French Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War Politics

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What role did French nuclear weapons play in post-Cold War politics?

At first glance, this question might seem marginal or even obsolete. After all, since the 1990s, the “second nuclear age” has seen nuclear weapons relegated to the background of European strategic priorities. Overshadowed by threats perceived as more immediate, such as terrorism or migration crises, this issue sometimes appears rooted in a bygone era – the era of bipolar tensions during the Cold War.

And yet, reducing France’s nuclear weapons to a mere strategic remnant would be a mistake. This military and political artifact holds a unique place in France’s national and institutional identity. Indissociable from presidential power, it goes beyond its deterrent function to embody a symbol of national sovereignty. As illustrated by a certain narrative of Gaullist grandeur – solemnly displayed at the Charles de Gaulle Memorial at Les Invalides or, more sarcastically, in works such as A Very Secret Service or OSS 117 – nuclear weapons in France belong as much to the realm of politics as to that of strategy.

This commemorative dimension did not fade in the post-Cold War era: every president of the fifth Republic, from François Mitterrand to Emmanuel Macron, has drawn on this symbol – sometimes explicitly – to reinforce their stature. Whether through doctrinal speeches, concrete decisions or even subtle allusions, nuclear weapons remain a tool of legitimacy and credibility for the head of state, the ultimate guarantor of national integrity and security.

In this analysis, I propose to explore the trajectory of nuclear weapons in French politics from 1991 to the present day. Three dynamics emerge: its gradual decline in the 1990s, a period of political and strategic adaptation, then its resurgence in response to renewed threats. These developments do not merely reflect strategic debates, they also reveal deeper transformations within republican institutions and broader shifts in French political life.

The Immediate Post-Cold War Era (1991-1997)

Nuclear deterrence was at the heart of France’s strategic and political concerns during the Cold War. This complex issue was not confined to the restricted circles of military or diplomatic experts; it permeated public debate, influenced presidential campaigns and embodied major issues such as national sovereignty, collective security within the Atlantic Alliance and France’s role in the world. A clear illustration of this centrality has been the 1988 presidential campaign of François Mitterrand, whose campaign video highlighted the link between the President and nuclear weapons.

This period was characterized by widespread acceptance of nuclear weapons as an essential element of national defense. While disagreements existed over the precise management of France’s nuclear force – particularly regarding issues such as strategic autonomy and the relations with the United States – a majority of the population appeared to support the country’s possession of nuclear weapons. This collective adherence was accompanied by a general awareness of nuclear issues: concepts such as “second-strike capability” or “deterrence of the weak against the strong” were familiar to a significant proportion of French society, well beyond expert circles.

In the final years of François Mitterrand’s presidency, following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the nuclear debate remained marked by a certain continuity with that of the Cold War. Issues such as the Hadès missile – a short-range tactical nuclear missile developed by France at the end of the Cold War – sparked controversies similar to those surrounding its predecessor, the Pluton. The debates were focused on the limited range of both missiles, which only allowed strikes against democracies. The controversy surrounding the Hadès thus illustrated the persistence of traditional issues surrounding France’s nuclear deterrent. However, a new dynamic was emerging: a renewed interest in the European dimension of deterrence, questioning the evolving role of French nuclear weapons in the continent’s security architecture. On January 10, 1992, François Mitterrand himself opened the door to discussions on the Europeanization of nuclear deterrence, initiating a reflection that would influence strategic debates in the decades to come.

This period was also marked by disagreements that transcended traditional partisan divides, pitting different visions against each other even within the socialist majority itself. Some leaders, such as Pierre Joxe, advocated for a break with Mitterrand’s defense policies. They aimed to promote a more “professionalized” approach to national defense, aligning more closely with Alliance standards, where nuclear deterrence would be more integrated into a European framework. This orientation was resolutely forward-looking, emphasizing increased cooperation with European partners and the pooling of strategic efforts. In contrast, other left-wing figures, often close to the ideas of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, defended a more sovereigntist stance.

On April 8, 1992, the moratorium on nuclear testing triggered an institutional controversy surrounding nuclear deterrence and its long-term viability. In France, this debate was merely a technical dispute; it raised fundamental questions about the relationship that should be established between political will and nuclear institutions, such as the Military Affairs Directorate of the Commissariat for Atomic and Alternative Energy (CEA) and the Chief of Defense Staff. The cohabitation between François Mitterrand and a right-wing majority from 1993 onwards further politicized the issue, transforming the nuclear testing moratorium into a real point of contention between parts of the left and the right.

