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(Italy and the Russo-Ukrainian War: Strategic Continuity or the Impact of Populist Tensions? – Nicolas-François Perron)
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 caught many Italian political leaders off guard, including Giorgia Meloni, who has served as President of the Council of Ministers since October 2022 and leads the national-conservative, far-right Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) party. At a summit in 2023, approximately 18 months after the conflict began, Meloni openly acknowledged this: “In 2014, the magnitude of the situation was not fully grasped in the West, and we may have hoped that Moscow’s imperialist expansionism would stop there. We were wrong, and it is important to recognize that.”
Since February 2022, Italy has taken significant diplomatic, humanitarian, and military measures to support Ukraine. In terms of bilateral military aid, Italy now ranks 12th globally, with contributions amounting to €1.34 billion (CAD 2.01 billion). However, in terms of heavy military assistance, it rises to 7th place with €0.84 billion (CAD 1.26 billion), notably due to the deliveries of 155 mm/152 mm howitzers, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), and an advanced surface-to-air missile system (NASAMS).
For some analysts, Italy’s stance on the Ukraine conflict appears complex and challenging to fully comprehend. On the one hand, Italian public opinion is sometimes seen as more sympathetic toward Russia than other Western nations, and it would be influenced by historical, cultural, and economic ties that have fostered a more cooperative relationship between Rome and Moscow. On the other hand, the rise of pro-Russian populism within the government since 2018 has added to this complexity. Parties such as Matteo Salvini’s Lega have maintained institutional and political ties with Vladimir Putin’s party in Russia. Despite Italy’s military aid being relatively less significant than that of other countries, Rome’s strong condemnation of the Russian invasion reportedly surprised Moscow, signalling a shift in Italy’s posture toward Russia. How, then, can Italy’s military support for Ukraine be interpreted?
This article identifies three factors explaining Italy’s stance. Firstly, Italy frames its military engagement in Eastern Europe and its support for Ukraine within a broader perspective of European and transatlantic security architecture. Thus, Rome adopts a comprehensive approach to its military involvement as a middle power. Secondly, the role of Russia in Italian strategic thinking should be relativized. Despite historical, economic, and personal ties, Russia is not central to Italy’s strategic vision. Faced with significant structural changes, such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, Italy is as reluctant as its allies to pursue cooperation with Moscow. Finally, Italian populism has had a less decisive influence on defence policy than might have been expected. This is partly due to internal and external systemic pressures, as well as the evolution of Italian populism and the gradual normalization of its political movements since 2019.
The Enlarged Mediterranean and Italy’s Euro-Atlantic Defence Posture
After World War II, Italy’s national interests were deeply shaped by the emergence of a political elite divided between a socialist left and a Catholic right. Both ideological currents shared a common opposition to war and the use of force in resolving international conflicts. This pacifism grew stronger after 1945 amidst a challenging process of de-fascistization and a reduction in Italy’s defence industrial capabilities. The influence of external actors, notably through the 1947 Peace Treaty signed between Italy and the Allies, also contributed to this trend. This peaceful orientation was institutionalized in Article 11 of the 1947 Constitution, which rejects using war as a political tool while promoting cooperation with international organizations to establish a world order based on peace and justice. During this period, Italy adopted a relatively limited role on the global stage.
With the end of the Cold War, Italy’s defence posture took a new direction. Starting in the 1990s, the country became significantly more active globally, increasing its external engagements and significantly boosting the number of Italian soldiers deployed in crisis management, stabilization, and peacekeeping operations.
Italy’s postwar strategic posture is based on three core pillars: (1) European integration and multilateralism, primarily within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU); (2) transatlantic relations, particularly strategic and military cooperation with the United States; and (3) the Enlarged Mediterranean, considered a zone of strategic interest due to Italy’s role as a crossroads between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.
The institutional framework of NATO is a fundamental element of Italy’s Euro-Atlantic engagement. Italy’s commitment to NATO transcends internal political divisions. As described by Coticchia and Vignoli, despite changes in government, Italy has consistently prioritized participation in NATO-led missions. Since the end of the Cold War, Italy has progressively established itself as a security provider within the organization, actively participating in various NATO operations, including in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Due to its strategic geographical location, Italy plays a key role in implementing NATO’s Mediterranean strategy.
