In February 2025, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting between American and Russian envoys to agree on the terms for initiating direct Russo-American negotiations over the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv, which has lasted three years. The choice of the Saudi capital was no coincidence: Riyadh maintains privileged diplomatic relations with both the Trump administration (dating back to his first term in office, during which his first official foreign visit was to Saudi Arabia) and Moscow. The choice of Saudi Arabia as the host illustrates the position taken by several Arab states since the start of the war in February 2022 – states which, far from severing ties with Moscow, have instead maintained or even strengthened their relations with Vladimir Putin’s regime. For instance, in June 2023, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune paid a state visit to Russia at Vladimir Putin’s invitation, more than a year after the launch of the Russian offensive against Kyiv. A few weeks later, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi met with President Putin in Saint Petersburg in July of the same year. Moreover, beyond maintaining diplomatic relations, certain stances taken by Arab states have at times surprised Western analysts. In the Gulf region, for example, during the February 25, 2022, vote at the United Nations (UN) Security Council on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates – a non-permanent member and an ally of both the United States and France – abstained from the vote. As for Saudi Arabia, it has at times been accused of coordinating with Russia since the start of the Ukrainian conflict, to maintain high hydrocarbon prices, on which both Saudi and Russian economies are particularly dependent.
These few examples illustrate the complex, and at times ambiguous, positions that several Arab states have taken regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Far from unequivocally condemning the attack launched on February 24 2022, some member states of the Arab League – including some that are particularly close allies of the United States – have distanced themselves from the legitimacy-based stance asserted by Western powers. This has created the impression that they do not automatically align themselves with international law and the values upheld by the UN system. Such a position may seem all the more surprising at first glance, given that countries like Algeria have long made the fight against imperialism and the defence of peoples’ right to self-determination the cornerstone of their foreign policies and have done so for several decades.
The contribution aims to analyze the positions of several Arab states, grouped into three categories, regarding the Russian aggression; to shed light on the underlying factors shaping these positions; and to draw conclusions about the stance of states located in a region marked by intense rivalries among major powers on the international stage. It demonstrates that several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have adopted distinctive positions, guided both by the pursuit of their direct interests and by a careful effort not to confront the United States and other Western powers openly. Finally, it seeks to determine whether, as Maurice Gourdault-Montagne suggests, the Russia-Ukraine war is perceived by countries of the Mediterranean rim and the Middle East as merely a “regional conflict between Whites,” lacking fundamentally decisive importance.
Russia’s Allies: The Special Case of Algeria
In the wake of the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, several North African and Middle Eastern states have adopted measured – or even accommodating – stances toward Moscow. In addition to Syria, then led by Bashar al-Assad, and Sudan, whose ties with Moscow were well-known and long-standing, the case of Algeria is particularly noteworthy. For years, Algeria’s rhetoric has positioned the country as a staunch defender of the principle of the people’s right to self-determination. Its support for the Polisario Front, which advocates for the establishment of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, is well established. In the Middle East, historically and even more strongly since October 7, 2023, Algiers has shown strong diplomatic support for the Palestinian cause. Just days after the Hamas attacks, Algeria called for an “immediate international intervention” against Israeli “aggression”. President Tebboune reaffirmed his country’s “unwavering support for the Palestinian people” a few months later. One might have expected Algeria to express firm support for Ukraine, given that Kyiv’s resistance appears to echo the very struggles that Algeria has supported in the past – and continues to support today.
Yet, far from condemning Moscow’s actions, Algiers – particularly its military, the People’s National Army (ANP) – has continued cooperating with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. In addition to the aforementioned visit of the Algerian President to Russia in June 2023, the two countries conducted bilateral naval exercises off the Algerian coast in October 2022, a sign of strengthened friendship. At the institutional level, Algeria, alongside countries such as Iran and Syria, voted against a proposal to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council in April 2022. Similarly, in March 2022, Algeria once again found itself with Sudan, Iraq, and Iran in abstaining from a UN General Assembly vote that called for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine.
How can one explain Algeria’s seemingly “unnatural” stance on the Ukrainian crisis? It is important to highlight that Algiers and Moscow have maintained deep cooperative ties for several decades. Militarily, Russia accounts for nearly three-quarters of Algeria’s arms imports. Moscow supplies fighter jets, anti-ship missiles, transport helicopters, air surveillance radars, and other military equipment. The Algerian military may even perceive this support as essential to remain in power. From a political point of view, Moscow has officially backed Algeria’s bid to join the BRICS+ group, which has recently undergone a phase of expansion. These various political and military interests help explain Algeria’s position on the Ukrainian conflict: with long-standing and multifaceted ties to Russia, the Algerian regime has little incentive to jeopardize its relationship with Moscow over the Russo-Ukrainian War. However, a shift was observed in the spring of 2023, when Algeria supported a UN General Assembly resolution condemning “Russian aggression” against Ukraine. This change, though limited, as Algeria abstained again in July 2024 during a vote demanding an end to Russian aggression, could indicate a desire on Algeria’s part not to appear systematically aligned with Russia, especially as Algiers presents its political independence as a key marker on its international identity.
