1- Introduction
Cyber threats are escalating across Canada, and NATO allied countries, evolving in both scale and sophistication. While traditional cyberattacks targeting government infrastructure and networks persist, threats to civil society and democratic institutions, such as the now infamous “fake news”, are intensifying. Yet, governments across the Alliance, including Canada, continue to lag behind these developments compared to adversaries in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and a gradually more hostile Delhi. They react to well-documented threats even as new threats emerge, driven by the rapid advancement of generative artificial intelligence (AI), which enables foreign interference campaigns to be created and scaled at an exponential speed. .
Canada has emerged as a key leader in strengthening global cybersecurity and combatting foreign disinformation. It played a pivotal role in the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), established in 2018 at the G7 Charlevoix Summit, and spearheading the formation of a specialized “cyber” division within its military forces. These initiatives have enhanced collective capacities to detect cybersecurity breaches, counter disinformation campaigns, and mitigate foreign interference. .
Still, much of this work remains reactive, with a limited understanding of the structure of foreign information operations—let alone how adversaries navigate complex digital ecosystems. While not inherently harmful, this approach is insufficient for addressing the rising threat of foreign interference, especially as the United States retreats from its traditional role as Canada’s strategic partner.
To address this challenge, Canada must adopt an “all hands on deck” approach to cybersecurity, especially regarding foreign information operations and gradually develop a whole-of-society approach to the issue. Unlike many other areas of security and defence, Canada has a unique opportunity to assert leadership in this domain and develop a proactive framework.
A truly proactive strategy should leverage existing expertise from academia and the private sector on cybersecurity and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) while simultaneously expanding the talent pool through sustained investment in research. This requires not only supporting established initiatives but also taking calculated risks in funding emerging research ventures before threats escalate beyond manageable levels. Crucially, Canada must harness cutting-edge technologies, insights, and innovations from its scholars and technology firms—particularly in artificial intelligence—to enhance threat detection, strengthen digital resilience, and stay ahead of adversarial actors operating within complex information ecosystems. To make this vision a reality, Canada must also address the political and institutional dimensions of cybersecurity and foreign information operations. A truly effective strategy requires strong political leadership, cross-partisan commitment, and a recognition that digital threats are not just technical challenges but fundamental issues of national security and democratic integrity.
By doing so, Canada can position itself at the forefront of information warfare defence, bolstering both national security and the broader resilience of its democratic institutions. Looking ahead, such a strategy could propel Canada toward a leadership position among NATO allies, creating opportunities for enhanced bilateral and multilateral digital cooperation in the Atlantic.
2- The Growing Target on Canada’s Back
Canada has increasingly become a focal point for foreign information operations, owing to several contributing factors. Canadian policymakers and the Foreign Interference Commission (FIC), which was established to conduct a public inquiry into electoral processes and democratic institutions targeted by foreign interference, have noted this trend. Canada’s active participation in international alliances like NATO and the G7 positions it as a strategic target for adversaries looking to undermine Western cohesion. Furthermore, Canada’s multicultural society, marked by diverse diaspora communities, presents opportunities for foreign actors to leverage transnational ties for influence.
Canada’s Interesting Position for Foreign Interferers
Recent investigations have revealed that countries such as China, Russia, and India have sought to interfere in Canada’s democratic processes. A thorough investigation led by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue found that these countries engaged in disinformation campaigns and other tactics aimed at destabilizing Canadian institutions. Although these efforts were largely ineffective in changing election outcomes, they highlight the ongoing threat that Canada faces. Heightened concerns regarding Chinese Communist Party (CCP) “spamouflage” campaigns targeting Canadian MPs and the recent exposure of Russian-funded Canadian media influencers illustrate the escalating issue that foreign information operations pose.
Foreign actors are likely to use Canada more and more as a proxy to send messages to broader Western audiences, including the United States and other NATO allies. By targeting Canada, adversaries have the opportunity to test and even to refine their information warfare strategies on a NATO ally who may be perceived as easier to isolate than European countries. Moreover, Ottawa’s growing rift with Washington and lack of perceived substantive delivery on defense commitments positions Canada as an interesting target for more overt foreign operations by antagonistic states seeking a lower risk of substantive retaliation. For instance, Canada’s historical unique relationship with the U.S., albeit strained at the moment, can be viewed as a convenient conduit for indirect attempts at influence. This is evident in cases such as the arrests and imprisonment of the two Michaels by Beijing, following the detention of Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou by Canadian authorities under an extradition request from the United States for fraud charges. Likewise, the killing of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in July 2023, followed by the arrest of three Indian nationals alleged to have ties to the Indian government, sparked a tit-for-tat game of diplomatic retaliation between Canada and India, bringing the relationship to a historic low showcases the willingness of foreign countries to overtly clash with Canada to the point of conducting operations on its territory. While this alleged operation on Canadian territory had no linkage to the U.S, the fact that Washington had also accused India of similar attempts and received “full cooperation” from Delhi, led to some disappointment when support for Canada did not come with the same initial intensity and result.
