fondamentalement hostile aux États-Unis et à tout ce qui symbolise l’Ouest, peut-on réellement affirmer que l’élargissement de l’OTAN est à la source des changements qui ont affecté la politique russe depuis 20 ans ? On peut en douter. En effet, l’humiliation qu’ont représentée la libération des pays d’Europe centrale du joug soviétique en 1988-1989 et l’éclatement de l’URSS en 1991 n’a pas été causée par l’Alliance, pas plus que le chaos économique qu’a vécu la Russie dans les années 1990 ni la corruption endémique des élites. Le tournant à droite de l’opinion russe, y compris une hostilité croissante à l’égard de l’Occident, a aussi précédé de plusieurs années l’élargissement de l’Alliance. Ce repli nationaliste rappelle d’ailleurs la relation complexe et contradictoire que la Russie a historiquement entretenue avec l’Occident depuis Pierre le Grand jusqu’à Vladimir Poutine, une relation faite de fascination et de ressentiment orgueilleux. D’où les effets de balancier que la politique étrangère russe a connus depuis des siècles entre hostilité et attirance pour l’Occident. L’élargissement de l’Alliance a certainement joué un rôle significatif dans l’humiliation symbolique de l’ancienne superpuissance, mais il faut insister pour dire que les causes du virage autoritaire de la Russie et de ce que certains appellent la ‘nouvelle guerre froide’ doivent être cherchées ailleurs que dans l’élargissement de l’OTAN. Les trois arguments précédents ne doivent évidemment pas nous amener à ignorer les problèmes que soulève l’élargissement. Depuis le début de la dernière décennie, l’Alliance fait en effet face à deux menaces nouvelles, l’une interne et politique, l’autre externe, de nature plus militaire. Vers une désolidarisation de l’OTAN ? La crise politique interne de l’Alliance est probablement la plus insidieuse. Depuis le début des années 2000, l’enthousiasme pour le libéralisme et la démocratie, qui avait caractérisé la première décennie de l’après-guerre froide, a été remplacé partout en Europe, notamment parmi les pays d’Europe centrale et des Balkans, par la déception et l’inquiétude. L’intégration aux institutions européennes et la mondialisation n’ont souvent, aux yeux des habitants d’Europe centrale, pas apporté la prospérité et la stabilité attendues, et les chocs qu’ont constitués l’émigration de leurs meilleurs talents, la crise financière de 2008 et les vagues migratoires en provenance du Moyen-Orient et d’Afrique en 2015-2016 ont accentué le malaise politique et social. Faut-il s’étonner que des mouvements politiques à la fois antilibéraux, nationalistes, critiques des institutions européennes et xénophobes aient profité de cette anxiété collective pour se faire élire ? C’est visiblement ce qui s’est passé en Hongrie, en Pologne et en République tchèque. Le corollaire de ce phénomène a été que plusieurs de ces États ont adopté des mesures antilibérales, s’attaquant soit à l’indépendance de la justice, à la liberté de la presse, et allant, dans certains cas, jusqu’à l’adoption de pouvoirs d’exception illimités en faveur de l’exécutif. Soulignant la fragilité de la démocratisation dans ces régions, notons par ailleurs que sept autres États parmi les nouveaux membres de l’OTAN (Albanie, Monténégro, Macédoine du Nord, Croatie, République tchèque, Bulgarie et Roumanie) méritent l’appellation de régimes ‘hybrides’ ou ‘démocraties semi-consolidées’ de la part de Freedom House.  À l’évidence, il est difficile de jeter la pierre à ces États, dans la mesure où ce qu’on appelle la vague populiste s’est également manifestée à l’Ouest, avec plus ou moins de succès, sans compter aux États-Unis, avec l’élection de Donald Trump, qui symbolise, lui aussi, le rejet du libéralisme et de l’internationalisme sous toutes ses formes. Les conséquences de ces dérives populistes et autoritaires sont extrêmement importantes pour l’OTAN et pour l’Union européenne, dans la mesure où elles menacent leur cohésion en tant que communautés de valeurs. Est-il envisageable que le phénomène populiste puisse faire éclater la communauté européenne et atlantique ? Certains l’avancent. Il faut cependant souligner que la plupart des pays d’Europe de l’Est, de la Baltique aux Balkans en passant par la Pologne et la Hongrie, dépendent largement de l’Union européenne et de l’Alliance pour leur prospérité économique et leur sécurité. Les Européens de l’Est, paradoxalement, comptent parmi les supporters les plus fervents de l’UE et de l’OTAN, tout en élisant des gouvernements profondément eurosceptiques qui n’en profitent pas moins des largesses de Bruxelles. La situation n’est donc pas désespérée, dans la mesure où l’Europe centrale reste ancrée à l’Ouest par ses propres intérêts. Par contre, il ne faut pas négliger que pour des leaders antilibéraux, comme Orban en Hongrie ou Babis en République tchèque, l’autoritarisme et le discours anti-occidental d’un Poutine est un exemple à imiter. Y a-t-il là un danger de dérive sécuritaire vers l’Est ? C’est certain. D’ailleurs, même la Chine tente d’accroître son influence dans la région. Le danger d’une désolidarisation de certains membres de l’Alliance n’est donc pas à écarter et le cas récent de la Turquie ne manque pas d’inquiéter de ce point de vue. La résurgence russe La seconde menace à laquelle fait face l’Alliance est plus directement militaire. Comment assurer la défense du continent, et particulièrement dans ses approches au Nord et à l’Est, face à une Russie de plus en plus agressive ? Depuis 2008, Moscou a manifesté de plus en plus clairement sa volonté de rétablir des zones d’influence à la périphérie de son ancien empire, quitte à employer l’intimidation ou la force, comme cela a été le cas en Crimée en 2014. Tous les moyens ont été bons à cette fin, donnant naissance au concept de guerre ‘hybride’, ce qui inclut autant des gestes diplomatiques que des opérations de désinformation ou des gesticulations plus militaires. L’OTAN doit donc tenter de rétablir une relation de dissuasion face à son ennemi traditionnel, mais dans un cadre géographique plus large et plus difficile à défendre. Un simple coup d’œil à une carte de l’Europe suffit à s’en convaincre. L’ironie évidemment est que l’Alliance a endossé, pendant deux décennies, le concept de la sécurité collective et mis l’accent sur le modèle des petites forces expéditionnaires adaptées aux opérations de paix multilatérales. L’ensemble des forces européennes, sauf exception, a donc abandonné le modèle de la défense territoriale, réduisant la taille de leurs forces proportionnellement. À titre d’exemple, en 1990, la RFA pouvait déployer 215 bataillons (infanterie, blindés et artillerie). En 2015, ce chiffre est tombé à 34, soit une coupure de 84%. Le nombre de bataillons français subissait, quant à lui, une réduction de 60% et celui de l’armée britannique de plus de 50%. Les États-Unis allaient d’ailleurs imiter leurs alliés européens, leurs forces passant de 99 bataillons à 14, soit une coupure de 86% en termes de personnel militaire. Sans même parler de budget ou d’équipement, les Européens seraient-ils capables de défendre une frontière qui va de la Baltique à la Roumanie ? Les scénarios les plus sérieux soulignent, à cet égard, l’énorme fossé capacitaire de l’Alliance en cas de confrontation avec la Russie. La pente à remonter est considérable, et on peut se demander si la volonté politique collective des membres de l’Alliance suffira à rétablir, à moyen terme, l’équilibre de la dissuasion. Faut-il pour autant accepter la déclaration du président français selon laquelle l’Alliance est en état de ‘mort cérébrale’ ? Il est peut-être bon de rappeler, dans cette perspective, la longévité remarquable de l’OTAN et sa capacité à survivre aux crises et aux changements de l’ordre international depuis 1945. Pourquoi l’OTAN de 2021 serait-elle moins en mesure de répondre aux défis du 21e siècle ? Soulignons, dans ce sens, que l’appui de l’opinion publique européenne demeure très majoritairement favorable à l’Alliance, et que la plupart  des membres de l’Alliance font de leur mieux depuis quelques années pour répondre aux critères budgétaires de l’OTAN. Face aux nouveaux défis à l’Est, l’OTAN s’est également engagée dans un processus de transformation destiné à renforcer ses capacités de dissuasion face à la Russie. Il n’y a donc pas de raison de désespérer, surtout que les États-Unis semblent mieux disposés, sous la présidence Biden, à assumer leur rôle de leadership au sein de l’Alliance. Une version plus courte de ce texte a d’abord été publiée en anglais, ici. [1] Comme le montre Sara Moeller dans un article récent, le processus de réforme des déploiements et des structures de commandement de l’OTAN s’est fait indépendamment du processus d’élargissement de l’Alliance, de 1991 à 1997, ce qui était une erreur majeure. Les autorités de l’Alliance ne se sont donc posé la question de l’impact qu’aurait l’élargissement sur les missions et les dispositions militaires de l’OTAN qu’à partir de 1996-1997. Grosso modo, on a coupé d’environ 25% les capacités militaires de l’Alliance, restructuré les commandements, tout en ignorant les missions qu’aurait à entreprendre l’OTAN élargie en matière de défense. L’OTAN n’a pas non plus exigé des pays d’Europe centrale des capacités militaires correspondantes à ces missions. Les critères politiques ont été suffisants. Résultat, on a fait de l’élargissement à rabais, quitte à ce que tous ces problèmes soient résolus plus tard. ## L’élection de Joe Biden : Conséquences pour les alliés démocratiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lelection-de-joe-biden-consequences-pour-les-allies-democratiques/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > L’arrivée au pouvoir du président Biden risque de ne pas entraîner la rupture tant attendue vis-à-vis de son prédécesseur et d’accroître la pression envers les alliés démocratiques en matière de sécurité et de défense. L’élection présidentielle américaine a démontré de la ténacité des idées, des politiques et du style de leadership du président Donald J. Trump. Le nationalisme conservateur et le populisme qui ont marqué sa présidence bénéficient toujours d’un large soutien populaire et ne disparaitront pas avec l’inauguration d’un président démocrate. Les alliés des États-Unis devront continuer à tenir compte des incidences de ce courant de pensée sur la politique étrangère américaine, le système d’alliances et l’avenir de l’ordre international libéral. L’arrivée au pouvoir du président Biden risque donc de ne pas entraîner la rupture tant attendue vis-à-vis de son prédécesseur et d’accroître la pression envers les alliés démocratiques en matière de sécurité et de défense. La continuité de Trump à Biden Le président Trump a mis de l’avant une politique étrangère marquée par un « nationalisme conservateur », le populisme et le protectionnisme, ainsi que par un dédain envers les institutions multilatérales et une approche transactionnelle liant les intérêts commerciaux et sécuritaires des États-Unis. Ces éléments s’appuient sur une longue tradition intellectuelle aux États-Unis et ont été appuyés par plusieurs Républicains; il est maintenant clair que ces idées demeurent populaires parmi l’électorat américain. Bien que le président désigné Biden ait fait campagne sur une approche diamétralement opposée à celle de Trump, fondée sur le retour de l’internationalisme libéral et du leadership américain, il lui sera difficile de marquer une rupture profonde avec la politique étrangère de son prédécesseur. Premièrement, il devra peut-être composer avec un Sénat à majorité républicaine, qui pourrait le contraindre dans le choix de son cabinet, et avec l’aile gauche du Parti démocrate au Congrès, qui pourrait limiter ses ambitions en matière de sécurité internationale. Ce courant partage en effet avec le mouvement nationaliste conservateur la promotion d’un repli sur soi et d’une priorisation des besoins socioéconomiques intérieurs, bien qu’il diverge sur la manière d’y répondre. Conjuguée à la gestion de la pandémie de la COVID-19, à l’anxiété socioéconomique, aux tensions raciales et à la fatigue généralisée à l’égard des « guerres interminables », cette priorisation des affaires domestiques amènera le président Biden à poursuivre le retrait militaire américain amorcé sous Barack Obama et poursuivi par Donald Trump vers la fin de son mandat. Ainsi, l’on peut s’attendre à la poursuite du désengagement militaire américain d’Afghanistan et d’Irak, ainsi qu’à une réticence à s’engager dans une nouvelle aventure militaire. La défense des droits humains et de la démocratie par la force militaire ne semble pas prête de reprendre le haut du pavé à Washington. Dans cette perspective, les alliés des États-Unis continueront d’être sollicités afin de compenser le retrait américain, comme en témoigne le renforcement de la présence militaire de l’OTAN en Irak. Deuxièmement, la polarisation politique et l’hyper-partisannerie qui ont marqué l’élection présidentielle américaine conduiront l’administration Biden à se tourner vers l’intérieur afin de colmater les divisions profondes qui clivent les Américains et alimentent la dysfonction politique. Comment un pays aussi divisé peut-il forger un consensus et assurer un leadership mondial ? Comment ne pas craindre le caractère éphémère et renversable des engagements des États-Unis, variant au gré du cycle électoral américain ? La fracture politique des États-Unis va miner le leadership international des États-Unis, lequel passe impérativement par la crédibilité et la durabilité de l’engagement des États-Unis, en particulier en ce qui a trait aux garanties de sécurité auprès de leurs alliés. Troisièmement, une certaine continuité est à prévoir entre l’administration Biden et Trump en raison des bouleversements géostratégiques qui s’approfondissent. En dépit d’une polarisation croissante, un consensus bipartisan solide existe sur le désir de maintenir la primauté des États-Unis à l’ère d’une intensification de la compétition entre grandes puissances. Le président élu a exprimé sa crainte devant la menace posée par la Chine. Il poursuivra donc une politique de compétition envers Pékin et maintiendra le pivot vers l’Asie-Pacifique. Finalement, en ce qui concerne la Chine, il semble y avoir un consensus bipartisan assez fort pour les États-Unis lui tienne tête. Les Américains sont d'accord, puisqu’une majorité d’entre eux ont une opinion négative de la Chine. Cependant, Washington aura besoin d'alliés afin de pouvoir influencer, contenir ou dissuader la Chine de manière crédible dans la région de l’Asie-Pacifique. C'est un domaine dans lequel les États-Unis ont généralement l’avantage : ils ont plus d'amis dans le monde que la Russie et la Chine. Si Trump ne l'a pas vu clairement, son Secrétaire à la défense nouvellement licencié, Mark Esper, le comprenait bien : « Our global constellation of allies and partners remain an enduring strength that our competitors and adversaries simply cannot match ». Une rupture de style de leadership Ces éléments de continuité ne doivent pas masquer le fait qu’une rupture de style à 180 degrés est à prévoir dans le style de gestion et de leadership américain sous une administration Biden. Outre le ton, plus convivial et conciliant, et la capacité d’engager le dialogue avec ses homologues, la plus grande rupture à prévoir avec l’arrivée au pouvoir de Biden réside dans l’importance qu’il accordera à réparer les ponts avec les alliés des États-Unis. Bref, l’unilatéralisme fera place au multilatéralisme. Avec la victoire de Biden, les États-Unis vont rapidement bénéficier d'un changement radical de l’opinion publique internationale. Une récente enquête du Pew Research Centre a révélé que les cotes favorables aux États-Unis sont à leur plus bas niveau depuis deux décennies. La situation ne peut que s’améliorer. Les dirigeants du monde seront-ils aussi indulgents ? Si l’on se réfère à la période immédiate de l’après-Bush, c’est-à-dire lorsque Barack Obama est arrivé au pouvoir, les experts n'étaient pas très optimistes quant à la reprise des bonnes relations avec les alliés. Les États-Unis ont pourtant réussi, malgré le clivage transatlantique qui existait depuis le début de la guerre en Irak en 2003. Cela dit, si les alliés peuvent composer avec les désaccords, ils ne réagissent pas bien aux surprises et à l'imprévisibilité, ce qu'ils ont vécu ces quatre dernières années. L’approche d’endiguement de la Chine privilégiée par Biden reposera sur une action concertée avec les alliés de la région, et partagera avec eux une volonté d’éviter l’escalade des tensions et l’instrumentalisation des institutions multilatérales afin de favoriser la coopération sectorielle avec la Chine. Cette approche, qui s’articulera lors d’un Sommet des démocraties, sollicitera des engagements plus fermes de la part des alliés des États-Unis afin de mobiliser et coordonner leurs efforts en vue de freiner l’autoritarisme et l’agressivité chinoise. Face à la Russie, l’administration Biden souhaitera réaffirmer les engagements de sécurité des États-Unis au sein de l’OTAN, adopter une posture ferme vis-à-vis de l’Ukraine et poursuivra le pivot vers la défense collective amorcée depuis 2014. Cela dit, le président Biden cherchera rapidement des avenues de coopération, en commençant par la prolongation du Traité de réduction des armes stratégiques qui expire en février 2021. Bien que l’on attribue souvent à Trump le fait que les alliés de l'OTAN ont augmenté leurs dépenses totales de défense de 130 milliards de dollars depuis 2016, sa tolérance de l'autoritarisme a également permis un recul démocratique en Pologne, en Hongrie et en Turquie. Cela finit par éroder la cohésion politique de l'OTAN et, par extension, la crédibilité de sa capacité de dissuasion. Même si la puissance militaire de l'OTAN demeure impressionnante, la crédibilité de ses signaux envers la Russie et d'autres adversaires est minée par la désunion politique. Les tensions actuelles entourant la Turquie illustrent les dangers possibles d’un effritement de la cohésion au sein de l’Alliance atlantique. Si Trump a fait preuve de dédain pour les alliances traditionnelles, il s'en est bien mieux sorti avec les alliés de complaisance, qui sont de nature transactionnelle, comme son style diplomatique. Cependant, l’ajustement le plus important ne sera pas à faire avec les alliés traditionnels des États-Unis, qui feront au moins preuve d'enthousiasme pour renforcer les institutions internationales par un engagement plus important des États-Unis, mais avec des rivaux comme la Russie et la Chine. Le président Trump a même encouragé ces régimes, en exprimant parfois de l'admiration pour Vladimir Poutine et le style de leadership de Xi Jinping. Comment Biden va-t-il restaurer la crédibilité des États-Unis et réussir à dissuader les adversaires ? L’approche ferme et concertée qui sera priorisée par Biden dans un contexte de compétition accrue entre grandes puissances exigera une plus grande contribution de la part des alliés des États-Unis et un rapprochement avec des démocraties émergentes telles que l’Inde et l’Indonésie. Ceci passera par des efforts renouvelés afin d’accroître les exercices militaires conjoints, une mutualisation des acquisitions militaires, une augmentation soutenue des budgets de la défense et du niveau de préparation des forces militaires, ainsi qu’un partage plus équitable du fardeau, et ce, dans un contexte économique incertain à cause de la pandémie. S’il sera plus facile pour les alliés de travailler avec une administration Biden, il sera également plus difficile de dire non à l’expression du renouvellement du leadership américain et aux demandes de soutien qui en émaneront. La politique étrangère américaine de Biden devra véhiculer une position intransigeante à l'égard des principes et des valeurs consacrés par le traité de Washington, soit le traité fondateur de l'OTAN. En donnant l’exemple, les États-Unis auront à leur disposition l’une des meilleures stratégies pour contrer les discours russes et chinois. Il pourrait également être nécessaire de réaffirmer ad nauseam l'argument en faveur des institutions internationales et de la diplomatie multilatérale, car les forces du nationalisme, du protectionnisme et du populisme de droite aux États-Unis ne disparaîtront pas du jour au lendemain. Considérations et recommandations politiques Au cours des quatre dernières années, les Canadiens se sont-ils désensibilisés aux menaces et à l'intimidation de Trump ? Lorsque Biden arrivera à la Maison-Blanche, le gouvernement Trudeau ou tout successeur aura la tâche de recouvrer la dignité du pays en tant que proche allié et partenaire des États-Unis. Le Canada a dû se dérober ou gagner du temps en raison des tendances mercantiles de Trump, mais il y a d'importantes décisions à venir qui ne peuvent plus être reportées, de la coopération en matière de renseignement à la défense continentale, avec la modernisation du NORAD. Le point positif d’avoir traité avec l'administration Trump pendant quatre ans et d’avoir survécu à des défis diplomatiques monumentaux comme la renégociation de l'ALENA, est que les capacités de négociation du Canada ont été aiguisées. Il ne fait aucun doute que des leçons importantes ont été tirées de ce processus, de même que l’établissement de contacts importants entre Ottawa et Washington. Ottawa peut continuer à en tirer profit. Avec Biden à la barre, le Canada et les États-Unis ne seront pas parfaitement alignés – ils ne l'ont jamais été – mais le Canada profitera de relations bilatérales plus prévisibles (du moins pour quatre ans) et ceci sera une énorme victoire en soi. Certaines questions resteront difficiles à régler, quel que soit le maître de la Maison-Blanche, comme les relations bilatérales du Canada avec la Chine. Sur d'autres enjeux, le Canada devrait miser sur ce qui a bien fonctionné par le passé. Diriger des missions de l'OTAN en est un exemple, et le Canada devrait envisager de faire de même dans le cadre des Nations unies. Assumer des postes de commandement permet un meilleur contrôle des paramètres d'intervention et une plus grande visibilité au sein de ces institutions. Il est plus important pour le Canada d'apporter une contribution significative, avec un impact tangible, et de bénéficier de la reconnaissance qui l'accompagne, plutôt que d'envoyer des contributions symboliques à travers de nombreuses missions, dans ce qui est souvent appelée la guerre de contribution, ce qui signifie afficher votre drapeau dans le plus grand nombre d'endroits possible plutôt que de diriger. La fin imminente du commandement canadien de la mission de l’OTAN en Irak offre d’ailleurs l’opportunité de s’investir au sein d’une mission de l’ONU afin de rehausser la crédibilité du Canada en matière de maintien de la paix. Enfin, il devrait être plus facile de promouvoir la politique étrangère féministe du Canada maintenant que son plus proche allié n'est plus dirigé par un misogyne et un raciste. Par-dessus tout, il est temps que le Canada actualise sa vision de la politique étrangère en entreprenant le même type de consultations qu'il a menées en 2016 pour la politique de défense. La transition politique aux États-Unis, combinée à la pandémie mondiale et à une Chine plus antagoniste, devrait être une raison suffisante pour entreprendre cet exercice.   ## L’élection présidentielle iranienne et les signes avant-coureurs d’un repli du régime islamique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lelection-presidentielle-iranienne-et-les-signes-avant-coureurs-dun-repli-du-regime-islamique/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Six des élus ne sont en fin de compte que des figurants dont la seule fonction est de légitimer l’élection du seul et unique véritable... À la veille des élections présidentielles iraniennes qui se tiendront le 18 juin 2021, la République islamique iranienne apparaît plus figée que jamais. Sans doute serait-il prématuré, comme le font certains analystes, d’évoquer une mort prochaine du régime tant celui-ci a démontré, par le passé et jusqu’à récemment, son extraordinaire capacité de résilience. Néanmoins, les conditions dans lesquelles s’est déroulé jusqu’ici le processus de sélection des candidats à la présidentielle témoignent d’une forme de sclérose institutionnelle et de rigidification politique. Au cours des précédentes échéances électorales, les Iraniens ont pris l’habitude de voir le pouvoir en place disqualifier les prétendants les plus « réformateurs ». Placé sous le contrôle des conservateurs de tous poils, le puissant Conseil des gardiens de la Constitution – dont la fonction est notamment de valider les candidatures  –, a toujours eu coutume de marginaliser les postulants anti-establishment. Mais, cette année, le Conseil a plus que jamais mis un point d’honneur à écarter les prétendants les moins orthodoxes. La disqualification d’Ali Laridjani est à cet égard tout à fait symptomatique. L’ancien président de l'Assemblée consultative islamique d'Iran, pourtant homme du sérail et figure historique du camp conservateur, a vu sa candidature rejetée en raison de ses prises de position en faveur d’une relance de l’économie, d’une position plus conciliatrice dans le dossier nucléaire et d’une certaine forme de reprise du dialogue avec les États-Unis. Son frère, Sadegh Larijani, chef du système judiciaire iranien et membre influent du Conseil de discernement (autre institution clef du système islamique), s’est lui-même insurgé contre cette décision qu’il a qualifiée d’inique et d’indéfendable. D’autres figures de proue du clan conservateur, dont l’ancien président Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ou le vice-président Eshagh Djahanguiri, n’ont pas non plus été jugés aptes à concourir à la prochaine échéance électorale. Une candidature sans rivale Sur les 600 candidats initialement inscrits sur les listes électorales, dont une vaste majorité de conservateurs, seules sept figures du régime se sont vues autorisées à se présenter aux élections présidentielles, parmi lesquels Saeed Djallili, secrétaire du Conseil suprême de sécurité nationale, et Mohsen Rezaei, ancien commandant du Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique (CGRI) et actuel secrétaire du Conseil de discernement. La plupart des analystes conviennent cependant que sur ces sept « élus », six d’entre eux ne sont en fin de compte que des figurants dont la seule fonction est de servir de faire-valoir pour légitimer l’élection du seul et unique véritable prétendant du régime : l’hodjatoleslam Ebrahim Raïssi, directeur de la fondation (ou Bonyad) Astan-e Qods-e Razavi, chef du système judiciaire iranien et vice-président de l'Assemblée des experts. Le procédé est si flagrant que la presse iranienne n’hésite plus à le qualifier de « candidat sans rival ». Favori du Guide suprême de la révolution islamique, l’ayatollah Ali Khamenei, cet ultraconservateur est un farouche partisan de l’application de la Charia et du principe théocratique du Velayet-e faghih hérité de l’ayatollah Khomeini au détriment de la promotion des libertés publiques et des droits individuels. Âgé de 60 ans, Ebrahim Raïssi est un proche d’Ali Khamenei, dont il a été élève au séminaire. Figure hautement controversée tant en Iran qu’à l’étranger, Ebrahim Raïssi est, entre autres, tristement célèbre pour le rôle central qu’il a joué, à la toute fin de la guerre Iran-Irak, dans l'exécution massive de prisonniers et de dissidents politiques (1988). En tant que juge en chef, ce Fouquier-Tinville iranien porte également une responsabilité de premier plan dans la préservation du caractère extrêmement répressif du système judiciaire iranien et dans le fait que seule la Chine exécute un plus grand nombre de prisonniers politiques chaque année que l’Iran. Radicalisation institutionnelle D’aucuns conjecturent que, en plus de sa probable élection au mois de juin prochain, Ebrahim Raïssi est fortement pressenti pour devenir le prochain Guide suprême de la révolution islamique. Sa position de vice-président de l'Assemblée des experts constitue à cet égard un véritable atout puisque c’est cet organe qui a la charge de choisir les nominations à cette position tant convoitée. Vieillissant et malade, l’ayatollah Khamenei a par ailleurs toutes les raisons de voir en lui un dauphin idéal - susceptible de prolonger son propre règne et de pérenniser le régime islamique. En ce sens, l’ascendance que connaît actuellement Raïssi sur la scène politique iranienne est révélatrice d’un repli du régime islamique sur lui-même et d’un processus de radicalisation institutionnelle. Pour l’heure, le poste de président de la République iranienne pourrait constituer un marchepied pour accéder à cette fonction souveraine advenant le décès d’Ali Khamenei (82 ans). En attendant de poursuivre son ascension au sein du système politique iranien, Ebrahim Raïssi promet, s’il vient à être élu président, d’imprimer une orientation autrement plus intransigeante que celle de son prédécesseur, l’ayatollah Rouhani, aux relations de la République islamique iranienne avec les Occidentaux. Certes et contrairement à ce que l’on a l’habitude de croire en Amérique du Nord et en Europe, le président de la République ne jouit que de pouvoirs très limités au sein du système politique iranien. La Constitution de 1979 restreint considérablement les prérogatives du chef de l’exécutif iranien, dont le rôle est le plus souvent réduit à celui de « secrétaire » au service du Guide suprême – ce dernier étant, dans les faits, le véritable maître d’œuvre de la politique étrangère et de sécurité de la République islamique. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’ayatollah Khamenei s’assure traditionnellement que n’accèdent à ce poste que des candidats connus pour leur loyauté et leur docilité envers les institutions non électives du régime et envers le Guide suprême en particulier. Durcissement de la posture anti-occidentale et pro-asiatique Nonobstant le rôle limité qui sera le sien s’il est élu, il convient de noter que le candidat Raïssi a fait campagne sur le thème de l’intransigeance vis-à-vis des États-Unis et les chancelleries occidentales. Cet hodjatoleslam, rang du clergé chiite inférieur, ne fait pas mystère de son hostilité envers un réchauffement des relations avec les gouvernements occidentaux ou envers la reprise des négociations pour un nouvel accord nucléaire élargi avec les pays du P5+1. Faisant référence aux difficultés économiques extrêmes auxquelles fait actuellement face l’Iran et à la nécessité de trouver une solution pour sortir de cette ornière, Raïssi a repris à son compte la déclaration du Guide suprême selon laquelle les dirigeants iraniens ne devraient pas « perdre un seul instant » dans leurs efforts pour lever les sanctions américaines. Dans cette même perspective, Raïssi a aussi déclaré : « Au lieu de chercher à négocier avec l'ennemi, nous devons résoudre les problèmes économiques du pays en gérant correctement les capacités humaines et naturelles du pays ». Par conséquent, l’élection, au demeurant fort probable, d’Ebrahim Raïssi n’augure pas seulement d’un durcissement des relations irano-occidentales, mais aussi d’une certaine forme de « bunkerisation » du régime islamique. De manière générale, l’issue des prochaines élections présidentielles promet de confirmer l’orientation anti-occidentale et pro-asiatique du régime iranien ainsi que son arrimage croissant sur le bloc des pays de l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai. ## L’espace occupé par le droit international dans la dynamique de compétition sino-américaine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lespace-occupe-par-le-droit-international-dans-la-dynamique-de-competition-sino-americaine/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note politique a pour objectif d’évaluer l’espace qu’occupe le droit international dans la dynamique de compétition entre Washington et Le droit s’avère aujourd’hui omniprésent au sein des relations internationales, agissant notamment à titre de régulateur des activités interétatiques ou encore comme vecteur de légitimation. Bien qu’il soit à vocation universelle, l’approche des États à l’égard du droit international n’est ni homogène ni systématique. À cet effet, les grandes puissances ont su démontrer à plusieurs reprises que la poursuite d’intérêts politiques suffisait pour limiter, voire ignorer, certains principes du droit international.  Paradoxalement, le droit est utilisé récurremment par les États lorsque ceux-ci considèrent qu’il peut servir la poursuite de leurs objectifs stratégiques. En définitive, il est établi que la politique et le droit sont intrinsèquement liés, ce qui se révèle encore plus vrai au niveau du système international, où ce sont principalement les mêmes acteurs qui agissent comme législateurs, en l’interprétant et en veillant à son application. Conséquemment, les opportunités d’instrumentalisation du droit international dans la poursuite d’objectifs politiques se sont multipliées parallèlement au développement du réseau juridique. Enfin, la rivalité sino-américaine n’est pas étrangère à ce phénomène. Cette note politique a pour objectif d’évaluer l’espace qu’occupe le droit international dans la dynamique de compétition entre Washington et Pékin. Elle débute par une analyse de la relation réservée au droit international par chacun des deux États. Par la suite, elle effleure le débat sémantique entourant la conceptualisation du phénomène du « lawfare », s’identifiant comme un type d’instrumentalisation et perceptible au sein de la présente dynamique. Suivant cela, des clivages comportant des implications juridiques sont abordés, nommément, le révisionnisme chinois du droit international de la mer, la légifération des armes létales autonomes et, finalement, la zone grise du cyberespace. Enfin, la note conclut en présentant des recommandations pour le gouvernement canadien. Relation respective des États-Unis et de la Chine avec le droit international Les États-Unis sont reconnus comme étant les instigateurs du système international. Outre le récent aléa « trumpiste », les présidences américaines ont généralement influencé positivement le déploiement et le maintien des organisations internationales, en plus d’agir comme leader au sein de celles-ci. Toutefois, le dévouement à la mise en place de ses institutions s’est révélé être prééminent au respect des règles qui en ont émergé. Théoriquement dualistes, les différentes lectures du droit international aux États-Unis convergent à divers degrés vers la notion d’exceptionnalisme, octroyant à Washington un statut particulier, lui justifiant une marge d’autonomie singulière sur la scène internationale. Quoique cette vision, lorsque jointe à leur historique d’instrumentalisation du droit international, mine la cohérence du discours américain, cela n’empêche pas les États-Unis de faire appel à l’importance de la règle de droit dans les affaires internationales de façon répétée.  Cette rhétorique s’illustre à plusieurs reprises, comme ce fut le cas lors du voyage du président Barack Obama (2009-2017) en Australie en 2011 ou, plus récemment, par la déclaration du président Joe Biden sur le rôle des États-Unis dans le monde. Bien que le ressenti exceptionnaliste soit contestable sur le plan juridique, Washington cherche toujours à défendre l’ordre international libéral qu’il a activement construit et conséquemment, la règle de droit qui s’y applique. La relation de la Chine avec le droit international ne partage pas cet historique. En effet, il est reconnu que le droit sert une fonction différente au sein de la culture chinoise. Pour plusieurs hauts fonctionnaires chinois, le système international libéral est l’objet de conflits et de compétitions inéquitables. Cette rhétorique prend racine dans ce qu’on appelle le « siècle d’humiliation ». Lors de cette époque, l’autorité chinoise dit avoir été subjuguée par les puissances occidentales. En effet, la Chine s’est fait imposer plusieurs « traités inéquitables » qui ont impacté son intégrité territoriale et sa souveraineté. En raison de cet historique, la Chine a développé un ressentiment envers l’Occident et le droit international, ce dernier s’étant identifié comme un instrument domination. De ce fait, l’empreinte du leadership chinois au sein des organisations internationales a longtemps été marginale. L’ordre international libéral ainsi que les normes et valeurs qui y ont été développées et qui y sont aujourd’hui véhiculées n’ont pas le même écho auprès de l’État asiatique. Bien que la Chine se soit développée parallèlement à cette évolution systémique, le droit international importe néanmoins au gouvernement chinois, que ce soit comme vecteur de légitimité internationale ou comme instrument stratégique. Longtemps à l’écart, le gouvernement chinois cherche aujourd’hui à jouer un rôle actif dans l’environnement juridique. Néanmoins, Pékin demeure limité par la portée de sa légitimité normative en raison de l’écart idéologique séparant son positionnement paradigmatique à celui de l’ordre international libéral. Aujourd’hui, Pékin perçoit son ascension comme un « rajeunissement », qui, interrompu par l’Occident, tend à le remettre sur le chemin de sa gloire passée. À cet effet, cette perception provient en partie de la réémergence de l’ancienne croyance chinoise du Tianxia. Cette dernière, qui troque l’égalité entre les nations du modèle onusien par une structure hiérarchique sinocentrique, se veut diamétralement opposée à l’ordre international libéral. Au-delà de la compétition où chacun cherche à promouvoir une trame narrative et à orienter la prolifération normative, les deux États perçoivent une utilité stratégique au droit international. Toutefois, ils ne la conçoivent pas de façon identique. Tandis que Washington tarde à envisager un usage alternatif du droit international se voulant plus offensif, Pékin identifie explicitement le droit comme un instrument « militaire » pouvant servir à la défense de ses intérêts. Identifiée par l’expression « Falu zhan », et mieux traduit par le terme anglais « lawfare », cette conceptualisation du droit en tant qu’instrument de guerre s’est codifiée en 2003 par le Parti communiste chinois (PCC) au sein d’un document intitulé « Political Work Regulations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army ». Pour Pékin, le droit est un outil lui permettant de conserver un avantage stratégique vis-à-vis de son adversaire, que ce soit avant, pendant, ou après l’apparition d’un conflit. Complexité sémantique Le droit et la politique ne peuvent être dissociés et interagissent sur une multitude de niveaux. Une des lectures possibles du droit est qu’il peut se définir comme un but, un moyen, ou un obstacle dans sa relation avec la politique. À cette fin, les activités d’instrumentalisation et ainsi que celle du « lawfare » sont cohérentes avec cette conception. La conceptualisation d’une opération juridique comme une opération guerrière est redevenue d’actualité suivant la guerre contre la terreur en 2001.  Popularisé par le major général américain Charles J. Dunlap Jr, le terme « lawfare » renvoie initialement à une méthode de guerre où le droit est utilisé comme un moyen pour atteindre un objectif militaire. Bien que certains considèrent le terme péjoratif, Dunlap le conceptualise comme étant neutre et l’identifie comme une dimension incontournable des conflits modernes. Tout en conservant cette notion d’usage dans la poursuite d’intérêts stratégiques, le terme s’est graduellement élargi afin d’inclure des zones d’activités en dehors du champ de bataille traditionnel. Néanmoins, des limitations persistent, que ce soit en lien avec l’applicabilité du terme aux activités extérieures au carcan militaire ou encore à la dissociation du « lawfare » des pratiques légales courantes qui se veut parfois complexe. Cette ambiguïté conforte l’idée selon laquelle cette notion continuera d’évoluer et que ce ne sont pas toutes ses idéations qui feront consensus. Il est par ailleurs pertinent de soulever que cette forme d’instrumentalisation du droit international s’est développée presque conjointement au concept de guerre hybride, résultant en un renforcement mutuel des deux concepts. Bien qu’il existe un flou sémantique entourant la conceptualisation du « lawfare », tout porte à croire que les avenues d’instrumentalisation du droit international et du « lawfare » ne feront qu’augmenter. En raison de la volatilité de sa définition, cette note emploiera le « lawfare » dans son sens le plus élargi, soit comme l’usage du droit aux fins de la poursuite d’objectifs stratégiques, sans enclaver le phénomène au cadre militaire. Le révisionnisme chinois du droit international de la mer en mer de Chine du Sud Depuis le début du XXe siècle, la mer de Chine du Sud est le terrain de multiples revendications. La plus notoire d’entre elles renvoie au traçage de la « ligne à neuf traits » par Pékin, initialement cartographiée en 1947. Sujet controversé, c’est en 2009 que le débat juridique sur cet enjeu a pris de l’ampleur, soit suivant l’envoi d’un communiqué par Pékin soutenant sa souveraineté « indiscutable » sur les îles et les eaux adjacentes de la région. Le tracé, qui a fait l’objet d’une procédure d’arbitrage par un tribunal de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage à la suite d’une initiative des Philippines en 2013, a été déclaré sans fondement légal en vertu du droit international. Malgré une décision en faveur des Philippines, la Chine a rejeté ce dernier, arguant que le jugement n’aura aucun effet sur « la souveraineté territoriale et le droit maritime applicable » dans la région. Et elle agit toujours comme de fait. En ce sens, Pékin cherche à consolider sa réclamation territoriale extensive dans la région par le biais de facteurs politiques, économiques et militaires, et non par un affrontement direct. À cet effet, le droit s’identifie comme étant central à la stratégie du PCC pour l’atteinte de cet objectif. À titre d’exemple, une récente loi passée par le gouvernement chinois, nommément la « China Coast Guard (CCG) Law », octroie à l’autorité chinoise un pouvoir de coercition en mer de Chine méridionale et du Sud violant systématiquement plusieurs articles de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (CNDUM). Cette législation, qui entend réguler les activités de la Garde côtière chinoise, s’étend à l’intégralité des « eaux sous juridiction chinoise ».  Les travaux préparatoires de cette loi ainsi que les récentes activités coercitives chinoises à l’intérieur de la zone économique exclusive (ZEE) des Philippines tendent à concrétiser les craintes de plusieurs voulant que Pékin cherche à étendre ses activités législatives dans la zone maritime contestée pour consolider ses requêtes de souveraineté. Soutenant avec fermeté qu’elle n’a pas tort, la Chine cherche à moduler l’acceptabilité de ses actions dans la région. Après avoir considérablement perturbé l’environnement géopolitique régional, Pékin cherche à instituer un ordre légal afin de cristalliser ses gains; elle mise sur une reconception de la perception « d’illégalité » entourant son comportement. En perpétuant des activités maritimes sur la base d’une lecture résolument erronée des provisions de la CNUDM, Pékin tente de manipuler le droit international coutumier. Par effet de répétition et d’acceptation tacite, ou dans le cas échéant, par l’existence d’une dissuasion implicite de l’opposition, la Chine cherche à remanier l’environnement juridique en mer de Chine du Sud pour y augmenter son contrôle. Pour Washington, cette région relève d’une importance particulière. En plus de partager plusieurs intérêts avec ses alliés en périphérie de la mer de Chine du Sud, ceux-ci vouent également un appui de longue date à l’ordre international libéral instauré par les États-Unis. Néanmoins, bien que la précédente administration américaine ait fermement affirmé que les actions chinoises violaient le droit international et déclaré son appui au verdict rendu par le tribunal d’arbitrage en 2016, la portée de la rhétorique de Washington reste restreinte. D’une part, l’appel des États-Unis à respecter le droit international de la mer se voit considérablement miné par leur absence de ratification de la CNUDM. À cet effet, l’histoire des politiques américaines vis-à-vis de l’applicabilité du droit international de la mer exemplifie l’attitude ambivalente de Washington quant à l’usage de la règle de droit dans sa gestion des affaires internationales. L’incapacité américaine de ratifier le traité a également pour effet d’agrémenter l’argumentaire chinois, en plus d’élargir son éventail d’actions possibles. De surcroit, la réaffirmation du soutien des États-Unis au verdict de 2016 par le secrétaire d’État Anthony Blinken plus tôt cette année aura également un faible impact. Le traitement américain à l’égard des différentes cours internationales étant manifestement ambigu, cette posture diplomatique est facilement soulignée par Pékin à sa défense. Pour les États-Unis qui partagent des intérêts économiques et sécuritaires en plus de faire contrepoids à l’influence chinoise, les actions futures en mer de Chine du Sud revêtent une importance stratégique capitale pour Washington. Les armes autonomes létales et le droit international La mise au point de nouvelles technologies militaires comme celle des systèmes d’armes létales autonomes (SALA) s’accompagne d’importantes préoccupations juridiques. À cet effet, l’ambivalence américaine sur une éventuelle légifération des SALA crée une fenêtre d’opportunité pour Pékin. Bien que les États-Unis et la Chine aient pris part aux rencontres du groupe d’experts abordant le sujet entre 2014 et 2019 au regard de la Convention sur l'interdiction ou la limitation de l'emploi de certaines armes classiques des Nations Unies, les deux rivaux adoptent un discours nuancé, mais opposé.  En 2019, alors que Washington a jugé prématurée la rédaction d’un instrument juridique contraignant sur le sujet et qu’il fallait éviter de stigmatiser l’utilisation de ce type d’équipement militaire, Pékin s’est positionné en faveur d’une interdiction. En effet, la Chine a déclaré ouvertement l’importance de légiférer ces nouvelles technologies afin d’agir en complémentarité avec le droit international humanitaire existant. Toutefois, la définition proposée par son équipe diplomatique est volontairement erronée. De surcroit, l’absence de clarifications ultérieures sur sa conceptualisation d’une future législation s’avère révélatrice. Cette prise de position s’identifie comme une instrumentalisation du discours juridique sur le sujet dans l’objectif de délégitimer la position maintenue par les États-Unis. La Chine met à profit l’ambivalence américaine pour se faire passer pour l’acteur prônant la création d’un instrument contraignant, tout en poursuivant parallèlement ses activités de recherche et de développement dans le domaine. La position américaine, qui s’appuie sur la logique d’éviter d’octroyer un avantage stratégique à un adversaire en s’en privant soi-même, si maintenue, perpétuera l’avantage stratégique du PCC. Les récents développements à ce sujet n’ont que confirmé que les Américains préfèrent l’adoption d’un code de conduite plutôt que de principes juridiques contraignants. Le maintien du double discours de Pékin doit amener à une révision stratégique à Washington. D’emblée, les États-Unis doivent cesser de faire usage d’une rhétorique visant à réduire les risques se rattachant à l’utilisation de ce type d’équipement militaire pour consolider leur position sur l’élaboration de principes non contraignants. En l’absence de tels principes, le discours maintenu par Washington nuit davantage aux intérêts stratégiques américains qu’il ne les aide, car la Chine peut conserver ce double discours sans réellement craindre de répercussions. Le cyberespace : une zone grise Le cyberespace relève, lui aussi, d’une importance particulière au sein de la rivalité sino-américaine. Le fait que les États ne se positionnent pas de la même manière dans le cyberespace a un impact sur leur engouement vis-à-vis du développement normatif. Dans un rapport du groupe d’experts gouvernementaux chargé d’examiner les progrès de l’informatique et des télécommunications dans le contexte de la sécurité internationale en 2013, les États participants – dont la Chine et les États-Unis – avaient convenu de l’applicabilité de la Charte des Nations Unies dans le cyberespace. Deux ans plus tard, la Chine a rejeté le nouveau rapport d’experts où l’on reconnait l’importance des principes du droit international humanitaire au sein du cyberespace. Par contre, à l’été 2021, elle a accepté l’applicabilité du droit international humanitaire au cyberespace dans le cas de conflits armés. Pour les Américains, l’utilisation de principes déclaratoires est en adéquation avec leur stratégie cybernétique. Toutefois, celle-ci est fortement critiquée, car centrée sur la dissuasion, et elle s’est prouvée progressivement inefficace. En effet, tandis que les États-Unis entendent à respecter le droit international humanitaire sur l’intégralité du spectre de leurs activités militaires, l’engagement chinois à cet effet est davantage symbolique que sincère. Bien que la Chine ait démontré son soutien à la règle de droit sur les enjeux de sécurité globaux, son oscillation sur l’application du droit international et plus particulièrement du droit international humanitaire au cyberespace laisse planer un doute légitime quant à sa réelle intention de vouloir lier sa pratique, que ce soit par le biais conventionnel ou par le développement de droit coutumier. De surcroit, la stigmatisation du comportement chinois dans le cyberespace, qui est explicitement qualifié de malicieux par Washington et ses alliés, vient consolider ce doute. Enfin, même si les États semblent s’entendre sur l’applicabilité du droit international dans le cyberespace, un problème persiste. Les principes élaborés par la Charte des Nations Unies, tout comme ceux émanant du droit international coutumier, sont fortement teintés de l’environnement dans lesquels ils ont évolué. Conséquemment, ces principes ont été réfléchis dans une logique où les États pouvaient modifier la stabilité internationale par la coercition ou la force brute; logique qui se révèle plus nuancée au sein du cyberespace. En amont de la création de règles contraignantes, il est utile de comparer la position des États vis-à-vis du maintien du statu quo. Pour le PCC, le cyberespace est l’intersection de trois préoccupations majeures : le maintien de la légitimité du régime, la sécurité nationale et la dépendance technologique-économique. Pour eux, les normes existantes n’ont pas pour vocation de réguler les activités dans le cyberespace et c’est pour cette raison que la Chine tente de jouer un rôle dans la prolifération normative. En ce sens, bien qu’elle ait participé aux discussions sur le sujet, la Chine peut espérer poursuivre ses activités cyber, dites offensives, celles-ci s’orchestrant sous le seuil des critères qualitatifs d’un « conflit armé ». Quant à Washington, le maintien de sa position passive lui octroie un désavantage devant un statu quo, conséquence de l’inadéquation de sa stratégie de dissuasion. Bien que les États-Unis aient récemment appuyé la récente démarche française encourageant le dialogue sur les normes dans le cyberespace, ils s’abstiennent de mener l’effort pour aller au-delà de principes déclaratoires. Paradoxalement, l’histoire a démontré que la création d’instruments internationaux contraignants régulant les activités au sein d’un domaine enclin à une course aux armements est l’une des meilleures manières de retrouver le dialogue et diminuer les tensions.  Bien que le président Biden ait rappelé l’importance des normes et des institutions au sein de sa stratégie sur le cyber, beaucoup reste à faire. Que peut faire le Canada ? Le Canada n’est pas entièrement étranger au phénomène d’instrumentalisation du droit international. Bien qu’il ne soit pas reconnu pour se prêter diligemment à cette activité, il a déjà recouru à cette stratégie dans le passé. Toutefois, la dynamique de compétition entre grandes puissances au sein du système international doit amener le Canada à reconsidérer l’usage stratégique du droit international. L’idée qu’un État puisse faire avancer ses intérêts stratégiques ou s’en prendre à un autre État en usant du droit international n’est aujourd’hui plus à démontrer. Bien que ce constat ne soit pas nouveau, il est nécessaire pour le Canada de réévaluer cette menace. Il faut aujourd’hui considérer le « lawfare » comme un type d’activité dont l’existence s’avère intégrée à celles des conflits hybrides. À cet effet, un État adhérant à la règle de droit comme le Canada ne peut espérer se prêter aux mêmes tactiques que les États autoritaires percevant presque exclusivement le droit international comme un outil stratégique. Néanmoins, Ottawa peut espérer jouer un rôle d’importance dans la réponse américaine aux manœuvres de Pékin. Malgré l’adoption d’un comportement empreint d’une sélectivité indiscutable, l’approche américaine à l’égard du droit international, si elle devait s’homogénéiser, pourrait considérablement nuire aux activités chinoises. 1. Le gouvernement canadien doit encourager le Congrès américain à changer son approche vis-à-vis de la CNUDM. Membre de la CNUDM, le Canada devrait chercher à amener le Congrès américain à adhérer au traité. Comme mentionné précédemment, Washington est incontournable dans l’élaboration de nouvelles normes. Bien que le Congrès américain soit indécis quant à la portée de la ratification de la CNUDM, le Canada doit s’ingénier à recentrer la discussion américaine sur la portée symbolique de la ratification, plutôt que sur l’usage stratégique à court terme. Par la démonstration de l’inconditionnalité de son support au droit international, les États-Unis viendraient rehausser la légitimité de leur appel au respect de la règle de droit. De surcroit, le Canada devrait encourager le gouvernement américain à davantage soutenir les autres États de la région qui désirent entreprendre des initiatives juridiques à l’égard des activités chinoises en mer de Chine du Sud; en plus de lui-même, réitérer son appui à ce genre de démarches. 2. Le Canada doit miser sur l’adoption d’une définition des SALA qui est en adéquation avec ses intérêts et ceux de ses alliés. L’absence de définition universelle pour définir ce type d’équipement pourrait se présenter comme une opportunité pour Ottawa et Washington, en même temps qu’une épine au pied pour Pékin. Sans que les États-Unis soient appelés à condamner entièrement leur orientation stratégique actuelle, une définition plus précise des SALA forcerait le leadership chinois à réévaluer son engagement envers une légifération de ce type d’arme. À la lecture de sa conceptualisation fortement anachronique des SALA, on peut parier que Pékin refuserait de reconnaître cette définition, ce qui saperait la crédibilité de sa poussée juridique. Instigateur de la Convention sur l’interdiction des mines antipersonnel, le Canada pourrait transposer cette approche qui s’est antérieurement prouvée efficace pour veiller à ce que le cadre juridique encadrant ces armes soit en concordance avec ses intérêts stratégiques et ceux de ses alliés. De surcroit, ce genre de démarche serait d’autant plus bénéfique pour Ottawa, car elle pourrait être réalisée, sans un appui direct de Washington, tout comme ce fut le cas en 1997. Ce genre d’initiative pourrait permettre de débloquer l’impasse actuelle, en plus de revitaliser l’image canadienne sur la scène internationale. 3. Le Canada doit diversifier son approche pour le développement de bonnes pratiques dans le cyberespace. Les compétitions stratégiques dans le cyberespace sont caractérisées par l’exploitation plutôt que par la coercition. Le Canada, étant déjà relativement actif sur le sujet de la cybersécurité sur le plan national par l’adoption de sa Stratégie nationale sur la cybersécurité, ce dernier pourrait jouer le rôle de leader au sein du développement normatif en renchérissant sur sa volonté de mettre en place des normes encadrant les bonnes pratiques dans le cyberespace. Bien que le Canada ait statué en 2020 qu’il considère que le droit international et les normes développées par les précédents travaux du groupe de travail sur le sujet sont suffisants, il gagnerait à nuancer son discours. Par exemple, Ottawa pourrait s’inspirer de l’orientation stratégique américaine de l’« initiative persistence ». Cette dernière comporte une facette défensive et offensive axée sur l’exploitation de vulnérabilités et qui s’inscrit sur un continuum d’activités. Par des démarches de « tacit bargaining », le Canada pourrait espérer poursuivre ses intérêts nationaux tout en participant au développement de bonnes pratiques dans le cyberespace. ## L’Europe et le Canada après l’OTAN : penser la sécurité euro-atlantique sans Washington URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/leurope-et-le-canada-apres-lotan-penser-la-securite-euro-atlantique-sans-washington/ Modified: 2026-02-17 Si Trump lâchait l'Europe en se repliant sur « son hémisphère », il faudrait défendre un continent et un océan sans Washington. Moins lourde que l’OTAN mais plus robuste face à l'hypothèse d'un retrait américain, une architecture de sécurité en réseau, fondée sur la multiplication et l’interconnexion des coalitions de volontaires pourrait permettre de se protéger sans les États-Unis. Le co-directeur du RAS Justin Massie propose un modèle de recomposition stratégique. Lisez le texte complet ici. Crédit photo: AP Photo/CP/Fred Chartrand ## L’infoguerre en Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/linfoguerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2022-06-01 > Ce point chaud fait état de la vulnérabilité occidentale dans l’espace informationnel et propose de tirer les leçons de la guerre en Ukraine Érigé en pilote héroïque, la capacité du fantôme de Kiev à faire vaciller l'aviation russe a conquis les esprits des civils occidentaux. Entouré de mystère, ce soldat vengeur n’était finalement qu’un mythe construit à travers des images détournées d’un jeu vidéo. Néanmoins, dans une société de l’immédiateté, le message fut suffisamment viral pour raviver la résistance du peuple ukrainien. Cette stratégie de communication des Forces armées ukrainiennes est symptomatique d’un usage offensif de l’information. Le passage progressif à la société de l’information a déplacé le centre de gravité de l’action stratégique du terrain matériel vers le terrain informationnel. Ainsi, le cinquième champ de bataille devient un terrain privilégié pour capitaliser les succès tactiques, montés de toute pièce ou bien réels, afin de les transformer en victoires politiques. La guerre en Ukraine n’a rien de novateur sur ce point. Néanmoins, elle a démontré la pérennité du domaine informationnel durant les conflits armés et une conscience très forte de l’aspect stratégique de l’information. Si l’exemple de l’aviateur ukrainien est anecdotique, la bataille qui se joue sur les réseaux sociaux et les médias traditionnels l’est beaucoup moins. Le Kremlin, qui était devenu maitre dans l’art de manipuler le champ informationnel dans la cadre de la guerre hybride, est désormais acculé sur tous les fronts de cet espace de conflictualité non conventionnel. Alors que l’invasion se poursuit, les manœuvres informationnelles font rage en parallèle des combats. Face à l’impasse opérationnelle et l’échec de la guerre éclair, le redéploiement stratégique de l’armée russe sur le front de l’Est pourrait mener à un  renversement du rapport de force moral. Avec ce changement de récit qui n’est pas exempt de conséquences opérationnelles, le scénario de l’enlisement du conflit pourrait se réaliser à mesure que l’Ukraine arrive à convaincre la communauté internationale. Si l’issue du conflit reste incertaine, la guerre de l’information menée par le Kremlin est d’ores et déjà un échec. De prime abord, la Russie n’est pas à ses premiers coups d’éclat dans l’espace informationnel. Moscou a très bien saisi que l’utilisation d’armes non conventionnelles se situant en dessous du seuil de la guerre, à l’instar des opérations cognitives, accule et affaiblit les démocraties occidentales. Toutefois, les récentes défaillances stratégiques de la machine informationnelle russe sont autant de moyens pour comprendre l’évolution de l’écosystème politique et informationnel. Ainsi, ce point chaud fait état de la vulnérabilité occidentale dans l’espace informationnel. Il argue que tirer les leçons de la guerre en Ukraine et de son extension dans le champ informationnel permettra de réduire la perméabilité des régimes démocratiques face aux ingérences numériques. D’autre part, il propose un ensemble de recommandations pour que la communauté des démocraties puisse riposter efficacement tout en préservant les valeurs démocratiques. La vulnérabilité de la communauté transatlantique face à la nouvelle guerre psychologique L’avènement des technologies d’information et du cyberespace ont parachevé le renouveau des opérations cognitives. Le contrôle de l’image et de l’information ont toujours fait partie des conflits, mais l’apparition de la cyberguerre, qui vient en soutien à des instruments plus classiques, permet de posséder un moyen supplémentaire pour agir sur le monde physique.  Désormais, loin d’être le seul fait des armées, le cyberespace est en proie à des guerres intangibles se déclinant sous deux grands volets. Les cyberattaques visent à taper les systèmes d’information ou encore à faire fuiter des données. Quant à la guerre de l’information, la lutte psychologique qui se répand comme une trainée de poudre sur les réseaux sociaux lui donne une tout autre dimension. Puisque le champ de bataille ne se limite plus à la prise de zones clefs sur le terrain et que la confrontation directe avec le Kremlin a été écartée, il appartiendra à la communauté transatlantique de saisir l’ensemble des soubassements de l’infoguerre. La Russie est parvenue à investir l’espace informationnel avec brio. De manière significative, les pays membres de l’OTAN ont également développé leurs capacités de communications stratégiques depuis plusieurs années. Toutefois, face aux manipulations informationnelles, l’ouverture des démocraties occidentales et la perméabilité qu’elle induit sont toujours autant préjudiciables. Dès lors, les démocraties et les citoyens constituent des cibles privilégiées de cette guerre d’un nouveau genre. Entre les ingérences dans les processus électoraux et la manipulation numérique qui prolifère via les fantassins de la désinformation, le débat public est empoisonné. La révolution numérique altère profondément la démocratie et constitue un puissant ferment de perturbation. Pour autant, la dissémination d’informations clivantes pour déstabiliser et orienter la prise de décisions stratégiques vers ses intérêts est vieille comme le cheval de Troie. Ce qui est novateur, ce sont les possibilités techniques qu’offrent les réseaux sociaux pour la prolifération « d’armes de distractions massives ». À terme, la démocratie et ses attributs devraient être considérés comme des infrastructures critiques au même titre que les opérateurs de défense face aux manœuvres numériques. L’empreinte russe dans les ingérences étrangères à l’encontre des processus électoraux pour le référendum du Brexit ou encore durant les élections présidentielles américaines atteste des capacités de nuisance très performantes du Kremlin dans le cyberespace. Contrairement à ces cyber-superpuissances, les entités des services de renseignement occidentaux ont la responsabilité de développer des capacités offensives à l’intérieur des balises démocratiques. Cela n’est évidemment pas le cas pour les commandements cyber chinois ou russes qui œuvrent sans ces limites. Une défaillance stratégique se dessine dans la mesure où les États démocratiques développent des capacités de cyber-résilience pour répondre aux attaques incessantes des États adverses. Il fait consensus au sein des institutions occidentales « qu’il est contre-productif de lutter contre la propagande par de la propagande ». Malgré les efforts des États membres de l’OTAN, à travers cette posture défensive et ces capacités offensives limitées par les impératifs démocratiques, la communauté transatlantique semble vouée à accuser un retard dans la conduite des opérations d’influence. Une nouvelle donne sécuritaire : la guerre permanente Dans le domaine militaire, en évitant le lourd tribut du sang, la désinformation permet de personnaliser le conflit et le récit qui l’entoure. Par exemple, la guerre contre le terrorisme est structurante et justifie une certaine ligne de conduite opérationnelle. Dans un second temps, l’espace émotionnel se trouve être investi pour susciter de vives réactions de l’opinion publique et créer un état d’irrationalité. Les images des tortures de l’État islamique commises au Levant ont permis de faire adhérer l’Occident à la riposte mondiale en 2014. Or, l’organisation sévissait sur un terrain qu’elle avait sclérosé depuis au moins le retrait américain d’Irak en 2011. Finalement, la désinformation s’inscrit dans une logique globale de maintien de la confusion et d’orientation des flux d’information à des fins stratégiques. Toutefois, cette guerre cognitive qui vise à dénaturer les vecteurs de transmissions de l’information ne se cantonne pas aux périodes de guerre et l’Occident peine à saisir l’ampleur du défi. S’en suit alors une logique de guerre permanente. Les cyber-ingérences ne sont pas seulement déployées lors de conflits comme l’attestent les manipulations de l’information qui ont émaillé les élections occidentales. Les modes de confrontation évoluent, les actes hostiles ciblés se développent significativement dans l’espace cyber et brouillent finalement la distinction du temps de paix et de guerre. Les manipulations informationnelles formatent la réceptivité de l’opinion publique pour créer les conditions favorables sur le terrain et ainsi améliorer la conduite des opérations militaires. « L’arme suprême de la guerre c’est soumettre l’ennemi sans combattre ». Dans une certaine mesure, elles permettent de faire plier l’ennemi avant l’utilisation d’armes létales. L’arme psychologique est devenue centrale et cette facette de la guerre hybride a trouvé dans le conflit en Ukraine une parfaite concrétisation. Toutefois, depuis la guerre en Syrie, la révolution de Maïden en 2013 ou encore l’annexion de la Crimée, les régimes occidentaux saisissent mieux les stratégies de manipulation numérique et les caractéristiques régulières de la couverture médiatique russe. Durant, la guerre en Syrie, la Russie se positionnait comme le dernier bastion contre l’islamisme. Ce récit civilisationnel s’est donc mué en un récit de la lutte contre le nazisme en Ukraine, mais les ressorts sont les mêmes et visent à légitimer une intervention majeure à l’étranger. Un récit russe contredit par l’enlisement du conflit Première leçon de la guerre en Ukraine, la Russie semblait vouloir dicter sur l’échiquier international ce qu’allaient devenir les conflits de demain, mais elle s’est finalement retrouvée prisonnière de son propre jeu. L’opération militaire spéciale, selon la rhétorique de Moscou, s’est heurtée à une résistance ukrainienne qu’elle a largement sous-estimée. Si le rapport de force sur le terrain est totalement déséquilibré, contre toute attente, l’opposition ukrainienne a habilement pris le dessus sur la Russie dans le champ informationnel. La confrontation des récits se nourrit du streaming de la surinformation en continu et l’écosystème informationnel semble plus que défavorable à la Russie. La campagne de propagande qu’elle a méticuleusement préparée n’a pas trouvé l’écho escompté à l’international. Avec une entrée en guerre ratée, le récit de la libération du peuple ukrainien peine à encore tenir debout. La Russie a commis une erreur stratégique de taille. En imposant un agenda militaire trop ambitieux avec une Blitzkrieg défectueuse sur le plan tactique, le temps joue désormais contre elle. Plus la guerre s’enlisera, plus le récit russe sera contredit par une liste de morts qui ne cessera de s’allonger. Le décès d’au moins un tiers du haut commandement russe en est l’illustration. Pour le Kremlin, la priorité sera donc de faire évoluer le récit qui, à cause du redéploiement stratégique sur le front de l’Est, ne correspond plus au discours de l’opération spéciale. À terme, ce revers stratégique pourrait paralyser l’incursion russe et offrir des leviers informationnels à Kiev pour discréditer l’armée russe. Les effets limités d’une unique stratégie de communication officielle pour plusieurs auditoires Si l’Ukraine est loin d’avoir gagné la guerre, elle a déjà largement gagné la bataille cognitive en Occident. Désormais isolé, Vladimir Poutine y est perçu comme un envahisseur malfaisant. Alors que Moscou avait initialement essayé de fragmenter la réponse de la communauté transatlantique, le déclenchement de l’invasion aura finalement permis de cimenter la cohésion du clan occidental à travers un réveil stratégique inédit. Néanmoins sur la scène internationale, ses soutiens en Afrique ne faiblissent pas. De surcroit,  la future participation de la Russie au G20 irrite la communauté transatlantique. Cette décision de maintenir la présence de Moscou atteste du refus d’une partie de la communauté internationale de marginaliser la Russie.  Toutefois, le président chinois, qui avait enclenché un rapprochement diplomatique durant les Jeux olympiques et qui a tout intérêt à ce que la Russie remporte un maximum de gains en Russie, peine désormais à soutenir son amitié sans limites et à répondre à l’appel à l’aide du président russe, tout du moins de manière officielle. Si la condamnation est unanime en Occident, les déclarations de soutien à l’Ukraine sont finalement plus limitées dans le sud global. À l’échelle internationale, l’absence de condamnation de certains États, qui peut parfois s’apparenter à « une neutralité pro-russe » mue par des intérêts économiques est profitable pour le Kremlin qui souhaite tenir à l’écart nombreux de ses partenaires. Si l’opération de séduction de la communauté transatlantique est un profond échec, l’objectif de fédérer l’opinion publique russe autour de la guerre est un franc succès. Le soutien populaire à la guerre en Russie atteint 60%. Vladimir Poutine est parvenu à faire grimper sa cote de popularité en Russie à un pourcentage similaire faute de pouvoir améliorer son image à l’international. En mettant en avant la résistance héroïque du peuple, les autorités ukrainiennes ont largement participé à dessiner cette nouvelle donne politique internationale, mais n’ont pas réussi à atteindre la bulle informationnelle russe. Les leçons du David ukrainien face au Goliath russe La question est désormais de savoir comment l’Ukraine, ce nain géopolitique, a réussi à lutter efficacement contre la Russie sur le terrain informationnel qu’elle maitrisait davantage. Kiev est parvenu à développer une iconographie guerrière s’insérant dans une « micromythologie ». En érigeant des symboles n’ayant rien à envier à ceux développés par les meilleurs communicants politiques, les autorités ukrainiennes ont très bien saisi l’enjeu de la viralité. Les images de mères de famille préparant des cocktails Molotov pour leurs époux ou encore les photographies de lanceurs Javelin présentées comme le talon d’Achille de l’armée russe ont permis de mobiliser les opinions étrangères parfois très jeunes. Une toute nouvelle génération de soldats non armés utilise les réseaux sociaux comme une arme. Si la guerre en Ukraine n’est pas le premier conflit à s’étaler sur ces plateformes, elle n’en est pas moins celle qui a conduit à la plus grande mobilisation citoyenne virtuelle, notamment via la diaspora ukrainienne qui relaye instantanément les nouvelles. L’angle mort de cet éveil de la jeunesse, c’est la quasi-absence de la Russie. En s’enfermant dans le récit de l’opération spéciale, Moscou n’est plus en mesure d’adapter stratégiquement son récit à l’instantanéité de l’information puisqu’elle cache la nature même du conflit à sa population. Finalement, le sacro-saint de toute l’iconographie ukrainienne est l’acteur devenu chef de guerre par la force des évènements, à savoir le président Zelensky. En prenant le risque de s’afficher avec ses soldats dans les rues de Kiev, il se positionne comme un Homme du peuple. Tandis que son homologue russe se place durant les réunions de crise au Kremlin à l’opposé de la table de son état-major, renforçant dès lors l’image de l’isolement. Dans une tentative tardive de sauver son image et puisque la bataille de la communication lui échappe, Vladimir Poutine célébrait l’annexion de la péninsule ukrainienne de Crimée dans un stade bondé de 80 000 personnes. Le basculement d’une dictature de la manipulation à une dictature de la peur Ce type de mise en scène ne séduit pas à l’international. Néanmoins, dans une société où les infrastructures autarciques ne cessent de se consolider, elle peut tout à fait renforcer l’aura fragilisée d’un leader. Pour cela, resserrer l’étau de la censure devait être impératif pour imposer son narratif sans aucune contestation possible. C’est chose faite. Si le phénomène n’est pas nouveau en Russie, la mise sous cloche de la société interpelle par son ampleur. Dans un revirement historique de la Douma, l’adoption d’un texte de loi a entériné la fin des médias indépendants. Les Russes peuvent désormais encourir jusqu’à 15 ans de prison s’ils contestent les informations émanant du gouvernement. Après Facebook et Twitter, ce fut au tour d’Instagram d’être bloqué par les autorités russes dans une tentative presque désespérée d’empêcher toute possibilité d’accéder aux sources alternatives d’information. Alors que de nombreux Russes souhaitaient se tenir à l’écart du conflit, l’interdiction de ces plateformes numériques les conduira à une brutale politisation qui pourrait se retourner contre Vladimir Poutine. Dernier fait d’armes macabre, la découverte des massacres dans la ville de Boutcha a conduit à une déferlante d’infox. La théorie de la mise en scène de ce carnage est largement relayée par les pro-russes. Cette rhétorique du coup monté n’est pas à ses balbutiements. Lors de la destruction d’un hôpital durant le conflit, les autorités russes avaient accusé certaines des victimes d’être des acteurs. Alors que les accusations de crimes de guerre se précisent, l’envergure des ramifications du réseau tentaculaire de la machine (dés)informationnelle russe s’expose pour soutenir le fragile récit du Kremlin. Les manœuvres informationnelles russes parviennent à chaque séquence à semer le doute. Maitre de la manipulation, Moscou n’est pas la seule à œuvrer dans l’immoralité. Les risques d’une lutte informationnelle asymétrique La situation d’agresseur agressé n’est pas similaire, néanmoins l’Ukraine arrive à rivaliser et à étioler le récit russe en utilisant les mêmes tactiques d’armes sémantiques que l’envahisseur. Sans nécessairement sombrer dans l’ampleur de la machination russe, Kiev arpente un chemin dangereux en optant pour la mésinformation. Au bord d’une possible disparition, les autorités ukrainiennes mettent en avant des informations partiellement vraies ou erronées. Toutefois, les rétropédalages ont été nombreux et les demandes d’enquêtes internes sur de possibles exactions se sont succédé. Les leaders occidentaux montent au front pour dénoncer les dérives autoritaires de Moscou, mais ils semblent beaucoup moins regardants lorsque la désinformation provient du camp allié. Les accusations de crime de guerre ne concernent pas seulement l’armée russe. Des images de prisonniers russes torturés par l’armée ukrainienne ont embarrassé le gouvernement ukrainien et ses soutiens internationaux. Avec une étonnante défense qui n’est pas sans rappeler celle du Kremlin, l’armée ukrainienne a dénoncé une mise en scène organisée par le camp rival. Le capital sympathie et la crédibilité de l’Ukraine pourraient être minés par cette stratégie. Cette valse de la désinformation remet en question la capacité de l’Ukraine et de l’Occident à lutter contre la stratégie informationnelle russe tout en gardant leur nature démocratique. Accroitre la coopération pandomaine en responsabilisant les plateformes numériques Face à la fuite en avant de Moscou, l’Europe a développé un arsenal de sanctions qui a affecté les canaux audiovisuels russes. C’est ainsi que les chaînes d’informations RT et Sputnik ont été interdites de diffuser sur tous les supports numériques grâce à une décision historique de l’Union européenne. Les réseaux sociaux ont emboité le pas. Tiktok, Facebook et sa filiale Instagram ont suspendu le contenu diffusé par ces médias, tout ceci entérinant le phénomène de politisation de ces plateformes. Les directives adoptées par l’UE semblent drastiques, mais prises certainement trop tard. Les cyber-avantages de la Russie doivent conduire à un sursaut stratégique de taille en renforçant les fonds et les moyens fournis aux taskforces de la lutte contre la désinformation de chaque État. Alors que les efforts de nettoyage des réseaux sociaux ont été intensifiés depuis l’annexion de la Crimée, renforcer la coopération avec les géants de la Tech est de mise. Ces entreprises devront être enclines à collaborer dans le domaine de la modération du contenu. Dans le cas contraire, faire pression sur elles pour obtenir la suppression des comptes conspirationnistes avant que les conflits se déclenchent sera une priorité. Finalement, s’attaquer à l’origine du problème en repensant le modèle économique néfaste de ces plateformes est de mise. Les GAFAM jouent un rôle dans la propagation de la désinformation en plaçant sur un même niveau la diffusion des intox et des faits. Pour lutter contre ce phénomène, l’automatisation de la vérification des faits doit être approfondie. Avec cette nouvelle responsabilité algorithmique qui émergera, la citoyenneté numérique sera ainsi préservée et le terrain informationnel ne sera pas laissé à la merci des puissances adverses pour préparer de futures opérations. Améliorer le cadrage dans le cadre de la lutte contre la désinformation Il va sans dire qu’il existe un problème de cadrage pour saisir la vulnérabilité occidentalela panoplie d’instruments russes pour s’engouffrer dans cette brèche et enfin les récentes défaillances de la machine informationnelle russe. D’une part, les gouvernements occidentaux devront prioriser la lutte contre le piratage de l'esprit humain comme ils l’ont fait sur le piratage des réseaux et la guerre en Ukraine constitue un excellent baromètre. D’autre part, une distinction entre la falsification de l’information volontaire et les informations visant à promouvoir les intérêts russes s’impose également pour cibler stratégiquement les menaces et ne pas sombrer dans la contre-propagande. De surcroit, le cyberespace est transfrontalier par nature tandis que la question des armées est intrinsèquement liée à la souveraineté. Cet espace de conflictualité ne peut donc pas être appréhendé de la même manière que les menaces conventionnelles. Une réponse purement gouvernementale comportera des limites tandis que tomber dans le technosolutionnisme ne sera pas suffisant. En coopération avec les entreprises du secteur, la solution adéquate nécessite une approche pangouvermentale. Une meilleure coordination dans la lutte contre ces ingérences numériques pourrait se faire à travers l’action de l’OCDE et, via des relais au niveau des États, sous la forme de gouvernance interministérielle du numérique. Toujours à l’échelle nationale, la sensibilisation à la pédagogie du numérique dès le plus jeune âge doit devenir une cause nationale pour l’ensemble des démocraties libérales. Avec ce travail d’apprentissage numérique qui irriguera l’ensemble de la société, la détection et le décryptage de la désinformation seront simplifiés et le citoyen ne sera plus une cible critique lors de manœuvres numériques adverses. Seulement à travers cette meilleure compréhension des enjeux sous-jacents à l’infoguerre, la législation sur les services numériques pourra évoluer en parallèle d’une plus grande perception des menaces par le public. Renforcer les moyens de riposte globaux dans les limites des balises démocratiques En développant ses propres plateformes alternatives pour contourner la mainmise occidentale sur ces technologies, la Russie a instauré un véritable rideau de fer sur le web. Enfermée dans son propre réseau, cette stratégie pourrait se retourner contre Moscou. En s’appuyant sur ce phénomène de replis, les pays occidentaux pourraient cantonner les Russes dans leur réseau. Ce dispositif intensifierait la mise sous cloche pour ainsi mettre en place un embargo informationnel performant. Alors que plusieurs de ces réseaux sociaux sont traités comme des « organisations extrémistes » par le Kremlin, la restriction de leurs activités pourrait se  prolonger après le conflit. Or, ces plateformes constituent des relais économiques importants pour les commerçants russes. Ce contingentement pourrait renforcer le mécontentement social à l’encontre du Kremlin. Si la chape de plomb qui s’abat sur l’internet russe pourrait être tout aussi profitable qu’elle a été pour la Chine afin d’accroitre le contrôle sur sa population, elle permettrait tout de même de réduire la perméabilité de nos régimes face aux ingérences russes en limitant l’accès aux relais d’influence. Cette stratégie offensive pourrait également prendre la forme d’un encouragement à la formation de médias russophones indépendants ne répondant à aucune organisation partisane. Les gouvernements occidentaux devront s’atteler à retracer le fil des financements de ces structures opaques au service de la propagande anti-occidentale. La prolifération des intoxs russes est une entreprise fructueuse. La publicité sur ce type de contenu, à travers des plateformes comme Google qui en distribuerait plus des deux tiers, devra être interdite afin de réduire la transmission des fausses informations sur la guerre en Ukraine et sur de futurs conflits. Il sera également nécessaire de déconstruire les méthodes plutôt que les intoxs puisque « dans la guerre informationnelle, le côté qui dit la vérité perd ». La réfutation comporte des limites liées au temps alors que la réactivité est impérative et que les civils sont saturés par l’information. L’approche systémique permettra de faire face à la propagation continue de désinformation. Finalement, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer résume les atouts incontestables de nombreux régimes occidentaux : « C’est par le renforcement de ces attributs démocratiques que l’on pourra continuer à incarner pour les populations russes un modèle alternatif » et ainsi déstabiliser les fondements mêmes de l’empire du mensonge. En réduisant les clivages au sein de nos sociétés pour en améliorer la résilience ou encore en renforçant la transparence de nos vecteurs d’informations, les buts de la démocratie pourront être atteints avec des méthodes compatibles avec celle-ci. Violer temporairement nos valeurs par souci d’efficacité est contre-productif. Comme il a été démontré, de nombreux outils sont offerts aux démocraties libérales pour lutter efficacement dans le cadre de l’infoguerre. Le respect des impératifs démocratiques permettra de ne pas nourrir le discours adverse. Or, les élites russes ne sont pas dupes sur la déroute de l’armée qui a poussé Moscou à revenir à son projet originel de se concentrer sur l’occupation de l’Est de l’Ukraine. Lorsque les soldats rentreront et raconteront qu’ils ne se sont pas battus contre des néonazis pour libérer un peuple asservi, ce sera au tour des civils russes de saisir l’envergure de la bulle informationnelle qui volera alors en éclat. ## L’interprétation erronée de l’histoire par Macron est contre-productive URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/linterpretation-erronee-de-lhistoire-par-macron-est-contre-productive/ Modified: 2022-06-14 > Les déclarations de Macron concernant l’humiliation et la Russie vont à l’encontre des objectifs de politique étrangère qu’il a lui-même déclarés, à savoir sa recherche d’autonomie stratégique européenne et son rôle de médiateur entre l’Ukraine et la Russie. Dans un entretien fait à l’ensemble de la presse quotidienne régionale française, le président français Emmanuel Macron a affirmé que : « il ne faut pas humilier la Russie pour que le jour où les combats cesseront, nous puissions bâtir un chemin de sortie par les voies diplomatiques ». Il a ajouté « e suis convaincu que c’est le rôle de la France, d’être puissance médiatrice ». Bien qu’il ait souligné dans la même entrevue que la France renforcerait son soutien militaire et financier à l’Ukraine, ses propos sur l’humiliation ont provoqué une vive réaction. Le ministre ukrainien des Affaires étrangères, Dmytro Kulebo, a ainsi tweeté que « es efforts pour éviter l’humiliation de la Russie ne peuvent qu’humilier la France et tous les autres pays qui la réclament. Car c’est la Russie qui s’humilie elle-même ». En avançant cet argument de l’humiliation, qu’il avait déjà formulé par le passé, Macron semble s’appuyer sur une lecture particulière du traité de Versailles et de son lien potentiel avec la montée du nazisme et la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Selon cette interprétation, le traité de Versailles a été une paix humiliante pour l’Allemagne, notamment en raison de l’inclusion de la « clause de culpabilité de guerre » (article 231) qui attribue à l’Allemagne l’entière responsabilité du conflit afin de justifier les réparations massives qui lui ont été imposées. Le traité de Versailles ayant provoqué un profond ressentiment dans la société allemande, dont les membres s’attendaient en fait à une paix plus clémente, les idées revanchardes et militaristes y ont trouvé un terreau fertile. Cela a préparé le terrain pour qu’Adolf Hitler et les nationaux-socialistes prennent le pouvoir et plongent l’Europe dans une guerre mondiale encore plus calamiteuse. La déclaration de Macron sur l’humiliation est aussi déroutante qu’exaspérante pour beaucoup de personnes en Ukraine et dans les pays de l’OTAN qui ont une frontière directe avec la Russie dans le nord-est de l’Europe. D’une part, elle repose sur une compréhension très problématique des causes du nazisme et de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. D’autre part, elle contribue à aliéner la France de ses propres alliés le long du « flanc oriental » de l’OTAN, à savoir l’Estonie, la Lettonie, la Lituanie et la Pologne. En effet, les déclarations de Macron concernant l’humiliation et la Russie vont à l’encontre des objectifs de politique étrangère qu’il a lui-même déclarés, à savoir sa recherche d’autonomie stratégique européenne et son rôle de médiateur entre l’Ukraine et la Russie. ... Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## L’Iran des Gardiens : comment la Chine s’ajuste à la prise de contrôle croissante du CGRI URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/liran-des-gardiens-comment-la-chine-sajuste-a-la-prise-de-controle-croissante-du-cgri/ Modified: 2026-05-28 La crise iranienne ne se joue pas seulement dans les frappes, les menaces et les communiqués diplomatiques. Elle se joue aussi dans les recompositions internes du pouvoir à Téhéran et dans la manière dont les partenaires eurasiatiques du régime s’y adaptent. Parmi ces partenaires clefs, la République populaire de Chine apparaît moins attentive à l’Iran officiel et institutionnel qu’à l’Iran opérationnel : celui des flux énergétiques, des circuits logistiques et des réseaux sécuritaires, au cœur desquels le Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique (CGRI) s’impose désormais comme un acteur central. Plusieurs indices récents laissent entrevoir un rapprochement entre Pékin et des structures liées au CGRI. Celui-ci ne doit ni être surestimé — il ne correspond ni à une alliance formelle ni à un alignement stratégique complet — ni être ignoré. Il s’inscrit dans une transformation plus profonde du régime iranien, marquée par un affaiblissement relatif de l’architecture cléricale et une montée en puissance des structures militaro-sécuritaires. La question centrale est donc la suivante : que signifie ce rapprochement du point de vue des intentions chinoises ? S’agit-il d’un pari stratégique sur un nouvel acteur dominant, ou d’un ajustement pragmatique à une réalité interne iranienne en mutation ? Au cours du cessez-le-feu décidé en avril 2025, cette question a gagné en actualité. Le dossier iranien s’inscrit désormais plus ouvertement dans une dynamique triangulaire entre Washington, Pékin et Téhéran : les discussions autour d’un éventuel accord avec l’Iran, la question de la réouverture du détroit d’Ormuz et les échanges sino-américains sur la gestion de la crise confirment que Pékin n’est plus seulement un partenaire économique de Téhéran, mais un acteur dont Washington cherche aussi à mobiliser l’influence. La thèse défendue ici est que la Chine ne cherche pas à tout « miser » sur le CGRI, mais à adapter son partenariat à un Iran en cours de redéfinition. Elle intègre le CGRI comme interlocuteur incontournable, tout en évitant l’alignement et en conservant une capacité de contrôle du risque. La république populaire ne choisit pas les gardiens ; elle prend acte de leur centralité et s’adapte en conséquence. Un rapprochement ancré dans des pratiques concrètes Le rapprochement sino-iranien repose d’abord sur des développements concrets et de mieux en mieux documentés. Plus que jamais, la Chine s’impose comme le principal débouché du pétrole iranien, absorbant une part considérable des exportations de Téhéran, souvent estimée entre 80 et 90 %, à travers des circuits de contournement des sanctions. Ces flux reposent sur des mécanismes sophistiqués : flottes fantômes, transbordements en mer, intermédiaires financiers et logistiques. Les sanctions américaines visant des raffineries chinoises et des réseaux de transport impliqués dans ces échanges confirment l’ampleur de cette réalité. Washington considère explicitement ces circuits alternatifs comme un soutien à la capacité de résilience économique et stratégique du régime islamique. Au-delà du pétrole, des formes plus discrètes de collaboration existent. Plusieurs rapports évoquent l’utilisation par l’Iran de systèmes chinois de navigation et de positionnement, notamment BeiDou, pour améliorer ses capacités militaires. Une enquête du Financial Times, reprise par Reuters, a également évoqué l’utilisation par l’Iran d’un satellite de reconnaissance chinois pour améliorer sa surveillance de positions militaires américaines au Moyen-Orient. L’information demeure sensible et doit être maniée avec prudence, mais elle illustre le type de coopération sous seuil qui intéresse ici : non pas une alliance militaire déclarée, mais des apports capacitaires pouvant renforcer indirectement les structures iraniennes associées à la conduite opérationnelle de la crise. Enfin, des exercices navals conjoints entre la Chine, l’Iran et la Russie témoignent d’une coopération militaire en expansion accélérée depuis la guerre des 12 jours du mois de juin 2025. Ces interactions ne constituent pas une alliance à proprement parler, mais elles contribuent à structurer des canaux de communication, une dynamique d’inter-opérationnalisation technologique et des habitudes de coordination. Pris ensemble, ces éléments indiquent l’existence d’une collaboration encore fragmentée mais de plus en plus approfondie, qui s’opère en grande partie à travers les réseaux liés au CGRI. Un Iran transformé : le CGRI comme centre de gravité opérationnel Ces interactions en développement constant au cours de la dernière année prennent d’autant plus de sens dans le contexte actuel d’une profonde transformation interne du régime iranien. Confirmant une tendance observable depuis plusieurs années, mais accélérée par les frappes américaines et la disparition de plusieurs cadres importants du régime, le Sepāh-e Pāsdārān-e Enghelāb-e Eslāmi (CGRI) s’affirme plus nettement encore comme un acteur transversal, combinant fonctions militaires, économiques et logistiques. Les Pasdaran jouent désormais un rôle incontournable dans les infrastructures, les circuits énergétiques et les réseaux commerciaux parallèles. Cette évolution ne signifie pas la disparition complète du pouvoir clérical, du moins dans son acception formelle, mais elle modifie de facto la structure réelle du régime. Dans un contexte de sanctions et de confrontation, les Gardiens sont désormais les seuls capables d’assurer la continuité opérationnelle — sécurité, flux, logistique — et acquièrent de ce fait une centralité accrue. Déjà Maître-Jacques du système islamique depuis une quinzaine d’années, le CGRI contrôle ou influence aujourd’hui une part prépondérante des flux stratégiques, supervise des réseaux critiques et constitue l’ossature de la projection régionale iranienne. Initialement conçu comme une garde idéologique chargée de protéger la révolution et de garantir la survie du régime, il a progressivement débordé ce rôle en investissant l’économie, les infrastructures, les circuits de contrebande, les fondations paraétatiques et les réseaux régionaux de milices. Par la combinaison de la coercition sécuritaire, du contrôle des ressources, de la captation des marchés sous sanctions et de l’influence institutionnelle, le Corps des Gardiens s’est imposé comme l’un des principaux opérateurs du pouvoir réel. Cette centralité, ancienne mais encore accentuée par les chocs récents, en fait, vu de Chine, un point de passage obligé pour tout acteur extérieur cherchant à préserver un accès fonctionnel à l’Iran réel. Pour Pékin, cette transformation impose un ajustement. Il ne s’agit plus simplement de traiter avec les institutions officielles, mais de composer avec un système où le pouvoir réel est de plus en plus militarisé au profit du CGRI, et non de l’armée régulière iranienne, l’Artesh. Celle-ci demeure chargée de la défense conventionnelle du territoire, mais elle reste politiquement subordonnée et beaucoup moins intégrée que les Pasdaran aux réseaux économiques, sécuritaires et régionaux du régime. Le rapprochement avec le CGRI apparaît alors comme une adaptation fonctionnelle inévitable à un Iran en cours de mutation. Une convergence sous contrainte, non un alignement Il convient cependant de noter que la montée en puissance du CGRI recoupe les intérêts chinois, mais de manière ambivalente. D’un côté, elle facilite l’accès à des circuits capables de fonctionner sous sanctions, de maintenir des flux malgré la pression et d’opérer dans l’opacité. Pour une Chine soucieuse de sécuriser ses approvisionnements, cela représente un avantage. Mais à l’inverse, le CGRI demeure porteur d’une logique stratégique génératrice de risques. La culture d’action du Sepāh-e Pāsdārān privilégie le recours aux conflits indirects et la projection d’une pression coercitive à l’échelle régionale. La menace récurrente d’une fermeture du détroit d’Ormuz illustre précisément cette ambivalence. Pour Téhéran, et plus encore pour les réseaux sécuritaires qui structurent sa posture régionale, Ormuz constitue un levier de pression asymétrique contre Washington et ses alliés. Pour Pékin, en revanche, ce même levier devient un risque systémique : toute perturbation majeure de ce passage stratégique pourrait fragiliser les flux énergétiques dont dépend encore une part importante de son économie. Or ces dynamiques peuvent directement nuire aux intérêts fondamentaux de la Chine, notamment la stabilité du détroit d’Ormuz et la continuité des flux énergétiques. Pékin est particulièrement sensible à ce risque. La Chine a appelé à plusieurs reprises à la retenue et à la désescalade dans le Golfe, notamment face aux tensions autour du détroit d’Ormuz. Elle a également renforcé ses stocks stratégiques de pétrole, anticipant une possible dégradation de la situation. C’est ici que la relation avec le CGRI prend tout son sens : la Chine a besoin de maintenir un canal avec l’acteur iranien le plus directement associé aux instruments de coercition régionale, non pour encourager leur usage, mais pour limiter les effets d’une escalade qui menacerait ses propres intérêts. Cette double posture — engagement économique et prudence stratégique — révèle une logique centrale : la Chine est soucieuse de tirer parti de la relation avec l’Iran sans en subir les risques systémiques. La question d’Ormuz permet ainsi d’ancrer concrètement cette logique : Pékin accepte l’utilité stratégique d’un Iran sous pression, mais redoute le moment où cette pression pourrait se transformer en rupture des flux dont dépend sa propre sécurité énergétique. Composer avec le CGRI sans en devenir prisonnier La Chine ne cherche pas à s’aligner exclusivement sur le CGRI. Elle adopte plutôt une stratégie de gestion du risque : préserver les bénéfices de la relation iranienne tout en limitant les coûts potentiels d’une escalade régionale. Dans cette logique, Pékin maintient ses échanges économiques avec l’Iran et contribue, de fait, à la résilience du régime, notamment par ses importations de pétrole, certains transferts de technologies duales à potentiel militaire et le maintien de circuits commerciaux actifs malgré les sanctions. Dans le même temps, elle évite toute implication militaire directe, toute alliance formelle et toute exposition excessive. Cette ambivalence n’est pas une contradiction, mais le cœur de la prudence stratégique chinoise. Elle permet à Pékin de bénéficier d’un Iran sous pression — qui mobilise une partie des ressources et de l’attention américaines — sans être entraîné dans la confrontation avec Washington. L’Iran devient ainsi un espace de compétition indirecte, où les coûts de la rivalité sino-américaine sont partiellement externalisés. Pour les raisons analysées jusqu’ici, le CGRI occupe une position centrale dans cette équation. Il permet au régime iranien de fonctionner sous contrainte, en maintenant les flux énergétiques, les réseaux logistiques et la cohérence sécuritaire du système. Mais il est aussi porteur d’une logique d’action fondée sur l’escalade asymétrique, susceptible de provoquer des dynamiques incontrôlables, notamment dans le Golfe. C’est cette dualité qui oblige Pékin à composer avec le CGRI sans en devenir prisonnier. La Chine doit maintenir un lien avec lui, car il constitue l’une des principales interfaces du pouvoir réel iranien ; mais elle doit simultanément éviter d’être entraînée dans ses logiques d’escalade. Elle ne cherche donc pas à le contrôler — ce qui dépasserait ses capacités et contreviendrait à ses intérêts — mais à encadrer les effets de son action, notamment par des leviers économiques et une diplomatie de désescalade. L’enjeu est donc de préserver un équilibre actif : maintenir l’Iran suffisamment fonctionnel pour qu’il reste un partenaire utile, tout en évitant que les dynamiques portées par le CGRI ne produisent une rupture stratégique majeure. Conclusion : une convergence sans alignement Le rapprochement entre la Chine et le CGRI ne constitue pas une alliance stratégique formelle. Il reflète une adaptation à une transformation interne du régime iranien accélérée sous l’effet de la guerre avec les États-Unis et Israël. Tout en prenant soin de ne pas mettre tous ses œufs dans le panier des gardiens, Pékin reconnaît que ce panier est devenu incontournable. Dans un Iran fragilisé, sanctionné et engagé dans une confrontation prolongée, le CGRI est aujourd’hui un acteur central et incontournable du pouvoir effectif. La stratégie chinoise consiste donc à rester proche sans s’aligner, à soutenir sans s’engager, à influencer sans contrôler. Elle vise à préserver les bénéfices de la relation iranienne tout en limitant les risques d’escalade. C’est dans cette capacité à naviguer entre engagement et prudence que réside la spécificité de la posture chinoise. Elle ne repose ni sur une alliance, ni sur une neutralité, mais sur une gestion fine des dépendances et des risques. En ce sens, le phénomène est moins spectaculaire qu’une alliance institutionnalisée, mais potentiellement plus significatif. Il révèle une manière d’exercer l’influence sans exposition directe, de tirer parti d’un partenaire sous pression sans en assumer pleinement les coûts, et de s’adapter à un système en mutation sans s’y enfermer. La Chine ne s’aligne pas sur le CGRI. Elle s’adapte à l’évolution du contexte dans lequel celui-ci opère — et c’est précisément ce qui rend sa stratégie à la fois difficile à saisir et redoutablement efficace. Crédit image: Tasnim News Agency via Wikimedia Commons. ## L’Italie et la guerre en Ukraine : continuité stratégique ou impact des tensions populistes ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/litalie-et-la-guerre-en-ukraine-continuite-strategique-ou-impact-des-tensions-populistes/ Modified: 2025-01-13 > ’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par la Russie en février 2022 a pris de nombreux responsables politiques italiens au dépourvu... (L’Italie et la guerre en Ukraine : continuité stratégique ou impact des tensions populistes ? - Nicolas-François Perron) L’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par la Russie en février 2022 a pris de nombreux responsables politiques italiens au dépourvu, parmi lesquels Giorgia Meloni, présidente du Conseil des ministres depuis octobre 2022 et dirigeante du parti national-conservateur et d’extrême droite Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). Lors d’un sommet en 2023, environ 18 mois après le début du conflit, Meloni l’a ouvertement reconnu : « En 2014, l’ampleur de la situation n’avait pas été pleinement saisie en Occident, et nous avions peut-être espéré que l’expansionnisme impérialiste de Moscou s’arrêterait là. Nous nous sommes trompés, et il est important de le reconnaître ». Depuis février 2022, l’Italie a pris des mesures significatives de soutien diplomatique, humanitaire et militaire en faveur de l’Ukraine. En matière d’aide militaire bilatérale, l’Italie se classe aujourd’hui au 12e rang mondial avec 1,34 milliard d’euros (soit 2,01 milliards de dollars canadiens). Cependant, pour ce qui est de l’aide militaire lourde, elle grimpe au 7e rang avec 0,84 milliard d’euros (1,26 milliard de dollars canadiens), notamment grâce à l’envoi d’obusiers de 155 mm/152 mm, de lance-roquettes multiples (MLRS) et d’un système avancé de missiles sol-air (NASAMS). Pour certains analystes, la position de l’Italie à l’égard du conflit en Ukraine peut apparaître comme difficile à appréhender dans toute sa complexité. D’une part, l’opinion publique italienne est parfois perçue comme plus sensible à la Russie qu’au sein de certains autres pays occidentaux, alimentée par des liens historiques, culturels et économiques qui auraient favorisé une relation plus coopérative entre Rome et Moscou. D’autre part, l’émergence depuis 2018 d’un populisme notamment pro-russe, au sein même du gouvernement, nourrit cette complexité. Certains de ces partis, notamment la Lega avec Matteo Salvini, ont entretenu des liens institutionnels et politiques avec le parti de Vladimir Poutine en Russie. Même si l’aide militaire fournie par l’Italie est relativement moins importante que celle fournie par d’autres pays, la forte condamnation de l’invasion russe par Rome aurait surpris Moscou, perçue comme un virage dans la posture italienne vis-à-vis de la Russie. Dès lors, comment interpréter l’engagement militaire de l’Italie en soutien à l’Ukraine ? *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## L’occupation russe de la Géorgie et la remise en cause de son intégrité territoriale URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/loccupation-russe-de-la-georgie-et-la-remise-en-cause-de-son-integrite-territoriale/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Dans le contexte d’élections législatives en Géorgie, prévues pour le 31 octobre 2020, les pressions de la Russie sur ce petit État caucasien se poursuivent, tant par la saisie croissante de territoire que par des campagnes de propagande massives. Dans le contexte d’élections législatives en Géorgie, prévues pour le 31 octobre 2020, les pressions de la Russie sur ce petit État caucasien se poursuivent, tant par la saisie croissante de territoire que par des campagnes de propagande massives. Au moment où les projecteurs se tournent vers le Nagorno-Karabakh, un territoire sécessionniste d’Azerbaïdjan dont le conflit en dormance s’est réveillé depuis le 27 septembre 2020, il existe d’autres territoires sécessionnistes tout près au Caucase, en Géorgie, qui mériteraient tout autant l’attention médiatique. Cela fait maintenant plus de douze ans que les forces russes ont envahi la Géorgie et occupé 20% de son territoire. La Russie continue de violer la souveraineté et l’intégrité territoriale de la Géorgie avec sa politique agressive de « frontière mobile », une stratégie qui implique l’annexion progressive de petits segments du territoire géorgien par l’expansion de ses zones d’occupation déjà illégales. La timide réponse occidentale à cette violation flagrante du droit international peut avoir encouragé Moscou à annexer la Crimée lors d’un accaparement de terres similaire en 2014. La mobilité des frontières dans un contexte de ce que plusieurs ont qualifié de conflit « gelé » montre d’une part que le conflit n’est précisément pas « gelé » et, d’autre part, qu’il continue d’entraîner des pertes humaines. En effet, la mort suspecte d’un Géorgien de 29 ans, M. Kvaratskhelia alors qu’il visitait Gali en mars 2019, en est un exemple. Bien que les autorités abkhazes aient allégué son suicide, les examens de la dépouille montrent clairement des indications de torture. Le 17 mars 2019, seulement quelques jours après le décès de M. Kvaratskhelia, un autre Géorgien, Givi Beruashvili, a été interpelé par les forces d’occupation à Ditsi, village limitrophe de la région de Tskhinvali, pour avoir rendu visite à ses grands-parents qui vivent à 500 mètres de la ligne de contact. L’absence de mandat de surveillance internationale rend invisibles ces abus, alors que les groupes sécessionnistes et leurs commanditaires russes continuent d’employer des méthodes extra-légales de coercition en toute impunité. Depuis l’occupation de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud par la Russie et la reconnaissance subséquente de leur indépendance par cette dernière, une soi-disant frontière administrative sépare les territoires saisis du reste de la Géorgie. Derrière ces territoires sécessionnistes, à peine voilée, se cache la main de Moscou sans laquelle il leur serait impossible de maintenir leur indépendance factice. Parvenus au statut d’États de facto, i.e. sans reconnaissance de la part de la communauté internationale, mais forts du soutien de leur commanditaire russe, les deux territoires sécessionnistes maintiennent des revendications territoriales sur des parcelles de terre de leur territoire autonome, tel qu’il fut limité dans le régime soviétique disparu depuis trente ans, qui échappent toujours à leur contrôle. Le caractère mobile de cette « frontière » permet à la Russie de grappiller davantage de petits bouts de territoire à sa guise, élargissant ainsi sa zone d’occupation. Les revendications territoriales des autorités sécessionnistes font l’affaire de Moscou, qui augmente ainsi son contrôle territorial indirectement. Cette politique de mobilité des frontières se fonde sur une compréhension élastique du droit soviétique (et en particulier de la Constitution de 1977), qui permettrait à ces entités de recouvrer l’entièreté des territoires dont elles jouissaient du temps de leur autonomie soviétique. Cette frontière mobile prend les allures d’un véritable front – i.e. une frontière administrative non définitive qui départage momentanément des entités territoriales telles des empires, concept qui est d’ailleurs à l’origine du mot frontière. Des Géorgiens sont expulsés des terres nouvellement occupées et risquent d’être kidnappés s’ils traversent la nouvelle frontière administrative qui s’est fait arbitrairement établir avec la bénédiction de Moscou. Cette frontière, dont le tracé est souvent modifié sans avertissement, augmente d’autant plus l’insécurité de la population géorgienne. Des histoires comme celle de Dato Vanishvili, dont le terrain a été incorporé au sein de l’Ossétie du Sud au cours d’une nuit en mai 2015, soit près de sept ans après la guerre de 2008, se multiplient. Entre 2008 et 2018, on estime que la Russie a ainsi unilatéralement modifié la frontière au détriment de la Géorgie 56 fois. D’autres chercheurs arrivent au décompte de 54 changements de frontières unilatéraux par la Russie entre 2011 et 2018. Cette politique de la frontière mobile exploite l’inquiétude de Tbilissi face à la perte durable d’un important segment de son territoire, poussant le gouvernement géorgien à la table des négociations avec le Kremlin. En 2015, des bornes frontières ont été déplacées vers le village de Tsitelubani, qui héberge une petite section de 1605 mètres de l’oléoduc Baku-Supsa, long de 830 km, exploité par la compagnie pétrolière BP sur un territoire que la Russie occupe désormais partiellement. Malgré sa taille très limitée, ce petit segment de l’oléoduc suffit pour permettre à ceux qui contrôlent la zone de perturber le flot du pétrole au besoin. L’occupation de la zone agit ainsi comme une épée de Damoclès sur les gestionnaires de cette infrastructure stratégique. De façon similaire, l’avancée de la frontière mobile vers la seule autoroute qui relie l’ouest de la Géorgie au reste du pays permet à Moscou d’exercer une plus grande pression sur la Géorgie en menaçant de déconnecter Tbilissi d’une portion du territoire géorgien. La frontière ne se situe actuellement plus qu’à 400 mètres de cette autoroute. Les arrestations illégales par les forces d’occupation sont devenues de plus en plus fréquentes ces dernières années. Entre 2017 et 2019, 327 Géorgiens se sont fait arrêter pour avoir « franchi illégalement la frontière ». De tels cas montrent non seulement une intention hostile continue de la Russie contre les Géorgiens, mais également la violation de l’accord de cessez-le‑feu de 2008 négocié par l’Union européenne (UE) et le maintien d’une présence illégale de troupes russes sur le sol géorgien, toutes des mesures qui empêchent la Géorgie de restaurer son intégrité territoriale. La politique étrangère pro-occidentale de la Géorgie – notamment l’approfondissement de ses relations avec les États-Unis et le projet très populaire d’adhérer à l’OTAN et à l’UE – génère évidemment de la frustration à Moscou. Pourtant, les choix faits par une grande majorité de Géorgiens restent inébranlables. Des sondages récents compilés par le National Democratic Institute (NDI) des États-Unis montrent que 83% des répondants géorgiens sont favorables à l’adhésion de la Géorgie à l’UE et 78% soutiennent l’adhésion à l’OTAN. Ces deux organisations entretiennent d’ailleurs savamment l’espoir d’une éventuelle adhésion, sans toutefois chercher à indisposer la Russie de manière frontale. La tactique de Moscou de créer suffisamment de problèmes à la Géorgie pour que cette dernière mette en attente ses ambitions de politique étrangère semble donc fonctionner. Conçue pour saper ce désir d’intégration, cette stratégie vise également à montrer que la communauté euro-atlantique n’est pas très disposée à intégrer la Géorgie rapidement, ni à intervenir pour empêcher la Russie d’étendre sa zone d’occupation. Simultanément, la Russie rend ainsi impossible pour la Géorgie de recouvrer son intégrité territoriale et de remplir les conditions essentielles à son adhésion tant à l’UE qu’à l’OTAN, c’est-à-dire l’établissement de relations harmonieuses avec ses minorités et la reconnaissance mutuelle des frontières avec ses voisins. La mise en attente indéfinie de l’adhésion tant convoitée de la Géorgie à ces organisations occidentales et la prédation territoriale qui se poursuit impunément illustrent que, par ces politiques de frontières mobiles, Moscou réussit, pour l’instant, à dissuader et l’UE et l’OTAN d’étendre leur influence dans la région. Pourtant, cette stratégie de dissuasion de la Russie ne fonctionne pas parfaitement. Le partenariat stratégique entre la Géorgie et les États-Unis a atteint de nouveaux sommets lorsqu’en 2017, le département d’État américain a autorisé une vente militaire à la Géorgie portant sur des missiles antichars portables Javelinman et des unités de lancement de commandement Javelin (CLU), de l’équipement qui figurait sur la liste de souhaits de la Géorgie depuis de nombreuses années. De même, le projet de Washington de vendre à la Géorgie des FIM-92 Stingers, un système de défense aérienne portable, souligne l’engagement des États-Unis à poursuivre une coopération étroite dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité. De son côté, la Géorgie progresse dans sa coopération avec l’OTAN en ce qu’elle est actuellement le plus grand contributeur non membre de l’OTAN à la Force internationale d’assistance à la sécurité (FIAS) en Afghanistan et le troisième pays contributeur au total. L’exercice conjoint OTAN-Géorgie 2020 tenu le mois dernier en est un autre exemple. Ces relations intensifiées entre Tbilissi et Washington entretiennent les espoirs de la Géorgie d’adhérer un jour à l’Alliance transatlantique, ce qui peut être vu comme un certain échec des efforts de la Russie d’amener la population géorgienne à rejeter les valeurs occidentales en provoquant des perturbations sociales en Géorgie. Opérations d’information En dehors des menaces physiques et militaires, la Russie continue à faire appel à des méthodes plus subtiles pour exercer son influence sur la Géorgie et la population géorgienne. Ces dernières années, l’ingérence de la Russie dans les élections et les processus politiques d’autres pays est devenue un sujet majeur de préoccupation en Occident. Dans le voisinage immédiat de la Russie, cependant, ce phénomène n’est pas nouveau. Parallèlement à son action militaire directe, le Kremlin s’est engagé dans une campagne continue de guerre de l’information visant à saper la démocratie et à déstabiliser la situation politique dans ces pays. C’est donc sans surprise que la Géorgie compte parmi les pays faisant l’objet d’opérations d’influence russe visant à dérailler sa politique étrangère et accroître la polarisation politique au niveau national. La Géorgie est en effet une cible de choix des attaques cybernétiques et de la propagande en provenance de la Russie. Depuis l’éclatement de l’URSS, de nombreuses phases de tensions entre les deux pays ont donné lieu à diverses campagnes d’information de Moscou sous une multitude de formes. La guerre russo-géorgienne d’août 2008 a certes été la forme la plus manifeste de ces attaques caractérisées par une coordination ingénieuse des opérations militaires traditionnelles sur le terrain physique avec des cyberattaques et des opérations d’information. Les campagnes de désinformation de Moscou à l’endroit de la Géorgie n’ont jamais vraiment cessé depuis. Il n’est pas rare que ces campagnes impliquent directement des hauts fonctionnaires des ministères russes des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense ainsi que le président Vladimir Poutine lui-même. Plus récemment, Moscou a par exemple lancé une opération d’information contre le Centre Richard Lugar pour la recherche en santé publique, basé à Tbilissi et financé par les États-Unis, le 11 septembre 2018. Le Centre Lugar est un laboratoire qui fait partie du système public de soins de santé de Géorgie. Le commandant russe des troupes de défense radiologique, chimique et biologique, Igor Kirilov, a allégué que le Centre Lugar était un laboratoire où les États-Unis auraient mené des expériences illégales sur des humains, y tuant plus de 73 personnes. Moscou a également accusé Washington de développer des armes biologiques au Centre Lugar. Il est tout à fait plausible qu’une attaque aussi médiatisée que celle contre le laboratoire de Lugar constitue une mesure stratégique visant à susciter la méfiance du public géorgien et international envers les États-Unis dans le but de saper l’intégration de la Géorgie dans la communauté transatlantique. À l’approche des élections législatives géorgiennes le 31 octobre 2020, il n’est pas étonnant que Tbilissi soit sur le qui-vive. Après tout, la Russie a une assez longue expérience d’interventions dans les campagnes électorales et référendaires de pays étrangers, dont l’élection présidentielle américaine en 2016, mais tout particulièrement dans les anciennes républiques soviétiques. Pour ce qui est des élections géorgiennes, les campagnes de désinformation en provenance de la Russie ont débuté dès 2019 par le soutien à des groupes pro-russes de Géorgie, tel que l’Alliance des Patriotes, et la diffusion d’idées à l’effet que l’Azerbaïdjan et la Turquie seraient des ennemis de la Géorgie, alors que la Russie serait un bon voisin sachant soutenir les pays amis. Comme c’est le cas ailleurs, la campagne de propagande russe en Géorgie cherche à exploiter les vulnérabilités existantes dans la société. Les valeurs traditionnelles, la religion et les conflits territoriaux sont quelques-unes des questions qui fournissent un terrain fertile pour la manipulation des électeurs en Géorgie. Pour faire avancer ses intérêts, le gouvernement russe soutient divers acteurs pro-Kremlin, tels que les partis politiques, les médias, les ONG et les groupes extrémistes radicaux, qui agissent souvent comme des vecteurs de diffusion de récits anti-occidentaux. L’institution la plus influente du pays – l’Église orthodoxe géorgienne – est également soumise à une influence russe significative et le clergé orthodoxe sert souvent de sources ou d’amplificateurs de récits pro-russes et anti-occidentaux. Cependant, tous ces acteurs n’ont pas de liens directs et ouverts avec la Russie, et certains peuvent agir comme des amplificateurs naturels ou des « idiots utiles », contribuant au récit pro-Kremlin, véhiculé au moyen de soft power et de propagande, qui diffuse des théories du complot et des fausses nouvelles qui divisent. Une étude de la Media Development Foundation (MDF) sur la propagande anti-occidentale a observé que les récits anti-occidentaux adoptent une approche à trois niveaux: semer la peur, instiller le désespoir et proposer des solutions alternatives. Selon le rapport de la MDF, la propagande anti-occidentale russe évoque le risque d’une guerre et de pertes de territoires, ainsi que la menace d’une érosion de l’identité nationale pour promouvoir les peurs dans la société géorgienne. Les principaux messages utilisés pour instiller le désespoir se concentrent sur le scepticisme quant à la volonté de l’UE et de l’OTAN de soutenir la Géorgie et le récit d’un « déclin libéral » en Occident. Dans ce contexte, le dialogue direct avec la Russie et la neutralité politique et militaire sont proposés comme solutions aux problèmes territoriaux et une orientation pro-russe est présentée comme un moyen de protéger l’identité géorgienne et d’assurer la stabilité économique. L’écosystème de propagande de la Russie s’est fortement appuyé sur Facebook, le réseau social le plus populaire de Géorgie. Les acteurs pro-Kremlin ont extensivement exploité l’infrastructure des médias sociaux pour répandre la désinformation et les fausses nouvelles. Dans le cadre de sa surveillance des médias sociaux, la Société internationale pour des élections justes et la démocratie (SIEJD) – un chien de garde géorgien des élections et de la démocratie – déclare avoir découvert des réseaux organisés sur Facebook qui fonctionneraient de manière coordonnée pour amplifier et diffuser artificiellement le contenu pro-russe de News-Front et de Sputnik. News-Front, un véhicule ouvert et agressif de désinformation russe, établi dans la  Crimée occupée en 2014, a été lancé en géorgien en octobre 2019, s’engageant dans des opérations d’information sur Facebook peu de temps après. Plus précisément, selon les résultats de l’enquête de la SIEJD News-Front a tenté de susciter l’antagonisme et l’agression parmi les utilisateurs géorgiens de Facebook, divisant la société, créant une polarisation politique [...] et employant une gamme de tactiques pour diffuser des messages anti-occidentaux et pro-russes. Dans le cadre de son opération, News-Front a utilisé de faux comptes qui partageaient du contenu News-Front de manière secrète, organisée et ciblée avec au moins 31 groupes Facebook ouverts avec une audience combinée de plus d’un demi-million [d’utilisateurs]. Outre la promotion de contenus anti-occidentaux et pro-russes, ce réseau ciblait à la fois les groupes Facebook pro-gouvernementaux et pro-opposition « avec des messages provocateurs adaptés qui auraient pu servir à diviser la société en deux camps et à déclencher la confrontation ». Ce n’est certainement pas un hasard si le service géorgien de News-Front a été lancé un an avant les élections législatives d’octobre 2020 en Géorgie. Il est fort probable qu’un réseau Facebook fabriqué ait été mis en place pour influencer le discours pré-électoral et alimenter davantage la polarisation en Géorgie, où le débat politique est déjà très chargé. Cependant, le début de la pandémie de la COVID-19 et la crise sanitaire mondiale qui a suivi ont fourni un moment opportun pour News-Front de lancer une nouvelle offensive d’information en Géorgie. News-Front et son réseau Facebook se sont rapidement mobilisés pour diffuser de la désinformation, des rumeurs à propos de complots et des messages anti-occidentaux en Géorgie. La désinformation russe liée à la COVID-19 en Géorgie a tenté de déformer la réalité et de promouvoir l’opinion selon laquelle la Géorgie devrait se distancier de l’Occident tout en attaquant implicitement les institutions étatiques et les mesures prises pour contenir le virus. Une fois de plus, la désinformation russe a tenté de discréditer le Richard Lugar Center for Public Health Research, l’accusant d’être impliqué dans la propagation du virus et sapant la confiance dans ses efforts pour lutter contre l’épidémie de coronavirus. La SIEJD a également affirmé que, comme News-Front, un autre média russe, Spoutnik, utilisait également de faux comptes Facebook pour amplifier artificiellement le contenu de cette propagande en Géorgie. Facebook a supprimé l’infrastructure mondiale de News-Front de sa plateforme en avril 2020, interdisant à l’organisation de se réinstaller sur le réseau. Les faux comptes associés à Sputnik trouvés par la SIEJD ont également été supprimés à peu près au même moment. Cela a peut-être limité certaines des capacités de l’infrastructure de désinformation russe sur Facebook avant les élections législatives en Géorgie, mais ces enquêtes démontrent que la Russie exploite et continuera d’exploiter les capacités des médias sociaux pour influencer le discours public et les élections en Géorgie. La place de la Géorgie dans la stratégie de Poutine L’utilisation par la Russie de la « tactique du salami » n’est pas nouvelle. Ces dernières années, cependant, Moscou a utilisé de manière plus proactive des moyens violents pour miner la souveraineté géorgienne. Le récent déclin de Poutine dans les sondages d’opinion à propos du taux de satisfaction des Russes à son endroit pourrait être l’un des facteurs expliquant l’augmentation de ces provocations. Selon une récente enquête menée par l’institut de sondage russe le Centre Levada, les taux d’approbation de Poutine sont tombés à leur plus bas niveau depuis 2006, avec seulement 33,4% des personnes interrogées en Russie déclarant avoir confiance en son régime. Des propositions impopulaires, comme l’augmentation de l’âge de la retraite et une croissance économique atone, frustrent le public. C’est précisément l’intervention militaire en Tchétchénie et le miracle économique du début des années 2000, qui avaient valu un large soutien populaire à Poutine et on ne peut exclure qu’il tente de réitérer cet exploit en misant sur le nationalisme russe et en adoptant un certain aventurisme en politique étrangère : l’occupation des territoires géorgiens et, plus important encore, l’annexion de la Crimée ont rehaussé ses cotes de popularité qui avaient déjà connu une certaine baisse. Évidemment qu’il s’agit là d’un pari dangereux de la part de Poutine, car ce faisant, il fait alourdir le régime de sanctions dirigées contre les oligarques russes, qui sont également parmi ses soutiens les plus importants. Cependant, bien qu’on puisse voir dans ces interventions une simple politique géopolitique qui a réussi, on ne peut évacuer du revers de la main cette préoccupation de Poutine par sa popularité en déclin. Bien qu’elle soit moins problématique sur le plan du droit international, car la Russie intervient à l'invitation du président syrien Bachir el Assad, l’intervention militaire en Syrie pourrait s’inscrire de cette même logique. Jusqu’à présent, les stratèges du Kremlin ont su habilement distraire le public en présentant les exploits de la force militaire russe à l’étranger. Alors que les Russes ordinaires commencent à remettre en question les efforts de Poutine pour restaurer la « grandeur passée » de la Russie, la perte de confiance intérieure et l’isolement politique exaspèrent Poutine. La Géorgie semble être l’endroit de prédilection pour atteindre ses objectifs, étant le pays le plus ouvertement pro-occidental de la région, sans être pour autant protégée par le parapluie de l’OTAN. Aussi, il n’est pas besoin d’envahir de nouveau le pays pour avoir un effet, il suffit d’élargir les territoires qui sont déjà occupés, une mesure peu couteuse à laquelle la Géorgie n’a pas les moyens de s’opposer. ## L’orientation de la relation Sino-Canadienne en 2026 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lorientation-de-la-relation-sino-canadienne-en-2026/ Modified: 2026-02-19 Policy Forum Politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur un sujet important pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Pour cette cinquième édition, nous avons demandé à quatre experts de répondre à cette question : peu après que le premier ministre Mark Carney ait annoncé un « partenariat stratégique » renouvelé avec la Chine, un pays que la stratégie indopacifique 2022 du Canada qualifie de « puissance mondiale de plus en plus perturbatrice », les États-Unis ont averti que tout accord de libre-échange avec ce pays pourrait nuire fondamentalement au Canada et compromettre l'ACEUM, qui fera l'objet d'un examen plus tard cette année. Selon votre avis d'expert, comment le Canada devrait-il gérer ses relations diplomatiques et économiques avec la Chine en 2026 ? Balkan Devlen | Institut MacDonald-Laurier Le « partenariat stratégique » du premier ministre Mark Carney avec la Chine repose sur quatre hypothèses : que la Chine est un partenaire commercial fiable, qu'Ottawa dispose d'un levier significatif auprès de Pékin, que se rapprocher du principal rival géopolitique de Washington renforcera d'une manière ou d'une autre la position d'Ottawa dans les renégociations de l'ACEUM, et que ce gouvernement est capable de gérer habilement les risques qui en découlent. Ces quatre hypothèses sont erronées. La Chine a une longue histoire de coercition économique, y compris à l'égard du Canada, qui remonte à bien avant Trump 2.0. La dépendance commerciale du Canada à l'égard des États-Unis éclipse largement tout moyen de pression que pourrait offrir une alliance avec la Chine. Signaler un rapprochement avec Pékin est beaucoup plus susceptible de provoquer une réaction négative de la part des États-Unis que d'obtenir des concessions. Par ailleurs, les récentes réalisations du gouvernement fédéral – des échecs en matière d'ingérence étrangère à la débâcle des deux Michaels, en passant par des décisions discutables en matière de politique industrielle comme les subventions pour les véhicules électriques – n'inspirent guère confiance dans sa capacité à mener à bien cette tâche délicate. Prétendre que Carney représente un nouveau départ, c'est ignorer que l'équipe dans son ensemble reste largement inchangée. Le discours de Carney à Davos sur l'union des puissances moyennes sonne creux. Alors que la Chine fait pression sur le Japon pour qu'il modifie ses politiques, Ottawa reste ostensiblement silencieux. Chercher à conclure des accords bilatéraux avec une puissance autoritaire qui s'est ingérée dans les élections canadiennes, s'est livrée à des activités d'espionnage, de subversion et de coercition économique, et a détenu des citoyens canadiens n'est pas la manière dont les puissances moyennes protègent leurs intérêts. Que devrait faire le Canada ? L'idéal serait qu'Ottawa rejoigne une coalition de démocraties partageant les mêmes idées – le Royaume-Uni, l'Allemagne, le Japon, la France – afin de résister collectivement à la coercition économique chinoise tout en travaillant avec les États-Unis, et non contre eux, pour renforcer les liens économiques transatlantiques. Le Canada devrait également tracer une ligne claire : développer ses exportations agricoles et énergétiques vers la Chine tout en limitant fermement la coopération dans les domaines de la propriété intellectuelle, des minéraux critiques, de la fabrication de pointe et de la recherche scientifique. Parallèlement, Ottawa doit mener des opérations de contre-espionnage vigoureuses afin de signaler que l'ingérence chinoise dans les affaires canadiennes ne sera pas tolérée. Le commerce des matières premières présente des risques gérables, ce qui n'est pas le cas d'une intégration plus profonde. Le Dr Balkan Devlen est chercheur à l'Institut Macdonald-Laurier et cofondateur et directeur de Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory. Il est enseignant, analyste en politique étrangère et consultant, avec plus de vingt ans d'expérience sur trois continents. Yuxi Liu | Université ShanghaiTech Briser le prisme, voir la Chine sous un nouveau jour Alors que le Canada trace sa voie avec la Chine en 2026, son principal défi n'est pas d'ordre technique, mais cognitif : il doit se libérer des modèles mentaux contraints par des étiquettes telles que « puissance de plus en plus perturbatrice » et le prisme habituel de Washington. Historiquement, cependant, les politiques chinoises les plus importantes du Canada, depuis le rapprochement de Pierre Trudeau, reposaient sur la capacité à dialoguer avec la Chine selon ses propres conditions, au-delà des scénarios géopolitiques dominants. Un changement fondamental est donc impératif. Le Canada doit cultiver un nouveau cadre diplomatique qui reconnaisse la diversité des dynamiques de la société chinoise et les aspirations de son peuple, qui s'appuie sur des recherches approfondies plutôt que sur des suppositions, et qui développe un esprit d'exploration constructive afin d'identifier les domaines de coopération mutuellement bénéfiques. Pour que ce nouveau cadre soit substantiel, il doit être nourri par une compréhension publique plus profonde et plus nuancée de la Chine. Cela nécessite un changement conscient, loin des discours réactifs et centrés sur les menaces. Une société capable de discuter de la Chine sans suspicion automatique est mieux équipée pour prendre des décisions stratégiques fondées sur ses intérêts. En outre, la valeur immense des liens entre les peuples canadiens – ses communautés sino-canadiennes dynamiques, ses étudiants et ses relations de jumelage entre villes – doit être reconnue et entretenue de manière stratégique. Ces liens constituent un pont essentiel pour le contact et la compréhension mutuelle, en particulier lorsque les relations officielles se refroidissent. Pour y parvenir, il faut un investissement concerté et à long terme de la part du gouvernement, du monde universitaire, du milieu des affaires et d'autres acteurs de la société civile – des initiatives menées non pas dans un but de gain politique éphémère, mais dans celui d'une compréhension fondamentale. La voie à suivre pour le Canada commence en 2026 avec le courage de démanteler ces barrières cognitives et d'élaborer une politique fondée sur ses propres intérêts nationaux et sur une compréhension globale et authentique de la Chine. Ce n'est qu'alors qu'une feuille de route stable et durable pour les relations bilatérales pourra être tracée. La Dr Yuxi Liu est professeure adjointe à l'Institut des sciences humaines de l'Université ShanghaiTech et experte en relations sino-canadiennes. Elle est titulaire d'un doctorat en histoire de l'Université du Québec à Montréal et a également occupé des postes de recherche en Suisse et en France. Pascale Massot | Université d’Ottawa La visite de Carney en Chine doit être replacée dans un contexte plus large Tout d'abord, le contexte nord-américain constitue la toile de fond immédiate et établit le cadre dominant autour des objectifs de résilience économique et de diversification. Ces objectifs sont à la fois essentiels et difficiles à concilier, compte tenu de la politique provinciale canadienne et de l'examen conjoint de l'ACEUM prévu cet été. L'accord sur les véhicules électriques (VE) soulève des questions importantes sur l'avenir de l'industrie des VE et, plus largement, sur l'avenir de l'industrie automobile au Canada. À cet égard, le gouvernement canadien devra tracer une voie qui concilie les différents intérêts en jeu, tout en gardant un œil sur le moyen et le long terme. Deuxièmement, le contexte géopolitique est également important compte tenu du rôle significatif que joue la Chine sur la scène internationale. Les Canadiens doivent cesser d'assimiler une relation diplomatique fonctionnelle avec la deuxième économie mondiale à une approbation des politiques de ce pays. La Chine est une grande puissance mondiale qui influence toute une série de questions d'intérêt national et international, et le Canada doit entretenir des relations substantielles avec ce pays. Tout autre choix ne serait pas dans l'intérêt du Canada. Il est certain que ces relations ne seront pas toujours faciles : il y a des domaines où nos intérêts se recoupent et d'autres où ils divergent. C'était vrai avant et cela reste vrai aujourd'hui, mais il ne s'agit pas d'un retour à une époque révolue. Nous sommes entrés dans une nouvelle ère, qui doit s'appuyer sur notre histoire bilatérale. La stratégie indo-pacifique du Canada pour 2022 qualifie la Chine de « puissance mondiale de plus en plus perturbatrice » et, bien que le gouvernement ait éludé la question de savoir s'il avait changé de position sur cette évaluation, nous devons nous habituer à avoir plusieurs idées en tête en même temps. Le fait que l'essor de la Chine ait perturbé le statu quo et soit en train de transformer le monde est avant tout une constatation descriptive. Ce diagnostic est important, mais ce qui importe encore plus, c'est ce que nous faisons ensuite. Le premier ministre Mark Carney a fait preuve d'une grande assurance en se rendant en Chine avant la visite du président Trump en avril. Cependant, cette visite n'a pas résolu toutes les tensions et contradictions inhérentes à nos relations, qui devront être gérées avec prudence au cours des prochaines années. Pascale Massot est professeure agrégée à l'École d'études politiques de l'Université d'Ottawa. En 2022, elle a été membre du Comité consultatif indo-pacifique auprès du ministre canadien des Affaires étrangères. Stephen R. Nagy | Université internationale chrétienne, Tokyo Gérer la Chine en 2026 : discipline, levier et garde-fous Le Canada devrait gérer sa relation avec la Chine en 2026 par une diplomatie disciplinée et bien séquencée — en protégeant d’abord les intérêts essentiels de l’alliance avec les États-Unis, tout en gardant avec Pékin des canaux étroits et pragmatiques. D’abord, Ottawa doit traiter l’ACEUM et le marché américain comme des réalités structurelles, pas comme une option parmi d’autres. Avec la révision de l’accord plus tard cette année, le Canada doit éliminer toute ambiguïté : aucune démarche vers un ALE avec la Chine, transparence complète envers Washington sur toute entente commerciale liée à la Chine, et application stricte pour que le Canada ne devienne pas une plateforme de transbordement de produits chinois vers les États-Unis. L’objectif : désamorcer et stabiliser — pas récolter des applaudissements à Davos. Ensuite, le Canada devrait abandonner le vocabulaire de “partenariat stratégique” au profit d’une approche de coopération sélective + gestion des risques. La Chine est à la fois un marché et — selon la Stratégie indo-pacifique du Canada — une puissance « de plus en plus perturbatrice ». L’engagement devrait viser des secteurs non stratégiques (agroalimentaire, dossiers consulaires, mobilité étudiante, climat lorsque possible), tout en érigeant des garde-fous fermes sur les minéraux critiques, les technologies avancées, les données et la recherche à double usage. Troisièmement, Ottawa doit bâtir du levier avant l’engagement en renforçant les partenariats avec le Japon, la Corée du Sud, l’Australie, l’UE et l’Asie du Sud-Est — sur les chaînes d’approvisionnement, les normes et la sécurité économique. Concrètement : renforcer la coordination du PTPGP, élargir des mécanismes minilatéraux de résilience, et développer une coopération “modulaire” sur la surveillance maritime, l’évasion des sanctions et les intrants critiques. Quatrièmement, la résilience démocratique interne est une politique étrangère : mettre en œuvre et faire respecter le registre de transparence sur l’ingérence étrangère, renforcer la sécurité de la recherche et les règles de divulgation universitaires, et rendre les évaluations du renseignement actionnables politiquement. Si ces vulnérabilités persistent, les alliés douteront de la fiabilité du Canada, et Pékin continuera d’exploiter nos failles. Enfin, Ottawa devrait communiquer une doctrine simple : coopérer là où les intérêts convergent, dissuader là où ils s’opposent, et ne jamais échanger la sécurité continentale contre un soulagement commercial à court terme. Bref : moins de grandes déclarations, plus d’alignement réfléchi, une diversification patiente, et un engagement avec la Chine seulement là où le Canada peut absorber la coercition et continuer de dire non. Stephen R. Nagy est professeur de politique et d’études internationales à l’International Christian University. Il est également chercheur principal et responsable du projet Chine au Macdonald-Laurier Institute, ainsi que chercheur invité au Japan Institute for International Affairs. Le titre de son livre à paraître est « Japan as a Middle Power State: Navigating Ideological and Systemic Divides ». Crédit image: Fred Dufour-Pool/Getty Images ## L’OTAN à l’heure de la COVID-19 : d’une crise sanitaire à une crise politique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lotan-a-lheure-de-la-covid-19-dune-crise-sanitaire-a-une-crise-politique/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Ce point chaud questionne comment l’actuelle pandémie de COVID-19 a-t-elle influencé les activités concrètes de l’OTAN ? Ce billet de blogue est écrit dans le cadre du Cycle d’ateliers virtuels portant sur le renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Le quatrième atelier portait sur l’OTAN et la défense, et a fait intervenir Carla Martinez Machain, professeure à la Kansas State University, Stéfanie von Hlatky, professeure à la Queen’s University et le Colonel Éric Laforest, commandant, de la Force opérationnelle en Lettonie. Les informations relatées dans le texte sont une synthèse générale des idées présentées par les conférenciers.[1] Visionnez la vidéo du quatrième panel Comment l’actuelle pandémie de COVID-19 a-t-elle influencé les activités concrètes de l’OTAN – ses déploiements, ses exercices pour développer ses propres capacités, ainsi que ses activités de renforcement des capacités au sein de ses partenaires étatiques (en Irak notamment) ? Pour répondre à cette question, deux niveaux d’analyses différents – et incidemment deux perspectives alternatives – peuvent être retenus : la question centrale de l’influence de la pandémie sur l’efficacité des activités de l’alliance d’un point de vue stratégique et opérationnel d’un côté, ou la question connexe de l’influence de la crise sanitaire sur la légitimité de ces opérations auprès des civils au sein des États receveurs de l’assistance sécuritaire d’un autre côté. D’un point de vue opérationnel, les déploiements de l’OTAN sont conceptualisés comme des engagements de long terme. Dans certains cas comme en Irak et en Afghanistan, l’objectif est de former les troupes des pays hôtes. D’autres missions visent davantage à dissuader de potentielles menaces via le stationnement de forces armées à l’étranger : l’opération Enhanced Forward Presence dans les pays baltes notamment. Si, dans ce cadre d’engagements institutionnalisés et durables, la pandémie de la COVID-19 n’a pas directement entraîné de « vide de sécurité » dans les espaces d’intervention de l’alliance atlantique, la crise sanitaire a pris la forme d’une contrainte opérationnelle supplémentaire s’ajoutant aux différents défis auxquels sont déjà confrontées ces missions. Les opérations de l’OTAN font face à des contraintes différenciées dépendamment du contexte d’opération, et, dans le cadre d’une alliance multinationale, des capacités distinctes des forces armées nationales spécifiquement engagées au sein de chaque mission. Conséquemment, les effets contraignants de la COVID-19 ont pris des formes différentes selon les théâtres d’opérations; perturbations de la rotation des troupes, cessations temporaires de certains exercices et formations militaires, etc. Certains programmes essentiels de l’OTAN ont en particulier été réorientés, pour répondre aux exigences immédiates de sécurité sanitaire. Les formations menées par les gender advisors, dont le but est de renforcer la place des femmes au sein de l’alliance, de renforcer la compréhension de l’influence différenciée des conflits sur les personnes dépendamment de leur genre, ou encore de lutter contre les violences sexuelles dans le cadre des activités de l’alliance, ont par exemple été momentanément redirigées. Habituellement destinées tant aux membres à l’OTAN qu’au personnel des États hôtes, ces activités liées à la mise en place de la Résolution 1325 des Nations Unies ont en effet été recentrées, pour la plupart, sur les membres internes à l’alliance. À côté de la dimension stratégique, l’un des niveaux d’analyse de plus en plus considérés dans l’étude des déploiements est celui du degré de légitimité politique qui en découle auprès des civils au sein des espaces d’intervention. En complément de leurs objectifs géostratégiques primordiaux, ces missions sont de fait souvent pensées comme des outils d’influence politique essentiels par les principaux bailleurs de fonds étatiques, leur permettant pragmatiquement de développer leurs soft power auprès des opinions publiques de leurs alliés et partenaires. Mobilisés dans le cadre de missions aux temps longs, allant de plusieurs mois à plusieurs années pour certains membres, les contingents étrangers interagissent quotidiennement avec les civils. Ayant d’importantes conséquences sociales et économiques sur les espaces géographiques concernés, ces rencontres « banales » affectent en retour la perception des habitants locaux concernant le bien-fondé de ces interventions et leur nécessité pour le développement de capacités de défense nationale crédibles. Construire des relations apaisées entre civils et militaires, notamment via la conduite d’actions transparentes, est dès lors essentiel du point de vue de l’OTAN. Face au coût politique subséquent, une contestation locale entraînerait une probable reconsidération de l’acceptation de la présence étrangère par les autorités locales et nuirait aux objectifs à moyen et long terme de l’alliance. Cette étude des contacts interpersonnels quotidiens est d’autant plus essentielle à analyser dans un contexte de compétition croissante entre plusieurs programmes de renforcement des capacités, qui tractent incidemment différents modèles politiques sous-jacents ; des modèles centrés autour d’une sécurité démocratique d’un côté, et des modèles plus hiérarchiques et autoritaires de l’autre. C’est à ce niveau des contacts interpersonnels quotidiens que la COVID-19 a le potentiel d’affecter durablement les activités de l’OTAN. Alors que les risques pour la légitimité des soldats étrangers étaient importants, notamment en cas hypothétique de perception d’un risque sanitaire décuplé par la présence de contingents étrangers jugés peu ou pas assez soucieux des consignes sanitaires, les interactions quotidiennes entre forces exogènes et populations civiles ont été limitées au maximum. Le contingent canadien engagé en Lettonie a par exemple fortement réduit les rencontres de ses agents avec le reste de la population. Un équilibre nécessaire doit alors être trouvé entre isolements nécessaires, dans le but de prévenir les risques de propagation du virus, et isolations sociales absolues, qui risquent de nuire durablement à la perception qu’a la population locale des forces étrangères stationnées dans le cadre de l’OTAN. S’il est encore difficile d’évaluer à court terme l’influence de telles mesures nécessaires sur la légitimité des opérations de l’alliance, des études à moyen et long termes permettront de déterminer les retombées de ces « opportunités manquées » en termes d’interactions sociales. L’alliance conservera sans doute ses déploiements avec l’objectif de la dissuasion. Ces activités demeurent centrales à l’alliance. Cependant, peu importe le niveau d’analyse retenu, la pandémie de la COVID-19 semble ultimement marquer un moment charnière pour l’OTAN et ses ambitions en termes du renforcement des capacités de ses partenaires stratégiques, à des pays tels que l’Irak ou l’Afghanistan. Amender certains programmes spécifiques ou redéfinir certaines priorités semble aujourd’hui tant possible que souhaitable, à un moment où l’alliance militaire est affectée par un désintérêt croissant de la part de certains de ses membres centraux ainsi que par des tensions géostratégiques de plus en plus sensibles entre certains de ses États membres. Quelques-unes des questions qui se posent sont alors les suivantes : Comment mieux articuler les besoins des principaux bailleurs de fonds et ceux des pays receveurs dans une relation de mutuels bénéfices ? Comment améliorer la perception locale d’opérations internationales dont les objectifs centraux et les activités quotidiennes sont souvent méconnus ? Comment repenser le rôle de ces opérations dans le cadre de crises sanitaires majeures ou pandémies mondiales ? Définir un modèle plus résilient face à des crises par nature imprévisibles peut, dans le futur, permettre d’améliorer tant les capacités opérationnelles de l’alliance que l’acceptation de ses activités par les populations qu’elle ambitionne de protéger en premier lieu. [1] Les idées présentées n’engagent cependant que son auteur. ## L’OTAN amorce-t-elle un virage vers la Chine ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lotan-amorce-t-elle-un-virage-vers-la-chine/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Alors que les membres de l’OTAN s’apprêtent à actualiser le concept stratégique de l’alliance, clarifier le positionnement de l’OTAN... « Les ambitions déclarées de la Chine […] présentent des défis systémiques pour l’ordre international ». Cette phrase du communiqué du sommet de l’OTAN qui s’est tenu à Bruxelles le 14 juin dernier a retenu l’attention de tous, la presse allant jusqu’à évoquer un « tournant » dans l’histoire de l’alliance atlantique jusque-là focalisée sur la Russie et la lutte contre le terrorisme. Les prises de parole des chefs d’État à l’issue du sommet ont néanmoins mis en lumière des divergences entre alliés sur la portée réelle de ce virage vers la Chine. Si le président Biden a souligné que le comportement de Pékin posait des défis pour la sécurité collective de l’alliance, le président français a quant à lui mis en garde contre une dispersion de l’OTAN dont le cœur de métier militaire a peu à voir avec la Chine. La Chine n’est pas un sujet entièrement nouveau à l’OTAN. Les alliés ont déjà mentionné la Chine dans la brève déclaration du sommet de Londres en décembre 2019 dans une phrase néanmoins assez vague : « Nous sommes conscients que l’influence croissante et les politiques internationales de la Chine présentent à la fois des opportunités et des défis, auxquels nous devons répondre ensemble, en tant qu’Alliance ».  Si ces déclarations sont révélatrices d’une prise de conscience au sein de l’Alliance des défis posés par la montée en puissance chinoise, elles ne suffisent pas pour autant à définir la stratégie de l’OTAN à l’égard de Pékin. Alors que les membres de l’OTAN s’apprêtent à actualiser le concept stratégique de l’alliance, clarifier le positionnement de l’organisation vis-à-vis de la Chine sera indispensable. Un défi transversal pour l’Alliance Bien que la Chine ne représente pas une menace militaire directe pour l'OTAN, à la différence de la Russie ou de groupes terroristes, les implications pour la sécurité euro-atlantique de la montée en puissance économique, diplomatique, mais aussi militaire de Pékin sont potentiellement nombreuses. Les investissements chinois dans des infrastructures critiques en Europe, qu’il s’agisse des réseaux de télécommunication ou d’installations portuaires, pourraient affaiblir la capacité de l'OTAN à répondre à des crises internationales sur le plan diplomatique, voire militaire. La participation majoritaire de Pékin dans le capital d’environ 10 % des ports européens ou encore ses investissements dans des routes et voies ferrées en Europe de l'Est pourraient compliquer la mobilité et la préparation militaires de l'OTAN en cas de crise. De même, si certains alliés faisaient le choix d’équipements Huawei dans leurs réseaux 5G, l'intégrité de leurs télécommunications serait mise en cause compte-tenu des liens étroits de l'entreprise avec le régime chinois. Certaines chaînes d'approvisionnement de défense de pays de l’OTAN sont également dépendantes de la Chine, comme cela a été récemment révélé par le biais du programme F-35. Les activités militaires de la Chine se rapprochent également de l’espace euro-atlantique, comme le signale d’ailleurs le communiqué du sommet de Bruxelles. Les marines russe et chinoise ont récemment effectué des exercices militaires conjoints en Méditerranée et dans la mer Baltique, révélant une coopération militaire de plus en plus étroite entre Pékin et Moscou. La collaboration entre la Chine et la Russie se renforce également dans l'Arctique, où les deux pays investissent dans des projets de gaz naturel ainsi que dans des voies maritimes dans le cadre de l’initiative connue sous le nom de la « Route Polaire de la Soie ». Au-delà de la zone euro-atlantique, la Chine accroît son arsenal nucléaire et développe de nouveaux systèmes (missiles de longue portée ou hypersoniques) dont les effets déstabilisateurs pourraient avoir un impact direct sur la sécurité de l’OTAN. Dans le domaine spatial, la Chine investit dans des capacités cinétiques antisatellites qui pourraient potentiellement menacer tout satellite des membres de l'alliance. Les alliés sont aussi régulièrement la cible de cyberattaques provenant de « hackers » basés en Chine. Enfin, les alliés sont confrontés à une politique étrangère chinoise de plus en plus agressive et contraire aux valeurs démocratiques de l’alliance. Au cœur de la pandémie de la Covid-19, Pékin a notamment intensifié ses efforts de désinformation et a ciblé directement les pays de l'OTAN. La Chine exploite également les liens économiques étroits qu’elle entretient avec certains alliés pour fragiliser l'unité des Européens lorsqu’il s’agit de condamner les violations des droits de l'homme commises par Pékin. Cette stratégie, d’ores et déjà à l’œuvre à l’Union européenne, pourrait à l’avenir s’étendre à l’OTAN lorsque l’organisation sera amenée à soutenir des positions contraires aux intérêts chinois. L’émergence de la question chinoise à l’OTAN Longtemps ignorée, la question chinoise a fait son apparition à l’OTAN en avril 2019, en réponse essentiellement à la pression croissante exercée par l’administration Trump qui faisait de la compétition avec Pékin une priorité absolue. Alors que les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l’OTAN se réunissaient à Washington pour marquer les 70 ans de l’Alliance, le secrétaire d'État américain Mike Pompeo a exhorté les alliés à se mobiliser face à la « concurrence stratégique chinoise ». À l’issue de cette rencontre ministérielle, des travaux ont ainsi été lancés à l’OTAN afin d’évaluer les implications sécuritaires de la montée en puissance de la Chine pour l’Alliance. Les alliés ont d’ores et déjà pu adopter un premier rapport confidentiel sur le sujet à la fin de l’année 2019, en amont du sommet de Londres, et ont poursuivi leurs travaux depuis. La question chinoise a par ailleurs occupé une place importante dans les travaux de réflexion sur l’avenir de l’OTAN lancés au lendemain du sommet de Londres à la demande des chefs d’État et de gouvernement. Baptisé « OTAN 2030 », ce processus d’adaptation constituait une réponse aux critiques exprimées par le président français sur les dysfonctionnements internes de l’Alliance. Dans leur rapport final remis en décembre 2020, les experts de haut niveau nommés par le secrétaire général Jens Stoltenberg pour alimenter cette réflexion ont notamment recommandé que l’OTAN « consacre beaucoup plus de temps, de ressources politiques et d'actions aux défis de sécurité posés par la Chine ». La mention de la Chine comme « défi systémique » dans le communiqué du sommet de Bruxelles constitue donc le point d’aboutissement logique de cette prise de conscience progressive des défis posés par Pékin. Qualifier la Chine en ces termes a par ailleurs été rendu possible par une plus grande convergence entre Washington et les capitales européennes sur la question. Même si l'Union européenne avait commencé à définir une approche plus géopolitique à l’égard de la Chine, en la qualifiant notamment de « rival systémique » en 2019, les Européens souhaitaient néanmoins garder leur distance avec la stratégie jugée trop clivante et agressive de l’administration Trump. La situation semble avoir sensiblement changé avec l’arrivée de l’administration Biden, qui prône une approche plus équilibrée vis-à-vis de Pékin, tandis que les Européens ont été amenés à durcir le ton face à l’agressivité diplomatique croissante de la Chine. La notion retenue dans le communiqué de Bruxelles (« défi systémique ») semble à ce titre refléter un point d’équilibre entre les États-Unis et les Européens. Les pièges d’un « pivot » vers la Chine La convergence transatlantique n’est toutefois pas totale s’agissant du rôle à attribuer à l’OTAN dans cette compétition avec la Chine. Certains pays européens, à commencer par la France et l’Allemagne, estiment qu’une mobilisation de l’OTAN face aux défis chinois comporte de nombreux risques. Trois écueils en particulier sont à éviter. Premièrement, la Chine ne doit pas être confondue avec la Russie. Certes, la Chine représente un défi à part entière pour l'Alliance, mais elle ne constitue pas une menace militaire directe pour l'OTAN, contrairement à la Russie. Même si Pékin mène des actions militaires déstabilisantes en Indopacifique, il convient de garder à l’esprit que « l'OTAN est, et restera, une alliance régionale pour l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord », comme l'a récemment souligné le secrétaire général Jens Stoltenberg. De même, la montée en puissance de la Chine ne doit pas être considérée de manière purement binaire. Comme le rappelle le cadre fixé par l’Union européenne, Pékin est à la fois un rival systémique, un concurrent et un partenaire. La même approche doit prévaloir à l’OTAN dont le communiqué de Bruxelles comporte d’ailleurs un appel à un « dialogue constructif avec la Chine lorsque cela est possible ». Deuxièmement, les alliés ne doivent pas tomber dans le piège de la précipitation. La Chine ne constitue pas une menace immédiate nécessitant des décisions urgentes, mais représente un défi stratégique à long terme pour les décennies à venir. Pour mieux comprendre ce défi, l'OTAN aurait tout intérêt à déterminer soigneusement comment et où Pékin affecte les intérêts fondamentaux de ses membres avant d'élaborer sa stratégie. Même si les alliés de l'OTAN ont entamé ce travail préparatoire, il reste beaucoup à faire à cet égard. On peut en dire autant de tout dialogue potentiel entre l'OTAN et la Chine. Avant de nouer un dialogue avec Pékin, les alliés devront avoir au préalable une position consolidée, faute de quoi ils risquent d'apparaître divisés. Troisièmement, l’OTAN ne doit pas chercher à sortir de sa raison d’être militaire. Comme cela a été évoqué plus tôt, lorsqu’il s’agit de l’Europe, l’essor de la Chine pose en premier lieu des défis sur le plan des valeurs, de la souveraineté économique ou encore de l’autonomie technologique. Pour relever efficacement ces défis, l'OTAN doit éviter d’empiéter sur les compétences des États ou de l'Union européenne, qui sont plus à même d’agir dans ces champs non militaires. La duplication à l’OTAN des outils juridiques ou financiers mis en place à l’échelle nationale ou européenne serait la pire des options, d’autant plus dans un contexte où l’Alliance doit d’ores et déjà poursuivre son adaptation face à des menaces sécuritaires plus immédiates (posture agressive de la Russie, résilience de la menace terroriste). Cet ordre des priorités est par ailleurs notable dans le communiqué de Bruxelles qui mentionne la Russie 63 fois, le terrorisme 23 fois et la Chine seulement 10 fois. Quel rôle pour l’OTAN ? Si le communiqué de Bruxelles comporte une description des défis soulevés par la Chine (paragraphe 55) et un appel au maintien d’un dialogue constructif (paragraphe 56), il ne dit rien du rôle que pourrait jouer l’OTAN dans ce contexte. Actée lors de ce même sommet, l’adoption d’un nouveau concept stratégique d’ici l’année prochaine sera certainement l’occasion de fixer les grandes lignes de la stratégie de l’OTAN face à Pékin (là où le concept de 2010 ne mentionne pas une fois la Chine). Compte tenu des principes de précaution évoqués précédemment, l’OTAN pourrait renforcer son action dans trois directions : Renforcer la compréhension et le suivi à l'OTAN des activités de la Chine susceptibles d'avoir une incidence sur la sécurité transatlantique. Les alliés gagneraient à améliorer leur compréhension collective des actions de la Chine pouvant miner la défense collective et la résilience de l'OTAN. Cela passe par un partage accru de renseignement entre les alliés, un renforcement de l'expertise interne de l'OTAN et un suivi plus étroit des activités militaires chinoises (exercices notamment) dans la zone de responsabilité du Commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe (SACEUR). Approfondir la coordination politique entre les alliés et avec les partenaires de l'OTAN. L’Alliance pourrait servir de plateforme permettant aux alliés d’échanger sur les actions de la Chine et leurs réactions éventuelles. Cela s'inscrirait dans le cadre d'un effort plus large visant à rétablir l'OTAN comme un forum politique transatlantique essentiel. De même, les alliés pourraient accroître leurs interactions avec les quatre partenaires de l'OTAN dans la région Asie-Pacifique, à savoir le Japon, la Corée du Sud, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Des discussions plus régulières dans le cadre du format dit « OTAN+4 » favoriseraient une connaissance commune des capacités et activités de la Chine. Développer la coopération entre l'OTAN et l'UE pour aider les alliés à renforcer leur résilience face à l'influence croissante de la Chine. Afin d’éviter toute duplication, l'OTAN devrait offrir son soutien et intensifier sa coopération avec l'Union européenne lorsqu'il s'agit de passer au crible et d'évaluer les investissements chinois dans les infrastructures critiques des alliés, de sécuriser les réseaux de télécommunications 5G, de contrer les campagnes de désinformation chinoises ou de stimuler l'innovation conjointe pour maintenir l'avance technologique de l'OTAN dans la course contre la Chine. Une coopération accrue et directe entre l’Union européenne et les États-Unis dans ces domaines est également indispensable, comme le souligne d’ailleurs la déclaration conjointe du sommet UE – États-Unis du 15 juin dernier. Dans son discours à la conférence de sécurité de Munich, le président Biden a fixé une priorité claire pour les alliés des États-Unis : « Nous devons nous préparer ensemble à une compétition stratégique à long terme avec la Chine ». Pour que l'OTAN puisse jouer un rôle utile dans cet effort collectif, les alliés devront commencer par mieux comprendre les implications sécuritaires de la montée en puissance de la Chine, accroître leur coordination politique et surtout chercher à renforcer la coopération avec l'Union européenne pour faire face à un défi sortant largement du seul champ militaire. Ce texte est inspiré d’un article de l'auteur publié en anglais par le Center for Strategic and International Studies  : cliquez ici pour le consulter. Pierre Morcos est chercheur invité au Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington DC).   ## La “doctrine Freeland” et la stratégie Indo-Pacifique du Canada : entre isolement et confusion URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-doctrine-freeland-et-la-strategie-indo-pacifique-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > La "doctrine Freeland" et la stratégie Indo-Pacifique du Canada : entre isolement et confusion. Pour un pays qui n'a pas entrepris de... Pour un pays qui n'a pas entrepris de révision complète de sa politique étrangère depuis près de deux décennies, le Canada a vu, en l'espace d'un automne, l’articulation de deux visions qui ont pour objectif de guider son engagement international. La première a pris la forme d'un discours prononcé par la vice-première ministre Chrystia Freeland devant la Brookings Institution à Washington, le 11 octobre. Ses remarques, qui ont rapidement été renommées la « Doctrine Freeland », exposent la façon dont le Canada devrait naviguer dans le monde de l'après après-Guerre froide, qui, selon elle, est marqué par une compétition entre démocraties et autocraties. Un peu plus d'un mois plus tard, le Canada a publié sa stratégie pour l’Indo-Pacifique, attendue depuis longtemps. La ministre des Affaires étrangères Mélanie Joly a estimé que cette stratégie était une réorientation de la politique étrangère du Canada vers la région Indo-Pacifique, même si Ottawa compte maintenir ses engagements actuels sur les autres théâtres. Ces deux visions offrent deux réflexions stratégiques distinctes sur la façon dont le Canada devrait se positionner dans un monde de rivalité et de changement. Pourtant, si les deux présentent des points forts évidents, ceux-ci risquent, dans les deux cas, d’être compensés par les faiblesses de ces textes. La doctrine Freeland : une recette pour s’isoler davantage Le discours de Freeland à Washington reconnaît une réalité désormais incontournable, à savoir que l'ordre international libéral du moment unipolaire de l'après-Guerre froide est révolu et ne reviendra pas. Même si certaines normes et pratiques traditionnellement associées à l'internationalisme libéral continueront d'influencer la conduite interétatique, les conditions qui ont permis l'expression la plus complète de l'ordre libéral n'existent tout simplement plus. Au cours des trois dernières décennies, l'ère de l'hégémonie libérale a permis au Canada de mener une politique étrangère confortable et axée sur des valeurs. En revanche, l'ordre international émergent menace de forcer le découplage entre certains des impératifs de la politique étrangère du Canada et l'identité nationale du pays. Dans cette perspective, Mme Freeland peut être félicitée pour avoir eu le courage de s’attaquer à la culture canadienne en matière de politique étrangère, une culture qui est bien ancrée et apparaît dépassée. Pourtant, si le diagnostic de Mme Freeland est exact, les traitements qu'elle propose sont problématiques. Son discours présente trois piliers de réflexion pour la révision d’une approche occidentale vis-à-vis du reste du monde : les relations entre démocraties, celles avec les régimes autoritaires et enfin celles avec les États qui « nichent entre les deux camps ». Chaque pilier présente des défauts fondamentaux. Ensemble, ils constituent une recette qui risque de renforcer - plutôt que réduire - l'isolement du Canada sur la scène internationale. Le premier pilier de Mme Freeland, qui est, selon elle, « le plus fondamental », appelle à un approfondissement des relations entre les démocraties du monde. Si, à première vue, il y a peu de raisons d'être en désaccord avec une telle proposition, le diable se cache dans les détails. Par exemple, l'idée selon laquelle l’« amilocalisation » (friendshoring : commerce entre pays qui partagent les mêmes valeurs démocratiques) offrirait une solution aux problèmes de sécurité d'aujourd'hui se heurte à des difficultés dès que l’on s’intéresse aux détails. Qu'est-ce que l’amilocalisation nous permettrait d'obtenir de nos alliés que nous n'obtenions pas déjà d'eux ? Dans quels secteurs spécifiques devrions-nous nous dissocier de nos adversaires ? Combien de temps une telle réorientation des chaînes d'approvisionnement prendrait-elle et comment pourrait-elle être appliquée ? Quel serait le coût pour les consommateurs ? De plus, l'approfondissement des liens économiques entre les États-Unis et leurs alliés européens et asiatiques ne menacerait-il pas la position privilégiée du Canada dans l'économie américaine ? Bien qu'on ne puisse s'attendre à ce qu'un seul discours réponde à toutes ces questions de manière suffisamment détaillée, elles soulèvent néanmoins des doutes quant à la faisabilité de l’« amilocalisation » en tant que cadre de la politique étrangère. Après l'effondrement des relations entre l'Empire et la périphérie au XIXe siècle et des blocs géopolitiques au XXe siècle, nous vivons aujourd'hui dans le premier ordre véritablement mondial de l'histoire. On ne sait toujours pas dans quelle mesure l’amilocalisation permettrait aux démocraties libérales d'améliorer leur influence relative et leur attractivité dans ce nouvel ordre mondial, un ordre qui sera inévitablement façonné par le pluralisme politique et culturel. En effet, le concept divise au sein même de l'Occident, certains estimant que réinvestir dans une architecture du commerce mondial qui serait ouverte et fondée sur des règles est un effort plus intéressant qui jouerait en faveur de l’Occident. Les volontés de découplage risquent d'entraîner un nivellement par le bas que les pays occidentaux - en particulier les économies dépendantes comme le Canada - ne gagneront peut-être pas. Le deuxième pilier mentionné par Mme Freeland - et celui qui est le moins développé conceptuellement - concerne les relations avec les pays dits intermédiaires, qui ne sont ni nos alliés démocratiques ni nos adversaires autoritaires. Une telle terminologie est susceptible de réduire notre influence auprès de ces pays plutôt que de nous aider à construire des ponts avec eux, si tant est que nous ayons l'intention d'entreprendre un effort substantiel pour construire de tels ponts et sortir de l'approche largement centrée sur les alliés (approche caractéristique de la politique étrangère canadienne au cours des dernières décennies). Ces pays « intermédiaires » ne se considèrent pas comme des acteurs qui pourraient être utilisés dans le cadre d’une lutte idéologique qui les dépasse, mais comme les auteurs de leur propre destin. Ce sont des États souverains et ils n'ont pas besoin qu'on leur explique quels sont leurs intérêts. Le troisième pilier - et le plus problématique - du discours de Mme Freeland appelle à repenser nos relations avec les pays autoritaires. Cette partie du discours est truffée d'hypothèses qui ne reflètent pas la nature complexe de l'ordre international émergent. L'idée même selon laquelle le monde d'aujourd'hui est marqué par une compétition entre démocraties et autocraties est démentie par de nombreux faits facilement observables. Dans le cas de l'Ukraine, les pays occidentaux démocratiques se tournent vers les pays autoritaires que sont le Venezuela, l'Arabie saoudite, le Qatar et l'Azerbaïdjan pour les aider à faire face aux retombées énergétiques de la guerre. Parallèlement, certaines des plus grandes démocraties du monde, comme l'Inde et le Brésil, se sont largement abstenues de condamner l'agression de la Russie contre l'Ukraine. Dans la région Indo-Pacifique, le système politique léniniste du Vietnam ne l'a pas empêché de s'associer à l'Occident pour répondre à ses préoccupations en matière de sécurité face à la Chine. Ces faits montrent que le Canada ne devrait pas adopter le paradigme « démocratie contre autocratie » comme critère de renforcement de son engagement international, étant donné que ce paradigme ne permet pas de saisir les dynamiques des plus grands défis géopolitiques d'aujourd'hui (l'Ukraine) et de demain (l'Indo-Pacifique). Le schéma binaire démocratie-autocratie manque également de nuances pour rendre compte de la diversité des systèmes politiques dans le monde, ainsi que des différents objectifs de politique étrangère que peuvent avoir les États autoritaires. Alors que la Russie fait fi des normes établies et est sortie perdante de la Guerre froide, la Chine a été grandement bénéficiaire du statu quo et cherche à maintenir des liens économiques et technologiques avec l'Occident pour alimenter sa modernisation et sa croissance. Bien que l'ascension de la Chine suscite de nombreuses préoccupations - légitimes - en matière de sécurité, les impératifs qui façonnent les relations du Canada avec la Chine diffèrent fondamentalement de la question des relations avec une Russie revancharde. Cela est d'autant plus vrai que Pékin occupe une place centrale dans le commerce mondial et dans le multilatéralisme, dont Ottawa est traditionnellement dépendant. L'affirmation générale de Mme Freeland selon laquelle « les régimes autoritaires nous sont fondamentalement hostiles » et « notre réussite fait peser sur eux une menace existentielle » réduirait la marge de manœuvre du Canada qui lui aurait pourtant permis de mener une politique étrangère reflétant l'intérêt national au cas par cas. Étant donné qu’une coopération doit aller dans les deux sens, cela implique l'établissement d'un cadre général pour les relations qui facilite (au lieu de décourager) la collaboration lorsque nos intérêts sont alignés. Pour une ministre des Affaires étrangères dont l’allocution de signature en 2017 était centrée sur la nécessité de maintenir « l'ordre international fondé sur des règles », il est choquant de constater que le discours récent de Freeland n'accorde que peu d'attention à la manière dont l’adhésion à la concurrence idéologique pourrait miner la résilience des normes internationales. Et si Mme Freeland admet que la coopération avec les pays autoritaires reste nécessaire dans des domaines d'intérêt commun tels que le changement climatique, cette coopération peut devenir beaucoup plus difficile lorsque le paradigme (en matière de politique étrangère) est axé essentiellement sur la concurrence sécuritaire (voire sur l'endiguement pur et simple). Du point de vue intellectuel, il est cohérent d'adopter une vision de la politique étrangère canadienne qui cherche moins à s’éparpiller en rejoignant de multiples et divers clubs/groupes et qui est plus étroitement axée sur les intérêts fondamentaux du Canada. Il n’est pas sûr que cela soit cependant l'intention initiale de Freeland. La vision de Freeland risque de pousser le Canada à se refermer au sein de l’Occident non géographique, mais sans les avantages d'une politique étrangère plus étroitement ciblée. Le paradigme Freeland en politique étrangère canadienne est de nature idéologique et de portée mondiale. Cependant, le Canada n'a pas les moyens d'être simultanément un acteur central en Amérique du Nord, en Europe, en Asie et dans les forums multilatéraux. Une vision plus géographique ainsi qu'une orientation régionale pourraient-elles mieux servir les intérêts canadiens ? La stratégie Indo-Pacifique du Canada :  un document engendrant de la confusion Le Canada a publié sa stratégie pour l’Indo-Pacifique à la fin du mois de novembre. Ce document a été salué comme étant le « document stratégique le plus substantiel » en matière de politique étrangère qui ait émané d'un gouvernement canadien depuis des années. Compte tenu du rôle central de l'« ancrage nord-atlantique » dans l'élaboration de la politique étrangère du Canada depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le simple fait d'élaborer une stratégie Indo-Pacifique pourrait contribuer à rééquilibrer les priorités internationales du Canada pour tenir compte du déplacement des centres de gravité géopolitique et économique du monde. En particulier, l'absence d'une utilisation des termes « libre et ouvert » pour formuler les enjeux régionaux dans ce document est une évolution bienvenue, car cela peut indiquer que la stratégie régionale d'Ottawa se distingue de l'approche plus conflictuelle de Washington. La conceptualisation de la région par le gouvernement se distingue également car elle exclut l'océan Indien occidental et se taille un rôle spécial de « voisinage » dans le Pacifique Nord, ce qui démontre la volonté (louable) de cibler les objectifs stratégiques. Toutefois, si on va plus loin dans l’analyse, trois lacunes majeures sont visibles. Premièrement, la stratégie Indo-Pacifique ne s'appuie pas sur une compréhension plus générale de la nature et de la portée des intérêts du Canada dans un ordre international en mutation. Il serait nécessaire de mener un examen complet de la politique étrangère qui situerait les intérêts indo-pacifiques du Canada dans un cadre de référence global, en évaluant l'importance relative de la région par rapport aux impératifs politiques sur d'autres théâtres géographiques. En l’absence d’un tel examen, les objectifs régionaux du Canada continueront de manquer de clarté. Cette situation est exacerbée par la promesse (émise dans la stratégie) de renforcer la présence militaire du Canada dans la région, ce qui suggère une incapacité à cibler davantage des ressources nationales limitées. Cela va à l'encontre des recommandations du Réseau d'analyse stratégique et reflète une réticence à reconnaître qu'un environnement de plus en plus militarisé sur le continent européen continuera d’accaparer une grande partie de l'attention du Canada dans le domaine militaire. Même une victoire de l'Ukraine dans la guerre actuelle n'éliminera pas le défi que la Russie est susceptible de poser pour le système de sécurité européen à long terme. Une présence militaire canadienne symbolique dans la région Indo-Pacifique est davantage susceptible de désorganiser la politique étrangère globale du Canada que de dissuader la Chine. Deuxièmement, bien que la Chine soit au premier plan et occupe une part importante dans ce texte, la stratégie Indo-Pacifique n'a pas été utilisée comme une occasion de poursuivre une stratégie détaillée et calibrée pour la Chine. À ce titre, l'inquiétude persiste quant à la possibilité que le Canada ait développé une stratégie Indo-Pacifique dans le but de ne pas avoir à proposer une approche globale et révisée vis-à-vis de la Chine. La stratégie est claire quant à la nature multidimensionnelle du défi que représente la Chine pour la sécurité canadienne et l'ordre mondial. Toutefois, elle ne précise pas si le fait d’empêcher la Chine de dominer l'Indo-Pacifique en termes de sécurité représente un intérêt vital pour le Canada et, le cas échéant, si cet objectif peut être atteint par des mesures autres que l'endiguement et le découplage complets. Bien qu’il soit symboliquement fait mention de la nécessité de coopérer sur certains dossiers, aucune plateforme concrète de coopération n'est identifiée. En outre, il n’y aucune démarche de délimitation des domaines dans lesquels la coopération devrait être restreinte pour des raisons de sécurité. Que ce soit au niveau national, bilatéral, régional ou multilatéral, l'accent est mis sur la contestation de la Chine ou sur la défense face aux conséquences négatives de ses actions. Le focus mis sur la coexistence avec la Chine par Marc Garneau, le prédécesseur de Joly, dans son approche des « quatre C » a disparu. Le résultat est que le Canada n'a pas réussi à exprimer clairement, de manière simple, s'il est en faveur d'une région ouverte ou d'une région structurée par une nouvelle Guerre froide. Ainsi, comme dans le cas de la doctrine Freeland, une relation dont le point de départ intellectuel est la confrontation plutôt que la coexistence peut avoir du mal à faire de la place pour la coopération, même lorsque celle-ci est dans l'intérêt des deux parties. Il n'est pas possible de traiter un adversaire comme une menace existentielle, de poursuivre une stratégie de confrontation générale et d'espérer choisir des domaines de coopération en fonction de ses propres préférences. Enfin, il s’agit d’une occasion manquée qui aurait pu permettre de démêler les différentes valeurs et les différents intérêts de manière à clarifier la portée des objectifs régionaux du Canada. Bien que nous nous soyons habitués à l’hypothèse selon laquelle la promotion de nos valeurs s’accorde avec la promotion de nos intérêts, le déclin de l'hégémonie libérale dans la politique mondiale entraîne le découplage (partiel) de ces deux objectifs. Pour souligner la portée Indo-Pacifique du document, l'Inde figure en deuxième position (après la Chine) dans la description de l'engagement régional du Canada. Pourtant, la stratégie présente le désir d'approfondir les relations avec New Delhi en utilisant le langage de la démocratie et des droits de la personne, plutôt que des intérêts stratégiques communs, malgré le recul démocratique évident et largement reconnu de l'Inde. Le paradigme Indo-Pacifique, développé en réaction à la montée en puissance de la Chine, est par nature un concept stratégique davantage qu’un concept fondé sur des valeurs. L'accent mis sur les valeurs partagées avec l'Inde, alors que celles-ci font défaut à bien des égards, révèle à quel point Ottawa a encore du mal à déterminer et articuler ses intérêts. La stratégie fait également de multiples références à l'établissement de relations avec des pays « d’optique commune » (like-minded partners). Cependant, plusieurs partenaires du Canada dans l’Indo-Pacifique se sont abstenus de critiquer l'agression illégale de la Russie contre l'Ukraine. De même, une grande partie de l'Asie du Sud-Est considère la Chine comme un partenaire économique important et non comme une menace existentielle, quels que soient les différends territoriaux que ces pays peuvent avoir avec Pékin. Il est difficile de savoir dans quelle mesure le Canada partage effectivement les mêmes idées que des pays comme l’Inde. Cela soulève la question suivante : le Canada est-il vraiment déterminé à s'engager en faveur des priorités des acteurs de la région ou Ottawa se concentrera-t-elle inévitablement sur l'approfondissement des relations avec ses quelques partenaires qui partagent vraiment les mêmes idées, comme le Japon et l'Australie ? En fin de compte, le Canada paie le prix de plusieurs années à maintenir une posture réactive à l'égard de l'Asie. La stratégie canadienne est publiée neuf mois après celle des États-Unis et plus d'un an après celle de l'Union européenne. De plus, le soi-disant pivot vers l'Asie de Washington, malgré tous ses défauts, date de l'administration Obama. Nous sommes en retard sur la question et nous n'avons pas réussi à formuler clairement nos priorités globales en matière de politique étrangère. Nous sommes donc contraints de nous adapter aux conditions fixées par d'autres. Cela vaut notamment pour la confrontation avec la Chine, pour laquelle les États-Unis se réserveront le droit de promouvoir leurs intérêts tout en imposant des limites à la marge de manœuvre de leurs alliés dans la définition de leurs propres intérêts. Cela réduira sans aucun doute l'éventail d’actions potentielles pour l'engagement d'Ottawa dans la région. Conclusion : un futur continental pour le Canada ? D'une part, le changement conceptuel de Mme Freeland, qui passe de la préservation de l'ordre international fondé sur des règles à une quasi-adoption d'une nouvelle Guerre froide, devrait inquiéter tous les Canadiens qui croient qu'un certain degré de prévisibilité mondiale est nécessaire pour qu'Ottawa puisse se tailler une politique étrangère qui aille au-delà de la garantie de la souveraineté nationale et de la sauvegarde de la relation avec les États-Unis. Si la vice-première ministre croit que les intérêts du Canada sont en grande partie continentaux, elle devrait le faire savoir explicitement. Un tel acte rendrait un grand service à la politique étrangère canadienne en l'aidant à surmonter des décennies de dérive sans but. D'autre part, malgré les grandes attentes qui accompagnaient la publication de la stratégie Indo-Pacifique, le Canada semble avoir très peu appris de son partenaire régional, l'Australie. Canberra est beaucoup plus consciente de la nature ciblée et géographique de ses intérêts, et a réussi à devenir un acteur à part entière dans la région Indo-Pacifique tout en évitant les dangers d'une expansion excessive. Certes, la géographie de l'Australie diffère de la nôtre - le Canada est simultanément un État de l'hémisphère occidental, de l'Atlantique, de l'Arctique et du Pacifique. Toutefois, au XXIe siècle, le statut de puissance moyenne dépend en partie d'une présence déterminante dans un complexe de sécurité régional. Le Canada n'occupe une telle position nulle part, que ce soit dans les Amériques, en Europe, ou en Asie. Pendant des décennies, nous avons refusé d'affronter la réalité du déclin de notre influence mondiale relative, en grande partie pour des raisons liées à notre identité nationale et à notre politique intérieure. Ce faisant, nous nous sommes éparpillés et nous avons laissé passer des occasions de conserver notre statut de puissance moyenne. Le Canada est trop isolé des principales dynamiques économiques et stratégiques en Asie pour être pris au sérieux en tant qu'acteur régional de premier plan, au même titre que le Japon, l'Inde ou l'Australie. Le Canada ne jouera jamais non plus un rôle aussi important que la France ou l'Allemagne dans le tissu politique européen. Toutefois, avec une population plus importante, le Canada pourrait être davantage pris au sérieux par son voisin américain. Par ailleurs, le changement climatique ouvre la voie à une importance stratégique accrue de l'arrière-cour canadienne en Arctique pour les acteurs du monde entier. Ces faits plaident en faveur d'une politique étrangère plus continentale pour le Canada, car c'est la voie la plus prometteuse pour retrouver le statut de puissance moyenne à (peut-être très) long terme. Malgré toutes les discussions entourant la stratégie Indo-Pacifique du Canada, on a trop peu tenu compte du fait qu’une stratégie consiste à faire des choix, surtout lorsque les ressources sont limitées. ## La compétition entre grandes puissances dans l’Arctique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-competition-entre-grandes-puissances-dans-larctique/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique explore comment le concept d'exceptionnalisme arctique se heurte au retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances. Cette note stratégique explore la mesure dans laquelle le concept d'exceptionnalisme arctique se heurte au retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances, en particulier le comportement stratégique résurgent de la Russie dans le Grand Nord et la tentative de la Chine d'accroître son influence et son accès à la région arctique. Contexte L'Arctique est à la fois une zone de coopération et de compétition stratégique. Les relations circumpolaires coopératives sont rendues possibles par un certain nombre d'institutions et d'accords régionaux clés, tels que le Conseil de l'Arctique, la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (UNCLOS)[1], la Déclaration d'Ilulissat[2] et le Code polaire. Ces institutions facilitent la coopération intergouvernementale, principalement sur les questions non sécuritaires, en se concentrant sur des questions telles que la résolution des conflits territoriaux, l'administration du domaine maritime, la protection de l'environnement et le développement économique. Bien que le Conseil de l'Arctique gère la coopération en matière de recherche et de sauvetage, aucun mécanisme régional global ne gère les questions de sécurité de l'Arctique dans le domaine militaire. Si l'Arctique a joué un rôle dans la compétition stratégique entre les États-Unis et la Russie pendant la guerre froide, les menaces étaient constituées par les bombardiers stratégiques et les ICBM qui passaient au-dessus du pôle pour menacer l'Amérique du Nord, et les opérations sous-marines sous la glace de la mer Arctique concernaient les sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins (SNLE) déployés et les sous-marins chasseurs tueurs qui les menaçaient. La région arctique n'était pas accessible comme elle l'est devenue aujourd'hui en raison des changements climatiques qui modifient les saisons de sorte que l'Arctique est libéré de ses glaces pendant de plus longues périodes de l'année, ouvrant ainsi la région à une navigation accrue, à l'exploration des ressources et à la recherche scientifique. Les défis d'aujourd'hui ont de multiples facettes et impliquent des menaces traditionnelles et non traditionnelles pour la sécurité. Les premières concernent l'activité militaire croissante des États côtiers de l'Arctique pour défendre, dissuader, renforcer la souveraineté nationale et répondre aux urgences ; les secondes sont liées aux effets des changements climatiques au niveau régional sur les populations, les infrastructures et la faune du Nord. La dimension stratégique de la sécurité dans l'Arctique présente un intérêt particulier dans ce billet, avec un aperçu de la manière dont le comportement militaire russe et les ambitions chinoises dans l'Arctique remettent en question le paradigme coopératif de la région, souvent qualifié d'exceptionnalisme arctique. L'émergence d'un dilemme de sécurité régionale ne remet pas nécessairement en cause la coopération dans l'Arctique, mais elle introduit des variables complexes qui affectent les relations entre les États rivaux. Qu'est-ce que l'exceptionnalisme arctique ? Käpylä et Mikkola décrivent l'Arctique comme étant perçu « comme relativement isolé de la politique de puissance mondiale, caractérisé principalement comme un espace apolitique de gouvernance régionale, de coopération fonctionnelle et de coexistence pacifique ». Ils suggèrent qu'en dépit du fait que l'Arctique soit devenu une région de plus en plus mondiale, avec l'incertitude introduite par la politique étrangère de la Russie et des États-Unis ces derniers temps, « l'exceptionnalisme arctique a fait preuve d'une résilience continue, les acteurs arctiques ayant activement essayé de maintenir la coopération régionale dans un environnement international difficile ». Les spécialistes de la sécurité dans l'Arctique débattent de la question de savoir si l'exceptionnalisme arctique demeure un concept valable dans un contexte régional en évolution. Gjørv et Hodgson affirment que l'exceptionnalisme arctique « décrit une condition sélective de la sécurité », proposant un outil analytique plus approprié, à savoir la sécurité globale (comprehensive security) qui « ne rejette pas les processus de coopération, ni ne nie les zones de tension qui favorisent une perception accrue de l'insécurité ». Ils affirment que le fait de considérer l'Arctique comme exceptionnel « doit beaucoup au moment et au contexte dans lesquels les relations régionales arctiques ont été institutionnalisées ». Ainsi, un contexte de sécurité global et régional changeant verra l'émergence de nouvelles dynamiques arctiques qui pourraient avoir un impact sur le paradigme coopératif. Il reste à voir si les conditions de coopération et de paix perdureront compte tenu du comportement militaire provocateur de la Russie, de la multiplication des exercices dans l'Arctique européen par les alliés et partenaires de l'OTAN, et des ambitions économiques de la Chine dans la région. Le risque de conflit dans la région est faible, car les États y ayant des intérêts ont avantage à entretenir des relations de coopération pacifique. Toutefois, le risque de malentendus et de débordement de conflits dans d'autres régions vers l'Arctique pose des défis. Le déploiement par la Russie de systèmes d'armes conventionnelles et nucléaires déstabilisants sur son territoire arctique est particulièrement préoccupant, de même que la réponse des États-Unis pour contrer les nouvelles technologies dans tous les domaines. Discussion La région arctique gagne en importance stratégique et en potentiel économique. Un dilemme de sécurité faible à modéré se forme dans l'Arctique en raison de la compétition entre grandes puissances et de la tension et de l'incertitude qu'elle introduit parmi les principaux acteurs régionaux. Un dilemme de sécurité décrit les conditions dans lesquelles les tentatives d'un État pour accroître sa sécurité par le développement de capacités défensives amènent d'autres États (en particulier les États rivaux) à percevoir cet État comme un agresseur potentiel. La perception d'une menace et la vulnérabilité qui en résulte amènent les autres États à répondre en développant leurs propres capacités défensives, ce qui amène le premier État à percevoir le comportement militaire de ces États comme agressif. La militarisation et les tensions qui en résultent entre les États concurrents sont le résultat de la volonté de ces États d'accroître leur propre sécurité. Les principales grandes puissances de la région sont : 1) une Russie résurgente qui remilitarise sa région arctique en remettant à neuf les bases de l'époque de la guerre froide et en en construisant de nouvelles; 2) une Chine révisionniste qui cherche à exercer une influence régionale pour faire avancer ses intérêts économiques et scientifiques dans l'Arctique; et 3) les États-Unis qui pivotent vers l'Arctique en réponse aux conditions environnementales résultant des changements climatiques, ainsi qu'aux nouveaux défis stratégiques posés par les États concurrents. La compétition entre grandes puissances se déroule à l'échelle mondiale et régionale, car les États concurrents poursuivent des intérêts économiques et sécuritaires à long terme dans l'Arctique. Les défis concernent les développements potentiellement provocateurs des grandes puissances et l'absence d'une organisation ou d'un forum régional pour gérer les questions de sécurité militaire. Il y a le défi émergent de la coopération stratégique croissante entre la Russie et la Chine et le fait que les deux États augmentent leurs capacités en matière de missiles avec l'intention de mettre en danger des sites essentiels aux États-Unis et au Canada. Quel est l'impact de la compétition entre grandes puissances sur la sécurité et la stabilité dans l'Arctique ? Comme discuté, la sécurité a une multitude de significations, allant des dimensions humaines, environnementales, sociales et économiques, soit non traditionnelles au domaine politico-stratégique réaliste traditionnel. La stabilité tend à être renforcée par des institutions formelles et des arrangements informels, ainsi que par l'adhésion à des régimes juridiques et à des normes qui régissent les comportements. La prévisibilité est renforcée par la transparence et le dialogue. Les comportements étatiques (et non étatiques) qui violent ces normes de comportement établies compromettent la stabilité et la sécurité. Cela crée des conditions de tension entre les acteurs, marquées par la méfiance, l'incertitude et la peur, qui peuvent avoir un impact sur les institutions destinées à maintenir un ordre coopératif dans la région. Les défis posés par les actions mondiales – comme les développements militaires et les tensions dans d'autres parties du monde – peuvent avoir des implications régionales. Les tensions peuvent déborder sur l'Arctique ou une confrontation peut dégénérer en crise en raison d'un mauvais calcul ou d'un malentendu. Il pourrait en résulter que des États se retirent d'accords, que des fossés se creusent entre les États, et entre les États et leurs citoyens (par exemple, entre les peuples autochtones et l'État, comme on a pu l'observer au Groenland), et que les institutions et les accords soient affaiblis. Par exemple, les États-Unis et la Russie se sont engagés dans une coopération militaire de 2009 à 2012. La Russie et les pays occidentaux ont participé à la Table ronde sur la sécurité dans l'Arctique et à la Conférence des chefs d'état-major du Nord, ce qui leur a permis d'instaurer un climat de confiance. Cependant, après l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie et les actions de la Russie aidant les séparatistes au Donbass (Ukraine), la coopération militaire entre l'Occident et la Russie a été suspendue, car la tension et la méfiance ont augmenté (cela a été observé lorsque la Russie a retiré sa participation à la Table ronde sur la sécurité dans l'Arctique et au forum des chefs d'état-major de l'Arctique). L'avancée de la Chine dans l'Arctique La Chine est un concurrent de plus en plus important des États-Unis dans le monde et a clairement démontré ses ambitions de devenir un acteur de l'Arctique. Ses intérêts dans le Grand Nord vont du développement économique à la recherche scientifique, en passant par la recherche de revendications dans l'océan Arctique central. Selon sa politique arctique de 2018, la Chine se déclare « Near-Arctic State » – une revendication controversée qui a hérissé les véritables nations arctiques (telles qu'attribuées par leur géographie, leur politique, leur population et leur culture). La Stratégie arctique décrit les intérêts de la Chine dans l'Arctique comme étant économiques, environnementaux et stratégiques. Les objectifs économiques et de navigation de la Chine dans le cadre de sa Route de la soie polaire (la dimension arctique de son initiative « Belt and Road ») comprennent des investissements dans le développement de gaz naturel liquide en Russie (péninsule de Yamal), des investissements dans les infrastructures de la Route maritime du Nord et des investissements dans des ports et des bases en Islande et au Groenland. La méthodologie de l'économie prédatrice de la Chine pose des problèmes potentiels aux États économiquement vulnérables comme l'Islande et le Groenland, et son utilisation de la coercition et du contrôle économiques a des implications politico-stratégiques importantes. La coercition économique est un instrument de compétition. Le comportement économique prédateur de la Chine crée une dépendance économique, qui peut lui permettre de se tailler une place dans l'Arctique. En outre, Auerswald considère l'activité de la Chine au sein du Conseil de l'Arctique comme une approche « du pied dans la porte » visant à lui créer un rôle plus important dans la gouvernance de l'Arctique. Tous ces outils visent à accroître l'accès, l'influence et les revendications de la Chine dans l'Arctique.  En outre, la nature à double usage des navires de recherche, des ports et des bases crée un potentiel pour de futures utilisations militaires des infrastructures et de la recherche scientifique. Le comportement stratégique de la Russie L'activité stratégique de la Russie dans l'Arctique est perçue comme une provocation et constitue l'un des principaux comportements qui contribuent à un dilemme de sécurité dans la région. Les activités militaires de la Russie dans d'autres parties du monde contribuent également à une compétition stratégique globale avec les puissances occidentales, ce qui tend à teinter la façon dont les analystes occidentaux perçoivent les intentions de la Russie dans le Grand Nord. Les efforts de la Russie pour contrôler la route maritime du Nord, posant un problème de liberté de navigation aux États-Unis, et ses progrès dans le domaine de la technologie des missiles offensifs, qui impliquent l'essai et le déploiement de systèmes dans l'Arctique (en plus d'autres zones d'importance stratégique, comme Kaliningrad), constituent des développements problématiques significatifs. La Russie est une puissance arctique supérieure à celle des États-Unis et des autres nations arctiques. Elle a un long historique d'opérations dans la région et a revitalisé des bases et ports arctiques tout en en construisant de nouveaux. Elle a modernisé et développé de nouveaux systèmes d'armes conventionnelles et nucléaires, à courte, moyenne et longue portée. Dans le cadre de la défense Bastion visant à protéger les actifs stratégiques dans la région, la Russie déploie également des capacités d’interdiction régionale avec des systèmes de défense aérienne (tels que le S-400) et des missiles antinavires. Les activités militaires résurgentes, perçues comme provocatrices par les pays occidentaux, en particulier l'OTAN, comprennent des patrouilles de bombardiers stratégiques à proximité de l'espace aérien d'autres États de l'Arctique et des exercices dans la brèche Groenland-Islande-Royaume-Uni (GIUK Gap). Cet écart, qui constitue un élément important du concept de défense Bastion[3], vise à protéger les sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d’engins qui patrouillent dans la mer de Barents et l'océan Arctique. En plus des développements militaro-stratégiques, la Russie accroît sa coopération économique avec la Chine dans le développement du gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) sur la péninsule de Yamal et d'autres projets (GNL 2). Cette coopération s'étend au développement de l'infrastructure le long de la route maritime du Nord, en plus de la construction d'une flotte de brise-glace, afin de contrôler et d'administrer la route maritime du Nord. La coopération avec la Chine se poursuivra tant qu'elle servira les intérêts et les avantages nationaux de la Russie, mais cette relation doit être comprise comme une relation de circonstance avec des gains mutuels dans la foulée. La manière dont elle se développera au cours des 10 à 15 prochaines années est indéterminée. La publication par la Russie, en mars 2020, des Principes fondamentaux de la politique de la Fédération de Russie dans l'Arctique jusqu'en 2025 expose ses intérêts nationaux et ses objectifs à long terme dans l'Arctique. Le document aborde principalement la dimension économique, la recherche scientifique, les questions autochtones, ainsi que la coopération et le dialogue par le biais du Conseil de l'Arctique; mais il indique un intérêt pour la gestion des conflits potentiels dans la région. Les États-Unis et le comportement stratégique de l'Occident L'Arctique est devenu une nouvelle région d'intérêt militaire pour les États-Unis. D'un point de vue stratégique, l'Arctique est une « voie d'approche » pour les menaces visant le territoire nord-américain. Les États-Unis et le Canada procèdent à une transformation de la défense nord-américaine, y compris par la modernisation du NORAD, en réponse aux défis posés par les nouvelles menaces offensives des grandes puissances qui pourraient passer par l'Arctique. La modernisation implique de faire évoluer les concepts de défense et de dissuasion avec l'architecture de défense continentale pour contrer les avancées russes et chinoises en matière de capacités de missiles à longue portée, tels que les véhicules planeurs hypersoniques, les missiles de croisière de nouvelle génération et les systèmes aériens sans pilote. Le Commandement du Nord des États-Unis et le NORAD proposent un changement en faveur de nouvelles approches en matière de dissuasion afin de renforcer la crédibilité et la rentabilité. Ces approches comprennent la dissuasion par interdiction et la dissuasion par la résilience – facilitées par des systèmes résilients intégrés en couches de capteurs et d'autres formes de collecte de données pour la connaissance de tous les domaines – mais aussi la domination de l'information et la supériorité décisionnelle facilitée par l'analyse rapide des données par l'apprentissage automatique et l'intelligence artificielle. Ces processus permettent aux décideurs de disposer de plus de temps pour examiner les options disponibles pour répondre aux menaces pesant sur le territoire national.  L'intégration mondiale de ces systèmes implique également le partage des données avec les alliés et les partenaires à un rythme rapide, ce qui faciliterait les réponses aux menaces sur le théâtre arctique européen (comme autour de la Norvège, la mer de Barents et le GIUK Gap), ainsi que dans l'Arctique nord-américain. En réponse aux grandes puissances, ainsi qu'aux menaces non traditionnelles au sein et à partir de l'Arctique, les différentes branches de l'armée américaine ont publié des stratégies pour l'Arctique. Ce qui est intéressant à propos de ces stratégies est que, bien que la marine et la garde côtière américaines aient publié un certain nombre de stratégies pour l'Arctique au cours de la dernière décennie, un nouveau développement a eu lieu : l'armée de l'air et l'armée de terre américaines ont publié des stratégies pour l'Arctique, alors qu'elles ne l'avaient jamais fait auparavant. Ces stratégies renforcent les concepts de forces interarmées (entre les branches militaires, les autres ministères et les partenaires multinationaux) pour la région afin de répondre aux diverses menaces à la sécurité – traditionnelles et non traditionnelles – qui émergent dans l'Arctique. Le pivot des États-Unis vers l'Arctique ne s'observe pas seulement dans le contexte nord-américain, mais aussi par l'augmentation des exercices de l'OTAN dans l'Arctique et la coopération nordique en matière de défense. Les exercices de l'OTAN dans l'Arctique européen, dans et autour de la Norvège, impliquent à la fois des États de l'OTAN et des partenaires (non membres de l'OTAN), comme la Suède et la Finlande. Le plus notable d'entre eux est l'exercice Trident Juncture de 2018, au cours duquel la Russie a exercé certaines de ses propres capacités en réponse. Le comportement de l'OTAN est déjà un point sensible pour la Russie et les exercices en Arctique impliquant l'Alliance sont aussi potentiellement provocateurs pour la Russie. La Russie perçoit l'augmentation de l'activité de l'OTAN près de ses frontières comme une menace et considère la militarisation occidentale de l'Arctique comme véhiculant des intentions offensives[4]. Considérations Il existe un débat parmi les analystes de l'Arctique à propos de la question de savoir si l'OTAN doit s'impliquer davantage dans l'Arctique. L'OTAN n'a pas de politique ou de stratégie pour l'Arctique à l'heure actuelle, mais la multiplication des exercices en Norvège et dans les environs pourrait changer la donne. Les exercices de l'OTAN et le déploiement de ses forces près des frontières de la Russie sont perçus comme une provocation par la Russie, ce qui pourrait accroître le potentiel de conflit dans la région. Existe-t-il un « exceptionnalisme arctique » qui ne peut être affecté par les développements géopolitiques ? Comme il a été présenté ci-dessus, l'exceptionnalisme arctique définit l'Arctique comme une zone de paix et de coopération régie par des institutions chargées de résoudre les différends. Ce concept suppose que la région ne serait pas affectée par la concurrence des grandes puissances. Cependant, les développements actuels suggèrent que le comportement des grandes puissances peut avoir un impact sur la stabilité et la sécurité dans l'Arctique, bien que l'ampleur soit encore inconnue. L'incertitude croissante donne lieu à des spéculations sur les résultats possibles compte tenu des trajectoires des activités de la Russie et de la Chine. La compétition entre grandes puissances peut avoir des impacts différents sur la sécurité et la stabilité dans différentes parties de l'Arctique, comme l'Arctique nord-américain par opposition à l'Arctique européen ou à l'ouest de la mer de Béring et des îles Aléoutiennes. Un conflit dans la région est peu probable, bien que des affrontements et des phases de montée des tensions puissent se produire dans l'Arctique européen. Les intentions de la Russie semblent plus transparentes et prévisibles, compte tenu du déploiement de ses forces stratégiques et de ses systèmes de défense, de sa militarisation dans la région et de l'expression des intérêts décrits dans ses politiques (bien que son approche des conflits en zone grise dans de multiples domaines suscite une certaine ambiguïté). La Russie entend défendre sa sphère d'influence, dissuader les menaces pesant sur ses capacités de deuxième frappe, poursuivre ses intérêts économiques et le développement de ses ressources, notamment en contrôlant la navigation dans la route maritime du Nord. La Chine, en revanche, est plus imprévisible, étant donné son approche économique prédatrice et ses ambitions d'accroître son influence par le biais du droit international et du Conseil de l'Arctique. Elle a le potentiel de creuser un fossé entre les États et de devenir une menace pour la sécurité grâce à ses capacités à double usage dans les eaux arctiques et à ses investissements dans les infrastructures des nations arctiques vulnérables. Néanmoins, le Conseil de l'Arctique restera un forum de coopération. Il n'est pas certain que le Conseil diminuera ou deviendra inefficace si le climat de coopération dans l'Arctique est mis à mal. Les actions susceptibles de miner le Conseil et d'autres institutions régionales sont celles qui violent les normes et les règles de comportement appropriées. D'autre part, la concurrence stratégique nucléaire et conventionnelle pourrait avoir un impact sur le cadre de coopération, mais cela pourrait ne s'appliquer qu'au domaine militaire où la coopération et l'engagement ont déjà été gelés suite à l'ingérence de la Russie en Ukraine. La coopération sur les questions non militaires peut se poursuivre parallèlement aux différentes dynamiques qui émergent dans le domaine militaro-sécuritaire. La question de l'impact de l'émergence de nouvelles technologies de missiles et du contexte post-stratégique de contrôle des armements au niveau régional doit être examinée. Si les États-Unis et la Russie se retirent du contrôle des armements et d'autres régimes de coopération, tels que le traité « Ciel ouvert », la stabilité de la région pourrait être affectée. Les accords de contrôle des armements ont généralement des effets stabilisateurs qui pourraient renforcer la coopération dans d'autres domaines. Un monde post-traité ABM et post-traité FNI (et dans cinq ans peut-être post-Nouveau START[5]) pourrait affecter la sécurité et la stabilité dans l'Arctique en créant des conditions propices aux courses aux armements et au déploiement croissant de systèmes déstabilisants dans le Grand Nord, tels que les technologies d'armement offensif et la défense antimissile. Les capacités stratégiques nucléaires et conventionnelles jouent un rôle important dans la compétition entre grandes puissances. Les États-Unis, la Russie et la Chine mettent au point de nouvelles technologies conventionnelles et nucléaires plus rapides, plus maniables, plus furtives, plus précises et plus exactes, qui peuvent être considérées comme déstabilisantes au niveau mondial, mais aussi avoir des effets régionaux. Ainsi, la rupture du contrôle des armements menant à un phénomène de course aux armements pourrait avoir un impact dans l'Arctique, en particulier sur le rôle de l'Arctique dans les déploiements de systèmes nucléaires offensifs et de défense antimissile (notamment les plateformes aériennes et maritimes de la flotte du Nord de la Russie, et les défenses aériennes et antimissiles des États-Unis en Alaska). La Russie peut cibler l'Amérique du Nord tout en restant en dessous du seuil nucléaire et peut attaquer les États-Unis en cas de conflit dans un autre lieu pour empêcher ou retarder le déploiement sur d'autres théâtres comme l'Europe. Les systèmes à plus courte et moyenne portée déployés dans le Nord de la Russie peuvent atteindre des cibles dans l'Arctique européen (par exemple, la mer de Barents). Outre le déploiement de systèmes dans le Grand Nord, les essais d'armes nucléaires dans l'Arctique ont des répercussions sur la sécurité aux niveaux local et régional, car ils risquent d'empoisonner par radiation les populations et la faune. Ces développements créent des défis pour la stabilité dans l'Arctique, mais il est difficile de déterminer l'impact qu’un environnement de sécurité post-contrôle des armes aurait sur le cadre de coopération plus large de la région. Conclusion Un dilemme de sécurité régionale pourrait-il bouleverser le cadre coopératif des relations arctiques ? Lackenbauer soutient que « l'Arctique n'est ni une région de coopération exceptionnelle ni une région de conflit indépendante des dynamiques du système international ». Ce sentiment est repris dans des déclarations récentes du commandant de l'USNORTHCOM et du NORAD. Ce qui est mondial est également régional dans le contexte actuel d'une concurrence accrue entre grandes puissances, qui implique l'expansion des capacités de projection de puissance (militaire et économique) des États-Unis, de la Russie et de la Chine dans l'Arctique. Néanmoins, les intérêts nationaux de ces puissances présentent à la fois des caractéristiques de coopération et de concurrence. Le tableau suivant démontre que, bien que ces grandes puissances préfèrent la sécurité et la stabilité dans l'Arctique, la concurrence continue d'être une caractéristique importante. La compétition entre grandes puissances, qui s'exprime par une intensification du dilemme de sécurité, introduit l'incertitude et l'imprévisibilité dans l'Arctique. Il est possible qu'un dilemme de sécurité accru résultant de tensions croissantes entre les puissances puisse perturber les notions d'exceptionnalisme arctique, mais il reste à déterminer dans quelle mesure. Les forums régionaux offrent des possibilités de maintenir la coopération et le dialogue dans certains domaines, comme le Forum des garde-côtes de l'Arctique. La présidence russe du Conseil de l'Arctique, qui débutera en mai, pourrait permettre d'améliorer le dialogue dans les domaines non militaires, mais le manque de moyens pour aborder les questions de sécurité demeure. Les possibilités de créer un forum arctique distinct pour traiter des questions de sécurité militaire qui serait réceptif aux vues de la Russie sont encore à explorer. [1] L'article 2 expose les dispositions générales de la convention : « Statut juridique de la mer territoriale, de l'espace aérien au-dessus de la mer territoriale, de son lit et de son sous-sol ». Bien que les États-Unis participent aux conventions sur le droit de la mer et reconnaissent son statut juridique international, ils n'ont pas ratifié le traité. [2] Entre les cinq nations circumpolaires de l'Arctique – les États-Unis, le Canada, la Russie, le Groenland (Danemark) et la Norvège – la déclaration d'Ilulissat affirme la coopération par le biais de l'UNLCOS et la protection marine dans l'Arctique. [3] Selon Melino et al., « la posture militaire de la Russie dans son Arctique occidental reflète l'héritage soviétique de la défense par bastion, composée de "cercles concentriques" destinés à protéger le territoire stratégique ». Ils suggèrent que les exercices régionaux menés par la Russie au-delà de la péninsule de Kola et de la mer de Barents laissent penser que la Russie pourrait étendre sa défense de bastion et ses capacités de négation maritime vers le GIUK Gap. [4] Selon Julie Wilhelmsen, chercheuse senior à l'Institut norvégien des affaires internationales (NUPI), la Russie « perçoit ce type d'activité comme une menace pour la Russie et en tire une image de l'Occident sur le point de l'encercler et que celui-ci contribue à la militarisation de l'Arctique », ce à quoi la Russie tend à attribuer une intention offensive. [5] Le Nouveau START est le dernier traité bilatéral de contrôle des armements encore en vigueur entre les grandes puissances nucléaires – les États-Unis et la Russie. Nancy Teeple est chercheuse postdoctorale au North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network et professeure adjointe au Département de science politique et d'économie du Collège militaire royal du Canada. ## La coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire : Perspectives non américaines URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-cooperation-de-renseignement-dans-un-monde-multipolaire-perspectives-non-americaines/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique propose une canadianisation du renseignement, c’est-à-dire d’orienter la collecte et l’analyse des renseignements... Cette note stratégique fait suite à la conférence organisée par le Réseau d’analyse stratégique intitulée « La coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire : perspectives non américaines » du 6 mai 2021. Cette conférence a réuni d’éminents professionnels et universitaires du renseignement et des études stratégiques dont : Jill Sinclair du ministère de la Défense nationale, Daniel Jean, ancien conseiller en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement auprès du premier ministre du Canada, Artur Wilczynski du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications, Heather De Santis de Sécurité publique Canada, Björn Fägersten de l’Institut suédois des affaires internationales, Claudia Hillebrand de l’Université Cardiff, Gustav Gressel du Conseil européen des relations étrangères, Adriana Seagle de l’Université Bellevue, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé de l’Université Bishop’s, Stephanie Carvin de l’Université Carleton, Thomas Juneau de l’Université d’Ottawa, Reg Whitaker de l’Université Victoria, Nancy Teeple du Collège militaire royal du Canada, Patrick F. Walsh de l’Université Charles Sturt et Justin Massie de l’Université du Québec à Montréal. Même si elle est souvent peu traitée, la coopération en matière de renseignement n’est pas un nouveau phénomène. En particulier, depuis l’émergence du terrorisme international, la coopération en matière de renseignement s’est étendue à un niveau mondial. Cette menace continue de poser un défi aux services de renseignement, mais la transition actuelle de la puissance et l’intensification de la concurrence stratégique entre les grandes puissances exigent un changement de la vision de la coopération en matière de renseignement. Dans ce cadre, la conférence visait à établir une meilleure compréhension de la montée de la concurrence entre les grandes puissances dans un monde numérique. Ce phénomène soulève de nombreux défis dans une société libre et ouverte qui nécessite une coopération en matière de renseignement pour les relever. Quatre grands thèmes ont été abordés lors de cette conférence : les défis de la coopération de renseignement, l’Union européenne (UE) en tant qu’acteur du renseignement, le rôle du concept de Renseignement, Surveillance et Reconnaissance sur la stabilité stratégique et l’avenir du Groupe des cinq (Five Eyes), dont le Canada et l’Australie, en matière de coopération de renseignement. Dès lors, on peut tirer de cette note stratégique le manque de coopération internationale sur des sujets d’intérêt stratégique à l’heure de la compétition entre les grandes puissances comme les nouvelles technologies et les réticences nationales à pleinement partager les renseignements essentiels, sauf en cas de crises. Cette note stratégique met également en lumière le manque d’imputabilité et de surveillance des activités de partage de renseignements. Toutefois, il n’en demeure pas moins que la coopération continue de s’accentuer, et des acteurs comme l’UE vont jouer un rôle de plus en plus important dans le milieu du renseignement et de la coopération transnationale de renseignement. Cela dit, avec la croissance importante des besoins de coopération, de nombreux défis émergent pour des pays comme le Canada, qui dépendent des capacités de renseignement d’alliés plus puissants. Dans un tel cas, il faut renforcer la capacité à identifier nos propres menaces et intérêts nationaux, tout en continuant à coopérer avec nos alliés en leur apportant une expertise spécifique. Nous recommandons enfin pour le Canada une canadianisation du renseignement, c’est-à-dire d’orienter la collecte et l’analyse des renseignements étrangers vers une poursuite plus claire et plus ferme des intérêts proprement canadiens, contrairement à la réception de renseignements bruts ou finis qui peuvent ou non refléter les besoins et intérêts canadiens. À cette recommandation s’ajoutent aussi plusieurs initiatives intéressantes, notamment l’engagement plus prononcé et horizontal de la communauté de la sécurité nationale et du renseignement (SNR) envers les entités non traditionnelles qui sont maintenant ciblées par les menaces émergentes. Des acteurs tels que les entreprises innovantes du domaine des technologies de pointe et les centres de recherche et d’excellence technologique ont à disposition des compétences et des connaissances qui pourraient permettre à la communauté de la SNR de mieux répondre aux menaces émergentes qui demandent une plus grande approche multidisciplinaire. Soutenir le développement des connaissances et des stratégies d’atténuation face aux menaces ne ferait que disposer les acteurs externes à vouloir partager davantage avec la communauté de la SNR. Les défis de la coopération en renseignement La coopération de renseignement, aussi connue sous les noms de liaison et de partage de renseignements, est l’une des activités de renseignement la plus secrète et qui comporte de nombreux défis en constante évolution, notamment au sein des démocraties occidentales. Tout d’abord, il faut comprendre que toute agence de renseignement opère principalement selon ses propres intérêts et pour soutenir les objectifs de politique étrangère, de sécurité, et de défense de son pays. Dans ce contexte, la coopération s’effectue lorsqu’il y a un avantage évident surpassant les coûts. Cela est notamment le cas pour combler un manque d’informations, aller chercher une expertise différente, réduire les coûts d’une opération, lutter contre une menace commune, ou encore obtenir ou espérer obtenir quelque chose en échange. Toutefois, il existe de nombreuses contraintes, voire restrictions, à la coopération de renseignement. Plusieurs éléments peuvent limiter l’échange de renseignements : des perceptions différentes des menaces ; des intérêts nationaux différents ; les cadres juridiques nationaux ; les cultures organisationnelles ; les pratiques des agences de renseignement étrangères, notamment au regard des droits humains ; ou encore la peur que l’information échangée soit fuitée ou communiquée à une tierce partie, compromettant non seulement le lien de confiance, mais aussi les méthodes et les sources des agences de renseignement. Cette dernière préoccupation explique en partie pourquoi la coopération de renseignement est l’une des activités les plus secrètes et invisibles des agences de renseignement et l’une des plus difficiles à cartographier et à surveiller. Cette invisibilisation de la coopération de renseignement va s’accroître à mesure que les besoins de coopération vont augmenter, comme c’est le cas depuis la lutte contre le terrorisme jusqu’à la compétition entre les grandes puissances d’aujourd’hui. Il y a alors un paradoxe qui se forme, entre l’augmentation de l’invisibilité des activités de renseignement conduite par l’augmentation des besoins de coopération, et le désir et la nécessité de plus en plus importante de rendre les activités de renseignement démocratiquement responsables et imputables. Or, on se retrouve aujourd’hui avec une augmentation du volume de renseignements échangés, une multiplication des acteurs bénéficiant de la coopération et une flexibilité grandissante sur les arrangements, souvent ad hoc et temporaires, de la coopération. Si l’on ajoute à cela la globalisation de la coopération de renseignement à l’ère de la lutte contre le terrorisme, il devient alors important de trouver des mécanismes d’imputabilité et de surveillance de cette activité de renseignement. Si la coopération de renseignement est, de façon pragmatique, utile et nécessaire, l’histoire nous enseigne que de nombreuses erreurs, dommageables pour le citoyen, ont été commises par les activités d’échanges de renseignements. Toutefois, les mécanismes actuels d’imputabilité et de surveillance sont limités par les frontières et les lois nationales, rendant complexe le suivi des échanges de renseignements. Il faut alors renforcer ces mécanismes, ou créer des mécanismes d’imputabilité et de surveillance supranationaux, permettant de rendre plus transparents les échanges de renseignements. Un modèle intermédiaire, non supranational, mais institutionnalisé et transnational, est le Conseil de surveillance et de révision du renseignement du Groupe des cinq (FIORC), composé des principaux organes de surveillance nationaux des cinq pays membres, et s’occupant entre autres d’améliorer la transparence des activités de renseignement. L’Union européenne : le renseignement comme vecteur d’autonomie stratégique Depuis de nombreuses années, l’UE, poussée notamment par la France et l’Allemagne, tente d’acquérir une certaine autonomie stratégique, c’est-à-dire renforcer son indépendance, ses capacités et sa résilience sur un certain nombre de domaines comme la sécurité et la défense, ou encore la politique étrangère de façon générale. Dans un monde multipolaire, caractérisé par la réapparition de la compétition entre les grandes puissances, certains acteurs au sein de l’UE et certains États membres sont de plus en plus motivés à atteindre une autonomie stratégique, pour d’une part sortir l’UE de sa dépendance vis-à-vis des États-Unis en matière de sécurité et de défense et d’autre part pour confronter les ambitions russes et chinoises en Europe. Il semble que pour atteindre cet objectif, un des vecteurs soit la création d’une véritable capacité de renseignement au niveau de l’UE. En effet, l’atteinte d’une autonomie stratégique, c’est-à-dire avoir la capacité d’agir selon ses intérêts, passe par la compréhension de l’environnement stratégique. Pour l’UE, le défi est de définir ses propres menaces, sans dépendre de la perception des menaces américaine. Or, les capacités de renseignement de l’UE, tout comme la coopération de renseignement en son sein, sont loin d’être suffisantes à l’heure actuelle. Outre le besoin de renforcer les capacités nationales de renseignement de certains pays, la structure même de l’UE est un défi pour les services de renseignement. Basée sur un espace de libre circulation et de libre-échange, elle est souvent exploitée pour la commission de crimes ou d’actes d’espionnage, et rend le travail des agences nationales de renseignement particulièrement difficile. Le besoin de coopération devient donc indispensable. Pourtant, l’échange de renseignements reste encore limité, sauf lorsqu’un évènement majeur survient. Au niveau européen, il n’existe pas d’organe supranational responsable du renseignement. Il existe toutefois des organes facilitant la coopération au niveau européen, sans mandat de collecte de renseignements, mais recevant les renseignements des agences de renseignement des membres de l’UE comme le Centre d’analyse du renseignement, la Direction du renseignement de l’État-Major de l’UE ou encore Europol. Si en matière de criminalité et de terrorisme, la coopération de renseignement a été satisfaisante, il n’en est pas de même pour les quatre secteurs indispensables pour une autonomie stratégique que sont l’autonomie décisionnelle, opérationnelle, commerciale et technologique. À ces niveaux, la coopération de renseignement au sein de l’UE est assez rudimentaire, compte tenu des divergences d’intérêts nationaux, de volonté politique et de perception des menaces. Comme il n’est pas possible de créer une agence supranationale européenne de renseignement sans changer de traité, l’UE doit mettre l’accent sur le renforcement de la coopération de renseignement entre les pays membres à travers des entrainements conjoints, des opérations conjointes ou encore des formations conjointes pour renforcer la confiance mutuelle. Un des exemples est le projet de la Coopération structurée permanente (PESCO) de créer un centre de coordination sur la surveillance des domaines du cyberespace et de l’information. Ultimement, créer une réelle capacité de renseignement européenne nécessitera une certaine perte d’autonomie nationale et de souveraineté nationale. Le concept de Renseignement, Surveillance et Reconnaissance : opportunité stratégique ou vecteur d’instabilités ? Le Renseignement, surveillance et reconnaissance (RSR) est un concept stratégique qui permet aux décideurs d’anticiper les changements, d’atténuer les risques et d’orienter les résultats. C’est une activité à la fois de renseignement et d’opérations qui synchronise et intègre la planification et l’exploitation de capteurs, de ressources et des systèmes de traitement pour appuyer en direct les opérations actuelles et futures. En d’autres termes, le RSR est une capacité avancée de renseignement permettant d’avoir l’avantage décisionnel. Toutefois, la supériorité des États-Unis dans ce domaine crée une asymétrie qui pourrait remettre en question la stabilité stratégique. Traditionnellement, la stabilité stratégique est maintenue par la dissuasion nucléaire. Aujourd’hui, dans les doctrines stratégiques des grandes puissances, le nucléaire est incorporé avec d’autres capacités plus traditionnelles. La multiplication des domaines de confrontation, notamment l’espace et le cyberespace, demande une dissuasion multidomaines, notamment lorsque des adversaires comme la Russie et la Chine utilisent des tactiques hybrides ou de zone grise, le cyberespace ou encore les nouvelles technologies pour déstabiliser les démocraties occidentales. L’avantage du RSR dans cette complexification des modes de confrontation est d’anticiper les capacités, les intentions et les actions des adversaires. Cependant, cet avantage stratégique comporte certains risques d’entraîner au mieux de la manipulation et de la désinformation de la part d’adversaires inférieurs, et au pire des comportements agressifs préemptifs. Tout d’abord, les adversaires des États-Unis commencent à exploiter les vulnérabilités des systèmes américains via des méthodes asymétriques dans l’espace, le cyberespace et l’information. Ensuite, cela encourage certains pays comme la Chine et la Russie à déployer des capacités pour interdire l’accès à certaines zones. Enfin, la supériorité technologique américaine amène la Russie et la Chine à multiplier les opérations de renseignement humain sur le territoire américain et dans les pays alliés, notamment en matière d’espionnage. La supériorité des capacités technologiques à des fins de renseignement des États-Unis, si elle offre des avantages certains en matière d’anticipation, de détection et de ciblage, entraîne également le recours croissant des adversaires aux techniques et opérations asymétriques. Il revient maintenant aux États-Unis de coopérer davantage avec les alliés pour atténuer les vulnérabilités exploitées par ses adversaires. Quel avenir pour le Groupe des cinq ? Le partenariat du Groupe des cinq, l’institutionnalisation la plus avancée de partage de renseignements entre les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, le Canada, l’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande, comporte son lot d’avantages et d’inconvénients pour les partenaires les moins puissants comme le Canada ou l’Australie et se retrouve face à de nombreux défis à l’ère de la multipolarité. Un des défis les plus importants à l’ère de la compétition entre les grandes puissances est la compréhension des nouvelles technologies et la prise en compte des nouveaux domaines de confrontation comme le cyberespace. Le Groupe des cinq et les pays membres au niveau national ont un rôle à jouer pour s’assurer de l’efficience du renseignement à l’environnement actuel. Par exemple, l’Australie a instauré un Conseil national consultatif et scientifique du renseignement, chargé de proposer une approche plus stratégique et structurelle de l’évolution technologique et de son impact sur la communauté du renseignement australien. Ce type d’initiatives pourrait se développer au sein du Groupe des cinq pour permettre de nouvelles opportunités de coopération dans les domaines des technologies et des sciences. Une approche intégrée permettrait aux pays membres du Groupe des cinq de profiter des efforts de chacun. Pour aller encore plus loin, chaque pays pourrait se concentrer sur un ou des domaines dans lesquels il peut apporter une plus grande expertise et la mettre à disposition de ses partenaires. Ce type de coopération permettrait une économie de ressources tout en comblant les lacunes des appareils nationaux de renseignement par l’expertise que les autres ont à offrir. La régionalisation des menaces, notamment en Asie du Sud-Est, pose également la question de la coopération entre le Groupe des cinq et les autres pays, comme le Japon. Sans forcément aller jusqu’à l’idée d’une intégration complète et institutionnelle d’autres pays au sein du Groupe des cinq, il serait toutefois opportun de penser à une forme d’expansion du Groupe des cinq, selon des critères géographiques ou de types ou de nature des menaces, et d’introduire, sans forcément intégrer, d’autres pays pour une coopération plus profonde et durable sur un sujet particulier. Le Japon pourrait par exemple être introduit au sein du Groupe des cinq pour une coopération approfondie par rapport à la menace chinoise en Asie du Sud-Est. La « Canadianisation » du renseignement Si la multipolarité et la compétition entre les grandes puissances apportent de nombreuses opportunités pour le Groupe des cinq, il subsiste toutefois quelques défis quant à la coopération en matière de renseignement pour des pays comme le Canada. En effet, bien que cela apporte de nombreux avantages au Canada — comme une énorme source de renseignements étrangers bruts et finis, le Canada dépend des renseignements partagés par ses alliés puisqu’il est dépourvu d’un service de renseignement étranger qui collecte, centralise et coordonne clandestinement des renseignements humains étrangers en dehors de ses frontières. Ce « biais du producteur » vient donc refléter les intérêts et les priorités du pays destinateur et entraîne le risque considérable de se faire manipuler ou encore de servir des intérêts étrangers à défaut de ceux des Canadiens. Dans le monde du partage de renseignements, la capacité d’acquérir des renseignements représente une forme de pouvoir où l’information est une monnaie d’échange. Ces échanges mutuels peuvent donc être utilisés comme moyen de persuader des partenaires à se conformer à un nexus étranger. Cela est particulièrement vrai pour le Canada sachant qu’il est bien plus souvent consommateur qu’auteur de produits de renseignement étranger. Ce manque de contribution lui a d’ailleurs valu la réputation, auprès de certains de ses partenaires, d’être perçu comme un « profiteur​ » au détriment d’un contributeur plus actif au partage de renseignements. Ce sentiment est alimenté par deux réalités distinctes. D’emblée, sa position privilégiée au sein du Groupe des cinq, mais aussi, les circonstances géographiques de son territoire qui le positionne directement dans le périmètre de défense et de sécurité des États-Unis. Il est donc dans l’intérêt du Canada de développer ses capacités en la matière, soit par le biais d’un service de renseignement étranger — qui semble toutefois peu probable en ce moment pour diverses raisons — soit par une « canadianisation » de la collecte et de l’analyse du renseignement étranger. En fournissant une contribution canadienne plus importante, le Canada se positionnerait de manière à être pris plus au sérieux et à démontrer que la qualité vaut parfois mieux que la quantité. Recommandé par Stephanie Carvin et Thomas Juneau, cette « canadianisation » se définit comme une « constellation d’initiatives visant à orienter la collecte et l’analyse de renseignements étrangers vers une poursuite plus claire et plus forte des intérêts proprement canadiens, par opposition à la réception de renseignements bruts et finis qui peuvent ou non refléter un lien avec le Canada. » Quoique naissant et éparpillé, ce phénomène est vraisemblablement en pleine évolution au sein de la communauté de la sécurité nationale et du renseignement. Pour le moment, ce phénomène ne résulte que d’une série de petites initiatives et non d’une stratégie cohérente et élaborée, mais il constitue néanmoins une alternative intéressante, faisable et réaliste. De plus, renforcer les bénéfices de cette dernière permettrait de produire des évaluations indépendantes et plus adaptées aux besoins canadiens qui, en retour, devraient mieux supporter les prises de décisions et ainsi conduire à une élaboration des politiques plus efficace et plus cohérente. La « canadianisation » du renseignement étranger n’est pas une approche qui est mutuellement exclusive aux autres alternatives, elle s’inscrit en parallèle dans le but commun de permettre au Canada de mieux répondre à ses intérêts et priorités. D’une manière similaire, elle ne doit pas être vue comme une alternative qui vise à miner la démarche du renforcement de la coopération du renseignement, mais bien à positionner le Canada comme un meilleur collaborateur en contribuant davantage, de manière positive et active, à ses partenariats en matière de renseignement. Cette nouvelle posture offrirait la possibilité au Canada de façonner le narratif des enjeux transnationaux en offrant une perspective distincte et propre aux valeurs et priorités canadiennes. Cependant, en se fondant sur ce constat, il faudrait d’abord que ces valeurs, priorités et besoins canadiens soient mieux définis pour que de tels produits puissent voir le jour et ce n’est malheureusement pas quelque chose que nos décideurs politiques semblent présentement intéressés à régler. Certes, les capacités canadiennes en matière de renseignement étranger font défaut à plusieurs niveaux. Cependant, une définition plus claire des priorités de la politique étrangère du Canada servirait de support à une « canadianisation ». La prochaine étape serait de réfléchir à ce qui pourrait être fait pour encourager la poursuite de cette tendance au Canada. Il va de soi qu’une meilleure intégration des efforts de la communauté canadienne de la sécurité nationale et du renseignement (SNR) est requise afin de mieux faire face aux menaces émergentes, car l’évolution de l’environnement de ces dernières ne permet plus la négligence et les erreurs au niveau de l’anticipation des menaces sans qu’elles n’aient de conséquences considérables sur la sécurité et la prospérité du Canada. Considérations pour le Canada au niveau de la coopération C’est dans cette optique d’encourager la poursuite d’une « canadianisation » qu’il est fortement recommandé que la communauté de la SNR continue ses efforts de collaboration auprès des ministères et organismes de la fonction publique qui ne sont pas traditionnellement rattachés aux enjeux liés à la sécurité nationale et au renseignement. Il en va de même pour les nouvelles cibles non gouvernementales, qu’il s’agisse d’universités, de centres d’excellence, de groupes de réflexion, d’entreprises privées ou des médias. En effet, la réalité est que les services de renseignement n’ont plus le monopole de l’information et que l’expertise et les connaissances requises pour faire face aux menaces demandent une plus grande multidisciplinarité. Ces ressources et compétences peuvent être mises à disposition par les différents acteurs non gouvernementaux grâce à une collaboration plus étroite. Dès lors, afin de mieux comprendre ces nouvelles menaces et les mesures d’atténuation possibles, il serait opportun que la communauté de la SNR s’investisse plus sérieusement dans un engagement continu et horizontal avec ces nouvelles cibles non gouvernementales pour lesquelles bâtir et maintenir une confiance mutuelle reste à consolider. Une collaboration entière pourrait faire en sorte que la société civile et le secteur privé canadien soient plus conscients des menaces émergentes. De plus, bien qu’elle se soit développée au cours des dernières années, cela contribuerait à renforcer la littératie du renseignement à travers tous les secteurs affectés, puisque la communauté de la SNR reste encore nébuleuse pour plusieurs secteurs et hauts fonctionnaires. Dès lors, par des actions de sensibilisation et de transparence, elle devrait être mieux apte à véhiculer au sein des acteurs externes son rôle, ses priorités, ses limites, ce dont elle a besoin pour être efficace et comment elle peut être utilisée de manière réaliste. La clarification de ses besoins et de ses capacités réelles reste à être mieux définie et pourrait possiblement répondre à la mentalité de cloisonnement entre la population canadienne et la communauté de la SNR. Une piste de réflexion intéressante pour parvenir à ce dénouement passe par le biais d’une initiative similaire au projet de recherche collaboratif Public Intelligence ou à l’Open Source Enterprise établi par le Directeur du renseignement national américain. Sous la responsabilité du Conseiller à la sécurité nationale et au renseignement au sein du Bureau du Conseil privé, cette ressource agirait à titre de base de données centrales de l’exploitation des sources ouvertes de tous les médias — presse écrite, audiovisuelle et en ligne. Elle viserait également à regrouper les contributions collectives de chercheurs indépendants, d’universités, de centres d’excellence, de groupes de réflexion, d’entreprises privées et des médias. Elle inclurait aussi les rapports et les publications provenant des divers ministères et organismes de la fonction publique tels que les différents plans stratégiques, les rapports annuels d’examen et de surveillance des activités ainsi que les évaluations de menaces courantes qui affectent les différents secteurs canadiens. Ce cadre serait possible d’accès pour tous les citoyens canadiens de manière publique et transparente. Les bienfaits d’un tel projet semblent pertinents et méritent une considération particulière puisqu’il permettrait de tirer parti de l’expertise des acteurs du secteur public et privé afin de rendre le Canada et les citoyens canadiens plus résilients face aux menaces. En effet, d’une manière, elle permettrait à la communauté de la SNR d’améliorer ses méthodes et ses mesures d’atténuation potentielles et d’un autre côté elle pourrait favoriser un électorat qui soutient davantage son important travail. Les entreprises privées quant à elle obtiendraient un support à l’égard de l’atteinte de leurs buts et objectifs d’innovation et de prospérité. De son côté, la société civile bénéficierait d’une plateforme qui les outillerait à mieux revendiquer et protéger la sécurité, les droits et les libertés des Canadiens. En somme, dans une perspective de bénéfice mutuel et d’action concertée, soutenir le développement des connaissances face aux menaces émergentes et en constante évolution ne ferait que disposer les acteurs externes à vouloir plus partager avec les intervenants de la communauté de la SNR. D’autre part, au sein de la communauté de la SNR elle-même, une meilleure coopération inter-agence et un processus d’échange d’information demandent à être accentués. Les priorités, moyens et activités divergentes des différents intervenants engendrent des problèmes de communication et de malentendus qui nuisent à une réponse optimale des demandes en renseignement, mais aussi aux décisions prises par le gouvernement. Si elle semble s’être considérablement améliorée, une coordination encore plus importante est nécessaire au sein de la communauté pour pallier les problèmes qui nuisent à la coopération inter-agence. En effet, la compétition bureaucratique, un vocabulaire interne distinct, des procédures opérationnelles normalisées, des interprétations opposées et des habilitations de sécurité différentes ne contribuent pas à fournir une réponse optimale aux menaces qui pèsent sur le Canada. Dès lors, une approche similaire au cadre de travail intitulé Une vision (One Vision) qui vise à améliorer la coopération et à simplifier le processus d’échange d’information entre le SCRS et la GRC, devrait être mise à l’échelle de la communauté de la SNR. Certes, cela nécessiterait un niveau sans précédent de coordination des politiques nationales et internationales de la SNR canadienne, mais elle permettrait de favoriser une cohésion inter-agence multidimensionnelle. Ainsi donc, elle demanderait l’intégration complète des efforts de différents départements et ministères afin de remédier aux défis des différentes cultures et procédures organisationnelles pour offrir une meilleure réponse face aux menaces qui pèsent sur la société canadienne. Conclusion Tout compte fait, si le désir est réellement de mieux pallier les problèmes liés à l’émergence de nouvelles menaces et de relever les nombreux défis provenant de la transition actuelle du pouvoir et l’intensification de la concurrence stratégique entre les grandes puissances, il faut faire appel à l’innovation, ainsi qu’à une fusion sans précédent des connaissances, des pratiques, de la planification et des cultures de tous les secteurs affectés. Par ailleurs, les alliés et les États partageant des priorités et des valeurs démocratiques similaires doivent comprendre que leurs intérêts nationaux sont mieux servis par le biais d’une coopération en matière de renseignements et d’actions alignées. De plus, si le Canada souhaite pleinement bénéficier d’une coopération multilatérale en matière de renseignement, il doit être capable d’en faire plus pour lui-même et par lui-même. Plus il sera apte à contribuer de manière active, plus il obtiendra en retour. Cette « canadianisation » du renseignement attribuerait une valeur ajoutée au Canada comme partenaire et lui permettrait de servir des intérêts qui reflètent ses priorités et ses valeurs. Pour conclure, dans le but de rendre les entreprises et les citoyens canadiens plus résilients face aux menaces, il est recommandé que la communauté canadienne de la SNR établisse un cadre multilatéral de coopération et d’assistance mutuelle avec les différents acteurs externes. Par le biais d’engagements itératifs et systémiques, les intervenants de la communauté doivent établir des liens avec les autres secteurs de la société canadienne et tirer parti de l’ensemble de leurs connaissances et compétences spécialisées pour faire face à la complexification des menaces en constante évolution. ## La coopération franco-canadienne en matière industrielle de défense : État des lieux et perspectives de développement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-cooperation-franco-canadienne-en-matiere-industrielle-de-defense-etat-des-lieux-et-perspectives-de-developpement/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Le 26 septembre 2024, la France et le Canada ont signé une déclaration commune prévoyant un partenariat renforcé en matière de défense... Cette note stratégique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) avec le soutien du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada et de la DGRIS (Ministère des Armées, France), qui vise à développer des échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens. Les opinions exprimées ou implicites dans la présente note stratégique sont celles des auteurs et ne représentent pas nécessairement les points de vue du ministère de la Défense nationale, des Forces armées canadiennes ou de tout organisme du gouvernement du Canada (en ce qui concerne Erik Vouvalidis) ni de l’Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (en ce qui concerne Gaspard Schnitzler). Résumé Le 26 septembre 2024, la France et le Canada ont signé une déclaration commune prévoyant un partenariat renforcé en matière de défense et de sécurité. Si la coopération de défense franco-canadienne poursuit ces dernières années une dynamique positive au niveau politico-militaire, elle demeure pourtant assez peu développée sur le plan industriel. En effet, à l’exception de quelques contrats emblématiques, les acquisitions d’équipement français par les forces armées canadiennes et d’équipement canadien par les armes françaises restent limitées. Cette situation s’explique notamment par les liens militaires étroits qu’entretient le Canada avec les Etats-Unis, qui se traduisent par une priorité donnée à l’acquisition d’équipements américains. Si cette proximité avec l’industrie de défense américaine représente un frein aux coopérations industrielles de défense, il existe pour autant des opportunités de coopération entre industriels de défense français. En effet, l’important processus de modernisation que connaissent actuellement les forces armées canadiennes pourrait donner lieu à des rapprochements dans les prochaines années, notamment dans les domaines suivants : La co-construction et l'utilisation de sous-marins de nouvelle génération, en établissant un partenariat stratégique autour du remplacement des sous-marins canadiens de la classe Victoria (dans le cadre du programme CPSP) et la sécurisation des voies maritimes en Arctique et dans l’Atlantique-Nord. La co-construction et l'utilisation de navires brise-glaces, en élargissant à la France le partenariat trilatéral autour de la production de navires brise-glaces (ICE Pact), lancé en juillet 2024 par le Canada, les États-Unis et la Finlande. État de la coopération industrielle de défense entre la France et le Canada Bien que relativement limitée comparée à d’autres partenaires, la coopération de défense franco-canadienne poursuit une dynamique positive aux niveaux stratégiques et opérationnels. Sur le plan opérationnel, cette dernière se matérialise avant tout par des échanges de personnels, la participation à des exercices interarmées (notamment dans le cadre de l’OTAN), ainsi que des déploiements dans le cadre d’opérations conjointes (i.e par le passé Barkhane et MINUSMA). Au niveau stratégique, la relation bilatérale a été renforcée et institutionnalisée ces dernières années, notamment par l’instauration en 2015 d’un Conseil franco-canadien de coopération en matière de défense, qui réunit régulièrement les ministres de la défense des deux pays, ainsi que la tenue régulière d’un Comité aux affaires stratégiques. En 2023, l’Agence de l’innovation de défense (AID) française et la Direction recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) ont par ailleurs signé un arrangement spécifique dans le domaine de l’innovation de défense. Plus récemment, le 26 septembre 2024, la France et le Canada ont signé une “Déclaration relative à un partenariat renforcé en matière de défense et de sécurité” qui prévoit une coopération renforcée dans les domaines suivants: le soutien à l’Ukraine, l’Indopacifique, la gestion de crises, la modernisation des forces armées, ainsi que la lutte contre les ingérences étrangères et la manipulation de l’information. Pourtant, si la coopération de défense franco-canadienne semble connaître une dynamique positive au niveau politico-militaire, elle demeure assez peu développée sur le plan industriel. En effet, à l’exception de quelques contrats emblématiques, tel l’obtention en 2015 par Arquus (ex-RTD) d’un contrat d’environ 500 millions d’euros, pour la fourniture de 1 500 camions militaires aux forces armées canadiennes[1], ou plus récemment, en septembre 2024, l’attribution à Thales d’un contrat de 23 millions d’euros pour la fourniture de 200 caméras thermiques portables multifonctions Sophie Ultima, l’acquisition d’équipement français par les forces armées canadiennes reste limitée. Ainsi, sur les dix dernières années (2013-2023), à l’exception de l’année 2016[2], le volume des exportations d’armement françaises vers le Canada se situaient entre 4 et 24 millions d’euros par an, pour une moyenne à 11 millions d’euros. A titre de comparaison, les exportations d’armement françaises vers les Etats-Unis atteignaient sur la même période une moyenne annuelle de 190 millions d’euros.[3] Cette situation s’explique notamment par les liens étroits qu’entretient le Canada avec les Etats-Unis, qui se répercutent sur les relations entre industriels de défense canadiens et américains. En effet, voisins et alliés, partageant une frontière commune de près de 9 000 km, les deux pays jouissent d'une relation privilégiée, tant sur le plan économique que militaire, notamment en tant que deux seuls pays non-européens de l'OTAN. Au niveau économique, les deux pays bénéficient depuis les années 1990 d’un accord de libre-échange, qui facilite l’importation de marchandise et l’implantation dans le pays d’entreprises américaines, faisant des Etats-Unis le premier partenaire commercial du Canada. Sur le plan militaire, en plus d’être alliés au sein de l’OTAN, les deux pays coopèrent étroitement au sein du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD) – une organisation bilatérale en matière de défense aérienne créée en 1957 – ainsi que dans le cadre des « Five eyes », une alliance entre services de renseignement américains, australiens, britanniques canadiens et néo-zélandais. Cette proximité, l’importante présence d’entreprises de défense américaines sur le territoire canadien, ainsi que la quête d’interopérabilité entre les deux pays, expliquent en grande partie la priorité donnée par le Canada aux équipements militaires d’origine américaine. Cela s’illustre particulièrement dans le domaine aéronautique, où de nombreuses entreprises américaines telles que Lockheed Martin, Boeing ou Bell Flight, disposent de filiales bien implantées au Canada. Ainsi, à l’exception de l’achat récent (en 2023) d’avions ravitailleurs A330 MRTT d’Airbus, la majorité des aéronefs de l’aviation royale canadienne sont d’origines américaines, qu’il s’agisse des avions de combat F-18 et F-35, des avions de transport C-130 et CC-177, des avions de patrouille maritime P-3, ou encore des hélicoptères de transport CH-147 et multi-rôles CH-146. Il en est de même dans le secteur terrestre, qui, à l’exception des chars Leopard 2 allemands, est essentiellement composé de véhicules d’origine américaine, produits par les filiales canadiennes de General Dynamics Land Systems, Textron ou Oshkosh Defense (i.e. véhicules blindés VBLIII et LAV6, véhicules de transport de troupe M113 et Coyote, véhicules tous terrains HUMVEE…). Dans le domaine naval, la tendance est légèrement différente, dans la mesure où le Canada dispose d’une importante industrie nationale qu’elle entend préserver et développer. Ainsi, la « Stratégie nationale de construction navale » canadienne limite les possibilités d’exportation pour l’industrie navale française, dans la mesure où les bâtiments de surface doivent en priorité être produits au Canada, à l’instar des 15 navires de combat du programme NCSC dont la construction a été confiée aux Chantiers Maritimes Irving d’Halifax, au grand dam de Naval Group et Fincantieri, qui avaient soumis à Ottawa une offre commune basée sur le design de la frégate FREMM. Malgré tout, les entreprises françaises se sont vu attribuer un certain nombre de contrats dans le domaine naval ces dernières années, la plupart du temps en tant que sous-traitants. Ainsi, en 2021, le missilier MBDA s’est vu attribuer par Lockheed Martin Canada un contrat pour équiper les futurs navires de combat de surface canadien (NCSC) de systèmes de défense anti-aérienne Sea Ceptor. De son côté, Thales Canada s’est vu attribuer en 2023 un contrat d’environ 300 millions d’euros pour le soutien de la flotte de petits navires de guerre et de navires auxiliaires de la Marine royale canadienne, qui comprend une centaine de navires de 24 classes différentes.[4] Afin de répondre aux critères de passation de marché canadiens et de renforcer leurs chances d’obtenir des contrats au profit des Forces armées canadiennes, de nombreux industriels français ont ouvert des filiales au Canada. C’est notamment le cas de Thales (qui compte environ 2 000 salariés dans le pays), Safran (présent avec environ 2 000 salariés répartis sur 7 sites), Airbus (qui compte environ 4 000 salariés dans le pays), ou encore Naval Group (présent depuis 2014 sous le nom de Naval Group Technologies Canada). Néanmoins, la préférence américaine susmentionnée, ainsi que les échecs répétés rencontrés par l’industrie tricolore lors de campagnes récentes, contribuent à faire du Canada un marché difficilement accessible (et donc non-prioritaire) pour les industriels de défense français. Zoom sur le poids économique des industries de défense française et canadienne Le poids économique de l’industrie de défense tout comme le rapport de l’Etat à cette dernière, varient significativement entre la France et le Canada. Ainsi, l’industrie de défense canadienne emploi environ 36 000 salariés et s’organise essentiellement autour de petites entreprises (85% des acteurs du secteur ont moins de 250 salariés). Son poids économique demeure assez modeste (environ 14Md€ de chiffre d’affaires en 2022) ainsi que son volume d’exportation (environ 7 milliards de dollars en 2022). A l’inverse, l’industrie de défense française occupe un poids économique significatif et est considérée comme un acteur stratégique de premier plan, qui génère environ 200 000 emplois directs et indirects. Présente sur la quasi-totalité des segments, elle s’organise autour d’une dizaine de grands groupes, mêlant systémiers-intégrateurs et équipementiers (i.e. Airbus, Thales, Safran, Naval Group, Dassault, MBDA, KNDS…) et d’environ 4 000 PME, générant un chiffre d’affaires annuel de plus de 30 milliards d’euros. De facto, le poids et la dépendance des deux industries à l’export n’est pas comparable. Ainsi, en 2022, le volume de prise de commande de l’industrie de défense française s’élevait à 27 milliards d’euros, faisant de la France le 3ème pays exportateur d’armement au monde. Il en est de même pour les pays vers lesquels exportent Paris et Ottawa. Alors que les exportations d’armement canadiennes sont majoritairement à destination des Etats-Unis (63% en 2022), la plupart des prises de commandes d’armement français concernent la zone Proche et Moyen-Orient (64% en 2022). Opportunités de coopération industrielle de défense franco-canadienne Si la proximité avec l’industrie de défense américaine et les limites fixées par les Etats-Unis en termes de choix de plateforme[5], peuvent être un frein aux coopérations industrielles de défense, il existe pour autant des opportunités de coopération entre industriels de défense français et canadiens, qui pourraient donner lieu à des rapprochements dans les prochaines années. C’est d’ailleurs ce que semble laisser entendre la “Déclaration relative à un partenariat renforcé en matière de défense et de sécurité” de septembre 2024, qui contient un volet dédié à la coopération autour de la modernisation des forces armées des deux pays. Outre un “partage des savoir-faire technologiques respectifs” et des “échanges sur l’organisation et l’amélioration de nos processus d’acquisition”, cette dernière prévoit notamment une coopération renforcée “dans les domaines terrestre, maritime, aérien et cyber”, sans pour autant citer de capacités précises pouvant faire l’objet d’une coopération. L’opportunité d’une coopération renforcée réside avant tout dans le fait que les forces armées canadiennes connaissent actuellement une période d’importante transformation, conduisant à ce que plusieurs chantiers majeurs de modernisation aient été récemment lancés, ou soient en passe de l’être. Ainsi, dans sa dernière stratégie de défense nationale, intitulée « Notre Nord, fort et libre : Une vision renouvelée pour la défense du Canada », le gouvernement canadien annonce une hausse du budget de défense (+8,1 milliards CAD sur les 5 années à venir et +73 milliards CAD sur les 20 prochaines années) ainsi que d’importants investissements dans plusieurs secteurs. Ottawa prévoit notamment d’acquérir des avions dotés de systèmes de détection et de commandement aéroportés (AWACS), des navires de combat de surface (NCSC)[6], des missiles longue portée, des drones de surveillance et d’attaque, des capacités de lutte anti-drones, de nouveaux hélicoptères tactiques, ou encore de nouveaux sous-marins. En outre, le Canada explore également la possibilité d’acquérir de nouveaux véhicules adaptés à la glace, de moderniser son artillerie, son parc de chars et ses véhicules blindés légers, de se doter de nouveaux moyens de défense aérienne, ainsi que de lancer un programme de production de véhicules blindés légers. Ces investissements demeurent néanmoins incertains dans la mesure où ils dépendront du résultat des prochaines élections fédérales canadiennes, qui devraient se tenir d’ici octobre 2025. Perspectives de coopération dans le domaine des sous-marins Parmi les opportunités de coopération qui pourraient voir le jour dans les prochaines années, la France et le Canada pourraient nouer un partenariat stratégique autour de la question du renouvellement des sous-marins canadiens. En effet, le Canada, ne dispose à ce jour que de quatre sous-marins à propulsion diesel-électrique acquis d’occasion auprès de la Royal Navy (Royaume-Uni) à la fin des années 1990, qui devraient être retirés du service fin 2030. Aussi, le pays souhaite se doter de nouveaux sous-marins, plus modernes, pour permettre à la marine canadienne de protéger les approches et les voies maritimes du Canada, ainsi que de participer aux missions de l’OTAN. Si ce besoin a été exprimé à plusieurs reprises ces dernières années[7], notamment dans un rapport parlementaire de la Commission Défense du Sénat publié en 2017 et dans le cadre du « Programme de sous-marins de patrouille canadiens » lancé en 2021 par la Marine royale canadienne, il n’a pour le moment jamais été concrétisé. Cela pourrait bien évoluer alors que la dernière stratégie de défense nationale canadienne (avril 2024) mentionne la volonté « d’étudier les possibilités de renouvellement et d’expansion de notre flotte de sous-marins pour que la Marine royale canadienne continue d’agir comme élément de dissuasion sur les trois côtes grâce aux sous-marins à propulsion classique capables de naviguer sous la glace ». Depuis, ce projet a été précisé, notamment par le Premier ministre Justin Trudeau qui a annoncé en juillet 2024 que le Canada allait acheter « 12 sous-marins à propulsion classique capables de naviguer sous la glace ». Baptisé « Projet de sous-marins de patrouille canadien » (PSPC), ce programme, dont le coût total est estimé d’environ 60 milliards de dollars canadiens, a officiellement été lancé le 10 juillet 2024, avec la publication d’une déclaration par le ministère de la Défense nationale, qui annonce la publication d’une demande d’information officielle « à l’automne 2024 ». Outre le fait qu’il devrait permettre au Canada de resserrer ses liens avec ses alliés et partenaires, le communiqué précise que ce programme devra « créer une relation durable entre le Canada et son (ou ses) partenaires stratégiques pour soutenir la formation du personnel et le partage de l’information ». Soucieuse de minimiser les délais et les coûts, la marine royale canadienne préconise l'acquisition de nouveaux sous-marins étrangers prêts à l'emploi, dont le premier exemplaire devrait être livré au plus tard en 2035, afin d’éviter toute rupture capacitaire. A ce jour, la marine royale canadienne a identifié six modèles pouvant répondre à ses besoins, dont le sous-marin français Shortfin Barracuda de Naval Group, aux côtés du sous-marin allemand U212CD (TKMS), suédois C-71 Oceanic (Saab), espagnol S-80 (Navantia), sud-coréen KSS-III Batch 2 (Hanwha) et japonais Taigei (Kawasaki et MHI). Confrontés à des difficultés de production entraînant d’importants retards, les constructeurs américains n’ont pas été sollicités. Aussi, plusieurs entreprises se sont déjà positionnées, dont l’allemand TKMS, profitant de la visite du ministre de la défense allemand Boris Pistorius à Ottawa en mai 2024, à l’occasion de laquelle l’Allemagne et la Norvège (tous deux membres du programme U212CD) ont proposé au Canada la mise en place d’un « partenariat stratégique » pour protéger les voies maritimes de l’Arctique ainsi que celles de l’Atlantique-Nord. Si la France ne s’est pour le moment pas officiellement positionnée, nouer un partenariat stratégique autour de la question de la défense de l’Arctique et du Grand Nord, serait une excellente opportunité de renforcer la coopération de défense franco-canadienne et par là même de relancer la coopération industrielle de défense entre nos deux pays, en l’inscrivant dans la durée autour d’un projet structurant. En effet, face à la hausse des activités russes et chinoise, la France entend s’investir davantage dans cette zone du globe et pourrait faire bénéficier le Canada de son expérience opérationnelle (navigation sous-marine océanique), tandis que le Canada pourrait apporter à la France sa connaissance du terrain Arctique et de la navigation dans les glaces. De plus, les sous-marins expéditionnaires de la famille Barracuda de Naval Group semblent répondre aux principales exigences identifiées par le Canada en matière de capacités sous-marines (furtivité, létalité, persévérance et capacité de déploiement dans l’Arctique), ces derniers bénéficiant d’une autonomie et d’une endurance accrues, héritées de leur ascendance nucléaire. Au-delà des capacités opérationnelles et des délais de livraison, ce choix dépendra notamment de la capacité de la France à proposer un partenariat structurant à l’industrie navale canadienne (i.e. formation, infrastructures, maintien en condition opérationnelle…) qui permette de rapprocher les bases industrielles des deux pays et génère des retombées économiques positives, tant à l’échelle locale que nationale. Perspectives de coopération dans le domaine des navires brise-glaces Un autre domaine à fort potentiel de coopération franco-canadien concerne la production de navires brise-glaces. Alors que le Canada, les États-Unis et la Finlande ont lancé lors du sommet de l'OTAN de juillet 2024 un projet de construction commune de navires brise-glaces, sous le nom de “'Icebreaker Collaboration Effort” (ou ICE Pact), la France aurait tout intérêt à rejoindre ce projet et de bénéficier de l’expertise du Canada en la matière, en acquérant un ou plusieurs navires de ce type auprès de l’industrie navale canadienne. En effet, malgré le fait qu’elle possède la seconde ZEE au monde derrière les Etats-Unis, la France ne dispose à ce jour que d’un navire brise-glace, “L'Astrolabe”, exclusivement dédié à des missions de ravitaillement en Antarctique et de surveillance des ZEE.[8] Il n’existe pas de navire équivalent pour la zone Arctique. Le besoin pour la France de tels équipements étant limité en termes de volume, contrairement au Canada, une production purement nationale n’aurait pas d’intérêt. A l’inverse, un partenariat industriel franco-canadien autour de la production de ces équipements renforcera la collaboration industrielle entre Paris et Ottawa, ainsi que leur capacité à mener des missions communes en Arctique et dans le Grand Nord, conformément à la volonté affichée par les deux pays. À propos des auteurs Gaspard Schnitzler est chercheur à l’Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS), spécialiste des questions de défense européennes et des politiques industrielles de défense. Auparavant, il a travaillé comme analyste au sein du ministère des Armées. Gaspard est diplômé de l’institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) où il enseigne aujourd’hui. Erik Vouvalidis est analyste au sein du secteur de l'infrastructure et environnement du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Auparavant, il a travaillé comme analyste à Sécurité publique Canada, au sein du secteur de la sécurité nationale et de la cybersécurité. Erik est titulaire d'une maîtrise en affaires internationales de la Norman Paterson School of International Affairs de l'Université Carleton. [1] Via Mack Defense, la filiale américaine du groupe Volvo. [2] En raison du contrat susmentionné. [3] Le volume financier des exportations d’armement du Canada vers la France demeure inconnu. Néanmoins, la France figure parmi les quatre principales destinations des licences d’exportation d’armement délivrées en 2022 par le Canada (derrière le Royaume-Uni, l’Allemagne et Israël) avec 226 licences délivrées pour des « articles stratégiques. Source. [4] Dont les navires de défense côtière de la classe Kingston, les navires d’entraînement de la classe Orca, ainsi que les navires de soutien auxiliaires. [5] En raison notamment de l’intégration sur ces dernières d’équipements d’origine américaine. [6] Le programme NCSC prévoit l’acquisition de 15 navires de combat en vue du remplacement des destroyers de la classe Iroquois et des frégates de classe Halifax. [7] Il apparaissait déjà dans le Livre blanc sur la défense publié en 1987 [8] Propriété des Terres australes et antarctiques françaises (TAAF) et de l’Institut polaire français Paul-Émile Victor (IPEV), il est armé par la Marine nationale. ## La coopération internationale et la gestion des menaces traditionnelles et émergentes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-monde-dapres-la-cooperation-internationale-et-la-gestion-des-menaces-traditionnelles-et-emergentes/ Modified: 2026-07-10 > Suite à son deuxième colloque annuel, le Réseau d'analyse stratégique a produit l'ouvrage collectif « Le monde d’après ? La coopération internationale et la gestion des menaces traditionnelles et émergentes ». Suite à son deuxième colloque annuel, le Réseau d'analyse stratégique a produit l'ouvrage collectif « Le monde d’après ? La coopération internationale et la gestion des menaces traditionnelles et émergentes ». La thématique du deuxième colloque annuel du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), tenu les 9-10 décembre 2021, se penchait sur les transitions qui ont marqué la politique internationale. D’abord, plusieurs pays ont entamé une transition post-pandémique, choisissant un allégement des restrictions en matière de santé publique. Nos expert.e.s, tout au long de l’année, ont remarqué les effets marqués de la COVID-19 sur bien des activités en matière de sécurité et de défense, comme par exemple les opérations que mènent les Forces armées canadiennes au Canada et à l’étranger. D’autre part, l’année 2021 a aussi connu des tendances plus prononcées et inquiétantes au niveau de la compétition entre grandes puissances et un affaiblissement de la démocratie à l’échelle mondiale. Force est de constater que le Canada doit conjuguer avec un environnement de sécurité toujours plus complexe. Comme le note Kerry Buck, ancienne ambassadrice du Canada à l’OTAN, dans ce collectif, cet environnement connait plusieurs défis qui ne se sont qu’exacerbés avec la pandémie : « premièrement, la plupart des pays se sont repliés sur eux-mêmes; deuxièmement, dans de nombreux pays, la démocratie et la cohésion sociale ont été ébranlées; et, troisièmement, l’ordre mondial devient plus imprévisible, avec des dynamiques de pouvoir changeantes parmi les principaux acteurs et de nouvelles sources d'instabilité. » Et prenant compte de ces principaux acteurs, la compétition accrue entre grandes puissances ne fait que réduire la marge de manœuvre d’une puissance moyenne comme le Canada. Vers la fin de l’année 2021, la présence militaire de la Russie, près des frontières de l’Ukraine, inquiétait. Quelques mois après, la Chine exprimait son amitié « sans limite » pour la Russie, y laissant la voie libre pour son agression du 24 février 2022. Les signes de cette dégringolade sécuritaire étaient visibles lors du colloque et les efforts diplomatiques de dernière minute, qu’ils aient été déployés par le président Biden ou le Président Macron, n’ont guère porté fruit par la suite. L’article de Zachary Paikin note que ces événements imposent des contraintes encore plus fortes sur le Canada : « La réduction des options politiques limite désormais la capacité du Canada à poursuivre ses intérêts nationaux, alors même que le paysage international est passé d'une transition graduelle de l'ordre à une instabilité et une insécurité totale dans le sillage de la guerre d’agression de la Russie contre l'Ukraine. » Pourtant, la posture du Canada face à l’Ukraine est sûrement l’un des seuls dossiers où la politique étrangère et de défense avait une réelle cohérence stratégique. Si pendant des années, nous avions pu questionner l’efficacité d’une mission axée sur la formation militaire en Ukraine, il ne reste plus aucun doute sur le bien-fondé de cette mission. Pareillement, l’alignement stratégique du Canada envers l’OTAN, et son repli du côté de l’ONU, semble avoir été le bon pari. Là où le Canada demeure toujours dans l’incertitude quant à son orientation stratégique réside dans la région de l’Indopacifique. Et malgré l’élaboration d’une stratégie canadienne axée sur cette région, il y aura des choix difficiles à faire, car le Canada n’est pas une puissance à portée mondiale, malgré la rhétorique qui nous parvient parfois d’Ottawa. Srdjan Vucetic s’exprime très clairement sur le fait selon lequel les engagements du Canada sont difficiles à réconcilier avec ses moyens : « En effet, les promesses de partage du fardeau de l’alliance que le Canada fait pour garder l’Indopacifique ‘libre et ouvert’ affectent par définition des promesses similaires faites dans d'autres contextes – de la modernisation du NORAD au prochain concept stratégique de l’OTAN et au plan d'action sur les changements climatiques. » Il faut au moins essayer de clarifier les orientations stratégiques du Canada et d’effectuer des choix mieux arrimés aux capacités diplomatiques, économiques et militaires à sa disposition. Il est maintenant nécessaire que le Canada identifie clairement qui sont les menaces principales, comme le font ses alliés. La Russie a chassé toute ambiguïté qui planait sur son statut, mais qu’en est-il de la Chine ? L’identification d’une menace contribue à plus de clarté stratégique. Au-delà de la menace que représente la Russie, l’une des premières étapes est de reconnaître, à la fois au niveau gouvernemental et dans la sphère publique, que le Canada se fait quotidiennement attaquer en dessous du seuil de la guerre, que cela soit dans le cyberespace ou l’espace extra-atmosphérique. En effet, le gouvernement canadien ne donne d’orientations claires qu’en période de guerre, mais se retrouve au dépourvu en crise dans la zone grise et le domaine de l’information. Il doit ainsi améliorer sa capacité d’anticipation par l’articulation claire de ses intérêts et de ses priorités en amont des crises. Maintenant qu’un processus de révision de la politique de défense a été annoncé, le RAS tient à ce que ce processus ouvre la porte à de réels débats, ainsi qu’une réflexion profonde sur l’orientation stratégique du Canada, accompagnée d’un engagement du public qui devrait se montrer plus prononcé dans le contexte de la guerre en Ukraine. L’objectif à atteindre est de réduire le mur à l’intérieur du gouvernement entre le niveau politique et la fonction publique, entre les partis politiques et entre le gouvernement et les universitaires, les experts et la société civile canadienne, un objectif qui est au cœur du mandat que s’est donné le RAS. Un énoncé de politique de défense mis à jour est également un exercice de diplomatie publique, tant international que national, servant à signaler les enjeux et les objectifs de politique étrangère importants pour le Canada. Ainsi, il faut choisir les dossiers sur lesquels le Canada a un intérêt et un avantage comparatif particulier pour arriver à une approche cohérente de l’ensemble du gouvernement du Canada en ce qui concerne son engagement international. Il faut sortir de l’approche de la politique internationale par les performances, comme le Canada a réussi à le faire avec la crise en Ukraine. Mais dans d’autres régions, l’engagement du Canada ne bénéficie pas d’une telle crédibilité. Par exemple, si le Canada décide de renouveler son engagement sur le continent africain, ou encore au Moyen-Orient, il doit offrir des contributions plus ciblées qui passent par une meilleure compréhension de la diversité des contextes locaux. Il est aussi important de constater que le Canada n’est non plus à l’abri des menaces sécuritaires sur son propre territoire. Il fait face à une recrudescence des cyberattaques le ciblant, ce qui nécessite la mobilisation de ressources pour protéger les infrastructures essentielles. D’autre part, il est impératif d’élaborer une nouvelle stratégie de cybersécurité, ainsi qu’une réflexion sur l’avenir du NORAD dans la cadre d’une vision innovante de ce qu’est la défense continentale. Les investissements sont visibles, et ils ont été bonifiés lors de l’annonce du budget fédéral de 2022, mais ceux-ci demeurent insuffisants et ne sont pas appuyés d’une vision stratégique cohérente et clairement articulée. Le texte d’Émile Lambert-Deslandes élabore justement une panoplie de questions pour nourrir ces réflexions, notamment en nous poussant à s’interroger sur « quelle devrait être la relation avec les États-Unis, si le est prêt à investir pour devenir un membre productif de ses alliances et si ses valeurs devraient servir comme objectifs de sa politique internationale. » Répondre à ce type de questions représente un défi de taille auquel le RAS peut contribuer, en préparant la tenue de son troisième colloque annuel le 22 septembre 2022. Consultez la version complète de l'ouvrage collectif ici : Ouvrage collectif - RAS 2e colloque annuel Table des matières « Introduction, » par Stéfanie von Hlatky et Justin Massie. « Le (dés)ordre du monde post-COVID-19 : Un guide de l’engagement international du Canada pour l’année à venir, » par Kerry Buck. « De l’Atlantique au Pacifique : Une nouvelle posture stratégique pour le Canada, » par Zachary Paikin. « L’hégémonie de la Chine et la stratégie indopacifique du Canada, » par Srdjan Vucetic. « Pour sa politique internationale, le Canada doit faire des choix difficiles, » par Émile Lambert-Deslandes. ## La COVID-19 et le renforcement des capacités à l’étranger : Assistance à la sécurité et formation durant la pandémie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-covid-19-et-le-renforcement-des-capacites-canadien-a-letranger-assistance-a-la-securite-et-formation-durant-la-pandemie/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Comment le renforcement des capacités, plus que toutes autres opérations de formation et d’assistance à la sécurité, a-t-il été affecté par la COVID-19? Comment le renforcement des capacités, plus que toutes autres opérations de formation et d’assistance à la sécurité, a-t-il été affecté par la COVID-19? Qu’est-ce qui risque de se produire? Dans la mesure où les opérations de renforcement des capacités du Canada se produisent dans un cadre multilatéral, la principale question pour le Canada est comment la pandémie a-t-elle affectée les opérations alliées de renforcement des capacités. La pandémie a entraîné une réduction générale des opérations d'assistance à la sécurité. Le modèle d'opérations qui a été le plus touché semble refléter deux critères : les priorités de santé publique et les priorités de politique étrangère. Au cours de l'année prochaine, nous pouvons nous attendre à une nouvelle perturbation de ces activités avec de nouvelles vagues du virus. À plus long terme, les dommages économiques et les limites qui en découlent pour les budgets de la défense peuvent rendre le renforcement des capacités moins attrayant (s'il est considéré comme inessentiel) ou plus intéressant (s'il est considéré comme un bon moyen de poursuivre des intérêts géostratégiques à un coût relativement faible, par rapport à des interventions plus robustes). Dans tous les cas, les activités de formation militaire des alliés sont susceptibles de se recentrer sur les missions essentielles. Le Canada devra faire face à des pressions pour maintenir ses capacités en Lettonie et en Ukraine, mais il pourrait manquer de plus en plus de structures multilatérales pour ce type d’opérations dans d'autres contextes. L’assistance à la sécurité avant la pandémie L'assistance à la sécurité est une activité clé de renforcement des capacités pour les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC), qui est de plus en plus sollicitée depuis la fin de la participation canadienne en Afghanistan. Ce changement a été d'une grande importance pour les alliés du Canada au cours des dix dernières années. Sous l'effet des contraintes budgétaires qui ont suivi la crise financière de 2008, et face à l'épuisement des déploiements à grande échelle, plusieurs États ont recentré leur manière de faire face à la lutte contre les insurrections, le terrorisme et d'autres problèmes de sécurité, visant à moins utiliser leurs propres forces et à renforcer davantage les forces des partenaires. Durant cette même période, la Russie et la Chine se sont fait de plus en plus présentes dans le domaine du renforcement des capacités, notamment en Afrique subsaharienne. L’étendue des impacts de ces opérations n’est pas très claire. Certaines recherches suggèrent que la formation façonne effectivement les normes et valeurs dominantes des armées locales. D'autres recherches mettent en évidence ses conséquences involontaires, comme un lien entre la participation au programme d'éducation et de formation militaire internationale des États-Unis et les coups d'État. D'autres recherches encore suggèrent que le renforcement des capacités a probablement peu d'effet dans la lutte contre l'insurrection et le terrorisme en particulier, car il est facilement compromis par les autorités locales qui détournent la formation, les armes et les fournitures au profit de loyalistes politiques ou qui ne permettent pas aux officiers et aux soldats formés d’appliquer réellement leur formation. Indépendamment de ces préoccupations, les opérations de renforcement des capacités ont toutefois été un outil politique populaire, en partie parce qu'elles indiquent la volonté de faire sa part sans assumer un fardeau excessif. La réduction des renforcements de capacités dans le cadre de la pandémie : un signal des priorités ?  Puis la pandémie a frappé. La COVID-19 a conduit à l'ajournement de certaines activités de renforcement des capacités et à la réduction d'autres. Le Canada était loin d'être le seul à réagir ainsi. Les FAC, aux côtés de leurs alliés de l'OTAN, ont suspendu leurs activités de formation en Irak (opération IMPACT). Le Canada a également retiré son personnel en Ukraine (UNIFIER), et a reporté une session de formation au Niger (NABERIUS). De même, les États-Unis ont annulé des exercices dans le monde entier, y compris avec des partenaires clés comme la Corée du Sud et Israël, et le Royaume-Uni a suspendu ses activités de formation au Kenya. Par ailleurs, certains autres États ont poursuivi leurs activités de renforcement des capacités. La France a notamment maintenu l'opération Barkhane au Sahel pleinement opérationnelle, et la Chine a souligné qu'un exercice d'entraînement au Cambodge en mars et avril s'est déroulé comme prévu. Deux logiques sous-tendent ces décisions : la santé publique et les priorités de politique étrangère. Tout d'abord, la situation locale de la pandémie de coronavirus est à l'origine de plusieurs de ces décisions. Un exemple extrême comme la décision des États-Unis, fin mars, de suspendre toutes les activités de formation dans tout pays désigné comme niveau d'alerte 2 ou 3 par les Centers for Disease Control (CDC). En substance, dans l'urgence, ils ont adopté un critère de santé publique global, confié à une agence de santé publique, plutôt que de tenir compte des intérêts de politique étrangère de chaque pays. Deuxièmement, cependant, ces décisions reflètent dans une large mesure les priorités des États en matière de formation. Si l'OTAN a suspendu ses activités de formation en Irak le 20 mars, mais a maintenu certaines activités de formation dans les États baltes et en Pologne, il est difficile de voir autre chose qu’une alliance pleinement consciente de ses priorités, signalant aux pays membres un engagement en première ligne avec la Russie pour les opérations hors zone. Par conséquent, le fait de maintenir certaines missions de renforcement des capacités essentiellement intactes témoigne d'un engagement, et est considéré comme tel. C'est le cas de l'opération Barkhane, que la France a placée au centre de sa politique étrangère en Afrique. De même, la Chine a montré relativement publiquement qu'elle maintenait son opération de formation au Cambodge alors même qu'elle gardait une grande partie de son propre pays fermée en raison de la pandémie. Ce signal démontre à la fois un engagement particulier envers un de ses partenaires, mais révèle aussi que la Chine - et le Cambodge - ne se souciait pas particulièrement de la maladie. Certains des choix du Canada ont révélé ses propres priorités. Par exemple, le 26 mars, le jour où le retrait de l'opération UNIFIER a été annoncé, la Lettonie avait plus de cas de COVID-19 confirmés que l'Ukraine. En maintenant l’opération REASSURANCE tout en retirant temporairement l'UNIFIER, le Canada a indiqué que le renforcement des capacités en Ukraine n'est pas aussi important pour celui en Lettonie. Quelle qu’en soit l’intention, ce choix reflète l'engagement du Canada envers un de ses alliés à l'OTAN, tout en envoyant un signal clair à cet effet. Cela nous rappelle que la préoccupation centrale des opérations de renforcement des capacités du Canada est ce que font ses alliés. Ces opérations se déroulent presque toujours dans un cadre plus large, que ce soit l'ONU, l'OTAN ou un partenariat ad hoc. La décision du Canada en Irak s'inscrit donc dans le cadre d'une décision plus large de l'OTAN. Un observateur extérieur peut raisonnablement conclure que le Canada effectue du renforcement des capacités principalement pour remplir ses engagements dans le cadre d'une alliance et, en second lieu, pour établir des relations avec des armées partenaires spécifiques. Les impacts de la COVID-19 sur le renforcement des capacités à court et moyen terme Étant donné que les efforts de renforcement des capacités du Canada s'inscrivent dans le cadre d'efforts multilatéraux plus larges, utilisés par le Canada pour contribuer aux efforts collectifs, la question clé pour l'avenir est de savoir ce que ses partenaires en formation, comme ses alliés de l'OTAN, vont faire. Pour s'en faire une idée, il faut formuler quelques hypothèses sur la pandémie et ses effets globaux au cours de l'année prochaine. Les hypothèses suivantes semblent raisonnables : La pandémie perdurera. Il faudra au moins jusqu'à la mi-2021 pour mettre au point un vaccin fiable, et même à ce moment-là, il faudra encore de nombreux mois pour que ce vaccin soit largement disponible. Les décideurs politiques du monde entier vont essayer de trouver des moyens de prévenir la prochaine pandémie et de s'y préparer, en faisant par exemple preuve d'une plus grande vigilance, d'une plus grande prudence en matière de voyages et de chaînes d'approvisionnement, et d'une plus grande volonté d'adopter plus rapidement des restrictions d'urgence lorsqu'une nouvelle épidémie se déclare. Ces hypothèses impliquent que l'inquiétude concernant les opérations de renforcement des capacités ne disparaîtra pas. Il pourrait bien y avoir de futures vagues de suspensions d'opérations. Cela continuera à rendre ces opérations plus difficiles à organiser et à planifier, moins fiables et moins attrayantes. Il existe des mesures d'atténuation que le Canada et d'autres États ont déjà mis en place et peuvent étendre, telles que la quarantaine avant déploiement, les contrôles sanitaires intensifs et la réduction de certaines activités de formation. Mais beaucoup dépendra de la confiance entre l'État formateur et le gouvernement hôte, qui devront tous deux suivre des pratiques de santé publique rigoureuses. Le Canada devra négocier les termes des protocoles sanitaires de ces missions avec les partenaires locaux afin de maintenir la confiance avec les pays bénéficiaires et les partenaires multilatéraux. Dans le cas contraire, le soutien à ces déploiements diminuera tant dans le pays d'origine que dans le pays bénéficiaire. Même dans ce cas, il n'y a aucune garantie qu'une opération de renforcement des capacités sera menée. Les voyages et les interactions apparemment inutiles seront confrontés à un scepticisme généralisé et devront être justifié pendant un certain temps. En cas d'épidémie locale, les opérations futures pourraient facilement être suspendues à tout instant. Les conséquences seront sans doute problématiques pour les États-Unis. En effet, la complexité bureaucratique rend la mise en place d'opérations de formation difficile, même quand les conditions sont bonnes. En effet, un planificateur militaire doit rassembler des fonds provenant de nombreux programmes différents avec des autorisations différentes du Congrès, chacun ayant leurs propres exigences et délais. Il faut ajouter à cela la suspension des opérations de formation, et la perturbation administrative qui en découle, ce qui rendra la formation assez difficile à planifier. Le MDN doit se préparer à la confusion de son partenaire américain dans les opérations de formation avec lesquelles il s'associe aux États-Unis. Plus généralement, au cours de l'année à venir, le Canada devrait être prêt à ce que ses principaux partenaires multilatéraux fassent moins d’opérations de renforcement des capacités. En ajoutant les critères de santé publique aux priorités de la politique étrangère, les alliés du Canada à l'OTAN - à quelques exceptions près, comme la France au Sahel - continueront probablement à réorienter le renforcement des capacités loin des contextes de contre-insurrection dans des zones comme l'Irak et à se concentrer sur la préservation des activités de renforcement des capacités parmi les membres de l'OTAN et les principaux pays non-membres comme l'Ukraine. Certaines suspensions peuvent aller encore plus loin. Lors des prochaines vagues de la pandémie, le Canada devrait être prêt à ce que ses principaux alliés prennent des décisions concernant leurs opérations sur la base des seuls critères de santé publique, comme l'ont fait les États-Unis, et non sur la base d'un équilibre des intérêts de politique étrangère. Cela limitera les contextes multilatéraux dans lesquels le Canada peut procéder au renforcement des capacités et dans lesquels il est impératif qu'il le fasse dans le cadre de sa politique étrangère. Afin de maintenir le renforcement des capacités dans d'autres contextes, le Canada devra se préparer à le faire avec une faible participation de ses alliés. Les conséquences à plus long terme de la pandémie : renforcement des capacités et COVID-19 dans un contexte géostratégique changeant L'analyse des impacts probables de COVID-19 à long terme nécessite des hypothèses plus larges. Ce qui suit semble réaliste : Avec la crise économique, il y aura une pression importante et croissante pour réduire les budgets militaires, bien que ceux-ci puissent être reportés pendant un certain temps par le financement du déficit en raison des faibles taux d'intérêt. La concurrence géopolitique entre la Chine, la Russie et les États-Unis va s'aggraver. Malheureusement, ces hypothèses ne permettent pas encore de prédire clairement comment les autres États s'engageront dans le renforcement des capacités. Deux scénarios sont plausibles, découlant des deux premières hypothèses. Premièrement, les réductions peuvent affecter les opérations de renforcement des capacités de manière disproportionnée, car elles peuvent être considérées comme étant non essentielles par rapport à d'autres fonctions de défense (en plus des risques sanitaires associés au fait d’avoir des membres des forces armées de différents pays à proximité les uns des autres). Toutefois, les opérations de renforcement des capacités pourraient bien devenir plus populaires dans les prochaines années, en particulier si la rivalité géostratégique s'intensifie et si les intérêts des États-Unis et d'autres États s'affrontent dans différents pays. Les préoccupations relatives aux budgets de la défense peuvent en fait épargner le renforcement des capacités ou même le rendre plus attrayant, tout comme les limites des ressources ont contribué à faire passer les missions contre-insurrectionnelles à grande échelle au renforcement des capacités durant les deux premières décennies des années 2000. Les grandes puissances qui poursuivent des rivalités géopolitiques peuvent chercher des moyens relativement peu coûteux de le faire et ne pas engager leurs forces dans des interventions directes coûteuses, dangereuses et potentiellement déstabilisatrices. Le renforcement des capacités avec des mandataires locaux peut être un outil politique de ce type, intéressant pour des États comme la Chine, la Russie, les États-Unis, la France et la Grande-Bretagne qui cherchent à affirmer leur pertinence et leur influence dans divers pays. Dans ce scénario, les alliés du Canada sont susceptibles de demander au Canada d'en faire plus. ## La crédibilité d’abord : repenser la stratégie canadienne face à l’hostilité américaine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-credibilite-dabord-repenser-la-strategie-canadienne-face-a-lhostilite-americaine/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Introduction : le maillon manquant de la stratégie canadienne Le débat stratégique canadien est monopolisé par le réarmement, la dissuasion militaire et la gestion des alliances. Ces priorités sont légitimes et cette note ne les remet pas en question : le réarmement constitue la base de toute posture stratégique crédible, et les engagements envers l'OTAN lient le Canada à des obligations qui conditionnent son accès aux cercles de décision occidentaux. Mais cette équation est incomplète. Elle occulte le maillon qui conditionne l'efficacité de l'ensemble : la crédibilité internationale du Canada, c'est-à-dire la perception que ses alliés (et le reste de la communauté internationale) ont de sa fiabilité, de la cohérence de sa politique étrangère et de la lisibilité de son processus décisionnel. L'argument central de cette note est le suivant : la crédibilité multilatérale du Canada détermine directement la perception que les États-Unis ont de lui comme interlocuteur, ce qui conditionne en retour la qualité de sa diplomatie bilatérale et l'efficacité de ses leviers de négociation. Cette chaîne causale est réversible, volatile et relationnelle. Un Canada perçu comme fiable et cohérent par ses alliés pèse davantage à Washington. Un Canada dont le processus décisionnel est illisible s'affaiblit simultanément auprès de ses partenaires et auprès de l'hégémon qu'il cherche à influencer. La séquence 2024-2026 en offre la démonstration empirique la plus saisissante depuis 2003. La crédibilité stratégique come variable composite : contribution, réciprocité, cohérence et identité Pour une puissance moyenne comme le Canada, dont la dépendance militaire structurelle envers les États-Unis est irréductible à court terme, la crédibilité internationale constitue la ressource stratégique centrale. La littérature sur la recherche de statut souligne que la reconnaissance internationale repose sur des dynamiques sociales et intersubjectives, dans lesquelles les interactions diplomatiques et la participation institutionnelle jouent un rôle central. Dans ce cadre, les travaux sur les puissances moyennes montrent que des États comme le Canada ont historiquement compensé leurs limites matérielles par des stratégies de diplomatie de niche fondées sur le multilatéralisme et la médiation. Enfin, l’approche du pouvoir normatif met en évidence la capacité de certains acteurs à influencer les normes internationales à travers la diffusion de valeurs et de pratiques spécifiques. L'analyse de la campagne libyenne de l'OTAN a confirmé cette logique sur le plan opérationnel : l'influence canadienne au sein de l'OTAN en 2011 était directement proportionnelle à la cohérence et à la visibilité de sa contribution, indépendamment de sa puissance matérielle. Ces cadres sont nécessaires mais insuffisants pour rendre compte de ce qui distingue une posture normative avec dissuasion d'une posture normative sans dissuasion. Pour compléter l'analyse, il convient de décomposer la crédibilité stratégique en trois conditions nécessaires mais insuffisantes séparément, dont l'articulation produit la dissuasion indirecte caractéristique d'une puissance moyenne. La première condition est la contribution active : peser par la valeur ajoutée là où les grandes puissances sont absentes, défaillantes ou illégitimes. C'est la dimension instrumentale de la crédibilité. Pour exister dans les calculs stratégiques des autres acteurs, il faut être présent et utile dans les espaces que les grandes puissances négligent. La contribution warfare désigne cette logique : non pas s'impliquer pour être visible, mais s'impliquer pour être indispensable, ce qui conditionne l'accès aux espaces de décision et la capacité d'influence sur les normes qui y sont produites. La deuxième condition est la réciprocité explicite : signaler qu’il existe des coûts à certaines demandes et que certaines positions ne seront pas abandonnées sous pression. Sans cette dimension, la contribution relève de la coopération plutôt que de la dissuasion. Comme le montre l’analyse stratégique des engagements, une déclaration qui n’implique aucun coût anticipé ne modifie pas les calculs de l’adversaire, puisqu’elle peut être abandonnée sans conséquence. À l’inverse, un engagement devient crédible lorsque le coût de sa violation est perçu comme réel par l’interlocuteur. Pour une puissance moyenne confrontée à une puissance coercitive, cette réciprocité explicite constitue la condition qui transforme une contribution en dissuasion indirecte. La troisième condition est la cohérence procédurale : la capacité à maintenir des positions stables et coordonnées dans le temps et sous pression. Elle concerne la construction interne de la politique étrangère et de défense, notamment la coordination entre le premier ministre, le ministère des Affaires étrangères et le ministère de la Défense nationale, ainsi que la lisibilité de la communication extérieure. Sans cohérence procédurale, la contribution devient inconstante et la réciprocité devient imprévisible, ce qui revient, dans les calculs des autres acteurs, à une absence de crédibilité effective. Les trois conditions précédentes relèvent d'une perspective stratégique de la réputation : la crédibilité comme outil de maintien des intérêts de sécurité et de coopération. Mais la réputation opère aussi à un second niveau, dit constitutif : les décideurs responsables de la politique étrangère sont soucieux de leur image de soi et cherchent à éviter ce que la littérature nomme l'insécurité identitaire. Cette dimension explique pourquoi l'incohérence procédurale ne résulte pas seulement de défaillances organisationnelles mais d'une tension entre la posture proclamée et les contraintes réelles de la situation : les décideurs oscillent lorsque leur image de soi entre en contradiction avec les exigences du moment. De plus, les préoccupations de réputation sont d'autant plus déterminantes dans les délibérations que le niveau de cohésion du groupe décisionnel est élevé. Cette observation enrichit la troisième condition en lui donnant un fondement causal précis : la cohérence procédurale dépend non seulement de la coordination formelle entre institutions mais de la cohésion identitaire du groupe composé par le premier ministre et ses principaux conseillers, c'est-à-dire de leur capacité à partager une résolution commune de la tension entre posture proclamée et contraintes conjoncturelles. La chaîne causale centrale de cette note peut être formulée ainsi : contribution active combinée à une réciprocité explicite et à une cohérence procédurale ancrée dans la cohésion identitaire du groupe décisionnel produit de la crédibilité stratégique. Cette crédibilité génère de la prévisibilité, qui intègre le Canada dans les calculs de ses alliés comme acteur fiable. Cette intégration constitue le levier de négociation canadien face à la coercition américaine, et fonctionne comme une forme de dissuasion indirecte. Les trois conditions sont analytiquement indépendantes et leur absence produit des défaillances différentes : un État qui contribue sans réciprocité est exploitable ; un État qui affiche une réciprocité sans cohérence procédurale est imprévisible ; un État dont le groupe décisionnel manque de cohésion identitaire produira de l'incohérence même avec de bonnes intentions stratégiques. La chaîne causale à l’épreuve des faits Une posture sans dissuasion Pour comprendre pourquoi la séquence Trudeau-Trump a produit les résultats qu'elle a produits, il faut identifier laquelle des trois conditions faisait défaut. Élu en 2015 en promettant un retour vers l'internationalisme libéral après une décennie de gouvernement conservateur, Trudeau déclara dès sa victoire « Canada is back ». Sa politique étrangère reposait sur une prémisse structurellement fragile : la coopération comme finalité, sans logique de réciprocité ni de coût imposé aux acteurs qui franchissaient des lignes. Trudeau avait confié à des alliés de l'OTAN que le Canada n'atteindrait jamais l'objectif de 2% du PIB en défense — confidence révélée en avril 2023 via des documents du Pentagone fuités au Washington Post, soit huit ans après son élection, aveu tardif mais public d'une posture sans dissuasion. La promesse de « jusqu’à » 600 soldats pour les missions de paix onusiennes — formulation délibérément plaffonnée que les autres gouvernements évitaient — s’est traduite par un déploiement pic d’environ 200 personnels au Mali pendant un an (2018-2019), soit environ un tiers du plafond annoncé, avant de retomber à des niveaux marginaux. Sur l’ensemble du mandat Trudeau, la contribution mensuelle moyenne en personnels uniformisés fut de 78 — exactement la moitié de celle du gouvernement Harper. Le fossé entre la rhétorique du réengagement et les contributions effectives était réel et documenté, mais il résultait autant de contraintes institutionnelles — priorité accordée à l’OTAN et à la Lettonie, prudence post-Afghanistan, missions onusiennes devenues dangereuses — que d’un manque de volonté politique. La perception qui en découlait était cependant structurelle : le Canada participait aux institutions sans en payer le prix. En termes schellingiens, sa posture relevait du cheap talk, des déclarations sans mécanisme de réciprocité et sans signal crédible de résistance. Pour Trump, qui opère en logique transactionnelle de force, un interlocuteur dont la stratégie repose sur les normes et la bonne volonté sans contrepartie constitue une cible structurellement accessible. Sur le plan constitutif, l'image de soi progressiste du Canada était incompatible avec la logique de réciprocité qu'exigeait la relation avec Trump, et cette tension non résolue se traduisait en incapacité à tenir des positions coûteuses. L'ingérence américaine et ses implications souveraines. Cette vulnérabilité a été exploitée avec une précision rarement déployée envers d'autres alliés. Au-delà des menaces tarifaires et de la rhétorique d'annexion, l'administration Trump a toléré et encouragé une ingérence directe dans la cohésion constitutionnelle du Canada. Le secrétaire au Trésor Scott Bessent a publiquement déclaré que l'Alberta serait un partenaire naturel des États-Unis, tandis que des fonctionnaires du Département d'État ont rencontré à plusieurs reprises des représentants de l'Alberta Prosperity Project. The Walrus a documenté comment cette ingérence a soulevé des qualifications aussi graves que trahison et sédition dans le débat public, et tracé un parallèle avec la déstabilisation russe du Donbas en 2014. La sénatrice Paula Simon a formulé la préoccupation directement : « ce dont je m'inquiète le plus maintenant, c'est de l'ingérence étrangère des États-Unis. » C'est précisément parce que la posture Trudeau n'avait construit ni réciprocité ni cohérence procédurale que cette exploitation était possible. L'absence d’engagement crédible rendait le Canada vulnérable à une coercition ciblant sa cohésion constitutionnelle elle-même. Carney et la reconstruction : la réciprocité comme rupture conceptuelle Ce que le successeur de Justin Trudeau, Mark Carney introduisit que son prédécesseur n'avait pas, c'était la deuxième condition manquante : une logique de réciprocité explicite. La formule prononcée à la Maison-Blanche en mai 2025 (« as you know from real estate, there are some places that are never for sale ») n'est pas une déclaration normative : c'est un signal de coût au sens schellingien. Elle signifie que certaines demandes ont un prix et que certaines positions ne seront pas abandonnées. Le signal fut reçu : Trump modifia le ton et déclara avoir beaucoup de respect pour le nouveau premier ministre. Ce changement ne signifie pas que la pression américaine disparut car Trump continua de revisiter la rhétorique du 51ème État à plusieurs reprises, et Carney ne répondit pas systématiquement. C'est le passage du cheap talk au credible commitment qui modifia les termes de la relation asymétrique. Sur le plan constitutif, Carney avait aussi résolu la tension identitaire que Trudeau n'avait pas su gérer : son profil d'économiste international lui permettait d'assumer simultanément l'image de leader de puissance moyenne autonome et celle d'interlocuteur sérieux pour Washington, sans que ces deux identités entrent en contradiction. Un événement très récent illustre la dynamique de ce mécanisme dans sa dimension symbolique. Le 6 avril 2026, des extraits d'un livre à paraître du biographe royal britannique Robert Hardman révèlent que Trump aurait reconnu en privé l'improbabilité de l'annexion du Canada : « I suppose Canadians have got 200 years of history and all that, 'Oh, Canada' thing. You can't deal with that in three-and-a-half years. I guess it's not going to happen. » Ce recul, attribué par Hardman au respect de Trump envers le roi Charles III et la monarchie canadienne, illustre le mécanisme en sens inverse : ce qui a modifié les calculs de Trump n'est pas la capacité militaire canadienne, c'est un signal de statut — l'identité souveraine, l'histoire, la couronne. C'est de la crédibilité structurelle. Il convient cependant de nuancer : ce recul est basé sur un calcul de faisabilité conjoncturel (« three-and-a-half years ») et non sur une modification durable des intentions américaines. Carney reconstitua également la première condition en entreprenant une diplomatie multilatérale active : partenariat stratégique avec la Chine (21 accords, première visite depuis 2017, réduction des tarifs sur le canola, objectif d'augmenter les exportations de 50% d'ici 2030) ; partenariat stratégique avec l'Inde (accord Cameco de 2,6 milliards de dollars, première visite bilatérale depuis 2018, négociations CEPA) ; partenariat de défense et de sécurité avec l'Union européenne, intégration au programme SAFE, 12 accords sur quatre continents en un an. Le discours de Davos du 20 janvier 2026 synthétise cette stratégie : coalitions ad hoc par dossier, réseau de connexions multilatérales, posture de puissance moyenne active. CIVICUS a cependant relevé que l'approche ignorait les voix du Sud global, limite programmatique réelle à la portée de la stratégie. Par ailleurs, la proactivité diplomatique de Carney présente une limite que les communications officielles canadiennes révèlent directement. Le Bureau du Premier ministre désigne sous le même terme de 'partenariat stratégique' aussi bien la relation avec la Chine — concurrent systémique appuyant diplomatiquement la Russie — que celle avec le Qatar ou la Corée du Sud, avec lesquels le Canada entretient des accords de défense réels fondés sur des valeurs partagées. Cette désignation identique pour des relations de nature incompatible n'est pas un problème de formulation : elle signale une absence de hiérarchisation des priorités dans le langage officiel, ce qui affaiblit la lisibilité de la posture canadienne et produit exactement le type d'ambiguïté que la troisième condition cherche à éviter. Mars 2026 : la défaillance de la troisième condition La crise iranienne révèle que si Carney a reconstruit les deux premières conditions, la troisième reste le maillon faible. Quatre positions se succédèrent en une semaine : soutien initial aux frappes, soutien avec regret depuis l'Australie, impossibilité d'exclure catégoriquement une participation militaire, puis affirmation que le Canada ne participera jamais à l'offensive. Ces revirements furent aggravés par une coordination défaillante : la ministre Anand, depuis New Delhi, appelait toutes les parties à respecter les règles de l'engagement international, signal incompatible avec le soutien initial du premier ministre. Des experts qualifièrent la position de labyrinthe de contradictions, et Al Jazeera formula le verdict suivant : « when Washington whistles, Ottawa salutes. » En termes analytiques, l'absence de cohérence procédurale a neutralisé les deux autres conditions : la contribution active et la réciprocité signalée à Davos sont devenues illisibles parce que le processus décisionnel qui devait les soutenir était défaillant. Sur le plan constitutif, les signaux divergents entre le premier ministre, la ministre des Affaires étrangères et le ministre de la Défense reflètent une insuffisance de cohésion identitaire au sein du groupe décisionnel face à une crise de haute intensité : chacun gérait différemment la tension entre l'image de puissance moyenne autonome construite à Davos et les contraintes imposées par la pression américaine, sans résolution collective de cette tension. Les positions oscillantes qui en résultent sont le symptôme observable d'une insécurité identitaire non résolue au niveau du cabinet. Le Royaume-Uni, la France, l’Allemagne et l’Espagne ont refusé de participer à l’action offensive de l’administration Trump, maintenant une position distincte fondée sur le droit international sans rompre leurs alliances. C’est précisément la posture que Carney avait appelé à construire à Davos. Le Canada avait les relations institutionnelles pour adopter une position similaire. Ne pas l’avoir fait constitue un signal de cheap talk qui fragilise simultanément la réciprocité et la crédibilité multilatérale. Il serait cependant analytiquement inexact d'affirmer que cet épisode a effacé l'ensemble du capital constitué. La crise iranienne est beaucoup trop récente pour en tirer conclusions. Les partenariats diversifiés, la crédibilité personnelle de Carney et la reconnaissance internationale du discours de Davos ne sont pas annulés par une séquence de défaillance décisionnelle. Ce que mars 2026 révèle, c'est la volatilité de la troisième condition et le risque de répétition dès lors que la cohésion identitaire du groupe décisionnel est mise à l'épreuve d'une crise de haute intensité. Implications stratégiques : consolider les trois conditions L'analyse qui précède génère des recommandations organisées autour des trois conditions de la crédibilité stratégique. Consolider la contribution active exige de maintenir et d'approfondir la proactivité diplomatique engagée depuis 2025, mais aussi d'y investir structurellement là où les espaces sont vacants. Le Canada est le seul pays du G7 sans ambassade permanente à Bagdad, le financement de sa Stratégie pour le Moyen-Orient a pris fin en avril 2025, et l'Oman a occupé le créneau médiateur que le Canada aurait pu revendiquer lors de la crise iranienne. Les 37 millions de dollars d'aide humanitaire pour le Liban annoncés en mars 2026 illustrent la capacité de mobilisation rapide mais ne constituent pas une présence structurelle. La Fondation Asie Pacifique souligne que les partenariats indo-pacifiques restent fragiles tant que les engagements ne sont pas consolidés dans la durée. S'impliquer pour être indispensable, c'est la logique de la contribution warfare qui transforme la présence en levier stratégique réel. Maintenir la réciprocité explicite signifie faire de la logique de coût une grammaire permanente de la politique étrangère et non un attribut personnel du premier ministre en poste. Cela exige que le réarmement soit accompagné d'une doctrine claire sur les conditions de la participation canadienne aux opérations et aux coalitions, de sorte que les partenaires et les adversaires puissent anticiper les positions canadiennes et les intégrer dans leurs calculs. Brookings note que Carney cherche à négocier depuis une position de force, mais cette position suppose que les engagements soient tenus quand ils ont un coût, ce que mars 2026 n'a pas confirmé. Rétablir la cohérence procédurale est la recommandation la plus urgente, et elle implique les deux dimensions identifiées dans ce cadre. Sur le plan organisationnel, la coordination entre le cabinet du premier ministre, le ministère des Affaires étrangères et le ministère de la Défense nationale doit être renforcée pour que les positions canadiennes soient produites de manière unifiée avant d'être communiquées. Sur le plan constitutif, le groupe décisionnel doit partager une résolution commune de la tension entre posture proclamée et contraintes structurelles, de sorte que la pression américaine ne produise pas d'oscillations observables entre les membres du cabinet. Ce que Trudeau avait comme défaut structurel, une posture sans réciprocité, Carney risque de le reproduire sous une autre forme, une posture de réciprocité sans cohésion identitaire du groupe décisionnel. Dans les deux cas, le résultat observable est le même : un Canada que la pression peut réduire à la loyauté absolue. Le réarmement est nécessaire et constitue la base de toute posture stratégique crédible. Mais son efficacité est conditionnée par la crédibilité politique qui lui donne sens. Un Canada qui se réarme sans coordonner sa politique étrangère, qui prononce des discours de principes sans les assumer sous pression, et qui aspire à des coalitions de puissances moyennes sans en payer le coût, n'obtiendra pas de ses capacités militaires accrues un levier proportionnel à l'investissement consenti. La crédibilité d'abord, parce que c'est elle qui transforme la puissance en influence, et l'influence en autonomie stratégique réelle pour une puissance moyenne. Crédit image: CC BY 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons. ## La crise au Mali et ses dimensions internationales – Table ronde URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-crise-au-mali-et-ses-dimensions-internationales-table-ronde/ Modified: 2022-10-21 > Le Mali est au centre des conflits dans le Sahel depuis maintenant une décennie. Il se trouve à un moment charnière: crises politiques... Le Mali est au centre des conflits dans le Sahel depuis maintenant une décennie. Il se trouve à un moment charnière: crises politiques, transformations des interventions internationales, de questions profondes par rapport à l’opération de paix MINUSMA. Comment comprendre ces changements? Quelles en sont les conséquences pour le Mali, la région, les interventions internationales et les opérations de paix? Participant.es : Adib Bencherif, Université de Sherbrooke Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal – Saint-Jean Ousmane Diallo, Amnesty International Dirk Druet, Université McGill Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Bishop’s University Mamoudou Gazibo, Université de Montréal Présidente :Marie-Joëlle Zahar ## La fin de l’ère Assad en Syrie : Entre pressions internationales et défis intérieurs URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-fin-de-lere-assad-en-syrie-entre-pressions-internationales-et-defis-interieurs/ Modified: 2025-01-13 > La fin de l'ère Assad en Syrie : Entre pressions internationales et défis intérieurs. Par Gianmarco Fontana. (La fin de l'ère Assad en Syrie : Entre pressions internationales et défis intérieurs - Gianmarco Fontana) Après des années d'impasse, la guerre civile syrienne est revenue sur le devant de la scène internationale. Au cours des deux dernières semaines, le pays a été le théâtre d'une série d'événements sans précédent qui ont bouleversé son paysage politique et qui ont abouti à la chute du régime de Bachar el-Assad dans la nuit du dimanche 8 décembre. Profitant de l'instabilité et de l'incertitude, une coalition diversifiée de rebelles a lancé une offensive qui a débuté dans les centres urbains du nord - Idlib et Alep - et a rapidement progressé vers Damas. L'effondrement rapide du gouvernement de Bachar el-Assad marque la fin de plus de cinq décennies de pouvoir centralisé et coercitif de la famille Assad. Ces développements inattendus s'inscrivent dans un contexte plus large qui englobe des dimensions nationales, régionales et internationales. Une analyse approfondie de ces facteurs est essentielle pour comprendre les implications de ce bouleversement et ce que l'avenir pourrait réserver à la Syrie, qui s'engage dans une transition potentielle vers un nouveau modèle de gouvernance. Ce rapport examine les facteurs géopolitiques et nationaux qui ont conduit à ces événements transformateurs, qui ont interrompu cinquante ans de régime autocratique et plus de 14 ans de conflit. Cette nouvelle voie intérieure pour le pays doit être analysée à travers les questions d'ordre régional et international, car l'imbrication des dimensions nationales et internationales représente le caractère unique du cas syrien. Du plan intérieur... Le régime Assad, établi après le coup d'État de Hafiz al-Assad en 1970 et dirigé par Bashar al-Assad depuis 2000, se caractérise à la fois par la continuité et le changement par rapport à son prédécesseur. Ce régime se caractérise par un fort personnalisme, des élites soigneusement sélectionnées et fidèles au président, un vaste appareil de contrôle et de répression, l'exclusion des minorités de la gouvernance et un mépris des droits de l'homme. Les réformes économiques et sociales ont été largement absentes, ce qui a alimenté un mécontentement généralisé dans le pays. L'arrivée au pouvoir de Bachar al-Assad en 2000 a d'abord suscité des espoirs de réforme. Après trente ans de règne sans partage de Hafiz al-Assad, beaucoup considéraient le jeune Assad, avec son éducation occidentale et son image moderne, comme un catalyseur potentiel de changement. Au début de son mandat, Bachar a réussi à positionner la Syrie entre deux blocs : le « bloc occidental », représenté par la France - l'ancien dirigeant colonial du pays - et les États-Unis, et le « bloc oriental », composé de partenaires de longue date tels que la Russie et l'Iran. Ce jeu d'équilibre diplomatique a été de courte durée, les espoirs de modernisation s'estompant au milieu des années 2000 après le « printemps de Damas ». L'optimisme qui a brièvement émergé pendant le « Printemps de Damas » a cédé la place à une nouvelle frustration publique, préparant le terrain pour les soulèvements de 2011. Ce mécontentement a atteint un point de basculement en mars 2011, lorsque des manifestations civiles ont éclaté dans le cadre d'une vague plus large de soulèvements dans toute la région. Ce que l'on appelle le « printemps arabe » - une expression souvent rejetée par les spécialistes parce qu'elle simplifie à l'excès et néglige les luttes politiques qui se déroulaient depuis longtemps dans les sociétés arabes bien avant 2011 - a servi de toile de fond aux Syriens pour exiger des réformes. ... aux facteurs internationaux : l'internationalisation du conflit Les manifestations de 2011 contre le régime Assad, motivées par des griefs généralisés concernant la corruption, la stagnation économique, les divisions sectaires et l'exclusion politique, ont rapidement fait l'objet d'une répression brutale. Cette réaction a fragmenté l'opposition et empêché une mobilisation nationale coordonnée. La stratégie du régime consistant à diviser pour régner s'est avérée essentielle pour étouffer la dissidence. Dès l'été 2011, des fissures sont apparues au sein des forces de sécurité d'Assad. D'importantes défections au sein de l'armée syrienne ont conduit à la formation de l'Armée syrienne libre (ASL), une coalition de groupes d'opposition armés. Initialement axée sur la protection des civils contre les forces gouvernementales, l'ASL s'est progressivement orientée vers la libération des principaux centres urbains, notamment Homs, Suwayda, Idlib et Alep. Cependant, l'absence d'un leadership unifié et d'une stratégie cohérente a entravé leurs efforts, laissant l'opposition vulnérable aux divisions internes et aux manipulations externes. L'opposition fragmentée est rapidement devenue un champ de bataille pour les intérêts régionaux et internationaux. Alors que le régime d'Assad recevait un soutien militaire et financier constant de la part de Moscou et de Téhéran, l'opposition a bénéficié de l'appui de toute une série d'acteurs extérieurs. Les États-Unis et les pays européens ont apporté un soutien financier et diplomatique limité, mais ont évité toute implication militaire directe, craignant de répéter les erreurs de l'Afghanistan (2001), de l'Irak (2003) ou de la Libye contemporaine (après 2011). Dans le même temps, les États du Golfe tels que l'Arabie saoudite, les Émirats arabes unis et le Qatar ont soutenu les factions de l'opposition, bien que de manière incohérente en raison de rivalités internes. La Turquie, acteur régional majeur, a profité du conflit pour poursuivre ses intérêts stratégiques, en particulier dans le nord de la Syrie. L'émergence de l'État islamique (ISIS) entre 2014 et 2019 a ajouté une nouvelle couche de complexité au conflit, incitant une coalition internationale dirigée par les États-Unis à intervenir sous la bannière de la lutte contre le terrorisme. En 2020, un accord ténu entre la Russie et la Turquie a ramené un calme relatif dans le nord de la Syrie. Les efforts de normalisation, y compris la réintégration de la Syrie au sein de la Ligue arabe en 2023, semblaient indiquer une détente entre les puissances régionales. Toutefois, la flambée de violence d'octobre 2023, provoquée par un regain de tensions entre Israël et les groupes de résistance palestiniens, a ravivé l'instabilité régionale. Cet environnement instable a détourné l'attention des alliés d'Assad, ce qui a encore affaibli l'emprise de son régime sur le pouvoir. La Russie reste empêtrée dans sa guerre contre l'Ukraine, le Hezbollah a une trêve fragile avec Israël, et l'Iran est préoccupé par son programme régional plus large - principalement axé sur la préservation de la zone d'influence qui le relie à la Syrie, au Liban et au Hezbollah dans un effort pour dissuader le rival israélien. Ces dynamiques changeantes illustrent l'interconnexion profonde entre les bouleversements intérieurs et la géopolitique internationale au Moyen-Orient, où les intérêts et les identités des acteurs étatiques sont inextricablement liés. L'effet domino : La chute rapide de Bachar el-Assad Le pic d'instabilité intérieure et l'évolution de la dynamique régionale ont ouvert la voie à une série d'événements décisifs au cours des deux dernières semaines. Des groupes rebelles basés dans les villes d'Alep et d'Idlib, dans le nord du pays, ont lancé une offensive contre l'armée syrienne, affaiblie par des années de conflit et privée du soutien nécessaire de son allié russe. Les insurgés se sont rapidement emparés des principaux centres urbains du nord, notamment Alep et Idlib, avant de progresser vers le sud le long de l'autoroute M5, principal axe routier nord-sud de la Syrie. En quelques jours, ils ont pris le contrôle de Hama et de Homs, avant d'arriver à Damas entre le 7 et le 8 décembre. La chute rapide de Damas a marqué la fin du règne de Bachar el-Assad. Le président s'est réfugié en Russie, demandant l'asile à son plus puissant allié. Cette évolution dramatique a été facilitée par la Turquie, qui a longtemps maintenu une « zone tampon » dans le nord de la Syrie. Depuis 2020, les cellules antigouvernementales d'Idlib et d'Alep, dont beaucoup sont soutenues par la Turquie, ont établi un contrôle de facto sur la région. Cette proximité avec la frontière turque, combinée aux préoccupations d'Ankara concernant la présence kurde dans le nord-est de la Syrie et le fardeau que représente l'accueil de plus de trois millions de réfugiés syriens, a fait du nord de la Syrie un point central de la politique étrangère de la Turquie. La composition des forces antigouvernementales souligne la complexité de l'opposition. Bien que le terme « rebelles » soit souvent utilisé comme un descripteur général, ces groupes sont loin d'être homogènes. À Idlib et à Alep, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), un groupe djihadiste anciennement affilié à Al-Qaïda, a joué un rôle de premier plan aux côtés de factions soutenues par la Turquie, telles que l'Armée syrienne libre. Malgré leurs idéologies et leurs objectifs divergents, ces groupes se sont temporairement unis pour atteindre un objectif commun : l'éviction du régime d'Assad. Après le départ d'Assad, la Syrie est confrontée à une grande incertitude. Alors que les insurgés et les civils ont célébré la chute du régime qui avait régné d'une main de fer pendant plus de cinq décennies, des doutes subsistent quant à la capacité du pays à construire un modèle de gouvernance inclusif et stable. Cherchant à atténuer le risque de chaos, l'ancien premier ministre Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali et d'autres ministres sont restés en Syrie, assurant au public que les institutions de l'État continueraient à fonctionner pendant la transition. En coordination avec Abu Mohammad al-Julani, le chef du HTS, al-Jalali a nommé Mohammed al-Bashir à la tête d'un gouvernement de transition. M. Al-Bashir, qui a précédemment dirigé le gouvernement de salut syrien à Idlib, est chargé de superviser la transition jusqu'à ce que les conditions permettent la tenue d'élections libres et ouvertes à tous. La trajectoire politique de M. Al-Bashir reste incertaine, tout comme ses liens avec les dirigeants du HTS qui ont mené l'offensive depuis le nord. Auparavant, il occupait un poste de direction au sein de la société d'État Syrian Gas Company, qui fait partie du ministère du pétrole. Toutefois, depuis 2022, il a été ministre du développement, puis premier ministre, au sein de l'administration d'Idlib contrôlée par le HTS. Aujourd'hui, M. Al-Bashir est confronté au formidable défi que représente l'avenir de la Syrie. Son rôle consiste à favoriser le dialogue non seulement entre les diverses factions nationales du pays, mais aussi avec les acteurs internationaux qui s'investissent dans la trajectoire de la Syrie. Sa capacité à jouer un rôle de médiateur dans ces dynamiques complexes sera déterminante pour les perspectives de stabilité et de reconstruction du pays. L'actuel gouvernement de transition syrien comprend les mêmes ministres qui ont servi au sein du gouvernement de salut syrien (SSG), l'organe directeur de la région nord du pays qui échappe au contrôle du régime Assad depuis plusieurs années. Cette institution est affiliée à Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), le groupe responsable du lancement des récentes opérations spéciales il y a deux semaines. Le gouvernement de transition est chargé de maintenir le fonctionnement des institutions de l'État pendant au moins 18 mois, dont 6 mois pour rédiger une nouvelle constitution, jusqu'à la tenue de nouvelles élections. Malgré les célébrations généralisées parmi les Syriens dans leur pays et à l'étranger, les défis à venir sont immenses. Le retour de près de six millions de réfugiés sera déterminant pour la gouvernance du pays. La réforme des institutions de l'État, qui ont longtemps été vidées de leur substance pour servir un cercle étroit de pouvoir, nécessitera des réformes visant à favoriser l'inclusion et la représentation. En outre, le démantèlement du sectarisme ancré par des décennies de domination alaouite sera essentiel à l'établissement d'une société unifiée et équitable. La communauté alaouite, une branche du chiisme, constitue une minorité en Syrie, où environ 70 % de la population est sunnite. D'autres groupes, dont les Druzes, les Kurdes, les chrétiens et les chiites, contribuent également à la diversité du tissu social du pays. La famille Assad, qui fait partie de la communauté alaouite, a toujours tiré parti de son statut de minorité pour échapper à la marginalisation à laquelle ce groupe est généralement confronté dans la hiérarchie sociale syrienne. Depuis la présidence de Hafiz al-Assad, le régime a systématiquement exploité les tactiques sectaires pour fragmenter et affaiblir l'opposition, consolidant ainsi son emprise sur le pouvoir. Cette stratégie n'a toutefois pas eu d'effets bénéfiques pour l'ensemble de la communauté alaouite. Au contraire, le régime Assad a coopté de manière sélective des élites de diverses communautés, y compris des élites économiques sunnites, pour asseoir son autorité. Ces alliances révèlent à quel point les divisions sectaires visaient moins l'autonomisation des communautés que la consolidation pragmatique du pouvoir. La résilience du régime ne reposait pas uniquement sur le favoritisme sectaire, mais sur l'inclusion stratégique d'individus dont l'influence politique ou économique pouvait favoriser sa survie, indépendamment de leur affiliation sectaire. Ainsi, le sectarisme et la cooptation en Syrie ont fonctionné comme deux piliers interdépendants de la stratégie du régime Assad, illustrant comment les politiques identitaires ont été instrumentalisées pour maintenir le pouvoir plutôt que pour promouvoir les intérêts d'une communauté spécifique. Le chemin vers la reconstruction de la Syrie en tant qu'État cohésif, démocratique et prospère sera ardu, exigeant une navigation prudente dans des divisions politiques, sociales et économiques profondément enracinées. L'avenir de la Syrie et de la région MENA : L'avenir du contexte géopolitique Dans les circonstances actuelles, il est impératif d'analyser de manière critique les facteurs qui ont conduit à la fin de l'ère Assad, tout en considérant leurs implications pour la Syrie et le Moyen-Orient au sens large. Bien que les prévisions géopolitiques soient par nature incertaines, l'exploration des conséquences régionales potentielles fournit des indications précieuses. Parmi les acteurs régionaux, la Turquie semble avoir été l'un des principaux bénéficiaires de la chute d'Assad. Tirant parti de sa position unique de pont entre l'Europe et le Moyen-Orient, Ankara a habilement fait avancer ses objectifs de politique étrangère tout au long du conflit syrien. La création d'une zone tampon dans le nord de la Syrie, l'accueil de plus de trois millions de réfugiés syriens et son opposition au régime d'Assad et aux aspirations kurdes dans le nord-est de la Syrie ont permis à la Turquie de consolider son influence. Cette approche a renforcé le rôle d'Ankara en tant qu'acteur indispensable dans le processus de transition de la Syrie. En outre, l'implication de la Turquie dans la modération de factions telles que le HTS au cours du processus d'Astana met en évidence sa capacité à naviguer dans les complexités du conflit tout en sauvegardant ses intérêts stratégiques. Ces dernières années, la Turquie s'est habilement positionnée entre deux blocs : ses alliés de l'OTAN et les soutiens internationaux d'Assad, la Russie et l'Iran. L'acuité stratégique d'Ankara réside dans sa capacité à faire avancer ses objectifs de politique étrangère en Syrie et dans la région au sens large en capitalisant sur l'indécision et l'ambiguïté de ses alliés occidentaux tout en maintenant simultanément . En participant aux négociations visant à stabiliser la Syrie, la Turquie est parvenue à jouer un rôle de médiateur entre ces acteurs divergents, ce qui met en évidence la complexité de ses motivations et de ses choix en matière de politique étrangère. Cet équilibre a parfois placé la Turquie en porte-à-faux avec ses alliés de l'OTAN, en particulier lorsque les troupes kurdes ont été soutenues par les États-Unis pour combattre ISIS, ce qui a renforcé les tensions au lieu d'un plan commun pour la stabilité dans la région. En outre, Ankara s'est notamment concentrée (et se concentre toujours) sur l'affaiblissement des forces kurdes dans le nord de la Syrie, qui sont soutenues par les États-Unis en tant que partenaires clés dans la campagne anti-ISIS. Cette divergence met en évidence la priorité accordée par la Turquie à ses préoccupations en matière de sécurité nationale, en particulier en ce qui concerne la question kurde, par rapport à l'alignement sur les objectifs plus larges de l'OTAN. Le double positionnement de la Turquie a renforcé son rôle d'acteur pivot dans le conflit syrien. L'influence d'Ankara s'étend désormais non seulement à l'élaboration de la dynamique intérieure de la Syrie, mais aussi au maintien des canaux diplomatiques entre les sponsors internationaux d'Assad, ses propres intérêts stratégiques et ceux des alliés de l'OTAN, y compris les États-Unis. Ces derniers restent déterminés à préserver leur présence dans la région pour faire contrepoids à l'influence russe et iranienne. La situation dans le nord-est de la Syrie représente un défi majeur. Riche en ressources naturelles telles que le pétrole et l'eau, cette région reste sous l'influence des Forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS), une coalition à majorité kurde qui a maintenu une gouvernance semi-autonome. Ankara considère l'affiliation des FDS au PKK (Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan), un groupe désigné comme organisation terroriste par la Turquie et plusieurs pays occidentaux, comme une menace directe. La gestion de cette tension sera au cœur de la stratégie régionale de la Turquie. Au sud, Israël a adopté une position plus affirmée, pénétrant le territoire syrien pour la première fois depuis 1973 (à l'exclusion des hauteurs contestées du Golan). Selon certains médias israéliens, la chute d'Assad constitue un point d'interrogation important pour Tel-Aviv, car « pour le meilleur et pour le pire, Assad était le diable qu'Israël connaissait ». Si la Syrie et Israël entretiennent depuis longtemps des relations tendues, la présidence de Bachar el-Assad a été marquée par des décennies de relative stabilité frontalière. Son départ présente donc à la fois des opportunités et des risques pour les intérêts stratégiques d'Israël. D'une part, le départ d'Assad pourrait affaiblir les liens entre l'Iran et ses alliés régionaux, notamment la Syrie, l'Irak et le Hezbollah. Ces derniers jours, Israël a mené plus de 300 frappes aériennes visant des installations militaires syriennes afin d'empêcher que des armes ne tombent entre les mains de groupes extrémistes. La chute d'Assad représente donc une opportunité d'affaiblir l'influence régionale de l'Iran, en particulier son soutien au Hezbollah, dans le but de saper ce que l'on appelle « l'axe du mal » - une ligne imaginaire de continuité reliant l'Iran, la Syrie, l'Irak et le Hezbollah dans une zone stratégique influençant la stabilité régionale et internationale. D'autre part, la transition en Syrie pourrait permettre aux factions rebelles islamistes de prendre pied dans la nouvelle structure de gouvernance du pays. Israël n'a cessé d'exprimer ses inquiétudes quant au vide politique en Syrie, considérant cette évolution comme une menace potentielle pour sa sécurité et sa position régionale. La Russie, alliée de longue date d'Assad, est désormais confrontée au défi de rééquilibrer sa position. Tout en offrant l'asile à Assad, Moscou reste profondément investie dans le maintien de son ancrage stratégique en Syrie, en particulier sa base navale de Tartous - le seul avant-poste de la Russie en Méditerranée - et sa base aérienne de Lattaquié. Le Kremlin a assuré qu'il était prêt à dialoguer avec les nouveaux dirigeants syriens, dans le but de préserver ses implantations militaires et d'empêcher une nouvelle déstabilisation de la région. Les pays occidentaux ont adopté une approche prudente. Les nations européennes ont exprimé leur soutien au peuple syrien dans ses efforts pour se libérer de la dictature d'Assad, mais leur implication directe reste limitée. Pendant ce temps, le président américain nouvellement élu, Donald Trump, a réitéré une position isolationniste en matière de politique étrangère, soulignant que l'avenir de la Syrie est une question que les Syriens doivent résoudre, tout en reprochant au Kremlin d'avoir abandonné son principal partenaire dans la région. Tout au long de la crise syrienne, les États-Unis ont joué un rôle ambigu et fluctuant. Si leur intervention la plus notable a eu lieu pendant la campagne contre l'État islamique, où ils ont fourni un soutien militaire - y compris des frappes aériennes et des formations - aux milices kurdes, ce soutien a ensuite été réduit pendant la première présidence Trump. La réduction subséquente de l'implication des États-Unis a donné à la Turquie une plus grande marge de manœuvre dans le nord de la Syrie. Ces derniers jours, coïncidant avec la dernière ligne droite de sa présidence, Joe Biden a fait remarquer que l'approche américaine avait influencé l'équilibre régional, ce qui a incité l'administration à réévaluer son engagement en Syrie. Cependant, il n'existe aucune preuve d'un soutien direct ou d'une coordination entre Washington et les groupes rebelles dirigés par le HTS, responsables de la récente offensive. Malgré leur prudence, les États-Unis ne sont pas restés passifs. Peu avant les opérations rebelles, Washington a mené des frappes aériennes visant les milices syriennes soutenues par l'Iran en réponse à une attaque contre la base de Shaddadi. En outre, les forces américaines ont mené des opérations spéciales contre les restes de l'État islamique, cherchant à empêcher le groupe d'exploiter le vide créé par la chute d'Assad. La stratégie américaine semble se situer à mi-chemin entre les politiques de Biden et de Trump. Cette approche vise à affaiblir simultanément l'influence régionale de l'Iran et le positionnement mondial de la Russie, à protéger son allié israélien et à maintenir un certain degré de leadership dans la région. Conclusion La situation en Syrie reste extraordinairement complexe. Le pays est aux prises avec les conséquences durables d'un conflit civil qui a duré plus d'une décennie, tout en s'engageant dans une nouvelle phase de reconstruction politique, sociale et économique après plus de cinquante ans de gouvernance par la famille Assad. Au cœur de ce processus se trouve la nécessité de favoriser le dialogue entre les principaux acteurs nationaux, y compris les civils, les diverses factions rebelles et les institutions en place. Dans ce contexte, la réintégration des millions de réfugiés et de personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays est particulièrement cruciale, car ils constituent une part importante de la population syrienne et doivent être habilités à contribuer à la création d'une société libre et plus inclusive. Le rôle des acteurs internationaux qui sont intervenus à des degrés divers tout au long du conflit est tout aussi crucial. La poursuite de leur engagement et de leur dialogue est essentielle pour empêcher l'émergence d'un vide de pouvoir, qui pourrait exacerber la radicalisation et menacer la stabilité de l'ensemble de la région. Alors que la Syrie entre dans une nouvelle phase d'incertitude, son avenir reste lié à l'interaction des forces régionales et internationales. Le règlement des griefs de longue date, la promotion d'une gouvernance inclusive et la reconstruction du tissu social nécessiteront un équilibre délicat entre la coopération nationale et étrangère. Pour la région MENA, la chute d'Assad signale non seulement un changement dans la politique syrienne, mais aussi un réalignement potentiel de la dynamique des pouvoirs régionaux, dont les résultats se répercuteront dans les années à venir. ## La fin des illusions : Pour une politique étrangère indépendante dans un monde en désordre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-fin-des-illusions-pour-une-politique-etrangere-independante-dans-un-monde-en-desordre/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > L’échec du gouvernement Trudeau à faire élire le Canada au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies fut un affront sans précédent dans l’histoire du pays. L’échec du gouvernement Trudeau à faire élire le Canada au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies fut un affront sans précédent dans l’histoire du pays. Il s’agit d’une humiliation autant pour le Canada – qui a investi de l’argent, du temps et du capital politique considérable – que pour le premier ministre lui-même. Après tout, c’était son idée de faire compétition contre l’Irlande et la Norvège afin de tenter d’obtenir un siège pendant son règne comme premier ministre. Deux conclusions diamétralement opposées ont été tirées de ce cuisant revers. D’une part, certains allèguent que la défaite à New York n’a rien de grave et n’enlève rien à la pertinence de l’actuelle politique étrangère du Canada. Après tout, les Canadiens semblent s’en ficher de manière générale, tandis que l’échec est principalement attribué à une question de timing, à un manque de ressources investies dans les opérations de paix et l’aide internationale, ou encore à un manque de cohérence et de lisibilité. Bref, il ne s’agirait que de rehausser et de financer la politique actuellement en place pour assurer le « retour » du Canada sur la scène internationale. D’autres voient plutôt dans cette défaite humiliante la preuve ultime que les fondements de la politique étrangère sont à repenser entièrement. Au-delà des causes conjoncturelles, la défaite du Canada à l’ONU est symptomatique de déficiences structurelles de sa politique étrangère. Le rôle de rassembleur dont s’était drapé le Canada a frappé le mur d’une dure réalité : la communauté internationale ne souhaite pas accorder davantage d’influence au Canada. Elle lui a préféré des États moins riches et moins populeux, mais qui s’affichent ouvertement comme indépendants. Le Canada a malheureusement la réputation de ne pas avoir l’échine nécessaire pour confronter les grandes puissances et d’être trop faible pour défendre des positions fondées sur des principes. Bref, le Canada doit sortir de son état de vassalité pour s’imposer comme un acteur international d’influence. Cette nécessité s’impose d’autant que le Canada doit désormais naviguer dans un environnement international de plus en plus hostile, marqué par la fracture de l’ordre international libéral. La pandémie de la COVID-19 a en effet accéléré et intensifié au moins trois bouleversements géopolitiques fondamentaux : la compétition agressive et multidimensionnelle entre grandes puissances, le dysfonctionnement des institutions multilatérales et le repli sur soi des États-Unis. Cette combinaison funeste est sans précédent et appelle le Canada à repenser de fond en comble sa politique internationale, puisque deux de ses principaux piliers – le multilatéralisme et la relation spéciale avec les États-Unis – sont ébranlés. La troisième option Justin Trudeau pourrait trouver dans la politique étrangère de son père les bases d’une alternative crédible pour faire face aux défis inédits auxquels le Canada est confronté. Surnommée la troisième option, cette alternative se fonde sur la défense décomplexée des intérêts nationaux du pays et par l’affirmation de son indépendance sur la scène internationale. L’adoption d’une telle politique étrangère indépendante exige un véritable changement de paradigme pour le Canada, qui est habitué de s’en remettre aux autres pour faire des choix difficiles sur la scène internationale. Concrètement, une politique étrangère indépendante passe d’abord par l’abandon des vieux réflexes de dépendance que sont de déléguer à l’ONU, à l’OTAN et à Washington les orientations stratégiques du Canada. Il doit d’abord et avant tout penser par lui-même. Pour ce faire, une réflexion ardue mais nécessaire s’impose afin de mieux circonscrire les intérêts nationaux du pays. Le Canada a trois intérêts vitaux à défendre dans un monde de plus en plus hostile : assurer la sécurité de son territoire et de sa population, soutenir la prospérité de son économie et éviter d’être enchevêtré dans un conflit mondial. Ces intérêts ont longtemps été assurés par la protection et la superpuissance des États-Unis et par un ordre international régi par des règles et des normes libérales. Dans un contexte de montée du protectionnisme, du nationalisme et du révisionnisme, conjugué au bouleversement climatique, ces garanties ne tiennent plus. Défendre les intérêts nationaux Pour défendre ses intérêts nationaux, le Canada doit s’affranchir de son état de vassalité et définir des ambitions à la hauteur des moyens qu’il est prêt à engager. Pour défendre son territoire et sa population, le Canada doit se doter des moyens nécessaires pour détecter, dissuader et vaincre toute menace, qu’il s’agisse de cybersécurité, de missiles hypersoniques ou encore de trafic étranger près de ses côtes. S’il est impossible pour le Canada de défendre son territoire sans la coopération des États-Unis, il n’en demeure pas moins qu’il ne peut plus se fier entièrement sur son voisin du sud pour lui fournir le renseignement et le soutien nécessaires pour garantir sa sécurité nationale. Une plus grande autonomie stratégique est requise. Le Canada gagnerait à regarder du côté de l’Australie, qui vient de réviser en profondeur sa politique de défense afin de se doter d’une posture stratégique plus indépendante. Si Canberra ne remet pas en cause son alliance avec les États-Unis, elle souhaite néanmoins développer une autonomie et des moyens propres afin de se prémunir contre un soutien ambivalent de Washington. L’adoption d’une telle posture d’autonomie stratégique serait difficile au Canada, compte tenu de la proximité avec les États-Unis, mais elle est désormais vitale. Le repli sur soi des États-Unis, conjugué à sa grande volatilité politique, ne permet pas de présumer que notre voisin du sud sera à nos côtés, incluant pour défendre le Canada sur son vaste territoire Arctique, qui fait l’objet de convoitises des grandes puissances. Plus encore, comme la pandémie l’a clairement démontrée avec le manque de personnel militaire pour soutenir les autorités civiles canadiennes et les tentatives des États-Unis d’empêcher la livraison de masques au Canada, le Canada doit accroître ses capacités nationales et réduire sa dépendance envers les États-Unis. Il serait naïf de croire que tout rentrera dans l’ordre suite à l’élection présidentielle américaine. Le candidat Joe Biden privilégie une posture protectionniste et anti-chinoise similaire à bien des égards à celle de Trump, et la grogne intérieure marquée par une profonde détresse économique et sociale ne disparaitra pas subitement au lendemain d’une éventuelle victoire démocrate. Pour assurer sa prospérité à l’ère du protectionnisme et d’une rivalité persistante avec la Chine, le Canada doit se doter d’une politique industrielle capable de soutenir une plus grande autonomie dans des secteurs névralgiques, tels que les technologies émergentes, l’agro-alimentaire, les ressources stratégiques et l’énergie renouvelable. Le Canada doit simultanément se doter d’un objectif de doubler sa population afin de bénéficier d’un marché intérieur conséquent. De même, le Canada doit poursuivre ses tentatives de préserver un ordre économique fondé sur les règles, telle que l’initiative de réforme de l’OMC. En ce qui a trait à la sécurité internationale, la prévention de crises mondiales est prioritaire, car elle entraînerait assurément le Canada dans son sillage. Deux enjeux sont particulièrement criants : l’escalade d’un conflit régional (par exemple, en Europe de l’Est ou en mer de Chine méridionale) en une guerre entre grandes puissances; et une migration de masse en raison des changements climatiques, des guerres civiles et des inégalités accrues. Pistes d’action Pour prévenir de tels scénarios catastrophes, le Canada doit adopter une stratégie multidimensionnelle, appuyée par des moyens de dissuasion, de punition, de persuasion et de prévention en amont. Le Canada ne devrait pas se cantonner dans l’un ou l’autre de ces rôles, ni encore se contenter de suivre la posture des États-Unis. Des partenariats stratégiques avec des pays clés devraient être établis afin de multiplier l’influence internationale du Canada tout en assurant un maximum de flexibilité. Concrètement, le Canada doit regarder au-delà de l’OTAN pour s’investir davantage auprès d’une poignée de partenaires-clés en Asie-Pacifique, dont les intérêts convergent avec les nôtres. Il doit privilégier des coalitions d’États aux vues similaires sur les enjeux clés qui requièrent une coopération internationale, dont les changements climatiques, la cybersécurité et les armes autonomes, par exemple. Il doit également recentrer son attention sur l’Arctique, un pivot géostratégique central pour le Canada, et développer une stratégie concertée et ferme vis-à-vis de la Chine, en particulier dans le domaine de protection de l’information et des ressources stratégiques. Il est temps pour le Canada d’abandonner la rhétorique moralisatrice et sa tendance à quitter la table quand il est temps de payer la facture. Plutôt que de parler fort et de faire peu, le Canada doit faire davantage et parler plus clairement. Réviser la politique étrangère La défense des intérêts nationaux du Canada et l’affirmation de son indépendance requièrent une révision majeure de sa politique étrangère. Deux conditions sont nécessaires pour qu’elle soit réalisable : un consensus entre les principaux partis politiques sur la réorientation stratégique du Canada et l’octroi de ressources budgétaires adéquates. Sans consensus politique, la politique étrangère demeurera source de partisanerie, de division et de revirements après chaque élection. Sans ressources suffisantes, le Canada sera condamné à suivre ses alliés ou à payer les frais de leur indifférence à l’égard de nos intérêts. Ceci sera particulièrement pénible dans un contexte de récession post-COVID, car à chaque période de compression budgétaire passée, quel que soit le parti politique au pouvoir, les budgets alloués à la défense, à la diplomatie et à l’aide internationale ont été coupés. Il faut impérativement empêcher qu’un tel scénario se reproduise en suscitant l’aspiration des Canadiens à se doter des moyens nécessaires pour assurer leur sécurité et leur prospérité dans un environnement belliqueux. Dans cette optique, un comité d’experts devrait être mobilisé afin de dresser un portrait de l’environnement géostratégique actuel, de définir les contours d’une posture plus indépendante pour le Canada, et de susciter la collaboration des Canadiens afin de jeter les bases d’un nouveau consensus stratégique.   ## La France a-t-elle vraiment un problème avec le concept américain de dissuasion intégrée ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-france-a-t-elle-vraiment-un-probleme-avec-le-concept-americain-de-dissuasion-integree/ Modified: 2024-02-27 > Le concept de « dissuasion intégrée » (« Integrated Deterrence ») occupe une place centrale dans la stratégie de défense nationale... Le concept de « dissuasion intégrée » (« Integrated Deterrence ») occupe une place centrale dans la stratégie de défense nationale américaine publiée par l’administration Biden fin 2022. De manière classique, la stratégie de défense américaine mentionne plusieurs approches de la dissuasion, qu’il s’agisse de la dissuasion par déni (diminuer les chances de succès adverses), par résilience (réduire ses gains) ou par imposition de coûts directs et collectifs (accroître le coût de son action), tout en s’appuyant sur un signalement adapté à l’adversaire. La dissuasion intégrée doit également permettre une meilleure gestion de l’escalade, particularisée à chaque cas de figure (reprenant ainsi le concept de « tailored deterrence »). Devant répondre à un problème de dissuasion au sens large, en particulier sous le seuil nucléaire et dans les zones grises, il s’appuie sur une triple intégration : d’une part, celle de tous les services du Pentagone dans une logique multi-domaine afin d’imposer des dilemmes stratégiques à l’adversaire ; d’autre part, celle des différents acteurs de l’administration (« whole-of-government approach ») ; enfin, celle des alliés et partenaires des États-Unis que ce soit en Europe ou dans l’Indo-Pacifique. Dans leur étude No I in Team publiée en décembre 2022, les chercheuses américaines Stacie Pettyjohn et Becca Wasser proposent une grille analytique pour opérationnaliser le concept de dissuasion intégrée, en concentrant leur attention sur la place des alliés dans ce concept. Elles identifient trois niveaux d’intégration - stratégique, institutionnel et tactique - ainsi que les obstacles à l’intégration des alliés pour chacun de ses niveaux. L’étude rapporte les propos « d’un officiel d’un pays allié » interrogé en amont par les autrices dans le cadre de leurs recherches : « nous avons deux problèmes avec la dissuasion intégrée – le premier concerne l’intégration, le second la dissuasion ». Même si la nationalité de « cet officiel » est pudiquement passée sous silence, il n’est guère de secret que la France est l’un des alliés des États-Unis qui a exprimé le plus de préoccupations et de scepticisme à l'égard de la notion de dissuasion intégrée depuis que celle-ci a été introduite par l’administration Biden. La défiance française s’explique par le fait que Paris s’affirme depuis plus de 60 ans comme une puissance nucléaire indépendante, souvent désireuse de se dissocier des concepts américains jugés incompatibles avec ses priorités et ses moyens (comme par exemple, la doctrine américaine de « réponse flexible »). Que le responsable cité dans l’étude de Pettyjohn et Wasser soit français ou non, il ne fait aucun doute que cela aurait pu être le cas. S’il existe indéniablement des différences de fond entre la dissuasion à la française et le concept américain de dissuasion intégrée, les débats se cristallisent bien trop souvent sur des questions purement sémantiques. Celles-ci capturent inutilement l’attention et tendent in fine à occulter le fait qu’il existe également de nombreux points de convergence entre la pensée stratégique française et celle des États-Unis quant à la manière de dissuader, de décourager et de contraindre les adversaires potentiels. Mon intention est ici de lever le voile sur ces disputes sémantiques qui polluent le débat stratégique et empêchent la France et les États-Unis de se concentrer sur la noblesse de l’objectif : comment mieux dissuader leurs adversaires communs, mieux anticiper les scenarii de contournement de la dissuasion nucléaire ou de rupture du tabou nucléaire et in fine mieux joindre leurs efforts pour maîtriser l’escalade en leur faveur lors d’un conflit régional. … Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## La guerre « low-tech » de la Russie contre l’Ukraine a discrédité son récit de modernisation militaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-guerre-low-tech-de-la-russie-contre-lukraine-a-discredite-son-recit-de-modernisation-militaire/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > Les dirigeants russes, le gouvernement, les médias d’État et les fabricants d’armes ont déployé beaucoup d’efforts pour construire et... Le 29 janvier 2023, Dmitri Rogozine, ancien chef de l’agence spatiale russe et maintenant chef du groupe de conseillers militaires les « Tsar’s Wolves » (les loups du tsar), a affirmé que quatre drones terrestres anti-char Marker étaient en cours de préparation afin d’être testés par les forces armées russes sur le champ de bataille en Ukraine. Auparavant, les médias d’État russes avaient décrit le Marker comme un véhicule possédant les capacités de conduite autonome « les plus avancées » en Russie, utilisant la reconnaissance d’objets fondée sur l’intelligence artificielle (IA) et traitant des données via des algorithmes de réseaux neuronaux. Le système aurait été testé avec un mode de navigation « entièrement autonome » pour patrouiller autour du cosmodrome de Vostotchny. À présent, Rogozine affirme que le Marker va subir un « baptême du feu » au combat et qu’il sera capable de détecter et de cibler automatiquement les chars Abrams et Leopard lorsque l’Ukraine les aura reçus de ses alliés. De telles déclarations ambitieuses sur les capacités de la Russie dans le domaine de l’IA et de l’autonomie militaires ne sont pas nouvelles. Les dirigeants russes, le gouvernement, les médias d’État et les fabricants d’armes ont déployé beaucoup d’efforts pour construire et maintenir un récit qui vante la modernisation militaire de la Russie. Ce récit met de l’avant, comme priorités clés, les systèmes robotiques – en particulier les véhicules aériens sans équipage (UAV) ou drones – ainsi que l’intégration de l’IA et de l’autonomie dans les forces armées. L’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par la Russie a cependant révélé le décalage entre le récit mis de l’avant par Moscou et la réalité des capacités technologiques militaires russes. Cet écart, qui peut être inattendu de la part de ce qui a été décrit comme la « deuxième armée du monde », est particulièrement visible lorsqu’on s’intéresse au caractère « low-tech » des forces armées russes et à leur utilisation limitée de la robotique et de l’IA dans leurs systèmes d’armes. En outre, l’écart est susceptible de se creuser davantage, car le développement technologique de la Russie est entravé, entre autres, par l’état général de l’économie russe, les sanctions et la « fuite des cerveaux » des spécialistes en technologies de l’information (TI).  Bien que des fonctionnaires tels que Rogozine continuent de faire la publicité des capacités militaires de la Russie en matière d’IA, ces efforts de désinformation et de relations publiques qui promeuvent une armée russe prétendument sophistiquée et indestructible ne sont plus crédibles.   …   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon !     Anna Nadibaidze (@AnnaRNad) est candidate au doctorat en relations internationales au Center for War Studies de l’Université du Danemark du Sud (SDU). Elle est chercheuse au projet AutoNorms, financé par le Conseil européen de la recherche. ## La guerre à Taïwan est-elle imminente ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-guerre-a-taiwan-est-elle-imminente/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique conclut que la guerre n'est pas inévitable et que le scénario le plus probable jusqu'à la fin des années 2020 est.. La guerre à Taïwan est-elle imminente ? Si oui, comment se déroulerait-elle ? Ces questions figurent parmi les débats les plus saillants des chercheurs en études stratégiques. S'il est impossible d'apporter des réponses incontestées, nous pouvons néanmoins fournir des éléments de réponse par une évaluation rationnelle des facteurs qui rendent la guerre probable ou non. Les facteurs les plus conséquents qui font pencher la balance vers la guerre sont la modernisation des forces armées chinoises, associée à l'exaspération du Parti communiste chinois face au statu quo et à sa confiance dans la réussite d'une action militaire contre Taïwan. Inversement, le coût immense – qu'il soit économique, politique ou de réputation – d'une réunification forcée de Taïwan avec la Chine continentale est le principal facteur qui en réduit la probabilité, car elle menacerait la sécurité du régime. Le scénario le plus probable jusqu'à la fin de la décennie est le maintien des mesures chinoises de zone grise. Toutefois, en cas de recours à la violence, l’intérêt sera de faire un usage massif de la force pour imposer un fait accompli à Taïwan. 1. Contexte Après deux décennies de guerre civile chinoise, en 1949, Tchang Kaï-chek et le parti Kuomintang se sont réfugiés à Taïwan pour y établir la République de Chine (RDC), tandis que le Parti communiste chinois (PCC) prenait le contrôle du continent chinois et établissait la République populaire de Chine (RPC/Chine). Depuis lors, la guerre civile chinoise n'a jamais officiellement pris fin, et l'un des principaux objectifs de souveraineté du PCC a été d'unifier Taïwan avec le continent. La RDC, considérée par Pékin comme une province chinoise dissidente, s'est métamorphosée depuis 1949. D'un gouvernement nationaliste dictatorial, son gouvernement a évolué à partir de la fin des années 1980 vers un régime démocratique libéral qui a tenu sa première élection présidentielle en 1996. Depuis 1978, les États-Unis ne reconnaissent plus la RDC, mais la RPC comme le seul gouvernement légal de la Chine. En 1979, la loi sur les relations avec Taïwan (TRA) a été signée. Avec les six assurances des États-Unis envers Taïwan et les trois communiqués États-Unis-RPC de 1972, 1978 et 1982, elle définit les relations entre les États-Unis et Taïwan. Bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas d'une alliance militaire officielle, le TRA précise les engagements des États-Unis à fournir des armes à Taïwan. Les États-Unis ne prennent pas officiellement position sur la manière dont la question taïwanaise devrait être résolue, tant que cela se fait de manière pacifique. L'ambiguïté des États-Unis concernant leur soutien à Taïwan en cas de guerre vise à dissuader la Chine d'attaquer Taïwan, tout comme elle entend empêcher Taïwan de déclarer une indépendance de jure. Cette politique de double dissuasion a permis d'éviter la guerre depuis 1979, mais la question de savoir si les États-Unis devraient clarifier leur engagement envers Taïwan fait débat, étant donné que la puissance de la Chine a considérablement augmenté depuis 1979. La Chine exerce une pression croissante sur Taïwan, qui se manifeste par la violation récurrente de la zone d'identification de défense aérienne (ADIZ) de Taïwan au-delà de la ligne médiane servant de frontière de facto, qui n'avait pas été franchie avant 2020. Pékin a également considérablement renforcé sa pression diplomatique pour empêcher Taïwan d'adhérer à des accords de libre-échange, à des organisations internationales ou à des relations bilatérales. Plus généralement, l'influence géopolitique de Pékin résultant de son développement fulgurant est utilisée de manière assertive pour faire avancer la réunification par le biais de la guerre de l'information, des cyber-attaques, de la coercition économique et des démonstrations militaires, également appelées mesures de zone grise. La détérioration de la situation à Taïwan s'inscrit dans le contexte de la compétition sino-américaine entre grandes puissances, où Taïwan revêt une valeur stratégique, technologique, économique et idéologique pour les États-Unis et la Chine. Taïwan est un point chaud, car la lutte pour le contrôle de l'île a le potentiel de déclencher une guerre entre deux ennemis qui se disputent l'influence hégémonique en Asie de l'Est. Les enjeux de chaque côté sont suffisants pour que les deux protagonistes se battent et fassent tout leur possible pour obtenir le résultat qu'ils préfèrent sur Taïwan. Compte tenu des tensions résultant de la concurrence stratégique entre les États-Unis et la Chine, il est de plus en plus compliqué de maintenir le statu quo à Taïwan. Un accident pourrait précipiter un conflit à fort potentiel d'escalade. Le coût d'une invasion de Taïwan est incroyablement élevé pour le PCC. Pourtant, la Chine pourrait décider de recourir à la force en fonction de l'évolution de sa situation intérieure, de sa perception de l'équilibre des forces, de la modification du statu quo et de son évaluation de la fenêtre d'opportunité actuelle. Ainsi, si la guerre n'est pas nécessairement imminente, elle constitue une sérieuse possibilité à moyen et long terme. Il est donc essentiel de comprendre les facteurs potentiels qui pourraient provoquer des frictions et une guerre entre Taïwan, la Chine et les États-Unis. La guerre pour Taïwan est-elle imminente ? Quelles sont les lignes rouges chinoises et quelles conditions pourraient déclencher l’utilisation de la force chinoise contre Taïwan ? Quel est le scénario le plus probable d'une attaque sur Taïwan ? Basé sur le symposium « Is War Over Taiwan Coming » du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, qui s'est tenu à Montréal les 2 et 3 juin 2022, ce rapport commence par présenter l'importance de Taïwan pour la Chine et les États-Unis. Il expose ensuite les conditions qui pourraient déclencher une attaque de la Chine contre Taïwan avant d'évaluer les arguments qui soutiennent l'imminence relative d'une attaque contre Taïwan. Le rapport se penche par la suite sur les arguments qui s'opposent à une attaque imminente contre Taïwan, en soulignant que la plupart des experts pensent que la Chine a plus à perdre, dans le cadre d'une analyse coûts-bénéfices rationnelle, à lancer une attaque qu'à supporter un statu quo insatisfaisant. Le rapport conclut que la guerre n'est pas inévitable et que le scénario le plus probable jusqu'à la fin des années 2020 est la poursuite des mesures de zone grise de la Chine. 1.1. L'importance de Taïwan pour la Chine En 1992, le Consensus a été signé entre le parti Kuomintang (KMT) de Taïwan et la RPC, reconnaissant l'existence d'une seule Chine. Malgré le désaccord sur la signification du terme « Chine » – RPC ou RDC ? – le consensus ambigu de 1992 a maintenu le statu quo entre les deux rives du détroit. Mais en 2016, avec l'arrivée au pouvoir de l’indépendantiste Tsai Ing-Wen, du Parti démocratique progressiste (PDP), et sa réélection en 2020, les relations inter-détroit se sont détériorées. Tsai Ing-Wen a refusé de maintenir l'interprétation du Consensus de 1992 par Pékin dans son discours de réélection en 2020. Pékin assimile le Consensus de 1992 à l'arrangement « un pays, deux systèmes » en vertu duquel Macao et Hong Kong sont administrés. Lorsque Xi Jinping est arrivé au pouvoir en 2012, il a développé le concept du « rêve chinois », qui est associé au renouveau de la nation chinoise. Il implique, entre autres, la réunification avec Taïwan. Le renouveau de la Chine trouve racines dans les traumatismes historiques chinois et constitue un thème durable dans le discours intérieur chinois. Il n'y a jamais eu de calendrier précis accompagnant le discours sur le renouveau de la nation chinoise, mais Xi a mentionné 2049 comme date d'achèvement, ce qui soulève des questions sur Taïwan. Xi a de plus en plus autorisé la discussion d'une prise de contrôle par la force de Taïwan, faisant de ce thème un courant dominant au sein du PCC – un développement significatif dans une Chine hautement censurée. Les multiples appels de Xi à avancer sur la voie de la réunification et à ne pas transmettre cette dernière de génération en génération ont lié la légitimité de Xi à la question taïwanaise. Le désir de Xi de se réunifier avec Taïwan et le fait qu'il ait fourni ce qui semble être une date constituent un changement significatif par rapport aux dirigeants chinois précédents. D'autant plus que la préparation aux contingences d’une attaque sur Taïwan représente un tiers du budget de défense de la Chine et constitue la principale mission de guerre des forces armées chinoises pour des raisons stratégiques, économiques et culturelles. D'un point de vue stratégique, la conquête de Taïwan permettrait à la Chine d'exercer une plus grande influence sur les acteurs régionaux. Située dans la première chaîne d'îles, la prise de Taïwan permettrait à l'APL de projeter sa puissance dans le Pacifique occidental et potentiellement de neutraliser les forces américaines dans la région. Une fois Taïwan sous contrôle, la Chine pourrait mettre en place des blocus sur des acteurs locaux tels que le Japon ou les Philippines. La Chine libérerait également « des dizaines de navires, des centaines de lance-missiles et d'avions de combat, des milliers de personnes et des milliards de dollars » consacrés à une guerre pour Taïwan. En conséquence, la Chine serait en mesure de contraindre davantage les acteurs régionaux à se conformer à ses préférences dans les mers de Chine méridionale et orientale, renforçant ainsi sa domination régionale. En outre, l'absorption de l'économie de 600 milliards de dollars de Taïwan et de ses entreprises de technologie de pointe constituerait un avantage majeur pour la RPC. C'est à Taïwan que se trouve la Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), l'une des deux principales entreprises avec Samsung qui détient un quasi-monopole sur la production des puces électroniques les plus avancées disponibles sur le marché. Quiconque contrôle TSMC contrôle une technologie essentielle pour garder une longueur d'avance en matière d'intelligence artificielle et, par extension, de plateformes d'armement de nouvelle génération. Les semi-conducteurs sont également cruciaux pour la production de nombreux produits électroniques utilisés dans la vie quotidienne. Les capacités de production de la Chine en matière de « fabrication avancée et de technologies numériques » dépendent de l'accès aux semi-conducteurs de Taïwan rendant de ce fait le contrôle de leur source de production stratégique. Culturellement, l'indépendance de facto de Taïwan est perçue comme un stigmate d'une période sombre de l'histoire chinoise : le Siècle des humiliations (1839-1949). Après sa défaite dans la deuxième guerre de l'opium, la Chine a été contrainte de signer le premier d'une longue liste de traités inégaux qui ont démembré les territoires chinois. S'emparer de Taïwan ne mettrait pas seulement fin à la guerre civile chinoise et affirmerait la légitimité et l'autorité du PCC, mais constituerait également une avancée majeure dans le renouveau de la nation chinoise. En conquérant Taïwan, le PCC démontrerait que la Chine s'est pleinement remise du Siècle des humiliations, au cours duquel elle n'a pu défendre son intégrité territoriale. Placer Taïwan sous le contrôle du PCC est hautement symbolique et une question d'honneur, de pensée stratégique et de motivations nationalistes étroitement associées au rêve chinois, au PCC et à la légitimité de Xi. Concrètement, la réunification de Taïwan avec le continent selon le principe « un pays, deux systèmes » aux conditions de Pékin signifierait que : « La RDC cesserait d'exister et le drapeau de la RPC remplacerait celui de Taïwan ». « Taïwan serait absorbée puis transformée en une région administrative spéciale comme Hong Kong ou Macao ». « Taïwan n'aurait plus de politique étrangère et de défense propre ». « La Chine aurait son mot à dire sur la façon dont les dirigeants de Taïwan sont choisis ». « Taïwan conserverait son armée et l'APL ne serait pas stationnée à Taïwan ». « Les États-Unis ne seraient pas autorisés à projeter leur puissance depuis Taïwan ». 1.2. L'importance de Taïwan pour les États-Unis Si Taïwan est cruciale pour le renouveau de la Chine, l’île est également centrale pour la domination américaine de l'Indopacifique. Washington a des incitations géostratégiques, géoéconomiques et idéologiques à garantir l'indépendance de facto de Taïwan. Taïwan est un élément essentiel de la capacité des États-Unis à projeter leur puissance en Asie de l'Est et à contenir la Chine. Comme l'a décrit le général Douglas MacArthur il y a 70 ans, ce porte-avions insubmersible est vital pour l'effort américain visant à empêcher l'expansion territoriale régionale de la Chine derrière la première chaîne d'îles. Selon Charles Philippe David, sans Taïwan, il n'y a pas d'« offshore balancing ». De plus, les industries technologiques américaines dépendent des semi-conducteurs haut de gamme taïwanais, tout comme la Chine. Des efforts ont été faits récemment pour rapatrier des usines de semi-conducteurs aux États-Unis, mais la technologie la plus avancée restera à Taïwan pour un certain temps. Par conséquent, une attaque de la Chine contre Taïwan entraînerait une contraction économique aux États-Unis et menacerait l'avance technologique américaine dans des technologies critiques comme l'intelligence artificielle, avec des conséquences désastreuses pour la primauté de l'Amérique. Il y a également la crainte pour les États-Unis de perdre leur crédibilité s’ils ne réagissent pas à une agression, même si Washington n'a pas de traité de défense officiel avec Taïwan comparable à ceux avec la Corée du Sud ou le Japon. Les États-Unis risquent néanmoins de subir des coûts de réputation en l'absence de réaction à une agression, car le libellé du TRA précise que les États-Unis doivent armer Taïwan pour dissuader une attaque. Selon Hyon Joo Yoo et Steven F. Jackson, l'absence de réaction des États-Unis face aux menaces extérieures pesant sur Taïwan pourrait accroître la peur de l'abandon au Japon et en Corée du Sud, malgré leurs traités de défense. En conséquence, les alliés régionaux de Washington pourraient chercher à se doter d'armes nucléaires ou accommoder les préférences de la Chine qui sont antithétiques à la vision américaine d'une région Indopacifique libre et ouverte (Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)), ce qui constituerait un résultat menaçant pour les États-Unis et les autres nations commerciales. Enfin, les États-Unis ont des intérêts idéologiques à maintenir le régime démocratique taïwanais. Il est plus facile et préférable pour Washington de traiter avec des démocraties fondées sur des principes politiques et économiques libéraux communs qu'avec des régimes illibéraux. Taïwan est un contrepoint politique régional au régime autoritaire de la RPC. Aider Taipei à résister une réunification forcée soutient les standards normatifs préférés des États-Unis. 2. La guerre arrive-t-elle ? 2.1. Facteurs faisant pencher la balance vers une éventuelle guerre à Taïwan A. La solidification de l'identité taïwanaise Très peu de Taïwanais souhaitent une réunification avec la Chine continentale. Selon une enquête de l'Université nationale Chengchi, 64% des résidents de Taïwan s'identifient comme étant exclusivement taïwanais, 30% comme étant à la fois taïwanais et chinois, et 3% comme chinois. Par rapport à 1992, 46,4 % s'identifiaient comme Taïwanais et Chinois, 25,5 % comme Chinois et 17,6 % comme Taïwanais.  En 2020, la réélection de Tsai Ing-Wen, qui souhaite garder une certaine distance avec le continent, illustre cette tendance de la société taïwanaise. Cependant, elle n'est pas la politicienne la plus anti-continent. Tsai Ing-Wen entend maintenir le statu quo et évite toute référence explicite à l'indépendance de Taïwan. Ce n'est pas le cas de son très populaire vice-président, William Lai, un candidat probable aux élections de 2024 qui est plus favorable à l'indépendance de Taïwan. S'il devait se présenter et remporter les prochaines élections, cela encouragerait Pékin à prendre des mesures drastiques. Le climat politique taïwanais actuel inquiète Pékin, qui craint que la réunification pacifique n'ait jamais lieu et que le seul moyen de réunifier Taïwan avec la Chine soit de l'imposer à la société taïwanaise. B. Liens étroits entre les États-Unis et Taïwan Parallèlement, nous assistons à un renforcement des liens entre les États-Unis et Taïwan. Les visites récurrentes de législateurs et de secrétaires adjoints américains à Taïwan provoquent l'ire de la Chine. En réaction, les démonstrations militaires de l'APL se sont multipliées. À un moment donné, la Chine pourrait lancer une attaque si elle juge que la présence de militaires étrangers à Taïwan est trop importante ou que les liens entre les États-Unis et les responsables taïwanais sont devenus inacceptables. Tsai Ing-Wen a officiellement confirmé la présence de soldats américains à Taïwan « pour augmenter la capacité de défense de l’île », ce qui est un aveu risqué. Taïwan est l'un des rares dossiers qui bénéficient d'un soutien bipartisan au sein du Congrès américain. Ce dernier a adopté en 2018 le Taiwan Travel Act, établissant un cadre pour l'augmentation des échanges gouvernementaux de haut niveau entre les États-Unis et Taïwan. En 2018, l'Asia Reassurance Initiative Act a été signé, permettant de resserrer les liens économiques, politiques et sécuritaires avec Taïwan. En 2019, le Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act a été adopté pour aider Taïwan à élargir ses liens diplomatiques et ses partenariats mondiaux. La loi sur l'assurance de Taïwan, qui fait partie de la loi sur les crédits consolidés de 2021, invite Taïwan à augmenter ses dépenses de défense et exige davantage de transferts et de ventes d'armes des États-Unis vers l'île. Elle prévoit également d'aider Taïwan à faire partie de plus d'organisations internationales. Enfin, on pourrait mentionner le Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act. Bien qu'il n'ait pas été adopté, ce projet de loi est d'une importance capitale, car il contient des dispositions permettant aux États-Unis d'utiliser la force pour défendre Taïwan dans certaines circonstances. S'il devient un jour une loi, cela mettrait fin à la politique américaine d'ambiguïté stratégique. C. La modernisation de l'APL Le facteur le plus important associé à l'agression possible de Taïwan concerne la modernisation de l'Armée populaire de libération (APL) et la modification de l'équilibre des forces entre les États-Unis et la Chine en Asie de l'Est qui en résulte. À son arrivée au pouvoir en 2012, Xi a lancé une réforme des forces armées chinoises afin de produire une « force de classe mondiale » capable de combattre des guerres mondiales d'ici 2049 – date du centième anniversaire de la RPC. Les réformes militaires comprennent la création de nouveaux commandements de théâtre conjoints, des mises à jour du matériel, une meilleure collaboration entre les militaires et les civils, et la transformation de la marine de l'armée chinoise en une puissance maritime. La Chine a acquis des missiles antinavires, des sous-marins silencieux, des avions de combat avancés et des défenses aériennes intégrées. L'équilibre militaire entre la Chine et Taïwan profite à la Chine, qui consacre vingt-cinq fois plus de fonds à son budget militaire que Taïwan. La Chine a dépensé 3 000 milliards de dollars au cours des trois dernières décennies pour développer ses forces armées. Sans surprise, dans la plupart des war games, la Chine est capable de subjuguer Taïwan avant que les États-Unis n'aient la possibilité d'intervenir. Les capacités militaires de la Chine, qui sont structurellement liées à la Russie, se sont considérablement améliorées et permettent la projection de puissance dans les mers de Chine méridionale, orientale et sur Taïwan. La marine de l'APL est devenue la plus grande marine au monde, avec 355 navires et sous-marins contre 293 navires pour les États-Unis. La marine américaine reste cependant dominante dans le Pacifique occidental en ce qui concerne la puissance de combat. Cela dit, la Chine possède la plus grande capacité de construction navale au monde, ce qui constitue un atout pour la croissance de sa marine militaire. Selon le Commandement de l'Indopacifique des États-Unis, la Chine devrait avoir un avantage de 8 contre 1 en matière de navires de guerre régionaux par rapport aux États-Unis et des avantages similaires en matière d'avions d'ici 2025. En outre, la Chine a rattrapé les progrès technologiques militaires des États-Unis et espère les dépasser d'ici la fin de la décennie. La Chine a développé ses missiles balistiques et de croisière conventionnels sol-air. Certains missiles peuvent passer des ogives conventionnelles aux ogives nucléaires, ce qui rend difficile l'identification du type de missile lancé. L'A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) de la Chine réduirait sérieusement la marge de manœuvre des États-Unis en Asie de l'Est s'ils décident d'intervenir pour aider Taïwan en cas d’attaque chinoise. Une autre caractéristique frappante de la modernisation de l'APL est qu'elle a été menée principalement pour l'emporter dans le cas d'une invasion amphibie d'une « grande île, d'un blocus ou d'une attaque de missiles » – difficile de ne pas penser ici aux scénarios de guerre pour Taïwan. Bien qu'elle ne soit pas encore achevée, la modernisation réussie des forces armées chinoises a permis à Pékin de modifier l'équilibre des forces dans la région, y compris dans le détroit de Taïwan, où Pékin a longtemps été militairement défavorisé. Grâce à la capacité d'action conjointe de l'armée de l'air, de la marine, de l'armée de terre et de la force des fusées stratégiques, la Chine a théoriquement le dessus sur Taïwan. La crédibilité de Taïwan et la dissuasion américaine vis-à-vis de la Chine ont diminué en raison du faible niveau de préparation militaire de Taïwan et de l'érosion de la position des forces régionales américaines. D. La confiance de la Chine dans ses forces armées Cette modernisation a encouragé la croyance que la Chine a les moyens de détruire les infrastructures stratégiques de Taïwan avec des missiles balistiques et de croisière très avancés ou qu'elle pourrait facilement mettre en place un blocus contre Taïwan indéfiniment, tout comme elle pourrait couper Taïwan de l'Internet et altérer les lignes de communication par des cyber-attaques. En revanche, l'organisation d'une invasion amphibie victorieuse est moins certaine, car il s'agit d'une campagne difficile à mettre en œuvre. Mais le sentiment général à Pékin est que l'APL peut gagner une confrontation militaire limitée contre Taïwan et potentiellement contre les États-Unis. L'APL pense que l'équilibre des forces est en faveur de Pékin parce que la Chine se soucie davantage de Taïwan et est plus proche que les États-Unis. Selon Michael Beckley et Hal Brands, Pékin a généralement recours à la force pour éviter de perdre des territoires ou pour profiter d'une fenêtre d'opportunité qui se referme pour étendre son contrôle sur des revendications contestées. Les États-Unis et leurs partenaires renforcent leur présence régionale et encerclent la Chine. Bien que les forces armées taïwanaises manquent cruellement d'effectifs, elles tentent de résoudre ce problème et d'accroître leurs capacités. Par ailleurs, des experts font remarquer que les investissements américains en matière de défense en Asie de l'Est et les coalitions et partenariats militaires, comme le QUAD et l'AUKUS, entravent déjà la projection de puissance de la Chine et le feront de plus en plus au fil du temps. D'ici 2030, la Chine sera probablement confrontée à un environnement opérationnel beaucoup plus difficile qu'actuellement. De nombreux moyens américains déployés dans la région sont anciens et devront être remplacés au cours de la prochaine décennie. Ainsi, les années 2020 constituent une décennie optimale pour une action chinoise, car l'équilibre des forces sera le plus favorable à la Chine. Si la Chine attend trop longtemps, cette fenêtre d'opportunité se refermera, ce qui rendra plus compliquée et plus coûteuse toute action militaire à l'avenir. L'amiral américain Davidson pense que 2027 est l'année idéale, tandis que d'autres hauts responsables militaires américains et taïwanais ont proposé une série de dates potentielles (2025, 2027, 2030 à 2049) où la Chine pourrait tenter une réunification armée. Selon Oriana Skylar Mastro, la perception qu'ont les dirigeants chinois de leurs chances de victoire compte plus que leurs chances objectives de succès. Et les conseillers de Xi lui disent de plus en plus souvent que l'APL pourrait réunifier Taïwan par la force à un coût supportable. Par conséquent, il n'est pas impensable pour Xi de croire que la fenêtre d'opportunité pourrait bientôt se refermer et qu'il doit agir rapidement. La publication croissante d'articles en Chine appelant à une résolution rapide de la question de Taïwan pendant que la Chine bénéficie d'un maximum de chances de succès exprime un sentiment d'urgence. Cela fait dire à l'amiral américain Michael Studeman que l'invasion de Taïwan « n'est qu'une question de temps, pas une question de si ». Et Mastro estime à 60 % les chances actuelles de guerre entre Taïwan et la Chine. E. Une guerre pour détourner l'attention des problèmes intérieurs Le recours à la force contre Taïwan est une décision aussi bien politique que militaire. La légitimité du PCC étant de plus en plus fondée sur le nationalisme plutôt que sur la simple croissance économique, il pourrait se sentir obligé d'agir. D'autant plus que 70 % des Chinois soutiennent fermement le recours à la force pour réunifier Taïwan avec le continent. Compte tenu des problèmes sociaux, politiques et financiers intérieurs de la Chine, le renforcement du nationalisme par le biais de la « carte Taïwan » pourrait être un moyen commode de détourner l'attention du chômage, des pénuries d'électricité, de la corruption, de la dette élevée, des inégalités, du taux de croissance déclinant ou de tout autre problème intérieur. Selon Jennifer Chang, « [...] Lorsque la Chine opère à partir d'une position de faiblesse interne et externe [...], elle pourrait être tenté de mener une politique étrangère plus agressive – et éventuellement à recourir à une action militaire contre Taïwan ». Il est également important de noter le problème démographique de la Chine. Sa population vieillit rapidement. C'est typique d'une nation qui s'enrichit, mais les jeunes sont indispensables pour mener des guerres. Ce déclin démographique impose un délai d'action limité. 2.2. Scénarios d'une guerre pour Taïwan Il existe plusieurs lignes rouges qui, si elles sont franchies, pourraient déclencher une action militaire chinoise contre Taïwan. La première et la plus importante ligne rouge que Taïwan ne doit pas franchir si elle veut éviter une action militaire chinoise contre elle est de déclarer officiellement son indépendance ou d'organiser un référendum sur son indépendance. La RPC a adopté, en 2005, une loi anti-sécession qui exige de la Chine qu'elle s'efforce de réunifier pacifiquement Taïwan, tout en précisant que si toutes les voies pacifiques ont été épuisées et que Taïwan s'oriente sérieusement vers l'indépendance, alors « l'État emploiera des moyens non pacifiques et d'autres mesures nécessaires pour protéger la souveraineté et l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine ». Une sécession claire de Taïwan, ou même une rhétorique sérieuse sur l'indépendance, est susceptible de déclencher une réponse immédiate de la Chine continentale. Toutefois, même si Taïwan respecte le statu quo actuel, la combinaison de la puissance de Pékin et son exaspération liée à la lenteur de la réunification pourrait entraîner une action agressive. Ci-dessous est une liste des différents scénarios auxquels pourrait ressembler une guerre à Taïwan : Saisie des petites îles de Taïwan : Après avoir imposé un ultimatum infructueux à Taipei pour qu'il entame le processus de réunification selon le principe « un pays, deux systèmes », Pékin pourrait bombarder les petites îles de Taïwan situées près des côtes chinoises, comme l'île de Dongsha, l'île de Taiping, l'île de Pratas ou l'île de Wuqiu. La Chine pourrait alors s'emparer d'une ou plusieurs d'entre elles et les transformer en bases de lancement, en menaçant de futures actions militaires si Taïwan refuse toujours d'entamer le processus de réunification. Campagne de bombardements aériens : Partant des mêmes prémisses, une action plus énergique consisterait en des campagnes conjointes de missiles et d'attaques aériennes de l'APL contre Taïwan dès le départ, frappant des cibles militaires et gouvernementales stratégiques, voire des infrastructures civiles stratégiques telles que des axes de communication, des routes, des ponts, etc. L'objectif serait de forcer Taipei à se rendre et à accepter une certaine forme de réunification sans mettre le pied sur l'île, par le biais d'une opération de choc et d'effroi. Blocus : une campagne de bombardements aériens pourrait être complétée par un blocus pour couper l'île de ses importations vitales. La marine de l'APL peut encercler Taïwan et empêcher les navires marchands d'entrer dans l'un de ses sept principaux ports, dont quatre font face à la Chine continentale. Taïwan importe 60 % de sa nourriture et 98 % de son énergie. Les réserves alimentaires et énergétiques de Taïwan ne dureraient que quelques mois sans approvisionnement extérieur. L'objectif serait d'étrangler l'île pour la forcer à capituler. Campagne de bombardements aériens sur Taïwan et sur des cibles régionales américaines : Outre le bombardement de Taïwan, la Chine pourrait décider d'attaquer les forces américaines dans la région (Japon, Corée du Sud et même Guam) afin de paralyser la capacité des États-Unis à intervenir dans les premières phases du conflit. Plus l'intention des États-Unis d'intervenir militairement est crédible, plus la Chine est susceptible de cibler les forces américaines dans sa première salve. Cela entraînerait un risque important d'escalade puisque la Chine et les États-Unis seraient en guerre, exposant potentiellement la Chine continentale aux représailles américaines. Selon Bruno Tertrais, la Chine pourrait tenter de proposer un accord au Japon avant la campagne de bombardement : pas d'assistance japonaise aux États-Unis en échange de l'abandon par Pékin de ses revendications sur les îles Senkaku. Invasion amphibie de Taïwan : Il s'agirait de la campagne la plus coûteuse et la plus complexe à mettre en œuvre. Elle nécessiterait une opération conjointe d'une ampleur colossale, avec des pertes massives, des risques élevés d'échec et des milliards de dollars dépensés. Des millions de membres des services chinois devraient être mobilisés, « notamment des soldats, des marins, des aviateurs, des fusiliers, des marines, des cyber-guerriers, des policiers armés, des réservistes, des milices terrestres et des milices maritimes ». Selon le ratio de trois attaquants pour un défenseur, il faudrait envoyer environ 1,35 million de soldats de l'autre côté du détroit pour avoir une chance de submerger les forces taïwanaises. 2.3. Facteurs faisant pencher la balance contre une attaque sur Taïwan Malgré des facteurs alarmants qui indiquent qu'une guerre pour Taïwan pourrait être imminente, des facteurs importants relativisent l’idée d’une attaque chinoise contre Taïwan. Après une rencontre relativement récente entre Joe Biden et Xi Jinping, Pékin a réaffirmé son intention de « s'efforcer de réaliser la perspective d'une réunification pacifique avec la plus grande sincérité et les plus grands efforts ». Xi s'est également abstenu de mentionner Taïwan dans les principaux discours du PCC, où il s'est plutôt concentré sur la modernisation et les progrès socio-économiques. Dans l'ensemble, la Chine est satisfaite de sa croissance économique constante, de son influence croissante et de sa stabilité. Pour l'instant, les réformes économiques et la lutte contre la corruption sont plus importantes que l'unification de Taïwan, car le développement de la Chine est la principale source de légitimité du PCC. La légitimité est cruciale pour la sécurité du régime, qui est l'objectif le plus important du PCC. Par conséquent, Pékin n'est pas motivé à utiliser la force militaire pour accélérer la réunification, car cela mettrait en danger la croissance économique et l'accès aux technologies. A. L'APL n'est pas encore prête et manque d'expérience en matière de combat La modernisation de l'APL et la création de commandements de théâtre conjoints ont amélioré l'efficacité des forces armées chinoises, notamment pour les éventualités concernant Taïwan. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que la dernière bataille de la Chine remonte à 1979 contre le Vietnam et qu'elle manque d'expérience récente en matière de combat. La modernisation de l'APL n'est pas non plus terminée, car la Chine ne dispose pas de tous les moyens navals et aériens nécessaires pour mener à bien une invasion de Taïwan. Des progrès en coordination des forces terrestres, maritimes et aériennes dans le cadre de grandes opérations amphibies conjointes sont encore à faire. Selon le rapport du Pentagone de 2021 sur le développement militaire et sécuritaire de la Chine, la marine de l'APL s'est concentrée sur le développement de la capacité à lancer « des missions expéditionnaires régionales et éventuellement mondiales plutôt que sur le grand nombre de navires de transport et de péniches de débarquement de taille moyenne qui seraient nécessaires pour un assaut direct de plage à grande échelle ». Le rapport du Pentagone mentionne également les cinq incapacités de l'APL, qui limitent l'efficacité des forces armées chinoises, notamment au niveau opérationnel : « Certains commandants ne peuvent pas (1) juger des situations ; (2) comprendre les intentions des autorités supérieures ; (3) prendre des décisions opérationnelles ; (4) déployer des forces ; et (5) gérer des situations inattendues ». Une invasion amphibie est déjà un mouvement risqué à entreprendre pour n'importe quelle armée. Elle nécessite « une supériorité aérienne et maritime, l'accumulation rapide et le maintien des approvisionnements à terre, et un soutien ininterrompu ». Elle est encore plus risquée pour une armée qui n'est pas préparée de manière optimale et qui manque d'expérience récente du combat. B. L'invasion de Taïwan est difficile Outre le manque de préparation, de capacités et d'expérience de combat de l'APL, la conquête d'une île idéalement adaptée à la défense constitue une tâche très difficile. Comme le dit Ian Easton, «  le terrain côtier [...] est un rêve devenu réalité pour un défenseur ».  Seules quatorze plages taïwanaises sont propices à une invasion amphibie, entourées de falaises et de jungles. Le détroit de Taïwan subit régulièrement des typhons et de fortes vagues, ce qui entraverait l'efficacité opérationnelle de l'APL. Easton fait également remarquer que Taïwan possède des collines de granit qui abritent des tunnels et des bunkers et que le cadre très urbain de Taïwan avantage aussi la défense. Les capacités asymétriques de Taïwan, telles que les drones, les mines marines, la défense aérienne portable, les systèmes antiblindés, etc., rendraient la tâche de l'APL de débarquer sur les plages de Taïwan remarquablement complexe et coûteuse. De plus, même si la Chine réussissait à envahir Taïwan, le PCC serait alors confronté à une énorme résistance locale, voire à la guérilla. Ce serait un cauchemar de pacifier l'île et de l'incorporer dans les structures de gouvernance de la Chine après avoir imposé des destructions, des pertes et des souffrances inouïes – l'Ukraine est un bon exemple. Compte tenu de la difficulté d'envahir Taïwan, une invasion amphibie semble peu attrayante, surtout si l'on y ajoute le risque d'une intervention internationale pour arrêter la tentative de l'APL de subjuguer l'île. C. Facteurs économiques, politiques et réputationnels limitant le recours à la force par la Chine Les États-Unis fournissent des armes et une formation aux forces armées de Taïwan, tandis que la plupart des pays occidentaux et régionaux sympathisent avec l'indépendance de facto et/ou le système politique démocratique de Taïwan. Cette situation implique que Taïwan n'acceptera jamais de se rendre et d'accepter pacifiquement le diktat de Pékin. Taïwan dispose de ressources et de soutien, ce qui permet à Taipei de résister. Le seul moyen pour Pékin d'imposer sa volonté à Taïwan est la coercition. Toutefois, la perspective d'un coup réussi contre Taïwan est peu probable. Washington pèserait probablement de tout son poids pour soutenir Taïwan en cas d'agression chinoise, avec l'aide relative de partenaires et d'alliés internationaux comme le Japon et l'Australie. Même seuls, les États-Unis sont déjà une formidable puissance militaire capable de causer de grandes difficultés à la Chine. Les forces navales et aériennes américaines pourraient harceler et détruire les lignes d'approvisionnement chinoises. La marine chinoise constituerait une cible de choix pour les bombardiers, les avions de chasse, les sous-marins et autres équipements militaires américains stationnés dans la région. Pour la Chine, la perspective de devoir affronter militairement les États-Unis « remet en question toute la notion de dissuasion », étant donné les terribles conséquences d'une telle issue. Si la Chine et les États-Unis se font la guerre à propos de Taïwan, la situation pourrait s'aggraver considérablement, même si la doctrine de la destruction mutuelle assurée limite une telle escalade. Également, Taïwan est une plaque tournante centrale pour les dernières technologies de semi-conducteurs. La perspective de contrôler la production de semi-conducteurs de pointe de Taïwan est attrayante pour Pékin, car cela servirait son ambition de réduire sa dépendance à l'égard des sources extérieures pour les puces et de devenir un géant de la technologie. Toutefois, si la Chine déclenche une guerre, il est presque certain que les installations où sont produits ces précieux semi-conducteurs seraient endommagées, voire détruites. Toute perturbation brutale des chaînes d'approvisionnement en semi-conducteurs serait coûteuse pour l'économie mondiale, entraînant des pénuries sur le marché, une inflation, une hausse du chômage et des troubles sociaux. Pékin serait confronté à une pénurie de semi-conducteurs, ce qui paralyserait sérieusement ses capacités de production technologique. Il en coûterait également des milliards de dollars à la Chine pour reconstruire les infrastructures, attirer à nouveau les talents et remettre en place la logistique nécessaire pour relancer la production de semi-conducteurs après la guerre. La reconstruction de Taïwan elle-même coûterait des milliards de dollars, car elle serait sans aucun doute anéantie par une campagne de bombardements aériens ou une invasion amphibie. Si on ajoute les sanctions, l'embargo commercial et la suspension des liens commerciaux avec de nombreux pays importants qui ont constitué la base de la croissance économique de la Chine, cela équivaudrait alors à une menace existentielle, selon Charles Parton. Comme l'a noté Jeangène Vilmer, la faible acceptabilité sociale potentielle par la Chine des pertes massives qu'entraînerait une invasion de Taïwan est un puissant facteur de dissuasion. Sans parler des dommages réputationnels de la Chine. Comme pour la Russie, les États-Unis se donneraient beaucoup de mal pour transformer la Chine en paria si elle entamait une guerre contre Taïwan. La Chine subirait un isolement monumental, bien que plus compliqué à mettre en œuvre, étant donné la position centrale de la Chine dans l'économie mondiale. Mais l'image de la Chine dans le monde serait entachée, ce qui compliquerait les projets de leadership mondial du pays, notamment dans les institutions internationales où il faut coopérer avec les autres et obtenir leur consentement. 2.4. Les leçons de la guerre en Ukraine Selon Lyle Goldstein, l'implication la plus inquiétante de la guerre Russie-Ukraine pour Taïwan est que la Chine pourrait conclure que la Russie a été trop « douce » avec l'Ukraine et qu'elle aurait dû bombarder agressivement le pays dès le début pour s'assurer une victoire rapide. Pour Wen-Ti Sung, la guerre actuelle en Ukraine a élevé le seuil de supériorité militaire requis pour obtenir la victoire dans un conflit entre deux pays. Ni Lexiong en déduit que la guerre en Ukraine réduira probablement la tentation pour la Chine d'utiliser la force pour régler la question de Taïwan, car l'APL n'a pas encore atteint le seuil militaire nécessaire pour l'emporter, ce qui signifie que les risques d'échec sont élevés. L'armée chinoise est structurellement liée aux armes russes, qui ont fait un mauvais travail en Ukraine. Par conséquent, la Chine pourrait douter de sa capacité opérationnelle à réussir une invasion de Taïwan, d'autant plus que Taïwan dispose d'un grand nombre des mêmes armes fabriquées aux États-Unis qui ont sérieusement endommagé l'armée russe. Comme le dit Jeangène Vilmer, « la Chine est beaucoup moins préparée à faire quelque chose de beaucoup plus difficile que ce que la Russie n'a pas réussi à faire en Ukraine ». Tout ce qui n'est pas une victoire totale sur Taïwan pourrait pousser officiellement l'île à déclarer son indépendance. Cela anéantirait la crédibilité de la Chine et ferait apparaître ses forces armées comme un « tigre de papier », pour reprendre l'expression de Bonnie Glaser, mettant finalement en péril la chose la plus importante pour le PCC : la sécurité du régime. Historiquement parlant, la Chine a eu recours à la force pour stopper les tendances au déclin, mais dans le contexte mondial actuel, la Chine est, dans l'ensemble, en pleine ascension. Attaquer Taïwan ne ferait que mettre en danger la progression de la Chine sans garantie de succès. La plupart des analystes pensent que la réalisation du rêve chinois, qui nécessite une croissance économique continue et un accès à la technologie pour développer le reste de la Chine, est suffisante pour dissuader Xi d'attaquer Taïwan. La logique est qu'une guerre menacerait les marchés d'exportation de la Chine, les investissements directs étrangers et l'accès aux intrants technologiques nécessaires à la réalisation de ses objectifs, qu'il s'agisse de l'initiative « Belt and Road » (BRI), de l'initiative « Made in China 2025 » ou de tout autre plan de développement. Les conséquences d'une démarche agressive à l'égard de Taïwan feraient dérailler le cours du développement de la Chine alors que celle-ci jouit d'une situation avantageuse en Asie malgré les défis intérieurs. La conquête de Taïwan « entraînerait probablement une coalition anti-chinoise beaucoup plus ferme dans le monde ». Non seulement cela « torpillerait » la réalisation du rêve chinois de Xi en 2049, mais cela pourrait même ébranler les fondements du pouvoir du PCC. Cela rend peu probable la perspective d'une invasion pure et simple. Cependant, « il ne faut jamais sous-estimer ce que les élites peuvent se raconter si elles veulent vraiment faire la guerre ». Conclusion Si les États-Unis ne modifient pas leur politique d'ambiguïté stratégique ni ne déploient de forces à Taïwan, et si Taïwan ne déclare pas son indépendance de jure, la Chine s'en tiendra probablement à des mesures de zone grise à court et moyen terme. La Chine s'appuiera de plus en plus sur diverses actions coercitives allant de l'espionnage, du harcèlement maritime, de la désinformation et des démonstrations militaires à la guerre cybernétique, spatiale, électromagnétique et cognitive, afin de signaler sa capacité à « saboter numériquement Taïwan en cas de crise » et à « isoler l'île dans de multiples domaines ». La stratégie de Pékin est de soumettre Taïwan sans combattre et d'imposer une pression constante sur Taïwan pour éroder sa volonté de maintenir une indépendance de facto. Les zones grises sont « un choix pour les États révisionnistes, et l'autre option est la guerre ». La Rand Corporation a identifié 80 types de zones grises. Juste au-dessus des zones grises se trouve l'imposition d'une quarantaine chinoise sur Taïwan pour une durée limitée ou illimitée, c'est-à-dire le contrôle des espaces aériens et maritimes de Taïwan avec des interférences intermittentes ou permanentes dans ce qui entre et/ou sort de Taïwan (armes américaines, semi-conducteurs, etc.). Dans un tel scénario, le principal port (Kaohsiung) et l'aéroport (Taoyuan) de Taïwan seraient soumis à des opérations de contrôle maritime et aérien menées par le gouvernement chinois. Contrairement à un blocus, une quarantaine ne serait pas considérée comme un acte de guerre, mais comme une mesure psychologique visant à semer le désespoir quant à la viabilité de l'indépendance de facto de Taïwan. Face à une quarantaine, les Américains devraient choisir entre accepter la quarantaine, contester la quarantaine en escortant les avions et les navires commerciaux par des navires et des avions de la marine américaine, ou briser la quarantaine avec la force militaire brute. Une quarantaine s'inscrit dans la continuité logique des mesures de zone grise de la Chine. Elle correspond aux écrits chinois sur l'escalade, qui indiquent que « les actions escalatoires doivent toujours être graduelles et compléter des objectifs nationaux plus larges ». Cependant, le concept de « l'échelle d'escalade » de la théorie des jeux explique la logique qui pourrait prévaloir dans une telle situation : « En règle générale, les jeux ne se jouent pas en un seul tour, mais en de multiples itérations, dont les résultats préparent le terrain pour le prochain mouvement. L'échelle fonctionne comme une métaphore parce que chaque camp a des choix qui peuvent le mener à l'échelon suivant, qui peut être plus proche de l'objectif, mais aussi plus éloigné du sol. Le fait d'être plus éloigné du sol augmente la difficulté de descendre de l'échelle et augmente également le danger si le grimpeur glisse ». Ainsi, on pourrait penser qu'une quarantaine limite l'escalade, alors que la progression exprimée par l’échelle de l'escalade conduirait vraisemblablement à un recours massif à la force. Néanmoins, si une quarantaine est imposée, ce sera probablement entre 2027 et 2030. Pourquoi ? Les forces armées chinoises seront prêtes pour une invasion amphibie vers la fin de la décennie. Bien qu'une quarantaine ne soit pas une invasion amphibie, le processus d'escalade pourrait rendre inévitable une invasion amphibie de Taïwan une fois la quarantaine imposée. Il est donc nécessaire que les forces armées chinoises soient capables de le faire, ce qui sera le cas vers 2027. Et après la décennie actuelle, l'environnement opérationnel de la Chine sera beaucoup plus compliqué pour les raisons présentées dans le rapport. Par conséquent, cette fenêtre de trois ans est la plus susceptible d'être le théâtre d'une quarantaine. Selon Charles Parton, il est également concevable que la Chine oblige ses partenaires commerciaux à choisir entre son marché et celui de Taïwan, fasse pression sur les pays pour qu'ils ne reconnaissent pas les passeports taïwanais et utilise son influence sur les pays du Moyen-Orient pour limiter leurs exportations d'énergie vers Taïwan afin de nuire à l'économie de ce pays. Jeangène Vilmer évoque des cyberattaques massives, des blocus commerciaux, la coupure de câbles sous-marins, et même la prise de petites îles taïwanaises près des côtes chinoises. Il est fort probable que la Chine continuera à violer la zone d'identification de défense aérienne (ADIZ) de Taïwan et s'attaquera potentiellement à l'espace aérien avant la fin de la décennie. L'objectif global est de créer des processus entropiques. Selon Cleo Paskal, la guerre entropique vise à paralyser Taïwan de l'intérieur et à affaiblir progressivement sa détermination au point de la faire capituler sans action militaire. Même si la plupart des experts estiment qu'un recours massif à la force est peu probable, quel serait le scénario le plus probable si la Chine décidait quand même d'y recourir ? Nous avons vu en Ukraine qu'un État qui se bat pour sa survie est très déterminé. Nous savons que la Chine est généralement plus réactive que proactive et que le débat sur l'abandon de la politique américaine d'ambiguïté stratégique gagne du terrain. Un simple blocus ou une simple campagne de bombardement de petites îles taïwanaises au large de ses côtes ne suffirait pas à contraindre efficacement Taïwan, mais mobiliserait les États-Unis et Taïwan. Cela compliquerait l'environnement opérationnel chinois pour d'autres actions, tandis que les gains inhérents au contrôle d'une ou plusieurs petites îles ne sont pas suffisants pour la Chine. C'est pourquoi une campagne de bombardement contre Taïwan serait probablement privilégiée en cas de recours à la force. Parallèlement, les Chinois mettraient très probablement en place un blocus de Taïwan et tenteraient d'établir un contrôle aérien et maritime pour interdire l'accès à la marine et aux navires commerciaux américains afin d'isoler Taïwan et de l'obliger à se rendre. En outre, nous avons tous fait un pas en arrière lorsque la Russie a mis ses forces nucléaires en état d'alerte. La Chine augmente actuellement le nombre de ses armes nucléaires et ne ralentira pas. Par conséquent, si la campagne de bombardements, le blocus et même l'utilisation de forces spéciales pour éliminer les hauts responsables taïwanais ne suffisent pas à soumettre Taipei, Pékin pourrait soit entreprendre une invasion amphibie soutenue par la dissuasion nucléaire, soit déclarer une victoire peu crédible. Compte tenu des coûts déjà encourus par une campagne de bombardement et des coûts futurs qu'entraînerait un échec public, la Chine choisirait probablement d'envahir Taïwan. Si la Chine croit que l'Amérique interviendra en faveur de Taïwan, elle pourrait être tentée de frapper simultanément Taïwan et les forces régionales américaines pendant la première salve de missiles. L'objectif serait de contraindre Taïwan à entamer un processus de réunification selon les conditions de Pékin en bombardant l'île pour la soumettre tout en réduisant la capacité de réaction des forces régionales américaines. Que la Chine frappe ou non les États-Unis, il est peu probable qu'elle fasse un usage limité de la force. Par conséquent, les intérêts en jeu favorisent un recours massif à la force et à l'escalade – si la force doit un jour être utilisée – pour résoudre la question de Taïwan selon les conditions de Pékin. Mis devant le fait accompli, Washington aurait le choix entre engager des coûts énormes pour briser le blocus de la Chine et l'expulser de Taïwan ou faire marche arrière. L'objectif des États-Unis est donc de faire en sorte que la Chine ne conclue pas que la force est préférable au statu quo ni qu'un fait accompli est possible. Mais comment atteindre un tel objectif ? Rendre le prix déjà extrêmement élevé d'une réunification forcée encore plus élevé en mettant en œuvre une version maximaliste de la stratégie de dissuasion par le déni (clarté stratégique et présence américaine renforcée à l'avant) est une option. Maintenir l'ambiguïté stratégique actuelle et renforcer les capacités asymétriques de Taïwan en est une autre, tandis que conclure un grand accord avec la Chine ou simplement abandonner Taïwan sont également dans le champ des possibles. ## La guerre d’Ukraine vue du monde arabe URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-guerre-dukraine-vue-du-monde-arabe/ Modified: 2025-05-13 En février 2025, l’Arabie saoudite accueillait une rencontre entre émissaires américains et russes afin de s’entendre sur les modalités d’engagement de négociations russo-américaines directes sur le conflit opposant Moscou et Kiev depuis maintenant trois ans. Le choix de la capitale saoudienne n’est pas anodin, Riyad entretenant des relations diplomatiques privilégiées avec l’administration Trump (et ce depuis le premier mandat de ce dernier, qui avait effectué son premier déplacement à l’étranger dans le pays) et avec Moscou. Le choix de l’Arabie saoudite illustre la position de plusieurs États arabes depuis le début de la guerre en février 2022, qui, loin de couper les liens avec Moscou, ont conservé et pour certains renforcé leurs liens avec le régime de Vladimir Poutine. Ainsi, en juin 2023, le président algérien Abdelmadjid Tebboune effectuait une visite d’État en Russie à l’invitation de Vladimir Poutine, plus d’un an après le lancement de l’offensive russe contre Kiev. Il précéda de quelques semaines le président égyptien Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, qui rencontra le président Poutine à Saint-Pétersbourg au mois de juillet suivant. Par ailleurs, au-delà du maintien des relations diplomatiques, certaines prises de positions arabes ont pu quelque peu surprendre les analystes occidentaux. En effet, du côté du Golfe arabe, lors du vote par le Conseil de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU), le 25 février 2022, d’une résolution condamnant l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine, les Émirats arabes unis, membre non permanent et pourtant allié des États-Unis et de la France, se sont abstenus. L’Arabie saoudite est quant à elle parfois accusée de s’entendre avec la Russie depuis le début du conflit ukrainien afin de maintenir un prix élevé des hydrocarbures, dont son économie, comme celle de la Russie, est particulièrement dépendante. Ces quelques exemples illustrent ainsi les positions complexes, voire ambiguës qu’entretiennent plusieurs États arabes avec le conflit russo-ukrainien. Loin de condamner sans équivoque l’attaque déclenchée le 22 février 2022, certains États membres de la Ligue arabe, pour certains particulièrement proches des États-Unis, ont pris leur distance avec le légitimisme revendiqué des positions occidentales, donnant l’impression de ne pas soutenir par défaut le droit international et les valeurs du système onusien. Ce positionnement peut être d’autant plus surprenant au premier abord, puisque certains États comme l’Algérie ont fait de la lutte contre l’impérialisme et la défense du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes le fil conducteur de leurs politiques étrangères, et ce depuis plusieurs décennies. Cette contribution se propose d’analyser les positions de plusieurs États arabes, répartis en trois catégories, au sujet de l’agression russe ; de mettre en lumière leurs déterminants ; et de conclure quant au positionnement d’États situés dans un espace soumis à de fortes rivalités entre les grandes puissances sur la scène internationale. Elle démontre que plusieurs États de la région Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord (MENA) ont adopté des positions singulières reposant à la fois sur la prise en compte d’intérêts directs tout en veillant à ne pas s’opposer frontalement aux États-Unis et aux autres puissances occidentales. Elle vise, finalement, à déterminer si, comme l’affirme Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, vue des pays du pourtour méditerranéen et de la région moyen-orientale, la guerre russo-ukrainienne ne constitue qu’un « conflit régional entre Blancs » ne présentant pas un caractère fondamentalement déterminant. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## La guerre russo-ukrainienne vue d’Iran : un test politique et stratégique peu concluant pour « l’axe Téhéran-Pékin-Moscou » ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-guerre-russo-ukrainienne-vue-diran-un-test-politique-et-strategique-peu-concluant-pour-laxe-teheran-pekin-moscou/ Modified: 2024-11-14 L’Iran et la Russie sont-ils vraiment des alliés ? Cette interrogation, aussi sensible qu’actuelle, trouve des éléments capitaux de réponse dans le conflit qui oppose la Russie à l’Ukraine, particulièrement depuis février 2022. Elle est également révélatrice d’une évolution plus large de la scène internationale, à savoir la recomposition stratégique de celle-ci en plusieurs pôles de puissance, où ne domineraient plus seulement l’Europe de l’Ouest et les États-Unis d’Amérique. Depuis le début des années 2000, l’ascension fulgurante de la Chine comme première puissance économique mondiale et rivale des États-Unis se fait incontestable, autant que le réengagement russe de l’arène internationale depuis la fin du moment unipolaire américain après l’invasion de l’Iraq de 2003. À cela s’ajoute la fin de la recherche de fréquentabilité par l’Iran en direction de l’Europe et des États-Unis, après la sortie américaine du JCPOA, l’Accord sur le nucléaire iranien, officialisée par la déclaration du président Donald Trump le 8 mai 2018. De là, moult analystes et médias avancent la matérialisation d’un « axe Pékin-Téhéran-Moscou » qui constituerait même une « anti-hégémonie », scénario catastrophe selon Zbigniew Brzeziński, conseiller à la sécurité nationale du président Jimmy Carter. Cet « axe » ou alliance tripartite se matérialiserait d’autant plus que le 4 juillet 2023, l’Iran devient membre à part entière de l’Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai (OCS), organisation internationale de coopération économique et politique créée entre autres par la Chine et la Russie, ou encore par l’adhésion de l’Iran au BRICS (devenu depuis BRICS+) au 1er janvier 2024, sommet international semblant faire miroir avec le G7. Autant d’éléments semblant consolider un « Sud Global », réunissant tous les pays fustigeant la perception d’un impérialisme ou d’une prééminence auto-conférée sur la scène internationale de l’Europe de l’Ouest et de l’Amérique du Nord, c’est-à-dire de l’« Occident ». La guerre russo-ukrainienne, exacerbée depuis le 24 février 2022, aurait alors dû offrir l’incontestable matérialisation de cet « axe Pékin-Téhéran-Moscou », ces États étant dépeints comme à la recherche permanente du rétablissement de leurs empires respectifs. La guerre Russie-Ukraine représente alors un test en conditions réelles de cet « axe », et plus spécifiquement de la relation Russie-Iran. S’agit-il d’États alliés, de solides partenaires ou plutôt de puissances aux intérêts momentanément compatibles, voire de compagnons d’infortune de la scène internationale ? *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## La marine russe et l’Arctique : nouvelle réalité, anciens enjeux URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-marine-russe-et-larctique-nouvelle-realite-anciens-enjeux/ Modified: 2023-08-25 > Alors que la mer Baltique est en passe de devenir un « lac otanien » avec l’entrée dans l’OTAN de la Finlande et, celle, à venir de la Suède Alors que la mer Baltique est en passe de devenir un « lac otanien » avec l’entrée dans l’OTAN de la Finlande et, celle, à venir de la Suède, l’Alliance cherche à s’investir davantage sur son flanc arctique. La zone arctique se trouve à l’extrémité nord de la ligne de fracture qui sépare la Russie et la communauté euro-atlantique, de la mer du Nord à la Méditerranée orientale. Bien qu’il n’existe pas à ce jour une stratégie otanienne pour l’Arctique, l’intégration des deux nouveaux membres nordiques devrait cependant apporter une plus grande cohérence et une fluidité augmentée au dispositif de l’OTAN sur son flanc Nord. Dans la nouvelle réalité de la confrontation entre Russes et Occidentaux sous le seuil du conflit, la zone arctique fait aujourd’hui figure de théâtre secondaire sur lequel sont projetées des tensions extra-régionales en provenance de la mer Noire et d’Ukraine. Le débouché occidental de la Route maritime du Nord (RMN) pourrait bien cependant redevenir une ligne d’endiguement et de contrôle de l’activité de la marine russe, structurée par l’OTAN autour de la ligne maritime imaginaire reliant le Groenland, l’Islande et le Royaume-Uni (GIUK), comme au temps de la Guerre froide. Disposant de la plus grande ligne côtière en Arctique – 14 000 kilomètres entre la mer de Barents et le détroit de Béring –, la Russie va quant à elle désormais se retrouver face à un Conseil de l’Arctique « otanisé ». Principale force naval arctique, la flotte russe du Nord – qui aligne près de 25 sous-marins et une vingtaine de bâtiments de surface (porte-avions, croiseurs, frégates et navires amphibies) – a son quartier-général établi à Severomorsk (dans la région de Mourmansk). Avant la guerre, elle faisait l’objet d’un programme de modernisation conçu à la fin des années 2000 et mis en œuvre depuis le début des années 2010, dans le cadre du programme d’armement 2011-2020, censé rénover ses capacités de surface et sous-marines.  Qu’en est-il désormais ? Compte tenu du nouveau contexte géopolitique post-24 février 2022, et alors que les combats se poursuivent en Ukraine, comment la marine russe se positionne-t-elle dorénavant en Arctique ? Quels intérêts est-elle censée promouvoir et protéger dans cette région ? Quelle est sa posture dans ce contexte de tensions et dans quelle mesure le conflit en Ukraine est-il de nature à contrarier ou modifier les plans de modernisation de la flotte du Nord entrepris par Moscou voilà bientôt 10 ans ?   …   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## La meilleure amie de la Chine en Occident ? La menace croissante de l’implication de la Chine dans la recherche quantique en Nouvelle-Zélande URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-meilleure-amie-de-la-chine-en-occident-la-menace-croissante-de-limplication-de-la-chine-dans-la-recherche-quantique-en-nouvelle-zelande/ Modified: 2024-09-10 > Le développement de la technologie quantique est au cœur des préoccupations internationales en matière de sécurité. Il n'est donc pas... Le développement de la technologie quantique est au cœur des préoccupations internationales en matière de sécurité. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que de nombreux pays considèrent que la recherche et le développement de ces technologies sont essentiels à leurs propres efforts de sécurité nationale, étant donné que les ordinateurs quantiques sont censés briser les normes cryptographiques actuelles. Pour accélérer et approfondir les efforts de recherche et de développement, les États se tournent souvent vers la collaboration internationale. Le partenariat de renseignement Five Eyes (ou « Groupe des cinq »), composé des États-Unis, du Royaume-Uni, du Canada, de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande, est particulièrement intéressant à cet égard. Lors d'un sommet officiel des Five Eyes en octobre 2023, des représentants de chaque pays ont souligné l'importance de s'adapter aux technologies émergentes. Le directeur général du MI5 du Royaume-Uni, Ken McCallum, a déclaré que « les enjeux des technologies émergentes sont désormais incroyablement élevés ; les États qui ouvrent la voie dans des domaines tels que l'intelligence artificielle, l'informatique quantique et la biologie synthétique auront le pouvoir de façonner notre avenir à tous. » L'accent mis sur les technologies quantiques et autres technologies émergentes dans le secteur de la sécurité démontre l'engagement du Groupe des cinq à assurer le leadership dans ces domaines. Issu d'un pacte entre les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni visant à poursuivre l'échange de renseignements d'origine électromagnétique après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'organisation Five Eyes est un partenariat crucial de partage de renseignements entre les principaux pays de l'anglosphère. Récemment, ce partenariat a fait la une des journaux en tant que canal de renseignements qui a permis au Canada d'accuser l'Inde d'avoir assassiné Hardeep Singh Najjar en 2023, démontrant ainsi sa pertinence actuelle. Tous les membres du réseau Five Eyes ont reconnu la menace potentielle que représente la Chine dans le domaine quantique, faisant de ce pays leur principal adversaire dans ce domaine. Si la Chine devenait le leader mondial dans le domaine quantique, elle deviendrait, par défaut, un leader mondial dans le domaine de la cybersécurité. En 2020, la Chine a réussi à établir une liaison quantique sécurisée entre deux stations terrestres de plus de 1 000 kilomètres. Il s'agit d'une avancée majeure dans le domaine des communications quantiques, qui donne à la Chine une longueur d'avance sur les autres pays et lui permet de revendiquer un avantage dans le domaine des communications. Récemment, la Chine a également indiqué qu'elle avait comblé l'écart entre les États-Unis et la Chine en matière d'informatique quantique. Auparavant, les États-Unis affirmaient être en avance sur les développements chinois ; cependant, les données récentes suggèrent que la course au leadership dans ce domaine est maintenant plus proche que jamais. Mais que signifierait un leadership dans le domaine quantique pour la Chine et les Five Eyes? Cet article résume les risques et les avantages associés à la technologie quantique et l'impact potentiel de la collaboration quantique entre la Nouvelle-Zélande et la Chine sur la sécurité et le partenariat Five Eyes. Pour examiner l'étendue de la collaboration de la Nouvelle-Zélande avec la Chine et déterminer si cette collaboration présente un risque pour la Nouvelle-Zélande et ses partenaires du Groupe des cinq, des statistiques et des données provenant des rapports annuels du Dodd-Walls Centre for Photonic and Quantum Technologies entre 2021 et 2023 ont été consultées. Enfin, l’article se termine par une brève recommandation aux responsables néo-zélandais afin d'atténuer les risques liés à la collaboration quantique en cours entre le Dodd-Walls Centre et la Chine. Quantum - modifier les normes et les stratégies de sécurité Les ordinateurs quantiques peuvent traiter des informations et briser la plupart des normes cryptographiques existantes à un rythme nettement plus rapide. En fait, l'ordinateur quantique le plus récent de Google a réalisé en quelques secondes une tâche qui aurait pris 47 ans à un ordinateur moderne. Si la Chine prend le leadership dans le domaine quantique, les systèmes de communication sécurisés ainsi que les documents nationaux sécurisés utilisés par le Groupe des cinq deviendraient vulnérables à l'interception et à la corruption par des acteurs chinois malveillants. Toutefois, l'informatique quantique et la cryptographie ne sont pas les seuls domaines quantiques qui présentent un risque pour la sécurité. Les développements en matière de détection et de communication présentent également un avantage unique pour le pays qui obtient l’avantage sur ses rivaux. Dans le domaine de la détection, le quantique offre une précision et une vitesse accrues par rapport aux technologies de détection modernes. Si cette précision et cette rapidité sont révolutionnaires dans les secteurs de la santé et de l'environnement, elles le sont également dans les secteurs de la sécurité et de la défense. Le leadership quantique dans les domaines de la détection offre aux armées la possibilité de déterminer l'emplacement des bases, des navires et des sous-marins, et de s'engager dans la guerre spatiale avec une précision sans précédent. Les acteurs malveillants chinois peuvent utiliser ces technologies pour identifier des faiblesses ou des cibles en vue d'attaques futures. Enfin, les communications quantiques offrent un avantage unique en matière de sécurité : en plus d'être plus sûres que les communications modernes, elles ne peuvent être interceptées ou modifiées de quelque manière que ce soit sans que le destinataire et l'expéditeur en soient informés. Bien que le développement de ces technologies nécessite également le développement de grilles et de systèmes capables de supporter le quantique, il est important de reconnaître l'importance et l'impact potentiel des avancées dans ces secteurs. Les avancées dans les domaines quantiques, même aux premiers stades de développement, ont le potentiel de modifier complètement les normes de sécurité internationales actuelles. Compte tenu de tous les avantages et risques associés au développement quantique, il n'est pas étonnant que des pays comme la Nouvelle-Zélande aient commencé à investir dans ces secteurs. Les efforts de développement quantique de la Nouvelle-Zélande ont souligné l'importance de la collaboration internationale pour consolider la position de l'État en tant que leader quantique. D'autres pays, comme le Canada et les États-Unis, ont adopté une approche plus prudente de la collaboration internationale. Afin de contrer les efforts étrangers malveillants en matière de recherche et de développement, les États-Unis et le Canada ont publié des listes d'organisations avec lesquelles la collaboration doit être limitée, voire inexistante. Les organisations figurent sur ces listes en raison de leurs liens avec des activités militaires et de défense étrangères de haut niveau ou de leur association avec des entités identifiées comme allant à l'encontre des priorités nationales. Avec ces listes et un positionnement clair du Groupe des cinq et de la Chine en tant que concurrents, la collaboration au sein du groupe n'est pas surprenante. La collaboration avec la Chine, en revanche, l'est. Alors que l'on s'attendait à ce que les partenaires des Five Eyes soient en tête de la collaboration quantique avec la Nouvelle-Zélande, la Chine est restée le premier coauteur international des publications du Dodd-Walls Centre for Photonic and Quantum Technologies de la Nouvelle-Zélande au cours des trois dernières années. Une certaine coopération avec la Chine est prévisible - la Chine est un leader en matière de développement technologique et offre de nombreux avantages dans ce domaine. Toutefois, ce sont les relations de collaboration entre les entités quantiques néo-zélandaises et chinoises qui ont été qualifiées de « risquées » par les gouvernements américain et canadien qui sont préoccupantes. Les sections suivantes examinent l'étendue de cette collaboration avec des organisations chinoises et le risque de menace potentiel qu'elles représentent, et proposent des domaines de coopération accrue au sein de l'organisation Five Eyes afin de mieux sécuriser les efforts de développement de la recherche. Collaboration quantique en Nouvelle-Zélande En 2021, le Centre Dodd-Walls a publié son premier rapport annuel comprenant des données sur les coauteurs internationaux. Il est surprenant de constater que les coauteurs chinois occupent la première place, avec 27% de l'ensemble des publications du centre signées par des coauteurs internationaux. La même situation s'est produite en 2022, où les coauteurs chinois se sont classés au premier rang, représentant 36,34% des publications du centre cosignées au niveau international. Cette situation s'est répétée une fois de plus dans le récent rapport 2023, dans lequel la Chine représentait 34,67% des publications cosignées. Cette collaboration avec la Chine n'est pas mauvaise en soi. Certaines organisations du pays ne représentent pas une menace pour la sécurité nationale. Les organisations qui représentent une menace ont été identifiées par les États-Unis et le Canada sur leurs listes respectives d'entités et d'organismes de recherche désignés. Parmi les organisations figurant sur ces listes, au moins trois apparaissent dans le rapport annuel 2021 du Dodd-Walls Centre. Il s'agit de l'université Beihang, de l'Institut de technologie de Pékin et de l'université des sciences et technologies de Nanjing. En 2022, l'Université polytechnique du Nord-Ouest, qui figure à la fois sur les listes des États-Unis et du Canada, est citée comme coauteur. En 2023, l'université de Baihang, l'institut de technologie de Pékin, l'université des sciences et technologies de Nanjing, l'université du Nord de la Chine et l'université du Sichuan figurent à nouveau sur la liste des coauteurs. Si ces organisations apparaissent nommément sur les listes d'entités et dans les rapports annuels, d'autres représentent un risque. En 2021, le rapport annuel incluait l'Académie chinoise des sciences, l'École supérieure de l'Académie chinoise d'ingénierie physique et l'Université des sciences et de l'ingénierie du Sichuan. Les listes d'entités et d'organismes de recherche des États-Unis et du Canada mentionnent des départements spécifiques au sein de ces académies et universités, comme l'Institut d'automatisation de Shenyang de l'Académie chinoise des sciences. En revanche, le Dodd-Walls Centre ne mentionne pas dans son rapport annuel le département ou l'institution avec lequel il collabore. La distinction des départements sur les listes d'entités et leur absence dans les rapports annuels du Centre Dodd-Walls s'est poursuivie avec l'École supérieure de l'Académie chinoise d'ingénierie physique et l'Université des sciences et de l'ingénierie du Sichuan. En utilisant les listes publiées par les États-Unis et le Canada et en recoupant les publications des organisations citées par le Centre Dodd-Walls comme coauteurs internationaux, j'ai examiné la coopération potentiellement « risquée » dans le cadre de la collaboration chinoise du Centre Dodd-Walls. Le nombre de publications collaboratives de ces entités « à risque » a été comparé au nombre total de publications internationales cosignées et au nombre total de publications chinoises cosignées. Le processus a été répété en ajoutant les départements non spécifiés afin de fournir des données sur le risque le plus élevé actuellement présent dans les collaborations du Dodd-Walls Centre. Les résultats de ce recoupement et de l'examen des données sont les suivants : En 2021, le pourcentage de coauteurs du Centre Dodd-Walls figurant sur les listes de surveillance canadiennes et américaines était d'au moins 2,4%, mais pouvait atteindre 4,8% si l'on tient compte des départements non spécifiés mentionnés précédemment. En 2022, l'Académie chinoise des sciences et la Graduate School of the China Academy of Engineering Physics apparaissent à nouveau. En 2022, le pourcentage des coauteurs internationaux du Dodd-Walls Centre figurant sur les listes de surveillance canadiennes et américaines était donc d'au moins 0,97%, mais pouvait atteindre 2,9%. En 2023, l'Académie chinoise des sciences et la Graduate School of China Academy of Engineering Physics font à nouveau leur apparition. Ainsi, en 2023, le pourcentage de coauteurs chinois figurant sur les listes de surveillance canadiennes et américaines était d'au moins 2,22%, mais pouvait atteindre 3,11%. En examinant les coauteurs chinois indépendamment du reste des coauteurs internationaux du Centre Dodd-Walls, j'ai constaté que la collaboration avec des organisations et des entités nommées représentait entre 10% et 20% en 2021, entre 3,7% et 11,11% en 2022, et entre 6,4% et 8,97% en 2023. Au total, le Dodd-Walls Centre revendique entre 8 et 38 publications cosignées avec les organisations et entités citées précédemment en 2021. En 2022, le nombre de publications cosignées se situe entre 1 et 7. En 2023, les publications avec les entités se situent entre 8 et 20. Bien que le volume des publications ait diminué entre 2021 et 2023, le risque pour la sécurité lié à toute association avec ces entités n'a pas diminué. La dualité de la collaboration entre la Nouvelle-Zélande et la Chine La présence de ces entités et des organismes de recherche cités dans les rapports annuels du Dodd-Walls Centre est préoccupante. Si les États-Unis et le Canada ont tous deux inscrit ces organisations sur la liste des menaces potentielles pour la sécurité nationale, la collaboration devrait être limitée, voire inexistante. Or, ce n'est pas le cas. Au contraire, comme démontré ci-dessus, le principal centre de développement quantique de Nouvelle-Zélande a, au cours des trois dernières années, entretenu une collaboration importante avec ces entités. La collaboration entre le Dodd-Walls Centre et les entités chinoises figurant sur les listes de surveillance canadiennes et américaines s'est principalement concentrée sur les applications environnementales et sanitaires de la quantique, conformément à l'accord signé sur une feuille de route quinquennale pour la coopération scientifique et technologique entre la Nouvelle-Zélande et la Chine. À première vue, ces domaines ne semblent pas concerner les efforts en matière de sécurité nationale. Cependant, les technologies quantiques, telles que les capteurs qui sont principalement développés dans les domaines de la santé et de l'environnement, sont classées comme des technologies à double usage. Cela signifie qu'un capteur quantique développé pour des applications environnementales ou sanitaires peut être plus facilement et rapidement adapté à des fins de sécurité. En d'autres termes, les mêmes technologies de détection utilisées pour localiser les principaux gisements de minerais sous la terre ou pour localiser les maladies dans le corps pourraient être utilisées pour localiser les sous-marins nucléaires et d'autres systèmes et infrastructures critiques. Si la Chine continue de représenter la majorité de la collaboration quantique de la Nouvelle-Zélande via le centre Dodd-Walls, la sécurité des futures technologies de communication quantique et d'autres développements au sein de la Nouvelle-Zélande et de ses partenariats de partage de renseignements continuera d'être exposée à des risques accrus. Heureusement, le centre Dodd-Walls offre la possibilité d'une collaboration accrue entre le Groupe des cinq pour contrer les efforts de la Chine dans le domaine des technologies quantiques. Contrer les menaces croissantes En matière de politique quantique, la Nouvelle-Zélande s'est souvent tournée vers ses partenaires traditionnels pour obtenir des conseils. Cette alliance des politiques quantiques est essentielle pour conserver l'avantage dans la course aux armements quantiques avec la Chine. Les États-Unis et le Canada ayant publié des listes d'entités et d'organismes de recherche désignés, la Nouvelle-Zélande devrait s'efforcer de suivre les traces de ces pays. À l'heure actuelle, il n'existe en Nouvelle-Zélande aucune liste d'entités ou d'organismes de recherche nommés permettant de suivre les efforts de collaboration internationale. Cela signifie que les menaces potentielles ont plus de chances de passer à travers cette faille dans la sécurité nationale de la Nouvelle-Zélande. Il serait approprié que le gouvernement néo-zélandais d'élaborer une liste d'entités ou d'organismes de recherche nommés qui s'aligne sur celle du Canada et des États-Unis. Ces pays devraient encourager l'élaboration d'une telle liste et son alignement sur les listes existantes. Le Canada et les États-Unis ont déjà fourni une base de connaissances sur ces entités à risque et s'aligner sur eux permettrait à la Nouvelle-Zélande d'approfondir ses relations de collaboration avec ses alliés traditionnels. En outre, l'établissement d'une telle liste permettrait de limiter ou d'éliminer la collaboration quantique avec des organisations qui représentent une menace importante pour les efforts de sécurité nationale et internationale. Sans cette liste, ces organisations pourraient continuer à chercher à collaborer avec les principaux instituts quantiques et pourraient appliquer tout développement critique à leurs propres efforts de sécurité nationale. Les technologies quantiques étant à double usage, les organisations peuvent plus facilement appliquer à leurs efforts de défense les progrès réalisés en matière de capteurs quantiques et d'autres technologies issues de la recherche dans le domaine de la santé ou de l'environnement. Ces développements restent cruciaux pour les efforts de sécurité nationale, et sans l'alignement des efforts quantiques de la Nouvelle-Zélande sur ceux de ses alliés, la menace des technologies quantiques chinoises continuera de croître. Conclusion Les pays du Groupe des cinq et la Chine se disputent le titre de leader dans le domaine quantique. La coopération internationale a joué un rôle essentiel dans l'accélération de la recherche et du développement des technologies quantiques. Toutefois, le centre Dodd-Walls de Nouvelle-Zélande pourrait placer la Chine dans une position avantageuse en tant que premier collaborateur international. Si toutes les collaborations avec la Chine ne constituent pas une menace, le centre Dodd-Walls a coopéré avec des entités connues et des organismes de recherche désignés par les États-Unis et le Canada comme présentant des risques pour la sécurité nationale. Cela est particulièrement important dans le cadre du partenariat de partage de renseignements Five Eyes, qui s'appuiera probablement sur les technologies quantiques pour partager des informations classifiées au fur et à mesure que ces technologies se développeront. L'absence d'entités ou de listes d'organismes de recherche désignés en Nouvelle-Zélande signifie que ces menaces peuvent continuer à croître et à se développer au sein du secteur quantique néo-zélandais. Le gouvernement néo-zélandais doit s'efforcer d'aligner davantage ses efforts en matière de technologie quantique sur ceux de ses alliés en élaborant et en publiant sa propre liste d'entités ou d'organismes de recherche nommés, alignée sur celles déjà publiées par les États-Unis et le Canada. Si la Nouvelle-Zélande poursuit sa coopération non contrôlée avec la Chine, les communications quantiques et les efforts d'échange de renseignements pourraient être compromis, et la recherche dans le domaine quantique plus vulnérable à d'éventuelles failles de sécurité. * Bailee Dobson est chercheure au Centre for International and Defence Policy et participe au projet « QFVEY : Quantum Security, Strategy, and Technology in Five Eyes Nations ». Ce projet a reçu un financement du ministère de la Défense nationale par le biais d'une subvention d'engagement ciblé dans le cadre du programme MINDS (Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security). Les points de vue et les opinions exprimés dans ce document ne reflètent pas nécessairement les points de vue ou les positions du ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces armées canadiennes. ## La modernisation de la défense continentale et l’avenir de la politique de défense du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-modernisation-de-la-defense-continentale-et-lavenir-de-la-politique-de-defense-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Avec les menaces qui pèsent sur la sécurité de l’Amérique du Nord et un environnement international aussi instable, le Canada, tout... Le 14 août dernier, le ministère de la Défense du Canada et le département de la Défense des États-Unis (DoD) ont émis une déclaration conjointe sur la modernisation du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD). Cette déclaration expose les priorités des deux pays quant à la modernisation du NORAD : investir dans la connaissance de la situation (par la mise à niveau du Système d’alerte du Nord (SAN)), améliorer les systèmes de commandement et de contrôle, mener des activités de recherche et de développement, et développer la « capacité de dissuader et, si nécessaire, de vaincre les menaces aérospatiales en évolution pour l’Amérique du Nord ». Déjà suggérée par le général américain Terrence J O’Shaughnessy et le brigadier général américain Peter M. Fesler dans leur rapport de septembre 2020, l’idée d’un NORAD plus offensif continue à gagner en importance alors que la concurrence stratégique croissante, les progrès rapides de la technologie et les changements climatiques minent la protection offerte par le NORAD. Ravivant une fois de plus le débat sur la participation canadienne au système de défense antimissile balistique (BMD), la modernisation du NORAD soulève de surcroit plusieurs enjeux. D’ailleurs, si cette déclaration conjointe paraît ambitieuse, elle n’indique pas quel pays va investir dans quelle priorité. Est-ce que le Canada va investir dans toutes ces priorités, ou devrait-il déterminer ses propres priorités ? Faisant suite à des ateliers réunissant des experts en matière de défense[1], cette note politique reprend leurs pistes de réflexion pour ce que plusieurs ont appelé « le chapitre non écrit » de la politique de défense du Canada de 2017, Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, c’est-à-dire un chapitre portant sur les enjeux de la défense continentale et de la modernisation du NORAD. D’abord, le Canada doit se positionner sur l’utilisation de la défense antimissile dans la modernisation du NORAD. Ensuite, le Canada doit réfléchir à ses intérêts stratégiques, en plus de déterminer ses priorités et ce qui le menace, afin de choisir les régions dans lesquelles il veut agir. Dans tous les cas, la modernisation du NORAD ne peut plus attendre afin d’offrir une défense continentale adéquate face aux nouvelles menaces. La modernisation du NORAD : Quid de la défense antimissile? Le continent nord-américain fait face depuis plusieurs années à une modernisation des armements des adversaires du Canada et des États-Unis. Par exemple, l’innovation en matière de missiles hypersoniques conçus pour pénétrer la défense continentale nord-américaine complexifie les efforts de défense antimissile. Pour faire face à ces nouveaux défis en matière de défense, la modernisation du NORAD est plus que nécessaire en raison de la désuétude de ses équipements. Il existe deux grands volets de la modernisation du NORAD. Le premier volet, principalement défensif par nature, consiste en la connaissance de la situation et les capteurs associés. Considérant que les équipements actuels ayant pour but la connaissance de la situation et la détection sont sur le point d’être obsolètes, une rénovation de ses équipements et l’installation de nouveaux capteurs permettront dans un avenir proche d’atteindre la connaissance de tous les domaines. Ce volet de la modernisation du NORAD est la pierre angulaire de la défense continentale, permettant la dissuasion, la détection et les contre-mesures. La mise à niveau du SAN, tout comme l’acquisition de nouveaux chasseurs et de navires, par exemple, s’inscrit dans cette optique de domination de l’information, mais les efforts de modernisation du NORAD ne peuvent se limiter à améliorer des équipements datant de l’époque de la guerre froide, au détriment d’une vision stratégique plus adaptée aux défis contemporains. Le deuxième volet, de nature plus offensive, consiste en la capacité à intercepter les missiles ciblant le territoire nord-américain ainsi que la capacité d’attaquer les plateformes de lancement de ces missiles. Le développement de ces capacités implique l’extension de la dissuasion par des capacités d’interdiction, rendant la défense continentale plus offensive. La modernisation du NORAD passera surtout par ces deux volets pour réussir à contrer les nouvelles menaces. Face à une multitude de menaces et à diverses avenues de modernisation complémentaires, quelles devraient être les priorités du Canada en matière de modernisation du NORAD ? Dans le contexte international actuel, le débat sur la participation du Canada aux capacités offensives du NORAD s’avère inévitable. Les experts consultés sont d’avis que le Canada va et devrait se concentrer sur le volet défensif du NORAD, c’est-à-dire la surveillance et la détection multi-domaines des menaces. Ceci est d’autant plus important s’il n’y a pas de consensus entre les élites politiques et que l’opinion publique est davantage en faveur de contributions défensives. D’ailleurs, selon certains, la participation au volet offensif du bouclier antimissile risquerait de rendre le Canada trop dépendant des décisions américaines qui ne correspondraient pas forcément aux valeurs et intérêts canadiens. Sachant que les Canadiens sont trois fois plus susceptibles de dire que le Canada doit promouvoir ses valeurs plutôt que ses intérêts, et que le Canada soutient la stabilité stratégique plutôt que le BMD depuis le début des années 2000, la participation aux capacités offensives du NORAD est plus qu’incertaine. D’un autre côté, le Canada devra peut-être s’orienter vers une dissuasion offensive dans certains domaines, comme le cyber ou la défense aérienne où l’avantage est plutôt à l’offensif, afin d’être un partenaire crédible dans la défense contre les menaces offensives d’adversaires. Cette participation ne signifie pas nécessairement que le Canada doit accueillir des dispositifs d’interception, mais cela n’est pas nécessairement exclu non plus. Le Canada a la possibilité d’explorer des rôles cinétiques et non cinétiques, qu’il veuille entreprendre une mission offensive dans certains domaines ou mettre l’accent sur la résilience et la limitation des dommages. Autrement dit, le Canada pourrait contribuer à la défense antimissile même s’il ne s’engage pas directement dans les mécanismes offensifs de neutralisation. L’avenir de la politique de défense du Canada Au-delà de la défense continentale, la question d’une refonte de la politique de défense du Canada se pose, notamment à la lumière de la réorientation de la stratégie de défense américaine vers l’Asie-Pacifique. Or, la politique de défense du Canada souffre d’une absence d’orientation stratégique, c’est-à-dire d’un guide déterminant les priorités internationales du pays. Le Canada fait face à des bouleversements internationaux majeurs, incluant la résurgence de la compétition entre grandes puissances, et plus particulièrement les relations sino-américaines de plus en plus conflictuelles – des éléments absents de l’énoncé de politique de défense de 2017. D’ailleurs, l’une des raisons du retrait hâtif des États-Unis d’Afghanistan était de mieux se préparer pour faire face à la Chine, qui devient l’adversaire le plus important des États-Unis selon le président Biden. Si l’objectif de Joe Biden était surtout de ramener le statu quo malmené sous Trump, et donc de rééquilibrer la rivalité sino-américaine, ses craintes sont maintenant que le système international se trouve à un point critique qui déterminera l’avenir de la démocratie dans le monde. Il semble alors que Biden considère que les États-Unis et les autres démocraties sont en conflit avec la Chine et les autocraties. Toutefois, les États-Unis sont clairs dans leur désir de ne pas laisser la Chine atteindre ses objectifs en matière de puissance et d’influence dans le monde. Même si l’administration Biden manque de clarté, selon certains, quant aux moyens que les États-Unis mettront en œuvre pour contrer la Chine, il faudra inévitablement s’attendre à ce que les États-Unis demandent l’appui de ses alliés, notamment le Canada. Il n’est toutefois pas encore clair quelles seront les demandes américaines à l’égard de l’Asie-Pacifique. Cependant, le Canada ne joue traditionnellement pas un rôle majeur dans cette région, se concentrant davantage sur la sécurité transatlantique par des contributions en Europe de l’Est et au Moyen-Orient. Il est également peu probable que le Canada devienne un acteur incontournable en Asie-Pacifique, ce rôle étant occupé par d’autres alliés des États-Unis. Mais il faut s’attendre à ce que le Canada soit sollicité, d’une façon ou d’une autre, pour contribuer aux efforts américains contre la puissance chinoise. Or, en matière de contributions, le Canada est inégal selon les dossiers et ne peut pas être partout à la fois. Le Canada devra faire des choix dans les contributions qu’il souhaite fournir. Si, durant le soi-disant « âge d’or » de l’internationalisme, le Canada s’est bâti une réputation de gardien de la paix, le Canada semble désormais dénué d’une identité internationale forte et reconnaissable. La montée des tensions en Asie-Pacifique fait resurgir une problématique souvent négligée par le Canada, à savoir l’identification et la priorisation des menaces. L’énoncé de défense de 2017 est l’exemple parfait d’une politique de défense sans stratégie de défense. Le document n’identifie pas clairement les acteurs menaçants et échoue à prioriser les menaces. Or, depuis 2017, le contexte international a évolué sans que la politique de défense canadienne ne soit revue. Le Canada ne peut plus compter sur les États-Unis pour défendre ses intérêts. Si nous devons tirer une leçon de l’administration Trump, c’est que les États-Unis peuvent devenir une menace pour les intérêts nationaux canadiens. La forte polarisation partisane aux États-Unis risque de ramener une administration similaire à celle de Donald Trump dans les prochaines années. Une certaine autonomie stratégique est donc importante pour le Canada, sans pour autant tourner le dos aux États-Unis. Le Canada devra faire des choix pour faire face à la montée en puissance de la Chine et de la Russie, comme ses alliés. L’Australie a, par exemple, choisi d’unir ses forces avec les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni en Asie-Pacifique. Le point de vue des experts américains Qu’en pensent les experts de la défense américaine ? Les experts consultés s’entendent sur le fait que le Canada est un partenaire irremplaçable, notamment en raison de sa position géographique, mais qu’il doit absolument définir ce qui le menace. Ce faisant, les États-Unis et le Canada pourront trouver une perspective commune des menaces qui planent sur la sécurité de l’Amérique du Nord et ainsi décider d’une stratégie commune plus efficace et coordonnée. L’influence de la compétition entre grandes puissances sur le point de vue des experts américains est indéniable. Dans un contexte de pivot américain vers l’Asie-Pacifique et de concurrence stratégique croissante avec la Russie et la Chine, les Américains perçoivent le Canada comme un allié fiable, mais qui accuse un certain laxisme en matière de priorisation et d’identification de ses intérêts stratégiques. Face aux positions assumées des États-Unis, cela pose nécessairement problème. Les experts américains souhaitent donc non seulement plus de clarté, mais aussi plus d’ouverture de la part du Canada. L’importance de l’engagement du Canada à moderniser le NORAD va de pair, pour eux, avec une ouverture face à de nouvelles technologies de détection et à de nouvelles infrastructures. La participation du Canada à la défense antimissile – notamment au BMD – ne fait cependant pas consensus en raison de sa portée limitée dans un contexte de compétition entre grandes puissances. Selon certains, la priorité devrait être accordée à la connaissance de la situation, notamment en raison de l’état critique du SAN en Arctique. Au niveau diplomatique, les experts américains sont d’avis que le Canada a une voix tout à fait puissante, surtout lorsque combinée avec celle des États-Unis. L’influence d’une voix unissant le Canada et les États-Unis dans l’Arctique n’est pas à négliger. Même si les deux pays doivent composer avec les limites de leur souveraineté nationale, ils ont tout intérêt à collaborer ensemble. Un alignement des positions du Canada et des États-Unis sur les enjeux en Arctique et en Asie-Pacifique serait évidemment pour eux la meilleure option. Recommandations Le Canada se doit, dans tous les cas, d’identifier clairement les enjeux et les acteurs menaçants et les prioriser. Ce travail d’identification et de priorisation permettra au Canada de cibler les contributions qu’il peut faire en fonction de leur importance face aux intérêts canadiens, mais aussi aux attentes des alliés. Alors que le Canada a longtemps été divisé entre ses positions atlantiste (OTAN), continentaliste (États-Unis) et internationaliste (ONU), faut-il maintenant prioriser plus spécifiquement l’Arctique, l’Asie-Pacifique, ou une autre région du monde ? Le Canada a tout intérêt à affiner ses positions et à être moins éparpillé entre ses différentes postures internationales. En fait, le Canada ne peut plus se permettre de saupoudrer ses capacités dans toutes les régions du globe : il doit se concentrer sur les régions dans lesquelles il a des intérêts stratégiques prioritaires. Or, le Canada ne peut pas se permettre d’avoir une logique totalement indépendante de ses alliés. Il faut alors que le Canada priorise les partenariats qui soutiennent la voie choisie par le Canada, quelle qu’elle soit. En tant qu’État souverain, le Canada doit d’une certaine façon prioriser l’Arctique, au vu de son importance stratégique, et cela passe par sa présence dans le Nord. Que ce soit à travers les forces militaires, le développement économique, la fourniture de services, les populations autochtones, les changements climatiques ou la défense nationale, le Canada doit se préoccuper de l’Arctique. La modernisation du SAN, en ce sens, est une priorité. Le Canada ne devrait donc pas, dans un avenir proche, participer au volet offensif du bouclier antimissile, mais plutôt investir son temps, ses fonds et son expertise dans les technologies de surveillance et de détection des menaces, notamment en Arctique, car les États-Unis comptent déjà sur l’aide du Canada dans ce domaine – ce qui n’est pas le cas du BMD. En Asie-Pacifique, le Canada doit trouver un moyen de contribuer aux développements dans la région avec les capacités limitées d’une puissance moyenne. Cela pourrait passer par un renforcement de la présence diplomatique du Canada et l’accroissement de partenariats avec les alliés régionaux. Le Canada a l’opportunité de se bâtir une réputation dans la région sans toutefois s’impliquer militairement. Le Canada peut rester un acteur secondaire en Asie-Pacifique. En tant que puissance moyenne, le Canada n’a pas les moyens d’être présent de façon significative partout. Il doit choisir ses contributions avec précaution, là où il peut apporter une valeur ajoutée. Pour cela, le Canada ne doit pas se contenter de petites contributions un peu partout, mais plutôt cibler des régions ou enjeux prioritaires. Il est donc impératif de réfléchir à une concentration des ressources sur des créneaux où le Canada dispose d’une expertise avérée, à l’instar du maintien de la paix pendant la guerre froide. Cela pourrait être le renforcement de capacités et la formation militaire en Asie et en Afrique, ou encore des capacités d’intervention lors de catastrophes naturelles. Le cyberespace pourrait également être un créneau intéressant, en coopération avec les pays d’Europe de l’Est, à condition de bénéficier de ressources suffisantes. Cependant, il existe deux contraintes à se focaliser sur des créneaux. La première est de trouver un créneau avec un pouvoir symbolique capable d’offrir de l’influence internationale au Canada et d’unir les Canadiens. La seconde contrainte est qu’il existe un danger à choisir un créneau : un pays disposant de plus de moyens pourrait invisibiliser le Canada dans ce domaine. Ainsi, les créneaux fonctionnent mieux lorsqu’ils dérivent naturellement d’une expérience et expertise particulière reconnue du pays.[2] En ce qui concerne l’alignement du Canada avec les États-Unis, il est très difficile d’imaginer que les positions canadiennes ne soient pas alignées au minimum avec celles du DoD, surtout en ce qui concerne le NORAD. Cependant, le Canada ne peut plus se permettre d’être un resquilleur (free rider). Il faut problématiser la relation du Canada avec les États-Unis. Il ne s’agit pas ici de ne plus considérer les États-Unis comme le premier et le plus important allié du Canada. Il s’agit plutôt de réaliser et d’accepter que les États-Unis ne considèrent plus nécessairement le Canada comme son premier allié. L’expérience du mandat de Donald Trump à la présidence a montré à quel point les États-Unis peuvent aussi représenter une menace significative aux intérêts du Canada. Un possible retour à l’instabilité politique n’est pas à négliger avec nos voisins du Sud. Avec les menaces qui pèsent sur la sécurité de l’Amérique du Nord et un environnement international aussi instable, le Canada, tout comme les États-Unis, ne peut plus se permettre de repousser la modernisation du NORAD : il faut agir maintenant. La modernisation du NORAD et du SAN figure dans les programmes du Parti libéral comme du Parti conservateur du Canada, démontrant un consensus sur une modernisation défensive du NORAD. Or, sans débat public prévu sur cette modernisation et avec le peu de détails fournis par les partis sur le fond et la forme de cette dernière, la question du NORAD risque de faire des vagues au sein de la population canadienne lorsqu’on connaîtra enfin la nature et le prix réel de cette modernisation inévitable. [1] Le premier atelier du 17 juin 2021 a réuni Jonathan Paquin de l’Université Laval, Stéphane Roussel de l’École nationale d’Administration publique, Gaëlle Rivard Piché de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada, Yann Breault du Collège militaire royal de St-Jean, Laurent Borzillo de l’Université du Québec à Montréal, Chantal Lavallée du Collège militaire royal de St-Jean, Nancy Teeple de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada, Pauline Pic de l’Université Laval, Pierre Colautti de l’Université Laval, Stéfanie von Hlatky de l’Université Queen’s, Justin Massie de l’Université du Québec à Montréal,  Marco Munier de l’Université du Québec à Montréal et Camille Raymond de l’Université du Québec à Montréal. Le deuxième atelier du 7 juillet a réuni Christopher Sands de la Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Anessa Kimball de l’Université Laval; Major Général (ret.) Randy “Church” Kee du Wilson Center et de l’Université d’Alaska, Jack David anciennement au Permanent Joint Board on Defense des États-Unis et Ian Williams du Center for Strategic and International Studies. [2] Nous souhaitons remercier Adam Chapnick pour cette remarque. ## La non-violence comme stratégie de résistance au Myanmar URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-non-violence-comme-strategie-de-resistance-au-myanmar/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > La campagne contestataire contre le coup d'État qui a renversé le gouvernement élu d'Aung San Suu Kyi au Myanmar émule maintes stratégies... Le maintien et le renforcement, au fil des semaines, des protestations au Myanmar malgré l’intensification de la répression de l’État s’inscrivent dans une tendance plus générale des mouvements de résistance d’acquérir un soutien international en faisant se retourner contre elle la violence des autorités. Inspirée d’autres mouvements de résistance dans le monde, la campagne contestataire contre le coup d'État qui a renversé le gouvernement élu d'Aung San Suu Kyi au Myanmar émule maintes stratégies de résistance non-violente qui ont porté fruit en parvenant à accroître suffisamment la pression domestique et internationale sur un gouvernement répressif afin de le renverser ou du moins, l’obliger à faire certaines concessions. Le Canada et d’autres pays alliés ont condamné l’usage de la violence par les forces armées du Myanmar contre les protestataires non-violents. Le département américain du Trésor a indiqué en mars dernier qu'il imposerait des sanctions à des membres de la junte, dont le chef de la police qui agit en coordination avec les militaires pour réprimer les manifestants. Le Secrétaire général des Nations unies, Antonio Guterres, a également incité la communauté internationale à s’engager dans une condamnation plus ferme des actes répressifs de la junte contre la population. L’ancien premier ministre australien, Kevin Rudd, a même appelé à une intervention du Conseil de sécurité. Si le mouvement contestataire au Myanmar continue ainsi de prendre de l’ampleur et qu’il maintient une discipline non-violente, on peut s’attendre à un engagement plus soutenu de la part d’États démocratiques, dont le Canada, pour faire cesser les violences et assurer la restauration d’un gouvernement démocratiquement élu, en ayant notamment recours à davantage de sanctions économiques contre la junte militaire. L’indignation internationale vis-à-vis de violences perpétrées contre des manifestants est toutefois généralement tributaire de la nature non-violente d’une campagne de résistance. Par la terreur qu’elle suscite, l’intensification de la répression de l’État contre les protestations au Myanmar risque à tout moment de rompre la discipline non-violente du mouvement et de diminuer le nombre de protestataires prêts à braver les violences étatiques. Comment faire alors en sorte de maintenir une pression suffisante sur un gouvernement répressif tout en conservant une stratégie de résistance non-violente plus susceptible de convaincre les audiences internationales de la légitimité des revendications et de la nécessité d’intervenir ? Une stratégie de résistance en permanente adaptation Le mouvement protestataire au Myanmar a usé d’un large éventail de tactiques non-violentes dont les objectifs sont entre autres d’inciter les populations locales à rejoindre la rue ainsi que d’attirer l’attention internationale sur le conflit, tout en accentuant la pression sur le régime militaire en place. Pour prévenir des irruptions et des arrestations massives, les protestataires ont notamment mis sur pied un réseau de vigiles civils dont le rôle est d’alerter l’arrivée des militaires à l’aide de casseroles qu’on entrechoque pour signaler le danger. L’utilisation de casseroles comme outil de contestation de l’autorité politique fait partie du répertoire d’actions généralement mobilisé par les mouvements non-violents, une méthode entre autres éprouvée lors du printemps étudiant de 2012 au Québec et dont la capacité à réunir un plus large public au sein de la mobilisation avait été auparavant démontrée lors des manifestations contre la répression politique du régime Pinochet au Chili. Le mouvement protestataire au Myanmar a également fait preuve d’ingéniosité en usant de codes culturels locaux visant à la fois à élargir la contestation à d’autres pans de la société et à pousser les forces policières à faire défection. Des vêtements de femme ont par exemple été pendus au-dessus des rues pour protéger les manifestants des charges policières puisque passer sous eux est traditionnellement perçu comme pouvant porter malheur aux hommes – une stratégie qui n’a toutefois pas empêché les militaires d’utiliser des gaz lacrymogènes, des balles en caoutchouc et des grenades assourdissantes pour disperser les manifestants. La force du mouvement protestataire au Myanmar est donc de faire preuve de flexibilité en adaptant ses tactiques de résistance aux actions répressives qui sont mises en place pour contrer la dissidence, faisant alors en sorte d’exercer une pression complexe et diffuse sur le régime. Le mouvement est également parvenu à intégrer dans ses rangs plusieurs groupes sociaux dont les intérêts et revendications divergent habituellement, une diversité dans la mobilisation qui constitue généralement un élément crucial du succès des campagnes de résistance non-violentes. Plusieurs groupes au sein du mouvement de résistance se sont d’ailleurs rassemblés au sein d’un Comité général de grève des nationalités, ce qui a permis une meilleure coordination des actions militantes sur l’ensemble du territoire. En limitant ses tactiques de résistance à des actions non-violentes, le mouvement restreint également la capacité du régime à légitimer les mesures répressives qu’il met en place aux yeux de la communauté internationale. L’objectif des protestataires est donc d’imposer un coût de réputation à la junte si elle décide d’utiliser la violence contre une opposition pourtant non-violente et dont les revendications politiques font échos aux normes internationales les plus susceptibles d’engager des acteurs étrangers dans le conflit. La littérature scientifique sur le sujet a effectivement exposé l’avantage qu’implique la non-violence en ce qui a trait aux perceptions des audiences internationales, notamment parce que la non-violence serait perçue comme une forme moins extrême de résistance et faciliterait ainsi les concessions politiques. De plus, le mouvement d’opposition s’est efforcé de faire appel à la responsabilité de protéger de l’ONU lorsqu’un État n’assure pas la protection de sa population, en érigeant entre autres des banderoles et des boucliers sur lesquels on pouvait lire « R2P ». Ici encore, les protestataires ont donc usé de références au régime normatif international afin que les actions violentes vis-à-vis des protestataires aient pour conséquence d’affaiblir la junte et que la répression politique engendre un effet boomerang en insufflant un nouveau souffle à la mobilisation. La fragile position du Canada Le cas du Myanmar illustre l’influence du système international sur les pratiques des mouvements de résistance. L’établissement d’un réseau mondial d’activistes préconisant les méthodes non-violentes de résistance a permis la propagation au niveau global du succès de certaines campagnes non-violentes. Plusieurs États, dont le Canada, ont démontré une sensibilité particulière vis-à-vis de mouvements de résistance non-violents, et ont souvent diminué leur soutien à ces mouvements lorsque ces derniers ont eu recours à des tactiques violentes. Dans ses énoncés condamnant le coup d’État et la répression du régime, le Canada a mis de l’avant l’usage de la non-violence par les protestataires. Justin Trudeau a personnellement critiqué les actions répressives de la junte militaire. Ottawa participe de fait au cadrage du conflit, ce qui affecte la capacité subséquente de la junte à légitimer la répression. Le Canada exerce par le fait même une pression normative sur les mouvements protestataires afin qu’ils usent de certaines tactiques de résistance au détriment d’autres. Les manifestations contre le coup d'État qui a renversé le gouvernement élu d'Aung San Suu Kyi ont jusqu’à maintenant fait preuve d’une remarquable résilience et d’une forte capacité à maintenir la discipline non-violente malgré des restrictions et des réponses de plus en plus extrêmes de la part des militaires. Cependant, plusieurs médias ont rapporté des cas récents d’escalade de la violence entre les protestataires et la police. Des protestataires ont également annoncé leur intention d’abandonner les tactiques non-violentes et de s’armer pour contrer la répression de plus en plus brutale du régime. Plusieurs études ont démontré que les mouvements de résistance civile qui joignent les tactiques non-violentes à des actions violentes, comme les affrontements de rue avec la police actuellement observés, tendent à diminuer leur capacité à atteindre leurs objectifs de changement politique. La radicalisation potentielle du mouvement vers la violence risque également d’intensifier la répression étatique, voire de préparer le terrain pour une situation encore plus catastrophique telle qu’observée en Syrie où les manifestations non-violentes réprimées ont finalement abouti à une guerre civile. En somme, une radicalisation du mouvement d’opposition à la junte militaire pourrait compliquer la position du Canada qui devra dès lors se distancer d’un mouvement aux actions de résistance plus extrêmes, de façon à réaffirmer l’importance pour le Canada d’une résolution pacifique du conflit et du retour d’un gouvernement démocratiquement élu. D’autre part, le soutien du Canada au mouvement protestataire a ouvert la porte à d’ultérieurs engagements. Ainsi, le Burmese Canadian Action Network (BCAN) a envoyé une lettre au premier ministre Justin Trudeau et au ministre des Affaires étrangères Marc Garneau les incitant urgemment à dépêcher des ressources matérielles en soutien à la population du Myanmar en plus de reconnaître officiellement le Comité représentant l'Assemblée de l'Union qui rassemble les représentants élus aux élections de novembre 2020. ## La nouvelle politique de défense britannique et ce que le Canada peut en tirer URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-nouvelle-politique-de-defense-britannique-et-ce-que-le-canada-peut-en-tirer/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Alors que le Canada cherche à revoir sa planification stratégique, il est important qu’il prenne acte des décisions prises par l’un de ses... C’est finalement avec un an de retard que le gouvernement britannique a publié, en mars dernier, son Integrated Review. Annoncé d’avance comme la plus importante révision de la place du Royaume-Uni dans le monde depuis la fin de la guerre froide, le document couvre tous les aspects de la politique internationale. Le titre de la politique, « Global Britain in a Competitive Age », signale l’ambition contenue dans ses pages. Il s’agit pour Boris Johnson de démontrer qu’en quittant l’Union européenne (UE), le Royaume-Uni s’est donné toute la latitude nécessaire pour conserver son influence et continuer de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans les affaires internationales. Le document s’accompagne d’un Command Paper, dans lequel le ministère de la Défense offre des précisions sur l’avenir des forces armées et une stratégie pour l’industrie de la défense. Au moment où le Canada cherche à revoir sa planification stratégique, il est important qu’il prenne acte des décisions prises par l’un de ses plus proches alliés. À cet effet, Ottawa devrait travailler à l’intégration de ses capacités de défense. Repenser les programmes d’acquisitions, entre autres à la lumière de la place grandissante des nouvelles technologies, semble également impératif. Le Canada devra également développer une stratégie cohérente et pragmatique pour encadrer ses actions en Indopacifique, une région qui se trouve au cœur du retour de la rivalité entre grandes puissances. Le retour de la compétition géostratégique Le constat que pose le document sur l’état de l’environnement stratégique est pessimiste : la multipolarité s’accroît et les menaces qui pèsent sur le Royaume-Uni augmentent. De toutes, la menace provenant d’acteurs étatiques est jugée la plus importante, un changement de paradigme par rapport à sa précédente politique de défense. La Corée du Nord et l’Iran sont mentionnés, mais la Russie demeure, pour Londres, la menace la plus aigüe et la plus directe, autant par ses capacités nucléaires que par sa maîtrise des activités en zone grise. Il reste que c’est la Chine qui préoccupe surtout le Royaume-Uni, à en juger par cette nouvelle politique stratégique. Elle est décrite comme une compétitrice systémique qui représente la plus grande menace à la sécurité économique du Royaume-Uni, l’accroissement de sa puissance devenant un défi pour la sécurité, les valeurs et le système politique de Londres et de ses alliés. Le document reflète malgré tout l’ambivalence qui règne au sein de la classe politique quant à la posture à adopter. En effet, le gouvernement britannique finit par ménager la chèvre et le chou en admettant que la relation avec la Chine soit faite de confrontation et de coopération. En cela, le Royaume-Uni adopte une position similaire à celle des États-Unis. Face aux défis que posent des États comme la Russie et la Chine à l’ordre international, le Royaume-Uni juge que défendre le statu quo n’est plus suffisant. Il annonce donc vouloir activement travailler à façonner l’ordre international de demain. Pour y arriver, Londres compte sur le fait que les grandes et moyennes puissances pourront jouer un rôle important dans le futur si elles arrivent à collaborer entre elles. Le Royaume-Uni souhaite donc occuper une place centrale dans l’action collective d’États partageant les mêmes idées que lui, ce qui laisse présager une augmentation des formats de coopération en « minilatéral ». Londres cherche à s’affirmer comme leader de la sécurité dans la région euro-atlantique. À cet effet, elle poursuit le développement du UK Joint Expeditionary Force dont 10 États sont membres. La Défense a aussi réaffirmé que les forces armées continueraient leur participation au programme de présence avancée en Europe de l’Est et en mer Baltique de l’OTAN. Dans le même temps, le Royaume-Uni accroît sa contribution à la mission de l’OTAN en Irak et envoie 300 soldats à la mission de maintien de la paix des Nations unies au Mali. Mais la nouvelle la plus importante reste le retour de la Grande-Bretagne à l’Est de Suez. L’importance croissante de l’Indopacifique se manifeste par une nouvelle stratégie d’implantation de bases militaires, la signature récente d’accords de défense avec le Japon et l’Inde, et le déploiement du nouveau porte-avions HMS Queen Elizabeth dans la région. Ce dernier sera accompagné de navires américain et néerlandais, en plus de participer à des exercices avec plusieurs alliés européens et asiatiques. Au-delà de ce déploiement, des navires de patrouilles extracôtiers seront stationnés de façon permanente dans la région. Le nombre d’attachés militaires et de diplomates en poste en Asie du Sud-Est est également en augmentation. Surtout, le Royaume-Uni entend coopérer étroitement avec son plus proche allié, les États-Unis. Londres vise un rapprochement encore plus important avec Washington, en particulier au sein d’organisations comme le Groupe des cinq (Five Eyes) et l’OTAN. L’accent mis sur l’Alliance atlantique et les démocraties libérales dans la politique britannique suggère qu’un des objectifs de la stratégie britannique est de rassurer l’administration Biden sur le sérieux de son engagement envers l’ordre international. Aussi, cela signifie que la sécurité transatlantique restera la priorité du Royaume-Uni, quelle que soit sa rhétorique sur l’Indopacifique. Si la coopération avec plusieurs États européens est mise de l’avant – plus précisément avec la France, l’Allemagne et l’Irlande – presque aucune mention n’est faite de l’UE. Nonobstant l’acrimonie résiduelle liée au Brexit, le Royaume-Uni ne pourra pas faire autrement que de travailler avec l’UE sur les principaux enjeux mis de l’avant dans sa nouvelle politique stratégique. Il est donc étrange que Londres ne fasse pas mention de l’UE en ce qui a trait à l’Indopacifique, et ce alors qu’elle vient de publier sa propre stratégie relative à cette région. Même constat sur la question de la sécurité dans la région euro-atlantique, où l’UE semble vouloir coopérer davantage, et pourrait devenir une interlocutrice privilégiée de la Maison-Blanche en la matière. Une politique de défense pour l’ère de l’information Le Royaume-Uni reconnait l’importance croissante des nouveaux types de menaces technologiques. Il fait face à des adversaires qui, par leur recours aux activités sous le seuil de la guerre, brouillent la frontière traditionnelle entre les domaines civil et militaire, mais aussi entre la guerre et la paix. Dans ce contexte, le gouvernement et les forces armées ont mis en place de nouvelles approches de sécurité nationale, notamment par la poursuite d’une approche pangouvernementale qui implique autant la défense que la diplomatie, ou encore le commerce, l’aide au développement et le renseignement. Cela se matérialise déjà par la fusion entre les ministères des Affaires étrangères et du Développement, décidée en 2020. Le ministère de la Défense poursuit le travail entamé dans le récent Integrated Operating Concept. Comme son nom l’indique, cette nouvelle approche vise à intégrer les cinq domaines (armée, marine, aviation, espace, cyber) des forces armées du Royaume-Uni, à associer ces dernières aux autres branches de l’État et à rendre interopérables les actions entreprises par le Royaume-Uni et ses alliés en matière défense. L’intégration fait référence à l’utilisation conjointe des capacités navales, aériennes, spatiales et cybernétiques dans des opérations multi-domaines. C’est d’ailleurs dans ces domaines que l’essentiel des investissements est réalisé. En travaillant à faire passer les forces armées de l’ère industrielle à l’ère des systèmes d’information, l’objectif reste en grande partie de dissuader d’éventuels adversaires. L’importance accordée aux capacités sous le seuil et à la résilience sociétale élargit cependant la portée de la dissuasion. Cela implique une nouvelle posture de force, plus affirmée, plus dynamique et un déploiement avancé et continu. L’ensemble doit permettre une capacité d’adaptation susceptible de permettre une prise de décision plus efficace et une meilleure rapidité d’action. La création de la National Cyber Force (NCF) constitue un pas vers l’intégration de l’ensemble des branches de l’État. Son unicité est qu’elle rassemble des éléments des forces armées (dont un régiment dédié à la guerre cybernétique), du renseignement et des départements civils de l’État. L’agilité institutionnelle de la NCF signifie que l’ensemble des ressources peuvent aussi être mises au service d’opérations, tant défensives qu’offensives. Elle procure donc un avantage indéniable en permettant de répondre efficacement aux menaces et défis de zone grise que posent des États comme la Russie ou la Chine. L’impact des attaques sur Solarwind ou plus récemment sur Colonial Pipeline illustre l’actuelle fragilité des infrastructures critiques. La clef de l’intégration et de la modernisation est le développement de capacités technologiques facilitatrices. On parle, entre autres, de traitement des données, d’intelligence artificielle, de bio-ingénierie et de technologies quantiques. Pour ce faire, l’objectif du Royaume-Uni est de devenir un leader en matière de recherche et développement (R&D) dans lequel un investissement de 2,4% du PIB est prévu. Dans le domaine spatial, cela se traduit par la volonté de détenir 10% du marché mondial d’ici 2030. En R&D comme dans le domaine spatial, la sortie de l’UE implique des pertes financières importantes pour les institutions britanniques. Les investissements prévus par Londres pourraient, au final, ne servir qu’à combler ce manque à gagner engendré par le Brexit. La nouvelle stratégie pour l’industrie de la défense va dans cette direction. La pandémie de la COVID-19 met présentement en lumière l’importance de maintenir des capacités de production et une maîtrise souveraine de certaines technologies. De ce fait, le Royaume-Uni décide d’adopter une posture plus protectionniste dans ses programmes d’acquisitions. L’importance de la compétition internationale sera donc pondérée par des considérations de sécurité nationale dans l’attribution des contrats. Qui profite et qui écope des nouveaux investissements? Une portion significative des investissements prévus est dirigée vers les forces navales. La Royal Navy veut s’établir comme la première marine d’Europe et renouer avec une capacité de projection globale de sa puissance. Son plan implique l’acquisition de 13 frégates (l’objectif est une flotte de 24 frégates), le remplacement de leur classe de destroyers et le développement d’un nouveau modèle de vaisseaux multi-usage pouvant agir comme plateforme pour l’embarquement de drones. Sont également en développement de nouveaux missiles surface-surface et sept sous-marins. La clef de cette reconfiguration navale est la mise en service de leurs deux nouveaux porte-avions de la classe Queen Elizabeth. Le remplacement des sous-marins dédiés à la dissuasion nucléaire a aussi récemment été confirmé. Surtout, le Royaume-Uni annonce, dans l’Integrated Review, le développement de nouvelles armes nucléaires et l’augmentation du nombre total de têtes qu’il détient. Ces derniers points seront réalisés en étroite collaboration avec Washington. Il s’agit d’un renversement complet de la posture britannique, qui réduisait son arsenal nucléaire depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Les justifications de ce changement sont très vagues, le Royaume-Uni se contentant de dire qu’il est le résultat de la complexification de l’environnement international et de la croissance des menaces technologiques. Le développement des capacités antimissiles russes pourrait néanmoins en être la véritable raison. Chose certaine, cette décision affecte déjà négativement l’image du Royaume-Uni et fait craindre une augmentation généralisée des stocks nucléaires mondiaux. La Royal Air Force, quant à elle, continue l’acquisition d’avions de combat F-35. Leur nombre total a néanmoins été revu à la baisse, tant et si bien que des appareils américains sont présentement embarqués sur le porte-avions Queen Elisabeth pour son déploiement en Indopacifique. Cela pourrait être appelé à se perpétuer dans le temps. Cette décision s’explique sans doute par le fait que la RAF travaille déjà sur un chasseur de 6e génération, dont la mise en service est prévue pour 2035, et qui serait doté de technologies de radar à haute vitesse et d’intelligence artificielle. Elle investit également dans des drones, autant pour soutenir les chasseurs, que pour les remplacer éventuellement. Par ailleurs, un commandement spatial existe maintenant au sein de la RAF avec pour objectif de devenir un acteur important dans ce domaine plus contesté que jamais. Ce sont 1,4 milliard de livres qui seront investies dans ce domaine. Londres cherche à, d’une part, se protéger des menaces spatiales à l’aide de systèmes basés sur terre et dans l’espace. D’autre part, elle cherche à s’assurer un accès autonome à l’espace, ce qui devrait être réalisé en 2022 avec la mise en orbite de satellites. Avec cette capacité de lancement, le développement d’un système britannique de positionnement par satellites – qui coopérait avant le Brexit au système européen Galileo – pourrait voir le jour. À terme, Londres souhaite détenir l’habileté de surveiller et défendre les intérêts britanniques dans et à travers l’espace. L’ensemble de ces mesures est soutenu par une augmentation substantielle du budget de la défense qui passera à 2,2% du PIB. Le programme d’acquisition de nouvelles capacités est estimé à près de 24 milliards de livres sur quatre ans, soit le plus important investissement depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Le Royaume-Uni se hisse donc au 5e rang des États en termes de dépenses militaires. Cependant, des coupes ont dû être réalisées afin de réinvestir dans ces nouveaux programmes. L’armée de terre est celle qui écope le plus au sein des forces armées, ses effectifs étant réduits de 10 000 hommes. Un autre secteur où des coupes étaient attendues est celui de l’aide au développement. La dernière révision des dépenses a réduit l’APD de 0,7% à 0,5% du PIB, soit une réduction budgétaire de 25 à 30 milliards de livres d’ici 2025. Ce dernier point va à contrecourant de l’approche pangouvermentale énoncée, en réduisant l’influence diplomatique et politique de Londres. Cela pose nécessairement la question de la capacité des forces armées de répondre à des enjeux de plus en plus divers et non militaires. Une vision trop ambitieuse ? La nouvelle politique britannique est donc une stratégie globale qui ne fait aucun compromis vis-à-vis ses engagements. Concrètement, trois points laissent planer un doute sur la faisabilité de l’Integrated Review. D’un, Londres fait le pari qu’un virage vers la haute technologie permettra à ses forces armées de conserver un avantage vis-à-vis de potentiels adversaires. Ce choix implique une explosion des coûts d’acquisitions et, à terme, une dépendance technologique accrue au niveau opérationnel. À cet égard, le professeur Peter Roberts se demande si le Royaume-Uni se prépare pour le conflit qu’il souhaite mener ou celui qu’il devra mener. De deux, le corollaire du virage technologique est un choix de la qualité sur la quantité. Le personnel en uniforme de l’armée, par exemple, descendra à 73 000 en termes d’effectifs. Bien qu’historiquement bas – du jamais vu depuis le 18e siècle –, le problème des effectifs apparait lorsque les déploiements augmentent au même moment. La question est peut-être davantage criante pour la Royal Navy. Déjà, il n’est pas garanti qu’elle pourra utiliser pleinement ses nouveaux porte-avions, faute de posséder le nombre suffisant d’avions embarqués et les vaisseaux d’escorte nécessaires. Il sera difficile de jouer parallèlement un rôle significatif dans les régions indopacifique et euro-atlantique. De trois, la question financière est celle qui demeure la plus préoccupante et qui amène la communauté internationale à demeurer sceptique. Le Bureau national d’Audit jugeait déjà inabordable le plan du ministère de la Défense pour s’équiper. La question des finances publiques post-COVID-19 représente aussi un enjeu de taille et la Défense pourrait en subir les conséquences. Difficile de savoir ce qui sera conservé si les moyens viennent à manquer, car l’absence de compromis s’accompagne d’un manque de clarté quant aux priorités selon les domaines (spatial, cyber, maritime, etc.). À ce titre, Londres semble avoir dérogé à la définition donnée par John Lewis Gaddis de la grande stratégie, soit « le processus par lequel les fins sont liées aux moyens, les intentions aux capacités, les objectifs aux ressources. ». Dans ces conditions, il est raisonnable de se questionner sur la manière dont Londres pourra articuler une stratégie d’action cohérente. Recommandations et considérations pour le Canada Le travail entrepris par le Royaume-Uni, aussi exhaustif qu’ambitieux, confirme des tendances déjà observées dans les dernières politiques d’autres alliés du Canada, comme l’Australie. Ottawa doit savoir en tirer des leçons afin de mieux appréhender le futur de ses relations internationales. Premièrement, les trois plus proches alliés du Canada – les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la France – tournent maintenant leur attention vers la région indopacifique. Malgré qu’elle soit devenue le nouveau « centre du monde », le Canada n’a toujours pas publié de documents élaborant le rôle qu’il entend y jouer. La présence ponctuelle du Canada en mer de Chine et la récente entente de coopération en matière de sécurité avec le Japon indiquent que le Canada souhaite travailler avec ses partenaires de la région. Si le Canada semble vivre son « moment Indopacifique », il doit s’y avancer avec précaution. En effet, la région est au cœur des tensions entre grandes puissances et les risques de se retrouver pris dans un conflit sont grands. Aussi, Ottawa ne dispose que de capacités réduites. Une présence accrue en Asie est susceptible de compromettre ses engagements en Europe et dans le Grand Nord, où le Canada est à même de jouer un rôle notable. Ne pas commettre la même erreur de surengagement que le Royaume-Uni est, en ce sens, impératif. Sans s’engager trop rapidement en Indopacifique, le Canada devra tout de même aborder l’épineuse question de sa relation avec la Chine. L’ambivalence canadienne à l’égard du gouvernement n’a plus sa place. Ne pouvant agir seul face au géant chinois, le Canada doit, plus que jamais, s’associer à d’autres démocraties libérales pour espérer tirer son épingle du jeu. Deuxièmement, il est nécessaire de penser et de mettre en place une approche pangouvernementale en matière de défense et de sécurité. Le budget fédéral récemment déposé par le gouvernement reste malheureusement muet sur ces questions. Il est pourtant indispensable qu’Ottawa débute une réflexion digne de ce nom en politique étrangère – le dernier livre blanc sur la question remonte à 2005 – suivi d’un investissement en conséquence. Les forces armées, pour leur part, ont amorcé un virage bienvenu vers l’ère de l’information. L’utilisation de nouvelles technologies par les forces armées ne doit pas nécessairement se transformer en dépendance vis-à-vis de celles-ci, ce qui pourrait arriver au Royaume-Uni. L’exemple de la France représente un modèle alternatif pertinent quant à l’utilisation de la technologie et son incorporation dans les moyens militaires et non militaires. Face aux nouvelles menaces cyber, de désinformation ou d’ingérence dans les élections, c’est cependant l’ensemble de l’appareil étatique qui devra travailler de concert afin de défendre les intérêts canadiens. Pour ce faire, le Canada devra s’appuyer sur les nouvelles technologies. S’il peut se targuer d’avoir une avance dans certains domaines comme l’intelligence artificielle, il faudra à l’avenir investir en R&D et s’assurer de maintenir des capacités de production souveraines, dont l’importance a été réitérée maintes fois durant la pandémie. Le Canada peut s’inspirer ici de la nouvelle politique industrielle britannique qui juge important de supporter l’industrie nationale et de conserver un savoir-faire et des capacités souveraines. À noter que l’Australie et l’Allemagne ont récemment fait un choix semblable. Troisièmement, le Canada doit revoir la manière dont il conduit ses programmes d’acquisitions. D’une part, la rapidité de l’évolution technologique actuelle entre en contradiction avec ses processus traditionnellement longs et visant l’achat de plateformes qui sont pensées pour être en service pendant des décennies. Le risque, en ce sens, est de voir un achat devenir plus rapidement désuet. Le Royaume-Uni planifie ainsi déjà le développement du chasseur de 6e génération qui remplacera ses F-35 (5e génération) alors que le Canada tergiverse encore sur le modèle qui remplacera ses vieux CF-18 de 4e génération. La Défense nationale doit miser sur des systèmes et un processus d’acquisitions plus flexibles qui s’adapteront mieux aux percées technologiques. D’autre part, une meilleure supervision et reddition des comptes des projets d’acquisitions apparait inévitable. Le récent rapport du Directeur parlementaire du budget sur le programme des nouvelles frégates canadiennes est révélateur. Maintenant estimé à 77 milliards de dollars, le coût total a triplé depuis ses débuts. Par ailleurs, l’opacité entourant le contrat et l’absence de redevabilité des décideurs minent la confiance envers les institutions. Les finances publiques seront sous pressions suite à la pandémie et des choix difficiles devront être faits au sein des forces armées. De nombreux navires et aéronefs devront être remplacés dans les prochaines années si le Canada souhaite maintenir ses capacités, notamment ses sous-marins et des brise-glaces. Il est grand temps que le Canada entreprenne une discussion sur ces enjeux, aussi complexes qu’importants, s’il souhaite rester pertinent sur la scène internationale. ## La peur de rater : La modération de Meloni pour la stabilité du scénario international. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-peur-de-rater-la-moderation-de-meloni-pour-la-stabilite-du-scenario-international/ Modified: 2023-10-24 > Les dernières élections italiennes, tenues en septembre 2022, représentent un tournant à la fois pour le pays et la communauté internationale. Les dernières élections italiennes, tenues en septembre 2022, représentent un tournant à la fois pour le pays et la communauté internationale. Selon plusieurs analystes, la victoire de la coalition de droite dirigée par Giorgia Meloni marque un point de bascule et un changement politique significatif dans le scénario national et international. La coalition victorieuse a défendu des positions eurosceptiques et pro-russes par le passé, ainsi que des positions extrêmement conservatrices sur diverses questions, telles que l'immigration, la sécurité et les droits sociaux. La position du Bel Paese au sein du contexte régional européen et du paysage international plus large souligne l'importance de sa position face aux défis nationaux et mondiaux, qui affectent l'équilibre mondial. Il convient de noter la position géographique stratégique de l'Italie, sa force économique, son patrimoine culturel, sa culture stratégique, son influence diplomatique, ses remarquables capacités de soft power, sa gestion efficace des crises migratoires et sa stabilité politique. Ce « point chaud » examine deux des questions de politique étrangère les plus importantes auxquelles le nouveau gouvernement italien est confronté : l'alignement international vis-à-vis de Moscou et les politiques de sécurité. Compte tenu de l'amitié de longue date entre les milieux de droite italiens et Poutine, les déclarations de la nouvelle Premier ministre élue, Giorgia Meloni, semblent plaider en faveur d'une réorientation vers Bruxelles et l'OTAN plutôt que vers Moscou. Le nouveau gouvernement Meloni a pris ses fonctions à un moment particulièrement délicat pour le destin des équilibres nationaux et internationaux. En effet, l'invasion russe de l'Ukraine, ainsi que les nouvelles pressions migratoires en provenance de la région MENA et de la route des Balkans, créent un paysage sécuritaire difficile pour les partenaires de la zone euro et l'Italie elle-même. Depuis sa nomination fin septembre 2022, la nouvelle Premier ministre a publiquement confirmé le soutien de l'Italie à l'Ukraine dans le cadre d'une coopération indissociable entre les alliés de l'OTAN et les membres de l'UE. Giorgia Meloni a souligné l'importance d'une ligne d'action commune entre les pays de la zone euro et le bloc nord-atlantique pour promouvoir un concept de sécurité global, pas seulement régional. Lors du dernier sommet à Vilnius en juillet 2023, la Première ministre a souligné l'engagement de l'Italie et de ses partenaires occidentaux envers le gouvernement de Kiev. En effet, au cours des derniers mois, les discussions sur l'adhésion de l'Ukraine à l'OTAN ont relancé le débat public et politique sur le rôle de l'organisation, les conditions d'intégration des nouveaux membres et les tactiques stratégiques à utiliser pour défendre le gouvernement de Zelensky contre l'invasion prolongée de Moscou. La plupart des commentaires émis au cours des mois précédant les élections, lorsque des rumeurs sur une possible victoire de Meloni circulaient déjà, soulignaient que l'Italie courait le risque de devenir le maillon faible en Europe, compromettant l'unité des membres de l'OTAN et le "consensus" sur l'Ukraine et la Russie. À ce jour, les preuves ont démenti ces appréhensions, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'agenda de politique étrangère de la nation. Dans le contexte des conséquences profondes de l'intervention militaire de la Russie en Ukraine, de l'escalade des coûts de l'énergie et des pressions inflationnistes généralisées touchant l'ensemble de l'Union européenne, la perspective de politique étrangère de l'Italie - troisième économie de l'Union - jouera un rôle particulièrement crucial dans les mois à venir. La préservation de l'unité européenne sur les sanctions et le soutien militaire à l'Ukraine tout en contrecarrant l'agression russe dépendra largement des politiques de l'Italie vis-à-vis de Moscou et de son approche envers les alliés à Bruxelles et à Washington. La question de la position de l'Italie vis-à-vis de Moscou dans le cadre régional européen est cruciale : bien que la Première ministre Meloni ait déjà réitéré son soutien à Kiev, suivant ainsi le choix de son prédécesseur Draghi d'envoyer du matériel de soutien à l'Ukraine, le passé de certains membres de la coalition au pouvoir en Italie doit être pris en considération. Les élites politiques de droite en Italie ont souvent été critiquées par leurs homologues européens pour leur attitude ambiguë envers le président Poutine. Des représentants de certains des partis de droite qui forment maintenant la coalition au pouvoir ont eu des relations personnelles avec le leader du Kremlin, jetant une lumière négative sur l'Italie, notamment compte tenu de l'importance de la position régionale du pays par rapport à la politique étrangère agressive de la Russie. Ces dynamiques, qui ramènent l'attention sur l'occupation russe du Donbass en 2014, ont été régulièrement abordées par les cercles du centre-droit italien, qui ont critiqué l'inefficacité et l'absurdité des sanctions imposées à Moscou par les alliés occidentaux. En effet, il s'agit d'une question particulièrement difficile pour l'Italie, qui dispose de ressources énergétiques limitées et dépend fortement des importations de matériaux russes. L'ancien Premier ministre Giuseppe Conte, chef du parti populiste Movimento 5 Stelle, a déjà critiqué les sanctions de l'UE contre Moscou, mais il a tenté de présenter sa critique en termes d'approvisionnement en énergie plutôt que de positionnement politique réel. L'ancien Premier ministre récemment décédé, Silvio Berlusconi, était largement reconnu comme un proche allié de Vladimir Poutine, et il a été impliqué dans une situation contentieuse après l'élection du nouveau gouvernement. Malgré les enjeux au niveau international, il n'a pas manqué de souligner sa longue relation avec Poutine, sapant ainsi la crédibilité de l'Italie auprès de ses alliés. De même, l'ancien ministre de l'Intérieur et actuel vice-Premier ministre Matteo Salvini représente un facteur de discorde en ce qui concerne la position de l'Italie. Il est un partisan ouvert de Poutine : en 2014, il a soutenu l'intervention en Crimée, la qualifiant de légitime, et a critiqué les sanctions occidentales nuisibles à l'UE et à l'Italie ; en 2018, il a conclu un accord entre son parti et celui du président russe, qui est toujours en vigueur aujourd'hui ; en 2019, une enquête a révélé que la Russie aurait offert trois millions d'euros à un membre de la Ligue pour financer la campagne électorale du parti au Parlement européen. Contrairement à Berlusconi, cependant, Salvini semble avoir fait marche arrière par rapport à ses positions explicites précédentes concernant la Russie, peut-être pour préserver la stabilité du gouvernement et la crédibilité de l'Italie, et sous l'impulsion de l'exemple de Meloni. Après les élections, Giorgia Meloni a souligné l'engagement constant et renouvelé de l'Italie envers l'alliance atlantique et le bloc occidental en général lors de l'inauguration du nouveau gouvernement. La Première ministre s'est entretenue avec les dirigeants des plus hautes institutions de l'UE le 23 octobre lors de sa première visite internationale. Les principaux sujets de discussion portaient sur la gestion de la crise énergétique, avec des références à l'occupation de l'Ukraine par la Russie et à la position de l'Italie, ainsi que sur la gestion des fonds du PNRR. Meloni a déclaré qu'elle travaillait déjà sur des solutions pratiques pour aider les familles et les entreprises à faire face aux défis de l'insuffisance des approvisionnements énergétiques et de la hausse des coûts mensuels des services publics. En ce qui concerne l'alignement international sur la question ukrainienne, Meloni a réitéré son soutien à Kiev, soulignant la possibilité d'un déploiement supplémentaire d'armes en cas de décision conjointe des membres de l'OTAN ou de l'UE et exprimant son désir de faire de l'Italie un bastion régional et international. La nouvelle Première ministre italienne a choisi de suivre les traces du précédent gouvernement Draghi dans la gestion des fonds de relance post-pandémie que l'Italie recevra de l'UE. La nomination de Giancarlo Giorgetti au poste de ministre de l'Économie est perçue comme un signe que l'Italie tiendra ses promesses envers Bruxelles. Giorgetti était en effet ministre du Développement économique dans le gouvernement Draghi, qui était considéré comme digne de confiance par les institutions européennes. Ainsi, l'un des défis régionaux les plus importants pour le gouvernement italien sera de démontrer sa fiabilité en tant que partenaire des institutions européennes à un moment où la montée des défis dans le cadre continental menace la stabilité et la cohésion de l'Union. D'autre part, en ce qui concerne les dépenses publiques liées à la participation à l'alliance de l'OTAN, il semble que l'Italie rencontre des problèmes avec le budget de l'organisation (les fameux 2 % du PIB à consacrer à la Défense, en signe de partage du fardeau au sein de l'organisation). Compte tenu de sa dette publique très élevée, Rome est confrontée à de nombreux défis pour atteindre le seuil prédéterminé de légèrement plus de 1,5 % en 2022 (contre 1,57 % l'année précédente). Guido Corsetto, ministre de la Défense et co-fondateur du parti Fratelli d'Italia, a souligné à plusieurs reprises l'engagement de l'Italie à respecter le seuil convenu par l'OTAN. Les projections du seuil de 2 % publiées par la division diplomatique de l'OTAN montrent que la part du PIB de l'Italie atteindra le seuil prédéterminé seulement en 2028. Selon le Document de programmation de la Défense pluriannuelle pour la période de trois ans 2022-2024, publié par le ministère italien de la Défense, la tendance montre une valeur de 1,54 % pour 2022, qui restera inchangée en 2023, tandis qu'une augmentation à 1,65 % est prévue pour 2024.   La porte d'entrée sud de l'Europe La question de la migration est une autre priorité de politique étrangère importante pour le nouveau gouvernement de droite en Italie. L'Italie est un point d'arrivée pour les routes notoires en provenance du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord via les Balkans ou la Méditerranée elle-même en raison de sa situation stratégique en Europe du Sud. Meloni a rapidement réitéré l'accord avec la Libye conclu sous le gouvernement dirigé par le Parti démocrate précédent et signé par l'ancien Premier ministre Gentiloni en 2017. L'accord prévoit que le gouvernement italien fournisse une assistance économique et technique aux autorités libyennes (en particulier à la garde côtière) afin de réduire le trafic de migrants en Méditerranée. La Libye a accepté d'améliorer les conditions dans ses centres de réception des migrants en échange. Le récit véhiculé par les gouvernements italiens, soutenue par les partenaires européens et Washington, est celle de la lutte contre le terrorisme. En effet, la Libye est un pays en proie à une guerre civile qui fait rage depuis la chute du régime de Kadhafi, exacerbée au fil du temps par la radicalisation des parties sur le terrain et soutenue par divers acteurs internationaux. En réalité,  , non seulement en Libye - point d'arrivée de l'Afrique subsaharienne mais aussi point de départ en raison de son débouché maritime. Les tactiques violentes et arbitraires de la garde côtière libyenne pour secourir les migrants en Méditerranée et les contraindre à une détention indéfinie dans les prétendus centres de détention ont choqué l'opinion publique internationale. Le non-respect de la Libye de la Convention de 1951 sur les réfugiés, ainsi que l'impact de cette situation sur les migrants secourus en Méditerranée, suscitent de sérieuses préoccupations. Le gouvernement italien, complice des atrocités commises contre les migrants d'autres pays d'Afrique subsaharienne ainsi que des Libyens, est critiqué pour son soutien continu aux autorités libyennes malgré la connaissance par l'opinion publique internationale des conditions arbitraires de détention dans les camps libyens. Dans l'ensemble, il semble que le nouveau gouvernement dirigé par Meloni ait mis en œuvre des choix de politique étrangère très clairs depuis le début, en particulier sur deux vecteurs principaux : d'une part, un soutien renouvelé à Bruxelles et aux alliés de l'OTAN pour la stabilité internationale ; d'autre part, une attention renouvelée à la question de la migration grâce à des accords avec le gouvernement de Tobrouk, officiellement reconnu par l'OTAN comme le gouvernement libyen officiel post-Kadhafi. Ainsi, malgré les spéculations préélectorales, il semble que le gouvernement italien suive une stratégie de continuité avec les administrations nationales précédentes et que la convergence des visions politiques et militaires puisse en réalité se concrétiser en une réelle realpolitik.   La politique étrangère stratégique de l'Italie : Naviguer entre sécurité, énergie et alliances mondiales En termes de sécurité et d'approvisionnement énergétique, l'accent mis par le gouvernement italien sur l'Afrique du Nord est un autre point critique de la politique étrangère du pays. En effet, la crise internationale déclenchée par l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie a poussé Rome à chercher à renforcer d'autres partenariats pour plusieurs raisons : d'abord, pour créer une zone hautement sécurisée en mer Méditerranée, où Moscou dispose d'un soutien clé dans les bases navales de son partenaire syrien ; ensuite, pour s'émanciper des sources d'énergie russes en demandant un approvisionnement plus important en gaz naturel d'Alger. De plus, le gouvernement Meloni a récemment conclu des séries de réunions avec le gouvernement tunisien dirigé par le président Saïed et certains représentants du FMI, cherchant une assistance externe à la lumière de la grave crise économique et de la légitimité du pouvoir central. La Tunisie, souvent citée comme le seul pays de la région MENA à avoir connu et surmonté avec succès une période de transition démocratique suite aux manifestations de 2011, connaît actuellement une régression démocratique en raison de la gestion défaillante du pouvoir central : le président Saïed a assumé tous les pouvoirs en 2021 après avoir été élu en 2019, puis a révoqué des membres de son gouvernement et a enfin bloqué les activités du Parlement, resserrant son emprise sur le pouvoir. Le Parlement a ensuite été définitivement dissous à l'été 2022, les députés étant accusés par le président de chercher à saper la sécurité intérieure du pays. Dans cette situation, Saïed a commencé à travailler via des décrets présidentiels. Cela a mis en place une forme de pure présidentialisation, donnant au président le pouvoir de nommer et de révoquer unilatéralement les Premiers ministres et les ministres. En raison de leur proximité géographique et de la nature stratégique de leur relation, les liens entre l'Italie et la Tunisie sont historiques : le pays, à la frontière entre la Méditerranée et l'Afrique subsaharienne, est un point de passage critique pour les migrants d'Afrique centrale cherchant des alternatives en Europe du Sud. La Tunisie, comme la Libye, est donc un acteur important dans le discours sur la sécurité et les choix politiques de Rome et de l'ensemble du bloc européen. Cependant, les choix européens en matière de sécurité et de soutien économique à la République tunisienne restent problématiques, éphémères et inefficaces, en particulier s'ils ne sont pas accompagnés de demandes de conditionnalité telles que la redistribution, la formation et le développement. Certains chercheurs ont également mis l'accent sur ce point spécifique, en raison du rôle clé de la Tunisie dans le cadre méditerranéen et de son partenariat avec Bruxelles. L'importance du partenariat avec la Tunisie pour l'Italie repose également sur la question de l'énergie : à la recherche de partenaires alternatifs à Moscou, l'Italie s'est engagée depuis un an et demi dans une voie d'émancipation vis-à-vis de la Russie pour l'approvisionnement énergétique. Le partenariat renouvelé avec l'Algérie implique le transport des ressources algériennes via un pipeline sous-marin qui traversera 400 kilomètres de côtes tunisiennes avant d'atteindre l'Italie. En effet, comme l'a déclaré la Première ministre Meloni elle-même, «[...] également à cet égard, l'Italie a fait un travail important pour garantir le financement. Il s'agit d'une infrastructure stratégique qui relie davantage le destin de nos deux nations, permettant à l'Italie et à la Tunisie de devenir des hubs d'approvisionnement énergétique pour leurs régions respectives : pour l'Europe dans le cas de l'Italie, et pour les besoins d'approvisionnement des pays africains, en particulier l'Afrique du Nord.» En général, la Première ministre a réitéré ces derniers jours qu'elle n'est pas «insatisfaite» de ceux qui cherchent à défendre leurs frontières, leur souveraineté nationale et leur identité, tels que la Pologne et la Hongrie. Ainsi, il semble que l'administration Meloni affiche sa matrice nationaliste et identitaire, typique des choix et des récits de l'alt-right. Les questions liées aux accords avec la Libye et la Tunisie, en conséquence, renforcent la position du gouvernement italien en tant que rempart des politiques de containment de la migration, malgré le manque de profondeur d'analyse concernant les motivations derrière les départs des migrants de leurs lieux d'origine (souvent liées à des crises politiques, sociales et climatiques). À l'échelle mondiale, le leadership de Meloni a suivi de manière pragmatique les traces du précédent gouvernement dirigé par Draghi dans sa gestion de la Chine et de son initiative Belt and Road, en contraste marqué avec les prérogatives sur lesquelles l'accord était basé. L'ouverture envers Pékin a été inaugurée par le Mémorandum d'Entente sur l'initiative Belt and Road, dévoilé en 2019 par le gouvernement Conte I de l'époque, malgré les opinions divergentes de la Ligue de Matteo Salvini, avec laquelle le Mouvement 5 Étoiles de Conte partageait la coalition au pouvoir. Selon Giorgia Meloni, l'accord était une grosse erreur, et la nouvelle Première ministre a ralenti son renouvellement éventuel - une question dont la trajectoire ne sera officiellement connue qu'à la fin de 2023. Cette position est donc cohérente avec celle de Mario Draghi, qui avait exprimé précédemment des réserves concernant le Mémorandum, qu'il estimait devoir être examiné attentivement. Par conséquent, la question reste ouverte, et la Première ministre Giorgia Meloni a déclaré que le retrait éventuel de l'Italie du Mémorandum Belt and Road ne coïnciderait pas nécessairement avec une détérioration des relations entre Rome et Pékin, qui demeure un partenaire mondial important. Lorsque le Mémorandum a été signé, l'Italie avait été vivement critiquée, notamment par Washington, pour être le seul pays du G7 à s'être officiellement engagé dans une voie de détente et d'accords avec Pékin. La question des fusions et acquisitions éventuelles de sociétés italiennes par des investisseurs chinois reste au centre des relations entre l'Italie et la Chine. L'engagement renouvelé du nouveau gouvernement envers le bloc atlantique et les alliés occidentaux pourrait conduire à une plus grande assertivité de l'Italie vis-à-vis de Pékin à l'avenir. ******* Dans l'ensemble, la position internationale de l'Italie ne semble pas beaucoup dévier de celle des gouvernements précédents, comme le montre déjà la littérature, à l'exception des relations avec Pékin - que le gouvernement Meloni tente de mettre de côté. Malgré les craintes liées aux affinités idéologiques et politiques entre le nouveau gouvernement italien et les gouvernements régionaux d'extrême droite eurosceptique, il semble que le leadership de la Première ministre Meloni soit destiné à suivre les traces des grandes puissances européennes, du moins en matière de politique étrangère. Le soutien renouvelé à l'Ukraine dans son conflit avec la Russie, la position pro-OTAN et pro-UE, le renouvellement des politiques d’endiguement de l'immigration et de sécurité, et enfin, la rupture graduelle et potentielle avec les accords Rome-Pékin semblent tous indiquer que l'Italie tente de maintenir une position de premier plan dans les hiérarchies régionales et internationales, avec le soutien de ses alliés occidentaux. ## La place de l’Inde dans le Quad à l’aune d’AUKUS URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-place-de-linde-dans-le-quad-a-laune-daukus/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Quels sont les effets de l'annonce d'AUKUS sur le Quad et plus spécifiquement sur le rôle de l’Inde au sein de cette organisation ? Contexte Le Dialogue quadrilatéral pour la sécurité (Quad) est un groupe de coopération réunissant l’Inde, le Japon, l’Australie et les États-Unis qui a vu le jour pour la première fois en mai 2007. Cette structure est héritée du « Core Group » qui a été constitué après le tsunami de 2004 dans l’Océan indien pour coordonner l’aide humanitaire. Les États membres souhaitèrent par la suite en élargir le domaine d’action, notamment en organisant des exercices militaires conjoints, les Exercices Malabar. Ce groupe n’a jamais affiché une volonté de contrer la montée en puissance de la Chine dans la région, mais la réaction de Pékin a tout de même été virulente, qualifiant le Quad de « petite OTAN ». Finalement, le retrait rapide de l’Australie a officiellement mis fin à ce premier essai en 2008. Le Quad renaît lors du Sommet de l’Association des Nations d’Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN) à Manille, en novembre 2017. Son objectif est désormais de « promouvoir une région Indopacifique libre, ouverte, prospère et inclusive, afin de servir les intérêts de toutes les puissances dans la région et dans le monde ». Cette décision s’inscrit dans un contexte de montée des tensions entre les États-Unis et la Chine sous l’administration Trump. Pour New Delhi, c’est également un moment stratégique, seulement quelques mois après son face-à-face avec l’Armée Populaire de Libération de Chine sur le plateau de Doklam, et l’inauguration officielle de la base militaire permanente chinoise à Djibouti le 1er août 2017. Les pays du Quad ont explicitement refusé d’en faire une alliance militaire anti-chinoise. Selon certains analystes, ce sont notamment les réticences de l’Inde qui limitent l’ampleur de cette coopération. Toutefois, le Quad, en permettant à ses membres d’affirmer leur solidarité, envoie un message stratégique clair à la Chine « suffisamment restreint pour éviter des répercussions de la part de Pékin ». Avec l’organisation du premier sommet (virtuel) des chefs d’État du Quad en mars 2021, le nouveau président américain, Joe Biden, semblait faire de cette organisation un pilier central de sa stratégie pour une « Indopacifique libre et ouverte ». Néanmoins, l’annonce, en septembre 2021, de la formation d’AUKUS, une alliance trilatérale de sécurité entre l’Australie, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis, dessine un nouveau cercle, dont l'Inde est exclue, et ce, une semaine avant le premier sommet en personne des chefs d’État du Quad. Quels sont les effets d’une telle annonce sur le Quad et plus spécifiquement sur le rôle de l’Inde au sein de cette organisation ? La création d’AUKUS soulève plusieurs points. Premièrement, elle ravive en Inde des doutes sur la question de la fiabilité des États-Unis. Toutefois, malgré les inquiétudes, l’alliance ne semble pas provoquer un affaiblissement de la coopération stratégique au sein du Quad. Elle permettrait au contraire de clarifier la position de ce dialogue pour la sécurité. Enfin, AUKUS et ses effets pourraient même permettre à l’Inde de maintenir son autonomie stratégique. La question de la fiabilité des États-Unis Les bonnes relations entre l’Inde et les États-Unis sont récentes et les réticences de l’Inde concernant une alliance avec l’Occident sont encore nombreuses. En effet, les États-Unis sont perçus par beaucoup en Inde comme un partenaire faillible. Cette image a des racines profondes qui remontent à la Guerre froide à la suite de la coopération des Américains avec le Pakistan et de l’ostracisation de l’Inde dans la communauté internationale après les essais nucléaires de 1974. Plus récemment, le parti communiste en Inde s’est opposé de manière virulente à une coopération avec les Américains lors de la signature de l’accord nucléaire de 2005. La naissance du Quad 1.0 a ravivé ces critiques. Ainsi, lors d’une visite à Pékin en 2007, le premier ministre de l’époque, Dr. Manmohan Singh, fut contraint de réaffirmer « l’indépendance de la politique étrangère » indienne. À l’été 2021, le départ des États-Unis d’Afghanistan a fait renaître ce débat dans la perspective d’un possible retour de groupes terroristes soutenus par les talibans à la frontière entre l’Inde et le Pakistan. C’est dans ce contexte de méfiance que s’inscrit l’annonce d’AUKUS. Cet évènement a donc contribué à renforcer les interrogations en Inde sur la fiabilité des États-Unis en tant que partenaire. En effet, l’annonce s’accompagne d’une livraison de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire à l’Australie, provoquant ainsi la rupture d’un contrat avec Naval Group, une entreprise française, signé en 2016 et qui prévoyait la vente de douze sous-marins à propulsion conventionnelle. Cette annonce a provoqué de fortes réactions en France, avec notamment le rappel de l’ambassadeur français en Australie et aux États-Unis. Cet évènement entache encore un peu plus la réputation de l’allié américain. La Chine en a d’ailleurs profité pour développer le narratif selon lequel les États-Unis sont un allié faillible, car AUKUS montrerait que la mentalité « America First » a survécu à l’administration Trump. L’Inde possède son propre plan de développement d’une flotte de sous-marins nucléaires d’attaque pour améliorer ses capacités de déploiement dans l’Océan indien ainsi que sa capacité nucléaire de frappe en second. Toutefois, les États-Unis ont souligné le caractère « exceptionnel » de cette alliance et n’envisagent pas d’élargir l’AUKUS à l’Inde, mais proposent des collaborations occasionnelles. On observe une politique à deux vitesses des coopérations entre les membres du Quad ainsi que les limitations de l’India-US Defence Trade and Technology Initiative lancée en 2012 qui exclue une coopération indo-américaine dans le domaine des sous-marins nucléaires. Toutefois, l’annonce d’AUKUS a permis de renforcer la vigueur du pivot vers l’Asie ainsi que la perception des États-Unis comme une puissance déterminée à renforcer ses alliances dans l’Indopacifique. Le secrétaire à la Défense américain, Lloyd J. Austin, a aussi assuré au ministre de la Défense indien, Rajnath Singh, que les États-Unis allaient continuer à coopérer avec l’Inde au sein du Quad. Un affaiblissement de la coopération stratégique au sein du Quad ? Selon l’Amiral Arun Prakash, qui a joué un rôle important dans le rapprochement entre les marines indienne et américaine, AUKUS se présente comme un club exclusif qui laisse l’Inde et le Japon de côté dans l’Indopacifique. Le Quad était capable de poser une alternative à la Chine et AUKUS aurait en quelque sorte diminué cette capacité en l’empêchant de réaliser son plein potentiel. L’inquiétude porte notamment sur le fait que le Quad en soit réduit à s’occuper d’enjeux tels que les changements climatiques et la lutte contre la pandémie de COVID-19, lui retirant ainsi son intérêt stratégique dans la région. Au-delà de la critique d’une fragilisation indirecte du Quad, AUKUS a également des conséquences stratégiques directes pour l’Inde. L’Océan indien, qui s’étend de la côte est de l’Afrique à l’Australie, est perçu par l’Inde comme faisant intégralement partie de sa sphère d’influence. Cette « doctrine Monroe » indienne pousse l’Inde à être sensible à un possible « encombrement de l’espace stratégique de l’Océan indien ». Les États-Unis ont déjà fait l’objet de critique lorsque, en avril 2021, la Navy américaine a mené une opération de « Liberté de Navigation » dans la Zone Économique Exclusive indienne sans le consentement de New Delhi. Ainsi, même si l’Australie est un partenaire de l’Inde au sein du Quad, la perspective d’un déploiement de nouveaux sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire dans la région n’est pas forcément bienvenue. Dans cette perspective, AUKUS rajoute effectivement un acteur capable de se déployer dans l’est de l’Océan indien et diminue mathématiquement la primauté indienne. De plus, l’Inde s’inquiète d’une réaction chinoise qui prendrait la forme d’une expansion de son activité militaire au-delà de la mer de Chine du Sud et donc dans l’est de l’Océan indien. En effet, dans le cadre de la « Two Ocean Strategy », les incursions de sous-marins nucléaires d’attaque de la marine de l’Armée Populaire de Libération dans l’Océan indien sont déjà récurrentes et pourraient s’intensifier. Toutefois, d’autres voix nuancent ces inquiétudes en affirmant qu’AUKUS et le Quad ne sont pas à opposer au sein d’un jeu à somme nulle, mais seraient davantage complémentaires. En effet, leur création a été motivée par une raison similaire : contrer la montée de l’assertivité de la Chine dans l’Indopacifique. Les mêmes valeurs sont mises en avant dans les déclarations communes des deux groupes, c’est-à-dire la liberté de navigation et le respect du droit international. Le Quad, qui est un partenariat stratégique, se concentre davantage sur des enjeux non conventionnels de sécurité comme les technologies émergentes, la vaccination ou le contre-terrorisme. Le domaine d’action d’AUKUS, qui est une véritable alliance, relève davantage des enjeux de défense. La distinction entre sécurité et défense est ici essentielle : le Quad ne perd pas son intérêt stratégique, mais ses prérogatives sont désormais plus claires. Le sommet de septembre 2021 à Washington visait justement à monter que le Quad n’allait pas disparaître à l’inverse de ce que la Chine pouvait espérer. Une des raisons pour lesquelles l’Inde s’inquiétait de la résurrection du Quad en 2017 était le manque de « clarté stratégique » de l’Australie vis-à-vis de la Chine. AUKUS a eu le mérite de balayer ces doutes. Le ministre philippin des Affaires étrangères, Teodoro L. Locsin Jr, estime, à propos de la livraison de sous-marins, qu’un « renforcement de la capacité de déploiement d’une puissance alliée géographiquement proche devrait restaurer et maintenir l’équilibre plutôt que le déstabiliser ». Ainsi, l’Inde, au lieu de s’inquiéter de la présence de sous-marins australiens dans la région, devrait au contraire reconnaître que ce développement est dans son intérêt et dans celui de la région. Plus largement, la constitution d’AUKUS, au lieu d’affaiblir le Japon et l’Inde, renforce l’architecture de partenariats dans l’Indopacifique dont le Quad n’était pas la seule expression. En effet, l’Inde fait partie de plusieurs autres coopérations plus ou moins actives à l’image des dialogues trilatéraux Inde-Japon-États-Unis depuis 2011 ou encore Australie-Inde-Japon depuis 2015. De plus, AUKUS attire un nouvel acteur dans la région, le Royaume-Uni, qui pourrait également travailler avec le Quad. Cette multiplication des partenariats vise à renforcer l’équilibre de la puissance. La création d’AUKUS permet aussi au Quad de prioriser d’autres sujets que l’aspect militaire et cela s’inscrit dans la lignée de la vision de l’Inde. La stratégie indienne dans la région, même si elle manque encore de cohérence, avait été exposée en 2015 par le premier ministre Modi avec le label SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) et complétée par l’Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative en 2019. L’ASEAN était mise en avant comme l’organisation centrale pour la politique indienne « Act-East » en Indopacifique afin de souligner l’importance de la coopération et de l’inclusivité. Le sommet des chefs d’État de septembre a permis de répondre aux critiques des pays de l’ASEAN qui reprochaient au Quad de ne pas les aider à pallier les besoins d’infrastructures. L’objectif implicite du Quad est de proposer une alternative à la Belt and Road Initiative chinoise en insistant sur les « normes élevées » de leurs programmes de financement. La position de l’Inde au sein du Quad L’Inde possède une culture stratégique particulière qui valorise l’autonomie stratégique. New Delhi fait donc preuve de réticences face aux alliances militaires. Plusieurs facteurs d’explication sont à prendre en compte : la prégnance du passé colonial, la méfiance vis-à-vis de l’Occident et la stratégie de non-alignement héritée de la position du premier ministre Nehru pendant la Guerre froide. De plus, comme l’explique L. Lee dans un rapport du Lowy Institute, « l’Inde partage des intérêts communs avec les trois autres membres du Quad, mais serait moins capable de résister aux coûts qui lui seraient imposés si elle devenait un partenaire plus actif ». En effet, malgré la modernisation rapide de son armée, l’Inde a des capacités militaires limitées et sa proximité géographique avec la Chine la met dans une position particulière. New Delhi ne veut pas provoquer l’hostilité chinoise alors que les problèmes frontaliers ne sont pas réglés, comme l’ont prouvé les affrontements de la vallée de Galwan en 2020 qui ont fait vingt morts côté indien. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères indien, S. Jaishankar, lors du dialogue de Raisina en avril 2021, a insisté sur le fait que le Quad n’est pas une « OTAN asiatique ». De plus, une transformation du Quad en alliance militaire aurait également des implications stratégiques sur son partenariat avec la Russie. Traditionnellement, l’Inde a donc été perçue comme le « maillon faible » du Quad et comme un frein à l’évolution du dialogue vers une organisation plus militaire. L’annonce d’AUKUS pourrait retirer une pression sur l’Inde au sein du Quad, « en attirant l’ire de la Chine ». L’Inde se verrait moins forcée à prendre des engagements sur le plan de la défense et pourrait ainsi conserver son autonomie stratégique en n’opérant pas ouvertement une politique de « balancing » contre la Chine. De la même façon, le Quad n’a fait aucune déclaration conjointe sur la crise en Ukraine, ce qui ne met pas l’Inde dans l’embarras par rapport à son partenaire russe. Toutefois, la réticence à se positionner sur cet enjeu pourrait lui nuire à long terme. Enfin, la création d’AUKUS pourrait représenter une opportunité stratégique pour l’Inde si cela lui permet de développer des coopérations avec d’autres pays. Les discussions entre le premier ministre N. Modi et le président français Macron dans les heures qui ont suivi l’annonce d’AUKUS montrent que c’est notamment avec la France que la coopération pourrait s’approfondir. Les deux chefs d’État ont souligné « le rôle important que joue le partenariat entre l’Inde et la France pour promouvoir la stabilité et la sécurité dans la région ». Les deux pays organisent depuis 1998 les exercices navals bilatéraux Varuna et l’Inde a commandé 36 Rafale à la France en 2016. Comme l’avait évoqué la ministre de la Défense française, F. Parly en 2020, cet accord pourrait mener à d’autres coopérations. L’Inde est par exemple dans une position favorable pour négocier avec la France une possible vente de sous-marins Barracuda. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada La création d’AUKUS a donc souligné plusieurs enjeux pour l’Inde en questionnant la fiabilité du partenaire américaine et a semblé fragiliser le Quad. Toutefois, ces inquiétudes sont nuancées par le fait qu’AUKUS renforce l’architecture de la sécurité dans l’Indopacifique et dans une certaine mesure, permet à l’Inde de se concentrer sur d’autres enjeux au sein du Quad que l’aspect militaire et de maintenir son autonomie stratégique. L’Inde est un acteur central pour la stratégie américaine dans l’Indopacifique et sa position géographique « apporte une légitimité politique particulière au plan des États-Unis pour un nouvel équilibre des puissances », ce qui évite de présenter les enjeux dans la région comme un affrontement entre l’Asie et l’Ouest. Dans un tel contexte, le Canada « manque à l’appel ». À l’annonce d’AUKUS, le premier ministre Trudeau a rappelé que le Canada n’était pas intéressé par les sous-marins nucléaires américains. Au-delà de cet aspect matériel, le Canada est, à l’inverse de l’Australie, très peu impliqué dans l’Indopacifique ou alors de manière ponctuelle. L’évolution du Quad n’implique pas non plus directement les intérêts canadiens, mais en tant que membre du Groupe des cinq qui possède une frontière maritime sur le Pacifique, le Canada se doit d’avoir un œil sur cette région. Si un groupe de travail au sein des Affaires mondiales se penche actuellement sur la question, le Canada n’a pour l’instant pas de stratégie officielle pour l’Indopacifique. Il possède davantage un rôle de spectateur dans la région et cette position attentiste pourrait être problématique dans l’avenir. En effet, le Canada a un intérêt à défendre un ordre international fondé sur des règles et la liberté de navigation dans la région. Comme l’a défendu Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, « loin d’être à l’abri de cette lutte de pouvoir transpacifique, le Canada est au centre de celle-ci ». Il soutient que la stratégie canadienne dans la région devrait être une « politique diplomatique active en faveur des États-Unis ». Cela permettrait à Ottawa de participer à « l’affrontement juridique », notamment en mer de Chine méridionale, sans devoir supporter des coûts militaires exorbitants. Cette stratégie pourrait-elle être mise en place avec le Quad ? Le nouveau sommet du Quad au Japon en 2022 ouvre la possibilité d’étendre le dialogue avec un Quad Plus. En 2020, la Nouvelle-Zélande, la Corée du Sud et le Vietnam avaient déjà participé à une réunion du Quad afin d’échanger sur la gestion de la pandémie et pourraient coopérer sur d’autres dossiers. La question d’une possible adhésion du Canada au Quad est également en suspens même si cela pourrait risquer de détériorer davantage ses relations avec la Chine. Le ministère canadien des Affaires mondiales a affirmé qu’en tant que nation du Pacifique, « le Canada travaille avec les quatre membres du Quad pour répondre aux enjeux communs dans la région ». Si les États-Unis semblent favorables à un élargissement du Quad, l’Inde et l’Australie sont plus réservées. Quoi qu’il en soit, un Quad Plus représente une piste d’action à considérer sérieusement. ## La politique étrangère du Canada est-elle réellement féministe ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-politique-etrangere-du-canada-est-elle-reellement-feministe-bilan-et-recommandations/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique suggère que la politique étrangère féministe du Canada serait bonifiée en respectant plus rigoureusement les critères La présente note stratégique soutient que, pour honorer sa promesse, le gouvernement du Canada devrait mettre en œuvre sa politique étrangère féministe (PEF) dans le cadre d'une approche globale et holistique, conjointement avec d'autres initiatives connexes liées à la sécurité et à la défense. Cette approche devrait également être conforme à l'optique intersectionnelle de l'élaboration des politiques de l'Analyse comparative entre les sexes plus (ACS+), qui a été intégrée dans tous les ministères et organismes fédéraux. Pour ce faire, nous évaluons la politique étrangère féministe du Canada en répondant à trois questions : « Qu'est-ce que la PEF du Canada et quels sont ses objectifs ? », « Qui participe à l'élaboration de la PEF du Canada ? » et « Comment la PEF est-elle mise en œuvre ? ». Notre analyse suggère que, dans son état actuel, la politique étrangère féministe du Canada serait bonifiée en respectant plus rigoureusement les critères de l'ACS+, définis par Affaires mondiales Canada (2017) comme une évaluation des « répercussions potentielles des politiques, des programmes ou des initiatives sur divers ensembles de personnes – femmes, hommes ou autres ». Si cette note stratégique propose des recommandations concrètes en vue d'atteindre cet objectif, il encourage également les acteurs des affaires étrangères et de la défense à réfléchir aux considérations et aux principes fondamentaux en matière d’égalité des genres qui se perdent face à des approches politiques axées sur les résultats et visant le court terme. Qu'est-ce que la PEF ? - La PEF du Canada devrait clarifier davantage ce qu'implique une politique étrangère « féministe » du point de vue du gouvernement canadien. La politique étrangère du Canada, telle qu'elle est définie actuellement, a une portée trop limitée et reproduit des divisions inutiles et cloisonnées entre la politique étrangère, la sécurité et la défense, les droits de la personne et le développement. Une approche féministe devrait combler ces fossés et requiert une approche holistique et intersectorielle. - Les objectifs plus larges de la poursuite d'une politique étrangère féministe ne sont pas précisés. Dans son état actuel, l'accent mis sur le lien entre une politique étrangère féministe et une plus grande efficacité dans la mise en œuvre du développement, de la démocratie et de la sécurité a entraîné des conséquences inattendues, car cette approche ne reconnaît pas la valeur intrinsèque de la diversité et de l'inclusion. Nous développons ces points ci-dessous. Qui y participe ? - La poursuite de la politique féministe est principalement déployée dans des canaux officiels, d'État à État, qui ne sont pas propices à la réalisation de ses objectifs au niveau du terrain. Elle doit s'accompagner d'un engagement soutenu avec les organisations de la société civile et dans des lieux où l'État n'est qu'un acteur parmi d'autres (ou carrément absent). - Dans la même veine, la PEF du Canada ne fait pas suffisamment de place à un engagement significatif de la diversité des acteurs concernés par ce programme politique. Une PEF est par définition collaborative et inclusive, où les acteurs locaux non étatiques qui sont consultés ont leur importance dans la conception des initiatives de la PEF. - La PEF du Canada devrait faire plus de place à la reconnaissance de diverses formes d'expertise et d'agence. Le jargon gouvernemental et les déclarations de haut niveau peuvent faire perdre de vue les objectifs de la PEF. Un engagement plus poussé des universitaires et de la société civile serait souhaitable à cet égard, afin de mieux relier les principes de la PEF à la poursuite des objectifs et des résultats en matière d'égalité des genres. Comment est-elle mise en œuvre ? - La PEF du Canada reste, à notre avis, trop symbolique et performative, ainsi que hiérarchisée dans sa conception et sa mise en œuvre. - Une politique étrangère féministe devrait plutôt être conçue et mise en œuvre d'une manière suffisamment souple pour permettre une programmation sensible au contexte dans divers milieux régionaux, nationaux et sociétaux. - La politique étrangère du Canada est fortement axée sur le court terme et n'accorde pas suffisamment d'attention au moyen et au long terme, ni aux liens entre les objectifs à court, moyen et long terme. Elle est également en tension et en contradiction avec d'autres aspects de notre politique étrangère et de sécurité, d'où la nécessité d'une vision plus holistique, pour identifier et résoudre ces divergences. Comme nous l'expliquons plus en détail ci-dessous, le fait de ne pas s'attaquer rapidement à ces limites entraverait concrètement la capacité du gouvernement canadien à atténuer le risque d'effets contre-productifs et de conséquences négatives involontaires qui s'avéreront de plus en plus difficiles à inverser avec le temps. Certains de ces effets négatifs potentiels sont directement liés au programme féministe ; d'autres ont trait à des objectifs de politique étrangère et de sécurité où le lien avec les objectifs féministes – et plus largement avec la sensibilité au genre – n'est peut-être pas évident, mais néanmoins significatif. Quoi : La portée et les objectifs de la PEF du Canada Introduite en 2017 par le gouvernement du premier ministre Justin Trudeau, la politique étrangère féministe du Canada prétend adopter une « approche explicitement féministe de [...] la politique étrangère et du développement international pour cibler l'égalité des genres et l'autonomisation des femmes et des filles » (Lamensch 2020, traduction libre). Selon Affaires mondiales Canada, la politique étrangère féministe « reconnaît que le fait de favoriser des sociétés ouvertes, inclusives et fondées sur les droits, dans lesquelles toutes les personnes, quel que soit leur genre, peuvent pleinement tirer parti d’une participation égale à la vie économique, politique, sociale et culturelle, constitue un moyen efficace de construire une société plus sûre et un monde plus prospère » (Affaires mondiales Canada). La portée de la PEF du Canada Au-delà de cette déclaration, nulle part le gouvernement canadien ne définit explicitement l'adjectif « féministe » dans sa politique étrangère féministe. Là où il s'en rapproche le plus, c'est dans la Politique d'aide internationale féministe (PAIF) du Canada, qui stipule qu’ « une approche féministe en matière d’aide internationale reconnaît que la promotion de l’égalité des genres et du renforcement du pouvoir des femmes et des filles exige la transformation des normes sociales et des relations de pouvoir ». (Affaires mondiales Canada). Cependant, les priorités qu'Affaires mondiales Canada identifie dans les documents publics et dans ses interventions endossent généralement les fondements néolibéraux de l'ordre international plutôt que de les réformer ou de les remettre en question. Cela introduit une tension fondamentale entre les objectifs des politiques d'un point de vue féministe, car une PEF qui ne cherche pas à changer les relations de pouvoir hiérarchiques dans l'ordre international ne peut ouvrir des possibilités significatives et durables pour transformer et surmonter les inégalités et les marginalisations qui résultent directement des pratiques néolibérales. Bien qu'il soit peu probable qu'une telle tension soit résolue de sitôt, les moyens de l'atténuer devraient être sérieusement envisagés. En effet, si l'on se concentre sur l'inclusion et l'autonomisation des femmes en tant qu'individus sans une politique mondiale plus transformatrice, il est peu probable que l'on puisse compenser, et encore moins changer, les structures hiérarchiques qui contribuent à la marginalisation des femmes et d'autres groupes sous-représentés ou désavantagés. Recommandation : Tout en travaillant à l'inclusion et à l'émancipation des femmes, le gouvernement canadien devrait également envisager les changements à apporter aux institutions qui perpétuent la marginalisation des femmes et des groupes sous-représentés ou désavantagés. Une approche féministe de la diplomatie commence également par l'écoute des personnes en marge de la société. Dans ce domaine, le Canada a été à l'avant-garde de la promotion des droits des femmes et des filles, ainsi que de l'égalité des genres et des sexes dans les pays touchés par des conflits et au-delà. Il s'agit d'un domaine où le gouvernement canadien a adopté une position activiste. Il a défendu la cause des droits des femmes et pris la parole pour défendre les femmes en danger dans leur pays d'origine, parfois au détriment de ses relations diplomatiques. Il a également pris des engagements concrets à l'appui de ce programme.  En particulier, le nouveau Fonds Égalité permettra effectivement aux organisations locales de femmes dans les pays touchés par des conflits de mener à bien leur travail de médiation et de consolidation de la paix. Ces succès peuvent inspirer la manière dont la PEF du Canada est déployée dans d'autres domaines et champs d'action, tout en tenant compte des spécificités de chaque contexte. Les objectifs d'une politique étrangère féministe Le Canada estime qu'une politique étrangère féministe apportera plus d'efficacité et de productivité pour vaincre la pauvreté et favoriser le développement durable et la paix. Le problème de cette conception est double : l'accent mis sur l'efficacité ne reconnaît pas que l'égalité des genres et la diversité sont des valeurs qui valent la peine d'être poursuivies en soi, plutôt qu’instrumentalisées; ce faisant, la PEF du Canada, telle qu'elle est actuellement formulée, fait peser des attentes et des responsabilités élevées (liées au genre) sur les épaules des femmes et des communautés marginalisées, renforçant involontairement les stéréotypes liés au genre. Selon la Politique d'aide internationale féministe (PAIF) du Canada, les femmes et les filles sont de puissants agents de changement qui « ont la capacité de transformer leurs ménages, leurs sociétés et leurs économies ». La promotion de l'égalité des genres, selon la PAIF, entraînera une forte croissance économique, augmentant le produit intérieur brut mondial de 12 000 milliards de dollars en une seule décennie. Elle contribuera également à réduire les niveaux mondiaux d'extrême pauvreté de 12 % et la faim chronique de 17 %, apportant aide et espoir à 150 millions de personnes dans le monde (Affaires mondiales Canada). Que cela soit voulu ou non, la PAIF relie donc l'inclusion des femmes aux avancées sociales et économiques. S'il est parfois nécessaire de convaincre des gouvernements et des sociétés autrement réticents de considérer les avantages apportés par l'égalité des genres, une telle approche risque d'affaiblir les valeurs normatives d'équité et de diversité, qui devraient être considérées comme des fins en soi. Recommandation : Le Canada a eu tendance à présenter les arguments en faveur de l'inclusion comme la chose intelligente à faire plutôt que comme la bonne chose à faire. Si une logique instrumentale peut être nécessaire pour convaincre les parties réticentes, il est important que la PEF du Canada ne perde pas de vue l'importance des valeurs normatives d'équité et de diversité, qui devraient être poursuivies comme des fins en soi. Le gouvernement du Canada considère l'augmentation de la participation des femmes au maintien de la paix comme une question d'efficacité opérationnelle. Les femmes dans les missions de maintien de la paix présenteraient des avantages pratiques, notamment la possibilité de fouiller d'autres femmes aux points de contrôle, de faciliter l'accès aux hommes et aux femmes de la région et de servir de modèles aux femmes et aux filles de la région. Pourtant, à ce jour, il n'existe aucun lien avéré entre une augmentation du nombre de femmes en uniforme chargées du maintien de la paix et l'efficacité opérationnelle, en partie parce que les effets sont difficiles à retracer et à mesurer, mais aussi parce qu'ils ne seront probablement pas observables à court terme. De nombreux arguments en ce sens sont normatifs et fondés sur des hypothèses genrées et trompeuses concernant les qualités et les attributs des femmes, plutôt que de refléter une évaluation de leurs rôles et fonctions réels au sein des opérations de paix. La PEF du Canada fait peser un fardeau supplémentaire sur les épaules des femmes en uniforme dont la présence dans les missions de maintien de la paix est censée aider à alléger le fardeau émotionnel que représente le traitement des survivants et contribuer à contrôler le comportement de leurs collègues masculins, prétendument en les dissuadant de commettre des inconduites sexuelles par leur seule présence. De même, l'accent mis sur les femmes en tant qu'agents de la paix dans leurs communautés, y compris dans le contexte des processus de paix, fait peser une responsabilité supplémentaire (et injuste) sur les femmes tout en la retirant aux hommes, qui restent les principaux auteurs de la violence sexiste dans les conflits. S'il est important de mettre l'accent sur l'action des femmes, il existe également un risque de reproduire involontairement des stéréotypes sexistes et de faire obstacle à un changement transformateur au niveau communautaire. En effet, la plupart de ces attentes sont ancrées dans des hypothèses répandues selon lesquelles les femmes sont pacifiques, naturellement enclines et capables d'accomplir des tâches interpersonnelles spécifiques, notamment en tant qu'aidantes émotionnelles ou en tant que championnes systématiques des questions relatives aux femmes en général, quel que soit le contexte. Ces suppositions ignorent les cas de violence perpétrée par les femmes, et ajoutons-le, dans le souci de leurs propres intérêts, et pas seulement ceux d'hommes manipulateurs. De même, la PEF du Canada renforce involontairement les stéréotypes genrés lorsqu'elle affirme que « les preuves démontrent que les femmes consacrent une plus grande partie de leur revenu au profit de leurs enfants, améliorant ainsi la nutrition, la santé et les possibilités d’éducation de la génération future ». Si les données peuvent étayer de telles déclarations, elles ne tiennent pas compte des conditions structurelles qui créent de telles réalités et façonnent l'action des femmes, notamment par le biais de la socialisation genrée des femmes et des hommes. Plus important encore, le fait de s'appuyer sur de tels récits pour justifier la PEF enferme les femmes dans des comportements spécifiques et pose des conditions à leur inclusion et leur participation, alors que ces conditions et attentes ne sont pas imposées aux hommes. Recommandation : Dans la mesure où ses initiatives et ses programmes mettent l'accent sur l'action des femmes, le Canada doit veiller à ne pas reproduire involontairement les stéréotypes liés au genre, posant ainsi les conditions de leur inclusion et de leur participation. Qui : Identifier et s'engager avec un large éventail de partenaires Une politique étrangère féministe est par définition inclusive et collaborative. Elle est également très consciente des asymétries de pouvoir et de la manière dont elles peuvent entraver la coopération. Depuis 2017, le gouvernement du premier ministre Justin Trudeau a pris un certain nombre de mesures pour rétablir les ponts avec la société civile et les experts, que ce soit au sein ou en dehors du milieu académique. En effet, un éventail d'acteurs sociétaux a été consulté dans le cadre de la préparation du lancement du Plan national d’action du Canada consacré aux femmes, à la paix et à la sécurité et de l'Initiative Elsie. Davantage d'efforts devraient être déployés pour s'engager auprès de différentes parties prenantes dans divers endroits du « Sud global ». Bien que nous tenions à reconnaître l'importance des consultations de la société civile qui ont eu lieu dans le cadre des réunions du G7, de la réunion des femmes ministres des Affaires étrangères à Montréal en 2018, de la Conférence des Nations unies sur le maintien de la paix à Vancouver, de la conférence sur la liberté des médias et de la Coalition pour l'égalité des droits, l'absence d'engagement cohérent et soutenu avec les parties prenantes non occidentales dans les régions et les localités où cette politique étrangère est mise en œuvre risque de teinter la PEF du Canada de connotations paternalistes et occidentalo-centrées, créant une résistance inutile et évitable qui peut, dans certains cas, avoir peu à voir avec le cœur même d'un programme féministe. Compte tenu de l'engagement mondial limité du Canada à ce jour et de l'impact des décisions de fermer un certain nombre d'ambassades canadiennes ou de réduire leur personnel, en particulier dans les pays du Sud global, les tentatives de déploiement d'une PEF exigeront du gouvernement canadien qu'il établisse un pont entre son expertise, ses ressources et ses programmes avec des partenaires qui sont déjà investis, ou qui sont au moins intéressés (sans doute en raison d'un ensemble de facteurs stratégiques et normatifs) à élaborer et/ou à mettre en œuvre des politiques étrangères féministes et/ou des plans d'action nationaux sur les Femmes, la paix et la sécurité (FPS). Dans la région Asie-Pacifique, au-delà des champions « occidentaux » engagés dans des discussions régionales sur l’agenda FPS (tels que l'Australie, le Canada, la Nouvelle-Zélande et les États-Unis), le Japon et l'Indonésie sont les acteurs les plus bruyants, bien que d'autres, comme la Malaisie et Singapour, pourraient prendre de la vitesse. Il y a cependant une grande résistance à l’agenda FPS de la part d'autres gouvernements qui se méfient des implications de peindre les questions d'égalité des genres avec un pinceau de sécurité et le perçoivent comme un autre cheval de Troie pour une intervention non désirée dans leurs affaires intérieures. Néanmoins, l'ANASE et les institutions connexes où elle exerce une « centralité », comme le Sommet de l'Asie de l'Est et le Forum régional de l'ANASE (dont le Canada est membre) ont adopté des déclarations et d'autres initiatives sur l’agenda FPS qui ouvrent de nouveaux points d'entrée. Un élan similaire est observable dans les réseaux régionaux d'experts non gouvernementaux et de la société civile. Au Moyen-Orient, le Canada a appuyé la Jordanie, le Liban et l'Autorité palestinienne dans leurs premières démarches importantes. En Afrique, des organisations régionales comme l'Union africaine, la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'Est et la Communauté de développement de l'Afrique australe ont pris l'initiative d'élaborer des outils et des politiques favorables aux femmes, tandis que certains pays ont été plus proactifs que d'autres dans la priorisation des approches féministes en matière de politique étrangère, de développement et de sécurité. Le consensus croissant selon lequel une approche sensible au genre en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité est un marqueur nécessaire des « cool kids » dans la cafétéria mondiale de la politique internationale offre de nouvelles opportunités pour le Canada de contribuer à la pression collective par les pairs, de montrer l'exemple et de fournir un soutien aux autres « entrepreneurs de normes », gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux, de manière constructive. Recommandation : La PEF du Canada doit prévoir la meilleure façon de s'engager avec les États nouvellement engagés dans une approche de la politique, du développement et de la sécurité fondée sur le féminisme ou le genre. L'approfondissement de l'engagement avec ces partenaires peut les aider à tracer leur propre voie vers une PEF tout en consolidant les objectifs de la politique étrangère du Canada. Le Canada devrait également être plus attentif aux sources de résistance et aux préoccupations concernant les connotations occidentales/libérales de la PEF et des concepts connexes tels que les Femmes, la paix et la sécurité, et élaborer des stratégies pour atténuer ces préoccupations. La promotion et la mise en œuvre du programme de la PEF du Canada à l'étranger exigent d'étendre sa portée au-delà d'une approche centrée sur l'État. Si les approches féministes et basées sur le genre des enjeux qui sous-tendent notre politique étrangère demeurent peu familières, et dans certains cas menaçantes pour d'autres États, une myriade d'acteurs sociétaux ont fait ce travail à partir de zéro bien avant que le Canada ne songe à élaborer une politique étrangère féministe. Ces efforts du bas vers le haut ont joué un rôle majeur dans l'ouverture des mentalités au niveau gouvernemental, de sorte que ce « nouveau » programme puisse également s'y développer. Ainsi, la mise en œuvre de la PEF du Canada à l'étranger nécessite l'identification et un partenariat soutenu avec des acteurs et des espaces où le programme peut être poursuivi par (et avec) des acteurs non étatiques, tels que des experts et la société civile. Pour l'instant, le Canada a surtout compté sur ses ONG partenaires internationales pour établir des liens avec ces acteurs et ces espaces. Cependant, la recherche féministe met en garde contre l'hypothèse selon laquelle les ONG occidentales et axées sur le genre vont nécessairement relayer fidèlement les opinions et les priorités de leurs partenaires du Sud global. Le Canada doit utiliser des canaux directs, formels et informels, et avoir des yeux et des oreilles sur le terrain pour identifier ces points d'origine locaux et ascendants et trouver des moyens d'intégrer et de soutenir ces perspectives et ces efforts. Ce type d'engagement est susceptible de modifier les structures de pouvoir traditionnelles, ce qui est nécessaire pour établir les conditions d'une paix et d'une sécurité durables à long terme. Recommandation : La promotion et la mise en œuvre du programme de la PEF du Canada à l'étranger nécessitent l'identification des acteurs et des espaces où ce programme peut être mis en œuvre par et avec des acteurs non étatiques, ainsi qu'un partenariat durable avec ces acteurs. Le Canada doit accroître sa capacité à identifier ces points d'origine locaux, à établir des liens directs avec eux et à trouver des moyens d'intégrer et de soutenir ces perspectives et ces efforts. Le langage utilisé pour spécifier les objectifs de la politique étrangère et de sécurité limite en soi le champ d'action possible de manière parfois imprévisible et involontaire, avec des implications pour le type de parties prenantes qui finissent par être impliquées. Par exemple, le langage « Femmes, paix et sécurité », bien qu'il soit maintenant familier aux acteurs de la société civile engagés dans le travail de consolidation de la paix, reste étranger et, en fait, attire la suspicion d'un plus large éventail d'ONG féministes et autres travaillant sur des questions relatives aux droits humains, au changement climatique, à la santé maternelle et à d'autres questions de développement. En outre, l’agenda FPS a été adopté plus naturellement par les acteurs de l'élite des organisations de la société civile dans les capitales du Sud global qui sont déjà bien connectés et plongés dans les réseaux, débats et partenariats occidentaux sur la sécurité, l'intervention humanitaire et le maintien de la paix. En revanche, les organisations de terrain et les acteurs communautaires dans les endroits où la plupart des activités de base visant à encourager la tolérance, la confiance dans les relations intercommunautaires et à soutenir les processus de paix de manière à contribuer aux objectifs plus larges qui sous-tendent l'agenda FPS, n'ont pas adopté ce langage, et ce pour deux raisons principales. Premièrement, le langage de l'ONU est souvent perçu par ces acteurs comme élitiste, paternaliste, conservateur et centré sur l'Occident. Deuxièmement, bon nombre de ces acteurs considèrent que la « sécurité » est, au pire, le langage du gouvernement, souvent utilisé pour justifier des politiques qui restreignent les libertés civiles, voire menacent la vie même des militants et des communautés avec lesquels ils travaillent; ou, au mieux, qu'elle sort du cadre de leur expertise et de leur mandat. À leur tour, de nombreux acteurs de la société civile qui traitent directement de la paix et de la sécurité (humaine) n'ont pas encore intégré les considérations de genre dans leur plaidoyer et leur travail de fond, et ne s'identifient pas comme des organisations féministes. Cela est souvent dû non pas à un manque d'intérêt, mais à un manque de ressources matérielles et humaines. En effet, de nombreuses organisations de la société civile impliquées dans ce travail restent dominées par les hommes, tandis que les dossiers relatifs au genre auront tendance à être attribués et portés, en premier lieu, par le personnel et les activistes féminins, parfois en plus de leur charge de travail antérieure. Si, dans de nombreux cas, la prise de conscience de ce fossé est reconnue, ces acteurs ne sont pas (encore) aussi bien équipés pour poursuivre des objectifs explicitement féministes que les organisations féministes et/ou de femmes qui se tiennent à l'écart de la « paix et de la sécurité ». Bien que les deux côtés de ce fossé de la société civile soient peuplés d'acteurs pertinents, le langage du « féminisme », du « FPS » et même de la « politique étrangère » en lui-même, surtout lorsque ces termes sont utilisés de manière isolée, risque d'empêcher notre capacité à identifier et à intégrer ces différentes perspectives dans la conception et la mise en œuvre des politiques. Recommandation : Lorsqu'il s'engage avec les parties concernées, le Canada devrait prêter attention au langage qu'il utilise et évaluer la manière dont ce langage est susceptible d'être reçu et perçu, afin de s'assurer qu'il n'exclut pas involontairement des parties importantes. En outre, le Canada devrait envisager des moyens de soutenir les parties prenantes au-delà du renforcement des capacités, étant donné que les limites proviennent souvent non pas d'un manque d'intérêt ou même d'expertise, mais de ressources financières et humaines appropriées. Comment la PEF du Canada est-elle mise en œuvre ? Dans sa forme actuelle, la politique étrangère féministe du Canada a peu de chances d'atteindre ses objectifs parce que 1) elle a suivi une approche qui mise sur la représentation plutôt qu’une réelle inclusion des femmes, 2) elle reproduit des divisions cloisonnées et inutiles dans les domaines de la politique étrangère, comme la sécurité, les droits humains et le développement, qu'une approche féministe exigerait d'aborder de façon holistique, intersectorielle et moins centrée sur l'Occident, et 3) elle a privilégié le symbolisme au processus. La PEF du Canada a une portée limitée et est orientée vers une approche qui mise sur la représentation plutôt qu’une réelle inclusion des femmes L’Initiative Elsie pour les femmes dans les opérations de paix, qui vise à augmenter le nombre de femmes casques bleus, a été un projet phare de la PEF du Canada. Si l'augmentation de la participation significative des femmes en uniforme dans les opérations de l'ONU est un objectif louable, une politique de sécurité et de défense féministe doit aller au-delà de l'augmentation du nombre de femmes en uniforme et du démantèlement des barrières empêchant le recrutement de corps féminins dans les institutions de sécurité. Le problème est double : d'une part, et comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, une logique instrumentaliste sous-tend la nécessité d'augmenter le nombre de femmes en uniforme. D'autre part, étant donné que la plupart des troupes de maintien de la paix sur le terrain sont recrutées dans les pays du Sud global, ces pays sont pressés d'introduire rapidement des politiques sensibles au genre pour accueillir les femmes à un rythme beaucoup plus rapide que les pays du Nord global. Le résultat est peu féministe : les femmes en uniforme du Sud global sont rapidement intégrées dans l'armée, mais on leur assigne des fonctions genrées qu'elles sont censées mieux remplir, par exemple l'assistance aux survivantes de violences sexuelles liées à des conflits, et elles sont soumises à une pression accrue pour porter le fardeau de la sécurité en atteignant les objectifs des missions de l'ONU sensibles au genre. Dans ce processus, il n'y a pas d'appréciation réelle des préjugés et des exigences supplémentaires en matière de travail auxquels les femmes sont confrontées, en particulier dans l'armée mais aussi à la maison avant d'être déployées, ni de compréhension profonde des contextes locaux et internationaux dans lesquels les troupes sont déployées. La perspective de l'ACS+ impliquée dans l'Initiative Elsie du Canada devrait réorienter ses efforts en faveur de la socialisation et de la formation avant d'envoyer des femmes en uniforme du Sud global servir dans des missions de maintien de la paix où on leur demande de porter un double fardeau et d'être cataloguées dans des rôles sexués. Cela est sans compter les pressions qui les suivent sur place lorsque les systèmes de soutien appropriés ne sont pas en place dans leur pays. En outre, la crise actuelle des Forces armées canadiennes en matière d'inconduite sexuelle, un échec manifeste en matière d'intégration et d'inclusion des femmes, ainsi que d'autres problèmes omniprésents qui font écho à des questions similaires à celles abordées ici en relation avec les partenaires du Sud global, jettent une ombre sur la légitimité du Canada en tant qu'instigateur de l'Initiative Elsie. Recommandation : Nous recommandons de soutenir la conception et la mise en œuvre d'une réforme à long terme du secteur de la sécurité qui tienne compte de la dimension de genre, par le biais de changements progressifs visant à transformer la culture des forces armées dominée par les hommes, et à faciliter l'intégration des femmes et l'acceptation des compétences et des capacités du personnel militaire féminin à tous les niveaux de décision. Une politique étrangère féministe ne peut fonctionner en silos Une PEF est holistique dans son approche. Elle exige que des principes féministes guident toutes les décisions de politique étrangère. Ce n'est pas le cas actuellement au Canada. Par exemple, alors que le Fonds Égalité financera des médiatrices en Afrique de l'Ouest, le Canada a également soutenu le secteur de l'industrie extractive par le biais d'Exportation et développement Canada.  Plusieurs entreprises de l'industrie extractive n'ont pas respecté les droits des populations autochtones, ont mis en péril la sécurité alimentaire et économique des femmes rurales, et ont dénaturé le travail de ces femmes médiatrices. Cette déconnexion entre les secteurs et les initiatives peut entraîner la mise en œuvre simultanée de politiques incompatibles. Par exemple, les femmes rurales du Liberia ont reçu une formation afin de pouvoir négocier avec les sociétés d'industries extractives et s'engager dans des ateliers alternatifs de génération de revenus, car elles ne peuvent plus exploiter et vendre les plantations de manioc qu'elles cultivent depuis des générations. À moins de reconsidérer le soutien à l'expansion des industries extractives dans le pays, une telle formation risque de coopter plutôt que de dynamiser la participation économique des femmes. De même, l'incohérence entre le soutien du Canada aux femmes yéménites pacificatrices et la décision du gouvernement Trudeau de reprendre la vente d'armes à l'Arabie saoudite a également été largement décriée. Recommandation : Les politiques de sécurité et de défense et les politiques de développement économique ne peuvent être séparées si l'on veut éviter les incohérences et les contradictions. En outre, les composantes de paix et de sécurité d'une politique étrangère féministe ne peuvent être correctement valorisées et mises en œuvre à l'étranger, et dans des régions et des États spécifiques, sans qu'une plus grande attention soit accordée aux compréhensions préalables et existantes de ce que signifie la « sécurité » et de la manière dont elle est définie dans divers secteurs. Dans la mesure où l'intersection entre le genre et la sécurité, par exemple, est un sujet relativement nouveau et, à bien des égards, encore peu familier, elle est nécessairement interprétée à travers le prisme de concepts connexes. L'un de ces concepts est la « sécurité humaine », qui comporte des connotations occidentalo-centrées dans de nombreux contextes, en particulier dans sa compréhension plus étroite (et politiquement sensible) de « l'absence de menace » et son association avec les éléments plus sensibles et interventionnistes des principes de la « responsabilité de protéger ». La résistance de certains partenaires du Canada à l'intégration du genre dans les politiques, ou au programme des FPS en particulier, a moins à voir avec la substance du programme (bien que cela fasse partie de l'équation) qu'avec une hyper vigilance quant à ses origines et à l'identité de ses défenseurs. Que cette prudence soit légitime ou déplacée, sans un ancrage adéquat dans les discours et pratiques de sécurité locaux, combiné à un soutien aux acteurs déjà impliqués dans la conception et la promotion de politiques basées sur le genre à l'intersection de la sécurité et du développement, l'agenda féministe du Canada à l'étranger ne peut réussir. Il ne peut pas non plus être soutenu par une approche unique. La politique étrangère féministe du Canada doit également reconnaître les limites des composantes militaristes de l'agenda FPS. Celles-ci servent principalement à renforcer la capacité des acteurs et des secteurs qui, dans de nombreux contextes, produisent en fait de l'insécurité pour les groupes marginalisés de la société, notamment les femmes, mais aussi les peuples autochtones, la communauté LGBTQ2 et d'autres groupes minoritaires. En outre, une approche militarisée du genre, de la paix et de la sécurité se heurtera nécessairement à une résistance dans des secteurs et des contextes où la sécurité a traditionnellement été définie de manière « non traditionnelle » (d'un point de vue occidental) et globale, soulignant sa relation étroite avec le développement. En Asie du Sud-Est et en Asie-Pacifique, par exemple, ce lien entre sécurité et développement est au cœur de la façon dont les gouvernements, les experts et les milieux de la société civile abordent la politique étrangère et de sécurité depuis leur création. Tout en restant conscient des connotations négatives associées à la « sécurité humaine » dans certains contextes, l'adoption d'une définition explicitement plus large de la sécurité permettrait au Canada d'inclure des formes non militarisées de sécurité (sécurité alimentaire, sécurité environnementale, sécurité sanitaire) et de tenir compte de la manière dont les différentes parties concernées comprennent l'(in)sécurité, de la façon dont elles s'attaquent à ces insécurités et de ce dont elles ont besoin pour se sentir plus en sécurité. Par exemple, l'accès aux services de santé sexuelle et reproductive est essentiel pour les femmes et les filles. Dans les pays en développement disposant de peu de ressources, les services de santé maternelle sont ceux qui souffrent le plus de manque de fonds. En cas de pandémie ou de maladie virale grave, le système de soins de santé est faussé, car toutes les ressources locales sont transférées pour combattre la maladie. Certaines études montrent que le taux de mortalité maternelle en Sierra Leone a augmenté au même rythme que les cas d'Ebola, étant donné que les services de soins maternels et autres services de gynécologie n'étaient plus disponibles. Dans les pays ayant accès à des ressources, la santé sexuelle et reproductive peut également constituer une question de sécurité importante, car un nombre croissant d'États ont cherché ou cherchent à limiter l'accès à l'interruption de grossesse. Recommandation : Le Canada devrait prêter attention à la manière dont ses partenaires et les autres parties impliquées comprennent la sécurité. Il devrait également reconnaître et chercher à compenser le fait que les aspects militaristes de son programme FPS servent à renforcer la capacité des acteurs et des secteurs qui, dans de nombreux contextes, produisent en fait de l'insécurité pour les groupes marginalisés de la société, y compris, mais sans s'y limiter, les femmes. Une PEF est autant une question de processus que de substance La manière dont la PEF du Canada est actuellement mise en œuvre mérite un examen approfondi. Dans l'état actuel des choses, le Canada devra clarifier son approche en matière de création de partenariats au pays et à l'étranger, en plus de préciser la dimension temporelle de ses interventions dans le cadre de la PEF et de reconsidérer la manière dont il évalue les progrès. Créer des partenariats Lorsqu'on examine les tendances de l'engagement international du Canada, on constate qu'elles ont été largement motivées par des politiques d'alliance, des intérêts économiques ou des exigences liées à l'appartenance à des organisations internationales. Maintenir et développer des partenariats plus diversifiés au pays et à l'étranger est une condition de réussite. Au Canada, la PEF du Canada peut et doit servir à encourager les réponses de l'ensemble du gouvernement, mais aussi de l'ensemble de la société, avec la prochaine itération du Plan national d’action du Canada consacré aux femmes, à la paix et à la sécurité. Il convient toutefois de noter que la nomination d'un ambassadeur pour les Femmes, la paix et la sécurité issu de la société civile est un développement encourageant. À l'étranger, l'établissement de partenariats avec des acteurs respectant à divers degrés les principes féministes est un jeu d'équilibre. Tout d'abord, le gouvernement du Canada devra définir des principes directeurs d'engagement et d'intervention qui favorisent et défendent les droits humains. Cela ne signifie pas que le Canada doit faire cavalier seul, mais plutôt que la prise de décision et les coalitions doivent être guidées d'abord et avant tout par les principes de la PEF. Le Canada pourrait trouver des partenaires « naturels » auprès de la Suède, de la France, du Mexique et du Luxembourg, pour commencer, étant donné que ces pays ont également adopté des politiques étrangères dites féministes, sous une forme ou une autre. Deuxièmement, il devra également sortir de ses schémas établis pour établir des partenariats institutionnalisés avec des partenaires du Sud global. Troisièmement, le Canada doit aussi énoncer ses objectifs féministes lorsqu'il poursuit des relations diplomatiques avec des pays comme l'Arabie saoudite, ainsi qu'avec des pays comme la Hongrie, la Pologne et le Kenya qui ne respectent pas les droits des femmes et l'égalité des genres. Là aussi, il est nécessaire de financer et d'écouter ceux qui sont en marge. Quatrièmement, le Canada ne devrait pas négliger l'engagement avec les pays qui ont exprimé des préoccupations concernant les objectifs de la PEF, y compris ceux qui sont liés à l’agenda FPS. Recommandation : Au fur et à mesure qu'il établit les partenariats essentiels au succès de sa PEF, le Canada doit définir des principes directeurs d'engagement et d'intervention qui favorisent et défendent l'égalité des genres. Il doit également établir de nouveaux partenariats, en particulier dans les pays du Sud global, et préciser ses objectifs féministes dans ses engagements avec les pays qui expriment des préoccupations au sujet des objectifs de la PEF ou qui ne respectent tout simplement pas les droits des femmes et l'égalité des genres. Relier le court, le moyen et le long terme Identifier, traiter et transformer les relations de pouvoir et les inégalités structurelles qui ont fait obstacle à l'inclusion des femmes et à l'égalité des genres demande du temps. Les initiatives à court terme visant à inclure les femmes doivent être complétées par des initiatives à plus long terme visant à changer les mentalités des sociétés, notamment par des programmes de socialisation et un accent sur l'éducation. Mais les politiques étrangères survivent rarement aux changements de gouvernement. Bien qu'il y ait généralement un accord entre les partis sur la PEF du Canada, il subsiste des différences importantes dans la façon dont les différents partis fédéraux canadiens comprennent les priorités qui y sont associées. En d'autres termes, il faut veiller à ce que l'orientation de la PEF du Canada ne change pas radicalement avec les changements de gouvernement. Un pas important dans cette direction a été franchi lorsque le Parlement a approuvé le principe du financement pluriannuel qui, selon le Rapport au Parlement sur l’aide au développement officielle du gouvernement du Canada 2017-2018, offre aux partenaires du Canada un degré d'assurance à des fins de planification et la souplesse nécessaire pour répondre aux conditions changeantes sur le terrain. Recommandation : Parce que l'inclusion des femmes et l'égalité des genres nécessitent des transformations structurelles, une PEF doit s'inscrire dans la durée. Elle doit compléter les initiatives à court terme par des efforts structurels à plus long terme. Reconsidérer les évaluations basées sur les performances Puisque les changements structurels sont des processus à long terme, les méthodes d'évaluation qui empruntent la logique de la gestion axée sur les résultats sont vouées à faire échouer tant les ambitions de la PEF du Canada que les attentes des partenaires de la PEF du Canada. Le modèle privilégié pour la mesure du rendement, avec ses indicateurs et ses mesures essentiellement quantitatives, est mal adapté pour faire état des relations de pouvoir et pour évaluer la progression réelle des individus bénéficiant des programmes issus de la PEF du Canada. Les évaluations basées sur la performance illustrent également la manière dont certains résultats sont quantifiés et « comptent », alors que d'autres effets difficiles à mesurer des politiques ne sont pas documentés et passent inaperçus. Ce qui est mesuré « dépend également des problèmes qui semblent politiquement importants ». Le choix de mesures et d'indicateurs quantitatifs peut permettre de savoir, par exemple, combien de femmes étaient présentes à une certaine réunion, combien de femmes en uniforme sont déployées dans une mission de paix des Nations unies ou combien d'ateliers ont été organisés sur des sujets pertinents. Cependant, ils ne permettent pas de savoir si et comment les voix des femmes ont été prises au sérieux, ou si les femmes en uniforme sont censées utiliser des compétences « féminisées » et accomplir des tâches « genrées » telles que la liaison avec la population locale, en particulier les femmes et les filles. Lorsque des descriptions qualitatives sont incluses dans les évaluations, elles tendent à accompagner, expliquer et illustrer par des exemples les « faits concrets » produits par les indicateurs quantitatifs. Cela est important, car seules certaines pratiques et certains résultats à court terme sont rendus visibles. Deuxièmement, bien que l'on pense généralement que l'utilisation d'évaluations basées sur les performances fournit une évaluation neutre et impartiale, ainsi qu'un point de référence universel pour la comparaison, la sélection d'indicateurs et d'outils de mesure particuliers a des conséquences. Par exemple, si Affaires mondiales Canada souhaite mesurer l'impact de sa politique d'aide internationale féministe sur « les personnes les plus pauvres et les plus vulnérables », cette catégorie comprendra des personnes aussi variées que les veuves, les personnes handicapées, les jeunes, les personnes âgées, etc. qui sont très différentes les unes des autres, ce qui entraîne un processus analytique en contradiction avec la méthodologie promue par l'ACS+. En outre, les indicateurs et les mesures sont orientés vers la désignation de « meilleures pratiques » et de normes de performance implicites en présentant des exemples de réussite de ces « femmes vulnérables » qui ont surpassé les autres. Ces jugements seront à leur tour utilisés pour prendre des décisions sur le pays ou la communauté dans lesquels nous devrions investir à l'avenir, laissant de côté les valeurs inclusives fondamentales sur lesquelles une PEF est promulguée. Recommandation : Étant donné que les évaluations basées sur les résultats ne peuvent pas saisir les changements dans les relations de pouvoir ou les inégalités structurelles, ni évaluer adéquatement une augmentation de l'autonomisation individuelle, Affaires mondiales Canada devrait développer des moyens plus sophistiqués et appropriés d'évaluer le changement. En conclusion, cette note stratégique s'est appuyée sur l'outil ACS+ pour examiner la PEF du Canada et l'a jugée insuffisante. L'approche canadienne privilégiant la représentation des femmes ne permet pas de s'attaquer aux asymétries de pouvoir et aux inégalités structurelles qui sous-tendent l'exclusion des femmes et l'inégalité entre les genres. Pour que la PEF canadienne réponde aux espoirs de ses partisans, un effort sérieux de définition, d'inclusion et de mise en œuvre réfléchie est nécessaire. Liste des recommandations Tout en travaillant à l'inclusion et à l'émancipation des femmes, le gouvernement canadien devrait également envisager les changements à apporter aux institutions qui perpétuent la marginalisation des femmes et des groupes sous-représentés ou désavantagés. Le Canada a eu tendance à présenter les arguments en faveur de l'inclusion comme la chose intelligente à faire plutôt que comme la bonne chose à faire. Si une logique instrumentale peut être nécessaire pour convaincre les parties réticentes, il est important que la PEF du Canada ne perde pas de vue l'importance des valeurs normatives d'équité et de diversité, qui devraient être poursuivies comme des fins en soi. Dans la mesure où ses initiatives et ses programmes mettent l'accent sur l'action des femmes, le Canada doit veiller à ne pas reproduire involontairement les stéréotypes liés au genre, posant ainsi les conditions de leur inclusion et de leur participation. La PEF du Canada doit prévoir la meilleure façon de s'engager avec les États nouvellement engagés dans une approche de la politique, du développement et de la sécurité fondée sur le féminisme ou le genre. L'approfondissement de l'engagement avec ces partenaires peut les aider à tracer leur propre voie vers une PEF tout en consolidant les objectifs de la politique étrangère du Canada. Le Canada devrait également être plus attentif aux sources de résistance et aux préoccupations concernant les connotations occidentales/libérales de la PEF et des concepts connexes tels que les Femmes, la paix et la sécurité, et élaborer des stratégies pour atténuer ces préoccupations. La promotion et la mise en œuvre du programme de la PEF du Canada à l'étranger nécessitent l'identification des acteurs et des espaces où ce programme peut être mis en œuvre par et avec des acteurs non étatiques, ainsi qu'un partenariat durable avec ces acteurs. Le Canada doit accroître sa capacité à identifier ces points d'origine locaux, à établir des liens directs avec eux et à trouver des moyens d'intégrer et de soutenir ces perspectives et ces efforts. Lorsqu'il s'engage avec les parties concernées, le Canada devrait prêter attention au langage qu'il utilise et évaluer la manière dont ce langage est susceptible d'être reçu et perçu, afin de s'assurer qu'il n'exclut pas involontairement des parties importantes. En outre, le Canada devrait envisager des moyens de soutenir les parties prenantes au-delà du renforcement des capacités, étant donné que les limites proviennent souvent non pas d'un manque d'intérêt ou même d'expertise, mais de ressources financières et humaines appropriées. Nous recommandons de soutenir la conception et la mise en œuvre d'une réforme à long terme du secteur de la sécurité qui tienne compte de la dimension de genre, par le biais de changements progressifs visant à transformer la culture des forces armées dominée par les hommes, et à faciliter l'intégration des femmes et l'acceptation des compétences et des capacités du personnel militaire féminin à tous les niveaux de décision. Les politiques de sécurité et de défense et les politiques de développement économique ne peuvent être séparées si l'on veut éviter les incohérences et les contradictions. Le Canada devrait prêter attention à la manière dont ses partenaires et les autres parties impliquées comprennent la sécurité. Il devrait également reconnaître et chercher à compenser le fait que les aspects militaristes de son programme FPS servent à renforcer la capacité des acteurs et des secteurs qui, dans de nombreux contextes, produisent en fait de l'insécurité pour les groupes marginalisés de la société, y compris, mais sans s'y limiter, les femmes. Au fur et à mesure qu'il établit les partenariats essentiels au succès de sa PEF, le Canada doit définir des principes directeurs d'engagement et d'intervention qui favorisent et défendent l'égalité des genres. Il doit également établir de nouveaux partenariats, en particulier dans les pays du Sud global, et préciser ses objectifs féministes dans ses engagements avec les pays qui expriment des préoccupations au sujet des objectifs de la PEF ou qui ne respectent tout simplement pas les droits des femmes et l'égalité des genres. Parce que l'inclusion des femmes et l'égalité des genres nécessitent des transformations structurelles, une PEF doit s'inscrire dans la durée. Elle doit compléter les initiatives à court terme par des efforts structurels à plus long terme. Étant donné que les évaluations basées sur les résultats ne peuvent pas saisir les changements dans les relations de pouvoir ou les inégalités structurelles, ni évaluer adéquatement une augmentation de l'autonomisation individuelle, Affaires mondiales Canada devrait développer des moyens plus sophistiqués et appropriés d'évaluer le changement. ## La politique étrangère et la 44e élection générale au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-politique-etrangere-et-la-44e-election-generale-au-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Comment les partis politiques se sont-ils distingués en matière de politique étrangère ? L’examen de la couverture médiatique... « La politique étrangère du Canada n’a jamais été aussi importante depuis une génération », énonce d’emblée la plateforme électorale du Parti conservateur du Canada. Pourtant, les enjeux internationaux ont largement été ignorés lors de la 44e campagne électorale fédérale. Ceci s’inscrit dans une longue tradition de préférer débattre d’enjeux nationaux, voire provinciaux, plutôt que d’aborder un domaine qui relève pourtant exclusivement du gouvernement fédéral. Même au plus fort de la guerre en Afghanistan durant la première décennie 2000, l’intérêt des Canadiens envers ces enjeux n’était pas au rendez-vous durant les élections. Tout laisse croire que cette tendance sera la même cette année. Les affaires étrangères demeurent loin des priorités des électeurs, ces derniers se disant surtout préoccupés par la pandémie et le coût de la vie. Plusieurs décrient cette situation, soulignant que si le Canada ignore l’international, celui-ci ne l’ignorera pas en retour, comme en témoignent, par exemple, la prise en otage de Canadiens par la Chine, l’interférence russe dans les élections canadiennes, ou encore les centaines de Canadiens toujours coincés en Afghanistan. D’autres estiment au contraire que le Canada n’a que peu d’emprise sur les affaires internationales et qu’il est difficile pour les partis d’opposition de proposer de bonnes idées en la matière, faute d’accès au renseignement classifié. Ceci n’a pourtant pas empêché les chefs de partis de débattre par le passé de politique internationale. Aussi récemment qu’en 2015, les libéraux de Justin Trudeau se sont démarqués par leurs propositions d’accueillir 25 000 réfugiés syriens, de mettre fin aux opérations de combat contre l’État islamique, et d’économiser des milliards en n’achetant pas de chasseurs F-35. Cette élection rappelle avec force que les campagnes électorales ont un impact considérable sur les relations internationales du Canada et sur la vie des Canadiens. Qu’en est-il de la 44e élection fédérale ? Comment les partis politiques se sont-ils distingués en matière de politique étrangère ? L’examen de la couverture médiatique de la campagne électorale révèle sans surprise le peu d’attention accordée aux affaires internationales par les principaux chefs de partis[1]. Deux exceptions sont toutefois notables, l’Afghanistan et la Chine, qui ont été sommairement abordées au cours de la campagne. L’analyse comparative des plateformes électorales révèle quant à elle certains éléments de divergence, dont les relations avec la Chine, mais surtout un large consensus sur une politique étrangère mettant de l’avant les valeurs canadiennes et sur les principales dépenses militaires. L’Afghanistan L’élection a été déclenchée au lendemain de la prise de Kaboul par les talibans, imposant ce sujet comme un enjeu dès le début de la course. Malgré l’intérêt des Canadiens pour le conflit et le souhait d’une forte majorité d’entre eux que le Canada fasse tout en son pouvoir pour rapatrier rapidement les interprètes afghans, le sujet n’a été que partiellement effleuré pendant la campagne. Si chaque chef de parti a rapidement fait part de ses inquiétudes, statuant unanimement qu’une aide devait être apportée aux ressortissants canadiens ainsi qu’aux collaborateurs afghans, il leur a été plus difficile d’expliquer ce qu’ils auraient fait de mieux. Le principal reproche émis à l’encontre du gouvernement Trudeau a été sa réponse jugée plus réactive que proactive, un avis partagé par une majorité de Canadiens, qui se sont montrés déçus de la gestion de la crise par les libéraux. Lors du premier « débat » des chefs, les chefs d’opposition s’en sont pris au plan d’évacuation mis en place par le gouvernement Trudeau, sans toutefois prendre le soin de présenter des alternatives concrètes. Le chef libéral a défendu son plan de retrait, en spécifiant que le Canada avait évacué près de 3 700 personnes, soit davantage que plusieurs autres pays européens. Bien que les chefs du NPD et du PCC n’aient pas rétorqué en force sur ce dossier, le chef du Bloc Québécois a défendu en quelque sorte l’inaction canadienne sur la base de son impuissance. Il a déclaré que le Canada ne constitue pas une puissance mondiale et que ses actions sur la scène internationale ne peuvent être réalisées qu’en coordination avec ses alliés. Le débat en anglais n’a pas permis d’aller plus loin sur la question, si ce n’est qu’une répétition des critiques adressées au gouvernement Trudeau d’avoir déclenché des élections au beau milieu d’une gestion de crise humanitaire. Bien que les partis d’opposition semblent s’entendre sur le fait que le gouvernement fédéral aurait dû agir davantage en amont, il est à noter que seul le Parti conservateur a énoncé un plan d’action concret. Dans une déclaration vidéo diffusée le 26 août, Erin O’Toole a proposé que le Canada poursuive non seulement sa coopération avec ses alliés afin de permettre l’évacuation d’Afghans, mais qu’il établisse en outre des corridors humanitaires en collaboration avec l’Inde, notamment, et qu’il offre du soutien matériel et politique à la résistance afghane contre le régime taliban. Une promesse qui pourrait d’ailleurs susciter des représailles contre le Canada. Tous les partis politiques se sont par ailleurs rapidement entendus sur la non-reconnaissance du régime taliban, bien que les tergiversations du ministre Marc Garneau aient laissé planer un certain flou sur la position libérale en début de campagne. Cette promesse de ne pas reconnaître le nouveau régime afghan risque de venir hanter le prochain gouvernement canadien. Mariam Monsef a brouillé davantage le message du Parti libéral en appelant les talibans « nos frères » dans une vidéo plaidant la protection des femmes et des minorités en Afghanistan – une terminologie qui avait une connotation particulière et qui était culturellement adéquate selon les explications de la ministre, mais qui a suscité un tollé au point tel qu’elle lui aura peut-être coûté sa circonscription. Il est en effet contreproductif d’éviter d’établir des rapports diplomatiques avec des régimes honnis, puisque cela prive d’un accès pouvant être utile pour défendre nos intérêts à leur égard. C’est d’ailleurs pourquoi le Parti libéral de Justin Trudeau avait promis de rétablir les relations diplomatiques avec l’Iran en 2015. L’un des principaux obstacles qui ont empêché la mise en œuvre de cette promesse tient au fait que l’Iran, tout comme les talibans d’ailleurs, est désigné comme commanditaire de terrorisme. La conditionnalité de l’aide internationale par le G7, en revanche, apparaît une bien meilleure façon d’influer sur le nouveau régime afghan. Il est en effet difficile d’identifier les bienfaits de l’absence de liens diplomatiques, outre le fait de s’autoféliciter de maintenir une politique étrangère dite de principe. La Chine Le second enjeu international qui a été abordé lors de la campagne électorale porte sur la Chine. Le premier ministre Trudeau se dit « préoccupé » qu’un chantier naval d’État chinois construise un traversier pour passagers pour une société d’État canadienne, alors que le Parti conservateur s’est engagé à annuler le contrat une fois élu. Puis lors d’un entretien sur les ondes de Radio-Canada, Trudeau a été interrogé sur son ouverture à refuser d’extrader l’ex-dirigeante de Huawei, Meng Wanzhou. Il a répondu sans ambages que le Canada ne se plierait pas au « chantage » de la Chine. « Acquiescer mettrait à risque tous les voyageurs canadiens et les travailleurs canadiens qui se retrouvent en Chine ou ailleurs dans le monde, s’ils savent qu'ils peuvent faire du chantage pour avoir des résultats politiques en mettant la pression sur le Canada via ses citoyens », a ajouté le premier ministre. La commémoration du 1 000e jour d’incarcération de Michael Kovrig et de Michael Spavor a également été l’occasion pour le chef du NPD de rappeler l’importance de « continuer à travailler avec nos alliés internationaux pour mettre de la pression sur la Chine et permettre la libération de ces Canadiens ». Le second débat en français a vu surtout Erin O’Toole exposer une approche différente à l’égard des relations avec la Chine. Le chef conservateur a appelé à une « approche plus sérieuse », notamment en ce qui concerne la technologie 5G de Huawei et les tarifs commerciaux sur l’acier et l’aluminium. Il a également été rejoint par le chef néodémocrate pour critiquer le manque de leadership de Justin Trudeau sur le plan des droits de la personne, rappelant l’absence du premier ministre lors du vote de la motion parlementaire sur la reconnaissance du génocide de la population ouïghour au Xinjiang. C’est au cours du débat en anglais que la relation sino-canadienne a été la plus débattue. Le chef libéral assura que le Canada a fait beaucoup pour défier la Chine autant sur la sphère des droits humains que sur le plan économique. Le chef conservateur a attaqué en déclarant que la voix canadienne a été inexistante de la scène internationale pour protéger les deux Michael. Erin O’Toole a repris à son compte le slogan libéral de 2015, déclarant : « Canada is needed back on the world stage. We may be smaller than China with respect to population and economy, but we’re giant when it comes to commitment, to human rights, to dignity and to the rule of law ». Le premier ministre a répliqué que la meilleure manière de ramener les deux Michael au Canada passe par la coordination avec les alliés. « You do not simply lob tomatoes across the Pacific », a-t-il ajouté de façon à illustrer l’impuissance de mesures plus coercitives. L’échange sur la Chine s’est conclu avec les commentaires du chef bloquiste, qui a saisi l’occasion d’exposer le piètre palmarès du premier ministre quant à la protection des droits de la personne. Pourtant, l’analyse comparative des plateformes électorales démontre que les partis partagent une vision relativement commune sur la question, fondée sur une politique étrangère dite « de principe ».[2] Par exemple, autant le PCC que le PLC pourraient avoir formulé cette position néodémocrate, selon laquelle le parti « osera tenir tête à la Chine avec une stratégie forte et cohérente pour défendre nos intérêts, ici comme ailleurs. Nous travaillerons avec nos allié·es pour développer une réponse internationale robuste et coordonnée au mépris de la Chine pour l'État de droit. Nous dénoncerons les violations des droits de la personne commises par la Chine, soutiendrons les demandeurs d’asile pro-démocratie de Hong Kong et offrirons un soutien coordonné aux personnes qui sont menacées ici par des entités chinoises. » Dans le cadre de leur vision pour « contrer l’autoritarisme et l’ingérence étrangère », les libéraux promettent ainsi de cesser de procrastiner en déposant un projet de loi pour préserver l’intégrité et la sécurité des systèmes de télécommunications, dont la 5G, sans toutefois affirmer, comme les conservateurs, leur désir d’interdire Huawei de l’infrastructure canadienne. Les conservateurs se démarquent effectivement par la virulence et le détail de leurs propositions visant à « affronter la menace posée par le Parti communiste chinois », marquée par « le mal et la tyrannie ». Ils considèrent les « dirigeants communistes » comme « une menace claire et grandissante pour les intérêts canadiens et pour nos valeurs. Ils enlèvent nos citoyens, ciblent notre économie et intimident les membres de la communauté canadienne chinoise. » Les conservateurs proposent, entre autres, de soutenir l’idée d’une « coalition de démocraties », défendue par le président américain Joe Biden, de « reconnaître le génocide des Ouïghours et encourager nos alliés à faire de même », de mettre sur pied « un groupe de travail permanent sur l’ingérence étrangère », « d’imposer des sanctions aux pays et aux ressortissants étrangers qui prennent des Canadiens en otage », de retirer le Canada de la Banque asiatique d’investissement dans les infrastructures dirigée par la Chine, de donner « asile aux défenseurs de la liberté en Chine continentale et aux minorités persécutées », de même que tenter de joindre le Dialogue quadrilatéral sur la sécurité (Quad) formé par les États-Unis, l’Inde, le Japon et l’Australie. Il va de soi que l’adoption de telles mesures entraînerait une réaction sévère de la part de la Chine, mais le chef conservateur s’est montré évasif lorsqu’interrogé, lors du premier débat en français, sur la possibilité de représailles chinoises. Les dépenses et les interventions militaires Un dernier enjeu s’est imposé à la toute fin de la campagne électorale, avec l’annonce d’un partenariat entre l’Australie, les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni en matière de défense. Celui-ci vise à approfondir la coopération entre les trois alliés dans les domaines de l’intelligence artificielle, la cybersécurité, les capacités de frappes longue distance, et surtout le développement de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. Cette annonce s’inscrit dans un contexte de rivalité croissante vis-à-vis de la Chine, qui a amené les trois alliés à réorienter leurs politiques de défense vers l’Indopacifique. Le Canada a été critiqué non seulement parce qu’il n’a été ni consulté, ni même prévenu de cette annonce, mais surtout du fait qu’il ne semble toujours pas avoir développé une vision pour faire face aux tensions croissantes dans la région. L’absence du Canada de l’entente tripartite s’explique donc en partie de son faible intérêt historique pour l’Indopacifique et de sa difficulté apparente à déterminer une voie à suivre. Pourtant, le gouvernement Trudeau travaille sur une stratégie pour la région depuis avril 2019. Son exclusion tient aussi probablement au fait qu’aucun des partis politiques n’ose soutenir l’acquisition de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire dans le processus en cours de renouvellement de la flotte canadienne. Pour M. Trudeau, le Canada « ne sera pas de sitôt » sur le marché de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. Les chefs conservateur et néodémocrate ont critiqué le premier ministre pour l’exclusion du Canada de l’entente, mais n’ont pas été jusqu’à suggérer l’acquisition d’une telle technologie. Ceci s’explique du fait du consensus relatif sur l’augmentation prévue des dépenses militaires. Autant le NPD que le PCC appuient le processus actuel d’acquisition de nouveaux chasseurs et de navires de combat, lesquels s’élèveront à plusieurs dizaines de milliards de dollars. Les conservateurs et les libéraux s’engagent en outre à soutenir la mise à niveau du Système d’alerte du Nord dans le cadre de modernisation du NORAD, à acquérir deux brise-glaces polaires, ainsi qu’à amorcer le processus de remplacement de la flotte de sous-marins, alors que le NPD et le Bloc demeurent muets sur ces questions, malgré les milliards supplémentaires que ceci pourrait nécessiter. Les conservateurs vont plus loin que les autres en proposant de nouvelles initiatives, qui ne sont toutefois ni budgétées, ni clarifiées.  Par exemple, ils entendent « bâtir une capacité canadienne de contribution au renseignement étranger », sans préciser s’il s’agit de créer une nouvelle agence de renseignement extérieur. Ils proposent également de développer une « nouvelle stratégie sur la souveraineté, la dissuasion et la détection » dans l’Arctique, sans en préciser la nature, et à « lancer plus de satellites en orbite basse pour les télécommunications et la défense dans l’Arctique », sans indiquer si cela s’ajouterait à l’entente déjà conclue avec Télésat. Une même continuité est à prévoir en ce qui a trait aux interventions militaires. Tant les libéraux que les conservateurs proposent de renforcer la contribution canadienne aux opérations actuelles de l’OTAN, en particulier en Lettonie et en Ukraine. Les conservateurs ajoutent toutefois leur volonté de fournir des armes létales et l’imagerie RADARSAT à l’Ukraine. Alors que les conservateurs privilégient l’établissement d’un Centre d’excellence des opérations dans l’Arctique de l’OTAN, les libéraux proposent la création d’un Centre d’excellence sur le climat et la sécurité de l’OTAN. Curieusement, aucune plateforme électorale ne mentionne l’une des principales opérations militaires en cours du Canada, à savoir la participation à la Coalition globale contre le groupe État islamique en Irak et en Syrie. Le sort des centaines de militaires déployés dans la région est donc voué au statu quo, mais cette omission témoigne peut-être de la sensibilité du dossier des opérations de formation dirigées par les États-Unis, dans le contexte de l’échec en Afghanistan. Il est particulièrement étonnant que le NPD n’appelle pas au retrait des troupes canadiennes d’Irak et d’autres missions soutenues par l’OTAN. Tout au plus propose-t-il de donner la priorité « aux initiatives multilatérales de maintien de la paix partout dans le monde ». Il n’est donc pas clair si les néodémocrates ne considèrent que les Casques bleus opérant sous commandement de l’ONU comme gardiens de la paix, ou si les troupes déployées à la demande des gouvernements irakien, jordanien, libanais, ukrainien et letton en font également partie. Encore plus étonnant se trouve l’abdication totale des libéraux de Justin Trudeau à soutenir une participation canadienne aux opérations de maintien de la paix de l’ONU, alors qu’il s’agissait de l’une de leurs promesses phares en 2015. Force est donc de constater le consensus canadien à l’effet que la sécurité du Canada ne repose désormais qu’exclusivement sur les États-Unis et l’OTAN. Le besoin d’une plus grande indépendance dans le contexte d’un ordre international de plus en plus fracturé, quant à lui, est largement absent des préoccupations des élus canadiens. Conclusion La politique étrangère a encore été l’une des principales absentes des élections canadiennes, si ce n’est que quelques dossiers imposés par l’actualité. Le faible intérêt des Canadiens par rapport à d’autres préoccupations plus immédiates, de même que le consensus relatif entre les principaux partis politiques expliquent sans doute cette situation. Il n’en demeure pas moins que les promesses électorales discutées au cours de la campagne ou énoncées dans les plateformes amèneront le prochain gouvernement à prendre des décisions coûteuses et conséquentes, malheureusement à l’abri du regard d’une majorité d’électeurs. [1] Les quotidiens La Presse, Le Devoir, Le Journal de Montréal, The Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, National Post ont été systématiquement scrutés, de même que les comptes Twitter des chefs de parti, les trois débats officiels, ainsi que leurs entretiens accordés aux réseaux de télévision CTV, CBC et Radio-Canada. [2] Le Bloc québécois fait bande à part en ne se prononçant sur aucun dossier international outre le prolongement international des compétences constitutionnelles québécoises et la volonté de cesser la vente d’armes à l’Arabie saoudite, deux thèmes ignorés par tous les autres partis politiques. ## La Pologne et la défense de l’Europe face à la Russie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-pologne-et-la-defense-de-leurope-face-a-la-russie/ Modified: 2026-07-09 « Ils ont perdu une bonne occasion de se taire. » C’est ainsi qu’en février 2003, le Président français de l’époque, Jacques Chirac, parlait du soutien de plusieurs nouveaux États membres de l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et futurs membres de l’Union européenne (UE) à la politique américaine sur l’Irak, la Pologne en tête. Le rôle de Varsovie entre son adhésion à l’OTAN en 1999 et aujourd’hui en Europe centrale et orientale a grandement changé, au point où, elle souhaiterait concurrencer le leadership du couple franco-allemand sur le continent européen dans le cadre d’une crédibilité accrue en matière de défense et de sécurité. L’invasion illégale de l’Ukraine par la Fédération de Russie a, depuis trois ans, replongé l’Europe dans un contexte de fortes tensions où les dépenses militaires deviennent cruciales pour assurer la sécurité des États membres de l’OTAN, mais aussi par extension de l’UE. La Pologne se place en tête devant les autres États membres de l’Alliance avec une estimation de 4.7% de son PIB pour les dépenses liées à la Défense en 2025, surpassant tous les Alliés incluant les États-Unis en part du PIB, et une bonne situation économique qui la place comme première économie d’Europe centrale et orientale et sixième à l’échelle de l’Union européenne, devant la Suède et la Belgique notamment. En 2025, les États-Unis bouleversent les équilibres dans les relations transatlantiques. Le président ukrainien, Volodymyr Zelensky, est insulté à la Maison Blanche, l’Union européenne est perçue par Washington comme une organisation anti-américaine et le Canada se retrouve en guerre commerciale et verbale avec les États-Unis. Au même moment, la guerre continue en Ukraine et la Russie devient, pour l’Europe et pour l’OTAN, une menace existentielle. Or, cette Europe ne peut plus se résumer aux puissances économiques et militaires allemande et française. La Pologne montre son souhait d’être un acteur de premier plan ayant pris au sérieux cette menace russe en investissant massivement dans ses capacités militaires et fait aussi partie des plus importants soutiens à l’Ukraine. Dans ce contexte, le Canada doit élargir ses relations avec les partenaires européens, notamment la Pologne, dans le but de renforcer la coopération en matière de défense et de production d’équipements militaires. D’un État prévoyant, mais paria, à un acteur majeur dans les crises Comme le rappelait en 2023 le journaliste du New York Times, Andrew Higgins, plus personne en Europe ne peut dire à la Pologne de se taire maintenant. Varsovie est aujourd’hui un acteur crucial en Europe. Ses craintes au sujet des menaces russes contre l’Europe centrale et orientale se sont avérées être justifiées par l’invasion illégale de l’Ukraine et les actes de sabotages russes en Europe. Depuis 2008 et l’invasion de la Géorgie par la Fédération de Russie, Varsovie n’avait pas cessé d’alerter ses alliés à l’OTAN et l’UE sur la menace que représente la Russie, critiquant le « Reset » des relations russo-américaines de l’administration Obama en 2009 ou le rapprochement franco-russe du Président Macron en 2019. Les Alliés, dont le Canada, ne peuvent donc plus ignorer l’opinion de Varsovie sur les politiques décidées à l’OTAN et sur l’Ukraine. Ce nouveau rôle de Varsovie en matière de leadership n’était pas évident avant la deuxième phase de la guerre en Ukraine (la première étant l’invasion et l’annexion illégale de la Crimée et la guerre dans la région ukrainienne du Donbass en 2014 et 2015). En effet, depuis 2015, la Pologne a été isolée sur la scène européenne en raison de la tournure anti-démocratique, voire autoritaire des gouvernements en place. Lors des élections présidentielles de 2015, Andrzej Duda fut élu président, puis les élections législatives donnèrent une majorité absolue à son parti Droit et Justice (PiS), un parti placé au centre-droit sur l’échiquier politique polonais, qui resta au pouvoir jusqu’en 2023. Pendant ces huit années au pouvoir, le PiS mit en place de multiples réformes remettant en cause l’État de droit, la justice et les libertés individuelles. En 2017, la Pologne fut mise en cause par l’Union européenne pour ces dérives anti-démocratiques faisant d’elle un « mauvais élève » au sein de l’union. Cependant, avec le début de l’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine, les relations entre la Pologne et ses partenaires européens se sont réchauffées, à l’exemple des mots de l’ancien premier ministre Mateusz Morawiecki : « Il faut mettre fin au conflit à l’Ouest, le véritable ennemi est à l’Est ». Dès le début des opérations d’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, la Pologne s’est fermement opposée à la décision russe, soutenant les multiples sanctions, qualifiant la Fédération de Russie d’État soutenant le terrorisme, et est devenue depuis le nœud logistique de l’aide militaire occidentale pour leur livraison vers l’Ukraine avec l’aéroport Rzeszów-Jasionka puis par des corridors terrestres et ferroviaires à la frontière. En 2025, le contexte sécuritaire en Europe est remis en question par les perspectives potentielles d’un retrait entier ou partiel des États-Unis de l’OTAN, mais aussi du continent. En Europe centrale et orientale surtout, la crainte d’une attaque russe s’est intensifiée à la suite des positions de l’administration américaine sur la guerre en Ukraine et sur ses relations avec Moscou. Au même moment, la Pologne a pris la présidence de l’Union européenne pour les six prochains mois avec comme priorités la défense et la sécurité. Il s’agit donc d’une période cruciale pour Varsovie et son potentiel de leadership en Europe. La première armée d’Europe sera polonaise Il est vrai que Varsovie a fait du réarmement de ses forces un point important, et ce même avant 2022. Dès le début des années 2000, la Pologne s’est engagée à répondre aux standards de l’OTAN le plus rapidement avec, en 2002, l’achat des premiers chars modernes de combat (Leopards 2A4 et 2A5), ainsi que la construction de véhicules blindés sur le sol polonais par l’entreprise finlandaise Rosomak, puis en 2004 la commande des premiers F-16 américains. Cependant, le réarmement important de la Pologne débute dans les années 2010. L’arrivée au pouvoir aux États-Unis de Barack Obama en 2009 avec, d’une part, son plan de « Reset » des relations russo-américaines et, d’autre part, la politique du pivot vers l’Indopacifique et la compétition avec la Chine, inquiète Varsovie qui y voit déjà un certain désengagement américain en Europe. Cette inquiétude est alimentée aussi par la décision du président américain d’annuler le déploiement du système de défense antimissile en Europe afin de confirmer les nouveaux rapports positifs entre Washington et Moscou. Pour les Polonais, cette décision illustre une certaine naïveté américaine sur les objectifs russes en Europe. En effet, en 2008 la Fédération de Russie avait déjà envahi la Géorgie créant deux régions séparatistes en Abkhazie et en Ossétie du Sud. Face à ces inquiétudes, Varsovie vote en 2012 un plan de modernisation technique (PMT - Plan Modernizacji Technicznej), à hauteur de 40 milliards dollars et couvrant les futures dépenses militaires de 2013 à 2022. L’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014 et la guerre dans le Donbass ukrainien en 2015 ont amené Varsovie à devoir renforcer plus rapidement que prévu son programme de réarmement. Dès 2015, la Pologne a dépassé le seuil des 2% du PIB dans les dépenses militaires alors que l’Allemagne était à 1.19% et la France à 1.78%. Depuis, les gouvernements polonais successifs, bien qu’ayant des désaccords sur les montants alloués au réarmement, ont tous eu le même postulat sur la nécessité de renforcer les forces armées face à la menace russe et la menace hybride à la frontière avec le Bélarus. En 2018, le programme Wisla a visé à réaménager le plan prévu en 2012 afin de s’adapter à l’évolution de la situation en matière de Défense. Le premier mandat de Donald Trump à la Maison Blanche n’a fait que renforcer l’idée, pour la Pologne, de la nécessité de se réarmer face à une Russie de plus en plus active dans la déstabilisation des démocraties occidentales avec des cas d’ingérences dans les élections américaines de 2016 (cherchant à favoriser Donald Trump) et françaises de 2017 (cherchant à favoriser Marine Le Pen). Ainsi entre 2018 et 2022, les commandes polonaises en termes d’équipements se sont multipliées avec l’achat de matériels américains notamment mêlant achat de matériel de qualité et entretient de bonnes relations avec le président américain. La Pologne s’est équipée de batteries sol-air Patriot, d’hélicoptères UH-60 (Black Hawk), ainsi que de lance-roquettes multiples HIMARS. Varsovie espérait aussi pouvoir convaincre le président américain de maintenir sa présence en Europe pour dissuader la Russie en se mettant d’accord sur une présence permanente de troupes américaines sur le territoire polonais, et en proposant même la construction d’un « Fort Trump ». À la veille de l’invasion de l’Ukraine, les forces armées polonaises étaient considérablement renforcées et remplissaient les critères de standardisation OTAN. La Pologne (797 chars de combat) surpassait en nombre les parcs de chars de combat français (222 chars Leclerc) et allemand (284 chars Leopard), détenait la première flotte aérienne d’Europe centrale et orientale, mais connaissait un léger retard sur sa marine bien qu’elle développait ses capacités pour la sécuritisation de la Mer Baltique face aux menaces russes. Les budgets polonais pour les dépenses militaires n'ont cessé de croître pour arriver à 4% du PIB en 2024, passant en 10 ans de 10.1 milliards $ à 34.9 milliards $ représentant plus de la moitié des dépenses de la France (64.2 milliards $ en 2024). En 2024, les forces armées polonaises étaient classées 3ème en termes d’effectifs au sein de l’OTAN avec 216.000 personnes (contre 204.600 pour la France), derrière les États-Unis et la Turquie. Bien que ces effectifs aient mélangé armée de professionnels, réservistes et volontaires, ils illustraient le souhait polonais de compter d’une part sur la qualité de ses équipements modernes et d’autre part sur la massification afin de répondre aux défis d’une guerre terrestre de haute intensité. La modernisation des forces armées polonaises a donc été pensée pour s’adapter aux exigences du combat de haute intensité avec le développement des moyens de frappes en profondeur et la construction d'une fortification défensive, notamment aux frontières avec l’enclave de Kaliningrad et le Bélarus. À l’été 2024 le gouvernement de Donald Tusk annonçait le financement du projet de Bouclier de l’Est d’un montant de 2.5 milliards $ visant à construire des fortifications à la frontière avec le Bélarus et la Fédération de Russie. Ce bouclier comprendra des barrages modernes ainsi que des fortifications de surveillance. Il se fera conjointement avec les États baltes (Estonie – Lettonie – Lituanie), frontaliers de la Fédération de Russie et du Bélarus. Dans le cadre de la communication stratégique en direction de la Russie et du Bélarus, les responsables politiques polonais aiment présenter les forces armées polonaises comme la « première armée d’Europe », devant la France et l’Allemagne. Après ces efforts, il semble qu’elle est en passe de le devenir, surtout sur les capacités terrestres. Cependant des questions se posent sur la capacité économique et structurelle de la Pologne pour maintenir ces efforts sur le long terme. En effet, les efforts importants appliqués par les différents gouvernements questionnent sur la capacité de la Pologne à maintenir ces efforts dans le temps, tout en assurant une acception claire de la population pour cet effort national. Après Paris et Berlin, Varsovie devient un centre majeur de l’Europe En janvier 2025, la Pologne prenait la tête de la présidence du Conseil de l’Union européenne pour une période de six mois avec un slogan « Sécurité, Europe ! ». La présidence du Conseil permet à un trio d’États, ici la Pologne avec le Danemark et Chypre, de définir les thèmes et les grandes questions qui seront traités durant la période par le Conseil de l’UE. Parmi les sept principaux axes, la Pologne met en priorité l’accent sur la Défense et la Sécurité de l’Union européenne. Durant ce mandat, le gouvernement polonais souhaite travailler sur le renforcement de la préparation des partenaires européens dans la défense du continent et donc améliorer l’industrie de défense en Europe. Le 3 février dernier, lors d’une rencontre informelle à Bruxelles entre plusieurs représentants européens, dont le Premier ministre britannique invité, Keir Starmer, l’avis était de renforcer les dépenses européennes dans la Défense et l’aide à l’Ukraine. La Pologne soutient l’idée d’alléger les règles de la Banque européenne d'investissement afin d’aider au financement de projets de Défense, comme le projet Bouclier de l’Est. Ces discussions sur un accord européen concernant le financement de projets pour le renforcement de la Défense des alliés étaient déjà présentes dans les discussions de la présidence française du Conseil de l’UE début 2022. Cependant, la Pologne tient aussi à réfléchir à l’amélioration de la coopération directe entre l’Union européenne et l’OTAN, élargissant les acteurs impliqués, dont le Canada et les États-Unis. Cette présidence permet à Varsovie d’être au cœur de toutes les discussions européennes et de mettre en avant son agenda politique au moment où le couple franco-allemand, habituellement « leader » de l’Union européenne, connaît un certain ralentissement. En effet, la France est dans une situation politique interne instable depuis la dissolution de l’Assemblée nationale en juin 2024 et l’absence de majorité claire, ce qui a eu pour conséquence la chute d’un premier gouvernement en décembre dernier et de fortes critiques envers le Président français, Emmanuel Macron. Néanmoins, le président français est très actif sur le sujet de l’Ukraine et de la défense des alliés européens depuis les fortes tensions entre Washington et Kyiv après l’entrevue désastreuse à la Maison Blanche fin février entre Donald Trump et Volodymyr Zelensky. Du côté allemand, l’éclatement de la coalition des partis SPD, Verts, FDP en novembre dernier amenant le chancelier Olaf Scholz à perdre un vote de confiance en décembre, l’ont obligé à convoquer des élections législatives anticipées. Les conservateurs de la CDU ont remporté l’élection, mais il faut noter une émergence majeure du parti d’extrême-droite AFP. Le futur chancelier allemand, Friedrich Merz, s’est dit en faveur du renforcement des forces armées allemandes[1], ainsi que d'une révision des ententes stratégiques, évoquant la possibilité d’ouvrir le débat sur l’idée d’un parapluie nucléaire européen, en coopération avec les deux seules puissances nucléaires du continent : le Royaume-Uni et la France. Bien que la France et l’Allemagne retrouvent une certaine forme de décision d’agir pour la défense de l’Europe et le soutien à l’Ukraine, la Pologne se démarque par sa ligne stable sur la perception de la menace russe depuis 2008, par une stabilité politique actuellement, mais aussi par les investissements consentis dans sa défense depuis son adhésion à l’OTAN en 1999. La Pologne, qui entretient par ailleurs de bons rapports avec le 47e président américain, veut être perçue comme un interlocuteur de premier plan en Europe. La Pologne face à l’abandon américain de l’Ukraine et de l’Europe L’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par près de 200.000 soldats russes en 2022 a, comme dit précédemment, mis au clair l’étendue des objectifs révisionnistes des frontières en Europe par la Fédération de Russie. Cependant, alors que la communauté transatlantique avait été en mesure à l’époque de répondre ensemble pour dénoncer cette invasion et aider l’Ukraine, trois ans plus tard la situation a bien changé. En 2025, la nouvelle administration américaine montre son souhait de mettre fin à la guerre coûte que coûte, même si cela indiquerait l’abandon des territoires illégalement occupés (Crimée comprise). De plus, le président américain a aussi annoncé exclure l’adhésion à l’OTAN de l’Ukraine en gage de garantie de sécurité, renforçant la division entre Washington et les chancelleries européennes sur la conduite des négociations de paix. Le sort réservé à l’Ukraine inquiète donc grandement en Europe centrale et orientale sur le soutien de « l’allié » américain. De plus, depuis plusieurs semaines déjà, le refrain d’un retrait militaire américain de l’OTAN et donc de l’Europe inquiète. Un tel départ laisserait les Européens devant le devoir de se réorganiser pour dissuader toute tentative russe sur le flanc Est de l’alliance atlantique. Bien que les mots paix et cessez-le-feu sont de plus en plus évoqués pour parler de la guerre en Ukraine, la Fédération de Russie ne semble pas s’apprêter à arrêter les efforts militaires. L’International Institute for Strategic Studies estime que cette année, les dépenses militaires de la Russie représenteront 7.5% du PIB. De plus, durant son allocution du 5 mars dernier, le Président français, Emmanuel Macron, expliquait que la Russie prévoyait d’accroître les rangs de ses forces armées avec 300.000 soldats supplémentaires, mais aussi un accroissement de matériels. Même si la guerre devait cesser en Ukraine, il est certain que le continent européen resterait sous la menace directe d’une Russie enhardie par ses gains dans sa campagne militaire. Donc, entre le risque d’abandon de l’Ukraine et de l’Europe par l’administration américaine, le gouvernement polonais ne faiblit pas et tient à démontrer sa détermination à la défense du flanc Est de l’Europe. Le Premier ministre, Donald Tusk, a récemment annoncé que le gouvernement travaille sur un programme permettant d’assurer à chaque homme adulte en Pologne une formation militaire basique[2]. Il a aussi annoncé l’objectif fixé à 500.000 membres des forces armées, parlant de « Course à la Sécurité ». Malgré les craintes d’un retrait américain, le gouvernement polonais tente d’assurer le lien transatlantique, s’illustrant comme l’État le plus à même de discuter avec l’administration Trump. Cependant, le Royaume-Uni et la France ont démontré un certain leadership dans les dernières semaines, notamment en proposant de travailler sur le déploiement potentiel de troupes européennes en Ukraine dans le cadre d’un cessez-le-feu ou d’un traité de paix, visant à assurer le respect d’un quelconque accord signé. La Pologne de son côté s’est opposée à toute participation à ce déploiement, ce qui pourrait remettre en question sa réelle détermination face à la menace russe. Néanmoins cette décision peut être compréhensible en raison de la nécessité pour la Pologne d’assurer la protection de son territoire, de ses frontières avec l’enclave de Kaliningrad et le Bélarus et aussi la protection de la frontière polono-lituanienne qui assure un lien terrestre entre les États baltes et le reste du continent européen. Considérations politiques pour le Canada En janvier dernier, l’ancien Premier ministre du Canada, Justin Trudeau, a signé un accord de coopération nucléaire avec le gouvernement polonais de Donald Tusk qui vise à améliorer la coopération canado-polonaise dans le secteur du nucléaire et de la transition énergétique. Le prochain gouvernement canadien devra maintenir l’approfondissement des relations avec Varsovie. Que doit retenir le Canada au sujet de l’évolution des rapports de force en Europe ? Les considérations politiques à retenir : Les élections à venir en Pologne En mai 2025, les Polonais seront appelés à voter. Les derniers sondages donnent, tant aux élections présidentielles que législatives, en tête le parti (Coalition Civique ou KO) de l’actuel Premier Ministre polonais (36% d’intentions de vote pour le candidat à la présidentielle, Rafal Trzaskowski, et 35% au Parlement). Le parti KO est considéré comme étant au centre de l’échiquier politique en Pologne. Cependant il faut aussi noter un niveau élevé des partis d’opposition. D’une part, le précédent parti au pouvoir (PiS), dont le Président actuel, Andrzej Duda, fait partie, est crédité à 24% pour les présidentielles et 31% des intentions aux législatives, avec Karol Nawrocki comme candidat. D’autre part, on observe aussi la montée du parti d’extrême-droite Confédération Liberté et Indépendance (KWOiN) avec 19% des intentions de vote pour les présidentielles et législatives. Les positions des différents partis politiques sur la question de la politique étrangère sont similaires et le résultat des élections ne devrait pas grandement influencer ces deux sujets politiques, avec notamment le souhait de maintenir des liens forts avec l’allié américain. La thématique de la sécurité reste un thème majeur dans ces élections. Cependant, la dernière fois que le PiS était au gouvernement, la Pologne a été grandement critiquée sur le respect des droits fondamentaux et le retour au pouvoir de ce parti pourrait rendre difficile un approfondissement des relations entre Ottawa et Varsovie. La Pologne est un acteur-clé dans le soutien à l’Ukraine Varsovie est l’un des plus importants soutiens tant militaire qu’humanitaire pour Kyiv. En 2025, l’aide polonaise à l’Ukraine représente l’équivalent de 4.91% du PIB de la Pologne en additionnant l’aide directe, mais aussi l’aide aux réfugiés. La Pologne a accueilli près d’un million de réfugiés sur son territoire depuis le début de l’invasion. De plus, du point de vue militaire, Varsovie a délivré un nombre conséquent de moyens : environ 800 chars de combat, près de 500 véhicules de combat d’infanterie et d’importants stocks de munitions, mais aussi des avions de combat de fabrication soviétique. En plus de son aide directe, la Pologne est devenue le lieu de la centralisation des aides militaires occidentales envoyées en Ukraine, grâce à ses infrastructures aériennes, ferroviaires et routières. De son côté, le Canada a certes une aide militaire, en termes d’équipements, plus limitée à l’Ukraine depuis 2022. Cependant Ottawa a été très présent en Ukraine avant la guerre avec l’Opération UNIFIER, qui était « une mission d’instruction militaire de professionnalisation et de renforcement des capacités des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) en soutien à l’Ukraine », mise en place en 2015. Depuis la guerre, l’Opération UNIFIER a déplacé des missions de formation en Europe et notamment en Pologne, renforçant les liens entre Varsovie et Ottawa en matière de coopération dans l’aide à l’Ukraine. Environ 54.000 membres des forces armées ukrainiennes ont été formés depuis le début de l’Opération, rendant crédible la position du Canada sur l’aide à l’Ukraine. La Pologne est un allié-clé dans les relations transatlantiques et la coopération économique Avec une croissance positive constante de ses dépenses militaires et des investissements dans l'industrie de défense, la Pologne devient un pilier du renforcement des capacités européennes. En s'engageant avec Varsovie sur ces questions, le Canada pourrait faciliter des partenariats industriels et stratégiques bilatéraux, servant à renforcer les relations avec Varsovie. Ce rapprochement industriel pourrait notamment permettre à Ottawa de trouver de nouvelles pistes d’achat d’équipement militaire (voir recommandation 1). La Pologne joue un rôle central dans le renforcement du flanc Est de l’OTAN. Son engagement dans la sécurité régionale en fait un partenaire stratégique pour le Canada, qui partage les mêmes objectifs de stabilité face aux menaces russes avec notamment la présence militaire canadienne dans la région dans le cadre de l’Opération REASSURANCE. Dans le cadre de cette présence en Lettonie, la Pologne devient un partenaire majeur pour assurer la protection du corridor Suwałki. Depuis 2022, ce corridor a été identifié comme un point faible du dispositif de l’Alliance face aux risques d’attaques russes contre les États membres de l’OTAN. Le rôle croissant de la Pologne dans la politique européenne offre aussi au Canada une opportunité d’approfondir ses liens avec l’UE par l’intermédiaire d’un État favorable à une coopération renforcée avec l’Amérique du Nord. Il n’est pas question de remettre en cause le rôle de la France ou de l’Allemagne, mais de diversifier ses rapports avec les partenaires européens, d’autant plus qu’il existe une importante communauté polonaise au Canada, avec environ 1.1 millions de Canadiens de descendance polonaise.  Pourquoi la Pologne doit devenir un partenaire plus important pour le Canada ? En capitalisant sur l’influence grandissante de la Pologne en Europe, le Canada pourrait consolider son rôle au sein des alliances transatlantiques et renforcer son activité politique en Europe de l’Est, un enjeu clé pour la stabilité mondiale. Cependant, ces recommandations doivent être combinées à la priorité polonaise pour la défense au sein de l’OTAN et donc accroître le budget pour les dépenses militaires. Recommandations pour le gouvernement du Canada 1- Renforcer la coopération bilatérale en matière de défense et de sécurité Comme il a été mentionné précédemment, la Pologne et le Canada coopèrent déjà ensemble sur les domaines de défense et de sécurité avec d’une part leur participation aux missions et exercices militaires de l’OTAN, avec notamment leur participation commune à l’International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2014 et la présence, entre 2014 et 2017, de troupes canadiennes en rotation sur le sol polonais (entre 120 et 220 personnes) à Drawsko Pomorskie. D’autre part, avec l’invasion de l’Ukraine, le Canada a relocalisé sa mission de formation des troupes ukrainiennes en Europe et notamment en Pologne dans le cadre de l’Opération UNIFIER. Ainsi, la coopération entre Pologne et Canada en matière de défense et de sécurité est déjà importante, mais elle pourrait encore s’approfondir. Dans un premier temps, le Canada pourrait renforcer son accord bilatéral avec la Pologne sur la sécurité générale de l’information en incluant les mêmes principes que ceux annoncés dans le cadre du partenariat bilatéral avec la France. Ce dernier visait à assurer le renforcement de la cybersécurité et de l’échange de renseignements concernant différents axes, notamment l’ingérence, l’espionnage et le sabotage. En ayant connaissance des actes de sabotages russes en Europe, le Canada devrait commencer à renforcer cette coopération avec ces États ciblés, dont la Pologne, afin de mieux se préparer face à ce type de menace, qui pourraient être russe. ou bien chinoise. Deuxièmement, au printemps 2024, la Pologne, en collaboration avec plusieurs autres États frontaliers de la Russie[3], a annoncé un accord pour établir un « Mur de drones » sur les 3.800km de frontière allant de la Norvège jusqu’à la Pologne. Ce projet de mur de drones vise à améliorer les capacités de surveillance de la frontière car chaque drone est en mesure de couvrir une plus large zone que l’installation habituelle de caméras fixes. De plus, la guerre en Ukraine a démontré l’importance majeure des drones dans les opérations militaires, que ce soit pour du combat, mais aussi et surtout pour du renseignement et de la reconnaissance. En 2023, le Canada a annoncé l’acquisition de 11 systèmes d’aéronefs télépilotés, accompagnés par l’achat de moyens nécessaires autour (postes de contrôle, hangars, services de soutien, ...) acquis auprès du fabricant américain General Atomics Aeronautical System. En raison des tensions politiques et commerciales entre le Canada et l’administration américaine, il semble nécessaire pour Ottawa de trouver de nouvelles alternatives en terme d’acquisition de matériel militaire aéronautique. Afin de couvrir plus largement son espace aérien et notamment dans le Nord Arctique, le Canada pourrait donc renforcer sa coopération avec la Pologne dans le projet de « Mur de drones » via l’achat de drones européens avec, en contrepartie, un élargissement du « Mur » jusqu’à la frontière nord du Canada. Cet élargissement permettrait de couvrir une zone aussi menacée par l’aviation et la marine russe. 2- Soutenir l’émergence du leadership polonais dans les relations avec l’UE Le Canada et la Pologne ont toujours entretenu d’importantes relations bilatérales depuis la fin de la Guerre froide. Depuis 2022, le Canada apporte son aide à la Pologne pour la gestion des réfugiés en provenance d’Ukraine. Dans le cadre d’un renforcement de ses relations avec les États d’Europe centrale et orientale, le Canada devrait collaborer avec la Pologne sur les enjeux transatlantiques pour promouvoir des positions communes lors de forums internationaux. Ensuite, Ottawa devrait encourager Varsovie à jouer un rôle moteur dans l'évolution des politiques européennes en faveur d’un renforcement des liens avec l’Amérique du Nord. En effet la Pologne reste un des États européens le plus engagé dans la conservation des bonnes relations avec les États-Unis malgré les tensions actuelles sur la guerre en Ukraine et sur les relations commerciales avec l’Union européenne. Alors que le Canada a la présidence du G7 cette année, il serait pertinent d’accorder une place plus importante à la Pologne dans un format de rencontre élargie, démontrant ainsi la considération du gouvernement canadien dans l’émergence du leadership polonais en Europe. 3- Développer les échanges économiques et énergétiques La Pologne est le premier partenaire économique du Canada en Europe centrale et orientale. En plus de l’accord de coopération nucléaire signé en début d’année, le Canada pourrait continuer de renforcer ses investissements en Pologne dans les secteurs stratégiques comme l’énergie. Le gouvernement canadien pourrait soutenir des accords de coopération énergétique, notamment en matière de gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) et d’énergies renouvelables. LNG Canada, première installation d’exportation de GNL à grande échelle, souhaite faire ses premières exportations de GNL dès cette année 2025. D’autres projets d’installation sont prévus pour les environs de 2027-2030. La Pologne de son côté cherche à diversifier ses importations de gaz, alors qu’elle dépendait du gaz russe avant l’invasion de 2022, et pourrait donc être un partenaire pertinent pour le Canada et son gaz naturel liquéfié. [1] Le 18 mars 2025, le Bundestag vote un plan de dépense militaire majeur à hauteur de centaines de milliards d’Euros. [2] Cette formation sera aussi proposée aux femmes sur une base volontaire cependant. [3] Norvège, Finlande, Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie. ## La polysémie de la communauté de sécurité : vers une Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN) « centrée sur le peuple » ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-polysemie-de-la-communaute-de-securite-vers-une-association-des-nations-de-lasie-du-sud-est-asean-centree-sur-le-peuple/ Modified: 2023-03-31 > Dans un article publié dans la revue International Studies Quarterly, Stéphanie Martel soutient que la construction d'une communauté de sécurité peut être comprise comme un processus de performance discursive fondé sur la négociation constante entre des conceptions concurrentes de la sécurité comme de la communauté. Dans un article publié dans la revue International Studies Quarterly, Stéphanie Martel soutient que la construction d'une communauté de sécurité peut être comprise comme un processus de performance discursive fondé sur la négociation constante entre des conceptions concurrentes de la sécurité comme de la communauté. Ce processus, en d'autres termes, est intrinsèquement polysémique, omnidirectionnel et contesté. Pour le bénéfice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, dont le mandat inclut la mobilisation de l’expertise de recherche pour la communauté de défense canadienne, elle revient ici sur cette approche originale en prenant pour cas d'étude l'ASEAN. Introduction Le 31 décembre 2015, l’Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN)[1] a officiellement annoncé l’établissement de sa communauté de sécurité, et ce, malgré le fait qu'elle ne remplisse pas ses propres critères pour en constituer une. En effet, l'ASEAN s’est qualifiée elle-même de « communauté de sécurité » à de nombreuses reprises depuis le début du 21e siècle et demeure un exemple souvent mobilisé par les chercheur.e.s de communauté de sécurité « naissante ». Pourtant, elle s'écarte aussi de la façon dont ce concept est généralement compris en Relations internationales, c'est-à-dire en tant que groupe d'États ayant renoncé à l'usage de la force comme moyen légitime de régler leurs différends. En Asie-Pacifique comme ailleurs dans le monde, la construction d'une communauté de sécurité englobe aujourd'hui beaucoup plus que la simple absence de guerre entre les États. Les défis non militaires et transnationaux sont une partie incontournable des mandats des institutions de sécurité à travers le monde, notamment en raison d’une "sécuritisation" en continu d’un nombre croissant d’enjeux auparavant considérés comme relevant de domaines de gouvernance non sécuritaires. D’autre part, les acteurs non étatiques jouent un rôle de plus en plus actif dans la gouvernance mondiale, y compris en matière de sécurité. En d’autres termes, la gouvernance de la sécurité se diversifie de plus en plus, tant dans la portée de son mandat que dans l'identité de ses participants. Compte tenu de cette diversification, une définition plus large du concept de communauté de sécurité est requise. Une communauté de sécurité peut en fait être conçue comme un collectif dans lequel les membres collaborent dans le but de protéger un référent commun contre une ou plusieurs sources d’insécurité. Par le fait même, je soutiens que la construction d'une communauté de sécurité peut être comprise comme un processus de performance discursive fondé sur la négociation constante entre des conceptions concurrentes de la sécurité comme de la communauté. Ce processus, en d'autres termes, est intrinsèquement polysémique, omnidirectionnel et contesté. Premièrement, la construction d'une communauté de sécurité est influencée par des interprétations distinctes (1) de ce que la poursuite de la sécurité signifie pour une communauté donnée et (2) d’où se situent les limites de la communauté, la rendant ainsi polysémique, c’est-à-dire qu’elle a plusieurs sens (ou significations) qui ne sont pas aisément conciliables. Deuxièmement, ce processus est omnidirectionnel, car ces interprétations distinctes lancent également la communauté de sécurité dans des sens (ou chemins) différents, poursuivis simultanément, ce qui peut se traduire par de l’incohérence en matière de politiques, mais contribue par ailleurs à justifier la pertinence des institutions qui personnifient la communauté sur plusieurs plans à la fois. Troisièmement, les agents sociaux s'inspirent de ces interprétations concurrentes pour remettre en question la façon dont leurs homologues participent à la construction de la communauté de sécurité, ce qui en fait un processus profondément contesté, avec des effets sur les politiques adoptées. Cette contestation se manifeste sous deux formes distinctes, mais interdépendantes, que j'appelle « externe » et « interne ». D'une part, les acteurs en présence s'engagent dans une contestation « externe » en proposant des versions distinctes, relativement cohérentes, mais potentiellement incompatibles de la communauté de sécurité lors de leur participation à sa construction. D'autre part, même lorsque les agents sociaux convergent vers une seule version de la communauté de sécurité, ils participent toujours à une contestation « interne » en débattant de la signification spécifique, des limites et des solutions politiques et sécuritaires associées à cette version. Pour illustrer mon argumentaire, je m'inspire du cas de l'ASEAN en tant que principal exemple d'une institution se définissant comme une communauté de sécurité « en devenir », aux prises avec le caractère diversifié de la gouvernance sécuritaire au 21e siècle. Mieux comprendre le spectre de positions concurrentes sur la sécurité régionale et le rôle de l’ASEAN dans ce domaine est nécessaire pour faire sens des politiques adoptées par les acteurs de la région et pour assurer une participation efficace des partenaires de l’ASEAN, y compris le Canada, à la gouvernance sécuritaire en Asie Pacifique. Par ailleurs, il est nécessaire de prendre au sérieux le rôle fondamental que joue le discours dans le développement de cette communauté de sécurité. Celui-ci a des effets politiques réels sur la nature des réponses à l’insécurité élaborées et mises en œuvre par les acteurs de la région, en mer de Chine comme au Myanmar, ou dans le contexte de discussions sur l’ordre régional de l’Indo-Pacifique ou la relance du dialogue quadrilatéral (ou « Quad »). Dans cet article, je m’intéresse en particulier aux effets sur les politiques de sécurité humaine, mais les impacts de cette réalité transparaissent sur l’ensemble du spectre des enjeux sécuritaires. Polysémie dans la communauté de sécurité La tentative de l’ASEAN de former une communauté de sécurité comprend plusieurs objectifs, sans hiérarchie claire entre eux. Ses principales composantes sont (1) une approche indirecte, fondée sur le dialogue, de la gestion des conflits interétatiques au sein des États de la région, (2) un accent sur les menaces « non traditionnelles » à la sécurité des États membres, et (3) une ouverture limitée à une dimension humaine de la sécurité, dans le cadre d'un objectif plus large de transformation de l’ASEAN en une communauté « centrée sur le peuple » (ou people-centered). La délimitation de ces objectifs distincts - et concurrents - résulte du caractère diversifié de la gouvernance de sécurité dans la région de l’Asie-Pacifique, caractérisée par, d'une part, un processus soutenu de sécuritisation des questions non militaires et transnationales qui prend racine dès la création de l'organisation et, d'autre part, la participation croissante d'une variété d'acteurs non étatiques à la gouvernance régionale – ex. expert.e.s et organisations non gouvernementales. Trois « volets » du discours interagissent dans le débat sur la communauté de sécurité ASEAN. Chaque volet véhicule une version particulière de la communauté de sécurité, qui consiste en un ensemble relativement cohérent de positions sur la principale source d'insécurité régionale, le ou les objets référents (ou ce qui doit être sécurisé) et le rôle de l'ASEAN dans la poursuite de la sécurité régionale. Alors que ces versions de la communauté de sécurité se confrontent dans le même contexte multilatéral, elles soutiennent également la (re)production de l'identité de l'ASEAN en tant que communauté de sécurité « en devenir ». Dans une première version (non traditionnelle) de la communauté de sécurité, l'insécurité régionale est conçue comme étant principalement d'origine transnationale, minant la capacité des États à exercer un contrôle sur leurs frontières. Dans cette version, la communauté régionale englobe les États membres de l'ASEAN conformément à sa vision de l’Asie du Sud-Est comme région cohérente. Le domaine transnational d'où provient le danger est présenté comme étant situé à l'extérieur, mais pouvant se faufiler dans la communauté, qui elle a besoin de mettre en commun ses ressources pour protéger le caractère sacré du territoire commun, national et régional contre une variété d’enjeux. Ces enjeux relèvent principalement du crime transnational (ex. trafics illicites, piraterie, terrorisme, cybercriminalité, etc.), mais s’étendent depuis plus récemment aux pandémies et aux catastrophes environnementales. Dans cette première version, la nature de la menace est également conçue comme ayant fondamentalement changé du fait de la mondialisation, le risque de guerre interétatique étant considéré comme chose du passé. Une deuxième version (traditionnelle) de la communauté de sécurité suggère que l'insécurité régionale découle principalement de la réémergence de problèmes de sécurité « traditionnels », dans le contexte de nouvelles tensions dans la mer de Chine méridionale (et dans la péninsule coréenne), ainsi que d'une rivalité accrue entre les États-Unis et la Chine. L'ASEAN y est présentée comme ayant un rôle particulier à jouer dans la création des conditions de paix entre les États régionaux, en agissant comme un « médiateur honnête » des relations entre les puissances, en favorisant le dialogue sur les défis stratégiques qui affectent la région et en soutenant le développement d’une coopération sur des questions de sécurité, y compris de défense, non sensibles. C’est dans ce cadre que l’ASEAN a développé sa propre position sur un ordre régional de l’Indo-Pacifique, face à la prolifération d’initiatives externes qui remettent en question sa « centralité » dans l’architecture de sécurité régionale. Dans une troisième version (centrée sur le peuple) de la communauté de sécurité de l’ASEAN, l’insécurité est présentée comme provenant de l’omniprésence des défis quotidiens liés à la survie, au bien-être et à la dignité des populations d’Asie du Sud-Est. Une bonne dose de méfiance entoure encore la notion de « sécurité humaine » au sein de l'ASEAN, qui a toutefois fait preuve d'une ouverture croissante envers la reconnaissance d'une dimension humaine à la sécurité, notamment visible dans son adoption récente de l’agenda onusien « femmes, paix et sécurité ». Cette version présente les personnes, décrites collectivement comme « le peuple », comme un objet référent à la sécurité régionale aux côtés de l’État. Cette préoccupation se manifeste, plus généralement, dans l’extension de l’objectif du groupe de se transformer en une communauté « centrée sur le peuple », qui alimente sa position sur différents enjeux comme la protection des victimes du trafic humain, la déradicalisation ou, plus récemment et timidement, les opérations de paix, selon une version tronquée et moins polémique de la responsabilité de protéger. Dans ce qui suit, je me concentre sur cette troisième version de la communauté de sécurité de l’ASEAN pour discuter de la façon dont la contestation « interne » s’opère entre des acteurs de différentes « voies » du multilatéralisme régional (officielle, informelle et non gouvernementale). L’identité de l’ASEAN en tant que communauté « centrée sur le peuple » remise en question Les participants au débat sur la communauté de sécurité qui adhèrent à la version « centrée sur le peuple » sont largement d’avis que l’organisation devrait s'efforcer de mieux relever les défis qui ont une incidence sur la sécurité des populations d’Asie du Sud-Est au quotidien, et que plus l'ASEAN en fera sur ce front, mieux ce sera. Pourtant, ces acteurs sont ouvertement en désaccord sur la place qui devrait être accordée aux « personnes » au sein de l’approche sécuritaire de l’ASEAN, que ce soit sur l’identité des personnes incluses comme de leur rôle dans l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre des politiques sécuritaires. L’opposition la plus claire au discours officiel de l’ASEAN provient des ONG de la région qui investissent de plus en plus le dialogue sécuritaire régional, notamment parce que l’ASEAN elle-même accepte de leur faire une place. La participation des ONG au débat sur la « communauté centrée sur le peuple » se déroule de trois manières principales, par lesquelles ces organisations se heurtent à divers degrés de résistance de la part des gouvernements. Premièrement, les ONG militent en faveur d’une définition de la sécurité régionale qui laisse plus de place à un objet référent humain dans l’approche sécuritaire de l’ASEAN par rapport à l’État, alors que les gouvernements privilégient ce dernier. Deuxièmement, les ONG tirent également parti de sources de pouvoir discursives pour pousser l'ASEAN vers des formes de participation plus substantielles de la société civile. Troisièmement, les ONG peuvent souvent participer directement au débat sur la communauté de sécurité de l’ASEAN même si elles restent exclues des espaces sanctionnés par l’organisation. Lorsqu’elles rencontrent trop de résistance, elles se replient sur l’organisation de manifestations ou de boycotts, ainsi que d’autres modes de participation externe, plus confrontationnels et publics, qui mettent la réputation de l’organisation en péril et la pousse à agir. Ces pratiques discursives sont mises en œuvre dans trois domaines spécifiques. Le premier domaine voit les ONG mettre de l’avant des positions alternatives sur la nature de l’insécurité par le biais de leur engagement au sein de l'ASEAN sur la question de la traite des personnes. Le deuxième domaine concerne leur promotion d'une approche « guidée par les personnes » (ou people-driven) de la communauté de sécurité pour s’assurer que la société civile participe à la prise de décision. Le troisième domaine se traduit par une contestation interne à la fois sur le sens de la sécurité et sur les frontières de la communauté à travers un travail de plaidoyer sur la crise des Rohingyas, qui prend principalement part à l’extérieur des espaces prévus ou tolérés par l’organisation. Ensemble, ces exemples illustrent la manière dont les ONG revendiquent le rôle d’« architectes de sens » dans la construction d'une communauté de sécurité malgré des contraintes importantes à leur participation à ce processus. Cette participation ne peut être comprise autrement que par une meilleure prise en compte du rôle que joue le discours dans cette histoire. Conclusion La construction d'une communauté de sécurité peut être comprise comme un processus polysémique, omnidirectionnel et contesté, fondé sur la création de sens, dont la finalité est toujours en mouvement. Le discours n’est pas que rhétorique, mais structure le « champ des possibles » en matière de politiques sécuritaires. Sa mobilisation en pratique a des effets concrets et réels. La contestation occupe une place centrale tout au long de ce processus. Distinguer les formes externes et internes de contestation discursive sur le sens de la sécurité et sur les frontières de la communauté permet de mieux comprendre comment la construction d'une communauté de sécurité se déroule en pratique, même lorsqu’elle reste un travail en cours, y compris du point de vue de ses propres membres. Plusieurs conceptions de la sécurité et des réponses coopératives adéquates face au « danger » co-existent et se confrontent en Asie du Sud-Est et au sein de l’ASEAN. Cette réalité demeure fort mal comprise, en particulier par les États partenaires de l’ASEAN, y compris le Canada, qui participent au multilatéralisme sécuritaire en Asie Pacifique alors que les codes implicites de la gouvernance régionale continuent de leur échapper. Une participation efficace à ces processus nécessite une meilleure compréhension de la gamme de positions qui existent dans cette région sur la nature de l’insécurité, les frontières de la communauté régionale et le rôle de l’ASEAN dans la gouvernance sécuritaire. Ces positions divergentes, qui ne sont pas réductibles à des positions « nationales » ou de groupe cohérentes, co-existent parfois au sein d’un même groupe ou État, sont légitimes et peuvent être conciliées. Il ne s’agit pas de déterminer quelle « version » de la communauté de sécurité est la plus représentative de la « réalité » sécuritaire de la région – elles le sont tout autant. Ces positions divergentes constituent un répertoire collectif, mais hautement diversifié dans lequel puisent les acteurs en présence pour élaborer, négocier et mettre en œuvre leurs politiques sécuritaires. Une participation efficace du Canada au dialogue multilatéral sur la sécurité dans cette région, sa contribution constructive à la sécurité régionale et sa capacité à promouvoir les intérêts et positions de la population canadienne sur les enjeux de sécurité de l’Asie Pacifique dépend donc d’une meilleure prise en compte du caractère polysémique de cette communauté de sécurité en devenir. [1] L’acronyme “ANASE” est parfois (mais de moins en moins) employé pour faire référence à cette organisation en français, mais contrairement à ASEAN, n’est pas formellement reconnu par l’institution, dont la langue d’usage est l’anglais. Je privilégie par conséquent ASEAN ici. ## La prochaine présidence lituanienne du Conseil de l’UE : enjeux, objectifs et implications URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-prochaine-presidence-lituanienne-du-conseil-de-lue-enjeux-objectifs-et-implications/ Modified: 2026-06-01 La Lituanie s’apprête à assumer la présidence tournante du Conseil de l’Union européenne pour une période de six mois à compter du 1er janvier 2027. Bien que la date de prise de fonction semble encore lointaine, ce pays balte a déjà commencé à se préparer à assumer ce rôle clé. La présidence offre à la Lituanie une occasion majeure d’exposer sa vision stratégique pour l’Europe et de façonner l’agenda de l’Union européenne (UE), notamment en matière de politique de défense. Après tout, la Lituanie est confrontée à un environnement sécuritaire critique, prise en étau entre l’enclave russe militarisée de Kaliningrad et son allié satellite, la Biélorussie. Le but de cet article est de mettre en lumière les intérêts et les objectifs que la Lituanie poursuivra lors de sa présidence du Conseil de l’Union européenne. Pour commencer, la Lituanie s’efforcera probablement de promouvoir la coopération européenne en matière de défense, en mettant particulièrement l’accent sur le renforcement de la base industrielle de défense européenne. Bien que son orientation de politique étrangère soit fondamentalement atlantiste, la Lituanie a noué des liens solides avec l’Allemagne dans le domaine de la défense. Elle joue un rôle de plus en plus actif dans les efforts européens en matière de défense. La Lituanie tentera également de se servir de la tribune que lui offre la présidence pour mobiliser le soutien en faveur de l’Ukraine dans ses efforts visant à remporter une forme de victoire militaire dans sa guerre défensive contre la Russie. Cet article développe ces thèmes et décrit certaines implications politiques pour le Canada. Pour comprendre pourquoi la prochaine présidence de la Lituanie est importante pour le Canada, il faut garder à l’esprit que le Canada fournit l’épine dorsale militaire de la brigade des Forces terrestres avancées en Lettonie voisine, en tant que nation-cadre. Ottawa a également exprimé à plusieurs reprises son intérêt à développer des liens plus étroits dans le domaine de l’industrie de la défense avec ses alliés et les entreprises européennes. Le Canada est également aligné diplomatiquement avec la Lituanie en ce qui concerne la Russie. Alors que Chypre occupe actuellement la présidence, l’Irlande devant prendre la relève le 1er juillet, le Canada trouvera beaucoup plus de points communs avec la Lituanie, ce qui devrait se traduire par des possibilités de collaboration plus étendues. La Lituanie, atlantiste et européiste en matière de défense À compter du 1er janvier 2027, la Lituanie assurera pendant six mois la présidence du Conseil de l’Union européenne, l’organe officiel qui représente les gouvernements des États membres au niveau de l’UE. La présidence du Conseil implique de présider la plupart des comités et groupes de travail, de décider de l’ordre du jour en coordination avec l’Irlande et la Grèce — les deux autres pays composant la présidence tripartite de dix-huit mois — et de mener les négociations au nom du Conseil avec le Parlement européen et la Commission. La présidence ne permet pas à son titulaire national de diriger l’UE sur le plan politique ni de définir la politique étrangère de l’UE. Malgré son nom, elle ne dispose d’aucun pouvoir exécutif et n’a donc pas la capacité de diriger la Commission, le Parlement ou même le Conseil européen. En effet, la Commission européenne est la principale autorité exécutive chargée d’adopter une perspective européenne globale sur les questions relatives au commerce ainsi qu’à la mise en œuvre des traités et de la législation adoptée par le Parlement européen, ce dernier étant composé de représentants des citoyens de l’UE. Néanmoins, la présidence tournante du Conseil de l’Union européenne permet à son titulaire de négocier des accords législatifs majeurs et de définir les priorités à long terme de l’UE grâce à son pouvoir de fixation de l’ordre du jour. Un thème majeur auquel on peut s’attendre de la part de la Lituanie pendant sa présidence concernera la coopération européenne en matière de défense. Le fait que Vilnius encourage une plus grande coopération européenne en matière de défense pourrait surprendre les observateurs habitués à voir ce pays balte comme étant fidèle aux États-Unis et atlantiste dans son orientation géopolitique. Après tout, la Lituanie a participé à l’invasion de l’Irak menée par les États-Unis, au grand dam de pays d’Europe occidentale comme la France. Outre ses efforts pour adhérer à l’UE, elle a accordé une grande importance à ses relations bilatérales avec les États-Unis pour obtenir son adhésion à l’OTAN, que la Lituanie a considérée comme la condition sine qua non de sa propre sécurité à long terme. En effet, c’est Dalia Grybauskaitė qui, en tant que présidente de la Lituanie, a insisté pour que l’Alliance élabore enfin des plans militaires concrets pour défendre les pays baltes. Bien que la Lituanie ait réduit ses dépenses de défense à moins de 1 % au plus fort de l’austérité pendant la Grande Récession, elle a fini par donner la priorité à l’achat d’équipements américains lorsqu’elle a commencé à reconstruire ses forces armées après que la Russie eut annexé la Crimée à l’Ukraine et déstabilisé la région du Donbass. La Lituanie a été le premier pays à offrir une aide militaire létale à l’Ukraine. La Lituanie a entretenu des relations positives avec la première administration Trump, qui respectait ce pays balte pour ses efforts visant à recapitaliser son armée et à assumer ainsi sa part du fardeau de la défense. Pour autant, son orientation atlantiste au fil des ans ne doit pas occulter le fait que la Lituanie a tissé des liens plus étroits en matière de défense avec des membres de longue date de l’OTAN. Bien que la Lituanie accueille une compagnie de forces américaines et ait reçu un financement important dans le cadre de l’Initiative européenne de dissuasion, l’Allemagne est sans doute devenue le partenaire le plus important de la Lituanie. On comprend aisément pourquoi. Non seulement l’Allemagne assure l’essentiel de la présence alliée avancée sur le territoire lituanien, mais elle a également rendu cette présence de facto permanente d’une manière que peu auraient anticipée lorsque le statut de nation-cadre de l’Allemagne a été annoncé pour la première fois. Beaucoup s’attendaient à ce que l’Allemagne interprète de manière restrictive l’Accord de fondation OTAN-Russie comme excluant tout stationnement significatif de troupes de combat sur les territoires des anciens satellites et colonies de Moscou. Pourtant, la mise en place d’une présence permanente et des infrastructures nécessaires pour soutenir ce déploiement a déjoué ces attentes initiales. Le fait que l’Allemagne ait finalement assumé davantage de responsabilités en matière de sécurité européenne par le biais de ses propres dépenses militaires a suscité beaucoup d’optimisme parmi les Lituaniens concernant cette relation bilatérale. La Lituanie a également encouragé la coopération industrielle européenne en matière de défense. En effet, le premier et actuel commissaire européen à la Défense est le Lituanien Andrius Kubilius. Son mandat consiste à superviser la stratégie industrielle européenne de défense et à renforcer la capacité industrielle de l’UE en matière de défense en comblant les lacunes clés en matière de capacités, en supprimant les obstacles à la mobilité militaire, en développant une industrie spatiale compétitive et en identifiant les vulnérabilités à l’échelle de l’UE face aux menaces cybernétiques et hybrides. Dans cette optique, la Lituanie continue bien sûr de s’approvisionner auprès des États-Unis, notamment en véhicules tactiques légers interarmées (JLTV), en hélicoptères UH-60M Black Hawk et en systèmes de roquettes d’artillerie à haute mobilité (HIMARS) de fabrication américaine. En 2025, le Département d’État a indiqué que « les États-Unis ont environ 640 millions de dollars de contrats de vente en cours pour des articles et services de défense d’origine américaine destinés à la Lituanie dans le cadre du programme de ventes militaires à l’étranger ». Cependant, Vilnius prend des mesures pour diversifier ses fournisseurs et mener des efforts de collaboration tant en matière d’approvisionnement que de recherche et développement. Elle participe à l’initiative européenne Sky Shield, dirigée par l’Allemagne, visant à développer une défense aérienne intégrée sur le continent. Le grand fabricant allemand d’équipements de défense Rheinmetall construit une usine en Lituanie qui produira des munitions d’artillerie de 155 mm. La Lituanie deviendra le plus grand utilisateur étranger de systèmes d’obusiers automoteurs CAESAR de fabrication française d’ici la fin de la décennie. La Lituanie a obtenu environ 1 milliard d’euros de prêts de la Banque européenne d’investissement l’année dernière pour soutenir ses investissements en matière de défense jusqu’à la fin de la décennie, une grande partie de ce financement étant consacrée aux infrastructures militaires. Le fait que la Lituanie trouve un équilibre entre l’achat de matériel américain et une coopération intra-européenne accrue lui confère une grande crédibilité auprès de nombreux gouvernements de l’UE. Le problème avec la France, par exemple, lorsqu’elle exhorte ses alliés européens à acheter davantage de matériel européen, c’est que ce message est souvent interprété comme une incitation à acheter davantage de matériel français. On ne peut pas accuser la Lituanie d’un tel égoïsme. Elle ne ressemble pas non plus beaucoup à la Pologne, qui a généralement préféré acheter autant de matériel américain que possible, tout en diversifiant ses achats en se tournant vers la Corée du Sud. Le bilan de la Lituanie n’est bien sûr pas parfait. Même avec les autres pays baltes, l’Estonie et la Lettonie, il y aurait beaucoup plus à faire. La défense côtière reste un projet national en cours, et ce n’est que récemment que la Lituanie s’est lancée dans des achats conjoints. Néanmoins, comme l’indiquent les résultats de 2025 du Fonds européen de défense, les innovateurs lituaniens jouent un rôle plus visible dans la recherche et le développement des technologies de défense européennes, faisant bien plus que leurs homologues lettons mais restant en retrait par rapport à leurs homologues estoniens. Bien sûr, le programme de la présidence lituanienne va au-delà des questions de défense. L’élargissement de l’UE, en particulier en ce qui concerne l’Ukraine et la Moldavie, ainsi que la compétitivité sont d’autres questions prioritaires pour la Lituanie. Néanmoins, compte tenu de la détérioration de l’environnement sécuritaire, la Lituanie est susceptible de mettre fortement l’accent sur la sécurité internationale et la coopération en matière de défense. Soutenir l’Ukraine, contenir la Russie La Lituanie figure parmi les plus fervents soutiens de l’Ukraine. En plus d’avoir été le premier pays de l’OTAN à lui fournir une aide militaire létale, la Lituanie a mis en place une coopération politico-militaire par le biais de sa participation à la brigade trinationale avec la Pologne et l’Ukraine, qui a pris part à divers exercices militaires et opérations humanitaires. La Lituanie participe également au Triangle de Lublin avec ces deux mêmes pays, tout en étant une fervente partisane de l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’UE et à l’OTAN. Les raisons qui poussent la Lituanie à soutenir l’Ukraine sont simples. Les deux pays ont un passé marqué par la lutte contre l’occupation et la domination russes. Dans des circonstances historiquement similaires mais loin d’être identiques, leurs aspirations à l’autonomie nationale et à l’indépendance souveraine ont été contrecarrées par Moscou dans le passé. Les deux pays perçoivent en la Russie une menace majeure pour leur sécurité qui doit au moins être contenue, voire vaincue sur le champ de bataille. Si la Russie ne cherche pas à s’emparer de territoires, elle tente d’exercer un contrôle politique en utilisant tous les leviers à sa disposition, qu’il s’agisse de liens ethniques locaux, des flux énergétiques, de déploiements militaires, de la corruption ou d’autres vecteurs de subversion. L’Ukraine et la Lituanie partagent un intérêt commun à réduire la capacité de la Russie à étendre son autocratie au-delà de ses frontières internationalement reconnues. Le soutien à l’Ukraine est devenu un élément majeur de l’orientation géopolitique extérieure de l’UE. À ce jour, l’UE a approuvé plus de 190 milliards d’euros d’aide macrofinancière et de soutien budgétaire à l’État depuis 2022. Outre l’aide militaire que les États membres ont fournie à l’Ukraine sur une base bilatérale, la Facilité européenne pour la paix a financé le remboursement des armes, des munitions et de la formation. L’UE a apporté son soutien aux réfugiés ukrainiens ainsi qu’à la reconstruction des infrastructures et de la société ukrainiennes. Cependant, l’UE comptant 27 membres, des désaccords internes ont parfois empêché l’octroi d’une aide encore plus importante à ce pays en difficulté. Les dirigeants nationaux favorables à la Russie — comme l’a montré l’ancien premier ministre hongrois Viktor Orbán — peuvent utiliser leur droit de veto institutionnel pour faire obstacle à l’aide financière et militaire de l’UE à l’Ukraine. La Lituanie ne peut évidemment pas empêcher les forces pro-russes d’influencer la politique étrangère d’autres pays. Les États membres conservent une grande latitude pour déterminer leur politique étrangère et leur posture militaire. Même les pays favorables à l’Ukraine pourraient être tentés de se recentrer sur leurs problèmes internes. Cependant, la Lituanie mettra à profit sa présidence pour redynamiser le soutien de l’UE à l’Ukraine. Comme l’a fait remarquer le ministre des Affaires étrangères Kęstutis Budrys dans une entrevue accordée à la Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, « est naturel que l’on se demande combien de temps ce soutien sera nécessaire, d’autant plus que les enjeux nationaux accaparent les agendas nationaux au cours des cycles démocratiques. Mais nous devons nous rappeler : même s’il y a un cessez-le-feu ou une forme d’accord de paix, l’ensemble de l’architecture de sécurité européenne continuera de dépendre d’une Ukraine forte. » Les répercussions pour le Canada Au cours des dix-huit derniers mois, le Canada s’est efforcé de nouer des liens toujours plus étroits avec l’Europe. Cette volonté se manifeste notamment dans le domaine de la politique de défense, où le Canada espère redynamiser ses propres forces armées, en partie en ayant recours à des mécanismes financiers de l’Union européenne tels que le règlement « Sécurité et action pour l’Europe » (SAFE) et en envisageant des projets de collaboration avec des entreprises européennes du secteur de la défense. Les deux pays ont bien plus en commun que ne le laissent supposer leurs différences considérables en termes d’étendue territoriale, de situation géographique, de taille et de ressources naturelles. Le Canada a été l’un des premiers à fournir une aide militaire à l’Ukraine post-Maïdan, alors que de nombreux pays de l’OTAN s’en sont abstenus. Le Canada n’a pas de troupes en Lituanie, mais il constitue l’épine dorsale des Forces terrestres avancées déployées en Lettonie voisine. Toute situation d’urgence militaire majeure impliquant la Lituanie touchera la Lettonie. Les forces armées baltes s’entraînent ensemble et, ce faisant, ont fini par inclure l’Ukraine dans leurs activités. Les flux commerciaux entre les deux pays sont minimes, en raison de la tyrannie de la gravité commerciale. Cependant, reconnaissant l’importance croissante de la Lituanie en matière de sécurité, le Canada a renforcé sa présence diplomatique à Vilnius en y ouvrant une ambassade en 2023. Si le Canada venait un jour à développer sa propre capacité d’exporter du gaz naturel liquéfié (GNL) vers l’Europe, il trouverait un acheteur en Lituanie, puisque la ville portuaire de Klaipėda abrite un important terminal de GNL. À tout le moins, le Canada devrait prêter attention à la manière dont la Lituanie encourage une plus grande coopération industrielle en matière de défense au sein de l’Europe. Le Canada et ses alliés européens tentent tous deux de combler d’importantes lacunes en matière de capacités tout en réduisant leur dépendance globale envers les États-Unis. Les règles en matière de financement et d’approvisionnement limiteront la mesure dans laquelle les entreprises canadiennes pourraient participer au développement de certaines capacités. Néanmoins, les forces canadiennes positionnées en Lettonie souffrent de lacunes en matière d’artillerie et de munitions, sans parler des mesures de lutte contre les drones. La Lituanie est tout aussi attentive à ces vulnérabilités. À ce titre, il pourrait être possible de tirer parti de la politique industrielle européenne de défense pour permettre aux forces locales de l’OTAN d’améliorer leurs capacités de dissuasion et de combat. Le Canada peut contribuer de manière significative aux discussions plus larges sur le développement des capacités et des technologies de défense le long du flanc est, discussions que la Lituanie mènera certainement. D'un autre côté, les frustrations occasionnelles de la Lituanie concernant le rythme des marchés publics de défense en Europe devraient inciter les décideurs politiques canadiens à la prudence quant aux perspectives pour le Canada d'acquérir des capacités européennes ou de coproduire du matériel militaire avec des entreprises européennes. Le marché européen de la défense a été, et restera, fragmenté et très protectionniste. L’achat de matériel militaire américain était une option attrayante, car c’était aussi l’option la plus fiable. Ce calcul a peut-être changé ces derniers temps, compte tenu de l’annonce selon laquelle l’administration Trump a annulé des commandes militaires destinées à des acheteurs étrangers, y compris en Europe, afin de pouvoir reconstituer les stocks que sa campagne militaire contre l’Iran avait épuisés. Pourtant, la conséquence à court terme de ces annulations est d’accroître la demande pour les systèmes non américains, ce qui pourrait à son tour créer davantage de retards à mesure que les pays commencent à changer de file d’attente. Certains anciens législateurs et producteurs lituaniens ajoutent que la Lituanie est en effet devenue trop dépendante des fournisseurs étrangers, les formalités administratives pénalisant souvent les fabricants locaux. Avec l’arrivée à la présidence en janvier d’un fervent défenseur de l’Ukraine, le Canada a l’occasion de renforcer son soutien. Bien sûr, le Canada continue d’apporter son aide à l’Ukraine par le biais de garanties de prêts et d’autres instruments financiers visant à soutenir l’État ukrainien et à financer l’aide militaire fournie via la liste des besoins prioritaires de l’Ukraine. Pourtant, la Lituanie cherchera à changer le discours sur l’Ukraine. Depuis trop longtemps, le Canada et ses alliés européens se sont contentés de laisser les États-Unis prendre l’initiative sur les questions relatives à l’Ukraine, bien qu’ils aient, bien sûr, apporté un soutien significatif aux aspirations de ce pays à rejoindre l’UE et l’OTAN. Plutôt que de se contenter de promettre de soutenir l’Ukraine « aussi longtemps qu’il le faudra », on peut s’attendre à ce que la Lituanie pousse ses partenaires de l’UE à élaborer une stratégie à long terme pour permettre enfin la victoire ukrainienne et contenir une Russie revancharde. La Lituanie mettra à profit sa présidence pour articuler une vision stratégique positive pour l’Europe et façonnera ainsi l’ordre du jour de manière à ce que l’Ukraine dispose de meilleures ressources, quelle que soit la ligne de pensée du moment à Washington. Le Canada sera le bienvenu dans ces discussions et devrait donc chercher à être le lien nord-américain solide dans le cadre de ces efforts. Crédit image: CC-BY-4.0: © European Union 2023– Source: EP via Flickr. ## La prolifération des drones civils militarisés en Ukraine : une école de guerre pour les états-majors occidentaux URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-proliferation-des-drones-civils-militarises-en-ukraine-une-ecole-de-guerre-pour-les-etats-majors-occidentaux/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > La scène médiatique a hâtivement dépeint le drone Bayraktar TB-2 comme « l’atout aérien de Kyiv » pour lutter contre les incursions de... La scène médiatique a hâtivement dépeint le drone Bayraktar TB-2 comme « l’atout aérien de Kyiv » pour lutter contre les incursions de l’envahisseur russe, surestimant au passage son efficacité militaire dans un conflit de haute intensité. Pour autant, « la guerre des drones » en Ukraine ne se limite pas aux TB-2 : elle met également en scène d’autres types de vecteurs civils utilisés à des fins militaires ayant produit des résultats tactiques notables dans les deux camps. L’amplification de la « dronisation » du champ de bataille déjà observée en Syrie et durant la guerre au Haut-Karabagh interpelle désormais par son ampleur. L’utilisation en Ukraine de drones civils militarisés et peu onéreux, sur un spectre de missions élargi, constitue l’un des marquants de l’évolution de la conflictualité aérienne. Avec l’arrivée massive de ces drones légers sur le terrain militaire, l’équation technocapacitaire de la guerre s’en trouve bouleversée. Les stratégies d’approvisionnement militaire entreprises depuis 2014 auront permis à Kyiv de faire preuve d’une grande flexibilité pour mieux exploiter les technologies civiles à des fins militaires et ainsi supplanter la Russie en qualité et en quantité sur ce segment. La capacité des forces armées ukrainiennes (FAU) à innover pour compenser la plus grande puissance de feu adverse est une leçon inspirante pour nos propres modèles d’armées. Compte tenu de l’expérience opérationnelle accumulée par les parties au conflit concernant l’utilisation de ces technologies non conventionnelles, il convient de tirer des recommandations au profit des forces armées occidentales pour qu’elles soient également en mesure de faire évoluer leur propre doctrine d’emploi des drones. Depuis 2014, deux tendances en Ukraine et en Russie en matière d’armement aux lourdes conséquences stratégiques Durant la première guerre du Donbass en 2014, les capacités aériennes de l’Ukraine avaient été fortement réduites par les systèmes antiaériens russes. Mais en ayant démontré toute l’étendue de leur capacité pour pallier les déficiences de renseignement, Kyiv a rapidement saisi que la conjugaison des modes d’emploi opérationnels des drones pourrait constituer un réel atout tactique. Pour ces raisons qui s’ajoutent au faible coût de production de ces plateformes, l’Ukraine a investi entre 2014 et 2022 dans le développement d’une industrie locale de drone tout en bénéficiant du soutien de plusieurs pays membres de l’OTAN pour améliorer ses infrastructures de défense. La remise sur pieds de l’armée de l’air ukrainienne est donc passée par l’acquisition d’un parc complet de systèmes aériens (drones d’attaque, tactiques, de contact, etc.) tout en se séparant d’une partie de ses chasseurs les plus anciens.   …   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## La République islamique sous pression et au bord du gouffre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-republique-islamique-sous-pression-et-au-bord-du-gouffre/ Modified: 2024-11-14 À maints égards, l’élimination d’Hassan Nasrallah, tué lors d’une frappe israélienne sur son quartier général en banlieue de Beyrouth, constitue un grave revers et un tournant majeur pour l’influence de Téhéran au Proche-Orient. En attendant de mesurer l’étendue et les retombées de l’offensive israélienne au Liban, la mort du leader historique du Hezbollah marque l’aboutissement de deux semaines cruciales durant lesquelles la milice pro-iranienne a subi de lourdes pertes, d’abord à cause d’opérations de sabotage de ses systèmes de communication, puis grâce à une série de frappes ayant décapité son appareil politico-militaire. Loin d’être insignifiantes, ces actions israéliennes redéfinissent les dynamiques stratégiques entre l’Iran et Israël dans la région du Levant et réduisent la gamme de choix disponibles aux dirigeants iraniens. Bilan de la dernière année de conflit asymétrique Le Hezbollah est encore à ce jour le pilier central de la stratégie iranienne au Moyen-Orient, un atout scrupuleusement armé et financé depuis 1982 pour affronter indirectement ses ennemis israéliens et américains. Forte, en septembre 2024, de ses quelque 150 000 missiles et 80 000 combattants, cette milice libanaise chiite représente la principale force de dissuasion de l’Iran face à Israël, lui offrant une présence stratégique au sud du Liban et un puissant levier de pression sur la frontière nord d’Israël. Cependant, la destruction d’une partie substantielle de ses capacités militaires au cours des derniers mois – près de 50 % selon les sources israéliennes – et la perte de ses dirigeants militaires et politiques modifient l’équation israélo-iranienne. À l’heure actuelle, le Hezbollah n’est plus en capacité d’agir efficacement comme rempart stratégique pour le régime iranien, et les actions menées par ce dernier pour manifester sa solidarité envers la milice libanaise restent limitées, comme en témoigne la portée restreinte de la récente offensive balistique contre Israël. La mutilation d’une partie des capacités opérationnelles du Hezbollah et la désorganisation de son système décisionnel s’ajoutent à l’anéantissement des moyens du Hamas – autre allié historique de Téhéran dans sa rivalité avec Israël. Après près d’un an de guerre contre Tsahal, l’organisation palestinienne est confrontée à des défis existentiels. La capacité d’action de ses dirigeants, notamment des personnalités clés comme Yahya Sinwar, est fortement hypothéquée. Les forces de défense israéliennes (FDI) ont ciblé ses infrastructures réduisant considérablement son potentiel militaire. Dans ce contexte, l’assassinat d’Ismail Haniyeh, le chef du mouvement palestinien, en plein cœur de Téhéran lors de la cérémonie d’investiture du nouveau président iranien Massoud Pezechkian, a infligé un coup sévère tant au mouvement palestinien qu’à la République islamique elle-même. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## La résilience démocratique face à la lame de fond autoritaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-resilience-democratique-face-a-la-lame-de-fond-autoritaire/ Modified: 2023-01-19 > La résilience démocratique face à la lame de fond autoritaire. Seulement à travers ce refus du relativisme, les démocraties libérales... La prophétie de la fin de l’Histoire et de l’inéluctable triomphe du modèle démocratique devront attendre. Le spectre des néo-autoritarismes hante désormais des régimes que les penseurs politiques pensaient inébranlables. Si les évènements du Capitole ont entériné avec force et fracas le déclin d’un hégémon, ils ont surtout démontré que le moteur normatif de la démocratie n’est plus infaillible et que le monde n’a surement plus besoin de la tutelle américaine. L’érosion démocratique affecte l’ensemble des espaces régionaux. En passant par la démocratie la plus populeuse avec la montée du nationalisme hindou, à l’inexorable avancée du populisme en Europe de l’Est (Pologne, Hongrie, etc.) ou encore par la dérive autoritaire dont fait preuve le président Erdogan, ce changement de paradigme profond tend à déliter les fondements mêmes de la marque démocratie. Les menaces que représentent la constitution d’un front commun illibéral ou encore la multiplication d’offensives d’acteurs étatiques, qui semblent ne pas respecter les règles qui régissent l’ordre international, sont légion. Ils devraient pousser les démocraties libérales à développer une stratégie globale pour renforcer une coopération multilatérale afin de soigner les maux de la démocratie et ainsi se relever de la chute annoncée. Par conséquent, afin d’éviter un bégaiement de l’Histoire à travers des prédictions erronées, la communauté des démocraties se doit d’élaborer des moyens globaux de résistance pour améliorer la résilience démocratique et des stratégies offensives proactives contre ces régimes qui prospèrent sur le terreau de nos propres contradictions et dissensions politiques. L’irrationalité du monde libre et la régression démocratique Dans ce siècle initialement salué comme celui porteur d’une ferveur pour la démocratisation impossible à endiguer, le constat est sans appel, le moins mauvais de tous les systèmes commence à montrer des signes de faiblesses. Avec un recul certain, seulement la moitié de la population mondiale a vécu en démocratie en 2021. Si la pandémie mondiale et l’ensemble des restrictions aux libertés individuelles qu’elle sous-tend sont parfois instrumentalisées pour réprimer les droits humains, elles ne sont pas moins les catalyseurs d’une longue tendance à la régression. Les coups d’État ou encore les prises de pouvoir anticonstitutionnel se sont accrus significativement tandis que certains bastions de ce modèle, à l’instar des États-Unis ou de la France, sont devenus des démocraties défaillantes. Un diagnostic sur les plans intérieur et extérieur de ce déficit démocratique s’impose. Le désenchantement à l’égard de la démocratie et la dévalorisation de la politique semblent prévaloir. Cantonnée à un rôle minimal, la confiance du citoyen s’érode progressivement envers le système représentatif. Autre composante, ces démocraties libérales semblent désormais asservies par un capitalisme exacerbé. Présenté à son origine comme un couple vertueux, les inégalités mondiales n’ont cessé de croitre depuis quarante ans. Pour pallier cette tendance, le modèle de l’État providence que les décideurs politiques ont érigé en rempart semble incapable de juguler ces disparités profondes. Le discrédit est alors jeté sur des élites technocratiques perçues comme inefficaces puisque le système semble changer «  de dirigeants mais pas de politique ». L’absence d’impact concret du vote sur le quotidien des votants fait naitre une frustration populaire et un enrayement des processus électoraux qui s’exprime à travers les urnes. L’ampleur de l'abstention n’est pas le seul symptôme. Alors que la confrontation des idées est de plus en plus complexe, l’éclatement du centrisme induit une polarisation politique -accélérée par les algorithmes sensationnalistes des technologies de l’information- qui gangrène les sociétés occidentales. L’électorat semble condamner à choisir entre des technocrates déconnectés qui observent impuissants leur propre déliquescence et des entrepreneurs de colère qui profèrent des slogans creux pour rentrer en résonance avec la lassitude des citoyens. Sur la scène internationale, l’arrogance occidentale, genèse de son déclin, a porté un coup certain à la marque démocratie. Après avoir fait tomber le monde soviétique sans porter les armes, l’Occident en proie à une euphorie s’est donné comme objectif d’exporter son modèle démocratique. Si l’intention est louable, promouvoir la démocratie à coup d’ingérences étrangères et de missiles parait inconcevable. Portés par un destin messianique, les chefs de file de l’Occident se sont prêtés à l’exercice. Entre le recours à la force contre Milosevic en Bosnie en 1995, le renversement de Kadhafi en Libye en 2011, les exactions commises par les Américains à la prison d’Abou Ghraib durant la deuxième Guerre du Golfe ; l’utilisation de la puissance pour promouvoir des changements de régime est un échec cuisant. Totalement déconnecté des réalités sur le terrain, l’Occident a tenté d’imposer la démocratie, mais a attisé la guerre et mis en échec la paix. Si l’interventionnisme libéral est en déclin, l’hypocrisie du monde libre semble l’avoir remplacée. Lorsque la France fait preuve d’une certaine complaisance envers la nouvelle junte tchadienne issue d’une prise de pouvoir anticonstitutionnelle, mais désavoue les nouvelles autorités maliennes issues d’un putsch, ou encore que les États-Unis montent en première ligne pour garantir l’indépendance de Taïwan mais se positionnent en retrait concernant le processus de colonisation mené par Israël sur le territoire palestinien; le message politique est alors brouillé. Sur le plan idéologique, alors que la communauté des démocraties se doit d’être irréprochable, la compromission occidentale face aux régimes autoritaires rend illégitime le discours sur l’universalité des valeurs. Cette stratégie de l'irrationalité dictée par des intérêts stratégiques divergents offre des leviers supplémentaires pour légitimer le narratif sur l’impérialisme occidental et consacrer l’attrait des régimes autoritaires. L’irrépressible séduction de l’autoritarisme Miné de l’intérieure, l’Occident démocrate peine à saisir le basculement de la centralité du monde. Ce changement de paradigme profond instille une tentation autoritaire. Le flou conceptuel autour du néo- autoritarisme et du populisme illustre l’hybridité de ces variants illibéraux. Néanmoins, ils usent souvent des mêmes ressorts pour s’affirmer comme des alternatives radicales, mais crédibles. La crispation identitaire du monde occidental est une réalité, elle n’en est pas moins instrumentalisée par les détracteurs de la démocratie afin de mettre en exergue une nouvelle doxa. Entre nationalisme ou encore rejet du multilatéralisme et du progrès, la grande famille des populistes puise dans un répertoire de valeurs axé sur le retour à la tradition pour lutter contre ce qu’ils dénoncent comme la décadence occidentale. Les soubassements de ce discours antisystème proviennent de cette résistance revancharde contre les élites dirigeantes prétendument corrompues et au service de l’étranger (l’immigration, vassalisation envers des puissances étrangères et la finance mondialisée). Émerge alors des « Hommes forts » qui serait les porte-étendards de la souveraineté et du peuple réel délaissé par la mondialisation. La sacralisation des urnes et la capacité de vider de sa substance la démocratie par la voie des élections libres (ou simulacre d’élections libres) sont symptomatiques de la perméabilité de nos régimes. Alors que ce phénomène délétère paraissait inconcevable, ces régimes hybrides s’accommodent de l’absence de garantie des droits fondamentaux. Si la dénaturation de l’idéal démocratique était une stratégie camouflée, elle est désormais exercée aux yeux de tous, à l’instar de Victor Orbàn qui se réclame du concept de démocratie illibérale. La performance comparée des formes de gouvernance montre que dans le cadre de la crise sanitaire, les politiques efficaces pour endiguer la pandémie n’étaient ni populistes, ni autoritaires et ni libérales. Toutefois, la capacité de dépasser l’impossibilisme légal en s’affranchissant des règles de l’État de droit offre des opportunités d’action attractives pour les régimes anti-démocratiques. En faisant taire ou en supprimant, la lenteur des règles bureaucratiques, les garde-fous et les institutions du contre-pouvoir ; les démocraties illibérales gagnent en souplesse et débloquent la paralysie de l’action publique pour ainsi promouvoir un autoritarisme compétitif. Le populisme devient alors une sorte de rampe de lancement de la dérive autoritaire. Avec différent degré d’aliénation, un glissement insidieux s’opère alors entre la démocratie libérale, la démocratie illibérale et les régimes autoritaires avec un spectre aussi large qu’il existe de combinaisons. En jouant avec les limites du jeu démocratique, Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro ou encore Erdogan légitiment les pouvoirs néo-autoritaires exercés par les dictatures fossilisées et suppriment de fait la dichotomie simplificatrice entre la démocratie et l’autoritarisme. Il va s’en dire que dans le cadre de la compétition des puissances, les menaces qui pèsent sur la démocratie sont symptomatiques de ce renversement de tendance. Une prise de conscience de cette nouvelle donne politique et de la nature complexe des néo-autoritarismes qui se sont adaptés à l’air du temps est impérative. Définir ces régimes comme il se doit permettra de qualifier correctement les dérives/crimes qu’ils commettent pour à terme leur refuser l’instauration de régime répressif alternatif. La démocratie libérale n’est donc pas le terminus de l’itinéraire démocratique. Ce diagnostic réaliste permettra de poser les bases de la lutte contre la viralité autocratique puisque les États illibéraux ne sont plus confinés dans leurs zones. L’Occident libéral peut être sclérosé aussi bien de l’intérieur qu’assiégée de l’extérieur. Une compétition asymétrique : Oeuvrer dans un ordre international où les règles se délitent La capitalisation des efforts de privation du pouvoir permet de faire émerger une politique étrangère agressive avec la mobilisation de tout l’appareil d’État. Dès lors, le développement d’une répression transnationale à l’encontre des démocraties s’exerce avec des capacités de nuisance sans égal. Ces formes hybrides de gouvernance conjuguent les canaux conventionnels pour faire valoir leurs intérêts ainsi que des tactiques autoritaires se situant en dehors du droit international et qui échappent alors à l’Occident. Vilipender les régimes autoritaires ne semble plus suffisant pour contenir leur incursion sur la scène internationale. L’offensive chinoise pour l’obtention des postes à haute responsabilité au sein des institutions internationales manifeste avec éclat cette stratégie d’influence pour orienter le système vers ses intérêts. Son engagement international croissant est à mettre en perspective avec ses propres initiatives (nouvelle route de la soie, financement infrastructures, etc.). La désoccidentalisation du monde passe nécessairement par une refonte de l’ordre international et ces régimes semblent en prendre pleinement conscience. Victime collatérale du repli américain, l’OMS est devenue l’instance privilégiée pour la Russie, la Chine ou encore la Corée du Nord afin d’exprimer la supériorité de leur modèle durant la crise sanitaire. De surcroit, Pékin use de son poids économique, de son soft power grandissant et de sa capacité à manipuler l’information pour exporter son modèle vers des démocraties fragiles. Si cette stratégie comporte des limites, la Chine continentale est parvenue à isoler encore davantage Taïwan sur la scène internationale. Les investissements massifs et les liens de dépendance en Afrique ont permis de faire pencher la balance vers Pékin, désormais seuls deux pays africains reconnaissent Taipei contre treize en 1995. L’Afrique subit un reflux autoritaire et Pékin lui vend son modèle de gouvernance autoritaire à mesure que la démocratie s’éloigne. Au-delà des succès diplomatiques, les tours de force se multiplient. Entre l’assassinat de Jamal Kashoggi, l’affaire Skripal, l’arrestation d’un opposant politique avec une fausse alerte à la bombe dans un avion fomenter par Alexandre Loukachenko ; les dissidents des régimes autoritaires ont la vie dure. Les sanctuaires pour leur sécurité se délitent face à ce schéma de répression internationale qui vise à saper la démocratie et à se prémunir de toutes critiques. Depuis 2014 environ 600 attaques autoritaires transfrontalières ont été recensées. Il est impératif pour l’Occident de mettre un terme à cette stratégie de harcèlement international. Pour cela, un engagement plus ferme envers la responsabilité de protéger est nécessaire. Un soutien actif et une protection des dissidents sur le terrain permettront de semer les germes de l’opposition avec un effet déstabilisateur pour ces régimes aussi effectif que les attaques permanentes à l’encontre de la démocratie. Ce schéma d’intimidation passe également par la nouvelle plateforme que représentent les technologies d’informations. Les cyberattaques, les ingérences étrangères et la désinformation numérique rentrent dans la pratique de l’influence qui est par exemple dans l’ADN de la Russie. Au-delà de marginaliser des individus, cette stratégie de déstabilisation s’insère plus globalement dans les réponses militaires asymétriques de la guerre hybride. L’architecture de l’ordre international limite la marge de manœuvre des démocraties qui accusent dès lors un retard certain dans ces nouveaux espaces de conflictualité non conventionnels. Toute en gardant sa nature démocratique, la communauté des démocraties se doit de développer une prévention augmentée avec des moyens défensifs et offensifs pour lutter dans le cadre de la guerre informationnelle. Finalement, le renouveau stratégique agressif de ces formes alternatives de gouvernance est consacré par le géant chinois qui semble sorti de sa période d’hibernation comme l’atteste l'offensive de ces loups guerriers. Dans la course à l’hégémonie, il illustre que l’adhésion aux valeurs démocratiques n’est plus nécessaire pour briguer la place de leader mondial. Quant à la Russie, elle s’attaque désormais directement à la démocratie dans son ancien pré carré pour neutraliser l’expansion d’un modèle qui la fragilise. La lutte idéologique s’accompagne donc d’incursions militaires bien plus concrètes et la communauté des démocraties est acculée face à ce réveil stratégique de taille. Dans l’enceinte onusienne, lors du vote sur la résolution contre la guerre en Ukraine, de nombreux pays africains, l’Inde ainsi que la Chine se sont abstenus. Cette neutralité et cet élan démocratique modéré sont liés à la volonté de ne pas froisser la Russie avec qui ces États conservent de bonnes relations pouvant aller jusqu’à des liens d’amitié. Si ce phénomène résulte par exemple des leviers d’influence russes en Afrique, des lignes de convergence entre des régimes qui peinent à approfondir leur processus de démocratisation se dessinent. Vers la constitution d’un front commun illibéral  Pékin observe confortablement le dénouement de la guerre sur le vieux continent tel un test grandeur nature de la réaction occidentale par rapport à ses propres ambitions territoriales. La Chine développe néanmoins une position ambiguë en reprenant le récit du Kremlin sur l’opération militaire spéciale déployée en Ukraine. Si cette quasi-alliance illibérale est moins concrète, le nouvel élan stratégique impulsé par l’invasion russe jouera en la faveur de Joe Biden pour la constitution d’une alliance des démocraties même si son sommet pour la démocratie manquait d’ambitions. La logique de blocs semble resurgir et ce revirement stratégique pourrait entériner le renouveau de la bipolarisation de l’arène internationale. Les déclarations de soutien à la Chine concernant sa politique antiterroriste à l’encontre des minorités ouïghoures présageaient les lignes de fractures entre l’Occident libéral et un front commun illibéral en émergence. L’Occident s’élevait pour dénoncer un génocide culturel tandis que Pékin, chef de file d’un idéal anti-démocratique, rétorquait en fédérant 46 pays pour soutenir sa politique repressioniste au Xianjang. Au-delà de la guerre d’influence, ce rapprochement est allé encore plus loin lors de la guerre en Syrie. Lorsque la communauté transatlantique tergiversait pour renverser Bachar el-Assad, sa survie a été rendue possible grâce à Moscou et Téhéran, les bailleurs de fonds d’un régime sous perfusion. L’axe de résistance Damas-Moscou-Téhéran a porté un coup décisif à l’influence et à la stratégie occidentales au Levant. Entre la simple convergence d’intérêts conjoncturels et la constitution d’une alliance pérenne, le rejet de l’Occident est générateur de partenariats. Toutefois, si Bachar el-Assad a exprimé son soutien à l’invasion russe en Ukraine, la rencontre entre les deux homologues évoque davantage un sauvetage de l’illusion d’une souveraineté syrienne. La dépendance du dictateur Assad envers Vladimir Poutine incarne ces relations asymétriques de pouvoir qui ne se limite pas au cas syrien. Renforcer l’alliance des démocraties pour ébranler le colosse au pied d’argile illibéral Main dans la main durant la trêve olympique, la solidité des liens d’amitié « sans limite » entre Moscou et Pékin est désormais mise à rude épreuve. La neutralité de façade de la Chine commence à montrer ses limites. Pékin oscille entre sauver le principe de non-ingérence, pilier de sa politique étrangère, et s’aligner stratégiquement avec la Russie dans leur opposition commune aux démocraties libérales occidentales. Dans ce cadre, la déclaration conjointe pour dénoncer la politique d’élargissement de l’OTAN aurait pu conduire à un soutien plus actif de Pékin envers Moscou. Les relations sino-russes se nourrissent du durcissement américain à leur égard et la « pariatisation » du Kremlin la conduit à se tourner vers Pékin. Toutefois, la demande d’assistance militaire prend davantage la forme d’un appel à l’aide que d’un simple rapprochement. Soucieux de restaurer son statut de poids lourd politique, Moscou peine désormais à ne pas apparaitre comme le vassal de Pékin. Puisque la puissance économique chinoise ne joue pas dans la même catégorie que celle de la Russie, la constitution d’une alliance pourrait conduire Pékin à rejoindre Moscou dans sa mise au ban de la scène internationale. Finalement, l’axe de convenance décrit davantage ces relations fragiles. Par crainte d’être marginalisées, ces liens d’amitié indéfectibles entre les puissances illibérales ressemblent davantage à une inféodation en cascade. La solidarité entre ces États est bridée par la fragilité de ses fondements, comme l’atteste le renouveau des tensions entre Ankara et Moscou. Le « nouvel axe du mal » se délite lorsque les intérêts stratégiques de ses membres s’éloignent. De l’autre côté du prisme, outre le manque de concertation et les divergences stratégiques du clan occidental, la nouvelle donne conflictuelle mondiale pousse la communauté des démocraties à renforcer sa cohésion et à approfondir la coopération dans la lutte contre l’offensive de l’autoritarisme. Alors que les régimes anti-démocratiques ne cessent de dicter l’agenda international, la constitution d’une alliance des démocraties fédèrera l’Occident libéral contre des puissances qui peinent à y parvenir. Cela permettra de dépasser la paralysie du Conseil de sécurité, de freiner la contagion autoritaire et d’endiguer l’incursion de ces régimes dans l’ordre international qu’ils dénaturent. Il s’agira de ne pas abandonner les États qui tombent dans leur giron en renforçant la coopération et en maintenant le dialogue en tout temps. C’est-à-dire ne pas reproduire ce que la diplomatie française a pu faire envers la nouvelle junte malienne. Finalement, le renforcement capacitaire d’un tel partenariat doit prendre la forme d’une approche pangouvernementale qui ne passe pas nécessairement par la confrontation directe avec ses adversaires. Les fondements d’une communauté des démocraties pour lutter contre les rivaux systémiques Les États-Unis endossaient le rôle de leader du monde libre jusqu’à la parenthèse Trump. Néanmoins, loin de se cantonner à un seul mandat, le Trumpisme pourrait survivre à son créateur et s’installer durablement dans le spectre politique américain. En ravivant l’idée d’un « pouvoir par l’exemple », le nouveau locataire de la maison blanche pourrait bien redorer le blason démocratique de la première puissance mondiale. Néanmoins, cette nouvelle inconstance dans ce leadership soulève l’enjeu de savoir qui endossera le rôle de champion de la démocratie alors que les mouvances autoritaires se pérennisent dans l’espace politique. Le sursaut civique salutaire en France ou encore aux États-Unis pour faire barrage aux extrêmes et aux populistes fut salvateur, mais la barrière démocratique est mince et un glissement pernicieux vers l’autoritarisme peut vite arriver. Dans ce contexte, les leaders démocratiques à l’échelle régionale doivent être valorisés pour offrir des abris démocratiques en cas de basculement d’un État vers des formes plus autoritaires de gouvernance. Puisque « la démocratie est mieux promue collectivement », avec ce nouveau leadership démocratique décentralisé qui émergera, la circulation transnationale des dispositifs démocratiques et de régulation politique sera plus diffuse et sécurisée. Les fers de lance de l’Union européenne que sont la France et l’Allemagne pourraient endosser ce rôle malgré leurs divergences sur le devenir de l’Europe. Quant au Canada, il pourrait constituer la solution de replis dans un continent nord-américain fracturé par un état de la démocratie américaine préoccupant.  Enfin, des îlots de démocraties comme le Ghana, le Costa Rica ou encore la Corée du Sud peuvent constituer des références de stabilité politique plus inspirantes pour leurs aires régionales respectives. L’Occident se trouvera allégé du fardeau qu’il s’est lui-même infligé et qu’il n’est pas capable d’honorer, à savoir l’exportation de la démocratie. Ce point chaud s’efforce de déconstruire l’antagonisme entre la démocratie et l’autoritarisme. La nouvelle communauté des démocraties devra également faire preuve de souplesse en appliquant une politique de la porte ouverte. En étant inclusive, cette initiative permettra de saluer les efforts de poursuite des processus de démocratisation en cours sans pour autant offrir un vernis de légitimité démocratique à ceux qui ne le méritent pas. Dans certaines alliances comme l’OTAN cette politique d’entrée a montré ses limites, notamment concernant la pertinence de la candidature ukrainienne. Pour éviter de telles dissensions politiques entre ses membres, la discipline devra être de mise pour ne pas altérer le fondement démocratique de cette communauté et pour dépasser la première expérience non concluante portée par Madeleine Albright en 2000. Tout aussi décevant, le sommet des démocraties à l’initiative du président Biden portait sur la défense contre l’autoritarisme mais a finalement été vidé partiellement de sa substance. Selon le classement Freedom House, un tiers des régimes conviés laissait à désirer ce qui a ravivé l’esprit de recroquevillement clanique de la part de la puissance américaine. Une nouvelle initiative se doit d’être portée par un groupement d’États démocratiques afin  d’éviter une sélection discutable des nations conviées et pour accroitre la légitimité d’une telle alliance.  Elle devra également être à l’origine d’un ensemble d’incitatifs ou encore de mesures de soutien/pression pour passer de la rhétorique à l’action. Ensuite, son caractère informel permettra de mettre au ban tous les États qui opèrent un revirement politique vers ces formes alternatives de gouvernance incompatible avec ses idéaux. La mise en place de mécanismes d’alerte précoce permettra de déceler les menaces externes et d’y faire face rapidement. Dans un second temps, développer un soutien indéfectible envers les alliés démocratiques menacés avec une posture crédible de dissuasion est une nécessité. À travers son caractère inédit, l’ampleur de la réponse occidentale envers l’invasion russe pourrait en dissuader plus d’un de réviser les frontières par la force. Néanmoins, cet arsenal de sanctions aurait également pu être déployé par les démocraties non occidentales. Cela aurait conduit à un embargo encore plus performant jugulant dès lors l’économie russe et ses capacités d’amortir les sanctions. Il va sans dire que Moscou souffre. Toutefois, le fait que les sanctions soient presque uniquement occidentales est symptomatique de cette incapacité à élargir le cercle de ceux qui œuvrent contre la montée de l’autoritarisme. Avec cet appui international très faible, la communauté transatlantique est forte, mais bel et bien isolée au sein d’une bulle occidentale. L’attentisme latent du Sud global complique l’isolement de la Russie. Mettre sur pied une réponse collective à la hauteur de l’offensive de l’autoritarisme est donc la clef d’une communauté des démocraties résiliente face à un front commun illibéral désuni. Fragmenter la collaboration entre les dirigeants autoritaires est une nécessité pour réduire leurs capacités de nuisances. Sans nécessairement encourager un esprit de guerre froide ou encore de sombrer dans une croisade idéologique, un réaménagement et un renforcement des réseaux de partenariat entre les démocraties libérales s’imposent. Une ligne de conduite démocratique comme préalable à l’engagement stratégique Au sein des États membres de cette alliance, sur les plans intérieur et extérieur, la cohérence stratégique et le dialogue citoyen doivent dicter l’élaboration des politiques pour améliorer la résilience démocratique. Dès lors, la lutte contre la corruption, l’argent sale et les réseaux d’influence sont une priorité. Le régime de sanctions élaboré contre la Russie a permis de mettre un terme à l’obstination du gouvernement allemand de réaliser le projet Nord Stream 2. Si ce projet a été abandonné par la force des évènements, il a permis d’envoyer un signal fort et il devrait servir d’exemple pour élaborer une ligne de conduite démocratique dont le respect doit être dans l’ADN de nos dirigeants et une condition à tout partenariat international. Puisque le modèle de gouvernance démocratique est toujours attrayant, les leaders politiques doivent capitaliser sur cette tendance afin d’annoncer des actions et des engagements spécifiques pour promouvoir un respect absolu de la règle de droit passant avant les intérêts stratégiques de chacun. Seulement à travers ce refus du relativisme, les démocraties libérales pourront renforcer l’autorité de la démocratie et développer des leviers de discussions pour contrecarrer les tentations illibérales de nombreuses nations.  Les attributs démocratiques se verront renforcer et les régimes autocratiques ou ceux qui s’en rapprochent dangereusement ne seront plus en mesure de coopter l’étiquette de démocratie, en sapant son idéal et les valeurs communes, pour renforcer leur propre crédibilité. ## La résurrection de Lazare, ou la seconde jeunesse de l’OTAN : Les conséquences de l’invasion russe sur l’OTAN URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-resurrection-de-lazare-ou-la-seconde-jeunesse-de-lotan-les-consequences-de-linvasion-russe-sur-lotan/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique analyse les conséquences de l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine sur l’architecture sécuritaire transatlantique. Le 24 février 2022, alors que la plupart des experts estimaient probable une attaque russe conséquente, mais limitée sur l’Est ukrainien – du moins pour ce qui est des buts de guerre – le pouvoir russe lançait l’invasion de l’Ukraine avec pour objectifs tant l’Est ukrainien que la prise de Kyiv et l’installation d’un régime client. Cette décision russe a provoqué ce faisant un certain nombre de bouleversements en Europe et au sein de la communauté transatlantique (ex : augmentation massive des budgets de défense, référendum sur l’opt-out danois, discours du chancelier allemand au Bundestag le 28 février, création de nouveaux bataillons internationaux de l’OTAN en Europe de l’Est, etc.). On assiste ainsi à des modifications/évolutions au sein des structures européennes et transatlantiques que sont en particulier l’Union européenne (UE) et l’OTAN. L’objectif de cette note stratégique est par conséquent d’analyser plus précisément les conséquences de l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine sur l’architecture sécuritaire transatlantique. Bien que de nombreux tweets sur le sujet soulignent l’ironie de la situation et l’échec manifeste du président russe à affaiblir, voire à disloquer l’OTAN, il n’en reste pas moins vrai que Vladimir Poutine vient littéralement de ressusciter l’OTAN, et ce pour plusieurs années, voire au moins une à deux décennies. On pourrait presque parler de miracle ici tant la situation était peu reluisante, voire désespérée ces dernières années, en particulier sous l’administration Trump. Au début des années 2010, engagée profondément en Afghanistan, puis partiellement en Libye, l’OTAN se cherchait alors une nouvelle raison d’être, la Guerre froide et la fin de l’URSS remontant alors à près de vingt ans. La conquête explicite de la Crimée et implicite (à travers la mise sur pied de mouvements sécessionnistes prorusses) d’une portion des régions du Donbass par la Russie en 2014 offrit cependant un nouvel élan et souffle à l’OTAN, en particulier suite aux décisions prises lors du sommet du Pays de Galles. Outre le doublement des effectifs de la force de réaction rapide (NATO Response Force, NRF), une Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) comprenant 5 000 militaires pouvant être déployée en 2 à 5 jours fut créée. Il fut en outre décidé de déployer par rotation au travers de la Présence avancée renforcée de l’OTAN quatre groupements tactiques multinationaux de niveau bataillon en Estonie, en Lettonie, en Lituanie et en Pologne. Mais l’arrivée au pouvoir de Donald Trump inaugura quatre années de calvaire pour l’Alliance, celle-ci en venant pour rappel à craindre que son soixante-dixième anniversaire en 2019 ne se transforme en ses funérailles. Il faut également reconnaitre que les agissements de la Turquie d’Erdogan durant cette période (en Syrie contre les Kurdes alliés de la coalition internationale contre Daesh; contre l’UE en recourant aux migrants comme outil de pression; vis-à-vis de la Grèce en Méditerranée) contribuèrent tout autant à l’état avancé de délabrement stratégique et politique de l’OTAN, à tel point que le président français Macron parla de manière provocante de sa mort cérébrale. Si l’élection de Biden donna des lueurs d’espoir, celles-ci furent rapidement obscurcies par la débâcle afghane et l’annonce surprise d’AUKUS durant l’été 2021. Bref, alors que l’OTAN sombrait, un « sauveur inattendu » apparu, le président russe Vladimir Poutine. Cette résurrection se manifeste en termes de cohésion, mais aussi sur certains enjeux tels que le montant des budgets de défense ou encore le déploiement de troupes sur le flanc oriental de l’Alliance. Bien que des tensions demeurent, l’invasion russe a réussi en effet à créer une entente et une coordination forte entre les alliés, contribuant même à l’émergence de consensus (encore précaires cependant) sur les scènes politiques internes des États membres (partie I). Plusieurs mesures de renforcement des capacités de l’OTAN ont pu ce faisant être rapidement décidées et mises en œuvre (partie II) telles les augmentations des budgets de défense au sein de plusieurs pays ou encore le déploiement de nouvelles troupes en Europe de l’Est. On assiste d’ailleurs au règlement définitif de la question des 2% du PIB à investir dans la Défense : ce montant ne peut plus être contesté désormais, du moins pas sans d’importants risques politiques pour ces contempteurs. Les évolutions à l’œuvre seront de ce fait porteuses d’éventuels changements au sein de l’OTAN, plus précisément en ce qui concerne sa hiérarchie militaire et les différents postes composant celle-ci (partie III). Ceci n’annihile pas toutefois certains risques (partie III) à court et moyen terme pour l’organisation, en particulier en cas de prolongation du conflit. L’invasion ayant aussi des répercussions sur l’UE ou encore sur la Chine, compte tenu des liens de l’Alliance avec la première et de ses préoccupations relatives à la seconde, bien que se focalisant sur l’OTAN, ce rapport traitera de ces deux aspects dans une dernière partie (partie IV). Le retour en force de l’OTAN est indéniable, y compris vis-à-vis d’autres organisations telles l’Union européenne. Il s’inscrit dans un nouveau contexte créé par l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine, celui non pas d’une « Troisième Guerre mondiale », mais plutôt d’une nouvelle « Guerre froide ». Certes, plusieurs caractéristiques diffèrent entre cette nouvelle « Guerre froide » et le contexte politique et international ayant prévalu entre 1949 et 1989. Il n’en demeure pas moins vrai qu’à nouveau il y a un pouvoir de l’autre côté de l’Arctique et à l’est de l’Europe qui représente clairement une menace pour l’intégrité territoriale et la souveraineté politique de ses voisins immédiats 1. Une cohésion retrouvée Bien que quelques fausses notes ont eu lieu depuis le 24 février, il est assez étonnant de constater à quel point l’ensemble joué par l’orchestre que forment les membres de l’Alliance est assez harmonieux, en particulier lorsque l’on analyse les comportements de certains pays tels les États-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni, ou encore la Turquie. Même si certaines rivalités demeurent, la plupart des grands pays – en particulier ceux qui s’étaient distingués ces dernières années par des actions ou des mesures polémiques, voire contestables – prennent chacun leur part de responsabilités et réussissent pour le moment à agir de concert (ou du moins à donner majoritairement cette impression). Cette cohésion retrouvée est présente également au sein des scènes politiques nationales des États membres. Dans plus d’un pays, les positions politiques de certains partis politiques anti-OTAN, antiaméricains ou prorusses ont été fortement atténuées. D’autres mouvements politiques peu suspects jusqu’ici de sympathie à l’égard de l’UE et de l’OTAN tendent à prendre publiquement des positions favorables à celles-ci. Un leadership américain effacé Alors que la débâcle en Afghanistan ou l’affaire AUKUS révélèrent une absence de leadership de la part des États-Unis et de la nouvelle administration Biden, la guerre russo-ukrainienne constitue à cet égard une réactivation de ce dernier au sein de la communauté transatlantique. Bien que l’on ne puisse parler de Leading from Behind, la gestion par les États-Unis et les rôles forts qu’ils laissent dans cette crise à certains de leurs alliés – en particulier le Royaume-Uni, la France ou encore la Pologne – est assez singulière : si Washington reste naturellement le primus inter pares au sein de l’Alliance, sa gestion actuelle favorise les mises en avant tantôt de Londres, tantôt de Paris ou encore de Varsovie sur ce dossier et réussit ce faisant à accroître les effets d’entraînement et de cohésion au sein de l’Alliance. Alors que les États-Unis procèdent depuis plus de dix ans à leur stratégie de pivot vers le Pacifique, l’invasion russe a clairement suspendu ce mouvement, des troupes étant à nouveau envoyées en Europe. Depuis un mois, plusieurs déclarations américaines ont contribué ainsi à réaffirmer l’engagement américain vis-à-vis de la défense de l’Europe face à la menace posée par Moscou. De son côté, à rebours de sa vieille réputation d’allié réticent au sein de l’OTAN, Paris a pris plusieurs mesures favorables à l’Alliance. Profitant de la présidence française du Conseil de l’Union européenne, le président Macron s’est attribué un rôle de coordination entre les Européens avec le président ukrainien, mais aussi à la demande de Zelensky un rôle de contact avec le président russe. Même si certaines voix continuent de critiquer la position française, bien que militant toujours pour l’autonomie stratégique européenne, Paris réussit jusqu’ici à éviter de se distinguer négativement de ses alliés, tout en assumant un rôle de leader à l’échelle européenne en partenariat avec d’autres capitales. Ce rôle est néanmoins quelque peu délaissé à l’occasion de la phase finale de la campagne électorale relative à l’élection présidentielle en France. En cas de réélection d’Emmanuel Macron, il est probable qu’il vienne cependant à se renforcer à nouveau. La guerre en Ukraine offre parallèlement à Boris Johnson l’occasion de mettre de l’avant le leadership de Londres dans un dossier dont elle s’est fait la championne dès 2014. L’entente entre le Royaume-Uni, la Pologne et l’Ukraine conclue quelques jours avant l’invasion britannique (bien qu’encore en gestation) est une démonstration de la volonté de la Grande-Bretagne de rester, selon les termes de la Revue intégrée, « le principal allié européen au sein de l’OTAN ». Le cas de la Turquie illustre encore plus le retour d’une cohésion forte au sein de l’OTAN. Allié ambivalent, la Turquie était depuis 2019 sous sanctions américaines suite à l’achat de systèmes antiaériens russes S-400, ainsi que sous sanctions européennes pour des raisons humanitaires et à cause de son positionnement en Syrie. De fortes tensions et incidents avaient même eu lieu avec Paris et Athènes ces dernières années. Or, sans soutenir les sanctions occidentales contre la Russie, la Turquie a fermement condamné l’invasion russe et a réitéré son soutien à l’intégrité physique et à l’indépendance de l’Ukraine, mais aussi à la politique de la « porte ouverte » de l’OTAN. Ankara a également bloqué les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore aux navires de guerre russe conformément à la Convention de Montreux de 1936. Plus étonnant encore, le président français annonçait le 25 mars le lancement d’une opération humanitaire d’évacuation des civils de Marioupol en étroite coordination avec la Turquie et la Grèce. Celle-ci toutefois n’a pu avoir lieu étant donné les décisions prises par Moscou relatives aux combats dans Marioupol. Tensions persistantes Que cela soit sur la question des livraisons d’armes et de matériel à l’Ukraine ou encore sur celle des sanctions, on retrouve là encore une assez forte cohésion entre les alliés. Si l’Union européenne s’est d’ores et déjà engagée pour un milliard et demi d’euros d’aides en fournitures militaires, les États-Unis de leur côté viennent d’adopter une enveloppe de 14 milliards de dollars pour la crise ukrainienne, bien que la moitié soit destinée aux déploiements de troupes américaines en Europe. La coordination sur les sanctions économiques implique toutefois des échanges plus denses entre les alliés, certaines divergences demeurant, même si beaucoup a déjà été accompli en l’espace de quelques semaines. À titre d’exemple, l’Allemagne a pris la décision symbolique de suspendre le projet de gazoduc Nord Stream 2 qui avait vocation à augmenter les livraisons de gaz russe à destination de l’Allemagne. Cependant, certains pays européens dont l’Allemagne et l’Italie restent fortement dépendants des importations russes. Si Berlin, Paris et Londres hésitent encore à se priver des hydrocarbures russes, Washington a ordonné un embargo sur les importations américaines de pétrole et de gaz russes. Les États-Unis poussent ce faisant les Européens à relancer le débat autour de l’indépendance énergétique. Si même des pays tels l’Allemagne et l’Italie, qui faisaient traditionnellement preuve de compréhension voire de mansuétude envers Moscou, ont depuis modifié leur discours, un pays se distingue encore tant sur les sanctions que sur les livraisons d’armes, à savoir la Hongrie de Victor Orban. Ses capacités d’influence sont néanmoins limitées et pour l’instant elle n’est pas en mesure de bloquer les mesures prises par les autres pays. Son positionnement pourrait évoluer cependant, du fait de pressions de la part de ses alliés habituels du groupe de Visegrad, le risque d’isolement complet pour Budapest n’étant pas sans danger, tant au sein de l’UE que de l’OTAN. Un nouveau consensus L’on assiste également à l’émergence d’un certain consensus sur la menace russe et la nécessité de maintenir l’OTAN. Malgré la force du courant trumpiste, le soutien à l’Ukraine est l’un des rares points où il y a encore consensus aux É-U, quand bien même les modalités de ce soutien restent discutées. En France, les discours russophiles et favorables au locataire du Kremlin – y compris de plusieurs candidats majeurs à l’élection présidentielle – tendent à être oubliés, masqués, ou a minima fortement atténués, toute la classe politique condamnant l’agression russe. Traditionnellement, l’Allemagne avait toujours été un membre fiable et fidèle de l’Alliance. Or l’arrivée au pouvoir d’un gouvernement comprenant le SPD et les Verts laissaient craindre des évolutions quant à ce positionnement, certains membres de ces deux partis critiquant violemment tant l’OTAN que l’arme nucléaire. Bien qu’il y ait encore des voix discordantes, l’invasion russe met cependant un terme à toute remise en question forte de ce trait caractéristique de la politique de défense allemande des dernières décennies. On assiste ainsi actuellement à un retour d’un consensus fort en faveur de l’Alliance, et ce malgré l’absence des chrétiens-démocrates de la CDU/CSU au gouvernement. De même, l’Italie habituellement ambigüe sur sa relation avec la Russie a aujourd’hui pris conscience que la Russie ne peut plus être un partenaire fiable sur l’échiquier international, et semble maintenant pleinement revendiquer son appartenance à une identité européiste et transatlantique guidant ses choix de politique étrangère et de défense. Si initialement le principal parti prorusse et antimilitariste, le Mouvement 5 Étoiles, ne voulait pas explicitement nommer la Russie comme responsable au début du conflit, il soutient maintenant pleinement le gouvernement sur les sanctions contre le pays ainsi que sur l’augmentation des effectifs militaires au sein de l’OTAN sur le front est. 2. Vers un renforcement des capacités de l’OTAN La cohésion retrouvée n’est cependant qu’une des illustrations de la résurrection de l’OTAN, les évolutions en cours sur les budgets d’armements en constituant un autre exemple éloquent, tout comme celui du déploiement de troupes sur le flanc oriental. La fin programmée du débat sur le partage du fardeau La guerre en Ukraine provoque en effet une accélération de l’augmentation des dépenses de défense à l’œuvre dans nombre de pays membres de l’Alliance. Elle marque également la fin probable du débat vieux de près de 20 ans des 2 % de dépenses consacrées à la Défense au sein de l’OTAN. Remontant au sommet de Riga de l’OTAN de 2006, cet engagement plus moins contraignant des alliés d’engager 2% de leur PIB pour leur défense constituait une pomme régulière de discorde entre Européens et Américains. Compte tenu de l’estimation générale faible de la menace russe ces dernières années et des pressions américaines – surtout sous le mandat de Donald Trump – pour certains États la question se résumait simplement à acheter de nouveaux avions de chasse F-35. L’invasion russe met majoritairement un terme cependant à ces atermoiements et à ce débat. Il est d’ailleurs probable que d’ici quelque temps le débat ne porte plus sur les 2 % qui seront atteints par quasiment tous les États, mais plus sur la réalité de la puissance militaire de chacun compte tenu des dépenses engagées. Parmi les grands États de l’OTAN, trois groupes semblent se former pour l’heure : ceux ayant radicalement changé de position; ceux qui ne changent pas leurs prévisions en termes de dépenses; et ceux qui augmentent un peu ce dernier ou chez qui ceci commence à être envisagé. L’Allemagne et l’Italie illustrent le mieux le revirement de position sur cette question chez certains États. L’invasion russe a provoqué en effet un électrochoc sur la question des moyens alloués à la Bundeswehr, les propos publics du chef d’état-major de l’Armée de Terre indiquant que l’armée de Terre qu’il dirigeait était à sec ayant achevé de désillusionner nombre de responsables en Allemagne. L’illustration la plus manifeste de cet électrochoc fut le discours du chancelier devant le Bundestag le 27 février annonçant une augmentation durable du budget militaire permettant de dépasser les 2% du PIB alloués pour la Défense, ainsi que la création d’un fonds de restructuration et d’acquisition pour la Bundeswehr d’un montant de 100 milliards d’euros. Or pour rappel, les trois partis membres de la coalition gouvernementale contestaient jusqu’à maintenant – y compris vigoureusement dans leur programme politique – l’objectif des 2% du PIB consacrés au budget de la Défense. Certains évoquent même désormais le retour du service militaire supprimé sous le deuxième gouvernement de Merkel, il y a une dizaine d’années. Bien que disposant de plus de moyens que le Canada pour un budget de la défense et un PIB comparable au Canada, l’Italie faisait jusqu’ici partie des pays peu disposés à augmenter leurs dépenses en défense, celle-ci ne représentant que 1,4 % du PIB italien. Or désormais, le premier ministre italien appelle à une augmentation « sans précédent » du budget de la défense, ainsi qu’à une concertation européenne sur les investissements futurs en matière de sécurité. À côté de Berlin et de Rome, Varsovie et Ankara se distinguent par l’absence de modification ou même de frémissement en la matière dans leurs prévisions. Ceci s’explique toutefois compte tenu du taux déjà largement supérieur aux 2 % de leurs dépenses dans le domaine de la défense. Avant même le début de la guerre russo-ukrainienne, Varsovie avait ainsi décidé d’augmenter son budget militaire et avait prévu de doubler l’effectif de ses troupes afin de devenir plus autonome en matière de sécurité. Pour la Turquie, son budget de la défense était lui aussi déjà une priorité et il devrait d’ailleurs atteindre les 17,5 milliards de dollars (USD) en 2025. Les États-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni et le Canada forment le troisième groupe chez qui l’on assiste à une légère augmentation (États-Unis et Canada) ou à des premiers indicateurs d’une volonté d’augmenter encore le budget de la défense, ce dernier étant proche des 2 % (France), voire déjà supérieur (Royaume-Uni). L’annonce des investissements prévus par l’Allemagne provoquera très certainement à court/moyen terme cette augmentation en France et en Royaume-Uni. Il est en effet peu probable que les deux pays à l’origine de la Politique de sécurité et de défense européenne (PSDC) acceptent d’être surclassés militairement par Berlin. Au sein de ce groupe, le Canada se distingue cependant, les annonces d’augmentation du budget de la défense restant très modestes (ce dernier atteindrait au mieux seulement 1,4 % du PIB). Certes l’invasion russe a provoqué un changement de la perception canadienne de l’environnement international, autant au niveau de la population que du politique. Plusieurs experts ont ainsi plaidé au cours des dernières semaines pour une augmentation du budget canadien de la défense afin d’améliorer les capacités de défense. Le Parti conservateur fait également pression pour que le gouvernement Trudeau accélère sa propre stratégie d’armement. À l’inverse, le chef du NPD qui soutient désormais le gouvernement libéral minoritaire de Justin Trudeau continue pour l’instant de contester l’objectif des 2 %. Par conséquent, alors que l’invasion change profondément le calcul politique des dépenses de défense en Europe, le Canada pourrait être isolé parmi ses alliés du fait de son faible budget de défense, surtout si le débat venait à se déplacer non plus sur le montant des dépenses, mais sur l’efficacité des moyens disponibles. Renforcement de l’OTAN sur son flanc oriental À la veille de la chute du mur de Berlin, 400 000 militaires provenant des pays de l’OTAN étaient stationnés en Allemagne de l’Ouest (dont 60 % étaient américains), auxquels s’ajoutaient les forces de la Bundeswehr, ainsi que les 60 000 soldats américains déployés ailleurs en Europe. S’il est peu probable que l’OTAN déploie un nombre comparable de militaires sur son flanc oriental (comprenant les trois pays baltes, la Pologne, la Slovaquie, la Hongrie, la Bulgarie et la Roumanie), on assiste cependant à une augmentation notable des effectifs présents dans ces pays. Depuis l’invasion russe, le Pentagone a reconnu devoir modifier sa posture de défense en Europe pour augmenter le stationnement permanent de troupes, mais aussi les déploiements rotationnels pour faire face à la Russie. 14 000 soldats américains supplémentaires ont été dépêchés dans les pays baltes, en Pologne et en Hongrie, pour un total de 100 000 soldats américains en Europe, contre 80 000 avant la guerre. Le Pentagone a aussi procédé à un repositionnement de troupes et de matériels : 800 soldats sont partis d’Italie vers les Pays baltes, 20 hélicoptères Apache sont passés d’Allemagne vers les Pays baltes, 12 de Grèce vers la Pologne et 8 F-35 ont été transférés d’Allemagne vers la Lituanie, l’Estonie et la Roumanie. Tout cela s’ajoute aux 12 000 soldats américains placés en alerte dans le cadre de la NATO Response Force (NRF) de l’OTAN qui comprend 40 000 hommes. De son côté, en termes de déploiement la Grande-Bretagne a presque doublé les effectifs présents en Estonie, les faisant passer de 900 à 1700. Le nombre de véhicules blindés passera à 48 et celui de chars à 24. Aussi, 350 soldats s’ajouteront aux 100 déjà présents en Pologne. Deux navires britanniques ont également rejoint la Méditerranée orientale en février pour mener des opérations de monitorage aux côtés d’autres membres de l’OTAN. Dirigeant cette année la VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force), la France vient quant à elle d’annoncer prendre la tête d’un nouveau bataillon de l’OTAN qui sera positionné en Roumanie. À cette fin, 250 militaires français (l’effectif final devant faire le double) ont récemment pris position sur une base roumaine près de la frontière ukrainienne. Fin février 2022, l’Italie a confirmé déployer environ 1 350 militaires en Hongrie et en Lettonie dans le cadre de l’OTAN, l’envoi de 130 militaires et 12 avions de combat en Roumanie, ainsi que 235 personnels, 2 navires et un avion de combat en mer Noire. Berlin a annoncé ces derniers jours également le déploiement à venir de plusieurs centaines de militaires sur le flanc oriental de l’Alliance : 350 soldats doivent rejoindre prochainement les 500 militaires allemands déjà présents en Lituanie; plusieurs bâtiments devraient être déployés prochainement dans la Baltique; une batterie de missiles Patriot sera prochainement déployée en Slovaquie et intégrée dans un groupement tactique de l’OTAN semblable à ceux présents dans les États baltes. L’Allemagne compte en outre déployer dans ce pays une demi-douzaine de chasseurs Eurofighter. En ce qui concerne le Canada, le 22 février dernier, avant que l’invasion débute, le premier ministre Trudeau avait déjà annoncé le déploiement de 460 soldats supplémentaires pour renforcer l’alliance en Europe de l’Est. Cela comprend une unité d’artillerie d’environ 100 soldats en Lettonie, qui se joindra à 540 autres membres des Forces armées à la tête d’un groupement tactique de l’OTAN (opération REASSURANCE), ainsi qu’une deuxième frégate – le HMCS Halifax – et un avion de patrouille CP-140 Aurora. Actuellement, c’est ainsi près de 25 000 militaires issus de pays membres de l’OTAN qui sont déployés sur le flanc oriental de l’Alliance, sans compter les armées nationales des huit pays composant ce dernier. Un an plus tôt, on n’en comptait pourtant qu’à peine la moitié. Il est fort probable que ce nombre augmente encore au cours des prochains mois, surtout en cas de poursuite du conflit. Ceci, ainsi que les velléités d’adhésion de la Suède et de la Finlande à l’OTAN, pose par conséquent la question d’une éventuelle réorganisation des structures de l’Alliance. 3. Réformes et risques probables À côté des éventuelles modifications de la structure interne de l’OTAN, la résurrection de l’OTAN reste malgré tout menacée par certains risques de tensions et de divergences. De nouveaux plans de défense du territoire de l’Alliance – surtout en cas d’élargissement de ce dernier en Scandinavie – devraient voir le jour, et pourraient être accompagnés de tractations sur la hiérarchie militaire au sein de l’alliance (plus précisément en ce qui a trait à l’attribution automatique de tel ou tel poste à certains pays). Par ailleurs une nouvelle administration trumpiste en 2025 pourrait mettre fin prématurément à cette nouvelle jeunesse de l’Alliance, en particulier si celle-ci venait à reprendre à son compte le positionnement erratique de Donald Trump sur les questions de la défense européenne ou les relations avec Moscou. Vers des réformes de la structure otanienne ? Alors que la dernière grande réforme structurelle de l’OTAN remonte au sommet de Prague de 2002, il n’est pas impossible qu’une nouvelle restructuration ait lieu tant en termes de commandement qu’en termes de nationalité occupant tel ou tel poste. Plusieurs facteurs militent déjà pour celles-ci, sans compter ceux qui pourraient s’y rajouter (par exemple, l’adhésion de la Suède et de la Finlande impliquant la prise en compte de leur territoire dans les plans de défense de l’Alliance) : l’augmentation des troupes stationnées en Europe orientale; le rôle majeur joué par la Pologne dans la défense orientale; le Brexit et ses conséquences sur les arrangements dits de Berlin + entre l’UE et l’OTAN. En effet, les accords dits de Berlin + de 2003 renforçaient le rôle de l’adjoint au commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, DSACEUR), faisant de lui un acteur clé de la coopération OTAN-UE, le poste étant dévolu presque sans discontinuité depuis 1949 à un Britannique. L’appartenance du Royaume-Uni aux deux organisations ainsi que ses liens forts avec Washington plaidaient alors pour le maintien de ce poste dans les mains d’un Britannique. Or le Brexit modifie cela. Une première tentative française pour prendre cette fonction aurait d’ailleurs eu lieu dès 2017. Il est probable que d’autres suivent, d’autant plus en cas d’affaiblissement partiel du Royaume-Uni, si l’Écosse venait à devenir indépendante. Il n’est pas impossible non plus que le poste de DSACEUR vienne à être dupliqué ou réparti en deux fonctions : ce fut ainsi le cas dans les années 1980 ou pendant plus de dix ans, il exista deux DSACEUR, l’un de nationalité britannique, l’autre de nationalité allemande. La question de la future nationalité du prochain secrétaire général de l’OTAN pourrait constituer un autre enjeu, le mandat de l’actuel secrétaire touchant à sa fin, bien qu’il vienne récemment d’être prorogé de quelques mois eu égard à la guerre. Certains souhaitent qu’une femme soit enfin nommée à ce poste, ce qui serait une première. D’autres pays pourraient toutefois parallèlement insister pour que le poste revienne à un Européen issu d’un pays membre de l’UE et participant à la PSDC, ce qui n’est plus le cas depuis 2009. Risques de fractures et de tensions potentielles Plus le conflit perdure, plus il risque potentiellement de mettre à mal la cohésion de l’OTAN. Pour l’heure, le scénario d’une riposte militaire directe a été écarté par les alliés en raison de l’absence de l’obligation juridique d’intervenir et face aux risques d’affrontement direct avec la Russie. Si cette attitude s’explique du fait du statut de puissance nucléaire de la Russie (et est en cela comparable aux comportements des pays occidentaux lors du soulèvement de Budapest de 1956, du Printemps de Prague de 1968, ou encore de l’invasion russe de l’Afghanistan durant la Guerre froide), indirectement elle peut favoriser une augmentation des crimes de guerre commis par la Russie. De ce fait, il n’est pas sûr que cette position de non-intervention résiste en cas de recours à des armes chimiques par Moscou, en particulier du fait des pressions des opinions publiques en Occident. Compte tenu des livraisons d’armes, sans compter l’afflux en volontaires transitant par la frontière entre l’Ukraine d’un côté et la Pologne, la Slovaquie et la Roumanie de l’autre, des actions russes contre des convois ne sont pas non plus à écarter, ce qui là encore comporterait un risque tant d’escalade avec une implication militaire de l’OTAN que de désunion sur une telle escalade parmi les membres de l’Alliance. Par ailleurs, submerger l’Ukraine d’armes risque de faciliter la violence non étatique, le trafic d’armes et le terrorisme sur le long terme en Europe. Il est possible par conséquent que l’on assiste à des dissensions à court/moyen terme sur la bonne manière de dissuader la Russie et de soutenir l’Ukraine. La tentative polonaise de transférer des MIG-29 aux forces armées ukrainiennes, le débat sur une zone d’exclusion aérienne au-dessus de l’Ukraine, ou encore l’embargo unilatéral des États-Unis sur les hydrocarbures russes sont à cet égard des signaux annonciateurs de potentielles divergences futures. À moyen terme, la cohésion au sein de l’alliance tant sur le conflit russo-ukrainien qu’au-delà reste en outre dépendante de la politique intérieure américaine. En cas de congrès trumpiste en 2022, voire d’un président trumpiste en janvier 2025, la résurrection de l’OTAN pourrait être alors gravement compromise, en particulier en cas de sortie américaine de l’Alliance, même si celle-ci semble ne plus être évoquée aux États-Unis, du moins pour le moment. 4. Conséquences de la guerre sur l’UE et la Chine La guerre en Ukraine provoque également des évolutions et des réactions tant au sein de l’UE, partenaire intime de l’OTAN en Europe, qu’en Chine, et pose par extension la question de la répartition des tâches entre l’OTAN et l’UE en Europe, mais aussi de l’implication éventuelle de l’OTAN en Indopacifique. Une Union européenne surprenante, mais demeurant un nain militaire Bien que pour l’heure la défense territoriale en Europe ne fasse pas encore partie véritablement de ses compétences – et ce malgré la présence de l’article 42.7 du traité de Lisbonne découlant de l’homologue renforcé de l’article 5 de l’OTAN de la défunte UEO – l’UE a surpris plus d’un expert par sa réaction depuis le début de l’invasion. L’ampleur de la réaction de l’UE a en effet surpris, que cela soit sur le dossier des sanctions économiques ou plus frappant encore de la fourniture en armes. Ce point est le plus étonnant du fait de l’activation en outre par l’UE du mécanisme de la Facilité européenne pour la paix créé moins d’un an auparavant et non conçu initialement pour ce type de dépenses. Grâce à ce dernier, l’UE contribua dès les premiers jours à hauteur de 500 millions d’euros à l’effort de guerre ukrainien, et vient désormais de tripler. L’UE est-elle en train de mettre un terme au fossé capacités-attentes dont elle souffre ? Alors qu’elle vient d’adopter enfin sa Boussole stratégique, le processus de validation de celle-ci, accéléré initialement suite à une volonté française d’en tirer profit pour la campagne présidentielle, risque au final de porter préjudice à l’UE, les retombées de la guerre russo-ukrainienne étant loin d’être achevées. Pour autant, on peut constater une certaine coordination et entente notable parmi les États membres, de même qu’une atténuation des tensions sur certains dossiers, tel celui de la réforme de l’État de droit en Pologne. En effet, tout comme au sein de l’OTAN – malgré des divergences initiales fortes sur Nord Stream 2 ou encore les sanctions – il est surprenant de constater l’existence d’une cohésion assez forte entre les États membres de l’Union européenne (exception faite de la Hongrie). Les mesures évoquées en lien avec les livraisons d’armes et l’utilisation à cette fin de la Facilité Européenne pour la Paix, instrument des plus récents et conçu initialement à destination des armées africaines, démontrent l’efficacité de la coordination entre les États de l’UE. Bien que logique vu le contexte, on assiste en outre à un retour en grâce de la Pologne parmi les États membres, celle-ci étant de par sa position géographique, mais aussi son engagement en faveur de l’Ukraine, passé d’État paria, archétype de ce que certains nomment les démocraties illibérales, au modèle d’État défenseur de la démocratie. Pour rappel, les relations entre la Pologne et les autres États – exception faite en particulier de la Hongrie – se sont détériorées depuis la crise de l’État de droit en Pologne et les réformes contestées menées par le parti au pouvoir. Or, pour reprendre les propos du président polonais, désormais « la priorité est la sécurité du continent, la sécurité du monde occidental, la sécurité de l’Ukraine et la sécurité de la Pologne ». Parallèlement, depuis l’invasion, il est certain que l’UE et ses politiques connaissent une nouvelle force d’attraction. Alors qu’en quelques jours à peine, trois nouveaux pays – à savoir l’Ukraine, la Moldavie et la Géorgie – viennent de poser acte de candidature pour être membre de l’UE, il se pourrait que le Danemark renonce également après 30 ans d’attachement à celle-ci à sa dérogation ayant trait à la Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune. Les prochains mois pourraient être ceux également de la fin de la neutralité autrichienne et irlandaise, et ce alors Vienne et Dublin avaient toujours jusqu’ici rappelé avec vigueur leur attachement à leur neutralité (bien que participant à la PSDC). Toutefois, au vu de la situation et du contexte, il est probable que les capacités militaires de l’UE demeurent relativement faibles, l’OTAN demeurant l’instance privilégiée par la majeure partie des États européens. L’adoption trop tôt de la boussole stratégique a empêché celle-ci de prendre véritablement en compte les conséquences en cours et à venir de la guerre en Ukraine. La dernière version du projet de nouvelle force de réaction rapide européenne est révélatrice de ce décalage. S’appuyant sur les groupements tactiques existants de l’Union européenne, elle ne prévoit qu’un effectif limité (environ 5 000 militaires), loin d’atteindre ce faisant les objectifs initiaux de la PSDC fixés à Helsinki (de l’ordre de 50 000). En outre, tout semble indiquer que son champ d’action resterait en dehors du territoire national des États membres de l’UE. Certes, la PSDC s’inscrit dans la Politique Étrangère – et non interne – de Sécurité Commune (PESC). Toutefois, refuser de faire évoluer les théâtres d’opérations possibles de la force de réaction rapide revient à condamner celle-ci, les États d’Europe de l’Est privilégiant leur défense territoriale à des opérations extérieures en Afrique ou au Moyen-Orient. Cette position des Européens de l’est préexistant à l’invasion russe ne peut que se renforcer suite à celle-ci. Par extension, il est probable que ceci affecte également le développement du quartier général militaire de l’UE, QG développé à partir de la Capacité actuelle militaire de planification et de conduite. Une meilleure coordination et entente avec l’OTAN pourrait permettre d’éviter ce scénario, mais nécessiterait que Paris propose une plus étroite collaboration entre les deux institutions. La fourniture d’armes à l’Ukraine montre toutefois que l’UE commence à prendre conscience de ses moyens militaires indirects, le premier d’entre eux étant justement ses ressources financières. L’augmentation à venir de l’ensemble des budgets de la défense des pays membres de l’UE à hauteur de 2% – voire plus – de leur PIB dotera en outre l’UE d’un budget militaire équivalent plus ou moins à la moitié de celui des États-Unis et égal ou supérieur à celui de la Chine. Paradoxalement, cette manne financière risque de mettre à mal les projets de coopération dans le domaine de l’armement au sein de l’UE, certains acteurs industriels espérant ainsi échapper à ce qu’ils considèrent au mieux comme une contrainte déplaisante. Cet apport financier pourrait toutefois favoriser le développement d’une forte capacité industrielle de défense en Europe, à condition toutefois que cet apport ne soit pas aspiré par les industries américaines. Une UE développant ses capacités et sa puissance n’est pas impossible. Fort heureusement pour elle, l’invasion russe fait suite au mandat de Donald Trump aux États-Unis et aux évènements de l’été 2021 que furent le pacte AUKUS et la débâcle en Afghanistan. Ceux-ci ont permis de diminuer le désir de dépendance absolue chez certains responsables européens vis-à-vis de Washington. Seront-ils capables d’éviter de retomber dans ce travers ? Telle est la question désormais. L’UE bénéficie toujours de l’attrait qu’elle exerce au-delà de ses frontières, attrait illustré par les demandes d’adhésion de l’Ukraine, de la Moldavie et de la Géorgie. Elle détient enfin un autre avantage encore inexploité, à savoir celui d’être aussi potentiellement une alliance militaire grâce à l’article 42.7 du traité de Lisbonne. Le fait que les négociations en cours entre la Russie et l’Ukraine semblent exclure automatiquement une adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, mais non à l’UE, pourrait encore une fois permettre à celle-ci de s’affirmer comme un acteur incontournable, y compris d’un point de vue sécuritaire, grâce à ce même article. Toutefois, là encore une utilisation judicieuse de ce dernier ne sera pas possible sans une coordination plus étroite sur le plan militaire entre l’UE et l’OTAN. À cet égard, le choix du futur secrétaire général de l’OTAN pourrait constituer un enjeu majeur à venir, tout comme la nationalité des prochains DSACEUR. Conséquences pour le rôle de l’OTAN en Indopacifique Bien que considérée comme la grande « alliée » de la Russie, depuis le début du conflit, la Chine adopte une position ambigüe. Il est probable qu’elle conserve celle-ci afin de favoriser sa position au niveau international. En matière économique, l’isolation croissante de la Russie pourrait lui permettre d’acquérir du pétrole et du gaz russe à moindre coût malgré des coûts internationaux très élevés. Sur le plan diplomatique, la position chinoise s’est traduite par une abstention lors du vote de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies pour dénoncer l’agression russe de l’Ukraine. La Chine n’en fera pas plus pour soutenir son voisin, craignant de se voir isolée sur la scène internationale et que la réputation de Xi Jinping soit entachée de la manière que celle de Poutine l’est présentement – autant à la maison qu’à l’étranger. La déclaration de Xi Jinping du 4 février dernier voulant que « l’amitié de la Chine pour la Russie n’avait aucune limite » semble aujourd’hui bien loin. Sur le plan militaire, la Chine est par ailleurs en mode observatrice. Elle prend note des angles morts de la stratégie poursuivie par la Russie et des difficultés opérationnelles qu’elle rencontre face à une armée ukrainienne que personne ne pensait capable d’une telle performance sur le terrain. La question est de savoir si les événements en Ukraine serviront de mise en garde contre la perspective d’une invasion chinoise de Taiwan. Durant une audience du comité sur le renseignement du Congrès, le 8 mars 2022, le directeur de la CIA mentionnait que la Chine était surprise par la tournure que prenait la crise ukrainienne, autant sur le plan de la réponse coordonnée de l’Occident que de la piètre performance des forces russes sur le terrain. En favorisant un rapprochement entre les États d’Occident, l’agression russe nuit grandement aux efforts que Beijing a depuis longtemps faits pour creuser des fossés entre Washington et l’Union européenne. Suite à une série d’entrevues réalisées avec des membres du Pentagone, Bloomberg concluait que la difficulté que rencontre la Russie dans son offensive, son isolation au sein de l’économie globale et les manifestations contre la guerre au sein de la population russe allaient certainement faire réfléchir le Parti communiste chinois quant à ses plans d’invasion de Taiwan. La manière dont la Chine approuve tacitement la conduite russe doit cependant sonner l’alarme dans les chancelleries occidentales, surtout en Europe. L’ensemble des membres de l’Alliance doivent être prêts à faire comprendre à Beijing que soutenir Moscou aura un coût. Cela peut aller dans le sens d’une révision de la manière dont les membres de l’OTAN conçoivent leur présence dans la région indopacifique ou des limites posées aux interconnexions entre les systèmes technologiques européens et chinois. Les évènements en Ukraine risquent toutefois d’avoir deux conséquences pour l’OTAN et l’engagement américain dans le Pacifique. Au grand déplaisir de Washington, les autres membres de l’Alliance pourraient militer pour une refocalisation de l’OTAN strictement sur son environnement immédiat – surtout sur la menace russe – le tout a priori à la grande joie de Beijing. Pour autant, ceci pourrait aller de pair avec une capacité accrue des autres Alliés d’assurer quasiment seuls leur sécurité et leur défense face à Moscou. Les autorités politiques de Moscou de 2022 ne disposent en effet plus de la force de frappe de leurs homologues du temps de la Guerre froide. À moyen terme, les forces des alliés présents sur le flanc oriental pourraient ainsi potentiellement se passer des 100 000 militaires américains présents en Europe, permettant plus facilement que par le passé le recentrage de la majorité des forces et ressources américaines dans l’Indopacifique. De plus, l’ampleur du réarmement européen pourrait même à moyen terme permettre aux autres alliés de prendre également leur part du fardeau en Indopacifique, la menace russe n’étant plus – et de loin – équivalente à celle que constituait l’URSS. Conclusion Si parler de Troisième Guerre mondiale est largement exagéré – pour ne pas dire erroné – les évènements actuels marquent le début de ce que l’on pourrait dénommer une seconde Guerre froide. C’est dans ce contexte que l’on assiste à une deuxième jeunesse à l’OTAN, jeunesse qui prend la forme d’une cohésion retrouvée et de mesures fortes renforçant ses capacités, dont les dépenses en matière de défense et les déploiements sur le flanc oriental. Des risques de divergences et de tensions entre les alliés demeurent cependant en cas d’escalade dans le conflit, mais aussi sur le dossier des sanctions économiques. En outre, bien qu’isolé, le cas de la Hongrie de Victor Orban demeure problématique pour la cohésion au sein de l’Alliance. Le risque majeur à moyen terme réside cependant dans les politiques intérieures des États membres et plus particulièrement aux États-Unis, en cas de victoire du courant trumpiste au Congrès ou lors de la prochaine élection présidentielle. Il n’est pas impossible que l’OTAN vienne en outre à évoluer dans ses structures, tout en approfondissant ses liens avec l’Union européenne, qui même si elle demeure un nain militaire pour l’heure, dispose de plusieurs atouts. Une implication de l’Alliance en mer de Chine ou dans les questions liées à l’Indopacifique est désormais peu probable, du moins à court et moyen terme. Toutefois, tous les membres (Européens compris) de l’Alliance auront intérêt à prêter attention dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne au comportement de Beijing – et au besoin à le sanctionner – la Chine et la Russie visant par leurs actions la remise en cause de l’ordre international actuel, qui pour l’heure reste fondamentalement influencé par les démocraties libérales. L’auteur tient à remercier Maria Aftimos, Rémy Carugati, Maxandre Fortier, Tancrède Jankowski, Marco Munier et Camille Raymond pour leurs contributions et l’appui à la recherche. ## La Russie au Sahel : vers une aggravation des situations sécuritaires et politiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-russie-au-sahel-vers-une-aggravation-des-situations-securitaires-et-politiques/ Modified: 2022-06-01 > Il est désormais incontestable que la Russie est devenue un acteur influent et dangereux au Sahel, un acteur qui aggrave peut-être... Il est désormais incontestable que la Russie est devenue un acteur influent et dangereux au Sahel, un acteur qui aggrave peut-être délibérément les problèmes de la région, alors que les pays du Sahel luttent pour faire face à des crises politiques et sécuritaires croissantes. Ce que fait la Russie est une mauvaise nouvelle pour les Africains subsahariens, mais a également des ramifications plus larges en dehors du continent. Ceci étant dit, je souhaite mettre en garde les lecteurs français contre la tentation de rendre la Russie responsable des échecs de la politique française et de la domination, au Mali de politiques populistes antifrançaises. Ce que les Russes ont fait, c’est exploiter astucieusement les échecs français, les échecs des régimes soutenus par la France et les sentiments antifrançais déjà présents au Sahel, sentiments dont la France partage une grande part de responsabilité après une longue histoire d’interventions postcoloniales, pour ne pas parler de la colonisation elle-même. Le fait d’être conscient de l’influence russe ne doit pas détourner les dirigeants français et le public français de l’introspection concernant leurs propres erreurs, et des effets parfois déstabilisateurs des actions françaises, même celles qui avaient les meilleures intentions. L’une de ces erreurs, directement liée à l’influence russe, est l’incapacité à prendre en compte la pleine mesure des opinions hostiles répandues dans la région et leur signification. Pour autant que je sache, les efforts français pour les contrer et s’engager sérieusement dans une bataille de récits ont toujours été pour le moins désordonnés. ... Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## La Russie rate sa sortie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-russie-rate-sa-sortie/ Modified: 2022-06-01 > S’exprimant par l’invasion brutale et non provoquée de l’Ukraine, l’hubris d’un dictateur se croyant encore à la tête d’une grande puissance Lorsqu’un empire tire sa révérence, il peut le faire avec une certaine élégance, ou en semant le chaos et la désolation dans son sillage. Ce deuxième scénario décrit bien la Russie de Vladimir Poutine, prêt à tout pour faire oublier le déclin géopolitique et maintenir le rang de son pays dans le concert des nations. Au prix d’une musique discordante, voire d’un effondrement. Deuxième puissance militaire mondiale, détentrice de l’arme nucléaire et d’un siège permanent au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, la Russie souffre d’un produit intérieur brut inférieur à celui du Canada et d’une démographie en berne. Depuis 1991, elle a aussi perdu une bonne partie de son territoire et de sa sphère d’influence. Cet écart entre un passé marqué par la grandeur et un présent rabougri explique en bonne partie la politique étrangère de Moscou. S’exprimant par l’invasion brutale et non provoquée de l’Ukraine, l’hubris d’un dictateur se croyant encore à la tête d’une grande puissance menace non seulement la paix régionale, mais aussi l’ordre international. Certains pensent que le sentiment d’encerclement et d’humiliation éprouvé par les élites russes à la suite de l’élargissement de l’OTAN rendait cette action inévitable. Je ne le crois pas. Même si l’on peut discuter de la façon dont la Russie a été poussée dans les câbles après la fin de la Guerre froide, Vladimir Poutine avait le choix. ... Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## La sécurité écologique, les programmes autochtones de protection marine et l’élargissement du concept de « sécurité climatique » URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-securite-ecologique-les-programmes-autochtones-de-protection-marine-et-lelargissement-du-concept-de-securite-climatique/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Ce document illustre comment une perspective de sécurité écologique peut apporter un éclairage nouveau sur les liens entre le changement climatique, la sécurité et les relations entre les nations autochtones et les structures gouvernementales canadiennes. Le changement climatique menace la sécurité des individus, des communautés et des industries à travers le Canada et dans le monde entier. Une approche, celle du cadre de sécurité écologique, suggère que pour faire face aux menaces posées par le changement climatique, nous devons nous concentrer sur les processus écologiques eux-mêmes et les protéger. Je me penche ici sur le partenariat entre les gardiens marins Kitasoo/Xai'xais et le gouvernement de la Colombie-Britannique. Cette analyse montre comment les programmes IMGP offrent une occasion pratique et coopérative d'œuvrer en faveur de la sécurité écologique au Canada, et suggère aux gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux d'investir dans les programmes de gardiens afin de soutenir à la fois la sécurité climatique et le leadership autochtone. Introduction Alors que les effets du réchauffement climatique dû à la dépendance continue aux combustibles fossiles deviennent de plus en plus pressants, les institutions et organisations nationales et internationales continuent de proposer des solutions hautement hiérarchisées visant à atténuer les effets du changement climatique tout en maintenant la stabilité nationale et internationale. En cette période de changements rapides, des débats ont surgi autour du concept même de « sécurité », avec des questions telles que « la sécurité pour qui ? » ou « la sécurité contre quoi ? », générant de multiples perspectives quant à une stratégie efficace pour traiter les questions climatiques et énergétiques. Une approche, le cadre de sécurité écologique, suggère que la sécurité doit être orientée vers la biosphère elle-même, les communautés vulnérables et les générations futures. Une approche de sécurité écologique exige des observateurs qu'ils reconsidèrent nos systèmes sociaux, économiques et politiques existants à la lumière de la menace existentielle que représente le changement climatique et qu'ils regardent au-delà des efforts institutionnels ou descendants étroits pour assurer la sécurité. Dans le contexte canadien, une perspective de sécurité écologique peut apporter un éclairage nouveau sur les intersections entre le changement climatique, l'industrie extractive et les relations entre les structures de gouvernance autochtones et canadiennes. Étant donné que les changements de température, les conditions météorologiques et les catastrophes naturelles touchent déjà de manière disproportionnée les communautés nordiques et autochtones, les discussions sérieuses sur la sécurité climatique au Canada doivent intégrer et prendre au sérieux les besoins des peuples autochtones. À bien des égards, le cadre de sécurité écologique offre une perspective plus accommodante dans laquelle explorer les options permettant de répondre aux besoins des peuples autochtones et des environnements locaux. Dans cette note, je présente une vue d'ensemble du cadre de sécurité écologique et soutiens que cette approche peut révéler des voies pratiques et viables pour des pratiques de sécurité non conventionnelles et intersectionnelles. Plus précisément, le partenariat entre les gardiens maritimes Kitasoo/Xai'xais et BC Parks offre un exemple de cadre de sécurité écologique intersectionnel en pratique. Le chevauchement et la contestation des revendications d'autorité entre les gouvernements fédéral, provincial et autochtone illustrés par ce cas suggèrent que le concept de sécurité doit être examiné de manière critique dans un contexte écologique et que l'éventail des acteurs susceptibles d'assurer la sécurité doit être élargi. Changement climatique, menaces environnementales et sécurité écologique À ce jour, les principales instances chargées d'analyser et de relever les défis posés par les changements climatiques sont les institutions et les organisations nationales et internationales. Depuis plusieurs décennies, les gouvernements nationaux, notamment au Canada et aux États-Unis, intègrent les changements climatiques dans leurs stratégies de sécurité nationale à des degrés divers. La dernière politique de défense du Canada, intitulée Notre Nord, fort et libre, intègre plus que jamais les implications des changements climatiques dans la planification de la défense canadienne. Des études récentes suggèrent qu'une grande majorité des États dans le monde ont également reconnu les liens entre le changement climatique et les défis liés à la sécurité nationale, et que beaucoup ont intégré des mesures telles que la réduction des émissions de GES, l'augmentation des fonds alloués aux secours en cas de catastrophe et une plus grande coopération entre les militaires et les civils sur les questions climatiques dans leurs plans et documents de sécurité nationale. En fait, 73 % de tous les documents stratégiques sur la sécurité nationale publiés entre 2008 et 2020 faisaient référence au changement climatique et aux effets des changements environnementaux sur la défense nationale. Au niveau international, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU)  organise depuis 2007 des débats sur le thème du changement climatique et de ses impacts. Une résolution présentée en 2021, qui a ensuite été bloquée, visait à formaliser le rôle de l'ONU dans la lutte contre les menaces liées au climat. En 2024, le Canada a parrainé l'ouverture du Centre d'excellence de l'OTAN sur le changement climatique et la sécurité, qui soutient la capacité des alliés à relever les défis liés à la sécurité climatique, à s'y adapter et à partager leurs connaissances en la matière. Malgré cet intérêt et cette reconnaissance croissants, la définition de la relation entre le changement climatique et la sécurité, ainsi que les réponses jugées appropriées, font l'objet de vives controverses. Les institutions nationales et internationales ont tendance à considérer la sécurité climatique comme une menace pour la stabilité nationale et mondiale en raison, entre autres, de l'augmentation des migrations induites par le climat, de l'évolution des conditions météorologiques et de la raréfaction des ressources. Une certaine attention a également été accordée aux impacts du changement climatique sur les individus et les communautés, en particulier à travers les discours sur la sécurité humaine qui mettent en évidence les inégalités et les vulnérabilités structurelles, notamment les dynamiques liées au genre, à la race et au Nord-Sud. Si la prise de conscience croissante et le mouvement général visant à lutter contre les implications du changement climatique sur la sécurité sont notables, certains chercheurs suggèrent que les analyses existantes négligent des aspects importants de la sécurité. À cet égard, le concept de sécurité écologique redéfinit la relation entre le changement climatique et la sécurité en réfléchissant de manière critique à cette intersection dans une perspective éclairée par les domaines de l'écologie politique, de l'économie politique internationale, de l'environnement et de l'éthique. La sécurité écologique met en avant la relation complexe et interdépendante entre les communautés et les processus écologiques eux-mêmes comme référence principale de la sécurité. Contrairement aux cadres conventionnels de la sécurité climatique, la sécurité écologique se concentre principalement sur la stabilité et la longévité des systèmes écologiques, plutôt que sur des objets de référence tels que les frontières nationales ou les systèmes internationaux. Les approches conventionnelles de la sécurité climatique considèrent généralement les gouvernements nationaux ou les institutions internationales comme les « acteurs » responsables de la sécurité, mais l'approche élargie de la sécurité écologique reconnaît le rôle des communautés locales dans la création de conditions de sécurité accrues. Ce changement d'orientation nécessite une gamme différente de réponses et d'approches, les chercheurs suggérant un élargissement simultané de ce qui constitue la « sécurité » et un regain d'intérêt pour la refonte des systèmes socio-économiques existants, notamment la dépendance aux combustibles fossiles, les systèmes agricoles et le capitalisme mondial. Sans surprise, cette position a suscité de vives critiques de la part des décideurs politiques, des chercheurs et des observateurs, qui affirment que la « sécurité » dans ce sens est utopique, irréaliste et offre peu de solutions concrètes. Malgré cela, les travaux récents de Matt McDonald suggèrent que la sécurité écologique gagne du terrain sur le plan institutionnel, même si les progrès restent lents. Je suggère ici qu'une approche de la sécurité écologique existe déjà dans la pratique et n'est pas hors de portée, comme le suggèrent certains critiques. Plus précisément, nous voyons un cas de sécurité écologique mis en œuvre par les programmes autochtones de protection marine (IMGP) en Colombie-Britannique (C.-B.), qui donne un aperçu de ce à quoi pourrait ressembler un cadre de sécurité écologique en action. Programmes autochtones de protection marine : le programme IMGP et le projet pilote Kitasoo/Xai’xais Les programmes de gardiens marins autochtones (IMGP) sont des programmes professionnels mis en place par une Première Nation ou une coalition de nations afin de mener diverses activités environnementales, éducatives, culturelles et coercitives au sens large. Les IMGP ont pour objectif de mobiliser les connaissances autochtones et de développer une voie significative permettant aux peuples autochtones d'atteindre une plus grande autonomie dans la gestion de leurs territoires traditionnels. Les gardiens mènent des activités de surveillance, d'observation et d'application de la loi ; des activités liées à la recherche, telles que la collecte, l'analyse et la communication de données ; et des activités de sensibilisation, notamment des activités éducatives et culturelles, ainsi que la collaboration avec d'autres nations ou autorités locales et régionales. Ces programmes contribuent souvent à protéger les populations animales locales contre la chasse ou la pêche illégales, à recueillir des données sur les projets industriels proposés et à fournir des informations aux différents niveaux de gouvernement sur l'aménagement du territoire. Les IMGP sont reconnus comme des affirmations actives des droits autochtones, car ils offrent aux nations des moyens d'exercer leur autorité et leur autodétermination sur leurs territoires. Les IMGP sont couramment intégrés dans la littérature universitaire et les espaces politiques sous l'angle de la conservation, car les gardiens sont considérés comme des protecteurs de l'environnement, des détenteurs de connaissances et des membres de la communauté investis dans la préservation de leur environnement. Cependant, reléguer ces programmes à la sphère technique de la gestion des terres ou des études environnementales peut conduire à négliger les dimensions sociales, politiques et même sécuritaires des IMGP. Pour de nombreux peuples autochtones, la santé et la survie de leurs territoires traditionnels, y compris la terre, l'air, l'eau et les animaux non humains, sont profondément liées à la sécurité de la nation et de son peuple. Comme les IMGP sont activement engagés dans la protection des territoires traditionnels, ils peuvent être considérés comme la mise en œuvre des principes de sécurité écologique. En termes simples, les gardiens autochtones agissent pour protéger leur écosystème local contre les menaces extérieures, assurer la survie à long terme de l'environnement et des personnes qui en dépendent, et incarner une politique de résistance et de renaissance en assumant des responsabilités en matière de réglementation, d'application et de gouvernance. Les gardiens côtiers Kitasoo/Xai'xais sont l'un de ces IMGP, situé sur la côte centrale de la Colombie-Britannique. En juin 2022, les nations Kitasoo/Xai'xais et Nuxalk ont signé un protocole d'accord avec BC Parks pour lancer le projet pilote Guardian Shared Compliance and Enforcement (Guardian Shared Compliance and Enforcement Pilot Project). Ce projet a donné lieu à un partenariat entre les nations et BC Parks, dans le cadre duquel 11 gardiens individuels des deux nations ont suivi une formation et se sont vu attribuer les mêmes pouvoirs légaux que les gardes forestiers de BC Park. Il est intéressant de noter que, bien que la nation Kitasoo/Xai'xais se soit associée aux autorités provinciales de la Colombie-Britannique pour le programme pilote, elle s'est en même temps publiquement opposée aux projets du gouvernement fédéral visant à établir une installation de GNL et une route d'exportation dans les eaux de Kitasoo/Xai'xais, déclarant unilatéralement la baie de Kitasu zone marine protégée en 2023 en vertu du droit autochtone. Par conséquent, s'il peut être tentant de considérer le partenariat entre les Watchmen et BC Parks comme un pas vers un rapprochement entre les autorités fédérales, provinciales et autochtones, la nation Kitasoo/Xai'xais n'a pas adopté une politique de coopération aveugle. Au contraire, ce cas met en évidence les relations complexes et controversées entre les autorités autochtones, provinciales et fédérales. Discussion : contestation, coopération et sécurité Le programme des gardiens côtiers Kitasoo/Xai’xias, associé à d’autres initiatives environnementales menées par les peuples autochtones, soulève des questions intéressantes sur la sécurité écologique dans la pratique et sur l’impact de la délégation de pouvoirs entre les gouvernements coloniaux et les gouvernements des Premières Nations sur ces initiatives. J'ai déjà fait valoir ailleurs que les actions directes et les efforts de désobéissance civile, tels que la résistance des Wet'suwet'en et d'autres Premières Nations à la construction de nouveaux pipelines de pétrole et de gaz en Colombie-Britannique, constituent des exemples de sécurité écologique en action. Étant donné que ces mouvements sont menés par des communautés locales qui s'attachent à empêcher directement la poursuite des projets d'extraction, ils incarnent le cadre de la sécurité écologique en ce sens qu'ils considèrent l'environnement lui-même comme l'objet de la sécurité et qu'ils remettent sérieusement en question les systèmes socio-économiques actuels. À l'instar d'autres mouvements menés par des Autochtones contre des projets d'extraction, tels que ceux contre les pipelines Keystone XL et Dakota Access aux États-Unis, les Premières Nations pratiquent un « refus génératif » en mettant en œuvre une manière différente d'aborder l'environnement, tout en affirmant l'autorité et la légitimité des formes de gouvernance autochtones par le biais de manifestations. De tels exemples de désobéissance civile mettent souvent en évidence les liens entre les luttes des Premières Nations contre l'autorité fédérale ou provinciale, la résistance à la dégradation de l'environnement et à l'industrie extractive, et la mise en œuvre de la sécurité écologique par l'action directe. La « sécurité » a une signification différente pour les communautés confrontées à l'oppression structurelle des autorités étatiques et qui subissent des menaces en temps réel sur leurs terres, leurs eaux et leurs écosystèmes. Will Greaves a fait valoir que les revendications des peuples autochtones du Canada en matière de sécurité sont souvent ignorées par les autorités fédérales et provinciales en raison du défi que représentent les revendications autochtones d'autodétermination pour les sociétés coloniales elles-mêmes. Étant donné que les revendications des nations autochtones en matière de légitimité et d'autorité menacent la souveraineté sous-jacente de la gouvernance canadienne, la sécurité des peuples autochtones ne peut être prise au sérieux par l'État. Tout comme la sécurité de l'environnement lui-même ne peut être prise en compte de manière adéquate sans remettre en question la domination des relations socio-économiques capitalistes, la sécurité des peuples autochtones nécessite de s'attaquer aux idées historiquement ancrées sur la légitimité et l'autorité de la gouvernance fédérale. Bien que cela puisse sembler être un problème insoluble, je propose que le partenariat entre les Kitasoo/Xai'xias et BC Parks représente une voie possible pour envisager la mise en œuvre d'une sécurité écologique intersectionnelle. Comme indiqué ci-dessus, les gardiens Kitasoo/Xai'xais assurent la sécurité de leur écosystème et de leur communauté locale par leurs actions en tant que gardiens, avant même leur implication auprès du gouvernement provincial. Les gardiens eux-mêmes décrivent leurs activités de conservation et de surveillance comme l'incarnation de leur vision du monde, profondément liée à leur identité en tant que nation. Cependant, depuis leur partenariat avec BC Parks, l'autorité réelle et perçue des gardiens s'est accrue, car ils sont désormais en mesure de dresser des contraventions, d'infliger des amendes et d'appliquer la loi sur les parcs de manière indépendante. Il s'agit à la fois d'un renforcement de la capacité pratique des gardiens à assurer la sécurité de leur territoire et de leur communauté, et d'un changement important dans la capacité du gouvernement canadien à soutenir la sécurité des peuples autochtones eux-mêmes. En déléguant cette autorité à l'IMGP, la province de Colombie-Britannique contribue à renforcer la sécurité de la nation Kitasoo/Xai'xais, à la fois en soutenant l'autodétermination et l'autonomie de la nation et en renforçant la capacité des gardes à assurer la sécurité écologique sur leurs territoires. Conclusion & Recommandations Cette brève discussion vise à susciter une réflexion critique sur la notion de sécurité dans le contexte du changement climatique et des relations entre l'État canadien et les nations autochtones. Le cas des IMGP et des gardiens marins Kitasoo/Xai'xais nous incite à réfléchir à la manière dont la sécurité face au changement climatique peut nécessiter une approche multiforme et intersectionnelle, telle que celles qui aident les communautés locales et autochtones à assurer la sécurité à petite échelle, mais de manière significative. La sécurité écologique nous rappelle que tous les systèmes sont liés et que, par conséquent, les solutions doivent également couvrir différents lieux sociaux et niveaux de gouvernance. Je suggère que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux du Canada examinent sérieusement les possibilités de collaboration significative offertes par les IMGP et des programmes tels que le projet pilote de conformité et d'application partagées en Colombie-Britannique, et étudient les possibilités de collaboration avec les nations et les IMGP à travers le pays. Cette collaboration pourrait prendre la forme d'un réseau national de programmes de gardiens, soutenant et élargissant les 30 programmes de gardiens existants à travers le pays.  Le programme australien des gardes forestiers autochtones pourrait servir d'exemple au gouvernement fédéral canadien à cet égard. D'un point de vue traditionnel de la défense, le gouvernement fédéral pourrait envisager d'élargir le rôle des peuples autochtones au sein des Rangers canadiens et d'intégrer des éléments des IMGP et de la gouvernance autochtone au sein des Rangers. En fin de compte, les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux devraient s'efforcer d'adopter une perspective de sécurité écologique alors que le Canada s'enfonce davantage dans la crise climatique. Cela ne signifie pas nécessairement des changements immédiats et radicaux dans notre paysage politique et économique, mais peut être considéré comme une invitation à faire participer davantage de parties prenantes au débat sur la sécurité climatique et à reconnaître le potentiel du leadership autochtone à travers le pays. À propos de l’autrice Aly Tkachenko est doctorante en relations internationales et politique canadienne à l'Université de Victoria. Ses recherches portent sur les études critiques en matière de sécurité, le changement climatique, la sécurité océanique et la désobéissance civile. Aly est chercheuse au sein du Réseau nord-américain et arctique de défense et de sécurité (NAADSN) et bénéficiaire d'une bourse 2024 de l'Association canadienne pour la sécurité climatique (CSAC). Ses travaux à l'Université de Victoria sont supervisés par le Dr Will Greaves. ## La souveraineté et la sécurité de l’Arctique canadien : de qui se méfier ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-souverainete-et-la-securite-de-larctique-canadien-de-qui-se-mefier/ Modified: 2025-11-17 Plusieurs articles parus en septembre 2025 ont renoué avec des postures alarmistes sur les menaces qui pèseraient sur la souveraineté du Canada. Leurs auteurs dépeignent le tableau sombre d’un Canada incapable de contrôler son territoire arctique et en butte à une Chine et à une Russie agressives qui nourrissent de grandes convoitises envers son territoire. Dans ces sombres scénarios, on parle de brise-glace russes parcourant les eaux de l’archipel arctique, de bases chinoises construites à l’insu des autorités canadiennes, voire d’une attaque de l’Arctique canadien par l’armée russe. Le problème, c’est que ce sombre tableau repose sur des scénarios très théoriques et s’appuie sur des observations non pertinentes. Pire encore, il rate probablement les véritables enjeux, qui résident à la fois dans la nécessité pour le gouvernement canadien d’assurer une présence gouvernementale dans le Nord et de contrer d’éventuelle remises en question de sa souveraineté en Mer de Beaufort et dans le Passage du Nord-Ouest par les États-Unis. L’ours et le dragon sont-ils de véritables prédateurs ? Sur quelle base peut-on affirmer que des brise-glaces russes sillonneront les eaux du Passage du Nord-ouest, alors qu’ils ont déjà fort à faire le long des côtes sibériennes et qu’ils sont construits précisément pour soutenir le trafic commercial? Sur quel élément peut-on affirmer que la Chine pourrait construire une base dans l’archipel sans que les travaux ne se fassent détecter ? Comment peut-on affirmer que des navires commerciaux chinois parcourront les eaux arctiques canadiennes sans en demander la permission ? Quels sont ces mystérieux précédents de navires scientifiques chinois qui, selon les auteurs, accosteraient régulièrement sur les terres arctiques canadiennes pour y installer illégalement du matériel de télécommunication ? Le seul cas connu d’un navire chinois ayant approché les côtes arctiques canadiennes sans que sa visite ait été prévue est celui de la visite du brise-glace Xuelong à Tuktoyaktuk, en 1999, mais cette demande s’était perdue dans les méandres de la bureaucratie canadienne. Il y a eu évidemment le cas des bouées de surveillance chinoises, retrouvées (et retirées) par les Forces armées canadiennes il y a quelques années : le saut qualitatif entre la présence de bouées et l’établissement de structures sur la masse terrestre serait cependant très conséquent. De plus, le fait que l’armée canadienne ait récupéré les bouées de surveillance représente davantage une preuve que le Canada surveille son Arctique et peut réagir à des intrusions que le contraire. Au-delà de ces éléments qui relèvent davantage de la spéculation que des faits, les tenants du scénario sino-russe procèdent par amalgame pour dépeindre la collusion de la Chine et de la Russie dont les intentions seraient, bien évidemment, forcément hostiles au Canada. La Russie se montre agressive dans l’espace aérien des pays de l’OTAN – c’est exact, mais en mer Baltique et en mer Noire, dans le contexte de la guerre en Ukraine – et donc serait une menace en Arctique. Pourtant, la fréquence des patrouilles aériennes russes vers l’espace aérien nord-américain demeure réduite (1, 2, 3). La Russie ne s’est pas retirée du Conseil de l’Arctique ; la Russie n’a jamais contesté les revendications de plateaux continentaux étendus du Canada ou du Danemark dans l’océan Arctique, même si ces revendications empiètent sur la sienne, et même lorsque le Canada a étendu son domaine revendiqué en 2022. Tout se passe comme si, dans le cadre d’un accord tacite qui perdure malgré les tensions sur le théâtre ukrainien, les États riverains de l’Arctique s’abstenaient de contester les revendications des voisins[1]. Par ailleurs, la coopération entre la Russie et les autres États arctiques a continué post-février 2022 à la conférence des parties de l’accord international pour la prévention d’activités non réglementées de pêche en haute mer dans le centre de l’océan Arctique. En mer de Chine du Sud, la Chine a exercé de fortes pressions militaires pour s’emparer d’ilots et écarter les autres protagonistes régionaux – c’est exact – et donc serait une menace en Arctique. Mais quel est lien entre Arctique et la mer de Chine? Dans le contexte arctique, la Chine a ratifié le moratoire sur la pêche commerciale dans l’océan Arctique central, en plus d’adopter les normes du Code Polaire. La Chine multiplie les missions scientifiques polaires – c’est exact – et ces missions seraient à vocation duale civile et militaire – c’est possible. La Chine a commencé à participer à des patrouilles communes avec les Russes, aériennes au sud du détroit de Béring, navales le long de la Route maritime du Nord. Des auteurs en déduisent que la Chine serait une menace à court terme à la souveraineté arctique du Canada. Ces affirmations enchaînent les suppositions et les extrapolations géographiques sans réellement s'appuyer sur des observations concrètes attestant d’intentions hostiles en Arctique. Formuler une hypothèse n’est pas la même chose qu’affirmer l’existence de menaces. Si la Russie réinvestit dans sa sphère militaire après des années de déclin accéléré, c’est notamment avec l’objectif de redévelopper sa flotte et ses actifs militaires, qui ont connu un important déclin au cours de la décennie 1990, après la disparition de l’URSS. On peut considérer par exemple l’évolution des effectifs de la marine russe depuis 1983 (figure 1). Figure 1 : Évolution du nombre de bâtiments de la flotte russe, 1983-2024 Il apparait clairement que la Russie dispose d’effectifs loin de ceux de l’époque soviétique, et qui ont continué de décliner sauf pour les sous-marins et pour les frégates. Il y a eu des modernisations récentes certes, mais lentes (13 ans de construction pour la dernière frégate Neustrashimny; 9 ans pour le dernier SNLE de classe Borei) du fait de sous-investissements dans les chantiers navals et d’une perte de compétence suite au départ de nombreux ingénieurs. Les modernisations, réelles, et les lancements récents ne compensent pas les retraits. On note les efforts consentis sur les sous-marins, les destroyers et les frégates : ils traduisent une posture défensive (1, 2) dite de défense du bastion que constitue la mer de Barents. Le fondement de la doctrine russe demeure la dissuasion nucléaire, tandis que les forces navales disposent de plus en plus d’unités de défense côtière (frégates, corvettes) destinées à protéger les actifs économiques sibériens et, surtout, la zone de départ des sous-marins balistiques. Ces unités navales sont peu propices à des assauts de longue portée. De plus, la Russie ne dispose que de deux navires d’assaut (et plusieurs navires de débarquement plus petits). Aucun navire de la flotte russe n’est à coque de glace. De même, les médias occidentaux ont largement relayé la forte communication russe lors du déploiement des missiles mobiles antinavires Bastion en 2018. Or, il s’agit d’équipements essentiellement de moyenne portée (300 km), donc de défense côtière. Ces moyens ne constituent donc pas une menace directe pour le Canada. Enfin, il n’y a pas eu d’ouverture de nouvelle base militaire russe dans l’Arctique, sauf pour un bâtiment abritant un bataillon de 250 hommes près de la base aérienne de Nagurskoye, dans l’archipel de la Terre François Joseph. Ces réouvertures de bases anciennes (1, 2), qui sont modernisées, ne constituent pas nécessairement un pas vers une attaque du Canada.  La Russie souligne qu’elle a étoffé ses défenses anti-aériennes, ses radars côtiers, mais tout ceci reflète encore une fois constitue une posture défensive : la Russie entretient la représentation qu’elle pourrait être attaquée par les forces de l’OTAN, alors que l’exploitation des ressources arctiques représente désormais environ 10 à 15% de son PIB. Si un théâtre d’opération pouvait nourrir une certaine inquiétude de cet effort russe de réinvestissement militaire, ce serait la Norvège, proche de la Baltique où se font sentir les tensions entre Russie et Occidentaux. Mais précisément, le déclenchement de la guerre en Ukraine a conduit à une diminution des manœuvres navales russes en mer de Norvège tandis que le nombre de patrouilles aériennes est demeuré relativement stable. Du côté de l’Arctique nord-américain, le NORAD a signalé 8 patrouilles russes dans l’ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) de l’Alaska ou du Canada en 2023 ; 12 en 2024 et 8 au 28 octobre 2025. C’est un nombre proche de la moyenne depuis 2007 (environ 12 patrouilles par an), assez peu élevé, avec des postures de vol peu agressives : les vols militaires dans les ADIZ ne sont pas illégaux en regard du droit international et le NORAD estime que ces patrouilles ne constituent en rien un danger. Il n’y a donc clairement pas de posture agressive militaire de la part de la Russie vers les autres régions de l’Arctique, mais un effort réel de modernisation et d’accroissement des capacités de défense. Il est certain que le Canada ne doit pas laisser s’installer dans la durée ses faibles capacités de contrôle, d’observation et de surveillance de son domaine arctique. De même, surtout dans un contexte de tension politique avec la Russie et la Chine, il est important de maintenir une vigilance réelle, de monter des plans contingents dans l’Arctique et de préserver une capacité opérationnelle réelle. L’accroissement de la fréquentation maritime à la faveur des changements climatiques impose une meilleure capacité de contrôle et de réaction, pas seulement pour contrer des menaces militaires, mais surtout pour être en mesure de prévenir les risques d’accidents et de catastrophe environnementale. Le long délai nécessaire (cinq semaines) pour prêter secours au navire-conteneur Thamesborg, échoué dans le Passage du Nord-Ouest le 6 septembre 2025 et qui fit peu de bruit dans les médias canadiens, devrait être instructif à cet effet. Cependant, ces lacunes ne signifient pas que Russes et Chinois cherchent à s‘emparer de l’Arctique canadien. Par ailleurs, le trafic maritime de transit demeure très faible, et le récent buzz médiatique autour du transit d’un porte-conteneur entre la Chine et le Royaume-Uni via la Route maritime du Nord ne saurait masquer le désintérêt de la plupart des compagnies maritimes pour cette activité (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) : en 2024, ce sont 97 navires qui ont transité par la RMN et 31 par le Passage du Nord-ouest (dont seulement 10 navires de commerce), contre plus de 11 000 par Panama et plus de 18 000 par Suez. Pendant ce temps, à Washington… Si certains croient détecter la menace du côté de Moscou et de Beijing, d’autres se tournent plutôt vers le sud. C’est le cas d’Adam Lajeunesse, directeur du Canadian Maritime Security Network, de Stéphane Roussel et, plus récemment, de Franklin Griffiths, professeur émérite à l’Université de Toronto, qui expriment de sérieuses craintes de voir les États-Unis s’en prendre à la souveraineté et à la sécurité de l’Arctique canadien. Outre les tarifs appliqués à plusieurs de ses exportations, la société canadienne a pris bonne note des menaces d’annexion (parfois déguisées en invitations pressantes) et de remise en question du tracé des frontières proférées par le Président Trump. Plus encore, le locataire de la Maison-Blanche a également menacé d’annexer le Groenland et Canal de Panama, quitte à utiliser la force pour y parvenir . Il est impossible de mesurer le sérieux de telles menaces, mais l’hostilité, ou à tout le moins le peu de considération de l’administration Trump pour le Canada, peut justifier la formulation de scénarios plus dangereux, plus immédiats et plus pressants. L’un de ces scénarios concerne l’Arctique canadien. Deux conflits maritimes opposent le Canada aux États-Unis dans cette région : l’un concerne le tracé de la frontière maritime (mer territoriale et ZEE) entre les deux pays en mer de Beaufort, l’autre le statut juridique du Passage du Nord-Ouest, considéré comme des eaux intérieures par le Canada et comme un détroit international par les États-Unis. Dans ce second cas, les craintes engendrées par les traversés des navires SS Manhattan en 1969 et du USGC Polar Sea en 1985 se sont atténuées suite à la signature de l’Accord de Coopération dans l’Arctique entre les deux pays en 1988, même si le sujet revient périodiquement dans les débats sur la sécurité dans l’Arctique canadien. C’est la première administration Trump qui réveille ce vieux démon en 2019, lorsqu’il ordonne la tenue d’une opération de liberté de navigation dans le Nord canadien, opération qui n’aura cependant pas lieu. Ce type d’initiative consiste à envoyer des navires dans des eaux internationales qu’un État revendique comme étant siennes, ceci pour réaffirmer le droit des tiers partis d’y naviguer librement. C’est un tel scénario que Franklin Griffiths imagine dans un avenir rapproché, ce qui aurait pour effet de rendre caduc l’Accord de 1988. Plusieurs raisons pourraient pousser le Président américain à agir ainsi : intimider le Canada pour obtenir des concessions commerciales, économiques (tel un accès à certaines ressources), voire territoriales; désir de déstabiliser un gouvernement avec qui il négocie; et même, pourquoi pas, donner du poids à son projet d’absorption du Canada. Paradoxalement, les scénarios fondés sur une menace chinoise ou russe pourraient servir les visées américaines, puisqu’elles peuvent fournir à l’administration Trump un prétexte pour agir. Les États-Unis pourraient ainsi justifier une initiative contre la souveraineté canadienne en affirmant vouloir préserver celle-ci d’une mainmise de Moscou ou Beijing. Plus encore, une telle action enverrait le signal aux autres puissances que Washington a remis au goût du jour la doctrine Monroe, et que le Canada, comme le reste des Amériques, est de nouveau la chasse gardée des États-Unis. C’est contre une telle « aide » que les Canadiens doivent se prémunir, expliquent Lagassé et Massie (2025). Ce principe voulant que le Canada doive se prémunir contre une aide potentiellement trop envahissante de la part des États-Unis, a été formulé dès les années 1970 par le chercheur  Nils Ørvik (1973), mais c’est probablement la première fois qu’il peut s’appliquer avec tant de pertinence. Le Canada a néanmoins plus de cartes dans son jeu qu’on pourrait le croire. Les États-Unis sont singulièrement pauvres en moyen de naviguer dans l’Arctique, ne disposant que de trois brise-glaces opérationnels (Polar Star, Healy et Storis). Le récent accord conclu avec la Finlande pour la livraison de quatre brise-glaces ne prévoit la livraison du premier bâtiment que d’ici 2028. L’envoi d’une unité militaire qui n’est pas conçue pour affronter des glaces serait extrêmement risqué, au point où les navires américains pourraient avoir besoin d’une aide canadienne – ce qui affaiblirait grandement la portée de l’opération. Une autre menace plane sur l’Arctique canadien. Un coup d’œil à la carte du Nord de l’Amérique révèle combien seraient grandes les conséquences, pour le Canada, d’une annexion du Groenland par les États-Unis. Le Canada se retrouverait presque enclavé par des territoires américains, avec les États-Unis disposant d’un accès direct au Passage du Nord-Ouest. Malgré le maintien des accès océaniques sur les côtes est et ouest, la situation géopolitique du Canada deviendrait très inconfortable. Le risque de voir Washington déclencher une opération de liberté de navigation demeurera pour un avenir prévisible. Le gouvernement canadien doit donc être prêt à réagir rapidement à une éventuelle crise, en déployant symboliquement une ou plusieurs unités de la Marine et de la Garde côtière en réponse à l’initiative américaine. À moyen et long terme, cette posture nécessite de grands investissements tant en matériels qu’en infrastructure et en opération. La manne engendrée par la croissance spectaculaire du budget de la Défense annoncée par le gouvernement Carney offre l’occasion de procéder à ce renforcement. À la nécessité de contrer une éventuelle initiative américaine s’ajoute une autre raison de soutenir la croissance des ressources octroyées aux forces canadiennes pour opérer dans l’Arctique, à savoir l’importance grandissante du rôle des Forces canadiennes comme agence constabulaire et de soutien aux opérations des autres ministères dans la région. Le ministère de la Défense nationale est en effet la seule organisation gouvernementale à avoir les moyens physiques d’opérer dans la région, et donc d’y représenter l’autorité. À cet égard, elles doivent s’assurer du respect des lois et de la prestation de services aux communautés locales, ainsi que de disposer des capacités d’agir en situation d’urgence. Les changements climatiques et l’augmentation des activités humaines dans la région qui pourrait bien en découler (exploitation des ressources, navigation, tourisme) ne font qu’accentuer la demande pour les services gouvernementaux. Plus encore, la réalisation de cette mission complète et renforce celle visant à affirmer la souveraineté de l’État canadien dans la région, dans la mesure où tous deux passent par une présence officielle efficace et ostensible. On peut bien prétendre que les efforts de défense dans l’Arctique canadien visent à contrer les menaces russe ou chinoise, et que ces efforts seraient insuffisants. Agiter la perte de souveraineté et de territoire peut constituer un bon slogan, mais cette crainte est rarement conseillère d’une politique arctique cohérente et rigoureuse. Dans les faits, en veillant sur son territoire, c’est contre l’ « aide » américaine que se défend d’abord le Canada. [1] La seule exception étant lorsque Washington a publié sa revendication en 2023, ce que Moscou a contesté, non pas tant le tracé de l’espace maritime ainsi revendiqué par les États-Unis, mais parce que pour Moscou –  et le point est crédible – Washington ne peut se prévaloir de l’article 76 de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer si les É-U n’ont pas ratifié ladite convention. ## La stratégie arctique du Département de la Force aérienne des États-Unis et les répercussions pour le Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-strategie-arctique-du-departement-de-la-force-aerienne-des-etats-unis-et-les-repercussions-pour-le-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Le pivot des États-Unis vers l'Arctique aura des implications pour le Canada en particulier, surtout en ce qui concerne le NORAD, ainsi qu'en général pour les alliés de l'OTAN dans l'Arctique. Les États-Unis ont conclu que l'Arctique est maintenant l'une des régions les plus importantes du monde sur le plan géostratégique. La Maison Blanche a publié un certain nombre de stratégies pour l'Arctique, y compris la toute première stratégie arctique du département américain de l'Air Force. Le pivot des États-Unis vers l'Arctique aura des implications pour le Canada en particulier, surtout en ce qui concerne le NORAD, ainsi qu'en général pour les alliés de l'OTAN dans l'Arctique. Contexte Le souhait du Canada est devenu réalité. Pendant des années, les États-Unis ont semblé ignorer complètement l'Arctique, oubliant même qu'ils étaient un État arctique. Le Canada a dû convaincre les États-Unis de se joindre au Conseil de l'Arctique en 1996. En arrière-plan, le NORAD surveillait régulièrement l'Arctique, et le Canada et les États-Unis s'y exerçaient, quoique plus tactiquement que stratégiquement, et sur de courtes périodes de temps. Près de vingt-cinq ans plus tard, les États-Unis ont conclu que l'Arctique est désormais l’une des régions géostratégiques les plus importantes au monde. Rapidement, les États-Unis ont publié davantage de stratégies pour l'Arctique, y compris la toute première stratégie pour l’Arctique du Département américain de la Force aérienne. Qu'est-ce que cette stratégie laisse présager pour l'avenir, et plus particulièrement pour le Canada ? Que suggèrent la création de la Force spatiale américaine et le Plan de commandement unifié des États-Unis pour le Canada ? Est-ce que le Canada regrettera ou se réjouira de l’attention accrue que les États-Unis portent à l'Arctique ? La stratégie « Étoile du nord » de la Force aérienne Officiellement lancée le 21 juillet 2020, la stratégie arctique de l'United States Air Force (USAF), baptisée « Étoile du nord », comporte quatre axes : 1) la vigilance dans tous les domaines d’opération ; 2) la projection de puissance grâce à une force crédible de combat ; 3) la coopération avec les alliés et les partenaires ; 4) la préparation aux opérations en Arctique. Les axes 1 et 3 concernent le Canada, les alliés de l'OTAN et les partenaires et seront mis de l’avant. Les axes 2 et 4 amèneront le Canada à repenser sa stratégie en Arctique. Comme l’a soutenu Lindsay Rodman, la stratégie arctique du Pentagone de 2019 a marqué un tournant pour les États-Unis dans l’Arctique et a ouvert la porte à une assistance alliée accrue. La stratégie Étoile du nord contribue à consolider ce tournant et souligne l’importance pour les alliés et les partenaires, y compris les peuples autochtones, de travailler ensemble compte tenu de l’infrastructure limitée et de la vaste géographie. L’interopérabilité est donc essentielle. Étoile du nord met également en évidence l'importance et le rôle de l'espace en tant que domaine particulièrement important pour l'Arctique. Le Canada peut s'attendre à plus d'occasions de s’exercer dans l'Arctique (et pendant de plus longues périodes) et que les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) suivent le nouveau rythme imposé par les États-Unis lorsqu’ils s’engageront dans cette région. Compte tenu des conditions de fonctionnement et de la géographie difficiles du pôle arctique, qui limitent l'utilité des radars au sol, les satellites spatiaux sont essentiels pour donner une meilleure image de ce qui se passe au sol, dans et sur les océans, ainsi que dans l’espace aérien. L'air et l'espace sont essentiels en Arctique, car ce sont les voies d'accès les plus rapides. Dans de nombreux cas, ce sont également les seuls moyens de déployer rapidement et avec précision le personnel. Ce que Étoile du nord souligne, cependant, c'est que les alliés ne peuvent plus penser à opérer dans un seul domaine à la fois : l'air, l'aérospatial, l'espace, le cyberespace, le maritime, le terrestre et même l'espace cognitif (opérations de réflexion, de propagande et de désinformation) doivent être considérés conjointement. C'est l'objet de l'étude binationale Évolution de la défense de l’Amérique du Nord (EvoNAD) de la Commission permanente mixte de défense. L'époque où le personnel de la marine, par exemple, se concentrait uniquement sur l'environnement maritime est révolue. Il est nécessaire d’établir une coopération interservice, de manière conjointe avec les alliés et dans tous les domaines. En effet, la surveillance, le commandement et le contrôle, la communication et le ciblage mutuel dans tous les domaines sont les nouveaux objectifs des États-Unis auxquels les alliés seront pressés de suivre et de contribuer. Pourquoi l'Arctique et pourquoi maintenant ? L'USAF a déjà envisagé une stratégie pour l'Arctique, mais ce n’est que tout récemment qu'elle s'est concrétisée. L'une des raisons est que la Force spatiale – désormais active au sein du Département de la Force aérienne – sera le générateur de force des experts spatiaux pour le USPACECOM en particulier, mais aussi pour le USNORTHCOM et le NORAD et pour d'autres commandements de combat. Le USNORTHCOM est chargé à la fois de surveiller et de vaincre les menaces spatiales entrantes. Le NORAD n'assiste quant à lui qu’en matière d’alerte. Dans les deux cas, davantage d'experts spatiaux seront forcément utiles, en particulier dans un contexte arctique, avec moins de moyens de surveillance. L'autre raison du moment choisi pour Étoile du nord est que l'Arctique est divisé entre trois commandements géographiques de combat (USNORTHCOM, EUCOM et INDOPACOM). Les insuffisances entre ces commandements peuvent être exploitées par les concurrents. Une vue et une approche globales de l'Arctique contribuent à réduire l'importance de ces faiblesses. La USAF et la Force spatiale ne possèdent aucune fonction opérationnelle, mais elles opèrent à travers les filières de commandement. Le personnel militaire canadien peut ainsi s'attendre à travailler avec le personnel de la Force spatiale à l'avenir, en particulier dans le cadre d'exercices et d'opérations impliquant l'Arctique. On s'attend également à ce que les alliés et les partenaires puissent s'assurer que les données arrivent et soient analysées de façon pertinente, ce qui signifie que la rapidité, l'exactitude et le contexte du processus et des informations et des renseignements fournis par les alliés contribueront, d’une certaine manière, aux priorités des États-Unis. Ceci soulève la question suivante : le Canada peut-il suivre, contribuer et agir face à cette nouvelle façon de penser la surveillance commune de tous les domaines ? Alors que beaucoup focalisent sur la nécessité de moderniser le Système d'alerte du nord (SAN), le lancement d’Étoile du nord et l'inclusion de l'espace comme élément important de la stratégie suggèrent qu'une révision de l'architecture militaire américaine est en cours et, avec elle, une nouvelle doctrine qui pourrait avoir un impact monumental pour le Canada – au premier rang desquelles la participation du Canada au NORAD et son avenir. La Force spatiale comme pression sur le Canada ? Étant donné que la surveillance multi-domaines est le nouvel objectif, l'espace devient un élément rassembleur et une solution pour réduire les faiblesses existantes. Les ressources spatiales peuvent accéder à tous les domaines en même temps. Les radars terrestres dans l'Arctique, par exemple, peuvent être configurés pour voir l'espace aérien, mais pas l’espace terrestre, aérien, aérospatial et maritime à la fois – la courbure de la terre et la superficie du territoire à surveiller sont technologiquement insurmontables aujourd'hui. De l'espace, cependant, une zone beaucoup plus grande peut être captée avec de plus en plus de précision. Le Canada dispose d’une très petite direction spatiale au sein des FAC. En fait, la plupart des experts spatiaux résident à l’Agence spatiale canadienne et sont des civils. De toute évidence, le Canada a un vif intérêt pour la technologie spatiale. La Constellation Radarsat, par exemple, fournit des informations vitales à une pléthore de ministères canadiens et à leurs alliés. Et, pour la toute première fois, les FAC ont envoyé un officier général au Commandement spatial de la USAF (USAFSPC). Le brigadier-général K.G. Whale a été nommé à un nouveau poste de commandant adjoint des plans, USAFSPC, à Colorado Springs, ce qui suggère que les FAC sont déjà en train de prépositionner le personnel clé dans l'architecture spatiale américaine. Le commandement des plans est le meilleur endroit pour avoir un aperçu des façons actuelles et futures de penser la stratégie et les opérations. Il s’agit là d’une excellente décision logistique. Le NORAD va vouloir de plus en plus d'informations fournies par les moyens spatiaux pour suivre le rythme des nouvelles activités dans l'Arctique. La Force spatiale américaine disposera à l'avenir de 16 000 personnes dont elle pourra tirer parti en créant des synergies et des opportunités de formation et de recrutement très spécialisée à long terme. Étant donné que le Canada ne peut pas créer des experts spatiaux du jour au lendemain, et que la taille limitée des FAC limite la possibilité d’une force spatiale distincte, une solution consisterait à détacher du personnel civil de l'Agence spatiale canadienne auprès du NORAD pour maintenir le Canada engagé dans les nouveaux développements en matière de surveillance, de suivi et de ciblage. Après tout, la Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) des États-Unis envoie des civils travailler au QG du NORAD depuis 2002. Que les experts ne portent pas d’uniformes militaires n'est pas important ; ce qui est nécessaire, c'est l'expertise et le savoir, en particulier dans le domaine spatial axé sur la surveillance et l'évitement / l'atténuation des débris spatiaux. La recherche de surveillance dans tous les domaines suggère que le plan de commandement unifié (UCP) actuel des États-Unis est appelé à changer et que l'Arctique est l’une des causes de ce changement. Actuellement, 11 commandements – 6 géographiques et 5 fonctionnels – ont évolué depuis 1946. L'un des changements les plus importants de l'UCP a eu lieu en 1986 pour corriger les rivalités entre les services attribuées aux échecs au Vietnam, à la crise des otages en Iran et à l'intervention américaine en Grenade. La loi Goldwater-Nichols exigeait que les commandants des troupes combattantes se rapportent directement au Secrétaire à la Défense plutôt qu’aux chefs de service afin de promouvoir la collaboration entre l’armée de terre, la marine, les marines et l’armée de l’air, et non pas en fonction des hiérarchies de chaque arme. La solution était de créer des commandements géographiques qui exigeaient que les divers services travaillent ensemble. En revanche, diviser le monde en grande régions de commandements amène son lot de lacunes, notamment pour l’Arctique. Ajoutée à cela la nécessité de considérer tous les domaines ensemble, plutôt que séparément, une restructuration des commandements paraît nécessaire. Et tout comme la création du USNORTHCOM signifiait une remise en question du NORAD ainsi que de l’ancien Commandement Canada (maintenant Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada), il en sera de même pour l’UCP. La Force spatiale, le Cyber ​​Command et, sans aucun doute, un groupe de travail dans le domaine cognitif feront pression sur les alliés des États-Unis pour combler leurs lacunes et contribuer à la stratégie globale américaine en cette nouvelle ère de concurrence entre les grandes puissances. Le Canada dispose d’un avantage certain : les membres du personnel canadien sont les adjoints de plusieurs commandements et flottes du système militaire américain et la récente nomination du BGén Whale au USSPACECOM n’est qu’une autre nomination judicieuse. Toutefois, des postes ponctuels pourraient ne pas suffire à l'avenir dans certains domaines, notamment lorsque le nombre, la diversité et l'étendue des effectifs deviennent importants. Étant donné que les États-Unis sont clairement plus intéressés par l'Arctique et voudront surpasser les capacités de leurs adversaires potentiels, des exercices de longue durée dans l'Arctique (comme Juncture 2018 en Norvège, mais plus étendus) sont probables à l'avenir. Le Canada est limité en personnel, mais une possibilité serait que quelques forces d’opérations spéciales canadiennes se joignent aux marines norvégiennes, britanniques et américaines pour s’entrainer à tour de rôle pendant quatre mois en Norvège l’hiver. Une autre serait de souligner l’importance de la mission d’alerte du NORAD – elle pourrait être essentielle pour aider la deuxième flotte nouvellement reconstituée dans l’espace vulnérable Groenland-Islande-Royaume-Uni-Norvège. Le cadre commun des opérations maritimes du Canada est vital pour le NORAD et ses partenaires du Five Eyes. À l'avenir, il est probable que le Groenland rejoigne le NORAD dans une certaine mesure – si ce n'est que pour le positionnement stratégique vital de la base de l'armée de l'air de Thulé et de ses centres de missiles balistiques BMEW – pour concevoir un cadre maritime étendu auquel il pourrait contribuer pour une meilleure compréhension des navires d’intérêt se rapprochant de l'Amérique du Nord. En effet, comme Jim Fergusson et moi le soutenons depuis plusieurs années, la logique fonctionnelle qui a motivé la création du NORAD – c'est-à-dire que l'espace aérien de l'Amérique du Nord était indivisible – est le cas pour tous les domaines. La stratégie Étoile du nord laisse présager une doctrine militaire plus fonctionnelle à l'avenir – une doctrine qui met l’accent sur les domaines plutôt que sur la géographie. On peut dès lors s’attendre à une augmentation du recrutement au Canada pour des experts spatiaux, cyber et cognitifs, y compris de personnels civils. Compte tenu de l’attention portée à l’Arctique, la contribution du Canada aux opérations discrétionnaires ailleurs dans le monde pourrait devoir être réduite. Après tout, les deux premières priorités de défense sont le Canada et l'Amérique du Nord. Enseignements tirés de l'attention accrue des États-Unis dans d'autres domaines Bien sûr, le Canada a déjà dû faire face à la pression de « suivre » la création du USCYBERCOM.  Ce dernier permettra au Canada de tirer des enseignements sur ce à quoi il peut s’attendre compte tenu de l’évolution de l’architecture militaire et des priorités des États-Unis. Deux facteurs récents suggèrent que la création de la Force spatiale et de la dernière stratégie pour l’Arctique pourrait accroître les attentes des États-Unis concernant les engagements et la contribution des alliés dans le domaine spatial, et que ces attentes seront plus élevées que dans le domaine du cyberespace. Le premier facteur, bien sûr, est la concurrence croissante entre les puissances et la vulnérabilité apparente des États-Unis, en particulier vis-à-vis de la Chine. Lorsque le Cyber Command a été créé en 2008 (en tant que commandement sous-unifié sous USSTRATCOM, puis en tant qu’arrangement bivalent entre la NSA et le USCYBERCOM), le monde se remettait de la récession globale et la Chine et la Russie n’étaient pas les préoccupations qu’elles sont aujourd’hui. De plus, les sanctions semblaient limiter les ambitions nucléaires et cyber de l’Iran et de la Corée du Nord.  Aujourd’hui, les États-Unis sont beaucoup plus préoccupés par les capacités de la Russie et de la Chine ainsi que par leurs intentions de remodeler l’ordre mondial libéral. Si les États-Unis veulent maintenir leur supériorité militaire, ils doivent dépasser les capacités de leurs concurrents et planifier la façon de dissuader un changement de l’ordre actuel. Bien que le Canada exprime également des préoccupations au sujet de la Chine et de la Russie, la politique de défense Protection, Sécurité, Engagement de 2017 est plus silencieuse lorsqu’il s’agit de porter des accusations. Cependant, le Canada a noté que le domaine du cyberespace nécessitait une plus grande attention en raison de son importance pour les États-Unis. Le Canada a d’ailleurs créé la profession de cyberopérateur en 2017. Au même moment, le président Trump a élevé le USCYBERCOM au statut de commandement de combat unifié (fonctionnel). Il utilise principalement du personnel provenant des composantes cyber de différents services de l’armée. En clair, le personnel vient au CYBERCOM prêt à travailler; il s’agit de postes opérationnels et non d’entrainement. En revanche, au sein de la Force spatiale, il s’agit principalement de former du personnel, ce qui nous amène au deuxième facteur pouvant exercer une pression sur le Canada. La Force spatiale forme et exerce des experts spatiaux pour qu’ils soient affectés au sein des commandements et des forces armées – il s’agit donc d’accroître le nombre d’experts de l’espace. Compte tenu de cette orientation, le Canada ressentira probablement plus de pression d’imiter le fonctionnement américain en la matière, parce que la création de postes et la formation sont concentrées dans l’Aviation royale canadienne (ARC) plutôt que dans plusieurs services militaires, comme c’est le cas pour le cyber. L’ARC est intimement liée au NORAD, qui lui est lié au USNORTHCOM et au pivot américain vers l’Arctique. Conclusion Compte tenu de l’importance des ressources spatiales pour assurer la surveillance de tous les domaines dans l’Arctique, et compte tenu de la concurrence croissante entre grandes puissances, les alliés des États-Unis peuvent s’attendre à ce que les États-Unis accordent de plus en plus d’attention à l’Arctique et préfèrent le domaine spatial pour offrir davantage d’options de surveillance. Ceci sera plus particulièrement le cas du Canada compte tenu de la désuétude du SAN et du temps considérable qu’il faudra pour créer un remplaçant multisystème.  Étant donné que le NORAD a une mission vitale d’alerte aérospatiale axée principalement sur les accès à l’Arctique, le Canada serait avisé de prêter attention à la Stratégie pour l’Arctique de la USAF et d’envisager des moyens de générer plus d’experts spatiaux (et du cyberespace) afin de demeurer un allié fiable.   Les forces interarmées visent l’intégration des services nationaux – Armée de l’air, Armée de terre, Marine – dans une structure de commandement holistique. Les forces combinées se rapportent à l’intégration des forces alliées. Ainsi, le NORAD devrait être considéré comme forces combinées, ce qui est évident dans le développement d’un Commandement des composantes aériennes des Forces combinées (CCFC) au NORAD. La révélation que la Russie a libéré un satellite à l’intérieur d’un satellite soulève d’ailleurs des inquiétudes quant à une capacité spatiale de plus en plus offensive.    En effet, on se demande à quel moment une Force cyber sera nécessaire pour aider à la génération de force. Cependant, les rivalités entre les services et les arguments que le cyberespace est différent des autres domaines joueront contre la création d’une Force cyber jusqu’à ce qu’il y ait une refonte de l’UCP similaire à Goldwater-Nichols. À titre d’exemple, les États-Unis participent au projet de radar polaire over-the-Horizon de Recherche et développement de la Défense du Canada (RDDC) et au Programme scientifique et technologique de sensibilisation à la situation et à tous les domaines. ## La Stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada : promesses, angles morts et arbitrages URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-strategie-industrielle-de-defense-du-canada-promesses-angles-morts-et-arbitrages/ Modified: 2026-02-25 Rediffusion | Webinaire du mercredi 18 février 2026 Retour sur la Stratégie Industrielle de Défense du Canada. Présentée par Justin Massie et Philippe Lagassé. Une discussion modérée par Anne-Caroline Desplanques. ## La stratégie turque et iranienne dans l’approvisionnement de drones en Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-strategie-turque-et-iranienne-dans-lapprovisionnement-de-drones-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > L’approvisionnement militaire turc et iranien aux forces armées russes et ukrainiennes est visible par la présence de drones TB2, Mohajer et Shahed 136 sur le champ de bataille. Ce soutien stratégique et militaire désavoué par Téhéran et Ankara n’est pas exclusivement le symptôme d’une alliance sécuritaire ou encore d’une coopération militaire. L’approvisionnement militaire turc et iranien aux forces armées russes et ukrainiennes est visible par la présence de drones TB2, Mohajer et Shahed 136 sur le champ de bataille. Ce soutien stratégique et militaire désavoué par Téhéran et Ankara n’est pas exclusivement le symptôme d’une alliance sécuritaire ou encore d’une coopération militaire. L’approvisionnement en drones représente en fait de véritables paris politiques et géopolitiques pour Erdogan et Raïssi. Les deux dirigeants se retrouvent dans des situations de fragilité interne. La Turquie en raison d’un autoritarisme politique critiqué et d’une crise économique sans précédent, l’Iran en raison de son isolement international mais surtout du récent mouvement de révolte émanant de sa société civile. Le soutien que le pouvoir turc et iranien apporte tant à Kyev qu’à Moscou leur permettent de capitaliser politiquement sur ces drones afin de faire prévaloir leurs intérêts géopolitiques et économiques sur la scène régionale et internationale. À travers son fournissement en drones TB2 aux forces ukrainiennes, Ankara assure sa position dite d’équilibriste qui lui est nécessaire pour confirmer son alignement avec l’OTAN et contrecarrer l’influence russe en mer Noire tout en conservant le dialogue ouvert avec la Russie pour des raisons économiques et géopolitiques. Dans l’optique d’élections législatives et présidentielles en juin 2023, le positionnement d’équilibriste d’Erdogan a pour objectif de renforcer l’assise du président turc à l’interne en redorant son image. Les drones Mohajer et Shahed 136 iraniens fournis aux forces russes permet à Téhéran d’espérer obtenir des contreparties en Syrie où l’Iran cherche à établir un corridor direct entre Téhéran et Beyrouth et en Asie centrale ou le pouvoir iranien est déstabilisé par l’Azerbaïdjan et ses alliés. Le soutien apporté aux forces russes permet aux Iraniens de développer leurs technologies de drones mais plus largement de rééquilibrer les rapports de forces avec ses ses opposants régionaux (Israël notamment) et donc de renforcer son axe de résistance au Moyen-Orient. Introduction L’implication iranienne et turque dans le conflit ukrainien à travers un approvisionnement en drones militaire aux forces armées russes et ukrainiennes a été fortement médiatisée et interroge les incitatifs turcs et iraniens derrière leurs soutiens respectifs aux deux belligérants. Amorcé en 2016 au travers d’un accord de coopération militaire, le rapprochement stratégique entre l’Ukraine et la Turquie s’est accéléré en 2019 avec la signature d’un contrat de 69 millions de dollars entre Baykar Marina et Ukrspetsproekt portant sur l’achat de drones : l’Ukraine est alors devenue un des premiers importateurs de drones Bayraktar TB2. Ces échanges commerciaux ont permis à l’Ukraine au début de l’invasion russe en février 2022 d’avoir une flotte initiale de 24 drones de combat. Du côté russe, selon les informations fournies par les Américains, la première livraison de drones iraniens de type Shahed-136 et Mohajer aurait été menée fin août 2022. La communauté internationale observe par la suite dès le mois de septembre leur apparition sur le champ de bataille ukrainien. Les drones iraniens sont peu sophistiqués, mais leur faible coût (environ 20 000 dollars) représente un avantage évident pour les Russes : user l’arrière-front ukrainien et bénéficier d’un relatif rééquilibrage à moindre coût[1]. En effet, à travers des effets cumulatifs les Russes espèrent fragiliser l’arrière-front ukrainien selon une logique d’usure. Ce double approvisionnement de la part de l’Iran et de la Turquie suit évidemment des logiques économiques : en effet, le déploiement de leurs technologies sur un théâtre conflictuel leur permet de perfectionner celles-ci, mais aussi d’acquérir une plus grande crédibilité en tant qu’exportateur de drones et in fine d’augmenter leurs parts de marché. Cependant, la volonté turque de se distancer de l’exportation des drones en Ukraine depuis février 2022 ou encore la non-reconnaissance des Iraniens d’avoir approvisionné les Russes pendant la guerre montre que la décision d’approvisionner ou non un belligérant revêt plusieurs enjeux (géo)politiques. Par conséquent, excepté les considérations économiques, quels sont les incitatifs politiques qui déterminent l’approvisionnement de drones iraniens et turcs en Ukraine ? Dans quelle mesure les stratégies politiques qui ont déterminé l’approvisionnement turc et iranien diffèrent-elles ? Dans une première partie, nous aborderons les incitatifs politiques turcs, mais aussi les gains géopolitiques qu’espère retirer Erdogan dans l’optique de l’échéance électorale de juin 2023. Dans une deuxième partie, nous reviendrons sur les motivations iraniennes derrière l’approvisionnement de drones à la Russie et nous démontrerons que les priorités extérieures de l’Iran ont favorisé son appui aux forces armées russes dans le conflit en Ukraine. Les motivations turques derrière l’approvisionnement de l’Ukraine en TB2 Durant les premiers mois de la guerre en Ukraine, les Bayraktar TB2 bénéficient rapidement d’une importante popularité et sont érigés comme symbole de la résistance ukrainienne en raison de leurs faits d’armes. En effet, la surprenante désorganisation des troupes russes et l’absence d’une véritable campagne aérienne russe visant à établir la domination dans le domaine aérien au début de la guerre ont permis à ces drones de s’illustrer et d’amenuiser les stocks armés du Kremlin. Ces drones ne constituent pas « l’arme secrète » des Ukrainiens et ne permettront pas à eux seuls de repousser les Russes hors des frontières ukrainiennes. Cependant, ils ont permis de freiner l’avancée des troupes russes et de soutenir la contre-offensive ukrainienne. Ce succès militaire permet à la Turquie de renforcer sa crédibilité technologique et politique à plusieurs égards. En effet, les résultats des TB2 sur le champ de bataille ukrainien attirent de nouveaux clients, mais permettent surtout à Ankara de capitaliser politiquement sur cette technologie. Le fournissement de TB2 confirme une proximité stratégique entre Kyiv et Ankara malgré sa relation fluide avec la Russie. Ses relations de coopération avec les deux pays lui ont imposé un positionnement dit d’« équilibriste » et répondent à un intérêt de politique interne : la réélection d’Erdogan et de l’AKP lors des prochaines élections présidentielles et législatives en juin 2023. La volonté d’Erdogan d’assurer la continuité de son pouvoir autoritaire en 2023, lui impose de ménager tant les intérêts ukrainiens et russes pour des raisons géopolitiques et économiques. Premièrement, la coopération entre les Turcs et les Ukrainiens répond à une inquiétude commune, celle d’une potentielle suprématie russe en mer Noire. L’accès que celle-ci offre à la mer Méditerranée la rend stratégique, notamment pour le volume des exportations d’hydrocarbures et de produits agricoles des pays riverains qui y transitent. En effet, l’Ukraine et la Russie sont les deux plus grands exportateurs de céréales et empruntent la mer Noire pour acheminer leurs exportations. Ainsi, la Turquie qui retire de nombreux avantages économiques et politiques de son contrôle des détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles s’inquiète des récentes manœuvres russes autour de cette zone maritime. Celles-ci visent à désenclaver Moscou par un accès aux mers chaudes et notamment à la Méditerranée en renforçant le positionnement russe en mer Noire. Effectivement, l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 a procuré à la Russie une zone maritime trois fois plus grande en mer Noire. Ses opérations de déstabilisation en Géorgie à travers tant son intervention militaire en 2008 en Ossétie du Sud ou encore lors de campagnes de propagande massive lors d’élections législatives en 2020 démontrent un important intérêt à déstabiliser un autre État côtier de la zone. Ce révisionnisme présage pour Ankara un relatif encerclement et une suprématie russe sur cet espace riche en hydrocarbures. Désormais, l’acquisition supplémentaire de territoires littoraux ukrainiens pourrait accorder à Moscou une suprématie en mer Noire et imposerait une situation de quasi-bipolarité (exception faite de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie) qui ne sera pas en faveur des intérêts sécuritaires et économiques turcs. La coopération entre Kyev et Ankara est donc renforcée par la lutte contre les aspirations russes en mer Noire, mais aussi par l’expression turque d’une sensibilité pour les Tatars de Crimée notamment depuis 2014. Ce rapprochement a facilité l’intensification d’une collaboration en matière d’armements et devient en 2019 un partenariat stratégique s’articulant essentiellement autour des drones turcs.  