Since the second half of the 2010s, Italy has refocused its external engagements toward the Enlarged Mediterranean region, gradually shifting away from its interventions in the Middle East initiated in the early 2000s. This strategic readjustment is reflected in Italy prioritizing the Balkans, the Sahel, and North Africa. This shift was solidified by the publication of the 2015 White Paper on International Security and Defence, which reaffirmed the Euro-Mediterranean region as a strategic priority for Italy’s defence institutions, enjoying broad bipartisan consensus. Consequently, despite major geopolitical events in the East, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Enlarged Mediterranean remains at the core of Italy’s strategic priorities. Indeed, nearly half of Italy’s military commitments are concentrated in this region.
Recent strategic documents, such as the 2022 Mediterranean Security and Defence Strategy, describe the Mediterranean as “once again at the center of the international stage” and a “pillar for strengthening Italy’s role on the global stage.” Former Defence Minister Lorenzo Guerini (2019–2022) emphasized the region’s importance, stating that the objective is to “promote a more nuanced analysis of crises, recognizing the southern region as an integral part of global dynamics, impacting practically all areas.” This reflects Italy’s intention to reposition the Mediterranean at the heart of global issues, representing both a strategic shift toward addressing instability in North Africa and the Sahel and a cautious use of force focusing on capacity-building missions to tackle terrorism and illegal migration in the region.
On the operational level, Italy seeks to position itself as a key security actor within NATO in cooperation with its southern European allies. This positioning aims to ensure regional security and to link Mediterranean geopolitics with European security through a comprehensive security architecture. In other words, while NATO’s center of gravity shifts toward the North and East due to the Russo-Ukrainian War, and as the Alliance integrates Sweden and Finland, Italy aims to demonstrate its commitment within this European security architecture as a middle power.
The goal is to strengthen ties between these strategic regions to maximize European and Italian security through a comprehensive approach that integrates the geopolitical dimensions of Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, President Sergio Mattarella reaffirmed this stance by stating that “Russian aggression in Ukraine has further highlighted the geopolitical continuity and strategic importance of Italy’s and Europe’s relations with the Enlarged Mediterranean basin and the African continent as a whole, which has been particularly affected by the repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.”
Rome-Moscow Axis to Be Contextualized
In political and academic circles working on Italian foreign and defence policy, the idea of historical relations between Italy and Russia holds significant weight. During the Cold War, the importance of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its ties to Moscow shaped bilateral diplomatic relations. For instance, during the Berlin Crisis in 1961, despite Rome’s clear Atlanticist stance, Italy sought to play a mediating role between the West and the USSR. Today, these ties are reflected in a convergence of strategic interests, important interpersonal relationships, Italy’s energy dependence, and an ideological affinity with a Russia perceived as “conservative” or “traditional” by some nationalist and conservative parties in Italy. This relationship would have facilitated dialogue and cooperation between the two countries.
Firstly, as a middle power in a shifting strategic environment following the end of the Cold War, Italy reportedly sought to position itself as a “mediator” between Russia and the United States. In doing so, and in line with the behaviour typical of a middle power, it aimed to maintain its military and cultural alignment with the West while simultaneously preserving economic and energy ties with Russia. According to others, Italy sought to counterbalance NATO’s eastward shift towards Eastern Europe and Russia since 2014, instead emphasizing threats from Southern Europe, such as transnational migration and terrorism. In this way, Italy aimed to mitigate the threat posed by Russia to Europe.
Italy’s Prime Minister during the 2000s, Silvio Berlusconi, reportedly sought to embody a bridge between Rome and Moscow through close personal ties with his counterpart, Vladimir Putin. For the Italian leader, Italy had a role to play in building a bridge between the two former rivals. Berlusconi was not the only Italian head of government to directly impact relations between the two countries. According to Fabrizio Coticchia and Jason Davidson, Matteo Renzi, who served as Prime Minister between 2014 and 2016, attempted to adopt a more conciliatory stance toward Russia during the Crimea crisis, allegedly driven by electoral considerations. Others point to a longstanding tradition of friendly cultural ties between the two states, as well as shared strategic affinities and inclinations.
When tensions between Russia and the West arose in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea, many observers highlighted that Italy’s dependence on Russian gas limited the Italian government’s room for maneuver. As a result, economic, trade, and energy relations between the two countries would also encourage a more conciliatory stance from Rome toward Russia in the context of international tensions. Advocates of this argument point to the Italian government’s stance on sanctions at the outset of the large-scale invasion in February 2022 as evidence of this ambivalence. From the beginning of the invasion, Mario Draghi’s government supported the EU’s economic and trade sanctions against Moscow but initially refused to include Russian gas exports.
