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This policy report is part of a special series, directed by Laurent Borzillo (Forum de défense et stratégie, FDS), Teodora Morosanu (FDS), and Benjamin Boutin (Association France-Canada) with support from the Canadian Department of National Defence’s Mobilizing New Ideas in Defence and Security (MINDS) program and the DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, which aims to develop Franco-Canadian strategic exchanges.
Summary
The transatlantic security architecture, based on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), is critical to European and North American stability, but it faces increasing problems in confronting Russian and Chinese threats. NATO’s reinforced Eastern European defences and financial contributions to Ukraine’s military operations demonstrate its responsiveness, but the EU’s reliance on US leadership highlight continuing weaknesses.
France has taken the lead in advocating for European sovereignty and greater NATO-EU cooperation. Meanwhile, Canada’s own commitments shows its strategic potential, particularly in the Arctic, despite shortcomings in national defence. However, concerns remain about NATO’s coherence, the reliability of US assistance, and Europe’s willingness to take greater responsibility for its security. With NATO and Europe potentially facing the most severe “hot war” crisis since World War II, the central question is: What’s next for transatlantic security?
Key Recommendations:
- Focus NATO investments on strategic areas like cybersecurity, Arctic surveillance, and hybrid warfare.
- Reinforce a culture of shared responsibility within NATO, promoting a balanced alliance where each country’s contributions align with their strengths and capabilities.
- Strength partnerships between France, Canada, and other allies now to help NATO hedge against future volatility in U.S. foreign policy allowing to ensure a robust and more autonomous transatlantic security architecture regardless of American political shifts.
- Secure NATO’s Arctic interests by leveraging Canada’s Arctic expertise.
- Create a NATO Logistics Command Center to streamline troop movements and supply routes, with Canada and France leading by example in logistical efficiency.
- Establish a Transatlantic Task Force on Hybrid Threat Resilience to counter cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic coercion.
Introduction
The “transatlantic security architecture” refers to the complex network of defence and diplomatic alliances, primarily NATO and the EU, that ensures collective security and stability across Europe and North America, deterring threats from adversarial powers like Russia and China. It represents both a strategic foundation and a platform to reinforce regional stability, allowing these Member States to lead collaborative defence initiatives and uphold shared democratic values. Although France and Canada have very different military capabilities, they can both be considered middle powers among NATO members when economic and diplomatic impact are considered.
The importance of the transatlantic security architecture has only grown in recent years. For instance, NATO currently considers the Russian Federation’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine to be the most serious and immediate threat to Europe. This issue is at the heart of NATO’s agenda, as Russia attempts to continue its violent westward expansion and direct authority by force, subversion, invasion, and annexation. The ongoing conflict also touches on broader global security issues, including the rise of China, the new geopolitical battleground of the Arctic, and the failures of post-Cold War deterrence in the European theater. Amid such tensions, Europe cannot afford to be solely reactive in its alliances and strategic planning.
Faced with Russia’s growing violations of the international system and the ongoing threat of Putin’s use nuclear weapons, NATO has updated its military strategies, consolidating its presence in Eastern Europe with the establishment of battle-ready formations. The organization has also reinforced aerial surveillance missions and the presence of its naval forces in the waters of the Baltic and the Mediterranean. Despite French President Emmanuel Macron infamously described NATO’s work as “brain dead” in 2019, the invasion of Ukraine seems to have given NATO renewed relevance to France leadership. The conflict has also led traditionally neutral countries like Sweden and Finland to join NATO, adding a critical 1,300 kilometers of security buffer along Finland’s border with Russia. Indeed, the tradition of neutrality has become less relevant since the war in Ukraine, furthering the fact that the traditional diplomatic tenets of neutrality and non-engagement are becoming increasingly obsolete in 21st century Europe.
For its part, the European Union (EU) continues to play the leading geopolitical role in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite the organization’s general lack of strategic power, it is making a significant financial contribution to military training in Ukraine, even surpassing the United States. The EU has also been grappling with non-military challenges, in particular the continent’s heavy economic and resource dependence on Russian gas, which limits Europe’s room to maneuver and makes it impossible to implement a full embargo against the Russian state. Since then, steps have been taken to reduce these security vulnerabilities, but European energy independence will take time and require significant policy alignment among Member States – if it is ever achieved.
