Cyprus, a divided island
“Peace is not the absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a will to benevolence, to trust, to justice.” This quotation from Spinoza highlights the situation in Cyprus, caught between war and peace. An island state in the eastern Mediterranean and a former British colony, Cyprus has been independent since the signing of the Treaty of Guarantee of the Constitution on August 16, 1960, which entrusted the island’s political stability to three countries: the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey. However, breaking the British yoke did not herald the advent of peace on the island. Some Greek nationalist circles supported Enosis (“union” in Greek) and wanted the island to be united with Greece. In 1964, violent ethnic clashes between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots led to the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The two communities were physically separated by a demilitarized buffer zone administered by the UNFICYP. In the summer of 1974, President Makarios III, whose mandate applied de jure to the whole island, expressed the wish that Greek officers should leave the Cypriot National Guard. In response, some of the latter, aided by EOKA-B, a Greek-Cypriot paramilitary group, and the dictatorship of the Athens colonels, launched an attempted coup d’état in Cyprus. On July 20, Turkey launched a military intervention in the north of the island, justifying its action on the basis of Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, which states that “Insofar as joint or concerted action should prove impossible, each of the three Guarantor Powers reserves the right to act with the sole aim of re-establishing the order created by the present Treaty.” The fall of Athenian power, already weakened when the Cyprus crisis emerged, condemned the coup to failure. Turkey reacted by refusing to leave the now-liberated territory. Intervention then turned to occupation: 37% of the de jure territory administered by Nicosia came under de facto Turkish authority, before the proclamation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) in November 1983. In addition to this fragmentation of Cypriot territory, there are the sovereign British military bases of Dhekelia and Akrotiri, installed since 1959 and considered by Nicosia to be another form of occupation. However, this territorial division has not prevented Cyprus from joining the European Union (EU) and becoming a member state in 2004.
Forty years have passed since then. Although the island is no longer at war, peace is not assured. Firstly, it does not exist at the same time on any scale (local, regional, national, international). Secondly, conflict prevention is only partially achieved (the recent clashes surrounding the illegal road-building project in Pyla are a case in point). Thirdly, the peace achieved does not suit any of the parties involved, with both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots feeling aggrieved by the situation. The island is thus frozen in an interstitial space between war and peace. In this context, the “TRNC”’s recent diplomatic contacts call this immobility into question, notably by highlighting a possible rapprochement between the occupying authorities and the Kremlin, all under Turkish influence.
The increasingly relative isolation of the “TRNC”
Although Ankara immediately recognized the “TRNC” as sovereign, such a proclamation of independence was not met with unanimous approval in the Turkish world. For example, the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani enclave between Armenia, Turkey, and Iran, immediately recognized the sovereignty of the “TRNC”, but Baku did not. As a result, the “TRNC” was not included in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), founded in 2009 by Azerbaijan in Nakhchivan. Despite the emergence of dissenting voices from the Muslim world (Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan and Somalia) when Resolution 541 was adopted on November 18, 1983, calling on “all States not to recognize any other Cypriot State than the Republic of Cyprus”, the “TRNC”’s only lasting diplomatic link to date has been with Ankara.
However, the current warming of relations between the “TRNC” and Aliyev’s Azerbaijan – a circumstantial ally of Erdoğan’s Turkey – reinforces rhetoric opposed to a lasting settlement of the Cyprus question on the basis of a federal state, which is the position adopted by the United Nations (UN). The current Turkish-Cypriot “leader”, the conservative nationalist Ersin Tatar, is firmly committed to a two-state solution for Cyprus. He is more broadly vassalized and aligned with all of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s international positions. Northern Cyprus is therefore a bridgehead for Turkish gas exploitation in the eastern Mediterranean. Following Ankara’s lead, Tatar is fully involved in the process of consolidating diplomatic ties with Baku. This is illustrated by the Turkish and Azerbaijani desire to strengthen the Turkish-Cypriot presence within cooperation organizations, whether regional (OTS) or international (Organization of Islamic Cooperation). In this respect, the statements made by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev at the “multilateral political consultations” held in Istanbul at the beginning of October in the run-up to the 10th OTS summit, affirming that the “TRNC” flag would be flown at the events to be held in Azerbaijan, are a powerful indicator of the strengthening of this relationship.
