While Iran has suffered its most severe attack since the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in the context of Israeli and U.S. strikes against its nuclear program, and with the Islamic regime appearing to falter, another major development, largely overshadowed by Operation Rising Lion, raises questions about Tehran’s strategic repositioning in the region: the withdrawal of its navy from the Red Sea. Confirmed in April 2025, this move marks a significant turning point in the regional maritime balance. Having maintained an intermittent yet notable presence there since 2008, Iran is now leaving a key area without clarifying its intentions, sparking debate about the true nature of this move: is it an admission of weakness, a temporary tactical maneuver, or a long-term strategic adjustment?
Tehran’s lack of clear communication quickly gave way to an interpretive void, one that some actors—notably the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Saudi Arabia—were quick to fill by portraying this disengagement as a success of their military and diplomatic pressure. These interpretations, widely echoed by international media and influenced by Western think tanks such as the International Crisis Group and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also serve the regional agendas of these powers, which view this withdrawal as a sign of the Iranian regime’s strategic weakening.
This article aims to demonstrate that Iran’s naval withdrawal from the Red Sea, occurring in a context of heightened tensions—culminating notably in the June 2025 clashes—should not be interpreted as a definitive retreat. Rather, this decision is part of a cautious and adaptive strategy aimed at avoiding the risks of escalation in a region of major importance, where the United States has significantly reinforced its presence by deploying two carrier strike groups, while Tehran’s Houthi allies continue to suffer repeated strikes. Faced with the erosion of its naval capabilities, growing logistical constraints, limited budgetary resources, and now increased pressure on the regime itself, Iran is adopting a posture of tactical withdrawal, intended to preserve its forces while maintaining its freedom of action in the long term. Far from signalling an irrevocable abandonment, this operational pause reflects a broader strategic logic grounded in the avoidance of direct confrontation, the use of asymmetric tools, and the support of non-state actors. Iran’s naval withdrawal thus appears to be a strategic respite: a temporary adjustment allowing Tehran to reposition itself while awaiting a more favourable regional context for its maritime ambitions.
An Overview of the Current Situation in the Red Sea
A Tactical Maneuver in the Face of Urgency: The Immediate Reasons Behind Iran’s Naval Withdrawal
Several specific and circumstantial factors converge to explain this short-term withdrawal. First, the undeniable U.S. military superiority in the Red Sea serves as a significant deterrent. The deployment of two carrier strike groups, built around Ford- or Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, provides the United States with a powerful mobile strike capability. These groups are supported by AEGIS destroyers equipped with long-range missiles (SM-2, Tomahawk), as well as an advanced surveillance system incorporating MQ-9 Reaper drones, P-8 Poseidon aircraft, and satellite assets.
This superiority is reinforced by coordination with allied navies within the Combined Maritime Forces, ensuring a rapid multinational response. By contrast, the Iranian navy remains constrained by aging equipment, fragile logistics, and constant exposure to detection. Under these conditions, a tactical withdrawal appears to be a rational response to a clearly unbalanced balance of power.
Secondly, the operational cost of maintaining a presence in the Red Sea has become increasingly difficult for Iran to justify in the eyes of a public that is growing ever more hostile toward the adventurism of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the financial burden it entails—a hostility likely to deepen after the Israeli and U.S. strikes of 2025. Domestically, Iran faces a series of major economic challenges: persistent sanctions, rampant inflation, and the chronic depreciation of its national currency have significantly reduced its ability to sustain prolonged deployments. Not to mention corruption and mismanagement of rent distribution in the allocation of national wealth.
In 2025, the budget allocated to the Iranian armed forces increased significantly, reaching approximately US$8.19 billion, a 200% increase over the previous year. The Iranian government had to resort to borrowing from the National Development Fund to cover part of these deficits, highlighting the financial constraints that weigh on its military capabilities.