The 1995 presidential election revealed how central military nuclear issues remained in French politics. Jacques Chirac, in favor of resuming nuclear testing, directly opposed Lionel Jospin, who advocated for their ban. This divergence came to the forefront during the runoff debate between the two parties, when the issue of nuclear testing was discussed. Chirac solemnly reminded Jospin that nuclear weapons should not become a subject of explicit political discord, urging his opponent to respect the “ritualization” of this debate in the republican tradition. Ironically, this stance sharply contrasted with his actions during the 1993 cohabitation, when he exploited the same issue to criticize François Mitterrand. This paradox illustrates an implicit rule of French political life: while debate on nuclear policy is allowed, open and direct criticism remains taboo for a presidential candidate.

Jacques Chirac’s decision to resume nuclear testing after his election in 1995 triggered an unprecedented controversy. It provoked massive criticism on the international scene, fueled by the mobilization of civil society and an echo in popular culture – as illustrated by the film Godzilla, which implicitly referred to these tests. Beyond the controversies surrounding the tests themselves, this period from 1995 to 1997 was marked by rich strategic debates. The press extensively covered discussions on the European dimension of deterrence and France’s relationship with the Alliance. This led to debates in Parliament, particularly regarding the Franco-German common defense concept in 1997, which emphasized the role of France’s nuclear deterrence within the Alliance.

The Debate Dries Up (1997-2014)

From 1997 onwards, nuclear weapons gradually lost their prominence in the French public debate. This marginalization can be attributed to a combination of factors. On one hand, the end of nuclear testing, announced by Jacques Chirac in 1996, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratified on April 6, 1998, marked a significant milestone, perceived as the closure of a historic chapter in French deterrence. On the other hand, strategic setbacks, such as France’s failure to fully reintegrate into NATO’s integrated command, reduced the impact of certain French diplomatic ambitions, making the nuclear issue less visible in public discussions. In 1995-1996, as France conditioned its reintegration into NATO’s integrated command on the appointment of a European to lead the Allied Command in the Mediterranean, the United States rejected this option, sealing the failure of French ambitions to strengthen European strategic autonomy within the Alliance.

After Jacques Chirac dissolved the National Assembly, the Left’s return to power in 1997 did not challenge the strategic consensus on nuclear policy. At first glance, one might have expected the presence of an environmentalist party in government – historically critical of deterrence – to spark debates or tensions. However, no significant opposition emerged publicly, reflecting a broad, cross-party commitment to nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of national strategy.

Moreover, this period was marked by a doctrinal renewal. Jacques Chirac’s speeches, notably in 2001 at the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale (IHEDN) and in 2006 in Brest, signaled a significant evolution in France’s nuclear posture. The president emphasized the adaptability of nuclear weapons in the face of contemporary challenges, particularly asymmetric threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These statements reflected a desire to maintain the relevance of deterrence, while modernizing it to address more complex crisis scenarios, where state and non-state actors increasingly overlap.

The cross-party consensus between the left and the right on the new nuclear deterrence policy helped establish an official support that limited any challenge to this strategy. Moreover, the introduction of the five-year presidential term, combined with the fact that parliamentary elections were scheduled to coincide with the presidential calendar following the September 24, 2000 referendum, further weakened the role of the parliamentary opposition, which was often reduced to a minority position until the next presidential election.

The doctrinal evolution did not prevent nuclear deterrence from disappearing from media debates. Attention shifted instead to conflicts in the Middle East and the rise of terrorism, which directly affected France. Meanwhile, financial crises and Europe’s growing indifference to strategic issues, combined with occasionally tense relations between Paris and Washington from 2003 to 2012, relegated France’s strategic agenda to the back burner.

In this context, nuclear deterrence is not debated. Although it remains in the background, it no longer sparks the intense public debates that characterized previous decades. The issue is considered strategically obsolete.

Despite growing disinterest in nuclear issues, nuclear weapons still hold a strong symbolic place in French political life. The 2007 runoff debate between Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy further illustrates the enduring symbolic importance of this topic, as it remains essential for presidential candidates to demonstrate knowledge of France’s nuclear capabilities. However, both candidates’ evident lack of awareness regarding the exact number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) or nuclear attack submarines (SSN) during the presidential campaign illustrates the gradual fading of nuclear deterrence from public debate. This trend is even more telling given that the interviewer himself made factual errors while correcting Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, further underscoring the limitations of public debate on nuclear policy.