Ces échanges commerciaux ont permis à l’Ukraine de renforcer, pour un temps, ses capacités dissuasives et défensives face à l’agressivité de la Russie. Cela a également permis à Kyev de bénéficier d’un appui turc dans sa volonté d’adhésion à l’OTAN. Pour la Turquie, ce rapprochement renforce son positionnement dans l’OTAN et lui permet potentiellement de faire prévaloir ses intérêts malgré une politique étrangère agressive en Syrie ou encore certaines tensions avec les États-Unis suite à l’achat par Ankara de missiles anti-aériens russes S-400 et l’achat de gaz russe en roubles. De fait, la Turquie parvient à assurer son alignement avec ses alliés de l’OTAN via son approvisionnement en drones tout en conservant ses liens économiques avec la Russie. En effet, Ankara a su préserver le dialogue avec le Kremlin malgré son invasion du territoire ukrainien à partir de février 2022. Ce positionnement dit « d’équilibriste » est d’autant plus surprenant que la Turquie et la Russie ont à de nombreuses reprises démontré d’importantes divergences géopolitiques en Syrie, en Libye, mais aussi dans le Caucase. Ce paradoxe résidant dans les liens turco-russes est qualifié de connivences pragmatiques. Plus concrètement, la Turquie et la Russie cultivent des liens qui ne constituent pas des alliances engageantes et coûteuses, mais qui leur permettent : « de contrôler un moment l’agenda international, de peser sur la scène diplomatique mondiale, de contraindre les autres et d’obtenir des résultats immédiats ». Deuxièmement, le positionnement actuel d’Erdogan lui permet de conserver ses liens économiques avec la Russie qui représente le troisième partenaire commercial de la Turquie.  Cette forte activité économique entre les deux pays ne permet pas à la Turquie de se priver de ce partenaire commercial et donc d’appliquer les sanctions occidentales contre la Russie compte tenu du marasme économique turc actuel caractérisé par une inflation dépassant sur un an 80% et une baisse de 44% de la livre turque par rapport au dollar en 2021. D’un point de vue géopolitique, la Turquie a besoin de conserver ses liens avec la Russie qui domine l’espace aérien syrien pour qu'Ankara établisse sa « zone de sécurité » de 30 km de large le long de sa frontière sud en Syrie. En effet, bien que la projection russe en Syrie soit menacée par le rapport de forces en Ukraine, les forces aérospatiales russes (VKS) sont encore fortement présente dans le nord-est de la Syrie. La volonté russe d’établir un système de défense dans la région de Qamishli (zone kurde) confirme la présence russe sur le long terme et in fine donne un levier de pression à Poutine sur Erdogan. La Turquie a lancé entre 2016 et 2019 trois opérations dans le nord de la Syrie contre les Kurdes, notamment contre la coalition des forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS) soutenues par Washington et auparavant par une coalition internationale pour reprendre Kobané à l’État islamique en 2015. La Russie avait déjà toléré les trois dernières interventions militaires turques au nord de la Syrie même si le Kremlin cherche à éviter la division du territoire syrien en zones d’influence. Le 13 novembre 2022 un attentat à Istanbul est attribué par le pouvoir turc au PKK (Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan) et à l’YPG (Unités de protection du peuple) et Erdogan a depuis lancé l’offensive « Griffe épée » dans le nord de la Syrie et de l’Irak. Les Kurdes pourtant alliés de Washington appellent les Russes et non les Américains à freiner les Turcs dans leur volonté d’offensive terrestre. En d’autres termes, si la Turquie souhaite poursuivre ses attaques contre le FDS pour assurer la mise en place de sa « zone de sécurité » sur son flanc sud, elle doit s’assurer que la Russie ne s’y oppose pas pour éviter les bombardements russes sur les troupes turques. L’implication turque en Ukraine a donc répondu à des intérêts de politique interne. Erdogan avec sa position dite d’équilibriste tente de soutirer des gains économiques et sécuritaires en mer Noire et en Syrie afin de redorer son image sur la scène interne turque et favoriser sa réélection et celle de son parti. En effet, l’opposition civile turque grandit et s’exaspère tant du marasme économique que de l’autoritarisme politique, ce qui pourrait menacer l’assise du pouvoir d’Erdogan et de l’AKP lors des futures élections. Les motivations iraniennes derrière l’approvisionnement de drones Mohajer et Shahed 136 La volonté iranienne de fournir des drones à la Russie répond quant à elle à des considérations principalement géopolitiques. Il s’agit de renforcer l’Iran à l’externe tant en développant son « axe de résistance chiite » au Moyen-Orient qu’en protégeant ses intérêts en Asie centrale. Ces aspirations régionales ont pour but de contrecarrer toute tentative extérieure de déstabilisation du régime dans un contexte de fragilisation du pouvoir. L’Iran a tout intérêt de soutenir les Russes dans leur guerre en Ukraine tant pour éviter que le pouvoir russe subisse un revers trop coûteux politiquement, mais aussi pour confirmer un rapprochement stratégique entre les deux pays. Historiquement, le soutien iranien répond à une évidente proximité idéologique avec le pouvoir russe. Dès l’instauration de la République islamique d’Iran, les officiels perçoivent l’environnement international comme lui étant hostile et donc menaçant pour sa survie. Cette perception se nourrit et est favorisée par un anti-occidentalisme virulent. Cependant, après des décennies d’isolement sur la scène internationale en raison de sa stratégie « Neither East nor West », l’Iran opte en 2005 pour une stratégie « Look to the East Policy » (Nagah be Shargh) formulée par Ari Larijani[2]. Malgré les tentatives sous le président modéré Rohani de se rapprocher de l’Occident avec l’établissement du Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) à partir de 2015, l’Iran n’a jamais vraiment abandonné sa volonté de favoriser ses liens avec l’ « Est », et de témoigner son sentiment d’appartenance eurasien commun à la Russie. Le long processus d’adhésion de l’Iran à l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai qui a obtenu son statut de membre permanent en septembre 2022 l’illustre. De plus, l’Iran n’a pas hésité à violer la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité 2231, qui lui interdisait de fournir de l’armement militaire jusqu’en 2023 (constituant un des fondements du JCPOA) malgré la reprise des négociations pour le rétablissement de l’accord en avril 2021. Ainsi, la livraison de matériel militaire à la Russie en Ukraine témoigne d’un ancrage iranien à l’« Est[3] » indéniable faisant fi du risque d’abandonner définitivement sa réintégration dans le système international. Outre la proximité idéologique entre les deux États qui pourraient expliquer cet approvisionnement, le renforcement de leur coopération répond également à des intérêts sécuritaires et stratégiques iraniens. L’approvisionnement de drones à la Russie permet à Téhéran de renforcer un allié russe ce qui lui évite un isolement sur la scène internationale, mais permet aussi de contourner les sanctions occidentales visant à étouffer l’économie iranienne. Parallèlement cette coopération lui offre également des potentiels leviers de pression sur le dossier syrien vis-à-vis de la Russie et favorise l’implantation de sa stratégie eurasiatique[4]. En effet, la Russie est historiquement l’hégémon en Asie centrale. La Chine y développe cependant son influence depuis plusieurs années, notamment à travers la Belt and Road Initiative. Dans ce contexte, et compte tenu du rapprochement entre Bakou et Tel Aviv, Téhéran est forcé d’appuyer sa stratégie eurasiatique sur les Russes afin de favoriser ses intérêts, y compris par extension dans le Caucase, où les conflits se dégèlent depuis plus de deux ans. Dès 2020, lors de l’éclatement de la guerre au Karabakh, un affrontement indirect est perçu entre l’Azerbaïdjan et l’Iran. Erevan était soutenu par les forces armées iraniennes et Bakou par la Turquie, mais aussi par Israël. Aussi, la victoire éclair de l’Azerbaïdjan sur l’Arménie permise notamment par la fourniture de drones Bayraktar TB2 turcs a été vécue comme une humiliation tant par les Arméniens que par le pouvoir iranien. L’approvisionnement actuel de drones à la Russie dans le cadre du conflit en Ukraine permet ainsi d’envoyer un signal clair de dissuasion à la Turquie et à Israël : celui d’un rattrapage technologique indéniable en matière de drones. L’envoi par les Russes de matériel militaire occidental capturé sur le terrain ukrainien participe à ce dessein iranien de modernisation militaire et offre également une contrepartie à Téhéran en échange de ses drones. Parallèlement les tensions avec Bakou se sont récemment encore intensifiées suite aux déclarations d’Ilham Aliyev concernant l’instauration du corridor Zangezur, qui connectera directement l’Azerbaïdjan à la Turquie (en passant par la république autonome du Nakhitchevan, mais aussi par le territoire arménien) excluant de fait l’Iran de l’itinéraire. Ce projet est d’autant plus considéré comme dangereux par les Iraniens en raison des liens économiques et militaires entre Israël et l’Azerbaïdjan. La présence soupçonnée par Téhéran de troupes israéliennes sur le sol azéri renforce ici également le sentiment de « citadelle assiégée »[5] par le pouvoir iranien. Pour faire pression sur Bakou et freiner son rapprochement avec Israël, l’Iran souhaite contrecarrer le projet du corridor Zangezur (toujours en construction) en promouvant le corridor de transport international golfe Persique-mer noire (ITC). L’exclusion de l’Azerbaïdjan de ce corridor ne lui permettrait pas de bénéficier significativement du transport et du commerce international en Asie centrale et aurait probablement de lourds coûts politiques. Évidemment, pour renforcer la prééminence de l’ITC et sa crédibilité sur le futur Zangzur, les Iraniens doivent bénéficier du soutien de la Russie. En effet, Moscou détient une plus grande force de pression sur la Turquie et sur Israël, les deux principaux pays qui soutiennent Bakou dans son projet d’isoler l’Iran en Asie centrale. Le récent approvisionnement de drones permet également à l’Iran de demander des contreparties et de faire pression sur la Russie en Syrie, zone sur laquelle des divergences considérables sont perceptibles entre ces deux alliés. Si Moscou s’implique en Syrie en 2015 avec pour principal objectif de sauvegarder le régime Al-Assad et afin d’amplifier sa présence au Moyen-Orient, l’Iran cherche à travers son implication à préserver ses intérêts sécuritaires, mais aussi à projeter sa puissance au Moyen-Orient. Depuis les années 1980, Téhéran cherche à influencer les sphères du pouvoir syrien et la guerre civile de 2011 a représenté l’opportunité pour l’Iran de favoriser son contrôle sur l’administration d’une partie du territoire syrien et les officiels du pays. Téhéran poursuit donc sa stratégie de « guerre de procuration » par son soutien aux milices pro-iraniennes et le déploiement d’une partie de ses troupes issues du corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique en Syrie et plus largement au Moyen-Orient. Assurer son influence sur l’État failli syrien lui permettrait d’établir un corridor territorial direct entre Téhéran et Beyrouth en passant par l’Irak et la Syrie. La présence accrue de l’Iran en Syrie permet donc de renforcer son « axe de résistance » et de modifier un rapport de forces actuellement en sa défaveur au Moyen-Orient en raison de la supériorité économique et militaire de ses rivaux régionaux, le principal étant Israël. Dans un souci de contrecarrer l’influence grandissante de l’Iran au Moyen-Orient et notamment en Syrie, Tel-Aviv a établi un « mécanisme de déconfliction » suite à l’implication russe au sol et dans les airs en 2015 dans la guerre syrienne. Celui-ci a pour but d’assurer une coordination militaire avec Moscou afin d’éviter les affrontements indirects avec les forces armées russes lorsqu’Israël mène ses raids aériens et ses opérations contre les déploiements iraniens. Bien évidemment ce mécanisme n’est pas en faveur des intérêts de l’Iran et démontre l’absence du soutien russe à ses ambitions géopolitiques teintées de confessionnalisme en Syrie et plus largement au Moyen-Orient. En effet, si les Russes et Iraniens se sont entendus sur le maintien au pouvoir d’Assad, la solution politique souhaitée diffère. La Russie cherche à stabiliser la Syrie pour y assurer une assise et n’identifie pas la présence de groupes armés non étatiques pro-iraniens comme étant favorable à leurs objectifs. De fait, elle n’adhère pas à la volonté iranienne de renforcer un axe chiite dans la région et d’influencer le pouvoir syrien pour développer son influence dans la région. En effet, la stratégie iranienne de guerre par procuration se traduisant par un soutien accru à la présence de ces milices en Syrie mine le renforcement du pouvoir central syrien et n’est donc pas dans l’intérêt des Russes. Aujourd’hui, la Russie se trouve par conséquent dans une situation délicate. La guerre qu’elle mène en Ukraine affaiblit ses positions stratégiques dans d’autres zones notamment en Syrie. Cet effort de guerre présage effectivement pour les Russes une « économie » dans le déploiement de leurs capacités militaires en Syrie. Téhéran pourrait profiter de ce nouveau besoin pour développer ses ventes de drones, mais aussi acquérir un levier de pression plus important sur les Russes. La fourniture en drones est donc pour l’Iran un moyen de renforcer son alliance avec la Russie dans le but d’obtenir son soutien en Asie centrale, mais représente aussi l’opportunité de développer des leviers de pressions sur Moscou qui lui permettront d’obtenir des concessions sur le dossier syrien. ***** Cette analyse a démontré que les stratégies politiques des deux pays diffèrent à plusieurs égards. En effet, Ankara semble être guidé par des considérations plus politiques que géopolitiques. La volonté d’Erdogan de renforcer son pouvoir et d’assurer sa réélection en juin 2023 explique en partie son fort dynamisme diplomatique sur le dossier ukrainien. Ses liens avec l’Ukraine et la Russie lui permettent d’étendre son influence sur la sphère internationale à travers ses capacités de médiation entre les belligérants malgré des comportements agressifs dans son environnement régional (Haut-Karabakh, Syrie, etc.). La volonté d’assurer ses positions en mer Noire à travers un rapprochement avec Kyiv et son besoin de préserver ses liens avec la Russie pour des raisons économiques et sécuritaires (notamment en Syrie) pourrait lui permettre de redorer son image afin de renforcer son positionnement à l’interne. En ce qui concerne la fourniture de drones à la Russie par l’Iran, celui-ci répond plus à des dynamiques géopolitiques et à une volonté de préserver le régime iranien des tentatives de déstabilisation israélienne dans son environnement régional direct : le Moyen-Orient et l’Asie centrale. L’asymétrie de puissance entre Téhéran et Tel-Aviv met à mal le développement de « l’axe de résistance » iranien et menace par conséquent sa projection de puissance sur la scène régionale et sa sécurité intérieure. Afin de modifier ce rapport de forces défavorable, l’Iran favorise un rapprochement stratégique avec la Russie dont il a besoin pour appuyer sa stratégie eurasiatique afin de développer ses capacités de dissuasion contre Bakou et en Syrie contre Israël. Cette dépendance vis-à-vis des Russes pour soutenir la politique régionale de Téhéran est intensifiée dans le contexte d’une fragilisation du pouvoir politique iranien en raison du mouvement de révolte interne. L’approvisionnement des drones en Ukraine représente une opportunité certes économique pour les deux pays, mais répond donc à des pressions et à des intérêts divergents. Ces soutiens militaires peuvent être perçus comme des paris cependant risqués pour Ankara et Téhéran. En fournissant ces drones, les deux pays encouragent la poursuite du conflit, or l’enlisement qui pourrait découler de ce soutien militaire serait contre-productif : en vue des rapports de forces actuels sur le champ de bataille, une poursuite du conflit contribuerait à l’affaiblissement de la Russie (même en cas de reprise de l’initiative sur le champ de bataille par Moscou). Pour la Turquie, cet affaiblissement minerait son double jeu entre l’OTAN et Moscou et réduirait certainement les gains économiques qu’elle retire du contournement russe des sanctions internationales. Pour l’Iran, la probabilité que le pouvoir russe mette à la marge les intérêts iraniens pour assurer sa survie s’accentuera également avec l’affaiblissement potentiel de Moscou en Ukraine. De fait, le pays paierait le prix fort d’un positionnement marqué à « l’Est » et sans la puissance des Russes, se rendrait extrêmement vulnérable aux opérations de déstabilisation israéliennes et aux pressions généralisées de la communauté internationale.   [1] Interview avec le Dr. Delanoë effectuée le 16 novembre 2022 sur les relations russo-iraniennes dan le contexte de la guerre russo-ukrainienne et de la fourniture de drones iraniens. [2] Interview avec le Professeur Pahlavi effectuée le 9 novembre 2022 sur la stratégie diplomatique de l’Iran et le conflit en Ukraine. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid ## La tentative avortée de retirer les troupes canadiennes de l’OTAN et les leçons pour Mark Carney URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-tentative-avortee-de-retirer-les-troupes-canadiennes-de-lotan-et-les-lecons-pour-mark-carney/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Ce texte fait partie de la série spéciale d'essais Retour vers le futur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique, financée par une subvention du programme MINDS du ministère de la Défense nationale. Introduction Le 20 avril 1968, à la suite du départ du premier ministre Lester B. Pearson, Pierre Elliott Trudeau accède à la tête du gouvernement canadien avec l’intention explicite de remettre en question les fondements de la politique étrangère héritée de ses prédécesseurs. Trois jours seulement après son entrée en fonction, il déclenche des élections générales et annonce rapidement le lancement d’une révision en profondeur de la politique étrangère canadienne. Cette initiative dépasse largement le cadre d’une simple réorganisation administrative : elle vise à contester les hypothèses structurantes qui ont orienté la politique internationale du Canada depuis près de deux décennies, notamment celle du maintien d’un contingent militaire d’environ 10 000 soldats déployés en Europe de manière continue depuis 1951 et l'adhésion à l’Organisation de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN). Pour Trudeau, la politique de défense devrait découler des priorités de la politique étrangère, et non l'inverse. Autrement dit, ce n'est pas l'engagement du Canada envers l'OTAN qui devrait déterminer l'orientation générale de sa politique étrangère, mais bien une définition préalable des intérêts et des capacités nationales. Durant la campagne électorale de mai-juin 1968, Trudeau qualifie en effet l’OTAN de « relique des années 1950 » et s’interroge publiquement sur la pertinence du maintien d’une « forte présence militaire » canadienne en Europe. Il plaide alors pour une réorientation des priorités stratégiques du Canada vers l’Amérique du Nord et pour une plus grande autonomie décisionnelle à l’égard des États-Unis. Toutefois, en décembre 1969, à l’issue de dix-huit mois de révision approfondie, le gouvernement Trudeau adopte une politique qui confirme plutôt le maintien de l’engagement canadien au sein de l’OTAN, tout en annonçant néanmoins une réduction des effectifs, de 10 000 à 5 000 soldats. Cette note politique examine la tentative d'autonomie stratégique de Pierre Elliott Trudeau, qui visa à affranchir la politique de défense canadienne de sa dépendance structurelle envers l'OTAN et les États-Unis. En dépit d'un gouvernement majoritaire et d'un capital politique considérable, cette entreprise ne produisit qu'un résultat modeste, soit une réduction des effectifs de 10 000 à 5 000 soldats, bien en deçà de la transformation radicale initialement envisagée. Son héritage se mesure toutefois sur un temps plus long. Plus d'un demi-siècle plus tard, le Canada n'a toujours pas procédé à une révision intégrée de politique étrangère, se limitant à des exercices circonscrits à la politique de défense. Cette trajectoire institutionnelle suggère que la vision trudeauiste, consistant à subordonner les engagements de défense aux intérêts nationaux plutôt qu'aux impératifs d'alliance, est progressivement devenue l'hypothèse implicite de l'appareil gouvernemental canadien, sans pour autant avoir jamais été pleinement traduite en action à court et moyen terme. Toutefois, la dépendance structurelle aux États-Unis et à l’OTAN demeure un enjeu saillant en 2026. À l'heure où le premier ministre Mark Carney aspire à son tour à recomposer la relation stratégique du Canada avec les États-Unis et à consolider l'autonomie décisionnelle canadienne dans un contexte de tensions bilatérales croissantes, l'expérience de Trudeau constitue néanmoins un précédent instructif. Les obstacles à une réorientation de la politique de défense à court et moyen terme sont de nature structurelle, persistants, et susceptibles d'éroder même les mandats les plus robustes. L'analyse des contraintes bureaucratiques, alliées et politiques qui ont circonscrit la marge de manœuvre de Trudeau permet ainsi de cerner les écueils à éviter et les conditions préalables à la faisabilité d'une véritable réorientation stratégique. L’orthodoxie internationaliste et sa contestation La politique étrangère canadienne de l’après-guerre se cristallise autour d’un consensus dominant, élaboré sous le gouvernement du Premier ministre Louis St Laurent entre 1948 et 1951, avec Lester B. Pearson comme secrétaire d’État aux Affaires extérieures. Cette orthodoxie internationaliste repose sur plusieurs principes centraux : un engagement actif au sein des institutions multilatérales, notamment l’OTAN ; la conviction que la sécurité du Canada est indissociable de celle de la communauté internationale ; et la croyance que le Canada peut exercer une influence disproportionnée par un rôle de médiateur et de « puissance moyenne » sur la scène mondiale. Cette approche repose également sur le constat que le territoire national demeure relativement à l’abris des menaces directes, du moins de celles sur lesquelles le Canada exercerait une quelconque agentivité. La politique étrangère canadienne après la Seconde Guerre mondiale s’ancre résolument dans un axe transatlantique (OTAN), un engagement internationaliste (ONU) et une relation (ou intégration) bilatérale continentale considérable avec les États-Unis. Ce consensus est soutenu et reproduit par une bureaucratie particulièrement cohésive. Le ministère des Affaires extérieures, composé d’environ 200 fonctionnaires issus de milieux sociaux et éducatifs largement homogènes, exerce alors une influence déterminante et rarement contestée sur la formulation de la politique étrangère. Bien que le gouvernement progressiste-conservateur de John Diefenbaker (1957-1963) remette en cause certains éléments de cette orthodoxie, ses tentatives de réforme demeurent limitées et n’ébranlent pas les hypothèses fondamentales de cet internationalisme. Le retour de Pearson au pouvoir en 1963, cette fois comme Premier ministre, revitalise ce cadre, bien que les contraintes d’un gouvernement minoritaire et l’évolution de l’environnement stratégique limitent sa marge de manœuvre. L’arrivée de Pierre Elliott Trudeau constitue une rupture intellectuelle et politique avec cette tradition. Sa formation, marquée notamment par son séjour à Paris après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, l’expose aux débats européens sur l’émergence d’une « troisième force » cherchant à dépasser la logique binaire de la Guerre froide. À l’Institut d’études politiques et dans les cercles associés à des revues telles qu’Esprit et Le Monde, Trudeau développe une critique conceptuelle de ce dualisme idéologique. Il rejette à la fois le communisme et l’anticommunisme orthodoxe, refusant, selon ses propres termes, d’« être enrôlé dans l’un ou l’autre des totalitarismes » et dénonçant la division « dangereuse » de l’humanité en blocs antagonistes. Ces convictions se manifestent déjà durant son passage au Bureau du Conseil privé entre 1949 et 1951. Sous le gouvernement Louis St. Laurent, Trudeau s’oppose à la participation canadienne à la guerre de Corée et au déploiement rapide de forces canadiennes en Europe à partir de 1951, qu’il interprète comme des manifestations d’un alignement automatique sur le leadership états-unien. Élu député en 1965 et nommé ministre de la Justice en 1967, il devient rapidement l’un des critiques les plus articulés de cette orthodoxie en défense, remettant en question « l’inutilité d’une bonne partie de nos efforts militaires ». Trudeau n’est toutefois pas isolé dans cette contestation. Une faction de gauche au sein du Parti libéral, menée par l’ancien ministre des Finances Walter Gordon, formule la contestation la plus sérieuse au consensus d’après-guerre. Ce groupe comprend des membres du cabinet de Pearson, tels que Allan MacEachen, Edgar Benson, ainsi que les députés québécois Jean Marchand et Gérard Pelletier, proches collaborateurs et amis personnels de Trudeau. Ensemble, ils soutiennent que la politique de défense canadienne doit être réévaluée afin de réduire sa dépendance à l’égard des États-Unis et de repenser la participation du Canada au sein de l’OTAN et du NORAD. En 1967, Gordon réunit Trudeau, Marchand et de hauts fonctionnaires, dont Marcel Cadieux et Basil Robinson, pour défendre l’idée que la reprise économique européenne rend désormais excessive la présence militaire canadienne sur le continent. La révision et la résistance bureaucratique Le 15 mai 1968, soit trois semaines après l’accession au pouvoir de Trudeau et en pleine campagne électorale, le Cabinet entérine une recommandation du Comité du Cabinet sur les priorités et la planification visant le lancement d’une révision complète de la politique des Forces armées canadiennes. La directive prévoit l’examen de structures de forces alternatives, de leurs coûts et des options stratégiques disponibles, avec un rapport attendu pour la mi-juillet. Cette décision établit le cadre institutionnel de la réorientation souhaitée par le nouveau Premier ministre. La victoire électorale du 25 juin 1968, qui accorde aux libéraux une majorité confortable de 155 sièges sur 264, renforce considérablement le mandat politique de Trudeau. Il affirme alors que l’environnement stratégique international a profondément évolué depuis la Deuxième Guerre mondiale et que l’Europe ne nécessite plus le maintien d’une « forte présence militaire » canadienne pour assurer sa sécurité. Certains observateurs, notamment dans le milieu académique, estiment que l’engagement militaire canadien en Europe génère peu d’influence réelle auprès des alliés, en l’absence de liens économiques ou culturels particulièrement étroits avec le continent. Cette orientation trouve d'ailleurs un écho notable dans l'opinion publique, bien que le soutien populaire varie selon les enjeux considérés. Les données de sondage indiquent qu'une nette majorité de Canadiens, près de 74 %, souhaitent une politique étrangère plus indépendante des États-Unis, un sentiment particulièrement prononcé parmi l'électorat libéral. Une proportion comparable s'oppose au maintien de l'accès américain aux bases et à l'espace aérien canadiens, révélant un courant nationaliste sur lequel Trudeau peut légitimement s'appuyer pour justifier sa démarche de révision. La question du désengagement militaire européen suscite toutefois des réponses plus partagées : environ un tiers des répondants se déclarent favorables au retrait des troupes canadiennes d'Europe et jugent le niveau des forces militaires excessif, tandis qu'une majorité demeure attachée à ces engagements. Trudeau dispose ainsi d'une base d'appui réelle, mais insuffisante pour revendiquer un mandat populaire sans équivoque en faveur d'un retrait de l'OTAN, même si, là encore, les électeurs libéraux se montrent sensiblement plus réceptifs à cette posture que l'ensemble de l'électorat. Cette vision politique de Trudeau se heurte toutefois à une résistance institutionnelle marquée au sein du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Dès le début de 1968, avant même l’élection de Trudeau à la direction du Parti libéral, le ministère produit une étude interne recommandant explicitement le maintien des forces canadiennes en Europe. Son auteur, Norman Robertson, n'est pas un observateur ordinaire. Haut fonctionnaire de carrière et l'un des principaux architectes de la posture internationaliste canadienne d'après-guerre, il incarne précisément l'orthodoxie que Trudeau cherche à remettre en question. Robertson y conclut que la neutralité est impraticable et que l'influence internationale du Canada dépend de son engagement au sein de l'OTAN. Son raisonnement repose sur une logique de réciprocité : la présence militaire canadienne en Europe constitue la monnaie d'échange qui donne à Ottawa un siège à la table des grandes puissances occidentales et lui permet d'exercer une influence sur des dossiers dépassant largement le cadre strictement militaire. Retirer ces forces reviendrait donc à se priver volontairement des leviers d'influence sur lesquels repose le statut international du Canada depuis 1949. Cette analyse reflète une conviction profondément enracinée au sein de la bureaucratie canadienne, soit l’idée que l'engagement militaire européen n'est pas une fin en soi, mais le fondement structurel du poids diplomatique canadien sur la scène mondiale. Le sous-secrétaire d’État aux Affaires extérieures, Marcel Cadieux, exerce un rôle central dans cette résistance. Fonctionnaire de carrière étroitement associé à l’orthodoxie internationaliste et atlantiste, Cadieux perçoit les positions de Trudeau comme excessivement idéalistes, voire dangereuses. Usant de son accès privilégié au Premier ministre et de son contrôle sur la circulation de l’information, il contribue à ralentir et encadrer le processus de révision. Les documents soumis à Trudeau soulignent systématiquement les risques diplomatiques d’un retrait, les coûts politiques vis-à-vis des alliés et la perte d’influence internationale qui en découlerait. Cette résistance, discrète mais persistante, contraint le Premier ministre à évoluer dans un environnement bureaucratique largement hostile à ses objectifs de réforme. Les pressions des alliés et les contraintes d’alliance Parallèlement, les partenaires de l'OTAN, en particulier les États-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et la République fédérale d'Allemagne, exercent des pressions diplomatiques soutenues pour préserver l'engagement canadien. L'invasion soviétique de la Tchécoslovaquie en août 1968 renforce considérablement les arguments en faveur du maintien des forces occidentales en Europe. Il convient toutefois de souligner que cet événement n'a pu exercer une influence aussi déterminante que parce que le processus de révision était encore en cours au moment de la crise. La résistance bureaucratique et les pressions externes ne constituent donc pas des facteurs indépendants : c'est précisément le ralentissement institutionnel du processus, alimenté par l'opposition discrète du ministère des Affaires extérieures, qui a ouvert une fenêtre temporelle dans laquelle les événements internationaux ont pu modifier le rapport de force politique en faveur du statu quo. La capacité des appareils bureaucratiques à retarder les réformes constitue ainsi, en elle-même, un mécanisme de résistance au changement. Washington fait clairement savoir à Ottawa qu’un retrait canadien serait interprété comme un signal de désengagement occidental susceptible d’encourager d’autres alliés à réduire leurs contributions, à un moment où l’effort militaire états-unien est fortement mobilisé par la guerre du Vietnam. L’Allemagne exprime des inquiétudes similaires, soulignant qu’un retrait canadien affaiblirait sa posture défensive face à l’Union soviétique. Londres, engagée dans ses propres réductions de forces pour des raisons budgétaires, redoute un effet d’entraînement parmi les alliés européens. Ces pressions se manifestent par divers canaux diplomatiques : échanges bilatéraux, interventions lors des réunions de l’OTAN et contacts informels entre hauts fonctionnaires. Le gouvernement Trudeau se retrouve ainsi confronté à un dilemme stratégique : un retrait risque d’isoler le Canada au sein de l’Alliance et de réduire son influence sur d’autres dossiers, tandis que le maintien de l’engagement contredit les promesses électorales et la vision intellectuelle du Premier ministre. Les divisions internes et l’opposition parlementaire Les tensions ne se limitent pas à la sphère internationale. Au sein du Cabinet, les divisions sont profondes. Une faction menée par Walter Gordon, Jean Marchand et Gérard Pelletier soutient toujours une réduction substantielle, voire un retrait complet, des forces canadiennes d’Europe, tandis que d’autres ministres, notamment responsables de la défense et des affaires étrangères, privilégient la continuité. Mitchell Sharp, nommé secrétaire d’État aux Affaires extérieures en 1968, adopte progressivement une position prudente, mettant en garde contre les conséquences diplomatiques d’un désengagement rapide. À la Chambre des communes, l’opposition est vigoureuse et transpartisane. Le Parti progressiste-conservateur de Robert Stanfield dénonce toute réduction comme un affaiblissement de la sécurité occidentale et un manquement aux responsabilités internationales du Canada, soutenant que l’OTAN demeure « le meilleur instrument de défense collective de l’Occident ». Même le Nouveau Parti démocratique, bien que critique de l’Alliance atlantique, hésite à appuyer un retrait complet, privilégiant plutôt une transformation progressive vers un système de sécurité collective plus inclusif et politique dans le contexte d’une détente entre les deux blocs. Les débats parlementaires d’avril 1969, à la suite de l’annonce de la réduction des forces canadiennes de 10 000 à 5 000 soldats, mettent à nouveau en lumière ces clivages. Les conservateurs qualifient la décision de « l’une des plus graves erreurs de la politique étrangère canadienne », arguant qu’elle intervient à un moment inopportun. Bien que la majorité libérale rende improbable toute remise en cause institutionnelle, le débat impose des coûts politiques réels en cadrant publiquement la réduction des forces comme une erreur stratégique, ce qui restreint la marge de manœuvre du Premier ministre. Le compromis : réduction mais maintien de l’engagement Confronté à des contraintes bureaucratiques, alliées et politiques, Trudeau accepte un compromis sensiblement éloigné de ses ambitions initiales. Le 3 avril 1969, il annonce le maintien de la participation canadienne à l’OTAN, écartant toute option neutraliste ou non alignée. Cette décision s’accompagne d’une reconfiguration de la hiérarchie des priorités de la politique de défense, dans laquelle la souveraineté nationale et la défense continentale passent au premier rang, devant l’engagement envers l’OTAN et les missions de maintien de la paix. Cette hiérarchisation vise à concilier la volonté de réduire les coûts et la dépendance stratégique avec la nécessité de préserver la crédibilité internationale du Canada. La publication en 1970 du document Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens institutionnalise cette approche. Articulé autour de six priorités : souveraineté et indépendance, paix et sécurité, justice sociale, qualité de vie, harmonie avec l’environnement et prospérité économique, le document présente l’OTAN comme un pilier important mais non exclusif de la politique de sécurité canadienne. Il affirme notamment que « le Canada ne peut contribuer efficacement à la paix et à la sécurité internationales que s’il préserve son indépendance de jugement et d’action », signalant la volonté persistante de distance critique à l’égard de l’orthodoxie atlantique. Trudeau cherche à subordonner la politique envers l’OTAN à la politique étrangère plutôt que l’inverse. Dans les faits, cependant, le Canada reste étroitement intégré aux structures de l'OTAN. Certes, Trudeau parvient à accomplir d'autres ruptures significatives, notamment le retrait des missiles nucléaires américains du sol canadien. Toutefois, sur la question spécifique de la posture canadienne au sein de l'Alliance atlantique, qui constitue l'objet de la présente analyse, l'expérience de Trudeau illustre les limites structurelles auxquelles se heurte même un Premier ministre doté d'un mandat fort et d'une volonté réformatrice lorsqu'il cherche à transformer en profondeur les engagements de défense collective du Canada. Leçons de l’échec de Trudeau pour le gouvernement Carney Institutionnaliser rapidement le soutien public L'échec de Trudeau montre que même un mandat majoritaire et un appui populaire élevé ne suffisent pas à transformer la politique de défense si le capital politique n'est pas rapidement converti en décisions institutionnelles irréversibles. La publication, le 17 février 2026, de la première Stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada témoigne, en partie, d'une volonté de tirer cette leçon. En effet, si une part importante du soutien à cette hausse rapide des capacités militaires est liée à la figure polarisante de Trump, 89% des Canadiens conçoivent que l’industrie de défense puisse bénéficier au reste de l’économie. Ce faisant, en liant le réarmement à la création d'emplois locaux, notamment par l'objectif de porter à 70 % la part des acquisitions attribuées à des entreprises canadiennes et la promesse de 125 000 emplois sur dix ans, le gouvernement Carney cherche à constituer une coalition d'intérêts économiques durables en faveur des investissements militaires. La création de l'Agence d'investissement en défense, conçue pour centraliser et accélérer les approvisionnements, vise par ailleurs à établir un fait institutionnel. Cette démarche se heurte toutefois à une tension que l'expérience de Trudeau rend familière. Alors que le gouvernement Carney affiche la volonté de réduire la dépendance canadienne envers les États-Unis et de diversifier les partenariats de défense, les Forces armées canadiennes demeurent profondément intégrées à la relation bilatérale avec Washington, dont dépendent l'interopérabilité, l'accès aux capacités de pointe et la conduite d'opérations majeures. Les formulations prudentes de la Stratégie, qui affirme simultanément la priorité aux fournisseurs canadiens et la volonté d'entretenir une relation de défense canado-américaine solide, trahissent cette tension non résolue. Cette politique de défense sous Carney laisse ainsi entrevoir une tension civilo-militaire susceptible de freiner la mise en œuvre des objectifs du gouvernement. Le risque est que cette ambiguïté, comparable à celle qui paralysa la révision de Trudeau entre volonté réformatrice et résistance institutionnelle, dilue progressivement l'impulsion politique initiale. Anticiper les pressions alliées pour éviter l’isolement diplomatique À la fin des années 1960 et au début des années 1970, Trudeau se retrouva largement isolé face à un front occidental uni, incapable d'anticiper les pressions de Washington, Londres et Bonn, renforcées par la crise tchécoslovaque. Aujourd'hui, Carney s'inscrit dans un contexte sensiblement différent : les États-Unis chercheront à maintenir la dépendance canadienne via des exigences commerciales et d'interopérabilité, mais contrairement aux années 1960, l'érosion durable du lien de confiance transatlantique amène de nombreux alliés européens et indopacifiques à chercher eux-mêmes à diversifier leurs partenariats de défense et leurs chaînes d'approvisionnement. L'adhésion du Canada au programme Readiness 2030 de l'Union européenne, la signature de plus de partenariats de défense, ou encore l'examen d'une flotte mixte de chasseurs F-35 et Gripen illustrent cette logique de diversification par les engagements concrets. Plus largement, le développement de coalitions minilatérales ciblées, notamment avec le Royaume-Uni, les pays nordiques et baltes ou certains partenaires indopacifiques, permettrait au Canada de disposer de leviers d'influence collectifs et de créer des faits accomplis c. Cette convergence offre au Canada une fenêtre d'opportunité que Trudeau n'avait pas : la possibilité d'inscrire sa diversification dans un mouvement collectif plutôt que de paraître agir en solitaire. Crédit Image: Chiloa, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons ## La TRIPP, un vrai chemin vers la paix entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/la-tripp-un-vrai-chemin-vers-la-paix-entre-larmenie-et-lazerbaidjan/ Modified: 2025-11-25 Analyse du plan de Donald Trump pour l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan Le 8 août 2025, Donald Trump reçoit à la Maison Blanche le Président de l’Azerbaïdjan Ilham Aliyev et le Premier ministre arménien Nikol Pachinian, et leur affirme son soutien au processus de résolution du conflit entre les deux pays, qui dure depuis plus de trente ans. Les deux anciennes républiques socialistes soviétiques se sont affrontées à plusieurs reprises durant cette période pour le contrôle du Haut-Karabagh, région montagneuse alors peuplée majoritairement d’Arméniens et enclavée dans l’Azerbaïdjan. En septembre 2023, l’armée azerbaïdjanaise reprend le contrôle total de cette enclave et de sa capitale Stepanakert, renommée Khankendi et réintégrée au sein de la République d’Azerbaïdjan. Sa population arménienne a dû fuir en Arménie, mais la fin de ce conflit armé pose plusieurs questions qui continuent de nourrir des tensions entre les deux pays : sort réservé aux prisonniers de guerre arméniens, préservation de l’héritage culturel dans la région, repeuplement de la région sous l’autorité du gouvernement de Bakou et ‘accueil des réfugiés du Karabagh en Arménie. Alors que la guerre était l’élément le plus déterminant pour le paysage politique et géopolitique dans la région, la paix durable est désormais l’objectif dont se réclament tous ces acteurs, répondant au principe de « la paix par le deal » cher au président des Etats-Unis. Mais la construction de cette paix se heurte également à des intérêts différents. Dans ce point chaud, les objectifs des acteurs régionaux et extérieurs, qui disent soutenir l’apaisement dans le Caucase, seront analysés. Le Karabagh, nouvelle vitrine du gouvernement d’Aliyev Premièrement, il est important de s’interroger sur le conflit en lui-même et sa résolution. Côté azerbaïdjanais, on dit que le dossier est refermé avec la réintégration de la région du Karabagh, tandis que côté arménien, on déplore l’absence de mesures en faveur des populations civiles, notamment vis-à-vis de l’épineuse question du « droit au retour ». En effet, une grande partie de cette population habitant dans la république sécessionniste de l’Artsakh (nom du Haut-Karabagh en arménien) y résidait déjà avant la première guerre en 1988. A l’inverse, les populations azéries qui ont été exilées dans d’autres région d’Azerbaïdjan après la prise de contrôle par les Arméniens sont aujourd’hui incitées à revenir dans la région, alors que la plupart des villages azéris sont restés à l’abandon pendant trois décennies. A coups de mesures incitatives et de construction d’infrastructures, le président Aliyev tente de rendre la région attractive pour ses citoyens, en proposant entre autres de vivre dans des villes nouvelles construites par le gouvernement à moindre coût, afin de renforcer sa popularité. L’objectif d’Aliyev est de tourner la page de la guerre, malgré les accusations de nettoyage ethnique, et demande à l’Arménie d’amender sa constitution en retirant les références à l’Artsakh et de mettre fin au groupe de Minsk de l’OSCE, qui était une plateforme pour un processus de pacification, surveillée par la Russie, les États-Unis et la France. Or, les demandes du président Aliyev continuent d’alimenter le ressentiment en Arménie, partagée entre volonté de trouver une paix durable et traumatisme de cette terre perdue. La crise politique en Arménie Le gouvernement de Pachinian est en effet sous tension. Le Premier ministre, issu d’une révolution de velours en 2018, est aujourd’hui en conflit ouvert avec l’opposition parlementaire, mais également avec l’Église apostolique arménienne, qui dispose d’une autorité morale au sein de la population, ainsi qu’avec Samuel Karapetian, qui est l’homme le plus riche du pays et propriétaire de la plus grande société énergétique. Le Premier ministre dit avoir échappé à un coup d’État organisé par ce dernier et par l’évêque Bagrat Galstanian, qui se fait le porte-parole des opposants au processus de paix avec Bakou. La rupture entre le gouvernement et ces acteurs est aussi très profonde et divise la société arménienne. Sur fond de cette nouvelle divergence se pose une divergence plus ancienne, plus géopolitique, entre les partisans d’un rapprochement avec l’Occident, incarnée par Pachinian, et les nostalgiques de la relation très forte avec la Russie. En effet, suite au retrait des troupes russes chargées du maintien de la paix dans le couloir de Latchine entre l’Arménie et le Haut-Karabagh en 2023, Yerevan est allé plus loin que jamais dans son divorce avec Moscou, indirectement lié à l’isolement stratégique de Vladimir Poutine depuis le 24 février 2022. Ce retrait des Russes, déploré par l’Arménie, a été interprété par des experts comme un blanc-seing accordé à Ilham Aliyev pour mener la dernière guerre, par crainte de détériorer leurs relations avec lui. Par exemple, l’Arménie a suspendu sa participation à l’Organisation du traité de sécurité collective, alliance politico-militaire pilotée par le Kremlin, et fait voter une loi en faveur une potentielle candidature à l’entrée dans l’Union européenne au parlement. Cette orientation prise par le gouvernement arménien a révélé la perte d’influence de la Russie dans le Caucase du Sud, région qu’elle considère comme son « étranger proche ». La Russie tente tant bien que mal de garder des relations étroites avec l’Arménie, qui a longtemps été l’un de ses relais favoris dans la région. Mais les relations se sont également dégradées entre la Russie et l’Azerbaïdjan, avec l’interpellation de multiples Azéris en Russie et de Russes en Azerbaïdjan au cours des derniers mois et la fermeture des médias pro-russes dans l’ancienne RSS. Le torchon brûle entre Bakou et Moscou, et d’autres acteurs pourraient en profiter. Normalisation(s) ? En effet, l’Arménie réalise qu’elle ne peut se permettre de dépendre de la Russie sur un plan militaro-stratégique et commercial. C’est pour cela que le dossier de la normalisation avec la Turquie est remis sur la table. La frontière turco-arménienne est fermée depuis la première guerre en 1994, et Ankara a imposé un blocus commercial en solidarité de son allié à Bakou. Mais le Premier ministre Pachinian a rencontré le président Erdogan à Istanbul, ce qui est un fait rare dans l’histoire de la relation entre les deux pays. La Turquie semble plus ouverte qu’avant à une ouverture des frontières, qui serait bénéfique pour les régions frontalières, voire à une normalisation. Cependant, cette normalisation semble dépendre de la normalisation entre Yerevan et Bakou, car la Turquie reste fidèle à son alliance avec l’Azerbaïdjan, en dépit de certains désaccords de fond, notamment sur le Proche-Orient. De son côté, l’Arménie essaie de miser sur un projet appelé « Crossroads of Peace » (ou « Carrefours de la paix »), qui permettrait d’ouvrir les frontières entre les pays du Caucase. Cela semble nécessaire, à partir du moment où la Géorgie, qui était le pays resté neutre dans ce différend, et donc voie de passage pour beaucoup, semble de moins en moins fiable en raison de la politique de son nouveau gouvernement, non reconnu par une partie de la communauté internationale. « Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity » Source L’une des conditions posées par l’Azerbaïdjan pour signer la paix définitivement avec l’Arménie est la création d’un couloir qui traverserait la région du Syunik dans le sud de l’Arménie, et relierait la région autonome du Nakhitchevan au reste de l’Azerbaïdjan. Pour l’instant, les Azéris du Nakhitchevan doivent passer par l’Iran pour y accéder. Par ailleurs, cette région autonome est limitrophe de la Turquie sur quelques kilomètres : le rêve des nationalistes azéris est de relier ces deux composantes du monde turcique. L’Azerbaïdjan est déjà le premier partenaire énergétique de la Turquie, qui se voit desservie par la Géorgie. Ces projets de corridor sont considérés comme dangereux pour les Arméniens, d’abord parce qu’ils porteraient atteinte à leur souveraineté territoriale, ensuite parce que le gouvernement de Bakou a déjà montré qu’il n’était pas digne de confiance. L’Arménie tient à sa région méridionale du Syunik, ainsi qu’à son étroite frontière avec la République islamique d’Iran, qui reste un partenaire économique non négligeable. Pendant que le Premier ministre arménien veut surtout éviter l’Azerbaïdjan d’occuper cette fine bande de terre de quelques kilomètres qui lui donnerait un accès au Nakhitchevan et à la frontière avec la Turquie, le Président Aliyev veut éviter un corridor contrôlé par les Arméniens, qui pourraient imposer des droits de passage sur leur territoire. Aliyev appelle ce couloir le « corridor du Zanguezour », et fait ainsi référence au nom azéri de la région du Syunik, ce qui est considéré comme une provocation du côté arménien, puisque cette dénomination fait abstraction de la souveraineté de Yerevan sur cette vallée. C’est ici qu’intervient le président Trump. Son objectif : déjouer l’influence des Russes et des Iraniens dans le Caucase. Le 47e président continue son projet de faire la paix à tout prix à travers des deals, et ne cache plus son intention de gagner le prix Nobel de la paix pour cette raison. Parmi les six ou sept paix qu’il dit avoir instituées, il compte celle entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan, même si les pays ne sont plus en conflit armé depuis 2023. Trump a ainsi proposé d’être un intermédiaire pour les deux dirigeants du Caucase du Sud. Il propose un bail emphytéotique américain sur la route du Syunik, renommée TRIPP, pour Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, et permettrait de relier le Nakhitchevan à Bakou. Cette mainmise des Américains durerait cent ans, mais pose plusieurs questions : d’abord, la souveraineté nationale de l’Arménie est-elle véritablement respectée ? Ensuite, clôt-elle les ambitions de Bakou et institue-t-elle une paix stable ? Enfin, ce corridor permet-il de désenclaver la région, dans laquelle beaucoup de frontières restent complètement fermées, en l’absence de véritable normalisations diplomatiques ? Un tournant géostratégique pour désenclaver la région L’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan doivent se servir de cette nouvelle donne pour transformer leurs relations bilatérales. Longtemps, ces deux pays ont été dans l’orbite de Moscou, qui a continué d’alimenter les tensions entre les deux pendant des décennies. L’Arménie a toujours été très dépendante de la Russie, car au contraire de l’Azerbaïdjan, elle ne dispose pas de ressources énergétiques propres. Ce dernier a gardé sa relation historique avec la Turquie, même si des désaccords sur certains sujets se font de plus en plus entendre (notamment sur la relation de ces deux pays à Israël, rival stratégique d’Ankara mais partenaire militaire et énergétique infaillible de Bakou). La Géorgie, qui gardait des liens cordiaux avec les deux pays, est confrontée elle-même à une instabilité inédite, ce qui oblige tout le monde à repenser les rapports dans l’ensemble de la région. L’Iran était l’allié traditionnel par défaut de l’Arménie, par rivalité avec l’Azerbaïdjan. Aujourd’hui très affaibli par sa guerre contre l’État hébreu, Téhéran voit d’un mauvais œil le projet de TRIPP, dans une zone qui était influencée par Moscou bien plus que par Washington. Mais les États-Unis ne sont pas un partenaire suffisant, et l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan ont besoin de développer les partenariats en Eurasie. C’est ainsi que la Chine apparaît comme une nouvelle option : contrairement à la Russie, elle ne tarit pas d’une mauvaise image auprès des gouvernements respectifs et propose d’inclure ces pays dans ses nouvelles routes de la soie. L’Azerbaïdjan est vu comme essentiel dans l’établissement du fameux corridor transcaspien, aussi appelé Middle Corridor (parfois « corridor médian » en français), et qui relie la mer de Chine à l’Europe en passant par le Kazakhstan, le Caucase (contournant au passage l’Arménie) et la Turquie. L’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan, tout comme la Turquie ont ainsi participé, en qualité de partenaire de dialogue, au sommet de Tianjin, de l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai, qui réunit entre autres la Chine, la Russie, l’Inde, le Pakistan et l’Iran, et tente de proposer une alliance alternative à l’hégémonie américaine aux pays d’Asie. C’est dans ce cadre que Nikol Pachinian a rencontré Xi Jinping. Entre la TRIPP américaine et le dialogue avec l’Est, l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan semblent, à différents égards, tenter de jouer sur plusieurs tableaux pour assurer leur transition géostratégique. Yerevan a également profité de la fin de la guerre pour nouer des relations avec les pays de l’OCS, en particulier avec l’Inde, dont elle était déjà proche au cours des dernières années. A noter que Yerevan a instauré des relations diplomatiques avec le Pakistan, qui était le seul Etat membre de l’ONU qui ne reconnaissait pas l’indépendance du pays du Caucase, en raison de son soutien à Bakou. A présent, l’Arménie est reconnue par l’intégralité de la communauté internationale. Le rapprochement avec l’UE Et l’Union européenne dans tout ça ? L’UE est un partenaire important pour les deux pays, en les incluant dans sa politique de voisinage, mais opte pour une relation adaptée à chaque gouvernement. Tandis que la relation avec l’Azerbaïdjan est principalement commerciale, en raison de l’exportation d’énergie par Bakou vers l’Europe, l’Arménie est considérée comme un relais essentiel dans la région, en particulier depuis que le nouveau gouvernement de la Géorgie semble abandonner ses désirs d’intégration dans l’UE. Ainsi l’UE a installé une mission civile à Yeghenadzor en Arménie depuis 2023. L’Union européenne a toujours soutenu le processus de paix entre les deux pays, et a salué les efforts faits par Yerevan et Bakou dans le cadre de la rencontre à la Maison blanche. L’Union européenne encourage également le processus de normalisation entre l’Azerbaïdjan et l’Arménie, ainsi qu’entre cette dernière et la Turquie. Certains pays membres de l’UE ont historiquement davantage soutenu l’Arménie, en particulier la France et la Grèce, tandis que d’autres ont en général montré leur proximité avec Bakou. A présent, quel avenir pour la présence européenne dans cette région ? En Arménie, le gouvernement veut montrer son désir de rapprochement avec l’Europe, à travers un texte voté au parlement en mars 2025, « enclenchant la procédure d'adhésion à l'UE », toutefois sans caractère contraignant au niveau diplomatique. Aucune candidature d’adhésion n’a été officiellement entamée, contrairement à la Géorgie, l’Ukraine ou encore la Moldavie. Si cette orientation pro-européenne du cabinet Pachinian est inédite pour un gouvernement arménien, elle reste sujette à des nuances. D’abord, Yerevan a aussi développé de nombreux liens avec l’Inde et la Chine, ainsi qu’avec certains pays du Golfe ; ensuite, sa politique intérieure joue un rôle très important dans cet aspect. En effet, en juin 2025, le pays organise des élections parlementaires, qui seront certainement déterminantes dans l’orientation de l’Arménie. Pachinian est à présent relativement impopulaire, notamment à cause de ses différends avec l’Église apostolique, mais est également exposé à des campagnes de désinformation de la part de la Russie, de même qu’en Moldavie à l’aune des élections de septembre 2025. S’il est réélu Premier ministre, il devra également soumettre au référendum la question des modifications dans la Constitution exigées par l’Azerbaïdjan pour un traité de paix, ce qui est loin d’être gagné. Toutes ces questions de politique intérieure rendent le gouvernement de Pachinian très exposé à des ingérences étrangères, et pourraient, à l’avenir, fragiliser les relations euro-arméniennes. En conclusion, on pourrait dire que si l'Arménie et l'Azerbaïdjan sont sur le point de conclure une paix durable, la situation reste très tendue. La prochaine échéance qui sera clé pour l'avenir de cette région est le scrutin des élections législatives arméniennes en 2026, qui seront vraisemblablement marquées par des tensions politiques très fortes, des tentatives d'ingérence inédites et une incertitude très forte dans la population. Le sort de la Géorgie voisine est tout aussi incertain, et semble démontrer que la stabilité régionale durable n'est pas pour 2025 ou 2026. Cependant, les efforts de normalisation de l'Arménie vis-à-vis de ses voisins occidental et oriental ne sont pas anodins. Le recul de l'influence russe ne l'est pas non plus. Moscou n'a sans doute pas renoncé à cette région, qu'elle considère comme hautement stratégique par sa géographie, son histoire et ses liens commerciaux. Pour la Turquie de Recep Tayyip Erdogan, le Caucase gagne en importance stratégique, et contribue à sa consolidation dans le grand jeu géopolitique, quand sur le plan intérieur, le gouvernement doit faire face à des nouveaux défis. Le diagnostic pour les Occidentaux est ambivalent : d'un côté, la paix est encouragée, y compris suite au plan de Trump, et la Russie semble avoir reculé ; d'un autre, cette situation a favorisé l'émergence de la Turquie comme nouvelle puissance régionale et de l'Azerbaïdjan comme partenaire stratégique, alors que ce dernier a fait montre d'un repli autoritaire inédit et a mis fin à toute issue multilatérale dans le conflit avec l'Arménie. En l'état, l'Arménie semble être le nouvel allié privilégié de l'UE dans la région, au moment où la Géorgie est en pleine dérive autoritaire et retombe dans le « proche étranger » cher à Vladimir Poutine. Reste à savoir si cette tendance est durable, et si les promesses annoncées par Donald Trump à travers sa fameuse TRIPP seront suivies de réelles avancées diplomatiques. ## Le Canada devrait viser davantage qu’un statut d’observateur au sein du GCAP URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-devrait-viser-davantage-quun-statut-dobservateur-au-sein-du-gcap/ Modified: 2026-07-29 Cette collaboration multilatérale représente une occasion sans précédent pour le Canada de contribuer à l'essor de la prochaine génération de puissance aérienne. Le Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) est une collaboration trilatérale entre l'Italie, le Japon et le Royaume-Uni visant à développer un avion de combat de sixième génération destiné à remplacer respectivement les Eurofighter Typhoon britanniques et italiens d'ici 2040, ainsi que la flotte japonaise de Mitsubishi F-2, dont le retrait est prévu en 2035. Pour le Canada, il est prévu qu'un statut officiel d'observateur lui soit accordé lors d'une réunion des trois ministres de la Défense en juillet, ce qui lui permettra d'accéder à des informations sensibles sur le projet pendant qu'Ottawa délibère sur une éventuelle participation en tant que partenaire de développement ou futur acheteur. Ouvrir la porte au GCAP constitue une étape logique pour un gouvernement Carney déterminé à diversifier les acquisitions militaires du Canada en réduisant sa dépendance aux solutions américaines au profit de partenariats plus étroits avec des alliés et partenaires partageant les mêmes valeurs. Cette démarche s'inscrit dans le prolongement de la décision majeure du gouvernement d'entamer des négociations avec Saab en vue de l'acquisition du système de veille aérienne avancée GlobalEye, plutôt que de retenir des solutions américaines. Je soutiens que le moment est venu pour le Canada de chercher à jouer un rôle plus important dans le GCAP, au-delà du simple statut d'observateur, en tant que partenaire de développement capable d'apporter des contributions uniques. Le Canada dispose d'un secteur aéronautique compétitif, reconnu pour son expertise en avionique, en capteurs et en radars. Il abrite également des entreprises de calibre mondial spécialisées dans la simulation de vol et la formation des pilotes. Grâce à ses importantes capacités d'extraction et de raffinage des minéraux critiques, le Canada pourrait en outre fournir des intrants essentiels à la production que les trois partenaires devraient autrement se procurer en Chine. La participation canadienne au GCAP doit être considérée comme distincte du débat en cours entre le F-35 et le Gripen, puisque ces appareils de cinquième et de génération 4,5+ sont évalués pour remplacer la flotte vieillissante de CF-18 de l'Aviation royale canadienne (ARC), dont le retrait est prévu en 2032. Même si le GCAP respecte son calendrier actuel, les premières livraisons au Canada ne surviendraient vraisemblablement pas avant la fin des années 2030. Par conséquent, la question du choix entre le F-35 et le Gripen demeurera déterminante à court terme. Le GCAP comme « système de systèmes » Qu'est-ce qui caractérise un avion de combat de sixième génération? Outre des capacités de furtivité accrues et un rayon d'action supérieur, son trait distinctif réside dans une architecture de « système de systèmes », où un avion piloté commande une escadrille de drones dotés d'intelligence artificielle (IA), appelés aéronefs de combat collaboratifs sans pilote (Unmanned Collaborative Combat Aircraft – UCCA), qui agissent comme des « ailiers fidèles » (loyal wingmen) tout en bénéficiant d'un degré élevé d'autonomie. Ces futurs chasseurs sont conçus comme de véritables superordinateurs aéroportés et centres de commandement, jouant un rôle de « quart-arrière » (quarterback). Ils s'appuient sur les capacités déjà offertes par les appareils de cinquième génération — notamment la guerre électronique et la reconnaissance avancée fondée sur des capteurs sophistiqués — tout en plaçant ces fonctions au cœur même de leur profil opérationnel. Dans le cas des chasseurs de quatrième génération, conçus pour percer les défenses aériennes et frapper des cibles tant aériennes que terrestres, ou encore des appareils de cinquième génération mettant davantage l'accent sur la furtivité avancée, l'avion piloté demeure l'acteur principal. À l'inverse, les chasseurs de sixième génération devraient presque toujours évoluer aux côtés d'un essaim d'UCCA destinés à accroître la « masse de combat » de la mission et à agir comme les « bras prolongés » du pilote. Celui-ci analysera les données recueillies en temps réel par les capteurs alimentés par l'IA de l'appareil, puis traitées par le « nuage de combat » (combat cloud), afin d'exécuter les ordres de mission. La plateforme GCAP représente bien davantage qu'une simple coopération industrielle visant à construire un avion de combat. Il s'agit d'une initiative ambitieuse d'intégration technologique couvrant des domaines comme l'intelligence artificielle, le partage de la propriété intellectuelle, les chaînes d'approvisionnement interconnectées et le développement d'une plus grande autonomie vis-à-vis des États-Unis. Outre le Canada, plusieurs autres pays ont manifesté leur intérêt à rejoindre le projet, notamment l'Australie, l'Arabie saoudite, la Pologne, Singapour, la Suède et l'Allemagne. Toutefois, alors que le Royaume-Uni et l'Italie ont laissé entendre qu'ils seraient relativement ouverts à un élargissement du consortium, le Japon s'est montré plus réticent à accueillir de nouveaux partenaires, craignant qu'un tel élargissement n'entraîne un processus de négociation complexe et long qui ralentirait l'élan du projet. Cette divergence reflète en partie des priorités différentes entre les partenaires. Tokyo cherche avant tout à livrer les appareils d'ici 2035 afin de pouvoir répondre à un environnement stratégique régional qui se détériore sous l'effet des tensions croissantes avec la Chine. Londres et Rome privilégient quant à eux un échéancier plus flexible afin de permettre le développement complet des capacités de « système de systèmes » du GCAP. Le plaidoyer canadien en faveur d'une participation au projet devrait être articulé autour de sa capacité à combler des lacunes ciblées en matière de capacités industrielles et de chaînes d'approvisionnement au sein du partenariat trilatéral. Par exemple, au cours de la prochaine décennie, le Canada devrait devenir l'un des rares grands producteurs de terres rares à l'extérieur de la Chine. Dans les applications militaires, les systèmes de haute technologie comme les avions de combat figurent parmi les principaux consommateurs de ces matériaux : un seul F-35 en contient plus de 400 kilogrammes. Compte tenu des avancées technologiques attendues pour les chasseurs de sixième génération, ceux-ci devraient en nécessiter davantage. Il serait irréaliste de s'attendre à une révision importante de la répartition actuelle du travail industriel, puisqu'une telle démarche entraînerait des coûts de transaction supplémentaires et diluerait les responsabilités que chacun des partenaires a déjà obtenues pour son champion national de l'industrie de la défense dans le cadre de la conception de la plateforme GCAP. Les trois pays seront particulièrement prudents à l'idée d'intégrer de nouveaux partenaires, d'autant plus que les désaccords industriels entre Dassault Aviation et Airbus Allemagne ont récemment fait échouer la collaboration sur le Future Combat Air System (FCAS), le projet d'avion de combat de sixième génération évalué à 100 milliards d'euros. Par conséquent, les trois partenaires seront vraisemblablement davantage disposés à accueillir des pays capables d'apporter des injections de financement ainsi que des engagements d'achat futurs d'appareils, sans exiger en contrepartie une renégociation importante de la répartition industrielle existante. La principale raison est que la viabilité financière du projet, dont le coût total est estimé à plus de 130 milliards de dollars, devient de plus en plus incertaine. Le Royaume-Uni devait initialement engager plusieurs milliards de livres sterling en faveur du GCAP à la fin de 2025 dans le cadre de son Defence Investment Plan pour la prochaine décennie. Toutefois, les retards répétés ont fait naître des doutes quant à sa capacité à réunir les fonds nécessaires. De son côté, le Japon a consacré 500 milliards de yens (3,1 milliards de dollars américains) au projet au cours des cinq années se terminant en mars et a approuvé un financement supplémentaire de 170 milliards de yens, mais des sommes beaucoup plus importantes seront requises au cours des prochaines années. Cette situation survient alors même que Tokyo fait face à ses propres contraintes budgétaires après avoir annoncé la toute première réduction de la taxe à la consommation sur les produits alimentaires, une mesure qui devrait coûter au gouvernement 8 000 milliards de yens sur deux ans. Ce que le Canada devrait faire Le Canada devrait concentrer ses efforts sur l'obtention de possibilités de collaboration en recherche-développement (R-D) et en innovation dans le cadre d'un investissement multidimensionnel à long terme visant à renforcer les capacités futures de l'Aviation royale canadienne (ARC) ainsi que la base de connaissances et les capacités technologiques du secteur canadien de la défense. L'acquisition d'avions de combat de sixième génération par le Canada n'est pas une question de savoir si, mais quand. Conformément au principe « Construire–S'associer–Acheter » (Build–Partner–Buy Framework) de la Stratégie industrielle de défense, le Canada devrait donc chercher à participer au développement d'un système de prochaine génération en tant que partenaire, plutôt que de demeurer simple observateur en attendant d'en devenir éventuellement acheteur. Toutefois, un engagement envers le GCAP pourrait conduire à un scénario où le Canada exploiterait à terme une flotte mixte composée de trois types d'avions de combat — le F-35, le Gripen et le futur appareil du GCAP — alors qu'il existe déjà une opposition importante à l'idée même d'une flotte composée de seulement deux chasseurs différents. La voie la plus raisonnable consisterait à mener à terme l'acquisition des 88 F-35 déjà commandés, compte tenu des ressources considérables qui ont déjà été engagées en matière d'infrastructures de soutien, de maintenance, de formation du personnel et de logiciels. Les F-35 permettraient au Canada de remplir l'essentiel de ses engagements en matière de défense continentale et au sein du NORAD. Les ressources restantes devraient ensuite être consacrées au développement et à l'acquisition des futurs appareils du GCAP et de leurs UCCA, afin de renforcer le potentiel expéditionnaire de l'ARC entre l'Europe et l'Indo-Pacifique. Une solution de rechange au GCAP consisterait à conclure un partenariat avec Saab afin de construire des Gripen au Canada, une entente qui pourrait également ouvrir la voie à un rôle important dans le propre programme suédois d'avion de combat de sixième génération. Le Konceptet Framtidens Stridsflyg (KFS) (« Programme conceptuel pour le futur système de combat aérien ») poursuivrait une approche de « système de systèmes » semblable à celle du GCAP et mène actuellement des études conceptuelles préliminaires. Toutefois, une adhésion au GCAP ouvrirait la porte à une collaboration entre les entreprises et les instituts de recherche canadiens et les acteurs les plus avancés de l'industrie, notamment BAE Systems au Royaume-Uni et Leonardo en Italie — tous deux partenaires industriels du programme F-35 et auparavant associés à Airbus dans le cadre du développement de l'Eurofighter Typhoon — ainsi que Mitsubishi Heavy Industries au Japon, constructeur du Mitsubishi F-2 (dérivé du F-16 américain) et engagé dans les travaux précurseurs ayant mené au projet GCAP depuis le début des années 2010. Les retombées en matière d'acquisition de connaissances et les possibilités de recherche-développement conjointe dépasseraient ainsi largement celles qu'offrirait une collaboration avec Saab uniquement. Avec l'abandon du projet Future Combat Air System (FCAS) mené par la France, l'Allemagne et l'Espagne, le GCAP constitue désormais le plus prometteur des projets occidentaux d'avion de combat de sixième génération auquel le Canada pourrait réalistement se joindre. Certains pourraient évoquer le programme américain Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), qui développe le F-47. Toutefois, même si Washington pourrait éventuellement ouvrir la voie à une collaboration internationale, cette éventualité demeure peu probable. Le F-47 est en effet destiné à remplacer le F-22 Raptor, un chasseur de supériorité aérienne qui n'a jamais été exporté vers des pays alliés afin de préserver la confidentialité de ses technologies les plus sensibles. Par conséquent, le GCAP représente pour le Canada la meilleure porte d'entrée vers un rôle véritablement significatif dans la conception et la fabrication d'un avion de combat de sixième génération. Si Ottawa décide de défendre avec vigueur sa candidature en mettant de l'avant les contributions uniques qu'il est en mesure d'apporter au projet, il trouvera sans aucun doute des partenaires réceptifs. Crédit image: Hunini via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0. ## Le Canada devrait-il rejoindre le « Dôme doré » ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-devrait-il-rejoindre-le-dome-dore/ Modified: 2025-09-02 Policy Forum Politique est un nouveau format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d'opinions d'experts sur un sujet important pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Pour cette première édition, nous avons demandé à quatre experts leur point de vue sur la participation potentielle du Canada au Golden Dome, un important projet de défense antimissile à plusieurs niveaux proposé par l'administration Trump plus tôt cette année. Jean-François Bélanger, Collège royal danois de défense La décision du Canada de se joindre au projet Golden Dome devrait être conditionnelle à la capacité d'Ottawa d'obtenir des modalités de gouvernance binationale qui vont au-delà de la fourniture de données provenant de capteurs et de systèmes d'alerte. Si cet accord était conclu, il renforcerait probablement l'effet de « défense contre l'aide » du NORAD en consolidant l'engagement du Canada envers la défense continentale au nord du 49e parallèle, en particulier au-dessus de l'Arctique, et augmenterait le contrôle souverain sur les interceptions, des missiles balistiques aux missiles hypersoniques, au-dessus du territoire canadien. De plus, cela éviterait la « participation asymétrique » exigée par l'administration Bush lors des négociations sur la défense antimissile de 2005, qui avait découragé la participation du Canada. Compte tenu de l'impopularité historique de la défense antimissile et des armes spatiales au Canada, il serait essentiel de négocier une clause de sortie au cas où les États-Unis développeraient à l'avenir une doctrine de missiles déployés dans l'espace qui irait à l'encontre des politiques canadiennes. La participation canadienne serait donc fondée sur une doctrine selon laquelle les interceptions ne proviennent pas de missiles situés dans l'espace, car ceux-ci pourraient techniquement être utilisés à des fins offensives. L'un des points de négociation pourrait concerner le transfert de la responsabilité du commandement de la défense antimissile de l'USNORTHCOM au NORAD lui-même. De cette façon, les interceptions au-dessus du territoire canadien nécessiteraient une clé canadienne, à l'instar des accords à double clé utilisés par les alliés des États-Unis pour les armes nucléaires américaines déployées à l'avant pendant la guerre froide. Pour ce faire, les deux pays devraient définir le processus de commandement binational et s'entendre sur l'utilisation et l'interprétation des données fournies par les capteurs. Le Canada ne devrait pas être simplement consulté. Il jouerait un rôle à part entière dans le processus. Sur le plan politique, le Canada devrait provisoirement se joindre aux phases initiales du projet Golden Dome, celles qui concernent les capteurs et les données, afin d'influencer l'architecture du projet. Il ne devrait s'engager à investir dans des intercepteurs de missiles, et à assumer la majeure partie du coût, qu'après avoir obtenu la garantie d'une infrastructure de commandement et de contrôle binationale sur le territoire canadien, l'accès à l'algorithme qui alimentera le backend du système et un droit de regard sur le contrôle des coûts à l'avenir. Jean-François Bélanger est professeur adjoint en opérations militaires au Collège royal danois de défense et titulaire d'un doctorat de l'Université McGill. Ses recherches portent notamment sur les armes nucléaires, la dissuasion et la prise de décision. Andrea Charron, Université du Manitoba En raison de sa participation au NORAD, le Canada participe déjà à la détection des menaces aériennes et balistiques qui pèsent sur l'Amérique du Nord, et sa mission de contrôle fournit des moyens pour contrer les attaques menées par des avions à voilure fixe et des missiles de croisière. Par conséquent, compte tenu du statu quo, le Canada ferait partie du Golden Dome, qu'il y soit officiellement inclus ou non. Compte tenu des menaces que représentent les missiles, le Canada a besoin de sa propre architecture intégrée de défense aérienne et antimissile (IAMD), coordonnée avec les systèmes américains et futurs systèmes de l'OTAN. Les raisons sont doubles. Premièrement, en raison de la géographie du Canada et du fait que la voie d'approche la plus rapide pour atteindre des cibles situées aux États-Unis passe par l'Arctique canadien, le Système d'alerte du Nord (une série de systèmes radar à courte et longue portée) et les futurs systèmes radar transhorizon (c'est-à-dire les variantes arctiques et polaires) fourniront des données essentielles sur la connaissance du domaine. Deuxièmement, en raison des trois missions du NORAD - alerte et contrôle aérospatial et alerte maritime - le NORAD est chargé de détecter et de neutraliser les menaces aériennes qui pèsent sur l'Amérique du Nord, notamment les chasseurs, les bombardiers, les missiles de croisière (lancés depuis les airs ou la mer) et les missiles de croisière intercontinentaux. Le NORAD n'a pas pour mission de neutraliser les missiles balistiques entrants. Il a du mal à faire face à certains types de systèmes aériens avancés sans pilote avec les capteurs dont il dispose actuellement. Le refus du Canada en 2005 de participer au système américain de défense antimissile balistique à mi-course basé au sol signifie que le NORAD avertit de l'arrivée de missiles balistiques, mais n'a pas son mot à dire ni aucun rôle à jouer dans leur neutralisation. Ce pouvoir décisionnel appartient au Commandement nord-américain (USNORTHCOM). L'environnement menaçant a contraint le Canada à repenser ses besoins futurs en matière de défense. Le Canada doit défendre ses infrastructures civiles et militaires essentielles, ce qui nécessite un système IAMD. Les intercepteurs spatiaux sont un pont trop loin, mais il existe de nombreux éléments du Golden Dome et des futurs systèmes de l'OTAN auxquels le Canada participera et devrait participer. L'avantage des alliés est que les capteurs et les systèmes qu'ils hébergent loin du Canada peuvent aider le Canada et vice versa. Si les systèmes américains et européens ne se concentreront pas spécifiquement sur le Canada sans sa participation, le Canada aura besoin à la fois de capacités nationales et de l'aide de ses alliés. Andrea Charron est professeure et directrice du Centre d'études sur la défense et la sécurité à l'Université du Manitoba. Elle est titulaire d'un doctorat du Collège militaire royal du Canada. Ses recherches portent notamment sur le NORAD, l'OTAN, le Conseil de l'Arctique et la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada. Paul Meyer, Université Simon Fraser Il existe certaines mauvaises idées qui, malgré toute logique, refont surface périodiquement. L'une d'entre elles est le rêve américain de construire un bouclier impénétrable capable de protéger le pays contre toute forme d'attaque missile. Le président Ronald Reagan a adopté le concept de bouclier avec son Initiative de défense stratégique. Cependant, celle-ci n'a pas réussi à mettre en place un système terrestre viable, sans parler d'une constellation d'intercepteurs dans l'espace. Néanmoins, l'industrie de la défense était tout à fait disposée à dépenser des milliards pour poursuivre ce mirage et les politiciens se sont rendus complices en exemptant le programme des réglementations habituelles régissant les achats militaires. À l'heure actuelle, la version du président Donald Trump de l'illusion du bouclier national est le « Golden Dome ». Il affirme qu'il peut être créé en trois ans pour seulement 175 milliards de dollars, un rêve chimérique scandaleux qui recevra l'indulgence des principaux entrepreneurs américains du secteur de la défense. Le Canada devrait éviter ce gâchis pour trois raisons. La première est son inefficacité : les performances médiocres du système terrestre existant n'inspirent pas confiance, tandis que le système spatial fantaisiste nécessiterait, selon certaines estimations, une constellation de 40 000 intercepteurs. Une autre raison est qu'il serait déstabilisateur, car les adversaires des États-Unis ne permettront pas que leurs forces de représailles soient neutralisées par un futur système qui pourrait générer un avantage technologique et qui pourrait les inciter à augmenter leurs arsenaux de missiles offensifs à titre de protection. Le Golden Dome pourrait entraver les efforts futurs de négociation de réductions. La mise en place d'intercepteurs dans l'espace détruirait également l'espoir de préserver celui-ci comme un environnement non militarisé, ce que le Canada défend depuis des décennies. Enfin, il y a les coûts. Selon le Congressional Budget Office, les seuls aspects spatiaux de la défense contre quelques missiles balistiques intercontinentaux coûteraient plus de 500 milliards de dollars. Trump a déclaré au Canada que la participation au projet Golden Dome coûterait environ 100 milliards de dollars. Le Canada devrait donc éviter le « trou noir » que représente Golden Dome et s'en tenir à ses plans actuels de contribution à la modernisation du NORAD. Paul Meyer est chercheur en sécurité internationale et professeur adjoint à l'Université Simon Fraser, directeur du groupe canadien Pugwash et ancien diplomate de carrière canadien. Il a été ambassadeur auprès de la Conférence du désarmement à Genève de 2003 à 2007. Gaëlle Rivard Piché, CDA Institute Les discussions autour de la participation potentielle du Canada au Golden Dome occultent souvent la réalité la plus urgente : le Canada est devenu de plus en plus vulnérable face à ses adversaires. Les bombardiers russes qui contournent l'espace aérien nord-américain ne sont plus la seule préoccupation. Les drones, les missiles de croisière avancés et les armes hypersoniques menacent désormais les territoires canadiens et américains. Les défis dans les domaines maritime, spatial et cybernétique ne font que compliquer davantage la situation. Pour déterminer si le Canada devrait se joindre au Golden Dome, il faut faire la distinction entre la connotation politique du projet et les impératifs opérationnels qui ont initialement poussé les États-Unis à mettre au point un système de défense à plusieurs niveaux. Les commandants successifs du NORAD et de l'USNORTHCOM ont maintes fois mis en garde contre l'évolution rapide de ces menaces, non seulement pour les États-Unis, mais pour l'ensemble de l'Amérique du Nord. Le Canada a mis du temps à reconnaître que ces dangers nous touchent aussi directement. La mission du NORAD se limite à l'alerte aérospatiale, au contrôle aérospatial et à l'alerte maritime. En cas d'attaque balistique, c'est l'USNORTHCOM, et non le NORAD, qui est seul responsable de l'interception d'un missile entrant. Le Canada ne dispose pas de capacités de défense aérienne et antimissile, ce qui le laisse à la merci de ses adversaires et de la bonne volonté des États-Unis. En cas d'attaque complexe et à plusieurs niveaux contre l'Amérique du Nord, on ne peut pas supposer que Washington allouerait ses ressources limitées en matière de défense antimissile pour protéger les cibles canadiennes. Une défense aérienne et antimissile intégrée est désormais essentielle pour la défense du Canada et de l'Amérique du Nord. Le Golden Dome est une solution possible. La mise en place d'un système souverain de défense aérienne et antimissile canadien en est une autre. Ces deux options soulèvent des questions cruciales concernant la capacité, le coût, la technologie, le commandement et le contrôle, ainsi que les délais de livraison. Cependant, de par la nature même du NORAD, tout système souverain canadien serait inévitablement lié aux défenses américaines. En fin de compte, le Canada ne peut pas laisser la fierté nationale prendre le pas sur la sécurité et la défense nationales. Bien que la souveraineté en matière de défense ait une valeur importante, elle doit être mise en balance avec le besoin urgent de s'intégrer de manière transparente à notre plus proche allié militaire face à l'évolution rapide des menaces qui pèsent sur le continent. Gaëlle Rivard Piché est directrice générale de la Conférence des associations de la défense et de l'Institut CDA. Elle est titulaire d'un doctorat en affaires internationales de l'Université Carleton et a travaillé comme analyste stratégique pour Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada. ## Le Canada doit se défendre contre l’aide américaine en développant des capacités souveraines URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-doit-se-defendre-contre-laide-americaine-en-developpant-des-capacites-souveraines/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Comment le Canada doit-il adapter sa politique de défense pour faire face aux réalités du nouvel environnement géopolitique ? Plusieurs experts ont proposé, depuis le retour au pouvoir de Donald Trump, que le Canada refonde sa politique étrangère, diversifie ses partenariats stratégiques et développe des capacités plus autonomes en matière de renseignement, de dissuasion et d’industrie de défense. Ces propositions peuvent sembler relever de l’hérésie tant elles sonnent une note discordante avec la complaisance historique du Canada en matière de défense. Pourtant, l’actualité géopolitique impose de doter le Canada de capacités de défense souveraines. Or, les débats actuels n’ont rien de nouveau. Dans cette analyse, nous proposons que le Canada revienne à un concept méconnu de la politique de défense canadienne. Ce concept est celui de la « défense contre l’aide » (defence against help), élaboré par Nils Ørvik en 1973 dans le but de proposer les contours d’une politique de défense pour un État faisant face à une puissance majeure à ses frontières. Lorsque ce concept a été utilisé afin de donner un sens à la politique de défense canadienne, notamment dans le contexte de sa relation asymétrique avec les États-Unis, plusieurs ont soutenu que le Canada poursuivait cette stratégie dans ses relations avec les États-Unis. Néanmoins, ce n’est pas le cas. Plutôt que d’adopter une stratégie privilégiant le développement d’une force militaire capable de garantir le contrôle territorial canadien sans recourir à « l’aide américaine », les gouvernements fédéraux successifs ont privilégié une structure de force largement définie par une intégration étroite avec les États-Unis. En conséquence, ils ont ignoré la potentielle menace posée par les États-Unis contre l’intégrité territoriale canadienne. Face à l’hostilité affichée par l’administration Trump à l’égard de la souveraineté canadienne (et danoise), à ses menaces d’abandonner la protection des alliés des États-Unis et à sa volonté de mener une guerre tarifaire tous azimuts, force est de constater que les États-Unis ne constituent plus un allié fiable et bienveillant. Comme l’a affirmé sans ambages le premier ministre Mark Carney : « L’ancienne relation que nous avions avec les États-Unis, basée sur l’intégration approfondie de nos économies et une coopération étroite en matière de sécurité et de défense, est terminée ». Dans cette optique, il a lancé un réexamen de l’acquisition de F-35 et affirmé son intérêt de participer au projet de « Dôme d’or » annoncé par le Président Trump, déclarant : « Nous sommes maintenant dans une position où nous collaborons si nécessaire , mais nous n’allons pas nécessairement collaborer ». Cette stratégie passe par deux piliers : diversifier les partenaires du Canada en se rapprochant d’alliés plus fiables, tels que les Européens, ainsi que privilégier le développement d’une industrie militaire canadienne. Pour mettre en œuvre la vision de M. Carney, il est nécessaire de revisiter l’idée originale d’Ørvik afin de dresser les contours d’une politique de défense contre l’aide américaine pour les décennies à venir. Pour ce faire, nous débuterons par rappeler comment le Canada s’est retrouvé dans la situation difficile dans laquelle il se retrouve aujourd’hui. Ensuite, nous présenterons les défis auxquels le Canada est confronté actuellement. Enfin, nous proposerons une série de mesures afin que le Canada surmonte ces défis en mettant en œuvre une stratégie de défense contre l’aide. La renonciation de capacités souveraines de défense Pour comprendre la situation actuelle du Canada en matière de défense, il faut remonter assez loin dans le temps. Il est important de reconnaître tout d’abord que les dépenses militaires canadiennes au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale n’ont connu une véritable ascension qu’entre 1950 et 1953 en proportion du PIB. Comme en attestent les données du SIPRI, le Canada est passé de 2,43% du PIB alloué aux dépenses militaires en 1950 à un sommet de 7,37% en 1953. Puis, avec la fin de la guerre de Corée, la proportion de dépenses militaires n’a cessé de diminuer jusqu’en 1974, atteignant à ce moment 1,78% du PIB. Ce déclin progressif a coïncidé avec l’introduction de programmes sociaux et reflétait le développement de la doctrine de destruction mutuelle assurée entre les États-Unis et l’Union soviétique. Dans ce contexte, il n’était pas logique que le Canada consacre une part substantielle de ses dépenses aux forces armées. En effet, comme l’indiquait le Livre blanc sur la défense publié en 1970 par le gouvernement de Pierre Trudeau, « il n’y a pas de niveau évident pour les dépenses de défense au Canada ».[1] Quoique le constat peut paraître banal, ce fut une tournant dans la politique de défense canadienne depuis la guerre de Corée. Plutôt que de fixer un pourcentage du PIB à atteindre, le Livre blanc estimait que les dépenses militaires devaient tenir comptes des besoins des autres programmes gouvernementaux. D’une part, le gouvernement de Pierre Trudeau réduisit de moitié le contingent Canadiens déployés en Europe, passant de 10 000 à 5 000 militaires et de six à trois escadrons de CF-104. En effet, le Livre blanc inversait les priorités canadiennes, faisant passer la défense du territoire national devant les obligations envers l’Alliance atlantique. D’autre part, même si le Livre blanc déclarait que l’objectif premier de la politique de défense canadienne était de « préserver la souveraineté et l’indépendance du pays », il acceptait la dépendance à l’égard de la protection américaine en matière de dissuasion nucléaire. Compte tenu de la menace posée par les missiles balistiques intercontinentaux soviétiques, le Livre blanc renonçait « à consacrer des sommes importantes à l’achat d’un nouvel équipement ou de nouvelles installations qui ne pourraient servir dans l’avenir qu’à la défense anti-bombardiers active ». Le Canada choisissait de se fier entièrement sur les capacités de détection, d’interception et de représailles anti-missiles des États-Unis pour assurer sa protection territoriale. Puisque l’accord du NORAD « ne spécifie aucun niveau de forces, équipement ou installations » requises, « la nature et l’étendue de la contribution du Canada restent matière à décision pour le gouvernement du Canada. » Pourtant, le gouvernement de Pierre Trudeau lança dès 1975 un programme de réarmement des Forces canadiennes. Il augmenta de façon considérable le budget consacré à la défense entre 1976 et 1984, de façon à acquérir une nouvelle flotte d’avions de chasse, de navires, de véhicules blindés et de chars d’assaut. Si le premier objectif était de remplacer plusieurs capacités vieillissantes, un second consistait à maintenir un engagement militaire conséquent en Europe afin d’accroître les relations commerciales avec le Vieux Continent et de maintenir la réputation d’allié fiable de l’OTAN. La part du PIB consacrée à la défense passa ainsi de 1,78% en 1974 à 2,12% en 1984, soit une augmentation réelle de 49%. Le gouvernement Mulroney entendait poursuivre sur cette voie dans les années 1980 en promettant une augmentation significative des dépenses de défense, mais cela ne s’est jamais concrétisé. La fin de la Guerre froide de même que les contraintes budgétaires canadiennes rendirent caduc les mesures imposantes annoncées en 1987. Malgré le programme de réarment amorcé par son prédécesseur, le gouvernement Mulroney estimait que les ressources consacrées à la défense étaient insuffisantes pour respecter les engagements militaires canadiens. Dressant un constat sévère, le Livre blanc de 1987 déclarait : Les forces maritimes possèdent trop peu de bâtiments opérationnels, ont une capacité extrêmement limitée de mener des opérations dans l’Arctique et sont dépourvues de moyens de garantir que les voies navigables et les ports du Canada soient exempts de mines. […] Les forces terrestres, quant à elles, sont aux prises avec une très grave pénurie de matériel et ne comptent pas assez de soldats prêts au combat […]. Les forces aériennes, pour leur part, manquent nettement d’aéronefs pour transporter les troupes et le matériel en Europe en période de tension et pour assurer le soutien durant des hostilités ; elles manquent également d’appareils de patrouille maritime et d’armes modernes destinées aux CF-18 et n’ont pas de CF-18 de remplacement pour compenser les pertes subies en temps de paix. Plutôt que de réduire les engagements du Canada en Europe, qui aurait eu pour effet de compromettre « la cohésion de l’Alliance », le Livre blanc préconisait un réinvestissement majeur dans les forces armées. Grâce à une croissance réelle de 2% des dépenses militaires par année (c’est-à-dire après inflation), environ 270 grands projets d’acquisition de matériel étaient prévus, dont les suivants : sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire (SSN), avions de patrouille à grand rayon d’action, chasseurs CF-18A et frégates additionnelles, système d’alerte du Nord, systèmes de sonars fixes dans l’Arctique, et systèmes de surveillance spatiale. À ceci s’ajoutaient la création de brigades territoriales supplémentaires, l’augmentation du nombre de militaires affectés en Europe, ainsi que la consolidation des engagements militaires en Europe, de sorte d’être en mesure de déployer une division (i.e., deux brigades) en Allemagne en cas de crise. Il va sans dire que, aux yeux du gouvernement Mulroney, le Canada ne disposait pas des capacités nécessaires pour défendre le pays face à une possible agression extérieure. Par exemple, pour justifier l’acquisition de 10 à 12 SSN, le Livre blanc affirmait : « Le SSN est le seul type de bâtiment capable d’assurer surveillance et contrôle dans l’océan Arctique et dans les eaux canadiennes prises par les glaces… Le SSN est considéré comme l’achat le plus avantageux pour la Marine, parce qu’il s’agit d’une plate-forme anti-sous-marine pouvant mener des opérations dans les trois océans qui nous intéressent. » Dès novembre 1989, toutefois, le premier ministre Mulroney déclarait lors d’une visite en URSS que la politique de défense de 1987 était dépassée. Le Canada renonçait alors à assurer une présence anti-sous-marine effective dans les trois océans qui le bordent, soit un espace océanique de près de six millions de km2. Afin d’équilibrer le budget fédéral le gouvernement Chrétien entama d’importantes coupures budgétaires dans les années 1990. Le budget de défense fut réduit de 30% entre 1994 et 1998 et le renouvellement des équipements majeurs fut indéfiniment retardé. Les dépenses militaires passèrent de 2,11% du PIB en 1986 à 1,11 % en 2005 et le gouvernement réduisit la taille de ses forces d’un tiers. Néanmoins, les Forces armées canadiennes furent déployées dans presque toutes les opérations alliées, du Golfe persique à l’Afghanistan, en passant par la Bosnie et le Kosovo. La combinaison d’un rythme opérationnel élevé et de faibles dépenses a mené le Canada, et de nombreux autres alliés européens, à optimiser sa planification et ses dépenses militaires. Cette optimisation a consisté à s’appuyer de plus en plus sur les États-Unis pour financer la recherche et le développement de nouvelles capacités militaires, ce qui permit au Canada d’en bénéficier pour un coût relativement faible. En prime, les Forces armées canadiennes purent accroître leur interopérabilité avec leurs homologues américains et, surtout, purent participer à des opérations aux côtés des États-Unis à un coût minime. Dans le cadre du NORAD, le Canada a en outre approfondi son étroite collaboration avec les États-Unis pour défendre le continent nord-américain, tout en retardant les investissements supplémentaires, tels que de nouveaux avions chasse et de ravitaillement, des systèmes de radars et de défense aérienne adaptés aux technologies avancées, des systèmes de renseignement, surveillance et reconnaissance (ISR), ou encore des sous-marins capables d’opérer dans les eaux glacées. Cette solution était jugée optimale car le Canada pouvait maintenir une force polyvalente dotée de capacités de combat dans les trois armées, tout en consacrant à la défense un peu plus de 1% de son PIB, compte tenu de la collaboration étroite avec les États-Unis. Le débat entourant le refus du gouvernement canadien de participer au programme de défense antimissile des États-Unis illustra également cette dynamique. Comme le souligna Philippe Lagassé, certains affirmèrent que de permettre aux États-Unis de défendre le continent contre les missiles balistiques sans une contribution canadienne porterait atteinte à la souveraineté du Canada. Contrairement au concept de défense contre l’aide d’Ørvik, cependant, peu d’analystes ont suggéré que le Canada construise son propre système de défense antimissile, ou encore se dote de ses propres capacités d’interception. Les arguments contre la décision du gouvernement canadien ne visaient pas développer des capacités de défense souveraines contre l’aide américaine, mais plutôt à profiter de la protection offerte par le système américain et des faibles coûts d’un soutien politique canadien, tout en conservant un « siège à la table » afin d’espérer participer à la prise de décision sur l’interception de missiles. L’intérêt déclaré du gouvernement Carney envers une participation du Canada dans le « dôme d’or » du président Trump semble signaler que le Canada reconnait que la protection américaine ne sera plus gratuite. La poursuite de l’alignement au cours du premier mandat Trump Le gouvernement de Justin Trudeau amorça en 2017 un vaste programme de recapitalisation des Forces armées canadiennes afin de remplacer les équipements vieillissants ou désuets, puis, en 2022, afin de moderniser les installations du NORAD. Les dépenses en capital prévues pour la défense jusqu’en 2037 étaient estimés à 215 milliards de dollars. En 2024, le gouvernement Trudeau annonça un autre programme de recapitalisation, prévoyant faire passer le budget annuel de défense de 41 milliards de dollars en 2024 à 57,8 milliards de dollars en 2029, soit une augmentation de 41%. Aussi importante soit-elle, cette augmentation ne devait faire passer la proportion des dépenses militaires de 1,35% qu’à 1,58% du PIB, soit loin de l’engagement du Canada auprès de l’OTAN de consacrer 2% du PIB en défense en 2024. La hausse notable mais modeste des dépenses militaires prévue par le gouvernement Trudeau s’inscrivait dans la même approche d’alignement sur les États-Unis que ses prédécesseurs, prévoyant surtout l’acquisition de capacités américaines. Bien sûr, le Canada a acheté auprès d’Airbus 16 avions CC-295 Kingsfisher pour effectuer des opérations de recherche et de sauvetage, ainsi que neuf avions CC-330 Husky pour le ravitaillement en vol et le transport de personnalités. Nous pouvons également penser à de nombreux autres exemples de capacités européennes acquises pour les FAC, mais lorsqu’il s’agissait d’investissements majeurs en matière de capacité de combat, le gouvernement canadien demeurait fermement décidé de se doter de technologie américaine. Par exemple, l’on peut citer l’acquisition de 88 chasseurs F-35A auprès de Lockheed Martin, de trois aéronefs de renseignement, reconnaissance et surveillance Beechcraft King Air 350ER auprès de Textron, de 16 avions de patrouille maritime P-8A Poseidon auprès de Boeing, du système de combat Aegis de Lockheed Martin pour les 15 futurs navires de guerre, ou encore du système de communication par satellite à large bande (WGS-9) de Boeing. En privilégiant l’acquisition de capacités militaires produites à l’étranger, le Canada se privait de fait du développement de ces systèmes par sa propre industrie nationale. L’acquisition d’une flotte de P-8A, d’une valeur de 10,4 milliards de dollars en 2023, suscita d’ailleurs la controverse, car le gouvernement canadien préféra un fournisseur américain (Boeing) plutôt que Bombardier, une entreprise canadienne, et les capacités de surveillance maritime avancées développées par General Dynamics Mission System – Canada pour le remplacement de la flotte CP-140 Aurora. L’option proposée par Bombardier semblait trop incertaine en termes de calendrier et de disponibilité opérationnelle pour Ottawa, malgré les assurances de Bombardier que l’avion serait prêt au début des années 2030. Cette décision est l’exemple par excellence de la stratégie d’approvisionnement militaire canadienne, qui exige des capacités existantes et éprouvées au moment de la décision d’acquisition, acquiesce aux préférences des militaires canadiens pour des appareils interchangeables avec ceux utilisés par les États-Unis, et renonce du même coup à développer une industrie canadienne dans un secteur aussi stratégique et névralgique que constitue l’industrie aérospatiale. Car si le Canada avait choisi de privilégier le développement de capacités souveraines, il aurait investi dans l’industrie canadienne plusieurs années avant le moment de remplacer la flotte d’Aurora, de manière à ce qu’il existe une solution éprouvée et fabriquée au Canada au moment venu. Cette renonciation au développement de capacités souveraines pouvait représenter un choix optimal à l’époque où le programme de recapitalisation des FAC s’appuyait sur une projection des dépenses militaires sous le seuil de 2% du PIB et avec la confiance envers une intégration étroite avec les forces armées américaines. Telle était la situation au début de la seconde investiture de Trump. Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, force est toutefois de constater que cette stratégie met à risque le Canada. Le défi de Trump 2.0 Le président américain Donald Trump a remis en question la souveraineté du Canada, lancé une guerre commerciale contre ses alliés et semé le doute quant à l’engagement des États-Unis envers l’Article 5 de l’OTAN. Ces attaques sont répétées, ciblent plusieurs alliés, s’inscrivent dans une vision promulguée dès son premier mandat et, contrairement à ce dernier, sont désormais mises en œuvre de manière agressive. Par exemple, les services de renseignement américain mènent des opérations d’espionnage au Groenland. En ce qui concerne le Canada, deux interprétations s’opposent. Certains estiment que la rhétorique du président Trump fait partie d’une stratégie visant à inclure le Canada dans une forteresse nord-américaine, alors que d’autres jugent qu’il faut prendre M. Trump au mot, à savoir que les États-Unis n’ont pas besoin de ce que le Canada a à offrir et que la défense du Canada est trop onéreuse pour les États-Unis. Peu importe laquelle de ces visions est la plus représentative de la pensée du président Trump, il n’en reste pas moins que cette administration remet en cause les fondements de la politique et de la planification de la défense canadienne. Que le Canada soit lâché par Washington et forcé d’assurer sa propre sécurité, ou qu’il soit confronté à la volonté américaine de combler unilatéralement les défaillances de la défense territoriale du Canada, tous deux scénarios signifieraient l’arrêt de mort de la politique de défense conjointe et amicale du continent nord-américain qui prévaut depuis la fin des années 1930. L’une des possibilités les plus inquiétantes est que M. Trump ou l’un de ses successeurs concluent que le Canada est tellement important pour la sécurité américaine qu’il doit être défendu par les États-Unis aux conditions imposées par Washington. L’administration appliquerait alors au Canada une rhétorique similaire à celle appliquée au Groenland. Ce scénario est peut-être improbable, mais beaucoup de choses que l’administration Trump a fait ces derniers mois semblaient initialement improbables, comme le fait de s’aligner sur la Russie de Vladimir Poutine, de miner la communauté du renseignement américain, et de saper les principes fondamentaux de la Constitution américaine. Plusieurs au sein de la communauté canadienne de sécurité et de défense estiment que Trump n’est qu’un problème temporaire et qu’Ottawa doit en conséquence maintenir une stratégie consistant à se baisser la tête et se protéger (duck and cover). L’ancien ministre de la Défense, Bill Blair, minimisait ainsi la menace posée par les États-Unis à la mi-février 2025, et le ministère de la Défense temporise la nécessité de reconsidérer l’acquisition de chasseurs F-35. Cette attitude est compréhensible étant donné l’étroitesse des liens qui unissent la communauté de la défense canado-américaine. Toutefois, le gouvernement du Canada n’a pas le luxe de supposer que la stratégie du sablier fonctionnera face à Trump. Il serait politiquement irresponsable de jouer la montre face Trump et d’éviter de se prémunir contre les scénarios d’un abandon ou d’une coercition américaine. Il est fort possible que les fondements populistes, nationalistes, protectionnistes et autoritaires de la politique étrangère de Donald Trump s’inscriront dans la durée. Les actions et les paroles de l’administration Trump représentent une menace claire pour le Canada, même si elles n’aboutissent pas à une guerre contre le Canada. Si le scénario d’une invasion à grande échelle du Canada par les États-Unis n’est pas crédible, un autre beaucoup plus probable est celui d’une incursion américaine afin de sécuriser l’accès à des ressources naturelles, des infrastructures critiques, ou des voies maritimes canadiennes, incluant dans le Grand Nord. Ce scénario pourrait voir les États-Unis déployer des forces militaires sur le territoire canadien sous prétexte de « l’aider » à résoudre un incident ou un problème de sécurité, mais ne jamais quitter ensuite. Cela se ferait sous le couvert d’une intervention amicale, d’une offre d’assistance face à une menace réelle ou fabriquée. Le président Trump a déjà offert de déployer des forces américaines au Mexique afin d’aider le pays à combattre les cartels de la drogue et son conseiller Peter Navarro a affirmé que les cartels sont en expansion au Canada. Une « offre » similaire pourrait donc être faite au Canada. Si cette offre venait, ou devrions-nous plutôt dire si cette offre était imposée, elle le serait à la façon de Don Corleone – sans que l’on puisse la refuser. Le Canada se verrait demander d’accepter en toute amitié une aide inamicale et ne pourrait compter sur ses alliés européens pour lui prêter main forte. Se défendre contre l’aide non sollicitée Que doit faire le Canada pour se préparer à une telle éventualité ? Lorsque Ørvik proposa le principe de défense contre l’aide au Canada, il l’entendait au sens finlandais du terme. En effet, la Finlande a veillé à ne pas avoir besoin de l’« aide » soviétique pour maintenir son indépendance et sa souveraineté au cours de la Guerre froide. La défense contre l’aide représentait la meilleure stratégie qu’un petit État voisin d’une grande puissance potentiellement hostile pouvait adopter. Selon Ørvik, trois principes sont essentiels afin de réussir une stratégie de défense contre l’aide : 1) plus grande est l’importance stratégique du territoire d’un petit État pour son puissant voisin, plus il devra investir dans ses capacités militaires afin de dissuader une aide non sollicitée ; 2) la volonté et la capacité du petit État à empêcher l’accès et l’utilisation de son territoire doit être perçue comme crédible par son voisin plus puissant; et 3) le petit État doit pratiquer une politique de non-alignement à l’égard des États rivaux de son puissant voisin. Compte tenu de l’importance croissante du territoire canadien pour les États-Unis en raison de sa position géographique et de ses richesses naturelles, l’adoption d’une stratégie de défense contre l’aide par Ottawa exigerait, outre le non-alignement sur la Chine ou la Russie que pratique déjà le Canada, le développement d’une capacité militaire crédible et suffisante pour faire face à tout incident, problème ou menace sur son sol, dans ses airs, ou dans ses eaux. Une telle politique de défense, fondée sur l’autonomie, la résilience et la diversification des partenaires, permettrait d’empêcher la grande puissance voisine d’utiliser un prétexte pour déployer ses forces sur le territoire de son plus petit voisin. De cette façon, le Canada pourrait dire en toute crédibilité aux États-Unis : « nous n’avons pas besoin de votre aide ». Il faudrait plus d’une décennie ou deux pour que le Canada puisse de manière réaliste mettre en pratique une stratégie de défense contre l’aide tant Ottawa a systématiquement sous-investi en défense et renoncé au développement de capacités souveraines. Cela dit, la tâche n’est pas impossible. À court terme, le Canada ne peut se priver des capacités américaines existantes. Les abandonner rendrait le Canada encore plus vulnérable et nuirait à son industrie militaire profondément intégrée à celle des États-Unis. Mais en même temps, le Canada doit dès à présent et avec un sentiment d’urgence développer ses capacités souveraines dans des secteurs critiques et nouer des partenariats avec des alliés fiables afin de réduire la dépendance chronique sur les États-Unis. Cela permettrait de jeter les bases d’une politique crédible de défense contre l’aide à l’horizon de 2040. À quoi cela ressemblerait-il dans la pratique ? Cela signifierait une force capable de défendre son propre espace aérien et maritime, ainsi que de faire face à un accident majeur et à des catastrophes naturelles sur l’ensemble du territoire national, incluant en Arctique. Cela signifierait en outre une force disposant de systèmes de communication, de renseignement et de surveillance indépendants, incluant par satellites, capteurs sous-marins et radars. Enfin, la défense contre l’aide signifierait prioriser la défense du territoire canadien par rapport aux missions expéditionnaires et privilégier le développement de capacités souveraines plutôt que l’acquisition d’équipement américain. L’exemple le plus probant réside dans l’acquisition de F-35, remise en question par le premier ministre Carney. Avec raison, certains estiment que le Canada devrait se tourner vers une alternative européenne, comme le Gripen ou le Rafale, de manière à réduire la dépendance du Canada à l’égard du soutien opérationnel et technologique des États-Unis. Toutefois, les critiques ont également raison de souligner que le Canada a tellement besoin de nouveaux avions de chasse qu’il ne peut se permettre un retard supplémentaire pour remplacer ses CF-18, et que les F-35 offrent des capacités furtives inégalées par leurs concurrents européens. Dans une logique de défense contre l’aide, le Canada devrait dès lors opter pour une flotte mixte, tel que le préconise l’ancien commandant de l’Avion royale canadienne, Yvan Blondin. Aux 88 F-35A prévus entre 2026 et 2034 devrait être ajoutée une flotte de 50 chasseurs européens, de manière à porter la flotte canadienne à 138 appareils, soit autant que la quantité de F-18 acquise en 1982. Le choix du second appareil devrait être conditionné à ses capacités de défense du territoire canadien tout autant qu’à la volonté du fournisseur de développer les capacités de production au Canada, de manière à établir les bases d’une capacité industrielle nationale. C’est d’ailleurs ce à quoi s’étaient engagés Dassault et Saab. À ceci devrait s’ajouter la participation du Canada dans le développement d’un chasseur de 6e génération, soit du côté du Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) développé par le Royaume-Uni, le Japon et l’Italie, soit auprès de la France et de l’Allemagne et leur Système de Combat Aérien du Futur (SCAF), de manière à développer en tandem les capacités de drones qui feront partie intégrant de la future génération d’avions de chasse. Il ne fait aucun doute qu’une flotte mixte et le développement d’une industrie aérospatiale nationale serait coûteuse et exigeante en termes de personnel. Le modèle d’une force simple et interchangeable avec les États-Unis est beaucoup moins onéreux. C’est précisément pourquoi il était optimal pour le Canada de privilégier ce modèle jusqu’à présent. Certains pourraient arguer que tant que la coercition américaine ne se matérialise pas, il n’est pas nécessaire de s’en prémunir. Le problème avec cette logique, bien entendu, est que si cette coercition se matérialiserait, il serait trop tard pour l’en empêcher. Si des pays tels que le Royaume-Uni, l’Italie, l’Allemagne, la Grèce et la Pologne ont fait le choix de maintenir une flotte mixte d’avions de chasse, le Canada pourrait s’inspirer de leur modèle de développement du personnel et des infrastructures afférentes. D’autres secteurs stratégiques devraient être priorisés par la future stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada, qui est attendue au cours de l’été 2025. Parmi les capacités souveraines à développer, citons les avions d’alerte précoce aéroportés (AEW&C), une vaste de gamme de drones (navires de surface sans pilote, véhicules sous-marins sans pilote, véhicules aériens sans pilote de basse, moyenne et haute altitude), des capteurs acoustiques sous-marins, ou encore des systèmes de missiles air-sol et antinavires. Dans d’autres domaines, tels que les sous-marins, un partenariat stratégique avec la Suède (Saab), la France (Naval Group), l’Allemagne (TKMS), l’Espagne (Navantia) ou la Corée du Sud (Hanwha) sera nécessaire. Le choix du fournisseur devrait être fondé non seulement sur les capacités techniques des sous-marins proposés, mais également sur la volonté de transférer au Canada la propriété intellectuelle et l’infrastructure nécessaires au maintien en service et développement technologique des capacités associées aux sous-marins. Dans cette perspective, le premier ministre Carney a raison d’envisager participer à l’ambitieux programme « dôme d’or » de défense antimissile du président Trump. Dans les mots du premier ministre : « Oui, c’est une bonne idée pour le Canada d’avoir une protection contre les missiles, parce qu’à partir de maintenant, il y a de vraies menaces contre le Canada venant de Russie, de Corée du Nord et peut-être de Chine, d’ici un certain temps ». Il faut toutefois rappeler que le Canada participe déjà au système de détection et d’alerte du programme de défense antimissile nord-américain, et qu’il collabore avec les États-Unis au développement des radars, satellites et autres infrastructures associées à la modernisation du NORAD. Toutefois, dans la logique de la défense contre l’aide, la participation du Canada à la défense antimissile devrait s’appuyer sur le développement de capacités canadiennes de surveillance, détection et d’interception, dans les limites de ce qui semble utile pour garantir la souveraineté du Canada. Ainsi, il serait sage d’investir dans les systèmes de radars, de satellites et de missiles de longue portée, mais sans doute moins dans les capacités d’interception basées dans l’espace. La mise en œuvre d’une politique de défense contre l’aide serait nécessairement plus coûteuse que la politique actuelle d’intégration au sein des forces armées américaines. Mais le contexte politique est favorable à des investissements majeurs en défense et les Canadiens appuient en majorité une hausse des dépenses militaires. Le plan du premier ministre Carney prévoit ajouter plus de 30 milliards de dollars aux prévisions budgétaires de la politique Notre Nord, Fort et Libre (NNFL), annoncé en avril 2024. Ceci ferait passer le budget annuel de la défense de 41 milliards de dollars en 2024-25 à 68,4 milliards de dollars en 2028-29, soit une hausse de 67%. Si les alliés de l’OTAN s’entendent comme prévu sur un nouveau seuil de 3,5% du PIB en défense, cela signifierait, selon les estimations du Directeur parlementaire du budget, un budget annuel de 128 milliards de dollars en 2030, soit une hausse de 212% par rapport au budget de 2024-25. De telles hausses budgétaires rendraient donc non seulement possible mais surtout impérative la mise en place d’une stratégie de défense contre l’aide, puisque dépenser de telles sommes dans l’industrie américaine plutôt que canadienne ferait scandale. En effet, si le premier ministre Carney a raison d’affirmer que 75% des acquisitions militaires actuelles du Canada vont à l’achat d’équipement américain, maintenir un tel ratio serait économiquement indécent et politiquement risqué. Dans un contexte d’investissements majeurs en défense, la stratégie de défense contre l’aide constitue la meilleure voie à suivre. Conclusion L’histoire de la politique de défense canadienne témoigne d’un choix constant de dépendance à l’égard des États-Unis, fondé sur une logique de rationalisation budgétaire et d’interopérabilité stratégique. Toutefois, le retour de Donald Trump au pouvoir, et plus largement l’instabilité politique croissante chez notre voisin, impose une révision profonde de cette posture. L’actualisation du concept de la « défense contre l’aide » permettrait au Canada de recouvrir sa souveraineté militaire, en renforçant ses capacités nationales, en diversifiant ses partenariats industriels et stratégiques, et en préparant une réponse crédible à toute tentative d’ingérence « amicale » de Washington. Ce changement de cap exige non seulement des investissements massifs mais aussi un engagement politique soutenu pour développer une industrie de défense autonome et résiliente. À l’aube de choix budgétaires cruciaux et de tensions géopolitiques durables, le Canada a l’occasion historique de transformer sa dépendance en puissance souveraine. Le succès de cette transformation dépendra de notre volonté collective d’assumer les coûts de notre indépendance et de bâtir, dès aujourd’hui, les bases d’une sécurité nationale conçue par et pour les Canadiens. La fatigue constituera un défi majeur à surmonter. De nombreux Canadiens guetteront le moindre signe de recul de Trump pour affirmer que nous devons revenir à nos anciennes habitudes. Il est vrai que les anciennes méthodes sont faciles, confortables et peu coûteuses. La perspective de retourner au statu quo ante et de ne plus jamais avoir à se préoccuper de Trump est très attrayante et pourrait finalement l’emporter. Mais seule une stratégie de défense contre l’aide permettra au Canada de protéger sa souveraineté, de tirer profit de son économique, et de se rendre moins vulnérable aux soubresauts politiques américains. [1] Traduction libre de la version anglaise : « There is no obvious level for defence expenditures in Canada. » La version officielle en français n’est pas aussi claire : « Le Canada ne possède pas de barème afin de déterminer l'importance des dépenses de la défense. » ## Le Canada doit se préparer à la coercition américaine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-doit-se-preparer-a-la-coercition-americaine/ Modified: 2025-03-21 > Si le Canada entretient depuis longtemps des relations étroites et stables avec son voisin américain, les menaces d’asphyxier l’économie... Si le Canada entretient depuis longtemps des relations étroites et stables avec son voisin américain, les menaces d’asphyxier l’économie canadienne afin de le forcer à joindre les États-Unis, de cesser d’assurer la protection du Canada, de redessiner les frontières, ou encore d’exclure le Canada de l’alliance du Five Eyes obligent à envisager la possibilité que le président Trump exerce des pressions susceptibles de saper la souveraineté et la sécurité du Canada. L’on peut certes espérer que le président Trump ne mettra pas ses menaces à exécution, mais il serait irresponsable de ne pas se préparer au pire. D’autant plus que les menaces d’annexion ne visent pas que le Canada, mais également un autre allié transatlantique, le Danemark, et que le président Trump persiste et signe dans son appétit pour l’impérialisme du 19e siècle. Si l’idée que les États-Unis se retournent contre leur allié du Nord peut sembler farfelue à certains, nous devons être conscients des risques potentiels. Une approche lucide de la sécurité nationale exige d’anticiper et de se préparer à des scénarios où les États-Unis utiliseraient leur poids considérable pour atteindre leurs objectifs impérialistes. Dans cette analyse, j’examine quatre scénarios possibles et propose une voie à suivre pour accroître la résilience du Canada et atténuer les risques posés par la politique brutale de Donald Trump. Quatre scénarios de coercition américaine Pendant des décennies, le Canada a compté sur la protection des États-Unis dans le cadre du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD) et d’une coopération militaire plus large. Toutefois, une administration américaine plus transactionnelle et égoïste pourrait décider que la protection militaire du Canada n’est plus dans son intérêt, que ce soit parce qu’elle coûte trop cher, comme le soutien Trump, ou encore parce que Washington souhaite faire pression sur le Canada pour qu’il accepte son annexion aux États-Unis. Le Canada se trouverait alors hautement vulnérable aux menaces extérieures, y compris l’agression potentielle d’États rivaux tels que la Chine et la Russie. Le principe selon lequel les États-Unis garantiront la sécurité du Canada ne tient plus car le lien de confiance a été rompu. Le Canada pourrait être lâché par son principal allié par un simple message sur les réseaux sociaux. Le Canada doit dès lors se préparer à l’éventualité d’un abandon stratégique, que ce soit face à une attaque cyber ou la violation de son espace aérien ou de ses voies maritimes. Les intérêts économiques et stratégiques des États-Unis pourraient également conduire à des actions unilatérales plus agressives sur le territoire canadien. Cela pourrait se manifester à l’égard de différends territoriaux tels que le passage du Nord-Ouest, que les Américains considèrent comme des eaux internationales et non canadiennes, ou encore dans les Grands Lacs, que convoite ouvertement Trump. Des préoccupations similaires pourraient s’appliquer au territoire arctique pour ses ressources naturelles, ou encore à l’espace aérien pour effectuer une démonstration de force et faire plier le Canada. Ceci, bien entendu, éprouverait la capacité du pays à contrôler son propre territoire. Les Forces armées canadiennes dépendent fortement de la technologie et du matériel américains. Si Washington décidait de restreindre l’accès à des ressources militaires essentielles, telles que les pièces détachées, les mises à jour de logiciels ou le partage de renseignements, cela pourrait considérablement affaiblir l’état de préparation opérationnelle militaire du Canada. Des systèmes tels que l’avion de chasse F-35, les capteurs et le système de combat des futurs navires de guerre du Canada et le système d’alerte du Nord, qui est en voie de profonde modernisation, dépendent tous du soutien continu des États-Unis. Si l’accès à ces équipements était bloqué, la capacité du Canada à se défendre et à contribuer aux opérations alliées serait gravement compromise. Enfin, un autre risque potentiel réside dans la possibilité que le gouvernement américain – ou des entités privées opérant avec une approbation tacite – soutiennent des acteurs au sein du Canada qui cherchent à déstabiliser le pays. Il pourrait s’agir de campagnes de désinformation massive visant à influencer les élections canadiennes, de coercition économique ciblant des industries stratégiques, voire d’un soutien à des mouvements annexionnistes. De telles tactiques ont été utilisées dans d’autres pays pour exercer de l’influence et créer des divisions, et le Canada doit être vigilant face à ces menaces. La riposte canadienne : autonomie, résilience et atténuation des risques Face à ces menaces de coercition, le Canada doit prendre des mesures décisives pour renforcer sa souveraineté, diversifier ses partenariats en matière de sécurité et accroître la résilience sociétale. L’ère de l’alliance indéfectible et incontestée avec les États-Unis touche peut-être à sa fin. Le Canada doit donc repenser les fondamentaux de sa politique de défense. La première étape consiste à développer dans l’urgence et dans la durée une base industrielle et technologique de défense. Le Canada doit développer ses propres capacités dans des domaines essentiels tels que les drones, les technologies de renseignement, de surveillance et de reconnaissance (ISR), le transport stratégique et les systèmes de communications. En favorisant une base industrielle nationale solide, le Canada peut réduire sa dépendance à l’égard de la technologie militaire américaine et garantir le maintien de son état de préparation opérationnelle, quelles que soient les pressions extérieures. Cette première mesure doit être menée avec urgence, mais ne pourra pas être réalisée à court terme. En conséquence, le Canada doit également élargir et approfondir ses partenariats stratégiques en matière de défense au-delà des États-Unis. Si les relations bilatérales avec Washington restent importantes, une dépendance excessive à l’égard d’un seul pays constitue une vulnérabilité inacceptable. Le renforcement des liens de défense avec des pays disposant d’une industrie militaire relativement autonome des États-Unis mais interopérable avec les forces américaines devraient être privilégiés, tels que la France, la Suède et la Corée du Sud. Ces derniers pourraient fournir au Canada d’autres sources de technologie militaire avancée, notamment en matière de feux de précision à longue portée, de sous-marins, de systèmes de défense aérienne et de partage de renseignements. Ces pays partagent l’engagement du Canada en faveur de valeurs démocratiques et de la stabilité mondiale, ce qui en font des partenaires naturels pour le renforcement de la sécurité nationale. Par exemple, l’idée d’écarter l’acquisition de F-35 se répand en raison du bris de confiance à l’égard des États-Unis. Le ministre canadien de la Défense a ainsi exprimé son intention de réexaminer l’acquisition de 88 F-35 d’ici 2034. La meilleure stratégie consisterait à adopter une flotte mixte, c’est-à-dire à maintenir l’achat de 88 chasseurs de 5e génération auprès de Lockheed Martin, mais d’y ajouter une flotte de Gripen ou de Rafale afin de réduire la dépendance canadienne à l’égard des États-Unis. Ceci permettrait par le fait même de disposer d’une flotte d’avions de chasse d’une taille similaire à celle que possédait le Canada durant la guerre froide. De même, ceci devrait être conjuguée au développement d’un avion de chasse de 6e génération avec des partenaires autres que les États-Unis, tel que le projet mené par le Royaume-Uni, le Japon et l’Italie. Le Canada joue un rôle important dans la sécurité européenne, que ce soit par l’entremise de son contingent militaire en Lettonie, dont la mission est de défendre ce pays contre une possible agression russe, ou encore par le soutien militaire offert à l’Ukraine pour résister à l’invasion russe. Ces contributions sont essentielles pour dissuader la Russie d’envahir ses voisins, mais elles ont été faites sur la prémisse que les États-Unis garantiraient la protection du territoire canadien en cas de guerre. Ce présupposé ne tient plus. Le Canada devrait donc réévaluer son engagement envers la sécurité européenne en le conditionnant à un soutien européen à l’égard de sa propre souveraineté et à un plus grand accès aux chaînes de production militaire européennes dans le processus de modernisation et d’autonomisation des Forces armées canadiennes. Par exemple, le Canada pourrait négocier l’acquisition de sous-marins, de systèmes de défense aérienne, ou encore de chasseurs français en contrepartie d’une délocalisation de la production vers le Canada et des investissements canadiens dans la production d’autres équipements militaires produits en France. Des exercices militaires conjoints avec les Européens, sans la présence des États-Unis, permettraient également de nouer des relations plus étroites et résilientes entre les alliés euro-atlantiques et se prémunir contre un possible désengagement américain. Ceci pourrait s’ancrer dans un processus plus large d’approfondissement des relations entre le Canada et l’Union européenne, à l’instar des modèles britannique, norvégien ou suisse. Cela pourrait se traduire par la formalisation d’un pacte de défense mutuelle qui inclurait explicitement l’intégrité territoriale du Canada. La réciprocité doit effectivement être un principe cardinal de la politique de défense du Canada. L’on ne peut que déplorer le peu d’empressement des Européens à dénoncer les ambitions annexionnistes de Trump, d’autant plus que près de 2 000 Canadiens sont actuellement déployés en Lettonie afin d’assurer l’intégrité des frontières des alliés européens et qu’Ottawa n’exclut pas de contribuer à une force de dissuasion en Ukraine visant à assurer le respect d’un éventuel cessez-le-feu. Face à la remise en question du principe de l’article 5 de l’OTAN par le président Trump, une alliance au sein de l’alliance, comprenant les alliés les plus volontaristes, dont le Royaume-Uni, la France, l’Allemagne et la Pologne, est plus que jamais nécessaire. L’idée n’est d’ailleurs pas nouvelle, comme en témoigne le partenariat stratégique franco-hellénique et celui entre Londres et Varsovie. Plus important encore peut-être, le Canada doit sensibiliser davantage son opinion publique à l’évolution du paysage géopolitique. De nombreux Canadiens estiment encore que les États-Unis ne menaceront pas l’intégrité du Canada. Cette hypothèse est de plus en plus risquée. La transparence gouvernementale est clé pour maintenir un lien de confiance envers les autorités, et doit donc être accrue de manière substantielle afin de préserver l’unité sociale. Ceci passe notamment par une vaste campagne dans les médias sociaux afin d’offrir une information juste et accessible à tous, ainsi qu’à contrer les mensonges proférés par des acteurs hostiles, incluant américains. La sensibilisation du public est un pilier essentiel de la résilience nationale, qui garantit que les citoyens canadiens soutiennent les investissements nécessaires en matière de sécurité et d’autosuffisance. De même, le soutien aux think tanks canadiens doit être accru afin d’encourager le dialogue et éclairer davantage le débat public. À ceci s’ajoute la nécessité absolue de lancer une campagne de consultation afin d’élaborer, dans l’année courante, un nouvel énoncé de politique étrangère et de défense capable d’offrir une vision claire, stratégique et coordonnée pour assurer la protection du Canada face à la coercition américaine. Le Canada ne peut se permettre d’être à nouveau pris de court par le pivot brutal des États-Unis. Si la prise de conscience actuelle est à saluer, il est désormais temps de passer à l’action. Les États-Unis demeurent l’allié le plus proche et le partenaire commercial le plus important du Canada. Cependant, nous ne pouvons pas ignorer les risques réels posés par les priorités changeantes des États-Unis et la possibilité que Washington exerce des pressions sur le Canada d’une manière qui porte atteinte à notre souveraineté et à notre sécurité. Une approche proactive est nécessaire pour se préparer à des scénarios dans lesquels les États-Unis constitueraient une menace contre la sécurité nationale du Canada. ## Le Canada doit se préparer aux bouleversements sismiques auxquels le Pentagone va être confronté URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-doit-se-preparer-aux-bouleversements-sismiques-auxquels-le-pentagone-va-etre-confronte/ Modified: 2025-01-13 > L'élection de Donald Trump a des implications si vastes. le Canada doit se préparer aux bouleversements sismiques auxquels... (Le Canada doit se préparer aux bouleversements sismiques auxquels le Pentagone va être confronté - Theodore McLauchlin) L'élection de Donald Trump a des implications si vastes pour le Canada qu'il est facile de perdre le fil. L'une d'entre elles, qui ne saute peut-être pas aux yeux mais à laquelle le gouvernement doit donner la priorité, est la politisation à venir des forces armées américaines. Le Canada dépend des États-Unis pour sa défense et pour la poursuite de ses objectifs de sécurité ailleurs. Il n'y a pas beaucoup de moyens de contourner ce problème. Ils sont le colosse de notre continent. Nos services armés travaillent avec eux tous les jours : au sein de NORAD avec sa structure de commandement intégrée, au sein de l'OTAN, entre officiers en échange, dans la planification à long terme. Nous n'avons pas toujours pu compter sur les États-Unis pour agir de manière responsable et efficace. Les limites légales sur ses actions sont débattues et parfois inadéquates. Néanmoins, nous avons pu compter sur des forces armées américaines relativement professionnelles, dans le sens d’une armée qui donne à ses dirigeants civils ses meilleurs conseils et qui mettent ensuite en œuvre les décisions de ces derniers, dans le respect de la Constitution. Comme toute grande organisation, il ne s'agit pas d'une machine bien huilée. Mais nous n'avons jamais eu affaire à une armée américaine déchirée par les divisions partisanes et finalement déliée de la loi. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, très probablement. Depuis sa première présidence, Donald Trump en veut au Pentagone et à ses généraux, qu'il tient pour responsables de la résistance à sa volonté. Il s'est engagé depuis lors à écarter les généraux « woke » concernés par la diversité, l'équité et l'inclusion ou le changement climatique, et a même invoqué l'exécution de l'ancien président de l'état-major interarmées, le général Mark Milley. En arrière-plan, il y a le désir exprimé par M. Trump d'utiliser les forces armées dans des missions intérieures sans précédent, pour appréhender les migrants et réprimer les manifestations. Selon la coutume et la tradition, ces missions ne sont pas censées incomber aux forces armées régulières, telles que l'armée de terre, la marine, l'armée de l'air ou les marines des États-Unis. En effet, la Loi Posse Comitatus est censée interdire le déploiement de ces forces dans le cadre du maintien de l'ordre à l'intérieur du pays. La Loi sur l'insurrection permet toutefois au président de contourner la Loi Posse Comitatus. Il est vrai que la Garde nationale a en revanche un rôle surtout interne qui comprend la répression des troubles civils. (Contrairement aux forces armées régulières, la Garde est organisée par les États à moins d'être placées sous contrôle fédéral.) Cependant, les ordres de Trump pourraient bien être sans précédent, même pour la Garde, en fonction des circonstances et des règles d'engagement. Quoi qu'il en soit, lui et ses alliés ont invoqué à la fois la Garde nationale et les forces régulières. Ces instructions peuvent être inconstitutionnelles. Ils seront certainement controversés. Les soldats peuvent (et doivent) résister aux ordres « manifestement illégaux », mais ce que cela signifie en pratique est loin d'être clair. Une armée qui se plie à la volonté de Trump est une armée qui ne fera qu'une bouchée de ses objections, ou qui n'en émettra pas du tout. Et si les hauts responsables civils et militaires du ministère de la défense et des forces armées acceptent ces ordres, il devient beaucoup plus difficile pour les soldats de les refuser. Avec ces ordres en arrière-plan, tous les signes montrent que la purge menacée est en train de se produire. Un projet de décret circule qui créerait des « warrior boards » composés d'officiers retraités triés sur le volet et chargés d'écarter les hauts dirigeants jugés problématiques, avec un test décisif de « wokeness » pour la loyauté envers le MAGA. Cette mesure s'appliquerait aux généraux trois et quatre étoiles (169 postes au 30 septembre 2023). Il existe des limites légales à la marge, mais dans les grandes lignes, rien ne peut arrêter une version de ce plan. Le fait que Trump ait nommé Pete Hegseth au poste de secrétaire à la défense suggère sa volonté manifeste de le mettre en œuvre. Hegseth est un commentateur de Fox News qui n'a aucune expérience à haut niveau en matière de défense nationale, mais qui dénonce les hauts responsables militaires en les qualifiant de « réveillés », et qui défend les émeutiers du 6 janvier et les criminels de guerre en uniforme. Même si M. Hegseth n'est pas nommé secrétaire à la défense, sa nomination témoigne de la volonté manifeste de M. Trump. Une telle purge n'est absolument pas nécessaire. Trump pourrait mettre en œuvre ses principales propositions en matière de politique de défense sans licencier qui que ce soit. Il a gagné le mandat démocratique de le faire, un mandat que les forces armées ont le devoir de respecter. Il aurait pu au moins vérifier si ses plans étaient mis en œuvre, puis licencier en toute légitimité les militaires réticents à le faire. Mais en installant des loyalistes dès le départ, Trump va créer un changement radical. Les règles du jeu pour devenir un haut responsable pourraient consister à dire à Trump ce qu'il veut entendre; à servir d'accessoire politique, comme l'a fait le général Milley lors des manifestations « Black Lives Matter » de 2020, à son insu et à son grand regret; à dénoncer ses concurrents pour n’être pas suffisamment « MAGA »; et à mettre en œuvre même les ordres les plus douteux du point de vue juridique et constitutionnel de Trump. En bref, la loyauté l'emporte sur la compétence. Nous le savons parce que c'est ainsi que Trump choisit ses collaborateurs. La nomination de Hegseth en elle-même est une preuve suffisante. Il va sans dire que ce n'est pas une façon de créer la confiance, d'obtenir les meilleurs conseils militaires ou de planifier l'avenir. Il existera encore une énorme réserve de professionnalisme et de compétence dans le corps des officiers américains. Mais il en résultera une bataille entre partisans et professionnels, un enracinement des factions et des batailles pour les promotions tout aussi partisanes que ce que nous voyons à la Cour Suprême. Ces dernières années, les normes de non-partisanerie au sein des forces armées se sont érodées : souvent, les officiers militaires ne voient rien de mal à ce que le personnel en service actif insulte un dirigeant politique sur le lieu de travail ou sur les médias sociaux, ou à ce que des généraux à la retraite prennent la parole lors de conventions politiques. Toutefois, la purge à venir pourrait faire éclater tout cela au grand jour. Et il ne serait pas facile de contenir ces tendances par la suite. Les futurs présidents pourraient tenter de ramener le corps des officiers vers « leurs » propres loyalistes. Et même une tentative d'un futur président de rétablir des critères professionnels plutôt que partisans pour le leadership militaire s'attaquerait nécessairement à l'emprise du mouvement MAGA sur les hauts responsables militaires, et serait perçue comme une démarche partisane en soi. Les conséquences pour le Canada pourraient être graves. Par exemple, notre personnel de la Défense nationale pourrait avoir à se demander si l'analyse de leurs homologues américains soit aussi objective que possible, ou si elle se limite plutôt à ce que le patron semble vouloir entendre. Aussi discrètement que possible, et en fonction de l'ampleur des changements de personnel, ce scepticisme pourrait devoir faire partie du processus de planification politique. Les principaux risques se situent toutefois à moyen et à long terme. Les controverses à venir dans le domaine de la défense américaine pourraient avoir des répercussions sur les débats au Canada. À cet égard, les partis politiques canadiens ont un rôle essentiel à jouer. Ils doivent se tenir à l'écart de la bataille qui s'annonce au Pentagone, afin d'éviter qu'elle ne prenne de l'ampleur au Canada. La guerre contre l'IED pourrait exacerber encore davantage les controverses et les défis liés au changement de culture dans nos propres forces armées. Les parties ne sont pas d'accord sur cette question, ce qui est légitime et approprié dans une démocratie où les forces armées sont contrôlées par des civils. Mais au service de ces débats, ils doivent résister à toute tentation de s'en prendre au personnel militaire canadien de haut rang, comme l'ont fait les Républicains. Cela ne ferait qu'aggraver la méfiance et les factions au sein des FAC, ce dont les Canadiens ne pourraient que pâtir. En outre, les dirigeants politiques canadiens devraient également aborder les débats militaires à venir aux États-Unis avec une grande discrétion. Si le Canada est perçu comme intervenant ouvertement, il risque de subir les foudres de Washington, de devenir un enjeu politique américain et de subir des pressions pour modifier ses propres politiques militaires en fonction des préférences américaines. Enfin, à long terme, le principal partenaire et allié militaire du Canada semble en passe de devenir plus divisé en interne, de voir son personnel et ses politiques façonnés par des débats politiques partisans rancuniers, de perdre davantage la confiance du public et d'être moins capable de planifier efficacement et donc de gérer les défis du 21e siècle à long terme. Cela augmentera les difficultés pour le Canada lorsqu’il s’agit de maintenir sa défense continentale et de poursuivre ses objectifs de sécurité à l'étranger. Nous devons réfléchir à ce que signifie le fait de ne plus pouvoir compter sur les États-Unis en matière de défense autant que par le passé. L'heure des grands choix approche. ## Le Canada en 2025: Quels échecs, quelles améliorations ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-en-2025-quels-echecs-quelles-ameliorations/ Modified: 2025-12-23 Quelle question de politique étrangère et de défense du Canada a connu le moins d'améliorations au cours de la dernière année, et sur quoi le gouvernement du Canada devrait-il concentrer ses efforts pour l'année à venir? Policy Forum Politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur un sujet important pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Pour cette quatrième édition, nous avons demandé à trois experts leur point de vue sur la performance du gouvernement canadien en 2025. Louise Blais | Université Laval L’enjeu ayant le moins progressé cette année est la relation de défense et de sécurité avec les États-Unis, un pilier que nous continuons d’aborder de manière fragmentée. Malgré des investissements additionnels, notamment pour moderniser NORAD, le Canada n’a toujours pas articulé une stratégie proactive qui intègre l’ensemble des défis de sécurité continentale. Cette lacune devient encore plus préoccupante lorsqu’on considère l’évolution du dossier mexicain. Washington débat désormais ouvertement de possibles opérations militaires ciblées contre les cartels sur le sol mexicain. Une telle décision créerait un dilemme stratégique majeur pour le Canada : sommes-nous prêts à définir notre position si notre allié principal choisit d’agir dans ce cadre? Avons-nous évalué les impacts sur la coopération trilatérale, sur l’ACEUM, et sur la sécurité de nos propres frontières? Rien n’indique qu’un tel scénario ait été anticipé avec sérieux. Plus largement, notre absence de stratégie continentale nous pousse parfois à compenser par un rapprochement avec l’Europe. S’il est important, ce pivot ne peut remplacer la relation de défense avec les États-Unis, sans laquelle ni la protection de notre territoire ni la stabilité de nos chaînes d’approvisionnement ne peuvent être garanties. S’éloigner de Washington, volontairement ou par omission, reviendrait à fragiliser notre propre sécurité. Pour la prochaine année, la priorité doit être claire: Bâtir une stratégie de sécurité nord-américaine assumée au plus haut niveau, qui relie nos investissements, notre engagement envers NORAD, et une préparation sincère aux dilemmes émergents y compris ceux liés au Mexique et aux décisions militaires américaines. Louise Blais est diplomate en résidence et membre associée de l'ESEI. Elle a occupé le poste d'ambassadrice et de représentante permanente adjointe du Canada auprès des Nations Unies de 2017 à 2021, où elle était responsable de l'Agenda 2030 et de la campagne pour le Conseil de sécurité. Alexander Lanoszka | Université de Waterloo Dans dix ans, les membres de la communauté de la défense canadienne pourraient envisager l'année 2025 d'au moins deux façons. Ils pourraient considérer 2025 comme l'année d'un changement catalyseur attendu depuis longtemps qui a contribué à redonner une vitalité bien nécessaire aux Forces armées canadiennes (FAC). Après des décennies de négligence, les dirigeants canadiens ont enfin été en mesure de prendre un engagement financier et politique durable pour reconstruire les FAC, rétablissant ainsi la réputation du Canada en tant qu'allié militaire fiable tout en donnant au pays le pouvoir d'action dont il avait tant besoin dans un monde de plus en plus en proie à des conflits violents. Cependant, il existe un risque que 2025 ne soit qu'un feu de paille. Les nouveaux engagements financiers pourraient s'avérer temporaires, à l'instar de ce qui s'est produit pendant et avant les années Harper. Malgré toutes les bonnes paroles prononcées par les dirigeants politiques à l'époque, les vieilles habitudes ont eu du mal à disparaître. Plutôt que d'envisager les achats en fonction des besoins et des fonctions militaires, les politiciens les considéraient toujours comme un moyen de développer l'économie régionale et de créer des emplois, sans parler de marquer des points politiques faciles. Les capacités militaires et de défense en ont souffert. L'examen en cours du programme F-35 montre à quel point l'avenir reste incertain. Initialement motivée par les déclarations corrosives du président américain Donald Trump, cette révision continue de traîner en longueur en raison des affirmations très contestables de Saab concernant les avantages en termes d'emploi de la production d'avions Gripen au Canada. Ainsi, s'il y a un domaine dans lequel les dirigeants civils canadiens peuvent s'améliorer, c'est celui-ci : ils doivent prendre au sérieux les besoins réels des FAC pour accomplir la mission qui leur est confiée et mieux aligner leurs investissements et leurs plans en conséquence. Alexander Lanoszka est professeur agrégé en relations internationales à l'Université de Waterloo et directeur du programme de maîtrise en service public. Il est codirecteur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique et ses recherches portent sur la politique des alliances, les théories de la guerre et la politique européenne. Sarah Sharma | Université d’Ottawa Les énergies renouvelables sont essentielles à la sécurité et à la souveraineté futures du Canada. Au cours de l'année écoulée, le gouvernement libéral dirigé par Carney a entrepris le plus important recul de la politique climatique canadienne de la dernière décennie. Plus significatif encore, le gouvernement fédéral et la province de l'Alberta ont annoncé un protocole d'accord pour la construction d'un nouveau pipeline dans l'intérêt de la « construction nationale ». En réalité, nous ne pouvons pas nous permettre d'investir des fonds publics dans des projets d'infrastructure énergétique qui ne sont pas rentables, qui menacent les relations avec de nombreuses Premières Nations et qui provoquent des conflits interprovinciaux susceptibles de compromettre d'autres grands projets d'infrastructure. La souveraineté énergétique du Canada ne peut reposer sur les épaules de l'industrie pétrolière et gazière. Un groupe d'anciens hauts responsables militaires a récemment affirmé que la crise climatique et l'insécurité énergétique constituent des menaces légitimes pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Les énergies renouvelables constituent la voie la plus viable vers la neutralité carbone et peuvent être bénéfiques tant pour la durabilité que pour la sécurité. Nous devons investir dans les énergies renouvelables partout au Canada, en particulier dans les communautés isolées et arctiques qui font de plus en plus l'objet de préoccupations géopolitiques. Les communautés arctiques doivent bénéficier d'investissements dans l'ingénierie géothermique afin de protéger le pergélisol, dans les énergies renouvelables afin de remplacer le diesel, et dans des formes de conservation écologique afin de protéger les vies, les moyens de subsistance et les écosystèmes. Au-delà de l'Arctique, la mise en place d'infrastructures capables de résister à des chaleurs extrêmes, notamment grâce à des sources d'énergie propres, sera vitale pour les Canadiens confrontés à des risques sanitaires liés au réchauffement croissant des mois d'été. Les énergies renouvelables ne sont pas un « plus » à ajouter à l'agenda politique lorsque tout va bien ; elles sont une « nécessité » pour un avenir économique solide et sûr. Sarah E. Sharma est professeure adjointe à la Faculté des sciences politiques de l'Université d'Ottawa. Ses recherches portent sur la manière dont le pouvoir, la politique et l'économie influencent les politiques environnementales et leurs résultats à l'échelle transnationale, nationale et infranationale. ## Le Canada et « ReArm Europe » : plus d’argent, plus d’impact ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-et-rearm-europe-plus-dargent-plus-dimpact/ Modified: 2025-06-30 Alors que le monde devient « de plus en plus dangereux et divisé », le premier ministre Mark Carney a déclaré son intention de relancer les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) grâce à un programme de dépenses majeur visant à combler les lacunes importantes en matière de capacités tout en réduisant la dépendance globale envers les États-Unis. M. Carney s'est même engagé à porter les dépenses de défense à 2 % du produit intérieur brut du Canada d'ici mars 2026. Le catalyseur de ce réarmement est évident. Bien qu'il se soit engagé à atteindre l'objectif de 2 % lors du sommet de l'OTAN au Pays de Galles en 2014, le Canada est à la traîne par rapport à la plupart de ses alliés, malgré l'agressivité de la Russie envers ses voisins et les défis sécuritaires liés à la montée en puissance de la Chine. Plus récemment, les propos annexionnistes du président des États-Unis, aussi graves soient-ils, ont également suscité l'inquiétude au Canada quant à son incapacité à garantir sa propre souveraineté politique et son intégrité territoriale. L'un des éléments clés de cette initiative visant à reconstruire les FAC consiste à impliquer le Canada dans le programme ReArm Europe, tel qu'envisagé dans la déclaration commune sur la sécurité et la défense publiée par le Canada et l'Union européenne le 23 juin 2025. Créé en mars dernier par la Commission européenne, ReArm Europe est un programme de prêts qui débloque jusqu'à 800 milliards d'euros (1 250 milliards de dollars) sur cinq ans pour les États membres de l'UE afin qu'ils les consacrent à la défense. Il est ouvert aux États non membres de l'UE comme le Royaume-Uni et le Canada. À première vue, l'adhésion à ReArm Europe permettrait à Ottawa de faire progresser trois objectifs connexes. Premièrement, l'accès à ces fonds permettrait en théorie au Canada d'augmenter ses dépenses de défense. Deuxièmement, ces fonds supplémentaires pourraient contribuer à stimuler l'industrie de la défense canadienne. Troisièmement, enfin, la participation à ce programme de prêt concrétiserait l'objectif déclaré de M. Carney de diversifier les partenariats du Canada en matière de sécurité afin de réduire sa dépendance vis-à-vis des États-Unis. Mais qu'est-ce que ReArm Europe exactement, et que peut-on raisonnablement attendre de la participation du Canada à ce programme ? Malgré les sommes colossales en jeu, peu d'articles ont été publiés au Canada sur le programme de prêt de l'UE. Le but de cet essai est d'évaluer ReArm Europe en expliquant ce qu'il est, quels problèmes il vise à résoudre dans l'industrie européenne de la défense et, plus important encore, quels problèmes il ne résoudra pas. Nous montrerons ensuite comment le Canada pourrait participer de manière fructueuse à ReArm Europe. En résumé, nous soutenons que le Canada devrait modérer ses attentes quant à ce que cette initiative stratégique de défense peut offrir. Bien qu'elle puisse débloquer des fonds pour le Canada, l'absence de changements structurels significatifs sur le marché européen de la défense et les besoins spécifiques du Canada limiteront ce que ReArm Europe peut faire pour le Canada alors qu'il tente de relancer ses propres forces armées. L'objectif déclaré de ReArm Europe est d'encourager une plus grande collaboration en matière de dépenses, mais l'effet pratique sera probablement de soutenir les industries nationales européennes. Qu'est-ce que ReArm Europe ? La première chose à noter est que « ReArm Europe » est un terme inexact. Bien que le roi Charles III y ait fait explicitement référence dans son discours du trône en mai, l'utilisation du nom « ReArm Europe » est quelque peu anachronique. Les Premiers ministres espagnol et italien ayant estimé que cette expression était trop provocatrice, l'initiative de défense stratégique a été rebaptisée « Readiness 2030 », 2030 étant la date suggérée par les services de renseignement européens comme étant celle à laquelle la Russie pourrait avoir la capacité d'attaquer les États membres de l'UE/OTAN. Le fait que les dirigeants européens aient du mal à appeler un chat un chat est révélateur de certains des défis décrits ci-dessous. Indépendamment de la politique qui sous-tend son nom, la Commission européenne a dévoilé ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 en mars 2025 afin qu'il serve d'initiative de défense stratégique visant à mobiliser l'industrie et les capitaux pour la sécurité commune. Conçue comme un complément aux efforts de modernisation de la défense au niveau national, elle vise à réaliser des économies d'échelle dans le secteur et à garantir l'approvisionnement militaire, principalement par l'harmonisation réglementaire, le rapprochement des marchés financiers et la coordination des achats entre les États participants. Selon les estimations récentes de la présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula Von der Leyen, ReArm Europe vise à mobiliser 800 milliards d'euros sur cinq ans. Cela dit, ce chiffre est légèrement trompeur, car ReArm Europe n'est pas financé par une augmentation des contributions au niveau de l'UE, mais principalement par des dépenses déficitaires sanctionnées par l'UE. Bien que son règlement constitutif « Security and Action For Europe » (SAFE) prévoie des prêts d'achat communs pour un montant total de 150 milliards d'euros, ReArm Europe verra les 650 milliards d'euros restants levés en exemptant les dépenses militaires des exigences budgétaires prévues par le pacte de stabilité et de croissance de l'UE. D'autres avantages pour le secteur seront obtenus grâce à la déréglementation, les projets de défense pouvant bénéficier d'investissements utilisant l'aide économique des États membres et l'assistance de la Banque européenne d'investissement, qui a récemment triplé son portefeuille de défense. La durée des prêts accordés sous la bannière de ReArm Europe peut aller jusqu'à 45 ans, ce qui en fait une dette multigénérationnelle afin d'atténuer les compromis entre les dépenses militaires et les dépenses civiles auxquels les pays européens sont déjà confrontés. À son tour, comment le Canada s'intégrerait-il dans ce système ? Étant donné qu'il n'est pas membre de l'UE, il n'est pas tenu de se conformer à l'assouplissement de sa réglementation fiscale. Selon le règlement SAFE, les tiers peuvent bénéficier d'achats conjoints s'ils signent un partenariat de sécurité et de défense (SDP) avec le bloc, une mesure confirmée par les décideurs politiques canadiens. Compte tenu du débat intense qui entoure la dépendance du Canada à l'égard des États-Unis pour les produits liés à la défense, de nombreux décideurs politiques, dont le Premier ministre, ont présenté ce mécanisme comme une occasion de réduire cette dépendance et de diversifier les liens du Canada en matière de sécurité. Néanmoins, plusieurs éléments du plan laissent de nombreuses questions importantes sans réponse, et l'intégration de pays extérieurs à l'Union européenne offre moins d'avantages, en particulier en dehors de l'environnement de sécurité continental, que ce ne serait le cas pour les États membres de l'UE. Contraintes structurelles dans le secteur européen de la défense L'objectif général de ReArm Europe est de faciliter les dépenses de défense sur le continent européen. Après tout, la combinaison des dividendes de la paix après la guerre froide, l'accent mis sur les opérations expéditionnaires hors zone et l'austérité financière ont épuisé de nombreux établissements de défense européens au cours des trois décennies qui ont précédé l'invasion à grande échelle de l'Ukraine par la Russie. Le fait que les États-Unis aient fourni des garanties de sécurité solides et disposent de fournisseurs de défense compétitifs qui vendent des capacités militaires de haute qualité n'a pas non plus aidé l'industrie européenne de la défense. Peu d'entreprises s'étant imposées comme leaders sur le marché européen, les fournisseurs traditionnels se sont retranchés sur les marchés publics nationaux. Avec la baisse de la demande et la réduction des budgets militaires, le secteur européen a connu moins d'innovations disruptives que l'industrie américaine de la défense, malgré la préférence de cette dernière pour les entreprises traditionnelles. Les gouvernements continuaient de voir la valeur de leurs industries de défense nationales, mais les marchés publics avaient tendance à suivre les objectifs industriels dans un esprit de juste retour, ce qui freinait les projets d'approvisionnement communs et créait des inefficacités pour de nombreux produits militaires, mais certainement pas tous. Il en résulte une duplication de certains systèmes, comme les véhicules blindés de combat et les systèmes de commandement et de contrôle, tandis que d'autres besoins, comme la production de munitions, ont été négligés par beaucoup. Trop de pays ont eu tendance à considérer la défense comme une source d'emploi plutôt que comme un moyen de se préparer stratégiquement. Bien qu'en hausse par rapport à 11 % en 2010, les dépenses consacrées à l'acquisition collaborative d'équipements de défense en Europe restent inférieures à l'objectif de 35 % fixé par la Commission européenne, s'élevant à 18 % des dépenses totales de défense en 2020. Les établissements de défense européens ne sont pas dimensionnés pour se préparer à une guerre de haute intensité, malgré leur potentiel de puissance latent global. Plus précisément, ils ont eu du mal à honorer les commandes existantes. Les goulets d'étranglement dans l'approvisionnement ont été caractéristiques de l'industrie européenne de la défense. Un rapport de 2011 de la commission des comptes publics de la Chambre des communes (Royaume-Uni) a souligné que le Typhoon, un avion multirôle acheté par la Grande-Bretagne avec l'Allemagne, l'Italie et l'Espagne, constituait un exemple édifiant en matière de collaboration européenne dans le domaine de la défense, compte tenu des « retards considérables et de l'augmentation vertigineuse des coûts » qui ont accompagné le projet. La Royal Air Force a ensuite été contrainte de cannibaliser ses avions pour en récupérer les pièces détachées. L'Australie a dû mettre hors service sa flotte d'hélicoptères de transport tactique NH90 de NHIndustries, fabriqués en Europe, quinze ans avant la date prévue, en raison de leurs performances médiocres et du « manque de pièces de rechange ». Bien que l'aérospatiale soit l'un des secteurs les plus européanisés de l'industrie européenne de la défense, l'acquisition par le Canada de l'Airbus C295 accuse déjà six ans de retard. Ces frustrations n'ont fait que s'accentuer après que l'Ukraine s'est montrée capable de déjouer les efforts de la Russie pour renverser son régime dès les premiers jours de son invasion à grande échelle. Avant même que Donald Trump ne reprenne ses fonctions présidentielles, la relance de la base industrielle de défense européenne était devenue une priorité. Mettant de côté ses instincts pro-marché antérieurs, le bloc s'est orienté vers une politique industrielle visant à sécuriser son approvisionnement énergétique et à reconstruire ses capacités de production. L'enthousiasme pour les dépenses financées par l'endettement de ReArm Europe rend ce point encore plus saillant lorsqu'on considère l'aide militaire à l'Ukraine, qui est en partie considérée comme une dépense préventive pour un futur conflit impliquant l'UE. Et en effet, l'une des raisons pour lesquelles certains membres de l'OTAN ont accordé une aide militaire plus importante à l'Ukraine, au moins jusqu'en 2022, était le montant qu'ils avaient dépensé pour leur propre préparation stratégique au cours des années qui ont précédé l'attaque à grande échelle de la Russie. Toutefois, comme le montre la controverse sur le nom de ReArm Europe, les États membres de l'UE restent divisés sur le soutien à l'Ukraine et, par conséquent, sur la préparation à un conflit stratégique avec la Russie. Ainsi, même si ReArm Europe tente de remédier à la sous-capacité industrielle en consolidant et en coordonnant la production de systèmes de défense clés, l'essentiel de ReArm Europe consiste à injecter de l'argent dans les problèmes inhérents à l'industrie européenne de la défense. Les chaînes d'approvisionnement resteront complexes et les différences nationales compliqueront également les plans d'approvisionnement communs. Les inefficacités persisteront en l'absence d'une vision commune plus solide de la défense, que divers commentateurs ont déclarée essentielle pour que l'industrie européenne de la défense puisse réaliser des progrès significatifs. Pas de grandes attentes En raison de la structure de l'initiative, l'adhésion à ReArm Europe par l'intermédiaire de la SAFE en tant qu'État non membre de l'UE comporte plusieurs obstacles structurels pour le Canada. Malheureusement, même si l'initiative mérite d'être poursuivie, les dirigeants canadiens ne devraient pas surestimer les avantages qu'ils tireront de ReArm Europe. Dans le cadre d'un effort plus large visant à accroître l'efficacité et la productivité au sein de l'Union européenne à la suite du rapport Draghi de 2024, la Commission européenne a créé l'Union de l'épargne et de l'investissement (UEI). Cette initiative renforcera ReArm Europe, car l'intégration des marchés des capitaux et la facilitation des transactions bancaires transfrontalières permettent de relier l'épargne européenne aux besoins d'investissement. Le Canada ne fait pas partie de l'UES et celle-ci aura donc peu d'incidence sur les marchés financiers canadiens. Il est essentiel de noter que le fait d'orienter l'épargne européenne vers des investissements au Canada va à l'encontre de l'objectif déclaré de renforcer le secteur de la défense et la compétitivité mondiale de l'Europe. En effet, l'objectif premier de l'UES est de réduire la fragmentation du secteur bancaire européen et d'encourager la croissance économique au sein de l'Union européenne. Bien sûr, les entrepreneurs canadiens du secteur de la défense pourraient bénéficier indirectement du fait que leurs homologues européens disposent de plus de capitaux et rencontrent moins d'obstacles à l'investissement qu'auparavant. Cependant, on peut faire valoir que le Canada n'a pas besoin des fonds de l'UE pour mener à bien ses propres dépenses déficitaires. Le Canada n'a qu'à dépenser son propre argent. Il est essentiel de noter que cette initiative stratégique donnera la priorité aux projets qui contribuent à la défense continentale. Après tout, elle s'appelle « Réarmer l'Europe », et non « Réarmer l'Amérique du Nord » ou même « Réarmer l'Atlantique Nord ». Cette priorité se traduit par le statut accéléré (c'est-à-dire sans SDP requis) accordé aux pays européens qui sont au moins partiellement intégrés au marché commun de l'Union européenne, y compris ceux de l'Espace économique européen, de l'Association européenne de libre-échange et de l'Ukraine, cette dernière étant censée bénéficier de l'intégration de la défense et de l'aide militaire que ReArm Europe pourrait contribuer à développer. Les marchés publics communs sont même accessibles aux pays en voie d'adhésion et aux pays candidats comme la Serbie et la Turquie, même si leurs chances d'adhérer à l'UE sont actuellement très faibles. La priorité accordée aux produits de défense européens pour l'Europe est également évidente dans les conditions d'utilisation des fonds. Les règles sont claires. En ce qui concerne les consommables de guerre tels que les munitions et les missiles, les États membres « doivent veiller à ce que les composants représentant 65 % du coût du produit final proviennent de l'Union, des pays de l'AELE membres de l'EEE ou de l'Ukraine ». Cette exigence est plus stricte pour les systèmes complexes, car les États membres de l'UE doivent également veiller à ce que « les contractants contrôlent entièrement la conception des équipements de défense » afin de ne pas créer de « nouvelles dépendances » dans leur production. En bref, dans le scénario le plus optimiste, les contractants canadiens pourraient réaliser jusqu'à 35 % du coût du produit final. La réalité sera toutefois loin de ce seuil, car les décideurs politiques européens considéreront probablement que le déploiement de capitaux outre-Atlantique augmente les coûts en raison de la simple distance géographique qui sépare le Canada des chaînes d'approvisionnement et des ressources militaires européennes, ce qui limitera sa participation à des projets d'approvisionnement conjoints. En effet, étant donné que près des deux tiers des exportations canadiennes dans le domaine de la défense étaient destinées aux États-Unis en 2022, l'industrie canadienne de la défense est tellement intégrée à son homologue américaine qu'il sera difficile de la libérer, d'autant plus que, en vertu du titre III de la loi américaine sur la production de défense (Defence Production Act), les entreprises canadiennes de défense sont traitées comme des entreprises américaines. Le fait que les achats de défense canadiens aient été orientés vers les États-Unis nuit à la crédibilité d'Ottawa en tant qu'investisseur potentiel et peut rendre la question du contrôle de la conception délicate pour Ottawa. Enfin, ReArm Europe contribuera probablement à financer de grandes entreprises traditionnelles qui sont des champions nationaux sur le continent. Pour ces raisons, les possibilités de collaboration en matière d'innovation et de partage de technologies entre les deux côtés de l'océan Atlantique pourraient rester limitées. Les quelques initiatives qui ont été proposées, telles que la relocalisation de la production de l'avion de combat Gripen de Saab au Canada, doivent être considérées avec scepticisme. Deux questions se posent. La première concerne la faisabilité et la rentabilité de la mise en place et du maintien de nouvelles installations de production dans un délai raisonnable. La seconde, plus pertinente, concerne la pertinence d'acquérir les capacités spécifiques que ces initiatives encourageraient. L'une des raisons pour lesquelles le marché européen de la défense est fragmenté est que, comme le note Jan Joel Andersson, « les divergences entre les exigences nationales, les philosophies de conception et les intérêts politiques et industriels rendent difficile tout accord ». Le Canada a ses propres considérations qui reflètent son orientation géopolitique, notamment son implication importante dans la défense de l'Amérique du Nord. Bien que le bilan du futur programme d'avions de combat du Canada soit particulier, notamment en raison des controverses qui ont entouré l'acquisition du F-35, l'une des raisons pour lesquelles Dassault et Airbus sont hors jeu est qu'ils ne pouvaient pas respecter, à un coût raisonnable, les exigences en matière de systèmes de commandement, de contrôle et de communication que nécessite la participation du Canada au Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD). Une approche plus sensée pourrait consister à situer la participation du Canada à ReArm Europe dans le contexte de ses engagements européens préexistants. Après tout, le Canada est en train d'augmenter son engagement militaire dans la brigade multinationale en Lettonie, dont il est la nation cadre depuis 2017. Les inquiétudes concernant la viabilité de l'engagement canadien se sont intensifiées à la suite de la décision prise lors du sommet de Madrid en 2022 de faire passer l'ancien groupement tactique de présence avancée renforcée d'un bataillon de grande taille à une brigade. La rotation de 1 900 membres du personnel des FAC entre le Canada et la Lettonie a pesé lourdement sur le dispositif global des forces canadiennes. Ainsi, les besoins en capacités qui servent directement la contribution canadienne – munitions et autres consommables – pourraient être financés par ReArm Europe, tirant ainsi parti des chaînes d'approvisionnement plus courtes et des partenariats existants que la brigade incarne déjà. Conclusion L'adhésion à ReArm Europe a été une priorité déclarée du premier ministre Carney dans le cadre de ses efforts louables pour redynamiser les Forces armées canadiennes. Devenir membre de ReArm Europe présente des avantages, d'autant plus que le Canada participe déjà à la sécurité européenne en tant que contributeur de premier plan à la brigade multinationale en Lettonie. Cependant, ces avantages ne doivent pas être surestimés auprès du public canadien. Les responsables de la défense canadienne devraient modérer leurs attentes quant à ce que ReArm Europe peut réellement apporter. La raison est simple : l'industrie européenne de la défense restera probablement fragmentée selon les frontières nationales et donc sujette à des inefficacités. L'utilisation des fonds prêtés dans le cadre de cette initiative donnera une forte préférence aux produits européens fabriqués en Europe. Les sommes colossales associées à ReArm Europe ne doivent pas détourner l'attention de ces questions. Jacob Tuckey poursuit une maîtrise en gouvernance mondiale à la Balsillie School of International Affairs de l'Université de Waterloo et est un chercheur émergent au sein du Réseau d'analyse stratégique. Alexander Lanoszka est professeur agrégé au département de sciences politiques de l'Université de Waterloo et codirecteur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique. Les auteurs remercient Richard Shimooka pour ses commentaires sur une version antérieure de cet article. ## Le Canada et la 5G de Huawei URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-et-la-5g-de-huawei/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le Canada et la 5G de Huawei La technologie 5G et l’entreprise chinoise Huawei La 5G est la cinquième génération de communications mobiles, qui fera suite à la 4G. La 5G apportera un nouvel écosystème qui permettra une interconnexion entre différents domaines, applications et clients. Cette technologie se basera sur un écosystème majoritairement virtuel, c’est-à-dire qu’il sera constitué davantage de logiciels que d’infrastructures matérielles. Cette évolution rendra possible la connexion sur une même infrastructure physique d’une multitude d’utilisateurs disposant chacun d’un réseau virtuel. Parmi les domaines où la technologie 5G est particulièrement attendue on retrouve : la santé (chirurgie à distance), l’industrie (contrôle et diagnostics à distance, objets connectés, automatisation des usines), l’énergie (compteurs intelligents, prévisions de consommations, énergies renouvelables), les municipalités (villes intelligentes), l’automobiles (autonomisation et automatisation des véhicules), ou encore la réalité virtuelle et la réalité augmentée. Néanmoins, il faut souligner que la 5G ne vient pas simplement avec de nouvelles avancées logicielles, mais également avec de nouvelles technologies matérielles, notamment pour les méthodes de transmission de données qui impliquent l’installation de nouvelles infrastructures matérielles. Toutefois, cette nouvelle technologie vient avec son lot d’inquiétudes. Tout d’abord, selon Martijn Rasser la 5G brouille la distinction entre le cœur et la périphérie du réseau, ce qui rend plus complexe l’isolation de certains éléments du réseau, contrairement à la 4G actuelle. Ensuite, la composante logicielle du réseau entraine la multiplication des lignes de codes, ce qui est susceptible de rendre plus complexe la sécurisation du réseau et plus nombreuses les vulnérabilités selon Melissa Hathaway. En effet, en analysant l’écosystème 5G de l’entreprise chinoise Huawei, le Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC) Oversight Board du Royaume-Uni y a découvert plusieurs centaines de vulnérabilités suffisamment importantes pour créer de sérieux dommages en cas d’exploitations malveillantes. Enfin, Huawei étant l’entreprise la plus avancée dans le domaine de la 5G, sa proximité présumée avec le gouvernement chinois amène plusieurs démocraties occidentales à questionner la place de Huawei dans leurs infrastructures nationales. Effectivement, dans une ère de compétition entre les grandes puissances, l’ombre de l’État chinois derrière l’entreprise Huawei inquiète particulièrement les démocraties occidentales dans lesquelles l’entreprise est déjà bien implantée. C’est surtout la nouvelle Loi chinoise sur le renseignement national de 2017 qui pose problème. Dans celle-ci, il est clair que la sécurité nationale est l’affaire de tous dans le pays. L’article 14 permet à l’État de demander aux organes, aux organisations et aux citoyens compétents de leur fournir de l’aide, du soutien ou toute coopération nécessaire tandis que l’article 16 autorise les responsables du renseignement à entrer dans les endroits et les zones d’accès restreint présentant un intérêt, interroger les personnes, les organisations ou les institutions compétentes et de lire et recueillir les dossiers, documents ou articles pertinents. Dans ce contexte, la crainte est que l’État chinois demande à l’entreprise Huawei de coopérer avec les services de renseignement et obtienne l’accès aux réseaux ou des informations sur des pays rivaux, comme le Canada ou les États-Unis. C’est pour cela que les réseaux mobiles doivent être considérés comme des activités d’importance vitale, comme c’est le cas en France, désignant alors l’action régalienne de l’État comme source de protection. Les partenaires des Five Eyes face à la 5G de Huawei Les Five Eyes, partenariat en matière de renseignement réunissant les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, le Canada, l’Australie et la Nouvelle Zélande, est l’un des partenaires les plus importants du Canada pour la sécurité nationale. La question de la 5G de Huawei intéresse particulièrement les pays des Five Eyes, dans la mesure où ces derniers s’échangent un volume important de renseignement. Quelles est donc la position des alliés du Canada sur la 5G développée par l’entreprise chinoise ? Les États-Unis ont déjà banni les équipements de Huawei dans de nombreux ministères et ont décidé de bannir la 5G fournie par l’entreprise chinoise. Les États-Unis avertissent également les alliés des Five Eyes que s’ils acceptaient la technologie 5G de Huawei, les échanges de renseignement en seraient compromis. Le Royaume-Uni, premièrement d’avis de simplement restreindre l’accès de Huawei à son infrastructure 5G, a récemment décidé de bannir complètement la 5G de l’entreprise chinoise et de bannir tous les équipements Huawei des réseaux d’ici 2027. La décision britannique aurait été prise pour ne pas nuire à ses relations avec les États-Unis, notamment dans une période de Brexit. L’Australie, bien plus encore que les États-Unis, est également hostile à la 5G de Huawei et ont décidé de la bannir. Cette décision a été prise sur la base de recherches poussées faites par l’Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Selon Patrick Walsh, professeur en renseignement et études de sécurité à l’université Charles Sturt, après avoir cherché à simplement restreindre et sécuriser son réseau de la technologie de Huawei, le service de renseignement a conclu que l’effacement des frontières entre cœur et périphérie et la grande virtualisation du réseau rendaient ce type de sécurisation très difficile. Enfin, la Nouvelle Zélande, tout comme le Canada, n’a pas encore pris de décision finale sur la 5G de Huawei. Le gouvernement néozélandais a affirmé que cette technologie posait certains problèmes sécuritaires. Cependant, la Nouvelle Zélande est dans une position particulière, entre les États-Unis et la Chine. Le pays dépend beaucoup de l’économie chinoise et essaie donc de ménager ses relations. De l’autre côté, la Nouvelle Zélande a peur d’un abandon de la part des États-Unis si elle ne suit pas les positions de Washington, selon Joe Burton de l’Université de Waikato. Toutefois, elle craint aussi d’être piégée par le choix des Five Eyes, et de ne pas avoir le choix que de suivre ses partenaires. Il est probable alors que la Nouvelle Zélande n’attende plus que la décision canadienne pour se positionner, à moins que le Canada n’attende lui-même la décision néozélandaise. Au-delà des Five Eyes, les pays européens se penchent aussi sur l’épineuse question de la technologie 5G de Huawei. La France, sans bannir complètement les équipements Huawei, a décidé de fournir des autorisations limitées aux opérateurs utilisant la technologie Huawei et invite les opérateurs n’ayant pas encore choisi Huawei de ne pas le faire. Les Pays-Bas n’ont pas pris de décision gouvernementale sur un éventuel bannissant de l’entreprise chinoise, mais son plus important opérateur téléphonique a décidé de bannir de son cœur de réseau les équipements Huawei, tandis que la plus importante firme mobile du Danemark réserve ses contrats 5G à des fournisseurs européens. Quoi qu’il en soit, l’Union européenne a décidé de faire de la sécurisation de ses réseaux téléphonique et informatique une priorité et de traiter le problème de manière commune.  Quel choix pour le Canada ? Le Canada, un des derniers Five Eyes à ne pas avoir pris de décision, va devoir se positionner rapidement après la décision du Royaume-Uni de bannir l’entreprise chinoise de son réseau 5G. C’est sans compter les pressions qu’exercent les États-Unis sur le Canada, les menaçant de réévaluer la coopération en échange de renseignements si le Canada autorisait Huawei dans son infrastructure 5G. De son côté, Justin Trudeau déclarait qu’il regardait attentivement ce que ses alliés décidaient pour être sûr que tout le monde faisait le nécessaire pour s’assurer des opportunités économiques tout en sécurisant les réseaux et les infrastructures. Le premier ministre est également attentif à ce que lui conseillent ses officiels de sécurité nationale. À ce sujet, Richard Fadden, ancien directeur du Service canadien de renseignement de sécurité et ancien conseiller à la sécurité nationale de Harper et Trudeau, affirme qu’il n’y a pas vraiment de consensus au sein de la communauté du renseignement canadienne sur le bannissement total de la 5G de Huawei. Certains seraient en faveur d’un tel bannissement tandis que d’autres pensent possible de simplement limiter les accès de Huawei en sécurisant les réseaux sensibles. Quoi qu’il en soit, il semblerait difficile pour le Canada de prendre une décision qui irait à l’encontre des choix de ses partenaires des Five Eyes. En effet, une telle décision serait dommageable à ses relations avec les Five Eyes, et surtout avec son voisin américain. De plus, compte tenu de la très grande intégration des télécommunications et des réseaux entre les États-Unis et le Canada, une autorisation de la 5G de Huawei en sol canadien menacerait directement le voisin américain, ce que le Canada ne souhaite pas. Il est donc envisageable que ces éléments pèseront d’un poids non négligeable sur la future décision canadienne qui semble privilégier une approche commune au sein des Five Eyes. Cependant, selon Melissa Hathaway, la course à la 5G est déjà perdue pour le Canada, et celui-ci devrait maintenant investir en recherche et développement dans les technologies d’avenir, pour sortir de la dépendance technologique envers la Chine. Au-delà de la simple 5G, c’est toute la vision canadienne de son approche avec la Chine quoi doit être repensée. Pour Fadden, le Canada, qui serait en train de prendre conscience que la Chine ne sera possiblement jamais un partenaire stratégique d’importance, compte tenu de son agressivité en matière de renseignement, devra se doter d’une vision stratégique globale sur la Chine. Stéphanie Carvin, professeure à la Norman Paterson School of International Affairs de l’Université Carlton, affirme pour sa part que le Canada doit repenser sa stratégie de cybersécurité et doit se doter d’une véritable doctrine en la matière. Le dossier de la 5G dépasse donc largement la simple question du développement technologique. Il est symptomatique du positionnement géostratégique que le Canada entend adopter à l’ère d’une rivalité décomplexée entre la Chine et les États-Unis. ## Le Canada et la lutte de pouvoir en Arctique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-et-la-lutte-de-pouvoir-en-arctique/ Modified: 2020-10-27 > Dans cette troisième capsule, les experts Whitney Lackenbauer et Magali Vullierme s'intéressent à l'Arctique, ce vaste territoire convoité par la Russie, la Chine, les États-Unis et d'autres puissances dont les intérêts peuvent entrer en conflit avec ceux du Canada. Ottawa doit-elle craindre leurs ambitions ? Qui sont ses alliés ? Que devrait-elle surveiller de plus près ? Dans cette troisième capsule du Réseau d’analyse stratégique animée par Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, nos experts Whitney Lackenbauer et Magali Vullierme s'intéressent à l'Arctique, ce vaste territoire convoité par la Russie, la Chine, les États-Unis et d'autres puissances dont les intérêts peuvent entrer en conflit avec ceux du Canada. Ottawa doit-elle craindre leurs ambitions ? Qui sont ses alliés ? Que devrait-elle surveiller de plus près ? ## Le Canada peut-il être influent dans un monde marqué par le retour des rivalités entre grandes puissances ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-peut-il-etre-influent-dans-un-monde-marque-par-le-retour-des-rivalites-entre-grandes-puissances/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Le Canada doit non seulement faire face à un déclin de l'hégémonie américaine, mais aussi à un retour des rivalités entre grandes puissances dont nous sommes témoins  en Ukraine, en Syrie et en mer de Chine méridionale. Points saillants Le Canada n'a ni les moyens ni la puissance  d'influencer, et encore moins de façonner, la nature du système international. Bien que le Canada ne puisse influencer la nature du système en rivalisant avec des puissances comme la Chine, la Russie ou d’autres puissances émergentes, il peut néanmoins aspirer à influencer ses dynamiques en travaillant en petits groupes et avec ses partenaires et alliés. Le Canada peut atténuer les effets d’un retour à une rivalité entre grandes puissances en travaillant à la mise sur pied de nouveaux régimes de coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité  et par la promotion de liens institutionnels pour protéger l'ordre actuel. Contexte De nombreux signes suggèrent que le monde s'éloigne d'un ordre dominé par les États-Unis. S'il est trop tôt pour statuer sur  ce monde émergent, nous savons qu’il pose déjà de sérieux défis à l'ordre international libéral. Le Canada doit non seulement faire face à un déclin de l'hégémonie américaine, mais aussi à un retour des rivalités entre grandes puissances dont nous sommes témoins en Ukraine, en Syrie et en mer de Chine méridionale. La question est de savoir si le Canada a ce qu'il faut pour influencer les relations internationales dans ce nouvel environnement. Et, si oui, quels sont les domaines dans lesquels le Canada peut espérer jouer un rôle constructif ? La nature et les dynamiques du système international Le système international rassemble des États jouant différents rôles, lesquels sont définis par  la combinaison de leur puissance matérielle et de la perception qu'ils ont de leur propre place en son sein. C'est dans cet esprit que Robert Keohane, professeur de relations internationales bien connu, a élaboré il y a plusieurs décennies une typologie des comportements qui est très pertinente aujourd'hui pour comprendre la place du Canada dans un ordre mondial en pleine mutation. La première catégorie de Keohane est composée d'États « déterminants » pour le système international. Des États qui sont assez puissants pour façonner la nature du système  et le dominer par leur puissance militaire et la taille de leur économie. Les États-Unis, et très probablement la Chine au XXIe siècle, font partie de cette catégorie. L’ouvrage Destined for War, de Graham Allison, rappelle que les Américains et les Chinois sont les grands rivaux au sommet de la structure internationale et qu'une guerre entre eux sur la nature et la domination du système reste une possibilité au XXIe siècle. Les États « influençant » le système  constituent la deuxième catégorie de Keohane, en référence aux pays qui ne peuvent pas dominer le système, mais qui peuvent néanmoins influencer sa nature. La France, la Russie et le Royaume-Uni, en tant que puissances nucléaires et membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, entreraient actuellement dans cette catégorie. L'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie ou l'opposition de la France à la guerre américaine en Irak en 2003 nous rappellent que même s'ils ne peuvent pas dominer le système, ces États doivent être pris au sérieux, car ils ont le pouvoir de l'influencer par des actions unilatérales. Mais qu'en est-il du Canada ? Le Canada fait partie du troisième groupe de Keohane : les États « affectant » le système. Des pays qui ne peuvent pas façonner ou influencer la nature du système, mais qui peuvent avoir un impact sur sa dynamique en travaillant en petits groupes au sein d'organisations internationales. C'est ainsi que le Canada a pu exercer une influence par le passé. Le Canada a contribué à réduire les tensions internationales pendant la guerre froide et a réussi depuis lors à influencer le comportement des États par la promotion de normes internationales. En travaillant avec partenaires et alliés, le Canada peut espérer  atténuer les effets néfastes des rivalités entre grandes puissances, et ce, en s’attaquant aux  nouvelles sources d'anarchie dans le système et en défendant l'ordre international actuel par la mise en place de régimes et par le renforcement des institutions existantes. Après tout, les normes, les règles et les institutions sont à peu près tout ce dont dispose le Canada pour assurer sa sécurité et sa prospérité au XXIe siècle. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada Les régimes internationaux fixent les limites entre la conformité et la déviance et leurs normes sous-jacentes exercent des pressions sociales sur les États pour qu'ils se conforment aux attentes. Sachant cela, le Canada devrait promouvoir de nouveaux régimes de sécurité pour contraindre les grandes puissances à se conformer aux nouvelles normes dans le but de réduire leur tentation de recourir à des actions unilatérales. Le Canada devrait réglementer les systèmes d’armes létales autonomes Une source d'anarchie qui doit être surmontée est l'absence de réglementation sur l'utilisation des systèmes d'armes létales autonomes (SALA). Ces armes transforment notre rapport à  la sécurité, la guerre et la paix et peuvent provoquer un changement radical dans l'ordre mondial en pleine mutation. Les experts prédisent maintenant que   les dispositifs militaires capables de sélectionner des cibles sans intervention humaine directe pourraient être opérationnels dans un avenir très proche. Cette possibilité soulève des préoccupations en matière de sécurité dans un système international de plus en plus fragmenté et où les rivalités entre puissances sont à la hausse. La bonne nouvelle est que des armes pleinement autonomes n'ont pas encore été créées et que des discussions internationales sur leur utilisation sont déjà en cours aux Nations unies. Au cours des six dernières années, le Canada, a participé à de nombreuses réunions au cours desquelles les aspects juridiques, éthiques et techniques de cette question ont été abordés. La mauvaise nouvelle est que plusieurs États, dont la Chine, la Russie et les États-Unis, travaillent au développement de ces armes. De plus, après des années de discussions, les experts ne parviennent toujours pas à s'entendre sur les définitions techniques, notamment celle de l'autonomie. Cette absence de définitions consensuelles empêche l'ONU d'avancer vers un régime international qui pourrait légalement contraindre, voire bannir, leur utilisation. Plusieurs États militent déjà pour l'interdiction  des SALA (par exemple la Colombie, le Pakistan et de nombreux États africains) tandis que d'autres demandent un régime juridiquement contraignant pour assurer le contrôle humain de certaines de leurs fonctions spécifiques (par exemple l'Autriche, le Brésil et le Chili). Une campagne internationale pour arrêter le développement de ces armes (Campaign to Stop Killer Robots) a obtenu le soutien de plus de 80 ONG nationales et internationales, telles que Human Rights Watch et Amnistie Internationale. Toutefois, de nombreux gouvernements sont opposés à un régime juridiquement contraignant. Certains d'entre eux se contenteraient d'une déclaration politique sur la nécessité d'un contrôle humain lors de leur utilisation (par exemple la France et l'Allemagne), tandis que d'autres sont simplement opposés à toute mesure qui limiterait l’utilisation des SALA (par exemple les États-Unis, la Russie, Israël et l'Australie). Les récents développements suggèrent que le gouvernement canadien prend cette question au sérieux. La lettre de mandat du ministre canadien des Affaires étrangères, M. Champagne, publiée en décembre 2019, indique que le ministre doit « faire avancer les efforts internationaux visant à interdire le développement et l'utilisation de systèmes d'armes totalement autonomes ». Depuis lors, cependant, le gouvernement n'a pas publié de déclaration officielle en faveur d'une interdiction de ces armes. Le Canada devrait saisir cette occasion pour se joindre à un effort multilatéral visant à interdire l'utilisation et la production des SALA qui fonctionneraient sans un niveau significatif de contrôle humain. Cela pourrait être un moyen significatif pour un État comme le Canada d'avoir un impact sur les dynamiques de ce monde émergent. Le Canada dispose de quatre atouts principaux à cet égard.  Premièrement, il est connu pour ne pas développer d'armes totalement autonomes et est donc bien placé pour occuper une position d’acteur légitime. Deuxièmement, le Canada possède une expertise reconnue en tant qu'entrepreneur dans l’établissement de normes et a investi dans d'importantes initiatives multilatérales dans un passé pas si lointain. La Convention d'Ottawa sur l'interdiction des mines antipersonnel et la Commission internationale sur l'intervention et la souveraineté des États démontrent qu'avec une volonté politique, le Canada peut être un État important qui « affecte » le système. Le Canada a déjà démontré qu'il sait comment rassembler les États et créer un consensus. Troisièmement, le Canada est membre de plusieurs organisations, dont le G7, le G20, l'OTAN, l'APEC (le forum de la Coopération économique de la zone Asie‑Pacifique), le Commonwealth et la Francophonie. Ces institutions pourraient être utilisées comme des multiplicateurs de force afin d’amplifier l'effort du Canada et augmenter ses chances de succès. Quatrièmement, le Canada est une nation autant de l'Atlantique que du Pacifique. Ce faisant, il a maintenu des liens étroits avec des États « influençant » le système et « affectant » le système, autant en Europe que dans la région du Pacifique, principalement pour des raisons culturelles et de sécurité. Le Canada pourrait donc tirer parti de cet avantage dans le but de faciliter la coordination avec des États  qui  partagent des visions similaires. Il pourrait aussi faire pression sur ses plus proches alliés, notamment la France, le Royaume-Uni et l'Australie, pour qu'ils se joignent à un tel régime de coopération. Certains observateurs feront valoir que puisque les discussions aux Nations unies sur les SALA sont déjà en cours depuis des années, le Canada et ses alliés devraient simplement se tenir à l'écart de cet enjeu. Toutefois, il est pertinent d'examiner ce qui a découlé des négociations sur les mines antipersonnel dans le cadre de la Convention des Nations unies sur les armes classiques dans les années 1990. Les États comme le Canada, la Norvège et la Belgique, ont été frustrés par le système onusien fondé sur le consensus qui profitait aux grandes puissances qui n’étaient pas favorables à une interdiction de ces armes. À cette époque, les discussions traînaient en longueur et les négociateurs cherchaient à trouver le « plus petit dénominateur commun » pour parvenir à un consensus. Cela a conduit le Canada à faire pression pour un nouveau régime négocié en dehors des Nations unies. Initialement, Ottawa a réussi à réunir de nombreux États et ONG  et, grâce à ses efforts et à son leadership, plus de 120 pays (dont le Royaume-Uni, la France, l'Allemagne, l'Australie et le Japon) ont finalement signé le traité d'Ottawa. Cela démontre que lorsqu’un leadership politique est exercé, les États qui affectent le système peuvent avoir un impact sur les dynamiques du système international. Le Canada devrait défendre l'ordre international en intensifiant les mesures institutionnelles contraignantes Un changement dans la distribution de la puissance n'implique pas automatiquement un changement de l'ordre international. En effet, le déclin relatif de la puissance hégémonique américaine  ne signifie pas nécessairement la fin de l'hégémonie libérale occidentale, notamment si un groupe d'États puissants assure collectivement la pérennité de cet ordre. Si le Canada et d'autres alliés  « affectant » le système comme l'Allemagne, l'Italie, le Japon et les pays du MIKTA, ne peuvent empêcher les transformations systémiques, ils peuvent potentiellement préserver l'ordre actuel, ou du moins ralentir sa désintégration, en s'associant à des États  qui « influencent » le système comme le Royaume-Uni et, plus important encore, la France, qui exerce un leadership politique fort au sein de l'Union européenne. Pour ce faire, ce groupe d'États devrait mieux coordonner leurs efforts et exercer un plus grand leadership au sein des institutions internationales, notamment au sein de l'OMC et du G20. Ces États pourraient promouvoir l’enchevêtrement institutionnel  pour surmonter les effets indésirés des rivalités entre grandes puissances. Selon Daniel Deudney et John Ikenberry, cette stratégie d’enchevêtrement vise à se lier institutionnellement les uns aux autres afin  de se contraindre mutuellement. Cette pratique est particulièrement importante en ce qui concerne les puissances comme  la Chine et la Russie, car le fait de s'engager au sein d’institutions contraignantes permettrait d'ancrer ces États dans des modèles de comportement acceptables, ce qui pourrait réduire leur tentation de recourir à des actions unilatérales. L'idée ici n'est pas de créer un contrepoids institutionnel au sein du G20 ou de l'OMC dans le but de bloquer et nuire à la Chine ou à la Russie. Il serait d’ailleurs contre-productif d’agir ainsi au sein de ces forums. De telles mesures ne feraient qu'aliéner ces États et les inciter davantage à créer une alternative à l'ordre libéral actuel. Pour paraphraser Joseph Nye, les États libéraux qui « affectent » et qui « influencent » le système doivent affiner leur capacité à façonner les préférences des grandes puissances par l'attraction plutôt que par la coercition. Ils doivent contribuer à combler les fossés et à créer un consensus au sein de ces institutions. Une fois de plus, le Canada pourrait faire preuve d'opportunisme et tirer parti de ses avantages comparatifs pour intensifier l’enchevêtrement institutionnel. En tant que nation de l'Atlantique et du Pacifique, il pourrait non seulement accroître la coordination avec ses partenaires des  « Five-Eyes », du G7 et de l'OTAN, mais aussi se rapprocher des pays du MIKTA, qui s'efforcent ouvertement de combler les fossés par la recherche d'un consensus dans le but de préserver l'ordre mondial actuel. ## Le Canada se voit-il vassal ou souverain ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-canada-se-voit-il-vassal-ou-souverain/ Modified: 2026-01-21 Le Canada s’apprête à publier sa première Stratégie de sécurité nationale depuis 2004. Vingt-deux ans… une éternité s’est écoulée depuis la dernière réflexion d’envergure sur les menaces qui pèsent contre le Canada et l’orientation stratégique souhaitée pour guider le pays. Depuis, le monde a basculé, et notre confort intellectuel avec lui. L’ordre international qui protégeait le Canada sans lui demander grand-chose en retour s’est fissuré. La question n’est plus de savoir si le monde est devenu plus dangereux, tant la réponse est évidente. La véritable question est plus inconfortable : sommes-nous prêts à regarder en face la nouvelle nature de la menace ? Cette menace ne vient pas seulement de Moscou ou de Pékin. Elle vient aussi – et de plus en plus clairement – de Washington. Cette idée peut paraître choquante parce qu’elle se heurte à des décennies d’amitié canado-américaine et de bienveillance de l’hégémon à l’égard de son voisin. Mais la politique internationale n’est pas un album de souvenirs : elle est faite de rapports de force, et ces rapports ont changé. Ce point chaud a été publié en intégralité sur le site de La Presse.  Pour y accéder : Le Canada se voit-il vassal ou souverain ?, par Justin Massie et Srdjan Vucetic, publié le lundi 19 janvier 2026.   ## Le conflit du Haut-Karabakh : catalyseur d’un nouvel ordre régional URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-conflit-du-haut-karabakh-catalyseur-dun-nouvel-ordre-regional/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Dans cette note stratégique, Pierre Jolicoeur revient sur le conflit du Haut-Karabakh et examine différentes considérations politiques pour le Canada. Le 9 novembre, l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan ont signé un accord de fin des hostilités, sous l’égide de la Russie. Ce cessez-le-feu, qui consacre une victoire militaire pour l’Azerbaïdjan, aura maintes répercussions sur la sécurité régionale et au-delà. Le cadre changeant du processus de paix entourant le conflit du Haut-Karabakh – d’une entreprise euro-atlantique à une entreprise régionale – indique que ni la Russie ni la Turquie ne continuent à considérer l’Occident comme un acteur pertinent dans leur cour arrière. Cette dynamique, que l’on avait déjà observée dans d’autres théâtres conflictuels ces derniers mois, notamment suite au retrait militaire des États-Unis de la Syrie, est indicative d’un changement de paradigme dans la gestion du cours des affaires internationales, voire dans l’ordre mondial. Ce changement de paradigme est favorisé par un certain désengagement des États-Unis et un « réveil » et une alliance de circonstance des deux principales puissances régionales. Au moment d’écrire ces lignes, un cessez-le-feu parrainé par la Russie vient de mettre un terme à la guerre entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan. Les derniers bilans officiels parlent de plus de 2300 soldats et de 50 civils morts du côté arménien, mais ce chiffre est incomplet puisque l’Azerbaïdjan n’a toujours pas communiqué ses pertes militaires, tout en faisant état de 93 civils décédés des suites du conflit. Les deux parties affirment avoir tué « des milliers » de militaires de l’autre camp. Des sources russes indiquent, deux semaines avant l’établissement du cessez-le-feu que les pertes seraient de l’ordre de 5000 morts, ce qui en ferait un des conflits les plus meurtriers de l’année. Au cours des opérations militaires, de nombreuses sources ont indiqué d’importantes acquisitions territoriales réalisées par l’Azerbaïdjan, y compris des sources arméniennes qui pourtant ont tendance à minimiser leurs pertes. Après les stupeurs et les craintes initiales que cette escalade belligène entraîne les acteurs régionaux, notamment la Turquie et la Russie, et leurs alliés par extension, ces acteurs extérieurs ont fait preuve d’une certaine retenue. Il n’est toujours pas possible d’envisager quelle sera la solution à ce conflit, mais il est toutefois d’ores et déjà permis d’affirmer que cette guerre aura des conséquences au-delà du nombre de victimes ou des destructions sur le terrain. Un nouveau cadre sécuritaire régional se développait parallèlement aux combats, potentiellement annonciateur d’un nouvel ordre international. Le réveil du « conflit gelé » au Haut-Karabakh entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan s’est étiré sur des mois : après des escarmouches frontalières entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan en juillet 2020, les combats de l’automne ont sans conteste été les plus violents depuis l’établissement d’un cessez-le-feu en 1994. Cette soudaine reprise des hostilités contraste avec les signes encourageants de rapprochement entre les deux camps qui semblaient se dessiner en 2018, notamment avec l’instauration d’une ligne d’alerte directe entre les leaders des deux camps. On fait souvent référence aux conflits gelés pour désigner ces conflits sécessionnistes de l’ex-URSS, où les parties sécessionnistes ont réalisé des gains militaires sur le terrain sans pour autant obtenir une reconnaissance internationale. Ces conflits s’enlisent alors dans des processus de paix interminables qui finissent par entrer dans un état de dormance, du fait du manque de progrès dans les négociations. Le terme « gelé » ne caractérise cependant pas tellement les conflits eux-mêmes, qui voient souvent la reprise épisodique des violences, mais plutôt les processus de paix visant à les résoudre. C’est particulièrement vrai dans le cas du conflit du Haut-Karabakh qui jusqu’à ce jour ne bénéficiait d’aucune force d’interposition de la paix pour faire respecter les accords de cessez-le-feu. Il est important de rappeler que ce conflit est essentiellement une lutte à trois acteurs – Arménie, Azerbaïdjan et République du Haut-Karabakh (RHK, appelée Artsakh par les Arméniens) – et comporte une double nature : elle est à la fois une lutte sécessionniste interne à l’Azerbaïdjan et un conflit international opposant l’Arménie à l’Azerbaïdjan, même si les combats se sont presque exclusivement déroulés en Azerbaïdjan. Les combats de l’automne 2020 ont pris des proportions existentielles pour les principaux protagonistes. Les Arméniens du Karabakh défendent des terres qu’ils considèrent les leurs depuis trois millénaires et, par analogie au génocide arménien de 1915, affirment risquer l’élimination pure et simple. Pour sa part, l’Azerbaïdjan cherche à rétablir son intégrité territoriale en restaurant sa souveraineté sur le territoire sécessionniste autoproclamé. Non seulement les forces sécessionnistes s’étaient affranchies de la gouverne de Bakou depuis le début des années 1990, mais elles occupaient d’importants territoires azerbaïdjanais, sept districts en fait, au-delà de ce qui constituait la région autonome du Nagorno-Karabakh de l’époque soviétique. Les forces sécessionnistes comptaient se servir de ces territoires occupés comme monnaie d’échange dans leurs négociations avec les autorités azerbaïdjanaises, alors que la restitution a été exigée par quatre résolutions de l’ONU (Résolutions 822, 853, 974 et 884) depuis 1993. Progressivement, la possession de ces territoires s’est transformée en occupation, avec la construction d’infrastructures permettant de lier le Haut-Karabakh à l’Arménie. L’Azerbaïdjan, frustré et humilié de voir les résolutions de l’ONU sans effet, et de se voir obligé d’absorber une importante population de réfugiés et de personnes déplacées, cherche à prendre sa revanche depuis l’éclatement du conflit il y a une trentaine d’années. Bien que la RHK subsiste de manière indépendante de l’Azerbaïdjan depuis 1994, il s’agit d’un État de facto qu’aucun autre État n’a reconnu, ni même l’Arménie voisine ou la Russie. Cette dernière a pourtant reconnu deux autres territoires sécessionnistes ayant acquis leur indépendance de facto de la Géorgie voisine dans un contexte similaire, l’Ossétie du Sud et l’Abkhazie, suite à la guerre qu’elle a livrée à la Géorgie en août 2008. Depuis ces événements, la Russie continue d’intervenir dans la vie politique de cette petite république du Caucase. À l’instar des territoires sécessionnistes en Géorgie, le conflit du Haut-Karabakh interpelle le droit international placé devant le dilemme de devoir trancher entre deux principes diamétralement opposés : celui du droit des peuples à l’autodétermination et celui du droit des États à défendre leur intégrité territoriale et leur souveraineté. La crise humanitaire et le jeu des puissances régionales interpellent également la communauté internationale et, éventuellement, pourraient à terme nécessiter son intervention. Étant donné l’insatisfaction des belligérants par rapport à leur insécurité respective, les éclats de l’été ont clairement préparé la guerre de l’automne. À l’occasion de la 75e Assemblée générale des Nations Unies en septembre 2020, les discours prononcés par les dirigeants arméniens et azerbaïdjanais, quelques jours à peine avant le début des opérations militaires à grande échelle du 27 septembre, portaient déjà en germe l’escalade à venir. Le premier ministre arménien Nikol Pashinyan et le Président azerbaïdjanais Ilham Aliyev ont tous deux utilisé un langage équivoque : le premier faisait la promotion du droit à l’autodétermination tout en dénonçant l’implication croissante de la Turquie, le second déplorait le manque de progrès diplomatique dans la résolution de ce conflit et accusait la partie arménienne d’intransigeance. De fait, depuis le début des années 1990, les négociations pour résoudre le conflit du Haut-Karabakh sont ancrées dans le processus de Minsk, qui s’inscrit dans le cadre de l’Organisation pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe (OSCE), dont est issu un groupe de contact co-présidé par les États-Unis, la France et la Russie : le Groupe de Minsk. Ce groupe s’est constitué dès 1992, à l’époque où l’OSCE était encore la Conférence pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (CSCE). Malgré son cadre euro-atlantique, le Groupe de Minsk inclut tous les États intéressés et acteurs étatiques régionaux d’importance, y compris la Turquie, à l’exception notable de l’Iran. Cependant, au cours des près de trente ans de son existence, ce groupe de contact a poursuivi ses travaux sans atteindre de résultats tangibles. On a de plus en plus l’impression, en particulier en Azerbaïdjan, que le Groupe de Minsk est incapable ou refuse de fournir une solution efficace au conflit. En début juillet 2020, le président Aliyev a ouvertement attaqué le processus de paix et remis en question la nécessité de négocier avec l’Arménie. Seulement quelques jours plus tard ont éclaté les attaques sur la frontière arméno-azerbaïdjanaise. Cette coïncidence, s’il s’agit bien d’une coïncidence, n’est pas sans rappeler les critiques analogues émises par les autorités azerbaïdjanaises en février et en mars 2016, soit peu avant la reprise des hostilités – dans ce que certains ont appelé la « guerre d’avril » ou la « guerre de cinq jours » – qui se sont soldées par près de 200 victimes et la reconquête par l’Azerbaïdjan de quelques positions sur le pourtour du Haut-Karabakh. Ce qui a changé en 2020 Il n’est pas exceptionnel que l’on assiste à une reprise des hostilités armées dans ce conflit « très peu gelé ». Ce qui distingue cependant l’escalade actuelle des éclats précédents est le rôle beaucoup plus actif de la Turquie, celui plus réservé de la Russie et l’absence des États-Unis. L’analyse des réactions officielles de ces acteurs extérieurs donne aux observateurs un aperçu des conséquences que cette reprise violente du conflit pourrait avoir : elle pourrait être le prélude à une transformation du processus de paix d’un processus euro-atlantique en un processus plus « régional ». Depuis l’été 2020, la Turquie – qui n’a jamais été neutre sur cet enjeu du fait de sa proximité culturelle avec l’Azerbaïdjan, mais qui a toujours évité de s’impliquer trop fortement de peur de s’attirer les foudres de Moscou – semble avoir abandonné sa neutralité de façade. Au-delà des critiques dirigées contre l’Arménie lors des éclats de juillet, Ankara a intensifié sa rhétorique contre l’Arménie en août, à l’occasion du centenaire du traité de Sèvres. Le président turc Recep Tayyip Erdogan a multiplié les critiques de l’Arménie à la suite d’exercices militaires conjoints turco-azerbaïdjanais à la fin juillet et au début d’août de cette année. Dès septembre, des observateurs font état d’un soutien diplomatique accru de la Turquie à l’endroit de Bakou et du transfert de matériel militaire turc vers l’Azerbaïdjan. Sans que ce soit confirmé officiellement, les témoignages se sont accumulés à l’effet que la Turquie utilise des centaines de combattants armés pro-turcs ayant œuvré en Syrie pour soutenir Bakou, bien que ce soit vivement démenti de la part des autorités politiques et intellectuelles du pays. Contrairement aux attentes, l’appui sans équivoque en provenance de la Turquie et sa présence militaire en Azerbaïdjan ne se sont pas heurtés à une vive réaction de la part de la Russie, qui s’est contentée pendant près de dix jours de lancer un appel à la retenue aux belligérants – une position très peu vocale qui a donné l’impression que la Russie, pourtant l’alliée stratégique de l’Arménie dans le cadre de l’Organisation du traité de la sécurité collective (OTSC), soit très peu intéressée à s’impliquer dans ce conflit. Après dix jours, Moscou s’est activée à piloter des pourparlers de paix, même après qu’un de ses hélicoptères ait été abattu par erreur par les forces azerbaïdjanaises au-dessus du territoire arménien. Plusieurs analystes à Moscou et ailleurs questionnaient même si une implication de la diplomatie russe dans ce conflit n’engendrerait pas un coût trop élevé pour les bénéfices que peut en retirer Moscou. La Russie a réussi à négocier un cessez-le-feu le 9 octobre, une trêve humanitaire le 17 octobre et une autre le 26 octobre, trois ententes qui furent ignorées sur le terrain. Pour sa part, l’accord du 9 novembre semble avoir eu plus d’écho : un cessez-le-feu a été signé par l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan, notamment une entente qui comprend un rôle de maintien de la paix pour la Russie. Il s’agit ici d’une première, car le cessez-le-feu précédent, qui a suspendu l’essentiel des hostilités armées entre 1994 et 2020, n’était pas accompagné d’une force d’interposition déployée dans la région. Fait à noter, l’accord ne fait nulle mention du rôle du Groupe de Minsk ou de l’OSCE. Vers un tandem Turquie-Russie au Caucase? Bien que tacite, la participation de la Turquie au conflit dans une région que la Russie considère comme son arrière-cour peut être vue par le prisme d’une synergie de politique étrangère de Moscou et d’Ankara sur plusieurs fronts. Ainsi, alors même que la Turquie et la Russie se tiennent sur des côtés opposés dans les guerres civiles syrienne et libyenne, elles ont toutes deux trouvé un terrain d’entente dans leur éloignement respectif des paradigmes politiques et même militaires occidentaux. Pour la Turquie, cet éloignement prête le flanc à la critique de ses partenaires de l’OTAN, un phénomène dont l’ampleur grandit à mesure qu’Ankara multiplie les gestes de provocation unilatéraux, que ce soit en Syrie, en Libye ou, plus récemment, en Méditerranée orientale. Le régime du président Erdogan affiche de plus en plus ouvertement une politique étrangère nationaliste sans complexe, que certains qualifient d’irrédentiste, mais qui est davantage axé sur des considérations politiques et sécuritaires et serait plus proche d’un certain « gaullisme à la turque ». Plusieurs questionnent maintenant si la Turquie est toujours un partenaire fiable au sein de l’Alliance atlantique, ce qui mine le climat de confiance indispensable entre alliés, au moment où la Turquie cherche à faire sa marque sur la scène régionale. Du côté de Moscou, ce changement d’approche pourrait s’expliquer par une tentative de faire revivre la doctrine Primakov (du nom de l’ancien ministre russe des Affaires étrangères et premier ministre Evgueni Primakov), voulant que la Russie forme des alliances régionales pour ainsi résister à l’hégémonie mondiale des États-Unis. De nombreux observateurs estiment que la reprise du conflit armé au Haut-Karabakh est un nouveau chapitre dans la guerre par procuration séculaire que se livrent Moscou et Ankara dans le Caucase. Pourtant, après un examen plus approfondi de la situation géopolitique actuelle, il semble plutôt que les deux parties aient développé un certain rapprochement, voire une collaboration pragmatique dans certains dossiers au Caucase plutôt que d’utiliser chaque prétexte pour relancer leur rivalité historique. Ce conflit renouvelé semble leur procurer une opportunité de travailler ensemble afin d’exercer une influence dans la région tout en excluant les puissances occidentales. La relation amour-haine turco-russe est devenue la plus évidente quand, le 24 novembre 2015, des chasseurs F-16 turcs ont abattu un avion Sukhoï SU-24 russe au-dessus de la frontière entre la Turquie et la Syrie. L’incident qui aurait pu être utilisé par Moscou pour aggraver les tensions avec Ankara, s’est simplement traduit par un froid diplomatique momentané qui fut déjà oublié à la mi-2016, lorsque les deux pays ont annoncé la reprise de leurs relations diplomatiques. En 2017, les relations turco-russes étaient déjà redevenues suffisamment amicales pour que les deux pays signent un accord de coopération militaire ouvrant la voie à l’achat par Ankara de missiles sol-air de fabrication russe. Vu les problèmes de sécurité indéniables que pose l’achat d’équipement militaire russe par la Turquie pour les partenaires de cette dernière au sein de l’OTAN, la crainte que la Turquie bascule dans le camp de la Russie dans un climat qui rappelle celui de la guerre froide, a provoqué l’ire de Washington, qui a annulé certains programmes de coopération avec Ankara, dont le programme des F-35, et même entamé une réflexion sur la possibilité d’exclure la Turquie de l’Alliance atlantique. Ankara ne semble pas s’en préoccuper, poursuivant de façon ouverte, provocatrice aux yeux des Occidentaux, un rapprochement avec des régimes peu fréquentables – Iran, Venezuela et Russie – tout en adoptant une politique de plus en plus nationaliste sur la scène régionale. Il faut dire que les pays membres de l’OTAN peuvent difficilement exclure la Turquie de l’Alliance atlantique, une impossibilité stratégique selon plusieurs analystes, car cela signifierait pour l’OTAN de se couper du détroit du Bosphore essentiel pour ses navires et mènerait à l’isolement complet des flottes roumaines et bulgares, en plus d’anéantir la possibilité de voir un jour la Géorgie intégrer l’OTAN. Conscient de sa position stratégique, Erdogan se moque des préoccupations de ses partenaires de l’OTAN en décidant de tester ses nouveaux systèmes de missiles russes le 16 octobre 2020, soit en pleine crise du Haut-Karabakh, un geste qui sera probablement suivi de l’exclusion de la Turquie d’autres programmes de l’OTAN, voire de sanctions, sans pour autant mener à son expulsion. Outre leur suspicion et leur attitude oppositionnelle à l’égard de l’Occident, la Russie et la Turquie ont toutes les deux su profiter de plusieurs développements au cours des deux dernières années pour accroître leur coopération, en particulier dans le Caucase du Sud. L’isolationnisme accru de la politique étrangère américaine des dernières années et le déclin de l’intérêt des pays européens dans la région fournissent une opportunité à la Russie et à la Turquie de « détourner » le dossier du Haut-Karabakh du Processus de Minsk de l’OSCE en le convertissant en une entreprise régionale. Cet acte de conversion est même accéléré par les gestes de défiance posés par la Turquie, qui n’hésite plus à se froisser avec les pays occidentaux. Après des mois de relations houleuses entre Ankara et Paris, au sujet de la Libye ou de l’exploration pétrolière en Méditerranée, Erdogan reproche désormais au président français Emmanuel Macron son projet de lutter contre l’islamisme radical en France. Face aux critiques très peu diplomatiques formulées par Erdogan, qui a questionné la « santé mentale » de Macron en l’invitant « à se faire soigner », la France n’eut d’autres choix que de rappeler l’ambassadeur de la Turquie. À la même occasion, le président turc a accusé la France d’être « responsable de l’occupation d’une partie du territoire de l’Azerbaïdjan par les séparatistes pro-arméniens », ce qui vise évidemment à miner la crédibilité de la France, qui abrite une large population d’origine arménienne, dans son rôle potentiel de médiatrice neutre dans ce conflit et en tant que co-présidente du Groupe de Minsk avec les États-Unis et la Russie. La rupture des relations diplomatiques franco-turques ne pourra que limiter davantage les pressions que Paris est en mesure d’exercer sur les acteurs de ce conflit, alors que la Turquie y manifeste sa participation de plus en plus ouvertement. Les États-Unis étant complètement absorbés par la campagne présidentielle et ses suites, il ne reste plus que la Russie pour s’occuper d’entretenir le processus de paix de Minsk. Dans ce contexte, il n’est pas étonnant que la Turquie appelle à l’établissement d’un nouveau cadre de négociation pour le processus de paix pour le Haut-Karabakh, un cadre qui se ferait désormais à quatre : Arménie, Azerbaïdjan, Russie et Turquie. Les conséquences de la transposition du conflit du Haut-Karabakh d’un cadre multilatéral de l’OSCE dans un cadre plutôt régional russo-turc (avec un rôle iranien possible, mais pas encore clair) pourraient être majeures et durables. Dans ce contexte, l’approche « attentiste » initiale de la Russie, suivie par son implication dans la négociation d’un cessez-le-feu entre les protagonistes, porte fruit. En effet, la Russie a habilement su utiliser ses différents leviers de pression pour imposer son processus de paix alternatif à celui du Groupe de Minsk. D’ailleurs, le cessez-le-feu négocié le 9 novembre prévoit le déploiement d’une force russe de maintien de la paix composée de 1960 militaires, une perspective qui n’avait jamais été acceptée par les protagonistes (surtout l’Azerbaïdjan) jusqu’à maintenant. La Turquie y obtient un rôle de superviseur de l’application de l’accord. Une autre conséquence de cet accord est l’évacuation complète de la perspective du Haut-Karabakh : en effet, jusqu’à maintenant, l’Arménie avait toujours refusé de signer un quelconque accord sans que la RHK en soit partie. Le fait que l’Arménie ait signé cet accord de cessez-le-feu désavantageux indique non seulement son extrême vulnérabilité géopolitique, mais donne également du crédit à la thèse azerbaïdjanaise qui, depuis des décennies, affirme que le conflit du Haut-Karabakh n’est pas tant un conflit sécessionniste sur son territoire qu’un conflit interétatique entre l’Azerbaïdjan et l’Arménie voisine. Ainsi, même s’il est clair que l’Azerbaïdjan est passé à l’offensive militaire ces dernières semaines, cet État aime projeter une image de soi comme étant la victime de l’intransigeance des Arméniens depuis trente ans. Du point de vue de la Turquie, le récent conflit et la possible diplomatie régionale en collaboration avec la Russie pour le résoudre apportent un double avantage : l’occasion, pour Erdogan, de revendiquer une victoire militaire et diplomatique et, plus important encore, le renforcement du « mentorat » de la Turquie sur l’Azerbaïdjan. Ces deux éléments permettent à la Turquie d’avancer son programme d’affirmation sur la scène régionale et internationale. Malgré l’appel du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU, lancé le 29 septembre, à contenir le conflit et à poursuivre sa médiation dans le cadre de l’OSCE, il est devenu évident que le processus de Minsk n’est plus une option viable pour les acteurs impliqués dans le conflit. Ceci signifie l’enterrement définitif de ce processus moribond, qui avait déjà été abandonné par l’Arménie depuis longtemps. Le passage d’un processus de paix d’un cadre multilatéral – le Groupe de Minsk de l’OSCE – à un cadre plus régional russo-turc indique que l’Occident est un acteur de moins en moins pertinent dans la cour arrière de la Russie et de la Turquie. Que ce soit par choix ou par convergence accidentelle, les deux puissances régionales sont prêtes à définir et à mettre en œuvre leurs propres stratégies de sécurité dans le Caucase du Sud de manière bilatérale, avec seulement des objections symboliques et timides de la part de l’Occident. Le processus de Minsk semble être la dernière victime de cette tendance ainsi que du désengagement américain dans le cours des affaires mondiales. Considérations politiques pour le Canada Le conflit du Haut-Karabakh interpelle le Canada à maints égards. D’abord, le soutien de plus en plus documenté de la Turquie auprès des forces azerbaïdjanaises est préoccupant, car ce partenaire de l’OTAN a livré de la technologie canadienne aux forces armées azerbaïdjanaises, qui l’ont utilisée dans leurs opérations militaires de l’automne. En réaction, la firme canadienne BRP a suspendu ses livraisons de moteur de drones à la Turquie et un examen complet des produits canadiens militaires susceptibles d’avoir été employés sur le champ de bataille caucasien est mené par les autorités canadiennes afin de voir s’il n’y a pas lieu d’élargir l’embargo. Ensuite, en tant que puissance moyenne, le Canada a toujours privilégié le travail diplomatique des organisations internationales. C’est là une façon canadienne d’avoir une voix sur la scène internationale, une voix généralement peu entendue en dehors de ces organisations en raison de l’alignement historique du Canada sur les positions géopolitiques des États-Unis. Or l’échec du Groupe de Minsk et la quasi-absence de médiation occidentale dans ce conflit sont une occasion perdue. Étant largement perçu comme un État relativement neutre sur les enjeux du Caucase, Ottawa aurait été bien positionné pour tenter de faire le pont entre les protagonistes. Une telle initiative diplomatique pourrait éventuellement aider le Canada dans ses ambitions à obtenir un siège non permanent au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU. Enfin, Ottawa doit prendre position sur l’enjeu de la reconnaissance – ou la non-reconnaissance – de l’indépendance de la RHK. Il s’agit d’un enjeu sensible pour le Canada, qui héberge une petite population d’origine arménienne qui compte plusieurs artistes, intellectuels et personnalités publiques. Cette communauté a une bien plus grande visibilité que les personnes d’origine azerbaïdjanaise, beaucoup moins nombreuses au pays, ce qui lui permet de bénéficier d’une certaine capacité d’influencer les autorités politiques canadiennes. C’est ainsi qu’elle a su convaincre les législateurs canadiens de reconnaître le génocide de 1915, malgré les menaces de rétorsions de la Turquie, pourtant un allié dans le cadre de l’OTAN. Cette influence explique également l’initiative du sénateur Leo Housakos, qui a déposé une motion demandant la reconnaissance de l’indépendance de la république du Haut-Karabakh. Le Canada n’est pas le seul pays à être interpelé par la communauté de la diaspora arménienne, car un véritable mouvement a été lancé pour la reconnaissance internationale de la RHK. L’Uruguay, comme bien souvent sur ce genre d’enjeu – après tout, il s’agit du tout premier État au monde à avoir reconnu le génocide arménien de 1915 – ouvre le bal en discutant explicitement la possibilité de reconnaître l’indépendance de la République du Haut-Karabakh, même si cela se fait sur un territoire diminué. Sa capitale, Montevideo, l’a formellement reconnue. Pour le Canada, il convient toutefois d’être prudent avant de se lancer dans un tel processus de reconnaissance étatique. Le Haut-Karabakh est une entité ayant fait sécession d’un État souverain, l’Azerbaïdjan, que le Canada a reconnu dans ses frontières héritées de l’époque soviétique. Or, en dehors des situations coloniales, le droit international ne reconnait généralement pas un droit à la sécession, sauf à de très rares situations spécifiques – telle une occupation étrangère (comme au Koweït en 1990) ou en cas de dissolution d’État (comme l’URSS et la Yougoslavie en 1991 et la Tchécoslovaquie en 1993) – des conditions qui ne sont pas applicables au Karabakh. Certes des juristes activistes tentent de développer un nouveau droit à la sécession depuis une vingtaine d’années, à savoir dans le cas de populations qui seraient soumises à une répression sévère et de longue durée. Le seul cas qui a pu en bénéficier à ce jour est celui du Kosovo, pourtant un cas qui est loin de faire l’unanimité. Toujours contestée par la Serbie, l’indépendance du Kosovo n’est reconnue que par une centaine d’États et l’entité ne parvient pas à gagner l’appui nécessaire pour faire son entrée à l’ONU. Au moment de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance du Kosovo, en février 2008, la plupart des États l’ayant reconnu comme un nouvel État indépendant, comme le Canada, ont pris la peine de souligner qu’il s’agissait d’un cas unique qui ne créerait pas de précédent. Or, quoi qu’en pensent les autorités canadiennes, et malgré les mises en garde de spécialistes,  une telle unicité est insoutenable en droit international et la reconnaissance du Kosovo constitue bien un précédent, qui a d’ailleurs servi de modèle à la reconnaissance de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud par la Russie et quelques autres États en 2008. Si le Canada s’engage dans une nouvelle reconnaissance de ce type, il risque de reproduire ce qui a toujours été présenté comme ayant un caractère unique. Il s’agit d’un jeu dangereux qui pourrait, d’une part, déstabiliser l’ordre international en banalisant l’ingérence dans les affaires internes des États tout en favorisant la multiplication des États et, d’autre part, venir hanter le Canada si jamais une province canadienne cherchait à faire sécession et obtenait des appuis étrangers dans ses efforts sécessionnistes. Ottawa ne peut s’attendre à la retenue des autres États s’il se permet de soutenir une approche qui porte atteinte de façon flagrante à la souveraineté d’autrui. ## Le cyberspace comme nouveau théâtre d’affrontement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-cyberspace-comme-nouveau-theatre-daffrontement/ Modified: 2022-05-10 > Le cyberespace est considéré comme un élément majeur du nouvel ordre mondial. Le cyber est un espace qui est créé par une interconnexion... Deux cyberattaques ont visé l’Ukraine à la mi-janvier. L'Ukraine et ses alliés Occidentaux ont accusé à de maintes reprises Moscou de mener des attaques informatiques contre leurs sites et infrastructures, ce dont la Russie se défend. Par le passé, Moscou avait déjà utilisé l’arme cyber pour acculer son voisin ou encore pour préparer une intervention militaire. Un virus informatique dissimulé sous les apparences d’un rançongiciel a été décelé par Microsoft. La découverte par Microsoft de l’existence de cette cyberattaque intervient également un jour après qu’environ 70 sites internet d’institutions ukrainiennes - tels que celui du ministre des Affaires étrangères, ou du conseil de Défense et de la Sécurité - ont été attaqués. Le cyberespace est considéré comme un élément majeur du nouvel ordre mondial. Le cyber est un espace qui est créé par une interconnexion mondiale, tel un nouvel environnement virtuel. Cette définition a été adoptée par la France dans le second Livre Blanc de 2012 qui considère le cyberespace comme un milieu comme la terre ou la mer, dans lequel se produisent des opérations stratégiques qui ne sont pas uniquement militaires ou encore de l’ordre de l’action stratégique, diplomatique et culturelle. Cette nouvelle donne change aussi la manière d’appréhender l’action dans le cyberespace en le considérant comme un espace stratégique comme les autres (terre, mer, air et espace extra-atmosphérique). Animation: -Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, fellow et conseiller principal en communications et partenariats au CÉRIUM Intervenants: -Alix Desforges: chercheuse en PostDoctorat au sein de GEODE depuis septembre 2018. -Stéphane Taillat: Maitre de conférence à l’IFG LAB. Il est également directeur adjoint du master spécialisé « opérations et gestion de crises en cybersécurité » à l’école française de Saint-Cyr. ## Le développement de la 5G et l’impact de la présidence de Donald Trump sur le partage de renseignements au sein du Groupe des cinq URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-developpement-de-la-5g-et-limpact-de-la-presidence-de-donald-trump-sur-le-partage-de-renseignements-au-sein-du-groupe-des-cinq/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > La gouvernance particulière du président Trump et le caractère sécuritaire de la 5G bouleversent l’unité du Groupe des cinq, mais les pays membres peuvent s’adapter à ces défis. Le développement de la technologie 5G pose un nouveau défi au sein de l’alliance informelle des « Five Eyes », c'est-à-dire le Groupe des cinq. Cette nouvelle technologie permet d’améliorer considérablement la vitesse de débit des données, l’interopérabilité des réseaux et devient la nouvelle norme en matière de télécommunications sans fil. Son développement est concentré aux mains d’un petit nombre d’acteurs, dont Huawei, un des plus gros fabricants d’équipements de télécommunications. La proximité qui existe entre le gouvernement chinois et Huawei entraîne des préoccupations quant à la possibilité pour la Chine de détourner cette technologie à des fins politiques. Une utilisation illégale du réseau 5G pose des menaces importantes aux appareils de sécurité des États occidentaux. Le président Trump s’est opposé fortement au développement de la 5G par Huawei et est allé jusqu’à indiquer que les États-Unis arrêteraient de partager des renseignements avec les pays qui n’excluent pas Huawei de leurs télécommunications. Le développement de la 5G et la présidence de Trump posent alors des défis nouveaux pour l’avenir du Groupe des cinq dont le Canada fait partie. La gouvernance particulière du président Trump et le caractère sécuritaire de la 5G bouleversent l’unité de l’alliance, mais les pays membres peuvent s’adapter à ces défis s’ils ne veulent pas que celui-ci soit durable. L’imbrication de la technologie et de la sécurité Le développement de la 5G pose un nouveau défi pour l’alliance du Groupe des cinq, car c’est la première fois, pour les pays membres, qu’un outil de modernisation technologique est perçu comme une menace aussi élevée à la sécurité intérieure. La 5G permet d’améliorer l’efficacité de nombreux domaines tels que les transports, les moyens de communication ou la défense. Cette révolution technologique apporte, en parallèle, de nouvelles menaces au cyberespace des pays membres et cela en fait donc un enjeu de sécurité considérable. Pour en contrôler les effets, il est nécessaire de mettre en place des mécanismes de contrôle, mais le développement de ceux-ci peine à rattraper celui de la technologie 5G en elle-même. La cybermenace représente un nouvel enjeu à l’international et nécessite un partage de renseignements accru et efficace afin de contrebalancer la vulnérabilité des infrastructures. Aussi, la menace représentée par la 5G est amplifiée par le monopole que possède Huawei sur son développement. En Chine, le secteur privé est intrinsèquement lié au gouvernement. Le financement actif du groupe Huawei par le gouvernement chinois laisse à penser que celui-ci a des intérêts non négligeables dans ses activités. De plus, deux lois concernant le partage de renseignement en Chine obligent Huawei à participer aux activités de renseignement du gouvernement chinois. Pour la Chine, les objectifs de sécurité nationale sont indissociables de la participation des acteurs de toutes les branches de la société. Le manque de clarté du langage juridique des deux lois laisse à penser qu’il serait simple pour la Chine d’invoquer des préoccupations sécuritaires afin d’utiliser la technologie 5G pour s’infiltrer dans les infrastructures de ces ennemis. Dans le contexte du développement de la 5G, en s’imposant comme un acteur perturbateur de l’ordre international établi, la Chine cristallise son rapport avec les puissances occidentales. Les membres du Groupe des cinq ont donc mis en place, au sein de leur pays respectif, des comités chargés de déterminer le potentiel danger que représente Huawei dans l’installation de la 5G et tous mettent en avant le risque qui y est associé. Pourtant, tous n’ont pas encore pris de décision quant à la participation de Huawei dans le développement des réseaux 5G. Ceci laisse penser qu’il n’y a pas d’approche uniformément acceptée sur le sujet, ce qui est surprenant, car le domaine des technologies de communication est plutôt facteur d’alignement au sein de l’alliance. Le statut spécial des États-Unis en matière de renseignement Les États-Unis représentent, au sein de l’alliance et de façon globale, le plus gros fournisseur de renseignement dans le système international. La communauté du renseignement américaine est composée d’une multitude d’agences qui travaillent de manière autonome, mais en collaboration les unes avec les autres. Une des principales missions de celles-ci est de prévenir le vol de secrets américains en contrant les efforts d’espionnage des autres États et en acquérant des informations pour évaluer les services de renseignement des acteurs pour neutraliser ceux qui peuvent s’avérer hostiles. C’est dans cette dynamique que se développe la surveillance de Huawei. Le pays se positionne comme l’un des détracteurs principaux de Huawei. Depuis la présidence d’Obama, des inquiétudes ont été transmises quant au potentiel danger que représente Huawei dans l’industrie de la télécommunication.  En 2018, ces inquiétudes sont formalisées par une déclaration de ne pas utiliser les produits de la compagnie faite par les trois grandes agences américaines de renseignement. S’en suit, en 2019, la signature d’un décret par le président Trump qui place Huawei dans sa liste d’ennemis étrangers et qui l’empêche de commercialiser des produits aux États-Unis. Ici, le pays cherche à exclure totalement Huawei de son appareil commercial afin de protéger sa sécurité nationale. Le fait que les États-Unis soient le plus gros fournisseur de renseignement au sein de l’alliance lui accorde un statut d’autorité parmi les pays membres. Son positionnement contre Huawei doit être partagé pour maintenir une relation stable au sein du Groupe des cinq. Son influence est telle que certains pays membres ont changé de décision à la suite de pressions de la part des Américains. La Grande-Bretagne a, initialement, choisi de permettre à Huawei d’accéder à certains de ces moyens de communication en fixant certaines restrictions d’accès aux parties plus sensibles du réseau. Les États-Unis ont mis en avant leur désaccord quant à cette décision et ont menacé l’avenir du partage de renseignement entre les deux acteurs. Ces pressions ont conduit la Grande-Bretagne à réviser sa décision et à éliminer toutes les technologies Huawei de ses réseaux d’ici 2027. Il en va de même pour le Canada. Malgré qu’aucune décision officielle n’ait encore été prise, le pays a été prévenu plusieurs fois des possibles conséquences désastreuses si le Canada venait à compromettre son réseau. Le cas particulier de Huawei et de la 5G montre alors la présence d’asymétries et de tensions bilatérales que les pays membres ont tout intérêt à prendre en considération s’ils veulent que l’alliance perdure. La présidence de Trump et l’amplification des tensions L’arrivée de Donald Trump à la présidence des États-Unis amplifie les tensions présentes au sein de l’alliance. Pour ce qui est de Huawei, Trump est influencé par la rivalité stratégique qu’il entretient avec la Chine. Cette rivalité est exacerbée depuis l’arrivée de Trump au pouvoir. En matière de partage de renseignement, le Président a un comportement imprévisible qui entraîne des bris de confiance parmi les alliés. Par exemple, le partage d’informations avec la Russie concernant les attentats de Manchester a altéré la relation entre la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis. C’est d’ailleurs cette relation particulière qu’entretient Trump avec la Russie qui apporte des tensions au sein de l’alliance. Les implications de la relation entre Trump et Poutine sur l’appareil de sécurité américain et celui de ses alliés sont difficilement identifiables. Toutefois, il existe une multitude de liens entre les deux dirigeants. Cette ambivalence a conduit la Grande-Bretagne à demander d’être rassurée, par la communauté de renseignement américaine, sur le fait que le président Trump ne va pas compromettre ses opérations d’espionnage en Russie. Aussi, Trump a une relation délicate avec sa communauté de renseignement. Il émet beaucoup de critiques publiques sur les pratiques de la communauté en matière d’espionnage. À plusieurs reprises, il a fait pression sur la communauté de renseignement pour qu’elle présente des analyses en conformité avec ses opinions. Ces divisions internes ont des répercussions sur la capacité des États-Unis à être perçu comme un acteur de confiance avec qui l’on peut partager des renseignements. La confiance est un facteur essentiel pour le maintien et l’efficacité du Groupe des cinq. Ses pays membres partagent une culture stratégique commune et un nombre important d’informations confidentielles. Il s’agit d’un réseau de partage complexe dont le succès a été garanti par un maintien de la confiance et d’une certaine transparence entre les alliés. La présidence de Trump ainsi que les relations qu’il entretient avec les dirigeants des pays membres menacent l’équilibre de confiance initial de l’alliance. Toutefois, il est important de noter que ce n’est pas la première fois que l’on observe des bris de confiance au sein de l’alliance. Par exemple, l’affaire du sous-lieutenant canadien Jeffery Delisle, accusé d’avoir partagé du renseignement classifié avec la Russie a eu une incidence sur le degré de confiance entre les alliés. Considérations et recommandations politiques Le développement de la 5G dans le contexte de la présidence de Trump entraîne de nombreux défis qui se poursuivront même si les États-Unis changent d’administration. La position du pays concernant Huawei est claire et ne risque pas de changer. Le Canada est fortement dépendant du renseignement fourni par l’alliance et se doit donc de participer activement aux efforts de l’alliance pour pallier ces défis. D’abord, pour atténuer et mieux contrôler les enjeux de sécurité liés au développement de la 5G, le Canada et le reste de l’alliance doivent avoir une attitude proactive et collective sur la question de la cybersécurité. Les activités de renseignement et les opérations militaires, à l’échelle internationale, vont bientôt être menées en utilisant la 5G. Quel que soit le fournisseur, la 5G représente une menace importante à la sécurité nationale si le gouvernement n’a pas les moyens de la contrôler. L’alliance doit alors donner l’exemple en s’assurant que la sécurité est une priorité pour tous dans l’acquisition de la 5G. Le décryptage est le type de renseignement principal au sein de l’alliance et est tout à fait pertinent sur la question de la cybersécurité. Chaque pays doit donc s’assurer d’avoir les moyens nécessaires pour mobiliser ce type de renseignement pour protéger le cyberespace. Au Canada, des initiatives doivent être mises en place pour améliorer le partage de renseignement sur cette question. Cela passe par une orientation plus poussée des priorités stratégiques vers la cybersécurité. Au même titre que pour la lutte contre le terrorisme, le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité doit développer un centre intégré composé d’experts pour analyser ce type de menaces. Le Canada peut aussi profiter de cette opportunité pour s’imposer dans la sécurité non traditionnelle en élaborant des normes formalisées sur la bonne conduite en matière de 5G.  Si les membres du Groupe des cinq participent à ce travail de normalisation, qui est nécessaire à l’ensemble de la communauté internationale, cela permet de réaligner les intérêts de chacun des membres vers cet intérêt collectif. Ensuite, en ce qui concerne la domination américaine dans l’alliance, le Canada a d’abord intérêt à s’aligner à la décision américaine de bannir Huawei de son réseau 5G. Il faut faire un choix entre la protection sécuritaire qu’apportent les États-Unis et le marché commercial lucratif chinois. Il est nécessaire pour le Canada de maintenir une relation forte avec les États-Unis. En tant que puissance moyenne, le pays est particulièrement vulnérable aux menaces étatiques et transnationales, ne disposant pas d'autant de moyens en matière de renseignement que son voisin du sud. Pour maintenir un partenariat bénéfique avec les pays membres, le Canada doit s’assurer de toujours apparaître comme un partenaire pertinent aux yeux des autres. Pour cela, le Canada doit poursuivre ses efforts de refonte de son processus de surveillance et de partage de renseignement. Depuis 2016, le pays s’efforce de proposer des réformes qui visent à moderniser et dynamiser la communauté de renseignement canadienne. Cela passe notamment par la création du comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le renseignement chargé de superviser l’ensemble des activités des différentes agences. Cet effort de modernisation va permettre au Canada de réaffirmer sa pertinence aux yeux des pays membres et même peut-être de lui accorder une place plus égalitaire par rapport aux autres pays de l’alliance. Aussi, le Canada doit rappeler aux États-Unis qu’il y va de sa sécurité nationale de protéger les intérêts américains. Il est donc important de passer au-delà des divergences d’opinions entre dirigeants et de continuer à s’aligner sur l’intérêt américain. Enfin, la présidence de Trump a cristallisé le rapport de force entretenu avec la Chine. Les appareils de sécurité des membres sont très liés, en particulier celui du Canada avec les États-Unis. Si une menace chinoise est perçue par les États-Unis, celle-ci s’applique directement au reste des alliés. Pour nuancer les effets de ces tensions diplomatiques et retrouver un esprit d’unité, le Canada et le reste de l’alliance doivent réorienter les priorités stratégiques du Groupe des cinq vers la menace commune représentée par la Chine. Chaque pays de l’alliance a des enjeux stratégiques ou diplomatiques à régler avec la Chine. Une orientation claire des priorités de l’alliance vers l’endiguement de la menace chinoise fait passer un message fort à cette dernière. Cette orientation stratégique passe par un élargissement de l’intérêt de l’alliance au-delà du renseignement électromagnétique. S’unifier unilatéralement contre une menace va participer à une réaffirmation de l’unité et de la confiance qui existe entre les membres. Aussi, en faisant de la menace chinoise une priorité, l’alliance donne l’exemple et envoie un message aux partisans de l’ordre international établi. Cette position de leadership peut, à elle seule, pallier le bris de confiance causé par la présidence de Trump et le développement de la 5G. ## Le don canadien de 900 drones à l’Ukraine : Une réponse adéquate aux besoins du terrain? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-don-canadien-de-900-drones-a-lukraine-une-reponse-adequate-aux-besoins-du-terrain/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Le 19 février dernier, le ministère de la Défense nationale a déclaré, dans un communiqué de presse, un don de plus de 800 drones à l’Ukraine Le 19 février dernier, le ministère de la Défense nationale a déclaré, dans un communiqué de presse, un don de plus de 800 drones à l’Ukraine. Ce don entend répondre à un besoin grandissant pour des technologies militaires depuis le début de l’invasion russe il y a deux ans. Les systèmes aériens sans pilote (Unmanned Aerial System : UAS) SkyRanger R70, de la compagnie Teledyne FLIR, représentent un don de plus de 95 millions de dollars. Plus récemment, le communiqué de presse du 26 avril annonçait un don supplémentaire de 100 drones, pour un total de 900 drones. Ces annonces sont adéquates puisqu’elles montrent une adaptation de l’aide militaire à la réalité du terrain. Depuis l’invasion russe, l’utilisation croissante des drones dans la guerre est largement documentée. Les microdrones commerciaux bon marché sont devenus des pièces d’artillerie essentielles à la réussite des opérations militaires ukrainiennes. Si le communiqué de presse du 26 avril affirme que la livraison a débuté en mai 2024, le plan de livraison des 900 drones reste encore à être précisé par le gouvernement fédéral. Ottawa est d’ailleurs souvent critiqué pour l’écart qui existe entre ses paroles de soutien envers Kyiv et son manque d’action concrète. À titre d’exemple, le don annoncé il y a plus d’un an d’un système de défense antimissile sol-air, nommé NASAMS, ne s’est toujours pas concrétisé. Le gouvernement des États-Unis est responsable de la production du système NASAMS, mais aucune date de livraison n’a encore été annoncée. Les belles paroles du Canada et les délais de livraison affectent la crédibilité du gouvernement. Selon les données de l’Institut Kiel publiées en avril 2024, le Canada se place au dixième rang parmi les principaux contributeurs en aide militaire à l’Ukraine en termes de millions de dollars. Cependant, ces données incluent l’aide militaire dont la date de livraison est précisée, mais pas encore complétée. Dans ce contexte, la fourniture de drones de la part du Canada répond-elle aux besoins de l’Ukraine et peut-elle faire une différence sur le champ de bataille ? Plusieurs soutiennent que la quantité de drones compte davantage que leur qualité dans la guerre en Ukraine, la quantité étant une qualité en soi. Si la quantité est effectivement impérative pour que l’Ukraine compense l’avantage stratégique de la Russie, la présente note politique défend plutôt la thèse que le Canada doit miser sur la supériorité technologique de ses dons en armes que sur leur quantité. Le conflit russo-ukrainien est caractérisé par une asymétrie des capacités militaires, la Russie ayant les moyens d’une grande puissance. Les drones améliorent grandement les capacités de collecte d’informations, de surveillance et de renseignement dans la guerre, faisant ainsi une réelle différence sur le champ de bataille. La supériorité technologique des dons constitue donc un avantage considérable pour l’Ukraine, les technologies émergentes pouvant faire pencher l’équilibre de pouvoir en faveur des plus innovants. Cependant, pour que cette stratégie soit efficace, il est nécessaire d’augmenter la vitesse de production et de livraison. Les SkyRanger R70 sont-ils adaptés aux besoins ukrainiens ? Déjà en usage en Ukraine, les SkyRanger R70 peuvent remplir plusieurs fonctions sur le champ de bataille, que ce soit pour l’observation, le ciblage, la collecte de données ou encore pour le transport de charges militaires allant jusqu’à 3,5 kilogrammes. Ces drones sont dotés de caméras thermiques qui leur permettent de détecter des cibles potentielles qui émettent de la chaleur et ce, même durant la nuit ou malgré des intempéries. Ces caméras sont nécessaires puisque les combats nocturnes se sont répandus dans le conflit entre l’Ukraine et la Russie. De plus, Teledyne FLIR affirme que son produit est en mesure d’opérer dans des environnements hostiles où la communication et les réseaux GPS sont impossibles. Cette capacité de vol semi-autonome permet au SkyRanger R70 d’éviter le brouillage (ou jamming en anglais). La guerre électronique est en effet une caractéristique du conflit, les signaux GPS étant fréquemment brouillés. Il n’est pas rare que des signaux GPS soient modifiés afin de tromper les drones et ainsi tendre des pièges à l’adversaire. Des microdrones Black Hornet de Teledyne FLIR ont déjà été offerts à l’Ukraine grâce aux dons des gouvernements norvégiens et britanniques, ce qui donne une crédibilité supplémentaire à l’entreprise quant à l’efficacité de ses produits sur le terrain. Actuellement, les drones de type « first-person view » (FPV) sont les plus utilisés au front. Ces drones kamikazes sont pilotés à distance à l’aide d’une caméra intégrée, d’une télécommande et d’un casque que porte le pilote. Le casque permet de visionner le point de vue du drone. Les quadricoptères d’observation chinois Mavic sont également très présents sur le champ de bataille. Ces drones commerciaux sont faciles à piloter, accessibles et abordables, leur coût variant de 3 000 à 6 000 dollars en fonction du modèle. Le coût élevé des SkyRanger R70 s’explique entre autres par leur production occidentale. Ayant été conçus pour les marchés militaires occidentaux, leur production n’est pas adaptée à une fabrication en série comme le sont les quadricoptères Mavic. Les politiques de défense occidentales ont tendance à mettre l’accent sur des armes dispendieuses et sophistiquées, mais la production de celles-ci n’est pas adaptée au rythme qu’impose une guerre d’attrition de haute intensité impliquant une grande puissance. Par ailleurs, les drones chinois Mavic comportent certains défauts sur le plan de la cybersécurité. En plus d’être vulnérables au jamming, leur logiciel est crypté en raison de leur origine chinoise. Il est donc impossible de déterminer quelles informations sont recueillies par les fabricants en Chine. Les drones offerts par le Canada sont fabriqués en Ontario, ce qui permet d’éviter cet enjeu. Les UAS proposés par le Canada correspondent à la réalité du terrain dans la mesure où ils peuvent remplir diverses fonctions cruciales, performer lors de combats nocturnes et éviter les cyberattaques. Toutefois, le délai de production et de livraison demeure beaucoup plus long lorsque comparé à la production ukrainienne qui peut atteindre 150 000 drones par mois à un coût plus abordable. Alors que le don canadien de 900 drones semble important à première vue, il est estimé que 10 000 drones par mois sont perdus au front par Kyiv, ce qui équivaut à plus de 300 drones par jour. Même s’ils incluent sans doute les drones kamikazes, ces chiffres soulignent l’étendue de l’utilisation des drones dans ce conflit tout en mettant en perspective l’aide canadienne par rapport au besoin réel sur le terrain. Le président Volodymyr Zelensky a d’ailleurs annoncé l’objectif de produire un million de drones FPV pour l’année 2024. Le don de 900 UAS est significatif en termes de supériorité technologique, mais semble insuffisant pour répondre au besoin de l’Ukraine. Ceci soulève l’enjeu de la production de drones. La production des drones et le rôle accru de la société civile En raison de la guerre d’attrition, l’Ukraine et la Russie ont développé une dépendance envers les drones commerciaux utilisés à des fins tactiques. Parmi les tendances observables en Ukraine, il y a une forte mobilisation de la société civile et des compagnies privées. Les microdrones sont largement issus de l’industrie civile, avec plus d’une centaine de start-up qui opèrent en Ukraine pour contribuer à l’effort de guerre. La mobilisation civile permet d’accélérer l’approvisionnement en matériel militaire et en drones. Face à ces innovations, l’armée ukrainienne a dû s’adapter, notamment par l’implémentation de processus de certification plus courts qui durent près de trois mois. Autrement dit, le gouvernement ukrainien s’est adapté à ce nouveau mode de production afin de fournir suffisamment de matériel militaire à ses troupes dans un contexte d’urgence. Ce processus de certification accéléré témoigne d’une certaine institutionnalisation du drone au sein de l’appareil gouvernemental. Le 6 février dernier, le président Zelensky a annoncé la création d’une nouvelle branche des forces armées, soit le Unmanned Systems Forces. Cette institutionnalisation graduelle du drone témoigne de l’évolution de la doctrine de défense et ouvre la porte à une collaboration plus étroite avec Kyiv sur ce type d’armements. Les ONG Come Back Alive et Aerorozvidka incarnent l’étendue de la mobilisation civile pour la défense ukrainienne. Come Back Alive est une plateforme de sociofinancement qui permet de fournir du matériel comme des drones aux forces armées ukrainiennes. Aerorozvidka convertit des drones commerciaux pour un usage militaire et construit même son propre modèle de drone, le R18. De nombreux civils construisent des drones FPV dans leur domicile pour ensuite les offrir à l’armée ukrainienne. Chaque drone FPV a une valeur approximative de 400$, ce qui représente un coût nettement inférieur à celui annoncé par le Canada pour les SkyRanger R70 (environ 100 000$ l’unité). Les drones FPV sont souvent à usage unique, ce qui explique leur coût abordable. Les SkyRanger R70 sont, quant à eux, destinés à un usage à long terme. Par ailleurs, l’usage des imprimantes 3D par les groupes civils pour créer des pièces de drones témoigne de leur lien étroit avec les forces armées ukrainiennes et de leur implication dans la guerre. L’impression 3D permet de fournir des pièces beaucoup plus rapidement que la livraison en provenance des États membres de l’OTAN. En Ukraine, le conflit a révélé le rôle majeur de la société civile et du secteur privé dans l’effort de guerre et dans la production rapide de drones bon marché et efficaces. Un nombre élevé de drones est essentiel afin de saturer le champ de bataille et pour développer des systèmes d’essaim de drones (drone swarm). Un essaim de drones est un groupe de drones bon marché qui collaborent entre eux par des connexions de réseau fiables dans l’objectif d’accomplir des tâches complexes. Les essaims de drones sont le résultat de l’intelligence artificielle et représentent une nouvelle tendance du conflit russo-ukrainien. Les SkyRanger R70 sont dispendieux et livrés en quantité limitée par rapport au besoin de Kyiv, mais leur utilisation se fait sur le long-terme et principalement pour l’observation et la surveillance, à l’inverse des systèmes d’essaim. Alors que l’industrie civile contribue grandement à fournir une quantité élevée de drones, le Canada peut apporter son aide au travers de l’innovation technologique. Le Canada doit miser sur la supériorité technologique Le don de 900 drones est un premier pas vers davantage d’engagements de la part du Canada vis-à-vis du conflit en Ukraine. Le soutien militaire envers l’Ukraine est primordial dans la défense de sa souveraineté, de son intégrité territoriale et du respect du droit international. Le gouvernement fédéral condamne fermement la guerre d’agression russe qui représente un danger pour la sécurité de l’ordre international libéral. Pour que les actions du Canada correspondent davantage au discours tenu par le gouvernement, il est primordial de miser sur la supériorité technologique de l’Ukraine. Une course à l’armement de drones et à l’innovation technologique s’opère et les plus rapides bénéficieront d’avantages considérables. Recherche et développement Malgré l’important soutien international, il existe un écart entre l’assistance fournie à l’Ukraine et les besoins sur le terrain. Si l’Occident souhaite maintenir l’Ukraine dans la guerre, alors il est nécessaire de miser sur la supériorité technologique et de se tourner vers des moyens plus durables. Si des systèmes dispendieux tels que les drones turcs Bayraktar TB2 étaient efficaces au début de la guerre, les troupes russes se sont adaptées à ce type d’artillerie. Ceci exprime l’importance d’une adaptation technologique rapide. En outre, cette guerre démontre que les frontières entre les domaines militaires et civils deviennent de plus en plus poreuses, c’est pourquoi il est nécessaire d’investir dans la recherche et le développement (R&D) au sujet des drones commerciaux à usage militaire. En maximisant les connaissances sur les innovations technologiques ukrainiennes, il est possible d’augmenter l’efficacité des drones au front et de renforcer la cybersécurité. L’investissement en R&D permettrait d’adapter le mode de production occidental à celui de l’Ukraine et de fournir davantage de drones à moindre coût. En effet, il reste encore du progrès à faire au niveau de l’approvisionnement en matériel militaire, que ce soit au niveau de la vitesse de livraison ou encore de la production. L’investissement dans la R&D est l’occasion de mieux bénéficier des ressources financières allouées par le Canada au soutien militaire de l’Ukraine, tout en développant une expertise canadienne au sujet de ces technologies émergentes. Intelligence artificielle L’intelligence artificielle (IA) constitue un avantage comparatif du Canada. Une part importante de la R&D est d’ailleurs l’incorporation de l’IA aux drones. L’IA contribue à éviter le brouillage et à autonomiser les drones. Par exemple, le Reinforcement Learning est une simulation qui permet à l’IA de développer son autonomie en apprenant par des essais-erreurs jusqu’à être en mesure de prendre les décisions les plus optimales en fonction d’une situation donnée. De plus, la cueillette de données de vols est essentielle afin d’alimenter les algorithmes d’IA qui pourront développer des systèmes d’essaim de drones. Les drones qui se dirigent en essaim sur une cible sont plus difficiles à intercepter par les systèmes de défense aérienne, ce qui augmente leur performance. Puisque ce type d’attaque deviendra plus fréquent, il est nécessaire de développer l’IA pour être en mesure de mener de telles opérations et pour se défendre face à elles. Par ailleurs, l’IA et les essaims de drones entraînent la saturation de l’espace de combat. L’utilisation massive des drones fait augmenter l’intensité des combats et rend le champ de bataille plus létal, ce qui soulève notamment l’enjeu de la protection des pilotes de drones. Les drones sont en mesure de détruire l’artillerie lourde et dispendieuse de l’ennemi, comme les chars d’assaut ou les systèmes de missiles antiaériens, faisant des pilotes de drones des cibles majeures au front. Ceci souligne l’importance d’assurer leur protection et de développer des systèmes de défense aérienne avec l’IA. Le secteur privé et la chaîne de production Le secteur privé joue un rôle majeur dans l’innovation et la production des nouvelles technologies, comme le démontrent les nombreuses start-up en Ukraine ou les entreprises comme Teledyne FLIR. Le modèle ukrainien montre que les start-up sont des acteurs clés dans la création d’une armée de drones. Afin de soutenir la chaîne de production des drones, il faut renforcer la collaboration entre le secteur public et le secteur privé. La poursuite de la collaboration avec Teledyne FLIR et le soutien de plus petites entreprises innovantes sont donc des éléments pertinents pour le Canada. Ceci peut favoriser le développement de nouvelles technologies qui augmenteraient la performance et l’efficacité des drones, que ce soit au niveau de la connectivité ou encore de la navigation. L’incorporation de l’impression 3D a également le potentiel d’accélérer significativement l’approvisionnement en pièces de drones. La formation des pilotes de drones La compagnie Teledyne FLIR enverra des formateurs à Kyiv afin d’enseigner à un certain nombre de pilotes des forces armées ukrainiennes l’utilisation des drones SkyRanger R70. Quant au gouvernement canadien, il investit déjà dans l’instruction militaire par l’opération UNIFIER. La création d’un programme dédié à la formation des pilotes de drones serait un ajout majeur aux vues de la situation actuelle au front. Dans les unités nouvellement formées en Ukraine, le taux de réussite concernant l’atteinte des cibles par un drone est souvent autour de 10 à 15 %. Dans les unités spécialisées comme les services de renseignement ukrainiens, le taux de réussite peut atteindre 70 % ou 80 %. Ainsi, l’entraînement des pilotes augmente l’efficacité des drones. KazhanFLY est une école de pilotage de drones qui offre un cours de dix jours. KazhanFLY est également une initiative ukrainienne, civile et volontaire. En s’inspirant de ce type d’école et en collaboration avec le Unmanned Systems Forces, il pourrait être intéressant d’inclure une formation de pilotage de drones dans l’opération UNIFIER. Alors que les soldats ukrainiens apprennent davantage à manier les armes classiques, il y a un manque quant au maniement des microdrones. Il est important de former un grand nombre de pilotes en raison du grand nombre de drones sur le terrain. Investir dans la formation, notamment au travers de simulateurs de pilotage en réalité virtuelle, permet de renforcer les capacités des militaires ukrainiens par rapport à cette réalité du terrain. Conclusion Cette note politique a traité du don de 900 drones offert par le Canada à l’Ukraine afin de mettre en perspective le soutien militaire canadien par rapport à la réalité du terrain. Le conflit entre l’Ukraine et la Russie a mis de l’avant une nouvelle tendance de la guerre, c’est-à-dire l’utilisation croissante de microdrones commerciaux bon marché à des fins militaires. Des considérations politiques ont été émises à ce sujet. La R&D, l’IA, la collaboration avec le secteur privé et la formation des pilotes de drones sont des considérations adressées au gouvernement afin que le Canada agisse davantage en concordance avec ses paroles de soutien. Afin d’offrir une aide significative à l’Ukraine, il faut miser sur la supériorité technologique et renforcer la chaîne de production.   ## Le jeu dangereux de Trump: Faire pression sur l’Iran et contrer la montée en puissance de la Chine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-jeu-dangereux-de-trump-faire-pression-sur-liran-et-contrer-la-montee-en-puissance-de-la-chine/ Modified: 2025-05-12 Dans une interview accordée le 30 mars, le président américain Donald Trump a menacé l'Iran de bombardements et de droits de douane secondaires si Téhéran n'acceptait pas un nouvel accord nucléaire avec Washington. Il a indiqué que des discussions étaient en cours entre des responsables américains et iraniens, mais n'a pas fourni de détails spécifiques. M. Trump a déclaré que si aucun accord n'était conclu, il envisagerait de réimposer des droits de douane secondaires similaires à ceux imposés il y a quatre ans. En réponse, l'Iran a rejeté les négociations directes sous la pression et les menaces militaires des États-Unis, mais a réitéré sa volonté de s'engager dans des discussions indirectes. Trump a également indiqué qu'il prendrait une décision sur les tarifs secondaires dans quelques semaines si aucun progrès n'était réalisé. Cette décision fait suite à celle qu'il a prise en 2017 de retirer les États-Unis de l'accord nucléaire conclu en 2015 avec l'Iran. Une semaine plus tard, le 8 avril, adoptant une position un peu moins agressive, le président Trump a annoncé que des responsables américains rencontreraient directement les dirigeants iraniens pour discuter des ambitions nucléaires du pays. Il a averti que si les négociations échouaient, « l'Iran serait en grand danger ». Il a également déclaré que si les négociations n'aboutissaient pas, les États-Unis pourraient entreprendre une action militaire contre les installations nucléaires iraniennes, soulignant que l'Iran ne devait pas être autorisé à posséder des armes nucléaires. Depuis le début de son second mandat, le président Trump oscille entre une ligne dure et une approche plus indirecte à l'égard de Téhéran. Ces changements constants soulèvent la question de la logique sous-jacente à la politique iranienne de l'administration Trump. Cet article soutient que sous ces oscillations se cache un objectif stratégique : utiliser une pression maximale non seulement pour limiter les ambitions nucléaires de l'Iran, mais aussi pour perturber son alliance de plus en plus profonde avec la Chine - réaffirmant ainsi la domination des États-Unis dans la région et contrant l'influence mondiale croissante de Pékin. Trump est-il sérieux au sujet de la menace de bombardement ? La première question qui se pose est de savoir si le président américain est sérieux lorsqu'il évoque la possibilité d'attaquer l'Iran. L'administration de Trump a poussé à des sanctions plus agressives et à une pression militaire sur l'Iran, en particulier depuis qu'il a retiré les États-Unis de l'accord nucléaire de 2015 au cours de son premier mandat. Il a récemment étendu le déploiement des forces militaires américaines au Moyen-Orient et a menacé de procéder à des frappes militaires si l'Iran ne parvenait pas à un accord. Certains critiques, dont le commentateur médiatique conservateur Tucker Carlson, se sont prononcés contre un conflit militaire, évoquant le risque de pertes et de dommages importants pour les États-Unis. Si l'histoire récente nous a appris quelque chose, c'est que rien de ce que le président Trump annonce ne doit être pris à la légère. Récemment, Vladimir Poutine a déclaré que l'une de ses déclarations les plus farfelues, comme l'idée de prendre le contrôle du Groenland, devait être prise au sérieux. Cela dit, l'approche du président Trump, notamment en ce qui concerne la République islamique d'Iran, a toujours été transactionnelle. Malgré les décisions audacieuses qu'il a prises depuis le début de son second mandat, il semble probable qu'il choisisse de reprendre sa stratégie de pression maximale à l'égard du régime iranien, en poussant les dirigeants iraniens à faire le plus de concessions possibles, notamment en ce qui concerne le programme nucléaire. À cet égard, il convient de noter que sa stratégie de non-prolifération est largement soutenue par la plupart de ses alliés et, dans une certaine mesure, par la Russie de Poutine qui, malgré son soutien à Téhéran, n'est pas tout à fait à l'aise avec l'idée d'un Iran nucléaire. Si une guerre totale des États-Unis contre l'Iran reste improbable, la possibilité de frappes ciblées contre les infrastructures et les installations nucléaires iraniennes ne peut être écartée, notamment en raison du précédent créé par la frappe réussie d'Israël sur le réacteur nucléaire syrien, aujourd'hui abandonné, en 2007. Cette opération a démontré la volonté et la capacité des alliés régionaux à agir de manière décisive contre les menaces nucléaires perçues. Dans ce contexte, les États-Unis pourraient choisir de déléguer cette action à Israël, en lui apportant un soutien logistique ou de renseignement plus ou moins important. La stratégie sous-jacente consisterait à exercer une pression militaire calibrée afin de ramener l'Iran à la table des négociations, notamment en ce qui concerne son programme nucléaire. L'affaiblissement de l'Iran le pousse-t-il à négocier avec Trump ? Une autre question importante est de savoir si la reprise de la stratégie de pression maximale et le recours aux menaces militaires suffiront à convaincre les autorités iraniennes de s'asseoir à la table des négociations et d'engager des discussions directes avec les représentants de l'administration Trump. Il est important de noter que les États-Unis n'ont pas eu de discussions directes avec l'Iran depuis l'administration Obama. Bien que l'Iran ait rejeté les négociations directes avec les États-Unis sous la direction de Trump, il a exprimé sa volonté de s'engager dans des pourparlers indirects. En réponse à l'annonce de M. Trump, Nour News, aligné sur le Conseil suprême de sécurité nationale de l'Iran, l'a critiquée comme étant une opération psychologique visant à influencer l'opinion publique. La République islamique d'Iran refuse depuis longtemps les négociations directes avec les États-Unis pour des raisons idéologiques et politiques, considérant ces discussions comme une légitimation des politiques américaines qu'elle perçoit comme nuisibles à sa souveraineté et à la stabilité régionale. Même lorsque le dialogue peut sembler bénéfique d'un point de vue international, les responsables peuvent refuser des négociations directes avec les États-Unis en raison de rivalités internes au régime, d'une rhétorique nationaliste et de la crainte de perdre leur légitimité nationale. L'Iran estime que des négociations directes pourraient compromettre ses principes fondamentaux, notamment sa position sur l'influence régionale, le développement nucléaire et la résistance à la domination occidentale. L'Iran préfère les pourparlers multilatéraux, qu'il considère comme un moyen plus équilibré d'aborder les problèmes avec les États-Unis sans isoler ses positions. Le 7 avril, Téhéran a confirmé sans surprise la reprise du dialogue sur le programme nucléaire iranien, tout en précisant qu'il s'agirait de discussions indirectes. Le ministre iranien des affaires étrangères, Abbas Araghchi, a déclaré que les discussions se dérouleraient sous la médiation d'Oman, avec la participation de l'envoyé américain au Moyen-Orient, Steve Witkoff. Cela fait suite à une annonce antérieure du président Trump concernant des pourparlers « directs » avec l'Iran, bien que Téhéran ait rejeté l'idée de négociations directes. Il est intéressant de noter que la Russie a récemment proposé sa médiation entre Téhéran et Washington, notamment en ce qui concerne le programme nucléaire iranien. Cette initiative témoigne du rôle croissant de la Russie dans la diplomatie internationale, d'autant plus que les tensions entre l'Iran et les États-Unis restent vives. L'offre de médiation du Kremlin reflète à la fois ses intérêts stratégiques et son désir de promouvoir le multilatéralisme, réduisant ainsi la probabilité d'actions unilatérales de la part des États-Unis. L'ouverture de la Russie s'appuie également sur la position conciliante de l'administration Trump, qui permet à Moscou d'étendre son influence, en particulier dans des régions comme le Moyen-Orient où le leadership des États-Unis s'est affaibli. Cependant, les récents développements au Levant, y compris l'affaiblissement des forces mandataires de l'Iran et de ses capacités militaires asymétriques, ont considérablement diminué la profondeur stratégique régionale de l'Iran. Cette perte, combinée aux sanctions et à l'isolement diplomatique, pourrait pousser Téhéran à reconsidérer son refus de négociations directes avec les États-Unis. Bien que l'Iran ait été idéologiquement opposé à de telles négociations, l'évolution de la dynamique régionale et les coûts économiques et politiques de sa stratégie actuelle pourraient faire du dialogue avec les États-Unis une option plus viable pour désamorcer les tensions et protéger ses intérêts. Au-delà du fou : Le fil de soie Bien qu'elle puisse paraître désordonnée et improvisée, la politique internationale de l'administration Trump trouve sa cohérence dans son objectif de limiter l'influence mondiale de la Chine - que ce soit au Panama, au Groenland, sur la scène économique mondiale ou en mer de Chine méridionale. Le vice-président américain a confirmé l'existence d'un fil conducteur anti-chinois dans la politique de Washington, affirmant que depuis son entrée en fonction, l'administration Trump cherche un antidote à l'« économie mondialiste », qui, selon les décideurs américains, profiterait systématiquement aux intérêts chinois. En ce qui concerne l'Iran, Washington est particulièrement inquiet de voir l'Iran tomber sous l'influence de la Chine. En mars 2021, Téhéran et Pékin ont signé un ambitieux partenariat stratégique couvrant les secteurs économique, technologique et militaire. L'accord de 25 ans entre la Chine et l'Iran marque un rapprochement stratégique perçu par les Etats-Unis comme une menace directe pour leurs intérêts. Cette coopération se manifeste par des échanges militaires, notamment des ventes d'armes, des exercices conjoints et des partages technologiques, renforçant ainsi les capacités défensives et offensives de l'Iran. Sur le plan économique, cette alliance s'étend à l'énergie, aux infrastructures et à des secteurs économiques plus larges, intégrant l'Iran dans l'initiative chinoise « Belt and Road » (BRI) et liant davantage la République islamique à la Chine. Pour la Chine, la position de l'Iran au carrefour du Moyen-Orient, de l'Asie centrale et de l'Asie du Sud en fait un élément essentiel de ses stratégies géopolitiques et économiques. Washington craint que ce partenariat ne fasse de l'Iran un pivot stratégique, affaiblissant ainsi ses efforts pour limiter l'influence de la Chine au Moyen-Orient et en Asie. À moyen terme, l'activisme diplomatique de la Chine, qui vise à rapprocher l'Iran d'acteurs régionaux tels que l'Arabie saoudite et le Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG), est perçu comme un moyen pour Pékin de s'imposer comme un acteur politique et économique de premier plan, marginalisant ainsi l'influence américaine. À long terme, cette coopération tripartite pourrait faciliter l'émergence d'un bloc eurasien, dont l'Iran serait le maillon clé, et qui pourrait servir de contrepoids à l'hégémonie américaine. Ces éléments offrent un contexte plus large pour comprendre l'approche de Washington vis-à-vis de l'Iran, en particulier à la lumière de la résurgence de la stratégie de « pression maximale » et des menaces permanentes d'action militaire. Au lieu de recourir à des frappes militaires qui dévasteraient l'économie et l'infrastructure de l'Iran, les États-Unis visent à atteindre un objectif plus stratégique : détacher l'Iran de l'influence croissante de la Chine. Ce faisant, Washington espère rétablir progressivement l'Iran dans la sphère d'influence américaine, où il peut être plus facilement géré et influencé politiquement et économiquement. La stratégie américaine vise à éloigner l'Iran de ses liens de plus en plus étroits avec la Chine et à encourager Téhéran à revenir à un cadre dans lequel ses activités économiques et politiques sont plus étroitement alignées sur les intérêts américains. Au minimum, Washington espère intégrer l'Iran dans un système commercial qui reste soumis à la surveillance et aux réglementations américaines, en veillant à ce que l'influence américaine continue à façonner le paysage économique de la région et à ce que l'Iran reste quelque peu limité dans ses transactions internationales. Cette approche reflète une vision à long terme visant à réaffirmer la domination des États-Unis au Moyen-Orient et à réduire l'empreinte croissante de la Chine dans la région. Conclusion En conclusion, les tensions actuelles entre les États-Unis et l'Iran reflètent un paysage politique complexe et fluctuant, la stratégie du président Trump oscillant entre des moyens de pression agressifs et des ouvertures diplomatiques. Malgré ses menaces d'action militaire et de réimposition de tarifs secondaires, la probabilité d'une guerre à grande échelle reste faible, même si des frappes ciblées pourraient toujours être sur la table en tant qu'outils de négociation. La résistance de l'Iran aux négociations directes souligne sa position idéologique, mais l'évolution de la dynamique régionale et la pression croissante pourraient obliger Téhéran à reconsidérer sa position. Par ailleurs, les inquiétudes de Washington concernant les liens croissants entre l'Iran et la Chine ajoutent une nouvelle urgence à la situation, les États-Unis cherchant à limiter l'influence de la Chine dans la région. En fin de compte, la stratégie américaine ne vise pas seulement à endiguer le nucléaire, mais aussi à réaffirmer sa domination au Moyen-Orient en remodelant les alliances et le cadre économique de l'Iran. Alors que la partie d'échecs géopolitique se déroule, une chose est sûre : les enjeux sont élevés et l'équilibre des forces dans la région pourrait changer radicalement dans les années à venir. ## Le mirage de la transition démocratique au Tchad URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-mirage-de-la-transition-democratique-au-tchad/ Modified: 2023-09-04 > Les pourparlers de paix de l’année dernière entre les autorités tchadiennes et les groupes armés tchadiens ainsi que le « dialogue national » semblaient... Les pourparlers de paix de l’année dernière entre les autorités tchadiennes et les groupes armés tchadiens ainsi que le « dialogue national » semblaient peut-être inaugurer une nouvelle ère pour ce pays d’Afrique centrale après la mort du président Idriss Déby. Cependant, il s’agissait probablement d’un mirage. Depuis l’indépendance du pays en 1960, les changements de dirigeants tchadiens n’ont jamais été le résultat de processus démocratiques, inclusifs ou transparents. Il est peu probable que cette transition soit différente, et les alliés et les fournisseurs d'aide humanitaire du Tchad doivent se préparer à cette réalité. Pendant trop longtemps, des parties prenantes telles que l’Union africaine (UA), l’Union européenne (UE) et les États-Unis ont fermé les yeux sur les pratiques antidémocratiques de ce pays au nom sans doute des relations de longue date du Tchad avec la France et de la capacité de son armée à repousser les menaces des insurgés armés. Bien que cela soit vrai, ce ne sont pas des raisons qui justifient soutenir des pratiques autoritaires. La crise de légitimité actuelle a débuté en avril 2021, lorsque le président Idriss Déby a été tué dans des affrontements avec le groupe rebelle Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (FACT) après avoir été au pouvoir pendant trente ans. Faisant fi de la disposition constitutionnelle tchadienne selon laquelle le pouvoir doit être transmis au président de l’Assemblée nationale jusqu’aux élections, le fils d’Idriss Déby, Mahamat Déby, s’est déclaré président du Conseil Militaire de Transition, qui devait gouverner pendant dix-huit mois jusqu’à la tenue d’élections démocratiques. Des millions de dollars ont été fournis par le Canada, l’UE et la France pour soutenir le processus de transition, mais la probabilité qu’une véritable transition ait lieu est, à présent, très faible.   …   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon !   ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 11 – Accompagner les entreprises dans le marché défense, Eric Chocron-AXEO URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-11-accompagner-les-entreprises-dans-le-marche-defense-eric-chocron-axeo/ Modified: 2026-09-25 > Le marché canadien de la défense offre des occasions importantes aux entreprises d’ici. Mais vouloir y entrer est une chose. Comprendre comment y arriver en est une autre. Le marché canadien de la défense offre des occasions importantes aux entreprises d’ici. Mais vouloir y entrer est une chose. Comprendre comment y arriver en est une autre. Dans cet épisode du Nord Stratégique, Éric Sauvé reçoit Éric Chocron, président par intérim d’Axéo, qui s’apprête à lancer un parcours d’accompagnement destiné aux entreprises souhaitant faire leurs premiers pas dans le secteur de la défense. Une discussion sur les occasions qui s’ouvrent aux PME canadiennes, mais aussi les défis bien réels : comprendre les besoins militaires, naviguer dans les processus gouvernementaux, adapter son offre, développer les bons partenariats et surtout éviter de perdre du temps et de l’argent en abordant ce marché comme un marché commercial traditionnel. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 12 – F-35 ou Gripen-E avec Bruno Aviation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-12-f-35-or-gripen-e-with-bruno-aviation-french-reporter/ Modified: 2026-09-29 > Une entrevue passionnante avec Bruno Aviation, un journaliste français spécialisé en aviation militaire, pour plonger au cœur d'un débat qui a suscité de vives discussions au Canada : F-35 ou Gripen E ? Une entrevue passionnante avec Bruno Aviation, un journaliste français spécialisé en aviation militaire, pour plonger au cœur d'un débat qui a suscité de vives discussions au Canada : F-35 ou Gripen E ? Pendant près d'une heure, Eric et Bruno comparent les deux appareils, mais surtout les philosophies très différentes qui les sous-tendent. Stelthed, guerre électronique, capteurs, fusion de données, rayon d'action, coûts, maintenance, interopérabilité avec les alliés, retombées industrielles et souveraineté : ils vont bien au-delà d'une simple comparaison de fiches techniques. Bruno apporte également une perspective européenne particulièrement intéressante à un débat qui est souvent abordé presque exclusivement sous un angle canadien et nord-américain. F-35 ou Gripen E ? Il n'y a pas de réponse simple, et c'est précisément ce qui rend cette discussion si captivante. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 13 – La vision de la commandante de l’Aviation royale canadienne, LGen Jamie Speiser-Blanchet URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-13-la-vision-de-la-commandante-de-laviation-royale-canadienne-lgen-jamie-speiser-blanchet-2/ Modified: 2026-10-02 > Le marché canadien de la défense offre des occasions importantes aux entreprises d’ici. Mais vouloir y entrer est une chose. Comprendre comment y arriver en est une autre. L’AVIATION ROYALE CANADIENNE À UN POINT TOURNANT | LGen Jamie Speiser-Blanchet F-35, drones, intelligence artificielle, défense du Nord, NORAD, nouvelles technologies : à quoi ressemblera l’Aviation royale canadienne de demain ? Pour cet épisode du Nord Stratégique, Eric Sauvé reçoit la lieutenante-générale Jamie Speiser-Blanchet, commandante de l’Aviation royale canadienne, pour une discussion de fond sur sa vision de l’ARC et les transformations majeures qui l’attendent. Nous parlons évidemment du remplacement des CF-18 et de l’arrivée du F-35, mais surtout de ce que signifie réellement moderniser une force aérienne dans un environnement où les drones, les systèmes autonomes, les capteurs, les réseaux et l’intelligence artificielle transforment rapidement la guerre aérienne. Nous abordons également la défense du Canada et du Grand Nord, le rôle du NORAD, la coopération avec les États-Unis et nos alliés, ainsi que le défi humain derrière cette transformation : recruter, former et conserver les aviateurs dont l’ARC aura besoin. Une conversation sur les avions, bien sûr, mais surtout sur la force aérienne que le Canada devra construire pour les prochaines décennies. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép 14 – MGén Alain Forand, Ancien Colonel du R22R — Ses Mémoires : Entre feu et verglas URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-14-mgen-alain-forand-ancien-colonel-du-r22r-ses-memoires-entre-feu-et-verglas/ Modified: 2026-10-02 > Dans cet épisode du Nord Stratégique, le major-général Alain Forand nous parle d'une vie consacrée au métier des armes et au Royal 22e Régiment. Une histoire qui commence avec un petit gars de Farnham, bien loin d’imaginer jusqu’où l’uniforme allait le mener. Le major-général Alain Forand met actuellement la touche finale à ses Mémoires. Et quand on regarde son parcours, on comprend rapidement qu’il y a beaucoup à raconter. Dans cet épisode du Nord Stratégique, il nous parle d'une vie consacrée au métier des armes et au Royal 22e Régiment. Une histoire qui commence avec un petit gars de Farnham, bien loin d’imaginer jusqu’où l’uniforme allait le mener. Nous remontons aux débuts : son entrée dans les Forces armées canadiennes, sa découverte du métier d’officier d’infanterie, ses premières responsabilités et son attachement au Royal 22e Régiment. Puis viennent les opérations et les expériences qui vont progressivement façonner le soldat, l’officier et le commandant. Chypre, d’abord, dans le contexte des grandes missions canadiennes de maintien de la paix. Puis le Sahara occidental. Ensuite la Croatie et les Balkans, alors que les militaires canadiens sont confrontés à une réalité beaucoup plus brutale. Nous abordons également l’Afghanistan, une guerre qui marquera profondément les Forces armées canadiennes et toute une génération de militaires. Même après avoir quitté le service actif, Alain Forand demeurera étroitement lié à l’institution et à son régiment, notamment à travers ses fonctions honoraires. Mais au-delà des opérations et des postes occupés, nous parlons du leadership et du commandement, mais aussi de ce qu’on apprend réellement après des décennies passées avec des soldats. De l’importance des mentors. Des erreurs qui font grandir. Des responsabilités qui viennent avec le grade. De la nécessité de connaître ses gens et de leur donner l’espace nécessaire pour exercer leur propre leadership. Alain Forand revient aussi sur l’évolution de l’Armée canadienne qu’il a connue pendant sa carrière : les différentes générations de soldats, les transformations de l’institution, les périodes plus difficiles et ce qui, malgré tout, demeure fondamental dans le métier militaire. Il y a également dans cette conversation quelque chose de beaucoup plus personnel : l’amour du métier. Pourquoi certaines personnes restent profondément attachées à l’Armée longtemps après avoir quitté l’uniforme. À travers ses souvenirs se dessine finalement le parcours d’un homme qui aura traversé plusieurs époques de l’histoire militaire canadienne. Une longue conversation sur le métier des armes, le leadership, les soldats, les opérations et les leçons apprises. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 10 – Lt-général (ret.) Richard Evraire – Leadership, bilinguisme et une vie au service du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-10-lt-general-ret-richard-evraire-leadership-bilinguisme-et-une-vie-au-service-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-09-09 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et le lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard Evraire discutent sur le métier des armes, le commandement, le français, l’évolution des Forces et les leçons d’une vie passée à servir le Canada. Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le lieutenant-général (ret.) Richard Evraire pour revenir sur une carrière militaire exceptionnelle et, surtout, sur les leçons qu’il en a tirées. Ils discutent de son parcours au sein des Forces armées canadiennes, de son accession aux plus hauts échelons de l’institution et des expériences qui ont façonné sa conception du commandement. Mais cette conversation va bien au-delà de sa carrière. Ils discutent de leadership, des qualités qui distinguent selon lui les grands leaders et de l’importance de l’empathie lorsqu’on commande des hommes et des femmes. Une réflexion particulièrement intéressante à une époque où certains présentent justement l’empathie comme une faiblesse. Ils abordent également un sujet qui lui tient profondément à cœur : le bilinguisme dans les Forces armées canadiennes. Quelle place le français occupe-t-il aujourd’hui dans l’institution? Pourquoi la maîtrise des deux langues officielles constitue-t-elle bien davantage qu’une simple obligation administrative? Et pourquoi le bilinguisme représente-t-il également un véritable atout dans nos relations avec nos alliés? Une conversation sur le métier des armes, le commandement, le français, l’évolution des Forces et les leçons d’une vie passée à servir le Canada. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 3 – Philippe Lagassé – Le système d’acquisition militaire est-il brisé? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-3-philippe-lagasse-le-systeme-dacquisition-militaire-est-il-brise/ Modified: 2026-07-08 Le Canada investit des milliards en défense, mais pourquoi les projets prennent-ils autant de temps? Dans cet épisode du Nord Stratégique, le professeur Philippe Lagassé explique les véritables défis du système d'approvisionnement militaire canadien, les contraintes politiques et bureaucratiques, ainsi que les pistes de solution. Une discussion essentielle pour comprendre pourquoi il est si difficile d'équiper rapidement les Forces armées canadiennes. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 4 – Marc Dauphin – la guerre en Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-4-marc-dauphin-la-guerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2026-07-17 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le Dr Marc Dauphin, médecin militaire, auteur et vétéran des Forces armées canadiennes. Au cours de sa carrière, il a notamment dirigé un hôpital multinational en Afghanistan, ce qui fera l'objet d'un épisode subséquent. Nous faisons ici le point sur la guerre en Ukraine, que Marc suit depuis longtemps. Où en est réellement le conflit? Quelles leçons les armées occidentales doivent-elles tirer de cette guerre? Les drones ont-ils révolutionné le champ de bataille? Que nous dit l'histoire sur les conflits d'aujourd'hui? Et surtout, comment cette guerre pourrait-elle se terminer? Une conversation qui met en perspective les enjeux militaires, stratégiques et géopolitiques du plus important conflit en Europe depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 5 – André Gélinas – Former la police afghane URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-5-andre-gelinas-former-la-police-afghane/ Modified: 2026-09-09 Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit André Gélinas, sergent-détective retraité du SPVM et vétéran de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan, qui a participé à la formation de la Police nationale afghane. À travers son expérience sur le terrain, il explique les défis immenses de bâtir une force policière dans un pays en guerre : corruption, analphabétisme, différences culturelles, infiltration des talibans, manque de ressources et difficulté à gagner la confiance de la population. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 6 – Marc Dauphin – Médecin de guerre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-6-marc-dauphin-medecin-de-guerre/ Modified: 2026-08-11 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et le Dr Marc Dauphin discutent des réalités de la médecine de guerre. Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit le Dr Marc Dauphin, ancien commandant du Role 3 multinational de Kandahar et auteur du livre Médecin de guerre. En 2009, son équipe a traité un nombre sans précédent de blessés graves tout en maintenant un taux de survie de 97 %, un record historique pour un hôpital en zone de guerre. Nous discutons des réalités de la médecine de guerre : les blessures inimaginables, les « mass casualties », le commandement d’une équipe multinationale sous une pression constante, les dilemmes éthiques et le lourd impact psychologique que laisse un tel environnement. Comment soigne-t-on indistinctement des soldats alliés, des civils afghans, des femmes, des enfants et même des combattants ennemis? Comment prend-on les bonnes décisions lorsque les ressources sont limitées et que plusieurs vies sont en jeu simultanément? Un échange captivant sur le courage, le leadership, l'innovation médicale et l'humanité au cœur de l'un des conflits les plus marquants du XXIᵉ siècle. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 7 – Charlotte Duval-Lantoine – Recrutement et rétention URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-7-charlotte-duval-lantoine-recrutement-et-retention/ Modified: 2026-08-24 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et Charlotte Duval-Lantoine discutent des problèmes de recrutement et de rétention au sein des Forces. % Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Fellow et vice-présidente aux opérations à l’Institut canadien des affaires mondiales (CGAI), pour une discussion franche sur les problèmes de recrutement et de rétention au sein des Forces. Pourquoi autant de militaires choisissent-ils de partir? Le problème est-il vraiment le recrutement, ou faut-il d’abord s’attaquer aux raisons qui poussent les gens à quitter l’institution? Culture organisationnelle, leadership, conditions de service, attentes des nouvelles générations : nous examinons ce qui doit changer si les Forces veulent reconstruire leurs effectifs. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 8 – André Gélinas – Une vie dans la police URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-8-andre-gelinas-une-vie-dans-la-police/ Modified: 2026-08-26 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et André Gélinas discutent sur le métier de policier, ses réalités et son évolution. Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit André Gélinas, policier retraité et analyste bien connu du public québécois, pour une discussion franche sur le métier de policier, ses réalités et son évolution. André revient sur son parcours, sur ce qui l’a amené à choisir cette profession et sur certaines des expériences qui ont marqué sa carrière. Nous discutons également du travail policier tel qu’il se vit sur le terrain, de la relation avec la population, des transformations de la profession et des défis auxquels font face les policiers aujourd’hui. Une conversation sérieuse, mais ponctuée d’anecdotes et de l’humour bien caractéristique d’André Gélinas. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép. 9 – Charlotte Duval-Lantoine – La culture organisationnelle des Forces URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-9-charlotte-duval-lantoine-la-culture-organisationnelle-des-forces/ Modified: 2026-08-27 > Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé et Charlotte Duval-Lantoine discutent sur la culture organisationnelle des Forces armées canadiennes. Dans cet épisode, Éric Sauvé reçoit Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Fellow au Canadian Global Affairs Institute et auteure de The Ones We Let Down: Toxic Leadership Culture and Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces. Leadership, discipline, identité militaire, intégration, normes sociales, changement générationnel, cheveux colorés : nous abordons plusieurs sujets qui divisent et qui soulèvent une question plus fondamentale. Quelle culture militaire voulons-nous pour les FAC de demain? Une discussion animée, parfois en désaccord, mais qui va bien au-delà des slogans et des positions faciles. ## Le Nord Stratégique – Ép.2 – Thomas Juneau – Iran et Moyen-Orient URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-2-thomas-juneau-iran-et-moyen-orient/ Modified: 2026-07-08 La guerre entre Israël, les États-Unis et l'Iran semble prendre fin. Mais les véritables conséquences stratégiques de ce conflit commencent à peine à se faire sentir. Dans cet épisode de Le Nord stratégique, Éric Sauvé reçoit Thomas Juneau, professeur à l'Université d'Ottawa et l'un des plus grands spécialistes canadiens du Moyen-Orient et de l'Iran. Thomas Juneau soutient que cette guerre a constitué une erreur stratégique majeure. Ensemble, nous analysons pourquoi. Au cours de cette conversation, nous abordons notamment : Les leçons militaires et stratégiques du conflit. Les limites de la puissance américaine. L'avenir du régime iranien et des Gardiens de la révolution. Les conséquences pour Israël et les pays du Golfe. Les répercussions sur la sécurité nationale canadienne, la diplomatie et les Forces armées canadiennes. Les grands changements géopolitiques qui pourraient façonner les prochaines années. Une discussion de fond sur l'une des crises internationales les plus importantes de notre époque. ## Le Nord Stratégique, Ép. 1 : Justin Massie, les leçons de l’Ukraine et de l’Iran URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nord-strategique-ep-1-justin-massie-les-lecons-de-lukraine-et-de-liran/ Modified: 2026-07-08 Tirons-nous les bonnes leçons des conflits en Ukraine et au Moyen-Orient? Justin Massie, professeur à l'UQAM et directeur du Réseau d'analyse stratégique, répond sans détour. Au programme: Les leçons militaires de la guerre en Ukraine Le conflit Iran-Israël et ce qu'il révèle sur la dissuasion moderne La présence canadienne en Lettonie: sommes-nous à la hauteur? Animé par Éric Sauvé, vétéran des Forces canadiennes et président d'Innovigo. Abonne-toi pour ne pas manquer les prochains épisodes.    ## Le nouvel accord avec l’Iran : promesse brisée ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-nouvel-accord-avec-liran-promesse-brisee/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Lors de la campagne électorale de 2016, Donald Trump s’était engagé à négocier « un accord totalement différent » avec l’Iran. Quatre ans plus tard, dans quelle mesure Donald Trump a-t-il brisé sa promesse de renégocier une entente et quelles sont les raisons profondes qui sous-tendent réellement son échec? Lors de la campagne électorale de 2016, le candidat Trump s’était engagé à négocier « un accord totalement différent » avec l’Iran - comprendre un accord beaucoup plus englobant et dépassant la seule question nucléaire. Quatre ans plus tard, alors que les élections présidentielles se profilent à nouveau et que l’actuel locataire de la Maison-Blanche ambitionne un second mandat, les Iraniens n’ont toujours pas concédé de nouveau deal. Mais dans quelle mesure Donald Trump a-t-il brisé sa promesse de renégocier une entente et quelles sont les raisons profondes qui sous-tendent réellement son échec ? Il n’y a certes pas eu de négociations ‘traditionnelles’ à proprement parler, c’est-à-dire de négociations diplomatiques adoptant les canaux des institutions multilatérales comparables au processus qui avait abouti au Plan d’action global commun (PAGC) signé entre l’Iran et le P5+1 en juillet 2015. Pour autant, cela ne veut pas dire qu’il n’y a pas eu tentative de négociation. Souvent décrite comme une technique de marchandage au bord du gouffre, la stratégie de « pression maximale » de Trump n’est pas fondamentalement différente de la politique de « fermeté-transaction » de ses prédécesseurs dans la mesure où elle vise également à ramener les Iraniens à la table des pourparlers. Adepte de ce qu’il appelle lui-même « the art of the deal », Trump ne fait que substituer une technique de vente agressive (hard selling) aux accommodements feutrés des présidents qui l’ont devancé et de l’administration Obama en particulier - mais le principe fondamental et les objectifs recherchés restent très comparables. Ensuite, il convient de noter que l’échec de cette négociation tient moins au style agressif de l’actuel locataire de la Maison-Blanche qu’aux termes fixés par Washington et ses alliés occidentaux. Dès sa prise de fonction, le secrétaire d’État Mike Pompeo annonce que Washington reste disposé à rétablir les liens diplomatiques et économiques avec Téhéran en échange - et c’est là où le bât blesse - d’une dénucléarisation complète, de la cessation du programme iranien de missiles balistiques et de celle des activités d’influence jugée déstabilisatrices des Gardiens et de la Force Quds au Moyen-Orient – soit autant d’éléments réclamés non seulement par les autres administrations pré-Trump mais aussi par les alliés européens des États-Unis incluant la France de Macron, la Grande-Bretagne de Johnson ou l’Allemagne de Merkel. Le fait est que l’exigence occidentale (mise sous tutelle des programmes nucléaires et balistiques ajoutée à la diminution significative des activités régionales de Téhéran) touche à deux impératifs non négociables de la politique de sécurité de la République islamique : 1) protection de la forteresse iranienne et préservation de la souveraineté nationale ; 2) promotion, autour de l’Iran, d’une sphère d’influence régionale servant de zone tampon stratégique permettant justement de renforcer la protection de la fameuse forteresse iranienne. Pour les Iraniens, il s’agit là de deux points sur lesquels ils ne peuvent céder simultanément (se priver de l’assurance-vie nucléaire et, en même temps, de la sphère d’influence protectrice) sans risquer d’affaiblir la souveraineté interne et externe du régime. Ce n’est donc pas faute d’avoir continué à négocier (même si cela s’est fait de manière agressive), ni en raison d’une divergence fondamentale avec ses partenaires européens (qui, en somme, demandent essentiellement la même chose que Washington) que le Plan d’action global commun (PAGC) n’a pas été remplacé par un accord plus englobant, mais bien parce que ce qu’exigent les Occidentaux ne peut être satisfait par les Iraniens sans que, à leurs yeux, cela ne remette en cause leurs intérêts vitaux. Comme l’explique Richard Nephew, chercheur principal au Center on Global Energy Policy de l'Université Columbia et ancien fonctionnaire du département d'État, les demandes occidentales « are beyond Iran's willingness to even discuss ». Le blocage vient donc des deux bords. Encore une fois, la figure très médiatique de Trump tend à focaliser l’attention générale et à fournir une explication universelle à toutes sortes de phénomènes, mais l’équation géopolitique est beaucoup plus large et surtout beaucoup plus complexe. Au mois d’août 2020, déjà en pleine campagne électorale pour sa réélection, Donald Trump s’est à nouveau engagé à obtenir de l’Iran un nouvel accord si les urnes lui offraient un second mandat. Rien pour l’heure n’indique qu’il adopterait une nouvelle approche pour y parvenir. Professeur à l’université Georgetown, Matthew Kroenig n’en doute pas, la stratégie demeurerait la même : « exercer une « pression maximale » sur le régime iranien pour le forcer à s’asseoir à la table des négociations ». Mais que l’on ne s’y trompe pas : l’adoption d’un style diplomatique plus amical, bien que gage d’apaisement des tensions, ne produirait pas de résultats plus spectaculaires. Seul un arrangement global prenant en compte les impératifs stratégiques de l’Iran et ses intérêts vitaux - quelque chose qui n’a jamais réellement été tenté jusqu’ici - serait susceptible de faire bouger les lignes. À défaut, la République islamique risque fort, comme elle l’a déjà fait au cours des deux dernières années, de se rapprocher de ses partenaires eurasiatiques de l’Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai - au premier rang desquels : la Russie et la Chine. ## Le partenaire russe vu de New Delhi : entre logique de diversification et convergences stratégiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-partenaire-russe-vu-de-new-delhi-entre-logique-de-diversification-et-convergences-strategiques/ Modified: 2025-09-15 Le 7 août dernier, le conseiller indien à la Sécurité nationale, Ajit Doval, confirmait que le président russe Vladimir Poutine effectuerait une visite officielle à New Delhi à la fin de l’année 2025, dans un contexte de tensions grandissantes entre l’Inde et les États-Unis. Il s’agira de sa première visite en Inde depuis le début de la guerre en Ukraine. Cette annonce s’inscrit dans une séquence diplomatique initiée en juillet 2024, lorsque le Premier ministre indien, Narendra Modi, s’était rendu à Moscou – sa dernière visite remontant à 2019 (tandis qu’il avait accueilli Vladimir Poutine à New Delhi en 2021). Ce déplacement, le premier depuis sa réélection pour un troisième mandat, un mois plus tôt, avait suscité de vives critiques internationales, notamment en raison du calendrier : il coïncidait en effet avec le sommet de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et intervenait peu après le bombardement, par la Russie, d’un hôpital pour enfants en Ukraine. Aux États-Unis, le secrétaire d’État adjoint pour l’Asie du Sud, Donald Lu, avait ainsi exprimé «  déception concernant le symbole et le moment choisi pour le voyage du Premier ministre Modi à Moscou. Nous avons ces discussions fermes [tough] avec nos amis indiens. » Dans ce contexte et à l’approche de la visite présidentielle prévue à la fin de l’année 2025, cet article se propose d’évaluer la profondeur du partenariat entre l’Inde et la Russie, plus de trois ans après le début de la guerre en Ukraine. Il s’agira également d’examiner les débats que cette relation suscite à New Delhi, ainsi que les perspectives qu’ouvre le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche. Si le partenariat repose sur des fondations historiques solides et des intérêts stratégiques convergents, il est indéniable que la relation a été – et est encore – mise à l’épreuve par plusieurs facteurs régionaux et globaux. Aujourd’hui, la relation semble toutefois compatible avec la vision indienne d’un monde multipolaire, dans lequel elle cherche à maximiser son autonomie stratégique, ce que la Russie lui permet de continuer à faire. *** Pour lire la suite, consultez le site du Rubicon. ## Le partenariat sino-russe et la bipolarisation du monde URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-partenariat-sino-russe-et-la-bipolarisation-du-monde/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique soutient que la guerre actuelle en Ukraine ne brisera pas le partenariat « illimité » sino-russe et accélérera... Cette note stratégique soutient que la guerre actuelle en Ukraine ne brisera pas le partenariat « illimité » sino-russe et accélérera la bipolarisation du monde. La Chine a des intérêts politiques, énergétiques et stratégiques à collaborer avec la Russie. La Chine ne perdra pas de vue son partenariat stratégique avec la Russie tant que la réunification avec Taïwan ne sera pas accomplie, ce qui aura pour effet de polariser davantage le système international. Toutefois, la Chine a trop à perdre sur le plan économique si elle embrasse sans ambiguïté la cause de la Russie en Ukraine. Cela constitue un levier que l'Occident pourrait utiliser pour creuser un fossé entre la Chine et la Russie. L'Occident, et plus particulièrement les États-Unis, devrait également équilibrer sa concurrence stratégique avec la Chine en renforçant la coopération sur des intérêts communs tels que les changements climatiques, la prolifération nucléaire et la prévention des pandémies. Enfin, Washington devrait atténuer les craintes du Parti concernant la sécurité du régime. Ces craintes poussent la Chine à se rapprocher de la Russie et exacerbent une concurrence stratégique déjà tendue entre les États-Unis et la Chine. *** À ce jour, il y a des signes clairs, comme des restrictions aux exportations ou financières, qui démontrent que la République populaire de Chine (Chine) n'est pas disposée à s'aligner complètement sur la Fédération de Russie (Russie) dans la guerre actuelle en Ukraine. Ceci dit, d'autres signes indiquent le soutien implicite de la Chine aux actions de la Russie : la couverture favorable à la Russie de la guerre par les médias d’État chinois ou encore l'absence de condamnation par la Chine de la violation par la Russie de la souveraineté de l'Ukraine, malgré l'importance de la souveraineté dans la politique étrangère chinoise. Il est entendu que Pékin n'a aucun appétit pour une guerre en Ukraine, car le pays est un important centre de transit dans le cadre de son initiative « la Ceinture et la Route » (BRI). La Chine n'a pas non plus intérêt à voir le retour de la guerre en Europe qui pourrait sérieusement déstabiliser son principal marché d'exportation et entraver ses intérêts économiques. Et pourtant, le 4 février 2022, la Chine a publié une déclaration conjointe avec la Russie dévoilant un nouveau partenariat stratégique sans limites. Bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas d'une alliance militaire officielle, c'est tout comme. Ce partenariat reflète la collaboration stratégique de long terme entre la Chine et la Russie qui atteint de nouveaux sommets avec les deux pays reconnaissant pour la première fois leurs préoccupations cruciales respectives : l'expansion de l'OTAN vers l'est et la stratégie Indopacifique des États-Unis. La guerre en Ukraine est-elle un tournant qui scelle un ordre bipolaire où la Chine et la Russie forment un bloc géopolitique et l'Occident un autre ? Cette analyse met en lumière l'évolution du partenariat sino-russe des années 2000 à aujourd'hui pour répondre à cette question. La Chine et la Russie partagent une affinité idéologique pour l'autoritarisme, et leur partenariat repose sur trois piliers centraux. Le premier est l'opposition politique et diplomatique aux États-Unis, notamment aux Nations unies. La Chine et la Russie veulent toutes deux assurer la sécurité politique des régimes autoritaires contre ce qui est perçu comme la menace libérale hégémonique des États-Unis. Le deuxième pilier concerne la coopération sino-russe en matière de défense et englobe les exercices militaires et les ventes d'armes. Le troisième pilier a trait à la complémentarité économique : la Chine a besoin de matières premières, tandis que la Russie a besoin de marchés d'exportation pour ses matières premières. Je commence par retracer l'évolution du partenariat sino-russe des années 2000 à aujourd'hui afin d'illustrer la solidification continue du partenariat avec un net approfondissement à partir de 2014. Sur la base de cette analyse, je soutiens que la bipolarisation du monde est en cours, avant de formuler quelques recommandations pour le bloc occidental afin de creuser un fossé entre la Chine et la Russie pour atténuer ce phénomène. La relation bilatérale sino-russe de 2000 à 2014 : La coopération politique et diplomatique L'URSS et la Chine ont eu une histoire compliquée tout au long du 20e siècle. Au début de la guerre froide, en 1950, les deux pays ont signé le traité sino-soviétique d'amitié, d'alliance et d'assistance mutuelle. Cette alliance a eu un impact significatif sur l'équilibre des forces pendant la guerre froide, mais elle a été de courte durée pour diverses raisons. L'alliance n'a duré que neuf ans et a pris fin en 1959 avec la scission sino-soviétique. L'Union soviétique et la Chine sont passées d'alliées à rivales acrimonieuses. En 1985, le rapprochement sino-soviétique a commencé avec les deux camps essayant de mettre en place un modus vivendi. Puis avec la chute de l'URSS en 1989, une autre période de normalisation sino-russe a été initiée. À l'aube du 21e siècle, nous avons commencé à observer une sérieuse convergence politique et diplomatique entre la Chine et la Russie. En mars 1999, la Russie a parrainé une résolution au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies (CSNU) pendant la guerre du Kosovo, exigeant la cessation immédiate de la force contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie. La Chine a voté en faveur de cette résolution, même si elle ne l'a pas coparrainée. Cet événement constitue un moment important de la collaboration diplomatique entre la Chine et la Russie. Le bombardement de l'ambassade de Chine à Belgrade pendant la guerre du Kosovo en 1999 par les États-Unis a modifié la vision de la Chine des motivations de Washington, toujours convaincue que le bombardement était intentionnel. Depuis cet événement, la Chine et la Russie sont de plus en plus agacées par ce qu'elles considèrent comme la menace de la supériorité militaire de Washington et sa volonté de promouvoir ses intérêts indépendamment du droit international et sans tenir compte des intérêts légitimes des autres États. Ces griefs communs constituent le fondement politique de la coopération sino-russe au sein du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Depuis le début des années 2000, la Chine et la Russie ont réussi, sur le plan politique, à régler un grand nombre de leurs problèmes de longue date. En 2001, les deux pays ont signé le traité sino-russe de bon voisinage et de coopération amicale (renouvelé en 2021). Il s'agissait d'une avancée significative dans la normalisation des relations bilatérales sino-russes initiée en 1989. Le processus de normalisation a culminé en 2005, avec le règlement par la Chine et la Russie d'un différend frontalier qui avait provoqué des escarmouches entre la Chine et l'URSS en 1969. En 2003, l'Organisation de coopération de Shanghai (OCS) a été créée par la Chine et la Russie avec d'autres pays d'Asie centrale. L'OCS est la principale organisation multilatérale sur laquelle la Chine et la Russie s'appuient pour promouvoir leurs intérêts en matière de sécurité en Asie centrale, notamment en coordonnant les exercices militaires entre ses membres. Malgré une méfiance mutuelle persistante, la Chine et la Russie collaborent de plus en plus au sein des organismes internationaux. En 2003, la Chine et la Russie, entre autres pays, se sont vigoureusement opposées à la guerre en Irak et à la « coalition de volontaires » des États-Unis, dénonçant l'unilatéralisme américain qui contourne les Nations unies pour lancer une guerre préventive dans le but de changer de régime. Plus tard, en 2007, la Chine et la Russie ont opposé un veto conjoint à une résolution du CSNU parrainée par les États-Unis concernant les violations des droits de l'homme et la répression politique au Myanmar. Ce vote a été le premier d'une coopération diplomatique stratégique durable entre la Chine et la Russie observable par l’imposition de veto sur des résolutions du CSNU. Depuis la normalisation, la guerre de Géorgie de 2008 a été la première turbulence importante dans le partenariat sino-russe. Lorsque la Russie a envahi les territoires géorgiens d'Abkhazie et d'Ossétie du Sud, la vision qu'avait la Chine de la Russie a été négativement impactée. Moscou a reconnu ces deux territoires comme des États indépendants, mais n'a pas réussi à recevoir de la Chine et d'autres États de l'OCS la reconnaissance de ces nouvelles entités pro-russes lors d'un sommet à Douchanbé, au Tadjikistan, quelques semaines après l'invasion russe. Néanmoins, la Russie a au moins réussi à obtenir l'abstention de la Chine lors du vote d'une résolution des Nations unies condamnant ses actions. Toutefois, la Chine n'a jamais totalement approuvé la Russie et a été assez mécontente des actions de Moscou en Géorgie. Cela n'a rien d'étonnant, compte tenu de l'insistance de la Chine sur le respect de la souveraineté et de ses propres problèmes de séparatisme (Xinjiang, Tibet, Taïwan). D'un autre côté, cette friction n'a pas empêché les deux pays, de 2007 à 2012, d'opposer conjointement cinq vetos supplémentaires au CSNU. Et depuis cette période, le partenariat sino-russe tracte également le groupement d'économies émergentes nommé BRICS (Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine et Afrique du Sud), qui défend un ordre international multipolaire économique et politique. Coopération militaire et ventes d'armes Avec la normalisation des relations sino-russes, les deux pays ont considéré les liens de défense et de sécurité comme des domaines de coopération cruciaux, en plus de la collaboration politico-diplomatique. La coopération en matière de défense, deuxième pilier de la coopération sino-russe, repose sur deux volets : les exercices militaires et les ventes d'armes. Cette orientation se reflète dans le « Partenariat de coordination stratégique fondé sur l'égalité et les avantages et orienté vers le 21e siècle » de 1996. En 2011, ce mécanisme a été élevé au rang de partenariat stratégique global. Ces documents ont facilité la coopération sino-russe de haut niveau sur divers sujets, tels que les exercices militaires conjoints, les ventes d'armes et les discussions sur la sécurité régionale et mondiale. La « Consultation stratégique de l'état-major Chine-Russie » est une réunion centrale pour gérer la coopération entre les deux armées qui se tient chaque année depuis 1997. Les exercices militaires joignant les armées chinoise et russe sont bilatéraux ou multilatéraux. En 2003, les forces armées chinoises et russes ont organisé leur premier exercice militaire conjoint dans le cadre de l'OCS. En 2005, une mission de paix a été organisée dans le cadre de l'OCS et du traité de bon voisinage et de coopération amicale. Une autre étape importante a été franchie en 2012 avec un exercice bilatéral annuel conjoint en mer. De 2003 à 2014, la Chine et la Russie ont participé à 20 exercices militaires de toutes sortes, menés de manière bilatérale ou multilatérale. Ces exercices conjoints ont permis d'accroître l'interopérabilité des armées chinoise et russe, même si ces dernières ne sont pas aussi interopérables que les membres de l'OTAN. Ces exercices ont néanmoins été efficaces pour accroître les capacités opérationnelles, la confiance mutuelle et une culture de défense commune (au cours des deux dernières décennies, de nombreux officiers militaires chinois et russes ont été formés en Russie et en Chine, respectivement). Le second volet de la coopération en matière de défense est la vente d'armes. Le début et le milieu des années 2000 ont été de bonnes années pour le commerce sino-russe en matière de défense : La Chine importait 87 % de ses armes de Russie. La Chine était désireuse d'importations d'armes étrangères non occidentales en raison des sanctions résultant de la répression de la place Tiananmen et de son désir de moderniser son armée. Quant à la Russie, elle était avide d'exporter des technologies et des licences militaires obsolètes pour compenser son manque d'absorption interne, car le pays traversait des difficultés économiques. Ceci dit, la Russie n'était pas pour autant disposée à exporter sa technologie de pointe en raison de la rétro-ingénierie chinoise des systèmes militaires russes haut de gamme et pour des raisons de sécurité. Les importations militaires de la Chine en provenance de la Russie l'ont cependant aidée à améliorer sa propre industrie de défense ainsi que ses capacités de projection de puissance (notamment sur Taïwan) et de défense. Ces acquisitions comprennent des chasseurs à réaction (Su-27 et Su-30), des systèmes de défense contre les missiles sol-air (S-300), des destroyers à missiles guidés de classe Sovremennyy et des sous-marins de classe Kilo. De 2002 à 2007, la Chine a importé de Russie des équipements militaires d'une valeur moyenne de 2,3 milliards de dollars. Après avoir atteint un pic de 3,2 milliards de dollars en 2005, une réduction importante a été observée de 2006 à 2014 avec des recettes moyennes de 600 millions de dollars par an. Coopération économique Sur le plan économique, plus largement, qui constitue le troisième pilier du partenariat sino-russe, le total des échanges bilatéraux de marchandises était relativement modeste, même si la tendance était à la hausse : 7,1 milliards de dollars en moyenne entre 1997-2002, 15,5 entre 1997-2007 et 73,6 entre 2007-2017. Au début des années 2000, environ 60% des exportations russes vers la Chine étaient des produits chimiques, pharmaceutiques, des machines, des équipements de transport et des produits manufacturés. En revanche, les exportations de la Chine vers la Russie étaient principalement constituées de produits manufacturés à faible intensité de capital et à forte intensité de main-d'œuvre. Les services et les investissements directs étrangers (IDE) étaient également minimes. La situation a commencé à changer entre 2007 et 2012. Les exportations russes de combustibles et de minéraux ont atteint 75 % du total des exportations du pays vers la Chine. Quant à la Chine, elle a continué d'exporter des produits manufacturés vers la Russie, bien que plus sophistiqués. Et pour la coopération énergétique, le seul projet significatif, l'oléoduc Sibérie orientale-Océan Pacifique, a été annoncé en 2006 et financé par la Chine. L'oléoduc a été ouvert en 2011 et était le premier de ce type à relier les deux pays, permettant une intégration énergétique accrue. Des années 2000 à 2014, la relation sino-russe a été caractérisée par une complémentarité économique modérée. Des années 2000 à 2014, les trois piliers de la coopération sino-russe – politique-diplomatie, défense et économie – se sont approfondis, même s'ils sont restés limités par divers facteurs. En ce qui concerne les aspects militaires et politiques, la Russie était toujours réticente à exporter des systèmes d'armement sophistiqués vers la Chine. Des craintes persistantes concernant les ambitions de la Chine dans l'Extrême-Orient russe, mais aussi l'utilisation potentielle par la Chine des systèmes militaires avancés russes contre la Russie restreignaient certaines ventes d’armes. Toutefois, les liens entre militaires et les exercices militaires conjoints se sont multipliés au cours de cette période (2000-2014) et ont contribué à accroître la confiance mutuelle et l'interopérabilité. Ce rapprochement s'est traduit diplomatiquement par des votes similaires pour contrer les États-Unis au CSNU. En revanche, sur le plan énergétique, les infrastructures nécessaires pour une coopération plus approfondie faisaient défaut, la plupart des champs gaziers sibériens étant reliés à l'Europe par des pipelines. Mais les besoins énergétiques croissants de la Chine allaient être de plus en plus comblés par la Russie après la réorientation de sa politique étrangère en 2014 avec l'annexion de la Crimée. 2014-2022 : L'accélération du partenariat sino-russe Coopération politico-diplomatique Depuis l'annexion de la Crimée, la Russie et la Chine se sont rapprochées dans tous les aspects de leurs relations. Tout comme la Chine l'avait fait en 2008 après l'attaque de la Géorgie par la Russie, Pékin s'est abstenu de voter en faveur des résolutions du CSNU invalidant les résultats du référendum séparant la Crimée de l'Ukraine pour en faire une partie de la Fédération de Russie. Néanmoins, la Chine n'a pas approuvé publiquement la position de la Russie, même si Xi admire l'opération menée par la Russie en 2014 en Crimée, car Poutine a renforcé sa popularité sur le plan intérieur et a assuré à son pays « une grande partie de territoire et des ressources ». Malgré l'admiration de Xi, les institutions financières chinoises ont fait preuve d'un strict respect du régime de sanctions par crainte de sanctions secondaires, même si la Chine s'oppose toujours rhétoriquement aux sanctions occidentales. En conséquence, la Russie a eu du mal à émettre des dettes ou des actions sur le marché boursier chinois. Seule une poignée de banques politiques chinoises – la China Development Bank et l'Export-Import Bank of China – ont fourni des fonds aux entités russes sanctionnées. Ces banques sont moins connectées à l'économie mondiale que les autres banques chinoises et, par extension, moins sujettes aux sanctions secondaires. Quoi qu'il en soit, Pékin a toujours réussi à fournir des financements pour des accords politiques bilatéraux cruciaux. De plus, un an après l'annexion de la Crimée, Xi et Poutine ont réussi à signer un accord visant à rendre complémentaires des projets politico-économiques transnationaux initialement concurrents : la BRI de la Chine et l'Union économique eurasiatique (UEE) de la Russie. La Russie a réévalué les ambitions de la Chine en Asie centrale, qui étaient auparavant considérées comme concurrentielles avec des domaines de coopération mineurs, étant donné la volonté de la Russie de maintenir sa prépondérance dans la sphère post-soviétique. Moscou n'appréciait pas la présence croissante de la Chine en Asie centrale, mais a dû faire un compromis avec Pékin en raison des sanctions occidentales résultant de l'annexion de la Crimée. Cette nouvelle réévaluation a ouvert la voie à une coopération plus approfondie et est devenue un tournant dans les relations entre les deux pays. Cette coopération politique s'est traduite au niveau diplomatique, notamment au CSNU. En 2017, la Chine et la Russie ont utilisé pour la sixième fois leur veto pour bloquer une résolution du CSNU soutenue par l'Occident visant à sanctionner le régime de Bachar al Assad concernant son utilisation d'armes chimiques en Syrie. En 2021, la Chine et la Russie ont soutenu la suppression des sanctions économiques contre l'Afghanistan. Elles ont appelé au déblocage des avoirs du pays en opposant leur veto à une résolution du CSNU visant à demander des comptes au régime des talibans. On peut également mentionner la coopération sino-russe pour atténuer les sanctions imposées à la Corée du Nord et à l'Iran. La Chine et la Russie ont étroitement collaboré au sein d'institutions multilatérales telles que le G20, l'APEC, la Conférence sur l'interaction et les mesures de confiance en Asie, le Forum de Xianghsan, la réunion des ministres de la Défense de l'ANASE Plus et le Dialogue de Shangri-La. L'expansion de ces réunions multilatérales liées aux questions de sécurité s'est avérée être une occasion pour les officiers militaires de haut niveau de la Chine et de la Russie de se rencontrer et de se coordonner en marge des événements. Coopération économique Un autre rapprochement sino-russe significatif depuis 2014 concerne les domaines économique et technologique. Après l'annexion de la Crimée, la Russie a décidé de réorienter l'économie russe vers la Chine. L'objectif était de faciliter les investissements chinois dans les grandes infrastructures et les projets liés à l'énergie pour exploiter les ressources naturelles de la Russie et vendre massivement des hydrocarbures et des produits agricoles à la Chine. Un mégadeal de 400 milliards de dollars a été signé en 2014 pour les exportations de gaz russe vers la Chine via le gazoduc Power of Siberia (pompant 38 milliards de mètres cubes de gaz par an), qui a été achevé en 2019. En 2014, les banques centrales russe et chinoise ont mis en place une ligne de swap de 150 milliards de yuans (24 milliards de dollars), renouvelée tous les trois ans pour faciliter le commerce bilatéral malgré les sanctions. Cette mesure s'inscrit dans le cadre d'un effort de dédollarisation des deux pays pour réduire la part du dollar américain dans le commerce bilatéral. Aujourd'hui, le dollar américain représente 40 % des exportations de la Russie vers la Chine, contre près de 100 % en 2013. La dépendance de la Russie à l'égard de la Chine pour les marchés d'exportation et les lignes de crédit n'a cessé d'augmenter, car seule la Chine a les moyens économiques d'accorder des prêts conséquents à la Russie et d'absorber sa production énergétique. La Chine représente 17,3 % du PIB mondial, alors que la Russie n'en représente que 1,7%. De plus, il existe de grands projets et collaborations technologiques en cours. En 2014, la Chine et la Russie ont créé la « Commission Chine-Russie sur l'importante de la coopération stratégique en matière de navigation par satellite ». L'Administration spatiale nationale chinoise et l'Agence spatiale fédérale russe travaillent conjointement, depuis 2015, au développement de composants spatiaux pour leurs systèmes de navigation par satellite respectifs : Beidou et GLONASS. On peut également voir une coopération se mettre en place sur la technologie des moteurs aéronautiques. En 2017, l'Institut chinois de recherche sur l'aviation a signé un protocole d'accord avec l'Institut central des moteurs d'aviation de Russie. En 2020, la Chine et la Russie ont convenu de renforcer ces collaborations en établissant une feuille de route pour la science, la technologie et l'innovation jusqu'en 2025. Dans le cadre de cette initiative, il existe, entre autres, un fonds d'investissement conjoint pour les projets de haute technologie afin de développer la coopération dans des domaines critiques comme la recherche sur l'intelligence artificielle. Cette liste est loin d'être exhaustive, car la collaboration concerne également la production d'énergie nucléaire, les trains à grande vitesse et d'autres développements d'infrastructures. La coopération technologique s'est considérablement développée depuis 2014. En plus de cela, en 2020, la Russie est devenue la plus importante source d'importations de pétrole de la Chine, déplaçant l'Arabie saoudite. Et Gazprom, la plus grande compagnie gazière russe, ambitionne de tripler ses exportations de gaz pour fournir la moitié de la demande chinoise. La Russie a également profité de la guerre commerciale sino-américaine de 2018 pour stimuler ses exportations de minéraux et de produits alimentaires vers la Chine. Le 4 février 2022, Poutine et Xi ont signé deux accords supplémentaires pour étendre la coopération gazière et pétrolière représentant 117,5 milliards de dollars. Le même jour, les deux dirigeants ont également signé des dizaines d'autres accords sur le commerce et les investissements, la lutte contre les monopoles, le sport, les satellites, la numérisation et d'autres domaines de coopération. Et un mois avant cette rencontre, la Chine avait déjà levé une interdiction sur le blé provenant de certaines régions russes afin d'augmenter les importations agricoles. Enfin, la Chine et la Russie ont annoncé en janvier 2022 qu'elles allaient construire conjointement un nouveau gazoduc, Power of Siberia 2, qui devrait entrer en service dans 3 ans pour transporter jusqu'à 50 milliards de m3 par an. Pour donner quelques chiffres, le commerce Chine-Russie a atteint 146 milliards de dollars en 2021, contre 68 milliards en 2015. Les principales exportations chinoises vers la Russie concernent les télécommunications, l'aviation, l'industrie des médias et les jouets en peluche, tandis que la Russie exporte principalement des hydrocarbures et des produits agricoles vers la Chine. La part du dollar dans le total des échanges économiques sino-russes a été inférieure à 50% pour la première fois enregistrée en 2020, alors qu'elle constituait environ 90% de ces interactions en 2014. En 2021, 17% des échanges bilatéraux ont été réalisés en yuan. La Russie détient 140 milliards de dollars de dette chinoise (quatre fois plus qu'en 2018), tandis que la Chine détient 14,2 % des réserves de change de la Russie. En 2021, le dollar ne représentait que 16% des 640 milliards de dollars de réserves de change de la Russie contre 46% en 2017. Le yuan représentait 13% (77 milliards de dollars) de ces réserves en 2021. La Chine a exporté 70 milliards de dollars de marchandises vers la Russie en 2021, soit nettement plus que dans les années 2000. Toutefois, cela reste faible par rapport aux exportations chinoises vers l'Union européenne et les États-Unis, qui totalisent environ 1 000 milliards de dollars. Depuis 2014 et l'annexion de la Crimée, le commerce sino-russe a augmenté d'environ 50 %, et la Chine est devenue le premier marché d'exportation de la Russie. Coopération militaire et ventes d'armes L'annexion de la Crimée a également déclenché une coopération plus approfondie entre les armées russes et chinoises, notamment en 2017 avec la signature d'une nouvelle feuille de route pour la coopération militaire. Depuis 2014, des exercices maritimes conjoints (organisés pour la première fois en 2012) ont eu lieu dans les régions d'intérêt de chacun. Par exemple, les exercices navals sino-russes de 2014 ont eu lieu en mer de Chine orientale, près des îles Senkaku contestées, tandis qu'en 2017, la Chine a renvoyé l'ascenseur en acceptant de s'entraîner en mer Baltique. En 2016, la Chine et la Russie ont mené pour la première fois un exercice de sécurité aérospatiale. Cette manœuvre était centrée sur la « défense aérienne et antimissile, l'appui-feu opérationnel et mutuel, et les frappes de missiles balistiques et de croisière sino-russes ». Très important également, la Chine est incluse dans l'exercice annuel du commandement stratégique de la Russie depuis 2018. Il s'agit d'une solidification majeure des liens sino-russes en matière de défense. Historiquement, seuls les anciens États soviétiques ont participé à cet exercice qui mobilise les quatre commandements stratégiques de la Russie pour simuler une guerre entre grandes puissances. En 2019, les forces aériennes de l'Armée populaire de libération et les forces aérospatiales russes ont organisé pour la première fois une patrouille aérienne stratégique conjointe. Dans le cadre de cet exercice, plusieurs bombardiers chinois H-6K et russes Tu-95 n'ont pas hésité à pénétrer dans la zone d'identification de défense aérienne (ADIZ) sud-coréenne et japonaise à des fins d'entraînement. Parmi les autres exercices militaires, citons l'exercice d'appréhension de franchissement illégal de la frontière, l'exercice de secours en cas de catastrophe, l'exercice antiterroriste et les exercices d'urgence dans les ports fluviaux. Les deux pays participent aussi régulièrement à des événements militaires internationaux tels que des biathlons de chars ou les Jeux internationaux de l'armée. La Chine et la Russie ont mené 28 exercices militaires depuis 2003 avec la variété et la complexité de ces derniers qui se sont développées depuis 2014, exprimant ainsi des intentions amicales mutuelles. Les exercices militaires conjoints sont utiles pour améliorer l'interopérabilité et la compréhension mutuelle, notamment pour surmonter les obstacles linguistiques et culturels. Ils donnent également aux directions militaires chinoises et russes l'occasion d'interagir et de recueillir des renseignements sur les capacités, la culture de défense et les méthodes de combat de l'autre armée. La prochaine étape logique des exercices militaires sino-russes concernera probablement la cybernétique, les drones, la guerre électronique, l'espace et l'utilisation de l'intelligence artificielle dans les systèmes militaires pour guider les missiles hypersoniques et autres armes. Depuis l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie, les ventes d'armes ne sont pas en reste non plus. La Russie a conclu qu'étant donné que la production industrialo-militaire de la Chine rattrape rapidement son retard, elle devrait profiter de la fenêtre pour vendre des armes pendant qu'elle le peut. Dès lors, la décision de suspendre l'interdiction de vendre des technologies militaires avancées spécifiques à la Chine a été prise. Ainsi, la Chine a pu acquérir, en 2015, vingt-quatre avions de combat avancés russes « Su-35 », six systèmes de défense aérienne « S-400 » et quatre « sous-marins de classe Lada ». Ces acquisitions ont permis à la Chine de modifier sérieusement l'équilibre des forces dans les mers de Chine méridionale et orientale et vis-à-vis de Taïwan en particulier. Ce n'est pas tout, Poutine et Xi ont signé en 2015 un contrat pour la production conjointe de 200 hélicoptères de transport lourd de nouvelle génération d'ici 2040. Selon le SIPRI, de 2016 à 2020, 77% de toutes les importations d'armes chinoises, représentant 5,1 milliards de dollars, provenaient de Russie, ce qui représentait 18% des exportations totales d'armes de la Russie. Cela représente une augmentation de 49 % des ventes d'armes par rapport à la période 2011-2016. La Chine est le meilleur client de la Russie pour les ventes d'armes, juste derrière l'Inde. On peut toutefois se demander si les mauvaises performances militaires de la Russie en Ukraine ne vont pas réduire ses ventes d'armes. La capacité de survie et l'efficacité des véhicules blindés, des systèmes de défense aérienne, des systèmes d'alerte radar et autres équipements militaires de l'armée russe ont en effet été sérieusement compromises en Ukraine. La Chine vend également des armes à la Russie grâce à la progression rapide de son complexe industrialo-militaire, notamment dans la technologie des drones, les systèmes informatiques et la construction navale. Par exemple, en raison des sanctions, Moscou ne peut pas acheter d'équipements spécifiques aux pays occidentaux, comme les moteurs diesel dont elle a besoin pour son projet de corvettes Buyan-M. Moscou s'appuie donc sur les moteurs chinois et sur d'autres composants électroniques pour compenser son non-accès à la technologie militaire occidentale. L'alliance de facto sino-russe, la guerre en Ukraine et la bipolarisation du monde Des années 2000 à 2014, le partenariat sino-russe s'est progressivement renforcé avec une nette accélération à partir de 2014 dans tous les domaines : coopération politico-diplomatique à l'ONU, complémentarité économique et coopération en matière de défense fondée sur une convergence géopolitique. Avec la guerre actuelle en Ukraine, il y a des interrogations quant à l’étendu du soutient chinois à la Russie et si Pékin était au courant des intentions belliqueuses de Moscou dès le début. Étant donné le degré de la coopération sino-russe en matière de défense et la relation personnelle étroite entre Xi et Poutine, il semble peu probable que la Chine n'ait pas su que la Russie était déterminée à attaquer l'Ukraine. Cependant, cela ne signifie pas que Pékin est prêt à subir des sanctions secondaires à plein effet pour la Russie. Aujourd'hui, tout comme en 2014, la Chine dénonce les sanctions occidentales contre la Russie, mais veille simultanément à se conformer au régime de sanctions dans son ensemble. La difficulté pour Pékin est qu'il ne peut pas se permettre de sacrifier complètement ses échanges économiques et ses excédents commerciaux avec l'Union européenne et les États-Unis, ni d'abandonner complètement son partenaire russe. Nous observons des signes clairs de prudence de la part de la Chine : Pékin a appelé toutes les parties concernées à faire preuve de retenue en Ukraine, tandis que les entreprises chinoises ont refusé de fournir des pièces d'avion à la Russie et la Banque asiatique d'investissement dans les infrastructures (AIIB) et la Nouvelle banque de développement ont cessé de travailler avec le Belarus et la Russie pour « préserver leur intégrité financière ». D'autres banques chinoises comme la Banque de Chine et la Banque industrielle et commerciale de Chine ont aussi réduit les fonds disponibles pour acheter des produits de base russes afin de se conformer au régime de sanctions, de peur d'être coupées du dollar. Huawei a également réduit certaines de ses activités en Russie pour cette même raison. Sans parler de la frustration de la Chine face à la perturbation des chaînes d'approvisionnement mondiales. Cela signifie-t-il que Pékin acceptera d'isoler totalement la Russie afin de ne pas subir de coûts économiques et de réputation ? Le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères, Sergey Lavrov, s'est rendu à Pékin le 30 mars et a rencontré son homologue chinois, Wang Yi, en marge de la troisième réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères sur la question afghane entre les pays voisins de l'Afghanistan. Il s'agit d'un signe clair que la Chine n'a pas l'intention de tourner le dos à la Russie alors que l'Occident exerce une pression croissante sur cette dernière. Xi a déjà décidé qu'il n'abandonnera pas Poutine. Comme l'a démontré cette analyse, la Chine a investi beaucoup de ressources et d'efforts dans sa relation avec la Russie, que ce soit dans le domaine de l'énergie, de la technologie ou de la défense. La Chine a établi des lignes d'échange de devises avec la Russie, ce qui lui permet de procéder à des échanges dans ses devises, ce qui réduit les risques de sanctions secondaires. La Chine dispose également de banques plus politiques et moins liées au système financier basé sur le dollar et disposées à fournir une assistance économique à la Russie. La Chine le fait depuis 2014 et continuera à le faire. La Chine est soupçonnée d'avoir aidé la Russie à cacher des titres libellés en dollars sur des comptes offshore aux Caïmans et en Belgique. Si la Chine crée effectivement un système financier pour aider Moscou à accéder à des liquidités et à les dissimuler (77 milliards de dollars de réserves en yuans se trouvent en Chine), elle subira des répercussions. Mais Pékin est prêt à accepter un certain degré de douleur économique pour des raisons géostratégiques. Ces raisons géostratégiques touchent à la sécurité énergétique de la Chine et à Taïwan. La Chine est un importateur net d'énergie, ce qui signifie qu'elle doit sécuriser ces importations stratégiques pour alimenter sa croissance économique. Moscou est un exportateur d'énergie fiable qui est désireux de relier ses réserves de gaz et de pétrole à la Chine par le biais de pipelines. La Russie est liée à la sécurité énergétique de la Chine, ce qui fait de Moscou un partenaire stratégique de Pékin. Et la sécurité énergétique préoccupera de plus en plus la politique étrangère chinoise, étant donné l'intensification de la compétition sino-américaine en Asie de l'Est. Washington a renforcé sa stratégie Indopacifique (QUAD, AUKUS) et tente activement de mobiliser ses alliés dans la région pour contenir la Chine. Les États-Unis ne cachent pas non plus leur volonté de garantir le droit de Taïwan à choisir son destin sans subir la coercition de la Chine. Toutefois, nous savons que la réunification de Taïwan avec le continent n'est pas négociable et qu'il s'agit d'une question d'intégrité territoriale et d'honneur du point de vue de la Chine. Ainsi, la méthode de la force brute utilisée par la Russie est une méthode que la Chine pourrait utiliser contre Taïwan si les mesures de « zone grise » de Pékin ne parviennent pas à réunifier Taïwan avec le continent. Nous savons également qu'en cas d'attaque contre Taïwan, les États-Unis mettraient très probablement en place un blocus contre la Chine dans le détroit de Malacca, dont dépendent 70 % des importations chinoises de pétrole et de GNL. Dans un tel scénario, les exportations terrestres de matières premières de la Russie vers la Chine deviendraient cruciales, car les voies maritimes seraient, selon toute vraisemblance, bloquées. Ainsi, tant que la question de Taïwan ne sera pas réglée, la Chine n'abandonnera pas son partenaire russe, même si cela implique des coûts économiques et de réputation. La Chine a besoin de l'énergie de la Russie en cas de guerre avec Taïwan. La Russie est l'un des rares pays capables de fournir à la Chine les exportations d'énergie dont elle aurait besoin si de vives turbulences survenaient. Par ailleurs, s’il l’abandonnait, Pékin perdrait les avantages de la technologie militaire de Moscou qui joue un rôle dans la modernisation de l'Armée populaire de libération (APL). Selon les prévisions, l'APL sera en mesure de mener à bien une invasion amphibie de Taïwan d’ici 2027 ou 2049. Dans l'intervalle, la Chine a besoin de l'expertise militaire de la Russie. Et si la Chine envahit Taïwan, il sera également crucial d'obtenir l'abstention de la Russie sur une éventuelle résolution du CSNU contre la Chine. Par conséquent, la Chine a tout intérêt à soutenir la Russie en Ukraine tout en attendant la réciprocité de la Russie dans le cas d'une guerre chinoise contre Taïwan. Pour ces raisons, le partenariat sino-russe résistera à la guerre actuelle en Ukraine et se renforcera, poussant encore plus loin la bipolarisation du monde. Implications et recommandations L'unité transatlantique a été de mise pour aider l'Ukraine et punir la Russie jusqu’ici, mais pourrait ne pas le rester si l'Occident devait sanctionner la Chine. Cela serait en effet beaucoup plus compliqué que sanctionner la Russie. Washington aurait du mal à amener les Européens à réduire sensiblement leurs échanges avec la Chine, à moins que les États-Unis ne parviennent à compenser la contraction économique pour l’Occident des sanctions secondaires contre la Chine. Cependant, avec la montée du protectionnisme aux États-Unis et la polarisation intérieure croissante qui a un impact sur la stabilité de la politique étrangère de Washington, il est peu probable que les États-Unis puissent réussir une telle chose. Dès lors, l’unité transatlantique retrouvée peut rapidement se transformer en désunion transatlantique. Que devrait faire l'Occident ? L'Occident devrait tirer les leçons de la guerre ukrainienne pour ne pas les reproduire sur le dossier taïwanais. De 2015 à 2022, l'Occident n'a pas réussi à donner à Poutine l'espoir que l'accord de Minsk II puisse être appliqué. En particulier, Paris et Berlin n'ont pas fait pression sur Kiev dans le format Normandie pour que l’Ukraine accorde l'autonomie et l'amnistie au Donbass comme ils auraient pu le faire. On pourrait également dire que si l'OTAN avait proposé un plan d'action pour l'adhésion de l'Ukraine en 2008, la guerre actuelle n'existerait pas. Quoi qu'il en soit, l'Occident devrait donner à Pékin l'espoir qu'une réunification pacifique avec Taïwan est toujours possible, ou du moins que le statu quo est intact, et que la politique d'une seule Chine tient toujours. Dans le même temps, il est nécessaire de fournir à Taïwan des capacités asymétriques afin d'augmenter le coût d'une attaque chinoise contre l'île. La déclaration de Joe Biden expliquant que les États-Unis sont prêts à défendre militairement Taïwan est contre-productive. Comme indiqué plus haut, Pékin sait que ses importations d'énergie seraient menacées si un conflit sur Taïwan éclatait, car les routes maritimes seraient très probablement fermées. Par conséquent, la situation actuelle accroît la valeur de la Russie en tant que partenaire fiable en matière énergétique, politique et de défense pour la Chine. Cependant, la Chine a énormément profité de la mondialisation et ne souhaite pas révolutionner le système international, mais simplement légitimer son régime politique et ses valeurs sur la scène mondiale. Une bonne partie de la dimension politico-diplomatique du partenariat sino-russe repose sur une volonté commune de contrer l'ingérence libérale des Occidentaux dans leurs affaires intérieures. Qu'il s'agisse de violations des droits de l'homme, de promotion de la démocratie ou d'appels purs et simples à un changement de régime, ces ingérences finissent indubitablement par rapprocher la Chine et la Russie. En revanche, contrairement à la Russie, la Chine a intérêt à préserver la stabilité de l'économie mondialisée. Plus les échanges économiques entre l'Occident et la Chine sont nombreux, plus il est coûteux pour la Chine d'endommager ses relations commerciales avec les pays occidentaux au profit de la Russie. Le « découplage » entre les États-Unis et la Chine réduirait considérablement ces coûts. Si la Chine et les États-Unis pouvaient se percevoir mutuellement non pas tant comme des menaces idéologiques que comme des concurrents stratégiques pour des raisons structurelles, la base du pilier idéologique de la coopération sino-russe s'éroderait. L'Occident ne peut rien faire pour arrêter la coopération énergétique et de défense entre la Chine et la Russie, mais il peut certainement atténuer les craintes de la Chine à l’égard de la survie du régime. Et pour cela, il est nécessaire d'accepter d'être en désaccord sur l'idéologie – la Chine ne se libéralisera pas, ni les États-Unis n'adopteront un régime à parti unique. La seule façon constructive d'aller de l'avant est de coopérer, lorsque c'est possible, tout en acceptant la concurrence lorsqu'elle est inévitable, ce qui n’inclue pas l'idéologie. Ainsi, au lieu de tenir une rhétorique trop idéologique, Washington devrait plutôt maintenir son ambiguïté stratégique et accentuer la coopération avec la Chine dans les domaines des changements climatiques, de la prolifération nucléaire, des affaires et de la prévention des pandémies, afin d'équilibrer une relation bilatérale déjà définie par la concurrence stratégique. Cela pourrait inciter la Chine à diversifier ses paris un peu plus qu'elle ne le fait actuellement. Enfin, en regardant l'histoire, une autre façon de mettre un peu de distance dans la relation Chine-Russie concerne l'Inde. Dans les années 1950, une source importante de tensions sino-soviétiques était la proximité de la Russie avec l'Inde. L'Occident devrait essayer d'exacerber cette rivalité sino-indienne de longue date pour fissurer le partenariat sino-russe. Les ventes d'armes constituent un moyen d'y parvenir. L'Inde est le premier acheteur d'armes de Moscou, et les deux pays partagent une « relation spéciale », alors que la relation sino-indienne est mauvaise. En 2018, l'Inde a commandé pour 5 milliards de dollars de systèmes de missiles russes S-400 pour dissuader la Chine et le Pakistan. L'Inde devrait recevoir la plupart des S-400 d'ici 2023. Si Moscou livre les S-400 à l'Inde, comme il en a l'intention, cela déclenchera inévitablement l'ire de la Chine. Pékin ne veut pas que l'équilibre des forces vis-à-vis de New Delhi soit modifié négativement parce que son « partenaire russe illimité » arme son rival régional, l'Inde. Cependant, si Washington tente d'empêcher l'Inde d'obtenir ces S-400 par le biais de la loi Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, cela risquerait de couper court aux griefs chinois contre la Russie. Par conséquent, les États-Unis pourraient fermer les yeux sur cet accord afin de semer la discorde entre la Russie et la Chine en exploitant les dynamiques de puissance. Par ailleurs, les S-400 seront pointés sur la Chine et le Pakistan et ne menaceront pas Washington ou ses alliés.  Si les conditions s'y prêtent, cette méthodologie peut être appliquée au Vietnam et à d'autres pays qui entretiennent des relations étroites avec la Russie et subissent de fortes pressions de la part de la Chine. *** Le partenariat sino-russe s'est renforcé depuis les années 2000 avec une nette accélération après l'annexion de la Crimée en 2014. Il repose sur trois piliers : la coopération politico-diplomatique, la coopération en matière de défense et la complémentarité économique. La Chine n'a pas abandonné la Russie en 2008 ni en 2014 et ne l'abandonnera pas aujourd'hui dans sa guerre ukrainienne. La Russie joue un rôle dans l'un des objectifs les plus importants de la politique étrangère chinoise : la sécurité énergétique. En cas de guerre pour Taïwan, la Chine s'appuierait grandement sur les exportations terrestres russes de matières premières, car les États-Unis bloqueraient très probablement le détroit de Malacca, où transitent la plupart des importations maritimes chinoises d'énergie. Malgré sa progression militaire fulgurante, la Chine a toujours besoin de la technologie militaire russe pour moderniser l'APL afin qu'elle soit capable de mener à bien une invasion de Taïwan. Pékin aura également besoin de l'abstention diplomatique de la Russie aux Nations unies si une guerre éclate à propos de Taïwan. Par conséquent, alors que l'Occident sanctionne et isole la Russie, la Chine restera un partenaire fiable de la Russie. Pékin n'utilisera pas son influence sur la Russie pour arrêter la guerre. La position de la Chine irritera de plus en plus l'Occident, et la bipolarisation du système s'accentuera, d'autant plus si des sanctions secondaires sont imposées à la Chine. Pour creuser un fossé entre la Chine et la Russie, il faut 1) tempérer la rhétorique idéologique visant la Chine; 2) équilibrer les tensions inhérentes à la rivalité sino-américaine par une coopération sur le changement climatique, la prolifération nucléaire et la prévention des pandémies; 3) réaffirmer la politique d'une seule Chine; 4) utiliser les dynamiques de puissance pour exacerber les contradictions sino-russes; et 5) inciter la Chine à privilégier ses échanges économiques avec l'Occident par rapport à son partenariat stratégique avec la Russie. ## Le pivot stratégique américain dans l’espace indopacifique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-pivot-strategique-americain-dans-lespace-indopacifique/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Quel bilan pouvons-nous faire du pivot stratégique annoncé par l’administration Obama il y a une décennie ? Points saillants La stratégie du pivot américain vers l’Asie, lancée par l’administration Obama en 2011, vient en réaction à l’important changement structurel que représente l’essor économique et militaire de la Chine. Cette stratégie a entraîné un rééquilibrage stratégique et un détournement de l’attention des États-Unis au Moyen-Orient. Le pivot a permis aux États-Unis d’accroître leur présence dans l’Indopacifique et de renforcer leur niveau de coopération avec leurs alliés de la région. Cette stratégie connaît néanmoins des limites, notamment en matière de financement. Dans le même temps, le pivot a contribué à la détérioration des relations avec Pékin qui se sent bien entendu visée par cette stratégie. Le Canada, par crainte de détériorer ses relations avec la Chine, n’a pas encore prononcé de réponse officielle à la stratégie de rééquilibrage des États-Unis. Cela ne l’a pas empêché de multiplier ses actions en Indopacifique sans les afficher trop ouvertement. Introduction   Quel bilan pouvons-nous faire du pivot stratégique annoncé par l’administration Obama il y a une décennie ? Pour rappel, cette stratégie du pivot – ou rééquilibrage – est intervenue en réaction aux changements structurels de l’ordre international causé par la montée en puissance de la Chine, et plus généralement, de l’Asie. Dix ans plus tard, ce pivot asiatique est de plus en plus marqué par de vives tensions entre les deux puissances mondiales, mettant d’une part à l’épreuve les alliés américains, et mettant en évidence d’autre part les limites du recentrage américain vers l’Asie. Le Canada, par crainte de détériorer ses relations avec la Chine, n’a pour l’heure pas annoncé de réponse officielle à la stratégie de rééquilibrage des États-Unis. Néanmoins, le Canada reconnaît l’importance de la région de l’Indopacifique en en faisant discrètement l’une de ses préoccupations stratégiques et militaires majeures, en témoignent par exemple les nombreux efforts de déploiement de la Royal Canadian Navy sur place. Plus encore, le gouvernement libéral de Justin Trudeau s’est engagé à lancer une stratégie pour l’Asie-Pacifique, qui est en processus d’élaboration depuis avril 2019, avec comme objectif d’« approfondir les partenariats diplomatiques, économiques et en matière de défense dans la région. » Contexte En novembre 2011, la Secrétaire d’État Hillary Clinton annonçait l’adoption par les États-Unis du pivot stratégique vers l’Asie. Cette vision stratégique – avec l’objectif de placer « l’Asie au cœur de la politique américaine » – s’illustrait concrètement comme un engagement militaire, économique et diplomatique des États-Unis dans le but d’accroître sa présence et son influence au sein de l’espace indopacifique ; mais également dans celui de renforcer sa force dissuasive à l’égard de la Chine. Pour Barack Obama et ses successeurs, la menace chinoise s’exprime par sa fulgurante croissance : elle est aujourd’hui la première puissance commerciale et économique avec près de 15% de part de marché, dispose de la deuxième plus importante marine de guerre et ne cache pas ses ambitions de devenir la première puissance incontestable d’ici à 2049. Depuis cette annonce, les États-Unis ont poursuivi leur stratégie en investissant des ressources considérables dans cette zone névralgique. La puissance américaine a notamment déployé 60% de sa marine dans le Pacifique, permettant ainsi de renforcer ses relations avec le Japon, l’Inde et l’Australie dans le cadre du Dialogue de sécurité quadrilatéral (Quad). En outre, l’objectif est de renforcer les capacités militaires de ses alliés ainsi que l’interopérabilité entre eux. Le terme initialement employé « pivot stratégique » fut toutefois abandonné au profit de celui de « rééquilibrage » (rebalancing) en raison de sa connotation belliqueuse à l’égard de la Chine et, de surcroît, celui-ci suggérait que les États-Unis se détourneraient des enjeux européens et moyen-orientaux. La conclusion en 2016 de l’Accord de partenariat transpacifique (PTP), un vaste accord de libre-échange impliquant douze pays du Pacifique sauf la Chine, se reflétait davantage dans la notion de « rééquilibrage » puisqu’elle soulignait la dimension commerciale du repositionnement américain. Le moins que l’on puisse dire c’est que la stratégie de rééquilibrage vers l’Asie a évolué en une décennie. Depuis ses timides fondations sous l’administration Bush, suivies par son annonce formelle par l’administration Obama, elle a été marquée par un revirement radical opéré par le républicain Donald Trump, puis un retour en arrière récemment initié par Joe Biden. Ces allers-retours stratégiques n’ont pas manqué de déstabiliser les alliés américains, dont les réactions furent elles aussi diverses. Si les alliés traditionnels des États-Unis, à l’instar du Japon, de l’Australie ou encore de la Corée du Sud, font état d’un quasi parfait alignement avec le rééquilibrage américain, la crainte d’envoyer un signal provocateur à la Chine peut toutefois en amener certains à rechercher davantage d’indépendance militaire et stratégique. Ainsi, certains États souhaitent se positionner à équidistance des deux puissances mondiales en privilégiant le multilatéralisme, comme le démontrent les cas de l’Indonésie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande. Enfin, la tendance chez les États rivaux des États-Unis – principalement l’Iran et la Russie – est au rapprochement avec la Chine, qui perçoit cette situation comme une opportunité d’augmenter son influence. Loin de faire l’unanimité, la stratégie américaine du pivot dresse finalement un bilan mitigé puisque les objectifs initiaux des États-Unis ne semblent pas réellement atteints. De plus, cette politique a un coût que les limites budgétaires américaines ne permettent que partiellement, créant par ailleurs un désengagement progressif parfois contesté dans d’autres régions sensibles du monde. L’évolution du repositionnement stratégique américain Bien que la stratégie ait été présentée par l’administration Obama, le rééquilibrage américain en Asie n’est pas l’œuvre d’une seule administration puisqu’elle était déjà en place sous George W. Bush. À cette époque, le terme employé par l’administration républicaine était celui de virage (« shift ») vers l’Asie, qui impliquait une volonté d’accroître les capacités militaires des alliés de la région et de renforcer l'interopérabilité bilatérale avec eux. C’est en ce sens qu’en 2007, l’administration Bush avait soutenu une proposition japonaise visant à créer un dialogue de sécurité « quadrilatéral » (Quad) entre les États-Unis, le Japon, l’Inde et l’Australie. La marine américaine avait elle aussi affecté 60% de sa flotte de sous-marins nucléaires d'attaque dans le Pacifique. George W. Bush avait toutefois décidé de mettre sur pause le virage vers l’Asie afin de ne pas provoquer la Chine, mais également parce que la Maison-Blanche s’était empêtrée dans des conflits en Afghanistan et en Irak qui avaient pour effet de détourner l’attention de Washington des transformations géostratégiques dans l’espace indopacifique. Dès l’arrivée de Barack Obama à Washington, des experts sinologues avaient invité la nouvelle administration à accentuer la présence américaine en Indopacifique, à la suite de quoi la Stratégie de sécurité nationale de 2010 présentait les prémisses de la stratégie du pivot. Ainsi, le recadrage des impératifs stratégiques américains sous Obama répondait à un besoin ressenti de modifier le récit stratégique des États-Unis, en se concentrant davantage sur l’Indopacifique que sur le Moyen-Orient. Le rééquilibrage vers l’Asie était également destiné à élargir l’accès des États-Unis aux marchés étrangers et à soutenir une économie américaine en déclin relatif dans un contexte où Barack Obama avait été élu sur un programme devant sortir l’Amérique des guerres du Moyen-Orient. Dès son arrivée au pouvoir, Donald Trump a pour sa part prôné une politique étrangère en Asie fondée sur une approche libre et ouverte en Indopacifique (Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy – FOIP) plus ou moins cohérente. Pendant sa présidence, Trump a maintenu des éléments de continuité avec la stratégie de rééquilibrage de son prédécesseur, reconnaissant la nécessité de répondre fermement au comportement déstabilisateur de Pékin. Toutefois, au lieu de miser sur une stratégie collective prudente comme son prédécesseur, Trump a mis de l’avant une rhétorique de confrontation avec la Chine et de défiance avec ses alliés en ayant recours à l’utilisation de sanctions et des tarifs douaniers. De plus, suivant ses promesses électorales, celui-ci a annoncé, dès novembre 2016, le retrait des États-Unis du Partenariat transpacifique, détruisant ainsi l’architecture économique du rééquilibrage stratégique. Cette décision était en contradiction avec l’idée d’une zone libre et ouverte dans le Pacifique. Elle n’a pas manqué d’affecter la crédibilité des États-Unis, notamment vis-à-vis de ses alliés dans la région, puisque les signataires avaient eux-mêmes pris des risques stratégiques en adhérant à la stratégie d’Obama. Par exemple, le Japon a considéré le retrait américain comme un revers bouleversant sa propre stratégie face à la Chine. D’autre part, cette décision a largement réjoui la Chine en lui permettant d’imposer ses propres normes commerciales au sein de l’espace indopacifique par de nouveaux traités de libre-échange, dont le Partenariat régional économique global, qui regroupe quinze pays et plus de deux milliards d’habitants. Au niveau budgétaire, bien que la Stratégie de défense nationale de 2018 (National Defense Strategy) ait placé la région indopacifique au cœur de la stratégie de défense des États-Unis, les experts considèrent que l’allocation des ressources dans la région était insuffisante pour réaliser les ambitions stratégiques américaines, et ce depuis la présidence d’Obama. L’arrivée au pouvoir de Joe Biden en janvier 2021 est venue redistribuer les cartes, celui-ci s’étant fixé pour objectifs de reconstruire les relations avec ses alliés du Pacifique, fragilisées par l’administration Trump, tout en tentant de mettre fin aux abus financiers de la Chine. Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, il est clair que Biden souscrit davantage à l’approche d’Obama qu’à celle de Trump et met l’accent sur le leadership et l'engagement des États-Unis au niveau mondial. Le nouveau président a élargi le concept du FOIP lors du dernier sommet du Quad pour appeler à une région de l’Indopacifique qui soit « free, open, inclusive … anchored by democratic values and unconstrained by coercion ». Biden cherche à rétablir la confiance que Trump avait brisée chez les alliés de la région indopacifique. En effet, quelques semaines après son entrée en fonction, il s’est entretenu par téléphone avec des dirigeants du Japon, de la Corée du Sud et de l’Australie, tous des alliés importants des États-Unis dans la région. De plus, les premières visites diplomatiques effectuées par les membres de l’équipe de politique étrangère de Biden ont eu lieu en Asie. Globalement, Biden a affirmé que les États-Unis coopéreraient avec Pékin dans la mesure du possible, notamment sur des questions comme celle des changements climatiques. Pour autant, les États-Unis restent en désaccord avec les nombreuses tentatives chinoises de coercition économique (voir notamment les conflits à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce), les multiples violations des droits humains qui leur sont imputées (récemment mises en lumière par les allégations de crime contre l’humanité du Parti communiste chinois à l’encontre du peuple ouïghour), ou encore en ce qui concerne toutes les questions liées à la propriété intellectuelle et, plus généralement, à celles d’ordre géopolitique. Au total, il a été estimé qu’environ 66 milliards de dollars seraient investis pour la région de l’Indopacifique d’ici 2022. Plus particulièrement, la « Pacific Deterrence Initiative » du Département de la Défense prévoit une somme de 5,1 milliards d’investissements destinée à développer et acquérir des capacités de défense, à améliorer les capacités des alliés et des partenaires et développer des technologies avancées. En outre, le 15 septembre dernier, l’annonce de la création de l’AUKUS, un traité de défense trilatéral entre l’Australie, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis, est venue confirmer l’approfondissement du pivot par le président Biden. Dans l’objectif de contrer la Chine, ce traité prévoit la vente par les États-Unis de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire à l’Australie. L’entente prévoit aussi le partage d’informations, de technologies et de renseignement. Les réactions au rééquilibrage américain Les alliés traditionnels des États-Unis, inquiets par la montée en puissance de la Chine, ont pour la plupart souscrit au rééquilibrage stratégique américain depuis 2011. Le Japon, par exemple, considère les États-Unis comme un allié essentiel en ce qui concerne la question clé de la souveraineté territoriale sur les îles Senkaku. Les deux États ont accru leur coopération en matière de sécurité au cours des dernières années. En outre, la formulation « Indopacifique libre et ouvert » (FOIP) a été développée par le Japon avant d’être adoptée par les États-Unis, ce qui témoigne de l’alignement quasi parfait entre les politiques des deux États sur la question de l’Indopacifique. La Corée du Sud et l’Inde sont quant à elles plus ambivalentes par rapport au langage du FOIP ciblant la Chine. Étant des voisins plus directs de la Chine, ces deux États sont plus réticents à l’idée de risquer de provoquer Pékin. On peut toutefois affirmer que la Corée du Sud et l’Inde se sont alignées sur la politique américaine, dans la mesure où ces deux États sont partisans de l'accroissement de la coopération économique et de défense dans la région de l’Indopacifique. L’Australie pour sa part considère que son alliance avec les États-Unis est essentielle à sa sécurité et cherche à l’approfondir, notamment à travers le Quad. De plus, la récente intensification de la coopération avec les États-Unis dans le cadre de l’entente AUKUS indique un alignement encore plus marqué sur la politique américaine. Une seconde tendance de « non-alignement » est observable chez les États qui n’adoptent pas de politiques alignées sur la Chine ou sur les États-Unis. Cette posture permet d’entretenir des relations avec les deux États rivaux, tout en conservant une certaine autonomie. Par exemple, l’Indonésie favorise le multilatéralisme pour équilibrer l'influence des États-Unis et de la Chine. La Nouvelle-Zélande, bien qu’elle soit membre du Groupe des cinq (Five Eyes) est un autre pays qui adopte une posture de non-alignement, en affirmant son indépendance en matière de politique étrangère. L’attitude amicale de la Nouvelle-Zélande envers la Chine est d’ailleurs en rupture avec la position adoptée par les autres partenaires du Groupe des cinq, notamment l’Australie, qui a préféré annuler certains accords conclus dans le cadre de l’initiative de la Nouvelle route de la soie. À l’inverse, la tendance chez les États rivaux des États-Unis est au rapprochement avec la Chine. Les pays qui n’entretiennent pas de bonnes relations avec les États-Unis, et qui sont par conséquent portés à contester l’ordre mondial libéral dominé par les États-Unis, préfèrent se ranger du côté de la Chine dans la compétition sino-américaine. La Russie, qui a vu sa relation avec l’Occident se détériorer depuis l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014, s’est tournée vers l’initiative de « Grande Eurasie » allant dans ce sens. Ce projet vise officiellement à promouvoir l'intégration paneurasienne, mais celui-ci a été interprété comme un rapprochement forcé avec la Chine par les sanctions occidentales contre la Russie, et de surcroît positivement accueilli par la Chine qui subit elle aussi des pressions occidentales. La participation de la Russie à l’initiative de la Nouvelle route de la soie, à la Banque asiatique d'investissement pour les infrastructures et surtout à l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai montre la volonté de la Russie de renforcer ses liens avec la Chine. L’Iran cherche aussi à se rapprocher de la Chine, laquelle voit pour sa part l’Iran comme un tronçon nécessaire à l'édification de la Nouvelle route de la Soie. À cet égard, l’Iran a signé en 2021 l’accord de coopération stratégique de vingt-cinq ans avec la Chine. Les limites de la stratégie Dix ans après l’annonce officielle du pivot, cette stratégie ne fait pas l’unanimité auprès des experts. Pour certains, les bénéfices liés à l’augmentation de l’influence et de la présence stratégiques des États-Unis dans la région indopacifique sont inférieurs aux coûts engendrés par la grande stratégie de rééquilibrage vers l'Asie-Pacifique. Le premier problème soulevé par certains observateurs concerne la mise en œuvre de la stratégie sur le terrain. Le Budget Control Act de 2011 a provoqué des coupes dans le budget de la Défense jusqu’en 2015, qui ont limité la capacité du Département de la Défense à poursuivre le rééquilibrage. Malgré la promesse d’Obama selon laquelle « budget reductions will not come at the expense of that critical region », l’absence d’augmentations significatives du budget militaire pour la région de l’Indopacifique a été suffisante pour contrarier les objectifs stratégiques du pivot. De plus, en détournant leur attention du Moyen-Orient et de l’Europe pour se concentrer sur l’Asie, les États-Unis ont considérablement accru la vulnérabilité de ces régions. L’aventurisme russe en Ukraine, l’érosion de la démocratie dans certains États d’Europe centrale et orientale, dont la Hongrie et la Pologne, et l’instauration d’un califat par l’État islamique en Irak et en Syrie seraient en partie causés par la négligence relative des États-Unis. Finalement, la stratégie du pivot est accusée d’avoir envoyé un signal hostile à la Chine en tentant de la contenir militairement. Cette perception a provoqué une réponse encore plus agressive de la Chine, qui a fait valoir ses revendications en mer de Chine méridionale et orientale et accru ses actions coercitives à l’égard de Taiwan. Pendant ce temps, Pékin continue de combler l’écart avec les États-Unis en matière de capacités militaires et sa part du PIB mondial est en croissance constante. Bien que d’importants efforts aient été faits pour étendre l’influence américaine en Indopacifique, il n’est pas certain que le pivot ait atteint ses principaux objectifs face à la Chine. En somme, il est manifeste que les Américains ont eu plus de facilité à conceptualiser le pivot qu’à le mettre en œuvre. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada Les États-Unis n’ont fait aucune demande spécifique au Canada en ce qui concerne sa stratégie de rééquilibrage en Asie et le gouvernement canadien n’a jamais émis de réponse officielle à l’égard de cette stratégie américaine. Il faut dire que le Canada ne dispose pas des moyens militaires nécessaires pour exercer une influence déterminante dans cette région. Son exclusion de l’entente militaire AUKUS en septembre dernier n’a fait que confirmer une fois de plus cet état de fait. Le Canada n’a pas non plus encore formulé de stratégie globale en Asie par crainte de contrarier la Chine et d’envenimer des relations déjà très tendues avec elle. Rappelons en effet que les tensions actuelles et préexistantes entre les deux États ont récemment été nourries par les crises de l’affaire Huawei et des citoyens canadiens emprisonnés en Chine. Cela n’a pas empêché le Canada d’approfondir discrètement ses liens économiques et militaires avec ses alliés de l’Indopacifique, notamment en augmentant sa participation aux exercices militaires conjoints avec ses alliés dans la région. Le Canada a également pris part à tous les exercices RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise), et le niveau de sa participation a augmenté de façon significative au début des années 2010. Nous recommandons qu’il poursuive en ce sens. De plus, le Canada et les États-Unis ont signé le Canada-US. Asia-Pacific Defence Policy Cooperation Framework. Les deux États ont ainsi convenu de tenir un dialogue stratégique sur la défense, notamment par le fait de coordonner leurs activités et exercices d’entraînement dans les pays de l’Asie-Pacifique. Ainsi, sans faire d’annonce tambour battant, le Canada aurait intérêt à poursuivre ses investissements stratégiques en Indopacifique tout en restant conscient des limites de ses moyens. Au-delà de la dimension militaire, l’annonce du rééquilibrage par l’administration Obama a amené plusieurs observateurs canadiens à mettre de l’avant le rôle que pourrait jouer le Canada dans l’espace indopacifique en cas de crise internationale. L’idée est que le Canada pourrait contribuer efficacement à la désescalade de crise en jouant un rôle de médiateur, là où il a des intérêts importants. À cette fin, le Canada compte utiliser ses ressources limitées pour « s’engager dans un processus à long terme de renforcement de la confiance entre les pays de la région ». Le désir d’engagement diplomatique du Canada se traduit entre autres par sa volonté de devenir membre du Sommet de l’Asie de l’Est et de la réunion des ministres de la Défense des pays de l’Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-Est (ANASE ou ASEAN). Le Canada peine toutefois à obtenir l’adhésion à ces forums, confirmant de ce fait son manque de présence dans la région au cours des deux dernières décennies. Nous recommandons donc que le Canada travaille au développement de partenariats plus approfondis notamment avec les membres de l’ANASE afin d’accroître sa présence diplomatique dans l’espace indopacifique. ## Le plateau continental arctique et le Canada : quels risques politiques? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-plateau-continental-arctique-et-le-canada-quels-risques-politiques/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > L’allocation du plateau continental dans la région arctique a fait l’objet de moult spéculations. Certains, particulièrement dans les médias L’allocation du plateau continental dans la région arctique a fait l’objet de moult spéculations. Certains, particulièrement dans les médias, présentent cet enjeu comme une des raisons principales pour un futur conflit arctique, soulignant les richesses se trouvant dans la région.   D’autres analystes soulignent plutôt la nature coopérative de cette allocation jusqu’à présent, suggérant que le respect du droit international et de la coopération devrait a priori se poursuivre dans le futur. Il appert de faire la part des choses entre ces camps optimiste et pessimiste afin de bien peser les implications possibles pour les États arctiques dont le Canada. La façon dont le droit international est écrit laisse un risque politique certain pour la possibilité d’un conflit à propos du plateau continental arctique. Néanmoins, ce risque est limité par la présence de facteurs contraignants. La Commission sur les limites du plateau continental : coopération et mandat La Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer stipule que les États peuvent s’entendre entre eux pour résoudre des revendications chevauchantes (contradictoires, donc possiblement conflictuelles). Nous l’avons observé par exemple en juin 2022 lorsque le Danemark et le Canada se sont entendus pour résoudre leurs revendications chevauchantes, ce qui a mené à délimiter le plateau continental entre les deux pays dans la mer du Labrador. Ils peuvent aussi soumettre des données à la Commission des Nations Unies sur les limites du plateau continental (CLPC) afin que les experts de la Commission émettent des recommandations aux États. L’optimisme quant aux plateaux continentaux se fonde bien souvent sur cette Commission et surtout sur la réaction des États à l’égard de ses recommandations. Selon notre analyse, une forte majorité d’États a mis en œuvre ces recommandations ou les a acceptées sans encore les avoir mis en œuvre (98%). Plusieurs États ont ainsi accepté d’amasser davantage de preuves scientifiques afin de resoumettre leurs dossiers à la demande des experts de la Commission. La Russie est un exemple sur ce point. Ces exemples pointent vers une légitimité significative de la CLPC auprès des États souverains. Le respect de la procédure parfois longue de la Commission et l’acceptation des opinions des experts de la CLPC constituent assurément des signes optimistes quant à la résolution de ces enjeux. Par contre, il faut bien comprendre que la CLPC ne statue que sur les limites externes des plateaux continentaux sur lesquels planent des revendications chevauchantes entre deux ou plusieurs États. En d’autres mots, la Commission n’émet pas d’avis sur les zones chevauchantes, donc qui sont sujettes à dispute entre les États qui revendiquent ces zones. Dans notre cas d’espèce par exemple, la Commission n’a pas pour mandat de statuer où se termine la portion canadienne du plateau continental arctique et où commence la portion russe de ce même plateau : cette tâche ultimement revient aux États concernés de décider à la suite de négociations. Deux constats s’imposent donc. D’une part, la légitimité de la Commission est bien présente, mais elle est le résultat d’un évitement de dossiers controversés ou conflictuels : les contentieux sont laissés aux États. D’autre part, les États arctiques devront négocier afin de régler ce dossier : la Russie, le Canada et le Danemark ont des revendications chevauchantes sur la dorsale de Lomonosov (voir la carte au lien suivant) qui devront se résoudre à la suite de négociations entre les parties. Cela a de nombreuses implications pour le Canada.   Négocier le plateau continental arctique La principale conséquence pour le Canada est que des négociations sur le plateau continental arctique sont incontournables. L’entente signée en juin 2022 avec le Danemark portant entre autres sur le plateau continental dans la mer du Labrador est un exemple que de telles négociations peuvent aboutir. Par contre, dans le cas du plateau continental arctique, cela signifie que le Canada devra négocier aussi avec la Russie, un État avec lequel le Canada a eu peu d’interactions directes, avant ou après l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Il faut noter par contre que la Russie et le Canada ont adopté des stratégies similaires sur ce dossier, soumettant un dossier initial de données, puis resoumettant des données supplémentaires plus tard avec des revendications considérablement élargies sur le plateau continental arctique. Ainsi, la revendication du Canada s’étend jusqu’à la limite de la zone économique exclusive de la Russie et la revendication russe s’étire jusqu’à la limite de la zone économique exclusive du Canada. Or, la Russie a démontré dernièrement ses aptitudes à orchestrer des guerres juridiques (lawfare) pour atteindre ses buts stratégiques. Les négociations sur le plateau continental arctique pourraient ainsi être teintées de cette stratégie de la part de la Russie : l’obstructionnisme, la promotion d’interprétations alternatives, ou encore le déploiement de ressources ou la construction d’infrastructures près des zones contestées sont des possibilités déjà bien établies dans le répertoire russe de lawfare. Ce type de tactique est déjà déployé par la Russie en regard de l’archipel norvégien de Svalbard et de son plateau continental. Sur cette note, il serait judicieux pour le Canada d’approcher ses alliés afin de mieux comprendre les stratégies hybrides russes. Oslo entre autres a un riche historique d’interactions avec Moscou : le Canada pourrait tirer des enseignements de l’expérience norvégienne avec la Russie autant sur les dossiers difficiles (le cas de Svalbard) que sur les réussites (l’accord frontalier de 2010 dans la mer de Barents). Une réflexion et des moyens Bien sûr, ce dossier du plateau continental arctique ne se réglera pas sitôt et l’exploitation des ressources dans le plateau doit se penser sur le long terme plutôt que le court terme. Les discussions sont encore en cours pour établir des règles communes afin d’encadrer les activités minières en eaux profondes, le tout ayant été remis à 2024. La « tyrannie de la géographie » rend aussi les ressources dans l’océan Arctique central moins attrayantes : les coûts d’exploitation seront nécessairement plus élevés que des gisements ailleurs sur la planète. Les déplacements resteront de même difficiles dans la région, même avec un couvert glacier plus mince ou réduit, ce qui constitue une limite supplémentaire pour exploiter le plateau continental. Ce temps supplémentaire doit être utilisé par le Canada pour entreprendre une réflexion sur l’approche à privilégier en ce qui a trait à l’océan Arctique central. Le Passage du Nord-Ouest et la défense continentale ont monopolisé l’attention de la politique arctique canadienne jusqu’à maintenant. Il faudra toutefois développer une stratégie pour défendre les intérêts canadiens et jouer un rôle dans cette nouvelle région appelée à s’ouvrir. Cela inclut le développement de moyens et de capacités pour être présent dans cette région. Jusqu’à maintenant, les navires achetés ou annoncés par le Canada ne sont pas destinés pour l’océan Arctique central : les navires de patrouilles extracôtiers ne seront pas de taille pour l’environnement de cet océan. La construction de deux brise-glace polaires annoncés en 2021 devrait partiellement pouvoir remplir ce rôle, mais les tâches seront nombreuses pour ces brise-glaces, surtout si nous observons un accroissement du trafic maritime via le Passage du Nord-Ouest. Des ressources dédiées uniquement à l’océan Arctique central seraient nécessaires afin de montrer le sérieux de l’approche canadienne face à cette région. Réfléchir et investir dans des navires pour surveiller et être présent dans cette zone servira assurément le Canada dans ces négociations sur le plateau continental arctique. Investir en défense est toujours une entreprise hasardeuse au Canada. Pour autant, la défense de l’Arctique reçoit un appui significatif dans la population canadienne, comme le démontre un sondage récent de la firme Ipsos. Il s’agit d’un signe positif. Dans ce cas d’espèce, des investissements en défense s’inscriraient dans un contexte plus large dans lequel le pays doit développer une approche cohérente pour une région qui s’ouvrira davantage à l’activité humaine. Il s’agit aussi d’une région qui ajoutera un voisin difficile à gérer au Canada, la Russie, qui possède des moyens considérables et des tactiques avec lesquelles le Canada a peu d’expérience directe. Il est à espérer que la réflexion sur ces questions se mettra en branle le plus rapidement possible : se fier sur les organisations internationales dans ce cas ne règlera pas tout. Voir Tropin au lien suivant: https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=971596 ou par Goldenziel au lien suivant : https://www.cornelllawreview.org/2023/01/23/an-alternative-to-zombieing-lawfare-between-russian-and-ukraine-and-the-future-of-international-law/ ## Le potentiel de leadership du Canada dans la reconstruction de l’Ukraine après la guerre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-potentiel-de-leadership-du-canada-dans-la-reconstruction-de-lukraine/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Le potentiel de leadership du Canada dans la reconstruction de l’Ukraine après la guerre. La maxime lapidaire de Charles Tilly selon... Introduction La maxime lapidaire de Charles Tilly selon laquelle « la guerre a fait l’État, et l’État a fait la guerre », reflète les effets des contraintes du temps de guerre sur l’élaboration et l’accélération des réformes institutionnelles au sein des États modernes. Le conflit agit comme un catalyseur : il exige que les organes de l’État se mobilisent ou périssent. Conformément à la formule de Tilly, les périls mortels qui ont accompagné l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 et l’invasion russe de 2022 ont nécessité une modernisation globale du système de gouvernance de l’Ukraine. Au cours des huit dernières années, l’Ukraine a réussi à se débarrasser de son héritage postsoviétique tout en se restructurant avec pour objectif un avenir plus libéral et démocratique. Le Canada, de concert avec ses alliés occidentaux, a un rôle essentiel à jouer dans la consolidation de ces gains à long terme en Europe de l’Est. Malgré les simulacres de référendum organisés dans les territoires occupés, l’Ukraine cherchera très probablement une résolution sur le champ de bataille, et non à la table des négociations.  Une exception particulière pourrait être faite si la Russie proposait de revenir à la ligne de front qui était celle du 24 février, ou à la suite d’un changement brutal de la situation militaire. Le désespoir de Poutine face à l’impressionnante contre-offensive automnale de l’Ukraine s’est manifesté par une campagne de conscription de masse et par le renouvellement de la menace d’une frappe nucléaire limitée. Bien que la victoire de l’Ukraine ne soit pas encore assurée, les lourdes pertes russes à Kherson et Kharkiv démontrent une continuité dans l’évolution de l’équilibre des forces sur le champ de bataille. Le Canada et les autres partisans de l’effort militaire ukrainien devraient commencer à mettre en œuvre une architecture pour la paix qui sera établie tôt ou tard. Quel que soit le territoire final sous l’autorité de Kyiv au moment d’un futur accord de paix, un engagement proactif en faveur de l’intégration de l’Ukraine doit être concrétisé par la mise en œuvre d’un ensemble complet de mesures de reconstruction et d’assistance pour l’après-guerre. L’expertise technique et le leadership du Canada sur ce front peuvent aider à reconstruire rapidement l’Ukraine, à coordonner les ressources alliées, à faciliter le retour des citoyens déplacés, à renforcer l’ordre international fondé sur des règles ainsi qu’à consolider la position du Canada au sein de l’OTAN et d’autres organismes multinationaux. L’Ukraine aura besoin d’un programme multinational monumental pour se reconstruire Si l’Ukraine a réussi à empêcher l’effondrement de ses institutions à la suite de l’invasion russe, la guerre a eu des conséquences brutales sur la population du pays et ses infrastructures économiques. En septembre 2022, l’inflation sur douze mois dépassait 20% et le gouvernement a dû contracter des dettes massives pour rester solvable. Un rapport du 1er juin a estimé que le total des dommages directs atteignait plus de 97 milliards de dollars US et que les secteurs ukrainiens les plus touchés étaient ceux du logement, des transports, du commerce et de l’industrie. La perturbation de l’économie devrait coûter 252 milliards de dollars US supplémentaires cette année, ce qui devrait augmenter la proportion d’Ukrainiens qui vivent sous le seuil de pauvreté et réduire le PIB du pays de 15,1%. En juillet, la Conférence pour la Reconstruction de l’Ukraine qui s’est tenue en Suisse a permis d’élaborer la Déclaration de Lugano. Cette déclaration a été signée par les représentants de plus de quarante pays, ainsi que par la Banque européenne d’investissement et l’OCDE. Ce document, qui vise à orienter la reconstruction de l’Ukraine, met en avant l’importance d’un partenariat international, d’un processus axé sur des réformes, d’une plus grande transparence, de la primauté du droit et de l’engagement multisectoriel des parties prenantes. De même, le 25 octobre, la présidence allemande du G7 a coorganisé avec la Commission européenne à Berlin une conférence internationale d’experts sur le redressement, la reconstruction et la modernisation de l’Ukraine. Il en ressort que les besoins de financement extérieur de l’Ukraine pourraient atteindre entre 3 et 5 milliards de dollars US par mois en fonction de l’ampleur totale des bombardements russes à la fin du conflit. Le gouvernement fédéral du Canada devrait être prêt à définir des engagements précis en ce qui concerne la reconstruction de l’Ukraine, des mesures qui doivent s’inscrire de manière constructive dans les programmes de Lugano et de Berlin. Depuis le début de l’année, le système politique canadien a fait preuve d’un dynamisme remarquable dans l’utilisation des divers leviers d’intervention à sa disposition en situation de crise. À ce jour, le Canada a offert près de 620 millions de dollars canadiens en prêts bilatéraux, dont 500 millions ont déjà été versés à l’Ukraine. Par le biais du FMI, le Canada a offert jusqu’à  1,4 milliard de dollars canadiens sous la forme de prêts au gouvernement ukrainien, dont 1 milliard a déjà été versé. Entre le 24 janvier et le 3 août, le Canada a été le cinquième fournisseur mondial d’aide militaire à l’Ukraine, le troisième fournisseur d’aide humanitaire et le quatrième fournisseur en termes de dépenses financières totales. Après avoir aidé à coordonner le  régime multinational de sanctions mis en œuvre contre la Russie, le Canada est également devenu le premier pays occidental à saisir les biens russes sanctionnés afin de les reconvertir au profit des victimes de guerre ukrainiennes. Pour aller de l’avant, ces efforts initiaux doivent être transformés en un ensemble plus vaste de mesures de reconstruction qui visent à pallier les séquelles régionales et mondiales du conflit. Compte tenu des besoins colossaux de Kyiv, Ottawa faire preuve de pragmatisme dans ses dépenses pour éviter que la rigueur budgétaire ne s’immisce dans son processus décisionnel. Des pistes pour le renforcement des institutions ukrainiennes par le Canada Les priorités immédiates devraient inclure des mesures visant à alléger la pression sur la chaîne d’approvisionnement agricole ukrainienne afin de lutter contre l’insécurité alimentaire mondiale, en particulier pour les pays en développement qui dépendent des cultures ukrainiennes et russes pour nourrir leurs populations. Un nouvel accord agricole entre le Canada et l’Ukraine peut sauver des vies à un moment où les prix alimentaires en fonction de l’inflation ont atteint leur plus haut niveau depuis les années 1970. Bien que le Canada ait financé un projet de 52 millions de dollars canadiens par l’entremise de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture (FAO) afin de remédier aux pénuries de stockage de céréales en Ukraine, il est possible d’en faire davantage pour accroître les capacités ukrainiennes et encourager de meilleures pratiques agricoles afin d’améliorer le rendement total. Plus de 65% des terres arables en Ukraine sont constituées de Chernozem, un type de sol noir organique extrêmement fertile. Le transfert de connaissances canadiennes sous la forme d’échanges pédagogiques et de conseils d’experts peut permettre de mettre en place les technologies, les processus et les méthodes financières modernes nécessaires pour tirer parti des avantages agricoles naturels de l’Ukraine. Chaque année, ce sont 500 millions de tonnes de sols ukrainiens qui sont érodées par des pratiques dépassées telles que la culture avec labour à grande échelle. Le Canada et l’Ukraine ont donc un intérêt commun à protéger les terres arables et à atténuer les effets néfastes du changement climatique sur les zones agricoles productives. Les directives internationales concernant la modification et la déréglementation de l’économie centralisée de l’Ukraine peuvent permettre de davantage développer le potentiel de ses entreprises, de ses exportateurs, de ses fournisseurs d’énergie et de son industrie technologique naissante. Avec des dizaines de milliers de réfugiés ukrainiens désireux de rentrer du Canada, ainsi qu’avec la volonté de la diaspora ukraino-canadienne, le pays est prêt à subir une transformation structurelle sous-tendue par des investissements et des innovations à l’étranger. Pour accueillir au mieux ces nouveaux atouts, l’État ukrainien devra réduire considérablement les formalités administratives et développer un environnement propice aux droits de propriété immobilière, exempt d’une corruption qui a été endémique dans l’histoire du pays après 1991. Pour sa part, le gouvernement du Canada devrait envisager de relancer la Section des programmes juridiques internationaux du ministère de la Justice en partenariat avec l’Institut national de la magistrature et l’Association du barreau canadien. En organisant la visite de juristes canadiens hautement qualifiés en Ukraine, il serait possible de mettre en place des initiatives de réorganisation juridique et de renforcement des capacités, des formations à la rédaction de textes législatifs ainsi que la supervision de commissions pour une réforme juridique qui s’avère indispensable pour le pays. La prospérité de l’Ukraine à long terme reposera sur une conception et une application plus strictes de l’état de droit, protégées par un pouvoir judiciaire vigilant et réactif. Sur le plan diplomatique, l’adhésion et la stature du Canada au sein d’organismes multilatéraux de premier plan comme l’ONU, la Cour internationale de Justice, la Cour pénale internationale, le G7, l’OCDE et l’OTAN fournissent une plateforme pour l’avancement de la cause ukrainienne sur plusieurs dossiers. Le Canada pourrait, par exemple, appuyer la création d’un Tribunal spécial chargé de poursuivre les auteurs du crime d’agression commis contre l’Ukraine. Une enquête en bonne et due forme sur les dirigeants russes accusés de crimes contre l’humanité et de crimes de guerre renforcerait les fondements du régime juridique international tout en rendant justice aux victimes ukrainiennes. De même, l’ardent plaidoyer du Canada en faveur de l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN devrait générer des avantages à long terme, notamment du fait de la gratitude de ce futur partenaire au sein de l'alliance transatlantique. L’incapacité à maintenir l’ordre régional en Europe de l’Est a déplacé le fardeau sur les pays occidentaux, qui doivent maintenant prendre des mesures préventives pour s’assurer que les transgressions russes contre l’Ukraine ne se répètent pas. Dans le domaine de l’aide militaire et de l’échange de renseignements, le Canada n’est pas obligé d’être le principal fournisseur de services de sécurité pour l’Ukraine. Il peut cependant travailler de manière complémentaire avec ses alliés afin de combler les lacunes de l’appareil de défense ukrainien. Le mois dernier, les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) ont amélioré la capacité de la plaque tournante de transport de Prestwick en Écosse afin d’accélérer l’expédition d’armes et d’équipement en Ukraine. Dans le cadre de l’opération UNIFIER, les officiers canadiens ont contribué à la modernisation et à la formation de 33 000 soldats ukrainiens entre 2015 et 2022. Cet entraînement s’est avéré essentiel pour la résistance de l’Ukraine contre l’assaut initial russe en février. À mesure que la situation va se stabiliser, le Cabinet devrait être prêt à autoriser la reprise et l’expansion des missions des FAC de renforcement des capacités en Ukraine afin de promouvoir l’interopérabilité des systèmes et de permettre à l’armée ukrainienne de répondre aux normes de l’OTAN en vue de son adhésion éventuelle. Établir des principes pour le XXIe siècle La guerre entre la Russie et l’Ukraine, telle que Timothy Snyder l’a décrite de manière troublante, interroge « les politiques de mort massive et [...] la valeur de la vie en politique ». Il s’agit désormais d’établir des « principes pour le XXIe siècle ». Tout comme l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 a stimulé la reconstitution fondamentale de la société ukrainienne, les répliques du bellicisme russe pourraient également donner une impulsion pour des réformes nationales et transnationales radicales. Le Canada a un choix à faire à cet égard : adopter un véritable engagement matériel en faveur de la résilience démocratique à l’étranger, ou débiter de simples platitudes en son nom. Gagner la guerre en Ukraine est une condition préalable pour gagner la paix qui s’ensuivra. À de nombreux égards et selon divers paramètres, le Canada se trouve dans une position spéciale pour exercer une influence sur le processus de reconstruction de l’Ukraine d’après-guerre. Il ne doit pas laisser passer l’occasion d’aider l’Ukraine à se remettre sur pied tout en renforçant ainsi la sécurité européenne. De ce point de vue, la diplomatie canadienne peut avoir un impact générationnel durable en Europe de l’Est. Les contacts institutionnels directs et l’échange d’informations permettent aux dirigeants canadiens d’écouter et d’apprendre des expériences douloureuses de l’Ukraine en temps de guerre. Enfin, les développements de la cyberguerre, des techniques pour contrer la désinformation et des nouvelles doctrines sur le champ de bataille peuvent permettre de faire une ébauche de l’ampleur et de la configuration des futurs conflits militaires du XXIe siècle. -Anvesh Jain ## Le pouvoir du narratif : désinformation, stratégie et prédiction des scénarios futurs dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-pouvoir-du-narratif-desinformation-strategie-et-prediction-des-scenarios-futurs-dans-la-guerre-russo-ukrainienne/ Modified: 2024-12-13 > La guerre russo-ukrainienne, déclenchée par l'invasion russe de 2022, ne se limite pas à des affrontements militaires. Au cœur... La guerre russo-ukrainienne, déclenchée par l'invasion russe de 2022, ne se limite pas à des affrontements militaires. Au cœur de cette guerre moderne se trouve un champ de bataille invisible mais décisif : celui de l'information. La gestion du narratif, autant pour mobiliser l'opinion publique intérieure qu'internationale, est devenue une arme centrale pour l'Ukraine et la Russie. L'importante croissance des réseaux sociaux, ainsi que l'utilisation de la désinformation comme stratégie politique, soulèvent des questions majeures pour les pays comme le Canada. Comment préserver une souveraineté numérique face aux ingérences étrangères ? Quelles stratégies adopter pour protéger les citoyens contre la manipulation de l’information et renforcer leur résilience face aux fausses nouvelles ? Comprendre comment l'Ukraine a sécurisé son espace numérique, tout en déjouant les campagnes de désinformation russes, offre des leçons cruciales sur la souveraineté numérique et la protection de l'espace informationnel. Narratifs en conflits : face à l’opinion internationale Le narratif ukrainien s’est articulé autour des stratégies de défense et de communication ukrainiennes. Un exemple frappant de la manière dont les leaders contemporains utilisent la rhétorique pour influencer l'opinion publique et renforcer leur position est celui de Volodymyr Zelensky, qui a su utiliser les réseaux sociaux de manière innovante, en exploitant une communication centrée sur trois éléments clés : la personnalisation du message, l'usage d'une rhétorique émotionnelle et la maîtrise de l'espace médiatique global. D'une part, en diffusant des messages courts et émotionnels à destination du public ukrainien, il a consolidé la résilience intérieure de son pays. D'autre part, une présence constante dans les médias internationaux, tout en adaptant ses discours aux cultures et aux références historiques des parlements étrangers. Le récit médiatique mondial a donc positionné l'Ukraine comme une victime légitime nécessitant un soutien international. Dans les manuels militaires, le principe de surprise est fondamental : révéler des offensives à l'avance diminue leur impact. Pourtant, en Ukraine, la communication autour des offensives semble relever d'une stratégie politique. Dépendante de l'appui occidental, l'Ukraine utilise ces annonces pour garantir le soutien continu de ses partenaires en montrant qu'elle conserve des perspectives de succès. Bien que l'état-major russe soit probablement au courant de ces opérations grâce à ses capacités de renseignement, ces déclarations s'adressent avant tout à l'opinion publique et aux partenaires internationaux. La Russie, de son côté, a développé un narratif centré sur la défense de ses intérêts stratégiques et la protection des certaines populations russophones, justifiant ainsi ses actions en Ukraine. Ce narratif a été diffusé à l'intérieur du pays et à l'international, tentant de gagner la sympathie ou du moins, la neutralité des autres nations. Il est important de souligner que la Russie présente ses actions comme une "opération spéciale", cherchant à minimiser l'ampleur de l'offensive. Ce choix de terminologie vise également à éviter les implications légales que le terme "guerre" pourrait entraîner, tant sur le plan interne qu'international. Elle a également exploité des références historiques, comme la lutte contre le nazisme pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, pour légitimer ses actions aux yeux de sa propre population et de certains segments de l'opinion internationale. Le gouvernement russe dénonce notamment l’association des forces ukrainiennes à des figures controversées, comme le Régiment Azov,  ou de par la popularité de certaines personnalités comme Stepan Bandera. La guerre en Ukraine présente des similitudes frappantes avec d'autres conflits, notamment avec la situation à Gaza. Dans les deux cas, les gouvernements utilisent le narratif comme élément central de leur stratégie militaire, cherchant à obtenir le soutien international pour leurs actions, malgré les critiques du droit international. À Gaza, comme en Ukraine, le narratif est construit autour de la légitimité de la défense nationale face à une menace perçue, ce qui permet de justifier des actions militaires controversées. Dans le cadre du conflit israélo-palestinien, un exemple récent de désinformation a émergé après l’attaque du Hamas le 7 octobre 2023. Des allégations non vérifiées de la part des médias israéliens, selon lesquelles « 40 bébés décapités » auraient été découverts dans une zone sévèrement touchée. Bien que ce récit ait été relayé par divers médias et largement diffusé à l'international, il a ensuite été prouvé infondé. Utiliser des images ou des récits d’enfants dans des contextes de guerre est une stratégie puissante, car elle touche un registre émotionnel universel et symbolise l’innocence. En peignant l’ennemi comme insensible à cette innocence, ces récits visent à le diaboliser aux yeux du public, renforçant l’idée qu'il représente une menace si extrême qu’il ne respecte même pas la vie des plus vulnérables. Ce genre de discours rappelle des exemples passés, comme celui des « bébés arrachés des couveuses » au Koweït avant la guerre du Golfe en 1990, où des témoignages dramatiques avaient été utilisés pour influencer l’opinion publique en faveur d’une intervention militaire. Ainsi, la guerre de l’information autour de ces histoires d’enfants non seulement attire l’empathie, mais sert aussi à déshumaniser l’ennemi en renforçant le sentiment d’urgence morale chez le public international. Le conflit au Proche-Orient a largement capté l’attention des médias américains, reléguant la guerre en Ukraine au second plan. Ce décalage a contribué à accentuer un désintérêt progressif de l’opinion publique pour la situation en Ukraine, déjà présent dans les débats politiques et médiatiques. Alors que Jacques Baud, analyste stratégique, soutient que les narratifs façonnent directement les stratégies militaires, d'autres analystes, comme Lawrence Freedman, historien militaire britannique, suggèrent que la manipulation des informations peut parfois échouer à influencer l'issue des conflits. Par exemple, Freedman souligne que malgré l'intense propagande américaine avant la guerre d'Irak, l'effondrement rapide du régime de Saddam Hussein ne s'est pas déroulé comme les stratèges l'avaient prévu. Ce phénomène illustre bien comment la communication de guerre peut être exploitée pour orienter la perception de la réalité dans un contexte de conflits, renforçant ainsi l'idée que : "ce n'est pas tant ce que les gens pensent, mais à quoi ils pensent", comme le souligne Maxwell E. McCombs et Donald L.Shaw dans leur théorie de l’agenda-setting. Contrôle et protection de l’espace informationnel ukrainien Cette citation apocryphe de Rudyard Kipling, reste pertinente : "La première victime de la guerre, c’est toujours la vérité." Depuis les années 1990, l’Ukraine a été un terrain de jeu pour l'influence russe, notamment à travers les médias et les infrastructures numériques. Cependant, c'est après les événements de 2014, avec l'annexion de la Crimée et le conflit dans le Donbass, que l'Ukraine a commencé à percevoir son espace informationnel comme un domaine à protéger, au même titre que son territoire physique. Depuis 2017, l'Ukraine a bloqué des ressources russes comme Yandex et VKontakte, les considérant comme des vecteurs de désinformation. Cette politique s'est intensifiée après 2022, avec des mesures visant à sécuriser l'infrastructure numérique contre les cyberattaques, notamment la relocalisation de base de données publiques vers des serveurs des pays voisins.  Ce blocage a permis à l'Ukraine de limiter l'influence russe sur son propre territoire numérique et de réduire la propagation des narratives pro-russes parmi la population ukrainienne. Sous la loi martiale instaurée depuis le 24 février 2022, un décret signé par Volodymyr Zelensky a regroupé les chaînes de télévision nationales en une seule plateforme pour diffuser en continu des informations sur la guerre. S’en suit l’interdiction de diffusion des chaines Sputnik et RT, une décision prise par l’Union Européenne pour soutenir ce blocage de l’influence russe bien que les chaines soient accessibles en quelques clics sur internet. Le développement d'un espace culturel ukrainien en ligne, comme Ukraine.ua vise à contrer la domination historique des contenus russes en Ukraine et à construire une souveraineté numérique. La création de médias indépendants ukrainiens et la promotion de la culture locale ont contribué à construire une narrative ukrainienne distincte, renforçant ainsi la résilience nationale face aux influences extérieures. Désinformation et souveraineté numérique : La bataille des réseaux sociaux en Ukraine Les réseaux sociaux ont joué un rôle crucial dans la diffusion et l’amplification de ces narratifs. L'Ukraine a utilisé Twitter, TikTok et d'autres plateformes pour maintenir le soutien international, diffuser des récits de résilience, dénoncer les crimes de guerre et toucher un public plus jeune. Le phénomène des faux comptes utilisés pour propager des messages pro-russes ou pro-ukrainiens est un exemple concret mais minime de la structure complexe des médias à notre ère. Selon l’institut de sociologie de Kiev, en octobre 2023, 44% des Ukrainiens utilisaient Telegram comme première source d’information, surpassant la télévision, utilisée par 43% des citoyens. Il est curieux de voir que l’Ukraine a tout récemment interdit l’utilisation de Telegram sur tous les appareils du personnel gouvernemental.  Le principe de liberté d'expression, prôné par les médias numériques tels que X (anciennement Twitter), peut engendrer des ambiguïtés quant à l'impact de la désinformation. La situation au Brésil en est une illustration notable. En août 2024, la Cour suprême brésilienne a ordonné la suspension de la plateforme X, reprochant à celle-ci de ne pas se conformer à des injonctions judiciaires visant à lutter contre la désinformation. Cette décision a été motivée par le refus de X de bloquer des comptes accusés de diffuser de fausses informations, notamment en lien avec des partisans de l'ancien président Jair Bolsonaro. En réponse, X a entrepris des démarches pour se conformer aux exigences légales brésiliennes, notamment en bloquant les comptes incriminés et en payant les amendes imposées. Ces actions ont conduit la Cour suprême à lever la suspension de la plateforme en octobre 2024, permettant ainsi à X de reprendre ses activités au Brésil.  