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Since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War, two camps have rapidly emerged. Those supporting Ukraine in the defence of its territory and existence, such as the United States and European countries, have given it unwavering rhetorical support, but more elusive material support. Meanwhile, important countries, not only in terms of economic and military power, but also population, such as China and South Africa, are supporting Russia in its conflict, but are not actively participating in it. However, a third large group of countries has chosen not to take a position in the conflict. This attitude is relatively common in the countries of the “Global South”. This list includes a number of African, Arab and South American countries. This analysis will focus on the case of Egypt.
Egypt is a country in a very special position, being at the crossroads between the two great blocs. It has always tried to adopt a position of non-alignment and was even a founding member of the movement in the 1950s that refused to join either of the two geopolitical blocs of the Cold War. Moreover, Egypt is of great importance as it is Africa’s leading military power, is ranked among the top 20 world powers and its arsenal is mainly made up of Russian, American and French equipment. What’s more, Egypt’s military budget will only amount to 1.1% of GDP in 2022 (i.e., around 5 billion), but this still places it among the African countries with the highest military spending, along with Morocco. The country’s strong relations with both Russia and the United States, and their Western allies, strongly influence its position in this war. Its large population (100 million inhabitants), its socio-economic characteristics and President Al Sissi’s desire to put Egypt back at the forefront of the international scene make this country an interesting case to study in order to understand the position of African countries and, more generally, of many countries of the South in this war. This text therefore examines how Egypt is trying to maintain balance in the Russo-Ukrainian War, and whether its non-alignment is still possible.
Egyptian diplomatic relations
Egypt’s relations with Russia, the United States and Europe are as much economic, with agreements between the Egyptian government and the European Union, as they are military, with contracts for the purchase of Rafale fighter jets from France and the acquisition of Russian and American military equipment. In particular, American military aid has enabled Egypt to consolidate its position as an international military power by financing a very large proportion of its military expenditure. Relations between Egypt and Russia are not new. During the era of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and pan-Arabism, the Soviet Union, engaged in the Cold War, positioned itself as an ardent supporter of liberation movements and a crucial ally in the decolonization process in the Middle East and Egypt. This strategy was designed to counter Western influence in the region. The demise of the Soviet Union obviously distanced Egypt from Russia in the period 1992 – 2014. However, their relations developed strongly in 2014 following the coup d’état of Abdel Fattah Al Sissi. Russia took advantage of the United States’ retreat from Egypt due to various criticisms of Al Sissi’s coup and failure to respect human rights to offer military aid to the country. Since then, Russia (along with France) has been one of Egypt’s main arms suppliers.
Their relationship is not limited to a military partnership: it includes a significant economic component, particularly in the energy field. Since 2015, Egypt has been planning to build Africa’s second nuclear power plant. This project came to fruition in 2022, when the building permit was awarded to the Russian company Rosatom, which was entrusted with its construction. On the economic front, their relationship is very diverse. Egypt is a favourite destination for Russian and Ukrainian tourists. Several million Russian tourists visit Egypt every year, accounting for 40% of the country’s total tourism. This tourism has led to the development of Egyptian seaside resorts, and represents a significant part of the Egyptian economy. Russia is also Egypt’s leading supplier of cereals. Egypt consumes 15 million tonnes of wheat, 80% of which is imported from Russia (50%) and Ukraine (almost 30%). Russia is therefore a key player in Egypt’s national project, as well as in its international relations.
Russia is not, however, in a dominant position in its relations and exchanges with Egypt, as it also maintains very good relations with Ukraine’s allies, such as the United States and the European Union. These positive relations have grown steadily since the beginning of the war. Most of its relations with the United States are based on their military partnership. Egypt is a privileged NATO partner in the Mediterranean dialogue in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to its relationship with NATO, the United States has been providing Egypt with considerable military aid for a long time now. With no less than 1.3 billion dollars a year for almost sixty years, the total aid provided since the late 1970s amounts to 70 billion dollars, making Egypt the third most aided country by the United States, behind Israel and Ukraine since the beginning of the war. On the European side, Egypt is an integral part of the European Union’s Neighborhood Policy. What’s more, the region is Egypt’s biggest customer, absorbing 30% of its exports. A number of countries, such as France and England, have special relations with Egypt, inherited from the colonial period. Relations with Ukraine are also important, as Egypt is Ukraine’s main economic partner in Africa. Their relations are diverse and extend to the economic sphere, with substantial trade, a strong influx of tourists (several million before the war) and the presence of some one hundred Ukrainian companies in Egypt.
The consequences of the conflict
Although the war was confined to European territory, it affected more countries than it might appear. The consequences of the conflict are more than significant for many countries, and particularly for Egypt and Africa, given these countries’ dependence on Russian-Ukrainian cereals. It has created a humanitarian crisis and intensified an already severe economic crisis in Egypt.
Indeed, the outbreak of war halted wheat exports from Ukraine and Russia for a time, leaving African countries to fend for themselves. Egypt was no longer able to supply wheat to produce bread for its population, causing prices to soar. Today, the government finds itself with no real short-term solution to produce in greater quantities, given that 90% of water resources come from the Nile and 80% is already used for agriculture. Although Egypt is keen to achieve food sovereignty for its own security, it will not be able to do so for a number of years.
