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One year ago, Le Rubicon honoured me by publishing an article entitled “Ukraine-Russie : une guerre de 20 ans” (Ukraine-Russia: a 20-year war), developing the idea that we were then halfway through this conflict. This perspective stemmed from intrinsic factors related to the specific characteristics of this confrontation that began in late 2013, and extrinsic factors derived from applying the managerial concept of the change curve to the trajectory of wars in general. What is the situation one year later?
The year 2022 was marked by the short-termism of the military operations, from Ukraine’s unexpected initial resistance to its victorious autumn counteroffensive, accompanied by circumstantial aid from the United States and Europe in the primary sense of “related to circumstances”: Ukrainians largely held their destiny in their hands. The year 2023 has been one of consolidation and structuring of aid, upon which Ukraine is now dependent militarily and economically. This situation resulted in a more limited margin of maneuver, as demonstrated by President Zelensky’s diplomatic activism and the political-mediatic pressure in favour of the summer counteroffensive. The year 2024 will be about the sustainability of the war for Ukraine, a nation now dependent on Western strategic choices that oscillate between mobilization and renunciation.
These oscillations give rise to a wavering stance, naturally favourable to a Russia that stands by its choices and manages to have them accepted by its public opinion, to the point that the question has shifted in four months from “Will Ukraine reconquer Crimea?” to “Can Russia win the war?”. However, after investing so much in Ukraine and making this conflict an illustration of the struggle between democracies and autocracies, can the United States and Europeans afford a setback? Rationality would dictate a negative answer, but the facts are stubborn: all the available evidence indicates a renunciation by default from the West for lack of adequate mobilization. To discuss this issue, we will contextualize the politico-military situation before exploring the constraints that weigh on the dynamics of the conflict and finally analyzing the resulting political orientations of the various actors.
1/ “The probability of a Ukrainian victory […] is not high, militarily.”
It is now possible to distinguish two phases of the war in Ukraine: the first one from February 24 to early November 2022 and the second one that has since begun. The symbolic rupture was the evacuation of the Kherson pocket organized by Russia, west of the Dnieper, between November 9 and 11, 2022, under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces’ counteroffensive.
1.1/ Ukrainian Successes Are a Strategic Surprise
The first phase of this war was marked by the failure of the Russian armed forces to achieve their objectives, namely to overthrow President Zelensky and his government and bring Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence. It was a resounding failure due to the magnitude of human and material losses: 100,000 killed and wounded compared to approximately 180,000 men initially engaged, 1,450 tanks, i.e. half of the existing fleet, 450 artillery pieces, 70 helicopters, 65 aircraft, and thousands of vehicles. It was also a resounding failure at the operational level: initial errors in analyzing the expected resistance, ineptitude in joint (land, air, navy) and combined arms combat, limited impact of cyber attacks, absence of drones, and inability to exploit intelligence. Finally, it was a resounding failure in terms of reputation: consistently presented as the second military power in the world behind the United States of America (U.S.) with the fifth largest military budget in the world in 2021, while Ukraine ranked 36th , Russia has largely lost its conventional military credibility as a great power.
The uninformed reader must be well aware of the surprise it represented among specialists: I remember numerous discussions with French and foreign military personnel about the large Russian exercises Zapad and Vostok. During the Vostok 2018 exercise, Russia claimed the participation of 300,000 men, including probably 100,000 combatants, 36,000 armoured vehicles and other vehicles, 1,000 planes and helicopters, and 80 ships. It saw the participation of the People’s Liberation Army of China for the first time. The Zapad 2021 exercise brought together 200,000 men, including Belarusian forces, and employed modern equipment (next-generation armoured vehicles, drones and even robots within combat units). Even though the demonstration was far from perfect, all Western specialists agreed on the observation of a gradual improvement in the capabilities of the Russian armed forces in terms of equipment and training. Those deserved a serious consideration: “serious games.” Nevertheless, as demonstrated by the researcher Dimitri Minic, the Russian failure is primarily that of its strategic thinking, which focused on the theory of circumventing the armed struggle and aimed to obtain the desired results by avoiding military confrontation. It led to conceptualizing the invasion of Ukraine as a simple police operation, believing the population was sufficiently supportive of the Russian cause within the framework of a “typical mirage of Russian political-military elites.”
On the other hand, the resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces has exceeded all expectations. As pointed out by Rose Gottemoeller, former NATO Deputy Secretary General, “We underestimated the Ukrainians,” as Western officials expected a swift military defeat and the collapse of the government. This success is naturally the result of extensive efforts undertaken after the 2014 military defeat against Russia. The adoption of a National Security Strategy in 2015, followed by a Defence Transformation Roadmap in 2016, aimed at adopting NATO standards and interoperability with NATO by 2020. This effort encompassed various dimensions: the reorganization of the armed forces, a ten-year equipment acquisition plan, reserve reforms, transfers of equipment by the United States ($2.7 billion between 2014 and January 2022), an artillery modernization, and the purchase of Bayraktar TB2 drones from Turkey. It was accompanied by NATO, which adopted a comprehensive set of assistance measures during the Warsaw Summit on July 9, 2016. However, no one imagined that the Ukrainians would reach such a level of preparedness, considering the low results achieved with the Afghan National Army – even if the context was different.
