After years of stalemate, the Syrian civil war has once again taken center stage in international discussions. Over the past two weeks, the country has witnessed an unprecedented sequence of events that has disrupted its political landscape, culminating in the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on the night of Sunday, December 8. Capitalizing on the instability and uncertainty, a diverse coalition of rebels launched an offensive that began in northern urban centers—Idlib and Aleppo—and rapidly advanced to Damascus.
The swift collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government signals the end of more than five decades of centralized, coercive rule by the Assad family. These unexpected developments are part of a broader context that encompasses domestic, regional, and international dimensions. A thorough analysis of these factors is essential to understand the implications of this upheaval and what the future may hold as Syria embarks on a potential transition toward a new governance model. This report examines the geopolitical and domestic factors that led to these transformative events, which have disrupted fifty years of autocratic rule and more than 14 years of conflict. This new domestic path for the country must be analyzed through the issues of regional and international order, as the intertwining of the domestic and international dimensions represent the uniqueness of the Syrian case.
From the domestic setting…
The Assad regime, established after Hafiz al-Assad’s 1970 coup and led by Bashar al-Assad since 2000, has been characterized by both continuity and change compared to its predecessor. Hallmarks of this regime include strong personalism, carefully selected elites loyal to the president, an extensive apparatus of control and repression, the exclusion of minorities from governance, and a disregard for human rights. Economic and social reforms have been largely absent, fueling widespread dissatisfaction in the country. Bashar al-Assad’s ascent to power in 2000 initially raised hopes for reform. Following thirty years of Hafiz al-Assad’s unchallenged rule, many viewed the younger Assad, with his Western education and modern image, as a potential catalyst for change. Early in his tenure, Bashar managed to position Syria between two blocs: the “Western bloc,” represented by France—the country’s former colonial ruler—and the United States, and the “Eastern bloc,” composed of longstanding partners like Russia and Iran. This diplomatic balancing act was short-lived, with hopes of modernization fading by the mid-2000s after the so-called “Damascus Spring”. The optimism that briefly emerged during the “Damascus Spring” gave way to renewed public frustration, setting the stage for the 2011 uprisings.
This dissatisfaction reached a tipping point in March 2011 when civilian protests erupted as part of the broader wave of uprisings across the region. The so-called “Arab Spring” — a term often discarded by scholars for oversimplifying and overlooking the longstanding political struggles in Arab societies well before 2011 — provided the backdrop for Syrians to demand reform.
… To the international factors: the internationalization of conflict
The 2011 protests against the Assad regime, driven by widespread grievances over corruption, economic stagnation, sectarian divides, and political exclusion, were swiftly met with brutal repression. This response fragmented the opposition and prevented coordinated nationwide mobilization. The regime’s strategy of divide-and-rule proved critical in suppressing dissent.
By the summer of 2011, cracks began to appear within Assad’s security forces. Significant defections within the Syrian army led to the formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a coalition of armed opposition groups. Initially focused on protecting civilians from government forces, the FSA gradually transitioned to liberating key urban centers, including Homs, Suwayda, Idlib, and Aleppo. However, a lack of unified leadership and coherent strategy hindered their efforts, leaving the opposition vulnerable to internal divisions and external manipulation.
The fragmented opposition soon became a battleground for regional and international interests. While the Assad regime received consistent military and financial support from Moscow and Tehran, the opposition garnered backing from a range of external actors. The United States and European countries provided limited financial and diplomatic support but avoided direct military involvement, wary of repeating the mistakes of Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), or contemporary Libya (post 2011). Meanwhile, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar supported opposition factions, albeit inconsistently due to internal rivalries. Turkey, a major regional player, capitalized on the conflict to pursue its strategic interests, particularly in northern Syria.
The emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS) between 2014 and 2019 added a new layer of complexity to the conflict, prompting an international US-led coalition to intervene under the banner of counterterrorism. By 2020, a tenuous agreement between Russia and Turkey brought relative calm to northern Syria. Efforts at normalization, including Syria’s reintegration into the Arab League in 2023, seemed to signal a détente among regional powers. However, the outbreak of violence in October 2023, sparked by renewed tensions between Israel and Palestinian resistance groups, reignited regional instability.