Cette affaire met en lumière les tensions entre la liberté d'expression et la responsabilité des plateformes numériques dans la gestion de la désinformation, ainsi que les défis auxquels sont confrontés les gouvernements pour réguler le contenu en ligne tout en respectant les droits fondamentaux. Des initiatives comme StopFake.org, qui visent à vérifier les informations et à dénoncer les fausses nouvelles, illustrent comment l'Ukraine tente de reconquérir son espace informationnel, en comptant plus de 7000 articles vérifiés sur la plateforme. Un autre exemple innovant est l'utilisation de l'application Diia, initialement conçue pour simplifier des démarches administratives. Depuis l’invasion russe, Diia est devenue un outil de renseignement civil, les citoyens ukrainiens peuvent soumettre des photos et vidéos géolocalisées des mouvements militaires russes. Cela a permis une participation active de la population dans la défense national pour signaler les évènements suspects. Dans un contexte de guerre de l'information, à qui revient le pouvoir de déterminer ce qui est vrai ? Comment les initiatives de fact-checking peuvent-elles éviter de devenir elles-mêmes des outils de propagande ? La vérification des informations s’appuie souvent sur l’utilisation de procédés, d’analyse des métadonnées, ou encore l’examen détaillé des preuves visuelles. Ces méthodes sont renforcées par des logiciels d’édition spécialisés. Toutefois, la question de l’objectivité des organismes de fact-checking se pose fréquemment, ces derniers étant parfois accusés de servir des intérêts politiques. Le rôle autrefois fondamental du journaliste, qui agissait comme un filtre de l’information avant sa diffusion au public, s’est affaibli à l’ère du numérique. Désormais, n’importe quel individu peut produire et diffuser des contenus en ligne, facilitant ainsi la propagation de fausses informations. En mars 2022, un deepfake montrant le président Zelensky appelant les Ukrainiens à déposer les armes a circulé sur les réseaux sociaux bien qu’il fut rapidement démenti par les autorités ukrainiennes. La Complexité de la prédiction des scénarios futurs Dans le cadre du conflit en Ukraine, l'utilisation du SIGINT (renseignement d'origine électromagnétique) et du CYBER n’ont pas été absent. Selon l'Institut Français de Géopolitique, les flux électromagnétiques jouent un rôle crucial dans la conduite des opérations militaires modernes.  Avec le soutien l'OTAN, l'Ukraine a pu accéder à des technologies avancées de surveillance des communications, lui offrant ainsi un avantage considérable sur le terrain. De plus, d’autres acteurs ont apporté leur soutien technologique, En 2022, l'Ukraine a utilisé des outils d'intelligence artificielle, notamment avec l'aide de Palantir et son projet Gotham, qui a permis d’agréger du SIGINT. De son côté, Starlink a contribué avec son aide satellitaire et sa couverture réseau sur le territoire ukrainien. Ce qui a permis d’analyser les mouvements des troupes russes et prédire les zones de conflit à venir. Ces prédictions ont permis à l'armée ukrainienne de se préparer aux offensives, limitant les pertes humaines et matérielles. Cependant, la fiabilité de Starlink a parfois été remise en question. Dans certains cas, l’entreprise a restreint ou interrompu son réseau, invoquant des préoccupations de sécurité ou des considérations stratégiques. L'armée ukrainienne a signalé des pannes dans des zones reprises à la Russie, provoquant des débats sur la dépendance envers des entreprises privées pour des opérations militaires critiques. En parallèle, la Russie elle-même a tenté de perturber la connexion Starlink en Ukraine, rendant l'accès au réseau instable par moments. Ces interruptions ont alimenté les inquiétudes quant à la capacité de l’entreprise à fournir une assistance constante en temps de guerre. D'autres sources indiquent que les performances de Starlink en Ukraine, en termes de vitesse et de couverture, varient également, ce qui pose des défis supplémentaires. En ce sens, cette situation met en lumière les questions de souveraineté numérique et d’autonomie stratégique de l’Ukraine, en soulevant le risque qu’une entreprise privée puisse influencer directement la disponibilité de ressources critiques en période de conflit. Les fuites des "Discord leaks" ont révélé que le ministère de la Défense russe avait été infiltré par des renseignements américains, consolidant l’idée que l’invasion russe a été anticipée bien avant son déclenchement. Les pays européens, notamment l’Allemagne, la France et l’Italie, n’ont pas tous anticipé l’invasion russe en Ukraine en raison de leurs liens économiques avec la Russie. L’Allemagne dépendait du gaz russe, la France visait une coopération stratégique, et l’Italie, également dépendante énergétiquement, entretenait des relations commerciales importantes. La guerre a révélé les risques de cette confiance aveugle envers Moscou. L’encadrement adéquat : la doctrine militaire La doctrine militaire est un cadre stratégique qui vise à aligner les moyens disponibles avec les objectifs spécifiques de chaque nation. La comparaison avec d'autres conflits permet de tirer des leçons sur la manière dont les prédictions peuvent être faussées par la désinformation. Les erreurs de prédiction pendant la guerre en Irak en 2003, basées sur de fausses informations sur les armes de destruction massive, montrent à quel point les décisions stratégiques peuvent être influencées par des récits construits pour justifier des actions militaires. De la même manière, les erreurs d'interprétation de la situation en Ukraine par certains experts montrent les limites de la prévision stratégique dans un brouillard de guerre. Il est essentiel de reconnaître que chaque armée fonctionne selon une logique qui lui est propre, dictée par sa doctrine nationale et pourtant certains spécialistes des pays de l’OTAN s’étonnent que la Russie n’utilise pas les mêmes techniques pour faire la guerre. Tenter de comprendre les forces armées d'un pays en se basant sur les concepts de la doctrine militaire d'un autre peut mener à des erreurs d'interprétation. D’autres ont montré que leurs évaluations des batailles ou des performances d'équipements militaires étaient souvent influencées par leurs propres expériences, sans tenir compte du contexte spécifique de l'adversaire. Connaître les forces et les faiblesses de son propre camp est important, mais Sun Tzu, nous rappelles qu’il est tout aussi crucial de comprendre la manière dont l'ennemi pense, réagit et mobilise ses ressources. Ce point a été négligé dans de nombreuses analyses militaires, conduisant à des conclusions inexactes. En utilisant divers outils tels que le renseignement et la reconnaissance, des informations précises doivent être obtenues. Le champ de bataille ne doit pas être imaginé, mais fondé sur des faits concrets. Les affirmations que la Russie était trop faible pour mener à bien sa mission spéciale ou pour prolonger la guerre, se sont révélées totalement irréalistes. Des voix comme celle de Michael Kofman, soulignent également que l'armée russe, malgré ses lacunes logistiques, reste une force à ne pas sous-estimer, remettant en question les analyses trop optimistes sur un effondrement rapide de la Russie. Se trouve-t-elle dans une position de force ? Une production élevée et une consommation en diminution, pourtant, elle ne semble pas prête à capituler de sitôt. Peu importe le brouillard de guerre créé par le narratif, que ce soit dans la sphère médiatique ou publique, un corps armé se doit de faire confiance aux aptitudes acquises durant sa formation. Cela implique de respecter ses fonctions avec un encadrement assuré par la doctrine militaire nationale. Ce cadre, en cas de désinformation majeure, permet de maintenir la clarté dans l'environnement psychologique du soldat, du capitaine et de son commandant, sans les exposer aux influences fluctuantes de la désinformation. Ils ne se laissent pas distraire par les récits extérieurs mais s’appuient sur des observations concrètes et une connaissance directe du terrain, une connaissance construite par l’expérience et l’analyse des faits sur le terrain. En procédant ainsi, l’information transmise aux décideurs est plus fiable et moins exposée aux distorsions des récits externes, permettant une prise de décision plus adéquate et ancrée dans la réalité. ## Le renforcement des capacités avant et après la COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-renforcement-des-capacites-avant-et-apres-la-covid-19/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Portant sur l’impact de la COVID-19 sur les activités de renforcement des capacités, le panel a donné lieu à une discussion animée sur les multiples questions que soulevait déjà le renforcement des capacités avant la pandémie, et sur comment la COVID-19 les affecte aujourd’hui. Vendredi le 25 septembre dernier s’est tenu le premier panel d’un cycle de 5 ateliers sur le renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19 organisé par le Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Modéré par Théodore McLauchlin, professeur agrégé au département de science politique et directeur du Centre d’études sur la paix et la sécurité internationale (CEPSI) à l’Université de Montréal, le panel incluait deux conférencières : Renanah Miles Joyce, boursière postdoctorale en Grand strategy, security and statecraft au programme de sécurité internationale de la Harvard Kennedy School et, conjointement, au programme d’études de sécurité du Massachusetts Institute of Technology; et Linnéa Gelot, professeure agrégée en études de paix et développement et chercheure senior à la Folke Bernadotte Academy. Portant sur l’impact de la pandémie sur les activités de renforcement des capacités, le panel a donné lieu à une discussion animée sur les multiples questions que soulevait déjà le renforcement des capacités avant la pandémie, et sur comment la COVID-19 les affecte aujourd’hui. Le présent point chaud résume les points saillants de cet échange. Visionnez la vidéo du premier panel Le renforcement des capacités avant la COVID-19 Forme de coopération sécuritaire au travers de laquelle un acteur transfère des capacités techniques et des normes à un autre acteur dans le but d’améliorer les habiletés des forces armées de ce dernier à faire face efficacement à des défis de paix et sécurité, le renforcement des capacités est devenu au fil des années un outil important de la politique étrangère de plusieurs pays occidentaux. Il se présente en effet comme un moyen alternatif de contribuer à la paix et à la sécurité internationale, moyen qui implique moins de risques et de coûts que l’alternative d’un déploiement direct à grande échelle. Pour Théodore McLauchlin, qui travaille actuellement à un projet intitulé Politics of Foreign Military Training où il examine les impacts politiques des formations militaires internationales, il est donc question de s’impliquer à l’étranger sans payer un lourd tribut. Plusieurs objectifs sous-tendent ces opérations de renforcement de capacités : la performance militaire, la lutte contre insurrection, le contre-terrorisme, le respect des droits de la personne, et la démocratisation. Avant la pandémie, le renforcement des capacités était aussi une opportunité pour les pays prestataires, d’étendre leur influence dans les pays récipiendaires. En effet, au travers des activités de formation organisées, les forces armées formatrices avaient l’occasion d’interagir, d’échanger et de socialiser avec leurs homologues récipiendaires. Pour Renanah Miles Joyce, dont le projet de livre intitulé Exporting Might and Right : Great Power Security Assistance and Developping Militaries porte sur l’efficacité de l’assistance à la sécurité en tant qu’outil des grandes puissances pour façonner les normes et le comportement militaires dans les petits États, il s’agit donc d’un tremplin de diffusion aisée des valeurs et intérêts du prestataire. Pour certains auteurs, les États qui reçoivent les formations militaires dispensées par les États-Unis – par exemple – développent facilement une vision pro-américaine. Certaines normes comme la libéralisation, le respect des droits de la personne, la réduction de la répression seraient ainsi acceptées plus aisément par les pays récipiendaires. Ce point reste toutefois en débat dans la littérature. Par ailleurs, la littérature et les débats entre professionnels portaient également sur des questions telles que l’impact des activités de renforcement des capacités sur les coups d’État; l’utilité de ces activités dans le contexte des gouvernements autoritaires ou corrompus; ou encore l’effet que peut avoir la multiplicité des prestataires sur la capacité de mener un transfert cohérent des normes et pratiques – selon qu’ils agissent dans une logique de coordination ou de concurrence. La COVID-19 vient donc allonger la liste de questions à se poser sur le renforcement des capacités. Les perturbations que crée la COVID-19 L’une des premières conséquences de cette pandémie, ce sont les difficultés économiques qu’elle a entrainées à l’échelle mondiale. Qui dit difficultés économiques dit également coupures budgétaires et recalibrage des priorités et des urgences. Ainsi, la première question qui se pose est de savoir à quel point le renforcement des capacités va demeurer une priorité pour les États prestataires. S’il s’agissait d’un moyen moins coûteux pour atteindre certains objectifs en sécurité internationale, le paradoxe qui se pose est qu’avec la pandémie, sa valeur peut changer. Pour Théodore McLauchlin, le renforcement des capacités ne serait plus absolument une priorité dans le contexte actuel – de crise économique et d’urgences internes – pour certaines puissances qui s’impliquaient dans ce genre d’activités. En revanche, il se peut que le bas prix du renforcement des capacités, comparativement à d’autres formes d’intervention, rende plus attrayante cette activité dans une époque de dégâts économiques et de budgets réduits. En effet, les États-Unis, le Canada, et le Royaume-Uni ont annulé ou réduit certaines activités de formation depuis le début de la pandémie, tandis que d’autres comme la Chine, la Russie et la France ne l’ont pas absolument fait. Pour les panélistes, les activités de renforcement de capacités pourraient aussi être limitées aux activités essentielles. Mais quelles seront les activités considérées comme essentielles ? Les intérêts géopolitiques pourraient devenir un autre élément susceptible de faire pencher la balance : les choix pourraient alors être faits en fonction de critères comme gagner du terrain, étendre ou maintenir son influence, passer un message aux adversaires sur nos capacités. Par exemple, on observe que certains prestataires, comme la Chine et la Russie, ont poursuivi des activités de formation militaire malgré la pandémie; tout comme l’a fait la France dans le cadre de l’Opération Barkhane au Sahel. De plus, la COVID-19 pose le problème des restrictions des déplacements et des contacts physiques. Le déplacement des forces armées formatrices ou récipiendaires se trouvant entravé, ceci soulève la possibilité de transmettre l’instruction à distance. Mais, selon Renanah Miles Joyce, se posent alors les problèmes du manque d’infrastructures technologiques dans certains pays et régions en développement, de l’accentuation des difficultés que posent les barrières linguistiques, et de l’entrave au processus de socialisation qui est cher aux prestataires occidentaux. Également, la formation stratégique pourrait souffrir davantage que la formation tactique avec les mesures de distanciation : elle a lieu habituellement dans des salles de classe (et non en plein air). En plus, son accent sur l’approfondissement de liens interpersonnels entre officiers de différents pays est particulièrement difficile à maintenir avec le passage aux cours en ligne. La discussion sur le renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19 était aussi l’occasion de visiter des instruments alternatifs de gestion de la sécurité. Linnéa Gelot, dont le projet actuel est intitulé African Union Waging Peace, a soulevé ce point en partant du cadre des opérations de maintien de la paix. Rappelant que, dans un contexte de crise du multilatéralisme et de manque de coordination entre les puissances étatiques, plusieurs missions de maintien de la paix ont été forcées de réduire leurs effectifs ou d’arrêter — c’est le cas au Congo, en Haïti, au Darfour ou encore au Libéria. Gelot a souligné que désormais les missions politiques (de médiation) sont de plus en plus mises de l’avant au détriment des déploiements militaires, et que les opérations se focalisent davantage sur les tâches essentielles plutôt que sur les multiples dimensions qui sont plus à même d’aider les personnes touchées par des conflits. Cette tendance qui prédate la pandémie pourrait donc s’intensifier dans le contexte actuel de crise sanitaire. De la même manière, la diminution de l’investissement occidental dans le renforcement des capacités pourrait créer une opportunité pour les initiatives régionales, que ce soit au niveau du renforcement des capacités ou des opérations de maintien de la paix, de se développer davantage. Pour elle, ce serait l’occasion pour les organisations internationales et les grandes puissances d’encourager cela. ## Le renseignement face à la menace chinoise URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-renseignement-face-a-la-menace-chinoise/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > La récente sortie publique du directeur du SCRS au Canada, nommant la Chine comme une menace pour le pays, reflète bien les défis des communautés du renseignement pour faire face à la Chine. En septembre 2020, le président de la Commission permanente de la Chambre des représentants sur le renseignement (CPCRR) des États-Unis, Adam Schiff, a publié un court article critique dans Foreign Affairs dans lequel il affirme que la communauté du renseignement américain n’est pas préparée pour faire face à la menace chinoise. Si Adam Schiff n’a pas totalement tort, la réalité est toutefois plus nuancée et complexe. Cette réalité est également visible en France et au Canada, où le renseignement est conscient de la menace que représente la Chine, mais où la réorientation en matière de renseignement pour faire face à cette menace semble se faire attendre. La récente sortie publique du directeur du SCRS au Canada, nommant la Chine comme une menace pour le pays, reflète bien les défis des communautés du renseignement pour faire face à la Chine. Quelle est la capacité du renseignement américain à faire face à la menace chinoise ? Quelles leçons tirer pour les communautés de renseignement au Canada et en France, toutes aussi confrontées à cette menace ? Un renseignement américain alerte, mais insuffisamment préparé Le renseignement américain, loin d’être aveugle, est tout à fait conscient de la menace que représente la Chine, et ce, depuis longtemps. En effet, dans l’évaluation annuelle de la menace du directeur national du renseignement de 2007, la Chine était présentée comme étant l’un des « menaces et défis » majeurs pour les États-Unis dans les années à venir, même si en 2007, la priorité était accordée à la lutte contre le terrorisme et à la prolifération nucléaire. Il y a près de 15 ans, le renseignement américain était déjà conscient de la menace que représentaient les activités d’espionnage économique de la Chine et des défis que posait sa croissance économique et militaire. Aujourd’hui, la Chine est devenue la menace stratégique la plus importante pour les États-Unis. En décembre 2020, le directeur national du renseignement, Daniel Ratcliffe, affirmait que la Chine est la menace la plus grande à la liberté et à la démocratie depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. C’est également une position que partage le directeur du FBI, Christopher Wray, en affirmant que la Chine est la menace la plus importante à long terme pour l’avenir des États-Unis. Il ira plus loin en avançant que « the stakes could not be higher. » L’évaluation annuelle de la menace du directeur national du renseignement de 2019 et l’évaluation de la menace intérieure de 2020 rendent toutes deux compte de l’importance de la menace chinoise pour la sécurité des États-Unis, tant au niveau militaro-stratégique à travers la capacité de la Chine à cibler avec des missiles au sol des satellites dans l’orbite terrestre, la construction de bases militaires outre-mer et sa modernisation des capacités militaires dans les domaines maritimes, des opérations offensives aériennes et de mobilisation à grande distance pour ses opérations, qu’aux niveaux sécuritaire et économique à travers les cyberattaques, les activités d’influence politique et l’espionnage. Pourtant, le rapport de la CPCRR mentionne que la communauté du renseignement américain ne s’est pas suffisamment adaptée aux changements géopolitiques et technologiques causés par la montée en puissance de la Chine et qu’elle échoue à prendre suffisamment en compte les menaces non militaires. Cependant, la Commission se base sur une définition relativement restrictive du renseignement, c’est-à-dire en tant que collection, analyse et dissémination du renseignement étranger et du contre-espionnage aux décideurs politiques. Cette conception provient de la vision traditionnelle du cycle du renseignement qui ne rend pas compte de la réalité des missions du renseignement. Par exemple, la Commission d’examen des questions économiques et de sécurité des États-Unis et de la Chine a, dès 2016, démontré les nombreux efforts de la communauté du renseignement pour contrer les activités agressives chinoises, notamment en matière d’espionnage. De plus, le FBI a depuis longtemps mis l’accent sur les menaces non militaires en provenance de la Chine, comme l’espionnage économique et les menaces qui pèsent sur le milieu académique. Cependant, comme le mentionnent Adam Schiff et le rapport de la CPCRR, l’allocation des ressources dans la communauté du renseignement pour faire face à la menace chinoise n’est pas suffisante pour permettre aux États-Unis de concurrencer la Chine sur la scène internationale et de garantir leur sécurité nationale. Le gouvernement américain doit également renforcer sa capacité à perturber et à dissuader les opérations d’influence chinoises aux États-Unis. Par ailleurs, Adam Schiff pense que la communauté du renseignement américain doit continuer à prioriser les efforts en contre-espionnage face à la Chine. C’est d’ailleurs une position que partage l’administration Biden et la directrice nationale du renseignement, Avril Haines, qui affirme qu’une de ses priorités sera de consacrer davantage de ressources pour contrer la menace chinoise. Elle se présente d’ailleurs comme étant favorable à une position agressive des États-Unis face à la Chine. Toutefois, la Chine n’est pas la seule menace contre les intérêts américains et le renseignement est donc confronté à une multitude de dangers. La CPCRR rappelle d’ailleurs que le renseignement américain continue de faire face à de nombreux défis. Par exemple, le Moyen-Orient et l’Asie du Sud sont des régions qui soulèvent plusieurs enjeux, notamment par l’implication des États-Unis en Afghanistan et en Irak, dans la lutte contre le terrorisme international, mais aussi en raison de la coopération en renseignement délicate avec l’Arabie Saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis, qui depuis 2017, poursuivent des politiques contraires aux objectifs régionaux des États-Unis. Par ailleurs, la menace pour les États-Unis ne vient pas seulement de la Chine, mais aussi de la prolifération nucléaire, de l’utilisation d’armes chimiques et de la modernisation militaire de la Russie. Cela est sans compter la menace intérieure des extrémismes violents qui demande un investissement croissant de la part du renseignement intérieur pour y faire face. Dans ces conditions, il y a un véritable travail de priorisation des menaces à mener, pour allouer correctement les ressources nécessaires à la communauté du renseignement. La menace chinoise vue par le renseignement français et canadien Si les États-Unis, en tant que grande puissance en compétition directe avec la Chine, sont peut-être davantage ciblés par la menace chinoise, la France rapporte également de son côté plusieurs opérations chinoises d’espionnage. Pourtant, autant au niveau de la sécurité intérieure que de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, la France ne considérait pas, jusqu’à très récemment, la menace chinoise comme l’une de ses priorités. Ces dernières se limitaient à la lutte contre le terrorisme d’inspiration islamiste et à la subversion violente. Pourtant, le renseignement français est bien conscient de la menace chinoise, comme le montre l’allocution du ministre de l’Intérieur en 2019 concernant l’espionnage et le pillage économique que mène la Chine en France. Celui-ci affirme notamment que la Direction générale de la Sécurité intérieure (DGSI) investit des moyens importants pour suivre l’évolution de la menace chinoise sur le territoire français, notamment en matière de contre-espionnage. La DGSI est donc particulièrement consciente de la menace chinoise et déploie son arsenal d’investigation pour y faire face. Au niveau politico-stratégique, c’est avec l’actualisation stratégique de 2021 que la Chine entre dans le giron du renseignement extérieur, par ses activités déstabilisatrices et par sa qualification de « rival stratégique pour l’UE, » ce qui amène aussi la France à se concentrer davantage sur les nouveaux domaines (cyber, spatial et intelligence artificielle) pour faire face aux stratégies hybrides. Le renseignement devient alors une des priorités de modernisation des capacités françaises pour faire face à la compétition avec la Chine, notamment avec des investissements accrus ainsi que la modernisation des moyens de renseignement, surtout dans le domaine informatique. Le budget de la DGSE a d’ailleurs augmenté de 7,8% en 2021, surtout consacré à la cybersécurité. Au Canada, la situation est relativement similaire à la France. La communauté du renseignement reconnaît l’ampleur de la menace chinoise. David Vigneault, le directeur du SCRS a, en février 2021, nommé le gouvernement chinois comme une menace pour le Canada, notamment par ses activités d’espionnage économique ciblant l’industrie pharmaceutique, l’intelligence artificielle, l’informatique quantique, l’aérospatiale ou encore les technologies océanologiques et son ingérence étrangère, notamment dans sa chasse aux opposants politiques chinois sur le sol canadien. Le directeur du SCRS appelle ainsi à un renforcement des défenses du Canada. Cependant, il semble que le gouvernement tarde à renforcer ses mesures de contre-ingérence et de contre-espionnage. David Mulroney, ancien ambassadeur canadien en Chine, affirme quant à lui que la Chine est la menace la plus importante pour le Canada, notamment pour sa capacité à cibler les élites canadiennes, compte tenu notamment des liens économiques majeurs de certaines élites canadiennes avec la Chine. Par l’incitatif économique, la Chine sécurise ainsi les voix de certaines élites canadiennes avec l’intention d’orienter certaines décisions majeures du Canada. Selon lui, le Canada est une cible endormie pour la Chine. La Chine cible également particulièrement le milieu académique, à travers des partenariats de recherches ou à travers différentes associations étudiantes chinoises. Pourtant, cela fait au moins une dizaine d’années que le renseignement canadien alerte le gouvernement canadien sur l’ampleur de la menace chinoise. La situation ne semble pas s’améliorer en période de pandémie, alors que le renseignement canadien prend de plus en plus la parole publiquement afin d’alerter le public sur la menace chinoise, incluant en matière d’espionnage dans le domaine pharmaceutique. Le défi de la priorisation des menaces Les États-Unis, la France et le Canada font ainsi face à un même défi en ce qui concerne la menace chinoise : celui de prioriser cette menace. Si le renseignement peut avertir de menaces potentielles, seuls les dirigeants politiques peuvent décider d’en faire une priorité en matière de sécurité nationale, réorientant ainsi les moyens de renseignement vers cette menace. Or, ce que dénonce Adam Schiff pour le renseignement américain, c’est le manque de ressources allouées à la menace chinoise au sein de la communauté du renseignement, allocation qui dépend de la priorisation des menaces par le gouvernement. Il faut à tout prix éviter de reproduire l’exemple du début des années 1990, où le renseignement américain alertait de la menace grandissante d’Al-Qaeda, sans que cela ne soit suivi d’une réorientation des moyens de renseignement. La situation est similaire en France et au Canada, où le renseignement reconnaît l’ampleur de la menace posée par la Chine, mais où le gouvernement n’en fait pas (encore) une priorité. Le véritable problème se trouve donc dans la priorisation des menaces par les gouvernements. En considérant, au niveau politique, la Chine comme une priorité en matière de sécurité nationale, une réorientation des moyens de renseignement pourrait alors en découler. La question, délicate, sera de déterminer la nature et l’importance relative de la menace chinoise par rapport aux autres menaces.   ## Le Réseau en bref URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-reseau-en-bref/ Modified: 2020-10-07 > Voici la vidéo promotionnelle du Réseau d'analyse stratégique! Découvrez la vidéo promotionnelle du Réseau d'analyse stratégique. ## Le retrait naval de l’Iran de la mer Rouge : abdication ou repositionnement stratégique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-retrait-naval-de-liran-de-la-mer-rouge-abdication-ou-repositionnement-strategique/ Modified: 2025-09-05 Alors que l’Iran vient de subir la plus grave attaque depuis la guerre Iran-Irak (1980-1988) dans le contexte des frappes israéliennes et américaines contre son programme nucléaire et que le régime islamique semble vaciller, un autre développement majeur, largement éclipsé par l’opération « Rising Lion », invite à s’interroger sur le repositionnement stratégique de Téhéran dans la région : le retrait de sa marine de la mer Rouge. Confirmé en avril 2025, cet acte marque un tournant important dans l’équilibre maritime régional. Présent de manière intermittente mais significative depuis 2008, l’Iran quitte une zone clé sans expliciter ses intentions, suscitant un débat sur la nature réelle de ce mouvement : est-ce un aveu de faiblesse, une manœuvre tactique ponctuelle ou un ajustement stratégique à long terme ? L’absence de communication claire de Téhéran a rapidement laissé place à un vide interprétatif, que certains acteurs – notamment les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, Israël et l’Arabie saoudite – se sont empressés de combler en présentant ce désengagement comme un succès de leur pression militaire et diplomatique. Ces lectures, largement relayées par les médias internationaux et influencées par des think tanks occidentaux, tels que l’International Crisis Group ou le Center for Strategic and International Studies, servent aussi les agendas régionaux de ces puissances, qui voient dans ce retrait un signe d’affaiblissement stratégique du régime iranien. Le présent texte vise à démontrer que le retrait naval iranien de la mer Rouge, survenu dans un contexte de vives tensions – culminant notamment avec les affrontements de juin 2025 – ne doit pas être interprété comme un recul définitif. Cette décision s’inscrit plutôt dans une stratégie prudente et adaptative visant à éviter les risques d’escalade dans une région d’importance majeure où les États-Unis ont considérablement renforcé leur présence en déployant deux groupes aéronavals, tandis que les alliés houthistes de Téhéran subissent des frappes répétées. Confronté à l’usure de ses capacités navales, à des contraintes logistiques croissantes, à des ressources budgétaires limitées et, désormais, à une pression accrue sur le régime, l’Iran choisit ici une posture de retrait tactique, destinée à préserver ses forces tout en maintenant sa liberté d’action sur le plus long terme. Cette pause opérationnelle, loin de traduire un abandon irrévocable, reflète une logique stratégique plus large, fondée sur l’évitement des confrontations directes, l’usage d’outils asymétriques et le soutien à des acteurs non étatiques. Le repli naval iranien apparaît ainsi comme une respiration stratégique : un ajustement temporaire permettant à Téhéran de se repositionner dans l’attente d’un contexte régional plus favorable à ses ambitions maritimes. *** Pour lire la suite, consultez le site du Rubicon. ## Le réveil européen et transatlantique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-reveil-europeen-et-transatlantique/ Modified: 2023-01-09 > Procurez-vous le livre Les nouvelles formes de guerre, le deuxième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Procurez-vous le livre Le réveil européen et transatlantique, le troisième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Une nouvelle génération d’experts renommés, d’observateurs avisés des opérations en cours livre ici ses points de vue éclairés, accessibles au plus grand nombre et accompagnés d’une riche infographie. Les différentes contributions de ce livre sont issues de la plateforme francophone d’analyse de questions internationales Le Rubicon. Le paradoxe est qu’en faisant la guerre à l’Ukraine, Vladimir Poutine a redonné sa colonne vertébrale à l’ordre dit libéral et aux alliances de sécurité du monde d’hier. En quelques jours seulement, il a réussi le tour de force d’unifier et de consolider l’Europe et l’OTAN. L’Europe se réarme, l’Allemagne adopte un budget de 100 milliards d’euros pour moderniser son armée. Des Etats jusqu’alors neutres ou non alignés livrent des milliers d’armes à l’Ukraine. Et la Suède et la Finlande pourraient prochainement rejoindre l’OTAN. Ce volume s’intéresse à ce moment historique de l’histoire européenne et de la relation transatlantique, en déclinant les conséquences (économiques, politiques, industrielles, militaires) de la guerre en Ukraine pour l’Europe et l’OTAN, c’est-à-dire pour l’avenir de notre continent et de notre sécurité. SOMMAIRE « La relance de la défense européenne : par les États, pour les États », par Samuel B.H. Faure « Aux armes, Européens ! », par Pierre Haroche « Vers l’augmentation accélérée des dépenses militaires en Europe », par Lucie Béraud-Sudreau « Union européenne : l’heure de la puissance ? », par Delphine Deschaux-Dutard et Bastien Nivet « La guerre en Ukraine, impact sur l’OTAN et l’UE», par le général Olivier Rittimann « Que reste-t-il du flanc Sud de l’OTAN », par Thierry Tardy « L’administration Biden et la guerre en Ukraine : évolution de l’approche stratégique », par Giovanna de Maio « Le réveil militaire du Canada n’est pas pour demain », par Justin Massie « Garantir la sécurité à long terme de l’Ukraine », par Maria Popova et Oxana Shevel ... Le Rubicon publiera de petits livres destinés au grand public, qui permettront d’aborder, clairement et précisément, les nouvelles questions brûlantes liées à l’actualité internationale. Chaque mois, à partir d’avril 2022, les Équateurs publieront un ouvrage d’environ 128 à 144 pages, au prix de 10 à 12 euros, synthèse du travail des experts de la plateforme Le Rubicon. La nouvelle collection du Rubicon ## Le réveil militaire du Canada n’est pas pour demain URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-reveil-militaire-du-canada-nest-pas-pour-demain/ Modified: 2022-06-28 > S’il est dans l’intérêt du Canada que l’Ukraine inflige une défaite totale à la Russie, pourquoi ne pas fournir davantage de soutien... L’invasion russe de l’Ukraine a causé une telle onde de choc dans les capitales occidentales qu’elle a entraîné un sursaut militaire. Celui-ci est marqué, entre autres, par des réinvestissements massifs dans les budgets de défense, le déploiement de milliers de troupes aux frontières orientales de l’OTAN, la livraison accélérée et considérable d’armes aux Ukrainiens, un consensus sur la menace claire et immédiate que représente le revanchisme russe, ainsi qu’un élargissement de l’OTAN à la Suède et à la Finlande. Bref, l’Alliance atlantique semble ressuscitée après sa soi-disant « mort cérébrale » annoncée à l’automne 2019. À ce portrait d’unité, il faut toutefois reconnaître qu’une certaine disparité demeure dans le sursaut des alliés et ce, à deux niveaux. D’abord, les alliés varient dans leur niveau de réinvestissement en défense et dans l’ampleur du soutien accordé à l’Ukraine. Pour le président Zelensky, ceci s’explique par leurs intérêts divergents. Il s’est ainsi montré critique envers les Français, qui refusent de fournir des armes offensives « parce qu’ils ont peur de la Russie », et des Allemands, qui « font une erreur » en souhaitant ménager leurs liens économiques avec la Russie. Les alliés divergent en outre sur l’issue souhaitée de la guerre. Les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni partagent la position maximaliste de l’Ukraine : la défaite totale de la Russie. Selon le secrétaire américain à la défense, « l’Ukraine peut encore gagner la guerre » en affaiblissant durablement la Russie au point où elle ne puisse envahir ses voisins. Similairement, la secrétaire d’État britannique aux affaires étrangères soutient que la victoire de l’Ukraine – un « impératif stratégique » – nécessite de « pousser la Russie hors de l’ensemble de l’Ukraine » et de lui fournir des armes autant défensives qu’offensives aux standards de l’OTAN. A contrario, la France, l’Allemagne et l’Italie, notamment, demeurent fidèles aux objectifs initiaux de la guerre, c’est-à-dire de minimiser les pertes territoriales de l’Ukraine et forcer la Russie à négocier un cessez-le-feu le plus favorable que possible à l’Ukraine. Dans les mots du président Macron : « Nous restons concentrés sur notre objectif  : tout faire pour obtenir un cessez-le-feu et aider l’Ukraine à négocier dans les termes que l’Ukraine décidera pour elle-même. » Le chancelier allemand estime lui aussi qu’il est impératif de mettre fin le plus rapidement possible à la guerre. Si les deux camps se rejoignent sur le soutien à l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine et qu’il appartient aux Ukrainiens de déterminer les conditions acceptables d’un règlement négocié, les maximalistes ont intérêt à ce que la guerre se prolonge afin d’infliger des pertes durables à la Russie. Les minimalistes favorisent, pour leur part, un règlement rapide du conflit et un accord de paix qui ne se fasse « ni dans la négation, ni dans l’exclusion de l’un l’autre, ni même dans l’humiliation ». Qu’en est-il du Canada ? Si l’on se fie à la rhétorique en provenance d’Ottawa, il se situe résolument dans le camp des maximalistes. La vice-première ministre Chrystia Freeland est allée jusqu’à appeler au changement de régime à Moscou : « Les démocraties du monde entier, y compris la nôtre, pourront être en sécurité seulement lorsque le tyran russe et ses armées seront vaincus ». Lors de sa visite à Kyiv, le premier ministre Trudeau a également appelé à une victoire de l’Ukraine contre la Russie. Le problème est que, fidèle à ses habitudes, le gouvernement canadien a la verve facile et les gestes plus discrets. Il agit en contradiction avec le conseil prodigué par le président américain Theodore Roosevelt : le Canada parle fort mais tient un petit bâton. Ce paradoxe s’illustre sur le plan des investissements en défense, du déploiement de troupes en Europe et de la fourniture d’armes aux Ukrainiens. Ce fossé entre la rhétorique et le comportement n’est pas nouveau, mais il mine la capacité du Canada d’articuler une politique de défense cohérente. S’il est dans l’intérêt du Canada que l’Ukraine inflige une défaite totale à la Russie, pourquoi ne pas fournir davantage de soutien militaire à l’Ukraine ? Il semble qu’Ottawa préfère une rhétorique grandiloquente à moindre coûts, qui se traduit par une posture internationaliste libérale à rabais. Il serait préférable de s’attarder à mieux circonscrire les contours de la paix souhaitée et de mobiliser toutes les énergies pour l’atteindre. … Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## Le réveil ukrainien : adapter la posture de défense du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-reveil-ukrainien-adapter-la-posture-de-defense-du-canada/ Modified: 2025-05-20 Depuis l’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par la Russie en février 2022, le Canada a progressivement accru son aide militaire au gouvernement ukrainien, mais celle-ci demeure modeste en comparaison de celle fournie par ses principaux alliés occidentaux. Cet article avance deux arguments principaux. D’abord, la contribution limitée d’Ottawa reflète une perception d’une menace indirecte que représenterait la Russie pour ses intérêts nationaux. Le gouvernement canadien tend à cadrer le conflit comme une atteinte à l’ordre international fondé sur des règles plutôt que comme un risque immédiat pour sa propre sécurité. Cette lecture contraste nettement avec celle des États d’Europe de l’Est, pour lesquels la guerre constitue une menace existentielle nécessitant un engagement militaire substantiel. Notre second argument met en lumière une lacune stratégique persistante : le Canada n’a pas anticipé les défis d’une éventuelle transition vers la paix, notamment le rôle que l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et ses membres, dont le Canada, pourraient être appelés à jouer dans la stabilisation post-conflit. Or, la capacité du Canada à contribuer de manière significative à cet effort est limitée par ses ressources militaires actuelles. Il risque ainsi, une fois de plus, d’être pris de court par les exigences liées à la défense de la sécurité européenne face à une Russie résurgente. Cet article propose une série de recommandations afin de remédier aux déficits structurels qui entravent l’adaptation de la posture de défense du Canada. Alors que le pays pourrait être appelé à jouer un rôle accru dans la région euro-atlantique, de nouvelles mesures sont nécessaires pour améliorer sa préparation opérationnelle et renforcer sa posture stratégique. Cela apparaît d’autant plus important dans un contexte de potentiel désengagement américain de l’architecture sécuritaire européenne. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## Le rôle contesté de la Turquie au sein de l’OTAN URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-role-conteste-de-la-turquie-au-sein-de-lotan/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Depuis la chute de l’URSS, le gouvernement turc conteste l’utilité de l’OTAN. En quoi la Turquie agit-elle contre les intérêts de l’OTAN et quels sont ses intérêts stratégiques? Depuis la chute de l’URSS, le gouvernement turc conteste l’utilité de l’OTAN. Cette remise en question s’est manifestée récemment par les prises de décision du gouvernement turc : en se procurant des S-400 russes, en collaborant militairement avec l’Iran et avec la Russie et en rivalisant avec d’autres membres de l’OTAN dans la région méditerranéenne. En quoi la Turquie agit-elle contre les intérêts de l’organisation et quels sont les intérêts stratégiques de la Turquie ? L’acquisition de S-400 russes par la Turquie : plus qu’une transaction militaire Depuis l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014, les tensions militaires s’intensifient entre l’OTAN et la Russie. La dernière doctrine militaire russe, publiée en 2014, qualifie l’OTAN de menace pour la sécurité territoriale de la Russie. Pourtant, en 2019, le gouvernement turc s’est procuré deux systèmes antimissiles russes (S-400). Le Congrès américain avait immédiatement bloqué la livraison d’avions de chasse F35 à l’armée turque. Cette acquisition a grandement compliqué la stratégie de l’OTAN, car ces systèmes dévoilent de l’information militaire au gouvernement russe. Cet achat militaire met en doute les intentions politiques de la Turquie. Traditionnellement, la Turquie était perçue comme la « sentinelle avancée du monde occidental » contre la Russie. Dans le cas d'une offensive russe contre un autre pays de l’OTAN, l’armée turque demeura-t-elle un partenaire fiable ? La Turquie semble obtenir des concessions politiques de la Russie. Une des stratégies russes consiste à jumeler les ventes d’équipements militaires aux négociations politiques afin d’accroître son influence au Moyen-Orient. Les négociations russo-turques semblent suivre cette logique, puisque quelques mois séparent la signature des pourparlers d’Astana (mai 2017) et l’annonce du gouvernement turc d’obtenir des S-400 (septembre 2017).  L’achat des S-400 par l’armée turque a probablement permis d’obtenir des gains politiques notamment dans le conflit syrien. Les pourparlers d’Astana et l’importance de la « question kurde » pour la Turquie Nous pouvons remarquer une constante dans la stratégie militaire turque en Syrie, soit d’empêcher l’émergence d’une région autonome kurde contrôlée par le Parti des travailleurs kurdes (PKK). Cet impératif stratégique explique : Les derniers rapprochements militaires entre la Turquie, l’Iran et la Russie (les pourparlers d’Astana et de Sotchi); Les nombreuses critiques du gouvernement turc envers l’armée américaine pour avoir soutenu les combattants kurdes; Les tentatives d’obtenir de l’assistance militaire et des garanties de l’OTAN. D’un côté, des collaborations turco-russes et turco-iraniennes contre le PKK ont pris racine au tournant du nouveau millénaire. En 1993, 1994 et 1995, l’Iran et la Turquie avaient signé des protocoles de sécurité, exigeant de ne plus soutenir le PKK. En 2000, les premiers ministres russes et turcs avaient aussi conclu des ententes de principes pour faciliter le combat contre les séparatistes en Russie et en Turquie. Les pourparlers d’Astana sont aussi une coordination militaire pour entre autres combattre le PKK en Syrie. De l’autre, durant la guerre d’Irak en 2003, la Turquie avait refusé de joindre la coalition anglo-saxonne sous prétexte que l’intervention faciliterait la création d’un Kurdistan. Pendant le conflit syrien, l’armée américaine entraînait et équipait le YPG, une filiale syrienne du PKK. Ainsi, les rapprochements militaires entre la Turquie, l'Iran et la Russie voulaient contrecarrer les objectifs militaires du gouvernement américain.  Ces rapprochements demeurent problématiques pour l’OTAN, même si le gouvernement américain ne semble plus soutenir le PKK. La Turquie collabore avec deux pays ciblés par des sanctions de l’UE et des États-Unis. Parallèlement, en 2012, en 2015 et en 2020, la Turquie a exigé des réunions d’urgence (selon l’article 4 du traité) au sujet du conflit syrien. Cette approche comporte des contradictions, puisque la Turquie veut obtenir du soutien militaire de l’OTAN, tout en négociant séparément avec l’Iran et la Russie. L’indépendance énergétique turque au centre des tensions en Méditerranée Compte tenu de l’importance stratégique de la région méditerranéenne, la Turquie adopte une stratégie militaire risquée : En menant des exercices militaires rivaux contre la France et la Grèce en Méditerranée; En adoptant une rhétorique agressive envers ces deux pays de l’OTAN; En concurrençant les objectifs stratégiques russes en Libye. En fait, le contrôle de l’est de la Méditerranée et du nord de la Libye s’avère primordial pour la sécurité énergétique du pays. L’économie turque dépend d’un approvisionnement constant en énergie. N’ayant pas les capacités de productions énergétiques suffisantes pour la demande, le gouvernement turc doit importer massivement du gaz naturel et du pétrole russe et iranien. En Libye, la Turquie appuie le gouvernement d’entente nationale (GEN). Ce dernier contrôle Syrte, une ville portière et la majorité des puits pétroliers libyens. Récemment, un gisement gazier en mer méditerranéenne orientale a été découvert par une compagnie turque. Avec la mainmise sur ces deux territoires, le pays pourrait réduire ses importations énergétiques et développer une politique énergétique plus indépendante de la Russie et de l’Iran. L’atteinte de ces objectifs se fait cependant au détriment de la stabilité régionale. La Turquie rivalise avec la Grèce et la France  pour les mêmes zones maritimes. Le gouvernement turc a qualifié ces deux pays d’impérialistes en comparant les interventions actuelles aux conquêtes coloniales.  Sans un apaisement des tensions, la Turquie risque d’entrer en guerre avec deux alliés, en plus d’être marginalisée au sein de l’OTAN. Le gouvernement turc rivalise aussi avec la Russie en Libye. D’un côté, l’armée russe soutient une coalition dirigée par le maréchal Haftar. De l’autre, l’armée turque entraîne des soldats du GEN et des milices libyennes.  Bref, pour sécuriser des zones stratégiques, la Turquie semble prête à sacrifier son implication au sein de l’OTAN et à se montrer inflexible envers les positions grecques, françaises et russes. La crise de la COVID-19 en Turquie : relance économique et politiques agressives Déjà avant la crise, la situation économique du pays était précaire : Les conflits syriens et libyens, le coup d’État raté et l’afflux de réfugiés ont déstabilisé le pays; Depuis 2018, le marché turc est considéré comme spéculatif et à risque selon les indices boursiers; La crise sanitaire a causé un ralentissement économique mondial, accentuant les problèmes économiques et politiques de la Turquie. La diminution importante du tourisme mondial et des exportations a eu un impact significatif sur l’économie turque. Les dernières actions militaires en Méditerranée sont probablement entreprises pour relancer l’économie et pour dévier l’attention sur leurs difficultés internes. Cependant, la Turquie agit à l’encontre de l’article 1 du traité nord-atlantique, puisqu’elle met en danger la stabilité régionale et a recours à la force sans le consentement de l’ONU. Recommandations pour les Forces armées canadiennes La Turquie semble considérer l’OTAN comme étant inadaptée à ses besoins sécuritaires. Le pays développe une politique sécuritaire incluant l’OTAN, la Russie et l’Iran. Elle a participé aux pourparlers d’Astana, a acheté des S400 russes et a continué de collaborer avec l’OTAN. Cette stratégie sécuritaire comporte des risques importants avec la montée des tensions au sein de l’OTAN, envers la Russie et envers l’Iran. Les intentions militaires de la Turquie demeurent ambiguës. Certaines tactiques se retrouvent sous le seuil de la guerre, comme l’entraînement de milices en Libye. Le gouvernement turc se dispute avec la France et avec la Grèce, deux partenaires stratégiques du Canada. Enfin, la Turquie s’associe à des puissances émergentes, l’Iran et la Russie, désirant modifier l’ordre international. La Défense canadienne doit donc agir prudemment : Dans la mesure du possible, il faut concilier les intérêts stratégiques de la Turquie à la vision globale de l’OTAN; Les efforts communs de dissuasion contre les agissements de la Turquie peuvent inciter le pays à collaborer davantage avec la Russie et avec l’Iran; En même temps, le Canada doit exiger un dialogue excluant la menace d’intervention armée; La reprise des discussions entre la Turquie, la Grèce et la France s’avère nécessaire, que ce soit au sein de l’OTAN ou dans un cadre moins formel. ## Le rôle du Canada dans le nouveau paysage nucléaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-role-du-canada-dans-le-nouveau-paysage-nucleaire/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Le Canada est membre du TNP et, grâce à l'utilisation de sa tribune et au développement d'une politique étrangère cohérente en matière de... La conférence d'examen du traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) doit avoir lieu en janvier 2022. Entre sa ratification en 1968 et la fin de la guerre froide, le paysage nucléaire a radicalement changé. Les tensions géopolitiques croissantes de l'ère multipolaire actuelle ont créé un nouveau sentiment d'urgence en matière de désarmement nucléaire. Les défis auxquels la communauté internationale est confrontée étant désormais trop nombreux pour être traités de manière bilatérale, le dialogue multilatéral est appelé à jouer un rôle clé pour faire face aux dangers entourant les armes nucléaires, leur prolifération et leur utilisation potentielle. Des cadres concurrents au TNP ont même vu le jour avec la signature du Traité sur l'interdiction des armes nucléaires (TIAN) en 2017. Le Canada est membre du TNP et, grâce à l'utilisation de sa tribune et au développement d'une politique étrangère cohérente en matière de lutte contre la prolifération et de réduction du risque nucléaire, il pourrait jouer un rôle clé dans la construction d'un monde plus sécuritaire. Cette note stratégique est divisée en quatre sections. Premièrement, elle établit le cadre juridique actuel du TNP et souligne ses principales faiblesses. Deuxièmement, elle évalue les deux facteurs sous-jacents qui rendent nécessaire une action plus concertée en matière de prolifération et de réduction des armements. Troisièmement, elle définit les trois risques qui composent le paysage nucléaire moderne. Quatrièmement, elle fournit au gouvernement du Canada des recommandations sur la manière de réviser modérément son rôle et de tracer une nouvelle voie plus prudente en ce qui concerne les armes nucléaires. Le cadre juridique du traité de non-prolifération nucléaire Conceptualisé pendant la guerre froide, le TNP est la pierre angulaire du régime de non-prolifération. Il regroupe 191 États et repose sur trois piliers. Ces piliers font référence à la non-prolifération en soi, au droit de toutes les parties de développer la recherche, la production et l'utilisation de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques et, enfin, aux procédures de désarmement. Celles-ci exigent que toutes les parties s’engagent : « à poursuivre de bonne foi des négociations sur des mesures efficaces relatives à la cessation de la course aux armements nucléaires à une date rapprochée et au désarmement nucléaire ». Si le TNP a relativement bien réussi à réglementer la non-prolifération pendant des décennies, les changements qui ont transformé le système international après la fin du monde bipolaire ont généré des questions et des défis fondamentaux quant à son efficacité. L'intensification des interconnexions entre les États signifie que, à bien des égards, ce traité datant de la guerre froide est désormais incapable de faire face au paysage actuel. En ce qui concerne la non-prolifération, l'octroi d'un monopole intemporel aux États adhérents possédant déjà des armes a amené de nombreuses personnes à qualifier le TNP de « grand bargain ».  Et même si la plupart des États l'ont ratifié, la portée de ses dispositions est mise à mal par les fondements mêmes du droit international, à savoir le principe de souveraineté des États. Comme un traité ne peut pas créer d'obligations pour des États tiers, des États comme l'Inde, le Pakistan ou même Israël n'ont jamais été soumis aux limites imposées par le TNP, même s'ils sont aujourd'hui tous des puissances nucléaires publiques ou secrètes. Ceci illustre bien les limites du traité en matière de non-prolifération. Même s'il a fourni un cadre pour les pratiques des États en matière d'armes nucléaires, son inapplicabilité aux États non membres et son manque de légitimité morale concernant l'octroi de monopoles ont de graves conséquences. En ce qui a trait à la recherche pacifique, même si celle-ci est tout à fait légitime, elle a conduit à une plus grande diffusion des matières et des technologies nucléaires au sein du système international. Ainsi, dès 2007, une quarantaine d'États ont été identifiés comme « possédant suffisamment de matière fissile pour produire une bombe ». Bien que les activités de recherche pacifique ne doivent pas être interdites, elles complexifient néanmoins le calcul de la menace nucléaire aujourd'hui, alors que nous observons une augmentation du nombre d'États utilisant l'énergie nucléaire dans le cadre de leurs efforts en matière d'énergie « propre ». S'il est vrai que l'énergie nucléaire est une énergie performante et qu'elle peut être au cœur du programme de transition énergétique, il est toujours pertinent d'évaluer la diffusion de la technologie nucléaire à travers le prisme des politiques de sécurité et de désarmement. Si l'énergie nucléaire n’est pas intrinsèquement mauvaise, il n’en demeure pas moins que la diffusion de la technologie nucléaire s’est avérée trop diffuse pour être efficacement supervisée, comme cela était prévu à l'origine. Enfin, c'est en matière de désarmement que le TNP semble le plus obsolète. En effet, même si la dissémination des armes nucléaires a été contrôlée horizontalement, la prolifération verticale a atteint un sommet bien au-delà des prévisions. En ce sens, le TNP fait davantage référence à une obligation de moyens qu'à une obligation de résultat et est particulièrement peu spécifique en ce qui concerne les obligations de désarmement. Ceci est différent des traités couvrant d'autres armes de destruction massive (ADM), comme ceux sur les armes chimiques ou biologiques. S'il est clair que le TNP a eu un impact significatif sur le contrôle de la prolifération nucléaire, la dynamique actuelle reflète une déconnexion importante entre le contexte entourant sa conceptualisation et l'état actuel des relations de pouvoir dans le système international. Même si le TIAN est récemment entré en vigueur, il ne fait guère de doute que les puissances nucléaires et les pays qui bénéficient d'un parapluie nucléaire ne le ratifieront pas. Les Pays-Bas en sont la preuve, puisque même face à une opinion publique fortement favorable à l'adhésion au traité, la pression internationale l'a emporté sur les préoccupations intérieures et les a tenus à l'écart du traité. Ce que le cadre actuel démontre, c'est que l'autosurveillance n'est sans doute pas le meilleur moyen de parvenir au désarmement ni d'arrêter les programmes d'armement en matière d'ADM, car ce sont les États qui ont le plus besoin d'être surveillés qui fixent les paramètres, desquels d’ailleurs ils ne cessent de se soustraire. À une échelle plus « micro », les traités bilatéraux ne parviennent pas à suivre la dynamique actuelle du système international en matière de désarmement. Il existe aujourd'hui de multiples dyades nucléaires (États-Unis-Russie, États-Unis-Chine, États-Unis-République populaire de Corée, Inde-Pakistan, Inde-Chine, et potentiellement d'autres), et les liens entre elles sont plus nombreux que jamais. Par conséquent, les restrictions sur les armements par le biais d'accords bilatéraux sont difficiles à maintenir, car les pays peuvent les considérer comme une autodépréciation de leurs capacités militaires face à d'autres concurrents. C'est ce que montre le récent retrait des États-Unis du traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (FNI), en réaction à la modernisation militaire de la Chine, exempte de traités. Même s'ils restent utiles pour la mise en œuvre de politiques concrètes de désarmement, les traités bilatéraux ne peuvent constituer à eux seuls la solution au désarmement nucléaire. À la lumière de cet aperçu de la structure juridique, il est juste de dire que le cadre actuel du droit international est devenu inefficace et que le désarmement nucléaire reste un défi moderne. Il a besoin d'être renouvelé. Les facteurs sous-jacents Même dans le cadre juridique international actuel qui encadre la possession et le développement d'armes nucléaires, il existe des facteurs sous-jacents importants. Bien qu'aucun de ces risques ne soit nouveau, il est important de les prendre en compte avant de passer en revue le paysage nucléaire moderne. Les dernières frappes nucléaires ont eu lieu en 1945, il y a plus de 75 ans. Pourtant, la menace que représente une guerre nucléaire pour la survie de l'humanité demeure aussi grande qu’au cours de la guerre froide : en 2021, le Forum économique mondial classe encore l'utilisation d'armes de destruction massive comme le troisième risque avec le plus d’impact et la plus grande menace existentielle. Dans le contexte de rivaux nucléaires belliqueux qui se défient les uns les autres en cette nouvelle ère de compétition entre grandes puissances, le niveau de risque actuel est croissant, comme le fait valoir l'UNIDIR dans son rapport de 2020. Il existe deux facteurs sous-jacents : l'omniprésence des biais de perception dans le système international et le pouvoir destructeur des armes nucléaires modernes. Associés à la dangerosité du paysage moderne, ils alimentent le décalage qui existe entre les positions des États nucléaires et la menace réelle qu'ils représentent. La possession d'armes nucléaires rend nécessaire le développement de doctrines pour dissuader efficacement les agressions de rivaux. Pourtant, ces rivalités alimentent un scepticisme mutuel, qui est aggravé par les biais de perception inhérents au système international. Comme le système est « multilatéral et interactif » et que « la notion de dyades de dissuasion distinctes n'est peut-être plus un cadre utile », le danger de perceptions erronées, c'est-à-dire d'une mauvaise interprétation des signaux envoyés par un autre État, ne doit pas être sous-estimé. Le fondement du système international est que « bon nombre des moyens par lesquels un État tente d'accroître sa sécurité diminuent la sécurité des autres », ce qui renvoie au dilemme de sécurité. Cependant, comme les États perçoivent à travers le « processus actif de construction de la réalité », leur perception peut être déviée par des communications erronées, des signaux contradictoires, des informations incomplètes et des biais d’interprétation. Par exemple, Charles A. Duelfer et Stephen Benedict Dyson ont fait valoir de manière convaincante les erreurs de perception étaient au cœur des conflits entre les États-Unis et l'Irak. En effet, les organisations militaires professionnelles ont tendance à être influencées dans leur comportement par des tendances organisationnelles qui, bien souvent, résultent en un échec de dissuasion. Comme elle joue un rôle dans les conflits conventionnels, la perception erronée pourrait également être à l'origine de tout conflit nucléaire et de toute dynamique de dissuasion, car un événement aussi simple qu'une déclaration mal interprétée, rendue de plus en plus probable par l'erreur humaine et l'interconnexion croissante des dyades de dissuasion nucléaire, pourrait déclencher les arsenaux. Il s'agit d'une caractéristique des relations entre la Chine et les États-Unis, la concurrence autour d'intérêts fondamentaux étant aggravée par des dilemmes de statut. Cela est particulièrement important puisque des études ont constaté que « les attitudes du public sur l'opportunité d'utiliser des armes nucléaires sont largement motivées par des considérations conséquentialistes d'utilité militaire », car « la volonté d'utiliser des armes nucléaires augmente considérablement lorsque les armes nucléaires offrent des avantages par rapport aux armes conventionnelles pour détruire des cibles critiques ». Le TNP ayant été fondé à l'origine sur la doctrine de la dissuasion élargie, les doutes de leurs alliés par rapport aux engagements de sécurité des États-Unis, s’ils ne renforcent pas leurs engagements, pourraient signifier que davantage d'États pourraient chercher à proliférer pour garantir leur sécurité. Ainsi, le biais de perception entre les puissances et ses probabilités croissantes d'impact rendent le paysage actuel, en raison de sa dynamique volatile et multilatérale, préoccupant. Le potentiel destructeur des armes de destruction massive a été ancré dans la conscience mondiale par l'image des champignons atomiques d'Hiroshima et de Nagasaki et des centaines de milliers de morts. Avec les avancées technologiques qui ont eu lieu depuis et le développement des bombes thermonucléaires, il est désormais plausible qu'une seule bombe puisse entraîner la mort de millions de personnes. Alors que les bombes qui ont été larguées sur Hiroshima et Nagasaki avaient une puissance respectivement de 15 kilotonnes et 20 kilotonnes de dynamite, les armes thermonucléaires modernes ont maintenant l'équivalent d'au moins 100 kilotonnes de dynamite ou plus. L'utilisation de moins de 1% des 13 125 ogives estimées actuellement pourrait même perturber le climat mondial. En tant que tel, le pouvoir destructeur croissant des armes nucléaires depuis leur invention constitue, à lui seul, une menace existentielle. Ces deux facteurs exposent ce qui devrait être considéré comme une « déconnexion » entre la façon dont les États dotés d'armes nucléaires traitent leur arsenal et la menace réelle qu'ils représentent. En effet, la façon dont les pays et les acteurs envisagent et calculent les risques réels liés aux armes nucléaires repose sur l'intuition et les données erronées qui proviennent du fait que ces armes n'ont été utilisées qu'à une époque où elles étaient beaucoup moins destructrices qu'aujourd'hui. L'utilisation sous-stratégique des armes nucléaires dans des engagements limités a été directement suggérée par les États-Unis dans leur Nuclear Posture Review de 2018, qui a souligné le rôle du potentiel de guerre nucléaire limitée pour la dissuasion et les théâtres d'engagement régionaux. Certes, les doctrines de l'époque de la guerre froide évoquaient cette possibilité, mais cela revient à négliger ce qui était depuis 1985 un principe directeur de la politique nucléaire des États-Unis et de la Russie : l'accord Reagan-Gorbatchev selon lequel une « guerre nucléaire ne peut être gagnée et ne doit jamais être menée ». Les risques que représentent les armes nucléaires sont catastrophiques, et le potentiel de conflits nucléaires, même limités, est important. L'examen du TNP devrait donc être considéré par le Canada non seulement comme une occasion de s'engager dans ce débat, mais aussi comme un moyen d'assurer sa propre sécurité à long terme grâce à l’entremise de traités multilatéraux de réduction des armements des grandes puissances. Le paysage nucléaire moderne Le paysage nucléaire actuel doit également être perçu comme une source d'inquiétude. Aujourd'hui encore, les chefs d'États et de gouvernements sont très peu incités à mettre en œuvre des politiques visant à abandonner leurs arsenaux nucléaires. Bien que leurs arsenaux respectifs aient généralement diminué depuis l'entrée en vigueur du TNP, les armes nucléaires constituent toujours un risque actuel pour la communauté internationale. Il y a actuellement neuf États qui possèdent des armes nucléaires : La Chine, les États-Unis, la Russie, la France, le Royaume-Uni, la Corée du Nord, Israël, l'Inde et le Pakistan. Seuls les cinq premiers sont soumis aux dispositions du TNP. Nonobstant le petit nombre d'États dotés d'armes nucléaires, tout argument qui réduit la menace nucléaire à une question dépassée doit être systématiquement rejeté pour plusieurs raisons. La première tient au fait que certains États se trouvent sur ce que l'on appelle le « seuil nucléaire ». Ces États, qui possèdent la capacité de développer des armes nucléaires si nécessaire, représentent un risque de prolifération important dans le paysage nucléaire actuel. Tous ces États ne représentent pas une menace : les recherches suggèrent que les États qui poursuivent une libéralisation économique sont plus susceptibles d'adopter la modération et la latence que « leurs homologues repliés sur eux-mêmes, nationalistes et radicaux confessionnels ». C'est lorsqu'un tel État du seuil adopte une position hostile à l'égard de ses voisins ou rivaux que la faiblesse actuelle du régime de non-prolifération est mise en évidence. L'État du seuil le plus important et le plus préoccupant est l'Iran. Malgré les pressions et les sanctions internationales, ainsi que l'accord de 2015, on estime qu'en septembre 2021, l'Iran était à un mois de posséder suffisamment d'uranium enrichi pour fabriquer une ogive nucléaire. Comme les dirigeants iraniens ne veulent pas ou hésitent à revenir à la table des négociations avec les États-Unis, cette situation intenable remet en cause la puissance des mécanismes de non-prolifération actuellement en place et ouvre la porte à d'autres crises. De plus, comme Israël perçoit cela comme une menace existentielle, il prévient aussi ouvertement qu'il n'hésitera pas à frapper. Pour fonctionner, le TNP a besoin que tous les participants agissent de bonne foi et soient fiables. Le manque de fiabilité des États-Unis, dû à l'évolution de leur politique intérieure et aux objectifs concurrents des administrations démocrates et républicaines en matière de politique étrangère, a rendu les accords conclus dans le cadre actuel beaucoup plus laborieux. Un autre point clé est la modernisation de l'armement nucléaire. Même si le nombre global d'ogives nucléaires est en baisse, cela est principalement dû à la campagne de démantèlement des ogives retirées du service par la Russie et les États-Unis. Néanmoins, chaque pays qui possède des armes nucléaires procède actuellement à une modernisation de son inventaire. À cet égard, le cas de la Chine est le plus préoccupant. Depuis son premier essai nucléaire en 1964, la Chine a maintenu une doctrine de dissuasion minimale, qui ne vise qu'une capacité crédible de deuxième frappe. Cependant, les récents développements concernant les capacités nucléaires de la Chine soulèvent de nombreuses questions quant à son engagement envers cette doctrine. Elle a actuellement environ 250 silos en construction à Yuman et Hami, ce qui constitue l'expansion la plus importante de l'arsenal nucléaire chinois à ce jour. La Chine n'est pas non plus le seul pays à suivre cette voie spécifique : les États-Unis et la Russie modernisent simultanément leurs ogives nucléaires, leurs systèmes de lancement de missiles et d'avions, ainsi que leurs installations de production d'armes nucléaires. De surcroit, les récents développements technologiques dans le domaine des missiles hypersoniques ne semblent qu’avoir exacerbé cette dynamique. Dans un contexte d’une intensification de la rivalité entre grandes puissances, le manque de confiance entre les acteurs semble encourager un réinvestissement actif dans les armes nucléaires, ce qui remet en cause le TNP et le rend de plus en plus obsolète et difficile à faire respecter. Enfin, une troisième raison est la dépendance accrue des États à l'égard de l'armement à propulsion nucléaire. Le nouveau partenariat trilatéral AUKUS entre l'Australie, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis est l'exemple le plus récent de ce phénomène. Le premier projet du partenariat sera de « livrer une flotte de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire à l'Australie ». Ce nouveau développement et la normalisation associée de la possession de matériel nucléaire en dehors du système d'inspection de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) remettent en cause le régime de non-prolifération en introduisant une faille que d'autres États pourraient exploiter. Si la technologie et le matériel nucléaires se répandent à l'échelle mondiale et font partie des arsenaux conventionnels de la plupart des États, cela pourrait faire entrer une quantité croissante d'uranium enrichi dans le paysage actuel sans aucune garantie internationale. Si toutes ces questions rendent le calcul nucléaire actuel considérablement plus complexe, le fait que les lacunes du TNP soient exacerbées par la dynamique nucléaire sous-jacente du système international joue inévitablement un rôle dans l'émergence de ces nouvelles questions. Recadrer le rôle et les intérêts du Canada En tant que membre de l'OTAN, le Canada est depuis longtemps impliqué dans le discours nucléaire international. Il a toutefois maintenu une position ambiguë : s'il ne cherche pas à posséder ses propres armes et soutient en principe leur élimination, il est favorable à la possession continue d'ADM par ses alliés et compte sur eux pour assurer sa sécurité à travers l'OTAN et le NORAD. En particulier, l'évolution de la situation au sein de l'OTAN sur cette question pourrait être imminente. Une adhésion comme observateurs au TIAN par la Norvège et l’Allemagne pourrait avoir des impacts significatifs sur la cohésion de l’alliance. Alors que la dissuasion nucléaire redevient un outil stratégique courant et que « la diplomatie du contrôle des armements est en plein essoufflement », le Canada a l'occasion de revoir sa stratégie avec modération et de définir une nouvelle politique étrangère prudente, mais proactive en matière d'armes nucléaires. Celle-ci devrait protéger ses intérêts et ses objectifs stratégiques en maintenant une ambiguïté nécessaire, mais en favorisant également une plus grande sécurité au sein du système international. Nous proposons que le Canada aborde la conférence d'examen du TNP comme un point d'inflexion et comme une occasion de recadrer modérément sa position nucléaire contradictoire. L'interrelation des deux facteurs sous-jacents susmentionnés avec le paysage nucléaire moderne rend le danger d'une prolifération accrue et les risques associés trop importants pour être simplement ignorés. Les instabilités à venir au sein de l'OTAN en matière de dissuasion nucléaire signifient également que l'actuelle stratégie canadienne de maintien du statu quo ne suffira pas totalement. Puisque la modernisation nucléaire rend le principe de la « dissuasion par punition » plus coûteux et que le débat en cours est sur l’adoption d’une posture de « dissuasion par déni, » il semble clair que le risque d’une augmentation de la vitesse de la course à l’armement et à l’innovation technologique chez les grandes puissances n’est pas minime. Le gouvernement canadien devrait s'engager dans une campagne sur le désarmement nucléaire multilatéral afin de tenter de prévenir toute nouvelle prolifération et de gérer les risques croissants. Nous suggérons trois façons pour le gouvernement canadien de le faire. 1. Promouvoir la réduction des armes nucléaires et un désarmement progressif Il existe actuellement un manque de confiance entre les États non dotés d'armes nucléaires et les États dotés d'armes nucléaires parties au TNP, notamment en ce qui concerne l'engagement en matière de désarmement. Bien que le nombre d'États possédant ces armes ne représente que 3% des membres du TNP, les préoccupations des États non-détenteurs de l’arme nucléaire n'ont pas encore été entendues. Même si les sondages montrent qu'une forte majorité de Canadiens aimerait voir le Canada adhérer au TIAN, le Canada s'exposerait sans doute à des répercussions de la part de ses alliés en agissant ainsi, ce qui limite considérablement sa marge de manœuvre. Cependant, comme le Canada est déjà membre du TNP, il pourrait profiter de son appartenance à cette plateforme déjà existante. Dans le cadre de la prochaine conférence d'examen, le Canada doit jouer un rôle de facilitateur. Comme le Canada ne peut pas durcir spontanément sa position sur l'armement nucléaire, il devrait au moins chercher à promouvoir un dialogue transparent entre les États détenteurs de l’arme nucléaire membre du TNP (P5) et les États non-détenteurs de l’arme nucléaire. Les accords bilatéraux étant plus facilement abandonnés, les accords multilatéraux devraient être la nouvelle voie à suivre. Pour éviter une guerre nucléaire, il faut que le contrôle des armements accompagne la dissuasion. Le Canada pourrait plaider pour le renouvellement des politiques de contrôle des armements. En pratique, cela impliquerait pour le Canada de s'opposer à l'extension du stockage des armes nucléaires au sein de l'OTAN au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour maintenir ses capacités de dissuasion actuelles dans le cas où l'Allemagne se retirerait du partage nucléaire. Cela impliquerait aussi de soutenir la négociation et la mise en œuvre de nouveaux traités visant à limiter la portée et le potentiel destructeur des technologies des armes nucléaires, et de promouvoir des sanctions contre tout pays qui abandonnerait ces nouveaux traités. 2. Combler les lacunes et rétablir la confiance dans le TNP Le cadre du TNP est devenu, à certains égards, obsolète et mal adapté aux défis croissants auxquels il doit faire face. Lors de la prochaine conférence d'examen, le Canada devrait plaider en faveur de l'introduction de nouvelles garanties et d'un contrôle de supervision de la possession de matières nucléaires dans le cadre de l'arsenal conventionnel des États. Ramener le TNP sous le système d'inspection de l'AIEA pourrait être une mesure positive pour empêcher l'établissement d'un nouveau précédent préjudiciable, pour rendre impossible aux « proliférateurs potentiels d'utiliser les programmes de réacteurs navals comme couverture pour le développement d'armes nucléaires ». Il est possible que le Canada doive lui-même acquérir des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire pour remplacer ses navires vieillissants de la classe Victoria considérant que le maintien des capacités opérationnelles de sa marine est l'un des objectifs de la Défense nationale canadienne. Ainsi, la promotion de cette nouvelle mesure pourrait être une preuve de bonne foi préventive qui renforcerait considérablement sa crédibilité s'il devait s'engager dans cette voie, même s'il n'y a aucune chance qu'il se dote de l’arme nucléaire. Bien sûr, si le Canada décide d’acquérir des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire, l'impact serait limité, mais il est essentiel de combler la lacune en matière de supervision pour rétablir la confiance dans le TNP. L'importance croissante de l'énergie nucléaire dans les plans de transition de nombreux pays vers une économie à faibles émissions pourrait être un phénomène positif. Cependant, le renforcement de la surveillance des programmes énergétiques pacifiques pourrait également réduire la méfiance et éviter que des États voyous n'utilisent ces programmes pour des motifs secrets. Enfin, il faudrait sérieusement envisager de dynamiser le TNP en introduisant des mécanismes d'application pour pénaliser les États qui ne respectent pas ses dispositions ou qui s'en retirent. La faiblesse du régime actuel est en partie exacerbée par les revirements politiques des principaux acteurs, car il compte sur eux pour lancer des initiatives et des mesures de non-prolifération. La systématisation des sanctions et des conséquences pourrait être un moyen de faire face à cette évolution préoccupante. 3. Renforcer les normes existantes de non-utilisation et d'absence d'essais nucléaires Nina Tannenwald a fait valoir que, depuis 1945, la norme de non-utilisation des armes nucléaires a été « le phénomène le plus important de l'ère nucléaire ». Cette norme « a stigmatisé les armes nucléaires comme des armes inacceptables de destruction massive ». Bien qu'elle ait été respectée jusqu'à présent, le fait qu'il s'agisse d'un principe normatif signifie qu'elle pourrait également être brisée puisqu'elle ne dispose, en soi, d'aucun mécanisme d'application et que l'aversion envers les armes nucléaires est relative au sein de la population. Le principe Reagan-Gorbatchev, même s'il date de l'époque de la guerre froide, devrait être renouvelé et promu par le Canada. Certaines dyades, comme les États-Unis et la Russie, s'y sont récemment réengagées. Encourager les autres États à les suivre serait une étape importante. Empêcher les États d'envisager sérieusement des stratégies de première utilisation et un engagement limité est une autre étape nécessaire pour renforcer cette norme. En outre, la norme de l’interdiction d’essai nucléaire devrait également être renforcée, car elle « signifie la reconnaissance des dangers associés à l'utilisation ». En pratique, cela signifie que le Canada devrait utiliser son influence et sa tribune pour promouvoir l'engagement de toutes les puissances nucléaires sur ces questions, et leur réengagement envers ces deux normes. ## Le soutien militaire à l’Ukraine. Une cohérence nécessaire autour de trois dimensions : discours, dons en matériel et production industrielle URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-soutien-militaire-a-lukraine-une-coherence-necessaire-autour-de-trois-dimensions-discours-dons-en-materiel-et-production-industrielle/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Les oppositions occidentales à l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie ont indéniablement entraîné des conséquences sur les dynamiques diplomatiques, militaires et économiques interétatiques. Parmi elles, figure le développement de réflexions multiples parmi les alliés autour des moyens militaires à consacrer à la résistance ukrainienne. Les oppositions occidentales à l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie ont indéniablement entraîné des conséquences sur les dynamiques diplomatiques, militaires et économiques interétatiques. Parmi elles, figure le développement de réflexions multiples parmi les alliés autour des moyens militaires à consacrer à la résistance ukrainienne. Face à cette nouvelle composante géopolitique se dégage une tendance de certains gouvernements à connaître d’importantes difficultés à se positionner vis-à-vis de la Russie. Si certains États se démarquent par un fort plaidoyer en faveur de la cause ukrainienne, d’autres révèlent leurs réticences politiques en raison de la crainte d’être perçu comme « cobelligérant », et par extension de contribuer à une supposée « escalade » avec Moscou. Les États désireux de soutenir la victoire de l'Ukraine se trouvent aussi parfois confrontés à leurs propres limites matérielles pour leur permettre d’atteindre leurs objectifs. Le Canada s’est illustré en fervent défenseur de la cause ukrainienne pour avoir immédiatement condamné l’invasion russe. Sans détour, le gouvernement a aussi déclaré souhaiter le rétablissement total de l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine. Campant sur une position forte dans son discours, Ottawa est cependant loin de l’être dans le domaine des dons en matériel. Il en va de même dans celui de l’augmentation de sa production industrielle, sans même parler de son manque de volonté relatif à l’objectif au sein de l’OTAN des 2 % du PIB consacré à la défense. Entre le 24 janvier 2022 et le 31 juillet 2023,  Ottawa n’était que le douzième contributeur ayant donné le plus d’armes lourdes à l’Ukraine derrière la France et le Royaume-Uni – avec 0,3 milliard de dollars engagés – et le quatorzième rang en prenant en compte la part de ses stocks nationaux d’armes lourdes engagées en Ukraine (avec 6% de son propre stock militaire livré à Kyiv). S’il est vrai que l’aide canadienne se classe au cinquième rang des pays donateurs, ce soutien s’est davantage exprimé sous forme de prêts que par l’envoi d’équipement létal, alors que c’est précisément ce dernier que le président ukrainien demande pour poursuivre son objectif militaire. La récente visite du président Zelensky au Parlement canadien a sans doute constitué une opportunité pour Justin Trudeau d’afficher sa volonté de redresser le tir. À cette occasion, le premier ministre du Canada y a annoncé l’envoi de 50 véhicules blindés supplémentaires à l’Ukraine, ainsi que le don d’une enveloppe de 650 millions de dollars canadiens destinée à l’aide militaire. Le rééquilibrage de l’aide canadienne doit aussi nous rappeler que des critiques – telles que formulées à Ottawa – peuvent être adressées à d’autres gouvernements et États de la communauté transatlantique. L’objectif de cette note est de mettre en exergue le niveau d’engagement de deux États, parmi les plus proches alliés du Canada, à savoir le Royaume-Uni et la France, ces deux pays s’étant en outre distingués à plusieurs reprises depuis le lancement de l’invasion. Depuis février 2022, la France a affiché un discours évolutif avec une tendance de plus en plus prononcée en faveur d’un soutien clair de la victoire de l’Ukraine. Ses balbutiements des débuts, principalement par risque de « froisser » Moscou, ont pour autant eu un coût réputationnel et politique important. Pour redresser le tir et revaloriser son capital diplomatique, Paris est devenu en 2023 le premier pays à envoyer à Kyiv des chars d’assaut d’origine occidentale. Un cap supplémentaire a également été franchi par l’annonce de la formation de pilotes ukrainiens, levant ainsi un tabou supplémentaire. Par ailleurs, pour tenir ses engagements militaires et anticiper l’avenir, le pouvoir français a exigé l’intensification de sa production industrielle pour garder à niveau ses stocks.   De son côté, le Royaume-Uni est rapidement apparu comme un partenaire fiable de l’Ukraine. Les discours politiques de ses représentants successifs ont fait état d’une cohérence irréprochable, tandis que ses investissements militaires ont suivi la même conduite. Londres apparait ainsi comme l’un des « chefs de file » européens, notamment pour avoir fait preuve de réactivité aux premiers jours du conflit. Ses dons matériels étaient en adéquation avec les besoins ukrainiens sur le terrain, comme en témoignent la fréquence et la qualité de ses livraisons, quitte à mettre ses stocks en difficulté. Le Royaume-Uni n’a en revanche pas su anticiper la question de ses stocks en manquant d’augmenter ses commandes et sa production industrielle. Tardivement, mais sûrement, Londres a souhaité redresser le tir en s’inspirant de son allié européen. La récente mise à jour du Defence Command Paper met finalement la lumière sur la nécessité de traiter la question du renouvellement de ses stocks militaires. Le nécessaire recalibrage du discours politique français pour corriger son ambiguïté initiale Du côté de l’Hexagone, l’analyse des variations du discours politique de ces dix-neuf derniers mois permet de dégager une idée globale de l’évolution du positionnement français. Les déclarations successives de l’exécutif français montrent clairement une tendance à l’augmentation du niveau de soutien à accorder à l’Ukraine. En se concentrant uniquement sur les déclarations publiques, la France a affiché – au fil du temps, et par « paliers » – le souhait de plus en plus fort d’une victoire claire de l’Ukraine. Trois paliers ont alors été identifiés : le premier (février 2022) s’apparente à un « soutien minimal » qui opère une distinction nette entre l’agresseur et l’agressé, et qui accorde un soutien dénué d’objectif clair à l’Ukraine. Au second « palier » (mai 2022), Paris adopte une dialectique confuse consistant à refuser la victoire de la Russie, sans pour autant encourager explicitement la victoire de son ennemi. Le troisième (février 2023) se caractérise par une plus grande cohérence de la France puisqu’elle soutient à la fois la défaite de la Russie et la victoire de l’Ukraine. Après un dernier « palier » franchi (mai 2023), le président français présente la Russie non plus comme simple agresseur de l’Ukraine, mais bien comme une menace globale à la paix et à la sécurité européenne. Une analyse plus segmentée de cette évolution montre toutefois que le positionnement de la France s’est aussi caractérisé par une ambiguïté omniprésente à chaque palier franchi, bien qu’elle ait eu tendance à se résorber par la suite. Cette ambiguïté s’est exprimée par le fait que le soutien français a régulièrement été parasité par une série de maladresses dommageables sur le plan diplomatique. Les bavures diplomatiques françaises ont régulièrement été alimentées par les apparitions publiques du Président français, notamment lorsqu’il a adopté l’argumentaire du danger de l’« humiliation » ou de l’« écrasement » de la Russie.   Un soutien français « minimal » accordé à l’Ukraine pendant les deux premiers mois du conflit en Ukraine   Au lendemain de l’invasion russe, le président français s’était dans un premier temps contenté d’accorder un soutien « minimal » à son homologue ukrainien. Ce premier « palier » s’est reflété dans son allocution du 24 février 2022, au cours de laquelle il a immédiatement établi que la « France se tient du côté de l’Ukraine ». À cette occasion, il a opéré une claire distinction entre l’agresseur et l’agressé, spécifiant qu’il serait nécessaire d’aider militairement et politiquement l’Ukraine. Pour autant, dans ses déclarations publiques immédiates, le pouvoir politique français n’a pas souhaité clairement employer les termes de « victoire » ou de « défaite » concernant l’un ou l’autre des belligérants.   La France ne soutient ni la victoire de l’Ukraine ni celle de la Russie, mais elle souhaite lui éviter l’« humiliation »  Plus de deux mois plus tard, à l’occasion de son discours devant le Parlement européen, Emmanuel Macron a passé un deuxième « palier » en statuant que la Russie ne devrait pas l’emporter. Il a également précisé que la France œuvrerait pour la préservation de l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine, sans pour autant prendre la responsabilité de délimiter et de définir lesdites frontières. Puis, il a aussi nuancé son propos en invitant à « ne jamais céder à la tentation ni de l'humiliation ni de l'esprit de revanche ». En lien avec cela, Emmanuel Macron n’a pas hésité à faire le parallèle avec le traité de Versailles qui en 1919 avait « ravagé les chemins de la paix » (une analogie historique fallacieuse qui a pourtant été depuis déconstruite par les historiens). Cette référence à la notion d’humiliation a été réitérée, un mois plus tard, dans un entretien à la dépêche du Midi : « Il ne faut pas humilier la Russie pour que, le jour où les combats cesseront, nous puissions bâtir un chemin de sortie par les voies diplomatiques ». Premièrement, Paris a ici certainement tenu à se préserver du « risque de cobelligérance » – ou du moins de celui de l’ « escalade » – alors même que cette première n’est ni définie dans le droit, ni dans les faits. Deuxièmement, la formule d’« humiliation » auquel fait référence le président est en réalité une reprise d’un récit de propagande et de stratégie russe qui consiste à définir subjectivement ce qui les « humilie » pour avoir un droit de regard sur les actions occidentales. La dialectique croyant pouvoir concilier la préservation de l’intégrité ukrainienne à la non-humiliation de la Russie (aussi subjective soit-elle) a ainsi rapidement été fustigée par Kyiv, ce qui n’a pas manqué de déclencher une vague de critiques et d’incompréhension au sein du pouvoir ukrainien. La France souhaite désormais la défaite de la Russie et la victoire de l’Ukraine, mais elle rejette l’« écrasement » de la Russie Près d’un an après le début du conflit, la France a passé son troisième « palier » en exprimant clairement son soutien à la « victoire » de l’Ukraine. Le président français l’a explicitement formulé, le 9 février 2023, en présence de son homologue ukrainien : « Nous nous tenons aux côtés de l’Ukraine, fermement, et avec la détermination de l’accompagner vers la victoire et le rétablissement de ses droits légitimes » et « La Russie ne peut, ni ne doit l’emporter ». Comme ce fut le cas au palier précédent, ce discours a une fois encore été nuancé par le refus de l’« écrasement » de la Russie lors d’un entretien tenu le 18 février 2023 (« l'écrasement de la Russie n'a jamais été la position de la France et ne le sera jamais » selon E. Macron). Ce troisième « palier » s’est donc exprimé par la volonté d’une victoire claire de l’Ukraine, mais d’un refus de l’écrasement de Moscou.   La France identifie désormais la Russie comme « ennemi commun » et abandonne le récit stratégique russe de l’« humiliation » Le positionnement français s’est durci par le franchissement d’un dernier « palier ». Le Sommet GLOBSEC à Bratislava (21 mai 2023) a d’abord été l’occasion pour Emmanuel Macron de reconnaître avoir « manqué de cohérence » dans son approche (comprendre : dans son positionnement face à la guerre), à l’échelle nationale comme à l’échelle européenne. Au cours de ce discours, la reformulation du positionnement stratégique de l’Hexagone a été radicale. Bien loin de son rôle révolu de « médiateur » et de son discours d’autrefois visant à ne surtout pas risquer de froisser Moscou (lexique de l’« humiliation », de l’« écrasement »), Emmanuel Macron a changé le ton en décrivant les « tentatives de la Russie pour bousculer tout l’édifice de sécurité européenne et remodeler selon ses termes celui-ci ». La Russie n’apparaît alors non seulement plus comme l’agresseur de l’Ukraine, mais bien comme une menace à l’ensemble de l’architecture de sécurité européenne. Dans la même lancée, la France a ouvertement cherché à convaincre l’Iran – soit l’un des plus importants alliés de Moscou – à mettre fin à son soutien à la Russie, et a même tenté de rallier les pays du Sud à son soutien à l’Ukraine.     L’évolution des choix de livraisons d’armement est aussi représentative de l’évolution du discours français La posture française s’est aussi exprimée dans la dimension militaire de son soutien à l’Ukraine, c’est-à-dire par l’évolution de ses choix de livraisons d’armement. L’évolution des engagements militaires français a globalement suivi la même logique que celle de son discours politique, puisque les dons miliaires se sont progressivement intensifiés par « paliers ». Pour autant, le franchissement de ces « paliers » est souvent apparu insuffisant et déconnecté des besoins ukrainiens pour repousser l’armée russe. D’un point de vue global, l’État français est une sorte de « maillon faible » en ce qui concerne ses engagements militaires à l’Ukraine. Selon l’Ukraine Support Tracker, la France est classée en quinzième position en matière d’aide militaire bilatérale à l'Ukraine (entre le 24 janvier 2022 et le 31 juillet 2023). À titre de comparaison, le niveau d’engagement français représente sur cette période douze fois moins que son allié britannique, et trois fois moins que le Canada. Pour autant, la France a dédié à l’Ukraine entre 10 et 12% de ses stocks propres d’armes lourdes. Positionnée au 9e rang de ce classement, la France engage légèrement moins ses stocks propres que le Royaume-Uni (entre 12% et 24%[1]), mais largement plus que le Canada (environ 5-6%[2]).   Le « soutien » minimal français s’est exprimé par une période de carence de deux mois avant les premières livraisons militaires à l’Ukraine Les données de l’Ukraine Support Tracker montrent une première période de carence de deux mois avant les premières livraisons militaires françaises d’armes lourdes à l’Ukraine (février - avril 2022). Fin avril 2022, la France s’est décidée à prélever 12 canons CAESAR sur ses propres équipements à l’emploi, là où les autres pays ont puisé dans leurs stocks d’anciens matériels ou de réserve. Cette période séparant le début de l’invasion russe des premières livraisons militaires françaises correspond parallèlement au passage de la France de son « soutien minimal » à son deuxième « palier », tel qu’identifié précédemment. Notons qu’avant cela, la France avait officiellement affirmé soutenir une logique dite « défensive » pour mieux justifier sa réticence à livrer entre autre des chars « lourds » et des avions de chasse (une distinction qui est toutefois purement subjective, attribuer une fonction strictement « défensive » ou « offensive » à une arme ne reflétant aucunement les réalités juridiques et militaires).   La France s’est rapidement heurtée aux critiques visant l’insuffisance de ses livraisons militaires à l’Ukraine Au printemps 2022 déjà, et suite aux demandes du président Zelensky, de nombreux débats ont eu lieu parmi les alliés de l’Ukraine au sujet de la possibilité de lui fournir des chars « lourds ». Du côté français, l’autorisation de la livraison d’un total de 30 CEASAR entre avril et janvier 2023 a semblé insuffisante compte tenu des objectifs français d’aider l’Ukraine à repousser la Russie, et de retrouver son intégrité territoriale. Les armes lourdes comme les chars étant à même de faire la différence dans le cas des guerres à haute intensité, leur octroi par d’autres alliés a largement été médiatisé et apprécié par les forces ukrainiennes. Pourtant, en refusant jusqu’alors à l’Ukraine l’octroi de chars Leclerc, et pour avoir livré des armes lourdes au compte-goutte seulement, certains spécialistes considèrent que les choix stratégiques français d’alors restaient insuffisants et décevants, soutenant que la livraison de chars Leclerc aurait permis de redresser le tir en renforçant le capital diplomatique français. L’issue à la guerre souhaitée par la France semblait significativement déconnectée des efforts nécessaires pour l’atteindre. Le Président Emmanuel Macron justifiait plus tard la faiblesse des dons français en affirmant que le plus important n’est pas la quantité, mais plutôt la qualité des armes fournies: il faut « privilégier les livraisons utiles pour mener ces opérations et résister, plutôt que des engagements qui arriveront très tard ou très loin ».   Pour soutenir la « victoire » de l’Ukraine, la France lui a symboliquement livré les premiers chars de conception occidentale En janvier 2023, l’aide militaire française est toutefois passée à la vitesse supérieure avec l’annonce de l’envoi de quatorze chars légers AMX-10 RC, qui ont progressivement été livrés jusqu’au mois de mars 2023. Parallèlement, la France franchissait son troisième « palier » dans son discours, à savoir en soutenant ouvertement la « victoire de l’Ukraine » et la « défaite » de la Russie. En concédant les AMX-10 RC à l’Ukraine, la France a envoyé un signal fort à la communauté transatlantique. Bien qu’un débat au sein de l’Europe remette aujourd’hui en cause la qualification de « char » des AMX-10 RC, ces dons représentaient les premiers chars de conception occidentale fournis à l’Ukraine, tous les précédents ayant été de conception russe. Par cette livraison, la France a certainement souhaité gommer son image de maillon faible du soutien à l’Ukraine. Et pour rehausser son niveau de crédibilité en tant qu’allié de l’Ukraine, la France pouvait bien se permettre un tel prélèvement dans l’inventaire de son armée de Terre puisque sa perte capacitaire ne concernait en réalité que 5% de son parc d’AMX-10 RC (sur un stock d’environ 200 unités encore en service début 2023) et que ces derniers ont progressivement commencé à se voir remplacer par les Engins blindés de reconnaissance et de combat Jaguar depuis 2020. Plus récemment, en mai 2023, la France a levé un nouveau tabou en annonçant qu’elle allait former des pilotes ukrainiens. Dans la même logique, cet engagement est venu parachever le franchissement d’un cap supplémentaire dans le soutien français.   L’exemple Nexter s’inscrit dans une nouvelle logique d’intensification de la production industrielle française Compte tenu de l’augmentation de ses dons militaires à l’Ukraine, la France a dû anticiper la question de ses stocks. En l’occurrence, le concepteur et fabricant de l’obusier CAESAR Nexter a enregistré une augmentation fulgurante de près de 200% de sa production, passant d’une production moyenne de deux unités par mois avant le conflit, à six unités par mois en janvier 2023. Cela s’explique en grande partie par la nécessité française de rehausser le niveau de stock de CAESAR en raison de ses livraisons progressives de 30 obusiers CAESAR à l’Ukraine, entre avril 2021 et janvier 2023. Notons qu’en juillet 2022, la France ne possédait que 58 de ces exemplaires sur les 77 unités requises, conformément au format défini dans le rapport annexé à la Loi de programmation militaire (LPM) 2019-25. Par ailleurs, cette même loi prévoit le financement de commandes de telles armes afin de ramener le parc de CAESAR dans l’Armée de terre à son nombre initial, ce qui a permis à M. Sébastien Lecornu d’effectuer une commande estimée à 85 millions d’euros de 18 CAESAR au mois de juillet 2022. Cette initiative est venue répondre à la question de leur remplacement, lorsque l’on sait que la France a prélevé ses dons sur sa propre dotation de l’Armée de Terre et que, outre la crise ukrainienne, un certain nombre de ces pièces ont été déployées à Djibouti, en Côte d’Ivoire ou encore aux Émirats arabes unis. Pour assurer cet engagement, le ministre des Armées M. Lecornu a annoncé en mars 2023 que les délais de production des CAESAR avaient été réduits de 60% par Nexter, passant de 44 mois à 18 mois, afin de respecter la volonté de l’exécutif français d’accélérer la cadence industrielle. Durant un entretien bilatéral tenu avec l’expert en sécurité internationale Pierre Haroche, ce dernier a estimé que la France tire deux enseignements principaux de plus d’un an de conflit en Ukraine. Premièrement, les moyens militaires nécessaires à l’atteinte des objectifs fixés pour elle-même – à savoir la « victoire » de l’Ukraine et la « défaite de la Russie » – font revenir la guerre de haute intensité au-devant de la scène. Deuxièmement, la guerre de haute intensité nécessite de mettre l’accent sur la question de ses stocks et des masses de munitions. Comme le dit Pierre Haroche, il semblerait que dans sa politique d’armement, la France tend petit à petit à intégrer ces deux enseignements dans la manière dont elle applique sa politique d’armement. De ce fait, il est important pour l’Hexagone d’opérer un rééquilibrage entre ses capacités expéditionnaires et ses capacités de haute intensité, sans abandonner le scénario expéditionnaire asymétrique. L’exemple de Nexter illustrerait donc le passage de la France à une intensification de ses flux de production, consistant à encourager les industriels à produire plus, et plus vite.   La cohérence britannique visant à condamner l’agression russe et à encourager la victoire de l’Ukraine Du côté britannique, l’analyse du discours politique de ces dix-neuf derniers mois fait état d’une importante cohérence. L’approche actuelle du gouvernement dirigé par Rishi Sunak s’inscrit dans la continuité de celle de ses prédécesseurs, M. Boris Johnson et Mme Liz Truss, puisqu’elles témoignent ensemble de la volonté britannique d'accorder un soutien indéfectible à l’Ukraine. Dans ses quelques déclarations publiques immédiates, l’ancien Premier ministre Boris Johnson a d’emblée adopté un discours bien plus tranché que son homologue français à la même période. Dans une apparition télévisée destinée à la population britannique, le 24 février 2022, Boris Johnson mentionnait déjà la possibilité d’inclure une dimension militaire à la réponse britannique à l’invasion de l’Ukraine. L’objectif y était déjà clairement annoncé : l’entreprise risquée de Vladimir Poutine devait se solder par l’échec. Pour cela, M. Johnson a assuré que le Royaume-Uni travaillerait de concert avec l’Ukraine pour la restauration de sa souveraineté et de son indépendance (suggérant par là le souhait d’un retour aux frontières précédant l’invasion russe de février 2022). Par ailleurs, le même jour, M. Boris Johnson qualifiait le dirigeant russe devant le Parlement britannique d’« agresseur sanguinaire qui croit en la conquête impériale » et estimait que « Poutine a toujours été déterminé à attaquer son voisin ». Le langage adopté par le Premier ministre d’alors semble en comparaison bien éloigné des craintes françaises des débuts, à savoir celles de céder à la tentation de l’« humiliation » ou encore de l’ « écrasement ». Le 3 mars 2022, Mme Truss alors Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères, énonçait que le Royaume-Uni s’assurerait que Vladimir Poutine perde la guerre (« We will together ensure that Putin loses »). Le double objectif militaire du Royaume-Uni fut d’emblée clairement présenté : en premier lieu, celui de la défaite de Vladimir Poutine sur le sol ukrainien, notamment à l’aide du déploiement d’armes défensives britanniques pour leur permettre de stopper les chars russes ; deuxièmement, celui de contenir l’agression russe par le renforcement de la présence de l’OTAN sur le flanc oriental, ainsi que par la sécurité européenne via la force expéditionnaire dirigée par le Royaume-Uni. Ce type de discours n'a cessé d’être répété de manière cohérente par le Premier ministre suivant, M. Rishi Sunak, comme à l’occasion de la Conférence de sécurité de Munich de 2023 ou encore devant le Parlement britannique en février 2023.   Le Royaume-Uni - un « chef de file » en matière de soutien à l’Ukraine, comme en témoigne son aide militaire En accord avec son discours politique, Londres a aussi fait preuve d’un soutien militaire quasi exemplaire sur la période globale du conflit. L’analyse macro des données jusqu’à présent collectées permettent de mettre en évidence la forte réactivité britannique ainsi que l’importance de ses concessions matérielles à l’Ukraine. D’une part, le Royaume-Uni a fait partie des pays les plus réactifs au lendemain de l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Il est notamment l’un des premiers pays à s’être engagés dans la fourniture de soutien militaire et à avoir entrepris d’entraîner des pilotes de chasse et des marins ukrainiens. Cette réactivité est loin d’être surprenante, puisqu’elle s’inscrit dans une certaine continuité politique. Quelques mois déjà avant l’invasion russe et face à la menace grandissante de Moscou, Londres avait déjà annoncé l’ouverture de négociations d’un pacte trilatéral britannico-polonais-ukrainienne.  D’autre part, la quantité du matériel militaire fourni à Kyiv font du Royaume-Uni l’un de ses alliés militaires les plus importants. Pour la période du 24 janvier 2022 au 31 juillet 2023, les données de l’Ukraine Support Tracker permettent de dresser un classement des plus grands fournisseurs de soutien militaire à l'Ukraine. Le Royaume-Uni y apparaît en troisième position au niveau mondial – et en deuxième à l’échelle de l’Europe – avec un total de près de 6,58 milliards d’euros investis. La volonté politique britannique, mise en perspective avec son budget militaire qui est l’un des plus importants en Europe (68,5 milliards de dollars en 2022), explique la tête de classement dont dispose le Royaume-Uni. Le pouvoir britannique a pris tellement au sérieux la crise ukrainienne que le soutien annuel militaire moyen accordé à l’Ukraine est actuellement supérieur à celui accordé à l’URSS durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (1941-1945) : environ 6 milliards d’euros pour l'Ukraine en 2022 à comparer au 3,5 milliards en moyenne par an durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale (en prenant en compte l’inflation). Là où le pouvoir britannique se distingue en revanche relativement moins, c’est précisément par son niveau d’engagement d’armes lourdes en faveur de l’Ukraine (5e position). À l’échelle européenne, Londres perd sur ce critère quelques rangs en se voyant notamment devancer par la Pologne (2e position) et les Pays-Bas (3e position). Et pour cause : l’invasion de l’Ukraine a eu pour conséquence directe de faire exploser les budgets de la défense de la Pologne et des Pays-Bas. L’augmentation du budget polonais s’explique logiquement par sa position géographique vis-à-vis de l’Ukraine et de la Russie, qui voit cette invasion comme une menace directe à leur propre souveraineté. Dans le second cas, les Pays-Bas ont choisi par cette augmentation d’envoyer un signal fort aux alliés de l'OTAN et aux partenaires européens. Cette initiative leur permettra par ailleurs d’atteindre la norme de l’OTAN des 2 % du PIB en 2024 et 2025, sachant qu’Amsterdam s’était auparavant fait reprocher de négliger ses forces armées. In fine, l’augmentation des budgets militaires de ces États permet d’assurer une plus importante quantité de livraisons d’armes lourdes aux forces ukrainiennes. De son côté, Londres avait déjà atteint avant la guerre les 2% préconisés par l’OTAN, et a procédé à une rallonge budgétaire en mars 2023, probablement pour poursuivre ses efforts en matière d’engagement militaire. Enfin, la part de ses propres stocks engagés en Ukraine (6e position) durant la même période est elle aussi moins importante. Le Royaume-Uni reste globalement en deçà de ses voisins scandinaves et baltes (Norvège et Danemark), qui font eux face à une menace géographiquement plus directe. La République tchèque et les Pays-Bas se hissent pour leur part respectivement aux 1er et 3e places du classement. Le Royaume-Uni reste tout de même un acteur important en ce qu’il cède une partie conséquente de ses propres stocks à l’Ukraine. Il a concédé environ 15% de ses véhicules de troupes blindées FV103 Spartan rien qu’en avril 2022, 53% de ses obusiers de 155mm/152mm et 17% de ses lance-roquettes multiples M270 sur la première année du conflit. De plus, il a fourni plusieurs systèmes de défense aérienne tout en assurant la formation des forces ukrainiennes à l’usage de ces systèmes, dont Starstreak, conçu pour abattre à courte distance les avions volant à basse altitude. En un sens, la lecture de la posture britannique peut être double. Le Royaume-Uni se situe en deçà des efforts d’autres États européens, pour leur part menacés plus directement par la Russie. Pour autant, il maintient largement son statut de « chef de file » européen en faisant preuve d’un effort constant dans ses soutiens militaires.   Sur le modèle français, le pouvoir britannique a redéfini ses choix de dons militaires à mesure de l’évolution du conflit Comme mentionné précédemment, dès le lancement de l’invasion russe, le pouvoir britannique a immédiatement livré des armes à l’Ukraine. Entre février 2022 et juillet 2023, le Royaume-Uni s’est distingué par la livraison régulière d’armes militaires et/ou lourdes en tous genres à Kyiv : navires de lutte antimines, véhicules blindés, possibles missiles de croisière Storm Shadow et encore différents types d’obusiers. Pour autant, tout comme ses alliés occidentaux, le pouvoir britannique s’est dans un premier temps montré hésitant à l’idée de céder aux demandes de chars « lourds » du président M. Zelensky. À mesure de l’aggravation de la crise ukrainienne, le pouvoir britannique a comme la France passé un « palier » supérieur en concédant ses premiers chars à l’Ukraine. L’annonce en janvier 2023 de la livraison française de chars légers AMX-10RC à l’Ukraine a visiblement ouvert une brèche. Le même mois, le Royaume-Uni s’est tardivement décidé à se séparer de quatorze de ses chars Challenger-2. Cette décision a constitué un tournant : les Challenger-2 furent les premiers chars « lourds » occidentaux (après les AMX-10 RC, dont la qualification en tant que telle fait débat) à avoir foulé le sol ukrainien. Pourtant, les Challenger-2 ne s’avèrent pas si avantageux pour les forces armées ukrainiennes puisqu’elles nécessitent d’engager toute une filière de maintenance pour une disponibilité limitée. De plus, son canon n’est pas compatible avec les munitions de l’OTAN. Pour rappel, le Royaume-Uni souhaitait déjà rénover ou remplacer ses chars Challenger-2 encore en service en 2015 dans le cadre du Life Extension Program en raison de leur obsolescence, de leur manque de performance et de leur incompatibilité avec les munitions de 120 mm aux normes de l’OTAN.   L’absence des investissements militaires britanniques conjuguée au contexte de la crise ukrainienne a rendu le rééquilibrage de ses stocks nécessaire L’exemple des Challenger-2 fait état d’un constat : contrairement à la France, Londres a manqué d’investir par anticipation dans la reconstitution de ses stocks militaires. Le Royaume-Uni a d’abord failli dans le calcul de sa quantité disponible d’armes lourdes. Si cela n’a dans un premier temps pas semblé poser de problème majeur (ses dons à l’Ukraine se sont d’abord majoritairement limités à des prélèvements sur ses stocks de réserves), il lui a par la suite bien fallu se déposséder d’une partie de ses stocks directs pour fournir à Kyiv ses Challenger-2. En outre, le contexte de la crise ukrainienne a surtout mis en évidence la mauvaise qualité des chars dont disposait alors le Royaume-Uni : en 2021, avant le début de la crise ukrainienne, des députés britanniques avaient déjà fait part de leur inquiétude vis-à-vis de l’obsolescence de son artillerie lourde :   « Si l’armée britannique devait combattre un adversaire équivalent en Europe de l’Est au cours des prochaines années, alors qu’ils restent sans aucun doute parmi les meilleurs au monde, nos soldats seraient forcés de se battre avec une combinaison de véhicules blindés obsolètes, la plupart d’entre eux ayant au moins 30 ans ou plus, avec une faible fiabilité mécanique, très largement vulnérables face à des systèmes de missiles et d’artillerie plus modernes et manquant de façon chronique de défense aérienne adéquate »   Suivant l’annonce de la livraison de 14 Challenger-2 en janvier 2023, certains parlementaires britanniques ont affirmé qu’une telle ponction priverait l’armée britannique de 25 à 30% de ses « actifs opérationnels », puisque sur les 227 unités dont disposait le Royaume-Uni au moment de son annonce, 148 unités avaient été mises de côté l’année précédente pour être portées au standard « Challenger 3 ». Cela sous-entend que Londres ne disposerait actuellement que de 42 exemplaires « réellement » disponibles, c’est-à-dire en état de marche. Comparativement à la France, qui n’a livré jusqu’en mars 2023 que 5% de ses chars légers AMX-10 RC ; le Royaume-Uni semblerait avoir engagé entre 25% et 30% de son inventaire de Challenger-2 – certes en partie obsolètes – ce qui n’empêche pas pour autant cette ponction de représenter une perte capacitaire significative dans l’immédiat, d’autant plus que la capacité opérationnelle totale des chars modernisés est prévue pour 2030. Ce débat parlementaire met en exergue la question de la disponibilité et de la durabilité des stocks militaires britanniques, dans un contexte géopolitique de forte demande. Sur le cas du « Challenger 3 », l’armée britannique s’est félicitée de l’accélération de leur conception en février 2023. S’il est fort probable que le Royaume-Uni soit en mesure de prononcer la pleine capacité opérationnelle de ces chars d’ici à 2030, le ministre de la Défense Ben Wallace a dû se résoudre à prendre de plus grandes mesures pour assurer l’augmentation du nombre de commandes. C’est sans compter la récente publication de la mise à jour du Defence Command Paper par le ministère de la Défense, en juillet 2023, prévoyant – entre autres – de renforcer la réserve opérationnelle britannique. À cette fin, l’armée britannique a prévu de réaffecter 2,5 milliards de livres sterling à l’augmentation de ses stocks de munitions. Le document stratégique met aussi en lumière l’augmentation future de la fourniture d’armes, jusqu’en 2030, dans une optique de renforcement de la productivité de l’armée britannique. La réactivité (tardive) du Royaume-Uni semble toutefois plus faible que celle que la France, comme le montre la multiplication rapide des commandes passées par le ministre de la Défense français au fabricant Nexter. Enfin, l’annonce antérieure (mai 2023) du développement d'un nouvel obus – conjointement avec l’Allemagne – montre que le Royaume-Uni prend en réalité de plus en plus au sérieux la problématique du renouvellement de ses stocks. En somme, Londres tire ses propres leçons de la guerre en Ukraine tout en s’inspirant des méthodes de son allié européen français.   Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada En tant que premier pays occidental à avoir reconnu l’indépendance de l’Ukraine, Ottawa a fait le choix d’un discours politique plus fort que celui de la France et tout aussi ambitieux que celui du Royaume-Uni. Lorsqu’il s’agit concrètement de donner les moyens à l’Ukraine de l’emporter, le Canada est pourtant à la traîne. Plus d’un an et demi après le début du conflit, il apparaît en dixième position du classement des donateurs d’armes lourdes à l’Ukraine, et huitième à celui – plus global – des engagements militaires bilatéraux. Malgré cela, la pression internationale et politique a forcé Ottawa à livrer une certaine quantité d’artillerie lourde à l’Ukraine dont l’inventaire peut être consulté sur le site officiel du ministère de la défense canadien. Parmi celles-ci figurent en partie huit chars de combat Leopard 2, 44 missiles AIM-9, quatre systèmes d’obusiers M777 ou encore 208 véhicules blindés. Le Canada est également resté silencieux sur la question du renouvellement de ses équipements militaires pour remplacer ces dons à l’Ukraine, puisqu’aucune annonce n’a été faite jusqu’alors à ce sujet. Pour finir, le pays s’est vu reprocher (notamment par le Pentagone) l’absence d’une véritable augmentation de son budget militaire à même de consacrer au moins 2% de son PIB à la défense, tel qu’exigé par la règle des 2%. Malgré son engagement pris en 2014 d’atteindre cet objectif, le Premier ministre Justin Trudeau a reconnu en avril 2023 – comme forme de désaveu – que le Canada n’atteindrait jamais les cibles de dépenses susmentionnées. La visite du président Zelensky à Ottawa, le 22 septembre 2023, a donné l’occasion au pouvoir politique d’envoyer le signal d’une volonté plus forte d’augmenter sa contribution militaire à l’effort de guerre des forces ukrainiennes. Toutefois, pour redresser davantage le tir, le Canada devra tirer plus de leçons du positionnement de ses proches alliés européens afin de ne pas entacher sa crédibilité. En particulier, M. Trudeau devrait envoyer un signal fort par l’intensification de ses livraisons d’armes lourdes. En matière de gestion de ses stocks, Ottawa devrait également tirer des leçons de ses deux alliés outre-Atlantique. Par exemple, l’augmentation des rythmes de production britanniques et français leur permettra à terme de « faire leur part » tout en réfléchissant à l’avenir de leurs stocks et en anticipant leur réajustement. Pour faire face à ses « problèmes de capacité », il est évident que le Canada doit à son tour songer au remplacement de ses propres stocks militaires. Or en dépit de l’enlisement du conflit en Ukraine, le Canada n’a pour l’instant pas fait de commandes pour remplacer ses dons prélevés sur ses stocks. Sur ces plans-là, de telles initiatives pourraient aussi et surtout largement renforcer le capital diplomatique canadien et lui permettre aussi d’éviter la privation de son influence sur la scène internationale. Le Canada se voit déjà reprocher depuis quelques années de ne pas « faire sa part » en raison de son 25e rang en matière de budget militaire (sur 29 pays membres de l’OTAN), renvoyant logiquement Ottawa au banc des pays isolés au sein de l’alliance, en deçà des 2% du PIB exigés. [1] Ces deux chiffres reflètent ici la différence entre les promesses énoncées et les livraisons effectuées à ce jour. [2] Ibidem. ## Le terrorisme en Asie du Sud et sa résonance mondiale à la suite des attentats de Pahalgam en 2025 : une perspective diasporique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/le-terrorisme-en-asie-du-sud-et-sa-resonance-mondiale-a-la-suite-des-attentats-de-pahalgam-en-2025-une-perspective-diasporique/ Modified: 2025-11-11 Les attaques de Jaffar Express, Pahalgam et Khuzdar, qui ont eu lieu en 2025 en Asie du Sud, ont suscité plusieurs réponses mondiales et régionales de la part des États et des acteurs de la diaspora qui appellent à agir contre le terrorisme transfrontalier. La réponse a été paradoxale : des États autoritaires comme la Chine et la Russie se sont joints à l’Inde et au Pakistan pour façonner une réponse mondiale au terrorisme, présentée comme un ordre international « démocratique » à travers la Déclaration de Tianjin de l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai. Dans le même temps, les mobilisations des diasporas sud-asiatiques au Canada, au Royaume-Uni et en Australie ont démontré comment la participation démocratique à l’étranger peut à la fois promouvoir la solidarité contre le terrorisme et approfondir la polarisation entre les éléments nationalistes qui font écho aux griefs de leur patrie. Cet article soutient que les attentats terroristes de 2025, en particulier celui de Pahalgam, ont non seulement déclenché une initiative géopolitique contre le terrorisme, telle que la Déclaration de Tianjin, mais ont également suscité des réactions mitigées au sein des diasporas sud-asiatiques à travers le monde. C’est particulièrement le cas au Canada, qui abrite 2,3 millions de personnes d’origine sud-asiatique, où la confrontation diplomatique avec l’Inde en 2023 et la désescalade qui a suivi ont conduit à une approche prudente face aux questions sensibles, telles que la réponse diasporique aux attentats terroristes en Asie du Sud. Les attentats de 2025 et bref contexte historique Le 11 mars, le Jaffar Express, transportant 440 passagers de Quetta à Peshawar, a été attaqué et détourné par des militants de l’Armée de libération du Baloutchistan (BLA). Les otages ont ensuite été secourus par les forces de sécurité pakistanaises lors d’une opération de sauvetage d’une durée de deux jours. Le 21 mai, une explosion de bombe visant un bus scolaire près de Zero Point, à Khuzdar, le long de l’autoroute Quetta–Karachi, a tué dix enfants et blessé plus de trente-quatre autres. Les responsables de la sécurité pakistanaise ont déclaré que l’attaque avait été menée par des mandataires indiens. Le 22 avril 2025, cinq membres du The Resistant Front (TRF) une branche du Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) basé au Pakistan ont tué 26 personnes à Pahalgam, lors d’une excursion dans la vallée de Baisaran, au Cachemire. Bien que l’attaque ait été revendiquée par le TRF, le ministre pakistanais de la Défense, Khawaja Asif, a accusé l’Inde, qualifiant l’attentat d’ « opération sous faux drapeau », ajoutant : « Nous pensons qu’il s’agissait d’une attaque mise en scène, une opération sous faux drapeau visant à en accuser une autre partie. » De son côté, l’Agence nationale d’investigation indienne (NIA) a affirmé que l’Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) du Pakistan et le LeT étaient les véritables responsables de l’attentat. Après les attentats, les tensions diplomatiques entre le Pakistan et l’Inde se sont rapidement intensifiées. New Delhi a déclaré les diplomates militaires pakistanais personae non gratae, réduit le personnel de la Haute Commission du Pakistan et annulé le régime d’exemption de visa de l’Association sud-asiatique pour la coopération régionale (SAARC) pour les ressortissants pakistanais. L’Inde a également fermé la frontière d’Attari-Wagah entre les deux pays et suspendu le Traité des eaux de l’Indus. Tous les services postaux et les navires battant pavillon pakistanais ont aussi été interdits d’accès aux ports indiens. Alors que le ministère pakistanais des Affaires étrangères a présenté ses condoléances à la suite des attaques, il a adopté des mesures de rétorsion en annulant les visas pour les ressortissants indiens, en fermant son espace aérien et en suspendant les échanges commerciaux. Les forces armées indiennes ont lancé l’opération Sindoor, attaquant neuf camps terroristes situés au Pakistan et dans le Cachemire , tuant plus de cent militants liés au Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Hizbul Mjuahideen (HM) et au Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Les forces indiennes ont neutralisé ces sites, qui étaient soupçonnés d'être des camps d'entraînement de ces trois groupes terroristes considérés comme une organisation djihadiste visant à libérer le Cachemire de l'occupation indienne. Le Pakistan a répliqué par des frappes contre des bases militaires indiennes, ce qui a entraîné de nouvelles attaques de missiles et de drones de la part de l’Inde, jusqu’à ce que les deux pays conviennent d’une désescalade le 10 mai 2025. La région du Jammu-et-Cachemire demeure une source de discorde entre l’Inde et le Pakistan depuis la partition de l’Inde en 1947. La Ligne de contrôle (LoC), l’une des frontières les plus militarisées au monde, a été formalisée par l’Accord de Simla en 1972, lorsque les gouvernements indien et pakistanais ont délimité leurs zones administratives respectives du Jammu-et-Cachemire. Depuis lors, l’article 370 de la Constitution indienne accordait à cette région un certain degré d’autonomie pour gérer ses propres affaires. En 2019, le gouvernement du Premier ministre Modi a révoqué ce statut autonome, plaçant la région sous le contrôle du gouvernement central, avec l’intention de la réorganiser en un Cachemire à majorité musulmane, un Jammu à majorité hindoue et un Ladakh à majorité bouddhiste (ce dernier partageant des frontières avec le Tibet et le Gilgit-Baltistan administré par le Pakistan). Les organisations terroristes opérant dans cette région sont profondément motivées par le ressentiment historique suscité par les politiques du gouvernement indien. Les répliques mondiales et la déclaration de Tianjin Les trois attaques ont déclenché des réactions géopolitiques, notamment l’adoption de la Déclaration de Tianjin en septembre 2025, en Chine, par l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai (OCS). Celle-ci a affirmé que les pays devaient agir sans « deux poids, deux mesures » pour prévenir le terrorisme transfrontalier, en faisant référence aux attentats de Pahalgam, du Jaffar Express et de Khuzdar. La déclaration a été parrainée par la Chine, la Russie, l’Inde et le Pakistan, marquant un rare moment de coopération internationale. L’OCS, qui trouve son origine dans le groupe des « Cinq de Shanghai » en 2001, a été fondée par la Chine, la Russie, le Kazakhstan, le Kirghizistan, le Tadjikistan et l’Ouzbékistan. Depuis, elle s’est élargie pour inclure le Bélarus, l’Inde, l’Iran et le Pakistan comme États membres ; l’Afghanistan et la Mongolie comme États observateurs ; et l’Azerbaïdjan, l’Arménie, le Bahreïn, l’Égypte, le Cambodge, le Qatar, le Koweït, les Maldives, le Myanmar, le Népal, les Émirats arabes unis, l’Arabie saoudite, la Turquie et le Sri Lanka comme partenaires de dialogue. Les objectifs de l’OCS sont de renforcer la confiance et les relations de bon voisinage, d’approfondir la coopération dans de multiples secteurs, de préserver la paix et la sécurité régionales et de promouvoir un ordre international plus juste et plus démocratique. Bien qu’il puisse paraître ironique que des régimes autoritaires tels que la Russie et la Chine assurent le leadership pour promouvoir un ordre international « démocratique », l’OCS demeure l’une des rares organisations régionales où des nations rivales coopèrent sur une même plateforme. En d’autres termes, elle a réussi à convaincre le Pakistan de reconsidérer le transfert de responsabilité concernant les attentats terroristes de 2025 et de négocier avec l’Inde la réintégration du Traité des eaux de l’Indus. Le Premier ministre Shehbaz Sharif a également exprimé sa volonté de privilégier la diplomatie plutôt que la confrontation, et même d’apporter son soutien à l’Initiative chinoise pour la gouvernance mondiale (GGI). Cette position pourrait être influencée par la dépendance croissante du Pakistan à l’égard des investissements chinois, tels que le corridor économique sino-pakistanais (CPEC), le port de Gwadar, ainsi que par la pression d’une dette chinoise croissante, qui s’élève à 26,6 milliards de dollars américains. La position du Pakistan reflète également le poids régional croissant de l’Inde, qui a réussi à orienter Islamabad vers une coopération accrue au sein du cadre de l’OCS. Résonance diasporique À la suite des attentats de Pahalgam, la diaspora sud-asiatique a organisé des manifestations à Londres, Copenhague, Melbourne, Katmandou, Toronto et Vancouver. Des protestations ont également éclaté en France, en Finlande, en Allemagne, en Espagne et aux États-Unis. Le 25 avril à Londres, des manifestants pro-indiens rassemblés devant le Haut-Commissariat de l’Inde ont scandé des slogans en faveur de l’Inde, exhortant les gouvernements à déclarer le Pakistan comme un État soutenant le terrorisme. Des manifestants britanniques d’origine pakistanaise se sont, quant à eux, mobilisés en soutien aux Cachemiris. Une forte présence policière a été déployée pour prévenir tout affrontement violent. Des débats polarisés ont également émergé sur les réseaux sociaux après la diffusion d’une photo d’un responsable pakistanais tenant une affiche du pilote de l’armée de l’air indienne Varthaman, tout en faisant un geste d’égorgement. Cet incident, qui a provoqué une vague d’indignation, a conduit un porte-parole de la Friends of India Society International UK à appeler le gouvernement britannique à soutenir l’Inde et à reconsidérer sa politique envers le Pakistan. La diaspora indienne a organisé une manifestation devant le consulat du Pakistan à Toronto, au Canada, sous l’égide du Hindu Forum Canada, rejointe par l’Indo-Canadian Kashmir Forum, le Baloch Human Rights Council Canada, les Canadians for Human Rights Watch, le Canada India Global Forum et Nimittekam Canada. En raison des émotions intenses suscitées par les attentats terroristes, de nombreux manifestants nationalistes scandaient « Pakistan Murdabad (mort au Pakistan ». À Federation Square, dans la ville de Melbourne, des milliers de personnes appartenant à la communauté indienne ont manifesté en scandant « Hindu Lives Matter » et « Pakistan Army Terrorist Army », exprimant des sentiments nationalistes similaires. Cependant, à Toronto, la même semaine, des membres de la communauté indienne, rejoints par des Hindous, des Juifs, des Baloutches, des Iraniens et d’autres Canadiens, ont également organisé une veillée aux chandelles à la mémoire des victimes des attaques. À Londres également, la communauté indienne a organisé une veillée aux chandelles à Piccadilly Circus. La diaspora canadienne est l’une des plus importantes au monde parmi les immigrants d’origine sud-asiatique et se mobilise fréquemment autour des enjeux touchant leur pays d’origine. En 2022, la communauté pakistanaise a manifesté à Montréal en soutien à l’ancien Premier ministre Imran Khan, lorsqu’il a été évincé par une motion de censure. En 2024, des manifestants se sont rassemblés à Mississauga, au Canada, pour soutenir l’incarcération de l’ancien Premier ministre Imran Khan. Ainsi, les responsables gouvernementaux canadiens et les acteurs non gouvernementaux demeurent prudents, craignant que les conflits survenant dans le sous-continent indien n’affectent la cohésion sociale au sein de leur diaspora. Par mesure réflexive, le Premier ministre Mark Carney a condamné l’attentat terroriste de Pahalgam, tout en publiant une déclaration conjointe des ministres des Affaires étrangères du G7 formulée ainsi : « Nous appelons à une désescalade immédiate et encourageons les deux pays à engager un dialogue direct en vue d’une issue pacifique. » Des déclarations de la Pakistan-Canada Association et de la Vedic Hindu Cultural Society de Colombie-Britannique ont plaidé pour des relations pacifiques au sein de la communauté au Canada. La Hindu Canadian Society a également publié des lignes directrices destinées aux Canadiens hindous afin d’éviter les agressions et de favoriser une vie harmonieuse. De plus, à la suite des audiences de la Commission sur les ingérences étrangères, qui ont examiné les opérations d’influence présumées de la Chine, de l’Inde, de la Russie et d’autres États, Ottawa doit adopter une stratégie proactive d’engagement auprès des diasporas afin de protéger leurs communautés contre toute manipulation étrangère. Les nominations de ministres comme Anita Anand aux Affaires étrangères et Gary Anandasangaree à la Sécurité publique, qui entretiennent des liens étroits avec les communautés sud-asiatiques et la politique de leur pays d’origine, représentent donc des avancées positives dans ce sens. Cela est particulièrement important après la crise diplomatique entre le Canada et l’Inde en 2023, à la suite de l’assassinat du citoyen canadien sikh Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Les autorités canadiennes ont non seulement accusé les services de renseignement indiens d’avoir organisé ce meurtre, mais aussi évoqué la présence d’agents indiens liés au gang criminel Bishnoi, soupçonné d’avoir visé la communauté sud-asiatique au Canada. Conclusion La récente vague d’attentats terroristes en Asie du Sud a provoqué des ondes de choc à l’échelle mondiale, suscitant des réactions de la diaspora, des veillées de solidarité ainsi qu’une réponse géopolitique plus large. La Déclaration de Tianjin de l’OCS illustre les conséquences profondes du terrorisme lié au Pakistan et l’influence diplomatique de l’Inde dans la région. Alors que les attaques de Pahalgam ont ravivé les tensions entre l’Inde et le Pakistan, entraînant une escalade diplomatique et des émotions négatives au sein de la diaspora indienne mondiale, elles ont également mis en lumière la nécessité de solidarité entre les communautés face au terrorisme. Les manifestations de la diaspora mondiale ont par ailleurs démontré la profondeur des liens transnationaux qui relient les immigrants d’origine sud-asiatique aux enjeux touchant leur pays d’origine. Le Canada, qui abrite une importante diaspora sud-asiatique, devrait donc se positionner comme un acteur à la fois équilibré et vigilant, en continuant de renforcer son engagement auprès de cette communauté et en encourageant sa représentation dans la politique étrangère afin de servir les intérêts canadiens — notamment en protégeant ses institutions démocratiques contre toute ingérence étrangère. ## Les armes létales autonomes : entre mythes et confusions URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-armes-letales-autonomes-entre-mythes-et-confusions/ Modified: 2023-08-15 > L’argumentaire développé ci-dessous met l'accent sur deux aspects clés relatifs aux enjeux posés par les SALA ... En mai 2023, des articles de presse rapportaient qu’une intelligence artificielle (IA) avait tué son propre instructeur lors d’un test mené par l’armée américaine. Bien qu’il s’agisse d'un test virtuel sans conséquences physiques, cet événement a permis d’illustrer les dangers potentiels que représente cette technologie. Pendant le test, l'IA avait pour objectif de neutraliser un système de défense ennemi, avec l'accord ou le refus final de l'homme. L’IA aurait réalisé que le refus de l’opérateur perturbait l’accomplissement de sa mission et l’aurait donc pris pour cible. Il est à noter que l'armée de l'air américaine a rapidement démenti l'existence d'un tel test, rappelant que les États-Unis étaient attachés à une utilisation éthique et responsable de l’IA. Que cette histoire soit anecdotique ou non, cet exemple montre que les stratégies de défense sont en constante mutation et que l'apparition d'armes autonomes dotées d'intelligence artificielle soulève des interrogations majeures. Ces avancées engendrent à la fois des fantasmes et des inquiétudes relatives à l'avenir de la guerre et à la rivalité entre grandes puissances. En septembre 2017, lors d'un discours prononcé à Moscou devant des étudiants, le président Vladimir Poutine déclarait ainsi que le pays qui serait en tête dans la recherche sur l'intelligence artificielle deviendrait le leader mondial. Cette perspective devient particulièrement pertinente, lorsqu'on considère les répercussions potentielles de l'usage de l’IA dans le domaine militaire. Les systèmes d'armes létales autonomes (SALA) parfois alimentés par l’IA, se présentent sous plusieurs formes, tels que des missiles autoguidés, des robots militarisés et des drones de toute taille. Ces derniers ont le potentiel de bouleverser les schémas traditionnels de la guerre en redéfinissant la dynamique des conflits armés par l’introduction de nouvelles tactiques et stratégies de défense. Cette utilisation inquiète bon nombre d’États et d’organisations non gouvernementales puisque les SALA se distinguent a priori par leur capacité à choisir et à attaquer des cibles sans intervention humaine comme le soutient le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR). Toutefois, la définition des SALA n’est pas universelle. Chaque État adopte sa propre définition plus ou moins restrictive. Des professeurs de l’Université d’Oxford et de l’Institut Alan Turing ont identifié à partir de documents officiels, 12 définitions des SALA fournies par des États ou des acteurs internationaux clés. Certains pays, tels que la France et les États-Unis, définissent les SALA comme des machines qui, une fois activés sont entièrement autonomes de l’homme. Le gouvernement britannique précise dans sa définition que les systèmes autonomes peuvent comprendre et interpréter les intentions humaines. Ainsi, le Royaume-Uni se distingue en soulignant les capacités intrinsèques des systèmes autonomes. Enfin, certains, tels que la Suisse et le CICR, mettent l'accent sur la nature des tâches accomplies par la machine et les implications juridiques de l’action autonome. Selon eux, la machine devrait, en tout temps, être capable de respecter le droit international humanitaire (DIH), en particulier dans le processus de ciblage. Il y a donc des approches divergentes de la part des États et des acteurs internationaux clés lorsqu'il s'agit de définir les systèmes d’armes létales autonomes. L’argumentaire développé ci-dessous met l'accent sur deux aspects clés relatifs aux enjeux posés par les SALA : l'ambiguïté de leur définition et les défis inhérents à l'établissement d’un cadre normatif. Ces éléments permettent de mettre en lumière les idées préconçues et la réalité concernant l'utilisation de ces armes autonomes, souvent décrites dans la presse comme des « game changer » (autrement dit des armes pouvant changer la donne et la dynamique des conflits armés). Par extension, ainsi que nous le verrons, ces interrogations posent la question de la place de l’être humain sur le champ de bataille et la possibilité de réduire celle-ci. Degré d’autonomie et contrôle humain Les multiples définitions des SALA s'expliquent par la difficulté inhérente à qualifier précisément ce qu'est l'autonomie. En effet, il est essentiel de distinguer entre les fonctions automatisées par l'homme et l'indépendance des systèmes d'intelligence artificielle vis-à-vis de l'homme. Or ce dernier n’est pas la réalité actuelle des SALA. Le degré d’autonomie se détermine par la capacité de ces armes à prendre des décisions selon leur propre analyse (préprogrammée par l’homme) de la situation. Il existe plusieurs degrés d’autonomie. Par exemple, la marine russe s’illustre avec leurs missiles P-800 Oniks, plus petits que les missiles Granit, mais toujours dotés d’un système d'intelligence artificielle. Grâce à son système autonome « feu et oublie », ce missile pourrait à l’aide de son guidage par satellite, suivre sa cible en temps réel et adapter sa trajectoire. D’après les médias étatiques russes, il pourrait même travailler en tandem pour repérer et classer les cibles avant de choisir une stratégie d'attaque appropriée. Une fois la cible principale détruite, les missiles restants pourraient alors s’orienter vers d'autres navires afin d'éviter toute duplication d'attaque. Les missiles Oniks ne sont pas les seules armes autonomes capables de choisir une cible et de l’abattre sans intervention humaine grâce à leur programmation. Les drones suicides tels que le Kargu-2 turc et le KUB russe seraient capables de fonctionner en complète autonomie et de cibler indépendamment de l’assistance humaine. Un atout perçu comme considérable par plusieurs États tels que les États-Unis et la Chine, d’où les investissements considérables dans le développement de ce type d’armes autonomes. Toutefois, les entreprises de défense ont tendance à exagérer les capacités de leurs produits et seules des sources « confidentielles » laissent entendre une utilisation autonome de ces armes dans le rapport des Nations Unies sur la Libye en 2021. À cela s’ajoutent les SALA fixe telle que la sentinelle robotique sud-coréenne SG-RA1. Cette arme est déployée dans la zone démilitarisée entre les deux Corées. Bien qu'elle puisse repérer les intrusions et tirer de manière autonome, elle envoie toujours une demande d’autorisation de tir au poste de commandement. Ce choix de garder un contrôle humain relève avant tout d’une considération éthique de la Corée du Sud puisqu’il existe bien une fonction lui permettant de tirer sans supervision humaine. Par conséquent, la contrainte principale ne se situe pas dans la technologie elle-même. Elle réside plutôt dans la disposition d’un gouvernement à développer ou à reconnaître l'existence d'une technologie si critique sur le plan politique. Il est crucial de faire la différence entre l'autonomie et le contrôle afin de ne pas considérer l'automatisation et le contrôle humain comme des concepts mutuellement exclusifs : l'automatisation peut éliminer l'intervention humaine, mais ne rend pas le contrôle humain impossible. L’absence d’un cadre normatif Ces degrés d’autonomie de ces systèmes d’armes pouvant agir sans supervision humaine directe ont poussé certains États, tels que l’Autriche, le Brésil et le Costa Rica à vouloir réguler leur utilisation. Cela fait plus de 30 ans que nous voyons les armes autonomes se développer, mais ce n’est que récemment que la première commission des Nations Unies a appelé à l’interdiction des SALA tant qu’un cadre normatif approprié n’est pas établi. La question se pose donc de savoir si ces armes autonomes actuelles représentent une rupture significative par rapport à de précédents développements. Il est essentiel de noter que les armes autonomes ne sont pas un concept entièrement nouveau, tel que l’illustrent les mines terrestres ou les systèmes de défense antimissile automatisés. L’autonomie des armes est donc déjà présente sous diverses formes depuis un certain temps et certaines d'entre elles sont soumises à une réglementation. À titre d’exemple, les mines anti-personnelles sont régulées internationalement par la Convention d’Ottawa depuis 1997. Ainsi, il y a plus de 25 ans, une prise de conscience avait déjà été faite sur la nécessité de limiter les armes indépendantes du contrôle humain avec cette convention. Un point de vue qui a été réitéré récemment devant le Parlement européen, les Nations Unies et le CICR. Le problème avec l’évolution des armes autonomes et le manque de régulation réside dans deux points. Premièrement, la diversité des armes autonomes et leur degré variable d'autonomie rendent l'établissement d'une définition et a fortiori d'un cadre normatif cohérent et efficace, extrêmement complexe. Un défi majeur que la communauté internationale n’a pas encore réussi à relever. À cela s’ajoute, le contexte stratégique actuel et les motivations géopolitiques. Certains États, notamment les États-Unis et la Russie, qui développent ces systèmes n'ont aucun intérêt à soutenir le développement d’une réglementation puisqu’ils estiment pouvoir tirer un avantage concurrentiel sur leurs adversaires, tels que des capacités d'attaque plus précises, une diminution des pertes humaines et une meilleure réactivité sur le champ de bataille. Dans ce contexte, ces États sont peu enclins à encourager la mise en place d'une réglementation stricte qui pourrait restreindre leur liberté d’action et leur avantage technologique. Les SALA : entre mythes et réalités Pour autant, ces systèmes d’armes autonomes vont-ils révolutionner les termes de la guerre ? Ou bien vont-ils subir le même sort que les armes hypersoniques, dont on attendait une révolution majeure, mais qui se sont révélées être jusqu’ici principalement des armes de « communiqué de presse » ? En effet, il ne faut pas croire à la création de l’arme parfaite. Les SALA, aussi révolutionnaires soient-ils, ont des limites et des vulnérabilités. Comme toute technologie électronique, ils sont susceptibles d'être perturbés ou neutralisés. Ils seront soumis aux attaques de l’adversaire qui pourrait, en prenant le contrôle de leur canal de communication, brouiller ou intercepter les informations ou renseignements de la machine. Le caractère imprévisible et instable des conflits modernes implique l’utilisation d’une variété d'armes et de stratégies pour atteindre les objectifs militaires. Les drones autonomes ne sont donc qu’un outil de plus du « Air power » à disposition des États. Certes les progrès technologiques améliorent la collecte et le partage d'informations sur le champ de bataille, pourtant l’intelligence artificielle contribue en partie à complexifier les choses. Entre autres, les systèmes autonomes introduisent de nouvelles variables et exigent une adaptation constante. L'IA combinée aux armes hypersoniques provoque des prises de décisions ultra-rapides, ce qui peut entraîner des situations tactiques soudaines et risquées. La guerre en tant qu’activité humaine contient indéniablement des facteurs imprévisibles et de l'ambiguïté. De ce fait, malgré ces innovations, il y aura toujours certaines limites à la capacité de voir et de comprendre complètement les réalités complexes d'un scénario militaire. Le brouillard de la guerre de Clausewitz ne fait que se déplacer en suivant l’apparition de ces nouvelles technologies. Les stratégies qui reposent excessivement sur la rationalité et la certitude sont tout simplement dangereuses dans l’environnement dynamique et variable qu’est la guerre. Faut-il croire à une réduction de la présence humaine sur le champ de bataille ? L'utilisation croissante des drones et des armes autonomes nous pousse à nous questionner sur l'avenir des opérations militaires. Assisterons-nous à nouveau à des offensives massives avec des forces expéditionnaires comme le débarquement de Normandie en 1944 ou verrons-nous plutôt un pays être envahi par un essaim de drones ? En mai 2022, la Chine lançait son premier porte-drones de navigation autonome, prénommé « Zhu Hai Yun ». Officiellement présenté comme un vaisseau de recherche océanographique, ces fonctions militaires sont pourtant bien présentes. Ce vaisseau pouvant accueillir jusqu’à 50 drones aériens, de surfaces et sous-marins, devient un instrument de choix pour l’action chinoise en Indopacifique. Parallèlement la Turquie s’illustre aussi par le développement de « vaisseaux-mères de drones » équipés des Bayraktar TB2. Certes, ces vaisseaux-mères ne seraient pas en mesure de participer à des conflits aériens de haute intensité où ils ne pourraient, à titre d’exemple, rivaliser avec des porte-avions légers dotés de F-35B japonais ou italiens. Toutefois, dans des zones faiblement défendues, ils pourraient changer la nature des batailles côtières. À cet égard, les Bayraktar TB2 ont pu démontrer leur efficacité au cours des derniers mois, que cela soit dans le conflit du Haut-Karabagh ou dans la guerre russo-ukrainienne. Toutefois, à distance ou sur le champ de bataille, il ne faut pas conclure à l'effacement de l'individu. L'issue d'un conflit ne peut être garantie par cette seule technologie. En effet, même si l’utilisation de drones autonomes peut être couronnée de succès, l’occupation du territoire reste une vérité indéniable dans certains contextes opérationnels, une chose qui ne pourra pas être accomplie par les SALA. Ces derniers ont donc une « place complémentaire à celle des combattants ». Les phases d’occupation/stabilisation (et par extension de reconstruction) feront toujours partie des conflits et nécessiteront la présence de personnel sur le terrain. Alors que la volonté de tout pays technologiquement développé est d’en finir rapidement avec la guerre, l’issue de celle-ci n’est jamais certaine et demeure un enjeu politique complexe. L’exemple de la situation en Ukraine illustre le fait que l’adversaire est souvent en mesure de s’armer des mêmes technologies que son opposant. Ainsi, même si la guerre peut évoluer vers de nouvelles sphères, in fine, celle-ci est un problème politique qui se règle au sol et nécessite des troupes et donc des êtres humains. **** Armes étant l’objet actuellement de plusieurs fantasmes et de tentatives d’interdiction sans qu’il ne soit clairement établi ce qu’est un SALA, ces systèmes d’armes continueront probablement à connaître des définitions multiples. Même si les gouvernements ont leur part de responsabilité dans cette situation, elle résulte aussi des ambigüités et confusions entretenues par les médias et les autres acteurs internationaux. Il convient aussi de ne pas trop donner foi aux thèses prétendant que les SALA constituaient une énième révolution militaire, reléguant par extension l’humain à l’arrière-front, voire le déconnectant de la guerre. La problématique de savoir si la guerre est intrinsèquement liée à la présence humaine sur le champ de bataille ou si elle pouvait être remplacée par les nouvelles technologies trouve in fine sa réponse dans les propos éclairants du Colonel Ardant du Picq : « L'homme est l'instrument premier du combat ».     ## Les campagnes internationales de dénonciation et leurs conséquences sur les conflits civils URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-campagnes-internationales-de-denonciation-et-leurs-consequences-sur-les-conflits-civils/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note politique émet des hypothèses sur ce qui pourrait être fait pour éviter les conséquences néfastes sur les civils qui résultent... Lorsque des actes de violence contre des civils sont largement médiatisés, le Canada est souvent pressé de rejoindre ses alliés dans des campagnes de dénonciation publique visant à augmenter le coût politique pour un acteur de réprimer les droits humains. Le Canada s’est par exemple illustré dans la campagne anti-apartheid en Afrique du Sud, en cherchant notamment des moyens de soutenir l'intérêt mondial vis-à-vis des violences dans le pays et en tentant d’influencer ses alliés vers l’imposition de sanctions économiques contre les responsables. Face à des images et des comptes rendus d’atrocités, il est ainsi tout à fait compréhensible que des gouvernements s’indignent et identifient les responsables de violences, qu’il s’agisse de régimes autocratiques ou de groupes armés. Toutefois, aussi intuitives et nécessaires que puissent sembler à première vue ces dénonciations, celles-ci ne sont cependant pas sans conséquence pour les conflits civils et les risques subséquents de violence politique. En effet, des études indiquent que les campagnes de dénonciation internationale échouent souvent à mettre fin à la violence contre les civils et exacerbent parfois même les abus en radicalisant ceux qui les commettent. Il apparaît donc nécessaire de réfléchir à la façon dont le Canada et ses alliés devraient intervenir publiquement pour assurer la protection des droits humains, mais tout en préservant la stabilité politique et sécuritaire des régions visées par les campagnes de dénonciation internationale. L’objectif de cette note politique est donc double. D’abord, il s’agit de définir les campagnes de dénonciation internationale et les différents impacts qu'elles peuvent avoir sur les conflits civils. Ensuite, il sera question de discuter des politiques canadiennes actuelles de dénonciation internationale et de proposer des pistes qui minimiseraient les risques que ces campagnes aient des effets pervers et entraînent une augmentation des violations des droits humains. Pour ce faire, cette note met de l’avant certaines conséquences tragiques de la récente campagne occidentale de dénonciation visant la junte militaire birmane au lendemain du coup d'État de février 2021, puis tente d'émettre des hypothèses sur ce qui n'a pas fonctionné et ce qui pourrait être fait pour éviter les conséquences néfastes sur les civils qui résultent des campagnes internationales de dénonciation. Une brève histoire des campagnes internationales de dénonciation   Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les questions de protection des droits de la personne ont pris une importance mondiale. L’accroissement du nombre d'organisations non gouvernementales de défense des droits humains, conjugué à l'évolution des médias et à leur présence grandissante dans les zones de conflit, a sensibilisé le public à ces enjeux, tout en encourageant les électeurs à faire pression sur leurs représentants pour une action internationale contre les régimes oppressifs. Cela a abouti à la création d'un réseau mondial de défense des droits de la personne qui a travaillé pour faire connaître les atrocités et leurs auteurs (identification), et veiller à ce que les coupables de violations des droits humains soient punis socialement (déshonneur). Le contexte de l'après-guerre froide des années 1990 s'est avéré être un terreau fertile pour l'établissement de nouvelles normes concernant la responsabilité des États de protéger leurs populations contre les atteintes aux droits humains et, à l'inverse, le devoir moral de la communauté internationale d'assurer la protection de ces droits. En effet, l'attention mondiale portée aux défis sécuritaires s'est progressivement déplacée de la menace nucléaire vers les questions de protection des droits humains à mesure que les conflits intra-étatiques se multipliaient et devenaient la principale source d'instabilité dans le monde. Les dirigeants occidentaux ont alors commencé à adopter l'idée d'interventions humanitaires, c'est-à-dire d'interventions coercitives au service des valeurs humanitaires universelles, afin de donner un sens moral à la société internationale. De cette manière, la mondialisation libérale et l'hégémonie américaine ont élargi le terrain idéologique et normatif sur lequel les conflits intra-étatiques se sont déroulés – les violations des droits de la personne sont devenues un problème à traiter au niveau international et parfois au détriment des normes de souveraineté des États. Les rebelles commercialisent alors leur cause et leurs souffrances via les médias de masse et les organisations internationales non gouvernementales (OING) dans le but d'attirer l'attention internationale, ce qui est susceptible de générer en retour une indignation morale et ainsi de forcer la communauté internationale à agir contre le coupable « perçu ». Par le biais de ce processus, il est souvent apparu à la fois légitime et nécessaire pour les démocraties occidentales de s'exprimer publiquement contre les régimes accusés de crimes contre leurs propres populations et, dans certains cas, d'aller jusqu'à intervenir militairement pour empêcher de nouvelles effusions de sang. Le changement normatif de la politique internationale après la guerre froide a donc fait en sorte que les campagnes de dénonciation internationale sont devenues un outil de politique étrangère répandu en Europe occidentale et en Amérique du Nord. Les États se joignent ainsi aux OING et aux réseaux transnationaux dans leurs dénonciations publiques des violations des droits humains et menacent les régimes d'invoquer la responsabilité de protéger et de voter des sanctions économiques au Conseil de sécurité, ou de prendre d'autres mesures coercitives visant à mettre fin aux abus étatiques. Ce sens de conscience globale et de responsabilité morale est donc devenu une nouvelle force dans la politique mondiale et a changé à jamais la manière dont les conflits intra-étatiques sont combattus. Comment l’indignation internationale peut inverser le cours de la violence Concrètement, la manière dont les politiques de dénonciation sont susceptibles d'affecter la capacité et la volonté d'un acteur de réprimer les droits humains demeure sujette au débat. Les mécanismes généralement identifiés sont les suivants. Premièrement, les OING créent des connaissances sur les abus et partagent des informations avec les journalistes concernés. Les médias agissent alors ensuite comme une courroie de transmission pour que les violations locales se transforment en controverses internationales et se propagent au-delà des frontières. De l’autre côté, l'outrage moral agit comme un levier pour inciter les acteurs étrangers à agir contre les contrevenants et à montrer leur soutien aux victimes. L'avantage pour les États de s'engager dans des condamnations morales et des sanctions économiques est donc double : d'une part, ils évitent d’éventuels dommages à la réputation causés par une inaction face à des violations flagrantes des droits humains; d'autre part, ils signalent leur attachement à l'ordre international libéral et aux normes que celui-ci perpétue. Pour les personnes visées par les dénonciations, les conséquences sont toutefois majeures. En effet, la désapprobation internationale des auteurs en fait des parias avec qui aucun partenaire ne souhaite interagir ou faire des affaires, de peur d'être à son tour associé à des crimes contre les droits humains. En conséquence, l’on s'attend à ce que les agresseurs modifient leur comportement répressif s'ils ne peuvent pas risquer la perte de pouvoir, de ressources, d'alliés ou de légitimité qu'entraînerait l'inaction face à une telle condamnation. En réalité, le processus n'est pas si simple et il n'est pas non plus facile pour les victimes de violations des droits humains de se faire entendre sur la scène internationale. Une lutte pour le récit est susceptible d'avoir lieu entre les responsables de violence et leurs opposants, ce qui risque de compliquer les efforts des victimes pour faire connaître les abus. En effet, la violence d'État est souvent réinterprétée ou occultée afin d'éviter tout contrecoup qui renforcerait la dissidence. De même, les groupes rebelles utilisant la violence contre les civils essaient souvent de se présenter comme des victimes ou de légitimer leur violence en réaction aux abus commis par leurs opposants. De ce point de vue, la réussite des victimes à responsabiliser les auteurs de leurs crimes dépend fortement de leur capacité à transmettre des informations sur les abus dans les jours qui suivent les événements répressifs. Des entrepreneurs dissidents, qui mobilisent des sympathisants et veillent à ce que l'information sur les abus atteigne le plus grand nombre, jouent ainsi un rôle crucial pour retourner la violence contre ceux qui la mettent en place. D’autre part, tous les pays ne sont pas également susceptibles d’être visés par des dénonciations internationales à la suite d'une répression sévère. En fait, les États les plus puissants du système sont souvent partiellement immunisés contre les campagnes de dénonciation et de sanction, car ils peuvent exercer des représailles et faire pression sur leurs accusateurs. De même, les États sont souvent réticents à condamner publiquement leurs alliés et partenaires économiques, comme en témoignent les très rares critiques des pays européens auxquelles l'Espagne a été confrontée lorsque son gouvernement a eu recours à la répression politique contre les sécessionnistes catalans. Un autre point à considérer sur l’influence de ces campagnes sur le recours à la violence politique concerne la relation entre les oppresseurs et le groupe qui est opprimé. Lorsque les dissidents font partie de groupes minoritaires, la répression étatique est plus susceptible de se produire que face à des mouvements qui mobilisent une plus grande partie de la population sur laquelle les dirigeants politiques doivent s'appuyer pour demeurer au pouvoir. En d'autres termes, la relation de dépendance, ou l'absence de dépendance entre les auteurs de violences et leurs victimes, joue un rôle clé dans la décision des États de s'engager dans la violence politique pour réprimer leur opposition, tout en ayant également un impact sur la mesure dans laquelle la répression parviendra à écraser la dissidence. Ceci est important, car dans les cas de campagnes de résistance dirigées par des minorités, des tiers partis semblent nécessaires pour affecter la relation de dépendance entre les groupes réprimés et ceux qui les répriment. En effet, en identifiant et en dénonçant les contrevenants, les acteurs étrangers augmentent le coût de la répression des minorités et lient ainsi le sort politique des opprimés à celui de leur oppresseur. Un bon exemple de cette logique est celui du processus d'indépendance du Timor oriental. Bien que l'invasion indonésienne du Timor oriental ait entraîné de graves exactions contre la population civile, le gouvernement de Jakarta a payé peu de frais politiques jusqu'à ce qu'une controverse internationale sur le massacre de Santa Cruz fasse de la répression politique une stratégie de plus en plus intenable pour lutter contre le mouvement sécessionniste au Timor oriental. La minorité timoraise, que les autorités indonésiennes étaient parvenues à présenter à la population nationale comme violente et dangereuse, est en fait devenue, grâce au soutien international et aux protestations non-violentes, suffisamment importante sur le plan politique pour que la répression cesse et que des négociations soient initiées. Les conséquences indésirables des dénonciations internationales sur les violations des droits humains D'autres études de cas indiquent cependant que les campagnes internationales de dénonciation peuvent avoir des effets qui vont au-delà des intentions de ceux qui les mettent en œuvre, voire de saper les objectifs initiaux visant à améliorer le bilan d'un gouvernement en matière de droits humains. Par exemple, la pression morale et sociale exercée sur un régime peut paradoxalement l'inciter à restreindre les activités des organisations de la société civile afin de masquer le non-respect des normes et engagements en matière de droits humains. Il s'agit d'une conséquence particulièrement perverse puisqu'il a été démontré que les organisations de la société civile jouent un rôle crucial pour assurer la protection des droits humains. De plus, lorsqu'ils sont visés par des dénonciations internationales, les gouvernements répressifs peuvent intensifier certaines violations, tout en réduisant d'autres. Cela est dû à la capacité variable des gouvernements d’améliorer leur bilan en matière de droits humains en fonction du type de violations commises et de leur contrôle sur les agents de la terreur. Par ailleurs, les gouvernements peuvent substituer certains types de violations à d'autres afin d'éviter le blâme international, ou même recourir à des milices pro-gouvernementales pour « se distancier de l'exécution de la violence tout en récoltant les fruits de la répression ». En fait, ces résultats font écho à d'autres travaux qui montrent que les alternatives à l'intervention militaire telles que les sanctions économiques ont souvent empiré plutôt qu'amélioré les conditions des droits de la personne dans le pays ciblé, notamment parce qu'elles augmentent l'instabilité politique et affectent la capacité du gouvernement à contrôler ses agents de sécurité. La façon dont ces campagnes influencent les luttes entre les forces politiques locales est également d'une grande importance si l'objectif est de mettre fin aux violations des droits humains. En effet, la pression internationale sur un gouvernement renforce souvent l'opposition locale et les voix dissidentes, ce qui peut à son tour inciter les dirigeants politiques à recourir à la répression contre leurs opposants politiques et à réprimer davantage la dissidence. En outre, les acteurs non étatiques bénéficient parfois de la publicité internationale générée par des actes de violence contre les civils et peuvent donc avoir un intérêt à intensifier la violence avec leur adversaire étatique afin d’attirer des acteurs étrangers dans le conflit. Pire encore, lorsque des États étrangers accusent des gouvernements répressifs et font allusion à la menace d'une intervention militaire humanitaire, ils peuvent inciter des groupes minoritaires à se rebeller et à affronter l'État, ce qui peut entraîner une augmentation de la violence politique et ainsi engendrer des conséquences catastrophiques pour les populations civiles. Ce phénomène a été tragiquement démontré dans l'ex-Yougoslavie, où des minorités nationales ont parfois intentionnellement provoqué des violences génocidaires afin de déclencher une intervention occidentale à leur faveur. Dénoncer les bourreaux au Myanmar Le coup d'État de Tatmadaw qui a renversé le gouvernement élu d'Aung San Suu Kyi au Myanmar en février 2021 a déclenché une violence généralisée dans le pays. Des images choquantes de manifestants non armés battus, arrêtés en pleine rue et torturés sont apparues dans les médias occidentaux, associées à des images poignantes de manifestants brandissant des banderoles transmettant un message clair : « Nous avons besoin de la [responsabilité de protéger] ». Des dénonciations et des sanctions internationales ont immédiatement suivi. Le Canada a participé à la campagne de dénonciation et d'humiliation contre la junte militaire, et le premier ministre Justin Trudeau a même critiqué les actions répressives de l'armée sur Twitter. La position du premier ministre Trudeau est conforme à la politique étrangère de longue date du Canada à l'égard du Myanmar; des sanctions ciblées contre certaines personnes et entités répertoriées sont d’ailleurs en place depuis 2007. Il n'est pas non plus nouveau pour le Canada de s'engager dans ce type de condamnation ou de se positionner comme une voix de premier plan quant à la défense des droits humains dans le monde. En effet, le Canada, soucieux de coopération multilatérale en matière de sécurité internationale, a souvent suivi ses alliés dans des campagnes internationales de dénonciation. Par exemple, la répression du mouvement sécessionniste au Timor oriental avait fait l'objet de dénonciations et de sanctions canadiennes contre des responsables indonésiens, ce qui avait conduit à des manifestations anti-Suharto au Canada et à une réponse cinglante de Jakarta à Ottawa. Cependant, la récente campagne de dénonciation au Myanmar ne semble pas encore aboutir au même succès qu'au Timor oriental. Ainsi, les négociations entre la junte et les acteurs étrangers ont échoué à plusieurs reprises, tandis que la violence a continué de s'intensifier. Par ailleurs, le bourbier politique dans lequel s'enfonce aujourd'hui le pays est loin d'être sans lien avec la campagne diplomatique d'exclusion et de dénonciation visant la junte. En effet, les critiques et les sanctions internationales ont créé un mirage d'interventionnisme et sapé les efforts de médiation. En conséquence, les manifestants attendent désormais un engagement plus soutenu de la communauté internationale en leur faveur et consacrent de la sorte une part importante de leurs activités de résistance à la recherche d'un soutien international. Des entretiens avec des groupes rebelles ont également révélé que certains ont pris le pari risqué d'une escalade de la violence avec la junte afin de déclencher une intervention occidentale. Plus inquiétant encore, ces condamnations ont accru la pression sur le régime, ce qui a donc incité la junte à intensifier la répression afin de consolider son pouvoir. Enfin, le manque de leadership international pour faire face à la crise et les espoirs déçus de l'opposition ont convaincu le gouvernement fantôme du Myanmar d'appeler à une « guerre défensive populaire » contre les forces militaires de la junte. Le pire est donc en train de se produire alors que les organisations humanitaires s'alarment d'un afflux de réfugiés dans les pays voisins. Ce qui semble ainsi avoir échoué au Myanmar, c'est la possibilité de trouver un compromis qui pourrait amener la junte à la table des négociations. En effet, les sanctions et dénonciations reflétaient à l’origine la volonté de la communauté internationale d'isoler la junte afin de la contraindre à négocier avec l'opposition et à faire cesser les violations. Ce qui n'était cependant pas envisagé, c'était le signal que les condamnations internationales ont transmis à l'opposition : continuez à vous battre et nous vous soutiendrons. Cela a en fait entravé la probabilité d'une résolution pacifique du conflit en plus d'augmenter la violence dans le pays, car les belligérants ont ressenti un sentiment d'urgence et ont décidé de s'engager tous les deux dans une stratégie sans compromis, qui ne pouvait qu'ouvrir la voie à l’émergence d’une guerre civile. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada Le poids et l'influence des mots outrepassent parfois les intentions initiales. Les campagnes de dénonciation internationale ont des conséquences pour les conflits civils qui sont difficiles à prévoir et peuvent changer avec le temps. Le Canada devrait donc être prudent et stratégique lorsqu'il s'engage dans des condamnations morales et des dénonciations publiques contre des gouvernements abusifs. Ce qui pourrait être fait pour éviter de nouvelles tragédies n'est pas simple, mais pas impossible non plus. Quatre pistes d’action sont à privilégier. Premièrement, les campagnes de dénonciation devraient toujours être explicites dans leurs motivations et leurs objectifs. Le Canada doit veiller à ce qu'il y ait le moins de flou possible sur ses intentions et son engagement futur dans le conflit afin d'éviter de faux espoirs pour les groupes luttant contre des gouvernements répressifs. Il doit également être clair que les condamnations vis-à-vis d’un régime répressif ne constitue pas de facto un support à ses opposants. Deuxièmement, le Canada devrait travailler en étroite collaboration avec les organisations locales de défense des droits de la personne avant d'envisager tout commentaire public sur la violence en cours. Bien que les médias exercent souvent des pressions pour que les politiciens prennent rapidement la parole sur des crises internationales, les propos du Canada auront un impact plus significatif et bénéfique s'ils sont préparés en coordination avec des acteurs qui peuvent réellement agir sur le terrain pour mettre fin à la violence. De plus, les liens développés avec ces organisations locales pourront servir de base sur laquelle le Canada pourra ensuite s’appuyer afin de contribuer aux efforts de maintien de la paix. Troisièmement, les mesures diplomatiques d'exclusion et les sanctions économiques imposées par le Canada doivent être conçues de manière à faciliter (et non à empêcher) un éventuel dialogue avec les responsables de violences. De fait, le Canada doit faire savoir, dans ses dénonciations publiques, que l’allègement des mesures punitives est tributaire de gestes concrets des responsables visés afin d’atténuer les violences. Qui plus est, l'imposition de mesures punitives en réponse aux violations des droits humains doit être progressive afin que le régime visé puisse reculer et n'ait aucun intérêt à persister dans la répression. Il faut faire en sorte que les responsables de violence aient un avantage réel à faire cesser les violations et ne tentent pas plutôt d’esquiver les sanctions internationales qui les visent. De cette façon, les campagnes doivent être pensées de façon à offrir une voie de sortie honorable aux régimes visés afin que ceux-ci abandonnent leurs tactiques répressives. Enfin, le Canada doit continuer de s’engager auprès de ses alliés lorsque de larges exactions sont commises contre les populations civiles. En effet, la parole du Canada vis-à-vis d’une crise humanitaire aura une plus grande portée si elle s’accorde à celles de ses alliés. De plus, en dialoguant avec ses alliés avant de prendre la parole, le Canada minimise les risques que les dénonciations envoient aux acteurs sur le terrain des signaux contradictoires. ## Les Canadiens veulent jouer un rôle diplomatique plus important dans les affaires internationales : tracer une nouvelle voie pour notre place dans le monde URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-canadiens-veulent-jouer-un-role-diplomatique-plus-important-dans-les-affaires-internationales-tracer-une-nouvelle-voie-pour-notre-place-dans-le-monde/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Dans ce point chaud, Jean-Christophe Boucher analyse les résultats d'un sondage d'août 2020 sur les préférences et ambitions des Canadiens en matière de politique étrangère. Les deux dernières décennies ont été difficiles pour la politique étrangère canadienne. Les gouvernements successifs à Ottawa ont eu du mal à articuler une politique cohérente ancrée dans nos valeurs et nos intérêts et à allouer des ressources à ces objectifs. En bref, nous avons perdu le contrôle de notre propre destin dans le monde. En temps aussi confus, un premier pas vers une nouvelle réflexion sur notre place dans le monde devrait commencer par une prise de conscience des préférences et des ambitions des Canadiens en matière de politique étrangère. À cette fin, le Réseau canadien sur la défense et la sécurité a convoqué certains des plus grands experts du Canada pour concevoir une enquête publique. Un groupe dirigé par l'Université de Calgary a travaillé avec Nanos Research pour déployer un sondage en août 2020, interrogeant 1504 Canadiens sur leurs attitudes à l'égard de la politique étrangère et de défense. Cliquez ici pour consulter les résultats du sondage. Nous avons d'abord demandé aux Canadiens quel devrait être, selon eux, notre rôle dans le monde. La réponse de loin la plus courante (31% des répondants) était que le Canada devrait être un gardien de la paix, un médiateur ou une voix de la raison dans les affaires internationales. D'autres réponses courantes relevaient que le Canada était un chef de file/décideur, un modèle et un défenseur des droits de la personne et aidant ceux qui en ont besoin. Ces réponses montrent que les Canadiens croient généralement que notre contribution aux affaires mondiales devrait se concentrer sur la désescalade des tensions dans un environnement international tendu où le caractère raisonnable fait défaut. En d’autres mots, il s'agit d'un rôle ambitieux pour n'importe quel pays, sans parler d'une petite puissance comme le Canada qui n'a ni la puissance économique ni la puissance militaire pour diriger le cours des événements mondiaux. En outre, nos moyens d'influence traditionnels, comme tirer parti des organisations internationales, ont été limités par l'enchevêtrement croissant de la concurrence des grandes puissances. Ce que nous pouvons faire, cependant, c'est diriger notre énergie et notre détermination vers l'établissement de relations plus solides avec des pays partageant les mêmes idées – comme le Royaume-Uni, la France, l'Allemagne, le Japon, l'Australie et la Corée du Sud – et mobiliser ces réseaux pour créer des zones d'ordre dans un monde agité. Deuxièmement, nous avons demandé dans quelle mesure, le cas échéant, les répondants pensent que le Canada fait face à des menaces internationales. 41% des personnes interrogées ont répondu que ces menaces étaient importantes, tandis que 36% étaient neutres et 20% dans une faible mesure. Cela montre que les Canadiens sont conscients de la détérioration de l’environnement sécuritaire dans le monde. Toutefois, comme la figure 1 ci-dessous semble l’indiquer, il y une forte disparité suivant les régions et le sexe avec les Québécois et les femmes étant le plus circonspecte face à la présence d’une menace internationale. Les répondants des Prairies (Alberta, Saskatchewan et Manitoba) et les hommes, quant à eux, perçoivent cette menace plus réelle. Lorsque nous leur avons demandé ce qu'ils croyaient être la menace la plus et la deuxième menace la plus importante, la Chine (34%) a été identifiée comme la principale menace, suivie de très près par les États-Unis/Trump (31%), des cyber-attaques (16%), et du terrorisme (13%). La patience des Canadiens avec la Chine et les États-Unis s’érode et, par conséquent, cela augmente le coût intérieur des efforts du gouvernement pour promouvoir de meilleures relations avec ces pays. Figure 1 : Perceptions de la menace chez les Canadiens (disparités entre région et sexe) Troisièmement, nous avons examiné comment le Canada devrait promouvoir sa place dans l'environnement mondial. La figure 2 ci-dessous présente les résultats. Les réponses les plus courantes étaient la diplomatie (82%), le commerce international (80%) et la politique environnementale (79%). Comparativement, l'immigration (59%), l'aide étrangère (54%) et la défense nationale (54%) étaient considérées comme moins importantes en tant qu'instruments de politique étrangère. Cette focalisation sur la diplomatie, le commerce et la politique environnementale correspond à l'idée que notre valeur ajoutée dans les affaires mondiales est notre capacité à transcender les intérêts personnels et à travailler vers des objectifs plus larges à long terme. Ce qui est surprenant, cependant, c'est que nous n'avons pas vraiment investi dans ces outils. Il semble que les Canadiens sont en faveur d’une augmentation des ressources consacrées à la diplomatie canadienne. Figure 2 : Importance des outils de politique étrangère pour promouvoir la place du Canada dans le monde Quatrièmement, sur la question de l'équilibre entre la promotion de nos intérêts et de nos valeurs, 59% des Canadiens ont soutenu que nous devrions donner la priorité à la promotion de nos valeurs dans le monde, tandis que seulement 17% ont suggéré que nous devrions nous concentrer sur nos intérêts, avec quelques écarts importants constatés entre les régions et entre les genres. Un très grand nombre de Canadiens (36%) ont indiqué que le commerce et les échanges économiques étaient nos principaux intérêts nationaux, tandis que 16% ont répondu la responsabilité environnementale, 8% la sécurité et 6% le pétrole et le gaz/l'énergie. Lorsque nous leur avons demandé précisément quelles valeurs devraient être promues, 25% ont répondu l'inclusion, l'équité et l'égalité, suivi de la paix (13%), des droits de l'homme (13%) et de la démocratie (11%). Cet accent sur l'inclusivité est très intéressant. En termes de politique étrangère, les Canadiens expriment le besoin d’être authentique – pour reprendre la notion de Charles Taylor – sur la scène mondiale. Cela pourrait être réalisé en ancrant notre politique dans notre sens commun en tant que société pluraliste, et en s'efforçant de développer un projet politique qui reconnaît la force de la diversité. L’accent mis par le gouvernement Trudeau sur une politique étrangère féministe est une bonne première étape, car cela reconnaît notre attachement à l’égalité des sexes. Néanmoins, il ne tire pas pleinement parti de l'étendue d'une société qui négocie, bien qu’imparfaitement, le bilinguisme, l'inclusion et la reconnaissance des Noirs, des Autochtones et des personnes de couleur, et un engagement à promouvoir les droits des LGBTQ +. De toute évidence, le gouvernement du Canada peut redéfinir ses priorités et être plus audacieux. Cela n’est qu’un aperçu de ce que nous apprenons sur l’attitude des Canadiens à l’égard de la politique étrangère, mais deux grandes conclusions semblent découler de ces résultats. Premièrement, les Canadiens veulent s'impliquer dans les affaires mondiales, s'engager vigoureusement dans la diplomatie pour promouvoir nos valeurs – en particulier notre attachement à un projet politique centré sur la tolérance et la diversité – et nos intérêts économiques. Deuxièmement, les attitudes agressives de Pékin et de Washington D.C. sont perçues comme les principales menaces à la souveraineté canadienne et à la stabilité internationale. Les Canadiens ont pris note de la concurrence croissante entre ces deux puissances et se méfient de plus en plus d'elles. Cela justifie les efforts de la part du gouvernement canadien pour développer de meilleures relations avec d'autres États du monde et pour investir des ressources dans notre corps diplomatique afin de réduire notre dépendance à l'égard de la Chine et des États-Unis. ## Les conséquences de la guerre en Ukraine dans l’Arctique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-consequences-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine-dans-larctique/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > Face à l’impact des sanctions sur les grands projets de gaz industriels en Sibérie, le Kremlin n’a pas changé sa position, condamnant avec... Depuis l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie en février 2022, la région de l’Arctique a fait l’objet de nombreuses sanctions économiques de la part des pays occidentaux, en particulier de l’Union européenne. Les conséquences pour l’économie russe sont immédiates, avec la suspension de plusieurs projets de développement d’usines d’hydrocarbures, le projet Arctic LNG2 notamment. Le retrait des entreprises européennes du projet et l’interruption de l’approvisionnement en technologies indispensables à son fonctionnement pourraient affecter les ambitions du Kremlin dans sa stratégie de développement de la région de l’Arctique. Il en va de même pour la construction de la flotte de méthaniers brise-glace, qui devait accompagner la mise en service d’Arctic LNG2. Cependant, Vladimir Poutine reste inflexible sur sa politique arctique et pousse les industriels russes à trouver et à mettre en œuvre des solutions pour compenser la défection des technologies occidentales. L’absence de la Russie au Conseil de l’Arctique, l’escalade à propos des questions de sécurité dans l’Arctique et la volonté du Kremlin de sécuriser encore davantage la route maritime du Nord laissent présager un regain de tension dans cette région qui bénéficiait jusqu’à présent d’un niveau exceptionnel de coopération. ## Les défis sécuritaires en Afrique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-defis-securitaires-en-afrique/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > Pendant des décennies, l’Afrique a été considéréecomme une région éloignée et passive. Désormais,elle concentre tous les regards et... Pendant des décennies, l’Afrique a été considérée comme une région éloignée et passive. Désormais, elle concentre tous les regards et toutes les ambitions. Elle constitue la plus grande réserve de ressources naturelles et, dans trente ans, elle abritera un quart de la population mondiale. Reflet d’un univers fracturé, le continent concentre aujourd’hui nombre des enjeux politiques et stratégiques qu’affronte la « communauté internationale» dans son ensemble : compétition entre grandes puissances, mercenariat, fragilité des transitions démocratiques, relativité de la paix. À partir d’exemples récents et particulièrement brûlants, ce volume déconstruit certains discours convenus et saisit les transformations en cours, en faisant la part belle aux enjeux stratégiques et aux terrains les plus sensibles (Sahel, Mali, Tchad, Éthiopie). Notre avenir immédiat se joue aussi en Afrique. Procurez-vous le livre Les défis sécuritaires en Afrique, le sixième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Une nouvelle génération d’experts renommés, d’observateurs avisés des opérations en cours livre ici ses points de vue éclairés, accessibles au plus grand nombre et accompagnés d’une riche infographie. Les différentes contributions de ce livre sont issues de la plateforme francophone d’analyse de questions internationales Le Rubicon.   SOMMAIRE L’Afrique dans le grand jeu mondial par Nina Wilén Europe-Afrique : les enjeux d’une relation à redéfinir par Arthur Banga L’onde de choc à venir du mercenariat : les conséquences de la guerre en Ukraine pour l’Afrique par Raphaël Parens La Russie au Sahel : vers une aggravation des situations sécuritaires et politiques par Michael Shurkin Défis sécuritaires en Afrique de l’Ouest par Didier Castres La technocratisation des portefeuilles de la défense et de la sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest par Oswald Padonou Minusma « à la carte » ou fin de partie géopolitique au mali par Arthur Boutellis Le mirage de la transition démocratique au Tchad par Alexandra Lamarche Éthiopie : un si fragile vernis de paix par Sonia Le Gouriellec   Le Rubicon publiera de petits livres destinés au grand public, qui permettront d’aborder, clairement et précisément, les nouvelles questions brûlantes liées à l’actualité internationale. Chaque mois, à partir d’avril 2022, les Équateurs publieront un ouvrage d’environ 128 à 144 pages, au prix de 10 à 12 euros, synthèse du travail des experts de la plateforme Le Rubicon. ## Les défis stratégiques de la France URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-defis-strategiques-de-la-france/ Modified: 2023-03-23 > Procurez-vous le livre Les défis stratégiques de la France, le quatrième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Guerre en Europe, reconfiguration au Sahel, préparation aux conflits de haute intensité, risque terroriste, montée en puissance de la Chine, ruptures technologiques, autonomie stratégique, influence de la France dans le monde… les défis ne manquent pas. Ce volume dresse un panorama des principaux défis stratégiques de la France à l’heure d’une offensive sans précédent contre ses intérêts et les valeurs qu’elle porte depuis des siècles. Procurez-vous le livre Les défis stratégiques de la France, le quatrième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Une nouvelle génération d’experts renommés, d’observateurs avisés des opérations en cours livre ici ses points de vue éclairés, accessibles au plus grand nombre et accompagnés d’une riche infographie. Les différentes contributions de ce livre sont issues de la plateforme francophone d’analyse de questions internationales Le Rubicon. SOMMAIRE « Le déclassement de la France est une idée fausse », par Michel Duclos « L’éveil de la France face au défi chinois », par Pierre Morcos « L’Indo-Pacifique, espace stratégique de la puissance aérospatiale française », par Paco Milhiet « AUKUS, un coup de semonce pour les relations franco-américaines », par Célia Belin « L’interprétation erronée de l’histoire par Macron est contre-productive », par Alexander Lanoszka « Il ne faut pas humilier la Russie ». La formule et ses implications politico-stratégiques », par Olivier Schmitt « Que reste-t-il de la propagande russe en France ? », par Etienne Soula « La haute intensité : limites du concept et implications pour la France », par Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer « La préparation de la prochaine loi de programmation militaire confond vitesse et précipitation », par Olivier Schmitt « La sécurité climatique dans la réflexion stratégique en France », par Adrien Estève   Le Rubicon publiera de petits livres destinés au grand public, qui permettront d’aborder, clairement et précisément, les nouvelles questions brûlantes liées à l’actualité internationale. Chaque mois, à partir d’avril 2022, les Équateurs publieront un ouvrage d’environ 128 à 144 pages, au prix de 10 à 12 euros, synthèse du travail des experts de la plateforme Le Rubicon. La nouvelle collection du Rubicon ## Les élections présidentielles aux États-Unis : quel impact sur les relations irano-américaines ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-elections-presidentielles-aux-etats-unis-quel-impact-sur-les-relations-irano-americaines/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Quelle que soit l’issue des urnes, il ne faut pas s’attendre à une « révolution » dans la politique de Washington vis-à-vis de la République islamique d’Iran. Avant même que Donald Trump ne prenne ses fonctions il y a quatre ans, les médias prophétisaient une rupture majeure dans les relations avec l’Iran. Depuis des mois, advenant une victoire démocrate aux élections présidentielles de 2020, ces mêmes médias nous promettent un autre virage à 180 degrés. Et pourtant, les résultats de la prochaine élection présidentielle américaine ont peu de chances de modifier en profondeur la relation irano-américaine. Quelle que soit l’issue des urnes, il ne faut pas s’attendre à une « révolution » dans la politique de Washington vis-à-vis de la République islamique d’Iran. Rien pour l’heure n’indique que Donald Trump envisage de revenir sur sa stratégie de « pression maximale » dans l’éventualité d’un second mandat. S’il venait à le remplacer à la présidence des États-Unis, Joe Biden promet d’adopter une approche plus modérée – sans pour autant remettre en cause les postulats fondamentaux qui sous-tendent la politique iranienne de ses prédécesseurs. Oscillante à la surface, cette politique peut effectivement donner le sentiment d’incessantes ruptures et contradictions. Mais une analyse plus approfondie montre que, au-delà des différences de styles et de moyens, elle demeure étonnamment constante – guidée par des facteurs structurels qui dépassent les inflexions que lui donnent les locataires successifs de la Maison-Blanche. Revenons ici sur les raisons de cette continuité et sur quelques-unes de ses implications potentielles. La première raison, sans doute la plus importante du côté américain, tient aux paramètres géopolitiques permanents qui fixent invariablement l’axe de la politique de Washington vis-à-vis de l’Iran. Pour s’en rendre compte, il faut prendre du recul historique, adopter une perspective « macro » et regarder la ligne directrice tracée par cette politique au cours des quatre dernières décennies. Depuis la révolution islamique et le fracassant divorce de 1979, Washington est en mode « récupération » – ce qui se traduit par un jeu à double vitesse. D’un côté, il s’agit de réengager la République islamique à travers le dialogue et une certaine forme de marchandage économique, diplomatique et militaire. De l’autre, il s’agit de limiter la capacité de nuisance du régime iranien sur la scène régionale et continentale. Malgré les périodes de chaud et de froid, les différentes administrations américaines ont toutes composé autour de cette partition géopolitique et sa logique binaire. Seule change la manière : les démocrates favorisent généralement la négociation, la concertation internationale et les approches multilatérales – sans toutefois abandonner l’usage de la contrainte. Quant à eux, les républicains privilégient l’unilatéralisme, l’interventionnisme, la force et l’intimidation sans jamais renoncer à ramener les Iraniens à la table des négociations. Au-delà des variations formelles de style et de ton, toutes les administrations ont pratiqué avec l’Iran cette politique de « fermeté-ouverture » et de « négociation-neutralisation ». Cette approche à deux vitesses se retrouve sous des formes variées dans la doctrine Carter, dans la posture plus ou moins intransigeante de Reagan et des Bush père et fils, dans le Dual Containment de Clinton ou dans l’option de la Main tendue d’Obama – mais en fin de compte elle obéit toujours à la même logique sous-jacente dictée par d’immuables facteurs d’ordre structurel. Adepte de ce qu’il appelle lui-même « the art of the deal », Trump n’a fait que substituer une technique de vente agressive aux marchandages feutrés de ceux qui l’ont devancé dans le bureau ovale. Une approche frontale, voire brutale, qui, pourtant, n’est pas fondamentalement différente de la politique de « fermeté-transaction » de ses prédécesseurs dans la mesure où elle vise également à ramener les Iraniens à la table des pourparlers. Comme le souligne Dombrowski et Reich, « u point d’être alarmant pour ses partisans et rassurant pour ses détracteurs, tout jusqu’ici suggère que le président Trump […] a lui aussi adopté, et continuera d’adopter, ce que le président Obama avait appelé avec ironie le ‘Washington Playbook’ ». Au terme du premier mandat Trump et malgré ces revirements spectaculaires, les experts tendent à relativiser la thèse d’une « révolution ». À leurs yeux, si le trumpisme imprime indéniablement un nouveau ton à la diplomatie américaine, il n’en continue pas moins de renforcer des tendances préexistantes. Certains soulignent que les changements observables au niveau tactique et caractérisés par l’utilisation de nouveaux « moyens » ne doivent pas être confondus avec des modifications d’ordre structurel ayant trait aux « finalités » de la politique étrangère américaine qui, elles, demeurent essentiellement pérennes. D’autres concluent que, derrière les accents de rupture, la politique iranienne de l’administration Trump s’inscrit dans la continuité de celle de l’administration Obama en ce qui concerne ses principes directeurs, à savoir diminuer l’influence régionale de la République islamique tout en l’empêchant de tomber dans l’escarcelle des grandes puissances eurasiatiques. Quant à Joe Biden, s’il condamne irrévocablement la « pression maximale » de Trump, il fait totalement siens les fondements de la politique de « fermeté-transaction » de ses autres prédécesseurs. À la surface, tout dans la rhétorique du candidat démocrate laisse présager un revirement majeur dans la politique iranienne de Washington. « We urgently need to change course » a-t-il notamment déclaré lors d’une entrevue donnée à CNN, ajoutant notamment que : « By any objective measure, Trump's "maximum pressure" has been a boon to the regime in Iran and a bust for America's interests. » Pourtant, une lecture attentive de ce discours fait apparaître que ces désaccords affichés avec la doctrine Trump se situent davantage au niveau de la forme qu’au niveau du fond. Dans la même entrevue, Joe Biden précise: « there is a smart way to be tough on Iran, and there is Trump's way. » S’il préconise de reconsidérer les moyens utilisés au cours des quatre dernières années, il demeure extrêmement conventionnel, voire conservateur, en ce qui concerne les objectifs poursuivis. Non seulement il s’agit d’empêcher l’Iran d’acquérir l’arme atomique, mais aussi de ramener ses dirigeants à la table des négociations pour obtenir – qui plus est – un accord plus englobant et plus contraignant que le JCPOA signé en 2015 – un accord élargi à la cessation des « activités déstabilisatrices » des gardiens de la révolution dans la région et à la suspension de l’ambitieux programme de missiles balistiques iraniens. Autant de clauses d’un nouvel accord que le candidat démocrate entend imposer à Téhéran et qui touchent à des aspects essentiels de la souveraineté iranienne tout en faisant écho à la politique de « fermeté-ouverture » et de « négociation-neutralisation » pratiquée par Washington au cours des quatre dernières décennies. L’autre raison majeure pour laquelle le résultat des élections présidentielles américaines ne risque pas de modifier en profondeur les relations irano-américaines est que, à Téhéran, les dirigeants islamiques n’en attendent pas grand-chose et que, pour tout dire, ils affichent même le plus grand scepticisme. Une victoire démocrate permettrait certes au régime iranien de reprendre son souffle et d’espérer un relâchement de l’effort de strangulation politique, économique et militaire subie depuis bientôt quatre ans. Mais, exercée de manière plus diplomatique, ils savent pertinemment que la pression américaine ne cesserait pas pour autant. Surtout, la « doctrine Biden » continuerait, malgré tout, de menacer les impératifs stratégiques vitaux de l’Iran – des impératifs qui, même abordées avec la plus grande courtoisie, demeureront non-négociables aux yeux des Iraniens. En effet, la mise sous tutelle des programmes nucléaires et balistiques ajoutée à la diminution significative des activités régionales de Téhéran présente l’inconvénient de toucher des points cruciaux sur lesquels les Iraniens ne peuvent céder simultanément (se priver de l’assurance-vie nucléaire et, en même temps, de la sphère d’influence protectrice) sans risquer d’affaiblir la souveraineté interne et externe du régime. Autant dire des lignes rouges. Comme l’explique Richard Nephew, chercheur principal au Center on Global Energy Policy de l'Université Columbia et ancien fonctionnaire du département d'État, les exigences précédemment formulées par les occidentaux et désormais reprises par Biden « are beyond Iran's willingness to even discuss ». S’ajoute à cela une raison supplémentaire pour laquelle il serait naïf de penser qu’un mandat démocrate se traduirait automatiquement par une amélioration des relations irano-américaines : les dernières années se sont accompagnées d’un renforcement majeur des “hardliners” qui, déjà donnés gagnants aux prochaines élections iraniennes, sont plus que jamais réticents à faire de nouvelles concessions envers Washington. Une dernière raison, et pas des moindres, pour laquelle il est désormais peu probable que l’Iran décide malgré tout d’accepter les nouvelles conditions que lui proposerait un nouveau président américain tient aux orientations stratégiques adoptées par Téhéran au cours des dernières années – dont certaines avant même l’élection de Donald Trump. Parmi ces orientations stratégiques la plus importante est sans aucun doute le rapprochement majeur opéré avec les membres de l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai (OCS) au premier rang desquels la Russie et la Chine. Des puissances eurasiatiques qui, en plus de promouvoir un ordre mondial plus multipolaire, partagent avec l'Iran une posture farouchement westphalienne ne souffrant aucune remise en cause des principes de souveraineté et de non-ingérence – y compris dans le domaine des droits humains. En témoignent la candidature iranienne à l’OCS et le nouveau partenariat stratégique de 25 ans que négocient actuellement Téhéran et Pékin. Certes, les dirigeants iraniens, éminemment pragmatiques et opportunistes, ne bouderaient pas la possibilité d’engranger quelques gains économiques ou diplomatiques si les Occidentaux leur en offraient la chance, mais ils le feraient avec précaution et retenue tant le régime se méfie désormais de cet Occident dans lequel, pour reprendre les mots employés par le ministre des affaires étrangères iranien, l’Iran « n’a jamais eu vraiment d’espoir ». Dans la même entrevue, ce même Zarif, pourtant du camp des modérés, déclarait déjà en 2019, que l’Iran s’est résolument tourné vers le « bloc eurasiatique » et que « the future of our foreign policy lies in that way ». De sorte qu’au-delà des changements politiques et des décisions ponctuelles auxquelles son évolution est souvent reliée à tort, la relation irano-américaine, bien moins fluctuante qu’elle n’y paraît, obéit avant tout aux forces profondes du jeu des grandes puissances et à son inexorable logique géopolitique. ## Les enjeux du réchauffement climatique en Arctique pour le Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-enjeux-du-rechauffement-climatique-en-arctique-pour-le-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Ce point chaud souligne certains impacts directs du changement climatique pour le Canada à la fois comme menace et opportunité, ainsi que les impacts découlant de l’attractivité montante de l’Arctique. Le changement climatique, dû à une hausse de la concentration de gaz à effets de serre (GES), est un facteur impactant l’ensemble des aspects de la vie en Arctique. Il impacte notamment son climat très sensible et ses systèmes hydro et écologique. L’une des particularités du réchauffement climatique est qu’il se renforce à mesure qu’il se rapproche des latitudes élevées, et donc des deux hémisphères de la planète. Ces régions se réchaufferaient à un rythme deux fois plus rapide que dans le reste du monde ; or elles constituent le régulateur climatique de toute la planète. De ce fait, il est forcément impactant pour chaque pays arctique, dont le Canada. En effet, le Groupe d’experts intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat (GIEC) explique la certitude d’un réchauffement global à +1,5°C par rapport à l’ère préindustrielle et la grande probabilité d’atteindre les +2°C. Dans tous les cas, et encore plus dans le cas de l’Arctique, cela présente des risques pour « la santé, les moyens de subsistance, la sécurité alimentaire, l’approvisionnement en eau, la sécurité humaine et la croissance économique ». Les premières conséquences de ce réchauffement dans la région sont la fonte de la banquise et du dégel du pergélisol, ce qui enclenche de nombreuses réactions en chaîne de conséquences désastreuses. Le paradoxe de cette région est que ces changements constituent la fois une menace et une opportunité. D’abord, c’est une catastrophe environnementale menaçant tous les pays de multiples manières (par exemple les incendies, inondations, épidémies, famines, migrations). D’autre part, cela s’avère créer de nombreuses nouvelles possibilités stratégiques, en particulier pour les pays arctiques, ainsi que ceux qui se revendiquent « du proche Arctique » (par exemple la Chine). Ce point chaud souligne donc certains impacts directs du changement climatique pour le Canada à la fois comme menace et opportunité, ainsi que les impacts découlant de l’attractivité montante de l’Arctique (par exemple les opportunités économiques). Différents impacts du réchauffement climatique en Arctique touchant le Canada Avec ce réchauffement climatique, les enjeux en Arctique sont multiples pour le Canada. Premièrement, la fonte de la banquise permet de faciliter l’accès aux ressources naturelles de la région arctique et donc leur exploitation. On sait que cette région regorge de minerais (par exemple les diamants, l'or, le plomb, le zinc, le nickel, l'uranium, le fer, les terres rares), mais des chiffres hypothétiques sur des réserves d’hydrocarbures dans les sous-sols arctiques, comme le gaz et le pétrole, ont également été mentionnés. Le pôle Nord abriterait 13% des réserves mondiales de pétrole et 30% de celles de gaz. De plus, la mer arctique est riche en ressources halieutiques dont l’exploitation par les activités de pêcheries sera plus facile d’accès. En effet, il est normalement nécessaire d’utiliser des bateaux spéciaux ainsi que des brise-glaces pour pratiquer la pêche dans cette région. Cependant,  la diminution de la glace et sa possible disparition pendant la période estivale d’ici la fin des années 2030 vont permettre un accès plus facile et à plus d’acteurs. En revanche, l’accentuation d’une pêche intensive dans cette région peut grandement contribuer à la raréfaction des ressources, causant de sérieux dommages environnementaux et à l’approvisionnement des populations locales (dont les populations canadiennes). Les problèmes de variation de la circulation thermohaline de l’eau, responsable de la circulation des courants d’eau sur la planète (la densité de l’eau est affectée à la fois par sa température et par son taux de salinité) affecteront entre autres les ressources halieutiques et toute la faune arctique. Cela aura également pour conséquence de rendre l’accès à la nourriture plus difficile pour les populations locales canadiennes. Ainsi, dans un premier temps, les ressources halieutiques seront plus accessibles à la pêche canadienne grâce à la diminution de la glace. Néanmoins, dans un deuxième temps, les effets néfastes évoqués ci-haut vont mettre ces populations en difficulté pour s’alimenter et s’autosuffire avec les ressources disponibles ainsi que leur accès par la terre ou la glace. Contribuera aussi à ce phénomène de raréfaction des ressources inévitablement dans les eaux canadiennes la probable densification des activités de pêche internationale dans la région. L’impact du réchauffement climatique et de la crise environnementale sur les ressources ainsi que l’engouement qu’il suscite pour l’exploitation des ressources naturelles arctiques provoque des effets néfastes. Ces facteurs contribuent d’une part simultanément à la dégradation accélérée de l’environnement arctique tout en altérant le renouvellement des ressources naturelles (comme la faune et la flore marine ou terrestre) tel un cercle vicieux autoentretenu. Ces effets ne s’arrêtent pas aux barrières nationales de par leur caractère diffus. De plus, cela impacte la vie ou la survie des populations canadiennes locales dans la satisfaction de leurs besoins primaires. L’on sait aussi que cette fonte de la glace donne logiquement naissance à plusieurs potentielles routes maritimes nationales et internationales, notamment le passage du Nord-Ouest du côté Canada et des États-Unis, et la Route maritime du nord du côté de la Russie (nord-est) entre les océans Atlantique et Pacifique. Un troisième passage moins connu est le Pont arctique reliant les ports de Moscou (Russie) et Churchill (Canada), utile pour acheminer le pétrole russe sur les marchés nord-américains. Enfin, une route transpolaire coupant l’Océan Arctique est aussi envisagée.  Le trafic maritime va connaître une grande intensification grâce à ces routes pour différentes raisons : premièrement pour l’exploitation de différentes ressources mentionnées plus tôt. Ensuite, l’affluence croitra pour profiter des raccourcis qu’offrent les routes maritimes évoquées qui permettent de relier, par exemple dans le cas du passage du Nord-Ouest côté Canada, l’Europe et l’Asie. En effet, cela constitue une route de 30% à 40% plus courte que les itinéraires passant par le canal de Suez ou le détroit de Panama. À ces perspectives de navigation commerciales et industrielles facilitant les échanges, s’ajoute aussi une possibilité de croissance au niveau des croisières touristiques dans la région. Il est donc facile de prévoir plus de passages dans les eaux territoriales du Canada non soumises « aux droits de passage inoffensif et de transit ». Il est également à noter que cette facilitation d’accès à ces routes maritimes rend paradoxalement la navigation encore plus dangereuse et aléatoire dans ces zones à cause de la multiplication des icebergs et des polar lows (cyclones imprévisibles se formant au-dessus de zones libres de glace). Cela augmente le risque d’accident pour les bateaux ou de catastrophe naturelle selon ce que comporte sa cargaison (risque de marée noire ou d’extrême pollution). S’ajoute aussi le développement d’autres centrales nucléaires flottantes, comme l’a fait la Russie pour la première fois en 2019, pouvant causer de forts dégâts environnementaux en cas d’accidents. En revanche, la navigation en Arctique présente aussi des contraintes commerciales fortes qui impactent la rentabilité du transport. Bien que les distances soient plus courtes, elles demandent aux bateaux plus d’efforts (et donc une grande consommation de carburant) et une vitesse moindre pour parvenir à destination. De plus, le peu, voire l’absence de destinations portuaires secondaires dans cette zone, rend de si longues distances parcourues moins rentables économiquement. De même, on compte aussi les coûts élevés qui s’ajoutent comme les coûts d’assurance (difficultés d’intervention dans les conditions arctiques et régions maritimes à haut risque), ou les services de brise-glaces facturés par la Russie. Les changements climatiques permettent donc au Canada de voir de potentielles nouvelles routes maritimes se former et devenir plus accessibles, mais les rendent aussi dangereuses à cause des incertitudes liées à la dérive des icebergs. Cela implique donc une intensification des navigations dans ses eaux territoriales. Pour l’instant, le Canada peut continuer à refuser le passage de bateaux étrangers au niveau du passage du Nord-Ouest pour les navires présentant un risque pour l’environnement.  En effet, les navires sont en eux-mêmes une augmentation de risques : sources de pollution (liées aux passages ou aux marchandises en cas d’accident), d’accidents en tous genres (collisions, dommages causés par la glace, chavirages, échouements, naufrages) et d’infractions concernant les règles de navigation ou de délimitation du territoire canadien. Est aussi rendue possible la navigation d’une route bordant le littoral lui permettant d’accéder à un plus grand nombre de zones reculées et jusque-là très difficiles d’accès. Il sera donc à la fois possible de les rejoindre afin de ravitailler les populations canadiennes locales, et plus facile de développer un commerce maritime avec elles. Est à souligner le fait que ces nouvelles routes seront accessibles à un nombre supérieur de types de bateaux en raison des conditions moins extrêmes de navigation (par exemple le besoin en brise-glaces limités). Les populations arctiques, dont celles du Canada, sont aussi mises à mal par le réchauffement climatique. Une grande préoccupation concerne la fonte des glaces et du pergélisol. L’Arctique est une formidable réserve d’eau potable et la glace est un excellent piège pour capturer les agents toxiques circulant dans l’eau depuis des décennies. La fonte de la banquise met en péril une partie des réserves d’eau potables tout en libérant ces agents jusqu’alors prisonniers. Conséquemment, ils contaminent l’eau douce qui circule dans cette région que les populations canadiennes consomment et dont ils se servent quotidiennement. La fonte des glaciers et du pergélisol augmente aussi le niveau de l’eau, ce qui peut amener les côtes maritimes habitées et construites à se retrouver sous le niveau de la mer et donc détruites. De son côté, le dégel du pergélisol n’est pas en reste sur les conséquences négatives que subiront les populations arctiques. Sa glace lui conférant sa propriété isolante et étanche, elle permettait aux lacs naturels d’eau douce d’être maintenus, et aux terres d’être solides pour accueillir la construction d’infrastructures nécessaire au développement de la vie dans la région. Avec la disparition de leur couche glacée, les sols perdent leurs propriétés étanches et solides. En conséquence, les réserves d’eau douce contenues dans les lacs seront amenées à disparaître, rendant l’accès à cette ressource de base pour les populations encore plus difficile à trouver. Les sols, quant à eux, en deviendront instables et marécageux. Cela remet alors en cause toute construction stratégique ou liée au développement de la région (ponts, rails, routes, bâtiments). Les émanations de gaz à effet de serre jusqu’alors prisonnières du sol s’échapperont, alimentant le réchauffement climatique et ses conséquences. Considérations politiques et recommandations pour le Canada Concernant la première préoccupation environnementale liée aux ressources et à la pollution, le Canada pourrait penser à instaurer ou à renouveler les règles concernant les quotas de pêche pour la pêche nationale dans les eaux canadiennes arctiques. Mais il devrait aussi essayer de proposer une régulation préventive des activités aux instances de gouvernance internationale arctique desquelles il est membre telles que le Conseil de l’Arctique ou la Dimension nordique (membre observateur). Vérifier le caractère dissuasif des sanctions de transgression des règles et les durcir le cas échéant est aussi une piste intéressante pour assurer l’efficacité des règles. Peut également être envisagé la création d’une règlementation aboutie sur le type de carburant utilisé par les transports maritimes, aujourd’hui encore trop polluant. On pourrait aussi penser à la délimitation d’espaces protégés sous forme de parcs terrestres ou maritimes, ainsi qu’un maintien de recension des êtres vivants habitant le milieu afin de s’assurer du maintien de ces dernières. Concernant la facilitation d’exploitation des ressources ainsi que leur acheminement et leur distribution, cela peut dans une certaine mesure aider au développement commercial de la région. Il pourrait alors être judicieux de penser un développement portuaire à multiples objectifs (comme nous le verrons plus bas), le long de la côte territoriale. Les recommandations pouvant être faites à propos des routes et de la circulation maritime sont les suivantes. Le Canada devra peut-être mettre en place une coopération de surveillance avec les États-Unis en ce qui concerne son archipel du nord pour lequel il est plus difficile de maintenir une surveillance de bons respects des règles maritimes. Il est aussi probable que le gouvernement canadien doive se préparer à accepter la navigation de bateaux étrangers dans ces eaux-là lorsque la glace rendra la navigation totalement effective. Le gouvernement canadien pourrait investir dans plus d’équipement et de groupes d’intervention et de sauvetages en cas d’accident pour optimiser son efficacité, ainsi que renforcer la coopération internationale pour garantir la sécurité des routes maritimes (plus d’équipes de sauvetages et de logistique pour porter secours et assistance aux bateaux en détresse). Un monitorage accru des eaux peut s’avérer nécessaire pour connaitre le trafic, s’assurer du respect des délimitations nationales et internationales et mieux guider les bateaux. La construction de ports le long des côtes servirait à sécuriser le trajet des bateaux grâce à des haltes possibles en chemin, tout en facilitant le ravitaillement des populations canadiennes dans ces régions. Avec les changements que subit le milieu naturel arctique au Canada, les conditions de vie des populations canadiennes arctiques sont donc gravement mises en danger (contamination, raréfaction des réserves d’eau douce, ou encore un sol instable et non propice à la survie des infrastructures actuelles). Bien que certains contaminants polluants organiques persistants (POP) comme le BPC (biphényles chlorés) et le DDT (dichlorodiphényltrichloroéthane) ne soient plus utilisés dans les pays industrialisés, ils ont toujours cours dans certaines régions du monde comme l’Afrique ou l’Amérique du Sud. À cela s’ajoute la montée des eaux généralisée qui touchera bien évidemment les côtes territoriales canadiennes. Or 46% de la population arctique habitante sur ces zones côtières. Le problème d’accès à de l’eau saine pour la population canadienne est très préoccupant. Dans un premier temps, préconiser plus de tests quant à la qualité de l’eau locale peut permettre aux habitants d’adopter un comportement adapté pour leur santé (choix de consommation d’une eau bouillie ou en bouteille). Ensuite il est important d’agir de manière préventive. Le Canada pourrait peut-être présenter aux instances de gouvernance internationales (par exemple l’ONU, les instances arctiques) une demande de durcissement des règles d’utilisation des contaminants de la sorte comme ce fut le cas pour le mercure. Il pourrait aussi proposer une extension de liste de ceux à proscrire totalement pour prévenir leur épandage dans les eaux et la contamination future de l’environnement ainsi que des ressources consommées par les populations arctiques canadiennes. Pour finir, il est judicieux de continuer à réfléchir à de potentielles solutions et à de nouvelles visions d’occupation adéquate de la région arctique, compte tenu de la modification de la réalité des sols.  Il est donc important d’investir dans la recherche et le développement afin de réfléchir et mettre au point de nouveaux types d’infrastructures adéquats. En attendant, il serait important de se montrer anticipateur et de déplacer autant que possible les zones habitées en les éloignant des côtes. On peut penser à l’utilisation de nouvelles infrastructures sur pilotis intégrant la technologie onéreuse des « thermosiphons » pour éviter le réchauffement du sol causé par les bâtiments chauffés. ## Les impacts géopolitiques de la COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-impacts-geopolitiques-de-la-covid-19/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Les impacts géopolitiques de la COVID-19 incluent le renforcement de l’État et ses vulnérabilités, la concurrence entre grandes puissances et les opérations de désinformation. La pandémie de la COVID-19 a des impacts géopolitiques considérables. Elle agit comme catalyseur sur trois problématiques saillantes : le renforcement de l’État et de ses vulnérabilités dans un contexte de démondialisation, l’accélération de la concurrence entre grandes puissances, ainsi que les opérations agressives de désinformation. Ceci pose plusieurs défis pour les démocraties occidentales, dont le Canada, qui doivent d’adapter rapidement. Le renforcement de l’État et de ses vulnérabilités La pandémie contribue à renforcer le rôle traditionnel de l’État comme protecteur de sa population contre les menaces externes, tout en exposant ses vulnérabilités internes. En considérant la COVID-19 comme une source d’insécurité et une menace mortelle pour ses citoyens, l’État a eu moins de difficulté à justifier et à imposer des mesures extraordinaires pour y faire face, qu’il soit démocratique ou non. Ses prérogatives régaliennes ont ainsi été renforcées. Parallèlement, la pandémie a également mis en exergue les vulnérabilités de l’État. Les États fédéraux, par exemple, ont vu s’accroître les tensions entre leurs différents ordres de gouvernement. En Europe, il existe un risque d’effritement interne de l’Union européenne (UE) causé par une préférence envers les réponses nationales à une menace pourtant globale. D’un autre côté, l’UE pourrait tout aussi bien sortir renforcée après la pandémie si elle parvient à mettre sur pied une réponse commune et à s’imposer comme leader par son expertise de calibre mondial en matière de santé. Face au désengagement américain, l’UE aurait tout avantage à promouvoir les mécanismes multilatéraux pour faire face à la pandémie, profitant alors de l’opportunité offerte pour s’imposer dans une nouvelle ère de coopération internationale en prenant le leadership là où la gouvernance mondiale faiblit. Plus globalement, la pandémie est venue remettre en question la mondialisation des dernières décennies, en réaffirmant la place de l’État comme garant de la sécurité de sa population et en favorisant des réponses nationales à une menace pourtant globale. La mondialisation, accélératrice de la propagation du virus, doit être repensée. Une relocalisation des secteurs stratégiques et une réduction de la dépendance aux puissances étrangères peu fiables sont nécessaires afin de prévenir et de préparer la population à des crises similaires à l’avenir. Ceci se fera particulièrement ressentir dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense. La sécurité sanitaire, voire alimentaire et industrielle, s’imposera comme secteur primordial de la sécurité nationale, alors que les besoins de sécurité intérieure gagneront en importance par rapport aux intérêts extérieurs. L’accélération de la compétition entre grandes puissances  La pandémie de la COVID-19 a contribué à accélérer la concurrence stratégique entre les grandes puissances en exacerbant les tensions existantes et en introduisant de nouvelles formes de compétition. D’un côté, la gestion incohérente de la pandémie aux États-Unis et l’abdication de son rôle traditionnel de leader ont érodé la confiance internationale envers le pays. D’un autre côté, la Chine et la Russie se présentent comme ayant la situation sous contrôle et tentent de redorer leur leadership international tout en augmentant leurs activités de cyberespionnage et d’espionnage industriel. Cependant, l’inhabileté de la Chine à gérer l’épidémie sur son territoire et l’agressivité de ses actions risquent de miner son soft power. De plus, l’accroissement de l’influence chinoise dans le Pacifique pourrait être compromis par des difficultés économiques de la Chine après la COVID-19, entrainant alors une baisse de l’aide et de la présence chinoise dans le Pacifique. Avec le repli sur soi des États-Unis et l’augmentation des divergences transatlantiques, cette situation pose de sérieux défis pour les démocraties. Celles-ci doivent privilégier la souplesse afin de contrer les effets de l’unilatéralisme américain, traiter avec la puissance montante chinoise tout en freinant ses pratiques nuisibles, et contribuer à préserver la stabilité internationale malgré des pressions populistes en faveur d’un repli sur soi. Les opérations agressives de désinformation La pandémie a été l’occasion du recours à des opérations agressives de désinformation, que ce soit sur les moyens de se protéger, sur l’accès à certains médicaments, sur les causes de la pandémie, ou encore sur la compétence des autorités occidentales à gérer la crise. Ceci contribue à l’anxiété générale de la population, à l’érosion de la confiance à l’égard des institutions gouvernementales et des scientifiques, et à des tensions entre les démocraties afin d’affaiblir leur coopération. Une tendance récente à souligner est le renforcement des liens entre la Russie, la Chine et l’Iran dans ce type d’opérations de désinformation. Elles ont mené à l’émergence de nombreuses théories du complot sur les origines du virus, les contestations des mesures de confinement, la méfiance envers les démocraties occidentales, les futurs vaccins ou encore les processus de collecte de renseignements personnels et autre mesure de traçage des individus. La pandémie représente possiblement un tournant majeur pour le renseignement. Même si le renseignement s’intéresse au risque sanitaire depuis de nombreuses années, il n’en fait pas pour autant sa priorité. Les services de renseignement sont donc relativement mal préparés pour prévenir et répondre à ces risques sanitaires. Ceci est amené à changer. Le renseignement a le potentiel de fournir une alerte précoce sur les risques sanitaires, permettant une prise de décision efficace et éclairée. En réorientant efficacement le renseignement opérationnel, il est possible d’accéder à des informations précieuses. Par exemple, le renseignement humain pourrait s’intéresser au recrutement de sources aux connaissances épidémiologiques et médicales à l’étranger. Recommandations pour le Canada La pandémie de la COVID-19 a intensifié le souverainisme américain. Conjuguée à l’intensification de la compétition sino-américaine, cette situation amène à repenser la posture du Canada dans un monde de plus en plus multipolaire. Le Canada se doit d’adopter une posture plus indépendante de celle des États-Unis, en cherchant à rallier la communauté internationale autour de positions communes et à défendre ses intérêts avec résolution. Ceci passe par l’exercice d’un leadership aux côtés des alliés démocratiques qui partagent les mêmes intérêts que le Canada afin de préserver l’ordre international libéral, de même que d’éviter d’être coincé entre Washington et Beijing. Plus spécifiquement, le Canada doit prioriser l’approfondissement de sa coopération de défense avec l’Australie, le Japon et la Corée du Sud. Le Canada doit également réévaluer sa structure de force et ses priorités en matière de défense nationale. D’une part, la pandémie a entrainé une réduction des opérations extérieures des FAC, l’annulation de plusieurs exercices sur le territoire national et un redéploiement au Canada pour assister les autorités civiles. Or, un manque de ressources semble limiter la capacité des FAC à répondre à l’ensemble des besoins intérieurs, qu’ils soient liés à la COVID-19, aux inondations ou aux incendies de forêt. La nécessaire priorisation des besoins intérieurs amène à revoir l’allocation des ressources et des opérations des FAC. Ceci doit inclure la remise en question de certains présupposés qui ont guidé jusqu’alors la politique de défense canadienne, dont le maintien de forces multifonctionnelles. L’austérité budgétaire qui pourrait suivre la crise de la COVID-19 imposera des choix difficiles; ceux-ci doivent être stratégiques et réfléchis. Pour ce faire, une révision approfondie de la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada paraît nécessaire, idéalement par l’entremise d’un comité mixte (parlementaire et sénatorial) ouvert à la participation des experts et du grand public. Un nouvel énoncé de politique étrangère – et la révision de la politique de défense qui en découlera – doit tenter de rallier les Canadiens autour d’un nouveau consensus sur l’orientation stratégique du pays. Le Canada n’est pas épargné des luttes d’information liées à la recherche de remèdes et de vaccins à la pandémie et aux efforts de désinformation des grandes puissances. Un effort supplémentaire doit être mis sur les capacités de collecte et d’analyse du renseignement sanitaire pour améliorer la prévention et fournir des informations pertinentes pour la prise de décisions. La désinformation a également impacté les FAC, suggérant un risque accru de propagation du virus parmi le personnel militaire. Le Canada doit ainsi repenser sa stratégie de défense pour y inclure les risques sanitaires et pandémiques et revoir son positionnement stratégique post-COVID-19. La désinformation risque en outre d’augmenter la méfiance de la population canadienne envers les autorités politiques et scientifiques en provoquant des mouvements contre le confinement, la vaccination ou la médication en lien avec le coronavirus, par exemple. Pour limiter les effets de la désinformation, l’Équipe de la défense devrait continuer à utiliser les différentes plateformes de médias sociaux afin d’informer les Canadiens sur la pandémie ainsi qu’augmenter ses capacités de vérification de l’information ou financer une tierce partie pour le faire.   ## Les nouvelles armes hypersoniques : des outils psychologiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-nouvelles-armes-hypersoniques/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Les armes hypersoniques peuvent renforcer les craintes d’attaques préemptives et modifier dangereusement les scénarios d’escalade des... Les armes hypersoniques peuvent renforcer les craintes d’attaques préemptives et modifier dangereusement les scénarios d’escalade des crises dans les années à venir. Cet argument populaire repose sur l’idée selon laquelle leur trajectoire de vol imprévisible crée une ambiguïté en ce qui concerne la cible des missiles. En outre, le fait que les radars ne s’adaptent pas très bien à leur altitude inhabituelle et à leur vitesse extrême réduit l’intervalle du temps durant lequel le pays attaqué peut réagir. Alors que les missiles balistiques existants franchissent le seuil hypersonique de Mach 5, les nouvelles armes hypersoniques – à la fois les planeurs hypersoniques et les missiles de croisière – sont destinées à voler à des vitesses hypersoniques soutenues dans l’atmosphère et ont suffisamment de manœuvrabilité pour changer leur trajectoire de vol. Cependant, l’utilité militaire des armes hypersoniques reste incertaine, en particulier dans le cas des systèmes à longue portée, et leur fiabilité ainsi que leur faisabilité nécessitent encore des tests rigoureux. Il est probable que les armes hypersoniques ne créent de nouveaux effets militaires qu’à des distances tactiques, principalement en raison de leur vitesse qui raccourcit l’intervalle de temps pour réagir.   L’infrastructure actuelle du NORAD n’est pas suffisante pour faire face à l’élargissement du spectre des menaces liées aux missiles. La prétendue invincibilité des armes hypersoniques ne devrait pas empêcher le Canada d’affirmer ses choix stratégiques. Elle ne devrait pas non plus miner sa détermination à moderniser le NORAD. Le gouvernement du Canada devrait aborder la question des armes hypersoniques selon deux lignes politiques. Premièrement, en coordination avec les États-Unis, le Canada doit accroître la protection de l’espace aérien nord-américain. La défense de la zone continentale nord-américaine devra être, à l’avenir, multidimensionnelle et intégrée, associant des capteurs terrestres et spatiaux aux contre-mesures sol-air et air-air pour une détection rapide et un suivi constant, tout en permettant une interception efficace. Cela nécessite non seulement d’améliorer la portée de l’alerte précoce et de moderniser les systèmes de communication, de commandement et de contrôle, mais également d’introduire de nouveaux intercepteurs de missiles. L’investissement qui a été approuvé pour la modernisation du NORAD permet au Canada d’ajouter des capacités et d’élargir son mandat. Deuxièmement, pour contrer la politisation et la médiatisation des armes hypersoniques, le gouvernement du Canada devrait travailler avec ses alliés afin d’améliorer la compréhension des menaces hypersoniques. L’instrumentalisation de la technologie hypersonique dans la compétition des grandes puissances a créé des attentes exagérées concernant les effets militaires des armes hypersoniques. Alors que la course technologique entre les États-Unis, la Chine et la Russie s’intensifie, le Canada et ses alliés doivent accélérer leurs efforts pour mettre à jour les normes de contrôle des armements et d’exportation existantes afin de mieux réglementer le développement et l’utilisation de la technologie hypersonique à des fins militaires, ainsi que de contrôler sa prolifération. *** Introduction La menace liée aux missiles russes a particulièrement augmenté en Europe avec la fin du traité FNI (traité sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire) en 2019 et le déploiement de missiles aérobalistiques Kinzhals à Kaliningrad, l’enclave russe à la frontière de la Pologne et de la Lituanie, tous les deux membres de l’OTAN. De plus, le planeur hypersonique Avangard développé par la Russie ces dernières années a une portée stratégique capable de frapper le continent nord-américain. De ce fait, Les systèmes d’armes hypersoniques en tant que nouveaux vecteurs d’ogives nucléaires et non nucléaires gagnent également en importance dans le contexte de la politique affirmée par la Chine visant à porter son arsenal nucléaire à 1 000 ogives avant la fin de la décennie. Les attentes exagérées concernant la capacité hypersonique – et à leur tour les lignes budgétaires gonflées qui garantissent l’investissement dans de nouvelles armes – dégradent l’environnement de sécurité. La course technologique intense entre les États-Unis, la Russie et la Chine, et dans une moindre mesure en Australie, en Corée du Sud, en Inde, en France, en Royaume-Uni et au Japon, mais aussi en Corée du Nord et en Iran, a aggravé le dilemme de la sécurité. Étant donné que cette technologie émergente a acquis la réputation d’être une arme invincible et imparable, les pays tentent de construire leur arsenal à partir de la perception de leur propre vulnérabilité et les exhibent lors de défilés militaires, de conflits en cours ou lors d’essais d’armes. Une fois que la nouvelle technologie hypersonique aura mûri, soit d’ici les années 2030, quelle sera l’efficacité des radars du Système d’alerte du Nord (SAN) contre des missiles qui atteignent  des vitesses extrêmes et qui évoluent à des altitudes inhabituelles ? Le rôle défensif du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD) actuellement appuyé par le Canada ne sera pas suffisant pour contrer les missiles de croisière à longue portée ou les planeurs hypersoniques avancés. Cependant, même si cela est peu connu, la gestion des systèmes d’arme hypersonique impose un arbitrage entre vitesse, maniabilité et altitude, et il est possible d’exploiter ces faiblesses afin de renforcer les défenses contre la menace hypersonique. Cet article met en avant trois points principaux. Premièrement, les affirmations sur l’utilité militaire des armes hypersoniques sont prématurées, en particulier dans le cas des systèmes à longue portée. Deuxièmement, il est certain que le nombre de menaces liées aux missiles a augmenté avec le développement de systèmes d’armes extrêmement rapides et manœuvrables depuis le ciel. Enfin, troisièmement, cette concurrence technologique est devenue politisée, les armes hypersoniques servant d’outil politique pour démontrer les prouesses technologiques et le statut de grande puissance d’un pays, ce qui augmente les risques d'escalade lors des crises. Pour ces raisons, il est important d’avoir conscience des attentes exagérées concernant l’application militaire de la technologie hypersonique et de repenser la façon dont le Canada assure sa défense aérienne et antimissile. Menace hypersonique en cours de fabrication Les armes hypersoniques sont présentées comme une nouvelle classe de vecteurs qui peuvent voyager à des vitesses extrêmes (cinq fois la vitesse du son) dans l’atmosphère terrestre et ont une capacité de manœuvrabilité exceptionnelle. Elles sont de plus présentées comme des armes qui combinent l’avantage des missiles balistiques (vitesse) et de croisière (précision) existants. Concrètement les développements et travaux portant sur les armes hypersoniques se déclinent en deux variantes principales, reposant soit sur la technologie de « superstatoréacteur » (scramjet), soit sur la technologie de « rebond atmosphérique » (boost-glide). Premièrement, les missiles de croisière hypersoniques (HCM, Hypersonic Cruise Missile) sont une version plus rapide des missiles de croisière existants, car ils sont propulsés par un statoréacteur à combustion supersonique, également appelé « superstatoréacteur ». Parce que les statoréacteurs obtiennent l’oxygène nécessaire directement de l’atmosphère, les missiles hypersoniques sont plus petits et plus maniables. Étant donné que les superstatoréacteurs sont utilisés dans des conditions extrêmes, il a fallu plusieurs décennies pour développer un moteur qui fonctionnerait à une vitesse hypersonique dans l’atmosphère. Toutefois en raison de défis techniques, il n’existe aujourd’hui aucun système d’armes d’ores et déjà déployé et en activité utilisant un superstatoréacteur. Deuxièmement, les planeurs hypersoniques (HGV, Hypersonic Glide Vehicle) ne sont pas motorisés et dépendent d’une fusée pour être soulevés et libérés dans l’atmosphère à des altitudes comprises entre 40 et 100 kilomètres, après quoi ils volent sans moteur vers leur cible. Contrairement à la trajectoire facilement calculable des missiles balistiques, le concept de rebond atmosphérique rend les altitudes de rentrée des HGV imprévisibles et permet au planeur de manœuvrer le long de trajectoires alambiquées. La plupart des HGV en développement utilisent des missiles balistiques pendant la phase de « boost ». En 2021, la Chine a installé un planeur hypersonique sur une fusée en orbite, inspirée du système soviétique de bombardement orbital fractionné ou FOBS (opérationnel de 1969 à 1983). La nouveauté de ce système ne réside pas dans la combinaison d’un orbiteur et d’un planeur hypersonique. En effet, ce type de système existe depuis des décennies sous le nom de navette spatiale, un système propulsé par une fusée qui passe ensuite en mode de vol orbital, avant de revenir en planant vers la Terre. Ainsi, la nouveauté réside plutôt dans l’utilisation par la Chine d’ogives nucléaires sur ces systèmes. En un mot, les caractéristiques des nouvelles armes hypersoniques sont censées créer un moment de surprise, car elles raccourcissent l’intervalle de temps dans lequel le pays attaqué peut réagir. Comme elles peuvent changer de direction de vol à des altitudes inhabituelles, elles peuvent également échapper aux défenses antimissiles et déstabiliser le pays attaqué qui peut difficilement prédire leur cible. De plus, les capacités de destruction de ces armes ne reposent pas uniquement sur leur énergie cinétique : elles peuvent également transporter des ogives. La Russie et la Chine développent toutes deux des systèmes duaux, c’est-à-dire qu’ils ont la capacité de transporter des ogives conventionnelles comme des ogives nucléaires. Par exemple, le missile de croisière hypersonique russe 3M22 Tsirkon d’une portée de 1 000 km, le missile balistique chinois DF-17 (2 500 km), ainsi que le missile balistique intercontinental DF-41 associés à des planeurs hypersoniques sont à double usage. La capacité hypersonique offensive devrait donc ajouter une ambiguïté quant au type d'ogive utilisé et à l'identité de la cible. Contourner les lois de la physique Tout cela semble plutôt terrifiant, mais l’état de la recherche technologique et les lois de la physique recommandent un certain scepticisme. Du point de vue technique, la maîtrise de la capacité hypersonique, c’est-à-dire la capacité de voler à des vitesses hypersoniques dans l’atmosphère tout en conservant la navigabilité et la maniabilité, est une question relative à la science des fusées. La communauté scientifique estime que les HGV et les HCM ne seront pas opérationnels avant les années 2030 (pour les HGV) et 2040 (pour les HCM). En effet, les pays qui souhaitent déployer ces armes doivent encore résoudre quelques problèmes importants : il leur faudra notamment dépasser les difficultés rencontrées pour atteindre la vitesse hypersonique dans une atmosphère épaisse. En effet, la chaleur créée par la friction de l’air à des vitesses aussi élevées peut faire fondre le missile (ou le planeur), gâcher sa navigation ou le rendre visible aux capteurs infrarouges qui pourraient alors le suivre le missile, ruinant ainsi le précieux effet de surprise des systèmes hypersoniques. En même temps, ces véhicules sont sensibles à toute imperfection ; par exemple, une fissure dans le panneau de carbone a provoqué l'accident de la navette spatiale Columbia lors de son retour. Non moins important, le vol hypersonique motorisé est plus demandeur en carburant que le vol supersonique, car le véhicule doit traverser l'atmosphère. Cela augmente le coût opérationnel de ce système d’armes. Le développement de ces systèmes d’armes hypersoniques est coûteux en temps et en ressources. Les nouvelles armes hypersoniques doivent faire l’objet de tests supplémentaires, mais leurs exigences techniques en font déjà une capacité de niche. Voler hypersonique dans l’atmosphère implique des compromis importants en termes de vitesse, d’altitude, de maniabilité et de précision. Fait important et plutôt surprenant, deux points sont généralement omis dans les débats publics sur les armes hypersoniques : leur utilité militaire discutable et la possibilité de contre-mesures. Faisable et utilisable dans une certaine mesure Premièrement, bien que les armes hypersoniques puissent être techniquement réalisables, leur utilité militaire, en particulier à des distances stratégiques, reste incertaine. Du point de vue militaire, la question de savoir quel problème les nouveaux systèmes d’armes hypersoniques tentent de résoudre reste sans réponse. Les missiles hypersoniques existent depuis plusieurs décennies, ils sont simplement mieux connus sous le nom de missiles balistiques intercontinentaux (ICBM). Techniquement, tous les missiles balistiques d’une portée supérieure à quelques centaines de kilomètres sont hypersoniques puisqu’ils peuvent voler plus vite que Mach 5. Par exemple, le Minuteman III américain, opérationnel depuis 1970, peut parcourir plus de 9 600 kilomètres pour atteindre Mach 23. Des études basées sur la modélisation informatique ont montré que la vitesse et la portée des planeurs hypersoniques sont comparables, sinon inférieures, aux ICBM existants et aux missiles balistiques lancés par sous-marin. L’avantage stratégique des armes hypersoniques risque donc d’être minime. Selon l’endroit où elles sont développées, les armes hypersoniques rétablissent ou éliminent la destruction mutuelle assurée. L’argument en faveur des armes hypersoniques stratégiques met en avant qu’elles renforcent la dissuasion en améliorant les capacités de frappe en second. En revanche, ces armes peuvent éroder la dissuasion en permettant au pays de surmonter les défenses antimissiles et d’abattre la capacité de frappe en second de l’adversaire. En effet, pour la Russie, les planeurs hypersoniques à longue portée ont une nouvelle qualité qui leur permettrait de surmonter les défenses intérieures américaines. Même si l’avantage des armes hypersoniques est plus faible lorsqu'elles parcourent des distances intercontinentales, elles représentent, pour la Russie, une stratégie de couverture. En revanche, la Chine a développé des armes hypersoniques pour davantage projeter sa puissance en mer de Chine méridionale et au-dessus de Taïwan en contournant les défenses antimissiles américaines dans la région Asie-Pacifique. La crainte chinoise d’une frappe préventive américaine qui désactiverait la capacité nucléaire de la Chine et priverait la Chine de sa capacité de riposte semble être le motif qui justifie l’équipement de son DF-41 avec plusieurs planeurs. Cependant, la Chine et la Russie ont déjà la capacité d’atteindre le sol américain avec leurs ICBM et leurs missiles balistiques lancés par des sous-marins nucléaires. En outre, les défenses antimissiles continentales contre les missiles balistiques à longue portée existants ne sont pas connues pour leurs performances éblouissantes. Pourtant, l’obsession de déjouer le réseau américain de défense aérienne et antimissile a conduit à une situation quelque peu extrême où la Chine a testé un planeur hypersonique à partir de l’espace. Inspirée par les FOBS, la Chine a démontré qu’elle pouvait échapper complètement aux défenses antimissiles américaines en survolant le pôle Sud. Cependant, le test d'un tel système de planeur à propulsion orbitale pourrait n’être qu’un signal de la Chine qui montre son accès à l’espace, et une distraction de l’utilisation potentiellement plus conséquente d’armes hypersoniques à des distances tactiques. Les effets hypersoniques se feront en effet très probablement sentir au niveau sous-stratégique. Cela peut inclure la capacité de contrecarrer les défenses locales et de fournir des capacités de frappe rapide contre les forces armées déployées localement, en particulier dans la guerre navale, et contre des cibles de grande valeur, urgentes ou encore des cibles renforcées. La Russie et la Chine ont ainsi l’intention d’acquérir des missiles antinavires, tels que le Tsirkon russe 3M22 et le Starry Sky-2 (ou Xing Kong-2) de la Chine, qui sont capables de rendre même des porte-avions vulnérables. Ces systèmes hypersoniques peuvent avoir des implications stratégiques en raison de la capacité duale de leurs vecteurs. On passe à côté de l’essentiel lorsque l’on discute pour déterminer si un pays déploie des armes nucléaires à des vitesses supersoniques ou hypersoniques : le type d’ogive fait la différence, pas la vitesse. L’interception des missiles hypersoniques Deuxièmement, les missiles hypersoniques peuvent être arrêtés. Bien que la lutte contre les menaces hypersoniques soit difficile en raison de leurs vitesses élevées, de leur maniabilité et de leurs altitudes de vol, leur signature infrarouge et des vulnérabilités liées au vol hypersonique dans l’atmosphère rendent l’interception de la phase de vol plané réalisable. Cependant, il faudrait une amélioration majeure de l’architecture des capteurs spatiaux et de nouvelles capacités d’interception pour tenir compte des altitudes de fonctionnement (20-100 kilomètres), de la trajectoire imprévisible et de la vitesse des armes hypersoniques. Les systèmes de défense améliorés devront articuler plusieurs strates de capteurs et permettre l’intégration de toutes les données, et ce, sur tout le continent. Ils devront aller au-delà des défenses antimissiles balistiques classiques. Les systèmes de défense aérienne et antimissile existants reposent principalement sur les radars terrestres et maritimes pour l’alerte précoce, et ces radars ne sont pas équipés pour suivre les armes hypersoniques de manière efficace. On s’attend à ce que les armes hypersoniques volent à des altitudes plus basses, c’est-à-dire inférieures à l’altitude des intercepteurs de missiles balistiques et suffisamment basses pour que la courbure de la Terre les rende indétectables par la détection radar au sol tout en étant au-dessus de l’altitude des défenses aériennes les plus basses. Des systèmes de défense aérienne et antimissile efficaces devraient connecter les parties thermiques des capteurs infrarouges avec les capacités d’interception de la couche supérieure à l’extérieur de l’atmosphère et les capacités d’interception de la couche inférieure dans l’atmosphère pour une capacité globale de détection et de suivi d’une menace hypersonique. En effet, l’Agence américaine de défense antimissile (MDA), en collaboration avec l’Agence de développement spatial, a développé une constellation de satellites de surveillance en orbite basse avec des capteurs pour indiquer et avertir d’un lancement. La MDA a également lancé des efforts pour réaliser un Glide Phase Interceptor, un nouveau prototype de missile qui sera associé au système de défense antimissile balistique Aegis. Les signatures infrarouges et le plasma autour des véhicules hypersoniques pourraient déjà permettre aux systèmes de défense Patriot et THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) de détecter les armes hypersoniques pendant la phase de vol plané lorsqu’elles opèrent à l’intérieur de l’atmosphère et à des vitesses plus faibles. En adaptant les logiciels et la propulsion, il sera possible d’intercepter les missiles lors de cette phase à une courte distance. En effet, si ces systèmes de défense peuvent être adaptés pour intercepter les armes hypersoniques, ils ne peuvent couvrir que de petites zones et il serait excessivement cher de les utiliser pour la défense continentale. Pourtant, toute défense efficace contre des missiles extrêmement rapides et manœuvrables devrait probablement s’organiser à l’échelle du continent. Cela nécessitera une coopération entre les alliés et, en fin de compte, une intégration par le biais de l’intelligence artificielle, car les nouveaux systèmes de défense nécessiteront de nouveaux outils logiciels pour traiter au plus vite des données de renseignement multiples, détecter les lancements d’armes et suivre les menaces imminentes. L’étape cruciale consistera à articuler efficacement deux aspects de la défense : D’une part, les nouvelles strates/couches (en cours de développement) de capteurs spatiaux d’alerte précoce qui détecteront et suivront la signature thermique (cette signature étant plus forte au début des phases de vol) D’autre part, des effecteurs qui s’appuient soit sur les capacités d’interception de la couche supérieure, tel qu’elles sont fournies par les systèmes adaptés Aegis et THAAD, soit sur les capacités d’interception de la couche inférieure (dans l’atmosphère), tel qu’elles sont fournies par les systèmes Patriot et SAMP/T. Étant donné que les armes hypersoniques opèrent dans un entre-deux, entre les domaines aérien et spatial, les armes hypersoniques peuvent avoir un impact significatif sur l’efficacité des systèmes de défense aérienne et antimissile. La place de la technologie hypersonique dans la compétition géopolitique Compte tenu des limitations technologiques persistantes, l’effet actuel des armes hypersoniques a été principalement psychologique du fait d’une signalisation stratégique, d’une projection de statut, d’une volonté d’intimidation des adversaires et d’une propagande. Par exemple, à la veille de la Journée de l’armée chinoise le 1er août, Pékin a présenté publiquement et pour la première fois une vidéo de lancement de son missile DF-17. Ce missile est connu pour sa capacité à transporter un planeur hypersonique depuis 2019. Bien que l’on sache peu de chose sur l’état opérationnel de cette arme, la vidéo de lancement intervient quelques jours avant la visite de Nancy Pelosi à Taïwan, et avant son test du système de missile DF-17 lors d’un exercice de tir réel dans le détroit de Taiwan. Bien que (ou parce que) la Russie soit devenue une puissance militaire en déclin empêtrée dans une guerre, le président Poutine a annoncé que les forces navales russes allaient être équipées de missiles de croisière hypersoniques Tsirkon. L’utilisation très médiatisée du missile Kinzhal en Ukraine en mars 2022 (prétendument la première arme hypersonique utilisée en temps de guerre) traduit une tentative russe d’utiliser un soi-disant missile hypersonique afin d’afficher un prétendu sentiment de confiance. Kinzhal est cependant essentiellement une arme de propagande ou pour être plus exact un missile balistique air-sol présenté comme un système d’arme hypersonique sans qu’aucune capacité de manœuvre exceptionnelle n’ait été documentée. Plus précisément, il s’agit d’une version modifiée du missile balistique tactique Iskander-M sol-air, lancée à partir d’un avion intercepteur supersonique MiG-31, qui propulse le missile pour qu’il atteigne des vitesses plus élevées à une altitude inhabituelle pour un missile balistique et ainsi étende sa portée. Les armes hypersoniques, et les technologies émergentes en général, sont devenues un outil politique des gouvernements qui les utilisent à des fins de propagande grâce à leur réputation d’arme invincible destinée à intimider et à contraindre l’adversaire. Le pouvoir politique peut ainsi alimenter les craintes existantes en déformant les faits quant à l’état opérationnel de leurs armements. Indépendamment du manque de données et d’informations vérifiées sur la fiabilité et les performances des systèmes d’armes hypersoniques, la Chine et la Russie ont affirmé à plusieurs reprises avoir déployé ces armes. La Russie aurait déployé son premier planeur hypersonique Avangard en décembre 2019. En 2020, la Chine a déclaré que son planeur hypersonique DF-17 était opérationnel. Les États-Unis, de leur côté, ont affirmé qu’ils n’avaient, pour l'instant, testé que des prototypes d’armes et qu’ils mettraient en service leurs armes hypersoniques en 2023. Même si les États-Unis avaient déjà investi dans l’hypersonique dans le cadre du programme Prompt Global Strike (frappe planétaire rapide), l’augmentation du budget de la recherche hypersonique au cours des dernières années, (de quelques centaines de millions à quelques milliards de dollars) s’est effectuée en réaction aux progrès technologiques russes et chinois dans la mise en service de systèmes d’armes hypersoniques. Cela reflète une perception de manque de progrès des États-Unis dans le développement de nouvelles armes hypersoniques offensives, plutôt qu’une volonté de combler une lacune réelle dans leurs capacités militaires. Actuellement, les menaces hypersoniques ne sont pas basées sur une capacité militaire réelle et ne confèrent aucun avantage significatif. Alors que les armes hypersoniques pourraient être techniquement possibles dans les deux prochaines décennies, la disponibilité technique et la faisabilité technologique ne produisent pas automatiquement des effets militaires réels si elle n’est pas accompagnée d’une doctrine solide. Par conséquent, les remous médiatiques à propos des armes hypersoniques sont plus dangereux que la technologie elle-même, principalement pour deux raisons. Premièrement, perpétuer la croyance en des armes révolutionnaires invincibles alimente la rivalité entre grandes puissances. L’utilisation de la réputation des armes hypersoniques comme outil politique pour rappeler  son statut de grande puissance, en particulier à une époque où les normes de contrôle des armements disparaissent, crée de l’instabilité. Deuxièmement, l’hypervitesse n’est qu’une des caractéristiques qui façonneront la guerre future dans les domaines aérien et spatial. L’attention médiatique met l’accent sur la vitesse, alors qu’elle devrait le mettre sur la manœuvrabilité. Cela masque donc le fait que le spectre des menaces liées aux missiles s’élargit et qu’il existe des missiles avec différents degrés de manœuvrabilité. Par exemple, au lieu de planeurs hypersoniques sensationnels, mais mal définis, il serait plus exact de parler d’une nouvelle génération de vecteurs de rentrée manœuvrable (MARV), ce qu’améliorent la manœuvrabilité et étendent la portée d'un missile tout en restant dans l'atmosphère pendant la majeure partie de leur vol. Quelles implications de ces systèmes d’arme hypersonique pour la défense du Canada et de l’Amérique du Nord ? Contrairement au déterminisme technologique, qui se manifeste dans l’attention médiatique qui clame la fausse promesse d’une arme hypersonique révolutionnaire, l’armée a besoin d’une doctrine raisonnable et d’un budget pour financer les programmes de développement hypersoniques, ainsi que d’une politique de technologie hypersonique saine. Il reste vital d’apprivoiser la course au prestige et à la suprématie technologique, ce que déforme les perceptions des menaces des pays et augmente le risque d'escalade de la crise. Ces trois puissances militaires prévoient d’acquérir des armes de combat hypersoniques, ce qui contraste avec leur principale mission de dissuasion. Une fois que la technologie hypersonique aura mûri, permettant aux systèmes d’armes de devenir opérationnels et de produire des effets militaires à valeur ajoutée, la capacité hypersonique représentera un facteur majeur dans la détection et l’interception des menaces de missiles. Le gouvernement du Canada serait bien avisé d’aborder la question de la menace hypersonique dans le contexte de l’élargissement du spectre des menaces liées aux missiles selon deux orientations stratégiques. 1/ Mettre à jour les défenses antimissiles en coordination avec les États-Unis pour protéger l’espace aérien nord-américain. Des pays comme les États-Unis et le Canada devraient concentrer leurs investissements sur la défense antimissile hypersonique à courte et moyenne portée, car la propagation des planeurs hypersoniques peut miner la défense continentale nord-américaine. Compte tenu des changements climatiques qui touchent l’Arctique, de la guerre en cours en Ukraine et de la propagation de technologies émergentes aux effets militaires peu connus, le Canada devrait affirmer ses choix stratégiques et sa détermination à moderniser le NORAD. Les préoccupations récurrentes concernant la menace russe dans l’Arctique canadien, comme, par exemple, les bombardiers russes volant à proximité  de la limite de l’espace aérien canadien, n’ont fait qu’augmenter depuis l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine en février 2022. En outre, bien que la Chine se concentre sur sa suprématie régionale, ses planeurs hypersoniques ont également des portées intercontinentales. Même si les menaces de missiles russes et chinois contre le territoire canadien demeurent faibles, le gouvernement canadien devrait repenser le NORAD selon les lignes conceptuelles d’un système de défense aérienne et antimissile entièrement intégré. Les futures défenses continentales devront mettre l’accent sur des systèmes de défense de zone qui soient multicouches et intégrés, composés de capteurs terrestres et spatiaux bien connectés avec des intercepteurs air-sol et air-air pour une détection rapide et un suivi constant. En effet, les nouveaux systèmes hypersoniques traverseront l’atmosphère et l’espace extra-atmosphérique en étant davantage manœuvrables et en atteignant des vitesses extrêmes et des altitudes inhabituelles. Fondamentalement, les gouvernements doivent également investir des ressources dans de nouveaux intercepteurs. En outre, les capacités d’interception hit-to-kill pourraient être complétées par des contre-mesures électromagnétiques (micro-ondes pour endommager l’électronique interne du missile) et cybernétiques (brouillage). Pourtant, en raison de la température de surface élevée des missiles hypersoniques, il est douteux que les lasers puissent représenter un moyen efficace d’arrêter la menace. Le nouvel investissement du Canada à hauteur de 4,9 milliards de dollars canadiens dans la modernisation du NORAD, approuvé en juin 2022, pourrait concerner à la fois l’ajout de capacités et l’élargissement de son mandat. Cela signifierait aller au-delà de la mise à niveau du SAN – le système radar qui fournit une couverture d’alerte précoce et un suivi des menaces – et de la modernisation des systèmes de commandement, de contrôle et de communication, pour inclure également de nouveaux intercepteurs de missiles air-air, en plus des avions. Il sera important de choisir avec soin le bon mécanisme d’interception. Alors que le ciblage des plateformes de lancement et le recours aux avions de chasse intercepteurs ont été les options les plus populaires, dans le cas des missiles hypersoniques à longue portée et des planeurs, les intercepteurs doivent cibler le véhicule lui-même avec des missiles. Par conséquent, investir dans la défense active, et pas seulement dans la dissuasion, et inclure la défense terrestre pour protéger les cibles de grande valeur devrait être inévitable. Les radars terrestres actuels sont insuffisants à eux seuls puisque les missiles balistiques ne seront bientôt plus qu’une des menaces contre l’Amérique du Nord. Le Canada devra s’assurer que le NORAD est également en mesure de se protéger contre les attaques de missiles de croisière dont les capacités de portée et de vitesse ont évolué, et contre les planeurs volant à des altitudes inhabituelles, ce qui rend la construction de couches de capteurs spatiaux cruciale pour leur détection et leur suivi. La Missile Defence Agency américaine prévoit de mettre en place une défense contre les planeurs hypersoniques avant la fin des années 2020 (au plus tôt). Il est vrai qu’Ottawa a refusé à deux reprises de participer à la défense antimissile terrestre à mi-parcours (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense) des États-Unis, en raison de préoccupations liées aux armes nucléaires – tout en soutenant la Défense aérienne et antimissile intégrée de l'OTAN (IAMD Integrated Air and Missile Defence) au-dessus de l’Europe et le rôle d’alerte tactique et d’évaluation des attaques du NORAD. Toutefois, la défense contre les planeurs hypersoniques pourrait être plus acceptable politiquement, non seulement parce que les planeurs hypersoniques passent peu de temps dans l’espace, mais aussi parce qu'une participation donnerait au Canada une influence sur la prise de décision en matière de défense de l’Amérique du Nord. 2/ Travailler à une meilleure compréhension de la capacité militaire hypersonique et contrôler sa propagation. La politisation des armes hypersoniques dans la compétition des grandes puissances a créé une lacune dans la compréhension des menaces hypersoniques et de la capacité réelle des systèmes d’armes hypersoniques. Les grandes puissances ne se copient pas seulement les unes les autres, mais exagèrent délibérément les capacités des systèmes d’armes encore en développement, tout en exploitant ces perceptions déformées à des fins de propagande. La dangereuse course technologique s’intensifie alors que la Chine a testé une fusée orbitale avec un planeur, et que, peu de temps après, les États-Unis ont annoncé la construction de plusieurs couches de capteurs spatiaux pour détecter ce planeur. En réaction, la Russie a testé une arme antisatellite capable d’abattre des satellites américains. Cependant, les pays en compétition pour un statut de grande puissance ont tendance à exagérer l’importance de l’introduction d’armes hypersoniques dans l’arsenal. L’utilité militaire reste inconnue en termes de défense et de portée stratégique, tandis que les armes hypersoniques semblent être principalement utiles aux « agressifs et aux défavorisés ». Le gouvernement canadien devrait s’efforcer d’accroître la sensibilisation et la compréhension de la capacité militaire hypersonique. Il devrait également promouvoir le contrôle de sa propagation par le biais de outils de maîtrise des armements et contribuer à l’objectif de  l’OTAN d’établir des normes de gouvernance pour les technologies émergentes et de rupture (EDT). Ce faisant, le Canada pourrait éviter une plus grande déconnexion entre les experts techniques, d’une part, et les représentants politiques et militaires, d’autre part. Le Canada pourrait ainsi travailler avec ses alliés pour mieux réglementer le développement et l’utilisation de la technologie hypersonique à des fins militaires. Le traité New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) couvre également les planeurs hypersoniques à portée stratégique. Leur prolifération n’est attendue que chez les pays qui possèdent déjà des missiles balistiques, nécessaires à leur phase de propulsion. En revanche, le développement des missiles de croisière hypersoniques est plus lent, car la propulsion hypersonique est coûteuse en carburant et en ressources. Le Canada devrait revoir la technologie hypersonique et les exportations de missiles afin d’éviter la prolifération des systèmes d’armes offensifs. Le régime de contrôle de la technologie des missiles tend à être le forum central pour clarifier et mettre à jour la réglementation à mesure que la technologie des missiles évolue, ainsi que l'accord de Wassenaar sur les technologies à double usage et le code de conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques. Cependant, les débats sont toujours en cours sur la façon dont ces outils pourraient restreindre les planeurs hypersoniques, en s’appuyant sur une analogie avec les MARV. Le Canada et d’autres pays désireux d’introduire des réformes dans la gouvernance mondiale des missiles devraient également tenir compte du caractère dual de la technologie hypersonique. En particulier, la propulsion hypersonique a un immense potentiel pour aider à construire une infrastructure plus durable pour l’exploration spatiale. Contrôler la militarisation de la technologie hypersonique ne devrait pas empêcher le développement de nouveaux véhicules spatiaux qui peuvent également évoluer à des vitesses hypersoniques (sans pour autant transporter d’ogives). ## Les nouvelles formes de guerre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-nouvelles-formes-de-guerre/ Modified: 2022-10-24 > Procurez-vous le livre Les nouvelles formes de guerre, le deuxième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! On parle beaucoup de la « guerre » mais elle reste une notion molle, aux contours mal définis, en premier lieu parce qu’elle est un phénomène protéiforme : la « guerre » n’est pas qu’un conflit armé interétatique comme celui qui oppose actuellement la Russie et l’Ukraine, c’est aussi et même beaucoup plus souvent des opérations clandestines, des actions invisibles mais influentes, ce que l’on appelle la « guerre cognitive », c’est la désinformation, la « guerre » contre le virus, le rôle des technologies, l’importance de la formation, de la temporalité, etc. C’est, en d’autres termes, un « fait social total ». Ce volume revient sur les différentes formes de la guerre, et ses évolutions les plus récentes, illustrées par des exemples concrets, tirés des quatre coins du monde. Procurez-vous le livre Les nouvelles formes de guerre, le deuxième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Une nouvelle génération d’experts renommés, d’observateurs avisés des opérations en cours livre ici ses points de vue éclairés, accessibles au plus grand nombre et accompagnés d’une riche infographie. Les différentes contributions de ce livre sont issues de la plateforme francophone d’analyse de questions internationales Le Rubicon. SOMMAIRE « Chronos et Athéna. Le facteur temporel dans les questions stratégiques», par Olivier Schmitt « Gagner la guerre avant la guerre, c’est d’abord préparer les chefs», par le général Benoît Durieux « La guerre cognitive : agir sur le cerveau de l’adversaire», par le colonel David Pappalardo « Les technologies nouvelles et émergentes changent-elles la donne pour les petites puissances », par le général Michael Claesson et Zebulon Carlander « Les « libérateurs » : comment la « galaxie Prigojine » raconte la chevauchée du groupe Wagner au Sahel», par Maxime Audinet et Colin Gérard « Qu’est-ce qu’une action clandestine réussie ?», par Damien van Puyvelde, Rory Cormac et Calder Walton « Les réfugiés peuvent-ils être utilisés comme armes ? Un défi pour l’Occident», par le major Eric Hovey « La mobilisation des militaires dans la crise sanitaire. Les risques d’une armée « à tout faire »» par Matteo Mazziotti di Celso « Amplitude et subtilité du droit international humanitaire dans la guerre en Ukraine», par Julia Grignon ... Le Rubicon publiera de petits livres destinés au grand public, qui permettront d’aborder, clairement et précisément, les nouvelles questions brûlantes liées à l’actualité internationale. Chaque mois, à partir d’avril 2022, les Équateurs publieront un ouvrage d’environ 128 à 144 pages, au prix de 10 à 12 euros, synthèse du travail des experts de la plateforme Le Rubicon. La nouvelle collection du Rubicon ## Les orientations stratégiques du Québec et du Canada : enjeux sécuritaires, enjeux diplomatiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/enjeux-securitaires-enjeux-diplomatiques/ Modified: 2022-04-01 > À l’heure de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, qui laisse présager de nombreuses répercussions politiques, économiques et militaire... À l’heure de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, qui laisse présager de nombreuses répercussions politiques, économiques et militaires tant au niveau national qu’international, le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) a organisé un grand événement intitulé « Les orientations stratégiques du Québec et du Canada  : enjeux sécuritaires, enjeux diplomatiques ». L’événement a eu lieu le 23 mars 2022 sous la forme de deux panels, le premier avec un accent sur l’Amérique du Nord et le second, dans une perspective internationale. Cette matinée était présentée à l’occasion de la troisième édition des Rendez-vous Gérin-Lajoie, présentée par l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) et qui rassemble des expertes et experts universitaires de renom et de la relève en recherche, des praticiens et des diplomates. Plusieurs questions d’actualité sur les défis et stratégies du Québec et du Canada ont été abordées, dans un contexte marqué par un ordre international fracturé et le retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances. L’animation a été assurée par Justin Massie, professeur titulaire de science politique à l’UQAM et co-directeur du RAS, et par Mélanie Marquis, correspondante parlementaire à Ottawa pour La Presse. Avec la participation de : -Louise Blais, ancienne Ambassadrice et Représentante permanente adjointe du Canada à l’Organisation des Nations unies (2017 à 2021) -Laurent Borzillo, stagiaire postdoctoral au sein du Département de science politique de l’UQAM et auprès du RAS -Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, professeure invitée en science politique à l’Université de Montréal -Justin Massie, professeur titulaire de science politique à l’UQAM et co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique -David Morin, professeur agrégé à l’Université de Sherbrooke et co-titulaire de la Chaire UNESCO en prévention de la radicalisation et de l’extrémisme violents -Camille Raymond, étudiante à la maîtrise au Département de science politique de l’UQAM et boursière Banque Scotia Scotia-IEIM 2021 -Gaëlle Rivard Piché, analyste stratégique, Recherche et développement, pour Défense Canada -Stéphane Roussel, directeur de recherche du Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Québec (CIRRICQ) et professeur titulaire à l’École nationale d’Administration publique (ENAP) -François Audet, directeur de l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal ## Les origines et les suites de la guerre du Nagorno-Karabakh : Baromètre des relations de la Russie avec la Turquie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-origines-et-les-suites-de-la-guerre-du-nagorno-karabakh-barometre-des-relations-de-la-russie-avec-la-turquie/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique examine les origines et les suites de la guerre du Nagorno-Karabakh, un conflit gelé depuis vingt-deux ans. Le conflit armé du Nagorno-Karabakh entre l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Arménie, qui a débuté le 27 septembre, a duré près de deux mois et aurait fait plus de 10,000 morts, dont deux fois plus du côté azéri. Il a pris le monde entier par surprise. Il n'y a là rien d'étonnant. Il s'agissait d'un conflit gelé depuis vingt-deux ans et donc pratiquement oublié, sauf bien sûr, par les deux petits États en cause. S'il a connu une importante couverture médiatique, c'est en raison de la conjoncture internationale actuelle et de la dimension des nouveaux enjeux qu'il révèle dans la politique internationale de la Russie post-soviétique et de la recherche de sa place dans le monde. La faiblesse apparente de la Russie Pendant le premier mois de la guerre, et même plus, la Russie a paru hésitante et même incapable de soutenir et défendre l'Arménie qui était et demeure son alliée militaire. Elle fait effectivement partie de l'OTSC (Organisation du Traité de Sécurité Collective), l'alliance remise sur pied par Vladimir Poutine en 2002, qu'il voyait comme le noyau dur des alliés de la Russie et qui est comparée abusivement à une OTAN de l'Est. Elle compte six des anciennes républiques soviétiques et l'Arménie y abrite une base militaire russe. On comprend pourquoi l'Azerbaïdjan n'y a jamais adhéré. Il a été partiellement démembré par l'Arménie peu après la fin de l'URSS. Démembré d'une part par la prise du Nagorno-Karabakh qui était une région autonome comprenant 80% d'Arméniens, et d'autre part par la conquête de territoires qui s'étendent très au-delà de l'enclave arménienne. L'Azerbaïdjan a ainsi perdu 14% de son territoire; le Karabakh comptant pour 9%. Dans le chaos qui régnait à Moscou en 1992, l'opinion était nettement favorable à l'Arménie. Des groupes militaires russes encore mal contrôlés par Eltsine ont prêté main forte aux combattants arméniens. En 1993 après la fin des hostilités, 800,000 Azéris avaient quitté les territoires conquis et 400,000 Arméniens avaient émigré en Arménie dans la foulée de deux pogroms qui furent assimilés au génocide arménien. La passivité militaire de la Russie pendant la reconquête par l'Azerbaïdjan de la majeure partie des territoires perdus au début du siècle, y compris d'une partie du Karabakh, a été justifiée par Vladimir Poutine par des arguments de droit international. Il a fait valoir, comme pour se justifier, que l'indépendance auto-proclamée du Nagorno-Karabakh n'avait jamais été reconnue ni par la Russie, ni même par l'Arménie; ce qui est rigoureusement exact. Il oublie cependant de dire que si l'Arménie ne l'a pas fait, c'est à la demande et même à l'exigence de la Russie de Boris Eltsine après le cessez-le-feu de 1994. L'histoire explique bien des choses. On était alors en pleines guerres inter-ethniques de sécession dans l'ancienne Yougoslavie avec leur cortège d'horreurs qui auraient été impensables en Europe quelques années plus tôt. Principale responsable de ces guerres, la Serbie a été mise au ban des nations. En conséquence, la révision des frontières des États post-soviétiques était un sujet tabou à Moscou pour les ultra-occidentalistes de l'entourage de Eltsine dont l'objectif premier était de voir la Russie « joindre les rangs du monde civilisé », pour utiliser leurs termes[1]. Tout récemment, après l'arrêt des hostilités en Azerbaïdjan, Vladimir Poutine a donné une très longue entrevue pour expliquer et justifier le comportement de la Russie pendant le conflit. Parlant comme s'il avait été un arbitre neutre entre les deux parties, il a cependant critiqué l'Arménie, mais pas du tout l'Azerbaïdjan[2]. Pour ce faire, il s'est référé au Groupe de Minsk qui avait été mis sur pied en 1994 et présidé conjointement par les États-Unis, la Russie et la France (dans l'esprit de la fin de la guerre froide) pour trouver une solution au conflit qui soit acceptable aux deux parties et qui n'a jamais pu réussir malgré plusieurs tentatives. Poutine a souligné qu'en 2013 il avait proposé, avec l'accord des deux autres co-présidents du Groupe, une restitution par l'Arménie de sept districts azéris pour détendre la situation et pouvoir régler plus facilement ensuite le statut du Karabakh. Erevan s'y était opposé pour garder un moyen de pression important afin d'obtenir la renonciation à ce territoire. En d'autres mots, selon lui, c'était l'intransigeance de l'Arménie qui bloquait un dégel de la situation. Poutine a aussi affirmé que quelques semaines après le début de la guerre, en octobre, le président de l'Azerbaïdjan avait accepté de conclure un cessez-le-feu à la seule condition que les anciens citoyens azéris, notamment ceux de la ville de Shusha, puissent retourner au Karabakh. Il s'est dit étonné que le président arménien ait refusé de saisir cette proposition. Si tout au long du conflit armé la Russie est apparue comme en perte d'influence et incapable de peser sur le cours des événements, on a vu par la suite que ce fut un choix délibéré. On allait assister à un important redressement de son rôle avec la fin des hostilités. Les succès militaires d'un Azerbaïdjan épaulé par la Turquie Avant même la première guerre du Karabakh, les relations de l'Azerbaïdjan avec la Russie étaient déjà très mauvaises et n'ont fait que s'aggraver par la suite même si Moscou n'en était que peu responsable. L'effondrement économique, l'un des pires de l'ex-URSS, et l'absence de forces armées dignes de ce nom expliquent largement sa défaite. Le chaos politique a commencé à s'arrêter peu après le cessez-le-feu de 1994, avec l'arrivée au pouvoir d'un personnage politique de haut calibre : Heydar Aliyev. Avec Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, Aliyev avait été l’un des deux membres du Politburo du Parti communiste de l'URSS que Iouri Andropov envisageait en 1984 pour lui succéder comme Secrétaire-Général du Parti. Après son décès en 2003 il fut remplacé par son fils Ilham Alyev, toujours en place. Dans les années qui ont suivi leur accession au pouvoir, le redressement économique de l'Azerbaïdjan a été assez spectaculaire, grâce à la réalisation de plusieurs grands projets d'exportation de pétrole vers la Turquie qui en a beaucoup bénéficié, tant comme consommateur que comme voie de transit vers l'Europe. On pense ici à l'oléoduc Bakou-Tbilissi-Ceyhan qui fait un parcours de 1,768 kilomètres pour arriver sur la Méditerranée et à celui de 1,300 kilomètres depuis Bakou vers la Russie au port de Novorossiisk pour exportation vers l'Europe. Il n'est pas nécessaire d'insister sur la très forte dépendance de la Turquie pour ses importations de gaz russe. Ces liens économiques majeurs ont forcément favorisé des liens politiques importants, mais variables entre les trois pays. En octobre 2009, après des années et des années d'hostilité, deux protocoles d'accord ont été signés entre l'Azerbaïdjan et l'Arménie. Le premier visait à établir des relations diplomatiques entre les deux États, à reconnaître comme définitive leur frontière commune et permettre ainsi des échanges commerciaux. Le second visait à chercher des compromis sur les enjeux qui les séparaient. À Erevan, on envisagea de diluer l'exigence de la reconnaissance du génocide de 1915 par un projet d'étude conjointe des événements survenus alors. Une autre commission devait rechercher un compromis sur l'avenir du Nagorno-Karabakh. L'événement provoqua un tollé à Bakou où on menaça de suspendre les relations avec Ankara et d'annuler des projets de nouveaux accords pétroliers. Mais, près d'un an plus tard, sous la pression de la diaspora arménienne, le Parlement d'Erevan annula les protocoles signés. L'hostilité commune de l'Azerbaïdjan et de la Turquie à l'endroit de l'Arménie en sortit nettement renforcée. Il est assez étonnant que la nouvelle guerre pour le Nagorno-Karabakh n'ait pas été prévue longtemps avant le début des hostilités malgré une tension constante et forte. Le rapport de force autant militaire qu'économique entre les deux parties n'avait plus rien à voir avec celui de la première. Les soldats azéris sous les drapeaux étaient au nombre de 67,000 et l'Arménie en comptait 45,000. Pour ce qui est des chars d'assaut et autres véhicules armés, l'Arménie en comptait respectivement 529 et 1,000 alors que l'Azerbaïdjan en avait 665 et 1,637. L'ensemble des avions et hélicoptères de combat était de 127 du côté azéri et de 65 du côté arménien. En 2019, le budget de la défense de Erevan était de $1,8 milliard et celui de Bakou était de $645 millions. Malgré toute cette supériorité, Ilham Aliyev a jugé prudent autant politiquement que militairement de demander une aide directe de la Turquie. Comme on le sait, c'est celle-ci qui a fourni les drones qui se sont avérés très efficaces et qui a envoyé des officiers de très haut niveau pour coordonner sinon même diriger les opérations. Il a été fait aussi état de mercenaires provenant de la minorité turque de Syrie qui avait combattu le régime Assad avant d'avoir dû se réfugier en Turquie. Le retour décisif de la Russie Tout au long de la guerre de quarante-quatre jours, Poutine a demandé un cessez-le-feu. Il a réussi à l'obtenir, ou plutôt à l'imposer, après que l'Azerbaïdjan eut repris presque tout le territoire entourant le Nagorno-Karabakh et une partie non négligeable de ce dernier. On ne connaît pas le contenu des nombreux entretiens qu'il a eu avec Aliyev et Erdogan. Cependant, à divers signes on peut croire qu'ils ont été très durs et orageux. Trois semaines après le début des hostilités, lors d'une rencontre à Istanbul entre le président ukrainien Zelenski et son homologue Erdogan, celui-ci lui a réaffirmé que la Turquie refusait de reconnaître l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie. On sait qu'il soutient ouvertement les revendications de la minorité des Tatars qui comptent pour 12% de la population de la péninsule. Avec son penchant provocant, il est allé plus loin et lui a même dit, dans une déclaration commune, qu'il aiderait l'Ukraine à joindre les rangs de l'OTAN. Il sait très bien que c'est pour bloquer une telle éventualité que la Russie soutient la rébellion du Donbass qui dure depuis six ans. Poutine a réussi à imposer le cessez-le-feu avant que l'Arménie ait totalement perdu le Karabakh. Il est certain que c'est l'Azerbaïdjan qui a choisi d'accepter le cessez-le-feu et qui a dû mettre la Turquie devant sa décision. Ce faisant, Ilham Alyiev a montré qu'il accordait une nette préférence géopolitique à la Russie. En lui demandant d'accepter de ne pas rétablir complètement l'intégrité territoriale de son pays, Poutine a voulu éviter une défaite totale et catastrophique de son alliée l'Arménie. Il en sera redevable à son homologue azéri. Et ce n'est pas tout ce qu'il lui doit. Pour garantir le cessez-le-feu, les accords prévoient le déploiement d'un contingent militaire russe de 2,000 hommes en territoire azéri, autour de l'espace réduit du Karabakh, pour une période renouvelable de cinq ans. Pour la première fois depuis la fin de l'URSS, des forces militaires russes seront stationnées en Azerbaïdjan. Avant la publication des termes du cessez-le-feu, il fut annoncé à Istanbul que des militaires turcs se joindraient aux forces de maintien de la paix. Il n'en a rien été. Tout au plus quelques observateurs turcs pourront être accueillis dans un centre de surveillance du cessez-le-feu. Soulignons que cet accord ne dit rien du tout sur l'avenir du Karabakh. Le cessez-le-feu est renouvelable après cinq ans. L'habileté de Poutine à faire avaliser un tel compromis est assez remarquable. L'accès de l'Arménie au Karabakh lui est maintenant garanti par les forces militaires russes. En retour, et c'est là une concession majeure de l'Arménie, celle-ci a accepté la construction sur son territoire d'une route qui permettra à l'Azerbaïdjan de rejoindre le Nakhitchevan, qui est une entité importante de son territoire enclavée entre l'Arménie et l'Iran. Jusqu'à maintenant les communications terrestres de l'Azerbaïdjan vers sa région autonome doivent nécessairement passer par l'Iran. L'Azerbaïdjan obtiendrait ainsi une sortie vers la Turquie avec laquelle elle n'a pas de frontière[3]. Ce fut certainement une concession très difficile pour Poutine à obtenir. Il reste cependant à voir quand et comment pourra se faire cette route. Source : Carte de l'Azerbaïdjan avec le Haut-Karabakh et la zone contrôlée par l'armée arménienne jusqu'en novembre 2020. Consultez le fichier d’origine ici. Quelques mots s’imposent sur l'attitude de l'Iran pendant le conflit. Il faut souligner d'abord qu'il y a plus de deux fois plus d'Azéris en Iran qu'en Azerbaïdjan; soit 23 millions face à 10 millions. Des deux côtés, la grande majorité de ceux-ci sont chiites, tout comme la vaste majorité de la population de l'Iran. Les relations entre les deux États ont souvent été difficiles. Notamment en raison du fait qu'Israël a compté pour 60% des achats d'armements de l'Azerbaïdjan entre 2015 et 2019 selon les chiffres du SIPRI; le reste venant de la Russie et la Turquie. C'est après bien des hésitations et en raison du poids de sa population azérie que Téhéran a appuyé l'Azerbaïdjan. Si la guerre avait duré quelques jours de plus, l'Azerbaïdjan aurait reconquis la totalité de son territoire, à moins d'une entrée en guerre de la Russie. Poutine a-t-il dû menacer de le faire ? On le saura peut-être un jour. Quoi qu'il en soit, lors de sa très longue conférence de presse du 17 novembre, et contrairement à ses commentaires concernant l'Arménie, il a fait preuve d'une grande déférence à l'endroit d'Aliyev et même de la Turquie. En réponse aux questions des journalistes concernant l'appui majeur donné par la Turquie à l'Azerbaïdjan, il leur a répondu: « L'Azerbaïdjan est un État indépendant et souverain et il a parfaitement le droit de choisir ses alliés comme il le veut ». Il ne dirait assurément rien de tel en ce qui concerne la Géorgie et l'Ukraine... On pourrait dire que la Turquie a un statut très particulier dans ses relations avec la Russie. Étant donné que le cessez-le-feu du 9 novembre ne prévoit strictement rien sur l'avenir du Nagorno-Karabakh, l’on risque fort de retourner au conflit gelé pendant 25 ans ; et pour combien de temps ? Si le lien routier prévu en Arménie entre les deux morceaux de l'Azerbaïdjan peut se faire, il devrait entraîner une détente entre les deux États. Le mieux à espérer dans ces conditions serait une formule de double appartenance du Karabakh à l'Arménie et à l'Azerbaïdjan. Est-ce possible ? L'avenir le dira. Les difficiles bonnes relations de la Russie et de la Turquie Dans les termes les plus simples, ce qui explique ces bonnes relations sont leurs déceptions et leurs désillusions, plus récentes dans le cas de la Turquie, à l'égard du monde occidental. Ces déceptions et désillusions concernent davantage l'Europe dans le cas de la Turquie, et davantage les États-Unis dans le cas de la Russie. Avec l'annexion de la Crimée et surtout en raison de la guerre du Donbass et ses milliers de morts, la Russie a été mise au ban de l'ensemble du monde occidental. Pour ce qui est de la Turquie, il faut se rappeler que durant les premières années de son pouvoir à Ankara en 2003, Erdogan a fait de nombreux efforts pour répondre aux exigences de l'Union européenne afin que la Turquie puisse y adhérer, pour finalement essuyer un refus. Il a par la suite cultivé la nostalgie de l'Empire ottoman de même que l'Islam pour donner une mission internationale à la Turquie, sans bien sûr vouloir le reconstituer. La géographie et l'histoire font donc en sorte qu'il y a là un chevauchement partiel, mais non négligeable de ce que Moscou appelle la « sphère des intérêts légitimes » des deux États; le terme de sphère d'influence étant devenu politiquement incorrect. Malgré toutes les frictions survenues entre elles, la Russie attache une grande importance à la Turquie parce qu'elle la voit comme un très important facteur de multipolarité dans la conjoncture internationale actuelle. On touche ici à ce qui est devenu l'objectif central de la politique internationale de la Russie depuis sa prise en main en janvier 1996 par Evgueni Primakov, éminent universitaire et grand maître de la géopolitique, dans le contexte et en raison du second élargissement de l'OTAN vers l'Est. C'est avec la Chine que la Russie a fondé en 2001 l'Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai (OCS), dont l’un des premiers objectifs était la promotion de la multipolarité dans le monde par le renforcement de leurs liens économiques, politiques et militaires. C'est dans ce cadre qu'ont eu lieu de grandes manœuvres militaires entre la Chine, la Russie et quelques-uns de ses alliés d'Asie centrale[4]. Avec des statuts variables, plusieurs autres États ont rejoint l'OCS, qui est devenue le principal foyer et promoteur de la multipolarité. En 2012, la Turquie a demandé à devenir membre à part entière de l'OCS. Erdogan y a obtenu un statut particulier, la Turquie étant membre de l'OTAN; un cas unique. En novembre 2016, quelques jours après que le Parlement de Strasbourg eut suspendu ses négociations avec Ankara pour son accession à l'Union européenne, l'OCS lui a confié la présidence d'un groupe de consultation sur les enjeux énergétiques. Avec un fort appui de Moscou, c'était la première fois que l'OCS donnait un tel mandat à un membre à statut particulier. L'importance géopolitique de la Turquie pour la Russie tient aussi et peut-être même davantage à son achat de missiles russes de défense anti aérienne S-400, qui comptent parmi les armements les plus sophistiqués dont dispose Moscou. C'est là ­un événement sans précédent dans toute l'histoire de l'OTAN. Erdogan a résisté là-dessus aux nombreuses pressions des États-Unis qui ont même appliqué quelques sanctions. Malgré cela, un second contrat d'achat a été conclu en août dernier. En raison des effets perturbateurs qui en résultent pour la cohésion de l'OTAN, la Russie ne peut que souhaiter que la Turquie y demeure. En conclusion, il faut souligner que la Russie paie pour l'instant un prix politique assez léger au regard de ce que peut valoir la Turquie en termes de multipolarité. C'est à l'intérieur du triangle Russie-Iran-Turquie qui cherche à rétablir l'intégrité territoriale de la Syrie que la Russie prend davantage en compte les intérêts de la Turquie qui veut y établir une zone tampon sur ses frontières pour empêcher un passage possible de forces kurdes. Pour Erdogan, les revendications kurdes intérieures comme extérieures sont le principal danger qui pèse sur la Turquie. Que peut faire le Canada d'aussi loin ? Le 22 octobre dernier, dans le contexte des événements évoqués plus haut, mais sans rapport direct avec eux, Vladimir Poutine s'adressait à un large auditoire d'universitaires et d'éditorialistes étrangers venant entre autres des États-Unis et du Canada, dans le cadre de sa rencontre annuelle ce qui s'appelle le « Club de discussion Valdai ». Il y a tenu des propos d'une arrogance nettement plus étonnante que d'habitude : Laissez-moi vous assurer chers amis que nous évaluons objectivement nos potentialités : notre potentiel intellectuel, territorial, économique et militaire. Je me réfère ici à nos options actuelles et à notre potentiel global. En renforçant ce pays et en regardant ce qui arrive dans le monde et dans d'autres pays, je voudrais dire à ceux qui s'attendent encore à voir la force de la Russie décliner graduellement, la seule chose qui nous inquiète est d'attraper un rhume à vos funérailles. On voit dans ces propos un reflet compensatoire de la mise au ban de la Russie dans le monde occidental et des multiples sanctions dont elle a fait l'objet ces dernières années. Si Poutine n'a pas encore salué la victoire électorale de Joe Biden, ce n'est certainement pas par déférence envers Donald Trump. C'est qu'il s'attend à pire et qu'il cherche comme on dit parfois, « à lui tenir la dragée haute ». Le Canada a déjà pu contribuer à faciliter une atténuation notable des tensions entre les États-Unis et la Russie. Il n’est pas clair qu’il en ait encore la capacité. [1] Soulignons pour cela qu'en 1992, Eltsine a refusé de donner suite à une résolution très majoritaire de ce qui s'appelait encore le Soviet suprême de Russie concernant la Crimée. Cette résolution exigeait sa restitution à la Russie, en faisant valoir que son transfert à l'Ukraine par Khrouchtchev en 1954 était illégal parce que la Constitution soviétique exigeait qu'un changement de frontières fasse l'accord des républiques concernées et pas seulement d'une décision du Soviet suprême de l'URSS; ce qui n'avait pas été respecté. La Crimée comptait alors plus de 70% de Russes. [2] Le texte de ses propos mérite d'être lu en entier : cliquez ici. [3] Voir la carte ci-haut, où on voit bien avec tout cela l'arbitraire des frontières établies par Staline. [4] Il faut souligner les récentes et colossales manœuvres « Vostok-2018 », aussi bien terrestres que navales conduites en septembre dernier en Extrême-Orient par la Russie avec une participation très importante de la Chine. Elles auraient mobilisé plus de 300 000 personnes. ## Les périls de l’attractivité : les petits États du flanc oriental de l’OTAN face à l’incertitude américaine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-perils-de-lattractivite-les-petits-etats-du-flanc-oriental-de-lotan-face-a-lincertitude-americaine/ Modified: 2025-07-17 L’arrivée de Donald Trump à la Maison-Blanche pour un second mandat représente un défi majeur pour l’approche sécuritaire des pays du flanc oriental de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN). Alors que ces États ont commencé à revoir leurs priorités stratégiques après l’agression russe contre l’Ukraine, ils sont désormais confrontés à des incertitudes quant à l’engagement futur des États-Unis pour leur sécurité, sans mentionner un hypothétique rapprochement entre les États-Unis et la Russie. Cette contribution propose d’aborder ces enjeux à travers une étude comparative des stratégies de sécurité nationale adoptées par quatre petites nations du flanc oriental de l’OTAN à la suite de l’agression russe de février 2022 : la Bulgarie, la République tchèque, l’Estonie et la Lettonie. Ces nations font partie des neuf pays du format dit de Bucarest qui fut établi en 2015 à l’initiative conjointe de la Pologne et de la Roumanie. Ce groupe inclut, outre ces deux pays, la Bulgarie, la République tchèque, l’Estonie, la Hongrie, la Lettonie, la Lituanie, et la Slovaquie. Leur sélection est justifiée par le fait que ces nations ont revu leur stratégie de sécurité nationale après l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie. Leur répartition géographique au sein du flanc oriental de l’OTAN, sans compter les trajectoires que leurs relations avec la Russie ont prises, permet également de les analyser au prisme de différences et similarités quant à leurs approches stratégiques. Enfin, ces dernières peuvent être abordées sous l’angle de la catégorie analytique des petits États. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## Les pistes de collaboration canado-française face aux nouvelles menaces sécuritaires et climatiques dans l’Arctique canadien URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-pistes-de-collaboration-canado-francaise-face-aux-nouvelles-menaces-securitaires-et-climatiques-dans-larctique-canadien/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Alliés , la France et le Canada entretiennent également des relations bilatérales dans de nombreux domaines dont celui de la défense. Cette note stratégique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) avec le soutien du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada et de la DGRIS (Ministère des Armées, France), qui vise à développer des échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens. Résumé Alliés au sein de nombreuses organisations internationales, la France et le Canada entretiennent également des relations bilatérales dans de nombreux domaines dont celui de la défense. Focalisée sur les sous-régions arctiques, cette note propose des pistes de collaboration possibles entre le Canada, État arctique, et la France, pays observateur du Conseil de l’Arctique. L’identification de pistes de collaboration possibles entre ces deux États est d’autant plus intéressante que l’Arctique canadien doit faire face à des menaces sécuritaires et climatiques toujours plus importantes qui pourraient nécessiter un appui de ses alliés. La mise à jour de la politique de défense canadienne, publiée le 8 avril 2024 par le Premier ministre canadien, Justin Trudeau, et son ministre de la Défense, Bill Blair, répondait d’ailleurs à la nécessité de faire face aux nouvelles menaces créées par « l’évolution de l’environnement géopolitique et des paysages naturels » pour le Canada et sa population. Plus précisément, cette nouvelle politique identifie trois tendances, au sein desquelles des pistes de collaboration entre le Canada et la France pourraient être développées. Les menaces sécuritaires posées par certaines puissances extérieures dans l’Arctique canadien se cristallisent autour de la présence de la Chine. Depuis 2022, le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS) alerte sur le risque de prise d’intérêt chinois (et russes) dans la construction d’infrastructures commerciales (mines, télécommunications) et civiles (routes, maisons, etc.) dans le Nord. Les défis liés aux nouvelles technologies dans les sous-régions arctiques peuvent être illustrés par le caractère éminemment stratégique des câbles sous-marins de télécommunications. Les récentes coupures de câbles ont d’ailleurs illustré la vulnérabilité de ces infrastructures de télécommunications et le besoin de souveraineté numérique de certains acteurs étatiques. Traités encore trop souvent de manière uniforme par les médias, les impacts des changements climatiques seront inégaux selon les sous-régions arctiques nord-américaines, européennes et russe. L’étendue, la géologie et l’environnement naturel de l’Inuit Nunangat en font un des États les plus à risque, au côté de la Russie. La France et le Canada ont déjà créé des liens en matière de recherche stratégique. Ceux-ci pourraient être renforcés sur les enjeux de défense, tant au sein des universités que des instituts de recherche, en créant, par exemple, des synergies entre MINDS et la DGRIS. Lors d’une potentielle actualisation de la Stratégie polaire française, il pourrait être mis en exergue l’augmentation nécessaire des entraînements conjoints de recherche et sauvetage entre les deux États. Enfin, le partage d'informations et de données scientifiques sur la désinformation et sur les risques et impacts multiples des changements climatiques pergélisol doit continuer à s’accentuer entre le Canada, la France et leurs alliés. Des premières mesures ont été annoncées lors de la visite d'Emmanuel Macron au Canada fin septembre 2023. Introduction Le monde a radicalement changé depuis la publication de la politique de défense Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, en 2017. Le Canada fait face à de nouvelles menaces à la sécurité en constante évolution, dont les changements climatiques et leur incidence sur l’Arctique, les menaces de la Russie, de la Chine et d’autres pays à l’encontre des règles internationales qui nous protègent tous, ainsi que l’évolution accélérée du caractère du conflit. - Bill Blair, 8 avril 2024 Le Canada et la France sont alliés de longue date et partagent des valeurs communes. De nombreux échanges et collaborations existent dans différents domaines : économie, culture, éducation, francophonie… Face aux nombreuses tensions géopolitiques, aux nouveaux conflits, au retour de la guerre en Europe, et à l'augmentation des actes d'ingérence, il convient de renforcer la coopération en matière de défense au profit des intérêts bilatéraux. Le dialogue bilatéral dans le domaine de la défense a déjà été institutionnalisé en 2015 par l'établissement du Conseil franco-canadien de coopération de défense. Concernant la région Arctique, la France souhaite maintenir un haut niveau d’engagement sur les plans scientifique, environnemental, économique et stratégique. Elle l'a d'ailleurs réaffirmé dans sa feuille de route nationale arctique en 2016 et dans sa stratégie polaire en 2022. Dans ce cadre, le ministère des Armées développe sa connaissance des activités des acteurs de la région, étatiques et privés et affine sa vision des évolutions pouvant avoir un impact sur les intérêts français. À ce titre, l'observatoire de l’Arctique, financé par la Direction générale des relations internationales et de la stratégie (DGRIS) du ministère des Armées français et piloté par la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS), permet d'assurer un suivi transversal des thématiques arctiques, allant des stratégies des États à la production de normes en passant par les développements technologiques et aspects environnementaux. Afin d’identifier les pistes de collaboration possibles entre la France et le Canada concernant ces enjeux, un état des lieux des enjeux de défense identifiés par le Canada pour ses sous-régions arctiques est nécessaire. Cela est d’autant plus important que la politique de défense du Canada a récemment été révisée et que la collaboration bilatérale entre ces deux États dans ce secteur dans les sous-régions arctiques est à ce jour restreinte. En effet, le 8 avril 2024, le Premier ministre canadien, Justin Trudeau, et son ministre de la Défense, Bill Blair, ont publié une mise à jour de la politique de défense face aux « nouvelles menaces » créées par « l’évolution de l’environnement géopolitique et des paysages naturels » pour le Canada et sa population depuis 2017, lors de la publication de la dernière Politique Arctique du Canada. Si les experts font une analyse plus ou moins critique de cette mise à jour (Légion ; Marquis ; Massoud ; Ouellette-Vézina), cette nouvelle politique pointe trois tendances « puissantes et interconnectées (qui) sont en train de remodeler notre monde ». Tout d’abord, les changements climatiques et leurs effets déstabilisants et disproportionnés sur l’Arctique et le Nord du Canada rendent ces sous-régions de plus en plus accessibles et les confrontent à de nouveaux défis sécuritaires. Ensuite, les ‘autocraties et les États perturbateurs’ remettent en question l’ordre international assurant la sécurité et la prospérité du Canada, notamment par des « violations flagrantes du droit international par la Russie » et des tentatives de la Chine de remodeler l’ordre international. Enfin, les technologies nouvelles et perturbatrices redéfinissent rapidement les conflits et perturbent la sécurité du Canada. Focalisée sur les sous-régions arctiques, cette note traitera de ces enjeux en les regroupant sous deux bannières. Nous traiterons dans une première partie des menaces sécuritaires posées par certaines puissances extérieures sur le sol canadien et de celles liées aux nouvelles technologies pour le Canada. Puis, dans une deuxième partie, nous traiterons de certaines menaces, identifiées comme les plus importantes, liées aux impacts des changements climatiques dans les régions de l’Inuit Nunangat, l’Arctique canadien. Enfin, des recommandations et des axes de collaboration entre la France et le Canada sur les thématiques de cette note seront proposés. Partie 1 : Menaces sécuritaires Aujourd’hui, nous sommes confrontés à un défi générationnel complexe. [...] La démocratie, le libre-échange, ainsi que les règles et les valeurs qui les sous-tendent sont de plus en plus contestés par les États autoritaires. Parallèlement, la nature des conflits change tandis que la technologie évolue rapidement. En fin de compte, on remet en question nos valeurs les plus chères de démocratie, de liberté, de paix et d’équité. - Bill Blair, avril 2024 Les menaces sécuritaires identifiées dans l’Arctique canadien sont de deux ordres : l’ingérence et la présence de certaines puissances extérieures sur le sol canadien et les défis liés aux nouvelles technologies. Les menaces sécuritaires posées par certaines puissances extérieures dans l’Arctique canadien sont avant tout illustrées par la présence de la Chine. En effet, selon Mr Laporte, Directeur exécutif de la Direction des relations de sécurité et de défense Affaires mondiales Canada, le Canada est très attentif aux activités chinoises et aux activités militaires communes de la Chine et de la Russie, notamment les exercices maritimes. Si, selon lui, les ambitions et la percée économique chinoises dans la région arctique reflètent ses engagements croissants dans la gouvernance mondiale, il n’en reste pas moins qu’une méfiance grandissante du Canada envers la Chine existe. Accélérée depuis 2018 avec l’Affaire des deux Michaël, cette méfiance s’est cristallisée dans l’Arctique canadien autour de plusieurs événements du début d’année 2023, révélant les risques d’ingérence de la Chine au moyen d’infrastructures ou de domaines duales. En effet, début 2023, quatre objets volants non identifiés ont été repérés puis abattus en Amérique du Nord. Si un seul de ces ballons a été formellement identifié comme appartenant à la Chine, l’Armée canadienne a détecté, peu de temps après, des bouées de surveillance chinoises dans ses eaux arctiques. Certes, ce phénomène n’est pas nouveau et remonte à 2022 (Eye On the Arctic ; The Globe and Mail ; Eye on the Arctic) mais l'enchaînement de ces événements a exacerbé les tensions déjà présentes dans les relations bilatérales sino-canadiennes. Par ailleurs, ils ont montré les défis posés par la connaissance du milieu arctique (Domain Awareness) et la difficulté de répondre aux menaces face aux distances et aux conditions hostiles de l’Inuit Nunangat. Ils ont également rappelé les risques potentiels d’utilisation d’infrastructures ou de technologies à usage duale. En effet, bien que mobilisées dans le cadre d’un projet de recherche scientifique chinois, ces bouées « capables de cartographier le fond marin et de mesurer l’épaisseur de la glace », étaient également « capables de surveiller l’activité sous-marine ». Si l’intention militaire n’a pas été prouvée dans ce cas, elle reste possible. En sus de la recherche et de la coopération scientifique, d’autres domaines civils où la Chine est partie prenante inquiètent le Canada (The Globe and Mail ; Journal de Québec ; Journal de Québec). C’est notamment le cas de la navigation et des pêches illégales effectuées par des navires chinois dans ses eaux territoriales. Le manque d'infrastructures dans le Nord, qu'elles soient essentielles (maisons, hôpitaux, écoles) ou liées au secteur économique (minier) amène également son lot de défis. Tout d’abord, il entraîne déjà un exode vers les villes du Sud, comme dans les Territoires du Nord-Ouest. La Première ministre des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, Caroline Cochrane, a précisé en juillet dernier que « le Canada ne pourra pas y exercer sa souveraineté si ses communautés ne sont pas correctement outillées et construites » et si ces dernières se vident de leurs habitants. À plus long terme, si ce phénomène se généralise et que l’Inuit Nunangat devient inhabitable, ce sera l'identité arctique même du Canada qui pourrait être remise en question. Ensuite, la prise d’intérêt de l’État chinois dans des projets miniers et d’infrastructures dans l’Inuit Nunangat pose des enjeux de sécurité nationale. Par exemple, le port en eaux profondes « Gray Bays », essentiel pour le développement économique du Nunavut, est également soupçonné de favoriser les activités militaires et de surveillance de la Chine. Le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS) alerte, depuis 2022, sur le risque de prise d’intérêt chinois (et russes) dans la construction d’infrastructures commerciales (mines, télécommunications) et civiles (routes, maisons, etc.) dans le Nord. Le SCRS est même allé jusqu’à proposer ses services aux représentants inuit pour les aider à plaider leur dossier au Fédéral, notamment pour la rédaction d’une proposition de budget visant à augmenter les dépenses de ce dernier dans les infrastructures. En sus, Natan Obed, président d’Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), a demandé au SCRS de partager davantage d’informations pour permettre d’être mieux préparé. Le SCRS, quant à lui, serait en train d’augmenter sa présence dans le Nord et de consolider ses relations avec les communautés inuit pour mieux sécuriser la zone et contrer l’ingérence étrangère et l’espionnage. En effet, selon des documents consultés par Radio Canada, le SCRS aurait identifié des investissements étrangers clandestins, des tentatives d’ingérence à tous les niveaux du gouvernement et dans les programmes et financements de la recherche ainsi que des vols de recherches ou de données. Tout récemment, le Canada a bloqué pour la première fois une vente de terres rares à une entreprise basée en Chine. Le gouvernement fédéral n’exclut pas d’intervenir à nouveau afin de « restreindre les investissements chinois dans le secteur minier canadien », Ottawa considérant que les métaux rares relèvent de la sécurité nationale et qu’ils constituent un élément déterminant de sa stratégie de décarbonation. Les défis liés aux nouvelles technologies dans les sous-régions arctiques peuvent être illustrés par le caractère éminemment stratégique des câbles sous-marins de télécommunications. En effet, les récentes coupures de câbles ont illustré la vulnérabilité de ces infrastructures de télécommunications et le besoin de souveraineté numérique de certains acteurs étatiques, particulièrement l’Union européenne. En mer Baltique, trois câbles sous-marins (un finlandais, un suédois et un russe) et un gazoduc ont été endommagés dans la nuit du 7 au 8 octobre 2023 par l’ancre d’un porte-conteneur chinois, le New Polar Bear (Staalesen ; Kauranen et Van Overstraeten ; Sytas et Kauranen ; Kauranen et Johnson). Bien que le caractère délibéré de ses coupures n’ait pu être formellement montré, ces dommages ont révélé le rôle de l’Arctique comme route centrale de transit des données numériques. Pour finir, les menaces issues de conflits armés traditionnels ayant pour théâtre l’Arctique restent, aujourd’hui encore, très hypothétiques, face à l'environnement et à l’isolement de certaines sous-régions arctiques. Notons toutefois que l’Arctique européen, composé de plusieurs États souverains dont certains sont frontaliers avec la Fédération russe, serait théoriquement plus menacé dans le cas d’un conflit armé que l’Arctique nord-américain, composé de deux États alliés, les États-Unis et le Canada. Partie 2 : Menaces climatiques Nous ne pouvons plus compter sur la géographie du Canada – entouré de trois océans – pour nous protéger. - Mélanie Joly, avril 2024 Les impacts des changements climatiques sur l’environnement marin et terrestre arctique sont médiatisés depuis déjà plusieurs dizaines d’années. Or, ils sont souvent traités de manière uniforme, gommant l’incroyable diversité des sous-régions arctiques nord-américaines, européennes et russes. Concernant les menaces climatiques pour l’environnement marin, l’exemple le plus connu reste l’ouverture des voies maritimes navigables, un phénomène dont les impacts réels sont encore trop peu - ou mal - relayés (Lasserre ; voir les chapitres ‘Navigation’ de L’Année Arctique ; Polar Navigation). En effet, il est souvent avancé que la disparition de la banquise estivale faciliterait la navigation dans l'océan arctique. Or, si les côtes russes, plus éloignées de la banquise, pourraient théoriquement être plus « accessibles », ce n’est pas le cas pour l’archipel canadien, dont les chenaux pourraient être bloqués par l’augmentation des bourguignons (« growlers ») et autres glaces dérivantes. Par ailleurs, des deux côtés, le morcellement de la banquise complique les mises à jour des cartes des glaces, augmente l’humidité, le brouillard et le risque de tempêtes - autant de phénomènes qui rendent la navigation incertaine, moins rapide et plus risquée. Pour Laporte, cette ouverture de voies maritimes serait à double tranchant, permettant d’un côté de nouvelles opportunités maritimes et perturbant de l’autre massivement la vie quotidienne et les infrastructures civiles et militaires. Pour le Canada, ces ouvertures signifieraient un nécessaire renforcement des capacités de surveillance dans la région, notamment face au risque écologique, dans des zones peu peuplées et aux infrastructures limitées. Au niveau circumpolaire, cette augmentation de la navigation signifierait également une augmentation des moyens de recherche et sauvetage, les États côtiers ayant une obligation internationale légale de porter secours aux navires en détresse croisant dans leurs eaux. Autre sujet très médiatisé, la probabilité de la présence de ressources naturelles situées en mer est à remettre dans son contexte. Il est important de rappeler que l’étude de l’United States Geological Survey (USGS) sur les réserves potentielles d’hydrocarbures maritimes en Arctique parue en 2008 est basée sur des probabilités et non sur des ressources avérées. Or, elle sert aujourd'hui encore de référence, faute d’études plus récentes de même ampleur. Par ailleurs, même si cette estimation est avérée, notons que la plupart de ces ressources seraient localisées dans les fonds marins des zones économiques exclusives (ZEE) des États côtiers. Ainsi, elles seraient la propriété exclusive de ces États, réduisant au minimum le risque de conflits ou de « courses aux ressources » (Observatoire de l’Arctique, Rapport 4, Note 2, non publique). Concernant les menaces climatiques pour l'environnement terrestre, les États arctiques ne seront également pas tous égaux. La menace la plus importante est l'accélération du dégel du pergélisol, sol composé de roches, de sédiments et de glace dont la température demeure inférieure ou égale à 0 °C pendant au moins deux années consécutives. Par exemple, la Fédération de Russie est composée à 65% de pergélisol, rendant cet État le plus menacé par ce phénomène. Selon une étude, 80% des infrastructures de l’Arctique russe sont construites sur du pergélisol. L’Arctique Nord-américain (composé, dans cette même étude, de l’Alaska, du Yukon, des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, du Nunavut, du Nunavik, du Nunatsiavut et du Nord du Labrador) vient en deuxième position, suivi du Groenland, des pays scandinaves et de l’Islande. Outre les menaces sur les environnements marins et terrestres, les changements climatiques en Arctique peuvent également être illustrés par leurs impacts sur ​les populations arctiques, et plus particulièrement les peuples autochtones. En effet, pour Bridget Larocque, ancienne conseillère politique et chercheuse auprès de l’Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) et directrice exécutive du Gwich’in Council International (GCI) (2007-2012), les menaces climatiques impactent en premier lieu les droits et savoirs traditionnelles des Autochtones, intrinsèquement liés au rôle central du Territoire (appelé « Nuna » en Inuktitut) pour leur bien-être. En effet, les changements climatiques exacerbent l’ensemble des menaces aux dimensions de Sécurité humaine. Par exemple, outre la modification des routes de migrations des espèces animales due au réchauffement de la température du sol, de l’air et de l’eau, le dégel du pergélisol augmente le déchargement d’eau douce dans les deltas, poussant vers le large les poissons marins et leurs prédateurs, menaçant d’autant plus la sécurité alimentaire des communautés circumpolaires. À terme, ces menaces combinées risquent d’aggraver le phénomène susmentionné d’exode vers le Sud et son impact sur la souveraineté canadienne dans le Nord. L’importance de ces enjeux pour le Nord du Canada peut être illustrée par les propos de Stéphane Roussel, Professeur à l’École nationale d’administration publique. Selon lui, le ministère de la Défense est le seul à avoir les capacités suffisantes pour apporter les services nécessaires aux populations autochtones et devrait multiplier les approches de sécurité humaine dans ses politiques de sécurité intérieure - une relance qui serait également souhaitable pour l’OTAN. Cette prise de position est partagée par Laurent Borzillo, chercheur à l’ENAP, qui soutient que de plus gros investissements dans les patrouilles de Rangers permettraient d’anticiper ces menaces et d’assurer une meilleure protection des communautés autochtones (Gouvernement du Canada ; Radio Canada ; Lackenbauer, Vullierme & Roussel). Pour finir, notons que dans son Rapport d’évaluation des impacts sécuritaires des changements climatiques, publié le 9 juillet 2024, l’OTAN résume l’ensemble des menaces auxquelles devront faire face les Forces alliées en Arctique : « défis technologiques et logistiques » des théâtres d’opération arctique (climat rigoureux de plus en plus imprévisible, vitesse des vents, forts courants de marée, longues distances, obscurité, éloignement, couvertures radars, satellites et infrastructures militaires et critiques limitées) ; érosion côtière, dégradation du pergélisol et inondations risquant d’endommager les infrastructures militaires ; inondations, neige ou tempêtes bloquant les voies d’approvisionnement ; augmentation des précipitations affaiblissant la capacité de portage des sols et des routes ; lutte contre les incendies de forêt boréale ; « sécurité environnementale et humaine ». Face à ces menaces sécuritaires et climatiques, quelles seraient les pistes de collaboration entre la France et le Canada ? Partie 3 : Pistes de recommandations pour une collaboration canado-française Avant d’aller plus loin, nous souhaitons souligner que ces pistes de recommandation sont à prendre pour ce qu’elles sont, c’est à dire notre modeste contribution pour une « pensée stratégique bilatérale commune » qui pourrait permettre de mieux comprendre les perceptions respectives de ces deux États concernant ces sous-régions. La France et le Canada ont déjà créé des liens en matière de recherche stratégique qui pourraient être renforcés sur les enjeux de défense, tant au sein des universités que des instituts de recherche. Les deux États disposent d'ailleurs de programmes de financement similaires. Au Canada, le ministère de la Défense nationale finance le programme de Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS). En France, la Direction générale des relations internationales et de la stratégie (DGRIS) du ministère des Armées français finance le dispositif ministériel de soutien à la recherche stratégique (études externalisées, subventions, Pacte enseignement supérieur). La DGRIS assure également la tutelle de l’Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire (IRSEM), l’organisme de recherche stratégique du ministère des Armées. Nous recommandons de renforcer la collaboration entre les acteurs institutionnels et les acteurs publics et privés. À l'instar de la journée d'étude organisée par le programme de personnalités d'avenir France-Canada sur « L'Arctique et la coopération transatlantique » nous préconisons d'organiser un événement annuel de plus grande ampleur avec le soutien des deux États. Cet événement annuel pourrait s’organiser en alternance entre le Canada et la France. La proximité de Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon avec le Canada pourrait être un atout pour l’organisation d’une de ces journées d’étude. Les panels seraient composés de jeunes chercheuses et chercheurs en sciences sociales et en sciences naturelles, d’institutionnels et de militaires français et canadiens. Cet événement annuel contribuera à la réflexion bilatérale sur ces enjeux et au renforcement des réseaux d'experts. Enfin, le programme MINDS, la DGRIS et l'IRSEM pourraient engager des discussions pour co-financer une bourse de doctorat pour un(e) candidat(e) qui bénéficiera de la double tutelle universitaire franco-canadienne. Le renforcement de ces liens en recherche stratégique pourrait se faire à l'occasion d’une nécessaire actualisation de la Stratégie polaire française. En mettant à jour le nouveau contexte géopolitique, notamment avec l'intégration de la Suède et de la Finlande dans l'OTAN, cette mise à jour pourrait aussi mettre en exergue l’augmentation nécessaire des entraînements conjoints de recherche et sauvetage entre les marines canadiennes et françaises et entre l’Armée de terre française et les Rangers canadiens. Enfin, il nous semble primordial de continuer à encourager un partage d'informations et de données scientifiques sur la désinformation (notamment sur les infrastructures en Arctique) et sur les risques et impacts multiples des changements climatiques (par exemple sur la présence de virus et bactéries présents dans le pergélisol) entre le Canada, la France et leurs alliés, à l’image, par exemple, du programme international de recherche Takuvik entre l’Université Laval et le CNRS. Des premières mesures ont déjà été annoncées lors de la visite d'Emmanuel Macron au Canada fin septembre 2023. La France et la Canada ont appelé à travailler ensemble pour favoriser le développement d’un partenariat renforcé en matière de défense et de sécurité. Plusieurs actions ont été annoncées pour renforcer le soutien à l'Ukraine et la surveillance maritime en Indopacifique. Les deux Etats ont aussi rappelé leur implication dans le Plan d’action de l’OTAN sur le changement climatique et la sécurité. Fin 2023, cela a d'ailleurs donné lieu à l'ouverture à Montréal du Centre d’excellence OTAN pour le changement climatique et la sécurité qui est composé de Canadiens, Français et de membres des autres pays alliés. Concernant l'Arctique canadien, la France et le Canada ont rappelé leur collaboration au sein de l'opération NANOOK avec la tenue d'exercices militaires communs. Les deux pays souhaitent augmenter les exercices de navigation conjointe, le partage d’expérience, l’interopérabilité et la formation des équipages dans les environnements polaires, en profitant notamment de l’expertise et du soutien des forces armées canadiennes dans l’Arctique canadien. Autre point d'intérêt sur notre sujet, Ottawa et Paris souhaitent renforcer leurs échanges pour répondre efficacement aux menaces d'ingérences, mesure primordiale pour lutter contre les ingérences dans la région Arctique. Cela rejoint également les initiatives prises lors du dernier G7 en Italie, grâce au Mécanisme de réponse rapide G7 mis en place lors du G7 à Charlevoix en juin 2018. Cela permet de renforcer la coordination à l'échelle du G7 pour déceler, prévenir et contrer les menaces qui pèsent sur les démocraties des pays membres. À propos des auteurs Alexandre Cicard est diplômé d'un bachelor à Audencia Business School et d'une maîtrise en science politique à l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Il a piloté et coordonné pendant 3 ans le programme des études stratégiques à la Direction générale des relations internationales et de la stratégie (DGRIS) du ministère des Armées à Paris.  Aujourd'hui, il est chargé de communication et assistant de l'ambassadrice à la Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale (OACI) à Montréal.  Magali Vullierme, docteure en science politique, est chercheure post-doctorante au sein du Réseau sur la défense et la sécurité nord-américaines et arctiques (RDSNAA, Université Trent). Elle est également chercheure associée à l’Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique (OPSA, Université Ottawa), au CEARC (Université Paris-Saclay, UVSQ) et à l’Observatoire de l’Arctique (dirigé par la Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique pour le compte du Ministère des Armées, France). Enfin, elle est membre du GDR Arctique (CNRS, France). Ses recherches visent à mieux comprendre les interrelations entre, d’une part les populations autochtones et locales des régions arctiques, et, d’autre part, les enjeux multi-scalaires de sécurité (collaboration avec les Forces armées, risques liés au changement climatique, sécurité sanitaire).    ## Les postures de politique étrangère canadienne après la crise du canal de Suez de 1956 : leçons pour les débats actuels URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-postures-de-politique-etrangere-canadienne-apres-la-crise-du-canal-de-suez-de-1956-lecons-pour-les-debats-actuels/ Modified: 2026-09-18 Ce texte fait partie de la série spéciale d’essais Retour vers le futur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, financée par une subvention du programme MINDS du ministère de la Défense nationale. Résumé  Depuis le retour de Donald Trump à la présidence américaine en 2025, la fiabilité des États-Unis en tant qu'alliés au sein de l'OTAN est sérieusement remise en question. Face à cette incertitude, le Canada se retrouve à la croisée des chemins, une situation qui rappelle celle qui avait suivi la crise de Suez de 1956. Cet article examine les trois postures stratégiques envisagées par le Canada au lendemain de cette crise — alignement sur les États-Unis, rapprochement avec l'Europe et indépendance stratégique — afin d'en tirer des enseignements pour le contexte contemporain. L'analyse montre que chacune de ces postures comporte des avantages et des risques spécifiques, et qu'aucune ne peut être adoptée dans sa forme pure. L'article conclut que le Canada devrait privilégier une approche hybride : maintenir une coopération nord-américaine suffisante, approfondir ses partenariats européens et diversifier activement ses alliances pour renforcer son autonomie stratégique. Introduction Depuis 2025 et l'arrivée de Trump à la tête du gouvernement américain, la question de l'alliance transatlantique est revenue à de nombreuses reprises sur la table. Les États-Unis manifestent, sur le plan rhétorique, une volonté ferme de se retirer des enjeux de sécurité européens et cherchent à transférer le fardeau de la défense à leurs alliés. Bien que, sur le plan capacitaire, les efforts déployés par l’administration Trump soient nuançables, il demeure qu’une épée de Damoclès pèse sur les Européens et le Canada quant à leur capacité à compter sur leur allié commun. De plus, la multiplication des postures agressives étatsuniennes à l'égard du Groenland ou encore vis-à-vis du Canada a un impact direct sur la coopération transatlantique et plus particulièrement sur l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN). La volonté de désengagement américain, combinée à leur agressivité et à l'éventualité de leur retrait de l'alliance, engendre une incertitude grandissante dans la sphère occidentale. Ainsi, face à la fracture possible de l'OTAN, quelle posture de défense le Canada doit-il adopter afin de renforcer sa sécurité et de demeurer crédible sur la scène internationale ? Rares sont les fois où l'alliance transatlantique a risqué de vaciller. Cependant, en 1956, lors de la crise de Suez, l'OTAN a failli se briser en raison de la réaction américaine face à la décision franco-britannique d'intervenir dans le canal de Suez à la suite de sa nationalisation par Nasser. Cette situation a amené le Canada à réfléchir à une nouvelle posture à adopter en matière de politique étrangère. Devait-il suivre les Européens, et principalement le Royaume-Uni, ou bien poursuivre la voie de l'alignement sur les États-Unis déjà enclenchée durant les années 1940 ? Une troisième solution a également émergé : l'affirmation d'une politique étrangère autonome pour un pays encore jeune, tout récemment indépendant, cherchant à consolider son unité nationale. Ces débats ont animé la scène politique canadienne au lendemain de la crise, mais aussi au début des années 1960. Cet article aborde les leçons tirées par le Canada de la crise de Suez, principalement sur la relation entre alliés dans un contexte de discorde et de rupture, afin d'examiner, dans un contexte présentant des similitudes, les postures que pourrait adopter le Canada. Pour cela, il examine d'abord le contexte des années 1960 et la situation actuelle afin d'en établir les parallèles. Il revient ensuite sur les trois postures envisageables pour le Canada — l'alignement sur le voisin américain, l'alignement sur les Européens, et l'indépendance stratégique à travers la recherche de nouveaux partenariats — en analysant ce qu'elles impliquent concrètement pour le pays et les risques qu'elles comportent, notamment face aux États-Unis qui affirment toujours une forte velléité à l'égard de leur voisin du Nord. Ce texte propose que le Canada adopte un dosage des trois postures : s'inspirer d'un modèle de défense fondé sur l'autonomie, poursuivre sa coopération avec les alliés européens et mettre en place une stratégie de hedging vis-à-vis du voisin américain. 1956 et 2025 : Deux crises différentes mais similaires La situation entourant le canal de Suez déboucha sur une crise majeure à la fin des années 1950. La nationalisation du canal par le président égyptien Gamal Abdel Nasser suscita une vive réaction franco-britannique, ces deux pays cherchant à reprendre le contrôle des infrastructures qu'ils avaient auparavant administrées. La pression exercée par les États-Unis entraîna une véritable rupture dans les relations entre alliés, ainsi qu'un changement de posture pour la France et le Royaume-Uni. Ce moment marque une fracture au sein de l'OTAN. La réponse canadienne à la crise est bien connue : sous l'impulsion du ministre des Affaires étrangères Lester B. Pearson, la création d'une force d'intervention des Nations Unies a permis de stabiliser la situation et a été saluée à travers le monde, lui valant le prix Nobel de la paix. Cependant, cet épisode fit naître des débats plus profonds au sein de la politique canadienne quant à l'orientation à prendre en période de rupture au sein de l'alliance. Les uns appelaient à suivre le Royaume-Uni, les autres plaidaient pour consolider le lien avec les États-Unis, tandis que certains défendaient une posture autonome et indépendante, à un moment où le Canada se devait de renforcer son identité biculturelle. Les années 1950 et 1960 ont ainsi été marquées par une époque de rupture entre alliés, plaçant le Canada à l'intersection de trois chemins. Certains parallèles peuvent être établis avec la situation actuelle. Aujourd'hui, le Canada ne traverse plus une période cruciale de construction nationale, bien que certains enjeux identitaires aient ressurgi depuis l'arrivée de Trump. Au lieu d’une construction, le Canada se retrouve dans une période de contestation en raison de l’incertitude entourant les référendums au Québec et en Alberta. Par ailleurs, la crise n'est pas de même nature : il ne s'agit plus de la volonté de puissances européennes de conserver leur emprise sur d'anciennes colonies, mais du manque de fiabilité d'un allié jusqu'alors précieux, les États-Unis. Le second mandat de Trump est marqué par de nombreux coups d'éclat ayant profondément modifié la perception du système international et de l'OTAN. Le président américain affiche clairement sa volonté de se désengager de l'Europe, tout en multipliant les actes et déclarations agressifs à l'égard de ses alliés sur les questions du Groenland, de la guerre en Ukraine, ou encore des relations avec le Canada. Face à cela, la coopération au sein de l'OTAN semble plus difficile qu’auparavant, ce qui pose des risques de divisions entre les membres et peut enrayer son efficacité, et l'Europe, portée en grande partie par la France, cherche à entraîner ses partenaires vers l'autonomie stratégique. Bien que ce projet se révèle plus complexe qu'initialement envisagé, la scission dans les relations transatlantiques est suffisamment profonde pour qu'une révision des postures d'antan s'impose. Ainsi, le Canada se retrouve de nouveau à la croisée des chemins. Il pourrait choisir de se tourner vers son voisin et de renforcer ses liens avec lui — bien que l'attitude américaine à son égard rende cette option difficilement envisageable dans le contexte actuel. Il pourrait également se rapprocher des Européens, ce qui lui offrirait une alternative face à un voisin imprévisible, mais avec une certaine incertitude quant à la capacité européenne à garantir sa sécurité et à la réaction américaine, ainsi qu’au fait que son éloignement géographique impose un poids important sur la coopération avec l’Europe. Enfin, la recherche de partenaires extérieurs et l'affirmation d'une posture indépendante constituent une troisième voie. Si les deux moments sont marqués par des crises de natures différentes, ils font ressurgir des problématiques similaires pour le Canada. Le parallèle est donc pertinent, et il est utile d'examiner les postures que le pays a envisagées dans les années 1960, pour en mesurer la résonance dans le contexte actuel. Trois postures types possibles pour le Canada La première posture envisagée fut celle de l'alignement sur les États-Unis. Dans les années 1960, certains défendaient l'idée que, étant donné son avantage culturel et géographique, le Canada se devait d'approfondir sa relation avec les États-Unis. Cette relation était perçue comme un atout stratégique : s'en éloigner aurait conduit le pays à perdre considérablement en influence sur la scène mondiale. Cette logique reposait également sur le fait qu'après la crise de Suez, le Canada bénéficiait d'une influence notable sur la politique américaine, en particulier lorsque celle-ci touchait directement Ottawa. Certains estimaient dès lors que le pays devait jouer un rôle d'intermédiaire, servant de porte-parole des préoccupations mondiales auprès de Washington, notamment pour les alliés occidentaux et européens, mais aussi pour les pays neutres ou communistes dans le contexte de la guerre froide. C'est l'idée de la quiet diplomacy, portée par Lester B. Pearson : le Canada, grâce à sa proximité informelle avec les États-Unis, pouvait tenter d'orienter les politiques de Washington par des canaux discrets. De plus, à la sortie de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l'alignement sur le voisin semblait la voie la plus naturelle, particulièrement pour bénéficier de la couverture sécuritaire américaine et de la défense continentale. Pour les partisans de cette orientation, le Canada devait prioriser le NORAD et l'OTAN. Certains y voyaient toutefois un risque de satellisation, estimant que les intérêts communs ne garantissaient pas l'absence de vassalisation, tandis que d'autres considéraient ce risque comme négligeable. Cette voie reposait ainsi sur un rapprochement maximal avec les États-Unis en faisant coïncider les postures, en profitant pleinement de la couverture américaine et en permettant au Canada de servir de relais diplomatique pour d'autres puissances, dans l'espoir d'exercer une influence sur la politique étrangère américaine. La deuxième posture était celle de l'indépendance stratégique. Certains estimaient que le Canada devait adopter une politique de neutralité, ce qui lui aurait permis d'agir pour le bien commun et de contribuer à la résolution de crises internationales, ce qui serait impossible avec l'alignement sur Washington. Cette option impliquait en revanche de renoncer aux avantages sécuritaires liés à la relation avec les États-Unis, notamment la couverture du NORAD. Paradoxalement, cette rupture était aussi perçue comme protectrice : en ne se présentant plus comme un allié américain, le Canada aurait réduit son exposition aux tensions géopolitiques découlant de cet alignement. Les partisans de l'indépendance stratégique estimaient par ailleurs que la priorité du moment n'était pas le maintien de la puissance américaine, mais le renforcement de l'identité biculturelle canadienne, la promotion de l'équité internationale et la modernisation socio-économique du Tiers-Monde. En optant pour la neutralité, le Canada aurait pu se poser en leader des nations récemment indépendantes et décolonisées, défendant les intérêts des pays du Sud global. Contrairement à la quiet diplomacy, cette approche supposait que le Canada « parle fort » et assume publiquement ses positions, dans une logique de méfiance à l'égard des États-Unis. Des risques de représailles étaient également identifiés, les États-Unis ayant montré, dans leurs relations avec l'Égypte, la Pologne ou la Yougoslavie, qu'ils n'hésitaient pas à user de pression économique ou politique. L'alignement actuel épargnait jusqu'alors le Canada de tels risques ; une indépendance stratégique aurait donc accru la probabilité de mesures coercitives américaines en cas de divergences politiques. Cette approche reposait ainsi, dans le contexte de l'époque, sur la nécessité d'affirmer l'identité canadienne et de diversifier les partenariats. La question de la neutralité ou de l'éloignement des États-Unis englobait l'idée que le Canada pouvait devenir un acteur influent auprès des pays du Tiers-Monde et des non-alignés. Elle impliquait néanmoins un effort de renforcement militaire autonome et une réduction de la dépendance envers Washington, au risque d'exposer le pays à d'importantes représailles. Enfin, la troisième voie possible était celle de l'alignement sur les Européens. Moins populaire à l'époque, elle consistait à soutenir les positions britannique et française dans l'après-Suez. Du fait de ses liens historiques forts avec ces deux pays, le Canada aurait pu y trouver des partenaires stratégiques de premier plan. La crise de Suez avait d'ailleurs révélé des divisions au sein de la société canadienne sur la question de suivre le Royaume-Uni ou de privilégier la relation avec les États-Unis. L'idée d'un rapprochement avec l'Europe, en dehors du seul cadre de l’OTAN, était présente dans les débats. Ce rapprochement était également perçu comme un moyen de rééquilibrer la relation avec Washington et de réduire la dépendance structurelle envers le voisin américain en diversifiant les partenariats stratégiques. Il pouvait aussi s'inscrire dans une perspective de contrepoids à l'influence américaine, tant en Europe qu'au Canada, que ce soit dans le cadre de l'OTAN ou en dehors. Enfin, certains soulignaient que le renforcement du lien transatlantique, notamment à travers l'OTAN, créait une interdépendance sécuritaire faisant de l'Europe un garant indirect de la sécurité canadienne. L'alignement sur l'Europe offrait ainsi au Canada la possibilité de se défaire de sa dépendance américaine et de tisser un nouveau réseau de partenaires, autant dans un cadre allié qu’en dehors. Cette voie ne sera cependant pas celle retenue dans les années 1960, le Canada s'orientant de plus en plus vers les États-Unis, accroissant de fait sa dépendance à l'égard du voisin nord-américain. Quelles implications pour le Canada? La première voie envisageable dans la situation actuelle demeure encore celle de l'alignement sur les États-Unis. L'interdépendance structurelle et géographique entre les deux pays confère à cette orientation une certaine logique : le NORAD demeure un pilier incontournable de la coopération bilatérale en matière de défense, et les liens économiques et commerciaux restent étroitement imbriqués sans réelle possibilité d’autarcie entre les deux pays. Le gouvernement canadien, même dans le contexte actuel de tensions, continue de maintenir des intérêts convergents avec Washington sans rompre frontalement avec l'administration américaine. Transposée au contexte présent, cette posture supposerait un approfondissement de la relation diplomatique avec l'administration Trump, dans l'esprit de la quiet diplomacy chère à Pearson : peser discrètement sur les orientations de Washington plutôt que de s'y opposer ouvertement. Cela impliquerait toutefois un alignement préalable sur les priorités de l'administration en place, au risque que toute divergence publique ne génère des frictions. Sur le plan défensif, cette voie passerait par le maintien de l'architecture sécuritaire nord-américaine existante, en renonçant à diversifier les partenariats vers l'Europe, la Suède ou d'autres acteurs. Cette option, bien que pragmatique en apparence, n'est pas sans contreparties. Elle implique dans le présent une forme de subordination aux positions états-uniennes et cantonnerait le Canada dans un rôle d'intermédiaire qui ne reflète pas nécessairement ses propres ambitions. Elle accentuerait par ailleurs une dépendance déjà profonde envers Washington et exposerait davantage le pays aux ingérences américaines. Pour autant, une rupture totale avec les États-Unis demeure impensable : cette voie doit donc être envisagée comme un socle minimal, non comme une stratégie suffisante en elle-même. La deuxième voie est celle du rapprochement avec l'Europe. Cette orientation est déjà partiellement engagée : l'intégration au programme SAFE, le partenariat possible, mais non confirmé, avec la Suède et SAAB autour d'une éventuelle flotte de Grippen, l'acquisition d'appareils de guet aérien, la participation à la coalition des volontaires ou encore le déploiement militaire en Lettonie témoignent d'un ancrage européen croissant dans la politique de défense canadienne, au moins sur le plan politique et rhétorique. Dans une dimension plus capacitaire, la participation canadienne et européenne dans les industries de défense de chacun demeure encore trop distante, ce qui nécessite ainsi la concrétisation des partenariats et un engagement plus marqué des deux camps vis-à-vis de l’autre. Aller plus loin nécessiterait néanmoins des choix structurants : généraliser l'acquisition d'équipements militaires européens pour réduire la dépendance aux industriels américains, attirer les investissements de la base industrielle de défense européenne au Canada, intensifier les échanges commerciaux transatlantiques et, peut-être, approfondir le cadre institutionnel liant Ottawa à Bruxelles. Un tel pivot ne passerait pas inaperçu à Washington et exposerait le Canada à des mesures de représailles — un risque déjà évoqué dans les débats stratégiques des années 1950. Il faut également reconnaître que les intérêts canadiens et européens ne coïncident pas toujours : les menaces perçues, les priorités géographiques et les ambitions stratégiques divergent suffisamment pour rendre un alignement total peu réaliste. Cette voie apparaît donc davantage comme un levier de rééquilibrage que comme une alternative pleine et entière. La troisième voie, enfin, est celle de l'indépendance stratégique. Le Canada se doterait d'une autonomie accrue en matière de défense et de politique étrangère, voire d'une posture de non-alignement assumée. Comme dans les années 1960, cela passerait par la recherche de nouveaux partenariats en dehors des sphères américaine et européenne. Certains signes contemporains vont dans ce sens : la posture de Carney sur l'ordre mondial multipolaire, le rapprochement avec la Chine ou encore les coopérations envisageables avec des pays comme la Corée du Sud dans le domaine du réarmement ou encore avec l’Australie. Cela se manifesterait aussi par un recul des positions canadiennes sur les prises de décisions américaines. Cette voie soulève cependant une question que les débats des années 1960 avaient abordés : celle de l'unité nationale. En 1956, la crise de Suez avait révélé les tensions entre les communautés anglophone et francophone du Canada et la nécessité pour le pays de travailler sur leur identité et le caractère biculturel du pays. Aujourd'hui, cette fracture prend une forme différente mais tout aussi prégnante. Les référendums annoncés en Alberta et au Québec font ressurgir des risques importants pour l’unité canadienne alors que le contexte de pression américaine n'a fait que renforcer. Une posture d'indépendance stratégique pourrait à la fois paraitre comme la solution mais aussi annoncer de nouvelles problématiques. En rompant avec les structures de sécurité nord-américaines et avec l'OTAN pour affirmer une posture de non-aligné ou de neutre, le Canada pourrait alimenter les tensions internes plutôt que de les apaiser et s’isoler sur la scène internationale auprès de certains de ses alliés. Pour les provinces qui voient dans la relation avec les États-Unis un enjeu économique vital, un tel désengagement serait politiquement difficile à défendre. L'affirmation d'une voie autonome doit donc s'accompagner d'un discours de cohésion nationale, faute de quoi elle risque de fragiliser davantage le pays qu'elle ne le renforcerait. Conclusion Ainsi, le Canada n’a pas à suivre une de ces voies pleinement. Chacun possède ses propres problématiques : accroissement de la dépendance, risque de représailles, risque d’isolement et de perte de crédibilité. Ces perspectives représentent plus d’archétypes de positions abordables. En ce sens, le Canada pourrait poursuivre à la fois l’intégration à certains niveaux avec les États-Unis et, en parallèle, développer son alignement sur l’Europe, tel qu’il le fait déjà, sans pousser complètement vers une rupture. Enfin, la recherche de nouveaux partenaires devient plus intéressante afin de renforcer les objectifs établis d’indépendance dans le secteur de la défense et de la politique étrangère. À la lumière de l'analyse historique et des enjeux contemporains, cinq recommandations politiques se dégagent pour orienter la stratégie canadienne : Maintenir un engagement pragmatique avec les États-Unis dans le cadre du NORAD. Le Canada doit préserver les mécanismes de défense continentale existants tout en refusant toute forme de vassalisation politique. Un dialogue informel et discret — dans la tradition de la quiet diplomacy — permettrait d'exercer une influence sur Washington sans compromettre la souveraineté canadienne. Accélérer et institutionnaliser le rapprochement stratégique avec l'Union européenne. Les partenariats déjà engagés — programme SAFE, acquisition de matériels européens, présence en Lettonie — doivent être approfondis et formalisés. Le Canada devrait envisager des accords-cadres de coopération en matière de défense avec l'UE afin de réduire sa dépendance vis-à-vis des équipements et garanties sécuritaires américains. Investir massivement dans les capacités de défense nationale. Toute posture d'autonomie stratégique, même partielle, exige une base industrielle et militaire crédible. Le Canada doit se donner les moyens d'une défense plus autonome, notamment en atteignant l'objectif des 2 % du PIB fixé par l'OTAN, en diversifiant ses fournisseurs d'équipements militaires et en développant une industrie de défense nationale compétitive. Diversifier les alliances stratégiques au-delà du cadre transatlantique. Le Canada devrait renforcer ses partenariats avec des puissances moyennes partageant ses valeurs, notamment la Corée du Sud, le Japon et l'Australie. Cette diversification permettrait de réduire la vulnérabilité du pays aux revirements de politique étrangère américaine, tout en offrant de nouveaux débouchés technologiques dans le secteur de la défense. Affirmer une doctrine de politique étrangère clairement articulée. Face à l'instabilité de l'environnement géopolitique, le Canada gagnerait à publier un livre blanc de défense et de politique étrangère définissant explicitement ses priorités stratégiques, ses lignes rouges vis-à-vis des pressions américaines, et ses engagements envers ses partenaires. Une telle clarté doctrinale renforcerait la crédibilité internationale du Canada. Crédit image: Imperial War Museums, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. ## Les relations transatlantiques en période de pandémie : Coopération ou compétition ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-relations-transatlantiques-en-periode-de-pandemie-cooperation-ou-competition/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > La pandémie de la COVID-19 a fait ressortir les dynamiques des relations transatlantiques contemporaines, qui oscillent entre coopération et rivalité au temps de la compétition entre les grandes puissances. La pandémie de la COVID-19 a fait ressortir les dynamiques des relations transatlantiques contemporaines, qui oscillent entre coopération et rivalité au temps de la compétition entre les grandes puissances. Alors que les États-Unis poursuivent sur le chemin de l’unilatéralisme, l’Union européenne (UE) est déchirée entre l’opportunité historique de développer son autonomie stratégique et son traditionnel manque de cohésion. C’est dans ce contexte que plusieurs experts se sont penchés sur l’avenir des relations transatlantiques dans le cadre de conférences organisées par le Brookings Institute à l’été 2020. Ce « point chaud » en présente les grandes lignes. L’Union européenne au cœur de la compétition entre les grandes puissances L’Union européenne a été durement touchée par la pandémie alors que la compétition entre les grandes puissances s’accroit. Celle-ci tente d’envoyer un message clair à la Chine face à l’agressivité de sa politique internationale tout en cherchant une autonomie stratégique à l’heure où les États-Unis continuent leur remise en question du multilatéralisme. L’Union européenne, dont l’unité a été fragilisée au plus fort de la pandémie, se trouve coincée entre les États-Unis et la Chine dans une compétition accrue entre grandes puissances. Pourtant, l’UE est loin, à l’heure actuelle, d’avoir toutes les cartes en main pour s’affirmer comme un acteur de taille au milieu de cette compétition. Les débuts de la pandémie ont fait ressortir l’une des plus grandes faiblesses de l’UE, à savoir sa désunion, avec des réponses plus nationales que multilatérales sur la gestion de la COVID-19, ainsi qu’un manque de solidarité envers ses membres les plus touchés. La Chine a alors profité de cette porte ouverte pour critiquer la gestion européenne de la pandémie tout en proposant son aide là où l’UE faisait défaut. L’UE s’est toutefois reprise par la suite en fournissant de l’aide logistique, des réserves de liquidité aux banques locales, du matériel médical et pharmaceutique essentiel, ainsi qu’en augmentant la production européenne de matériel de protection des travailleurs de la santé et en renforçant la surveillance régionale de la pandémie. D’ailleurs, l’UE perçoit de moins en moins la Chine comme un partenaire et davantage comme un rival. Ce changement de position fait suite aux nombreuses actions agressives de la Chine, notamment dans le cyberespace, mais aussi à la nature de ses politiques de développement économique et de son approche des droits humains. Pourtant, la relation sino-européenne est complexe et loin de la simple dichotomie ami-ennemi. En effet, comme le rappelle la présidente de la Commission européenne Ursula von der Leyen, la relation entre l’UE et la Chine est à la fois l’une des plus importantes stratégiquement et l’une des plus difficiles politiquement. C’est sans compter les liens économiques forts qui unissent les deux acteurs, notamment les nombreux investissements chinois dans les ports, les chemins de fer, les télécommunications et les autres investissements indispensables dont certains pays, comme l’Italie, la Grèce et le Portugal ont grandement besoin. À ce sujet, l’Italie a d’ailleurs conclu un contrat à plusieurs milliards de dollars avec la Chine, renforçant ainsi sa relation avec Beijing. La pandémie n’a fait que réaffirmer l’importance de la présence chinoise en Europe. Comme le souligne la chercheure associée du Brookings Institute, Giovanna De Maio, l’opinion publique italienne commence à considérer la Chine davantage comme amicale, et se méfie de plus en plus d’autres pays européens comme la France et l’Allemagne. Ainsi, même si la politique étrangère italienne n’a pas connu de tournant majeur à l’égard de la Chine, compte tenu de sa position transatlantique forte, il commence à se développer des mouvements pro-Chine et anti-UE. Cette position est d’ailleurs partagée par Fiona Hill, également chercheure au Brookings Institute lorsqu’elle affirme que la Chine, ou la Russie, peuvent devenir une alternative aux partenaires traditionnels pour des pays comme l’Italie. Face à ces défis, la ministre de la Défense allemande Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer soutient que malgré les mésententes au sein des pays membres, l’UE doit répondre collectivement, notamment en faisant valoir ses valeurs de libertés fondamentales, d’égalité et de droits humains face à la Chine. Elle ajoute qu’il est important de continuer à investir dans la défense, malgré une baisse des budgets de défense accentuée par la pandémie. Pour Charles Fries, secrétaire général adjoint Politique de sécurité et de défense commune du Service européen d’action extérieure, il sera important après la pandémie que l’UE développe une autonomie stratégique la rendant capable de répondre en tant que producteur de sécurité, tout en étant prêt à répondre seul aux menaces. Il sera également important de réduire la dépendance dans les secteurs de la sécurité et des technologies, tout en poussant plus loin l’agenda de défense de l’UE en développant ses propres capacités de défense. Claudio Graziano, président du Comité militaire de l’Union européenne, rajoute que l’UE a besoin de développer ses capacités de renseignement ainsi qu’une nouvelle approche en cyberdéfense et cyber-renseignement. Sur ce dernier point, l’UE a tout récemment imposé ses premières sanctions contre des cyberattaques provenant de pays comme la Chine et la Russie. Toutefois, alors que la plupart des acteurs européens ne remettent pas en question les liens transatlantiques de l’UE, Timo Pesonen, directeur général pour l’industrie de la défense et l’espace de la Commission européenne, affirme que l’UE dépend trop des États-Unis et qu’elle doit être moins transatlantique et plus européenne. Même si les débuts de la pandémie ont mis au jour les faiblesses de l’UE, cette dernière semble vouloir sortir renforcée de cette pandémie. L’UE travaille ainsi à renforcer son autonomie stratégique tout en mettant en œuvre une Europe de la défense pour s’éloigner de la dépendance envers les États-Unis. Les États-Unis : alliés ou rivaux ? Depuis l’arrivée de Donald Trump à la Maison Blanche, les relations des États-Unis avec le Canada et l’UE se sont effritées et l’attitude unilatéraliste américaine a été exacerbée pendant la pandémie, que l’on pense à la tentative de bloquer les ventes de masques de protection au Canada ou à la tentative d’avoir l’exclusivité sur un potentiel vaccin contre la COVID-19 au détriment des alliés. La doctrine « America First » pose en effet de nombreux défis aux alliés traditionnels des États-Unis et reflète le désengagement américain de la sphère internationale et son retrait du multilatéralisme. Pour Julianne Smith, chercheure au Center for a New American Security et ancienne conseillère adjointe à la sécurité nationale du vice-président Joe Biden, c’est la première fois dans l’histoire des relations UE-US que le président américain montre régulièrement et ouvertement du mépris envers le projet européen. Donald Trump ne voit en effet aucune valeur dans la relation entre les États-Unis et l’Union européenne et pense même que l’UE aurait été créée pour avoir un avantage sur les États-Unis. Les relations transatlantiques se sont par ailleurs dégradées pendant la pandémie de la COVID-19 alors que les États-Unis de Donald Trump sont perçus comme peu fiables et imprévisibles. En cause, l’attitude unilatéraliste des États-Unis et son désengagement envers l’Union européenne. Alors que l’administration américaine a décidé d’interdire de voyage les Européens sans consultations diplomatiques au début de la pandémie, elle prévoit maintenant privilégier une option nationale plutôt que multilatérale pour la sécurisation de ses chaines d’approvisionnement. Ellen Lord, la sous-secrétaire américaine de la Défense pour les acquisitions et le soutien, affirme que la sécurisation des chaines d’approvisionnement doit privilégier une approche nationale et se faire spécifiquement aux États-Unis. Du côté européen, l’attitude américaine est pour le moins ambiguë et renforce la perception selon laquelle les États-Unis ne sont plus un allié fiable de l’UE. En effet, alors que l’administration Trump semble prendre position en faveur du Royaume-Uni dans l’affaire du Brexit, elle a récemment décidé de retirer une grande partie de ses troupes en Allemagne. Le président Trump justifie cette décision en affirmant que l’Allemagne ne paie pas les 2% requis à l’OTAN et qu’elle essaie de profiter des États-Unis. Or, la ministre allemande de la Défense rappelle que son pays a toujours été un allié fiable de l’OTAN, et que compte tenu de l’augmentation de l’agressivité de Moscou, la sécurité de l’Europe garantit aussi la sécurité des États-Unis. Elle ajoute qu’il est regrettable que les États-Unis retirent leurs troupes et que le redéploiement des troupes américaines sera un message clair pour l’UE. Si le redéploiement ne se fait pas en Europe, cela sera un signe de plus de l’abandon de l’UE par les États-Unis. Cependant, pour Mark Esper, secrétaire américain de la Défense, il ne s’agit pas de faire un choix entre l’Europe ou l’Asie, mais plutôt d’essayer de trouver un juste équilibre entre les deux régions représentant des intérêts et des défis sécuritaires pour les États-Unis. L’important pour Washington, c’est d’optimiser ses positions pour se préparer sur le long terme à la compétition entre les grandes puissances. Faire face aux menaces communes en renforçant la coopération transatlantique Autant pour faire face à la pandémie qu’à la rivalité de la Russie et de la Chine, il est indispensable pour l’Occident de maintenir une coopération transatlantique solide. Sur la COVID-19, il serait opportun de coordonner les approches pour diversifier les chaines d’approvisionnement et diminuer la dépendance envers la Chine, de promouvoir une coopération dans la régulation du matériel pharmaceutique et médical, de libéraliser les restrictions transatlantiques sur le matériel médical, ou encore de renforcer les échanges scientifiques, la recherche médicale conjointe et la coopération dans l’innovation en matière de santé publique. Or, tout ceci est actuellement mis à mal par l’approche égoïste du président Trump. Face à la Chine, une coopération pleine et entière entre les États-Unis et l’UE permettrait de créer plus de leviers pour essayer de mettre en place des politiques plus amicales. Une coopération transatlantique est également nécessaire pour protéger le système international libéral basé sur les règles remis en question par la Chine. Quelles que soient les compétitions et les tensions, une coopération transatlantique doit mettre l’accent sur les valeurs à protéger et à promouvoir. D’ailleurs, comme le rapporte Charles Fries, il semble qu’il y ait des discussions entre l’UE et les États-Unis sur la question de la Chine, signe d’une certaine coopération. À ceci s’ajoutent d’autres signes d’une coopération transatlantique, notamment l’adoption par l’OTAN et l’UE de deux déclarations communes en 2016 et 2018 actants 74 actions conjointes, ainsi que la rencontre en juin dernier pour discuter des implications sécuritaires communes de la COVID-19 et de la convergence des intérêts entre les deux organisations. L’OTAN  doit également réussir à combler ses faiblesses en matière de coopération pour faire face à la menace grandissante de la Chine et de la Russie, selon Clark Cooper, assistant-secrétaire pour les affaires militaires et politiques du département d’État américain. D’ailleurs, les tactiques de la Chine et de la Russie pour diviser les pays de l’OTAN ne fonctionnent pas car ils partagent des valeurs communes. Selon lui, la notion de sécurité doit être étendue à la sécurité des infrastructures et des télécommunications. Enfin, pour le secrétaire général adjoint de l’OTAN, Mircea Geoana, l’UE et l’OTAN doivent faire converger leur identification des menaces pour avoir une approche commune. Selon lui, il n’y a pas de place pour une Union européenne agissant seule en matière de défense et l’OTAN reste un incontournable pour la stabilité internationale. Par ailleurs, l’OTAN semble vouloir atteindre un niveau de coopération supérieur, notamment en matière de renseignement, avec le développement de la Joint Intelligence and Security Division, comme le fait remarquer James Appathurai, l’assistant-secrétaire général adjoint pour les Affaires politiques et la Politique de sécurité de l’OTAN. Celle-ci, première division civilo-militaire du Quartier général de l’OTAN, permet de fournir des estimations cohérentes pour la prise de décision au sein de l’OTAN. Cette division a d’ailleurs permis, grâce aux renseignements partagés par tous les alliés, certaines décisions importantes de l’OTAN, notamment l’expulsion d’environ 150 officiers de renseignement russes non déclarés à la suite de la tentative d’assassinat de Sergei Skripal au Royaume-Uni. Ainsi, même si les derniers mois ont montré un regain de compétition transatlantique, avec des États-Unis unilatéralistes et des positions européennes divisées, la coopération n’a pas été abandonnée pour autant. Même si la pandémie a accentué certaines tensions, les relations transatlantiques restent tout de même solides, grâce à des valeurs communes et une communauté de sécurité institutionnalisée avec l’OTAN. Cette dernière doit redoubler d’efforts pour combler ses faiblesses et accroitre la coopération dans la compétition entre les grandes puissances. De son côté, l’UE ne doit pas venir remplacer l’OTAN, mais la complémenter, selon la ministre allemande de la Défense. Enfin, même si les relations transatlantiques sont dans une période turbulente, avec la montée de la compétition entre les grandes puissances et la vision négative du président Trump en Europe, il existe un véritable potentiel pour renforcer ces relations qui dépend seulement de la volonté des acteurs concernés. Beaucoup de cette volonté pourrait être retrouvée avec l’élection de Joe Biden à la présidence des États-Unis. ## Les risques liés à l’ambiguïté : l’opinion publique taïwanaise, la crédibilité des États-Unis et l’efficacité de la dissuasion URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-risques-lies-a-lambiguite-lopinion-publique-taiwanaise-la-credibilite-des-etats-unis-et-lefficacite-de-la-dissuasion/ Modified: 2023-11-09 > La politique des États-Unis à l’égard de Taïwan a été une source de controverse continue. Alors que des avertissements suggèrent... La politique des États-Unis à l’égard de Taïwan a été une source de controverse continue. Alors que des avertissements suggèrent que Pékin pourrait se préparer à utiliser la force contre Taïwan d’ici 2027, voire avant, les experts sont divisés quant à savoir si les actions des États-Unis dissuadent ou provoquent la République Populaire de Chine (RPC). Les ventes d’armes et les passages de navires de guerre américains dans le détroit de Taïwan sont monnaie courante. Mais les déclarations de « clarté stratégique », les propositions visant à changer le nom de l’ambassade de facto de Taïwan aux États-Unis, les invitations pour que Taïwan participe aux exercices RIMPAC et les visites de haut niveau de responsables américains à Taïwan ont suscité beaucoup plus de controverses. Alors qu’une grande partie des débats s’est concentrée sur la réaction de Pékin à la politique américaine, il est tout aussi crucial de prendre en compte la réaction de Taïwan. D’une part, Raymond Kuo a argumenté qu’il serait difficile de persuader le gouvernement taïwanais de mettre en œuvre une stratégie de défense asymétrique si des doutes subsistent quant à la volonté des États-Unis d’intervenir. D’autre part, selon Bonnie Glaser, un changement de la politique américaine en faveur de la clarté stratégique pourrait inciter la RPC à recourir à la force, soulignant ainsi l’importance de signifier la détermination des États-Unis par le biais de signaux. La deuxième vague de American Portrait Survey (APS)[1] réalisée à Taïwan révèle que les États-Unis rencontrent un problème de crédibilité auprès du public, mais montre également que ce public réagit aux signaux américains. Lorsqu’on leur a demandé si les États-Unis étaient un pays « crédible », seuls 34 % ont indiqué être d’accord (bien que ce résultat soit nettement plus élevé que les 9,4 % qui étaient d’accord avec l’affirmation selon laquelle la RPC était un pays crédible). Les résultats ne traduisent pas un sentiment anti-américain ni une opinion généralement négative des États-Unis : lorsqu’on leur a demandé d’évaluer la démocratie américaine sur une échelle de 1 à 10, 84,4 % ont attribué aux États-Unis une note de 5 ou plus, et 60,1 % n’étaient pas d’accord avec l’affirmation selon laquelle la RPC surpasserait les États-Unis au cours des dix prochaines années. Les répondants taïwanais ont une image généralement positive des États-Unis, mais ils nourrissent également de sérieux doutes quant à la crédibilité des États-Unis. Ce qui est encore plus préoccupant, c’est que ces doutes se sont accrus, même si la politique américaine à l’égard de Taïwan a généralement été cohérente : entre la première et la deuxième vague de l’enquête (menées respectivement en septembre 2021 et novembre 2022), la confiance en la crédibilité des États-Unis parmi les répondants taïwanais a diminué de plus de 10 points de pourcentage (de 45,3% à 34%). [1] La deuxième vague de l’American Portrait Survey (APS) a été parrainée par l’Institut d’Études Européennes et Américaines (IEAS) de l’Academia Sinica à Taïwan et menée par le Centre d’Études Électorales (ESC) de l’Université Nationale Chengchi à Taïwan. Elle était basée sur un échantillon de 1 234 adultes taïwanais, interrogés par téléphones fixe (708) et mobile (526) entre le 15 et le 20 novembre 2022. Avec un niveau de confiance de 95 %, l’erreur d’échantillonnage aléatoire maximale possible est de 2,79 %.   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## Les sanctions économiques contre une superpuissance mondiale : Une réaction adéquate dans une perspective de dissuasion et de punition? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-sanctions-economiques-contre-une-superpuissance-mondiale-une-reaction-adequate-dans-une-perspective-de-dissuasion-et-de-punition/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note politique examine les effets des sanctions économiques imposées à la Russie et détermine si une stratégie interventionniste non... L’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie au mois de février a marqué une violation claire du droit international. Vladimir Poutine nie le statut d’État de l’Ukraine, mais l’illégitimité de la guerre d’agression russe et des motifs de conquête territoriale est flagrante, ce qui donne à la communauté internationale le droit d’intervenir militairement. Cependant, malgré les appels à l’aide du président ukrainien Volodymyr Zelensky pour un soutien militaire international, davantage de pays ont choisi d’imposer des sanctions plutôt que de fournir des armes lourdes, et aucun n’a choisi de se battre aux côtés de l’Ukraine contre la Russie. Les sanctions sont une stratégie de politique étrangère répandue en politique contemporaine, en particulier lorsque l’action militaire s’accompagne d’un risque d’escalade, une option dangereuse face à une puissance nucléaire. Pourtant, une campagne de sanctions contre un pays aussi puissant et influent que la Russie est sans précédent et force le Canada et ses alliés de l’OTAN à articuler clairement leurs objectifs. L’objectif de cette note politique est d’examiner les effets des sanctions économiques imposées à la Russie et de déterminer si une stratégie interventionniste non militaire pourra exercer suffisamment de pression sur Poutine pour mettre fin à la guerre en Ukraine. Premièrement, cette note donne un aperçu des raisons qui sous-tendent l’imposition de ces sanctions et des stratégies politiques actuelles des alliés de l’OTAN. Elle examine ensuite dans quelles circonstances Poutine pourrait échapper aux effets punitifs prévus des sanctions et conclut en soulignant les trajectoires politiques possibles pour le Canada. Contexte L’OTAN a été critiquée pour son absence d’intervention militaire directe en Ukraine et son incapacité à mettre en place une zone d’exclusion aérienne. Cependant, en tant qu’alliance défensive et en vertu de l’article 5, la tâche principale de l’OTAN est de préserver la paix et la sécurité de ses pays membres. Étant donné qu’un engagement militaire direct avec la Russie risquerait d’étendre et d’intensifier la guerre, les alliés de l’OTAN ont donné la priorité à la restriction du conflit au territoire de l’Ukraine. Alors que les négociations avec le président yougoslave Milosevic ont permis de mettre fin à la guerre de Bosnie en 1995, les alliés de l’OTAN hésitent à négocier avec Poutine, dont les objectifs expansionnistes pourraient entraîner des différends territoriaux plus importants. Afin de minimiser le risque de confrontation nucléaire ainsi que les gains territoriaux russes, l’alliance a opté pour une intervention directe dans le conflit sous forme de sanctions économiques. Les sanctions économiques : À quoi servent-elles ? Le but ultime de l’imposition de ces sanctions est d’influencer les calculs des acteurs dans ce conflit par la dissuasion et la punition. La stratégie de dissuasion englobe deux écoles de pensée : la dissuasion par le déni, par laquelle les acteurs rendent improbable ou irréalisable le succès des actions de leur adversaire, et la dissuasion par la punition, par laquelle les acteurs menacent d’imposer des sanctions si l’agresseur donne suite à ses menaces. La dissuasion par le déni est considérée comme une stratégie plus fiable puisqu’elle fonctionne de manière proactive pour convaincre un adversaire que ses objectifs ne peuvent pas être atteints à un coût raisonnable. Dans le cas de l’Ukraine, cependant, les alliés de l’OTAN ont choisi la dissuasion par la punition. Cette stratégie est moins coûteuse et permet aux alliés de l’OTAN d’échapper à une intervention militaire pour défendre l’Ukraine, qui n’est pas membre de l’alliance. De toute évidence, cette stratégie n’a ultimement pas réussi à dissuader Poutine, qui a conclu que les gains territoriaux potentiels l’emportaient sur les coûts prévus de la guerre en Ukraine. C’est pourtant là que les sanctions ont pris un rôle punitif : après l’invasion de Poutine, les alliés de l’OTAN ont mis en œuvre toutes leurs menaces de sanctions contre la Russie tout en ajoutant des mesures encore plus sévères visant directement les oligarques russes, ce qui reflète une tentative de pénaliser Poutine en rendant sa guerre trop coûteuse pour qu’il puisse la maintenir. Étant donné qu’il est difficile de faire la guerre avec une économie en difficulté, la punition par les sanctions vise donc à modifier l’équilibre de l’interdépendance économique pour pénaliser le comportement indésirable d’un adversaire. En ciblant la performance économique de l’État adverse, les sanctions visent à faire comprendre que les comportements agressifs ne seront pas tolérés et qu’ils ne peuvent pas persister sans engendrer des coûts considérables. Malgré la simplicité de cette logique, il est difficile d’évaluer l’efficacité des sanctions. Les sanctions sont rarement appliquées indépendamment d’autres missions de politique étrangère, comme des campagnes d’approvisionnement en armes ou de secours humanitaire, et elles influencent souvent les décisions des acteurs clés en concomitance avec des facteurs personnels ou politiques ambigus. Attribuer les résultats de la politique étrangère à la seule stratégie économique risque de simplifier à l’excès les réalités contextuelles, où certains facteurs qui sont parfois inconnus ou qui se recoupent sont souvent pris en compte dans les analyses coûts-bénéfices des acteurs. Par conséquent, bien que les sanctions puissent être corrélées aux résultats observés, il existe peu de circonstances où la causalité peut être explicitement établie. Malgré ces difficultés à évaluer l’efficacité globale des sanctions, il reste important d’analyser dans quelle mesure les sanctions proposées par les acteurs intervenants atteignent leurs objectifs déclarés. Les sanctions actuelles contre la Russie visent à mettre fin à la guerre contre l’Ukraine en intensifiant les conflits logistiques au sein de l’armée russe et en amplifiant le sentiment anti-Poutine. La section suivante donne un aperçu des mesures imposées à la Russie par les acteurs internationaux et examine si ces sanctions peuvent atteindre avec succès leurs objectifs punitifs. Un aperçu de cette campagne sans précédent L’invasion de la Russie a provoqué une réponse économique multilatérale sans précédent par sa taille, sa portée et sa rapidité. Quelques semaines seulement après le 24 février, quarante-et-un pays, dont les États-Unis, l’Union européenne (UE), le Royaume-Uni, le Canada, l’Australie, le Japon, la Corée du Sud et Taïwan, ont mis en œuvre des sanctions sévères et des mesures de contrôle des exportations contre la Russie. Des exemples antérieurs avaient démontré l’efficacité d’une application rapide et généralisée des sanctions pour dissuader ou punir les opposants. La rapidité de cette réponse réfute l’hypothèse de Poutine selon laquelle l’invasion de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014 a déstabilisé l’alliance de l’OTAN. Alors que les tensions sous-jacentes persistent entre les alliés, l’intensification de l’agressivité russe depuis 2014 a en réalité augmenté les dépenses de défense de l’OTAN et réduit le temps de réponse de ses alliés. Cela se reflète dans les décisions du Canada, des États-Unis et de l’UE de bloquer diverses banques et grandes entreprises russes, y compris Sberbank, la plus grande banque de Russie qui détient 33% des actifs du système bancaire. L’action la plus significative au niveau multilatéral a été l’exclusion de la Russie de la communauté financière mondiale. La décision des pays du G7 de geler les avoirs russes et de déconnecter la Banque centrale russe (CBR) de SWIFT rallonge considérablement le processus de paiement en devises étrangères. Étant donné que les sanctions couvrent le dollar américain, l’euro, le yen, la livre sterling et le franc, il apparaît difficile pour Poutine d’échapper à ces restrictions: la diminution des devises étrangères russes et le gel des avoirs empêchent la Russie de puiser dans ses 643 milliards de dollars de réserves de change et de convertir des actifs étrangers en roubles pour fournir des liquidités aux établissements bancaires sanctionnés. Alors que les économies de marché émergentes comme la Turquie, le Brésil et l’Inde ont hésité à condamner les actions de la Russie ou à imposer des sanctions économiques, ces réticences ont été partiellement compensées par les boycottages de grandes entreprises mondiales, comme BP et Shell, qui se sont retirés des projets pétroliers et gaziers pour échapper aux conséquences politiques. La combinaison des réponses nationales, multilatérales et de celles des entreprises a permis de doubler le taux d’intérêt de la Russie qui est passé de 9,5% à 20%. Parallèlement, la monnaie russe a perdu 45% de sa valeur. Il s’agit de la plus forte baisse de cette monnaie depuis la crise économique de 1998. Alors que la dette extérieure de la Russie est maîtrisable, s’établissant à 27% de son PIB, le calendrier de remboursement de la dette à court terme pose à Poutine un défi considérable: au courant de l’année prochaine, les entreprises russes seront obligées de rembourser plus de 100 milliards de dollars, ce qui empêchera de nombreux emprunteurs russes de refinancer leurs dettes. Par conséquent, le gouvernement sera contraint de puiser dans l’épargne intérieure pour rembourser la dette en période de croissance négative. Des sanctions supplémentaires sur les équipements technologiques et les entreprises liées au domaine de la défense rendront impossible pour la Russie de produire divers produits militaires au niveau national, ce qui montre les effets punitifs de la campagne actuelle. Plus précisément, les États-Unis ont imposé un embargo sur les puces semi-conductrices, utilisant ainsi leur forte emprise sur les marchés technologiques pour cibler les vulnérabilités du complexe militaro-industriel russe. Étant donné que le système financier russe est fortement intégré au système mondial, l’imposition de lourdes sanctions économiques aura de graves répercussions sur les économies nationales des États qui les mettent en place. Cette réponse vise donc à envoyer un message clair à Poutine : la communauté internationale condamne ses actions et les capacités économiques et militaires de la Russie seront ciblées par des politiques internationales stratégiques jusqu’à ce qu’il recule. Les sanctions économiques sont-elles suffisantes ? Les chiffres présentés ci-dessus indiquent que le gel des réserves de change de la Russie, la mise en œuvre d’embargos commerciaux et l’exclusion de la Russie du système SWIFT ont effectivement entravé la capacité économique de cette dernière. Néanmoins, les difficultés économiques ne doivent pas être assimilées à un succès politique et, dans plusieurs scénarios, les sanctions pourraient s’avérer inefficaces dans une perspective de dissuasion ou de punition compte tenu du statut de puissance nucléaire de la Russie. Les sanctions peuvent ne pas atteindre leurs objectifs pour trois raisons principales. La première serait un retard dans la mise en place de ces sanctions en raison d’autres intérêts qui primeraient pour les États qui les imposent. Avant l’invasion, les puissances occidentales étaient extrêmement préoccupées par le maintien des relations diplomatiques avec la Russie. Alors que les alliés de l’OTAN ont averti que l’invasion de l’Ukraine entraînerait une pénalisation économique, les puissances occidentales ont mal communiqué à propos de l’ampleur des sanctions qu’elles étaient prêtes à imposer à la Russie avant l’invasion. Même lorsque des preuves des plans de Poutine ont été révélées, peu d’efforts immédiats ont été faits pour mettre en pause le projet du gazoduc NS2 ou écraser le secteur énergétique russe. La déclaration de Biden en décembre selon laquelle les États-Unis ne déploieraient pas de force militaire en cas d’invasion a probablement enhardi Poutine en réduisant l’ambiguïté stratégique et en lui permettant de se préparer à faire face aux conséquences économiques qui allaient en découler. Ainsi, bien que Poutine ait sous-estimé la capacité de l’OTAN à mettre en œuvre une réponse cohérente, son accumulation de réserves fédérales, la minimisation de la dette extérieure et l’équilibre budgétaire suggèrent que la pénalisation économique était un coût prévisible qu’il était prêt à payer. Une politique réactionnaire aurait pu être justifiée étant donné le risque d’intervenir prématurément contre une force nucléaire. Cependant, la menace de sanctions n’a pas dissuadé Poutine de faire des avancées dans le domaine militaire, suggérant que la réponse réactionnaire de l’OTAN a peut-être donné à Poutine suffisamment de temps pour se préparer à une campagne militaire malgré son économie en souffrance. Deuxièmement, les sanctions peuvent échouer lorsqu’elles ne sont pas en adéquation avec leur objectif. Bien que les sanctions imposées à la Russie soient sans précédent par rapport aux campagnes précédentes, la Russie est également beaucoup plus puissante que les pays précédemment ciblés. Compte tenu de sa vaste économie et de son réseau d’alliances, la Russie est mieux préparée à supporter le poids de la pénalisation économique. Par exemple, la nature ciblée des sanctions imposées peut permettre à la Russie d’utiliser les produits de secteurs d’exportation non affectés, comme les matières premières, pour compenser partiellement l’impact de l’exclusion de SWIFT et des sanctions sur les exportations de pétrole. Alors que la part des réserves de devises étrangères de la Russie dans les pays de l’OTAN est passée de 93% à 46% depuis 2016, la Russie pourrait être en mesure de maintenir une marge bénéficiaire considérable pour soutenir le budget national. Même si l’UE parvient à réduire ses exportations de gaz de 66% d’ici la fin de l’année, la Russie peut, à court terme, éviter une crise budgétaire qui aurait pu imposer un retrait immédiat des troupes. Cette légère flexibilité offre également à la Russie la possibilité d’élargir son marché. Le soutien militaire et économique de la Chine offre un autre moyen d’échapper aux effets escomptés des sanctions imposées. Bien que Pékin n’ait fourni qu’une faible aide économique à la Russie lors de l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 pour ne pas provoquer de sanctions secondaires, la nature changeante des relations sino-américaines depuis 2014 pourrait modifier la réponse de la Chine dans le contexte actuel. Au cours de la dernière décennie, la Chine et les États-Unis ont été en désaccord sur d’innombrables questions politiques, notamment le cyberespace et les réglementations en mer de Chine méridionale. De nombreux États de l’UE considèrent désormais la Chine comme un rival en raison de la diminution de ses investissements à l’étranger. Bien qu’il n’y ait aucune garantie que la Chine offrira un soutien économique substantiel à la Russie, la diminution de l’engagement de la Chine vis-à-vis des États-Unis et de l’UE signifie qu’il est à présent moins risqué pour elle d’aider la Russie que lors des conflits précédents. Ce facteur, combiné à la diminution de la dépendance de la Russie au dollar américain depuis 2014, pourrait atténuer l’impact des mesures imposées et doit être pris en compte par les acteurs occidentaux. Enfin, les sanctions peuvent ne pas atteindre leurs objectifs lorsqu’elles produisent des effets imprévus qui peuvent aller contre leurs objectifs initiaux. Alors que les dirigeants occidentaux ont tenté d’imposer des restrictions ciblant les élites russes plutôt que la population en général, le retrait d’entreprises dans les domaines de la technologie, de l’agriculture et des produits pharmaceutiques, combiné à la crise monétaire actuelle, affecte gravement la population russe. À son tour, Poutine utilise les difficultés économiques créées par l’imposition de sanctions pour mobiliser le soutien à son régime. Les médias contrôlés par l’État qui génèrent la propagande pro-Kremlin présentent les sanctions comme des politiques occidentales qui ciblent injustement la population russe. Ainsi, là où les sanctions occidentales visaient à affaiblir la légitimité de Poutine, elles ont également contribué à un effet de ralliement autour du drapeau. Si Poutine réussit à déformer les actions de l’OTAN pour convaincre la population russe que les sanctions sont disproportionnées, la campagne pourrait avoir l’effet inattendu et non souhaité de réduire la pression intérieure sur Poutine et de faire taire ces voix qui appellent à mettre fin à la guerre. De la même façon, le manque de soutien non occidental à la réponse américaine face à la guerre pourrait décourager les partenaires clés de la stratégie de l’OTAN dans l’Indopacifique, comme l’Inde et le Vietnam, de condamner les actions russes. La campagne de sanctions a démontré la capacité de l’Occident à contrôler le système économique mondial, et de nombreux pays restent sceptiques quant à la capacité des réponses occidentales à refléter leurs intérêts. Par conséquent, les accusations de Poutine selon lesquelles l’Occident utilise sa position hégémonique pour imposer une vision du monde et un système de valeurs particuliers peuvent trouver un écho auprès de pays non occidentaux clés, affectant ainsi le soutien aux intérêts occidentaux sur d’autres questions de politique étrangère. Recommandations pour le Canada Le Canada soutient fermement l’ordre international fondé sur des règles que Poutine a ouvertement défié. Malgré l’impact sévère de la campagne de sanctions sur l’économie russe en ruine, Poutine ne montre aucun signe de recul. Si la survie de l’économie russe et le succès de son effort de guerre dépendent du maintien de l’indifférence de certains États clés, de la capacité de Poutine à modifier les alliances commerciales et du soutien de la population russe, le Canada doit s’efforcer de combler les failles économiques par des sanctions secondaires tout en améliorant le message que la campagne de sanctions renvoie à l’international. Le Canada a déjà imposé plus de 750 sanctions à des acteurs et organisations clés en Russie, en Ukraine et en Biélorussie depuis le début du conflit, mais il est encore possible d’intensifier les mesures existantes. Bien que la stratégie des alliés de l’OTAN ait été réactive, le Canada doit maintenant utiliser les sanctions de manière offensive et se préparer à imposer des sanctions secondaires si des pays comme la Chine, l’Inde ou le Brésil montrent une volonté d’aider la Russie. Le Canada peut prendre l’initiative de mettre sur pied un groupe de travail conjoint sur les sanctions afin d’établir un ensemble de sanctions secondaires uniforme pour tous les alliés de l’OTAN. Ce faisant, le Canada peut encourager les pays qui font actuellement preuve d’indifférence à l’égard de la violation russe du droit international à boycotter les importations de gaz et de pétrole. Cela signalera qu’une absence de sanctions à l’égard de la Russie nuira à leurs intérêts de développement économique à long terme. Cela peut également aider à réduire l’horizon temporel durant lequel la Russie est capable de fonctionner économiquement malgré les mesures actuelles, augmentant ainsi la pression à laquelle Poutine est confronté et le poussant à retirer les troupes russes. Le Canada doit également s’efforcer d’établir un plan de communication clair ainsi qu’une alliance de communications numériques pour surmonter les effets imprévus des sanctions sur la légitimité nationale et internationale de Poutine. Après que le Service fédéral russe des communications, des technologies de l’information et des médias de masse a ordonné à tous les médias nationaux d’utiliser uniquement des informations provenant de sources russes officielles le 24 février, les civils se sont tournés vers les réseaux privés virtuels (RPV) pour éviter les restrictions d’information. Depuis, le nombre de demandes de RPV a augmenté de 873% par rapport à la moyenne pré-conflit. Bien que la plupart des Russes continuent d’exprimer leur soutien à Poutine et de blâmer l’Occident pour les tensions en Ukraine, le Canada devrait capitaliser sur cet accès accru et cette demande de médias et d’information non censurés pour générer un sentiment anti-guerre parmi les Russes, et ce, avant que l’utilisation de RPV ne soit effectivement étouffée par les tactiques de censure de Poutine. Il est possible d’atteindre cet objectif en mettant en place une alliance de communications numériques pour tirer parti des ressources et de l’expertise des médias mondiaux, des communications et des moyens technologiques afin d’améliorer la circulation de l’information en Russie, en s’efforçant de montrer l’inexactitude du récit de Poutine tout en maintenant l’intégrité d’Internet. Le Canada doit également expliquer clairement aux Russes et aux États qui restent sceptiques vis-à-vis de l’Occident que les sanctions ont été imposées pour punir la violation du droit international par Poutine et non pour exprimer une supériorité occidentale. Bien qu’une suspension de la coopération avec la Russie soit nécessaire, le Canada doit démontrer sa volonté d’inclure la Russie dans les discussions et les organes décisionnels futurs, comme le Conseil de l’Arctique, qui sont essentiels à son succès économique. En signalant que l’exclusion de la Russie de l’économie mondiale est une mesure punitive et non permanente, le Canada peut étouffer l’attrait de la rhétorique anti-occidentale de Poutine, augmentant ainsi la pression nationale et internationale à laquelle il fait face pour qu’il mette fin à la guerre. Enfin, alors que Poutine s’efforce de diviser les partenaires qui coopèrent contre lui, le Canada doit rester clair et sans ambiguïté lorsqu’il affirme que les sanctions imposées ne seront pas levées tant que les forces russes ne seront pas retirées et tant que cette retraite russe ne sera pas « en vigueur et irréversible ».  Poutine est déterminé à démontrer la capacité de la Russie à résister aux sanctions, d’autant plus que poursuivre des négociations en l’absence de gains territoriaux substantiels met en péril sa survie politique. À son tour, le Canada devrait se préparer à augmenter son budget pour la nourriture, les livraisons de fournitures et l’aide humanitaire afin de soutenir l’Ukraine dans la guerre. Le Canada doit montrer que, même si l’OTAN ne s’engage pas dans une confrontation militaire directe avec la Russie, elle ne sera pas soumise à la coercition nucléaire sur la scène internationale. ## Les talibans et le dilemme ouïghour : À quoi s’en tenir ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-talibans-et-le-dilemme-ouighour-a-quoi-sen-tenir/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > ...il marque également l’adoption d’une rhétorique de stigmatisation par l’État chinois à l’égard de sa minorité musulmane, les Ouïghours. Bien que le 20e anniversaire des attentats terroristes du 11 septembre 2001 rappelle l’intervention américaine en Afghanistan et le début de la guerre contre le terrorisme, il marque également l’adoption d’une rhétorique de stigmatisation par l’État chinois à l’égard de sa minorité musulmane, les Ouïghours. L’approche du Parti communiste chinois (PCC), qui s’est révélée être exponentiellement oppressive et intrusive, a suscité son lot de préoccupations chez plusieurs membres de la communauté internationale. Ceci s’est d’ailleurs amplifié à la suite de la fuite des « China Cables ». Ces documents, qui proviennent directement du gouvernement chinois, ont permis de mettre en lumière l’imposante structure d’oppression mise en place par le PCC à l’égard des minorités ethniques vivant dans la région de l’Ouest. Bien que le PCC se détache toujours systématiquement des attaques à leur égard, l’évolution de la situation au Xinjiang et les multiples violations des droits de la personne sont aujourd’hui largement documentées. La récente reprise du pouvoir par les talibans en Afghanistan ramène en avant-plan des inquiétudes de stabilité régionale et de sécurité, et ce, autant pour les États-Unis que pour les États limitrophes. Bien malgré elle, la Chine se voit elle aussi préoccupée par l’évolution de la situation en Afghanistan. Partageant une frontière avec l’Afghanistan, la province chinoise du Xinjiang correspond à une zone sensible pour le gouvernement chinois. Celle-ci offre des avantages économiques, politiques et stratégiques non négligeables au PCC, en plus de s’avérer incontournable dans la mise en œuvre du projet chinois des nouvelles routes de la Soie (Belt and Road Initiative). Devant l’importance que revêt la province pour la Chine, celle-ci s’avère particulièrement anxieuse à l’idée d’une réémergence de terrorisme transfrontalier en Afghanistan, ce type d’activités pouvant entraîner des répercussions significatives au Xinjiang. La relation entre les deux entités semble être conditionnée par deux facteurs. D’une part, la liaison économique et, d’autre part, l’abstention mutuelle à s’immiscer dans les affaires intérieures de l’autre. Sans aucun doute, l’économie sera une préoccupation centrale pour le nouveau gouvernement afghan. Devant une inflation incessante, un seuil de pauvreté très élevé et l’interruption des flux financiers occidentaux, les manœuvres de soutien économique s’avèrent particulièrement restreintes. Face à un manque d’options et l’aide conditionnelle des membres du G7, la Chine s’est rapidement identifiée comme la meilleure avenue pour l’obtention d’une aide financière significative. En offrant une aide « implicitement » conditionnelle à l’adoption de politiques acerbes à l’égard des mouvements djihadistes antichinois, le PCC tente d’éviter tout éventuel débordement dans la province du Xinjiang. Cependant, pour la population ouïghoure qui réside en Afghanistan, le rapprochement entre les talibans et le gouvernement chinois soulève nombre de préoccupations, non sans fondement. La puissance du levier économique chinois au sein des pays arabes est si significative qu’elle y perpétue un silence presque total sur les politiques du PCC au Xinjiang, et ce, même chez les États ayant tendance à normalement défendre les droits des musulmans. Pire encore, certains États ont déjà eux-mêmes pris des mesures afin de permettre une extension de la politique chinoise, comme ce fut notamment le cas de l’Arabie Saoudite. Malheureusement, le facteur économique, s’il est isolé, semble être suffisant pour condamner tout espoir d’un changement de discours de la part des pays arabes sur la situation des Ouïghours. Or, celui-ci ne peut être pleinement isolé. En cherchant à s’attirer des promesses du gouvernement taliban, la Chine cherche à sécuriser sa frontière avec l’Afghanistan pour éviter toutes répercussions sur ses activités au Xinjiang. Toutefois, pour assurer la tenue de ses promesses visant à éviter la réémergence d’actes terroristes internationaux, le gouvernement afghan doit avoir le « monopole de la violence », ce qui n’est actuellement pas le cas. En effet, l’existence d’électrons libres à divers endroits en Afghanistan complexifie la garantie visant à ce que l’intégrité du territoire chinois soit pleinement respectée. De surcroit, bien que la Chine le souhaite, une prise de position du régime taliban allant à l’encontre du Parti islamique du Turkestan pourrait considérablement heurter la légitimité du nouveau gouvernement. De plus, malgré la demande du président Xi Jinping appelant aux « partis concernés » de bien vouloir éradiquer la menace terroriste, l’équipe de l’ONU suivant l'évolution du régime taliban a statué que celui-ci entretient toujours de solides liens avec Al-Qaïda.  D’autre part, la plupart des acteurs régionaux, tout comme l’occident en général, espèrent l’atteinte d’une stabilité en Afghanistan et soulignent également l’importance de cette lutte contre le terrorisme. Devant un message relativement homogène de la part de la communauté internationale, l’appel au contrôle de la radicalisation est unanime. Or, afin de concrétiser cette demande, les talibans devront s’assurer de contenir les groupes extrémistes comme ISIS-K; un de leurs principaux opposants. Bien que ceci fut possible avec la présence américaine, leur départ laisse planer une incertitude quant à la capacité des talibans de tenir en échec cette menace grandissante. Pour l’État islamique, les tergiversations talibanes sur la gestion du dossier ouïghour sont inacceptables; celles-ci ont même été utilisées comme motif pour l’attentat terroriste à Kunduz le 8 octobre 2021. Pour ces raisons, force est de constater que la valeur des promesses du nouveau gouvernement afghan peut être remise en question. L’équilibre entre les acteurs reste fragile. Le nouveau gouvernement afghan, bien qu’il ait récemment pris action sur la frontière sino-afghane pour démontrer son intention de respecter son entente avec le PCC; reste pour sa part floue quant à son désir d’importer les pratiques chinoises à l’égard de la minorité ouïghoure. L’inquiétude de Beijing, qui provient en partie du fait que la montée du régime fondamentaliste taliban a déjà eu des échos au Xinjiang, semble revenir en avant-plan. Bien que l’extrapolation extrême de cette crainte ait amené Pékin à mettre en œuvre des politiques draconiennes dans la province du Xinjiang et qu’elle tente de mobiliser le gouvernement taliban à poursuivre dans ce même élan, le PCC pourrait se retrouver bientôt face à une impasse advenant l’incapacité ou le manque de volonté du gouvernement afghan de respecter ses promesses. Dans l’éventualité où ceci devait se réaliser, Pékin se retrouverait paralysé par son dévouement au principe de « non-interférence » dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre État.  En ce sens, l’évolution de la situation en Afghanistan pourrait avoir un effet notable sur le comportement chinois dans la région, mais également sur l’ensemble de son positionnement stratégique. De l’autre côté de l’Atlantique, le Canada poursuit toujours sa réflexion à savoir s’il reconnaîtra le nouveau gouvernement afghan. Le fait est que la décision canadienne risque fortement de s’inspirer de celle de ses alliés, comme l’Angleterre ou les États-Unis, soit l’octroi d’une reconnaissance conditionnelle à de multiples conditions, notamment celle renvoyant à ce que l’Afghanistan ne redevienne pas un havre pour le terrorisme international. Or, comme mentionné précédemment, devant une opposition aussi forte que celle de l’État islamique et un contrôle aussi peu effectif sur l’ensemble de son territoire, le régime taliban pourrait rapidement se retrouver acculé au pied du mur. ## Les tensions croissantes dans le détroit de Taïwan et leurs répercussions sur les intérêts canadiens URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-tensions-croissantes-dans-le-detroit-de-taiwan-et-leurs-repercussions-sur-les-interets-canadiens/ Modified: 2026-09-18 On peut affirmer qu’aucun autre conflit sur la planète aujourd’hui ne présente un risque aussi élevé de déclencher une guerre entre superpuissances — voire une guerre nucléaire — que celui du détroit de Taïwan. Les répercussions d’une guerre autour de Taïwan, compte tenu de la forte probabilité d’une intervention des États-Unis et du Japon, seraient véritablement mondiales : elles coûteraient des billions à l’économie mondiale et provoqueraient des perturbations dans le commerce et les chaînes d’approvisionnement qui dépasseraient de loin les effets de la pandémie de Covid-19. Alors qu’il révise sa stratégie indopacifique, le Canada doit également s’assurer de bien comprendre les enjeux liés au détroit de Taïwan, ainsi que les coûts considérables pour sa propre sécurité nationale s’il ne se préparait pas adéquatement à faire face à diverses situations d’urgence futures — au premier rang desquelles une quarantaine, un blocus naval ou une invasion de Taïwan par la Chine. Il y a encore quelques années, surtout depuis la fin de la Guerre froide, peu de gens s’intéressaient à Taïwan ou étaient même capables de le situer sur une carte du monde. Les événements récents — qu’il s’agisse de l’influence souvent néfaste de la Chine au sein de nos propres sociétés, de ses démonstrations de force militaire, de la pandémie de Covid-19 ou encore du rôle que jouent les semi-conducteurs dans nos vies — ont mis en avant Taïwan et l’importance de cette jeune démocratie pour notre monde. Les tensions croissantes autour du statut de Taïwan, à mesure que la Chine gagne en confiance et en assurance, obligent les puissances régionales et la communauté internationale à examiner la situation de plus près. On ne peut plus ignorer les risques d’escalade et de conflit armé majeur au sujet de Taïwan, car une telle évolution aurait des conséquences désastreuses pour l’économie mondiale et menacerait de déstabiliser l’ordre mondial tel que nous le connaissons. Le présent document aborde les principaux éléments qui ont alimenté ce conflit de longue date ainsi que les mesures adoptées par Pékin au cours de la dernière décennie pour accroître la pression sur Taïwan. Il explore ensuite des scénarios d’escalade plausibles et formule des recommandations quant aux réponses possibles de la communauté internationale, y compris du Canada, afin de dissuader un conflit majeur dans le détroit de Taïwan et, si la dissuasion échouait, d’atténuer les effets d’une crise majeure. Taïwan joue un rôle central et de première ligne dans la nouvelle guerre froide qui s’annonce, et le camp démocratique ne peut se permettre de rester impréparé ou indifférent face à une crise potentielle dans le détroit de Taïwan. Mettre la pression : les mesures coercitives de la Chine à l’encontre de Taïwan au cours de la dernière décennie La décision de Pékin d’intensifier la pression sur Taïwan s’inscrit dans le cadre de l’affirmation croissante de la Chine sur la scène internationale, ainsi que de sa frustration grandissante face à son incapacité à contraindre le peuple taïwanais à se plier à ses exigences politiques en matière d’unification. De la militarisation de la mer de Chine du Sud au mépris du droit international à l’espionnage et à la guerre politique visant des pays partout dans le monde — sans parler de l’Initiative de la Ceinture et de la Route (ICR) et de la mainmise sur les élites qui l’accompagne —, la République populaire de Chine est devenue une nouvelle réalité pour les États qui se sont soudainement retrouvés à lutter pour trouver un équilibre entre, d’une part, les occasions offertes par une collaboration avec la Chine, et les effets corrosifs de cette relation sur les institutions démocratiques, d’autre part. Au moment où Tsai Ing-wen, du Parti démocratique progressiste (PDP) pro-Taïwan, est entrée en fonction en mai 2016, une grande partie de la communauté internationale avait pris conscience que des décennies de relations avec la Chine, y compris son adhésion à l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) en 2001, n’avaient pas réussi à transformer la République populaire de Chine en un pays respectueux des normes démocratiques et du droit international. En réalité, ce rapprochement a plutôt donné naissance à une République populaire de Chine plus sûre d’elle-même, de plus en plus affirmée, et dont les dirigeants étaient davantage disposés à défier — et à réécrire — le droit international et les normes de conduite d’une manière mieux adaptée à son modèle autocratique de gouvernance. La persistance de Taïwan en tant qu’entité démocratique souveraine fait obstacle aux ambitions grandissantes de Pékin. Non seulement la démocratie dynamique de Taïwan contredit l’affirmation du PCC (et celle de divers intellectuels) selon laquelle la démocratie est incompatible avec la civilisation chinoise — privant ainsi les 1,3 milliard de Chinois de la possibilité de développer leur pays selon ce modèle —, mais l’alignement de Taïwan sur les États-Unis et d’autres pays démocratiques menace également (du moins selon Pékin) de contenir les ambitions expansionnistes de la Chine. Comme pour souligner ce point, la situation géographique de Taïwan le long de la première chaîne d’îles reliant le Japon à l’Asie du Sud-Est est perçue comme une ligne invisible en mer qui enferme la Chine, entravant ainsi la capacité de l’Armée populaire de libération (APL) à s’étendre dans le Pacifique occidental et au-delà. Par conséquent, depuis 2016, le conflit dans le détroit de Taïwan a pris une dimension de plus en plus régionale, voire mondiale, les développements qui s’y produisent pouvant avoir des répercussions sur l’ensemble de l’économie mondiale ainsi que sur la politique internationale. Alors que les analystes en sécurité, les représentants gouvernementaux et les groupes civiques soulignent depuis longtemps la nécessité de défendre Taïwan contre l’ingérence chinoise en raison du statut de démocratie de cette nation insulaire, le rôle de Taïwan en tant que producteur d’une part très importante — plus de 90 % — des semi-conducteurs les plus avancés au monde, et par conséquent la position centrale qu’elle occupe dans l’alimentation de l’économie mondiale à l’ère de l’intelligence artificielle (IA), a pris de l’importance ces dernières années. (Si des champions nationaux comme la Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, ou TSMC, sont devenus des noms connus de tous à travers le monde, c’est l’écosystème créé à Taïwan au fil de décennies de travail acharné et visionnaire qui a rendu ce miracle possible — un miracle qui, de surcroît, serait pratiquement impossible à reproduire ailleurs.) De plus, plus de 3,32 billions de dollars canadiens de marchandises transitent chaque année par le détroit de Taïwan, ce qui représente environ un cinquième du commerce maritime mondial et 10 % du commerce mondial. Selon certaines analyses, le coût d’une guerre dans le détroit de Taïwan pour l’économie mondiale serait de l’ordre de 13,86 billions de dollars canadiens, soit environ 10 % du PIB mondial — un coup plus dur pour l’économie mondiale que la pandémie de Covid-19, la crise financière mondiale et l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine réunies. Aucun pays ne peut donc se permettre d’ignorer ce goulot d’étranglement potentiel lorsqu’il élabore ses stratégies nationales. Plus que jamais, la communauté internationale a tout intérêt à garantir la paix et la stabilité dans le détroit de Taïwan. Rien de tout cela n’est purement altruiste. La politique ne l’est jamais. Au contraire, alors que Taïwan devient un État de première ligne dans une nouvelle guerre froide, qui oppose les démocraties à plusieurs puissances autoritaires et révisionnistes menées par la Russie et la Chine, Taipei a intensifié ses efforts de rapprochement avec les démocraties partageant les mêmes valeurs à travers le monde et a élargi la portée et la profondeur de l’engagement qu’elle peut établir avec divers pays, malgré les limites imposées par leur politique de « Chine unique ». Au cours des années Tsai, Taïwan a eu recours à la diplomatie discrète, aux échanges de type « Track 1,5 » et à d’autres instances pour approfondir ses liens bilatéraux et multilatéraux, partageant souvent sa vaste expérience en matière de lutte contre l’ingérence électorale de la République populaire de Chine, la guerre cognitive, l’espionnage, la cyberguerre, les opérations de « zone grise » et d’autres formes de coercition avec des partenaires qui peinaient à relever correctement le défi de l’influence autoritaire au sein de leurs propres sociétés. Au cours de cette période, les investissements étrangers à Taïwan, accompagnés des investissements taïwanais à l’étranger, ont également prospéré, créant de nouvelles dépendances et internationalisant davantage la « question » taïwanaise. Plus la présence étrangère à Taïwan s’est accrue – sous forme de personnel, de capitaux, d’investissements et de biens immobiliers – et plus la dépendance à l’égard des entreprises taïwanaises s’est renforcée au sein des chaînes d’approvisionnement mondiales, plus il est devenu difficile pour Pékin de prétendre que Taïwan constituait une « question interne », pour laquelle il ne tolérerait aucune « ingérence » extérieure. Cherchant à contrer l’accueil favorable réservé à Taïwan par la communauté internationale, Pékin a redoublé d’efforts pour ravir certains des alliés diplomatiques officiels de Taïwan et ainsi isoler davantage cette nation insulaire. Au cours des huit années du mandat de l’administration Tsai (2016-2024), la République populaire de Chine a réussi à débaucher 11 des alliés diplomatiques de Taïwan, faisant passer leur nombre de 23 à 12. Au cours de cette même période, la Chine a usé de son influence au Conseil de sécurité et à l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies pour empêcher Taïwan de se joindre à des organisations multilatérales, ne serait-ce qu’à titre d’observateur. Ainsi, malgré le rôle important qu’elle joue dans l’économie mondiale, Taïwan n’avait pas de siège au sein d’organisations telles qu’Interpol, l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) et l’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale (OACI), basée à Montréal, pour n’en citer que quelques-unes. Les dangereuses lacunes engendrées par l’exclusion persistante de Taïwan sont devenues d’autant plus évidentes en période de crise internationale, comme lors de la pandémie de Covid-19. Aucune campagne de sensibilisation ni aucun appel lancé par les alliés diplomatiques de Taïwan et certains des pays les plus puissants du monde n’ont réussi à contrecarrer les manœuvres politiques de Pékin à l’ONU. Tout au long de la présidence de Tsai, le PCC a élargi sa panoplie de moyens pour s’ingérer dans la démocratie taïwanaise, ses institutions et son environnement informationnel, tout en redoublant d’efforts en matière d’espionnage pour voler des secrets gouvernementaux, militaires et industriels. Le PCC a également coopté des politiciens, des magnats des médias, des personnalités religieuses, des membres du crime organisé et des gens d’affaires — souvent au moyen d’incitatifs financiers — afin de pénétrer davantage à Taïwan, en utilisant l’information comme une arme pour mener une guerre cognitive contre la population taïwanaise ainsi que contre les alliés de Taïwan à l’étranger. Ce mécanisme de cooptation, ainsi que la formation de mandataires locaux, est devenu un modèle que la Chine a reproduit dans des pays du monde entier afin de renforcer sa capacité à façonner l’environnement à son avantage. La capacité de Taïwan à faire face à cette menace et à adapter ses lois en matière de sécurité nationale pour relever ce défi de la « zone grise » a suscité un vif intérêt à l’échelle mondiale, les démocraties cherchant à tirer des leçons de l’expérience taïwanaise afin de pouvoir, elles aussi, s’adapter avec succès à l’ingérence du PCC, en atténuer les effets et y faire face. Beaucoup se sont tournés vers Taïwan, par exemple, pour apprendre de son gouvernement et de sa société civile comment contrer l’ingérence électorale du PCC. Outre les instruments de « pouvoir tranchant », Pékin a également renforcé ses outils de « pouvoir dur » afin de resserrer l’étau coercitif autour de Taïwan. S’appuyant sur plusieurs années d’investissements à deux chiffres dans son armée, la Chine s’est montrée de plus en plus disposée à déployer l’APL autour de Taïwan, à l’instar de ce qu’elle a fait dans d’autres régions où elle est en conflit territorial avec ses voisins, comme en mer de Chine orientale et méridionale. Progressivement, Pékin a accru sa présence militaire autour de Taïwan et déployé un nombre croissant d’aéronefs et de navires de guerre dans le cadre d’exercices, tous présentés comme des « avertissements » contre l’indépendance de Taïwan. Souvent, mais pas toujours, ces exercices militaires à grande échelle, ainsi que les campagnes de propagande qui les accompagnaient, coïncidaient avec l’annonce de ventes d’armes majeures par les États-Unis à Taïwan. Pékin s’en est servi pour signaler à la communauté internationale qu’il ne tolérerait aucun rapprochement avec Taïwan, et espérait que cette posture menaçante conditionnerait l’opinion publique taïwanaise en lui rappelant la menace militaire qui pesait de l’autre côté du détroit de Taïwan. Tout comme en mer de Chine du Sud, la présence croissante de l’APL, ainsi que celle de la Garde côtière chinoise (CCG), de la « milice maritime » et des navires scientifiques, constituait une stratégie d’escalade progressive : à chaque petite intensification, à chaque nouvelle réalité sur le terrain ou en mer, la Chine « faisait bouillir la grenouille » et créait une « nouvelle normalité ». De plus en plus souvent, les aéronefs de l’APL ont commencé à franchir la ligne tacite de Davis, ou ligne médiane, dans le détroit de Taïwan, qui avait servi pendant des décennies de frontière non officielle pour éviter les accidents impliquant des aéronefs militaires. De plus en plus, Pékin a déployé des navires de la GCC (la Garde côtière chinoise diffère nettement des gardes côtières civiles telles qu’on les conçoit en Occident, agissant davantage comme une organisation paramilitaire, ou une « deuxième marine » relevant en fin de compte du commandement de la Commission militaire centrale, dirigée par Xi Jinping) ainsi que des navires ostensiblement civils constituant une « milice maritime » pour s’infiltrer dans le détroit de Taïwan et dans les eaux entourant les îles périphériques taïwanaises de Kinmen et de Matsu. La Chine cherche à renverser le consensus international selon lequel le détroit de Taïwan constitue une voie navigable internationale; elle vise plutôt à convaincre la communauté internationale que le détroit fait partie des eaux intérieures de la Chine. Pékin a déposé des plaintes chaque fois que des marines étrangères — y compris celle du Canada — ont exercé leur droit de passage dans le détroit de Taïwan, déployant ces dernières années l’APL pour harceler les flottilles en transit. Ayant largement abandonné une stratégie d’incitation (gagner le « cœur et l’esprit » des Taïwanais s’est en grande partie soldé par un échec)[1] et s’appuyant principalement sur la coercition, le PCC comptait sur le fait que, d’ici 2020, la population taïwanaise serait suffisamment effrayée pour élire, lors de l’élection présidentielle de cette année-là, un candidat plus disposé à reprendre le dialogue avec Pékin. Ce n’est pas ce qui s’est produit. Au contraire, dans le sillage de la répression à Hong Kong l’année précédente, Tsai a remporté une réélection retentissante avec un nombre record de 8,17 millions de votes contre son principal adversaire et favori de Pékin, Han Kuo-yu du Kuomintang (KMT). Le DPP a également réussi à conserver sa majorité de sièges, bien que plus étroite, au Yuan législatif. Les démonstrations de force dans le détroit de Taïwan n’avaient pas réussi à contraindre les Taïwanais à se soumettre, tout comme les signaux de menace de l’APL n’avaient pas réussi à influencer la première élection présidentielle directe de Taïwan en 1996. Le résultat de l’élection de 2020 n’a pas dissuadé Pékin, qui a encore intensifié ses actions en renforçant sa présence militaire, avec des survols et des passages de navires de la PLA quasi quotidiens. Cette escalade a atteint un nouveau sommet en août 2022 avec la visite à Taïwan de la présidente de la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis de l’époque, Nancy Pelosi. Dans ce qui allait devenir le premier d’une série d’exercices à grande échelle de plusieurs jours menés par l’APL autour de Taïwan au cours des trois années et demie suivantes, ces manœuvres ont encerclé Taïwan en simulant un éventuel assaut amphibie ou un blocus/une quarantaine, et ont donné lieu au tir d’un certain nombre de missiles balistiques. Plus que jamais, Pékin signalait à la communauté internationale qu’il n’accepterait plus le genre d’engagement que représentait la visite de Nancy Pelosi à Taïwan — même si celle-ci n’était pas sans précédent, puisque le président de la Chambre des représentants de l’époque, Newt Gingrich, avait fait de même 25 ans auparavant. Pékin déplaçait les limites et établissait de nouvelles règles dans le but de restreindre davantage la capacité de Taïwan à étendre son rayonnement auprès de la communauté internationale. Depuis août 2022, l’APL a mené sept exercices à grande échelle autour de Taïwan, en faisant ainsi une nouvelle norme. Cette présence militaire croissante autour de Taïwan, chaque nouvelle manœuvre se rapprochant un peu plus des eaux territoriales de Taïwan (24 milles marins), accroît les risques d’accidents et de malentendus.