The multilateral collaboration is an unprecedented opportunity for Canada to build the next generation of air power
The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) is a trilateral collaboration between Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom to develop a sixth-generation fighter jet to respectively replace the British and Italian Eurofighter Typhoons by 2040 and the Japanese fleet of Mitsubishi F-2s slated to retire by 2035. For Canada, it is expected to be formally granted observer status at a meeting of the three defence ministers in July, thereby gaining access to sensitive project information while Ottawa debates whether to participate as a future development partner or buyer.
Opening the door to the GCAP is a natural next step for a Carney government intent on diversifying defence procurement away from U.S. solutions in favour of closer partnerships with like-minded allies and partners. It follows the Government’s major decision to enter into negotiations with Saab to purchase its GlobalEye early warning system over American offerings.
I argue that the moment is ripe for Canada to push for deeper involvement on GCAP beyond observer status as a development partner able to make unique contributions. Canada has a competitive aeronautics sector with strengths in avionics, sensors, and radars. It boasts world-class flight simulation and pilot training firms. With its wealth of critical minerals mining and refining infrastructure, Canada would supply vital production inputs that the trio must otherwise source from China.
Canadian participation on the GCAP should be considered distinct from the ongoing F-35/Gripen debate because the latter are fifth and 4.5-plus generation fighters weighed as options to replace the RCAF’s aging fleet of CF-18s due to retire in 2032. Even if GCAP proceeds on schedule, deliveries for Canada would likely not take place until the late 2030s. As a result, the F-35/Gripen question will remain salient in the short-term.
The GCAP platform as a “system of systems”
What makes a sixth-generation fighter? In addition to improved stealth capabilities and increased operational range, the defining characteristic is a “system of systems” framework where a manned fighter leads a squadron of artificial intelligence (AI)-enhanced drones known as unmanned collaborative combat aircraft (UCCAs) acting as “loyal wingmen” exercising a high degree of autonomy.
These future fighters are being envisioned as airborne supercomputers and command centres executing a “quarterback” role, building on fifth-gen capabilities such as electronic warfare and advanced sensor-driven reconnaissance and placing them at the forefront of the fighter’s role profile.
In the cases of fourth-generation fighters designed to bypass air defenses and strike both aerial and ground targets or fifth-gen fighters’ increased emphasis on advanced stealth capabilities, the manned fighter has been the principal actor. By contrast, sixth-generation fighters are expected to almost always operate with a swarm of UCCAs designed to boost the mission’s “combat mass” and act as the “extended arms” of the pilot, who analyzes the real-time data collected by fighter’s AI-enhanced sensors and processed by the broader “combat cloud” to execute mission commands.
The GCAP platform entails more than industrial cooperation in building a fighter jet. It is an ambitious bid for technological integration in digital technologies like AI, shared intellectual property, interconnected supply chains, and autonomy away from the United States.
Beyond Canada, other countries that have expressed interest in joining the project include Australia, Saudi Arabia, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, and Germany. However, whereas Britain and Italy have signaled a degree of willingness to expand the consortium, Japan has shown reluctance to take on additional partners over concerns that it would involve a complex and time-consuming negotiation process that would halt project momentum.
This reflects in part differing priorities between the partners. Tokyo is focused on delivering jets by 2035 so that it is equipped to respond to a deteriorating regional security environment driven by rising tensions with China, whereas London and Rome favor a more flexible timeline to fully develop the GCAP’s “system of systems” capabilities.
A Canadian case for joining the project should be calibrated around its ability to fill targeted capacity and supply chain gaps in the core trilateral partnership. For example, over the next decade, Canada is expected to become one of the few major rare earth producers outside of China. In defence applications, high-tech systems like fighter jets are one of the top consumers, with a single F-35 housing over 400 kilograms. Given the extent of technological upgrades expected for sixth generation fighters, they can be expected to require even more.
Expectations of significant revisions to the existing industrial workshare would be unrealistic because it would create more transaction costs and dilute the agreed upon roles each partner has already secured for its respective national defence champion in building the GCAP platform. The trio will be especially wary of taking on more partners given that industrial disagreements between France’s Dassault and Airbus Germany recently sunk the €100 billion Future Combat Air System (FCAS) collaboration, another sixth-generation fighter project.
As a result, the three partners are more likely to welcome countries that can bring injections of funding and commitments to future jet orders without accompanying demands for significant renegotiations of the existing workshare. The main reason is that the fiscal health of the project, which is estimated to eventually cost upwards of $130 billion, is on increasingly uncertain ground.
Britain had been scheduled to commit billions of pounds to GCAP in late 2025 as part of its Defense Investment Plan for the next decade, but repeated delays have cast doubt on whether it can come up with the funds. Similarly, Japan has contributed ¥500 billion ($3.1 billion) in the five years to March and approved an additional ¥170 billion, but significantly higher sums will be needed in the years ahead. This comes at a time when Tokyo is facing its own fiscal pressures after announcing its first ever consumption tax cut on food, a move that is expected to cost the government 8 trillion yen over two years.
What Canada Should Do
Canada should focus on securing collaborative R&D and innovation opportunities as part of a long-term multidimensional investment in the RCAF’s future capabilities and the benefits accrued to the Canadian defense sector’s knowledge and technological base. Canada’s procurement of sixth-generation fighters is not a question of if, but when. In line with the Defence Industrial Strategy’s “Build-Partner-Buy Framework”, Canada should thus seek to participate in developing a next generation system as a partner instead of merely observing from the sidelines as a potential buyer.
However, committing to GCAP could bring about a future scenario where Canada has a three-fighter mixed-fleet along with the F-35 and Gripen at a time where there is already significant opposition against even a two-fighter fleet.
A sensible path would be to follow through with the 88 orders of F-35s given the resources already committed in terms of supporting infrastructure, maintenance, personal training, and software. The F-35 would cover Canada’s main commitments to continental defence and NORAD. Remaining resources should be allocated to developing and procuring future GCAP fighters and UCCAs that would enhance the RCAF’s expeditionary potential bridging Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
An alternative to the GCAP would be to commit to partnering with Saab to build Gripens in-country, a deal that could potentially dovetail with a major role on the Swedish firm’s own sixth-generation fighter project. The Konceptet Framtidens Stridsflyg (KFS, “Concept Program Future Air Combat System”) is reportedly pursuing a similar system-of-systems approach as the GCAP and is the process of conducting early-stage conceptual studies.
However, joining the GCAP would open the door for Canadian firms and research institutes to collaborate at the industry’s cutting-edge with Britain’s BAE Systems and Italy’s Leonardo, both production partners for the F-35 and which previously worked with Airbus on the outgoing Eurofighter Typhoon, and Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which built the Mitsubishi F-2 (based on the American F-16) and has been working on precursors to the GCAP project stretching back to the early 2010s. The knowledge gains and joint R&D opportunities would thus significantly exceed a collaboration with Saab alone.
With the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS project cancelled, the GCAP is the most promising of the remaining Western sixth-generation fighter projects that Canada could feasibly join. Some may point to the United States’ Next-Generation Air Dominance program developing the F-47. However, though Washington may open the door to future international collaboration, the likelihood is low given that the F-47 is designed to replace the F-22 Raptor, the air superiority fighter which has never been exported to allies to protect its sensitive technologies.
As a result, the GCAP is Canada’s best gateway to a meaningful role in designing and building a sixth-generation fighter. Should Ottawa proceed with making a strong case for the unique contributions it would bring to the project, it will undoubtedly find receptive ears.
Image Credit: Hunini via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0.
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