Are Iran and Russia truly allies? This sensitive and timely question finds substantial answers in the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, especially since February 2022. It also reflects a broader shift on the international stage toward a strategic restructuring into multiple power poles, where Western Europe and the United States no longer solely dominate.
Since the early 2000s, China’s rapid rise as the world’s leading economic power and main U.S. rival has become undeniable, as has Russia’s re-engagement on the international scene following the end of the American unipolar moment after the 2003 Iraq invasion. Added to this is Iran’s abandonment of efforts to seek favourability with Europe and the United States following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPoA, the Iran nuclear deal, which President Donald Trump officially announced on May 8, 2018. Consequently, analysts and media have increasingly discussed the formation of a “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis,” potentially forming an “anti-hegemony” coalition — a scenario Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, warned against. This tripartite “axis” seemingly solidified further when, on July 4, 2023, Iran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an economic and political cooperation body established by China and Russia, and when Iran became a member of the BRICS (now BRICS+) on January 1, 2024, a forum that seems to mirror the G7. These developments appear to consolidate a “Global South,” uniting countries that challenge the perception of Western imperialism or self-imposed supremacy on the international stage from Western Europe and North America.
The Russo-Ukrainian War intensified on February 24, 2022, and was expected to confirm the existence of this “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis,” as these states are often depicted as constantly striving to restore their respective empires. The Russia-Ukraine war thus serves as a real-world test of this “axis” and, more specifically, the Russia-Iran relationship. Are they true allies, solid partners, merely powers with momentarily compatible interests or even companions in adversity on the international scene?
This article will examine Iran’s perception of the Russia-Ukraine conflict since 2022 and Tehran’s role in it. It will also study its stance on the war and its international implications. In terms of discourse and diplomacy, Iran has remained cautious, refraining from assigning any principled blame to Russia and instead attributing responsibility to the U.S. for sparking the Eastern European crisis while calling for an end to ongoing hostilities. Economically, notable rapprochement has occurred between Tehran and Moscow since the beginning of the war, though significant obstacles to deepened cooperation remain. Strategically, Iran benefits from Russia’s increasing isolation but seems in no rush to become more involved in the conflict, despite U.S. and Ukrainian claims of Iran’s co-belligerence. These elements all point to an undeniable conclusion: the Russo-Ukrainian War reveals itself as a politically and strategically inconclusive test for the “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis.”
The Russia-Ukraine War from Iran’s Perspective: Reinforcing a U.S.-Blaming Narrative
From the start of the war in Ukraine in February 2022, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Khamenei (the first and primary source of power in the Islamic Republic), has avoided attributing any responsibility for the conflict to Russia. Iran never mentions Russian accountability or Moscow’s initial armed assault on Ukrainian territory as an explanatory factor for the conflict. Tehran adheres strictly to a diplomatic and political stance that never hints at Russian fault, avoiding terms like “aggression,” “Russian attack,” or “war.” In this respect, a statement from Iran’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN) on October 12, 2022, is particularly illuminating, highlighting Iran’s cautious and evasive position: calling for a resolution to a conflict it cannot expressly name to avoid acknowledging Russia’s undeniable armed invasion of Ukraine. The statement to the UN employs only the terms “crisis in Ukraine” or “conflict in Ukraine,” never once mentioning “Russia” or “Russian,” thereby erasing Moscow’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict. It refers to “war” only in much later statements. This Iranian stance also manifested on March 2, 2022, during the 11th Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly, where Tehran (alongside Beijing) abstained from voting on a non-binding resolution condemning Russia’s attack on Ukraine. However, it did not vote against the resolution (unlike Damascus, Minsk, or Pyongyang).