[2] Et avec cela, la possibilité qu’une escalade débouche sur un conflit armé majeur, non pas de manière intentionnelle, mais plutôt par une série de manœuvres et de contre-manœuvres : une marche vers la guerre à l’aveuglette, aux conséquences incalculables pour la communauté internationale. Nous ne pouvons pas non plus exclure la possibilité qu’un conflit armé majeur survienne à la suite d’une décision délibérée des dirigeants du PCC. Comme l’a démontré la décision de Vladimir Poutine d’envahir l’Ukraine en 2022, les dirigeants autoritaires forts ne pèsent pas toujours le pour et le contre d’une action radicale de la même manière que le font généralement les dirigeants des démocraties. Pour eux, la survie du régime, l’orgueil démesuré, l’idéologie et le désir de « faire avancer l’histoire », ajoutés à leur tendance à ignorer les conseils des spécialistes qui les entourent (ou au fait qu’ils reçoivent des conseils de flagorneurs qui hésitent à contredire le dirigeant fort), l’emporteront parfois sur les coûts prévus de l’aventurisme. Ainsi, bien qu’il n’y ait aucune garantie que Xi Jinping suivra les traces de son allié Poutine et déclenchera une guerre contre Taïwan, cette perspective ne peut être totalement écartée. D’ailleurs, Xi n’a pas besoin du précédent établi par Poutine pour engager son pays sur une voie similaire. Ce qui a empêché (jusqu’à présent) Pékin de choisir l’option militaire pour résoudre la « question de Taïwan », comme on décrit souvent ce conflit, c’est la dissuasion : la conviction des dirigeants de Pékin que les coûts potentiels d’une tentative d’annexion de Taïwan par la force seraient trop élevés et trop déstabilisants pour le régime du PCC, dont la principale préoccupation reste la capacité à se maintenir au pouvoir. On ne peut savoir quel serait l’impact, sur le soutien du peuple chinois au PCC, d’une tentative ratée d’invasion de Taïwan, ou d’une tentative dont le coût serait trop élevé tant sur le plan matériel qu’en termes de pertes humaines, d’autant plus que de récents sondages menés dans le pays montrent que la majorité des Chinois se satisfont du statu quo et ne sont pas particulièrement favorables à ce que leur gouvernement recoure à la force pour annexer Taïwan. La dissuasion face à une attaque de l’APL repose sur une combinaison de facteurs : la détermination et les moyens de Taïwan à contrer une incursion de l’APL, avec la perspective de pertes importantes du côté de l’envahisseur; et la certitude que l’armée américaine se joindrait au combat aux côtés de Taïwan, peut-être avec l’aide d’autres pays comme le Japon et d’une poignée d’autres alliés. La poursuite des ventes d’armes américaines à Taïwan joue également un rôle majeur dans le maintien de la dissuasion. Les signaux forts de soutien de la communauté internationale, soulignés notamment par les déclarations du G7 et de l’OTAN, ainsi que les transits visant à garantir la liberté de navigation dans le détroit de Taïwan et les exercices militaires menés par l’alliance en prévision d’imprévus régionaux, jouent tous un rôle important dans la façon dont Pékin évalue les chances de succès d’une invasion de Taïwan. Il en va de même pour un blocus naval ou une quarantaine qui, étant donné qu’une telle manœuvre ne se produirait pas dans le vide et déstabiliserait inévitablement l’économie mondiale, pourrait également susciter des mesures de rétorsion de la part des États-Unis et d’autres puissances régionales. La politique de longue date des États-Unis concernant une implication potentielle dans un scénario impliquant le détroit de Taïwan repose sur une « ambiguïté stratégique », selon laquelle Washington ne déclare pas clairement s’il interviendrait dans le conflit pour contrer l’APL, ni, le cas échéant, de quelle manière. En d’autres termes, cette stratégie vise à maintenir les dirigeants chinois dans l’incertitude. Jusqu’à présent, malgré les fanfaronnades de Pékin, cette stratégie a fonctionné, et Pékin n’a pas attaqué Taïwan. Mais ce calcul pourrait être en train de changer, ce qui explique pourquoi certains experts ont préconisé que les États-Unis abandonnent leur stratégie d’ambiguïté au profit d’un message plus clair indiquant que toute tentative de s’emparer de Taïwan par la force entraînerait une intervention américaine (l’ancien président Joe Biden a fait quelques allusions à une telle clarté au cours de sa présidence, mais le département d’État américain est revenu sur ces déclarations, ce qui suggère que la politique américaine en la matière n’avait pas changé). Deux autres variables ne manqueront pas d’influencer le point de vue des dirigeants chinois quant à la viabilité d’une option militaire pour Taïwan. La première est la perception du soutien américain à Taïwan, qui découle d’une analyse des signaux émanant de la Maison-Blanche, du Congrès américain et d’autres piliers de la politique étrangère des États-Unis. L’administration américaine affirme-t-elle clairement son soutien continu à Taïwan, par le biais de ses politiques et de ses ventes d’armes? Ou, à l’inverse, s’oriente-t-elle vers l’isolationnisme, le transactionnalisme, ou est-elle distraite et submergée par des imprévus majeurs ailleurs? La deuxième variable concerne l’état de l’APL elle-même et l’évaluation par les dirigeants chinois selon laquelle l’armée chinoise est suffisamment équipée et entraînée pour risquer une opération militaire à grande échelle contre Taïwan. En d’autres termes, l’APL dispose-t-elle des capacités à la hauteur de ses intentions? Pendant des décennies, le PCC a fait part de son intention de recourir à la force contre Taïwan, mais n’a jamais donné suite à cette menace, en grande partie parce que l’armée chinoise n’était ni prête ni suffisamment équipée pour exécuter un tel ordre. Il y a quelques années, Xi a ordonné à l’APL de se doter des moyens nécessaires pour envahir Taïwan d’ici 2027 si l’ordre en était donné (ce qu’on appelle la « fenêtre de Davidson », terme tiré des remarques de l’amiral à la retraite Philip S. Davidson de la Marine américaine). Cette directive a souvent été mal interprétée par les analystes en sécurité et les médias comme constituant une date limite — en d’autres termes, une confirmation que la Chine ferait usage de la force contre Taïwan en 2027. Aucune directive de ce genre n’a jamais été donnée par les dirigeants chinois, et les récentes mesures de répression contre la corruption au sein de l’APL, ainsi que les défis technologiques auxquels fait face l’industrie de la défense chinoise, indiquent qu’une échéance de 2027 pour la préparation opérationnelle pourrait être prématurée. Cela pourrait faire gagner un peu de temps à Taïwan et à ses alliés, mais une chose est certaine : après plusieurs années d’investissements massifs dans le domaine militaire, l’APL chinoise est, tant sur le plan quantitatif que qualitatif, bien mieux placée pour montrer sa puissance qu’elle ne l’était il y a à peine dix ans. Survivre en période d’incertitude : l’assertivité chinoise et Trump 2.0 Taïwan entre désormais dans une nouvelle ère marquée par une grande incertitude. Depuis mai 2024, le pays a un nouveau président, William Lai Ching-te, du DPP, qui a succédé à Tsai après deux mandats (en vertu de la Constitution de la République de Chine, un président ne peut exercer plus de deux mandats consécutifs). Considéré comme un défenseur plus virulent et combatif de l’indépendance de Taïwan que son prédécesseur, plus prudent, M. Lai fait face à une forte opposition au Parlement, où le DPP a perdu sa majorité de sièges lors des élections de 2024, tenues en même temps que le scrutin qui l’a porté au pouvoir. Menée par le KMT et le Parti populaire de Taïwan (TPP), une formation plus modeste, l’opposition a utilisé ses nouveaux pouvoirs pour déstabiliser le budget du gouvernement central, édulcorer les lois sur la sécurité nationale adoptées sous l’administration Tsai dans un contexte d’ingérence croissante du PCC, et réduire un budget spécial de défense de 1,25 billion de NT$ (54,8 milliards de dollars canadiens) destiné à renforcer la capacité de Taïwan à dissuader une attaque de la Chine. Les députés de l’opposition ont également sapé les efforts du gouvernement visant à acquérir et à développer un grand nombre de véhicules sans pilote. Bien que certaines figures de l’opposition au Yuan législatif, le parlement taïwanais, agissent peut-être de mauvaise foi ou en tant que mandataires de la Chine, la plupart n’en font rien et se contentent ostensiblement de suivre les directives de leur parti, justifiant leurs actions comme relevant de la politique habituelle dans un contexte politique fortement polarisé. Et pourtant, quelles que soient leurs motivations, ce mélange d’opposition déloyale et semi-loyale a le même effet : un pays qui semble divisé en deux, désuni et qui peine à se rassembler pour se défendre contre une agression extérieure. Si elle se prolonge sur une longue période, une telle désunion risque également d’envoyer un mauvais signal aux alliés de Taïwan, au premier rang desquels les États-Unis, dont l’administration actuelle observe attentivement la situation pour déterminer si ses partenaires — en particulier les pays qui dépendent des États-Unis pour leur sécurité — sont suffisamment sérieux et déterminés à assurer leur propre défense nationale (Le budget spécial de défense du président Lai vise, entre autres, à porter les dépenses de défense de Taïwan à 5 % du PIB, ce qui est considéré comme le « minimum » attendu par les responsables de l’administration Trump). La Chine a saisi cette occasion pour accroître de manière marquée ses activités militaires et celles menées dans la « zone grise » autour de Taïwan. La deuxième source d’incertitude à laquelle Taïwan est confrontée est la nature du gouvernement actuel à Washington. Bien que la première administration Trump ait été, dans l’ensemble, bénéfique pour Taïwan et ait conduit à un engagement sans précédent entre les deux parties (dont la plupart s’est poursuivi sous l’administration Biden), Trump 2.0 est une tout autre affaire. D’une part, le revirement apparent de l’administration Trump contre la démocratie et le libéralisme place Taïwan dans une position difficile, car une grande partie du discours sur la nécessité de défendre Taïwan s’est historiquement articulée sur le fait qu’il s’agit d’une démocratie comme la nôtre. Ainsi, afin de gagner en influence auprès de l’administration Trump imprévisible et de maintenir sa valeur aux yeux des États-Unis, Taipei a dû réorienter ses priorités vers d’autres domaines. Les semi-conducteurs, ainsi que les investissements de plusieurs milliards de dollars que des entreprises taïwanaises comme TSMC ont réalisés aux États-Unis, constituent un domaine qui a donné à Taïwan un levier d’influence, tout comme le rôle que Taïwan peut jouer dans le maintien de la paix et de la stabilité dans la région, principalement au sein de la première chaîne d’îles. Et pourtant, la capacité de Taïwan à influencer les décideurs à Washington — et plus précisément le président Trump lui-même — est quelque peu limitée. Trump 2.0 est plus imprévisible, plus axé sur les transactions, et beaucoup moins contraint par le droit international et les règles établies de longue date de la politique internationale. De plus, le président Trump semble avoir laissé entendre qu’il serait disposé à accorder aux grandes puissances une plus grande liberté au sein de leurs « sphères d’influence » légitimes — une division du monde dans laquelle les petites puissances n’auraient que peu, voire aucune voix au chapitre quant à leur destin. Alors que Trump semble se concentrer ostensiblement sur la sécurisation de l’hémisphère occidental, il n’est pas impossible que, dans le cadre d’un grand compromis, Washington décide d’abandonner d’autres régions du monde à des grandes puissances telles que la Russie et la Chine. Un tel avenir n’est en aucun cas prédéterminé, et le président Trump a démontré à maintes reprises qu’il pouvait changer d’avis. (Tous les regards sont donc tournés vers sa prochaine rencontre avec Xi Jinping à Pékin en septembre.) Mais la perspective d’un tel abandon est un scénario qui préoccupe grandement Taipei, Tokyo, Manille et Séoul, car elle les expose à la possibilité de devoir un jour affronter seules la puissance hégémonique régionale, la Chine, sans pouvoir compter sur le parapluie de sécurité américain. Une telle perspective ne doit pas être prise à la légère, ni considérée comme le caprice d’un dirigeant atypique : elle fait écho à une lassitude croissante au sein de l’opinion publique américaine et à la perception, justifiée ou non, que l’Occident (et certains alliés en Asie) profite sans contrepartie de la générosité des États-Unis depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le Congrès américain demeure un allié indéfectible de Taïwan, mais les efforts continus de l’administration Trump pour conférer au pouvoir exécutif des pouvoirs sans précédent — et apparemment sans contrôle — signifient que la capacité du Congrès à influencer l’élaboration des politiques en matière de guerre et de paix pourrait se voir davantage restreinte. Le renouvellement générationnel au sein des partis républicain et démocrate soulève également des incertitudes quant au maintien de l’engagement envers Taïwan, car les nouveaux députés et députées pourraient avoir d’autres priorités. Tout cela se produit alors que certains signes indiquent que des régimes révisionnistes et autoritaires, menés par Moscou et Pékin, collaborent plus étroitement pour remettre en cause l’ordre mondial et mettre à rude épreuve l’alliance militaire dirigée par les États-Unis (une alliance qui, de surcroît, est elle-même attaquée par l’administration Trump). La Chine et la Russie pourraient chercher à détourner l’attention des États-Unis – ou d’alliances de sécurité telles que l’OTAN – et à les submerger en déclenchant simultanément diverses situations d’urgence, ce qui pourrait affaiblir la capacité de réaction de l’alliance. Par exemple, la Russie et la Chine semblent approfondir leur coopération militaire en Asie du Nord-Est, la Corée du Nord agissant comme un multiplicateur de force pour compliquer la capacité des États-Unis, du Japon et peut-être de la Corée du Sud à réagir à une situation d’urgence à Taïwan. La Chine approvisionne l’industrie de l’armement russe pour soutenir sa guerre contre l’Ukraine, tandis que la Corée du Nord a fourni du matériel et des soldats à l’armée russe. Taïwan et ses alliés doivent donc suivre de près les développements mondiaux qui risquent de mobiliser des ressources habituellement déployées dans la région indopacifique, car cela réduirait la capacité de l’alliance à maintenir une dissuasion face à l’APL. Une série de situations d’urgence majeures en Europe, en Amérique latine, au Moyen-Orient ou en Asie, surtout si elles devaient se produire simultanément, pourrait offrir à la Chine une occasion d’utiliser la force contre Taïwan. Déjà, la guerre menée par les États-Unis et Israël contre l’Iran a forcé les forces armées américaines à transférer des capacités du théâtre indopacifique vers le Moyen-Orient. Les options du Canada : préparation, multilatéralisme et dissuasion Taïwan est le 15e partenaire commercial du Canada à l’échelle mondiale et le 6e dans la région indopacifique. Le volume total des échanges bilatéraux est estimé à 6 milliards de dollars canadiens. Taïwan est la 21e économie mondiale en termes de PIB nominal, et son marché boursier est désormais le cinquième plus important au monde. Ces chiffres ne reflètent toutefois pas pleinement l’exposition du Canada au « point d’étranglement » taïwanais. À l’instar du reste du monde, l’économie canadienne dépend fortement du commerce maritime qui transite par le détroit de Taïwan, ainsi que des semi-conducteurs de pointe et des industries connexes qui gravitent autour de Taïwan. Par conséquent, la stratégie indopacifique d’Ottawa ne peut se permettre de rester passive face à la question de Taïwan. De concert avec d’autres partenaires, le Canada doit se doter des moyens et des politiques qui lui permettront de se préparer à faire face à diverses situations d’urgence dans le détroit de Taïwan, parmi lesquelles une quarantaine ou un blocus maritime de Taïwan — les scénarios les plus probables à l’heure actuelle et que l’APL et la GCC ont mis en scène ces dernières années — ainsi que des conflits armés majeurs tels qu’une invasion de Taïwan, des frappes de décapitation ou des opérations militaires limitées. Cette trousse d’outils stratégiques doit inclure les moyens de surveiller les indicateurs d’une crise imminente ainsi que les mesures nécessaires pour atténuer les effets néfastes d’une situation d’urgence sur l’économie canadienne et sa sécurité nationale (réacheminement du fret, assurance, évacuation de jusqu’à 60 000 citoyens canadiens, etc.). Il doit disposer de la capacité d’analyse nécessaire pour cerner les voies d’escalade, la durée potentielle d’une quarantaine ou d’un blocus, les secteurs de l’économie canadienne qui seraient les plus touchés par de tels scénarios, tout en identifiant les lacunes dans ses capacités diplomatiques et de sécurité actuellement déployées dans la région. Rien de tout cela ne doit aller à l’encontre de la politique de « une seule Chine » d’Ottawa[3] bien qu’un tel exercice doive néanmoins cerner le risque de représailles de la part de Pékin en réponse à la position du Canada en cas de crise. Conscient de ses ressources limitées dans la région, il est également clair que le Canada tirerait grandement profit de jouer un rôle dans un contexte multilatéral, qui devrait par ailleurs revêtir un caractère permanent plutôt qu’ad hoc ou réactif. La stratégie indopacifique du Canada devrait également viser à renforcer le rôle du pays dans la prévention des conflits et la dissuasion dans le détroit de Taïwan et dans l’ensemble de la région, en signalant à Pékin que tout aventurisme et toute tentative de modifier le statu quo par la force déclencheraient une riposte de la part d’une coalition de grandes économies (p. ex., le G7). De plus, le Canada, de concert avec des alliés partageant les mêmes vues, devrait être prêt à consentir des investissements accrus, tant sur le plan diplomatique que militaire, et à renforcer sa présence dans la région en réponse aux doutes grandissants quant au maintien des engagements des États-Unis en tant que garant de la stabilité dans l’Indopacifique. Même si un retrait n’était que théorique et ne se concrétisait pas, l’alliance tirerait profit d’une capacité accrue dans la région. La stratégie d’Ottawa doit également tenir compte du fait que l’annexion de Taïwan par la République populaire de Chine, surtout si elle était réalisée par la force et la coercition, entraînerait inévitablement un environnement géopolitique moins prévisible et plus hostile. Abandonner Taïwan à son sort enverrait un mauvais signal aux puissances révisionnistes en renforçant l’impression que la communauté des démocraties est incapable, ou peu disposée, à tenir bon. Des pays comme la Russie s’en trouveraient enhardis et pourraient en conclure que l’expansionnisme dans d’autres régions du monde — chez les alliés de l’OTAN en Europe ou dans l’Arctique — passerait également sans opposition. Dans ce contexte, le Canada a tout intérêt à veiller à ce que, de concert avec ses alliés, il fasse le nécessaire pour maintenir le statu quo mondial tout en continuant de renforcer ses institutions démocratiques contre l’ingérence autoritaire étrangère, un domaine dans lequel le Canada peut tirer de précieuses leçons de l’expérience même de Taïwan. [1] Une majorité écrasante de la population taïwanaise est favorable au « statu quo », c’est-à-dire à l’indépendance de facto, de la République de Chine (Taïwan). Le soutien à la réunification avec la République populaire de Chine (RPC) se situe à un faible pourcentage à un chiffre, et parmi ces partisans, un nombre important insiste sur le fait que la réunification ne pourra avoir lieu qu’une fois que la RPC se sera démocratisée. Il est également important de noter que tant les partisans de l’indépendance de jure de Taïwan (taidu) que ceux qui soutiennent le maintien d’une République de Chine souveraine (huadu), nom officiel de Taïwan, s’accordent à s’opposer à une domination par la RPC. Ainsi, on peut simultanément s’opposer à une déclaration d’indépendance de Taïwan (à la suite de laquelle la République de Chine cesserait d’exister) et à l’annexion par la République populaire de Chine; en d’autres termes, l’opposition à l’indépendance de Taïwan ne va pas nécessairement de pair avec le soutien à la réunification avec la République populaire de Chine. [2] Le nombre de navires chinois repérés autour de l’île principale de Taïwan (à l’exclusion de ses îles périphériques) a atteint un niveau record de 244 en juillet 2026, soit une moyenne de près de huit par jour. Ce chiffre n’inclut pas les déploiements de la Marine de l’Armée populaire de libération (APL) dans la région. Entre mai 2026 et la rédaction du présent document en septembre 2026, plus de 1 300 navires chinois opéraient autour de l’île principale de Taïwan et de ses îles périphériques. [3] À ne pas confondre avec le principe de « Chine unique » de Beijing. À propos de l'auteur J. Michael Cole est chercheur principal non-résident basé à Taipei auprès du Global Taiwan Institute à Washington, D.C., de l’Institut Macdonald-Laurier à Ottawa, au Canada, et du Taiwan Research Hub de l’Université de Nottingham au Royaume-Uni. Il est également chercheur associé à la Fondation Prospect à Taipei, à Taïwan. Il a auparavant occupé le poste de conseiller principal en matière de lutte contre l’influence autoritaire étrangère au sein de l’Institut républicain international. Son dernier ouvrage, The Taiwan Tinderbox: The Island-Nation at the Center of the New Cold War, a été publié par Polity en septembre 2025. Avant de s’installer à Taïwan en 2005, il était analyste du renseignement au Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité, à Ottawa, au Canada. Il est titulaire d’une maîtrise en études de guerre du Collège militaire royal du Canada. Crédit image: modifié de Al Jazeera English via Flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0. ## Les travailleurs humanitaires locaux : Les pièces souvent négligées du casse-tête humanitaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/les-travailleurs-humanitaires-locaux-les-pieces-souvent-negligees-du-casse-tete-humanitaire/ Modified: 2026-02-24 > Ce point chaud met en lumière le rôle important et sous-étudié des travailleurs humanitaires locaux au sein des organisations d'aide. La plupart des programmes humanitaires font appel à des consultants à différents stades de leur mise en œuvre pour évaluer l'efficacité de la conception et de la mise en œuvre du programme. En principe, ces rapports de consultants sont des documents cruciaux pour le développement des connaissances – bien qu'en réalité, ils puissent être très contestés par les professionnels humanitaires qui vivent la réalité de la politique humanitaire au quotidien. Il ne fait aucun doute que les consultants en aide humanitaire sont importants pour leur expertise précieuse dont les professionnels de l’aide sont en général dépourvus. Cette expertise leur permet de traduire les connaissances relatives à un programme d'aide en un langage écrit accessible à un public plus large, tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur du secteur humanitaire. Ils possèdent en effet des compétences uniques en matière d'investigation, d'analyse et d’enquête qui permettent aux organisations d'aide de retenir les leçons opérationnelles qu'elles ont apprises dans des rapports structurés et organisés. Ces rapports peuvent être utilisés à long terme et sont destinés à des publics tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur du secteur de l'aide humanitaire. Le paradoxe cependant, est que l'écrasante majorité des rapports de consultation sur l'aide ont été rédigés par des consultants expatriés qui, malgré le fait qu'ils soient incontestablement bien informés, viennent néanmoins de l'extérieur de l'environnement de crise. Ils ne possèdent pas un type d'information crucial, à savoir des connaissances détaillées, continues et actualisées sur les défis opérationnels et les réussites des programmes d'aide depuis leur conception initiale. En revanche, les travailleurs humanitaires locaux – qui ont acquis des années d'expérience de première ligne dans la mise en œuvre de leurs programmes – possèdent ces connaissances. En conséquence, un consultant doit faire preuve d'une humilité et d'une volonté exceptionnelles pour apprendre des travailleurs humanitaires locaux afin de produire un rapport utile. La déconnexion des expatriés En général, la plupart des professionnels humanitaires expatriés ont peu de chances de rester au sein d’une même mission pendant une longue période. Leurs contrats sont souvent de courte durée, principalement de quelques mois à un an, ce qui signifie que le roulement parmi les travailleurs humanitaires expatriés est fréquent. Il n'est pas rare que les professionnels expatriés arrivent dans un pays ou un programme où ils ne sont pas familiers avec les dimensions géographiques, sociales et politiques locales. De même, les consultants expatriés restent sur le terrain pendant une courte période (de quelques semaines à quelques mois) et recueillent des informations par le biais d'un programme de visites très serré, se précipitant dans différents bureaux de terrain avant de repartir rapidement pour produire leur rapport ailleurs. Dans ce laps de temps limité, ils doivent consacrer l'essentiel de leur présence à collaborer et à socialiser avec les travailleurs humanitaires locaux afin de bien remplir leur propre fonction professionnelle. Néanmoins, ce n'est souvent pas le cas. Séverine Autesserre a depuis longtemps souligné l'isolement des intervenants expatriés dans les conflits qui les éloigne de leurs homologues locaux. Dans Peaceland, par exemple, elle détaille l'existence d'un « cercle d'intervenants » dans les environnements conflictuels réservé aux expatriés et à « une poignée d'élites locales – généralement les proches des intervenants, et parfois de riches hommes d'affaires, des employés d'importantes agences internationales ou des dirigeants d'ONG locales de premier plan ». Ces « cercles » sont rarement accessibles à la classe ouvrière locale, y compris aux travailleurs humanitaires locaux. Par conséquent, si le réseau local d'un consultant en matière d'aide réside principalement dans ce « cercle », le document analytique qu'il produit risque de ne pas contenir les précieuses informations spécifiques au contexte fournies par les membres du personnel local. Cette logique particulière peut également être appliquée pour comprendre les positions d'autres professionnels humanitaires expatriés travaillant dans différentes communautés locales en crise. Dans son plus récent ouvrage, The Frontlines of Peace, Autesserre approfondit cette question en la situant dans le contexte spécifique de la consolidation de la paix, en notant que souvent, « en ce qui concerne les promotions, la plupart des organismes de maintien de la paix récompensent le nombre de missions accomplies dans différents pays plutôt que le temps passé dans une région particulière ». En outre, elle observe également que de nombreux « intervenants discréditent les étrangers qui restent trop longtemps dans un endroit spécifique... en les accusant d'être ‘devenus natifs’ : ils seraient trop imprégnés par la culture locale et trop proches des populations hôtes pour mener à bien leur mission ». Cet état d'esprit a longtemps encouragé le rejet injustifié de l'expertise locale et la préférence croissante pour les connaissances thématiques et hiérarchisées – préférées pour leur caractère généralisable et leur simplicité dans des environnements de crise qui sont, au contraire, uniques et complexes. Il est également très vraisemblable que la plupart des expatriés soient arrivés sur le terrain sans aucune connaissance locale au moins une fois au cours de leur carrière professionnelle. Certains professionnels de l'humanitaire expatriés révèlent cette réalité dans des mémoires relatant leur expérience de terrain. Dans Emergency Sex, Heidi Postlewait affirme qu'elle est arrivée à son poste de secrétaire pour la mission des Nations Unies au Cambodge alors qu'elle « ne savait même pas où se trouvait le Cambodge ». Leanne Olson, dans A Cruel Paradise, a admis qu'elle « n'avait pas la moindre idée de ce qui se passait en Bosnie » lorsqu'elle est y arrivée pour son poste à Médecins sans frontières. Ceci peut naturellement vite évoluer, mais cela dépend de la manière avec laquelle les professionnels expatriés tendent à se référer ou non aux connaissances du personnel local à court terme, mais également de leur capacité à intégrer la vie locale pour effectuer leurs propres observations à long terme. Le personnel local négligé En fait, les organisations d'aide humanitaire et de développement sont conscientes de l'importance de leur personnel local. Après tout, ils connaissent les routes, les coutumes communautaires, la langue et les contextes politiques nationaux dans lesquels les organisations doivent naviguer. Comme le suggère Elizabeth Harrison, les connaissances locales (et non le personnel local) apparaissent de plus en plus dans les récits opérationnels de la plupart des programmes menés dans des environnements de crise. Cependant, ce narratif perpétue la justification voulant que le personnel local occupe des postes non dirigeants, de type soutien, se concentrant sur la coordination et la mise en œuvre des décisions du programme prises par les dirigeants expatriés. Autesserre suggère à juste titre que dans le panorama actuel de la consolidation de la paix, les professionnels expatriés continuent de « faire la pluie et le beau temps » et ce, alors qu'ils « interagissent en grande partie avec les dirigeants politiques et militaires, s'appuient sur une expertise et des ressources externes, utilisent le même type de solutions partout dans le monde... ne s'immergent pas dans les problèmes locaux complexes, ne développent pas une connaissance approfondie de l'histoire, de la politique et des cultures des pays dans lesquels ils travaillent ». Dans le même temps, Silke Roth note que de nombreux professionnels locaux devraient « former régulièrement de nouveaux membres au sein de leurs équipes internationales », ce qui est préoccupant si l'on tient compte de l'observation de Shevchenko et Fox selon laquelle les travailleurs humanitaires locaux eux-mêmes ont rarement accès aux possibilités de promotion à des postes de direction que le personnel expatrié occupe souvent. En fait, Ong et Combinido indiquent que même si les professionnels locaux sont dotés de compétences intellectuelles leur permettant de naviguer dans des circonstances et des conditions de vie nouvelles et inconnues, ils ont toujours « une mobilité professionnelle limitée au sein de l'organisation mondiale ». À bien des égards, bien que les professionnels locaux soient appréciés pour les connaissances qu'ils possèdent sur le terrain, on ne leur fait pas nécessairement confiance pour prendre des décisions administratives basées sur leurs connaissances locales en vue d'ancrer les trajectoires futures de leurs organisations sur le terrain. Crédit : Islamic Relief Worldwide The Frontlines of Peace est significatif pour la narration vive et pleine d'espoir d'Autesserre qui rappelle aux lecteurs que le maintien de la paix a toujours été un effort construit pierre par pierre, soutenu par des personnes de tous horizons qui partagent la même aspiration à la paix quotidienne. Si la planification, les structures et la gestion des choses ont fait couler beaucoup d'encre, ceci est moins le cas de la gestion des personnes ou encore du type d'acteurs au centre de la consolidation de la paix et de l'opérationnalisation de l'aide humanitaire. En fait, la plupart des ouvrages pertinents disponibles comportent, d'une manière ou d'une autre, cette caractéristique particulière, qui peut potentiellement être une raison principale de leur impopularité auprès des travailleurs humanitaires locaux. En se concentrant sur de vastes structures et systèmes, nous avons peut-être présumé que les organisations d'aide humanitaire étaient des acteurs unitaires au sein d'une structure plus large, considérant les travailleurs humanitaires comme des sources d'expertise humaine presque remplaçables. Cependant, en réalité, les travailleurs humanitaires locaux sont des individus uniques avec leurs propres noms, histoires et potentiels qui ont longtemps été négligés et qui, plus important encore, ont une connaissance et des savoir-faire inégalés pour favoriser la paix dans leurs communautés d'origine. Alors que les fournisseurs d'aide sont souvent considérés comme jouissant d'un privilège relatif par rapport aux bénéficiaires de l'aide, cette perception est remise en question par la présence des professionnels locaux. Dans une certaine mesure, ils sont également victimes des crises mêmes qu'ils s'efforcent de résoudre (ce qui les place également dans une position unique pour comprendre le conflit dans lequel ils vivent). Dans la réalité complexe des conflits, alors que nous nous efforçons de comprendre la vulnérabilité des communautés locales face aux difficultés et de concevoir la meilleure façon de les atteindre, nous avons peut-être oublié que les travailleurs humanitaires locaux – qui vivent au quotidien la nécessité de fournir une assistance vitale aux communautés en crise – sont également vulnérables à leur manière. Stoddard, Harmer et Haver soulignent que les professionnels locaux de l'humanitaire, bien qu'ils assument une part importante des tâches opérationnelles et de mise en œuvre des programmes d'aide, sont légèrement moins protégés et indemnisés que leurs homologues internationaux. En outre, Jackson et Zyck constatent qu'ils reçoivent également moins de formation, de bénéfices de moyens de subsistance, de dispositions de sécurité et de soutien psychosocial que leurs collègues expatriés. Par exemple, Sally Mohsen, une professionnelle locale qui avait travaillé pour Save the Children en Égypte pendant le printemps arabe, a raconté comment les membres du personnel local de l'agence ont été exposés à d'importantes menaces de sécurité du fait qu'ils ne pouvaient pas voyager avec les véhicules appartenant à l'ONG et qu'on leur demandait d'utiliser les transports publics à la place. La politique logistique de l'époque était justifiée par des limitations de financement, mais Mohsen a précisé que « lorsqu'un membre du personnel international voyageait, l'organisation lui attribuait une voiture ». Cette réalité est encore démontrée par l'édition 2019 du Rapport sur la sécurité des travailleurs humanitaires produit par Humanitarian Outcomes, indiquant qu'une écrasante majorité des décès de travailleurs humanitaires au cours de la dernière décennie sont des employés locaux. Vers une approche de l'aide humanitaire plus locale et axée sur les personnes John F. Mitchell soutient à juste titre que l'humanitarisme est plus politique que jamais, ce qui rend les travailleurs humanitaires de plus en plus vulnérables aux attaques ciblées des acteurs politiques locaux dans les environnements conflictuels. Cela signifie qu'il ne suffit pas d'examiner la manière dont les programmes sont conçus. À l'avenir, alors que nous continuons à tirer les leçons des nouveaux défis, problèmes et échecs, il serait peut-être utile de nous demander si les travailleurs humanitaires locaux ont été bien soutenus. Après des années de réflexion sur la structure de l'humanitarisme et du maintien de la paix en général, avons-nous vraiment reconnu les capacités, les connaissances et le potentiel des professionnels locaux ? Il existe plusieurs voies par lesquelles les organismes d'aide, ainsi que les institutions donatrices canadiennes, peuvent mieux impliquer les travailleurs humanitaires locaux dans leurs futurs efforts humanitaires. Pour les agences d'aide internationale, il peut être avantageux de : Encourager la prise de décision au niveau local. Réduire la fréquence des rapports du bas vers le haut et accepter que le personnel local puisse faire plus que mettre en œuvre et soutenir des programmes d'aide. Adoptez une formation ad hoc et à long terme pour les membres du personnel local sur la manière d'analyser les informations locales en vue d'une action conséquente, de s'engager avec les communautés et les pairs, et de diriger des équipes efficaces. Donner la priorité au maintien en poste du personnel local, en particulier celui affecté aux bureaux et stations des communautés rurales et éloignées. Les membres du personnel local sont souvent recrutés en fonction de la disponibilité des fonds pour des programmes spécifiques – ce qui signifie que lorsqu'un certain programme d'aide est terminé, le personnel local concerné peut être licencié. Au lieu de recruter des professionnels locaux pour les besoins des programmes à venir, les agences d'aide devraient explorer comment les nouveaux programmes peuvent être conçus pour utiliser les compétences des membres du personnel local existant. Pour le Canada, et en particulier pour les institutions donatrices telles que l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), il est important de : Écouter les travailleurs humanitaires locaux. Le Canada peut bénéficier de la consultation des travailleurs humanitaires locaux dans le processus d'affectation des fonds. L'intégration des opinions des travailleurs humanitaires locaux aidera le Canada à soutenir les initiatives d'aide qui aident davantage les communautés en crise. L'aide humanitaire fonctionne mieux lorsqu'elle répond aux besoins les plus urgents de ses bénéficiaires. Investir dans les travailleurs humanitaires locaux. Le Canada devrait envisager non seulement de financer des programmes d'aide, mais aussi de former et de protéger les professionnels de l'aide qui les mettront en œuvre. Les stratégies de programmation de l'aide sont robustes dans le secteur – bien qu'il y ait encore des leçons à tirer sur la planification de l'aide, il est temps d'aider également les travailleurs humanitaires locaux qui fourniront l'aide sur les lignes de front des conflits. En fin de compte, alors que nous nous concentrons tous sur ce que nous avons supposé être généralisable – la conception d'un programme, les structures de l'insécurité, les causes du conflit – il peut être très facile d'oublier que ces éléments sont intrinsèquement centrés sur les personnes, et que leur impact ultime concerne la vie quotidienne des gens. Il est important de mieux comprendre ceux qui s'efforcent d'apporter de l'aide et de maintenir la paix sur les lignes de front des conflits – qui ils sont, ce qu'ils perçoivent, et comment ils pensent pouvoir faire la différence – afin de trouver de nouvelles voies pour l'aide humanitaire dans sa réalité politisée. Les travailleurs humanitaires locaux, dans ce cas, peuvent être la boussole dont nous avons besoin. ## Loi agents étrangers en Géorgie : la Russie avance ses pions URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/loi-agents-etrangers-en-georgie-la-russie-avance-ses-pions/ Modified: 2024-10-07 La loi agents étrangers, sous la houlette de Bidzina Ivanichvili et des Russes En mai dernier, le gouvernement dirigé par le parti Rêve géorgien a décrété que les organisations non-gouvernementales dont le financement était à plus de 20% d’origine étrangère devaient faire l’objet d’une inscription au registre des « agents étrangers », avant d’être interdits. Cela signifie que de nombreuses organisations américaines ou européennes promouvant la démocratie en Géorgie sont menacées : le German Marshall Fund, le Forum for Civil Society, l’Open Society Foundation etc. Pour comprendre cette loi, qui a conduit à de nombreuses manifestations dans le pays, et même au veto posé par la Présidente Salomé Zourabichvili, nous devons revenir à la Révolution des Roses en 2003. Alors qu’Édouard Chevardnadze, ancien chef de la diplomatie soviétique, était président de la République de Géorgie, un grand mouvement populaire mené par l’ancien ministre Mikheil Saakachvili s’est formé, reprochant à Chevardnadze de mener une politique corrompue, d’être trop proche de la Fédération de Russie et d’empêcher la progression des droits dans la société civile. À l’époque, le mouvement des Roses était très largement financé par ces fondations américaines et européennes. La démission de Chevardnadze avait conduit à une nouvelle élection présidentielle, remportée par Saakachvili et son parti, le Mouvement national uni. Saakachvili a mené une politique de rapprochement avec l’OTAN et l’Union européenne, au grand dam de Moscou. De plus, le soutien russe aux républiques séparatistes d’Abkhazie et d’Ossétie du Sud et la guerre en 2008 avaient définitivement acté le divorce entre la Russie et une partie de la population géorgienne, convaincue de la nécessité d’un rapprochement avec l’Occident. D’ailleurs, en 2013, lorsque Mikheil Saakachvili et son parti étaient à leur tour accusés de corruption et tombés en disgrâce, le parti Rêve géorgien, fondé par le milliardaire Bidzina Ivanichvili, ayant fait fortune en Russie principalement, continuait officiellement la politique extérieure tournée vers l’ouest. Rêve géorgien a longtemps défendu l’idée d’une adhésion à l’Union européenne, qui est une opinion très partagée en Géorgie. Cependant, avec la loi « agents étrangers », ce projet prend du plomb dans l’aile, et ce constat est aussi partagé par la Commission européenne. En dépit des manifestations pro-européennes et de l’avis de la Présidente Zourabichvili, la Géorgie finira par voir cette loi s’appliquer. La Cour constitutionnelle a été saisie, mais il est peu probable que celle-ci retoque la loi. Beaucoup d’observateurs voient cette loi comme l’influence du Kremlin, puisque de nombreuses lois similaires ont déjà été votées au Bélarus et en Russie. Aujourd’hui, seules 469 des 30 000 ONG (soit 1,5%) présentes en Géorgie ont répondu au critère des 20% de financement étranger. Le débat sur cette loi rythme la campagne pour les élections législatives du 26 octobre prochain. L’opposition souhaite abroger la loi, mais reste extrêmement divisée, tandis que Rêve géorgien a intégré le parti Pouvoir au peuple dans sa coalition. Or, ce parti fut créé en 2022 à partir d’une scission de Rêve géorgien farouchement opposée à l’aide étrangère, en particulier américaine. Cette scission avait provoqué la perte de majorité absolue de Rêve géorgien au parlement et a vraisemblablement mis la pression sur le parti de gouvernement pour faire adopter cette loi. En janvier 2024, Bidzina Ivanichvili, longtemps resté officiellement en retrait de la politique mais extrêmement puissant à travers sa fortune et le succès du parti qu’il avait créé, fait son retour en tant que président d’honneur de Rêve géorgien. Certains voient dans le changement de Premier ministre opéré le 29 janvier un retour au premier plan de l’oligarque, sans doute désireux de prendre ses distances avec l’Europe. En effet, la Commission européenne avait cité la « désoligarchisation » comme priorité pour la Géorgie en 2022. Ivanichvili est également l’objet de nombreuses critiques d’ONG internationales, ce qui peut expliquer son soutien à la loi sur les agents étrangers. Les USA, accusés de fomenter un coup d’État Les États-Unis, historiquement un partenaire important de la Géorgie, ont été accusés par le gouvernement de Tbilissi de vouloir le renverser, par deux fois. Ainsi, les manœuvres militaires des forces armées américaines qui devaient avoir lieu du 26 juillet au 6 août 2024 ont été annulées par le Pentagone, qui veut « réexaminer l’ensemble de sa coopération » avec la Géorgie. Après la loi sur les agents étrangers, ce coup sérieux porté aux relations américano-géorgiennes pourrait aussi renforcer l’influence de la Russie dans le Caucase. Historiquement, surtout depuis la révolution des Roses, Washington et Tbilissi ont partagé de très bonnes relations, avec des accords de coopération dans la politique de développement, mais aussi dans la coopération militaire, dans le cadre de la guerre au terrorisme international. La Géorgie a été l’un des soutiens les plus importants (dans le ratio par habitant) aux missions menées par les Américains en Irak et en Afghanistan, notamment via le « Georgia Train and Equip program » entre 2002 et 2004, suivi du « Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program » entre 2004 et 2007. Les États-Unis ont d’ailleurs historiquement soutenu l’adhésion de la Géorgie à l’OTAN. Après la guerre de 2008 contre la Russie, les États-Unis continuent de soutenir la Géorgie. Le tournant opéré par le parti Rêve géorgien depuis l’invasion de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014 n’a pas encore mené à un rétablissement plein et entier des relations russo-géorgiennes, mais nous pourrions tout de même affirmer qu’en l’état, la Géorgie est en voie de rapprochement avec Moscou. La Géorgie est en quelque sorte en voie de « désukrainisation », c’est-à-dire qu’elle est en train de retrouver des intérêts communs avec la Russie, et de retourner dans le giron géostratégique de celle-ci, en témoigne la position du gouvernement vis-à-vis de l’intégration européenne. Pour la Géorgie, la stratégie est très difficile à expliquer. Le divorce entre la population pro-européenne et le parti Rêve géorgien semble actée. Ainsi, pour se maintenir au pouvoir, c’est vraisemblablement la transition vers l’autoritarisme et, à moyen terme, le retour dans la russki mir (concept central du nationalisme russe qui désigne la sphère d’influence historique et culturelle de la Russie) qui seront privilégiés. Le rapprochement avec l’Union européenne, qui était allée jusqu’à la reconnaissance de la candidature géorgienne à l’adhésion le 14 décembre 2023, a été interrompu à la suite du Conseil européen de juin 2024, qui suspend la candidature géorgienne à cause de la loi sur les agents étrangers. La récente crise avec les États-Unis va dans ce sens également. Depuis février 2022, la Géorgie, par sa situation géographique et son histoire, attire l’attention de l’OTAN et de l’UE, et la société civile géorgienne s’est fait entendre en ce sens. Mais d’un autre côté, le tournant autoritaire du gouvernement de Tbilissi, son rapprochement avec Moscou et la crise récente avec les États-Unis disqualifient la coopération intergouvernementale, alors que le soutien à l’opposition est devenu quasiment impossible, à cause de la loi contre les agents étrangers. Même la supervision démocratique des élections s’annonce compliquée. Enfin, pour Moscou, la crise géorgienne en 2024 est l’occasion de refermer une parenthèse plus de vingt ans de relations froides, marquées par la guerre en 2008. Si Rêve géorgien se maintient au pouvoir, la loi sur les agents étrangers restera en vigueur. Ainsi, le principal obstacle au réarrimage de la Géorgie à l’espace stratégique russe disparaîtrait. ## Lutter contre les menaces visibles et invisibles de la Route de la soie numérique chinoise URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/lutter-contre-les-menaces-posees-par-la-route-de-la-soie-numerique-chinoise/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Lutter contre les menaces visibles et invisibles de la Route de la soie numérique chinoise (La Chine). Lors du 48e sommet du G7, les États... Introduction Lors du 48e sommet du G7, les États membres se sont de nouveau engagés à élaborer des approches afin de contester la domination géopolitique croissante de la Chine et les menaces à la cybersécurité qu’elle représente. L’initiative, intitulée Partenariat mondial pour les infrastructures, recadre et réoriente l’initiative Build Back Better World (B3W) qui avait été initiée par les États-Unis en 2021. Celle-ci visait à financer des projets technologiques et d’infrastructure dans les pays en développement afin de proposer une alternative à l’initiative chinoise de la Nouvelle route de la soie (One Belt One Road Initiative, BRI). Annoncée sous la présidence Xi en 2013, cette Nouvelle route de la soie (BRI) cherche à créer une ceinture maritime et une route terrestre qui traverse l’Eurasie et rejoint la Chine, et ce dans le cadre d’un plan plus large qui vise à renforcer la position de la Chine en tant que grande puissance. Sur le plan stratégique, l’initiative s’est efforcée de transformer les entreprises d’État en sociétés multinationales compétitives qui offrent des prêts généreux aux pays en développement pour mettre en place des projets d’infrastructures critiques. La BRI vise donc à créer une région économique intégrée qui place la Chine en son centre. La Chine tire ainsi parti de son influence géopolitique, en ciblant des zones commerciales internationales compétitives, comme la mer de Chine méridionale, pour défier la puissance occidentale et la domination transatlantique. Cette note politique examinera la BRI en mettant l’accent sur la façon dont la Route de la soie numérique (Digital Silk Road) chinoise représente une menace croissante pour la sécurité internationale, ce qui reste un sujet récurrent dans les discussions entre les pays du G7. La Route de la soie numérique (DSR ci-après) est le plus grand projet d’infrastructure au monde et cherche à aider les exportateurs chinois dans le secteur des technologies de l’information et des communications en investissant dans les réseaux technologiques des États bénéficiaires. Compte tenu des progrès sans précédent de la Chine en matière de technologie de surveillance et d’intelligence artificielle (IA ci-après), l’accent mis par la DSR sur les réseaux de télécommunications et sur les projets de villes intelligentes fait de la DSR un élément clé de la stratégie de la BRI qui vise à étendre l’influence de la Chine. À une époque où l’activité économique mondiale se numérise de plus en plus et où les normes internationales libérales sont progressivement remises en question par les tactiques autoritaires de renseignement de la Chine, le Canada doit s’efforcer de maintenir une économie technologique concurrentielle tout en défendant ses intérêts en matière de sécurité. Cette note politique examinera les efforts que la Chine déploie pour accroître sa puissance géopolitique grâce aux progrès de la DSR. Cette note recommandera au Canada d’encourager l’investissement dans des projets multilatéraux (comme le Partenariat mondial pour l’infrastructure) qui remettent en question l’emprise de la Chine sur l’infrastructure numérique et sur l’établissement de normes internationales. Le Canada devrait présenter ces projets comme des occasions d’investissement pour convaincre les pays et les sociétés sceptiques en Occident des avantages de ces projets en matière d’investissement. De plus, cette note recommandera au Canada de tirer parti de l’augmentation de ses investissements dans le NORAD pour financer des technologies de surveillance, comme des sous-marins (capable de naviguer sous la banquise du pôle Nord), et coordonner les efforts de cybersécurité de l’OTAN pour lutter contre les menaces chinoises à la cybersécurité. Contexte Avec l’ouverture de son économie au commerce extérieur et la mise en place de politiques libérales à la fin des années 1970, la Chine a connu une croissance économique rapide. La Chine est aujourd’hui le plus grand investisseur mondial et la deuxième plus grande économie mondiale après les États-Unis – elle devrait prendre la tête de ce classement d’ici 2030. À la suite d’un coûteux processus de réduction des droits de douane pour adhérer à l’OMC en 2001, la politique économique de la Chine s’est concentrée sur l’attraction des investissements directs à l’étranger en signant des traités bilatéraux d’investissement avec plus de cent pays. Au cœur de ce plan politique se trouve la BRI, qui rassemble actuellement les économies de plus de soixante-et-onze pays d’Eurasie, ce qui représente deux tiers du PIB mondial. La stratégie qui sous-tend la BRI chinoise est double : premièrement, elle cherche à étendre le contrôle économique de la Chine en créant de nouveaux marchés et en élargissant l’utilisation de la monnaie chinoise. Cette expansion aide la Chine à poursuivre sur sa lancée dans les domaines de création de zones de libre-échange et de coopération financière, tout en s’attaquant aux excédents de capitaux dans ses industries productives, comme l’acier et le ciment. Deuxièmement, la BRI s’efforce de remédier aux lacunes et aux vulnérabilités de la stratégie de politique étrangère de la Chine. En mettant en œuvre un réseau qui permet aux entreprises chinoises de contrôler la production et d’en maximiser l’efficacité, la Chine peut réinventer les voies d’approvisionnement énergétique de la région, améliorant ainsi l’accès aux régions clés en termes de ressources telles que l’Inde et l’Asie centrale. Par conséquent, la Chine peut utiliser son emprise sur les ressources pour mobiliser des soutiens dans les organes de gouvernance régionale et peut également utiliser les investissements économiques pour justifier une présence militaire accrue à l’étranger. L’industrie technologique chinoise a connu un essor fulgurant à la suite de l’annonce de la BRI en 2013. Étant donné que la DSR offre une option peu coûteuse pour mettre en place la technologie blockchain, la Chine a saisi cette opportunité pour mettre à profit son avantage concurrentiel dans le secteur de la technologie et ainsi réduire sa dépendance vis-à-vis de l’industrie américaine. Par conséquent, la DSR est devenue une priorité absolue dans les stratégies de politique économique et étrangère de la Chine. Pour accroître l’adhésion, la Chine a promu avec succès l’initiative lors de forums internationaux : rien qu’en 2019, les gouvernements du Japon, de la Nouvelle-Zélande, d’Israël, de l’Autriche, du Chili, du Brésil, de l’Indonésie et du Kenya ont annoncé des accords de coopération avec la Chine pour des projets de science-technologie, de technologies de l’information et de communication et de câbles à fibre optique. D’ici 2030, l’Asie aura besoin de 26 000 milliards de dollars US d’investissements dans les infrastructures pour que les pays en développement puissent participer avec succès à l’économie mondiale. L’ONU reconnaît que la BRI est nécessaire pour atteindre les objectifs environnementaux et de développement durable, car les prêts chinois sont l’une des seules options de financement qui soit suffisante pour permettre aux pays en développement d’améliorer leurs infrastructures technologiques. Néanmoins, Pékin profite de la décadence occidentale pour accroître sa puissance économique et militaire par le biais de la BRI, et les implications sécuritaires et idéologiques de cette tactique doivent être prises au sérieux. BRI : exemple parfait du piège de diplomatie de la dette ? La notion de diplomatie du piège de la dette est utilisée pour décrire des situations dans lesquelles des pays puissants cherchent à élargir et renforcer leur influence en proposant des prêts attrayants aux pays en développement les plus faibles, et ce même lorsqu’il est peu probable que ces pays soient en mesure de rembourser ces dettes. Des exemples comme le port de Hambantota au Sri Lanka sont souvent cités pour montrer que les motivations des entreprises chinoises ne sont pas altruistes. Les initiatives de la DSR, cependant, sont financées principalement par la Banque chinoise d'exportation et d'importation et la Banque chinoise de développement, qui, compte tenu de leur statut de banques politiques , n’accordent que peu d’importance à la génération de profits : dans plus de quatre-vingt-cinq cas, la Chine a restructuré ou annulé des dettes bancaires pour des projets de la BRI sans confisquer d’actifs. Ces exemples, combinés aux généreuses périodes de prêt offertes à de nombreux pays entreprenant des projets de la BRI, suggèrent que les accusations selon lesquelles la Chine commet une diplomatie du piège de la dette, au sens traditionnel du terme, peuvent être injustifiées. Cependant, même si la Chine ne crée pas explicitement de pièges de la dette par la saisie d’actifs, plus de 90% des contrats DSR analysés comprennent des clauses stipulant que la Chine peut, si elle le souhaite, « résilier le contrat [...] si un changement « significatif » dans les lois ou les politiques de l’État bénéficiaire a lieu », ce qui laisserait les pays emprunteurs dans une situation financière précaire. Par conséquent, les pays de la DSR sont souvent poussés à participer à des négociations bilatérales qui servent in fine les intérêts politiques de la Chine. La Chine a utilisé son influence économique pour encourager les pays de la DSR à soutenir et à défendre sa position dans les organes de gouvernance internationale, en particulier à propos de questions controversées comme la persécution des musulmans ouïghours par la Chine ou la militarisation de la mer de Chine méridionale. Ainsi, même en l’absence de saisie d’actifs, les objectifs derrière la BRI chinoise s’alignent sur la logique de la diplomatie du piège de la dette : prêter à des pays moins puissants pour qu’ils construisent des infrastructures dans des secteurs dominés par la Chine, comme la technologie et l’IA, afin de promouvoir l’expansionnisme et la domination chinoise. Des implications sécuritaires préoccupantes qui l’emportent sur le potentiel économique ? La DSR et son expansion rapide posent plusieurs problèmes de sécurité que les États libéraux, comme le Canada, ne peuvent pas se permettre d’ignorer. Ces risques incluent notamment la prolifération de tactiques autoritaires d’espionnage et d’acquisition de données, et le fait que la Chine refuse ou manipule l’accès à des technologies critiques. La DSR chinoise a été une solution attrayante pour les pays qui cherchent à accélérer le développement de leurs secteurs d’infrastructures technologiques tout en conservant leur autonomie. Compte tenu de la fragilité de la démocratie et de l’influence limitée de l’Occident dans la région cible de la DSR, l’expansion rapide de la DSR est susceptible de menacer la vision occidentale post-guerre froide d’une Eurasie ouverte et libérale. Premièrement, la diffusion de technologies de surveillance chinoises dans les pays de la BRI peut augmenter le nombre de répressions autoritaires et les renforcer. La Chine a déjà mis en œuvre, à l’intention des responsables et des entreprises technologiques des pays de la DSR, des programmes gouvernementaux de formation à la censure et à la surveillance de l’activité Internet en temps réel. Le lancement par la Chine de projets de villes intelligentes dans les pays de la DSR est encore plus troublant. Ces villes, sur la base du modèle chinois de surveillance d’État, utilisent des technologies invasives d’IA et de reconnaissance faciale pour surveiller et traiter les activités monétaires et de sécurité publiques. La construction de centrales qui produisent de l’énergie renouvelable est importante pour les efforts mondiaux qui visent à faire progresser les sources d’énergie durable ; cependant, le financement par la DSR des interconnexions de réseaux électriques permet à la Chine de contrôler une grande partie de l’allocation régionale d’électricité. Les interconnexions utilisées pour construire des réseaux électriques le long de la DSR dépendent de réseaux de communication exploités par des entreprises d’État, comme la State Grid Corporation of China, qui améliorent les capacités de renseignement et d’espionnage de l’État chinois. Ainsi, la Chine peut restreindre ou refuser l’accès à l’énergie aux pays de la DSR qui menacent ou s’opposent aux intérêts politiques ou économiques de la Chine. En outre, l’acquisition chinoise de données dans les pays de la BRI pourrait accélérer le développement par la Chine de technologies d’IA conçues pour exploiter des matériaux sensibles. Les actions de sabotage sont plus difficiles à détecter avec les réseaux logiciels émergents, ce qui pose des risques lorsque la Chine finance la construction de ports à l’étranger. Les systèmes de câbles sous-marins construits à proximité des installations militaires occidentales permettent un meilleur accès aux détails confidentiels des renseignements étrangers avec un faible risque de détection. Si les entreprises d’État chinoises accèdent à des ports stratégiques, comme Nanisivik au Canada, les intérêts des forces navales en Amérique du Nord et en Occident plus généralement pourraient être menacés. D’un point de vue économique, la construction de ports par la Chine, une construction qui repose sur des infrastructures de la BRI, pourrait également renforcer l’influence politique des sociétés de financement chinoises. La mise en œuvre de réseaux 5G permettant l’espionnage et les violations de données peut être utilisée par la Chine pour faire chanter les politiciens dans les pays de la DSR, ou pour contrôler les flux commerciaux et l’accès aux ports afin de punir les opposants politiques. Au Népal, par exemple, la Chine a bloqué le traitement des paiements des élites et des entreprises sur des plateformes comme Alipay et WeChat, utilisant sa domination dans le secteur de la blockchain pour interférer discrètement. En fin de compte, la DSR augmente la surveillance de l’État et la modération du contenu tout en laissant les pays de la DSR, tout comme ceux qui n’en font pas partie, soumis aux tactiques d’espionnage autocratiques de la Chine. L’évolution des normes internationales Les normes technologiques rassemblent l’ensemble des règlements et protocoles qui régissent une tâche technique reproductible. En règle générale, ces normes sont établies par des organismes mondiaux de normalisation tels que l’Organisation internationale de normalisation et sont approuvées par les pays membres des organisations. Cependant, les normes peuvent également être fixées en fonction du volume du marché : s’il domine le marché, un pays peut obtenir un soutien international implicite en faveur de ses normes nationales, y compris dans le cas d’un régime autoritaire répressif. Dans le cas de la Chine et de son utilisation des technologies d’IA et de 5G, cette voie alternative d’établissement de normes pourrait s’avérer efficace, en particulier compte tenu du manque actuel d’autres options disponibles et suffisantes de financement des infrastructures dans les pays de la DSR. L’imposition par la Chine de ses propres normes technologiques aux pays de la DSR contribue donc à la polarisation de l’ordre mondial : en confinant les pays de la DSR au sein de l’écosystème chinois et en les laissant soumis à la pression politique chinoise, la Chine rend la tâche de plus en plus difficile aux prêteurs traditionnels que sont le FMI et la Banque mondiale. Il est donc plus ardu de s’assurer que les projets technologiques respectent de meilleures pratiques dans des domaines tels que la protection de l’environnement et les droits de l’homme. Les politiques de prêt et les programmes d’ajustement structurel de la Banque mondiale et du FMI ont historiquement reflété les intérêts occidentaux et ont contribué à d’innombrables revers économiques et au maintien de la pauvreté dans les économies émergentes. Compte tenu du scepticisme généralisé parmi les pays du Sud à l’égard des projets dirigés par l’Occident, comme le Build Back Better World, il n’est pas surprenant que de nombreux dirigeants aient opté pour un financement par la DSR. Cependant, à l’instar de nombreux projets de financement historiques du FMI et de la Banque mondiale, les investissements de la DSR engendrent des clauses et des résultats néfastes. Par exemple, les conditions des prêts accordés aux pays pour des projets de la DSR sont rarement rendues publiques. Étant donné que les créanciers n’adhèrent pas officiellement au Club de Paris, les banques chinoises peuvent échapper à la pression qui les forcerait à fonctionner de manière transparente, ce qui se traduit par une fourniture de prêts illimitée. En outre, la nature complexe des projets d’IA et de surveillance accroît la dépendance à l’égard des entreprises technologiques chinoises privées, ce qui est préoccupant car celles-ci se préoccupent principalement de promouvoir leurs propres intérêts commerciaux en réduisant les coûts de transaction. De nombreux projets de DSR commencent donc sans évaluations adéquates des conséquences financières, environnementales ou sociales. Par conséquent, les États qui sont confrontés à des crises politiques et des crises de la dette peuvent se tourner vers la Chine pour un renflouement afin d’éviter les conditions strictes de réforme économique et politique généralement imposées par les organismes financiers conventionnels comme le FMI. Cependant, cela signifie également que les dirigeants qui commettent des violations des droits de l’homme ou sapent les principes démocratiques peuvent compter sur la Chine pour obtenir un soutien économique, et ce alors que les conditions de la Banque mondiale ou du FMI auraient pu avoir un effet dissuasif efficace. Ce fut le cas en Malaisie, où les prêts chinois émis pour des projets d’infrastructure de la DSR ont permis aux élites politiques de s’engager dans des pratiques de corruption et de recherche de rentes. Au Kenya, la corruption politique encouragée par les investissements de la DSR a exacerbé les tensions ethniques. Si la Chine réussit à utiliser la DSR pour passer du statut d’État «  soumis aux normes à celui qui fait les normes », les normes et pratiques existantes qui promeuvent un ordre mondial libéral sont, de fait, considérablement menacées. Le Partenariat mondial pour l’infrastructure vise à attirer quarante milliards de dollars de financement du secteur privé d’ici 2035 pour investir dans des projets conformes à des normes environnementales et d’équité élevées. Pourtant, au cours de sa première année, l’initiative B3W n’a connu que des progrès marginaux pour attirer les investissements du secteur privé. Les responsables de la Maison Blanche affirment que les initiatives du G7 « ne visent pas à faire choisir entre et la Chine », mais il est évident que leur objectif reste néanmoins de fournir une alternative aux investissements de la BRI pour contester la domination croissante de la Chine. Malheureusement, compte tenu du scepticisme occidental et de l’avance significative de la Chine en matière d’investissements infrastructurels dans la région, les initiatives d’investissement menées par l’Occident pourraient avoir des difficultés à concurrencer la BRI. Recommandations pour le Canada En répondant à la DSR, le Canada doit tenir compte de l’importance de la continuité de l’engagement économique avec la Chine, et ce même dans un contexte géopolitique polarisé. À l’heure actuelle, la Chine est le deuxième partenaire commercial du Canada, chaque pays détenant un solide avantage comparatif en termes de matières premières échangées. Bien que le scandale Huawei de 2019 ait mis fin aux négociations sur les accords de libre-échange, le commerce entre les deux pays demeure productif et la dénonciation pure et simple de la DSR risquerait de compromettre l’objectif de long terme du Canada qui est de diversifier les accords de libre-échange avec la Chine et les pays de l’ANASE. Afin de demeurer concurrentiel sur le plan économique et remettre en question la domination de la Chine sur le marché, le Canada peut adopter une approche collaborative à l’égard de la BRI en s’efforçant d’établir des partenariats économiques multilatéraux avec les pays des BRICS. Toutefois, en tant que puissance moyenne, le Canada doit faire preuve de prudence dans sa coopération future avec la Chine et ne peut pas laisser les avantages économiques de relations commerciales amicales l’emporter sur la nécessité de s’attaquer aux menaces à la sécurité que pose l’initiative de la DSR. Le Canada devrait donc accroître ses investissements dans les technologies émergentes et accroître sa participation aux institutions multilatérales qui s’efforcent de contester la domination chinoise dans les secteurs technologiques et dans l’établissement des normes. Premièrement, le Canada doit continuer de travailler aux côtés des États-Unis et d’autres pays du G7 pour défier l’emprise régionale de la Chine, en veillant à ce que le Partenariat mondial pour l’infrastructure soit stratégique et réaliste. L’initiative ne sera peut-être pas en mesure de concurrencer directement la BRI en termes de portée, mais elle peut intégrer d’une meilleure manière les entreprises nationales et les pays occidentaux sceptiques. En s’efforçant de convaincre les entreprises du secteur privé canadien de la possibilité d’obtenir des rendements sur investissement grâce à des projets à l’étranger, le Canada peut accroître le financement et l’aide en matière de cybersécurité aux pays qui s’engagent à poursuivre des projets dans le cadre du Partenariat. Cet arrangement pourrait également inclure la formation de diplomates cyber pour travailler avec des entreprises étrangères de technologies de l’information et des communications et des gouvernements afin de remédier aux vulnérabilités des réseaux. L’augmentation des investissements dans ces projets qui s’opposent à la domination technologique chinoise contribuera également à convaincre les pays en développement que le Partenariat mondial pour les infrastructures diffère des sources traditionnelles d’aide occidentale. En présentant les projets comme des occasions d’investissement (plutôt que comme des actions de bienfaisance) qui cherchent à « générer des rendements pour tous », le Canada peut aider à exposer les coûts et les risques du modèle chinois et démontrer qu’il existe une solution de rechange à la BRI qui soit plus saine et bien financée. Afin de défier la puissance croissante de la Chine dans le secteur technologique et dans l’établissement de normes internationales, le Canada devrait accroître de manière proactive ses investissements dans les entreprises technologiques nationales tout en élargissant sa participation aux institutions multilatérales. La technologie 5G continuera d’être un aspect important du système mondial des technologies de l’information et des communications, et le Canada doit avoir une industrie forte et une main-d’œuvre instruite pour être en mesure de concurrencer la croissance des entreprises chinoises. Bien que ces infrastructures présentent des risques inévitables, de meilleurs investissements dans les entreprises technologiques et dans la recherche renforceront l’avantage et la crédibilité du Canada dans la contestation de l’utilisation antidémocratique de ces innovations par la Chine. De même, en se joignant à des organismes multilatéraux comme la BAII (Banque asiatique d’investissement pour les infrastructures) qui s’associe déjà à la Banque mondiale et qui a l’habitude d’accueillir des expertises étrangères, le Canada peut mieux influencer les procédures d’établissement de normes pour le contrôle de la qualité et le financement dans les pays de la DSR. Le Canada devrait exiger que les projets chinois reflètent leur engagement proclamé envers une BRI verte et transparente en insistant sur les évaluations environnementales préalables aux projets et en énonçant des normes claires sur ce qu’un « projet vert de la BRI » doit impliquer. Enfin, le Canada devrait utiliser son engagement à investir 4,9 milliards de dollars pour la modernisation du NORAD au cours des six prochaines années pour améliorer les renseignements sur les activités de la Chine près des passages stratégiques du Canada. Lors des prochaines réunions de l’OTAN, le Canada devrait capitaliser sur cet engagement, ainsi que sur la prise de conscience accrue dans les pays démocratiques que « les risques posés par Moscou et Pékin ne peuvent plus être compartimentés », afin d’encourager les stratégies de défense collective contre les cyberattaques.  Pour affirmer sa souveraineté arctique et défendre sa position juridique dans les eaux arctiques, le Canada doit utiliser les investissements du NORAD pour soutenir financièrement et infrastructurellement son engagement à sécuriser et à militariser les routes maritimes du Nord. Compte tenu de l’expansion rapide de la DSR et de son engagement stratégique en Eurasie, rien ne garantit que les pays cibles choisiront le Partenariat mondial pour l’infrastructure ou d’autres initiatives occidentales pour contrer l’influence chinoise. Néanmoins, en affrontant les risques posés par la DSR et en offrant des solutions alternatives aux investissements de la BRI, le Canada peut signaler à la Chine que, même si le multilatéralisme décline et que les idéaux libéraux se fragmentent, le Canada ne restera pas passif face à la coercition économique et numérique. -Michelle Marcus ## Mackinder, les modèles et la nouvelle route de la soie : un outil fallacieux ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/mackinder-les-modeles-et-la-nouvelle-route-de-la-soie-un-outil-fallacieux/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Les travaux de Mackinder sur le Heartland (1904) semblent connaitre un vif regain d’intérêt depuis l’avènement en 2013 du projet chinois des nouvelles routes de la soie, ou Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Résumé Les travaux de Mackinder sur le Heartland (1904) semblent connaitre un vif regain d’intérêt depuis l’avènement en 2013 du projet chinois des nouvelles routes de la soie, ou Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Avec un important volet de liaisons continentales s’étendant à travers l’Asie centrale, la similitude entre la BRI et la théorie de Mackinder a intrigué nombre d’analystes, qui voient désormais dans le modèle du Heartland une grille de lecture pertinente pour appréhender la politique chinoise des nouvelles routes de la soie. Ce modèle conceptuel est-il réellement adapté? Il semble qu’il traduise mal la réalité. Introduction La modélisation géopolitique est un projet scientifique controversé. L'ambition de forger un modèle analytique global et permanent pour rendre compte de la relation entre l'espace et le pouvoir a donné lieu à des recherches importantes, notamment celles d'auteurs comme Spykman et Mackinder. Ces publications, en particulier l'introduction par Mackinder de la théorie du Heartland (1904), ont suscité beaucoup d'intérêt depuis l'avènement en 2013 de l'ambitieux projet chinois de la nouvelle route de la soie, ou la « Belt and Road Initiative » (BRI). En mettant l'accent sur les liens continentaux couvrant l'Asie centrale, la similitude entre la BRI et la théorie de Mackinder a frappé de nombreux analystes, qui voient maintenant dans le modèle du Heartland une grille d'analyse pertinente pour étudier la politique chinoise de la BRI. Mais ce modèle conceptuel est-il vraiment approprié ? Cet article décrit comment le modèle du Heartland est mobilisé dans le contexte du développement de la BRI chinoise, et souligne les risques scientifiques de s'appuyer sur des modèles analytiques au détriment de la recherche empirique. Pour une meilleure compréhension de la BRI, il semble plus pertinent de s'appuyer sur la recherche empirique. La théorie géopolitique de Mackinder et son modèle intemporel La théorie du Heartland est le nom donné à une analyse géopolitique globale de l'histoire du monde proposée par le géographe britannique Halford Mackinder (1861-1947). Mackinder s'est efforcé de comprendre les mécanismes de l'histoire du monde, en vue de définir des règles générales décrivant l'équilibre de la puissance. Dans l'article qu'il publia en 1904, Mackinder cherchait à dévoiler « a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations » (Mackinder, 1904, p.422). Mackinder associe une région déterminante, le Heartland, à l'orientation générale de l'histoire du monde. Cependant, l'existence d'une région pivot dans l'histoire politique du monde est invoquée mais jamais expliquée. En 1919, dans son livre Democratic Ideals and Reality, Mackinder a publié son célèbre prédicat: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island Who rules the World-Island commands the World. (Mackinder, 1919, p.194). Fig. 1. Localisation de la zone pivot, ou Heartland, dans la théorie de Mackinder (1904). Source: Mackinder (1904), p.435.   En 1943, Mackinder mobilise à nouveau sa théorie du Heartland. Il avertit que si, à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale alors en cours, Moscou pouvait étendre son territoire vers l'ouest, l'URSS deviendrait la « greatest land power on the globe » (Mackinder, 1943, p.601). Cependant, ce raisonnement prospectif n'est pas plus fondé sur une analyse géographique empirique que l'article de 1904 ou le livre de 1919. Un autre géographe et penseur précurseur de la géopolitique, Nicholas Spykman, est parvenu à une position diamétralement opposée en se basant sur le même type de raisonnement : une analyse historique, tout aussi eurocentrique que celle de Mackinder, qui l'a conduit à une conclusion finale affirmant le contraire du mantra de Mackinder : Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world (Spykman, 1944, p.43) Dans l'analyse de Spykman, c'est dans le Rimland[1] que se trouve la base du pouvoir, et non dans le Heartland. Mais ni Spykman ni Mackinder ne fournissent d'éléments de démonstration tangibles pour étayer leur thèse, et ne parviennent pas à établir un lien de causalité convaincant, une relation explicative entre les zones qu'ils ont étudiées et les événements historiques. L'avènement de la « Belt and Road Initiative » chinoise : la confirmation du modèle de Mackinder ? Au cours des dernières années, plusieurs auteurs ont établi un lien direct entre la théorie du Heartland de Mackinder et la BRI chinoise. La BRI articule le développement de grands corridors de développement (NDRC 2015), en s'appuyant sur l'exploitation des principaux chemins de fer transasiatiques qui rappellent l'analyse de Mackinder : « Trans-continental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land-power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heart-land of Euro-Asia. » (Mackinder, 1904, p.434). Ainsi, Leong Kok Wey (2019) note une forte corrélation entre la théorie de Mackinder et les développements maritimes et continentaux de la BRI. Invoquant cette théorie, Leong Kok Wey conclut que « If this geopolitical strategy is successful, China will ‘rule the Heartland’ and ‘command’ the seas » (p.3). Harper (2019) souligne le fait que l'expansion chinoise sur le continent asiatique bouleverse les intérêts des États-Unis : « One of the immediate implications of the BRI for the other external actors present in Eurasia is as a potential challenge… […]. It is this challenge that raises the spectre of Mackinder’s depictions of Eurasia with the BRI’s land corridors being a means to bypass maritime routes, which would adversely affect one of Washington’s primary strategic advantages in the form of its navy. » (p.117). Shukhla (2015) voit un parallèle direct entre les nombreux projets ferroviaires de la BRI en Asie centrale, au Moyen-Orient et en Asie du Sud-Est, et la théorie de Mackinder, dans laquelle l'expansion ferroviaire de la Russie est présentée comme une menace. Yu (2019, p.196) suggère que « The rivalry over the Eurasian Heartland marks a historical return of Mackinder’s Heartland theory. » Plusieurs auteurs établissent ainsi un parallèle entre les développements de la BRI et la théorie de Mackinder, voyant dans ce parallèle la preuve que la Chine nourrit une stratégie mondiale et cherche à bouleverser l'ordre mondial, un raisonnement basé en grande partie sur une adhésion sans réserve à la théorie de Mackinder. « From a purely geographic perspective, the trajectory of the planned land-based New Silk Road (the Belt) aligns to a significant degree with Mackinder’s Heartland theory » (Shortgen, 2018, p.27). « The Eurasian heartland remains the world’s geopolitical pivot, an idea as true a hundred years ago as it is today. The Eurasian heartland is the BRI’s birthplace, a necessary corridor for the Chinese-envisioned new continental economic reality » (Yu, 2019, p.10). La stratégie chinoise à l'égard du Moyen-Orient constitue « a global strategy designed to fulfill Chinese geopolitical ambitions. » Les autorités chinoises se seraient appuyées sur les déclarations de Mackinder : « Situé au cœur de ‘l’île-monde’ de Mackinder (1904), le Moyen-Orient représente un pivot pour l’établissement de la sphère d’influence chinoise, puisque ‘qui contrôle le cœur du monde commande à l’île du monde, qui contrôle l’île du monde commande au monde.’ » (Maury et al, 2019, p.61). D'autres auteurs voient dans les projets de la Chine la preuve de la validité de la théorie de Mackinder : « China’s cooperation with Russia, its Belt and Road Initiative, its growing presence in the Indian Ocean and Africa, and its burgeoning sea power are evidence of Mackinder’s prophetic powers » (Sempa, 2019). Un débat scientifique désuet Cependant, plusieurs auteurs ont déjà noté la simplicité scientifique des thèses de Mackinder et Spykman. Ó Tuathail (1996) a étudié la dimension mythique et orientée de la théorie de Mackinder, visant à proposer un modèle capable de légitimer la politique britannique en Asie centrale. Venier (2010) a souligné l'absence d'une « démonstration rigoureuse » de la théorie de Mackinder. L'héritage de ces modèles théoriques de l'école dite matérialiste ne pose plus de problème épistémologique pour l'école géographique en géopolitique, dont les chercheurs considèrent les travaux de Mackinder ou de Spykman comme des moments datés, des jalons dans l'histoire de la pensée géopolitique, mais sans grande valeur scientifique. Les sciences politiques et la géographie étaient, au début du XXe siècle, à la recherche d'une respectabilité scientifique dans l'identification des lois du champ politique qui énoncent clairement les mécanismes formels qui relient l'espace au pouvoir (Lasserre et al, 2020a). Cette chimère de l'école matérialiste est aujourd'hui dépassée, mais elle a marqué durablement les réflexions en géopolitique. « A une époque où les principes de causalité et de détermination sont les références universelles, la géographie pense tenir avec la domination ou la lutte pour l’espace son explication toute faite » (Dussouy, 2006, p.112). Comme l'ont souligné Entin et Entina (2016, p.341), « It is not a surprise that Mackinder’s theory remains popular even now. Such simple, beautiful, artificial, convenient and all-explaining teachings are always in demand and easier to accept » Cependant, la valeur de la géopolitique ne réside pas dans la prédiction, une entreprise souvent risquée, mais dans l'analyse : « la géopolitique revisitée, loin de toute prophétie, dévoile un monde de possibilités » (Dussouy, 2001, p.50). Une popularité contemporaine, le reflet des craintes occidentales ? Pourquoi alors mettre autant l'accent sur le modèle de Mackinder lorsqu'on parle des projets chinois, plutôt que sur celui de Spykman, deux théories tout aussi globales et non démontrées ? Les auteurs chinois se réfèrent rarement au modèle théorique de Mackinder, mais plutôt à des auteurs chinois comme Sun Tzu (Boillot, 2020). Par ailleurs, la pléthore de cartes en circulation représentant les projets de corridors chinois entourant l'Asie centrale et les routes maritimes dans une étreinte souvent présentée comme menaçante est une approche à prendre également avec précaution. La plupart de ces cartes sont fausses (Lasserre et al, 2020b) et non officielles - le gouvernement chinois ayant interdit la production de telles cartes approximatives en 2017 (Jones et Zeng, 2019, p.1425). Les médias et plusieurs chercheurs, dont des Chinois, ont été trompés par ces cartes inexactes. L'interprétation d'une stratégie politique avec une théorie basée sur la lecture d'une autre rivalité (la Russie et l'Empire britannique), et surtout d'une théorie non prouvée et très contestable sur le plan scientifique, n'est pas nouvelle. Plusieurs auteurs ont déjà souligné que la théorie de Mackinder a été largement utilisée à Washington lors de la création de la politique américaine pour contrer l'Union soviétique pendant la guerre froide (Parker 1988, Sloan 1988 ; Brzezinski 1997). Une position similaire semble contribuer aux craintes occidentales contemporaines concernant la stratégie territoriale de la BRI, ce qui est cohérent avec : …an American tradition of focusing on map-based geopolitical and geostrategic thinking. This ‘cartohypnosis’ goes back to Halford Mackinder’s portrayal of the Eurasian landmass as the global ‘Heartland’. Stemming from Mackinder’s geopolitics, the idea of needing to prevent the Soviet Union from controlling this ‘Heartland’ […] governed much of American strategy during the Cold War […]. Thus, it is understandable that the BRI could easily be seen by Americans thinking in this tradition as a Chinese ‘great game’ intended to extend its geopolitical influence westward (Garlick, 2020, p.110). Debié est du même avis : Ainsi le succès de Mackinder ou Spykman pendant la guerre froide, le regain d’intérêt pour Haushofer, semblent inspirés par l’exercice cartographique. Les experts du Pentagone ou du Department of State qui, sur les cartes des années cinquante, voient grandir la tache rouge au centre de l’Eurasie et comparent les modèles cartographiques de Mackinder ou Spykman sont frappés par la ressemblance. Bientôt, les voilà convaincus de la valeur prophétique des modèles et du génie de leurs auteurs, puisque la carte dessinée en 1904 ou en 1944 a prédit ce qui est en train d’arriver dans les années 1947-56. (Debié, 1991). Ainsi, comme Mackinder et Spykman, il apparaît que l'attrait de ces modèles théoriques et de leur appui cartographique global réside dans leur correspondance avec les préoccupations de l'heure. Mackinder a délibérément imaginé un modèle présenté comme éternel mais qui repose en réalité sur une lecture de la rivalité britannique avec la Russie, puis sur la peur de l'URSS. Il en va de même pour le modèle de Spykman, tout aussi général dans son discours, mais orienté vers l'endiguement de l'Union soviétique. Au moment de l'avènement de la Chine comme nouvelle grande puissance, il semble que le regain d'intérêt pour la théorie de Mackinder pourrait refléter la crainte des Occidentaux de voir leur prédominance politique remise en cause. Implications pour le Canada Le modèle de Mackinder, qui reflète l'état de la pensée géopolitique au début du XXe siècle, ne peut que s'avérer un piètre outil pour rendre compte des projets de la Chine en Asie par le biais de la BRI. Il semble que même si la tentation de mobiliser un modèle géopolitique pour s'attaquer à la complexité de la BRI est compréhensible, elle ne peut pas fournir d'analyses fructueuses. Le modèle du Heartland de Mackinder a été conçu dans un contexte spécifique de rivalité de grandes puissances entre la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne en vue de démontrer ce que Mackinder percevait comme l'urgence de protéger les intérêts de la Grande-Bretagne en Asie du Sud et en Asie centrale. Le modèle est donc spécifiquement et contextuellement orienté, sinon imparfait, puisque Mackinder l'a construit pour souligner la menace de la Russie. En outre, il surestime le risque de conflit et minimise délibérément d'autres éléments comme la coopération, le commerce et la géopolitique intérieure. Afin de mieux comprendre les implications de la BRI en matière de sécurité, il ne faut pas s'appuyer sur des modèles archaïques et simplistes qui ne peuvent rendre compte de la complexité de la réalité actuelle. Pour les scientifiques et les analystes du gouvernement canadien, une approche efficace de la stratégie de développement de la « nouvelle route de la soie » de la Chine doit tenir compte des spécificités de l'actuel BRI, de l'Asie du XXIe siècle, et prendre en considération les éléments suivants : La BRI de la Chine ne se résume pas seulement au transport, mais c'est une dimension majeure du projet. Cependant, plusieurs des corridors et axes de transport développés par la BRI sont antérieurs à l'annonce de 2013 et ont souvent été conçus par d'autres pays ou institutions (Lasserre 2019) : ils reflètent donc les intérêts de plusieurs pays et pas seulement ceux de la Chine. Analyser la BRI à travers le seul prisme de l'intérêt de la Chine est donc trompeur. Les paramètres politiques qui orientent le développement des projets de la BRI reflètent en grande partie des considérations géoéconomiques locales ou régionales. Le premier développement des services ferroviaires transasiatiques a été largement impulsé par les fabricants occidentaux et la compagnie ferroviaire allemande Deutsche Bahn afin d'améliorer leur logistique et de relier les filiales européennes et chinoises des usines de production. Ce projet est également cher à la Chine, qui le considère comme un outil de développement de la région du Xinjiang, sujette aux conflits. Une bonne compréhension des réalités sociales, économiques et politiques locales est une condition préalable à une bonne compréhension des enjeux de la stratégie de la BRI. Si la BRI est aujourd'hui considérée par plusieurs chercheurs comme ayant des dimensions géopolitiques, il serait irréfléchi de la considérer comme un simple outil politique destiné à favoriser la puissance de la Chine. La BRI est une stratégie de développement opportuniste qui intègre de nombreux secteurs économiques (dont, par exemple, les transports, les télécommunications, l'énergie, la santé, le tourisme, l'éducation et la culture) dans diverses régions selon des critères encore indéfinis et très généraux, dont plusieurs répondent aux mécanismes politiques et administratifs internes de la Chine (Jones et Zeng, 2019) mais aussi aux souhaits des États partenaires. La prise en compte des mécanismes de gouvernance des différents projets de la BRI est donc nécessaire pour éviter les erreurs. L'absence de critères systématiques dans la gouvernance de la BRI peut refléter le fait que cette stratégie en est encore à ses débuts. Les États partenaires de la Chine, les institutions et les médias exercent une pression croissante pour que le gouvernement et les banques chinoises fassent preuve de plus de transparence et de rigueur dans l'attribution des projets. L'échec de Hambantota[1] n'était pas un stratagème conçu par la Chine pour endetter le Sri Lanka et finalement prendre le contrôle du port, contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait croire ; il était plutôt le résultat d'une planification corrompue par les autorités locales et d'un enthousiasme excessif des autorités bancaires chinoises. Pour que le Canada puisse profiter de cette situation, il doit faire partie de la solution, ne pas rejeter la BRI, et donc participer activement à la Banque asiatique d'investissement dans les infrastructures et suggérer de participer à des projets de développement. [1] Le port sri-lankais a été accordé à la Chine en 2017 sur un bail de 99 ans après que l'État sri-lankais se soit avéré incapable d'assurer le paiement de sa dette colossale. Le port, construit dans la région d'origine du président, n'a pas réussi à faire des bénéfices. [1] Le Rimland, ou Croissant intérieur, est la zone littorale de l'Eurasie, la frange occidentale, méridionale et orientale du monde, densément peuplée et ouverte au commerce maritime. Références Boillot, J.-J. (2020). Les routes de la soie et le 36e stratagème. Diplomatie 101, 46. Debié, F. (1991). La géopolitique est-elle une science? Un aspect de la géographie politique de Peter Taylor. Stratégique n°50. Dussouy, G. (2001). Quelle géopolitique au XXIe siècle? Bruxelles: Complexe. Dussouy, G. (2006). Les théories géopolitiques. Traité de Relations Internationales I. Paris: L’Harmattan. Entin, M. & Entina, E. (2016). Russia’s role in promoting Great Eurasia geopolitical project. Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, 83(3), 331-351. Garlick, J. (2020). The Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative from Asia to Europe. London: Routledge. Harper, T. (2019). China’s Eurasia: the Belt and Road Initiative and the Creation of a New Eurasian Power. The Chinese Journal of Global Governance, 5(2), 99-121. Jones, L. & Zeng, J. (2019) Understanding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: beyond ‘grand strategy’ to a state transformation analysis, Third World Quarterly, 40(8), 1415-1439. Lasserre, F. (2019). Les corridors transasiatiques: une idée ancienne opportunément reprise par la Chine. In Lasserre, F.; É Mottet and B. Courmont (eds.) (2019). Les nouvelles routes de la soie. Géopolitique d’un grand projet chinois. Québec, PUQ, 31-54. Lasserre, F., Gonon, E. and Mottet, É. (2020a). Manuel de géopolitique. Enjeux de pouvoir sur des territoires. Paris, Armand Colin. Lasserre, F.; Huang, L. and Mottet, É. (2020b). The Emergence of Trans-Asian Rail Freight Traffic as Part of the Belt and Road Initiative: Development and Limits. China Perspectives, 2020/2, 43-52. Leong Kok Wey, A. (2019). A Mackinder–Mahan Geopolitical View of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. RUSI Newsbrief 39(6), London: Royal United Services Institute, https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20190705_newsbrief_vol39_no6_wey_web.pdf Mackinder, H. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal, 23(4), 421-437. Mackinder, H. (1919). Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction. London: Constable and Cie. Mackinder, H. (1943). The Round World and the Winning of the Peace. Foreign Affairs, 21(4), 595-605. Maury, B.; Struye de Swielande, T. and Vandamme, D. (2019). Les nouvelles routes de la soie au Moyen-Orient: complexité d’une région essentielle pour la Chine. Diplomatie 101, 58-61. NDRC, National Development and Reform Commission (2015). Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml. Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). Critical geopolitics: the politics of writing global space. London: Routledge. Parker, G. (1988). The Geopolitics of Domination. London: Routledge. Sempa, F. (2019). China and the World-Island. Today’s strategists should keep Mackinder in mind when looking at China’s efforts across Eurasia and Africa. The Diplomat, Jan. 26, https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/china-and-the-world-island/. Shortgen, F. (2018). China and the Twenty-First Century Silk Roads: a New Era of Global Economic Leadership? In Zhang, W.; Alon, I. and Lattemann, C. (eds.), China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Changing the Rules of Globaliszation, p.17-33. Cham: Palgrave. Shukhla, A. (2015). Understanding the Chinese One-Belt-One-Road. Mackinder Redux: Struggle for Eurasia after the Cold War. Vivekananda International Foundation, Occasional Paper, https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/understanding-the-chinese-one-belt-one-road.pdf. Sloan, G. (1988). Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books. Spykman, N. (1944). The Geography of the Peace, ed. by Helen R. Nicholl. New York: Harcourt Brace and Co. Venier, P. (2010). Main Theoretical Currents in Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century. L’Espace Politique 12|2010-3, http://espacepolitique.revues.org/1714 Yu, S. (2019). The Belt and Road Initiative: Modernity, Geopolitics and the Developing Global Order. Asian Affairs, 50(2), 187-201. ## Maintenir l’engagement du public à l’égard des priorités du Canada en matière de sécurité et de défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/maintenir-lengagement-du-public-a-legard-des-priorites-du-canada-en-matiere-de-securite-et-de-defense/ Modified: 2026-07-29 Cette note politique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) avec le soutien du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada, qui vise à développer des échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens. Introduction  Lors du Sommet de l’OTAN à La Haye, en juin 2025, le Canada s’est engagé à porter ses dépenses de défense à 2 % de son produit intérieur brut (PIB) d’ici le printemps 2026 — un objectif atteint en mars 2026 — tout en se fixant comme objectif à plus long terme d’atteindre 5 % du PIB d’ici 2035. Cette décision a marqué un tournant historique dans la posture de défense du Canada sur la scène internationale. Selon les mots du premier ministre Mark Carney, « l’ordre mondial traverse actuellement une période de rupture. Nous assistons non seulement à l’émergence de nouvelles menaces, mais aussi à la convergence de grandes tendances qui obligent le Canada à repenser fondamentalement sa posture stratégique. » Les conséquences des changements climatiques, particulièrement dans l’Arctique, ainsi que les avancées technologiques majeures — du cyberespace à l’intelligence artificielle en passant par les missiles hypersoniques — ont profondément transformé l’environnement stratégique. Toutefois, les changements radicaux de la politique étrangère américaine, conjugués à l’approche imprévisible et transactionnelle du président Trump, s’inscrivent dans un contexte international de plus en plus compétitif, où les rivalités entre grandes puissances s’intensifient et où les menaces deviennent toujours plus diversifiées. Ces transformations ont profondément ébranlé le sentiment de sécurité des Canadiens et accru considérablement leur sensibilisation aux enjeux de défense ainsi qu’à la nécessité d’investir dans la défense du pays. Toutefois, la sensibilisation à elle seule ne suffira pas à maintenir l’appui du public. Préserver la confiance de la population exige une approche plus substantielle de l’engagement citoyen, fondée sur une meilleure compréhension des priorités en matière de défense grâce à une communication claire, à la transparence et à des activités de mobilisation soutenues. À mesure que le Canada accroît ses ambitions en matière de défense, il sera essentiel d’harmoniser les politiques publiques avec la compréhension qu’en a la population. Un public informé et engagé est davantage susceptible d’appuyer les investissements à long terme — soit 33,5 milliards de dollars par année en dépenses directes au cours des dix prochaines années — nécessaires pour respecter la cible de dépenses établie par l’OTAN lors du Sommet de La Haye de 2025. Projets communs et renforcement des partenariats Maintenir l’engagement du public envers les priorités du Canada en matière de sécurité et de défense exige une participation à long terme reposant sur des projets communs et des partenariats durables. Le contexte géopolitique actuel est marqué par l’évolution des dynamiques commerciales et par des conditions géopolitiques de plus en plus instables. Le Canada renouvelle ses partenariats internationaux, notamment avec l’Europe et l’Asie. Pour une puissance moyenne comme le Canada, l’alignement stratégique n’est plus une option : il est essentiel de privilégier des alliances ciblées et efficaces afin de faire progresser ses intérêts en matière de sécurité et d’économie. En particulier, le renforcement de l’engagement du Canada auprès de ses partenaires européens — notamment en devenant le premier et le seul pays non européen à adhérer à l’Accord Security Action for Europe (SAFE) de l’Union européenne — a contribué à placer les questions de défense au cœur du débat public et à sensibiliser davantage la population aux risques qui pèsent sur la sécurité nationale. Les initiatives conjointes avec les partenaires européens offrent également un moyen concret de rapprocher les politiques de défense de la société civile. Les efforts de collaboration dans des domaines tels que la cybersécurité, où le Canada joue déjà un rôle par l’entremise du Mécanisme de réponse rapide du G7 et des capacités cybernétiques des Forces armées canadiennes, pourraient être élargis afin d’y associer les universités, le secteur privé et les établissements de recherche. En misant sur l’expertise existante, en investissant dans la recherche émergente et en développant des filières de talents, le Canada pourra faire évoluer sa posture d’une approche réactive vers une approche proactive. Ces initiatives rendent les enjeux de sécurité plus concrets, favorisent l’innovation et contribuent à une population mieux informée et davantage engagée. Les Dialogues sur la sécurité nationale et la défense, organisés par le Conference of Defence Associations Institute, constituent un modèle évolutif illustrant cette approche. Conçus comme une série de consultations organisées à l’échelle du pays et ancrées dans les réalités locales, ces dialogues permettent de déplacer les discussions au-delà de la région de la capitale nationale pour les tenir dans des collectivités partout au Canada. En réunissant des intervenants locaux — notamment des représentants du secteur de la défense, de l’industrie, du milieu universitaire, des dirigeants autochtones et des membres de la communauté — ils créent un espace propice à des échanges éclairés et bidirectionnels sur les défis auxquels le Canada est confronté en matière de sécurité ainsi que sur les implications d’une augmentation des investissements en défense. Ce modèle est particulièrement efficace parce qu’il inscrit les débats sur la sécurité nationale dans les réalités régionales. Les dialogues prévus dans des villes comme Yellowknife, Vancouver et Whitehorse mettent en lumière des enjeux tels que la souveraineté dans l’Arctique, la sécurité du Nord et la résilience des collectivités, tout en veillant à intégrer de façon significative les perspectives autochtones. Cette approche inclusive dépasse la simple consultation pour favoriser une participation active, renforçant ainsi la légitimité et la pertinence des politiques de défense. Les capacités de défense ancrées dans les collectivités jouent également un rôle important dans le maintien de l’engagement du public. Les Rangers canadiens, particulièrement dans le Nord, contribuent directement à la souveraineté, à la surveillance du territoire et aux interventions d’urgence, tout en entretenant des liens étroits avec les communautés locales. Leur rôle constitue un lien tangible entre les priorités nationales en matière de défense et les réalités quotidiennes de la sécurité. Accroître le soutien, la visibilité et l’engagement envers les Rangers, notamment au moyen de plateformes de dialogue et d’initiatives de reconnaissance publique, permettrait de renforcer la compréhension des défis de sécurité auxquels le Canada est confronté et de favoriser un plus grand sentiment de responsabilité collective. De telles initiatives de mobilisation renforcent la culture de sécurité au sein de la population, consolident la confiance envers les institutions de défense et favorisent un sentiment de responsabilité partagée. En créant des forums communautaires récurrents et en les reliant à des objectifs stratégiques plus larges, le Canada peut maintenir l’intérêt du public pour les questions de défense à long terme, tout en veillant à ce que la mobilisation demeure inclusive, ancrée dans les réalités régionales et liée à des résultats concrets en matière de politiques publiques. Communication publique et transparence Une communication publique intentionnelle et proactive Le renforcement de la culture de sécurité au Canada exige une plus grande transparence. Une ouverture accrue envers la société civile et les alliés contribuerait à renforcer la confiance et l’appui du public. La déclassification stratégique d’informations soigneusement sélectionnées pourrait constituer un moyen d’y parvenir. Par exemple, des mises à jour sur des opérations telles que l’opération REASSURANCE pourraient mettre en valeur l’état de préparation et la fiabilité des forces de l’OTAN déployées en Europe de l’Est. En mettant en lumière les forces et les réussites de ces missions, il serait possible de susciter un sentiment de fierté tant chez le personnel militaire que dans la société civile. Une plus grande transparence quant à l’affectation des ressources financières favoriserait également une meilleure compréhension par le public de l’incidence de ces investissements sur la sécurité nationale et internationale, renforçant ainsi la légitimité des dépenses en matière de défense. La diffusion d’exemples concrets de réalisations — notamment des exercices conjoints de l’OTAN ou des initiatives de mobilisation communautaire — permettrait de renforcer la confiance et la coopération avec les populations locales. À l’inverse, communiquer ouvertement sur les missions qui n’ont pas atteint les résultats escomptés permettrait d’en tirer des leçons afin d’éviter de reproduire les mêmes erreurs et démontrerait un engagement envers la reddition de comptes. De tels récits et retours d’expérience opérationnels contribueraient à accroître l’appui du public, à soutenir les initiatives en cours et à assurer le maintien du financement des efforts de sécurité. Les créateurs de contenu numérique au service de la sécurité internationale Tout comme les plateformes de médias sociaux peuvent favoriser la propagation de la désinformation, leur utilisation efficace offre également des possibilités importantes en matière de communication stratégique, de mobilisation du public et de lutte contre la désinformation. À mesure que les créateurs de contenu politique gagnent en influence dans les espaces numériques, ils peuvent contribuer à alimenter le débat démocratique, à favoriser une meilleure compréhension des enjeux internationaux et à renforcer une communauté mondiale plus informée, plus connectée et plus engagée. Ils peuvent également contribuer à maintenir l’intérêt croissant du public pour les questions de sécurité internationale observé depuis les dernières élections fédérales, dans un contexte marqué par les tarifs douaniers et la rhétorique présidentielle concernant une éventuelle annexion du Canada. Une question fondamentale se pose alors : si le Canada ne raconte pas lui-même son histoire en matière de défense et de sécurité, qui le fera? Ce que certains qualifient de propagande peut être perçu par d’autres comme de la communication stratégique, particulièrement dans un contexte d’insécurité et d’aggravation des menaces à la sécurité nationale et internationale. Face aux préoccupations croissantes concernant la souveraineté du Canada et sa place sur la scène internationale, le pays doit façonner lui-même ses récits stratégiques; autrement, d’autres le feront à sa place. L’importance de la communication stratégique est bien illustrée par le cas des îles Senkaku/Diaoyu, où le Japon, la Chine et la Corée ont eu recours à diverses stratégies de communication afin de promouvoir leurs intérêts respectifs en matière de sécurité régionale et d’accès aux ressources. Les plateformes numériques et les créateurs de contenu exercent aujourd’hui une influence considérable sur le débat public et peuvent contribuer à améliorer la littératie médiatique. Certains créateurs jouent déjà un rôle actif comme défenseurs de la démocratie en diffusant de l’information sur la sécurité collective. En République tchèque, Johanna Bazlerova a lancé Jsme v obraze, un projet qui diffuse des informations sur l’OTAN et l’Union européenne tout en mobilisant les publics sur les plateformes numériques. Aujourd’hui, Bazlerova rejoint près de 198 000 abonnés sur Instagram. Soutenir des créateurs comme elle au moyen de subventions ou de programmes dédiés permettrait d’encourager une nouvelle génération de créateurs politiquement engagés. En leur offrant des ressources et un soutien flexible, ils seraient mieux en mesure de produire du contenu à fort impact, d'améliorer la littératie médiatique sur les questions de sécurité et de renforcer la résilience du public face à la désinformation. Des programmes tels que Protect the Future, dans lesquels des jeunes et des créateurs de contenu explorent le rôle de l’OTAN en matière de sécurité internationale et de défense, constituent également des modèles prometteurs. Cette initiative permet aux créateurs d’accéder aux coulisses de l’Alliance et de rencontrer des spécialistes afin de mieux comprendre les activités de l’OTAN. Elle donne également aux jeunes la possibilité d’exprimer leur point de vue sur l’Alliance et ses activités de manière libre et non censurée. Bien que ce programme présente une réelle valeur, une lacune importante demeure quant à la pérennité du rôle croissant des créateurs de contenu politique dans ce domaine. Nombre d’entre eux doivent concilier un emploi à temps plein avec la recherche, la production et la diffusion de leur contenu. L’octroi de subventions à certains créateurs pourrait contribuer à combler cette lacune et à maintenir l’intérêt des jeunes pour les enjeux de sécurité. Ces subventions ne seraient assorties d’aucune obligation concernant la couverture médiatique ou l’interprétation des défis liés à la sécurité internationale. Elles viseraient uniquement à soutenir la création de contenu indépendant, éclairé et accessible au public. Mettre les arts au service de la sécurité internationale Le recours aux arts peut rassembler les communautés et promouvoir un sentiment de responsabilité partagée à l’égard de la sécurité. Le prestigieux Festival du film One World, en République tchèque, met en lumière les enjeux mondiaux liés aux droits de la personne par l’entremise du cinéma, suscitant ainsi le dialogue et sensibilisant le public. Son modèle pourrait inspirer le Canada ainsi que les organisations à but non lucratif souhaitant établir un partenariat avec One World ou lancer des initiatives semblables dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense. En combinant le récit, les documentaires, les conférences, la mobilisation citoyenne et une programmation inclusive, de telles initiatives peuvent favoriser les échanges culturels et accroître la participation du public aux enjeux de sécurité qui touchent les droits de la personne. L’art transcende les cultures et les frontières, ce qui en fait un puissant vecteur de sensibilisation aux questions de sécurité. L’humour, notamment par l’entremise du spectacle d’humour, peut mobiliser le public de diverses façons en mariant le rire à des thèmes sérieux. De nombreux humoristes utilisent déjà leur plateforme pour commenter l’actualité sociale, politique et historique, en rendant accessibles des enjeux géopolitiques complexes grâce à une approche humoristique. La comédie peut ainsi sensibiliser le public aux questions de défense et de sécurité, tout en encourageant une réflexion critique et une meilleure compréhension des événements internationaux. Parmi les humoristes qui abordent déjà des thèmes politiques figurent Rick Mercer, Sophie Buddle, Faris Hytiaa, Brad Semotiuk, Sammy Obeid, Dragos et Victor Pătrășcan. La création d'un programme de subventions thématique — par exemple pour soutenir la production d'une tournée ou d'un spectacle humoristique consacré à la géopolitique — pourrait constituer une façon novatrice de sensibiliser le public aux enjeux de sécurité internationale, tout en réunissant citoyens, universitaires et professionnels du domaine. Il s'agirait d'une initiative financée par des fonds publics, mais administrée selon le principe de l'indépendance (« arm's length ») afin de préserver la liberté artistique. Ce financement viserait à soutenir des humoristes qui traitent déjà de ces sujets et à accroître leur rayonnement sans leur imposer de contraintes quant au contenu de leurs prestations. Après tout, l'humour repose sur l'authenticité. Une telle initiative encouragerait davantage d'artistes à s'intéresser aux questions de sécurité internationale et contribuerait à maintenir l'engagement du public envers ces enjeux. À titre d'exemple, Rick Mercer a parcouru le Canada avec la tournée Stand-Up For Canada, réunissant plusieurs humoristes canadiens qui présentaient des numéros de satire politique. Cette tournée a connu un succès remarquable et a contribué à familiariser les spectateurs avec les enjeux politiques canadiens. Elle est aujourd'hui accessible gratuitement sur CBC Gem, permettant à des personnes partout au pays d'en profiter. Conclusion L'évolution de l'environnement de défense du Canada exige la mise en place de partenariats stratégiques capables de soutenir, à long terme, l'engagement du public envers les priorités nationales en matière de sécurité et de défense au moyen de projets communs, d'initiatives collaboratives et de partenariats durables, tout en favorisant une culture plus large de participation, de transparence et de responsabilité partagée dans la promotion du rôle du Canada en matière de sécurité et de défense internationales. À mesure que l'environnement de sécurité mondial devient plus complexe, il est essentiel de favoriser et de maintenir la compréhension du public grâce à une communication intentionnelle, à des initiatives créatives et à des programmes communautaires inclusifs. En rapprochant les politiques publiques des citoyens — que ce soit par le dialogue, les créateurs de contenu numérique ou les arts — le Canada peut renforcer durablement l'appui de la population et sa résilience. Une telle approche permettra de veiller à ce que les priorités en matière de défense demeurent adaptées aux besoins et conformes aux valeurs ainsi qu'aux intérêts du Canada et de ses alliés, tout en consolidant la sécurité du pays et sa place sur la scène internationale. Recommandations: Développer et diversifier les projets communs tout en renforçant les partenariats stratégiques. Offrir un soutien flexible aux créateurs de contenu politique afin de leur permettre de produire du contenu à fort impact, d'améliorer la littératie médiatique en matière de sécurité et de renforcer la résilience du public face à la désinformation. Mettre sur pied une tournée ou un spectacle d'humour consacré à la géopolitique afin d'accroître l'engagement du public envers les enjeux de sécurité internationale, et créer un festival du film consacré aux questions de défense et de sécurité. À propos des auteures Gabrielle Andrychuk est conseillère principale en matière de politique et éditrice. Elle détient un master en études de sécurité internationale ainsi qu’un baccalauréat ès arts en sciences politiques et en sociologie. Elle est passionnée par la politique internationale, la recherche, l’analyse et la planification stratégique. Emmylou Sergent est Directrice de l'accompagnement stratégique chez ADIT North America, cabinet spécialisé en intelligence économique et diplomatie d'affaires. Elle a précédemment occupé le poste de coordonnatrice d’événements à l'Institut de la Conférence des associations de la défense (Institut de la CAD) à Ottawa, où elle a organisé des conférences nationales sur la défense et dirigé les Dialogues sur la sécurité et la défense nationale. Elle a effectué un stage à l'Assemblée nationale à Paris, au sein de la branche de la coopération et des questions bilatérales, où elle a rédigé des notes de synthèse sur des enjeux de politique étrangère et assuré la coordination des groupes d'amitié France-Canada et France-Québec. Elle est titulaire d'un Master en relations internationales de l'Université de Montréal, avec une thèse portant sur la stratégie indopacifique de la France. Elle est analyste au sein du Programme jeunes chercheurs de l'Institut d'études géopolitiques appliquées (IEGA), membre du Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS) et ancienne participante au Programme Personnalités d'Avenir France-Canada. Crédit image: Billy Wilson via Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0. ## Maintien de la paix à l’ère de la COVID-19 : une opportunité pour avancer ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/maintien-de-la-paix-a-lere-de-la-covid-19-une-opportunite-pour-avancer/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Comment l’actuelle pandémie de la COVID-19 a-t-elle influencé le renforcement des capacités dans le domaine du maintien de la paix ? Ce billet de blogue est écrit dans le cadre du Cycle d’ateliers virtuels portant sur le Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Le troisième atelier organisé le 3 novembre 2020 portait sur le maintien de la paix et a fait intervenir Marie-Joelle Zahar, professeure à l’Université de Montréal, Cedric de Coning, professeur au Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Arthur Boutellis, conseiller au International Peace Institute et Mody Berethe, directeur de l’École de maintien de la paix de Bamako. Les informations relatées dans le texte sont une synthèse générale des idées présentées par les conférenciers.[1] Visionnez la vidéo du troisième panel Comment l’actuelle pandémie de la COVID-19 a-t-elle influencé le renforcement des capacités dans le domaine du maintien de la paix ? Répondre à cette question semble nécessiter un retour préalable sur les mutations de l’engagement onusien en zones de conflits dans les années précédant la crise sanitaire. Que ce soit au Mali, en République centrafricaine ou en République démocratique du Congo, les opérations de paix ont depuis la fin de la Guerre froide été progressivement réorientées vers la gestion des conflits internes multipartites, s’éloignant peu à peu de l’objectif qui prévalait précédemment de résolution des conflits étatiques souvent binaires. En l’absence d’accords de paix et de ressources matérielles suffisantes pour faire face à des situations sécuritaires peu prévisibles, l’objectif premier de ces nouvelles opérations de stabilisation est principalement de protéger les populations civiles aujourd’hui, en prévenant la mutation de situations sociopolitiques complexes en guerres civiles de haute intensité. Dans ce contexte d’opérations nouvelles — et souvent pensées de manière plus offensive —, les activités onusiennes de renforcement des capacités se sont logiquement transformées dans les dernières années. De manière positive, le besoin de consacrer des ressources humaines et matérielles conséquentes au renforcement continu des capacités du personnel onusien intervenant en zones de conflit est aujourd’hui pleinement reconnu. Sur le plan militaire, des formations destinées aux troupes opérant dans le cadre d’opérations de paix des Nations Unies sont menées régulièrement au cours même de leurs déploiements sur le terrain. Le but est souvent d’adapter des unités formées dans des cadres nationaux hétérogènes à des opérations qualitativement différentes et menées en conjonction avec d’autres armées. De plus en plus de formations portent par exemple sur des secteurs clés tels que l’évacuation de personnel blessé, la gestion d’engins explosifs improvisés ou sur la protection des populations civiles entendue plus largement. Sur le plan civil, dans une moindre mesure, des formations au sein même des opérations de paix ont aussi été progressivement mises en place, dans le but de sensibiliser les intervenants civils aux problématiques centrales entourant le maintien de la paix et, dans une perspective de plus long terme, la résolution des conflits. De manière générale, la planification des opérations de paix a reçu une attention accrue dans les dernières années, dans le but de mieux coordonner les actions des pays financeurs des opérations et des pays principalement engagés via l’envoi de troupes sur les théâtres conflictuels. Des avancées majeures ont également été menées dans l’évaluation des performances des différentes opérations onusiennes avec l’objectif, pour les organisations engagées, de s’assurer que les programmes remplissent des critères prédéfinis d’efficience. Par ailleurs, l’un des progrès importants est la coopération croissante des Nations Unies avec des organisations régionales — au premier rang desquelles l’Union africaine — qui, en favorisant une meilleure réappropriation locale, contribue indéniablement à renforcer la légitimité des opérations de paix. Tout de même, si des progrès ont indéniablement été réalisés, des problématiques structurelles demeurent aujourd’hui concernant le fonctionnement des opérations de paix, avec une répercussion directe sur l’effectivité du renforcement des capacités dans ce domaine. La division récurremment mise en lumière entre pays du nord fournisseurs de financements pour les opérations de paix et pays du sud fournisseurs de troupes reste un élément central du partage des responsabilités en matière de maintien de la paix, et continue de définir un modèle inévitablement déséquilibré. L’agenda des opérations de paix demeure de fait déterminé par les priorités stratégiques et opérationnelles des pays financeurs (supply-driven), au détriment des capacités prédictives des opérations sur les terrains de déploiement. Dans le domaine du renforcement des capacités, les formations onusiennes de larges échelles — nécessairement coûteuses — demeurent exceptionnelles et souffrent d’un manque d’institutionnalisation. Si elles s’améliorent, les capacités d’évaluation du succès des opérations peuvent également être encore perfectionnées et adaptées à des contextes sociopolitiques singuliers et changeants. Par ailleurs, si les dimensions civiles sont de plus en plus reconnues comme centrales, beaucoup des opérations actuelles demeurent principalement centrées autour d’enjeux sécuritaires à court terme, et peinent à penser la construction de la paix dans un temps politique plus long au sein des espaces conflictuels. C’est dans ce contexte équivoque — tant d’indéniables progrès que de persistants défis — que s’inscrit la crise sanitaire liée à la COVID-19. D’un côté, touchant tant les pays en crises politiques que les pays financeurs et contributeurs de troupes, la pandémie a très tôt été reconnue comme un enjeu saillant par les Nations Unies. Déjà confrontées à plusieurs cas de crises sanitaires majeures — au premier rang desquelles les crises liées au choléra en Haïti ainsi que la gestion de l’épidémie d’Ebola en République Démocratique du Congo —, les opérations de paix ont rapidement mis en place les mesures sanitaires nécessaires pour mitiger l’effet de la pandémie sur leurs activités quotidiennes. Certaines rotations militaires ont été suspendues et beaucoup de membres du personnel civil des Nations Unies ont commencé à travailler depuis leur domicile, mais les principales tâches de l’organisation ont dans l’ensemble été maintenues. D’un autre côté, si la pandémie ne met pas à l’ordre du jour des problématiques qualitativement nouvelles dans le domaine du maintien de la paix, elle semble accroître la saillance des tensions et débats préexistants.[2] La crise sanitaire souligne une fois encore les limites d’un système d’intervention international dont l’agenda opérationnel est entièrement défini par les principaux financeurs. Alors que les systèmes politiques et économiques de ces bailleurs de fonds sont largement impactés par la pandémie, le risque est que ceux-ci décident rapidement de limiter leurs investissements aux opérations quotidiennes jugées strictement essentielles — souvent les actions opérationnelles de sécurité immédiate — au détriment des opérations de long terme ; par exemple la construction d’institutions politiques solides et inclusives dans les pays d’intervention. Dans ce cadre, les opérations de renforcement des capacités risquent d’être prioritairement sacrifiées. Finalement, si elle renforce indéniablement la centralité de problèmes préexistants, la pandémie marque également une période charnière pouvant, par la force des choses, devenir synonyme d’améliorations incrémentales des opérations de paix. La mise en retrait déjà anticipée de certains intervenants internationaux dans les zones de conflits peut par exemple être l’occasion d’accorder plus de place à des initiatives de pacification locales. La mise en arrêt de certains programmes de formation peut, de la même manière, devenir une opportunité inédite de les repenser de manière créative pour les adapter à des contextes changeants ; notamment au Sahel, où les crises politiques, sociales et sécuritaires ne peuvent être pensées de manière isolée. Mettre l’accent sur la formation des hauts gradés au sein des hiérarchies militaires et policières peut notamment servir à mieux structurer les opérations de manière générale. Les opérations de paix onusiennes peuvent par ailleurs être reconceptualisées comme un outil pouvant indirectement servir les pays contributeurs de troupes, via la formation de leurs armées et polices dans des contextes différents de ceux qu’ils connaissent au sein de leurs cadres nationaux. En mettant l’accent sur des questions liées au respect des droits humains, sur la prévention des conflits plutôt que sur leurs seules résolutions et sur le développement de relations apaisées entre autorités civiles et militaires, ces formations pourraient incidemment renforcer une « culture de paix » au-delà des seuls espaces d’intervention des Nations Unies. Alors que les risques de crises sociales sont aggravés par la pandémie et la gravité de ses répercussions économiques, reconsidérer la manière dont les opérations de paix des Nations Unies peuvent être des espaces de transmission du savoir et de bonnes pratiques semble nécessaire. Prochainement, la question centrale sera ainsi de savoir  : comment, de la crise, faire naître un modèle d’intervention onusien plus en phase avec les contraintes et enjeux contemporains ?   [1] Les idées présentées n’engagent cependant que son auteur. [2] Comme préalablement démontré dans le cas de la contre-insurrection et du contre-terrorisme. ## Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/making-sense-of-the-poly-crisis-a-view-from-down-under/ Modified: 2026-09-29 Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under Une présentation de John Blaxland avec la collaboration du professeur Justin Massie Dr. John Blaxland est directeur du bureau de liaison Amérique du Nord et est professeur à l'Université Nationale d'Australie ## Mer de Chine du Sud : face à l’affirmation chinoise, quel front commun ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/mer-de-chine-du-sud-face-a-laffirmation-chinoise-quel-front-commun/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > On observe un regain de tension à l’été 2020 en mer de Chine du Sud entre la Chine, d’une part, et plusieurs États d’Asie du Sud-est et les États-Unis, d’autre part. On observe un regain de tension à l’été 2020 en mer de Chine du Sud entre la Chine, d’une part, et plusieurs États d’Asie du Sud-est et les États-Unis, d’autre part. Alors que la montée en puissance économique et militaire de la Chine ne cesse de se préciser dans la région depuis plusieurs années, de récents développements sembleraient traduire la volonté chinoise d’affirmer davantage ses revendications dans cet espace maritime. Le 3 mars 2020, un bâtiment des garde-côtes chinois a éperonné et coulé un navire de pêcheurs vietnamien près des îles Paracels, disputées entre Pékin et Hanoï, et occupées par les Chinois depuis 1974. Le 17 avril, un navire des garde-côtes de Malaisie a signalé la présence, dans la zone économique exclusive malaisienne, d’un bâtiment chinois d’exploration pétrolière escorté de sept navires des garde-côtes chinois. La Malaisie n’a pas réagi officiellement à cette violation de sa zone économique exclusive (ZÉE), mais le garde-côtes a poursuivi sa surveillance du navire chinois. Début juillet, la Chine a mené des manœuvres militaires autour des îles Paracels, puis encore en août simultanément dans quatre mers entourant la Chine. Enfin, à la fin août, suite au survol du golfe de Bohai par un avion espion américain, la marine chinoise a tiré deux missiles balistiques antinavires en mer de Chine du Sud. Par ailleurs, le nombre d’« opérations de liberté de navigation »[1] menées par les États-Unis en mer de Chine du Sud est passé de zéro en 2014 à deux en 2015, puis trois en 2016, six en 2017, cinq en 2018 et neuf en 2019. Si la marine américaine ne demeure pas en reste, l’agressivité chinoise renouvelée a suscité une vaste réprobation dans la région. Même les Philippines, que le président Duterte n’a cessé de rapprocher de la Chine tout en s’éloignant de l’allié américain, ont réagi en affichant leur solidarité avec le Vietnam. En juillet, rompant avec leur traditionnelle position de neutralité sur la question des revendications contradictoires en mer de Chine du Sud, les États-Unis ont fermement rejeté les revendications chinoises. Mike Pompeo, le secrétaire d’État américain, a condamné sans détour ce qu’il estime traduire la volonté de Pékin de considérer la mer de Chine du Sud comme sous sa souveraineté. En avril 2020, la marine américaine a procédé à des manœuvres avec l’Australie en mer de Chine du Sud, puis en juillet, à de nouvelles manœuvres, impliquant, fait exceptionnel, deux porte-avions. Gesticulations de part et d’autre, ou tentative de la Chine de faire progresser à nouveau ses positions en mer de Chine, en profitant des difficultés économiques et politiques des États-Unis et de ses alliés, provoquées par la pandémie ? Qu’en est-il exactement ? Analyse – une stratégie chinoise déterminée La politique chinoise dans le litige de la mer de Chine du Sud se caractérise par trois points majeurs : l’alternance de crises suivies de périodes d’apaisement; le refus de reconnaitre les principes du droit international de la mer tout en maintenant une grande ambiguïté sur la nature des revendications chinoises; une habile politique de division entre les pays de l’Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est (ASEAN). Premièrement, la région a déjà connu d’autres épisodes de vives tensions, en général résultant d’initiatives chinoises. La Chine est habile et cible ses interventions avec soin afin de minimiser l’impact politique de ses gestes, faisant ainsi progresser peu à peu ses positions militaires et ses intérêts politiques. Dernière puissance à occuper des ilots dans l’archipel des Spratleys, elle occupe quelques positions en 1988 à la faveur d’un affrontement naval avec le seul Vietnam, jouant sur la division que provoquait l’alignement de Hanoi sur le bloc soviétique. En 1995, la Chine a étendu ses positions aux dépens du secteur philippin, sans qu’une position commune ne puisse être atteinte. La Chine a par la suite joué l’apaisement avec les négociations sur un Code de conduite, resté lettre morte, puis en offrant la possibilité de zones de développement conjoint, notamment en 2005 avec les Philippines, puis en 2013 avec le Vietnam dans le golfe du Tonkin et de nouveau en 2017 avec les Philippines. Ces projets n’ont jamais abouti à ce jour. En 2014, une crise sévère a débuté lorsque les travaux de poldérisation massifs des ilots occupés par la Chine ont été découverts, dans le but d’y édifier aérodromes, hangars et quais pour ce qui semble être la construction de points d’appui militaires. La Chine n’est pas la seule à s’être engagée dans ces travaux majeurs; Taiwan, le Vietnam, les Philippines et la Malaisie ont également remblayé et étendu leurs ilots afin d’y développer des installations militaires, mais l’ampleur des travaux menés pour les garnisons chinoises était sans commune mesure. Le Pentagone estimait les surfaces remblayées sur la mer, de décembre 2013 à juin 2015, à 2 900 acres (1 173,6 hectares) par la Chine, 80 (32,4 ha) par le Vietnam, 70 (28,3 ha) par la Malaisie, 14 acres (5,67 ha) par les Philippines et 8 acres (3,24 ha) par Taiwan. Une fois ses positions renforcées, la Chine a relâché sa pression pour quelques années. La crise actuelle semble donc marquer la récurrence de cette stratégie chinoise d’alterner pression et apaisement. Deuxièmement, en 2016, la Cour Permanente d’Arbitrage (CPA), saisie par les Philippines, a rendu un jugement invalidant toute revendication d’espace maritime à partir des ilots des Spratleys, ainsi que toute revendication basée sur la notion de titre historique. La Cour ne s’est pas prononcée sur les revendications de souveraineté sur les ilots, mais a précisé que ceux-ci ne pouvaient générer que des eaux territoriales, ruinant par le fait même toute base légale aux revendications étendues de droits souverains de la part de la Chine. Pékin refuse de reconnaitre le jugement, tout en maintenant une ligne ambiguë, refusant de préciser comment les limites de ses revendications en mer de Chine méridionale (les fameux neuf tirets) ont été tracées, ni la nature des eaux ainsi définies : mer territoriale, zone économique exclusive, ou simple zone maritime dans laquelle les ilots lui appartiennent ?  Le comportement de la Chine et de sa garde côtière, interceptant les chalutiers et les plates-formes de forage étrangers, milite de plus en plus pour une revendication correspondant au minimum à une ZÉE, mais dont l’étendue se trouve en contradiction manifeste avec les principes de la Convention sur le droit de la mer (CNUDM), surtout depuis l’arrêt de la CPA de 2016. Troisièmement, la Chine a habilement su jouer des rivalités entre les acteurs de l’ASEAN et des frictions occasionnelles avec les États-Unis. Ainsi, la tactique de ciblage sélectif des pays visés par les coups de force de la Chine, évoquée ci-dessus, a permis à Pékin d’éviter la constitution d’un front commun. En 1988, la Chine n’a attaqué que le seul Vietnam, alors isolé dans un contexte de Guerre froide, ne suscitant ainsi que de faibles réactions des autres protagonistes, alors même que ce conflit permettait à la Chine de prendre militairement position dans l’archipel des Spratleys. En 1995, la Chine a occupé des positions dans le seul secteur philippin des Spratleys, là encore provoquant une molle réaction des membres de l’ASEAN, puis encore en 2012 lors de la prise du récif de Scarborough. En 2013, lorsque les Philippines ont déposé leur plainte auprès de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage, les autres membres de l’ASEAN impliqués dans le conflit ont offert un maigre soutien. Offrir un appui politique et économique solide permet également à Pékin de développer des relations fortes avec certains membres de l’ASEAN, notamment la Thaïlande, qui ne semble guère prioriser l’action diplomatique pour contrer la Chine en mer de Chine du Sud, et surtout le Cambodge, dont le régime et l’économie jouissent d’un soutien sans faille de Pékin. En contrepartie, le Cambodge a bloqué à deux reprises, en 2012 et en 2016, les projets de motion de l’ASEAN se préoccupant de la situation politique et militaire en mer de Chine du Sud. Incidences sécuritaires et stratégie pour le Canada La Chine semble manifestement déterminée à déployer une stratégie sur le temps long, afin de faire progresser ses intérêts et ses revendications. La Chine sait jouer des divisions entre pays de l’ASEAN pour faire progresser ses positions et a su éviter tout casus belli avec les États-Unis. Le risque sécuritaire, à court terme, est relativement faible : il réside essentiellement en l’accroissement progressif de la solidité des positions chinoises et de la possibilité de faire prévaloir ses revendications sur les archipels contestés et sur les espaces maritimes de mer de Chine du Sud; et dans le risque de voir des FoNoPs américaines déraper vers une crise, voire un incident militaire. Tant que les États-Unis ne ratifieront pas eux-mêmes la CNUDM, tout argument de Washington basé sur l’ordre juridique international, quand bien même la Chine a ratifié la CNUDM en 1994, sera perçu comme très limité, voire biaisé. De plus, aux yeux d’une Chine de plus en plus décomplexée, la lecture même du droit international devient divergente de celle des Occidentaux. Ainsi, pour la Chine, les manœuvres militaires d’un État tiers ne sont pas acceptables dans la ZÉE, alors que les Occidentaux soutiennent que rien de tel ne figure dans la CNUDM. Et la Chine persiste à refuser le jugement de la CPA de 2016. La démonstration unilatérale de la puissance navale par Washington, surtout si elle s’appuie sur la participation active des alliés dans la région, peut envoyer un message de dissuasion, mais cette stratégie du bras de fer peut être risquée ne serait-ce que du fait des frictions sur le terrain. Il faudra une diplomatie multilatérale minutieuse pour persuader la Chine de s'engager dans des négociations avec l’ASEAN pour trouver une solution fondée sur des règles. Pour le moment, la Chine récuse toute négociation multilatérale. Les manœuvres militaires de Washington et les accords de sécurité bilatéraux doivent s’accompagner d’efforts visant à renforcer la capacité de l’ASEAN. Cette capacité, c’est aux États de la région de la trouver, en faisant taire leurs divergences (rivalités sur les chevauchements de revendications d’espaces maritimes, litiges sur l’occupation de certains ilots) pour développer un front commun le plus large possible, à défaut d’un illusoire front commun de l’ASEAN. Ainsi, le président philippin Duterte, longtemps très pro-chinois après son élection en 2016, s’est-il rapproché du Vietnam et de la Malaisie après avoir constaté la rigidité de la Chine dans le litige sur les zones de pêche et l’occupation du récif de Scarborough. L’Indonésie, en butte aux incursions récurrentes de navires et chalutiers chinois dans sa ZÉE au nord-est des îles Natuna, se rapproche ostensiblement de Kuala Lumpur et de Hanoi. Comme l’a déclaré le premier ministre vietnamien en novembre 2019, lors du sommet de l’ASEAN, « en 2020, nous voulons nous concentrer sur le renforcement de la cohésion durable de l'ASEAN en soutenant la solidarité et l'unité… ». Le Canada a longtemps déployé des efforts importants pour favoriser le dialogue entre protagonistes de cette dispute, en finançant et en animant les discussions officieuses au tournant du siècle, de la fin des années 1980 jusqu’en 2006 environ. Sans tourner le dos à cette ouverture, et tout en poursuivant une action diplomatique pour modérer l’action américaine, il parait plus opportun maintenant d’œuvrer à la construction d’un réel consensus en Asie du Sud-est maritime pour une position commune forte face à la Chine. [1] Freedom of Navigation Operations, FoNoPs, sont des opérations navales visant à délibérément ignorer les revendications jugées excessives par Washington, ou à manifester un message politique. En mer de Chine du Sud, il s’agit de navires entrant dans les eaux territoriales des ilots des Paracels, occupés par la Chine en totalité depuis 1974 mais revendiqués par le Vietnam. ## MINUSMA « à la carte » ou fin de partie géopolitique au Mali URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/minusma-a-la-carte-ou-fin-de-partie-geopolitique-au-mali/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > Dix ans après la mise en place de la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA)... Dix ans après la mise en place de la Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA), l’avenir de celle-ci et de ses 15 000 militaires et policiers est plus que jamais incertain. L’opération de paix, autorisée en 2013 dans le sillon de l’intervention militaire franco-africaine par un Conseil de sécurité alors uni derrière la « plume[1] » française, est aujourd’hui logiquement remise en question dans un contexte de défiance entre les partenaires traditionnels du Mali et les nouvelles autorités du pays. Lors du renouvellement de son mandat en juin 2023, le Conseil de sécurité devra en ce sens trancher entre trois grandes options proposées par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies dans un examen interne publié en janvier dernier : une augmentation des effectifs ; une reconfiguration à effectifs constants ; ou une transition vers une « mission politique », sans Casques bleus. Le Mali, aujourd’hui gouverné par une junte militaire soutenue par la Russie – à Bamako comme à New York – ne veut plus de la France comme « plume » des résolutions, exige une MINUSMA « à la carte », et hausse le ton face aux mouvements armés du Nord qui se réorganisent. Même si la mission continue de servir certains des intérêts divergents de l’État hôte, de membres permanents du Conseil, et de la bureaucratie onusienne, elle risque néanmoins d’être la victime collatérale des nouvelles rivalités de puissances.   …   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## Naviguer dans la rivalité des grandes puissances : Une stratégie canadienne pour la prochaine décennie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/naviguer-dans-la-rivalite-des-grandes-puissances-une-strategie-canadienne-pour-la-prochaine-decennie/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > En réponse à la divergence croissante des intérêts entre le Canada et les États-Unis, l'occasion est mûre pour Ottawa de faire progresser sa propre vision de la sécurité régionale et de jouer un rôle plus actif dans le maintien de l'ordre mondial. Malgré des cas périodiques de tensions et de désaccords, Ottawa s'est fortement appuyée sur ses relations avec Washington pour ancrer sa politique étrangère depuis la période de l’après-guerre. L'impasse bipolaire soviéto-américaine a donné au Canada l'occasion de s'enraciner dans le bloc occidental dirigé par les États-Unis à des fins de sécurité. L’unipolarité subséquente à la guerre froide a encore plus approfondi la logique de dépendance du Canada à l'égard des États-Unis - non seulement en termes économiques avec l'avènement du libre-échange, mais aussi géopolitiquement et psychologiquement alors que Washington cherchait à étendre la portée de l'ordre international libéral dirigé par l'Occident au travers du globe. Cet effort de l'après-guerre froide pour créer un ordre mondial libéral de portée universelle a maintenant échoué. Émergeant dans son sillage, une période d'incertitude et de rivalité entre grandes puissances durera probablement tout au long de cette décennie naissante, sinon au-delà. Bien que le multilatéralisme fondé sur des règles ne soit pas entièrement incompatible avec la multipolarité, la notion d'un ordre mondial dirigé par l'Occident et enraciné dans des valeurs libérales l'est manifestement. En fait, la dynamique actuelle favorise la poursuite de relations globalement à somme nulle entre les États-Unis et l'entente sino-russe, et ce, même si la politique étrangère américaine renoue avec les alliances et l'internationalisme libéral ou si elle poursuit sa tendance à une défense plus amorale de la primauté mondiale américaine. Un tel résultat est contraire aux intérêts canadiens. Par conséquent, le Canada doit commencer à cultiver une position nationale de plus en plus indépendante à l'égard de l'Europe et de l'Asie-Pacifique, où son intérêt primordial demeure la préservation d'un ordre de sécurité stable. Les réalités de la géographie et du pouvoir garantissent que Washington restera le principal partenaire économique et sécuritaire d’Ottawa. Cependant, en tant que nation commerçante qui dépend fortement d'un cadre international fondé sur des règles, le Canada doit assurer un certain équilibre dans sa politique étrangère post-guerre froide fortement centrée sur les États-Unis s'il souhaite être un décideur et ne pas subir les décisions. Alors que les pressions d'un monde de plus en plus concurrent ont commencé à avoir des conséquences directes pour le Canada au cours des dernières années, la nécessité d'un ajustement est devenue évidente. Le Canada et la guerre froide Chine-États-Unis Au sein des milieux politiques occidentaux existe une notion commune à savoir que la Russie et la Chine sont des puissances révisionnistes déterminées à renverser l'ordre international. Cependant, Moscou et Pékin peuvent également être considérés comme ayant des objectifs de statu quo : le Kremlin souhaite maintenir le statut de grande puissance de la Russie après avoir émergé de la guerre froide en un État affaibli, tandis que le Parti communiste chinois cherche à conserver le pouvoir en partie en préservant les conditions internationales nécessaires pour poursuivre la modernisation économique de la Chine. En tant que telle, la menace qui pèse sur l'ordre établi fondé sur des règles n'émane pas d'une seule puissance, mais plutôt de la nature à somme nulle des relations entre grandes puissances qui est le résultat structurel inévitable du système actuel. Les relations américano-chinoises devenant plus tendues, le Canada se retrouve pris au milieu. Les efforts américains pour sévir contre Huawei et limiter les perspectives commerciales entre le Canada et la Chine, comme convenus dans l'accord de l'ACEUM, ont conduit à l'arrestation de deux citoyens canadiens en Chine et à une détérioration plus large des liens entre Ottawa et Pékin. Ce résultat est moins le produit des différends spécifiques entre le Canada et la Chine que le résultat de l’incapacité d’Ottawa à élaborer un paradigme stratégique plus large pour guider ses relations avec les grandes puissances concurrentes. L’incapacité du Canada à s’adapter à ce jour aux réalités du nouveau monde est attestée par ses relations en déclin ou en difficulté non seulement avec la Chine, mais aussi avec l’Inde, la Russie, l’Iran, l’Arabie saoudite et les États-Unis. Des exemples de concurrence croissante dans les relations sino-américaines sont antérieurs à l'administration Trump. Le président Obama a annoncé le « Pivot vers l'Asie » stratégique de son pays et a entrepris des efforts pour empêcher les alliés américains de rejoindre la Banque asiatique d'investissement pour les infrastructures dirigée par la Chine, tandis que le lancement par Pékin de la Belt and Road Initiative en 2013 visait à élever la Chine au-dessus du statut de puissance régionale. La guerre commerciale sino-américaine et la pandémie de la COVID-19 qui ont suivi marquent l'intensification et la consolidation de cette dynamique d'hostilité ouverte. Dans ce contexte, la Chine a traité la pandémie comme une double crise de sécurité nationale interne-externe et a évolué vers une posture internationale de plus en plus affirmée. Ceci, à son tour, a mené à un alignement renforcé entre les membres du Quad, composé des États-Unis, du Japon, de l'Australie et de l'Inde. Bien que les internationalistes libéraux aient fait de la défense et de la revitalisation des alliances américaines un élément central de leur critique du président Trump, cette tendance régionale vers une impasse bipolaire est susceptible de se poursuivre indépendamment de qui occupe la Maison-Blanche. Ironiquement, bien que la stratégie américaine soit théoriquement orientée vers la préservation d'une région « indo-pacifique libre et ouverte », la consolidation d'une guerre froide sino-américaine économiquement armée menace le caractère ouvert et fondé sur des règles du commerce régional. Cela limiterait les possibilités du Canada de diversifier ses partenaires commerciaux - un pilier clé de toute politique étrangère canadienne indépendante. Cela dit, l’agressivité croissante de la Chine et ses aspirations démesurées l’ont conduit vers une impasse. Tandis que la montée en puissance de la Chine a suivi l’émergence initiale d’après-guerre du Japon et des Tigres asiatiques en tant que puissances économiques, la prochaine vague de croissance asiatique en faveur de l’Inde et de l’ASEAN entraînera un déclin relatif de Pékin. La morosité actuelle de la Chine et sa conduite de plus en plus inflexible pourraient donc viser à créer un ordre régional favorable à la poursuite et à la préservation de ses intérêts fondamentaux avant que sa capacité à les garantir ne soit réduite. Ordre régional dans une Europe multipolaire Les États-Unis ont également fait un effort concerté pour coopter leurs partenaires européens dans leur lutte pour la prééminence vis-à-vis de la Chine. Cela révèle à quel point Washington a pivoté vers l'Asie depuis les premières décennies de l'après-guerre froide, donnant la priorité aux considérations stratégiques mondiales avant la poursuite d'un ordre de sécurité européen stable. L’Union européenne (UE) n’ayant pas réussi à construire un ordre réglementaire et politique centré sur Bruxelles couvrant l’ensemble du continent, le désengagement psychologique de Washington de l’Europe laisse une UE post-Brexit coincée dans un ordre régional multipolaire qui inclut également la Russie et la Turquie. L’alliance transatlantique dirigée par les États-Unis, qui exclut l’acteur le plus puissant militairement du continent européen (la Russie), ne peut pas agir comme le seul garant d’un cadre régional de sécurité stable dans ce contexte. Pourtant, malgré les questions non résolues concernant l'avenir du leadership américain, Washington n'a pas renoncé à son désir de maintenir la primauté régionale en Europe, tandis que Moscou reste réticente à entamer un véritable rapprochement avec Bruxelles en raison de l'incertitude sur le potentiel de l'UE à émerger comme un acteur de sécurité véritablement autonome. Ces deux facteurs garantissent la poursuite des tensions régionales. De plus, l'instabilité croissante en Europe ne peut être attribuée uniquement à un manque de leadership américain. La volonté croissante de la Turquie d’utiliser le hard power comme moyen de faire progresser ses intérêts stratégiques a été renforcée par le vide de pouvoir en Libye, qui est lui-même le produit de la surexploitation américaine qui a provoqué l’effondrement du régime de Kadhafi en 2011. La brève période post-guerre froide de la primauté américaine a créé l'illusion qu'un ordre international dirigé par l'Occident pouvait avoir une portée mondiale et être enraciné dans des valeurs partagées. Le Canada a un intérêt vital à faire en sorte que le déclin de cet ordre libéral ne soit pas remplacé par un monde enraciné dans des sphères d'influence. Pourtant, les trois grandes puissances mondiales - les États-Unis, la Chine et la Russie - semblent poursuivre des stratégies qui visent d'une manière ou d'une autre à cela : découper de manière préventive des arrangements régionaux dans une compétition à somme nulle pour compenser leur fragilité politique interne et se prémunir contre la possibilité de leur déclin relatif à moyen terme. Les États-Unis en particulier, confrontés à une multitude de défis socio-économiques et politiques, ne seront probablement pas disposés à réviser les principes fondamentaux de leur position internationale axée sur la primauté. Les grandes puissances n'ont qu'une influence limitée dans un monde basé sur un statut d’État souverain universel, mais cette décennie à venir précède la future consolidation potentielle de l'Europe et l'essor de l'Afrique et du Rimland asiatique. Dans l'intervalle, le triangle États-Unis-Russie-Chine jouera vraisemblablement un rôle important dans l'élaboration des contours de l'ordre mondial émergent. Conclusion Dans un monde de plus en plus concurrentiel, le Canada ne se retrouve plus isolé par sa géographie ou l’unipolarité américaine. Les tensions croissantes en Europe et dans la région de l’Asie-Pacifique - deux théâtres auxquels le Canada est directement confronté - menacent d'imposer des pressions économiques et sécuritaires qui restreignent la liberté d'action du Canada. En réponse à la divergence croissante des intérêts entre le Canada et les États-Unis, l'occasion est mûre pour Ottawa de faire progresser sa propre vision de la sécurité régionale et de jouer un rôle plus actif dans le maintien de l'ordre mondial. En ce qui concerne l'Asie, le Canada devrait chercher à peindre un contraste avec le Quad, en soutenant Washington dans tous les efforts visant à préserver un ordre régional ouvert, mais en résistant aux plans visant à contenir la Chine. Ottawa devrait s'opposer à toute initiative agressive de Pékin pour ancrer une sphère d'influence chinoise dans des endroits comme la mer de Chine du Sud. Cependant, il doit saluer le désir de la Chine de jouer un rôle régional à la mesure de son influence croissante, reconnaître la légitimité de ses préoccupations en matière de sécurité et aider à la guider vers une posture mondiale plus conforme à ses capacités encore naissantes. Cela marquerait un changement par rapport à la récente politique chinoise du Canada enracinée dans l’engagement pour l’engagement, au profit d’une approche plus stratégique, mais non alarmiste visant à positionner le Canada comme un défenseur de la stabilité et un interlocuteur de confiance pour toutes les parties. Il ne s'agit pas d'un appel à l'équidistance entre les États-Unis et la Chine, mais plutôt d'un appel à incorporer un équilibre plus conceptuellement développé dans la politique étrangère canadienne, conçu pour s'adapter aux nouvelles pressions internationales et maintenir les possibilités futures de diversification du commerce. Dans le cas de l'Europe, sans compromettre sa position de membre de premier plan de l'OTAN ni accepter le révisionnisme territorial russe, le Canada devrait ouvertement indiquer sa préférence pour un ordre de sécurité européen stable et annoncer qu'il est prêt à engager un dialogue avec toutes les parties à cette fin. Le déclin relatif à moyen terme des États-Unis a conduit à la réémergence de l'Eurasie au centre de la puissance mondiale. Même si les tendances démographiques et autres favorisent une période renouvelée de domination américaine à long terme, un paradigme stratégique axé sur l'équilibre entre l'Eurasie et les États-Unis contribuera à faire en sorte que le Canada sorte de cette période d'instabilité en tant qu'acteur indépendant avec une économie en croissance et une plateforme diplomatiquement interconnectée capable d'utiliser son voisin du sud comme multiplicateur de puissance à l'échelle mondiale. ## Ne comptez pas sur nous : l’impréparation militaire du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/ne-comptez-pas-sur-nous-limpreparation-militaire-du-canada/ Modified: 2024-06-17 L’armée canadienne est en proie à une « spirale mortelle ». C’est ainsi que le ministre de la Défense nationale, Bill Blair, a décrit l’état des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) lors de la Conférence annuelle sur la sécurité et la défense d’Ottawa le mois dernier. Les remarques de Blair font référence à la profonde crise de recrutement et de rétention à laquelle l’armée canadienne est confrontée. Les FAC font face à un déficit de 16 000 personnes, soit environ 15 % de leur effectif autorisé de 71 500 membres dans la force régulière et de 30 000 réservistes. Malgré diverses initiatives telles que l’ouverture de l’armée aux résidents permanents, aucune amélioration significative n’est en vue. À peine moins de 1 % des demandes de résidents permanents pour rejoindre les forces régulières ont été acceptées, avec notamment 15 000 demandeurs ayant abandonné le processus de demande d’une longueur de 18 à 24 mois. Malgré les contrats de haut niveau conclus par le gouvernement canadien pour l’acquisition de nouveaux équipements tels que des F-35, des drones Predator et des P-8A Poseidon, l’incertitude persiste quant à la disponibilité du personnel nécessaire pour utiliser ces capacités une fois qu’elles seront opérationnelles, compte tenu du rythme actuel. Les alliés et les critiques demandent à juste titre au Canada de respecter l’objectif de dépenses de défense à la hauteur de 2 % du produit intérieur brut tel qu’exigé par l’OTAN. Cependant, les défis auxquels est confrontée l’armée canadienne vont bien au-delà du simple manque de financement. La capacité du Canada à apporter une contribution significative aux opérations alliées majeures est sérieusement remise en question dans un avenir proche. Malgré une augmentation des dépenses de défense de 70 % entre 2017 et 2026, un rapport interne sur l’état de préparation des Forces armées canadiennes a été rendu public dans les médias la même semaine que les remarques de Blair. Ce rapport dresse un tableau sombre : la plupart des principales flottes du Canada ne sont pas disponibles ou sont inutilisables. En effet, en moyenne, seulement 45 % de la flotte aérienne du Canada est opérationnelle, tandis que la Marine royale canadienne peut opérer à 46 % de sa capacité et l’armée à 54 %. Cela signifie que même l’ambition modeste du Canada en matière de projection militaire – qui se limite à seulement trois frégates, deux escadrons de chasseurs et une brigade mécanisée – n’est pas garantie. En tant que neuvième économie mondiale et douzième en termes de PIB par habitant, le Canada apporte en réalité une contribution relativement faible à la sécurité de ses alliés et semble être incapable de soutenir ses propres objectifs militaires limités. Peu d’indices laissent présager une amélioration prochaine pour l’armée canadienne. Le 8 avril 2024, le gouvernement canadien a annoncé un nouveau financement de la défense dépassant les 72 milliards de dollars sur les deux prochaines décennies. Cela devrait porter les dépenses militaires canadiennes à un maximum de 1,76 % du produit intérieur brut en 2029. Cette injection de fonds est bienvenue, s’ajoutant aux quelque 215 milliards de dollars que le gouvernement prévoit d’investir au cours des 20 prochaines années. Cependant, la majeure partie de ces nouvelles dépenses ne devrait être débloquée qu’au cours de la prochaine décennie et ne résoudra pas les problèmes immédiats de l’armée. Selon le chef d’état-major de la Défense, le général Eyre, il ne manque pas 16 000 militaires au sein des FAC, mais plutôt 30 000 afin d’être en mesure de mettre en œuvre la nouvelle politique de défense canadienne intitulée Notre Nord, fort et libre. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## Nouvelles technologies, changements climatiques et guerre en Ukraine : Quels impacts sur la modernisation du NORAD ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/nouvelles-technologies-changements-climatiques-et-guerre-en-ukraine-quels-impacts-sur-la-modernisation-du-norad/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > L’urgence climatique prend de l’ampleur au même moment où le contexte géopolitique bascule : le Canada peut affirmer ses choix et démontrer L’invasion russe de l’Ukraine remet à l’agenda du gouvernement canadien l’importante modernisation du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD). En réponse à cette guerre, la ministre de la Défense nationale Anita Anand a assuré que même si elle n’était pas en mesure de fournir les plans pour moderniser le NORAD pour l’instant, la Défense nationale travaille activement à développer un ensemble de nouvelles technologies à court terme. Le Canada semble enfin enclin à prioriser la défense de son territoire, alors qu’il a laissé ce chapitre non écrit dans sa politique de défense de 2017. Deux motifs principaux doivent guider le Canada dans le processus de modernisation du NORAD, qui sera prioritaire au cours de la prochaine décennie : les impératifs de défense bien définis des États-Unis et l’urgence des changements climatiques, particulièrement en région arctique. Le contexte international de compétition entre grandes puissances, où l’Arctique sera décidément un théâtre important, est en filigrane de ces deux motifs : il pousse les États-Unis à agir, et fait surgir de nouvelles menaces au fur et à mesure que les changements climatiques modifient la géographie du territoire. D’un côté, les États-Unis doivent moderniser leurs capacités afin de contrer les nouvelles technologies russes et chinoises, qui sont difficiles à détecter et neutraliser. Les capacités du NORAD en ce sens sont très limitées, surtout en ce qui concerne le Système d’alerte Nord (SAN), déjà ciblé comme l’une des priorités du processus de modernisation du NORAD. La particularité de cet enjeu est que les États-Unis ont des priorités claires pour leur stratégie de défense à cet égard – ce qui n’est pas le cas du Canada. D’un autre côté, les changements climatiques ouvrent non seulement la voie à de nouvelles menaces extérieures en raison de leur impact sur la géographie du territoire – notamment la fonte des glaces en Arctique –, mais aussi en raison de menaces intrinsèques à ces bouleversements climatiques, comme les dommages potentiels aux infrastructures essentielles à la défense, ou le dépassement des capacités opérationnelles des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC). Pourtant, les changements climatiques sont quasi absents de la réflexion sur le NORAD, malgré l’impact majeur qu’ils auront sur les activités de la Défense au cours des prochaines années. L’urgence climatique et les impératifs américains doivent pousser le Canada à définir ses propres priorités et à choisir ses avenues d’actions concrètes – des avenues qui refléteront également les valeurs canadiennes. Cette note politique propose un état des lieux sur la modernisation du NORAD ainsi qu’un survol des impératifs et des priorités de Washington et du NORAD en matière de défense. Le texte présente les avancements de la Défense canadienne en matière de changements climatiques ainsi que les différents impacts que ces derniers auront sur ses activités et ses capacités. Finalement, des considérations et des recommandations pour le Canada sont formulées, en fonction du contexte international actuellement bouleversé par la guerre en Ukraine. Un état des lieux sur la modernisation du NORAD En janvier 2022, le général VanHerck, commandant du NORAD et du United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), avançait que la modernisation du NORAD doit s’effectuer sur une fenêtre de cinq à six ans. Techniquement, beaucoup a déjà été fait pour déterminer ce qui est à moderniser et quelles sont les priorités. Par exemple, la mise à niveau du SAN, l’importance d’une dissuasion intégrée et le besoin urgent de renforcer les capacités en matière de connaissance du domaine (domain awareness), de surveillance et de contrôle, notamment dans l’Arctique, sont tous déjà établis comme des priorités pour la prochaine évolution du NORAD. Toutefois, les actions concrètes se font attendre. Le ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) a annoncé le 31 janvier 2022 avoir accordé un contrat de soutien en service du SAN à la Nasittuq Corporation, une entreprise inuite. Ce contrat de maintenance et d’entretien du système actuel est loin de celui d’une modernisation, attendu depuis plusieurs années en raison de la désuétude des capacités du SAN, qui fut complété entre 1986 et 1992 en utilisant la technologie disponible des années 1970. Il a été conçu pour détecter les menaces de bombardements aériens provenant de l’URSS, une menace datant de 50 ans déjà. Bien qu’elle figure parmi les priorités énoncées dans la politique de défense du Canada Protection, Sécurité, Engagement (PSE) de 2017, la modernisation du NORAD et du SAN n’a toujours pas d’avenue concrète et spécifique adoptée par les États-Unis et le Canada. Le dernier budget fédéral de 2021 allouait de nouvelles dépenses totalisant plus de 100 milliards au cours des prochaines années, dont 163 millions seulement seront attribués à la modernisation du NORAD. Tout porte à croire que ces fonds seront (ou ont été) alloués à la recherche et à l’élaboration de concepts, puisqu’aucun projet concret de modernisation n’a été annoncé au cours de la dernière année. Les estimations des coûts de la modernisation se chiffrent entre 10 et 15 milliards, le Canada devant possiblement régler 40% de la facture totale. Les dépenses liées à la modernisation du NORAD sont donc appelées à augmenter au cours de la prochaine décennie, au-delà de ce qui a été prévu dans la politique de défense du gouvernement Trudeau. Le général VanHerck a énoncé que la prochaine étape de cette modernisation se trouve maintenant dans les mains du politique : « The next step in my mind is for the secretary of Defense and the minister of National Defense to sit down and come up with a framework that moves both Canada and United States forward within our departments on how we would talk about fielding of these capabilities, the agreements for who’s going to pay for what, what capabilities. » L’évolution du NORAD est donc entamée, mais elle reste à concrétiser. Même si les États-Unis et le Canada réaffirment leur partenariat depuis un an, les détails du plan pour moderniser le NORAD ne sont toujours pas révélés. Ceci est d’autant plus problématique que les demandes américaines pour mettre en œuvre leur vision de cette modernisation susciteront le débat au Canada. Cela ne devrait pas tarder : la ministre de la Défense Anita Anand a mentionné récemment qu’elle entend mener à bien la modernisation du NORAD à court terme et que « le Canada sera à la table des négociations avec un ensemble de mesures solides pour améliorer NORAD ». Peu importe la nature de ces mesures, le gouvernement devra rendre des comptes à la population canadienne et se montrer transparent. Les impératifs américains dans la modernisation du NORAD et leur stratégie de défense Lors d’un entretien de janvier 2022, le général VanHerck a clarifié trois de ses priorités pour la modernisation du NORAD. La première est la connaissance du domaine, ce qui comprend la modernisation des capacités du SAN, afin de créer une dissuasion efficace et qui permet de prendre des décisions éclairées. La seconde priorité découle de la première : la supériorité décisionnelle ou encore la domination de l’information, afin que celle-ci arrive aux bonnes personnes plus rapidement. La troisième priorité est la mise en place d’une dissuasion intégrée de tous les domaines, puisque selon le général, tous les problèmes et les enjeux actuels sont globaux et ne peuvent plus être réglés de façon régionale ou par un seul domaine. La vision du général VanHerck s’étend au-delà de l’Amérique du Nord : « My defense plan for North America doesn’t start in North America. It starts forward with allies and partners. It starts forward with my fellow combat commanders and CJOC being able to create day to day deterrence options, and de escalation options, and if required, defeat, but not defeat in North America, defeat forward. » Ces priorités cadrent évidemment avec la Stratégie du NORAD et du USNORTHCOM de mars 2021, qui détaille quatre principes stratégiques clés : une approche intégrée de défense (en termes de régions, de domaines et d’États), la connaissance du domaine, la domination de l’information et la supériorité décisionnelle. Pour mieux comprendre cette stratégie, il est important de distinguer les rôles du NORAD et du USNORTHCOM : le NORAD s’occupe du contrôle aérospatial et des alertes aérospatiales et maritimes pour la défense de l’Amérique du Nord, tandis que le USNORTHCOM défend le territoire des États-Unis – dissuade, détecte et vainc les menaces contre les États-Unis, mène des activités de coopération en matière de sécurité avec les alliés et les partenaires, et soutient les autorités civiles. Le NORAD et le USNORTHCOM coopèrent depuis la création de ce dernier en 2002. Il faut donc garder en tête que les nouveaux développements défensifs des États-Unis associés à l’aérospatial ou à l’Arctique n’ont pas nécessairement à passer par le NORAD : c’est le cas notamment de la défense antimissile (GMD et BMD). Les États-Unis, conformément à leur stratégie de défense, accordent beaucoup de valeur et d’importance à la création d’une structure permettant une dissuasion intégrée et une fenêtre d’opportunités de première frappe/réponse. Cette dissuasion est intégrée en ce qu’elle prend en considération cinq catégories : Tous les domaines (conventionnel, nucléaire, cyber, spatial, informationnel); Tous les théâtres de compétition et de conflits potentiels; Tout le spectre des conflits – de la guerre de haute intensité à la zone grise; Tous les instruments de pouvoir nationaux (sanctions économiques, outils diplomatiques, etc.); Tous les alliés et les partenaires américains (Europe, Asie, Amériques, etc.). Les États-Unis ne veulent pas se retrouver dans la position vulnérable associée à l’époque de la guerre froide. Ils craignent de se laisser distancer par le développement des nouvelles technologies russes et chinoises. Ces technologies, comme les véhicules à planeurs hypersoniques, par exemple testés en Arctique par la Russie au cours de la dernière année, peuvent esquiver les radars terrestres en se cachant derrière la courbure de la Terre. Du fait de leur rapidité de déplacement et de leur manœuvrabilité pour échapper aux mesures défensives, ces missiles sont extrêmement difficiles à repérer et à abattre. Les États-Unis poursuivent deux technologies clés afin de gagner la course : les systèmes « boost-glide » qui placent un véhicule planeur hypersonique au sommet d’un propulseur de missile balistique, et les missiles de croisière hypersoniques qui utiliseraient les technologies « scramjet » (qui permettent un fonctionnement efficace à des vitesses hypersoniques et une combustion supersonique). Les armes hypersoniques vont permettre aux États-Unis d’être une source de dissuasion crédible contre la Chine et la Russie, qui ont déjà des armes hypersoniques fonctionnelles. Les armes hypersoniques font également partie du « Conventional Prompt Global Strike Program » des États-Unis, par lequel Washington veut acquérir la capacité d’effectuer des frappes dans un délai minimal (pas plus d’une heure après avoir donné l’ordre de frapper la cible) avec un haut degré de sécurité technique partout dans le monde. Il s’agit d’une façon pour la puissance américaine d’avoir un meilleur temps de réponse ou d’attaque – c’est-à-dire la supériorité décisionnelle, l’une des priorités stratégiques du NORAD et du USNORTHCOM. Lors d’un témoignage devant la Commission des forces armées de la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis le 8 mars dernier, le général VanHerck a réaffirmé l’importance de la menace russe. Il propose deux solutions pour améliorer les capacités de détection et de connaissance du domaine : un système intégré de surveillance sous-marine et un système de radars à horizon lointain (over-the-horizon). Le général a mentionné son intention de travailler conjointement avec la Marine américaine et le Canada pour surveiller et assurer la connaissance des positions des sous-marins autour du globe. Enfin, concernant les radars à horizon lointain, VanHerck a précisé que ce système aurait une portée d’environ 6400 km dans les domaines maritime, aérien et spatial. Ce nouveau système offrirait une capacité d’alerte rapide nettement supérieure à celle des systèmes existants, permettant de combler les limites du SAN. Pour atteindre la domination de l’information, la Stratégie du NORAD et du USNORTHCOM se base sur le concept de commandement et de contrôle interarmées tous domaines (Joint All-Domain Command and Control – JADC2) pour surmonter les cloisonnements entre les services, les organismes et les pays. C’est notamment grâce à l’intelligence artificielle et à l’apprentissage automatique (machine learning) que le NORAD pourra traiter, afficher et diffuser rapidement les données recueillies par les systèmes. La résilience des systèmes et des infrastructures critiques sera aussi un thème important pour le NORAD et le USNORTHCOM au cours des prochaines années. Selon Colin Kahl, le sous-secrétaire à la Défense pour les politiques, les adversaires des États-Unis n’ont pas l’intention de mener un conflit prolongé contre eux, mais plutôt de les aveugler et les ralentir. Or, la résilience, définie comme la capacité d’un système à prévenir les perturbations, à y répondre et/ou à s’y adapter, a été négligée au cours des dernières années par Washington. Il va sans dire que cet attribut est essentiel au domaine de la défense aérospatiale, dont le NORAD est un des principaux gardiens. Les États-Unis cherchent donc à maintenir leur supériorité au niveau de la défense et le NORAD peut être un véhicule par lequel ils implanteront de nouvelles technologies et effectueront les mises à jour nécessaires à l’atteinte des objectifs américains. Dans la Stratégie du NORAD et du USNORTHCOM, il est clairement énoncé que : « We must defend our nations should deterrence fail and our adversaries attack. Our surest path is through a globally integrated and resilient all-domain awareness infrastructure that is processed, synchronized, and presented to create information dominance, resulting in decision superiority over adversaries. Embracing these strategic principles requires a fundamental change of culture for NORAD and USNORTHCOM and our mission partners. » Les impacts réels pour le Canada de ce changement de culture annoncé au sein du NORAD sont difficiles à évaluer pour l’instant. Il demeure que les priorités canadiennes ne sont pas aussi clairement définies et que l’aspect offensif de certains impératifs américains susmentionnés ne cadre pas avec les valeurs canadiennes traditionnellement mises de l’avant au cours des dernières années. Les changements climatiques, quant à eux, sont cependant une priorité évidente pour la Défense canadienne, même s’ils sont peu mentionnés lorsqu’il est question de la modernisation du NORAD. Les changements climatiques et la Défense nationale canadienne Les changements climatiques sont considérés, d’un point de vue de défense et sécurité, comme un « facteur de multiplication des menaces », puisque le stress climatique augmente des risques sécuritaires interreliés. Les changements climatiques sont donc un enjeu de sécurité nationale et devraient être traités de cette façon pour penser la modernisation du NORAD. Le MDN et les FAC ont, au cours des dernières années, mis en place plusieurs instruments et stratégies prenant en considération l’impact des changements climatiques sur la défense canadienne. La politique de défense du Canada de 2017 identifie les changements climatiques comme un élément prédominant des différents problèmes de sécurité humaine et nationale dans l’Arctique et des catastrophes humanitaires. Cela entraîne une « hausse des besoins en services de recherche et sauvetage une attention internationale et des activités militaires accrues ». Le MDN a également publié en 2020 la Stratégie énergétique et environnementale de la Défense (SEED) 2020-2023, qui fait état de l’avancée des objectifs d’écologisation du MDN. En effet, le MDN est reconnu comme le « plus grand consommateur d’énergie et le plus grand émetteur de du gouvernement fédéral ».  La SEED présente trois grands objectifs : produire moins de gaspillage d’énergie et une énergie plus propre, réduire les risques liés aux changements climatiques et réduire l’empreinte environnementale de la Défense. Elle cible plusieurs sous-objectifs, comme une réduction de 40% des émissions de GES d’ici 2025 et une émission nette à zéro d’ici 2050, l’utilisation de sources d’énergie plus propres pour les bâtiments et les véhicules, et élaborer des cadres d’évaluation des risques des changements climatiques sur les FAC. Par contre, les cibles de réduction absolue des émissions de GES (40% d’ici 2025 et de 90% d’ici 2050) ne s’appliquent pas au parc de véhicules de sûreté et de sécurité nationale – qui inclut les aéronefs, les navires et les véhicules terrestres tactiques du MDN, de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada et de la Garde côtière canadienne. Il est annoncé qu’afin de contribuer à l’objectif d’émissions nettes zéro d’ici 2050 fixé par la SEED et la Stratégie pour un gouvernement vert, la mise à niveau du parc de véhicules va tenir compte « de la disponibilité, du respect des capacités financières et de la faisabilité opérationnelle ». En effet, malgré les objectifs atteints ou fixés de la SEED 2020-2023, les deux plus gros projets actuels d’acquisition du Canada – les 88 avions chasseurs et les 15 navires de combat de surface – ne semblent pas aller dans le sens de la SEED, puisque ces acquisitions utiliseront encore les énergies pétrolières et continueront à émettre des GES. En ce sens, il y a une contradiction entre l’obligation du Canada de renouveler ses capacités afin d’être un partenaire utile au sein de ses alliances (l’OTAN et le NORAD notamment) et d’être en mesure d’assurer sa souveraineté sur son territoire, vis-à-vis de la volonté canadienne de réduire son empreinte écologique. Il est certain que les enjeux de sécurité nationale ne peuvent pas être soustraits aux enjeux posés par les changements climatiques dans un environnement international aussi incertain. En revanche, trouver une façon de concilier ces impératifs est nécessaire, surtout quand le MDN est déjà avisé des impacts des changements climatiques sur ses activités. En effet, les changements climatiques ont de multiples impacts majeurs sur les activités de la Défense nationale et des FAC, notamment en ce qui concerne trois grandes catégories : leurs infrastructures, les nouvelles menaces en Arctique et les déploiements militaires. Les infrastructures des FAC et du MDN Les changements climatiques affectent grandement les infrastructures militaires canadiennes, particulièrement en région arctique. Celles-ci doivent potentiellement être repensées, déplacées ou rénovées en raison des impacts des changements climatiques, mais aussi pour atteindre l’objectif de réduction des GES du MDN et ses objectifs de la SEED 2020-2023. La fonte du pergélisol et la hausse du niveau de l’eau, particulièrement, pourraient avoir de graves conséquences sur les installations du NORAD en Arctique. L’environnement opérationnel est particulièrement difficile en Arctique et les infrastructures doivent être adaptées pour être plus résilientes à des conditions météorologiques extrêmes. Et pourtant, les changements climatiques sont à peine considérés dans la réflexion entourant l’évolution du NORAD. L’Arctique et les changements climatiques Les changements climatiques augmentent l’importance géostratégique de l’Arctique. Selon le MDN, les changements climatiques ont entraîné « l’accroissement de la navigabilité dans l’Arctique » et le Canada doit y améliorer sa capacité de surveillance des activités. Cette nécessité figure parmi les priorités de la modernisation du NORAD, mais aussi dans le Cadre stratégique pour l’Arctique et le Nord du Canada de 2019. Selon ce Cadre, deux priorités s’imposent : renforcer les capacités du Canada en matière de connaissance du domaine, de surveillance et de contrôle dans l’Arctique, notamment par « l’acquisition de nouvelles capacités aériennes, terrestres, maritimes et spatiales » et de renforcer la protection environnementale dans la région. Cependant, mise à part la modernisation de la flotte CP-140 Aurora, aucun investissement n’est prévu précisément pour la surveillance sous-marine dans la politique de défense du Canada – une capacité incontournable en Arctique. La sécurité humaine est aussi particulièrement importante, surtout en ce qui concerne les Premières Nations qui sont confrontées à d’importants bouleversements dus aux conséquences des changements climatiques (déplacements de population, inondations, feux de forêt, etc.). Les FAC et les Rangers jouent donc un rôle clé dans la région arctique, autant pour assurer la souveraineté canadienne que pour assurer la sécurité des habitants : un rôle qui est d’ailleurs appelé à prendre de l’ampleur.  Pourtant, la seule base permanente en région arctique se compose d’environ 55 personnes à Alert, sur l’Île d’Ellesmere, et d’environ 1 400 membres du 1er Groupe de patrouille des Rangers canadiens dispersés dans le Nord. Les déploiements militaires Les FAC ressentent déjà l’impact des changements climatiques sur leur disponibilité, leurs opérations, leur formation, leurs exercices et leurs installations. La demande pour l’intervention des FAC au Canada à la suite de catastrophes naturelles (l’opération LENTUS) est plus fréquente, et cette tendance continuera à s’aggraver en raison de l’instabilité générée par les changements climatiques. Cela est sans compter la demande causée par des enjeux domestiques autres que les désastres naturels, comme l’opération LASER – la réponse des FAC à la pandémie de COVID-19. Plus encore, cette pression sur la demande des FAC se fait aussi sentir à l’international. Dans le cadre du pilier d’engagement à l’international réitéré dans la politique de défense du Canada, les FAC sont appelées à porter assistance lors de missions humanitaires à la suite de catastrophes – des catastrophes qui seront plus fréquentes avec les changements climatiques. L’enjeu de la demande et de la hausse du nombre de déploiements des FAC se superpose à celui du manque de personnel. Les FAC devraient compter environ 100 000 soldats à plein effectif, mais il leur manquait environ 10 000 membres à la fin du mois de novembre 2021. 10 000 autres membres étaient répertoriés comme indisponibles pour le service parce qu’ils n’étaient pas formés, ou encore malades ou blessés. La ministre de la Défense Anita Anand a d’ailleurs énoncé à ce sujet que même si le monde souhaite voir le Canada plus impliqué à travers le monde, la Défense travaille actuellement à évaluer les capacités des FAC à répondre à la demande simultanément à de multiples endroits. La demande est donc forte quant au soutien des FAC et requiert un effort de priorisation des demandes et de formation du personnel. Les changements climatiques doivent donc être une priorité dans la modernisation du NORAD, au même titre que les demandes américaines et les considérations géopolitiques internationales. Les conséquences de l’invasion russe en Ukraine : Considérations géopolitiques pour le Canada La prévention plutôt que la défense (offensive) du territoire nord-américain a été l’approche privilégiée par le NORAD depuis sa création, et ce, malgré les ambitions stratégiques des États-Unis. Cette prévention va de pair avec la dissuasion. Le débat sur les avenues offensives de la défense aérospatiale – comprise dans le mandat du NORAD – refait cependant ponctuellement surface, au gré des nouvelles menaces, du contexte international changeant et des renégociations du NORAD. La modernisation du NORAD actuelle, maintenant dans les mains du politique, couplée avec les nouvelles technologies russes et chinoises, sont suffisantes pour raviver ce débat. L’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie le 24 février dernier pourrait bien ouvrir la voie à un revirement de la position canadienne face à la défense antimissile. La guerre en Ukraine affecte déjà les perceptions canadiennes de la Russie, autant au niveau de la population que du politique. Le parti conservateur en appelle aussi à ce que le Canada prenne plus au sérieux la sécurité de son territoire arctique et insiste sur l’importance de moderniser le NORAD. Le Canada, qui accueille la plus grande diaspora ukrainienne en dehors de l’Ukraine et de la Russie, a tout intérêt à réagir fortement contre la Russie – c’est d’ailleurs avantageux pour un appui électoral de la population d’origine ukrainienne aux prochaines élections.  Il est fort probable que l’invasion russe, considérée par certains comme un moment qui « inaugure une nouvelle ère dans la géopolitique mondiale », donne une impulsion suffisante pour que le Canada réévalue son implication dans la défense antimissile.  Comme le mentionne Andrea Charron, « l’Ukraine a rendu le NORAD encore plus important, car nous sommes la porte d’entrée de l’OTAN ». Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, la crainte d’une attaque russe limitée en Arctique n’a jamais été aussi réelle qu’actuellement, surtout si Poutine se sent pris au piège en Ukraine. La défense antimissile serait en ce sens un moyen de dissuader la Russie d’un tel type d’attaque, mais aussi de défendre efficacement le territoire canadien. Le contexte géopolitique actuel pousse plusieurs experts à recommander une augmentation du budget de défense du Canada afin d’accroître ses capacités de défense. La ministre Anand envisage actuellement plusieurs options en ce qui concerne le budget pour la Défense, dont des options « agressives » allant jusqu’à dépasser 2% du PIB. Dans tous les cas, cela doit passer prioritairement par l’investissement dans la mise à niveau du NORAD. L’invasion russe en Ukraine est une occasion pour le Canada de se montrer à la hauteur de ses alliés de l’OTAN, au moment où le calcul politique des dépenses de défense en Europe change profondément, et d’investir concrètement dans le rehaussement de ses capacités défensives. Enfin, le Canada ne doit pas oublier les quatre années au pouvoir de Donald Trump à la présidence américaine, au cours desquelles il était beaucoup plus difficile d’arriver à des consensus entre les deux États. Le gouvernement Trudeau aurait tout avantage à profiter de la coopération et de l’ouverture de l’administration Biden, car le vent pourrait bien tourner lors des prochaines élections américaines. Le retour des Républicains au pouvoir et d’un président potentiellement aussi imprévisible que Trump pourrait entraver gravement la coopération militaire du Canada et des États-Unis et les travaux de la modernisation du NORAD, alors que l’environnement international plonge de plus en plus vers la multipolarité. Dans ce scénario, les États-Unis pourraient décider de jouer la carte de l’unilatéralisme et cesser de prioriser le partenariat avec le Canada, en agissant sans le consulter. Le Canada ne peut pas défendre son territoire seul et dépend de la coopération avec les États-Unis, qu’il le veuille ou non – armes nucléaires y compris. Une administration républicaine telle que connue sous le président Trump ne serait donc pas de bon augure pour le Canada. En tenant compte de l’environnement géopolitique actuel et de la polarisation de l’électorat américain, tout porte à croire que le meilleur moment pour être proactif et conclure des accords sur la modernisation du NORAD est maintenant. Recommandations pour le Canada La dimension holistique de la modernisation du NORAD (connaissance de tous les domaines et dissuasion intégrée) implique beaucoup de ramifications et de zones floues à ce jour. Quel rôle le Canada jouera-t-il et quelles sont les limites de son implication quant aux nouvelles technologies convoitées par les États-Unis ? Ces réponses sont pour l’instant dans les mains du politique, mais elles devront être définies. Le Canada et les États-Unis s’entendent sur plusieurs éléments de la modernisation du NORAD. La nécessité de la connaissance de tous les domaines, surtout en Arctique, fait consensus, de même que l’importance d’une dissuasion intégrée. Cependant, la participation du Canada à chacun de ces domaines (conventionnel, cyber, spatial, informationnel), théâtres et spectres d’intervention demeure nébuleuse, car peu abordée par le gouvernement canadien et peu débattue dans la société civile. Ceci inclut bien entendu l’épineux dossier de la défense antimissile. Le Canada doit définir les capacités qu’il souhaite prioriser sur son territoire. Des systèmes de radars à horizon lointain (over-the-horizon) pour le SAN doivent être l’une des priorités pour faire face aux nouvelles technologies russes et chinoises, tel qu’avancé par le général Van Herck. La surveillance sous-marine sera également une nécessité, une capacité qui n’est actuellement pas priorisée dans les investissements de la Défense, mais qui fait partie des priorités américaines. La possibilité d’investir dans des capacités du domaine cyber n’est pas à négliger, et cela pourrait représenter une façon pour le Canada d’acquérir des capacités offensives sans passer par la défense antimissile. L’utilisation de drones, de sous-marins et de satellites pour la connaissance du domaine en Arctique doit également être ciblée comme prioritaire, autant en ce qui concerne la détection de menaces que pour surveiller les conséquences des changements climatiques. Les changements climatiques et la résurgence actuelle de la menace russe en Arctique mettent également en relief l’importance d’investir dans de meilleures capacités de recherche et sauvetage. À cela s’ajoutent les difficultés reliées au processus d’approvisionnement de la Défense, les longs délais à prévoir avant la finalisation des projets – la majorité des projets d’acquisition actuels ne seront prêts qu’à partir de la fin de la décennie – et les capacités limitées des FAC. Le Canada n’a tout simplement pas le choix d’investir maintenant dans le NORAD. Les impacts des changements climatiques doivent également être pris en considération concrètement dans la modernisation du NORAD. Non seulement cela est nécessaire, mais urgent. Le Canada doit considérer que les changements climatiques engendrent une hausse de la demande des FAC, que ce soit à l’international ou sur le territoire canadien. L’environnement mondial plus qu’incertain actuellement soulèvera des demandes américaines concernant la protection du territoire nord-américain, sans compter les théâtres européen et asiatique. Les FAC, en manque de personnel tout en étant plus sollicitées, devront revoir leurs priorités et leur structure, afin de répondre aux nouvelles demandes. Le MDN devrait aussi prioriser la modernisation et l’écologisation des infrastructures des FAC et du MDN, surtout en Arctique. Tout en étant en conformité avec la SEED et PSE, cela permettrait de mettre à niveau les infrastructures et les installations autant au niveau des émissions des GES, que pour prévenir les conséquences des changements climatiques sur ces dernières. De plus, cela permettrait d’équilibrer les coûts environnementaux reliés aux grands projets d’acquisition canadiens susmentionnés. Ces mises à niveau comptent aussi le processus de modernisation du NORAD : une modernisation qui ne peut plus attendre afin de renforcer les capacités de surveillance et de connaissance du domaine du Canada. Finalement, le Canada doit repenser sa façon de travailler avec les États-Unis. Ottawa doit se montrer proactif quant à l’impact des changements climatiques sur ses capacités et ses activités de défense et cesser d’être en réaction avec les décisions de son voisin du Sud. Le partenariat et le dialogue avec les États-Unis sont nécessaires, mais cela ne veut pas dire que le Canada doit être dans l’attente. L’urgence climatique prend de l’ampleur au même moment où le contexte géopolitique bascule : le Canada peut affirmer ses choix et démontrer son leadership dans la modernisation du NORAD. ## Opinion publique et dépenses militaires au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/opinion-publique-et-depenses-militaires-au-canada/ Modified: 2021-09-22 > Avec Jean-Christophe Boucher, professeur adjoint, Département de science politique à l’Université de Calgary et chercheur au RAS. Ce projet propose d’évaluer les facteurs influençant l’opinion des Canadiens en matière de dépenses militaires à l’aide de sondages expérimentaux. La compétition entre grandes puissances crée-t-elle un environnement international hasardeux qui justifierait une croissance des dépenses militaires afin de faire face à l’instabilité mondiale ? L’attitude du public envers les dépenses militaires est-elle influencée par le type d’interventions ou missions militaires auxquelles prennent part les Forces armées canadiennes ? Notre sondage, comprenant six traitements et un groupe contrôle (2 800 participants), fut déployé en juillet 2021 par la firme de sondage Nanos Research. Avec Jean-Christophe Boucher, professeur adjoint, Département de science politique à l’Université de Calgary et chercheur au RAS. ## Opportunité dans la modernisation du NORAD : créer une composante cybernétique interorganisationelle interarmées URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/opportunite-dans-la-modernisation-du-norad-creer-une-composante-cybernetique-interorganisationelle-interarmees/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Ce billet explore la création d’une composante cybernétique interorganisationelle interarmées au sein du NORAD. Sommaire Ce document explore la création d’une composante cybernétique interorganisationelle interarmées (Joint Interagency Cyber Component, JICC) au sein du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD), pour faire face aux cybermenaces qui pèsent sur le continent nord-américain. Le JICC-NORAD pourrait soutenir la modernisation du NORAD et fournir un organe opérationnel doté de l’autorité et des moyens nécessaires pour faire face aux menaces modernes qui pèsent sur la défense continentale de l'Amérique du Nord. Les cybermenaces qui pèsent sur la défense continentale constituent un défi croissant auquel il faut répondre de manière proactive. Les cyberopérations offensives sont à la fois conventionnelles et asymétriques, et nécessitent donc des approches nouvelles pour faire face à un environnement de menace complexe. Les structures actuelles permettent de faire face aux cybermenaces, mais elles ne sont pas suffisamment intégrées pour que le Canada puisse garantir la représentation des intérêts nationaux dans la cyberdéfense continentale. La création du JICC-NORAD pourrait remédier aux lacunes de la défense continentale dans le domaine de la cyberdéfense en fournissant une alerte anticipée des cybermenaces contre l'Amérique du Nord, en menant des cyberopérations défensives (COD) en appui aux opérations du NORAD et en servant de plate-forme aux agences, aux ministères et au secteur privé pour coordonner la cyberdéfense continentale. Le JICC-NORAD pourrait être l'occasion pour le Canada de réaffirmer sa participation à la défense continentale nord-américaine, tout en maîtrisant les ressources et les risques politiques associés à une contribution militaire accrue. Ce billet a été produit à l'origine pour le North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) : consultez la version anglaise originale.   Introduction Ce billet explore la création d’une composante cybernétique interorganisationelle interarmées (Joint Interagency Cyber Component) (JICC) au sein du NORAD en tant qu’option pour moderniser de manière proactive les approches de la défense continentale et ainsi faire face aux menaces émergentes dans le cadre de futurs conflits hybrides. L'importance de la défense continentale et de la modernisation du NORAD a été récemment soulignée par le président américain Joe Biden dans son premier appel officiel avec le premier ministre Justin Trudeau. Actuellement, le NORAD ne s'occupe pas explicitement des cybermenaces et ne s'engage pas directement dans des cyberopérations. Nous considérons le JICC comme un moyen potentiel de répondre à ces menaces et comme une nouvelle avenue pour la contribution canadienne à NORAD. Le NORAD est une organisation binationale qui réunit le Canada et les États-Unis et qui se concentre sur la défense de l'Amérique du Nord par le biais d'un système d'alerte maritime et d'un système d'alerte et de contrôle aérospatial. Nous suggérons que la création d'une composante cybernétique intégrée au NORAD pourrait aider le Canada et les États-Unis à adopter une approche pan-domaine de la défense continentale. Le concept du JICC-NORAD est important pour le Canada et la coopération canado-américaine en matière de défense par le biais du NORAD, car il pourrait : Aider au développement d'atouts pour accroître la cyber-résilience, les capacités et la connaissance de la situation; Contribuer à la modernisation du NORAD pour faire face aux menaces émergentes dans un environnement pan-domaine; Gérer efficacement les ressources et les risques politiques tout en apportant des contributions essentielles à la défense nord-américaine. Le JICC-NORAD favorise une approche nouvelle pour faire face à un environnement de menace continental dynamique. Le JICC vise essentiellement à renforcer la collaboration au sein de NORAD. Le JICC-NORAD se concentre sur l'utilisation de l'expertise nationale, la promotion d'une approche binationale pour faire face de manière proactive aux cybermenaces, et la facilitation formelle de la coopération par le biais de ressources cybernétiques dédiées. Il sert au NORAD d’alerte anticipée pour identifier et résoudre les cybermenaces par l'intermédiaire de cyberopérations défensives. Nous articulons ce concept en donnant d'abord un bref aperçu de la structure organisationnelle et du mandat actuel du NORAD. Cela comprend une description des contributions nationales du Canada et des États-Unis à la cyberdéfense et des approches privilégiées pour la défense continentale. Ensuite, nous décrivons l'environnement actuel de la menace au niveau de la défense continentale et montrons brièvement comment la modernisation du NORAD a tenté de combler les lacunes en matière de capacités. Nous présentons ensuite les détails et les justifications pour un JICC-NORAD. Nous concluons en réitérant l'importance de ce concept et en formulant des commentaires sur les prochaines étapes à suivre. (Cyber) défense continentale La coopération canado-américaine en matière de défense s’inscrit dans le Cadre de travail des trois commandements (Tri-Command Framework) entre le NORAD, le Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada (COIC) et le Commandement du Nord des États-Unis (USNORTHCOM). Le NORAD s'occupe de la défense continentale, opère dans les domaines aérospatial et maritime, et a pour mandat de « décourager, détecter et contrer les menaces aériennes pour le Canada et les États-Unis » en coopération avec les États-Unis. Actuellement, le NORAD ne s'occupe pas explicitement des menaces liées au domaine cyber ; cependant, les opérations du domaine aérien comprennent « la coordination des opérations cybernétiques et des opérations d’information et l'élaboration de recommandations sur les besoins futurs ». La structure organisationnelle actuelle du NORAD place les menaces de défense continentale liées aux cyberattaques sous le mandat des deux commandements américains. Le NORAD comprend trois régions : 1) la région de l'Alaska (ANR), 2) la région canadienne (CANR) et 3) la région continentale des États-Unis (CONR). La CANR se concentre sur la surveillance, l'identification, le contrôle et l'alerte des aéronefs pénétrant dans l'espace aérien canadien et dirige les forces de défense aérienne à l'intérieur du Canada. En outre, le Canada coopère avec les États-Unis par l'intermédiaire du NORAD dans le cadre d'opérations, de formations et d'exercices conjoints. Dans le contexte de la défense continentale au sein du NORAD, les menaces liées aux cyberattaques sont actuellement traitées par le Cyber Commandement américain (USCYBERCOM) et le Cyber Commandement de l'armée américaine (ARCYBER). USCYBERCOM et le NORAD L'ARCYBER est une équipe de mission de l'USCYBERCOM chargée de soutenir le corps combattant de l'USNORTHCOM (entre autres commandements de combat) en matière de cyberopérations défensives (COD) et de cyberopérations offensives. L'USNORTHCOM se concentre sur les efforts de défense nationale des États-Unis et sur l'Amérique du Nord continentale, y compris le Canada. L'élément primordial du soutien cybernétique passe par les équipes du Cyber Operations-Integrated Planning Elements. Ces cellules (ou détachements de l’USCYBERCOM) sont intégrées au sein de l'USNORTHCOM et fournissent des options cybernétiques au commandant, ainsi qu’un cyberespace non-conflictuel avec d’autres cyber-entités. Cependant, elles ne disposent pas de capacités endémiques cyber, car elles ont pour mission de retourner à leur unité d'origine. Contributions canadiennes au NORAD et à la cyberdéfense La contribution du Canada à la défense continentale prend la forme de ressources financières, de personnel et de matériel pour le NORAD. Grâce au NORAD, le Canada peut se concentrer sur la surveillance et le contrôle opérationnel de son espace aérien national afin de maintenir sa souveraineté. La nature binationale du commandement permet au Canada de répondre aux menaces d'une manière économiquement avantageuse, qui sert ses intérêts nationaux et favorise la coopération pour la défense collective de l'Amérique du Nord. Le personnel canadien participe, aux côtés de leurs homologues américains, aux activités liées au NORAD, principalement pour soutenir les opérations aérospatiales dans le Nord. Sur le plan interne, le Canada contribue au NORAD par l'intermédiaire du COIC, de l’État-major interarmées stratégique, du Vice-Chef d'état-major de la défense, et de l’Aviation royale canadienne. Le Canada fait face aux cybermenaces par l'intermédiaire du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST), du Centre canadien pour la cybersécurité (CCC) et du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN)/Forces armées canadiennes (FAC). Le CST est mandaté par la Loi sur le Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications pour protéger et défendre les systèmes cyber canadiens, acquérir des renseignements extérieurs, mener des opérations défensives et actives à l'étranger, ainsi que pour aider les organismes nationaux d'application de la loi, les agences de sécurité et le MDN/les FAC. Le CCC se concentre sur la défense des réseaux du gouvernement du Canada contre les menaces cybernétiques et sur le soutien à la protection des infrastructures essentielles (IC) et des Canadiens en ligne par le biais de conseils d'experts, de services et de rapports d'évaluation accessibles au public. La principale unité cybernétique des FAC est le Centre d'opérations des réseaux des Forces canadiennes, qui est « chargé de mener des opérations défensives dans le cyberespace du MDN et des FAC afin de détecter, de vaincre et/ou d'atténuer les actions offensives et exploitantes pour maintenir la liberté d'action ». Cette unité collabore étroitement avec le CCC pour permettre la COD. En 2018, les FAC ont créé le métier de cyberopérateur, en consacrant des membres cyber formés à travailler en collaboration avec les ministères et organismes nationaux et les alliés internationaux pour détecter les cybermenaces et y répondre, en appui avec les impératifs opérationnels de la Marine, de l'Armée de terre et de l'Armée de l'air. Cette capacité naissante n'est toutefois pas encore pleinement opérationnelle. Le développement actuel des cyber capacités est géré par le directeur général du développement des forces des capacités d'information, le BGén Patrice Sabourin. Coopération cybernétique entre le Canada et les États-Unis Le Canada et les États-Unis coopèrent sur les questions de cyberdéfense, mais cette coopération ne relève pas explicitement de la défense continentale et ne se fait pas par l'intermédiaire du NORAD. Il existe plusieurs voies informelles et formelles pour la coopération actuelle entre les États-Unis et le Canada en matière de cyberdéfense : tout d'abord, la coopération par le Groupe des cinq (Five Eyes) (Australie, Canada, Nouvelle-Zélande, États-Unis et Royaume-Uni) ; ensuite, par le Canada et les États-Unis bilatéralement sur la protection des infrastructures critiques et le partage des informations et des ressources. C'est ce que montre par exemple le Plan d'action sur la cybersécurité entre Sécurité publique Canada et le Département américain de la sécurité intérieure. Ces voies de coopération cybernétique s'accompagnent à la fois d'opportunités et de défis pour le Canada. Le JICC-NORAD pourrait apporter une contribution plus formelle et plus structurée à la coopération canado-américaine en matière de cyberdéfense continentale et aider le Canada à atteindre ses objectifs en matière de cyberdéfense. Les objectifs du Canada dans le domaine cyber Selon « Protection, Sécurité, Engagement » (PSE), la vision du MDN et des FAC pour leur rôle dans le domaine cybernétique est d'adopter « une posture plus délibérée dans le cyberdomaine en renforçant nos défenses et en menant des cyberopérations actives contre d’éventuels adversaires dans le contexte de missions militaires autorisées par le gouvernement ». Le MDN/FC cherche également à investir dans des capacités conjointes qui comprennent « capacités cryptographiques, les capacités des opérations d’information et les cybercapacités, ce qui inclura des projets de cybersécurité et de connaissance de la situation, l’identification des cybermenaces et la réponse à celles-ci, ainsi que le développement de capacités pour mener des opérations d’information et des cyberopérations offensives militaires dans le but de cibler, d’exploiter, d’influencer et d’attaquer à l’appui des opérations militaires ». Le Canada vise à renforcer le cyberengagement dans la défense nationale et les activités de défense continentale. Le MDN et les FAC participent à la défense continentale par l'intermédiaire du NORAD, mais cette participation doit tenir compte de toute l'étendue du spectre des menaces, au-delà des menaces liées aux domaines aérospatial et maritime. Environnement de cybermenaces Les cybermenaces qui pèsent sur la défense continentale constituent un défi croissant qui doit être examiné dans la même mesure que les menaces aérospatiales et maritimes actuelles et émergentes. Les cybercapacités offensives sont mises en œuvre par des adversaires étatiques et non étatiques traditionnels, au moyen de vecteurs asymétriques conventionnels et persistants, et sont suffisamment souples pour toucher des cibles situées à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du spectre conventionnel. En raison de leur portée et de leur capacité à affecter de manière significative les infrastructures essentielles et les nœuds C4I (Commandement, Contrôle, Communications, Ordinateurs, Intelligence), nous estimons que les cybercapacités offensives ont le potentiel de devenir une menace stratégique pour la défense continentale de l'Amérique du Nord. Comparées aux armes balistiques ou hypersoniques, les cybercapacités offensives offrent des avantages clés qui augmentent leur probabilité d'être utilisées contre des cibles nord-américaines. Ces « cyberarmes » (et leurs infrastructures de soutien) ont des coûts d'ingénierie et de maintenance faibles par rapport aux armes stratégiques conventionnelles, tout en ayant une portée relativement illimitée et des capacités de perturbation à grande échelle. Les effets cybernétiques n'entraînent pas automatiquement des pertes de vies humaines ou des dommages physiques, peuvent éventuellement être inversés par leur auteur et sont parfois difficiles à attribuer. Ces caractéristiques font des capacités cybernétiques offensives un outil idéal pour les conflits en dessous du seuil de la guerre et constituent la tendance actuelle et prévisible en matière de conflits entre les principaux acteurs du cyber. Les acteurs antagonistes ont les moyens, l'intention et la possibilité de menacer l'Amérique du Nord. Certains ont intégré les cyber-options dans leur doctrine militaire conventionnelle et leurs capacités offensives. La Chine, par exemple, « considère les cybercapacités comme un élément essentiel de sa posture globale de dissuasion stratégique intégrée, au même titre que la dissuasion spatiale et nucléaire », et cherche à utiliser les cybercapacités pour cibler les nœuds de commandement et de contrôle (C2), les réseaux logistiques et les infrastructures essentielles, afin de contraindre un adversaire. De même, la Russie a intégré des cybercapacités dans son concept de « guerre hybride » et en a fait l'utilisation lors des conflits en Géorgie et en Ukraine. Les menaces asymétriques persistantes véhiculées par des moyens informatiques constituent un autre défi majeur pour la défense continentale de l'Amérique du Nord. Les acteurs étatiques hostiles utilisent les cybercapacités dans des opérations en dessous du seuil de la guerre : ces capacités ont été utilisées dans la sphère des opérations d'information, influençant les processus démocratiques et les décisions politiques et économiques. On observe la même chose avec le cyberespionnage, qui consiste à voler l'expertise technique, les données, la propriété intellectuelle et les technologies sensibles d'autres pays. En outre, l'Évaluation des cybermenaces nationales 2020 du CST indique que la convergence des technologies opérationnelles et des technologies de l'information expose les opérations d’information à un risque plus élevé de cyberperturbation par un tiers. La pandémie actuelle a exposé les vulnérabilités des infrastructures essentielles et de l'économie canadiennes à la cyberperturbation, aux rançons, à la cybercriminalité et au cyberespionnage. Les gouvernements canadien et américain ont tous deux intensifié leurs efforts pour contrer les cyberattaques des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques contre les réseaux de distribution et de logistique du vaccin contre la COVID-19. Cette évolution du paysage des menaces conventionnelles et asymétriques fait écho aux préoccupations du Général (retraité) Terrence O'Shaughnessy et du BGén Peter Fesler (l'actuel directeur adjoint des opérations du NORAD) concernant le renforcement du SHIELD. Autant les nouvelles capacités hypersoniques représentent une menace croissante, autant la montée en puissance des capacités cyber-offensives conventionnelles et asymétriques représente également un défi pour la défense continentale nord-américaine et exige que le NORAD soit modernisé afin de maintenir sa pertinence et ses capacités d'alerte rapide. Différentes visions de la modernisation La vision actuelle du Canada en matière de modernisation du NORAD est axée sur la lutte contre les menaces émergentes, avec un accent particulier sur le renouvellement du Système d'alerte nord (SAN). Conformément à PSE, « dans le cadre de la modernisation du NORAD, nous avons l’intention, en collaboration avec les États-Unis, de jeter un regard d’ensemble sur les menaces et les dangers qui guettent l’Amérique du Nord dans tous les domaines. […] Le Canada collaborera avec les États-Unis pour moderniser le Commandement et surmonter ces défis ainsi que ceux concernant la défense continentale. […] Le Canada et les États-Unis examineront conjointement les options en vue de renouveler le Système d’alerte du Nord et de moderniser le NORAD, ce qui est essentiel à la réalisation du mandat d’alerte et de contrôle aérospatiaux et d’alerte maritime du NORAD. » Dans ce contexte, l'objectif de la modernisation est conçu comme un moyen de faire face aux nouvelles menaces qui pèsent sur la défense continentale. Toutefois, les nouvelles technologies et l'évolution des priorités nationales en matière de défense auront une incidence sur ces priorités de modernisation à l'avenir, et la vision de la modernisation du NORAD reste donc contestée. Comme il a été soutenu ailleurs, cette compréhension de la modernisation du NORAD pourrait être élargie pour inclure la composante cybernétique interorganisationelle et les opérations conjointes spécifiques au monde cybernétique, afin de refléter l'environnement dynamique, interconnecté et en constante évolution de la menace. Nous soutenons que le concept de modernisation du NORAD pourrait être élargi pour inclure des mises à jour organisationnelles et basées sur les connaissances. Bien que des initiatives telles que Pathfinder soient des étapes utiles dans la gestion des données des capteurs, la modernisation du NORAD devrait inclure l'augmentation des capacités de dissuasion, de détection et de neutralisation des menaces pour la défense continentale. Ces menaces comprennent les cyberopérations des principaux adversaires, et le NORAD ne traite pas directement les cybermenaces à l'heure actuelle. Comme nous l'avons montré dans la section précédente, les cybermenaces sont présentes dans le contexte actuel. Afin de faire face à ces menaces, la modernisation pourrait prendre la forme d’une composante commune. Nous proposons que le NORAD envisage de faire appel au JICC pour faire face aux menaces dans les domaines qui ne relèvent pas de sa mission actuelle et ainsi de combiner les forces cyber défensives des deux pays. Explorer l’idée d’une composante cybernétique interorganisationelle interarmées pour le NORAD En termes simples, la défense continentale inclut la cyberdéfense, et la cyberdéfense continentale est une affaire commune. Le JICC-NORAD pourrait se concentrer sur la cyberdéfense par l'intermédiaire de cyberopérations défensives et du soutien aux autorités civiles, ainsi que par la contribution du personnel militaire canadien et américain. Les principales fonctions du JICC-NORAD pourraient être les suivantes : Fournir une alerte anticipée des cybermenaces contre l'Amérique du Nord ; Mener des cyberopérations défensives en appui aux opérations du NORAD ; Servir de plaque tournante pour les agences, les ministères et le secteur privé afin de réduire les conflits et de coordonner la cyberdéfense continentale. Pourquoi est-ce important ? En tant qu'organisation binationale de cyberdéfense, le JICC-NORAD pourrait faire en sorte que le Canada ait son mot à dire dans la planification opérationnelle et la définition des priorités de la cyberdéfense continentale, en particulier lorsque les infrastructures critiques nord-américaines (télécommunications, réseaux logistiques, réseaux électriques) sont vulnérables aux perturbations informatiques, car elles sont de plus en plus intégrées. La contribution et le leadership du Canada en matière de cyberdéfense continentale pourraient démontrer notre fiabilité en tant que partenaire et notre prévoyance face aux menaces stratégiques, et aider le Canada à dépasser la stratégie de « défense contre l'aide ». La centralisation des cyber-ressources et des acteurs au sein du JICC-NORAD pourrait apporter une contribution indispensable à la modernisation des capacités pan-domaines, ou JADC2 (Joint All-Domain Command and Control). Les données recueillies par des moyens informatiques pendant les opérations cyber-défensives et d'alerte rapide pourraient fournir des renseignements essentiels, en particulier lorsqu'elles sont mises en relation avec les données recueillies sur d'autres plateformes. Ce volume accru de données collectées pourrait également encourager le NORAD à accélérer l'adoption de systèmes de traitement utilisant l'informatique quantique et l'intelligence artificielle (IA). Comme l'ont indiqué Charron et Fergusson : Plus les domaines surveillés par le commandant du NORAD sont nombreux, plus celui-ci dispose, en théorie, d'informations pour prendre des décisions vraisemblablement plus loin dans le temps et l'espace. En d'autres termes, un éventail élargi de missions permet au NORAD de voir plus loin et de réagir plus rapidement sur le continuum de la menace. En gardant à l'esprit que les cybercapacités peuvent être utilisées seules ou en conjonction avec d'autres systèmes d'armes ou capacités de coercition, une composante portant une attention particulière au domaine cybernétique fournirait au commandant du NORAD une connaissance étendue de la situation. D'autres (voir Babb) ont défendu l'idée d'élargir les opportunités d'une cyber-collaboration accrue au sein du NORAD et d'un engagement étendu avec le secteur privé. Toutefois, l'intégration des moyens informatiques au sein de NORAD est actuellement limitée. Plus généralement, le JICC-NORAD pourrait être l'occasion pour le Canada de réaffirmer sa participation à la défense continentale nord-américaine, tout en gérant les ressources et les risques politiques généralement associés à une contribution militaire accrue. L'investissement du Canada dans l'expertise et l'infrastructure de COD au profit de la défense nord-américaine représente une alternative pertinente et pratique aux autres systèmes d'armes de défense continentale, surtout lorsque le Canada « a traditionnellement évité la préemption principalement en raison de contraintes politiques et de ressources limitées, ainsi que de la taille et de la portée beaucoup plus réduites de son armée ». En outre, un investissement canadien dans les capacités de cyberdéfense du NORAD est généralement une opportunité politiquement sans risque. Sur le plan intérieur, il pourrait probablement gérer les sensibilités politiques habituellement irritées par la participation éventuelle du Canada au programme américain de défense contre les missiles balistiques. Au niveau international, l'investissement dans la cyberdéfense plutôt que dans les armes balistiques pourrait avoir moins d'impact sur le plaidoyer du Canada en faveur du désarmement, notamment vis-à-vis de la Russie, de la Chine ou de l'Iran. Comment cela pourrait fonctionner ? En s'appuyant sur des moyens inter-agences, le JICC-NORAD pourrait viser à intégrer des organismes civils tels que la National Security Agency (NSA), la Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), le CST et le Cyber Centre, en plus du MDN/FAC et du ministère américain de la défense (US DoD). Le concept JICC-NORAD est une composante (par opposition à un commandement), car il pourrait fonctionner comme une sous-unité sous l'égide du NORAD/USNORTHCOM, et pourrait être composé de membres de diverses cyber organisations canadiennes et américaines. En outre, cette organisation pourrait devenir un pont entre les intérêts privés et universitaires, en favorisant les relations nécessaires pour stimuler l'innovation et la cohésion des efforts. Bien que le Canada et les États-Unis s'attaquent tous deux aux cybermenaces nationales, il est nécessaire de renforcer leur collaboration dans le cadre de la défense continentale. Les menaces pour la défense continentale sont un effort de collaboration et sont gérées par le NORAD. Ainsi, selon ce raisonnement, les cybermenaces pour la défense continentale devraient être traitées par une sous-composante du NORAD. Cette structure permettrait au Canada d'apporter son expertise, de briser les silos dans la planification de la défense et d'accroître la participation à la coopération en matière de défense. L'investissement et le développement du domaine cyber sont des priorités et des exigences pour la défense nationale. L'exploitation des relations existantes avec un allié dont le Canada est déjà très dépendant permet de trouver une solution rentable pour développer davantage nos capacités de cyberdéfense. En raison de son lien essentiellement militaire, le JICC-NORAD pourrait ouvrir la voie à une évolution plus rapide des FAC dans le domaine des cyberopérations qui est principalement contrôlé, au Canada, par le CST. Pourquoi la création du JICC-NORAD est importante, et les prochaines étapes Les contributions actuelles du Canada au NORAD et sa vision de sa modernisation doivent être élargies pour répondre véritablement aux nouvelles menaces qui pèsent sur la défense continentale. Toutefois, cette révision ne doit pas être assortie d'un lourd tribut, de contraintes non nécessaires ou de redondance. Bien que les menaces soient présentes, l'expertise et la base de connaissances informatiques existent au sein des deux États pour relever ces défis. Il est important que le Canada continue à s'engager avec les États-Unis sur les questions liées à la défense collective, et la collaboration par le biais du NORAD est un élément clé pour atteindre cet objectif. Bien que le Canada et les États-Unis coopèrent sur des questions de défense et de cyberdéfense ailleurs, le JICC-NORAD offre une nouvelle approche pour accroître la flexibilité et les capacités. Le JICC-NORAD vise à faire passer cette collaboration au niveau supérieur de la défense continentale. Elle peut également ouvrir de nouvelles possibilités de collaboration avec d'autres partenaires, y compris des acteurs du secteur privé et d'autres parties prenantes de confiance, ainsi que promouvoir davantage le partage d'informations et de meilleures pratiques entre les alliés. En outre, la structure du JICC-NORAD garantira que le Canada a la possibilité de faire valoir ses intérêts et de contribuer de manière égale par le biais du format des composantes. En effet, il ne s'agit pas d'une unité de rattachement ou guidée par les directives d'une chaîne de commandement étrangère. Nous avons établi un plan d'action pour le concept du JICC-NORAD, y compris son importance et sa justification. L'élaboration d'une cyberstratégie de défense continentale est une étape supplémentaire dans le processus de révision du NORAD. Une autre étape importante est la révision de l'Accord du NORAD et l'introduction d'un mandat cyber au sein de celui-ci. Le JICC-NORAD est un objectif à long terme qui implique de multiples phases de planification. Le Canada pourrait montrer la voie dans le processus d'ouverture des domaines et d'intégration d'une perspective cybernétique dans la mission de NORAD visant à dissuader, détecter et vaincre les menaces à la défense continentale.   L'autrice tient à remercier Ehren Edwards pour son dévouement à favoriser les liens entre l'expertise universitaire et le gouvernement. Les auteurs souhaitent remercier la Dr. Shannon Nash pour avoir donné l'opportunité d'écrire cet article et la Dr. Andrea Charron pour ses commentaires perspicaces sur les versions précédentes de cet article. Les opinions exprimées dans ce document n'engagent que les auteurs et ne représentent pas le ministère de la Défense nationale ou les Forces armées canadiennes. ## PANEL 1 – Le Canada et le maintien de la paix en Afrique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-le-canada-et-le-maintien-de-la-paix-en-afrique/ Modified: 2021-06-23 > Le Canada et le maintien de la paix en Afrique : S'engager envers l'ONU ou renforcer les capacités des organisations régionales et sous-régionales? PANEL 1 - Le Canada et le maintien de la paix en Afrique : S'engager envers l'ONU ou renforcer les capacités des organisations régionales et sous-régionales? Présidé par : Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Panélistes : -M. Mahamat Saleh Annadif -Dr. Bruno Charbonneau -Dr. Wane El-Ghassim -Dr. Lise Howard ## PANEL 1 – 10 décembre 2020 : L’ordre international fracturé URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-10-decembre-2020-lordre-international-fracture/ Modified: 2021-02-16 > Panel organisé dans le cadre du colloque annuel « L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada » du Réseau d'analyse stratégique, les 10 et 11 décembre 2020. « L’ordre international fracturé », avec Jonathan Paquin (ULaval), Anessa Kimball (ULaval) : Adaptation sous l’incertitude : Le leadership américain et l’avenir de l’ordre fracturé, Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM) : La mer de Chine méridionale : Dimension militaire des comportements chinois et Thomas Juneau (UOttawa) : Le Moyen-Orient, entre Trump et Biden. Panel organisé dans le cadre du colloque annuel « L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada » du Réseau d'analyse stratégique, les 10 et 11 décembre 2020. Panel 1 - 10 décembre 2020 : L’ordre international fracturé Modérateur : Jonathan Paquin (ULaval) Panélistes : - Anessa Kimball (ULaval) : Adaptation sous l’incertitude : Le leadership américain et l’avenir de l’ordre fracturé - Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM) : La mer de Chine méridionale : Dimension militaire des comportements chinois - Thomas Juneau (UOttawa) : Le Moyen-Orient, entre Trump et Biden ## PANEL 1 – Coopération européenne et transatlantique en matière de renseignement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-cooperation-europeenne-et-transatlantique-en-matiere-de-renseignement/ Modified: 2021-05-17 > Coopération européenne et transatlantique en matière de renseignement : Jill Sinclair, Björn Fägersten, Claudia Hillebrand and Gustav Gressel Panel organisé dans le cadre de la conférence « Coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire – Perspectives non-américaines », le 6 mai 2021. Panel 1 - Coopération européenne et transatlantique en matière de renseignement - Modératrice : Jill Sinclair (Ministère de la Défense nationale) - Panélistes : Björn Fägersten (Institut suédois des affaires internationales) : The Intelligence Demands of European Strategic Autonomy Claudia Hillebrand (Université Cardiff) : The Spiral Loop of Intelligence Liaison: Issues for Secrecy and Accountability Gustav Gressel (Conseil européen des relations étrangères) : Subversive Challenges to the Single European Space ## PANEL 1 – Enjeux climatiques et menaces dans l’Arctique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-enjeux-climatiques-et-menaces-dans-larctique/ Modified: 2025-02-18 > Mots d’ouverture - Professeur Stéphane Roussel, ENAPModérateur :Benjamin Boutin, Directeur, Association France Canada... Cette vidéo est bilingue (anglais - français) Mots d’ouverture - Professeur Stéphane Roussel, ENAP Modérateur : Benjamin Boutin, Directeur, Association France Canada Intervenants : Bridget Larocque, Chair Northern Advisory Board and Co-lead, North American Arctic Defence and Security Pauline Baudu, Université du Québec à Montréal Dr Laurent Borzillo, École nationale d’administration publique (ÉNAP) Eric Laporte, Directeur exécutif de la Direction des relations de sécurité et de défense (IGR) ## Panel 1 – La guerre vue du Sud URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-la-guerre-vue-du-sud/ Modified: 2024-09-25 > Panel 1 - La guerre vue du Sud - Moderator: Justin Massie, Amélie Chalivet, Kevan Gafaïti, Rachid Chaker, Antonin Blanchard.. La guerre vue du Sud Commentaires : Justin Massie Amélie Chalivet : L’Inde face à la guerre en Ukraine Kevan Gafaïti : La guerre russo-ukranienne vue d’Iran : un test politique et stratégique peu concluant pour « l’axe Téhéran-Pékin-Moscou » ? Rachid Chaker : La guerre d’Ukraine vue du monde arabe Antonin Blanchard : Le non-alignement Égyptien face à la guerre russo-ukrainienne Pierre-Marie Meunier : Souveraineté, rapports de force et droit international : la ligne de crête chinoise du soutien à la Russie ## PANEL 1 – Le retrait d’Afghanistan et son impact sur la compétition entre grandes puissances URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-le-retrait-dafghanistan/ Modified: 2022-01-28 > Le retrait d’Afghanistan et son impact sur la compétition entre grandes puissances. Modéré par Justin Massie Modéré par Justin Massie (UQAM) Igor Delanoë (Observatoire franco-russe -- CCI France-Russie -- à Moscou) La Russie face à l'Afghanistan post-retrait américain : entre embastionnement et régionalisation de la sécurité Pierre Jolicoeur (Collège militaire royal du Canada) Reconfiguration géopolitique en Eurasie : entre défis et opportunités pour la Russie Niva Yau Tsz Yan (Académie de l’OSCE à Bichkek) Les calculs de la Chine en Afghanistan Ting Sheng Lin (Université du Québec à Montréal) Le cimetière des empires piègera-t-il la Chine ? ## Panel 1 – Trump 2.0 et les relations transatlantiques : quel diagnostic ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-trump-2-0-et-les-relations-transatlantiques-quel-diagnostic/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Panel 1 - Trump 2.0 and transatlantic relations: what diagnosis? - Dr. Elena Lazarou, EPRS- Dr. David Cadier, researcher on European... Modéré par Pr. Justin Massie, professeur de science politique, Université Québec à Montréal, co-directeur du Réseau d’Analyse Stratégique, co-directeur Le Rubicon. - Dr. Elena Lazarou, EPRS - Dr. David Cadier, chercheur sur la sécurité européenne, IRSEM - Dr. Alexander Lanoszka, professeur agrégé, Université de Waterloo - Dr. Sven Biscop, directeur du programme « L’Europe dans le monde », Institut Egmont ## Panel 1 : Développer une approche multi-domaine dans les nouveaux espaces de confrontation. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-developper-une-approche-multi-domaine-dans-les-nouveaux-espaces-de-confrontation/ Modified: 2022-11-14 > Prolifération technologique, exploitation de nouveaux espaces et menaces multidimensionnelles—qu’est-ce que ces concepts signifient... Prolifération technologique, exploitation de nouveaux espaces et menaces multidimensionnelles—qu’est-ce que ces concepts signifient et qu’impliquent-ils? Ce panel élucidera ces deux questions en explorant les répercussions qu’auront ces nouvelles menaces pour le Canada, sa population et sa position dans le monde. Avec l’élargissement de l’espace géostratégique en direction de l’Asie et l’émergence du cyberespace comme champ de bataille entre les nations, les confrontations interétatiques vont désormais plus loin que les simples champs économiques et militaires. Les experts de ce panel fourniront observations et analyses afin de permettre à tous de mieux comprendre cette réalité et ce qu’une approche multi-domaine pour le Canada signifierait réellement. Modérateur : Émile Lambert-Deslandes (doctorant, Université Queen’s) Intervenants : Gaëlle Rivard Piché (Analyste stratégique, Recherche et développement -Gregory Smith (Major-Général, FAC) Stéphanie Martel (Professeure adjointe, Université Queen’s) Justin Massie (Professeur titulaire, Université du Québec à Montréal) ## PANEL 1 : Le dilemme stratégique de l’Europe dans un monde en mutation. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/cooperation-des-democraties-en-matiere-de-defense-contre-lautoritarisme/ Modified: 2021-11-22 PANEL 1 : Le dilemme stratégique de l'Europe dans un monde en mutation. Hôte : Jonathan Paquin ( Université Laval ) Modératrice : Alexander Lanoszka (Université de Waterloo) Panélistes : Olivier Schmitt ( Université du Danemark du Sud) Dominika Kunertova (ETH Zürich) Andrew Dorman ( King's College )   ## Panel 1 : Transition de puissance et ambiguïté stratégique des alliés de Washington URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-transition-de-puissance-et-ambiguite-strategique-des-allies-de-washington/ Modified: 2024-04-05 > Panel 1 : Transition de puissance et ambiguïté stratégique des alliés de Washington. Modérateur : Frédérick Côté, Candidat au doctorat...  L’ambiguïté stratégique des alliés et partenaires de Washington face à la mutation de l’ordre international | Panel 1 : Transition de puissance et ambiguïté stratégique des alliés de Washington Modérateur : Frédérick Côté, Candidat au doctorat en études internationales à l’École supérieure d’études internationales Alexander Lanoszka – Professeur agrégé de relations internationales, Université de Waterloo Titre : Est-ce-que les alliés et partenaires de Washington sont vraiment ambigus? Pierre Colautti – Candidat au doctorat au département de science politique, Université Laval à Québec Titre : La réponse des alliés des États-Unis face au manque de garantie de sécurité de Washington sous les présidences Obama et Trump. Émile Lambert-Deslandes – Candidat au doctorat, département d’études politiques, Université Queen’s Titre : Ambiguïté et latence nucléaire : Le cas historique des alliés des États-Unis Nicolas-François Perron-Giroux – Doctorant, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Titre : Les implications de la transition de la puissance sur la politique de défense canadienne : signaux diplomatiques et acquisitions militaires. ## Panel 1 (25 septembre) : Renforcement des capacités au jour zéro URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-1-25-septembre-renforcement-des-capacites-au-jour-zero/ Modified: 2020-11-23 > Dans la dernière décennie, le renforcement des capacités est devenu un pilier de la gestion internationale des conflits. Le COVID-19 est cependant arrivé, perturbant le renforcement des capacités. Dans cette série d'ateliers, nous explorons les conséquences de la pandémie et la voie à suivre pour aller de l'avant. Ce premier atelier passera en revue les questions centrales reliées au domaine du renforcement des capacités telles qu’elles se présentaient avant la pandémie. Qu’est-ce qui a été réalisé ? Qu’est-ce qui a fonctionné ? Quelles critiques sont restées sans réponse ? Nous évaluerons également comment le COVID-19 affecte ces questions et crée de nouveaux problèmes. Entrons-nous dans un nouveau monde ? Dans la dernière décennie, le renforcement des capacités est devenu un pilier de la gestion internationale des conflits. Le COVID-19 est cependant arrivé, perturbant le renforcement des capacités. Dans cette série d'ateliers, nous explorons les conséquences de la pandémie et la voie à suivre pour aller de l'avant. Ce premier atelier passera en revue les questions centrales reliées au domaine du renforcement des capacités telles qu’elles se présentaient avant la pandémie. Qu’est-ce qui a été réalisé ? Qu’est-ce qui a fonctionné ? Quelles critiques sont restées sans réponse ? Nous évaluerons également comment le COVID-19 affecte ces questions et crée de nouveaux problèmes. Entrons-nous dans un nouveau monde ? Consultez le résumé du panel ## Panel 2 – L’évolution de la guerre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-levolution-de-la-guerre/ Modified: 2024-09-25 > Panel 2 - L’évolution de la guerre - Alexander Lanoszka, Vincent Tourret, Marco Munier, Isabelle Delumeau... L’évolution de la guerre Commentaires : Alexander Lanoszka Vincent Tourret : De quoi s’agit-il ? Les leçons de la guerre en Ukraine pour nos visions des conflits futurs Marco Munier : Comment prédire la guerre ? Isabelle Delumeau : Une lecture stratégique des aspects navals de la guerre russo-ukrainienne Walid Ferguen : Le pouvoir du narratif : désinformation, stratégie et prédiction des scénarios futurs dans le conflit en Ukraine ## PANEL 2 – L’impact de la fin de la guerre en Afghanistan sur l’OTAN URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-limpact-de-la-fin-de-la-guerre-en-afghanistan/ Modified: 2022-01-28 > L’impact de la fin de la guerre en Afghanistan sur l’OTAN. Modéré par Richard Giguère. Avec Chiara Ruffa, Alexander Lanoszka... Modéré par Richard Giguère Chiara Ruffa (Université d’Uppsala, Suède) Le retrait des États-Unis d’Afghanistan : quel avenir pour les missions hors zone de l'OTAN ? Alexander Lanoszka (Université de Waterloo) Réflexions sur la puissance américaine et son leadership dans les alliances après l’Afghanistan Hani Nasser (Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) Canada et l'OTAN Heidi Hardt (Université de Californie, Irvine) Les leçons stratégiques de l'OTAN en Afghanistan au lendemain de l'exode ## PANEL 2 – Le Canada et le maintien de la paix en Europe : les enjeux des alliances URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-le-canada-et-le-maintien-de-la-paix-en-europe-les-enjeux-des-alliances/ Modified: 2021-06-23 > Le Canada et le maintien de la paix en Europe : les enjeux des alliances - Stéfanie von Hlatky, Ambassadrice Kerry Buck et Major-Général Denis Thompson. PANEL 2 - Le Canada et le maintien de la paix en Europe : les enjeux des alliances Présidé par : Stéfanie von Hlatky Panélistes : - Ambassadrice Kerry Buck - Major-Général. Denis Thompson ## PANEL 2 – Les défis du partage du renseignement URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-les-defis-du-partage-du-renseignement/ Modified: 2021-05-17 > Les défis du partage du renseignement : Artur Wilczynski, Adriana Seagle, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Stephanie Carvin et Thomas Juneau Panel organisé dans le cadre de la conférence « Coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire – Perspectives non-américaines », le 6 mai 2021. Panel 2 - Les défis du partage du renseignement - Modérateur : Artur Wilczynski (Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications) - Panélistes : Adriana Seagle (Université Bellevue) : Transatlantic Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Université Bishop’s) : Search for Trust: Challenges in UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Stephanie Carvin (Université Carleton) & Thomas Juneau (Université d'Ottawa): Don’t Hold Back: Canadianize ## PANEL 2 – Les équipements et capacités nécessaires pour l’Arctique … URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-les-equipements-et-capacites-necessaires-pour-larctique/ Modified: 2025-02-18 > Les équipements et capacités nécessaires pour l’Arctique : comment favoriser la production et la coopération industrielle au sein de la... Les équipements et capacités nécessaires pour l’Arctique : comment favoriser la production et la coopération industrielle au sein de la communauté transatlantique Modératrice : Professeure Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Intervenants : Dr Thomas Hughes, Mount Allison University (en distanciel) Professeur Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Professeur Stéphane Roussel, École nationale d’administration publique (ENAP) Gaspard Schnitzler, Chercheur à l’Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) ## PANEL 2 – 10 décembre 2020 : Le renforcement des capacités et la gestion des conflits URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-10-decembre-2020-le-renforcement-des-capacites-et-la-gestion-des-conflits/ Modified: 2021-03-02 > PANEL 2 : Le renforcement des capacités et la gestion des conflits, Modérateur : Théo McLauchlin (UMontréal), Panélistes : Lee Seymour (UMontréal) : Renforcement des capacités et sécurité sur le terrain?, Bruno Charbonneau (Collège militaire royal de St Jean) : Le retour de la sécurité humaine?, Yolande Bouka (Queen’s) : Femmes, paix, et sécurité Panel organisé dans le cadre du colloque annuel « L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada » du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, les 10 et 11 décembre 2020. PANEL 2 – 10 décembre 2020 : Le renforcement des capacités et la gestion des conflits Modérateur : Théo McLauchlin (UMontréal) Panélistes : Lee Seymour (UMontréal) : Renforcement des capacités et sécurité sur le terrain? Bruno Charbonneau (Collège militaire royal de St Jean) : Le retour de la sécurité humaine? Yolande Bouka (Queen’s) : Femmes, paix, et sécurité ## Panel 2 – L’affaiblissement des institutions internationales URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-laffaiblissement-des-institutions-internationales/ Modified: 2024-06-11 > Avec l’arrivée des prochaines élections présidentielle américaine, il est possible d’anticiper un potentiel changement au sein de... Avec l’arrivée des prochaines élections présidentielle américaine, il est possible d’anticiper un potentiel changement au sein de l’ordre international, plus précisément en lien avec un désengagement des États-Unis au sein des institutions internationales. Ce panel vise à explorer les implications de ce changement de paradigme pour la communauté internationale dans son ensemble, mais aussi quelles sont les avenues de contribution pour le Canada. Modérateur: Alexander Lanoszka, Professeur agrégé, Université Waterloo Intervenant.e.s: -- Arthur Boutellis, Professeur, Université Columbia -- Heidi Hardt, Professeure agrégée, Université de Californie, Irvine -- Natascha Hryckow, Ancienne Coordinatrice du Groupe d’experts des Nations unies sur la Somalie ## Panel 2 – Relation transatlantique et guerre en Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-relation-transatlantique-et-guerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Panel 2 – Relation transatlantique et guerre en Ukraine avec Maud Quessard, Anastasiya Shapochkina, Laurent Borzillo et Camille Grand Modéré par M. Gurvan Le Bras, SEAE - Dr. Maud Quessard, directrice du domaine « Europe, Espace Transatlantique, Russie », IRSEM - Anastasiya Shapochkina, présidente du think tank Eastern Circles, maitre de conférences en géopolitique, Sciences Po - Dr Laurent Borzillo, chercheur postdoctoral à l’École d’administration publique - Camille Grand, directeur du programme Défense, ECFR ## Panel 2 : Comprendre les intérêts des États du sud à l’égard des grandes puissances URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-comprendre-les-interets-des-etats-du-sud-a-legard-des-grandes-puissances/ Modified: 2024-04-05 > Modérateur : Talbot Imlay – Professeur titulaire au Département des sciences historiques, Université Laval... Modérateur : Talbot Imlay – Professeur titulaire au Département des sciences historiques, Université Laval Amabilly Bonacina, Candidate au doctorat en science politique, Université de Montréal Titre : La politique étrangère de Lula 3 : entre les défis d’un Brésil en reconstruction et un monde en mutation Roromme Chantal, Professeur agrégé de science politique à l’École des hautes études publiques (HEP), Université de Moncton Titre : Pouvoir symbolique et la “retenue durable” envers la Chine en Indo-Pacifique Amélie Chalivet, Doctorante en cotutelle, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas et à l’Université du Québec à Montréal Titre : L’Inde face aux enjeux de Taïwan et de la mer de Chine méridionale : études de cas sur l’évolution de l’ambiguïté stratégique indienne. Jean F. Crombois, Professeur agrégé d’études européenne, American University de Bulgarie Titre : La politique étrangère bulgare et la guerre en Ukraine: vers une politique pro-occidentale plus affirmée ? ## Panel 2 : Les atouts stratégiques canadiens pour la coopération régionale et internationale. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-les-atouts-strategiques-canadiens-pour-la-cooperation-regionale-et-internationale/ Modified: 2022-11-14 > La politique internationale du Canada s’insère dans une démarche consciemment multilatérale. Ce panel sur la place que le Canada prend au.. La politique internationale du Canada s’insère dans une démarche consciemment multilatérale. Ce panel sur la place que le Canada prend au sein de multiples institutions régionales et internationales comme « middle power » afin de faire valoir ses intérêts stratégiques. Il dispose de nombreux atouts pour mettre en œuvre sa politique internationale—il suffit de les identifier, puis de les exploiter. Afin de comprendre comment le Canada pourrait conserver et augmenter son statut à l’international, les experts de ce panel procéderont à un examen critique de ses capacités à maintenir ses engagements et à en créer de nouveaux. En somme, ils viseront à identifier la place que la coopération peut jouer dans la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada. Modératrice : Renée Filiatrault (Ancienne agente du service extérieur) Intervenants : Theodore McLauchlin (Professeur agrégé, Université de Montréal) Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Professeure titulaire, Université Bishop’s) Kerry Buck (Senior Fellow, École supérieure d’affaires publiques et internationales) ## PANEL 2 : Opérations en matière de défense pour le Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-operations-en-matiere-de-defense-pour-le-canada/ Modified: 2021-11-16 Animateur : Jonathan Paquin ( Université Laval ) Modératrice : Andrea Charron (University of Manitoba) Panelistes : Stephanie Carvin (Carleton University) Marco bruno Munier (Université du Québec à Montréal) Jean-Christophe Boucher ( University of Calgary) ## Panel 2 (16 octobre) : Contre-insurrection et contre-terrorisme URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-2-16-octobre-contre-insurrection-et-contre-terrorisme/ Modified: 2020-11-23 > Ce second atelier s’intéresse à la contre-insurrection et au contre-terrorisme ; deux des domaines clés du renforcement des capacités. Les débats dans ces secteurs s’orientent souvent autour de l’éthique, des coûts et de l’efficacité des interventions directes et de l’entraînement de partenaires, des questions de légitimité locale ou encore des difficultés à soutenir des gouvernements instables. À la suite de la pandémie de COVID-19, la contre-insurrection et le contre-terrorisme sont-ils toujours prioritaires pour des bailleurs de fonds externes soumis à une crise économique ? Comment la pandémie affecte-t-elle la coopération et le développement de connaissances dans les opérations de renforcement des capacités ? Comment la crise actuelle modifie-t-elle les stratégies adoptées, notamment en ce qui concerne le contact avec des armées partenaires, la prise en compte des inégalités de genre et ethniques face à la pandémie, ainsi que la priorité accordée aux soins de santé ? Ces changements persisteront-ils ? Ce second atelier s’intéresse à la contre-insurrection et au contre-terrorisme ; deux des domaines clés du renforcement des capacités. Les débats dans ces secteurs s’orientent souvent autour de l’éthique, des coûts et de l’efficacité des interventions directes et de l’entraînement de partenaires, des questions de légitimité locale ou encore des difficultés à soutenir des gouvernements instables. À la suite de la pandémie de COVID-19, la contre-insurrection et le contre-terrorisme sont-ils toujours prioritaires pour des bailleurs de fonds externes soumis à une crise économique ? Comment la pandémie affecte-t-elle la coopération et le développement de connaissances dans les opérations de renforcement des capacités ? Comment la crise actuelle modifie-t-elle les stratégies adoptées, notamment en ce qui concerne le contact avec des armées partenaires, la prise en compte des inégalités de genre et ethniques face à la pandémie, ainsi que la priorité accordée aux soins de santé ? Ces changements persisteront-ils ? Consultez le résumé du deuxième panel ## PANEL 3 – Coopération en matière de renseignement dans un contexte de multipolarité URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-3-cooperation-en-matiere-de-renseignement-dans-un-contexte-de-multipolarite/ Modified: 2021-05-17 > Coopération en matière de renseignement dans un contexte de multipolarité : Heather De Santis, Reg Whitaker, Nancy Teeple et Patrick F. Walsh Panel organisé dans le cadre de la conférence « Coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire – Perspectives non-américaines », le 6 mai 2021. Panel 3 - Coopération en matière de renseignement dans un contexte de multipolarité - Modératrice : Heather De Santis (Sécurité publique Canada) - Panélistes : Reg Whitaker (Université de Victoria): Intelligence Cooperation in Historical Perspective, from Cold War Bipolarity to the Multipolar Present Nancy Teeple (Collège militaire royal du Canada): Enhanced ISR and its Effect on Strategic Stability Patrick F. Walsh (Université Charles Sturt): Australia’s National Intelligence Community: Challenges and Opportunities in a Multi-Polar World ## Panel 3 – La coopération militaire dans l’Arctique… URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-3-la-cooperation-militaire-dans-larctique/ Modified: 2024-06-12 > Modérateur : Prof. Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)Intervenants :Consul général des États-Unis à Montréal... Modérateur : Prof. Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Intervenants : Consul général des États-Unis à Montréal, Robert P. Sanders Professeure Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Contre-amiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN) Dr. Pauline Pic, Université Laval (en distanciel) ## Panel 3 – Le soutien occidental URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-3-le-soutien-occidental/ Modified: 2024-09-25 > Panel 3 - Le soutien occidental - Laurent Borzillo, Justin Massie, Chantal Lavallée and Alexander Lanoszka take part in this discussion. Le soutien occidental Commentaires : Laurent Borzillo Justin Massie : L’avenir du soutien occidental Alexander Lanoszka « Plus ça change … ? » : Les stratégies des alliés du flanc est de l’OTAN dans l’ombre de la guerre Russie-Ukraine Chantal Lavallée : Le soutien européen à l’Ukraine ## PANEL 3 – 11 décembre 2020 : Le multilatéralisme en chute libre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-3-11-decembre-2020-le-multilateralisme-en-chute-libre/ Modified: 2021-03-25 > Panel organisé dans le cadre du colloque annuel « L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada » du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, les 10 et 11 décembre 2020.PANEL 3 – Le multilatéralisme en chute libre, Modératrice : Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (UBishops), Panélistes :Marie-Joëlle Zahar (UMontréal) : Back to the Future? Les Nations unies dans la tourmente, Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s) : Contributions de l'ASEAN au multilatéralisme et à l'ordre régional en Asie-Pacifique, Costanza Musu (UOttawa) : L'Union Européenne face au multilatéralisme  Panel organisé dans le cadre du colloque annuel « L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada » du Réseau d’analyse stratégique, les 10 et 11 décembre 2020. PANEL 3 – Le multilatéralisme en chute libre Modératrice : Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (UBishops) Panélistes : Marie-Joëlle Zahar (UMontréal) : Back to the Future? Les Nations unies dans la tourmente Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s) : Contributions de l'ASEAN au multilatéralisme et à l'ordre régional en Asie-Pacifique Costanza Musu (UOttawa) : L'Union Européenne face au multilatéralisme ## Panel 3 – Le tournant transatlantique : du Moyen-Orient vers l’Indopacifique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-3-le-tournant-transatlantique-du-moyen-orient-vers-lindopacifique/ Modified: 2025-03-10 > Panel 3 – Le tournant transatlantique : du Moyen-Orient vers l’Indopacifique avec Dr. Bayram Balci, Elise Barandon et Amélie Chalivet Modéré par Dr. Antoine Bondaz, IDEA et FRS - Dr. Bayram Balci, chercheur au CERI-Sciences Po - Elise Barandon, doctorante au Centre Thucydide et IRSEM, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas - Amélie Chalivet, doctorante au Centre Thucydide, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas et UQAM ## Panel 3 (3 novembre) : Maintien de la paix URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-3-3-novembre-maintien-de-la-paix/ Modified: 2020-11-23 > Ce troisième atelier s’intéressera au maintien de la paix. En dépit de leur expansion spectaculaire à la fin de la guerre froide, les opérations de paix ont été confrontées à d’importants problèmes d’appropriation locale et de durabilité. Leur légitimité a également été affectée par des échecs retentissants en Somalie, en Bosnie et au Rwanda. Les acteurs extérieurs étaient dans ces cas réticents à s’engager dans des déploiements ne pouvant être justifiés en matière de sécurité nationale. Les acteurs locaux étaient pour leur part mécontents par rapport à ce qu’ils percevaient comme des interventions ayant une faible compréhension des contextes locaux, préférant se tourner vers des solutions locales à des problèmes locaux. Pour sortir de ce dilemme, le renforcement des capacités des organisations régionales et des forces armées d’États touchés par les conflits a semblé être la réponse évidente. Ce troisième atelier s’intéresse au maintien de la paix. En dépit de leur expansion spectaculaire à la fin de la guerre froide, les opérations de paix ont été confrontées à d’importants problèmes d’appropriation locale et de durabilité. Leur légitimité a également été affectée par des échecs retentissants en Somalie, en Bosnie et au Rwanda. Les acteurs extérieurs étaient dans ces cas réticents à s’engager dans des déploiements ne pouvant être justifiés en matière de sécurité nationale. Les acteurs locaux étaient pour leur part mécontents par rapport à ce qu’ils percevaient comme des interventions ayant une faible compréhension des contextes locaux, préférant se tourner vers des solutions locales à des problèmes locaux. Pour sortir de ce dilemme, le renforcement des capacités des organisations régionales et des forces armées d’États touchés par les conflits a semblé être la réponse évidente. Consultez le résumé du troisième panel ## PANEL 3: Coopération en matière de défense dans la région Asie-Pacifique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-3-cooperation-en-matiere-de-defense-dans-la-region-asie-pacifique/ Modified: 2021-11-16 Animateur : Jonathan Paquin ( Université Laval ) Modératrice : Cleo Paskal (Chatham House) Panelistes: Hyon Joo Yoo (Trinity University) Lauren Richardson ( Australian National University) Nick Bisley ( La Trobe University) ## Panel 3: La cohérence stratégique du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-3-la-coherence-strategique-du-canada/ Modified: 2022-11-16 > Invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, conflits en zone grise, affaiblissement de l’hégémonie américaine et montée en puissance la Chine— Invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, conflits en zone grise, affaiblissement de l’hégémonie américaine et montée en puissance la Chine—le monde de 2022 est en ébullition. Coincé entre ses alliés aux intérêts parfois divergents et ses rivaux, le Canada se retrouve confronté au retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances. Face à cette situation, il doit s’adapter. Mais comment le faire de manière cohérente? Ce panel évaluera comment le Canada pourrait concevoir une politique étrangère cohérente en adéquation avec ses valeurs, mais surtout ses intérêts nationaux. Définir ceux-ci, ses priorités stratégiques globales et le budget nécessaire pour leur mise en œuvre est le défi auquel s’attaqueront les experts. Modérateur : Laurent Borzillo (Stagiaire postdoctoral, UQAM) Intervenants : Philippe Beaulieu Brossard (Professeur adjoint, Collège des Forces Chantal Lavallée (Professeure adjointe, Collège militaire royal de St-Jean Jonathan Paquin (Professeur titulaire, Université Laval) Gordon Venner (Ancien sous-ministre délégué, ministère de la Défense nationale) ## Panel 4 – Les stratégies alliées URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-4-les-strategies-alliees/ Modified: 2024-09-25 > Panel 4 - Les stratégies alliées avec Chantal Lavallée, Laurent Borzillo, Nicolas-François Perron et Alexandre Courtemanche. Les stratégies alliées Commentaires : Chantal Lavallée Laurent Borzillo : Le revirement stratégique de Macron Nicolas-François Perron : La stratégie Meloni Alexandre Courtemanche : L’échantillonnage militaire du Canada ## Panel 4 (20 novembre) : L’OTAN et la défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-4-20-novembre-lotan-et-la-defense/ Modified: 2020-12-03 > Ce quatrième atelier s’intéresse à l’OTAN et à la défense. Les tensions croissantes entre grandes puissances depuis le début des années 2010 ont remis le risque d’un conflit interétatique conventionnel à l’ordre du jour de la sécurité mondiale. Les États sont de plus en plus en concurrence dans des domaines en permanente évolution, tels que le cyberespace, l’espace et l’intelligence artificielle. Pour une alliance comme l’OTAN, cela soulève la question de savoir si les États membres sont bien équipés en matière de défense et de savoir comment les différentes responsabilités doivent être partagées. Le renforcement des capacités est un élément important de l’alliance, qui se manifeste par des activités de formation militaire et des exercices militaires conjoints. Quels défis la COVID-19 soulève-t-elle pour le partage des responsabilités au sein de l’OTAN ? Comment la pandémie a-t-elle entravé les activités conjointes ? A-t-elle amené les États membres à reconsidérer leurs investissements dans les capacités de défense de leurs alliés, notamment en ce qui concerne les dimensions genre, qui reçoivent souvent une faible priorité ? Comment la COVID-19 a-t-elle changé le fonctionnement des activités de renforcement des capacités sur le terrain ? Ce quatrième atelier s’intéresse à l’OTAN et à la défense. Les tensions croissantes entre grandes puissances depuis le début des années 2010 ont remis le risque d’un conflit interétatique conventionnel à l’ordre du jour de la sécurité mondiale. Les États sont de plus en plus en concurrence dans des domaines en permanente évolution, tels que le cyberespace, l’espace et l’intelligence artificielle. Pour une alliance comme l’OTAN, cela soulève la question de savoir si les États membres sont bien équipés en matière de défense et de savoir comment les différentes responsabilités doivent être partagées. Le renforcement des capacités est un élément important de l’alliance, qui se manifeste par des activités de formation militaire et des exercices militaires conjoints. Quels défis la COVID-19 soulève-t-elle pour le partage des responsabilités au sein de l’OTAN ? Comment la pandémie a-t-elle entravé les activités conjointes ? A-t-elle amené les États membres à reconsidérer leurs investissements dans les capacités de défense de leurs alliés, notamment en ce qui concerne les dimensions genre, qui reçoivent souvent une faible priorité ? Comment la COVID-19 a-t-elle changé le fonctionnement des activités de renforcement des capacités sur le terrain ? Consultez le résumé du quatrième panel ## Panel 5 (8 décembre) : Les Forces armées canadiennes à l’ère de la COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-5-8-decembre-les-forces-armees-canadiennes-a-lere-de-la-covid-19/ Modified: 2021-01-15 > Ce cinquième atelier s’intéresse aux Forces armées canadiennes à l’ère de la COVID-19. Le renforcement des capacités est devenu une part importante des activités des Forces armées canadiennes dans le monde. Ces opérations permettent au Canada d’avoir une influence sur la scène internationale et de contribuer aux efforts multilatéraux, tout en reconnaissant ses limites dans sa capacité à déployer des missions de grande échelle dans des contextes violents, comme en Afghanistan. La pandémie a cependant posé des défis considérables à ces activités. Certaines missions ont été suspendues, d’autres ont été réduites, et certaines rotations ont été interrompues, tandis que les FAC se sont efforcées de garder leurs membres en bonne santé. Que révèle la COVID-19 sur les priorités du Canada en matière de renforcement des capacités dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité ? Quelles leçons les FAC peuvent-elles tirer des opérations militaires outre-mer pour de futures pandémies ? Comment les effets différenciés de la pandémie selon le genre et l’ethnie ont-ils affecté les FAC et leur capacité à mener des activités de renforcement des capacités à l’étranger ? Ce cinquième atelier s’intéresse aux Forces armées canadiennes à l’ère de la COVID-19. Le renforcement des capacités est devenu une part importante des activités des Forces armées canadiennes dans le monde. Ces opérations permettent au Canada d’avoir une influence sur la scène internationale et de contribuer aux efforts multilatéraux, tout en reconnaissant ses limites dans sa capacité à déployer des missions de grande échelle dans des contextes violents, comme en Afghanistan. La pandémie a cependant posé des défis considérables à ces activités. Certaines missions ont été suspendues, d’autres ont été réduites, et certaines rotations ont été interrompues, tandis que les FAC se sont efforcées de garder leurs membres en bonne santé. Que révèle la COVID-19 sur les priorités du Canada en matière de renforcement des capacités dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité ? Quelles leçons les FAC peuvent-elles tirer des opérations militaires outre-mer pour de futures pandémies ? Comment les effets différenciés de la pandémie selon le genre et l’ethnie ont-ils affecté les FAC et leur capacité à mener des activités de renforcement des capacités à l’étranger ? Consultez le résumé du cinquième panel ## Panel étudiant – Concours de la meilleure publication URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-etudiant-concours-de-la-meilleure-publication/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > modérée par :Renée Filliatrault (Conseil stratégique, Réseau d’analyse stratégique) modérée par : Renée Filliatrault (Conseil stratégique, Réseau d’analyse stratégique) ## Panel étudiant – CONCOURS DE LA MEILLEURE NOTE STRATÉGIQUE URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/panel-etudiant-concours-de-la-meilleure-note-strategique/ Modified: 2022-11-14 > Modératrice : Johanna Masse (Chercheuse post-doctorale, Université Queen’s). Ce panel d'étudiants distingue certains de nos chercheurs... Modératrice : Johanna Masse (Chercheuse post-doctorale, Université Queen’s) ## Par dessein plutôt que par défaut URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/par-dessein-plutot-que-par-defaut/ Modified: 2023-01-06 > Par dessein plutôt que par défaut. Dans le contexte de la mise à jour de la politique de défense, le RAS/NSA a organisé une... Dans le cadre de l’élaboration de son colloque annuel en septembre 2022, le RAS a organisé au cours de l'été 2022 une série de consultations avec ses chercheurs afin de proposer des recommandations simples au ministère de la Défense nationale. Ce rapport est le résultat de ces consultations.  *** Dans le contexte de la mise à jour de la politique de défense, le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) a organisé une série de consultations avec ses chercheurs afin de proposer des recommandations simples au ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN), et tenant compte du caractère décisif de l’année 2022 pour la politique internationale. Au cours des deux dernières années, les experts du RAS ont déploré le fait que le Canada n’ait pas eu une articulation claire de ses priorités stratégiques. Ils ont reproché à la politique étrangère et de défense canadienne d’être moralisatrice, de faire preuve d’autosatisfaction et de ne pas s’accompagner de capacités appropriées pour relever les défis sécuritaires de la prochaine décennie et des suivantes. Parallèlement, la pandémie mondiale, qui a débuté en 2020, et un nouveau scandale d’inconduites sexuelles dans les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) en 2021 ont eu une incidence sur l’état de la défense nationale. En 2022, la compétition entre grandes puissances s’est considérablement intensifiée avec le retour de la guerre conventionnelle en Europe continentale à la suite de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie le 24 février. Le comportement de plus en plus agressif de la Chine en Asie de l’Est et son plus grand alignement sur la Russie érodent davantage l’ordreinternational libéral qui constitue la base de la sécurité et de la prospérité occidentales. Étant donné les impacts cumulés de ces évènements, le Canada ne peut plus se permettre d’être complaisant. Le suivisme, c’est-à-dire l’idée que le Canada peut adopter une approche attentiste et ensuite ajuster sa posture en fonction de ce que font ses principaux partenaires, n’est pas réalisable non plus, surtout dans un contexte où son plus proche allié, les États-Unis, est confronté à des troubles politiques intérieurs. Ce rapport est l’aboutissement des consultations du RAS à Montréal, Ottawa et Calgary et, bien qu’il ne soit pas censé être exhaustif, il offre des directives claires sur la façon dont le Canada devrait renouveler ses priorités stratégiques. Télécharger le rapport (PDF 159kb) ## Pare-feu et lignes de front: Le potentiel de leadership du Canada en matière de cybersécurité à l’ère des opérations d’information à l’étranger URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pare-feu-et-lignes-de-front-le-potentiel-de-leadership-du-canada-en-matiere-de-cybersecurite-a-lere-des-operations-dinformation-a-letranger/ Modified: 2025-05-07 1- Introduction Les cybermenaces se multiplient au Canada et dans les pays alliés de l'OTAN, évoluant à la fois en termes d'ampleur et de sophistication. Alors que les cyberattaques traditionnelles visant les infrastructures et les réseaux gouvernementaux persistent, les menaces contre la société civile et les institutions démocratiques, telles que les désormais tristement célèbres « fake news », s'intensifient. Pourtant, les gouvernements de l'Alliance, y compris le Canada, restent à la traîne de ces évolutions par rapport aux adversaires de Moscou, de Pékin, de Téhéran et d'un Delhi de plus en plus hostile. Ils réagissent à des menaces bien documentées alors même que de nouvelles menaces émergent, portées par les progrès rapides de l'intelligence artificielle (IA) générative, qui permet de créer des campagnes d'ingérence étrangère et de les mettre à l'échelle à une vitesse exponentielle. . Le Canada s'est imposé comme un leader clé dans le renforcement de la cybersécurité mondiale et la lutte contre la désinformation étrangère. Il a joué un rôle central dans le mécanisme de réaction rapide du G7, créé en 2018 lors du sommet du G7 à Charlevoix, et a été le fer de lance de la formation d'une division spécialisée « cyber » au sein de ses forces armées. Ces initiatives ont renforcé les capacités collectives de détection des atteintes à la cybersécurité, de lutte contre les campagnes de désinformation et d'atténuation des ingérences étrangères. . Cependant, une grande partie de ce travail reste réactive, avec une compréhension limitée de la structure des opérations d'information étrangères, sans parler de la façon dont les adversaires naviguent dans des écosystèmes numériques complexes. Bien qu'elle ne soit pas intrinsèquement nuisible, cette approche est insuffisante pour faire face à la menace croissante de l'ingérence étrangère, en particulier au moment où les États-Unis se retirent de leur rôle traditionnel de partenaire stratégique du Canada. Pour relever ce défi, le Canada doit adopter une approche de la cybersécurité qui mette tout le monde sur le pont, en particulier en ce qui concerne les opérations d'information à l'étranger, et développer progressivement une approche de la question à l'échelle de la société tout entière. Contrairement à de nombreux autres domaines de la sécurité et de la défense, le Canada a une occasion unique d'affirmer son leadership dans ce domaine et de développer un cadre proactif. Une stratégie véritablement proactive devrait s'appuyer sur l'expertise existante des universités et du secteur privé en matière de cybersécurité et de manipulation et d'interférence des informations étrangères (FIMI), tout en élargissant le vivier de talents grâce à des investissements soutenus dans la recherche. Pour ce faire, il faut non seulement soutenir les initiatives établies, mais aussi prendre des risques calculés en finançant des projets de recherche émergents avant que les menaces ne dépassent des niveaux gérables. Le Canada doit absolument exploiter les technologies de pointe, les connaissances et les innovations de ses chercheurs et de ses entreprises technologiques, en particulier dans le domaine de l'intelligence artificielle, afin d'améliorer la détection des menaces, de renforcer la résilience numérique et de garder une longueur d'avance sur les acteurs adverses qui opèrent dans des écosystèmes d'information complexes. Pour que cette vision devienne réalité, le Canada doit également se pencher sur les dimensions politiques et institutionnelles de la cybersécurité et des opérations d'information à l'étranger. Une stratégie vraiment efficace exige un leadership politique fort, un engagement multipartite et la reconnaissance du fait que les menaces numériques ne sont pas seulement des défis techniques, mais des questions fondamentales de sécurité nationale et d'intégrité démocratique. Ce faisant, le Canada peut se positionner à l'avant-garde de la défense contre la guerre de l'information, en renforçant à la fois la sécurité nationale et la résilience plus large de ses institutions démocratiques. À l'avenir, une telle stratégie pourrait propulser le Canada vers une position de leader parmi les alliés de l'OTAN, créant ainsi des opportunités pour une coopération numérique bilatérale et multilatérale renforcée dans l'Atlantique. 2- La cible croissante dans le dos du Canada : Le Canada est devenu de plus en plus un point focal pour les opérations d'information étrangères, en raison de plusieurs facteurs. Les responsables politiques canadiens et la Commission d'ingérence étrangère (CIE), qui a été créée pour mener une enquête publique sur les processus électoraux et les institutions démocratiques visés par l'ingérence étrangère, ont noté cette tendance. La participation active du Canada à des alliances internationales telles que l'OTAN et le G7 en fait une cible stratégique pour les adversaires qui cherchent à saper la cohésion de l'Occident. En outre, la société multiculturelle du Canada, marquée par la diversité des communautés de la diaspora, offre aux acteurs étrangers la possibilité de tirer parti des liens transnationaux pour exercer une influence. La position intéressante du Canada face aux ingérences étrangères Des enquêtes récentes ont révélé que des pays comme la Chine, la Russie et l'Inde ont cherché à s'ingérer dans les processus démocratiques du Canada. Une enquête approfondie menée par le juge Marie-Josée Hogue a révélé que ces pays ont mené des campagnes de désinformation et d'autres tactiques visant à déstabiliser les institutions canadiennes. Bien que ces efforts aient été largement inefficaces pour modifier les résultats des élections, ils mettent en évidence la menace permanente à laquelle le Canada est confronté. Les préoccupations accrues concernant les campagnes de « spamouflage » du Parti communiste chinois (PCC) ciblant les députés canadiens et la récente révélation de l'existence d'influenceurs médiatiques canadiens financés par la Russie illustrent le problème croissant que posent les opérations d'information étrangères. Les acteurs étrangers sont susceptibles d'utiliser de plus en plus le Canada comme intermédiaire pour envoyer des messages à des publics occidentaux plus larges, y compris les États-Unis et d'autres alliés de l'OTAN. En ciblant le Canada, les adversaires ont la possibilité de tester et même d'affiner leurs stratégies de guerre de l'information sur un allié de l'OTAN qui peut être perçu comme plus facile à isoler que les pays européens. En outre, le fossé grandissant entre Ottawa et Washington et le manque de respect des engagements en matière de défense font du Canada une cible intéressante pour des opérations étrangères plus manifestes menées par des États antagonistes à la recherche d'un risque moindre de représailles substantielles. Par exemple, la relation historique unique du Canada avec les États-Unis, bien que tendue à l'heure actuelle, peut être considérée comme un canal commode pour des tentatives indirectes d'influence. Cela est évident dans des cas tels que l'arrestation et l'emprisonnement des deux Michaels par Pékin, à la suite de la détention de Meng Wanzhou, de Huawei, par les autorités canadiennes à la suite d'une demande d'extradition des États-Unis pour des accusations de fraude. De même, l'assassinat du militant sikh Hardeep Singh Nijjar en juillet 2023, suivi de l'arrestation de trois ressortissants indiens soupçonnés d'avoir des liens avec le gouvernement indien, a déclenché un jeu de représailles diplomatiques entre le Canada et l'Inde, portant les relations à un niveau historiquement bas, montre la volonté des pays étrangers d'entrer ouvertement en conflit avec le Canada au point de mener des opérations sur son territoire. Bien que cette opération présumée sur le territoire canadien n'ait aucun lien avec les États-Unis, le fait que Washington ait également accusé l'Inde de tentatives similaires et ait reçu une « pleine coopération » de Delhi a entraîné une certaine déception lorsque le soutien au Canada n'a pas eu la même intensité initiale et le même résultat. L'instrumentalisation étrangère du multiculturalisme canadien Les communautés de la diaspora au Canada sont souvent la cible d'ingérences étrangères. Le gouvernement canadien, ainsi que le dernier rapport du FIC, indiquent que des gouvernements étrangers ont diffusé de la désinformation, harcelé, intimidé et surveillé des activistes et des critiques au sein des communautés chinoise et indienne au Canada, dans le but de supprimer la dissidence et de contrôler les récits à l'étranger. Cette répression transnationale menace non seulement les libertés individuelles, mais aussi la cohésion sociale et la sécurité nationale du Canada. La recherche indique une augmentation significative des publications canadiennes concernant le ciblage de la diaspora dans les médias chinois pendant les élections canadiennes, en particulier les informations visant les circonscriptions où la population sino-canadienne est importante. En ce qui concerne l'Inde, une enquête de la CBC a permis de découvrir des centaines de comptes suspects sur Twitter/X ressemblant à des bots qui diffusaient des informations erronées sur les institutions canadiennes. Le Canada joue-t-il dans la cour des grands? L'impression que le Canada « frappe fort » au sein du G7 et de l'OTAN, compte tenu de la taille relativement modeste de son économie et de son armée, peut accroître son attrait en tant que cible pour les opérations d'information étrangères. Malgré sa présence internationale, le Canada ne consacre actuellement qu'environ 1,37 % de son PIB à la défense, ce qui est inférieur au seuil de 2 % fixé par l'OTAN au moins jusqu'en 2032. Ce sous-investissement durable peut alimenter le sentiment que le Canada n'a pas la capacité ou la volonté de répondre avec force aux menaces extérieures. En conséquence, les adversaires peuvent considérer le Canada comme une « cible molle », l'utilisant comme un point d'entrée à faible risque pour des campagnes d'information visant à influencer des publics occidentaux plus larges. Ces vulnérabilités sont aggravées par l'affaiblissement du paysage médiatique, marqué par une baisse de la concurrence et la disparition des médias locaux, ce qui réduit les incitations à respecter les normes journalistiques et à lutter contre la désinformation. De même, l'identité nationale relativement diffuse du Canada, où l'appartenance régionale et ethnique prime souvent, peut le rendre plus sensible à l'ingérence identitaire visant à exploiter les divisions sociales. En d'autres termes, il ne s'agit pas seulement de l'état de préparation militaire réel, mais aussi de la manière dont les adversaires perçoivent la résilience du Canada et sa vulnérabilité à l'ingérence. Par rapport au Canada, les cibles alternatives de l'OTAN telles que l'Estonie, la Lettonie, la Lituanie et même la Finlande deviennent moins attrayantes pour la Russie en termes d'opérations d'information. Non seulement ces sociétés sont beaucoup moins diversifiées culturellement que le Canada, mais leur expérience historique sous la domination ou l'occupation soviétique a instillé un scepticisme plus profond à l'égard des récits russes, ce qui rend leurs populations plus résistantes à la propagande pro-russe (à l'exception de l'Allemagne de l'Est). Contrairement au Canada, où des publics diversifiés et plus ou moins sensibilisés peuvent être plus sensibles, les sociétés baltes ont développé une immunité collective comparable à la désinformation soutenue par le Kremlin. En outre, comme ces nations ont été les principales cibles de la guerre hybride russe pendant des décennies, elles ont mis en place des contre-mesures et des politiques solides, notamment des programmes d'éducation aux médias, des réglementations strictes sur les médias d'État russes et une infrastructure de cybersécurité avancée qui implique tous les niveaux de gouvernance, en particulier en Estonie. Par conséquent, la Russie a moins de chances de réussir à dépenser des ressources pour influencer ces populations, qui sont par nature plus résistantes et mieux préparées. Au lieu de cela, il est plus probable que Moscou se concentre sur une cible canadienne plus large, en particulier à un moment où les différends entre Ottawa et Washington rendent la coopération de plus en plus ténue. Dans l'ensemble, la diversité de la société canadienne, ses liens étroits avec les grandes puissances occidentales et sa vulnérabilité perçue au sein de ce cercle de grandes puissances en font une cible attrayante pour les opérations d'information étrangères. Il est essentiel de reconnaître ces vulnérabilités et d'y remédier pour protéger les institutions démocratiques du Canada et préserver son rôle en tant que membre stable et résistant de la communauté internationale. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que le gouvernement canadien ait investi du temps et des ressources dans sa Commission sur l'ingérence étrangère et qu'il ait pris la tête de l'initiative du G7 contre l'ingérence étrangère. À la suite de chocs tels que l'escalade rapide des tensions tarifaires par l'administration Trump, qui a mis à rude épreuve les liens économiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis, le statut de puissance moyenne d'Ottawa semble de plus en plus précaire. 3- L'avantage comparatif du Canada Le Canada s'est imposé comme un leader dans la recherche sur les médias et l'information, en particulier dans les domaines de la désinformation et des opérations d'information. Des institutions telles que le Cybersecurity and Privacy Institute de l'Université de Waterloo, le Citizen's Lab de l'Université de Toronto, l'Observatoire de l'écosystème des médias de l'Université McGill, le Laboratoire de l'intégrité de l'information de l'Université d'Ottawa et le Réseau canadien de recherche sur les médias numériques sont à l'avant-garde de la recherche sur des sujets tels que l'ingérence étrangère en ligne et la militarisation de la désinformation. Le Canada s'est également imposé comme un leader mondial en matière d'intelligence artificielle (IA) et d'innovation technologique, favorisant un écosystème dynamique de startups et d'éducation qui offre des avantages uniques par rapport à ses alliés américains et européens de l'OTAN. L'engagement d'Ottawa en faveur de l'IA se manifeste par des investissements importants et des initiatives stratégiques. En 2017, le Canada est devenu le premier pays à mettre en œuvre une stratégie nationale en matière d'IA, la Stratégie pancanadienne en matière d'IA, soulignant sa volonté de promouvoir la recherche et le développement en matière d'IA. Cette stratégie a permis la création de chaires d'IA à l'Institut canadien de recherches avancées, le recrutement de plus de 100 chercheurs et la formation de plus de 1 500 étudiants diplômés et boursiers postdoctoraux. Le gouvernement canadien a également développé activement des initiatives pour lutter contre la désinformation au sein de ses structures bureaucratiques par le biais du document « Countering Disinformation : A Guidebook for Public Servants », qui aide à former les fonctionnaires à identifier la diffusion de fausses informations et à y remédier. Enfin, le secteur canadien de l'IA est soutenu par un solide bassin de talents. En 2022-23, plus de 140 000 professionnels travaillaient activement dans le domaine de l'IA, soit une augmentation de 29 % par rapport à l'année précédente. Notamment, le Canada abrite 10 % des meilleurs chercheurs en IA au monde, ce qui le place au deuxième rang à l'échelle mondiale. Cette concentration d'expertise a favorisé un environnement florissant de startups, avec environ 1 500 entreprises développant des solutions d'IA dans diverses industries, y compris les soins de santé, la finance et la fabrication. En revanche, l'environnement de recherche aux États-Unis est confronté à d'importants défis en raison de la polarisation politique. Le Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO), connu pour ses études sur les abus des médias sociaux et la désinformation, a connu des incertitudes en matière de financement et des changements de direction, en partie dus à des pressions politiques extérieures. Cette situation met en évidence les difficultés que rencontrent les institutions américaines pour mener des recherches sur la désinformation dans un climat politique très polarisé, alors que d'importantes sociétés de médias sociaux semblent avoir abandonné la surveillance de la désinformation. Pendant ce temps, les responsables politiques fédéraux s'engagent à réduire le financement des agences de protection de la cybersécurité. L'environnement politique relativement plus stable du Canada en matière d'éducation et de recherche offre un terrain fertile pour la recherche et le développement de la désinformation. Il n'en reste pas moins vrai que la plupart des avancées technologiques de pointe sont réalisées aux États-Unis et que de nombreuses entreprises du Canada et d'ailleurs finissent par déménager ou envisagent de déménager aux États-Unis pour faire partie de ces écosystèmes et bénéficier d'incitations fiscales, ce qui provoque une importante « fuite des cerveaux » dans le domaine de la technologie au Canada. Par exemple, 64 % des travailleurs canadiens de la technologie interrogés envisageraient de déménager pour un emploi similaire aux États-Unis, alors que certains affirment que les droits de douane actuellement imposés au Canada risquent d'intensifier la fuite des cerveaux vers les États-Unis en rendant plus difficile pour les entreprises d'opérer dans les deux pays, ce qui favoriserait les marchés américains. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant la fin de l'IA et de l'écosystème technologique plus large du Canada. Ottawa peut agir pour accroître la rétention des entreprises et des travailleurs de la même manière que le gouvernement du Québec a créé les conditions nécessaires à l'établissement d'un écosystème de l'industrie des jeux vidéo dans sa province et a contribué à propulser l'écosystème canadien des jeux vidéo grâce à l'introduction d'un crédit d'impôt de 37 % pour les entreprises opérant dans ce secteur au début des années 2000. 4- Un cadre stratégique pour le leadership du Canada en matière de cybersécurité Pour se positionner comme chef de file en matière de cybersécurité et de recherche sur la désinformation parmi les alliés de l'Atlantique, le Canada doit élaborer une approche « globale de la société » pour atteindre des objectifs à court et à long terme. Tout d'abord, le Canada doit élargir son partenariat actuel entre les universités et le gouvernement, y compris les programmes tripartites avec le secteur privé. À l'avenir, le Canada doit développer sa propre numérisation des services publics et des infrastructures afin de renforcer la confiance du public dans les systèmes numériques et la légitimité du leadership du gouvernement dans le développement d'un écosystème sûr en matière de cybersécurité. Court terme : Jeter les bases de l'innovation interdisciplinaire Pour tirer parti de ces atouts existants, le Canada pourrait créer une agence de recherche avancée spécialisée qui se concentrerait sur l'innovation liée à la défense et engloberait les sciences sociales et humaines. L'intégration du programme de financement des trois agences (CRSH, IRSC, CRSNG) dans ce cadre permettrait de promouvoir la recherche interdisciplinaire, de s'attaquer aux multiples facettes de la désinformation et des menaces de cybersécurité, et de tirer parti d'un écosystème de 4 milliards de dollars déjà administré de manière centralisée. Par exemple, en 2021, le Parti libéral du Canada, s'il est réélu, a promis la création de l'Agence canadienne des projets de recherche avancée (CARPA), sur le modèle de l'Agence américaine des projets de recherche avancée pour la défense (DARPA), qui a donné à la planète des technologies qui ont changé le monde, comme Internet et le système GPS, afin d'encourager l'innovation et de maintenir le leadership technologique. Toutefois, cette initiative n'a pas encore été concrétisée, ce qui laisse une lacune dans l'infrastructure de recherche stratégique du Canada. Cette approche permettrait d'améliorer la collaboration entre le gouvernement, les universités et le secteur privé, de favoriser l'innovation et de veiller à ce que la recherche se traduise par des politiques efficaces et des technologies diffusées. En tirant parti de ses capacités de recherche existantes et en développant les initiatives interdisciplinaires, le Canada peut se positionner en tant que leader dans la lutte contre les menaces nationales de désinformation au sein de l'OTAN. Compte tenu de la représentation relative plus élevée de la recherche en sciences sociales dans le financement fédéral au Canada qu'aux États-Unis, Ottawa a la possibilité d'améliorer la recherche universitaire interdisciplinaire et les possibilités de formation pour les générations actuelles et futures de spécialistes de la désinformation et de la cybersécurité, tant dans les domaines des STIM qu'en dehors de ceux-ci. Comme indiqué précédemment, le Canada dispose déjà d'une base solide en matière d'universités, de centres de recherche, d'engagement du secteur privé et d'infrastructures de financement universitaire soutenues par le gouvernement. Ce qui fait encore défaut, c'est la volonté politique des décideurs et des acteurs exécutifs d'activer et de renforcer ces institutions existantes. En conséquence, le prochain gouvernement fédéral doit donner la priorité à l'adoption et à la mise en œuvre de cadres législatifs clés, à savoir le projet de loi C-27, qui comprend la loi sur l'IA et les données, la loi sur la protection de la vie privée des consommateurs et la loi sur le Tribunal de la protection des renseignements personnels et des données ; le projet de loi C-63 sur les préjudices en ligne ; et le projet de loi C-26, qui vise à moderniser la loi sur les télécommunications en y intégrant des dispositions relatives à la cybersécurité. Ensemble, ces mesures forment l'échafaudage essentiel d'un écosystème résilient et innovant, tout en protégeant les droits numériques et la vie privée des Canadiens. Le long terme : Apprendre des alliés pour renforcer la confiance et la résilience numérique Face à l'évolution des menaces numériques et à la sophistication croissante des opérations d'information étrangères, le Canada doit prendre des mesures proactives pour renforcer sa résilience numérique. Une stratégie à long terme devrait se concentrer sur l'instauration de la confiance institutionnelle, le renforcement de la cybersécurité et l'amélioration de la culture numérique du public. En s'inspirant d'alliés performants comme l'Estonie, le Canada peut travailler à l'élaboration et à la mise en œuvre de systèmes d'identité numérique sécurisés, à l'extension de la gouvernance des données ouvertes et à la mise en place de mesures préventives contre la désinformation. Le renforcement des alliances avec les partenaires de l'OTAN améliorera encore la capacité du Canada à relever les nouveaux défis cybernétiques. Une stratégie tournée vers l'avenir permettra non seulement de protéger la démocratie canadienne, mais aussi de renforcer la confiance dans les institutions publiques et d'assurer un leadership technologique à long terme. Le gouvernement estonien s'est imposé comme un acteur de premier plan dans la numérisation de la gouvernance, en lançant la numérisation de ses systèmes d'éducation et de santé à la fin des années 1990. Aujourd'hui, la plupart des interactions entre les citoyens et le gouvernement peuvent se faire par voie numérique, malgré la menace persistante des cyberattaques et des campagnes de désinformation russes. Grâce à un élan d'entreprenariat politique et à une réaction favorable des secteurs privé et universitaire, l'Estonie a mis au point un système de gouvernance numérique complet, résistant et efficace, souvent appelé « e-Estonie ». Par exemple, un projet de recherche tripartite impliquant les secteurs public, privé et universitaire, dirigé par des universitaires de TalTech et financé par le gouvernement et des initiatives privées, a abouti à la formation du groupe de recherche sur l'État numérique de la prochaine génération (Next Gen Digital State Research Group). Cette équipe de recherche se consacre à la découverte et à la mise en œuvre de nouvelles technologies par le biais d'une collaboration multidisciplinaire. L'objectif principal est de fournir des ressources aux chercheurs universitaires innovants tout en veillant à ce que les résultats soient accessibles au public et au secteur privé et qu'ils puissent être mis en œuvre de manière pratique. L'un des principaux avantages de cette transformation numérique a été l'augmentation de la confiance dans les institutions gouvernementales et de la satisfaction de la population estonienne quant à l'efficacité du gouvernement. Lorsque l'on aborde les menaces émergentes des opérations d'information étrangères, qui s'appuient principalement sur la diffusion de fausses informations pour répandre le scepticisme politique, la confiance institutionnelle est primordiale. En outre, des infrastructures numériques résilientes favorisent le maintien de cette confiance en atténuant l'impact des cyberattaques sur l'efficacité. Voici quelques exemples que le Canada peut mettre en œuvre de manière assez transparente à moyen et à long terme. Premièrement, le Canada devrait mettre en œuvre un système d'identité électronique (e-ID), qui fournit aux citoyens une identité numérique sécurisée leur permettant d'accéder à un large éventail de services en ligne, notamment le vote, les services bancaires et les soins de santé, ce qui représente une initiative forte. Ce système garantit que les citoyens peuvent s'authentifier en ligne en toute confiance, réduisant ainsi le risque de fraude d'identité et renforçant la confiance dans les interactions numériques, et il a joué un rôle central dans l'infrastructure numérique de l'Estonie. Le Canada a tout à gagner de l'adoption d'un système d'identité numérique centralisé et sécurisé similaire. En fournissant aux citoyens un moyen fiable d'identification en ligne, le gouvernement peut faciliter l'accès sécurisé aux services et favoriser une plus grande confiance dans les plateformes numériques. Cette confiance est essentielle pour lutter contre la désinformation, car les citoyens sont plus enclins à se fier à des sources d'information vérifiées lorsqu'ils ont confiance dans la sécurité et l'authenticité des canaux numériques. Il est intéressant de noter que les gouvernements provinciaux ont déjà commencé à explorer cette solution, l'Ontario ayant développé un programme d'identité numérique pour les services publics en ligne. Par conséquent, le gouvernement fédéral est susceptible de rencontrer moins de résistance de la part des provinces s'il associe ses initiatives numériques à un soutien financier significatif et s'il donne aux provinces les moyens d'adapter les technologies émergentes à leurs besoins spécifiques. Une telle approche aiderait également Ottawa à éviter des échecs retentissants tels que le système de paiement Phoenix et l'application ArriveCan, qui ont tous deux gravement entamé sa crédibilité numérique. Pour éviter de nouveaux faux pas, il faut plus que de la coordination : il faut de l'humilité. Si le gouvernement n'est pas en mesure de fournir une infrastructure numérique fiable, efficace et rentable, il doit laisser la place à ceux qui le peuvent. Aujourd'hui plus que jamais, Ottawa doit reconnaître non seulement ses points forts, mais aussi ses points faibles, et ouvrir la porte aux experts qui ont la vision et la capacité technique de diriger. Le secteur technologique canadien recèle le talent et l'innovation nécessaires pour construire un avenir numérique sûr et adapté. Le rôle du gouvernement devrait être de permettre et d'intégrer cette expertise, et non de lui barrer la route. Deuxièmement, l'amélioration de l'accessibilité des données gouvernementales par le biais d'une structure de gouvernance « ouverte » est essentielle pour améliorer la transparence et favoriser la confiance entre les citoyens et les autorités canadiennes. Dans le cas de l'Estonie, le gouvernement publie des données en libre accès sur de nombreux aspects de ses activités afin de promouvoir la responsabilité et de permettre aux citoyens de prendre des décisions plus éclairées. Il travaille également à la mise en œuvre d'une API pour faciliter la collecte de big data et la formation sur les données de l'État pour les parties prenantes des secteurs public et privé. Cette approche permet non seulement d'accroître la confiance dans le gouvernement, mais aussi de réduire le champ dans lequel la désinformation peut se développer. Notamment, l'Estonie affiche les niveaux de confiance les plus élevés dans les institutions nationales parmi les États européens postcommunistes, un résultat frappant compte tenu des niveaux de confiance historiquement faibles de la région, en partie dus à des expériences de répression et de corruption. Ces résultats sont particulièrement significatifs si l'on considère les institutions non politiques, telles que celles liées à l'administration publique et à la prestation de services, ainsi que les institutions politiques. Son expérience atteste du potentiel de transformation des politiques d'ouverture des données pour rétablir la confiance, en particulier dans des contextes marqués par la fragilité institutionnelle ou le scepticisme démocratique. Dans des pays comme l'Estonie, les citoyens jouissent de droits numériques étendus : ils ont accès aux données de l'État et peuvent soumettre des pétitions, participer à des consultations et voter entièrement en ligne. Au Canada, une initiative prometteuse a vu le jour sous la forme du projet de loi C-27 et de la mise en œuvre de la « Charte numérique » nationale. Ce projet de loi s'appuie sur des initiatives similaires de l'Union européenne, telles que le Règlement général sur la protection des données (RGPD), adopté en 2018, la Loi sur les services numériques (LSN), adoptée en 2022, ainsi que la Loi sur la gouvernance des données et la Loi sur le marché numérique, également adoptées en 2022, qui ont tous remodelé le paysage de la gouvernance numérique de l'UE depuis 2018. Cependant, en janvier 2025, le projet de loi C-27 n'a toujours pas été adopté, malgré son potentiel pour renforcer la capacité de l'État et cultiver la confiance du public dans la gouvernance numérique. À l'heure actuelle, le Canada continue de se débattre avec l'accès aux données en temps réel, des lois obsolètes sur la liberté d'information contribuant à la lenteur des temps de réponse et à une sensibilisation limitée du public aux données disponibles. Pourtant, le climat actuel, marqué par un effet de ralliement autour du drapeau et une préoccupation accrue pour la sécurité nationale, représente une fenêtre politique unique pour Ottawa. Ce moment doit être saisi non seulement pour faire avancer la législation élargissant l'accès à l'information, mais aussi pour institutionnaliser l'intégration des principales parties prenantes, y compris la société civile, le monde universitaire et le secteur technologique, dans le processus plus large de renforcement de la résilience numérique. En profitant de cette dynamique, le gouvernement fédéral peut à la fois moderniser sa gouvernance de l'information et renforcer la confiance démocratique à l'ère numérique. Troisièmement, le Canada doit élaborer une stratégie proactive et préventive de lutte contre la désinformation, axée sur le « pré-bunking », plutôt que de s'en remettre uniquement à une approche réactive, fondée sur le debunking. Le pré-démystification consiste à éduquer les individus sur les tactiques de désinformation avant qu'ils ne les rencontrent, un peu comme un vaccin, afin d'améliorer leur résistance aux effets de la désinformation. Ce concept est fondé sur la théorie de l'inoculation. En revanche, la démystification vise à réparer les dommages causés par la désinformation une fois que les individus y ont été exposés et ont accepté certaines de ses affirmations comme étant vraies. Actuellement, de nombreuses initiatives canadiennes, telles que Get Cyber Safe et des programmes de collaboration à but non lucratif comme MediaSmarts, ainsi que des opérations de traque de la désinformation menées et financées par le gouvernement, telles que le projet de désinformation des élections canadiennes et les mécanismes de réaction rapide (MRR) du Canada, sont d'excellentes idées. Le problème réside dans leur portée limitée auprès du grand public. Le Canada aurait tout à gagner à mettre en œuvre un programme national d'alphabétisation numérique directement dans le système éducatif. Un tel programme national rendrait obligatoire l'éducation et l'évaluation de la littératie numérique du primaire au secondaire, permettant au gouvernement canadien de fournir un financement adéquat grâce à ses pouvoirs de dépense tout en permettant aux provinces d'adapter le programme à leurs contextes régionaux.Bien que les campagnes publiques et les mécanismes réactifs soient nécessaires, leur efficacité est limitée sans une éducation préventive et des soins à des stades de développement plus précoces. Une réforme de l'éducation au numérique et aux médias devrait être une priorité dans la stratégie à moyen et long terme du Canada pour protéger sa population de la désinformation et se positionner en tant que leader dans ce domaine. Avec l'aide de mes amis Heureusement pour le Canada, l'OTAN s'engage de plus en plus à traiter les questions de cybersécurité. Ottawa peut compter sur des alliés possédant des expériences diverses pour l'aider à relever ses propres défis, en particulier lorsque l'alliance a besoin d'une stratégie proactive. Le Canada a tout à gagner de la mise en place de partenariats étendus et complets et d'efforts de collaboration avec des alliés comme l'Estonie, notamment d'une initiative bilatérale d'alphabétisation numérique. Ce programme pourrait permettre aux experts estoniens d'aider à concevoir des programmes de formation pour les fonctionnaires, les éducateurs, les journalistes et les représentants du gouvernement canadiens. Les ateliers et séances de formation conjoints entre fonctionnaires, praticiens et universitaires estoniens et canadiens sur la cyberdéfense, l'éducation aux médias et des sujets cruciaux tels que la sécurité des élections devraient être élargis pour créer à terme des organismes de recherche conjoints intégrant tous les niveaux de parties prenantes. Mieux encore, l'Estonie est désireuse de partager ses initiatives e-Estonia avec des partenaires partageant les mêmes idées. En outre, si les relations du Canada avec son principal allié traditionnel, les États-Unis, se détériorent, une participation accrue du Canada à des initiatives et à des réseaux européens, tels que l'Observatoire européen des médias numériques (EDMO), offre une voie solide pour renforcer la collaboration en matière de cyberdéfense avec les alliés européens de l'Atlantique par des moyens qui vont au-delà des moyens purement militaires. 5- Conclusion : L'avant-garde numérique du Canada Alors que les opérations d'information étrangères menacent de plus en plus les institutions démocratiques de l'Alliance atlantique, le Canada occupe une position stratégique unique. Bien que ses approches réactives par le biais du mécanisme de réaction rapide du G7 et la mise en place d'une cyberdivision militaire aient jeté les bases, elles restent insuffisantes face à l'évolution des menaces et il faut mettre en œuvre des contre-mesures proactives. Les avantages distinctifs du Canada - un solide écosystème de recherche universitaire spécialisé dans la désinformation, des talents de classe mondiale en matière d'intelligence artificielle et une relative stabilité politique pour mener des recherches sensibles - le placent en position de leader là où d'autres alliés se heurtent à des contraintes. Contrairement à son voisin du sud, où la polarisation a miné la continuité de la recherche, le Canada maintient l'équilibre nécessaire à un investissement soutenu dans la résilience numérique. La voie à suivre exige une action législative immédiate sur les projets de loi en cours concernant la gouvernance de l'IA et la sécurité des télécommunications, tout en établissant des structures de recherche interdisciplinaires reliant le gouvernement, le monde universitaire et l'industrie. Tirant les leçons de la transformation réussie de l'e-gouvernance en Estonie, le Canada doit développer des systèmes d'identité numérique sécurisés et intégrer des stratégies de pré-bunking dans les initiatives nationales de littératie numérique. Ce défi transcende les solutions technologiques et représente un test fondamental de la résilience démocratique à une époque où l'information est militarisée. En tirant parti de ses atouts, le Canada peut se forger un rôle de leader distinctif au sein de l'OTAN et du G7, au-delà des contributions militaires et économiques traditionnelles. Ce faisant, il renforcerait non seulement sa propre souveraineté numérique, mais aussi la résilience démocratique collective de toutes les organisations. L'intégrité des institutions démocratiques est en jeu à mesure que les opérations d'information gagnent en sophistication. La réponse du Canada déterminera non seulement sa position en matière de sécurité nationale, mais aussi l'avenir de la résilience démocratique à l'ère numérique. L'occasion de faire preuve de leadership est claire - reste à savoir si le Canada possède la volonté politique de la saisir. ## Penser la diversité en tous genres dans les affaires stratégiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/penser-la-diversite-en-tous-genres-dans-les-affaires-strategiques/ Modified: 2020-09-28 > Animée par Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, cette première capsule du Réseau d'Analyse Stratégique présente l'outil ACS+, ses avantages et ses limites. Animée par Jean-Frédéric Légaré-Tremblay, cette première capsule du Réseau d'analyse stratégique présente l'outil ACS+ (Analyse Comparative entre les Sexes +), ses avantages et ses limites, avec les chercheures Isabelle Caron et Gaëlle Rivard-Piché. ## Penser la modernisation du NORAD URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/penser-la-modernisation-du-norad/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Alors que le monde bascule de l’unipolarité à la compétition entre grandes puissances, les nouvelles capacités militaires de la Chine et de la Russie sont de réelles menaces à la sécurité de l’Amérique du Nord. La modernisation du NORAD n’est plus à débattre. Alors que le monde bascule de l’unipolarité à la compétition entre grandes puissances, les nouvelles capacités technologiques et militaires de la Chine et de la Russie sont de réelles menaces à la sécurité de l’Amérique du Nord. La modernisation du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD) n’est donc plus à débattre. Elle est nécessaire, d’autant plus que la durée de vie de plusieurs de ses installations, dont le Système d’alerte nord (SAN), arrive à échéance. Quels sont les processus de modernisation en cours et quelles devraient être les priorités du Canada ? Trois constats émergent. Premièrement, plusieurs processus de modernisation du NORAD font consensus au sein de l’appareil militaire canadien, l’industrie canadienne et la communauté scientifique canadienne. Deuxièmement, les États-Unis semblent miser sur la nécessité de nouvelles capacités offensives pour l’avenir du NORAD, mais le Canada, historiquement, n’a soutenu le NORAD que pour ses capacités défensives. Enfin, des obstacles à la modernisation du NORAD sont à prévoir au Canada, même si l’opinion publique canadienne semble en bonne position pour accepter de plus grands investissements en défense. De multiples avenues de modernisation La modernisation du NORAD est un enjeu qui préoccupe l’expertise canadienne depuis déjà plusieurs années et de multiples options sont à l’étude. Le contexte des nouvelles capacités chinoises et russes, cependant, engage le Canada et les États-Unis dans une course contre la montre pour moderniser les installations de la défense nord-américaine. Tout d’abord, la modernisation du SAN en Arctique fait consensus parmi les experts canadiens. Conçu à la fin de la guerre froide pour détecter des avions et des missiles volant à basse altitude, le SAN n’est plus en mesure de détecter les nouveaux missiles russes et chinois. Le général américain Terrence O'Shaughnessy, ancien commandant du NORAD, avertit depuis plusieurs années que les nouveaux missiles de croisière à armement nucléaire et les missiles hypersoniques ne sont pas détectés par le SAN. Plusieurs experts sont d’avis que le nouveau système, afin d’être efficace, devrait reposer sur une combinaison de radars alliant des capacités aériennes, spatiales et même sous-marines et marines (dans une approche à 360 degrés). Puisque les capacités de détection du SAN sont déjà inadéquates, mais que le temps et l’argent manquent pour le remplacer, sa modernisation pourrait consister en une mise à niveau vers de nouvelles capacités et un système plus intégré. La nécessité de mettre en œuvre des capacités de détection de tous les domaines fait aussi consensus entre l’appareil militaire, le domaine industriel et la communauté académique. En effet, les nouvelles armes chinoises et russes exploitent le manque d’interdépendance (les « coutures ») entre les différents réseaux de détection du NORAD, à savoir le SAN, le système de défense antimissile balistique (BMD) du Commandement Nord des États-Unis et le réseau de détection maritime. Pour surmonter ces menaces, le brigadier-général Peter Fesler suggère que le nouveau système devra combiner des radars à infrarouge à des fréquences radio et à l’acoustique. Une capacité importante d’un SAN modernisé devra être de détecter la menace à sa source et d’être en mesure de la traquer par la suite. La majorité des technologies qui permettront de développer ces capacités de détection dans tous les domaines sont en développement et l’industrie canadienne peut facilement participer à l’élaboration de ces technologies, notamment par son expertise en intelligence artificielle et en apprentissage automatique (« machine learning »). Des experts de la défense canadienne sont d’avis que des capacités offensives sont nécessaires afin de moderniser le NORAD et de répondre aux nouvelles menaces. Le NORAD pourrait ainsi être modernisé par l’ajout de capacités de détruire les plateformes de ses adversaires avant même le lancement de missiles. Le contexte actuel du retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances n’est d’ailleurs pas sans rappeler celui du début de la guerre froide. Depuis sa création en 1958, le NORAD doit continuellement s’adapter à un contexte géostratégique et technologique constamment en évolution. Qu’il soit question de développer une capacité de première frappe, ou encore une capacité de riposte conventionnelle ou nucléaire, le rôle du NORAD a toujours évolué pour faire face aux nouvelles menaces. La présente situation réactualise donc le débat sur les capacités offensives du NORAD. L’industrie canadienne perçoit notamment des opportunités de développer des mécanismes de mise en échec non-cinétiques, mais certains experts sont sceptiques quant à la capacité canadienne d’y parvenir. Un NORAD offensif ? Dans leur rapport de septembre 2020, le général américain Terrence J O’Shaughnessy et le brigadier-général américain Peter M. Fesler suggèrent qu’une nouvelle approche en matière de défense est nécessaire pour faire face aux menaces qui planent sur le territoire nord-américain. Face aux capacités de la Chine, allant des cyberattaques aux véhicules planeurs hypersoniques, et face aux capacités russes de frappe conventionnelle de précision à longue portée, la stratégie américaine purement offensive de projection de puissance à l’extérieur du territoire américain n’est plus suffisante pour faire face aux menaces actuelles. Les États-Unis ont eux-mêmes signalé, dans de nombreux documents récents, qu’ils se sentent plus vulnérables. Le NORAD prend donc une importance particulière dans l’élaboration d’une nouvelle approche américaine. Le fonctionnement cloisonné de l’approche actuelle est une faiblesse importante déjà exploitée par la Chine et la Russie, qui ont conçu des forces de frappe capables d’agir simultanément. Le NORAD et le Commandement du Nord ont donc élaboré la stratégie SHIELD (Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defense), un écosystème qui fournit une capacité multicouche de détection des menaces. La protection dans tous les domaines et l’analyse des données sont au cœur de ce nouveau système, qui commence déjà à être testé avec l’initiative « Pathfinder ». Le rapport de O’Shaughnessy et Fesler suggère donc un commandement du NORAD plus offensif, et non plus exclusivement défensif, tel que le démontre leur emploi des termes « engager l’archer au lieu de la flèche », c’est-à-dire viser les plateformes de lancement plutôt que les missiles. Or, le Canada soutient une participation à un NORAD purement défensif, qui participe à l’avertissement, et a refusé par le passé de participer au programme de bouclier antimissile (BMD), soit le seul effort significatif de modernisation de la défense nord-américaine au cours des deux dernières décennies. Tel que mentionné, un certain nombre d’experts plaide pour que le NORAD développe des capacités dissuasives pour faire face aux nouvelles armes chinoises et russes. Le Canada, cependant, n’a jamais encouragé ce type de positionnement et il est probable qu’un désaccord surgisse entre les deux pays. Des experts notent pourtant que le Canada aurait tout intérêt à se rallier au BMD. Dans la même veine, le Joint All Domain Awareness Command and Control (JADC2) est une initiative du Département américain de la Défense pour connecter tous les capteurs de tous ses domaines militaires – Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy, Space Force – afin de détecter rapidement les menaces et d’alerter les décideurs. Tel que l’avance Lee Obst, le Canada a des capacités techniques (comme l’intelligence artificielle) qu’il pourrait mettre à profit pour le développement de ce système. Par contre, la volonté politique canadienne, de même que ses pratiques d’approvisionnement, empêchent l’industrie canadienne de participer au JADC2. Le JADC2 pourrait être un avantage pour le NORAD et la défense continentale, mais aussi un projet d’infrastructure qui favoriserait la connectivité jusqu’aux coins les plus reculés du Nord. La nouvelle stratégie arctique du Département américain de la Défense de 2019, en ce sens, met l’accent sur l’importance de la dissuasion, mais aussi sur la compétition entre grandes puissances en territoire arctique, particulièrement sur les nouvelles capacités russes. Elle reconnaît l’importance de moderniser les installations du NORAD avec des dispositions dans tous les domaines, mais aussi de coopérer avec le Canada pour assurer la défense du continent. Malgré cela, la stratégie met de l’avant la nécessité de bâtir une force de dissuasion en Arctique indépendante de ses alliés, marquant à nouveau la volonté offensive américaine dans la défense de l’Arctique. Plusieurs initiatives américaines sont donc en cours pour moderniser la défense continentale et le NORAD, démontrant un virage plus offensif, qui représente peu la position stratégique canadienne. Considérations pour le Canada Plusieurs obstacles seront à surmonter pour moderniser le NORAD, les plus notables étant les coûts financiers élevés et le manque de temps. De même, l’Arctique pose aussi des contraintes, que ce soit afin de respecter les volontés des peuples autochtones qui y habitent, son environnement hostile ou la fonte des glaces et du pergélisol. La nécessité de remplacer les radars et d’agir dans tous les domaines pose le défi d’une série de plateformes différentes à gérer (on peut supposer aux niveaux maritime, aérien, terrestre, spatial et cyber) en plus d’un extraordinaire effort de mise à niveau des radars en peu de temps. Le Canada n’a pas le budget, à l’heure actuelle, pour y arriver. La volonté politique canadienne et les préoccupations domestiques pourraient aussi être un obstacle à la modernisation du NORAD, d’autant plus si celle-ci s’avère plus offensive que défensive. Selon un sondage d’août dernier mené par Nanos Research et un groupe de l’Université de Calgary, les Canadiens reconnaissent la Chine comme étant la menace principale à la sécurité du Canada. De plus, 41% sont d’avis que le Canada devrait augmenter ses dépenses en matière de défense nationale et 39% sont d’avis que le budget devrait rester le même. Ce sondage démontre une évolution de l’opinion publique canadienne, qui semble plus encline qu’auparavant à voir leur gouvernement investir en défense. Le gouvernement canadien pourrait ainsi tâter le terrain auprès de ses électeurs afin d’établir un budget adéquat pour la modernisation du NORAD. Recommandations pour le Canada Au regard des constats établis, le Canada doit investir dans les capacités défensives du NORAD. L’absence de budget alloué à sa modernisation, malgré l’allusion de ce besoin à maintes reprises dans la politique de défense du Canada de 2017, Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, devra être révisé, car le Canada ne peut plus échapper à cette modernisation aux vues des menaces chinoises et russes. Le résultat des élections américaines du 3 novembre a certainement un impact en ce qui concerne la marche à suivre pour cette modernisation. En effet, le Canada a opté pour une approche plus furtive lors du mandat du président Trump, notamment car le Canada ne contribue qu’à 40% des dépenses liées au NORAD. Suite à l’élection de Joe Biden à la présidence des États-Unis, le Canada pourrait opter pour une stratégie plus ouverte. Avant même l’entrée en poste du nouveau président en janvier, le Canada devrait prendre position et s’engager auprès de son électorat à investir massivement dans les capacités défensives du NORAD. Biden est connu pour son respect de la démocratie et de la non-ingérence dans les affaires internes des États. Le Canada, en s’engageant auprès de ses électeurs, sera tenu par cette promesse et les États-Unis pourront difficilement ne pas la respecter. Cependant, les coûts du maintien de la politique de défense actuelle sont trop exigeants pour une puissance moyenne comme le Canada. Les capacités restreintes du budget canadien en matière de défense, lié à un contexte économique difficile causé par la pandémie de la COVID-19, vont forcer le Canada à revoir ses priorités. En ce sens, et en prenant en considération la désuétude des arsenaux de défense canadiens et les menaces chinoises et russes, le Canada devrait privilégier sa propre protection pour les années à venir. Bien que le Canada prévoit que ses dépenses totales de défense, en pourcentage du PIB, augmenteront à 1,48 % d’ici 2024-2025, ces objectifs ne tiennent pas encore compte des dépenses à venir pour la modernisation du NORAD. Ainsi, afin de véritablement mettre en œuvre cette modernisation, le Canada devra envisager de couper dans d’autres portions de son budget de la défense. ## Plan stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/plan-strategique/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le plan stratégique du RAS a pour objectif d’orienter sa programmation qui s’articule principalement sur ses activités de mobilisation du savoir et de développement de la relève. Le plan stratégique du RAS a pour objectif d’orienter sa programmation qui s’articule principalement sur ses activités de mobilisation du savoir et de développement de la relève. Il s’agit d’un plan triennal (2020-2023), dont l’accomplissement permettra de jeter les bases en vue de sa pérennisation et de sa consolidation. Consultez le plan stratégique pour en apprendre plus sur : Notre mission Notre vision Nos valeurs Notre gouvernance Orientations stratégiques et objectifs Bilan des réalisations ## Pour le Canada, l’indépendance ne passe que par un seul chemin : investir dans sa défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pour-le-canada-lindependance-ne-passe-que-par-un-seul-chemin-investir-dans-sa-defense/ Modified: 2025-08-20 Au cours des derniers mois, les menaces du président américain Donald Trump d’en faire le « 51e État » ont ravivé un sentiment d'insécurité nationale au Canada et suscité un cri de ralliement patriotique au sein de sa population. Par conséquent, de nombreux politiciens et experts canadiens réclament la fin de sa dépendance envers les États-Unis et la recherche d'une nouvelle étoile à laquelle s'accrocher. Si la diversification doit effectivement être poursuivie, ceux qui suggèrent que le Canada devrait couper les ponts avec les États-Unis (et peut-être adhérer à l'UE) ont besoin d'un retour à la réalité. Toute évaluation sérieuse du rôle du Canada dans le monde doit arriver à la conclusion que son partenariat avec les États-Unis demeure son plus grand atout. Si avoir une discussion honnête sur les intérêts canadiens est l’objectif, il ne faut pas laisser l’orgueil et l'insécurité l’empêcher. Forger une identité et trouver la « place du Canada sur la scène mondiale » devrait commencer par accroître son rapport de force avec son partenaire indispensable (les États-Unis). À cette fin, le Canada devrait investir davantage dans ses capacités de défense afin d'obtenir ce que la plupart des Canadiens recherchent : 1) un plus grand pouvoir de pression auprès des États-Unis ; et 2) une plus grande capacité d'agir indépendamment des États-Unis, si nécessaire. Autrement dit, investir dans la défense du Canada, c'est investir dans son indépendance. Les actes de Trump en disent plus que ses mots Pour éviter d'être accusé d'être excessivement sympathique à l'égard du président américain actuel, permettez-moi d'être clair dès le départ : Trump représente une menace sans précédent pour la sécurité et la prospérité du Canada. Cependant, le partenariat étroit du Canada avec les États-Unis doit perdurer. En effet, aucun des deux pays ne peut survivre sans l'autre. S’il est nécessaire de se méfier des menaces impérialistes de Trump, il faut être encore plus attentif quant à ses actions, ou dans certains cas, à son inaction. De son propre aveu, l'idée que Donald Trump ordonne une invasion militaire du Canada demeure extrêmement improbable. Son souhait d'intégrer le Canada au patrimoine immobilier américain est davantage ancré dans son flair à la P.T. Barnum et ses tactiques de négociation explosives que dans un programme réaliste. Tout comme Barnum, le célèbre showman qui captivait le public avec ses spectacles exagérés, Trump lance fréquemment des idées incendiaires sans les concrétiser, comme sa promesse non tenue de 2016 de construire un mur entièrement financé par le Mexique. Plutôt que de se laisser tromper par ses menaces constantes, bâtir un Canada plus résilient demeure la meilleure méthode pour protéger le pays. L'indépendance commence chez soi Pour assurer la sécurité et l'indépendance à long terme du Canada, la logique nous dicte d'investir dans notre infrastructure de sécurité nationale. Cela présente plusieurs avantages : protéger le Canada, faire de nous un allié plus fiable pour tous nos partenaires et bâtir une nouvelle identité nationale en tant que protecteur de notre pays et défenseur de nos alliés, et non en tant que suppliant ou acolyte ayant besoin d'un protecteur pour le protéger en cas de problème. Un bon point de départ serait d'investir davantage dans la Marine et la Garde côtière canadiennes afin d'aider le Canada à affirmer sa souveraineté sur le plus long littoral du monde et d'apporter une aide précieuse à ses alliés pour sécuriser les voies de navigation maritime, contribuer aux patrouilles contre les activités illégales et dissuader les embargos maritimes, les points de congestion, les blocus et autres points chauds potentiels. De plus, alors que nous cherchons à  intensifier nos relations avec de nouveaux alliés, le Canada doit se rapprocher de deux pays plus que tout autre : le Japon et la Corée du Sud. Une capacité navale plus forte permettrait au Canada de participer à des missions en Asie-Pacifique afin de consolider de nouvelles alliances. La majeure partie de la croissance commerciale du Canada et la majeure partie des risques politiques mondiaux se situent dans la région Indo-pacifique. La stratégie canadienne pour la région indopacifique, lancée sous Justin Trudeau en 2022, contenait des recommandations politiques similaires ; il suffit de les mettre en œuvre. Des moyens navals accrus permettraient également de mieux protéger l'Arctique canadien. La Chine continue de cartographier clandestinement les fonds marins du Canada et de construire des brise-glaces équipés d'un submersible à plongée profonde qui pourrait mettre en péril les câbles sous-marins. Le Canada a franchi une étape importante dans son engagement à construire de nouveaux sous-marins et navires, mais il reste encore beaucoup à faire. Des systèmes maritimes autonomes, comme des véhicules sous-marins, une capacité anti-drone et des capteurs à déploiement rapide, doivent contribuer à la construction d'une nouvelle identité indépendante. Une forte présence maritime sur les côtes canadiennes et dans l'Arctique envoie un message fort aux États-Unis et au public canadien : son identité et sa défense ne dépendent pas uniquement de l'Amérique. Mark Carney a annoncé une « nouvelle ère, » mais les choses ont-elles vraiment changé ? La trame narrative du gouvernement Carney lors de sa campagne électorale concernant les relations canado-américaines était on ne peut plus clair : les États-Unis sont devenus un partenaire peu fiable et il est temps d’examiner des options alternatives. Dans son annonce concernant le renouvellement de l’armée canadienne, il a expressément mentionné que le Canada devait réduire sa dépendance envers les États-Unis et a promis des milliards de dollars d’investissements supplémentaires dans une stratégie de défense industrielle canadienne ainsi que la participation à ReArm Europe, afin de diversifier les dépenses en défense. Aussi pures que soient ses intentions de se distancer des États-Unis, les actions de Mark Carney (jusqu’à présent) révèlent une tout autre réalité. En matière d’acquisitions de matériel de défense, nous continuons d’acheter des produits américains pour le moment. Malgré de nombreuses suggestions selon lesquelles le Canada devrait cesser d’acheter des avions de chasse F-35 américains et confier le contrat à une compagnie basée en Europe, la vérité est que trouver un autre fournisseur à ce stade serait non seulement prohibitif en termes de prix, mais retarderait également un processus de remplacement entamé à la fin des années 1990 et censé avoir livré son dernier avion il y a 15 ans. La cheffe d'état-major de la défense du Canada, Jennie Carignan, a récemment exprimé son aversion pour le remplacement des F-35, affirmant que l'achat d'un avion européen ne ferait qu'augmenter les coûts. En réalité, l'idée de se tourner vers l'Europe pour ses achats de défense repose également sur une évaluation très optimiste des possibilités réalistes pour le Canada en matière de développement industriel avec ses alliés transatlantiques. Si l'adhésion récente du Canada à un partenariat stratégique de défense et de sécurité avec l'Union européenne a donné l'impression que le secteur canadien de la défense peut désormais concourir pour des contrats en Europe, la dure réalité demeure : les marchés européens de la défense restent très protégés, les leaders industriels étant réticents à céder du terrain et étant eux-mêmes aux prises avec des pénuries d'équipement et des goulots d'étranglement de la production face à une demande renouvelée. Même le Royaume-Uni doit aujourd’hui payer un prix d'entrée substantiel pour participer au programme de réarmement de l'UE et, malgré les nombreux discours de l'UE sur la nécessité de compter sur elle-même pour sa défense, il vient de promettre d'acheter jusqu'à 600 milliards de dollars d'équipement militaire américain dans le cadre de son accord commercial avec Washington. Le Canada peut s'attendre à des exigences similaires de la part de Trump, et nous y acquiescerons probablement. La dure réalité est que les entrepreneurs canadiens du secteur de la défense sont profondément ancrés dans les chaînes d'approvisionnement nord-américaines, tant sur le plan financier que technique et logistique. Ils ne peuvent pas simplement plier bagage et se réorienter vers un écosystème entièrement différent sans coûts, perturbations et incertitudes considérables. En ce qui concerne la sécurisation du périmètre canadien, M. Carney semble se rapprocher de plus en plus des États-Unis, indiquant une ouverture au « Dôme doré » américain, soit au système de défense antimissile multicouche proposé par Trump pour les États-Unis. Si le Canada devait rejoindre le Dôme doré, Carney serait un pionnier de la défense du Canada : aucun premier ministre canadien – de Pearson à Mulroney, en passant par Justin Trudeau – n'a jamais officiellement conclu de partenariat avec les États-Unis en matière de défense antimissile. Une participation à la défense antimissile marquerait non seulement un tournant historique dans la politique de défense canadienne, mais renforcerait également le NORAD, la plus importante alliance de sécurité du Canada et le seul partenariat militaire que les États-Unis se soient engagés à honorer ad vitam æternam. Sur le plan économique, le premier ministre Carney continue de forger ce qui pourrait bien être le partenariat canado-américain le plus étroit depuis une génération. Au cœur de cet effort se trouve son ambitieux projet de nouvel accord bilatéral de sécurité et de commerce – une initiative qui, selon Carney, est le fruit de discussions directes et continues (et de textos) avec le président Donald Trump lui-même. L’objectif : assurer la stabilité du marché à long terme et lever ou atténuer les tarifs douaniers qui menacent certains secteurs de l’économie canadienne. Pourtant, même sous le poids de tarifs punitifs, le Canada demeure le partenaire commercial le plus privilégié des États-Unis, bénéficiant d’un accès au marché plus large que tout autre pays. Ces développements contredisent fortement toute idée selon laquelle le Canada s’éloignerait de Washington ; en réalité, les données indiquent un partenariat qui se renforce – sur les plans économique, diplomatique et stratégique. Condamné à réussir Peu importe la tournure que prendront les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis, nous resterons le principal partenaire de l’autre en matière de sécurité et de défense. Ceux qui réclament que le Canada abandonne les États-Unis et élabore un partenariat avec une nouvelle grande puissance (par exemple, l'UE) oublient sa position géographique unique et  font preuve  d’un optimisme excessif par rapport à ce que d'autres partenaires et alliés potentiels peuvent offrir. Si nous souhaitons véritablement l'indépendance canadienne, nous avons le pouvoir de nous porter sauver nous-mêmes en investissant dans notre défense et notre sécurité. Agir ainsi rendra le Canada plus résilient face aux pressions américaines. Pour ces raisons, une augmentation des dépenses de défense demeure le meilleur moyen de consolider les intérêts canadiens et de lui donner la force et l'indépendance nécessaires pour négocier avec les États-Unis en tant que partenaire, et non en tant que mendiant. À propos de l'auteur Ross O'Connor était auparavant conseiller aux affaires étrangères et à la sécurité nationale auprès du premier ministre Stephen Harper et conseiller politique principal auprès des ministres des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense. ## Pour une plus grande inclusion et diversité en sécurité internationale : Pistes d’action pour le Réseau d’analyse stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pour-une-plus-grande-inclusion-et-diversite-en-securite-internationale-pistes-daction-pour-le-reseau-danalyse-strategique/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note présente une série de propositions visant à promouvoir la diversité, l’inclusion et une culture d’équité dans les activités du RAS. Du monde académique jusqu’au milieu politique, les questions d’inclusion et de diversité acquièrent une importance grandissante dans différentes sphères de la société canadienne. En sécurité internationale, le débat sur la diversité n’est pas nouveau. Toutefois, le champ d’études peine toujours à adopter une posture réflexive et la production du savoir demeure dominée par le point de vue eurocentriste. Dans la pratique de la sécurité internationale, si les programmes et politiques se voulant divers et inclusifs ont pris de l’ampleur dans les dernières années, ils ne sont toutefois pas exempts de biais. Au fait de ces tensions, le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), à mi-chemin entre le monde académique et le monde des praticiens, s’est doté d’une stratégie d’intersectionnalité encadrant la diversité et l’inclusion dans ses activités. Dans le même esprit et se voulant complémentaire à cette stratégie, cette note propose un survol des débats actuels sur la diversité et l’inclusion dans les études et la pratique de la sécurité internationale. La note présente ensuite une série de propositions visant à promouvoir la diversité, l’inclusion et une culture d’équité dans les activités du RAS. Ce faisant, cette note stratégique cherche à promouvoir un débat plus inclusif et accessible sur l’étude et la pratique de la sécurité internationale en adoptant une perspective diversifiée et en avançant la démocratisation d’un débat trop souvent dominé par certains groupes et perspectives. Diversité et inclusion en sécurité internationale : état des faits    La diversité désigne les dimensions et qualités uniques propres à chaque individu. L’inclusion réfère à la mise en place d’une culture collective d’équité et de respect de la différence. Historiquement, les hommes blancs occidentaux ont dominé l’étude et la pratique de la sécurité internationale. Aujourd’hui encore, de nombreux biais reliés à l’eurocentrisme, la race et le genre freinent l’inclusion d’une plus grande diversité en sécurité internationale. L’eurocentrisme favorise le point de vue occidental et tend à exclure les autres visions du monde. À l’extrême, il sous-entend la supériorité de la civilisation occidentale. Par exemple, la souveraineté étatique et le système international westphalien, deux concepts clés en relations internationales, sont basés sur l’idée que l’Europe du XIXe siècle avait atteint un état supérieur aux régions non européennes, perçues comme non-civilisées. Ces idées problématiques se retrouvent encore au cœur de certains programmes de consolidation de la paix et de renforcement des institutions étatiques des dernières décennies, qui mettent l’accent sur les institutions étatiques centrales aux dépens des mécanismes de gouvernance locale. La déconstruction des rapports de pouvoir autour du genre et de la race dans la théorie et la pratique de la sécurité internationale est au cœur du travail des féministes en relations internationales et des spécialistes des théories critiques de la race (critical race theory). Les théories féministes en relations internationales explorent une approche inclusive pour maximiser la sécurité de tous. Ces approches considèrent la race et le genre comme des éléments organisateurs des relations internationales, essentiels à la perception des menaces de sécurité ainsi qu’à la formulation des politiques étrangères et de défense. Toutefois, même si les chercheurs féministes et spécialistes des théories de la race critique cherchent à déconstruire les oppositions binaires (homme/femme, blanc/noir, Nord/Sud), les thèmes reliés au genre et à la race sont peu intégrés dans les discussions plus traditionnelles et souvent centrales des études stratégiques. Le genre et la race sont de plus rarement combinés au sein d’une même analyse. Même si les études critiques de sécurité semblent offrir l’espace nécessaire pour discuter des questions de diversité dans la recherche, elles n’échappent pas aux biais qui compliquent l’adoption d’une posture inclusive. Par exemple, les études critiques de sécurité au Canada s’intéressent à la production du savoir relié à la sécurité à travers différents thèmes : post-colonialisme et peuples autochtones, sécurité environnementale, immigration et frontières, sécurité humaine et gouvernance mondiale. Notamment, les peuples inuits conçoivent les changements climatiques et les menaces à la cohésion sociale comme des problèmes de sécurité, ce qui mène à une conception de la sécurité arctique articulée autour de la protection environnementale, de la préservation de l’identité culturelle, et de l’autonomie politique autochtone. Toutefois, ces approches n’échappent pas toujours à l’eurocentrisme : elles tendent à marginaliser les connaissances autochtones. Par exemple, la stratégie de la résurgence, centrale à l’autodétermination autochtone, s’articule autour de la remise en question de l’État canadien. Cependant, la mise en valeur des traditions autochtones comporte des éléments genrés et des représentations sexuelles stéréotypées qui ne sont pas prises en compte. Non seulement est-il difficile d’aspirer à l’inclusion sans considérer les perspectives de tous les Canadiens, mais les connaissances autochtones présentent des conceptions de sécurité complémentaires aux discussions critiques existantes, notamment en ce qui a trait à la sécurité humaine. Une approche intersectionnelle qui prend en compte un éventail de facteurs identitaires permet de remettre en question certains de ces biais, tout en favorisant à la fois diversité et inclusion. L’intersectionnalité ne se limite toutefois pas seulement à la recherche et joue un rôle important dans l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre de pratiques inclusives, équitables et efficaces. Diversité et inclusion dans la pratique de la sécurité internationale Les biais causant exclusion et homogénéité sont également reproduits dans la pratique de la sécurité internationale. Bien que la diversité soit de plus en plus considérée dans l’élaboration des objectifs de politique étrangère et dans les organisations internationales, son intégration est inégale. De même, les différents efforts d’inclusion au sein des organisations internationales et des forces armées se sont concentrés sur l’intégration des perspectives de genre, négligeant parfois les autres facteurs identitaires. Le concept de sécurité humaine Le concept de sécurité humaine, développé dans les années 1990, représente à la fois l’une des avenues les plus prometteuses pour une politique étrangère inclusive et un obstacle à la diversité. Le concept propose une sécurité concentrée sur l’individu plutôt que l’État et s’articule autour de menaces traditionnelles et non conventionnelles comme les changements climatiques et la pauvreté. Au cours des années 1990, l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) et des pays comme le Canada ont privilégié une approche axée sur le maintien de la paix, l’aide humanitaire et la création de normes internationales promouvant la protection des droits de la personne pour assurer la sécurité humaine. Le concept s’est essoufflé dans les années 2000, mais ses principes demeurent actuels. Notamment, la responsabilité de protéger, qui somme les pays d’intervenir pour prévenir les crimes contre l’humanité, a justifié l’intervention de l’OTAN en Libye en 2011. Le discours de la sécurité humaine s’incarne aujourd’hui dans des programmes politiques, militants et de recherche qui mettent de l’avant la protection des populations vulnérables, la considération des enfants dans les conflits armés et l’agenda Femmes, paix, et sécurité. En mettant au premier plan les expériences de conflit des individus au premier plan, les différentes applications de la sécurité humaine permettent de cibler des insécurités en temps de conflit qu’une approche conventionnelle à la sécurité ne peut capturer, comme les problématiques de genre ou des enfants-soldats. Malgré son potentiel inclusif, le concept de sécurité humaine inquiète. Comme dans le cas des droits de la personne et d’autres normes libérales universalisantes, le danger demeure que certaines problématiques particulières disparaissent sous l’étiquette générale de sécurité humaine. En effet et paradoxalement, les expériences diverses de différents groupes risquent d’être négligées dans la poursuite de la sécurité pour tous. Les pratiques inclusives sont donc celles qui arrivent à équilibrer le respect de la diversité avec les normes existantes. Le programme mondial sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité Les pratiques inclusives des organisations internationales et de certaines forces armées se concentrent généralement sur l’égalité des genres, souvent en ignorant d’autres facteurs identitaires. Depuis l’avènement de la Résolution 1325 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU en 2000 et le développement de l’agenda Femmes, paix et sécurité, l’ONU, l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN), l’Union africaine (UA) et les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC), entre autres, ont déployé des approches basées sur le genre favorisant l’inclusion. Ces approches combinent différentes stratégies telles que l’équilibre entre les genres (gender balancing), visant une plus grande représentation de femmes, et l’intégration systémique des perspectives de genre (gender mainstreaming). Celles-ci se veulent inclusives, mais misent souvent sur l’efficacité opérationnelle plutôt que sur l’équité et l’égalité comme justification première. En effet, plusieurs organisations de sécurité considèrent que l’intégration d’un plus grand nombre de femmes et des perspectives de genre dans les opérations améliorent leur efficacité. L’ONU, favorisant l’équilibre entre les genres, cherche à augmenter le nombre de femmes dans les contingents de Casques bleus à un minimum de 15%. De son côté, l’OTAN a créé des positions de conseillers en matière de genre et considère le genre à chaque étape de la planification opérationnelle. Les deux organisations citent les qualités particulières des femmes, notamment leurs talents de communication et leur aptitude à créer des liens avec les femmes et enfants locaux, comme contribuant à améliorer leur efficacité. L’Union africaine intègre des questions reliées au genre à l’entraînement des membres du Département de la paix et de la sécurité, l’organe de l’UA responsable des opérations de maintien de la paix régionales. Par exemple, la sensibilisation à l’usage du viol comme arme de guerre de même que le désarmement et la réintégration des combattants hommes, femmes et enfants sont intégrés à l’entraînement des soldats.  Dans le cadre de l’initiative Elsie du gouvernement canadien, les FAC cherchent à augmenter le nombre de femmes dans les opérations de paix, invoquant à la fois l’égalité entre les genres et l’efficacité opérationnelle comme objectifs. Bien qu’invoquer l’efficacité soit une façon influente de convaincre les commandants militaires, cette approche risque d’instrumentaliser le genre. Plusieurs féministes et militants pacifistes s’inquiètent de voir l’efficacité opérationnelle, et non l’égalité des genres en soi, devenir l’objectif final. Elles dénoncent notamment la militarisation du programme mondial sur les femmes, la paix et la sécurité. D’autres intellectuels, décideurs et professionnels militaires soutiennent qu’une telle militarisation est nécessaire : l’égalité des genres peut difficilement être poursuivie si les conditions de sécurité de base ne sont pas établies. Somme toute, si les stratégies de diversité de ces organisations ont fait des progrès significatifs en matière de genre, elles n’accordent pas autant de place à d’autres facteurs identitaires tels que l’origine ethnique ou l’orientation sexuelle, d’où l’importance de conceptualiser la diversité en appliquant le concept d’intersectionnalité. Diversité et inclusion: recommandations pour le RAS La stratégie d’intersectionnalité du RAS permet de cibler comment les différents aspects de l’identité d’une personne – sexe, genre, religion, orientation sexuelle ou race – créent différents rapports de pouvoir et de subordination dans son expérience du réel. Elle cherche à « s’assurer que la question de l’intersectionnalité soit bien présente dans l’ensemble des travaux des membres du Réseau et que ceux-ci reflètent une grande diversité et l’inclusion des groupes sous représentés ». Ce faisant, le RAS est mieux outillé pour assurer une plus grande représentation dans ses travaux et ses activités. Le reste de cette section propose une série de mesures pour mettre en œuvre cette stratégie de façon à créer un réseau inclusif. Au-delà de sa valeur intrinsèque, une approche inclusive et diversifiée peut générer plusieurs avantages. Afin de promouvoir la diversité et l’inclusion dans la recherche comme dans les activités, le RAS devrait se concentrer sur les trois priorités suivantes. 1 - Privilégier des avenues de recherche inclusives et diversifiées. À travers la mobilisation de la recherche en matière de défense et de sécurité, il serait possible pour le RAS de repenser les questions de recherche, privilégier la diversité des approches théoriques et méthodologiques, et équilibrer l’importance accordée aux différents aspects du champ. D’abord, repenser les questions de recherche de façon inclusive implique d’évaluer si la question de recherche participe à la consolidation d’une culture d’équité et de respect de la différence. La question hiérarchise-t-elle certains enjeux ? Quels sont les groupes de gens ciblés par le projet de recherche ? Ensuite, employer une variété de méthodes de recherche et d’approches théoriques favorise une plus grande diversité de perspectives et d’enjeux. Les méthodes de recherche participatives ou basées dans la collectivité sont de bons exemples de méthodes de recherche qui peuvent être plus inclusives. Des approches théoriques qui questionnent les rapports de forces comme les études féministes, la critical race theory, le constructivisme et le postcolonialisme devraient également être utilisées ou, du moins, prises en compte. Par ailleurs, assurer une plus grande représentation dans la bibliographie des travaux menés et publiés par le RAS et employer un vocabulaire inclusif sont d’autres façons de privilégier la diversité dans la recherche. Enfin, l’importance accordée aux différents aspects de la sécurité internationale devrait être considérée. Une définition plus large du domaine d’étude et de pratique permet d’accorder une plus grande place aux questions de genre, de race, d’intersectionnalité et de diversité au sein des trois axes du RAS. Par ailleurs, le RAS devrait assurer une représentation de ces travaux et perspectives dans ses principaux événements comme le colloque annuel, tout en offrant des espaces privilégiés pour discuter de ces questions à travers une série d’événements. Une telle approche favorisera une plus grande équité dans la production du savoir et le rayonnement dont bénéficient les chercheurs et praticiens associés au réseau. Avantages : Au niveau de la recherche en sécurité internationale, une approche pro diversité et inclusive permet de réconcilier les discours centraux et les discours critiques. L’exploration de différentes méthodes de recherche et approches théoriques a le potentiel de susciter de nouveaux débats, de favoriser la production d’un savoir plus représentatif et inclusif et de générer de nouveaux angles de recherche tout en rejoignant une plus grande communauté. 2 - Explorer des formats de partage des connaissances privilégiant diversité et inclusion. Les notes politiques, stratégiques et les points chauds publiés par le réseau constituent une plateforme qui a le potentiel de mettre en valeur des groupes et des voix sous-représentés dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale au Canada et ailleurs. Lors de ses événements, le RAS devrait également porter une attention particulière à la représentation de la diversité. Pour ce faire, le réseau pourrait approcher des individus qui détiennent une expertise particulière sur des questions d’actualité, mais qui se retrouvent souvent à l’extérieur des réseaux habituels. En rejoignant des individus à l’extérieur des milieux gouvernementaux, académiques, ou industriels, le RAS pourrait accroître son auditoire tout en facilitant l’accès à la publication et au débat public de groupes souvent marginalisés. Par exemple, il serait intéressant d’inviter des représentants des communautés autochtones à discuter des questions de sécurité nordique et arctique, ou encore de sécurité alimentaire liée aux pêcheries. Il est également important de prendre en compte les différences culturelles dans la diffusion de la connaissance. Par exemple, certains formats, comme une entrevue ou une conversation informelle (fireside chat), sont mieux adaptés à la diffusion des connaissances de certains leaders autochtones qu’un panel académique traditionnel. L’adoption de médiums de communications comme les vidéoconférences, forcée par la pandémie de la COVID-19, aide à démocratiser l’accès aux conversations sur les enjeux de sécurité. Cependant, il demeure important de faire des efforts pour rendre ces événements virtuels accessibles, par exemple en proposant des sous-titres ou une narration simultanée. De plus, ces événements devraient être annoncés à travers différents réseaux et disponibles en différé. Avantages : La diffusion de la recherche à travers les différentes activités du RAS gagnerait à prioriser la diversité et l’inclusion. Les formats de partage des connaissances qui valorisent la diversité et l’inclusion permettent de mieux refléter les clients et l’auditoire du RAS. De même, une plus grande représentation de la diversité maximise la reconnaissance du talent et de l’expertise en sécurité, met de l’avant des perspectives différentes et variées, et contribue à la création d’un espace positif et inclusif où tous et toutes sont à l’aise de s’exprimer. 3 - Appliquer les principes de diversité et d’inclusion dans les activités avec les partenaires. Le RAS devrait étendre les principes de diversité et d’inclusion à ses relations avec ses partenaires, tout en cherchant à créer des partenariats avec des organismes qui pourront contribuer activement à un débat varié et respectueux sur les questions de sécurité. Le RAS pourra ainsi compter sur une expertise plus vaste sur différents sujets et les organismes bénéficient en retour de la visibilité offerte par le réseau. Par ailleurs, le RAS devrait s’assurer que les bénéfices découlant des relations avec ses partenaires sont réciproques. Enfin, le RAS devrait s’assurer de s’associer avec des partenaires qui font également la promotion de la diversité et de l’inclusion au sein de leur propre organisation. Avantages : Exiger des efforts en matière de diversité et d’inclusion permet d’élargir et d’enrichir la conversation entre les milieux académiques, politiques, et militaires. Le RAS peut se positionner en chef de file en matière de diversité et d’inclusion dans le milieu de la défense et de la sécurité, créant ainsi un effet d’entraînement positif pour les acteurs du milieu de la sécurité.   ## Pourquoi craindre la Russie en Arctique ? Présentation de scénarios comme exercice de test d’hypothèse et de Red Teaming URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pourquoi-craindre-la-russie-en-arctique-presentation-de-scenarios-comme-exercice-de-test-dhypothese-et-de-red-teaming/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique propose une série de réflexions sur la manière et la raison pour lesquelles les intérêts, les actions et les intentions de la Russie en Arctique pourraient représenter des risques ou des menaces pour le Canada, autant aujourd’hui qu’à l'avenir. Résumé Cette note stratégique propose une série de réflexions sur la manière et la raison pour lesquelles les intérêts, les actions et les intentions de la Russie en Arctique pourraient représenter des risques ou des menaces pour le Canada, autant aujourd’hui qu’à l'avenir. En faisant du « red teaming » de scénarios futurs (c’est-à-dire, remettre en question les hypothèses en jouant le rôle d'un adversaire pensant), cette note stratégique passe en revue des sujets ou des thèmes que les analystes de défense et de sécurité pourraient considérer, parmi lesquels : les investissements russes dans la modernisation ou l'ouverture de nouvelles installations militaires, de recherche et sauvetage et d'infrastructures scientifiques dans sa région de l’Arctique; les campagnes hybrides de guerre et de désinformation, de même que le journalisme patriotique de la Russie; les différences de perception entre le Canada et l’OTAN sur les menaces russes; les conséquences potentielles du contrôle étatique resserré de la Russie sur l'espace d'information national; la perception russe des discours canadiens et alliés sur la coopération arctique; et la possibilité d’une agression russe en Arctique. Introduction Dans un environnement global de plus en plus complexe et incertain, caractérisé par une concurrence stratégique renouvelée, il est important de continuellement tester nos hypothèses et de questionner les « inconnus connus » et les « inconnus inconnus ». La plupart de mes publications mettent l’accent sur les possibilités de coopération circumpolaire et minimisent les probabilités de conflits armés conventionnels dans l’Arctique. J’ai souligné les points de convergence entre les intérêts canadiens et russes de l’Arctique, suggérant il y a une décennie que les stratégies régionales respectives de nos pays dans l’Arctique apparaissaient comme des « images miroirs ». Cependant, les messages des deux pays combinent des éléments de dissuasion stratégique et l’idée que la région devrait conserver son statut de « territoire de dialogue » et de coopération – ou, à tout le moins, de non-conflit. Bien que le Canada et la Russie continuent de partager de nombreux intérêts dans l'Arctique circumpolaire, la géopolitique et l'environnement de sécurité mondial suggèrent qu'ils resteront probablement, au mieux, des “frenemies” dans la région pour un avenir proche. Le comportement international russe au cours des six dernières années (mis en évidence par son annexion illégale de la Crimée et l'agression dans l'est de l'Ukraine) présage-t-il des conceptions révisionnistes similaires pour l'Arctique, ou les intérêts nationaux russes dictent-ils que le statu quo régional soit préservé puisque les coûts de déviation en seraient trop graves ? Les discours des médias russes couvrent un large éventail d'opinions, depuis les cadres durs de « conflit » qui mettent l'accent sur l'agression de l'OTAN, jusqu'à ceux qui promeuvent « l'exceptionnalisme arctique » décrivant la région comme « zone de paix ». De même, les messages russes officiels, jumelés à des investissements accrus pour leurs capacités militaires en Arctique, signifient à la fois une concurrence avec les adversaires de l'OTAN et des applications à double usage pour répondre aux besoins de « sécurité douce ». La délicate distinction entre, d’une part, les grandes menaces stratégiques, qui ont souvent un lien avec l'Arctique mais qui sont mieux évaluées à travers une lentille internationale plus large et, d’autre part, les risques ou les menaces de l’Arctique émanant de la dynamique ou des conditions régionales elles-mêmes, aide à analyser les capacités stratégiques qui peuvent être basées en Arctique de celles destinées à répondre aux défis et menaces de sécurité non traditionnels dans la région. Pour les analystes militaires et de sécurité, l'évaluation des facteurs de menace s’effectue à la fois en termes de capacité et d'intention. Les analystes de défense suggèrent qu'ils doivent être prêts à se défendre contre les premiers, car ces derniers peuvent être mal interprétés ou peuvent changer. Alors que la littérature open source peut ne pas offrir une image complète des capacités (et les flux de renseignements classifiés fourniraient d'autres indicateurs d'intentions), une analyse universitaire indépendante basée sur des informations non classifiées peut aider à envisager et à identifier les risques et menaces possibles sans adhérer aux biais culturels et aux hypothèses associées avec des institutions gouvernementales particulières. Dans cet esprit, cette Note stratégique se veut une série de réflexions modestes suscitées par des discussions et des débats avec des collègues lors de conférences et d'ateliers au cours des deux dernières années. Ces conversations m'ont encouragé à reconsidérer continuellement mes idées et mes évaluations sur la manière et la raison pour lesquelles les intérêts, les actions et les intentions de la Russie pourraient représenter des risques ou des menaces pour le Canada, autant maintenant qu’à l'avenir. Je ne les propose ni en tant que menaces probables, ni en tant que recommandations « réalisables ». Au lieu de cela, ces réflexions sont simplement proposées dans le cadre d'exercices en cours pour encourager un éventail plus approfondi de réflexions sur ce sujet – exercices dont je suis sûr que les penseurs russes entreprennent en ce qui concerne le Canada et ses alliés de l'OTAN. « Red teaming » de scénarios futurs En faisant du « red teaming » de scénarios futurs (c’est-à-dire, remettre en question les hypothèses en jouant le rôle d'un adversaire pensant), voici des sujets ou des thèmes que les analystes de défense et de sécurité pourraient considérer. La Russie a investi massivement dans la rénovation ou l'ouverture de nouvelles installations militaires, d'aérodromes, de recherche et sauvetage, d'approvisionnement et d'entretien et d'infrastructures scientifiques dans sa région de l’Arctique. Bien que j'aie soutenu que cela représente un moyen pratique pour Poutine de canaliser les fonds publics pour soutenir les oligarques du secteur des ressources qui se lancent dans des projets économiquement marginaux ou non rentables, cette infrastructure jette les bases de la projection des forces militaires russes dans le nord circumpolaire. Les infrastructures (capacités) construites à des fins « défensives » (intention) peuvent être converties à des fins « offensives » si les intentions changent, ou si leur utilisation défensive peut limiter la liberté d'action des Alliés de l'Ouest dans la région de l'Arctique eurasien et du détroit de Béring (l’interdiction d’accès et de zone : A2/AD). En conséquence, il est important pour les analystes occidentaux de surveiller attentivement les développements de l'infrastructure russe, en se concentrant sur les capacités matérielles en cours de développement et leurs utilisations potentielles au-delà de celles énoncées dans les déclarations officielles – en particulier les déclarations réconfortantes destinées à un public étranger qui dépeignent l'Arctique comme une « zone de paix » et un « territoire de dialogue ». Il existe de multiples volets au discours politique et médiatique russe qui mettent l'accent sur le « pouvoir dur » ou les discours sur la sécurité douce (comme c'est le cas dans les évaluations nord-américaines), et les analystes doivent tenir compte des deux. Les campagnes hybrides de guerre et de désinformation sont devenues les piliers centraux de l’approche évolutive de la Russie pour mener les conflits du XXIe siècle. Bien qu'une action militaire russe conventionnelle contre d'autres États de l'Arctique demeure hautement improbable compte tenu de la probabilité qu'une telle agression dégénère en une guerre générale que la Russie ne pourrait pas gagner, la Russie pourrait chercher à exploiter les divisions au Canada par le biais de campagnes de désinformation concertées conçues pour exacerber les tensions entre les Canadiens. Par exemple, les techniques russes de « diffamation et d’amplification » pourraient être utilisées pour semer la discorde politique générale dans le Nord canadien ou pour encourager l'investissement étranger dans les projets russes plutôt que dans le développement des ressources ou de transport canadien. Bien que les rendements relatifs de ce type de campagne de désinformation dirigée contre le Nord canadien soient minimes par rapport à une campagne similaire menée au Canada en général, elle ne peut être écartée si la stratégie de la Russie dans l'Arctique évolue dans une direction plus agressive. Le « journalisme patriotique » russe, qui acclame les prouesses militaires de la Russie dans l'Arctique, s'il est accepté sans réserve, pourrait amener le Canada et ses alliés à investir de manière excessive des ressources rares (financières et personnelles) dans les défenses de l'Arctique, des ressources qui, autrement, pourraient être déployées ailleurs à l'étranger pour faire avancer les intérêts nationaux et les valeurs canadiennes/occidentales. Le fait de consacrer à la défense de l'Arctique des ressources qui ne sont pas proportionnées à la menace militaire « réelle » pourrait également offrir des opportunités à la Russie d’étendre ses activités dans d'autres régions, compromettant ainsi la paix et la sécurité mondiales plus généralement. L'insistance du commandant général du NORAD, Terrence O'Shaugnessy, selon lequel « la patrie n'est pas un sanctuaire » face aux armes avancées et aux plates-formes de livraison de grande capacité, ne s'applique pas de manière égale dans tous les domaines, et la géographie reste une variable importante pour contraindre ou inhiber certains types d’opérations dans l'Arctique. Une suramplification des menaces arctiques (régionales) pourrait détourner l'attention de centres de gravité plus importants stratégiquement ailleurs dans le monde, jouant ainsi le jeu d'adversaires potentiels en réduisant la capacité du Canada et de ses alliés à projeter des forces militaires de notre patrie vers d'autres théâtres. Des évaluations différentes des menaces entre le Canada et ses alliés de l'OTAN, fondées sur des perceptions divergentes des intentions de la Russie dans l'Arctique, pourraient entraîner des divisions politiques et/ou une érosion de la confiance entre les membres de l'OTAN, divisant ainsi l'alliance. Pendant plus d'une décennie, la réticence du Canada à voir l'OTAN adopter un rôle explicite dans l'Arctique – par crainte que cela ne contrarie inutilement les Russes et/ou n'implique des États non arctiques peu compétents dans les questions arctiques – différait de pays comme la Norvège. Bien que la position officielle du Canada ait changé et qu'il s'engage maintenant ouvertement à « contribuer au renforcement de la connaissance de la situation et des moyens d’échange d’information dans la région, notamment avec l’OTAN », il ne partage pas nécessairement ses positions politiques avec certains membres de l'OTAN qui « militent activement pour la liberté de navigation » dans le passage du Nord-Ouest (Allemagne) ou qui suggèrent que l'Arctique est un « deuxième Moyen-Orient » (France). Exacerber de telles divisions aurait, bien entendu, une valeur stratégique pour la Russie. Une façon d'éviter cette divergence est de discerner soigneusement les « menaces arctiques » qui couvrent toute la région circumpolaire des menaces spécifiques à l'Arctique nord-américain ou aux pays nordiques, ainsi que de celles qui concernent l’accès de la Russie à l’Atlantique Nord par les eaux arctiques. Le Canada et ses alliés devraient être vigilants pour éviter que les problèmes de l’Arctique ne deviennent un blocage entre les membres de l’OTAN, ce qui pourrait faire de nous des pions dans le jeu de la Russie pour fragmenter l’alliance. Il y a un risque que les discours canadiens et alliés qui célèbrent exagérément la « coopération arctique » entre tous les États arctiques (y compris la Russie) puissent devenir un moyen pour la Russie de vendre l’idée à des publics nationaux et internationaux que l'Occident/l'OTAN a accepté la situation actuelle en Crimée et à l'est de l'Ukraine comme le nouveau statu quo. Bien que de nombreux commentateurs mettent rapidement en évidence le fait que de nombreuses formes de coopération régionale dans l'Arctique ont persisté depuis 2014 (mais pas dans le domaine militaire), les discours canadiens sur la coopération dans l'Arctique avec la Russie doivent veiller à ne pas discréditer les forces de l'OTAN qui s'engagent à aider leurs alliés ou à miner les sanctions occidentales contre la Russie pour son agression. Dans son Cadre stratégique pour l'Arctique et le nord du Canada, publié en septembre 2019, le Canada s’est engagé à prendre « des mesures pour relancer un dialogue bilatéral régulier avec la Russie sur les questions arctiques, dans des domaines prioritaires : les questions autochtones, la coopération scientifique, la protection de l'environnement, la navigation, ainsi que la recherche et le sauvetage », un dialogue qui pourrait faciliter le partage de meilleures pratiques, garantir que la souveraineté et les droits souverains des États côtiers de l'Arctique soient respectés au niveau international et instaurer la confiance en dehors de la sphère militaire. Tant que les communications stratégiques différencient clairement et délibérément les questions politiques de haut et de bas niveau, des discours qui promeuvent la coopération régionale dans l'Arctique sans saper la dissuasion stratégique ou la solidarité de l'alliance, et qui ne négligent pas les violations du droit international dans d'autres domaines, peuvent être appropriés et utiles pour promouvoir les intérêts du Canada. Le contrôle étatique resserré de la Russie sur l'espace d'information national peut faciliter la fausse représentation des politiques/stratégies de l'Arctique occidental et fomenter la rhétorique anti-OTAN parmi la population russe sous de faux prétextes en raison de la place centrale de l'Arctique dans la mythologie et l'identité nationale russes.  (Des exemples de journaux russes alarmistes identifiant les 5 000 Rangers canadiens comme une menace militaire pour la Russie sont un exemple absurde de la façon dont tout investissement militaire dans l'Arctique peut être faussé pour correspondre à un récit de la militarisation occidentale de la région et à des menaces contre la Russie !). Des messages vigilants sur les capacités militaires (réelles et prévues) du Canada sont essentiels pour éviter de nourrir les récits alarmistes de la Russie sur la militarisation de l'Arctique. La politique de défense du Canada de 2017, Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, situe prudemment la Russie comme un État qui « a démontré sa disposition à mettre à l’épreuve l’ordre de sécurité internationale », qui a réintroduit un « certain niveau de concurrence » et qui est l’un des États de l’Arctique ayant depuis longtemps collaboré « sur des questions économiques, environnementales et sécuritaires », en plus d’avoir « un intérêt durable à l’égard de la poursuite de cette collaboration productive ». Cette distinction peut et doit être maintenue, puisqu’elle permet un dialogue sur des questions de sécurité non techniques (telles que la recherche et le sauvetage, les opérations de sauvetage de masse et l'application conjointe des lois sur les pêcheries), tout en veillant à ce que le Canada soit prêt (de concert avec son allié américain) à détecter, vaincre et dissuader les menaces militaires contre la défense et la sécurité de l'Amérique du Nord. L'agression russe en Ukraine était fondée sur des facteurs, des logiques stratégiques et des considérations démographiques différents de ceux qui existent dans les États arctiques voisins de la Russie. Malgré des commentaires occasionnels établissant des analogies entre ce conflit et l'avenir potentiel de l'Arctique, je n'ai pas encore lu de scénario crédible où une situation comparable se déroulerait ou pourrait se dérouler dans l’Arctique – en particulier dans l'Arctique nord-américain. Les intérêts de longue date de la Russie au Svalbard, cependant, représentent une source potentielle de conflit dans l’Arctique européen, le journal russe Kommersant indiquant en 2016 (basé sur des conversations avec des sources au ministère russe de la Défense) que les efforts de la Norvège pour établir une « absolute national jurisdiction over the Spitsbergen archipelago and the adjacent 200 nautical miles maritime boundary around » pourraient engendrer des affrontements militaires. Le Canada et l'OTAN pourraient envisager de collaborer avec la Norvège pour évaluer plus systématiquement les menaces potentielles pour le Svalbard et discuter de la façon dont l'OTAN peut dissuader la Russie de contester militairement la souveraineté norvégienne sur l'archipel.   ## Pourquoi la « courageuse petite Belgique » envoie encore une fois ses F-16 en Irak et en Syrie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pourquoi-la-courageuse-petite-belgique-envoie-encore-une-fois-ses-f-16-en-irak-et-en-syrie/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le 1er octobre 2020, la Belgique a repris sa participation à l'opération Inherent Resolve, la coalition internationale dirigée par les États-Unis contre l'État islamique (ÉI), avec quatre avions de chasse F-16 et du personnel de soutien militaire. Pourquoi un petit pays comme la Belgique décide-t-il une fois de plus d'entrer en guerre dans ce conflit apparemment sans fin? Le 1er octobre 2020, la Belgique a repris sa participation à l'opération Inherent Resolve, la coalition internationale dirigée par les États-Unis contre l'État islamique (ÉI), avec quatre avions de chasse F-16 et du personnel de soutien militaire. Tout comme les contributions précédentes en 2014-2015 et 2016-2017, les F-16 belges seront basés en Jordanie et sont mandatés pour participer à tout le spectre des activités, y compris effectuer des vols de reconnaissance, fournir un soutien aérien aux troupes au sol et mener des frappes aériennes. Pourquoi un petit pays comme la Belgique décide-t-il une fois de plus d'entrer en guerre dans ce conflit apparemment sans fin ? La question est particulièrement intéressante compte tenu du contexte national dans lequel ce déploiement a été décidé. Non seulement le virus de la COVID-19 fait toujours rage dans tout le pays, mais la décision a également été prise sans avoir un gouvernement de plein pouvoir et sans perspective claire d'en avoir un de sitôt. Cela explique pourquoi le déploiement a été soumis à l'approbation préalable du Parlement - accordée le 25 juin - ce qui, dans des circonstances normales, n'est pas une exigence constitutionnelle ni une pratique courante en Belgique. Ce n'est qu'au moment de la rédaction de ce blogue, trois mois plus tard, qu'une formation gouvernementale de 493 jours a été conclue. Malgré un calendrier quelque peu singulier, cet engagement ne devrait pas être une surprise pour de multiples raisons. Il reste cependant à savoir pour combien de temps il bénéficiera d'un soutien national. Plus qu'une question de sécurité (inter)nationale Le déploiement de la Belgique est évidemment orienté vers l'ambition de la coalition de prévenir une résurgence de l'ÉI dans la région. Cette motivation a également dominé les débats parlementaires en juin dernier, avec l'accent répété sur la nécessité de « maintenir la pression ». L'ÉI a été présenté comme une menace pour la sécurité non seulement internationale, mais aussi nationale et ce n'est pas nouveau. Les déploiements antérieurs étaient également justifiés de cette manière. Alors que les menaces contre la population yézidi, la propagande de l'ÉI et le problème des combattants étrangers ont créé un sentiment d'urgence à l’international, la fusillade dans un musée juif à Bruxelles en mai 2014 et, plus important encore, les attentats à la bombe de mars 2016 à Bruxelles ont ajouté une dimension de sécurité nationale évidente. Pourtant, il est difficile de croire que les considérations de sécurité ont été la seule motivation du gouvernement pour répondre positivement à la demande du Commandement central américain de redéployer ses avions de chasse. De telles contributions vigoureuses semblent faire partie de l'ADN de la Belgique en tant que partenaire international. Les contributions antérieures à l'opération Inherent Resolve et les frappes aériennes lors de l'intervention en Libye en 2011 en témoignent. Cette participation active assure en outre un siège à la table du noyau des contributeurs militaires à Inherent Resolve et, de cette façon, une voix dans l'avenir de la région. Mais le plus important est que l'identité du pays est incontestablement liée aux principes du multilatéralisme, qui occupent une place de choix dans presque tous les accords gouvernementaux des dernières décennies. La Belgique n'accueille pas seulement le siège de l'OTAN et plusieurs des institutions de l'UE, elle est également l'un des membres non permanents les plus fréquemment élus du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU - son sixième mandat est actuellement en cours. Le multilatéralisme donne tout simplement à la Belgique une voix plus forte sur la scène internationale. Cependant, la promotion des principes du multilatéralisme ne va pas sans responsabilités ni attentes. La contribution active à Inherent Resolve doit également être considérée dans cette perspective. D'une part, elle s'inscrit dans la continuité des ambitions et de la politique fixées par le(s) gouvernement(s) précédent(s), visant à montrer l'engagement de la Belgique à contribuer activement au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales. La rumeur selon laquelle cette contribution a déjà été convenue beaucoup plus tôt avec les principaux membres de la coalition dirigée par les États-Unis ajoute encore plus de poids à cet argument. D'autre part, il y a aussi l'éléphant transatlantique dans la pièce. Comment un pays peut-il accueillir de manière crédible le siège de l'OTAN et se présenter comme un allié loyal alors qu'il est encore loin d'atteindre l'ambition de consacrer 2% de son PIB à la défense ? Contribuer activement aux frappes aériennes de la coalition est une façon de répondre aux attentes, mais n'est évidemment pas sans risque. Pendant combien de temps cette approche peut-elle encore satisfaire les alliés de la Belgique? L'état-major de la Défense nationale demande depuis des années déjà d'augmenter de manière crédible le niveau d'ambition, également en termes de liquidités et de capacités. Soutien domestique La nouvelle mission doit durer jusqu'en octobre 2021. Cependant, plusieurs questions qui pèsent sur le nouveau gouvernement de centre gauche dirigé par le premier ministre Alexander De Croo font douter de la durabilité de cette contribution. La première question clé est de savoir comment les partis de gauche au pouvoir vont gérer la mission. En juin, les partis vert et socialiste ont voté contre la résolution parlementaire qui légitimait la mission, exprimant leur inquiétude quant à l'absence de justification légale des activités militaires sur le territoire syrien. Le nouvel accord gouvernemental souligne la nécessité pour les missions militaires étrangères d'avoir un « mandat juridique international concluant ». Il n'est pas encore clair comment cette tension se manifestera à l'avenir, par exemple dans le contexte d'un débat autour d'une éventuelle extension de la mission. La deuxième question est de savoir combien de temps les avions de chasse belges seront capables de répondre aux attentes dans le cadre d'une modernisation des systèmes d'armes du pays. Ce n'est qu'en octobre 2018 que le gouvernement a décidé d'acheter 34 avions de chasse F-35 et il faudra un certain temps avant qu'ils ne remplacent réellement la flotte vieillissante de F-16. En outre, les précédentes contributions à Inherent Resolve ont eu lieu dans le cadre d'un partenariat d’alternance avec les Pays-Bas. L'engagement néerlandais reste maintenant limité au déploiement d'une force de protection militaire de 35 membres. Sans perspective d'être remplacée par des F-16 néerlandais, il reste à voir combien de temps la Force aérienne belge pourra maintenir ses avions de chasse en l'air. Enfin, il y a la question du soutien public domestique. Les protestations massives contre la guerre semblent être un lointain souvenir en Belgique. La crise de la COVID-19 occupera d'ailleurs la plupart des citoyens pendant encore quelques mois au moins. Mais plus cette contribution offensive durera, plus le risque de controverse sera élevé. Des nuages noirs se sont déjà amassés aux Pays-Bas, après que le gouvernement néerlandais ait dû admettre qu'un de ses avions de chasse avait tué jusqu'à 70 civils à Hawija en Irak, ce qui a conduit à une motion de censure contre le ministre de la Défense. Déjà en 2017, l'ONG internationale Airwars, qui surveille la campagne aérienne de la coalition, avait relié la Belgique à certains cas de victimes civiles. Bien que ces accusations aient été formellement démenties, des questions seront à nouveau soulevées. L'équipement des avions de chasse belges avec de nouvelles bombes de haute précision ne permettra pas d'éliminer complètement ce risque. Jusqu'à présent, la Belgique a été parmi les membres les moins transparents de la coalition. Comme le nouveau gouvernement s'est formellement engagé à accroître la transparence sur ses missions militaires, il sera intéressant de voir comment cela pourrait affecter le soutien domestique. Pour l'instant, la courageuse petite Belgique est de retour en action, mais ce n'est pas sans réserve. L'auteur est reconnaissant aux fonctionnaires de la Défense qui ont partagé leurs idées dans le cadre de la recherche pour ce billet. ## Pourquoi pas des sous-marins nucléaires canadiens? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pourquoi-pas-des-sous-marins-nucleaires-canadiens/ Modified: 2026-06-22 Les sous-marins du Canada sont en fin de vie. Construits il y a plus de trente ans pour la Marine royale britannique, les quatre sous-marins de la classe Victoria ont été acquis par le Canada dans les années 1990 et n’ont jamais vraiment été à la hauteur du potentiel annoncé. Ils doivent désormais être remplacés, et les programmes d’acquisition de sous-marins peuvent s’avérer de longues épreuves pleines d’incertitudes. Cependant, depuis que l’ancien premier ministre Justin Trudeau a annoncé, à l’été 2024, que le Canada prévoyait de se doter d’une flotte pouvant compter jusqu’à douze sous-marins, le projet d’acquisition de sous-marins canadiens a en réalité progressé extrêmement rapidement. La définition des exigences, la consultation de l’industrie et la présélection de deux constructeurs potentiels se sont toutes déroulées en un peu plus d’un an. En mars 2026, les deux constructeurs avaient soumis des soumissions détaillées, et le Canada pourrait désormais être à quelques semaines seulement de faire son choix final. Le premier sous-marin en lice pour le contrat canadien est celui de classe KSS-III de Hanwha Ocean, déjà en service au sein de la Marine sud-coréenne. Le deuxième sous-marin en lice est celui de classe Type 212CD de TMKS, actuellement en construction pour l’Allemagne et la Norvège. Le gouvernement du Canada a déclaré que, malgré les différences au niveau de leurs capacités, de leurs dimensions et de leurs systèmes, les deux modèles répondent aux besoins de la Marine royale canadienne, et que la décision finale reposera sur la mesure dans laquelle les soumissions concurrentes répondent aux besoins industriels, diplomatiques et économiques du Canada. Un point commun entre les deux modèles est qu’il s’agit de sous-marins diesel-électriques dotés d’un système de propulsion indépendant de l’air intégré – et non de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. Les sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire ont la réputation d’être les plus avancés et les plus performants au monde. Ils présentent de réels avantages par rapport aux sous-marins diesel-électriques qui sont pertinents pour le Canada. D’où la question : pourquoi le gouvernement et les forces armées du Canada semblent-ils ne manifester aucun intérêt pour les sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire destinés à la Marine royale canadienne? La réponse à cette question dépend des missions jugées prioritaires pour les sous-marins canadiens et des défis concrets liés à l’acquisition de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. Cela ne signifie toutefois pas que les sous-marins nucléaires ne présentent aucun avantage. Les avantages des sous-marins nucléaires par rapport aux sous-marins à moteur diesel De manière générale, les sous-marins nucléaires présentent les avantages suivants : ils disposent d’une autonomie considérable sans avoir besoin de se ravitailler, peuvent atteindre des vitesses de pointe supérieures à celles des sous-marins conventionnels sans pour autant sacrifier leur autonomie, et peuvent rester immergés pendant des mois sans avoir besoin d’échanger de l’air avec la surface. Les discussions concernant les sous-marins au Canada portent souvent sur l’Arctique, et tous ces avantages des sous-marins nucléaires sont pertinents pour y maintenir une présence constante. L’exploitation de sous-marins diesel-électriques est très difficile dans le Nord, car ils doivent faire un échange d’air avec la surface pour faire fonctionner leurs génératrices diesel qui rechargent leurs batteries. Cet échange d’air s’effectue habituellement, et de la manière la plus sécuritaire, à l’aide d’un schnorkel, mais la glace de mer rend ce processus risqué, car les schnorkels ne peuvent pas percer les couches de glace solides et peuvent être endommagés dans les zones où se trouvent des morceaux de glace instables. Les sous-marins nucléaires ne sont pas confrontés à ces problèmes. L’Arctique canadien ne dispose pas non plus d’installations capables d’accueillir des sous-marins, et la construction de telles installations s’est avérée être un immense défi. En l’absence d’installations de soutien dans le Nord, les distances que les sous-marins canadiens doivent parcourir – sans soutien – pour se rendre dans l’Arctique et en revenir peuvent en réalité être supérieures à la distance qui les sépare des ports amis en Asie ou en Europe, même s’ils ne quittent jamais les eaux canadiennes. Ces distances imposent donc une capacité à longue portée. L’autonomie nécessaire pour patrouiller sur ces distances est à la portée des sous-marins diesel-électriques, mais uniquement en contournant des contraintes qui n’existent pas pour les sous-marins nucléaires. La vitesse supérieure des sous-marins nucléaires est également un atout, car elle permet d’accroître l’efficacité des patrouilles. Une vitesse plus élevée signifie moins de temps de transit vers une zone de patrouille et plus de temps passé là où le sous-marin est nécessaire, ce qui pourrait permettre à un nombre réduit de sous-marins nucléaires d’assurer une couverture équivalente dans l’Arctique par rapport à une flotte diesel-électrique. Les avantages des sous-marins nucléaires s’étendent également au-delà de l’Arctique. L’une des principales capacités qu’offrent ces sous-marins est la possibilité de menacer les voies de communication maritimes d’un autre pays, c’est-à-dire les routes empruntées par ses navires marchands et militaires. Si le Canada devait menacer les voies de communication maritimes d’un autre pays – à moins que ce pays ne soit son allié de longue date en vertu d’un traité, soit les États-Unis –, la géographie impose qu’il le fasse à une grande distance des côtes canadiennes. Une portée importante est donc une condition indispensable pour que le Canada dispose de cette capacité, la vitesse constituant un autre avantage, car elle rend cette menace plus immédiate. Les sous-marins nucléaires sont mieux adaptés à cette tâche que les sous-marins non nucléaires. Une logique similaire s’applique à l’utilisation de sous-marins pour menacer des cibles terrestres. Les sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire et l’historique des acquisitions du Canada Ces avantages ont toujours été bien compris au sein de la Marine royale canadienne et du gouvernement du Canada. Le projet d’acquisition actuel n’est que la troisième fois que le Canada cherche à se doter de nouveaux sous-marins depuis que le premier sous-marin nucléaire, exploité par la Marine des États-Unis, a pris la mer en 1954. Bien que d’autres options aient finalement été retenues, il convient de noter que, dans le cadre des deux projets d’acquisition de sous-marins précédents, l’intention était, du moins pendant un certain temps, d’acquérir des sous-marins nucléaires. Dans les années 1950, la Marine royale canadienne avait choisi la classe Skipjack à propulsion nucléaire de la Marine des États-Unis avant que le gouvernement ne rejette ce projet et n’opte plutôt, en 1960, pour la classe Oberon non nucléaire du Royaume-Uni. Dans les années 1980, le gouvernement du Canada, sous la direction de Brian Mulroney, a annoncé dans son Livre blanc sur la défense de 1987 qu’il remplacerait la classe Oberon par des sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire. Il est toutefois revenu sur cette décision en 1989, pour finalement acquérir la classe Victoria, actuellement en service. Malgré le résultat, dans les deux cas, les avantages des sous-marins nucléaires ont occupé une place prépondérante dans les discussions et les débats. Les avantages des sous-marins nucléaires en termes de vitesse et d’autonomie existent toujours aujourd’hui, et les Canadiens, qu’ils soient au service du gouvernement ou non, en sont conscients. Le débat public sur les questions militaires au Canada est souvent limité, mais l’intérêt pour les sous-marins nucléaires a connu un regain après l’annonce du pacte AUKUS par les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et l’Australie en 2021. Cet accord visait à transférer à court terme plusieurs sous-marins nucléaires américains à l’Australie, l’objectif étant que ce pays soit un jour en mesure de construire ses propres sous-marins nucléaires sur son territoire. De nombreux Canadiens se sont demandé pourquoi le Canada ne pouvait pas être inclus dans cet accord. Une frange restreinte, mais bruyante, des milieux de la défense canadiens, tant au sein du public que du milieu universitaire, a continué de plaider en faveur des sous-marins nucléaires, tant pour leur efficacité opérationnelle que pour l’approfondissement de la coopération avec de tels partenaires. Néanmoins, rien n’indique publiquement que les sous-marins nucléaires aient été sérieusement envisagés par la Marine royale canadienne (MRC) ou le gouvernement dans le cadre de cet achat. Le coût est sans aucun doute un facteur dans cette décision, mais il ne constitue pas à lui seul une explication suffisante. Les acquisitions prévues par l’Australie dans le cadre de l’AUKUS nous fournissent un bon point de référence en matière de coûts pour le Canada. Ce projet devrait coûter jusqu’à 368 milliards de dollars au cours des 30 premières années – soit une moyenne de 12 milliards de dollars par année. Cette somme est colossale; elle absorberait près de la moitié des budgets de défense que les Canadiens ont l’habitude de soutenir. Cependant, le premier ministre Mark Carney s’est récemment engagé à porter les dépenses de défense du Canada à 3,5 % du PIB d’ici 2035. D’après les chiffres actuels du PIB, cela représente 52,5 milliards de dollars de dépenses de défense annuelles supplémentaires par rapport aux niveaux de 2024. Même si certaines priorités entreront en concurrence les unes avec les autres, un programme annuel de 12 milliards de dollars n’est pas inconcevable dans ce contexte, surtout s’il répond à un besoin fondamental. Plutôt que le coût, le désintérêt officiel persistant du Canada pour les sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire semble trouver sa source dans un élément inhabituel dans le discours canadien sur la défense : les décideurs ont aujourd’hui une compréhension plus approfondie des considérations stratégiques et industrielles que lors des cycles d’acquisition antérieurs. Priorités mal comprises La volonté du Canada de se doter de sous-marins nucléaires dans les années 1980 reposait sur une bonne compréhension des avantages de ces engins, mais sur une mauvaise interprétation des priorités stratégiques. L’élément déclencheur immédiat qui a conduit à la décision d’acquérir des sous-marins nucléaires a été le passage, sans autorisation canadienne, d’un brise-glace de la Garde côtière américaine, l’USCGC Polar Sea, par le passage du Nord-Ouest. Les États-Unis revendiquaient le passage comme un détroit international, ce qui leur conférait un droit de transit. En réponse aux préoccupations de la population, le gouvernement Mulroney a rapidement précisé que le Canada considérait les eaux traversant son archipel arctique comme des eaux intérieures, ce qui impliquait qu’une autorisation était toujours nécessaire pour y transiter. Cette position a placé le Canada dans une situation délicate, car il n’avait pas les moyens de surveiller les violations de ces revendications – et encore moins de les faire respecter. Surveiller en permanence l’ensemble de l’Arctique canadien à l’aide de navires, de satellites, d’avions ou de stations au sol était irréalisable pour des raisons techniques, et les autres pays auraient toujours su quand ces moyens étaient absents. Les sous-marins auraient constitué une solution intéressante, car ils auraient pu surveiller les navires sans être détectés eux-mêmes, forçant ainsi ces navires à toujours agir comme s’ils étaient surveillés, même si la couverture effective était intermittente. Comme il aurait été extrêmement difficile de faire opérer les sous-marins diesel-électriques de l’époque dans l’Arctique, le recours à des « sous-marins » à des fins de surveillance de l’Arctique impliquait l’acquisition de « sous-marins nucléaires ». Parallèlement à certaines estimations extrêmement optimistes du coût du programme et de l’intérêt probable des alliés à aider le Canada, le gouvernement a démontré qu’il comprenait cette réalité technique lorsqu’il a annoncé, dans son livre blanc sur la défense de 1987, qu’il ferait l’acquisition de sous-marins nucléaires, en précisant qu’ils constituaient à la fois « le meilleur moyen d’atteindre les capacités opérationnelles requises dans les vastes océans Pacifique et Atlantique » et « le seul navire capable d’exercer une surveillance et un contrôle dans les eaux recouvertes de glace du nord du Canada ». Si le jugement technique selon lequel les sous-marins nucléaires constituaient le seul outil permettant de surveiller et de contrôler les eaux de l’Arctique était fondé, la décision stratégique de donner la priorité à cet objectif ne l’était pas. Bien qu’il existe des justifications pour qu’un pays souhaite surveiller et contrôler l’ensemble de son territoire, il y aura toujours une hiérarchie des priorités fondée sur la valeur économique des différentes régions, leur proximité par rapport aux centres de population et aux pôles industriels, leur utilité stratégique, ainsi que les alternatives diplomatiques à la présence militaire. Par exemple, dans tout conflit avec une grande puissance navale, il est peu probable que la première priorité de la force sous-marine canadienne soit l’Arctique. La protection de la navigation dans le golfe du Saint-Laurent, le détroit de Juan de Fuca près de Vancouver, et les mers autour de Saint-Jean, d’Halifax et de Prince Rupert – à proximité de tous les plus grands ports du Canada – constituerait presque certainement une priorité bien plus élevée. Cette hiérarchisation reflète un concept fondamental de la stratégie militaire appelé « centre de gravité » – qui est le « pivot de toute puissance et de tout mouvement, dont tout dépend », selon le célèbre stratège Carl von Clausewitz, et le « point vers lequel toutes les énergies [d’un belligérant] devraient être dirigées » afin d’obtenir l’avantage et de remporter la victoire dans tout conflit. Aucun des centres de gravité du Canada – aucun de ses centres les plus vitaux, qu’ils soient financiers, industriels, liés aux ressources, démographiques, stratégiques ou commerciaux – ne se trouve dans l’Arctique. Cela ne signifie pas que l’Arctique n’ait aucune valeur dans plusieurs de ces domaines, mais l’Arctique n’est pas un pivot sur lequel le Canada s’appuie pour sa prospérité, sa capacité à projeter sa puissance militaire à l’étranger ou son existence en tant que nation. Les grands ports du Canada, en revanche, constituent ses centres de gravité, du moins lorsqu’il s’agit de mener une guerre sur ou à travers l’océan. Le Canada dépend des voies de communication maritimes qui doivent partir de ses ports. Comme ces voies maritimes ne traversent que très peu de goulets d’étranglement – et aucun susceptible d’être hostile – sauf aux points d’entrée de l’océan Indien, c’est à proximité de ces ports que l’on peut le plus efficacement menacer leur utilisation par le Canada. La traque de navires, même civils, en haute mer mobilise d’importantes ressources. Il s’ensuit que le Canada doit s’attendre à ce qu’ils constituent une cible hautement prioritaire pour ses adversaires. L’histoire confirme ce point de vue. Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les sous-marins allemands opéraient près de tous les grands ports de la côte Est du Canada, ainsi que dans le golfe du Saint-Laurent et même dans le fleuve Saint-Laurent. Un futur adversaire chercherait probablement à faire de même avec des sous-marins modernes sur les deux côtes. Les planificateurs militaires canadiens devraient prendre cela au sérieux. Prendre au sérieux la menace que représentent les sous-marins ennemis dans ces zones implique de privilégier les plateformes capables d’y faire face le plus efficacement possible. Le meilleur moyen de contrer un sous-marin est un autre sous-marin et, malgré les avantages des sous-marins nucléaires dans d’autres domaines, ce sont les sous-marins diesel-électriques qui l’emportent ici. Cet avantage tient essentiellement à leur profil sonore. Les sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire génèrent toujours du bruit, car ils ne peuvent pas arrêter leurs réacteurs : ils sont toujours discrets, mais jamais silencieux. Les sous-marins diesel-électriques, en revanche, peuvent fonctionner à l’aide de batteries dans un silence quasi total, ce qui leur confère un avantage. Cet avantage est certes perdu lorsqu’ils doivent recourir périodiquement à des génératrices diesel pour se recharger. Cependant, cela constitue moins un inconvénient près de leurs bases, où ils peuvent retourner au port ou obtenir le soutien d’autres moyens pendant cette période de vulnérabilité. En l’absence d’autre solution au problème de la surveillance de l’Arctique, on pourrait peut-être soutenir qu’un sous-marin nucléaire, moins efficace pour assurer la sécurité près des ports canadiens mais pouvant être utilisé dans l’Arctique – par opposition à un sous-marin diesel-électrique, qui était le meilleur sous-marin pour maintenir la sécurité près des ports, mais qui n’avait que très peu d’utilité dans l’Arctique – constituerait un compromis raisonnable. Néanmoins, la question de l’Arctique était avant tout une question qui aurait dû être réglée par la voie diplomatique, comme en témoigne le fait qu’elle l’a finalement été. En 1988, les États-Unis et le Canada ont convenu que les navires américains ne transiteraient pas par le passage du Nord-Ouest sans l’autorisation du Canada, même si les États-Unis ne reconnaissaient pas la revendication canadienne selon laquelle il s’agissait d’eaux intérieures. Peu d’autres pays ayant les moyens ou l’intérêt de naviguer dans cette zone – l’Union soviétique, principal concurrent, soutenait en fait les revendications du Canada – la question a été réglée. Le Canada a ainsi pu abandonner ses projets de sous-marin nucléaire l’année suivante. La situation actuelle Aujourd’hui, avec le recul des calottes glaciaires et l’industrialisation croissante à l’échelle mondiale, davantage de pays pourraient disposer à la fois des moyens et de l’intérêt nécessaires pour emprunter le passage du Nord-Ouest. Cependant, le Canada a réalisé de réels progrès pour faire reconnaître ses revendications sur la scène internationale, tandis que les nouvelles technologies offrent des options autres que les sous-marins nucléaires pour surveiller la région. Les satellites moins coûteux et les radars modernes à portée au-delà de l’horizon constituent deux de ces technologies. Une troisième technologie est celle des systèmes de propulsion indépendante de l’air (AIP) que l’on retrouve sur de nombreux sous-marins diesel-électriques modernes–y compris les deux que le Canada envisage d’acquérir. Les systèmes AIP ont commencé à être utilisés sur les sous-marins de guerre dans les années 1990, peu après l’achèvement de la classe Victoria, qui en était dépourvue. Il en existe plusieurs variantes, mais leur point commun est qu’ils permettent aux sous-marins diesel-électriques de produire de l’électricité pendant de longues périodes sans avoir recours à leurs génératrices diesel et sans devoir faire le plein d’air en surface – prolongeant ainsi parfois la durée pendant laquelle un sous-marin diesel-électrique peut rester entièrement immergé, de quelques jours à plusieurs semaines. Cela élimine en grande partie le principal obstacle à l’exploitation des sous-marins diesel-électriques dans l’Arctique : la nécessité de faire fréquemment surface pour respirer. Grâce à leur capacité de rester immergés pendant des semaines, ils peuvent s’aventurer en toute confiance dans des zones recouvertes de glace et retourner dans des zones libres de glace lorsque cela est nécessaire. Cette technologie ne les rend toutefois pas équivalents aux sous-marins nucléaires à tous égards. Leur vitesse soutenue lors de l’utilisation de l’AIP est limitée, par exemple. Cependant, comme les contraintes liées au bruit obligent même les sous-marins nucléaires à opérer principalement à basse vitesse, avec la possibilité d’accélérer à des vitesses plus élevées en cas d’urgence, et que les sous-marins diesel-électriques équipés de l’AIP peuvent imiter ce comportement en tournant au ralenti pour recharger leurs batteries et en accélérant en les déchargeant, cette différence tactique est moins importante qu’elle ne le paraît. Les systèmes AIP présentent toutefois l’inconvénient de ne pas pouvoir être rechargés en mer. Un navire disposant de 21 jours d’autonomie AIP au moment de quitter le port ne dispose que de ces 21 jours avant de devoir se ravitailler. Une fois ce délai écoulé, il doit recourir à des cycles de recharge plus fréquents jusqu’à ce qu’il revienne au port ou qu’il se ravitaille à partir d’un autre navire transportant des réactifs spécialisés. Cependant, même aux vitesses réduites auxquelles l’AIP est limité, 21 jours suffisent à un sous-marin pour patrouiller depuis l’extrémité hivernale la plus méridionale de la calotte glaciaire arctique jusqu’au point le plus septentrional du territoire canadien, et revenir. Cela ne se produira que rarement, voire jamais, puisque la capacité des sous-marins nucléaires à nuire au Canada à partir de ces emplacements est limitée, et qu’il n’y a probablement rien d’autre à cette zone. Mais le simple fait de disposer de cette option permet d’atteindre bon nombre des objectifs canadiens que seuls les sous-marins nucléaires pouvaient auparavant réaliser, car les autres pays devront se prémunir contre cette éventualité. Plus couramment, lorsqu’ils seront déployés dans l’Arctique, les sous-marins canadiens à propulsion AIP seront utilisés le long des voies de navigation qui s’ouvrent dans l’Arctique pendant l’hiver, afin de surveiller le trafic et, en cas de conflit, de traquer les sous-marins belligérants qui constituent une menace réelle pour ce trafic. Leur capacité de navigation sous la glace servira principalement à se déplacer d’une zone d’eau libre à une autre ou à priver les sous-marins nucléaires de la protection qu’ils pourraient autrement trouver sous la glace à proximité de ces voies de navigation. Ce sont là les activités prioritaires dans l’Arctique. Les sous-marins équipés de ces systèmes sont également capables de remplir d’autres rôles. La présence de sous-marins diesel-électriques au large de la côte est du Canada pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale montre que menacer la navigation de l’autre côté des océans fait depuis longtemps partie des capacités des sous-marins diesel-électriques. Les systèmes AIP ne font que renforcer leur capacité de survie lorsqu’ils sont loin de leurs bases. Les sous-marins diesel-électriques ne sont peut-être pas en mesure de menacer de façon autonome le trafic maritime aussi persistamment que les sous-marins nucléaires, mais ce problème peut être contourné en accédant à des ports amis à proximité, et il est peu probable que le Canada intercepte des navires, sauf pour appuyer ses alliés. Une logique similaire s’applique à la possibilité d’attaquer des cibles terrestres de grande valeur à l’aide de sous-marins. Les sous-marins équipés d’un système AIP peuvent encore être désavantagés dans ce domaine par rapport aux sous-marins nucléaires, mais ils disposent d’une capacité de base qui répond aux besoins du Canada. Si le Canada peut se contenter d’une capacité moindre lorsqu’il opère dans l’Arctique, perturbe la navigation ou attaque des cibles terrestres, c’est parce que ces aspects constituent tous des considérations secondaires pour sa flotte de sous-marins. Les missions les plus importantes des sous-marins canadiens se dérouleront à proximité des grands ports, où les sous-marins diesel-électriques disposaient déjà d’un avantage discutable par rapport aux sous-marins nucléaires. La capacité des sous-marins AIP à naviguer pendant des semaines sans recharger leurs batteries après avoir quitté le port amplifie considérablement cet avantage par rapport aux sous-marins nucléaires. Dans l’ensemble, l’avantage accru des sous-marins diesel-électriques équipés de systèmes AIP par rapport aux sous-marins nucléaires dans le domaine où les besoins du Canada sont les plus critiques, ainsi que leur capacité à accomplir un large éventail de tâches secondaires, élimine la plupart des arguments stratégiques qui pourraient être avancés en faveur de l’acquisition de sous-marins nucléaires par le Canada à l’heure actuelle. Le coup de grâce porté aujourd’hui à l’acquisition de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire par le Canada reste toutefois le même que dans les années 1980 : le Canada ne dispose d’aucune option lui permettant de les acquérir. Du moins, pas dans les délais requis. Parmi les trois alliés du Canada qui exploitaient des sous-marins nucléaires dans les années 1980, le Royaume-Uni et la France se montraient, au mieux, tièdes à l’idée que le Canada en fasse l’acquisition, tandis que les États-Unis y étaient carrément hostiles. L’hostilité des États-Unis avait trois causes fondamentales. Premièrement, il était clair que le désir du Canada de se doter de sous-marins à propulsion nucléaire était une réponse aux actions des États-Unis – considérant ces derniers comme une nation potentiellement hostile – et il est naturel qu’ils ne veuillent pas fournir eux-mêmes les moyens de contrer cette menace. Les États-Unis estimaient également que les eaux de l’Arctique revêtaient une importance stratégique modeste, et craignaient que l’investissement canadien dans les sous-marins nucléaires n’ait une incidence sur les forces qu’ils pouvaient se permettre de maintenir sur le théâtre européen, stratégiquement plus important. Enfin, bien que le passage du Nord-Ouest ne revêtît pas à l’époque une importance stratégique considérable en tant que détroit international, d’autres détroits internationaux revêtaient et revêtent encore une importance stratégique considérable, et le précédent d’un détroit international devenant des eaux intérieures aurait pu ouvrir la voie à une reclassification similaire pour les propriétaires d’autres détroits. L’attitude tiède du Royaume-Uni et de la France résultait à la fois de leur incrédulité quant à la volonté du Canada de mener son projet à bien, et des préoccupations des États-Unis. Le Royaume-Uni, en particulier, menait son programme de sous-marins nucléaires en étroite collaboration avec les États-Unis et ne pouvait exporter ses sous-marins ni son expertise sans l’approbation américaine. Pour la France, la désapprobation des États-Unis constituait une contrainte moins contraignante – mais restait néanmoins un facteur à prendre en compte. Cependant, ses sous-marins de l’époque étaient nettement inférieurs en termes de capacités et, de toute façon, ne convenaient pas vraiment aux opérations dans l’Arctique. Cette absence de partenaire enthousiaste constituait un obstacle majeur aux ambitions canadiennes. La technologie des sous-marins nucléaires n’a été véritablement développée de manière indépendante qu’une seule fois – par les États-Unis. Tous les autres exploitants ont bénéficié d’une aide pour se la procurer, que ce soit par l’espionnage (URSS), une coopération ouverte (Royaume-Uni et Chine), une coopération secrète (France) ou un accord de location (Inde). Il s’agit d’une technologie extrêmement difficile à mettre au point. Le Canada a néanmoins envisagé de développer son propre sous-marin nucléaire. Une proposition novatrice consistait en un sous-marin fonctionnant à l’aide de batteries, à l’instar d’un sous-marin conventionnel, mais équipé d’un réacteur nucléaire de faible puissance, le « Slowpoke-2 », destiné à recharger ces batteries pendant les périodes de faible activité sans avoir à faire surface. Il ne serait pas capable de fonctionner en continu à pleine puissance comme les autres sous-marins nucléaires, mais il n’aurait pas non plus besoin de faire surface pour recharger ses batteries comme un sous-marin conventionnel. Il s’agissait peut-être là d’une bonne idée à la base – le concept est très similaire au fonctionnement des systèmes modernes de propulsion indépendante de l’air – et on peut saluer le fait qu’elle reconnaisse de façon réaliste certaines des limites techniques du Canada, mais elle n’en restait pas moins peu réaliste. Non seulement le Canada n’avait aucune expérience dans la construction de sous-marins nucléaires, mais il n’avait aucune expérience dans la construction de sous-marins de quelque type que ce soit; pas depuis qu’il en avait assemblé quelques-uns pour le Royaume-Uni pendant la Première Guerre mondiale. Les sous-marins modernes reposent sur un certain nombre de systèmes hautement spécialisés – tels que les capteurs acoustiques et les systèmes de suppression du bruit – qui constituent d’immenses défis d’ingénierie que le Canada devrait surmonter par ses propres moyens. Même avec un concept de réacteur moins ambitieux, il faudrait des décennies et de multiples itérations avant qu’un sous-marin répondant aux besoins canadiens puisse être construit au pays. À titre de comparaison, la France a mis en service son premier sous-marin nucléaire en 1971. Mais ses conceptions ont toujours été considérées comme en retard par rapport à celles de ses contemporains jusqu’à ce que sa quatrième conception entièrement nouvelle – la classe Suffren – entre en service en 2020. Ce délai de 50 ans correspond à une estimation réaliste du temps nécessaire à un nouveau venu pour mettre au point des sous-marins nucléaires compétitifs. En fin de compte, cela aurait toujours rendu impossible l’acquisition de sous-marins nucléaires par le Canada dans les années 1980. Aucun autre exploitant de sous-marins nucléaires ne souhaitait, ni n’était en mesure, d’apporter au Canada l’aide nécessaire. Et le développement de cette capacité de manière indépendante sur plusieurs décennies ne répondait pas aux besoins du Canada. Une dynamique similaire s’applique aujourd’hui à la situation du Canada vis-à-vis de ses alliés : une contrainte de temps est imposée par le fait que le Canada doit disposer d’un remplaçant en service d’ici le retrait de la classe Victoria en 2035, et personne n’a à la fois la volonté et la capacité de l’aider. Pourquoi ne pas, alors, s’associer aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni? Après tout, ces deux pays collaborent tous deux avec l’Australie pour répondre à ses ambitions nucléaires dans le cadre de l’AUKUS – les premiers sous-marins devant entrer en service au début des années 2030. Le Canada est un pays de taille similaire à celle de l’Australie, entretenant des relations comparables (voire plus étroites) avec le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis. Cela pourrait laisser penser que le Canada pourrait envisager un accord et un échéancier similaires. Cependant, cette idée s’effondre lorsqu’on l’examine de plus près. La logique qui sous-tend l’AUKUS repose sur la situation géographique de l’Australie. Il ne s’agit pas simplement d’un accord prévoyant que les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni vendent des sous-marins nucléaires à l’Australie à court terme et aident ce pays à construire ses propres sous-marins nucléaires à long terme. Cela inclut également le droit de baser leurs propres sous-marins nucléaires en Australie – les coûts étant à la charge de l’Australie. L’Australie est beaucoup plus proche des zones où les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni souhaitent déployer leurs sous-marins dans la région indo-pacifique que ne le sont leurs propres côtes. Le stationnement de leurs sous-marins en Australie réduit le temps de transit, ce qui leur permet de maintenir un temps de « présence sur place » similaire même s’ils en exploitent un nombre moindre. Tant les États-Unis que le Royaume-Uni sont soumis à de sévères limites quant à leur capacité de construction de sous-marins nucléaires; on peut même soutenir qu’ils ne disposent pas d’une capacité suffisante pour leurs propres besoins. Ce n’est que parce que cet accord de stationnement réduit le nombre de sous-marins qu’ils doivent exploiter que certains de leurs sous-marins peuvent être libérés pour être vendus à l’Australie. Le Canada ne dispose pas de ce levier. Rien de ce que le Canada peut faire ne réduit le nombre de sous-marins dont les États-Unis ou le Royaume-Uni ont besoin. L’Australie devrait également contribuer de manière significative au processus de conception d’une nouvelle classe de sous-marins « AUKUS », qui constituera le prochain sous-marin nucléaire du Royaume-Uni et servira de modèle pour la version qui sera finalement construite en Australie. L’Australie peut y contribuer parce qu’elle a acquis une expérience considérable dans la construction, puis la modernisation, de sa classe actuelle de sous-marins – la classe Collins – dans les années 1990 et au début des années 2000. La classe Collins intégrait des innovations véritablement de classe mondiale et a permis de maintenir une industrie sous-marine performante. Le Canada, en tant qu’exploitant de sous-marins initialement conçus et construits au Royaume-Uni, ne peut pas apporter une contribution similaire. Les raisons pour lesquelles le Canada ne pouvait pas compter sur les États-Unis ou le Royaume-Uni pour développer une capacité de sous-marins nucléaires dans les années 1980 restent d’actualité. Au mieux, Washington considère toujours l’acquisition de sous-marins nucléaires par le Canada comme un projet qui détournera des ressources de domaines dans lesquels il préférerait que nous investissions. Au pire, il y voit toujours une action hostile visant directement ses intérêts. Le Royaume-Uni est trop intégré au programme américain pour soutenir le Canada de manière indépendante. Même si Londres et Washington étaient convaincus d’aider Ottawa à acquérir des sous-marins nucléaires, le calendrier est impossible à respecter. L’AUKUS a été créé en 2021. Même si le Canada pouvait suivre le même calendrier, commencer dès maintenant repousserait probablement la livraison du premier sous-marin au-delà de l’échéance de 2035. Un calendrier similaire ne pourrait être respecté que si l’AUKUS était abandonné et que le Canada prenait effectivement la place de l’Australie dans un accord similaire assorti d’un calendrier ambitieux. Sinon, les capacités des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni à aider le Canada ne seront disponibles qu’une fois qu’une grande partie de ce que promet l’AUKUS aura été livrée, bien après le début des années 2040. C’est trop long pour que le Canada puisse attendre. Il ne reste donc que la France comme partenaire potentiel. Cependant, bien que les sous-marins nucléaires français ne soient plus significativement désavantagés par rapport à ceux des États-Unis ou du Royaume-Uni, leur capacité à aider le Canada à respecter ses échéances n’est pas pour autant plus grande. La capacité de la France à construire des sous-marins nucléaires sur son territoire est limitée et semble entièrement mobilisée pour ses propres besoins bien au-delà de 2035. Si le Canada en assumait les coûts, une nouvelle capacité pourrait vraisemblablement être mise en place. Ce serait en soi un projet s’étalant sur une décennie, et compte tenu du délai de construction typique d’un sous-marin nucléaire en France, qui dépasse neuf ans, cela repousserait également la première livraison bien au-delà des années 2040. On pourrait envisager la possibilité que la France aide le Canada à construire des sous-marins nucléaires sur son propre territoire, mais les délais seraient encore plus longs. Le Brésil poursuit actuellement la construction nationale d’un sous-marin nucléaire avec l’aide de la France. Ce sous-marin a été commandé en 2008. Son lancement est actuellement prévu pour 2037, soit un délai de livraison de 29 ans. C’est beaucoup trop long pour que le Canada envisage cette voie pour sa prochaine génération de sous-marins. Conclusion La décision du Canada de ne pas se doter de sous-marins nucléaires ne résulte pas d’une seule contrainte, mais de la convergence de plusieurs facteurs. Les missions prioritaires du Canada pour ses sous-marins, qui constituent la raison d’être de sa flotte, sont mieux servies par des sous-marins diesel-électriques équipés de systèmes de propulsion indépendants de l’air – exactement ce que le pays cherche à mettre en place. Les technologies qui rendaient autrefois la propulsion nucléaire particulièrement adaptée aux opérations dans l’Arctique ne constituent plus le seul moyen d’opérer dans cet environnement. Bien que les sous-marins nucléaires offrent toujours des avantages en matière d’autonomie, de vitesse et d’endurance, ces avantages sont particulièrement pertinents lors d’opérations menées de manière autonome loin du territoire national, alors que le Canada n’est susceptible d’intervenir dans ces régions qu’aux côtés d’alliés. En termes simples, il n’existe aucune voie viable pour acquérir des sous-marins nucléaires dans les délais exigés par le Canada, que ce soit par l’intermédiaire d’alliés ou par le développement national. Le Canada a donc un choix clair à faire. Plutôt que de rechercher le sous-marin le plus performant en théorie, le Canada cherche celui qui est le plus adapté à ses besoins concrets – en fonction de sa géographie, de ses alliances et de ses priorités stratégiques. Les sous-marins nucléaires demeurent des outils puissants et, à certains égards, inégalés. Cependant, ce sont des outils conçus pour répondre à un ensemble de problèmes différents de ceux auxquels le Canada est confronté. L’absence d’une option nucléaire dans le programme d’acquisition actuel du Canada n’est pas un oubli. C’est le résultat d’une évaluation lucide de ce que le Canada attend de sa force sous-marine et de ce qu’elle est réellement en mesure d’accomplir. Crédit image: U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Josh Thompson. ## Prêt, engagé et renseigné – PANEL 1 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pret-engage-et-renseigne-panel-1/ Modified: 2022-04-20 > Prêt, engagé et reseigné, PANEL 1: Nexus climat et sécurité : Vers un nouveau paradigme ? Dirigé par : Bruno Charbonneau. note : Cette vidéo est suggérée pour un public bilingue. La voix off et la traduction des sous-titres ne sont pas disponibles. Prêt, engagé et reseigné : Le Canada et le rôle du renseignement  face aux menaces et défis émergents PANEL 1: Nexus climat et sécurité : Vers un nouveau paradigme ? Dirigé par : Bruno Charbonneau Panélistes : Will Greaves (Université de Victoria) Adrien Estève (Sciences Po) Diego Osorio (Centre FrancoPaix & membre auxiliaire du corps professoral, Université Adler) ## Prêt, engagé et renseigné – PANEL 4 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pret-engage-et-renseigne-panel-4/ Modified: 2022-04-20 > Prêt, engagé et reseigné : Le Canada et le rôle du renseignement  face aux menaces et défis émergentsPANEL 4 - Renseignement et collaboration note : Cette vidéo est suggérée pour un public bilingue. La voix off et la traduction des sous-titres ne sont pas disponibles. Prêt, engagé et reseigné : Le Canada et le rôle du renseignement  face aux menaces et défis émergents PANEL 4 - Renseignement et collaboration multilatérale Présidé par : Bruno Charbonneau Panélistes : Stephanie Carvin (NPSIA, Université Carleton) Thomas Juneau (Université d'Ottawa) Justin Massie (UQAM) Chantal Lavallée (Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean) ## Prêt, engagé et reseigné – PANEL 2 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/pret-engage-et-reseigne-panel-2/ Modified: 2022-04-20 > PANEL 2 : Nouvelles technologies, nouveaux partenariats ? Collaborations et anticipation. Dirigé par : Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé note : Cette vidéo est suggérée pour un public bilingue. La voix off et la traduction des sous-titres ne sont pas disponibles. Prêt, engagé et reseigné : Le Canada et le rôle du renseignement  face aux menaces et défis émergents PANEL 2 : Nouvelles technologies, nouveaux partenariats ? Collaborations et anticipation Dirigé par : Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Panélistes : Walter Dorn (Collège des Forces canadiennes) Christian Leuprecht (Collège militaire royal & Université Queen’s) Colonel Yannick Michaud (Directeur général adjoint, Politique de renseignement et partenariats (DGIPP)) ## Protéger les élections canadiennes à l’ère de l’ingérence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/proteger-les-elections-canadiennes-a-lere-de-lingerence/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Introduction La militarisation de l'information contre les démocraties est devenue une caractéristique de la compétition géopolitique moderne. Au cours de la dernière décennie, des pays du monde entier, dont le Canada, ont été la cible d'opérations d'influence de la part de régimes autoritaires cherchant à saper la confiance dans les institutions publiques. Les tactiques utilisées pour atteindre cet objectif varient considérablement, mais font souvent appel au financement illicite des campagnes, à la manipulation des communautés de la diaspora et à la propagation de la désinformation en ligne. Les résultats liés à ces opérations comprennent l'élévation de la rhétorique polarisante au rang de politique dominante, l'augmentation des tensions ethniques et le déclin de l'engagement civique. Ces conditions ont eu un impact sur la légitimité publique des institutions, limitant la capacité des élus à gouverner efficacement. Au Canada, la présence d'une ingérence étrangère depuis 2019 a suscité de vives inquiétudes parmi les citoyens de tous bords politiques, ce qui a donné lieu à un vaste débat et à une enquête publique. Au milieu de la prorogation controversée du parlement et de la colère généralisée sur les questions économiques, la campagne électorale fédérale canadienne de ce printemps est très susceptible d'être ciblée par des acteurs malveillants ayant intérêt à déstabiliser le pays. Il s'agit notamment d'une Russie revancharde cherchant à diviser l'OTAN, d'États désireux d'exercer une influence sur leur diaspora, comme l'Inde ou la République populaire de Chine (RPC), et même d'éléments populistes basés aux États-Unis. Compte tenu de la forte probabilité d'ingérence, le gouvernement du Canada doit mettre en œuvre une réponse solide aux campagnes d'influence étrangères et sécuriser ses processus démocratiques. Le présent rapport d'orientation présente les différentes menaces dans le cadre d'une évaluation globale, définit les impératifs politiques d'une stratégie d'atténuation et énumère plusieurs recommandations.  