Foreign Weaponization of Canadian Multiculturalism
Diaspora communities in Canada are often targets of foreign interference. The Canadian government, along with the latest report from the FIC, indicates that foreign governments have disseminated disinformation, harassed, intimidated, and surveilled activists and critics within the Chinese and Indian communities in Canada, with the aim of suppressing dissent and controlling narratives abroad. This transnational repression not only threatens individual freedoms but also jeopardizes Canada’s social cohesion and national security. Research indicates a significant rise in Canadian publications regarding diaspora targeting within Chinese media during Canadian elections, specifically information aimed at ridings with substantial Chinese-Canadian populations. In relation to India, a CBC investigation discovered hundreds of suspicious accounts on Twitter/X resembling bots that spread misinformation about Canadian institutions.
Canada Punching Above its Weight?
The perception that Canada has been “punching above its weight” within the G7 and NATO, given the relatively small size of its economy and military, may increase its appeal as a target for foreign information operations. Despite its international presence, Canada currently allocates only about 1.37% of its GDP to defense, falling short of NATO’s 2% benchmark until at least 2032. This sustained underinvestment can fuel perceptions that Canada lacks the capacity or will to respond forcefully to external threats. As a result, adversaries may view Canada as a “soft target”, using it as a low-risk entry point for information campaigns amies at influencing broader Western audiences. These vulnerabilities are compounded by a weakening media landscape, marked by declining competition and vanishing local outlets, which reduces the incentives to uphold journalistic standards and counter misinformation. Similarly, Canada’s relative diffuse national identity, where regional and ethnic affiliation often take precedence, may make it more susceptible to identity-based interference designed to exploit social divisions. In other words, it is not just about actual military readiness but also about how adversaries perceive Canada’s resilience and susceptibility to interference.
Compared to Canada, alternative NATO targets such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and even Finland are becoming less appealing to Russia in terms of information operations. Not only are these societies much less culturally diverse than Canada, but their historical experience under Soviet rule or occupation has instilled a deeper skepticism toward Russian narratives, making their populations more resistant to pro-Russian propaganda (except for East Germany). Unlike Canada, where diverse audiences with varying levels of awareness may be more susceptible, Baltic societies have developed a comparative collective immunity to Kremlin-backed disinformation. Furthermore, since these nations have been primary targets of Russian hybrid warfare for decades, they have built robust countermeasures and policies, including media literacy programs, stringent regulations on Russian state media, and advanced cybersecurity infrastructure that involves all levels of governance, especially in Estonia. As a result, Russia is less likely to succeed in expending resources to influence these populations, who are inherently more resistant and well-prepared. Instead, Moscow is more likely to shift its focus to a larger Canadian target, particularly at a time when disputes between Ottawa and Washington make cooperation increasingly tenuous.
Overall, Canada’s diverse society, strong connections with major Western powers, and perceived vulnerability within this great power circle render it an appealing target for foreign information operations. Recognizing and addressing these vulnerabilities is essential for protecting Canada’s democratic institutions and preserving its role as a stable and resilient member of the international community. It is therefore unsurprising that the Canadian government has invested time and resources in its Foreign Interference Commission and led the G7 initiative against foreign meddling. In the wake of shocks such as the Trump administration’s rapid escalation of tariff tensions that strained Canada’s economic ties with the U.S, Ottawa’s middle power status appears increasingly precarious.
3- Canada’s Comparative Advantage
Canada has established itself as a leader in media and information research, particularly in the areas of disinformation and information operations. Institutions such as the University of Waterloo’s Cybersecurity and Privacy Institute, the University of Toronto’s Citizen’s Lab, McGill University’s Media Ecosystem Observatory, the University of Ottawa’s Information Integrity Lab, and the Canadian Digital Media Research Network are at the forefront of research on topics including online foreign interference and the weaponization of disinformation.