In contrast, Iranian statements accusing the United States of causing this “crisis” are prolific and frequent. On March 1, 2022, just a week after the conflict began, Ayatollah Khamenei explicitly stated that “the root of the crisis in Ukraine are the U.S. policies,” adding that “the US regime is a regime that generates crises. It feeds on crisis.” Blaming Western imperialism, Iran points to the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and increased containment of Russia as underlying U.S. objectives. NATO, founded in 1949 at the initiative of the United States during the Cold War, aimed to create a defensive military alliance to protect European and North American territories against Soviet expansionism in practice. Although NATO’s original mission would seemingly lose its relevance with the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, and Russia’s subsequent decline, the organization paradoxically persisted and even strengthened. On July 9, 1997, a NATO-Ukraine commission was even established, and the organization’s strategic relationship with Kyiv regularly manifested in joint military exercises, such as the Sea Breeze 2021 naval exercises in the Black Sea on June 28, 2021. Echoing the Russian stance, in which President Vladimir Putin declared on November 30, 2021, that Moscow would react if Kyiv crossed a “red line” in its rapprochement with NATO, Tehran places the responsibility for the Ukraine conflict solely on the United States (and more broadly on “Western policies”) and the perception of NATO’s relentless expansion. Iranian media does not hesitate to label the Ukraine-Russia war as a U.S.-Russia proxy conflict, skillfully appropriating terminology often applied to Iran’s influence network in the Middle East. Ayatollah Khamenei even suggested that the United States is the primary beneficiary of the Ukraine war due to arms sales to Kyiv, indicating a lack of interest in seeing the conflict resolved quickly at the expense of the Ukrainian people.
In its rhetoric and politics, Iran thus crafts a narrative that reverses the usual perspective in Europe and North America on the Russia-Ukraine conflict that emphasizes Russia’s initial armed attack as the sole explanatory factor for the conflict. This complete reversal allows Iran not only to shield Russia from any attribution of blame but also to bolster a broader discourse portraying the United States as decadent and a creator of international crises. This first aspect appears to support a coherent, united “axis,” presenting a common front against a shared adversary: Washington and its allies.
The Increase in Trade Ties and Russia’s Blockage of Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Mixed Economic Outcomes for Russia-Iran Relations
If the “Tehran-Beijing-Moscow axis” might seem a reality, united by an international narrative denouncing the United States and Europe, the strengthening of economic ties between Russia and Iran has become noticeably evident since the start of the Ukraine war. In this regard, it is worth noting that Iran and Russia have been stable economic partners in recent years, and this commercial relationship has deepened since the war in Ukraine began. It is thus possible to identify both bilateral economic developments since the war and arrangements instituted as a result of it.
The first notable economic development since February 2022 is the North-South International Transport Corridor project. The agreement on the North-South Corridor was signed in September 2017 by Russia, India, and Iran, aiming to create a rail and maritime route between Russia and India, passing through Iran. This North-South Corridor offers substantial advantages for each state: India expects improved commercial connectivity, especially for its port of Nhava Sheva; Iran envisions reinforcing its position as an intercontinental logistics hub while creating new outlets for its Persian Gulf ports. Since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia, for its part, hopes to bypass the sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe while avoiding seas where its ships face difficult relations with coastal states (Baltic Sea states in northeastern Europe, states in southeast Europe, Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine in the Black Sea). However, this project appears mirage-like, as it must also confront American sanctions, among other obstacles delaying its full activation for many years.
Similarly, the second significant development in Russia-Iran economic relations concerns an interregional structure, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which unites Russia and four former USSR countries. Iran signed a free trade agreement with the EEU in December 2023, replacing the 2019 agreement. This economic area has seen its trade volume with Tehran increase by 150% over three years. Iran aims to secure observer status in this union, with the long-term goal of establishing a comprehensive free trade agreement.