1.2/ The Return of Russian Rationality from November 2022 Onward
The second phase of the war saw Russia returning to a more “rational” decision-making process in the conduct of the war under the pressure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive initiated in late August 2022. I use quotation marks because this rationality reflects the point of view of the aggressor, and the decisions stemming from it contributed to the perpetration of war crimes. After the announcement by the Russian President of a partial mobilization of 300,000 reservists on September 21, 2022, and the replacement of the commander in charge of the “special military operation” in Ukraine (appointment of General Surovikin on October 8, 2022), this change of approach crystallized with the evacuation by Russian forces of the Kherson pocket, west of the Dnieper River, between November 9 and 11, 2022. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, this allowed them to save 30,000 men from potential annihilation and, therefore, regain maneuverability while re-establishing a solid defensive line behind the river. It is naturally a political decision by Vladimir Putin himself, demonstrating a better flow of real operational information to the Kremlin and the Russian leader’s ability to acknowledge this reality. If doubts had been expressed in the media about the Russian President’s mental health, they are no longer relevant.
Three other decisions were made in October 2022: 1/ the only partial engagement of mobilized reservists to ensure their training with instructors withdrawn from the front, 2/ the launch of a massive bombing campaign from October 10 onward, targeting electrical, heating and water infrastructure, and therefore Ukrainian civilians, 3/ the mass enlistment of common law prisoners in combat via the Wagner Group. Finally, V. Putin employed clever communication towards the Russian public opinion to downplay his responsibility for the initial failures of the war: thus, on January 31, 2023, he staged a television interview with the Prosecutor-General of the Russian Federation, during which the latter outlines the dysfunctions encountered during the partial mobilization, publicly expressing what the population is thinking privately. The Russian President could thus present himself above the fray and designate others as responsible for the failures, not himself. The appointment of General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, as head of the “special military operation” on January 11, 2023, similarly aims to hold military leaders accountable for the conduct of the war.
In parallel, Ukraine accepted a battle of attrition around the city of Bakhmut, which, although it began in August, took on a new dimension in mid-November 2022, becoming the main focal point of the entire front and causing high losses due to the extensive use of artillery. This military choice to abandon the maneuver that had been so successful for Ukraine since the beginning of the war has been widely discussed in the United States: it was deemed an error due to its excessive human cost for Kyiv. However, it is important to contextualize this decision: the recapture of a significant portion of its national territory by Ukraine during the September-October 2022 counteroffensive highlighted the intensity of Russian atrocities committed against Ukrainian civilians (executions, widespread use of torture and rape, and arrests are now extensively documented, for example, in Izium or Kherson). In the legitimate concern to protect its population, the political power has thus been compelled to reject any further territorial loss, risking its military effectiveness. However, as we will elaborate later, accepting attrition warfare is more costly for the Ukrainians than for the Russians due to the population differential and, therefore, the capacity to replace the losses suffered.
The first semester of 2023 has been dedicated, on the one hand, to the Ukrainian consolidation in terms of Western military and economic support – with President Zelensky’s hero’s welcome in Washington on December 21, 2022; the agreement for the supply of heavy tanks in January 2023; the 24th Summit between the European Union and Ukraine in Kyiv on February 3; the surprise visit to the United Kingdom and France on February 8; the ovation from the European Parliament on February 9; finally the surprise visit by President Biden to the Ukrainian capital on February 20. On the other hand, there were ongoing fights for Bakhmut, which eventually fell into Russian hands in the last week of May. Ultimately, preceded by Russia’s preventive destruction of the Kakhovka dam on June 6, the Ukrainian counteroffensive was launched on June 8, 2023. Despite the episode of the Wagner Group rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin on June 23 and 24, destabilizing Vladimir Putin’s regime, the heavily fortified Russian front has so far resisted Ukrainian attacks. In an interview given on November 1, 2023 to The Economist, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Zaluzhnyi, acknowledged that the counteroffensive was in a triple deadlock: a strategic deadlock (“Russia has lost at least 150,000 dead. In any other country such casualties would have stopped the war”), a technological deadlock (“Just like in the first World War, we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate”), and a human deadlock (“Because sooner or later we are going to find that we simply don’t have enough people to fight”).