Iran’s naval capabilities, divided between the regular navy (Nedaja) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), rely heavily on aging vessels that require extensive maintenance. Keeping them away from their home ports imposes an increasingly heavy logistical burden. Furthermore, the war in Yemen—a central theatre of Iranian influence via the Houthis —is intensifying, marked by increased U.S. strikes. This development forces Iran to reconsider its strategy, as it seeks to minimize its visibility to avoid any direct military reaction.
This does not prevent the regime’s authorities from maintaining the option of indirect support to the Houthis (despite attempts at ceasefires with the Americans) and continuing to portray Iran as an emerging global maritime power, while, in the longer term, discreetly preparing to return to this theatre, which is essential for its strategic ambitions.
An Influence that Persists Through Other Channels
It should be noted that the naval withdrawal does not entail the end of Iranian influence in the region. Tehran, faithful to its forward-defence doctrine, continues to favour indirect and asymmetric methods to project power, i.e., without significant on-site intervention or troop deployment. Although less visible, its support for the Houthis remains active: arms transfers, intelligence sharing, and technical assistance via clandestine maritime or land channels.
Iran’s influence does not stop at Yemen. Further west, across the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Iran is reviving its ties with Sudan under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. After a long period of rupture, Tehran is reestablishing relations with Khartoum, notably by supplying military drones. This equipment strengthens Sudan’s operational capabilities, while providing Iran with a strategic foothold to maintain an (indirect) presence along the shores of the Red Sea. The port of Port Sudan, in particular, could become a logistical anchor point for its future maritime ambitions.
This dual approach—visible withdrawal, but continued engagement—already tested in practice, allows Iran to maintain a valuable strategic ambiguity. As in a game of chess, Tehran pulls back a piece not to concede ground, but to reposition itself while awaiting a more favourable configuration. This posture prevents its enemies from anticipating its next moves, allowing Iran to set the pace. For example, during the apparent withdrawal of some Iranian forces from Syria in 2020 under Israeli pressure, Iran simultaneously strengthened its logistical networks and its foothold through local militias, such as Hezbollah and the Liwa Fatemiyoun, thereby consolidating its strategic depth without direct confrontation.
At first glance, Iran’s withdrawal in response to the increased involvement of Western powers in the Red Sea might seem paradoxical, as it coincides with a renewed affirmation of Tehran’s strategic initiative. In reality, this withdrawal represents a calculated shift, allowing Iran to transition from a reactive posture to a more proactive one, relying on indirect and less confrontational modes of action. This dynamic is not unprecedented: historical analysis shows that Iran has repeatedly managed to turn apparent setbacks into levers of influence, reorienting situations perceived as unfavourable to its advantage.
Ambitions that Span the Long Term
A Maritime Ambition Rooted in History…
To understand Tehran’s ambitions in the Red Sea, it is necessary to situate them within the historical context of Iran’s naval presence in this strategic region. Even before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Pahlavi dynasty was already considering equipping Iran with a navy capable of projecting power to the far reaches of the Indian Ocean. Although the nature of the two regimes is fundamentally different and the missions of their naval forces are not the same, this geographically grounded ambition already reflected a desire for regional influence—consistent, moreover, with the Persian imperial legacy.
Under the rule of Iran’s last Shah, the country’s naval policy in the Red Sea was part of a broader strategy of regional power projection. In the 1970s, fueled by rising oil revenues, the Shah invested heavily in modernizing the navy, with the ambition of making Iran a maritime power capable of securing the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.
The last Shah sought to strengthen Iran’s presence in the Indian Ocean and to forge strategic alliances with coastal states, such as Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, by securing access to ports like Assab (now in Eritrea). This approach aimed to counter Soviet influence and the naval ambitions of the Arab petromonarchies, while asserting Iran’s role as regional enforcer with the support of the United States.
However, this ambitious naval policy was profoundly disrupted by the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which overthrew the Shah and, initially, refocused Iran’s military strategy on the defence of its national territory, particularly in the context of the Iran-Iraq War, at the expense of its maritime power projection.
