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The development of quantum technology is at the forefront of international security concerns. Unsurprisingly, with quantum computers expected to break current cryptographic standards, many countries consider the research and development of these technologies crucial for their own national security efforts. To increase the speed and depth of research and development efforts, states often turn to international collaboration. Of particular note is the Five Eyes intelligence partnership composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. At an official Five Eyes summit in October 2023, representatives from each country commented on the importance of adapting to emerging technologies. The UK’s MI5 Director General Ken McCallum stated that “the stakes are now incredibly high on emerging technologies; states which lead the way in areas like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and synthetic biology will have the power to shape all our futures.” This emphasis on quantum and other emerging technologies within the security sector demonstrates the Five Eyes’ commitment to securing leadership in these realms.
Emerging from a US/UK pact to continue sharing signals intelligence after the Second World War, Five Eyes is a crucial intelligence-sharing partnership among leading Anglosphere countries. Recently, the partnership has made headlines as the conduit for intelligence that led to Canada accusing India of assassinating Hardeep Singh Najjar in 2023, showcasing its ongoing relevance. All Five Eyes members have recognized China’s potential threat within the quantum realm, marking that country as their primary quantum challenger. Should China take the position of global leader in quantum, China would, by default, become a global leader in cybersecurity. In 2020, China successfully established a secure quantum link between two ground stations of over 1,000 kilometers. This was a major breakthrough in the realm of quantum communications, putting China ahead of other countries and closer to claiming supremacy in communications. Recently, China has also reported on closing the gap between US and Chinese quantum computing. Previously, the United States claimed to be ahead of Chinese developments; however, recent data suggests that the race for leadership in this domain is now closer than ever. But what would leadership in quantum mean for China and the Five Eyes?
In this Hot Take, I provide a summary of the risks and benefits associated with quantum technology and the potential impact of New Zealand’s quantum collaboration with China on security and the Five Eyes partnership. To examine the extent of New Zealand’s collaboration with China and whether this collaboration presents potential risk to New Zealand and its Five Eyes partners, statistics and data from the Dodd-Walls Centre for Photonic and Quantum Technologies’ annual reports between 2021 and 2023 were consulted. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief recommendation to New Zealand officials to mitigate potential risks associated with the Dodd-Walls Centre’s ongoing quantum collaboration with China.
Quantum – Shifting Security Standards and Strategies
Quantum computers can process information and break most existing cryptographic standards at a significantly faster rate. In fact, Google’s most recent quantum computer completed a task within seconds that would have taken a modern computer 47 years. If China takes leadership in this quantum domain, secure communication systems as well as secure national documents used by the Five Eyes would become vulnerable to interception and corruption by Chinese mal actors. However, quantum computing and cryptography are not the only domains of quantum that present a security risk. Sensing and communication developments also present a unique advantage to whichever country claims supremacy. Within sensing, quantum offers increased accuracy and speed compared to modern sensing technologies. While this accuracy and speed is groundbreaking in health and environmental sectors, these developments are also groundbreaking in security and defence sectors. Quantum leadership in sensing domains offers militaries the opportunity to determine the location of bases, ships, submarines, and to engage in space-based warfare with unprecedented accuracy. Chinese mal actors may utilize these technologies to identify weaknesses or targets for future attacks. Finally, quantum communications offers a unique security benefit – in addition to being more secure than modern communications, it cannot be intercepted or altered in any way without notifying the receiver and sender. While the development of these technologies also requires the development of grids and systems capable of supporting quantum, it is important to recognize the significance and potential impact of advancements in these sectors. Advancements in quantum domains, even in early stages of development, have the potential to completely alter current international security standards.