It is surmised that both NATO and the EU have shown greater responsiveness than Russian president Putin anticipated, although both organizations recognize the challenges that the “intensified strategic competition” of our times poses. NATO and the EU confirm the importance of a stronger and more effective European defence which contributes effectively to global and transatlantic security, complements NATO’s action, and provides cross-continent interoperability.
U.S. Political Instability and NATO Cohesion
Despite NATO and the EU’s robust response, the long-term role of the United States in European security remains uncertain. During Donald Trump’s first presidency, U.S. commitment to NATO was openly questioned, with criticism primarily focused on European members’ failure to meet the 2% defence spending target—a concern echoed during the Obama administration. 23 out of 32 NATO members now meet this target. However the U.K., Germany, and the U.S., which collectively account for approximately 85% of NATO defence spending, have done so since 2024, debates over NATO burden-sharing persist in U.S. political discourse and threaten deeper divisions within the alliance.
This tension will likely continue particularly as the Arctic becomes a strategic battleground between Russia and the West, with Alaska playing a pivotal geographic role. At the same time, the U.S. faces mounting challenges from two powerful adversaries, Russia, and China, splitting its focus and resources. To counter China’s rise, the United States has shifted attention to the Indo-Pacific, strengthening alliances through initiatives like the AUKUS tripartite agreement with Australia and the United Kingdom and engaging New Zealand’s interest in joining AUKUS’s second pillar. Although these moves bolster U.S. influence in the eastern hemisphere, they raise concerns about Washington’s ability—or willingness—to respond decisively to a potential escalation in Ukraine. A reduced U.S. role in European security would leave Europe vulnerable, potentially enabling Russia to advance in Ukraine. Although some experts advocate for greater European autonomy, the EU remains reliant on its American ally to navigate the conflict on its borders.
As NATO faces increasingly complex and diverse security challenges, the organization is forced to give priority to the quality and strategic value of emerging partnerships, rather than traditional tactics which experts argue are increasingly outdated traditional tactics and alliances in the contemporary security environment. Indeed, the word “sharing” in the term “burden sharing” traditionally associated with the Alliance has become largely inadequate. We are no longer in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the European continent is no longer a “burden” whose security depends solely on its American ally. NATO represents an alliance with benefits for each participant, and 2% target has for a time weakened the Alliance’s credibility and cohesion, with challenges to the efficacy and attainability of this target dating back as early as the Wales Summit of 2014. Moreover, there is new research indicating that spending predicts defence outputs and disaggregating defence spending is likely to improve results. While equitable burden-sharing may be an unrealistic model for all NATO partners, this issue demonstrates the importance of developing key bilateral defence relationships on pressing funding concerns.
France: An Emerging Leader
In a conflict involving Russia, the world’s second largest nuclear power, the worst-case scenario is the use of weapons of mass destruction. This is why mutual deterrence of all-out war remains a major objective. In this respect, two players who were previously middle-ranking powers are becoming increasingly significant: France and Canada. Since the departure of long-time German leader Angela Merkel, Emmanuel Macron has emerged as one of the more credible political bulwarks against Russian military victory. Although Macron has not always held an explicitly pro-Ukraine position and has repeatedly argued for a diplomatic solution with Russia, his stance has hardened in 2024, declaring in Prague in March 2024 that Europeans cannot be “cowards” when countering Moscow.
This change in Macron’s posture is particularly significant as France continues to be a leading defence power in NATO and Europe due to its significant defence funding, cutting-edge military technology, and assertive political leadership. With one of the largest military budgets in Europe—projected to exceed €413 billion from 2024-2030—France is modernizing its capabilities, notably in cyber and nuclear technology, and increasing its operational readiness across Europe. Politically, President Macron has championed European “strategic autonomy,” advocating for a stronger EU defence role to complement NATO and reduce dependence on the United States, positioning France at the center of defence policy in Europe.