Profils des menaces Fédération de Russie Le Kremlin a fait de la délégitimation du modèle libéral-démocratique un élément clé de sa stratégie dans ce que l'on appelle l'« étranger proche » et a étendu cette pratique aux États occidentaux au cours de la dernière décennie. Jusqu'à présent, l'attention portée au Canada a été modeste par rapport aux efforts déployés aux États-Unis et en Europe. Toutefois, à mesure que la guerre russo-ukrainienne s'engage dans des négociations précaires, il ne fait aucun doute que le Kremlin aura pour priorité de cibler les principaux membres de l'OTAN. Les tactiques employées par le régime de Poutine consistent généralement en des opérations de désinformation déployées dans la région euro-atlantique. Historiquement, Moscou a développé un appareil médiatique d'État pour diffuser du contenu dans les langues européennes, en investissant considérablement dans des entreprises telles que Sputnik News et Russia Today. Toutefois, comme ces médias ont été soumis à de nouvelles restrictions légales en raison de leur étroite affiliation avec le Kremlin, Moscou s'est adapté en redoublant le recrutement secret de personnalités locales pour promouvoir des récits favorables au Kremlin. Parmi les personnes soupçonnées d'avoir des liens avec la Russie figurent des journalistes, d'anciens représentants des Nations unies et même des partis politiques dans divers pays occidentaux. L'exécution des campagnes de désinformation par Moscou a largement bénéficié de la pénétration des médias sociaux et de l'absence de réglementation dans la région euro-atlantique. Grâce aux médias sociaux, le Kremlin a réussi à propager de nombreuses théories du complot et à se faire passer pour des membres de la société civile américaine afin d'amplifier son discours. Pour ce faire, il a toujours eu recours à des profils synthétiques de médias sociaux et a récemment commencé à intégrer l'intelligence artificielle générative (IA) pour fabriquer des preuves visuelles. Les plateformes de désinformation sont généralement très médiatiques, comme Facebook, X (Twitter) et Instagram. Compte tenu de la nature évolutive du vecteur de la menace russe, il est essentiel que le Canada reste vigilant quant à son impact sur les prochaines élections. République populaire de Chine (RPC) Fort d'une présence dans le Pacifique et d'une importante diaspora chinoise, le Canada est devenu une cible privilégiée de l'ingérence de la République populaire de Chine. Utilisant à l'origine des cyberattaques présumées et des opérations de blanchiment d'argent, la stratégie a évolué pour incorporer des outils tels que l'instrumentalisation des plateformes et la répression transnationale. Les tentatives de Pékin d'influencer les processus politiques canadiens ont été largement documentées dans le cadre d'une enquête publique, notamment lors des campagnes électorales fédérales de 2019 et 2021. En raison des restrictions imposées par la RPC à l'utilisation d'Internet, un écosystème parallèle d'applications parrainé par l'État a vu le jour, notamment le service de messagerie WeChat. En tant qu'application de prédilection de la population chinoise, WeChat est restée utilisée par les communautés de la diaspora pour garder le contact avec les membres de leur famille vivant sur le continent. En conséquence, l'application est devenue un outil efficace de répression de l'influence pour la RPC, utilisée dans des campagnes de diffamation contre plusieurs politiciens canadiens de premier plan et pour tenter d'interférer dans les élections. En s'appuyant sur cet appareil numérique largement adopté, les services de renseignement chinois ont pu mener des campagnes secrètes sur le sol étranger pour diffuser de la désinformation et faire taire les dissidents, en ciblant tout particulièrement la diaspora au Canada. Les cibles du harcèlement et de l'intimidation ont largement inclus des activistes prodémocratie et des droits des minorités qui critiquent vocalement le Parti communiste. En outre, le gouvernement du Canada s'est inquiété de l'éventualité d'une poursuite extralégale de dissidents par des agents de la RPC sur le sol canadien. Bien que l'impact des opérations de la RPC sur les élections canadiennes ait été minime en dehors des circonscriptions individuelles, on peut soutenir qu'il a affecté l'opinion publique et le discours politique. Par exemple, des allégations réfutées de trahison de parlementaires ont été utilisées par des politiciens canadiens pour attaquer des opposants et continuent de circuler sur les médias sociaux. Ainsi, bien que l'ingérence n'ait peut-être pas atteint son objectif premier, à savoir influencer les résultats électoraux, elle a contribué à ébranler dans une certaine mesure la confiance du public dans les personnalités politiques. Le Canada devrait donc accorder la priorité à l'élaboration de mesures de protection contre les actions chinoises lors des prochaines élections fédérales. République de l'Inde La stratégie suivie par l'Inde pour influencer les processus politiques canadiens présente de nombreuses caractéristiques communes avec celle de la RPC, notamment en ce qui concerne l'exploitation de la diaspora. Cependant, alors que la RPC cherche à s'ingérer à l'étranger au nom de la limitation, voire de l'écrasement, de la dissidence, la stratégie indienne vise plutôt à renforcer sa position mondiale et sa sécurité intérieure. Pour ce faire, elle cultive des liens avec des hommes politiques canadiens et cible des groupes nationalistes tels que le mouvement sikh du Khalistan. En tant que société fièrement multiculturelle, le Canada a une longue tradition politique d'ouverture aux minorités. Toutefois, la ligne de démarcation entre la sensibilisation et l'entretien est devenue floue ces dernières années, à mesure que la question de l'ingérence étrangère devenait de plus en plus controversée. Les hommes politiques ayant des liens avec la communauté sont souvent critiqués pour leurs opinions sur les politiques du gouvernement indien et doivent donc faire face à une opposition pro-Modi organisée. Par exemple, les allégations d'ingérence dans la course à la direction du Parti conservateur en 2022 étaient liées à un différend entre un candidat et le Premier ministre indien, Narendra Modi. Toutefois, l'aspect le plus controversé de la stratégie d'influence de l'Inde au Canada est son approche du mouvement du Khalistan. Le Canada, qui compte la plus grande population de sikhs en dehors de l'Inde, est le théâtre d'un activisme séparatiste qui reste un point de discorde dans les relations bilatérales. Les tensions ont atteint un point d'ébullition en 2023, lorsqu'un dirigeant nationaliste sikh a été assassiné sur le sol canadien par des ressortissants indiens prétendument liés au gouvernement de New Delhi. Cet événement s'inscrit dans la lignée des campagnes médiatiques anti-sikhs menées sur les réseaux sociaux de la diaspora, qui ont récemment attisé les tensions entre les Canadiens ayant des liens avec la région. Compte tenu du risque d'inflammation accrue des tensions sectaires et de soutien occulte à des candidats politiques, l'ingérence étrangère de l'Inde constitue une menace pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Éléments populistes aux États-Unis Le retour de Donald Trump dans le bureau ovale a provoqué l'apparition d'un fossé diplomatique entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Des accusations de pratiques commerciales déloyales aux ouvertures annexionnistes, les forces populistes aux États-Unis se sont attaquées au Canada dans leur réalignement de la politique étrangère américaine. Cela dit, il convient de noter que les efforts d'annexion n'ont pas eu beaucoup de succès et que la proposition reste impopulaire auprès de l'électorat américain. Cependant, l'existence d'une sphère médiatique populiste soutenant le président Trump présente un risque qui ne peut être ignoré, étant donné sa présence étendue sur de nombreuses plateformes de médias sociaux basées aux États-Unis et populaires au Canada. Ces dernières années, le populisme de droite aux États-Unis a tenté de faire des incursions dans l'environnement politique canadien, avec un succès modeste. Bien que les Canadiens ne se soient pas encore ralliés au président Trump lui-même, plusieurs mouvements politiques, dont la manifestation du Freedom Convoy de 2022, ont reçu le soutien manifeste de divers hommes politiques américains, y compris de M. Trump. Face à la réaction des forces de l'ordre canadiennes aux manifestations, certains partisans américains du convoi ont commencé à discuter activement de la « libération » du Canada par la force militaire. Les critiques intenses à l'encontre du gouvernement Trudeau se sont également poursuivies après l'acquisition, fin 2022, de la plateforme de médias sociaux Twitter (aujourd'hui X) par Elon Musk, qui a soutenu le convoi de manière véhémente. Dans l'environnement médiatique actuel, les populistes de droite américains amplifient leur rhétorique contre la souveraineté canadienne, cette fois avec le soutien tacite de l'exécutif. Par exemple, la démission du Premier ministre Justin Trudeau a offert à ces populistes une occasion unique de laisser entendre que les libéraux au pouvoir se préparent à voler les élections et à exacerber les tensions politiques. Alors que le Canada entame sa campagne électorale, il est clair que ce type de rhétorique ne fera que s'intensifier et que les décideurs politiques doivent immédiatement commencer à se préparer à une coercition accrue au sud de la frontière. De telles actions tenteront probablement de déstabiliser l'environnement électoral au Canada afin de forcer des concessions politiques. Impératifs politiques En concevant une réponse politique à l'ingérence étrangère, le gouvernement du Canada doit veiller à éviter la politisation et à prendre en compte le rôle des technologies émergentes. S'il ne le fait pas, la politique pourrait par inadvertance intensifier l'influence étrangère, en particulier parmi les groupes mécontents. Pour étayer ces craintes, l'examen des récentes élections en Roumanie et en Allemagne peut donner un aperçu de la manière dont les erreurs politiques peuvent être évitées. Roumanie : consolidation involontaire Bien que les principaux partis politiques roumains restent opposés à l'adhésion à Moscou, les mouvements pro-russes ont réussi à exploiter le sentiment anti-establishment. Plus récemment, l'annulation de l'élection présidentielle a illustré l'importance de la perception du public dans la gestion de la désinformation. Bénéficiant d'une campagne d'influence russe, le candidat indépendant Calin Georgescu a réussi à remporter 23 % des voix au premier tour, dans une surprise colossale, alors que la plupart des sondages s'attendaient à ce qu'il obtienne un résultat à un chiffre. En utilisant des plateformes de médias sociaux telles que TikTok et Telegram, Georgescu a mené une campagne réactionnaire qui mettait en avant diverses théories du complot et l'opposition à l'aide militaire ukrainienne. En outre, l'inspection des sources partagées sur ses profils de médias sociaux a révélé que de nombreux documents partagés par Georgescu étaient directement liés à des organes financés par le Kremlin. À la suite d'une enquête, la Cour constitutionnelle de Roumanie a officiellement annulé les résultats du premier tour le 2 décembre, citant des irrégularités financières dans la campagne de Georgescu. Cette décision a été accueillie par des manifestations de masse et condamnée même par l'opposante libérale de Georgescu au second tour, Elena Lasconi. En mars 2025, les autorités roumaines ont officiellement interdit à Georgescu de participer au nouveau tour des élections, ce qui a suscité de vives critiques de la part de ses partisans et a consolidé son soutien à d'autres partis politiques anti-establishment. En conséquence, on peut affirmer que les risques de désinformation en Roumanie ont augmenté. Tirant les leçons de cette affaire, les autorités canadiennes devraient veiller à ce que les partis politiques représentés puissent participer à l'avance à l'élaboration des politiques. Compte tenu de la polarisation actuelle de l'environnement politique, les accusations de partialité de la part des institutions publiques ne feront que diminuer la confiance dont elles jouissent de la part du public. En outre, comme l'a démontré l'affaire Georgescu, les mesures rétroactives visant à protéger les processus électoraux auront un effet catastrophique, accréditant les récits de désinformation. Par conséquent, gagner la confiance des parties prenantes représentées au Parlement devrait contribuer à minimiser la politisation de la sécurité des élections et le soutien viscéral aux agents étrangers accusés. Allemagne - Amplification par la technologie Les récentes élections en Allemagne offrent une étude de cas intéressante sur la manière dont les technologies perturbatrices, à savoir l'IA générative, jouent un rôle substantiel dans les campagnes d'influence étrangères. Bien que le soutien populiste américain à l'extrême droite ait été largement couvert, la prévalence des titres générés par l'IA et des médias visuels synthétiques pose un risque plus important pour l'intégrité des élections. L'utilisation de contenus d'information falsifiés pour influencer les élections n'est pas un phénomène nouveau. Toutefois, l'utilisation de ce type de contenu est devenue plus sophistiquée et plus efficace grâce aux outils d'intelligence artificielle et à la falsification des marques. Lors des élections allemandes, des initiatives soutenues par la Russie, telles que Doppelgänger, ont activement cloné l'image de marque et les profils d'organismes d'information de premier plan afin de diffuser de faux récits. En conséquence, de nombreux électeurs ont été exposés à des contenus présentant un vernis de crédibilité et accusant des hommes politiques de corruption et d'indécence, ce qui a donné un élan historique à des mouvements soutenus par l'étranger, tels que l'Alternative für Deutschland. Si l'interdiction des médias d'État s'est avérée efficace au Canada, la prévalence de ces vecteurs de désinformation sur le web pose un plus grand défi en termes de réglementation. Compte tenu de leur grande capacité de reproduction, il ne sera pas possible de les suivre à la trace ou d'en restreindre l'accès de manière efficace. Pour contrer cette tendance, les autorités canadiennes devraient s'attacher à renforcer le discernement de l'électorat en matière d'IA et à promouvoir l'éducation aux médias. Recommandations Campagnes de sensibilisation du public améliorées La première stratégie du gouvernement du Canada devrait consister à étendre ses campagnes de relations publiques existantes afin d'y intégrer des stratégies permettant de reconnaître les contenus générés par l'IA. En tant qu'arme émergente de désinformation utilisée par la Russie et la Chine, il est souhaitable que le public comprenne la technologie et ses traces pour résister à l'influence étrangère. Une campagne de mise à jour pourrait par exemple consister à diffuser côte à côte des vidéos standard et des images truquées afin de fournir aux citoyens un point de référence efficace leur permettant de faire la différence. Il est difficile de faire de même pour les sons générés par l'IA, mais la clarté du son et les changements de tonalité qui s'écartent de la parole naturelle peuvent le démontrer. En outre, la collaboration avec le secteur technologique, les établissements d'enseignement et les journalistes pourrait permettre de concevoir des campagnes qui touchent un large éventail de citoyens. Ces partenariats auraient également l'avantage de diversifier les canaux gouvernementaux, ce qui contribuerait à attirer les groupes démographiques mécontents. En favorisant un engagement et une sensibilisation maximums, l'électorat canadien peut renforcer sa protection contre la désinformation générée par l'IA. Renforcer les pouvoirs d'Élections Canada En tant que seule autorité chargée de statuer sur le processus électoral, il convient de confier toute autorité supplémentaire en matière de sécurité à Élections Canada, qui relève de la Chambre des communes. Responsable devant la Chambre des communes plutôt que devant le Premier ministre, ce rôle bénéficie d'un niveau unique de consentement populaire parmi les rôles bureaucratiques de l'État fédéral. En revanche, le fait de confier des pouvoirs centrés sur les élections à des organisations de sécurité nationale donnerait une impression d'autoritarisme et nuirait à la légitimité des politiques de sécurité électorale mises en place. En substance, Élections Canada devrait veiller à ce que la surveillance des processus démocratiques soit cohérente à tous les niveaux de gouvernement grâce à une coopération et une application accrues. Par exemple, la création d'un conseil entre les autorités électorales provinciales et Élections Canada faciliterait le partage des informations relatives à la sécurité électorale et permettrait un suivi à plus petite échelle que l'organisation fédérale pourrait ne pas être en mesure d'accomplir. En outre, l'approfondissement de la coopération avec le Centre d'analyse des déclarations d'opérations financières (CANAFE) en vue de détecter un éventuel financement illicite des campagnes électorales aiderait à déterminer si des acteurs étrangers allouent des ressources à des projets d'ingérence. D'autres avantages pourraient résulter de l'établissement d'une norme fédérale pour les processus internes des partis, garantissant une norme de sécurité commune et un système de vote pour les élections des dirigeants. Ce système pourrait être mis en place avec la participation des autorités provinciales, qui conserveraient les pouvoirs d'exécution sur leurs propres activités électorales. Mesures de cohésion civique Étant donné que plusieurs stratégies d'ingérence mettent l'accent sur l'exploitation de la politique de la diaspora, la stratégie poursuivie par le gouvernement devrait viser à consolider la tradition canadienne de multiculturalisme. Plus précisément, le gouvernement devrait adopter des mesures de coopération en consultation avec les groupes de la société civile et les médias de la diaspora basés au Canada. En contrant efficacement les messages de désinformation dans les sphères de la diaspora avec une présence pro-canadienne, la diversité de la population peut être considérée comme un facteur de protection plutôt que comme une vulnérabilité. La pierre angulaire de cette proposition de politique consiste à développer des communications stratégiques traduites, similaires au mécanisme de réaction rapide (MRR), dans la langue maternelle des communautés de la diaspora, afin de faciliter à la fois la sensibilisation et la participation démocratique. Cela peut aller de la publicité d'Élections Canada à la traduction, dans la langue des communautés ciblées, de campagnes d'information du public sur les risques de désinformation. Il peut s'agir de campagnes en mandarin ou en hindi, par exemple. L'utilisation de systèmes de traduction par IA générative pourrait faciliter la production par le gouvernement de ces publicités en temps réel, au fur et à mesure que de nouveaux récits s'imposent dans les sphères médiatiques. Enfin, il serait souhaitable d'établir un conseil d'engagement civique avec les leaders des communautés minoritaires et les organisations culturelles pour renforcer la promotion de l'identité pancanadienne et du multiculturalisme. Avec des antennes dans chaque province, la coordination des communications stratégiques pourrait être améliorée pour répondre à la menace de la désinformation au niveau local et étendre la couverture des campagnes en cours. ## Qu’est-ce que la dissuasion en zone grise ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quest-ce-que-la-dissuasion-en-zone-grise/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note politique passe en revue le concept de la zone grise, les principales préoccupations des conflits actuels en zone grise, les défis de la dissuasion en zone grise, et conclut par plusieurs moyens de dissuader les conflits en zone grise. Les types de conflits que les États cherchent à dissuader ont évolué depuis la guerre froide, présentant chaque fois de nouveaux défis. La théorie de la dissuasion est devenue populaire pendant la guerre froide, avec les capacités nucléaires dissuadant les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique de s'engager dans un conflit direct. Après la guerre froide, et surtout au début des années 2000 avec les guerres en Afghanistan et en Irak, les États occidentaux ont eu du mal à trouver comment dissuader les attaques terroristes, en particulier celles perpétrées par des acteurs non étatiques. Vers 2010, l'accent mis sur les opérations de contre-insurrection et de lutte contre le terrorisme à grande échelle a commencé à s'estomper, et l'attention s'est portée sur le retour de la rivalité entre les grandes puissances. La Russie, la Chine, l'Iran et la Corée du Nord ont accéléré le rythme auquel ils remettent en question l'ordre international fondé sur des règles, par des actions provocatrices et nocives qui ne franchissent cependant pas le seuil des actions de guerre. La plupart de leurs actions sont menées clandestinement dans le but de perturber l'hégémonie occidentale tout en évitant les actes ouverts qui pourraient entraîner des critiques ou des représailles. L'agression contre les pays occidentaux s'accroît et l'ambiguïté de ces menaces remet en question les concepts traditionnels de dissuasion. Alors que la théorie et les pratiques traditionnelles de dissuasion sont parfaitement assimilées, il existe un manque de consensus parmi les universitaires, les praticiens et le droit international sur ce qui constitue une agression ou une réponse appropriée en zone grise. L'absence de compréhension concrète de la zone grise rend plus difficile l'élaboration de théories et de politiques de dissuasion dans cette zone. Cette note politique passe en revue la littérature sur la théorie de la dissuasion, les définitions de ce qu'est et de ce que n'est pas la zone grise, les principales préoccupations des conflits actuels en zone grise, les défis de la dissuasion en zone grise, et conclut par plusieurs moyens de dissuader les conflits en zone grise. La théorie de la dissuasion Au fondement de la dissuasion, il y a la prévention de la guerre. Elle ne constitue pas une solution à long terme à un environnement de sécurité hostile, mais repose sur une approche fondée sur la menace pour convaincre les États rivaux qu'une action agressive n'est pas dans leur intérêt. La dissuasion peut être conceptualisée de plusieurs façons. La première consiste à dissuader les États par l’interdiction ou par la punition. La dissuasion par interdiction se produit lorsqu'un État dispose de capacités considérables qu'une attaque ennemie ne serait pas en mesure de surmonter ou dont l'impact serait considérablement réduit ou retardé. La dissuasion par la punition se produit lorsqu'un État agresseur choisit de ne pas attaquer parce qu'il croit que même s'il atteint son objectif, il serait soumis à une punition, telle que des sanctions ou une contre-attaque, qui serait plus coûteuse que ce qu'il a gagné lors de l'attaque initiale. Dans le scénario parfait, les capacités de défense d'un État seraient suffisamment fortes pour atteindre les deux objectifs, mais ce n'est pas le cas pour de nombreux États. Une façon alternative, mais complémentaire, de conceptualiser la dissuasion est de la concevoir comme une pyramide. La dissuasion nucléaire se situe au sommet de la pyramide, suivie de la répression par les forces armées et la puissance dure traditionnelle. Vient ensuite la dissuasion par interdiction. Enfin, il y a la dissuasion étendue, où un État est capable de dissuader les menaces parce qu'un ou plusieurs autres États le défendent. L'article 5 de l'OTAN est un excellent exemple de dissuasion étendue. Malheureusement, la dissuasion nucléaire, la dissuasion par la punition et même la dissuasion étendue ont un effet limité lorsqu'il est difficile de déterminer la nature des attaques étrangères dans la zone grise. Qu’est-ce que la zone grise ? Les actions en zone grise sont souvent qualifiées de manière interchangeable de guerre « hybride » ou « non conventionnelle ». Un conflit de zone grise désigne toute confrontation qui dépasse la compétition standard et diplomatique, mais qui ne franchit pas le seuil de la guerre. Il s'agit de la zone située entre la guerre et la paix. Ce type de conflit se manifeste dans divers domaines tels que l'économie, les finances, le cyberespace, la politique et autres, là où le conflit conventionnel est axé sur l'utilisation stratégique de la violence. Il peut également être mené par des États, des acteurs non étatiques ou des intermédiaires. Les conflits de zone grise peuvent intégrer des approches conventionnelles et non conventionnelles. Les attaques de zone grise sont souvent intentionnellement dissimulées, ce qui rend difficile l'attribution de la responsabilité, et elles sont généralement juste en dessous du seuil justifiant une réponse militaire. Ainsi, la dissuasion conventionnelle ne fonctionne pas lorsqu'on ne sait pas clairement qui a mené l'attaque, quelle était l'intention de l'attaque et à quel moment une attaque dépasse la zone grise et est suffisamment dommageable pour justifier une réponse violente. Zone grise vs guerre hybride Malgré le chevauchement conceptuel de la « zone grise » et de la « guerre hybride », elles ne sont pas synonymes. La guerre hybride est l'utilisation combinée de tactiques conventionnelles et non conventionnelles qui dépassent le seuil de la guerre. Certaines des tactiques hybrides utilisées, telles que la désinformation, peuvent se situer dans la zone grise. Les conflits de la zone grise sont uniquement les tactiques qui ne franchissent pas la ligne d'une agression formalisée au niveau de l'État. La guerre hybride se concentre sur les événements au niveau tactique, tandis que la zone grise englobe les considérations stratégiques à long terme des compétitions internationales. La figure 1 de Frank G. Hoffman fournit une représentation visuelle du spectre des conflits et montre clairement la différence entre la zone grise et la guerre hybride, où les deux relèvent du spectre des conflits dans la guerre non conventionnelle. C'est pourquoi les tactiques d'agression non conventionnelles sont souvent discutées comme un moyen de conflit de zone grise et de guerre hybride. Agressions contemporaines en zone grise Le conflit de zone grise est devenu un sujet d'intérêt principalement en raison des actions de la Russie, de la Chine, de l'Iran et de la Corée du Nord au cours des dix dernières années. Ces quatre États ont utilisé la désinformation et se sont engagés dans des cyberattaques par le biais de pirates informatiques et d’intermédiaires pour pénétrer les systèmes de sécurité et causer des dommages de faible niveau. La Russie et la Chine ont toutes deux procédé à des expansions territoriales graduelles, mais par des moyens différents. En 2014, la Russie a utilisé la désinformation pour aggraver les tensions en Crimée, ce qui a conduit à son annexion. En 2015 et 2016, un pirate informatique lié au Kremlin, Sandworm, a contaminé les services publics ukrainiens avec des logiciels malveillants et a privé d'électricité des milliers d'Ukrainiens. En 2017, la Russie a également été liée à un virus qui a rendu le système informatique de Maersk, une compagnie maritime danoise, inutilisable pendant une semaine, entraînant des pertes de 300 millions de dollars. Cela s'ajoute à d'innombrables cas de désinformation et de contrôle des médias visant les alliances occidentales et les opérations de l'OTAN. La stratégie est qualifiée de « simmering borscht », où la Russie tente d'étendre son influence sans provoquer une réaction occidentale. Depuis 2014, la Chine a construit des bases sur des îles de la mer de Chine du Sud afin d'étendre et de consolider ses revendications territoriales. Le comportement de la Chine a été qualifié de « tactique du salami » : elle érode lentement l'ordre et les normes internationales, divise les alliances et tente d'affirmer son interprétation préférée des lois internationales existantes. L'utilisation par la Chine de la sécurité maritime et des pêcheries pour étendre son contrôle sur la mer de Chine du Sud par des actes d'agression délibérés et indéniables est l'exemple parfait du conflit de zone grise. Les liens entre les entreprises chinoises et le gouvernement se sont également avérés être un point de conflit de zone grise avec Huawei, ce qui a suscité des inquiétudes parmi le Groupe des cinq. Les tensions avec la Chine ont contribué à une confrontation par la détention, le Canada détenant la cadre Meng Wanzhou et la Chine détenant les Canadiens Michael Kovrig et Michael Spavor. Bien que l'Iran et la Corée du Nord ne soient pas reconnus comme des acteurs clés dans la compétition entre grandes puissances, ils sont connus pour l'augmentation de l'agression en zone grise par des actions politiques, économiques, cybernétiques et militaires depuis 2016. Les défis de la dissuasion en zone grise Le paradoxe du conflit en zone grise est qu'il est plus saillant lorsque la guerre ouverte est dissuadée avec succès. C'est également pourquoi les conflits en zone grise étaient fréquents pendant la guerre froide. Le premier défi est que la zone grise est intrinsèquement ambiguë, et que la dissuasion, en particulier la dissuasion par la punition, dépend de réponses clairement définies à des attaques identifiables. Les attaques contre la société civile et qui se situent en dessous du seuil de l'article 5 de l'OTAN ne permettent pas de savoir si la solution doit être des actions militaires d'État à État. En outre, la dissuasion traditionnelle est basée sur des attaques directes et violentes, visant généralement des infrastructures militaires, ou entraînant des violences directes contre les civils. Pourtant, les dommages causés aux réseaux électriques et cybernétiques risquent d'être tout aussi dommageables. Une interruption prolongée de l'alimentation électrique et de la cyberinfrastructure pourrait entraîner la perte de vies humaines dans le cas des hôpitaux, du contrôle du trafic et de la sécurité alimentaire, et peut provoquer des pertes financières importantes lorsque les économies sont paralysées.  Une cyber-attaque récente contre une installation d'approvisionnement en eau en Floride démontre la vulnérabilité des services essentiels du secteur public. Les cyberattaques sont particulièrement difficiles à décourager parce qu'elles sont menées aussi bien par des acteurs au niveau de l'État, des groupes non étatiques et des individus, ce qui rend difficiles la recherche et l'attribution des responsabilités en temps réel. Elles visent également les secteurs privé et civil plus fréquemment que les agressions militaires classiques, ce qui nécessite une coordination entre le groupe attaqué et leurs services de sécurité nationaux. Les États démocratiques qui choisissent de respecter l'ordre international fondé sur des règles sont désavantagés lorsqu'il s'agit de conflits en zone grise. Des États comme la Russie, la Chine, l'Iran et la Corée du Nord ont des gouvernements très centralisés qui sont capables et disposés à recourir à la propagande, à prendre pour cible des entités civiles, à repousser les limites des normes juridiques et à utiliser des moyens non étatiques à leur avantage par rapport aux États de type libéral démocratique. Les États agresseurs utilisent à leur avantage l'engagement des États démocratiques envers les normes internationales et les processus d'approbation bureaucratiques pour exercer des représailles, réduisant ainsi l'impact de la dissuasion par la punition. Les États démocratiques se trouvent dans une situation difficile en raison de ces procédures bureaucratiques et de l'importance du contrôle civil de l'armée qui protègent les valeurs centrales de leur identité libérale. Ce à quoi ressemble la dissuasion dans la zone grise Ce n'est pas parce que la dissuasion est plus complexe dans la zone grise qu'elle n'a aucune valeur. Les politiciens et les universitaires doivent être conscients des limites de la dissuasion dans la zone grise et savoir comment adapter leurs approches stratégiques. Des lignes directrices clairement définies pour les actes d'agression, en particulier dans le cas du cyberespace, mais aussi des critères de recours à l’escalade de la force pour les attaques non militaires, peuvent contribuer à la dissuasion en zone grise par la punition. Dans le cas d'une agression conventionnelle en zone grise, les forces de réaction rapide sont l'un des meilleurs moyens de dissuasion de puissance dure dans lesquels l'Occident pourrait investir davantage. Dans le cas de l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie – où des forces paramilitaires et militaires camouflées ont été utilisées – des troupes rapidement déployables auraient augmenté les risques d'agir pour la Russie et elles auraient été capables de réagir plus rapidement à la seconde où la Russie aurait franchi la ligne de démarcation entre la zone grise et la guerre hybride. En ce qui concerne le cyberespace, des cyberattaques de représailles ou même le recours à l'armée lorsqu'une ligne est franchie pourraient être des moyens efficaces. Le lien entre la cybersécurité et les réponses militaires conventionnelles est mal défini, ce qui présente une fenêtre d'ambiguïté et une opportunité pour les attaquants. En outre, le secret entourant les cybercapacités offensives nuit à leur valeur dissuasive, car la dissuasion conventionnelle repose en partie sur une démonstration de force permettant à l'ennemi de comprendre les conséquences potentielles de ses actions. La dissuasion par interdiction semble toutefois être la voie la plus fortement préconisée pour améliorer la dissuasion dans les zones grises. Il s'agit d'abord de favoriser les investissements et la formation en matière de cybersécurité afin d'atténuer la vulnérabilité aux attaques. La deuxième partie de la dissuasion en zone grise par interdiction est la résilience, c'est-à-dire la résilience de la cyberinfrastructure, mais aussi de la société. Lors du sommet de Varsovie de 2016, l'OTAN a présenté sept exigences de base en matière de préparation civile : Assurer la continuité du gouvernement et des services gouvernementaux essentiels ; Un approvisionnement énergétique résilient ; La capacité à gérer efficacement les mouvements incontrôlés de personnes ; Des ressources alimentaires et en eau résilientes ; La capacité à faire face à des pertes massives de vies humaines ; Des systèmes civils de communication résilients ; Des systèmes civils de transport résilients. Recommandations pour le Canada Le Canada a régulièrement employé des méthodes de guerre hybride lors de ses interventions au sein d'États fragiles, même si cela n'est pas qualifié de cette façon. Les interventions du Canada font appel à la coopération civile et militaire ainsi qu'à des éléments économiques et politiques qui impliquent la formation, l'interaction et l'influence des forces de sécurité, des politiciens et du public. Les États démocratiques comme le Canada ont tendance à être performants face aux menaces immédiates pour la sécurité, mais à éprouver des difficultés lorsque vient le temps de faire face aux menaces de la zone grise qui se situent en dessous du seuil et qui ne suscitent pas l'inquiétude du public qui conduirait à l'action politique. Bien que le Canada ne soit pas en guerre, le public ne sait pas que le Canada est quotidiennement la cible d'attaques de zone grise contre son cyberespace, son système d'information publique, son armée et même contre son territoire physique. Le Canada doit élargir son engagement volontaire et stratégique dans la guerre hybride et se prémunir contre les menaces de la zone grise. La première étape pour renforcer la défense canadienne contre les conflits de la zone grise est de les comprendre. La littérature montre que nous avons besoin d'une définition plus claire de la zone grise et de la manière dont les États doivent y répondre. Cela devrait être soutenu par des organisations comme l'OTAN. Le Canada et ses alliés doivent comprendre ce qu'ils dissuadent, où ils fixent la limite des actions agressives et comment ils vont réagir. Le Canada, pour des raisons domestiques, doit clairement définir et tracer une démarcation de la zone grise d'agression. Le Canada doit également travailler au sein de l'OTAN pour établir un consensus sur les types d'attaques auxquelles l'alliance répondra en vertu de l'article 5, et sur la manière dont l'alliance entend réagir lorsqu'un acte d'agression ne franchit pas le seuil de la guerre. L'un des aspects les plus importants de la dissuasion par la punition est une réaction rapide. Le Canada doit continuer à s'assurer que ses militaires sont à la hauteur d'une réaction rapide lorsqu'un acte d'agression dépasse la zone grise. Il existe un écart plus important dans les capacités cybernétiques offensives ou de représailles du Canada. Le Canada devrait développer ses capacités de cybersécurité et de défense pour mener des contre-attaques – une façon de riposter par les mêmes moyens, et de demeurer dans la zone grise. Enfin, la manière la plus pacifique et la plus rassurante de protéger les Canadiens des agressions de la zone grise est par l’interdiction et la résilience. Comme les conflits en zone grise peuvent viser n'importe qui, la partie critique et difficile de l’interdiction et de la résilience est qu'ils nécessitent un engagement important de la population générale et du secteur privé. Le gouvernement canadien devra réglementer davantage et surtout promouvoir des normes plus élevées en matière de cybersécurité et d'infrastructures résilientes dans les secteurs public et privé. La gestion des crises devra se faire entre les ministres du cabinet et les PDG. Il sera également important de mener des campagnes d'éducation auprès du public sur la manière de détecter la désinformation et les cybervulnérabilités. Les conflits dans la zone grise nécessitent une approche par la société dans son ensemble pour une dissuasion efficace et pour éviter que l'agression sorte de la zone grise et qu'une guerre ouverte se déclenche. ## Quatre observations sur la Guerre russo-ukrainienne et ses perspectives de paix URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quatre-observations-sur-la-guerre-russo-ukrainienne-et-ses-perspectives-de-paix/ Modified: 2026-03-24 Ce texte est un compte-rendu d'une intervention tenue lors de la conférence 4 ans de guerre en Ukraine : Quelles perspectives de paix pour la sécurité transatlantique ? tenue le 23 février 2026 à l'UQAM. En dépit de tractations diplomatiques presque constantes, l’année 2025 ne nous aura pas rapproché d’une paix – loin de là. Par contre, elle nous a permis de clarifier un certain nombre de points majeurs. Commençons d’abord avec la guerre comme telle. Nous entendions l’été dernier le discours que l’avancée russe sur le front de l’Est était inexorable. Poutine l’a répété par la suite : ou bien vous nous donner le reste du Donbass, ou bien nous allons le prendre par les armes. Et pourtant, l’armée a beau avoir grugé un 10% supplémentaire de la superficie de la province de Donetsk au cours de la dernière année (pour un total de 78%), la ville de Pokrovsk – population de 60,000 avant 2022 — tient  toujours. Elle devait pourtant tomber à l’été 2024. Les villes fortifiées de Kramatorsk et Sloviansk – ironiquement, le berceau de l’insurrection séparatiste de 2014, mais reprises alors après 3 mois de siège –semblent encore loin du danger immédiat. Bien entendu, la guerre n’est pas linéaire et personne ne peut prédire son dénouement, mais l’horizon d’un effondrement du front ukrainien similaire à la débandade allemande sur le front de l’ouest en 1918 semble hautement improbable. La technologie de la guerre ne cesse de changer. Il y a deux ans, le problème le plus grave nous apparaissait comme étant l’asymétrie dans les capacités d’artillerie, la Russie atteignant parfois un avantage de 10 pour 1. Mais l’Europe, en s’approvisionnant en partie de stocks à travers le monde, est parvenue à largement combler ce désavantage ukrainien. L’an dernier, les carences du recrutement ukrainien étaient au premier plan. La situation reste toute aussi critique—le nouveau et très jeune ministre de la défense a révélé des chiffres ahurissants le mois dernier (2 millions d’Ukrainiens qui préfèrent se cacher plutôt qu’aller au front), mais il reste que la suprématie des drones de surveillance a pris le dessus sur l’infériorité numérique des soldats ukrainiens. En termes brutaux, moins il y a de soldats ukrainiens sur la ligne de front, plus il y a de soldats russes qui périssent. La première leçon de 2025 est donc que l’avancée russe sur le front de l’Est n’est pas inexorable. Puisque le front tient, alors la stratégie russe fut d’accentuer les attaques contre les civils. Il y a deux façons de s’en prendre aux civils. La première est de les attaquer directement par des bombardements aériens, comme la Russie l’a fait à Grozny dans les années 90, à Alep en 2015 ou à Marioupol au tout début de la guerre de 2022. Dans chaque cas, les pertes civiles ont été considérables. Mais à l’exception de Marioupol, les avions russes ont cessé très rapidement en 2022 de survoler l’espace aérien ukrainien, de peur de se faire abattre. La Russie a eu recours à l’artillerie pour pilonner les villes proches du front, transformant ainsi en champs de ruines toutes les villes du Donbas qu’elle a capturé ou assiégé – Bakhmout, Avdiivka et Pokrovsk parmi tant d’autres. La deuxième façon est de viser les infrastructures civiles. Pour Kyiv et les grandes villes à travers l’Ukraine, elle cherche, on le sait, à anéantir le réseau hydro-électrique pour ainsi profiter de l’hiver glacial. L’idée est de briser la résistance citoyenne, la forcer à mettre pression sur ses élites afin qu’ils mettent fin à la guerre à tout prix et acceptent les conditions russes. Il s’agit cependant d’une illusion. Les historiens vous diront que ça ne fonctionne jamais. Une armée peut décider de ne plus se battre–on l’a vu en Afghanistan en 2021 et en Syrie en 2024–mais s’attaquer aux civils tend à produire l’effet contraire. Je ne sais pas personnellement comment les Ukrainiens font pour endurer à répétition de longues pannes de courant à moins 20 degrés dehors, mais je sais que dans l’agrégat, sur la base de sondages crédibles, à la question “Combien de temps pouvez-vous tenir ?” trois Ukrainiens sur quatre répondent “Aussi longtemps que possible”. Malgré les attaques presque quotidiennes de drones et de missiles sur leurs villes. La proportion était à peine plus élevée il y a quatre ans. Probablement parce que l’alternative est pire : les Ukrainiens savent ce qui se passe dans les territoires occupés et les prisons russes – ou ce qui s’est passé à Boutcha en 2022. Deuxième clarification : la détermination ukrainienne ne craque pas. Et ce malgré les lourdes pertes militaires visibles dans chaque agglomération d’Ukraine, avec le flot continu de funérailles et de blessés graves revenant du front. Zelensky a récemment donné le chiffre de 55,000 morts, mais il apparaît maintenant probable que le bilan est au moins trois fois plus élevé. Une ONG ukrainienne a identifié, notices biographiques à l’appui, près de 100,000 soldats ayant péri depuis 2022, et près d’un autre 100,000 qui portés disparus, dont une forte proportion sont probablement décédés. La comparaison avec la première guerre du Donbas, celle de 2014-2021, est saisissante. Le nombre de soldats ukrainiens alors tués se chiffrait à un peu plus de 4,000. C’est donc entre 35 et 40 fois plus depuis 4 ans. Le nombre de morts du côté russe est beaucoup plus élevé, bien que pas nécessairement au pro rata de la population. Sur le plan de la géopolitique, l’année 2025 aura provoqué trois changements majeurs. Le premier a été l’arrêt complet de l’aide militaire et économique des États-Unis vers l’Ukraine – bien que l’Europe, en partenariat avec le Canada et d’autres pays non-européens, peut acheter des armes américaines et les envoyer en Ukraine. Le deuxième est la prise de conscience choc des pays de l’OTAN, le Canada inclus, qu’ils ne peuvent plus compter sur les États-Unis pour les défendre. Le résultat est une hausse massive des budgets de défense, un virage qui aura un impact majeur sur la guerre en Ukraine, mais pas à court terme. Le troisième changement est une rupture américaine avec les valeurs qui sous-tendent l’alliance occidentale. La plus fondamentale est l’idée que l’individu ou le citoyen a des droits face au souverain, face à l’État. Qu’il ne peut être arrêté arbitrairement et qu’il a droit à la vie. C’est le Bill of Rights anglais, devenu les droits humains. Ce qu’on appelle le droit international repose sur cette idée cardinale. Ainsi que sur le principe, depuis la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, qu’un État ne peut unilatéralement changer les frontières d’un autre État. L’invasion de l’Ukraine de 2022 bafoue ces deux principes en cherchant à détruire un État, qui est aussi une démocratie. Troisième clarification de 2025 : l’administration de Trump 2.0 est indifférente à ces deux principes de base. Dans son discours à la Conférence de Munich, le secrétaire d’État Rubio ne les a pas mentionné une seule fois. Sur le plan des négociations, la quatrième clarification est qu’en fait il n’y a pas eu de véritables négociations. Les Russes et les Américains se parlent, les Ukrainiens et les Américains se parlent, mais les Russes et les Ukrainiens ne se parlent pas. Par cela j’entends que les délégations russes aux rencontres bilatérales avec la partie ukrainienne n’ont jamais le mandat de discuter de questions politiques. Lorsque la délégation est menée par le propagandiste Vladimir Medinsky, alors le mandat est d’imposer des conditions et de donner des leçons de pseudo-histoire. Lorsque des militaires sont envoyés, c’est pour échanger sur les modalités d’un retrait unilatéral de l’armée ukrainienne du Donbass. Poutine ne veut pas négocier, surtout pas avec les Ukrainiens, et encore moins avec les Européens. Il faut comprendre que les fameuses “causes profondes du conflit”, que nous martèle la Russie depuis décembre 2021, trouvent leur source dans le refus par la coalition occidentale de redonner à la Russie son statut de puissance égale aux États-Unis. C’est pourquoi tout sommet entre Zelensky et Moscou apparaît illusoire. La Russie ne veut négocier qu’avec les États-Unis, par-dessus la tête de l’Europe et très certainement des Ukrainiens, et prétend même avoir obtenu un accord cet été dans ce qu’elle appelle “l’esprit d’Anchorage”, en référence au sommet d’Alaska entre Poutine et Trump en août 2025. Un retrait du Donbas ne pourrait-il pas mener à une cessation des combats ? Il y a l’argument militaire : l’Ukraine perdrait ses fortifications, son front serait dégarni, exposant Kharkiv et le centre du pays. Il y a le précédent historique : Poutine a pris la Crimée sans conséquences véritables et en 2022 il s’en est pris au pays en entier. Mais il y a aussi, et peut-être surtout, le principe. Si l’Ukraine acceptait de se retirer, le fondement qu’un État ne peut changer les frontières d’un autre État par la force deviendrait légalement bafoué. De surcroît, l’Ukraine accepterait, au terme d’une négociation politique, de condamner des centaines de milliers de ces citoyens à l’arbitraire du pouvoir russe. Ce qui est en jeu n’est pas seulement une question de territoire, le 25% restant du Donbas, mais le double principe qui anime en fait toute la résistance des Ukrainiens, soit leur droit national de vivre dans leur État, et leur droit citoyen face à l’État. Ces principes sont ceux de l’Europe et du monde libre, et leur violation aurait des conséquences très dangereuses pour la sécurité mondiale. Ils ont été abandonnés par l’administration américaine depuis le retour de Trump, mais ils restent fondamentaux. Les perspectives de paix sont-elles pour autant complètement bloquées ? Il est difficile d’entrevoir à court terme une percée diplomatique. La grande crainte de 2025 était que les États-Unis abandonnent l’Ukraine. Dans un sens, cela s’est déjà produit, avec l’aide militaire réduit à néant, et le choix de prioriser les systèmes et munitions de défense anti-aérienne sur le front moyen-oriental. Mais Trump, bien que toujours fasciné par Poutine, ne voit pas moins la Russie comme un adversaire sur le plan énergétique. D’où les sanctions contre les grands exportateurs de pétrole russe et aussi le rôle du renseignement de la CIA pour aider les Ukrainiens à mieux cibler les raffineries de pétrole et des usines militaires profondément en territoire russe. Trump met régulièrement Zelensky sous pression d’accepter l’inacceptable, mais il faut reconnaître qu’il a augmenté la pression envers la Russie là où ça fait le plus mal, soit l’exportation du pétrole servant à financer l’effort de guerre.[1] La Russie ne veut pas négocier, mais elle a depuis quatre ans adapté sa stratégie en fonction des réalités du terrain. Elle s’est retirée du front de Kyiv, puis de la province de Kharkiv et de la ville de Kherson en 2022. Elle a retiré ses navires de guerre du port de Sévastopol en 2023. À chaque fois, ce fut parce que la situation militaire l’imposait. Cela n’est pas encore produit sur le front du sud-est. Les chances qu’un tel dénouement survienne en 2026 ne sont pas de l’ordre de zéro. La Russie nous a révélé qu’elle a perdu une grande partie de sa capacité de projeter son pouvoir sur d’autres continents, comme en Syrie, en Iran, et au Venezuela. Reste à savoir si cela peut se transposer sur le front ukrainien. Un cessez-le-feu deviendrait possible quand et si la Russie en venait à réaliser que son option militaire est neutralisée. Mais comme Poutine vivait dans une bulle en 2022 où il croyait que les Ukrainiens ne résisteraient pas, tout porte à croire, dans le système ultra-opaque de la Russie, qu’il vit toujours dans une bulle coupée de la réalité. Les dictatures ont cependant ceci de particulier que tout ce qui apparaît immuable peut se mettre à changer très rapidement. L’impasse actuelle pourrait bien ne pas durer. À propos de l'auteur Dominique Arel, politologue, est titulaire de la chaire d'études ukrainiennes à l'université d'Ottawa (Canada) et le président de l'Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN). [1] Ces sanctions ont été suspendues depuis le début de la guerre en Iran. Crédit image: Ministère de la défense de l'Ukraine, CC-BY-SA 2.0 via Flickr. ## Quel avenir pour l’intervention française au Sahel ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quel-avenir-pour-lintervention-francaise-au-sahel/ Modified: 2022-07-05 > Face à ce rythme de recomposition de l’ordre régional, la France doit trouver sa voie pour poursuivre la lutte contre le terrorisme afin de Le conflit au Sahel est-il en voie de devenir un énième échec de la guerre totale contre le terrorisme ? Après des mois d’invectives, le couperet est finalement tombé, la perte de confiance réciproque a donné lieu au divorce entre Paris et Bamako. La nouvelle junte malienne aura franchi l’ensemble des lignes rouges fixées par le gouvernement français qui optait déjà, au-delà du narratif sur la transformation, pour un désengagement militaire progressif à l’horizon 2023. Entre l’alternance politique par le putsch, la confiscation du pouvoir par les élites militaires ou encore la prolifération des activités de nuisance de la nébuleuse islamiste, le Mali et plus largement le Sahel, sont en proie à une crise sécuritaire doublée d’une instabilité politique chronique. Face au chaos politique et dans un contexte d’enlisement sécuritaire, la France et ses alliés viennent d’annoncer officiellement un retrait coordonné du Mali. Lassée par la présence de l’opération française dont le tropisme contre-terroriste a vite montré ses limites, la junte militaire malienne exacerbe les sentiments anti-français pour pousser l’ancienne puissance coloniale vers la sortie. C’est chose faite. Désormais pour diversifier ses alliances et au risque de perdre ses partenaires traditionnels, Bamako se tourne vers la société de mercenariat Wagner, le pistolet sans matricule du Kremlin. Face à ce rythme de recomposition de l’ordre régional, la France doit trouver sa voie pour poursuivre la lutte contre le terrorisme afin de prolonger son implication militaire dans la bande sahélienne. Comprendre les erreurs stratégiques qui ont été commises par la France, en tant que nation-cadre de l’alliance militaire internationale, permettra de mieux définir les nouveaux paramètres possibles pour l’établissement d’un dispositif militaire ravivant l’élan stratégique de sa mission dans la sous-région. Un bilan terni par l’échec de la stabilisation du Sahel Le président Emmanuel Macron a précisé lors du sommet de l’Union africaine qu’il ne transigerait pas durant cette période de transition de quatre à six mois sur la sécurité des forces françaises en présence. Toutefois, plus de neuf ans après le début des opérations françaises au Mali, Paris est sommé par les autorités de Bamako de quitter le territoire sans délai. Accueillis en 2013 en libérateurs, les militaires français sont désormais chassés du Mali. Alors que la rupture est scellée, le revers est de taille pour le gouvernement français qui tente de sauver les mérites de son implication militaire. Efforts difficiles lorsque les violences à l’encontre des civils ont augmenté de 25% entre avril et juin 2021 alors que le dispositif militaire français était pleinement opérationnel. En amont des élections présidentielles françaises, le président Emmanuel Macron récuse l’idée d’un échec de l’opération Barkhane. Après la fin de la troisième respiration européenne pour lutter contre le djihadisme au Sahel, le porte-parole du Mouvement du 5 juin - Rassemblement des forces patriotiques (M5-RFP), dont est issu le premier ministre de transition malien, pointe l’absence de résultats concrets qui atteste selon lui de la faillite de l’opération française dans le pays. Éradiquer en vain la lame de fond djihadiste Les fondements mêmes de l’opération Barkhane peuvent fournir les indices qui ont conduit l’armée française au bourbier stratégique de laquelle elle parvient aujourd’hui à se défaire. En 2013, l’opération Serval reposait sur des objectifs précis et crédibles, à savoir enrayer la percée djihadiste dans le nord du Mali et reprendre le contrôle de Kidal, Gao et Tombouctou tout en évitant une prise de la capitale. L’euphorie après cette réussite stratégique a conduit les autorités françaises à définir les contours ambitieux du nouveau dispositif militaire. Beaucoup plus floue, l’opération Barkhane avait pour but de contenir la menace terroriste qui s’est désormais régionalisée tout en renforçant l’appareil sécuritaire des pays du G5 Sahel. Fort de cette approche multidimensionnelle et coopérative, les succès tactiques se sont succédé grâce à l’élimination de plusieurs leaders d’Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) tandis que l’ancrage de ces groupes armés terroristes (GAT) a pu être freiné un temps. La territorialisation des groupes djihadistes a été évitée, mais dans une région où il existe une couverture inégale des forces de sécurité de l’État malien, l’ancrage politique, économique et social de l’hydre islamiste n’a pas été mis à mal par l’assassinat de ces cibles clefs. L’attractivité de ces groupes ne peut être pleinement appréhendée par l’approche contre-terroriste. Les dynamiques communautaires antérieures au conflit ont été occultées par l’armée française conduisant à une erreur d’analyse stratégique de taille. Les conflits intra et intercommunautaires, les logiques claniques et familiales ou encore le système d’allégeance statutaire sont intrinsèquement liés à la montée de la radicalisation et offrent des leviers de recrutements pour les GAT. La guerre contre le terrorisme est structurante. Elle induit des paramètres qui constituent des œillères pour le gouvernement français qui peine à saisir l’ensemble des dynamiques locales. Puisque la guerre est un phénomène politique et le terrorisme l’un de ces variants qui brouille le temps de paix ou de conflit, il parait inconcevable de parvenir à éradiquer la montée de l’extrémisme violent seulement grâce à des victoires militaires, qui se sont certes multipliées pour l’armée française. L’outil militaire se doit de soutenir une approche politique holistique axée sur la résolution de conflits. Le délaissement des problèmes de gouvernance Le délitement des États post-indépendance, dans lequel s’inscrit le Mali, et leurs nombreux échecs sur le volet sécuritaire ou encore sur la difficulté d’approfondir les processus démocratiques ont nourri la remise en cause de ces modèles de gouvernance. La dépendance au sentier militaire et la situation économique désastreuse constituent un terreau fertile à la fois pour la multiplication des putsch, mais aussi pour l’instauration d’une zone d’influence des GAT qui proposent une alternative politique afin d’assurer des services minimums et de protéger les civils délaissés par le gouvernement central. L’incapacité à sécuriser les populations offre aux coups d’État successifs un large soutien populaire, à l’instar du Mali qui en a connu deux en moins d’un an, tandis que les faiblesses structurelles de l’État renforcent une spirale de violence profitable aux GAT. Afin d’enrayer cette dynamique cyclique, l’armée française a opté pour une stratégie contre-insurrectionnelle qui vise à sécuriser des espaces stratégiques dans le but d’instaurer des solutions politiques pour transformer les succès tactiques en victoires politiques. D’une part, en dépit du bilan militaire annuel positif, cette trame instaure une logique de guerre perpétuelle. D’autre part, par crainte d’être accusé d’ingérence étrangère, Paris a commis l’erreur de ne pas faire de state building et de confier ce processus aux autorités maliennes qui ne disposent ni des moyens financiers ni de la volonté politique pour s’attaquer aux causes sous-jacentes du conflit. L’externalisation de la militarisation de la région peut conforter certaines élites corrompues et attentistes qui n’actionnent pas les réformes nécessaires, notamment issues de l’accord d’Alger de 2015, pour le rétablissement de l’autorité gouvernementale et la refondation du tissu social malien. Les faiblesses structurelles de l’État malien et la résistance à la réforme qui en découle font de l’intervention française un dispositif militaire inopérant. Le président français a répété que « la France ne peut pas se substituer au retour de l'État et à la stabilité politique ». Le problème de gouvernance global ne peut pas être combattu par les armes. L’armée française lutte en vain contre une menace disparate que constituent les groupes terroristes. Un rapport de l’ONU pointe également la responsabilité des militaires maliens dans l’augmentation de la violence et les nombreux abus qui rongent ses rangs. « Ces trois dernières années, les victimes civiles liées au terrorisme au Sahel représentent entre 30 et 40% de la totalité des victimes, les autres sont tuées par les milices d’autodéfense et la répression menée par les armées nationales ». Ce phénomène manifeste avec éclat les défaillances de l’appareil sécuritaire malien. L’un des piliers de l’opération Barkhane et de la mission de formation de l'Union européenne au Mali (EUTM Mali) fut d’entrainer, de conseiller et de renforcer les forces armées maliennes (FAMa) et plus largement les forces conjointes du G5 Sahel en vue de leur autonomisation pour une appropriation de leur propre sécurité. Après des années de formation, l’armée malienne semble toujours incapable de constituer une force crédible capable de juguler la menace djihadiste. Ne voulant pas s’atteler à une réforme du secteur de la sécurité nécessaire pour abandonner le clientélisme et la cooptation qui sclérosent l’appareil sécuritaire malien, l’État français injecta de nombreuses liquidités dans des programmes de soutien souvent déconnectés des réalités sur le terrain pour la construction d’une réelle institution militaire. Les entraves furent nombreuses pour le renforcement des capacités militaires maliennes, notamment la difficulté de concilier les factions rivales et les divergences profondes qui se sont creusées entre les acteurs maliens et internationaux. Les erreurs opérationnelles et le délitement de la confiance réciproque  À l’origine de ce conflit qui ne cesse de s’enliser depuis dix ans se trouvait le groupe sécessionniste touareg, le Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), qui a embrasé la révolte contre les autorités militaires légitimes maliennes en 2012. Dans le nord du pays, les groupes terroristes se sont saisis de cette fenêtre d’opportunité en évinçant ce mouvement. Leur incursion actionna le début l’opération française Serval. Contre toute attente, l’armée française coordonna son action militaire avec celle du MNLA afin de coopérer dans le cadre de la libération d’otages français dans le nord du Mali. La France a vu dans ce groupe rebelle un allié potentiel alors qu’il constitue l’ennemi héréditaire des forces armées régulières qui se livrent entre eux une guerre fratricide depuis l’indépendance du Mali. Cette collaboration étroite avec des milices ethniques a terni les relations avec Bamako puisque la France, au lieu d’être un dispositif visant à soutenir la FAMa, semblait davantage faire cavalier seul. Ce choix tactique contestable a pu nourrir la perception malienne que le dispositif militaire français était une armée d’occupation. Similairement, un nationalisme malien a pu être exacerbé par le refus de l’armée française de laisser les forces spéciales maliennes entrer dans Kidal lors de sa libération des mains des djihadistes en 2013. Si la crainte de représailles de la FAMa à l’encontre des civils était crédible, il n’en a pas moins ravivé les sentiments anti-français creusant dès lors le fossé entre les deux partenaires. Le point de non-retour fut atteint lors des conclusions du rapport d’enquête de la MINUSMA établissant que la frappe aérienne menée par la force antidjihadiste française près du village de Bounti avait conduit au décès de 22 civils en janvier 2021. Cet incident a entériné la rupture du lien de confiance qui ne cessait de s’éroder entre le gouvernement français et les populations maliennes. Une partie de la classe politique française réfute l’accusation de bavure, toutefois les manifestations pour demander le départ des Français se sont accrues significativement. Une guerre perdue dans le domaine informationnel Les erreurs diplomatiques effectuées par la France ont renforcé le sentiment patriotique et souverainiste des Maliens et le gouvernement de transition ne s’est pas privé de capitaliser sur cette opinion publique hostile envers l’ancien colonisateur. La tentative de la nouvelle junte malienne de prolonger la période de transition de cinq ans en dépit de ses engagements concernant la tenue d’élections libres en février 2022 a eu de lourdes conséquences. Un arsenal de sanctions a été déployé par la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO) pour isoler le Mali sur la scène internationale et ainsi fragiliser l’économie pour exacerber les pressions internes des populations à l’encontre du gouvernement de transition. Dans le sillage de la CEDEAO, la France a opté pour une approche punitive en plaidant l’adoption de sanctions. La junte s’est alors empressée d’accuser Paris de fomenter l’embargo sur le Mali. En réagissant avec fermeté à ce coup d’État dans le coup d’État, la France envoie des signaux contradictoires puisqu’elle était attentiste lors du premier putsch au Mali et qu’elle a fait preuve d’une certaine complaisance envers la nouvelle junte tchadienne issue d’une prise de pouvoir anticonstitutionnelle. Le gouvernement français est taxé de faire preuve d'hypocrisie puisqu’il soutient des régimes répressifs lorsque leur maintien rentre dans sa stratégie régionale et désavoue la junte militaire malienne lorsqu’elle est ouvertement hostile à la présence française. Si l’incohérence stratégique est de mise, Paris est tout de même devenu le bouc émissaire de l’ensemble des maux du Mali. La France a vu l’ensemble des symboles de sa présence attaqués par des mouvements issus de la société civile africaine. Les accusations de perpétuation de la France-Afrique ou de néocolonialisme se répandent comme une trainée de poudre à travers le Sahel. Une partie de la population malienne ne comprend pas les objectifs de l’opération Barkhane et l’opinion publique sahélienne est sensible aux discours anticoloniaux. Toutefois, la désinformation n’en est pas moins en partie orchestrée par des États rivaux qui tentent de projeter leur puissance dans le sous-continent. Les fausses nouvelles trouvent un écho particulier sur les réseaux sociaux et le gouvernement français peine à faire valoir le caractère diffamatoire de ces rumeurs infondées pour la plupart. L’armée française accuse un retard certain dans cette lutte informationnelle parfois asymétrique en raison de la nature antidémocratique du régime de ses adversaires. En plus de jeter le discrédit sur l’armée française, cette propagande est alimentée par le Kremlin dans le cadre de sa stratégie hybride en Afrique. L’arrivée du groupe Wagner au Mali a cristallisé les tensions entre Paris et Bamako et la surenchère politique a tragiquement poussé ces paramilitaires dans les bras de Assimi Goita, le nouvel homme fort de la junte. Dans un chassé-croisé défavorable à la France, l’armée supplétive de la Russie ne pourra cependant pas combler le vide sécuritaire qui a émergé face au départ des 5000 soldats français. Ce dispositif militaire couteux pour le régime malien est trop faible et les intérêts stratégiques sont bien différents. La société privée de mercenariat Wagner avait initialement pour but de faire de la protection de personnalités clefs du régime, leur présence s’est dorénavant accrue pour atteindre 350 paramilitaires avec comme nouvel objectif de lutter contre le terrorisme qui prolifère dans le centre du Mali. Réduire l’empreinte au sol de l’armée française dans la région était une priorité stratégique depuis l’annonce de la transformation de l’opération Barkhane. Néanmoins, l’incapacité de développer une diplomatie structurante avec Bamako, la montée des sentiments anti-français et la nouvelle chevauchée du groupe Wagner au Mali est un camouflet pour Paris. La perte d’influence est indéniable, mais elle constitue un moyen pour la France de repenser son intervention dans la région. Une fenêtre d’opportunité pour un redéploiement stratégique nécessaire La juxtaposition de plusieurs dispositifs militaires au Sahel a conduit à la formation d’un embouteillage sécuritaire. Avec cette nouvelle donne sécuritaire, la France pourrait sous-traiter la gestion de l’insécurité malienne au groupe Wagner qui semble vouloir endiguer une menace djihadiste qu’un dispositif militaire d’environ 5000 soldats n’est pas parvenu à faire. Paris estime désormais que le contingent de paramilitaires russes a atteint 1000 individus.  Si les liens entre cette société privée et le Kremlin ne sont pas officiels, la junte malienne se rapproche tout de même dangereusement de Moscou tandis qu’elle vient de dénoncer de manière unilatérale les accords de défense bilatéraux avec la France. Ce nouveau partenariat en émergence permettrait-il de contenir les GAT au Mali et dans la région des trois frontières sans que ces derniers puissent déstabiliser l’ensemble de la bande sahélo-saharienne ?  La France pourrait dès lors concentrer ses énergies vers l’Europe de l’Est où l’Ukraine subit une invasion à grande échelle. Toutefois le dispositif russe semble aujourd’hui bien insuffisant pour réaliser un tel objectif. De surcroit, en faisant face à l’échec de Barkhane et une nouvelle fois à son passé colonial, la France ne souhaite pas pour autant abandonner son pré carré historique aussi facilement. Enfin, les méthodes opératoires de cette milice privée, notamment en Centrafrique où de nombreuses exactions ont été recensées, sont contraires aux règles d’engagements et à l’éthique de l’armée française. Face à la réaction de la junte malienne, la mission européenne Takuba déployée dans cette frontière avancée du vieux continent est finalement mort-née. Soucieux de consolider le leadership français, Emmanuel Macron, en tant que représentant du pays qui préside le Conseil de l’Union européenne pour ces six prochains mois, pourrait conserver l’ensemble des efforts diplomatiques qui a donné naissance à cette force multidimensionnelle internationale. Les États membres de cette coalition souhaitent « rester engager dans la région », ce qui est un atout incontestable pour la préservation de cette première expérience de grande envergure d’une Europe de la défense si chère pour la présidence française. Un redéploiement de la force européenne Takuba dans les zones stratégiques frontalières au Mali est encore possible. Au-delà de la solution de repli, même si la possibilité d’un repositionnement des forces en présence a pu conduire à des manifestations populaires sanglantes, le Niger pourrait devenir le nouvel État pivot pour sauver le nouveau dispositif militaire international. La France pourrait également étendre son soutien aux États du Golfe de Guinée qui partagent davantage son orientation stratégique et se trouvent être de plus en plus exposés aux activités de nuisances des GAT qui se déplacent vers le Sud. En œuvrant de concert avec ses partenaires européens et africains, ce nouveau dispositif pourrait renforcer les postures défensives des autres États membres du G5 Sahel. Il contiendrait les GAT afin que les terroristes ne menacent plus toute la région, mais à quel coût pour le Mali voisin ? Après l’expulsion de l’ambassadeur français, rétablir les canaux diplomatiques avec Bamako doit être une priorité pour Paris. Le retrait de la force Barkhane pourrait laisser l’opportunité à la junte de réactiver un dialogue bilatéral constructif avec les groupes armés terroristes pour l’avènement d’un accord d’Alger 2.0 plus inclusif, tout ceci en dépit de la ligne rouge fixée par le gouvernement français. Un accord d’amnistie sur le modèle du dialogue algérien des années 1990 pourrait émerger grâce à l’opportunité que représente le départ des Français. Conclusion L’opération française au Mali est un colosse au pied d’argile. Alors que le paysage conflictuel au Sahel ne cesse de se déplacer, le retrait accéléré des troupes françaises est l’occasion parfaite pour le gouvernement de poursuivre la réarticulation de son implication dans la sous-région. La nouvelle orientation stratégique qui est en train d’être développée devra nécessairement renforcer les soubassements politiques de cette intervention à des fins d’acceptabilité. Paris pourrait profiter des relations bilatérales avec les pays voisins qui sont moins dégradés que celles avec Bamako afin de faire émerger des partenariats militaires moins asymétriques. Une opération extérieure française moins exposée politiquement qui induit une empreinte plus légère via des moyens aériens et un renforcement des capacités dans le domaine informationnel sont de mises. Pour affronter cette concurrence croissante, la France doit réactiver le dialogue avec Bamako afin d’éviter de laisser le champ libre à la Russie. Avec les ambitions grandissantes du Kremlin, Paris est tenu de proposer une alternative crédible afin de combler le vide sécuritaire et pour répondre à la dynamique de diversification des relations des pays ouest-africains. Seulement à travers ce nouveau sursaut stratégique, la déroute française tant redoutée pourra être évitée. ## Quel plan B ? Refonder la politique étrangère face à la politique prédatrice de l’administration Trump URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quel-plan-b-refonder-la-politique-etrangere-face-a-la-politique-predatrice-de-ladministration-trump/ Modified: 2026-04-20 Ce texte est un compte-rendu de la conférence Quel plan B ? Refonder la politique étrangère face à la politique prédatrice de l’Administration Trump tenue le 7 avril 2025 à l'UQAM. Le retour de Donald Trump à la présidence des États-Unis en janvier 2025 soulève d’importantes interrogations quant à l’orientation future de la politique étrangère étatsunienne et à ses effets sur l’ordre international établi après la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette réélection, sans précédent dans l’histoire politique contemporaine des États-Unis, dépasse le cadre d’une simple alternance démocratique. Elle remet en question la nature du « phénomène Trump », de moins en moins perçu comme une parenthèse conjoncturelle, et de plus en plus envisagé comme un tournant idéologique et institutionnel durable, susceptible de redéfinir en profondeur la posture internationale des États-Unis. De surcroît, cette incertitude stratégique touche directement les alliés démocratiques traditionnels de Washington, les poussant à repenser en profondeur leurs orientations diplomatiques et sécuritaires. C’est dans ce contexte qu’une conférence, réunissant chercheurs et diplomates canadiens et européens, s’est tenue le 7 avril 2025 à l’Université du Québec à Montréal afin d’explorer les alternatives à une dépendance durable envers le leadership étatsunien. Le Plan A, celui d’un fort alignement sur les États-Unis, apparaît désormais caduc. Ce sont les fondements mêmes de la politique étrangère qui sont remis en question, obligeant à concevoir un véritable Plan B. Deux dimensions structurent cette problématique. La première est temporelle : la seconde administration Trump traduit-elle une rupture durable ou un épisode transitoire ? La réponse à cette question conditionne les choix entre adaptations ponctuelles et redéfinition structurelle des alliances. La deuxième dimension est stratégique : comment les démocraties alliées peuvent-elles, à la fois, préserver un lien avec les États-Unis et développer une forme d’autonomie stratégique? Cette note de synthèse, fondée sur les échanges de la conférence d'avril 2025, propose d'éclairer les pistes de recomposition de l'ordre international face aux incertitudes suscitées par la trajectoire actuelle de la politique étrangère étatsunienne. Les analyses convergent vers différents constats majeurs : la politique trumpienne constitue une rupture systémique avec l'ordre libéral d'après-guerre, contestant méthodiquement les valeurs démocratiques, les institutions multilatérales et les normes du droit international, plutôt qu'une simple parenthèse conjoncturelle ; les alliés traditionnels explorent désormais diverses stratégies d'adaptation, de l'équilibrage pour attractivité à l'autonomie stratégique européenne, en passant par la diversification des partenariats, révélant l'hétérogénéité des réponses face à un même défi ; l'Europe et le Canada sont contraints de redéfinir leurs fondements diplomatiques et sécuritaires, développant de nouveaux outils d'influence et renforçant leurs capacités autonomes pour préserver leurs intérêts dans un monde où le leadership étatsunien est devenu imprévisible, transactionnel et structuré autour de relations bilatérales asymétriques ; enfin, l'enjeu ukrainien cristallise ces tensions, testant la capacité des alliés à maintenir leur cohésion face aux repositionnements de Washington tout en assumant de nouvelles responsabilités continentales. Que veut Trump ? La seconde administration Trump se distingue par une rupture profonde avec les fondements de l’ordre international libéral institué après 1945. Comme l’ont souligné de nombreux analystes, cette orientation ne procède pas de simples ajustements tactiques ou conjoncturels, mais s’apparente à un rejet systémique des principes ayant structuré l’architecture internationale contemporaine. Elle traduit l’affirmation d’une vision alternative de l’ordre mondial, portée par le président Trump et soutenue par une base électorale consolidée. Selon Karine Prémont, ce socle idéologique est appelé à perdurer grâce à l’existence d’une « masse critique » d’électeurs, révélatrice d’un bris de confiance durable envers les normes et institutions du multilatéralisme libéral. Julien Toureille identifie une contestation méthodique de l’ensemble des piliers de cet ordre. Celle-ci vise tant les valeurs démocratiques et l’État de droit, que les normes fondamentales du droit international, notamment l’interdiction du recours à la force et le respect de la souveraineté. Les grandes institutions multilatérales, telles que l’Organisation des Nations Unies ou l’OTAN, sont également remises en question, tout comme l’architecture économique issue de l’après-guerre. Cette remise en cause globale s’inscrit, selon Toureille, dans une réinterprétation révisionniste de la doctrine Monroe : loin de prôner un retrait isolationniste, cette doctrine rénovée vise à réaffirmer l’hégémonie étatsunienne sur l’hémisphère occidental, en rupture avec les principes de coopération internationale. Cette inflexion idéologique s’accompagne d’une transformation des modes de gouvernement, marquée par une forte personnalisation de la prise de décision. Theodore McLauchlin décrit l’émergence d’un système informel, structuré autour d’un accès direct au président, où les dynamiques interpersonnelles prennent le pas sur les processus institutionnels formels. Cette configuration, proche d’une « cour de Versailles », repose sur la distribution de la « faveur » présidentielle — entendue comme l’octroi de ressources, de nominations ou de reconnaissance — devenue une ressource stratégique disputée par diverses factions internes. Pour Henri-Paul Normandin, cette personnalisation du pouvoir s’exprime aussi sur le plan symbolique : la politique étrangère devient un espace de mise en scène de l’autorité présidentielle, où la projection de puissance prime sur la délibération institutionnelle ou l’adhésion normative. Trois axes structurent les finalités de cette politique étrangère. Le premier réside dans une reconfiguration des relations avec les alliés traditionnels, fondée sur la remise en cause des engagements historiques et sur une exigence de réciprocité accrue dans les partenariats sécuritaires. Le deuxième relève d’une logique néo-mercantiliste, centrée sur l’accès prioritaire aux ressources stratégiques et sur la défense des intérêts économiques étatsuniens dans une perspective de compétition bilatérale. Le troisième vise à restructurer le système international autour d’un concert de grandes puissances, marginalisant les mécanismes multilatéraux au profit de relations bilatérales asymétriques et hiérarchisées. Enfin, cette réorientation stratégique participe à une reconfiguration idéologique du camp occidental. Comme le souligne Normandin, elle introduit une césure croissante au sein même des démocraties libérales, opposant un pôle fidèle aux principes du libéralisme politique — incarné notamment par le Canada et une partie de l’Europe — à un pôle illibéral, représenté par des États tels que la Hongrie, et désormais, dans une certaine mesure, les États-Unis. Cette fracture remet en cause la cohésion normative et stratégique du bloc démocratique tel qu’il s’était constitué depuis la fin de la Guerre froide. Quelles options pour les alliés ? Face à la redéfinition profonde de la posture internationale des États-Unis sous l’administration Trump, les alliés traditionnels se trouvent confrontés à la nécessité de repenser leurs stratégies nationales, mais aussi collectives. Dans ce contexte, Jonathan Paquin propose une typologie des réponses stratégiques articulée autour de deux axes : l’équilibrage interne et la gestion de l’ambiguïté stratégique. Cette grille d’analyse permet d’identifier plusieurs modèles de comportement. Certains États choisissent l’équilibrage pour attractivité, comme le Japon ou la Pologne, qui visent à maintenir l’engagement étatsunien en valorisant leur propre rôle stratégique au sein de l’alliance. D’autres privilégient l’équilibrage pour autosuffisance, stratégie illustrée de façon marquée par la Turquie, mais également envisagée par le Canada, qui consiste à réduire la dépendance à Washington en renforçant ses capacités nationales. Une approche plus nuancée, l’équilibrage interne, consiste à diversifier ses partenariats tout en conservant l’alliance principale — une posture adoptée par le Japon et, dans une certaine mesure, par le Canada. Enfin, le « hard hedging », dont la Turquie constitue l’archétype, suppose une diversification assumée, y compris en direction de partenaires non occidentaux. Cependant, cette typologie atteint ses limites face à des contextes géopolitiques plus contraints. Les petits États d’Europe centrale et orientale, comme le souligne Jean Combrois, illustrent cette difficulté. En raison de leur histoire récente, de leur proximité géographique avec la Russie et de leur dépendance sécuritaire à l’égard de l’OTAN, ces pays disposent de peu de marges de manœuvre. Ils restent structurellement dépendants des États-Unis, sans véritables alternatives stratégiques en cas de retrait étatsunien. À cette vulnérabilité s’ajoute une instabilité intérieure potentielle, alimentée par la montée des mouvements populistes, que la rhétorique trumpienne pourrait indirectement encourager, fragilisant ainsi leur ancrage euro-atlantique. L’Europe occidentale, quant à elle, explore une autre voie : celle de l’autonomie stratégique. Comme l’analyse Chantal Lavallée, cette aspiration se manifeste par une série de réponses nationales, parmi lesquelles l’augmentation des budgets de défense, la relance d’ambitions stratégiques françaises et allemandes, ainsi qu’un débat renouvelé sur l’avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire en Europe. À l’échelle institutionnelle, plusieurs initiatives européennes voient le jour : l’élaboration d’un livre blanc sur la défense, le lancement de l’initiative ReArm Europe, et la tentative de structuration d’un pilier européen au sein de l’OTAN. Toutefois, ces dynamiques se heurtent à des difficultés persistantes d’articulation entre les priorités nationales, les ambitions européennes et les exigences de la solidarité transatlantique. L’autonomie stratégique reste donc un projet en construction, marqué par une tension entre volonté d’émancipation et nécessité de cohésion. Dans ce paysage incertain, le cas ukrainien constitue un révélateur décisif. Comme le souligne Frédéric Labarre, l’Ukraine met à l’épreuve la capacité des alliés à réagir aux repositionnements de Washington. La perception d’une convergence entre Donald Trump et Vladimir Poutine alimente les craintes d’un désengagement étatsunien, plaçant les Européens devant la responsabilité de garantir, seuls si nécessaire, la continuité du soutien à Kiev. Les réponses françaises et britanniques illustrent une tentative de réaffirmation de leadership, à travers des promesses d’un engagement militaire et politique renforcé. Paradoxalement, cette situation a aussi permis de mettre en lumière l’extraordinaire résilience ukrainienne, notamment sur le plan industriel et technologique. Sous pression, l’Ukraine est parvenue à innover de manière significative dans le domaine de la défense, démontrant une capacité d’adaptation qui dépasse les attentes de ses partenaires. L’adaptation européenne Face aux reconfigurations profondes de la politique étrangère étatsunienne sous la seconde administration Trump, l’Europe est contrainte de redéfinir les fondements mêmes de son ancrage atlantique. Cette réévaluation découle d’une rupture manifeste avec le paradigme transatlantique classique, désormais fragilisé par un désengagement sélectif de Washington et par une indifférence stratégique croissante à l’égard des priorités européennes, comme le souligne Maude Quessard. Loin d’un leadership stable, les États-Unis incarnent, selon Laurent Borzillo, une hégémonie devenue instable et imprévisible, comparée à un « enfant roi prédateur », dont les décisions échappent aux cadres de coopération traditionnels. Pourtant, cette instabilité ne se traduit pas uniquement par une perte : elle constitue aussi une opportunité stratégique, selon Nicolas-François Perron, en offrant — possiblement — à l’Europe une marge de manœuvre plus large qu’au moment de l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine en 2022. L’Europe est désormais contrainte de se positionner comme acteur stratégique autonome, en assumant pleinement ses responsabilités continentales. Les réponses nationales à cette recomposition du lien transatlantique demeurent toutefois hétérogènes. La France, selon Borzillo, adopte une posture duale : elle s’engage dans un co-leadership discret avec le Royaume-Uni, tout en maintenant une ambiguïté stratégique calculée quant à une éventuelle extension de son parapluie nucléaire. Son soutien mesuré à l’Ukraine s’explique en partie par la volonté de préserver sa liberté d’action diplomatique sur d’autres fronts. L’Allemagne, de son côté, peine à traduire l’élan du Zeitenwende en transformations structurelles concrètes, en raison de contraintes institutionnelles et politiques persistantes. Néanmoins, l’arrivée de Friedrich Merz au pouvoir au début 2025 pourrait marquer un tournant potentiel dans la politique de sécurité allemande, notamment par une approche plus affirmée vis-à-vis des engagements internationaux. Dans ce contexte, l’idée d’une autonomie stratégique européenne gagne en consistance, en s’articulant autour de trois piliers complémentaires, selon Quessard. Le pilier capacitaire vise à renforcer la souveraineté technologique et militaire de l’Europe, à travers le développement de la Base industrielle et technologique de défense (BITD), ainsi que l’investissement dans les drones, la cybersécurité et les systèmes satellitaires. Le pilier organisationnel repose sur des formats souples et réactifs, tels que le Triangle de Weimar (France, Pologne et Allemagne) ou la constitution de coalitions agiles, capables de déployer des capacités rapidement en dehors des cadres institutionnels rigides. Enfin, le pilier diplomatique est marqué par un « pragmatisme de principe », alliant défense des valeurs et adaptation aux réalités géopolitiques. Cette posture se manifeste par une gestion active des zones grises, une stratégie d’influence renforcée, et une capacité à naviguer entre impératifs moraux et contraintes structurelles. L’ensemble de ces dynamiques illustre la tension croissante entre autonomie stratégique européenne et solidarité atlantique, et souligne la nécessité, pour les Européens, de construire une capacité d’action indépendante sans rompre pour autant les cadres de coopération existants. Cette redéfinition pourrait constituer, à terme, le socle d’un nouveau « contrat stratégique » intra-occidental, mieux adapté à un monde marqué par la multipolarité et l’imprévisibilité des alliances traditionnelles. L’adaptation canadienne Le retour de Donald Trump à la présidence oblige le Canada à reconnaître la nature structurelle et durable du changement à Washington. Comme l’ont souligné les différents chercheurs et diplomates, la politique étrangère étatsunienne actuelle ne reflète pas une simple parenthèse partisane, mais une redéfinition des priorités nationales, désormais centrées sur les intérêts économiques internes plutôt que sur les engagements stratégiques globaux. Cette transformation dépasse la seule personnalité de Trump : elle s’ancre dans une recomposition profonde des fondements de la politique étrangère étatsunienne. Selon David Morin et Justin Massie, le Canada ne peut plus présumer d’un alignement automatique avec Washington, même sous une future administration démocrate. Cette nouvelle donne impose une révision en profondeur des principes qui ont guidé la diplomatie canadienne depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Ce réalignement affecte particulièrement la position du Canada dans l’architecture de sécurité occidentale. Stéphane Roussel insiste sur le fait qu’Ottawa doit repenser ses leviers d’influence dans un environnement désormais structuré par une logique bilatérale et transactionnelle, plutôt que par le multilatéralisme et les institutions. Pour faire face à ce basculement, Massie appelle à une posture plus proactive : le Canada ne peut plus se contenter de suivre, il doit être force de proposition, porteur d’initiatives et d’idées. La question de la réciprocité en matière de sécurité devient ainsi centrale. Comme le formulent Massie et Yan Cimon, le Canada est prêt à « verser du sang » pour la sécurité collective en Europe, mais peut-il encore compter sur une réciprocité équivalente de la part des États-Unis ? Dans ce contexte, le renforcement de la marge de manœuvre stratégique canadienne passe par plusieurs axes. D’abord, celui d’une capacité de réflexion autonome, en particulier dans le domaine de la politique industrielle et technologique. Ensuite, celui de la résilience économique et stratégique, qui appelle à repenser les chaînes d’approvisionnement et à diversifier les dépendances commerciales. Enfin, la diversification des alliances constitue un levier essentiel : Morin et Massie plaident en faveur d’une recherche active de coalitions alternatives, notamment avec l’Europe et l’Asie, afin de réduire la dépendance exclusive envers les États-Unis. L’adaptation de la diplomatie canadienne à cette nouvelle configuration étatsunienne suppose aussi une évolution des outils et des méthodes d’influence. Roussel souligne l’importance de capter l’attention d’un président Trump dont les priorités, les sensibilités et le mode de fonctionnement rompent avec les normes présidentielles classiques. Cela implique de mobiliser le lien personnel entre dirigeants comme canal d’influence privilégié — une approche qui marque une rupture importante avec la tradition diplomatique canadienne, historiquement fondée sur les canaux institutionnels, les relations bureaucratiques et les normes de coopération multilatérale. Repenser l’ordre démocratique au-delà de l’hégémonie étatsunienne Les travaux de la conférence du 7 avril 2025 convergent vers un double diagnostic sans équivoque : la seconde administration Trump incarne une transformation structurelle et durable de la politique étrangère étatsunienne, marquant la fin de la présomption d’un leadership transatlantique stable et prévisible. Pour les démocraties alliées, cette évolution impose une redéfinition en profondeur des fondements de la coopération euro-atlantique. Depuis lors, les réponses nationales à cette recomposition stratégique ont donné lieu à des trajectoires contrastées. Au Canada, le nouveau Premier ministre Mark Carney, a annoncé l’atteinte anticipée de l’objectif de 2 % du PIB consacré à la défense, ainsi qu’un renforcement des partenariats sécuritaires avec les alliés européens et l’Union européenne — marquant une tentative d’inflexion de la posture canadienne. Toutefois, plusieurs incertitudes subsistent quant à la mise en œuvre concrète de ces engagements, notamment en ce qui concerne la capacité du Canada à développer une autonomie stratégique réelle vis-à-vis des États-Unis. En Allemagne, le Chancelier Friedrich Merz s’est engagé à faire de la Bundeswehr la force armée la plus puissante d’Europe, à travers un plan d’investissement massif à long terme. Cette ambition, bien qu’alignée avec la logique d’autonomie stratégique européenne, pourrait se heurter à des tensions internes croissantes : déjà fragilisé, Merz fait face à des critiques au sein de son partenaire de coalition, le SPD, dont plusieurs membres influents ont récemment publié une lettre ouverte dénonçant les risques d’une « course à l’armement » et appelant à une approche plus équilibrée. En France, le Président Emmanuel Macron a infléchi sa position à l’égard de la précédente administration Trump, réaffirmant avec force l’importance de l’OTAN pour la sécurité européenne — en rupture avec son diagnostic de « mort cérébrale » formulé en 2019 — tout en demeurant contraint par des marges budgétaires limitées. À l’inverse, l’Espagne avait, dès avant le Sommet de l’OTAN de juin 2025, indiqué qu’elle ne suivrait pas la nouvelle cible de 5 % des dépenses de défense, peinant même à atteindre le seuil de 1,3 %. En Italie, la Présidente du Conseil Giorgia Meloni adopte une posture d’équilibre, se positionnant comme un pont entre l’Europe et les États-Unis — une modération qui reflète les tensions internes à sa coalition, dont une frange reste sceptique face aux ambitions militaires franco-allemandes et privilégie un alignement atlantiste classique. L’analyse comparée des trajectoires nationales révèle ainsi une pluralité de réponses face au retour de Donald Trump et à la recomposition de l’ordre international. En Europe au Canada, les discours sur l’autonomie stratégique gagnent en visibilité, mais plusieurs pays restent contraints par des dépendances structurelles. Si hétérogènes soient-elles, ces dynamiques convergent vers un constat commun : le statu quo ante n’est plus tenable. Les mécanismes traditionnels de coordination, centrés sur la prééminence étatsunienne, ne suffisent plus à garantir la défense des intérêts des alliés dans la durée. Ce climat d’adaptation prudente a trouvé une illustration éloquente lors du Sommet de l’OTAN tenu à La Haye en juin 2025. Ce sommet a cristallisé les tensions identifiées lors des panels de la conférence, en particulier quant à la gestion d’un partenaire devenu à la fois imprévisible et dominateur. Toute l’organisation de la rencontre a semblé guidée par une priorité implicite : préserver la cohésion apparente de l’Alliance et ménager la sensibilité du président Trump. Avant son arrivée, ce dernier a jeté le trouble sur la portée de l’article 5 du traité de l’Atlantique Nord, en suggérant qu’il existait plusieurs définitions possibles de cette garantie fondamentale. Cette déclaration, loin d’être anodine, a ravivé les doutes des États membres quant à la fiabilité de la dissuasion collective, déjà fragilisée par les positions antérieures du président. Le Secrétaire général de l’OTAN, Mark Rutte, a adopté une posture de conciliation particulièrement marquée, allant jusqu’à affirmer que Trump « mérite tous les éloges » — une déclaration largement perçue comme une tentative diplomatique d’éviter la confrontation. Le communiqué final, particulièrement laconique sur le soutien à l’Ukraine, a révélé les lignes de fracture persistantes au sein de l’Alliance, tant sur la posture à adopter face à la Russie que sur l’avenir institutionnel de l’OTAN elle-même. Dans ce contexte, l’objectif formel de porter les dépenses de défense à 5 % du PIB semble difficilement atteignable pour de nombreux États membres, alors même que la relation transatlantique reste largement structurée par une logique transactionnelle et fluctuante. L’épisode du Sommet renforce ainsi l’un des constats centraux de la conférence d’avril : la résilience à long terme de l’ordre démocratique international ne peut plus reposer sur un leadership étatsunien stable. Elle exige une transformation profonde des cadres de coopération existants, une redistribution des responsabilités entre alliés, et l’affirmation d’une autonomie stratégique crédible — seules conditions, désormais, d’une sécurité collective durable. En définitive, la question n’est plus de savoir si une émancipation partielle vis-à-vis du leadership étatsunien est souhaitable, mais bien de déterminer comment la mettre en œuvre sans compromettre l’architecture démocratique et sécuritaire transnationale. C’est cette capacité à articuler autonomie stratégique, solidarité entre alliés et résilience institutionnelle qui déterminera si les démocraties occidentales peuvent continuer à jouer un rôle structurant dans un ordre international en recomposition. Liste des participants : Mot d’ouverture : Justin Massie, directeur du Département de science politique (UQAM), co-directeur, Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), Le Rubicon François Audet, directeur de l’IEIM Panel 1 : Que veut Trump? Karine Prémont (Université de Sherbrooke) Julien Toureille (Chaire Raoul-Dandurand) Theodore McLauchlin (Université de Montréal) Henri-Paul Normandin (IEIM) Panel 2 : Quelles options pour les alliés? Jean Crombois (American University in Bulgaria) Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Chantal Lavallée (Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean) Frédéric Labarre (Collège militaire royal du Canada) Panel 3 : L’adaptation européenne Laurent Borzillo (ÉNAP) Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Nicolas-François Perron (UQAM) Panel 4 : L’adaptation canadienne Stéphane Roussel (ÉNAP) Justin Massie (UQAM) David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke) Yan Cimon (Université Laval) Mot de clôture : Daniel Jean (ancien conseiller du premier ministre en matière de sécurité nationale) ## Quel successeur pour Jens Stoltenberg : l’OTAN aura-t-elle enfin une secrétaire générale européenne ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quel-successeur-pour-jens-stoltenberg-lotan-aura-t-elle-enfin-une-secretaire-generale-europeenne/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > Alors que l’OTAN a confirmé le départ à l’automne prochain de l’ancien premier ministre Norvégien Jens Stoltenberg en fonction depuis 2014... Février 2023 : près de douze mois après le déclenchement de l’invasion à grande échelle de l’Ukraine par la Russie, et alors que les alliés de Kyiv continuent pour certains d’ergoter sur le type d’armements lourds pouvant être livrés ou non à l’Ukraine, les principales structures composant l’architecture sécuritaire en Europe – l’OTAN et l’UE – poursuivent leur profonde transformation. Au regard des défis immédiats de l’OTAN (cf. résurrection de l’OTAN ; intégration à venir d’anciens pays neutres ; risque de nouvelle administration trumpiste y compris avec un épigone trumpien, etc.), le choix du prochain secrétaire général de l’OTAN s’avère d’autant plus pertinent à analyser. Traditionnellement – a contrario de l’Union européenne – les structures internes de l’OTAN n’étaient pas en effet considérées comme une bureaucratie puissante, cherchant à accroître leur autonomie. À cet égard les décisions relatives à l’Alliance étaient plutôt analysées à partir d’approches théoriques mettant en avant le rôle des États et des acteurs internes de ceux-ci. Or les derniers travaux publiés de John Deni, d’Heidi Hardt et de Leonard August Schuett portant en particulier sur la période 2017-2021 (sous celle de l'administration Trump) soulignent le rôle prépondérant joué par le secrétaire général de l’Alliance, ainsi que par plusieurs officiels de celle-ci dans le maintien et le développement de l’Alliance ces dernières années. Alors que l’OTAN a confirmé le départ à l’automne prochain de l’ancien premier ministre Norvégien Jens Stoltenberg  en fonction depuis 2014, qui prendra sa suite à la tête de l’organisation?   Ces derniers mois, plusieurs articles dans la presse américaine, canadienne, britannique, italienne, belge ou encore française ont abordé cette question de la succession de l’actuel secrétaire général de l’OTAN. Pour rappel, il existe un fort désir depuis plusieurs mois que la personne qui lui succèdera soit la première femme nommée à ce poste. Cet article ne vise toutefois pas à se faire le relais des bruits de couloirs au sein des institutions étatiques et internationales concernant le/la futur(e) secrétaire général(e) de l’OTAN. Il tend à l’inverse à lister méthodiquement, en prenant en compte trois critères initiaux, les candidatures pouvant être retenues pour occuper ce poste. Premièrement,  je prends pour acquis qu’il s’agira d’une femme et non d’un homme. Deuxièmement, il est certain que celle-ci aura occupé de hautes responsabilités au cours des dix dernières années (en étant soit chef d’État ou de gouvernement, soit ministre des Affaires étrangères ou de la Défense) au sein d’un des pays membres de l’Alliance. Le troisième critère est celui de la nationalité des candidates potentielles. En effet plusieurs nationalités peuvent être écartées parmi les 30 existantes (représentant les 30 États membres composant l’OTAN) du fait de certaines contraintes et règles informelles existantes.   …   Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon ! ## Quelle paix pour l’Ukraine ? Comprendre les causes de la guerre pour y mettre fin URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quelle-paix-pour-l-ukraine/ Modified: 2023-03-31 > Les perspectives de paix en Ukraine font actuellement l’objet de vives discussions. Trois positions principales structurent le débat... Les perspectives de paix en Ukraine font actuellement l’objet de vives discussions. Trois positions principales structurent le débat. D’un côté, certains affirment que la meilleure façon de parvenir à la paix est d’offrir une porte de sortie à la Russie par le biais de négociations et de concessions mutuelles. Ce point de vue est notamment partagé par John Mearsheimer, selon qui la guerre en Ukraine est la faute des États-Unis et que ces derniers devraient renoncer à leur soutien aux Ukrainiens. D’autres voix, autant progressistes que conservatrices, estiment que les États-Unis devraient entrer en négociation directe avec la Russie afin de trouver un règlement de paix, lequel passerait nécessairement par une compromission de l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine. Cette idée semble avoir l’ascendant moral puisqu’elle se réclame en faveur de la paix dès aujourd’hui. Elle est d’autant plus attractive que le risque d’une escalade incontrôlée du conflit pourrait mener à une confrontation directe, voire nucléaire, entre les États-Unis et la Russie. Dans les mots de deux experts : “Forcing a cornered nuclear-armed state led by a man who sees his misguided war as an existential struggle into a complete and humiliating retreat poses far greater risks than the benefits of trying to recapture every square mile of Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian forces. A negotiated cease-fire, with strong enforcement, is the best option.” D’autres affirment au contraire qu’il ne peut y avoir la moindre négociation avec le président Poutine, compte tenu de ses objectifs de guerre néocoloniaux en Ukraine. La seule fin possible à la guerre, de ce point de vue, est une défaite militaire totale de la Russie et un changement de régime à Moscou. Le président Zelensky a exprimé cette position maximaliste en déclarant que son gouvernement était prêt à dialoguer avec la Russie, « mais avec un autre président russe », et que ses objectifs de guerre comprenaient la libération de l’entièreté du territoire ukrainien, y compris la Crimée. Le président Biden a momentanément soutenu ce point de vue en déclarant que Poutine « ne peut pas rester au pouvoir », avant que ses collaborateurs ne précisent plus tard que Washington ne cherchait pas un changement de régime en Russie. La vice-première ministre du Canada a également fait écho aux appels à un changement de régime. Une troisième voie se trouve dans la position commune des Occidentaux : la paix sera éventuellement négociée, lorsque la Russie acceptera de mettre fin à son agression, et respectera l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine. Les États membres du G7 se sont ainsi mis d’accord pour exiger que la Russie cesse « immédiatement et sans conditions toutes les hostilités » et qu’elle se retire de l’entièreté du territoire ukrainien, « délimité par ses frontières internationalement reconnues » de 1991. Si certains remettent en question la nécessité de libérer la Crimée et une partie du Donbass, l’Allemagne qualifie cette position de naïve. La président Macron soutient cette position, affirmant que « Vladimir Poutine doit cesser cette guerre, respecter l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine et revenir autour de la table des discussions ». La stratégie occidentale est donc de fournir les moyens à l’Ukraine, par ses succès sur le champ de bataille, d’imposer les meilleurs termes que possibles lors d’éventuelles négociations de paix. Qui a raison? Quel est le meilleur espoir de paix en Ukraine ? La meilleure façon de répondre à cette question est de comprendre les origines du conflit et de s’appuyer sur les théories de la fin de la guerre. Sur cette base, la meilleure chance d’une paix durable en Ukraine passe par une révision en profondeur des ambitions impériales russes, le développement d’une force de dissuasion ukrainienne crédible, ou encore par l’imposition extérieure d’une telle force dissuasive. Autrement, le conflit a toutes les chances de se prolonger à un niveau plus ou moins élevé d’intensité. ... Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur la site du Rubicon ! ## Quelle stratégie multilatérale pour le Canada en Arctique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quelle-strategie-multilaterale-pour-le-canada-en-arctique/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Le comportement belliciste et révisionniste russe en Ukraine interroge sur ses positions en Arctique, compte tenu de l’importance stratégique Le comportement belliciste et révisionniste russe en Ukraine interroge sur ses positions en Arctique, compte tenu de l’importance stratégique de la région pour la Russie. Moscou y détient la frontière maritime la plus longue du monde et y a déployé ses capacités nucléaires dans la péninsule de Kola, conférant à la région un rôle primordial dans les capacités de dissuasion russes. D’un point de vue tactique, les exercices « Kavkaz-2012 », « Zapad-2013 » et « Kavkaz-2016 » ont révélé que malgré la faible probabilité d’un conflit en Arctique, la Russie pourrait y ouvrir un front dans l’éventualité d’un conflit régional ailleurs dans le monde. Les objectifs stratégiques de la Russie demeurent toutefois essentiellement défensifs : maintenir son statut de principale puissance arctique, préserver une capacité de dissuasion forte et crédible, ainsi que protéger ses intérêts économiques dans la région. Pourtant, l’une des conséquences les plus délétères pour la Russie de son invasion de l’Ukraine réside dans l’intensification d’un sentiment d’encerclement avec l’éventuelle adhésion de la Suède et de la Finlande à l’OTAN. La présence de l’OTAN sera certainement renforcée en Arctique et viendra affaiblir la domination de Moscou dans cette région. Cette nouvelle donne stratégique pourrait pousser la Russie à agir de manière imprévisible et belliciste. Pour éviter ce scénario, il est dans l’intérêt des alliés de renforcer leur capacité de dissuasion et de réassurance dans la région afin d’éviter le pire. Dans ce contexte, il est nécessaire de réfléchir aux besoins d’adaptation de la posture canadienne en Arctique – qui présente d’importantes vulnérabilités – et d’interroger la stratégie multilatérale du Canada dans la région. C’est dans cette perspective que le Réseau d’analyse stratégique a mené une série d’entretiens et organisé une table-ronde avec des experts et praticiens afin d’analyser les vulnérabilités du Canada en Arctique, ainsi que les perspectives de coopération sécuritaire dans la région dans un environnement stratégique incertain et instable. Ce rapport présente la synthèse de ces démarches.[1] Quelles menaces dans l’Arctique canadien ? Le Canada fait face à quatre types de menaces dans son espace arctique : la crise climatique qui entraine de graves conséquences pour la sécurité humaine des populations locales ; la posture juridique canadienne sur le passage du Nord-Ouest non reconnue internationalement ; les opérations de déstabilisation dites hybrides de pays tiers dans la région ; le manque de capacités canadiennes permettant d’assurer la surveillance et le contrôle de son espace aérien et maritime. La région de l’Arctique subit un réchauffement climatique trois fois plus rapide que la moyenne mondiale. Le manque d’infrastructure canadienne dans la région et l’effort mitigé de la communauté internationale pour contrôler le réchauffement climatique menacent actuellement les populations nordiques du Canada en dégradant progressivement leurs conditions de vie. Le rapport de l’Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’Arctique (OPSA) démontrait que la crise climatique et le manque d’infrastructures en 2022 ont occasionné une aggravation de la sécurité alimentaire, économique, environnementale, sanitaire, personnelle et politique en Arctique canadien. La modification des écosystèmes liés notamment au dégel du pergélisol impacte fortement l’indépendance alimentaire dans la région, mais provoque également la dégradation des infrastructures déjà peu développées, l’érosion côtière et la raréfaction de l’eau potable. L’acuité de la menace environnementale fait consensus parmi les experts et le manque de projets fédéraux permettant une prise en charge et une gestion efficace de ces défis accroît la vulnérabilité du Canada dans son espace arctique. De plus, le réchauffement climatique permet une augmentation des activités touristiques, commerciales et plus largement la présence d’acteurs privés qui ne détiennent pas une bonne connaissance de la région et peuvent contribuer à la fragilisation des écosystèmes. Si le réchauffement climatique ne peut être géré qu’à l’échelle du globe, le Canada doit rapidement remédier à ses failles structurelles, car elles pourraient renforcer des clivages sociaux et exacerber une frustration sociale. En effet, ce genre de contexte social facilite l’ingérence de divers acteurs étatiques, comme la Russie ou la Chine, qui recourent à des opérations hybrides (notamment à caractère informationnel). Si les pays arctiques n’ont jusqu’à présent notifié aucune opération de désinformation relative à l’Arctique, l’adhésion de la Suède et de la Finlande à l’OTAN aura un potentiel impact sur le cadrage russe de la région, ce qui pourrait provoquer une augmentation des campagnes de désinformation. Parallèlement, la projection d’une activité commerciale plus forte en Arctique en raison de la fonte accélérée des glaces renforce la nécessité pour le gouvernement canadien de maintenir sa posture juridique sur le passage nord-ouest (PNO). Bien que ni la Russie ni la Chine n’aient encore remis en question les revendications canadiennes sur le PNO, le bouleversement géostratégique qu’a provoqué l’invasion de l’Ukraine en 2022 confirme l’intérêt canadien de préserver sa posture sur le détroit. Revendiquer la souveraineté du Canada sur le PNO vise à contrôler de manière non discriminatoire la navigation dans un environnement fragile. Si des alliés comme le Japon ou la Corée du Sud reconnaissent les aspirations canadiennes sur le PNO, Ottawa est encore confronté au refus de son proche allié américain et, dans une moindre mesure, de ses alliés européens. Washington refuse de créer un précédent sur les passages maritimes, mais il reste primordial pour le Canada d’obtenir le soutien des États-Unis sur ce dossier afin d’écarter définitivement le risque que le PNO devienne juridiquement un détroit maritime international. Si la menace climatique et les risques qui en découlent font consensus parmi les experts, l’acuité des menaces conventionnelles dans l’espace arctique canadien fait débat. Pour certains, la menace conventionnelle est à écarter en raison de la géographie de l’Arctique canadien (les grandes distances et le climat difficile réduisant les probabilités d’une offensive réussie d’un pays tiers), mais aussi car la Russie et la Chine n’ont jusqu’à ce jour formulé aucun intérêt stratégique pour l’Arctique canadien. Dans cette perspective, un conflit au nord du pays est peu probable. Pour d’autres, le manque d’investissements canadiens en Arctique crée des risques importants pour la sécurité nationale. Le Canada demeure aux prises avec des lacunes importantes en termes de surveillance et de détection des menaces conventionnelles et hybrides dans la région. Si les discours politiques ont contribué à la sécuritisation de la région, les vulnérabilités stratégiques persistantes pourraient à terme miner la crédibilité du Canada auprès de ses alliés et rendre sa dissuasion inefficace face à ses rivaux. D’autre part, ce manque de résilience et de capacités favorise le développement de menaces hybrides en raison du traditionnel problème d’attribution propre à la nature de ces menaces. En effet, même s’il est difficile de communiquer au public l’acuité des opérations de déstabilisation en raison de leur caractère sensible, celles-ci sont remarquées dans la région et le Canada doit élaborer des mécanismes efficaces permettant de les contrer par souci de sécurité et de souveraineté. Les alliés européens en Arctique La dégradation sécuritaire en Arctique depuis l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie et a entrainé un renforcement des postures norvégienne, suédoise, danoise et finlandaise dans la région. La guerre d’Ukraine n’entraîne donc pas une rupture fondamentale dans leurs positions en Arctique, à l’exception des demandes d’adhésion de la Suède et de la Finlande à l’OTAN. Cependant, la mise en veilleuse de la coopération circumpolaire, en raison de la suspension des travaux réguliers du Conseil de l’Arctique, crée de l’incertitude en matière de gouvernance, de sécurité et de coopération. Depuis 2014, la Russie est explicitement identifiée comme une menace dans les stratégies arctiques des pays nordiques. Cela dit, si en termes de dissuasion, les dynamiques d’acquisition et de modernisation militaires poursuivent les stratégies élaborées avant février 2022, mais subissent depuis le déclenchement de la « deuxième guerre » russo-ukrainienne une relative accélération. La tendance à la hausse des budgets militaires et des investissements dans les capacités arctiques apparaît dès 2014 et s’intensifie. Depuis février 2022, la Norvège a augmenté de 7,3 % son budget de défense pour 2023 et a annoncé un investissement matériel d’environ 500 millions de dollars. Les effectifs des forces armées au Finmark et sur la base navale de Ramsund seront renforcés et des fonds seront mis en place pour renforcer les forces armées dans le Nord afin d’entreprendre une modernisation d’envergure. En effet, Oslo veut que ce nouveau budget de défense donne la priorité au Nord afin de préparer le pays à l’éventualité d’un conflit direct avec la Russie. Le Danemark a quant à lui mis fin à sa clause de dérogation au sein de l’UE relative à la PSDC (Politique de Sécurité et de Défense Commune) afin de renforcer sa coopération sécuritaire avec ses alliés européens. Il a par ailleurs rappelé encore récemment que l’Arctique reste la plus importante priorité sécuritaire du pays. En mai 2022, le Royaume du Danemark et le Groenland ont mis en place un accord permettant de développer les programmes d’éducation militaire, d’augmenter les effectifs des forces armées et d’établir un poste de surveillance muni de radars aériens sur les îles Faroe. Le projet est estimé à 13 millions de dollars. La Finlande annonce dès 2014 sa volonté de se remilitariser face au comportement belliciste russe. En 2020, une augmentation de 54% de son budget de défense est effectuée et le pays démontre depuis une volonté continue de renforcer ses capacités de dissuasion en Arctique. Cependant, la guerre en Ukraine bouleverse fortement sa perception de la menace dans le Grand Nord. Effectivement, son rapport d’octobre 2022 sur l’Arctique annule sa stratégie de 2021 et signale un changement géopolitique dramatique dans la région. La Finlande accélère son processus de remilitarisation et renforce ses alliances militaires. En novembre 2022, la Finlande se munit de 80 missiles de précision américain pour une valeur d’environ 323 millions de dollars américains et fait une déclaration d’intention avec la Norvège et la Suède pour renforcer leur coopération dans le Grand Nord. Après l’exercice Cold Response de mars 2022, le pays annonce pour 2023 89 exercices militaires internationaux pour développer la coordination sécuritaire avec ses alliés dans le Grand Nord. Fin 2022, Helsinki annonce une hausse de son budget de défense pour 2023 de 20%, ce qui représenterait 2,25% du PIB de la Finlande. La Suède suit la même dynamique de remilitarisation depuis 2014. Le pays poursuit son programme Total Defence 2021-2025 établi en 2017 visant à préparer la Suède à l’éventualité d’une guerre. Sa demande d’adhésion à l’OTAN l’amène de fait à accélérer le processus de remilitarisation et de modernisation de ses forces armées. Si la Suède détient un intérêt sécuritaire traditionnel dans l’Arctique, son nouveau gouvernement déclare en décembre 2022 qu’il misera sur le développement de drones et de satellites afin d’obtenir des capacités de surveillance plus développées (en Arctique et ailleurs). En effet, le Premier ministre Kristersson a déclaré que la guerre en Ukraine avait confirmé la nécessité de développer des capacités permettant d’avoir une meilleure connaissance des intentions russes (en Arctique et ailleurs). Son budget de défense suit les mêmes tendances que ses voisins européens, alors qu’il était d’environ 5 milliards USD en 2021, celui de 2023 est annoncé à environ 9 milliards USD. Le renforcement de la posture de défense arctique de ces quatre pays mise sur l’augmentation des capacités d’ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), l’interopérabilité interalliée et la modernisation des équipements afin de protéger leurs infrastructures critiques en mer Baltique et de Barents, et plus largement de renforcer leur souveraineté dans la région. Ceci soulève des pistes de réflexion qu’Ottawa pourrait emprunter afin d’accélérer ses investissements militaires et réfléchir aux opportunités de développements conjoints de capacités, de manière à réduire ses vulnérabilités dans son espace arctique. Comme ses alliés européens, le Canada prévoit pour 2023 une hausse de ses dépenses militaires d’environ 5 milliards de dollars US. En effet, la guerre en Ukraine a renforcé la cohésion de l’Alliance Nord Atlantique et a consolidé un consensus quant à l’identification de la menace imminente – une Fédération de Russie révisionniste et belliciste – pour le Canada et ses alliés. En revanche, le gouvernement canadien ne prévoit pas respecter son engagement auprès de l’OTAN de hausser ses dépenses militaires à 2% du PIB. Tout au plus prévoit-il atteindre 1,59% en 2026. Ceci contraste avec les projections d’atteindre la cible des 2% en 2026 pour la Suède, en 2028 pour la Norvège et en 2033 pour le Danemark. Ainsi, le Canada est le seul État arctique qui ne prévoit pas dépenser 2% de son PIB en défense au cours de la prochaine décennie. Recommandations pour le Canada Face aux importantes vulnérabilités dans sa zone arctique, le Canada doit impérativement repenser son engagement au sein de ses alliances (NORAD et OTAN) pour maximiser sa sécurité nationale. En effet, malgré une volonté politique de développer le multilatéralisme dans l’espace arctique nord-américain, les efforts en la matière demeurent insuffisants pour pallier les vulnérabilités stratégiques qui risquent d’être renforcées par l’incertitude et l’instabilité provoquées par l’agression russe en Ukraine. Dans ce contexte, le Canada doit prioriser et accélérer la modernisation du NORAD. Si en juin 2022, le gouvernement canadien annonçait un investissement de 4,9 milliards de dollars pour moderniser le NORAD au cours des six prochaines années, la récente opération de surveillance chinoise dans l’espace aérien rappelle la nécessité et le retard de la modernisation du NORAD. Par exemple, si l’acquisition récente de drones de surveillance maritime en Arctique représente un pas dans la bonne direction, celle de drones armés n’est prévue que pour la fin de la décennie, après plus de 20 ans de discussions. De plus, malgré le désir de remplacer la flotte de sous-marins au cours des années 2030, aucun budget n’a encore été affecté à ce projet hautement dispendieux. Enfin, contrairement aux Européens et aux Américains, le Canada n’a pas développé de plans d’investissements accrus dans son industrie de la défense afin d’accroître la production de munitions nécessaires à mener la guerre de haute intensité. Au-delà des déclarations publiques, un fossé se creuse donc en matière de posture de défense vis-à-vis de ses alliés dans le contexte du retour de la concurrence entre grandes puissances. Le nouveau contexte géostratégique qu’impose la Russie pourrait être l’occasion pour Ottawa de mettre fin à cet écart de capacités. En effet, si en 2020, le refus affiché de doter le NORAD de capacités offensives a marqué un désaccord stratégique avec les États-Unis, le besoin du Canada de renforcer sa crédibilité et sa capacité de dissuasion en Arctique, mais aussi d’obtenir le soutien de Washington sur le dossier du PNO, devrait l’encourager soit à reconsidérer le développement de capacités offensives pour le NORAD et à intensifier ses investissements de niche dans les capacités défensives que représentent l’ISR. L’approfondissement de l’alliance avec les États-Unis est nécessaire et pourrait s’institutionnaliser par l’entremise de la Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense, de sorte à faire valoir plus activement ses besoins et intérêts au sein de l’OTAN. En effet, l’intégration future de la Suède et de la Finlande viendra donner une plus grande visibilité à la coopération de défense nordique (NORDEFCO) au sein de l’Alliance atlantique. Washington et Ottawa ont intérêt de coaliser leurs stratégies sur l’espace arctique afin de contrebalancer une approche sécuritaire strictement nord-européenne. Le renforcement du positionnement nord-américain permettrait à Ottawa d’œuvrer à une division plus claire du fardeau maritime et aérien avec ses alliés européens en contrepartie de son investissement dans la sécurisation de l’Atlantique Nord et de l’Arctique canadien. Pour ce faire, le Canada et les États-Unis doivent identifier clairement le rôle du NORAD comme flanc nord-ouest de l’OTAN et œuvrer en ce sens. L’approfondissement de la coopération sécuritaire entre les États arctiques de l’OTAN serait également l’opportunité pour Ottawa d’obtenir un soutien de ses alliés européens sur le dossier du PNO, ainsi que d’envisager une meilleure coordination pour la détection des menaces hybrides, le partage du renseignement et les acquisitions communes. Pour certains, il reste difficile d’appréhender immédiatement l’option d’une coordination circumpolaire en matière d’ISR, en raison de divergences géographiques et géostratégiques des espaces arctiques européens et nord-américains. Cependant, si l’Arctique canadien diffère en plusieurs points avec celui de l’Europe, le Canada, les États-Unis, le Danemark, la Norvège, la Finlande et la Suède partagent un même besoin impératif d’identification des menaces, de surveillance et de reconnaissance. Les différences relatives aux cultures stratégiques, aux contextes politiques et aux dynamiques socio-économiques ne devraient pas décourager ces États à concevoir un développement conjoint de capacités, une meilleure coordination de leurs activités et à faciliter une plus grande intégration de leurs initiatives de défense. [1] La table-ronde a eu lieu le 19 janvier 2023 et la série d’entretiens a été menée du 1er au 3 février 2023. ## Quelle stratégie pour l’Occident en Ukraine ? Le renoncement par défaut URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quelle-strategie-pour-loccident-en-ukraine-le-renoncement-par-defaut/ Modified: 2024-03-20 > En synthèse, « persiste et signe », avec au cœur un questionnement de fond sur la stratégie occidentale... Il y a un an, Le Rubicon me faisait l’honneur de publier un article intitulé « Ukraine-Russie : une guerre de 20 ans » développant l’idée que nous étions désormais à la moitié de ce conflit, à la fois pour des raisons intrinsèques dues aux caractéristiques propres de cet affrontement engagé fin 2013 et des raisons extrinsèques résultant de l’application du concept managérial de la courbe du changement au déroulement des guerres de manière générale. Qu’en est-il un an plus tard ? En synthèse, « persiste et signe », avec au cœur un questionnement de fond sur la stratégie occidentale. L’année 2022 a été marquée par le court-termisme de la conduite des opérations, de l’inattendue résistance initiale de l’Ukraine à sa victorieuse contre-offensive d’automne, accompagnée par l’aide conjoncturelle des États-Unis et de l’Europe au sens premier de « lié aux circonstances » : les Ukrainiens ont très largement eu leur destin entre leurs mains. L’année 2023 a été celle de la consolidation et de la structuration d’une aide dont l’Ukraine est désormais dépendante tant sur le plan militaire qu’économique, avec pour conséquence une marge de manœuvre plus réduite, comme l’a bien montré à la fois l’activisme diplomatique du président Zelensky et la pression politico-médiatique en faveur de la contre-offensive d’été. L’année 2024 sera celle de la soutenabilité de la guerre pour une Ukraine désormais tributaire des choix stratégiques occidentaux, lesquels ne cessent d’osciller entre mobilisation et renoncement. Ces tergiversations créent un flottement, naturellement favorable à une Russie qui assume ses choix et parvient à les faire accepter par son opinion publique, au point que la question est passée en quatre mois de « l’Ukraine va-t-elle reconquérir la Crimée ? » à « la Russie peut-elle gagner la guerre ? ». Toutefois, après avoir autant investi en Ukraine et fait de ce conflit une illustration de la lutte entre démocraties et autocraties, les États-Unis et les Européens peuvent-ils se permettre un revers ? La rationalité commanderait de répondre par la négative, mais les faits sont têtus : tous les éléments à notre disposition montrent un renoncement par défaut de l’Occident, faute d’une adéquate mobilisation. Afin de discuter cette problématique, nous remettrons en perspective la situation politico-militaire avant de développer les contraintes portant sur la dynamique du conflit et enfin d’analyser les orientations politiques en découlant pour les différents acteurs. *** Pour poursuivre la lecture, rendez-vous sur le site du Rubicon. ## Quelle unité transatlantique dans la crise ukrainienne ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quelle-unite-transatlantique-dans-la-crise-ukrainienne/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > S’il y a unicité dans la condamnation du révisionnisme russe, des différences sont perceptibles entre les alliés en raison de considérations_ Alors que la Russie et les États-Unis soufflent le chaud et le froid sur l’imminence d’une invasion russe de l’Ukraine, la prévention d’une agression russe repose sur deux piliers sur lesquels peuvent peser les Occidentaux : la diplomatie et la dissuasion. Pour que ceux-ci puissent espérer altérer les calculs russes, l’Occident doit surmonter ses divisions et parler d’une seule voix. Le très haut niveau de coordination entre alliés dans leurs réponses apportées à la Russie témoigne de cet impératif. Le mot d’ordre est clair : unité. Or, s’il y a unicité dans la condamnation du révisionnisme russe, des différences sont perceptibles entre les alliés en raison de considérations de politique intérieure et de leur degré variable d’exposition à la menace russe et aux conséquences d’une riposte robuste à une agression russe. En effet, en dépit d’une forte solidarité, des disparités demeurent sur quatre enjeux cruciaux : le soutien à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’Alliance atlantique, le soutien matériel à l’Ukraine, le déploiement de contingents militaires sur le flanc Est de l’OTAN et le soutien à des sanctions contre la Russie. Ces lignes de fractures risquent d’être exposées encore davantage dans l’éventualité de concessions importantes faites à la Russie ou de représailles robustes en cas d’agression russe. Soutien à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN  La communauté transatlantique a réitéré son soutien sans réserve à la protection de l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine et à la politique de la porte ouverte consacrée par l’article 10 du document fondateur de l’Alliance. L’Union européenne refuse l’idée d’un nouveau Yalta, opposant les blocs d’influence les uns contre les autres, et propose plutôt un nouvel Helsinki, garantissant la souveraineté et l’inviolabilité des frontières. Les demandes russes d’une zone tampon entre elle et l’Alliance et de la neutralité de l’Ukraine ont donc été jugées inacceptables tant par Washington que l’OTAN et l’UE. Pourtant, la promesse d’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN offerte lors du sommet de Bucarest en 2008 laisse perplexes plusieurs pays occidentaux. Officiellement, la demande russe de mettre un frein à l’élargissement oriental de l’OTAN, conformément à la ligne rouge fixée par le Kremlin, a été balayée du revers de la main par les membres de l’Alliance. Néanmoins, on observe dans les faits des approches diplomatiques contrastées sur la question. Le soutien diplomatique le plus ferme pour l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN vient de la Pologne et des pays baltes. Ces derniers sont prêts à soutenir une intégration accélérée de l’Ukraine au sein de l’Alliance, qu’ils considèrent comme une garantie de sécurité supplémentaire face à la Russie. La Roumanie soutient également les aspirations euroatlantistes de l’Ukraine, tout comme le Canada, qui défend fortement la candidature ukrainienne. Washington adopte une stratégie plus prudente. Le président Biden insiste sur le fait que Moscou ne pourra pas étouffer le souhait ukrainien d’intégrer l’Alliance. Toutefois, l’adhésion de l’Ukraine n’est pas une priorité pour son administration, qui souhaite plutôt concentrer son énergie dans l’Indopacifique. En plus de ne pas vouloir exacerber l’animosité russe, Washington estime que l’Ukraine a encore beaucoup de travail à faire afin d’être éligible, notamment en matière de lutte contre la corruption. Similairement, Londres appuie, à travers une déclaration de soutien, les aspirations de l’Ukraine pour intégrer l’OTAN. Ce soutien est cependant conditionné à la mise en place de plusieurs réformes d’ordre politique, économique et de défense. L’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN n’est pas à l’ordre du jour non plus pour le ministre des Affaires étrangères José Manuel Albares, conformément à la position de l’Espagne qui s’était opposée en 2008 au processus d’adhésion rapide de l’Ukraine dans l’OTAN. Quant à l’Italie, ses intérêts économiques et sa forte dépendance au gaz russe (46%) représentent un contrepoids important au soutien actif de Rome à la candidature ukrainienne. Si l’Italie soutient l’adhésion de l’Ukraine dans l’UE, elle reste néanmoins évasive quand il s’agit de l’OTAN. Paris et Berlin se sont tous deux également opposés à l’intégration de l’Ukraine dans l’OTAN en 2008, et ils négocient actuellement avec Kiev et Moscou dans le format Normandie, ce qui tend à restreindre leur soutien diplomatique pour prolonger la discussion avec la Russie. Le président Macron questionne ouvertement si l’ambiguïté entourant l’adhésion possible de l’Ukraine « ne nous est pas défavorable ». Similairement, la ministre des Affaires étrangères allemande considère l’entrée de l’Ukraine dans l’Alliance comme irréaliste, alors que le chancelier allemand estime que l’enjeu n’est pas à l’ordre du jour. De manière plus directe, par l’intermédiaire de son ministre de la Défense, la Hongrie s’est officiellement opposée à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine au sein de l’Alliance. Malgré la gravité de la crise ukrainienne, Viktor Orban semble privilégier le maintien de sa relation avec Moscou en dépit de la crise ukrainienne. La Hongrie n’est pas seule dans son camp. La Croatie s’oppose également à une appartenance de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN. L’Ukraine semble ouverte à certaines concessions afin d’éviter la guerre. Ceci pourrait inclure la possibilité de renoncer à la demande d’adhésion à l’OTAN, inscrite dans sa constitution. « Peut-être que la question des portes ouvertes est pour nous comme un rêve », a déclaré le président ukrainien. Sur cet enjeu crucial aux yeux de Moscou, un consensus assez fort parmi les alliés demeure sur le principe de la politique de la porte ouverte, mais des divisions demeurent sur la pertinence de Kiev de joindre l’Alliance à court et moyen terme. Soutien matériel à l’Ukraine Un second volet du soutien occidental à l’Ukraine est matériel. Puisque l’Occident redoute la guerre, si le dialogue ne parvient pas à faire advenir une sortie de crise par la voie diplomatique, renforcer les capacités militaires de l’Ukraine pourrait dissuader la Russie de passer à l’action. Cependant, ici aussi on observe des divergences sur la nature et l’ampleur du soutien offert. Les États-Unis, principal bailleur de fonds de l’Ukraine, soutiennent significativement Kiev, malgré leur refus, pour le moment, de déployer des systèmes terrestres de lancement de missiles offensifs sur le territoire ukrainien. Deux cargaisons américaines, respectivement de 80 tonnes et de 200 livres d’armement létal ont été livrées. Cette aide s’inscrit plus largement dans la stratégie globale américaine de renforcement des capacités de défense de l’Ukraine pour atténuer l’avantage militaire russe. Les États-Unis viennent d’approuver le transfert de 650 millions de dollars d’armes à l’Ukraine, soit le montant le plus élevé en une seule année depuis le début de l’aide internationale amorcée en 2014. Forts de l’appui américain, les pays baltes ont accéléré l’envoi d’armes de fabrication américaine en Ukraine. La Lituanie et la Lettonie offrent des missiles antiaériens Stinger, alors que l’Estonie fournira des systèmes de missiles antichars Javelin. La République tchèque fournira à l’Ukraine des dizaines d’obus d’artillerie et des équipements connexes d’une valeur de 1,7 million de dollars. Varsovie, qui craint directement pour sa sécurité avec les mouvements de troupes à la frontière biélorusse, a également pris la décision de fournir des munitions défensives ainsi que des missiles antiaériens et des mortiers légers. Le Danemark a également annoncé une aide de 25 millions de dollars pour permettre la modernisation des forces armées ukrainiennes. Le Royaume-Uni s’est engagé à fournir des systèmes d’armement léger et de défense antichar. En étant de courte portée, ces armes permettent selon Londres d’accroître la capacité d’autodéfense de l’armée ukrainienne en cas d’invasion. De l’armement antinavire devrait être aussi acheminé en Ukraine pour aider le pays à faire face à la Russie dans la mer Noire et d’Azov. Enfin, des forces spéciales forment les forces armées ukrainiennes, notamment pour utiliser le matériel. La France considère qu’un soutien direct et un investissement plus marqué amoindriraient ses chances de jouer un rôle central dans la désescalade du conflit. Toutefois, les contrats d’armement prévoyant la livraison de vingt patrouilleurs à l’Ukraine seront honorés par la société française Ocea. La Roumanie n’a pas évoqué l’envoi d’armes en Ukraine, mais un accord pour stimuler la coopération militaro-technique avec Kiev a été récemment signé. Il en va de même pour Ankara. Cependant, la proposition du gouvernement turc de devenir un médiateur dans le conflit est mise à mal par la vente de drones qui accroît grandement les capacités militaires de l’Ukraine. Les drones Bayraktar constituent l’un des armements les plus sophistiqués des forces ukrainiennes. D’autres pays se contentent d’un soutien militaire non létal. L’Allemagne a par exemple offert 5 000 casques pour les soldats ukrainiens, jugeant que « les livraisons d’armes ne contribueraient pas actuellement » à désamorcer la crise. Dans cette perspective, Berlin est allée jusqu’à bloquer l’envoi d’armes de manufacture allemande par l’Estonie. Similairement, le Canada a d’abord limité son soutien à des équipements militaires non létaux comme des gilets par balles. Après une longue réflexion, il s’est engagé à fournir également des armes de petit calibre d’une valeur de 7,8 millions de dollars. Ottawa a également consenti à déployer des dizaines de soldats additionnels afin d’accroître la formation des militaires ukrainiens. Les troupes canadiennes, devant demeurer dans l’ouest de l’Ukraine, c’est-à-dire là où les « risques sont les moindres », ont toutefois été retirées, à l’instar des troupes américaines et britanniques, en anticipation d’une attaque imminente de la Russie. Les alliés divergent ainsi sur la nature et l’ampleur de leur soutien à l’Ukraine. Les maximalistes ont offert de l’équipement militaire létal, les plus prudents ont seulement acheminé un soutien non létal, alors que bien d’autres ne se sont pas prononcés sur le transfert d’armes. Déploiements militaires Face à la détérioration de l’environnement européen de sécurité, certains membres de l’Alliance s’attèlent à accroître leur présence militaire dans les pays limitrophes à l’Ukraine. Si les États-Unis ont exclu un déploiement militaire renforcé en Ukraine en cas d’invasion russe, ils ont plutôt décidé de déployer environ 3 000 militaires en Pologne et en Roumanie. Ces soldats s’ajoutent aux 8 500 militaires américains placés en alerte par Washington. Similairement, le Royaume-Uni a annoncé le déploiement d’un contingent de 350 militaires en Pologne, qui viendra s’ajouter aux 100 soldats déjà présents, tandis que le HMS Prince of Wales à la tête d’un détachement maritime d’intervention rapide est toujours en alerte. Le Danemark a également déployé une frégate dans la mer Baltique et quatre avions de chasse en Lituanie. Les Pays-Bas vont aussi envoyer deux avions de chasse F-35 en Bulgarie dans le cadre des missions de police de l’air de l’OTAN dans la région de la mer Noire. La ministre française des Armées, Florence Parly, était à Bucarest pour rappeler l’éventualité d’un déploiement de plusieurs centaines de militaires français afin de renforcer la posture de dissuasion de l’OTAN en Roumanie, tout en proposant la candidature française pour être la nation-cadre de cette force à déployer. L’Allemagne, qui avait initialement refusé d’envoyer des militaires en Europe de l’Est, a finalement décidé de fournir un contingent de 350 troupes en renfort aux 500 soldats déjà sur place en Lituanie, en plus de lui vendre des systèmes d’artillerie Howitzer. Malgré une lutte politique pour déterminer le rôle du pays dans le renforcement des capacités de l’OTAN, le gouvernement espagnol a fait le choix d’envoyer six avions de combat Eurofighter et une frégate avec 220 militaires à son bord en Mer noire et en Bulgarie pour soutenir l’effort de dissuasion de l’OTAN. Le Canada, qui commande l’un des quatre groupements tactiques multinationaux de l’OTAN visant à rassurer les alliés et dissuader la Russie, continue de soupeser l’augmentation de sa présence militaire en Lettonie. Similairement, l’Italie n’a pas contribué au renforcement des capacités militaires de l’OTAN sur son flanc Est, mais s’est avancée encore plus loin, déclarant que l’Europe n’avait pas les capacités militaires pour dissuader la Russie. Ces deux pays pourraient donc être sollicités afin de contribuer davantage au renforcement des capacités de l’Alliance en Europe de l’Est. Alors que l’OTAN accroît ses troupes sur son flanc oriental, ceci est contesté au sein de certains pays visés. La Hongrie s’oppose au déploiement de troupes de l’OTAN sur son territoire. Selon son ministre de la défense, la Hongrie n’est pas menacée et ne souscrit pas à la « rhétorique de la guerre froide qui est utilisée, aux menaces et à la démonstration de force » de l’Alliance. La Bulgarie et la Slovaquie sont quant à eux plus équivoques. Le ministre bulgare de la défense a été rabroué par son premier ministre après avoir déclaré son opposition au redéploiement de troupes de l’OTAN en Bulgarie. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Slovaquie estime pour sa part peu probable que le parlement appuie le déploiement d’un contingent de 1 000 troupes de l’OTAN sur son territoire. Ces réticences sapent donc le consensus au sein de l’OTAN sur la possibilité « de positionner des groupements tactiques supplémentaires dans le sud-est du territoire de l’Alliance ». Sanctions contre la Russie Pratiquement tous les pays occidentaux promettent de lourdes sanctions contre la Russie en cas d’invasion de l’Ukraine. Cependant, si les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni peuvent imposer unilatéralement des sanctions contre la Russie, ce n’est pas le cas des 27 pays membres de l’UE, qui doivent se mettre d’accord sur des sanctions communes. Les intérêts divergents des États membres pourraient compliquer l’élaboration d’un régime de sanctions commun. Ni l’UE, ni le Royaume-Uni, ni les États-Unis n’ont dévoilé de régime de sanctions à ce jour, malgré la demande en ce sens de l’Ukraine. Le Sénat américain réfléchit à un ensemble de sanctions qui varient en intensité et peuvent théoriquement cibler les avoirs de personnes proches du Kremlin, les exportations de certaines technologies en Russie, les institutions financières russes, le secteur extractif russe, le financement extérieur de la dette russe, le pipeline gazier Nord Stream 2 (NS2) ou encore le bannissement de la Russie du système bancaire SWIFT. Si l’Allemagne s’est opposée à cette dernière option, Berlin a néanmoins évolué sur NS2 sans être toutefois limpide sur le sujet. La ministre allemande des Affaires étrangères a déclaré que l’Allemagne était prête à subir de sérieux coûts économiques si la Russie devait attaquer l’Ukraine. Le chancelier Olaf Scholz a avancé que l’Allemagne resterait « absolument unie » avec ses partenaires pour prendre les sanctions adéquates, sans jamais nommer NS2. Le président américain a quant à lui ouvertement déclaré que le pipeline ne serait jamais ouvert en cas d’invasion russe. Outre l’ambiguïté allemande, l’Élysée a affirmé que « les sanctions ne sont pas l’alpha et l’oméga de la réponse » et « ne doivent pas entraîner des répliques qui auraient un coût pour nous en boomerang ». Or, un régime de sanctions qui se veut efficace sera nécessairement douloureux économiquement pour le vieux continent et potentiellement déstabilisant pour l’économie globale en raison de la taille de l’économie russe. L’Autriche s’oppose à l’inclusion du NS2 dans le régime de sanctions de l’UE contre Moscou en représailles d’une invasion de l’Ukraine. La Hongrie a aussi déclaré que de nouvelles sanctions sur la Russie seraient vouées à l’échec et que les demandes sécuritaires russes sont raisonnables. On observe en outre de récentes discussions entre le président Poutine et des hommes d’affaires italiens, malgré la demande du premier ministre italien et de parlementaires d’annuler cette rencontre. Cela traduit la difficulté que les intérêts économiques représentent pour la mise en place d’un régime de sanctions sévère. Il faudrait aussi s’attendre à une réplique russe en cas de lourdes sanctions, probablement de manière hybride : instrumentalisation de migrants, cyber attaques, chantage avec le gaz, etc. Ainsi, malgré des promesses de sanctions sévères et coordonnées en cas d’agression russe, les coûts pour l’économie ou la stabilité énergétique de l’Europe (40% de ses importations gazières viennent de la Russie) risquent de compliquer l’instauration d’un régime de sanctions commun. Plusieurs alliés, dont l’Allemagne, ont « besoin d’être constamment cajolé » afin de se rallier à la posture américaine. Par ailleurs, le seuil requis d’agression russe pouvant entraîner l’adoption de « la mère de toutes les sanctions » reste à définir. Si une invasion totale de l’Ukraine fédérait sans aucun doute une réaction occidentale forte, qu’en serait-il d’une attaque hybride ? Serait-ce suffisant pour imposer des sanctions drastiques ? Plus encore, des mesures robustes pouvant faire mal aux autorités russes, telles que d’empêcher l’acquisition de propriétés en Occident et de bannir le financement russe de partis politiques occidentaux, ne sont pas envisagés. Conclusion L’Alliance atlantique et l’Union européenne affichent un front commun face à une possible agression russe. Cependant, une ligne de fracture divise les États selon qu’ils craignent davantage l’usage de force russe ou des sanctions contre la Russie, ainsi qu’en fonction de considérations de politique intérieure. Un premier camp regroupe la Pologne, les Pays baltes et, dans une moindre mesure, les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni, qui privilégient des politiques maximalistes : ils soutiennent l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’Alliance, fournissent des armes létales à l’Ukraine, favorisent des déploiements militaires accrus et soutiennent l’imposition de sanctions sévères en cas d’invasion russe. Un second camp rassemble des alliés ambivalents qui conjuguent des positions maximalistes sur certains enjeux et plus timides sur d’autres. La France propose un déploiement militaire significatif en Roumanie, mais demeure hésitante sur les autres dossiers. Le Canada soutient fortement l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, mais hésite à contribuer significativement sur le plan militaire. L’Allemagne, quant à elle, demeure prudente sur tous les dossiers, mais semble de plus en plus disposée à abandonner NS2 en cas d’invasion russe. Un troisième groupe d’alliés pourrait jouer les trouble-fêtes. Si l’Italie hésite sur l’ensemble des dossiers, c’est la Hongrie qui adopte une posture la plus critique. Elle s’oppose à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN et à des sanctions contre la Russie et n’offre aucun soutien militaire à l’Ukraine. Pire, elle entend plutôt accroître sa coopération avec la Russie. Cela dit, la minorité d’alliés qui demeure sceptique sur l’opportunité d’une riposte ferme contre la Russie pourrait subir de fortes pressions à se rallier à la majorité. Ceci est particulièrement le cas du renforcement des troupes de l’OTAN sur son flanc oriental, où une invasion russe de l’Ukraine amplifierait la solidarité euroatlantique. De plus grandes divergences sont envisageables en matière de sanctions économiques et financières, en raison de différentiel d’exposition aux coûts, ainsi qu’en ce qui a trait au soutien militaire à l’Ukraine, car, contrairement aux autres domaines, celui-ci ne fait pas l’objet d’une coordination transatlantique. L’enjeu qui suscite pour l’instant de plus grandes divisions porte sur l’appartenance (théorique) de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN. Vue par certains comme une clé de voûte à une sortie de crise pacifique, l’offre d’un statut de neutralité pour l’Ukraine est considérée pour d’autres comme un appel à d’autres agressions de la Russie. Les réactions vives aux velléités d’une « finlandisation » de l’Ukraine témoignent de la sensibilité du sujet au sein de la communauté euroatlantique. Toutefois, une invasion et une occupation russes de l’Ukraine rendraient caduc cet enjeu. Elle signalerait que seule l’appartenance à l’OTAN est gage de sécurité. Autrement dit, la Russie peut espérer soutirer davantage aux Occidentaux en maintenant sa menace d’invasion sans passer à l’action. Une fois la guerre entamée, les alliés constateront l’échec de la dissuasion et se concentreront sur une posture punitive, axée sur des sanctions et un renforcement de leur présence militaire aux frontières de la Russie. Certes d’intensité variable d’un allié à un autre, ces mesures de représailles seront accompagnées d’un élan de solidarité similaire à celui qui a suivi l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014.   ## Quelles leçons à tirer de la « seconde guerre russo-ukrainienne » ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quelles-lecons-a-tirer-de-la-seconde-guerre-russo-ukrainienne/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique revient sur les premières leçons pouvant être tirées de la seconde guerre russo-ukrainienne... Cette note stratégique revient sur les premières leçons pouvant être tirées de la guerre en Ukraine. Elle s’appuie principalement sur deux séminaires organisés par le RAS et ses partenaires en février et mars 2023 sur ce thème. À rebours de ce qu’annonçaient certains experts et bien qu’une partie de son territoire soit encore occupé, l’Ukraine a su résister et reconquérir plusieurs territoires – même si cela peut s’expliquer en partie à travers le soutien occidental et d’autres États comme le Japon – les derniers véritables gains territoriaux russes conséquents remontant à l’hiver 2022. Alors que ces mêmes experts insistaient sur l’asymétrie flagrante entre Kyiv et Moscou en termes économiques, démographiques ou encore de puissance militaire, asymétrie prédestinant l’Ukraine au statut de vaincu et la Russie à celui de vainqueur, les 16 derniers mois ont démontré le peu de pertinence de telles lectures superficielles. Pourtant les guerres du Vietnam et d’Afghanistan du siècle dernier, sans parler de celle d’Afghanistan du XXIe siècle, ont régulièrement démontré la vacuité de ce type d’analyse. Qui plus est, ceci est une leçon vieille de plusieurs siècles et que les guerres médiques du Ve° siècle avant notre ère avaient déjà démontré. Une écrasante supériorité numérique y compris entre un régime autoritaire et un régime démocratique – c’est-à-dire entre un système pouvant mobiliser aisément ses ressources du fait de la quasi-absence de contre-pouvoirs et de débats et un autre où ces deux éléments constituent son essence même – n’est en rien gage de victoire. Faits saillants Les seize derniers mois ont révélé les nombreuses et importantes erreurs stratégiques et tactiques russes. Celles-ci résultent de la prégnance de son idéologie sur la planification de son effort de guerre. Parallèlement, l’Ukraine a su rapidement s’adapter à l’agression de son territoire en raison de son avantage moral, de la collaboration des civils avec son armée et de la force de son logiciel militaire[1]. Bien que peu abordé depuis le début de l’invasion, il convient de ne pas mésestimer l’importance du domaine maritime. Les faiblesses structurelles de l’Ukraine dans ce domaine faisant suite entre autres à la guerre de 2014 ont grandement facilité la tâche à la Russie dans le cadre de ses préparatifs d’invasion et lui ont permis d’affaiblir Kyiv économiquement, l’Ukraine dépendant fortement du commerce maritime. L’enlisement actuel et la prolongation de la guerre sur le plan opérationnel s’expliquent essentiellement du fait de l’absence d’une supériorité aérienne établie par l’un des deux camps. Ceci démontre l’importance du domaine aérien et la nécessité pour les Alliés au sein de l’OTAN de réinvestir rapidement et intensivement dans leurs capacités aériennes, afin d’assurer une nette et dissuasive supériorité aérienne sur le flanc nord de l’Alliance. Ceci est nécessaire en matière de drones, mais aussi pour l’ensemble des systèmes d’armes et de détection indispensables aux stratégies de déni d'accès et d’interdiction de zone. Contrairement aux estimations de plusieurs experts, le domaine du cyber a été de moindre importance dans le conflit jusqu’ici et a plus agi en complément des moyens traditionnels dans le cadre des opérations menées, qu’elles soient offensives ou défensives.   ******   Introduction Plus d’un an après que la Russie ait déclenché de manière injustifiée la seconde guerre russo-ukrainienne[2], et alors que l’on assiste depuis quelques semaines au début d’une nouvelle offensive ukrainienne, cette note met en lumière certains enseignements pouvant être tirés du conflit, en particulier sur le plan militaire. L’argumentaire qui y est développé s’appuie principalement sur deux séminaires organisés par le Réseau d’analyse stratégique et ses partenaires en février et mars 2023 abordant ces deux aspects du conflit. Le premier séminaire se composait de deux tables-rondes et d’une conférence (avec Michael Kofman) portant sur les leçons stratégiques de l’efficacité militaire russe en Ukraine. La première table-ronde visait à tirer des leçons militaires de l’analyse des performances ukrainiennes, russes, mais aussi indirectement de l’OTAN dans divers domaines (avec comme intervenants, Eliza Gheorghe, Frans Osinga, Hanna Shelest et Alexander Lanoszka). La seconde table-ronde a permis de faire échanger plusieurs experts sur les perspectives d’après-guerre (celle-ci réunissant Jack Porter, Maria Popova, Oxana Shevel et Justin Massie). Le second séminaire, qui a eu lieu le 16 mars 2023 sous la forme d’une large discussion entre une dizaine[3] d’experts, s’est focalisé sur les scénarios de sorties de conflits pour l’année 2023, mais également sur les faiblesses et atouts stratégiques des deux belligérants. Plus d’un après le début du conflit, plusieurs observations militaires et stratégiques peuvent être formulées. Celles-ci ne se limitent pas seulement au champ de bataille et à l’échelon tactique. Le rôle dominant ou au contraire limité, mais également parfois variable dans le temps de certains domaines militaires (maritime, aérien, cyber) révèle à quel point ce conflit recèle d’enseignements, en cas de future guerre de haute intensité. Cette guerre démontre en outre à quel point les logiciels militaires des deux belligérants, mais aussi la résilience de la société ukrainienne sont des variables déterminantes de l’évolution de celle-ci et qu’à bien des égards l’infériorité numérique et en termes de puissance de feu ne détermine pas nécessairement le résultat d’un conflit. Les raisons de l’enlisement russe et la surprise ukrainienne À la suite de la première conférence, il est ressorti que la stratégie russe a été influencée par une perception biaisée de l’Ukraine. Le statut de leader que s’attribue la Russie dans son environnement régional et celui de vassal qu’elle donne à l’Ukraine a influencé la planification de cette guerre et n’a pas permis au Kremlin d’évaluer correctement les capacités de résistance ukrainienne. En effet, s’il est difficile d’établir des conclusions sur l’enlisement russe sur le champ de bataille, il semblerait néanmoins que son idéologie ait pris le pas sur une planification efficace de son effort de guerre. Pour les panélistes de la deuxième table-ronde du séminaire du 24 février, la préparation des forces ukrainiennes à une nouvelle invasion au cours des années 2014-2022 (soit suite à l’annexion de la Crimée et du Donbass) a été sous-estimée par les Russes. En effet, outre les ouvrages de défense militaires qu’elle avait construits, l’Ukraine avait adopté en 2021 le concept de résistance et de résilience nationale et avait déjà entamé un renforcement de sa sécurité informationnelle. Ces mesures ont permis de préparer la société à l’éventualité d’une attaque et in fine ont renforcé la résilience du système ukrainien et de sa société. En sous-estimant l’Ukraine et son peuple, Moscou a ainsi prétendu pouvoir conquérir Kyiv en deux semaines. Plus de quinze mois après l’invasion, il est plus qu’évident que la Russie a formulé des ambitions impérialistes supérieures à ses capacités militaires. Malgré l’ampleur de l’offensive et les réformes de l’armée russe datant d’avant le déclenchement de la guerre, Moscou n’a pas réussi à percer les lignes de front ukrainiennes. La planification stratégique ambiguë de son effort militaire et le manque de préparation de ses troupes ont rendu cette offensive laborieuse et peu concluante sur le terrain. Les déficits structurels causés par une réduction des groupes tactiques de ses forces armées et l’absence d’une supériorité aérienne[4] ont empêché de plus Moscou de détruire les centres de gravité stratégique de l’Ukraine. Les experts de la conférence et de la première table-ronde du 24 février ont par ailleurs insisté sur la surprise qu’a constituée la résistance ukrainienne. Contrairement aux forces russes, l’armée ukrainienne a démontré une véritable coordination de ses forces, ainsi qu’une flexibilité qui lui a permis de rapidement s’adapter à l’agression russe. Deux raisons essentielles expliquent la résilience de la résistance ukrainienne. Si le peuple ukrainien ne s’attendait certainement pas à une offensive de cette envergure, il s’était progressivement adapté à un climat d’insécurité imposé d’une part par l’annexion de la Crimée et d’une partie du Donbass en 2014, et d’autre part compte tenu de la guerre de basse intensité et des opérations de déstabilisation russe ayant eu lieu entre 2014 et 2022. Cette acclimatation au risque s’est justement concrétisée par l’adoption en 2021 du concept de résistance et de résilience nationale précédemment mentionné. Les Ukrainiens détenant clairement le statut d’agressé, certains experts expliquent que cette position leur permet de faire preuve d’une motivation et d’une résilience sans faille. Effectivement, la guerre déclenchée par les Russes n’a été provoquée d’aucune manière : en ce sens Kyiv détient un avantage moral sur Moscou. Celui-ci lui permet de mobiliser la majorité de sa population face à l’agression non provoquée subie, mais aussi d’obtenir un soutien sans équivoque de la majeure partie de ses alliés. À titre de comparaison, les narratifs relatifs à la guerre de Géorgie de 2008 ont souvent mis de l’avant la part de responsabilité du gouvernement géorgien dans le déclenchement du conflit, celui-ci étant à l’origine des opérations militaires en Ossétie du Sud (bien qu’il soit légitimement argué qu’il s’agissait là de son propre territoire et non d’une région russe). Pour en revenir à la guerre russo-ukrainienne l’Ukraine, celle-ci  s’avère existentielle pour la survie de l’Ukraine et de son peuple, et a donc de facto rendu son logiciel militaire plus robuste. Les autorités militaires et politiques ukrainiennes ont bénéficié de la contribution des civils à l’effort de guerre dès le déclenchement de la guerre. Michael Kofman a ainsi mis de l’avant le fait que les civils n’ont pas hésité à défendre leurs villes en attendant le déploiement organisé des troupes ukrainiennes au début de l’invasion. Ceci a permis au logiciel militaire ukrainien de se renforcer et de rapidement se développer. Celui-ci a continué à bénéficier de la contribution des civils – y compris et surtout dans le domaine du renseignement – ce qui témoigne d’une véritable coopération entre les forces armées et la population ukrainienne dans le cadre d’une guerre totale. Pour certains experts, cette configuration a fait la différence face à des troupes russes désorganisées et moins motivées. De plus, des récits faits par les prisonniers de guerre russe, il semble que nombre de militaires russes ignoraient clairement leurs destinations/objectifs, y compris quelques jours, voire heures avant l’invasion ou a minima n’avaient en leur possession que des briefings erronés leur promettant un accueil en libérateurs de la part des Ukrainiens. Pour Alexander Lanoszka, ceci constitue une véritable une leçon stratégique à prendre en compte : selon lui cette guerre témoigne en effet de l’importance du logiciel militaire (software), tout aussi essentiel – si ce n’est plus – que les équipements militaires (hardware). Toutefois, ainsi que l’ont démontré les intervenants de la dernière table-ronde du premier séminaire, les erreurs tactiques et stratégiques russes, mais aussi le manque de capacités et d’équipements du côté ukrainien ont fait basculer la guerre vers l’enlisement. La seconde phase des affrontements illustre cela, le Kremlin décidant de pallier son manque d’effectifs par des séries de bombardements à répétitions afin d’amenuiser la résistance ukrainienne en affaiblissant son arrière-front. Cette logique d’usure déjà observée en Syrie a pour conséquence un coût humain non négligeable pour les Ukrainiens, mais n’a pas pour autant permis aux Russes de faire des avancées territoriales significatives. Selon Michael Kofman, les erreurs stratégiques et tactiques russes ont finalement eu pour conséquence une crise de confiance au sein de son armée. Bien que les informations soient difficiles d’accès, un mouvement de résistance et de désertion au sein même de l’appareil militaire russe est soupçonné. Le récent raid avorté du chef de Wagner sur Moscou prétextant pour justifier celle-ci des trahisons au sein de l’état-major militaire russe et exigeant les démissions du chef d’état-major général Valery Gerasimov et du ministre de la Défense Sergueï Choïgou a démontré publiquement le niveau de perte de confiance et de méfiance au sein même des forces russes (celles-ci comprenant l’armée régulière, mais aussi les armées privées telle celle d’Evgueni Prigojine ou encore de Ramzan Kadyrov). Ces dernières se révèlent démoralisées face à une société ukrainienne engagée, prête à se défendre face à l’agresseur pour survivre. Oxana Shevel rappelle qu’après un an d’affrontement, c’est près de 90% de la population ukrainienne qui déclarait vouloir continuer à se battre malgré les menaces de frappes nucléaires régulièrement formulées par Poutine. En date du 12 juin, ce chiffre demeure presque inchangé, s’élevant à 84%. Certes la Russie détient un avantage démographique indéniable comme évoqué lors du deuxième séminaire. L’Ukraine a toutefois clairement et nettement l’avantage du moral. Ainsi que certains l’ont fait valoir lors de la table-ronde du 16 mars, l’une des forces de la Russie est en effet sa démographie, comparativement à l’Ukraine. Dans une logique d’usure, Moscou possède l’avantage, du fait de la quantité de troupes qu’il peut mobiliser. En revanche, l’écart de motivation entre les deux camps est flagrant. Pour diverses raisons, l’Ukraine – que cela soit ses élites ou sa population – démontre clairement sa volonté de continuer la lutte. Malgré cet avantage moral, il reste aujourd’hui difficile à déterminer si les motivations ukrainiennes reconnues par tous suffiront à repousser définitivement les forces armées russes étant donné l’avantage démographique de Moscou et son absence de considération pour ses propres pertes, comme le rappelle Ekaterina Piskunova. La conduite de la guerre et l’importance respective de certains domaines militaires (maritime, aérien et cyber) Ainsi que l’a rappelé Hanna Shelest, bien que la guerre russo-ukrainienne soit avant tout une guerre terrestre, le domaine maritime est loin d’avoir été un théâtre secondaire du conflit en termes stratégiques. L’importance du rôle maritime pour la préparation de l’offensive russe en février 2022 est en effet particulièrement notable. Compte tenu de ses importantes pertes en capacités militaires maritimes en 2014 suite à l’annexion de la Crimée, l’Ukraine n’a pu garantir une protection exhaustive et une évaluation efficace des menaces sur sa côte maritime. L’envoi d’équipements maritimes par les alliés de l’Ukraine qu’à partir de 2019 fut trop tardif et n’a pas permis à l’Ukraine de rattraper son déficit en matière de défense et de sécurité sur sa côte maritime. L’Ukraine étant économiquement très dépendante du commerce maritime (70% de ses exportations proviennent de la mer), ce déficit en capacité fut lourd de conséquences. Les Russes ont su en effet capitaliser sur cette faiblesse stratégique et cette dépendance économique : un mois avant l’offensive de février 2022, les ports ukrainiens furent d’ailleurs bloqués par les Russes. Ceci permet de souligner qu’il convient également de ne pas négliger l’étude de la phase de préparation ayant précédé l’invasion, celle-ci permettant de mettre ainsi en lumière des faiblesses du côté ukrainien. Pour Hanna Shelest, les carences de l’Ukraine dans le domaine maritime et l’approvisionnement tardif d’équipement militaire doivent par conséquent pousser la communauté d’experts à réfléchir au renforcement des capacités ukrainiennes dans ce domaine. L’importance du domaine maritime dans la phase de préparation du conflit ne doit pas cependant occulter la prédominance du domaine aérien. Selon Frans Osinga, c’est ce dernier qui se révèle prédominant pour le rapport de force dans cette guerre et qui permet d’ailleurs d’expliquer l’enlisement en cours, celle-ci résultant de l’absence d’une supériorité aérienne établie par l’un des deux camps. Comme souligné par Michael Kofman, les raisons pour lesquelles Moscou a refusé de frapper au début de l’offensive les infrastructures ukrainiennes demeurent encore aujourd’hui assez floues. Il semblerait que la conviction d’une prise rapide de l’Ukraine et de sa capitale n’ait pas poussé l’état-major russe à réfléchir au moyen d’établir une domination aérienne qui aurait permis d’affaiblir les capacités défensives aériennes de l’Ukraine. De plus, le manque de capacités offensives dans le domaine aérien (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses / Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses, SEAD/DEAD), mais aussi la carence en pilotes expérimentés expliqueraient l’absence de domination russe sur le domaine aérien et donc l’enlisement des deux belligérants sur le champ de bataille. À cet égard, Frans Osinga tend à estimer qu’à de rares exceptions près l’impact du domaine aérien sur la situation stratégique en Ukraine n’a pas encore été assez étudié, alors que celui-ci est selon lui décisif pour la fin des affrontements et donc potentiellement pour une sortie de crise. Ce constat devrait faire office de leçon stratégique pour un des experts, notamment pour les alliés de l’OTAN qui soutiennent l’Ukraine. Selon Frans Osinga, l’importance stratégique de ce domaine démontre que la majorité des alliés doivent réinvestir rapidement et intensivement dans leurs capacités aériennes après avoir pendant des décennies désinvesti dans celles-ci. La supériorité aérienne de l’OTAN sur son flanc nord doit être rétablie au plus vite pour dissuader tout débordement des affrontements russo-ukrainien ou encore toute tentative russe de nouvelle déstabilisation. Ceci suppose également pour les Alliés de développer de manière conséquente leurs capacités en matière de drones, et ce quelque soit leur taille ou fonction. La guerre a démontré en effet le rôle considérable – bien que non-décisif à lui seul – joué par ces derniers que cela soit pour des fonctions de renseignement, de transport, de combat, ou suicide. S’en prémunir est tout aussi nécessaire, la Russie y ayant désormais régulièrement recourt. Ceci rend d’autant plus indispensable le développement  et la mise en œuvre de stratégie de déni d’accès et d’interdiction de zone, s’appuyant sur divers systèmes d’armes et de détection. Concernant le cyber, ainsi que le rappelle Alexander Lanoszka, ce dernier a été de moindre importance dans le conflit. Ceci devrait amener à nuancer l’importance attribuée aux nouvelles technologies dans la conduite de la guerre moderne. En effet, malgré l’émergence de technologies disruptives et de leurs impacts sur la stabilité mondiale, leur rôle secondaire dans cette guerre permet de relativiser leurs importances stratégiques. Il y a certes des leçons à tirer de l’intégration de ces nouvelles technologies au système de communication et de contrôle ukrainien par exemple. Cependant, elles n’ont qu’un rôle palliatif aux domaines dits « classiques » de la stratégie militaire. Pour les experts de cette table-ronde, le domaine cyber ne peut les remplacer. Toutefois, les outils cybertechnologiques permettent de développer les offensives et les défenses relatives à ces domaines classiques. La faible place du cyber tend in fine à confirmer le caractère traditionnel de cette guerre, à l’inverse de la guerre moderne qui mobilise des stratégies hybrides sur des fronts très localisés et délimités. Ainsi que certains experts l’ont mentionné, la guerre russo-ukrainienne se révèle une guerre d’usure à caractère total qui se repose sur la dissuasion nucléaire, l’artillerie lourde et l’idéologie, et d’une certaine manière elle fait écho dans ses modalités aux affrontements du XXème siècle. Conclusion Alors qu’il est malheureusement plus que probable que cette guerre se poursuive au-delà de l’année en cours, l’analyse de celle-ci permet d’identifier certaines leçons pouvant être utiles pour les Occidentaux et leurs alliés (y compris dans d’autres régions du monde, comme en mer de Chine). Il est évident à cet égard que l’idéologie impérialiste russe a poussé les élites et le pouvoir russes à formuler des ambitions politiques plus grandes que ses moyens militaires. Conséquence de cet aveuglement, le manque d’organisation et de planification de l’effort de guerre russe a rapidement fait glisser « l’opération spéciale » en guerre longue où enlisement et logique d’usure sont devenus des réalités. Parallèlement à l’influence néfaste de l’idéologie impérialiste russe, il est à noter la surprise qu’a constituée pour nombre d’experts la résistance nationale ukrainienne. Ceci met en lumière l’importance du logiciel militaire au sein d’une société et d’un État, ce dernier étant un facteur tout aussi déterminant que les systèmes d’armes à disposition. D’un point de vue tactique, plusieurs enseignements peuvent également être tirés du conflit. Si le domaine maritime a été capital dans le cadre de la préparation et de la phase initiale de la guerre, cela a ensuite été le cas du domaine aérien compte tenu de l’évolution des affrontements. Bien que l’importance du maritime et de l’aérien sont à souligner, il convient également de noter le rôle plus limité du cyber, et ce à rebours des prévisions et réflexions sur les futurs conflits. Peut-on pour autant estimer que cela serait le cas des guerres à venir ? À titre d’exemple, la nouvelle loi de programmation militaire française montre qu’au sein des armées et des élites françaises, l’analyse tend plutôt à considérer le cyber comme un élément majeur des affrontements à venir, d’où l’accroissement des crédits dans ce domaine. Ces premières leçons et constatations doivent cependant être considérées pour ce qu’elles sont, à savoir des analyses préliminaires. La guerre est en effet loin d’être terminée et ainsi que le mentionnaient les experts du second séminaire, du fait des motivations russes à l’origine de la guerre, les perspectives de paix sont plus que faibles pour les prochains mois. De plus, il est encore trop tôt pour espérer que les troubles intérieurs en Russie, dont la mutinerie de Wagner contre l’état-major militaire russe, aient un impact favorablement pour ce qui est d’une instauration d’une paix négative ou positive. Il est certain que les clivages au sein de l’appareil politico-militaire russe auront des effets sur le champ de bataille susceptibles de favoriser les Ukrainiens. Mais pour en revenir aux leçons pouvant être tirées de ce conflit, ainsi que l’illustre le domaine aérien, l’importance de certains secteurs peut varier au cours d’un conflit, tout comme la volonté de résistance et la mobilisation d’une société. Il convient donc de prendre en compte ces premières analyses/leçons, mais d’éviter de les considérer comme des leçons définitives de cette guerre.     [1] Traduction libre du terme military software se référant à tous les dispositifs et programmes mis en place pour planifier et lancer une offensive ou une défense face à un adversaire en temps de guerre. [2] Le terme seconde guerre russo-ukrainienne est utilisé afin de mettre de l’avant la rupture engendrée par l’invasion illégale et non provoquée de l’Ukraine par la Russie en février 2022. En effet, si la guerre à l’est de l’Ukraine n’a pas réellement cessé depuis 2014 malgré les accords de Minsk de 2015, février 2022 marque un tournant dans la conflictualité russo-ukrainienne. [3] Comprenant pour intervenants Dominique Arel, Laurent Borzillo, Yann Breault, Magdalena Dembinska, Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, Heidi Hardt, Justin Massie, Falk Ostermann, Ekaterina Piskunova et Olivier Schmitt. [4] La supériorité aérienne est jugée par les stratèges militaires en Occident comme une condition sine qua non à toutes offensives extraterritoriales. ## Quels avantages ou risques en matière de sécurité avec l’IA? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/quels-avantages-ou-risques-en-matiere-de-securite-avec-lia/ Modified: 2026-08-05 Policy Forum Politique est une série de publications visant à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’avis d’experts sur un sujet d’importance pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Pour cette septième édition, nous avons demandé à quatre experts de nous faire part de leur point de vue sur la question suivante : En juin 2026, le Canada a dévoilé sa nouvelle stratégie en matière d’intelligence artificielle (IA). Bien que cette stratégie fasse largement état des avantages économiques liés à l’adoption de l’IA, elle reste muette sur les considérations sécuritaires ou militaires, même si elle préconise certaines capacités souveraines. Quels avantages ou risques en matière de sécurité le gouvernement du Canada devrait-il prendre en compte lorsqu’il réfléchit à l’IA? Matthew da Mota (Canadian Shield Institute) La nouvelle stratégie canadienne en matière d’IA promet des possibilités et préconise le développement de capacités souveraines, mais elle traite la souveraineté comme une question industrielle axée sur la puissance de calcul, les micropuces, les modèles et les centres de données. Cette perspective confond propriété et contrôle. La souveraineté qui importe est d’ordre épistémique, et elle repose sur la gouvernance : la capacité de définir les conditions selon lesquelles l’IA s’intègre aux institutions qui détiennent le savoir du Canada, et de préserver le jugement humain qui vérifie la qualité de ce savoir. L’IA générative sape ces deux aspects. La désinformation et les « deepfakes » sont peu coûteux à produire; les individus peuvent se replier sur des machines privées de rétroaction flagorneuses; et il suffit d’un nombre étonnamment faible d’entrées malveillantes pour corrompre un modèle d’IA largement utilisé. C’est la confiance dans l’information elle-même qui est en jeu. Un adversaire n’a pas besoin de vaincre le Canada sur un champ de bataille où l’IA est mise à contribution; il lui suffit de pousser les Canadiens à se méfier de leurs propres connaissances. Or, les modèles sur lesquels repose cet environnement dépendent de quelques entreprises privées étrangères, qui échappent à la gouvernance canadienne. Une plus grande souveraineté informatique n’y changerait rien. L’armée n’est pas épargnée. À mesure que l’IA s’intègre dans la boucle décisionnelle, elle risque de nuire au jugement qu’elle est censée soutenir, par le biais de biais, d’une atrophie des compétences et d’une responsabilité floue lorsque les décisions sont éclairées, ou prises, par des acteurs non humains. Un danger encore plus profond réside dans le fait de succomber à la tentation de remplacer des systèmes de connaissances durement acquis et éprouvés par des systèmes automatisés avant même de saisir ce que nous sommes en train de céder. Ce problème est aggravé par le fait que nous ne comprenons pas comment l’IA va remodeler l’espace de combat. Nous ne pouvons donc pas juger dans quelle mesure nous pouvons nous y fier. En s’y engageant trop, le Canada s’expose à ces risques; en s’y engageant trop peu, il cède du terrain stratégique. Le plus grand risque pour la sécurité, mais aussi la plus grande occasion, que présente l’IA réside dans son potentiel à transformer de façon irréversible l’environnement du savoir. La capacité souveraine doit impliquer la gestion du flux de connaissances et la préservation délibérée du jugement humain indépendant — une infrastructure du savoir suffisamment résiliente pour soutenir l’IA et qui ne serait donc pas compromise par celle-ci. Concrètement, Ottawa devrait investir dans une infrastructure publique de recherche et de données digne de confiance — des dépôts sécurisés dont la provenance est vérifiable et dont l’intégrité est protégée — et établir des modalités de gouvernance régissant la manière dont l’IA est acquise et intégrée dans les institutions publiques, en trouvant un équilibre entre la sécurité de la recherche et la science ouverte. Poser d’abord ces fondements permet d’intégrer l’IA à une base de connaissances à laquelle les Canadiens peuvent faire confiance, plutôt que d’adopter l’IA pour ensuite seulement tenter de donner un sens aux systèmes hybrides homme-IA qu’elle crée. » Matthew da Mota est directeur de recherche en technologies émergentes et sécurité nationale au Canadian Shield Institute. Ses travaux portent sur la manière dont les technologies émergentes et l’évolution de la dynamique géopolitique redéfinissent la gouvernance, le savoir et la souveraineté, en mettant particulièrement l’accent sur les répercussions de l’intelligence artificielle et des infrastructures numériques sur la sécurité nationale. Balkan Devlen (Institut de Montréal pour la sécurité mondiale) La nouvelle stratégie d’Ottawa en matière d’IA est un document bien conçu qui aborde un problème bien précis. Elle vise à inciter davantage d’entreprises à adopter l’IA, à accroître la puissance de calcul sur le sol canadien et à réduire la dépendance vis-à-vis des nuages étrangers. Cependant, sa conception de l’exposition se limite aux centres de données et aux chaînes d’approvisionnement, et sa conception de la protection des Canadiens se limite à la vie privée et aux préjudices en ligne. Certes, ce sont là des préoccupations réelles, mais ce ne sont pas celles qui empêchent de dormir les milieux de la sécurité et du renseignement, tant au Canada que chez nos alliés. Les risques qui font de l’IA avancée un enjeu de sécurité nationale plutôt qu’un dossier de politique industrielle sont ceux qui pourraient s’avérer irréversibles. L’Institut pour la politique et la stratégie en matière d’IA les regroupe en trois catégories : la perte de contrôle, où des systèmes performants échappent à la surveillance humaine; la concentration extrême du pouvoir, où celui qui maîtrise en premier ces systèmes s’assure un avantage qu’aucun rival ni aucun électorat ne pourra contester par la suite; et la guerre entre grandes puissances, où la course elle-même — par erreur d’appréciation, action préventive ou instabilité liée à la course aux armements — prend une tournure cinétique. D’autres ajoutent une quatrième préoccupation : l’utilisation abusive catastrophique ou malveillante — pensez aux armes biologiques basées sur l’IA ou à la subversion de masse par le biais d’une guerre politique hyper-individualisée à grande échelle. Il ne s’agit pas là d’histoires de science-fiction transposées dans le domaine politique. Trois de ces risques sur quatre (à l’exception de la perte de contrôle) peuvent devenir réalité avant même que les systèmes d’IA ne surpassent l’intelligence humaine. Le Bureau du Conseil privé a coorganisé avec le CIGI un exercice de simulation qui a permis aux responsables de se familiariser avec ces risques et qui a conclu que les gouvernements doivent se préparer dès maintenant à l’arrivée, d’ici cinq ans, de systèmes dotés d’une intelligence équivalente à celle des humains ou surhumaine. Plus de trente députés et sénateurs de tous les partis ont qualifié la superintelligence de priorité en matière de sécurité nationale. L’objection évidente — le Canada ne développera pas d’intelligence artificielle générale (AGI), alors pourquoi s’y préparer? — repose sur un raisonnement erroné. C’est précisément parce que nous ne la développerons pas que nous avons toutes les raisons de façonner les règles et les résultats tant que nous le pouvons encore. Une stratégie à 360 degrés aurait identifié ces quatre risques comme des enjeux de sécurité pour le Canada et leur aurait attribué un mandat et un budget. Les États qui traitent l’IA avancée uniquement comme un dossier d’adoption seront régis par des décisions prises ailleurs. Espérons que la Stratégie de sécurité nationale tant attendue abordera ces questions. Balkan Devlen est chercheur principal en prospective stratégique à l’Institut de Montréal pour la sécurité mondiale (MIGS), chercheur principal à l’Institut Macdonald-Laurier (MLI) et professeur de recherche associé à l’Université Carleton. Jennifer Irish (Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory) & Dave McMahon (Clairvoyance Corp) Les progrès rapides de l’IA transforment le secteur canadien de la sécurité, du renseignement et de la défense. L’IA est à la fois un catalyseur et un facteur de bouleversement, et la capacité du Canada à maximiser ses avantages tout en réduisant les risques dépendra non seulement de sa stratégie en matière d’IA, mais aussi d’investissements complémentaires dans la sécurité, l’intégrité de l’information, la résilience et des partenariats de confiance. L’IA offre des possibilités considérables pour progresser davantage dans l’analyse des mégadonnées, la curation et l’évaluation du renseignement, la cybersécurité, les opérations de défense et la prise de décision fondée sur l’évaluation des risques. Parallèlement, le Canada est confronté à un environnement de menaces de plus en plus complexe, où la technologie est un élément déterminant de la concurrence et des conflits géopolitiques. L’IA générative permet la création de « deepfakes », de médias synthétiques et de campagnes de désinformation à grande échelle qui sapent la confiance du public. Elle peut également faciliter la répression transnationale, l’exploitation en ligne, la manipulation financière et des cyberattaques de plus en plus sophistiquées. Il existe un potentiel considérable et inexploité pour tirer parti de l’IA afin de détecter les cybermenaces, de contrer la manipulation de l’information et l’ingérence étrangères, de renforcer la résilience des infrastructures essentielles et d’améliorer la capacité du Canada à répondre à ces menaces émergentes. Une stratégie crédible en matière d’IA doit trouver un équilibre entre l’innovation et les mesures visant à contrer la désinformation et la manipulation de l’information rendues possibles par l’IA. Une première priorité pour le Canada consiste à se doter de capacités d’IA sécurisées et souveraines en développant les données nationales fiables, la capacité de calcul et l’infrastructure numérique, ainsi qu’une capacité souveraine de collecte de renseignements. Ces investissements réduiront la dépendance à l’égard des technologies étrangères pour les applications critiques en matière de sécurité nationale, tout en renforçant la résilience et la compétitivité économique. La collaboration internationale, y compris les approches fédérées avec des partenaires de confiance comme ceux d’Europe, peut être bénéfique pour compléter (et non remplacer) les capacités souveraines canadiennes, pourvu que l’ouverture d’Internet ne soit pas sacrifiée. Le succès dépend également d’une collaboration étroite entre les gouvernements, l’industrie, le milieu universitaire, la société civile et les alliés pour contrer les cyberattaques et les attaques informationnelles, soutenue par des méthodologies et des normes communes en matière de menaces, des plateformes sécurisées de partage de l’information, ainsi que des stratégies et des guides d’intervention harmonisés. Nous devrions continuer à explorer des options pour réglementer le développement de l’IA sans étouffer l’innovation. La stratégie canadienne en matière d’IA constitue une bonne base. Le prochain défi consiste à traduire les objectifs stratégiques en capacités opérationnelles grâce à des investissements soutenus, à des initiatives ciblées de lutte contre la désinformation, à un renforcement de la sécurité de la recherche, à une cyberdéfense coordonnée et à des partenariats durables qui garantissent que l’IA renforce à la fois la sécurité et la prospérité à long terme du Canada. Jennifer Irish est professeure auxiliaire à l’Université d’Ottawa (Telfer) et directrice de Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory. Ancienne diplomate canadienne, elle a été directrice fondatrice du Laboratoire de l’intégrité de l’information de l’Université d’Ottawa. Dave McMahon est chef de la direction de Clairvoyance Corp et chef de l’intelligence chez Sapper Labs. Dave a également occupé divers postes de direction au sein des Forces armées canadiennes, du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS) et du Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST). Crédit image: Planetmiko via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0. ## Quitter le club des profiteurs : Leçons de la Belgique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/abandonner-le-club-des-profiteurs-lecons-de-la-belgique/ Modified: 2025-05-30 Si les tensions liées au partage inégal des charges au sein de l'OTAN sont presque aussi anciennes que l'alliance elle-même, les « profiteurs » n'ont jamais été autant critiqués que depuis le retour de Donald Trump à la Maison Blanche. Pendant la campagne électorale, Trump a déclaré sans ambages que Vladimir Poutine pouvait « faire tout ce qu'il voulait » avec les pays de l'OTAN qui ne respectaient pas leurs engagements en matière de dépenses. Bien qu'il n'ait pas réitéré cette remarque depuis son entrée en fonction, son administration a clairement indiqué que les alliés devaient se mobiliser et respecter leurs obligations. Il est important de noter que Trump n'est plus le seul à faire pression pour une augmentation des dépenses. Les alliés d'Europe de l'Est, qui se sentent le plus directement menacés par l'agression russe, ont commencé à se faire l'écho de cette demande. La Pologne et l'Estonie, par exemple, ont publiquement approuvé l'objectif de 5 % dès janvier 2025. Le Premier ministre polonais Donald Tusk a clairement exprimé cette frustration en déclarant qu'« à l'heure actuelle, 500 millions d'Européens supplient 300 millions d'Américains de les protéger contre 140 millions de Russes ». De même, le secrétaire général de l'OTAN, Mark Rutte, plaide en faveur d'un nouvel objectif de dépenses pour l'OTAN depuis le début de son mandat, avertissant que l'objectif de 2 % n'est plus suffisant pour relever les défis sécuritaires à venir. À l'approche du sommet de l'OTAN à La Haye, la dynamique s'accélère en faveur d'un objectif de dépenses plus ambitieux, susceptible de dépasser le seuil actuel de 2 % du PIB. Un nouveau seuil de 5 % est envisagé, comprenant environ 3,5 % de dépenses directes de défense et 1,5 % supplémentaires pour soutenir les infrastructures et les besoins plus larges en matière de sécurité. Pour les profiteurs traditionnels de l'OTAN, l'issue est claire : les budgets de défense devront augmenter, et rapidement. Mais l'augmentation des dépenses militaires dans un délai aussi court s'accompagne de défis politiques, institutionnels et logistiques complexes. La Belgique, notre propre pays, a commencé à prendre des mesures dans ce sens et, ce faisant, a mis en évidence le type de frictions et de contraintes auxquelles d'autres pays, comme le Canada, pourraient bientôt être confrontés. Le deuxième choc a-t-il réveillé la Belgique ? La réélection de Trump marque le deuxième choc majeur pour les alliés de l'OTAN en moins de trois ans. Le premier s'est produit le 24 février 2022, lorsque les troupes russes ont franchi la frontière ukrainienne. Cette invasion a déclenché une vague de « prises de conscience » géopolitiques et de déclarations de Zeitenwende à travers l'Europe. Mais le choc a eu des effets inégaux au sein de l'alliance. Les pays les plus proches de la Russie, dont beaucoup investissaient déjà massivement dans leurs armées, ont considérablement augmenté leurs budgets de défense. Les États baltes visent désormais à consacrer 5 % de leur PIB à la défense dans un avenir proche. La Pologne a augmenté ses dépenses de défense de 2,7 % en 2022 à 4,2 % en 2024, et d'autres augmentations sont prévues. Les pays d'Europe du Nord ont également augmenté leurs investissements et ont commencé à (ré)introduire des approches globales de « défense totale ». À l'autre extrémité du spectre se trouvent les « profiteurs » de l'OTAN : les alliés qui ne consacrent qu'une fraction de leur PIB à la défense. Beaucoup d'entre eux n'ont procédé qu'à des ajustements modestes après l'agression de la Russie contre l'Ukraine en 2022, restant loin de l'objectif de 2 %. Notre propre pays, la Belgique, fait partie de ces profiteurs obstinés. Dans les cercles politiques belges, on dit souvent que nous sommes « le pire élève de la classe de l'OTAN ». Bien qu'elle héberge le siège de l'Alliance, la Belgique n'a pas respecté ses engagements depuis longtemps. L'année dernière, elle n'a consacré que 1,2 % de son PIB à la défense, soit une augmentation de seulement 0,2 point de pourcentage par rapport à 2022. De plus, le gouvernement précédent ne visait à atteindre l'objectif de 2 % fixé par l'OTAN qu'en 2035. La Belgique se retrouvait ainsi à la traîne derrière d'autres pays traditionnellement peu performants comme l'Espagne, l'Italie et le Canada, qui s'étaient tous engagés à respecter la norme des 2 % au plus tard en 2030. Il est clair que la guerre en Ukraine n'a pas entraîné de véritable changement dans la politique de défense belge. La Belgique était peut-être vraiment le « plus mauvais élève » de l'OTAN. Mais peu après le retour de Trump à la Maison Blanche, la Belgique a également mis en place un nouveau gouvernement. Cette coalition s'est engagée à mettre fin à ce que le ministre de la Défense Theo Francken a qualifié de « période de honte nationale ». L'accord de coalition visait initialement à atteindre l'objectif de 2 % d'ici 2029, avançant ainsi l'échéance de six ans. Puis, en mars, le gouvernement a de nouveau révisé son calendrier, annonçant qu'il atteindrait déjà cet objectif cette année. Est-ce le changement de gouvernement qui a finalement poussé la Belgique à agir ? Cela a certainement donné une impulsion, mais cela ne peut être la seule explication. Trois des quatre partis de la coalition faisaient déjà partie du gouvernement précédent. Le seul nouveau venu est la N-VA, un parti nationaliste flamand de centre-droit qui détient désormais le portefeuille de la défense. Mais cela ne constitue pas une rupture décisive avec le passé : la N-VA faisait déjà partie du gouvernement après le sommet du Pays de Galles en 2014 et détenait même le ministère de la Défense pendant une période de baisse des budgets. Il semble plutôt que ce soient les tensions transatlantiques croissantes qui aient donné l'impulsion finale. Après tout, des pays comme l'Espagne et l'Italie se sont également engagés récemment à atteindre l'objectif de 2 % cette année. Quelle que soit la cause précise, le club des resquilleurs européens pourrait enfin être en train de se réduire. Les défis liés à l'augmentation rapide des dépenses militaires Le gouvernement belge s'est engagé à atteindre la norme de 2 % des dépenses de défense fixée par l'OTAN d'ici la fin de l'année. Si la réalisation de cet objectif peut s'avérer insuffisante à terme, elle pose déjà des défis considérables. Ceux-ci ne feront que s'intensifier si l'objectif est revu à la hausse. Le premier défi est simple : comment financer de manière durable l'augmentation des dépenses de défense ? La création d'une marge de manœuvre budgétaire est un dilemme auquel tous les alliés de l'OTAN sont confrontés lorsque la nécessité d'augmenter les budgets de défense se fait sentir. Comme nous l'avons souligné dans une récente note d'orientation pour l'Institut royal des relations internationales d'Egmont, notre enquête auprès d'experts en sécurité nationale à travers l'Europe a révélé une grande diversité de stratégies budgétaires. L'Allemagne, la France et la Pologne ont principalement recours à l'endettement, une solution à court terme qui reporte les décisions structurelles. La Suède et les Pays-Bas ont opté pour des réaffectations budgétaires, tandis que les États baltes, confrontés à des menaces plus importantes, se sont montrés plus disposés à augmenter les impôts. La Belgique, pour sa part, s'est principalement appuyée sur des mesures temporaires pour atteindre l'objectif de 2 % fixé par l'OTAN d'ici 2025. Cela comprend 1,2 milliard d'euros provenant des taxes sur les bénéfices des actifs russes gelés détenus chez Euroclear, un dividende unique de 500 millions d'euros versé par la banque publique Belfius, 125 millions d'euros provenant de la reclassification de dépenses existantes en dépenses liées à la défense, et environ 2 milliards d'euros de prêts, qui ne sont pas inscrits au budget ordinaire suite à la décision de la Commission européenne d'assouplir les règles budgétaires de l'UE. S'appuyant principalement sur des mesures provisoires à court terme, la Belgique reste confrontée à un défi budgétaire structurel. Avec un déficit budgétaire préexistant important et une dette publique représentant 107 % du PIB, le maintien d'une augmentation des dépenses de défense nécessitera des décisions politiquement douloureuses. Ces décisions politiquement douloureuses ne seront pas faciles à prendre, étant donné que les dépenses de défense n'ont jamais été une priorité pour le public ou les élites politiques belges, principalement en raison de la position géopolitique de la Belgique. Située au cœur de l'Europe et entourée de nations amies, la Belgique se sent moins exposée à la menace d'une Russie renaissante que les pays d'Europe de l'Est. Même aujourd'hui, il n'existe aucun consensus entre les partis au pouvoir sur le dépassement du seuil de 2 %. Les chrétiens-démocrates flamands et wallons semblent tous deux opposés à cette idée. Le président des chrétiens-démocrates flamands a déjà déclaré que 2 % devrait être la limite maximale, tandis que le ministre wallon des Affaires étrangères, Maxime Prévot, souhaitait former une « coalition des réticents » pour s'opposer à l'objectif de 3,5 % ou 5 % fixé par l'OTAN. Un troisième défi, souvent négligé, consiste à dépenser efficacement les nouveaux budgets alloués à la défense. Les pays qui ont tardé à augmenter leurs investissements dans la défense se retrouvent désormais en queue de peloton en matière d'approvisionnement. D'autres, qui ont agi plus tôt, ont déjà obtenu des créneaux de production pour des systèmes critiques. Des pays comme la Belgique doivent faire face à des contraintes en matière de capacité industrielle de défense, un problème que l'UE commence à traiter en augmentant la production et en mettant en place des incitations industrielles. Les défis liés à la fin du parasitisme : les leçons tirées de l'expérience belge L'engagement récent de la Belgique à atteindre l'objectif de 2 % cette année souligne à la fois l'urgence et les défis importants que représente l'augmentation rapide des dépenses militaires. Le Canada se trouve dans une situation similaire, avec une marge de manœuvre budgétaire limitée et une dette publique dépassant 100 % du PIB. Pour atteindre et maintenir des dépenses de défense plus élevées, il faudra prendre des décisions politiquement difficiles, qu'il s'agisse de réductions des dépenses, d'augmentations d'impôts ou d'investissements financés par l'endettement. En Belgique, les choix budgétaires structurels ont été largement reportés. Le pays s'est appuyé sur des mesures temporaires pour atteindre l'objectif de 2 %. Ces solutions provisoires peuvent suffire à court terme, mais elles éludent le débat politique crucial sur l'intégration des dépenses de défense dans la planification budgétaire à long terme. Aux obstacles budgétaires existants s'ajoute l'absence de perception d'une menace forte parmi le grand public. Cela pourrait rendre plus difficile le maintien du soutien de la population à l'augmentation des dépenses de défense. Même lorsque la volonté politique et le financement sont alignés, les pays qui ont tardé à adopter cette approche, comme la Belgique et le Canada, se heurtent à des difficultés pratiques. L'expérience de la Belgique offre des enseignements précieux : un espace budgétaire limité exige une planification structurelle à long terme, le soutien du public ne peut être tenu pour acquis et les goulets d'étranglement industriels ne se résoudront pas d'eux-mêmes. Pour se débarrasser de l'étiquette de « profiteur », il ne suffit pas d'augmenter les dépenses, il faut les maintenir, les justifier et les utiliser efficacement. À propos des auteurs Michelle Haas est doctorante à l'Institut d'études internationales et européennes de Gand. Tim Haesebrouck est professeur adjoint à l'Institut d'études internationales et européennes de l'Université de Gand, en Belgique. ## Rapport sur le défi des réseaux : COVID-19 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/rapport-sur-le-defi-des-reseaux-covid-19/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le présent rapport explique les efforts que les réseaux de collaboration ont déployés pour examiner trois questions fondamentales issues de la pandémie de COVID-19. En juin 2020, au milieu de la plus grave crise sanitaire que le monde ait connue en une génération, les réseaux de collaboration du Programme MINDS ont répondu à un appel de documents de fond pour aider le ministère de la Défense nationale et les Forces armées canadiennes (MDN/FAC) à cerner et à comprendre les conséquences géopolitiques de la pandémie de COVID-19, à en tirer des leçons et à en mesurer les répercussions pour l’Équipe de la Défense. Le présent rapport explique les efforts que les réseaux de collaboration ont déployés pour examiner trois questions fondamentales issues de la pandémie de COVID-19 : tout d’abord, les effets de la pandémie sur la concurrence entre les grandes puissances, sur la prospérité économique et sur la stabilité politique; deuxièmement, les leçons retenues au Canada et à l’étranger sur la prévision et la gestion des crises sanitaires publiques et sur les moyens à prendre pour les enrayer, et le rôle qui convient aux forces armées dans les interventions dirigées par les autorités civiles; enfin, les défis et les possibilités que la pandémie présente à la Défense et aux autres portefeuilles de l’État, en particulier dans les domaines du personnel, de la logistique et de l’approvisionnement, de la gestion et des technologies de l’information (GI/TI), de la gouvernance, de la planification et des opérations. Réseaux ayant contribué au présent rapport Le Programme MINDS finance actuellement six réseaux de collaboration, chacun regroupant un éventail particulier d’universitaires, d’experts et de spécialistes de toutes les parties du Canada. Les auteurs ayant contribué au présent rapport comprennent des analystes bien connus et des voix nouvelles de la collectivité canadienne de la défense et de la sécurité. Les articles présentés ici sont les leurs et ils ne traduisent pas la politique ou les opinions du gouvernement du Canada, du ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces armées canadiennes. Leurs textes ont été intégrés dans le rapport dans la langue dans laquelle ils ont été reçus. Points saillants clés Aspects géopolitiques de la COVID-19 États assoiffés de pouvoir : La pandémie a accru l’importance et le pouvoir des États, car ce sont les seuls acteurs viables à même de gérer les interventions d’envergure nationale, de protéger les chaînes d’approvisionnement critiques et d’apporter des secours économiques à leurs citoyens et citoyennes. Désinformation : Les renseignements liés à la COVID-19 sont devenus des cibles prisées d’acteurs malveillants cherchant à semer la confusion et la méfiance et à politiser la pandémie, ce qui a des conséquences alarmantes pour les politiques nationales et internationales. Concurrence entre les grandes puissances : La pandémie accélère le déraillement et accentue la déstabilisation de l’équilibre entre les grandes puissances en concurrence les unes avec les autres. À preuve, le fléchissement de la coopération internationale, la politisation de la pandémie, la tension grandissante entre les États-Unis et la Chine, et l’opportunisme accru manifesté par les puissances moyennes et en montée. Démondialisation ? Malgré des décennies de mondialisation rapide, la pandémie de COVID-19 a enrayé cette expansion en fermant les frontières, en gardant les avions au sol, en contractant les marchés et en accentuant la concurrence internationale. Pointes alarmantes et courbes aplaties : La hausse du nombre de cas et un manque de leadership affaiblissent le pouvoir de convaincre des États-Unis, ce qui crée un vide que remplit la Chine, dont la réaction draconienne maladroite lui a permis d’aplatir la courbe. Leçons retenues Passage du télétravail à la « télévie » : Le télétravail est devenu la « nouvelle normale » pour des millions de personnes, ce qui a profondément perturbé la culture axée sur l’équilibre travail/vie personnelle, les besoins liés à la technologie de l’information et la sécurité de l’information. Technologie, sécurité et surveillance : Les technologies telles que l’intelligence artificielle, la recherche des contacts et la modélisation mathématique aident à lutter contre la COVID-19, mais elles favorisent aussi l’empiétement sur les droits et les libertés de la personne. État de préparation, résilience et dépendance : L’appui des forces de sécurité a été nécessaire pour préserver la résilience nationale, régionale et locale, mais la dépendance ainsi créée a suscité des questions sur la façon et l’à-propos de faire appel à la « force de dernier recours » dans l’avenir. L'Équipe de la Défense : Personnes, rôles et relations Choisir ses combats : La pandémie de COVID-19 a obligé les gouvernements à faire des compromis difficiles entre les intérêts de leur politique étrangère, la prospérité économique et la santé publique. Compter sur les Rangers : Comme les Rangers canadiens ont assumé de nouveaux rôles pour lutter contre la pandémie de COVID-19 dans les régions arctiques, il faut s’interroger sur les moyens à prendre pour garantir l’inclusivité, l’autonomie et l’autosuffisance des Autochtones. ## Rapport sur le projet de planification de la défense du COIC URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/rapport-sur-le-projet-de-planification-de-la-defense-du-coic/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le RAS a été chargé par le Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada de réaliser une étude comparative sur la planification de la défense. Le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) a été chargé par le Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada (COIC) de réaliser une étude comparative sur la planification de la défense. Trois séries de questions guident ce rapport : 1) Qu’est-ce que l’approche régionale, mondiale et fondée sur la menace pour la planification opérationnelle et stratégique ? Quels sont les avantages et les inconvénients de chacune d’entre elles au XXIe siècle ? 2) Qui utilise chacune de ces approches aujourd’hui et pourquoi les a-t-on adoptées ? Que pensent les adeptes de l’approche globale et de l’approche fondée sur les menaces des cadres alternatifs ? 3) Quelles leçons peut-on tirer pour le Canada ? Le rapport est divisé en trois parties. La première section présente les principales approches de la planification des forces, leurs points forts et leurs points faibles respectifs, et les illustre par l’évolution de la planification des forces aux États-Unis. La deuxième section examine la planification actuelle de la défense de sept alliés et partenaires : l’Australie, la France, Israël, l’Italie, la Norvège, la Suède et le Royaume-Uni. La dernière section présente quelques considérations politiques pour le Canada. ## Recadrer la crise ukrainienne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/recadrer-la-crise-ukrainienne/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Plutôt que de se diviser sur la manière de punir la Russie, le Canada et ses alliés pourraient envisager des moyens de soutenir une... Avril 2021. Pas moins de 150 000 soldats russes seraient déployés en exercice à la frontière ukrainienne selon les dires du chef de la diplomatie européenne Josep Borrell.  Encore ébranlé par le camouflet subit lors de sa visite à Moscou en février – où il s’est fait dire en conférence de presse que l’UE n’était pas un partenaire fiable – il exagère sans doute pour mieux tirer la sonnette d’alarme. Car la Russie elle-même ne cache pas l’ampleur du déploiement, précisant qu’il s’agit là d’une réponse à la menace posée par l’OTAN. « La Russie est dans son droit », souligne le président Poutine, en servant une mise en garde à ceux qui envisageraient de traverser la ligne rouge, qu’il trace lui-même. Tous comprennent que cette ligne se trouve en Ukraine, mais l’idée de devoir considérer les mises en garde du Kremlin polarise les chancelleries occidentales. Certains estiment que le comportement agressif et revanchard de la Russie doit être plus durement châtié par une action concertée des alliés, sans quoi Moscou y verra le signal qu’il peut poursuivre sa stratégie d’intimidation.  D’autres prennent d’abord acte des équilibres de puissance stratégique et cherchent, par le dialogue, à clarifier les règles d’une coexistence pacifique, sans quoi rien n’empêchera la spirale d’insécurité de nous engager dans une confrontation apocalyptique. Cette double contrainte ne semble permettre aucune issue convenable pour tous. Le durcissement des sanctions économiques – ou pire, une éventuelle reprise des combats – serait beaucoup plus coûteux pour l’Europe que pour l’Amérique. Il est loin d’être acquis que l’administration Biden saura reconstruire, au sein de l’Alliance, un consensus sur la marche à suivre.  Pour y arriver, il faudra faire preuve d’imagination pour recadrer différemment le problème, quitte à revoir le rôle que le pays et ses alliés de l’OTAN y jouent. Un tel recadrage conceptuel de la crise est-il possible ? La dialectique des narratifs contradictoires L’examen comparatif des représentations véhiculées à Moscou et à Washington semble complètement antinomique. Pour les uns, les faits marquants débutent lorsqu’une opération russe est menée contre l’administration régionale de Crimée, à Simféropol, contraignant les élus locaux à avaliser la tenue d’un référendum anticonstitutionnel sur l’autonomie, puis sur le rattachement de la péninsule à la Russie. Menée dans les règles de l’art de la dissimulation, l’opération se solde par la capture de bases ukrainiennes et l’annexion illégale de la péninsule. Elle se poursuit ensuite au Donbass, par le truchement d’un soutien actif, mais inavoué aux rebelles des républiques auto-proclamées de Lougansk et Donetsk. Or on entend chez les autres une histoire parallèle, mais tout aussi véridique. Au tournant de l’année 2014, une mobilisation de masse est organisée avec la complicité de Washington. L’objectif est de faire tomber un gouvernement démocratiquement élu en 2010 sur une plateforme de rapprochement avec la Russie. Des milices irrégulières d’extrême-droite prennent part aux émeutes qui forcent le Président Ianoukovitch à fuir la capitale. Elles contribuent à la formation d’un pouvoir anticonstitutionnel qui jure de contraindre Moscou à renoncer à toute influence sur leur pays. Le nouveau régime souhaite même expulser la marine russe de sa base navale historique de Sébastopol, promettant de déchirer le contrat de location en vigueur. Pire encore, la population russophone qui s’oppose à ce gouvernement non-élu est bientôt victime d’opérations armées dites « anti-terroristes », encore là avec le soutien des États-Unis et certains de leurs alliés. Ce ne sont pas les faits constitutifs de ces narratifs qui sont contradictoires – les uns n’excluant pas les autres – mais bien l’identification et la mise en accusation de celui qui est à l’origine de la guerre.  La sélection des éléments du récit, qui repose sur une volonté de faire porter sur l’autre la responsabilité de la crise, accentue l’intensité de la lutte représentationnelle. En amont, l’antagonisme porte sur les fondements normatifs de leurs actions respectives. On retrouve d’un côté cette idée messianique qu’il faut venir en aide aux forces démocratiques d’un État indépendant à qui l’on a promis à maintes reprises de garantir l’intégrité territoriale. Ce pays européen ne doit pas être abandonné au profit des velléités néo-impérialistes d’un régime de plus en plus autoritaire, qui viole les droits humains. On justifie ainsi la livraison d’armes létales, qui débutent sous l’administration Trump. De l’autre côté, il y a cette idée anachronique que les grandes puissances disposent d’un droit d’ingérence exclusif dans leur périphérie immédiate. Puisque Washington a ouvert les hostilités en s’ingérant dans la cour arrière de la Russie, les tenants de la realpolitik comprennent qu’une riposte était inévitable. Jamais le port stratégique de Sébastopol n’aurait pu être occupé par les navires américains sans que la Russie ne livre bataille. Et bien entendu, toute tentative de reconquête du Donbass (où habitent maintenant un demi-million de personnes ayant déjà demandé et obtenu la citoyenneté russe) sera opposée par la voie des armes. 13 000 morts plus tard, les démonstrations de forces se poursuivent de part et d’autre. Tous les éléments narratifs du conflit demeurent en place. Ou presque. La paix de Minsk Grande oubliée de ces deux narratifs rivaux qui dominent leur espace médiatique respectif, la paix conclue à Minsk en février 2015 demeure pourtant à ce jour le seul fondement d’une résolution pacifique d’un conflit, dont les acteurs se trouvent autant sur la scène intérieure que dans l’arène internationale. Quelqu’un se souvient-il encore que les mesures prévues par ce traité parrainé par le « quatuor de Normandie » (France-Allemagne-Russie-Ukraine) et signé entre les leaders des républiques sécessionnistes et le gouvernement ukrainien ont été formellement approuvées avec la résolution 2202 par le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU ? Âprement négocié par les deux poids lourds de diplomatie européenne dans un contexte militaire très défavorable à l’armée ukrainienne – alors directement aux prises avec des unités de « volontaires » russes sur son territoire – cet accord est difficilement acceptable pour les partisans d’une Ukraine totalement émancipée de l’influence du Kremlin. Car les termes de l’accord sont relativement favorables à la Russie, qui conserve par sa mainmise sécuritaire sur les régions de Donetsk et de Lougansk une solide hypothèque sur l’avenir transatlantique de l’Ukraine. En effet, le plan prévoit la tenue d’élections locales supervisées par l’OSCE, suivies d’une réintégration de ces régions dans l’État ukrainien, mais seulement après que des changements constitutionnels leur aient conféré une très large autonomie. C’est là une condition préalable au retour des forces ukrainiennes le long de frontière avec la Russie. Au demeurant, l’accord évoque le respect de l’intégrité territoriale du pays sans même évoquer l’épineuse question de la Crimée, dont il n’est aucunement fait mention dans le document. Plus de six années se sont écoulées déjà depuis cette violente offensive sur la ville carrefour de Debaltseve, lors de laquelle les rebelles soutenus par la Russie ont infligé une cuisante défaite aux forces ukrainiennes. Pour rappel, ce n’est pas le risque de représailles armées de l’OTAN qui a alors empêché la Russie d’avancer davantage. Déjà empêtrée en Irak et en Afghanistan, l’Alliance n’est clairement pas en moyen de se mesurer directement à la Russie pour aider un aspirant-membre, comme les Géorgiens l’ont appris douloureusement à leurs frais lors de la guerre d’août 2008. Il n’y a que le coût économique des sanctions qui soit pour Moscou dissuasif. Or compte tenu de la taille de ses ressources exportables et de l’accès au marché chinois, ces sanctions ne demeurent – on l’a bien vu – que bien partiellement dissuasives. Comme la plupart des cessez-le-feu, la paix de Minsk résulte d’un équilibre fragile des forces où la retenue du vainqueur est obtenue grâce aux concessions du vaincu. Washington s’est alors placé à l’écart du processus de négociation. Sous la pression du couple franco-allemand, Kiev a consenti à reconnaître une ligne de partage au sein du pays, garantissant l’amnistie à tous les combattants sécessionnistes. Certes, il n’est pas facile pour le gouvernement de mettre en œuvre les changements constitutionnels nécessaires à la réintégration formelle de régions largement autonomes, tant ceux-ci sont impopulaires. Or, ce que les troupes russes qui s’exercent à la frontière rappellent, c’est qu’une renonciation à cet engagement pourrait bien signifier une intensification dramatique des hostilités. La position du Canada La signature des accords de Minsk consécutive de la défaite militaire au Donbass est généralement indigeste pour la minorité ukraino-canadienne, le plus souvent originaire de Galicie et encore pleine de ressentiment contre l’Empire qui l’a occupé en 1939. Conscient du poids électoral de cette minorité, notamment dans les Prairies (où elle constitue plus de 10% de la population), le gouvernement canadien a toujours exprimé haut et fort son soutien pour les aspirations légitimes d’une Ukraine indépendante. La meilleure preuve tangible de cet engagement s’exprime par sa contribution à la Commission mixte multinationale sur la réforme de la défense et la coopération en matière de sécurité avec l'Ukraine, dirigée par les États-Unis et à laquelle participent cinq autres alliés (Grande-Bretagne, Suède, Danemark, Pologne et Lituanie). L’opération Unifier mise en place par les FAC en 2015 constitue une aide non létale au renforcement de forces armées ukrainiennes, une aide essentiellement offerte à travers des formations. Alors que le gouvernement Harper s’était montré ouvertement favorable à l’inclusion de l’Ukraine dans l’OTAN, tenant des propos extrêmement durs à l’égard de son homologue russe, son successeur Justin Trudeau doit maintenant faire preuve de plus de réserve sur cette question qui divise déjà depuis longtemps l’Alliance. Les visées expansionnistes de l’Alliance se sont avérées déstabilisantes pour l’environnement sécuritaire, encourageant Moscou à doubler la mise pour éviter de perdre pied en Ukraine. À lui seul, le renforcement de l’arsenal nucléaire russe (et le processus concomitant du démantèlement du régime de limitation des armes qui survient sous la présidence de Donald Trump) constitue, qu’on le veuille ou non, une invitation à la prudence. Les appels récents du Président Zelenski pour solliciter le soutien du Canada pour son admission dans les rangs de l’OTAN n’ont donné lieu à aucun commentaire du premier ministre, ni favorable ni défavorable, ce qui témoigne de l’embarras causé par ce dilemme. On comprend qu’il soit difficile pour le Canada de se désolidariser des objectifs géopolitiques de son principal partenaire commercial et des espoirs de sa diaspora ukrainienne. En même temps, faut-il le rappeler, le pays partage une longue frontière arctique avec son voisin russe, frontière qu’il n’est pas vraiment en mesure de protéger. Le gouvernement peut-il vraiment risquer de s’opposer à la recherche de termes mutuellement acceptables d’une coexistence pacifique ? En cas contraire, il lui faudrait clairement réitérer son soutien aux accords de Minsk. Redéfinir la nature du problème À quelques jours d’une première rencontre au sommet entre Joe Biden et Vladimir Poutine, quelques signaux positifs sont envoyés à l’effet que Washington est à la recherche d’une stratégie moins divisive au sein de l’OTAN, vraisemblablement pour mieux faire face à la Chine. Deux tournures absolument remarquables sont récemment survenues sans fanfare : 1) la menace de sanctions économiques contre les compagnies européennes engagées dans la construction du gazoduc North Stream reliant la Russie et l’Allemagne a été levée et 2) les discussions annoncées sur l’accession au plan d’adhésion de l’Ukraine ont été écartées de l’agenda du sommet de l’OTAN de Bruxelles à la mi-juin. L’Ukraine n’y a finalement pas été invitée. Faut-il y voir là la consécration d’une défaite dans une lutte géopolitique qui oppose l’Ouest à la Russie ? Loin de là, puisque la crise s’est tout de même soldée par l’inclusion de l’Ukraine au sein du libre-échange pan-européen. De plus, l’annexion et le soutien aux rebelles ont fouetté le nationalisme antirusse, qui n’est plus du tout le phénomène minoritaire qu’il avait été avant 2014. Sans être mort, le soft power de la Russie s’en retrouve considérablement affaibli. Du reste, il est possible d’opter pour une description de la crise qui élargit le cadre temporel de celle-ci au-delà de 2014. Il est envisageable de revenir à ce que l’Ukraine n’avait jamais cessé d’être depuis l’indépendance de 1991, soit un champ de bataille entre différentes représentations ethno-nationales, dont la composante slavo-orthodoxe liée à la Russie ne peut être soumise et détruite – pas plus d’ailleurs que l’ethno-nationalisme russophobe n’a pu l’être par 50 ans de domination soviétique. Ce conflit pourrait ainsi à nouveau être entendu pour ce qu’il était avant de dégénérer en guerre civile et en champ de bataille géopolitique, c’est-à-dire comme une profonde crise identitaire infranationale. Plutôt que de se diviser sur la manière de punir la Russie, le Canada et ses alliés pourraient envisager des moyens de soutenir cette réconciliation entre les Ukrainiens eux-mêmes.   ## Recompositions géopolitiques dans l’espace post-soviétique : « l’étranger proche » à l’épreuve de la guerre en Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/recompositions-geopolitiques-dans-lespace-post-sovietique-letranger-proche-a-lepreuve-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > L’invasion russe rebat les cartes diplomatiques en Asie centrale, au Caucase et en Europe de l’Est. Absorbé par le conflit russo-ukrainien qui tend à se transformer en une guerre d’usure, Moscou peine à conserver son statut de puissance stabilisatrice et son rôle d’arbitre régional. Après la multiplication des revers militaires qu’a subis la Russie face à la contre-offensive des forces armées ukrainiennes, il est de bon ton de dire que Moscou est acculé à la fois sur le terrain militaire, mais également diplomatique. Si l’étiolement de sa sphère d’influence au sein des pays occidentaux est une certitude, la marginalisation de la Russie dans l’espace post-soviétique l’est beaucoup moins. Toujours est-il que l’invasion russe rebat les cartes diplomatiques en Asie centrale, au Caucase et en Europe de l’Est. Absorbé par le conflit russo-ukrainien qui tend à se transformer en une guerre d’usure, Moscou peine à conserver son statut de puissance stabilisatrice et son rôle d’arbitre régional. Face à ce rythme de recomposition, le projet impérial russe a suscité de vives réactions dans ces pays qui composent le glacis sécuritaire de Moscou. Il convient également d’analyser l’éclatement de poches de conflits et la réaction limitée du Kremlin pour enrayer la montée des tensions régionales. L’équation sécuritaire de Vladimir Poutine se complexifie et plusieurs puissances adverses ou alliées en profitent pour développer de nouveaux partenariats, et ce au détriment d’une Russie trop accaparée à jouer sa réputation en Ukraine. L’issue de la guerre en Ukraine aura de larges conséquences sur le maintien ou le délitement des positions de la Russie dans l’espace post-soviétique. En arrachant une victoire, sa crédibilité sera renouvelée. En cas de défaite, son influence pourrait subir un déclin progressif et son isolement pourrait s’étendre au-delà de l’Occident. La Russie est toujours perçue comme la puissance stabilisatrice de la sous-région, mais la surenchère militaire et diplomatique dont elle fait preuve pourrait accroitre la capacité d’attraction de puissances adverses. À mesure que sa suprématie est contestée dans cet espace, Moscou est de plus en plus contraint dans le choix de son système d’alliance tandis que les États post-soviétiques aspirent à plus d’autonomie. La Chine et la Turquie semblent vouloir pour l’instant rester à distance des ambitions militaires du Kremlin dans la région tandis qu’un accroissement significatif de l’engagement diplomatique de l’UE et des États-Unis reste peu probable. Moscou n’est pas à l’abri d’un revirement stratégique de la part de ces puissances visant à la supplanter. L’usage de la violence armée interétatique pour régler ses différends territoriaux a profondément bousculé l’équilibre régional et entaché la crédibilité de la Russie en tant que médiateur. Pour autant, l’embrasement du Caucase et de l’Asie centrale ne doit pas être appréhendé comme la conséquence des déboires de la Russie en Ukraine. ***** Introduction Vladimir Poutine semble être passé maître dans l’art de déguiser une succession de défaites militaires en une victoire politique. En célébrant main dans la main avec les leaders fantoches l’annexion de quatre provinces ukrainiennes bordant la mer d’Azov, Vladimir Poutine peine tout de même à dissimuler l’important recul de son armée en Ukraine. En poursuivant sa reconquête, l’armée ukrainienne est finalement parvenue à renverser la tendance sur le terrain militaire grâce à une contre-offensive fulgurante qui lui a permis de récupérer 63% du territoire envahi par l’armée russe depuis le 24 février 2022. Alors que les probabilités d’arrêt du conflit demeurent des plus ténues, sa résolution semble s’éloigner à mesure qu’il évolue vers une guerre d’attrition. De surcroît, Vladimir Poutine est désormais confronté à un vent de contestation populaire ayant atteint de larges pans de la population. S’il n’existe pas de masse critique en mesure d’ébranler les fondements du pouvoir en Russie, l’annonce de la mobilisation partielle a conduit à des mouvements de résistance durement réprimés, se soldant par un exode d’environ 700 000 Russes vers l’étranger et les pays frontaliers de la Russie. Outre l’accueil des civils russes dans ces régions du pourtour de la Russie qui constituent le glacis sécuritaire de Moscou, les conséquences géopolitiques de la guerre en Ukraine commencent à être visibles. Entre la reprise des combats entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan, les tensions frontalières qui opposent le Kirghizistan et le Tadjikistan en passant par la percée géopolitique de puissances étrangères dans ce que Moscou a souvent considéré comme son « étranger proche », la sphère d’influence que le Kremlin considère comme naturelle s’embrase et s’érode peu à peu. Après un rapide rappel des ambitions de domination régionale de la Russie depuis 1991, cette analyse met en lumière l’intensification des tensions dans les pays de l’ex-URSS et l’incapacité de la Russie à les juguler, et ce pour au moins trois raisons. L’isolement diplomatique de Moscou semble se propager au-delà de l’Occident à mesure que le conflit russo-ukrainien s’enlise et que les inquiétudes des pays eurasiatiques s’accroissent. D’autre part, l’embrasement du Caucase et de l’Asie centrale questionne sur l’efficacité du rôle d’arbitre régional que Moscou s’est lui-même construit et qu’il peine désormais à maintenir. Enfin, face à ces deux dynamiques qui affaiblissent Moscou, des puissances adverses en profitent pour poursuivre leur montée en puissance dans l’espace eurasiatique, et ce au détriment d’une Russie qui est trop occupée à jouer sa réputation en Ukraine. Acculé à la fois sur le front militaire et diplomatique, il s’agira de saisir si l’orientation stratégique et les choix sécuritaires du Kremlin ont participé, s’il y a lieu, à la détérioration de sa propre sphère d’influence. Confrontée à une équation sécuritaire qui se complexifie, la Russie, qui semble subir une perte d’influence, est-elle en mesure d’assurer son rôle de garant de la stabilité régionale et de préserver son poids géopolitique dans l’espace post-soviétique ? Le coût politique de la réhabilitation du projet impérial russe S’il convient de revenir sur l’état de délabrement actuel des relations entre les acteurs régionaux du Caucase, de l’espace baltique et de l’Asie centrale, un certain regard sur les tentatives de restauration de l’influence russe sur l’espace post-soviétique permettra d’éclairer les faiblesses actuelles de la Russie sur ce même espace. En mêlant nostalgie de la grandeur soviétique/tsariste et patriotisme russe, la guerre de conquête menée par Vladimir Poutine en 2022 peut être appréhendée comme la consécration de la nature impériale de la Russie. Pour rappel, à partir de 1990, le premier pilier de la politique étrangère russe s’articule autour du rétablissement des relations avec son « étranger proche ». Ce concept développé pour protéger les intérêts permanents de l’ancienne puissance coloniale a permis au Kremlin de décréter l’existence d’une sphère d’intérêt vital composée de tous les États souverains issus de l’empire soviétique. Dorénavant, c’est bien le caractère exclusif de cette zone d’influence russe qui est remis en question. Lors de l’implosion de l’URSS, Moscou, qui était en quête de stabilité, a cherché à institutionnaliser le rapprochement avec les pays frontaliers pour éviter une détérioration de l’interdépendance économique, culturelle et linguistique qui les liait. À travers des organisations comme la Communauté des États indépendants (CEI) ou la création de l’Organisation de sécurité collective (OTSC) en 1992 – une alliance militaire calquée sur l’OTAN proposant sa propre lecture du principe de sécurité collective – Moscou a également aspiré à mettre un terme à l’expansion de l’OTAN tout en renforçant son leadership en Eurasie. Pour autant, le poids politique de la Russie au sein de ces organisations internationales a pu éloigner plusieurs États du projet eurasiatique pouvant être perçu comme un processus politique visant à rétablir la « Russie historique ». En somme, une tentative de restauration de ce qui constituerait « une partie inaliénable de notre histoire, de notre culture et de notre espace spirituel » selon la lecture révisionniste de Vladimir Poutine. Lors de la décennie qui a suivi l’effondrement de l’URSS, le processus d’intégration régionale russe a été perçu comme un projet néocolonial par plus d’un État. Et pour cause, le double jeu du Kremlin entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan et le soutien qu’il a apporté aux mouvements séparatistes en Géorgie ont conduit ces deux derniers à quitter l’OTSC en 1999 pour chercher des alliés ailleurs. Symbole de l’incapacité à approfondir les liens de coopération ou encore de régler les tensions ethniques et frontalières entre les membres de cette alliance militaire, les germes de la déstabilisation se sont développés insidieusement dans le « giron russe », formule en usage au Kremlin. Comprenant bien que l’intégration de la Russie sur la scène mondiale ne suffirait pas à garantir son droit de regard sur l’évolution de l’espace post-soviétique, Moscou a également misé sur la coercition et la répression. À travers une confiance retrouvée depuis le début de l’ère poutinienne caractérisée par une certaine nostalgie de l’empire, le Kremlin n’a eu de cesse d’exacerber des querelles ethniques et de manipuler des conflits territoriaux pour mettre en pratique son projet expansionniste. Pour ne citer que quelques exemples, la guerre éclair menée par la Russie à l’encontre de la Géorgie en 2008 pour soutenir les forces sécessionnistes des régions de l’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud et l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 sont symptomatiques d’une doctrine stratégique agressive, tout ceci la rendant de facto moins attractive en tant qu’allié. La stratégie de légitimation de Moscou, qui sera largement reprise en 2022, reposait sur l’idée d’une intervention humanitaire, reprenant de fait la rhétorique de la responsabilité de protéger. Elle se fondait également sur un mimétisme des discours occidentaux ayant justifiés les interventions de l’OTAN – notamment au Kosovo – et qui permettait à la Russie d’exiger d’être traitée de manière équitable dans ses choix stratégiques par la communauté internationale. En cherchant à être traité d’égal à égal avec les États-Unis et plus largement avec la communauté transatlantique, le Kremlin est paru soucieux de rétablir son poids géopolitique. En étant amené à penser que l’Alliance atlantique s’écroulerait sous le poids de ses propres contradictions politiques, Moscou a perçu le déclin occidental, s’illustrant notamment par la débâcle américaine en Afghanistan, comme un incitatif pour mettre en pratique son projet expansionniste en février 2022. Pari perdu pour Vladimir Poutine puisque l’OTAN semble ressuscitée grâce à l’identification d’un ennemi commun tandis que la Russie, à travers l’OTSC, ne semble plus en mesure d’enrayer les différends territoriaux qui déstabilisent les régions qui gravitent autour d’elle. Depuis trois décennies, Moscou s’efforce de rétablir son arrière-cour, mais Vladimir Poutine est désormais largement distrait par le conflit qui s’éternise en Ukraine. S’il convient de garder à l’esprit que les incidents diplomatiques et les affrontements dans les anciens États satellites de Moscou sont monnaie courante depuis le démembrement de l’URSS, il va s’en dire que les efforts diplomatiques et politiques pour inverser la tendance de « la plus grande catastrophe géopolitique du XXe siècle » ont pu être détériorés par l’aventure militaire du Kremlin. L’analyse des prises de position des anciennes républiques soviétiques à l’égard du conflit russo-ukrainien répond donc à un double objectif. Elle permettra de mesurer les velléités d’émancipation de ces États vis-à-vis de Moscou et dans un second temps de saisir la responsabilité du Kremlin dans ce regain de tensions qui pourrait conduire à un craquellement de sa zone d’influence. L’Europe de l’Est prise en étau entre les grandes puissances Au cœur des rivalités stratégiques entre l’Occident et la Russie, les pays d’Europe de l’Est qui étaient présents dans le voisinage partagé de ces deux grands ensembles sont désormais forcés de s’aligner dans un camp. Loin d’avoir constitué un groupe homogène dans leur attitude à l’égard de la Russie dans les années qui ont précédé l’invasion, les anciennes républiques soviétiques d’Europe de l’Est (Biélorussie, Lituanie, Lettonie, Estonie, Moldavie et Ukraine) sont désormais confrontées à un nouveau rideau de fer selon la formule de Sergueï Lavrov. Pour des raisons évidentes liées à l’invasion russe, le positionnement stratégique de l’Ukraine à l’égard du conflit ne sera pas analysé. Après dix mois de conflit russo-ukrainien, la résurgence de la logique de bloc et la fragmentation de l’espace européen a finalement permis de souder les rangs des pays européens membre de la communauté transatlantique, renforçant de fait la pression sur la Russie et ses partenaires. Devenu l’obligé de Vladimir Poutine, Alexandre Loukachenko a offert à la Russie une base arrière et une plateforme logistique pour les opérations menées dans le théâtre nord, notamment lors de la tentative ratée de conquête de Kyiv. Par la suite, le déluge de missiles et les drones kamikazes qui se sont abattus sur les principales métropoles ukrainiennes durant le mois d’octobre 2022 ont été lancés en partie depuis le territoire biélorusse, mais la complicité de Minsk ne s’arrête pas là puisqu’elle tend à se formaliser davantage. Les deux dictateurs se sont accordés sur la création d’un « groupe d’armées commun régional » composé d’environ 9 000 soldats. Minsk était en premier lieu réticente à l’idée d’intervenir militairement dans le conflit, mais les allégations de menaces ukrainiennes aux frontières biélorusses justifieraient, selon le ministère biélorusse de la Défense, la création de ce groupe militaire « défensif ». En cas d’implication directe à travers une attaque conjointe, la Biélorussie deviendrait dès lors un cobelligérant et s’exposerait à de lourdes sanctions occidentales en mesure de fragiliser plus encore Alexandre Loukachenko. Alors que le rapprochement avec Vladimir Poutine s’était fait non pas par choix, mais plus dans la contrainte afin de sauver le pouvoir chancelant du président biélorusse, sa survie politique dépend désormais du bon vouloir de son homologue russe. De l’autre côté du prisme, le choix de se prémunir d’une possible résurgence de la menace russe s’est durablement renforcé pour les États baltes depuis février 2022. Alors que l’enclave russe de Kaliningrad cristallise désormais toutes les tensions, les voix des pays baltes résonnent davantage au sein des institutions européennes et au Conseil de l’Atlantique Nord depuis la satisfaction amère d’avoir vu juste sur les intentions belliqueuses du Kremlin. Originellement dotés de moyens limités, la remontée capacitaire de ces États fut actionnée bien avant le début du conflit, tout comme la posture dissuasive de l’OTAN à l’Est, dont ils constituent à cet égard, des partenaires centraux pour déployer la posture de dissuasion et de défense de l’OTAN sur son flanc est. Sur le volet politique, la Lituanie, la Lettonie et l’Estonie ont imposé de nouvelles restrictions en interdisant notamment les touristes russes de se rendre sur leur territoire. En allant encore plus loin que ses pays voisins, la Lituanie a réalisé ce que l’UE n’est pas parvenue à faire, à savoir interdire l’importation de tous les hydrocarbures provenant de Russie. Après le revirement doctrinal actionné à la suite du traumatisme de l’annexion de la Crimée, l’invasion de l’Ukraine a finalement pérennisé les choix sécuritaires des États baltes adoptés depuis 2014. Bien que ces démarches stratégiques soient développées depuis la double adhésion de ces pays au sein de l’OTAN et de l’UE en 2004, le conflit russo-ukrainien constitue une rupture majeure dans la mesure où les pays baltes se sont coupés de la Russie. En proie également à une vulnérabilité extrême, la Moldavie est prise en tenaille entre la Roumanie (UE) et l’ouest de l’Ukraine. La région sécessionniste prorusse de Transnistrie pourrait quant à elle constituer un poste avancé pour permettre au Kremlin de prendre à revers les forces ukrainiennes. Si la Moldavie a acquis le statut de pays candidat à l’adhésion de l’UE en juin 2022, elle ne possède pas pour autant les mêmes garanties de sécurité que les autres pays d’Europe de l’Est. Puisqu’elle ne fait pas partie de l’OTAN, la Moldavie refuse d’imposer l’arsenal de sanctions à l’encontre de la Russie afin de se prémunir de toutes représailles russes. Cette neutralité de façade comporte des limites. La Moldavie subit dorénavant l’onde de choc de la guerre en Ukraine : le géant gazier Gazprom a menacé Chisinau de réduire ses livraisons de gaz. Obligée de concéder une certaine retenue pour éviter d’être traitée comme un « pays hostile » par le Kremlin, les dynamiques contradictoires de la Moldavie fragilisent par conséquent sa situation géopolitique. Concernant le Caucase (l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan seront traités séparément en raison du conflit qui les oppose), la Géorgie a également fait preuve d’une volonté réaffirmée de se rapprocher de l’UE. Pour ces raisons, elle s’est empressée de condamner l’invasion de l’Ukraine tout en faisant valoir sa candidature au sein de l’UE face à la réticence de certains États membres. Et pour cause, en étant en première ligne, la Géorgie craint un sort similaire à celui réservé à l’Ukraine si le conflit devait être amené à s’étendre. Le ministère des Affaires étrangères russes a fait part de ses préoccupations à l’égard des exercices militaires conjoints entre Tbilissi et l’OTAN organisés en septembre 2022 en déclarant que les efforts de l’Occident pour attirer la Géorgie dans son orbite constituent une menace pour la sécurité nationale de la Russie. Alors que les forces séparatistes soutenues par Moscou occupent encore 20% de son territoire, la priorité pour Tbilissi est de ne pas entrainer la Géorgie une nouvelle guerre avec Moscou. La guerre en Ukraine a remis en question les équilibres fragiles entre les acteurs européens et russes. Mues par des peurs sécuritaires élevées, les États baltes ont finalement fait le choix de renforcer leur politique de fermeté tout en priant les autres États européens de se conformer à leur posture maximaliste à l’encontre de la Russie. Plus le Kremlin poursuit sa fuite en avant, plus ces États pérennisent le rapprochement vers l’Occident en adoptant une stratégie dite cumulative, soit « un schéma sécuritaire dual dans lequel les alliances sont des garanties sécuritaires de même niveau que les capacités nationales ». Quant à la Moldavie et la Géorgie qui ne possèdent pas les mêmes garanties de sécurité, la capacité d’influence et de nuisance du Kremlin les restreint durablement dans leurs choix stratégiques. Elle les oblige également à concéder une certaine neutralité – pour éviter par exemple une reprise du conflit transnistrien – sans cautionner l’invasion en Ukraine, tout comme beaucoup de pays de l’ancien espace soviétique en Asie centrale et au Caucase au début du conflit russo-ukrainien. Des voix dissonantes s’élèvent au sein de la communauté eurasiatique Durant les deux années qui ont précédé la guerre en Ukraine, Moscou avait adopté une politique étrangère modérée envers les anciennes républiques soviétiques en faisant preuve d’une habileté diplomatique pour enrayer la montée des tensions dans son précarré historique. Néanmoins, en « étalant au grand jour des faiblesses insoupçonnées », Moscou peine dorénavant à assumer son rôle d’arbitre tout en préservant ses positions en Asie centrale. La Russie confrontée à un climat de méfiance en Asie centrale Pour les pays d’Asie centrale, défier l’ancienne puissance coloniale nécessitait de faire preuve d’une grande précaution oratoire pour ne pas subir les mesures de rétorsion de la Russie. Dorénavant avec les récentes évolutions du conflit russo-ukrainien, les cartes semblent rebattues. Si beaucoup d’observateurs internationaux parlaient d’une neutralité prorusse pour caractériser le non-alignement de nombreux États non occidentaux, c’est dorénavant le désalignement rhétorique qui semble prévaloir pour le Kazakhstan. Moscou avait bénéficié d’un gain de prestige certain lors du soutien militaire à hauteur de 3 000 parachutistes russes et de militaires de l’OTSC apporté au président kazakh en janvier 2022 pour mater l’insurrection qui le menaçait. Toutefois, le Kazakhstan a finalement décidé de s’éloigner de la Russie en coupant court aux « velléités russes d’utiliser l’OTSC en Ukraine (rappelant de fait) qu’il s’agit d’une alliance défensive et non d’une force de projection ». La douche froide ne s’est pas arrêtée là puisque le Kazakhstan a refusé de reconnaitre l’annexion des quatre oblasts ukrainiens. Dans la continuité de la dégradation croissante des relations entre les deux partenaires, le Kazakhstan a fait de sa priorité le contournement de la principale route d’exportation de son pétrole passant actuellement par le port russe de Novorossiisk (cette voie maritime servant actuellement de levier d’influence à Vladimir Poutine pour faire pression sur son homologue kazakh). Le meilleur allié de Moscou ne cesse ainsi de s’émanciper et contre toute attente le ton critique du président Tokaïev et la volonté de préserver son autonomie s’affirme. Il en va de même pour le président tadjik, qui durant une prise de parole au sommet de la CEI à Astana le 12 octobre 2022, a imputé l’effondrement de l’URSS à l’incapacité de la Russie à prendre en compte les intérêts des petites républiques soviétiques. Après ce parallèle lourd de sens, il a demandé à Vladimir Poutine de faire preuve de plus de respect envers son pays. Quant au Kirghizstan, son absence au sommet de la CEI à Saint-Pétersbourg et son refus d’organiser les exercices militaires conjoints de l’OTSC font craindre une prise de distance de sa part envers le partenaire russe. L’Ouzbékistan n’a pas hésité à ouvertement condamner l’annexion des provinces ukrainiennes, à défendre l’intégrité territoriale de l’Ukraine et à rappeler à Moscou le principe de non-interférence dans les affaires intérieures d’un État. De son côté, le Turkménistan se repose cependant sur la Russie pour se prémunir d’une crise majeure le long de sa frontière commune avec l’Afghanistan. Mais en étant en possession des quatrièmes réserves mondiales de gaz, le Turkménistan semble plus à même de se rapprocher de la Turquie qui s’efforce de se construire un « rôle vital » en matière d’énergie. Pour autant, le gouvernement d’Achgabat n’a jamais exprimé publiquement sa position à l’égard du conflit russo-ukrainien. Il souhaite toutefois maintenir des liens étroits avec le Kremlin, ce qui semble faire figure d’exception en Asie centrale. Ce regain de confiance de la part des républiques d’Asie centrale peut signifier deux choses. Il peut être le signe de l’émergence de nouvelles doctrines sécuritaires visant à multiplier les partenariats stratégiques pour réduire la dépendance à l’égard de la puissance tutélaire russe. Mais il pourrait également être lié à la volonté de réaffirmer la résilience des liens d’amitié avec Moscou afin que celle-ci accorde plus d’attention et de considération à ces petites républiques qui restent, malgré les risques d’affaiblissement géopolitique de la Russie, des alliés lorsque d’autres font le choix de s’en émanciper. Toujours est-il que dans un cas comme dans l’autre, ces invectives sont l’exemple même que les positions de la Russie dans la région s’étiolent et qu’un réajustement de ces partenariats asymétriques est de mise pour éviter que l’isolement de Moscou s’étende durablement au-delà de l’Occident. Ce bref rappel historique fait à Vladimir Poutine a eu pour but de réaffirmer que chaque ancienne république soviétique possède désormais des sensibilités et des intérêts qui leur sont propres. Or cet avertissement est intervenu lors de la rencontre trilatérale entre le président russe et ses homologues tadjik et kirghize pour tenter de trouver une solution diplomatique au conflit frontalier qui oppose ces deux derniers. Finalement, la prudence stratégique des États de ces sous-régions a pu laisser place à des discours désapprobateurs à l’égard de la nature impériale de la Russie ou à une lassitude face à son inaction envers la dégradation graduelle du contexte sécuritaire régional. L’image russe du médiateur de paix endommagée par l’embrasement du Caucase et de l’Asie centrale  Face à la réactivation de deux conflits gelés dans son « étranger proche », la Russie est confrontée à des doutes de la part de ses alliés quant à sa capacité à maintenir son engagement envers l’idée de sécurité collective, Moscou brillant pour l’heure par son inaction. L’inefficacité de l’alliance militaire portée par le Kremlin pour juguler les conflits internes Le premier conflit en question ici oppose le Kirghizstan et le Tadjikistan. Si la frontière commune entre ces républiques d’Asie centrale est le théâtre d’affrontements réguliers, cette nouvelle éruption de violences est la plus meurtrière depuis trente ans. Au cœur de cette tragédie, le découpage frontalier issu du démembrement de l’URSS y est pour beaucoup. En ne répondant à aucune réalité historique, il a participé à la fragmentation de l’espace régional et à la montée des tensions autour de l’enclave tadjike de Vorukh. Tracées sous la contrainte du régime soviétique, les limites administratives entre le Kirghizstan et le Tadjikistan ont pu créer des différends communautaires qui ont muté en un conflit interétatique lorsqu’elles ont acquis le statut juridique de frontières internationales. À cela s’ajoute le fait que « presque la moitié de la frontière entre le Tadjikistan et le Kirghizistan n’est pas encore tracée » et qu’un processus de militarisation rampante des frontières est venu accentuer les crispations sécuritaires de chacun. Si les deux parties se rejettent la faute, elles n’attendaient pas moins de la Russie qu’elle exerce son rôle de pacificateur par l’entremise de l’OTSC. Moscou a finalement demandé aux parties au conflit de trouver une solution par la voie du dialogue jugeant que les affrontements n’avaient pas atteint un niveau d’intensité suffisant pour qu’elle intervienne. Par conséquent, le Kremlin, à travers cette réaction limitée, adopte une posture stratégique ambiguë. D’une part parce qu’il invite le Kirghizstan et le Tadjikistan à s’assoir à la table des négociations lorsque, dans un même temps, Moscou règle ses différends territoriaux par la violence armée interétatique. D’autre part parce que les deux pays constituent les deux implantations militaires phares de la Russie en Asie centrale. Enfin parce qu’un conflit ouvert entre deux États membres de l’OTSC n’est pas prévu par les statuts de l’alliance militaire chapeautée par les Russes. Pour toutes ces raisons qui s’additionnent aux difficultés que Moscou rencontre en Ukraine, sa marge de manœuvre est restreinte et le Kremlin se retrouve pieds et poings liés. Dans ce cadre, les accords trouvés entre les deux pays se sont faits par des contacts strictement bilatéraux, écartant de fait la médiation russe. La Russie a trouvé une porte de sortie en stipulant que l’OTSC n’avait pas vocation à gérer des conflits entre les États membres de l’Alliance militaire. Néanmoins, le risque que l’OTSC devienne une coquille vide est d’autant plus important pour Moscou lorsqu’un conflit gelé se réactive et que la Russie se doit d’apporter une assistance militaire à un allié agressé militairement. L’OTSC une coquille vide ? La passivité du Kremlin face à ses obligations d’assistance Deux après la guerre au Haut-Karabakh, le conflit qui couve depuis trente ans entre Bakou et Erevan interroge désormais par le niveau d’intensité des affrontements survenus en septembre 2022. Tandis que les germes d’une guerre à plus grande échelle se sont installés, le Haut-Karabagh et plus récemment le territoire arménien ont été grignotés par Bakou. Tout ceci en dépit des efforts de médiation déployés par le président du Conseil européen Charles Michel lors des rencontres tripartites organisé pour parvenir à un accord de paix, ou tout du moins à une normalisation des relations entre Erevan et Bakou. De son côté, le parrain régional russe qui avait sonné la fin de la partie deux ans auparavant à travers un activisme diplomatique soutenu ne semble plus en mesure de contenir les aspirations territoriales azerbaïdjanaises. En 2020, sous la pression de Vladimir Poutine, le président azerbaïdjanais avait renoncé à prendre militairement le Haut-Karabakh. Aujourd’hui, la violation du fragile accord de cessez-le-feu négocié sous l’égide de Moscou et garanti par une force d’interposition de 2000 soldats russes revient à bafouer l’autorité du Kremlin. Bakou en est conscient, mais les déboires de la Russie en Ukraine lui offrent une opportunité stratégique pour revenir sur l’accord de paix préalablement signé et pour accélérer le rythme des négociations afin d’obtenir de plus larges concessions de la part d’Erevan. Quant à l’Arménie, elle s’est logiquement tournée vers ses alliés pour préserver son intégrité territoriale. En vertu de la clause de solidarité de l’OTSC activée pour la seconde fois de son histoire, la Russie et les autres États membres devaient prêter main-forte à l’Arménie. Seul juge du niveau d’assistance militaire à apporter, Moscou est confronté à un dilemme sécuritaire : sauver l’OTSC en tant qu’alternative crédible à l’OTAN en apportant l’assistance militaire qu’elle doit à l’Arménie reviendrait en effet à s’aliéner l’Azerbaïdjan qui se trouve être par la même occasion un allié de Kyiv et le protégé de la Turquie. Une nouvelle escalade des tensions pourrait renforcer la coalition turco-azéris et assurer une influence décisive à Ankara dans la sous-région face au concurrent russe. Parallèlement, les accords commerciaux signés entre l’Azerbaïdjan et la Russie concernant l’exportation d’hydrocarbure permettent à Moscou de contourner les sanctions occidentales. L’Arménie, qui pèse peu dans la coopération compétitive entre grandes puissances, pourrait alors servir de monnaie d’échange à la Russie pour maintenir ses partenariats stratégiques avec l’Azerbaïdjan et avec la Turquie afin d’éviter un rapprochement trop important entre ces deux derniers. Il semble qu’un « conflit armé dans le Caucase du Sud n’est pas à l’ordre du jour pour la Russie ». En d’autres mots, Moscou n’interviendra pas militairement dans la sous-région : la Russie ne possède pas en effet les moyens militaires et logistiques pour s’impliquer dans une deuxième guerre ; et plus important elle ne le souhaite pas. Une guerre sur plusieurs fronts aiderait grandement l’Ukraine en dispersant les efforts militaires russes. Ce relatif désintéressement a tout de même un coup politique pour le Kremlin. L’Arménie ne semble pas en mesure de se passer du soutien russe face à la supériorité militaire de l’Azerbaïdjan. Mais le niveau de défiance à l’égard de Moscou a atteint un point culminant lors des manifestations populaires à Erevan contre le régime russe et lors de la dernière rencontre de l’OTSC dans cette même capitale. Cette rencontre multilatérale s’est en effet soldée par le refus du Premier ministre arménien de signer la déclaration commune de l’Alliance militaire et par son départ abrupt de la table des discussions. En étant réticente à prendre parti, l’incohérence stratégique de la Russie et les réactions limitées qu’elle a provoquées ne seront pas sans conséquence sur sa fiabilité en tant qu’allié et sa crédibilité en tant que garant de la stabilité régionale. Également entachée, l’OTSC a su prouver qu’elle a « davantage vocation à marquer la loyauté de ses membres envers Moscou qu’à assurer leur sécurité ». Cette perte de vitesse dans la sous-région s’illustre également par le redéploiement stratégique de 1500 militaires russes présents au Tadjikistan vers le front ukrainien afin de soutenir l’effort de guerre. Cette diminution de la visibilité de la présence militaire russe a pu laisser un vide sécuritaire en mesure de déstabiliser l’espace eurasiatique. En priorisant ses propres intérêts stratégiques au détriment de ceux de ses alliés et en se révélant inefficace pour mettre à mal l’escalade militaire dans le Sud Caucase et en Asie centrale, la Russie a permis à d’autres puissances régionales d’avancer leurs pions. La construction de la première base chinoise sur le territoire tadjike ne semble pas être le seul élément permettant de démontrer le déclin de l’influence russe en Asie centrale. Un vide stratégique convoité par les puissances rivales voisines Bien que plusieurs spécialistes estiment que Bakou ne serait jamais intervenu militairement en Arménie sans l’aval de Moscou, le double jeu du Kremlin reste toutefois de l’ordre de la spéculation. Toujours est-il que la Russie doit désormais composer avec la Turquie dans le cadre de ce dossier et avec d’autres puissances régionales qui étaient absentes du jeu régional il y a plusieurs années. Si elles assurent des atouts géopolitiques au Kremlin dans le cadre de la guerre qu’elle mène chez son voisin, elles limitent tout de même grandement son indépendance stratégique. Pendant ce temps-là, la surenchère militaire qui est à l’œuvre offre de nouvelles opportunités pour revoir les allégeances diplomatiques. Une position d’équilibre fragile, mais néanmoins fructueuse pour la Turquie En se positionnant comme un acteur géopolitique majeur dans le cadre de la guerre en Ukraine, notamment lors de la négociation à Istanbul de l’accord « Initiative céréalière de la Mer Noire », Ankara a su se rendre indispensable pour Moscou et la médiation ne constitue pas son seul fait d’armes pour y parvenir. L’ambivalence stratégique dont elle fait preuve permettra-t-elle à Ankara de devenir un carrefour diplomatique ? Elle semble en bonne voie puisqu’elle constitue le seul acteur qui parvient à dialoguer avec l’ensemble des parties belligérantes. À mesure que le conflit russo-ukrainien évolue, Ankara parvient à se construire un rôle d’interlocuteur indispensable tout en projetant son influence plus efficacement en Asie centrale notamment grâce à l’établissement d’un avant-poste turc en Azerbaïdjan. Durant le conflit russo-ukrainien, les efforts de médiation opérés par Ankara et son rôle rempart face à Moscou en mer Noire ont été appréciés par les chancelleries occidentales. Son engagement envers la sécurité collective a suscité les remerciements chaleureux de la part de Jens Stoltenberg. Quant au solide partenariat en matière de sécurité entamé avec l’Ukraine à partir de 2014, il a doublement servi la Turquie. Il lui a permis de contester la suprématie de la Russie dans son voisinage et de se faire bien voir par les leaders occidentaux en participant au renforcement du dispositif sécuritaire ukrainien. Sur cette même période, la vente de 32 drones Bayraktar TB2, qui se sont illustrés sur le terrain militaire, a conduit à un léger réajustement du rapport de force initial et a conféré à l’industrie d’armement turc une aura certaine. Parallèlement, en ayant une certaine tendance à saper le travail de l’OTAN de l’intérieur, la Turquie constitue un allié non négligeable pour la Russie. En gardant ses options ouvertes concernant sa relation avec Moscou ou en bloquant l’adhésion de la Finlande et de la Suède pour prioriser ses propres intérêts stratégiques au détriment de ceux de l’OTAN, le président Erdogan nuit partiellement à la cohésion occidentale en exerçant un chantage stratégique. Dans le cas du conflit russo-ukrainien, la Turquie fait mine de condamner l’invasion. Mais elle permet également à Moscou de contourner les sanctions occidentales en offrant un débouché indispensable aux exportations d’hydrocarbures russes depuis l’embargo européen. Elle est également un partenaire économique clef, avec une nette augmentation du volume d’échange entre les deux pays depuis le début du conflit russo-ukrainien, et un partenaire militaire crucial en Syrie où, malgré les dissensions politiques, leurs actions ont pu être coordonnées. La position d’entre-deux de la Turquie lui accorde les faveurs de l’ensemble des parties au conflit. Pour cela, Moscou courbe l’échine en faisant preuve d’une certaine complaisance lorsqu’Ankara étend sa sphère d’influence au-delà du Conseil turcique. Récemment renommée l’Organisation des États turciques (Azerbaïdjan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Ouzbékistan, Turquie, Turkménistan), cette organisation pourrait muter dans les prochaines années en une alliance politico-militaire avec en son centre la Turquie. Ankara entend bien s’installer durablement dans la région en proposant un projet politique adapté à des pays composés à majorité de musulmans et parlant les langues turciques. La forte dépendance de ces États à la Russie, notamment dans le domaine de la défense, semble s’estomper à mesure que la Turquie vend ses armements lourds et ses drones à l’Azerbaïdjan, au Kirghizstan et également au Tadjikistan. L’usage de la diplomatie du drone s’étend à d’autres pays qui ne font pas partie de la communauté turcique puisque le Tadjikistan n’est pas turcophone. L’ambiguïté des relations entre la Russie et la Turquie pourrait se pérenniser s’ils en venaient à mener une lutte d’influence en utilisant le paysage centre-asiatique comme un nouveau terrain de confrontation. Malgré cela, Moscou a besoin d’Ankara qui a réussi à se positionner comme un médiateur irremplaçable grâce à une « diplomatie du grand écart » dans le cadre du conflit russo-ukrainien. Si garder cette position équidistante entre Kyiv et Moscou sera surement difficilement tenable sur le long terme, ce levier d’influence permet aujourd’hui au président Erdogan d’avoir le champ libre pour conclure des partenariats militaires avec presque l’ensemble des pays d’Asie centrale. Grâce à cela, Ankara développe une troisième voie d’intégration régionale comme alternative à celles proposées par la Russie et la Chine. Vers un réajustement de la position chinoise dans le conflit russo-ukrainien Alors que les relations sino-russes se nourrissent du durcissement américain à leur égard, les liens d’amitié présentés comme inébranlables par les leaders russes et chinois pourraient s’essouffler. Pékin hésite entre sauver le principe de non-ingérence, pilier de sa politique étrangère, et s’aligner avec la Russie dans la « croisade » qu’elle mène contre l’Occident. Finalement, Pékin aura fait preuve de prudence stratégique. Toutefois, le refus de soutenir l’effort de guerre russe, les récentes prises de paroles de l’exécutif chinois et le fait que plusieurs États cherchent à resserrer leurs liens avec la Chine rendent cette alliance informelle incertaine. À Astana en octobre dernier, alors que les leaders de l’ancien espace soviétique et la Chine se sont livrés à une intense joute diplomatique sur fond de guerre en Ukraine, un évènement marquant est passé sous les radars. En se positionnant comme un pont entre l’Occident et l’Orient, le Kazakhstan entretient des relations avec à la fois la Chine, l’UE et les États-Unis, ce qui a tendance à fortement agacer plusieurs officiels Russes. Avec un zèle qui n’est pas sans rappeler le discours révisionniste qui a amorcé le conflit en Ukraine, un député de la Douma a expliqué qu’il était nécessaire de dénazifier le Kazakhstan, ce à quoi Pékin a répondu sèchement en déclarant soutenir l’intégrité territoriale du Kazakhstan, une ligne rouge très claire à destination de Moscou. La prudence stratégique chinoise à l’égard du conflit a pu laisser place à une certaine exaspération envers les excès d’autorité du Kremlin. Pékin qui se cantonnait à son rôle de puissance économique dominante se mêle dorénavant des questions de sécurité sous-régionale – pourtant chasse gardée de la Russie – en proposant un processus de paix entre Kyiv et Moscou. Il convient alors de se demander si, à terme, Pékin pourrait supplanter Moscou dans son rôle de garant de la stabilité régionale. Pour y répondre, c’est vers un autre sommet diplomatique qu’il faut se tourner. À Samarcande, Pékin n’a cessé d’être courtisé lors de cette réunion étatique annuelle afin de déterminer les grands acteurs qui seront au cœur des projets d’infrastructures et de connectivité des nouvelles routes de la soie. Le président chinois a su rappeler qu’il constituait l’acteur économique central de la région tout en faisant la promotion d’un nouvel axe à travers les pays d’Asie central qui contournerait la Russie. En agissant sur d’autres fronts que l’Ukraine, le président russe souhaitait prouver à l’Occident qu’il n’est pas tant isolé sur la scène internationale. Cette mise en scène n’a pas permis de camoufler le fait qu’il s’est davantage retrouvé sous la pression de ses alliés qui cherchaient à adopter une position commune concernant les conséquences commerciales de l’aventure militaire du Kremlin. Comme l’atteste la tenue d’exercices militaires conjoints ou encore l’envol des exportations chinoises vers la Russie, il en faudra plus pour défaire l’alliance informelle entre les deux pays. Malgré tout, le G20 organisé à Bali a confirmé cette tendance au renforcement de l’isolement diplomatique de Moscou avec une prise de distance de la part de Pékin. Cette dernière s’est dite inquiète au sujet de la guerre sans pour autant exercer une pression réelle sur la Russie. Mais la critique à peine voilée de Xi Jinping envers son homologue russe concernant son opposition à une « instrumentalisation » des produits alimentaires et énergétiques laisse entrevoir un certain scepticisme de la part du leader chinois. À l’avenir, l’absence de prise de position claire de la Chine lui permettra de choisir son camp : se positionner comme un soutien de la première heure de la Russie, si elle remporte cette guerre, afin d’avancer leur vision commune d’un nouvel ordre mondial ; ou en cas de défaite russe s’éloigner durablement de Moscou pour ne pas être associée à l’amateurisme de l’armée russe. Dès lors, plusieurs opportunités stratégiques s’offrent à Xi Jinping, ce qui n’est pas le cas pour Vladimir Poutine qui devient de plus en plus limité dans le choix de son système d’alliance à mesure que son isolement se creuse. Finalement, le Kremlin n’a pas d’allié de rechange et Pékin profite de cette dépendance de circonstances pour accélérer son rapprochement avec les pays de l’orbite russe en organisant un « nouvel ordre de vassalité ». En restant à distance des ambitions militaires de Moscou, Pékin cherche tout d’abord à sécuriser ses corridors en créant un vaste espace de communication et d’échanges commerciaux pour la relier aux marchés européens. En somme, un prolongement de sa politique de bon voisinage. Mais celle-ci pourrait évoluer en une politique expansionniste, reposant sur la force de frappe de l’économie chinoise, à mesure que le déséquilibre dans le partenariat sino-russe se creuse. D’autant plus que Moscou a désormais encore moins de capacités pour compenser la supériorité diplomatique et économique chinoise. À l’avenir, Vladimir Poutine pourrait refuser de se faire court-circuiter sur son flanc asiatique en essayant de maintenir la Russie comme la grande puissance stabilisatrice dans la gestion des conflits régionaux. Il pourrait également recentrer son effort de guerre et diplomatique sur le Donbass pour sécuriser le gain territorial que représente l’annexion des régions ukrainiennes, tout ceci au détriment de ses positions dans l’espace eurasiatique. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, il convient toutefois de rappeler que son défaut de fiabilité pourrait pousser les États de l’ancien espace soviétique dans les bras de pays qui pourraient briguer la place de maitre de l’Eurasie. L’UE et les États-Unis peuvent-ils faire la différence dans la compétition stratégique qui se joue dans l’espace eurasiatique ? Quelle que soit l’issue du conflit russo-ukrainien et du processus d’adhésion de l’Ukraine au sein de l’UE, « l’Europe et la Russie risquent de se séparer pour longtemps ». Cette fracture sera d’autant plus notable entre les États-Unis et la Russie si Washington voit dans le conflit russo-ukrainien une occasion rêvée d’affaiblir durablement Moscou. Parallèlement sans pour autant avoir la volonté de devenir les gendarmes de la région, les États-Unis et l’Europe, en faisant preuve d’une habileté diplomatique, pourraient rehausser leur niveau d’ambitions géopolitiques au Caucase et en Asie centrale. En assumant désormais de vouloir agir « géopolitiquement », l’UE fait le pari de bâtir des partenariats plus approfondis dans ces régions. Dans le cas de l’Asie centrale, les ambitions stratégiques de l’Union européenne se sont accélérées avec la guerre en Ukraine. Le renforcement de ces relations bilatérales lui permettra de se rapprocher de l’indépendance énergétique et de l’autonomie stratégique tant recherchées en sécurisant de nouvelles voies d’approvisionnement énergétique. Les pays d’Asie centrale pourront quant à eux diversifier l’éventail de leurs stratégies diplomatiques et réduire la dépendance envers la Russie. Le déplacement de Charles Michel à Astana durant le sommet UE-Asie centrale et celui de Josep Borell au forum économique de Samarcande attestent de cette volonté européenne de s’affirmer dans le jeu régional et de rivaliser avec l’influence chinoise et russe. Dans le Caucase, la « mission civile » européenne envoyée le long de la frontière commune entre l’Azerbaïdjan et l’Arménie en vue d’une délimitation plus claire de celle-ci atteste du rôle majeur que joue l’Union européenne pour parvenir à la désescalade entre les deux pays. Tandis que la récente visite à Erevan de Nancy Pelosi (et qui a permis d’entamer des pourparlers entre les deux pays rivaux du Caucase à Washington) atteste du regain d’intérêt des Américains pour la sous-région. Néanmoins, une expansion importante de l’engagement américain ou une réorientation des politiques déjà établies en Asie centrale restent peu probables du fait que l’Asie du Sud reste la priorité stratégique absolue des États-Unis. Alors que l’ensemble des républiques centrasiatiques et celles du Caucase cherchent un nouvel équilibre géopolitique depuis le début du conflit russo-ukrainien, l’UE et les États-Unis disposent d’une grande opportunité pour renforcer les liens économiques et politiques avec les pays de ces régions hautement stratégiques. À l’instar de la reprise de l’initiative européenne « Global Gateway » prévoyant des investissements massifs dans des projets de connectivité, la guerre en Ukraine a eu le mérite de replacer l’Asie centrale et le Caucase comme des zones pivot/corridors centraux et non plus comme des angles morts de la politique étrangère de la communauté transatlantique. Conclusion La guerre en Ukraine a-t-elle porté finalement le coup de grâce à la zone d’influence russe ? Seul l’issu du conflit russo-ukrainien permettra d’y répondre. « Si la Russie gagne militairement, elle aura un énorme levier psychologique » pour peser dans les conflits régionaux. Au contraire, si elle perd, son influence subira un déclin progressif et plusieurs poches de conflit seront susceptibles d’éclater à nouveau. Toutes les nouvelles recompositions géopolitiques qui sont à l’œuvre conduisent à penser que Moscou joue bel et bien sa réputation. Il convient toutefois de rappeler que la Russie est toujours perçue comme la puissance stabilisatrice de la sous-région. L’Arménie n’a pas quitté l’OTSC malgré la fin de non-recevoir de l’alliance militaire et de nombreux États restent dépendants de Moscou sur le plan sécuritaire. Pour conserver son rang international, Vladimir Poutine s’active sur tous les fronts. Mais en étant absorbé par la guerre en Ukraine, il utilise énormément de ressources pour prouver son maintien dans le ballet diplomatique qui se joue en Eurasie. Pendant que la Russie s’épuise dans la surenchère militaire et diplomatique, la Chine et la Turquie en profitent pour étendre leur zone d’influence. Si elles répondent actuellement au souhait des pays de l’ancien espace soviétique de réduire leur dépendance envers le Kremlin, la Russie n’est pas à l’abri d’un revirement stratégique de leur part visant à la supplanter en tant que puissance militaire phare. L’accroissement de la présence de la Chine et de la Turquie, et dans une moindre mesure celle de l’UE et des États-Unis, aura des conséquences sur la carte diplomatique et sur la capacité de la Russie a assuré sa position géostratégique en Asie centrale. Plusieurs spécialistes considèrent qu’il convient de se garder de faire des prévisions sur l’issu du conflit russo-ukrainien et les possibilités de relégation de la Russie au rang de puissance moyenne. Toutefois, les conséquences de la succession de revers militaires et diplomatiques du Kremlin nous permettent d’ores et déjà de tirer plusieurs enseignements. Alors que de nombreux pays étaient prompts à choisir « l’équilibre » plutôt qu’à s’aligner, il s’avère que plusieurs lignes de convergence semblent désormais se dessiner. Pour certains, il s’agira de pérenniser leurs politiques de fermeté et de sanctions à l’égard de la Russie, tout en cherchant à en faire adhérer le plus grand nombre (États baltes), ou encore de poursuivre leur rapprochement vers l’Union européenne (Géorgie, Moldavie). D’autres confieront leur avenir au Kremlin en s’alignant stratégiquement avec lui (Biélorussie). Pour le dernier groupe, le non-alignement se précise – à des degrés différents – puisqu’ils refusent dorénavant de se voir imposer un nouveau rideau de fer  en développant une diplomatie dite multivectorielle (le reste du Caucase du Sud et l’Asie centrale). Et il va s’en dire que la dynamique de diversification des relations des pays de l’ancien espace soviétique n’est pas profitable à la Russie. Quant aux puissances régionales voisines qui profitent de la nouvelle architecture de sécurité qui tend à se dessiner (Turquie et Chine), elles constituent des sanctuaires pour éviter les sanctions occidentales. Si ce n’est pas déjà le cas, Moscou court le risque de l’hyperdépendance à leur égard ce qui affaiblira à terme ses positions dans l’espace post-soviétique. Comme l’atteste l’absence de réaction de l’OSC concernant les confrontations violentes entre le Kirghizstan et le Tadjikistan, avec la perpétuation des conflits dans la région, ces puissances étrangères ne vont pas se ruer pour assumer le fardeau de la sécurité. Pour ce qui a trait à sa position de stabilisateur, plus la Russie poursuit sa fuite en avant, plus sa crédibilité en tant que médiateur s’affaiblit. Pour autant, appréhender l’embrasement du Caucase et de l’Asie centrale comme une conséquence des déboires de la Russie en Ukraine reviendrait à tirer des conclusions hâtives et à ignorer les dynamiques régionales et les agendas politiques propres à ces États souverains. Néanmoins, ces conflits ont gagné en intensité (bilan humain, utilisation d’artilleries lourdes et drones, etc.) et en profondeur tandis que la Russie s’est contentée d’un service minimum pour prévenir l’escalade de la violence. Même si la reconquête ukrainienne dopée par l’assistance militaire occidentale pourrait se heurter à la stagnation du front dans les prochaines semaines, elle constitue un tournant militaire et psychologique. Si la capacité des Ukrainiens à se battre a été grandement sous-estimée, il est désormais évident que celle des forces armées de la Russie a été surestimée. « Aujourd’hui, non seulement son hard power voit ses limites, mais son soft power est désormais en déclin ». Par conséquent, l’effondrement du mythe de la puissance militaire russe a des échos au-delà du Kremlin puisqu’elles instillent des doutes et de la méfiance chez les sympathisants de la Russie. Les pays de l’espace post-soviétique profitent donc de ce nouveau degré d’autonomie et de la contestation de la suprématie de Moscou dans ce même espace pour chercher à diversifier leurs appuis. Face à cet isolement croissant dans les diverses plateformes régionales, le nouveau décret signé par Vladimir Poutine en septembre 2022 fournit au Kremlin un prétexte supplémentaire pour s’immiscer dans les territoires souverains de l’ancienne Union soviétique. Ce document dévoile une nouvelle politique humanitaire visant à défendre les populations russophones dans la région et les valeurs intrinsèques du « monde russe ». À mi-chemin entre un aveu de faiblesse lié à son déclin dans la région et une menace contre ses voisins qui chercheraient à s’émanciper, la Russie cherche à codifier son droit d’interférer dans les affaires intérieures d’un autre État. Plus révélateur encore, Moscou a bel et bien joué un rôle dans le craquellement de son glacis sécuritaire en faisant tomber le tabou « de la violence armée interétatique en tant qu’instrument au service d’objectifs politiques ». Que ce soit le Tadjikistan, le Kirghizstan et l’Azerbaïdjan, tous profitent du flou frontalier hérité de la période soviétique pour légitimer à leur tour leurs revendications territoriales sur les pays voisins. Finalement, Moscou, en s’attaquant à un État souverain, aura conduit à fragiliser l’unité interne de l’OTSC, à bousculer l’équilibre stratégique dans la région tout en ouvrant la porte à d’autres États pour étendre leur souveraineté territoriale par le biais d’une violence décomplexée.   ***   Tancrède Jankowski est titulaire d’un baccalauréat en droit et science politique obtenu au sein de l’Institut Catholique de Paris et est finissant à la maîtrise en études internationales, concentration cultures, conflits et paix au sein de l’Université de Montréal. Ses intérêts de recherche se concentrent sur la géopolitique de l’espace extra-atmosphérique, la sécurité ainsi que la résolution de conflits. Armel Bouvery est candidat à la maîtrise bi disciplinaire en droit internationale et politique internationale de l’Université du Québec à Montréal et a obtenu un baccalauréat universitaire en Sciences Politique à l’Université de Montréal. Durant son cursus universitaire il s’est spécialisé en sécurité internationale dans la zone sud-est asiatique. ## Repenser l’impact de la formation militaire américaine sur les coups d’États URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/repenser-limpact-de-la-formation-militaire-americaine-sur-les-coups-detats/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Les formations militaires à l’étranger représentent l’un des principaux outils de politique étrangère déployés par un nombre croissant de pays, incluant le Canada. Les formations militaires à l’étranger représentent l’un des principaux outils de politique étrangère déployés par un nombre croissant de pays, incluant le Canada. Dans les dernières années, un certain nombre d’officiers formés au sein de ces programmes ont été impliqués dans des tentatives de coups d’État, soulevant des inquiétudes par rapport au rôle que les formations à l’étranger peuvent jouer dans ces évènements. Ces inquiétudes sont le plus souvent exprimées dans le contexte de la formation militaire américaine. Une analyse des formations offertes par les États-Unis à des pays étrangers montre toutefois qu’un tel lien n’est pas certain. Points saillants Il est loin d’être certain que la formation militaire américaine augmente de manière générale la probabilité d’un coup d’État. Il est raisonnable de supposer qu’il en va encore moins pour la formation canadienne, compte tenu de la taille des programmes canadiens comparativement à ceux des États-Unis. Compte tenu du contexte multilatéral dans lequel il offre ce type de formations et de la taille modeste de ses investissements en la matière, le Canada devrait reconnaitre les limites de sa capacité à remodeler les armées étrangères. Il doit également comprendre que les conditions politiques locales jouent un rôle primordial dans le déclenchement des coups d’État, et que les formations militaires ne peuvent qu’avoir des impacts mitigés lorsqu’elles sont dispensées dans des systèmes politiques instables. Sans suspendre l’aide qu’elle offre aux pays partenaires, l’armée canadienne devrait concentrer ses efforts sur ses secteurs d’expertise, dont l’inculcation de normes démocratiques et de standards de professionnalisme militaire. Contexte Le 18 août dernier, un groupe d’officiers militaires a renversé le gouvernement malien dans un coup d’État. Au lendemain de ce nouveau bouleversement dans la vie politique malienne, un certain nombre de questions ont émergé concernant le fait que plusieurs des officiers impliqués ont participé, par le passé, à des programmes de formation militaire pilotés par des pays étrangers, dont les États-Unis. En fait, le coup du 18 août représentait la deuxième fois en huit ans que des officiers formés par l’armée américaine ont entrepris de renverser le gouvernement malien. Les évènements au Mali ont ainsi renouvelé les doutes concernant de potentiels liens entre la formation militaire américaine et les coups d’État. Au Canada, certains observateurs ont également soulevé des questions par rapport à l’impact des formations canadiennes sur l’incidence des coups d’État dans les pays partenaires, alimentant des débats concernant la nécessité de suspendre l’aide offerte aux armées étrangères. Est-ce que les formations militaires à l’étranger provoquent les coups d’État ? Les données disponibles ne nous permettent pas, pour le moment, d’offrir une réponse définitive. Ainsi, jusqu’à ce que nous en sachions plus, il est essentiel de demeurer sceptique face aux généralisations à ce sujet. L’impact de la formation militaire sur les coups d’État : un lien incertain Du Mali (2012, 2020) à la Thaïlande (2014), en passant par l’Égypte (2013) et le Zimbabwe (2017), de nombreux États ont été affectés par des coups d’État dans les dernières années, générant une quête de réponses, dans les cercles académiques et politiques, concernant les causes de ces renversements militaires. L’un des principaux facteurs ayant attiré l’attention des chercheurs à cet égard sont les formations militaires offertes par des pays étrangers à des armées locales. Cet intérêt découle en partie du fait que ce type de formation est devenu, dans les dernières années, l’un des principaux outils de politique étrangère et de diplomatie déployés par les pays occidentaux. De l’armée américaine entrainant les forces irakiennes, afghanes, ou ukrainiennes aux programmes de formation de la Direction de la coopération de sécurité et de défense (DCSD) de l’État français (p. ex. dans le cadre de l’opération Barkhane au Sahel), de nombreux États investissent en effet dans le « capital humain » à l’étranger, percevant le transfert d’expertise et de normes comme étant moins risqué et controversé que les interventions militaires directes. Ces formations — qui peuvent porter sur des sujets aussi variés que le contre-terrorisme, la lutte contre le narcotrafic, la cyber-sécurité, le contrôle des frontières, ou l’État de droit — permettent ainsi aux États dispensateurs de promouvoir leurs intérêts stratégiques et sécuritaires tout en acquérant une dose considérable de soft power. Elles peuvent également s’inscrire dans la stratégie internationale des grandes puissances, qui utilisent souvent ces formations pour créer, consolider, ou étendre leurs sphères d’influence sur l’échiquier mondial, en réponse aux actions d’États rivaux. Les pays bénéficiaires peuvent, eux aussi, obtenir d’importants bénéfices diplomatiques et militaires en participant à ces formations. Ces pays peuvent utiliser ces formations pour signaler leur attachement aux relations diplomatiques coopératives les liant aux États dispensateurs, en plus d’acquérir de l’expertise militaire leur permettant de faire face aux menaces qui les guettent. Certains travaux ont démontré que les formations militaires à l’étranger pouvaient générer un certain nombre des conséquences positives comme le développement d’institutions démocratiques, un plus grand respect des droits de la personne, ou une réduction de la violence politique dans les pays bénéficiaires. Or, l’actualité semble mettre en lumière un paradoxe inquiétant concernant les conséquences potentiellement néfastes de ce type de programme : le développement des capacités et de la légitimité des forces armées étrangères — l’objectif déclaré de ces formations — pourrait-il offrir les ressources techniques et symboliques à certains officiers pour renverser le gouvernement civil dans les États fragiles ? Certaines informations initiales — abondamment relayées par les médias — suggèrent qu’il existe effectivement un lien entre les formations militaires offertes par des pays étrangers et l’incidence de coups d’États par les armées formées. Nos collègues Jesse Dillon Savage et Jonathan Caverley, par exemple, ont démontré que les pays recevant une formation militaire américaine dans le cadre du programme International Military Education & Training (IMET) ont une probabilité de coup d’État deux fois plus élevée que les pays qui ne reçoivent pas cette formation. Ils suggèrent, de manière plausible, que ces formations donnent de la crédibilité et du pouvoir aux divisions d’officiers formés, des ressources qu’ils peuvent ensuite mobiliser pour rallier leurs collègues contre des gouvernements civils fragiles. Ce que les commentateurs notent trop peu souvent, toutefois, est que cette analyse ne concerne principalement qu’un programme de formation américain. Or, les États-Unis offrent plus de 34 programmes de formation militaire à leurs partenaires étrangers, et ce, dans presque tous les pays au monde. Le programme que Savage et Caverley lient à l’incidence des coups d’États — IMET — est important, mais ne représente que 14 % des dépenses des États-Unis en la matière et 11 % du personnel formé. Lorsque l’on considère l’ensemble des programmes américains, il n’existe pas d’apparente relation entre la formation militaire et les coups, même lorsque l’on examine des programmes très semblables au IMET. Une étude similaire, réalisée par des chercheurs à l’institut RAND, analyse les liens entre la formation militaire américaine et l’incidence de coups en Afrique et soulève aussi des doutes sur cette corrélation. Des recherches récentes démontrent que, en moyenne, la formation militaire américaine en Afrique a réduit l’interférence des armées nationales dans la sphère politique et leur participation aux violations des droits de la personne. Un phénomène répandu Il y a également d’autres raisons d’être sceptique par rapport à l’hypothèse selon laquelle la formation entraine les coups. Premièrement, il n’est pas particulièrement surprenant que les instigateurs du coup au Mali aient participé aux programmes américains. Entre 1999 et 2016, ces programmes ont vu défiler 2,4 millions de participants et ont coûté plus de 20 milliards de dollars. En effet, dans une multitude de pays, un nombre significatif d’officiers prennent part chaque année à ces pèlerinages de formation internationaux, posant les bases d’un circuit transnational d’académies, d’exercices et de manœuvres. Pour ces officiers, participer à de tels entraînements est souvent vital pour gravir les échelons de la hiérarchie militaire et pour bâtir une carrière fructueuse. Ainsi, même si certains exemples très médiatisés semblent indiquer la présence d’un lien entre les formations militaires américaines et l’incidence de coups dans les pays bénéficiaires, il semble que ceux-ci reflètent surtout l’ubiquité de ces programmes au sein de la plupart des armées modernes. Par ailleurs, dans la mesure où ces formations visent à renforcer les relations entre les sphères civiles et militaires, ce type de programme a tendance à être déployé dans des pays vulnérables aux coups comme le Mali. L’Histoire suggère en effet que les coups tendent à engendrer les coups. Un impact limité Une autre raison justifiant le scepticisme est qu’il est possible que l’impact de ces formations militaires ne soit que minime. D’une part, des programmes de formation d’envergure en Somalie, en Irak et en Afghanistan ont entrainé plus d’échecs et de frustration que de succès tangibles. À cet égard, Jahara Matisek a comparé les forces armées formées par des pays étrangers à des œufs Fabergé, « coûteuses et facilement brisées ». D’autre part, plusieurs activités de formation sont limitées à une poignée de soldats et ne durent que quelques jours. Ainsi, il est difficile de conclure que la formation militaire étrangère à elle seule génère d’importants changements dans les relations entre la société civile et la sphère militaire dans les pays bénéficiaires. Si nous ne pouvons pas tirer de conclusion générale relative au lien formation-coup, peut-être est-il possible d’identifier une corrélation dans certaines situations spécifiques — par exemple, en fonction du type d’entrainement donné ou de la manière dont les formations interagissent avec les conditions politiques locales. La place des normes démocratiques et professionnelles Certains commentateurs suggèrent que les formations se concentrent trop sur l’expertise technique et tactique, au détriment de l’inculcation de normes démocratiques et de standards de professionnalisme militaire. Or, dans la mesure où l’amélioration du contrôle civil de la sphère militaire est l’un des principaux objectifs de ces programmes, ces normes et standards occupent une place prééminente dans les cursus de formation. Le problème semble être lié à la difficulté de « transplanter » ces normes, comme les États-Unis et l’Union européenne l’apprennent actuellement après avoir dédié des années d’efforts et des dizaines de millions de dollars à tenter de réformer le secteur de la sécurité au Mali. Il faut également noter que les normes de professionnalisme militaire sont ambiguës et propices à mener à des abus. Comme notre collègue Risa Brooks le suggère de manière éclairante, la présence de telles normes aux États-Unis n’empêche pas le personnel militaire américain de s’immiscer dans la sphère politique. De manière inquiétante, Sharan Grewal démontre effectivement que la politisation croissante des officiers américains déteint de plus en plus sur les officiers étrangers formés. Tout cela ne signifie pas que nous ne devrions pas évaluer les programmes de formation de manière critique. Injecter d’importantes ressources dans les forces armées d’États fragiles est une entreprise risquée, qui peut potentiellement mener à des conséquences indésirables. En cherchant des partenaires efficaces en matière de sécurité, les États-Unis et leurs alliés se sont de plus en plus concentrés sur les unités d’élite, comme celles dirigées par le Colonel Goïta — à la tête de la nouvelle junte malienne. Bien que ces formations intensives et de longue durée peuvent contribuer à la transmission d’aptitudes importantes, elles peuvent également encourager l’essor de gardes prétoriennes qui menacent les gouvernements civils démocratiquement élus. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada Les formations militaires à l’étranger figurent également de manière importante dans l’éventail des outils de politique étrangère déployés par le Canada. Le renforcement des capacités de l’armée dans les pays partenaires est en effet l’une des principales missions des Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) dans le cadre de la politique de défense Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, actuellement en vigueur. Le transfert d’expertise et le développement des capacités permettent aux armées locales d’acquérir des ressources afin de répondre de manière plus efficace aux défis sécuritaires qui se présentent à eux, mais contribuent également à améliorer l’interopérabilité et à renforcer les relations entre les FAC et leurs partenaires. De ce fait, les questions entourant les liens entre les formations militaires à l’étranger et les coups d’État se posent également pour les décideurs canadiens. Cependant, notons qu’à la différence des États-Unis qui s’impliquent à grande échelle et souvent seuls dans des formations d’envergure à l’étranger, les opérations de formations que mènent les FAC à l’étranger sont d’une ampleur beaucoup plus modeste et se tiennent la plupart du temps dans des cadres multilatéraux, c’est-à-dire en partenariat avec les armées de pays alliés. Ainsi, si le lien entre les formations militaires américaines et les coups d’États reste mitigé, il semble que l’impact des formations canadiennes le sera davantage, soulignant l’importance d’entretenir des attentes réalistes par rapport à la capacité des FAC de remodeler les normes et pratiques des armées étrangères. Sur la base de ce que l’expérience américaine nous enseigne, il apparait possible que des formations qui mettent davantage l’accent sur l’inculcation de normes démocratiques et libérales et de standards de professionnalisme militaire et de gouvernance peuvent aider. Lorsqu’on considère les principales missions de formation données par le Canada entre 1999 et 2019, on remarque effectivement que, si la transmission de ces normes et standards occupent une place importante dans le curriculum de certains programmes canadiens (p. ex. dans le cadre de l’Opération Crocodile en République démocratique du Congo), les objectifs qui figurent le plus souvent au cœur de ces missions sont liés à l’amélioration de la performance militaire et à la lutte contre le terrorisme. Si les FAC à elles seules ne peuvent pas espérer produire de changements majeurs dans la trajectoire des armées étrangères, leur impact pourrait être de plus grande portée si, au sein des opérations multilatérales et coalitions auxquelles elles font partie, elles faisaient une promotion plus active d’une approche axée sur ces normes. Cependant, le fait que le déclenchement de coups d’État soit davantage influencé par des facteurs internes à un pays que par les efforts de la communauté internationale souligne les limites de l’impact des activités de formation. Il est tentant de croire que les problèmes militaires ont des solutions techniques. Or, ici, les enjeux semblent surtout politiques. Ils sont souvent le fruit de systèmes politiques instables, déchirés par des concurrences persistantes entre factions politiques, et incapables de répondre aux griefs d’une société, incluant ceux des officiers militaires qui en font partie. Dans ces conditions, les programmes internationaux de formation militaire, même ceux axés sur la diffusion de normes, ne peuvent avoir qu’un impact mitigé. En somme, même si l’impact des formations militaires sur les coups d’État dans les pays récipiendaires reste limité et difficile à déterminer, le Canada devrait maintenir cet outil de politique étrangère, mais le repenser à la lumière de ce que l’Histoire nous enseigne, tout en reconnaissant ses limites. ## Repenser la modération dans une perspective internationale: le cas de Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham en Syrie entre gouvernance étatique et pression internationale URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/repenser-la-moderation-dans-une-perspective-internationale-le-cas-de-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-en-syrie-entre-gouvernance-etatique-et-pression-internationale/ Modified: 2026-06-15 La transformation de Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), passé de l’un des mouvements djihadistes les plus radicaux de la guerre syrienne à une autorité dirigeante de la Syrie post-Assad reconnue à l’échelle mondiale, constitue l’un des développements politiques les plus extraordinaires de la dernière décennie au Moyen-Orient. Lorsque les forces du HTS dirigées par Ahmed al-Sharaa (anciennement connu sous le nom d’Abou Mohammed al-Jolani) sont entrées à Damas et ont renversé le régime de Bachar al-Assad en décembre 2024, la communauté internationale s’est trouvée confrontée à un défi inédit : comment les États et les organisations internationales doivent-ils réagir lorsqu’un ancien affilié d’al-Qaïda se retrouve soudainement en position d’autorité dirigeante de la Syrie? De nombreux analystes ont été surpris de constater que la normalisation diplomatique s’est opérée rapidement et pratiquement sans heurts : à la fin de 2025, al-Sharaa avait pris la parole devant l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, tenu des rencontres bilatérales avec des dirigeants européens et moyen-orientaux, et rencontré le président des États-Unis. Cette acceptation sans précédent de ce qui avait auparavant été qualifié d’« organisation terroriste » remet en question des conceptions bien établies, tant dans les débats universitaires que gouvernementaux, quant aux conditions dans lesquelles les groupes extrémistes se modèrent et acquièrent une légitimité. Les théories traditionnelles de la modération, en particulier l’hypothèse inclusion-modération, soutiennent que l’assouplissement idéologique découle principalement de facteurs internes tels que la participation électorale, l’intégration dans des organes législatifs, la formation de coalitions et la nécessité de rivaliser pour obtenir le soutien du public. Ces paradigmes ne suffisent pas à expliquer la trajectoire du HTS, puisque le groupe n’a participé à aucune élection, n’a pas été intégré au processus politique syrien formel du régime Assad et a été totalement exclu des négociations de paix pendant plus d’une décennie. Au contraire, le HTS s’est modéré sous le poids d’un isolement diplomatique de longue durée, de sanctions étouffantes et d’une exclusion de toutes les grandes négociations multilatérales et des forums institutionnels concernant l’avenir de la Syrie. On peut donc dire que le HTS s’est réformé non pas parce qu’il a été accueilli dans l’arène politique, mais parce que son exclusion lui imposait des coûts considérables qui ne pouvaient être réduits qu’au prix d’un ajustement majeur de sa posture idéologique et de son activité stratégique. De cette manière, le système international a activement façonné l’émergence du HTS plutôt que de simplement y réagir : des États étrangers, des organisations multilatérales et des institutions transnationales ont agi à la fois comme gardiens et accélérateurs, créant un contexte structurel dans lequel la modération est devenue la seule voie réaliste pour la survie et les objectifs du HTS. Les dirigeants du groupe semblent avoir pris conscience de cette réalité très tôt. À partir du milieu des années 2010, et plus rapidement après la défaite territoriale de l’État islamique en 2019, le HTS a entamé un processus interne de déradicalisation et de rebranding politique visant non seulement à apaiser les communautés locales sous son contrôle à Idlib, mais aussi à anticiper les conditions dans lesquelles il pourrait un jour être considéré comme un acteur légitime par les puissances extérieures. Cette modération stratégique a fonctionné à la fois comme une restructuration interne du pouvoir et comme une posture consciente à l’égard des attentes de la communauté internationale. Comprendre la modération du HTS et sa reconnaissance mondiale ultérieure exige un cadre qui dépasse l’inclusion interne pour examiner l’intersection entre l’adaptabilité interne et la pression systémique internationale. Cette analyse met en lumière un aspect nouveau et complet illustrant la manière dont le HTS, présenté à l’origine comme faisant partie de l’avant-garde djihadiste mondiale, a évolué vers un acteur de construction étatique capable d’interagir avec les pays les plus puissants du monde. Elle contextualise la transition du groupe vers la modération en examinant à la fois ses origines radicales et les influences internes et externes graduelles qui ont transformé sa conduite au cours de la décennie ayant précédé la chute du régime Assad. Elle examine ensuite comment ces processus préparatoires ont permis au HTS de devenir progressivement une autorité dirigeante reconnue diplomatiquement en 2025, en décrivant la vague sans précédent d’engagement international, les transformations institutionnelles en Syrie et l’émergence d’une nouvelle doctrine de politique étrangère sous al-Sharaa. Enfin, le rapport considère les implications plus larges de la trajectoire du HTS pour les approches internationales à l’égard des acteurs radicaux non étatiques, en soutenant que, dans certaines conditions structurelles, l’exclusion plutôt que l’inclusion peut générer des incitations à la modération et à la transformation politique. De l’avant-garde djihadiste à l’acteur protoétatique : la longue ère de la modération stratégique Pour comprendre l’importance du rebranding du HTS, il faut d’abord examiner les fondements idéologiques initiaux du mouvement, solidement ancrés dans la doctrine salafiste-djihadiste et les objectifs révolutionnaires internationaux. Lorsque Jabhat al-Nosra est apparu en 2012 comme affilié syrien d’al-Qaïda, ses dirigeants considéraient la Syrie comme un tremplin vers une transformation régionale plus vaste. Leur discours remettait en question la légitimité des États arabes existants, préconisait l’établissement d’un pouvoir islamique fondé sur une application stricte de la charia et considérait la violence comme le seul moyen de provoquer un changement politique. Le mouvement voyait les minorités confessionnelles comme des groupes adverses menaçant sa survie, condamnait toute forme de diplomatie avec les autres nations et tournait en dérision les forces rebelles soutenues par l’Occident en les présentant comme des marionnettes au service des intérêts des puissances mondiales. Ses premières décisions administratives, notamment l’instauration de tribunaux de la charia et d’une police religieuse, révélaient une orientation théologique rigide qui semblait immuable. Cependant, à partir du milieu des années 2010, le HTS a été confronté à plusieurs défis structurels qui ont progressivement rendu sa posture maximaliste intenable. Son isolement international était plus sévère que celui d’autres acteurs armés non étatiques dans les conflits contemporains : contrairement aux talibans, au Hezbollah ou au mouvement sadriste irakien, le HTS ne disposait d’aucun État protecteur prêt à lui fournir une protection diplomatique ni d’un canal officiel vers les discussions internationales. Les États-Unis, la Russie, l’ONU et les États régionaux insistaient sur son exclusion de toute négociation. Cet isolement a été renforcé par des sanctions étendues, qui rendaient même l’acheminement de l’aide humanitaire vers les territoires contrôlés par le HTS extrêmement difficile. Cette combinaison de contraintes coercitives et normatives a créé un contexte politique dans lequel le HTS ne pouvait accéder aux ressources, à l’aide extérieure ou aux canaux diplomatiques qu’en modifiant substantiellement sa position idéologique et son comportement. Parallèlement, le HTS procédait à des ajustements internes imposés par la réalité du contrôle territorial dans le nord-ouest de la Syrie. Lorsque la guerre est entrée dans une impasse prolongée après 2019, le HTS s’est retrouvé chargé de gouverner une région densément peuplée abritant des millions de civils déplacés à l’intérieur du pays. Le mouvement a compris, peut-être à contrecœur, que la pureté idéologique ne garantissait pas la viabilité administrative. Les populations locales avaient besoin de services, d’institutions et de stabilité politique. Répondre à ces besoins exigeait des compétences techniques, des procédures bureaucratiques et une coopération avec des organisations humanitaires étrangères, autant d’éléments incompatibles avec la rigueur doctrinale initiale du HTS. Ce problème de gouvernance interne a interagi avec les pressions internationales, produisant ce que l’on peut définir comme un « nexus interne-externe » des dynamiques de modération. Le premier tournant idéologique majeur du groupe s’est produit avec sa séparation formelle d’al-Qaïda en 2016-2017. Bien que des factions dures au sein du HTS s’y soient opposées, cette rupture a constitué une étape essentielle pour dissocier le groupe du djihad transnational et signaler une orientation plus locale et pragmatique. Loin d’être un simple geste symbolique, cette séparation a favorisé une réorganisation organisationnelle plus large qui a marginalisé les djihadistes transnationaux les plus irréductibles, promu des dirigeants pragmatiques et permis au groupe de présenter sa lutte en termes nationaux plutôt que mondiaux. Jérôme Drevon et Patrick Haenni ont identifié trois mécanismes simultanés à l’œuvre durant cette période : le passage d’un cadre doctrinal salafiste-djihadiste à un discours religieux plus jurisprudentiel et enraciné localement; le démantèlement ou la marginalisation des factions extrémistes au sein des rangs du HTS; et l’affaiblissement de la formation idéologique afin de réduire les engagements djihadistes transnationaux chez les nouvelles recrues. Ensemble, ces mesures ont transformé l’image du HTS et préparé l’étape suivante de son repositionnement stratégique. Un deuxième jalon a été la création du Gouvernement de salut syrien (Syrian Salvation Government, SSG) en 2017, que le HTS a soutenu et sur lequel il s’est de plus en plus appuyé comme partenaire administratif civil. Bien que le groupe ait conservé l’autorité ultime, il a présenté le SSG comme une organisation technocratique capable de fournir des services, d’établir des institutions et de représenter les communautés locales. Cette façade de gouvernement civil a permis au HTS d’interagir indirectement avec des acteurs internationaux et des organisations humanitaires qui refusaient auparavant de collaborer avec des groupes officiellement désignés comme terroristes. Plus important encore, elle a démontré la volonté du HTS de distinguer les fonctions militaires et civiles, ce qui se révélera plus tard crucial pour apparaître gouvernable aux yeux des autres puissances. Au fil des années, les commandants du HTS, en particulier al-Jolani, ont mené une campagne de communication systématique visant à remodeler l’image du groupe : les déclarations publiques mettaient l’accent sur la justice plutôt que sur la vengeance, sur la construction institutionnelle plutôt que sur la lutte révolutionnaire, et sur les priorités locales plutôt que sur le djihad mondial. D’une part, des entretiens accordés aux médias internationaux présentaient le HTS comme un mouvement syrien sans intention de frapper les intérêts occidentaux, soulignant l’importance d’un gouvernement civil unifié dans le nord-ouest. Ce message était explicitement conçu pour correspondre aux attentes des publics internationaux et les rassurer sur le fait que le HTS ne constituait pas une menace transnationale. Malgré cette évolution narrative, le groupe continuait néanmoins de recourir à des pratiques telles que des châtiments et l’exclusion politique. D’autre part, l’aide internationale restait fortement contrainte, les infrastructures économiques se dégradaient sous le poids des embargos et le SSG peinait à maintenir les services de base. Cette pénurie, combinée à l’absence de circuits financiers formels, a poussé le HTS à adopter une approche plus pragmatique : al-Jolani a commencé à mettre l’accent sur les zones d’investissement, la diversification économique, l’autosuffisance agricole et la réactivation industrielle plutôt que sur la zakat ou la redistribution islamique. Il a présenté une vision de « dignité économique » fondée sur la productivité plutôt que sur la charité, beaucoup plus compatible avec les aspirations de développement néolibérales que les convictions idéologiques antérieures de l’organisation. Au moment où le HTS lançait son offensive principale contre le régime syrien à la fin de 2024, l’organisation avait passé près d’une décennie à construire un récit de contrôle localisé, de rationalité institutionnelle et de modération idéologique. Ce récit était plus qu’une simple façade : même s’il est difficile de mesurer une véritable réforme idéologique interne, il ne fait guère de doute que le HTS a modifié ses institutions, son langage et ses pratiques afin de se présenter comme un acteur politique légitime capable d’accéder au pouvoir national. Ces changements ne témoignaient pas d’une intériorisation normative, mais d’une adaptation stratégique — une tentative de « jouer la modération » en prévision des attentes conditionnelles de la communauté internationale. Autrement dit, le HTS a changé parce que demeurer inchangé l’aurait condamné à un isolement permanent. La chute du régime Assad a offert au HTS une occasion sans précédent tout en le soumettant à un examen accru. Dès que Damas est passée sous son contrôle, le HTS a dû démontrer que la modération pratiquée pendant des années pouvait se traduire par des obligations de gouvernance étatique. L’étape suivante de son évolution — son émergence comme autorité gouvernementale reconnue à l’échelle mondiale — allait montrer jusqu’où sa modération stratégique et son rebranding avaient réellement réussi. La récompense de la modération : le HTS comme acteur étatique accepté internationalement L’éviction d’Assad en décembre 2024 a ouvert un scénario politique fondamentalement nouveau en Syrie, dans lequel le HTS, longtemps dénoncé comme organisation terroriste, est devenu de manière inattendue l’autorité principale gouvernant un pays fragmenté et épuisé. Ce qui a suivi a constitué un basculement diplomatique sans précédent dans l’histoire récente du Moyen-Orient, compte tenu de l’isolement international de la Syrie. En quelques semaines, la Syrie est passée du statut de paria international à celui de régime courtisé par des pays arabes, des ministères européens et des diplomates occidentaux. Ce changement brutal n’était pas accidentel, mais le résultat d’années de modération intentionnelle qui avaient placé le HTS en position de satisfaire les conditions de reconnaissance de la communauté internationale. Cette reconnaissance résultait de considérations pragmatiques de la part des gouvernements et institutions internationales recherchant stabilité, influence et coopération dans la période post-Assad, plutôt que d’un soutien normatif à l’idéologie du HTS. Après la prise de Damas, Ahmed al-Sharaa a proclamé la formation d’une administration intérimaire composée de technocrates et d’anciens membres du HTS. Les nouvelles autorités ont dissous ou fusionné les factions armées au sein d’une armée nationale, créé des ministères conçus pour fonctionner conformément aux standards bureaucratiques internationaux, entamé des discussions sur un processus de rédaction constitutionnelle et préparé le terrain pour de futures élections. Ces mesures visaient à présenter le HTS comme un groupe politique responsable respectant les normes mondiales de gouvernance. Al-Sharaa a également mis sur pied des commissions de justice transitionnelle et de recherche des personnes disparues, deux revendications de longue date des acteurs étrangers, envoyant les premiers signaux que la nouvelle administration entendait traiter les griefs accumulés au cours de décennies de guerre et de répression. Parallèlement, une vague sans précédent d’activité diplomatique s’est produite. L’Allemagne et la France ont envoyé leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères à Damas au début de janvier 2025, marquant les premières visites occidentales officielles en Syrie depuis plus de dix ans. Quelques jours plus tard, le premier ministre du Qatar ainsi que le ministre saoudien des Affaires étrangères se sont rendus à Damas, soulignant une volonté régionale coordonnée d’interagir avec la nouvelle administration. La visite de l’émir du Qatar a constitué la première visite d’un chef d’État à Damas à peine quelques semaines après la chute d’Assad. Elle représentait un soutien symbolique à la transition du HTS qui aurait été impensable un an auparavant. La normalisation s’est poursuivie en février 2025. Le directeur général de l’Organisation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques s’est rendu à Damas pour relancer les procédures de conformité syriennes, permettant aux nouvelles autorités de démontrer leur adhésion au droit international et aux obligations de conformité. Dans le même temps, les représentants américains Cory Mills et Marlin Stutzman ont effectué les premières visites semi-officielles du Congrès depuis 2012, suivies quelques mois plus tard par un groupe bipartisan de sénateurs. Ces rencontres ont marqué un changement progressif de la position de Washington : même si les États-Unis n’ont pas immédiatement retiré le HTS de leur liste d’organisations terroristes, ils ont reconnu que la réalité politique syrienne exigeait une forme d’engagement pragmatique. L’effort diplomatique a culminé à la fin de mai 2025, lorsque al-Sharaa s’est rendu à Riyad pour une rencontre historique avec le président américain Donald Trump. Cette réunion a lancé des discussions sur l’allégement des sanctions et la coopération antiterroriste, constituant le premier dialogue présidentiel formel entre les États-Unis et la Syrie depuis 2000. Dans les mois précédant le sommet, al-Sharaa s’était rendu en Turquie, aux Émirats arabes unis, au Qatar, en France, en Azerbaïdjan et en Russie, tandis que le roi Abdallah II de Jordanie l’avait reçu à Amman. L’invitation ultérieure à s’adresser à l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies en septembre 2025 a marqué la conclusion symbolique du parcours du HTS, passé de l’ostracisme à l’acceptabilité. Cet élan diplomatique a été renforcé par les efforts du HTS pour développer un cadre de politique étrangère clair : dans son discours à l’ONU en septembre 2025, al-Sharaa a présenté une stratégie fondée sur la diplomatie équilibrée, la stabilité régionale et la relance économique. Il a promis de coopérer avec les missions d’établissement des faits de l’ONU, remercié les pays arabes et occidentaux pour leur aide à la transition syrienne et présenté son administration comme défenseure à la fois de la souveraineté nationale et des obligations juridiques internationales. Son appel à une suspension immédiate des hostilités à Gaza était particulièrement notable, car il cherchait à associer la Syrie à des thèmes humanitaires internationaux plus larges tout en évitant un affrontement direct avec les préoccupations sécuritaires occidentales et israéliennes. La retenue sélective du HTS reflétait la nécessité d’éviter de contrarier des acteurs occidentaux importants dont la coopération était essentielle pour obtenir un allégement des sanctions et une aide à la reconstruction. Dans l’administration intérieure, le HTS a maintenu une posture modérée afin d’obtenir l’acceptation internationale : l’administration intérimaire a renforcé les ministères chargés des infrastructures, de la santé et de l’éducation et rétabli des canaux pour les ONG humanitaires dans des paramètres contrôlés. L’expérience administrative antérieure du SSG à Idlib a servi de base au développement des institutions nationales, permettant au gouvernement de revendiquer une compétence administrative. En outre, le HTS a cherché à rassurer les groupes minoritaires en affirmant qu’ils n’avaient pas à craindre de persécutions, en rupture nette avec les déclarations sectaires antérieures du groupe. Ces démonstrations de tolérance étaient utilitaires plutôt qu’idéologiques et traduisaient un abandon intentionnel de pratiques antérieures afin de satisfaire les attentes internationales en matière d’administration pluraliste. Les puissances étrangères ont récompensé cette modération non par solidarité idéologique avec le HTS, mais parce que les alternatives — effondrement de l’État, fragmentation des milices, reprise de l’expansion djihadiste — paraissaient nettement moins attrayantes que l’acceptation de la nouvelle administration dirigeante. Des puissances régionales comme la Turquie, le Qatar et l’Arabie saoudite y voyaient l’occasion de sécuriser leurs frontières, de limiter les flux de réfugiés, de façonner le destin de la Syrie tout en rééquilibrant l’ordre régional. Les puissances occidentales ont reconnu la valeur pragmatique d’un engagement avec une force ayant abandonné le djihad transnational, affichant une discipline interne et contrôlant un territoire stratégiquement important. Même la Russie a modifié sa position, passant d’une défense vigoureuse d’Assad à une reconnaissance conditionnelle du nouveau gouvernement comme interlocuteur légitime. Ces engagements diplomatiques ont servi non seulement de reconnaissance, mais aussi de canaux de conditionnalité permanente. Chaque visite, conférence et interaction institutionnelle a renforcé l’attente que le HTS reste modéré et respecte une gouvernance fondée sur des règles. Le processus a créé ce que l’on peut définir comme une boucle de rétroaction circulaire : la modération a permis d’obtenir la reconnaissance, laquelle a ensuite encouragé davantage de modération afin d’assurer la survie politique et la légitimité internationale. L’administration ne pouvait plus facilement revenir à un comportement radical sans subir des coûts réputationnels importants et compromettre les avantages diplomatiques et économiques qu’elle avait cherché à obtenir. Les critiques soutiennent que la modération du HTS est largement performative, dictée par des calculs opportunistes plutôt que par un véritable changement idéologique. Cette préoccupation n’est pas sans fondement, car les racines salafistes-djihadistes du groupe et son histoire de rigidité doctrinale soulèvent des doutes quant à la profondeur et à la durabilité de sa transformation. Toutefois, plusieurs facteurs structurels et institutionnels suggèrent qu’un retour au radicalisme entraînerait des coûts prohibitifs. Premièrement, le HTS a investi massivement dans des mesures de construction étatique en créant des ministères, en lançant des processus constitutionnels et en intégrant des technocrates dont le démantèlement minerait la gouvernance et la légitimité, tout en signalant un possible retour au radicalisme susceptible d’isoler à nouveau le groupe et le pays. Deuxièmement, la survie de la nouvelle administration est désormais indissociable de la reconnaissance internationale : l’allégement des sanctions, l’accès humanitaire et l’aide à la reconstruction dépendent du maintien de la modération, rendant tout revirement économiquement et diplomatiquement autodestructeur. Troisièmement, la marginalisation des factions les plus dures et l’affaiblissement des réseaux djihadistes transnationaux au sein du HTS ont réduit la capacité organisationnelle d’un retour idéologique. Enfin, une boucle de rétroaction conditionnelle — où chaque engagement diplomatique renforce les attentes de gouvernance fondée sur des règles — a verrouillé le groupe sur une trajectoire où la modération n’est plus seulement tactique, mais structurellement « collante ». Même si le scepticisme demeure justifié, ces dynamiques indiquent que la posture actuelle du HTS reflète une adaptation stratégique de plus en plus difficile à défaire. Derrière cette façade de normalité subsiste une tension fondamentale : la modération du HTS semble essentiellement opportuniste, motivée par les avantages potentiels de l’acceptabilité internationale plutôt que par une véritable transformation morale de sa vision intellectuelle du monde. Sa capacité à maintenir cette modération dépendra des dynamiques internes, notamment de son aptitude à contenir les factions dures, à gérer les crises économiques et à répondre aux attentes culturelles d’une population traumatisée par la guerre. Dans le même temps, les acteurs internationaux doivent trouver un équilibre délicat entre l’appui à la stabilisation de la Syrie et la prévention de la normalisation d’un mouvement armé aux fondements idéologiques controversés. Conclusion L’émergence du HTS, passé d’une faction djihadiste mondialement isolée au dirigeant de la Syrie post-Assad reconnu à l’échelle internationale, illustre un mécanisme complexe et souvent négligé de transformation politique. Contrairement aux théories traditionnelles de la modération, qui mettent l’accent sur l’inclusion et les incitations internes, le cas du HTS montre que l’exclusion, lorsqu’elle est cohérente, multilatérale et matériellement contraignante, peut créer les conditions permettant à des mouvements radicaux de recalibrer leurs cadres idéologiques et leur comportement institutionnel. L’argument central du rapport est que le HTS s’est modéré non parce qu’il a accepté les règles internationales, mais parce que le système mondial a fait de cette conformité une condition de survie et de légitimité. Cette trajectoire met en évidence l’influence structurelle de l’ordre international dans la définition des trajectoires offertes aux acteurs armés non étatiques. Elle montre comment la légitimité, loin d’être une caractéristique naturelle des acteurs étatiques, peut être accordée à des organisations auparavant radicales au moyen d’une adhésion performative aux normes mondiales. En même temps, la modération du HTS demeure situationnelle, instrumentale et potentiellement réversible. Sa viabilité à long terme dépendra d’une participation internationale soutenue, de changements continus dans la gouvernance intérieure et de la capacité du groupe à transformer une modération tactique en une identité politique plus profondément institutionnalisée et normative. L’exemple du HTS constitue un précédent important pour la manière dont la communauté internationale devrait aborder d’autres groupes armés opérant dans des contextes tout aussi fragmentés. Il suggère que, dans certaines conditions — en particulier lorsque l’isolement extérieur limite sévèrement l’accès aux ressources et à la légitimité — des acteurs radicaux peuvent devenir étonnamment ouverts à une modération stratégique. Cependant, les risques liés à ce type d’engagement demeurent considérables, et la distinction entre adaptation pragmatique et véritable transformation idéologique devra être suivie de près dans les années à venir. Crédit image: Commission européenne, CC BY 4.0. ## Repenser la stratégie de défense canadienne : quelles leçons tirer du Royaume-Uni et de l’Australie ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/repenser-la-strategie-de-defense-canadienne-quelles-lecons-tirer-du-royaume-uni-et-de-laustralie/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Qu'est-ce que le Canada a à apprendre du Royaume-Uni et de l’Australie qui réalisent une mise à jour importante de leur posture stratégique? Le mandat de Donald Trump aura confirmé une tendance lourde depuis la crise financière de 2008 : l’hégémon américain est bel et bien en déclin. Qui plus est, l’ordre international qu’il a construit est menacé par la résurgence d’acteurs étatiques. Reconnaissant les implications d’une telle transformation, le Royaume-Uni et l’Australie, deux proches alliés du Canada, réalisent une mise à jour importante de leur posture stratégique. Par des démarches similaires, ils cherchent, d’une part, à réviser le rôle qu’ils entendent jouer dans un système international marqué par un retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances. D’autre part, ils opèrent une restructuration de leurs forces armées et des dépenses qui y sont associées pour mieux faire face aux nouveaux types de menaces. Les exemples britanniques et australiens doivent servir de modèle pour le Canada. À cet effet, l’accent doit aller vers trois domaines : la marine, l’aérospatial et le cyber, mais surtout vers leur intégration « pan-domaine ». Un réinvestissement dans les capacités et une révision organisationnelle des forces armées apparaissent également nécessaires. Ce genre d’actions doit cependant faire suite à un travail de réflexion en amont pour développer une vision cohérente et holistique de ce que le Canada aspire être au 21e siècle. La révision stratégique du Royaume-Uni et de l’Australie Initialement prévu pour 2020, le UK Integrated Security and Defense Review sera finalement déposé en 2021 en raison de la crise de la COVID-19. Les grandes lignes du programme sont cependant connues à travers un rapport de la commission sur la défense du parlement. Il s’agit du plus important exercice de ce genre réalisé au Royaume-Uni depuis la fin de la Guerre froide. L’Integrated Review combine la portée, limitée, de rapports sur la défense publiés en 2010, 2015 et 2018. L’objectif est de définir la place du Royaume-Uni dans l’après-Brexit. La vision de Boris Johnson à ce niveau se résume dans le terme Global Britain, soit l’idée de rétablir catégoriquement sa place comme grande puissance. Pour y arriver, l’engagement principal est d’augmenter et de maintenir le budget de la défense à 2 % du PIB. S’y additionnent des dépenses de 21,9 milliards US sur quatre ans pour de nouvelles acquisitions. L’Australie a publié, l’été dernier, le 2020 Defence Strategic Update et le 2020 Force Structure Plan, qui font suite au livre blanc qui avait été déposé en 2016. Ce dernier prévoyait une dégradation de l’environnement sécuritaire international, prévision qui s’est confirmée et qui explique l’important processus que l’Australie entame. Car il ne s’agit pas ici d’une simple mise à jour. Le premier ministre Scott Morrison est clair à ce sujet : l’Australie connait son plus important réalignement stratégique depuis 1945. L’objectif est triple : façonner l’environnement stratégique régional, dissuader les actions à l’encontre de leurs intérêts et répondre aux menaces avec une force crédible. En termes financiers, ces objectifs ambitieux sont soutenus par un budget régulier de 29 milliards US, soit 2 % de son PIB, qui est d’ailleurs amené à augmenter davantage. Des investissements de 270 milliards US ont également été annoncés en renforcement des capacités. Le nouveau prisme au travers duquel concevoir l’utilisation des forces armées est l’opération multidomaine. Pour le vice-amiral Kyd de la Royal Navy, la fusion des capacités navales, aériennes, spatiales et cybernétiques constitue la base de cette vision. C’est précisément dans ces domaines que se concentre l’essentiel des mesures annoncées par le Royaume-Uni et l’Australie. Domaine naval Une portion significative des investissements faits de part et d’autre est dirigée vers les forces navales. Ce n’est pas anodin puisque plusieurs États redéfinissent présentement leur idée de ce qu’est une flotte équilibrée. Pour la Royal Navy, cela signifie renouer avec une capacité de projection globale de la puissance où une prééminence est donnée à l’offensive. Le plan britannique implique l’achat de 13 frégates (l’objectif est une flotte de 24 frégates) et le développement d’un nouveau modèle multi-usage pouvant agir comme plateforme pour l’embarquement de drones. Sont également en développement de nouveaux missiles surface-surface et sept sous-marins. Il a aussi été confirmé récemment que les nouveaux sous-marins dédiés à la dissuasion nucléaire devraient être opérationnels d’ici 10 ans. La clef de cette reconfiguration navale est la mise en service de leurs deux nouveaux porte-avions de la classe Queen Elizabeth, dont le navire éponyme devrait être déployé avec son groupe aéronaval, et des navires alliés, dès l’an prochain en Indopacifique. Déployant des capacités maritime, aérienne, cyber et électronique, un porte-avions et son groupe aéronaval restent, pour la Royal Navy, « une métaphore pour un État-nation qui entend rester pertinent sur la scène mondiale au niveau stratégique ». L’Australie traverse un processus de réflexion similaire. Il implique l’adoption de capacités opérationnelles augmentées pour son théâtre régional. C’est la situation géographique unique de l’Australie, et sa proximité avec la Chine, qui guide son plan d’acquisition. Elle investit dans l’achat de 9 frégates (pour un total de 17) munies de systèmes de drones et missiles surface-surface et surface-air. C’est surtout en guerre sous-marine que les projets d’envergure se situent. Dans ce domaine, ce sont 12 sous-marins, des systèmes de mines, de surveillance et de combat autonome et contrôlé à distance qui ont été annoncés. Fait nouveau dans le cas australien, les forces armées souhaitent avec ces acquisitions devenir une force de dissuasion autonome. Une grande importance est accordée à l’élaboration de systèmes de communications, de surveillance satellite, de combats électroniques et cyber, et d’analyse acoustique. Tout indique que ces nouvelles capacités seront entre autres utilisées pour accroitre la présence australienne en mer de Chine du Sud, en collaboration avec les États-Unis. Domaine aérospatial Sur le plan de l’aviation, la poursuite de l’acquisition des F-35 est centrale chez les Britanniques et les Australiens. Les premiers pourraient cependant couper de moitié le nombre d’achats prévus et poursuivre la conception d’un chasseur de sixième génération. Un élément névralgique des futures capacités aériennes des deux États passe par l’investissement massif dans des véhicules sans pilote. À noter qu’ils travaillent à incorporer aux chasseurs et aux drones des technologies d’intelligence artificielle. L’Australie mise aussi sur le déploiement massif de missiles alliant grande vitesse et longue portée. Le ton employé pour traiter de l’espace est sérieux et urgent. Il fait maintenant partie intégrante des biens communs mondiaux et émerge comme un lieu de conflits potentiels. La société et les forces armées modernes s’appuient sur les capacités de communication et d’information permises par les satellites. Pour les Britanniques et les Australiens, ces faits impliquent qu’il faut investir, d’une part, pour se protéger des menaces spatiales à l’aide de systèmes basés sur terre et dans l’espace. D’autre part, il faut s’assurer d’un accès autonome à l’espace. Ce dernier élément est un changement de paradigme important. De part et d’autre, il implique une participation conjointe des forces armées, de leur agence spatiale et de firmes privées. Britanniques et Australiens prévoient ainsi une coopération accrue avec les États-Unis dans ce domaine. Du côté australien, la mise en œuvre demeure imprécise. Au Royaume-Uni, un commandement spatial vient d’être créé avec pour mandat de permettre le lancement de fusées dès 2022. Domaine cyber Il est juste d’affirmer que c’est ici que les changements les plus importants ont eu lieu. En Australie, une politique de cybersécurité a été lancée cet été pour encadrer ce domaine spécifique, comprenant un budget de 1,67 milliard US. C’est en plus des mesures annoncées dans le 2020 Strategic Update, où 15 milliards US sont prévus dans les 20 prochaines années pour développer des infrastructures matérielles et logicielles. Jamais cet État n’a investi autant en cyberdéfense. L’essentiel des fonds est dirigé vers les forces armées, l’Australian Signals Directorate et l’Australian Cyber Security Centre. Malgré cela, l’Australie adopte un discours sensiblement différent sur la place de l’intégration entre les secteurs d’activités en matière de cybersécurité. Une collaboration accrue entre les branches civiles et militaires de l’État, ainsi qu’avec le secteur privé apparait nécessaire pour répondre efficacement aux cyber menaces. Comme dans les autres domaines, une coopération étroite avec les États-Unis est déjà en place. Le but, à terme, est de pouvoir mener des opérations dans les domaines du cyber, de l’électronique et de l’information, tant défensives qu’offensives. La distinction faite entre infrastructures matérielles et logicielles est importante. L’un des éléments clefs pour justifier le refus du gouvernement d’adhérer au réseau 5G de Huawei est le risque lié au contrôle du matériel. Les risques liés aux manufacturiers et aux chaines d’approvisionnements sont réels. Il faut également se concentrer sur des points importants comme l’innovation, le développement de nouveaux standards, ainsi que l’accès et le déploiement des infrastructures. L’Australie reconnaît l’ensemble de ces enjeux, ainsi que la nécessité de mettre l’accent sur l’éducation supérieure pour atteindre ses objectifs. C’est un grand bond depuis sa dernière stratégie déposée en 2016. Au Royaume-Uni, l’innovation se trouve principalement au niveau de la réorganisation institutionnelle. La création de la National Cyber Force (NCF) est un pas vers une plus grande intégration de l’ensemble des domaines touchant la cybersécurité. Son unicité est qu’elle rassemble dans une nouvelle structure des éléments des forces armées (dont le un nouveau régiment dédié à la guerre cybernétique), du renseignement et des départements civils de l’État. Elle procure donc un avantage indéniable en permettant de répondre efficacement aux menaces et défis de « zone grise ». L’agilité institutionnelle de la NCF signifie que l’ensemble des ressources peuvent aussi être mises au service d’opérations offensives. Une grande importance est aussi accordée aux capacités offensives et au soutien tactique. Le gouvernement combine à la NCF un nouveau centre de recherche consacré à l’intelligence artificielle en défense. Le tout est soutenu par un investissement initial de 1,5 milliard de livres sterling pour mettre en phase les forces armées avec les dernières avancées technologiques. Repenser la défense du Canada et se donner les moyens de ses ambitions Le Canada doit poursuivre un processus similaire à celui réalisé au Royaume-Uni et en Australie. Les trois États font actuellement face aux mêmes menaces : le retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances alors que des États autoritaires menacent l’ordre international et cherchent à déstabiliser les démocraties libérales. Le Canada a fait un pas dans la bonne direction l’an dernier lors de la publication du Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept. Ce document reconnait plusieurs impératifs. De un, moderniser les capacités pour s’adapter à une époque dominée par l’information, les données et la fin d’une distinction claire entre état de guerre et de paix. De deux, chercher à optimiser l’intégration. Ce leitmotiv doit être appliqué entre les branches civiles et militaires de l’État, entre les domaines d’opérations et entre le Canada et ses alliés. De trois, un effort soutenu sur le continent nord-américain. Ce qui ne signifie pas d’écarter de participer à des opérations avec nos alliés sur d’autres théâtres d’opérations. En matière navale, le Canada suit présentement la même direction que la Grande-Bretagne et l’Australie, avec un projet d’acquisition de 15 frégates. Les trois États ont sélectionné le même modèle Type 26 de BAE System. Des lacunes persistent cependant quant à la capacité de projection de la puissance canadienne dans sa région. D’un, il est impératif que le Canada se dote d’une flotte de brise-glaces capable d’accéder au cercle arctique en toutes saisons. En plus de réaffirmer la souveraineté canadienne sur ce territoire, la quantité de nouveaux enjeux qui émergent dans cette région stratégique justifie d’aller de l’avant sur cette question qui est depuis trop longtemps discutée. Le Canada est à la traîne sur la Russie, qui vient de lancer un nouveau brise-glace. Les États-Unis pensent aussi à en acquérir de nouveaux et à construire un port dans l’Arctique. De deux, le Canada doit renouveler sa flotte de sous-marins. Ce processus sera long et devrait déjà avoir débuté. La dernière politique de défense du Canada énonçait uniquement la modernisation des quatre vaisseaux de la classe Victoria afin qu’ils restent opérationnels jusqu’en 2040. Il y a cependant une limite à ce qu’il est possible de réaliser comme mise à jour sur des sous-marins construits dans les années 1980. Ils ont d’ailleurs tous été hors service en 2019 pour maintenance. Le Canada perd donc déjà en capacité opérationnelle, un phénomène qui s’accélérera avec l’âge de la flotte. À terme, il est impossible d’assurer l’intégrité de nos eaux territoriales et nos engagements auprès de nos alliés sans l’acquisition de nouveaux sous-marins. Dans le domaine aérien, il est évident que la saga des avions de chasse doit prendre fin. Le F-35 doit être choisi, car lui seul permet une interopérabilité, mais surtout la furtivité adéquate et la capacité d’intégration des données. Aussi, le Canada s’est doté d’une stratégie spatiale en 2019 qui signale l’importance accordée au domaine spatial, mais sa portée et les investissements corolaires restent limités. Elle met entre autres de l’avant un nouveau cadre réglementaire pour le secteur privé afin de développer les capacités d’innovations nationales. Contrairement à ses deux alliés, il ne considère pas le développement d’une capacité de lancement autonome. Cette question devrait aujourd’hui faire l’objet d’une réelle discussion alors que nos alliés adoptent une stratégie visant une plus grande autonomie d’action. La modernisation du NORAD est aussi urgente et répond aux impératifs géographiques et d’intégration multidomaine et interalliée. Le Système d’alerte Nord est maintenant vétuste et doit être remplacé. Idéalement, ce serait par un système intégrant l’ensemble des capacités radars existantes et capables d’en traiter l’information en temps réel. C’est la promesse du système SHIELD, mais surtout du Joint All-Domain Command and Control développé par l’armée américaine. C’est cette voie que le Canada devrait promouvoir dans la modernisation du NORAD. À noter qu’une approche semblable est poursuivie par l’Australie dans la modernisation de son propre système de radars. Une nouvelle composante spatiale est prévue et l’ensemble est soutenu par une politique industrielle de développement de technologies radars souveraines. Dans le domaine de la cybersécurité, c’est l’exemple britannique qui doit servir de guide. L’intégration d’éléments des forces armées, du renseignement, de la sécurité publique et autres branches de l’État apparait comme la voie à suivre pour répondre à la gamme complexe de menaces et de défis posés par la croissance exponentielle de la connectivité et du domaine cybernétique. Elle pourrait surmonter la tendance de l’administration publique à travailler en silo. Le dernier aspect qui ne doit pas échapper au Canada est qu’en repensant leur rôle, le Royaume-Uni et l’Australie se sont aussi donné les moyens de leurs ambitions. L’atteinte de la cible de 2 % du PIB recommandé par l’OTAN s’est faite malgré les conséquences économiques engendrées par la crise de la COVID-19 et les coûts liés aux feux de forêt en Australie. Le sous-financement des forces armées est un sujet de tensions récurrent entre le Canada et son allié américain. Alors qu’un sondage suggère que l’opinion publique est favorable à un investissement dans les forces armées, il est temps pour le Canada de considérer sérieusement cette option. ## Repenser les relations Canada-Russie : Un nouveau paradigme pour un monde multipolaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/repenser-les-relations-canada-russie-un-nouveau-paradigme-pour-un-monde-multipolaire/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique explore les relations Canada-Russie dans le contexte de l'émergence d'un monde « multi-ordre ». Les relations entre le Canada et la Russie ont atteint leur plus bas niveau depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Les liens entre les deux pays en Europe restent soumis à la dynamique hostile entre l'OTAN et la Russie. Toutefois, contrairement au théâtre euro-atlantique, l'équilibre des forces en Asie ne se prête pas nécessairement à une impasse binaire à long terme. En outre, les intérêts sécuritaires fondamentaux de la Russie se situent toujours en Europe, ce qui a permis à Moscou d'adopter une attitude moins conflictuelle à l'égard des affaires asiatiques. Dans un monde de plus en plus « multi-ordre », cela ouvre des possibilités pour le Canada de développer une approche plus collaborative et mutuellement bénéfique avec la Russie dans le contexte asiatique, même si les relations avec Moscou en Europe restent tendues. Une telle stratégie pourrait aider le Canada à dépasser certaines des contraintes imposées par la rivalité sino-américaine grandissante. Ce texte est une co-publication avec le Institute for Peace & Diplomacy : consultez la version anglaise.   Introduction La réaction du Canada à la crise ukrainienne de 2013-2014, pendant le mandat de Stephen Harper, s'est distinguée comme l'une des plus sévères de la communauté occidentale. Bien que les liens diplomatiques n'aient pas été formellement rompus, le niveau d'engagement entre Ottawa et Moscou a été sévèrement réduit. À l'exception d'une ouverture limitée et brève après les élections fédérales de 2015, sous le mandat de Stéphane Dion en tant que ministre des Affaires étrangères, les relations sont restées dans un état de gel profond depuis lors. Le dernier premier ministre canadien à avoir organisé un sommet bilatéral avec le président de la Russie (plutôt qu'une rencontre en marge d'un sommet multilatéral) était Paul Martin. En d'autres termes, plus d'une décennie et demie s'est écoulée sans engagement de haut niveau entre le Canada et une grande puissance voisine qu'il côtoie sur trois théâtres : dans la région euro-atlantique, où la Russie reste l'acteur le plus puissant sur le plan militaire après les États-Unis; dans l'Arctique, où le Canada et la Russie partagent l'écrasante majorité du littoral; et dans le Pacifique, qui devient de plus en plus central dans la géopolitique mondiale. Malgré les tensions croissantes, les autres dirigeants du G7 n'ont pas rompu le dialogue avec Moscou, qui est nécessaire pour gérer les enjeux de sécurité et maintenir la stabilité stratégique. Ce n'est peut-être pas une coïncidence si les autres pays du G7 ont aussi continué à obtenir régulièrement un siège au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU. Le Canada joue un rôle de premier plan dans la présence avancée renforcée (Enhanced Forward Presence) de l'OTAN en Europe de l'Est et a réuni le Groupe d'Ottawa pour proposer des réformes à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce. Mais l'avenir d'un ordre mondial changeant et incertain ne se décidera pas exclusivement dans des contextes multilatéraux et alliés. Les relations moribondes d'Ottawa avec Moscou ne constituent qu'une partie de la situation de plus en plus troublée du Canada en matière de politique étrangère. La dépendance croissante du Canada à l'égard des États-Unis depuis les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 a favorisé une politique étrangère trop axée sur les valeurs plutôt que sur les intérêts et souvent destinée à un public national plutôt qu'international. Le Canada est ainsi apparu peu sérieux à bien des égards, ce qui a nui à sa capacité de contribuer au multilatéralisme mondial aux plus hauts niveaux. Les relations tendues qu'entretient Ottawa avec plusieurs grandes capitales de la région eurasienne – dont Moscou, Pékin et New Delhi – ne font que renforcer sa relation de dépendance vis-à-vis de Washington. L'élection de Joe Biden à la présidence des États-Unis a également contribué à rendre politiquement plus acceptable une relation plus étroite entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Pour inverser cette tendance et tracer une voie plus autonome sur le plan stratégique, adaptée à un monde multipolaire, le Canada doit élaborer une carte mentale plus complète pour gérer ses liens avec les autres grandes puissances. Cela s'avérera extrêmement difficile dans les circonstances actuelles, compte tenu des contraintes associées aux relations conflictuelles de Washington avec Moscou et Pékin. Pourtant, après un examen plus approfondi, le Canada et la Russie ont certains impératifs stratégiques qui sont à bien des égards alignés. Un concept stratégique tripartite qui pose des paradigmes distincts pour la relation Canada-Russie en Europe, en Asie et dans l'Arctique pourrait porter des fruits importants. Et bien que le bilan du Canada en matière de coopération multilatérale dans le Nord circumpolaire soit bien établi, il existe un potentiel pour une approche collaborative des relations Canada-Russie dans le contexte asiatique également. Le Canada dans un monde « multi-ordre » émergent Le récit dominant dans les cercles politiques occidentaux est que les États-Unis et leurs alliés ont donné naissance à un « ordre international libéral » après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qui, bien que limité au bloc occidental pendant la guerre froide, s'est étendu après l'effondrement de l'Union soviétique pour atteindre une portée mondiale. La question de savoir si cette conception monolithique et occidentalocentrée de l'ordre international a été une description exacte des affaires mondiales reste ouverte. Quoi qu'il en soit, comme le soutiennent Richard Haass et Charles Kupchan, un tel ordre ne peut plus ancrer la stabilité mondiale dans un monde de plus en plus multipolaire et idéologiquement diversifié. Pourtant, l'alternative à un ordre international enraciné dans l'hégémonie occidentale n'est pas nécessairement un bloc contre-hégémonique centré sur l'entente sino-russe. La Chine a largement bénéficié des conditions internationales existantes, qui lui ont permis de connaître un essor économique impressionnant. La Russie, pour sa part, remet en question les excès perçus de l'Occident, mais ne s'oppose pas à l'ensemble des normes et institutions mondiales établies. L'issue probable de la rivalité actuelle entre les grandes puissances n'est donc pas un nouvel ordre monolithique, mais plutôt l'avènement d'un « monde à ordres multiples » (multi-order world). Une façon d'imaginer un monde « multi-ordre » est de le concevoir selon des lignes thématiques, avec des ordres distincts régissant des questions telles que le commerce, le contrôle des armes et les droits humains. On peut aussi imaginer un monde à ordres multiples selon des lignes géographiques, dans lequel les différentes régions sont implicitement soumises à des normes et des modèles d'interaction différents entre les États. Cela n'équivaudrait pas nécessairement à un « monde de régions », étant donné la nature intégrée de l'économie mondiale, la présence du droit international et la persistance de défis mondiaux tels que les pandémies et les changements climatiques. Toutefois, cela impliquerait de reconnaître que les institutions et les mécanismes nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre en Asie peuvent différer de ceux qui existent sur le théâtre euro-atlantique. La posture euro-atlantique du Canada reste fermement ancrée dans l'OTAN qui, ces dernières années, a repris sa mission fondatrice de dissuasion de la Russie. À l'époque de la guerre froide centrée sur le rideau de fer, ainsi que dans les premières décennies de l'après-guerre froide dominées par un Occident triomphant, l'adhésion à l'OTAN a donné au Canada un « siège à la table » aux côtés d'autres grandes puissances comme les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la France. Cependant, à mesure que le pouvoir mondial se déplace vers l'Est, le Canada doit reconnaître que la géopolitique de l'Asie-Pacifique sera structurée différemment de la dynamique euro-atlantique à laquelle il s'est habitué. Cela a des répercussions sur la façon dont le Canada devrait aborder ses relations avec les acteurs régionaux. Aucun bloc monolithique ou « OTAN asiatique » n'a émergé pour contenir la Chine malgré la montée en puissance de Pékin ces dernières années, même si la coopération en matière de sécurité a augmenté entre les États-Unis et des partenaires choisis tels que le Quad. Le commerce avec la Chine reste un élément crucial de la croissance économique de plusieurs alliés des États-Unis. L'Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est (ANASE) existe en partie pour limiter l'effet de la compétition entre grandes puissances – ses membres rejettent l'idée de devoir choisir entre Washington et Pékin. Ainsi, bien que la concurrence entre les États-Unis et la Chine menace de produire une dangereuse impasse bipolaire à court et moyen terme, la tendance à long terme en Asie demeure vers une certaine forme de multipolarité, alors que l'Inde et l'Asie du Sud-Est poursuivent leur ascension économique. Contrairement au théâtre euro-atlantique, qui se caractérise par un conflit bipolaire russo-américain sur les normes qui devraient régir la sécurité paneuropéenne, un ordre asiatique multipolaire est moins propice à une dynamique de « choisir son camp ». Le Canada devra donc entretenir des relations avec une variété d'acteurs en Asie afin de protéger efficacement ses intérêts régionaux. La montée en puissance de l'Asie sur la scène mondiale a coïncidé avec l'érosion des trois principaux piliers de la politique étrangère canadienne de l'après-guerre : le continentalisme, le multilatéralisme et l'atlantisme. Les changements dans la façon dont les États-Unis interprètent leurs intérêts économiques et géopolitiques impliquent qu'une relation spéciale avec les États-Unis ne peut plus être tenue pour acquise. Le Canada n'a pas réussi à obtenir un siège au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU depuis deux décennies, alors même que le multilatéralisme est mis à rude épreuve dans un monde marqué par la rivalité entre grandes puissances. L'atlantisme seul ne peut plus garantir le statut du Canada dans un monde où le pouvoir se déplace de plus en plus vers l'Est. Le Canada est mal préparé à cette nouvelle réalité. Si l'on imagine une carte dont le Canada est le centre, la politique étrangère canadienne est encadrée par quatre vecteurs, un pour chacun des quatre points cardinaux. Les vecteurs vers le sud et vers l'est – continentalisme et atlantisme – sont les plus développés en principe et en pratique, mais l'avenir du premier n'est plus assuré tandis que le second perd de son importance relative. Bien qu'Ottawa demeure matériellement peu investie et confrontée à une géographie inhospitalière dans son vecteur vers le nord – l'Arctique – l'identité nationale canadienne est intuitivement consciente du statut du pays en tant que « nation nordique ». En ce sens, le vecteur ouest du Canada – l'Asie – reste le plus sous-développé, tant sur le plan psychologique qu'empirique. Étant donné l'absence d'une OTAN asiatique, le simple fait d'accrocher un wagon aux États-Unis ne constitue pas une voie fiable pour accroître l'influence régionale du Canada. Cela est d'autant plus vrai que le fossé qui se creuse entre la Chine et les États-Unis menace le caractère fondé sur des règles de l'ordre régional enraciné dans le multilatéralisme ouvert et le commerce, sur lequel le Canada compte pour s'affirmer en tant qu'acteur souverain. La stratégie asiatique du Canada doit donc inclure un dialogue plus approfondi et une coopération sélective avec une pléthore d'acteurs régionaux. Paradoxalement, malgré le caractère conflictuel de la relation russo-canadienne sur le théâtre euro-atlantique, la Russie pourrait incarner un pays avec lequel le Canada devrait s'engager dans le contexte asiatique. Le Canada et la Russie : intérêts stratégiques communs À un niveau superficiel, le Canada et la Russie présentent certaines similitudes évidentes. Les deux pays présentent des géographies très étendues et occupent ensemble la grande majorité du littoral arctique. Ils sont tous deux situés à l'extrémité nord de leurs hémisphères respectifs et ont fait d'une certaine forme d'intégration hémisphérique un pilier essentiel de leur stratégie internationale – l'ALÉNA/ACEUM pour le Canada et la vision naissante de la « Grande Eurasie » dans le cas de la Russie. Ces dernières années, Ottawa et Moscou ont également cherché à mener des politiques étrangères à vecteurs multiples, le Canada vantant les avantages de la diversification commerciale et la Russie mettant l'accent sur son « pivot vers l'est » comme contrepoids à une dépendance excessive vis-à-vis de l'Europe. Les deux pays entretiennent un complexe mitigé d'infériorité-supériorité envers leur voisin plus puissant ou plus développé. Le Canada se complaît dans l'idée qu'il est une société plus pacifique et progressiste – « kinder and gentler » – que les États-Unis, mais il se méfie en même temps des excès de la puissance et de la prééminence américaines. De même, pendant des siècles, la Russie a vanté la supériorité de ses propres valeurs par rapport à la « dégénérescence » de l'Occident libéral et cosmopolite, tout en espérant « rattraper » le progrès économique et technologique de l'Europe. Tous deux considèrent également qu'avoir un « siège à la table » est un moyen de compenser leur puissance limitée ou en déclin: la Russie en tant que membre d'un consortium de grandes puissances au niveau mondial; le Canada par le biais de l'OTAN, où il peut s'asseoir aux côtés des principaux États occidentaux. Le Canada et la Russie sont également tous deux confrontés à un dilemme situé à l'intersection de la géographie et de l'identité nationale. Les Canadiens ont un fort sentiment d'appartenance à l'Amérique du Nord, mais aussi la ferme conviction qu'ils sont différents des Américains. La Russie fait partie intégrante de la politique et de la société européennes depuis des siècles, mais elle se trouve à la périphérie du continent – elle ressemble davantage à un empire multiethnique qu'à un État-nation européen ordinaire. La géographie bicontinentale de la Russie renforce son sentiment de grande puissance et sa responsabilité particulière dans le maintien de l'ordre mondial. Parallèlement, les tentatives régulières du Canada de transcender les limites de sa géographie éloignée par des discours diplomatiques et sécuritaires nobles sont liées à son statut d'acteur indépendant et important sur la scène mondiale. Toutefois, les similitudes les plus importantes entre le Canada et la Russie se situent au niveau stratégique, notamment dans la région Asie-Pacifique. Ottawa et Moscou préféreraient éviter une impasse à somme nulle entre les États-Unis et la Chine. La rivalité sino-américaine a nui aux efforts d'Ottawa en matière de diversification commerciale, l'administration Trump ayant persuadé le Canada d'accepter une clause lors de la renégociation de l'ALÉNA signalant un front commun dans le différend géoéconomique de Washington avec Pékin. Et bien que les facteurs matériels qui sous-tendent le statut de grande puissance de la Russie – une population importante, un arsenal nucléaire lourd, un corps diplomatique compétent, des ressources naturelles abondantes et une géographie étendue touchant plusieurs régions stratégiquement importantes – ne dépendent pas de l'état des relations sino-américaines, une confrontation prolongée entre les États-Unis et la Chine, qui englobe une grande partie de la géopolitique mondiale, menace de mettre Moscou sur le carreau en termes relatifs. Plus important encore peut-être, les politiques étrangères du Canada et de la Russie ont déjà commencé à montrer une tendance au découplage de leurs vecteurs asiatiques et européens. En d'autres termes, les graines d'un monde « multi-ordre » ont déjà commencé à être plantées. La question est maintenant de savoir si les décideurs d'Ottawa et de Moscou peuvent reconnaître ce point commun et s'en inspirer pour favoriser un dialogue mutuellement bénéfique et – à plus long terme – une coopération. Dans la région euro-atlantique, Ottawa et Moscou entretiennent une relation d'opposition. Bien que les dirigeants russes aient mis l'accent ces dernières années sur le vecteur eurasien/asiatique de leur politique étrangère, les intérêts fondamentaux de la Russie en matière de sécurité se situent toujours en Europe, la majeure partie de sa population résidant à l'ouest de l'Oural. Étant donné l'importance du forum que l'OTAN offre au Canada pour affirmer son statut et son identité (certes dépassé) de « puissance moyenne », les relations Canada-Russie en Europe sont structurellement limitées par la rivalité OTAN-Russie. Toutefois, le théâtre du Pacifique présente une dynamique différente. Contrairement à sa position alignée sur les États-Unis en Europe, le Canada a essayé – avec difficulté – de suivre une ligne fine dans ses relations avec la Chine, malgré la détérioration des relations entre Washington et Pékin. Le Canada ne s'est pas non plus précipité pour s'aligner avec le Quad soutenu par les États-Unis et ne s'est pas encore affilié à un quelconque projet « indo-pacifique » dont l'objectif est en partie de se prémunir contre les conséquences de la montée en puissance de la Chine. Un phénomène similaire existe au niveau de la politique étrangère russe. Ces dernières années, les relations de Moscou avec les capitales occidentales ont été marquées par des rivalités, allant du conflit à propos de l'Ukraine aux allégations d'ingérence électorale et de désinformation. La Russie reste l'acteur le plus puissant d'Europe, même si elle continue d'être exclue des principales institutions politiques et de sécurité du continent – l'OTAN et l'UE. La dynamique de confrontation est donc structurelle et devrait rester profondément enracinée. Compte tenu de sa rivalité permanente avec Washington, la Russie est en mesure d'utiliser son partenariat croissant avec la Chine pour causer des maux de tête stratégiques aux États-Unis, par exemple par le biais de la participation chinoise à l'exercice militaire Vostok-2018 ou de la coopération sino-russe en matière de détection de lancement de missiles. Cela dit, le vecteur asiatique de la politique étrangère russe n'est pas entièrement orienté vers un équilibrage avec les États-Unis. La Russie a en effet réussi à réunir deux rivaux historiques, l'Inde et le Pakistan, en tant que membres à part entière de l'Organisation de coopération de Shanghai, un organisme intergouvernemental visant à favoriser la coopération en matière de sécurité et d'autres questions clés en Eurasie. Compte tenu de l'image polarisée de la Chine et des États-Unis en Asie du Sud, la Russie a une occasion unique de jouer le rôle de réparateur utile dans cette région. À ce titre, la Russie s'est efforcée de désamorcer les tensions lors des affrontements frontaliers entre la Chine et l'Inde à la mi-2020 et a aussi proposé de faire office de médiateur dans l'impasse entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Nord au début de l'administration Trump. Le Canada en Asie : éviter la logique de la confrontation Les relations du Canada avec la Chine s'étant fortement détériorées ces dernières années, les appels se sont multipliés pour qu'Ottawa adopte une approche plus dure à l'égard de Pékin et aligne davantage ses efforts régionaux sur les pays « aux vues similaires » (like-minded countries) – un terme souvent cité, mais relativement vague. Cependant, le Canada est confronté à un défi structurel dans sa politique étrangère en ce qui concerne le théâtre du Pacifique. D'une part, le Canada doit préserver de bonnes relations avec son voisin américain. D'autre part, la rivalité entre les États-Unis et la Chine est un facteur déterminant de l'érosion des conditions internationales qui ont été vitales pour la sécurité, la prospérité et l'indépendance du Canada pendant des décennies. Le Canada ne peut transcender ce dilemme qu'en adoptant une posture qui intègre un élément de promiscuité stratégique. Les questions relatives à la sécurité européenne sont facilement perçues comme étant à somme nulle : si le coût perçu de l'inclusion de la Russie dans la structure de sécurité de l'Europe en tant que grande puissance « égale » revient à limiter la souveraineté des petits États voisins, alors la voie vers une relation de coopération devient inévitablement difficile. En revanche, bien qu'il soit encore sous-développé compte tenu de l'orientation historique du pays vers l'Europe, le vecteur de la politique étrangère russe en Asie reflète une dynamique moins combative et davantage à somme positive. En outre, la distribution du pouvoir et des ressources en Asie est par nature moins propice à une impasse bipolaire prolongée, ce qui crée un potentiel pour une pléthore de partenariats qui se recoupent dans la région. Le Canada a intérêt à préserver la structure multipolaire du théâtre du Pacifique pour se prémunir contre les excès possibles de la compétition sino-américaine. Ottawa devrait donc se féliciter du développement de l'engagement de la Russie en Asie, qui ne ferait que renforcer le caractère multipolaire de la région. Un pivot russe plus soutenu et plus confiant vers l'Asie pourrait également s'avérer bénéfique pour le théâtre euro-atlantique, permettant d'atteindre un nouvel équilibre sur le long terme à mesure que Moscou réorientera ses priorités de politique étrangère. Tout en maintenant son alignement avec l'OTAN sur les questions de sécurité euro-atlantique, Ottawa pourrait adopter une posture à l'égard des affaires asiatiques qui, sans être ancrée dans la neutralité, privilégie néanmoins la résolution des problèmes et la diplomatie par rapport aux actions qui encouragent une rivalité plus profonde. Compte tenu de l'investissement militaire et stratégique relativement faible du Canada en Asie à ce jour, une telle approche serait mieux adaptée aux capacités existantes du Canada et constitue une voie plus fiable pour améliorer l'image d'Ottawa dans la région. Alors que les dimensions continentale et atlantiste de la stratégie de sécurité du Canada sont axées en grande partie sur les engagements militaires par le biais du NORAD et de l'OTAN, le vecteur asiatique se prête davantage à une stratégie axée sur la diplomatie. Étant donné le caractère multipolaire de la région, c'est en Asie qu'un Canada engagé a le potentiel de devenir un acteur plus conscient de sa stratégie et moins uniquement normatif. Ottawa s'est distingué de Washington pendant la guerre froide bipolaire par ses contributions dans le domaine des normes et du multilatéralisme. Ces piliers resteront sans doute importants – quoique moins fiables – de la politique étrangère canadienne, mais ce n'est qu'en s'attaquant aux questions de stratégie et de polarité que le Canada pourra sortir de l'ombre de son voisin dans un monde asiatique multipolaire. Les économies canadienne et américaine restent étroitement intégrées, Washington continuera de considérer la sécurité de l'Amérique du Nord comme un synonyme de la sienne, indépendamment du désir de souveraineté du Canada, et ce dernier ne sera jamais en mesure de représenter une menace militaire ou stratégique sérieuse pour les États-Unis. Ottawa dispose donc du levier et de la souplesse nécessaires pour mener une politique étrangère plus ouverte – avec prudence – s'il le souhaite. Il existe donc une base pour une politique étrangère canadienne qui pose explicitement des paradigmes distincts pour l'engagement et la construction de l'ordre international dans différentes régions du globe. Dans ce contexte, Ottawa peut compartimenter les éléments de ses différends avec Moscou concernant l'Europe et poursuivre un dialogue bilatéral mutuellement bénéfique visant à explorer les intérêts communs des deux pays sur le théâtre asiatique. Ce dialogue constituera un mécanisme permanent grâce auquel les deux pays pourront améliorer leur profil régional et contribuer aux discussions sur la construction de l'ordre en Asie. Conclusion Ottawa pourra jouer un rôle important dans l'élaboration des normes en Asie-Pacifique uniquement s'il maintient une position ouverte, compte tenu de son maigre profil régional à ce jour. S'empresser de « choisir son camp » réduira immédiatement les perspectives d'engagement régional du Canada et le réduira à un statut de troisième rang, derrière les grandes puissances et derrière d'autres États qui sont plus sérieusement investis dans la sécurité régionale asiatique. Le cadre stratégique qui guide la position globale du Canada en Asie doit être exhaustif et transcender les différends existants avec les différents pays. Le dialogue stratégique d'Ottawa avec Moscou pourrait commencer par des efforts visant à identifier les éléments communs aux visions respectives des deux pays en matière de développement et de stabilité en Asie. Étant donné l'intérêt du Canada pour l'approfondissement de ses relations économiques avec l'Asie, il pourrait s'agir d'explorer comment la Russie envisage le rôle de son Union économique eurasienne (UEE) dans l'architecture commerciale de la région et si elle pourrait être intégrée à tout effort futur d'harmonisation des blocs commerciaux régionaux existants, y compris l'Accord de Partenariat transpacifique global et progressiste (PTPGP) et le Partenariat économique régional global récemment signé. L'exploration des possibilités pour les entreprises et les représentants canadiens de renforcer le fédéralisme et le développement économique dans l'Extrême-Orient russe représente un autre intérêt stratégique commun potentiel, car cela consoliderait davantage la répartition multipolaire du pouvoir en Asie. Bordant trois des quatre vecteurs cardinaux du Canada, la Russie représentera des défis stratégiques – et des possibilités – pour le Canada, et ce, peu importe qui siège au Kremlin. Or, c'est précisément sa quasi-ubiquité qui fait de la Russie le candidat idéal avec lequel le Canada peut explorer des méthodes de désagrégation de ces vecteurs pour se préparer au monde « multi-ordre » qui s'annonce. Le Canada a déjà une certaine expérience dans ce domaine, puisqu'il s'est efforcé au cours des dernières décennies d'isoler les affaires arctiques des conflits géopolitiques sur d'autres théâtres. Dans un monde de plus en plus décentré, ce n'est qu'en embrassant le caractère distinctif de chaque vecteur que le Canada pourra compenser son isolement géographique, accroître son influence mondiale et intégrer des approches régionales divergentes dans un ensemble stratégique cohérent. ## Répondre au renforcement du SHIELD : Une défense crédible et efficace pour l’Amérique du Nord URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/repondre-au-renforcement-du-shield-une-defense-credible-et-efficace-pour-lamerique-du-nord/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Andrea Charron répond au rapport du Général O’Shaughnessy & du Brigadier Général Fesler « Renforcer le bouclier : Une dissuasion crédible et une défense efficace pour l’Amérique du Nord ». Avec les innovations en matière de missiles à longue portée et de systèmes de défense antimissile étrangers, ainsi qu'avec l'évolution du paysage arctique, les menaces pour la sécurité nationale des États-Unis sont plus proches et moins dissuadées que jamais d'attaquer le territoire américain. Sans compromettre les ressources fiscales prévues pour atténuer la crise de la COVID-19, le Général Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy et le Brigadier-Général Peter M. Fesler exposent dans leur rapport « Renforcer le bouclier : Une dissuasion crédible et une défense efficace pour l’Amérique du Nord » les points sur lesquels les forces ennemies, notamment la Chine et la Russie, ciblent les faiblesses de la défense du territoire américain et comment les stratégies et organisations de défense américaines peuvent s’adapter à la puissance de leur force offensive. Leurs recommandations portent sur l'utilisation des technologies existantes pour améliorer les équipements, la collecte de données à partir de systèmes spatiaux, l'analyse des données pour la prise de décision, l'amélioration de la communication entre différentes lignes de défense et la collaboration transversale sur les défis communs. Le présent texte de notre experte Andrea Charron est en réponse au rapport de O’Shaughnessy et Fesler et se base sur son intervention lors de l'événement « The High-Tech Future of North American Defense » organisé par le partenaire du Réseau d'analyse stratégique le Canada Institute du Wilson Center, qui a permis un échange avec le Brigadier-Général Peter Fesler sur le contenu dudit rapport.  Écoutez l'échange entre le Brigadier-Général Peter Fesler et Andrea Charron : The High-Tech Future of North American Defense Le rapport de Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy et Peter M. Fesler est très intéressant et avant-gardiste sur la défense de l’Amérique du Nord. Il rassemble les idées issues de nombreux témoignages du Général O’Shaughnessy au Congrès et au Sénat au cours de son mandat. Il s'appuie sur la pensée de ses prédécesseurs et sur ce qui a été une série d'études de « NORAD Next » au dernier « EvoNAD » (l'évolution de la défense nord-américaine) sur la façon de repenser et de dépasser les menaces qui pèsent sur l'Amérique du Nord. Consultez le rapport : Général Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy & Brigadier-Général Peter Fesler, « Renforcer le bouclier : Une dissuasion crédible et une défense efficace pour l’Amérique du Nord, » Canada Institute, Wilson Center, septembre 2020. Les commandants successifs du NORAD ont eu, comme premier travail, à faire l’examen des missions et des capacités du NORAD à la lumière des menaces actuelles. Et je suis consciente, à l'anniversaire du 11 septembre 2001, de noter les efforts du NORAD ce jour-là – aucune organisation ne pense autant au 11 septembre que le NORAD. Les rappels de la journée se trouvent à l'extérieur et dans tout le siège du NORAD et du USNORTHCOM à la base aérienne Peterson. La plus grande force du NORAD a été sa capacité à se réinventer à la lumière des changements géopolitiques. Les changements ont été plus une évolution qu'une révolution, mais ils ont quand même eu de l'importance, et le Canada y a participé. De l'adoption d'un rôle d'assistance en matière d'interdiction de la drogue dans les années 1990 à la transition vers la lutte contre le terrorisme juste après le 11 septembre à l'adoption d'une mission d'alerte maritime en 2006, le NORAD continue de changer. Cette dernière « réflexion » sur la défense de l’Amérique du Nord suggère une révolution dans la façon dont on conçoit non seulement le rôle du NORAD, mais aussi le rôle du USNORTHCOM avec des conséquences pour d’autres commandements de combattants. Cette révolution est provoquée par le double défi de la compétition entre les grandes puissances et d'un plan de commandement unifié (PCU) conçu pour une autre époque. Le résultat final du rapport de O’Shaughnessy et Fesler est un appel à une nouvelle architecture de défense nord-américaine qui soit à la fois un rouage intégral du mécanisme de dissuasion américain et qui puisse « activement » - c'est-à-dire offensivement si nécessaire - défendre la patrie afin que l'armée américaine puisse maintenir sa supériorité et sa liberté de manœuvre. Cette révolution dépend de la conjonction de nombreux facteurs (et idéalement elle n’aurait pas lieu lors d'une pandémie lorsque les budgets économiques sont très sollicités). Une pensée audacieuse doit être applaudie. Inévitablement, cependant, une pensée audacieuse soulève également des questions, en particulier pour le Canada et pour le NORAD, car cette révolution, premièrement, pourrait être plus que ce que le public et le gouvernement canadiens peuvent digérer maintenant. Deuxièmement, cette révolution peut encore rendre l'Amérique du Nord vulnérable parce que l'accent mis sur la concurrence entre les grandes puissances (et le retour au défi des menaces symétriques) détourne l'attention des menaces persistantes, comme les changements climatiques (qui représentent un pourcentage important des missions du Commandement des opérations interarmées du Canada (COIC) et du USNORTHCOM, et des menaces asymétriques en Amérique du Nord. Premièrement, le Canada, il faut le reconnaître, est le plus grand partisan du NORAD pour de nombreuses raisons, notamment parce qu'il donne aux Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) un aperçu privilégié de la réflexion stratégique américaine concernant les décisions prises vis-à-vis de la défense nord-américaine. En plus d’avoir ouvert des possibilités supplémentaires de formation et de commandement pour les FAC, le NORAD a joué un rôle essentiel dans la fourniture de certaines des infrastructures clés comme le Système d’alerte du Nord (SAN), qui est également essentiel pour les organismes militaires et civils. Et, bien que le Canada « possède » ces actifs, les États-Unis ont contribué en majeure partie aux fonds bien que le NORAD soit binational. Le binational ne signifie pas que le Canada et les États-Unis opèrent seulement en parallèle (ce serait bilatéral), mais bien que le Canada et les États-Unis opèrent conjointement avec un seul objectif - la défense de l'Amérique du Nord. Le Canada adhère au NORAD parce qu'il a été jusqu'à présent un commandement défensif. Le NORAD opère à domicile et depuis le domicile, pas à l'extérieur. Ce que suggère le rapport de O’Shaughnessy et Fesler est que le NORAD ne sera plus un commandement exclusivement défensif, mais aussi un commandement offensif. C’est ce que l’on peut déduire de « engager l'archer au lieu de la flèche », c’est-à-dire viser les plates-formes de lancement plutôt que les missiles. La question devient : que se passe-t-il si les archers sont en dehors de la zone de responsabilité du USNORTHCOM ? Le NORAD n'a pas, en théorie, de limites géographiques à ses missions d'alerte étant donné sa zone d'opérations mondiale. Le NORAD transmettra-t-il l'avertissement à un autre commandement combattant ? Non seulement le Canada ne possède pas les capacités pour une telle fonction, mais cela implique aussi une restructuration fondamentale du PCU américain. Bien sûr, l'attaque et la défense sont les deux faces d'une médaille et on pourrait suggérer que ce n'est que de la sémantique, mais le langage compte. Le Canada hésite à utiliser le terme « adversaire » ; il n'est mentionné que trois fois dans la politique de défense « Protection, Sécurité, Engagement » (PSE) du Canada, alors que les changements climatiques sont mentionnés dix fois. La Russie est considérée problématique en Europe de l'Est et dans le contexte de l'OTAN, alors que la Chine « est une puissance économique mondiale en plein essor qui exerce une importante puissance militaire régionale » (PSE, p. 50). Plutôt que de parler de « chaînes de destruction », le Canada fait référence aux capacités de « détection et de destruction ». Lorsque les États-Unis font référence à la défense de la patrie, le Canada fait référence à la défense du Canada et de l'Amérique du Nord, et le Canada appelle l'Arctique un territoire autochtone plutôt qu'une forteresse. Ces différences de langage indiquent une vision différente de la façon dont nous percevons les menaces pour le Canada et de la meilleure façon de défendre le Canada et l'Amérique du Nord. Le Canada, par exemple, n'envoie pas de troupes outre-mer pour défendre le Canada, sauf avec le soutien de ses alliés et surtout des États-Unis. Pour les États-Unis, jusqu'à récemment - et cela a été référencé dans les journaux - la défense des États-Unis est un match qui se joue à l'étranger. Cette attention concertée à l'Amérique du Nord est donc nouvelle et nécessaire, mais encore très inégale entre les États-Unis et le Canada, tant en termes de menaces perçues que de capacités à réagir. Les données représentent l'ingrédient clé d'une grande partie de l’écosystème intégré à plusieurs niveaux de défense du territoire, appelé SHIELD (Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defence). Les renseignements provenant de tous les domaines et du monde entier, y compris des nouveaux capteurs, des moyens spatiaux et des renseignements des agences civiles et des alliés, amélioreront la fidélité des informations et de la prise de décision en produisant une image opérationnelle commune (IOC) meilleure et plus détaillée. Certes, après le 11 septembre, l’accès direct du NORAD aux sources d’alimentation de l’Administration fédérale de l’aviation (FAA) (et surtout du personnel de la FAA au service de quart) a été inestimable. Mais l'analyse basée sur l'intelligence artificielle (IA) et l’infonuage qui sera nécessaire sera a) très coûteuse à un moment où les deux économies sont en récession ; b) présume des processus d'approvisionnement opportuns et coordonnés ; et c) exclusivement américaine. Je ne peux pas imaginer que les États-Unis autoriseront leurs alliés à avoir le dernier mot sur les filtres appliqués ou à « s'approprier » la IOC, ce qui signifie que le problème du partage de données secrètes avec les États-Unis doit être résolu. À lire pour aller plus loin : NORAD Modernization: Report One: Awareness & Sensors Passons maintenant à la compétition entre les grandes puissances. La Russie est la menace la plus immédiate dans un contexte nord-américain (en raison de ses capacités, en particulier dans l'Arctique), mais la Chine est la principale menace dans tous les autres contextes et le concurrent le plus attendu des États-Unis. Ces derniers ont signalé, dans de nombreux documents récents, qu'ils se sentent plus vulnérables, bien que la plupart des attaques de la Russie et de la Chine contre les États-Unis aient été menées secrètement et via les réseaux sociaux/cyberattaques et l'espionnage. Néanmoins, une menace en Europe de l'Est ne peut plus être considérée comme une menace isolée uniquement pour la région environnante immédiate. Nous oublions que ce n’est qu’après le 11 septembre qu’il y a eu un commandement de combattants dédié à l’Amérique du Nord. Auparavant, il y avait le US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), chargé de la défense terrestre et maritime des États continentaux et fournissant une assistance militaire aux autorités civiles, et le NORAD pour la défense aérospatiale. Dans la carte du plan de commandement unifié avant le 11 septembre, toutes les régions du monde avaient un commandant en chef dédié à se concentrer sur les menaces qui pèsent sur cette région, mais ce n'était pas le cas pour l'Amérique du Nord. Cela devait changer et USNORTHCOM était la solution. Étant donné la concentration régionale des commandements géographiques des combattants, chacun a une posture et une concentration de menace différentes. Considérez les préoccupations de USSOUTHCOM contre EUCOM (par exemple). INDOPACOM est le monstre et celui-ci, avec EUCOM, se disputent le titre de commandement le plus stratégique au monde. (La doctrine américaine actuelle, je suggère, favorise le Pacifique, malgré le récent pivot vers l'Arctique). Le rapport d’O’Shaughnessy et Fesler suggère que le USNORTHCOM et le NORAD deviennent l’organisation cruciale au sein de l'UCP. D'une part, cela semble logique - bien sûr, la première obligation de l'armée est de défendre son pays. Mais plus de 70 ans de doctrine militaire américaine ont écarté, négligé et marginalisé la défense de la patrie. Les huit commandants du USNORTHCOM ont dû plaider pour que de l'attention soit accordée au USNORTHCOM et rappeler à la chaîne de commandement qu'elle fait davantage que du soutien à la défense des autorités civiles (aussi vital cela soit-il). Pour que SHIELD se concrétise, il faudra l'adhésion de tous les commandants géographiques et fonctionnels des combattants. Deuxièmement, l'hypothèse, tout au long du rapport, est que la Chine et la Russie ont l'intention d'empêcher les forces américaines de se déployer en raison de leur capacité à atteindre des cibles nord-américaines de loin, en supposant que la guerre nécessitera un grand nombre de soldats et d'actifs pour répondre, plutôt qu'un « come as you are » qui ne nécessite pas la mobilisation de troupes. Les technologies dont disposent la Russie et la Chine sont létales et, dans le cas des véhicules de glissement hypersoniques, sont actuellement invulnérables. Il y a d'autres États préoccupants, mais la Russie et la Chine ont toutes deux la capacité de perturber gravement l'Occident, et la Chine, en particulier, cherche à renverser l'ordre international en sa faveur. En conséquence, l'Amérique du Nord a besoin à la fois de dissuasion et de défense - le premier étant le rôle principal du NORAD depuis plus de 62 ans. C'est sur le volet de la défense que les auteurs suggèrent que nous réfléchissions bien au-delà de l'Amérique du Nord et dans tous les domaines - ce que mon collègue Jim Fergusson et moi défendons depuis de nombreuses années. Et tandis que USNORTHCOM a tous les domaines représentés sous son commandement, ce n’est pas le cas du NORAD et il ne semble pas y avoir d'appétit parmi les autres services (terrestres, maritimes, etc.) pour faire partie du NORAD, dont en témoigne le rejet du contrôle maritime. Tous les commandements et contrôles de domaines suggèrent également de repenser la tendance occidentale à s'organiser autour de commandants de composantes spécifiques au domaine. De plus, une partie importante de la défense des États-Unis est la capacité de vaincre une attaque de missile balistique. Le Canada a soutenu le fait de participer à l'avertissement, mais pas au volet de la défense. Cela pourrait changer, mais pourrait également exiger la renégociation de l'accord du NORAD, ce qui a toujours été difficile, et c'est pourquoi le Canada, en particulier, a fait pression pour que l'accord soit signé à perpétuité. Supposons que le Canada dise oui à la défense antimissile ; je me demande si cela garantit que le NORAD acquerra le commandement et le contrôle du système de distribution des opérations de mission continentales et, plus encore, par l’intermédiaire du NORAD, le Canada aurait-il son mot à dire sur les cibles à défendre ou à sacrifier ? Est-il garanti qu'une telle invitation à adhérer serait lancée par les États-Unis ? Généralement, une épée est brandie par une seule personne. Si les actifs spatiaux peuvent se substituer aux actifs terrestres et maritimes, alors le territoire du Canada peut ne pas figurer dans le calcul du mécanisme de défaite américain. À lire pour aller plus loin : De hauts dirigeants du NORAD plaident pour une nouvelle approche de la défense Enfin, le rapport met beaucoup l'accent sur la réception d'informations « à la vitesse de la pertinence » pour prendre des décisions rapides et meilleures. Après tout, les secondes comptent littéralement dans certains scénarios. À de nombreuses occasions, cependant, une catastrophe a été évitée parce qu'un soldat ou un analyste doutait de ce qu'un écran d'ordinateur lui disait ou avait remis en question les données clignotant sur leur écran. Et si le NORAD voulait exploiter, surveiller ou sonder une cible plutôt que de la vaincre ? Les processus assistés par IA qui entourent le SHIELD sont nécessaires, mais la manière dont il est configuré, c’est-à-dire avec quels paramètres de boucle OODA (observer – orienter – décider – agir) et quels filtres, sera cruciale. Il est important que le NORAD et le USNORTHCOM ne deviennent pas linéaires dans les options de réflexion ou de réponse. De plus, le Canada aura du mal à maintenir l'analyse prédictive et les plans conjoints de commandement et de contrôle de tous les domaines recommandés, non pas parce que les FAC ne sont pas capables, mais parce qu'elles peuvent à peine gérer ce que l'on attend d'elles actuellement - 50% des missions des FAC consistent à répondre aux événements nationaux tels que les inondations et les incendies. Les gouvernements trouveront-ils financièrement judicieux d'investir dans la défense assistée par ordinateurs (malgré les craintes qu'ils soient piratés, compromis ou rendus superflus) face à la concurrence entre grandes puissances qui, jusqu'à présent, a fait plus de dégâts avec quelques robots sur Twitter, que d’investir dans les capacités d’assistance aux autorités civiles des FAC ? Dix-neuf ans jour pour jour, lorsque les États-Unis ont été attaqués de l'intérieur par des kamikazes, la réponse a été des guerres très coûteuses menées « loin » pour faire face au terrorisme à sa source, mais cela a aussi donné l'impulsion pour finalement payer pour les informations indispensables sur l'espace aérien civil au QG du NORAD. Le NORAD s'est adapté, a créé  l'Opération NOBLE EAGLE et a concentré son attention sur l'Amérique du Nord. Après le 11 septembre, le NORAD et le USNORTHCOM se sont concentrés presque exclusivement sur le terrorisme sunnite. Il n'a pas disparu et les défis de la COVID-19 signifient que toutes les formes de terrorisme ont les bases parfaites pour prospérer. Une focalisation trop étroite sur la concurrence entre les grandes puissances peut rendre l'Amérique du Nord vulnérable à d'autres menaces - en particulier aux acteurs non étatiques. Cela impose aux gouvernements du monde entier, y compris le COIC et le USNORTHCOM, de réagir rapidement aux effets des changements climatiques. Le NORAD était et demeure une idée audacieuse. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, ce sont les forces aériennes qui ont reconnu l'espace aérien au-dessus de l'Amérique du Nord comme indivisible et exigeant une défense conjointe, et cette reconnaissance a été profondément ancrée dans la pensée de défense des deux pays aux niveaux politique et militaire. Je pense que nous convenons tous que la nécessité de moderniser le NORAD et que la relation de défense CANUS pour l'Amérique du Nord est d'une importance vitale. Les auteurs du rapport fournissent un point de départ utile et perspicace pour aller de l'avant avec des discussions détaillées entre le Canada et les États-Unis, et les moyens de le faire existent déjà – la Commission permanente mixte de défense et son Comité de coopération militaire sont les endroits évidents pour créer la base pour aller de l'avant, comme pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale et depuis. ## Réponses ad hoc aux crises et organisations internationales (ADHOCISM) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/reponses-ad-hoc-aux-crises-et-organisations-internationales-adhocism/ Modified: 2026-07-10 > Ce point chaud présente le nouveau projet ADHOCISM : Réponses ad hoc aux crises et organisations internationales. Les organisations internationales (OI) sont créées dans le but de résoudre les problèmes d'action collective lorsqu'une crise survient. Pourtant, les États membres ont à plusieurs reprises mis en place des réponses ad hoc aux crises dans des situations où l'on pourrait s'attendre à ce que les OI jouent un rôle central. ADHOCISM pose la question à savoir quel est l'impact des réponses ad hoc aux crises sur les organisations internationales. ADHOCISM veut ainsi contribuer à combler ce manque de connaissances par une étude systématique des réponses ad hoc aux crises dans deux domaines politiques: la sécurité et la santé. Avec cette comparaison, ADHOCISM veut faire appel à un phénomène de gouvernance empirique plus large. Par réponses ad hoc aux crises, on entend ici des groupes d'acteurs plus ou moins structurés qui conviennent de résoudre une crise particulière à un moment et en un lieu donné, en dehors d'une organisation internationale existante dans le même domaine politique. Les réponses ad hoc aux crises peuvent, à court terme, conduire à des réponses plus rapides et plus efficaces entre États partageant les mêmes idées, mais si les organisations internationales ne sont plus considérées comme les principaux instruments pour faire face aux défis mondiaux, le risque est également que la pertinence de ces organisations internationales va diminuer, et que des tendances similaires pourraient se développer dans d'autres domaines. Le réseau complexe des organisations internationales et sous-régionales a été l'un des principaux sujets de recherche en relations internationales. Bien qu’au départ, les chercheurs se sont surtout dévoués à expliquer la prolifération des OI, ils se sont progressivement concentrés sur l'étude des effets de l’élargissement de cette palette d’options (Alter & Meunier, 2009; Hofmann, 2019; Jupille, Mattli, & Snidal, 2013). Une affirmation centrale a été que l'appartenance à des institutions ayant des mandats similaires augmente les chances de forum-shopping, reflétant une logique fonctionnaliste (Drezner, 2009; Hofmann, 2009). Les États membres peuvent aujourd'hui choisir parmi un menu de plus en plus large d'options dans la gouvernance mondiale, allant des stratégies multilatérales traditionnelles en travaillant par le biais d'OI formalisée, aux solutions minilatérales via les « clubs de gouvernance », en passant par la gouvernance informelle (Rogers, 2020), dont les réponses ad hoc aux crises font partie intégrante. Le résultat est une ère de « multilatéralisme contesté » (Morse & Keohane, 2014) ou de « gouvernance mondiale en morceaux » (Patrick, 2015). Les clubs de gouvernance et le multilatéralisme informel ou les coalitions ad hoc sont souvent considérés comme plus efficaces, flexibles et agiles que les OI. Dans le même temps, ils sont critiqués pour leur manque de légitimité. Les spécialistes s'accordent généralement à dire que les OI aux niveaux mondial, régional et sous-régional se chevauchent en termes de mandat et d'adhésion, ce qui peut conduire à une coopération ou à une concurrence pour être les premiers intervenants (Brosig, 2010). Plus récemment, Hofmann (2019) a illustré comment l'interaction entre le chevauchement des adhésions et la diversité des préférences pourrait non seulement conduire au forum-shopping, mais aussi au « courtage » et même, de manière plus perturbatrice, à une « prise d'otages ». En général, le chevauchement des adhésions entre des institutions ayant un mandat géographique et fonctionnel similaire est considéré comme offrant aux États la possibilité de choisir le véhicule qui correspond le mieux à leurs intérêts (voir e.g. Haftel and Hofmann, 2019). Parmi les exemples les plus évidents, on peut citer l'architecture de sécurité de l'UE et de l'OTAN, mais les intérêts de réponses aux crises militaires de l'UA et de la Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO), les coalitions ad hoc comme la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) au Mali, la Force multinationale mixte (FMM) qui lutte contre Boko Haram dans le nord du Nigeria et le Groupe de contact sur la piraterie au large de la côte de Somalie (CGPCS) sont aussi de bonnes illustrations. En tant que tels, les chercheurs du domaine dans relations interorganisationnelles ne se contentent pas uniquement de souligner ces opportunités de forum-shopping et de coopération, ils insistent également de plus en plus sur le risque de rivalité entre les institutions, comme la concurrence pour les ressources et la légitimité (Biermann & Koops, 2017; Brosig, 2017). Nous assistons donc à une augmentation de la littérature théorisant les effets du chevauchement des organisations, mais jusqu'à présent avec un œil aveugle sur l'impact des coalitions ad hoc sur le système multilatéral. Pour de nombreuses bonnes raisons, les coalitions ad hoc sont le plus souvent perçues de manière positive. Elles sont considérées comme donnant aux États membres plus de choix et de flexibilité, créant notamment « un cadre permettant aux États de coopérer tout en poursuivant leurs intérêts nationaux » (Brubacher, Damman, & Day, 2017, 11). Les coalitions ad hoc évitent également les retards bureaucratiques et ne créent pas de précédents pour les réponses aux crises futures (Reykers & Karlsrud, 2017). Elles permettent aux États de poursuivre leurs intérêts nationaux (Brubacher et al., 2017) et d'éviter les délais bureaucratiques et les précédents futurs (Karlsrud and Reykers, 2019). Rynning (2013) a souligné la nécessité stratégique de mieux relier les coalitions de volontaires, les institutions et ce que l'on appelle les « tentes » ou les groupes de contact - où les coalitions ad hoc sont considérées comme « le fer de lance » et les OI et les groupements plus larges de nations partageant les mêmes idées peuvent offrir une orientation stratégique et une légitimité politique nécessaires. D'autres chercheurs se sont davantage concentrés sur les effets terrain de la prolifération institutionnelle et des coalitions ad hoc. Les coalitions ad hoc permettent aux États de garder davantage le contrôle - de leurs troupes ou de leur personnel militaire, par exemple - et elles offrent la possibilité aux « États pivots » d'« acheter des alliés » en récompensant financièrement ou politiquement des tiers « pour qu'ils servent dans des coalitions multilatérales », afin de poursuivre des objectifs nationaux (Henke, 2019; voir également Stone, 2013). Cependant, cette approche n'explique pas l'investissement continu dans des mécanismes de réponse rapide tels que la Force africaine en attente, les groupements tactiques de l'UE ou la Force de réaction de l'OTAN, qui n'ont tous pas été mis à contribution à ce jour. Un problème majeur est que le terme « coalitions ad hoc » est généralement utilisé comme un concept fourre-tout, ce qui ne reflète pas sa complexité empirique. Les coalitions ad hoc peuvent différer, par exemple, en termes de durée, de ressources, d'adhésion, de portée géographique et de relation avec les OI officielles (Karlsrud and Reykers 2020: 1527-29). Parce que nous ne comprenons pas complètement ce que sont les réponses ad hoc aux crises, nous ne savons pas non plus comment les différentes coalitions ad hoc pourraient affecter les OI existantes et émergentes. Nous ne savons pas si, quand et comment ces coalitions ad hoc entrent en concurrence ou même si elles sapent les OI établies ou en développement. De cette manière, les effets à long terme des réponses ad hoc et la résilience des OI à ce phénomène restent une boîte noire. Cas et méthodes : Pour faire progresser les connaissances sur les coalitions ad hoc, ADHOCISM établira un ensemble de données sur les réponses ad hoc aux crises dans le domaine de la santé et de la sécurité mondiales. Dans le domaine de la santé, l'étude de cas portera sur la relation entre l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS - OI) et l'Alliance du Vaccin (Gavi), la Coalition pour les innovations en matière de préparation aux épidémies (CEPI) et le projet conjoint COVAX. Dans le domaine de la sécurité, nos études de cas porteront sur la Force africaine en attente, les groupements tactiques de l'UE et la Force multinationale mixte (FMM) qui lutte contre Boko Haram; la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) et Barkhane, principalement au Mali; et le Groupe de contact sur la piraterie au large de la côte de Somalie (CGPCS). ADHOCISM permettra également de cartographier quantitativement et qualitativement les choix stratégiques de certains États membres afin d'explorer et d'expliquer les variations entre les coalitions ad hoc et leurs relations avec les OI dans le même domaine. Grâce à une série d'études de cas, cela apportera une contribution académique significative à notre compréhension des interrelations complexes entre les États membres, les coalitions ad hoc et les OI. Outre Karlsrud et Reykers, l'équipe comprend Malte Brosig (Université de Witwatersrand), Stephanie C. Hofmann (EUI et collaboratrice au Réseau d’analyse stratégique) et Pernille Rieker (Institut norvégien des affaires internationales). Les auteurs : John Karlsrud (Institut norvégien des affaires internationales) et Yf Reykers (Université de Maastricht et collaborateur au Réseau d’analyse stratégique) ## Retour aux fondamentaux de la « guerre de l’ombre » : 6 mois d’escalade entre l’Iran et Israël et leurs retombées URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/retour-aux-fondamentaux-de-la-guerre-de-lombre-6-mois-descalade-entre-liran-et-israel-et-leurs-retombees/ Modified: 2024-05-06 Après les récents affrontements entre l'Iran et Israël, alors que la situation tend vers l’apaisement, l’heure est à un premier bilan. Une période de six mois marquée par une escalade sans précédent a conduit la région au bord de l'abîme mais semble aboutir à une trêve précaire et à un retour aux fondamentaux de ce que les spécialistes appellent la « guerre de l’ombre » israélo-iranienne. Cependant, le rétablissement de cette forme de confrontation indirecte pourrait entraîner des conséquences funestes et potentiellement sous-estimées. Au sortir de la guerre Iran-Irak et de la guerre du Golfe, constatant ses faiblesses et la dis-symétrie de la distribution de puissance au profit des États-Unis et de leurs alliés, la République islamique adopte une stratégie a-symétrique. À l'instar d’autres puissances eurasiatiques, l'Iran mise sur cette approche multifacette qui consiste à compenser ses carences relatives dans les domaines diplomatiques, économiques, militaires en combinant tous ses atouts de manière pragmatique et non-conventionnelle - c'est-à-dire en évitant soigneusement la confrontation directe avec les adversaires américains et israéliens. La guerre des 33 jours de l’été 2006 lui fait franchir une nouvelle étape dans l’institutionnalisation de sa doctrine de guerre asymétrique. Comme le note alors son principal concepteur, le Major-General Mohammad Ali Djafari, commandant du CGRI : « Compte tenu de la supériorité numérique et technologique de l'ennemi, l'Iran recourra désormais systématiquement à une stratégie ‘asymétrique’ ». Dans une large mesure, l’Iran conduit cette stratégie de zone grise, sous le radar et sous le seuil de la guerre classique, par l’intermédiaire d’une myriade de mouvements non-étatiques, chiites ou pro-iraniens, tels que les Houthis zaydites du Yémen, les membres du Hachd al-Chaabi irakien ou les combattants sunnites du Hamas palestinien. L’approche du commanditaire iranien est d’offrir à ce type de proxy une autonomie et une marge de manœuvre opérationnelle suffisantes pour agir indirectement, tout en conservant la possibilité de nier de façon plausible (« plausible deniability » en anglais) son implication dans leurs initiatives ponctuelles. Fédérés autour de l’antisionisme, les acteurs de cette lutte par procuration forment le fameux « Axe de la Résistance » orchestré à distance par Téhéran et dont le mode opératoire consiste à harceler et à provoquer les forces américaines et israéliennes tout en permettant aux Iraniens de se soustraire à d’éventuelles représailles directes. Avec le soutien plus ou moins explicite des États-Unis, Israël joue aussi cette « guerre de l’ombre » via de nombreuses initiatives indirectes incluant notamment les assassinats de scientifiques iraniens (travaillant dans le domaine nucléaire), l’élimination d’officiers du Corps des Gardiens de la révolution islamique (CGRI) ou l’appui à des mouvements séparatistes dans l’Azerbaïdjan iranien, le Baloutchistan ou le Kurdistan etc. Les mois qui se sont écoulés depuis les attaques du 7 octobre 2023 ont été marqués par l’intensification de cette politique de pression tous azimut exercée sur le régime islamique et ses alliés régionaux. Au fur et à mesure que cette confrontation irrégulière, particulièrement propice à des dérapages incontrôlés, s’accentue, les observateurs se mettent à craindre l’étincelle pouvant entraîner l’éclatement d’une guerre directe entre Israël et l’Iran, prélude à l’embrasement régional. Après un round d’observation, les événements s’enchaînent rapidement à partir du début 2024 générant une spirale de violence ascendante. Entre janvier et mars, plusieurs officiers de la Force Al-Qods, branche expéditionnaire du CGRI, sont éliminés par l’aviation de Tsahal. Le 1er avril, ce ciblage systématique du réseau d’influence iranien connaît un premier point d’orgue avec le bombardement de la représentation diplomatique iranienne à Damas et la mort de plusieurs responsables iraniens parmi lesquels le Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commandant de la Force Al-Qods en Syrie et au Liban. Les frappes contre son ambassade pouvant être interprétées, en vertu du principe d’extraterritorialité comme frappe directe contre l’Iran, Téhéran ne peut rester impassible sans compromettre sa crédibilité - tant sur le plan domestique, que régional ou international. Dans la nuit du 13 au 14 avril 2024, la République islamique lance 170 drones et tire 120 missiles balistiques contre le territoire israélien. Ce n’est pas, à proprement parler, une surprise puisque les autorités iraniennes sont allées jusqu’à avertir, 72 heures à l’avance, que les Gardiens de la révolution s’apprêtaient à cibler Israël. Le fait reste néanmoins notable : pour la première fois depuis 45 ans, la République islamique attaque directement l'État hébreu, sans passer par ses intermédiaires traditionnels et depuis son propre territoire. Si Téhéran semble avoir momentanément rompu avec son mode opératoire de guerre sous le seuil de la violence armée, la rupture mérite néanmoins d’être relativisée. L'utilisation de missiles balistiques fait partie de la stratégie iranienne qui combine différents atouts, conventionnels et non conventionnels. L'objectif reste de dissuader toute attaque contre ses intérêts essentiels. Le choix des armes, des drones et de missiles balistiques, reflète surtout la volonté iranienne d’envoyer un message fort à Israël. L’idée est également de redorer le blason fortement terni du régime iranien depuis le 7 octobre 2023 : au cours des mois qui avaient suivi l’opération Déluge d’Al-Aqsa, Téhéran s’était contenté d’apporter sa caution morale au mouvement palestinien sans s’investir directement aux côtés du Hamas et des Houthis yéménites. Une prudence qui lui avait valu de paraître particulièrement pusillanime, voire démissionnaire, aux yeux de ses partenaires de l’Axe de la Résistance. La contre-attaque de la mi-avril est donc autant une opération militaire qu’une initiative de relations publiques visant à restaurer le statut de champion de la « lutte antisioniste » de la République islamique. Estimant avoir pleinement démontré leur fermeté à l’encontre de l’État hébreu, les responsables politiques et militaires iraniens espèrent dès lors que « l’affaire est close » et que la balle restera dans le camp Israélien. Des vœux qui rejoignent ceux des Américains et des Européens qui, ayant contribué à neutraliser l’attaque iranienne, lancent également des appels au calme. Soucieuse de désamorcer la crise, la Maison-Blanche avertit qu’elle n’appuiera ni ne cautionnera une expédition punitive Israélienne. C’est compter sans le désir ardent du gouvernement Netanyahou d’essuyer l’affront iranien et d’y trouver accessoirement un façon de détourner l’attention de l’opinion publique internationale de la crise à Gaza. Dans la nuit du 18 au 19 avril, Israël lance plusieurs missiles sur une base aérienne d'Ispahan, chargée de la protection de sites nucléaires iraniens, dont celle de Natanz. Au-delà de simples représailles, Israël entend à son tour envoyer un double message au régime islamique : d’abord, il s’agit de démontrer la supériorité technologique de Tsahal et sa capacité à pénétrer profondément le territoire iranien au nez et à la barbe des mollahs pour frapper les infrastructures sensibles du régime islamique et, en particulier, ses installations nucléaires; ensuite et du même coup, le but est d’illustrer l’incapacité du CGRI à repousser une telle attaque et à défendre le territoire national. Contrairement à Tsahal et à son dôme antiaérien qui avaient réussi à intercepter 99 % des projectiles lancés par les Iraniens, les Pasdarans n’ont pas été en mesure d’anéantir les missiles probablement lancés à distance via des drones MALE et possiblement supportés par des chasseurs furtifs F-35, faisant apparaitre toute l’entendu de la vulnérabilité iranienne. Par ailleurs, le gouvernement Netanyahou a voulu faire la démonstration de sa capacité à agir de manière pleinement souveraine en n’avertissant ses interlocuteurs américains qu’une ou deux heures avant le début de l’opération. Au lendemain de la riposte israélienne, après six mois d’escalade, alors que la communauté internationale retient son souffle et que les tensions ont atteint un niveau paroxysmique, les tensions retombent subitement. L’État hébreu et le régime iranien s’enferment et de concert dans un silence assourdissant - comme pour mieux reprendre leur numéro de « guerriers de l’ombre » là où ils l’avaient laissé en octobre 2023 : choisissant de ne pas revendiquer l’attaque, le gouvernement israélien refuse catégoriquement de la commenter. Ce faisant, il permet au régime islamique de sauver une nouvelle fois la face en minimisant la portée des frappes et en niant le fait qu’elles aient pu être perpétrées par l’« entité sioniste ». En ouvrant la porte à une désescalade, cette séquence augure d’un retour à la « guerre de l’ombre » entre Israël et l’Iran. Mais cet affrontement indirect promet également d’être désormais conduite de manière plus âpre à travers une utilisation plus systématique des outils cybernétiques, des attentats, des assassinats ciblés, des sabotages et de l’utilisation des proxys comme le Hezbollah et les Houthis. Il faut également s’attendre à ce que, plus conscients que jamais de leurs moyens conventionnels, les stratèges iraniens accélèrent leur programme nucléaire (notamment à travers l’accroissement de la production d'uranium enrichi, le développement de nouvelles technologies et la construction de installations nucléaires). L’approche israélienne visant à endiguer le régime iranien en démantelant et en détruisant son système de proxys pourrait en effet encourager les Iraniens à se replier sur eux-mêmes et à chercher à assurer la sécurité de la forteresse iranienne et la survie du régime islamique par d’autres moyens. Plusieurs observateurs estiment que si Israël persiste à affaiblir les relais régionaux de l’Iran (tels que les forces du Hach al-Chaabi en Irak) l’Iran pourrait être poussé à compenser ses pertes en matière de profondeur stratégique en renforçant sa dissuasion nucléaire. Autrement dit, Israël substituerait la menace relativement gérable posée par ces acteurs non étatiques contre une menace bien plus grave : celle d'un Iran possédant des armes atomiques. ## Retour vers le futur ? La création d’un service de renseignement humain étranger au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/retour-vers-le-futur-la-creation-dun-service-de-renseignement-humain-etranger-au-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Ce texte propose un survol des points saillants du débat entre les défenseurs et les réticents de la création d’un service de renseignement.. La question de savoir si le Canada devrait se doter d’un service de renseignement humain étranger, selon le modèle de la Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) américaine ou le Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) britannique, remonte au moins aux années 1990, voir à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale avec la décision du Canada de ne pas poursuivre ses activités d’espionnage à l’étranger. Pourtant, régulièrement, la question refait surface, tant dans le milieu académique que politique et médiatique. Ce texte, qui n’a pas pour ambition de trancher définitivement le débat, propose au contraire de revenir sur les points saillants de ce débat entre les défenseurs de la création d’un service de renseignement humain étranger (SRHE) au Canada et les réticents au projet, à la lumière du contexte international d’aujourd’hui et des développements récents du renseignement canadien. Tout en faisant état des transformations actuelles du renseignement canadien, ce texte argue que, quels que soient les besoins en renseignement du Canada, il est peu probable que le pays se dirige vers la création d’un service de renseignement humain étranger dans le court voir le moyen terme, et que les besoins en renseignement du Canada peuvent être atteints sans la création d’un SRHE. Le Canada et le renseignement étranger  Les activités de renseignement sont relativement peu publicisées au Canada et font rarement partie du débat politique, contrairement à ce qui se passe chez nos voisins américains et britanniques. Un rapport de 2021 du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS) relatif à l’attitude du public à son égard montre que les Canadiens connaissent relativement peu les fonctions du SCRS en tant que service de renseignement. Lorsque l’on mentionne le Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications (CST) aux Canadiens, seulement 26% disent en avoir entendu parler et 11% peut-être en avoir entendu parler. Cela démontre que les Canadiens sont largement peu informés sur leurs agences de renseignement et leurs fonctions. Le SCRS a été créé en 1984 pour remplacer le Service de sécurité de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC), accusée à l’époque d’avoir, entre autres choses, une approche agressive du renseignement en ayant recours à des opérations illégales d’espionnage politique. L’objectif était alors que le renseignement de sécurité dépende d’une agence civile et non policière. La GRC conserve toutefois son mandat d’application de la loi dans les questions concernant la sécurité nationale. Le SCRS, quant à lui, n’a aucune prérogative policière. Son mandat est d’enquêter sur les activités susceptibles de constituer des menaces pour la sécurité du Canada et d’en faire rapport au gouvernement, de prendre des mesures pour réduire la menace, de fournir des évaluations de sécurité sur les personnes qui doivent avoir accès à des informations classifiées, à des sites sensibles ou sur les candidats à la citoyenneté, la résidence permanente, la protection des réfugiés ou tout autre visiteur temporaire. Il a également pour mandat de recueillir des renseignements étrangers, sur le territoire du Canada, à la demande du ministre des Affaires étrangères ou du ministre de la Défense nationale. La notion de renseignement étranger au Canada n’est pas comprise en des termes géographiques, mais plutôt en termes de nature du renseignement. Ainsi, même si le SCRS a des capacités limitées de recueil de renseignements étrangers, il est toutefois présent à l’étranger dans le cadre de son mandat de renseignement de sécurité. Le renseignement de sécurité concerne les menaces à la sécurité du Canada qui sont mentionnées à l’article 2 de la loi du SCRS : l’espionnage ou le sabotage visant le Canada ou préjudiciables à ses intérêts; les activités clandestines influencées par l’étranger menaçant le Canada; le terrorisme au Canada ou à partir du Canada; et les actions cachées et illicites visant à renverser le gouvernement violemment ou à saper le régime de gouvernement établi. Le renseignement étranger est plus large et se comprend comme tout renseignement sur une entité étrangère, c’est-à-dire non canadienne. Si dans les textes, la distinction peut paraître claire, la réalité est plus ambiguë. Premièrement, selon l’article 16, le SCRS peut recueillir du renseignement étranger à l’intérieur du Canada, à condition que cela ne vise pas des citoyens canadiens ou des résidents permanents et seulement à la demande des ministères des Affaires étrangères ou de la Défense. Deuxièmement, on peut se demander dans quelle mesure le SCRS peut recueillir du renseignement étranger dans son mandat d’enquête sur des menaces à la sécurité du Canada prévu par l’article 2. Toutefois, s’il y a une chose qui est claire, c’est que le SCRS a des capacités limitées en termes de collecte de renseignements étrangers et d’opérations à l’étranger. La deuxième agence principale de renseignement est le CST, héritier des efforts d’interception de renseignement électromagnétique et de cryptanalyse de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le CST a pour mandat principal de protéger les informations et les systèmes informatiques du gouvernement du Canada, de recueillir des renseignements étrangers électromagnétiques et de mener des cyberopérations défensives et actives. Ainsi, le CST est le service de renseignement étranger du Canada, même si son mandat est limité au renseignement d’origine électromagnétique. Le CST ne peut toutefois pas intercepter de renseignements électromagnétiques sur le territoire canadien ou de citoyens canadiens, sauf lorsqu’il prête assistance à d’autres organismes comme le SCRS, la GRC ou encore les Forces armées canadiennes. Le Canada possède donc bien un service de renseignement spécifiquement étranger, mais il est limité au renseignement électromagnétique. Cette spécificité canadienne en amène certains à proposer la création d’un service de renseignement humain spécifiquement étranger au Canada, venant alors combler la faiblesse perçue du SCRS. Pour la création d’un service de renseignement humain étranger Quels sont les principaux arguments en faveur d’un tel service de renseignement ? Tout d’abord, un service de renseignement humain étranger permettrait au Canada d’être alimenté par des informations lui permettant de prendre des décisions pertinentes à partir d’informations que le Canada aura décidé de collecter en fonction de ses priorités, surtout dans un monde changeant où la dépendance aux renseignements étrangers de nos alliés ne sert plus forcément les intérêts canadiens. En effet, comme l’affirment Stephanie Carvin et Thomas Juneau, les informations que reçoit le Canada de ses alliés reflètent souvent les priorités et les intérêts de ces alliés et pas forcément ceux du Canada. Certains affirment que le Canada a potentiellement manqué des renseignements importants pour sa prise de décision, et que la possibilité de collecter des renseignements étrangers permettrait de faire progresser les objectifs géostratégiques, économiques, militaires, environnementaux et scientifiques du Canada. Sans se prononcer en faveur ou contre la création d’un SRHE, Farson et Teeple ont examiné quatre options pour que le Canada se dote de capacités en matière de renseignement étranger humain, mais aucune ne semble être une solution. Premièrement, le Canada pourrait créer une nouvelle institution, mais les coûts engendrés (estimés à environ 200 millions de dollars canadiens en 2006, contre 500 millions actuellement pour le service de renseignement étranger australien) risqueraient de dépasser les besoins en renseignement du pays – non identifiés clairement par les auteurs – d’autant plus qu’il n’est pas certain que la création d’un tel service soit bien accueillie par le public. Deuxièmement, le Canada pourrait étendre de manière importante le rôle du SCRS, lui permettant de recueillir du renseignement humain étranger et de mener des opérations clandestines, mais cela soulèverait de nombreuses questions légales, qui pourraient toutefois être surmontées. Troisièmement, il serait possible d’ajouter une composante de renseignement humain étranger à une agence qui ferait déjà du renseignement étranger, comme le CST. Toutefois, un tel ajout se buterait à une culture organisationnelle particulière du CST, exclusivement tournée vers le renseignement électromagnétique. Enfin, la dernière proposition serait d’étendre de façon limitée les pouvoirs et le mandat du SCRS en matière de renseignement étranger. Récemment, de nombreux articles publiés remettent sur l’avant-scène le débat sur la création d’un service de renseignement humain étranger au Canada. Si on pensait que ce débat, au moins sur la scène académique, était terminé, Hensler est revenu à l’attaque en publiant, 25 ans après sa prise de position en faveur de la création d’un tel service, un article sur les bienfaits pour le Canada de posséder un service de renseignement humain étranger. L’auteur commence par revenir sur les longues hésitations et esquives des différents gouvernements, aussi bien conservateurs que libéraux, à se pencher sur la question, arguant tantôt qu’il faut plus d’études (alors qu’il y en a déjà assez), tantôt affirmant qu’un tel service nuirait à la réputation internationale du Canada. Pour l’auteur, non seulement il n’en est rien, mais cela relève d’une incompréhension des gouvernements sur ce qu’est et sur ce que fait un service de renseignement humain étranger. Finalement, le principal point de son argumentaire, mise à part la mention que le Canada gagnerait en indépendance par rapport aux renseignements étrangers qu’il reçoit et qu’il pourrait gagner en influence, est que le Canada tire de l’arrière par rapport à la plupart de ses alliés, et que la création d’un tel service montrerait aux alliés du Canada, notamment au Groupe des cinq, son engagement à être sur un même pied d’égalité et ainsi augmenter son prestige. D’un autre côté, au cours des derniers mois, plusieurs tribunes journalistiques, académiques ou de praticiens du renseignement ravivent elles aussi le débat. Certains, sans se prononcer, rappellent qu’il est temps de se poser sérieusement la question, là où le Canada est de plus en plus dépendant des renseignements alliés. D’autres rappellent les coûts inhérents à la création d’un tel service et à la pratique de l’espionnage clandestin à l’étranger, que ces coûts soient financiers ou politiques. Toutefois, quitte à se lancer dans l’arène de l’espionnage international, un service de renseignement humain étranger doit être un minimum agressif, pour pouvoir aller chercher l’information d’intérêt. Or, le gouvernement doit être prêt à soutenir cette agressivité et surtout prendre ses responsabilités en cas d’échec ou de fuites dans les médias. Les arguments en faveur de la création d’un tel service mettent tous l’accent sur la défense des intérêts nationaux canadiens à travers la collecte et l’analyse de renseignements étrangers et la trop grande dépendance aux renseignements des alliés. Les alliés pourraient en effet décider de ne plus partager les renseignements avec le Canada, même si cela parait peu probable pour le moment. Le Canada aurait besoin d’un tel service pour avoir un avantage décisionnel, tout en faisant avancer ses intérêts sur la scène internationale. Par exemple, une très bonne estimation et évaluation de la menace et des renseignements sur la possible possession d’arme de destruction massive (ADM) par l’Irak en 2002-2003 a permis au renseignement canadien d’estimer qu’il n’y avait pas assez d’éléments probants en faveur de cette possibilité. Toutefois, cette évaluation correcte des renseignements a été faite en l’absence d’un SRHE et sur la base des renseignements transmis par les alliés. Contre la création d’un service de renseignement humain étranger D’un autre côté, plusieurs se positionnent en défaveur de la création d’un tel service de renseignement. Pour Robinson, cela serait un très mauvais choix politique pour le gouvernement canadien, car il soulève de nombreuses questions quant à la responsabilité publique d’un tel service tout en mettant en doute l’utilité de ce type de renseignement pour la prise de décision. En effet, il n’y aurait pas pour le moment de proposition solide pour rendre responsables devant le public les opérations clandestines et il n’y a pas d’éléments qui nous permettent d’affirmer avec certitude que le renseignement étranger a un impact direct sur le choix d’une politique étrangère. Pour d’autres, la vocation du renseignement canadien ne serait pas d’espionner de façon importante les pays étrangers pour obtenir un avantage en politique étrangère, mais plutôt de protéger le territoire et la population du Canada. C’est d’ailleurs dans le même sens que la contribution de Stuart Farson en 1999 s’inscrit. Selon l’auteur, le Canada n’aurait pas besoin d’un service de renseignement humain spécifiquement étranger, car tous les besoins en renseignement du Canada sont comblés. Il identifie quatre domaines d’utilité du renseignement au Canada : les affaires et le commerce, la sécurité nationale, les relations étrangères et les obligations internationales. Dans les deux premiers domaines, les affaires et la sécurité nationale, le renseignement est tourné vers l’intérieur du territoire. Le renseignement politique pour les relations étrangères serait quant à lui déjà bien fourni par le réseau d’ambassades canadiennes qui rapportent de nombreuses informations qui mériteraient seulement l’amélioration de leur analyse et de leur dissémination. Enfin, quant aux obligations internationales du Canada, celui-ci peut s’appuyer sur ses principaux alliés pour obtenir les renseignements nécessaires. De plus, l’une des préoccupations du Canada serait de ne pas être une menace pour les États-Unis, ce qui l’amène à privilégier un renseignement tourné vers l’intérieur. On pourrait toutefois objecter que depuis 1999, les besoins en renseignement du Canada ont peut-être changé, ce qui sera le sujet de la prochaine section. Est-il temps pour le Canada de se doter d’un tel service de renseignement ? Alors que nous avons vu les pour et les contre d’un tel service de renseignement, la question principale reste la même : est-ce que le Canada en a besoin ? Ainsi, s’il est clair que le Canada dépend majoritairement de ses alliés pour le renseignement humain étranger, et qu’il serait avantageux pour la prise de décision de s’appuyer sur son propre renseignement, il n’est pas certain que le Canada ait besoin d’un nouveau service pour cela. Stephanie Carvin et Thomas Juneau, qui sont d’accord sur l’importance de diminuer la dépendance aux renseignements étrangers de nos alliés, d’accroitre la capacité du Canada à aller chercher son propre renseignement et de produire ses propres analyses, proposent de « canadianiser » le renseignement canadien. Par ceci, les auteurs entendent surtout améliorer les capacités d’analyse au sein de la communauté du renseignement canadien, tout en s’appuyant davantage sur les renseignements collectés par le Canada. Ainsi, nul besoin de créer un nouveau service de renseignement, il s’agit plutôt d’augmenter l’efficience des services existants. C’est d’ailleurs une proposition qui est cohérente avec les évolutions récentes dans le domaine du renseignement canadien. Ainsi, on assiste depuis une vingtaine d’années à une évolution incrémentale des mandats et des pouvoirs du SCRS et du CST. Le CST a maintenant le pouvoir de recourir à des opérations actives dans le cyberespace, notamment pour neutraliser des appareils ou des réseaux informatiques présentant non seulement une menace pour la sécurité du Canada, mais aussi une menace pour les affaires internationales du Canada. De son côté, le SCRS a maintenant un mandat de perturbation et de réduction de la menace. Toutefois, cela s’applique toujours pour du renseignement de sécurité et il est interdit au SCRS d’intenter à la vie ou à l’intégrité physique d’une personne. De plus, un juge fédéral a récemment autorisé le SCRS à procéder à des investigations à l’étranger, même si les investigations violaient les lois du pays en question, lorsqu’il s’agit de menaces à la sécurité du Canada. Si on remarque que le renseignement canadien est toujours bien limité en ce qui concerne le renseignement étranger, il y a des évolutions incrémentales qui tiennent compte du contexte dans lequel le renseignement opère et qui ont pour objectif de rendre le renseignement canadien plus efficient dans ses tâches. D’autre part, et sans prendre le risque de formuler une prédiction hasardeuse sur l’avenir du renseignement canadien, on peut affirmer qu’il est peu probable, dans un avenir proche, que le Canada s’engage dans une création institutionnelle de ce genre. Même Hensler, pourtant un défenseur de la création d’un tel service de renseignement, remarque qu’il existe au Canada une aversion inhérente envers le renseignement humain étranger. Par ailleurs, la culture canadienne de sécurité nationale est plutôt averse au risque. D’autres recherches récentes sur l’appareil de renseignement canadien en arrivent aussi à des conclusions similaires, que ce n’est pas la façon canadienne de faire du renseignement que de s’adonner à la collecte clandestine de renseignements à l’étranger. En effet, le Canada aurait plutôt une culture défensive et minimaliste en matière de renseignement, privilégiant la protection du territoire et de la population du Canada, tout en recueillant du renseignement étranger électromagnétique et en contribuant à un partenariat multilatéral de partage de renseignements. Conclusion  Le Canada a donc une approche originale parmi ses alliés du renseignement étranger, compris en non pas en termes géographiques, mais selon la nature du renseignement recueilli. Le Canada a décidé d’avoir une capacité de renseignement humain étranger très limitée, tout en se dotant d’une importante capacité de recueillement de renseignements étrangers électromagnétiques. Cette carence en matière de renseignement humain étranger en a poussé plusieurs à se positionner en faveur d’un SRHE au Canada, que cela passe par la création d’une nouvelle agence de renseignement ou par l’extension des mandats du SCRS. Pour les défenseurs de la création d’un SRHE, l’avantage serait que le Canada déciderait quel renseignement recueillir en fonction de ses priorités et de ses intérêts plutôt que de dépendre des renseignements, voir des analyses, de ses alliés, qui reflètent souvent les priorités de ces derniers et non pas celles du Canada. D’un autre côté, certains sont sceptiques quant aux bienfaits et à la faisabilité d’un tel service, arguant que le Canada n’a pas de besoin supplémentaire concernant le renseignement étranger, que les coûts seraient prohibitifs, ou que les priorités du Canada ne sont pas dans l’espionnage de pays étrangers, mais dans la protection de son territoire et de sa population contre des menaces bien précises. Ce texte a notamment avancé l’idée que le Canada n’avait pas besoin de créer un SRHE pour le moment et qu’il lui suffisait de rendre l’appareil de renseignement canadien plus efficient à travers une canadianisation de celui-ci, comme le proposent Carvin et Juneau, c’est-à-dire en améliorant les capacités d’analyses et en s’appuyant davantage sur les renseignements canadiens. D’autre part, il est peu probable que le pays se lance dans une telle création institutionnelle compte tenu de sa culture plutôt minimaliste et défensive, averse au risque. Ainsi, si cela rend peu probable la création d’un service de renseignement humain étranger dans un court terme, cela n’empêche pas une évolution incrémentale du cadre juridique entourant la pratique du renseignement au Canada. Une évolution du cadre juridique est nécessaire, comme le fait remarquer le directeur du SCRS David Vigneault, pour que le renseignement canadien s’adapte à l’environnement international est aux nouveaux défis sécuritaires. C’est d’ailleurs cette option que les différents gouvernements ont choisie ces 20 dernières années. ## Ruée vers l’Indo-Pacifique : quelle place se taillera le Canada ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/ruee-vers-lindo-pacifique-quelle-place-se-taillera-le-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le Canada amorce actuellement un ajustement nécessaire de sa position en Asie-Pacifique et il a tout intérêt à miser sur l’Association des Nations d’Asie du Sud-Est (ANASE). Alors que la ruée vers l’« Indo-Pacifique » bat son plein, le Canada doit faire preuve d’un optimisme prudent afin de tirer son épingle d’un jeu géopolitique délicat. Contrairement à ce qu’on pourrait croire, il a tout intérêt à miser sur l’Association des Nations d’Asie du Sud-Est (ANASE). Ce billet a été produit à l’origine pour Open Canada : consultez la version française originale.   