This triple deadlock had been articulated as early as January 2023 during the press conference held by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and General Mark Milley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, following the meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group held in Ramstein on January 20, 2023. This group, co-chaired by the United States and Ukraine, coordinates the support contributions of 54 states, with the United States acting as the lead nation in this support coalition. On that occasion, General Milley had stated: “From a military standpoint, I still maintain that for this year it would be very, very difficult to military eject the Russian forces from all, every inch of Russian-occupied Ukraine.” He reiterated his November 16, 2022, statement in the same format: “The probability of a Ukrainian military victory – defined as kicking the Russians out of all of Ukraine, to include what they claim is Crimea – the probability of that happening anytime soon is not high, militarily.” The insistence of the now-retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States still deserves consideration, as it raises questions about the Western strategy towards the Ukrainian conflict based on what is achievable.
2/ The Conflict Dynamics are Constrained by Three Limiting Parameters
Based on this military deadlock, three key parameters limit the options regarding the evolution of the conflict. The first is political, involving the stakes of Ukrainian stability and the American orientation as the main provider of military aid. The second is human, characterized by a scarcity of resources on the Ukrainian side. The third is material, involving insufficient production of weapons and ammunition on the Western side.
2.1/ Political Limitations in Ukraine and the United States
After a year and a half of national unity, Kyiv’s first cracks are beginning to show regarding the conduct of the war and its prospects. Not only did the aforementioned interview with General Zaluzhnyi lack coordination with the Ukrainian presidency, but an article from Time released on the same day paints a picture of a Volodymyr Zelensky affected by the prolonged duration of the war, dissatisfied with Western support, and persisting in a costly strategy of immediate territorial reconquest. To my knowledge, this is the first article in Western media that tarnishes the heroic image carefully crafted by the Ukrainian President since February 2022. During his visit to Kyiv on November 20, 2023, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin felt compelled to declare: “It also gave us the opportunity […] to make sure that we maintain alignment between the operations on the ground and President [Zelensky]’s objectives,” evidence that the question is being raised. Adding to this is the issue of the 2024 Ukrainian elections: the presidential elections, theoretically scheduled for March 31, 2024, cannot take place as the country is under martial law due to the war. This situation is not exceptional: for example, the United Kingdom did not hold an election between 1935 and 1945 due to the outbreak of World War II. Nevertheless, 2024 presents an unfortunate conjunction with elections in Russia in March, for the European Parliament in June, and in the United States in November. This succession of elections generates a subtle discourse on the need for Ukraine both not to give up its democratic nature by following suit with others (the United States and the European Union) and to antagonize the Russian electoral farce through an exemplary process (Russia will likely see the re-election of Vladimir Putin with an overwhelming percentage – bets are open, 76.69% in 2018). The proposal is undoubtedly intellectually appealing, but the practical organization of elections proves to be quite unfeasible and, above all, could destabilize Ukraine.
The other primary political constraint lies in the position of the United States. While the European Union plays a crucial role in maintaining the Ukrainian state and economy, as I have demonstrated in a previous article, the military dimension primarily falls under the purview of the United States. The U.S. co-chairs the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, represents the majority of military aid, and decides for all contributors on upgrading transferred equipment (tanks, aircraft, long-range missiles), all while providing intelligence and counsel to the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, if support for Ukraine initially enjoyed bipartisan consensus, it is no longer the case today, neither in public opinion nor in Congress. By becoming a divisive issue between Democrats and Republicans, support for Ukraine is entangled in the presidential campaign leading up to the November 2024 elections, risking decision-making paralysis. Thus, on October 20, 2023, the Biden administration felt compelled to present a joint package of military aid to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan totalling $105 billion, with $61.4 billion allocated to the first, supported by a rare televised address from the U.S. president in the Oval Office. The new Speaker of the House and vocal supporter of Donald Trump, Republican Mike Johnson, only emphasized aid to Israel ($14.5 billion), deferring the question of Ukraine to a new bill contingent upon obtaining concessions on other issues. He also denounced the lack of clarity in the strategy pursued by Washington.
The evolution of American public opinion tends to deepen the partisan divide, as illustrated by the Gallup poll of November 2, 2023:
- 41% of Americans believe their country is “doing too much to support Ukraine,” compared to 24% in August 2022.
- Among voters declaring themselves Republicans, this figure reaches 62%. It also increases among Independents (44% compared to 28% in August 2022), a crucial category for winning presidential elections in the United States, as it is prone to shifting between the two major parties from one election to the next.
- 54% of Americans still express readiness to support the Ukrainian territorial reconquest, while 43% wish for a quick end to the conflict even if it means that Russia retains the conquered territories. Nevertheless, the gap has been steadily narrowing since August 2022 (66% versus 31%).
- Among Republican voters, this figure stands at 55% in favour of a quick peace accompanied by Ukrainian territorial concessions, while reaching 49% among independents, a significant increase since August 2022 (34%).