Finally, there appears to be a certain appeal toward a “conservative” and “traditional” Russia among the conservative right in Europe, including in Italy. For instance, Matteo Salvini, leader of the Lega party, shared with Vladimir Putin an affinity for certain Christian and conservative values, as well as a preference for an autocratic posture. Salvini envisioned political stability through a law-and-order policy, emphasizing patriotism in contrast to globalization. This stance is similar to that of Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s Prime Minister since October 2022, who stated in 2021 that Russia defended “European values and Christian identity.”
Although Italy-Russia relations are sometimes framed as complex, it is important to nuance the idea that these relations systematically lead to a more conciliatory and favourable stance toward Russia compared to other European and Western states. Gabriele Natalizia and Mara Morini argue that relations between Italy and Russia evolve depending on the stability of the international order. When this order is stable, Italy tends to adopt a cooperative stance toward Russia, but tensions are more likely to arise during periods of instability. As former Italian ambassador to Russia Sergio Romano explained, the relationship between the two states is not a deep, sincere partnership but rather a mutual attempt to secure shared benefits through alliances of convenience.
On various issues in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans, Italian strategic interests directly clash with Russia’s. Thus, although Rome has historically cultivated economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow, its commitments to NATO and the EU, combined with Russia’s authoritarian turn, have limited its room for maneuver, leading to a stronger alignment with the Western camp. Consequently, relations between Italy and Russia are not inherently more cooperative than those between other European states and Russia. This is further demonstrated by Fabio Battanin in 2012 through a historiography of Italy-Russia relations, which highlighted that, in reality, other European states maintain closer ties with Moscow.
Limits of Populism and Italy’s Defensive Stance
From the 1990s to the mid-2010s, Italian defence policy and military interventions were marked by broad bipartisan consensus. Moreover, whether combat operations or not, all military interventions were systematically framed as “peace missions,” a rhetoric supported by major political parties regardless of the operational context. However, the latter half of the 2010s saw the rise of populist parties, often anti-establishment, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration, or pro-Russian, partly due to an ideological attraction to alternatives to liberal democracy. These parties proposed platforms that diverged from traditional positions, both in domestic and foreign policy.
In Italy, several political movements led to the formation of populist governments starting in 2018. The first was the Conte I Government, which lasted from June 2018 to September 2019. It was followed by the Conte II Government from September 2019 to February 2021 and then by the Draghi Government, in office from February 2021 to October 2022. Since October 2022, the country has been led by Giorgia Meloni. During these different periods, these coalitions expressed divergent positions regarding NATO, the EU, Russia, and its own defence policy, thus breaking with the bipartisan consensus that had prevailed between 1990 and 2015 — at least rhetorically.
Within these coalitions, two populist parties played a central role: the Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S), an anti-establishment, catch-all party, and the Lega (League), a right-wing nationalist populist party. The M5S participated in all these coalitions, except for the one formed by Meloni in 2022, while the League did not participate in the Conte II Government. Initially advocating for an “exit from NATO,” the M5S shifted its position in 2017, instead calling for an “adjustment of the Atlantic Alliance to the new multilateral context,” emphasizing a strictly defensive approach to its activities. The party also opposed certain NATO missions and the storage of American nuclear weapons on Italian soil.
The League, for its part, has long maintained close ties with Russia, as evidenced by the signing of an agreement with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party in 2017, despite allegations of corruption surrounding these relations. However, the League has adopted more clearly pro-Atlanticist positions while acknowledging the pragmatic need to maintain diplomatic relations with Russia.
In his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte supported lifting international sanctions against Russia while reaffirming Italy’s commitment to NATO and the need for reforms within the organization. At the 2018 G7 summit in La Malbaie, he was the only leader to back U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal to reintegrate Russia into the group, aiming to recreate the G8. However, while the Conte I and II governments are often labelled “populist,” they upheld Italy’s membership in NATO, with the United States as its principal ally, while seeking to preserve economic relations with Russia.
In terms of defence, Italy has nonetheless continued to support initiatives such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). According to Cladi and Locatelli, Italy’s defence posture has remained remarkably stable due to systemic internal pressures and the need to ensure consensus among various influential groups. As a result, the Conte I and II governments had only a limited impact on Italy’s position regarding transatlantic or European relations.
The arrival of Mario Draghi, a technocratic figure outside the populist parties, at the head of the government marked a shift toward more Europhile and pro-Atlantic positions. This ended the period of populist governance, signalling a return to Italy’s traditional orientations. Under his leadership, Italian foreign policy refocused on European integration and strengthening transatlantic relations, representing a clear break from the Conte era. Draghi prioritized multilateralism, European solidarity, and enhanced cooperation with key partners such as Germany and France. He also recalibrated Italy’s relations with Russia and China, aligning the country with more critical positions toward these two powers.