Canada has also emerged as a global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) and technological innovation, fostering a vibrant startup and educational ecosystem that provides unique advantages compared to its U.S. and European NATO allies. Ottawa’s commitment to AI is evident through significant investments and strategic initiatives. In 2017, Canada became the first country to implement a national AI strategy, the Pan-Canadian AI Strategy, highlighting its dedication to promoting AI research and development. This strategy has resulted in the establishment of AI Chairs at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, the recruitment of over 100 researchers, and the training of more than 1,500 graduate students and post-doctoral fellows. The Canadian government has also actively developed initiatives to combat disinformation within its bureaucratic structures through the “Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants,” aiding in training civil servants to identify and address the spread of false information.
Finally, the Canadian AI sector is bolstered by a robust talent pool. As of 2022-23, over 140,000 professionals were actively engaged in AI, a 29% increase from the previous year. Notably, Canada is home to 10% of the world’s top-tier AI researchers, ranking second globally. This concentration of expertise has fostered a thriving startup environment, with approximately 1,500 companies developing AI solutions across various industries, including healthcare, finance, and manufacturing.
In contrast, the research environment in the United States faces significant challenges due to political polarization. The Stanford Internet Observatory (SIO), known for its studies on social media abuse and disinformation, has encountered funding uncertainties and leadership changes, partly due to external political pressures. This situation highlights the difficulties U.S. institutions face in conducting disinformation research within a highly polarized political climate, as significant social media companies appear to have given up on disinformation monitoring. Meanwhile, federal policymakers are pledging to reduce funding for cybersecurity-protecting agencies. Canada’s comparatively more stable political environment for education and research offers a fertile ground for disinformation research and development.
Nevertheless, it remains true that most cutting-edge technological advances are performed in the U.S and that many companies from Canada and elsewhere end up moving or considering moving to the U.S to be part of those ecosystems and benefit from tax incentives, causing a significant tech “brain drain” in Canada. For instance, 64% of surveyed Canadian tech workers would consider moving for a similar job in the U.S at a time when some argue that the ongoing tariffs imposed on Canada risk escalating the brain train to the U.S by making it harder for companies to operate in both countries, thus favouring U.S markets. Still, this does not mean the end of Canada’s AI and broader tech ecosystem. Ottawa can act to increase company and workers’ retention in similar ways Quebec’s government created conditions for the establishment of a video game industry ecosystem in its province and helped propel the Canadian video game ecosystem through the introduction of a 37% tax credit for companies operating in this sector in the early 2000s.
4- A Strategic Framework for Canada’s Leadership in Cybersecurity
To position itself as a leader in cybersecurity and disinformation research among the Atlantic allies, Canada must develop a “whole-of-society” approach to tackling short-to long-term goals. First, Canada needs to expand its existing academic-government partnership, including tripartite programs with the private sector. Looking ahead, Canada needs to develop its own digitalization of public services and infrastructure to enhance public trust in digital systems and the legitimacy of the government’s leadership in developing a secure cybersecurity ecosystem.
Short-term: Laying the Foundations for Interdisciplinary Innovation
To build upon these existing strengths, Canada could establish a dedicated advanced research agency that focuses on defense-related innovation and encompasses the social sciences and humanities. Connecting the tri-agency funding program (SSHRC, CIHR, NSERC) into this framework would promote interdisciplinary research, address the multifaceted nature of misinformation and cybersecurity threats, and take advantage of a centrally administered ecosystem of already $4 billion.
For example, in 2021, the Liberal Party of Canada, if re-elected, promised the establishment of the Canada Advanced Research Projects Agency (CARPA), modelled after the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which gave the planet world-changing technologies like the Internet and the GPS system to foster innovation and maintain technological leadership. However, the initiative has yet to be realized, leaving a gap in Canada’s strategic research infrastructure. This approach would improve collaboration between government, academia, and the private sector, fostering innovation and ensuring that research translates into effective policies and disseminated technologies. By leveraging its existing research capabilities and expanding interdisciplinary initiatives, Canada can position itself as a leader in addressing national misinformation threats within NATO. Given the higher relative representation of social science research in federal funding in Canada compared to the United States, Ottawa has the potential to enhance the interdisciplinary academic research and training opportunities for current and future generations of disinformation and cybersecurity scholars both within and beyond STEM fields.
As previously mentioned, Canada already possesses a strong foundation in universities, research centres, private section engagement, and government-backed academic funding infrastructure. What remains lacking is the political will among policymakers and executive stakeholders to activate and empower these existing institutions. Accordingly, the next federal government must prioritize the passage and implementation of key legislative frameworks—namely Bill C-27, which includes the AI and Data Act, the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, and the Personal Information and Data Protection Tribunal Act; Bill C-63 on online harms; and Bill C-26, which aims to modernize the Telecommunications Act by integrating cybersecurity provisions. Together, these measures form the essential scaffolding for a resilient and innovative ecosystem while simultaneously safeguarding the digital rights and privacy of Canadians.