It is important to emphasize that a U.S. election is primarily won on domestic policy issues rather than foreign policy. Nevertheless, the pursuit of alignment between the sentiments of “Independents” and partisan orientations constitutes a significant challenge in any campaign. In this case, the Republican discourse on not giving Ukraine a blank check voiced during the November 2022 midterm elections and sometimes caricatured in Europe is increasingly resonating with the opinion of the Independent electorate that will be decisive for the 2024 election: American money for Americans. The Biden administration is well aware of this risk and seeks to manage it by promoting the narrative that aiding Ukraine represents an excellent security-to-cost ratio against Russia. Additionally, it is formulating strong demands on Kyiv regarding the fight against corruption (resulting in the departure of Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov in September 2023). However, a positive narrative implies achieving military victories to win conviction, and, at this stage, Russia has gained more territory than Ukraine in 2023. The second element faces real challenges, as highlighted by the Time article quoting “a top presidential adviser in early October” in Kyiv: “People are stealing like there is no tomorrow,” evoking to American decision-makers the spectre or their experience in Afghanistan in this regard.
2.2/ Human Limitations in Ukraine
As the aforementioned Time article states, “One of Zelensky’s close aides tells me that even if the U.S. and its allies come through with all the weapons they have pledged, ‘we don’t have the men to use them,’” statement corroborated by General Zaluzhny’s remarks to The Economist. Furthermore, while former British Defense Minister Ben Wallace mentioned in an op-ed on October 1, 2023, that the average age of Ukrainian soldiers was over 40, the Time article specifies that this average would be 43 years old, which is particularly high.
According to the United Nations, Russia had a population of 145 million in 2020, compared to 44 million for Ukraine (within its internationally recognized borders). Ukraine must subtract the population of territories occupied by Russia since 2014, approximately 2 million for Crimea and 3.8 million for the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, leaving about 38 million people under the control of the Ukrainian government as of January 2022. Following the initiation of Russian military operations, 8 million people sought refuge abroad, and 6.4 million were still displaced as of December 2023, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. An undetermined number of Ukrainians live in the newly occupied areas (at least 1.5 million). Considering the significant population flows entering and leaving the national territory, Ukraine practically relies on a population of no more than 30 million inhabitants directly under government control, including over 5 million internally displaced persons (according to the UNHCR). In comparison, Poland had a population of 38 million in 2021, and Spain had 47 million. On the Russian side, while it is challenging to gauge accurately, approximately 1.2 million people have left the country since the beginning of the war. Ultimately, in terms of population, we are dealing with a ratio ranging between 1 to 4 and 1 to 5 in favour of Russia on a comparable Soviet-era age pyramid.
This imbalance raises the question of the sustainability of human losses. The accurate figures in this matter are, of course, at best inaccessible and at worst unknown. Still, according to various statements from the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Army, General Milley, in November 2022, the number of killed and wounded was equivalent between Russians and Ukrainians: 100,000 on each side (with a higher proportion of fatalities on the Russian side) in addition to 40,000 civilians killed and wounded (on the Ukrainian side). In August 2023, the New York Times reported on the U.S. administration’s internal assessments of casualties: 300,000 men for Russia (including 120,000 killed), 180,000 men for Ukraine (including 70,000 killed) and 40,000 civilians. This 1 to 1.5 ratio in the human toll of the conflict is unsustainable for Ukraine, given the disproportion between the two population reservoirs and the exposure of the Ukrainian civilian population to war. It sheds new light on Ukraine’s repeated requests for the supply of advanced equipment, as such weaponry has the potential to mitigate this disadvantage.
2.3/ Material Limitations in the West
Regardless of the courage of the soldiers, inter-state conflicts have tended, since the 20th century, to be won by the belligerent capable of producing the most equipment and ammunition, as exemplified by the United States, which became the “arsenal of democracies” during World War II, to borrow President Roosevelt’s expression used on December 29, 1940. The issue of equipment and ammunition provided to Ukraine has been the subject of countless articles since February 2022, ranging from Javelin and Stinger missiles in the beginning to multiple-launch rocket systems (such as HIMARS), artillery (like the CAESAR cannon), tanks, long-range missiles (ATACMS type), and cruise missiles (SCALP type), culminating with aircraft, with the United States approving on August 17, 2023, the transfer of F-16s by Denmark and the Netherlands. This topic is extensive, and it is easy to get lost in its technicalities, which are nonetheless very real. Let’s attempt to pinpoint the primary concerns.
Firstly, Ukraine entered the conflict with predominantly Soviet-era equipment, which remains the majority. In February 2022, it had 1150 pieces of artillery from that era and has since received the delivery of 450 to 500 pieces of Western models. However, the former have 152 and 122 mm calibres, while the latter are 155 and 105 mm. Soviet-era ammunition and spare parts are primarily produced in Russia and China and are, therefore, inaccessible to Ukraine. Ukraine must rely on the residual production of certain countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Poland, the Czech Republic) and purchases worldwide. Thus, the United States had acquired 45,000 shells of 152 mm and 20,000 of 122 mm (a relatively low amount) at the end of January 2023, nearly a year into the conflict. The Ukrainian army faces the challenge of managing two incompatible logistics chains, one following Soviet-era standards and the other adhering to NATO standards. Complicating matters further, Ukraine is also forced to undertake a transformation towards a Western equipment model even while at war. It is noteworthy that this transition remains incomplete for Eastern European countries that joined NATO fifteen years ago, signifying a substantial effort in terms of training, adaptation, and supply – a formidable task even in times of peace.