With all the benefits and risks associated with quantum development, it is no wonder that countries like New Zealand have begun investing in these sectors. New Zealand’s quantum development efforts have emphasized the importance of international collaboration to solidify the state’s position as a quantum leader. Other countries, such as Canada and the United States, have taken a more cautious approach to international collaboration. In an effort to counter malign foreign research and development efforts, the United States and Canada have released lists of organizations with whom collaboration should be limited or nonexistent. Organizations are placed on these lists due to their connections with high-level foreign military and defense efforts or for their association with entities identified to be working against national priorities. With these lists and a clear positioning of the Five Eyes and China as competitors, collaboration within the Five Eyes is no surprise. Collaboration with China, however, is. Despite expectations that Five Eyes partners would be at the top of quantum collaboration with New Zealand, China has remained the top international co-author for New Zealand’s Dodd-Walls Centre for Photonic and Quantum Technologies’ publications for the past 3 years. Some cooperation with China is to be expected – China is a leader in technological developments and offers many benefits in this realm. However, it is the collaborative relationship between New Zealand quantum and Chinese entities that have been labeled as ‘risky’ by the United States and Canadian governments that is concerning. The following sections explore the extent of this collaboration with Chinese organizations and their potential threat risk and proposes areas for increased cooperation within the Five Eyes to further secure research development efforts.
New Zealand’s Quantum Collaboration
In 2021, the Dodd-Walls Centre released its first annual report including data on international co-authors. Surprisingly, Chinese co-authorship ranked highest, accounting for 27% of all internationally co-authored publications from the centre. The same situation occurred in 2022, with Chinese co-authorship ranked at number one, accounting for 36.34% of the centre’s internationally co-authored publications. This story repeated itself once more in their recent 2023 report, in which China accounted for 34.67% of co-authored publications. This collaboration with China is not inherently bad. Some organizations within the country do not represent a national security threat. The organizations that do, however, have been identified by both the United States and Canada on their respective entity and named research organization lists. Of the organizations that appear on these lists, at least three appeared in the Dodd-Walls Centre’s 2021 annual report. These organizations included Beihang University, the Beijing Institute of Technology, and Nanjing University of Science and Technology. In 2022, Northwestern Polytechnical University, which is named on both the United States and Canada’s lists, was listed as a co-author. And, once again, in 2023 Baihang University, the Beijing Institute of Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, North University of China, and Sichuan University were listed as co-authors.
While these organizations appear on both entity lists and the annual reports by name, there remain others that represent a potential risk. In 2021, the annual report included the Chinese Academy of Science, the Graduate School of the China Academy of Engineering Physics, and Sichuan University of Science and Engineering. The United States’ and Canada’s entity and research organization lists name specific departments within these academies and universities, such as the Chinese Academy of Science’s Shenyang Institute of Automation. However, the Dodd-Walls Centre does not name the specific department or institution it is collaborating with in its annual report. The distinction of departments on entity lists and lack thereof in the Dodd-Walls Centre’s annual reports continued with the Graduate School of the China Academy of Engineering Physics and Sichuan University of Science and Engineering. Using the lists published by the United States and Canada and cross-referencing the publications from organizations named by the Dodd-Walls Centre as international co-authors, I examined the potentially ‘risky’ cooperation within the Dodd-Walls Centre’s Chinese collaboration. The number of collaborative publications from these ‘risky’ entities was compared to the total number of international co-authored publications and the total number of Chinese co-authored publications. The process was repeated adding in the unspecified departments to provide data on the highest possible risk currently present in the Dodd-Walls Centre’s collaborations. The findings of this cross-reference and data examination are as follows:
In 2021, the percentage of the Dodd-Walls Centre’s co-authors that appeared on both Canadian and American watch lists was at least 2.4%, but potentially as high as 4.8% accounting for the unspecified departments mentioned previously. In 2022, the Chinese Academy of Science and the Graduate School of the China Academy of Engineering Physics appeared again. For 2022, then, the percentage of the Dodd-Walls Centre’s international co-authors that appeared on both Canadian and American watch lists was at least 0.97%, but was potentially as high as 2.9%. In 2023, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Graduate School of China Academy of Engineering Physics made their appearance again. Thus, in 2023, the percentage of Chinese co-authorship that appeared on both Canadian and American watch lists was at least 2.22%, but was potentially as high as 3.11%. When examining Chinese co-authorship independently from the rest of the Dodd-Walls Centre’s international co-authors, I found that named organization and entity collaboration accounted for anywhere between 10% and 20% in 2021, 3.7% and 11.11% in 2022, and anywhere between 6.4% and 8.97% in 2023. In total, the Dodd-Walls Centre claims anywhere between 8 and 38 co-authored publications with the named organizations and entities listed previously in 2021. In 2022, these co-authored publications total anywhere between 1 and 7. In 2023, publications with entities totaled anywhere between 8 and 20. Although the volume of publications between 2021 and 2023 decreased, the potential security risk that comes with any association with these entities did not.
