Following the recent clashes between Iran and Israel, and with the situation tending towards a return to calm, it is time for an initial assessment. A six-month period of unprecedented escalation has brought the region to the brink of the abyss but seems to be now moving in the direction of a precarious truce and a return to the fundamentals of what specialists call the Israeli-Iranian “shadow war“. However, the re-establishment of this form of indirect confrontation could have disastrous and potentially underestimated consequences.
In the wake of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, the Islamic Republic adopted an asymmetrical strategy, recognizing its weaknesses and the dissymmetry in the distribution of power in favor of the United States and its allies. Like other Eurasian powers, Iran relies on this multifaceted approach, which consists of compensating for its relative shortcomings in the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres by combining all its assets in a pragmatic and unconventional manner – i.e., by carefully avoiding direct confrontation with its American and Israeli adversaries. The 33-day war of summer 2006 marked a new stage in the institutionalization of its asymmetric warfare doctrine. In the words of its principal creator, Major-General Mohammad Ali Djafari, Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp: “Given the enemy’s numerical and technological superiority, Iran will henceforth systematically resort to an ‘asymmetric’ strategy”.
To a large extent, Iran conducts this gray-zone strategy, under the radar and below the threshold of conventional warfare, through a myriad of non-state, Shiite or pro-Iranian movements, such as Yemen’s Zaydi Houthis, members of Iraq’s Hashd al-Shaabi, or the Sunni fighters of the Palestinian Hamas. The Iranian sponsor’s approach is to offer this type of proxy sufficient autonomy and operational leeway to act indirectly, while retaining the ability to plausibly deny its involvement in their ad hoc initiatives. United around anti-Zionism, the players in this proxy struggle form the famous “Axis of Resistance“, orchestrated from a distance by Teheran, whose modus operandi consists of harassing and provoking American and Israeli forces, while allowing the Iranians to evade any direct reprisals.
With the more or less explicit support of the United States, Israel is also waging this “shadow war” through a number of indirect initiatives, including the assassination of Iranian scientists working in the nuclear field, the elimination of officers from the IRGC and support for separatist movements in Iranian Azerbaijan, Baluchistan, and Kurdistan. In the months since the attacks of October 7, 2023, this policy of all-out pressure on the Islamic regime and its regional allies has intensified. As this irregular confrontation, particularly prone to uncontrolled escalation, intensified, observers began to fear a spark that could lead to the outbreak of a direct war between Israel and Iran, a prelude to regional conflagration.
After a period of observation, events followed in rapid succession from the beginning of 2024, generating an upward spiral of violence. Between January and March, several officers of the Al-Quds Force, the expeditionary arm of the IRGC, were eliminated by the Tsahal air force. On April 1, this systematic targeting of the Iranian network of influence reached its first climax with the bombing of the Iranian diplomatic representation in Damascus and the death of several Iranian officials, including Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of the Al-Quds Force in Syria and Lebanon. As the strikes against its embassy could be interpreted, under the principle of extraterritoriality, as a direct strike against Iran, Teheran could not remain passive without compromising its credibility—domestically, regionally or internationally.
On the night of April 13-14, 2024, the Islamic Republic launched 170 drones and fired 120 ballistic missiles against Israeli territory. Strictly speaking, this came as no surprise, since the Iranian authorities had even warned, 72 hours in advance, that the Revolutionary Guards were preparing to target Israel. Nevertheless, the fact remains remarkable: for the first time in 45 years, the Islamic Republic was directly attacking the Hebrew state, without going through its traditional intermediaries and from its own territory.
Although Teheran seems to have broken with its modus operandi of warfare under the threshold of armed violence, the break nevertheless needs to be put into perspective. The use of ballistic missiles is part of Iran’s strategy, which combines various conventional and non-conventional assets. The aim remains to deter any attack against its essential interests. The choice of weapons, drones and ballistic missiles, above all reflects Iran’s desire to send a strong message to Israel.
The idea was also to restore the Iranian regime’s tarnished reputation since October 7, 2023: in the months following Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa, Teheran had confined itself to lending its moral support to the Palestinian movement, without getting directly involved alongside Hamas and the Yemeni Houthis. This cautious stance made it appear particularly pusillanimous, even resigned, in the eyes of its partners in the Axis of Resistance.
The mid-April counterattack was therefore as much a military operation as a public relations initiative aimed at restoring the Islamic Republic’s status as champion of the “anti-Zionist struggle”. Believing that they have fully demonstrated their firmness against the Hebrew state, Iranian political and military leaders now hope that “the matter is closed” and that the ball will remain in Israel’s court. Their wishes are in line with those of the Americans and Europeans who, having helped neutralize the Iranian attack, are also appealing for calm. Anxious to defuse the crisis, the White House warned that it would neither support nor condone an Israeli punitive expedition. However, the Netanyahu government was eager to wipe out the Iranian affront, and to use it as a way of distracting international public opinion from the crisis in Gaza.
On the night of April 18-19, Israel fired several missiles at an air base in Isfahan, which is responsible for protecting Iranian nuclear sites, including Natanz, for two reasons. Firstly, to demonstrate Tsahal’s technological superiority and its ability to penetrate deep into Iranian territory under the mullahs’ noses and strike at the Islamic regime’s sensitive infrastructure, in particular its nuclear facilities. Secondly, and by the same token, to illustrate the IRGC’s inability to repel such an attack and defend its national territory.
Unlike Tsahal and its anti-aircraft dome, which succeeded in intercepting 99% of the projectiles launched by the Iranians, the Pasdaran were unable to annihilate the missiles, probably launched remotely via MALE drones and possibly supported by F-35 stealth fighters, revealing the full extent of Iran’s vulnerability. Moreover, the Netanyahu government wanted to demonstrate its ability to act in a fully sovereign manner by warning its American interlocutors only one or two hours before the start of the operation.
The day after Israel’s response, after six months of escalation, with the international community holding its breath and tensions having reached a paroxysmal level, tensions suddenly subsided. The Hebrew state and the Iranian regime locked themselves into a deafening silence—as if to pick up their “shadow warrior” act where they left off in October 2023. Choosing not to claim responsibility for the attack, the Israeli government categorically refused to comment on it. In so doing, it allowed the Islamic regime to save face once again by minimizing the scope of the strikes and denying that they could have been perpetrated by the “Zionist entity”.
By opening the door to de-escalation, this sequence augurs a return to the “shadow war” between Israel and Iran. But this indirect confrontation also promises to be conducted in a more bitter manner, through the more systematic use of cyber tools, attacks, targeted assassinations, sabotage and the use of proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis. Iranian strategists can also be expected to accelerate their nuclear program (through increased production of enriched uranium, the development of new technologies and the construction of nuclear facilities), more aware than ever that their conventional means are insufficient to secure its territory.
Israel’s approach to containing the Iranian regime by dismantling and destroying its system of proxies could in fact encourage the Iranians to turn in on themselves and seek to ensure the security of the Iranian fortress and the survival of the Islamic regime by other means. Many observers believe that if Israel persists in weakening Iran’s regional relays (such as the Hach al-Chaabi forces in Iraq), Iran could be driven to compensate for its losses in strategic depth by strengthening its nuclear deterrent. In other words, Israel would substitute the relatively manageable threat posed by these non-state actors for a far more serious threat: that of an Iran possessing atomic weapons.
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