Secondly, Western stocks of equipment and ammunition are low. The end of the Cold War allowed for a reduction in military spending under the “peace dividend,” and the asymmetric nature of the terrorist threat over the last thirty years has not led to the replenishment of inventories. The 2011 military intervention in Libya had already shown the limits of European capabilities, with a reliance on the United States due to the rapid depletion of certain stocks. With the war in Ukraine, there is a shift, returning to large-scale and highly consumptive conventional operations against a modern military. Thus, Ukraine fires between 4000 and 7000 shells per day, totalling between 1.5 and 2.5 million shells in a year, compared to approximately 20,000 per day for Russia. In this context, the transfer of one million shells by the United States in 2022 is both significant and insufficient. Regarding Stingers, the American short-range surface-to-air missile launcher, the U.S. transferred a quarter of its existing stock to Ukraine in the first months of the conflict. One last example: the focus in January 2023 was on the issue of the supply of Western tanks, from France’s announcement on January 4, 2023, regarding the delivery of AMX-10 RC light battle tanks to the coordinated decision on January 25 by Germany and the United States to authorize the shipment of respectively Leopard 2 tanks and M1 Abrams tanks; at this point, the primary concern was the scarcity of available tanks. After two years of conflict, the consequence of these low stocks is that Western countries have little left to transfer to Ukraine without jeopardizing their security. A senior British officer recently stated, “We’ve given away just about as much as we can afford.” For the United States, stock levels are now considered critical in absolute terms across several segments, and they are insufficient given the risks in other theatres, such as the Indo-Pacific with Taiwan. As mentioned by the Pentagon on December 14, 2023, “We have to start to make decisions about our own readiness.”
Thirdly, the question of stocks is closely tied to production capacity: depleting the former is only a temporary concern and thus manageable if the latter allows for a quick replacement – a matter of taps and bathtubs, so to speak. However, for the same reasons that stocks are low, production capacities have significantly diminished since the end of the Cold War simply because demand has collapsed. For example, in the United States, the production of 155 mm shells was 3,250 per month in 2022, compared to 4,000 to 5,000 firings of this calibre per day on the Ukrainian side. Production increased to 20,000 per month in 2023, with a goal of 40,000 per month by 2025, considering the necessary investments to create new production lines and the time required to train the workforce. Nevertheless, this production of around 500,000 shells per year in 2025 would take two years to replenish U.S. stocks before any could be provided to anyone, even though the minimum Ukrainian requirement is three times that (1.5 million).
Indeed, the structural increase in weapons and ammunition production requires significant investments from companies, hence firm orders from states, and ultimately, time to build the production facilities, recruit and train the workforce, as well as organize the supply chain. For example, the M777 howitzers supplied by the United States are no longer produced by their manufacturer, BAE Systems, with the last order dating back to 2017 (for India). Provided a contract for at least 150 units is signed to ensure the profitability of the company, reconstituting the production chain would take 30 to 36 months before starting to produce the first cannon. Finally, the example of Stingers mentioned above was cited by Ellen Lord, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, during her hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services on April 26, 2022. Her remarks caricature our subject: “In the past two months, the United States sent more Stinger missiles to Ukraine than we have manufactured in the last 20 years. The Stinger program is in its eighth restart. I will repeat. Eight times, we have restarted this program. This missile has not been modernized in 30 years.” Due to not paying the contractor to maintain a hot production line, components no longer exist, test equipment has become obsolete, the workforce has retired, and the supply chain needs to be rebuilt. If the U.S. Department of Defense placed an order for 1,700 Stingers in May 2022, it would take, at best, until October 2025 for the first one to enter production. This lengthy industrial production time, coupled with public procurement, is underestimated.
3/ Sustaining Support for Ukraine Does Not Constitute a Strategy: Possible Political Orientations of the Conflicting Parties Given their Strengths and Weaknesses
So far, Western policy towards Ukraine can be summed up with a statement from the last NATO summit in Vilnius on July 11, 2023: “We will continue our support for as long as it takes.” While the declaration of intent is commendable, it does not constitute a strategy. And considering the elements presented earlier, the trajectory of Ukraine and its Western supporters is precisely unsustainable due to a gap between means and ends that is too large. Therefore, what options are available to us?
