This Hot Take assesses local and international perceptions of the terrorist group Boko Haram in the Far North region of Cameroon, as well as the various responses proposed based on these perceptions. It highlights that the weight of history, community identity, and cultural ties between communities and young people affiliated with Boko Haram prevent an immediate resolution to the issue, particularly when international approaches perceive this movement as being completely isolated. On the contrary, Boko Haram is embedded in local social structures. This Hot Take then leads to how local perceptions can offer a new understanding of situations of insecurity and propose alternatives for lasting and acceptable peace in the context of Boko Haram in the Far North of Cameroon.
Understanding What Boko Haram Really Is
Since 2009, the Boko Haram group has posed serious problems for Cameroon’s national security, but also for sub-regional security in the Lake Chad basin. Boko Haram (the faction that succeeded Abu Shekau) is responsible for kidnappings, murders, rapes, destruction of property, and attacks that have caused forced displacement of populations and misery in the far north of Cameroon. In recent years, the group has been considered the greatest threat to the security of people in Cameroon and in the countries of the Lake Chad Basin. It should be noted that Boko Haram recruits from all social strata, without excluding any category based on sex, gender or profession. It operates using an asymmetric warfare strategy and its combatants are not identifiable at first glance (as they would be if they wore uniforms), unlike a conventional army.
International Perceptions of Boko Haram and Responses
Conflict analysts and governments describe Boko Haram as a ‘terrorist movement’ because of its various methods of operation, such as bombings, kidnappings and targeting civilians. Most of these analysts provide their expertise to both governments (such as the United States) and international institutions (e.g., the United Nations network, which is the predominant voice in managing situations of insecurity). Thus, Boko Haram has been labelled a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This categorization is linked to the classification of Boko Haram’s abuses and, above all, its methods, which correspond to those of terrorist activities.
The treatment or response recommended by the international actors involved to combat terrorism therefore consists of two main components: military action and the deradicalization of local populations.
Military action involves the mobilisation of national and sub-regional armed forces to locate and destroy Boko Haram’s physical positions. For example, since 2016, Cameroon’s Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) has been active in the far north region, conducting various search operations, surprise attacks and arrests, and protecting towns and villages through surveillance and intelligence patrols. These actions are supported by the United States (drone surveillance) and France (security intelligence). The military strategy is also based on self-defence or vigilantism, insofar as the army relies on local civilians in its operations, particularly to obtain security intelligence. This action is combined with the disarmament and demobilization of former Boko Haram militiamen. Military action is sporadic and short-term, its main purpose being the strategic defence of the political regime of President Paul Barthélemy Biya, who has been in power for 43 years.
Deradicalization takes the form of various programmes, projects and actions to combat violent extremism, including: women’s empowerment programmes, agro-poultry training for young people, psychosocial support through the reintegration of ex-combatants, food distribution to refugees and internally displaced persons, and the establishment of local community conflict mediation centres. These various containment strategies against Boko Haram are driven by United Nations agencies, non-governmental organisations, other intergovernmental organisations and state development agencies, such as the Danish International Development Agency, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit and the French Development Agency.
The approach that informs these two components is that of the fight against terrorism. However, the issue of Boko Haram cannot be reduced to terrorism alone. These responses may prove insufficient to address the full scope of the challenge. But how can the problem be identified in its entirety? It is by understanding the place that Boko Haram occupies in the local context that the group can be categorized.
Local Perceptions of Boko Haram
To understand the place that Boko Haram occupies, it is necessary to know what the local populations of the Far North of Cameroon think about it. It is therefore necessary to analyse local discourse on the perception of Boko Haram. This discourse is structured around two main elements: local statements about Boko Haram and coexistence with Boko Haram. These two discursive registers form the basis for reflection on a potential local security model specific to the context of the Far North region of Cameroon.
On the one hand, with regard to statements, Boko Haram, contrary to international perceptions, is considered a manifestation of mistrust that is part of local practices of resilience in the face of crises, whether social, political, economic or environmental. Boko Haram is not a unique phenomenon. Although the group itself is relatively recent, its practices (kidnappings, abductions, theft, looting and ransom demands) are very old in the Far North region of Cameroon and have been actively used by groups operating in the region since at least the 18th century. However, they intensified around the 1980s through ‘zarguina controls,’ or roadblock operations, which brutalized and robbed travellers in the region. These criminal operations are carried out by young people who live in the communities and participate in their active life. Sometimes they do so in collusion with traditional chiefdoms to line their pockets. These crimes are so endemic that they could be compared to a social institution which, although not codified, is perceived as normal. This is why roadblockers live in their communities and participate in their activities without necessarily being disturbed. They are therefore a product of the communities. Moreover, many young bandits come to the aid of their communities in the event of inter-community conflicts and, to date, participate in local vigilantism.
All these elements indicate that, in relation to some of its practices (theft, looting and kidnapping) and given the profile of many of the young people involved (motorcycle taxi drivers from the Far North, for example), Boko Haram is an offshoot of local communities. It is not a foreign group. Even if certain practices such as attacks or preaching jihadist radicalism are among the movement’s key strategies, it should be noted that they are new or only concern the modern version of local resilience, which, of course, many local populations reject. Given Boko Haram’s proximity to local communities in terms of the origins of many of the young people who have joined it, and the similarity between its terrorist practices and older, normalized practices (theft, looting, kidnapping and ransom demands), it is extremely difficult to put in place a security system that could stop this movement through military means. The weight of history, identity and cultural ties between communities and young people affiliated with Boko Haram do not allow for a military solution to the threat posed by Boko Haram. The weakness of international approaches is that they consider this movement to be completely isolated. However, it is very much part of local social structures.
On the other hand, the current international approach is complicated by the coexistence between communities and Boko Haram. This coexistence has its ups and downs. It is beneficial for a community when its young people, for example, defend it in situations of inter-community conflict. However, it is detrimental when these same young people then attack members of their own communities as well as members of other communities when they suspect them of colluding with the armed forces who are monitoring their positions. Life with Boko Haram is not only violent but also filled with normal activities such as fishing, farming, trade, illicit cross-border trafficking, and negotiations for social advancement. It is also marked by the group’s ideological influence, particularly through young people, street children and other curious individuals who thus avoid loneliness and find at least some social purpose.
Boko Haram’s presence is therefore made possible by local interconnectivity that is shaped on a daily basis, despite the insecurity. In reality, there is no real social distance between Boko Haram militiamen and the local population. This means that, contrary to the international perception of Boko Haram as an isolated phenomenon, it is in fact a movement integrated into the local context. This is why locals do not consider peace that does not include the militants, or at least the former militants, to be viable. Boko Haram’s intertwining with local life therefore indicates that a different security approach is needed. This approach must not exclude the militants, must not view the movement as having no roots in local life, and must not consider it as a mere manifestation of international terrorism.
Conclusion
The alternative for Canada lies in developing strategies to curb the negative effects of Boko Haram, not its social ties. This means devising norms that could compete with and replace those that allow the group to thrive. This goal could be achieved through organized discussions within community-based organisations. These norms should necessarily aim to promote community cohesion while preserving the idea of group identity. They must therefore focus on the pursuit of peace by eliminating mistrust or contestation of the various forms of legitimacy (NGO, national, international) proclaimed within communities. Finally, this solution proposed by local communities requires Canada to organize intensive discussions through research programmes that directly link universities and local community-based organizations.
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