Moreover, the economic crisis inherited from the consequences of COVID-19 has been accentuated by the Russo-Ukrainian War. The war led to the loss of a number of economic agreements, putting a strain on the Egyptian economy. To cite some of the consequences, we’re talking about inflation of 33% in 2023, a currency devaluation of 50% and a debt that has exploded to 90% of GDP. What’s more, the war has taken its toll on tourism in Egypt, which relied mainly on Russia and Ukraine.
Against this backdrop, Egypt finds itself caught up in serious crises stemming directly from the Russo-Ukrainian War, and is trying to find a way out through what is the guiding principle of its foreign policy: positive neutrality. However, Egypt is also striving to pursue its non-alignment, while hoping not to antagonize both sides at the same time. We must therefore examine how Egypt positions itself between the two great blocs in conflict, and the support it gives to whom and how.
The Egyptian position
Historically, although a partner of the United States and Russia, Egypt has never hesitated to defend state sovereignty. Indeed, its role in the non-aligned community since the 1950s has strongly influenced its position. Thus, it would have been logical to think that Egypt would continue in this vein by taking a stand in defence of Ukrainian sovereignty. However, Egypt changed its doctrine. In fact, the consequences of the war and the risk to its security have led it to seek a balance between the two camps. For Egypt, this balancing act is the best way to survive the conflict, while abandoning its doctrine of sovereign equality.
Egypt oscillates between the two camps. It cannot detach itself from Russia, nor can it do without the West and the international liberal system. For this reason, Egypt continues to trade with Russia in wheat imports. After the Africa-Russia summit in 2023, Egypt built up significant reserves of Russian wheat, with record imports for the country. On the diplomatic front, President Al-Sissi has kept in touch with his Russian counterparts and frequently receives their representatives. At the same time, Egypt has refused to implement sanctions against Russia because the consequences for its economy would be too great, much to the dismay of Ukraine. Furthermore, it was discovered in 2023 that an Egyptian arms delivery agreement to Russia was about to be put in place. 40,000 rockets were to be delivered. In this case, the USA and Ukraine put pressure on Egypt to reconsider its position. The pressure was successful, and Egypt agreed to deliver weapons to the USA for shipment to Ukraine. However, the war did relatively little damage to Russian-Egyptian relations, as Egypt cannot rely solely on Russia as an ally and pillar of its relations.
As a result, Egypt was also forced to turn to the West. It was granted loans from the IMF and the European Union in exchange for certain concessions in a number of areas, such as respect for human rights and control of its borders. This aid – 3 billion over 46 months to 2022, plus an additional 5 billion from the IMF and 7.5 billion from the European Union – is the second-largest after loans from the Gulf States. At the same time, Egypt is seeking to diversify its economic partners: trade with the United States and Europe has surged, while trade with Russia has simply stagnated. Trade with Europe has reached the tens of billions of dollars, and trade with the United States is double that with Russia (9 billion versus 4 billion). Finally, in its desire to see an end to the conflict, Egypt voted at the UN in favour of 3 major resolutions championed by the West. In 2023, it was one of the countries calling for an immediate halt to the fighting and the withdrawal of Russian troops. As the above point shows, Egypt’s abandonment of its arms deliveries to Russia in the face of international pressure finally caused it to make a 180-degree turn, indirectly sending 152mm and 155mm shells to Ukraine via the United States to give itself room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia.
Is Egypt really non-aligned?
Despite its efforts to promote non-alignment and maintain a position of neutrality in the conflict, Egypt is struggling to maintain this line of conduct. The fact that its two major allies are indirectly confronting each other in the Russian-Ukrainian war, and that its internal situation is weighing heavily on its position, means that it cannot remain truly neutral. Its dependence on Russia and its need for the West to resolve its crises are fundamental to Egypt’s position. It is a fervent advocate of a resolution to the conflict, regardless of the “winner”, without taking sides, as it does not wish to get bogged down, which would be highly detrimental to it. To sum up succinctly, the Egyptian government’s position is limited to doing everything in its power to resolve the conflict in order to, in turn, resolve its internal crises and survive. To this end, Al-Sissi has tried to position Egypt as the mediator of the conflict in 2023.
Finally, the potential big winner could be China, as it seeks to develop its relations with the Middle East. China sees Egypt as vital to its approach to the Middle East and, given its weight in the world economy, could become a major alternative for development and productive investment through the “belt and road initiative”.
Lastly, although it may be an affront to the United States, Egypt’s membership of the BRICS+ organization (now made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, but also recently including Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia) actually shows that Egypt is trying to maintain its position by diversifying its relations and partnerships, so as not to be caught in a dilemma between the United States and Russia. Indeed, the BRICS are not a military alliance, but rather a gathering of countries that may have profound differences of opinion on many issues. However, these countries are united in asserting the protection of their respective interests, respecting their independence, and collaborating on joint projects, without wishing to directly oppose the West. Moreover, Egypt has always maintained strong relations with the BRICS+ countries. Finally, the Russo-Ukrainian War highlights the break in Egypt’s doctrine on the international stage, and the precariousness of this policy of balance in the face of increasingly pressing demands from both sides.
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