Four points: 1/ The United States is the weak link due to its crucial role in military aid to Kyiv, and the November 2024 elections limiting their short-term perspective – Donald Trump is right to declare, “I will have that war settled in one day, 24 hours”, as it would only require announcing the suspension of American assistance. 2/ Russia is playing the long game of wearing down Ukraine in terms of combatants and the West in terms of weapons and ammunition while also working to fatigue public opinion. 3/ Ukraine no longer has the human resources to be on the offensive but can defend itself if Americans and Europeans provide the material means to do so. 4/ The Europeans, whose security is directly affected by the Russian posture and who have responded economically (sanctions, gas, economic aid), have no more strategy than the Americans and they fail to ramp up their capabilities in terms of weapons and ammunition.
3.1/ The Post-2024 Election American Solution: a Defensive Posture Until a Ceasefire is Reached
In a resounding article published on November 17, 2023, in Foreign Affairs, titled “Redefining Success in Ukraine,” Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan proposed a new strategy “centered on Ukraine’s readiness to negotiate a ceasefire with Russia and to simultaneously switch its military emphasis from offense to defense”. Such a strategy would mean acknowledging that the primary goal is no longer the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity but rather the defence and reconstruction of the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. According to these authors, even if Russia rejects the ceasefire proposal, Ukraine would benefit, at the very least, from the diplomatic initiative. It is imperative to implement a shift in military strategy, ensuring that Russian forces exhaust themselves against Ukrainian defence lines, reversing the current situation where the strain is predominantly on the Ukrainian side. At the negotiating table, the United States and some NATO allies individually would provide security guarantees to what remains of Ukraine, and the European Union would expedite its accession process. While this article is the work of think tank experts and not an official position of the U.S. administration, which has not formalized a strategy per se, it is particularly significant because its authors, who have served at high-level positions in both Republican and Democrat administrations, participated in secret discussions with Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, in April 2023.
Indeed, the authors articulate the state of the American debate and propose an exit strategy for the future U.S. administration, whether Democrat or Republican: Ukraine is at an impasse, and a strategic reorientation is necessary, contrary to what the usual discourse suggests. For instance, Secretary of Defense Austin, during his visit to Kyiv on November 20, 2023, said, “I wanted to reassure the leadership that the United States of America will continue to support Ukraine.” Or NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, on August 17, 2023: “It is the Ukrainians, and only the Ukrainians, who can decide when there are conditions in place for negotiations, and who can decide at the negotiating table what is an acceptable solution.” The shift to a defensive military posture is not only necessary but inevitable due to the attrition of Ukrainian capabilities: it acknowledges the battlefield’s reality. However, while firmly closing NATO’s door to Ukraine and being very generous with European Union’s membership to which they do not belong, the authors, in their search for a solution, notably neglect to scrutinize Russia’s war objectives and the ensuing implications for Ukraine.
3.2/ Russia, is Total Victory a Possible Option?
Indeed, from a Russian perspective, conditions are more favourable than in the spring of 2023. The Russian front holds militarily, and Ukrainian losses are high enough to allow for costly local offensives, as seen in Avdiivka. The winter of 2023-2024 has reignited the campaign of strikes against Ukrainian civilian energy facilities, which were already damaged the previous year and not fully repaired. The circumvention of sanctions, initially challenging, is now in full swing, and the Russian defence industry has shifted to a wartime economy. Moreover, the prospects appear promising with the three key elections of the year 2024: 1/ the Russian elections in March – a mere administrative formality after the explosive death of Yevgeny Prigozhin on August 24, 2023, sending a message of restraint to any ambition other than that of Vladimir Putin; 2/ the European elections in June, anticipating a rise in far-right influence, which is more receptive to Russian discourse – this sensitivity is also facilitated by actions of influence and disinformation, such as the tagging of David stars in Paris in November 2023, even though the European electoral rules do not favor significant political shifts; 3/ the U.S. elections in November, presenting for Russia a real opportunity to secure gains in Ukraine within the context of a political shift favouring the Republicans, – the U.S. electoral system proving to be conducive to external interference.
Therefore, by early 2025, Russia has no interest in any ceasefire whatsoever; on the contrary, the continuation of the conflict as it stands suits its leaders perfectly, as they have not lost sight of their initial intention to overthrow the government in Kiyv in favour of a regime under their control. From the Russian perspective, not only is victory plausible, but total victory has become a conceivable option again. The only question revolves around maintaining the population’s loyalty based on the dual promise of stability and prosperity, as presented by researcher Anna Colin Lebedev during a November 21, 2023, conference entitled “At what stage of the long war in Ukraine are we?”. If economic elites find new opportunities through military orders and the recovery of Western companies, political and administrative elites face fewer career prospects, and the state must bear the high cost of supporting the families of combatants. Nevertheless, as Russian historian Sergei Chernyshev points out, “In the end, the people lost nothing. Because they have nothing special to lose. On the other hand, what have they gained? Well, they have gained a lot. And first of all, a lot of money. […] Moreover, they feel like they’re part of something big.” In the longer term, beyond early 2025, Russia will reassess its strategic objectives based on the U.S. political reality and the Ukrainian situation.
