Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House for a second term presents a significant challenge to the security approach of the countries on the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While these states have begun to review their strategic priorities following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, they now face uncertainties regarding the future commitment of the United States to their security, not to mention the possibility of a hypothetical rapprochement between the United States and Russia.
This contribution proposes to address these issues through a comparative study of the national security strategies adopted by four small nations on NATO’s eastern flank following Russia’s aggression in February 2022: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia. These nations are part of the so-called Bucharest format, a group of nine countries established in 2015 through a joint initiative by Poland and Romania. In addition to these two countries, the group includes Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia.
Their selection is justified by the fact that these nations have revised their national security strategies following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Their geographical distribution along NATO’s eastern flank, as well as the different trajectories their relations with Russia have taken, make it possible to analyze them through the lens of both differences and similarities in their strategic approaches. Finally, they can be examined through the analytical category of small states.
As such, these small states are not in a position to lead strategic discussions within NATO and the European Union (EU), but their voices cannot be entirely ignored. Indeed, they play a role in decision-making processes within both institutions, which operate by consensus, especially given their vulnerability to external influences that could undermine any form of unity.
This contribution proposes, in a first part, to compare the content of their new national security strategies, and in a second part, to discuss the implications of possible changes in the foreign policy orientation of a second Trump administration with regard to European security.
This article suggests that such changes, if confirmed, could place these small NATO eastern flank states in an extremely delicate security position; moreover, these countries currently lack credible alternatives to the commitment of the United States and NATO. Indeed, all of them have pursued a policy of cultivating U.S. engagement to ensure their security, without having yet seriously considered a broader diversification of their security cooperation within the EU.
National Security Strategies
The practice of making national security strategies public is relatively recent. It was established in the U.S. in 1986, when Congress required each president to publish a national security strategy.
In Europe, the practice is not yet uniformly widespread. For example, Germany published its very first national security strategy in 2023. In other countries, there is no systematic tradition of developing such strategies. Typically, the need for a national security strategy is triggered by significant developments at the international level. For example, the 2014 Russia-Ukraine crisis, followed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, led several EU member states to adopt new national security strategies. These strategies were adopted by governments and are generally subject to a vote in national parliaments. Among the strategies analyzed in this contribution, only Bulgaria’s 2025 national strategy has not yet been approved by the National Assembly.
Although the relevance of these documents is sometimes questioned, they nevertheless serve important functions. First, they provide a common framework for understanding national security objectives across all levels of government and bureaucracy. Second, they enable national security priorities to be communicated to allies, as well as to potential adversaries and enemies. Third, they share these priorities with various non-state actors, such as analysts, experts, and academics, although these documents rarely attract public attention.
Small States: Between Attractiveness and Hedging
The concept of small states is the subject of much debate among international relations specialists. One approach defines them based on quantitative criteria linked to their economic and military resources. Another approach favors more qualitative criteria stemming from their behavior on the international stage. By “small states,” we refer to those that combine an awareness of their limited status, rooted in their historical experiences of dependence on major powers, with a sense of vulnerability on the international stage.
As such, these states have few strategic options. When part of an alliance system backed by a patron power, such as the Atlantic Alliance, they can choose to either strengthen military coordination with the United States, seek greater strategic autonomy, or combine both approaches over the short and long term. For example, faced with the Russian threat, Poland has pursued a policy of attractiveness, multiplying gestures of support towards the United States during Donald Trump’s first term and prioritizing purchases of American weapons over European alternatives.
An intermediate solution for these states could lie in a strategy of internal hedging consisting of varying their security options within their own alliance system. In the case of NATO, this strategy would involve prioritizing arms purchases from other member countries of the Alliance, not solely from the United States.
In other words, small states on NATO’s eastern flank can choose between these different strategies. The choice of the attractiveness logic, which would consist of betting everything on the United States, may prove risky if they begin to doubt the reliability of their protector, as was already the case during Donald Trump’s first term. These doubts have significantly deepened with the arrival of the new Trump administration.