The Algerian case also illustrates the stance of certain Arab states, which, far from immediately aligning themselves with the core principles of international law, have continued their cooperation with Moscow, likely considering that the Russo-Ukrainian War did not constitute a disruption significant enough to fundamentally challenge their bilateral relations. Conversely, other states in the region have opted for more balanced strategies.
The “Tightrope Walkers”: A Predominant Strategy in the Arab World
Aside from the very specific cases of Algeria, Sudan, and Syria (under Bashar al-Assad), the majority of Arab states have adopted a stance condemning the Russian attack launched in February 2022, without, however, fully severing ties with Moscow.
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s Egypt – and more broadly, the North African states (except for Algeria) – represent interesting cases in this regard. Closely aligned with the United States, Egypt voted in favour of the March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. However, what might initially have appeared to be a participation in the policy of isolating Russia on the international stage ultimately gave way to a much more balanced policy. Notably engaged in a partnership with Russia to develop a civilian nuclear program, Egypt subsequently sought to preserve its relationship with Moscow. For instance, Cairo abstained from voting for or against Russia’s exclusion from the UN Human Rights Council. Moreover, far from boycotting Vladimir Putin, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi travelled to Saint Petersburg in 2023 to meet him, despite the Russian president being the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. Putin even took part via videoconference in pouring concrete for the fourth block of the first Russian nuclear power plant designed in Egypt in January 2024. Later, in the summer of the same year, Egypt abstained from the July 2024 General Assembly vote demanding that Russia “immediately cease its aggression”. At the same time, however, Egypt committed in 2023 to supplying Ukraine with a number of munitions that were initially intended for Russia – symbolizing a policy aimed at avoiding clear alignment with either side in the conflict.
Egypt is not the only state that has demonstrated such an ambiguous policy. The Kingdom of Morocco also abstained from the March 2022 vote regarding the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine, while reiterating during the Ukrainian Foreign Minister’s visit to Rabat in May 2023, “Morocco’s consistent position on respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states”. Officially, Morocco’s stance is based on the premise that it “maintains good relations with both Russia and Ukraine and promotes a peaceful resolution to the conflict”, thus avoiding alienating either side. Under this officially claimed position of neutrality, Rabat extended its “congratulations” to the Russian Federation for Vladimir Putin’s re-election in March 2024. It is worth noting that the King of Morocco and the Russian President had previously met in Moscow in 2016, where they established a number of partnerships. Tunisia finds itself in a similar position. Although it voted in favour of the Russian withdrawal from Ukraine in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, it abstained from supporting the exclusion of Russia from the Human Rights Council. In 2024, Tunisia moved closer to Moscow politically (and likely militarily), as reflected in its vote in July 2024.
We describe the position adopted by several Arab states – the majority, in fact – as “balance”. It should be understood in light of these states’ geopolitical interests. While expressing a form of political solidarity with Ukraine by publicly affirming the importance of preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty, many Arab states have nonetheless continued – or even deepened – their relations with Russia. In fact, long before the outbreak of the conflict in February 2022, many of them had established various types of partnerships with Moscow, particularly strategic ones. Turning to Russia allows these states to diversify their alliances and avoid relying solely on Western technologies or expertise, especially in key sectors such as armaments and civil nuclear energy. Thus, while most Arab states support, in principle, Ukraine’s resistance and its struggle for territorial integrity and sovereignty, several MENA-region capitals have shown themselves unwilling to sacrifice the direct interests stemming from their partnerships with Moscow. They have therefore opted for a balanced stance: reaffirming Ukraine’s right to sovereignty, while opposing efforts to marginalize Russia on the international stage (such as in the Human Rights Council), and continuing both economic and political exchanges with the Kremlin.
The “Opportunists”? The Case of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia
The United Arab Emirates’ abstention during the United Nations Security Council vote on February 25, 2022, on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stands out as a significant development, especially since the UAE held the presidency of the Council at the time. Abu Dhabi, a former British protectorate that hosts several Western military bases (including a French one), distanced itself from its Western allies and refused to take an explicit stance on Russia’s blatant violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The official statement accompanying this vote was equally surprising: while the UAE acknowledged that “the evolution of the conflict undermines international peace and security” and reiterated the importance of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, it called on “all parties to immediately cease all hostilities” and urged for “de-escalation” – thus avoiding any direct condemnation of Moscow and effectively sending Ukraine and Russia back to back. Similarly, Abu Dhabi, like many other Arab states, abstained a month later from voting to exclude Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, and, in December 2023, condemned drone attacks against Russian territory. How can one explain the positioning of such a key Western ally in the Arabian Peninsula?