The Duality of New Zealand-China Collaboration
The presence of these entities and named research organizations on the Dodd-Walls Centre’s annual reports is concerning. If the United States and Canada have both listed these organizations as potential threats to national security, then collaboration should be limited or nonexistent. But that is not the case. Instead, as demonstrated above, New Zealand’s primary quantum development centre has, for the past three years, maintained significant collaboration with these entities. Collaboration between the Dodd-Walls Centre and Chinese entities listed on both Canadian and American watch lists has been focused primarily in environmental and health applications of quantum, aligning with the signed Arrangement on a Five-year Roadmap for New Zealand-China Science and Technology Cooperation. At first, these domains do not appear to be of concern for national security efforts. However, quantum technologies, such as sensors that are primarily developed in health and environmental domains, are classified as dual-use technologies. This means that a quantum sensor developed for environmental or health applications can be more easily and quickly adapted for security purposes. In other words, the same sensing technologies used for locating key mineral deposits beneath the earth or for locating disease in the body could be used to locate nuclear submarines and other critical systems and infrastructures. If China continues to account for the majority of New Zealand’s quantum collaboration via the Dodd-Walls Centre, the security of future quantum communications technologies and other developments within New Zealand and its intelligence sharing partnerships will continue to be at increased risk. Thankfully, through the Dodd-Walls Centre lies a potential for increased Five Eyes collaboration to counter these Chinese quantum efforts.
Countering Rising Threats
When it comes to quantum policy, New Zealand has often turned towards its traditional partners for guidance. This alliance of quantum policies is crucial to maintaining the advantage in the quantum arms race with China. With both the United States and Canada publishing entity and named research organization lists, New Zealand should seek to follow in these nations’ footsteps. Currently, there exist no named research organization or entity lists in New Zealand to monitor international collaboration efforts. This means potential threats have a greater chance of slipping through this crack in New Zealand’s national security.
I thus recommend that the New Zealand government develop an entity or named research organization list that aligns with Canada and the United States. These countries should encourage the development and alignment of such a list with existing ones. Canada and the United States have already provided a foundation of knowledge on these risky entities and aligning with them would deepen New Zealand’s collaborative relationship with its traditional allies. Furthermore, the establishment of such a list would serve to limit or to eliminate quantum collaboration with organizations that pose a large threat to national and international security efforts. Without it, these organizations may continue to seek collaboration with key quantum institutes and may apply any critical developments to their own national security efforts. With the dual-use nature of quantum technologies, organizations can more easily apply developments in quantum sensors and other technologies achieved via health or environmental research to their defensive efforts. These developments remain crucial to national security efforts, and without the alignment of New Zealand quantum efforts with its allies, the threat of Chinese quantum will continue to grow.
Conclusion
The Five Eyes countries and China are racing to claim the title of leader in the quantum realm. International cooperation has been vital to the increased research and development speed of quantum technologies. However, New Zealand’s Dodd-Walls Centre may position China in an advantageous position as its top international collaborator. While not all collaboration with China poses a threat, the Dodd-Walls Centre has cooperated with known entities and named research organizations identified by the United States and Canada as risks to national security. This is particularly important within the Five Eyes intelligence sharing partnership, which is likely to rely on quantum technologies to share classified information as these technologies continue to develop. New Zealand’s lack of entity or named research organization lists means these threats can continue to grow and develop within New Zealand quantum. The government of New Zealand must seek to further align its quantum efforts with its allies via the development and publication of its own entity or named research list aligned with those already published by the United States and Canada. Should New Zealand continue its unmonitored cooperation with China, quantum communications and intelligence sharing efforts could be compromised, and research within the quantum realm more vulnerable to potential security breaches.
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Bailee Dobson is a researcher with the Centre for International and Defence Policy affiliated with the project “QFVEY: Quantum Security, Strategy, and Technology in Five Eyes Nations.” This project has received funding from the Department of National Defence via a Targeted Engagement Grant through the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) Program. The views and opinions discussed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Armed Forces.
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