This volatile environment has distracted Assad’s allies, further weakening his regime’s hold on power. Russia remains embroiled in its war against Ukraine, Hezbollah has a fragile truce with Israel, and Iran is preoccupied with its broader regional agenda – mainly focused on preserving the influence zone that connects it to Syria, Lebanon and Hezbollah in an effort to deter the Israeli rival. These shifting dynamics illustrate the deep interconnection between domestic upheavals and international geopolitics in the Middle East, where state actors’ interests and identities are inextricably intertwined.
The Domino Effect: The Swift Fall of Bashar al-Assad
The peak of domestic instability and shifting regional dynamics set the stage for a decisive series of events over the past two weeks. Rebel groups based in the northern cities of Aleppo and Idlib launched an offensive against the Syrian army, which was weakened by years of conflict and lacked the necessary support from its Russian ally. The insurgents swiftly captured key urban centers in the north, including Aleppo and Idlib, before advancing south along the M5 highway, Syria’s principal north-south route. Within days, they seized control of Hama and Homs, arriving in Damascus between December 7 and 8.
The rapid fall of Damascus marked the end of Bashar al-Assad’s rule. The president fled to Russia, seeking asylum from his strongest ally. This dramatic development was facilitated by Turkey, which had long maintained a “buffer zone” in northern Syria. Since 2020, anti-government cells in Idlib and Aleppo, many supported by Turkey, had established de facto control over the region. This proximity to the Turkish border, combined with Ankara’s concerns over the Kurdish presence in northeastern Syria and the burden of hosting more than three million Syrian refugees, made northern Syria a focal point of Turkey’s foreign policy.
The composition of anti-government forces underscores the complexity of the opposition. Although the term “rebels” is often used as a blanket descriptor, these groups are far from homogeneous. In Idlib and Aleppo, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadist group formerly affiliated with al-Qaeda, played a prominent role alongside Turkish-backed factions such as the Free Syrian Army. Despite their divergent ideologies and goals, these groups temporarily united to achieve a common objective: the ousting of the Assad regime.
Following Assad’s departure, Syria faces significant uncertainty. While insurgents and civilians celebrated the fall of the regime that had ruled with an iron fist for over five decades, doubts remain about the country’s ability to construct an inclusive and stable governance model. Seeking to mitigate the risk of chaos, former Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali and other ministers have stayed in Syria, assuring members of the public that state institutions will continue to function during the transition. In coordination with Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the leader of HTS, al-Jalali appointed Mohammed al-Bashir to head a transitional government. Al-Bashir, who previously led the Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib, is tasked with overseeing the transition until conditions allow for free and inclusive elections. Al-Bashir’s political trajectory remains uncertain, as do his connections to the HTS leadership that spearheaded the offensive from the north. Previously, he held a managerial role at the state-owned Syrian Gas Company, part of the petroleum ministry. However, since 2022, he has served as development minister and later as prime minister within the HTS-controlled Idlib administration.
Now, Al-Bashir faces the formidable challenge of navigating Syria’s future. His role demands fostering dialogue not only among the country’s diverse domestic factions but also with international stakeholders invested in shaping Syria’s trajectory. His ability to mediate these complex dynamics will be critical to the country’s prospects for stability and reconstruction. The current Syrian Transitional Government includes those same ministers who served within the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), the governing body in the northern region of the country that has remained outside the control of the Assad regime for several years. This institution is affiliated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group responsible for launching recent special operations two weeks ago. The Transitional Government is tasked with maintaining the functionality of state institutions for at least 18 months, including 6 months to draft a new constitution, until new elections.
Despite widespread celebrations among Syrians at home and abroad, the challenges ahead are immense. The return of nearly six million refugees will be crucial for shaping the country’s governance. Reforming state institutions, which have long been hollowed out to serve a narrow circle of power, will require reforms to foster inclusivity and representation. Moreover, dismantling the sectarianism entrenched by decades of Alawite dominance will be critical to establishing a unified and equitable society.