Faced with the Russian threat, these small states on NATO’s eastern flank might therefore opt instead for a strategy of internal hedging – or even consider a combination of both approaches: one in the short term, the other in the long term. This path could lead them, for example, to invest more political capital in a security system anchored in the European Union. However, it must be noted that these strategic choices are proving more difficult for some countries, especially those that have decided to prioritize their relationship with the United States by reinforcing their military dependence on it, at the expense of a deeper commitment to promoting an autonomous European defence.
Comparative Analysis of National Security Strategies
The four documents analyzed here are: Estonia’s National Security Concept, the Czech Republic’s Security Strategy, Latvia’s National Defense Concept, and Bulgaria’s National Defense Strategy. The Estonian concept, adopted in 2023, follows the one from 2017. The Latvian and Czech documents also date from 2023 and replace the previous strategies adopted in 2015 for both countries. Bulgaria’s new security strategy is the most recent: it was published in March 2025 and replaces the one adopted in 2011.
With the exception of the Bulgarian case, where the strategy has not yet been debated in parliament, these documents were adopted by a broad majority in the respective national assemblies. In Estonia’s case, the new national security strategy was published on the eve of the 2023 parliamentary elections. The campaign thus provided an opportunity for the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE, a far-right populist party) to highlight its disagreements with the country’s security priorities, even though these remain fairly consensual.
In general, with the exception of Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, these national strategies confirm the priorities established in previous versions, with significant nuances mainly concerning the rise of the Russian threat, the emergence of the Chinese threat, and the resurgence of conventional threats.
Differences and Threat Identification
The documents differ in how they prioritize their areas of focus. The Bulgarian document emphasizes defense capabilities and military modernization, highlighting the importance of the Black Sea region and cooperation with NATO and EU allies.
The Czech strategy places strong emphasis on internal security, economic security, and cybersecurity. It underscores the need to counter hybrid threats, disinformation, and extremism. The Estonian document emphasizes social cohesion and resilience, economic security, and international cooperation, highlighting the importance of energy independence, a digital society, and cybersecurity, while explicitly identifying the risks of hybrid warfare waged by Russia, which could justify invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Latvian document prioritizes defense of the entire national territory, public participation in national defense, and strengthening the armed forces. It emphasizes resilience, the capacity to act, and the will to defend the state.
In summary, although the four strategies share a comprehensive approach, a commitment to collective defense, an emphasis on resilience, and acknowledgment of major threats, they differ in the prioritization of their strategic pillars and in the relative importance they attach to the roles of the EU and NATO in their security frameworks.
Regarding threat identification, all four documents consider Russia to be the primary threat. It is viewed as a direct threat to the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia, affecting the European security architecture, while Bulgaria mentions the possibility of a confrontation between Russia and NATO. The identification of Russia as a threat is a new development in both the Czech and Bulgarian security strategies. In the former, the previous document was still framed within the post-9/11 counterterrorism paradigm. In the latter, the shift is equally as notable: in 2014, in an interim document drafted ahead of the NATO summit in Wales, the Bulgarian government had to downplay the importance of the Russian threat compared to an earlier version of the text. At the time, Bulgarian foreign policy was still focused on maintaining good relations with Russia, especially in the area of gas and oil supplies.
In second place in the hierarchy of threats, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia cite China, though far behind Russia, while the Bulgarian strategy merely mentions Chinese activities in the Indo-Pacific region and its influence in the Western Balkans. Bulgaria has indeed pursued a policy of strengthening political and economic ties with China. This policy was formalized in 2019 by the signing of a strategic partnership between the two countries. It’s worth noting that the mention of the Chinese threat is a new addition in both the Czech and Bulgarian strategies, having been absent from their previous national strategies.
Other threats mentioned include: cyber threats (Czech Republic), migration and terrorism (Estonia, Bulgaria, Latvia), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Bulgaria), risks to economic security (Czech Republic), and economic dependence on authoritarian regimes (Estonia). Latvia also mentions hybrid threats.