Dans un contexte international marqué par un regain de rivalité entre la Chine et les États-Unis, une pression croissante sur le multilatéralisme, et des défis complexes qui requièrent une coopération accrue entre les États, le Canada amorce actuellement un ajustement nécessaire de sa position en Asie-Pacifique. Cet ajustement pourrait même mener à l’adoption d’une « vision » Indo-Pacifique, comme l’ont déjà fait plusieurs autres États afin d’affermir leur ancrage diplomatique et stratégique dans cette région. Afin de réussir cette entreprise délicate, à la mesure de ses ressources et capacités, et dans l’intérêt de la population canadienne, Ottawa doit faire preuve de prudence et renforcer ses acquis. Le Canada a, en particulier, tout avantage à accroître son soutien et sa participation aux institutions régionales dont l’ANASE forme le cœur. Pour ce faire, le Canada doit d’abord mieux comprendre et reconnaître la valeur ajoutée de ces institutions pour ce qu’elles sont, plutôt que ce qu’il aimerait qu’elles soient. Il doit également trouver un moyen de convaincre ses partenaires qu’il est, lui aussi, en mesure et prêt à contribuer à la paix et la stabilité de la région par le biais du multilatéralisme, y compris en soutenant l’ANASE dans l’atteinte des objectifs qu’elle se fixe pour elle-même. L’ANASE, mal comprise L’ANASE demeure méconnue et fort mal comprise au Canada. Si elle nous rejoint, c’est généralement par le biais de séances photo marquées par des poignées de mains étranges et d’autres rituels « exotiques » d’une diplomatie atypique menée à l’autre bout du monde. Y figurent, parfois, notre Premier Ministre ainsi que, plus souvent, les membres de son Cabinet, qui se prêtent au jeu sans nécessairement convaincre le public de la valeur de l’exercice. En effet, les résultats concrets et à court terme de toutes ces rencontres et sommets ne sont pas toujours apparents. Cela est particulièrement le cas en Asie Pacifique, où le dialogue multilatéral est souvent présenté – et perçu – comme une fin en soi. Cette caractéristique du multilatéralisme contribue à une désillusion généralisée envers les institutions internationales lorsque les États tardent à apporter des solutions aux problèmes auxquels ils font face collectivement, comme la COVID-19 et les changements climatiques. L’ANASE et les institutions au sein desquelles elle joue un rôle central, tels le Forum régional de l’ANASE (dont le Canada est membre), le Sommet de l’Asie orientale et la rencontre des ministres de la Défense de l’ANASE-Plus (auxquels Ottawa tente d’accéder jusqu’ici sans succès), n’échappent pas à cette désillusion. En fait, l’ANASE est même particulièrement vulnérable à ces critiques, étant donné son caractère « étrange » pour un public canadien et plus largement occidental, davantage familier avec l’Union européenne et l’OTAN. À tort ou à raison, ces institutions forment encore l’étalon par lequel on évalue la performance de toutes les autres. L’ANASE, avec son petit secrétariat peuplé par quelque 300 âmes, son budget limité, et sa tendance à balayer les enjeux sensibles sous le tapis, ne fait pas le poids à première vue. Cela veut-il dire que le Canada doit la délaisser, diriger ses énergies ailleurs et trouver d’autres options pour promouvoir ses intérêts stratégiques et économiques dans la région? Il serait normal de le penser, mais en réalité, c’est tout le contraire. Pour renforcer ses assises dans une région dont l’importance est aujourd’hui indéniable, le Canada a besoin de l’ANASE. Pour les résultats qu’elle produit, même s’ils ne sont pas toujours flamboyants, mais aussi, surtout, pour sa capacité unique à concilier une diversité de perspectives, d’intérêts et de préférences. Des résultats indéniables Sur le plan des résultats, l’ANASE peut se targuer d’un certain nombre de succès relatifs en matière de coopération en cas de pandémie ou de désastre humanitaire. Aujourd’hui, « grâce » à la COVID-19, personne ne doit se faire convaincre des répercussions transnationales majeures que peut avoir ce genre d’événement. Au cœur de la pandémie, l’ANASE a mis en place une réserve régionale d’équipements médicaux ainsi qu’un fonds régional de lutte contre la COVID-19 afin d’atténuer les disparités de ressources entre ses États membres. L’ANASE joue également un rôle ingrat, mais crucial, depuis plusieurs années, dans la gestion des conflits en mer de Chine méridionale. C’est elle qui mène les négociations diplomatiques vers l’adoption d’un code de conduite entre les parties à ces conflits, qui opposent au moins quatre de ses membres : Brunei, la Malaisie, les Philippines et le Vietnam, ainsi que la Chine et Taïwan. L’adoption d’un code de conduite contraignant et efficace demeure pour l’instant improbable. Par contre, au cours des dernières années, les États parties ont réussi à s’entendre sur des lignes de conduite lors de rencontres accidentelles en mer, sur la tenue d’exercices militaires conjoints, et sur l’établissement de lignes directes de communication en cas d’incident qui pourrait déstabiliser le transport maritime mondial, dont le tiers transite par cette zone. L’organisation a besoin de ses partenaires mieux nantis, dont le Canada, afin de renforcer ses capacités à fournir des solutions à ces enjeux majeurs, dont les ramifications transcendent les frontières nationales et régionales. Or, c’est sur le plan de la conciliation que la valeur ajoutée de l’ANASE est la plus claire, même si elle est aussi plus abstraite. L’ANASE est parvenue, sans interruption depuis sa création, en assurant un rôle de médiateur, à garder à la même table des États aux intérêts et préférences parfois diamétralement opposés. Elle leur offre l’occasion de s’entendre sur des principes communs visant à assurer la stabilité et la coopération dans l’intérêt de tous. Ce rôle, aucun autre acteur, y compris des puissances avec des capacités matérielles bien supérieures, comme les États-Unis ou la Chine, n’est parvenu à le remplir. C’est aussi la raison pour laquelle à chaque fois qu’un partenaire de l’ANASE, qu’il s’agisse de l’Australie, du Japon, ou des États-Unis, propose une nouvelle institution multilatérale pour la région, voire une « OTAN pour l’Asie » (une rengaine familière dans la région), le débat se solde toujours de la même façon. On en vient à admettre que si l’ANASE n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer. Le consensus actuel dans la région est qu’il vaut mieux renforcer l’organisation et les institutions qui en découlent que de se doter de mécanismes non-viables dans une région où les intérêts des États sont aussi difficiles à concilier. Beaucoup reste à faire. Étant donné la présence de joueurs au poids stratégique bien plus lourd, le Canada doit faire sa marque par le biais d’un soutien constructif à la position de l’ANASE. Il doit clarifier sa valeur ajoutée en misant sur des domaines et des enjeux de coopération spécifiques où il peut apporter une contribution substantielle et originale, tels que l’agenda Femmes, Paix et Sécurité. Le Canada aurait ainsi tort de négliger l’ANASE en faveur d’arrangements alternatifs, et ce même s’ils peuvent paraître plus attirants, notamment lorsqu’ils ont une dimension stratégique plus prononcée. En fait, l’engouement actuel pour la création d’un nouvel ordre régional qui prendrait racine dans la relance du « Quad » entre les États-Unis, l’Australie, l’Inde et le Japon doit être accueilli avec un grain de sel. De même pour la prolifération de « visions » et de « stratégies » pour l’Indo-Pacifique, dont les dernières en date nous proviennent de la France, des Pays-Bas et de l’Allemagne, et seront bientôt suivies d’initiatives similaires du Royaume-Uni et de l’Union européenne. Un rôle stratégique à se tailler Dans ce contexte, il y a certainement une place pour un engagement accru du Canada en Asie-Pacifique. Un ajustement en ce sens sera certainement vu d’un bon œil par ses partenaires, ouvrant la voie à de nouvelles opportunités de coopération sécuritaire et économique. Cependant, le Canada aurait tort de se lancer tête baissée dans la quête de l’Indo-Pacifique sans assurer ses arrières auprès de l’ANASE, qui conserve, malgré ses limites, la prérogative de fixer les termes du dialogue multilatéral en Asie-Pacifique. D’autant plus qu’il existe de nombreuses contradictions parmi les promoteurs du Quad sur des enjeux cruciaux, notamment sur la façon de composer avec la Chine comme hégémon régional en devenir, ainsi que sur les frontières de l’Indo-Pacifique. Dans un contexte marqué par autant d’incertitude et d’ambiguïté, le Canada a intérêt à faire preuve de prudence et à se placer au diapason de la position de l’ANASE et d’États membres clé. Parmi eux, on compte l’Indonésie, Singapour, mais aussi le Vietnam, dont la réputation a bénéficié d’une présidence de l’ANASE menée d’une main de maître en 2020 malgré les défis posés par la pandémie. Leur position est caractérisée par un optimisme prudent, ancré dans des principes qui guident le processus régional depuis longtemps et qui fait fi des modes passagères. Le Canada a tout à gagner à miser sur l’ANASE dans la course d’endurance qu’est le régionalisme en Asie Pacifique, même si parfois, elle peine à fournir des résultats concrets sur le court terme. Le jeu en vaut certainement la chandelle. ## S.2 Episode 16: Mitigating Risk URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-16-mitigating-risk-2/ Modified: 2023-03-01 > For our Feature Interview, Linna speaks with Dr. Ashley Williams about her findings on military to civilian transition and access to health.. In the sixteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN. Steve & Linna discuss the Emergency Act Inquiry - who was responsible, asset freezing, Doug Ford, US funding & PR of China activities in Canada. For our Feature Interview, Linna speaks with Dr. Ashley Williams about her findings on military to civilian transition and access to health services and some misconceptions about veteran health. She is also working on a veteran led project writing guidelines for healthcare providers project on chronic pain as well as a project on equine assisted learning for Public Safety personnel dealing with PTSD. Dr. Ashley Williams is a Post-Doctoral Fellow in Psychiatry and Behavioural Neurosciences as well as Co-Chair, Student and Post-Doctoral Engagement Committee (SPEC) with the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research/ L'Institut canadien de recherche sur la santé des militaires et des vétérans (CIMVHR). CIMVHR is a partner with the Canadian Defence and Security Network, students who would be interested in being part of CIMVHR’s Students and Postdoctoral Engagement Committee (cimvhr.ca/student-and-postdoct…ngagement-committee/). looking for candidates interested in policy making, there are opportunities to submit proposals submitted to the upcoming forum (cimvhrforum.ca/trainees interested in knowing more about SPEC outreach they are welcome to sign up for their distribution list to receive all future invitations and information. ## S.2 Episode 1: The Ones We Let Down URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-1-the-ones-we-let-down-2/ Modified: 2022-07-13 > For today’s feature interview, Artur speaks with our network partner Charlotte Duval – Lantoine about her newly published book... Today is the first episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Artur shares his view on the Rogers outage and protecting critical infrastructure and national security implications; Steve and Artur discuss responses to dissident Reservist James Topp, flags and you guessed it, the NATO Summit. For today’s feature interview, Artur speaks with our network partner Charlotte Duval – Lantoine about her newly published book “The Ones We Let Down.” ## S.2 Episode 11: A National Force URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-11-a-national-force-2/ Modified: 2022-11-30 > In the eleventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of UCalgary’s Centre for Military... In the eleventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss information sharing and other takeaways from the Emergencies Act Inquiry and implications for policing in Canada, Indo-Pacific strategy and allyship. Steve speaks with Peter Kasurak, Fellow at the Centre for International Defence Policy (CIDP) at Queen’s University about his book “A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army, 1950-2000” ## S.2 Episode 12: Domestic Emergency Operations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-12-domestic-emergency-operations-2/ Modified: 2022-12-14 > Domestic Emergency Operations. In the twelfth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate... In the twelfth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN. Steve & Linna discuss highlights from the CDSN's Annual Year Ahead event, takeaways from the Arbour Report's Stakeholder Engagement event, the recent RWE coup plot in Germany as well as Peruvian President Castillo's successful self-coup. -Stephen Saideman ## S.2 Episode 13: Welcome to 2023 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-13-welcome-to-2023-2/ Modified: 2023-01-18 > In the thirteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military... Welcome to 2023. In the thirteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss the Brazilian election protests, Canadian purchase of a U.S.-made National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) for Ukraine and a quick summary of F-35 procurement efforts. Today's feature interview is with Conseils de sécurité podcast host, Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé ## S.2 Episode 14: NATO(ish) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-14-natoish/ Modified: 2023-02-01 > Stefanie and Steve discuss her new book: Deploying Feminism, The Role of Gender in NATO Military Operations. Topics include the context of... In the 14th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Anessa L. Kimball, author of the new book, Beyond 2% – NATO partners, institutions & burden management: Concepts, risks & models discuss sending offensive equipment to Ukraine, the threat of Russian cyber attacks and Turkish resistance to NATO expansion. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Stéfanie von Hlatky, the Canada Research Chair on Gender, Security, and the Armed Forces, associate professor of political studies at Queen's University, Associate Dean of Research in the Faculty of Arts and Science and co-director of the Strategic Analysis Network and the Canadian Defence and Security Network (including co-host of Battle Rhythm, season 1!) During the interview, Stefanie and Steve discuss her new book: Deploying Feminism, The Role of Gender in NATO Military Operations. Topics include the context of the project idea, the research process, and fieldwork trips leading to the book. Stefanie also explained her previous research and the importance of focusing the book’s research on Women, Peace, and security, trying to convey gender equality as a key element to more stable security outcomes. The book is available at all the usual outlets, including the publisher Oxford University Press, and on amazon. ## S.2 Episode 15: Visionary Thinking URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-15-visionary-thinking-2/ Modified: 2023-02-15 > Steve & Artur discuss balloon responses, U.S. Air Force Gen. Minihan's memo & Chinese "police stations" in Canada... In the 15th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss balloon responses, U.S. Air Force Gen. Minihan's memo & Chinese "police stations" in Canada. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Major-General Lise Bourgon, currently the Women Peace and Security Champion for the CAF. During the interview, Steve spoke with MGen Lise Bourgon about their Job as a Chief of Personnel, the challenges they face as CMP’s current priorities are reconstitution, recruitment, and personnel retention. MGen Bourgon also explained the housing strategy for the CAF members, their protocol for managing problematic behaviors of members in leadership positions, and their efforts to reduce movements & relocations as a way to retain personnel. ## S.2 Episode 17: Interference & Oversight URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-17-interference-oversight-2/ Modified: 2023-03-17 > Today's feature interview is with author of World War Z, Max Brooks and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of Valens. Steve, Daveed and.... In the seventeenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss Chinese government election interference and police stations in Canada, oversight of the RCMP in BC and across Canadian communities & concerns about lagging progress for Canadian women in international defence roles. Today's feature interview is with author of World War Z, Max Brooks and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of Valens. Steve, Daveed and Max discuss their work in national security, specializing in the simulation and gaming world. They explain the creation process of Sleeping Giants’ simulation, Valens Global’s approach to war game simulations, and the benefits and purposes of their war games aiming to develop situational research skills and negotiation abilities. Links National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians: www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca The Modern War Institute: www.mwi.usma.edu ## S.2 Episode 18: Responsible Democracy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-18-responsible-democracy-2/ Modified: 2023-03-30 > Our co-hosts discuss foreign interference and intelligence, government leaks vs whistle blowing & protests in Israel. Responsible Democracy.. This is the 18th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2, titled "Responsible Democracy" with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss foreign interference and intelligence, government leaks vs whistle blowing & protests in Israel. Note from the Producer: CDSN was so busy these past 2 weeks, we didn't have time for a Feature Interview! If you are thirsty for new content and perspectives, check out our YouTube Channel with new presentations via our Capstone Seminar in Calgary, feature topics including: Effective Disaster Management and Multi-Stakeholder Role: A Case of Bangladesh. (Mohammed Sadman Sakib) Next Wave of Jihadists or Deradicalized Citizens?: A Controlled Narrative From A Human Security And Social Identity Perspective. (Haval Ahmad) Trauma, Culture, and Militarism: Multidimensional Healing in the Canadian Armed Forces. (Ash Grover) Approches alternatives afin de comprendre et surveiller la culture au sein de l’Équipe de la défense (Isabelle Richer) “Functional Actors” and Canadian Defence & Security Policy: Lessons from the Arctic 1985-2010. (Ryan Dean) Cold Comfort: Threat Perception and Confidence-Building in Europe and the Arctic (Thomas Hughes) The Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD): Legacy and Relevancy in the 21st Century. (Nicholas Glesby) Women, Peace & Security: Military Application and Beyond (Ye Hee (Leona) Ahn) ## S.2 Episode 19: Senator Rear-Admiral Rebecca Patterson URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-19-senator-rear-admiral-rebecca-patterson-2/ Modified: 2023-04-12 > For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Senator Rebecca Patterson, the first female CAF veteran to be appointed to the Senate. In the nineteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN; Steve & Linna discuss the Pope's rejection of the Doctrine of Discovery, repatriation of Canadian women and children from Syria & Star Wars Celebration weekend. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Senator Rebecca Patterson, the first female CAF veteran to be appointed to the Senate. ## S.2 Episode 2: Covering Canadian Defense & Security URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-2-covering-canadian-defense-security-2/ Modified: 2022-07-27 > For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with Senior political reporter for @GlobalNews, Amanda Connolly... Today is the second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Anessa Kimball, associate professor in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, director of Centre sur la sécurité internationale (CSI, Centre on International Security), and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Anessa discuss NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Canada’s turbine-related sanctions on Russia & GoC’s push for more airspace privacy. For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with Senior political reporter for @GlobalNews, Amanda Connolly about her experiences as one of Canada’s few national security and defense journalists. ## S.2 Episode 20: Canada’s NATO Burden Sharing URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-20-canadas-nato-burden-sharing/ Modified: 2023-04-26 > Canada's NATO Burden Sharing - This week's interview is with Jānis Garisons, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of... Canada's NATO Burden Sharing - In the 20th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Anessa L. Kimball, author of the new book, Beyond 2% – NATO partners, institutions & burden management: Concepts, risks & models. Steve & Anessa discuss NATO defence spending, intelligence leaks, Chinese police stations in North America and the civil war in Sudan. This week's interview is with Jānis Garisons, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Latvia. During the interview, Steve & Jānis discuss Operation Enhanced Forward Presence, conscription and resilience. Canada's NATO Burden Sharing (Jānis Garisons is Latvia's Secretary of State in the Ministry of Defense. Prior to that he was Undersecretary of State-Policy Director in the Ministry (2013-2015), and prior to that he was the Ministry's Policy Director (2008-2013). Garisons has also held positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Director of the Security Policy Department and Head of the Regional Co-operation and Arms Control Division. He received a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College in 2014 and a Master of History from the University of Latvia in 1996.) ## S.2 Episode 21: Climate Science & Policy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-21-climate-science-policy-2/ Modified: 2023-05-10 > In today's feature interview, Anessa speaks with Pauline Pic about her post-doctoral research on the intersections of human... Climate Science & Policy | In the twenty-first episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss use of force amongst Canadian policing agencies, the end of the COVID emergency & the Civil War in Sudan. In today's feature interview, Anessa speaks with Pauline Pic about her post-doctoral research on the intersections of human geography and human security in the Arctic. Tracking Injustice Project: trackinginjustice.ca ## S.2 Episode 22: The Trust Factor: Chat Apps URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-22-the-trust-factor-chat-apps-2/ Modified: 2023-05-25 > For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Dr. Bessma Momani about her research on mal/dis and mis information shared via... In the twenty second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN; Steve & Linna discuss the External Monitor’s Report on progress of addressing the Arbour Report, university labs come under government scrutiny for national security risks. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Dr. Bessma Momani about her research on mal/dis and mis information shared via multinational chat app groups. ## S.2 Episode 24: Visiting Defence Fellow, Col Cathy Blue URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-24-visiting-defence-fellow-col-cathy-blue-2/ Modified: 2023-07-06 > Today's feature interview, Steve interviews Col. Cathy Blue, the CDSN/NPSIA visiting Defence Fellow for 2022/2023, about her.. In the twenty fourth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss the wildfires and climate change, protests triggered by police violence in France; Wagner vs Putin; and the upcoming NATO Summit in Vilnius. Today's feature interview, Steve interviews Col. Cathy Blue, the CDSN/NPSIA visiting Defence Fellow for 2022/2023, about her experience in the program. Colonel Cathy Blue was born and raised in Hopefield, Prince Edward Island and developed her love for the Royal Canadian Air Force as an Air Cadet. Enrolling in the Canadian Forces in April 1989 as a Communication and Electronic Engineer (CELE), Lieutenant-Colonel Blue attended the University of Prince Edward Island under the Regular Officer Training Program. Colonel Blue has served in numerous operational and training positions across the Canadian Armed Forces, including positions within 8 Wing Telecommunication and Information Systems Squadron (WTISS), J6 Operations, 76 Communications Group and the Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics (CFSCE). Colonel Blue has had the honour of holding numerous command positions throughout her career as Commanding Officer 708 Communication Squadron, Commanding Officer 8 Air Communications and Control Squadron (8 ACCS) and as Commanding Officer 8 Mission Support Squadron. All were unit located on the largest Wing in the RCAF – 8 Wing Trenton. GO FLYERS! Colonel Blue has been posted to the Canadian Forces College (CFC) as Directing Staff for the Joint Command and Staff Programme (JSCP) and Programme Officer for the National Security Programme (NSP) followed by a posting to the RCAF Strategic Headquarters as Deputy Strategic A6 and Deputy Occupation Advisor for CELE. She was most recently posted to newly formed Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC) as the Special Advisor to Lieutenant-General Carignan Chief, Professional Conduct and Culture. Colonel Blue holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Physics and Computer Science from the University of Prince Edward Island, is a graduate of JCSP and holds a Masters in Defence Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. She is an avid hockey player, who (despite a four year posting to Toronto) remains a dedicated Ottawa Senators fan. Colonel Blue is married and the couple have two sons. ## S.2 Episode 25: Vice Admiral Angus Topshee on Canada’s Global Deployment URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-25-vice-admiral-angus-topshee-on-canadas-global-deployment-2/ Modified: 2023-07-19 > Today's feature interview, Steve interviews Vice Admiral Angus Topshee. The Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy answers questions... In the twenty fifth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Anessa L. Kimball, author of the new book, Beyond 2% – NATO partners, institutions & burden management: Concepts, risks & models. Steve & Anessa discuss the recent NATO summit in Vilinius: membership, arctic, expectations and Ukraine. Today's feature interview, Steve interviews Vice Admiral Angus Topshee. The Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy answers questions about personnel shortages, Canadian arctic security, human security as the heart of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the role of leadership in culture change. ## S.2 Episode 26: Transforming Military Cultures URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-26-transforming-military-cultures-2/ Modified: 2023-08-02 > For our feature interview Steve asks Nancy Taber, Tammy George & Maya Eichler about their experience setting up a MINDS network focused on... In the 26th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss rumors and personalities in the Defence & Public Safety cabinet shuffles; ongoing coup in Niger and civil disobedience in Israel in response to justice reforms. For our feature interview Steve asks Nancy Taber, Tammy George & Maya Eichler about their experience setting up a MINDS network focused on Transforming Military Cultures. Transforming Military Cultures is a network of Canadian and international academic researchers, defence scientists, military members, veterans, and people with relevant lived experience who are collaborating to challenge, reimagine, and transform the Canadian Armed Forces culture into one that embraces inclusivity and difference. The Network employs an anti-oppression framework in drawing on diverse critical perspectives and international lessons learned. Our activities aim to determine the root causes of the problematic military culture and provide practical insights to help transform Canadian Armed Forces culture into one that serves the future needs of Canada and Canadians. ## S.2 Episode 3: America’s Great-Power Opportunity URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-3-americas-great-power-opportunity-2/ Modified: 2022-08-10 > For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with @Ali Wyne, senior analyst with @Eurasia Group's Global Macro-Geopolitics practice... In the third episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss state secrets and SCIFs vis a vis Mar-a-Lago; Canada’s rising hate crime problem, and the US-Russia prisoner exchange. For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with @Ali Wyne, senior analyst with @Eurasia Group's Global Macro-Geopolitics practice about his new book "America's Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition" (Polity, 2022) ## S.2 Episode 4: Excellence Scholars URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-4-excellence-scholars-2/ Modified: 2022-08-24 > For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with CDSN’s 2022 Undergraduate Excellence scholars, Safia Hafid and Alex Rizkallah about their... In the fourth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN. Steve & Linna discuss the CDSN Summer Institute highlights, Veterans Affairs MAiD recommendation and the CBSA discrimination survey. For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with CDSN’s 2022 Undergraduate Excellence scholars, Safia Hafid and Alex Rizkallah about their MINDS funded projects. ## S.2 Episode 5: The Prisoners Dilemma URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-5-the-prisoners-dilemma-2/ Modified: 2022-09-13 > In the fifth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. In the fifth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss the mass casualty tragedy in Saskatchewan, harassment of Minister Freeland and the rise of political hate with comments on government intelligence gathering tools along with Artic Security. Steve speaks with Dani Gilbert about her article in this month’s Foreign Affairs journal, “The Prisoners Dilemma”. ## S.2 Episode 6: MINDS URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-6-minds/ Modified: 2022-09-28 > Steve & Anessa discuss developments in the war in Ukraine, Germany’s obligation to meet NATO’s 2% spending target and North Korea's New Law.. In the sixth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Anessa Kimball (They/Them), Full professor at Laval University, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Anessa discuss developments in the war in Ukraine, Germany’s obligation to meet NATO’s 2% spending target and North Korea's New Law on Preemptive Use of Nuclear Weapons. For today’s feature interview, Steve speaks with Ehren Edwards, Manager of the MINDS program. They talk about the vision, goals and grant fundings of the Program. ## S.2 Episode 7: Operation UNIFIER URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-7-operation-unifier-2/ Modified: 2022-10-05 In the seventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Artur Wilczynski, Retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations, Canada. Steve & Artur discuss the implications of the Nord Stream pipeline burst, Russian strategy in Ukraine, domestic emergency operations during Hurricane Fiona and protests in Iran. Steve speaks with LCol Gilbert about Operation UNIFIER, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) mission in support of Ukraine's security forces. ## S.2 Episode 8: Researching the Middle East URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-8-researching-the-middle-east/ Modified: 2022-10-19 > Today’s feature interview is with Giancarlo Franco, PhD student at Universite Laval, he speaks with Anessa about his research on the wars... In the eighth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of @UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss the Emergencies Act Inquiry, Russian targeting of energy & water infrastructure with remote weapons systems and the use of propaganda from both sides as well as the Chief of Defence Staff’s plea to the public to help with capacity building. Today’s feature interview is with Gianmarco Fontana, PhD student at Universite Laval, he speaks with Anessa about his research on the wars in the Middle East, including Iran. ## S.2 Episode 9: Leading By Example URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-2-episode-9-leading-by-example-2/ Modified: 2022-11-02 > This week’s Feature Interview is from the archives, revisiting a November 2020 episode with Major-General Lise Bourgon who is now Acting... In the ninth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Research Associate in the Trauma and Recovery Lab at McMaster University, and former post-doc fellow of the CDSN. Steve & Linna discuss the CDSN mid-term Conference, her research on mentorship presented at CDSN partner CIMVHR’s annual Forum; Doug Ford testifies before the Public Order Emergency Commission, rumors of a potential new Haiti Mission for Canada. This week’s Feature Interview is from the archives, revisiting a November 2020 episode with Major-General Lise Bourgon who is now Acting Commander Military Personnel Command, Canadian Armed Force Women, as well as Peace and Security Champion. ## S.3 Ep.23: Civil Wars URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s-3-ep-23-civil-wars-2/ Modified: 2024-12-05 > Today's feature interview is with Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security researchers Dr. Catherine Baillie Abidi and Dr. Dustin In episode 23 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve discuss the Halifax Security Forum debate about women in combat roles, Trump, Trudeau, Tariffs and US asylum seekers along with martial law in South Korea. Today's feature interview is with Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security researchers Dr. Catherine Baillie Abidi and Dr. Dustin Johnson on their recent volume of Civil Wars, Volume 26, Issue 3 (2024): www.tandfonline.com/toc/fciv20/26/3 Dr. Catherine Baillie Abidi is a scholarly practitioner in the Department of Child and Youth Study at Mount Saint Vincent University and has specialized in children and armed conflict for over two decades. She has worked in collaboration with dozens of Defence Forces and with international organizations such as the United Nations, Red Cross, and the International Labour Organization. She has over twenty publications in the field of peace and security and was the editor of Allons-y: Journal of Children, Peace and Security for five years. Dr. Baillie Abidi was awarded a Queen Diamond Jubilee Medal from the Governor General of Canada for her work in children, peace and security. At Mount Saint Vincent, she is leading research focused on conflict-related early warning, moral injury, and children and youth as agents of peace. Dr. Baillie Abidi is also the Co-Director of the Children, Peace and Security International Network, an active and collaborative group of international scholars, committed to researching inter-disciplinary, community-based, inclusive, and prevention-oriented approaches for protecting children and preventing their use in violence. Dr. Dustin Johnson is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, and he is based within the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security at the Canadian Defence Academy, where he researches child protection and gender dynamics in armed conflict and peacekeeping with a focus on Ukraine. He holds a PhD in peace and development studies from the School of Global Studies at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, and has previously published in journals such as International Peacekeeping, Civil Wars, and Global Responsibility to Protect. ## S2 Ep. 10: Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-10-canadian-forces-intelligence-command-cfintcom-2/ Modified: 2022-11-16 > For our Feature interview, Steve speaks with Major-General(MGen)Michael Wright, Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command... In the 10th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-hosts Steve Saideman & Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D. discuss messaging faux pas at the Vimy Gala, missile scare in Poland and COP27. For our Feature interview, Steve speaks with Major-General(MGen)Michael Wright, Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command and Chief of Defence Intelligence. ## S2 Ep. 27: Servicewomen’s Salute URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-27-servicewomens-salute-2/ Modified: 2023-08-30 In the twenty-seventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto. Steve & Linna discuss the just ended Summer Institute, the Canadian Armed Forces changing housing benefits for troops, a Survey about the Canadian public’s perception of the military, the current challenges the CAF faces due to Domestic and Emergency Operations given the increasing wildfires and Climate change events over the Summer especially the evacuation of Kelowna and Yellowknife. For our Feature Interview, Linna speaks with Rosemary Park, the founder of Servicewomen's Salute, which promotes and celebrates women's contributions to the Canadian Military. The CDSN is one of the partners helping with the upcoming Aspire & Inspire workshop series and Gala dinner organized by Servicewomen's Salute in October. ## S2 Ep. 28 – Training Exercises URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-28-training-exercises-2/ Modified: 2023-09-13 > For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Thomas Hughes a former postdoc for the CDSN. Thomas is currently a McKenna Postdoctoral Fellow.. In the twenty-eighth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at University of Calgary. Steve & Erin discuss the public inquiry into foreign election interference and its new commissioner Quebec Court of Appeal Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s trip to Asia for the ASEAN summit, India among the top sources of foreign interference in Canada, the break down of Trudeau’s plane in India, and China raising concerns about New Cold War. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Thomas Hughes a former postdoc for the CDSN. Thomas is currently a McKenna Postdoctoral Fellow at Mount Allison University. ## S2 Ep. 29 – Security vs. Populism URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-29-security-vs-populism-2/ Modified: 2023-09-27 > Steve & Artur discuss Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s revelation of intelligence that the government of India was involved in the murder... In the twenty-ninth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa. Steve & Artur discuss Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s revelation of intelligence that the government of India was involved in the murder of a prominent British Columbia Sikh leader, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, on Canadian soil and the risk of diaspora protestations being perceived as threats by home governments. The lack of vetting, which led House Speaker Anthony Rota to invite and recognize a man who fought for a Nazi unit in the Second World War during Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's visit to Parliament, the diplomatic and international embarrassment as well as Russia using this incident as propaganda to justify the war in Ukraine. The final discussion focused on the weaponization of parental rights in anti-trans protests and far right involvement, which has the potential to turn violent, and its implications for security in Canada. ## S2 Ep. 30 – Resilience podcast Meaghan Wilkin and Lobna Cherif URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-30-resilience-podcast-meaghan-wilkin-and-lobna-cherif-2/ Modified: 2023-10-11 > For our feature interview, Steve speaks with Professors Meaghan Wilkin and Lobna Cherif (Department of Military Psychology and Leadership.. In the thirtieth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Associate Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss Anessa’s research at the NATO Centers for Excellence in Europe, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the potential cut in the defense budget, Low artillery supplies and Europe’s perception of Canada’s NATO 2% commitment. For our feature interview, Steve speaks with Professors Meaghan Wilkin and Lobna Cherif (Department of Military Psychology and Leadership Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston) about the Resilience Plus podcast that is a new addition to the CDSN Podcast Network. The Resilience podcast provides resources on responding to trauma, empowering individuals to maximize their productivity and effectiveness in pursuing personal and professional goals. ## S2 Ep. 34: Learning Lessons at the Year Ahead with Lama Mourad URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-34-learning-lessons-at-the-year-ahead-with-lama-mourad-2/ Modified: 2023-12-06 > Our feature interview is with Lama Mourad, who will be joining us as a panel moderator for the Year Ahead on Dec 7th. In the thirty-fourth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss the infamous legacy of Henry Kissinger, F-35 procurement and interoperability and new allegations of a toxic workplace at CSIS. Our feature interview is with Lama Mourad, who will be joining us as a panel moderator for the Year Ahead on Dec 7th. Lama is an assistant professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. Her research focuses on the intersection of forced migration, local governance, and the politics of borders, with a regional focus on the Middle East. ## S2 Ep.31: Open by Default Project URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-31-open-by-default-project-2/ Modified: 2023-10-25 > For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Matt Malone, Assistant Professor at Thompson Rivers University... In the thirty-first episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto. Steve and Linna discuss her presentation on how men exposed to sexual trauma in the military access support services for that trauma at CIMVHR, the Meeting of MINDS event organized by the CDSN for the nine networks and ADM Policy, the Ombudsman criticizing Ottawa for not supporting military advisers and CSIS chief raises concerns about China's interest in Canadian universities. For our Feature Interview, Steve speaks with Matt Malone, Assistant Professor at Thompson Rivers University, and he researches the laws that protect secret information, especially trade secrecy, confidential information, access to information, privacy, data protection, and cybersecurity. They discuss Matt’s recent project, the Open by Default Project. ## S2 Ep.32: Battle Rhythm x Conseils de sécurité: Visiting Defence Fellow Colonel MC Harvey URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-32-battle-rhythm-x-conseils-de-securite-visiting-defence-fellow-colonel-mc-harvey/ Modified: 2023-11-08 > Today's feature interview is in French with Conseils de sécurité hosts Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé & Artur Wilczynski interviewing this... In the thirty-third episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Erin Gibbs Van Brunschot, Director of UCalgary’s Centre for Military, Security & Strategic Studies, and co-director of the CDSN. Steve & Erin discuss an increase in hate crimes across Canada, the war in Israel/Gaza & sexual misconduct in Latvia. Today's feature interview is in French with Conseils de sécurité hosts Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé & Artur Wilczynski interviewing this year's NPSIA/CDSN Visiting Defence Fellow Colonel Marie Christine Harvey. Colonel Harvey tells us about her career path, the challenges of the positions she has held, notably as an instructor and in command of domestic and international operations. She debunks myths about the military and explains how the Canadian Armed Forces differ from other armies. ## S2 Ep.33: Throwback -> 2019 Peace with Women Fellows URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-ep-33-throwback-2019-peace-with-women-fellows-2/ Modified: 2023-11-23 > Our guests are the 2019 Peace with Women Fellows who discuss a wide variety of issues from leadership and learning to recruitment and... In the thirty-third episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with co-host Linna Tam-Seto, Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto. Steve and Linna discuss CAF members access to benefits, the repercussion of burn pits and supressing lessons learned from Afghanistan. Our guests are the 2019 Peace with Women Fellows who discuss a wide variety of issues from leadership and learning to recruitment and retention. Fellows in order of appearance: 23:20: BG Lisa Ferris, NZ Defence Legal Services & Paz Magat, Director, Peace With Women Fellowship 29:10: Colonel Tracey Onufer, USAF, CoS SOF South & Commodore Solveig Krey, Norweigan Navy, Dep ACOS Ops 34:00: Colonel Debra Lovette, USAF, Human capital, Joint Force Space & Air Commodore Elanor Boekholt-o’Sullivan, Netherlands, Cyber Defence 38:20: LtColonel Joana Polekauskiene, Lithuania, instructor mil academy & Colonel Lysane Martel, RCAF professional development 42:30: Colonel Dr. Lale Baroschek, Germany, Recruitment & Colonel Solene le Floch, French Air Force, Human Resource manager 48:00: Captain Rachel Durbin, Australia, Navy, Future Force & Captain Fiona Shepherd, RN, ACOS Logistics, Operations and Plans ## S2 Episode 23: From Battalion to Brigade URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s2-episode-23-from-battalion-to-brigade-2/ Modified: 2023-06-07 > Dr Linna Tam-Seto talked with Dr. Alexandra Heber about her work on a glossary titled: “Glossary of Terms: A shared understanding of the... In the twenty third episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 2 with special co-host, Justin Massie, Full Professor of political science at the Université du Québec à Montréal, Associate Director of the Strategic Analysis Network, and Co-director of Le Rubicon; Steve & Justin record from Riga, Latvia where they provide highlights from their Stakeholder Visit to Task Force Latvia. For our Feature Interview, Co-host Dr Linna Tam-Seto (She/Her) talked with Dr. Alexandra Heber (She/Her) about her work on a glossary titled: “Glossary of Terms: A shared understanding of the common terms used to describe psychological trauma.” Dr. Heber explained the importance of the project as a shared language around Post traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is essential and she hopes that the upcoming version will serve as a source of information and a communication tool that facilitates discussions around mental health concerns within the Defence and Security community. ## S3 Ep 1: Inside the Strategic Joint Staff URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-1-inside-the-strategic-joint-staff-2/ Modified: 2024-01-17 > Today's feature interview is with Brigadier-General Errington, Strategic Joint Staff Director General Plans. In the first episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss Sweden in Latvia, CAF sexual misconduct reporting increases for men and General Eyre's retirement announcement. Today's feature interview is with Brigadier-General Errington, Strategic Joint Staff Director General Plans. Brigadier-General Errington’s command experience includes two years as a Rifle Platoon Commander in 2 PPCLI followed by a year as Recce Platoon Commander. He commanded an Airborne Platoon in both the Canadian Airborne Regiments (CAR) and the PPCLI Parachute Company, before commanding Anti-Armour Platoon. As a Major, he enjoyed two years as Officer Commanding A Company (para) in 3 PPCLI, then another two years in the Operations Squadron at Dwyer Hill Training Centre (DHTC). Following his promotion to LCol, he was appointed as the Special Operations Task Force Commander in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2010–2011, earning the Meritorious Service Medal. He assumed command of 3 PPCLI in June of 2012, and held the appointment until after the Regiment’s 100th Anniversary Ottawa Commemoration in September 2014. As a Colonel, he commanded the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown from July 2017–July 2019 when he was promoted to BGen. Brigadier-General Errington is very proud and humbled to have had the opportunity to command twice at the platoon, company, and unit levels in various Light, Airborne, and Special Force units. Brigadier-General Errington held a variety of staff jobs within the Battalion. However, he has predominantly been employed in current operations from the rank of Capt to BGen (Brigade G3 Operations (Ops), J35 in Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, DHTC Ops O/COS, CA G33, Director current Ops at Strategic Joint Staff and Chief of Staff Ops for the CA). Brigadier-General Errington’s operational experience includes overseas deployments to Croatia, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. His domestic operations have included those deployed to floods in Winnipeg and Medicine Hat; forest fires in British Columbia; and providing security for the G8 Summit in Kananaskis and the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010. Brigadier-General Errington has had some unique honours throughout his career, serving in the Queen’s Guard at Buckingham Palace in 1998, leading the Canadian parachute contingent to Normandy, France, in honour of the 70th Anniversary of D-Day, and commanding 3 PPCLI during the 100th Anniversary Commemoration. He has also held the appointment of Director of the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps from February 2016 to July 2019. Brigadier-General Errington was appointed Strategic Joint Staff Director General Plans in July 2022. ## S3 Ep. 10 – Domestic Politics and International Relations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-10-domestic-politics-and-international-relations-2/ Modified: 2024-05-29 > In the tenth episode of Battle Rhythm, season 3 – Steve and Wendy discuss ICC warrants, Canada’s decision to abstain from recognizing... In the tenth episode of Battle Rhythm, season 3 – Steve and Wendy discuss ICC warrants, Canada’s decision to abstain from recognizing Palestine in the UNSC and CSIS’s TikTok spying warning. This week, Wendy interviews Abe Newman about his new co-authored book, Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy. Professor Newman received his BA in International Relations from Stanford University and his PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He is a professor in the School of Foreign Service and Government Departments at Georgetown University. His research focuses on the ways in which economic interdependence and globalization have transformed international politics. He is the co-author of Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy (Holt/Penguin 2023); Of Privacy and Power: the Transatlantic Struggle over Freedom and Security (Princeton University Press 2019), co-author of Voluntary Disruptions: International Soft Law, Finance, and Power (Oxford University Press: 2018), author of Protectors of Privacy: Regulating Personal Data in the Global Economy (Cornell University Press: 2008) and co-editor of How Revolutionary was the Digital Revolution: National Responses, Market Transitions, and Global Technologies (Stanford University Press: 2006). His work has appeared in a range of journals including Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, International Security, Nature, Science, and World Politics. ## S3 Ep. 11: Interference URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-11-interference-2/ Modified: 2024-06-19 > For today's feature interview, Thomas Hughes interviews Rob Clark about foreign interference in the UK and what it means to him along... In the eleventh episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss the Canadian business community push to reach the NATO 2% target, US security agreement with Ukraine and foreign election interference. For today's feature interview, Thomas Hughes interviews Rob Clark about foreign interference in the UK and what it means to him along with the debate around the practicalities of mandatory military service inclusion in the UK’s upcoming election. Robert Clark is Policy Director at Curia UK, Fellow at Yorktown Institute, Washington DC and director of defence and security at Civitas. Prior to this he served in the British Army for fifteen years, including deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. ## S3 Ep. 12: Authoritarian Military Careers URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-12-authoritarian-military-careers-2/ Modified: 2024-07-04 > Steve speaks with Christian Gläßel, principal investigator of the research project “The Anatomy of the Authoritarian Security Apparatus”... In episode 12 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University, discuss Thomas's trip to Nunavut and the civilian - military relationship implications for Canada's newest Chief of Defence Staff (and former Battle Rhythm guest), Lt. Gen Jennie Carignan. In today's feature interview, Steve speaks with Christian Gläßel, a postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for International Security and principal investigator of the research project “The Anatomy of the Authoritarian Security Apparatus” (AASAP), funded by the German Research Foundation DFG. Christian obtained his PhD from the Mannheim Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences in 2020. His PhD on subversion, repression, and regime stability was awarded the Lorenz von Stein Prize. Before joining the Hertie School, Christian was a lecturer at the University of Mannheim and researcher in the ERC project "Repression and the Escalation of Violence" and the Collaborative Research Center "Political Economy of Reforms". In 2022, he substituted Nils-Christian Bormann as Professor of International Political Studies at Witten/Herdecke University. In his research, Christian investigates fundamental questions of authoritarian politics and touches new grounds on the inner workings of dictatorial regimes. His findings help us understand when autocracies develop, how they cement their rule, and why they break down. Christian’s work on autocratization processes, repressive organizations, information manipulation, and the death toll behind authoritarian soft power and sportswashing strategies has been published in all leading international political science outlets, including in the American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, European Journal of International Relations, and Comparative Political Studies, among others. ## S3 Ep. 18: Military Ethics Education and Application URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-18-military-ethics-education-and-application-2/ Modified: 2024-09-26 > Today’s feature interview is with David Whetham, Professor of Ethics and the Military Profession in the Defence Studies Department of... In episode 18 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve testifies at the Parliamentary Defence Committee, discussion ensues. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University and Steve also discuss the submarine procurement announcement, security clearances for provincial and territorial leaders and newly released intelligence priorities from the federal agencies. Today’s feature interview is with David Whetham, Professor of Ethics and the Military Profession in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London. David Whetham is the Director of the King’s Centre for Military Ethics and delivers or coordinates the military ethics component of courses for between two and three thousand British and international officers a year at the UK’s Joint Services Command and Staff College. Before joining King’s as a permanent member of staff in 2003, David worked as a BBC researcher and with the OSCE in Kosovo, supporting the 2001 and 2002 elections. David supports military ethics education in many different countries and has held Visiting Fellowships at the Stockdale Center for Ethical Leadership, US Naval Academy Annapolis, the Centre for Defence Leadership and Ethics at the Australian Defence College in Canberra and at the University of Glasgow. He was a Mid-Career Fellow at the British Academy in 2017-18 and is currently a Visiting Professorial Fellow at the University of New South Wales. He was appointed as the Jeffrey Grey Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence College in 2023. David is a founding member of the European Chapter of the International Society for Military Ethics (Euro ISME) which holds an annual conference for military practitioners, academics and defence policy-makers.In 2020, David was appointed as an Assistant Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force to contribute to the Afghanistan Inquiry into allegations of war crimes committed by Special Forces personnel. His contribution was published as an annex to the Brereton Report in November 2020, with all of the recommendations being accepted by the Chief of the General Staff and Prime Minister. He currently sits on the UK Defence Medical Services Ethics Committee, the UK MoD AI Ethics Panel, the 77X Ethics Advisory Panel, and the Australian Defence Force's International Standing Panel of Experts in Ethics. David is married with two children, and sits as a Magistrate on the Wiltshire Bench. In his spare time, he plays trombone with the 41º Big Band and enjoys epée fencing. ## S3 Ep. 2: When Rambo Meets the Red Cross URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-2-when-rambo-meets-the-red-cross-2/ Modified: 2024-01-31 > In our feature interview, Steve stays on the topic of civ-mil relations when he interviews Stanislava Mladenova about her dissertation... In the second episode of our third season, hosts Steve & Artur discuss implications for Trump's win in New Hampshire Primary, the federal ruling on inappropriate use of the Emergency Act in Ottawa and domestic political pressure to increase the role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Disaster Response requires culture change and more money for CAF personnel; plus Steve and Arthur set the bar for civil discourse when discussing Israel, the ICJ and Canada's role. In our feature interview, Steve stays on the topic of civ-mil relations when he interviews Stanislava Mladenova about her dissertation turned book about the working relationships between America Special Operations Forces and International Non-Governmental Organizations in fragile states. Stanislava is a Global Fellow at Brown University’s Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies. She recently completed her doctoral research at King’s College London, Department of War Studies, where she explored the functional relationship between SOF Civil Affairs Units, NGOs, and populations, in settings affected by low-intensity conflict and state fragility. Stanislava’s operational experience includes assignments in Afghanistan, where she served as a Political Adviser to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative on economic issues, governance, corruption, disaster management, gender, humanitarian assistance, and the recruitment of child soldiers. At the US Institute of Peace, she implemented programs that established dialogue and cooperation between the police forces, gendarmerie, and local communities in six West African countries. She holds a Master’s of Public Administration from the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs at the University at Albany, New York. ## S3 Ep. 25: Canada’s National Quantum Strategy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-25-canadas-national-quantum-strategy-2/ Modified: 2025-01-08 > Artur and Steve Saideman discuss PM Trudeau’s surprise announcement, the looming threat of US- Canada border security and tech billionaires In episode 25 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve Saideman discuss PM Trudeau’s surprise announcement, the looming threat of US- Canada border security and tech billionaires influence on policymaking. For today's feature interview, co-host Wendy Wong interviews a trio of Canada's Quantum experts: Kristen Csenkey, Ph.D., is a Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) Digital Policy Hub fellow. She is the Principal Investigator of multiple Department of National Defence-funded projects. Benjamin T. Johnson, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor at the University of Groningen, Netherlands, with the Department of International Relations and International Organization (IRIO). He is also a visiting Fulbright scholar at the University of Washington in Seattle, having received a Fulbright-NATO Security Studies Award for fall 2024. Greg Dick is a Co-founder and the Chief Executive Officer of Open Quantum Design. Prior to founding OQD he was a longtime senior executive at Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics. He also founded RESILIENT, an agency dedicated to helping organizations purpose build for resilience against unexpected change. doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2024.2397970 ## S3 Ep. 27 – Bridging the Gap with Visiting Defence Fellows URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-27-bridging-the-gap-with-visiting-defence-fellows-2/ Modified: 2025-02-07 In episode 27 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve discuss Danish defence concerns; the success of PM Trudeau’s trade war speech; the future of NATO and Defence Minister Blair’s goal of reaching 2% by 2027; plus Canadian Armed Forces changes to recruitment criteria. Today's feature interview is a fireside chat on a culture of cooperation with four Visiting Defence Fellows, hosted by producer Melissa Jennings: Col Nick Roby: VDF Carleton, 2024/2025 Gen MC Harvey: VDF Carleton. 2023/2024 Col Cathy Blue: VDF Carleton 2022/2023 Col Mike Babin: VDF Queen’s 2023/2024 ## S3 Ep. 28: Canada First, Not Canada Alone URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-28-canada-first-not-canada-alone-2/ Modified: 2025-02-20 > Today's feature interview Steve talks with Dr. Adam Chapnick, Professor of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and the... In episode 28 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University discuss JD Vance’s speech and subsequent reactions at the Munich Security Conference, NATO on life support, Conservative Party’s plan for a military base in Iqaluit, and a brief intro to the works of author Alistair MacLean. Today's feature interview Steve talks with Dr. Adam Chapnick, Professor of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). He is the award-winning author of Canada on the United Nations Security Council: A Small Power on a Large Stage, among other titles, and a former editor of International Journal. ## S3 Ep. 29: After Action Report: Ukrainian Foreign Legion URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-29-after-action-report-ukrainian-foreign-legion-2/ Modified: 2025-03-06 > Today's Feature Interview is with Major Dave Smith (retired). Dave Smith served 15 years in the Canadian Armed Forces as an infantry officer.. In episode 29 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur shares his professional opinion on the shocking exchange and fallout between two allies in the Oval Office last week as Steve looks for the silver linings. Steve and Artur also discuss France opening its nuclear umbrella and Canada’s future with the Five Eyes. Today's Feature Interview is with Major Dave Smith (retired). Dave Smith served 15 years in the Canadian Armed Forces as an infantry officer. He resigned in 2023 to join the International Legion for the Defence of Ukraine. He fought against the Russian invasion for eighteen months. ## S3 Ep. 4: A View From Finland & Germany on Defence Strategy URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-4-a-view-from-finland-germany-on-defence-strategy-2/ Modified: 2024-02-28 > Minna Ålander’s research focuses on NATO, security in Northern Europe, Nordic defence cooperation, Arctic security, as well as... In the fourth episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, Steve is joined by our new co-host and former CDSN postdoc, Dr. Thomas Hughes. Steve & Thomas discuss the motivations and implications behind a new allowance for Permanent Residents to join the Canadian Armed Forces, Hungary votes Sweden into being a NATO member & Canadian based company starts supplying drones to Ukraine. Today's feature interview is with Minna Ålander. Minna Ålander’s research focuses on NATO, security in Northern Europe, Nordic defence cooperation, Arctic security, as well as German and Finnish security and defence policy. Previously, Ålander worked at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. She holds a joint master’s degree in international relations from the Free University of Berlin, the Humboldt University of Berlin and the University of Potsdam. Since August 2023, Ålander is a Non-resident Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). ## S3 Ep. 9: The Hidden Costs of War URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-9-the-hidden-costs-of-war-2/ Modified: 2024-05-08 > This week Steve interviews Dr. Tanisha Fazal about her new book, Military Medicine and the Hidden Costs of War. In episode 3.9 co-hosts Steve and Artur discuss the Election Interference Commission of Inquiry and legislation along with Gaza protests on university campuses and a call for empathy. This week Steve interviews Dr. Tanisha Fazal about her new book, Military Medicine and the Hidden Costs of War. Tanisha Fazal is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. Her scholarship focuses on sovereignty, international law, and armed conflict. Fazal’s current research analyzes the effect of improvements in medical care in conflict zones on the long-term costs of war. She is the author of State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton University Press, 2007), which won the Best Book Award of the American Political Science Association’s Conflict Processes Section, and Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict (Cornell University Press), which won the Best Book Award of the International Studies Association's International Law Section and the American Political Science Association's International Collaboration Section. Her work has also appeared in journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, Daedalus, Foreign Affairs, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Review, International Studies Quarterly, and Security Studies. A frequent commentator on international relations and foreign affairs, she has been a fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. In 2002 she was awarded the Helen Dwight Reid Award of the American Political Science Association. From 2021-2023, she is an Andrew Carnegie Fellow. ## S3 Ep.13 – The venn diagram of policy, experience and research URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-13-the-venn-diagram-of-policy-experience-and-research-2/ Modified: 2024-07-25 In episode 13 of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve and Wendy (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) discuss Kamala Harris as the new Democratic presidential nominee and the implications for US foreign policy; Chief of Defence Staff Change of Command Ceremony; the CrowdStrike outage as well as Korean laser drones. Today's feature interview is with this year's CDSN postdoc, Manaswini Ramkumar. She is completing her PhD in International Relations at the School of International Service, American University in Washington DC, where she examines civil-military relations in the context of democratic erosion. She also studies postcolonial statebuilding, subnational democracy, and authoritarian resistance. Her work has been funded by American University, The Association for Documentary Editing and the American Political Science Association. She received her MPhil in IR from American University and MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore where she previously worked as an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Studies program and was a lecturer in Professional Military Education to the Singapore Armed Forces. ## S3 Ep.14: Leadership in times of crisis URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-14-leadership-in-times-of-crisis-2/ Modified: 2024-07-31 > In episode 14 of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve asks Artur what’s going on with CSIS and the new Interim Director... In episode 14 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa, Steve asks Artur what’s going on with CSIS and the new Interim Director, they discuss sabotage at the Olympics in Paris and Canadian disaster response coordination in the wake of the devastating Jasper fire. This episode’s featured interview is a throwback to Episode 2 of Battle Rhythm from July 10, 2019, Co-Director Stéfanie von Hlatky interviews (then) Brig.-Gen. Jennie Carignan who talks about leadership and affecting change in the military. General Jennie Carignan, Chief of the Defence Staff, has had a distinguished career since commissioning into the Canadian Military Engineers in 1990. She commanded two Combat Engineer Regiments, Royal Military College Saint-Jean, and the 2nd Canadian Division. She participated in multiple international and domestic deployments, led NATO Mission Iraq and most recently held the position of Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture. General Carignan holds two master's degrees and has received several honours, including the Commander of the Order of Military Merit and an honorary doctorate. She was promoted to her current rank in July 2024. ## S3 Ep.15: Medium Risk, Medium Reward URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-15-medium-risk-medium-reward-2/ Modified: 2024-08-14 > Steve and co-host Thomas Hughes, discuss the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the arctic, Canadians intercepting Chinese naval... In episode 15 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University, discuss the impacts of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the arctic, Canadians intercepting Chinese naval ships sailing through Arctic international waters along with far-right riots in the UK and with a final twist, Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory. Today's feature interview is with our new Visiting Defence Fellow, Col Nick Roby. Colonel Nickolas Roby joined the Canadian Armed Forces Primary Reserves in the rank of Gunner in 1997, and was commissioned into The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery in 2002. He has since commanded at the Troop, Battery, Rifle Company, as the Commandant of The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery School, and more recently, was the Commander of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (2022-2024). Serving in a variety of key staff assignments in Ottawa, Colonel Roby served as the Canadian Army analyst at Chief of Program, Executive Assistant to Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, as the coordinator to Deputy Chief-of-Staff Operations at the Canadian Army Headquarters, and as the Senior Military Assistant to the Minister of National Defence. Colonel Roby was employed as the Director of Army Personnel Management (G1) at the Canadian Army HQ from 2020 to 2022. Operationally, Colonel Roby deployed to Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force as the Deputy Commander of Brigade Troops, and Operations Officer of Combined Team Kandahar City Brigade HQ in 2009-10. In support of the United Nations, he deployed twice with the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) in 2013 and 2016. Colonel Roby is a graduate of the Joint Command and Staff Program at the Canadian Armed Forces College, Toronto. He holds a Baccalaureate in Arts from St. Thomas University, and a Master’s Degree in Defence Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. Colonel Roby is married to Jessica, and they lead an active lifestyle racing from one sporting activity to another with their four young children: Chloé, Maëva, Félix, and Kallee. ## S3 Ep.16 – Pride and Politics URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-16-pride-and-politics-2/ Modified: 2024-08-28 > Steve and Wendy discuss the National Security Transparency Advisory Group’s recommendations on AI, the controversy over the new Army logo... In our sixteenth episode of Battle Rhythm, season 3 Steve and Wendy (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) discuss the National Security Transparency Advisory Group’s recommendations on AI, the controversy over the new Army logo and the US Presidential candidate’s use of pop culture. Today's feature interview is with Ottawa based freelance journalist, Dale Smith. Dale Smith is a freelance journalist in the Canadian Parliamentary Press Gallery, writing about politics full-time since the 2008 federal election. He has written for the Ottawa Citizen, the National Post, Maclean’s, Canadian Business, the Canadian Press, iPolitics.ca, and the Hill Times. Dale lives in Ottawa. ## S3 Ep.17: Change Agent, Soldier-Scholar Dr. Alan Okros URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-17-change-agent-soldier-scholar-dr-alan-okros-2/ Modified: 2024-09-12 > Today’s feature interview is with Dr. Alan Okros, a full professor at the Royal Military College Department of Defence Studies and... In episode 17 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss the US Justice Department indictment of Russian funded media in North America (including Tenet Media in Canada), immigration backlash and hate crimes increase along with the UN campaign to provide Polio vaccines to children in Gaza. Today’s feature interview is with Dr. Alan Okros, a full professor at the Royal Military College Department of Defence Studies and has been supporting Chief Professional Conduct and Culture initiatives. He is also a co-director of the CDSN. Dr. Alan Okros holds a PhD in Industrial and Organizational Psychology from the University of Waterloo. He was appointed Associate Professor in the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership at the Royal Military College of Canada in 2004 and appointed as Full Professor to the Department of Defence Studies at CFC in 2008. In 2019, he assumed responsibilities as Deputy Director Research in the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security within the Canadian Defence Academy. ## S3 Ep.19: Conventional War & Means of Control URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-19-conventional-war-means-of-control-2/ Modified: 2024-10-10 > The Feature interview is with Byron Tau, an investigative and enterprise journalist who specializes in law, courts, and national security. In episode 19 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve has an agreeable discussion with David Pugliese on Canadaland’s Backbench podcast. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University and Steve discuss conventional war readiness, along with analysis of the Military’s domestic propaganda story and potential implications. Today's Feature interview is with Byron Tau. Byron Tau is an investigative and enterprise journalist who specializes in law, courts, and national security. He reports for and teaches at the Allbritton Journalism Institute, a journalism nonprofit launched in 2023 that trains and mentors early-career reporters. He previously worked at The Wall Street Journal and Politico. A native of Holliston, Massachusetts, Tau has degrees from McGill University in Montreal and Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. ## S3 Ep.20 – Development – Security Nexus URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-20-development-security-nexus-2/ Modified: 2024-10-24 > Steve travels to Pennsylvania, discussion on campaign spending ensues. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University.. In episode 20 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve travels to Pennsylvania, discussion on campaign spending ensues. Co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University and Steve also discuss New Brunswick's recent election, Canada-India relations, North Korean - Russian military cooperation and the escalation risk of US troops in Israel. Today's feature interview is with Rhonda Gossen, a former diplomat with Global Affairs Canada. The Year Ahead Event: www.cdsn-rcds.com/network-events/s…s-foreign-policy Rhonda Gossen is a former diplomat with Global Affairs Canada, assigned to Philippines, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Ghana. She is currently a senior consultant with UNDP, working on early recovery, forced displacement and refugee response, resilience, stabilization, development solutions to internal displacement and strategic planning. She worked as development advisor to the humanitarian coordinator for the Rohingya Crisis in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh and to UNHCR Lebanon on the Syrian refugee crisis. In addition to UNDP, she has undertaken assignments with the World Bank, UNICEF, UNHCR, in Pakistan, Lebanon, Nepal, Nigeria, South Sudan, Southern Africa, Bangladesh, Azerbaijan Afghanistan, and Iran. She is the author of an upcoming book with McGill-Queens University Press. ## S3 Ep.21: The Cookie Crumbles: US Election and Canadian Security URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-21-the-cookie-crumbles-us-election-and-canadian-security-2/ Modified: 2024-11-07 > Today’s feature interview is with co-author Stephane Leman-Langlois of “The Great Right North: Inside Far-Right Activism in Canada”... In our twenty-first episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve Saideman and Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) trade baking schedules and recipes before diving into US election campaign strategies, Canada’s 2% defence spending prospects, plus the US and China relationship. Today’s feature interview is with co-author Stephane Leman-Langlois of “The Great Right North: Inside Far-Right Activism in Canada” written by Stéphane Leman-Langlois, Aurélie Campana and Samuel Tanner. Stéphane Leman-Langlois is professor of criminology at Laval University, Québec. He holds the Canada Research Chair on Surveillance and the Social Construction of Risk. He is director of the Terrorism and Counterterrorism Research Group and of the Centre on International Security at Laval University. He is also co-director of the Observatoire sur la radicalisation et l’extrémisme violent (OSR). As a co-investigator of the Big Data Surveillance project, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Stéphane Leman-Langlois is co-leading (with Valerie Steeves) research Stream Three: Governance. This stream will examine the use of big data for policing and other forms of social control. ## S3 Ep.22: NATO Diplomacy with SNMG2 Comdr, Cmdre Matthew Coates URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-22-nato-diplomacy-with-snmg2-comdr-cmdre-matthew-coates-2/ Modified: 2024-11-20 > In the twenty-second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. In the twenty-second episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa Kimball, Professor at Université Laval. Steve & Anessa discuss upcoming NATO Parliamentary meetings in Montreal, communications espionage in European waters and Canadian implications for Trump’s cabinet picks. Today's feature interview is with Cmdre Matthew Coates. A native of Halifax Nova Scotia, Cmdre Coates is a Naval Warfare Officer in the Royal Canadian Navy. He graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada Kingston, with a degree in Electrical Engineering in 1998, and from Salve Regina University in 2010 with a Masters in Management. Cmdre Coates has held numerous staff and sea-going appointments, deploying multiple times on operations around the globe. Memorable highlights include a 2011 deployment as Executive Officer in HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN in support of NATO operations off the coast of Libya, and his appointment in 2013 as the Commanding Officer of HMCS IROQUOIS, a Tribal Class Destroyer. After his time in IROQUOIS he assumed command of Sea Training Atlantic where he was responsible for at-sea ship readiness and certification training. He is a two-time graduate of the United States Naval War College in Newport Rhode Island where he attended the Naval Staff College (class of 2010) and Naval Command College (class of 2017). In July 2017, he assumed the post of Director Naval Strategy, providing Force Development guidance in support of the future Navy. During this time Cmdre Coates was selected to participate in the RIMPAC 2018 Executive Steering Committee, responsible for planning major aspects of the multi-national exercise. He then deployed with the Chilean Navy as Deputy to the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander for the exercise. In July 2019, he assumed the post of Director Human Rights and Diversity within Chief Military Personnel, working to ensure the Canadian Armed Forces, along with the Defence Team, are an inclusive, equitable and diverse organization. After two rewarding and educational years in CMP, he returned to Navy lines, moving to Victoria BC to take up the appointment as Commander, Naval Personnel and Training Group. Evolving the Naval Training System to be best positioned to meet the needs of the RCN’s future fleet, Cmdre Coates completed three busy years prior to his appointment as Commander Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, during a ceremony 1 July 2024 in Toulon, France. When not at work, Matthew and his wife Meghan, enjoy time camping with their two boys, and cheering them on at the ball park and hockey arena. ## S3 Ep.26: Stealth, Persistence and Lethality: Naval Force Development URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-26-stealth-persistence-and-lethality-naval-force-development-2/ Modified: 2025-01-22 > ...discuss President Trump’s inauguration, the current media and information landscape, impending Tariffs on Canada, along with thoughts... In our twenty-sixth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Steve joins Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) in Kelowna to discuss President Trump’s inauguration, the current media and information landscape, impending Tariffs on Canada, along with thoughts on democratic backsliding. Our Feature interview is with Commodore Jason Armstrong, Director General Naval Force Development. Captain (N) Jason Armstrong joined the Canadian Armed Forces as a Maritime Surface and Subsurface Officer in 1989 and graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a Bachelor of Arts Honours History in 1993. Captain (N) Armstrong, upon completion of MARS training has served onboard HMC Ships on both coasts conducting a number of international deployments. He had the honour of commanding three HMC Ships during his command tour and deployed onboard HMCS TORONTO as commanding officer during OP REASSURANCE in 2014-2015. Captain (N) Armstrong has served in staff positions at Maritime Pacific and in Canadian Fleet Atlantic Headquarters. He has served twice in Ottawa, once as the Underwater Warfare requirements officer in the Directorate of Naval Requirements and the second time as the Director of Naval Requirements. Capt(N) Armstrong is a graduate of both the Joint Command and Staff Program and the National Security Program from the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, and he holds a Master’s degree in Defence Studies. Captain (N) Armstrong and his bride Monica have two outstanding young teenagers, Jack and Sara, who excel in the world of academics and athletics. Captain (N) Armstrong enjoys hockey and golf, both sports he plays poorly, cycling and coaching his children. ## S3 Ep.3: Czech Future Force URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-3-czech-future-force-2/ Modified: 2024-02-14 > Colonel Retired Petr Tichý is the program director at the NATO Future Forces International Exhibition. He is an experienced Sales... In the third episode of our third season, hosts Steve and Linna discuss Trump's threats on the safety of NATO allies, Minister Joly's launch of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and the facts behind the National Summit on Combatting Auto Theft. Colonel Retired Petr Tichý is the program director at the NATO Future Forces International Exhibition. He is an experienced Sales Project Manager with a demonstrated history of working in the electrical and electronic manufacturing industry. Skilled in Crisis Management, Negotiation, Analytical Skills, Government, and Operational Planning. Strong sales professional with a PhD focused in management from Defence University. His other positions include the NATO AGS project manager within Retia company. He worked as an independent researcher at the Population Protection Institute and an academic researcher at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Defence University. Petr Tichý retired from a career in the Czech Airforce with an educational background from the Military Academy (Master Pilot), Kosice, Air Force University (International Studies & Leadership), USAF Air Command and Staff College (Military Science & Operational Studies) and the NATO Defence College ## S3 Ep.30: Pan-Domain and CIMIC Responses URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-30-pan-domain-and-cimic-responses-2/ Modified: 2025-03-19 > In the 30th episode of Battle Rhythm Steve & Anessa discuss wrapping up the MINDS Network funded research on setting up Canada’s NATO... In the 30th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval. Steve Saideman & Anessa discuss wrapping up the Department of National Defence/Ministère de la défense nationale MINDS Network funded research on setting up Canada’s NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) , the upcoming 16th UNIDEF event CSI Centre sur la sécurité internationale; PM Carney defies convention by choosing Europe for his first international engagement, NATO SG Rutte’s visit to the White House possibly undermining NATO countries to appease Trump, pivoting away from the F35 deal towards diversifying air power, as well as a review of Trump’s reign of terror so far this year including the shutdown of USIP and ignoring court orders including massive deportations and what this means for Canada accepting US refugees. Lcol Philippe-Andre Genest is today's Feature Interview. Holding a Master’s Degree in Technology Management, Philippe-André Genest has more than 20 years of experience as a member, leader, mentor and recruiter, of organizational and specialized teams for national and international projects in civilian, institutional and military contexts. He possesses excellent knowledge of project management, team management and organizational management having been team leader for a consulting-engineering firm and the Ordre des Ingénieurs du Québec as well as a commander and staff-officer in varied military operational context. He has proven leadership as a civilian manager and a military officer. His fields of expertise include liaison and coordination, organizational management, the legal, regulatory and normative framework of the engineer profession, humanitarian aid and international development. Docotral student in Military History at Unviersit. du Québec a Montréal. Member of the Groupe de Recherche en Histoire de la Guerre. Member of Ordre des Ingénieurs du Québec (#128960), he is fluent in French and English and as a basic knowledge of German. ## S3 Ep.31: Challenging Assumptions Through Systems Thinking Approaches URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-31-challenging-assumptions-through-systems-thinking-approaches-2/ Modified: 2025-03-31 In the 31st episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mt. Allison University discuss Trump’s rhetorical shift on the 51st state threat on a phone call with PM Carney, the fallout from #Signalgate including for allies and does Canada need to follow Denmark’s lead on rallying European allies? Thomas and Philippe explore the power of transformative games to empower leaders in defence and security through the work of the Archipelago of Design in Today's feature interview. As Co-President of the Archipelago of Design, a not for profit, and Professor at Canadian Forces College, Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard’s purpose is to empower leaders in shifting mindsets in national security organizations to better set conditions for evolution and address complex situations. Philippe fulfills this purpose especially by mobilizing a crowdsourcing approach to designing transformative games captured as the "hop-on hop off model". This approach proved successful, resulting in the critical and popular appraisal of Breakthrough, a strategic mystery investigation game taking place in the Canadian Arctic in 2040,  its sequel, Shadows of Byzantium, taking place in Istanbul Turkey in 2040, and Inner Alliance. Just released in 2025 collaboration with Wero Creative, Inner Alliance set conditions for players to adapt to diverse constituencies in disaster relief operations in support of the WPS agenda. Philippe is currently collaborating with the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence (CCASCOE) to co-design a game to empower the centre and its agenda. Philippe lives in Leslieville, Toronto with his wife, daughter, son, and too many games. ## S3 Ep.32: Terrorism and authoritarian regimes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-32-terrorism-and-authoritarian-regimes-2/ Modified: 2025-04-30 In episode 32 of season 3 (recorded on voting day), Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss Canada’s federal election and Conservative anti-woke messaging along with how the next government can improve CAF recruitment and retention issues through a focus on healthcare, housing and procurement. Today's Feature Interview is with Michael Collins – Executive Director, The Americas, Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) This year will be the 12th edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last decade. The calculation of the GTI score considers not only deaths but also incidents, hostages and injuries from terrorism, weighted over a five-year period. The report is produced using event records on terrorist attacks since 1 January 2007. The current terrorism dataset contains over 66,000 terrorist incidents for the period 2007 until today. The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years. A country’s annual GTI score is based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. ## S3 Ep.33: NATO Ambassadors and Euro-Atlantic Security URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-33-nato-ambassadors-and-euro-atlantic-security-2/ Modified: 2025-05-14 In episode 33 of Battle Rhythm season 3, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve discuss PM Carney’s new cabinet choices for national security and defence files; David McGuinty as Minister of National Defence, Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree, Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand, and the issues they will face delivering on campaign promises including managing the US relationship, arctic defence, and procurement. Todays feature interview is with Margriet Vonno, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ottawa and Witold Dzielski, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Canada, in advance of our event to discuss NATO and Euro-Atlantic security on May 22nd at Carleton University. ## S3 Ep.34: Lessons Learned from former Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. (ret’d) Wayne Eyre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-34-lessons-learned-from-former-chief-of-defence-staff-gen-retd-wayne-eyre-2/ Modified: 2025-05-28 In episode 34 of season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss recruitment challenges for CAF’s new online system, Military Police watchdog holds a public hearing on a tragic suicide related to mishandling a sexual misconduct case, and Trump vs Harvard - what this means for higher education broadly. Steve poses questions to recently retired Gen. Wayne Eyre on lessons learned as Chief of Defence Staff and challenges ahead in defending Canada. ## S3 Ep.35: Evolving Security Strategies URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-35-evolving-security-strategies-2/ Modified: 2025-06-18 In our thirty-fifth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman take a deep dive into the security situation in Los Angeles and the role of the National Guard along with Ukraine strikes on Russia and tech war implications. Today’s feature interview is with Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Eleanor Ross of Valens Games to discuss how simulations can better prepare decision makers in unpredictable situations. For more information on tensions in the US Civil-Military relationship watch out for CDSN in the news, including this: www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opin…vil-war-rcna212215 ## S3 Ep.36: Canada’s Defence Opportunities and Challenges within NATO and NORAD URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-36-canadas-defence-opportunities-and-challenges-within-nato-and-norad-2/ Modified: 2025-07-09 In the 36th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, Steve Saideman and co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University discuss the ‘One Big Beautiful Bill’ Act and it's effects on Canadian defence, along with the complications of continental missile defence systems and nuclear deterrence. They also breakdown some of the budgeting allocations for NORAD Modernization and NATO defence commitments, and how PM Carney will have to reconcile both Trump and the Canadian public’s different expectations of behavior. Steve and former co-host extraordinaire, Stéfanie von Hlatky continue this discussion in The Hague during the NATO Summit. For analysis on the Summit from Stéfanie von Hlatky & Gaëlle Rivard Piché can be found here: cdainstitute.ca/nato-agreed-to-5-…-public-on-board/ ## S3 Ep.37: The Past, Present and Future of Canadian Defence URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-37-the-past-present-and-future-of-canadian-defence-2/ Modified: 2025-07-23 In the 37th episode of Battle Rhythm, Season 3, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve and Anessa discuss the challenges of teaching US Foreign Policy in the Trump 2.0 Era, Canada’s pledge on increased defence spending, recent CAF recruitment successes and persistent challenges in the midst of a culture change process to modernize the institution with a more inclusive military reflective of a liberal democracy (i.e. no more white supremacists and or extremists generally). ## S3 Ep.38: Cyber Command with Major-General Dave Yarker URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-38-cyber-command-with-major-general-dave-yarker-2/ Modified: 2025-08-06 In our thirty-eighth episode of Battle Rhythm season 3, Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman discuss Canada’s plans to recognize Palestine as a State while other options are still on the table (including an embargo on weapons sales to Israel); the prospects of getting to a two-state solution along with examining the lessons learned from the 2008 global economic fallout and Canada’s current guns vs butter dilemma. In today’s feature interview, Steve interviews Major-General Dave Yarker, Commander of Canadian Armed Forces Cyber Command (CAFCYBERCOM). Major General (MGen) Dave Yarker joined the Canadian Forces in 1989, graduating from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) Kingston in 1993. Following completion of Graduate studies and Signals officer Training in 1996 he served with 2 Bde as a Signals Officer in both 427 Tactical Helicopter Squadron and 2 Combat Engineer Regiment. He has been employed as staff in project management, joint, operational and strategic communications planning and deployed as the Canadian J6 to both Kosovo and Afghanistan. He has had the honour of command at 2 Canadian Mechanised Brigade Group Headquarters and Signals Squadron, the Canadian Forces Network Operations Centre, and the Canadian Forces Information Operations Group. Since 2010, he has had the good fortune to have been employed in the cyber operations field, commanding at Unit and Formation levels as well as holding key staff and liaison positions including with United States Cyber Command and Canada’s Communications Security Establishment. In 2022, he was then appointed as Director General Information Management Operations and the Joint Force Cyber Component Commander which became the Director General Cyber and Command and Control Information System Operation in 2024. On promotion to his current rank, he was appointed Cyber Force Commander He holds undergraduate degrees in Engineering Physics and History, along with master’s degrees in Engineering Physics and Defence Studies. Major General Yarker is married and the couple lives in Ottawa with their son. ## S3 Ep.39: Wicked Problems with Jody Thomas URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-39-wicked-problems-with-jody-thomas-2/ Modified: 2025-08-27 In episode 39 of season 3, co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) and Steve Saideman discuss the lack of women CAF members on current Peacekeeping postings and the challenges of committing Canada’s army to additional operations. They also discuss the implications of a new story of 5 CAF members suspended for hateful behavior and the impacts this may have on recruitment targets in the future. In today's feature interview, Steve discusses oversight and procurement with former Deputy Minister of Defence, Jody Thomas. Jody Thomas recently retired from the federal public service as National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister. Jody has broad and varied experience working at senior levels in the Public Service and in a series of increasingly demanding security operations roles. She joined the naval reserves at age 17 and was among the first women to serve on a Canadian military vessel. Jody began her public service career in 1988 when she was appointed Chief of Business Planning and Administration with Public Works and Government Services Canada’s Atlantic Region. From 1995-2010, she held increasingly senior roles at Passport Canada, culminating in Chief Operating Officer. In 2010, Ms. Thomas joined the Canadian Coast Guard where she held the positions of Deputy Commissioner of Operations and Commissioner of the Coast Guard. In March 2017, she joined the Department of National Defence where she served as Senior Associate Deputy Minister. She was appointed as Deputy Minister of National Defence in October 2017, a role in which she served until January 2022. Jody holds a Bachelor of Arts from Carleton University. ## S3 Ep.5: Janice Stein, Canada’s Dean of International Relations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-5-janice-stein-canadas-dean-of-international-relations-2/ Modified: 2024-03-13 > Janice Gross Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management in the Department of Political Science and the Founding Director of... In episode 5 of Battle Rhythm's third season, Steve and our newest co-host Dr. Wendy Wong discus strudel surveys, mark the 4 year COVID pandemic anniversary, Nikki Haley vs Donald Trump & Sudan’s human rights crisis. in Today's feature interview, Wendy asks Janice Stein about how we should be thinking about the 120 year old conflict in Gaza, deterrence theory and the challenges for academics studying security in the past and today along with barriers for defence policy makers in Canada compared to its counterparts. Janice Gross Stein is the Belzberg Professor of Conflict Management in the Department of Political Science and the Founding Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto. She is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada and a member of the Order of Canada and the Order of Ontario. She was the Massey Lecturer in 2001 and a Trudeau Fellow. She was awarded the Molson Prize by the Canada Council for an outstanding contribution by a social scientist to public debate and has received Honorary Doctorates of Laws from universities in Canada and abroad. She is also an Honorary Foreign Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Senior Fellow of the Kissinger Center at SAIS at Johns Hopkins University. Her current research focuses on technology and public policy in the context of great power competition. Last year, she co-chaired the National Advisory Committee on Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy for the Minister of Global Affairs ## S3 Ep.6: Bridging the Gap, One Post-Doc at a Time URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-6-bridging-the-gap-one-post-doc-at-a-time-2/ Modified: 2024-03-27 > Steve interviews our Post-Doc, Ryan Atkinson about his research on emerging technologies and NATO Centres of Excellence... In episode 6 of BR Season 3, Co-hosts Linna Tam-Seto and Steve Saideman discuss new legislation proposed to address the abuse of power crisis within DND; military to civilian transition issues for veterans transferring to public service and Tik Tok! Steve interviews our Post-Doc, Ryan Atkinson about his research on emerging technologies and NATO Centers of Excellence. Ryan Atkinson is Postdoctoral Fellow at Carleton University where his research focuses on defence policy. He previously worked at NATO and has experience in the private sector as a cybersecurity consultant. Ryan completed a PhD from Western University and an MA from the University of Toronto. ## S3 Ep.7: Is More Enough? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-7-is-more-enough-2/ Modified: 2024-04-10 > This week Steve interviews Roger Hilton, Canadian media presenter and research fellow at GLOBSEC in Bratislava. In the seventh episode of season three, co-hosts Anessa Kimball and Steve Saideman discuss some details from the newly released Defence Policy Update, NATO’s 75th Anniversary, Chief of Defence Staff, Gen Wayne Eyre has turned off commenting on his twitter (X) feed. This week Steve interviews Roger Hilton, Canadian media presenter and research fellow at GLOBSEC in Bratislava. GLOBSEC is a global think-tank with local offices in Bratislava, Brussels, Kyiv, Vienna, and Washington D.C. committed to enhancing security, prosperity and sustainability in Europe and throughout the world. Its mission is to influence the future by generating new ideas and solutions for a better and safer world. GLOBSEC helps to provide a better understanding of global trends and their consequences for society, economy, and security. We generate new ideas and solutions for a more stable, prosperous, and sustainable world, by: Conducting world-class research and political insight into major threats and risks to our society; Driving change by engaging esteemed policy-makers and senior leaders from different sectors in our policy initiatives; Putting together leaders and stakeholders from multiple sectors at the right time in one place. ## S3 Ep.8: Confidence Building Measures & Arms Control URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-8-confidence-building-measures-arms-control-2/ Modified: 2024-04-24 > In this week's feature interview Thomas speaks with William Alberque; Director of Strategy, Technology and Arms Control at the International In the 8th episode of our 3rd season, Steve and Thomas discuss NATO perspectives in Artic Security from his recent visit to the NATO Defence College in Rome, Arctic threats in the Defence Policy Update along with procurement investments and timelines PLUS FBI Director Wray’s analysis of Chinese hacker threat on critical infrastructure as well as US aid to Ukraine. In this week's feature interview Thomas speaks with William Alberque; Director of Strategy, Technology and Arms Control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies focusing on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems, as well as risk reduction and arms control. William previously served as the director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre (ACDC), with more than 25 years' experience in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. ## S3. Ep.24: Allied Military Leadership in Conversation URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s3-ep-24-allied-military-leadership-in-conversation-2/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > co-hosts Steve and Hannah meet up with a few of the incredible leaders that make up this year’s cohort of HFX Peace With Women Fellows... We are ending the year on a positive note with this Battle Rhythm / Notes From the Field crossover episode, co-hosts Steve and Hannah meet up with a few of the incredible leaders that make up this year’s cohort of HFX Peace With Women Fellows when they reached Ottawa on their whirlwind global tour. The Peace With Women Fellowship brings together senior, active-duty, military officers from NATO member and partner countries for a 3-week executive tour of the political, military and technological centers of the United States and Canada. The Peace With Women Fellowship is designed to challenge participants by engaging with senior government, military, corporate, and academic leaders to discuss and better understand the world’s leading security issues. The program endeavours to not only ensure that the Fellows can discuss the problems and ideas they face, but also propose innovative solutions and apply what they learn in their home countries. HFX is proud to lead the security community with this unprecedented Fellowship program advancing women’s leadership in security, while fostering a dynamic network of women military leaders across the world. In order of appearance: [03:45] Gp. Capt. Elizabeth Hutchison (Defence Attaché Chile Royal Air Force, Air Ops United Kingdom) Col. Nanda Kellij (Policy Director for Material, Environment, Real Estate and Sustainability Ministry of Defence, Policy Directorate. Netherlands) Col. Sonja Fischer, MD (Chief of Branch Protocol Executive Staff FMoD Germany) [24:06] Capt. Mette Stab-Johansen (Navy Command - Head of Operations and Planning. Royal Danish Navy) Col. Alison Gonzalez (Director of Staff, United States Space Force) [36:08] Col. Angela Thomas (Director Air Plans. Royal Canadian Air Force) Capt. Carolyn Moberley (National Strike Force Commander, United States Coast Guard) Maj. Anna Novak (Head of Logistics Department (S4) 58th Detached Motorized Brigade Land Forces, Armed Forces of Ukraine) ## S4 Ep.0 : Human Security in Conflict URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s4-ep-0-human-security-in-conflict/ Modified: 2025-09-16 Welcome back to class and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss The United States president renaming the Department of Defence to the Department of War after destroying a boat in the Caribbean; the Canadian Department of National Defence is ready to spend as it commits to extend the CAF’s mission in Latvia along with deploying fighter pilots in a NATO exercise. In today's feature interview, our Post-doctoral Fellow, Dr. Manaswini Ramkumar interviews Dr. Sarah Meharg and Major-General (Retired) Craig Aitchison, co-editors of the Canadian Military Journals Special Issues on Human Security: www.journal.forces.gc.ca/cmj-25.2-toc-en.html Dr. Sarah Jane Meharg is Adjunct Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada and the Senior Research Associate at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Ottawa Canada. She is Canada's leading post-conflict reconstruction expert and specializes in the research and implementation of advanced technologies for reconstruction initiatives. Dr Meharg focuses on economic acceleration in regions experiencing economic transitions, including post-conflict and post-disaster environments such as Afghanistan, Haiti and the Balkans. Dr Meharg has received numerous commendations for developing her unique theory of conflict- identicide (1997) -which defines the precursor stages of genocide. Major-General (Retired) Craig Aitchison is proud to have served Canada for over 38 years. A passionate and lifelong learner, he has earned a certificate in Culinary Arts from Saint Lawrence College, an undergraduate in Business Administration from the University of New Brunswick, and master’s degrees from Royal Military College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He deployed overseas five times including Afghanistan and Iraq, and commanded the Infantry School, Combat Training Centre and the Canadian Defence Academy. He was also very fortunate to act as the Deputy Commanding General for Operations for U.S. Army Alaska, now 11th Airborne Division (Arctic Angels). In 2023 he was invested into the Order of Military Merit at the rank of Commander. He has also been twice (2019 and 2021) awarded the U.S. Legion of Merit at the rank of Officer. His extensive experience in the military training and education system has created a very strong foundation and focused energy toward leader development, strategy development and design thinking. ## S4 Ep.1 : Overseen or Overlooked? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s4-ep-1-overseen-or-overlooked-2/ Modified: 2025-09-30 Welcome to autumn and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Artur Wilczynski, retired DG of Foreign Intelligence Operations Canada and Senior Fellow GPSIA, University of Ottawa; Artur and Steve discuss Russian incursions on NATO airspace, the legacy of Charlie Kirk and implications for the US, Canada and the world; along with Canada’s official recognition of the state of Palestine and the Netanyahu effect. Today's Feature Interview is with co-author of the book (with Stephen Saideman and David P. Auerswald) "Overseen or Overlooked? Legislators, Armed Forces and Democratic Accountability" Philippe Lagassé is associate professor and the Barton Chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. His research focuses on defence policy and military procurement, as well as civil-military relations and the role of institutions in international policymaking in the Westminster tradition. He teaches courses on defence policy and strategic studies. Between 2012-2014 he served as a member of the Independent Review Panel overseeing the evaluation of options to replace Canada’s CF-18 fighter aircraft, and he is currently a member of the Independent Review Panel for Defence Acquisition within the Department of National Defence. ## S4 Ep.2 : The Purge with Honourary Colonel Michelle Douglas URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s4-ep-2-the-purge-with-honourary-colonel-michelle-douglas-2/ Modified: 2026-08-31 > Steve and Thomas discuss the US Department of War/Defence’s public GOFO lecture, National Guard deployments and Thomas reports on the reactions in Belgium as drones fly over NATO Airspace, finally what are we learning from all of this when it comes to theory? (A: the Huntingtonian model is out) Welcome to autumn and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-host Thomas Hughes, Assistant Professor at Mount Allison University. Steve and Thomas discuss the US Department of War/Defence’s public GOFO lecture, National Guard deployments and Thomas reports on the reactions in Belgium as drones fly over NATO Airspace, finally what are we learning from all of this when it comes to theory? (A: the Huntingtonian model is out) Today’s feature interview is with Michelle Douglas, Michelle is a veteran, a former military officer, a survivor of Canada’s “LGBT Purge” and an activist in the movement to seek legal equality for the 2SLGBTQ+ community over the past 30 years. She is a bridge-builder. Michelle served as an officer in the Canadian Armed Forces from 1986 to 1989. Despite a distinguished service record, she was honorably discharged after being deemed “Not Advantageously Employable Due to Homosexuality.” After being fired by the military, Michelle’s landmark legal challenge in 1992 ended Canada’s formalized discriminatory policy against LGBT members of the military. This experience launched a decades-long commitment to volunteerism and activism for Michelle. She has been a part of many legal challenges to seek equality for the 2SLGBTQI+ community. Professionally, Michelle had a 30-year career in public service. She retired from the federal Department of Justice in 2019 where she held the position of Director of International Relations. She currently serves as the Executive Director of the LGBT Purge Fund. Michelle is a member of the board of directors of the Michaëlle Jean Foundation. She was awarded the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal in 2012 and was presented with the Canada Pride Citation in 2023. She was recently named an Honorary Colonel in the Canadian Armed Forces; she is assigned to the organization known as the Chief Professional Conduct and Culture. Michelle is a graduate of Carleton University. ## S4 Ep.22 : Planning for the Next Pandemic with CAF’s Surgeon General, MGen Scott Malcolm URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s4-ep-22-planning-for-the-next-pandemic-with-cafs-surgeon-general-mgen-scott-malcolm/ Modified: 2026-09-18 > With co-host Anessa L. Kimball, Ph.D., Professor at Université Laval; Steve Saideman and Anessa discuss defense spending eagerness in Ottawa and beyond Welcome to a new academic term and a new episode of Battle Rhythm, Steve Saideman and Dr. Linna Tam-Seto (Assistant Professor Department of Occupational Science & Occupational Therapy within the Temerty Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto) discuss updates on civil military relations from the American Political Sciences Association (APSA) Conference in Boston; why Canada is turning its back on our peacekeeping traditions; along with a lesson in leadership from Gen. Jennie Carignan while Hegseth leaves his troops stranded aboard the USS Lincoln along with commemorating 9/11. For today’s feature interview, Linna speaks with Surgeon General MGen Scott Malcolm about health security cooperation. Both Dr. Tam-Seto and MGen Malcolm will be speaking at CIMVHR’s Annual Forum from October 19-21, 2026 – in Halifax, Nova Scotia. ## S4 Ep.3 : Radical Pragmatism URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/s4-ep-3-radical-pragmatism-2/ Modified: 2026-08-31 > With co-hosts Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman. Steve shares insights from the German-Norweigan consortium to supply submarines to Canada and he and Wendy discuss the defence diplomacy involved along with protesting and what it means for democracy. In today’s feature interview, Wendy interviews Dr. Jessica F. Green, they discuss her book Existential Politics and her research focused on global governance, the politics of decarbonization, carbon pricing, and non-state actors. Welcome to spooky season and to a new season of Battle Rhythm, with co-hosts Dr. Wendy H. Wong (Professor of Political Science and Principal’s Research Chair at the University of British Columbia) and Steve Saideman. Steve shares insights from the German-Norweigan consortium to supply submarines to Canada and he and Wendy discuss the defence diplomacy involved along with protesting and what it means for democracy. In today’s feature interview, Wendy interviews Dr. Jessica F. Green, they discuss her book Existential Politics and her research focused on global governance, the politics of decarbonization, carbon pricing, and non-state actors. Jessica Green is a professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto. She is also cross-appointed in the School of Environment. She has previously held positions at Case Western University (in Cleveland, OH) and New York University (in NYC). Her newly released book, Existential Politics, explains why the Paris Agreement is Failing. Governments have misdiagnosed the political problem of climate change, focusing relentlessly on measuring, reporting, and trading emissions. This technical approach of “managing tons” ignores the ways that climate change and climate policy will revalue assets, creating winners and losers. Policies such as net zero, carbon pricing, and offsets all cater to the losers—owners of fossil assets. But in reality, climate change is a political problem, not a technical one. Climate politics should be understood as existential—creating conflicts that arise when some actors face the prospect of the devaluation or elimination of their assets or competition from the creation of new ones. Fossil asset owners, such as oil and gas companies and electric utilities, stand to lose trillions in the energy transition. Thus, they are fighting to slow decarbonization and preserve the value of their assets. Green asset owners, who will be the basis of the decarbonized economy, are fewer in number and relatively weak politically. Governments should use international tax, finance, and trade institutions to create new green asset owners and constrain fossil asset owners. ## Séance d’information sur le PRAP au ministère de la Défense nationale URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/seance-dinformation-sur-le-prap-au-ministere-de-la-defense-nationale/ Modified: 2021-11-16 > Cette séance d’information sur le Programme de recrutement d’agent.e.s des politiques (PRAP) au ministère de la Défense nationale fournira... Cette séance d’information sur le Programme de recrutement d’agent.e.s des politiques (PRAP) au ministère de la Défense nationale fournira des informations sur notre programme de perfectionnement professionnel de trois ans et expliquera pourquoi et comment postuler. Le PRAP peut être d’intérêt pour vous si vous : -Détenez la citoyenneté canadienne ou la résidence permanente -Détenez une maîtrise d’une université reconnue (complétée au plus tard le 31 juillet 2022) en sciences sociales, en sciences humaines, en arts ou dans une autre discipline liée à la sécurité et à la défense -Avez de l’expérience de la recherche, de l’analyse et de la rédaction de dossiers liés aux affaires internationales, à la défense ou à la politique publique ## Sécurité en concurrence : Analyse des perceptions de Boko Haram dans l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/securite-en-concurrence-analyse-des-perceptions-de-boko-haram-dans-lextreme-nord-du-cameroun/ Modified: 2025-06-12 Ce point chaud évalue les perceptions locales et internationales liées au groupe terroriste Boko Haram dans l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun ainsi que les diverses réponses proposées informées par ces perceptions. Il fait ressortir que le poids de l'histoire, l'identité communautaire et les liens culturels entre les communautés et les jeunes affiliés à Boko Haram empêchent une résolution immédiate de la question de Boko Haram, notamment lorsque les approches internationales perçoivent ce mouvement comme étant complètement isolé. Au contraire, Boko Haram s’inscrit dans les structures sociales locales. Ce point chaud débouche ensuite par ricochet sur la façon dont les perceptions locales peuvent offrir une nouvelle compréhension des situations d'insécurité et proposer des alternatives de paix durable et acceptables dans le contexte de Boko Haram dans l'extrême-nord du Cameroun. La nature de Boko Haram en discussion Depuis 2009, le groupe Boko Haram pose de sérieux problèmes à la sécurité nationale camerounaise, mais également à la sécurité sous régionale dans le bassin du Lac Tchad. Boko Haram (faction qui a succédé à Abu Shekau) compte à son actif des enlèvements, des assassinats, des viols, des destructions de bien, des attentats provoquant des déplacements forcés de populations et la misère dans l’Extrême-nord du Cameroun. Le groupe est donc considéré ces dernières années comme la plus grande menace à la sécurité des personnes au Cameroun ainsi que dans les pays du Bassin du Lac Tchad. Précisons rapidement que Boko Haram recrute dans toutes les couches sociales, sans exclure de catégories de sexe, de genre, ou de profession. Il agit dans une stratégie de guerre asymétrique et ses combattants ne sont pas identifiables à première vue (comme le serait un uniforme), à l’opposé d’une armée classique. Les perceptions internationales de Boko Haram et leurs réponses Les analystes des conflits et gouvernements qualifient Boko Haram de « mouvement terroriste » en raison de ses diverses méthodes de déploiement, telles que les attentats, les kidnappings et le ciblage des civils. La plupart de ces analystes fournissent leur expertise aussi bien aux gouvernements (comme celui des États-Unis) qu’aux institutions internationales (par exemple, le réseau des Nations Unies, qui constitue la voix prédominante en matière de gestion des situations d’insécurité). Ainsi, Boko Haram a été indexé comme étant un groupe terroriste affilié à Al-Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI). Cette catégorisation est liée à la classification des exactions posées par Boko Haram et surtout de ses méthodes qui correspondent à celles d’activités terroristes. La thérapie ou réponse indiquée par conséquent pour combattre le terrorisme d’après les acteurs internationaux impliqués est constituée de deux grandes composantes : l’action militaire et la déradicalisation des populations locales. L’action militaire s’articule par la mobilisation des forces armées nationales et sous régionales pour dénicher et détruire les positions physiques de Boko Haram. Par exemple, depuis 2016, le bataillon d’intervention rapide (BIR) du Cameroun est actif dans la région de l'extrême-nord, menant diverses opérations de ratissage, des attaques surprises et interpellations, de protection des villes et villages par des patrouilles de surveillance et de renseignement. Ces actions sont soutenues par les États-Unis (surveillance par drones) et la France (renseignement de sécurité). La stratégie militaire est également fondée sur l’autodéfense ou le vigilantisme dans la mesure où l’armée s’appuie sur les civils locaux dans le cadre de ses opérations, notamment afin d’obtenir du renseignement de sécurité. Cette action se conjugue, par ailleurs, avec le désarmement et la démobilisation d’ex-miliciens de Boko Haram. L’action militaire est ponctuelle et se fait à court terme, son but principal étant la défense stratégique du régime politique du président Paul Barthélemy Biya qui est au pouvoir depuis 43 ans. Quant à elle, la déradicalisation prend la forme de différents programmes, projets et actions en faveur de la lutte contre l’extrémisme violent, qui incluent : les programmes d’autonomisation des femmes, les formations agro-avicoles à destination des jeunes, l’appui psychosocial à travers la réinsertion des ex-combattants, la distribution de nourriture aux réfugiés et déplacés internes et la mise en place de centres locaux de médiation communautaire des conflits. Ces différentes stratégies de « containment » (endiguement) contre Boko Haram sont impulsées par les agences de l’Organisation des Nations Unies ainsi que par des organisations non-gouvernementales et autres organisations intergouvernementales et agences de développement étatiques, comme la Danish International Development Agency, la Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit et l’Agence française de développement. L’approche qui informe ces deux composantes est celle de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Or, la question de Boko Haram ne saurait se résumer seulement au terrorisme. Ces réponses pourraient se révéler insuffisantes pour faire face à l’ensemble de l’enjeu. Cependant, comment identifier le problème dans son entier ? C’est comprenant la place qu’occupe Boko Haram dans le contexte local que le groupe peut être catégorisé. Les perceptions locales de Boko Haram Pour comprendre la place que Boko Haram occupe, il faut savoir ce qu’en pensent les populations locales de l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun. Il est donc nécessaire d’analyser le discours local sur la perception de Boko Haram. Les modalités de ce discours se structurent autour de deux éléments principaux, à savoir : le registre des déclarations locales sur Boko Haram et le registre de la cohabitation avec Boko Haram. Ces deux registres discursifs constituent la base d’une réflexion sur un potentiel modèle local de sécurité propre au contexte  de l’Extrême-Nord du Cameroun. D’une part, en ce qui concerne les déclarations, Boko Haram, contrairement aux perceptions internationales, est considéré comme une manifestation de la méfiance qui s’inscrit dans les pratiques locales de la résilience face aux crises, qu’elles soient sociales, politiques, économiques ou environnementales. Boko Haram n’est pas un phénomène unique. En effet, si le groupe lui-même est relativement récent, ses pratiques (kidnappings, enlèvements, vols, pillages et demandes de rançon) sont très anciennes dans la région de l’extrême-nord du Cameroun et furent utilisées activement par des groupes œuvrant dans la région depuis au moins le 18ème siècle. Elles se sont toutefois intensifiées autour des années 1980 à travers les « contrôles zarguinas, » ou opération de coupeurs de routes, qui brutalisaient et dépouillaient les voyageurs dans la région. Ces opérations criminelles sont commises par des jeunes qui habitent dans les communautés et participent à leur vie active. Parfois, ils le font de connivence avec les chefferies traditionnelles pour renflouer leurs poches. Ces crimes sont dont si endémiques qu’ils pourraient être comparés à une institution sociale qui, bien que non codifiée, est perçue comme normale. C’est d’ailleurs pourquoi les coupeurs de route vivent dans leur communauté et participent à ses activités sans forcément être inquiétés. Ils sont par conséquent le produit des communautés. D’ailleurs, beaucoup de jeunes brigands volent au secours de leurs communautés en cas de conflits intercommunautaires et jusqu’à présent, participent au vigilantisme local. Tous ces éléments indiquent que, relativement à quelques-unes de ses pratiques (vols, pillages et enlèvements) et vu le profil de plusieurs jeunes qui y participent (moto-taximen de l’Extrême-Nord, par exemple), Boko Haram comme est une émanation des communautés locales. Il ne s’agit pas d’un groupe étranger. Même si certaines pratiques comme les attentats ou la prêche du radicalisme djihadiste sont parmi les stratégies phares du mouvement, il faut considérer qu’elles sont nouvelles ou alors ne concernent que la version moderne de la résilience locale dont, évidemment, beaucoup de populations locales se soustraient. Compte tenu de la proximité de Boko Haram avec les communautés locales en ce qui concerne les origines de plusieurs jeunes qui l’ont rejoint et du rapprochement entre les pratiques terroristes et celles plus anciennes qui sont normalisées (vols, pillages, enlèvements et demandes de rançon), il s’avère extrêmement difficile de mettre en place un système de sécurité qui pourrait enrayer ce mouvement grâce à l’option militaire. Le poids de l’histoire, l’appartenance identitaire et les liens culturels entre les communautés et les jeunes affiliés à Boko Haram ne permettent pas un règlement militaire de la menace que représente Boko Haram. La faiblesse des approches internationales est qu’elles considèrent ce mouvement comme totalement isolé. Or, il s’inscrit bien dans les structures sociales locales. D’autre part, l’approche internationale actuelle est compliquée par la cohabitation qui existe entre les communautés et Boko Haram. Cette cohabitation est marquée par de bons et de mauvais moments. Elle est bénéfique pour une communauté lorsque ses jeunes, par exemple, la défendent dans des situations de conflits intercommunautaires. Mais, elle est mauvaise lorsque ces mêmes jeunes s’attaquent ensuite aux membres de leurs communautés ainsi qu’aux membres d’autres communautés  lorsqu’ils les soupçonnent de connivence avec les forces armées qui épient leurs positions. La vie avec Boko Haram n’est pas seulement violente mais aussi remplie d’actions et d’activités normales de pêche, d’agriculture, de commerce ou de trafic illicites transfrontaliers et de négociation sur l’ascension sociale. Elle est également marquée par une implantation idéologique du groupe notamment  par le canal des jeunes, des enfants de la rue ou d’autres personnes curieuses qui évitent ainsi la solitudes et y trouvent au moins une utilité sociale. La présence de Boko Haram est donc permise par une interconnectivité locale qui se façonne au quotidien, malgré la situation d’insécurité. Dans les faits, il n’y a donc pas véritablement de distance sociale entre les miliciens de Boko Haram et les populations locales. Ceci signifie que, contrairement à la conception internationale qui perçoit Boko Haram comme un phénomène isolé, il s’agit en fait d’un mouvement intégré au contexte local. D’ailleurs, c’est pourquoi les locaux ne considèrent pas comme viable une paix qui n’intègre pas les miliciens ou du moins les ex-miliciens. L’imbrication de Boko Haram dans la vie locale indique par conséquent qu’une autre approche sécuritaire est nécessaire. Celle-ci ne doit pas exclure les miliciens, ne doit pas concevoir que le mouvement comme sans ancrages dans la vie locale, et ne doit pas le considérer comme une simple manifestation du terrorisme international. Conclusion L’alternative pour le Canada se présente ici en termes d’élaboration de stratégies pour endiguer les effets négatifs de Boko Haram et non ses liens sociaux. Il s’agit donc de penser des normes qui pourraient concurrencer et remplacer celles qui permettent au groupe de prospérer. Ce but pourrait se concrétiser à travers des réflexions organisées au sein des organismes à base communautaires. Ces normes devraient nécessairement viser la cohésion des communautés tout en préservant l’idée de groupe. Elles doivent donc tourner vers la recherche de la paix par l’élimination de l’idée de méfiance ou de contestation des différentes formes de légitimité (ONG, nationale, internationale) proclamées au sein des communautés. Enfin, cette piste de solution portée par les communautés locales nécessite pour le Canada d’organiser des réflexions intenses à travers des programmes de recherche qui mettent directement en relation les universités et les organismes à base communautaires locales.   ## Sensibilité aux conflits : Une approche clé pour l’adaptation climatique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/sensibilite-aux-conflits-une-approche-cle-pour-ladaptation-climatique/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Cette note stratégique souligne l’importance de la sensibilité aux conflits dans les initiatives d’adaptation climatique France-Canada... Cette note stratégique fait partie d’une série spéciale, dirigée par Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS) et Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) avec le soutien du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada et de la DGRIS (ministère des Armées, France), qui vise à développer des échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens. Résumé Cette note stratégique souligne l’importance de la sensibilité aux conflits dans les initiatives d’adaptation climatique France-Canada, en particulier dans les contextes fragiles. Ces initiatives devraient non seulement répondre aux défis climatiques, mais favoriser également la cohésion sociale et la résilience des communautés. Cette analyse synthétise les perspectives recueillies lors d’entretiens avec des experts du domaine. Ces experts soulignent à la fois l’importance de l’autonomisation des acteurs locaux et les défis liés à la mise en œuvre d’une approche sensible aux conflits. Ainsi, cette analyse soutient l’idée selon laquelle les initiatives françaises et canadiennes en matière d’adaptation climatique dans les contextes fragiles devraient inclure des analyses d’égalité de genre et l'inclusion sociale (GESI), privilégier le leadership local et les méthodes participatives, pour développer des mesures d’adaptation efficaces et durables. Ainsi, voici les recommandations clés de cette analyse : Il est essentiel que les interventions d’adaptation au changement climatique n’aggravent pas les tensions sociales existantes. Une analyse contextuelle approfondie et une approche de ne pas nuire (« Do No Harm ») doivent être mises en place pour éviter d’exacerber les conflits. En particulier, les projets doivent être conçus de manière à être sensibles aux dynamiques locales, incluant des analyses de genre et d'inclusion sociale (GESI), et des méthodes participatives pour garantir que les voix marginalisées soient prises en compte. Impliquer les communautés locales dès les phases de conception de projets permettrait d’assurer que les solutions soient adaptées et véritablement pertinentes pour les contextes locaux. Le renforcement des capacités locales et la formation en matière de sensibilité aux conflits pourraient garantir la durabilité des projets d’adaptation. Les équipes locales, ainsi que les partenaires français et canadiens, doivent être formés pour mieux comprendre les approches sensibles aux conflits et développer des solutions adaptées. Enfin, afin d’assurer l’efficacité des interventions d’adaptation climatique dans les contextes fragiles, il est recommandé d’organiser une concertation annuelle entre les institutions canadiennes et françaises, ainsi que les ministères et acteurs locaux. Ce processus participatif est particulièrement pertinent dans ces contextes, car il permettrait non seulement de coordonner les efforts entre les acteurs locaux, nationaux et internationaux, mais aussi d’assurer que les interventions prennent en compte des réalités et des dynamiques locales. Ce dialogue continu favoriserait également l’inclusion des communautés locales dans la prise de décision, renforçant ainsi la résilience collective face aux impacts du changement climatique dans les contextes fragiles. Contexte Selon le Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD), la sécurité climatique se réfère aux impacts de la crise climatique sur la paix et la sécurité, notamment dans les contextes fragiles et affectés par les conflits. Considéré comme un multiplicateur de crises, et une menace pour la sécurité nationale, humaine, internationale et écologique, le changement climatique est susceptible d’exacerber les risques qui menacent déjà la paix et la sécurité surtout dans les pays en situation de fragilité. Bien que les changements climatiques ne soient pas une cause importante de conflits armés de grande ampleur, il pourrait aggraver et prolonger les conflits existants, et exacerber les vulnérabilités existantes dans des régions déjà instables. En effet, les mouvements de population, les pressions environnementales telles que les inondations, les sécheresses et les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes causés par le changement climatique pourraient exacerber la compétition pour les ressources, l’instabilité politique dans les États fragiles et potentiellement des flux de migration de masse. Pour les pays déjà en proie à de multiples crises ou conflits, les changements climatiques pourraient exacerber davantage les tensions sociales, accroître la vulnérabilité et les griefs des populations, et réduire les opportunités économiques. Globalement, l’Afrique et l’Asie devraient être les régions les plus vulnérables en termes de conséquences humanitaires. Par exemple, dans le rapport de SPARC sur la perception des risques transfrontaliers liés au changement climatique et à l’adaptation, les participants au sondage d’Afrique de l’Est et de l’Ouest ont souligné que : Les sécheresses et les inondations figurent parmi les risques liés au changement climatique les plus graves auxquels sont confrontées leurs régions. La dégradation des terres et la perte de biodiversité́ sont des défis constants dans l’ensemble du Sahel, et elles ont une incidence sur les moyens de subsistance, les ressources en eau et la santé humaine et animale. Ainsi, la sécurité climatique, un sujet de préoccupation croissante ces dernières années, demeure une problématique de première importance au sein d’organisations régionales et internationales telles que le Conseil de sécurité , la Commission de l’Union africaine, l’Union européenne et l’OTAN. Outre l’évaluation des menaces, la sécurité climatique intègre la capacité à relever les défis liés au climat. Elle a une dimension adaptative, car elle implique non seulement la résistance aux risques, mais aussi la capacité à s’adapter et à trouver des solutions face aux impacts du changement climatique. Mettre l’accent sur la sensibilité aux conflits dans l’adaptation climatique Le premier partenariat franco-canadien pour le climat et l’environnement a été signé en 2018 et renouvelé en 2021. La troisième édition du partenariat est désormais adoptée pour une durée de trois ans (2024-2027). En plus du partenariat entre le gouvernement de la République française et le gouvernement du Canada pour le climat et l’environnement – 2024-2027, la France et le Canada sont également impliqués dans les problématiques climatiques qui affectent de nombreux pays du Sud, et collaborent avec ces pays (chercheuses, gouvernements, experts, etc.) sur des initiatives visant à renforcer la résilience climatique. Leur implication en tant que leaders mondiaux dans l’action climatique s’appuie sur leurs intérêts stratégiques, leur engagement humanitaire, et leurs efforts de développement international. Seulement, pour répondre efficacement aux impacts du changement climatique, il ne suffit pas de relever uniquement les défis climatiques, Il est essentiel de veiller à ce que les interventions d’adaptation n’aggravent pas les tensions sociales et politiques existantes. En particulier, il faudrait s’assurer que les interventions humanitaires et de développement n’exacerbent pas les conflits, notamment dans les situations de fragilité. En effet, les stratégies d'adaptation au changement climatique, particulièrement celles sur la gestion des ressources naturelles, peuvent entraîner une insécurité accrue des droits fonciers, marginaliser des groupes minoritaires et accélérer la dégradation environnementale. Surtout les institutions tant locales qu’internationales, pourraient réduire ou exacerber la probabilité de conflits, selon la manière dont les initiatives sont administrées. Elles pourraient affecter la distribution des services, la capacité de réponse et la manière dont les différends sont gérés. Ainsi, une approche sensible au conflit définie comme la capacité d’une organisation à comprendre le contexte dans lequel elle opère prend donc en compte certains facteurs pour être efficace : la consultation publique, la transparence et la prise en compte des voix marginalisées dans la planification et la mise en œuvre des projets. Cette approche fait également référence au concept de « ne pas nuire » (« Do No Harm »), « qui mandate que les organisations prennent des mesures pour prévenir et atténuer les conséquences négatives potentielles de leurs actions sur les populations affectées ». Cette préoccupation semble également être partagée par la France et le Canada, qui s’engagent activement dans divers efforts climatiques, notamment à travers des initiatives telles que CLARE (Adaptation aux changements climatiques et résilience), portées par le Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) et le Centre de Recherche pour le Développement International (CRDI), ainsi que des programmes tels qu’ADAPTACTION de l’Agence Française de Développement. De plus, une approche sensible au conflit est également pertinente pour concevoir et mettre en œuvre des initiatives d’adaptation climatique dans des contextes qui ne sont pas nécessairement classifiés comme des États fragiles ou des zones de conflit. En effet, de nombreuses régions peuvent faire face à des tensions sociales, économiques ou politiques sous-jacentes, même en l’absence de conflit ouvert.  Intégrer une approche sensible aux conflits dans les interventions d’adaptation climatique 1. Compréhension contextuelle et analyse égalité des genres et inclusion sociale (GESI) La conception des projets d’adaptation climatique doit tenir compte des expériences des différents groupes face aux conflits et au changement climatique. Un projet qui ignore les conflits ou qui travaille en isolation par rapport aux conflits actifs est peu susceptible de réussir. Au lieu de cela, les projets d’adaptation devraient établir des comparaisons et des parallèles entre les manières dont différents groupes vivent la vulnérabilité au changement climatique et aux conflits, en utilisant cette compréhension pour concevoir des interventions sensibles à ces dynamiques. La compréhension du contexte par une analyse intersectionnelle permet d’identifier les acteurs clés et de donner une voix aux populations marginalisées, plutôt que de laisser les voix dominantes s’imposer. Une analyse GESI ne permettrait pas seulement de réduire le risque d’exacerbation des conflits, mais pourrait aider également les chercheuses à reconnaître leur subjectivité, assurant ainsi que les interventions d'adaptation soient conçues avec sensibilité aux dynamiques sociopolitiques locales. Mais surtout, ces analyses sont également alignées avec l'agenda Femmes, Paix et Sécurité (FPS) des Nations Unies, qui guide les aspects relatifs au genre dans les interventions de développement. Cet agenda met l’accent sur l’importance de la participation des femmes et des groupes marginalisés dans les processus de paix et de sécurité, en veillant à ce que leurs perspectives soient intégrées dans les efforts de prévention des conflits et de consolidation de la paix. 2. L’importance du leadership et de l’appropriation locale La mise en œuvre d’une approche sensible aux conflits permettrait d’éviter le parachutage des chercheurs et chercheuses externes dans des contextes locaux. Cette approche est essentielle pour éviter de nuire et pour garantir que les interventions d’adaptation soient véritablement représentatives du contexte local. Pour les projets de recherche, il est donc essentiel de bien comprendre le contexte dans lequel on intervient. Qui sont les acteurs clés? Comment les impliquer efficacement ? Surtout, les experts plaident pour l’autonomisation de ces acteurs. La première étape consiste donc à travailler avec des partenaires locaux, tout en veillant à ce que ce partenariat soit équitable, en s’assurant qu’ils disposent réellement du pouvoir nécessaire pour diriger le processus de mise en œuvre d’un projet. Il est important d’impliquer les parties prenantes et les communautés dès les phases initiales du projet, en s’assurant que cette période soit utilisée pour engager les parties prenantes et les communautés, afin que les chercheuses aient le temps de réviser leurs objectifs, questions et méthodes si nécessaire. Le cas du Soudan du Sud Le Soudan du Sud, illustre parfaitement l’importance d’adopter une approche sensible aux conflits dans les mesures d’adaptation, mais aussi les défis que cela représente. Les changements climatiques ont poussé les pasteurs de Kapoeta à modifier leurs schémas de migration, empiétant ainsi sur des terres traditionnellement appartenant à d'autres communautés ethniques, ou croisant les routes de migration d’autres groupes de pasteurs, ce qui a intensifié les tensions en raison de la pression accrue sur les ressources. Dans leur article intitulé « Conflict-sensitive aid at the intersection of climate change, conflict and vulnerability in South Sudan », Pech et Chan se concentrent sur les recherches récentes menées par le Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CSRF), focalisées sur deux études de cas : Kapoeta, dans l'État de l'Équatoria oriental, et le corridor Mangala[1]-Bor. L’objectif était d’identifier et de refléter les points de vue des communautés sud-soudanaises affectées à la fois par le changement climatique et les conflits, ainsi que leur interaction avec le système d’aide. En effet, dans le corridor Mangala-Bor, les inondations ont souvent coïncidé avec des périodes de violences politiques intenses. Carte du Sud Soudan (ministère des Affaires étrangères et européenne, 2011) Mais surtout, le genre est également une dimension considérable dans ce nexus changement climatique, conflits, et déplacement. Comme le souligne, Pech et Chan: En tant que principales pourvoyeuses de nourriture et d’eau, et disposant de moins d’options de subsistance lorsqu’elles sont déplacées, en raison de taux d’alphabétisation généralement plus bas et d'une position sociale et économique plus fragile, les femmes sont particulièrement vulnérables à la raréfaction croissante de l'eau potable et de la nourriture. Dans certains cas, elles sont contraintes d’entreprendre des activités risquées, telles que parcourir de plus longues distances pour accéder à l’eau ou vendre de l’alcool, ce qui les expose à des violences sexuelles et basées sur le genre. En parallèle, cette intersection affecte aussi les hommes et les garçons, notamment en liant la masculinité à l’élevage de bétail, ce qui les expose davantage à des formes de violence organisée. Il est donc évident qu’une approche sensible aux conflits dans des contextes aussi complexes serait essentielle dans toute stratégie d’adaptation au changement climatique. Cependant, les acteurs humanitaires sont confrontés à des défis complexes en matière de sensibilité aux conflits pour différentes raisons, y compris la perception qu’ont les communautés des agences d’aide, une critique des réponses d’aides perçues comme « inadéquates » et « mal ciblées ». Mais surtout d’autres enjeux rendent difficiles la mise en place d’une approche sensible aux conflits tels que « des ressources limitées », la pression croissante que peuvent ressentir les acteurs de l’aide, et surtout, le « peu de capacités ou d’expertise pour soutenir une action intégrée, sensible à la fois au climat et aux conflits ». Cela ne doit cependant pas décourager les efforts pour adopter une approche sensible aux conflits, ni conduire à l’abandon face à des contextes difficiles. Ainsi, selon Pech et Chan, les initiatives d’aide devraient : Prendre en compte le contexte dans lequel les acteurs opèrent Promouvoir des stratégies qui garantissent que l’assistance est contextuellement pertinente et co-conçue avec les communautés. Prendre en compte l’impact potentiel de la construction de digues et d’autres infrastructures de gestion des inondations sur les routes migratoires Intégrer des systèmes de gestion des conflits dans les projets d’eau, d’assainissement et d’hygiène tels que les forages, hafirs et barrages. Surtout, une approche sensible au conflit pour être efficace devrait également prendre en compte une perspective de paix à savoir promouvoir une gestion durable des ressources, mais surtout favoriser le dialogue entre les parties en conflit. À ces recommandations, s’ajoutent l’outil présenté dans l’étude de Pech et Chan issu du document d’apprentissage du HCR sur le Soudan du Sud. Bien que ce modèle, illustre comment les interventions peuvent, dans les pires scénarios, causer des dommages involontaires aux communautés et aux relations communautaires, il met également l’accent sur les approches qui minimisent ces dommages, mais surtout celles qui abordent de manière positive les causes et les moteurs du conflit. Conflict sensitivity model: the Peace Spectrum[2] Le rôle des méthodes participatives Les meilleures pratiques actuelles en matière d’adaptation – que ce soit dans la recherche, le développement ou l’aide humanitaire tendent à être participatives et à se concentrer sur l’inclusion de différents groupes grâce à divers outils, y compris les living labs. Les méthodes participatives, telles que celles utilisées dans les laboratoires vivants, sont essentielles pour favoriser l'inclusion et permettre aux communautés vulnérables d’exprimer leurs besoins dans un environnement contrôlé. Ces méthodes facilitent non seulement le dialogue et la résolution des conflits, mais permettent également l’expérimentation d’approches collaboratives. Cependant, il est important de noter que parfois, les méthodes participatives explorées dans le cadre de l’adaptation peuvent parfois rendre les conflits plus visibles. Cela n’est pas nécessairement négatif, surtout lorsque ces conflits impliquent des institutions ou des groupes ayant des statuts sociaux ou économiques différents. Ces discussions et cette transparence offrent aux groupes marginalisés ou défavorisés l’occasion de faire entendre leur voix, ce qui pourrait permettre de corriger les injustices et d’assurer une plus grande équité dans la gestion, la gouvernance et la redistribution des ressources naturelles.  Assurer la durabilité et l’impact positif des interventions Pour garantir que les interventions d’adaptation climatique soient à la fois durables et bénéfiques, il est impératif d’adopter une approche holistique qui intègre la sécurité climatique et la sensibilité aux conflits. La France et le Canada, en tant qu'acteurs clés dans ce domaine, ont un rôle crucial à jouer en mettant en œuvre des stratégies qui répondent aux besoins locaux tout en évitant d’aggraver les tensions existantes. Voici les éléments essentiels qui pourraient permettre d’atteindre cet objectif : 1. Importance du diagnostic participatif Un diagnostic approfondi est essentiel pour comprendre les dynamiques locales et éviter les effets indésirables des interventions, y compris la maladaptation, c’est-à-dire des interventions qui exacerbent les tensions et les conflits au lieu de les atténuer. Ce diagnostic doit être participatif, impliquant les populations locales dans la collecte et l’analyse des informations. Cette approche permet non seulement d’obtenir une vue précise des besoins et des vulnérabilités, mais aussi de garantir que les interventions ne nuisent pas aux communautés. Il est crucial d’établir des mécanismes de rétroaction continue et de communication ouverte avec les acteurs locaux pour permettre une adaptation et une amélioration continue des projets. La mise en place de mécanismes de suivi et d’évaluation participatifs est essentielle pour s’assurer que les interventions atteignent leurs objectifs sans effets indésirables. En impliquant activement les communautés locales et les parties prenantes, ces mécanismes permettent de détecter et corriger rapidement les problèmes potentiels, tout en assurant que les interventions restent adaptées aux besoins changeants des communautés. 2. Renforcement des capacités et formation Le renforcement des capacités locales est fondamental pour assurer la durabilité des interventions. Les projets doivent inclure des formations et des modules pour aider les acteurs locaux à comprendre les enjeux de la sécurité climatique et à appliquer les compétences nécessaires pour les aborder. Les équipes françaises et canadiennes, collaborant étroitement avec les acteurs locaux, doivent également suivre ces formations. Les initiatives appuyées par la France et le Canada peuvent soutenir des ateliers, des cours et des formations pour renforcer la compréhension des problématiques climatiques et de gestion des conflits, tout en collaborant avec les parties prenantes locales pour garantir que les interventions soient adaptées au contexte spécifique. Les initiatives franco-canadiennes pourraient soutenir la sensibilité aux conflits dans les programmes de formation des acteurs locaux, et des équipes canadiennes et françaises impliquées dans les projets de recherche, ce qui inclurait des modules sur la gestion des conflits, la résolution pacifique des différends, et l'inclusion des perspectives des groupes marginalisés. 3. Consultation et collaboration avec les parties prenantes Les interventions doivent être conçues en étroite collaboration avec les parties prenantes locales, y compris les gouvernements, les ONG et les communautés. Il est crucial de consulter ces acteurs dès les phases de planification et de mise en œuvre pour que les projets répondent aux besoins locaux et respectent les normes culturelles et politiques. Les projets doivent inclure des mécanismes pour obtenir l’approbation des parties prenantes et veiller à ce que les interventions ne renforcent pas les tensions existantes. La collaboration intersectorielle, notamment en mobilisant les réseaux diplomatiques et les capacités en matière de développement international et de gestion des conflits, est essentielle pour développer des solutions aux défis posés par le changement climatique dans les contextes fragiles. 4. Promouvoir la cohésion sociale et éviter la maladaptation Enfin, il est crucial de reconnaître que la sécurité climatique et la sensibilité aux conflits sont intrinsèquement liées à la promotion de la paix et de la cohésion sociale. Les interventions climatiques ne doivent pas seulement atténuer les impacts environnementaux, mais aussi renforcer les liens sociaux au sein des communautés, promouvoir l’inclusion et l’égalité, et soutenir les efforts de consolidation de la paix. Des activités telles que des ateliers de dialogue communautaire, des projets communs de gestion des ressources naturelles, ou des initiatives de développement économique inclusif pourraient jouer un rôle clé dans la réduction des tensions sociales et la création d’un environnement plus stable et résilient face aux chocs climatiques. Surtout, les initiatives d’adaptation doivent éviter la maladaptation. Par exemple, une des expertes a souligné que les migrations internes causées par les déplacements climatiques pourraient créer de nouvelles tensions, notamment dans les zones urbaines. Une urbanisation croissante dans ces zones pourrait surcharger les infrastructures locales, accroître les inégalités sociales et pourrait même entraîner des conflits surtout lorsque les ressources sont limitées. Si les politiques d’adaptation ne tiennent pas compte de ces dynamiques, elles risquent de générer une maladaptation, aggravant ainsi les tensions sociales. Il est donc essentiel de mettre en place des interventions qui tiennent compte de ces aspects migratoires afin de prévenir de nouveaux déséquilibres sociaux, en particulier dans les centres urbains en croissance rapide. Ainsi, une recherche orientée vers les besoins, coproduite avec les utilisateurs par des approches transdisciplinaires, est nécessaire pour garantir que les interventions répondent aux différents niveaux de vulnérabilité sociale et favorisent l’apprentissage et l’échange entre les communautés. Approche sensible aux conflits dans les projets d’adaptation au changement climatique : Une coopération franco-canadienne renforcée Une approche sensible au conflit surtout dans les contextes fragiles est importante, car la sensibilité aux conflits dans les interventions d’adaptation climatique, pourrait non seulement aider les communautés vulnérables à s’adapter aux impacts du changement climatique, mais aussi contribuer à la prévention des conflits et à la promotion de la paix et de la stabilité. Cette approche, fondée sur une compréhension approfondie des dynamiques locales, une collaboration intersectorielle, et une attention particulière à l’inclusion sociale et à l'égalité des genres, pourrait avoir un impact positif dans la vie des populations affectées par le changement climatique. Ainsi, pour que les interventions d’adaptation climatique soient durables et efficaces, les interventions appuyées par la France et le Canada devraient combiner un diagnostic approfondi, un renforcement des capacités locales, une consultation continue avec les parties prenantes, et une attention particulière à la prévention de la maladaptation. En intégrant ces éléments, les deux pays pourraient maximiser l’impact positif de leurs interventions tout en contribuant à la paix et à la résilience des communautés face aux défis climatiques. Pour renforcer davantage la coopération franco-canadienne, il est essentiel de préciser les niveaux de collaboration entre les acteurs français et canadiens responsables de la mise en œuvre des projets. Cela inclut des institutions comme l’Agence Française de Développement (AFD) et le Centre de recherches pour le développement international (CRDI). Par exemple, CLARE vise à renforcer la résilience aux changements climatiques et aux risques naturels pour les pays d’Afrique et d’Asie-Pacifique à travers un portefeuille de projets en cours en Afrique et en Asie. La recherche soutenue par CLARE cherche à combler des lacunes critiques entre la science et l’action en développant de nouveaux outils, en soutenant également les gouvernements partenaires, les communautés et le secteur privé afin de trouver des solutions efficaces aux défis climatiques, tout en renforçant les capacités des chercheurs et des utilisateurs des résultats de la recherche. Quant à l’initiative AdaptAction, elle accompagne 15 pays et organisations régionales particulièrement vulnérables aux impacts du changement climatique dans la mise en oeuvre de leurs stratégies d’adaptation, en proposant une assistance technique et des activités de renforcement de capacités pour consolider leur gouvernance climat, et pour mieux intégrer l’adaptation au changement climatique dans leurs politiques publiques. Le CRDI et l’AFD pourraient tirer parti de leurs expériences respectives pour échanger des bonnes pratiques, analyses, méthodologies et expériences, et renforcer leurs approches pour intégrer la sensibilité aux conflits dans les projets d’adaptation au changement climatique. Il faudrait également inclure des ministères tels que Affaires mondiales Canada (AMC), le Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères. Une coopération entre les ministères, tant au Canada qu’en France, permettrait de mieux prendre en compte les dimensions sécuritaires et politiques des contextes fragiles dans la planification des projets climatiques. Ainsi, il est recommandé de créer une cellule de concertation annuelle qui réunirait ces acteurs clés. Cette cellule pourrait organiser des rencontres régulières pour discuter des projets en cours, discuter des avancées réalisées et identifier les défis à surmonter en matière de sensibilité aux conflits et d’adaptation climatique. Une telle plateforme favoriserait les échanges entre l’AFD, le CRDI, les ministères impliqués et d'autres organisations partenaires, permettant une meilleure coordination des efforts et une prise en compte systématique des enjeux locaux dans la mise en œuvre des projets. Elle offrirait également l’opportunité de discuter de l'intégration des principes Do No Harm et des analyses de genre dans les stratégies d’adaptation. Cette cellule de concertation serait également un forum d’échange inclusif où les acteurs et chercheuses des pays du Sud, les leaders communautaires, ainsi que les ministères locaux des pays partenaires concernés pourraient partager leurs connaissances et leurs perspectives. Pour cela, la collaboration avec des organisations locales déjà impliquées dans les projets d’adaptation de CLARE et de l’AFD pourrait être essentielle pour garantir que les solutions suggérées tiennent compte des contextes culturels et des défis uniques de chaque région. La présence active des ministères, tant du côté canadien que français, serait également cruciale pour intégrer les dimensions sécuritaires dans les projets d’adaptation. Leur expertise aiderait à prévenir l’escalade des tensions dans des contextes fragiles. On peut également souligner que le Canada, par l’entremise d’Affaires mondiales Canada (AMC), a déjà mis en place des lignes directrices sur la sensibilité aux conflits. Ce document ne représente pas la politique officielle du gouvernement du Canada, mais il contient des lignes directrices sur les pratiques exemplaires. Il est spécifiquement destiné aux organisations qui mettent en œuvre des projets financés par AMC et propose des orientations pour intégrer une analyse de sensibilité aux conflits. Ces lignes directrices pourraient constituer une base solide pour orienter les pratiques dans les projets financés, et elles pourraient être utilisées comme référence pour renforcer la coopération avec la France et coordonner les actions en matière de sensibilité aux conflits et d’adaptation climatique, en veillant à ce que les approches restent adaptées aux réalités locales. Finalement, la mise en place de cette cellule de concertation annuelle permettrait non seulement de mieux coordonner les efforts franco-canadiens, mais aussi de maximiser les bénéfices des interventions climatiques, tout en évitant d’aggraver les tensions existantes. Cette approche et ce dialogue continu permettraient de faire de la coopération franco-canadienne un modèle de collaboration respectueuse des dynamiques locales, en privilégiant l’inclusion, l’écoute active, et la cocréation de solutions. [1] La toponymie suivante est aussi utilisée : Mongalla. [2] Ce schéma illustre les impacts des interventions dans des contextes de conflit, depuis « faire du mal » (Doing harm) jusqu'à « contribuer à la paix » (Contributing to peace). La sensibilité aux conflits constitue une base fondamentale pour éviter les effets négatifs (Do No Harm) et renforcer les impacts positifs (Do More Good). Il met en évidence comment des approches sensibles peuvent prévenir l’escalade des tensions, traiter les causes structurelles des conflits, et soutenir une paix durable. ## Si vis pacem, para bellum ? : l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan à la recherche de la stabilité régionale après la guerre du Haut-Karabagh URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/si-vis-pacem-para-bellum-larmenie-et-lazerbaidjan-a-la-recherche-de-la-stabilite-regionale-apres-la-guerre-du-haut-karabagh/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Pendant l’automne 2023, les forces armées de l’Azerbaïdjan achèvent leur reconquête du territoire du Haut-Karabagh, jusque-là contrôlé par la république autoproclamée de l’Artsakh (nom arménien pour la République autoproclamée du Haut-Karabakh). Cette opération militaire solde a priori le conflit du Haut-Karabagh, qui avait commencé en 1988 alors même que l’Azerbaïdjan et l’Arménie n’étaient que des républiques socialistes soviétiques. Le casus belli était alors les tensions interethniques entre Arméniens et Azéris dans l’oblast autonome du Haut-Karabagh, et plus particulièrement la demande de transfert de l’oblast vers la RSS d’Arménie puis la suspension de cette dite autonomie par la RSS d’Azerbaïdjan. L’Arménie avait gagné la première guerre (1988-1994), en permettant aux Arméniens du Haut-Karabagh d’avoir le contrôle de ce territoire, ainsi qu’en occupant quelques territoires avoisinants, ce qui permettait la défense de cette république sécessionniste. En 1994, sous le patronage de la Fédération de Russie, seul un cessez-le-feu avait été trouvé. Ainsi, la présence de la république sécessionniste d’Artsakh n’a pas entraîné sa reconnaissance par d’autres Etats, même par l’Arménie. En 2016, l’Azerbaïdjan, mené par le fils de l’ancien président Heydar Aliyev, Ilham, avait lancé une offensive pour récupérer des terres contrôlées par les Arméniens. Après d’autres offensives en 2020 et 2023, l’Azerbaïdjan réussit à reprendre le contrôle de tout le territoire. Ce qui pourrait être perçu comme un conflit entre deux Etats pour une petite province n’a en fait rien d’anodin. D’abord, ce conflit se distinguait par la fragilité de la paix durant le gel du conflit, à l’inverse d’autres conflits post-soviétiques. Ensuite, ce conflit était particulier parce qu’il sort du cadre des alliances traditionnelles : ici, l’Alliance atlantique n’est pas impliquée. Même si le conflit a opposé les Azéris, majoritairement musulmans chiites, aux Arméniens, majoritairement chrétiens, il s’agit d’un conflit plus empreint de nationalismes que du fait religieux. D’ailleurs, l’Arménie fut soutenue par l’Iran, pourtant musulman chiite comme l’Azerbaïdjan. Enfin, ce conflit et ses conséquences sont extrêmement importants dans les équilibres géopolitiques actuels. Dans cette note de synthèse, il conviendra de se pencher sur les changements géopolitiques en 2024 pour ces deux Etats : l’Arménie, qui opère un véritable virage à cent-quatre-vingts degrés diplomatique ; l’Azerbaïdjan, qui multiplie les partenariats et tente d’émerger comme nouvel acteur régional. Tournant pro-occidental de l’Arménie Les décisions de Pachinian Nikol Pachinian (orthographié Pashinyan selon la translittération en anglais) est élu Premier ministre de la République d’Arménie en 2018, à la suite d’un mouvement appelé « révolution de velours », réunissant une partie de la société civile contre Serge Sarkissian, alors président de la République qui tente de s’accorder une prolongation de son mandat. Pachinian apparaît alors comme le candidat contre la corruption du gouvernement, qui est également très influencé par l’armée depuis les années 1990. Il met en œuvre une politique libérale, progressiste, en dehors des clivages traditionnels. Sur le plan géopolitique, il tente d’apaiser les tensions avec l’Azerbaïdjan, ce qui est un échec du point de vue des nationalistes arméniens : le Haut-Karabagh est à présent entièrement dominé par l’Azerbaïdjan, qui est plus puissant que jamais. Il a aussi cherché l’apaisement après la guerre, en cédant quelques terres à l’Azerbaïdjan. Pachinian a également tenté de se rapprocher de la Turquie, qui est l’autre puissance régionale dans le Caucase, ainsi que de la République islamique d’Iran. Enfin, la politique étrangère de Nikol Pachinian est caractérisée par son divorce avec Moscou. Le gouvernement d’Erevan a annoncé d’abord la suspension de sa participation (le 23 février 2024), puis la sortie (le 12 juin) de l’Organisation du traité de sécurité collective (ou OTSC), alliance militaire dirigée par le Kremlin, qui réunit d’anciennes républiques soviétiques (Bélarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Russie, Tadjikistan). L’OTSC est censée défendre les intérêts stratégiques de ses membres. Du point de vue d’Erevan, l’OTSC a donc failli à sa mission. Dans ce contexte, l’Arménie s’est rapprochée des pays occidentaux, notamment la France, la Grèce et Chypre, les États-Unis dans une moindre mesure, et a même évoqué une possible candidature pour l’intégration dans l’Union européenne. La réaction russe Pour les Russes, c’est à la politique de Nikol Pachinian qu’il faut imputer la défaite dans le Haut-Karabagh. Les alliances avec les Occidentaux seraient, selon l’ancien président de la Fédération Dmitri Medvedev, la raison de la détérioration des relations russo-arméniennes. Cette position est partagée par le gouvernement de Moscou, à travers la voix de sa porte-parole, Maria Zakharova, qui a jugé que l’Occident était derrière la décision de Pachinian de la suspension de sa participation aux réunions de l’OTSC. Le tournant pro-occidental de l’Arménie semble ne pas être digéré par les responsables russes. Dans le contexte de la guerre en Ukraine, la Russie craint une « ukrainisation » de l’Arménie, c’est-à-dire un éloignement entre une ex-RSS et la Russie. En effet, l’Ukraine, à travers sa coopération avec ses partenaires occidentaux, avait aussi pris ses distances avec la Russie au cours des trois dernières décennies. L’Arménie était jusqu’à présent un pilier du « proche étranger » de la Russie, constitué d’organisations internationales pilotées par le Kremlin. L’Arménie, en plus de l’OTSC qu’elle vient de quitter, est toujours membre de l’Union économique eurasiatique et de la Communauté des États indépendants. Quand on compare avec l’Azerbaïdjan ou la Géorgie, on remarque que l’Arménie a encore gardé de nombreux liens avec la Russie. Le pari de Pachinian de quitter le giron russe pour se rapprocher des Européens se justifie selon lui au vu de l’abandon des Russes dans le conflit au Haut-Karabagh, mais n’est pas partagé par tout le monde en Arménie. La réaction de la population arménienne En effet, deux visions s’affrontent au sein de la société arménienne sur les raisons de la perte du Haut-Karabagh. Pour Nikol Pachinian et ses partisans, c’est la Russie qui n’a pas joué son rôle de maintien de la paix dans la région. En effet, la Russie a par exemple délaissé le corridor de Latchine, qui faisait office de pont entre le territoire de la République d’Arménie et le Haut-Karabagh. Pour les opposants à Pachinian, le divorce entre l’Arménie et la Russie est antérieur à la dernière guerre du Haut-Karabagh. Certains vont même jusqu’à reprendre les éléments de langage de Moscou sur le rapprochement avec les Européens qui ne sont pas fiables dans la défense des Arméniens. Cette vision est défendue par l’opposition à Nikol Pachinian : d’abord, l’opposition partisane, menée par Gagik Tsarukyan, qui est aussi l’une des plus grandes fortunes du pays, et les anciens présidents Serge Sarkissian et Robert Kotcharian. Aussi, les derniers mois ont été marqués par la montée du mouvement « Tavouch pour la patrie », qui organise des manifestations de milliers de personnes pour appeler à la démission du gouvernement dans le cadre de cette défaite. Ce mouvement reprend le nom de la région du Tavouch, au nord-est, proche des villages cédés à l’Azerbaïdjan l’année dernière, dans le cadre des efforts de normalisation. Ce mouvement est incarné par l’archevêque de Tavouch Bagrat Galstanyan et rassemble les foules contre Nikol Pachinian. Il y a peu, l’archevêque, qui détient aussi la nationalité canadienne et qui est soutenu par le clergé apostolique arménien, a même déclaré son intention de devenir Premier ministre et s’est mis en retrait de ses fonctions religieuses. L’homme d’Église est aussi suspecté par des députés de la majorité d’être un espion de la Russie. Aujourd’hui, sa popularité, son discours et son statut de clerc traduisent un danger pour le gouvernement de Pachinian. Enfin, l’opposition est aussi symbolisée par des militants artsakhiotes. Samvel Chakhramanian, dernier président de la République d’Artsakh, qui se déclare aujourd’hui en exil en Arménie, avait décrété la dissolution de la république après la défaite en septembre 2023, mais avait ensuite déclaré cette dissolution « illégale », car contournant le parlement artsakhiote. Il est aujourd’hui l’une des figures de l’irrédentisme et s’oppose à la stratégie pacifiste de Pachinian. Dans ce contexte politique très tendu, nul doute que les élections législatives de 2026 joueront un rôle majeur dans l’évolution de l’Arménie à moyen-terme. Aliyev et Erdogan : jeux d’équilibristes La stabilité de l’alliance Ankara-Bakou Depuis l’indépendance de l’Azerbaïdjan en 1991, la Turquie est son plus grand allié, aussi bien en tant que partenaire commercial que soutien géopolitique. C’est la Turquie qui a permis à l’Azerbaïdjan de développer son économie pendant les trente dernières années, en accompagnant la construction de gazoducs, tels que la pipeline trans-anatolienne (TANAP), qui extrait du gaz dans la Mer caspienne et qui la distribue à la Turquie en passant par la Géorgie et en contournant l’Arménie. La Turquie a fourni de nombreuses armes à l’Azerbaïdjan dans le cadre de la guerre du Haut-Karabagh, comme les drones Bayraktar, qui ont été très utilisés. La Turquie a aussi été la première nation à soutenir l’Azerbaïdjan dans sa conquête des territoires alors sous contrôle arménien, comme lors de la déclaration de Choucha, signée par Recep Tayyip Erdogan et Ilham Aliyev dans une ville tout juste reprise par les forces armées azerbaïdjanaises. Cette déclaration confirme le soutien de la Turquie à l’Azerbaïdjan, qui se considèrent comme une seule nation, pour deux États. En effet, la Turquie et l’Azerbaïdjan sont très alignées en ce qui concerne les relations extérieures, en témoigne le rapprochement entre l’Azerbaïdjan et la République turque de Chypre du Nord. Cette alliance est aujourd’hui très consolidée et se justifie par deux facteurs principaux. Le premier est la convergence des intérêts : la Turquie et l’Azerbaïdjan partagent les mêmes partenaires commerciaux (Union européenne, Géorgie, pays d’Asie centrale), les mêmes rivaux régionaux (Iran, Russie) et la même vision géopolitique, à savoir le non-alignement entre le camp russe et le camp occidental. À l’inverse de l’Arménie, l’Azerbaïdjan n’est pas incité à nouer des alliances ni avec l’OTAN, ni avec l’OTSC, et sait faire du commerce avec l’Union européenne ainsi qu’avec des membres de l’Union économique eurasiatique. La seconde raison est un davantage idéologique : les régimes d’Erdogan et d’Aliyev ont des liens évidents avec le panturquisme, à savoir le rapprochement des peuples turciques, d’Istanbul à Bichkek au Kirghizistan. Ainsi, depuis 2009, les deux pays sont membres de l’Organisation des États turciques, qui est une organisation régionale importante en Asie centrale et occidentale, et qui permet de nombreuses coopérations dans les domaines de l’éducation, de la culture, de l’énergie, de la lutte contre le fondamentalisme religieux etc. La normalisation des relations avec l’Arménie ? Le projet panturc est aussi symbolisé par le corridor de Zanguezour que veulent construire les deux dirigeants. Ce couloir passerait par la région du Syunik en Arménie, et couperait même la frontière entre l’Arménie et l’Iran, tout en permettant au territoire principal de l’Azerbaïdjan d’avoir un accès direct à la province autonome du Nakhitchevan, exclave de l’autre côté de l’Arménie, ainsi qu’à la frontière avec la Turquie. Pour les Arméniens, ce projet est une menace pour leur intégrité territoriale. L’Arménie est aujourd’hui au pied du mur, forcée de s’entendre avec ses deux voisins, qui sont aussi ses deux plus grands rivaux : la Turquie ne reconnaît pas le génocide des Arméniens, ce qui en fait un éternel caillou dans la chaussure pour la réconciliation entre les deux États ; l’Azerbaïdjan à cause de la guerre du Haut-Karabagh et de l’ultranationalisme du discours d’Ilham Aliyev. En effet, lors des rencontres entre Nikol Pachinian et Ilham Aliyev, ce dernier a réclamé, dans la perspective de normalisation entre les deux pays, la cession des quelques territoires à la frontière dans la région du Tavouch, mais aussi de retirer du préambule de la Constitution de la République d’Arménie la référence à la Déclaration d’indépendance, qui évoque le génocide des Arméniens en « Arménie occidentale » (donc le territoire oriental de la Turquie actuelle) et l’Artsakh (donc le Haut-Karabagh, aujourd’hui intégré à l’Azerbaïdjan). Les références au mont Ararat dans les symboles nationaux de l’Arménie sont également négativement jugées par Ilham Aliyev. Enfin, ce dernier a parlé de l’Arménie comme de « l’Azerbaïdjan occidental », ce qui réveille le nationalisme arménien et plonge Erevan dans un dilemme : faut-il normaliser les relations avec Bakou pour enfin se rapprocher de l’Occident ou se préparer à une invasion de l’ensemble du territoire par l’armée azerbaïdjanaise ? En outre, la Russie tente de réapparaître dans le jeu diplomatique entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan. En effet, Vladimir Poutine a réalisé récemment une visite à Bakou, et essaie de réunir ses deux homologues autour d’un accord de paix durable, ce qui redonnerait à la Russie un rôle majeur dans la région. Entre OTAN et Russie : un jeu compliqué depuis la guerre en Ukraine et à Gaza L’invasion de l’Ukraine par l’armée russe en février 2022 a eu un effet indirect sur la situation dans le Haut-Karabagh, puisque que Moscou, qui était l’arbitre dans la région, a délaissé celle-ci et a ensuite pointé l’irresponsabilité du gouvernement d’Erevan. Aujourd’hui hors-jeu dans le conflit arméno-azerbaïdjanais, la Russie a laissé le leadership à d’autres puissances régionales, la Turquie en premier lieu. La Turquie est un membre de l’OTAN, mais ne partage pas toujours les positions des États occidentaux dans le conflit en Ukraine, et cherche à servir d’intermédiaire entre Vladimir Poutine et Volodymyr Zelensky, en vain. Le régime d’Ankara est régulièrement en froid avec ses partenaires européens. L’Azerbaïdjan a longtemps eu une relation privilégiée avec l’Ukraine, et est aussi membre de l’Organisation pour la démocratie et le développement,  soit une organisation de coopération régionale pro-européenne dans l’espace post-soviétique qui est censée contrebalancer l’influence russe et qui est aussi appelée GUAM, pour reprendre les initiales de ses membres : Géorgie, Ukraine, Azerbaïdjan et Moldavie. L’Azerbaïdjan a aussi été l’un des partenaires privilégiés de l’Union européenne sur l’énergie depuis la fin des échanges avec la Russie. Un accord entre la Commission européenne et l’Azerbaïdjan sur le gaz avait été signé en 2022. Cependant, l’Azerbaïdjan entretient aussi des relations exécrables avec certains pays européens, comme la France, et est même soupçonnée d’ingérence dans des mouvements indépendantistes en Nouvelle-Calédonie, en Martinique, en Corse et en Polynésie. La Turquie comme l’Azerbaïdjan ont réussi à prendre des distances vis-à-vis de la Russie, et à faire du commerce avec les Européens, mais s’opposent à eux sur certains sujets. Cette indépendance, que l’on pourrait qualifier d’ambiguïté stratégique, n’est possible que parce que la Turquie a réussi à construire son propre espace de coopération régionale. La guerre à Gaza a aussi révélé l’ambiguïté des régimes turc et azerbaïdjanais sur le sujet. La Turquie a régulièrement dénoncé l’offensive de Tsahal dans la bande de Gaza, autant dans ses relais médiatiques qu’aux Nations-Unies. Pourtant, la Turquie est l’un des principaux partenaires d’Israël. L’Azerbaïdjan est même davantage allié à Israël, considéré comme un véritable partenaire stratégique. Israël a vendu des systèmes de drones et de missiles à l’Azerbaïdjan qui ont été utilisés lors de sa guerre contre l’Arménie en 2020. L’Institut international de recherche sur la paix de Stockholm évoque même le chiffre de 69% d’importations d’armes d’origine israélienne entre 2016 et 2020. La raison de ce rapprochement est certainement la présence de l’Iran, ennemi juré d’Israël et grand rival de l’Azerbaïdjan.  A contrario, l’Arménie vient de reconnaître l’État de Palestine. Conclusion : Risques sécuritaires dans la région, enjeux qui concernent d’autres puissances Le Caucase du Sud est en pleine transformation d’un point de vue géopolitique. La fin de la guerre au Haut-Karabagh a certes achevé un conflit vieux de trente-cinq ans, mais les accords de paix entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan suscitent trop de contestation pour considérer que la rivalité entre les deux pays est terminée. Des efforts sont faits au niveau diplomatique, mais des intérêts de politique intérieure alimentent la possibilité d’une non-résolution du conflit, voire d’une exacerbation des tensions. Il est donc important de considérer les différents ordres du jour des pays de la région. Pour le gouvernement de Nikol Pachinian, la priorité est au rétablissement des relations avec ses voisins azerbaïdjanais et turc, afin de garantir la souveraineté de la république d’Arménie sur son territoire. Dans un second temps, la poursuite du rapprochement avec l’Occident est également un objectif affiché par le Premier ministre. Pour ce dernier, la perte de l’Artsakh est certes une tragédie pour le peuple arménien, mais est également une opportunité pour ne plus dépendre des orientations politiques du Kremlin : sortie de l’OTSC, fin des missions russes autour du Haut-Karabagh, alliances conclues avec des pays européens, candidature à l’adhésion à l’Union européenne. Deux défis s’imposent à lui : une défiance vis-à-vis d’une partie de la population, de plus en plus nationaliste et susceptible de vouloir rétablir le parapluie sécuritaire russe ; les positions extrêmement dures du régime de Bakou, qui ne vont pas dans le sens d’un apaisement, et qui, dans le discours du moins, prennent en tenaille les ambitions pacifistes de Nikol Pachinian. Pour Ilham Aliyev, l’agenda est plus difficile à décrypter. La reconquête du Haut-Karabagh était un principe quasi-consubstantiel à la formation de la république d’Azerbaïdjan, et la fin de cette guerre constitue un nouveau chapitre pour lui. L’Azerbaïdjan veut se développer sur le modèle des monarchies du Golfe arabo-persique. En effet, son modèle économique repose sur les exportations d’énergie, en l’occurrence le gaz, géré par la compagnie nationale SOCAR. Soucieux de montrer une image moderne de son pays, Ilham Aliyev a obtenu l’organisation de la COP29. Son prochain grand objectif est la mise en œuvre du projet de corridor de Zanguezour. S’il peut compter sur une très bonne relation avec la Turquie, l’Azerbaïdjan a vu ses relations avec ses partenaires européens sérieusement détériorées lors des derniers mois. La guerre menée pour restaurer sa souveraineté sur le Haut-Karabagh, dont plusieurs ONG rapportent des violations des droits de la personne ainsi que des crimes de guerre, lui a valu des critiques de la part de la Commission européenne et du Conseil de l’Europe. La France et l’Azerbaïdjan partagent désormais des relations exécrables, sur fond de cyberguerre, d’ingérences dans les affaires intérieures et de propagande. La Turquie cherche quant à elle à approfondir l’intégration avec l’Azerbaïdjan et soutient le projet de corridor de Zanguezour. En même temps, un léger rapprochement avec le gouvernement d’Erevan a eu lieu. Le but de la Turquie est de s’imposer comme acteur régional et d’être un interlocuteur incontournable des grandes puissances. Cette stratégie est proche de celle menée au Moyen-Orient (Syrie), en Afrique (Libye, Somalie) ou dans les Balkans occidentaux (Bosnie-Herzégovine, Kosovo). La Russie est clairement perdante dans les évolutions géostratégiques des dernières années. Militairement, la Russie a disparu du Caucase du Sud, excepté dans les républiques sécessionnistes géorgiennes. Cependant, parallèlement à sa volonté d’épuiser la résistance ukrainienne et son soutien occidental, la Russie essaie de réavancer ses pions dans le Caucase du Sud : alors qu’elle cherche à reprendre la main en Géorgie, elle peut également pousser une partie de la population arménienne à sanctionner le gouvernement de Nikol Pachinian et installer un régime plus favorable à Erevan, en jouant sur les tensions ethniques et la soif de revanche chez les Artsakhiotes. En parallèle, Vladimir Poutine est à la recherche d’un accord de paix entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan. En bref, le Kremlin a intérêt à s’imposer dans le Caucase, au vu de la situation dramatique dans sa partie septentrionale, en particulier au Daghestan, qui voit les velléités islamistes et indépendantistes progresser à vitesse grand V. Pour la République islamique d’Iran, l’objectif est surtout l’échec du corridor de Zanguezour, car ce dernier le priverait d’une vraie frontière avec l’Arménie, partenaire économique dans le Caucase. Les relations avec l’Azerbaïdjan ont toujours été assez froides, et ce dès l’indépendance de ce dernier. Le président azerbaïdjanais Aboulfaz Eltchibey (1992-1993) avait plaidé pour l’unification de l’ensemble des Azéris, y compris ceux vivant en Iran, qui représentent l’une des minorités les plus importantes de ce pays. Ce mouvement irrédentiste a amené l’Iran à prendre fait et cause pour l’Arménie, selon le principe « l’ennemi de mon ennemi est mon ami ». Le soutien permanent de Bakou à Israël renforce cette rivalité, et la mort dans un accident d’hélicoptère du président Ebrahim Raïssi de retour d’une visite en Azerbaïdjan n’ont pas arrangé les relations bilatérales. Enfin, la position des États occidentaux reste ambiguë. S’il y a évidemment des nuances dans les positions des différents États ou institutions, il existe une tendance lourde : les États-Unis, la France et l’Union européenne tentent de contrer l’influence des autres puissances régionales dans le Caucase. Mais la délicate question de leur position dans le conflit arméno-azerbaïdjanais s’est imposée : à plusieurs reprises, ces pays ont exprimé leur soutien aux Arméniens, tout en tentant de promouvoir des négociations entre Erevan et Bakou. D’une part comme de l’autre, la position occidentale a suscité des critiques : pour les Arméniens, cette position faisait fi du déséquilibre géopolitique et dans les violences ; pour l’Azerbaïdjan, la médiation était inaudible, au vu du soutien envers le Haut-Karabagh. Maintenant que la guerre est terminée, les Occidentaux peuvent retrouver un rôle de garant de sécurité régionale, surtout dans le but contrer les ambitions russes. ## Stratégie d’intersectionnalité URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/strategie-dintersectionnalite/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le Réseau d’analyse stratégique s’est engagé à avoir recours à une approche intersectionnelle pour atteindre ses objectifs. Contexte Prenant racine dans le mouvement féministe noir américain des années 1980 et 1990, la notion d’intersectionnalité fait référence à l'intersection des diverses identités sociales, physiologiques et psychologiques d'un individu qui façonnent sa perception de l’environnement ainsi que son expérience de vie. Dans une volonté d’atteindre la parité et de créer une société plus inclusive, le gouvernement fédéral canadien s’est engagé en 1995, dans le cadre de la ratification du Programme d’action de Beijing, à mettre en œuvre un outil permettant de faire avancer l’égalité entre les sexes au Canada (Canada, 2018a). Au début des années 2000, le gouvernement canadien lançait ainsi l’Analyse comparative entre les sexes (ACS), un outil visant la prise en compte des différences entre les sexes dans l’élaboration des programmes et des politiques et l’élimination des discrimination à l’égard des femmes. En 2011, Condition féminine Canada modernisait son approche en introduisant l’Analyse comparative entre les sexes plus (ACS+) afin de prendre en considération d’autres facteurs identitaires en même temps que le genre (Canada, 2018b). Depuis 2016, les mémoires au Cabinet et les présentations au Conseil du Trésor du Canada doivent obligatoirement inclure une ACS+. De plus, Condition féminine Canada a élaboré un cours en ligne accessible à tous afin d’enseigner les rudiments de l’outil et d’encourager les fonctionnaires à appliquer l’ACS+ à leur travail. Par ailleurs, le Réseau d’analyse stratégique s’est engagé à avoir recours à une approche intersectionnelle pour atteindre ses objectifs. Mise en œuvre d'une analyse intersectorielle L’analyse comparative entre les sexes plus (ACS+) L’ACS+ « sert à évaluer les répercussions potentielles des politiques, des programmes ou des initiatives sur divers ensembles de personnes – femmes, hommes ou autres » (Canada, 2018). L’outil propose une série de questions à poser avant d’entreprendre toute recherche ou toute activité dans le but de remettre en question les croyances ou les préjugés du chercheur ou de l’analyste. L’ACS+ comporte sept étapes distinctes : cerner les principaux enjeux, remettre en question les suppositions, recueillir les faits par des recherches et des consultations, formuler des options et des recommandations, surveiller et évaluer, communiquer (Canada, 2018). Certains chercheurs ont noté des limites à l’ACS+, dont le fait que l’outil repose d’abord sur une analyse selon le genre et le sexe avant d’inclure les autres facteurs identitaires (Hankivsky & Mussell, 2018).  De plus, les divers facteurs sont abordés comme des catégories indépendantes s’ajoutant les unes aux autres, ce qui va à l’encontre de l’essence même d’une approche intersectionnelle (Hankivsky & Mussell, 2018; Maillé, 2018). Certains ont également noté que la longue liste de questions proposées résulte souvent en un exercice consistant uniquement à cocher des cases plutôt qu’une réelle réflexion sur l’inclusion de groupes minoritaires. Enfin, nous ajoutons que les facteurs discriminants sont tous regroupés sous la catégorie « facteurs identitaires », sans aucune distinction quant à la réelle nature de ceux-ci. Bien que la stratégie d’intersectionnalité du Réseau d’analyse stratégique s’inspire de l’ACS+, elle innove en allant au-delà de celle-ci afin de s’assurer que la question de l’intersectionnalité soit bien présente dans l’ensemble des travaux des membres du Réseau et que ceux-ci reflètent une grande diversité et l’inclusion des groupes sous-représentés. Notre approche en matière d’intersectionnalité Notre stratégie d’intersectionnalité soutient que la perception des individus ainsi que leur expérience de vie sont façonnées par plusieurs facteurs pouvant s’avérer discriminants. L’importance et l’effet de ces facteurs peuvent varier selon le contexte et la situation. De plus, ces facteurs n’opèrent pas de façon indépendante, mais interagissent les uns avec les autres et peuvent contribuer à former des formes uniques de discrimination. Notre stratégie d’intersectionnalité se distingue de l’ACS+ de trois façons : Le point de départ n’est pas nécessairement le genre - Le point de départ de notre stratégie d’intersectionnalité n’est pas nécessairement le genre, mais varie selon la nature du projet ou de l’initiative. Par exemple, dans certains cas, le principal facteur discriminant peut être un handicap physique ou encore la langue, le genre pouvant influencer de façon secondaire. La stratégie d’intersectionnalité inclut trois types de facteurs discriminants  Les facteurs identitaires : Facteurs qui définissent l’identité d’un individu. Parmi les facteurs identitaires on retrouve notamment le genre, l’identité sexuelle, la race, la langue, la culture, l’origine ethnique, l’orientation sexuelle, etc. Les facteurs psycho-bio-neuro-physiologiques : Facteurs psychologiques, biologiques, neurologiques ou physiologiques qui affectent la façon dont les individus perçoivent ou expérimentent l’environnement externe. Parmi les facteurs psycho-bio-neuro-physiologiques on retrouve notamment le sexe biologique, l’âge, les handicaps physiques ou psychologiques, l’apparence physique, les styles d’apprentissage, les troubles d’apprentissage, etc. Les facteurs socio-économiques : Caractéristiques relatives à la position sociale ou économique d’un individu qui influencent son expérience de vie. Les facteurs socio-économiques incluent notamment le revenu, le niveau de scolarité, le lieu de résidence (rural vs. urbain, région vs. centre, etc.) , les conditions économiques de la communauté où vit un individu, la situation d’emploi, le statut matrimonial, la situation familiale, etc. La stratégie d’intersectionnalité inclut la prise en compte de la relation entre les catégories de facteurs discriminants – Les divers facteurs discriminants ne sont pas des catégories uniformes pouvant simplement être superposées les unes aux autres. Notre stratégie d’intersectionnalité s’intéresse spécifiquement à l’intersection de divers facteurs discriminants afin de comprendre comment la relation entre ces facteurs affecte la façon dont les individus perçoivent ou vivent une situation particulière. Pour aller plus loin, consultez notre capsule vidéo sur la diversité en tous genres dans les affaires stratégiques. Comment appliquer la stratégie d’intersectionnalité à notre travail ? L’ensemble des activités du Réseau d’analyse stratégique peut être regroupé sous trois grandes catégories : Activités de recherche et d’analyse; Activités de diffusion des résultats de la recherche; Activités de formation de nouveaux chercheurs et de nouveaux praticiens. Pour chaque catégorie, notre stratégie propose de répondre à trois questions fondamentales : Quel est le principal facteur discriminant ? Quels sont les autres facteurs qui influencent ou contribuent à la discrimination ? Comment l’intersection entre ces facteurs affecte-t-elle l’analyse et la recherche, la diffusion des résultats ou la formation des nouveaux chercheurs pour certains individus ? Ces trois questions nécessiteront d’effectuer des recherches afin de bien identifier les sous-groupes susceptibles d’être discriminés. Le type de données à recueillir variera selon la catégorie d’activités menée. Activités de recherche et d’analyse Les résultats de recherche et d’analyse sont fréquemment teintées des croyances et de biais inconscients des chercheurs. Les échantillons étudiés sont souvent considérés comme étant homogènes et les résultats obtenus sont ainsi généralisées à l’ensemble d’une population qui est également souvent pensée comme un tout homogène. Or, avant d’entreprendre des activités de recherche et d’analyse, il importe de se pencher sur les caractéristiques de l’échantillon ou de la population étudiée. Prenons par exemple une recherche s’intéressant à la rétention des recrues autochtones dans les Forces armées canadiennes. Il est possible que les raisons ayant incité certaines recrues à quitter l’organisation varient selon divers facteurs. Dans ce cas, le principal facteur discriminant sera l’origine autochtone puisqu’il sera intéressant de comprendre d’abord la différence entre les raisons qui poussent une recrue autochtone à quitter l’organisation à celles d’une recrue non-autochtone. Mais comme la catégorie « autochtone » n’est pas homogène, il est important d’identifier les autres facteurs pouvant modifier l’expérience des recrues. Par exemple, existe-t-il une différence entre les hommes et les femmes ? Est-ce que le fait d’avoir vécu sur une réserve ou non influence la décision des recrues ? La situation familiale influence-t-elle le choix ? Comment ces divers facteurs interagissent-ils ? Les raisons de quitter l’organisation sont-elles les mêmes pour un homme autochtone célibataire venant d’un centre urbain que pour une femme autochtone monoparentale venant d’une région plus éloignée ? D’autres facteurs peuvent-ils interagir et façonner l’expérience de ces recrues autochtones ? Avant d’entreprendre une activité de recherche ou d’analyse, il importe donc de bien noter les facteurs susceptibles d’influencer l’expérience de certains individus ou de sous-segments de la population et d’effectuer des recherches plus poussées et spécifiques afin d’éviter des généralisations qui omettraient de tenir compte de la spécificité des expériences de certains groupes qui sont sous-représentés dans notre société. Activités de diffusion des résultats de la recherche universitaire Les outils de diffusion des résultats de recherche sont la plupart du temps destinés à un public éduqué et sont souvent peu adaptés à un public plus large. Avant d’entreprendre l’élaboration de supports pour diffuser l’information, il importe de comprendre la diversité du public cible afin d’adapter les modes de communication. Par exemple, dans le cas d’une note d’information visant à informer des praticiens des résultats de recherches, le principal facteur discriminant sera le niveau de scolarité. On pourrait ainsi se demander si la note est écrite dans un langage accessible et exempt d’un jargon scientifique hermétique. Par ailleurs, selon l’audience cible, il importe de se demander si les personnes souffrant d’un handicap visuel peuvent avoir accès à la note d’information. Si la note est traduite, la traduction est-elle fidèle et reflète-t-elle la réalité propre à l’autre langue ? Les exemples et les expressions utilisées ont-ils une signification pour l’ensemble des individus qui liront cette note de façon à leur permettre de bien comprendre le message, ou sont-ils propres à la culture dominante ? Le format est-il facilement accessible pour tous ? Avant d’élaborer un outil de diffusion des résultats de recherche, il importe donc de bien noter les facteurs susceptibles d’influencer ou de limiter la compréhension des destinataires, afin d’éviter de limiter l’accès aux connaissances à certains groupes qui sont sous-représentés dans notre société. Activités de formation de nouveaux chercheurs et de nouveaux praticiens Les programmes de formation sont souvent conçus pour répondre aux besoins d’un public peu diversifié. Or, afin de maximiser la portée des activités de formation de nouveaux chercheurs et de nouveaux praticiens, il importe de bien définir les caractéristiques des participants et d’adapter les activités aux divers besoins et aux diverses réalités. Par exemple, dans le cas de la mise sur pied d’un programme de stagiaire postdoctoral dans le but de développer l’expertise bilingue des jeunes chercheurs canadiens, le principal facteur discriminant sera la langue parlée. La réalité des jeunes chercheurs francophones diffère considérablement de celle des jeunes chercheurs anglophones puisque le français demeure une langue minoritaire dans l’ensemble du Canada, sauf au Québec, ce qui est susceptible d’influencer l’expérience de chacun. Comment l’expérience d’apprentissage d’un stagiaire postdoctoral autochtone parlant majoritairement le français et habitant au Québec peut différer d’une stagiaire postdoctorale noire parlant l’anglais et habitant dans l’ouest canadien ? Enfin, d’autres facteurs peuvent également façonner l’expérience d’apprentissage comme les handicaps neurologiques, physiologiques ou psychologiques (ex. : dyslexie, troubles anxieux, etc.). Avant de concevoir des activités de formation de nouveaux chercheurs et de nouveaux praticiens, il importe donc de bien répertorier les facteurs susceptibles d’influencer les expériences d’apprentissage et d’élaborer des programmes qui sont bien adaptés à une population diversifiée afin de permettre aux participants de tirer le maximum de leur expérience. Le graphique suivant illustre notre stratégie d’intersectionnalité : Évaluer la mise en œuvre de la stratégie d’intersectionnalité L’équipe de direction du Réseau stratégique d’analyse s’est engagée à présenter un bilan annuel de la stratégie d’intersectionnalité au Conseil scientifique, cette évaluation visant à nous permettre d’ajuster nos activités afin de s’assurer que celles-ci comportent une grande diversité et inclusion des groupes sous-représentés. À cette fin, nous demandons à tous les membres du réseau de remplir un court formulaire (ci-bas) permettant de noter les facteurs discriminants que vous avez identifiés, ainsi que les mesures prises afin de tenir compte du caractère unique de l’expérience de certains sous-groupes minoritaires de notre société. Le formulaire doit ensuite être envoyée à Isabelle Caron, responsable de la mise en œuvre de la stratégie d’intersectionnalité pour le Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Lien vers le formulaire : https://forms.gle/PQJ4XACveXgk2Y7aA Pour aller plus loin Canada, "Qu’est-ce que l’ACS+?,” Condition féminine Canada, 2018. Olena Hankivsky, “Intersectionality 101,” The Institute for Intersectionality Research and Policy, Simon Fraser University (2014).  Chantal Maillé, “Intersectionalizing Gender Policies: Experiences in Quebec and Canada” French Politics 16:3 (2018): 312-327.  Olena Hankivsky & Linda Mussell, “Gender-Based Analysis Plus in Canada: Problems and Possibilities of Integrating Intersectionality,” Canadian Public Policy 44:4 (2018): 303-316.  ## Suspension d’un comité de défense par les États-Unis: Un geste de mauvais augure URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/suspension-dun-comite-de-defense-par-les-etats-unis-un-geste-de-mauvais-augure/ Modified: 2026-05-27 Ce passage est un extrait d'une lettre d'opinion publiée par Justin Massie et Stéphane Roussel dans La Presse.  Le 18 août 1940, le président Franklin D. Roosevelt et le premier ministre canadien William Lyon Mackenzie King diffusent la déclaration d’Ogdensburg, du nom de la petite ville de l’État de New York où se sont réunis les deux dirigeants. Ce communiqué annonce une première, soit la création d’une institution bilatérale chargée de faire des recommandations aux gouvernements sur les sujets touchants à la défense conjointe de l’Amérique du Nord. La Commission permanente mixte canado-américaine de défense (mieux connue sous son acronyme anglais de PJBD) a survécu à la fin de la guerre et a fonctionné tout au long de la guerre froide, avec des hauts et des bas. Après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, elle a contribué à faire évoluer la réflexion sur la sécurité des deux pays, notamment sur la réévaluation et la modernisation du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD) ou encore sur la coopération dans l’Arctique. Quatre-vingt-six ans plus tard, le sous-secrétaire d’État à la Guerre des États-Unis, Elbridge Colby, annonce mettre cette institution « sur pause », le Canada ayant « échoué à faire des progrès crédibles » en matière de défense. Quelles sont les véritables raisons de cette décision et quelles en sont les conséquences ? *** Pour lire la suite, rendez-vous sur le site Internet de La Presse. Crédit image: Martin Chamberland, Archives La Presse. ## Suspension du PJBD : quelle devrait être la réaction du Canada ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/suspension-du-pjbd-quelle-devrait-etre-la-reaction-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-05-29 Forum politique est un format de publication qui vise à stimuler le débat en présentant un large éventail d’opinions d’experts sur un sujet important pour la sécurité nationale du Canada. Pour cette sixième édition, nous avons demandé à trois experts de répondre à cette question : Comment le Canada devrait-il réagir à l’annonce récente selon laquelle le département américain de la Défense suspend sa participation au Comité mixte permanent de défense (PJBD) ? Créé pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale par un accord entre les États-Unis et le Canada avec un mandat général consistant à prodiguer des conseils sur toute question de défense et de sécurité continentale, le PJBD réunissait des praticiens civils et militaires afin de formuler des recommandations à l’intention des deux gouvernements. Il a marqué le point de départ des relations bilatérales en matière de défense entre Ottawa et Washington. Nicholas Glesby | Université Trent Avant la suspension officielle récemment annoncée, le PJBD était déjà de facto en pause, les États-Unis n’ayant organisé aucune réunion en 2025. Il existe toutefois d’autres institutions binationales qui opèrent au niveau opérationnel quotidien, telles que le Comité de coopération militaire (CCM), le NORAD, ainsi que les communications quotidiennes entre le Quartier général de la Défense nationale et le Pentagone. Les Canadiens ont besoin de plus d’informations pour évaluer pleinement les intentions derrière cette pause, au-delà du discours historique selon lequel le Canada serait faible en matière de défense. Le Canada consacre désormais 2 % de son PIB à la défense (et s’est engagé à atteindre 5 % d’ici 2035), avance à grands pas dans la mise en œuvre des projets de modernisation du NORAD, tels que le radar arctique « Over-the-Horizon », et les pilotes de la Force aérienne royale canadienne s’entraînent sur des appareils F-35 dont la livraison est imminente. Le Canada rend son territoire « à l’abri d’une attaque ou d’une invasion potentielle » qui menacerait la sécurité américaine, ce qui continue de guider l’approche d’Ottawa en matière de défense continentale. Le PJBD est un symbole durable de cette relation particulière. Par conséquent, cette pause annoncée de manière aussi publique est remarquable. Bien que la nature secrète du Conseil maintienne les discussions à l’abri des regards du public, ce qui signifie que la plupart des Nord-Américains ignorent son existence discrète, les Canadiens devraient considérer cette pause comme un signe que la vision plus large de Washington sur cette relation est en train d’évoluer. Cette pause « pourrait éventuellement être assouplie ou discrètement annulée » pour faire face à « l’environnement de menaces le plus complexe et en évolution rapide que nous ayons connu ». D’ici là, le Canada devra se concentrer sur d’autres canaux pour maintenir ses engagements permanents envers son voisin en matière de défense de l’Amérique du Nord. Nicholas Glesby est doctorant à l'École d'études canadiennes de l'Université Trent, administrateur du Réseau nord-américain et arctique de défense et de sécurité (NAADSN) et boursier étudiant au Centre d'études sur la défense et la sécurité (CDSS). Justin Massie | UQAM La suspension du PJBD par l’administration Trump constitue un signal politique préoccupant pour l’avenir des relations canado-américaines. L’administration Trump justifie sa décision par le manque de détails entourant le plan canadien de dépenses militaires. Cette critique n’est pas infondée : Ottawa n’a toujours pas présenté de plan détaillé expliquant comment le Canada atteindra 3,5 % du PIB en défense d’ici 2035. Toutefois, les demandes américaines traduisent une volonté d’imposer les choix stratégiques et industriels de Washington au Canada. Les responsables américains reprochent au Canada de ne pas avoir un plan crédible précisant concrètement comment Ottawa envisage s’aligner sur leurs priorités en matière de défense continentale, incluant la décision qui tarde concernant l’acquisition de 62 F-35. La suspension du PJBD apparaît ainsi comme une pression politique destinée à rappeler au Canada les coûts potentiels d’une plus grande autonomie stratégique. Si Ottawa refuse cette logique et poursuit la diversification stratégique, comme semble démontrer l’acquisition des GlobalEye de Saab, les tensions pourraient s’étendre à d’autres domaines. Dans le scénario le plus extrême, cela pourrait remettre en question le NORAD, considéré comme le cœur de la défense continentale. Céder aux pressions américaines ne réglerait toutefois pas le problème. Une concession encouragerait de nouvelles exigences demain. L’idée du premier ministre Carney d’une « forteresse nord-américaine » repose sur une hypothèse fragile : celle d’une convergence des intérêts canado-américains. La stratégie de la Maison-Blanche vise plutôt une réindustrialisation américaine aux dépends de ses alliés, combinée à une volonté d’imposer l’achat de plateformes américaines comme condition de la coopération stratégique. L’hypothèse d’un « grand bargain » nord-américain apparaît donc peu plausible. Dans ce contexte, la meilleure réponse du gouvernement canadien serait de rendre public un plan décennal cohérent de réinvestissement militaire qui assume clairement l’objectif de diversification de ses partenariats industriels de défense. Justin Massie est professeur titulaire et directeur du département de sciences politiques à l’UQAM. Il est également directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique et co-directeur de la publication Le Rubicon. En 2019, il a occupé la chaire de recherche Fulbright sur les relations canado-américaines à l’Université Johns Hopkins. Richard Shimooka | Institut Macdonald-Laurier Il y a de fortes chances que les efforts du sous-secrétaire à la Défense Elbridge Colby constituent un exemple d’entrepreneuriat politique de sa part, et qu’ils ne traduisent pas pour autant une volonté plus large de l’administration de modifier les relations bilatérales. Le processus interinstitutionnel de l’administration Trump s’est parfois révélé inefficace, c’est le moins qu’on puisse dire. Ses priorités sont clairement ailleurs : la guerre avec l’Iran, le déploiement bâclé de troupes en Pologne, l’adoption du budget de réconciliation et les prochaines élections de mi-mandat. Compte tenu de la faible importance du PJBD dans les relations bilatérales existantes entre les États-Unis et le Canada, Colby a peut-être pu le suspendre sans rencontrer beaucoup, voire aucune, résistance bureaucratique. Il ne faut donc pas réagir de manière excessive à l’annonce de Colby. Ottawa devrait plutôt s’attaquer aux racines du problème qui a apparemment provoqué la décision de Colby : les capacités militaires limitées du gouvernement et la lenteur du processus de modernisation. La capacité militaire du Canada est bien inférieure à celle de la plupart des autres alliés et dépend fortement de l’aide des États-Unis pour la défense de l’Amérique du Nord. Les membres des deux partis, l’establishment américain de la sécurité nationale, ainsi que d’autres partenaires et alliés, partagent cette vision du Canada. Bien que le gouvernement Carney semble déterminé à regrouper les questions de défense et de commerce dans une sorte d’accord, la nature désorganisée de l’administration Trump rend une telle approche difficile. Pour elle, la sécurité et la défense sont deux domaines distincts et restent des aspects non négociables des relations bilatérales. Il serait prudent pour Ottawa de collaborer avec le département de la Défense et d’apaiser ses inquiétudes concernant les Forces armées canadiennes de manière concrète. Richard Shimooka est chercheur à l’Institut Macdonald-Laurier. Il a été chercheur au sein du Programme d’études sur la gestion de la défense de l’Université Queen’s de 2007 à 2012, puis chercheur à l’Institut de la Conférence des associations de défense de 2012 à 2017. Crédit image: “Flags over Logan Pass” par GlacierNPS, Public Domain Mark. ## Table ronde – À quoi s’attendre de la guerre en Ukraine ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-a-quoi-sattendre-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2023-03-20 > Un an après l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine, cette table-ronde a pour objectif de faire le point sur les perspectives de paix précaires... À quoi s’attendre de la guerre en Ukraine ? Perspectives de paix, craintes d’escalade et avenir de l’architecture de sécurité européenne Un an après l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine, cette table-ronde a pour objectif de faire le point sur les perspectives de paix précaires (par ex., un cessez-le feu) et durables (par ex. un traité de paix), les perspectives d’une escalade de la guerre, ainsi que d’entrevoir l’avenir de l’architecture de sécurité en Europe. Modérateur : Prof. Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) Intervenant-e-s : Prof. Dominique Arel (Université d’Ottawa) Dr. Laurent Borzillo (Université du Québec à Montréal) Prof. Yann Breault (Collège militaire royal de St-Jean) Prof. Magdalena Dembinska (Université de Montréal) Prof. Delphine Deschaux-Dutard (Université de Grenoble Alpes) Prof. Heidi Hardt (Université de Californie, Irvine) Dr. Falk Ostermann (Université de Kiel) Dr. Ekaterina Piskunova (Université de Montréal) Prof. Olivier Schmitt (Université du Sud-Danemark) ## Table ronde – Drones et nouvelles technologies militaires URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/video-drones/ Modified: 2022-11-25 > L’objectif de la table ronde est d’aborder la place et le rôle des drones et des nouvelles technologies militaires... L’objectif de la table ronde est d’aborder la place et le rôle des drones et des nouvelles technologies militaires (ex : missiles hypersoniques) sur le champ de bataille compte tenu des enseignements pouvant être retirés des affrontements en Ukraine suite à l’invasion russe de février 2022. Alors qu’en réponse au comportement agressif et menaçant russe, on assiste à une augmentation des budgets d’armements au sein des pays membres de l’OTAN, au vu des choix en termes de dépenses à venir pour le Canada, il convient de s’interroger sur les apports réels (mais potentiellement aussi plus limité que prévu) de ces nouveaux outils dans la conduite de la guerre. Intervenantes : Dr. Ulrike Franke, chercheure à l’European Council on Foreign Relation Dr. Dominika Kunertova, chercheure à l’ETH Zürich – Center for Security Studies Anna Nadibaidze, étudiante au doctorat, Center for War Studies Université du Danemark du Sud Colonel David Pappalardo, attaché Air et Espace, Ambassade de France aux États-Unis Modératrice: Dr. Chantal Lavallée, professeure adjointe au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean ## Table Ronde – L’évolution de l’environnement politique et stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-levolution-de-lenvironnement-politique-et-strategique/ Modified: 2024-06-11 > Alors que les prochaines élections américaines approchent, cette table ronde réunit les directrices et directeurs de différents réseaux de... Alors que les prochaines élections américaines approchent, cette table ronde réunit les directrices et directeurs de différents réseaux de recherche canadiens afin d’engager une réflexion approfondie sur les enjeux stratégiques auxquels le Canada doit se préparer. Dans ce contexte, il est crucial que le Canada anticipe ces changements pour préserver ses intérêts et principes. Modérateur : Daniel Jean, Membre du Conseil Stratégique Intervenant.e.s : -- Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Directrice du Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP) et Professeure titulaire, Université de Montréal -- Stephen M. Saideman, Directeur du Réseau canadien sur la défense et la sécurité (RCDS) et Professeur titulaire, Université Carleton -- Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Chef d’Opérations Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) -- Guy Thibault, Président du Conseil d’administration du Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute ## Table ronde – Les défis sécuritaires en Afrique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-les-defis-securitaires-en-afrique/ Modified: 2023-06-26 A l’occasion de la prochaine publication du tome 6 Rubicon aux éditions Les Equateurs consacré aux défis sécuritaires en Afrique, cette table ronde réunissant les auteurs de ce nouveau volume permettra d’aborder en détails les divers enjeux traités par cet ouvrage. Modératrice : Marie-Eve Desrosiers Participants : Dr. Arthur Banga, Université Houphouët-Boigny Arthur Boutellis Général (e. r.) Didier Castres Alexandra Lamarche Dr. Oswald Padonou, professeur et directeur de programme à l’École Nationale Supérieure des Armées (ENSA-Bénin) Raphael Parens, chercheur associé au Foreign Policy Research Institute Michael Shurkin Dr. Nina Wilén, directrice du programme Afrique pour les relations internationales à l’Institut Egmont ## Table ronde 1 – AXE I – La Guerre en Ukraine : Quelles leçons à tirer et quelles perspectives de paix ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-1-axe-i-la-guerre-en-ukraine-quelles-lecons-a-tirer-et-quelles-perspectives-de-paix/ Modified: 2023-03-17 > Opérations, formation, logistique, renseignement et dissuasion nucléaire. Modération : Eliza Gheorghe. Panélistes : Frans Osinga... Table ronde 1 : Leçons militaires à tirer : opérations, formation, logistique, renseignement et dissuasion nucléaire Modération : Eliza Gheorghe, Bilkent University Panélistes : - Frans Osinga, Leiden University - Hanna Shelest, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”/ Ukraine Analytica - Alexander Lanoszka, University of Waterloo ## Table ronde 1 – Le choc des organisations régionales et internationales URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/2021-table-ronde-1/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > Cette table ronde explore les répercussions de la COVID-19 sur les organisations régionales et internationales. Alors que la réponse... Cette table ronde explore les répercussions de la COVID-19 sur les organisations régionales et internationales. Alors que la réponse logique à une problématique mondiale comme celle de la COVID-19 serait de miser sur des efforts multilatéraux, la pandémie a évincé les initiatives multilatérales et même régionales, au profit de l’augmentation des sentiments nationalistes et des réponses auto-intéressées de la part de nombreux États. Dans la période post-pandémique, les États pourraient ainsi investir davantage dans l’autosuffisance et redéfinir leurs domaines stratégiques, notamment en matière de sécurité sanitaire. L’écart croissant entre les réponses nationales, régionales et multilatérales à la COVID-19 remet en question le développement de la gouvernance mondiale et de l’intégration régionale, ainsi que l’avenir des organisations internationales et leurs capacités de coopération économique et politique. Les intervenants reviendront sur les tendances et les capacités d’adaptation de différents États, organisations ou entités internationales, face à ces grands enjeux. Modéré par Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Université Bishop’s) avec : Jean-Christophe Boucher (University of Calgary), Daniel Jean (Conseil stratégique, Réseau d’analyse stratégique), Stéphanie Bélanger (Collège militaire royal du Canada) et Roromme Chantal (Université de Moncton) ## Table ronde 1 : Politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-1-politisation-des-enjeux-de-defense-et-dorientation-strategique/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > Table ronde 1 : Politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique Thèmes : impact sur les décisions lorsque les enjeux viennent à être médiatisés ; impact sur les décisions de défense (opex, acquisition militaire) ; les questions de défense, des politiques publiques traditionnellement vues comme consensuelles, en processus de polarisation. Modération : Pr. Frédéric Mérand (UdeM) - Jean-Charles Larsonneur (député à l’Assemblée nationale 2017-2024) - Laurent Charbonneau (UdeM) - Laurent Borzillo, chercheur invité (CCEAE, UdeM/ ENAP) ## Table ronde 2 – AXE I – La Guerre en Ukraine : Quelles leçons à tirer et quelles perspectives de paix ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-2-axe-i-la-guerre-en-ukraine-quelles-lecons-a-tirer-et-quelles-perspectives-de-paix/ Modified: 2023-03-17 > Fin de la guerre et règlement de l’après-guerre : À quoi ressemblera un règlement politique. Modération : Jack Porter... Table ronde 2 : Fin de la guerre et règlement de l’après-guerre : À quoi ressemblera un règlement politique ? Modération : Jack Porter, The Citadel Panélistes : - Oxana Shevel , Tufts University - Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal - Maria Popova, McGill University ## Table ronde 2 – Coopérer avec nos rivaux dans un monde post-pandémique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/2021-table-ronde-2/ Modified: 2021-12-17 > Le déclin du leadership américain est considéré comme directement responsable des efforts des gouvernements nationaux pour se débrouiller... Le déclin du leadership américain est considéré comme directement responsable des efforts des gouvernements nationaux pour se débrouiller seuls face à la pandémie de la COVID-19. L’incapacité du président Donald Trump à mener la lutte contre la COVID-19 et à faire des gestes diplomatiques, mis à part de blâmer la Chine, est apparue comme un signe renouvelé de la prétendue faillite de l’ordre mondial libéral. La Chine et la Russie ont contribué à la redéfinition la compétition entre grandes puissances et le sens classique/occidental de la guerre, ce qui rend la réponse de l’Occident, c’est-à-dire des États-Unis, d’autant plus importante. Considérant le potentiel de la pandémie dans la création d’une conscience mondiale, il serait logique que l’Occident y réponde en renforçant ses alliances. Dans cette optique, la seconde table ronde pose la question centrale suivante : comment coopérer avec nos rivaux dans un contexte post-pandémie ? Alors que la pandémie a intensifié de nombreuses rivalités, il demeure que la coopération, même avec ses rivaux, est nécessaire pour faire face aux défis et menaces entraînés par le retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances et la menace posée par des États révisionnistes tels que l’Iran. Modérée par Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Srdjan Vucetic (Université d’Ottawa) Zachary Paikin (Centre for European Policy Studies) Gaëlle Rivard-Piché (Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada) MGén Huddleston (Chef d’État major- opérations interarmées du Canada, commandant de l’ARC) ## Table ronde 2 : La politisation en période électorale : un enjeu de défense et/ou d’orientation stratégique peut-il devenir l’enjeu majeur d’une élection/de la vie politique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-2-la-politisation-en-periode-electorale-un-enjeu-de-defense-et-ou-dorientation-strategique-peut-il-devenir-lenjeu-majeur-dune-election-de-la-vie-politique/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > La politisation en période électorale : un enjeu de défense et/ou d’orientation stratégique peut-il devenir l’enjeu majeur d’une élection... Thèmes : élections en Moldavie et en Géorgie (automne 2024) ; le sujet de la guerre russo- ukrainienne dans les démocraties occidentales ; les enjeux de défense lors des élections. Modération : Pr. Delphine Deschaux-Dutard (Université de Grenoble Alpes) - Florian Galleri (Université de Nantes) - Justin Massie (UQAM) - Maud Quessard (IRSEM) - Romain Le Quiniou (Euro Créative) ## Table ronde 3 : La politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique. URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-3-la-politisation-des-enjeux-de-defense-et-dorientation-strategique/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > Table ronde 3 : La politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique.......................... Table ronde 3 : La politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique, une conséquence des ingérences et de la diffusion des fake news Modération : Manon Fitzpatrick (Université de Genève) - Jean F. Crombois (Université américaine en Bulgarie) - Maxime Audinet (IRSEM) ## Table ronde 4 : Quelles contre-mesures contre les fake news et la politisation négative des enjeux de défense ? La politisation peut-elle être une solution ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-4-quelles-contre-mesures-contre-les-fake-news-et-la-politisation-negative-des-enjeux-de-defense-la-politisation-peut-elle-etre-une-solution/ Modified: 2024-12-18 > Quelles contre-mesures contre les fake news et la politisation négative des enjeux de défense ? La politisation peut-elle être une solution Modération : Diya Jiang (Université McGill) - Jean-Charles Larsonneur (député à l’Assemblée nationale 2017-2024) - Cristian Preda (Université de Bucarest) - Yannick Pincé (CIENS) - Laurent Cordonier (Fondation Descartes) - Tom Morin-Robinson (NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division) ## Table-ronde sur la défense Canadienne URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/table-ronde-sur-la-defense-canadienne/ Modified: 2022-11-22 Modérateurs : Stéfanie von Hlakty (Professeure agrégée, Université Queen’s) et Justin Massie (Professeur titulaire, Université du Québec à Montréal) Intervenants: Roland Paris (Professeur titulaire, Université d'Ottawa) Kerry Buck (Professionnelle en résidence, École supérieure d'affaires publiques et internationales, Université d'Ottawa) Jean-Christophe Boucher (Professeur adjoint, University of Calgary) ## Taïwan : une invasion est peu probable, mais la dissuasion reste vitale URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/taiwan-une-invasion-est-peu-probable-mais-la-dissuasion-reste-vitale/ Modified: 2022-09-06 > Tout en rappelant les raisons pour lesquelles l’invasion ne se produira pas, cet article examine les mesures qui seront probablement prises par le PCC dans les années à venir contre Taïwan et contre les pays qu’il perçoit comme des partisans de Taïwan et formule des suggestions sur la façon dont les gouvernements des pays démocratiques devraient réagir. Cet article est la version écrite d’une contribution faite le 2 juin 2022 lors d’une conférence « Is War over Taiwan Coming? » tenue à l’Université du Québec à Montréal. La version en anglais de cet article est disponible également sur le site du Council on Geostrategy.   En mai 2022, l’ancien secrétaire d'État des Affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth, Lord Hague, a consacré sa chronique hebdomadaire à la nécessité de recourir à la dissuasion militaire pour décourager le Parti communiste chinois (PCC) de lancer une invasion contre Taïwan. Hague n’est pas le premier – ni le dernier – à s’inquiéter d’une possible agression imminente de la part de la Chine. En mars 2021, lors de son témoignage devant le Comité des forces armées du Sénat des États-Unis, l’amiral Philip Davidson a affirmé que cette menace d’une invasion pourrait se « manifester » d’ici 2027. Pour autant, selon nous, malgré sa rhétorique de plus en plus belliqueuse et sa réaction à la visite à Taïwan de la présidente de la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis, Nancy Pelosi, le PCC n’envahira pas Taïwan au cours de la prochaine décennie. Il n’imposera pas non plus de blocus prolongé. Les conséquences économiques qui découleraient d’une potentielle action constituent en effet une contrainte essentielle pour le PCC. Le proverbe chinois « soulever une pierre et se la laisser tomber sur le pied » équivalent de l’expression «  se tirer une balle dans le pied » constituerait un euphémisme des plus légers de la situation qui en découlerait, tant le désastre qui en en résulterait pour les économies mondiale et chinoise serait conséquent. Un krach économique s’ensuivrait, provoquant un chômage massif en République populaire de Chine (RPC). Sans un filet de sécurité sociale adéquat, le chômage entraînerait un mécontentement de la population qui serait dirigé contre le parti. Jusqu’à présent, le PCC a toujours réussi à limiter les protestations aux questions locales . Toutefois il est probable qu’une dépression économique découlant d’une invasion conduise à des manifestations d’une ampleur qui dépasserait les limites de certaines villes et  districts (xian) pour prendre une ampleur nationale. Elles pourraient bien devenir une menace existentielle pour le parti. Or c’est un risque que le PCC – pour qui le maintien au pouvoir est primordial – ne prendra pas. Même si des blocus  et l’invasion ne se produisent pas – sous réserve d’absence de déclaration d’indépendance taïwanaise, le PCC ayant promis que celle-ci entraînerait automatiquement une invasion – le détroit de Taïwan sera le théâtre de violentes tempêtes géopolitiques – voire de typhons – au cours de la prochaine décennie. De plus, les gouvernements étrangers seraient bien avisés de se préparer au pire, même si les chances que le pire se produise sont faibles. Ainsi, une stratégie de dissuasion militaire reste nécessaire. Mais même nécessaire, celle-ci est insuffisante. La dissuasion politique et économique est plus importante encore. Pourtant, il s’agit d’un domaine largement négligé par les décideurs. Tout en rappelant les raisons pour lesquelles l’invasion ne se produira pas, cet article examine les mesures qui seront probablement prises par le PCC dans les années à venir contre Taïwan et contre les pays qu’il perçoit comme des partisans de Taïwan et formule des suggestions sur la façon dont les gouvernements des pays démocratiques devraient réagir. La dissuasion économique est à cet égard plus importante que la dissuasion militaire, bien que  les deux demeurent nécessaires. Deux points préliminaires Trop de commentateurs reprennent sans réfléchir les déclarations du PCC sur Taïwan. Deux revendications en particulier doivent être contestées : « Le principe d’une seule Chine représente un consensus universel dans la communauté internationale » ; et « Taïwan appartient à la Chine depuis l’Antiquité. Cette déclaration est fondée sur une base historique et sur une jurisprudence solide. » Ni l’une ni l’autre de ces déclarations n’est vraie. De nombreuses démocraties (entre autres, les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, l’Australie, le Canada et les Pays-Bas) n’ont pas adhéré au « principe d’une seule Chine » du PCC : elles maintiennent uniquement une « politique d’une seule Chine ». Le PCC ignore délibérément cette distinction importante[1]. Dans le communiqué de 1972 publié lorsque le Royaume-Uni et la RPC ont établi des relations diplomatiques, le Royaume-Uni « a reconnu la position du gouvernement chinois selon laquelle Taïwan est une province de la République populaire de Chine ». La position des États-Unis était encore plus explicite : « reconnaissent le fait que tous les Chinois des deux côtés du détroit de Taïwan maintiennent qu’il n’y a qu’une seule Chine et que Taïwan fait partie de la Chine » et « ne contestent pas cette position »[2]. Le Royaume-Uni et d’autres pays faisaient valoir qu’ils n’acceptaient ni ne rejetaient le point de vue chinois ; ils l’ont noté et n’ont pris aucune position à ce sujet. Cinquante ans plus tard, ces pays ne devraient pas permettre au PCC de les mettre dans une mauvaise posture, en déformant leur position et en les accusant de revenir sur des accords signés. Deuxièmement, il est moins important de s’opposer au PCC sur son interprétation de l’histoire de Taïwan que de continuer à souligner que les vingt-quatre millions de Taïwanais ont le droit de jouir des bienfaits d’une démocratie et de choisir leur propre voie sans coercition. Xi Jinping, le Secrétaire général du PCC, a déclaré : « le Parti dirige tout ». L’histoire ne fait pas exception : elle sert le PCC, et non pas la vérité. Toutefois, bien qu’il ne soit pas difficile de démontrer que l’histoire de Taïwan telle qu’elle est présentée par le PCC est une ineptie[3], les valeurs comptent plus que les débats sur la fabrication et la manipulation de l’histoire – et il n’est pas déraisonnable de soupçonner que le PCC utilise cela à seule fin de distraire avec un débat sur l’histoire, et ce, afin d’éviter un débat sur la capacité du peuple taïwanais à choisir son propre destin. Carte 1: L'Indo-Pacifique dans une perspective chinoise   Les raisons militaires pour lesquelles l’invasion reste improbable Il existe de bonnes raisons militaires pour lesquelles une invasion est peu probable. Les invasions maritimes sont des entreprises difficiles pour une armée expérimentée, ce que l’Armée populaire de libération (APL) n’est pas. Le détroit de Taïwan est large de 100 milles nautiques, et ses eaux et les conditions météorologiques y sont imprévisibles. La topographie de Taïwan ne faciliterait pas de plus l’invasion : il n’y a pas plus de quatorze plages sur lesquelles des quantités importantes d’hommes et de matériel pourraient être débarquées ; une fois à terre, les envahisseurs seraient confrontés à un terrain montagneux et étroit, plus favorable à la défense qu’à l’attaque. Les États-Unis seraient prévenus d’une attaque à l’avance et pourraient alors intervenir. Taïwan ne peut pas rivaliser avec le PCC en matière d’armement conventionnel, mais il s’est doté de capacités  asymétriques, à savoir sa défense dite « porc-épic » (comprenant des mines marines, des drones, des systèmes de défense aérienne et anti-blindés portables, des engins d’attaque rapide armés de missiles). Il sera ainsi difficile d’éliminer les petits détachements mobiles avant qu’ils n’infligent de lourdes pertes. Même si l’APL parvient à débarquer en nombre suffisant, la topographie de l’île se prête à la résistance de la guérilla. Du point de vue de Pékin ou d’ailleurs, il est impossible de savoir, avant que l’invasion se produise, si le peuple taïwanais défendra ou non sa patrie avec la ténacité dont ont fait preuve les Ukrainiens. Toutefois s’ils faisaient preuve de détermination, ils pourraient infliger de lourdes pertes. Une deuxième inconnue demeure : les États-Unis viendraient-ils à la défense de Taïwan ? Le Taiwan Relations Act oblige les États-Unis à fournir des armes à caractère défensif et à maintenir la capacité de l’île à résister à tout recours à la force ou à d’autres formes de coercition qui mettraient en péril la sécurité ou le système social et économique du peuple taïwanais. Si les États-Unis ne venaient pas en aide à Taïwan, ils perdraient leur emprise sur le Pacifique occidental. Taïwan fait partie intégrante de la « première chaîne d’îles » (voir : carte 1). Posséder cette chaîne permettrait à l’APL de dominer la « deuxième chaîne d’îles » et de menacer les bases américaines à Guam et Okinawa. De plus, échouer à aider Taïwan serait susceptible de faire douter les alliés américains dans la région et de les convaincre qu’eux non plus ne pourraient pas compter sur un soutien américain en cas de crise. Le Japon serait alors particulièrement préoccupé. Les raisons économiques qui feraient d’un blocus complet ou d’une invasion un désastre pour le PCC Actuellement, l’économie de la RPC ne se porte pas bien. Les raisons sont autant systémiques que conjoncturelles. Le PCC souhaite s’appuyer sur l’augmentation de la consommation et sur le marché domestique pour renforcer sa croissance économique. Toutefois, la consommation est restée obstinément basse, et continuera de l’être en l’absence de réformes politiques qui sont nécessaires pour donner du pouvoir et de l’argent aux consommateurs. L’ancien modèle qui reposait sur l’investissement ne permet pas de résoudre le problème de la baisse des rendements et de la productivité. Le troisième pilier de l’économie reste celui des exportations et une invasion de Taïwan détruirait ce pilier. On estime que 30% du commerce mondial passe par la mer de Chine méridionale. À l’exception des marchandises à destination de la Corée du Sud et du Japon, la quasi-totalité du commerce maritime de la RPC passe à proximité de Taïwan ou des bases américaines à Okinawa. Un blocus ou une invasion entraînerait une hausse des frais d’assurance de transport et des taux d’embauche. Au moins pendant un certain temps, les armateurs seraient réticents à faire passer leurs cargaisons près de la zone. En 2021, Taïwan a exporté 188,9 milliards de dollars (160,5 milliards de livres sterling) de marchandises vers la RPC et Hong Kong. Une grande partie de ce chiffre englobe l’exportation de marchandises électroniques et autres composants. Ceux-ci sont à leur tour intégrés dans les produits chinois, qui sont exportés dans le monde entier. Il est difficile de savoir quelle proportion des 3 500 milliards de dollars (2 900 milliards de livres sterling) des exportations annuelles de la RPC serait touchée si la guerre perturbait le commerce entre la RPC et Taïwan, mais ce chiffre serait bien supérieur aux 188,9 milliards de dollars (160,5 milliards de livres sterling) d’exportations taïwanaises. De plus, les exportations ne seraient pas les seules à souffrir. Les semi-conducteurs sont des composants essentiels pour les produits vendus sur les marchés intérieurs et d’exportation de la RPC. La Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) fournit plus de 60 % des semi-conducteurs avancés dans le monde. Elle a des activités importantes en RPC. En cas de blocus ou d’invasion, il est très peu probable que Taïwan ou les États-Unis laissent leurs compétences tomber entre les mains du PCC. À tout le moins, les installations de fabrication de TSMC basées à Taïwan seraient fermées, voire délibérément détruites ; les États-Unis et les Pays-Bas interdiraient l’utilisation future de leur propriété intellectuelle, de leur équipement et de leur soutien. Les conséquences sur l’économie chinoise (et mondiale) seraient immenses. Au cœur de l’enjeu de la dissuasion se trouve la question de l’ampleur des sanctions que les pays démocratiques accepteraient d’appliquer à la RPC dans le cas d’une invasion. Même si aucune sanction ou embargo n’était imposé, les consommateurs des pays démocratiques réduiraient leur consommation ou boycotteraient les produits chinois ; les investissements étrangers se tariraient ; le transport maritime serait perturbé et ses coûts augmenteraient considérablement. En réponse à l’indignation de l’opinion publique, il serait très difficile politiquement pour les gouvernements de pays démocratiques de ne pas imposer de sanctions, y compris financières. Compte tenu de l’état d’esprit qui règne à Washington, le niveau des sanctions pourrait être important et il y aurait des pressions sur les pays européens afin qu’ils suivent l’exemple des États-Unis. Enfin, le PCC se préoccupe à juste titre de la sécurité alimentaire et énergétique. Environ 80% de ses importations de pétrole proviennent de pays dont la géographie nécessite d’utiliser la route de transport passant par le détroit de Malacca ou par celui de la Sonde. Les États-Unis, le Canada et l’Australie sont en outre d’importants fournisseurs de denrées alimentaires. Si la RPC envahissait Taïwan, les États-Unis pourraient bloquer les détroits, tout en restreignant les approvisionnements alimentaires (notamment en soja). Il n’est pas étonnant par conséquent que la RPC estime nécessaire la construction d’une flotte de haute-mer et de bases navales pour soutenir sa présence dans l’océan Indien. Elle n’est toutefois actuellement pas en mesure de défier les États-Unis dans ces domaines. Le PCC peut évaluer les conséquences du blocus ou de l’invasion pour sa propre survie Les conséquences économiques d’un blocus ou d’une invasion de Taïwan seraient catastrophiques pour le PCC. Les effets directs sur sa propre économie seraient amplifiés par une récession mondiale brutale, restreignant encore davantage ses exportations. Le découplage économique – financier, technique, commercial, géopolitique – serait désastreux. Le chômage, qui atteint déjà presque 20 % chez les jeunes, augmenterait considérablement. En l’absence d’un filet de sécurité sociale, les masses protesteraient et manifesteraient. Jusqu’à présent, le PCC a maintenu les troubles au niveau local. Cependant, si le chômage et la pauvreté devenaient omniprésents, les chances de voir éclater des émeutes qui dépasseraient les limites des villes et des districts seraient élevées. Cela pourrait constituer une menace existentielle pour le PCC. Pourquoi le PCC devrait-il prendre ce risque, s’il estime que « l’Est est en pleine ascension alors que l’Occident décline » ? Une politique judicieuse serait d’attendre que la situation géopolitique ainsi que ses capacités militaires favorisent davantage ses intentions qu’elles ne le font aujourd’hui. Une invasion ratée ou bâclée détruirait le « rêve chinois » et les chances d’atteindre le « deuxième objectif du centenaire » du rajeunissement de la nation chinoise. Même une conquête réussie de Taïwan pourrait faire dérailler ce que Xi considère comme « historiquement inévitable ». Jouer la montre peut parfois être une politique judicieuse. Le PCC pourrait-il néanmoins lancer une invasion ? L’oracle de Delphes avait prédit que « si Crésus fait la guerre, il détruira un grand empire ». C’est ce qui arriva : il  détruisit en effet son propre empire lydien. Les dirigeants n’agissent pas toujours avec sagesse et l’orgueil ou le désespoir ne sont pas spécifiques au monde antique. Dans l’article 8 de la loi anti-sécession de 2005 et ailleurs, le PCC a promis que si Taïwan déclarait son indépendance, il envahirait l’île[4]. Il est juste de supposer qu’il tiendrait sa parole, même si cela détruisait le mythe du PCC selon lequel les Chinois n’ont pas la guerre dans les gènes et brisait l’image de l’unité des « fils et filles de la Chine » (中华子女). Le PCC ayant attisé la ferveur nationaliste, ne pas mettre sa menace à exécution détruirait sa crédibilité auprès de son propre peuple et serait plus dangereux pour le PCC qu’une invasion. Il convient de noter que le gouvernement taïwanais et son peuple en sont conscients et de ce fait, le soutien à une potentielle déclaration d’indépendance est très faible à Taïwan. D’autres arguments sont moins solides. Le PCC est certainement lucide sur le fait que le Département du Travail du Front uni (DTFU) et d’autres formes d’ingérence et d’influence n’ont pas réussi à attirer Taïwan ni à l’affaiblir. Beaucoup voient les niveaux croissants d’activité aérienne, balistique et navale comme un prélude au combat. Certes, l’APL a l’intention d’obtenir une capacité militaire qui lui permettrait d’envahir Taïwan avec succès. Partout, l’armée s’entraîne pour atteindre les capacités souhaitées, et se préparer à la possibilité que Taïwan déclare son indépendance. Toutefois, cela reste une option extrême. L’activité actuelle vise à épuiser la volonté taïwanaise de résister et à dégrader sa défense, notamment psychologiquement. Cela fait partie de la bataille pour convaincre le peuple taïwanais que la « réunification » est « inévitable et irrésistible ». De plus, même si, dans les années à venir, l’APL devient extrêmement forte, capable et confiante (pas seulement pour mener une invasion, mais pour dissuader ou repousser l’aide américaine à Taïwan), les arguments économiques en faveur de la retenue demeureront. Enfin, certains estiment que les dirigeants n’agissent pas toujours de manière logique. à l’image de Vladimir Poutine, le président russe. Toutefois, il y a des différences cruciales. La Russie est en déclin à l’inverse de la RPC. Poutine est plus un autocrate que Xi, qui, malgré tout son pouvoir, doit encore tenir compte des avis des autres dirigeants du PCC. Que la prise de décision de Xi ait toujours été bonne ou non, elle a au moins une logique, une rationalité. En fin de compte, cette logique est basée sur le besoin intransigeant de rester au pouvoir. Dans cette logique, envahir Taïwan est un risque inutile. Alors, que va faire le PCC à propos de Taïwan ?  Stratégie globale Si un blocus ou une invasion totale ne sont pas au menu du jour, le PCC n’a pas d’autre choix que de poursuivre sa stratégie actuelle : essayer de briser la volonté du peuple taïwanais et le convaincre que la « réunification » est « irrésistible et inévitable » en utilisant les mesures énoncées dans la section ci-dessous. L’idée « un pays, deux systèmes » était depuis longtemps maintenue en vie artificiellement et les événements de Hong Kong y ont définitivement mis fin. Selon les derniers sondages, le soutien à l’unification à Taïwan est de 6,5%. Les mesures que le PCC peut prendre (voir ci-dessous) viseraient à montrer au peuple taïwanais que c’est le gouvernement taïwanais et ses politiques infructueuses qui sont à l’origine de leurs souffrances. Le Parti démocrate progressiste (PDP) est le principal coupable aux yeux du PCC. Si le PDP est réélu en janvier 2024, nous assisterons probablement à une réaction plus féroce du PCC. En effet, si vers la fin de 2023 une victoire électorale du PDP semble probable, on pourrait assister à une adoption plus rapide de certaines des mesures ci-dessous. Pourtant, une victoire du Kuomintang (KMT) pourrait ne pas apporter de réconfort au PCC. En effet, pour être éligible, le KMT devra tenir compte du très faible nombre de Taïwanais favorables à l’unification. Le PCC tentera également de convaincre l’opinion mondiale de la justesse de sa position. Il cherchera à davantage mobiliser les pays en développement, ce qui, pour beaucoup de ces pays, signifie être intéressé par la valeur de l’argent de la RPC plutôt que par les valeurs démocratiques. Des actions spécifiques possibles au cours des prochaines années Si le PCC ne peut pas se permettre de lancer une invasion, il augmentera néanmoins la pression sur Taïwan et sur les pays qu’il perçoit comme ses partisans, à la fois pour faire avancer sa stratégie globale et pour convaincre ses 1,4 milliard de citoyens qu’il réalise des avancées. Mesures qui pourraient être prises à l’encontre de Taïwan au cours de la prochaine décennie : Xi Jinping est attaché à l’idée que la jeunesse peut être modelée. Les tentatives d' « éduquer » ou de convaincre les jeunes se poursuivront. Il est peu probable toutefois qu’elles réussissent. Le PCC continuera à financer l’opposition au PDP, en particulier via les temples et les fondations religieuses où la surveillance est moins stricte. Le DTFU tentera de jouer un rôle encore plus important, par exemple en contrôlant des médias et en influençant Internet. Jusqu’à présent, les sondages ont montré néanmoins que cette stratégie échouait. Augmenter l’isolement de Taïwan. Taïwan entretient actuellement des relations diplomatiques avec quatorze pays étrangers, dont le Vatican. Les efforts visant à réduire ce nombre se poursuivront. Le PCC peut chercher à empêcher les citoyens taïwanais de voyager à l’étranger en déclarant que les passeports taïwanais sont des documents invalides et en faisant pression sur d’autres pays pour qu’ils ne les reconnaissent pas. Davantage de poursuites pour sécession contre des Taïwanais vivant en RPC. Ceci vient encore de se produire le 3 août 2022. Refonte de la loi de sécession de 2005. Les termes de la loi actuelle sont généraux et cette loi n’a que peu importuné Taïwan. L’expérience acquise grâce à la loi sur la sécurité nationale (LSN) imposée à Hong Kong pourrait faciliter la création d’une LSN à appliquer à Taïwan. Une clause similaire à l’article 38 de la loi de Hong Kong, qui prévoit l’effet extraterritorial de la LSN, menacerait les Taïwanais qui défient Pékin où qu’ils se trouvent (les estimations du nombre de résidents taïwanais sur le continent varient de 404 000 à 1,2 million). Cette refonte de la loi a déjà été évoquée à plusieurs reprises par des juristes chinois[5]. Faire pression sur les entreprises taïwanaises, ce qui est déjà le cas. « Les entreprises et les sponsors financiers associés à des partisans de l’indépendance de Taïwan seront pénalisés conformément à la loi », a déclaré un porte-parole du Bureau des affaires taïwanaises en novembre 2021 lorsque le Far Eastern Group à Taïwan a été condamné à une amende pour avoir fait un don au PDP. Il est devenu courant pour le PCC d’imposer des restrictions sur les secteurs des exportations taïwanaises (les pommes en septembre 2021, les ananas en février 2022, le sable et les autres produits agricoles à la suite de la visite de Nancy Pelosi à Taïwan en août), bien que celles-ci soient plus symboliques que nuisibles et qu’elles encouragent Taïwan à diversifier davantage ses marchés[6]. Le cyberharcèlement est une réalité de la coexistence entre Taïwan et la RPC[7]. L’interférence dans les réseaux électriques et de communication à Taïwan serait un moyen d’accroître la pression. Des pressions pourraient être exercées sur les pays du Moyen-Orient pour qu’ils suspendent l’approvisionnement énergétique de Taïwan. Toutefois, compte tenu des interdépendances économiques entre la RPC et Taïwan, Pékin devrait faire attention à ne pas aller trop loin. Une activité militaire plus fréquente et plus menaçante. Jusqu’à présent, l’APL n’a pas traversé la mer territoriale de Taïwan (à 12 milles marins de la côte) ni survolé l’île. Des exercices de tir réel dans des zones proches de Taïwan ont les effets d’un blocus temporaire. Cependant, étant donné que les blocus infligent des pertes économiques à la RPC ainsi qu’à Taïwan, leur intensité sera limitée. « Réunifier » Jinmen et Mazu, les îles qui appartiennent à Taïwan, mais qui sont situées à proximité du continent. Le PCC n’utiliserait pas la force, mais plutôt la « persuasion » renforcée par une menace de couper l’approvisionnement en eau ou en électricité. Les États-Unis réagiraient-ils ? Considéreraient-ils qu’il s’agît d’une attaque contre le territoire taïwanais ? Occuper les îles Pratas, situées à environ 200 miles au sud-est de Hong Kong et à 270 miles au sud-ouest de Taïwan. Elles sont occupées par un petit détachement de troupes taïwanaises. Le PCC pourrait considérer que l’invasion de cette « tranche de salami » ne provoquerait pas une forte réaction internationale. Une tentative de capturer les îles Penghu, qui sont proches de la côte ouest de Taïwan. Cela nécessiterait une supériorité aérienne et navale. Une telle attaque ne différerait guère d’une invasion de l’île principale de Taïwan. Il s’agit donc d’une escalade improbable. Mesures qui pourraient être destinées au reste du monde au cours de la prochaine décennie : Il y aura une pression politique accrue sur les pays afin qu’ils adoptent la position du PCC sur Taïwan. Pour la plupart des petits pays, soutenir le « principe d’une seule Chine » ne représente pas une concession importante par rapport aux avantages économiques qu’ils peuvent recevoir de la RPC. C’est ce qui ressort de la récente déclaration conjointe publiée par la RPC et les pays africains à l’issue de la récente réunion du « Forum sur la coopération sino-africaine ». La pression augmentera sur d’autres pays qui tentent de poursuivre leurs relations avec Taïwan de la manière dont ils l’ont fait dans le passé. Cela est antérieur à la visite de Nancy Pelosi à Taïwan en août. Bien que la Lituanie en soit l’exemple expérimental, ce resserrement de la position du PCC a été annoncé dans son livre blanc de décembre 2018 sur les relations avec l’Union européenne (UE), dont le langage était nettement plus dur et comprenait des phrases telles que « aucun contact ou échange officiel sous quelque forme que ce soit » et « aucune institution de nature officielle ne devrait être établie ». Les visites de parlementaires à Taïwan continueront de faire l’objet d’une attention particulière. Le PCC est susceptible de recourir de plus en plus aux sanctions imposées à l’encontre de politiciens étrangers, d’universitaires et d’autres personnes qui franchissent ses « lignes rouges ». Les sanctions interdisent aux cibles et à leurs familles de se rendre en RPC et de faire des affaires avec des entreprises chinoises. Obliger les entreprises à choisir entre les marchés du continent et ceux de Taïwan. Depuis quelques années, les entreprises sont amenées à décrire Taïwan avec des termes désignés par le PCC. Cette pression peut être augmentée et devenir plus intrusive. Le PCC s’oppose aux survols et à la navigation dans les eaux autour de Taïwan par les forces aériennes et les marines des pays démocratiques. Alors que les États-Unis, en raison de leur plus grande puissance militaire, sont traités moins durement, il est probable que d’autres nations rencontrent une réponse plus intrusive et dangereuse. Au cours des derniers mois, des avions militaires chinois ont délibérément volé juste devant des avions canadiens et australiens. Le risque d’accident s’est donc accru. Bien qu’ils ne s’adressent pas aux étrangers, il est probable qu’il y ait un nombre croissant d’exercices de tir réel, ce qui causerait des problèmes temporaires pour la navigation (même si cela ne se transformera pas en un blocus prolongé et complet pour les raisons invoquées précédemment). Conclusion Comment les pays démocratiques peuvent-ils réagir ? Le premier pas vers une politique judicieuse est la compréhension : la compréhension de notre propre politique, de la politique du PCC et de ses fausses déclarations délibérées, ainsi que la compréhension de ce que le peuple taïwanais lui-même veut (cette dernière est trop souvent négligée). Nous devons être conscients de la différence entre notre « politique d’une seule Chine » et le « principe d’une seule Chine » du PCC, auquel nous n’avons jamais souscrit. C’est à nos gouvernements de décider de la nature de nos relations avec Taïwan et non au PCC. Nous devrions être conscients des distorsions de l’histoire du PCC et ne pas être séduits par elles. Et surtout, nous devrions valoriser les valeurs démocratiques. Près de 24 millions de Taïwanais ont le droit de décider de leur propre avenir. Or actuellement seuls 6,5% sont favorables à l’unification. Deuxièmement, nous devrions mieux comprendre la nature intimidante des relations du PCC avec le reste du monde. Capituler devant le PCC ne conduira qu’à de nouvelles agressions. Nous devons défendre fermement la Lituanie et d’autres pays qui s’attirent les foudres du PCC au sujet de Taïwan. Il est nécessaire d’assurer une plus grande unité politique entre le Royaume-Uni et l’UE, ainsi qu’entre l’Europe et nos alliés dans la région, les États-Unis, le Japon, la Corée du Sud, l’Australie et d’autres. Nous devrions également étudier attentivement les tactiques et les mesures utilisées par le DTFU pour interférer à Taïwan, car elles diffèrent peu de celles utilisées contre d’autres pays démocratiques. Les gouvernements devraient discuter avec Taïwan de l’utilisation par le PCC de tactiques de « zone grise ». Troisièmement, nous devons poursuivre nos efforts diplomatiques pour persuader d’autres pays de voter en faveur de l’adhésion de Taïwan à des organismes internationaux tels que l’Organisation mondiale de la santé et l’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale. Quatrièmement, nous devrions progressivement établir des relations avec Taïwan. Ce processus devrait dépasser les seules relations culturelles et interpersonnelles. Les relations commerciales requièrent un cadre adéquat, y compris des accords d’investissement et de libre-échange. Nous ne devrions pas éviter d’établir des relations ou de réaliser des visites parlementaires : il est important que nos parlementaires acquièrent une connaissance et une expérience de première main de la région. Bien que les visites ministérielles aux plus hauts niveaux puissent être trop provocatrices, les ministres dont les portefeuilles couvrent l’environnement, le commerce, la santé et d’autres questions d’intérêt mondial devraient s’y rendre. Dissuasion de l’invasion : deux précautions valent mieux qu’une Cependant, la partie la plus importante de la réaction des pays démocratiques devrait être la dissuasion. Même si les blocus et l’invasion sont très improbables pour les raisons invoquées, les gouvernements des pays démocratiques devraient faire tout leur possible pour dissuader l’action future, et peut-être, désespérée d’un PCC qui veut arriver à ses fins. Jusqu’à présent, l’accent a été mis sur la dissuasion militaire. Cette dissuasion est pertinente. Dans l’ensemble, la dissuasion militaire est de la responsabilité des États-Unis : il est peu probable que les forces européennes soient disponibles en temps ou en nombre suffisant. Néanmoins, d’autres pays démocratiques devraient être disposés à aider Taïwan à améliorer sa défense de « porc-épic », s’ils en ont la capacité et si les Taïwanais demandent une aide spécifique. Cela inclut la formation. Toutefois, l’approche économique est encore plus importante. Le PCC doit savoir dès maintenant, bien à l’avance, que les tentatives d’imposer une unification par la force sous quelque forme que ce soit conduiront à des sanctions et à des embargos. L’avertissement doit être donné discrètement, mais avec conviction, et très prochainement. Comme dans le cas de la dissuasion nucléaire, il s’agirait d’une destruction mutuelle assurée. Et de la même façon, il faudrait que ce soit crédible. Les gouvernements, encouragés par les entreprises, sont susceptibles de tergiverser. S’ils le font, ils seront en désaccord avec leur propre public, les parlementaires et la presse. En cas d’invasion ou d’unification forcée, le soutien en faveur des sanctions s’avérera irrésistible. Les gouvernements doivent le reconnaître maintenant et persuader le PCC de l’inévitabilité de ces sanctions[8]. Face à un Taïwan nettement mieux préparé militairement à résister à l’invasion et sachant qu’une invasion ou une unification contre la volonté du peuple taïwanais sera sanctionnée, le PCC s’abstiendra. Sa propre survie au pouvoir est son objectif primordial. Il comprend la logique inévitable et irrésistible selon laquelle les sanctions conduiront à un désastre économique, qui à son tour conduira à des troubles et à des manifestations à grande échelle dirigées contre le PCC, pouvant aboutir à la chute de ce dernier. Cela a failli se produire en1989. Le souvenir de cet épisode où il fut si près du précipice est marqué au fer rouge dans sa mémoire. Il ne voudra pas s’en rapprocher à nouveau.   ***   [1] Le « principe d’une seule Chine » du PCC établit qu’il n’existe qu’un seul État souverain sous le nom de Chine, la RPC servant de seul gouvernement légitime de cette Chine, et que Taïwan fait partie de la Chine. Selon la « politique d’une seule Chine », les pays acceptent qu’il n’existe qu’une seule Chine ; toutefois ils « reconnaissent » (c’est-à-dire prennent note) la position du PCC sur Taïwan, sans prendre position sur la question elle-même. [2] Le langage utilisé par les États-Unis était fondé sur des discussions avec le Royaume-Uni et ses négociations avec la RPC., au cas où les Chinois accepteraient le langage plus explicite dans leur communiqué avec les États-Unis, mais l’aurait refusé pour le Royaume-Uni. . [3] Pour d’excellentes synthèses des arguments, voir les travaux de Bill Hayton et de Gerrit van der Wees. [4] « Au cas où les forces séparatistes de  « l'indépendance de Taïwan » agiraient, sous quelque prétexte et manière que ce soit, dans le but de séparer Taïwan de la Chine, ou que des incidents majeurs provoquant la sécession de Taïwan de la Chine se produisaient, ou encore que les possibilités de la réunification pacifique soient complètement anéanties, l'État aura alors recours aux moyens non pacifiques et autres moyens nécessaires pour protéger la souveraineté nationale et l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine », cf. « Loi anti-sécession ». [5] Lors des « Two Sessions » en mars 2022, un membre de la Conférence consultative politique du peuple chinois a demandé instamment à ce qu’une nouvelle loi sur la sécession soit rédigée. [6] Les marchandises touchées ne représentent qu’une infime partie du commerce de Taïwan avec le continent. [7] Le nombre d’attaques a augmenté pendant la visite de Pelosi. [8] Même le gouvernement suisse a déclaré qu’il imposerait les mêmes sanctions à la RPC que l’UE.   Charles Parton est un ancien diplomate britannique, ayant passé 22 de ses 37 années de carrière à travailler en Chine, à Taiwan et à Hong Kong. Dans sa dernière affectation, il a été détaché à la délégation de l'Union européenne à Pékin en tant que premier conseiller jusqu'à la fin 2016. En 2017, il a été choisi comme conseiller spécial pour la Chine de la commission des affaires étrangères de la Chambre des communes. Il est actuellement membre du Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) et du Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). ## Taïwan et la « nouvelle Guerre froide » URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/taiwan-et-la-nouvelle-guerre-froide/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > L’analyse présentée ci-dessous met en évidence les principaux points de similitude et de différence dans le différend sur Taïwan... Cette note politique est issue d’une contribution faite le 2 juin 2022 lors d’une conférence « Is War over Taiwan Coming? » tenue à l’Université du Québec à Montréal.    Introduction La compétition entre grandes puissances est entrée dans une nouvelle phase instable. Avec l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie et les exercices militaires lancés par la Chine autour de Taïwan, le risque d'escalade de la compétition entre grandes puissances vers un conflit entre celles-ci a nettement augmenté, invitant à des comparaisons avec les guerres par procuration et les crises de la Guerre froide. Un précédent de cette rupture dans la politique mondiale peut être trouvé dans la guerre de Corée, qui a changé de manière décisive l'image du communisme international, ce dernier passant d'une menace politique et idéologique à un mouvement prêt à s'étendre par l'agression armée. Mais les analogies historiques, aussi suggestives soient-elles, ne sont pas concluantes. L'idée d'une « nouvelle Guerre froide » a déjà fait l'objet d'un vaste débat, et certains spécialistes ont affirmé que les différences l'emportaient sur les similitudes. Cette note politique se concentre sur la question de Taïwan, qui est un cas particulièrement approprié d'un point de vue méthodologique car elle a persisté de la Guerre froide à nos jours. D'un point de vue politique, il est également utile de relier le débat sur la sécurité de Taïwan à celui sur la « nouvelle Guerre froide », car ces deux débats se sont déroulés au même moment et ont abordés la même région, mais sans pour autant véritablement dialoguer entre eux : les débats sur Taïwan n'ont fait référence à la « nouvelle Guerre froide » que de manière périphérique en tant que cadre géopolitique, et les débats sur la « nouvelle guerre froide » n'ont fait référence à Taïwan que de manière tout aussi périphérique en tant que l'un des nombreux points de discorde dans la rivalité entre les États-Unis et la Chine. L’analyse présentée ci-dessous met en évidence les principaux points de similitude et de différence dans le différend sur Taïwan entre l'époque de la Guerre froide et aujourd'hui. Elle se concentre sur les périodes au cours desquelles les États-Unis et la RPC (République populaire de Chine) étaient des grandes puissances rivales (1949-1970 et 2016 à ce jour). Son constat est que les continuités se situent aux niveaux tactiques, et que les discontinuités se situent aux niveaux stratégiques. Ainsi au niveau tactique, les États-Unis ont toujours craint d'être piégés, tandis que Taïwan a toujours craint elle d'être abandonné par ceux-ci. Parallèlement Washington et Taipei ont toujours défendu Taïwan en tant que rival idéologique de la RPC. Pékin a toujours essayé pour sa part de défendre son agression contre Taïwan en prétendant fallacieusement avoir le soutien du peuple taïwanais. Enfin, il est à noter que les États-Unis ont toujours été neutres quant au statut politique de Taïwan. Pour ce qui est du niveau stratégique, Taïwan s'est résolument éloigné du nationalisme chinois au fil du temps et ce bien avant la fin de la Guerre froide. Parallèlement Taïwan a acquis une plus grande importance (en termes relatifs) pour la RPC à mesure que Pékin s'éloignait du maoïsme et fondait de plus en plus sa légitimité sur le nationalisme. Mais de son coté, Taïwan est devenue une véritable démocratie et les tendances géoéconomiques (notamment la domination mondiale de l'industrie des semi-conducteurs) ont fait de la sécurité de Taïwan un intérêt vital pour les États-Unis. Pour les responsables politiques, les différences l'emportent sur les similitudes. Compte tenu de la sensibilité accrue de Pékin à l'égard du statut politique de Taïwan et du caractère officieux des relations entre les États-Unis et Taïwan, le fait que Taïwan n'adhère plus au principe d'une seule Chine (comme c'était le cas pendant la Guerre froide) signifie que la relance d'une stratégie de Guerre froide dans le détroit de Taïwan déclencherait probablement un conflit entre Washington, Taipei et Pékin. Les récentes propositions politiques des États-Unis, telles que la reconnaissance de Taïwan ou l'adoption d'une clarté stratégique, ont des précédents dans la Guerre froide, mais comportent un risque d'escalade bien plus grand, car elles seraient probablement interprétées par Pékin comme une tentative de séparation permanente de Taïwan de la Chine. D’un autre côté, l'importance stratégique de Taïwan, signifie que la sécurité nationale des États-Unis repose sur la sécurité de Taïwan dans une mesure bien plus grande que pendant la Guerre froide. Compte tenu de l'importance des enjeux, l'implication politique de cette constatation est que les États-Unis (et plus généralement la communauté internationale) devraient adopter une approche de statu quo et d'aversion au risque qui se concentre sur le renforcement du soutien à Taïwan dans le cadre de la politique d'une seule Chine. Continuités Dans le différend sur Taïwan, les similitudes entre la Guerre froide et l'époque actuelle sont « tactiques » dans le sens où elles reflètent la manière dont les principaux acteurs poursuivent leurs intérêts fondamentaux, plutôt que la manière dont ils définissent ces intérêts. Les États-Unis ont toujours craint d'être piégés par Taïwan : depuis les années 1950 jusqu'à aujourd'hui, on s'est inquiété du fait que des engagements trop forts envers Taipei pourraient amener ce dernier à utiliser le couvert du soutien américain pour agir d'une manière qui pourrait déclencher un conflit avec Pékin. Au cours de la Guerre froide, cette préoccupation était axée sur les préparatifs du Kuomintang (KMT) en vue d'une contre-offensive contre les communistes chinois, tandis que dans la période qui a suivi la Guerre froide, cette préoccupation a été axée sur la possibilité d'une déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance par Taïwan. Au cours de ces deux périodes, les États-Unis ont pratiqué la « double dissuasion » contre Taipei et Pékin par le biais d'une politique d'ambiguïté stratégique. Taïwan, en revanche, craint l'abandon des États-Unis depuis que ceux-ci ont exclu le recours à la force militaire pour défendre Taïwan à l'hiver et au printemps 1950. Lorsque les États-Unis ont poursuivi le rapprochement avec la RPC dans les années 1970, le gouvernement de la République de Chine (RDC) a également craint que les négociations se fassent au détriment de sa sécurité. Les Six assurances visaient à répondre à ces préoccupations : elles comprenaient, entre autres, l'assurance que les États-Unis « n'ont pas accepté de consulter la RPC sur les ventes d'armes à Taïwan » et « n'exerceront pas de pressions sur Taïwan pour qu'elle entame des négociations avec la RPC ». Ces craintes d'abandon ont persisté, comme dans les premiers mois de l'administration Trump, lorsque ce dernier a laissé entendre que les États-Unis étaient prêts à utiliser Taïwan comme monnaie d'échange avec Pékin en matière de commerce. Un récent sondage d'opinion parrainé par le KMT (qui a tendance à être plus sceptique quant au soutien des États-Unis que le Parti démocrate progressiste, PDP), a révélé que plus de la moitié des personnes interrogées ne croyaient pas que les États-Unis déploieraient des forces pour défendre Taïwan en cas d'attaque de la RPC. Il existe un certain nombre d'autres similitudes tactiques. En période de concurrence stratégique avec Pékin, Washington et Taipei ont défendu Taïwan comme un modèle alternatif à la République populaire de Chine. Pendant la Guerre froide, il s'agissait de la rivalité entre la « Chine nationaliste » et la « Chine communiste », entre une économie politique qui préservait le capitalisme et la culture traditionnelle chinoise et une économie politique qui poursuivait le socialisme révolutionnaire. À l'époque contemporaine, Washington et Taipei se sont montrés beaucoup plus réservés quant à l'influence de la culture traditionnelle chinoise à Taïwan, mais ils ont mis l'accent sur Taïwan en tant qu'alternative démocratique au système autoritaire de la RPC, et la rivalité culturelle entre les deux rives du détroit est toujours visible dans l'enseignement du chinois. Autre similitude tactique, Pékin a tenté de donner à son agression contre Taïwan un vernis de légitimité en prétendant fallacieusement que ses actions étaient conformes à la volonté du peuple taïwanais. Pendant la Guerre froide, Pékin affirmait que le 28 février était un soulèvement spontané du peuple taïwanais en faveur du communisme. Aujourd'hui, Pékin insiste toujours sur le fait que seule une petite minorité de personnes à Taïwan soutient l'indépendance. Il n'existe aucune preuve historique que le communisme ait été le principal facteur à l'origine du soulèvement du 28 février, et les enquêtes d'opinion contemporaines à Taïwan ont montré que la plupart des personnes interrogées sont en faveur du statu quo (une minorité significative étant favorable à l'indépendance tandis qu’une petite minorité est en faveur de l'unification). Une autre similitude tactique est que les États-Unis sont restés constamment neutres sur le statut politique de Taïwan, une position que le président Truman a énoncée pour la première fois le 27 juin 1950 et que David Stilwell a répétée en août 2020. Il s'agit d'une décision tactique car elle crée une base juridique permettant aux États-Unis d'intervenir pour défendre Taïwan sans violer la souveraineté de la Chine, puisque les États-Unis ne considèrent pas Taïwan comme une partie de la Chine. Discontinuités Les principales différences entre la Guerre froide et l'époque actuelle sont « stratégiques », plus précisément dans la manière dont est intégré ce différend dans les intérêts fondamentaux de Washington, Taipei et Pékin. L'importance stratégique de Taïwan pour les États-Unis a ainsi considérablement augmenté depuis l'époque où le général Douglas MacArthur la qualifiait de « porte-avions et de sous-marin insubmersible ». L'aspect géographique est toujours significatif, bien sûr, et les discussions sur l'importance stratégique de Taïwan font invariablement référence à sa position dans la première chaîne d'îles. Mais la position dominante de Taïwan dans la fabrication de semi-conducteurs et sa démocratie ont élevé son importance stratégique pour les États-Unis. La Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) réalise actuellement plus de 50 % des revenus mondiaux dans la fabrication des puces en général et près de 90 % pour les puces les plus avancées (définies comme étant inférieures à 10 nm). Rick Switzer, de l'Office of Commercial and Economic Analysis de l'armée de l'air américaine, a estimé que la RPC contrôlerait près de 80 % de la capacité de fabrication de semi-conducteurs dans le monde si Taïwan était unifiée de force avec le continent. Steve Blank, de l'université de Stanford, a estimé que si la RPC interrompait l'approvisionnement en puces des usines de TSMC, il faudrait au moins cinq ans aux industries électroniques civiles et militaires des États-Unis pour s'en remettre. Comme Becca Wasser, Martijn Rasser et Hannah Kelley l'ont écrit dans une étude récente pour le Center for a New American Security, « un accès sécurisé à la production de l'industrie taïwanaise des semi-conducteurs est donc une nécessité stratégique ». De plus, contrairement à ce qui se passait pendant la Guerre froide, Taïwan est aujourd'hui une véritable démocratie, et le soutien des États-Unis à cette démocratie est un symbole de l'engagement des États-Unis à défendre l'ordre international fondé sur des règles et leurs alliés démocratiques. Ces facteurs signifient que l'importance stratégique de Taïwan pour les États-Unis a augmenté de façon spectaculaire depuis la Guerre froide. Au début de la Guerre froide, l'administration Truman avait conclu que, sur la base de la seule géographie de Taïwan, ce pays était important, mais pas vital pour les intérêts américains. Maintenant que Taïwan est essentielle pour les chaînes d'approvisionnement en semi-conducteurs et que Taïwan est une démocratie, on peut dire qu'elle s'est élevée au rang d'intérêt vital. L'importance stratégique de Taïwan a également augmenté pour Pékin en termes relatifs. Au cours de la période de concurrence stratégique entre les États-Unis et la RPC pendant la Guerre froide, la RPC a cherché à empêcher l'indépendance de Taïwan, mais empêcher l'indépendance de Taïwan était sans doute moins important pour Pékin que de mettre en œuvre l'idéologie maoïste sur le continent. La preuve en est que Mao a choisi de retarder l'invasion de Taïwan en juin 1950 – alors qu'elle aurait probablement réussi –  afin de soutenir l'invasion de la Corée du Sud par la Corée du Nord et de démontrer ainsi son soutien au mouvement communiste international. Avec le net recul de l'idéologie communiste après la réforme et l'ouverture, empêcher l'indépendance de Taïwan a considérablement augmenté sur la liste des priorités de la RPC. Le développement économique est l'autre pilier de la légitimité de la RPC, mais sous Xi Jinping, le développement économique a été relégué au second plan par rapport à la sécurité nationale. Le différend sur Taïwan est devenu beaucoup plus important pour Pékin ces dernières années qu'il ne l'était au cours des premières décennies de la Guerre froide. Pour Taïwan également, il y a eu une discontinuité stratégique dans la manière dont le gouvernement comprend ses intérêts fondamentaux. Pendant la Guerre froide, le parti-État qu’était le KMT donnait la priorité au nationalisme chinois avant toute autre considération, y compris la démocratie. Depuis la Guerre froide, la démocratisation a entraîné le déclin du nationalisme chinois (y compris l'identité chinoise au sein de l'électorat), et il y a eu des transferts de pouvoir réguliers et pacifiques entre un KMT modéré et un PDP modéré. Le gouvernement actuel du PDP ne maintient pas le principe d'une seule Chine, et même l'engagement du KMT envers le « Consensus de 1992 » (une formulation historique et controversée du principe d'une seule Chine) pourrait être remis en question à long terme. Johnny Chiang, l'ancien président du KMT, a tenté de supprimer le « consensus de 1992 » de la plate-forme du parti, et Eric Chu, le président actuel, a utilisé un langage évasif en le qualifiant de « consensus non consensuel » et d’ « ambiguïté constructive ». Taïwan ne définit plus ses intérêts en termes de nationalisme chinois, mais en termes de démocratie, de prospérité et d'ancrage dans l'ordre international fondé sur des règles. Implications politiques Compte tenu de toutes ces continuités et discontinuités, les implications politiques de cette analyse sont que les États-Unis et leurs alliés ne devraient pas tenter de raviver une stratégie d'endiguement de la Guerre froide dans le détroit de Taïwan. L'importance stratégique de Taïwan et les conséquences catastrophiques d'une guerre recommandent une approche de statu quo et d'aversion au risque qui implique un soutien accru à Taïwan dans le cadre de la politique d'une seule Chine. La combinaison de la sensibilité accrue de la Chine à l'égard de l'indépendance de Taïwan et de la résistance de Taïwan au principe d'une seule Chine signifie que les politiques qui étaient réalisables pendant la Guerre froide, telles que la reconnaissance diplomatique, exacerberaient les tensions dans le détroit de Taïwan au point de provoquer une crise, voire une guerre. Bien que la politique d'une seule Chine ait la réputation d'imposer de sévères restrictions à l'engagement des États-Unis et de la communauté internationale envers Taïwan, elle s'est avérée remarquablement souple et adaptable au cours des cinquante années qui ont suivi son adoption. Elle offre également une marge de manœuvre considérable pour un soutien accru des États-Unis à Taïwan. La loi sur les relations avec Taïwan, par exemple, stipule que « les États-Unis mettront à la disposition de Taïwan les articles et services de défense en quantité nécessaire pour permettre à Taïwan de maintenir une capacité d'autodéfense suffisante ». Cela signifie qu'il n'existe aucune limite légale ou théorique aux systèmes d'armes ou à la formation militaire que les États-Unis peuvent fournir à Taïwan. L'abandon de la politique d'une seule Chine serait à la fois inutile et contre-productif. Bon nombre des récentes propositions d'abandon de la politique d'une seule Chine ont l'intention louable de renforcer les défenses de Taïwan, mais elles risquent d'amener Pékin à tester ces défenses d'une manière que personne ne souhaite voir.     James Lee est assistant de recherche (équivalent de professeur adjoint) à l'Institut d'études européennes et américaines de l'Academia Sinica à Taiwan. Il est également chercheur affilié à l'Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation de l'Université de Californie. ## Taïwan face à la perte d’alliés diplomatiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/taiwan-face-a-la-perte-dallies-diplomatiques/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Alors que le Canada travaille à sa stratégie Indopacifique, il doit savoir incorporer la question du statut de Taïwan dans sa réflexion sur La guerre qui fait présentement rage en Ukraine entraine une crainte qu’un conflit similaire éclate dans le détroit de Taïwan. Les tensions entre Taipei et Beijing n’ont effectivement pas été aussi grandes depuis la crise de 1995-96. La question du statut de Taïwan cristallise, à bien des égards, la compétition qui oppose les États-Unis à la Chine, tant au niveau sécuritaire, idéologique, que technologique. La comparaison avec l’Ukraine élude cependant le fait que le Parti communiste chinois cherche avant tout à réunifier Taïwan sans avoir recours à ses forces armées. Pour ce faire, l’un des objectifs du Parti communiste est entre autres d’isoler Taïwan sur le plan diplomatique. L’île ne possède en effet aujourd’hui que des relations diplomatiques formelles avec 14 États. Alors que le Canada travaille à sa stratégie Indopacifique, il doit savoir incorporer la question du statut de Taïwan dans sa réflexion sur l’avenir de l’ordre international. Travailler à ce que Taïwan intègre des organisations internationales comme l’Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS) et l’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale (OACI), ou qu’il accède à l’Accord de partenariat transpacifique global et progressiste (PTPGP), permettrait non seulement de renforcer le statut international de l’île, mais irait aussi dans le sens des intérêts canadiens. Par ailleurs, le Canada pourrait chercher à rehausser son aide au développement afin d’offrir une alternative aux alliés de Taïwan courtisés par Beijing. Une île au statut particulier Pour comprendre le statut de Taïwan, il faut remonter à la fin de la guerre civile chinoise. En 1949, alors que la victoire du Parti communiste chinois (PCC) de Mao semblait inévitable, Le Kuomintang (KMT), parti politique dirigé par Tchang Kai-chek, refusa cependant de reconnaitre la victoire du Parti communiste et trouva refuge sur l’île de Taïwan. Les partis de part et d’autre du détroit de Taïwan prétendaient être les véritables représentants de la « Chine ». Plusieurs États commencèrent dès lors à reconnaitre le PCC comme représentant légitime de la Chine. Le Royaume-Uni choisit de le faire dès 1950. Le Canada attendit 1970. La République de Chine, située sur l’île de Taïwan, continua de siéger aux Nations Unies comme représentante de la « Chine » jusqu’en 1971, quand l’Assemblée générale vota à majorité la Résolution 2758 qui reconnaissait la Chine communiste comme détentrice du siège de la « Chine » aux Nations Unies. Exempt de la légitimité conférée par un siège aux Nations Unies, Taïwan perdit rapidement la reconnaissance de nombreux États, soit 75 entre 1971 et 2020. C’est que Beijing et Taipei reconnaissaient pendant longtemps le « principe d’une seule Chine », soit l’idée que le continent et l’île font partie d’un même ensemble. S’il n’existe qu’une seule Chine, il n’y a pas d’entente sur qui représente cette dernière. C’est pourquoi entretenir des relations diplomatiques formelles avec l’une implique de ne pas en avoir avec l’autre. Suite à la démocratisation de Taïwan dans les années 1990, la position sur le principe d’une seule Chine évolua. Si le KMT continue de mettre ce principe de l’avant, son principal opposant politique, le Parti démocrate progressiste (DPP), penche plutôt pour l’idée d’indépendance taïwanaise et met de l’avant l’utilisation du terme « Taïwan » plutôt que « République de Chine » pour décrire l’État insulaire. C’est sous ce nom que le président Chen Shui-bian déposa sans succès une candidature pour réintégrer l’ONU en 2007. L’ONU s’y opposa, citant son adhésion à la politique d’une seule Chine convenue dans le cadre de la résolution de 1971. L’actuelle présidente, Tsai Ing-wen, considère pour sa part Taïwan comme un État déjà indépendant de facto, mais ne possédant pas la reconnaissance légale pour être pleinement membre de la communauté internationale. Une Chine plus agressive que par le passé En réponse à l’élection du DPP de Tsai Ing-wen en 2016, qui tout en prônant le statu quo vis-à-vis la Chine cherche à obtenir une plus grande reconnaissance internationale, Beijing adopta une stratégie plus agressive pour isoler l’île. Le PCC annonça clairement que « tant que le DPP sera au pouvoir, tôt ou tard, Taïwan n’aura plus aucun allié diplomatique. » Ce sont ainsi huit États qui ont changé de camp depuis 2016, le dernier en date étant le Nicaragua en décembre dernier. Ce qui distingue la présente attitude chinoise de celle des périodes antérieures est l’intensité de l’activisme du PCC pour dérober les alliés diplomatiques à Taïwan. Cela est aussi vrai de la réaction de Beijing au développement des relations — même informelles — entre Taïwan et certains États d’Europe. La stratégie du Parti communiste chinois semble se résumer à utiliser ses capacités financières comme levier. Afin de convaincre les gouvernements étrangers à changer d’allégeance, Beijing garantit en contrepartie d’investir des sommes importantes en aide au développement. En 2016, Sao Tomé-et-Principe fut le premier État à mettre fin à ses relations avec Taïwan, dans ce que la présidente Tsai caractérise de « diplomatie du chéquier », qu’elle refuse de poursuivre. On a par la suite appris que Sao Tomé-et-Principe avait demandé environ 200 millions de dollars en aide financière afin de maintenir ses relations diplomatiques officielles avec Taïwan. Plus récemment, les îles Solomon ont mis fin à leurs relations avec Taipei pour la somme de 500 millions de dollars et Kiribati a fait de même en échange d’investissements en infrastructure et l’acquisition d’avions et de navires-cargos. La pression de Beijing explique que Taïwan ne conserve aujourd’hui des relations diplomatiques qu’avec 14 États, principalement du Pacifique et d’Amérique latine. En 2021, c’est la relation entre la Lituanie et Taïwan qui a ulcéré le Parti communiste chinois. L’utilisation du terme « Taïwan » pour nommer le bâtiment qui fait office d’ambassade non officielle, plutôt que le terme « Taipei » jugé plus neutre, a engendré une vive réaction de Beijing. Cette dernière coupa en effet ses relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec la Lituanie. La même année, le renforcement des liens économiques et politiques entre Taïwan et d’autres États d’Europe de l’Est comme la Slovénie et la République tchèque entrainèrent également leurs lots de menaces du PCC. La réaction de ce dernier est aux antipodes de celle qu’il avait eue en 2013 quand la Nouvelle-Zélande est devenue le premier État à signer un accord de libre-échange avec Taïwan. Depuis 2016, la Chine bloque également l’accès de Taïwan au statut d’observateur lors des assemblées générales d’agences spécialisées de l’ONU comme l’OMS et l’OACI, chose qu’elle avait tolérée entre 2009 et 2016. Pas de doute, l’exacerbation des tensions dans le détroit de Taïwan pousse le PCC à adopter une stratégie plus agressive pour isoler l’État insulaire. Les conséquences géopolitiques de cette rivalité diplomatique La Chine communiste ne cherche pas uniquement à isoler Taïwan en convainquant ses alliés diplomatiques de changer d’allégeance. Ses manœuvres font également partie d’une stratégie géopolitique plus large. En réussissant à convaincre le Panama de changer sa position en 2017, le Parti communiste ne gagnait pas seulement une bataille diplomatique, mais s’assurait aussi une relation privilégiée avec le gouvernement d’un État contrôlant l’un des plus importants passages du commerce maritime mondial. Une situation similaire est présentement à l’œuvre aux îles Salomon. Après avoir reconnu la Chine communiste en 2019, les deux gouvernements signèrent une entente de sécurité. Une version de cette dernière, coulée dans les médias, indique que les navires de guerre chinois seraient autorisés à accoster sur les îles et que Beijing pourrait envoyer des forces de sécurité « pour aider à maintenir l’ordre social ». L’attrait des îles Salomon s’explique entre autres par la présence d’un port en eau profonde, chose rare dans la région, qui peut accueillir des navires au tonnage important. La présence de militaires chinois représenterait une menace non seulement pour la stratégie américaine dans la région, mais aussi pour l’Australie, qui se situe au sud-ouest des îles. La stratégie diplomatique de Beijing et Taipei a également des répercussions au sein même des États courtisés où la joute géopolitique exacerbe les rivalités locales. Les dernières élections au Honduras et au Nicaragua ont ainsi pris une tournure internationale alors que les principaux candidats à la présidence faisaient entre autres campagne sur le maintien ou non de la relation diplomatique avec Taïwan. Les îles Salomon demeurent le cas récent le plus flagrant. La capitale du pays a connu plusieurs jours d’émeutes à la fin 2021, résultat des tensions entre les principaux leaders politiques et les deux principales îles du pays sur plusieurs enjeux, en grande partie les relations avec la Chine et Taïwan. Ce jeu d’échecs diplomatique peut donc entrainer une réelle déstabilisation dans des États du sud global. La reconnaissance internationale pour quoi ? Comme Taïwan a perdu un certain nombre d’alliés récemment, la question de la valeur de ces pays vient à l’esprit. Que gagne Taïwan à avoir si peu d’alliés parmi ces pays qui ont peu de valeur économique ou stratégique ? En termes de commerce, Taïwan ne reçoit effectivement pas beaucoup d’avantages économiques en entretenant des relations diplomatiques avec ces États. Selon le Bureau du commerce extérieur de Taïwan, celle-ci commerce davantage avec des États qui ne sont pas des partenaires diplomatiques, mais plutôt avec de grandes économies développées comme les États-Unis, le Japon et la Chine bien sûr. Ce qui manque à ces alliés en termes économiques, ils le compensent en offrant à Taïwan une forme de légitimité internationale. Il y a en effet un avantage certain à détenir des alliés diplomatiques officiels. La capacité d’entretenir des relations avec d’autres États demeure l’un des critères de la qualité d’État en vertu du droit international, comme en témoigne la Convention de Montevideo de 1933 sur les droits et les devoirs des États, qui énonce ces critères : posséder 1) une population permanente; 2) un territoire délimité; 3) un gouvernement; et 4) la capacité d’entrer en relation avec les autres États. Taïwan satisfait aux trois premiers critères, mais avec seulement 14 alliés diplomatiques et des relations non officielles avec plusieurs autres États, sa prétention à satisfaire au quatrième critère est vulnérable. Ainsi, les partenaires diplomatiques officiels aident la cause de Taïwan en donnant une légitimité aux affirmations selon lesquelles Taïwan possède bien les attributs d’un État indépendant. Puisque Taïwan n’est pas membre des Nations Unies — un autre marqueur quasi officiel du statut d’État — et ne possède pas de possibilités connexes de participer à ses agences spécialisées, ses alliés diplomatiques jouent un rôle clé en défendant sa cause aux Nations Unies et lorsque Taïwan est exclue de la participation à des organisations et agences spécialisées clés. Sainte-Lucie a par exemple pris la parole au nom de Taïwan lors de la dernière assemblée de l’OACI. Le portrait n’est cependant pas tout noir. Rappelons que Taïwan siège tout de même dans des organisations internationales comme le Comité olympique international, l’Organisation mondiale du commerce, la Banque asiatique de développement ou le forum de la Coopération économique pour l’Asie-Pacifique (APEC). Selon le Lowy Institute Global Diplomacy Index, Taïwan possède par ailleurs 111 représentations à l’étranger, ce qui la place devant des États comme la Malaisie, Israël ou la Norvège. Reconnaissant l’accentuation de l’offensive diplomatique du PCC depuis 2016, les États-Unis ont renforcé leurs liens avec Taïwan. Les deux gouvernements ont lancé en ce sens le Global Cooperation and Training Framework, une plateforme qui mobilise l’expertise taïwanaise pour répondre à des problèmes globaux. D’autres démocraties libérales ont emboité le pas à Washington en raffermissant leurs relations avec Taipei. On assiste ainsi à une augmentation des visites de parlementaires européens sur l’île, comme à celles du ministre des Affaires étrangères de Taïwan dans les capitales européennes. La réponse de ces États face à la stratégie d’isolement du Parti communiste chinois explique que l’économie de Taïwan continue de croître et que le désengagement de ses alliés diplomatiques ne provoque pour l’instant pas de sentiment de panique sur l’île. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada La question du statut diplomatique de Taïwan n’est pas confinée aux tensions entre les gouvernements de part et d’autre du Détroit. La stratégie de Beijing pour isoler Taipei s’inscrit dans une confrontation sécuritaire, idéologique et technologique plus large qui oppose les démocraties libérales et des États autoritaires révisionnistes. À l’aune de la publication de la stratégie Indopacifique du Canada, il importe que le Canada prenne en compte la question du statut de Taïwan et l’intègre à sa réflexion. Tout en maintenant claire sa reconnaissance de la politique d’une seule Chine, le gouvernement canadien dispose d’une marge de manœuvre appréciable pour renforcer ses liens avec Taïwan. En ce sens, les efforts visant à inclure Taïwan dans les processus multilatéraux au sein ou en dehors des Nations Unies, les stratégies visant à renforcer l’économie de Taïwan et le rehaussement de la coopération technique devraient tous faire partie de la stratégie canadienne à l’égard de Taïwan. Il faut être clair : ces mesures ne doivent pas être prises uniquement pour contrer les actions de Beijing, mais bien parce qu’elles représentent de réelles opportunités qui vont dans le sens des intérêts canadiens. Les options avancées ne sauraient mettre complètement un terme à la quête de Beijing visant à isoler Taïwan. Néanmoins, s’efforcer de favoriser des relations plus étroites entre Taïwan, le Canada et d’autres États, et de maintenir les relations diplomatiques existantes de Taïwan peut lui donner une certaine marge de manœuvre en plus de servir les intérêts canadiens. À tout le moins, plus les relations qu’entretient Taïwan avec d’autres États seront denses, plus les risques et les coûts auxquels Beijing fera face s’il décide d’utiliser des moyens non pacifiques pour réunifier l’île seront élevés. Le Canada devrait être plus énergique dans son soutien à l’adhésion de Taïwan aux organisations internationales dont les statuts acceptent les entités non étatiques. La manière dont Taïwan gère la pandémie de la COVID-19 illustre aisément la pertinence d’avoir son expertise au sein de l’OMS. Plus largement, le défi que posent les régimes autoritaires à l’ordre international fondé sur les règles doit pousser les démocraties comme le Canada à redoubler d’efforts pour définir les normes mondiales de demain. Dans ce contexte, obtenir qu’une autre démocratie, championne du féminisme qui plus est, siège aux côtés du Canada au sein d’organisations internationales renforcerait la promotion de normes fondées sur des valeurs et des intérêts communs. Sur le plan économique, Taïwan et le Canada apparaissent comme des partenaires idéaux, principalement étant donné la structure de leur base industrielle. L’île représente le 15e partenaire commercial du Canada. Dans un contexte où la diversification des partenaires commerciaux est un objectif d’Ottawa, accroitre les liens qu’il entretient avec Taïwan doit être en haut de l’agenda. Les deux gouvernements ont annoncé les débuts des négociations d’un accord bilatéral d’investissement plus tôt cette année. Le Canada devrait néanmoins surtout travailler à faire entrer Taïwan au sein du PTPGP, même si cela ne sera pas chose facile puisque l’entrée d’un nouvel État nécessite un consensus des parties prenantes. Une étude récente suggère que l’entrée de Taïwan dans le Partenariat aurait des retombés de 1,5 milliard de dollars pour l’économie canadienne. Cela permettrait également à Taïwan de resserrer ses liens avec plusieurs États de l’Indopacifique. Ottawa doit également saisir l’opportunité de coopérer en matière technique avec Taïwan. Mentionné plus haut, le Global Cooperation and Training Framework, établit conjointement par Taipei et Washington, serait une plateforme par où commencer. Bien que le Canada soit déjà partenaire, il pourrait emboiter le pas au Japon et à l’Australie en devenant un membre à part entière. Un tel geste enverrait un signal clair du soutien canadien envers Taïwan. L’ingérence électorale et la guerre de l’information sont d’autres domaines où la coopération doit impérativement être établie. Taïwan y possède une énorme expérience et l’île est depuis des décennies un lieu où l’armée populaire de libération chinoise teste ses tactiques dans ces domaines. Le Canada, pour sa part, prend tout juste conscience de sa vulnérabilité. Il est aujourd’hui clair que le gouvernement chinois a tenté d’influer sur les dernières élections canadiennes, les preuves allant en ce sens. Nul doute que coopérer dans la lutte aux ingérences chinoises serait grandement profitable au Canada. Finalement, le Canada devrait utiliser son aide au développement dans la région afin d’offrir une alternative à la Chine et ainsi tenter de ralentir la vitesse à laquelle Taïwan perd des alliés diplomatiques. La présente situation aux îles Salomon illustre le fait que le Canada ne peut plus continuer de négliger l’aide au développement. Ottawa n’y alloue ainsi que 0,3% de son PIB selon l’organisme Donor Tracker. Même l’augmentation annoncée dans le dernier budget fédéral le gardera loin de la cible de 0,7% fixée par l’ONU et que plusieurs des partenaires du Canada, comme l’Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni, ont atteinte. Il y a place pour un plan d’aide au développement bien plus ambitieux. L’incapacité de l’Occident à aider certaines régions du monde à prospérer ouvre nécessairement la porte à la Chine. Aide au développement et intérêt national ne sont pas antinomiques et Ottawa devrait reconnaitre qu’il s’agit d’un outil essentiel dans l’atteinte de ses objectifs internationaux. Face à l’accroissement des tensions entre Beijing et Taipei, le Canada doit être plus qu’un simple témoin passif. Les recommandations proposées auront nécessairement des coûts politiques dans les relations avec Beijing et Ottawa devra être capable d’encaisser des contrecoups à court terme pour atteindre des objectifs à long terme. Pour ce faire, il devra faire preuve de volonté politique et de résilience. C’est pourquoi il est impératif que le Canada coopère avec des États aux vues similaires. Sa stratégie devra reposer sur une vision du monde qui intègre la nouvelle agressivité du Parti communiste chinois vis-à-vis Taïwan dans le contexte du défi plus large qu’il pose à l’ordre mondial. ## Tenants et aboutissants du rapprochement entre l’Iran et le Soudan URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/tenants-et-aboutissants-du-rapprochement-entre-liran-et-le-soudan/ Modified: 2024-03-20 > Début février 2024, Ali Al Sadiq s'est rendu à Téhéran pour rencontrer Hossein Amir-Abdollahian ainsi qu'Ebrahim Raïssi. Début février 2024, le ministre soudanais par intérim des Affaires étrangères, Ali Al Sadiq, s'est rendu à Téhéran pour rencontrer son homologue Hossein Amir-Abdollahian ainsi que le président iranien Ebrahim Raïssi. Intervenant en pleine crise au Proche-Orient et alors que la nation africaine est embourbée dans une situation de guerre civile, cette visite est le dernier signe d’un réchauffement rapide des relations entre Khartoum et Téhéran. Au cours de la dernière année, les responsables soudanais et iraniens ont en effet convenu d'accélérer les démarches aboutissant à renouer les relations diplomatiques entre Téhéran et Khartoum précédemment rompues en 2016. Un rapprochement soudain qui soulève de nombreuses questions au sujet de la nature des relations bilatérales entre la République islamique d’Iran et la République du Soudan, des intérêts qui le motivent et de ses implications stratégiques. Des relations anciennes et étroites En guise de contextualisation, il faut rappeler que les liens entre l’Iran et le Soudan sont relativement anciens. Déjà positives à l’époque du dernier Chah, ces relations sont mises à l’épreuve de la guerre Iran-Irak (1980-88) au cours de laquelle Khartoum apporte son soutien à Saddam Hossein avant de se réchauffer à nouveau avec l’arrivée au pouvoir d’Omar Al-Bashir qui était un fervent admirateur du régime iranien et promoteur d’une réislamisation du Soudan. Au cours des années 1990, le développement des liens bilatéraux permet à l’Iran de sortir de son isolement diplomatique et de trouver un allié stratégique dans le monde arabe et dans la région clé que constitue la corne de l’Afrique. Durant cette période, la République iranienne apporte une assistance financière et militaire substantielle au gouvernement soudanais. Le Corps des gardiens de la révolution islamique (CGRI) va jusqu’à installer au Soudan l’une de ses premières antennes opérationnelles en dehors du Moyen-Orient. De sorte qu’au tournant des années 2000, l’Iran et le Soudan sont déjà des partenaires actifs et que les deux pays sont considérés par le Département d’État américain comme les principaux soutiens étatiques du terrorisme global. L’administration Bush les classe alors tous les deux dans le fameux « Axe du mal ». Les fondements d’une coopération stratégique Après des débuts prometteurs, la relation bilatérale entre la République islamique et la République du Soudan arrive à maturité à la faveur de la montée en puissance du CGRI au sein du système politique iranien et de sa prise de contrôle de la politique étrangère iranienne en faveur d’une ambitieuse stratégie d’influence régionale. À partir de 2005, les Gardiens de la révolution adoptent une doctrine asymétrique qui consiste à développer un vaste réseau d’intermédiaires disséminés à travers le monde musulman et transcendant le clivage confessionnel entre Chiites et Sunnites. Constituant ce que l’on appelle aujourd’hui l’« Axe de la résistance », ce réseau regroupe des partenaires chiites ou « chiites-compatibles » comme le régime alaouite de Syrie, le Hezbollah libanais ou les Houthis zaydistes du Yémen mais aussi, sur une base beaucoup plus opportuniste, des mouvements d’obédience sunnite comme le Djihad islamique et le Hamas. C’est alors que Téhéran renforce ses liens avec Khartoum qui devient rapidement son principal partenaire stratégique en Afrique. Se traduisant par la signature d’un important accord de coopération militaire, de nombreuses visites de haut niveau mais aussi par l’implantation de la Force Quds (le corps expéditionnaire du CGRI) en sol soudanais, l’intensification des liens bilatéraux suscite la plus vive inquiétude parmi les adversaires de l’« Axe de la résistance », Israël et États-Unis en tête. En janvier 2009, l’aviation israélienne bombarde une série d’installations du CGRI sur le territoire soudanais soupçonnées de servir à un vaste réseau de transfert d’armes en faveur du Hamas. À la faveur du Printemps arabe de 2011, les relations irano-soudanaises continuent de croitre : en 2014, les responsables militaires de Khartoum n’hésitent pas à considérer les Iraniens comme leurs meilleurs alliés dans la région. 2014-2020 : Du Zénith au Nadir À partir de 2014, certains facteurs convergent néanmoins pour mettre un terme à la lune de miel entre l’Iran des mollahs et le Soudan d’Al-Bashir. D’abord, la détérioration des relations entre la République islamique et l’Arabie Saoudite désormais engagée dans un effort systématique pour accroître l’isolement diplomatique et stratégique de Téhéran. Se conjuguant aux pressions diplomatiques de Ryad, l’offre de Washington de lever les sanctions qui pèsent sur le régime de Khartoum aboutissent à la décision soudanaise de participer à la coalition du Conseil de coopération du golfe (CCG) contre les Houthis soutenus par l’Iran. Enfin, la détérioration des relations irano-soudanaises s’accélère avec l’élection de Donald Trump et l’adoption de la stratégie dite de « pression maximale » contre la République islamique et son système d’influence régionale : les États-Unis, Israël et les pays du CCG travaillent alors de concert pour mettre l’Iran en quarantaine et démanteler son réseau d’intermédiaires. En 2016, le Soudan, emboîtant le pas à l’Arabie Saoudite, finit par rompre ses relations diplomatiques avec la République islamique. Dans le cadre du processus de rapprochement israélo-arabe initié par les accords d’Abraham, la République du Soudan va jusqu’à amorcer une normalisation de ses relations avec Israël. Privé de son lien stratégique avec l’État africain, l’Iran fait alors face à un nouveau risque de marginalisation au sein du monde arabo-musulman. 2020-2023 : Retour discret de l’Iran sur la scène soudanaise À partir de 2020, plusieurs éléments se conjuguent pour favoriser le retour progressif de l’Iran sur la scène soudanaise. D’abord, la décision de l’administration Biden de mettre la stratégie de « pression maximale » en veilleuse dans l’espoir de renouer le dialogue avec la République islamique et de raviver l’accord nucléaire de 2015. Aussitôt, Téhéran met à profit cet apaisement relatif et la marge de manœuvre qu’il lui procure pour relancer sa stratégie d’influence régionale et renouer ses liens avec des partenaires comme le Soudan. Au cours des quatre années qui suivent, le CGRI et la force Al-Quds profitent de la guerre civile soudanaise et de l’échec du processus de stabilisation chapeautée par la communauté internationale et l’Autorité intergouvernementale pour le développement (IGAD) pour reprendre pied dans l’est du pays grâce à l’appui d’Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, président soudanais et commandant des Forces armées restées fidèles à l’ancien leader islamiste Omar Al-Bashir - mais aussi par l’intermédiaire d’une « organisation parapluie » connue sous le nom de « Kizan » composée d’éléments éparses issus de l’armée régulière et d’unités paramilitaires. Ces différentes factions qui, même durant la période de rupture diplomatique, avaient conservé des liens informels avec l’Iran, le Hamas et l’Hezbollah, recommencent à recevoir l’assistance militaire et technique de Téhéran avec, notamment, la livraison de drones de combat Mohadjer-6 de fabrication iranienne. Les intérêts convergents de Téhéran et de Khartoum Le réchauffement soudain des relations entre l’Iran et le Soudan bénéficie de l’enlisement du pays africain dans une nouvelle guerre civile. Les forces armées soudanaises (FAS), qui ont subi des revers majeurs face aux Forces de soutien rapide (FSR) issues des anciennes milices janjawids et désormais privés du soutien des Émirats arabes unis, recherchent désespérément un appui militaire externe. Les observateurs s’accordent à penser que l’une des principales raisons qui poussent Abdel Fattah Al Burhan et l'armée soudanaise à rétablir les relations avec la République islamique est l’espoir d’obtenir des autorités iraniennes la livraison d’armes de précision et, en particulier, des drones de combat iraniens, comme le populaire Mohadjer-6. Bien que ce type d’équipement militaire n’ait pas le potentiel de modifier le rapport de force sur le champ de bataille, il peut contribuer à ralentir l’effondrement des SAF et soutenir la contre-offensive lancée début 2024. Pour l’Iran, la livraison de ses drones de combat permet de renforcer sa crédibilité diplomatique sur la scène africaine. La reprise de la coopération entre les deux pays coïncide d’ailleurs avec l’adoption, par le Soudan, d’une position nettement plus critique à l’égard de l’intervention israélienne dans la bande de Gaza. Pour l’Iran, il s’agit également d’acquérir un canal d’influence non négligeable lui donnant accès à l’est-Soudan et, surtout, à Port-Soudan dont elle a fait sa capitale de facto : à travers cette position stratégique et les quelques 700 km de frontières maritimes, les Iraniens disposent d’un atout considérable pour compléter leur dispositif de disruption sur le passage maritime de la mer Rouge. Vers un nouvel âge d'or des liens irano-saoudiens ? Jusqu’à maintenant, Téhéran peut se vanter d’avoir récupéré beaucoup du terrain perdu durant la période 2014-2020. En juillet 2023, quelques mois après l’annonce du projet de normalisation des relations entre Ryad et Téhéran, le gouvernement soudanais exprime ouvertement sa volonté de renouer ses relations avec l’Iran « aussi vite que possible ». L’annonce intervient lors de la première réunion publique de haut niveau depuis 2016 entre Al Sadiq et Amir-Abdollahian à Bakou, la capitale azerbaïdjanaise. Dans un revirement spectaculaire et en pleine crise ouverte par les attaques du Hamas du 7 octobre 2023, Khartoum annonce que l'Iran et le Soudan « ont discuté de la restauration des relations bilatérales entre les deux pays et de l'accélération des démarches de réouverture des ambassades ». Dans la foulée, les médias rapportent que Téhéran et le mouvement islamique du « Kizan » ont convenu de coopérer afin de « faciliter l’extension de l’influence dans la mer Rouge » en contrepartie d’un renforcement de l’assistance militaire iranienne au profit de la « résistance islamique » locale. De fait, ces avancées constituent autant de victoires pour l’Iran et marquent son grand retour sur la scène locale. Cependant, elles sont à prendre avec prudence eu égard à la pression accrue exercée depuis le début de l’année 2024 par les adversaires du régime iranien sur son réseau d’influence et ses différents intermédiaires. Qu’elle soit rouge ou bleue, tout semble indiquer que la prochaine administration américaine renouera avec une forme ou une autre de la stratégie de « Pression maximale » qui avait présidé au recul de la présence iranienne au Soudan. Reste à savoir si les relations irano-soudanaises entreront à nouveau dans une période de refroidissement. Quid de la position du Canada ? Entre désengagement et désintéressement Alors que le Soudan s’enfonce dans une guerre civile aggravée par les ingérences étrangères et affectant durement les populations civiles, la question se pose de la position adoptée par Ottawa. Entre la fin des années 1990 et le milieu des années 2000, le Canada avait joué un rôle actif, bien que secondaire, en faisant la promotion d’une opération de maintien de la paix sous égide de l’ONU. À travers ses efforts au sein des forums multilatéraux, Ottawa avait contribué à enrayer le génocide perpétré contre la population ethnique du Darfour à l’ouest du pays. Cependant, depuis la résurgence de la guerre civile, les efforts déployés par le Canada se limitent à du « service minimum ». Jusqu’ici, l’action la plus spectaculaire a été la visite effectuée au Kenya voisin, en avril dernier, par la ministre des Affaires étrangères, Mélanie Joly, pour s’entretenir avec les responsables de l’IGAD. Au chapitre des actions, le Canada s’est contenté, comme d’autres pays étrangers confrontés à l’aggravation de la situation, d’évacuer ses citoyens, d’allouer une enveloppe de 71 millions de dollars d’aide humanitaire et d’appeler à la paix. Aujourd’hui, alors que le potentiel d’escalade est au plus haut, le Canada n’a plus ni ambassadeur au Soudan ni envoyé spécial pour relayer l’information de terrain aux décideurs canadiens. Aucune sanction canadienne ne cible les principaux belligérants - locaux ou étrangers. « Franchement, nous sommes revenus à presque zéro » a déclaré Nicholas Coghlan, l’ancien ambassadeur du Canada au Soudan, « nous ne sommes pas dans le coup ». Symptomatique de ce désengagement et de ce désintéressement du Canada vis-à-vis de cette région du globe est le fait que la « stratégie pour l’Afrique » promise par les Libéraux depuis plusieurs années se fait toujours attendre. ## Tenir ses promesses et répondre à la crise du Myanmar : Feuille de route pour le Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/tenir-ses-promesses-et-repondre-a-la-crise-du-myanmar-feuille-de-route-pour-le-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Dans sa stratégie indo-pacifique de novembre 2022, le Canada a identifié la montée de la violence au Myanmar à la suite du coup d'État militaire de 2021 comme l'une des menaces les plus importantes pour la paix et la prospérité de la région. Se positionnant comme un partenaire actif et engagé dans la région indo-pacifique, le Canada s'est engagé à promouvoir la paix, la résilience et la sécurité dans la région en tant qu'objectif stratégique. Le Canada a également promis d'accorder une attention particulière à son engagement avec les pays de l'Association des nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est (ANASE). Enfin, la stratégie affirme que le Canada mettra en œuvre sa stratégie sur les Rohingyas, contribuant ainsi à atténuer la crise des réfugiés rohingyas. Pourtant, à l'heure où nous écrivons ces lignes, le Canada n'a pas nommé d'envoyé spécial pour les crises des Rohingyas et du Myanmar, comme il l'avait promis. Bien qu'il ait reconnu que la crise du Myanmar constituait une grave menace pour la sécurité de la région indo-pacifique, le Canada n'a pas abordé cette crise en détail et n'a pas non plus proposé de réponse globale dans sa stratégie indo-pacifique. La réponse terne à la guerre au Myanmar sape l'engagement du Canada en faveur de la paix et de la sécurité dans la région indo-pacifique. Le Canada doit donc prendre des mesures concrètes pour résoudre la crise du Myanmar afin de s'affirmer comme un allié crédible dans la région. Contexte Le 1er février 2021, la junte militaire birmane a renversé le gouvernement civil démocratiquement élu du Myanmar et détenu le président Win Myint ainsi que la dirigeante de facto du pays et lauréate du prix Nobel, Aung San Suu Kyi. La junte, officiellement connue sous le nom de Conseil d'administration de l'État, est dirigée par le général Min Aung Hlaing, qui est recherché par la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) pour avoir perpétré le génocide des Rohingyas en 2017. L'armée birmane a lancé des attaques génocidaires contre la population rohingya, un groupe minoritaire musulman au Myanmar, notamment des massacres, des viols et des incendies criminels, forçant de nombreuses personnes à fuir leur domicile. Un grand nombre de personnes déplacées de force vivent aujourd'hui dans le plus grand camp de réfugiés du monde, dans le district de Cox's Bazar, au Bangladesh voisin, un autre pays de la région indo-pacifique. Le coup d'État de 2021 a installé les auteurs de ces crimes contre l'humanité au pouvoir au Myanmar. Le coup d'État a violemment transformé la démocratie naissante d'Asie du Sud-Est en une longue guerre civile. Immédiatement après le coup d'État, de nombreux citoyens ont exprimé leur désaccord avec le régime militaire par des manifestations pacifiques et ont demandé le soutien de la communauté internationale en utilisant le hashtag #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar sur les médias sociaux. Cependant, lorsque les manifestants pacifiques ont fait les frais d'une répression meurtrière, un gouvernement parallèle et intérimaire a été formé en avril 2021. Ce gouvernement, appelé gouvernement d'unité nationale (NUG) du Myanmar, est l'un des principaux acteurs de la lutte actuelle du Myanmar pour la démocratie. Aujourd'hui, le NUG compte les Forces de défense du peuple (PDF) comme unités armées sous son commandement, qui participent à la résistance militante contre le SAC dans tout le pays. Parmi les autres acteurs importants de la lutte contre le régime militaire figurent les organisations révolutionnaires ethniques (ERO), le mouvement de désobéissance civile (CDM), qui a rassemblé des étudiants et des fonctionnaires en grève, ainsi que des militants pro-démocratie au Myanmar et dans la diaspora. L'objectif commun de ces différents acteurs au sein de ce vaste mouvement, également connu sous le nom de « révolution de printemps », est de renverser la junte et de reconstruire le Myanmar sous la forme d'une démocratie fédérale inclusive. La guerre au Myanmar : Conséquences sécuritaires Il n'y a pas de conflit sans répercussions, et la guerre au Myanmar ne fait pas exception. Quatre années de violence politique prolongée et de guerre civile ont entraîné une intensification de la crise de l'immigration qui met en péril la paix et la stabilité de la région indo-pacifique. Le nombre de réfugiés, de personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays et d'apatrides au Myanmar et en provenance de ce pays est passé de 2,6 millions en 2021 à 5,1 millions en 2024. Le Bangladesh, l'Inde et la Thaïlande supportent une grande partie du fardeau de cette crise de l'immigration. Selon le Haut-Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR), ce nombre devrait atteindre un total de 6,8 millions de personnes d'ici à la fin de 2025, soit une augmentation considérable de 1,7 million par rapport à 2024. L'ampleur des violences que l'armée du Myanmar inflige à sa propre population civile contribue à cette tendance alarmante au déplacement et à l'augmentation de l'insécurité dans la région. Le Myanmar est classé au troisième rang mondial sur la liste de l'Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) des pays qui compteront le plus grand nombre de décès dus à la violence politique en 2024, juste derrière l'Ukraine et la Palestine. C'est également le deuxième endroit le plus dangereux et le plus violent au monde, selon le Conflict Index 2024 de l'ACLED. Entre février 2021 et décembre 2024, 74 951 personnes sont mortes à cause de la guerre et de la violence politique au Myanmar. Au 19 mars 2025, des preuves documentaires indiquent que la junte a tué 1 474 femmes et 737 enfants et arrêté 5 971 femmes et 598 enfants. 170 peines de mort ont été prononcées à l'encontre de militants pro-démocratie et de leurs partisans civils. En outre, la junte a bombardé de manière inhumaine des écoles et des universités. Depuis le coup d'État militaire de 2021, plus de 170 établissements d'enseignement ont été pris pour cible, notamment lors de frappes aériennes, tuant intentionnellement de nombreux enfants et jeunes. Politiques canadiennes passées et présentes sur le Myanmar Les décideurs et les praticiens canadiens ont déjà examiné les conséquences de la violence politique au Myanmar et de la crise de l'immigration qui en découle dans le contexte de la politique étrangère canadienne. En 2017, l'ambassadeur Bob Rae a été nommé envoyé spécial au Myanmar, dirigeant les efforts diplomatiques canadiens pour aider à résoudre la crise des Rohingyas. La première phase de la stratégie du Canada pour répondre à la crise des Rohingyas au Myanmar et au Bangladesh a été lancée en 2018 sur la base des recommandations fournies par l'ambassadeur Rae dans son rapport de 2018. Dans la deuxième phase de la Stratégie du Canada pour répondre aux crises des Rohingyas et du Myanmar (2021-2024), le gouvernement du Canada a reconnu la nécessité d'un engagement soutenu et d'un soutien supplémentaire pour aider à relever les nouveaux défis qui sont apparus après le coup d'État de 2021. La deuxième phase de la stratégie énumère quatre objectifs clés : (i) soutenir les populations à risque et touchées par la crise au Myanmar et au Bangladesh, en particulier les réfugiés rohingyas, les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays et les communautés d'accueil touchées ; (ii) intensifier les efforts pour promouvoir une paix inclusive et durable au Myanmar ; (iii) cibler le soutien pour promouvoir le rétablissement d'un régime démocratique au Myanmar ; et (iv) accroître la pression sur les acteurs malveillants, y compris en continuant à demander des comptes pour les violations des droits de l'homme. Le Canada s'est également engagé à renforcer la coopération internationale, notamment par la nomination d'un envoyé spécial, afin d'atteindre ces objectifs. Les lacunes dans la réponse politique du Canada Bien que la guerre au Myanmar et ses conséquences soient perçues comme une menace réelle pour la sécurité de la région indo-pacifique, le Canada n'a toujours pas tenu ses promesses. Le fait que la stratégie indo-pacifique ne contienne pas d'actions spécifiques sur la manière dont le Canada s'attaquerait à la crise du Myanmar et à la crise de l'immigration qui en découle laisse penser que le Canada n'a peut-être fait qu'exprimer des vœux pieux à l'égard des communautés du Myanmar qu'il a l'intention d'aider. Le fait que la stratégie indo-pacifique mentionne que le Canada mettra pleinement en œuvre la deuxième phase de sa stratégie sur les Rohingyas, qui s'est achevée en décembre 2024, ne fait qu'ajouter du sel à la plaie. Toutefois, en mars 2025, aucun envoyé spécial n'avait encore été nommé pour les crises des Rohingyas et du Myanmar. Interrogé sur la nomination d'un envoyé spécial en novembre 2024, un représentant d'Affaires mondiales Canada a répondu que l'on ne s'attendait pas à ce qu'un envoyé spécial soit immédiatement nommé. En ce qui concerne la coopération internationale pour faire face à la crise du Myanmar, le Canada a réitéré son soutien aux efforts de l'ANASE pour résoudre la situation humanitaire au Myanmar. Toutefois, il ne suffit pas d'emboîter le pas à l'ANASE et de soutenir ses efforts politiques inefficaces, car l'ANASE a non seulement poursuivi mais aussi renforcé son engagement auprès de la junte en dépit de ses crimes de guerre. La mise en œuvre du consensus en cinq points de l'ANASE, une feuille de route établie en avril 2021 pour la paix au Myanmar et soutenue par le Canada, a échoué face à l'intransigeance du régime. Le Canada doit donc explorer d'autres moyens d'aborder la crise du Myanmar par des voies diplomatiques au-delà des relations bilatérales entre le Canada et l'ANASE afin de soutenir la consolidation de la paix au Myanmar, un objectif énoncé dans la stratégie indo-pacifique. Pourquoi le Canada devrait intensifier sa réponse au Myanmar L'une des raisons possibles de l'absence de réponse politique du Canada au Myanmar est la petite taille de la diaspora du Myanmar au Canada. Après tout, il n'y a que 9 235 immigrants du Myanmar au Canada, selon le recensement de 2021. Pour faire écho à la Fondation Asie Pacifique (FAP), il semble y avoir une disparité dans la réinstallation au Canada de personnes fuyant des conflits violents dans le monde entier, puisque 298 128 ressortissants ukrainiens sont arrivés au Canada entre le 17 mars 2022 et le 1er avril 2024. En revanche, le nombre de réfugiés réinstallés au Canada en provenance de pays non occidentaux reste beaucoup plus faible, avec 44 620 réfugiés admis dans le cadre de l'initiative de réinstallation des réfugiés syriens, 55 195 ressortissants afghans arrivés au Canada après la prise de pouvoir des talibans en 2021, et un total de seulement 5 675 réfugiés du Myanmar résidant au Canada en 2021. Ce qui est surprenant, c'est que seuls 1 000 réfugiés rohingyas ont été réinstallés au Canada depuis 2006, un chiffre très bas si l'on considère que les décideurs politiques canadiens ont tendance à souligner très souvent leur engagement à aider les réfugiés rohingyas. Avec les récentes réductions de financement de la part des États-Unis, les efforts d'aide humanitaire en faveur des réfugiés rohingyas sont menacés. La récente visite du secrétaire général des Nations unies, António Guterres, à Cox's Bazar met en évidence la gravité de la crise de l'immigration, et le Canada doit tenir ses promesses de fournir un soutien supplémentaire aux réfugiés rohingyas en fonction des nouveaux défis à relever. Les défenseurs des Rohingyas restent frustrés car ils ne voient que peu d'impact des prétendus fonds canadiens alloués à l'aide au déplacement, sans compter qu'il n'y a pas d'envoyé spécial. L'attention accrue du Canada à l'égard du Myanmar devient plus critique que jamais à la suite des récents changements politiques et stratégiques survenus aux États-Unis sous l'administration Trump. Le président Trump envisage une interdiction de visa similaire à celle mise en œuvre sous sa première présidence. Le Myanmar a été touché par sa première interdiction de visa et le sera probablement à nouveau si la seconde entre en vigueur. Le président Trump a également bloqué 45 millions de dollars qui financent le programme de bourses d'études pour le développement et l'inclusion, grâce auquel des étudiants marginalisés du Myanmar sont inscrits dans des universités à travers l'Asie. Ces changements dans la politique étrangère des États-Unis concernant le Myanmar signifient que le statut de protection temporaire (TPS) désigné aux ressortissants du Myanmar sous l'administration Biden a peu de chances d'être renouvelé après son expiration en novembre 2025. Ces changements offrent également au Canada une excellente occasion de combler le manque de leadership nord-américain dans la crise du Myanmar et de réaffirmer l'engagement du Canada en faveur des droits de l'homme, de la paix et de la prospérité au Myanmar et dans la région indo-pacifique. Recommandations politiques Nommer un envoyé spécial au Myanmar (comme promis) Le Canada doit nommer dès que possible un envoyé spécial au Myanmar qui s'appuiera activement sur le travail et l'héritage de l'ambassadeur Bob Rae. La nomination d'un envoyé spécial chargé de la guerre au Myanmar et de la crise de l'immigration qui en découle renforcera le rôle du Canada en tant qu'allié attaché à l'amélioration des droits de l'homme et à la stabilité durable dans la région indo-pacifique. L'envoyé spécial peut également servir de pont entre les praticiens canadiens peu au fait de ce qui se passe en première ligne au Myanmar et les populations marginalisées que le Canada a promis d'aider. Mettre en œuvre la localisation dans les pratiques d'aide humanitaire Pour soutenir plus efficacement les communautés touchées par la guerre au Myanmar, le Canada doit prendre l'initiative de décider comment distribuer l'aide humanitaire. La priorité doit être donnée aux petites organisations locales qui travaillent directement avec les populations locales du Myanmar et des régions frontalières, plutôt qu'aux grandes organisations et agences internationales qui facturent des frais généraux exorbitants. Il est également nécessaire de faire preuve de transparence quant à la manière dont l'aide canadienne est distribuée afin d'instaurer un climat de confiance entre les décideurs politiques canadiens et les communautés qu'ils souhaitent soutenir. Collaborer avec les dirigeants et la société civile des États membres de l'ANASE Le Canada devrait travailler en étroite collaboration avec les dirigeants et la société civile des États membres de l'ANASE pour faire face à la guerre au Myanmar. Cette recommandation s'inscrit dans le cadre de la stratégie indo-pacifique du Canada, car elle permettra d'accroître l'engagement entre le Canada et les différents pays de l'ANASE. Les pays de l'ANASE que le Canada devrait privilégier dans ses efforts diplomatiques pour atténuer la crise du Myanmar sont la Malaisie, la Thaïlande et l'Indonésie, car ils accueillent la plupart des réfugiés et des demandeurs d'asile en Asie du Sud-Est. ## Transparence et culture des normes dans le domaine spatial : la contribution du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/transparence-et-culture-des-normes-dans-le-domaine-spatial-la-contribution-du-canada/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > La communauté internationale n’a pas réussi à créer des règles consensuelles et contraignantes sur l’utilisation de l’espace. Quel rôle pour le Canada? La communauté internationale n’a pas réussi jusqu’à présent à créer des règles consensuelles et juridiquement contraignantes sur l’utilisation de l’espace extra-atmosphérique au-delà de celles spécifiées dans le traité de l’espace de 1967. De telles règles réduiraient l’ambiguïté et contribueraient à s’assurer que l’avenir de l’espace soit sûr, pacifique et utilisé au profit de tous. L’ambiguïté est de savoir qui utilise l’espace et à quelles fins, mais englobe aussi la nature des objets présents dans l’espace. Cela est dû en partie aux limites technologiques actuelles, mais aussi au manque volontaire de transparence de la part des acteurs de l’espace eux-mêmes. Il en résulte une incertitude qui suscite l’anxiété, crée des tensions et alimente l’insécurité. Une telle ambiguïté, en l’absence de règles et de normes, a mené des acteurs puissants et des nations spatiales à déclarer que l’espace est  « un nouveau domaine  opérationnel ».  La situation actuelle, si elle n’est pas maîtrisée, est sur le point de compromettre les grands rêves collectifs sur la manière dont l’espace peut profiter à l'ensemble de la communauté humaine. Leadership canadien Le Canada peut décidément agir face à cette ambiguïté et contribuer à sécuriser cette nouvelle frontière en expansion constante à des fins pacifiques. Le Canada a été le troisième pays à entreprendre des activités spatiales, il est l’un des premiers membres du Comité des utilisations pacifiques de l’espace extra-atmosphérique (CUPEEA) et il fait partie du programme de la Station spatiale internationale, le tout soutenu par l’industrie spatiale commerciale canadienne, pionnière et avancée. Le Canada a été un leader dans le domaine de l’espace et des technologies connexes, et est bien placé pour être un leader dans le domaine de la sécurité spatiale. Le Canada peut assurer ce leadership en adoptant des mesures pratiques nationales, de manière bilatérale et en dehors des instruments multilatéraux officiels, afin de promouvoir davantage la paix et la sécurité dans l’espace. Ce faisant et en s’appuyant sur ses obligations internationales actuelles dans ce domaine, il favoriserait la poursuite d’un domaine spatial pacifique. Mesures à prendre Dans un environnement de méfiance accrue, des activités bénignes peuvent sembler hostiles. Ainsi, les mesures de transparence et de confiance (MTC) sont un rempart important contre les menaces potentielles qui prolifèrent. Cependant, lorsque le processus des MTC multilatérales est bloqué, le Canada doit assumer sa responsabilité en tant que nation spatiale de premier plan par des actions unilatérales et bilatérales, en plus d’instiguer des mesures pouvant créer un environnement propice au progrès. Les lignes directrices aux fins de la viabilité à long terme des activités spatiales élaborées et adoptées par le CUPEEA pourraient être mises en œuvre par le biais de la législation afin de créer des normes claires pour, entre autres, l’utilisation durable de l’espace et les évaluations conjointes précédant le lancement. Cette approche présente l’avantage d’exiger des acteurs commerciaux nationaux qu’ils se conforment aux lignes directrices, contribuant ainsi à la formulation et au renforcement des normes relatives à l’espace extra-atmosphérique. Il serait utile de codifier au niveau national certaines de ces lignes directrices – un engagement à développer, par exemple, les capacités spatiales canadiennes de manière à éviter les dommages dans l’espace et à assurer la sécurité des opérations spatiales. Un tel engagement clarifierait ce que le Canada considère comme un comportement acceptable et soulignerait son engagement à respecter les normes juridiques. Les lignes directrices pourraient être mises en œuvre dans le cadre d’une stratégie fragmentaire par domaine thématique tout en les adaptant au contexte canadien. En plus de publier des informations techniques transparentes, le Canada devrait également formuler une doctrine spatiale approfondie avec des politiques associées afin de mieux contextualiser ses activités spatiales. En fournissant et en adhérant à une politique spatiale publique, le Canada renforcerait la confiance des autres acteurs de l'espace – une question cruciale dans les cas de technologies à double usage (comme les objets co-orbitaux). En l’absence de normes et de standards établis au niveau international, il est très utile que chaque État définisse clairement ses normes d’action, notamment en ce qui concerne les actions qui peuvent être facilement confondues avec des actions hostiles (par exemple, l’approche d’un autre objet en orbite). Le Canada, en divulguant ses standards, apporterait une contribution précieuse à la fondation de normes internationales dans ce domaine. Cette doctrine définirait notamment ce que le Canada entend par la « militarisation de l'espace », un concept généralement contesté à l’heure actuelle, mais aussi ce que le Canada considérerait comme une menace ou un recours à la force contre l’un de ses objets spatiaux, c’est-à-dire les activités qui contreviendraient à la Charte des Nations Unies (art. 2 (4)) et au Traité de l’espace de 1967. Sécurité spatiale Le développement et les essais de capacités antisatellites constituent un facteur de déstabilisation continu. Si le Canada souhaite un jour se doter de capacités antisatellites, il doit prendre des engagements clairs par le biais de sa législation nationale. Ces engagements pourraient suivre ceux formulés et proposés par l’Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement (UNIDIR) : pas de débris, peu de débris et notification.  Une telle législation, en outre, clarifierait la manière dont le Canada réagirait à une menace ou à une attaque antisatellite, ce qui réduirait encore une fois l’ambiguïté et permettrait de définir des normes. Pour éviter toute ambiguïté dans la nature de ses activités spatiales, le Canada devrait révéler les charges utiles de tous ses lancements et mettre à disposition pour inspection toute technologie à double usage. Cela pourrait se faire unilatéralement ou par le biais d’accords et d’ententes bilatéraux, dans l’idée de jeter les bases d’un régime de surveillance international en appui avec la proposition, vieille de plusieurs décennies, de la création d’une agence internationale de surveillance par satellite (ISMA). En outre, le Canada devrait faire des efforts au niveau national pour élargir la participation à la discussion et à la formulation de politiques pour une utilisation pacifique de l’espace. Le développement de la technologie spatiale est mené par les acteurs commerciaux et le domaine académique, autant que par les gouvernements. Il est vrai que les entités commerciales privées exacerbent les préoccupations en matière de sécurité en poursuivant le développement de technologies suspectes à double usage. Cependant, ces entités peuvent également faire progresser le développement de capacités de reconnaissance de la situation dans l’espace et ainsi soutenir la conformité et l’établissement de la confiance par le biais d’un dispositif de sécurité coopératif pour les activités spatiales.  Il est essentiel que les acteurs commerciaux soient inclus dans la discussion afin qu’ils puissent comprendre les normes qui sont développées, y contribuer, mais aussi les respecter et développer des technologies en accord avec celles-ci. Pour être un leader dans l’utilisation pacifique de l’espace extra-atmosphérique, le Canada doit encadrer et diriger ses puissants acteurs commerciaux. En élargissant l’éventail des acteurs impliqués dans la sécurité spatiale, il est probable que des solutions significatives, précises et efficaces soient générées pour répondre aux questions de sécurité spatiale. Il s’agit aussi d’une reconnaissance du fait que, dans un avenir proche, les dilemmes de sécurité dans l’espace ne seront pas strictement interétatiques et qu’ils incluront ou encore émaneront probablement des acteurs commerciaux de l’espace. Ces actions permettront de renforcer la confiance entre les acteurs de l’espace en dissipant les ambiguïtés sur la nature et la portée des opérations spatiales. Alors que la technologie progresse rapidement dans ce domaine, il reste difficile de suivre et de surveiller les objets dans l’espace. Il est donc nécessaire qu’à ce stade les États fournissent volontairement des informations concernant leurs activités spatiales afin de garantir la clarté des intentions et des actions. Propositions de pistes d’action Ces actions, ainsi que d’autres qui s’y rapportent, sont décrites dans les propositions suivantes : Le Canada devrait s’efforcer, sur le plan national, d’élargir la participation à la discussion et à la formulation de la politique concernant les utilisations pacifiques de l’espace extra-atmosphérique. Le Canada devrait élaborer et rendre publique une doctrine spatiale et les politiques qui y sont associées afin de mieux contextualiser et clarifier ses activités spatiales[1]. Les lignes directrices aux fins de la viabilité à long terme des activités spatiales élaborées et adoptées par le CUPEEA devraient être mises en œuvre par le biais de la législation[2]. Le Canada devrait conclure davantage d’accords bilatéraux sur la coopération dans l’exploration et l’utilisation de l’espace à des fins pacifiques, à l’image de l’accord actuel entre le Canada et les États-Unis[3]. Sur le plan bilatéral, le Canada devrait proposer des projets d’aide technologique et de renforcement des capacités aux programmes spatiaux des pays en développement afin de s’assurer qu’ils disposent des ressources nécessaires à la transparence et au respect des normes. Le Canada devrait entreprendre une démarche bilatérale et multilatérale de promotion de l’établissement d’une agence internationale de surveillance par satellite (ISMA). Le Canada devrait s’engager à diffuser volontairement le contenu de ses lancements (charges utiles) afin de certifier leur caractère non armé. Le Canada devrait faire la promotion, au niveau national, du lien entre les objectifs de développement durable des Nations Unies et la technologie spatiale, ce qui aidera la culture des normes et qui sensibilisera les citoyens à la façon dont l’espace est conceptualisé et utilisé dans la pratique[4]. Le Canada devrait favoriser l’expertise nationale en matière de défense spatiale afin de la mettre à profit lors de l’élaboration des politiques dans le cadre du Commandement de la défense aérospatiale de l’Amérique du Nord (NORAD) et en collaboration avec des partenaires européens, par le biais d’initiatives telles que l’Innovation pour la défense, l’excellence et la sécurité (IDEeS). En tant que membre de l’OTAN, le Canada devrait plaider pour le développement et la promotion d’engagements communs pour l’utilisation pacifique des satellites entre les membres de l’OTAN. Cela permettrait de renforcer le soutien au projet de Code de conduite de l’Union européenne pour les activités spatiales. Le Canada devrait continuer à jouer un rôle de premier plan dans les actes de transparence volontaire par l’intermédiaire des institutions multilatérales. Le Canada a été l’un des rares États à rendre compte de ses activités spatiales par le biais d’un rapport annuel au sous-comité scientifique et technique du CUPEEA. Le gouvernement canadien devrait reprendre ses contributions volontaires annuelles à l’UNIDIR[5] et soutenir spécifiquement les conférences sur la sécurité spatiale organisées par l’UNIDIR, en collaboration avec les ONG nationales. Ces propositions, bien que non radicales, sont pragmatiques et reposent sur des bases techniques solides. Ces changements spécifiques peuvent être intensifiés au fil du temps, tout en contribuant à la formulation de normes et d’une culture organisationnelle claire qui peut être mise à profit. Ces mesures spécifiques sont tirées de l’identification des menaces hautement prioritaires qui peuvent être atténuées par des mesures progressives. Une telle approche permet d’éviter les obstacles désormais bien définis à l’établissement d’une sécurité spatiale multilatérale : la promotion d’accords globaux malgré l’absence de consensus international et la poursuite par certains États d’objectifs géostratégiques qui s’étendent à l’espace extra-atmosphérique.    Veuillez noter que cet article a été préparé à l’origine pour les bourses de recherche pour diplômés 2019-2020 pour Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, un concours annuel organisé par la Simons Foundation en partenariat avec le Programme de recherche et d'information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale d’Affaires mondiales Canada. L’auteur a été l’un des quatre lauréats en 2019. L’article a été publié à l’origine à l’adresse suivante : https://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/highlights/2019-2020-graduate-research-awards-disarmament-arms-control-and-non-proliferation-award [1] L'espace est sporadiquement mentionné dans la politique de défense du Canada de 2017 Protection, Sécurité, Engagement, mais les références ne constituent pas une politique spatiale publique complète. [2] Le Canada se conforme déjà à certaines directives du CUPEEA par le biais de la loi canadienne sur les systèmes de télédétection spatiale (2005) et de son règlement d'application (2007), qui font d’une méthode claire d’élimination des produits de télédétection une condition préalable à l’obtention d’une licence de satellite, et par l’adoption par l’Agence spatiale canadienne des directives du Comité de coordination inter institutions sur la réduction des débris spatiaux (2012). [3] Accord-cadre de coopération entre le gouvernement du Canada et le gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique relatif à l’exploration et à l’utilisation de l’espace extra-atmosphérique à des fins pacifiques (2009). [4] « Exploration, imagination, innovation : une nouvelle stratégie spatiale pour le Canada » est un bon début. [5] Le gouvernement canadien n’a pas apporté de contribution volontaire à l’UNIDIR depuis 2015. Le Canada a fait des contributions volontaires fréquentes, mais pas toujours annuelles à l’UNIDIR entre 1991 et 2015. Le financement de l’UNIDIR est décrit dans le rapport annuel de ses directeurs. ## Ukraine : Le choc de la guerre URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/ukraine-le-choc-de-la-guerre/ Modified: 2022-04-27 > Procurez-vous le livre Ukraine : Le choc de la guerre, le premier volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Franchira-t-il le Rubicon ? La question est sur toutes les lèvres, alors que la Russie poursuit son invasion de l’Ukraine : le président Vladimir Poutine osera-t-il recourir à des armes de destruction massive ? C’est l’une des menaces abordée par cet ouvrage qui permet de comprendre le choc de la guerre en Ukraine, ses enjeux et au-delà le nouveau monde en formation. Quelle est la grande stratégie russe à l’œuvre ? Pourquoi Poutine sème-t-il le chaos et la désolation? Comment la Russie instrumentalise-t-elle le droit international pour justifier son bellicisme ? Quel sera le sort des exilés de guerre ? Comment l’Afrique réagit-elle à l’offensive russe ? À quelle justice internationale sera-t-il possible de recourir pour l’Ukraine ? La Russie peut-elle se déconnecter d’Internet ? Procurez-vous le livre Ukraine : Le choc de la guerre, le premier volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Une nouvelle génération d’experts renommés, d’observateurs avisés des opérations en cours livre ici ses points de vue éclairés, accessibles au plus grand nombre et accompagnés d’une riche infographie. Les différentes contributions de ce livre sont issues de la plateforme francophone d’analyse de questions internationales Le Rubicon. SOMMAIRE « Un désir de grande Russie ? Réflexions sur la grande stratégie russe », par Céline Marangé « La Russie rate sa sortie », par Frédéric Mérand « Les réactions africaines à la guerre en Ukraine », par Sonia Le Gouriellec « La Russie en Ukraine : un cas d’école de l’instrumentalisation du droit international », par Jean-Emmanuel Perrin « Agression de l’Ukraine et exil de guerre : l’Europe, toute l’Europe, rien que l’Europe ? », par Julian Fernandez, Thibaut Fleury Graff et Alexis Marie « Quelle justice internationale pour l’Ukraine ? », par Frédéric Mégret « La Russie peut-elle se déconnecter d’internet ? », par Kevin Limonier « Une guerre majeure toujours possible et moins improbable », par Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer Le Rubicon publiera de petits livres destinés au grand public, qui permettront d’aborder, clairement et précisément, les nouvelles questions brûlantes liées à l’actualité internationale. Chaque mois, à partir d’avril 2022, les Équateurs publieront un ouvrage d’environ 128 à 144 pages, au prix de 10 à 12 euros, synthèse du travail des experts de la plateforme Le Rubicon. La nouvelle collection du Rubicon ## Ukraine : Pourquoi l’OTAN doit faire des concessions URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/ukraine-pourquoi-lotan-doit-faire-des-concessions/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Le demi-soutien actuel de l'OTAN est insuffisant pour dissuader la Russie et encourage plutôt une intervention russe pour arrêter la... Depuis des mois, la Russie rassemble des troupes près des frontières de l'Ukraine. Plus de 100 000 soldats russes ont été signalés dernièrement, y compris des systèmes de missiles balistiques et d'autres équipements militaires. Des unités de Sibérie ainsi que de Russie méridionale et occidentale ont été mobilisées. La coopération militaire entre la Russie et la Biélorussie s'approfondit à mesure que les mouvements de troupes et les exercices militaires s'intensifient, menaçant directement Kiev. Le secrétaire d'État américain, Antony Blinken, devrait bientôt fournir une réponse écrite à certaines des demandes de la Russie et mettre « de nouvelles idées sur la table ». Certains experts et anciens diplomates pensent que l'Amérique devra concéder quelque chose de substantiel, que ce soit avant ou après une intervention. La Russie doit choisir entre deux options désagréables : l'humiliation ou la guerre. Vladimir Poutine a rendu publiques ses intransigeantes exigences. De graves coûts de crédibilité sont à venir s'il n'obtient pas au moins une de ses demandes. Pour des experts comme Anatol Lieven et Paul Robinson, l'objectif est d'aller au-delà de la proposition ukrainienne d'une demi-autonomie temporaire pour les régions séparatistes et de leur accorder une autonomie complète en échange d'un accord de paix et du retrait des troupes russes des zones conflictuelles. Ils suggèrent également de s'appuyer sur un déploiement militaire international pour assurer la démilitarisation effective de la région du Donbass. Renforcer la posture de dissuasion de l'OTAN en multipliant les incursions en mer Noire ou en augmentant le soutien matériel à l'Ukraine ne fait que conforter Poutine dans sa conviction qu'il n'est possible d'atteindre ses objectifs que par la voie militaire. Une autre solution consisterait pour l'OTAN à déclarer un moratoire sur toutes les nouvelles adhésions et à faire pression sur l'Ukraine pour qu'elle applique l'accord de Minsk II. Les membres de l'OTAN sont divisés quant à l'intégration de l'Ukraine dans l'Alliance, ce qui rend son adhésion hautement improbable. Il ne s'agirait donc pas d'une perte stratégique importante puisque l'OTAN n'a de toute façon aucune intention sérieuse d'accepter l'Ukraine. Soutien occidental à l'Ukraine La crispation actuelle de la Russie est en réaction directe au soutien continu de l'Occident aux forces ukrainiennes qui combattent les séparatistes soutenus par la Russie dans les régions de Donetsk et de Louhansk – collectivement connues sous le nom du Donbass. Le soutien de l'OTAN à Kiev est acheminé par le biais du paquet d'assistance global pour l'Ukraine. Depuis 2014 et l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie et la déstabilisation de l'Est de l'Ukraine, l'objectif de l'OTAN est d'accroître le renforcement des capacités et de fournir une formation militaire pour permettre aux forces ukrainiennes de résister aux milices soutenues par la Russie dans le Donbass. L'administration Biden a fourni à l'Ukraine des armes et du matériel militaire pour un montant total de 650 millions de dollars l’année dernière. Le Royaume-Uni a signé un protocole d'application de contrats navals avec Kiev en 2021, tandis que les États-Unis ont signé un cadre de défense stratégique et une charte de partenariat stratégique avec l'Ukraine. 200 soldats canadiens sont déployés en Ukraine dans le cadre de l'opération Unifier, et Ottawa a fourni une aide de 700 millions de dollars aux forces ukrainiennes depuis 2014. Dans le cadre d'efforts plus larges visant à renforcer sa posture de dissuasion après l'invasion de l'Ukraine en 2014, l'OTAN a augmenté ses déploiements en mer Noire (patrouilles navales et aériennes) et a renforcé la présence de l'Alliance en Europe de l'Est et du Sud. Plus récemment, la France a déclaré qu'elle enverrait des troupes en Roumanie dans le cadre des missions de « présence avancée renforcée » de l'OTAN. Un renforcement du matériel militaire de l’OTAN est aussi constatable dans les pays baltiques et d’Europe de l’Est. Les revendications et la détermination de la Russie Tout cela suscite de grandes inquiétudes sécuritaires en Russie. Poutine se méfie de la rhétorique défensive de l'OTAN (en raison des interventions de l'OTAN au Kosovo et en Libye, ainsi que de son expansion en Europe de l'Est après la guerre froide). Pour la Russie, le soutien des États-Unis à l'Ukraine équivaut à une intégration de facto de l'Ukraine dans l'OTAN, en dehors des dispositions de l'article 5. La volonté déclarée des États-Unis d'accroître l'interopérabilité entre l'Ukraine et l'OTAN est inacceptable pour Moscou pour des raisons sécuritaires et idéologiques. L'insistance de l'Ukraine à rejoindre l'OTAN et le soutien ferme de l'OTAN à sa politique de la porte ouverte (article 10) sont au cœur des griefs de la Russie contre l'Occident. Le Kremlin ne permettra jamais à l'Ukraine de réaliser son ambition d'adhérer à l'OTAN, et l’OTAN ne se battra jamais pour aider l'Ukraine à le faire. Contrairement à son précédent renforcement militaire en avril 2021, la Russie a cette fois-ci été limpide dans ses exigences publiques. Le Kremlin veut ramener l'expansion de l'OTAN en Europe à une architecture de sécurité européenne de 1997, obtenir des garanties écrites que l'OTAN ne s'étendra pas dans la sphère postsoviétique et mettre fin à l'assistance militaire de l'OTAN aux anciens États soviétiques. L'urgence des demandes publiques de la Russie et la menace de répondre au non-respect de ces exigences par des « mesures militaro-techniques de rétorsion » expriment la détermination de Moscou. La Russie ne peut pas simplement faire marche arrière après ses multiples tentatives infructueuses de dissuader la coopération OTAN-Ukraine : sa crédibilité est en jeu. Lors des entretiens de vendredi dernier entre  Blinken et Lavrov, les États-Unis ont accepté de fournir une réponse écrite pour répondre aux demandes de la Russie et exprimer leurs propres préoccupations. D'autres entretiens sont prévus, mais ils ne seront pas nombreux si la Russie n'obtient pas rapidement quelque chose. Certains experts estiment qu'une intervention militaire – si elle doit avoir lieu – se déroulera très probablement après le 20 février (date de la fin de l'exercice russo-biélorusse et des Jeux olympiques en Chine). La pression pourrait diminuer sensiblement si la réponse écrite attendue des États-Unis allait au-delà des mesures de réduction des risques liés aux exercices militaires et au contrôle des armements. Des concessions sur les déploiements de missiles ou les manœuvres en Europe ne suffiraient pas à empêcher la Russie d'attaquer l'Ukraine. Les mesures de confiance et autres subterfuges du genre ne feront pas oublier à la Russie la progression constante des « structures de renseignement américaines dans les branches clés du gouvernement ukrainien, et le déploiement de l'infrastructure militaire américaine [en Ukraine] ». Le renforcement des capacités et la dissuasion Les milices soutenues par la Russie dans le Donbass sont destinées à empêcher la progression locale de l'OTAN. Envoyer plus d'aide et d'armes à Kiev pousse Poutine à recourir à la force pour contrer la solidification d'une tendance qu'il considère comme de plus en plus menaçante. Poutine pense que l'Ukraine dérive inévitablement vers l'Ouest et que seule la force peut arrêter ce basculement. L'intention de l'Ukraine d'améliorer son équipement militaire pourrait aboutir à ce que Kiev dispose d’armes stratégiques – surtout si les États-Unis décident d'accélérer le processus. Si l'Ukraine obtient des armes qui peuvent modifier l'équilibre des forces, une attaque russe pour alléger les coûts actuels de l'inaction (réduction de la puissance militaire/augmentation de la vulnérabilité) devient rationnelle. Le risque pour la Russie est en effet que la modernisation militaire de l'Ukraine finisse par altérer la capacité russe à contraindre Kiev à des coûts raisonnables si l’Ukraine obtient des missiles à longue portée ou des systèmes de défense aériens. Plus la Russie attend pour arrêter par la force la progression de l'OTAN en Ukraine, plus les coûts d'une intervention militaire sont élevés. C'est pourquoi l'augmentation des transferts d'armes vers l'Ukraine est un jeu dangereux. D'un autre côté, on peut suggérer que la réponse écrite attendue de Washington pourrait mieux prévenir une nouvelle agression russe en spécifiant clairement des contre-mesures répondant à divers scénarios. Ces contre-mesures n'incluent cependant pas l'envoi de troupes, car une intervention militaire directe a été exclue par les États-Unis. Les options de pression maximale, sans déploiement d’hommes, avec lesquelles l'Occident pourrait menacer la Russie sont au nombre de trois : Premièrement, l'Allemagne pourrait suspendre la certification de Nord Stream 2 (NS2) en guise de mesure de rétorsion, soit pour la mobilisation militaire actuelle de la Russie, soit en cas de nouvelle agression. Deuxièmement, les États-Unis pourraient imposer davantage de sanctions aux oligarques russes et même interdire l’accès à la Russie aux technologies de fabrication américaine dont elle est fortement tributaire. Troisièmement, toutes les institutions financières russes pourraient être interdites du système bancaire SWIFT, isolant ainsi la Russie de l'économie mondiale. La troisième option semble cependant irréaliste. Elle implique de graves coûts logistiques et économiques touchant à la sécurité énergétique européenne. Il est clair que la Russie anticipe ces contre-mesures. Elles sont douloureuses et constituent le principal moyen de dissuasion de l'OTAN, même si le recours à l'une de ces mesures avant une attaque russe risquerait de la précipiter. La mise en œuvre de ces mesures doit donc se faire en représailles et seulement en cas d’échec à arrêter une intervention russe. L'Occident n'a aucun intérêt dans la guerre Les intérêts des pays occidentaux ne vont pas dans le sens des conséquences qui résulteraient de l’imposition de sanctions sévères sur la Russie. L'Amérique veut que la Russie maintienne une ambiguïté stratégique entre Washington et Pékin, et non pas qu’elle s’aligne entièrement sur son rival systémique. Cela se produirait inévitablement si l'Amérique donnait l'impulsion nécessaire pour bannir effectivement les institutions financières russes du système bancaire SWIFT. Dans ce cas de figure, la Chine ne se plierait vraisemblablement pas à des sanctions ultra-strictes qui porteraient gravement atteinte à son économie. Cette situation accélérerait le développement d'alternatives monétaires – la « dédolarisation » – contournant le dollar américain dans les échanges commerciaux au détriment de son influence dans le monde. L'Allemagne traverse une crise énergetique et a besoin du gaz russe pour sa transition énergétique tandis que la Russie, elle, de la technologie allemande. L'Union européenne est aussi fortement dépendante de la Russie pour ses importations énergétiques : 41% de son gaz naturel, 27% de son pétrole et 47% de ses combustibles fossiles solides. Si la ministre allemande des Affaires étrangères, Annalena Baerbock, a déclaré que NS2 était sur la table en fonction de l'escalade de la crise ukrainienne, Berlin n'est néanmoins pas disposé à envoyer des armes en Ukraine. NS2 est une question controversée. Nombreux sont ceux qui hésitent encore à politiser le pipeline. Macron a récemment déclaré vouloir engager des négociations avec la Russie indépendamment de la concertation diplomatique menée par les États-Unis. Si Macron est sérieux à ce sujet, il devrait se coordonner avec l'Allemagne pour offrir à la Russie des conditions de paix qui reflètent la voix et les intérêts de l'Europe. Donner à la Russie l'espoir qu'il est encore possible d'amener l'Ukraine à concéder un statut spécial au Donbass est le meilleur moyen d'éviter une intensification du conflit. En prenant cette voie, l'UE, sous la direction de Macron, pourrait avoir un poids plus important dans la sécurité de l'Europe conformément à l'accord de Minsk II, et prouverait ainsi que les ambitions géopolitiques de l'UE sont sérieuses. D'autre part, il pourrait être difficile pour des pays comme le Canada d'opérer un revirement en matière de politique étrangère sur l'Ukraine. La diaspora canado-ukrainienne, et son principal lobby, s'opposeraient sans aucun doute à une telle démarche. Le maintien de la souveraineté de l'Ukraine est fondamental pour le Canada pour de nombreuses raisons. Mais ce qui est également très important pour le Canada, c'est la perspective d'éviter une guerre entre la Russie et l'Ukraine qui aggraverait la polarisation du système international et rendrait le monde plus volatile et moins stable. Le dilemme de Chamberlain Quelles pourraient être les prochains objectifs de la Russie si l'OTAN l’accommode sur le dossier ukrainien ? Il est peu probable que la Russie poursuive son expansion si la crise ukrainienne est résolue dans des conditions acceptables pour Moscou. Tout d'abord, parce que l'économie russe devrait supporter des coûts massifs pour soutenir l'effort de guerre, ne serait-ce que pour tenir Kiev, sans même parler d’autres prises dans le proche voisinage de la Russie. Le scénario de la pression maximale – l'exclusion de la Russie de l'économie mondiale – rendrait presque impossible pour Moscou de financer des politiques expansionnistes à long terme, sans compter la résistance locale à laquelle la Russie serait confrontée. De plus, la Russie a tout intérêt à protéger le statut de la minorité russe en Ukraine orientale. L'ukrainisation des zones où vivent les minorités russophones en Ukraine, et la loi autochtone de Kiev excluant les minorités russes (ainsi que les Ukrainiens), touchent directement à l'identité de la Russie en tant que protectrice des minorités russes. Cette implication émotionnelle russe favorise son irrédentisme en Ukraine orientale et milite contre l'idée que la Russie fomente des visées expansionnistes. L'importance idéologique de l'Ukraine pour la Russie joue un rôle important dans la motivation de poursuivre une politique révisionniste à l'égard de l'Ukraine. Les intérêts idéologiques russes dans le reste de la sphère post-soviétique ne sont pas aussi importants qu'en Ukraine. Par conséquent, l'expansion russe est peu probable, car toutes les terres n'ont pas la même valeur d'un point de vue émotionnel (et sécuritaire). La « carte de pression » des États-Unis Comme brièvement mentionné, appliquer des sanctions sévères contre la Russie et demander à tout le monde de s'y conformer exacerberait les tensions au sein de l'OTAN. Si les États baltes et d'autres pays d'Europe de l'Est seraient ravis d'imposer des sanctions sévères à la Russie, il semble plus compliqué d'obtenir l'adhésion des autres pays européens. L'augmentation des coûts pour la Russie obligerait probablement l'Amérique à faire pression sur les Européens pour obtenir leur coordination. Le pivot américain vers l'Asie de 2011 et la réorientation des principales ressources vers l'Indopacifique indiquent l’orientation stratégique principale de Washington. Si l'Amérique devait faire pression sur les Européens pour qu'ils fassent quelque chose, il semblerait stratégiquement peu judicieux de le faire à propos du conflit en Ukraine. Après la retraite afghane et la création de l’AUKUS, l'Amérique doit préserver la cohésion déjà mise à mal de ses principaux alliés de l'OTAN. Déclarer des sanctions massives à l'encontre de la Russie ou renforcer sérieusement le soutien militaire à l'Ukraine et demander à tous de respecter cette ligne de conduite reviendrait à gaspiller une « carte de pression » utile pour des intérêts américains qui sont, in fine, non stratégiques. Pour que l'Amérique ne soit pas dans une position où elle doit choisir si elle doit ou non faire pression sur les Européens au sujet de l'Ukraine, il est nécessaire d'empêcher une invasion russe, car cela obligerait l'Occident à réagir. En donnant à la Russie l'espoir qu'une solution légale pour garantir l'autonomie et l'amnistie au Donbass est réalisable et qu'un moratoire sur toutes les nouvelles adhésions à l'OTAN est atteignable, on peut espérer prévenir ce qui semble être une intervention russe imminente. La nouvelle stratégie de l’OTAN Désamorcer une intervention russe et sortir de cette crise suppose donc de faire marche arrière et d’essayer de convaincre Moscou qu’une issue légale existe pour le Donbass. Pour cela, il faudrait faire pression sur l'Ukraine pour qu'elle mette en œuvre les réformes constitutionnelles nécessaires pour accorder l'autonomie et l'amnistie aux républiques du Donbass. Ces républiques séparatistes bénéficient d'un soutien important de la part de la population locale et sont soutenues par une grande puissance. Elles comptent des milliers de fonctionnaires, et surtout de soldats, qui sont plus déterminés à se battre – et à mourir – que l'OTAN. En fin de compte, le principal moteur de la conflictualité russo-occidentale est l’Ukraine. Le désir de Kiev d’intégrer l’OTAN s’oppose frontalement à la conception de la sécurité nationale et territoriale de la Russie. La Russie est prête à se battre pour sécuriser ses intérêts, tout comme le sont les Ukrainiens. Ces derniers n’ont cependant aucune chance réelle de l’emporter face à la Russie sans soutien occidental. Or, l’Alliance atlantique manque de la cohésion et des intérêts nécessaires pour consentir aux coûts associés à un réel soutien de l’Ukraine. Le demi-soutien actuel est insuffisant pour dissuader la Russie et encourage plutôt une intervention russe pour arrêter la modernisation militaire de l'Ukraine. Pour réellement dissuader la Russie, il faudrait que l’OTAN mette à disposition des moyens dont ses membres ne veulent pas subir les coûts. C'est pourquoi la mise en œuvre d'une stratégie correspondant aux moyens et aux intérêts réels de l'OTAN aiderait à empêcher une intensification de la crise. Et une telle stratégie implique de convaincre Moscou qu'un accord légal existe dans le Donbass en réorientant la pression occidentale de Moscou vers Kiev. ## Ukraine, un an après : premières leçons et perspectives URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/ukraine-un-an-apres-premieres-lecons-et-perspectives/ Modified: 2023-03-23 > Procurez-vous le livre Ukraine un an après : premières leçons et perspectives, le cinquième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Un an après l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, quelles leçons pouvons-nous tirer du choc de cette guerre qui couvait depuis au moins une vingtaine d’années ? Rien ne s’est passé comme on pouvait l’imaginer aussi bien dans sa narration que sur le théâtre des opérations. Le rôle des drones ou des cyberattaques n’a pas été si déterminant et a laissé place à des affrontement lourds, à la guerre des blindés, des tranchées. Parallèlement, le renseignement dans l’anticipation de l’invasion comme dans le succès des forces ukrainiennes, s’est révélé stratégique. Mais les leçons du passé nous enseignent qu’il faut agir tant sur les intentions que les capacités pour atteindre une paix durable. Quelles seront les répercussions mondiales pour les prochaines années de ce conflit majeur qui, seule certitude, sera long ? Quelles seront les conditions et les caractéristiques d’une potentielle paix ? Comment assurer la sécurité européenne ? Autant de questions brûlantes auxquelles tente de répondre ce volume percutant du Rubicon. Procurez-vous le livre, Ukraine, un an après : premières leçons et perspectives, le cinquième volume de la nouvelle collection du Rubicon ! Une nouvelle génération d’experts renommés, d’observateurs avisés des opérations en cours livre ici ses points de vue éclairés, accessibles au plus grand nombre et accompagnés d’une riche infographie. Les différentes contributions de ce livre sont issues de la plateforme francophone d’analyse de questions internationales Le Rubicon. SOMMAIRE Ukraine-Russie : une guerre de 20 ans" par Olivier Sueur Ukraine : de quoi l’oubli Yougoslave est-il le nom ? par Loïc Trégourès L’invasion de l’Ukraine et l’histoire militaire par Cédric Mas La guerre d’Ukraine et le renseignement : entre problèmes récurrents et usages émergents par Raphaël Ramos Invisible, impotent ou immature ? Premières leçons de l’usage du cyber en Ukraine par Alexis Rapin Guerre aérienne en Ukraine : le problème de Diagoras par David Pappalardo « Le fond qui remonte à la surface » ? Questionner la forme du soutien étatique aux organisations rebelles lors des guerres civiles par Arthur Stein L’attaque du pont de Crimée et les représailles russes : que dit le droit international ? par Louis Perez Cause juste et respect du droit international humanitaire : à propos du « rapport » d’Amnesty International par Julia Grignon L’impact de la guerre en Ukraine en Asie centrale : instabilité, méfiance et perte d’influence russe par Hélène Thibault Ce que la guerre en Ukraine fait à la coopération arctique par Camille Escudé Quelle paix pour l’Ukraine ? Comprendre les causes de la guerre pour y mettre fin par Justin Massie Le Rubicon publiera de petits livres destinés au grand public, qui permettront d’aborder, clairement et précisément, les nouvelles questions brûlantes liées à l’actualité internationale. Chaque mois, à partir d’avril 2022, les Équateurs publieront un ouvrage d’environ 128 à 144 pages, au prix de 10 à 12 euros, synthèse du travail des experts de la plateforme Le Rubicon.   ## Un an après la révolte du voile en Iran : bilan et état des lieux URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/un-an-apres-la-revolte-du-voile-en-iran-bilan-et-etat-des-lieux/ Modified: 2023-10-10 > 16 septembre 2022, Mahsa Amini, jeune femme kurde arrêtée à Téhéran - parce que son voile était mal ajusté -, est conduite au... 16 septembre 2022, Mahsa Amini, jeune femme kurde arrêtée à Téhéran - parce que son voile était mal ajusté -, est conduite au commissariat de police dont elle ne sortira pas vivante. Aussitôt la nouvelle de l’assassinat se répand et l’Iran s’embrase. Des nuées de femmes, la rage au cœur, allument des feux en y jetant leur tchador. Au cours de l’automne, la République islamique traverse une crise majeure d’une ampleur sans précédent depuis son avènement. Un an après ces événements, se pose la question de l’état du régime : dans quelle mesure ce qu’il est désormais coutume d’appeler la « révolte des tchadors » a-t-elle fragilisé la théocratie iranienne ? La révolte et la réaction Rappel des événements : dans les jours et les semaines qui suivent la mort de Mahsa Amini, les mollahs et les Gardiens de la révolution tremblent. Alors que ces derniers coupent Internet, la contestation gagne le cercle étroit du pouvoir : la propre sœur du Guide suprême épouse la cause des manifestants. Les iraniennes taillent leur chevelure et la chanson « Barāyé » [« Pour » en persan], qui dresse un réquisitoire contre la brutalité de la dictature cléricale, devient l’hymne d’une révolte populaire qui résonne à travers le monde. En octobre, les symboles les plus sacrés du régime sont pris à partie. Les programmes de la télévision islamique sont piratés et l’ayatollah Khamenei est accusé de faire « couler le sang de la jeunesse ». Quelques jours plus tard, la statue de l’imam Khomeini est déboulonnée tandis que sa maison natale est incendiée. En décembre, la révolte que rien ne semble pouvoir arrêter franchit une nouvelle étape : les manifestations s’improvisent arracheurs de turban des religieux. Les photos de la transgression de cet ultime tabou sont diffusées aux quatre coins du monde. Très vite cependant, mollahs et Pasdars reprennent la situation en main. Après avoir été pris de court, les autorités procèdent à de très nombreuses arrestations. S’appuyant sur de nombreux affidés recrutés à l’étranger parmi les chiites arabophones, la milice des Bassidjis s’adonnent à la répression la plus sanglante. Les manifestants arrêtés s’entassent à la sinistrement célèbre prison d’Evin subissant procès arbitraires et séances de torture. Comme aux heures les plus sombres de la révolution de 1979, les grues de chantier se transformant en gibet. Les images glaçantes de pendaisons parcourent à nouveau les écrans de télévision. Le monde regarde impavide Dès le mois de septembre, la nouvelle du drame se répand au-delà des frontières iraniennes. L’air de « Barāyé » est repris en chœur par les artistes occidentaux tandis qu’actrices et chanteuses se coupent les cheveux en solidarité avec leurs consœurs iraniennes. À Paris, le 16 janvier, à la tombée de la nuit, le slogan des demandeurs de liberté – Zan, Zendegi, Azād [« Femme, Vie, Liberté »] s’étale au premier étage de la tour Eiffel en lettres lumineuses. Au même moment, Charlie Hebdo consacre un numéro spécial à l’ayatollah Khamenei représenté en cancrelat accouchant d’une ribambelle de petits mollahs. Pourtant, l’émotion des Occidentaux à l’égard du drame iranien s’avère éphémère et superficielle. Bien que les diasporas iraniennes manifestent à Paris, New York, Berlin ou Londres pour condamner la répression, beaucoup de féministes hors-Iran campent une position attentiste, voire ambivalente aux yeux des iraniennes : « nous avons vu peu de preuves que les femmes en Europe ou en Amérique du Nord sont prêtes à descendre dans la rue pour montrer leur solidarité avec la révolution des femmes en Iran » écrit Masih Alinejad, journaliste iranienne et militante des droits des femmes. De fait, beaucoup d’intellectuels américains et européens s’inquiètent que les autodafés de tchador puissent stigmatiser les femmes portants niqabs et hidjabs en Occident. Comme l’explique Jean Birnbaum, sur les campus des Etats-Unis et d’Europe de l’Ouest, beaucoup voient dans le « féminisme universaliste » incarné par les femmes d’Iran l’héritage d’un colonialisme euro-centrique : selon celles et ceux qui gravitent dans ces milieux « la solidarité des femmes occidentales avec leurs sœurs en terre d’Islam masquerait souvent un état d’esprit condescendant, voire raciste ; les militantes qui se réclament d’un féminisme universaliste seraient aveuglées par leurs œillères occidentalo-centrées et se rendraient donc complices de la domination ‘blanche’ ». Lorsqu’elle s’exprime, l’indignation de la communauté internationale à l’encontre de la situation en Iran est donc très relative et s’explique surtout par la « faute grave » qu’ont commise les mollahs en appuyant l’« opération spéciale » de la Russie en Ukraine. Quelques heures seulement après le déclenchement de l’offensive russe, les autorités iraniennes légitimaient à demi-mot la décision de Vladimir Poutine en imputant l’escalade des tensions en Europe orientale aux États-Unis et à l’OTAN. Au cours des mois suivants, alors que le conflit s’enlise et s’éternise, Téhéran aggrave son cas en fournissant des drones de fabrication iranienne à l’ennemi public numéro un. Envahissant le ciel de l’Ukraine comme autant de sauterelles mécaniques, les Shaeed-136 et les Mohajer-6, accompagnent même, le 1er janvier 2023, les vœux de Vladimir Poutine de leur vrombissement de tondeuses à gazon. Partisans et résilience du régime En Iran, malgré l’ampleur de la révolte, il apparaît vite que la République islamique peut continuer de compter sur un socle d’irréductibles partisans. Les mollahs jouissent en effet du soutien indéfectible d’un fanatique estimé à un quart de la population. Autre fait notable, la majorité des pertes des forces armées de la République islamique d'Iran ont été enregistrées dans les provinces du Sistan et Baloutchistan, et du Kurdistan, ainsi que dans les villes à population kurde des provinces d'Azerbaïdjan occidental et de Kermānchāh. Il en ressort que la crise déclenchée en septembre 2022, a essentiellement été une révolte ayant eu pour théâtre les zones périphériques de la République islamique. Même à Téhéran, l’épicentre de la « révolte des tchadors » a eue des racines kurdes. Sa première victime, Mahsa Amini, dont le prénom kurde, « Gina », a été prohibé dans la capitale, est enterrée à Saghez, son pays natal et patrie des Peshmergas, tandis que le slogan de la révolution, le fameux « Zan, Zendegi, Azad » a d’abord été formulé en kurde avant d’être traduit en persan. Jouissant de l’appui de ses indéfectibles partisans et de l’indifférence relative de la communauté internationale, le régime peut vite relever la tête. Bien qu’elle ait traversé une crise majeure, la théocratie iranienne peut, dès le début de l’année 2023, se considérer tirée d’affaire. Certes, la révolte des tchadors a ébranlé le régime tout en alimentant les espoirs de son écroulement chez ses opposants. Pourtant, privée de leader et d’alternative claire, elle est progressivement étouffée par les sbires du régime. Se contentant de procéder à la libération de quelques prisonniers « sensibles », rassérénés et ragaillardis, ils ont crânement célébré, le 11 février 2023, les 44 ans de la révolution islamique. Au cours de l’été, la police des mœurs a repris du service avant que les amendes infligées aux iraniennes omettant de porter le voile ne soient sensiblement augmentées. Force est de constater que la moderation politique  et idéologique tant annoncé et tant attendu du régime islamique n’est pas pour demain. Bilan et monté en puissance des Gardiens Aujourd’hui, alors que la poussière retombe et que le régime semble avoir réussi à endiguer la vague de manifestations qui a déferlé sur l’Iran, il est permis de dresser un premier bilan : effroyable, celui-ci s’élève à plus de 500 manifestants, dont un cinquième d’enfants, tués par les autorités entre le 16 septembre 2022 et début 2023. Fait notable, les heurts avec les émeutiers ont également fait une centaine de morts parmi les membres des forces de sécurité iraniennes. Parmi eux, 34 étaient des miliciens bassidjis, soit 52 % du nombre total de morts alors que, dans le même temps, les Gardiens de la révolution ont été relativement épargnés par la violence des émeutes avec seulement 18 % des victimes gouvernementales. Ayant été en première ligne dans l’écrasement de la révolte, les Gardiens sont également les grands gagnants politiques de cette crise. Au cours de celle-ci, ils n’ont pas hésité à prendre leurs distances avec le Clergé en critiquant notamment les dérives de la police des mœurs et en l’accusant ouvertement d’avoir allumé l’étincelle qui a mis le feu aux poudres. Si le régime quadragénaire est irréformable et bien que la récente crise ait mis à jour ses profondes fissures, son effondrement n’en est pas pour autant imminent. Comme après les manifestations populaires de 1999, celles ayant suivi la réélection contestée d’Ahmadinejad en 2009, le « Printemps perse » avorté de 2011 et la vague de manifestations de 2018-2019, le régime iranien va, à nouveau et fort probablement, faire la preuve de son extraordinaire – et sinistre – capacité de résilience. Outre l’assurance-vie constituée par ses appuis extérieurs (Téhéran vient de resserrer ses liens avec Moscou et Pékin), le régime a développé ses propres anticorps pour faire face à ce type de défi. Loin de la saper, les crises qui se sont succédé depuis le début du siècle ont été l'occasion de solidifier l'assise politique de ce que les Iraniens appellent le Sepāh-e Pasdaran. Dénonçant les tentatives de ‘révolution de couleur’ imputées aux puissances occidentales, les Gardiens ont su capitaliser sur leur gestion de ces mouvements de rébellion pour prendre les rênes de la réaction antisubversive et, au passage, s'imposer comme les véritables maîtres de l'Iran. Dominant l’art de la contre-insurrection, ils ont fait de l’Iran une dictature militaire de facto. À l’instar de la Chine « communiste » et de la Russie « démocratique », cet Iran « à façade théocratique » est amené à poursuivre sa mue institutionnelle pour mieux s’intégrer – et trouver refuge – au sein d’un nouveau bloc « illibéral » qui prend forme autour, notamment, de l’Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai et du groupe des BRICS auxquels Téhéran vient d’adhérer. Conclusion En Iran, si les colonnes du Jéricho islamiste ont tremblé, le temple n’est donc pas encore prêt à s’effondrer. La répression féroce de la révolte des tchadors a beau avoir révélé à ceux qui se cachaient encore les yeux le véritable visage de la Mollahcratie, celle-ci demeure, à moyen terme du moins, robustement ancrée sur ses fondations originelles. La République islamique, qu'on pousse et qui titube parfois, n'a pas changé d'un iota : elle maintient le cap que lui avaient fixé les pères fondateurs en 1979. Ni les encouragements, ni les coups de pouce, ni les crises à répétition, n'ont jusqu'ici suffi à faire fléchir sa trajectoire radicale ou à abimer sa carapace dictatoriale. Au contraire, qu’elles soit motivées par la naïveté ou le cynisme, les chancelleries occidentales s’évertuent à prendre des décisions malencontreuses - comme le dégel récent par Washington de 6 milliards de dollars – qui, comme ici en renflouant les caisses du régime, contribuent à accroître sa capacité de répression et à prolonger son espérance de vie. L'Iran demeure l'un des pays au monde où les droits de la personne (et surtout des femmes) sont les plus bafoués, la liberté d'opinion la plus contrôlée et celle de la presse la plus muselée. Tant souhaité, le printemps perse devra attendre. ## Un multilatéralisme arctique aux prises avec le conflit ukrainien URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/un-multilateralisme-arctique-aux-prises-avec-le-conflit-ukrainien/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Un multilatéralisme arctique aux prises avec le conflit ukrainien. L'invasion russe de l'Ukraine n'a pas tardé à faire voler en... Le 23 février 2022 s’ouvrait la conférence de Kirkenes, une conférence organisée annuellement dans le nord de la Norvège, depuis 2002. Le forum a graduellement pris de l’importance dans le dialogue régional depuis, constituant une réunion d’importance, notamment à l’échelle de la région de Barents. Le ministre des Affaires étrangères russe, Sergey Lavrov, était présent et a prononcé un discours d’ouverture axé sur la coopération régionale, insistant notamment sur le fait que « au fil des ans, le forum s’est affirmé comme l’une des principales plates-formes pour la discussion constructive et dépolitisée des questions urgentes de la coopération internationale » et qu’il existait dans la région « des traditions bien établies d’assistance mutuelle et de relations de bon voisinage ». On pourrait y lire ce que certains nomment « l’exceptionnalisme arctique », en référence à un Arctique supposément isolé des tensions géopolitiques mondiales. Mais dans la nuit de ce même 23 au 24 février, la Russie envahissait l’Ukraine, ne tardant pas à faire voler en éclat cette image — déjà discutable — d’un Arctique à l’écart des grands enjeux géopolitiques. Les réactions ont de fait été rapides : dès le 3 mars, le Conseil de l’Arctique mettait sur pause toutes ses activités. La majorité des organisations régionales et sous-régionales ont emboîté le pas, isolant la Russie sur la scène arctique — quand, justement, la présidence tournante du Conseil lui échoyait. Le Conseil de l’Arctique « n’est pas saisi des questions intéressant la sécurité militaire », tel que précisé par la fameuse note de bas de page de la déclaration d’Ottawa — déclaration fondatrice du Conseil. Mais la coopération circumpolaire demeure appuyée sur « les principes fondamentaux de souveraineté et d’intégrité territoriale, fondés sur le droit international, sous-tendent depuis longtemps les travaux du Conseil de l’Arctique », dont l’invasion russe constitue une « violation flagrante », comme souligné dans la déclaration conjointe du 3 mars. Si cette mise sur pause de la coopération régionale — qui s’étend désormais bien au-delà du Conseil de l’Arctique — semblait donc incontournable, notre objectif ici est d’envisager le multilatéralisme arctique à l’aune de ce nouveau contexte. Le 8 juin 2022, un communiqué de sept membres du Conseil de l’Arctique — soit tous les États membres à l’exception de la Russie — annonçait une reprise limitée des travaux du Conseil, relançant les travaux qui n’impliquaient pas la participation de la Fédération de Russie. La question du multilatéralisme arctique demeure donc bien posée. La force des liens faibles en Arctique : Une région placée sous le signe de la coopération L’une des particularités majeures de la coopération Arctique réside dans la multitude de formats institutionnels permettant la coopération entre les acteurs régionaux — et les acteurs intéressés dans la région. En effet, si le Conseil de l’Arctique s’est progressivement affirmé comme un forum incontournable pour la gouvernance régionale, plusieurs formes « molles » de gouvernance existent à l’échelle de la région ainsi qu’à l’échelle sous-régionale, notamment dans le secteur de la mer de Barents. À ce Conseil s’ajoutent donc d’importantes conférences telles que l’assemblée annuelle de l’Arctic Circle ou la conférence norvégienne Arctic Frontiers. En attirant plusieurs milliers de parties prenantes arctiques tous les ans, ces deux évènements se sont imposés sur la scène politique régionale et jouent un rôle d’importance dans le dialogue arctique. Ces rencontres encouragent la coopération scientifique, autre force structurante régionale, ce que traduit notamment l’accord signé en 2017 visant justement à la favoriser. L’International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), fondé en 1990, est aussi un vecteur majeur de coopération scientifique. En Arctique particulièrement, la science s’est imposée comme un véritable outil diplomatique, permettant une continuité de la coopération même quand « d’autres canaux diplomatiques sont instables ». La coopération se construit aussi avec de nombreux acteurs dits non arctiques tels que les observateurs du Conseil, et elle se structure autour d’organisations sous-régionales comme le Conseil Euro-Arctique de la Mer de Barents, la politique Dimension Nordique de l’Union européenne, etc. Enfin, et surtout, cette coopération est portée par les organisations autochtones dont le territoire traditionnel ne correspond pas nécessairement aux frontières étatiques. Ces « liens faibles » constituent la force du modèle arctique régional en permettant la coopération à toutes les échelles — impliquant des acteurs même au-delà de l’Arctique — ; à tous les niveaux — impliquant des acteurs non étatiques — ; et dans divers secteurs — scientifique, environnemental, citons aussi par exemple le forum des garde-côtes arctique. Et, point crucial : cette coopération se construit délibérément autour d’enjeux qui n’ont pas trait à la sécurité militaire — d’où l’idée que la région pourrait en être isolée. Il a existé pendant un temps des réunions entre les chefs des forces armées des États arctiques, mais l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014 y mit un point d’arrêt. En 2021, la Russie avait évoqué la possibilité de reprendre les discussions, mais les autres États n’avaient pas donné suite. Au total, la coopération régionale s’est solidifiée justement parce que les enjeux de sécurité étaient exclus : elle se structure plutôt autour d’enjeux qui nécessitent une coopération circumpolaire, dont la gestion en collaboration est mutuellement bénéfique. Il y a quelques jours encore, Nikolay Korchunov, qui assure la présidence actuelle du Conseil de l’Arctique réaffirmait d’ailleurs que la Russie demeurait convaincue « qu’il n’y a pas de problèmes dans le Grand Nord qui ne nécessite une solution militaire ». Il est vrai que l’on peut souligner un mouvement récent de remilitarisation de l’Arctique, notamment dans l’Arctique russe, qui pourrait contraster avec ces déclarations, alors que des exercices réguliers sont également conduits dans la région. Ces exercices doivent aussi servir de rappel régulier quant à l’importance d’avoir des canaux de communications fonctionnels pour limiter le risque de mauvaise compréhension ou interprétation de leurs objectifs, et ainsi limiter le risque d’escalade. Une coopération désormais rattrapée par la géopolitique ? Ce modèle de coopération se construit progressivement depuis la fin de la guerre froide et s’il a connu des hauts et des bas — notamment après l’annexion de la Crimée — c’est la première fois que la diplomatie est totalement à l’arrêt dans la région. Cette pause nécessaire est un signal fort d’un désaccord majeur vis-à-vis de la violation du droit international — alors que ce sont justement ces principes de droit international qui sous-tendent la coopération régionale. On peut dans un premier temps soulever une nuance importante : les liens de coopération sont suspendus, et non rompus. Ce sont d’abord les échéances les plus proches qui ont été ajournées : une réunion du Conseil de l’Arctique et du Conseil économique de l’Arctique était prévue à Saint-Pétersbourg et en l’état actuel des choses, il n’était pas envisageable qu’elle se tienne. De son côté, l’IASC a également précisé que des décisions seraient éventuellement prises ultérieurement. L’immédiateté des enjeux de sécurité traditionnelle implique qu’ils prennent le pas sur les autres, mais la rupture n’est pas encore complète et il semble trop tôt pour affirmer le contraire. L’annonce du Conseil à propos de la reprise des activités n’impliquant pas la participation de la Russie semble abonder en ce sens : pour l’instant, il n’est pas question d’une exclusion formelle de la Fédération russe. Sans surprise, du côté des réactions russes, Nikolay Korchunov qualifiait la décision de suspendre les travaux du Conseil de regrettable. Mais deux éléments peuvent être relevés dans ses déclarations. D’abord, l’ambassadeur souligne que la Russie n’a « pas d’alternative » au développement de son Arctique — et la région est en effet une priorité stratégique du développement économique national. À ce titre, on peut souligner que de maintenir l’Arctique comme une zone de paix semble demeurer une priorité pour la Russie, qui n’aurait aucun avantage à voir le développement économique de sa façade arctique obéré par un conflit armé. Le pays a ainsi annoncé qu’il poursuivrait son agenda de développement économique — une priorité déjà affichée dans sa feuille de route, publiée au moment de prendre la présidence du Conseil. Korchunov met aussi en avant qu’« un gel temporaire de l’activité du Conseil “conduirait inévitablement à une accumulation de risques et défis pour la sécurité élargie dans la région” ». De fait, c’est là un nœud majeur du problème. La sécurité en Arctique est généralement entendue selon une acception très large, ne se limitant pas aux seuls enjeux de sécurité traditionnelle mais englobant des enjeux environnementaux, sociaux, économiques ou humains. Ainsi, de nombreux enjeux dont traite le Conseil de l’Arctique sont des enjeux transnationaux par nature, au premier rang desquels on retrouve les enjeux environnementaux. La coopération sur ces questions est essentielle dans la mesure où une approche limitée par des frontières artificielles n’est ni pertinente ni efficace. Or, ce sont au premier chef ces enjeux qui pâtiraient d’une rupture dans le modèle de coopération arctique. Si une suspension temporaire de la coopération apparaît comme essentielle dans une optique de signal fort, la question est donc désormais celle des modalités d’un éventuel retour du dialogue régional sur ces questions — retour dont la possibilité n’est pour le moment pas encore totalement écartée. Quelle coopération arctique sans l’Arctique russe ? À cette « force des liens faibles », ainsi qu’à l’importance de ces enjeux de sécurité élargis dans le dialogue régional s’ajoute une dimension incontournable : la géographie. Un rapide coup d’œil sur une carte de l’Arctique permet de se rendre compte que l’Arctique russe représente environ la moitié de la région circumpolaire et tout format de coopération qui l’exclut perd sa dimension arctique à proprement parler. C’est une question très largement soulevée dans les réactions publiées par les organisations autochtones notamment. Dans le communiqué publié par la section russe du Conseil Sami, on peut ainsi lire que les Sami « sont un seul peuple qui vit sans tenir compte des frontières des États » et qu’« aujourd’hui, plus que jamais, le peuple Sami de Russie a besoin d’un soutien international pour poursuivre la coopération entre les Sami des quatre pays ». Le communiqué publié par le Conseil Circumpolaire Inuit insiste également sur l’importance de la dimension circumpolaire de la coopération qui ne peut se limiter aux frontières nationales : « L’ICC a émergé de la guerre froide en tant que voix unificatrice des Inuit à travers notre territoire : l’Inuit Nunaat. Nous avons travaillé dur pour que nos sœurs et frères de Chukotka puissent se joindre à nous en 1992 ». La coopération régionale ne peut se prétendre arctique si elle n’a pas une dimension circumpolaire; elle doit aussi veiller à toujours maintenir une possibilité de dialogue pour les populations autochtones. Considérations politiques Dans le Cadre Stratégique pour l’Arctique et le Nord du Canada, les populations autochtones ont été directement intégrées dans le processus de rédaction de cette politique. Le procédé avait été mis en avant comme le nouveau « gold standard » de la politique arctique par la présidente de l’ICC, la Dre. Dalee Sambo Dorough. Fort de ce leadership, le Canada devrait continuer à œuvrer pour que les populations autochtones continuent d’avoir une voix sur la scène arctique pendant cette pause de la coopération régionale. Le Conseil de l’Arctique est la seule institution régionale où les populations autochtones ont une voix à part entière par l’entremise du statut de participant permanent. Malgré la pause du Conseil de l’Arctique, il est crucial que leur voix continue d’être à la fois entendue et prise en compte, en leur laissant la possibilité d’être inclus dans d’éventuelles futures déclarations communes. La mise sur pause du Conseil de l’Arctique ne saurait leur ôter leur position de participant permanent dont la voix doit être prise en compte pour toute décision prise sur la base du consensus. L’immédiateté des enjeux de sécurité traditionnelle ne doit pas totalement occulter l’ampleur des enjeux climatiques auxquels nous faisons face. La recherche scientifique est au cœur de la compréhension et de la lutte contre les changements climatiques. Or la recherche arctique est cruciale à cet égard, alors que la région est aux avant-postes des changements en cours et à venir. Il est primordial de trouver un moyen de continuer à faire de la recherche dans l’Arctique russe. Certaines voix s’élèvent pour souligner que poursuivre la coopération scientifique avec la Russie équivaudrait à leur concéder une victoire diplomatique. Certains recteurs d’universités russes auraient également signé une déclaration proguerre sans équivoque, rendant la coopération d’autant plus difficile à envisager. Malgré tout, l’ampleur des enjeux climatiques fait que la question ne peut pas être mise sous le tapis. Il apparaît donc essentiel de trouver le moyen de ne pas perdre de vue cet enjeu déterminant tout en maintenant une posture ferme vis-à-vis de la Russie. La coopération scientifique ne saurait être tout simplement mise à l’arrêt. La reprise de projets, notamment ceux déjà financés et entamés, n’impliquant pas de données sensibles, devrait faire l’objet d’une priorité. Cela présenterait l’avantage par ailleurs de garder un canal de discussion ouvert. Les coopérations scientifiques via relations personnelles sans passer par des institutions russes pourraient être priorisées de manière à conserver des liens existants, qui pourront servir de base à une reprise ultérieure de la coopération, quand les conditions d’un retour à des liens diplomatiques traditionnels auront pu être réunies. Ultimement, le retour à un fonctionnement régulier du Conseil de l’Arctique devrait être priorisé dès que possible — même autour d’enjeux circonscrits. Le succès de son modèle repose entre autres sur sa capacité à avoir établi un dialogue véritablement régional : c’est ce qui lui a permis de s’imposer comme le forum de discussion incontournable. Une pause trop longue voire une exclusion formelle de la Russie fermerait la porte à ce dialogue régional tout en l’ouvrant potentiellement à d’autres partenariats pour la Russie — qui pourraient finir par poser des problèmes stratégiques. L’importance de garder un canal de discussion avec ce partenaire arctique ne doit pas être sous-estimée. La mise sur pause de la coopération régionale pourrait aussi servir de rappel au Canada qui devrait viser à résoudre par la voie diplomatique ses différents frontaliers. La récente résolution de la frontière avec le Danemark et le Groenland concernant l’île de Tartupaluk (île de Hans) est un signal fort pour la stabilité de la région alors qu’une situation pacifiée cimente la stabilité régionale. Dans la continuité de la déclaration d’Ilulissat et l’engagement pris en faveur du respect du droit international et notamment de la Convention des Nations Unies pour le Droit de la Mer, il apparaît déterminant de veiller à garder une approche pacifiée et diplomatique apaisée dans la gestion d’éventuelles dissensions concernant les demandes de plateaux continentaux étendus qui sont présentement à l’étude. Trois demandes se chevauchent en Arctique, déposées par le Canada, la Russie et le Danemark pour le Groenland et les conclusions de la Commission pour les Limites des Plateaux Continentaux de l’ONU sont en attente. Puisque le rôle de cette commission est consultatif et qu’il appartient par la suite aux États de négocier sur la base de ses conclusions, il est de la responsabilité des États de garder une approche diplomatique et pacifiée pour les discussions à venir, afin de contribuer à la stabilité régionale. Les considérations techniques et scientifiques, à la source des conclusions à rendre par la commission, devront bien être considérées comme la base nécessaire des négociations à venir, au-delà d’enjeux politiques ou symboliques — alors que les trois demandes se chevauchent notamment au niveau si emblématique du pôle Nord géographique. -Pauline Pic ## Une menace latente pour 2024 : dans quelle mesure une crise constitutionnelle violente risque-t-elle de se produire aux États-Unis ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/une-menace-latente-pour-2024-dans-quelle-mesure-une-crise-constitutionnelle-violente-risque-t-elle-de-se-produire-aux-etats-unis/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > La tentative de Donald Trump de contester les résultats de l’élection de 2020, qui a culminé avec le soulèvement du 6 janvier 2021, a... La tentative de Donald Trump de contester les résultats de l’élection de 2020, qui a culminé avec le soulèvement du 6 janvier 2021, a engendré des questionnements importants dans la perspective de la prochaine élection présidentielle en 2024 et d’une potentielle nouvelle crise. Où en sommes-nous de ces risques à la suite des élections de mi-mandat et de la lutte pour le pouvoir qui en a résulté à la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis ? En fin de compte, le risque a, dans l’ensemble, diminué. Toutefois, des défis plus profonds demeurent. En particulier, cette note analyse les chemins qui pourraient mener à une crise constitutionnelle et à une violence politique à grande échelle. Je propose quatre critères qui, réunis, pourraient provoquer une crise constitutionnelle violente en 2024 : un candidat à la présidence qui conteste les élections ; des acteurs armés prêts à soutenir les allégations de fraude de ce candidat ; une croyance populaire largement réceptive à ces revendications ; et un point de bascule viable (en apparence) pour justifier les pressions extraconstitutionnelles. Les deux premiers critères seront probablement réunis en 2024. Les élections de mi-mandat n’ont pas changé grand-chose à cet égard. Le scénario le plus inquiétant qui mènerait à une crise constitutionnelle lors des élections de 2024 est celui dans lequel la crise se concentre sur un seul État dont dépend le résultat de l’élection. Compte tenu des élections de mi-mandat, le risque qu’une telle chose se produise a diminué, mais il s’agit toujours d’une possibilité. Si plusieurs États séparent les deux candidats, une crise constitutionnelle en 2024 pourrait également se produire, mais elle serait probablement moins difficile à résoudre qu’une crise autour d’un seul État contesté. Le déni des résultats électoraux de 2020 est toujours bien ancré dans le Parti républicain et a bénéficié d’une impulsion considérable (même si elle s’avère moins importante que prévu) maintenant que le « Grand Old Party» (GOP ; Parti républicain) contrôle la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis. Une crise constitutionnelle en 2024 : quatre critères Quelles sont les risques qu’une crise constitutionnelle violente se produise aux États-Unis en 2024 ? Ce que j’entends par crise constitutionnelle, c’est un épisode dans lequel le résultat de l’élection présidentielle est contesté par des acteurs politiques clés, et des groupes armés utilisent ou menacent de recourir à la violence pour influencer la façon dont le différend est résolu. Je m’empresse d’ajouter qu’il semble presque inévitable que quelqu’un conteste toute victoire du Parti démocrate, au moins dans une certaine mesure. La question ici est de savoir à quel point cette crise pourrait s’aggraver. S’agit-il seulement de quelques illuminés qui contestent les résultats, mais qui ne sont pas pris au sérieux? Ou s’agit-il d’une répétition du 6 janvier 2021, qui pourrait s’avérer pire encore, avec des manifestations à grande échelle, des milices mobilisées et une flambée de la violence ? Et en particulier, une telle crise pourrait-elle attirer la participation de membres des forces de sécurité – police et soldats ? Une crise grave est un risque latent, peu probable, mais suffisamment réaliste pour être pris au sérieux. Un bon point de départ serait de considérer ce qui pourrait conduire à une « situation révolutionnaire » selon les termes de Charles Tilly : une situation dans laquelle il y aurait deux revendications de souveraineté simultanées, mutuellement opposées et suffisamment soutenues pour remettre sérieusement en question l’ordre existant. Dans le cas américain, cela inclurait quatre aspects : Deux candidats à la présidence revendiquent la victoire lors d’une élection, c’est-à-dire que le candidat manifestement perdant refuse de céder (la revendication de souveraineté) ; Des acteurs armés soutiennent cette revendication de victoire (c’est-à-dire le risque d’actes de violence) ; L’affirmation semble plausible pour une partie importante de la population (ce qui équivaut à changer les motivations des élites politiques et des militants non-violents, et permettre à une insurrection de prendre l’apparence d’une action démocratique) ; Il semble possible de rejeter le résultat en instrumentalisant un moment clé, en faisant pression sur un petit nombre de personnes par exemple (ce qui signifie que l’action insurrectionnelle pourrait ainsi ressembler à une stratégie gagnante). Réunir ces différentes conditions a, au moins dans une certaine mesure, conduit au 6 janvier 2021. Trump avait refusé de concéder ; la plupart des Républicains croyaient que la victoire de Biden était illégitime, bien qu’il y ait eu un large consensus dans la presse et parmi les indépendants sur le fait que Biden avait gagné ; Trump avait le soutien de milices telles que les Oath Keepers (« Gardiens du Serment ») et les Proud Boys (« Les Garçons Fiers ») ; et la stratégie du 6 janvier était de faire pression sur le Congrès et le vice-président Mike Pence afin qu’ils n’acceptent pas le résultat. C’était un espoir farfelu, mais il est difficile de savoir ce qu’il se serait passé si Pence avait cédé à la pression. Des risques qui sont toujours présents : des candidats négationnistes, un soutien violent Pour 2024, les deux premières conditions restent plausibles. Premièrement, il est probable que le candidat républicain conteste une défaite. Il pourrait très bien s’agir à nouveau de Trump, bien que certains sondages et groupes de discussion suggèrent que les électeurs du GOP pourraient favoriser quelqu’un d’autre. Quant au gouverneur de Floride, Ron DeSantis, qui, selon beaucoup, a acquis un avantage majeur sur Trump avec les élections de mi-mandat, il refuse de concéder que Biden a remporté l’élection de façon équitable et il courtise le soutien des négationnistes. Il ne le fait pas aussi bruyamment que Trump lui-même, et son soutien au négationnisme est peut-être un simple moyen stratégique de courtiser les partisans de Trump tout en offrant une alternative plus acceptable. Toutefois, être prêt à nier la légitimité d’une élection à des fins personnelles suggère que, par rapport à un John McCain ou un Mitt Romney, il est difficile d’être sûr que DeSantis acceptera les résultats en cas de défaite. En ce qui concerne la deuxième condition, les acteurs violents, les enquêtes et les poursuites semblent avoir sérieusement affaibli les milices. Plus particulièrement, le leader des Oath Keepers, Stewart Rhodes, a été reconnu coupable de complot séditieux en novembre 2022. Les plus de 900 actes d’accusation émis à l’encontre des insurgés du 6 janvier et la désillusion à l’égard du 6 janvier lui-même ont remis en question la capacité de certaines milices à survivre en tant qu’organisations. Cela marque un changement majeur par rapport au manque relatif d’efforts de l’administration Trump dans la lutte contre l’extrémisme de droite et, comme le soutient Daniel Byman, est de bon augure pour 2024 (si on compare avec 2020). Cependant, les milices d’extrême droite restent actives. Les armes à feu sont maintenant monnaie courante lors des manifestations politiques. Le projet ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data) a révélé que l’activité d’extrême droite a en fait augmenté entre 2021 et 2022. En outre, cette activité est concentrée sur un plus petit nombre de groupes, ce qui suggère un niveau d’organisation plus élevé (bien que ces groupes soient potentiellement plus vulnérables face aux forces de l’ordre). Outre le potentiel de violence des milices, nous devons prendre au sérieux la possibilité d’implication des forces de l’ordre, voire du personnel militaire dans une crise, par la défection ou par le refus de s’opposer aux acteurs violents. En général, les ruptures militaires deviennent beaucoup plus probables dans les pays où les règles du jeu politique ne sont pas bien établies. À cet égard, il faut rappeler la remise en cause de normes démocratiques clés avant, pendant et après la présidence Trump – refuser d’accepter un résultat électoral, appeler à l’emprisonnement des opposants politiques et à l’utilisation de la violence lors des rassemblements, tenter de soutenir la police et les forces armées en tant que groupes politiques et faire des nominations clés des forces de l’ordre et de l’armée en tenant compte des loyautés personnelles –. Elle pose la question de la possibilité d’une action partisane de la part des forces de l’ordre ou du personnel militaire en cas de crise constitutionnelle. Si cela se produisait, la crise deviendrait beaucoup plus grave. Même si la grande majorité du personnel faisait son travail et respectait son serment à la Constitution (ce qui est très probable), la puissance de feu des insurgés pourrait augmenter considérablement avec des défaillances des forces de sécurité à petite échelle. Malheureusement, une telle défaillance reste possible, même si la probabilité que cela arrive est faible. Les groupes extrémistes recrutent activement (et de plus en plus) de personnel policier et militaire, actif comme à la retraite. Cela signifie toutefois que relativement peu de policiers et de soldats en service actif sont également membres d’organisations d’extrême droite. Le département de la Défense a mis en place certaines mesures pour remédier à ce problème, en mettant l’accent sur la mise à jour de ses définitions des activités interdites et l’amélioration de la formation et de la collecte de données (ce qui est nécessaire, mais les progrès sont lents). Cependant, le risque de rupture dépasse la frange radicale, car même les partisans ordinaires peuvent être prêts à agir au nom du négationnisme électoral. Après tout, les Républicains n’ont pas besoin d’être extrémistes pour croire que Joe Biden est un président illégitime. Ainsi, les études sur le personnel militaire américain révèlent qu’ils s’identifient de plus en plus comme partisans et croient de plus en plus qu’il est acceptable pour eux de s’engager dans une activité politique partisane. Dans le même temps, les politiciens civils (notamment Trump lui-même) ont de plus en plus tenté de se servir des forces armées pour atteindre des objectifs de politique partisane. Le personnel chargé de l’application de la loi semble – en grande proportion – disposé à imposer sa propre autorité contre la loi fédérale et étatique. Dans le cas d’une crise où de nombreux partisans pensent que l’élection est volée et donc que l’identité de celui qui détient légitimement le pouvoir exécutif n’est pas claire, les chaînes de commandement de la police et des forces armées (si elles sont déployées) pourraient en souffrir. Crise autour d’un seul État : un scénario moins probable mais toutefois possible Le négationnisme républicain en 2024 peut donc rassembler à la fois des dirigeants et des partisans volontaires. S’agira-t-il d’une stratégie viable ? C’est là où les élections de mi-mandat ont eu un impact. Un changement clé réside dans le quatrième critère de crise : la plausibilité de rejeter le résultat par une action concertée au moment d’un point de basculement. Ceci est particulièrement probable si le vainqueur de l’élection de 2024 l’emporte avec un seul État d’avance. Dans un tel scénario, les revendications républicaines selon lesquels leur candidat est le véritable gagnant sembleront plus plausibles que si la marge était de plusieurs États. En outre, quelques représentants de l’État en question pourraient subir des pressions pour jeter le doute sur le résultat, faire traîner le processus, pousser de faux électeurs et déplacer la compétition dans des tribunaux qui leur seraient favorables ou vers la Chambre des représentants des États-Unis (qui décide des élections en l’absence d’une majorité au Collège électoral). L’État en question deviendrait probablement un point focal pour la mobilisation politique, les manifestations et les déploiements de milices. Plus le temps d’attente pour que le résultat soit clarifié est grand, plus les gens risquent de douter du résultat affiché (ce qui est le troisième critère d’une crise) ; et plus les manifestations, les émeutes et les milices risqueront de se déclencher. Ici, les élections de mi-mandat ont eu un impact significatif.  