The Alawite community, a branch of Shi’ism, constitutes a minority within Syria, where approximately 70 percent of the population is Sunni. Other groups, including Druze, Kurds, Christians, and Shi’a, further contribute to the country’s diverse social fabric. The Assad family, part from the Alawite community, has historically leveraged its minority status to escape the marginalization typically faced by this group within Syria’s social hierarchy. Since Hafiz al-Assad’s presidency, the regime has systematically exploited sectarian tactics to fragment and weaken the opposition, consolidating its hold on power. This strategy, however, does not imply broad benefits for the Alawite community as a whole. Instead, Instead, the Assad regime has selectively co-opted elites from various communities, including Sunni economic elites, to secure its rule. These alliances reveal how sectarian divisions were less about communities’ empowerment and more about pragmatic power consolidation. The regime’s resilience relied not on sectarian favoritism alone but on the strategic inclusion of individuals whose political or economic clout could bolster its survival, irrespective of their sectarian affiliation. Thus, sectarianism and co-optation in Syria have functioned as two interdependent pillars of the Assad regime’s strategy, illustrating how identity politics were instrumentalized to maintain power rather than to promote the interests of any specific community.
The road to rebuilding Syria as a cohesive, democratic, and prosperous state will be arduous, demanding careful navigation of deep-rooted political, social, and economic divisions.
What’s Next for Syria and the MENA Region: The Future of the Geopolitical Context
Under the current circumstances, it is imperative to critically analyze the factors leading to the end of the Assad era while considering their implications for Syria and the broader Middle East. Although geopolitical predictions are inherently uncertain, exploring potential regional consequences provides valuable insights.
Among regional actors, Turkey appears to have emerged as a significant beneficiary of Assad’s fall. Leveraging its unique position as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East, Ankara has adeptly advanced its foreign policy objectives throughout the Syrian conflict. The creation of a buffer zone within northern Syria, the hosting of over three million Syrian refugees, and its opposition to both the Assad regime and Kurdish aspirations in northeastern Syria have allowed Turkey to consolidate its influence. This approach has bolstered Ankara’s role as an indispensable actor in Syria’s transition process. Moreover, Turkey’s involvement in moderating factions such as HTS during the Astana Process highlights its ability to navigate the complexities of the conflict while safeguarding its strategic interests. In recent years, Turkey has adeptly positioned itself between two blocs: its NATO allies and Assad’s international backers, Russia and Iran. Ankara’s strategic acumen lies in its ability to advance its foreign policy objectives in Syria and the broader region by capitalizing on the indecision and ambiguity of its Western allies while simultaneously maintaining diplomatic ties with Moscow and Teheran. Through its participation in negotiations aimed at stabilizing Syria, Turkey has managed to mediate between these divergent actors, a role that underscores its complex motivations and foreign policy choices.
This balancing has, at times, placed Turkey at odds with its NATO allies, especially as Kurdish troops have been backed by the US to fight ISIS, bolstering tensions instead of a common plan for stability in the region. Moreover, Ankara notably focused (and still focuses) on weakening Kurdish forces in northern Syria, which are supported by the United States as key partners in the anti-ISIS campaign. This divergence highlights Turkey’s prioritization of its national security concerns, particularly regarding the Kurdish issue, over alignment with broader NATO objectives.
Turkey’s dual positioning has solidified its role as a pivotal actor in the Syrian conflict. Ankara’s influence now extends not only to shaping Syria’s domestic dynamics but also to maintaining diplomatic channels between Assad’s international sponsors, its own strategic interests, and those of NATO allies, including the United States. The latter remains intent on preserving its presence in the region as a counterbalance to Russian and Iranian influence.
The situation in northeastern Syria presents a critical challenge. Rich in natural resources like oil and water, this region remains under the influence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-majority coalition that has maintained semi-autonomous governance. Ankara views the SDF’s affiliation with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a group designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey and several Western countries, as a direct threat. Managing this tension will be central to Turkey’s regional strategy.