It is reasonable to suggest that the UAE may have viewed the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War as a window of opportunity. First, Abu Dhabi has sought to preserve its pre-existing collaborations with Moscow, particularly in the military domain – the two states once considered jointly developing a fifth-generation fighter jet and signed a strategic partnership in 2018 – as part of a broader effort to diversify partnerships. Moreover, the Russian Federation may have seen the Russo-Ukrainian War as likely to generate significant opportunities, especially on the economic front. It has often been reported that a number of oligarchs left Russia in the first weeks of the conflict to seek refuge in Dubai, engaging in forms of money laundering amidst the wave of international sanctions imposed on Russia’s economic elites. The economic hub of the UAE is described as a particularly well-suited platform, given its ability to discreetly host foreign capital, effectively making it a form of “safe haven”. There were also reports of potential (and numerous) gold transfers to the UAE, as well as an increase in the transit of Russian oil through the country. Additionally, the UAE is said to have ramped up exports of various goods to Russia, in the context of the war that followed the February 24 2022, invasion. Thus, beyond the desire to maintain strong bilateral relations with Moscow, the UAE also appears to have sought to seize the opportunities created by the wartime context to derive economic benefits.
Similar criticisms have been directed at Saudi Arabia, Washington’s principal ally in the Gulf. In October 2022, the White House accused the kingdom of helping to finance the Russo-Ukrainian War by keeping oil prices high. This statement came just days after the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) member countries, including Saudi Arabia and Russia, cut their daily oil production by 2 million barrels. In a context of ongoing modernization – and in a country still heavily dependent on oil revenues – Riyadh may have seen the Russo-Ukrainian War as an opportunity to increase its financial income, which could then be used to fund various infrastructure projects outlined in the Vision 2030 plan. This is all the more relevant given that relations between Riyadh and Washington have deteriorated under the Obama and Biden administrations. Obama was criticized for his refusal to bomb Syria in the summer of 2013, for his 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), and for his perceived intent to scale back U.S. military involvement in the Gulf. As for Biden, his earlier statements on Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, whom he once referred to as “a pariah,” did little to foster a warming of relations.
The Gulf Arab States’ Russian Dilemma: Dealing with Pressure from Washington
Unlike its reactions toward other Arab countries, the United States was much more forceful in responding to the positions of its two Gulf allies regarding the Ukrainian conflict. Abu Dhabi’s initial stance during the first UN Security Council vote in February 2022, along with the UAE’s early reluctance to implement effective sanctions against Russia, its entities, or its nationals, led the United States and Europeans to exert strong pressure on Abu Dhabi to distance itself from Moscow. In November 2023, the United States announced the adoption of sanctions against Emirati companies due to their activities with Russia, particularly the supply of components allegedly used on the battlefield in Ukraine. Regarding Saudi Arabia, following the OPEC+ decision in October 2022, Joe Biden declared that the U.S. needed to “rethink” its relationship with Riyadh, announcing “consequences” and mentioning possible congressional action to reconsider American arms deliveries to the kingdom. Faced with the rapid deterioration of relations between the two historic allies, Riyadh sought to reassure its American partner. On October 12, 2022, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir gave a lengthy interview to CNN, stating that Saudi Arabia did not “support Russia”. Two days later, Saudi Arabia announced it would provide Ukraine $400 million in humanitarian aid, a move intended to demonstrate the kingdom’s genuine support for Kyiv. Finally, on October 15, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Volodymyr Zelensky held a telephone conversation to discuss the situation in Ukraine.
These various elements highlight the narrow room for manoeuvre available to Gulf Arab states in conducting their foreign policy in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. However, while Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have since sought to present themselves as neutral actors, both states have refused to turn their backs on Russia. Both capitals abstained once again from supporting the July 2024 resolution reiterating the condemnation of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It is worth noting, however, that this Gulf position later became an asset for Saudi Arabia following Donald Trump’s return to power in 2025. Having never openly taken a stance against Russia since the start of the conflict – and being a long-standing partner of the United States – the kingdom found itself in an ideal position to act as a mediator and neutral ground. This culminated in its hosting of negotiations between Washington and Moscow on Ukraine in February 2025, at the request of the new U.S. president, bringing significant diplomatic benefit to Riyadh.
A “Distant” Conflict from an Arab Perspective
While the conflict that began in October 2022 has reshaped the security stakes for Europe and the United States, the Arab world as a whole perceives this event differently, tending to relativize the central importance that Europe assigns to it. While most states in North Africa and the Middle East remain, in principle, committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the conflict is generally seen as secondary (and not central enough) to justify undermining their ties with Russia or the interests derived from those relations. While not all MENA states have adopted identical postures, a majority have advocated a form of balance, condemning the Russian aggression in principle but refusing to sever ties with Moscow. In the Gulf, however, the stance of its two major allies – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – did not go unnoticed by Washington, which did not hesitate to exert pressure or even impose sanctions in response to positions seen as contrary to U.S. interests, albeit with mixed results.
The war in Gaza, and the perceived “selective” commitment of Western powers to international law, particularly when it comes to actions carried out by Israel, despite the same powers having made respect for international law a cornerstone of their stance toward Russia, can only amplify this phenomenon. In the words of Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, former diplomatic adviser to Jacques Chirac, “others do not think like we do”. Each state defines its objective interests and evaluates every situation through that lens. This is, in fact, probably the only true point of convergence among all actors on the international scene.
About the Author
Rachid Chaker (@Rachid_Chak) is an Associate Professor in international relations at the Catholic University of Lille and a research associate at the Centre Thucydide at the Université Paris Panthéon-Assas.
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