Long-term: Learning from Allies to Build Trust and Digital Resilience
As digital threats evolve and foreign information operations grow more sophisticated, Canada must take proactive steps to bolster its digital resilience. A long-term strategy should focus on building institutional trust, enhancing cybersecurity, and improving public digital literacy. By learning from successful allies like Estonia, Canada can work on developing and implementing secure digital identity systems, expanding open-data governance, and creating pre-emptive measures against disinformation. Strengthening alliances with NATO partners will further enhance Canada’s ability to navigate emerging cyber challenges. A forward-thinking strategy will not only protect Canadian democracy but also foster trust in public institutions and ensure long-term technological leadership.
The Estonian government has emerged as a leading actor in the digitization of governance, initiating the digitization of its education and healthcare systems in the late 1990s. Today, most citizen-government interactions can be conducted digitally, despite the persistent threat of Russian cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. Through a surge of political entrepreneurship and a favourable response from the private and academic sectors, Estonia has developed a comprehensive, resilient, and efficient digital governance system often referred to as “e-Estonia.” For instance, a tripartite research project involving the public, private, and academic sectors, led by scholars from TalTech and funded by government and private initiatives, resulted in the formation of the Next Gen Digital State Research Group. This research team is dedicated to advancing the discovery and implementation of new technologies through multidisciplinary collaboration. The main objective is to provide resources to innovative academic researchers while ensuring that the outcomes are accessible to both public and private audiences and can be practically implemented.
One of the greatest benefits of such digital transformation has been the increased trust in government institutions and satisfaction with government effectiveness among the Estonian population. When discussing emerging threats from foreign information operations, which rely primarily on the dissemination of false information to spread political skepticism, institutional trust is paramount. Additionally, resilient digital infrastructures support the retention of this trust by mitigating the efficiency impact that cyberattacks may cause. Below are some examples that Canada can implement quite seamlessly on a medium to long-term basis.
First, Canada should implement an electronic identity (e-ID) system, which provides citizens with a secure digital identity enabling access to a wide array of online services including voting, banking, and healthcare, represents a strong initiative. This system ensures that citizens can authenticate themselves online confidently, thereby reducing the risk of identity fraud and enhancing trust in digital interactions, and it has been central to Estonia’s digital infrastructure. Canada stands to benefit from adopting a similar secure, centralized digital identity system. By providing citizens with a reliable means of online identification, the government can facilitate secure access to services and foster greater trust in digital platforms. This trust is essential in countering disinformation, as citizens are more likely to rely on verified information sources when they feel confident in the security and authenticity of digital channels. Interestingly, provincial governments have already begun exploring this solution, with Ontario developing a digital identity program for online public services.
Therefore, the federal government is likely to encounter less resistance from the provinces if it pairs its digital initiatives with meaningful financial support and empowers provinces to adapt emerging technologies to their specific needs. Such an approach would also help Ottawa avoid high-profile failures like the Phoenix pay system and the ArriveCan application, both of which severely undermined its digital credibility. Avoiding future missteps requires more than coordination—it requires humility. If the government cannot deliver reliable, efficient, and cost-effective digital infrastructure, it must make space for those who can. Now more than ever, Ottawa must recognize not only where its strengths lie but where they fall short—and open the door for experts with the vision and technical capacity to lead. Canada’s tech sector holds the talent and innovation needed to build a secure and responsive digital future. Government’s role should be to enable and integrate that expertise—not to stand in its way.
Secondly, enhancing government data accessibility through an “open-data” governance structure is key to improving transparency and fostering trust between citizens and Canadian authorities. In the case of Estonia, the government publishes open-access data on many aspects of its operations to promote accountability and enable citizens to make more informed decisions. They are also working on implementing an API to facilitate big data collection and training on state data for public and private sector stakeholders. This approach not only increases trust in government but also reduces the scope in which misinformation can thrive. Notably, Estonia reports the highest levels of trust in national institutions among postcommunist European states, a striking outcome given the region’s historically low trust levels rooted in part experiences of repression and corruption. These results are particularly significant when considering the non-political institutions, such as those tied to public administration and service delivery, as well as political institutions. Its experience attests to the transformative potential of open-data policies in rebuilding trust, particularly in contexts marked by institutional fragility or democratic skepticism.
Citizens in countries like Estonia enjoy broad digital rights: they have access to state data and can submit petitions, participate in consultations, and vote entirely online. In Canada, a promising initiative has emerged in the form of Bill C-27 and the implementation of the national “Digital Charter.” This proposed legislation draws inspiration from European efforts such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Services Act (DSA), and the Data Governance Act and Digital Markets Act—all of which have reshaped the EU’s digital governance landscape since 2018. However, as of January 2025, Bill C-27 remains unpassed, despite its potential to enhance state capacity and cultivate public trust in digital governance.
