This text is a summary of the conference What Plan B? Reshaping Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Trump Administration’s Predatory Policies held on April 7, 2025, at UQAM.
Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency in January 2025 raises important questions about the future direction of US foreign policy and its impact on the international order established after the Second World War. This re-election, unprecedented in contemporary US political history, goes beyond the scope of a simple democratic change of government. It calls into question the nature of the ‘Trump phenomenon’, which is increasingly seen not as a temporary blip but as a lasting ideological and institutional turning point that could profoundly redefine the international stance of the United States.
Moreover, this strategic uncertainty directly affects Washington’s traditional democratic allies, prompting them to thoroughly rethink their diplomatic and security orientations. It was in this context that a conference bringing together Canadian and European researchers and diplomats was held on 7 April 2025 at the University of Quebec in Montreal to explore alternatives to continued dependence on US leadership. Plan A, which involves strong alignment with the United States, now appears obsolete. The very foundations of foreign policy are being called into question, forcing the development of a genuine Plan B.
There are two dimensions to this issue. The first is temporal: does the second Trump administration represent a lasting break or a transitional episode? The answer to this question determines the choice between ad hoc adjustments and a structural redefinition of alliances. The second dimension is strategic: how can allied democracies both preserve their ties with the United States and develop a form of strategic autonomy?
This summary note, based on discussions at the April 2025 conference, aims to shed light on possible ways of reshaping the international order in the face of the uncertainties raised by the current trajectory of US foreign policy. The analyses converge on several key findings: Trump’s policy represents a systemic break with the post-war liberal order, methodically challenging democratic values, multilateral institutions and international law norms, rather than a mere temporary blip; traditional allies are now exploring various strategies for adaptation, from balancing for attractiveness to European strategic autonomy and diversification of partnerships, revealing the heterogeneity of responses to the same challenge; Europe and Canada are being forced to redefine their diplomatic and security foundations, developing new tools of influence and strengthening their autonomous capacities to preserve their interests in a world where US leadership has become unpredictable, transactional and structured around asymmetrical bilateral relations; Finally, the Ukrainian issue crystallizes these tensions, testing the allies’ ability to maintain their cohesion in the face of Washington’s repositioning while assuming new continental responsibilities.
What does Trump want?
The second Trump administration is marked by a profound break with the foundations of the liberal international order established after 1945. As many analysts have pointed out, this shift is not simply a matter of tactical or circumstantial adjustments, but rather a systemic rejection of the principles that have structured the contemporary international architecture. It reflects the affirmation of an alternative vision of the world order, championed by President Trump and supported by a consolidated electoral base. According to Karine Prémont, this ideological foundation is set to endure thanks to the existence of a ‘critical mass’ of voters, revealing a lasting breakdown of trust in the norms and institutions of liberal multilateralism.
Julien Toureille identifies a methodical challenge to all the pillars of this order. This challenge targets democratic values and the rule of law, as well as the fundamental norms of international law, in particular the prohibition of the use of force and respect for sovereignty. Major multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and NATO, are also being called into question, as is the post-war economic architecture. According to Toureille, this global questioning is part of a revisionist reinterpretation of the Monroe Doctrine: far from advocating isolationist withdrawal, this renewed doctrine aims to reaffirm US hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, breaking with the principles of international cooperation.
This ideological shift is accompanied by a transformation in modes of government, marked by a strong personalization of decision-making. Theodore McLauchlin describes the emergence of an informal system, structured around direct access to the president, where interpersonal dynamics take precedence over formal institutional processes. This configuration, similar to a ‘court of Versailles,’ is based on the distribution of presidential ‘favour’ — understood as the granting of resources, appointments or recognition — which has become a strategic resource contested by various internal factions. For Henri-Paul Normandin, this personalization of power is also expressed on a symbolic level: foreign policy becomes a stage for presidential authority, where the projection of power takes precedence over institutional deliberation or normative adherence.
Three axes structure the objectives of this foreign policy. The first lies in a reconfiguration of relations with traditional allies, based on questioning historical commitments and demanding greater reciprocity in security partnerships. The second is based on a neo-mercantilist logic, focused on priority access to strategic resources and the defence of US economic interests in a context of bilateral competition. The third aims to restructure the international system around a concert of major powers, marginalising multilateral mechanisms in favour of asymmetrical and hierarchical bilateral relations.
