Foreign agent law in Georgia: Russia steps up to the plate

The foreign agents law under the leadership of Bidzina Ivanichvili and the Russians

Last May, the government led by the Georgian Dream party decreed that non-governmental organizations whose funding was more than 20% foreign in origin had to be entered on the register of “foreign agents”, before being banned. This means that many American and European organizations promoting democracy in Georgia are under threat: the German Marshall Fund, the Forum for Civil Society, the Open Society Foundation, and others.

To understand this law, which led to numerous demonstrations in the country, and even to a veto by President Salome Zourabichvili, we need to go back to the Rose Revolution in 2003. When former Soviet diplomatic chief Eduard Shevardnadze was President of the Republic of Georgia, a large popular movement led by former minister Mikheil Saakashvili was formed, criticizing Shevardnadze for pursuing corrupt policies, for being too close to the Russian Federation and for preventing the advancement of rights in civil society. At the time, the Rose Movement was largely financed by these American and European foundations. Shevardnadze’s resignation led to a new presidential election, won by Saakashvili and his United National Movement party. Saakashvili has pursued a policy of rapprochement with NATO and the European Union, much to Moscow’s displeasure. Moreover, Russian support for the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the war in 2008 had definitively sealed the divorce between Russia and part of the Georgian population, convinced of the need for closer ties with the West.

Indeed, in 2013, when Mikheil Saakashvili and his party were in turn accused of corruption and fell from grace, the Georgian Dream party, founded by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who had made his fortune mainly in Russia, officially continued the West-oriented foreign policy. Georgian Dream has long advocated membership of the European Union, a widely held view in Georgia. However, with the “foreign agents” law, this project is taking a turn for the worse, and this observation is also shared by the European Commission. Despite pro-European protests and President Zurabishvili’s opposition, Georgia will eventually see this law implemented. The law has been referred to the Constitutional Court, but it is unlikely to be overturned. Many observers see this law as the result of the Kremlin’s influence since many similar laws have already been passed in Belarus and Russia. Today, only 469 of Georgia’s 30,000 NGOs (or 1.5%) have met the 20% foreign funding criterion.

The debate over this law is driving the campaign for the parliamentary elections on October 26. The opposition wishes to repeal the law, but remains extremely divided, while Georgian Dream has integrated the People Power party into its coalition. This party was created in 2022 from a split in Georgian Dream, fiercely opposed to foreign aid, particularly from the USA. This split had caused Georgian Dream to lose its absolute majority in parliament and probably put pressure on the governing party to pass this law.

In January 2024, Bidzina Ivanichvili, who had long remained officially out of politics but was extremely powerful because of his fortune and the success of the party he had created, made his return as Honorary Chairman of Georgian Dream. Some see the change of Prime Minister on January 29 as a return to prominence for the oligarch, no doubt keen to distance himself from Europe. Indeed, the European Commission had cited “de-oligarchization” as a priority for Georgia in 2022. Ivanishvili is also the subject of much criticism from international NGOs, which may explain his support for the Foreign Agents Act.

The USA accused of fomenting a coup d’état

The United States, historically an important partner of Georgia, has twice been accused by the Tbilisi government of wanting to overthrow it. As a result, military maneuvers by US armed forces scheduled to take place from July 26 to August 6, 2024, have been canceled by the Pentagon, which wants to “re-examine its overall cooperation” with Georgia. After the Foreign Agents Act, this serious blow to US-Georgian relations could also strengthen Russia’s influence in the Caucasus. Historically, especially since the Rose Revolution, Washington and Tbilisi have shared very good relations, with cooperation agreements in development policy, but also in military cooperation, as part of the war on international terrorism. Georgia has been one of the biggest supporters (in per capita terms) of American-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, notably via the Georgia Train and Equip program between 2002 and 2004, followed by the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program between 2004 and 2007. The United States has also historically supported Georgia’s membership of NATO. After the 2008 war with Russia, the United States continues to support Georgia. The turn taken by the Georgian Dream party since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 has not yet led to a full restoration of Russian-Georgian relations, but we could still say that, as things stand, Georgia is on the road to rapprochement with Moscow. In a way, Georgia is in the process of “de-Ukrainization”, i.e., it is regaining common interests with Russia and returning to the latter’s geostrategic fold, as evidenced by the government’s stance on European integration.

• For Georgia, the strategy is very difficult to explain. The divorce between the pro-European population and the Georgian Dream party seems to be a foregone conclusion. To stay in power, a transition to authoritarianism is likely and, in the medium term, a return to the russki mir (the central concept of Russian nationalism, designating Russia’s sphere of historical and cultural influence) that will be favoured. The rapprochement with the European Union, which had gone as far as the recognition of Georgia’s application for membership on December 14, 2023, was interrupted following the European Council of June 2024, which suspended Georgia’s application because of the law on foreign agents. The recent crisis with the USA also points in this direction.
• Since February 2022, Georgia’s geographical location and history have attracted the attention of NATO and the EU, and Georgian civil society has been vocal in its support. But on the other hand, the authoritarian turn of the Tbilisi government, its rapprochement with Moscow and the recent crisis with the United States disqualify intergovernmental cooperation, while support for the opposition has become virtually impossible, due to the law against foreign agents. Even the democratic supervision of elections looks set to be complicated.
• Finally, for Moscow, the Georgian crisis in 2024 is an opportunity to close a parenthesis of more than twenty years of cold relations, marked by the war in 2008. If Georgian Dream stays in power, the law on foreign agents will remain in force. This would remove the main obstacle to Georgia’s re-entry into the Russian strategic space.