… in Line with the Naval Strategy of Monarchical Iran…
Despite its ideological break with the monarchical regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran has gradually reintegrated some aspects of the Shah’s strategic vision. As Farideh Farih noted, despite its overt hostility towards the former regime, it has adopted “certain fundamental orientations of Iranian defence policy, particularly with regard to the strategic role of the Persian Gulf and the need to assert itself militarily there.” This hypothesis is supported by a study from the Washington Institute, which emphasizes that “the development of Iran’s naval capabilities forms part of a regional deterrence strategy largely inherited from the monarchy.”
As the Islamic regime consolidated its power and in response to geopolitical dynamics that transcended ideological divides, Tehran’s naval strategy gradually focused on a central and long-term objective: securing its interests in strategic maritime areas, such as the Strait of Hormuz—through which nearly 20% of the world’s oil transits—but also in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. To achieve this, the Iranian Republic has strengthened its navy, both the regular navy and the IRGC, and increased its military presence in several key areas, such as the Gulf of Aden. This naval posture aims as much to project power as to counterbalance American, Israeli, and Saudi influence in the region.
Although there is a degree of continuity in power projection, it should be noted that the approaches differ in certain respects. Under the Shah, Iran’s maritime ambitions aimed at developing a blue-water navy capable of projecting power as far as the Indian Ocean, within a logic of regional stabilization and recognition as a responsible power. The Islamic Republic, by contrast, has adopted a naval orientation based on asymmetric tactics and a destabilization strategy extending from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb. This strategic shift marks a notable break: whereas the imperial navy sought to ensure regional security, the Islamic Republic’s navy leverages instability as a tool of influence.
In the 2000s, taking advantage of the growing role of the IRGC in shaping the Islamic regime’s foreign policy, Tehran strengthened its fleet to extend its influence beyond the Strait of Hormuz, notably toward the Horn of Africa. The regular navy thus increased its missions in the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as the Red Sea. Iranian strategists viewed this area as crucial for monitoring maritime trade, supporting their allies (as they would do with the Houthis in Yemen from 2012-2013) and indirectly challenging Israel and the United States.
After the Arab uprisings of 2011, a major milestone was reached when Egypt, under Mohamed Morsi, allowed Iranian vessels to transit the Suez Canal. Iran thus marked its symbolic return to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, thereby asserting the resilience of its maritime doctrine.
Iran has also made use of allied bases, notably in Sudan before 2014, to secure a logistical presence. Thus, although transformed by Islamist ideology and the post-revolutionary geopolitical context, the Islamic Republic continues to leverage the maritime legacy of the pre-revolutionary period while adapting its operations and regional objectives to its “resistance” doctrine.
This historical continuity sheds light on the nature of the current withdrawal: not an abdication, but a temporary pullback dictated by adverse conditions. Tehran has not abandoned the long-term objectives outlined above—including control over strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb—but remains in an active waiting posture, ready to seize any favourable opportunity to reassert its presence or expand its influence.
… in Line with the Fundamentals of Iranian Strategic Culture
To assess and put into perspective the true scope of the current withdrawal, it is also necessary to consider Iran’s strategic culture. Deeply scarred by the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and constrained by its limited military capabilities, the Islamic Republic has always sought to avoid open confrontation (although this principle has been somewhat eroded since October 7, 2023, particularly in the context of its ballistic confrontation with Israel). Instead, it prefers to operate in the “grey zone”—that uncertain space between war and peace, where hybrid tactics, information warfare, and the use of proxy forces prevail.
Before its 2024-2025 withdrawal, Iran’s maritime presence in the Red Sea was based mainly on regular missions carried out by the Iranian navy, as part of a strategy of power projection and regional deterrence. A few concrete examples should be presented here.