Faced with the continuing weakening the transatlantic link, France is being forced to take on additional continental leadership, both politically and defensively. Despite France traditionally urging caution on full support of NATO, France’s 2017 strategic review nevertheless defined Europe’s strategic autonomy as crucial of its defence policy and is increasingly urging a more aggressive European stance. Within the strategy, France is committed to strengthening European defence within the EU framework, and particularly stresses the need for a common strategic culture. Since 2017, France has implemented a number of policy measures to strengthen European defence, such as the European Response Initiative, which aims to foster a shared European strategic culture. Strategic autonomy has been an official objective of the Union since the Strategy and, as a result, the EU has equipped itself with a permanent European “defence package” under the European Defence Fund. This package comprises a number of initiatives designed to improve European military capabilities and effectiveness. It includes a coordinated annual defence review (CARD), which identifies capability shortfalls, permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and aims to progressively deepen defence cooperation between EU members and endowed the European Defence Fund (EDF) with eight billion euros between 2021 and 2027 to help member states develop defence equipment, research, and technologies.
The EU states that the aim of this ambitious package is “to be in a position to act quickly and decisively when a crisis breaks out, with partners if possible and alone if necessary.” This desire for autonomy corresponds to the needs of the transatlantic security architecture, as “increasing European capabilities will also contribute to strengthening the Atlantic Alliance, a key element in European security.” Increased collaboration between the EU and NATO through a European pillar therefore appears to be a tangible possibility for strengthening and balancing the tensions inherent in current transatlantic defence. And although historically the development of European autonomy in security matters was not welcomed on the other side of the Atlantic, this trend changed when Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin declared in 2021 that the U.S. supported a joint EU defence plan that strengthened NATO.
Of course, the project of European strategic autonomy must acknowledge political and military realities, and the construction of a European defence will not be achieved immediately. However, the ongoing establishment of European strategic autonomy, difficult as this goal may be, may be the only safety net Europeans have to maintain the transatlantic security architecture and deal with emerging threats. Indeed, the path to effective strategic autonomy involve further development of a European pillar within NATO to balance transatlantic relations and maintain a security equilibrium on the continent during the ongoing Russian war of aggression in Ukraine. Recent dialogue recognizing the need for better NATO/EU collaboration, instead of inter-organization competition, has also been growing in the field.
Canada: An Unlikely Ally
The second state of interest at this crucial time is Canada, whose role in the defence space is closely linked to that of France. In September 2024, France clarified its future intentions by signing the Canada-France Declaration on a Strengthened Partnership in Defence and Security. This agreement highlighted the value of select non-European partners in France’s broader defence realignment. Building on a history of cooperation shaped by two world wars, the partnership aims to develop a “more ambitious strategic partnership,” focusing on emerging threats such as cyberattacks and foreign digital interference, Indo-Pacific security, and support for Ukraine. President Macron’s visit to Ottawa in September 2024 further emphasized the deepening ties between the two nations, as discussions with Prime Minister Trudeau encompassed defence, support for Haiti, combating climate change, and addressing the rise of artificial intelligence.
While Canada is not typically seen as a leading force in NATO, its partnership with France underscores the strategic potential of middle powers to fill key capability gaps and enhance NATO’s agility in addressing modern challenges. This collaboration gains importance against a backdrop of multilateral commitments, including the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein Group), the Tallinn Mechanism, and the 2024 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine by the G7. France and Canada’s shared history, language, and values further provide a solid foundation for coordinated operations that supplement NATO’s efforts, offering a more flexible, multilateral approach that complements U.S. leadership within the alliance.
However, Canada’s defence capabilities face significant challenges that limit its ability to consistently project influence. Chronic underfunding and an overly complex procurement system have hindered the modernization of Canadian defence infrastructure. For example, the Canadian Department of Defence recently spent $34.8 million on new sleeping bags for a joint northern exercise in Alaska, which were later deemed unsuitable for typical Canadian winters. Such missteps underscore persistent vulnerabilities in Canada’s defence planning and resourcing, which can impede its contributions to allied operations.