Finally, this strategic reorientation is part of an ideological reconfiguration of the Western camp. As Normandin points out, it introduces a growing divide within liberal democracies themselves, pitting a pole faithful to the principles of political liberalism — embodied in particular by Canada and part of Europe — against an illiberal pole, represented by states such as Hungary and, to a certain extent, the United States. This divide calls into question the normative and strategic cohesion of the democratic bloc as it had been constituted since the end of the Cold War.
What options are available to allies?
Faced with the profound redefinition of the United States’ international posture under the Trump administration, traditional allies are confronted with the need to rethink their national and collective strategies. In this context, Jonathan Paquin proposes a typology of strategic responses based on two axes: internal balancing and the management of strategic ambiguity. This analytical framework makes it possible to identify several models of behaviour.
Some states choose balancing for attractiveness, such as Japan and Poland, which aim to maintain US engagement by promoting their own strategic role within the alliance. Others favour balancing for self-sufficiency, a strategy clearly illustrated by Turkey, but also considered by Canada, which consists of reducing dependence on Washington by strengthening national capabilities. A more nuanced approach, internal balancing, consists of diversifying partnerships while maintaining the main alliance — a stance adopted by Japan and, to a certain extent, by Canada. Finally, ‘hard hedging,’ of which Turkey is the archetype, involves deliberate diversification, including towards non-Western partners.
However, this typology reaches its limits in more constrained geopolitical contexts. The small states of Central and Eastern Europe, as Jean Combrois points out, illustrate this difficulty. Due to their recent history, their geographical proximity to Russia and their security dependence on NATO, these countries have little room for manoeuvre. They remain structurally dependent on the United States, with no real strategic alternatives in the event of a US withdrawal. Added to this vulnerability is potential internal instability, fuelled by the rise of populist movements, which Trumpian rhetoric could indirectly encourage, thereby weakening their Euro-Atlantic anchoring.
Western Europe, for its part, is exploring another path: that of strategic autonomy. As Chantal Lavallée analyses, this aspiration is manifested in a series of national responses, including increased defence budgets, the revival of French and German strategic ambitions, and a renewed debate on the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe. At the institutional level, several European initiatives are emerging: the drafting of a white paper on defence, the launch of the ReArm Europe initiative, and the attempt to structure a European pillar within NATO. However, these dynamics are hampered by persistent difficulties in reconciling national priorities, European ambitions and the requirements of transatlantic solidarity. Strategic autonomy therefore remains a work in progress, marked by tension between the desire for emancipation and the need for cohesion.
In this uncertain landscape, the case of Ukraine is a decisive indicator. As Frédéric Labarre points out, Ukraine is testing the allies’ ability to respond to Washington’s repositioning. The perception of convergence between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is fuelling fears of US disengagement, leaving Europeans with the responsibility of ensuring, alone if necessary, continued support for Kiev. The French and British responses illustrate an attempt to reaffirm leadership through promises of increased military and political engagement. Paradoxically, this situation has also highlighted Ukraine’s extraordinary resilience, particularly in industrial and technological terms. Under pressure, Ukraine has managed to innovate significantly in the field of defence, demonstrating an ability to adapt that exceeds the expectations of its partners.
European adaptation
Faced with profound changes in US foreign policy under the second Trump administration, Europe is being forced to redefine the very foundations of its Atlantic ties. This reassessment stems from a clear break with the traditional transatlantic paradigm, now weakened by Washington’s selective disengagement and growing strategic indifference to European priorities, as Maude Quessard points out. Far from stable leadership, the United States embodies, according to Laurent Borzillo, a hegemony that has become unstable and unpredictable, compared to a ‘predatory child king’ whose decisions fall outside the traditional frameworks of cooperation.
However, this instability is not only a loss: it also represents a strategic opportunity, according to Nicolas-François Perron, by offering Europe — possibly — greater room for manoeuvre than at the time of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Europe is now forced to position itself as an autonomous strategic player, fully assuming its continental responsibilities.