Between 2020 and 2024, Iran’s presence took shape through the deployment of warships that patrolled the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Tehran justified these missions by citing the need to escort its merchant vessels and combat piracy; however, they were also part of a broader strategy aimed at demonstrating its strength to regional and Western powers. In 2021, for example, the Makran and the Sahand were sent as far as the Atlantic before returning via the Red Sea, symbolically underscoring Iran’s determination to showcase its power-projection capabilities.
In 2023, Iran was regularly accused of using its naval presence to provide logistical support to the Houthis in Yemen, although Tehran denied any direct involvement. In February 2023, the Royal Navy, supported by U.S. forces, intercepted a vessel coming from Iran carrying anti-tank missiles and components for ballistic missiles intended for the Houthis; shortly afterwards, French forces seized a boat carrying 3,000 assault rifles and anti-tank missiles. Experts and intelligence agencies asserted that Iranian ships such as the MV Behshad were operating in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, not as ordinary cargo vessels, but to “collect real-time intelligence” for the Houthis.
In January 2024, the Iranian destroyer Alborz crossed the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to enter the Red Sea, a key artery of international maritime trade. This operation was part of a series of deployments aimed at asserting Iran’s presence in the region. Nevertheless, this presence in the Red Sea remained essentially postural and political, intended to challenge the naval dominance of Western powers and their regional allies—particularly the United States and Israel—while showcasing Iran’s capabilities to conduct naval operations far from its territory.
Understanding Iran’s Post-“Rising Lion” Maritime Strategy in Light of the Country’s Opportunistic Historical Culture
At first glance, the Israeli strikes carried out as part of Operation Rising Lion, combined with the U.S. bombings of June 2025, might suggest that Iran’s naval strategy, based on the principles of flexibility and opportunism, is being seriously and irrevocably undermined. The damage inflicted on military and logistical infrastructure, coupled with the regime’s internal weakening, paints a picture of an Iran forced to retreat.
However, there is still no evidence that this dynamic is fundamentally changing the strategic logic that has guided Iran’s actions for several decades. Unless the regime were to collapse suddenly—a scenario that is now conceivable but still highly uncertain—Iran’s posture appears to be more of a tactical retreat than an abandonment. The pattern remains the same: disengage when faced with an unfavourable balance of power, reorganize, and return as soon as conditions become more favourable. This opportunistic flexibility, already observed in the past, could once again enable Iran to reassert its presence in the Red Sea if external pressure were to ease.
Despite its current withdrawal, Iran’s strategy in the Red Sea remains consistent and vigorous. It is based on time-tested principles—patience, adaptability, and indirect influence—that have allowed Iran to exert influence in the region beyond its conventional capabilities for more than two decades. Even when it lacks the necessary naval or financial resources, the Islamic Republic does not abandon its maritime ambitions; it adjusts them according to the context.
This opportunistic approach has already manifested in several instances. In 2011, at the height of the Arab uprisings, Tehran took advantage of the security vacuum in Egypt and Syria to send two warships into the eastern Mediterranean via the Suez Canal—a first since 1979. In 2016, following the partial lifting of sanctions under the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), Iran briefly increased the frequency of its missions in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. More recently, between 2020 and 2022, the Iranian navy demonstrated its resilience by maintaining regular rotations in the Sea of Oman and the Red Sea, despite the economic and health tensions caused by the pandemic. In 2021, the transoceanic mission of the Makran and the Sahand to the Atlantic illustrated this ability to symbolically assert its presence, even under constraints.
Even today, despite heavy setbacks and significant deterioration of its military capabilities, Iran continues to rely on local proxies—most notably the Houthis in Yemen—as well as on asymmetric means such as missiles, naval drones, and cyberattacks. Its tactical alliances with various state and non-state actors remain an important lever for regenerating, over the long term, its capabilities and maritime presence. Despite recent setbacks, the Islamic regime’s determination to disrupt the regional balance of power via the sea remains intact—even if, for now, it must operate with limited means and under a clearly unfavourable balance of power.