Despite these domestic hurdles, Canada remains a strategically valuable partner for France, offering unique advantages that bolster transatlantic security. Beyond NATO, their longstanding cooperation through trade, La Francophonie, and defence initiatives such as the Franco-Canadian Defence Cooperation Council and the Global Coalition to Defeat Da’esh reflects a reliable partnership with global reach. Canada’s aligned approaches with France in regions such as Haiti, Lebanon, the Indo-Pacific, and the Sahel demonstrate a shared commitment to stability in areas of vital transatlantic interest.
Although Canada’s standing within NATO is not currently ascending, its steady commitment to shared values, political reliability, and focus on multilateralism make it a useful partner for addressing evolving geopolitical challenges. For France, Canada provides a dependable ally that complements its strategic priorities within NATO, particularly in regions where French influence is critical to maintaining stability. This partnership reinforces the transatlantic security architecture, offering a counterbalance to the fluctuating role of the United States and underscoring the value of non-European allies in an increasingly complex global landscape.
Recommendations
To safeguard the transatlantic link, policy should reflect the distinct capabilities that each ally brings to the table, recognizes the changing value of the United States to NATO, and considers the rapidly changing security environment. Based on a review of existing proposals from relevant stakeholders, we recommend the following:
1) Prioritize capabilities with a significant defence impact
NATO should recognize defence investments by strategic value rather than traditional contributions alone. Emerging threats in cybersecurity, Arctic surveillance, and hybrid warfare necessitates strengthening the transatlantic partnership between France and Canada. Strengthening this alliance will increase accessibility of specialized technologies and regional expertise and ensure Member States are prioritized for high-impact, regional operations. Planning for joint Franco-Canadian initiatives in areas like cyber defence and Arctic readiness demonstrate the strategic value of such focused partnerships.
To solidify this partnership, NATO could establish dedicated joint task forces or technology-sharing agreements that facilitate collaboration on specific high-impact projects, allowing for deeper integration of Canada and France’s defence capabilities in both regional and NATO-led operations. Additionally, expanding joint military exercises in Arctic and cybersecurity domains would strengthen operational readiness and interoperability, providing a proactive defence posture against adversarial advances.
2) Rebuilding NATO solidarity
With the rise of radical groups and increased political polarization in both Europe and the United States, NATO’s cohesion is under threat, undermining the alliance’s ability to operate effectively as a unified front. the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance is under serious threat. For NATO to function optimally, it must rely on the political stability and democratic resilience of its member nations, which is critical for mutual trust and operational synergy within the transatlantic security architecture. To this end, France and Canada play pivotal roles in fostering solidarity within NATO by advocating for democratic values and supporting joint defence initiatives that emphasize equality among Member States.
To restore confidence among allies and reduce reliance on any single member, NATO should prioritize initiatives that require active contributions from multiple countries to increase political buy-in and decrease capacity limits. This particularly applies to areas such as cyber defence, intelligence-sharing, and counter-radicalization programs. For example, a Canada-France-led coalition focused on strengthening cyber defence and counter-radicalization measures could serve as a model for equitable collaboration, drawing on France’s robust intelligence networks and Canada’s advanced cyber capabilities.
This approach would reinforce a culture of shared responsibility within NATO, promoting a balanced alliance where each country’s contributions align with their strengths and capabilities. Ultimately supporting programs that foster joint responsibility, NATO can build a more resilient alliance, less vulnerable to shifting political climates in any one Member State, and position stronger regional contingents like France and Canada to maximize their existing expertise to lead in key areas.
3) Engaging under-utilized allies
The United States’s perceived lack of reliability as an ally has highlighted the risks of viewing NATO as a purely “transactional” alliance, a stance emphasized during the 2016-20220 Trump administration. Faced with issues as important as the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction, security alliances cannot depend on the outcome of a single country’s elections, or on the political will of isolated players to engage in a decision-making process based on consensus. Therefore, for NATO to maintain its integrity, it must look beyond sole reliance on the United States, and instead actively integrate contributions from other allies. France, as a European defence leader, can play a critical role by engaging traditionally “underutilized” allies such as Spain, Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, and especially Canada, to establish new strategic points of contact in critical areas of presure.