Regarding the prioritization of threats, all four strategies agree on giving precedence to conventional threats over hybrid ones, although with some nuance. The Bulgarian strategy recognizes hybrid threats but emphasizes military preparedness, collective defense within NATO, and the development of national armed forces. The Czech strategy highlights the danger of armed conflict while also stressing the persistent threat of cyber warfare, requiring a multifaceted and comprehensive approach. The Latvian document also prioritizes military threats, although these are viewed as part of Russia’s broader strategy. It even describes a potential scenario in which Russia launches a sudden military attack to seize a specific territory, followed by threats to use nuclear weapons to deter NATO reinforcements.
The Roles of the United States, NATO, and the European Union
Although all four strategies emphasize the importance of NATO and the European Union for their security, NATO is prioritized as the main source of deterrence. The role of the EU is widely seen as secondary; only the Czech and Bulgarian strategies explicitly mention the EU’s Strategic Compass for security and defense.
All four national strategies consider the partnership with the U.S. as crucial for their security. This importance is primarily expressed through NATO membership and the strength of the transatlantic bond. The Latvian strategy places particular emphasis on its bilateral strategic partnership with the U.S., including the need for a continued U.S. military presence. Bulgaria and Estonia also underline the critical role of the U.S. within NATO and in broader allied cooperation. The Czech Republic emphasizes transatlantic unity, within both NATO and the EU, as being vital to its security interests.
With regard to deterrence, all strategies highlight the superiority of NATO’s deterrent capability compared to that of the EU. In this regard, the presence of NATO troops on their territories is unanimously recognized as essential. Only the Latvian strategy places additional emphasis on the importance of the presence of US and Canadian troops stationed on its soil.
All strategies underscore the need to increase military spending, with some setting specific targets:
- Czech Republic: 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024, with further increases planned, up to 3% in 2030
- Estonia: at least 3%, with a target of 5% by 2026
- Latvia: 2.5% in 2025, 3% in 2027, then 4% the following year.
These targets were increased to 5% following the NATO summit held in The Hague on June 25, 2025, though following different trajectories. The Czech Republic announced an increase in defense spending to 3% by 2030, aiming to reach 5% by 2032 at the earliest. Estonia and Latvia both announced plans to reach 5% as early as 2026.
Bulgaria, initially reluctant to commit to specific figures, had to balance its public deficit reduction goals – a condition for joining the eurozone – with its defense ambitions. In this context, the new government led by Rossen Jelyazkov announced a trajectory aiming for 2.5% of GDP by 2028, rising to 5% by 2035.
Strategic Autonomy and Dependence
Although strategic autonomy has been a central theme in EU defense and security discourse since 2020, none of the four countries fully embrace this concept in their national strategies.
The Czech Republic and Estonia instead emphasize reducing their dependence on authoritarian states, particularly in the economic and energy sectors. Bulgaria focuses on energy diversification and independence, while Latvia highlights economic resilience and the development of its defense industry.
Regarding military procurement, Bulgaria and Latvia show a stronger preference for U.S.-made weapons over European ones, due to their strategic partnerships and participation in financial assistance programs. For example, in 2024, Latvia received a total of $80 million USD for the purchase of military equipment, including HIMARS systems and Black Hawk helicopters, not including the acquisition of coastal defense missile systems worth $105 million USD. Bulgaria is not far behind: in 2019, it acquired eight F-16 Block 70 fighter jets for its air force. In March 2025, the Bulgarian parliament approved the purchase of Javelin anti-tank missiles worth $82 million USD.
For Estonia and the Czech Republic, no procurement source has been explicitly prioritized. In Estonia’s case, the country has notably diversified its military purchases. In 2024, Germany was Estonia’s leading arms supplier, well ahead of the United States and France. In the Czech case, the national security strategy emphasizes domestic defense production while also recognizing the importance of interoperability of acquired equipment.