This diplomatic development coincides with the end of a certain balance of power in the region. This had been established between Armenia, Cyprus, and Greece on the one hand, and Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the “TRNC” on the other. A game of mutual threats reigned between the parties present, one of the keystones of which was the threat of recognition of the Republic of Artsakh in the face of that of the “TRNC”. This logic was broken by Baku’s offensive against Armenian separatist positions in Nagorno-Karabakh on September 19, 2023. Although the Cypriot Parliament unanimously condemned this military operation, it demonstrated that the threat of recognizing the Armenian secessionist territories no longer intimidated Aliyev-son, who was determined to avenge his father, who had been forced to accept the ceasefire of May 16, 1994, that confirmed the Armenian victory in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Everything now seems to point to Baku’s imminent recognition of the “TRNC”. The Cypriot-Turkish authorities are delighted (their Foreign Affairs “minister” stressing that the “recognition process” for the regime has begun). Moscow could accordingly see in this sequence of geopolitical reconfiguration an opportunity to intensify its Mediterranean presence, while destabilizing the Western camp.
The Russian game in the Eastern Mediterranean
Situated the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is both an observation point and a gateway to the Near and Middle East, whose strategic importance has long been recognized by the Kremlin.
The Russian Navy’s logistics base at Tartous in Syria (less than 110 nautical miles from the Cypriot coast) is the contemporary physical legacy of Russia’s determination to control its economic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this respect, the development of a major policy of influence in the region is a central issue. While the doctrinal basis of this policy is not new, its means of deployment are. Russia’s involvement in Syria demonstrated the Kremlin’s willingness to interact and become involved in a non-border conflict. This policy was also deployed in Libya, leading Moscow to interact with Ankara. Combining confrontation and cooperation, this relationship was established in the spaces left empty by the Western camp and should also be studied in the light of the ad hoc agreement between the Russian and Iranian powers.
Alongside these two theaters of operation, Russia has continued to develop its influence in Cyprus, mainly in the military and economic fields. The Cypriot National Guard has historically been equipped with Russian equipment (T-80s, BMP-3s, S-300s, etc.). At the same time, the signing of a defense cooperation agreement in 2015 increased cooperation between the two countries’ armed forces. In particular, the text opened Cypriot ports to Russian ships, which were at the gateway to the Syrian theater at the time.
On the economic front, the introduction of a “citizenship through investment” program played a major role in attracting Russian investors to the island. This allowed any individual investing a minimum of two million euros in the real estate sector to obtain Cypriot citizenship. Although this was denounced and attacked by the European Commission, it enabled a large number of Russian businessmen (nearly 3,000) to obtain a “golden passport”, bringing in around seven billion euros in investments for the Cypriot banking sector. On a macroeconomic scale, in 2018, 33% of Russia’s total inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock came from Cyprus; in mirror terms, in the same year, 40% of Russia’s total outward FDI stock was based in Cyprus, representing a sum of $189 billion.
However, February 24, 2022, marked a turning point in the relationship between the two countries. Nicosia turned away from its historical partner in favor of Brussels and Washington. In this respect, the ambiguity of some Eastern European and Middle Eastern states – condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine but not imposing economic sanctions on the Kremlin – does not prevail in Cyprus. The government is resolutely committed to cleaning up its financial image and standing “on the right side of history”. Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides, a fervent Europhile, recently asserted that “Relations with the Russian Federation are determined within the framework of our status as an EU member state. There is an illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, just as there was in Cyprus in 1974.” The disintegration of this Russian-Cypriot relationship, coupled with the diplomatic gestation of the “TRNC”, could prompt Moscow to give ever more serious consideration to reversing its position on the Cyprus question.
The stakes in a Russian recognition of the “TRNC”
Politically, Russian power could take advantage of this frozen European legal space to destabilize a region that is a “component of the European security architecture“. The consequences would include the disruption of the European and Atlantic legitimacy acquired in Nicosia. In operational terms, however, such recognition would not have any major consequences: with the Tartous naval base, Russian ships are already close neighbors of Western operations Noble Shield (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) and EUNAVFOR MED (EU), as well as the US 6th Fleet. However, the Russian stronghold would extend from the Syrian canal to the north and north-west of Cyprus.