Surtout, avec la défaite de  la plupart  des candidats refusant les résultats des élections à des postes d’administration électorale dans des États clés, une crise constitutionnelle concentrée dans l’un de ces États semble maintenant moins menaçante. C’était un scénario particulièrement inquiétant : un secrétaire d’État en Arizona ou au Michigan, ou un gouverneur en Pennsylvanie, qui abuserait de son pouvoir et qui multiplierait les signes de défi face à une victoire démocrate dans cet État (et donc la présidence). Ces fonctionnaires ont les moyens de perturber et de retarder la certification des résultats électoraux. Dans une élection serrée avec une apparente victoire démocrate avec une marge d’un seul État, ces responsables seraient alors en mesure de semer le doute sur le résultat de manière concrète. Les candidats pour des postes-clés dans des États fortement contestés qui ont refusé le plus ouvertement les résultats des élections de 2020 ont perdu les élections de mi-mandat de novembre. Je base cette évaluation sur les sept États avec une marge inférieure à 3% aux élections de 2020 et sur les évaluations du niveau de négationnisme du New York Times et du States United Democracy Center.  D’autres « négationnistes électoraux » ont gagné ailleurs, mais ils sont dans des États où n’importe quel Républicain gagnerait probablement de toute façon. Certaines préoccupations subsistent dans certains États très contestés. Le nouveau gouverneur du Nevada, Joe Lombardo, a adopté une position quelque peu ambiguë à propos de la victoire de Biden, mais son influence sera contrebalancée par un secrétaire d’État et un procureur général démocrates. En Caroline du Nord, bien qu’il n’y ait pas eu d’élection pour les rôles exécutifs de l’État et que les postes clés restent aux mains des démocrates, les deux victoires républicaines ont fait basculer la Cour suprême. C’est crucial pour les résultats de l’élection dans cet État. En février 2022, la Cour a rejeté, avec une seule voix d’écart, une carte électorale manifestement trafiquée. Cette Cour a maintenant demandé une nouvelle audience dans cette affaire et une deuxième sur l’identification des électeurs. En d’autres termes, la Cour suprême de Caroline du Nord est clairement disposée à jouer un rôle partisan. Les bons résultats pour la démocratie n’éliminent pas totalement le scénario d’une crise dans un seul État contesté. S’il apparaît que le candidat démocrate est en tête dans un État charnière après le jour du scrutin, il est fort probable que les Républicains qui refusent les résultats passeront à la vitesse supérieure, même s’il n’y a pas de négationnistes électoraux dans les bureaux locaux d’administration des élections. Ils peuvent jeter le doute sur le résultat par un discours public incessant, monter des contestations juridiques et exercer une pression sur les représentants républicains de l’État en question et sur le système judiciaire de l’État pour qu’ils s’impliquent dans la contestation. Les manifestants et les milices pourraient également se mobiliser pour ajouter à la pression par l’intimidation et même la violence. Le scénario de crise décrit ci-dessus pourrait encore se produire. Cela dit, cependant, les mauvais résultats des négationnistes dans les élections de 2022 les privent de certains outils essentiels pour retarder la confirmation du résultat, provoquer un doute officiel ou renvoyer la décision devant des tribunaux qui leur seraient favorables. Plus le délai avant qu’une victoire démocrate ne soit publiquement confirmée par les responsables électoraux et les tribunaux est court, plus il est probable qu’une telle escalade soit étouffée dans l’œuf et que ces acteurs négationnistes cèdent effectivement et rentrent chez eux. Les pertes subies par les responsables négationnistes des élections sont donc clairement une bonne nouvelle pour éviter de violentes crises constitutionnelles. Le négationnisme général montre que la crise est une option qui pourrait se concrétiser D’autre part, le négationnisme électoral est maintenant relativement répandu dans la vie politique américaine. Il aura un rôle majeur dans la Chambre des représentants contrôlée par les Républicains (et dans cet esprit, il est difficile de conclure que les élections de mi-mandat ont été une victoire sans faille pour la démocratie ; elles ont dépassé les attentes, mais ces attentes étaient faibles). Au cours des nombreux scrutins pour élire le président de la Chambre, Kevin McCarthy (Californie) a cédé aux demandes des plus membres les plus extrêmes du GOP. Ainsi, des personnalités autrefois marginales comme la représentante Marjorie Taylor Greene (Géorgie) – qui a déclaré que si elle avait été en charge de l’insurrection du 6 janvier, elle aurait été armée et elle aurait gagné, et qui a appelé à un « divorce national » entre les États républicains et démocrates – bénéficieront d’un temps de parole important pour pousser  le « Big Lie » (« Gros Mensonge ») selon lequel Trump aurait gagné en 2020. À la suite de la lutte pour la présidence, la représentante Greene est maintenant très proche de McCarthy, et ses sièges aux comités sur la sécurité intérieure et sur la surveillance et l’imputabilité (Committees on Homeland Security and on Oversight and Accountability) lui donnent une plate-forme pour mener son action perturbatrice. Le déni électoral est maintenant plus puissant parmi les membres républicains du Congrès qu’il ne l’était en 2020.  Les négationnistes des élections pourront utiliser et abuser des rôles d’enquête et de surveillance des comités de la Chambre pour promouvoir un récit sur la corruption démocrate.  Plus grave encore, la Chambre a maintenant créé un comité chargé d’enquêter sur la « militarisation » du gouvernement fédéral, revendiquant le pouvoir d’exiger la production de documents par le ministère de la Justice sur des enquêtes en cours et des documents hautement classifiés.  Le représentant Jim Jordan (Ohio), président de ce comité et du Comité judiciaire de la Chambre, a joué un rôle de premier plan dans les tentatives de Trump de contester l’élection. Cette décision soulève donc la crainte de voir le comité être utilisé pour entraver les enquêtes du ministère de la Justice sur les activités insurrectionnelles. Celui-ci a fermement résisté à l’ingérence du Congrès dans les enquêtes en cours dans le passé, mais la façon dont cet inévitable différend juridique sera résolu est encore incertaine. D’une manière ou d’une autre, cependant, le nouveau comité « Jordan » existe fin de promouvoir le récit selon lequel l’administration Biden et son utilisation du pouvoir sont illégitimes. En d’autres termes, les élections de mi-mandat ont donné au Congrès le pouvoir de refuser les élections. Il est toujours intéressant de se demander si les résultats étonnamment médiocres du GOP changeront la stratégie républicaine en matière de déni. Parmi les candidats perdants qui avaient nié les élections de 2020, nombreux sont ceux qui ont reconnu leur défaite aux élections de mi-mandat. Cela suggère que nier la victoire de Biden était dans certains cas davantage une tactique pour apaiser les Trumpistes qu’une conviction antidémocratique (mais cela n’apporte pas beaucoup de réconfort, et des personnes comme Kari Lake, battu au poste de gouverneur de l’Arizona, peuvent encore construire leur profil national en niant les résultats). Il y a eu des menaces et des perturbations du processus électoral, mais pas autant qu’on ne le craignait ; les efforts pour contester les résultats ont échoué. L’état d’esprit du GOP au lendemain de l’élection était celui de l’abattement (acceptant implicitement ses défaites) plutôt que du déni des résultats de mi-mandat eux-mêmes. Il existe des preuves prima facie que le négationnisme lui-même a nui au Parti républicain, en particulier à la marge. Selon mes calculs, sur les 50 courses à la Chambre classées par le site FiveThirtyEight.com comme les plus compétitives, il y avait 19 négationnistes républicains tels que définis par le Washington Post, dont trois ont gagné. Ces résultats sont mauvais quand ils sont comparés aux 14 victoires parmi les 31 candidats républicains non-négationnistes. Certaines voix ont émergé au sein du Parti républicain considérant Trump – et potentiellement le négationnisme qu’il représente – comme un frein électoral. Cela peut annoncer un tournant contre le négationnisme. Si le Parti républicain commence à croire que le  négationnisme trumpiste nuit plus qu’il n’aide et ajuste sa rhétorique et ses nominations en conséquence, cela affaiblira bon nombre des facteurs sous-jacents à une éventuelle crise constitutionnelle. Cependant, d’autres facteurs indiquent que le négationnisme continuera à animer le Parti républicain pendant un certain temps.  Le soutien républicain aux insurgés du 6 janvier a augmenté au fil du temps. En octobre 2022, seuls 22% des Républicains étaient d’accord pour dire que Biden avait été légitimement élu ; seuls 40% ont confiance dans le fait que les votes soient exprimés et comptés avec précision. L’analyse de ces résultats suggère que, bien que ces points de vue soient plus présents chez les Républicains particulièrement motivés par l’idéologie, le simple fait d’être républicain est un indicateur fort du négationnisme électoral de 2020 et ce, même parmi les modérés. Ceci est peut-être lié à une découverte similaire, selon laquelle vivre dans un district fortement républicain est un indicateur fort du négationnisme – un phénomène de chambre d’écho. Ces résultats ne conduisent pas à l’optimisme quant au déclin du négationnisme. En effet, loin de conclure que le négationnisme était une stratégie perdante, le GOP a proposé de se pencher encore davantage sur les allégations de fraude électorale. Tout cela signifie que, même si la marge est de plusieurs États en 2024, une crise constitutionnelle est toujours possible. La machine à nier les élections commencera probablement à tourner dans le cas d’une victoire démocrate présumée. De nombreuses voix républicaines remettraient probablement en question le résultat, élaborant toutes sortes de scénarios conspirationnistes dans les États séparant les deux candidats. Ces doutes seraient moins farfelus dans le cas d’une marge de victoire d’un seul État. En revanche, les extrémistes n’auraient pas de point de basculement clair à cibler ; les réformes juridiques ont maintenant clarifié le rôle du vice-président et ont relevé le seuil pour les membres du Congrès qui s’opposent à la liste des électeurs d’un État. La démocratie américaine est toujours menacée Je me suis largement concentré sur une crise qui aurait lieu en 2024, durant laquelle le GOP contesterait une victoire démocrate et une violente crise constitutionnelle émergerait. Cependant, en dehors de ce scénario, la démocratie peut s’éroder de bien d’autres façons. Les législatures des États tenues par les Républicains continuent d’adopter des projets de loi visant à limiter le droit de vote, notamment pour les Afro-Américains et pour d’autres groupes électeurs qui votent traditionnellement démocrate. La Cour suprême, dominée par les conservateurs, pourrait, dans sa décision sur l’affaire clé Moore c. Harper, approuver la théorie de la législature indépendante des États. Certains craignent que cette théorie ne donne à une législature d’État le pouvoir d’annuler les résultats d’une élection en nommant une nouvelle liste d’électeurs, mais cela demeure très douteux, car les États doivent toujours se conformer à la loi fédérale en la matière et le Congrès a maintenant refermé la faille. Cependant, l’arrêt Moore c. Harper crée d’autres problèmes. Plus précisément, la Cour suprême pourrait rendre les manipulations partisanes non révisables par les tribunaux des États (elle a déjà statué sur le fait que la constitution fédérale n’interdisse pas de telles manipulations). Cela créerait de nouvelles opportunités pour les législatures des États du Wisconsin ou de la Caroline du Nord de verrouiller les majorités républicaines. Enfin, il est encore tout à fait possible qu’un candidat républicain remporte une élection en 2024, en particulier avec un terrain de jeu aussi favorable qu’il l’est actuellement. Surtout si ce candidat est Trump, il y a de bonnes raisons de croire qu’il utiliserait sa présidence avec plus de détermination pour consolider son pouvoir, par exemple en ciblant les journalistes ou en promouvant les loyalistes dans l’exécutif (comme il l’a fait vers la fin de son dernier mandat). Le 8 novembre 2022, la stabilité démocratique aux États-Unis a donc connu une meilleure nuit que ce que beaucoup craignaient. Mais elle n’est pas pour autant tirée d’affaire.   ## Une solution à double usage pour un double problème: l’innovation et les dépenses de défense du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/une-solution-a-double-usage-pour-un-double-probleme-linnovation-et-les-depenses-de-defense-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-07-09 Résumé Le Canada est actuellement soumis à une pression intense pour atteindre les 2% du PIB consacrés à la défense et les 20% des dépenses de défense affectés à l'équipement, convenus par l'OTAN. Simultanément, le Canada est confronté à une baisse de productivité. En examinant les dépenses de défense actuelles du Canada, sa politique actuelle et son écosystème de R&D, ce document propose d'utiliser l'augmentation des dépenses de défense pour renforcer la politique d'innovation du Canada afin de faciliter la commercialisation et de l'aligner sur les besoins en matière de défense. Pour ce faire, il suggère 1) de renforcer la capacité de commercialisation du programme IDEaS en s'inspirant du programme DIANA de l'OTAN, 2) de remanier la stratégie canadienne en matière d'IA afin de mettre l'accent sur les partenariats militaires et civils et 3) de moderniser la stratégie du ministère des Transports en matière de drones afin de mettre l'accent sur la technologie des drones à double usage. Introduction En 2014, les membres de l'OTAN se sont engagés à consacrer au moins 2% de leur produit intérieur brut (PIB) aux dépenses de défense dans les dix ans à venir. 10 ans plus tard, 23 des 32 membres ont atteint cet objectif. Dans le prolongement de cet engagement, le président Donald Trump a critiqué à plusieurs reprises les membres de l'alliance pour ne pas avoir atteint cet objectif, allant jusqu'à demander que la barre soit relevée à 5% alors que les États-Unis consacrent actuellement 3,38% de leur PIB à la défense. En réponse, le ministre canadien de la défense a promis d'atteindre l'objectif de 2% dans les deux ans. Il n'y a pas eu de plans clairs sur la manière dont il compte y parvenir, ni de mise à jour officielle du gouvernement, puisque la politique la plus récente, approuvée par les deux principaux candidats au poste de premier ministre, vise à ne pas atteindre cet objectif d'ici à 2032. Malgré cette incertitude, un domaine semble particulièrement opportun : les dépenses d'équipement. L'une des promesses secondaires de l'objectif des 2% est de consacrer au moins 20% des dépenses de défense aux équipements majeurs, y compris la recherche et le développement (R&D). Le Canada en consacre actuellement 18,6%. Dans le même temps, le Canada prend du retard en matière d'innovation et de productivité, bien qu'il dispose d'une expertise de premier plan dans des industries contemporaines telles que l'intelligence artificielle et l'aérospatiale, ainsi que d'une population très instruite. Une politique recentrée sur les technologies à double usage telles que l'intelligence artificielle (IA) et les drones est l'occasion de faire d'une pierre deux coups : résoudre le problème de la commercialisation de la R&D et respecter les deux engagements de l'OTAN. Le plan de dépenses actuel La politique officielle actuelle du Canada, décrite dans la mise à jour de la politique de défense de 2024 intitulée Notre Nord fort et libre, vise à augmenter progressivement les dépenses chaque année jusqu'en 2030 au moins. Les dépenses de la politique mettent l'accent sur l'entretien des navires et des équipements, ainsi que sur la production de munitions. Bien qu'elle ne détaille aucune dépense au-delà de 2030, elle mentionne le souhait d'atteindre l'objectif de 2% d'ici 2032. À cette fin, le Canada a élaboré un plan de modernisation du NORAD, qui prévoit un investissement de près de 40 milliards de dollars sur 20 ans. Conformément à ce plan et en réponse à la proposition du président Trump de créer un système de défense antimissile inspiré du « Dôme de fer » en Amérique du Nord, le Canada a proposé de développer le système de capteurs, un programme qui pourrait encore impliquer davantage de dépenses. Les futurs plans de dépenses Alors que le Canada est en pleine campagne électorale, les deux principaux candidats ont des propositions limitées pour actualiser la politique actuelle. Pierre Poilievre, le candidat conservateur, n'a pas donné beaucoup de détails sur son plan pour atteindre l'objectif de l'OTAN. Il a déjà déclaré qu'il maintiendrait la politique actuelle (libérale) en matière de dépenses de défense. Il a également déclaré qu'il réduirait « l'aide étrangère inutile » pour atteindre l'objectif et, plus récemment, il a souligné que l'Arctique serait un élément clé de ses plans de défense. Le nouveau premier ministre et candidat libéral, Mark Carney, a promis d'accélérer le plan actuel de deux ans au cours de la course à la direction. Il a également annoncé un partenariat avec l'Australie pour développer la technologie des radars « Over-the-Horizon » pour l'Arctique. On ne sait pas s'il s'agit d'un nouvel investissement ou d'une partie du plan de dépenses actuel. Dépenses actuelles du Canada L'OTAN répartit les dépenses de défense en quatre catégories : Équipement, Personnel, Infrastructure et Autres (opérations). À première vue, les dépenses du Canada en matière d'infrastructure sont conformes à celles des autres membres de l'OTAN, mais les dépenses en matière de personnel et d'opérations sont plus élevées que dans les autres domaines. Les dépenses relativement faibles en matière d'équipement, qui comprennent la recherche et le développement (R&D), suggèrent qu'il pourrait s'agir d'une voie sous-explorée pour réaliser de nouveaux investissements. Le personnel Bien que l'augmentation du personnel augmente directement la capacité, les Forces armées canadiennes (FAC) n'ont pas atteint les objectifs de recrutement au cours des trois dernières années, le personnel militaire disponible étant, au mieux, en stagnation. Néanmoins, les FAC ont récemment mis en œuvre d'importants changements pour faciliter le recrutement, en assouplissant les critères médicaux et en accélérant le processus de recrutement. Elles ont également amélioré les conditions de travail des membres de la force. Le recrutement reste une préoccupation importante, et des initiatives politiques clés ont été prises, mais il est peu probable que les dépenses en personnel augmentent de manière drastique au cours des prochaines années. Infrastructures La situation des infrastructures est similaire à celle du personnel. Des investissements supplémentaires seraient théoriquement possibles. Avec seulement 60% de l'infrastructure du ministère de la Défense nationale (MDN) dans un « état convenable », ils sont même nécessaires. Cependant, la nature à long terme de l'investissement dans l'infrastructure et l'approche du « paiement réellement effectué » pour le calcul des dépenses de défense font qu'il n'est guère possible de procéder à un redressement rapide pour atteindre l'objectif de 2%. Bien qu'ils sortent du cadre de cette analyse, les investissements dans les infrastructures doivent figurer dans le plan à moyen et long terme et joueront certainement un rôle important dans le maintien de l'objectif de 2% et dans la garantie d'une capacité durable. En outre, à l'instar de la R&D et comme l'a reconnu la vice-ministre de la Défense nationale, les infrastructures militaires ont souvent un double usage, comme les pistes d'atterrissage dans l'Arctique qui relient les communautés éloignées et les logements pour les FAC qui réduisent les pressions sur le marché commercial. Opérations (autres) Les dépenses d'opérations - essentiellement les munitions, le carburant et les réparations - sont peu susceptibles de faire bouger l'aiguille à court terme, car les FAC sont déjà particulièrement actives dans les missions d'entraînement et consacrent une part importante de leur budget aux opérations. Ce problème est aggravé par le fait que les coûts d'exploitation augmentent souvent avec le personnel et, comme nous l'avons expliqué ci-dessus, il est peu probable qu'ils augmentent à court terme. En outre, les dépenses actuelles, gonflées par les dons à l'Ukraine, pourraient se calmer, puisque des négociations de cessez-le-feu sont en cours. L'équipement L'équipement comprend deux composantes principales : l'acquisition et la R&D. Près de la moitié des équipements étant « indisponibles et inutilisables », les dépenses d'acquisition devront constituer une priorité majeure des futurs budgets. Néanmoins, même si le gouvernement canadien voulait dépenser l'argent, il pourrait ne pas être en mesure de le faire avec son approche actuelle. Le directeur parlementaire du budget estime que les dépenses d'équipement sont réduites de 25% en raison des retards constants dans la passation des marchés, ce qui suggère la nécessité d'envisager d'autres possibilités de dépenses, en particulier si le calendrier devient plus serré. Ces retards risquent d'être encore aggravés par le réexamen des marchés publics aux États-Unis et par la pression exercée sur la base industrielle de l'Europe par le réarmement du continent. Ces deux problèmes soulignent la nécessité et l'opportunité de développer une industrie nationale de développement technologique. Le manque de personnel met également en évidence l'importance des dépenses en R&D : avec moins de troupes, l'efficacité devient plus importante. En outre, avec l'une des populations les plus instruites au monde et un certain nombre de centres de recherche et d'universités de haute technologie, le Canada dispose d'un vaste réservoir d'employés potentiels pour les industries lourdes en matière de recherche et de développement. Un coup d'œil sur les dépenses du Canada par rapport aux autres membres de l'OTAN et sur le contexte géopolitique actuel suggère que l'équipement est une bonne catégorie à cibler pour l'augmentation des dépenses. Le Canada et la R&D L'examen des dépenses fournit une raison de mettre l'accent sur la R&D, mais les caractéristiques économiques du Canada ainsi que les tendances récentes en matière de R&D, tant au niveau national qu'à l'échelle de l'Alliance, plaident en faveur d'une telle orientation. L'OTAN a récemment accordé une grande importance au développement des équipements, le Canada devant accueillir le bureau nord-américain de l'Accélérateur d'innovation pour la défense dans l'Atlantique Nord (DIANA) de l'OTAN. En accueillant ce bureau, le Canada est bien placé pour contribuer aux investissements de l'OTAN dans la recherche et en tirer profit. L'objectif de DIANA est d'amener les jeunes pousses sur le marché, mais c'est aussi là que le Canada est le plus en retard par rapport à des pays comparables. En effet, le Canada se classe au dernier rang pour ce qui est de la capacité de ses jeunes entreprises à s'adapter et à se lancer sur le marché, ainsi que pour ce qui est du financement moyen par jeune entreprise. L'association du financement de la R&D et des besoins militaires permet de résoudre ces deux problèmes. Le Canada est également toujours moins performant que ses pairs en ce qui concerne l'intensité de la recherche (dépenses de R&D/PIB). L'industrie de la défense étant trois fois plus intensive en recherche (dépenses de R&D en pourcentage des bénéfices) que le secteur manufacturier au sens large, son démarrage pourrait aider le Canada à rattraper son retard. Investir dans l'industrie de la défense est aussi particulièrement intéressant pour son impact sur l'économie canadienne dans son ensemble, car l'industrie maintient 55% des dépenses de sa chaîne d'approvisionnement au Canada. Investir dans la R&D en matière de défense ouvre également la voie au développement de technologies à double usage qui pourraient renforcer la capacité du Canada à mener des recherches de pointe. L'OTAN donne la priorité à neuf domaines technologiques perturbateurs. Parmi ceux-ci, en 2022, à peine 3% des entreprises canadiennes auront adopté l'intelligence artificielle et un peu plus de 2% la robotique. Cette statistique reflète la baisse du financement réel de la R&D au Canada depuis des décennies. Enfin, l'investissement dans la R&D atténue également un autre problème du Canada : sa population relativement peu nombreuse. Comme le montre la résistance de l'Ukraine à l'agression russe, la technologie agit comme un multiplicateur de force pour les armées. Le Canada ne sera jamais en mesure de fournir un nombre significatif de troupes à l'OTAN, mais il peut néanmoins renforcer l'ensemble de l'organisation en mobilisant son économie forte, sa population hautement qualifiée et son écosystème de recherche intégré. Principaux domaines d’action Le Canada dispose actuellement de deux principaux programmes de financement de la recherche en matière de défense : Innovation pour l'excellence et la sécurité en matière de défense (IDEaS) et Mobilisation des connaissances en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS). MINDS vise principalement à trouver des solutions en matière de politique et d'information du public, tandis qu'IDEaS a pour objectif de combler les lacunes technologiques de la défense canadienne. Les deux sont considérés comme des dépenses de défense, mais IDEaS s'aligne plus directement sur la partie développement de la R&D, car il fournit un soutien et un financement à toutes les étapes du cycle d'innovation, de la génération d'idées aux essais en conditions réelles. Malheureusement, depuis son lancement en 2018, IDEaS n'a permis qu'à quatre projets d'atteindre la phase de « test ». Ce fait, ainsi que l'absence d'étapes de post-développement telles que la commercialisation, ont été soulignés comme des faiblesses clés du programme dans son évaluation 2023. Cette évaluation a également souligné que cette étape était considérée comme une « meilleure pratique internationale » par des programmes similaires aux États-Unis, au Royaume-Uni, en Australie et en Nouvelle-Zélande. Toutefois, le problème central est insidieux, car les technologies militaires à usage unique ont un potentiel commercial limité en dehors des armées. Ce défaut souligne la nécessité de concentrer la recherche sur les technologies à double usage, qui peuvent ensuite être commercialisées sur un plus grand marché. Le recentrage du programme IDEaS afin d'encourager le développement de technologies à double usage et d'accroître le financement et le soutien à la phase de commercialisation offrirait ainsi une voie plus ciblée pour le développement de capacités de défense à l'échelle de la production de masse et contribuerait à la mise sur le marché de technologies de rupture canadiennes. Le programme IDEaS devrait donc être complémentaire des nouveaux accélérateurs DIANA de l'OTAN, qui partagent le même objectif mais l'abordent avec une orientation résolument commerciale. Deux technologies complémentaires méritent d'être soulignées en raison de leur potentiel pour le Canada : l'intelligence artificielle et les drones. Intelligence artificielle Le Canada a connu un grand succès dans le développement de la recherche fondamentale en matière d'intelligence artificielle, un universitaire britanno-canadien basé à l'université de Toronto ayant récemment reçu le prix Nobel pour « les découvertes fondamentales qui permettent l'apprentissage automatique ». Le Canada s'est donc distingué en tant qu'acteur précoce dans ce domaine, étant le premier pays à établir une stratégie nationale globale et à élaborer la Charte numérique. Cet avantage s'est légèrement émoussé au cours des dernières années, mais la structure formelle des instituts de recherche et le conseil consultatif restent des acteurs clés de la promotion de l'utilisation éthique de l'IA. Plus récemment, l'industrie canadienne a éprouvé des difficultés à rendre ses recherches opérationnelles. La stratégie pancanadienne en matière d'intelligence artificielle a tenté de relever ce défi en confiant la commercialisation à trois instituts. Toutefois, le manque de concentration et d'orientation de la politique a produit des résultats mitigés, notamment en ce qui concerne la propriété et l'adoption de la technologie au niveau national. L'ajout d'un pilier de défense à la stratégie, comprenant des orientations sur les technologies prioritaires, pourrait s'avérer judicieux. Ce pilier pourrait prendre la forme de partenariats militaro-civils, qui résoudraient les deux problèmes en traçant une voie claire entre la recherche et le marché et en alignant les besoins militaires sur la recherche, ce qui garantirait la demande. Cette collaboration, comme le montre le projet Maven des États-Unis, permet au secteur technologique de développer des produits utiles qui correspondent étroitement aux besoins militaires, tout en finançant la recherche sur ces technologies qui peuvent ensuite être commercialisées. Le Canada devrait s'appuyer sur ses forces en matière d'éthique et de développement de l'IA pour s'assurer que son industrie reste au premier rang mondial, non seulement pour ses capacités, mais aussi pour sa fiabilité. Drones Bien que l'OTAN ne considère pas les drones comme une « technologie émergente et perturbatrice », leur fabrication se situe en aval de chacune des neuf technologies, à l'exception de l'une d'entre elles. Les drones ont été spécifiquement ciblés dans le défi 2024 de DIANA. Le Canada est déjà un leader mondial de l'industrie aérospatiale civile, se classant parmi les quatre plus grands producteurs de moteurs et d'avions. Pourtant, l'industrie canadienne des drones est à la traîne. En 2024, la CAF achètera pour la première fois des drones de combat. Ces drones seront entièrement fabriqués par une entreprise américaine basée en Californie. Alors que le Canada reconsidère la fiabilité de la chaîne d'approvisionnement de défense intégrée avec les États-Unis, il devient impératif que le développement de cette technologie future se fasse, au moins partiellement, au Canada. La nécessité d'une production nationale est encore renforcée par l'importance de la capacité arctique pour le Canada, une capacité qu'aucun drone ne possède actuellement, et par les nouvelles opportunités de marché que le réarmement européen (qui exclut les sociétés américaines) pourrait peut-être créer. Cette année est également un moment clé pour l'industrie des drones au Canada, car la stratégie en matière de drones, établie en 2021, arrive à échéance cette année. Cette politique est résolument axée sur la gestion civile et la gestion des risques, mais son renouvellement ouvre la voie à une refonte de sa structure. La section 4.4 prévoit actuellement des investissements dans la recherche sur la sécurité et charge le ministère des transports de simplifier l'accès au marché en alignant la certification internationale. Le partenariat entre le ministère des transports et le ministère de la défense, qui figure déjà dans la stratégie, pourrait être renforcé par l'ajout d'un deuxième pilier à cette section. Il s'agirait de fournir des investissements supplémentaires dans les technologies des drones à double usage - en particulier au stade du développement et de la commercialisation - et de garantir l'interopérabilité avec les autres membres de l'OTAN. Cette approche s'aligne sur l'accent mis par le fonds de défense de l'UE sur l'augmentation de l'interopérabilité et l'investissement massif dans le renouvellement technologique rapide pour rattraper la Russie et la Chine. Conclusion et recommandations Le Canada est soumis à une pression intense pour atteindre l'objectif de 2% de l'OTAN : les États-Unis menacent de se retirer de l'organisation ou d'imposer des droits de douane, et il fait désormais partie de la faible minorité de membres qui n'a pas atteint le seuil de référence depuis que la Russie a lancé son invasion à grande échelle de l'Ukraine. L'équipement militaire du Canada s'effondre, tandis que son écosystème d'innovation ne parvient pas à fournir des technologies de rupture. La capacité d'innovation du Canada a été entravée par un sous-investissement chronique et sa croissance économique a été freinée par une faible productivité et l'incapacité à commercialiser la population extrêmement éduquée du pays. Ces défis peuvent être relevés en concentrant les investissements dans la R&D de défense et en alignant la recherche civile et militaire. Bien entendu, le Canada ne sera pas en mesure de remplir la totalité de ses obligations envers l'OTAN en augmentant simplement ses dépenses en R&D. Cependant, cette voie est sans doute la plus prometteuse pour le Canada. Cependant, cette voie est sans doute la plus utile, la plus pratique et la plus évolutive pour augmenter les dépenses de défense, tout en maximisant les avantages pour l'économie canadienne. Le Canada doit exploiter son potentiel en investissant dans des industries clés et en créant des cadres d'orientation, notamment en Renforcer le programme IDEaS pour encourager les technologies à double usage et faciliter la commercialisation, conformément aux accélérateurs Diana de l'OTAN ; En remaniant la stratégie du Canada en matière d'IA pour lui donner un pilier de défense clair, en alignant les besoins de la défense sur l'utilité civile ; Moderniser la stratégie du ministère des transports en matière de drones afin de mettre l'accent sur la recherche et le développement de technologies de drones à double usage. ## Vers un apaisement des tensions entre les États-Unis et la Turquie ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/vers-un-apaisement-des-tensions-entre-les-etats-unis-et-la-turquie/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > L’arrivée de Joe Biden à la présidence américaine sème le doute quant à la future politique étrangère envers la Turquie. Quelques jours après l’élection de Biden, le président turc avait promis des réformes démocratiques et économiques en Turquie. La persistance de la crise diplomatique entre les États-Unis et la Turquie aura des répercussions importantes sur la politique de défense canadienne. Bien que certains enjeux stratégiques demeurent conflictuels, il existe actuellement des terrains d’entente entre les deux pays comme l’endiguement de l’influence iranienne et russe et le renouvellement de l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien. Le Canada pourrait profiter du changement de l’administration américaine pour faciliter les discussions entre la Turquie et les États-Unis. Une résolution, même partielle, de cette crise, serait bénéfique pour les perspectives stratégiques du gouvernement canadien. Contexte L’arrivée de Joe Biden à la présidence américaine sème le doute quant à la future politique étrangère envers la Turquie. Quelques jours après l’élection de Biden, le président turc avait promis des réformes démocratiques et économiques en Turquie. Pourtant, avant la course présidentielle, Biden avait qualifié Erdogan d’autocrate et souhaitait soutenir plutôt l’opposition officielle en Turquie. Le nouveau Secrétaire d’État, Antony J. Blinken, a tenu des propos plus modérés. Le 19 janvier 2021, il a déclaré que la Turquie restait un allié, même si elle ne se comporte pas comme telle. Est-ce que ce changement d’administration américaine pourrait faciliter les relations entre les États-Unis et la Turquie ? Quels sont les obstacles et les facilitateurs pour apaiser les tensions entre les deux pays ? Pourquoi et comment le Canada peut-il intervenir dans ce dossier ? Des positions a priori incompatibles entre la Turquie et les États-Unis Depuis le coup d’État raté en Turquie, le 15 juillet 2016, les relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays demeurent très tendues. Ankara accuse Washington d’être complice de ce coup raté. Cette tentative de putsch serait l’œuvre d’un mouvement religieux turc : les Gülenistes. Or, le chef spirituel de ce mouvement, Fetthulah Gülen, est exilé aux États-Unis. Bien que le gouvernement turc exige son expatriation, le gouvernement américain la refuse. Tous les individus affiliés au mouvement Gülen sont considérés comme des terroristes en Turquie. L’acquisition de systèmes antimissiles russes (S-400) par la Turquie est également source de conflits. En réaction à cette transaction militaire, la Maison-Blanche avait annulé la vente d’avions de chasse (F-35) à la Turquie en juillet 2019, pour ensuite sanctionner le secteur de la Défense turque en décembre 2020. Ces systèmes antimissiles ont la capacité de transmettre de l’information militaire à l’armée russe. Compte tenu des tensions actuelles entre la Russie et l’OTAN, cet achat est perçu comme un rapprochement avec un opposant politique des États-Unis. Enfin, en 2019, la Cour fédérale du district sud de New York a accusé la Turquie d’avoir contourné les sanctions économiques imposées à l’Iran. En 2013, le Département du Trésor américain avait interdit les transferts d’argent afin de blanchir les transactions du gouvernement iranien. Les conclusions de ce procès établissent des liens entre la Banque Nationale turque (Halk bank) et le gouvernement iranien. Également, on souligne l’implication de hauts dirigeants turcs dans ce stratagème. Selon John Bolton, l’ancien conseiller stratégique de Trump, l’ancien président américain s’était immiscé pour influencer les procédures juridiques, car il entretenait des relations étroites avec Erdogan. Sous la nouvelle administration américaine, rien ne garantit que cette question ne ressurgisse pas. En considérant uniquement ces trois mésententes politiques, les positions turques et américaines semblent inconciliables. Or, la politique étrangère turque semble difficilement s’aligner aux aspirations régionales de la Russie et de l’Iran. Pour maintenir ses sphères d’influence au Moyen-Orient et au Caucase, la Turquie doit nécessairement limiter les gains de ces deux pays en coopérant avec les États-Unis. L’achat des S-400 : la preuve d’une « alliance russo-turque » ? L’acquisition de deux systèmes antimissiles S-400 par l’armée turque témoigne d’une proximité militaire avec la Russie. Dans le contexte actuel, il est compréhensible que les dirigeants américains restent méfiants des intentions politiques de la Turquie. Le gouvernement turc justifie la transaction militaire en évoquant le libre choix en matière d’autodéfense. De dernières générations technologiques, les S-400 sont capables de détecter les menaces aériennes et de les neutraliser avec des missiles à portées variables. Ces systèmes antimissiles permettent ainsi de moderniser la défense turque. Néanmoins, cette stratégie d’autodéfense implique la collaboration de la Russie, un adversaire politique des États-Unis. Les dirigeants turcs en sont conscients. Le 8 février 2021, le ministère de Défense turque a proposé de désactiver les S-400 et de les réactiver uniquement lors d’une attaque, en évoquant la clause des S-300 en Grèce. Bien que le gouvernement américain se montre intransigeant, le gouvernement turc semble vouloir négocier une sortie de crise. Le contexte s’avère opportun, car les relations russo-turques demeurent problématiques. Dans tous les conflits régionaux auxquels la Turquie et la Russie participent, les deux pays soutiennent des camps adverses, que ce soit en Syrie, en Libye ou, dans une moindre mesure, au Haut-Karabakh. La collaboration semble donc suivre cette logique : « mieux vaut coopérer avec son opposant que devenir son ennemi », car la Turquie a pu obtenir des gains tout en limitant ceux de la Russie. L’opération Bouclier d’Euphrate menée par l’armée turque en Syrie est l’aboutissement de cette stratégie. Néanmoins, cet effort de contraindre la Russie repose sur un équilibre fragile. En octobre 2020, la Turquie a signé un mémorandum favorisant la coopération militaire avec l’Ukraine. Cette décision d’appuyer encore une fois un rival politique russe met en lumière l’incompatibilité stratégique entre les deux pays. Pour faire un contrepoids à la Russie, la Turquie doit coopérer avec les États-Unis. L’armée turque hésite probablement à activer les systèmes antimissiles russes pour cette raison. L’accord sur le nucléaire iranien : le prochain terrain d’entente américano-turque Le scandale de l’Halk bank a également exposé d’autres liens problématiques pour les États-Unis, ceux entre la Turquie et l’Iran. Bien que l’événement soit critique, il s’inscrit dans une certaine continuité stratégique entre les deux pays depuis les années 2000. En fait, deux enjeux régionaux unissent l’Iran et la Turquie : freiner les mouvances autonomistes kurdes et défendre la cause palestinienne. Ces objectifs communs ne garantissent cependant pas l’absence de rivalité. Ankara et Téhéran soutiennent des factions kurdes opposées en Irak. Le gouvernement turc coopère avec les partis politiques kurdes affiliés au gouvernement régional du Kurdistan (le parti démocratique du Kurdistan et le Conseil national kurde), tandis que le gouvernement iranien endosse plutôt un parti fédéral kurde, l’Union patriotique du Kurdistan. La cause palestinienne permet aussi aux deux pays de promouvoir leur leadership au Moyen-Orient, mais les deux compétitionnent pour le même rôle. Enfin, l’Iran et la Turquie défendent deux communautés sectaires différentes en Syrie (alévi pour l’Iran et sunnite pour la Turquie). Même si les pourparlers d’Astana ont diminué les tensions entre les deux pays, ces rivalités persistent. Pour régler les différends politiques avec Téhéran, Ankara préfère tout de même la diplomatie. Cette approche pacifique s’opposait à la politique américaine sous Trump qui visait à affaiblir le régime iranien. En plus du retrait de l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien en 2018 et du renouvellement des sanctions contre le pays, l’administration américaine a soutenu des manifestations anti-Iran et a assassiné, en 2020, le commandant des Gardiens de la révolution iranienne. La plupart des pays de l’OTAN, y compris la Turquie, ont critiqué cette « pression maximale » exercée contre l’Iran. L’absence de soutien des pays de l’OTAN et la résilience du régime iranien expliquent l’échec de cette stratégie. Biden propose plutôt de renouveler l’accord sur le nucléaire iranien. Au lieu d’utiliser principalement la force, Washington veut limiter à nouveau la puissance iranienne par des moyens diplomatiques. À cet égard, Ankara et Washington veulent endiguer l’influence iranienne, sans recourir seulement au hard power. Cette réciprocité pourrait faciliter la reprise des discussions entre les deux pays. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada Même si leurs stratégies diffèrent, les États-Unis et la Turquie souhaitent limiter l’influence russe et iranienne. Les deux pays souhaitent aussi une reprise d’un dialogue constructif concernant le nucléaire iranien. Toutefois, certaines positions turques et américaines se réconcilient difficilement, comme la désinstallation des S-400 par l’armée turque ou l’extradition de Gülen. Pour ces raisons, il est trop tôt pour envisager une normalisation entre les deux pays. Les prochains mois risquent d’être critiques pour les relations américano-turques. Déjà, un mois avant le début du mandat de Biden, des sanctions contre le ministre de la Défense turque ont été imposées. En plus d’endosser ces sanctions, le nouveau président américain demeure inflexible face au dossier des S-400. Ces pressions obligeront la Turquie à clarifier ses intentions. Pour l’instant, le gouvernement turc promet des réformes démocratiques et a entamé des discussions avec les pays européens et les États-Unis, mais rien n’est encore concret. La persistance de la crise diplomatique entre les États-Unis et la Turquie nuit au fonctionnement optimal de l’OTAN. Depuis 2019, la Turquie bloque un projet de défense en Pologne et dans les pays baltes en utilisant son droit de veto. En échange, la Turquie exige que le Parti des travailleurs kurdes (PKK) soit reconnu comme une entité terroriste. Le non-respect des droits de la personne par le gouvernement turc, surtout depuis le coup d’État raté, ternit aussi l’image démocratique de l’OTAN. Avec la montée en puissance des pays du BRICS, il est important que l’organisation de défense collective envoie un message clair et unifié. La cohésion au sein des pays de l’OTAN semble être une priorité de la nouvelle administration américaine. Les promesses de Biden rompent avec l’isolationnisme de Trump. Par exemple, la reprise du JCPOA se veut un effort de diplomatie multilatérale. Ce retour au multilatéralisme coïncide davantage avec les intérêts du Canada. En s’inspirant du rôle de l’Allemagne durant la crise méditerranéenne, le Canada pourrait tenter d’apaiser les tensions entre les États-Unis et la Turquie. Les capacités de persuasion du Canada sont plus modestes, mais le gouvernement canadien pourrait profiter de cette période conflictuelle pour faciliter le dialogue entre les deux pays. Les États-Unis demeurent les plus aptes à convaincre la Turquie de respecter la mission de l’OTAN. Ainsi, toute action permettant, au mieux, une reprise sérieuse des discussions, ou encore une atténuation des tensions pourrait être avantageuse pour la politique de défense canadienne. L’apaisement des tensions lancerait un signal fort d’unité politique au sein de l’OTAN, nécessaire pour négocier avec la Russie. Une résolution positive de la crise crédibiliserait aussi la nouvelle administration américaine pour de futures négociations problématiques comme le nucléaire militaire iranien. ## Vers une force de réaction rapide européenne : Un tigre de papier de plus ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/vers-une-force-de-reaction-rapide-europeenne-un-tigre-de-papier-de-plus/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Il est à craindre non seulement que la force de réaction rapide de 5 000 hommes ne soit qu’une nouvelle Ferrari qui resterait au garage... Dans son retrait précipité d’Afghanistan, à rebours des messages initiaux de l’administration Biden qui prétendaient mettre l’ère Trump au rang d’accident de l’histoire, Washington ne s’est guère signalé par ses échanges réguliers avec ses alliés et encore moins par la coordination de ses actions avec ceux-ci. La défaite des Occidentaux en Afghanistan remet en question l’implication de l’OTAN dans des interventions « hors zone » et la fiabilité américaine pour un certain nombre des partenaires de Washington. De ce fait, il n’est guère étonnant que lors de la réunion des ministres européens de la Défense début septembre, l’idée d’armée européenne a refait son apparition. Certes, le terme d’armée européenne ne fut pas directement énoncé, les échanges portant sur la création d’une force de réaction rapide européenne de la taille d’une brigade (5 000 hommes). Pourtant c’est bien de cela dont il s’agit, que l’on dénomme ceci « armée européenne », « force de réaction rapide européenne », « groupements tactiques de l’Union européenne » ou, si l’on remonte aux années 1990, « corps européen ». Cette nouvelle proposition de force de réaction rapide européenne ne date toutefois pas de cette réunion. Elle remonte en fait à mai 2021, lors d’une précédente rencontre entre les ministres européens de la Défense, et fut discutée à partir d’une note diplomatique informelle suggérant cette idée, note signée par quatorze États membres, dont la France et l’Allemagne. Bien que Paris soit présenté comme un des initiateurs et soutiens, on ignore pour le moment si l’idée provient initialement de ses services, éventuellement en lien avec la prochaine présidence française de l’Union européenne (UE) prévue pour le premier semestre 2022. Peu médiatisée au cours de l’été, cette idée a naturellement regagné en publicité à la suite de ce qui est perçu en Europe comme le fiasco – voire la défaite – en Afghanistan. Configurée pour ressembler à une brigade et comprenant potentiellement des composants aériens et maritimes, cette force pourrait être déployée n’importe où, mais a priori seulement hors de l’Union européenne et de l’OTAN. Parmi les cas d’emploi évoqués, il y aurait, à titre d’exemple, un scénario d’appel à l’aide de la part d’un gouvernement en cas de menace pour sa stabilité et sa sécurité. Si les pays signataires de la note diplomatique, le SEAE (Service européen d’action extérieure) et le chef de la diplomatie européenne Josep Borrell semblent plus ou moins favorables à l’idée, ceci est moins le cas des États membres d’Europe de l’Est et du Nord. De plus certains des États membres craignent que cette nouvelle unité n’entraîne la fin des groupements tactiques de l’Union européenne, troupes auxquelles quelques États se sont attachés au fil des ans. Pour le moment il n’est pas encore certain que la proposition de constitution d’une force de réaction rapide soit un véritable projet en soi. En effet, il n’est pas impossible que l’idée soit avant tout mise de l’avant afin de favoriser une dynamique dans le cadre des projets actuels visant à renforcer les capacités de défense de l’Union européenne. Au vu des précédentes forces multinationales européennes préconstituées (brigade franco-allemande, groupements tactiques de l’Union européenne, corps européen, etc.) ainsi que des caractéristiques et fonctions de cette potentielle unité militaire, dans le cas où l’idée évoluerait vers un projet concret, il est probable que ce dernier connaisse les mêmes échecs que ses prédécesseurs. Sans même faire l’historique complet des différents projets, déclarations et unités constituées par les États membres de l’Union européenne, le dernier exemple en date que constituent les groupements tactiques de l’Union européenne (GTUE) démontre assez clairement les faiblesses et lacunes de ce type de proposition et de troupes militaires. De la taille de bataillon, soit 1 500 militaires, les GTUE furent créés à la suite de décisions prises en 2004. Censés être des troupes « crédible et cohérente, déployable rapidement, capable de mener des opérations autonomes ou d'assurer la phase initiale d'opérations de plus grande envergure », ils sont d’astreinte pour une durée de six mois et composés de plusieurs pays. Deux GTUE sont censés être d’alerte par semestre, ce mécanisme étant considéré comme opérationnel et en vigueur depuis 2007. De ce fait, on peut légitimement considérer la proposition de force de réaction rapide de 5 000 hommes comme une version plus étoffée des GTUE. Or, en près de quinze ans d’existence, ils ne furent jamais utilisés, et ce malgré les occasions qui se présentèrent (RDC en 2006, Tchad en 2008, Mali en 2013, République centrafricaine en 2014, etc.). Le but ici n’est pas d’énumérer ou d’avancer une analyse de ces échecs, mais plutôt de mettre en exergue le paradoxe consistant à penser que ce qui n’a pas fonctionné depuis près de 15 ans avec seulement des unités de la taille d’un bataillon réussisse avec l’équivalent d’une brigade sans qu’il n’y ait de profonds changements dans les caractéristiques de ces unités, dans les processus décisionnels, et surtout sans la présence régulière d’une volonté d’utilisation lors des crises. En effet, trouver des volontés d’emploi lors des sommets ou des réunions de constitution de ces unités est aisé dans l’histoire récente de l’UE. Ceci est moins le cas lorsque l’UE est confrontée directement à une crise, en particulier chez les pays ayant au moment de la crise des troupes membres des unités européennes d’alerte. Dans le cadre des discussions actuelles au sein de l’Union européenne, certains proposent justement des modifications quant au processus décisionnel lors des discussions portant sur un déploiement de troupes, l’idée étant de l’alléger voire de mettre fin au vote à l’unanimité. Les échecs semblables avec la brigade franco-allemande (BFA), qui elle n’implique que deux États, ne permettent pas d’être optimiste, quant bien même le processus décisionnel au sein de l’Union européenne serait allégé. En effet, la BFA n’a jamais été déployée avec ses régiments en trente ans d’existence. En outre, depuis plusieurs années, le calendrier semestriel des alertes des GTUE comporte de plus en plus de semestres vides ou à moitié pleins. Les États membres de l’UE se révèlent incapables désormais non pas de déployer au besoin des bataillons en urgence, mais simplement d’assurer deux bataillons par semestre, soit environ 3 000 hommes. Difficile dans ces conditions d’imaginer qu’il leur sera aisé d’assurer en permanence une force de réaction rapide de l’ordre de 5 000 hommes. Quand bien même ce premier obstacle serait surmonté, l’employer et éviter un destin semblable aux précédentes unités européennes jamais déployées ne serait pas une chose aisée. Cette proposition de force de réaction rapide européenne a naturellement profité des débats ayant suivi la débâcle en Afghanistan pour être médiatisée. Pour certains de ses nouveaux partisans, si une telle troupe avait existé en juillet et août dernier, elle aurait permis aux Européens d’être indépendants des décisions américaines lors des évacuations. Ce raisonnement oublie cependant qu’au même moment en théorie deux GTUE étaient d’alerte, soit l’équivalent au minimum de 3 000 militaires. Or à aucun moment le déploiement d’un voire des deux GTUE en alerte ne fut évoqué. Concrètement, déployer deux GTUE aurait était impossible, seul un GTUE étant d’astreinte pour le second semestre 2021. De plus, même pour ces missions et opérations permanentes, qu’elles soient de police maritime (cf. Eunavfor Atalanta) ou visant à aider à la formation militaire (cf. les EUTM,), l’UE est régulièrement confrontée à des difficultés en termes d’effectifs, de longs mois de négociations étant souvent nécessaires pour réunir ne serait-ce que quelques dizaines d’individus, ceci concernant de plus des missions ou opérations n’impliquant pas de combats. Même si le fiasco afghan est source d’amertume et de regrets, les Européens et surtout ceux de l’Ouest et du Sud ne devraient pas oublier que son importance n’est que relative pour les États d’Europe orientale confrontés à la menace russe. Étant donné que la perception de cette menace tend à s’accentuer, il est peu probable que ces États investissent beaucoup dans l’idée d’une force de réaction rapide de la taille d’une brigade qui interviendrait à plusieurs milliers de kilomètres de leurs frontières, frontières considérées comme directement menacées par Moscou. Si l’UE souhaite devenir un acteur de sécurité majeur dans le monde dans les prochaines années, résoudre en priorité le problème des effectifs des missions et opérations permanentes serait préférable au lancement d’une théorique et chimérique nouvelle force de réaction rapide. Il y a une dizaine d’années, un militaire néerlandais estimait que les « GTUE étaient une formidable Ferrari, mais une Ferrari qu’on laissait au garage ». Au vu de l’état des lieux des forces européennes multinationales préconstituées, il est à craindre non seulement que la force de réaction rapide de 5 000 hommes ne soit qu’une nouvelle Ferrari qui resterait au garage, mais même qu’elle en reste au stade des plans de constructions. ## Vers une reconnaissance russe de la « République Turque de Chypre du Nord » ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/vers-une-reconnaissance-russe-de-la-republique-turque-de-chypre-du-nord/ Modified: 2024-04-05 Chypre, une île divisée « La paix n’est pas l’absence de guerre, c’est une vertu, un état d’esprit, une volonté de bienveillance, de confiance, de justice. » Cette citation de Spinoza permet de mettre en évidence la situation chypriote, bloquée entre guerre et paix. État insulaire de Méditerranée orientale et ancienne colonie britannique, Chypre est indépendante depuis la signature du traité de Garantie de la Constitution du 16 août 1960, qui confie la stabilité politique de l’île à trois parties : le Royaume-Uni, la Grèce et la Turquie. Cependant, la sortie du joug britannique n’annonce pas l’avènement de la paix sur l’île ; certains milieux nationalistes grecs portent l’Énosis – « union » en grec – et souhaitent le rattachement de l’île à la Grèce. En 1964, de violents affrontements ethniques entre chypriotes-grecs et chypriotes-turcs aboutissent à la mise en place de la Force des Nations unies chargée du maintien de la paix à Chypre (FNUCHYP). Les deux communautés sont alors physiquement séparées par une zone tampon démilitarisée et administrée par la FNUCHYP. À l’été 1974, le Président Makarios III, dont le mandat s’appliquait de jure à la totalité de l’île, exprime le souhait de voir les officiers grecs quitter la Garde nationale chypriote. En réaction, une partie de ces derniers, aidée par l’EOKA B, un groupe paramilitaire chypriote-grec, et par la dictature des colonels d’Athènes, entame une tentative de coup d’État à Chypre. Le 20 juillet, la Turquie lance une intervention militaire dans le Nord de l’île, justifiant son action sur la base de l’article IV du traité de Garantie, qui dispose que « Dans la mesure où une action commune ou concertée ne s’avérerait pas possible, chacune des trois Puissances garantes se réserve le droit d’agir dans le but exclusif du rétablissement de l’ordre créé par le présent Traité. » La chute du pouvoir athénien, déjà affaibli quand émerge la crise chypriote, condamne le coup d’État à l’échec. La Turquie réagit en manifestant son refus de quitter le territoire pourtant désormais libéré. L’intervention s’est alors muée en occupation : 37% du territoire de jure administré par Nicosie s’est retrouvé de facto sous autorité turque, avant la proclamation de la « République Turque de Chypre du Nord » (« RTCN ») en novembre 1983. À ce morcellement du territoire chypriote s’ajoutent les bases militaires souveraines britanniques de Dhekelia et d’Akrotiri, installées depuis 1959 et considérées, par Nicosie, comme une autre forme d’occupation. Il reste que cette division territoriale n’a pas empêché l’accès de Chypre à l’Union européenne (UE), dont le pays est devenu un État-membre en 2004. Depuis, quarante années ont passé. Si l’île n’est plus en guerre, la paix n’y est pourtant pas assurée : premièrement, celle-ci n’existe concomitamment à aucune échelle (locale, régionale, nationale, internationale) ; deuxièmement, la prévention des conflits n’est que partiellement réalisée (les récents heurts autour du projet illégal de construction routière à Pyla en sont un exemple) ; troisièmement, la paix acquise ne convient à aucune des parties en présence, chypriotes-grecs et chypriotes-turcs estimant être lésés par la situation. L’île est donc gelée dans un espace interstitiel entre guerre et paix. Dans ce cadre, les récents contacts diplomatiques de la « RTCN » remettent en cause cet immobilisme, notamment en mettant en exergue un possible rapprochement entre les autorités d’occupation et le Kremlin, le tout sous contrôle turc. L’isolement de plus en plus relatif de la « RTCN » Si Ankara avait immédiatement reconnu la « RTCN » comme souveraine, une telle proclamation d’indépendance n’avait pas fait l’unanimité dans le monde turcique. Par exemple, le Parlement de la République autonome du Nakhitchevan, enclave azerbaïdjanaise entre l’Arménie, la Turquie et l’Iran, avait immédiatement reconnu la souveraineté de la « RTCN » mais Bakou ne s’était pas aligné sur cette position. Ainsi, la « RTCN » n’avait pas été incluse dans l’Organisation des États turciques (OET), fondée en 2009 par l’Azerbaïdjan à Nakhitchevan. Malgré l’apparition de voix divergentes issues du monde musulman (Bangladesh, Malaisie, Pakistan et Somalie) lors de l’adoption de la résolution 541 du 18 novembre 1983 demandant « à tous les États de ne pas reconnaitre d'autre État chypriote que la République de Chypre », le seul lien diplomatique durable de la « RTCN » était, jusqu’à présent, établi avec Ankara. Cependant, l’actuel réchauffement des relations entre la « RTCN » et l’Azerbaïdjan d’Aliyev – allié circonstanciel de la Turquie d’Erdoğan – renforce les discours opposés à un règlement durable de la question chypriote sur la base d’un État fédéral, qui est la position adoptée par l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU). L’actuel « dirigeant » chypriote-turc, Ersin Tatar, nationaliste et conservateur, est fermement attaché à une solution à deux États pour Chypre. Ce dernier est plus largement vassalisé et aligné sur toutes les positions internationales de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Il est donc une tête de pont pour l’exploitation gazière turque en Méditerranée orientale. Suivant Ankara, Tatar est ainsi pleinement impliqué dans le processus de consolidation des liens diplomatiques avec Bakou. Celui-ci s’illustre par la volonté turque et azerbaïdjanaise de renforcer la présence chypriote-turque au sein d’organismes de coopération, qu’ils soient régionaux (OET) ou internationaux (Organisation de la coopération islamique). À cet égard, les déclarations du Président azerbaïdjanais Ilham Aliyev lors des « consultations politiques multilatérales » menées à Istanbul début octobre en vue du 10e sommet de l’OET, affirmant que le drapeau de la « RTCN » flotterait lors des événements qui se tiendront en Azerbaïdjan, sont un indicateur puissant du renforcement de cette relation. Ce développement diplomatique accompagne la fin d’un certain équilibre des forces dans la région. Celui-ci s’était installé entre l’Arménie, Chypre et la Grèce d’une part et la Turquie, l’Azerbaïdjan et la « RTCN » de l’autre ; un jeu de menaces mutuelles régnait entre les parties entre présence, dont une des clés de voûte était la menace de reconnaissance de la République d'Artsakh face à celle de la « RTCN ». Or, cette logique a été rompue par Bakou avec son offensive contre les positions séparatistes arméniennes dans le Haut-Karabagh le 19 septembre 2023. Bien que le Parlement chypriote ait, à l’unanimité, condamné cette opération militaire, celle-ci a démontré que la menace de reconnaître les territoires sécessionnistes arméniens n’intimidait plus Aliyev-fils, décidé à venger son père, forcé d’accepter le cessez-le-feu du 16 mai 1994 entérinant la victoire arménienne dans la première guerre du Haut-Karabagh. Tout semble désormais indiquer une reconnaissance prochaine de la « RTCN » par Bakou. Le pouvoir chypriote-turc s’en félicite (son « ministre » des Affaires étrangères soulignant que le « processus de reconnaissance » du régime a débuté). Moscou pourrait alors voir dans cette séquence de reconfiguration géopolitique une opportunité d’intensifier sa présence méditerranéenne, tout en déstabilisant le camp occidental. Le jeu russe en Méditerranée orientale Au cœur de la Méditerranée orientale, Chypre constitue autant un point d’observation qu’une porte d’entrée sur le Proche et le Moyen-Orient, dont le Kremlin a depuis longtemps reconnu l’importance stratégique. La base logistique de la Marine russe à Tartous, en Syrie (à moins de 110 miles nautiques de côtes chypriotes) constitue l’héritage matériel contemporain de la volonté russe d’assurer un contrôle de ses intérêts économiques en Méditerranée orientale. En la matière, le développement d’une politique d’influence majeure dans la région est un enjeu central. Si la base doctrinale de cette dernière n’est pas nouvelle, ses moyens de déploiement le sont : l’implication russe en Syrie a montré la volonté du Kremlin d’interagir et de s’impliquer dans un conflit non-frontalier. Cette politique a également été déployée en Libye et amenait Moscou à interagir avec Ankara. Alliant affrontement et coopération, cette relation s’établissait dans les espaces laissés vides par le camp occidental et est également à étudier à l’aune de l’entente ad hoc entre les pouvoirs russes et iraniens. Parallèlement à ces deux théâtres d’opération, la Russie a continué de développer son influence à Chypre, principalement par les champs militaires et économiques. La Garde nationale chypriote est ainsi historiquement dotée de matériels russes (T-80, BMP-3, S-300…). Parallèlement, la signature d’un accord de coopération en matière de défense en 2015 a accru la coopération entre les forces armées des deux pays. Le texte ouvrait notamment les ports chypriotes aux navires russes, alors aux portes du théâtre syrien. Sur le plan économique, la mise en place d’un programme de « citoyenneté par l’investissement » a grandement participé à l’attraction d’investisseurs russes sur l’île. Celui-ci permettait à tout individu investissant un minimum de deux millions d’euros dans le secteur immobilier d’obtenir la citoyenneté chypriote. Si une telle démarche a été dénoncée et attaquée par la Commission européenne, elle a permis à de nombreux hommes d’affaires russes (près de 3 000) d’obtenir un « passeport doré », rapportant environ sept milliards d’euros d’investissements au secteur bancaire chypriote. À l’échelle macroéconomique, en 2018, 33% du total des stocks d’investissements directs à l’étranger (IDE) entrants en Russie venaient de Chypre ; en miroir, la même année, 40% du total des stocks d’IDE russes à l’étranger étaient basés à Chypre, représentant une somme de 189 milliards de dollars. Cependant, le 24 février 2022 a marqué un tournant dans la relation entre les deux pays. Nicosie s’est détourné de son partenaire historique, au profit de Bruxelles et de Washington. À cet égard, l’ambiguïté de certains États d’Europe orientale et du Moyen-Orient – condamnant l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine sans toutefois imposer de sanctions économiques au Kremlin – ne prévaut pas à Chypre. Le gouvernement est résolument engagé à assainir son image financière et à se tenir « du bon côté de l’Histoire ». Le Président chypriote Nikos Christodoulides, fervent europhile, affirmait encore récemment que « Les relations avec la Fédération de Russie sont déterminées dans le cadre de notre statut d’État membre de l’UE. Il y a une invasion russe illégale de l’Ukraine, comme ce fut le cas à Chypre en 1974. » Le délitement de cette relation russo-chypriote, couplé à la gestation diplomatique de la « RTCN », pourrait pousser Moscou à envisager de plus en plus sérieusement de revenir sur sa position vis-à-vis de la question chypriote. Enjeux d’une reconnaissance russe de la « RTCN » Sur le plan politique, le pouvoir russe pourrait profiter de cet espace juridique européen gelé pour déstabiliser une région qui est une « composante de l’architecture de sécurité européenne ». Les conséquences s’inscriraient notamment dans la perturbation de la légitimité européenne et atlantiste acquise auprès de Nicosie. Sur le plan opérationnel, une telle reconnaissance n’entraînerait toutefois pas de conséquences majeures : avec la base navale de Tartous, les navires russes sont déjà de proches voisins des opérations occidentales Noble Shield (Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN)) et EUNAVFOR MED (UE) et de la VIème flotte américaine. Il reste que le bastion russe s’étendrait alors du canal de Syrie vers le Nord et le Nord-Ouest de Chypre. Sur le plan stratégique, un grave coup serait porté à l’indécision européenne vis-à-vis de Chypre, Bruxelles n’apportant qu’un soutien timide à la résolution de l’occupation de plus d’un tiers du territoire souverain d’un de ses États-membres par une puissance étrangère. Si l’exercice diplomatique du Président Christodoulides à New-York à l’occasion de la 78ème Assemblée générale des Nations Unies lui a permis d’échanger avec le Président du Conseil européen et la Présidente de la Commission européenne, la question chypriote n’est toujours pas mise à l’agenda politique européen : dans son discours de rentrée du 13 septembre sur « l’état de l’Union », Ursula Von der Leyen ne fait aucune mention de l’île, ni de la nécessité de résoudre le problème chypriote. À l’égard de Chypre, l’apathie géopolitique européenne est donc ancrée. Mais à ne pas s’impliquer dans la résolution du problème chypriote, l’UE prend le risque de se trouver placée devant un fait accompli, piégée moralement et politiquement. Des signaux faibles, diffusés par le « pouvoir » chypriote-turc sur commande d’Ankara, indiquent les débuts d’un rapprochement diplomatique entre la Russie et la « RTCN », avec notamment un projet de mise en place d’un bureau consulaire en territoire occupé et de vols à destination de la Russie. Alors que le Président turc se trouvait début septembre à Sotchi, cette question diplomatique a été abordée. Erdoğan a ainsi annoncé que le pouvoir turc « se réjouissait que la Russie ouvre un bureau en « RTCN » ». Si cette dernière a tout de suite souligné que l’ouverture d’une telle représentation consulaire n’entraînerait pas de reconnaissance immédiate du gouvernement chypriote-turc par Moscou, le projet est révélateur du tournant progressif qu’opère la Russie sur l’île. Limites de l’action de Moscou en « RTCN » face à une Europe perdante dans tous les cas Bien que la reconnaissance de gouvernements sécessionnistes soit habituelle pour Moscou, une telle initiative comporte un risque majeur pour le Kremlin : conduire les États-Unis à accroître leur présence militaire sur l'île, déjà importante. Car bien décidé à combler l’espace laissé vide par la détérioration de la relation russo-chypriote, Washington est devenu un partenaire majeur de Nicosie. Sous l’impulsion des sénateurs américains Bob Menendez, alors Président de la Commission des affaires étrangères du Sénat, et Marco Rubio, le Congrès a adopté en 2019 le Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, qui levait, pour un an, l’embargo sur les armes à Chypre en vigueur depuis 35 ans. Le Sénat étudie même la possibilité de mettre fin au principe d’annualité, à la faveur d’un renouvellement tous les trois ans, afin de renforcer de manière durable le partenariat stratégique américain et d’écarter définitivement l’acteur russe de la scène chypriote. Par ailleurs, tous les États turciques ne partagent pas la vision de Bakou ou d’Ankara. Le Kazakhstan soutient en effet le gouvernement chypriote et est favorable à la recherche d'une solution à la question chypriote « conformément à la Charte de l'ONU et aux résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité » Mais cette position n’est pas majoritaire. Le site de l’OET, où la « RTCN » est un membre observateur depuis 2022, présente cette dernière de manière caricaturale, dans un mélange approximatif entre les données géographiques relatives à la République de Chypre et à celles de la « RTCN » et va même jusqu’à affirmer que l’un des « pays voisins de Chypre » est… « l’administration chypriote grecque ». Conclusion : le potentiel jeu turc Indéniablement, la « République Turque de Chypre du Nord » cherche à sortir de son isolement afin d’accéder au statut d’État souverain à part entière. Parallèlement, l’offensive éclair de Bakou dans le Haut-Karabagh a renversé l’équilibre des forces qui s’était établi vis-à-vis de Chypre, en démontrant que les menaces helléniques de reconnaissance de la République d’Artsakh n’effrayaient plus Aliyev. Parallèlement, l’effort azerbaïdjanais d’inclure la « RTCN » dans des organismes de coopération régionale et internationale (OET, OCI) semble indiquer une reconnaissance prochaine du régime d’occupation chypriote-turc. Cette séquence pourrait servir les intérêts russes, au détriment de l’ONU, de l’UE et de l’OTAN. Le Kremlin pourrait donc s’impliquer dans ce tournant stratégique : ses bâtiments de combat feraient alors escale dans des ports de jure dans le territoire de l’Union, mettant en exergue le camouflet politique et moral de l’Europe sur la question chypriote. Il reste qu’à Chypre, rien ne se fera sans l’accord d’Ankara, en position de force dans ce contexte. Si une forme de panturquisme peut évidemment être observée, cette « unité dans la langue » est pour le moment ralentie par la position du pouvoir turc, qui préfère entretenir le brouillard qui règne autour de Chypre, afin de garantir la pérennité de ses intérêts dans cet espace juridique flou. De plus, militairement, la Turquie n’a aucun intérêt à voir des soldats russes dans les territoires occupés. Enfin, le facteur religieux, qui explique en partie le rapprochement russo-chypriote via l’église orthodoxe, pourrait freiner l’intégration russe en « RTCN » si Moscou venait à reconnaître cette dernière. Toujours est-il que, dans le cas en présence, la réelle menace pour le camp européen ne vient pas de Moscou mais bien d’Ankara. L’intérêt d’Erdoğan est en effet de continuer à faire peser une menace : celle de la reconnaissance internationale de la « RTCN ». En s’appuyant sur son statut de puissance garante et membre de l’OTAN, la Turquie place ses pions sur l’île, petit à petit. Tout l’enjeu réside donc dans la potentialité de cette reconnaissance de la « RTCN », ce dont Erdoğan a bien conscience. Instrumentalisée, cette menace sert la rhétorique turque : en soulignant l’expansion territoriale de l’OTAN par l’intégration pure et simple de la « RTCN » dans les frontières turques afin de contrer une hypothétique menace russe, Ankara pourrait trouver des relais au sein de l’Alliance. Ce scénario mettrait fin à l’entre-deux chypriote actuel et assurerait, à la partie turque, d’obtenir ce qu’elle cherche à Chypre : son expansion territoriale et un accès pérenne aux ressources gazières en Méditerranée orientale. Il apparaît donc nécessaire de dénoncer cette manœuvre, afin qu’européens et atlantistes ne se retrouvent pas piégés à Chypre. ## Vers une stratégie canadienne en Indopacifique : Que retenir des exemples américains et européens ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/vers-une-strategie-canadienne-en-indopacifique-que-retenir-des-exemples-americains-et-europeens/ Modified: 2026-07-09 > Les auteurs examinent ce que les États-Unis et certains alliés européens ont développé comme stratégie permet de nourrir la réflexion sur... Tout indique que le gouvernement Trudeau publiera prochainement sa stratégie pour l’Indopacifique. Très peu de choses ont filtré du document sur lequel Affaires mondiales Canada travaille depuis quelques années, si ce n’est une volonté d’assurer une présence navale dans la région, un rôle encore à préciser dans la cybersécurité et la diversification des investissements et du commerce en Asie. Au moment où la rivalité sino-américaine exacerbe et militarise de plus en plus les tensions en Indopacifique, au point où certains envisagent un conflit armé d’ici six ans, il est impératif que le Canada élabore sa propre stratégie pour la région. En attendant, examiner ce que les États-Unis et certains alliés européens – le Royaume-Uni, la France, l’Allemagne, les Pays-Bas et l’Union européenne (UE) – ont eux-mêmes développé comme stratégie permet de nourrir la réflexion sur ce que devrait privilégier le Canada. À la lumière des diverses approches face à l’Indopacifique, il en ressort qu’Ottawa devra définir clairement comment il entend mobiliser le concept, autant en terme géographique que sectoriel. Il est aussi primordial d’articuler une stratégie inclusive et multidimensionnelle qui s’inscrit dans des initiatives régionales existantes, qui rassemble ses divers partenaires, et qui mise sur la valeur ajoutée concrète que peut apporter le Canada. Surtout, le Canada doit déployer des efforts pour éviter une escalade des tensions entre les États-Unis et la Chine, tout en prenant en considération que la région indopacifique est l’une, mais pas la première, des régions à prioriser. Les États-Unis et l’endiguement de la Chine L’approche de l’administration Biden face à la Chine et à la région indopacifique s’inscrit en grande partie dans la continuité de l’approche de celle de l’administration Trump. Toutefois, si Trump avait comme priorité la compétition économique, Biden semble mettre l’accent sur la sécurité régionale, sans négliger le domaine économique et commercial, et plus largement les droits humains. La toute nouvelle stratégie indopacifique des États-Unis met l’accent sur une « dissuasion intégrée », c’est-à-dire s’appuyant sur une multitude de domaines (technologie, économie, espace, cyberespace, etc.) que les États-Unis souhaitent maîtriser afin d’assurer leur primauté dans la région. Le département de la Défense considérait déjà au début de 2021 la Chine comme son principal défi face auquel il souhaite développer les concepts, les capacités et les plans opérationnels appropriés pour renforcer la dissuasion et maintenir l’avantage concurrentiel des États-Unis. Le renseignement américain estimait dans son évaluation de la menace de 2021 que la Chine constitue une menace importante, insistant sur les ambitions globales de la Chine. D’ailleurs, le renseignement américain a amorcé un virage vers la Chine, avec la constitution au sein de la CIA d’un bureau de mission sur la Chine. Toutefois, c’est dans les dernières semaines que les États-Unis ont commencé à définir les contours de leur stratégie pour l’Indopacifique. Si le nouveau partenariat américain, britannique et australien AUKUS annonçait la volonté américaine d’investir militairement la région, la tournée des pays asiatiques du secrétaire d’État Anthony Blinken et ses rencontres avec le Japon et la Corée du Sud vient ancrer le désir d’endiguement de la Chine et la volonté de préservation du statu quo dans la région indopacifique. Les États-Unis défendent donc une région indopacifique « libre et ouverte » : liberté de navigation d’un côté, mais aussi liberté face à toute politique coercitive de la Chine. « Notre objectif n’est pas de changer la , mais de façonner l’environnement stratégique dans lequel elle opère, en établissant un équilibre d'influence dans le monde qui soit le plus favorable possible aux États-Unis, à nos alliés et partenaires, ainsi qu'aux intérêts et valeurs que nous partageons. » Le plan d’action de cette nouvelle stratégie repose sur une dizaine d’objectifs clés. Le déploiement de nouvelles ressources dans la région est le premier objectif et se concrétisera par une assistance sécuritaire accrue pour renforcer les capacités maritimes et la connaissance du domaine maritime des alliés. Deuxièmement, les États-Unis prévoient lancer début 2022 un nouveau partenariat qui aura pour but, notamment, d’encourager et de faciliter le commerce à haut niveau, réguler l'économie numérique, renforcer la résilience et la sécurité de la chaîne d'approvisionnement, concentrer les investissements dans des infrastructures transparentes et à haut niveau, ainsi que de renforcer la connectivité numérique. Le rehaussement des mesures de dissuasion, le troisième objectif, entend décourager toute agression militaire contre les États-Unis et ses alliés et partenaires, incluant le détroit de Taïwan. Ensuite, les États-Unis souhaitent étendre leur coopération avec le Japon et la Corée du Sud au-delà de la sécurité, pour y inclure notamment le développement d’infrastructures, le renforcement des chaînes d’approvisionnement critiques ou encore la coordination trilatérale des stratégies régionales. Enfin, les derniers objectifs du plan d’action de la stratégie américaine pour l’Indopacifique ciblent l’investissement, tant économique que politique, pour le renforcement de certaines institutions régionales, dont l’ASEAN et le Quad, le soutien à l’ascension de l’Inde, la construction d’une résilience dans les îles du Pacifique, la promotion de la bonne gouvernance et enfin le renforcement et la promotion de technologies ouvertes, sécurisées, résilientes et fiables. Finalement, les États-Unis souhaitent s’appuyer sur une coalition la plus large et efficace que possible afin de « relever tous les défis, de saisir toutes les opportunités, de travailler à la réalisation de tous les objectifs ». Au niveau militaire, en décembre 2021, les États-Unis et le Japon ont mené deux exercices conjoints d’envergure, le Yama Sakura 81 et le Resolute Dragon, permettant de renforcer la coordination et l’interopérabilité des forces terrestres des États-Unis et du Japon. En janvier 2022, les États-Unis ont également mené une opération de liberté de navigation dans la mer de Chine du Sud, notamment pour dissuader les assertions agressives chinoises près de Taïwan ou du Vietnam. Enfin, en début d’année 2022, lors du Comité consultatif sur la sécurité États-Unis-Japon, les deux pays ont rappelé l’importance de dissuader, mais aussi de répondre, à toute déstabilisation de la région par la Chine. Si l’objectif premier des États-Unis dans la région est la prévention de tout conflit, cela ne veut pas dire qu’ils « ne sont pas préparés au conflit, » comme le mentionne le brigadier-général Ellison, commandant la 3e Brigade marine expéditionnaire. La question du statut de Taïwan cristallise, à bien des égards, la compétition qui oppose les États-Unis à la Chine, tant au niveau sécuritaire, idéologique que technologique. Les tensions entourant Taïwan avaient déjà été rehaussées d’un cran durant la présidence de Trump, quand ce dernier avait échangé au téléphone avec la présidente de l’île, allant à l’encontre du protocole suivi par les États-Unis depuis 1979. Il avait également accordé à Taïwan des ventes records d’armes et augmenté le nombre de transits que les vaisseaux effectuaient dans le Détroit de Taïwan et les exercices militaires réalisés en mer de Chine du Sud. Ces mesures ont toutes continué sous Biden. On a également appris que des soldats américains étaient présents sur l’île quand le cadre d’un programme de formation et que les États-Unis aidaient Taïwan, avec d’autres États occidentaux, à développer ses propres sous-marins. Biden a également convié Taïwan au Sommet des démocraties en décembre dernier. Depuis des mois, la Chine signale son mécontentement du rapprochement entre Washington et Taipei en s’introduisant dans la zone d’identification de défense aérienne. L’enjeu a lancé un débat sur les risques que la Chine lance une action contre Taïwan dans le but de « réunifier » l’île qu’elle considère comme une partie intégrante de son territoire. On se questionne autant sur la nature d’une potentielle attaque que sur la solution que les États-Unis devraient privilégier pour protéger l’île. Depuis 1979, les États-Unis maintiennent une politique d’ambiguïté stratégique vis-à-vis Taïwan, ce qui signifie qu’ils laissent planer le doute sur leur réaction exacte en cas d’attaque de l’île, tout en promettant à la Chine qu’ils ne soutiendraient pas une déclaration d’indépendance taïwanaise. Les propos tenus en 2021 par Biden en direct à la télévision semblaient pourtant clairement énoncer que les États-Unis allaient défendre Taïwan, provoquant l’ire de la Chine. Bien qu’un communiqué fut publié pour rectifier la position de la Maison Blanche, plusieurs se demandent si l’ambiguïté stratégique n’a pas, officieusement du moins, été délaissée. Le bienfondé de ce changement reste par ailleurs fortement contesté. Après un an à la Maison-Blanche, force est d’admettre que Joe Biden n’a pas beaucoup dérogé de la politique de son prédécesseur quant à la région indopacifique. Sur la relation avec la Chine et la question de Taïwan, l’administration est d’ailleurs pressée par un Congrès où ces sujets sont peut-être les derniers à faire consensus dans une Amérique plus polarisée que jamais. En matière de stratégie, les États-Unis cherchent à mettre de l’avant une dissuasion intégrée face à la Chine. Il faut cependant se questionner sur la capacité américaine à se concentrer sur l’Indopacifique dans un contexte où les enjeux sont nombreux en Europe. Le pivot britannique Le retour du Royaume-Uni à « l’Est de Suez » se concrétise depuis la publication de l’Integrated Review en mars 2021. L’objectif de Londres est de devenir « le partenaire européen avec la présence la plus importante et la mieux intégrée dans l’Indopacifique ». Ce projet était caressé depuis déjà un moment par Boris Johnson qui, en 2016, déclarait que la politique britannique de désengagement de la région dans les années 1960-70 avait été une erreur. La stratégie britannique s’exprime dans plusieurs volets : diplomatique, économique et sécuritaire. L’ensemble s’inscrit dans le concept de Global Britain, dont l’ambition est de permettre au Royaume-Uni de conserver son influence et continuer de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans les affaires internationales. Sur le plan diplomatique, le Royaume-Uni signala le début de son pivot vers l’Indopacifique en obtenant le statut de partenaire de dialogue auprès de l’ASEAN. Le pays profita également de sa présidence du G7 pour inviter l’Australie, l’Inde et la Corée du Sud à participer au sommet de juin dernier, un signe que Londres souhaite resserrer ses liens avec les États de la région. Le virage diplomatique s’exprime concrètement sur le terrain par l’augmentation du nombre d’attachés militaires et de diplomates en poste. Sur le plan économique, l’activisme dont fait preuve Londres s’explique par la nécessité de contrebalancer les effets du Brexit. C’est effectivement de 40 traités couvrant 70 États dont le Royaume-Uni sortait en quittant l’UE. Depuis, des traités ont été resignés avec 63 d’entre eux, dont le Japon, la Corée du Sud, Singapour et le Vietnam. S’y ajoutent de nouveaux accords conclus avec l’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Des négociations ont aussi été entamées avec l’Inde et les membres du Partenariat Transpacifique en vue d’y adhérer. En plus d’avoir signé des accords de défense avec l’Inde le Japon – l’on qualifie même la relation entre Londres et Tokyo de « quasi-alliance » –, la Grande-Bretagne a réinvesti et développé son réseau de bases militaires à travers la région. Elle augmentera aussi sa coopération avec le Five Power Defence Arrangements. Le déploiement du porte-avion HMS Queen Elizabeth et de son groupe aéronaval, accompagné de vaisseaux américains et néerlandais, se veut un signal important de la capacité britannique de projeter sa puissance dans la région. Au-delà de ce déploiement ponctuel, des navires de patrouilles extracôtiers seront stationnés de façon permanente dans la région pendant cinq ans. À partir de 2023, il est prévu d’y ajouter deux Groupes d’intervention côtière, comprenant une frégate, un navire d’assaut amphibie et un navire de soutien. Un autre élément important est la signature d’un nouveau partenariat trilatéral de défense entre les États-Unis, l’Australie et le Royaume-Uni (AUKUS). Ce partenariat semble à première vue réaliser les ambitions derrière le concept Global Britain et confirmer que cette stratégie aura une dimension maritime encore plus importante que prévu. Qualifié par le premier ministre Johnson de « vital pour défendre les intérêts britanniques à travers le monde », AUKUS est plutôt perçu par la Chine comme « compromettant gravement la paix et la stabilité régionales ». S’il vise donc à faire contrepoids à la Chine, le premier objectif reste de fournir une flotte de sous-marins nucléaires à l’Australie. Il est fort probable que Londres fournisse la technologie nucléaire, et les futurs vaisseaux pourraient être conçus à partir du modèle Astute de la marine royale. AUKUS s’ajoute donc à un ensemble d’initiatives visant à positionner le Royaume-Uni comme un interlocuteur important en Indopacifique. L’absence de Taïwan dans le dernier document stratégique britannique fut notée par plusieurs observateurs, surpris de voir la Grande-Bretagne rester muette sur l’enjeu sécuritaire le plus saillant de la région. Londres maintient des liens informels avec Taipei, plusieurs visites de ministres anglais ayant eu lieu dans les dernières années. C’était récemment le ministre du Commerce international qui y faisait une visite pour avancer les travaux en vue d’un accord commercial avec l’île. L’économie est un secteur prometteur de coopération puisque les deux pays sont de potentiels membres du Partenariat transpacifique et pourraient donc travailler ensemble. La ministre des Affaires étrangères britannique a par ailleurs promis de soutenir la Lituanie dans le conflit commercial qui l’oppose à la Chine et tournant autour des relations croissantes entre l’État balte et Taïwan. Questionné en chambre sur les répercussions du pacte AUKUS sur la réponse de Londres à une possible invasion de Taïwan, Boris Johnson mentionna qu’AUKUS n’était pas pensé en ce sens. Puis, le premier ministre spécifia que, dans le dossier des tensions entre la Chine et Taïwan, « soutenir les États-Unis est la seule option possible ». Néanmoins, Washington est de plus en plus clair sur son intention de défendre l’île en cas d’attaque chinoise, et tout suggère que l’Australie aurait décidé de faire de même. La question se pose, donc : que ferait Londres si ses deux plus proches alliés lui demandait de se joindre à eux ? Si le concept Global Britain et AUKUS ont effectivement comme objectif, entre autres, d’assurer le maintien d’un Indopacifique « ouvert » et « libre », il n’est pas incongru de penser que cela inclut la sécurité de Taïwan. Somme toute, la nouvelle stratégie britannique pour l’Indopacifique s’accompagne donc de nombreux engagements. Bien que Johnson veuille établir la Royal Navy comme la première marine d’Europe et renouer avec une capacité de projection globale de sa puissance, on peut douter de la faisabilité de ce pivot vers l’Indopacifique. Il sera effectivement difficile pour Londres de jouer parallèlement un rôle significatif dans les régions indopacifique et euroatlantique. La puissance indopacifique de la France    « La France est une nation de l’Indo-Pacifique », affirme le ministère français des Armées. Lors d’un discours à Sydney en 2018, le président français Emmanuel Macron affirmait, lui, que la France était désormais pleinement engagée dans la région indopacifique. Environ 1,6 million de Français vivent dans cette région, et 7 000 soldats français y sont constamment présents. Macron part du constat que la Chine est désormais un acteur global qui veut redéfinir son environnement stratégique. Selon lui, la France ne souhaite pas s’opposer à la Chine, mais travailler avec ses partenaires pour définir les règles du jeu dans la région et se positionner comme une force stabilisatrice. La Chine, menant une politique de puissance en Asie, et surtout en mer de Chine méridionale, accroît les tensions et fragilise les équilibres régionaux. Dans la loi de programmation militaire 2019-2025, la France soutient que les nouvelles formes de conflictualité et modes opératoires fondés sur l’ambiguïté des intentions et la combinaison de moyens d’action militaires et non militaires favorisent des risques élevés d’escalade en contribuant à maintenir un état de tension endémique qui affecte les relations entre les puissances. Dans ce contexte, la France a publié en 2019 sa stratégie de défense en Indopacifique. Les principaux objectifs de la France en matière de sécurité et de défense dans la région sont, selon cet énoncé, d’assurer la protection du territoire français dans la région, qui représente plus des deux tiers de sa zone économique exclusive, de contribuer à la sécurité des espaces régionaux, notamment à travers des coopérations de défense (ASEAN, Australie, Japon, Inde, États-Unis), de préserver l’accès aux espaces communs dans un contexte de compétition stratégique entre les États-Unis et la Chine, et surtout s’assurer du maintien de la stabilité stratégique et des équilibres militaires. C’est notamment au regard de ces objectifs que la France poursuit l’approfondissement de l’interopérabilité avec les forces armées des principaux partenaires que sont les États-Unis, l’Australie, le Japon et l’Inde, renforce sa présence dans les enceintes de sécurité de l’ASEAN et participe régulièrement à des exercices militaires avec les pays du Quad, les États-Unis et le Japon. La posture de défense française en Indopacifique est appuyée par cinq commandements supérieurs couvrant toute la zone : le commandement des forces armées dans la zone sud de l’océan indien (FAZSOI) permet la projection des forces militaires françaises dans une région où les alliés et partenaires disposent de peu de capacités d’action; le commandement des forces armées de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (FANC) et le commandement des forces armées en Polynésie française (FAPF) permettent à la France de sécuriser ses territoires et sa zone économique exclusive, en plus d’étendre ses dispositifs pour la réalisation de missions régionales au-delà des zones souveraines en coopération avec l’Australie, les États-Unis et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Ces trois commandements de souveraineté sont renforcés par deux commandements de présence : le commandement des forces françaises aux Émirats arabes unis (FFEAU) et le commandement des forces françaises à Djibouti (FFDJ). Au total, la France dispose de 12 bases disposant d’unités navales, de 12 avions de transport et de surveillance, 17 hélicoptères et 10 avions de combat pour couvrir toute la zone indopacifique. La France manque toutefois d’une présence permanente dans l’océan Pacifique Nord. Si la France ne précise pas davantage ses intentions de déploiements de ses forces dans la région, si ce n’est sa volonté de transiter en mer de Chine méridionale deux fois par an depuis 2014, elle mène depuis quelques années de nombreux exercices militaires avec des partenaires de la région en plus de déployer ponctuellement des moyens supplémentaires depuis la métropole. Le pays a notamment déployé en 2018 des avions de combat et de ravitaillement faisant escales en Malaisie, au Vietnam, à Singapour et en Inde, son porte avion Clémenceau en 2019 dans l’océan Indien et, en 2021, un sous-marin nucléaire d’attaque ainsi qu’un navire de soutien en mer de Chine méridionale, de même que des avions de combat et des bombardiers dans l’océan Indien pour une simulation de frappes au sol. En octobre 2021, la France a dévoilé la présence d’un navire militaire spécialisé en renseignement électromagnétique dans le détroit de Taïwan. Ces déploiements ponctuels font partie de la stratégie de la France de renforcement de sa présence dans la région indopacifique. S’ajoute à cela des exercices multinationaux, comme Pitch Black en 2018 avec l’Australie, ou ARC21 en 2021 avec les États-Unis, le Japon et l’Australie. Ces exercices, selon l’état-major français des armées, permettent de renforcer les capacités des pays alliés à œuvrer ensemble pour une zone indopacifique libre et ouverte. Tout comme son allié britannique, la question taïwanaise est absente de la stratégie française. Taïwan n’est mentionnée qu’à une seule reprise, en lien avec la coopération universitaire, absente donc des discussions sur la sécurité. C’est surtout par les actions de la France qu’émerge sa position sur cet enjeu. Mis à part les déploiements ponctuels pour assurer, selon la ministre des Armées, la défense de la liberté de navigation et le respect du droit international dans la région, ce sont davantage les parlementaires qui expriment, peut-être silencieusement, leurs positions sur la question. Notons ainsi la visite, en octobre 2021, de parlementaires français, dont un ancien ministre de la Défense, à Taïwan, ou encore la prise de position du vice-président de la commission sénatoriale des Affaires étrangères, de la Défense et des Forces armées, favorable au statu quo dans le détroit de Taïwan, et qui a notamment rapporté que les parlementaires taïwanais souhaitaient un soutien officiel de la France pour la sécurité de l’île. Ainsi, si Taïwan est absente des documents stratégiques français sur l’Indopacifique, il est fort probable que la France ne restera pas neutre face à un potentiel conflit militaire entre Taïwan et la Chine, même si le degré d’engagement de la France pour la protection de Taïwan reste encore à déterminer. Finalement, l’objectif premier de la France en Indopacifique est de soutenir l’émergence d’une architecture régionale de sûreté maritime en privilégiant la coopération bilatérale et multilatérale et le développement de capacités régionales de connaissance et de partage de l’information. C’est dans ce contexte que la France siège maintenant à la réunion des ministres de la Défense du Pacifique Sud et qu’elle s’est portée candidate au statut d’observateur des groupes de travail de l’ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus. L’ambivalence allemande En 2020, l’Allemagne publiait sa « directive pour l’Indopacifique ». L’utilisation du terme « directive » au profit de « stratégie » peut être comprise comme un choix de ne pas irriter Beijing. L’utilisation du concept d’Indopacifique avait elle-même été au centre d’un débat au sein du gouvernement allemand, qui était réticent à l’utiliser, car jugé trop hostile envers la Chine. Si le document finit par peser le pour et le contre concernant cette dernière, la publication de cette directive signale néanmoins un changement dans l’approche de l’Allemagne sur la région indopacifique. Motivée par les développements importants dans la région – l’évolution rapide de la distribution de la puissance et les différends croissants qui menacent la stabilité –, l’Allemagne souhaite travailler à la protection de l’ordre international fondé sur les règles à travers le multilatéralisme. La source de cette déstabilisation est, entre autres, la Chine « qui, dans une certaine mesure, remet en question les règles de l’ordre international ». La position allemande est cependant centrée sur la diversification des partenaires et l’inclusivité des initiatives. Berlin rejette le recours à des stratégies d’endiguement et de découplage économique. La directive allemande englobe de nombreux domaines. Le commerce et l’économie y occupent une place importante. Étant l’un des principaux exportateurs mondiaux, l’Allemagne comprend que sa prospérité future est étroitement liée à la stabilité et au développement de la région indopacifique. L’objectif de renforcer et diversifier les partenariats économiques vient répondre à cette nécessité et permettra à terme d’être moins dépendant de la Chine. La lutte contre les changements climatiques est également un pan important de la directive allemande. La diversification – autant politique qu’économique – passe pour l’Allemagne par un renforcement de sa relation avec l’ASEAN, qui est mentionnée 66 fois dans les pages du document. Nonobstant la sincérité de Berlin, la stratégie est habile, car l’ASEAN s’est toujours vue comme le forum central de la région, tout en rejetant fermement l’ingérence indue des grandes puissances. En se rapprochant d’elle, l’Allemagne pourra espérer influencer l’avenir de la région. La relation avec la Chine et les enjeux de sécurité restent tout de même les objets principaux de la directive. Eu égard à la première, il faut noter l’évolution du discours allemand. Jusqu’ici, la politique chinoise de l’Allemagne était presque exclusivement économique. Le pays a été le principal acteur à faire pression en faveur de l’accord d’investissement UE-Chine, signé en décembre 2020, et qui avait été mal reçu par Washington. En matière de sécurité, si elle n’attribue pas à Beijing la responsabilité des tensions en mer de Chine, la directive allemande est claire sur la nécessité de s’investir dans le maintien de la liberté de navigation et la coopération avec des démocraties et partenaires aux mêmes vues sur les questions de sécurité. Elle met, entre autres, l’accent sur le rôle que l’OTAN et l’UE doivent jouer à cet égard. Le plus révélateur est que le document ne mentionne jamais Taïwan, alors que les États-Unis la placent au cœur de leur programme régional. Par ailleurs, aucune réflexion n’est faite sur les lacunes précédentes de la relation sino-allemande, au moment où l’ancienne chancelière Merkel avouait que le pays avait été « naïf » à propos de la Chine. Les actions récentes de l’Allemagne dans la région indiquent néanmoins que le pays est prêt à agir concrètement. La signature d’un partenariat de collaboration avec le Japon en matière de renseignement en est le premier exemple. Par ailleurs, le pays a déployé la frégate Bayern au cours de l’année 2021, une première en 20 ans pour un vaisseau allemand. En faisant escale dans plusieurs États et en participant à des missions et des exercices dans la région, ce déploiement signale aux partenaires de l’Allemagne – surtout aux États-Unis – qu’elle est sérieuse dans sa volonté de s’investir dans la région. Le choix de déployer le navire seul, donc de ne pas l’inclure dans un groupe multinational au côté de la France ou de la Grande-Bretagne par exemple, indique que Berlin souhaitait minimiser le signal coercitif que cela envoyait à la Chine. Cette dernière refusa tout de même l’entrée du port de Shanghai au navire allemand pour protester contre son passage en mer de Chine du Sud. De passage au Japon avec la frégate, le chef de la marine allemande a annoncé que le pays planifiait d’être durablement présent dans la région, avec des avions déployés l’an prochain et une flotte dans les deux prochaines années. La lecture du document nous fait questionner la volonté de Berlin de réellement modifier les bases de sa relation avec Beijing, même si ses récents projets de déploiements peuvent indiquer l’inverse. Quels genres de signaux cela envoie-t-il aux deux grandes puissances ? Le résultat est pour le moins ambivalent. Chose certaine, le pays pourra difficilement concilier son intention de rassurer Washington de son soutien sans pour autant contrarier Beijing. L’internationalisme libéral des Pays-Bas Défini, comme chez son voisin allemand, par le terme « directive » plutôt que « stratégie », le document énonce un idéal d’inclusion tout en mettant clairement de l’avant les valeurs en fonction desquelles le pays entend agir et coopérer dans la région indopacifique. La promotion et la défense de la démocratie et des droits humains, ainsi que de l’ordre libéral international s’y trouvent au premier chef. Les Pays-Bas reconnaissent la pression à laquelle ces valeurs font face de la part des États autoritaires. Le pays dit vouloir coopérer en ce sens davantage avec les États de la région aux vues similaires. Ce groupe comprend l’Australie, le Japon, la Nouvelle-Zélande, la Corée du Sud, l’Inde, ainsi que l’ASEAN. Si l’importance de resserrer les liens bilatéraux est mentionnée, il est mainte fois rappelé que le cadre multilatéral est celui que les Pays-Bas favoriseront. La publication de la directive néerlandaise doit être comprise comme la volonté d’Amsterdam de contribuer au développement d’une stratégie officielle de l’UE. Les Pays-Bas conçoivent clairement leurs actions dans la région sous l’égide d’une stratégie européenne englobante. L’objectif est de voir cette dernière constituer une vision distincte de celle des États-Unis. Le document élabore tout de même les façons dont le pays tentera d’agir de son propre chef. Les secteurs dans lesquels ses actions se concentreront incluent la sécurité maritime et la connectivité. Cette dernière sera mise en œuvre en coopérant dans le développement des technologies numériques avec ses partenaires régionaux. L’objectif est de permettre de mieux intégrer l’économie néerlandaise à celles de la région et de faire face aux menaces de cybersécurité. En ce qui a trait à la sécurité maritime, la militarisation de la mer de Chine du Sud occupe une place non négligeable de la directive, tout comme l’importance de faire respecter la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. La fermeté employée dans la directive néerlandaise pour parler du rôle de la Chine dans la montée des tensions régionales détone des documents allemand et britannique, plus conciliants. Cela n’implique pas pour autant un alignement inébranlable sur les États-Unis. Les Pays-Bas cherchent en ce sens à « éviter que la région indopacifique ne devienne le pion d’une des grandes puissances ou le butin d’un conflit entre elles ». La participation d’une frégate néerlandaise au groupe aéronaval du porte-avion HMS Queen Elizabeth britannique, déployé cette année en Indopacifique, démontre que la position des Pays-Bas dépasse la simple rhétorique au sujet de sécurité maritime. Taïwan n’apparait pas non plus dans la directive néerlandaise. Les deux pays entretiennent tout de même des relations officieuses. Le changement de nom du Bureau néerlandais à Taipei, décrit par le représentant officiel comme signifiant « beaucoup plus » a été vivement critiqué par Beijing. Par ailleurs, le parlement des Pays-Bas a récemment prononcé son soutien envers Taïwan et la Lituanie vis-à-vis la Chine dans leur litige. La question demeure néanmoins entière sur la réaction que pourrait avoir La Haye face à une action chinoise à l’encontre de Taïwan. Un rapport paru en 2021 expose bien le problème auquel les Pays-Bas font face, rejeter un appel américain pour soutenir leur défense de Taïwan pourrait mener à la remise en question de l’article 5 de l’OTAN alors que d’accepter une requête américaine pourrait être perçu par Beijing comme une déclaration de guerre. Pris dans un dilemme cornélien, difficile de prédire ce que feront les Pays-Bas. Union européenne : une troisième voie est-elle possible ? Compte tenu des diversités nationales et des intérêts nationaux propres au sein de l’Union européenne, développer une stratégie européenne globale pour l’Indopacifique n’est pas une mince tâche. La récente stratégie de l’UE pour l’Indopacifique reflète cette difficulté d’amener 27 pays à adopter une lecture commune des défis dans cette région. La stratégie englobe un grand nombre de domaines d’intérêt, tels que la prospérité durable et inclusive, une transition verte, la gouvernance de l’océan, la gouvernance et les partenariats numériques, la connectivité, la défense et la sécurité humaine. La publication de ce document signale que l’UE reconnaît l’importance de la région indopacifique et souhaite participer au virage déjà opéré par plusieurs de ses membres et de ses alliés. Toutefois, en matière de sécurité et défense, la stratégie de l’UE demeure vague. Si elle insiste sur la préservation du statu quo stratégique dans la région, c’est-à-dire le maintien de la liberté de navigation et le respect du droit international assurés par la marine américaine, elle reste peu loquace sur la façon d’atteindre ses objectifs. Ainsi, l’UE souhaite accroître sa présence navale dans la région, notamment en participant à des exercices conjoints avec des partenaires régionaux sur la lutte contre la piraterie et la protection de la liberté de navigation et en développant sa « diplomatie navale ». L’UE souhaite également renforcer ses relations avec les partenaires régionaux par l’entremise de l’architecture de sécurité de l’ASEAN, ou encore de la coopération renforcée de l’UE en matière de sécurité en Asie, notamment pour couvrir les domaines du contre-terrorisme, de la cybersécurité, de la gestion de crise, de la sécurité maritime et de la manipulation des informations et des interférences étrangères. Si la sécurité du Détroit de Taïwan a un impact direct sur la sécurité et la prospérité de l’UE, selon la stratégie de l’UE pour l’Indopacifique, Taïwan est surtout considéré comme un partenaire économique. L’UE énonce également une vision très prudente de la Chine, reflet de la diversité d’intérêts des pays membres. 41% des pays membres soutiennent l’inclusion de la Chine à tout arrangement économique de libre-échange régional ou à un accord global, contre 48% qui se montrent sceptiques envers un accord de libre-échange avec la Chine et favorable à étendre les liens économiques au-delà de la Chine. De plus, il faut se rappeler que 18 pays de l’UE sont membres de l’initiative des nouvelles routes de la soie de la Chine (Belt and Road Initiative) et qu’en 2016, la Grèce, la Hongrie et la Croatie se sont opposées à une déclaration de l’UE condamnant fermement les revendications maritimes de la Chine. Dans la stratégie européenne, la Chine est considérée à la fois comme un partenaire indispensable avec qui il faut coopérer sur les questions d’intérêt commun en l’encourageant à jouer un rôle pacifique dans le développement de la région, tout en affirmant les désaccords avec celle-ci, notamment sur la question des droits humains. Il s’agit d’une posture décrite comme « d’engagement multifacette ». La stratégie de l’UE pour l’Indopacifique n’est pas assurée de tenir sur le long terme, notamment sur le volet sécurité et défense. D’abord parce que c’est en grande partie sur la France, l’Allemagne et les Pays-Bas que cette stratégie européenne repose. Or, si ce sont tous les trois des pays qui souhaitent renforcer la sécurité dans la région, ce n’est pas une position partagée par la majorité des pays de l’UE. En effet, de tous les pays de l’UE, seulement 12 sont en faveur d’une contribution pour les opérations assurant la liberté de navigation dans la région indopacifique. Bref, si l’UE exprime l’ambition d’offrir une troisième voie entre Beijing et Washington, sa difficulté à parler et agir de manière unie pose le risque réel qu’elle devienne stratégiquement insignifiante. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que l’unité européenne doive se faire au prix de vider sa stratégie indopacifique de toute substance. Considérations et recommandations pour le Canada Les stratégies énoncées par les Européens et les Américains peuvent servir de références pour l’élaboration de la stratégie canadienne. Face à l’importance de la région pour les principaux alliés du Canada, dont les États-Unis, il parait peu concevable que le Canada ne contribue pas minimalement aux efforts de sécurité régionale. Tout d’abord, l’action du Canada dans la région indopacifique doit privilégier l’objectif souligné par les Pays-Bas, à savoir de prévenir un conflit tant redouté entre Washington et Beijing, dont l’éventualité ne doit pas être sous-estimée. À titre de puissance moyenne, le Canada bénéficie grandement de la stabilité mondiale et du respect du droit international. Or, le principal moteur de ce conflit est la diplomatie de Xi Jinping visant à affirmer sa domination sur Taïwan, la mer de Chine méridionale et d’autres zones contestées, dont les îles Senkaku-Diaoyu en mer de Chine orientale. Taïwan représente l’enjeu le plus litigieux entre les deux superpuissances. Beijing mène des attaques de zone grise contre Taïwan, dont le déploiement d’un nombre record d’avions militaires au-dessus de l’île, et la Chine s’est déclarée prête à envahir Taïwan par la force à plusieurs reprises. De plus, la Chine conteste la domination américaine des voies maritimes stratégiques de la région, ce qui la met en compétition directe avec Washington. Face à cette situation, le Canada a tout intérêt que ces tensions n’éclatent pas en conflit armé, ce qui déstabiliserait l’ensemble du système international. Plus encore, contrairement à ses alliés européens, le Canada ne dispose pas de la même marge de manœuvre pour se distancer de son voisin du Sud en cas de conflit armé avec la Chine. Deux actions concrètes doivent alors être envisagées : d’une part, collaborer avec Taipei et les alliés de la région afin de dissuader une attaque chinoise contre Taïwan, incluant les îles Pratas; d’autre part, adopter une stratégie inclusive et multidimensionnelle pour la région afin de préserver un ordre fondé sur les règles. L’un des obstacles que rencontre le Canada dans la définition d’une stratégie réside dans le fait que ses principaux alliés sont divisés dans leur approche. Tant les organisations établies, comme l’OTAN et l’UE, que les nouveaux partenariats, comme le QUAD et AUKUS, poursuivent leurs propres objectifs. La création de ce dernier illustre le fossé existant entre les alliés les plus proches du Canada : les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la France. À cet égard, le Canada doit éviter la tentation de choisir un camp, puisque autant la dissuasion que le dialogue stratégique requièrent de parler d’une même voix. Ainsi, le Canada doit privilégier une stratégie inclusive qui rassemble ses alliés traditionnels et partenaires régionaux. C’est d’ailleurs de cette façon que le Canada a historiquement joué un rôle constructif sur la scène internationale : en travaillant avec des pays aux vues similaires pour résoudre les problèmes par le biais du multilatéralisme. Toutefois, les temps ont changé. Pour y parvenir aujourd’hui, le Canada devra prouver qu’il peut joindre le geste à la parole. Ce n’est que lorsqu’il aura regagné sa crédibilité sur la scène mondiale qu’il sera en mesure d’influer sur ceux-ci. Pour ce faire, le Canada doit investir dans certains domaines névralgiques. Pour répondre efficacement à la montée en puissance de la Chine, il faut reconnaître que les moyens militaires ne sont pas une panacée. Le Canada ne peut espérer s’investir de manière significative sur l’ensemble des objectifs américains dans la région. Il doit prioriser ses ressources. Dans cette perspective, il est essentiel de découpler les secteurs stratégiques de l’économie de celle de la Chine (terres rares, haute technologie, etc.) et de réorienter les chaînes d’approvisionnement vers des pays plus sûrs comme le Vietnam, de nouveaux partenaires commerciaux comme Taïwan, mais également les États-Unis, de manière à surmonter leur repli protectionniste. Le Canada doit aussi miser sur des investissements dans la cybersécurité et l’intelligence artificielle, des domaines où le Canada dispose déjà d’un potentiel important. Bien sûr, le Canada ne peut pas contrer seul les activités en zone grise de la Chine. C’est pourquoi il est également crucial d’intensifier le partage de renseignements et le renforcement des capacités avec des pays partageant les mêmes intérêts. Proposer un QUAD élargi, pour inclure la France et le Canada, permettrait par exemple de renforcer la dissuasion alliée contre la Chine et contribuerait à atténuer les désaccords au sein des alliés. Par ailleurs, le Canada devra définir clairement ce qui constitue « l’Indopacifique ». Si le concept est maintenant un cadre de référence pour de nombreux partenaires du Canada en Europe et en Asie, chacun se distingue par les limites géographiques qu’ils lui confèrent, l’importance qu’ils accordent aux divers secteurs d’interventions et aux approches multilatérales, et surtout à la place qu’y occupe la Chine. Pour plusieurs États, le concept d’Indopacifique porte effectivement sur la gestion de la montée en puissance de la Chine, mais pour le Canada, cela ne peut en constituer l’Alpha et l’Omega. Pour élaborer une stratégie pertinente et intervenir de manière constructive, le Canada devrait bien délimiter – en termes géographique et sectoriel – ce qu’il entend par Indopacifique et ce qu’il y fera. Il pourrait aller encore plus loin et compartimenter l’espace indopacifique en sous-zones géographiques, pour lesquelles le Canada développerait des intérêts et des objectifs distincts. En cela, la stratégie canadienne gagnerait en substance et en crédibilité, en plus de permettre de mieux guider son action dans cette immense région. Le Canada devra également bien définir les domaines dans lesquels il souhaitera intervenir. Le pays possède une expertise dans un ensemble de secteurs (gestion des pêches, construction d’infrastructures, développement et résilience des institutions, renforcement des capacités, cybersécurité) qui seront les bienvenues par les États de la région. Pour demeurer efficace, toutefois, la stratégie canadienne devrait cibler des domaines où le Canada peut apporter une valeur ajoutée par rapport à ses alliés, notamment au travers de partenariats régionaux déjà existants ou chercher à s’y greffer quand ceux-ci s’alignent avec ses intérêts. L’initiative pour la résilience des chaînes de production du Japon, de l’Australie et de l’Inde, ainsi que le Blue Dot Network pour le développement des infrastructures, représentent en ce sens des avenues intéressantes. Enfin, le Canada doit se rappeler que la stratégie est le processus qui consiste à rattacher les moyens aux fins. En ce sens, il doit prendre garde à ne pas surévaluer ses moyens. De toute évidence, il y aura des choix à faire. Le Canada doit mettre en perspective ses engagements dans la région indopacifique avec ses ressources limitées et les deux régions qui restent prioritaires : l’Amérique du Nord, ce qui inclut l’Arctique, et la région euroatlantique, actuellement sous haute tension. Une répartition des responsabilités devrait donc être élaborée avec ses alliés afin d’optimiser le partage du fardeau et de clarifier les attentes à l’égard des engagements alliés en dehors de leurs principales régions d’intérêt. L’élaboration de la Boussole stratégique de l’Union européenne et le nouveau Concept stratégique de l’OTAN représentent en ce sens des opportunités pour le Canada. Toutes ressources investies en Indopacifique doivent l’être que si les besoins nécessaires à la protection des intérêts nationaux du Canada en Arctique et en Europe ont été comblés. Les enjeux pour le Canada ne pourraient être plus importants, et le temps presse. Le Canada subit des coûts de plus en plus importants à naviguer à l’aveugle. S’il peut s’adapter au nouvel environnement stratégique et relever les défis qui se présentent à lui, le Canada pourra protéger ses intérêts nationaux et assurer sa part du fardeau pour préserver la paix et l’ordre international libéral. Autrement, il s’avérera une source de vulnérabilité sur l’un des enjeux les plus critiques de notre époque. ## Washington peut-elle sauver son leadership à l’OTAN ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/washington-peut-elle-sauver-son-leadership-a-lotan/ Modified: 2022-04-21 > Bien des actions devront être prises par la nouvelle administration Biden pour que les États-Unis retrouvent leur pleine influence au sein de l’OTAN. Le délaissement du leadership américain au sein de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN) n’est pas apparu avec Donald Trump. Dès la fin de la Guerre froide, le poids des États-Unis au sein de l’alliance était remis en question par les alliés européens. Le refus d’une intervention de l’OTAN en Irak en 2003 par la France et l’Allemagne indiquait déjà à cette époque que le leadership américain n’était plus incontesté. Plus récemment, l’administration Obama n’a pas non plus cherché à réaffirmer l’hégémonie américaine au sein de l’OTAN. Au contraire, le président Obama a plutôt mis de l’avant la stratégie du « Lead from behind », favorisant ainsi un réajustement dans le partage du fardeau au sein de l’alliance. Ce délaissement du leadership s’illustre notamment avec l’opération Unified Protector en Libye en 2011. Au cours de cette intervention, Washington n’a joué qu’un rôle de support, laissant la France et la Grande-Bretagne prendre les rênes des opérations. Lors de son arrivée au pouvoir, le président Donald Trump a poursuivi sur cette même lancée. Avec son slogan « America First », Trump a fait comprendre à ses alliés que la priorité de Washington n’était plus les affaires internationales. Trump estimait que les interventions militaires américaines étaient longues et coûteuses et qu’il valait mieux que Washington se concentre sur les politiques domestiques. C’est pourquoi il n’a pas hésité à retirer ses troupes de la Syrie en octobre 2019 sans consulter ses alliés au préalable. Le train du retrait progressif de Washington dans la gestion des affaires mondiales est donc en marche depuis longtemps. Les élections présidentielles américaines de 2020 risquent peu de changer cette tendance. Bien des actions devront être prises par la nouvelle administration Biden pour que les États-Unis retrouvent leur pleine influence au sein de l’alliance. Les priorités de Joe Biden Joe Biden l’a répété à de nombreuses reprises : sous sa présidence, les États-Unis afficheront un leadership plus affirmé sur la scène internationale et il y a fort à parier que l’OTAN sera au coeur de son dispositif stratégique. Selon lui, l’OTAN est « the most effective political-military alliance in modern history ». Mais comment le nouveau président des États-Unis pourra-t-il recouvrer le leadership au sein de l’alliance? La première chose à faire sera certainement de tenter de réparer les relations transatlantiques, lesquelles ont été mises à mal par le président Trump. Pour ce faire, Biden espère organiser un sommet de l’OTAN dans les premiers mois de son mandat. La diplomatie au sommet sera l’occasion idéale pour le président américain de montrer que les États-Unis sont de retour et qu’ils désirent resserrer les liens avec leurs alliés. Biden est clair à cet égard, ce sommet servira à marquer le retour des États-Unis au cœur du jeu international. Biden souhaite par ailleurs réaffirmer le leadership américain en revoyant les concepts stratégiques de l’organisation. Le dernier concept stratégique de l’OTAN date de 2010 et ne reflète plus les réalités internationales. La rédaction d’un nouveau concept stratégique permettrait d’y inclure des éléments conventionnels, notamment l’émergence de la Chine et les menaces en eaux internationales, mais aussi des menaces non traditionnelles comme l’intelligence artificielle, la corruption militarisée et les défis liés à l’espace. La réécriture d’un nouveau concept permettrait aux États-Unis de mettre de l’avant leurs priorités en politique étrangère. Ensuite, Biden désire que les membres réaffirment leur engagement démocratique envers l’organisation puisqu’il croit que le renforcement des institutions démocratiques des pays membres est une priorité pour que l’OTAN suive elle-même les valeurs qu’elle prêche. Cela pourrait impliquer par le fait même une attitude plus dure par rapport aux agissements de la Turquie en Mer Méditerranée et au Haut-Karabakh. Biden souligne l’importance des valeurs communes et de la confiance afin d’assurer une meilleure cohésion dans l’OTAN. Finalement, la question du partage équitable du fardeau et de l’atteinte du 2% ne risque pas de disparaître, malgré l’élection de Joe Biden. Certes, si Donald Trump y a accordé une importance capitale, il n’était pas le premier président américain à insister pour que ses alliés paient leur part. Biden va poursuivre dans cette même lancée. La principale différence résidera dans l’approche. Le président Trump a mentionné à maintes reprises que les États-Unis n’assisteraient pas un allié dans le besoin si ce dernier n’a pas payé 2% de son PIB en défense, remettant en question du même coup la sacralité de l’article 5 du Traité de 1949 et appliquant une logique de transaction au principe de sécurité collective. Joe Biden ne risque pas de tomber dans de tels extrêmes. L’aide de Washington n’est pas conditionnelle au 2%, et comme il l’a mentionné dans un essai écrit en mars 2020 pour Foreign Affairs, « the alliance transcends dollars and cents; the United States’ commitment is sacred, not transactional ». Recommandations pour le Canada Le Canada ne pourra pas rester coi face à ces changements au sein de l’alliance transatlantique. Le gouvernement Trudeau devra certainement prendre des mesures qui lui permettront de garder son allié américain proche tout en restant fidèle à l’Organisation. Deux décisions devront être prises par Ottawa. Démontrer son engagement envers l’OTAN. Le Canada doit continuer à être proactif et à s’impliquer dans les diverses interventions, formations et exercices de l’OTAN, notamment comme il le fait déjà en Lettonie. L’implication canadienne ne doit pas faiblir, car Biden estime grandement la place du Canada dans les opérations. Un engagement constant pourrait certainement permettre à Ottawa d’avoir plus de poids dans le Conseil de l’Atlantique nord. L’engagement envers l’OTAN passe aussi par l’augmentation des dépenses militaires. Le Canada est encore bien loin d’atteindre le 2% exigé et ne prévoit pas non plus l’atteindre d’ici 2024. Néanmoins, selon Stephen Saideman, l’OTAN sous la présidence Biden serait plus tournée vers les actions des alliés que vers les dépenses. Participer à la réforme de l’OTAN proposée par Biden. La révision des concepts stratégiques sera l’occasion idéale pour Ottawa de mettre son grain de sel dans les futures orientations de l’alliance transatlantique. Heureusement pour Ottawa, Biden et Trudeau ont des opinions semblables sur l’OTAN, la Russie et la démocratie, ce qui risque de faciliter la mise en avant des intérêts nationaux canadiens. Quant aux réformes démocratiques, l’avantage pour Ottawa d’y participer est que les implications et les coûts pour les forces armées canadiennes y seront moindres étant donné que Biden vise l’emploi de la force en dernier recours. Somme toute, même si Joe Biden a été élu 46e président des États-Unis dans une volonté de rupture avec les politiques internationales de Donald Trump, cela ne signifie pas que les problèmes subsistants au sein de l’OTAN seront réglés du jour au lendemain. Tous les États membres devront y mettre du sien, non seulement pour éliminer les tensions qui ne cessent d’augmenter à l’interne, mais également pour définir un leader clair qui remettra l’alliance sur le droit chemin. ## (Re)penser le rôle du Canada dans le maintien de la paix URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/repenser-le-role-du-canada-dans-le-maintien-de-la-paix/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > Dans un monde en changement où le multilatéralisme est profondément mis à l’épreuve, le maintien de la paix demeure un outil essentiel de la gestion multilatérale des questions de paix et de sécurité internationale. Mais l’outil fait face, depuis plusieurs années, à des défis majeurs dont, notamment, l’appui inconstant des membres du Conseil de sécurité, les moyens limités mis à disposition, les difficultés liées à la protection des civils et l’imbrication des conflits internes avec des dynamiques de terrorisme transnational.   Rapport : (Re)penser le rôle du Canada dans le maintien de la paix (en anglais)  Auteurs : Chloé Berland, Junru Bian et Corinne Dory Dans un monde en changement où le multilatéralisme est profondément mis à l’épreuve, le maintien de la paix demeure un outil essentiel de la gestion multilatérale des questions de paix et de sécurité internationale. Mais l’outil fait face, depuis plusieurs années, à des défis majeurs dont, notamment, l’appui inconstant des membres du Conseil de sécurité, les moyens limités mis à disposition, les difficultés liées à la protection des civils et l’imbrication des conflits internes avec des dynamiques de terrorisme transnational. Dans ce contexte, différentes organisations se sont néanmoins saisies de l’outil. En Afrique, où l’ONU a longtemps été le principal acteur du maintien de la paix, les ambitions et les réalisations des organisations régionales (Union Africaine) et sous régionales (CEDEAO, G-5 Sahel, CEEAC) ont permis à plusieurs de ces acteurs de se tailler une place importante dans la gestion des questions de paix et de sécurité à l’échelle du continent. En Europe, l’implication de l’OTAN dans le maintien de la paix, relativement peu problématique dans les années 1990 et 2000, est désormais compliquée par les profondes tensions entre les membres de l’alliance et la Russie. Présent dans ces deux aires géographiques, le Canada est un pays étroitement associé à la naissance du maintien de la paix; son gouvernement actuel est aussi un fervent défenseur du multilatéralisme. Ottawa a pourtant été critiquée pour ses absences de certaines aires géographiques, pour ses contributions « limitées » et pour les choix qu’elle a fait dans le cadre de son réengagement. Comment le Canada se positionne-t-il sur l’échiquier du maintien de la paix? Dans quelle mesure la participation aux opérations de paix est-elle une priorité pour le gouvernement canadien? Pourquoi devrait-elle l’être ou pas ? Si elle l’est, où le Canada devrait-il être impliqué et comment? Pour répondre à ces questions et pour évaluer dans quelle mesure et de quelle manière le Canada peut se distinguer dans le domaine du maintien de la paix, les intervenant.e.s seront invité.e.s à discuter de l’évolution des politiques stratégiques des organisations internationales, régionales et sous régionales qui agissent dans le domaine, de leurs besoins, et des manières d’arrimer les contributions canadiennes à leurs attentes. L’événement se tiendra le vendredi le 22 janvier 2021. Pour participer à la conférence, cliquez sur le lien suivant pour vous inscrire : https://zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_tZKuJygQTFWdsu1W1milTQ Programme ## 4 ans de guerre en Ukraine : Quelles perspectives de paix pour la sécurité transatlantique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/4-ans-de-guerre-en-ukraine-quelles-perspectives-de-paix-pour-la-securite-transatlantique/ Modified: 2026-02-04 4 ans de guerre en Ukraine : Quelles perspectives de paix pour la sécurité transatlantique ? 9h00–9h30 — Accueil des participant·e·s 9h30-9h45 — Mot d’ouverture François Audet (IEIM) Frédérick Gagnon (Chaire Raoul-Dandurand) 9h45-11h15 — Russie, Ukraine et perspectives de paix Modération : Justin Massie (UQAM) Panélistes : Dominique Arel (Université d’Ottawa) Maria Popova (Université McGill) Emmanuelle Rousseau (UQAM) Vincent Tourret (UQAM) 11h15-11h30 — Pause-café 11h30-13h00 — Faine Greenwood : “Little Flying Robots: The Age of Small Drone Warfare” Modération : Simon Hogue (UQAM) et Chantal Lavallée (Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean) 13h00-14h00 — Dîner 14h00-15h30 — Sécurité transatlantique après l’Ukraine : quelles trajectoires ? Modération : Simon Hogue (UQAM) Panélistes : David Cadier (IRSEM) Alexander Lanoszka (Université de Waterloo) Chantal Lavallée (Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean) Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) 15h30-16h00 — Mot de clôture Justin Massie (UQAM) Localisation de l'événement : Université du Québec à Montréal Centre Pierre Péladeau - Salon Orange 300 Boul. de Maisonneuve E, Montréal, QC H2X 3J8   ## À quoi s’attendre de la guerre en Ukraine ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/a-quoi-sattendre-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2023-03-10 > Après une année de guerre, cette table ronde a pour objectif de faire le point sur les perspectives de paix ephémères/précaires... À quoi s’attendre de la guerre en Ukraine ? Perspectives de paix, craintes d’escalade et avenir de l’architecture de sécurité européenne L’évènement se tiendra en français. Il sera enregistré et rendu disponible ensuite sur le site du RAS. Un an après l'invasion russe de l'Ukraine, cette table-ronde a pour objectif de faire le point sur les perspectives de paix précaires (par ex., un cessez-le feu) et durables (par ex. un traité de paix), les perspectives d'une escalade de la guerre, ainsi que d’entrevoir l’avenir de l’architecture de sécurité en Europe. Modérateur : Prof. Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) Intervenant-e-s : Prof. Dominique Arel (Université d'Ottawa) Dr. Laurent Borzillo (Université du Québec à Montréal) Prof. Yann Breault (Collège militaire royal de St-Jean) Prof. Magdalena Dembinska (Université de Montréal) Prof. Delphine Deschaux-Dutard (Université de Grenoble Alpes) Prof. Heidi Hardt (Université de Californie, Irvine) Dr. Falk Ostermann (Université de Kiel) Dr. Ekaterina Piskunova (Université de Montréal) Prof. Olivier Schmitt (Université du Sud-Danemark) Lien d'inscription pour suivre la table ronde sur Zoom     ## Appel à candidatures : Bourse de recherche de l’Association canadienne sur la sécurité climatique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/appel-a-candidatures-bourse-de-recherche-de-lassociation-canadienne-sur-la-securite-climatique/ Modified: 2023-10-24 > 'Association canadienne sur la sécurité climatique (ACSC-CSAC) a le plaisir d'annoncer le lancement du premier concours pour son... L'Association canadienne sur la sécurité climatique (ACSC-CSAC) a le plaisir d'annoncer le lancement du premier concours pour son programme de bourses de recherche. ACSC-CSAC (https://www.csac-acsc.org) est une association professionnelle de chercheurs, chercheuses et de praticiens, praticiennes du changement climatique et de la sécurité et qui offre une plateforme de soutien au développement et à la recherche, à la formulation de politiques, à la mobilisation des connaissances et à la sensibilisation du public dans le domaine de la sécurité climatique. Comprendre les liens entre le changement climatique et la sécurité est une priorité mondiale urgente pour les décideurs et décideuses politiques, les universitaires, la société civile et les praticiens et praticiennes de la sécurité et de la défense. Il existe des liens complexes entre la crise climatique causée par les sociétés humaines et des phénomènes tels que les conflits armés, l'extrémisme violent, les migrations, les déplacements, la pauvreté, la pénurie de ressources, l'instabilité politique, la prospérité économique, la sécurité énergétique et la résilience des communautés. Affronter efficacement ces défis exige des efforts interdisciplinaires de théorisation, d’analyse, de nouvelles pratiques et de méthodes mixes. Les défis en matière de politique de sécurité et de défense associés au changement climatique englobent la transformation des menaces internationales et nationales, les pressions politiques et opérationnelles pour décarboniser les activités de défense et de sécurité nationale et les tensions dynamiques entre les priorités concurrentes en matière de sécurité nationale, les considérations électorales nationales et l'engagement auprès d'un large éventail de mouvements sociaux. Avec l'augmentation des risques liés au climat dans les années à venir, il deviendra de plus en plus crucial d'identifier et de soutenir l’émergence de leaders dans le domaine du changement climatique et de la sécurité dont le travail contribuera à répondre à ces préoccupations. L’objectif de l’ACSC est la promotion et le soutien à l’établissement d’un réseau professionnel d'universitaires, d'analystes et de professionnels et professionnelles qui s'efforcent à comprendre et à relever les défis sociaux, politiques, économiques et écologiques interdépendants de notre époque. L'objectif de la bourse de recherche ACSC-CSAC est d’offrir un soutien financier et de contribuer au développement professionnel des étudiants et étudiantes aux études supérieures et des chercheurs et chercheuses en début de carrière travaillant dans le domaine du changement climatique et de la sécurité, au sens large, au Canada ou en relation avec le Canada. Chaque bourse comprend trois éléments : Une allocation de 3 000 dollars. Un article de recherche que le boursier ou boursière doit rédiger avant la fin de la bourse et qui sera publié par l'un des réseaux de recherche MINDS qui nous soutiennent. Des opportunités de formation et de développement professionnel. Celles-ci comprennent le mentorat d'un chercheur ou chercheuse expérimentée dans le domaine du climat et de la sécurité, des opportunités de réseautage avec des praticiens ou praticiennes et les frais de déplacement complets pour participer au Colloque sur la sécurité climatique dans la région du Pacifique et à l'atelier de développement de carrière de l’ACSC-CSAC qui aura lieu les 1er et 2 février 2024 à Victoria, en Colombie Britannique. Les boursiers et boursières devront : Participer aux activités professionnelles et scientifiques organisées par le ACSC-CSAC en 2024. Assister au Colloque sur la sécurité climatique dans la région du Pacifique et à l'atelier de développement de carrière de l’ACSC-CSAC qui aura lieu les 1er et 2 février 2024. Terminer une première version complète de leur travail de recherche avant la fin du mois de septembre 2024. Appuyer et promouvoir le travail de promotion d'une communauté professionnelle liée au changement climatique et à la sécurité au Canada. La bourse de recherche ACSC-CSAC est administrée par l'Association canadienne de la sécurité climatique. Elle est soutenue et financée par le Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada (CRSH) et trois réseaux de recherche du ministère de la Défense nationale du programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS): North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network/Réseau sur la defense et la sécurité nord-américaines et arctiques (NAADSN/RDSNAA), Réseau d’analyse stratégique/Strategic Analysis Network (RAS/NSA) et Canadian Defence and Security Network/Réseau canadien de défence et de sécurité (CDSN/RCDS).   INSTRUCTIONS Conditions d'éligibilité : Sont éligibles à la bourse de recherche ACSC-CSAC: Tous les étudiants et toutes les étudiantes aux études supérieures (maîtrise ou doctorat) inscrits dans une université canadienne et dont les recherches sont liées au domaine du changement climatique et de la sécurité. Les professionnels et professionnelles en début de carrière qui travaillent dans le domaine du changement climatique et de la sécurité au Canada ou en relation avec le Canada et qui ont terminé leurs études postsecondaires au plus tard sept ans avant la date de la demande. Les candidats et candidates doivent démontrer un intérêt pour la recherche ou une expérience professionnelle, de service ou de bénévolat en rapport avec le changement climatique et la sécurité. Ils et elles doivent être capables de communiquer verbalement en anglais, mais peuvent produire des travaux écrits en anglais ou en français. Veuillez noter que les employés à temps plein du gouvernement du Canada et les réservistes de classe B et C des Forces armées canadiennes ne sont pas admissibles à ce financement. Les réservistes de classe A sont admissibles à ce financement. En ce qui concerne la bourse financée par le RAS, la maîtrise du français écrit/oral fait partie des critères de sélection. Les candidatures francophones seront privilégiées. La bourse servira également à soutenir la production d'une publication en français. Ceux et celles qui souhaitent également être considérées pour la bourse RAS sont invitées à le spécifier dans leur lettre de candidature, à offrir des précisions sur leur niveau de français écrit et oral et, le cas échéant, à inclure une publication rédigée en français à leur dossier de candidature comme échantillon. Conditions: Les candidats et candidates doivent fournir les documents suivants : Le formulaire de candidature complété ci-dessous. Un CV professionnel. Une lettre de motivation décrivant vos aptitudes à recevoir la bourse. Une proposition de deux pages pour le projet de recherche ou l'article lié au changement climatique et à la sécurité qui sera appuyé par la bourse (vous devez décrire le domaine d'enquête, la ou les questions de recherche, la méthodologie, le calendrier général et les progrès réalisés à ce jour). Tous les documents doivent être reçus par courriel à l'adresse fellowship-bourse@csac-acsc.org avant 17 h, heure du Pacifique, le 1er décembre 2023. Veuillez adresser vos questions à fellowship-bourse@csac-acsc.org . La bourse de recherche ACSC-CSAC est administrée par : La bourse de recherche ACSC-CSAC est rendue possible grâce l’appui de: ## Appel à candidatures : Programme de personnalités d’avenir France-Canada sur les enjeux de Défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/appel-a-candidatures-programme-de-personnalites/ Modified: 2023-12-19 > Ce programme vise à approfondir les échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens compte tenu des défis auxquels ces deux alliés font face... du FORUM DE DEFENSE ET DE STRATEGIE. Descriptif : Ce programme vise à approfondir les échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens compte tenu des défis auxquels ces deux alliés font face actuellement principalement en Europe et en Arctique suite au comportement révisionniste de la Russie. Concrètement il vise à mettre sur pied un réseau de leaders émergents franco-canadiens nouant de réguliers contacts. Le groupe (10 personnes au moins) prendra part à deux séjours de 4/5 jours environ à chaque fois, l’un en France (principalement à Paris et dans une base navale soit à Brest soit à Cherbourg) et l’autre au Canada (Ottawa, Montréal et Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu). Durant ces séjours, plusieurs évènements privés (workshop en comité restreint avec certains responsables politiques, militaires, diplomatiques, académiques ou industriels) et ouverts au public (colloques, conférences ; un format hybride permettant le suivi en distanciel et la rediffusion sur You tube sera privilégié) seront organisés. Entre les deux séjours (prévus en mars 2024 et en mai 2024), deux workshops entre les participants et un ou deux invité(s) se tiendront en ligne et porteront sur les tensions en mer de Chine et l’architecture sécuritaire européenne (cf. Ukraine). Programme détaillé provisoire Contributions des participants Les participants seront invités à rédiger conjointement 5 notes stratégiques durant le projet (1. Menaces sécuritaires et climatiques dans l’Arctique ; 2. L’architecture sécuritaire en Arctique ; 3. L’architecture sécuritaire en Europe ; 4. Les coopérations multinationales industrielles et capacitaires en lien avec les défis de l’Arctique et de l’Atlantique Nord ; 5. Les futures zones de conflits et de tensions dans le monde : focus sur la mer de Chine). Ces 5 notes constitueront l’armature d’un mini-livre blanc franco-canadien portant sur l’architecture sécurité en Arctique et en Europe, sur les possibilités de coopérations militaires franco-canadienne en particulier dans le domaine des équipements militaires et sur les défis et tensions à venir sur la scène internationale. Les intervenants prenant part aux évènements publics seront invités également à soumettre chacun une note politique en lien avec leur présentation, note pouvant s’intégrer au mini-livre blanc. Les notes stratégiques et politiques seront publiées et disponibles en anglais et en français. Les candidatures pour ce programme (février 2024 - juillet 2024) sont désormais ouvertes, et ce jusqu'au 15 janvier 2024. Pour ce faire, il faut remplir la fiche de candidature ci-dessous et y adjoindre un CV, puis les envoyer aux adresses info@forum-defense-strategie.org, bbp.francecanada@gmail.com.  Les critères d’éligibilité pour candidater sont les suivants : Le programme vise à bâtir un réseau de leaders émergents : il s’adresse donc exclusivement à des candidats âgés de moins de 40 ans au 1er février 2024. Le programme s’adresse à des personnes ayant la nationalité française ou canadienne.  Les activités du programme ayant lieu en langue française et/ou anglaise, une bonne maîtrise d’au moins une des deux langues (C1, C2) et une bonne compréhension passive (compréhension orale et écrite) de l’autre est nécessaire. Un investissement dans le Programme (participation aux deux séjours et aux workshops, interaction avec les autres membres) est attendu sous peine d'exclusion. Aucun parcours professionnel ou champ académique spécifique n’est ciblé : le processus de sélection cherchera à assurer une diversité des profils retenus au sein de la promotion. Une dizaine d'auditeurs seront sélectionnés. ​Les administrateurs prendront en charge les frais afférents aux diverses activités du réseau (transport, hébergement, restauration) pour tous les participants.  La réunion inaugurale en ligne des membres du réseau aura lieu à au mois de février 2024. Frais d’inscription : 500 euros (non remboursables) Une fois sélectionnés et informés les candidats ont un délai de 15 jours pour retirer leurs candidatures. Un fois les candidats sélectionnés informés, ils auront un délai de 15 pour procéder par virement bancaire au versement des frais d’inscription. L’absence de règlement passé ce délai peut entrainer l'exclusion. Toute demande d'information complémentaire peut être adressée à info@forum-defense-strategie.org, bbp.francecanada@gmail.com.  Cliquez ici pour télécharger la fiche de candidature.  ## Appel à candidatures : Programme de personnalités d’avenir France-Canada sur les enjeux de Défense et de Diplomatie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/appel-a-candidatures-programme-de-personnalites-davenir-france-canada-sur-les-enjeux-de-defense-et-de-diplomatie/ Modified: 2025-01-09 > Ce programme vise à approfondir les échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens et au-delà, compte tenu des menaces et enjeux auxquels la France... Descriptif Ce programme vise à approfondir les échanges stratégiques franco-canadiens et au-delà, compte tenu des menaces et enjeux auxquels la France, le Canada, mais aussi les autres membres de la communauté euratlantique font face actuellement. Ces derniers se posent en termes de dissuasion (nucléaire, conventionnelle, sous le seuil) suite au comportement révisionniste de la Russie et eu égard aux défis posés par la Chine. Le programme se focalise plus particulièrement sur trois éléments relatifs aux enjeux de dissuasion : 1) les stratégies nécessaires en lien entre alliés selon les régions (Europe, Arctique, mer de Chine, etc.) ; 2) les mesures (y compris d’ordre diplomatique) à prendre pour assurer la solidité de celles-ci, en particulier en lien avec l’opinion publique; 3) les technologies émergentes à privilégier. En lien avec les enjeux identifiés, des thématiques annexes seront également traitées au cours de ce programme, cellesci ayant plusieurs liens avec ces mêmes enjeux : francophonie, Agenda Femme Paix et Sécurité, etc. Concrètement, s’inscrivant à la suite de l’édition 2024, ce programme vise à poursuivre la mise sur pied d’un réseau de leaders émergents (principalement franco-canadiens, mais également avec des personnes issues de la communauté euratlantique) nouant de réguliers contacts. Le groupe (10 personnes au moins) prendra part à deux séjours de 4/5 jours environ à chaque fois, l’un en France (principalement à Paris et à la base navale de Brest) et l’autre au Canada (Ottawa, Montréal et Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu). Durant ces séjours, plusieurs évènements privés (workshop en comité restreint avec certains responsables politiques, militaires, diplomatiques, académiques ou industriels) et ouverts au public (colloques, conférences ; un format hybride permettant le suivi en distanciel et la rediffusion sur You tube sera privilégié) seront organisés. Entre les deux séjours (prévus en mars 2025 et en mai 2025), un workshop entre les participants et un ou deux invité(s) se tiendront en ligne en lien avec les thématiques du programme. Contributions des participants  Les participants seront invités à rédiger conjointement 5 notes stratégiques durant le projet (1, Les stratégies de dissuasion en Europe et en Arctique face à la Russie ; 2, Gérer et dissuader les agressions sous le seuil ; 3, Quels types de leadership en tant que puissance moyenne peut jouer le Canada dans ces mesures de dissuasion ? ; 4, comment sensibiliser les citoyens aux questions de défense ; 5, Quelles sont les principales technologies émergentes et de rupture indispensables pour une dissuasion efficace et comment favoriser leur développement à travers des partenariats public-privé ?)). Ces 5 notes constitueront l’armature d’une publication collective en lien avec les enjeux du programme. Les intervenants prenant part aux évènements publics seront invités également à soumettre chacun une note politique en lien avec leur présentation, note pouvant s’intégrer à la. Les notes stratégiques et politiques - ainsi que potentiellement la publication collective - seront publiées et disponibles en anglais et en français. Les candidatures pour ce programme sont désormais ouvertes, et ce jusqu'au 19 janvier 2025. Pour ce faire, veuillez compléter la fiche de candidature ci-dessous et y adjoindre un CV, puis les envoyer aux adresses info@forum-defense-strategie.org, bbpfrancecanada@gmail.com. Fiche de candidature       Programme preliminaire Les critères d’éligibilité pour candidater sont les suivants Le programme vise à bâtir un réseau de leaders émergents : il s’adresse donc exclusivement à des candidats âgés de moins de 40 ans au 1er février 2025. Le programme s’adresse à des personnes ayant la nationalité française ou canadienne (ou ayant la résidence permanente au Canada), mais également aux personnes provenant de la communauté transatlantique/européenne (et disposant de la nationalité d’un des pays membres de celle-ci). Les activités du programme ayant lieu en langue française et/ou anglaise, une excellente maîtrise d’au moins une des deux langues (C1, C2) et une très bonne compréhension passive (compréhension orale et écrite) de l’autre est nécessaire. Précisions Aucun parcours professionnel ou champ académique spécifique n’est ciblé : le processus de sélection cherchera à assurer une diversité des profils retenus au sein de la promotion. Une dizaine d'auditeurs seront sélectionnés. Les associations organisatrices prendront en charge les frais afférents aux diverses activités du réseau (transport, hébergement) pour tous les participants. Un investissement dans le Programme (participation aux deux séjours et aux workshops, interaction avec les autres membres, rédaction des publications) est attendu sous peine de non-attribution du prix d’engagement, d’assiduité et de publication, voire d'exclusion du programme. A la fin du programme (ceci comprenant les publications mentionnées : notes stratégiques et publication collective), un prix d’engagement, d’assiduité et de publication sera versé aux participants (sous réserve du respect du point précédent) d’un montant de 150 euros. La réunion inaugurale en ligne des membres du réseau aura lieu au mois de février 2025. Frais de participation pour les candidats sélectionnés Une fois sélectionnés et informés les candidats ont un délai de 15 jours pour confirmer ou retirer leurs candidatures. 900 euros, ce montant incluant la somme reversée (150 euros) à la fin du programme aux participants sous la forme d’un prix d’engagement, d’assiduité et de publication. ; Une fois les candidats sélectionnés informés, ils auront un délai de 15 pour procéder par virement bancaire au versement des frais de participation. L’absence de règlement passé ce délai peut entrainer l'exclusion. Les frais de participation ne sont pas remboursables. Toute demande d'information complémentaire peut être adressée à info@forum-defensestrategie.org, bbp.francecanada@gmail.com. ## Appel à communications – Quebec Undergraduate Security Conference URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/appel-a-communications-quebec-undergraduate-security-conference/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Soumettez un résumé de 300-400 mots à isge.undergraduate@gmail.com sur l’un des quatre thèmes suivants avant le 16 novembre 2020 pour courir la chance de gagner $200 et de présenter votre recherche lors d’un colloque multi-universitaire sur la sécurité qui aura lieu le 6 février 2021. Soumettez un résumé de 300-400 mots à isge.undergraduate@gmail.com sur l’un des quatre thèmes suivants avant le 16 novembre 2020 pour courir la chance de gagner $200 et de présenter votre recherche lors d’un colloque multi-universitaire sur la sécurité qui aura lieu le 6 février 2021. 1. Les institutions internationales et les puissances émergentes; 2. Les institutions internationales et le déclin des grandes puissances; 3. Le nouvel agenda de sécurité de l’Organisation des Nations Unies; 4. Les institutions régionales et leurs défis. Nous préférons tenir la conférence en personne, mais les circonstances créées par la COVID-19 rendent cette tâche difficile. Nous prévoyons donc provisoirement d'organiser la conférence en ligne. Si les circonstances deviennent plus permissives, la conférence aura lieu à Montréal, avec des mesures de santé publique en place. Une décision finale sera communiquée le 6 Janvier 2021, et nous vous conseillons d’attendre cette date avant d’organiser votre voyage. ## Appel à communications – Colloque 2023 concours étudiant URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/appel-a-communications-colloque-2023-concours-etudiant/ Modified: 2023-10-03 > Vous êtes invités à soumettre un résumé de communication de 200 mots (incluant un titre) portant sur l’une des thématiques suivantes... Le RAS/NSA est heureux d’annoncer son concours étudiant dans le cadre de son Colloque 2023, se déroulant les 12 et 13 décembre prochains, par le biais de cet Appel à Communications. Cet appel est ouvert à tous les chercheurs émergents du Réseau de même que les étudiants au doctorat ou à la maîtrise qui ne sont pas encore membres* mais dont les travaux s'arriment aux thèmes listés ci-dessous. Vous êtes invités à soumettre un résumé de communication de 200 mots (incluant un titre) portant sur l’une des thématiques suivantes: (1) la compétition/collaboration interétatique sur les ressources naturelles, (2) le rôle des États non-alignés dans la compétition entre grandes puissances et (3) l’émergence de nouvelles frontières technologiques et de gouvernance. Les soumissions seront examinées par la direction du Réseau et trois finalistes seront sélectionnés. Ceux-ci seront invités à venir présenter leur communication au colloque annuel, à Ottawa, dans le cadre des panels portant sur les thèmes mentionnés. Les présentations seront évaluées par l’équipe de direction du Réseau et pourront obtenir les prix suivants: 1ère place: 500$ 2ème place: 300$ 3ème place: 200$ Ils seront ensuite invités à transformer leur communication en un texte qui sera publié par le RAS. Les propositions seront reçues et révisées par l’équipe du RAS sur une base continue jusqu’au 31 octobre 2023. Pour toutes questions, veuillez contacter Émile Lambert-Deslandes (21eld6@queensu.ca). Veuillez soumettre votre proposition à l’adresse suivante: info@ras-nsa.ca. * Si vous n’êtes pas encore chercheur émergent au sein du RAS mais souhaitez soumettre une proposition, veuillez joindre une courte déclaration d’intérêt de même que votre CV en plus de votre résumé de communication. Être chercheur émergent n’est pas nécessaire pour postuler, mais votre adhésion au Réseau est conditionnelle à votre maîtrise du français. ## Appel à communications-« (Re)penser le rôle du Canada dans le maintien de la paix » URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/appel-a-communications-repenser-le-role-du-canada-dans-le-maintien-de-la-paix/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Appel à communications destiné aux étudiants de 2e et 3e cycle, en vue de la première conférence annuelle de l’Axe 2 du Réseau d’analyse stratégique.Présentez vos recherches dans le cadre de cette conférence internationale intitulée « (Re)penser le rôle du Canada dans le maintien de la paix ». Appel à communications destiné aux étudiants de 2e et 3e cycle, en vue de la première conférence annuelle de l’Axe 2 du Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Présentez vos recherches dans le cadre de cette conférence internationale intitulée « (Re)penser le rôle du Canada dans le maintien de la paix ». La date limite pour soumettre un résumé est le 22 décembre 2020 et la conférence aura lieu le 22 janvier 2021. Informations complètes pour cet appel à communications. ## Appel à contributions : L’État et la défense nationale dans un monde désordonné URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/appel-a-contributions-letat-et-la-defense-nationale-dans-un-monde-desordonne/ Modified: 2022-07-28 La revue Études Canadiennes/Canadian Studies a le plaisir d’annoncer un numéro spécial sur le thème : « L’État et la défense nationale dans un monde désordonné : Le Canada et la France en perspective », sous la direction de Jean-Christophe Boucher (Université de Calgary), rédacteur invité, associé à la rédactrice en chef de la revue, Laurence Cros (Université de Paris). Les États occidentaux font face à un nouvel environnement de sécurité, marqué par la transformation et l’incertitude. Premièrement, au niveau systémique, nous assistons à une augmentation de la compétition des grandes puissances caractérisée par un retrait des États-Unis sur l’échiquier international et une volonté de la Chine et, dans une moindre mesure, la Russie, de se positionner comme rivaux. En outre, de nouveaux acteurs, tels que les groupes terroristes ou certaines puissances régionales, contrarient la puissance américaine et fragilisent la sécurité internationale au niveau régional. Deuxièmement, les organisations de la défense qui ont caractérisé la coopération internationale en matière de sécurité internationale des dernières décennies, telles que l’OTAN ou l’Europe de la défense, sont en crise d’identité et de légitimité. Finalement, l’univers de la sécurité s’est complexifié davantage avec l’émergence de nouveaux enjeux tels que la cyber sécurité, la guerre hybride et informationnelle, les changements climatiques, les flux migratoires, l’automatisation et le développement de l’intelligence artificielle, ainsi que les pandémies. Dans l’ensemble, ces diverses transformations créent un environnement sécuritaire désordonné qui complique davantage l’administration de la défense pour les pays occidentaux tels que le Canada et la France. Dans ce numéro spécial rassemblant des chercheurs des deux côtés de l’Atlantique, nous examinerons la façon dont le Canada, mais aussi la France (dans une perspective comparatiste avec l’approche canadienne), développent leur politique de défense et de sécurité afin de prendre en compte les nouveaux facteurs et enjeux d’un environnement de sécurité changeant. Ainsi, quatre axes thématiques canaliseront notre réflexion : Les nouveaux défis de la sécurité internationale : cyber sécurité, guerre informationnelle et de zone grise, automatisation et intelligence artificielle, flux migratoires, changements climatiques et pandémie ; La représentation de la sécurité dans le discours national au Canada et en France : est-ce un thème mobilisateur et de quelle sécurité parle-t-on ; L’administration de la défense : les acquisitions militaires, les budgets de la défense, le recrutement, l’inclusion et diversité au sein des forces armées ; Les interventions militaires et opérations extérieures. Les autrices et auteurs sont invité(e)s à envoyer une proposition de contribution (250 à 300 mots) accompagné d’une courte biographie (100 mots maximum) sous forme de document Word à l’intention du responsable du numéro spécial (jc.boucher@ucalgary.ca) avant le 1er décembre 2020, avec copie à laurence.cros@u-paris.fr. Les autrices et auteurs dont la proposition retenue sera retenue seront invité(e)s à soumettre un article complet (d’environ 8 000 mots) pour le 1er juillet 2021. Les articles seront soumis à la lecture de deux experts. Les textes retenus paraîtront en version papier dans le N°91 (décembre 2021), puis un an plus tard en libre accès sur http://journals.openedition.org/eccs/ En outre, si les circonstances le permettent, nous prévoyons d’inviter les autrices et auteurs à présenter leurs travaux à Paris à l’automne 2021. ## Atelier de recherche sur les enjeux de sécurité internationale en 2025 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/atelier-de-recherche-sur-les-enjeux-de-securite-internationale-en-2025/ Modified: 2025-01-28 > Atelier de recherche sur les enjeux de sécurité internationale en 2025. Avec... Atelier de recherche sur les enjeux de sécurité internationale en 2025   Agenda 09h00 : Mot d'introduction Jonathan Paquin et Alexander Lanoszka 09h10 : Panel 1 – Euro-Atlantique David Dubé , Maxime Philaire , Jacob Tuckey , 10h40 : Pause-café 10h50 : Panel 2 – Proche-Orient Mohammed Elgay , Benjamin Toubol , Éléonore Daniel-Vaugeois , 12h20 : Dîner 13h30 : Panel 3 – L’Afrique et l’Indo-Pacifique Falk Petegou , Alice Bonardi-Igout , Isabella Aung , 15h10 : Pause-café 15h20 : Discussion professionnelle sur la rédaction Jonathan Paquin , Alexander Lanoszka , Justin Massie , Sarah-Myriam Brulé-Martin , 16h15 : Remerciements ## Ateliers de formation pour étudiants et chercheurs émergents URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/ateliers-de-formation-pour-etudiants-et-chercheurs-emergents/ Modified: 2022-11-03 VISIONNER LES VIDÉOS DE L'ÉVÉNEMENT Cet atelier de formation s’adresse aux étudiant.e.s et chercheur.e.s émergent.e.s dans le domaine de la sécurité et la défense. Il comporte trois volets principaux : Atelier de préparation au programme de recrutement d’agents des politiques du Ministère de la Défense (10:30 à 12:00) (voir la vidéo) Intervenant : - Anthony Ippolito (Gestionnaire, Programme de recrutement d’agents des politiques au Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) Atelier de formation pour les concours de bourses du CRSH, à la maîtrise et au doctorat (13:00 à 14:30) (voir la vidéo) Intervenant.e.s : - Véronique Gilbert (Agente de politique au Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) - Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) Atelier pratique sur l’écriture de notes politiques (15:00-16:30) (voir la vidéo) Intervenant.e.s - Cecily Pantin (Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) - Namercia Dos Santos (Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada) - Thomas Juneau (Université d’Ottawa) Animation Stéfanie von Hlatky (Queen’s University)   Biographies ## Bourse doctorale 2021-2022 du Réseau d’analyse stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/bourse-doctorale-2021-2022-du-reseau-danalyse-strategique/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Le RAS offre une bourse de 10 000$ à un-e étudiante de 3e cycle, pour un poste de stagiaire doctoral au RAS pour l’année 2021-22. ## Changements géopolitiques dans le Caucase du Sud URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/changements-geopolitiques-dans-le-caucase-du-sud/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > Changements géopolitiques dans le Caucase du Sud Un an après la guerre du Karabakh Le 10 novembre 2020, après 44 jours de combats et plus de 6 000 morts, un cessez-le-feu négocié par la Russie fut conclu entre les belligérants. Arméniens et Azéris ont interrompu les combats, mais le statut juridique du Karabakh n’est pas pour autant défini, et le rôle accru de puissances régionales rivales dans la région complique la donne. Quelles perspectives de paix pour le Caucase du Sud ? ## Colloque | Canada–Europe : entre convergence stratégique et contraintes systémiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/colloque-canada-europe-entre-convergence-strategique-et-contraintes-systemiques/ Modified: 2025-09-19 Canada–Europe : entre convergence stratégique et contraintes systémiques Objectif : Analyser les recompositions de l’ordre stratégique euro-atlantique, les défis industriels, technologiques et sécuritaires, et identifier des pistes concrètes de coopération transatlantique. Cette journée exceptionnelle, pensée en résonance entre Montréal et Paris, est placée sous le sceau d’une volonté commune de renforcer les liens entre le Canada, la France et l’Europe. Ce colloque est co-organisé par Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Secrétaire Général Exécutif de France-Amériques et la Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, codirectrice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), dans le cadre des Journées Transatlantiques. L’après-midi de réflexion propose d’analyser les recompositions de l’ordre stratégique euro-atlantique et les perspectives de coopération renforcée entre le Canada et l’Europe. À l’heure où les transitions technologiques, sécuritaires et écologiques bouleversent les équilibres traditionnels, les démocraties libérales font face à un double impératif : préserver leur autonomie stratégique tout en consolidant leur résilience collective. Deux panels structureront cet après-midi, autour de questions clés liées à la souveraineté, à l’interopérabilité, à l’innovation et à la sécurité des infrastructures critiques. Programme détaillé : 15h00 – 15h15 | Mot d’ouverture par la Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé codirectrice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques. 15h15- 15h45 | Conférencier d’honneur, l’honorable Stéphane Dion, Ambassadeur du Canada en France et à Monaco et Envoyé Spécial auprès de l’Union européenne et de l’Europe  15h45 – 17h00 | Panel I– Alliances en mutation, souverainetés réinventées : repenser la coopération géostratégique Canada–Europe Dr. Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal, Co-director, Strategic Analysis Network Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Executive Director, CDA and CDA Institute General Claire Nestier, ECD Conseil, former Deputy Military Representative of France to NATO Dr. Stephen Saideman, Carleton University, Director, Canadian Defence and Security Network Dr. Pascal Boniface, géopolitologue et fondateur et directeur de l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (IRIS). Modérateur: Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Secrétaire général exécutif, France-Amériques 17h30 – 18h45 | Panel II– Transitions sécuritaires et technologiques : refonder le partenariat de défense Canada–Europe General Fabien Kuzniak, Military Advisor, Safran Lieutenant-General Alexis Rougier, General Officer, Space Command, Military Cabinet of the Minister of the Armed Forces Jean-Noël Bonnieu, Vice President for International Relations, Thalès Group General Philippe Steininger, Military Advisor to the President, CNES MGen (ret) Eric Tremblay, Directeur et responsable du marché de sécurité et défense PWC Modératrice: Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, codirectrice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) 18h45 – 19h15 | Conférencier d’honneur, l’Amiral Coldefy, Président de France-Amériques 19h15 – 19h20 | Mot de clôture, Madame Hélène Viau, Ministre Conseillère Ambassade du Canada 19h30 | Verre amical ## Colloque | Le fardeau militaire entre alliés : du partage au transfert ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/colloque-le-fardeau-militaire-entre-allies-du-partage-au-transfert/ Modified: 2025-12-22 Dans un contexte marqué par le désengagement sélectif des États-Unis et par les débats récurrents sur l’avenir de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN), la question du transfert de la part du fardeau de la défense collective assurée par les États-Unis vers leurs alliés (burden shifting) est désormais au cœur des réflexions gouvernementales des deux côtés de l’Atlantique. Ce colloque, qui se tiendra le 22 janvier 2026 à l’Université Laval aura ainsi pour objectif d’examiner les reconfigurations du partage et du transfert du fardeau entre alliés, en s’interrogeant sur les dimensions institutionnelles, stratégiques et industrielles de ce processus.   Programme - Jeudi 22 janvier 2026   9h-9h15 : Ouverture Propos introductifs : Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, codirecteur du Rubicon et chercheur associé au Centre Thucydide ; Données sur Le Rubicon : Amélie Chalivet, coéditrice du Rubicon, doctorante en science politique en cotutelle à l’UQAM et à l’université Paris-Panthéon-Assas.   9h15-10h45 : Panel 1. Partage et transfert du fardeau Modération : Jonathan Paquin, professeur de science politique et directeur de l’École supérieure d’études internationales de l’Université Laval, directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS). « Les dilemmes du partage et transfert du fardeau au sein de l’Alliance atlantique : le cas des petits pays d’Europe centrale et de l’Est », par Jean F. Crombois, maitre de conférences en politique européenne à l’Université américaine en Bulgarie ; « Avant le partage ou le transfert – comprendre les fardeaux de l’OTAN en matière de “contrôle de l’air” ? : Examiner le cas critique de transfert de fardeau dans la région baltique », par Anessa L. Kimball, membre du corps professoral en science politique à l’Université Laval et responsable de la direction du Canadian Defence & Security Network et Maxime Philaire, doctorant à l’Université Laval et chercheur émergent au RAS ; « Partage du fardeau : Quels indicateurs économiques pour quelle sécurité collective ? », par Renaud Bellais, conseiller institutionnel du CEO de MBDA et chercheur associé à l’ENSTA Bretagne et à l’université Grenoble-Alpes.   11h-12h30 : Panel 2. Transformation de l’OTAN Modération : Richard Giguère, professeur invité à l’Université Laval et ancien brigadier-général des Forces armées canadiennes. « L’action associative : un moyen pour pérenniser la relation transatlantique et un enjeu d’adaptation des structures et fonctionnements de l’Alliance », par Alexis Kummetat, consultant et membre fondateur de l’Association française pour la communauté euro-atlantique (AFCEA) ; « La transformation de l’OTAN et le paradoxe canadien : entre dépendance institutionnelle et réalignement stratégique », par Nicolas-François Perron, doctorant à l’UQAM et chercheur émergent au RAS ; « André Beaufre, l’OTAN et l’Europe : quand les failles juridiques deviennent un levier stratégique », par Élise Bernard, docteure en droit public et enseignante à Sciences Po Aix et à l’ESSEC ; Maud Quessard, maîtresse de conférences en science politique et directrice du domaine « Europe, Espace Transatlantique, Russie » à l’IRSEM.   14h-15h30 : Panel 3. Industries de défense et chaînes d’approvisionnement Modération : Anessa L. Kimball, membre du corps professoral en science politique à l’Université Laval et responsable de la direction du Canadian Defence & Security Network. « Les freins juridiques à l’établissement d’une BITD européenne prospère et autonome », par Rachid Chaker, chercheur en science politique à l’Université catholique de Lille et chercheur associé au Centre Thucydide ; « L’industrie de défense turque entre autonomie et interdépendance : un acteur-clé pour la réduction de la dépendance américaine ? », par Albert Kandemir, doctorant en science politique et ATER à l’université Paris-Panthéon-Assas ; « L’émergence du complexe militaro-tech : une souveraineté sous dépendance et des armées à l’épreuve de la startupisation », par Sylvain Munger, chargé de cours à l’Université de Montréal et chercheur associé à l’OBVIA ; « Économie de guerre et économie de paix », par Jean Belin, maître de conférences HDR à l’université de Bordeaux (BSE UMR – CNRS 6060).   15h30-16h : Clôture Justin Massie, codirecteur du Rubicon, professeur de science politique à l’UQAM et codirecteur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique.   Lieu du colloque : Auditorium Jean-Paul-Tardif Pavillon La Laurentienne (1er étage) Université Laval (Québec), LAU-1334 Pour accéder à l'intégralité du programme : ColloqueRubicon2026 Crédits image : Xavier Lejeune via iStock. ## Colloque 2024 – Les retombées stratégiques de l’élection présidentielle américaine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/les-retombees-strategiques-de-lelection-presidentielle-americaine/ Modified: 2024-05-27 *le colloque se déroulera en anglais et en français, une interprétation en direct sera disponible à l'aide de casques fournis pendant l'événement. À l’approche des prochaines élections américaines et les implications possibles d'un changement de leadership, une réflexion sur les enjeux stratégiques du Canada s'impose. Le colloque cherche à analyser les répercussions stratégiques des prochaines élections présidentielles américaines sur le paysage des relations internationales, en mettant l'accent sur la position et les stratégies du Canada. En cette période de changements politiques significatifs aux États-Unis, nous explorerons comment les résultats électoraux pourraient remodeler les alliances globales, les politiques étrangères, et les cadres de sécurité internationale en explorant différents scénarios possibles. Les panels aborderont les défis de la méfiance envers les institutions, la montée de la désinformation et les répercussions d'un potentiel retrait américain des institutions internationales, avec pour objectif d'analyser les conséquences pour la communauté internationale et le rôle des pays comme le Canada face à ce nouveau paradigme. Finalement, dans un contexte où l'évolution de la politique américaine pourrait entraîner un changement significatif dans le leadership mondial, le dernier panel explorera les actions à envisager pour parer l'absence des États-Unis, mettant en avant la nécessité de la coopération internationale et de la diplomatie pour assurer la stabilité et la sécurité mondiales. Télécharger le programme (PDF 7.9mb) Agenda: 9:00 – 9:15: Mot de bienvenue Stéfanie von Hlatky, Vice-doyenne à la recherche et Professeure titulaire, Université Queen’s 9:15 – 10:15: Conférencière d’honneur :  Larisa Galadza, Ancienne ambassadrice du Canada en Ukraine Modératrice : Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Co-directrice et Professeure titulaire à l’Université Bishop’s 10:15 – 10:30: Pause Santé 10:30 – 12:00: Table Ronde – L’évolution de l'environnement politique et stratégique Alors que les prochaines élections américaines approchent, cette table ronde réunit les directrices et directeurs de différents réseaux de recherche canadiens afin d'engager une réflexion approfondie sur les enjeux stratégiques auxquels le Canada doit se préparer. Dans ce contexte, il est crucial que le Canada anticipe ces changements pour préserver ses intérêts et principes. Modérateur : Daniel Jean, Membre du Conseil Stratégique Intervenant.e.s : Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Directrice du Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP) et Professeure titulaire, Université de Montréal Stephen M. Saideman, Directeur du Réseau canadien sur la défense et la sécurité (RCDS) et Professeur titulaire, Université Carleton Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Chef d’Opérations Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) Guy Thibault, Président du Conseil d’administration du Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute 12:00 – 13:00: Lunch 13:00 – 14:30: Panel 1 – Vers une résilience démocratique : L’ère de la post-vérité Le paysage politique contemporain est marqué par une méfiance croissante du public envers la légitimité du savoir et des institutions publiques, façonnée par les médias hybrides, la désinformation et la contestation. Dans ce contexte, le panel vise à mettre en lumière les défis auxquels sont confrontés des pays comme le Canada, et à engager une réflexion dans la recherche de solutions innovantes afin de relever ces défis et renforcer la résilience face à ces dynamiques politiques et sociales. Modérateur : Artur Wilczynski, Membre du Conseil Stratégique  Intervenant.e.s : Alexandre Sirois, Journaliste à La Presse Jean-Christophe Boucher, Professeur agrégé, Université de Calgary David Morin, Professeur titulaire, Université de Sherbrooke Michelle Tessier, Ancienne sous-directrice des opérations au Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité  Marc Doucet, Professeur titulaire, Université St. Mary’s 14:30 – 14:45: Pause santé 14:45 – 16:15: Panel 2 – L’affaiblissement des institutions internationales Avec l'arrivée des prochaines élections présidentielle américaine, il est possible d’anticiper un potentiel changement au sein de l'ordre international, plus précisément en lien avec un désengagement des États-Unis au sein des institutions internationales. Ce panel vise à explorer les implications de ce changement de paradigme pour la communauté internationale dans son ensemble, mais aussi quelles sont les avenues de contribution pour le Canada. Modérateur: Alexander Lanoszka, Professeur agrégé, Université Waterloo Intervenant.e.s: Arthur Boutellis, Professeur, Université Columbia Heidi Hardt, Professeure agrégée, Université de Californie, Irvine Natascha Hryckow, Ancienne Coordinatrice du Groupe d'experts des Nations unies sur la Somalie 16:15 – 16h30 : Mot de la fin et remerciements Justin Massie, Codirecteur et professeur titulaire, UQAM 17:00 – 18:30: Cocktail de réseautage à l’Hôtel Novotel ## Colloque annuel | Le Canada peut-il accroître son autonomie en défense ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/colloque-annuel-le-canada-peut-il-accroitre-son-autonomie-en-defense/ Modified: 2025-12-03 L’ordre mondial libéral s’estompe progressivement au profit d’un environnement international plus conflictuel, où les rapports de force et la compétition technologique redéfinissent les équilibres stratégiques. La Chine, les États-Unis et la Russie mènent désormais des politiques étrangères plus agressives, souvent révisionnistes, tandis que la course à l’armement, à la suprématie en intelligence artificielle et à l’accès aux minéraux critiques intensifie les rivalités entre grandes puissances. Dans ce contexte incertain et dangereux, la souveraineté et la sécurité du Canada se trouvent directement mises à l’épreuve. Le pays est forcé repenser les fondements de sa politique de défense afin de mieux s’adapter à ces transformations rapides. Face à tant d’incertitudes, une question centrale s’impose : le Canada dispose-t-il des moyens nécessaires pour renforcer son autonomie en matière de défense ? Quatre panels d’experts se pencheront sur cette question sous divers angles afin d’examiner les conditions, les contraintes et les opportunités d’une plus grande autonomie stratégique canadienne. Le premier panel portera sur la coopération industrielle et la diversification stratégique, en examinant comment le Canada peut renforcer son autonomie en matière de défense tout en maintenant des liens étroits avec ses alliés et en diversifiant ses partenariats internationaux. Le deuxième panel abordera le dilemme que pose l’intégration du Canada au système de défense antimissile nord-américain, en questionnant les moyens de concilier participation à la sécurité continentale et préservation de la souveraineté nationale. Le troisième panel traitera de l’autonomie numérique canadienne face aux cybermenaces et à la dépendance envers les géants technologiques étrangers, en explorant les conditions nécessaires à l’émergence de capacités autonomes dans le domaine numérique. Enfin, le dernier panel s’intéressera à la dissuasion « à la canadienne », en interrogeant la manière dont le Canada peut repenser sa posture stratégique dans un contexte de tensions accrues sur la scène internationale. Cet événement est réalisé en partenariat avec le CDA Institute et avec l'appui du programme MINDS. L'évenement aura lieu en format hybride : Hôtel DoubleTree by Hilton & En ligne Programme : 8h30 | Discours d’ouverture Jonathan Paquin, Directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 8h40 - 10h15 | Panel 1 : Coopération industrielle et diversification stratégique L’autonomie en matière de défense repose sur un écosystème industriel, technologique et diplomatique cohérent. Or, le Canada demeure fortement tributaire de ses alliés, en particulier des États-Unis, pour l’approvisionnement, la recherche et la production d’équipements militaires. Dans un contexte de rivalités accrues entre grandes puissances, cette dépendance soulève des défis stratégiques majeurs. Comment le Canada peut-il à la fois renforcer son autonomie stratégique, approfondir la coopération industrielle avec certains alliés et diversifier ses partenariats stratégiques ?  Ce panel se penchera sur les leviers politiques, institutionnels et économiques dont dispose le Canada pour consolider sa base de défense et accroître sa marge de manœuvre stratégique. Modération : Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Directrice générale, Institut de la CAD ; Yan Cimon, Professeur titulaire, Université Laval ; Philippe Lagassé, Professeur agrégé, Université Carleton ; Justin Massie, Codirecteur du réseau et professeur titulaire, UQAM ; Jacob Tuckey, étudiant à la maitrise, Université de Waterloo. 10h15 - 10h30 | Pause santé 10h30 - 12h00 | Panel 2 : Le bouclier anti-missile : comment concilier l’autonomie canadienne et intégration de la défense nord-américaine L’intégration éventuelle du Canada au système de défense antimissile nord-américain soulève un dilemme stratégique : comment participer pleinement à la sécurité continentale sans s’en remettre entièrement aux États-Unis pour la protection de notre territoire ? Le projet de « dôme doré » du président Trump cristallise les tensions entre dépendance et autonomie. Ce panel discutera des marges de manœuvre du Canada dans ce domaine sensible et des conditions nécessaires pour qu’une participation accrue ne se traduise pas par une perte de souveraineté décisionnelle. Modération : Steve Saideman, Professeur titulaire, Université Carleton ; Lieutenant-Général (ret.) Yvan Blondin ; Andrea Charron, Professeure, Université du Manitoba ; Paul Meyer, Professeur associé, Université Simon Fraser ; Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Directrice générale, Institut de la CAD. 12h00 - 13h00 | Lunch 13h00 - 14h30 | Panel 3 : Vers une plus grande autonomie numérique canadienne ? Face aux cybermenaces, à l’intelligence artificielle et à la dépendance aux géants technologiques américains, l’autonomie numérique devient une dimension essentielle de notre sécurité nationale. Le Canada a-t-il les moyens de développer des capacités souveraines en matière de cybersécurité, de gestion des données et d’infrastructures numériques critiques ? Ce panel explorera la place du numérique dans la stratégie de défense canadienne et les conditions nécessaires à une véritable autonomie technologique dans un environnement dominé par les États-Unis et la Chine. Modération : Sarah Sharma, Codirecteur du réseau et professeure adjointe, Université d’Ottawa ; Jean-Christophe Boucher, Professeur agrégé, Université de Calgary ; Stéphanie Carvin, Professeure agrégée, Université Carleton ; Leah West, Professeure agrégée, Université Carleton. 14h30 - 14h45 | Pause santé 14h45 - 16h15 | Panel 4 : Comment penser la dissuasion au Canada ? Dans un contexte international marqué par le retour des rivalités entre grandes puissances, les menaces proférées par Donald Trump et la modernisation des arsenaux nucléaires, la notion de dissuasion retrouve une importante centrale. Puissance non nucléaire et allié de l’OTAN, le Canada doit repenser sa posture face à des menaces hybrides, cybernétiques et conventionnelles. Que signifie « dissuader » pour un pays dont la stratégie repose sur la crédibilité des alliances plutôt que sur la possession d’armes stratégiques ? Ce panel s’interrogera sur la pertinence et les contours possibles d’une dissuasion « à la canadienne », entre engagement collectif et affirmation d’une autonomie stratégique accrue. Modération : Daniel Jean, membre du Conseil stratégique du réseau et ancien conseiller après du Premier Ministre du Canada en matière de renseignement et sécurité nationale ; Thomas Hughes, Professeur Adjoint, Université Mount Allison ; Émile Lambert-Deslandes, Candidat au doctorat, Université Queen’s ; Éric Ouellet, Professeur, Collège des Forces canadiennes ; Nancy Teeple, Analyste stratégique, Centre d’analyse et de recherche opérationnelle (CARO). 16h15 - 16h30 | Discours de clôture Justin Massie, Codirecteur du réseau et professeur titulaire, UQAM   Accéder à l'intégralité du programme en version PDF : FR - RAS Colloque Annuel 2025 ## COLLOQUE DU RUBICON – Les défis multidimensionnels de l’ingérence étrangère URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/colloque-du-rubicon-les-defis-multidimensionnels-de-lingerence-etrangere/ Modified: 2024-01-16 > Les défis multidimensionnels de l’ingérence étrangère. Avec la participation et le soutien de l’Ambassade de France au Canada télécharger le programme Jeudi 18 janvier 2024 17h30 -19h30 : Réception à l’Ambassade de France Vendredi 19 janvier 2024 8h30-9h00 : Mot d’ouverture – Rubicon an 2 Ambassadeur Michel Miraillet (Ambassade de France au Canada) Professeur Julian Fernandez (Université Panthéon-Assas/Université Galatasaray) Ambassadeur Jean-Baptiste Jeangène-Vilmer (Ambassade de France au Vanuatu) Professeur Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) 9h-10h30 : L’ingérence dans la recherche scientifique Modération : Professeur Julian Fernandez (Université Panthéon-Assas/Université Galatasaray) Intervenants : Professeure Magdalena Dembinska (Université de Montréal) Dr. Céline Marangé (IRSEM) Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché (Recherche et développement pour la Défense Canada) Dr. Marie Robin (Université Panthéon-Assas) Professeur David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke) 10h30-11h00 : Pause 11h00-12h30 : L’ingérence dans le champ informationnel Modération : Professeur Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) Intervenants : Professeur adjoint Jean-Christophe Boucher (Université de Calgary) Dr. Colin Gérard (Institut français de géopolitique) Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin Brûlé (Université Bishop’s) Charles Thepaut, sous-directeur veille et stratégie (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères) Alexis Rapin (Chercheur en résidence à l'Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels de la Chaire Raoul Dandurand) 12h30-14h00 : dîner 14h00-15h30 : L’ingérence électorale Modération : Ambassadeur Jean-Baptiste Jeangène-Vilmer (Ambassade de France au Vanuatu) Intervenants : Jean-Nicolas Bordeleau, doctorant (Université d'Ottawa) Professeur adjoint Aengus Bridgman (Unviersité McGill) Professeur Thomas Juneau (Université d’Ottawa) Marco Munier, doctorant (UQAM) Isabelle Poupart, Directrice générale, Affaires européennes (Affaires Mondiales Canada) Liens pour recevoir une invitation : Si vous souhaitez prendre part au colloque en présentiel, merci de bien vouloir vous signaler et remplir le formulaire suivant : Formulaire 1 Si vous souhaitez assister aux échanges entre les panélistes en distanciel, merci de bien vouloir vous signaler et remplir le formulaire suivant : Formulaire 2 La participation au colloque étant sur invitation seulement, une fois que vous vous serez inscrit(e) (formulaire 1 ou formulaire 2), dans la mesure des places disponibles, vous recevrez au plus tard au cours de la deuxième semaine de janvier une confirmation de la part du Rubicon et une invitation officielle. Veuillez noter que sans invitation de la part du Rubicon, vous ne pourrez accéder à cet évènement (que cela soit en présentiel ou en ligne). Pour ceux qui y prendront part en présentiel, il sera nécessaire d’avoir sur eux une pièce d’identité (carte nationale d’identité ou passeport). ## Colloque international de « l’Observatoire De la Politique Extérieure Américaine » URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/colloque-international-de-lobservatoire-de-la-politique-exterieure-americaine/ Modified: 2024-10-21 À l’heure de l’élection présidentielle américaine de 2024, le duel entre Donald Trump et Kamala Harris marque un tournant décisif pour la politique étrangère américaine et les ambitions contrariées d’un retour des Etats-Unis à la primauté. Dans un monde toujours plus fragmenté qui remet en question l’ordre international libéral post-1945, les États-Unis sont tiraillés entre des crises institutionnelles, économiques, culturelles et politiques devenues structurelles tandis que de nouvelles dynamiques de puissance se déploient. Peinant à restaurer le grand récit national au bénéfice des prédicateurs du déclin (Russes ou Chinois) et de la désoccidentalisation du monde, cette élection est marquée par l’internalisation des enjeux internationaux – Ukraine, Gaza. Elle pourrait constituer un moment de bascule stratégique pour les États-Unis vers la transition de puissance, tandis que les questions économiques et migratoires continuent de cristalliser les divisions internes, entre internationalisme et isolationnisme, mondialisation et démondialisation. Trump défend une approche nationaliste et isolationniste, tandis que Harris privilégie l’engagement et le multilatéralisme, deux visions qui reflètent des stratégies profondément opposées quant à la place que les États-Unis devront jouer dans le monde. Dans le contexte de la guerre en Ukraine, les États-Unis doivent réévaluer leur posture stratégique, les termes de leur leadership au sein de l'OTAN, et leur définition de la menace russe. Dans le même temps toute ambition de « Grande Stratégie » américaine à l’échelle globale est façonnée par la centralité de la rivalité avec la Chine et le risque de conflits multi-théâtres. La difficile gestion du conflit israélo-palestinien, depuis octobre 2023, avec des affrontements intenses entre Israël et le Hamas à Gaza et le Hezbollah au Sud Liban, accentue encore le difficile retour à un multilatéralisme propice à l’exercice de la puissance des États-Unis. Washington se trouve dans une position délicate: soutenir son allié historique tout en essayant de contenir une escalade régionale qui déstabilise une nouvelle fois le Moyen-Orient. La prophétie de la fin de la Grande Stratégie américaine, annoncée depuis Obama, prend tout son sens dans ce contexte et interroge la capacité des États-Unis à pouvoir encore formuler une stratégie cohérente face à de multiples crises et défis multiformes (conflits armés, cyberattaques, Guerres commerciales et technologiques) tout en préservant leurs alliances traditionnelles. Dans cet environnement stratégique contesté, plusieurs questions clés se posent : comment les États-Unis peuvent-ils maintenir une Grande Stratégie cohérente face à la montée de nouvelles puissances et à des conflits de plus en plus complexes, comme en Ukraine ou au Moyen-Orient ? Le leadership américain au sein de l’OTAN est-il encore pertinent face aux ambitions expansionnistes de la Russie ? Et plus largement, comment l’approche de Harris ou celle de Trump, chacune très différente, influencera-t-elle la manière dont les États-Unis envisageront leur rôle dans un monde multipolaire ? D’ailleurs, ces deux visions opposées ne font-elles pas face à une impuissance commune ? Ce colloque se concentrera sur les contraintes internes et externes qui pèsent sur la fabrique d’une politique étrangère adaptée à un ordre international en mutation, et interrogera les dilemmes stratégiques à l’œuvre pour mieux comprendre l’évolution de la puissance américaine après l’élection de 2024. Programme Mot d’accueil Pr. Martial FOUCAULT, directeur de l’IRSEM 9h30 : Introduction regards croisés sur les enjeux de l’élection américaine Mcf. Maud QUESSARD, directrice du domaine EETR (IRSEM) Pr. Elisa CHELLE, rédactrice en chef de Politique Américaine (Université Paris-Nanterre) 9h40-10h : Bipartisanship and U.S. Foreign Policy in Congress Keynote: Dr. Jordan TAMA (American University) Discutant: Mcf. Frédéric HEURTEBIZE 10h-11h : Panel 1 | La Politisation de La Politique Etrangère Président : Mcf. Pierre BOURGOIS (Université Catholique Angers) L’Executif : commandant en chef de la politique étrangère TBC  - Pr. François VERGNIOLLE DE CHANTAL (Université Paris-Cité) Back to the Future : Les Etats Unis entre démondialisation et re-mondialisation - Pr. Jean-Baptiste VELUT (Université Sorbonne-Nouvelle) L’immigration, un enjeu intermestique en transition ? - Mcf. Cléa FORTUNE (Université Sorbonne-Nouvelle) Acteurs religieux et internalisation des enjeux internationaux - Mcf. Marie GAYTE (Université de Toulon et du Var) Pause-Café 11h15 – 12h15 : Panel 2 | L’Ukraine et la Russie, Enjeux de Politique Intérieure ? Présidente : Mcf. Maud QUESSARD Keynote : Pr. Michael KIMMAGE (American Catholic University) Discutant: Dr. David CADIER (IRSEM) Discutant: Dr. Martin QUENCEZ (German Marshall Fund of the United States) Déjeuner  13h45 – 14h10: Strategy and Grand Strategy in the Next Administration Keynote: Dr. Joshua ROVNER (American University) Mcf. Frédéric HEURTEBIZE (Université Paris-Nanterre) 14h20 – 15h20 : Panel 3 | Les Etats-Unis et l’Impossible Désengagement du Moyen-Orient Présidente : Pr. Claudia CASTIGLIONI (Sciences-Po Paris) Un désengagement volontaire ou provoqué ? - Général Olivier PASSOT (IRSEM) Les enjeux du scrutin présidentiel américain pour les monarchies du Golfe - Dr. Fatiha DAZI HENI (IRSEM) L'Iran, les Gardiens de la Révolution et le" Grand Satan" américain : ruptures et alliances politiques depuis 1979 - Dr. Wendy RAMADAN ALBAN (IRSEM) & Sophia MARHOUG (Université Sorbonne) Pause-Café   15h30 – 16h45 : Panel 4 | Les Etats-Unis et la Redéfinition des Relations Transatlantiques Président : Dr. Elie BARANETS (IRSEM) Le partage du fardeau militaire en Ukraine - Pr. Justin MASSIE (Université du Québec à Montréal) La relation transatlantique, théâtre régional de compétition avec la Chine - Dr. Erwan LAGADEC (Georges Washington University) Les Etats-Unis et l’extrême droite, une menace sécuritaire pour les démocraties - Pr. Jean-Christophe BOUCHER (Université de Calgary) Les coopérations de renseignement dans la relation transatlantique : quelle présidence pour quelles conséquences ? - Dr. Clément RENAULT (IRSEM) 16h45 – 17h15 : Conclusion et débat Pr. Jonathan PAQUIN (Université Laval, Directeur de l’ESEI et Codirecteur du RAS) ## Colloque québécois sur la sécurité internationale des étudiants au premier cycle, 5ème édition URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/securite-internationale-des-etudiants/ Modified: 2024-06-12 > Cette conférence d’une journée vise à donner une tribune aux étudiant(e)s au baccalauréat pour présenter leurs résultats de recherche... Organisé par l’Université Bishop’s et le Centre sur la gouvernance sécuritaire et de Crise (CRITIC) du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean et du soutien du groupe de recherche International Security in the Globalization Era (ISGE) et le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), le Colloque québécois sur la sécurité internationale (QUSC) destinée aux étudiant(e)s de premier cycle lance son appel aux communications ! Cette conférence d’une journée vise à donner une tribune aux étudiant(e)s au baccalauréat pour présenter leurs résultats de recherche, interagir avec des chercheurs et experts et à élargir leurs réseaux avec d’autres étudiant(e)s, professeur(e)s et professionnels qui oeuvrent dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale. Cette conférence aura lieu samedi le 9 avril sur le campus l’Université Bishop’s. Thèmes du colloque (PDF 182kb) Cette année, la conférence sera divisée en 4 panels qui porteront sur l’un des thèmes suivants (pour en savoir plus, consultez les thèmes du colloque joint ci-dessus). Climat et sécurité environnementale Mondialisation, technologie et sécurité internationale Genre, paix et sécurité Les implications de la COVID-19 sur la paix et la sécurité   Les étudiant(e)s sont invité(e)s à soumettre un résumé de 300-400 mots, en français ou en anglais, sur l’un des quatre thèmes à l’adresse courriel suivante: qusc.bu@gmail.com avant le 16 décembre 2021. Les résultats de la sélection seront dévoilés le 21 décembre 2021. Les candidats auront jusqu’au 25 janvier 2022 pour compléter un texte d’environ 3 000 mots. Chaque panel sera présidé par un expert lié au thème. Un prix de 100 $ sera remis pour chacun des quatre travaux qui seront jugés les meilleurs au terme de la conférence. Les textes des récipiendaires seront également publiés sur le site du RAS. De plus, chaque étudiant recevra une attestation de participation. Du soutien pour les frais de logement et de transport pour la journée de la conférence sera fourni. Télecharger le programme (PDF 2.4mb) Coordinatrices étudiantes et coordinateurs étudiants Junru Bian - Étudiant au doctorat Université d'Ottawa Lily Schricker - Étudiant(e) en baccalauréat , Université Bishop Zachary Griffiths-Julien - Étudiant(e) en baccalauréat , Université Bishop Areg Aprahamian - Élève Officier, Royal Military College Saint-Jean Athena Pucovsky - Élève Officier, Royal Military College Saint-Jean Stefan Bobu - Élève Officier, Royal Military College Saint-Jean L'organisation de la cinquième édition du QUSC est rendue possible grâce au généreux soutien de l'Université Bishop's, du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, ainsi qu'à la commandite du Centre Franco-Paix. Le colloque est organisé également en collaboration avec le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), le projet International Security in the Globalization Era (ISGE), et l’initiative MINDS ## Comment renforcer la Défense du Canada en période d’incertitude stratégique ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/comment-renforcer-la-defense-du-canada-en-periode-dincertitude-strategique/ Modified: 2025-05-15 Conférence du professeur Philippe Lagassé. L'inscription est obligatoire, seulement 20 places en présentiel. Le lien Zoom sera envoyé ultérieurement aux personnes qui assisteront à l'événement à distance.   ## Comprendre l’Alliance des Cinq yeux (Five Eyes) URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/comprendre-lalliance-des-cinq-yeux-five-eyes-2/ Modified: 2022-07-28     ## Conférence sur la sécurité climatique dans la région du Pacifique et atelier de développement professionnel URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/pacific-climate-security-conference-and-career-development-workshop/ Modified: 2024-01-25 > Climate-related hazards will increase in coming years, making it vital to identify and support emerging leaders in the field of climate... *Cet événement sera présenté en anglais uniquement Comprendre les liens multidimensionnels entre le changement climatique et la sécurité à l’échelle mondiale, nationale et humaine est une priorité urgente pour les décideurs politiques, les universitaires, la société civile, ainsi que les praticiens de la sécurité et de la défense. Des relations complexes existent entre la crise actuelle du changement environnemental engendré par les êtres humains et les phénomènes tels que les conflits armés, l'extrémisme violent, les migrations, la pauvreté, la pénurie des ressources, l'instabilité politique, la prospérité économique, la sécurité énergétique et la résilience des communautés. Cela nécessite une analyse interdisciplinaire et multiméthode, ainsi que le développement de politiques adaptées. Les défis de sécurité liés au climat englobent les changements dans les environnements de menace internationaux et nationaux, la nécessité de décarboniser les activités de défense et de sécurité nationale, mais aussi les tensions entre des priorités de sécurité concurrentes, la politique électorale et une panoplie de mouvements sociaux. Les risques liés au climat augmenteront dans les années à venir, donc il est nécessaire d'identifier et de soutenir les leaders émergents dans le domaine du changement climatique et de la sécurité, ainsi que de cultiver des liens entre les chercheurs, les analystes et les praticiens engagés à relever ces défis interconnectés sur les plans sociaux, politiques, économiques.   L'ordre du jour de la première journée est le suivant : 8:30-8:45 - Welcome and Territorial Acknowledgement 8:45-9:00 - Opening Remarks - Dr. Will Greaves 9:00-10:30 - Panel 1: Climate and Security in a Changing World Order Panel 1 explores the connections between climate change and other political, geostrategic, and geo-economic changes occurring concurrently. Panelists provide expert perspectives on the inter-related stressors driving structural changes to the contemporary international order. 10:30-10:45 - Break 10:45-12:15 - Panel 2: Regional Climate Security Impacts Panel 2 examines specific impacts of climate change and their associated security concerns in different global regions. Panelists provide expert perspectives on climate security impacts in Northern Africa, Northern Canada, the North Atlantic region, and South Asia. 12:15-130 - Lunch 1:30-3:00 - Panel 3: Climate and Security in Western North America Panel 3 examines specific impacts of climate change and their associated security concerns in Western North America. 3:00-3:15 - Break 3:15-4:45 - Panel 4: Intersections of Climate, Security, and Justice in Canada Panel 4 examines intersections of climate change impacts, security concerns, and considerations of justice and equity in Canada. Panelists provide diverse and interdisciplinary perspectives on issues such as decarbonization and the clean energy transition, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, migration, displacement, and community resilience.   L'ordre du jour de la deuxième journée est le suivant : 8:30-9:00 - Coffee and Refreshments 9:00-10:15 - Panel 1: Canada Climate Security Fellows This panel will feature presentations from two Canada Climate Security Fellows. Fellows will present their research projects, receive feedback from an assigned discussant/ mentor, and participate in questions and answers with the other fellows and participating scholars and practitioners in the field. 10:15-10:45 - Break 10:45-12:00 - Panel 2: Canada Climate Security Fellows This panel will feature presentations from two Canada Climate Security Fellows. Fellows will present their research projects, receive feedback from an assigned discussant/ mentor, and participate in questions and answers with the other fellows and participating scholars and practitioners in the field. 12:00-1:00 - Lunch 1:00-2:30 - Expert Practitioner Panel, Part 1 - Q&A 2:30-3:00 - Break 3:00-4:15 - Expert Practitioner Panel, Part 2 – Q&A 4:15-5:00 - Closing Discussion and Next Steps ## Contre-insurrection et contre-terrorisme – Atelier virtuel 2 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/contre-insurrection-et-contre-terrorisme-cycle-dateliers-panel-2/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > La contre-insurrection et le contre-terrorisme sont deux des domaines clés du renforcement des capacités, particulièrement à la suite des guerres en Afghanistan et en Irak VISIONNER LA VIDÉO La contre-insurrection et le contre-terrorisme sont deux des domaines clés du renforcement des capacités, particulièrement à la suite des guerres en Afghanistan et en Irak. Les débats dans ces secteurs s’orientent souvent autour de l’éthique, des coûts et de l’efficacité des interventions directes et de l’entraînement de partenaires, des questions de légitimité locale ou encore des difficultés à soutenir des gouvernements instables. À la suite de la pandémie de COVID-19, la contre-insurrection et le contre-terrorisme sont-ils toujours prioritaires pour des bailleurs de fonds externes soumis à une crise économique ? Comment la pandémie affecte-t-elle la coopération et le développement de connaissances dans les opérations de renforcement des capacités ? Comment la crise actuelle modifie-t-elle les stratégies adoptées, notamment en ce qui concerne le contact avec des armées partenaires, la prise en compte des inégalités de genre et ethniques face à la pandémie, ainsi que la priorité accordée aux soins de santé ? Ces changements persisteront-ils ? Avec la participation de : • Major-Général Jennie Carignan, Commandante, Mission de l’OTAN en Irak • Marc-André Boisvert, Chercheur indépendant • Louis-Alexandre Berg, Georgia State University & United States Institute for Peace • Président : Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19 – Cycle d’ateliers virtuels Au cours de la dernière décennie et dans un monde confronté à des défis de sécurité de toutes sortes, aux échecs désastreux des interventions directes en Irak et en Afghanistan, ainsi qu’à la restriction des budgets après la crise financière de 2008, le renforcement des capacités est devenu un outil de plus en plus important pour la sécurité internationale. Alors que les États, les organisations internationales et les ONG cherchaient à renforcer les capacités de leurs partenaires pour faire face aux problèmes de sécurité dans de nombreux domaines différents, notamment la défense, la contre-insurrection/contre-terrorisme et la consolidation de la paix, le renforcement des capacités n’était pas seulement considéré comme plus durable à long terme que l’intervention internationale, il était également jugé utile afin de parvenir à un meilleur partage du fardeau. La pandémie de COVID-19 remet en question les exigences et les utilisations du renforcement des capacités. Les déplacements de personnel et le travail en côte-à-côte avec des partenaires se traduisent désormais en de nouveaux risques pour la santé; la calamité économique qui a résulté de la pandémie soulève des questions profondes sur la manière dont les États et les organisations modifieront leurs politiques. Les États ont-ils reconsidéré leur engagement dans ce qui était souvent considéré comme des missions de faible priorité ? Vont-ils, au contraire, se tourner davantage vers le renforcement des capacités afin que d’autres puissent assumer une plus grande part des responsabilités de sécurité ? Comment les besoins en matière de renforcement des capacités et la conduite des missions ont-ils évolué avec ce nouvel accent sur la sécurité sanitaire ? Ces changements sont-ils réversibles ou permanents ? Les difficultés de la coopération internationale se feront-elles sentir dans ce domaine ? Cette série d’ateliers virtuels abordera ces questions et d’autres thèmes connexes. Nous explorerons l’état du renforcement des capacités avant la pandémie; évaluerons ses impacts sur les opérations de renforcement des capacités dans les opérations de défense, de contre-insurrection et de contre-terrorisme et de maintien de la paix; et analyserons les défis posés aux Forces armées canadiennes. Les panels rassembleront des experts universitaires et des professionnels de l’élaboration des politiques afin d’apprendre les uns des autres. Organisateurs Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## Coopération de renseignement dans un monde multipolaire – Perspectives non-américaines URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/cooperation-de-renseignement-dans-un-monde-multipolaire-perspectives-non-americaines/ Modified: 2022-07-28 *La conférence aura lieu en anglais, mais sera traduite simultanément en français. PROGRAMME (PDF) et BIOGRAPHIES VISIONNER LES VIDÉOS DE L'ÉVÉNEMENT Programmation 10:15 – Mot d'ouverture Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) 10:30 – Coopération européenne et transatlantique en matière de renseignement (voir la vidéo) Modératrice : Jill Sinclair (Ministère de la Défense nationale) Björn Fägersten (Institut suédois des affaires internationales): The Intelligence Demands of European Strategic Autonomy Claudia Hillebrand (Université Cardiff): The Spiral Loop of Intelligence Liaison: Issues for Secrecy and Accountability Gustav Gressel (Conseil européen des relations étrangères): Subversive Challenges to the Single European Space 12:00 – Conférencier d'honneur (voir la vidéo) Daniel Jean, ancien conseiller en matière de sécurité nationale et de renseignement auprès du Premier ministre du Canada 12:45 - Dîner 13:30 – Les défis du partage du renseignement (voir la vidéo) Modérateur : Artur Wilczynski (Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications) Adriana Seagle (Université Bellevue): Transatlantic Intelligence Sharing and Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Université Bishop’s): Search for Trust: Challenges in UN Peacekeeping-Intelligence Stephanie Carvin (Université Carleton) & Thomas Juneau (Université d'Ottawa): Don’t Hold Back: Canadianize 15:00 - Pause 15:30 – Coopération en matière de renseignement dans un contexte de multipolarité (voir la vidéo) Modératrice : Heather De Santis (Sécurité publique Canada) Reg Whitaker (Université de Victoria): Intelligence Cooperation in Historical Perspective, from Cold War Bipolarity to the Multipolar Present Nancy Teeple (Collège militaire royal du Canada): Enhanced ISR and its Effect on Strategic Stability Patrick F. Walsh (Université Charles Sturt): Australia’s National Intelligence Community: Challenges and Opportunities in a Multi-Polar World 17:00 – Discours de clôture Thomas Juneau (Université d'Ottawa) ## Coopération des démocraties en matière de défense contre l’autoritarisme URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/defense-contre-lautoritarisme/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > Les tensions actuelles entre alliés surviennent trois ans avant les prochaines élections présidentielles américaines qui pourraient très... Événement bilingue avec traduction simultanée Le président Joe Biden appelle à une plus grande coopération entre les alliés démocratiques face à l'autoritarisme. Après son élection, il s'est empressé de rassurer les alliés d'Asie de l'Est et de l'OTAN sur la détermination de son administration à renforcer l'engagement des États-Unis à leur égard. Mais cela a-t-il été suffisant pour surmonter le traumatisme des années Trump ? On peut en douter. La décision du président Biden d'agir unilatéralement sur le retrait en Afghanistan, et la création surprise d'un partenariat stratégique avec l'Australie et le Royaume-Uni (AUKUS) dans le dos d'autres alliés démocratiques, notamment la France, ont sapé sa tentative initiale de recoller les morceaux avec ses alliés après Donald Trump. Les tensions actuelles entre alliés surviennent trois ans avant les prochaines élections présidentielles américaines qui pourraient très bien porter au pouvoir un républicain trumpiste, ou Donald Trump lui-même. Dans ce contexte, des questions difficiles doivent être posées : 1) Les alliés démocratiques partagent-ils suffisamment d'intérêts stratégiques et de confiance pour tenir en échec les puissances révisionnistes comme la Chine et la Russie ? 2) Disposent-ils d'une force défensive suffisamment cohérente pour les dissuader ? 3) Dans le cas où l'Amérique se replierait sur elle-même en 2025, les alliés de l'Amérique seraient-ils suffisamment coordonnés pour présenter un front commun afin de défendre l'ordre international établi ? L'objectif de l'atelier virtuel de Québec est de se concentrer sur l'état de la coopération des alliés des États-Unis en matière de défense. Alors que les menaces se multiplient et se diversifient, quelles sont les dynamiques politiques qui animent les relations entre les alliés démocratiques en 2021 ? Les alliés renforcent-ils leur coopération et, dans l'affirmative, cela se traduit-il par une convergence politique ? Si oui, les alliés se rangent-ils du côté de l'Amérique pour contrebalancer les ambitions de la Chine et de la Russie ? De plus, où la coopération en matière de défense entre les alliés des États-Unis se produit-elle et quelle est son étendue ? Cette coopération est-elle principalement régionale (par exemple, au sein de l'UE ou parmi les alliés de la région indo-pacifique) ou véritablement mondiale, de Tokyo à Canberra et de Londres à Berlin ? En revanche, si nous observons la dynamique inverse, c'est-à-dire une divergence des politiques et une autonomie stratégique, pourquoi est-ce le cas, et dans quel(s) domaine(s) et dans quelle mesure observe-t-on cela ? Cet atelier virtuel abordera ces multiples questions en examinant de manière comparative les problèmes de défense spécifiques abordés par les alliés européens, asiatiques et nord-américains, notamment l'Australie, la Corée du Sud, le Japon, le Canada, la France, l'Allemagne et le Royaume-Uni. Ce colloque virtuel est organisé par le professeur Jonathan Paquin. Programme et biographies ## De l’ambition à l’action : réussir la stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/de-lambition-a-laction-reussir-la-strategie-industrielle-de-defense-du-canada/ Modified: 2026-01-23 Cette conférence propose un regard franc sur la stratégie industrielle de défense (SID) du Canada. Alors que le gouvernement fédéral affiche l’ambition de renforcer les capacités souveraines, de diversifier les chaînes d’approvisionnement et d’accélérer le réarmement, l’enjeu n’est plus l’intention, mais l’exécution. Universitaires, industriels et acteurs publics seront réunis pour débattre sans détour des forces de la SID, des blocages à sa mise en œuvre et des choix structurants à opérer. L’objectif est d'identifier des pistes concrètes pour transformer l’ambition politique en capacités réelles, crédibles et durables au service de l’autonomie stratégique et de la résilience industrielle du Canada. Programmation 13h30 : Mot d'ouverture Frédérick Gagnon, Titulaire de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, Université du Québec à Montréal Justin Massie, Directeur du Département de science politique à l’Université du Québec à Montréal et co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 13h45 à 15h15 : Panel 1 - Regards croisés sur la stratégie industrielle de défense Animation : Frédérick Gagnon, Titulaire de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, Université du Québec à Montréal Jean-François Juneau, Directeur principal par intérim de l’équipe de la stratégie industrielle, Ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada Yan Cimon, Professeur titulaire, Département de management, Université Laval Anessa Kimball, Professeure titulaire, Département de science politique, Université Laval Justin Massie, Directeur du Département de science politique à l’Université du Québec à Montréal et co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 15h15 à 15h45 : Pause 15h45 à 17h30 : Panel 2 - Perspectives des acteurs clés de la stratégie industrielle de défense Animation : Fanny Tan, Chercheure, Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels, Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, Université du Québec à Montréal Marc Bigaouette, Directeur des programmes gouvernementaux canadiens, Bell Textron Guillaume Côté, Président-directeur général, Consortium de recherche et d'innovation en aérospatiale au Québec Pierre Seïn Pyun, Vice-président, Affaires gouvernementales et industrielles, Bombardier Youri Rousseau, Sous-ministre adjoint aux politiques économiques et aux affaires extérieures, Ministère de l’Économie, de l’Innovation et de l’Énergie Stéphanie Le Saux-Farmer, Directrice adjointe p.i., Direction des exportations en matière de défense, Affaires mondiales Canada 17h30 à 17h45 : Mot de clôture Cet événement est organisé en collaboration avec la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, Université du Québec à Montréal. Localisation de l'événement en présentiel : Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Pavillon Judith-Jasmin, Annexe (JE), Local JE-1150 1564 R. Saint-Denis, Montréal, QC H2X 1K1   ## De la mesure à l’anticipation des conflits : un système d’alerte précoce pour l’Afrique et le monde URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/de-la-mesure-a-lanticipation-des-conflits-un-systeme-dalerte-precoce-pour-lafrique-et-le-monde-2/ Modified: 2026-10-14 > Présentation hybride du prototype CYSAN et le cadre prédictif p-CSI, par Étienne Emboussi et Stéphane Akaba L’Afrique demeure l’une des régions les plus dynamiques du monde, porteuse d’importantes possibilités économiques, mais elle fait aussi face à des risques persistants de conflits violents, d’instabilité politique et de menaces à la sécurité. Les systèmes d’Alertes précoce sont passés du jugement d’experts à la prévision fondée sur les données : ils sont le plus fiables là où la violence est déjà installée. L’escalade soudaine reste le cas difficile, celui où même les modèles les plus avancés sont encore pris de court. En combinant modélisation des conflits, apprentissage automatique et analyse des médias, CYSAN part d’une question de recherche : peut-on anticiper la gravité d’un conflit assez tôt pour que la prévention puisse agir ? CYSAN, jeune entreprise canadienne établie à Gatineau, a développé un prototype de système d’alerte précoce qui suit les conflits en Afrique à l’aide de tableaux de bord Tableau et de données publiques sur les événements de conflit, et qui est conçu pour s’adapter à d’autres régions. Les cofondateurs de CYSAN présenteront ce prototype, puis le cadre conceptuel du p-CSI (indice prédictif de sévérité des conflits). Ce cadre vise à prévoir la sévérité des conflits, et non seulement le nombre d’événements, en combinant quatre dimensions de la sévérité et des signaux issus de l’environnement médiatique, pour estimer région par région la probabilité d’une escalade. La séance vise à : présenter le prototype et le cadre p-CSI à la communauté de recherche en sécurité et en prévention des conflits et aux praticiens ; soumettre au regard critique des chercheurs la valeur ajoutée attendue du p-CSI, formulée en hypothèses à tester ; recueillir des avis sur la validation empirique, les limites des données et les enjeux éthiques ; préparer une prochaine séance consacrée à la démonstration de la preuve de concept p-CSI. Intervenants : Étienne Emboussi, ing., M.Sc., président et cofondateur, CYSAN Stéphane Akaba, vice-président et cofondateur, CYSAN ; Professeur à temps partiel et doctorant, Université d’Ottawa ## Dix ans plus tard : bilan de la stratégie du pivot (rééquilibrage) américain vers l’Asie URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/dix-ans-plus-tard-bilan-de-la-strategie-du-pivot-reequilibrage-americain-vers-lasie/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > L’administration Obama annonçait en 2011 son intention de réaliser un pivot stratégique vers l’Asie. Dix ans plus tard, force est de constater que cette stratégie a évolué, passant du rééquilibrage stratégique à la stratégie du « Free and Open Indo-Pacific » sous Trump. Mais est-ce que le centre de gravité de la diplomatie et de la défense américaines s'est bel et bien déplacé vers l’Indo-Pacifique ? L’administration Obama annonçait en 2011 son intention de réaliser un pivot stratégique vers l’Asie. Dix ans plus tard, force est de constater que cette stratégie a évolué, passant du rééquilibrage stratégique à la stratégie du « Free and Open Indo-Pacific » sous Trump. Mais est-ce que le centre de gravité de la diplomatie et de la défense américaines s'est bel et bien déplacé vers l’Indo-Pacifique ? En retirant les États-Unis du partenariat transpacifique et en accélérant le retrait américain des affaires du monde, au moment où la Chine consolidait sa position en Indo-Pacifique, l’administration Trump a-t-elle compromis cette stratégie ? Et puis, comment les alliés de l’Amérique ont-ils réagi à cette stratégie du pivot et quel impact a-t-elle eu sur les puissances rivales comme la Chine, la Russie ou même l’Iran ? Enfin, quelles leçons le Canada doit-il tirer du pivot américain et quelles sont pour lui les implications stratégiques et défensives ? Ce colloque est organisé par le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) qui fut créé par le programme Mobilisation des idées nouvelles en matière de défense et de sécurité (MINDS) du ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il réunira des experts universitaires et militaires afin de faire le point sur cette question stratégique dans un contexte de rivalité accrue entre grandes puissances. VISIONNER LES VIDÉOS DE L'ÉVÉNEMENT Programme du colloque Programme préliminaire   9h30 à 9h35 : Discours d’accueil de Jonathan Paquin, responsable de l’Axe 1 (Université Laval)   9h35 à 11h15 : Panel 1 (voir la vidéo) Le pivot/rééquilibrage et les réponses des alliés de Washington Modératrice : Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s University) Rachel Esplin Odell (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft)           The US pivot then and now Jonathan Berkshire Miller (Japan Institute of International Affairs)           An East Asian Perspective on the Pivot: Japan and Korea Natalie Sambhi (Australian National University)          Australia and ASEAN states’ response to the pivot Cleo Paskal (Chatham House)           Les perceptions européennes des changements stratégiques dans l’indo-pacifique   11h15 à 12h00 : Conférencier d’honneur (voir la vidéo) Commodore Angus Topshee, OMM, MSM, CD, Officier de guerre navale - Marine royale canadienne   12h00 à 13h00 : Lunch   13h00 à 14h15 : Panel 2 (voir la vidéo) Réactions des puissances rivales au rééquilibrage américain Modérateur : Yann Breault (Collège militaire royal de St-Jean) Bonnie S. Glaser (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC)           Le positionnement de la Chine face au rééquilibrage américain Zachary Paikin (Global Policy Institute, London)           La réponse de la Russie à l’initiative américaine Pierre Pahlavi (Collège des forces canadiennes)          Les conséquences du pivot pour la politique étrangère iranienne et l’équilibre des puissances au Moyen-Orient   14h15 à 14h30 : Mot de clôture du responsable de l’Axe 1     ## Ecole d’été en études stratégiques : « Penser les conflits au XXIe siècle » URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/ecole-dete-en-etudes-strategiques-penser-les-conflits-au-xxie-siecle/ Modified: 2026-06-23 La première édition de l’École d’été en études stratégiques « Penser les conflits au XXIe siècle » s’est tenue à Paris du 8 au 13 juin 2026. Pendant six jours, 35 étudiantes et étudiants, venus de France et du Canada, ont participé à une formation intensive consacrée aux principaux défis stratégiques de notre époque. Les discussions ont notamment porté sur l’évolution de la relation transatlantique, le retour des politiques de puissance, l’élargissement des formes de conflictualité, la résurgence des enjeux nucléaires, le réarmement conventionnel et la recherche d’une plus grande autonomie stratégique européenne. Cette école d’été francophone est née d’une collaboration entre plusieurs institutions de référence dans le domaine des études stratégiques. Elle réunit l’Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire (IRSEM), les centres d’excellence « Organiser la surprise stratégique » et « Stratégie et conflits Bordeaux Campus », ainsi que l’Université Laval et le Réseau d’analyse stratégique. À travers des conférences, des ateliers et des échanges, les participants ont pu approfondir leur compréhension des enjeux de sécurité internationale tout en développant des liens durables avec leurs homologues de l’autre côté de l’Atlantique. Organisée alternativement en France et au Québec, l’École d’été poursuivra son développement avec une deuxième édition qui se tiendra en 2027 à l’École supérieure d’études internationales (ESEI) de l’Université Laval, à Québec. Crédit photo : momo11353 ## École d’été – Analyse computationnelle de textes sur la guerre en Ukraine URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/ecole-dete-analyse-computationnelle-de-textes-sur-la-guerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2023-05-11 > La formation développera ces capacités à l’égard d’une problématique de recherche spécifique : la guerre en Ukraine... Présentation Le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) organise une école d’été sur les méthodes d’analyse computationnelle de textes dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense. L’objectif de l’école d’été est de former une nouvelle génération de chercheurs sur l’analyse de textes assistée par ordinateurs afin de développer leurs capacités de traiter de vastes quantités de textes portant sur les enjeux de sécurité et de défense. Plus spécifiquement, l’école d’été formera les personnes étudiantes à la collecte, la gestion, l’analyse et la visualisation de données textuelles. Pour ce faire, la formation emploiera les logiciels R et Python. La formation développera ces capacités à l’égard d’une problématique de recherche spécifique : la guerre en Ukraine, qui suscite de vives tensions au sein de la communauté internationale. Les étudiants seront invités à se pencher sur la nature des perceptions, au sein d’un pays de leur choix, à l’égard de la guerre d’Ukraine, afin d’identifier les cadres dominants et le degré de contestation interne. Le travail accompli lors de l’école d’été débouchera sur un ouvrage collectif, lequel permettra de comparer les résultats de recherche et d’enrichir notre compréhension de la fragmentation en cours de l’ordre international libéral. L’école d’été offre ainsi aux étudiantes l’opportunité d’approfondir leurs connaissances empiriques et méthodologiques sur ces enjeux. Il s’agit également d’une excellente opportunité de partage de connaissances et de réseautage au sein du RAS. Programmation préliminaire Jour 1: La collecte des données Jour 2: L’étiquetage des données Jour 3: Le traitement des données et la modélisation computationnelle Jour 4: L’analyse des données Admissibilité Cette formation intensive est offerte à un groupe restreint d’étudiants afin d’offrir un soutien individualisé et un apprentissage personnalisé. Sont admissibles les étudiants travaillant sous la supervision de l’un des membres du Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Aucune expérience n’est nécessaire ; une connaissance de R ou de Python n’est pas un prérequis. La formation se déroulera en français et en anglais ; une bonne connaissance des deux langues est donc exigée. Date limite pour postuler : 24 mai 2023 Veuillez soumettre votre candidature, d’ici le 24 mai 2023, à info@ras-nsa.ca avec comme objet École d’été et en copie conforme l’expert du RAS qui supervise vos études, avec les deux documents suivants en pièce jointe : Curriculum vitae : formation antérieure, expérience de recherche, compétences méthodologiques, etc.; Lettre de motivation : pourquoi suivre l’école d’été du RAS ? Nous encourageons les candidatures des personnes autochtones, de couleur, LGBTQ2I et personnes handicapées. Nous favorisons l’équité et nous encourageons à indiquer dans la candidature si vous appartenez à l’un des groupes désignés. Seules les candidatures retenues seront contactées. Modalités L’école d’été est offerte gratuitement et se déroulera à temps plein du 4 au 7 juillet 2023 à l’UQAM. Seules les personnes disponibles entièrement au cours de cette période sont admissibles. Les frais de subsistance sont inclus pour tous, de même que les frais de transport et d’hébergement pour les personnes en provenance de l’extérieur de Montréal. ## Evolution et avenir de la relation entre l’OTAN et l’Arctique dans un contexte de (non)-politisation des questions de défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/evolution-et-avenir-de-la-relation-entre-lotan-et-larctique-dans-un-contexte-de-non-politisation-des-questions-de-defense/ Modified: 2025-02-27 la conférence se déroulera en anglais et en français Agenda: 8h30 : Mots d’ouverture Professeur Stéphane Roussel, ENAP Alexandre Courtemanche, UQAM 9h00-10h45 : Enjeux climatiques et menaces dans l’Arctique Modérateur : Benjamin Boutin, Directeur, Association France Canada Intervenants : Bridget Larocque, Chair Northern Advisory Board and Co-lead, North American Arctic Defence and Security (en distanciel) Pauline Baudu, Université du Québec à Montréal (en distanciel) Dr Laurent Borzillo, École nationale d’administration publique (ÉNAP) Eric Laporte, Directeur exécutif de la Direction des relations de sécurité et de défense (IGR) 10h45-11h15 : pause 11h15-12h30 : L’OTAN et l’Arctique Contre-amiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN) Discutante : Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Université de Bischop’s Thèmes potentiels : La place de l’Arctique au sein de l’OTAN Le rôle de l’OTAN dans l’Arctique La question du partage du fardeau dans le cadre des actions en lien avec l’Arctique 12h30-13h45 : déjeuner 13h45-15h15 : Les équipements et capacités nécessaires pour l’Arctique : comment favoriser la production et la coopération industrielle au sein de la communauté transatlantique Modératrice : Professeure Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Intervenants : Dr Thomas Hughes, Mount Allison University (en distanciel) Professeur Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Professeur Stéphane Roussel, École nationale d’administration publique (ENAP) Gaspard Schnitzler, Chercheur à l’Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques (IRIS) 15h15-15h45 : pause 15h45-17h15 : La coopération militaire dans l’Arctique dans un contexte de risques liés à la politisation/non-politisation des questions de défense au sein des sociétés démocratiques Modérateur : Prof. Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Intervenants : Consul général des États-Unis à Montréal, Robert P. Sanders Professeure Chantal Lavallée, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Contre-amiral Frédéric de Rupilly, JFCNF (OTAN) Dr. Pauline Pic, Université Laval (en distanciel) 17h15 - 17h30 : Mots de conclusion Benjamin Boutin Directeur, Association France Canada, et Teodora Morosanu, Forum de Défense et de Stratégie   ## Guerre de l’information : stratégies, règles et enjeux URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/guerre-de-linformation-strategies-regles-et-enjeux/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > L'objectif de la conférence est d'en apprendre davantage sur le Centre d’excellence en communications stratégiques de l’OTAN... L’heure d’événement : 12:30-14:00 EDT (UTC-4) / 17h30-19h00 CET (UTC+1) Le lieutenant-colonel Yves Desbiens Chargé de projet au Centre d’excellence en communications stratégiques de l’OTAN Le Laboratoire sur l'influence et la communication (Labfluens), le Laboratoire d’analyse de communication politique et d’opinion publique (LACPOP) et le Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS) vous convient à la conférence sur la communication d'influence "Guerre de l'information : stratégies, règles et enjeux" du lieutenant-colonel Yves Desbiens. L'objectif de la conférence est d'en apprendre davantage sur le Centre d’excellence en communications stratégiques de l’OTAN, la désinformation, les narratifs stratégiques, les nouvelles technologies de l’information et de communication (bots, trolls, AI, plate-forme digitale d’entraînement) la guerre hybride et autres. Quand ? Le mardi 15 mars prochain, de 12h30 à 14h Où ? Le local à l'UQAM vous sera communiqué par courriel, en même temps que le lien Zoom si vous souhaitez assister à la conférence en ligne Le lieutenant-colonel Desbiens est chargé de projet au Centre d’excellence en communications stratégiques de l’OTAN. Il détient un Baccalauréat en communication, programme Communication Sociale de l’UQTR. Télécharger la présentation (PPT 7.2mb) ## Hors des sentiers battus: nouvelles directions dans la recherche sur le militaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/hors-des-sentiers-battus-nouvelles-directions-dans-la-recherche-sur-le-militaire/ Modified: 2022-11-28 > Often called out for its lack of diversity and inclusion, it is not only the military institution that needs to change, but also the way... Régulièrement interpellée pour son manque de diversité et d’inclusion, ce n’est pas seulement l’institution militaire qui a besoin de changer, mais aussi la manière dont elle est étudiée. Pendant trop longtemps, la recherche sur le militaire s’est faite en silo. Trop peu d’échanges et de discussions entre chercheur.e.s prenaient place, parce qu’ils appartenaient à des disciplines différentes (science politique, sociologie, anthropologie, histoire, éthique appliquée, etc.) ou parce qu’ils travaillaient pour des institutions différentes (universitaires ou gouvernementales). Maintenant plus que jamais, il est important de prêter davantage attention aux approches et perspectives considérées qui comme marginales dans le champ de la sécurité internationale, et ce parce qu’elles peuvent apporter des réponses à certains des défis que l’institution militaire doit actuellement affronter. Rassemblant des chercheur.e.s – virtuellement et en personne – de différents pays, cette conférence a pour objectif d’explorer comment l’institution militaire peut être analysée de davantage de façon qu’on tend à imaginer lorsqu’il est question du militaire. C’est à propos de ce qu’on peut apprendre si on prête attention à ce que les chercheur.e.s sous-représenté.e.s, les chercheur.e.s ayant recours à des approches sous-représentées, ou travaillant sur des sujets sous-représentés, font. Mais l’objectif est aussi d’ouvrir un espace au sein duquel chercheur.e.s – et public – peuvent partager et apprendre des autres. La conférence est hybride. Le public peut y assister en présence ou virtuellement. Télécharger le programme et les bios (PDF 2.8mb) AGENDA: 8h30 - Mots d’ouverture – organisation de la conférence 8h45 - Panel #1 :La recherche participative au sein de l’institution militaire : de l’observation à la recherche-action au service des militaires Ce panel s’intéresse à la manière dont la recherche participative offre une perspective originale et pertinente lorsqu’il est question de l’analyse de l’institution militaire et de ses membres. À partir de perspectives différentes (sociologie, anthropologie, éthique appliquée, etc.) et s’appuyant sur des cas d’étude différents (la France, les Pays-Bas et le Canada), les quatre chercheures de ce panel présenteront leurs travaux sur l’utilisation de cette approche méthodologique dans leur recherche respective. La recherche participative permet de mieux comprendre des problématiques comme l’intégration des femmes dans les forces armées, les souffrances psychiques dont souffrent certains membres, ou plus généralement comment améliorer la situation des membres actifs, des vétérans, et de leurs proches. En ce sens, les apports de cette approche ne devraient pas être négligés. Panélistes: Marguerite Déon Léa Ruelle Elizabeth Suen Amber S. Spijkers 10h00 - PAUSE 10h15 - Panel #2: Les expériences vécues à la loupe : apprendre des militaires directement Ce panel porte sur les expériences vécues, et comment une meilleure compréhension de ce qui se passe au niveau individuel peut potentiellement aider à mieux comprendre – et donc ultimement améliorer – ce qui se passe au niveau institutionnel. Les expériences vécues permettent en effet de mieux appréhender la trajectoire des individus et comment ils font face aux obstacles qu’ils ou elles rencontrent au cours de certains moments de leur vie. Or, les parcours de vie des militaires peuvent être chaotiques. Apprendre par exemple des expériences vécues sur le champ de bataille, ou bien lorsque l’on transitionne hors des forces armées, peut permettre aux forces armées de mieux préparer ses membres lorsque, ou si, ils ou elles sont faces à ces situations. Panélistes: Dr. Jennifer O’Neil Dr. Michelle Jones 10h55 - PAUSE 11h00 - Panel #3: Représentation des identités de genre et sexuelles : vers une institution militaire plus inclusive et diverse Ce panel aborde la question des identités de genre et sexuelles – et leur intégration – au sein de l’institution militaire, et comment celle-ci est devenue centrale pour la plupart des forces armées dans les pays démocratiques. En effet, l’institution militaire a longtemps été synonyme d’hyper masculinité et d’hétéronormativité. Ceux qui ne correspondaient pas parfaitement à l’image et aux qualités attendues d’un soldat ne trouvaient pas forcément leur place au sein de l’institution, et pouvaient parfois être la cible de comportements déplacés, voire de harcèlements et de violences. Si l’armée d’aujourd’hui et de demain veut poursuivre l’agenda d’inclusion et de diversité qu’elle s’est donnée, cela nécessite une meilleure compréhension de ce que vivent certains de ses membres ainsi que des implications que cela a pour eux et elles, comme le montre les chercheur.e.s de ce panel. Panélistes: Dr. Pooja Gopal Dr. Linna Tam-Seto Dr. Rachel Yon & Major Rex Steel 12h00 - LUNCH 13h00 - BOOK PRESENTATION: D r Grazia Scoppio & Dr Sarah Greco The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces. International Perspectives on Immigrant Participation in the Military Alors que de nombreux pays à travers le monde s’appuient sur les immigrants pour soutenir leurs populations et économies, l’accès à l’institution militaire leur reste limité, voire refusé pour ceux qui n’ont pas encore obtenu leur citoyenneté. Empêcher les immigrants de servir les forces armées de leur pays d’accueil pose un problème d’équité morale et d’efficacité opérationnelle. Permettre aux immigrants de s’engager permettrait à l’institution militaire de représenter la population qu’elle sert, ains qu’encouragerait un changement culturel et davantage d’inclusivité au sein de l’institution tout en participant à la création d’une force militaire plus efficace. The Power of Diversity in the Armed Forces enquête sur la manière dont différents pays abordent la question de l’inclusion et de l’exclusion des immigrants dans leurs forces armées, et montre comment la participation militaire des immigrants peut ouvrir un chemin vers la citoyenneté, favoriser une plus grande intégration sociétale et permettre d’atteindre une 13h40 - PAUSE 13h45 - Panel #4 : Pour un changement de culture : saisir l’évolution institutionnelle militaire Ce panel porte sur la question de la culture militaire, et des difficultés non seulement de l’analyser, mais particulièrement de la changer. Devenue un cheval de bataille important, au Canada notamment, en raison de comportements problématiques qui y sont reliés, la culture militaire n’en demeure pas moins complexe à approcher en tant qu’objet d’étude. Les chercheur.e.s de ce panel abordent cette question d’angles différents mais complémentaires. Panélistes: Dr Isabelle Richer Major (retired) Marshall Gerbrandt Dr. Tamir Libel & Dr. Krystal Hackey 14h40 - PAUSE 14h55 - Panel #5 : La puissance étatique et la force militaire : une relation complexe et changeante Ce panel s’intéresse à la relation entre l’État et les forces armées, relation qui a évolué à travers les époques et les lieux, et qui influence la manière dont est appréhendée la question du pouvoir et de la puissance de manière générale. Comme vont le présenter les chercheurs de ce panel, cette relation évolue selon les contextes, et notamment si le pays en question est en période de conflit, et ce même si un État se dit neutre. Les discours nationalistes peuvent également influencer cette relation, de même que la présence de parties tierces, qui ne reconnaissent pas toujours l’une ou l’autre des institutions, voire les deux. Enfin, et malgré les possibilités offertes par de nouvelles technologies comme l’intelligence artificielle, il faut rester prudent quant au potentiel transformateur de ces nouvelles technologies, comme nous allons le voir dans ce panel. Panélistes: Arthur Servier Manaswini Ramkumar Benjamin Toubol Jacob Gateau 16h05 - PAUSE 16h10 - KEYNOTE: Dr. Maria Rost Rublee Le degré de diversité dans les études canadiennes Dans cette présentation, Dr Rublee explore le degré de diversité dans les études de sécurité canadiennes, et notamment la représentation démographique, les choix méthodologiques et les sujets. S’appuyant sur une enquête multiméthodes, elle avance que les études de sécurité canadiennes ne reflètent pas la diversité des chercheurs et étudiants travaillant sur le sujet, ni la diversité de la population canadienne dans son ensemble. 16h55 - Mots de fin ## Is War Over Taiwan Coming? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/is-war-over-taiwan-coming/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Financé par le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada, ce symposium réunit des experts internationaux pour échanger des idées sur la... Financé par le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada, ce symposium réunit des experts internationaux pour échanger des idées sur la situation de sécurité à Taïwan, qui s'avère de plus en plus être l'une des questions de sécurité les plus saillantes dans la région Indopacifique et un point central dans la compétition stratégique entre les États-Unis et la Chine. Une discussion approfondie est donc nécessaire sur les intentions de la Chine, la capacité des États-Unis à prévenir une guerre et la façon dont les partenaires et alliés régionaux appréhendent la question de Taïwan. Le premier panel évalue la probabilité d'une guerre, examine les scénarios d'urgence et étudie les facteurs permettant de prévenir un conflit. Dans les deuxième et troisième panels, l'objectif est d'examiner les meilleures stratégies des alliés et partenaires pour gérer la question de Taïwan. Enfin, le quatrième panel se concentre sur les leçons de la guerre en Ukraine pour Taïwan, l'évaluation par les alliés de l'imminence d'un conflit et leurs réactions potentielles si une guerre éclatait à Taïwan. Un cinquième panel, dédié aux étudiants des cycles supérieurs travaillant sur ces questions, clôturera la conférence. La conférence se déroulera dans un format hybride : les participants seront présents en personne et le public sera en ligne. Il est à noter que le symposium se déroulera en anglais, à l'exception du panel étudiant, qui aura lieu en français. 2 June 2022 9h15-9h30 Opening Remarks Justin Massie (UQAM) 9h30-11h30 - Is a Great Power War for Taiwan Inevitable? Chair and Discussant: Andrea Lane (Defence Research and Development Canada) James Lee (University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation) Charles Parton (Council on Geostrategy) Bonnie Glaser (German Marshall Fund of the United States) Cleo Paskal (Foundation for Defense of Democracies) 11h30-13h00 - Lunch 13h00-15h00 - How Are Allies Handling the Taiwan Question? Chair and Discussant: Justin Massie (UQAM)  Steven Jackson (Indiana University of Pennsylvania) Hyon Joo Yoo (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies) John Blaxland (Australian National University) 15h00-15h15 - Break 15h15-17h15 - How Are Partners Handling the Taiwan Question? Chair and Discussant: Guy St-Jacques (Institut d’études international de Montréal)  Derek Grossman (RAND Corporation) Sana Hashmi (Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation) Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM) 17h15-17h30 - Closing Remarks 3 June 2022 9h15-9h30 - Opening Remarks Justin Massie (UQAM) 9h30-11h30 - What Lessons Are Allies Drawing From Ukraine for Taiwan?  Chair and Discussant: Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval)  Charles-Philippe David (UQAM) Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer (IRSEM)  Tereza Novotna (Free University Berlin) Gaëlle Rivard-Piché (Defence Research and Development Canada) 11h30-13h00 Lunch 13h00-15h00 - Panel des chercheurs émergents Présidence et commentaire : Justin Massie (UQAM)  Maxandre Fortier (UQAM) Rémy Carugati (Université Laval) Camille Raymond (UQAM) Émile Lambert-Deslandes (Queen’s University) 15h00-15h15 – Closing Remarks ## Journée Transatlantique & la Patrouille de France URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/journees-transatlantiques/ Modified: 2026-09-29 > Joignez-vous à des décideurs internationaux lors des Journées transatlantiques à Paris. Découvrez le programme complet axé sur la sécurité, les technologies de défense et les alliances franco-canadiennes. L’air des alliances : recomposition des puissances et nouvelles interdépendances La présence exceptionnelle de la Patrouille de France, dans le cadre de la mission Liberté 250, donnera à cet après-midi de la Journée transatlantique une portée particulière. Symbole d’excellence, d’innovation et de confiance collective, elle incarne la profondeur des liens entre la France et les Amériques autant que la nécessité de repenser les alliances face aux transformations du monde. Dans un contexte marqué par la recomposition des puissances, les rivalités technologiques et les nouvelles interdépendances, les échanges porteront sur l’avenir de la gouvernance internationale, de la coopération transatlantique et de la sécurité collective. Son Excellence Nathalie G. Drouin, ambassadrice du Canada en France, apportera le regard du Canada sur ces mutations et sur les perspectives d’un approfondissement de la coopération franco-canadienne. Diplomates, responsables militaires, chercheurs et représentants de l’industrie croiseront leurs perspectives avant l’accueil de la Patrouille de France et l’allocution du général de brigade aérienne Pierre Gaudillière. Réunissant responsables militaires, diplomates, chercheurs, représentants de l’industrie et acteurs institutionnels, cet après-midi mettra ainsi en dialogue les transformations de l’ordre international et les réponses concrètes que peuvent leur apporter les alliances, l’innovation et les partenariats transatlantiques. PROGRAMME 14h30 – 14h45 | Accueil Mot d’introduction : Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos 14h45 – 15h00 | Allocution d’honneur : son Excellence Nathalie G. Drouin, Ambassadrice du Canada en France 15h00-16h00 : Table ronde – Le Monde après les certitudes Recomposition des puissances, nouvelles interdépendances et avenir de la gouvernance internationale Modération : Aubin Gonzalez Lapos Les bouleversements géopolitiques des dernières années ont remis en question les cadres d’analyse qui ont longtemps structuré notre compréhension des relations internationales. Les chaînes d’approvisionnement se reconfigurent, les rivalités technologiques s’intensifient, les politiques industrielles reviennent au premier plan et les institutions internationales sont appelées à se transformer. Comment penser ces mutations ? Sommes-nous face à une fragmentation du monde ou à une recomposition de ses interdépendances ? À partir des travaux du groupe Mondialisation sous tension, cette discussion croisera les regards de la science politique, de la sociologie, de l’économie politique internationale et des études stratégiques afin de mieux comprendre les transformations en cours. Dr. Miriam Cohen, professeure de droit à l’Université de Montréal, et directrice du Centre de recherche en droit public (CRDP) Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, professeure à Bishop’s University, et directrice du Centre FrancoPaix de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques Dr. Walter Kemp, directeur de la stratégie mondiale de l’Initiative mondiale contre la criminalité transnationale organisée Général Fabien Kuzniak, conseiller militaire du groupe Safran 16h00 PM – 16h20 | Pause 116h20 – 17h40 | Accueil de la Patrouille de France Mission Liberté 250 Allocution d’honneur: général de brigade aérienne Pierre GAUDILLIERE, sous-chef d’état-major « activité » de l’état-major de l’armée de l’air et de l’espace. Nous aurons le privilège de découvrir les coulisses de la Patrouille de France avec une démonstration exceptionnelle de « la musique », cette répétition au sol qui permet aux pilotes de préparer et de synchroniser chaque geste, chaque ordre et chaque enchaînement avant leur exécution en vol. Une véritable partition aérienne, orchestrée par le leader, où précision, coordination et confiance entre les pilotes sont essentielles. 17h40 | Mot de clôture  Conclusion de la journée : Aubin Gonzalez Lapos et Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Quels enseignements tirer de cette journée ? De la diplomatie des connaissances aux alliances stratégiques, les échanges auront montré combien les savoirs, les technologies, les industries et les partenariats internationaux sont désormais intimement liés. Cette conclusion ouvrira également les perspectives des prochaines initiatives de France-Amériques. 18h00 – 20h30 |  Verre amical Un moment privilégié de rencontre entre les intervenants, les membres de France-Amériques, les représentants des milieux diplomatique, militaire, industriel, académique et institutionnel afin de prolonger les discussions, favoriser les échanges et faire émerger de nouvelles coopérations franco-canadiennes. Remerciements Ce colloque a été construit en écho avec une année 2025/26 de rencontre transocéanique, dont notamment: le colloque transatlantique qui s’est déroulé à France-Amériques le 29 septembre 2025, le colloque transpacifique le 21 janvier 2026, et le colloque transarctique le 11 mai 2026. Nos remercions tout particulièrement la Patrouille de France et le général Pierre Gaudillière pour leur contribution essentielle à la co-construction de ces journées, ainsi que: l’équipe de l’Ambassade du Canada en France, le Centre FrancoPaix, l’armée de l’Air et de l’Espace et le CESA. Les administrateurs Romain Bethoux et Nicolas Renard ont également apporté leur concours à la construction de cette journée. L'événement se déroulera uniquement en présentiel à Paris. ## Journées Transpacifiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/journees-transpacifiques/ Modified: 2026-01-19 Convergences transpacifiques et nouveaux équilibres stratégiques Capacités de défense, industries stratégiques et technologies critiques dans l’Indo-Pacifique Cette journée exceptionnelle, pensée en résonance entre Montréal et Paris, est placée sous le sceau d’une volonté commune de renforcer les liens entre le Canada et la France. Objectif : L’objectif de la conférence est d’offrir un espace de réflexion et d’échange de haut niveau sur les nouvelles convergences transpacifiques, en croisant les perspectives stratégiques, industrielles et diplomatiques, afin d’éclairer les choix futurs en matière de sécurité, d’innovation et de coopération internationale. Programme: 15h00 – 15h05 | Mot d’Accueil, la Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, codirectrice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques. 15h05 – 15h20 | Conférencier d’Honneur : Général de Division aérienne Julien Sabéné, Général de l’Armée de l’Air et de l’Espace,  Commandant en second du Commandement de La Défense aérienne et des opérations aériennes – diplomatie aérienne. 15h20– 16h30 | Panel I – Ciel et mer : vecteurs de puissance et d’innovation industrielle Amiral Olivier Lebas, conseiller militaire naval d’Airbus, ancien commandant du Charles de Gaulle et ancien préfet maritime de l’Atlantique Pierre Seïn Pyun, Vice President, Government and Industry Affairs, Bombardier Defense Nathalie Tinjod, ESA Global Space Cooperation & Head of Space History Project 16h30– 17h00 | Pause café 17h00– 18h20 | Panel II – Souveraineté et continuité stratégique : de l’Atlantique à l’Indo-Pacifique  Christian Lechervy, envoyé spécial pour la Birmanie en appui des efforts internationaux, Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, ancien Ambassadeur de France en Birmanie Natascha Hryckow, Horn of Africa Institute of Peace and Security, Strategic Adviser Benoit Guidée, Directeur d’Asie et d’Océanie, Ministère de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères, ancien consul Général à Shanghai Anne Jourdain, France Asia Boost – founder/ ESCP Europe Alumni Deputy Chairwoman 18h20 – 18h45| Mot de clôture 18h45  |  Verre amical Ce colloque est initié par Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques, et la Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, codirectrice du Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), dans le cadre des Journées Transpacifiques. Cette conférence est construite en écho avec le colloque transatlantique qui s’est déroulé à France-Amériques le 29 septembre 2025. L'événement se déroule en présentiel seulement à Paris. ## L’invasion de l’Ukraine: 3 ans après URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/linvasion-de-lukraine-3-ans-apres/ Modified: 2025-01-31 > Le 24 février 2025 marquera les trois ans depuis le début de l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie. À cette occasion... Le 24 février 2025 marquera les trois ans depuis le début de l'invasion de l'Ukraine par la Russie. À cette occasion, la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand réunira des expertes et experts de renom pour une table ronde qui permettra de fournir différentes perspectives sur ce conflit armé qui perdure, d'analyser son évolution, d'examiner ses conséquences et de discuter des perspectives de sortie de crise. Déroulement Mot d'introduction par François Audet, directeur de l'Institut d'études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) Table ronde avec: Dominique Arel, titulaire de la Chaire d’études ukrainiennes à l’Université d’Ottawa Frédérick Gagnon, titulaire de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM Simon Hogue, chercheur à l’Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM Ekaterina Piskunova, chargée de cours au Département de science politique et au programme facultaire Études Internationales de l’Université de Montréal Louis Vachon, associé chez J.C. Flowers & Co Animé par Fanny Tan (chercheure en résidence à l'Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et étudiante à la maîtrise au Département de science politique de l’UQAM), cet évènement est organisé par la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand, en collaboration avec l’IEIM et le Réseau d'analyse stratégique. ## L’ambiguïté stratégique des alliés et partenaires de Washington face à la mutation de l’ordre international URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/lambiguite-strategique-des-allies-et-partenaires-de-washington-face-a-la-mutation-de-lordre-international/ Modified: 2024-06-12 Télécharcher le programme (PDF 989kb) Conférence du Réseau d’analyse stratégique en collaboration avec l’École supérieure d’études internationale Plusieurs s’interrogent sur la capacité des États-Unis à maintenir leur leadership mondial face au déclin relatif de leur puissance et à l’émergence des BRICS, en particulier de la Chine. Ces dernières années, un nombre croissant d’alliés de Washington ont manifesté une ambiguïté stratégique quant à leur rôle international dans un monde en mutation. La France, par exemple, a privilégié une Europe « ni alignée ni vassalisée devant quelque puissance que ce soit », pour reprendre les termes d’Emmanuel Macron. D’autres alliés, comme l’Italie et la Hongrie, ont développé des relations étroites avec la Chine et la Russie, ce qui suscite des préoccupations à Washington. Enfin, certains sont allés jusqu’à menacer de rompre leur alliance avec les États-Unis pour se réaligner sur la Chine et la Russie, comme les Philippines et la Turquie. L’agression de la Russie contre l’Ukraine semble avoir accéléré la mutation de l’ordre mondial. Plusieurs observateurs qualifient ce système de « monde multi-ordre » ou post-américain, où les alliés ont plus de latitude pour exprimer leurs divergences et leurs intérêts. Par exemple, la Turquie s’est abstenue de rejoindre le régime occidental de sanctions contre Moscou, et la Hongrie a refusé de condamner l’agression russe, bien qu’elles soient toutes deux membres de l’OTAN. Ce conflit a également ravivé le Mouvement des États non-alignés, qui refuse de choisir entre les États-Unis d’un côté et la Russie et la Chine de l’autre. Cela se manifeste par l’incapacité des États-Unis à rallier une majorité de pays du Sud Global à leur politique de soutien à l’Ukraine, ainsi que par la résistance de certains États à adopter des mesures restrictives à l’égard de la Chine dans le contexte de la compétition sino-américaine. Dans ce contexte, cette conférence, coorganisée par le RAS et l’École supérieure d’études internationales, a deux principaux objectifs. Tout d’abord, identifier et expliquer les comportements ambigus de certains alliés de Washington et évaluer la réaction des États-Unis face à ces comportements. Ensuite, cette conférence propose de mettre en lumière les États non-alignés, principalement les États du Sud, et les différentes réalités géopolitiques qui motivent leurs stratégies.     Agenda: 10h00 à 10h10 : Discours d’accueil Jonathan Paquin, Co-directeur - Réseau d’analyse stratégique 10h10 à 12h00 : Panel 1 : Transition de puissance et ambiguïté stratégique des alliés de Washington Modérateur : Frédérick Côté, Candidat au doctorat en études internationales à l’École supérieure d’études internationales Alexander Lanoszka - Professeur agrégé de relations internationales, Université de Waterloo Titre : Est-ce-que les alliés et partenaires de Washington sont vraiment ambigus? Pierre Colautti - Candidat au doctorat au département de science politique, Université Laval à Québec Titre : La réponse des alliés des États-Unis face au manque de garantie de sécurité de Washington sous les présidences Obama et Trump. Émile Lambert-Deslandes - Candidat au doctorat, département d’études politiques, Université Queen’s Titre : Ambiguïté et latence nucléaire : Le cas historique des alliés des États-Unis Nicolas-François Perron-Giroux - Doctorant, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Titre : Les implications de la transition de la puissance sur la politique de défense canadienne : signaux diplomatiques et acquisitions militaires. 12h00 à 13h15 : Lunch 13h15 à 15h15 : Panel 2 : Comprendre les intérêts des États du sud à l’égard des grandes puissances Modérateur : Talbot Imlay - Professeur titulaire au Département des sciences historiques, Université Laval Amabilly Bonacina, Candidate au doctorat en science politique, Université de Montréal Titre : La politique étrangère de Lula 3 : entre les défis d'un Brésil en reconstruction et un monde en mutation Roromme Chantal, Professeur agrégé de science politique à l’École des hautes études publiques (HEP), Université de Moncton Titre : Pouvoir symbolique et la “retenue durable” envers la Chine en Indo-Pacifique Amélie Chalivet, Doctorante en cotutelle, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas et à l’Université du Québec à Montréal Titre : L’Inde face aux enjeux de Taïwan et de la mer de Chine méridionale : études de cas sur l’évolution de l'ambiguïté stratégique indienne. Jean F. Crombois, Professeur agrégé d’études européenne, American University de Bulgarie Titre : La politique étrangère bulgare et la guerre en Ukraine: vers une politique pro-occidentale plus affirmée ? 15h15 à 15h25 : Mot de clôture Jonathan Paquin, Co-directeur - Réseau d’analyse stratégique   ## L’appui à la sécurité et au renforcement des capacités en Afrique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/lappui-a-la-securite-et-au-renforcement-des-capacites-en-afrique/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > À la lumière de cette conception du concept de ‘renforcement des capacités’, comment concevons-nous aujourd’hui les réponses aux défis... L'heure d'événement : 8:45-18:30 HDE (UTC-5) / 14h45-00h30 CET (UTC+1) Le consensus est clair aujourd’hui quant à la multi-dimensionnalité des enjeux de sécurité dans le monde et aux réponses à y apporter. Des enjeux aux semblants aussi divers que les changements climatiques, les violences genrées, les conflits armés et le terrorisme sont en réalité bien souvent interconnectés. Y répondre – ou du moins appuyer de manière efficace et appropriée la réponse développée par nos partenaires – nécessite donc une approche globale, comprise en termes de liens et ponts à faire entre ces enjeux et entre paliers d’action. Sans être l’unique espace où l’on retrouve ces enjeux de sécurité et efforts d’action multidimensionnels, l’Afrique a néanmoins été à l’avant-plan en ce qui a trait aux plus récentes réflexions sur les défis et réponses sécuritaires. Cet atelier vise spécifiquement à explorer les approches déployées en matière d’appui à la sécurité par différents acteurs – locaux, nationaux, régionaux, internationaux et les points de jonction entre certaines de celles-ci dans le but de faire le point sur les actions multidimensionnelles récemment mises en place en Afrique. Comment concevons-nous aujourd’hui les réponses aux défis sécuritaires de manière innovante, cohérente et complète ? Comment répondre à la multi-dimensionnalité des enjeux de sécurité et au fait qu’ils tendent à se profiler à travers de multiples niveaux ? Comment le faire tout en s’assurant d’une action qui s’appuie et renforce les initiatives, compétences et capacités nationales et locales ? La réponse à ces questions passe nécessairement par les ponts entre secteurs et communautés d’acteurs. L’atelier vise à aboutir à une conception et des recommandations pouvant nourrir le travail des chercheurs et praticiens. Télécharger le programme (3.6mb) Programme 8h45 - 9h : Mot d’ouverture  9h - 10h15 : Comment agir de manière innovante en réponse aux défis sécuritaires en Afrique? Sait-on mieux répondre de manière intégrée aujourd’hui? Si oui, comment? Quels sont des exemples d’action en matière de sécurité ou de renforcement des capacités particulièrement innovantes ou efficaces émergeant de contextes africains?  Présidente : Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal Niagalé Bagayoko, Africa Security Sector Network Mpako Foaleng, Département des Operations de Paix, ONU Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Université Bishop’s Visionnez l'enregistrement de ce panel! 10h15 - 10h45 : Pause-café 10h45 - 12h : Renforcer les capacités dans un cadre multidimensionnel Le concept de ‘renforcement des capacités’ – capacity-building – est un concept mobilisé pour faire face à divers défis de la sécurité. Quelles sont les problématiques et débats actuels en lien avec ce concept? Quelles sont les capacités les plus souvent traitées? Les capacités de qui, et un renforcement par qui? Comment concevoir des capacités de manière assez large et inclusive pour prendre acte de la multi-dimensionnalité des enjeux de sécurité en Afrique? Présidente : Niagalé Bagayoko, Africa Security Sector Network Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal—Saint-Jean Pierre Leroux, MFO Chief Liaison, Canadian Contingent Commande Adam Sandor, Université du Québec à Montréal Visionnez l'enregistrement de ce panel! 12h - 13h : Dîner 13h - 14h15 : De l’international au local: les croisements entre niveaux d’analyse et d’action Comment les actions à un niveau se répercutent-elles à d’autres niveaux ? L’importance d’inclure tous les bénéficiaires d’une action sécuritaire dans la conception de celle-ci est reconnue, mais comment le faire en pratique de manière crédible et durable? Président : Philippe Frowd, Université d’Ottawa Adib Bencherif, Université de Sherbrooke Arsène Brice Bado, Centre de Recherche et d'Action pour la Paix Maria Martin de Almagro, Université de Gand Visionnez l'enregistrement de ce panel! 14h15 - 15h30 : Le croisement de problématiques traditionnelles et non-traditionnelles Comment utiliser des outils non-traditionnels, pour faire face à des problématiques traditionnelles de la sécurité, comme la violence armée (terrorisme, guerres)? Comment définir l’innovation en matière d’action d’appui sécuritaire de manière à faire le pont entre chercheurs et praticiens? Quels sont les défis et les risques posés par des initiatives qui visent mettre en dialogue la sécurité traditionnelle et d’autres secteurs? Président : Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal—Saint-Jean Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Université Carleton Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal Virginie Tardif-Plante, Affaires mondiales Canada Philippe Frowd, Université d’Ottawa Visionnez l'enregistrement de ce panel! 15h30 - 16h : Pause-café 16h - 17h : Table-ronde générale : retour sur les enjeux centraux Qu’a-t-on appris par rapport aux interventions dans une sécurité multidimensionnelle en Afrique ? Quelles pistes d’action en découlent ? Quels nouveaux horizons de recherche ? 17h - 18h30 : Discours d’honneur : Cyril Obi, Social Science Research Council Redémocratiser l'Afrique ? Relever les nouveaux défis de la paix et de la sécurité en période de crise Visionnez l'enregistrement du discours d'honneur! 19h30 : Souper de réseautage ## L’Arctique entre refonte des alliances et consolidation des souverainetés URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/larctique-entre-refonte-des-alliances-et-consolidation-des-souverainetes/ Modified: 2026-04-10 Colloque : L’Arctique entre refonte des alliances et consolidation des souverainetés Cette journée exceptionnelle, pensée en résonance entre Montréal et Paris dans une volonté commune de renforcer les liens entre le Canada et la France, est l’occasion d’accueillir Madame Nathalie G. Drouin, nouvelle Ambassadrice du Canada en France. Ce colloque est coorganisé par Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques, et la Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Directrice du Centre FrancoPaix. Objectif : Offrir un espace de réflexion stratégique de haut niveau sur l’Arctique, en croisant les regards européens et nord‑américains autour des enjeux de souveraineté, des menaces hybrides et des défis climatiques, afin d’identifier des pistes concrètes de refonte des alliances, de renforcement des capacités de défense et de protection des infrastructures critiques, tout en intégrant les partenariats autochtones et les cadres de coopération multilatérale.   PROGRAMME: 14h30 – 14h40 | Mot d’accueil, la Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, directrice du Centre FrancoPaix, et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques. 14h40 – 15h00 | CONFÉRENCIÈRE D’HONNEUR : l’Ambassadrice du Canada en France et à Monaco - Mme Nathalie G. Drouin 15h00 – 16h20 | Le Grand Nord raconté : deux explorateurs face à un Arctique en mutation Ce panel vise à croiser deux regards d’explorateurs engagés sur l’Arctique pour mieux comprendre les transformations rapides du Grand Nord face au changement climatique, aux enjeux de souveraineté et aux nouvelles dynamiques géopolitiques. À travers leurs présentations, Jean-Louis Étienne et Jean Lemire partageront leur expérience de terrain et leur lecture des mutations en cours, avant un échange commun suivi d’une séance de questions-réponses avec le public. Dr. Jean-Louis Étienne, médecin, explorateur polaire, écrivain et ambassadeur des Pôles et de l’Océan auprès de l’UICN Jean Lemire, Émissaire aux changements climatiques et aux enjeux nordiques et arctiques auprès du Gouvernement du Québec Fireside chat entre entre Dr. Etienne et M. Lemire puis Q&A Modération: la Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, directrice du Centre FrancoPaix, et Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques. 16h20 – 16h40 | Pause café 16h45 – 17h30 | Panel I – Capacités, innovation et sécurité pan-domaine dans l’Arctique Une discussion réunissant décideurs politiques, chefs militaires et représentants industriels pour examiner les réponses opérationnelles et technologiques aux défis de sécurité arctique dans un environnement pan-domaine, couvrant sous-marin, terrestre, aérien, haute altitude et espace, incluant le rôle croissant des capacités satellitaires en surveillance, communications et sécurité arctique. Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Directrice exécutive, Conférence des associations de défense (CDA) et Institut CDA Général de corps aérien Dominique Tardif, Major général de l’armée de l’air et de l’espace Robert Sinclair M. l’Ambassadeur du Canada en Suède Modération: Aubin Gonzalez Lapos, Secrétaire général exécutif de France-Amériques 17h45 – 18h30 | Panel II – Souveraineté, menaces hybrides et désinformation dans l’Arctique Une discussion d’experts centrée sur les défis de souveraineté, les formes émergentes de compétition stratégique et les menaces hybrides façonnant l’environnement de sécurité arctique, avec une attention particulière aux implications pour la sécurité européenne, canadienne et transatlantique/transarctique globale. Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher, Professeur associé à l’Université de Calgary Mikaa Blugeon‑Mered, chercheur en géopolitique de la transition énergétique et spécialiste des pôles, enseignant à Sciences Po, à l’Université du Québec à Trois‑Rivières et à l’Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique Dr. Florian Krampe, Director of Studies, Peace and Development, at SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute),  Director of the SIPRI Climate Change and Risk Programme Amiral Hervé de Bonnaventure, Conseiller Défense du CEO du Groupe MBDA (à confirmer) Modération: la Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, directrice du Centre FrancoPaix 18h30 – 18h40 | Mot de clôture 18h45 |  Verre amical Nos remerciements vont au président de France-Amériques, l’Amiral Alain Coldefy, à l’équipe de l’Ambassade du Canada en France ainsi qu’au Centre FrancoPaix. Nous saluons également le soutien du Réseau d’analyse stratégique. Enfin, nous remercions chaleureusement et pour sa contribution essentielle à cette initiative : le colonel Romain Bethoux, de l’armée de l’Air et de l’Espace. Ce colloque a été construit en écho avec le colloque transatlantique qui s’est déroulé à France-Amériques le 29 septembre 2025, et le colloque transpacifique le 21 janvier 2026.   L'événement se déroulera en présentiel seulement à Paris ## L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/lautonomie-strategique-du-canada-au-21e-siecle/ Modified: 2026-09-16 > La conférence de lancement du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 3.0 se tiendra en format hybride le 14 septembre 2026 à l’UQAM. Cet événement réunira plusieurs universitaires et experts pour échanger sur l'autonomie stratégique du Canada et analyser les modèles inspirés d'autres pays. L’événement sera enregistré pour rediffusion Programme 13h15 — Accueil des participantes et des participants Inscription et café 13h45 — Mot d’ouverture : Lancement du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 3.0 Justin Massie, professeur, Département de science politique, UQAM ; directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 14h00 — Panel 1 — L’autonomie stratégique du Canada au 21e siècle : une feuille de route Présentation de l’étude, à lire ici Philippe Lagassé, professeur, École Norman Paterson d’affaires internationales, Université Carleton Justin Massie, professeur, Département de science politique, UQAM Commentaires Siobhan Harty, chercheuse invitée, École de politiques publiques Max Bell, Université McGill LGen (ret.), Yvan Blondin, ancien commandant de l’Aviation royale canadienne Jeffrey Collins, Directeur, Palmer Institute for Canadian Leadership Animation : Mathieu Carbasse, journaliste, Le Devoir 15h30 — Pause 15h45 — Panel 2 : L’autonomie stratégique ailleurs : quels modèles pour le Canada ? Comment d’autres États — grands et petits, alliés et partenaires — ont-ils défini et opérationnalisé leur autonomie stratégique ? Quelles leçons, transposables ou non, le Canada peut-il en tirer ? Chantal Lavallée, professeure agrégée et directrice du CRITIC, Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean Frédéric Mérand, professeur, Département de science politique, et directeur scientifique du CÉRIUM, Université de Montréal Jean-François Bélanger, professeur adjoint, Institut des opérations militaires, Collège royal de défense du Danemark Nicolas-François Perron, chercheur émergent, Réseau d’analyse stratégique, UQAM Animation : Emmanuelle Rousseau, professeure, Département de science politique, UQAM 17h00 — Mot de clôture Visuel conçu à l'aide de l'intelligence artificielle ## L’information à la vitesse de la confiance URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/7053/ Modified: 2023-03-09 > Les défis liés à l’information (la désinformation et la mésinformation) ne sont pas nouveaux, cependant la portée et... Information at the Speed of Trust: (dis/ill/mis) Information and Security Issues L’évènement se tiendra en anglais seulement. Cet événement ne sera pas enregistré. Les défis liés à l’information (la désinformation et la mésinformation) ne sont pas nouveaux, cependant la portée et le rythme de la circulation de l’information sont désormais sans précédent. La désinformation et mésinformation sont maintenant reconnues comme un défi incontournable en matière de sécurité par les gouvernements et les institutions internationales. Les opérations de paix des Nations Unies (ONU) ont été confrontées à une myriade de défis sur la nature de leurs pratiques, mandats et missions au niveau doctrinal, conceptuel et opérationnel. Ces défis ont suscité de nombreuses réflexions sur la façon dont les missions devraient aborder l’évolution de la dynamique sécuritaire et politique qui prévaut dans les communautés locales au sein desquelles les missions sont déployées à des fins de rétablissement, de maintien ou d’imposition de la paix. De plus, ces débats pertinents ont également généré des (re)considérations liées aux défis stratégiques, tactiques, logistiques, collaboratifs et coopératifs au niveau opérationnel sur le terrain que les missions doivent surmonter quotidiennement. Alors que les débats doctrinaux et les défis liés à la conceptualisation, à l’interprétation et à la mise en œuvre des opérations de paix continuent d’être évalués et largement analysés, ceux qui portent sur les perceptions locales et la mésinformation/désinformation ne sont pas assez analysés et étudiés. Ce n’est qu’au cours des quatre dernières années que le défi de faire face à la mésinformation et la désinformation a été introduit dans les mandats des missions de maintien de la paix. Cette conférence réunira des universitaires, des praticiens et des experts pour discuter des façons complexes et substantielles dont la désinformation et la mésinformation influent sur la sécurité aux niveau local, national et international.   Agenda 09:15 - 09:30 : Introduction Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Dr. Yvan Ilunga 09:30 - 11:30 : Comment l’information circule dans les communautés locales sujettes aux opérations de paix et comment cela impacte les dynamiques quotidiennes et à long terme des initiatives proposées par les opérations de paix mais aussi au niveau national ? Modérateur : Dr. Bruno Charbonneau Dr. Yvan Ilunga and Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Dr. Fifi Edu-Afful Master Warrant Officer Edwin Pinaroc Dr. Delphine Bonnardot Sebastian Fasanello 11:30 - 13:00: Diner 13:00 - 15:00 : Selon une perspective des Nations Unies, comment la désinformation est cadrée par les institutions internationales et quelles politiques et stratégies ont-elles mis en place pour y lutter ? Modératrice : Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Dr. Cedric De Coning Albert Trithart Pernilla Ryden Naomi Miyashita 15:15 - 17:15 : Dans quelle mesure la désinformation peut menacer la sécurité de la population nationale et représenter un enjeu de sécurité nationale ? Modérateur : Dr. Frédérick Gagnon Dr. Adriana Seagle Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher Dr. Mark Duerksen Dr. Dani Madrid-Morales 17:15 - 17:30 : Mots de clôture ## L’invasion de l’Ukraine, deux ans après URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/linvasion-de-lukraine-deux-ans-apres/ Modified: 2024-02-09 > À l’occasion du deuxième anniversaire du début de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, déclenchée le 24 février 2022... À l’occasion du deuxième anniversaire du début de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, déclenchée le 24 février 2022, cet événement réunira des expertes et experts de renom afin de fournir différentes perspectives sur ce conflit armé tragique qui perdure. Quelles sont les perspectives pour 2024? Une sortie de crise est-elle possible? Avec : Dominique Arel, titulaire de la Chaire d’études ukrainiennes à l’Université d’Ottawa Charles-Philippe David, fondateur de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM Ekaterina Piskunova, chargée de cours au Département de science politique et au programme facultaire Études Internationales de l’Université de Montréal Louis Vachon, associé chez J.C. Flowers & Co Justin Massie, codirecteur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM Simon Hogue, chercheur à l’Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels à la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM Animée par Frédérick Gagnon (titulaire de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et professeur au Département de science politique de l’UQAM), cette table ronde est organisée par la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand, en collaboration avec l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) et le Réseau d’analyse stratégique, dans le cadre de la quatrième édition des Rendez-vous Gérin-Lajoie. ## L’Opération IMPACT : Renforcement des capacités et lutte antiterroriste URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/loperation-impact-renforcement-des-capacites-et-lutte-antiterroriste/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Les opérations internationales dans des contextes de conflits armés ne passent actuellement pas seulement par le combat. En effet, une manière souvent ignorée par laquelle le Canada tente de contribuer à la sécurité internationale est le renforcement des capacités. Quels sont les objectifs de ces opérations? Comment est-ce qu’elles marchent dans le contexte de lutte antiterroriste? Comment est-ce que ces opérations font face aux défis de la collaboration avec les pays hôtes et de la durabilité de leurs interventions? Cet évènement abordera ces questions dans le contexte de la lutte contre Daech au Moyen-Orient. Conférence du major général Michel-Henri Saint-Louis sur les opérations internationales dans les conflits armés au Moyen-Orient.   Les opérations internationales dans des contextes de conflits armés ne passent actuellement pas seulement par le combat. En effet, une manière souvent ignorée par laquelle le Canada tente de contribuer à la sécurité internationale est le renforcement des capacités. Quels sont les objectifs de ces opérations ? Comment est-ce qu’elles marchent dans le contexte de lutte antiterroriste ? Comment est-ce que ces opérations font face aux défis de la collaboration avec les pays hôtes et de la durabilité de leurs interventions ? Cet évènement abordera ces questions dans le contexte de la lutte contre Daech au Moyen-Orient. Le major général Michel-Henri Saint-Louis a récemment servi en tant que commandant de la FOI-IMPACT, la plus grande force interarmées des Forces armées canadiennes, qui fournit l'élément de commandement et de contrôle national du Koweït aux efforts de renforcement des capacités des Forces canadiennes en Irak, au Liban et en Jordanie. Au cours de sa carrière dans les Forces armées canadiennes, le Mgén St-Louis a été déployé dans le cadre de plusieurs missions dans les États baltes et au Moyen-Orient et est titulaire de trois maîtrises axées sur la guerre, la défense et la stratégie. Il est l’un des dirigeants les plus expérimentés des Forces canadiennes. Cet évènement est organisé par le Réseau d'Analyse Stratégique (RAS) et le Centre d'études sur la paix et la sécurité internationale (CEPSI). ## L’ordre international fracturé : Conséquences pour la défense du Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/lordre-international-fracture-consequences-pour-la-defense-du-canada/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Le Canada doit s’adapter à un environnement international imprévisible, caractérisé notamment par une compétition accrue entre grandes puissances et une multiplication des conflits régionaux auxquels il est appelé à contribuer. Le colloque annuel du Réseau d’analyse stratégique se penche sur la problématique d’un ordre international fracturé en comparant l’adaptation de différentes régions au nouvel échiquier international, tout en considérant la viabilité d’un modèle de coopération axé sur le multilatéralisme, ainsi que le rôle accru du renforcement des capacités dans la gestion de conflits. Rejoignez-nous en direct les 10 et 11 décembre  2020 : https://video.ibm.com/channel/f8WynBYvYFp Le Canada doit s’adapter à un environnement international imprévisible, caractérisé notamment par une compétition accrue entre grandes puissances et une multiplication des conflits régionaux auxquels il est appelé à contribuer. Le colloque annuel du Réseau d’analyse stratégique se penche sur la problématique d’un ordre international fracturé en comparant l’adaptation de différentes régions au nouvel échiquier international, tout en considérant la viabilité d’un modèle de coopération axé sur le multilatéralisme, ainsi que le rôle accru du renforcement des capacités dans la gestion de conflits. VISIONNER LES VIDÉOS DE L'ÉVÉNEMENT Programme du colloque   JOUR 1 - 10 décembre 9:30 - 9:45 Discours d’accueil des co-directeurs 9:45 - 10:45 L’ordre international fracturé (voir la vidéo) Modérateur : Jonathan Paquin (ULaval) Adaptation sous l’incertitude : Le leadership américain et l’avenir de l’ordre fracturé : Anessa Kimball (ULaval) La mer de Chine méridionale : Dimension militaire des comportements chinois : Ting-Sheng Lin (UQAM) Le Moyen-Orient, entre Trump et Biden : Thomas Juneau (UOttawa) 11:00 - 12:00 Conférencier d’honneur (voir la vidéo) Lieutenant-général M. N. Rouleau, C.M.M., S.C.M., C.D (ministère de la Défense nationale) 12:00 - 13:00 Lunch 13:00 - 14:00 Le renforcement des capacités et la gestion des conflits (voir la vidéo) Modérateur : Théo McLauchlin (UMontréal) Renforcement des capacités et sécurité sur le terrain? Lee Seymour (UMontréal) Le retour de la sécurité humaine? Bruno Charbonneau (Collège militaire royal de St Jean) Femmes, paix, et sécurité : Yolande Bouka (Queen’s)   JOUR 2 - 11 décembre 9:30 - 9:40 Discours d’accueil des co-directeurs 9:40 - 10:40 Le multilatéralisme en chute libre ? (voir la vidéo) Modératrice : Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (UBishops) Back to the Future? Les Nations unies dans la tourmente : Marie-Joëlle Zahar (UMontréal) Contributions de l'ASEAN au multilatéralisme et à l'ordre régional en Asie-Pacifique : Stéphanie Martel (Queen’s) L'Union Européenne face au multilatéralisme : Costanza Musu (UOttawa) 11:00 - 12:00 Conférencière d’honneur (voir la vidéo) Marina Henke (Hertie School) ## L’OTAN et la défense – Atelier virtuel 4 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/lotan-et-la-defense-atelier-virtuel-4/ Modified: 2022-11-03 VISIONNER LA VIDÉO Cet événement est organisé dans le cadre du Cycle d’ateliers virtuels portant sur le Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Ce quatrième atelier s’intéressera à l’OTAN et à la défense. Les tensions croissantes entre grandes puissances depuis le début des années 2010 ont remis le risque d’un conflit interétatique conventionnel à l’ordre du jour de la sécurité mondiale. Les États sont de plus en plus en concurrence dans des domaines en permanente évolution, tels que le cyberespace, l’espace et l’intelligence artificielle. Pour une alliance comme l’OTAN, cela soulève la question de savoir si les États membres sont bien équipés en matière de défense et de savoir comment les différentes responsabilités doivent être partagées. Le renforcement des capacités est un élément important de l’alliance, qui se manifeste par des activités de formation militaire et des exercices militaires conjoints. Quels défis la COVID-19 soulève-t-elle pour le partage des responsabilités au sein de l’OTAN ? Comment la pandémie a-t-elle entravé les activités conjointes ? A-t-elle amené les États membres à reconsidérer leurs investissements dans les capacités de défense de leurs alliés, notamment en ce qui concerne les dimensions genre, qui reçoivent souvent une faible priorité ? Comment la COVID-19 a-t-elle changé le fonctionnement des activités de renforcement des capacités sur le terrain ? L'événement se tiendra en anglais avec interprétation simultanée. Les participants pourront poser des questions en francais. Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19 – Cycle d’ateliers virtuels Au cours de la dernière décennie et dans un monde confronté à des défis de sécurité de toutes sortes, aux échecs désastreux des interventions directes en Irak et en Afghanistan, ainsi qu’à la restriction des budgets après la crise financière de 2008, le renforcement des capacités est devenu un outil de plus en plus important pour la sécurité internationale. Alors que les États, les organisations internationales et les ONG cherchaient à renforcer les capacités de leurs partenaires pour faire face aux problèmes de sécurité dans de nombreux domaines différents, notamment la défense, la contre-insurrection/contre-terrorisme et la consolidation de la paix, le renforcement des capacités n’était pas seulement considéré comme plus durable à long terme que l’intervention internationale, il était également jugé utile afin de parvenir à un meilleur partage du fardeau. La pandémie de COVID-19 remet en question les exigences et les utilisations du renforcement des capacités. Les déplacements de personnel et le travail en côte-à-côte avec des partenaires se traduisent désormais en de nouveaux risques pour la santé; la calamité économique qui a résulté de la pandémie soulève des questions profondes sur la manière dont les États et les organisations modifieront leurs politiques. Les États ont-ils reconsidéré leur engagement dans ce qui était souvent considéré comme des missions de faible priorité ? Vont-ils, au contraire, se tourner davantage vers le renforcement des capacités afin que d’autres puissent assumer une plus grande part des responsabilités de sécurité ? Comment les besoins en matière de renforcement des capacités et la conduite des missions ont-ils évolué avec ce nouvel accent sur la sécurité sanitaire ? Ces changements sont-ils réversibles ou permanents ? Les difficultés de la coopération internationale se feront-elles sentir dans ce domaine ? Cette série d’ateliers virtuels abordera ces questions et d’autres thèmes connexes. Nous explorerons l’état du renforcement des capacités avant la pandémie; évaluerons ses impacts sur les opérations de renforcement des capacités dans les opérations de défense, de contre-insurrection et de contre-terrorisme et de maintien de la paix; et analyserons les défis posés aux Forces armées canadiennes. Les panels rassembleront des experts universitaires et des professionnels de l’élaboration des politiques afin d’apprendre les uns des autres. Organisateurs Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## La crise au Mali et ses dimensions internationales – Table ronde URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/la-crise-au-mali-et-ses-dimensions-internationales-table-ronde/ Modified: 2022-09-30 Le Mali est au centre des conflits dans le Sahel depuis maintenant une décennie. Il se trouve à un moment charnière: crises politiques, transformations des interventions internationales, de questions profondes par rapport à l'opération de paix MINUSMA. Comment comprendre ces changements? Quelles en sont les conséquences pour le Mali, la région, les interventions internationales et les opérations de paix? Participant.es : Adib Bencherif, Université de Sherbrooke Bruno Charbonneau, Collège militaire royal – Saint-Jean Ousmane Diallo, Amnesty International Dirk Druet, Université McGill Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Bishop’s University Mamoudou Gazibo, Université de Montréal Présidente :Marie-Joëlle Zahar ## LA DIPLOMATIE CANADIENNE DANS LES TURBULENCES DU SYSTEME INTERNATIONAL URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/la-diplomatie-canadienne-dans-les-turbulences-du-systeme-international/ Modified: 2025-02-05 Closed Seminar : 9h-12h Échanges entre jeunes chercheur.e.s et praticien.ne.s du monde de la diplomatie et de la défense. Lieu du séminaire du matin : 3744 rue Jean-Brillant, Montréal - Local 6420 (6e étage) Inscriptions (gratuites et obligatoires) au séminaire S'inscrire au séminaire 9h-10h15 - Seminar 1 : Rethinking Youth and Multilateralism: State of the Field and Methodological Tools 10h15-10h45 : Pause-café 10h45-12h - Seminar 2 :  Strategic Competition Revisited: the State of Research and Methodological Reflections 12h : Pause lunch Colloque : « La diplomatie canadienne dans les turbulences du système international » 13h-18h pas d'inscription nécessaire Lieu : HEC Montréal - Édifice Côte-Sainte-Catherine. 3000 Chem. de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, QC H3T 2A7 13h00 : Mot d’accueil Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Co-Director, Strategic Analysis Network and Professor, Department of Politics and International Studies, Bishop’s University 13h10 : Discours introductif  13h30-14h50 - Panel 1 : L’empreinte des valeurs canadiennes dans la diplomatie mondiale Modération : Frédéric Mérand, Professeur et directeur du département de  science politique à l'Université de Montréal Henri-Paul Normandin, chercheur associé à l'Institut d'Études Internationales de Montréal (IEIM) Renée Larivière,  Senior Director of Programmes at Interpeace Cat Evans, Director of European and African Affairs at Independent Diplomat 14h50-15h00 : Pause-café 15h00-16h20 - Panel 2 : Respect du Droit international et responsabilité de protéger face aux conflits contemporains Modération : Nicolas Klingelschmitt, Chercheur émergent - Réseau d'Analyse Stratégique Jennifer Welsh, professeure en relations internationales à McGill, directrice de la Maxswell Bell school of public policy Marie-Joëlle Zahar, professeure en science politique à l’Université de Montréal, directrice du Réseau francophone des Opérations de Paix (ROP) Graeme Simpson, Principal Representative & Senior Peacebuilding Advisor, Interpeace USA; Adjunct Lecturer in Law, Columbia University School of Law 16h20-16h30 : Pause-café 16h30-17h50 - Panel 3 : Pratiques émergentes et nouvelles priorités internationales : (Dés)information, importance des jeunes, concurrence et sabotage diplomatique Modération : Andrew Abou Mourad, Cofondateur de United Nations Youth of Canada Lieutenant-Colonel Carl Chevalier, Commandant du Centre de formation pour le soutien de la paix (PSTC) Michael Eaton, Executive Director of the National Model United Nations Daniel Jean, professionnel en résidence à l’École d’affaires publiques et internationales de l’Université d’Ottawa, membre émérite de l’École de la fonction publique du Canada, membre associé de l’Observatoire des conflits multidimensionnels de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand à l’UQAM et membre du Conseil stratégique du Réseau d’Analyse Stratégique -Natascha Hryckow, Associate Fellow within the Global Fellowship Initiative of the GCSP and Former Coordinator, United Nations Panel of Experts on Somalia Ali Altiok, Former Youth, Peace and Security Project Officer at Interpeace Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Professeure titulaire, Université Bishop’s Nicolas Klingelschmitt, Doctorant, Université du Québec à Montréal   Andrew Abou Mourad, Co-fondateur du United Nations Youth of Canada ## La fin de la guerre en Afghanistan : Quel impact pour l’OTAN et les rivalités entre grandes puissances ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/la-fin-de-la-guerre-en-afghanistan/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > Le retrait d’Afghanistan a soulevé de nombreuses questions tant à Washington qu’au sein des capitales alliées. Le retrait d’Afghanistan a soulevé de nombreuses questions tant à Washington qu’au sein des capitales alliées. Quel fut l’impact de ce retrait sur les dynamiques de coopération au sein de l’OTAN ? Nous savons que la décision de l’administration Biden d’opérer un retrait unilatéral a créé des tensions au sein de l’alliance. Le Royaume-Uni et la France ont notamment exprimé leurs frustrations et ont tous deux conclu qu’ils étaient trop dépendants des États-Unis pour assurer leur sécurité. Plus largement, que signifie pour l’OTAN la fin de la guerre afghane ? Est-ce la fin des « out of area missions » pour l’organisation ? Le retrait américain pose aussi la question des rivalités entre grandes puissances. Est-ce que ce retrait est perçu par Pékin et Moscou comme une preuve de plus voulant que les États-Unis soient en déclin ? Cinq mois après le retrait, la Chine et la Russie ont-elles profité du départ américain pour accroître leur influence et faire des gains géostratégiques en Asie centrale ? Ces questions sont au cœur de ce colloque organisé par le Réseau d’analyse stratégique en partenariat avec l’Institut militaire de Québec. Télécharger le programme ## La Guerre en Ukraine : Quelles leçons à tirer et quelles perspectives de paix ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/la-guerre-en-ukraine-reglement-politique-potentiel-et-lecons-a-en-retirer/ Modified: 2023-02-21 > Le conflit en Ukraine a marqué le retour des grandes guerres interétatiques sur le continent européen. Après un an de batailles sanglantes... note: Toutes les interventions se feront en anglais, une interprétation en direct en français sera disponible. La guerre en Ukraine a marqué le retour des conflits interétatiques sur le continent européen. Après une année de guerre et de lourdes pertes, cette conférence fait le point sur les principales leçons militaires tirées et évalue les possibilités d’un règlement politique du conflit. Pour ce faire, elle s’appuie sur la contribution de trois réseaux d’analyse : le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), l’Initiative européenne pour les études de sécurité (EISS) et le Département des études de renseignement et de sécurité à The Citadel. Ensemble, ils ont réuni des universitaires et des experts des États-Unis, du Canada et de l’Europe dans une démarche véritablement transatlantique. La conférence est organisée en deux tables rondes. La première portera sur les principaux enseignements militaires tirés de l’analyse des performances militaires de la Russie, de l’Ukraine et de l’OTAN dans un large éventail de domaines, notamment les opérations militaires, la formation, la logistique, le renseignement et la dissuasion nucléaire. Cette table ronde dégagera une analyse fine des principaux points forts et points faibles des forces armées russes et ukrainiennes sur le champ de bataille, ainsi que du soutien apporté par l’OTAN à l’effort de guerre. S’appuyant sur les résultats de cette analyse, la deuxième table ronde examinera les perspectives d’un futur règlement politique entre l’Ukraine et la Russie. Elle traitera notamment du rôle des puissances américaines et européennes dans ce contexte. En outre, plusieurs questions seront abordées : la répartition des territoires occupés par la Russie, la relation de l’Ukraine avec l'OTAN, les garanties de sécurité pour l’Ukraine, le statut des minorités russophiles dans le pays, les réparations de guerre et la levée des sanctions occidentales contre la Russie. En s’appuyant sur la littérature scientifique sur la résolution des conflits et la reconstruction post-conflit, cette table ronde évaluera les règlements diplomatiques et les scénarios possibles qui pourraient émerger de cette guerre. Ainsi, cette conférence espère enrichir notre compréhension de l’effort de guerre passé, de sa trajectoire actuelle et des perspectives d’un règlement politique pacifique. Télécharger le programme (PDF 1.8mb) Programme 8:00-8:15 (EST) / 14:00-14:15 (CET) : Mot d’ouverture Larry Valero, Director of the Citadel’s Department of Intelligence and Security Studies Hugo Meijer, Sciences Po & Director of the European Initiative for Security Studies Jonathan Paquin, Université Laval et Réseau d'analyse stratégique 8:15-9:00 (EST) / 14:15-15:00 (CET) : Conférencier d’honneur Michael Kofman – Director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses and a Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C. 9:00-10:15 (EST) / 15:00-16:15 (CET) : Table ronde 1 : Leçons militaires à tirer : opérations, formation, logistique, renseignement et dissuasion nucléaire Modération : Eliza Gheorghe, Bilkent University Panélistes : Frans Osinga, Leiden University Hanna Shelest, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”/ Ukraine Analytica Alexander Lanoszka, University of Waterloo 10:30-11:45 (EST) / 16:30-17:45 (CET) : Table ronde 2 : Fin de la guerre et règlement de l'après-guerre : À quoi ressemblera un règlement politique ? Modération : Jack Porter, The Citadel Panélistes : Oxana Shevel , Tufts University Justin Massie, Université du Québec à Montréal Maria Popova, McGill University 11:45-12:00 (EST) / 17:45-18:00 (CET) : Mot de clôture ## La lutte réfléchie du Canada: Les défis de la délibération et de la démarche vers la paix URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/la-lutte-reflechie-du-canada-les-defis-de-la-deliberation-et-de-la-demarche-vers-la-paix/ Modified: 2024-01-22 > This conference proposed to explore how Canada can position itself by optimally engaging both with International Organizations and... *Cet événement sera présenté en anglais uniquement La lutte réfléchie du Canada: Les défis de la délibération et de la démarche vers la paix Le Canada a été à l'avant-garde de la création et du fonctionnement des organisations internationales en tant que plates-formes et forums de discussion entre les États, peaufinant notamment les outils d'intervention afin d'atténuer les conflits, de protéger les populations et de renforcer la sécurité nationale. Cependant, la concurrence stratégique entre les grandes puissances complique ces interventions, compromettant à la fois les outils et leur impact sur les conflits dans le monde. Cette conférence propose d'explorer comment le Canada peut se positionner en s'engageant de manière optimale avec les organisations internationales et les pays qui ne sont ni membres de l'UE ou de l'OTAN. Cet événement examinera la manière dont l'environnement de l'information influence la compréhension des Canadiens de leur propre rôle en tant que membres et partenaires d'organisations/institutions internationales et abordera les opportunités et les risques liés au partage du fardeau lorsque ce dernier est jumelé au maintien de la préparation opérationnelle du pays. La conférence vise à contribuer à la discussion actuelle et à faire progresser l’acquis des connaissances dans le domaine grâce à une analyse approfondie des priorités en matière de politique de défense. La conférence créera un environnement de discussion bien équilibré en s’appuyant sur la recherche et l'expertise provenant du milieu universitaire, du gouvernement, des forces armées, du secteur privé et des ONG.     *Cet événement est gratuit et ouvert à tous, aucune inscription n'est nécessaire.   Ordre du jour 09:15 - 09:30 Introduction:  Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Bishop’s University, Co-Director Strategic Analysis Network 09:30 - 10:30 Panel 1: Perception locale de la paix - au Canada et à l'étranger Chair:  Sasha Kardos-Machado (Bishop’s University) and Irma Susset  (Bishop’s University) Yvan Yenda Ilunga, Salve Regina University Maj (Ret) Nicolas Boucher, Consultant, Calian, former U2 MINUSMA Fifi Edu-Afful, Senior Research Fellow at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)Visiting Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence American University School of International Service and University of Maryland Depart of Gov’t & Politics Simon Delorme-Chalifoux, Consultant (Deloitte) /Lecturer (Université Laval), former  Deputy Chief to ICRC in Syria. 10:30 - 10:45 : Pause 10:45 - 12:00 Panel 2: Le rôle du Canada dans la prévention des catastrophes et les réponses humanitaires Chair: Regan Simpson (Bishop’s University) and Christina Lépine (Bishop’s University) Junru Bian, PhD Candidate , University of Ottawa Kai Schafer, Canadian Kimberley Process Office Marie-Pier Allard-Caron, PhD Candidate, Queen’s University Alexandra Vargas, Global Affairs Canada 12:00 - 13:30 : diner 13:30 - 15:15: Panel 3 :  Parler pour ne rien dire : Diplomatie Discussions informelles : Chair: Irmah Alao (Bishop’s University) And Angus Whyte (Bishop’s University) Vincent Pouliot, McGill University Ambassador Sébastien Carrière, Chief of Protocol of Canada 15:15 - 15:30 : Pause 15:30 - 17:00 Panel 4 : L'état de préparation du Canada au changement (climatique) Chair:  Mikael-Benedict Worku (Bishop’s University) and Gabrielle Liu (Bishop’s University) Pauline Baudu, PhD Candidate, Université du Québec à Montréal,  Research Fellow, Centre FrancoPaix de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand, non-resident Research Fellow Center for Climate and Security,  Fellow at at CDA Institute Nicolas Hubert, Post-doctoral researcher, Visiting researcher, Centre FrancoPaix Colonel Marie-Christine Harvey, CAF-CDSN Fellow 17:00- 17:15: Conclusion - Dr Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé 18:00 - 19:30 Conférencier d'honneur: Le rôle de la jeunesse Dr. Graeme Simpson, Columbia University/Interpeace - Interpeace’s Senior Peacebuilding Advisor and Principal Representative Graeme Simpson est le représentant principal d'Interpeace (NY) et conseiller principal en matière de consolidation de la paix à Interpeace, auteur principal indépendant de l'"étude de progrès" sur la jeunesse, la paix et la sécurité mandatée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, maître de conférences en droit à la faculté de droit de l'université Columbia à New York, professeur à l'African Leadership Center du Kings College à Londres, ancien conseiller civil du ministre de la sûreté et de la sécurité dans le premier cabinet Mandela et, à ce titre, l'un des principaux auteurs de la stratégie nationale sud-africaine de prévention de la criminalité. ## La politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/la-politisation-des-enjeux-de-defense-et-dorientation-strategique/ Modified: 2024-12-09 Lundi 9 décembre 09h00-9h10 : Mot d’ouverture du colloque Dr. Laurent Borzillo, chercheur invité (CCEAE, UdeM/ ENAP) 09h10-10h30 - Table ronde 1 : Politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique : réalités et conséquences Thèmes : impact sur les décisions lorsque les enjeux viennent à être médiatisés ; impact sur les décisions de défense (opex, acquisition militaire) ; les questions de défense, des politiques publiques traditionnellement vues comme consensuelles, en processus de polarisation. Modération : Pr. Frédéric Mérand (UdeM) Jean-Charles Larsonneur (député à l’Assemblée nationale 2017-2024) Laurent Charbonneau (UdeM) Laurent Borzillo, chercheur invité (CCEAE, UdeM/ ENAP) 10h30-10h45 - Pause 10h45-12h00 - Table ronde 2 : La politisation en période électorale : un enjeu de défense et/ou d’orientation stratégique peut-il devenir l’enjeu majeur d’une élection/de la vie politique ? Thèmes : élections en Moldavie et en Géorgie (automne 2024) ; le sujet de la guerre russo- ukrainienne dans les démocraties occidentales ; les enjeux de défense lors des élections. Modération : Pr. Delphine Deschaux-Dutard (Université de Grenoble Alpes) Florian Galleri (Université de Nantes) Justin Massie (UQAM) Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Romain Le Quiniou (Euro Créative)   Mardi 10 décembre 09h00-10h15 - Table ronde 3 : La politisation des enjeux de défense et d’orientation stratégique, une conséquence des ingérences et de la diffusion des fake news Modération : Manon Fitzpatrick (Université de Genève) Jean F. Crombois (Université américaine en Bulgarie) Maxime Audinet (IRSEM) Magdalena Dembińska (UDEM) 10h15-10h30 - Pause 10h30-11h50 - Table ronde 4 : Quelles contre-mesures contre les fake news et la politisation négative des enjeux de défense ? La politisation peut-elle être une solution ? Modération : Diya Jiang (Université McGill) Jean-Charles Larsonneur (député à l’Assemblée nationale 2017-2024) Cristian Preda (Université de Bucarest) Yannick Pincé (CIENS) Laurent Cordonier (Fondation Descartes) Tom Morin-Robinson (NATO's Public Diplomacy Division) 11h50-12h00 - Mot de conclusion ## La relation transatlantique : enjeux, perspectives et contestations URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/symposium-international-3-ans-de-la-plateforme-le-rubicon/ Modified: 2025-01-21 > Ce symposium international marquera donc les trois années d'existence du Rubicon. Les trois panels nous permettront de présenter la richesse Le 29 janvier, IRSEM Europe, en collaboration avec le Centre Thucydide et le Réseau d'analyse stratégique, organise un symposium international à l'occasion du troisième anniversaire de la plateforme Le Rubicon.  L'événement portera sur le thème suivant : « La relation transatlantique : enjeux, perspectives et contestations ». La conférence abordera 3 thèmes majeurs : Trump 2.0 et les relations transatlantiques : quel diagnostic ? Relation transatlantique et guerre en Ukraine Le tournant transatlantique : du Moyen-Orient vers l'Indopacifique Ce symposium international marquera donc les trois années d'existence du Rubicon. Les trois panels nous permettront de présenter la richesse d'expertise de nos auteurs et autrices, de nos membres et de celles et ceux qui nous accompagnent. L'occasion de remercier celles et ceux qui se sont associés au Rubicon, de les faire échanger au-delà de notre seule plateforme et de promouvoir, in fine, la discussion au sein des études stratégiques francophones. Programme  9h – 9h15 : Ouverture  Pr. Julian Fernandez et Pr. Justin Massie, Comité de direction, Le Rubicon Dr. Philippe Perchoc, Direction d’IRSEM Europe 9h15 – 10h : Conférence d’honneur - Les incidences des élections américaines sur les dynamiques transatlantiques  Pr. Martial Foucault, directeur de l’IRSEM  10h – 12h : Panel 1 - Trump 2.0 et les relations transatlantiques : quel diagnostic ? Modéré par Pr. Justin Massie, professeur de science politique, Université Québec à Montréal, co-directeur du Réseau d’Analyse Stratégique, co-directeur Le Rubicon Dr. Elena Lazarou, EPRS Dr. David Cadier, chercheur sur la sécurité européenne, IRSEM Dr. Alexander Lanoszka, professeur agrégé, Université de Waterloo Dr. Sven Biscop, directeur du programme « L’Europe dans le monde », Institut Egmont Pause déjeuner  13h30 – 15h : Panel 2 - Relation transatlantique et guerre en Ukraine Modéré par M. Gurvan Le Bras, SEAE Dr. Maud Quessard, directrice du domaine « Europe, Espace Transatlantique, Russie », IRSEM Anastasiya Shapochkina, présidente du think tank Eastern Circles, maitre de conférences en géopolitique, Sciences Po Dr Laurent Borzillo, chercheur postdoctoral à l’École d’administration publique Camille Grand, directeur du programme Défense, ECFR 15h30 – 17h : Panel 3 - Le tournant transatlantique : du Moyen-Orient vers l’Indopacifique Modéré par Dr. Antoine Bondaz, IDEA et FRS  Dr. Bayram Balci, chercheur au CERI-Sciences Po Dr. Marie Hiliquin, chercheuse postdoctorale, IRSEM Europe Elise Barandon, doctorante au Centre Thucydide et IRSEM, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas  Amélie Chalivet, doctorante au Centre Thucydide, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas et UQAM  17h15-18H : Conclusion - La puissance européenne en 2025 Pr. Béatrice Heuser, professeure, Brussels School of Governance Avec la participation et le soutien ## La Stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada : promesses, angles morts et arbitrages URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/la-strategie-industrielle-de-defense-du-canada-promesses-angles-morts-et-arbitrages/ Modified: 2026-02-16 La Stratégie industrielle de défense du Canada : promesses, angles morts et arbitrages À l’heure où le Canada s’apprête à dévoiler sa nouvelle Stratégie industrielle de défense, une question s’impose : que contient réellement ce plan — et surtout, que laisse-t-il de côté? Joignez-vous à Philippe Lagassé et Justin Massie pour une discussion franche et éclairante sur les promesses, les angles morts et les arbitrages qui façonneront l’avenir de l’industrie de défense au pays. Entre souveraineté industrielle, dépendance aux alliés, capacités critiques et retombées économiques, cette conversation vous aidera à comprendre ce que la stratégie annonce… et ce qu’elle implique. Anne Caroline Desplanques, journaliste pour Le Journal de Montréal, assurera la modération. L'événement est un webinaire, et se déroule intégralement sur la plateforme Zoom.  ## Le monde d’après ? La coopération internationale et la gestion des menaces traditionnelles et émergentes URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/le-monde-dapres/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Évenement à venir - Le monde d’après ? La coopération internationale et la gestion des menaces traditionnelles et émergentes Le monde d’après ? La coopération internationale et la gestion des menaces traditionnelles et émergentes 9-10 décembre, 2021, diffusé depuis Ottawa   2021 fût une année de transition pour certains pays qui entrent dans une période post-pandémie, et pour d'autres qui continuent de jongler avec des défis sécuritaires plus traditionnels ou pour qui les enjeux sanitaires sont encore prédominants. Cette transition s’exprime à deux niveaux avec d'un côté l'impact inégal de la pandémie et de la diplomatie du vaccin, et de l'autre côté, une diplomatie internationale qui doit conjuguer avec un environnement de sécurité toujours plus complexe. Le colloque examinera de manière plus spécifique les conséquences découlant de la pandémie de la COVID-19 sur la diplomatie internationale et les enjeux sécuritaires dans un contexte où la compétition entre grandes puissances effectue un retour en force. Il abordera cette problématique par l'entremise de deux tables rondes et un discours d'honneur publiques au premier jour, et un atelier privé lors de la seconde journée. Télécharger le programme [1.3mb] Programme Journée 1 - de 9h à 17h 9h00 - 9h15 Mot d’ouverture des co-directeurs du Réseau 9h15 - 9h20 Lancement de la plateforme Rubicon « Lancement du Rubicon, une plateforme unique dans le monde de la recherche francophone », Jean-Baptise Jeangène Vilmer (Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire, IRSEM), Ryan Evans (War on the Rocks), and Justin Massie (Université du Québec à Montréal) 9h20 - 11h15 Table ronde 1 - Le choc des organisations régionales et internationales Cette table ronde explore les répercussions de la COVID-19 sur les organisations régionales et internationales. Alors que la réponse logique à une problématique mondiale comme celle de la COVID-19 serait de miser sur des efforts multilatéraux, la pandémie a évincé les initiatives multilatérales et même régionales, au profit de l’augmentation des sentiments nationalistes et des réponses auto-intéressées de la part de nombreux États. Dans la période post-pandémique, les États pourraient ainsi investir davantage dans l’autosuffisance et redéfinir leurs domaines stratégiques, notamment en matière de sécurité sanitaire. L’écart croissant entre les réponses nationales, régionales et multilatérales à la COVID-19 remet en question le développement de la gouvernance mondiale et de l’intégration régionale, ainsi que l’avenir des organisations internationales et leurs capacités de coopération économique et politique. Les intervenants reviendront sur les tendances et les capacités d’adaptation de différents États, organisations ou entités internationales, face à ces grands enjeux. 11h15 - 11h30 Pause-café 11h30 - 12h30 Discours d’invité de marque: Kerry Buck (Anciennement Ambassadrice du Canada et représentante permanente de l’OTAN) modérée par : Charlotte Duval-Lantoine (Ottawa Operations Manager and Fellow, CGAI) 12h30 - 13h00 Panel étudiant Concours de la meilleure publication, modéré par Renée Filliatrault (Conseil stratégique, Réseau d’analyse stratégique 13h00 - 14h00 Diner 14h00 - 16h00 Table ronde 2 - Coopérer avec nos rivaux dans un monde post-pandémique Le déclin du leadership américain est considéré comme directement responsable des efforts des gouvernements nationaux pour se débrouiller seuls face à la pandémie de la COVID-19. L’incapacité du président Donald Trump à mener la lutte contre la COVID-19 et à faire des gestes diplomatiques, mis à part de blâmer la Chine, est apparue comme un signe renouvelé de la prétendue faillite de l’ordre mondial libéral. La Chine et la Russie ont contribué à la redéfinition la compétition entre grandes puissances et le sens classique/occidental de la guerre, ce qui rend la réponse de l’Occident, c’est-à-dire des États-Unis, d’autant plus importante. Considérant le potentiel de la pandémie dans la création d’une conscience mondiale, il serait logique que l’Occident y réponde en renforçant ses alliances. Dans cette optique, la seconde table ronde pose la question centrale suivante : comment coopérer avec nos rivaux dans un contexte post-pandémie ? Alors que la pandémie a intensifié de nombreuses rivalités, il demeure que la coopération, même avec ses rivaux, est nécessaire pour faire face aux défis et menaces entraînés par le retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances et la menace posée par des États révisionnistes tels que l’Iran. 16h00 - 17h30 Activité de réseautage par invitation Journée 2 : Atelier sur invitation 9h00 - 9h15 Mot d’ouverture des co-directeurs du Réseau 9h15 - 12h15 Atelier privé – Chatham house rules Inspirée des points soulevés lors des ateliers de la première journée, la seconde journée du colloque a pour objectif de créer un espace de discussion entre praticiens, chercheurs et autres experts de la sécurité. Il s’agit également d’une occasion de formuler des recommandations à destination du ministère de la défense. Pensé comme une discussion à huis-clos, l’atelier permettra de faire le point sur la coopération multilatérale en contexte (post)-pandémique ainsi que sur les défis et les opportunités qui la sous-tendent. Dans un contexte international en mutation, il sera question d’aborder comment le Canada, par l’entremise de sa politique étrangère et de défense pourrait s’adapter aux nouvelles réalités mondiales. Plusieurs questions méritent ainsi d’être posées: celles relatives à la coopération en situation (post)-pandémique, celles de l’évolution du renforcement des capacités et son adaptabilité à un contexte sécuritaire changeant et celles relatives à l’équilibre entre grandes puissances dans un contexte de repli de l’interventionnisme américain et d’une politique étrangère chinoise plus offensive. Les résultats émanant des discussions seront à la base de recommandations formulées au ministère de la défense et seront par la suite colligés au sein d’un document de référence. 12h15 - 14h30 Lunch – Activité de réseautage ## Le Québec face au réarmement mondial URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/le-quebec-face-au-rearmement-mondial/ Modified: 2026-10-22 > Cette journée réunit des experts et praticiens autour de trois questions liées : quelle place l’industrie québécoise peut-elle prendre dans ce réarmement, à quelles conditions la société québécoise y adhérera-t-elle, et comment le nouveau gouvernement québécois transformera-t-il les relations du Québec avec le Canada, les États-Unis et l’Europe ? L’événement sera enregistré pour rediffusion Le Canada s’est engagé dans le réarmement le plus important depuis la fin de la guerre froide : hausse rapide des dépenses de défense, toute première Stratégie industrielle de défense, création de l’Agence de l’investissement pour la défense, rapprochement avec l’Europe et redéfinition de la relation avec les États-Unis. Ce tournant survient au moment où un nouveau gouvernement, issu des élections du 5 octobre 2026, prend les commandes à Québec. Cette journée réunit des experts et praticiens autour de trois questions liées : quelle place l’industrie québécoise peut-elle prendre dans ce réarmement, à quelles conditions la société québécoise y adhérera-t-elle, et comment le nouveau gouvernement québécois transformera-t-il les relations du Québec avec le Canada, les États-Unis et l’Europe ? Programme 8h30 — Accueil des participantes et des participants Inscription et café 9h00 — Mot de bienvenue Justin Massie, professeur, Département de science politique, UQAM ; directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique 9h15 — Panel 1 — L’industrie québécoise face au réarmement canadien Présentation de l’étude Justin Massie, professeur, Département de science politique, UQAM Maya Bouton, chercheure émergente, étudiante à la maitrise en Science Politique, UQAM et Sciences Po Grenoble Walid Ferguen, chercheur émergent, étudiant à la maîtrise, Science politique, UQAM 10h45 — Pause 11h00 — Panel 2 : Quelle acceptabilité sociale du réarmement canadien? Anessa Kimball, professeure, Université Laval Jean-Christophe Boucher, professeur agregé, Université de Calgary Stéphane Roussel, professeur, École nationale d’Administration publique Animation : Justin Massie, professeur, Département de science politique, UQAM 12h30 — Dîner 14h00 — Panel 3 : Le nouveau gouvernement québécois et les relations internationales du Québec et du Canada Daniel Beland, professeur, Université McGill David Morin, professeur agrégé, École de politique appliquée, Université de Sherbrooke Jean-François Payette, Directeur scientifique, OPSA, École nationale d’Administration publique Stéphane Paquin, professeur, École nationale d’Administration publique Animation : Anessa Kimball, professeure, Université Laval 15h30 — Pause 15h45 — Causerie : Le Québec dans le monde Participants à venir 16h30 — Mot de clôture 16h45 — Cocktail de réseautage Crédit photo :  Christian Chomiak, Unsplash ## Le Rubicon – Saison 1 : promouvoir les études stratégiques francophones Symposium international URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/le-rubicon-saison-1-promouvoir-les-etudes-strategiques-francophones-symposium-international/ Modified: 2022-11-18 > Symposium international organisé à l’occasion des 1 an de la plateforme francophone d’analyse des questions internationales LeRubicon.org Le symposium se déroulera en français. Symposium international organisé à l’occasion des 1 an de la plateforme francophone d’analyse des questions internationales LeRubicon.org Mercredi 7 décembre 2022 14h00 – 18h30 CET (UTC+1) | 8h00 – 12h30 EST (UTC-5)   14h – 14h20 (8h-8h20): Ouverture Pr. Fabrice d’Almeida, Vice-Président, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas Dr. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, co-directeur Le Rubicon 14h25 (8h25) : Keynote La francophonie dans les études stratégiques Pr. Béatrice Heuser, Université de Glasgow Pr. Thomas Lindemann, Université Versailles Saint-Quentin et École polytechnique 15h – 16h15 (9h-10h15) : Panel 1 Franchir le Rubicon : les contestations de l’ordre international Modéré par le Pr. Justin Massie, Réseau d’analyse stratégique, Université du Québec à Montréal, co-directeur Le Rubicon Mme. Sofia Kabbej, Université de Queensland (Australie), chercheuse associée à l’IRIS Dr. Manon-Nour Tannous, Université de Reims-Champagne-Ardenne, chercheuse associée au Centre Thucydide et au Collège de France Pr. Jonathan Paquin, Réseau d’analyse stratégique, Université Laval Dr. Marie Robin, Centre Thucydide, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas Pause-café 16h45 – 18h (10h45-12h) : Panel 2 Voguer sur le Rubicon : les institutions européennes et transatlantiques dans la tempête Modéré par le Pr. Julian Fernandez, Centre Thucydide, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas & Université Galatasaray, co-directeur Le Rubicon Dr. Laurent Borzillo, Réseau d’analyse stratégique, Université du Québec à Montréal Dr. Anna Colin Lebedev, Université Paris Nanterre Dr. Giovanna de Maio, chercheuse invitée à l'IERES, Université Georges Washington Pr. Julia Grignon, Institut de recherche stratégique de l’École militaire M. Louis Perez, Centre Thucydide, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas 18h – 18h20 (12h-12h20): Remarques conclusives Pr. Jean-Vincent Holeindre, Centre Thucydide, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas 18h30 (12h30): Cocktail télécharger le flyer ## Les Forces armées canadiennes à l’ère de la COVID-19 – Atelier virtuel 5 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/les-forces-armees-canadiennes-a-lere-de-la-covid-19-atelier-virtuel-5/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > Ce cinquième atelier s’intéressera aux Forces Armées canadiennes à l'ère de la COVID-19. Le renforcement des capacités est devenu une part importante des activités des Forces armées canadiennes dans le monde. Ces opérations permettent au Canada d’avoir une influence sur la scène internationale et de contribuer aux efforts multilatéraux, tout en reconnaissant ses limites dans sa capacité à déployer des missions de grande échelle dans des contextes violents, comme en Afghanistan. La pandémie a cependant posé des défis considérables à ces activités. Certaines missions ont été suspendues, d'autres ont été réduites, et certaines rotations ont été interrompues, tandis que les FAC se sont efforcées de garder leurs membres en bonne santé. Que révèle la COVID-19 sur les priorités du Canada en matière de renforcement des capacités dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité ? Quelles leçons les FAC peuvent-elles tirer des opérations militaires outre-mer pour de futures pandémies ? Comment les effets différenciés de la pandémie selon le genre et l'ethnie ont-ils affecté les FAC et leur capacité à mener des activités de renforcement des capacités à l'étranger ? VISIONNER LA VIDÉO Cet événement est organisé dans le cadre du Cycle d’ateliers virtuels portant sur le Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Ce cinquième atelier s’intéressera aux Forces armées canadiennes à l'ère de la COVID-19. Le renforcement des capacités est devenu une part importante des activités des Forces armées canadiennes dans le monde. Ces opérations permettent au Canada d’avoir une influence sur la scène internationale et de contribuer aux efforts multilatéraux, tout en reconnaissant ses limites dans sa capacité à déployer des missions de grande échelle dans des contextes violents, comme en Afghanistan. La pandémie a cependant posé des défis considérables à ces activités. Certaines missions ont été suspendues, d'autres ont été réduites, et certaines rotations ont été interrompues, tandis que les FAC se sont efforcées de garder leurs membres en bonne santé. Que révèle la COVID-19 sur les priorités du Canada en matière de renforcement des capacités dans le domaine de la défense et de la sécurité ? Quelles leçons les FAC peuvent-elles tirer des opérations militaires outre-mer pour de futures pandémies ? Comment les effets différenciés de la pandémie selon le genre et l'ethnie ont-ils affecté les FAC et leur capacité à mener des activités de renforcement des capacités à l'étranger ? L'événement se tiendra en français. Les participants pourront poser des questions en anglais.   Panélistes • Stéphanie Bélanger, Collège militaire royal du Canada • LCol Pierre Leroux, Forces armées canadiennes • Theodore McLauchlin, Université de Montréal • Major Audrey Hudon, Forces armées canadiennes   Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19 – Cycle d’ateliers virtuels Au cours de la dernière décennie et dans un monde confronté à des défis de sécurité de toutes sortes, aux échecs désastreux des interventions directes en Irak et en Afghanistan, ainsi qu’à la restriction des budgets après la crise financière de 2008, le renforcement des capacités est devenu un outil de plus en plus important pour la sécurité internationale. Alors que les États, les organisations internationales et les ONG cherchaient à renforcer les capacités de leurs partenaires pour faire face aux problèmes de sécurité dans de nombreux domaines différents, notamment la défense, la contre-insurrection/contre-terrorisme et la consolidation de la paix, le renforcement des capacités n’était pas seulement considéré comme plus durable à long terme que l’intervention internationale, il était également jugé utile afin de parvenir à un meilleur partage du fardeau. La pandémie de COVID-19 remet en question les exigences et les utilisations du renforcement des capacités. Les déplacements de personnel et le travail en côte-à-côte avec des partenaires se traduisent désormais en de nouveaux risques pour la santé; la calamité économique qui a résulté de la pandémie soulève des questions profondes sur la manière dont les États et les organisations modifieront leurs politiques. Les États ont-ils reconsidéré leur engagement dans ce qui était souvent considéré comme des missions de faible priorité ? Vont-ils, au contraire, se tourner davantage vers le renforcement des capacités afin que d’autres puissent assumer une plus grande part des responsabilités de sécurité ? Comment les besoins en matière de renforcement des capacités et la conduite des missions ont-ils évolué avec ce nouvel accent sur la sécurité sanitaire ? Ces changements sont-ils réversibles ou permanents ? Les difficultés de la coopération internationale se feront-elles sentir dans ce domaine ? Cette série d’ateliers virtuels abordera ces questions et d’autres thèmes connexes. Nous explorerons l’état du renforcement des capacités avant la pandémie; évaluerons ses impacts sur les opérations de renforcement des capacités dans les opérations de défense, de contre-insurrection et de contre-terrorisme et de maintien de la paix; et analyserons les défis posés aux Forces armées canadiennes. Les panels rassembleront des experts universitaires et des professionnels de l’élaboration des politiques afin d’apprendre les uns des autres. Organisateurs Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## Les futures zones de tensions et de conflits d’ici 2030 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/les-futures-zones-de-tensions-et-de-conflits-dici-2030/ Modified: 2024-04-24 Modération : Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, Canadian Global Affairs Institute Intervenants : Peter Hammerschmidt, Sous-ministre adjoint (Politiques), ministère de la Défense nationale  Prof. Costanza Musu, Professeure à l’École des études politiques de l’Université d’Ottawa Son Excellence M. Michel Miraillet, Ambassadeur de France au Canada Son Excellence, Mme Trine Jøranli Eskedal, Ambassadrice de Norvège au Canada  Professeure Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Université Bishop’s   *Conférence en présentiel seulement. Nombre de place limitée (60) ## LES MÉANDRES DE LA POLITIQUE MONDIALE: Non-alignement, défis hybrides, nouvelles frontières URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/les-meandres-de-la-politique-mondiale-non-alignement-defis-hybrides-nouvelles-frontieres/ Modified: 2024-01-12 > Grandes puissances. Alliés et amis. Rivaux ou, plus récemment, ennemis. Ce sont des termes généralement utilisés pour désigner... télécharger le programme (PDF 4.4mb) Grandes puissances. Alliés et amis. Rivaux ou, plus récemment, ennemis. Ce sont des termes généralement utilisés pour désigner les pays qui captent le plus notre attention en ce qui concerne la défense et notre sécurité. La période actuelle est de plus en plus souvent décrite dans le discours public comme une « nouvelle Guerre froide » et le monde nous apparaît de nouveau comme étant divisé en blocs rivaux. Nous coopérons avec certains et sommes en concurrence avec d’autres. Pourtant, la plupart des pays du monde ne cadrent pas facilement dans l’une ou l’autre de ces catégories. Au contraire, ils se situent souvent dans un entre-deux (voire en dehors). Leur non-alignement nous préoccupe et nous craignons qu’ils choisissent l’autre – le mauvais – camp. Dans le contexte géostratégique actuel, les institutions internationales deviennent un lieu privilégié de compétition. Les grandes puissances s’y disputent le soutien des indécis, mais se heurtent à la résistance de tentatives visant à forcer ces derniers à choisir. Le ‘Friendshoring’, par le renforcement des alliances existantes ou le lancement de nouvelles alliances entre des acteurs « qui partagent les mêmes idées », offre aussi de nouvelles possibilités de coopération. Une telle stratégie entraîne également la fragmentation, la fermeture et l'exclusion, perçue par certains comme une provocation qui augmente la probabilité d'un conflit. En outre, les menaces croissantes sous le seuil de la guerre, dans les domaines de la cybernétique, de l'information ou de l'intelligence artificielle, mais aussi dans les ‘nouvelles frontières’ de l'espace et des grands fonds marins, peuvent donner lieu à de nouveaux types de tensions pour lesquelles nous sommes mal préparés. Dans ce contexte instable, les conséquences du changement climatique sur la sécurité, qu'il s'agisse de l'élévation du niveau des mers, des catastrophes naturelles, de l'insécurité alimentaire ou des déplacements de population, sont de plus en plus évidentes. Elles demandent une coopération inter-étatique qui s'avère de plus en plus difficile dans un contexte de relations volatiles entre grandes puissances, et conduisent à des tensions dans l'Arctique, la mer de Chine méridionale, l’Afrique et ailleurs. Ce colloque cherche à élucider pourquoi et comment ces divers « entre-deux » de la sécurité et de la défense sont importants pour le Canada. Il traite d'un large éventail d’acteurs, de questions et de zones géographiques où la coopération et le conflit se déroulent simultanément, chevauchant bien souvent les clivages entre « nous » et « eux ». Il montre que le Canada devrait s'intéresser activement à ce qui se trouve dans les interstices de sa politique de défense et de sécurité, surtout s'il souhaite être prêt pour les enjeux futurs qui nous guettent. Panélistes Marc De Bellefeuille, Directeur-adjoint – Cyber, Espace et Technologies émergentes, Politique des domaines et de la technologie, Défense Nationale Victoria Breda, Senior Analyst - PCO   Nadège Compaoré, Professeure adjointe, Université de Toronto   Jean Daudelin, Professeur agrégé, Université Carleton Gen. Wayne Eyre, Chef d’état-major de la Défense Philippe Frowd, Professeur agrégé, Université d’Ottawa Alexander Lanoszka, Professeur adjoint, Université de Waterloo Frédéric Lasserre, Professeur titulaire, Université Laval   Marion Laurence, Professeure adjointe, Collège des Forces Canadiennes   Michael Manulak, Professeur adjoint, Université Carleton Pascale Massot, Professeur Adjointe, Université d'Ottawa Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Professeure titulaire, Université Bishop’s   Justin Massie, Professeur titulaire, Université du Québec à Montréal Jonathan Paquin, Professeur titulaire, Université Laval Sarah Sharma, Professeur adjointe, Université de Victoria   Chercheur.e.s émergent.e.s Amélie Chalivet, Étudiante en doctorat, Université du Québec à Montréal David Dubé, Étudiant en doctorat, Université Mcgill Emmanuelle Rousseau, Étudiante en doctorat, Université de Montréal Programme: 9:00 – 9:15: Discours d’ouverture : Justin Massie, Codirecteur du réseau et professeur titulaire, UQAM 9:15 – 10:15: Conférencier d’honneur: Gén. Wayne Eyre (CEMD, FAC) Modératrice: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Codirectrice du réseau et professeure titulaire, Université Bishop’s 10:15 – 10:30: Pause de santé 10:30 – 12:00: Panel 1 - La coopération lors d’une ère de renouveau : Les nouvelles frontières Les implications sécuritaires et les menaces croissantes dans les domaines de la cybernétique, de l'information et de l'intelligence artificielle, y compris la "nouvelle frontière" de l'espace, exigent davantage de gouvernance, la conception de nouvelles règles et un modèle de coopération qui devient de plus en plus difficile à établir, car la concurrence entre les États transforme ces questions des questions d'intérêt national en un jeu à somme nulle. L'objectif de non-prolifération nucléaire reste insaisissable et cette même concurrence a ramené le réarmement au premier plan. Ce panel examinera les défis et les opportunités de coopération dans ces différents domaines de sécurité émergents, ainsi que leurs implications pour le Canada et le monde. Modératrice: Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Codirectrice du réseau et professeure titulaire, Université Bishop’s Intervenants: Alexander Lanoszka, Professeur agrégé, Université de Waterloo Michael Manulak, Professeur agrégé, Université Carleton Marc De Bellefeuille, Directeur adjoint – Cybernétique, espace and technologies émergentes, domaines opérationnels et politiques de technologie, défense nationale David Dubé, Étudiant en doctorat, Université Mcgill 12:00 – 13:00: Lunch 13:00 – 14:30: Panel 2 –  Au-delà des alliés et des ennemis: Les acteurs non-alignés dans la politique mondiale L'évolution de l'équilibre des pouvoirs mondiaux et régionaux a favorisé l’avènement d’un environnement plus complexe, accordant à un nombre croissant d'acteurs la capacité d'exercer une influence plus ou moins grande. Les institutions internationales se sont adaptées aux nouvelles réalités à mesure que les puissances émergentes continuent de gagner en importance avec l'expansion d'organisations telles que les BRICS. Ce panel explore l'impact de la multipolarité grandissante sur l'environnement mondial, dans un contexte où certains États exigent que l'ordre international fondé sur des règles change, certains avec plus d'assurance que d'autres, tandis que d'autres acteurs agissent à l’extérieur de ces organes formels afin de garantir l’aboutissement de leurs propres intérêts. Ce panel aborde un sujet souvent négligé de la politique mondiale : la résurgence du non-alignement, les motivations qui se trouvent derrière ce phénomène et les implications stratégiques pour le Canada. Modérateur: Jonathan Paquin, Codirecteur du réseau et professeur titulaire, Université Laval Intervenants: Marion Laurence, Professeure adjointe, Collège des Forces canadiennes Philippe Frowd, Professeur agrégé, Université d’Ottawa Jean Daudelin, Professeur agrégé, Université Carleton Emmanuelle Rousseau, Étudiante en doctorat, Université de Montréal Amélie Chalivet,  Étudiante en doctorat, Université du Québec à Montréal 14:30 – 14:45: Pause de santé 14:45 – 16:15: Panel 3 – Coopération ou compétition ? Le cas des ressources naturelles Les ressources naturelles sont inégalement réparties dans le monde. L’essor des pressions géopolitiques et le retour du nationalisme économique signifient que les États - et les industries - se positionnent pour concurrencer avec leurs voisins, leurs rivaux, voire leurs partenaires, afin d’en garantir l'accès. Le pétrole, les minerais et même l'eau font l'objet de convoitise, menant à des conflits interétatiques et intraétatiques, qu’ils soient clandestins ou déclarés. Cette réalité est d'autant plus complexe et inquiétante considérant le fait que le changement climatique a un impact durable sur la distribution et l'extraction (non) éthique de ces ressources. Ce panel discutera de l’impact de la quête des ressources naturelles sur différentes régions du monde, de la rivalité entre les acteurs pour les obtenir et de la manière dont ils pourraient éventuellement coopérer. Modératrice: Sarah Sharma, Codirectrice du réseau et professeure agrégée, Université de Victoria Intervenants: Nadège Compaoré, Professeure agrégée, Université de Toronto Pascale Massot, Professeure agrégée, Université d’Ottawa Frédéric Lasserre, Professeur titulaire, Université Laval Victoria Breda, Senior Analyst, PCO 16:15 – 16:30: Discours de clôture 17:00 – 18:30: Cocktail de réseautage au Novotel ## Les orientations stratégiques du Québec et du Canada : enjeux sécuritaires, enjeux diplomatiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/les-orientations-strategiques-du-quebec-et-du-canada-enjeux-securitaires-enjeux-diplomatiques/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > À l’heure de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, qui laisse présager de nombreuses répercussions politiques, économiques et militaires tant Heure de l'événement : 9:00 - 12:30 HAE (UTC-4) | 14h00 - 17h30 CET (UTC+1) À l’heure de l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, qui laisse présager de nombreuses répercussions politiques, économiques et militaires tant au niveau national qu’international, l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) et le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) vous convient à un grand événement intitulé « Les orientations stratégiques du Québec et du Canada  : enjeux sécuritaires, enjeux diplomatiques ». L’événement aura lieu le 23 mars prochain, de 9h00 à 12h30 (heure de Montréal), sous la forme de deux panels, le premier avec un accent sur l’Amérique du Nord et le second, dans une perspective internationale. Cette matinée est présentée à l’occasion de la troisième édition des Rendez-vous Gérin-Lajoie. Elle rassemblera des expertes et experts universitaires de renom et de la relève en recherche, des praticiens et des diplomates. Plusieurs questions d’actualité sur les défis et stratégies du Québec et du Canada seront abordées, dans un contexte marqué par un ordre international fracturé et le retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances. L’animation sera assurée par Justin Massie, professeur titulaire de science politique à l’UQAM et co-directeur du RAS, et par Mélanie Marquis, correspondante parlementaire à Ottawa pour La Presse. L’événement est gratuit et s’adresse à la communauté universitaire et au grand public. Avec la participation de : (par ordre alphabétique) François Audet, directeur de l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal Louise Blais, ancienne Ambassadrice et Représentante permanente adjointe du Canada à l’Organisation des Nations unies (2017 à 2021) Laurent Borzillo, stagiaire postdoctoral au sein du Département de science politique de l’UQAM et auprès du RAS Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, professeure invitée en science politique à l’Université de Montréal Justin Massie, professeur titulaire de science politique à l’UQAM et co-directeur du Réseau d’analyse stratégique David Morin, professeur agrégé à l’Université de Sherbrooke et co-titulaire de la Chaire UNESCO en prévention de la radicalisation et de l’extrémisme violents Camille Raymond, étudiante à la maîtrise au Département de science politique de l’UQAM et boursière Banque Scotia Scotia-IEIM 2021 Gaëlle Rivard Piché, analyste stratégique, Recherche et développement, pour Défense Canada Stéphane Roussel, directeur de recherche du Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur les relations internationales du Canada et du Québec (CIRRICQ) et professeur titulaire à l’École nationale d’Administration publique (ENAP) Visionnez l'enregistrement de l'événement!   ## Maintien de la paix – Atelier virtuel 3 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/maintien-de-la-paix-atelier-virtuel-2/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > In spite of their dramatic expansion at the end of the Cold War, peace operations have been challenged by problems of local ownership and sustainability and beset by the impact of resounding failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. VISIONNER LA VIDÉO Cet événement est organisé dans le cadre du Cycle d’ateliers virtuels portant sur le Renforcement des capacités à l’ère de la COVID-19. Ce troisième atelier s’intéressera au maintien de la paix. En dépit de leur expansion spectaculaire à la fin de la guerre froide, les opérations de paix ont été confrontées à d’importants problèmes d’appropriation locale et de durabilité. Leur légitimité a également été affectée par des échecs retentissants en Somalie, en Bosnie et au Rwanda. Les acteurs extérieurs étaient dans ces cas réticents à s’engager dans des déploiements ne pouvant être justifiés en matière de sécurité nationale. Les acteurs locaux étaient pour leur part mécontents par rapport à ce qu’ils percevaient comme des interventions ayant une faible compréhension des contextes locaux, préférant se tourner vers des solutions locales à des problèmes locaux. Pour sortir de ce dilemme, le renforcement des capacités des organisations régionales et des forces armées d’États touchés par les conflits a semblé être la réponse évidente. Cependant, deux décennies plus tard, ces efforts sont toujours en cours et leurs réalisations sont de plus en plus remises en question. Sur le continent africain, par exemple, les militaires formés à l’étranger sont fréquemment accusés d’exactions en matière de droits de la personne et de violence sexuelle et sexiste. De plus, malgré des engagements à plus long terme et une posture plus solide, les armées africaines doivent encore obtenir des résultats durables dans des contextes tels que la Somalie ou le Sahel. La pandémie réduisant les ressources disponibles et les capacités de circulation, comment le renforcement des capacités de maintien de la paix s’est-il adapté dans ce contexte ? Comment les opérations de renforcement des capacités ont-elles cherché à identifier et à relever les défis spécifiques de la pandémie, en particulier ceux reliés aux dimensions de genre et d’ethnie ? À quels défis ces opérations vont-elles finalement devoir faire face à l’avenir ? L'événement se tiendra en anglais. Les participants pourront poser des questions en francais. Panélistes • Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Université de Montréal • Cedric de Coning, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs • Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute • Mody Berethe, Director of the Peacekeeping Training School Renforcement des capacités à l'ère de la COVID-19 - Cycle d'ateliers virtuels Au cours de la dernière décennie et dans un monde confronté à des défis de sécurité de toutes sortes, aux échecs désastreux des interventions directes en Irak et en Afghanistan, ainsi qu’à la restriction des budgets après la crise financière de 2008, le renforcement des capacités est devenu un outil de plus en plus important pour la sécurité internationale. Alors que les États, les organisations internationales et les ONG cherchaient à renforcer les capacités de leurs partenaires pour faire face aux problèmes de sécurité dans de nombreux domaines différents, notamment la défense, la contre-insurrection/contre-terrorisme et la consolidation de la paix, le renforcement des capacités n’était pas seulement considéré comme plus durable à long terme que l’intervention internationale, il était également jugé utile afin de parvenir à un meilleur partage du fardeau. La pandémie de COVID-19 remet en question les exigences et les utilisations du renforcement des capacités. Les déplacements de personnel et le travail en côte-à-côte avec des partenaires se traduisent désormais en de nouveaux risques pour la santé; la calamité économique qui a résulté de la pandémie soulève des questions profondes sur la manière dont les États et les organisations modifieront leurs politiques. Les États ont-ils reconsidéré leur engagement dans ce qui était souvent considéré comme des missions de faible priorité ? Vont-ils, au contraire, se tourner davantage vers le renforcement des capacités afin que d’autres puissent assumer une plus grande part des responsabilités de sécurité ? Comment les besoins en matière de renforcement des capacités et la conduite des missions ont-ils évolué avec ce nouvel accent sur la sécurité sanitaire ? Ces changements sont-ils réversibles ou permanents ? Les difficultés de la coopération internationale se feront-elles sentir dans ce domaine ? Cette série d’ateliers virtuels abordera ces questions et d’autres thèmes connexes. Nous explorerons l’état du renforcement des capacités avant la pandémie; évaluerons ses impacts sur les opérations de renforcement des capacités dans les opérations de défense, de contre-insurrection et de contre-terrorisme et de maintien de la paix; et analyserons les défis posés aux Forces armées canadiennes. Les panels rassembleront des experts universitaires et des professionnels de l’élaboration des politiques afin d’apprendre les uns des autres. Organisateurs Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/making-sense-of-the-poly-crisis-a-view-from-down-under/ Modified: 2026-03-11 Making Sense of the Poly-crisis: A View from Down Under Une présentation de John Blaxland. Inscription pour participer à distance. Localisation en présentiel : Université du Québec à Montréal Département de science politique  315, rue Sainte-Catherine Est Pavillon des Sciences de la gestion, Local R-3540 Montréal (Québec)  H2X 3X2 ## Opinion publique et dépenses militaires au Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/opinion-publique-et-depenses-militaires-au-canada/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Avec Jean-Christophe Boucher, Professeur adjoint, Département de science politique-Université de Calgary Ce projet propose d’évaluer les facteurs influençant l’opinion des Canadiens en matière de dépenses militaires à l’aide de sondages expérimentaux. La compétition entre grandes puissances crée-t-elle un environnement international hasardeux qui justifierait une croissance des dépenses militaires afin de faire face à l’instabilité mondiale ? L’attitude du public envers les dépenses militaires est-elle influencée par le type d’interventions ou missions militaires auxquelles prennent part les Forces armées canadiennes ? Notre sondage, comprenant six traitements et un groupe contrôle (2 800 participants), fut déployé en juillet 2021 par la firme de sondage Nanos Research. Avec Jean-Christophe Boucher, professeur adjoint, Département de science politique à l'Université de Calgary et chercheur au RAS. *L'événement aura lieu en format hybride, en personne et en ligne. ## Préparer la Guerre. Comment transformer les forces armées URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/preparer-la-guerre-comment-transformer-les-forces-armees-2/ Modified: 2026-01-07 INSCRIPTION EN PRÉSENTIEL (UQAM) - Toutes les places en présentiel ont été comblées INSCRIPTION À DISTANCE (ZOOM) « Préparer la Guerre. Comment transformer les forces armées ».  La conférence sera donnée par Olivier Schmitt, professeur au Royal Danish Defence College. Elle aura lieu le 8 janvier de 9h30 à 11h30 au local R-3540 et sur Zoom. L'inscription est gratuite et obligatoire. Localisation en présentiel : Université du Québec à Montréal Département de science politique  315, rue Sainte-Catherine Est Pavillon des Sciences de la gestion, Local R-3540 Montréal (Québec)  H2X 3X2 ## Prêt, engagé et renseigné : Le Canada et le rôle du renseignement face aux menaces et défis émergents URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/pret-engage-et-renseigne/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > Les intervenants seront invités à discuter de l’évolution du rôle du renseignement au Canada, au sein des organisations internationales... L’heure d’événement : 8:45-17:15 HAE (UTC-4) / 14h45-23h15 CEST (UTC+2) Ce colloque est financé par le programme MINDS du ministère de la défense nationale du Canada, en partenariat avec le Centre sur la gouvernance sécuritaire et de crise (CRITIC) du Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean et le Centre Franco-paix.   Ce deuxième colloque annuel portera sur le rôle du renseignement pour répondre aux défis émergents : les changements climatiques, la pandémie et l’essor de nouvelles technologies, et l’intégration d’une approche genrée dans le renseignement. Ce colloque se penchera ainsi sur deux questions.  D’une part, comment le renseignement au Canada permet-il d’anticiper et de réagir à ces nouveaux défis, au pays et dans le cadre de sa collaboration avec ses alliés ?  D’autre part, quelles opportunités et contraintes ces défis génèrent-ils pour améliorer les pratiques nationales et internationales dans le renseignement afin de rehausser cette capacité d’anticipation et de réaction au Canada et à l’international? Les intervenants seront invités à discuter de l’évolution du rôle du renseignement au Canada, au sein des organisations internationales et des pays alliés et à évaluer de quelle manière le Canada peut se distinguer en répondant à leurs attentes et en mettant de l’avant des approches novatrices et proprement canadiennes, notamment une approche féministe du renseignement. Ce colloque sera bilingue et combinera les réflexions et les recherches de professeurs, de praticiens et d’experts et celles des étudiants au deuxième et troisième cycle.  Ce colloque permettra le partage d’analyse des tendances mondiales, des meilleures pratiques, des opportunités et des conséquences pour le Canada eu égard aux enjeux discutés.  Il mettra de l’avant les plus récentes recherches sur ces questions.  Ce format permettra également la mise en réseau de la prochaine génération d’expertes en matière de défense et de sécurité. Il favorisera également le perfectionnement des nouveaux et jeunes chercheurs.  Les produits livrables seront rédigés et créés par les chercheurs et par les étudiants afin d’optimiser les connaissances et recherches mobilisées. Les enregistrements de la conférence du 8 avril dernier sont maintenant disponibles ! Panel 1 : Nexus climat et sécurité : Vers un nouveau paradigme ? Panel 2 : Nouvelles technologies, nouveaux partenariats ? Collaborations et anticipation Panel 4 : Renseignement et collaboration multilatérale Télécharger le Programme (PDF 2.1mb) Chloé Berland - Étudiante à la maîtrise, Département de science politique, Université de Montréal   Junru Bian – Étudiant au doctorat Université d’Ottawa ## Prévalence et degré de pénétration de la désinformation russe relative à la guerre russo-ukrainienne dans l’espace informationnel en Occident URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/prevalence-et-degre-de-penetration-de-la-desinformation-russe-relative-a-la-guerre-russo-ukrainienne-dans-lespace-informationnel-en-occident/ Modified: 2025-08-14 > Prévalence et degré de pénétration de la désinformation russe relative à la guerre russo-ukrainienne dans l'espace informationnel en Occident 9 h 15   Mot d’ouverture et présentation des recherches menées et des données pour les pays étudiés parmi les « dyades » de l’OTAN Équipe de recherche dirigée par Laurent Borzillo, Ph.D. Pr. Stéphane Roussel (ENAP) 9 h 30  Les narratifs en lien avec la guerre russo-ukrainienne dans les sociétés démocratiques : teneurs et argumentaires utilisés / comparatif avec d’autres thématiques Modératrice : Professeure Magdalena Dembińska (Université de Montréal) ; POL-CAN *en attente* Pr. Florian Töpfl (Université de Passau) Pr. Justin Massie (UQAM) Marco Munier (UQAM) Balthazar Stengelin (McGill) Susanne Aschi-Glesius, consule générale d’Allemagne Megan Minnion (OTAN) *en attente* 11 h 00   Pause-Café 11 h 30 Les vecteurs des discours pro-russes en Occident / La réceptivité des sociétés démocratiques aux narratifs et aux fausses nouvelles développés par la Russie Modérateur : Zachary Lemyre (Université de Montréal) Anthony Seaboyer, directeur du Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society (CSAFS; RMC) Nicolas-François Perron (UQAM) Maud Quessard, directrice du domaine Espace Euratlantique (IRSEM) Pr. Anatoliy Gruzd (Toronto Metropolitan University) Aurélie Bonal, cheffe de la délégation européenne au Canada *en attente* Julie Renaud (UQAM) *en attente* 13 h 00  Déjeuner 14 h 00  Mesures et actions possibles pour contrer la pénétration des narratifs pro-russes, d’origine russe et d’autres pays Modérateur : Mathieu Gariepy, (Université Laval) *en attente* Pr. Nicole Jackson (Université Simon Fraser) Khrystyna Holynska, Ph.D. (RAND) Pr. David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke Oana Goga, Ph.D (INRIA) Franziska B. Keller, Ph.D. (University of Bern) Pr. Reihaneh Rabbany (McGill) *en attente* 15 h 30  Mot de clôture Laurent Borzillo, Ph.D (ENAP) ## Prévenir l’extrémisme violent : Une approche pan-disciplinaire URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/prevenir-lextremisme-violent-une-approche-pan-disciplinaire/ Modified: 2022-11-03 > L'extrémisme violent est une menace actuelle et croissante au Canada et dans le monde. Comme c'est le cas pour de nombreux problèmes... Heure de l'événement en ligne: 9:00-12:30 HAE (UTC-4) | 14h00-17h30 CET (UTC+1) En personne: 9:00-17:00 HAE (UTC-4) L'objectif de cette conférence est de présenter les recherches actuelles en matière de prévention de l’extrémisme violent (PEV) d'un panel. L'extrémisme violent est une menace actuelle et croissante au Canada et dans le monde. Comme c'est le cas pour de nombreux problèmes complexes, nous devons faire appel à l'expertise de plusieurs disciplines et rechercher des approches de prévention créatives et collaboratives. Cette conférence comprendra une matinée de panels d'experts en matière de PEV dans le domaine de la criminologie, de la psychologie et des sciences politiques. Le premier panel examinera les théories et les facteurs contextuels à prendre en compte dans la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent. Le second panel identifiera les leçons clés tirées de ceux qui travaillent dans le domaine de la PEV et la façon dont elles peuvent informer nos lentilles théoriques. Cette conférence réunira des experts en sciences sociales et en théâtre, permettra de partager les dernières connaissances sur la prévention de l'extrémisme violent et offrira un moyen engageant et interactif de mobiliser les connaissances auprès d'un public plus large pour combattre l'extrémisme violent au Canada. Si vous assistez à la conférence en personne à l'Université Bishop's, veuillez remplir ce formulaire à l'avance : https://forms.gle/YiTw5mVf2T47mt3M7. Veuillez noter qu'une preuve de vaccination contre le COVID-19 (deux doses) et le port de masques à l'intérieur sont exigés pour assister aux conférences en personne à l'Université Bishop's pour le moment. Télécharger le programme (3.6mb) Programmation  (En personne et en ligne): 9h00 à 10h30 : Comment la théorie informe le terrain Présidée par Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin Brûlé (Université Bishop's) Dr. Djallil Lounnas (Al Akhawayn University) Dr. Adib Bencherif (Université de Sherbrooke) M. André Abel Barry (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie) 10h30 à 11h00 : Pause de santé 11h00 à 12h30 : Comment le terrain informe la théorie Présidée par Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin Brûlé (Université Bishop's) Dr. Ghayda Hassan & Dr. Sebastien Brouillette Alarie (Université du Québec à Montréal & CPN-PREV) M. Micah Clark (Carleton University) & M. Andrew Pel (Moonshot CVE) Dr. Heather Lawford (Université Bishop's) - Qui je suis et ce que je laisse derrière : Encadrement des récits de vie d'anciens extrémistes dans le cadre de l'identité et de l'héritage. d'identité et d'héritage (En personne seulement) 12:30-14:00 : Dîner 14:30-16:30 : Théâtre du forum interactif 16:30-17:00 : Remarques de clôture Avec le généreux soutien de : l'Université Bishop's, la Commission des étudiants du Canada, le Fonds de résilience communautaire, Sécurité publique Canada et le Réseau d'analyse stratégique. ## PROGRAMME DE RECRUTEMENT DES OFFICIERS DU RENSEIGNEMENT DE LA DÉFENSE – Séance d’information URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/programme-de-recrutement-des-officiers-du-renseignement-de-la-defense-seance-dinformation/ Modified: 2022-08-17 > Interested in a career with Canada's National Defence? Civilian Defence Intelligence Officers provide decision making information... Note : Cet événement est en français seulement et ne sera pas enregistré. Intéressé par une carrière à la Défense nationale du Canada? Les officiers civils du renseignement de la Défense fournissent de l'information sur la prise de décisions, évaluent l'information et effectuent des travaux difficiles pour assurer la sécurité du Canada. Cette séance d'information s'adresse aux étudiants des cycles supérieurs qui souhaitent faire carrière à la Défense nationale du Canada. Le gestionnaire du DIORP et des anciens sélectionnés du DIORP feront une présentation suivie d'une période de questions et réponses. La présentation couvrira les détails du programme, les différentes directions au sein de CFINTCOM pour l'emploi des diplômés, et un résumé d'être un analyste du point de vue d'un ancien. LES OFFICIERS CIVILS DU RENSEIGNEMENT DE DÉFENSE Fournir des informations au Ministre de la Défense nationale (MDN), au Chef d’état-major de la Défense (CEMD) et aux commandants pour la prise de décision; Évaluer les informations politiques, militaires, scientifiques et techniques à propos de gouvernements étrangers; Des possibilités de développement professionnel; et Un travail stimulant avec des mandats variés. LE PROGRAMME DE RECRUTEMENT DES OFFICIERS DU RENSEIGNEMENT DE LA DÉFENSE (PRORD) Recrute, développe et forme des personnes talentueuses en tant qu'officiers du renseignement de défense, du niveau d'entrée au niveau opérationnel – un programme de trois ans ; Produit des officiers du renseignement de défense qui collaborent, qui savent s'adapter, qui proviennent de milieux diversifiés, qui ont un large éventail d'expériences et qui sont capables d’accomplir le mandat du ministère avec excellence; et Investit dans le développement d'officiers du renseignement de la défense afin de mettre en place une capacité de renseignement à l'échelle du gouvernement. LE PROCESSUS D'ADMISSION AU PRORD Annonce du concours; Présélection en ligne; Examen; Entrevue; Jury de sélection; et Nomination au PRORD ## Quel plan B ? Refonder la politique étrangère face à la politique prédatrice de l’Administration Trump URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/quel-plan-b-refonder-la-politique-etrangere-face-a-la-politique-predatrice-de-ladministration-trump/ Modified: 2025-07-07 > Cette journée, consacrée aux questions de sécurité et de défense, permettra de faire le point sur la période de crise historique que... Conférence organisée conjointement par l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM), le Réseau d’analyse stratégique et Le Rubicon, dans le cadre des Rendez-vous Gérin-Lajoie. Cette journée, consacrée aux questions de sécurité et de défense, permettra de faire le point sur la période de crise historique que connaît le Canada, alors que sa souveraineté est directement menacée.  Une synthèse des discussions tenues lors de l'événement est disponible ici.   Programme préliminaire 8h30 – Accueil 9h00 – Mot d’ouverture Justin Massie, directeur du Département de science politique (UQAM), co-directeur, Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), Le Rubicon François Audet, directeur de l’IEIM 9h15 à 10h30 – Que veut Trump ? Modération : Justin Massie (UQAM) Karine Prémont (Université de Sherbrooke) Julien Toureille (Chaire Raoul-Dandurand) Theodore McLauchlin (Université de Montréal) Henri-Paul Normandin (IEIM) 10h30 à 11h00 – Pause-café 11h00 à 12h30 – Quelles options pour les alliés ? Modération : Laurent Borzillo (ÉNAP) Jean Crombois (American University in Bulgaria) Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Chantal Lavallée (Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean) Frédéric Labarre (Collège militaire royal du Canada) 12h30 à 13h30 – Déjeuner 13h30 à 15h00 – L’adaptation européenne Modération : Jonathan Paquin (Université Laval) Laurent Borzillo (ÉNAP) Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Nicolas-François Perron (UQAM) 15h00 à 15h30 – Pause-café 15h30 à 17h00 – L’adaptation canadienne Modération : Laura-Julie Perreault (La Presse) Stéphane Roussel (ÉNAP) Justin Massie (UQAM) David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke) Yan Cimon (Université Laval) 17h00 – Mot de clôture Daniel Jean (ancien conseiller du premier ministre en matière de sécurité nationale) L’événement est gratuit et ouvert au public et à toute la communauté universitaire – les étudiantes et étudiants de l’UQAM sont notamment invité.e.s à participer en grand nombre à cet événement gratuit.   Partenaires officiels des RVGL L’IEIM est heureux de compter sur l’appui de ses partenaires : Le ministère des Relations internationales et de la Francophonie du Québec (MRIF) Le Conseil des relations internationales de Montréal (CORIM) ## Quelles leçons tirer de la guerre en Ukraine ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/quelles-lecons-tirer-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine/ Modified: 2024-09-12 *Cet événement se tiendra en français et en anglais   9h00 – Mot d’ouverture 9h15-10h45 : La guerre vue du Sud Commentaires : Justin Massie Amélie Chalivet : L’Inde face à la guerre en Ukraine Kevan Gafaïti : La guerre russo-ukranienne vue d’Iran : un test politique et stratégique peu concluant pour « l’axe Téhéran-Pékin-Moscou » ? Rachid Chaker : La guerre d’Ukraine vue du monde arabe Antonin Blanchard : Le non-alignement Égyptien face à la guerre russo-ukrainienne Pierre-Marie Meunier : Souveraineté, rapports de force et droit international : la ligne de crête chinoise du soutien à la Russie 10h45-11h00 : Pause-café 11h00-12h30 : L’évolution de la guerre Commentaires : Alexander Lanoszka Vincent Tourret : De quoi s’agit-il ? Les leçons de la guerre en Ukraine pour nos visions des conflits futurs Marco Munier : Comment prédire la guerre ? Isabelle Delumeau : Une lecture stratégique des aspects navals de la guerre russo-ukrainienne Walid Ferguen : Le pouvoir du narratif : désinformation, stratégie et prédiction des scénarios futurs dans le conflit en Ukraine 12h30-14h00 : Déjeuner 14h00-15h30 : Le soutien occidental Commentaires : Laurent Borzillo Justin Massie : L’avenir du soutien occidental Alexander Lanoszka « Plus ça change ... ? » : Les stratégies des alliés du flanc est de l’OTAN dans l’ombre de la guerre Russie-Ukraine Chantal Lavallée : Le soutien européen à l'Ukraine Maud Quessard : Les États-Unis et l'Europe : l'impossible désengagement ? Frédérick Gagnon : L’avenir du soutien américain au-delà des élections du 5 novembre 15h30-15h45 : Pause-café 15h45-17h15 : Les stratégies alliées Commentaires : Chantal Lavallée Laurent Borzillo : Le revirement stratégique de Macron Nicolas-François Perron : La stratégie Meloni Alexandre Courtemanche : L’échantillonnage militaire du Canada 17h15-17h30 : Mot de clôture ## Renforcement des capacités au jour zéro – Atelier virtuel 1 URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/renforcement-des-capacites-au-jour-zero-atelier-virtuel-1/ Modified: 2022-11-03 VISIONNER LA VIDÉO Panel 1 (25 septembre) : Renforcement des capacités au jour zéro Avec la participation de : • Théodore McLauchlin, Université de Montréal • Renanah Miles Joyce, MIT • Linnéa Gelot, Folke Bernadotte Academy Cycle d'ateliers virtuels Au cours de la dernière décennie et dans un monde confronté à des défis de sécurité de toutes sortes, aux échecs désastreux des interventions directes en Irak et en Afghanistan, ainsi qu’à la restriction des budgets après la crise financière de 2008, le renforcement des capacités est devenu un outil de plus en plus important pour la sécurité internationale. Alors que les États, les organisations internationales et les ONG cherchaient à renforcer les capacités de leurs partenaires pour faire face aux problèmes de sécurité dans de nombreux domaines différents, notamment la défense, la contre-insurrection/contre-terrorisme et la consolidation de la paix, le renforcement des capacités n'était pas seulement considéré comme plus durable à long terme que l'intervention internationale, il était également jugé utile afin de parvenir à un meilleur partage du fardeau. La pandémie de COVID-19 remet en question les exigences et les utilisations du renforcement des capacités. Les déplacements de personnel et le travail en côte-à-côte avec des partenaires se traduisent désormais en de nouveaux risques pour la santé; la calamité économique qui a résulté de la pandémie soulève des questions profondes sur la manière dont les États et les organisations modifieront leurs politiques. Les États ont-ils reconsidéré leur engagement dans ce qui était souvent considéré comme des missions de faible priorité ? Vont-ils, au contraire, se tourner davantage vers le renforcement des capacités afin que d'autres puissent assumer une plus grande part des responsabilités de sécurité ? Comment les besoins en matière de renforcement des capacités et la conduite des missions ont-ils évolué avec ce nouvel accent sur la sécurité sanitaire ? Ces changements sont-ils réversibles ou permanents ? Les difficultés de la coopération internationale se feront-elles sentir dans ce domaine ? Cette série d'ateliers virtuels abordera ces questions et d'autres thèmes connexes. Nous explorerons l’état du renforcement des capacités avant la pandémie; évaluerons ses impacts sur les opérations de renforcement des capacités dans les opérations de défense, de contre-insurrection et de contre-terrorisme et de maintien de la paix; et analyserons les défis posés aux Forces armées canadiennes. Les panels rassembleront des experts universitaires et des professionnels de l'élaboration des politiques afin d'apprendre les uns des autres. Organisateurs Theodore McLauchlin +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 47668 theodore.mclauchlin@umontreal.ca Marie-Joëlle Zahar +1 (514) 343-6111, poste 20325 marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca ## Renseignement dans le maintien de la paix: défis et opportunités URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/renseignement-dans-le-maintien-de-la-paix-defis-et-opportunites/ Modified: 2023-09-26 > une discussion avec le Coordonnateur du Renseignement et de l'alerte précoce Guillaume Darmé. Animé par Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé Renseignement dans le maintien de la paix: défis et opportunités une discussion avec le Coordonnateur du Renseignement et de l'alerte précoce Guillaume Darmé. C'est événement est animé par Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brulé, Bishops' University   Cet événement est bilingue | Par invitation seulement Guillaume Darmé a été nommé Coordonnateur du Renseignement pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix, le 1er Juillet 2017. Il est en charge de la mise en place de la Politique de Renseignement adoptée en 2017, ainsi que de la création et de la coordination d’un système de Renseignement pour les Operations de Maintien de la Paix (OMP) des Nations Unies ainsi que de la coordination de l’alerte précoce dans les OMP. Précédemment, M. Darmé occupait la fonction de Conseiller Spécial et Chef de Cabinet du Secrétaire Général Adjoint (SGA) des Nations Unies pour les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix (2012 – 2017), offrant son expertise technique et stratégique au SGA sur les questions politiques et opérationnelles liées aux OMP, y compris sur le Renseignement. De 2007 à 2012, M. Darmé a occupé diverses fonctions au sein du Centre de Crise (CDC) du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Français, dans l’équipe qui a créé le CDC tout d’abord, puis en tant qu’adjoint au Chef des Opérations. Pendant cette période, Mr. Darmé a effectué de nombreuses missions de secours à l’étranger, venant en aide à des milliers de citoyens français et européens de par le monde, y compris des otages. Il a été décoré de la Médaille d’Honneur des Affaires étrangères pour services rendus à la Nation. Mr. Darmé est titulaire de deux Mastères en Gestion de crise et Négociations Internationales, et Systèmes stratégiques de défense, respectivement. ## Retraite intensive de développement professionnel pour les chercheur.e.s émergent.e.s URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/retraite-intensive-de-developpement-professionnel/ Modified: 2024-04-01 Le RAS-NSA est fier d’organiser sa retraite professionnelle intensive intensive pour les chercheur.e.s émergent.e.s à l’Université Queen’s à Kingston, en Ontario, du 27 au 29 mai 2024. Les participants auront l’opportunité de perfectionner leurs compétences en matière de développement et d’exécution de recherche, de mobilisation des connaissances, de sensibilisation et de communication, tout en recevant des informations concrètes et des formations par le biais de modules sur ce qu’implique réellement la recherche dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense canadiennes. Pendant deux jours, ils prendront part à plusieurs modules qui abordent chaque étape du processus de recherche, du début à la fin. Au troisième jour, ils se familiariseront avec la formation à la BFC-Kingston avant de se diriger au colloque annuel du RAS-NSA, qui aura lieu le 30 mai 2024.   Programme préliminaire Jour 1 - 27 mai 2024 9h30 - 10h30 : Introduction et activités brise-glace Discours de bienvenue et établissement d’objectifs. 10h30 - 10h45 : Pause de santé 10 h 45 - 12 h 15 : Module 1, Opérations militaires et communauté de défense Comment la recherche et l’analyse stratégique informent-elles les opérations militaires et les activités de défense ? En gardant cette question importante à l’esprit, cette séance se concentre sur l’interaction entre la recherche et la pratique. L’intégration de l’expertise externe est encouragée par le programme MINDS, mais l’engagement académique-militaire présente à la fois des opportunités et des défis. Cette séance est conçue afin de fournir des exemples de possibilités de connexion entre la recherche et les affaires militaires, ainsi que des stratégies pour améliorer la communication au-delà des divisions professionnelles. 12 h 15 - 13 h 15 : Pause de dîner Mentorat accéléré. 13:45 - 15:15 : Module 2, L’éthique de la recherche et les défis occasionnés par les environnements de travail sur le terrain Comment est-ce que les étudiants devraient aborder les aspects éthiques et sécuritaires de leur recherche ? Comment peuvent-ils se préparer efficacement aux aspects les plus complexes et les plus difficiles du travail sur le terrain ? Ce module est conçu pour donner un aperçu des considérations à prendre en compte lors de la réception d’informations sensibles, de voyages dans des zones plus instables et de la navigation dans des contextes locaux imprévisibles. 15:15 - 15:30 : Pause de santé 15h30 - 17h00 : Module 3, Organisation/logistique du travail sur le terrain Un élément parfois négligé, mais tout aussi important, d’un projet de recherche réussi est lié à la planification et à la logistique. Il est essentiel pour un chercheur de savoir qui contacter, comment les approcher et quelles sont les étapes à suivre pour organiser le travail sur le terrain. Ce module est conçu pour donner aux chercheur.e.s émergent.e.s des attentes réalistes sur ce que le travail de terrain implique au niveau pratique et pour proposer des conseils sur la manière de développer des réseaux de recherche au-delà du milieu académique. 18:00 - 20:00 : Souper   Jour 2 - 28 mai 2024 9h30 - 10h30 : Module 4, L’institution militaire 101 Pour les non-initiés, les opérations militaires sont entourées de concepts compliqués et d’une terminologie (et d’acronymes) inaccessibles. Ce module vise à familiariser les nouveaux boursiers avec la terminologie et les expériences du milieu militaire, ainsi qu’à leur fournir les connaissances nécessaires pour travailler et étudier au sein de la communauté de défense au Canada. 10h30 - 10h45 : Pause de santé 10 h 45 - 12 h 15 : Module 5, Poursuivre vos projets : Publications, sensibilisation et projets dérivés Que se passe-t-il après la collecte et l’analyse des données? Comment les nouveaux chercheurs peuvent-ils tirer le meilleur parti de leur recherche et de leur travail intellectuel? Ce module est conçu pour doter chercheurs émergents d’idées sur la façon de faire progresser leurs projets par le biais de nouvelles publications, d’actions de sensibilisation du grand public et de projets dérivés. 12:15 - 13:15 : Pause de dîner Stations de photos de portrait. 13 h 45 - 15 h 15 : Module 6, partie 1, Formation médiatique Un aspect essentiel de l’entreprise académique est désormais le travail ‘orienté vers le public’ que les chercheur.e.s doivent effectuer. Un élément important de ce travail relève de la rédaction d’éditoriaux et de courts textes destinés à informer le grand public tout en étant réactifs à l’actualité. Ce module est conçu pour former les chercheur.e.s émergent.e.s à identifier où et comment présenter leurs idées, comment écrire rapidement, et comment cultiver leur réputation en tant qu’intellectuel public auprès des journalistes et des médias variés. 15 h 15 - 15 h 30 : Pause de santé 15 h 30 - 17 h 00 : Module 6, Partie 2, Formation médiatique Accorder des entrevues à la radio et à la télévision peut être intimidant. Pourtant, de plus en plus, les universités et le gouvernement valorisent le travail orienté vers le public que font leurs chercheurs afin de publiciser la recherche auprès du grand public. Ce module vise à former les chercheur(e)s émergent(e)s afin qu’ils puissent se préparer pour de telles entrevues, anticiper les questions, déterminer les messages clés qu’ils souhaitent transmettre, ainsi que s’assurer de ne pas dévier de leur message lors du moment opportun. 18:00 - 20:00 : Souper   Jour 3 - 29 mai 2024 9 h 30 - 14 h 00 : Familiarisation avec la formation à la BFC Kingston   ## RETROUVER NOTRE CHEMIN : Définir une stratégie internationale cohérente pour le Canada URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/retrouver-notre-chemin-definir-une-strategie-internationale-coherente-pour-le-canada/ Modified: 2022-09-21 > Dans quelle direction le Canada va-t-il? Quelle devrait être sa place sur la scène internationale? Placé à la croisée des chemins devant... Inscription gratuite — l’inscription est maintenant ouverte (remarque : il s’agit d’un événement hybride avec des options d’inscription pour participer en salle ou en ligne. Les places sont limitées, alors inscrivez-vous sans délai pour réserver votre place) Programme (PDF 936kb) Dans quelle direction le Canada va-t-il? Quelle devrait être sa place sur la scène internationale? Placé à la croisée des chemins devant des changements globaux, il fait face à de nouvelles menaces, mais aussi à de nombreuses opportunités. Dans un contexte de remise en question de sa défense et des meilleurs moyens d'assurer sa sécurité, rejoignez des experts et praticiens pour comprendre notre époque à travers des discussions de fond sur la politique internationale du Canada. Après deux échecs consécutifs pour accéder au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et des capacités militaires en déclin, la place du Canada sur la scène internationale est remise en question. Alors que l’évolution du rôle des grandes puissances et l’affaiblissement des normes internationales sont au cœur des débats, une baisse significative de l’activisme diplomatique canadien est observable. Au même moment, la politique de défense canadienne souffre elle aussi parfois de manque de clarté. Développer une stratégie proactive pour repositionner le Canada sur l'échiquier international pourrait cependant changer la donne. Afin de prendre pleinement conscience de l’évolution rapide de l’environnement global de la sécurité, ce colloque fait le point sur l’état de l’environnement international et des nouvelles menaces. Les tables-rondes aborderont les atouts stratégiques du Canada pour y faire face ainsi que ses intérêts et priorités pour mieux dégager une cohérence stratégique canadienne à l’international afin de présenter l’esquisse du prochain chemin à prendre.  Dans le cadre de l'élaboration de ce colloque, le RAS a organisé une série de consultations avec ses chercheurs afin de proposer des recommandations simples au ministère de la Défense nationale. Ce rapport est le résultat de ces consultations. Cliquez sur le bouton pour télécharger le rapport complet. Rapport RAS (PDF 160kb) Jour 1 - 22 sept. 2022 - Ouvert au public, Centre national des Arts 9 :00 – 9:15 – Mot d’ouverture Stéfanie von Hlakty (Professeure agrégée, Université Queen’s) et Justin Massie (Professeur titulaire, Université du Québec à Montréal)  9:15 – 10:15 – Table-ronde sur la défense Canadienne Modérateurs : Stéfanie von Hlakty (Professeure agrégée, Université Queen’s) et Justin Massie (Professeur titulaire, Université du Québec à Montréal)  Intervenants: Roland Paris (Professeur titulaire, University of Ottawa) Kerry Buck (Senior Fellow, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa) Jean-Christophe Boucher (Professeure adjointe, University of Calgary) 10 :15 – 10:30 – Pause 10 :30 – 12 :00 – Panel 1 : Développer une approche multi-domaine dans les nouveaux espaces de confrontation. Prolifération technologique, exploitation de nouveaux espaces et menaces multidimensionnelles—qu’est-ce que ces concepts signifient et qu’impliquent-ils? Ce panel élucidera ces deux questions en explorant les répercussions qu’auront ces nouvelles menaces pour le Canada, sa population et sa position dans le monde. Avec l’élargissement de l’espace géostratégique en direction de l’Asie et l’émergence du cyberespace comme champ de bataille entre les nations, les confrontations interétatiques vont désormais plus loin que les simples champs économiques et militaires. Les experts de ce panel fourniront observations et analyses afin de permettre à tous de mieux comprendre cette réalité et ce qu’une approche multi-domaine pour le Canada signifierait réellement. Modérateur : Émile Lambert-Deslandes (doctorant, Université Queen’s) Intervenants : Gaëlle Rivard Piché (Analyste stratégique, Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada) Gregory Smith (Major-Général, FAC) Stéphanie Martel (Professeure adjointe, Université Queen’s) Justin Massie (Professeur titulaire, Université du Québec à Montréal) 12:00 – 13:00 – Dîner 13 :00 – 14:30 – Panel 2 : Les atouts stratégiques canadiens pour la coopération régionale et internationale. La politique internationale du Canada s’insère dans une démarche consciemment multilatérale. Ce panel sur la place que le Canada prend au sein de multiples institutions régionales et internationales comme « middle power » afin de faire valoir ses intérêts stratégiques. Il dispose de nombreux atouts pour mettre en œuvre sa politique internationale—il suffit de les identifier, puis de les exploiter. Afin de comprendre comment le Canada pourrait conserver et augmenter son statut à l’international, les experts de ce panel procéderont à un examen critique de ses capacités à maintenir ses engagements et à en créer de nouveaux. En somme, ils viseront à identifier la place que la coopération peut jouer dans la politique étrangère et de défense du Canada. Modératrice : Renée Filiatrault (Ancienne agente du service extérieur)  Intervenants : Theodore McLauchlin (Professeur agrégé, Université de Montréal) Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé (Professeure titulaire, Université Bishop’s) Kerry Buck (Senior Fellow, École supérieure d’affaires publiques et internationales) 14:30 – 14:50 – Pause 14:50 – 15:10 – Panel étudiant – CONCOURS DE LA MEILLEURE NOTE STRATÉGIQUE Modératrice : Johanna Masse (Chercheuse post-doctorale, Université Queen's) 15:10 – 16:40 – Panel #3: La cohérence stratégique du Canada. Invasion de l’Ukraine par la Russie, conflits en zone grise, affaiblissement de l’hégémonie américaine et montée en puissance la Chine—le monde de 2022 est en ébullition. Coincé entre ses alliés aux intérêts parfois divergents et ses rivaux, le Canada se retrouve confronté au retour de la compétition entre grandes puissances. Face à cette situation, il doit s’adapter. Mais comment le faire de manière cohérente? Ce panel évaluera comment le Canada pourrait concevoir une politique étrangère cohérente en adéquation avec ses valeurs, mais surtout ses intérêts nationaux. Définir ceux-ci, ses priorités stratégiques globales et le budget nécessaire pour leur mise en œuvre est le défi auquel s’attaqueront les experts. Modérateur : Laurent Borzillo (Stagiaire postdoctoral, UQAM) Intervenants : Philippe Beaulieu Brossard (Professeur adjoint, Collège des Forces canadiennes) Chantal Lavallée (Professeure adjointe, Collège militaire royal de St-Jean) Jonathan Paquin (Professeur titulaire, Université Laval) Gordon Venner (Ancien sous-ministre délégué, ministère de la Défense nationale) 16:40 - 16:55: Introduction de l’Indice des déploiements militaires Justin Massie (Professeur titulaire, Université du Québec à Montréal) et Barbora Tallova (Étudiante en maîtrise, Université d'Oxford) 16:55 – 17:00 – Mots de clôture Stéfanie von Hlakty (Professeure agrégée, Université Queen’s) et Justin Massie (Professeur titulaire, Université du Québec à Montréal)  17:00 – 18:30 – Activité de Réseautage au Centre national des Arts   ## S’allier et résister dans un monde en reconfiguration : le Canada à l’heure des choix URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/sallier-et-resister-dans-un-monde-en-reconfiguration-le-canada-a-lheure-des-choix/ Modified: 2025-10-09 À la lumière des orientations du premier budget du gouvernement Carney, attendu cet automne, cette table ronde réunira des expertes et experts de l’UQAM, membres de l’IEIM, qui offriront leurs perspectives sur le positionnement du Canada et les stratégies à adopter pour faire face à différentes problématiques mondiales. À l’occasion de la rentrée universitaire 2025-2026, l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) vous convie à la table ronde “S’allier et résister dans un monde en reconfiguration : le Canada à l’heure des choix”, qui aura lieu le vendredi 17 octobre 2025, de 12h30 à 14h00, au salon Orange du Centre Pierre-Péladeau de l’UQAM (300, boul. De Maisonneuve Est, Montréal). L’événement, aussi offert en ligne, est gratuit et s’adresse tant à la communauté universitaire, aux médias qu’au grand public. Un léger buffet sera servi à compter de 12h. Dans l’attente des orientations du premier budget du gouvernement Carney, attendu cet automne, cette table ronde réunira des expertes et experts de l’UQAM, membres de l’IEIM, qui offriront leurs perspectives sur le positionnement du Canada et les stratégies à adopter pour faire face à différentes problématiques mondiales.   Comment résister dans un contexte où le multilatéralisme est fortement affaibli et où le traditionnel allié américain fait désormais cavalier seul?   Dans ce monde en reconfiguration, sur quelles nouvelles alliances le Canada doit-il miser en priorité?  Les actions envisagées par le gouvernement fédéral sont-elles suffisamment innovantes? Sont-elles compatibles avec les vulnérabilités de certains groupes de notre société?   Ces questions seront abordées par nos panélistes sous différents angles :   Relations Canada-États-Unis : Frédérick Gagnon, professeur au Département de science politique, UQAM, titulaire de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques   Droit international, migrations : Ndeye Dieynaba Ndiaye, professeure au Département des sciences juridiques, UQAM, directrice de l’Observatoire sur les migrations internationales, les réfugiés, les apatrides et l’asile (OMIRAS)  Économie et commerce international : Julien Martin, professeur au Département des sciences économiques, ESG-UQAM, membre de l’équipe de recherche sur le Développement économique et les inégalités des territoires  Stratégie et défense : Justin Massie, professeur et directeur du Département de science politique, UQAM, co-directeur, Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS), Le Rubicon  Aide humanitaire et coopération : François Audet, professeur à l’ESG-UQAM, directeur de l’Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM) et de l’Observatoire canadien sur les crises et l’action humanitaires(OCCAH).  Organisé par l'Institut d’études internationales de Montréal (IEIM), la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, l’équipe de recherche sur le Développement économique et les inégalités des territoires, le Réseau d’analyse stratégique (RAS) et l’Observatoire sur les migrations internationales, les réfugiés, les apatrides et l’asile (OMIRAS).           ## Séance d’information sur le Programme de recrutement d’agent.e.s des politiques au ministère de la Défense nationale URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/programme-de-recrutement/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Séance d’information sur le Programme de recrutement d'agent.e.s des politiques au ministère de la Défense nationale Intéressé.e à vous joindre au Programme de recrutement d'agent.e.s des politiques au ministère de la Défense nationale ?  Cette séance d'information sur le Programme de recrutement d'agent.e.s des politiques (PRAP) au ministère de la Défense nationale fournira des informations sur notre programme de perfectionnement professionnel de trois ans et expliquera pourquoi et comment postuler. Il y aura suffisamment de temps pour poser vos questions à un ancien membre du programme après la présentation de 30-35 min.   Le PRAP peut être d’intérêt pour vous si vous : Détenez la citoyenneté canadienne ou la résidence permanente Détenez une maîtrise d’une université reconnue (complétée au plus tard le 31 juillet 2022) en sciences sociales, en sciences humaines, en arts ou dans une autre discipline liée à la sécurité et à la défense Avez de l’expérience de la recherche, de l’analyse et de la rédaction de dossiers liés aux affaires internationales, à la défense ou à la politique publique  Participer à cet événement vous permettra de : En savoir plus sur le PRAP, ce qu'il comporte, pourquoi et comment postuler Obtenir des conseils utiles sur chaque étape du processus de candidature Vous positionner pour une carrière dynamique qui vous permettra de non seulement façonner votre avenir, mais de façonner la Défense. Pour de plus amples renseignements sur le Programme de recrutement d'agent.e.s des politiques, veuillez visiter www.canada.ca/defense-prap ## Sensibiliser les sociétés aux enjeux de défense URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/sensibiliser-les-societes-aux-enjeux-de-defense/ Modified: 2025-05-07 À l'occasion des 80 ans de la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale en Europe, le Forum de Défense et de Stratégie, l'Association France-Canada et l'Ambassade de France au Canada organisent un évènement le 8 mai portant sur la sensibilisation des sociétés aux enjeux de défense au sein de la communauté transatlantique et comprenant un keynote introductif revenant sur la relation franco-canadienne. Keynote : La relation franco-canadienne à l’aune des 80 ans de la capitulation et de la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale en Europe Table ronde : Le retour de la prédation sans filtre sur la scène internationale : comment sensibiliser les sociétés et les élites aux enjeux de défense et de dissuasion ? Modération : Prof. Sarah-Myriam Marin-Brulé, Université Bishop’s Prof. Thomas Juneau, Ecole des études politiques de l’Université d’Ottawa Geneviève Tuts, Ambassadrice pour l’Union européenne au Canada Matthias Lüttenberg, Ambassadeur d’Allemagne au Canada Générale Jennie Carignan, cheffe d’état-major de la Défense canadienne Les échanges seront suivis d’un cocktail à l’Ambassade. ## Symposium annuel IRSEM-RAS : Guerres de l’information et Alliances stratégiques URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/symposium-annuel-irsem-ras-guerres-de-linformation-et-alliances-strategiques/ Modified: 2022-07-28 > Un premier symposium annuel entre les chercheurs français et canadiens issus de l'Institut de Recherche stratégique de l'École militaire (IRSEM) et du Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS) aura lieu le 21 juin 2022. Un premier symposium annuel entre les chercheurs français et canadiens issus de l'Institut de Recherche stratégique de l'École militaire (IRSEM) et du Réseau d'analyse stratégique (RAS) aura lieu le 21 juin 2022. Il est organisé en format workshop de deux demi-journées et proposera des regards croisés sur des enjeux stratégiques cruciaux. La première sera dédiée à l’intensification des guerres de l’information à l’ère numérique, la seconde à la modernisation et à la résilience des alliances stratégiques dans les espaces euro-atlantique et indopacifique. L'événement a lieu en mode hybride en direct de Paris, en français seulement. Programme   9H30-10H30 : Table ronde 1 - Les stratégies de modération des plateformes de partage de contenu à l’aune de leur modèle d’affaire Olivier Chatain (IRSEM-HEC) 10H45-11H45 : Table ronde 2 - Les écosystèmes d’influence informationnels russes au Canada et en Afrique Dr. Maxime Audinet (IRSEM) Colin Gérard (Institut Français de Géopolitique) Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher (RAS-Université de Calgary) Lieutenant-Colonel Yves Desbiens (OTAN (sous réserve)) 11H45-12H30 : Table ronde 3 - Les écosystèmes de propagande nationalistes et complotistes sur les réseaux sociaux et dans l'espace transatlantique Dusan Bozalka (CARISM-IRSEM) Sarah Rodriguez-Louette (Centre for Research on English-speaking World (CREW)) 12H30-14H00 : Pause 14H-15H : Table ronde 4 - Résilience et évolution de l’OTAN au regard du facteur Chine Dr. Pierre Haroche (IRSEM) Dr. Martin Quencez (USGMF Paris) Présidence et modération : Dr. Christelle Calmels (CERI Sciences Po) Discutant : Dr. Justin Massie (UQAM-RAS) 15H15-16H15 : Table ronde 5 - La modernisation des alliances et le renforcement des partenariats stratégiques en Indopacifique MCF Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Dr. Justin Massie (UQAM-RAS) Amélie Chalivet (Universités Panthéon-Assas et Sorbonne Université) Maxandre Fortier (UQAM) Présidence et modération : Dr. Elie Baranets (IRSEM) Discutante : Dr. Camille Brugier (IRSEM) 16H15 - 16H45 : Wrap-up | L’impact de la guerre en Ukraine sur l'évolution des alliances Dr Maya Kandel (CREW) MCF Maud Quessard (IRSEM) Dr Justin Massie (UQAM-RAS) ## Table ronde – Drones et nouvelles technologies militaires : quels enseignements tirés de la guerre russo-ukrainienne ? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/table-ronde-drones-et-nouvelles-technologies-militaires-quels-enseignements-tires-de-la-guerre-russo-ukrainienne/ Modified: 2022-11-08 > L’objectif de la table ronde est d’aborder la place et le rôle des drones et des nouvelles technologies militaires (ex : missiles... L’objectif de la table ronde est d’aborder la place et le rôle des drones et des nouvelles technologies militaires (ex : missiles hypersoniques) sur le champ de bataille compte tenu des enseignements pouvant être retirés des affrontements en Ukraine suite à l’invasion russe de février 2022. Alors qu’en réponse au comportement agressif et menaçant russe, on assiste à une augmentation des budgets d’armements au sein des pays membres de l’OTAN, au vu des choix en termes de dépenses à venir pour le Canada, il convient de s’interroger sur les apports réels (mais potentiellement aussi plus limité que prévu) de ces nouveaux outils dans la conduite de la guerre. Intervenantes Dr. Ulrike Franke, chercheure à l’European Council on Foreign Relation Dr. Dominika Kunertova, chercheure à l’ETH Zürich - Center for Security Studies Anna Nadibaidze, étudiante au doctorat, Center for War Studies Université du Danemark du Sud Colonel David Pappalardo, attaché Air et Espace, Ambassade de France aux États-Unis Modératrice Dr. Chantal Lavallée, professeure adjointe au Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean ## Table ronde – Les défis sécuritaires en Afrique URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/table-ronde-les-defis-securitaires-en-afrique/ Modified: 2023-06-26 > Trop longtemps essentialisé, souvent réduite à une conflictualité perpétuelle et à son cortège de besoins humanitaires, le continent... Table ronde - Les défis sécuritaires en Afrique A l’occasion de la prochaine publication du tome 6 Rubicon aux éditions Les Equateurs consacré aux défis sécuritaires en Afrique, cette table ronde réunissant les auteurs de ce nouveau volume permettra d’aborder en détails les divers enjeux traités par cet ouvrage. Trop longtemps essentialisé, souvent réduite à une conflictualité perpétuelle et à son cortège de besoins humanitaires, le continent africain concentre aujourd’hui nombre des enjeux politiques et stratégiques qu’affronte la « communauté internationale » dans son ensemble. La nécessité de porter un nouveau regard sur cet ensemble de 54 États n’en est que plus nécessaire. Modératrice : Marie-Eve Desrosiers Participants : Dr. Arthur Banga, Université Houphouët-Boigny Arthur Boutellis Général (e. r.) Didier Castres Alexandra Lamarche Dr. Oswald Padonou, professeur et directeur de programme à l'École Nationale Supérieure des Armées (ENSA-Bénin) Raphael Parens, chercheur associé au Foreign Policy Research Institute Michael Shurkin Dr. Nina Wilén, directrice du programme Afrique pour les relations internationales à l'Institut Egmont les défis sécuritaires en afrique date de parution : mi-juillet, 2023 ## Tensions mondiales, guerres locales ? L’évolution de la politique internationale des conflits URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/tensions-mondiales-guerres-locales-levolution-de-la-politique-internationale-des-conflits/ Modified: 2023-03-01 > L'ordre mondial est en perpétuelle évolution, les tensions internationales sont en hausse, renouvelant les craintes d'une confrontation... La participation à cet atelier se fait sur invitation seulement, veuillez contacter l'organisateur pour plus d'informations. L'ordre mondial est en perpétuelle évolution, les tensions internationales sont en hausse, renouvelant les craintes d'une confrontation internationale. Alors que les guerres civiles restent la forme dominante de violence politique organisée, celles-ci sont de plus en plus internationalisées. Quels sont les modèles d'implication internationale dans les guerres civiles, et comment évoluent-ils au fur et à mesure que l'ordre international change ? Comment les acteur.ice.s locaux·ales exercent-ils leur propre agentivité et répondent-ils à ces changements, et par quel(s) moyen(s) participent-ils aux changements internationaux plus larges ? Cet atelier pose les jalons d'un projet visant à faire le point sur ces questions. Tout d'abord, une série de présentations donnera un aperçu des tendances concernant les acteur.ice.s qui soutiennent les groupes armés dans les conflits civils, et comment (intervention ouverte ou secrète ; escalade dans la réponse). Ensuite, des expert.e.s nationaux·ales analyseront la manière dont les groupes armés répondent et tentent de naviguer, de manipuler et de façonner ces tendances à leur avantage, ainsi que les récits qui les entourent. En se concentrant sur les cas qui semblent annoncer des changements majeurs et sur des cas situés aux interstices de différentes tendances de l'ordre mondial, notre objectif est de mieux comprendre les conflits actuels à l'intersection du global et du local. Il s'agit d'un atelier préliminaire permettant aux chercheur.euse.s de partager leur compréhension des tendances et des réponses locales. Il s'agit d'une première étape d'un projet plus vaste, qui pose les fondements d'un travail plus abouti qui sera présenté lors d'un deuxième atelier à l'été 2023, et d'un volume édité. Workshop Programme   8:45 Bienvenue 9:00 Introduction - Agenda | Théodore McLauchlin (Université de Montréal) - Tendances 9:30 Configurations de soutien externe | Noel Anderson (University of Toronto) 10:00 Interventions ouvertes et secrètes | Arthur Stein (Université de Montréal) 10:30 Pause café 10:45 Escalade des interventions | Giuseppe Spatafora (University of Oxford) 11:15 Discussion de synthèse sur les tendances 12:00 Dîner - Stratégies locales 13:30 Ukraine | Tetyana Malyarenko (National University Odesa Law Academy) 14:00 Abkhazia | Anastasia Shesterinina (University of Sheffield) 14:30 Syrie | Ora Szekely (Clark University) 15:00 Pause café 15:15 Mali | Tatiana Smirnova (UQÀM) 15:45 Discussion de synthèse sur les stratégies locales 16:30 Discussion générale de synthèse : poursuite de l'atelier de suivi et de la publication d'un ouvrage. 17:00 Fin de l'atelier 18:30 Souper   Autres participants à la discussion : Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Lee Seymour, Alexandra Lamarche, Abdou Rahim Lema Mohamed, Aboubacar Maiga, Marion Zahar (Université de Montréal) La participation à cet atelier se fait sur invitation seulement, veuillez contacter l'organisateur pour plus d'informations. ## Trump après les midterms: quelle géopolitique mondiale au lendemain du 3 novembre? URL : https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/evenement/trump-apres-les-midterms-quelle-geopolitique-mondiale-au-lendemain-du-3-novembre/ Modified: 2026-10-14 > Deux jours après le scrutin, quel verdict sur la politique étrangère de Trump? Et comment le nouveau rapport de force à Washington pourrait-il changer la donne? Iran et Moyen-Orient, Ukraine, OTAN, Chine, guerre commerciale, Canada: tour d’horizon des dossiers à surveiller. Trump après les midterms: quelle géopolitique mondiale au lendemain du 3 novembre? Rarement les élections de mi-mandat américaines auront suscité autant d’attention dans le monde. Deux jours après le scrutin, quel verdict sur la politique étrangère de Trump? Et comment le nouveau rapport de force à Washington pourrait-il changer la donne? Iran et Moyen-Orient, Ukraine, OTAN, Chine, guerre commerciale, Canada: tour d’horizon des dossiers à surveiller. Cette conférence est organisée par l'Observatoire sur les États-Unis de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand et le Réseau d'analyse stratégique.