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In early February 2024, Sudan’s acting Foreign Minister, Ali Al Sadiq, traveled to Tehran to meet his counterpart Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and Iranian President Ebrahim Raissi. Intervening in the midst of the Middle East crisis and with Sudan mired in civil war, this visit is the latest sign of a rapid warming of relations between Khartoum and Teheran. Over the past year, Sudanese and Iranian officials have agreed to speed up the process leading to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two nations, which were previously severed in 2016. A sudden rapprochement that raises many questions about the nature of bilateral relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Sudan, the interests that motivate it and its strategic implications.
A Close and Ancient Relationship
On a background level, it should be remembered that ties between Iran and Sudan go back a long way. Already positive at the time of the last Shah, these relations were put to the test during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), during which Khartoum lent its support to Saddam Hossein. They warmed up again with the arrival in power of Omar Al-Bashir, who was a fervent admirer of the Iranian regime and a promoter of the re-Islamization of Sudan. During the 1990s, the development of bilateral ties enabled Iran to break out of its diplomatic isolation and find a strategic ally in the Arab world and in the key region of the Horn of Africa. During this period, the Iranian Republic provided substantial financial and military assistance to the Sudanese government. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) even set up one of its first operational branches outside the Middle East in Sudan. As a result, by the turn of the 2000s, Iran and Sudan were already active partners, and both countries were considered by the US State Department to be major state sponsors of global terrorism. The Bush administration classified them both as part of the notorious “Axis of Evil”.
The Foundations of Strategic Cooperation Between the Two Countries
After promising beginnings, the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Republic of Sudan reached maturity with the rise of the IRGC within the Iranian political system when it took over Iranian foreign policy and decided to pursue an ambitious strategy of regional influence. From 2005 onwards, the Revolutionary Guards adopted an asymmetrical doctrine, developing a vast network of proxies spread across the Muslim world and transcending the denominational divide between Shiites and Sunnis. Constituting what is today known as the “Axis of Resistance”, this network includes Shiite or “Shiite-compatible” partners such as Syria’s Alawite regime, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Zaydist Houthis, as well as, on a much more opportunistic basis, Sunni-based movements such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Teheran strengthened its ties with Khartoum, which rapidly became its main strategic partner in Africa. With the signing of a major military cooperation agreement, numerous high-level visits and the establishment of the Quds Force (the IRGC’s expeditionary force) on Sudanese soil, the intensification of bilateral ties aroused great concern among the adversaries of the “Axis of Resistance”, led by Israel and the United States. In January 2009, the Israeli air force bombed a series of IRGC facilities on Sudanese territory, suspected of being part of a vast arms transfer network for Hamas. Thanks to the Arab Spring of 2011, Iranian-Sudanese relations continued to grow. In 2014, Khartoum’s military leaders did not hesitate to present the Iranians as their best allies in the region.
2014-2020: From Zenith to Nadir
From 2014 onwards, however, a number of factors converged to put an end to the honeymoon between the mullahs’ Iran and Al-Bashir’s Sudan. First, there was the deterioration of relations between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia, which was now engaged in a systematic effort to increase Tehran’s diplomatic and strategic isolation. Combined with diplomatic pressure from Riyadh, Washington’s offer to lift sanctions on the Khartoum regime led to Sudan’s decision to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coalition against the Iranian-backed Houthis. Finally, the deterioration in Iranian-Sudanese relations accelerated with the election of Donald Trump and the adoption of the so-called “maximum pressure” strategy against the Islamic Republic and its system of regional influence. The United States, Israel and the GCC countries then worked together to quarantine Iran and dismantle its network of intermediaries. In 2016, Sudan followed Saudi Arabia’s lead and broke off diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic. As part of the Arab-Israeli rapprochement process initiated by the Abraham Accords, the Republic of Sudan went so far as to begin normalizing relations with Israel. Deprived of its strategic link with the African state, Iran faced a new risk of marginalization within the Arab-Muslim world.