In strategic terms, this would be a serious blow to Europe’s indecision on Cyprus, with Brussels giving only timid support to the resolution of the occupation of more than a third of the sovereign territory of one of its member states by a foreign power. While President Christodoulides’ diplomatic exercise in New York on the occasion of the 78th General Assembly of the United Nations enabled him to exchange views with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, the Cyprus question is still not on the European political agenda: in her September 13 “State of the Union” speech, Ursula Von der Leyen made no mention of the island, nor of the need to resolve the Cyprus problem. Europe’s geopolitical apathy towards Cyprus is therefore well established. But by not getting involved in resolving the Cyprus problem, the EU runs the risk of finding itself faced with a fait accompli, trapped both morally and politically.
Faint signals, broadcast by the Cypriot-Turkish “power” at Ankara’s behest, indicate the beginnings of a diplomatic rapprochement between Russia and the “TRNC”, including plans to set up a consular office in occupied territory and flights to Russia. While the Turkish President was in Sochi at the beginning of September, this diplomatic issue was discussed. Erdoğan announced that the Turkish government was “delighted that Russia is opening an office in the “TRNC””. While the latter immediately stressed that the opening of such consular representation would not entail immediate recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot government by Moscow, the project is indicative of the gradual turn Russia is taking on the island.
The limits of Moscow’s action over the “TRNC” with a losing Europe in every case
Although recognition of secessionist governments is customary for Moscow, such an initiative entails a major risk for the Kremlin. It could lead the United States to increase its already substantial military presence on the island. Determined to fill the gap left by the deterioration in Russian-Cypriot relations, Washington has become a major partner of Nicosia. At the instigation of US Senators Bob Menendez, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Marco Rubio, Congress passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act in 2019, lifting the 35-year-old arms embargo on Cyprus for one year. The Senate is even studying the possibility of ending the annuality principle, in favor of a renewal every three years, in order to strengthen the US strategic partnership on a lasting basis and definitively remove the Russian player from the Cypriot scene.
On the other hand, not all Turkic states share Baku’s or Ankara’s vision. Kazakhstan supports the Cypriot government and is in favor of finding a solution to the Cyprus question “in accordance with the UN Charter and the relevant Security Council resolutions“. The OTS website, where the “TRNC” has been an observer member since 2022, presents the latter in a caricatured way, in a rough mix between geographical data relating to the Republic of Cyprus and those of the “TRNC”, and even goes so far as to assert that one of Cyprus’ “neighboring countries” is… “the Greek Cypriot administration”.
Conclusion: the potential Turkish game
Undoubtedly, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is seeking to break out of its isolation in order to achieve the status of a fully-fledged sovereign state. At the same time, Baku’s lightning offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh reversed the balance of power that had been established vis-à-vis Cyprus, demonstrating that Greek threats to recognize the Republic of Artsakh no longer frightened Aliyev. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s efforts to include the “TRNC” in regional and international cooperation bodies (OTS, OCI) seem to indicate a forthcoming recognition of the Cypriot-Turkish occupation regime. This sequence could serve Russian interests, to the detriment of the UN, the EU and NATO. The Kremlin could therefore become involved in this strategic turning point: its warships would then call at de jure ports in the territory of the Union, highlighting Europe’s political and moral slap in the face on the Cyprus question.
The fact remains that nothing will be done in Cyprus without the agreement of Ankara, in a position of strength in this context. While a form of Panturquism can of course be observed, this “unity in language” is for the moment slowed down by the position of the Turkish government, which prefers to maintain the fog that reigns around Cyprus, in order to guarantee the continuity of its interests in this vague legal area. Moreover, from a military point of view, Turkey has no interest in seeing Russian soldiers in the occupied territories. Finally, the religious factor, which partly explains the Russian-Chypriot rapprochement via the Orthodox Church, could slow down Russian integration in the “TRNC” if Moscow were to recognize the latter. In any case, the real threat to the European camp comes not from Moscow, but from Ankara. It is in Erdoğan’s interest to continue to threaten the international recognition of the “TRNC”.
Relying on its status as a guarantor power and NATO member, Turkey is gradually placing its pawns on the island. The stakes lie in the potential of this recognition of the “TRNC”, which Erdoğan is well aware of. By emphasizing NATO’s territorial expansion through the pure and simple integration of the “TRNC” into Turkey’s borders, Ankara can counter a hypothetical Russian threat and find new supporters within the Alliance. This scenario would put an end to the current Cypriot in-between situation and ensure that the Turkish side obtains what it seeks in Cyprus: territorial expansion and lasting access to gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean. It therefore seems necessary to denounce this maneuver, so that Europeans and Atlanticists do not find themselves trapped in Cyprus.
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