In addition to increased energy cooperation between the two countries since the start of the war, despite competition for the title of leading gas exporter, a third economic priority since 2022 has been the shared goal of de-dollarizing their exchanges. American sanctions notably aim to restrict the use of the U.S. dollar and penalize third parties trading with these states in dollars (thus broadening the reach of US sanctions, commonly referred to as the extraterritoriality of American sanctions). Since 1979 (the year of its Islamic Revolution, as well as the institution of US economic sanctions following the hostage crisis at the American Embassy during the revolution), Iran has sought to bypass US sanctions—a priority Russia has also embraced since its annexation of Crimea in 2014. With the Ukraine war starting in February 2022 and the imposition of numerous sanctions, Russia has become the country most keen to avoid using the US dollar in its transactions to circumvent these sanctions. Consequently, Mohsen Karimi, Vice President of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran for International Affairs, highlighted in May 2023 the symbolism of VTB, Russia’s second-largest bank, opening a permanent office in Iran to de-dollarize their exchanges. At the end of December 2023, the heads of the Iranian and Russian central banks announced the completion of an agreement to conduct their trade in national currencies. Pleased to see another state working even more actively than itself to avoid using the dollar, Iran has since 2024, following its full integration into BRICS+, sought to promote among its members the complete abandonment of the U.S. currency in their exchanges. However, it seems unrealistic, even in the long term, that BRICS+ members would stop using the dollar, as it remains the cornerstone of the global economy unless there is a paradigm shift in the world economic order.
The only significant economic dimension between Iran and Russia instituted due to the Ukraine war is Iranian assistance to Russia in circumventing the sanctions imposed on it. While Iran is one of the most economically sanctioned countries globally, Russia took the top spot in February 2022. With its expertise in circumventing sanctions since 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran began holding confirmed meetings between Iranian and Russian officials and bankers in November 2022. Establishing a unique form of economic cooperation, Iran revealed its legal and economic mechanisms to Russia to help it circumvent the sanctions imposed on it.
In reality, it seems the Ukraine war is more of a catalyst for Russia-Iran economic relations than a peak in improvement. While there have been notable advances in economic aspects between the two states, it is important to remember that these advances are linked to economic issues predating the February 2022 war in Ukraine. No significant concrete progress has materialized between the two states, and it will take many more years to fundamentally strengthen their economic ties beyond the aforementioned announcements and developments.
Worse still, the Russia-Iran economic relationship has even taken on a particularly negative aspect in a supra-commercial context: Russia’s blocking of nuclear negotiations with Iran. On July 14, 2015, the Iran Nuclear Agreement, or JCPoA, was signed to regulate Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a gradual and substantial lifting of economic sanctions. Following the U.S. withdrawal under Donald Trump, a renewed hope and willingness to renegotiate emerged with Joe Biden’s arrival in the White House. However, since February 2022, Russia has completely blocked the potential conclusion of a new nuclear agreement with Iran, as it opposed Iran mastering the complete uranium cycle during the 2015 JCPoA negotiations. Russia has become the most sanctioned state in the world and would not accept the lifting of sanctions for Tehran, as this would offer a breath of fresh air to the Iranian economy, while Russia’s is on the brink of suffocation. Thus, the Russian president has intertwined the Iranian nuclear issue with the Ukraine war and the economic sanctions on Iran and Russia. How, then, could one justify the term “alliance” (understood as a formal or informal agreement between at least two states in the security or defence domain) or an “axis” between two states with existing but modest economic ties when one state blocks an agreement beneficial to the other at the risk of overshadowing itself?
Between Iranian Military Sales and Allegations of Co-Belligerence: the Opacity of Iranian Involvement in the Conflict
The martial dimension is the most conducive to studying the reality of the “Tehran-Beijing-Moscow axis,” as it provides a framework for states claiming to be partners to test their relationship in an open war situation. The military dimension of Iranian involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict has a specific characteristic: it is potentially the most significant compared to the political and economic fields while remaining hypothetical due to the opacity maintained by Iran and Russia. Iran consistently denies any involvement in the conflict and refutes any arms sales to Russia, while the latter remains conspicuously silent on possible military imports. The United States, the European Union, and Ukraine, however, vigorously claim that from April 2022, Iran has been supplying Russia with missiles (in September 2024, U.S. intelligence services asserted that Iran was also selling Russia Fath 360 missiles, a model developed in April 2022 that can carry an explosive charge of 150 kg over more than 100 km) and drones (notably the Shahed 136 attack model, inexpensive and designed to carry an explosive charge).