National responses to this reshaping of the transatlantic relationship remain heterogeneous, however. According to Borzillo, France is adopting a dual stance: it is engaging in discreet co-leadership with the United Kingdom, while maintaining calculated strategic ambiguity regarding a possible extension of its nuclear umbrella. Its measured support for Ukraine can be explained in part by its desire to preserve its diplomatic freedom of action on other fronts. Germany, for its part, is struggling to translate the momentum of the Zeitenwende into concrete structural changes due to persistent institutional and political constraints. Nevertheless, Friedrich Merz’s arrival in power in early 2025 could mark a potential turning point in German security policy, notably through a more assertive approach to international commitments.
In this context, the idea of European strategic autonomy is gaining ground, based on three complementary pillars, according to Quessard. The capability pillar aims to strengthen Europe’s technological and military sovereignty through the development of the Defence Industrial and Technological Base (BITD) and investment in drones, cybersecurity and satellite systems. The organizational pillar is based on flexible and responsive formats, such as the Weimar Triangle (France, Poland and Germany) or the formation of agile coalitions capable of rapidly deploying capabilities outside rigid institutional frameworks. Finally, the diplomatic pillar is marked by a ‘pragmatism of principle’, combining the defence of values with adaptation to geopolitical realities. This stance is manifested in active management of grey areas, a strengthened strategy of influence, and an ability to navigate between moral imperatives and structural constraints.
All of these dynamics illustrate the growing tension between European strategic autonomy and Atlantic solidarity, and underscore the need for Europeans to build an independent capacity for action without breaking existing frameworks for cooperation. This redefinition could ultimately form the basis of a new intra-Western ‘strategic contract’ better suited to a world marked by multipolarity and the unpredictability of traditional alliances.
Canadian adaptation
Donald Trump’s return to the presidency forces Canada to recognize the structural and lasting nature of the change in Washington. As various researchers and diplomats have pointed out, current US foreign policy does not reflect a mere partisan interlude, but a redefinition of national priorities, now focused on domestic economic interests rather than global strategic commitments. This transformation goes beyond Trump’s personality alone: it is rooted in a profound reshaping of the foundations of US foreign policy. According to David Morin and Justin Massie, Canada can no longer assume automatic alignment with Washington, even under a future Democratic administration. This new reality requires a thorough review of the principles that have guided Canadian diplomacy since the Second World War.
This realignment particularly affects Canada’s position in the Western security architecture. Stéphane Roussel insists that Ottawa must rethink its levers of influence in an environment now structured by a bilateral and transactional logic, rather than by multilateralism and institutions. To address this shift, Massie calls for a more proactive stance: Canada can no longer be content to follow, it must be a force for proposals, initiatives and ideas. The issue of reciprocity in security thus becomes central. As Massie and Yan Cimon put it, Canada is prepared to ‘shed blood’ for collective security in Europe, but can it still count on equivalent reciprocity from the United States?
In this context, strengthening Canada’s strategic manoeuvring room requires several approaches. First, it requires the capacity for independent thinking, particularly in the area of industrial and technological policy. Second, it requires economic and strategic resilience, which calls for a rethinking of supply chains and diversification of trade dependencies. Finally, diversifying alliances is an essential lever: Morin and Massie argue in favour of actively seeking alternative coalitions, particularly with Europe and Asia, in order to reduce exclusive dependence on the United States.
Adapting Canadian diplomacy to this new US configuration also requires an evolution in the tools and methods of influence. Roussel stresses the importance of capturing the attention of President Trump, whose priorities, sensitivities and modus operandi break with traditional presidential norms. This implies mobilizing personal ties between leaders as a privileged channel of influence — an approach that marks a significant break with Canadian diplomatic tradition, historically based on institutional channels, bureaucratic relations and norms of multilateral cooperation.
Rethinking the democratic order beyond US hegemony
The proceedings of the conference held on 7 April 2025 converged on a clear twofold diagnosis: the second Trump administration embodies a structural and lasting transformation of US foreign policy, marking the end of the presumption of stable and predictable transatlantic leadership. For allied democracies, this development requires a profound redefinition of the foundations of Euro-Atlantic cooperation.
Since then, national responses to this strategic realignment have taken contrasting paths. In Canada, the new Prime Minister, Mark Carney, announced that the target of spending 2% of GDP on defence would be met ahead of schedule, as well as a strengthening of security partnerships with European allies and the European Union — marking an attempt to shift Canada’s stance. However, several uncertainties remain regarding the concrete implementation of these commitments, particularly with regard to Canada’s ability to develop real strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the United States.
