While tensions over unequal burden sharing within NATO are nearly as old as the alliance itself, so-called free-riders have never come under fire as harshly as they have since Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office. During the campaign trail, Trump bluntly stated that Vladimir Putin could “do whatever the hell he wants” with NATO countries that fail to meet their spending commitments. Although he has not repeated the remark since taking office, his administration has made clear that allies must step up and meet their obligations.
Importantly, Trump is no longer alone in pressing for increased spending. Allies in Eastern Europe – who feel most directly threatened by Russian aggression – have started echoing this demand. Poland and Estonia, for instance, publicly endorsed the 5% target as early as January 2025. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk captured the frustration pointedly, remarking that “right now, 500 million Europeans are begging 300 million Americans for protection from 140 million Russians.” Similarly, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has advocated for a new NATO spending target since the start of his tenure, warning that the 2% goal is no longer sufficient to meet the security challenges ahead.
As the NATO summit in The Hague approaches, momentum is building for a more ambitious spending target, likely exceeding the current 2% of GDP benchmark. A new 5% threshold is being floated, comprising roughly 3.5% in direct defence spending and another 1.5% for supporting infrastructure and broader security needs.
For NATO’s traditional free-riders, the writing is on the wall: defence budgets will need to grow, and fast. But ramping up military spending in such a short timeframe comes with complex political, institutional, and logistical challenges. Belgium, our own country, has begun to take steps in that direction and in doing so, has exposed the kinds of frictions and constraints other countries, like Canada, may soon face.
Did the Second Shock Wake Belgium Up?
The re-election of Trump marks the second major shock to NATO allies in less than three years. The first came on February 24, 2022, when Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border. That invasion triggered a wave of geopolitical ‘wake-up calls’ and Zeitenwende declarations across Europe. But the shock had uneven effects across the alliance.
Countries closest to Russia, many of which were already investing heavily in their militaries, significantly increased their defence budgets. The Baltic states are now aiming to spend 5% of GDP on defence in the near future. Poland boosted its defence spending from 2.7% in 2022 to 4.2% in 2024, with further increases expected. Northern European countries also ramped up investment and began (re)introducing comprehensive ‘total defence’ approaches. At the other end of the spectrum are NATO’s so-called free riders: allies spending only a fraction of their GDP on defence. Many of them made only modest adjustments after Russia’s 2022 aggression against Ukraine, remaining far from the 2% target.
Our own country, Belgium, is one of these stubborn free riders. In Belgian policy circles, it is often said that we are ‘the worst student in NATO’s class.’ Despite hosting the Alliance’s headquarters, Belgium has long failed to meet its commitments. Last year, it spent just 1.2% of GDP on defence only a 0.2 percentage point increase from 2022. Moreover, the previous government only aimed to hit NATO’s 2% benchmark by 2035. This left Belgium even trailing behind after other traditional underperformers like Spain, Italy, and Canada, all of which pledged to meet the 2% norm by 2030 at the latest. Clearly, the war in Ukraine didn’t trigger a genuine shift in Belgian defence policy.
Perhaps Belgium really was NATO’s “worst student”. But shortly after Trump returned to the Oval Office, Belgium also installed a new government. This coalition pledged to end what Minister of Defence Theo Francken described as a “period of national disgrace.” The coalition agreement initially aimed to reach the 2% target by 2029, pulling the goal forward by six years. Then, in March, the government revised its timeline again, announcing it would already meet the target this year.
Was it the change in government that finally spurred Belgium into action? It certainly gave an impulse but is unlikely to be the sole explanation. Three of the four coalition parties were already part of the previous government. The only newcomer is N-VA, a centre-right Flemish nationalist party now holding the defence portfolio. But that is not a decisive break with the past: the N-VA was already in government following the 2014 Wales Summit and even held the defence ministry during a period of declining budgets. Instead, it seems that mounting transatlantic tensions delivered the final push. After all, countries like Spain and Italy have also recently pledged to meet the 2% target this year. Regardless of the precise trigger, Europe’s free-rider club may finally be shrinking.
Challenges of Rapidly Increasing Military Spending
The Belgian government has committed to reaching NATO’s 2% defence spending norm by the end of this year. While meeting this target may ultimately prove insufficient, it already presents considerable challenges. Those will only intensify if the target is raised further.
The first challenge is straightforward: how to sustainably finance increased defence spending? Creating fiscal space is a dilemma faced by every NATO ally when the need for higher defence budgets arises. As we highlighted in a recent Policy Brief for the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, our survey of national security experts across Europe revealed a variety of fiscal strategies. Germany, France, and Poland have primarily turned to debt, a short-term solution that postpones structural decisions. Sweden and the Netherlands have opted for budgetary reallocations, while the Baltic States, facing greater threats, have shown more willingness to raise taxes.
Belgium, for its part, has mainly relied on temporary measures to meet the NATO 2% target by 2025. This includes €1.2 billion from taxes on profits from frozen Russian assets held at Euroclear, a one-time €500 million dividend from the state-owned bank Belfius, €125 million by reclassifying existing expenditures as defence-related, and about €2 billion in loans, kept off the regular budget following the European Commission’s decision to loosen up the EU’s fiscal rules. Relying mainly on short-term stopgap measures, Belgium still faces a structural fiscal challenge. With a large pre-existing budget deficit and a public debt of 107% of GDP, sustaining higher defence spending will require politically painful decisions.
Such politically painful decisions will not be easy, given that defence spending has never been a priority for the Belgium public or political elites, mainly because of Belgium’s geopolitical position. Situated at the heart of Europe and surrounded by friendly nations, Belgium feels less exposed to the threat of a resurgent Russia than Eastern European countries. Even now, no consensus exists among governing parties about exceeding the 2% benchmark. Both Flemish and Walloon Christian Democrats appear opposed. The president of the Flemish Christian Democrats has already stated that 2% should be the upper limit, while Walloon Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Prévot wanted to form a “coalition of the unwilling” to resist a NATO target of 3.5% or 5%.
A third and often overlooked challenge lies in effectively spending newly allocated defence budgets. Late movers in terms of ramping up defence investment now find themselves at the back of the procurement queue. Others who acted earlier have already secured production slots for critical systems. Countries like Belgium must contend with constraints in defence-industrial capacity, an issue the EU is now beginning to address through ramped-up production and industrial incentives.
The Challenges of No Longer Being a Free-Rider: Lessons from Belgium
Belgium’s recent commitment to meet the 2% benchmark this year underscores both the urgency and the significant challenges involved in rapidly increasing military expenditure. Canada finds itself in a similar position, with limited fiscal space and public debt exceeding 100% of GDP. Achieving and sustaining higher defence spending will necessitate politically difficult decisions – be it through spending cuts, tax increases, or debt-financed investments.
In Belgium, structural budgetary choices have largely been postponed. The country has relied on temporary measures to meet the 2% goal. These stopgap solutions may suffice in the short term but sidestep the crucial political conversation about embedding defence spending into long-term budgetary planning. On top of the existing fiscal hurdles, is a lack of strong perceived threats among the general public. This might make it more difficult to sustain public support for increased defence spending. Even when political will and funding align, late adopters like Belgium and Canada encounter practical challenges.
Belgium’s experience offers valuable lessons: limited fiscal space demands long-term structural planning, public support cannot be assumed, and industrial bottlenecks will not resolve themselves. Shedding the free-rider label involves more than just increasing spending; it’s about sustaining it, justifying it, and using it effectively.
About the Authors
Michelle Haas is a doctoral student at the Institute for International and European Studies in Ghent.
Tim Haesebrouck is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for International and European Studies at Ghent University in Belgium.
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