Aware of the growing danger of an invasion from the fall of 2021, Draghi maintained until the beginning of the invasion that the EU should continue to engage in dialogue with President Putin. Thus, in the weeks leading up to the invasion of Ukraine, Draghi remained moderately optimistic about the possibility of a negotiated solution to the crisis, while Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio, a prominent figure in the M5S, refrained from explicitly condemning Putin’s actions. True to Italy’s approach in past crises involving Russia, the country officially criticized Moscow, which aligns with the positions of the United States and the EU, while advocating for a moderate approach focused on dialogue rather than direct confrontation.
From the outset of the conflict, the Draghi government supported Ukraine, even providing heavy weaponry for its fight against Russia. At that point, it firmly reiterated Italy’s commitment to the Euro-Atlantic framework. The government consistently emphasized the importance of continuing to support Ukraine by all available means, stressing that the provision of arms was essential to enable Ukrainians to defend themselves effectively. For his part, President Mattarella underscored the importance of unconditional support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, asserting that Italy, alongside its European allies, had a responsibility to contribute to the security and stability of the European continent. Thus, the rise of populism in Italy from 2018 onward has had only a limited impact on Italy’s defence posture.
This return to a more traditional stance can be observed with the rise to power of Giorgia Meloni in October 2022. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Fratelli d’Italia party advocated improving relations with Russia while maintaining a pro-Atlanticist position. Meloni and her party had praised Vladimir Putin’s 2018 electoral victories and his defence of Western values, adopting sovereignist and Eurosceptic positions. However, since the invasion, the new Prime Minister has firmly supported military aid to Ukraine, stating that “those who support Ukraine, including militarily, are working for peace” and demanding that Russia end its occupation.
She has thus reiterated Italy’s commitment to supporting Ukraine, particularly on the military front. At the NATO summit in Vilnius, Meloni emphasized that “the unity of the Atlantic Alliance […] to defend international law and common security is also the best way to protect our citizens.” Furthermore, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani stated that “the West is united […] we will support Ukraine until a just peace is achieved.” For Meloni, a lasting peace must include security guarantees for Ukraine, given Russia’s repeated violations of its commitments. She affirmed the “full support of the Italian government for the Ukrainian authorities […] until a durable and comprehensive peace is achieved.”
FdI and Giorgia Meloni appear to be undergoing a gradual transformation, moving away from their radical and anti-establishment positions toward a form of governance more integrated within European and transatlantic institutions. Since Meloni came to power in 2022, the party has adopted a stance that, while remaining firmly conservative, protectionist, and nationalist, seeks to soften the populist elements that previously defined it. This evolution suggests an attempt at political “normalization,” a trend often observed in radical right-wing parties seeking greater legitimacy on the international stage and among the national electorate. In this sense, Fratelli d’Italia seems to align itself more closely with a conservative right-wing ideology rather than being associated with fascist positions, responding to an electorate seeking stability and continuity within established frameworks. This reflects not only a desire to maintain strong ties with the EU and transatlantic allies but also to meet the expectations of a conservative voter base while integrating into more traditional institutional mechanisms.
Public opinion must also be taken into account. As demonstrated by Fabio Bordignon, Ilvo Diamanti, and Fabio Turato in a recent article, the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War significantly impacted Italians’ trust in the United States and Russia. Across all parties, whether left-wing, right-wing, or populist, there has been an increase in trust toward the United States and a significant decline in trust toward Russia. Moreover, the dissemination of images depicting the violence of the Russo-Ukrainian War appears to have shifted perceptions of political actors in Italy.
The Stability of its Defence Policy
Although Italy has historically maintained ambivalent relations with Russia, the Russo-Ukrainian War has highlighted a strategic continuity characterized by a strong Euro-Atlanticist commitment. The influence of populism on Italy’s defence policy has proven more limited than expected, largely due to internal institutional pressures, external geopolitical dynamics, and voter expectations. Rome has aligned itself with its European partners and NATO, firmly condemning Russian aggression while providing significant military support to Ukraine. This position, reiterated by Giorgia Meloni and her government, reflects a pragmatic adaptation by Italian political forces. Italy thus continues to play its role as a middle power, committed to ensuring stability within the European security architecture while safeguarding its strategic interests in the broader Mediterranean region. However, more than thirty months after the onset of the large-scale invasion, the growing domestic costs of the war could increase pressure for a diplomatic solution, potentially at the expense of unconditional military support.
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