3.3/ Ukraine, a Sustainable Defensive Strategy?
On the Ukrainian side, if victory was a real option before the June 2023 counteroffensive, it is no longer on the agenda if victory means the reconquest of lost territories. However, it is still relevant if the goal is to maintain a free country by resisting Russian aggression. Such a goal requires a defensive strategy that spares both manpower and equipment. President Zelensky has started to adjust his stance on this point with his statements on December 1, 2023 (“enough mines and concrete”). What can one expect for 2024? The continuation of the Russian air strikes campaign and fighting at specific points on the front before a possible Russian spring offensive, and a long wait for the results of the European and then American elections. An internal political crisis, simmering at the end of 2023, cannot be ruled out in 2024, especially given the human losses suffered and the inevitable sense of stagnation that will emerge.
The other key credibility issue of this defensive strategy lies in sustaining military support for Ukraine over time. However, it is clear that the Western countries have, at this stage, lost the battle of arms and munitions production against Russia and its supporters. Unless risking national capabilities, the arsenals are empty and cannot be replenished for years, given the current production pace. On the American side, one can identify three levels of difficulty: the first one is economic, with insufficient production and significant delays in establishing new industrial capacities, subject to government orders; the second is political, since aid to Ukraine now constitutes a secondary but still divisive element in the 2024 electoral campaign, preventing, for the moment, the approval of new funding and therefore the issuance of orders to the industry; the third is strategic, with a heated debate in Washington on the adequacy between the ends and means of U.S. policy – according to the latest report from the RAND Corporation, “the U.S. defence strategy and posture have become insolvent.” This report shows that the expected tasks of the U.S. military forces and other elements of national power at the international level from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific exceed the available means to accomplish them. Choices must, therefore, be made. For Europeans, the situation is worse, as we will see next. One thing is sure, however: without weapons and ammunition, a defensive posture is not much more credible over time than an offensive posture against a rearming adversary. At best, it would offer the possibility of getting through 2024 and its electoral deadlines.
3.4/ Exceeding the Limits of Boundaries or Confining Oneself to the Limits: the European Union Mobilises, but to What Extent?
On the European side, the existence of a border between the E.U. and both Ukraine and Russia makes this conflict an immediate priority, as demonstrated by the unprecedented mobilization of European institutions and Member States: an unprecedented level of sanctions, extensive use of the European Peace Facility for military aid, substantial financial assistance, trade facilities and a solidarity corridor to ensure the survival of the Ukrainian state and economy. However, Europe faces two levels of difficulty, which are industrial and strategic.
On the industrial front, the peace dividends following the end of the Cold War have been more pronounced in Europe than in the United States. As an example, but indicative of a general trend, defence spending represented 3% of Germany’s GDP in 1981, 1.5% in 1995 and reached a minimum of 1.07% in 2005. Thirty years under this dry regime have naturally atrophied the European defence industry, whose production capacities are now weak, much more so than the United States’. Thus, the commitment made by the European Union in March 2023 to provide one million 155 mm shells to Ukraine within a year cannot be fulfilled, with only 300,000 delivered by the end of November. Debates on E.U. taxonomy and the sustainability of the defence industry reduce access to funding necessary for investments. Moreover, industry stakeholders need visibility on orders through state announcements regarding the long-term level of their stocks, as recommended by researcher Camille Grand. By the end of 2023, the European Union and its Member States are not in the position to rapidly increase the production of weapons and ammunition, let alone compensate for a U.S. decline in this regard.
On the strategic front, it is undoubtedly in Europe’s interest for Ukraine to win, or at the very least, not to lose. Nevertheless, the European Union and its Member States offer no more strategy than the United States to do so in the short and medium term. In the long term, the objective is more apparent, as the 27 Heads of State and Government of the European Union unanimously decided on June 23, 2022, to grant Ukraine the status of a candidate country for accession. The launch of negotiations was agreed upon during the European Council on December 14 and 15, 2023. After lengthy twists and turns, the Member States and the Commission managed, on February 1, 2024, to force Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to relent and unlock the €50 billion aid package that will allow the Ukrainian state to function for the next four years. Nevertheless, accession negotiations will last for decades, and all E.U. member states must ratify this accession. Let’s recall that the E.U. has a collective security clause (Article 42.7 TEU): are Member States prepared to embrace Ukraine’s accession to the E.U. while NATO refuses it? What would public opinions think? What would be the strategic and military credibility of this commitment? How can Europeans organize themselves to ensure its effectiveness?