In the longer term, it remains unrealistic to believe that Iran will renounce its power-projection ambitions onto the strategic shores of the Indian Ocean, especially since this maritime zone is becoming increasingly central in great power competition. The growing presence of China, through the Maritime Silk Road initiative, and that of India, via its strategy to secure its western flank, reinforce the geostrategic importance of this area. In this context of heightened rivalries, Iran must maintain some form of naval presence, however modest, to avoid being sidelined in a maritime theatre that has become pivotal to the regional balance of power. Whether through its regular navy, its proxy forces, or its regional partners, Tehran will continue to pursue its maritime influence—a pursuit driven both by geopolitical logic and a quest for strategic recognition.
The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is constantly monitoring Iran’s naval repositioning, seeing it as much more than a mere military maneuver. Every Iranian movement at sea is analyzed as a strategic signal, revealing deep objectives and long-term calculations. For CENTCOM, it constitutes a discreet yet structured language, aimed at testing the red lines of Western powers, asserting a lasting regional presence, and strengthening Tehran’s levers of influence without engaging in direct confrontation.
Not fooled by Iran’s temporary naval withdrawal, CENTCOM has stated that Iran’s ballistic capabilities, drones, and arms deliveries “present a sophisticated multi-axis threat” and that every move of the Iranian navy is closely monitored, as it is seen as part of a broader strategic continuum. For U.S. officials, each Iranian naval repositioning conveys a coded message, revealing long-term strategic intentions. They view these movements as calculated attempts to test the tolerance thresholds of Western powers, maintain latent influence, and prepare for a return to the theatre as soon as political and military conditions allow. In short, CENTCOM monitors Iran’s naval repositioning with constant vigilance, perceiving in this apparent retreat not an end, but a controlled transition in Iran’s naval posture.
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All evidence therefore suggests that, despite recent setbacks, the withdrawal of the Iranian navy from the Red Sea should not be interpreted as an irreversible capitulation, even in light of the Israeli and U.S. strikes carried out in June 2025, which severely damaged its military infrastructure. Rather, it represents a meticulously planned repositioning, conceived not as an end but as a strategic pause within a broader trajectory. This move, marked by tactical caution and strategic consistency, follows a logic of preventive defence aimed at preserving the Islamic Republic’s military and diplomatic capabilities while waiting for more favourable conditions to reassert its presence in this crucial area. Far from signalling a renunciation or loss of influence, this withdrawal resembles a natural oscillation within the strategic cycle of an actor well versed in the art of geopolitical patience.
This approach fits within a strategic continuity and is based on a clear history of Iranian flexibility: naval missions adjusted according to regional and international constraints, the consistent use of local proxies such as the Houthis, and the ability to offset conventional limitations with asymmetric means (drones, cyberattacks, missiles). Tehran’s deep objectives—ensuring lasting access to strategic straits, strengthening its regional depth, and maintaining a presence, even if limited, along vital maritime trade routes—remain unchanged, despite shifts in regime and context.
It is true that the Iranian political-military system is based on a complex architecture, marked by the coexistence of multiple decision-making centers—between the Supreme Leader, the Supreme National Security Council, the Revolutionary Guards, and the regular army (Artesh)—which are sometimes in tension. This fragmented functioning gives the impression of an absence of a clear strategic line. However, despite these internal rivalries and institutional duality, one constant emerges: the determination to preserve national sovereignty and to extend regional influence, even at a lower cost. As the International Crisis Group notes: “The Iranian system, although opaque and pluralistic, manages to produce coherent decisions when it comes to its fundamental security priorities.”
Within this framework, the current naval withdrawal should not be interpreted as a definitive renunciation, but rather as a strategic pause—a tactical adjustment in a game where every move is calculated in light of external pressure and available resources. Far from structural incoherence, this is a form of strategic flexibility, shaped by decades of experience surviving under sanctions and engaging in asymmetric competition.
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