At present, Canada continues to struggle with real-time data access, with outdated freedom of information laws contributing to slow response times and limited public awareness of available data. Yet, the current climate—marked by a rally-around-the-flag effect and heightened concern for national security—presents a unique political window for Ottawa. This moment should be seized not only to advance legislation expanding access to information, but also to institutionalize the integration of key stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and the tech sector, into the broader process of building digital resilience. By capitalizing on this momentum, the federal government can both modernize its information governance and reinforce democratic trust in the digital age.
Third, Canada needs to develop a proactive and preventive strategy for countering disinformation that focuses on “pre-bunking” rather than solely relying on a reactive, debunking-based approach. Pre-bunking involves educating individuals about disinformation tactics before they encounter them, much like a vaccine, enhancing their resilience against the effects of disinformation. This concept is grounded in inoculation theory. In contrast, debunking aims to reverse the damage caused by disinformation after individuals have been exposed to it and have accepted some of its claims as truth. Currently, many Canadian initiatives, such as Get Cyber Safe and non-profit collaboration programs like MediaSmarts, as well as government-led and funded disinformation tracking operations like the Canadian election misinformation project and Canada’s Rapid Response Mechanisms (RRM), are excellent ideas. The issue arises from their limited reach within the general public. Canada stands to benefit by implementing a national digital literacy program directly into the educational system. Such a national curriculum would mandate digital literacy education and evaluation from elementary to secondary levels, enabling the Canadian government to provide adequate funding through its spending powers while allowing provinces to adapt the program to their regional contexts.While public campaigns and reactive mechanisms are necessary, their effectiveness is limited without preventive education and care at earlier development stages. A reform in digital and media literacy should be a priority in Canada’s medium to long-term strategy to protect its population from disinformation and position itself as a leader in this area.
With a Little Help from my Friends
Fortunately for Canada, NATO is increasingly committed to addressing cybersecurity issues. Ottawa has allies possessing diverse experiences to assist it in navigating its own challenges, especially when the alliance requires a proactive strategy. Canada stands to benefit from forming extensive and comprehensive partnerships and collaborative efforts with allies like Estonia, including a bilateral digital literacy initiative. This program could enable Estonian experts to help design training programs for Canadian bureaucrats, educators, journalists, and government officials. Joint workshops and training sessions between Estonian and Canadian bureaucrats, practitioners, and academics on cyber-defence, media literacy, and critical topics such as election security should be expanded to ultimately create joint research organizations integrating all levels of stakeholders. Even better, Estonia is eager to share its e-Estonia initiatives with like-minded partners. Furthermore, should Canada’s relationship with its traditional greatest ally, the US, deteriorate, increasing Canada’s involvement in European-led initiatives and networks, such as the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), offers a solid pathway to strengthen cyber-defense collaboration with European Atlantic allies in ways that extend beyond purely military means.
5- Conclusion: Canada’s Digital Vanguard
As foreign information operations increasingly threaten democratic institutions across the Atlantic Alliance, Canada occupies a unique strategic position. While its reactive approaches through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and military cyber division development have laid the groundwork, they remain insufficient against evolving threats and must implement proactive countermeasures.
Canada’s distinctive advantages—a robust academic research ecosystem specializing in disinformation, world-class AI talent, and relative political stability for conducting sensitive research—position it for leadership where other allies face constraints. Unlike its southern neighbor, where polarization has undermined research continuity, Canada maintains the equilibrium necessary for sustained investment in digital resilience.
The path forward requires immediate legislative action on pending bills addressing AI governance and telecommunications security while establishing interdisciplinary research structures bridging government, academia, and industry. Drawing lessons from Estonia’s successful e-governance transformation, Canada must develop secure digital identity systems and integrate pre-bunking strategies into national digital literacy initiatives. This challenge transcends technological solutions, representing a fundamental test of democratic resilience in an era of weaponized information. By leveraging its strengths, Canada can forge a distinctive leadership role within NATO and the G7 beyond traditional military and economic contributions. In doing so, it would not only enhance its own digital sovereignty but strengthen collective democratic resilience across organizations.
The integrity of democratic institutions hangs in the balance as information operations grow in sophistication. Canada’s response will determine not just its national security posture but potentially the future of democratic resilience in the digital age. The opportunity for leadership is clear—he question remains whether Canada possesses the political will to seize it.
Comments are closed.