Consequences of a Shift in the U.S. Approach to European Security
Donald Trump’s stances on NATO, the US presence in Europe, and the resolution of the war in Ukraine have caused a major shock in the countries on NATO’s eastern flank. These states now find themselves in a doubly delicate situation. On the one hand, their deliberate dependence on the U.S. makes any serious investment in a European defense extremely complicated. On the other hand, in the event of a major divergence between the U.S. and the EU, regarding Russia or even China, these small states would face dilemmas of dual loyalty.
In truth, the consequences of a shift in the U.S. approach to European security must be examined on two levels: the strategic level and the level of national policies.
At the strategic level, the emphasis placed on NATO (and secondarily on the U.S.) as the cornerstone of their security, places the small NATO eastern flank states before a considerable challenge. Donald Trump’s recent statements about the U.S. nuclear umbrella have cast doubt on NATO’s nuclear deterrence in the region. Announcements of potential American troop withdrawals in the context of peace talks with Russia would only deepen the security challenges for the four states studied. Worse still, the need to maintain good relations with the U.S., particularly for Estonia and Latvia, could place them in a position where they may be forced to choose sides if major political or strategic differences arise. This already happened in July 2021 when Lithuania agreed to open a Taiwanese representative office in its capital, as a sign of support for the U.S. administration’s policy, at the expense of the EU’s “One China” stance.
By contrast, EU-provided deterrence is not considered sufficient or capable of replacing NATO’s. The EU is recognized for its contribution to security, but its role is generally considered complementary to that of NATO. Its strengths lie in its ability to address a broad range of security threats through both civilian and military tools, promote regional stability, and encourage cooperation among member states.
However, the influence of Donald Trump’s policy is felt not only at the strategic level, but it also affects public opinion and domestic policies in these small eastern NATO countries. National cohesion on security issues is far from solid, and “Trumpist” rhetoric resonates with a significant portion of leaders and public opinions in Central and Eastern European countries.
Latvia and Estonia both have right-wing populist parties: National Alliance in the former and EKRE in the latter. EKRE, which finished second in the March 2023 elections, has taken increasingly Kremlin-aligned positions, while supporting increased defense spending and opposing Estonia’s participation in a potential European reassurance force in Ukraine. In Latvia, the National Alliance, founded by oligarch Ainārs Šlesers, embraces many of the ideas promoted by the new Trump administration, despite maintaining anti-Russian positions.
In the Czech Republic, research indicates that the broadly pro-European and international orientation that dominated between 1990 and 2013 is no longer as consensual or accepted since 2014. For example, the ANO party (“Yes” in Czech), led by former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has adopted rhetoric similar to Trump’s regarding the resolution of the war in Ukraine.
In Bulgaria, the situation is more complex. While the country has reoriented its foreign policy towards Russia since 2021, this shift remains incomplete and has not taken hold in public opinion. Furthermore, recent statements by leading political figures, including former Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, show increased support for positions advocated by Washington, rather than those promoted by Paris or Berlin.
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The small states on NATO’s eastern flank are particularly vulnerable to a shift in the U.S. approach to European security. All of them share the perception of a direct military threat from Russia, one that would only be emboldened by a U.S. disengagement and a weakening of the Atlantic Alliance. This highlights the limitations of their strategic choice, which relies almost exclusively on NATO and the U.S. to ensure their security.
At the same time, as reflected in their respective strategies, none of these countries has yet considered the possibility of internal hedging within the NATO system. Such hedging could include, for example, increased political investment in a security system based on the European Union. So far, only Estonia has demonstrated some degree of hedging, at least in terms of its military procurement.
Regarding the EU, none of these countries views it as a viable alternative to NATO for guaranteeing their security, but solely as a complementary entity. Furthermore, it is not certain that these countries are even in a position to fully support initiatives aimed at strengthening a European defense system, particularly if such projects involve deviating from the core strategic priorities of the United States.
In other words, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal from European security and a weakening of NATO, any alternative is currently perceived by these small eastern-flank NATO states as likely to leave them in a situation of increased insecurity in the face of the Russian threat. This clearly illustrates the dangers of the logic of attractiveness towards the U.S. that these countries have so far adopted in terms of security.
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