2020-2023: Iran’s Discreet Return to the Sudanese Scene
From 2020 onwards, a number of factors combined to favor Iran’s gradual return to the Sudanese scene. First, the Biden administration decided to put the “maximum pressure” strategy on hold in the hope of renewing dialogue with the Islamic Republic and reviving the 2015 nuclear agreement. Tehran immediately took advantage of this relative appeasement and the room for manoeuvre it provided to relaunch its strategy of regional influence and renew ties with partners such as Sudan. Over the next four years, the IRGC and the Al-Quds Force took advantage of the Sudanese civil war and the failure of the stabilization process overseen by the international community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to regain a foothold in the east of the country. This happened through the support of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudanese President and Commander of the Armed Forces loyal to former Islamist leader Omar al-Bashir and also through an “umbrella organization” known as “Kizan” made up of scattered elements from the regular army and paramilitary units. These various factions, which even during the period of diplomatic rupture maintained informal links with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, once again began receiving military and technical assistance from Teheran, including the delivery of Iranian-made Mohadjer-6 combat drones.
The Converging Interests of Teheran and Khartoum
The sudden warming of relations between Iran and Sudan benefits from the African country’s entrenchment in a new civil war. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which have suffered major setbacks against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) derived from the former Janjaweed militias and now deprived of support from the United Arab Emirates, are desperate for external military support. Observers agree that one of the main reasons driving Abdel Fattah Al Burhan and the Sudanese army to re-establish relations with the Islamic Republic is the hope of obtaining from the Iranian authorities the delivery of precision weapons and, in particular, Iranian combat drones, such as the popular Mohadjer-6. Although this type of military equipment does not have the potential to alter the balance of power on the battlefield, it could help slow down the collapse of the SAF and support the counter-offensive launched in early 2024. For Iran, the delivery of its combat UAVs will reinforce its diplomatic credibility on the African stage. The resumption of cooperation between the two countries coincides with Sudan’s adoption of a much more critical stance towards Israel’s intervention in the Gaza Strip. For Iran, it is also a question of acquiring a significant channel of influence giving it access to Eastern Sudan and, above all, to Port Sudan, its de facto capital. Through this strategic position and the 700 km or so of maritime borders, the Iranians have a considerable asset with which to complete their disruption of the Red Sea maritime passage.
Towards a New Golden Age of Iranian-Saudi Ties?
So far, Tehran can boast of having recovered much of the ground lost during the 2014-2020 period. In July 2023, a few months after the announcement of plans to normalize relations between Riyadh and Tehran, the Sudanese government openly expressed its desire to renew relations with Iran “as soon as possible”. The announcement came during the first high-level public meeting since 2016 between Al Sadiq and Amir-Abdollahian in Baku, the Azerbaijani capital. In a dramatic turnaround and in the midst of the crisis opened by the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Khartoum announced that Iran and Sudan “discussed the restoration of bilateral relations between the two countries and the acceleration of steps to reopen embassies”. Following this, the media reported that Teheran and the Islamic “Kizan” movement had agreed to cooperate in order to “facilitate the extension of [Iranian] influence in the Red Sea” in return for increased Iranian military assistance to the local “Islamic resistance”. In fact, these advances are victories for Iran, marking its return to the local scene. However, they should be treated with caution in view of the increased pressure exerted since the beginning of 2024 by the Iranian regime’s adversaries on its network of influence and various proxies. Whether red or blue, everything seems to indicate that the next American administration will return to some form of the “maximum pressure” strategy that led to the Iranian presence’s retreat in Sudan. It remains to be seen whether Iranian-Sudanese relations will once again enter a period of cooling.
What About Canada’s Position? Between Disengagement and Disinterest
As Sudan sinks into a civil war aggravated by foreign interference and severely affecting the civilian population, the question arises as to the position adopted by Ottawa. From the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, Canada played an active, albeit secondary, role in promoting UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations. Through its efforts in multilateral forums, Ottawa helped halt the genocide perpetrated against the ethnic population of Darfur in the west of the country. However, since the resurgence of civil war, Canada’s efforts have been limited to “minimum service”. So far, the most spectacular action has been a visit to neighboring Kenya last April by Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly for talks with IGAD officials. In terms of action, Canada, like other foreign countries faced with a worsening situation, was content to evacuate its citizens, allocate $71 million in humanitarian aid and call for peace. Today, when the potential for escalation is at its highest, Canada no longer has an ambassador in Sudan or a special envoy to relay information from the field to Canadian decision-makers. There are no Canadian sanctions targeting the main belligerents, local or foreign. “Frankly, we’re back to almost zero,” said Nicholas Coghlan, Canada’s former ambassador to Sudan, “we’re not in the loop”. Also symptomatic of Canada’s disengagement and disinterest in this part of the world is the fact that the “Africa strategy” promised by the Liberals several years ago is still not forthcoming.
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