Yet, every elected president, from Nicolas Sarkozy to Emmanuel Macron, has consistently reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear deterrence. This ritual often takes the form of a symbolic visit to the nuclear forces shortly after taking office, a gesture that underlines the close link between presidential power and deterrence. This practice reinforces a political continuity that faces no significant opposition within the five-year term framework. Although the law has evolved under Nicolas Sarkozy to introduce greater delegation in the conduct of nuclear affairs, the role of the President of the Republic has become even more central, as ministers have progressively played a diminishing role in this domain.

The continuity of the discourse on nuclear deterrence in presidential addresses has led to a stagnation of the debate. Presidents no longer take risks with regard to doctrine or its application. Discussions on deterrence remain confined to expert circles, never expanding into a broader national issue. As a result, nuclear weapons remain a unique political artifact, present in official discourse, but largely absent from public concerns and media debates.

The Return of the Nuclear Issue (since 2014)?

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 could have been seen as a pivotal moment in the nuclear weapons debate. Although studies, notably those by Corentin Brustlein, had, very early on, highlighted Russia’s aggressive sanctuarization to secure its territorial gains, it was Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 that truly rekindled media interest in France’s nuclear status. France then found itself isolated within the European Union on nuclear matters, as later reflected in Emmanuel Macron’s 2020 speech at the École de guerre. Many European countries then perceived his assertion of the European dimension to deterrence as a challenge to the Atlantic Alliance.

However, since February 2022, the war in Ukraine has amplified interest in military nuclear capabilities, reaffirming the relevance of deterrence – particularly French deterrence – in the face of Russian threats, as highlighted by the French 2022 National Strategic Review. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also revived strategic debates that had previously been pushed into the background. Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025 seems to be reinforcing this trend, reaffirming the need for France and Europe to reassess their nuclear posture in the face of the increasingly unpredictable nature of the United States.

The French political discourse on nuclear weapons remains surprisingly static despite rising global tensions and growing interest in defense issues – reflected in the proliferation of specialized media and increased public debates on military strategy. Successive governments have not significantly challenged France’s nuclear posture, which has remained unchanged for nearly 20 years, even though threats have considerably evolved.

Even within expert circles, where some advocate strategic adjustments, it remains difficult to translate these reflections into concrete political proposals. Although offset by a revival of defense discussions, this inertia highlights the limitations of a cautious debate still confined to highly specialized spheres. It struggles to reach the general public or drive meaningful reforms in France’s nuclear policy. This stagnation is partly due to the lack of accessible and concrete data on critical questions such as: Is it possible to develop new nuclear warheads? How much would such a program cost? How much would new delivery systems cost to develop? These questions are essential to stimulate a debate that all too often gets bogged down in doctrinal analysis with little practical impact.

Nuclear weapons could become an increasingly contentious political issue in the years to come. On one hand, the proposal to enshrine nuclear deterrence in the French Constitution, submitted to the National Assembly in February 2023, already reflects a willingness to use nuclear policy as a purely political tool. On the other hand, the European dimension of French deterrence is being challenged by parties such as La France Insoumise and the Rassemblement National. Although their criticisms have not yet had a significant impact on public opinion, they could, in the long run, weaken any attempt to further integrate France’s nuclear policy within the European Union.

Moreover, although nuclear issues do not yet dominate political debates, strategic concerns are beginning to influence electoral outcomes. For example, Raphaël Glucksmann’s strong performance in the European elections, compared with that of candidates from La France Insoumise, illustrates how a clear stance on major geopolitical issues, such as the war in Ukraine, can mobilize a segment of the electorate.

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Far from being a mere relic of the Cold War, France’s nuclear arsenal remains a central pillar of its defense strategy and national sovereignty. Since the end of bipolarity, it has gone through phases of decline and resurgence, reflecting both shifts in geopolitical threats and the internal dynamics of French politics. Although it has been relegated to the background of public debate, it has never ceased to symbolize power and independence for France. However, nuclear deterrence remains confined to expert circles despite its strategic and symbolic significance, limiting its engagement with public opinion and democratic debate.

In a context of shifting alliances and growing strategic uncertainties, nuclear weapons could once again become a subject of political controversy. It is essential to move beyond technocratic isolation and foster a broader discussion about their future role to ensure that they remain a credible pillar of France’s strategy, without being instrumentalized for partisan conflicts. Therefore, the challenge in the coming years will be to reintegrate deterrence into a structured national debate involving decision-makers, experts and society to secure its place within a clear strategic vision. After all, effective deterrence is measured not only in terms of its strike capability, but also in terms of the support it generates among those who ensure its long-term survival.

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Photo credits: VanderWolf-Images

Florian Galleri holds a Ph.D. in Contemporary History. His thesis examines the European dimension of French nuclear deterrence after the Cold War, focusing on nuclear deterrence and European defense cooperation.