In Germany, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has committed to making the Bundeswehr the most powerful armed force in Europe through a massive long-term investment plan. This ambition, although in line with the logic of European strategic autonomy, could come up against growing internal tensions: already weakened, Merz faces criticism from within his coalition partner, the SPD, several influential members of which recently published an open letter denouncing the risks of an ‘arms race’ and calling for a more balanced approach.
In France, President Emmanuel Macron has shifted his position from that of the previous Trump administration, strongly reaffirming the importance of NATO for European security — a break from his 2019 diagnosis of ‘brain death’ — while remaining constrained by limited budgetary margins. Conversely, Spain had indicated even before the June 2025 NATO summit that it would not meet the new 5% defence spending target, struggling even to reach the 1.3% threshold. In Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has adopted a balanced stance, positioning herself as a bridge between Europe and the United States — a moderation that reflects internal tensions within her coalition, a fringe of which remains sceptical of Franco-German military ambitions and favours a traditional Atlanticist alignment.
A comparative analysis of national trajectories thus reveals a plurality of responses to Donald Trump’s return and the reshaping of the international order. In Europe and Canada, discourse on strategic autonomy is gaining visibility, but several countries remain constrained by structural dependencies. However heterogeneous they may be, these dynamics converge towards a common conclusion: the status quo ante is no longer tenable. Traditional coordination mechanisms, centred on US pre-eminence, are no longer sufficient to guarantee the defence of allies’ interests in the long term.
This climate of cautious adaptation was eloquently illustrated at the NATO summit held in The Hague in June 2025. This summit crystallized the tensions identified during the conference panels, particularly with regard to the management of a partner that has become both unpredictable and domineering. The entire organisation of the meeting seemed to be guided by an implicit priority: to preserve the apparent cohesion of the Alliance and to spare President Trump’s sensibilities. Before his arrival, Trump had cast doubt on the scope of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, suggesting that there were several possible definitions of this fundamental guarantee. This statement, far from being insignificant, rekindled member states’ doubts about the reliability of collective deterrence, already weakened by the president’s previous positions. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte adopted a particularly conciliatory stance, going so far as to say that Trump ‘deserves all the praise’ — a statement widely perceived as a diplomatic attempt to avoid confrontation. The final communiqué, which was particularly laconic on support for Ukraine, revealed persistent divisions within the Alliance, both on the stance to adopt towards Russia and on the institutional future of NATO itself.
In this context, the formal goal of increasing defence spending to 5% of GDP seems difficult to achieve for many member states, even as the transatlantic relationship remains largely structured by a transactional and fluctuating logic. The summit episode thus reinforces one of the central findings of the April conference: the long-term resilience of the international democratic order can no longer rely on stable US leadership. It requires a profound transformation of existing frameworks for cooperation, a redistribution of responsibilities among allies, and the affirmation of credible strategic autonomy — now the only conditions for lasting collective security.
Ultimately, the question is no longer whether partial emancipation from US leadership is desirable, but how to achieve it without compromising the transnational democratic and security architecture. It is this ability to combine strategic autonomy, solidarity among allies, and institutional resilience that will determine whether Western democracies can continue to play a structuring role in a changing international order.
List of participants:
Opening remarks:
- Justin Massie, Director of the Department of Political Science (UQAM), Co-Director, Strategic Analysis Network (RAS), Le Rubicon
- François Audet, Director of IEIM
Panel 1: What does Trump want?
- Karine Prémont (University of Sherbrooke)
- Julien Toureille (Raoul-Dandurand Chair)
- Theodore McLauchlin (University of Montreal)
- Henri-Paul Normandin (IEIM)
Panel 2: What options are available to allies?
- Jean Crombois (American University in Bulgaria)
- Jonathan Paquin (Laval University)
- Chantal Lavallée (Royal Military College of Saint-Jean)
- Frédéric Labarre (Royal Military College of Canada)
Panel 3: European adaptation
- Laurent Borzillo (ÉNAP)
- Maud Quessard (IRSEM)
- Nicolas-François Perron (UQAM)
Panel 4: Canadian adaptation
- Stéphane Roussel (ÉNAP)
- Justin Massie (UQAM)
- David Morin (Université de Sherbrooke)
- Yan Cimon (Université Laval)
Closing remarks:
- Daniel Jean (former advisor to the Prime Minister on national security)
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