Moreover, Canada’s involvement offers a unique opportunity for France to foster collaboration in areas where both countries excel, such as Arctic sovereignty and cyber resilience. Canada’s recent doubling of its NATO contingent, the launch of the NATO Centre on Climate Change and Security in Montreal, and Canada’s commitment to NATO-led training on sovereign cyber effects underscore Canada’s strategic value as a steadfast and capable ally. Enhancing the French-Canada transatlantic partnership should also involve joint military exercises focused on Arctic readiness and expanded intelligence-sharing agreements to strengthen regional capabilities against the variables of cyber and environmental threats.
In consideration of the 2024 election, the impacts of the forthcoming second Trump presidency are not yet fully understood, yet it is reasonable to assume it could amplify challenges within NATO, potentially leading to even greater reductions of the U.S.’s support or a renewed emphasis on financial burden-sharing that may strain transatlantic ties. Strengthening partnerships between France, Canada, and other allies now would help NATO hedge against future volatility in U.S. foreign policy, ensuring a robust and more autonomous transatlantic security architecture regardless of American political shifts.
4) The High Arctic battlefield
The Arctic is widely regarded by experts as the “next perpetual flashpoint for great powers,” and the ongoing conflict with Russia only heightens its strategic importance. With NATO’s expansion northward, Europe and Canada can no longer afford to overlook Arctic sovereignty, especially as climate change reshapes traditional, ice-covered routes, making the region more accessible to potential adversaries. Russia’s increasing partnership with China adds to the urgency, altering the Arctic’s power dynamics.
Canada, a longstanding NATO leader in Arctic capabilities, offers France and other European partners a critical advantage in securing this region. Canada is among the few NATO members equipped with ice-breaking vessels—a capability even the United States lacks—enabling it to support year-round access and patrols in the North. Unlike the United States, Canada’s longstanding commitment to Arctic defence through NORAD has enabled it to develop resilient infrastructure and relationships with local communities, which are critical to deterring foreign influence. Canada’s ongoing re-tendering for submarines, following a survey of international suppliers, coupled with its experience and readiness for Arctic operations, provides a strategic edge that could be leveraged in collaboration with France.
To strengthen Arctic defence, NATO should prioritize joint Franco-Canadian training exercises in Arctic warfare and invest in shared infrastructure projects. France and Canada could also collaborate on developing climate-resilient technologies and joint surveillance programs, ensuring a robust, NATO-aligned presence in the Arctic. Such initiatives would not only bolster transatlantic security but would reinforce NATO’s collective sovereignty in a rapidly changing and increasingly contested region.
5) Enhancing logistical interoperability
As NATO prepares to address evolving threats across multiple regions, logistical interoperability—standardized procedures, shared infrastructure, and coordinated supply chains—has become a critical factor in maintaining operational readiness. Increasing logistical compatibility among NATO members would allow for quicker mobilization and reduce the logistical burden on frontline states, particularly in Eastern Europe, where rapid deployment is essential. Improving interoperability across the alliance could involve investments in shared transport hubs, streamlined supply networks, and unified digital infrastructure that allows NATO forces to operate seamlessly across borders.
For example, creating a ‘NATO Logistics Command Center’ under the NATO Logistics Committee to specifically oversee shared transport resources, coordinate troop movements, and manage supply routes would significantly enhance response times during crises. While France and Canada bring substantial logistical expertise—France’s experience in European and African deployments, and Canada’s proficiency in Arctic supply lines—successfully addressing NATO’s logistical challenges requires active leadership and input from Eastern Flank members. These members, particularly those in the Baltic region and Poland, face the gravest logistical challenges due to their proximity to potential conflict zones and the complexities of infrastructure beyond Germany. Explicitly integrating their strategic perspectives and infrastructure realities into the proposed logistics center would ensure that operational plans are grounded in the most pressing regional needs. By jointly leading efforts to establish standardized protocols and multi-national logistical networks in collaboration with Eastern Flank allies, France and Canada could set a model of efficient, cooperative logistics that enhances NATO’s overall agility and readiness, particularly in its most vulnerable areas.