To the south, Israel has taken a more assertive stance, penetrating Syrian territory for the first time since 1973 (excluding the contested Golan Heights). According to reports from some Israeli media outlets, Assad’s fall poses a significant question mark for Tel Aviv, as ‘for better or worse, Assad was the devil Israel knew.’ While Syria and Israel have long maintained strained relations, Bashar al-Assad’s presidency was marked by decades of relative border stability.
His removal thus introduces both opportunities and risks for Israel’s strategic interests. On the one hand, Assad’s departure could weaken the ties between Iran and its regional allies, including Syria, Iraq, and Hezbollah. Over the last days, Israel has conducted over 300 airstrikes targeting Syrian military facilities to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of extremist groups. Thus, Assad’s fall represents an opportunity to weaken Iran’s regional influence, particularly its support for Hezbollah in an effort to undermine the so-called ‘axis of evil’ — an imaginary line of continuity linking Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Hezbollah within a strategically area influencing regional and international stability. On the other, the transition in Syria could pave the way for Islamist rebel factions to gain a foothold in the country’s new governance structure. Israel has consistently voiced concerns over a political void in Syria, viewing such developments as a potential threat to its security and regional position.
Russia, a longtime ally of Assad, now faces the challenge of recalibrating its position. While providing asylum to Assad, Moscow remains deeply invested in maintaining its strategic foothold in Syria, particularly its naval base in Tartus – Russia’s only outpost in the Mediterranean See – and airbase in Latakia. The Kremlin has assured its readiness to engage with Syria’s new leadership, aiming to preserve its military settlements and prevent further destabilization in the region.
Western countries have adopted a cautious approach. European nations have voiced support for the Syrian people in their efforts to transition away from Assad’s dictatorship, but direct involvement remains limited. Meanwhile, newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump has reiterated an isolationist foreign policy stance, emphasizing that Syria’s future is a matter for Syrians to resolve, while blaming the Kremlin for abandoning its main partner in the region. Throughout the Syrian crisis, the United States has maintained an ambiguous and fluctuating role. While its most notable intervention occurred during the campaign against the Islamic State, where it provided military support—including airstrikes and training—to Kurdish militias, this backing was later curtailed during the first Trump presidency. The subsequent reduction in U.S. involvement granted Turkey greater room for maneuver in northern Syria.
In recent days, coinciding with the final stretch of his presidency, Biden remarked that the U.S. approach had influenced the regional balance, prompting the administration to reassess its engagement in Syria. However, there is no evidence of direct support or coordination between Washington and the HTS-led rebel groups responsible for the recent offensive.
Despite its cautious stance, the United States has not remained passive. Shortly before the rebel operations, Washington carried out airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed Syrian militias in response to an attack on the Shaddadi base. Additionally, U.S. forces conducted special operations against remnants of the Islamic State, seeking to prevent the group from exploiting the power void created by Assad’s fall.
The U.S. strategy appears to navigate a middle ground between Biden’s and Trump’s policies. This approach aims to simultaneously weaken Iran’s regional influence and Russia’s global positioning, protect its Israeli ally, and sustain some degree of leadership in the region.
Conclusion
The situation in Syria remains extraordinarily complex. The country is grappling with the enduring consequences of a civil conflict that has spanned over a decade, while simultaneously transitioning towards a new phase of political, social, and economic reconstruction after more than fifty years of governance by the Assad family. Central to this process is the need to foster dialogue among key domestic actors, including civilians, various rebel factions, and the entrenched institutional establishment. In this context, the reintegration of millions of refugees and internally displaced people is particularly crucial, as they constitute a significant portion of the Syrian population and must be empowered to contribute to the creation of a free and more inclusive society.
Equally critical is the role of international actors who have intervened to varying degrees throughout the conflict. Their continued engagement and dialogue are essential in preventing the emergence of a power vacuum, which could exacerbate radicalization and threaten the stability of the broader region. As Syria enters a new phase of uncertainty, its future remains tied to the interplay of regional and international forces. Addressing longstanding grievances, fostering inclusive governance, and rebuilding the social fabric will require a delicate balance of domestic and foreign cooperation. For the MENA region, the fall of Assad signals not only a shift in Syrian politics but also a potential realignment of regional power dynamics, the outcomes of which will reverberate for years to come.
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