An advanced form of co-belligerence is also asserted, especially by the United States and Ukraine, which, based on statements from their intelligence and security services, claim that Revolutionary Guards (the Islamic Revolution’s armed forces, distinct from the regular Iranian army) are present on the Ukrainian battlefield to assist and advise Russian forces. On October 20, 2022, U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby stated, “We assess that Iranian military personnel were on the ground in Crimea and assisted Russia in these operations.” Likewise, on November 24, 2022, Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, claimed that Ukrainian forces had eliminated Iranian military advisors in Crimea. While co-belligerence has no legal basis in international law, if this circumstance were proven, it would indicate, on the one hand, Iran’s increasingly advanced military expertise (to the extent of assisting a military power like Russia) and, on the other hand, a concrete operational reality of an “axis.”
The opacity surrounding Iran’s strategic involvement makes one thing clear: this “axis” is neither formal nor openly declared. It is difficult to attribute a strong, well-defined Iranian support for Russia in the war against Ukraine, as statements and counterstatements from multiple actors operate within frameworks extending beyond the Ukraine conflict alone. For Ukraine, establishing the internationalization of the war on its soil further legitimizes its appeals for support from Europe and the United States; for the United States, it confirms Iran’s “rogue state” status, ostracized from the international community and deemed unworthy of international engagement; for Iran, it presents a potential opportunity to benefit from this conflict that does not directly concern Tehran, while avoiding any accountability or involvement.
The Russia-Ukraine War: a Striking Symbol of the Inconsistency of the “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow Axis”
Discursive, political, economic, and strategic elements from the Ukraine war undoubtedly reflect a relative convergence of shared interests between Iran and Russia. However, the formal, tangible, and robust existence of a “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis,” actively operational in the context of the Ukraine war, cannot be substantiated. Numerous elements support this assertion. First and foremost, if this “axis” were a formal alliance like NATO or the European Union (where Article 42, paragraph 7 of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty notably specifies that “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter”), China, Iran, and Russia would explicitly claim it as an international defensive structure. However, this is not the case, and no official declaration from any of these states suggests such a position.
The denial of this “axis” by its potential members implies two scenarios: in the first case, this alliance is informal, and these states do not claim it (then the reason for this denial should be identified: it may not yet be fully organized and ready, it may be too weak compared to Western European and North American defence architectures, or it may hinder distinct national policies and objectives of China, Iran, and Russia). In the second case, this alliance or “axis” simply does not exist. This latter scenario seems more credible, as Iran’s alleged strategic involvement is likely opportunistic, allowing it to export its military production and increase revenue. Tehran may further benefit from Russia’s isolation, which has approached or even surpassed its own at the international level: on March 17, 2023, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin (theoretically requiring the 124 states party to the Rome Statute to arrest Putin if he were to visit their territory), a grave event that has never occurred against an Iranian president or Supreme Leader.
Added to this, China’s apparent lack of knowledge about Russia’s attack plans during the February 4, 2022, meeting between Putin and Xi, Iran’s 2024 presidential election of Massoud Pezeshkiân, who is open to dialogue with the “West,” but also Russia’s de facto permission for Israel to carry out airstrikes on Iranian interests in Syria (as Moscow controls Syrian airspace), and Russia’s obstruction of nuclear negotiations with Iran; all of which definitively undermine the concept of a “Beijing-Tehran-Moscow axis.”
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Kevan Gafaïti, a PhD candidate and associate researcher at the Centre Thucydide of the University Paris Panthéon-Assas, is currently working on a political science dissertation under the supervision of Professors Jean-Vincent Holeindre and Serge Sur. His research focuses on France’s foreign policy toward Iran since 1995. He also teaches at Sciences Po Paris.
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