Investing in logistical interoperability not only strengthens the transatlantic alliance by enabling faster, coordinated action but also reduces dependency on any single NATO member’s logistical infrastructure. A united logistics strategy would ensure that NATO’s ability to respond swiftly to threats in regions like the Arctic, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean remains robust, and reinforces a transatlantic security architecture that is prepared to meet the demands of modern warfare.
6) Building resilience against hybrid threats
Hybrid threats—including non-traditional tactics like cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion—are increasingly used by state and non-state actors to destabilize NATO member states from within. Enhancing resilience against these threats is essential for maintaining both national and collective security. NATO should prioritize developing a coordinated defence against hybrid warfare, equipping allies with the tools and resources needed to detect, mitigate, and respond to attacks on critical infrastructure, information networks, and public opinion.
A Transatlantic Task Force on Hybrid Threat Resilience could lead NATO’s efforts in this area, drawing on Canada’s expertise in cyber defence and France’s leadership in counter-disinformation initiatives. The task force would focus on strengthening NATO’s hybrid threat detection capabilities and establishing rapid response protocols for both physical and digital incursions. To avoid duplication of efforts, the Task Force would work in close coordination with the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki, leveraging its existing research, frameworks, and expertise. By building on the Helsinki center’s work, the Task Force could serve as a bridge between NATO’s operational requirements and the strategic insights developed by the Centers of Excellence. For instance, the creation of a shared intelligence hub for hybrid threat data, accessible to all NATO members, would complement the Helsinki center’s focus on best practices by operationalizing those insights into pre-emptive action. This collaborative approach would ensure a unified strategic framework while maximizing the utility of existing NATO resources and avoiding redundancies.
Additionally, conducting regular joint hybrid threat simulations involving NATO Member States would enable NATO forces to practice collaborative responses to cyber, information, and economic attacks. Such initiatives would not only deter adversaries by displaying NATO’s readiness but also ensure that member states are less susceptible to the internal destabilization that hybrid threats can provoke. By prioritizing resilience against these tactics, NATO can uphold a secure transatlantic alliance that is equipped to protect its member states from both traditional and unconventional challenges in today’s security landscape.
Conclusion
As the Russian-Ukrainian war continues to destabilize Europe, the transatlantic security architecture faces mounting pressure to adapt, prioritizing resilience and responsiveness to emerging threats. Addressing the advancing Russian threat is essential but doing so effectively will require NATO and the EU to think beyond traditional alliances and deepen partnerships that can offer lasting strategic value. The new NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, inherits a challenging role, particularly in managing EU-NATO coordination to build a stronger, more unified European defence framework. Rutte’s leadership will be pivotal in guiding NATO’s evolution, and his success will depend heavily on leveraging the distinct strengths of key partnerships—especially those like the burgeoning 21st century strategic alliance between France and Canada.
Indeed, the ongoing France-Canada partnership provides a model of collaboration for middle powers that combines regional expertise, technological capacity, and a commitment to transatlantic security goals. From Canada’s Arctic capabilities and cyber resilience to France’s military technology and leadership in European strategic autonomy, this partnership exemplifies the potential of middle powers to contribute substantial value to NATO, filling critical operational gaps that larger allies alone cannot address. By prioritizing high-impact capabilities, rebuilding alliance solidarity, engaging underutilized allies, and securing the High Arctic, France and Canada demonstrate how targeted collaborations can enhance NATO’s reach and responsiveness in the rapidly evolving security landscape that the transatlantic community faces.
About the Authors
Leah Schmidt is a PhD student at the University of Cambridge’s Department of Politics and International Studies, specializing in women, peace, and security research, posthumanist theory, and feminist security studies. She holds an MPhil in Gender Studies from Cambridge as the Canadian Chevening Scholar and Rotary Trust Global Grant Recipient, along with dual BA degrees in Women’s Studies (First Class Honours) and International Relations (Distinction) from the University of Calgary.
Léa Pérémarty holds a master’s degree in international law and politics from the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM), where she specialized in international security issues and the law of armed conflict. Her research focuses on the concept of lawfare and its application to the war in Ukraine. She also completed an internship at the Réseau d’Analyse Stratégique, contributing to research on contemporary defence and security issues.
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