Finally, a word on the trend of asserting that a defeat for Ukraine would have an existential consequence for the European Union. Even though the subject is highly sensitive, it is essential to remain level-headed: On the evening of February 24, 2022, all Western countries had written off Ukraine, and it was only after the Russian failure became apparent in mid-March that an alternative became possible. Russia, which already shares land borders with six NATO countries and five European Union countries (Norway outside the E.U., Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland), would have expanded its buffer zone, bumping against a NATO that now includes Finland and soon Sweden. Russia continues to undermine the foundations of the European Union through hybrid operations, such as the recent sending of migrants to the Finnish border. A victorious Russia in Ukraine would be all the more dangerous due to the intoxication of success combined with production capacities superior to those of Europe, or even the West. However, attacking a military alliance like NATO is not comparable to subjugating a country not covered by a defence agreement like Ukraine, and I would be much more worried about Georgia, Russia’s next designated victim, due to its newly granted E.U. candidate status. In this case, for European countries, the two essential issues are 1/ the sustainability and credibility of the American security guarantee, which could be undermined following the November 2024 elections, and 2/ the European ability to fully rebuild a deterrent conventional forces structure with its substantial industrial and, consequently, public funding implications. It’s worth noting that this second point would incidentally allow supporting Ukraine. In short, the European free-rider posture on American power is no longer a credible option, given the level of strategic uncertainty.
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In summary, in the face of a determined Russia intent on achieving its objectives, Ukraine is no longer the master of its destiny. It depends entirely on the will and/or capacity for assistance from the United States and Europe (European Union, United Kingdom, Norway): it is condemned to suffer the consequences of their decisions; hence the key issue well understood by President Zelensky of moral influence over his donors. The increasingly insistent reassertion of Ukraine’s decision-making autonomy by the Western powers now borders on hypocrisy. The key question is how Americans and Europeans envision their role in this conflict in the medium term: what is their strategy?
For the United States, the cold analysis is as follows: 1/ Military, Ukrainians will no longer be able to go further in terms of territorial reconquest, and there is no question of admitting into NATO a country of which 17% of the territory is occupied indefinitely by a Russia that remains the world’s leading nuclear power; 2/ Strategically, the Americans have no specific interest in Ukraine, especially now that Russia has depleted its conventional capabilities (men, equipment, economy), and this conflict is diverting their finite means from their real priorities (the Indo-Pacific); 3/Nevertheless, it would be appropriate to establish conditions for an honourable end, because, given the investment made, one can question the lesson learned by the rest of the World: deterrence of other ambitions or confirmation of their feasibility? To what extent can the United States let it be believed that they would abandon the defence of the free world and the international order it has forged? There are precedents: South Vietnam was abandoned in 1975 after a much more painful involvement for the Americans; similarly, Afghanistan in 2021. Haass and Kupchan’s article subtly proposes a compromise solution potentially acceptable to Russia, involving armed defensive neutrality within a reduced perimeter for Ukraine – a variant reminiscent of Finland during the Cold War, with or without a peace treaty. However, it is essential to note that the U.S. decision-making process can be abrupt and that the presidential election in November 2024 will be a decisive factor in this regard. Ultimately, the American posture is leaning towards an acceptance of renunciation.
For Europe, the issue boils down to one question: followership or autonomy? Now, it’s straightforward: Europe, lacking both the stockpiles and the production capacity to compensate for the anticipated American withdrawal in terms of weapons and ammunition and incapable of supporting Ukraine autonomously, will have to align with the political solution that the United States will present sooner or later. This outcome is all the more poignant because the European Union had never responded with such strength and unity to an international crisis, and its public opinion feels that much has been done to support Ukraine, yet this awakening falls far short of the required level. Since the American solution will exclude any NATO membership, the enlargement of the European Union to Ukraine will be bogged down in a very long-term process, similar to that of Turkey, as no European country will want to risk a confrontation with Russia without the certainty of American participation. “And faced with this return of tragedy in history, Europe must arm itself, not out of distrust of other powers, no, but to ensure its independence in this world of violence, not to suffer the choice of others, to be free,” President Emmanuel Macron presciently declared before the European Parliament on January 19, 2022, at the launch of the French presidency of the European Union. In this context, do the Europeans want to provide the means for this rearmament, including its financing? There is no evidence of this at present, and as it cannot accompany the escalation, Europe is condemned to renounce.
Ultimately, the American institutional paralysis leads to the progressive asphyxiation of Ukrainian military capabilities and the development of favourable prospects for a determined Russia unless there is a European political and industrial mobilization to offer an alternative solution. This deadlock raises once again the question of the ability of European countries to act independently of American choices to preserve their security interests, in a word, their “strategic autonomy”: let us hope that the impending trauma will have this cathartic virtue in the service of the defence effort of the Old Continent.
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Olivier Sueur (@SueurOlivier) is a strategic business and public affairs consultant, teaching at SciencesPo Paris and an Associate fellow at the Institute for Applied Geopolitical Studies (IEGA). He is a former deputy assistant secretary for NATO, the European Union and the United Nations at the French Ministry for the Armed Forces (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy – DGRIS) and previously negotiator for France at NATO’s headquarters.
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